[Senate Hearing 118-741, Part 1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-741, Pt. 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 4638
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
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PART 1
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. SPACE COMMAND
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
AIR FORCE POSTURE
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
ARMY POSTURE
NAVY POSTURE
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FEBRUARY 29; MARCH 7, 14, 21; APRIL 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18; MAY 16, 2024
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-122 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, ArkansasP:
CD PARAM
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
MARK KELLY, Arizona ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John P. Keast, Minority Staff, Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
february 29, 2024
Page
United States Strategic Command and United States Space Command.. 1
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 1
Statement of Senator Roger Wicker................................ 3
Witness Statements
Cotton, General Anthony J., USAF, Commander of United States 4
Strategic Command.
Whiting, General Stephen N., USSF, Commander of United States 14
Space Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 54
march 7, 2024
The Posture of United States Central Command and United States 65
Africa Command.
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 65
Statement of Senator Roger Wicker................................ 67
Witness Statements
Kurilla, General Michael E., USA Commander, United States Central 68
Command.
Langley, General Michael E., USMC Commander, United States Africa 81
Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 123
march 14, 2024
United States Northern Command and United States Southern Command 143
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 143
Statement of Senator Roger Wicker................................ 145
Witness Statements
Guillot, General Gregory M., USAF, Commander, United States 146
Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.
Richardson, General Laura J., USA, Commander, United States 155
Southern Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 225
(iii)
march 21, 2024
Page
United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea 235
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 235
Statement of Senator Roger Wicker................................ 237
Witness Statements
Aquilino, Admiral John C., USN Commander, United States Indo- 238
Pacific Command.
LaCamera, General Paul J., USA Commander, United Nations Command, 259
Combined Forces Command, United States Forces Korea.
Questions for the Record......................................... 300
april 9, 2024
Department of Defense Budget Posture............................. 311
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 311
Statement of Senator Roger Wicker................................ 313
Witness Statements
Austin, The Honorable Lloyd J., III, Secretary of Defense........ 315
Brown, General Charles Q., Jr., USAF, Chairman of the Joint 327
Chiefs of Staff.
Questions for the Record......................................... 378
april 10, 2024
United States Special Operations Command and United States Cyber 401
Command Posture.
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 401
Statement of Senator Roger Wicker................................ 403
Witness Statements
Maier, The Honorable Christopher P., Assistant Secretary of 404
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
Fenton, General Bryan P., USA, Commander, United States Special 406
Operations Command.
Haugh, General Timothy D., USAF, Commander, United States Cyber 419
Command; Director, National Security Agency; Chief, Central
Security Service.
Questions for the Record......................................... 466
(iv)
april 11, 2024
Page
United States European Command and United States Transportation 481
Command.
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 481
Witness Statements
Cavoli, General Christopher G., USA Commander, United States 481
European Command, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme
Allied Commander Europe.
Van Ovost, General Jacqueline D., USAF Commander, United States 493
Transportation Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 542
april 16, 2024
Air Force Posture................................................ 555
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 555
Witness Statements
Kendall, The Honorable Frank, III, Secretary of The Air Force.... 555
Allvin, General David W., USAF, Chief of Staff of The Air Force.. 557
Saltzman, General B. Chance, USSF, Chief of Space Operations..... 559
Questions for the Record......................................... 602
april 17, 2024
The Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security 619
Administration Atomic Energy Defense Activities.
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 619
Witness Statements
Granholm, The Honorable Jennifer M., Secretary of Energy......... 619
Hruby, The Honorable Jill M., Administrator of The National 621
Nuclear Security Administration.
Questions for the Record......................................... 662
(v)
april 18, 2024
Page
Army Posture..................................................... 689
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 689
Statement of Senator Roger Wicker................................ 691
Witness Statements
Wormuth, The Honorable Christine E., Secretary of The Army....... 692
George, General Randy A., USA, Chief of Staff of The Army........ 694
Questions for the Record......................................... 737
may 16, 2024
Navy Posture..................................................... 753
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 753
Statement of Senator Roger Wicker................................ 757
Witness Statements
Del Toro, The Honorable Carlos, Secretary of The Navy............ 759
Franchetti, Admiral Lisa Marie, Chief of Naval Operations........ 780
Smith, General Eric, Commandant of The Marine Corps.............. 791
Questions for the Record......................................... 847
Appendix
Navy Reserve 2024 Training Requirements Summary................ 897
(vi)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 2024
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan,
Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
receive testimony from General Anthony Cotton, Commander of
U.S. Strategic Command, or STRATCOM, and General Stephen
Whiting, Commander of U.S. Space Command, or SPACECOM.
Gentleman, thank you for your service to the Nation, and please
extend our thanks to the men and women who serve with you.
As in the past we have asked the commanders of STRATCOM and
SPACECOM to testify together. Until 2019, SPACECOM was a part
of Strategic Command. As SPACECOM continues its standup as an
independent command it is important to identify any gaps or
seams that have emerged during the transition.
On the global stage, Russia continues to behave recklessly
with regard to its nuclear weapons strategy. Recent press
reports say that Russia is considering violating international
space treaties and endangering the global use of space for
vital communications and sensing. Further, Putin has sabotaged
the strategic stability and arms control policies that both our
nations have respected for decades. Over the past year, Russia
has suspended its participation in the New START treaty and
withdrawn its ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. Russia continues to develop new third-strike nuclear
weapons, ranging from multi-megaton underwater torpedoes to
nuclear-powered cruise missiles.
At the same time, China is also advancing its missile
capabilities. China is quickly expanding its land-based missile
silos, building new air and sea nuclear delivery platforms, and
completing its nuclear command, control, and communications, or
NC3. These developments may have significant impacts on
stability in the Indo-Pacific and America's extended deterrence
commitment to our allies in the region.
Simply put, we are now in a trilateral nuclear competitive
era.
General Cotton, I would ask for your thoughts on how your
command is handling this challenge and how you plan to address
your force structure to deter both Russia and China while
minimizing the potential for escalation.
The United States is also well underway in its nuclear
modernization cycle, a once-in-a-generation effort to renew the
aging legs of our nuclear triad. As part of that effort, I
understand the Department is encountering such large costs
increases in the Sentinel ICBM replacement program that there
has been a [unclear 0:02:28] breach, which means the program
must undergo statutory reviews and an analysis of reasons for
cost overruns. The fiscal year 2024 NDAA required an assessment
of the operational impacts of these acquisition delays, and we
would ask for an update on the situation.
General Whiting, the threats to the United States and
allied space systems continue to increase. As we are seeing in
Ukraine, dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum plays a
vital role in modern warfare. We have seen large swaths of the
battlefield in the Ukraine rendered inoperable due to GPS
denial for precision weapons, as well as the disabling of
commercial satellite systems at both military [unclear
0:03:11].
China, for its part, has invested heavily in jamming the
electronic and kinetic technologies that could be used to
disable our military and civilian satellites. We are in a race
to dominate this field because any future conflict will involve
a constant battle to control the spectrum and cripple the
adversaries' communications and command and control. General
Whiting, I would ask for your perspective on the roles and
vulnerabilities of these space systems as well as lessons
learned from the conflict in Ukraine.
Space Command recently announced that it has reached full
operational capability. However, in my view full operational
capability does not necessarily mean full mission readiness. As
a warfighting domain, space requires new battle management
capabilities, especially the ability to detect a threat in
space and to relay that information to a weapons system. This
battle management directly affects our ability to protect
troops on the ground, and SPACECOM must continue to integrate
fully with the other combatant commanders. General, I hope you
will update us on this concept and what the Committee can do to
help bring it to fruition.
Finally, I would note that the missile defense mission was
recently transferred from STRATCOM to SPACECOM. This mission
set has never been more important for our troops around the
world, as we have seen threats increasing in the Red Sea,
Middle East, and Ukraine. I would like to know how you are
integration missile defense into your command and what
capabilities you need to protect our warfighters.
Thank you again to our witnesses for appearing today. I
look forward to your testimoneys.
I would note for my colleagues that there will be a
classified briefing immediately following this session in SVC-
217, to continue our discussion.
Let me now recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the witnesses for their service.
Last year's congressional Strategic Posture Commission
issued a report that was disquieting. Its conclusion was that
the United States must fundamentally update our nuclear and
space programs if we have any hope of countering growing
threats from Russia and China. Unfortunately, the current
Administration has naively maintained the status quo.
I am choosing my words carefully in making this statement.
While the United States has stayed complacent, Russia and
China have advanced by leaps and bounds in their nuclear and
space programs.
As we enter the third year of Putin's war against Ukraine,
Russia remains a major strategic threat to the United States.
Moscow owns the world's largest, most modern nuclear arsenal,
giving it a 10-to-11 advantage over the United States in
tactical nuclear weapons.
Russia has also developed new weapons unlike anything in
the U.S. inventory. It stocks nuclear-powered, trans-oceanic,
autonomous torpedoes and intercontinental cruise missiles.
Against such weapons, we are currently defenseless.
As bad as this sounds, China is rapidly becoming an even
greater threat. Beijing is modernizing and expanding its
nuclear forces at breakneck speed. It will likely outpace the
United States in the early 2030's. Already it successfully
deployed an operational strategic triad of nuclear missiles,
bombers, and submarines.
Over the past 3 years, China has tripled the size of its
nuclear arsenal and built an ICBM network larger than our own.
The Chinese have flown a missile that can drop nuclear warheads
from orbit anywhere on earth, with virtually no warning.
Both Russia and China are also openly developing and
testing counter-space capabilities. Each country has used
kinetic weapons to obliterate orbiting satellites. When this is
done, the blasts scatter thousands of debris fragments,
endanger hundreds of other satellites, and preview a
frightening future. Unfortunately, these aggressive actions
only scratch the surface of their real capabilities.
One would expect these threats to generate a sense of
urgency in Washington. Today's nuclear and space dangers should
prompt us to reassess our assumptions about the threat
environment and realign our resources accordingly. This is the
unanimous recommendation of the Bipartisan Strategic Posture
Commission, the unanimous recommendation of this bipartisan
commission.
Instead, we see more of the same. The current
Administration consistently delays nuclear and space
modernization programs. It chooses to dawdle instead of
actively confront a pair of dire truths: the United States'
nuclear capabilities are falling behind, and the future of war
will extend to space.
Collaboration with Congress and the White House could
replace that inaction with progress. We can start reclaiming
lost ground by following the recommendations of the Strategic
Posture Commission, the unanimous recommendations of this
bipartisan commission.
We must accelerate the National Nuclear Security
Administration's restoration of our basic industrial
capabilities. The current, slow pace is out of touch with the
reality.
Likewise, we must make progress on the Sentinel ICBM and
Columbia submarine programs. These programs require sustained
investment and innovation. But the benefit is worth the price
tag and elbow grease that it will require. The advances made by
our adversaries demand both defensive and offensive military
solutions.
I would like to hear from our witnesses about how this
Committee can help create a sense of urgency when it comes to
accelerating the modernization of our strategic arsenal and
adapting our forces to the new threat environment.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
General Cotton, your comments, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL ANTHONY J. COTTON, USAF, COMMANDER OF
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Cotton. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Wicker, and distinguished Members of this Committee. It is an
honor to be here today alongside General Whiting and a
privilege to represent the servicemembers and civilians of the
United States Strategic Command.
This is my second year appearing before you as the STRATCOM
Commander. I would like to thank this Committee and Congress
for their support not only to national defense but to my
portfolio. I have submitted my posture statement for the
record.
The most important message I want to deliver today is that
the forces under my command are ready to deter our adversaries
and respond decisively should deterrence fail. No adversary
should ever doubt our capability today. As a global warfighting
command, STRATCOM sets conditions across the globe as the
ultimate guarantor of national allied security. Our forces and
capabilities underpin and enable all other Joint Forces
operations.
We do this in the face of challenges unlike anything
America has ever encountered. We are confronting not one but
two nuclear peers, the Russian Federation and People's Republic
of China (PRC). This reality, combined by missile developments
in North Korea, Iran's nuclear ambitions, and the growing
relationships amongst those nations add news layers of
complexity to our strategic calculus. It also raises the
possibility of simultaneous conflicts with multiple nuclear-
armed adversaries.
The PRC is surpassing the United States in its number of
fixed intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, and
projections indicate its nuclear arsenal would encompass
approximately 1,000 warheads by 2030. As Russia's unprovoked
invasion of Ukraine enters its third year, its reliance on
nuclear forces increases as its conventional forces attrit.
Beyond Russia's traditional strategic triad it is expanding
and modernizing nuclear options that are not covered by
international arms treaties. Last Friday, President Putin
stated that 95 percent of Russia's strategic nuclear forces
have been modernized. In short, our competitors are improving
their position against the United States and its allies in
multiple domains at rates that are far exceeding the pace we
have seen just a few years ago.
While our legacy systems continue to hold potential
adversaries at risk, it is absolutely critical we continue at
speed with the modernization of our nuclear triad, including
land-based ICBMs, the B-21, the B-52, the Columbia-class
submarine, the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, and LRSO,
as well as numerous related systems, while also focusing on the
NC3 enterprise with its upgrades and cybersecurity.
I urge Congress to continue supporting these critical
national security capabilities, their associated
infrastructure, and the sustainment of legacy systems during
the modernization period.
Let me be clear. While modernization will continue to be
the priority, STRATCOM forces are ready to fight tonight, and
my components will always be ready to fight tonight.
So I thank you, and I look forward to your questions. Thank
you, Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Anthony J. Cotton
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Anthony J. Cotton
introduction
United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is a global
warfighting combatant command (CCMD). Our mission is to deter strategic
attack through a safe, secure, effective, and credible global combat
capability and, when directed, prevail in conflict. Our people are
foundational to the Command's mission and success, ensuring the safety
and security of our Nation and our Allies, 24 hours a day, 365 days a
year. I want to thank the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs for their continued leadership in support of
USSTRATCOM's mission areas. I would like to thank Congress for its
continued support in providing USSTRATCOM with the necessary resources
to execute our mission and for commissioning the recently released
bipartisan report on America's Strategic Posture, which provides
valuable insight into our challenges and offers a number of
recommendations to preserve existing advantages.
Today, the United States, its Allies, and partners continue to be
confronted by two major nuclear powers as strategic competitors and
potential adversaries: the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the
Russian Federation. We are also faced with the growing nuclear threat
posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Islamic
Republic of Iran's continued expansion of its nuclear program. What's
more, our potential adversaries are increasing their level of
coordination and cooperation with one another. This threat environment
raises the possibility of near-simultaneous conflicts with multiple
nuclear-armed, opportunistic adversaries.
The United States addresses these challenges through integrated
deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages--
leveraging the capabilities of our Joint Force to ensure that the
President has options to deter all potential adversaries. Integrated
deterrence is the bedrock of our National Defense Strategy (NDS). As
the NDS articulates, integrated deterrence spans all instruments of
national power, all Allies and partners, all domains and capabilities,
and is backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
USSTRATCOM's role, however, is not limited to nuclear plans and
operations.
USSTRATCOM responsibilities span strategic deterrence, nuclear
operations, nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)
enterprise operations, joint electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) operations
(JEMSO), global strike, and missile threat assessment. Executing these
responsibilities entails close alignment and collaboration with senior
national and Department of Defense (DOD) leadership, CCMDs, defense
agencies, and other elements of national power. Strategic deterrence is
critical to the DOD's integrated deterrence approach.
our people
To fulfill our strategic deterrence mission, USSTRATCOM relies on a
team of military and civilian members who are steadfast in their
dedication. People are the cornerstone of our organization, and I take
pride in working alongside such a talented and dedicated group of
professionals. I am committed to ensuring they have the support and
resources needed to succeed, and I firmly believe that investing in our
people is essential to our success. By providing comprehensive
professional development opportunities, career-enhancing experiences,
and targeted training programs to ensure our personnel are well-
prepared to conquer the challenges ahead, we are fostering the growth
of the next generation of strategic deterrence experts.
global security environment
The peace dividend once envisioned at the end of the cold war has
unfortunately failed to materialize in the long-term. Strategic
competition is on the rise, including in the nuclear domain, as
evidenced by Russia's comprehensive nuclear modernization efforts and
the PRC's rapid and opaque nuclear weapons buildup. The emphasis on
nuclear capabilities by potential adversaries, coupled with the
incorporation of technologies like hypersonic weapons (HSW) and
fractional orbital bombardment (FOB) capabilities, significantly
escalates global security risks. As noted in the 2022 Nuclear Posture
Review, the PRC and Russia also likely possess capabilities relevant to
chemical and biological warfare that pose a threat to U.S., Allied, and
partner forces, military operations, and civilian populations.
Taken individually, these developments are concerning; they are
only exacerbated by the increasing levels of cooperation between and
among the PRC, Russian Federation, DPRK, and Islamic Republic of Iran,
which creates the possibility for simultaneous crises and raises the
risk of opportunistic aggression. For example, Russian and PRC bombers
flew joint patrols over the western Pacific this past November and
conducted a joint maritime patrol near the Aleutian Islands over the
summer. The DPRK and Iran have also delivered arms to Russia to support
its war against Ukraine. This increasing cooperation and the risk of
simultaneous crisis or conflict place a premium on credible, robust,
and flexible joint force response options that signal our readiness and
commitment to potential adversaries, Allies, and partners.
the people's republic of china
The 2022 NDS identified the PRC as the Department's pacing
challenge and our most consequential strategic competitor. PRC
leadership has stated that the expansion of nuclear capabilities is
necessary to achieve ``great power status,'' and potentially perceives
its nuclear arsenal as a key deterrent to U.S. intervention in the
region. While the PRC's long-term nuclear strategy and requirements
remain unclear, the trajectory of its efforts points toward a large
nuclear and more diverse force with a high degree of survivability,
reliability, and effectiveness.
The PRC currently has a nuclear triad consisting of bombers,
submarines, and land-based missiles. Its H-6N bomber is equipped to
carry air-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, and the PRC is
actively developing a strategic stealth bomber, the H-20. The PRC also
has six Jin-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) equipped with
new third-generation JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), capable of striking the continental United States from PRC
littoral waters. Additionally, the PRC has approximately 1,000 medium
and intermediate-range dual-capable conventional or nuclear ballistic
missiles capable of inflicting significant damage to U.S., Allied, or
partner forces and Homelands in the Indo-Pacific.
As I reported to Congress in January 2023, the PRC's arsenal of
land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers
currently exceeds that of the United States. Today, the PRC likely has
more than 500 operational nuclear warheads and, should it continue
building weapons at its current pace, could have more than 1,000
nuclear warheads by 2030. In 2022, it built three new ICBM fields, with
at least 300 missile silos, each capable of housing the solid-
propellant CSS-10 Mod 2 ICBM. The PRC also maintains road mobile CSS-20
ICBMs, each armed with multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles (MIRV), and is developing a new generation of mobile ICBMs.
These developments, combined with the PRC's increasing counter-space
and cyber capabilities, pose a complex, but not insurmountable
challenge to U.S. strategic deterrence.
russian federation
The 2022 NDS identified Russia as an acute threat. Its unprovoked
war against Ukraine has caused the largest conflict on the European
continent since World War II and undermines the rules-based
international system. The invasion has also highlighted Russia's
willingness to employ nuclear coercion and attempt to influence
decisionmaking within the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Allies. Russia's violation of specific obligations
within the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) further
exacerbates this issue.
Russia is currently in possession of the largest and most diverse
nuclear arsenal of any nation. In September 2023, it proclaimed the RS-
28 SARMAT ICBM had been placed on combat duty. Additionally, Russia
continues to field new Severodvinsk-class nuclear-powered cruise
missile submarines, as well as Dolgorukiy-class SSBNs, armed with the
SS-N-32 Bulava SLBM.
Beyond Russia's traditional strategic triad, it is expanding and
modernizing its nuclear options. These include nuclear-capable
hypersonic systems such as the Tsirkon land attack cruise missile and
the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, the last of which Russia
has employed frequently against Ukraine in a conventional role. These
hypersonic systems add diversity and flexibility to Russia's nuclear
arsenal and complement its stockpile of approximately 2,000 theater
nuclear weapons that do not fall under New START limits.
democratic people's republic of korea
The DPRK views its nuclear arsenal as a means to ensure regime
survival and influence Republic of Korea and United States Forces in
the area. The DPRK is developing and fielding mobile short-,
intermediate-, and intercontinental-range nuclear capabilities that
place the United States Homeland and regional Allies and partners at
risk. DPRK leadership recently declared that the country's status as a
nuclear weapons state ``has now become irreversible,'' and it is
possible the DPRK will resume nuclear testing in order to demonstrate
its capabilities.
islamic republic of iran
The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to expand its nuclear
program by increasing its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and
deploying additional advanced centrifuges, which has shortened the time
Iran would need to acquire enough fissile material for a nuclear
weapon. Iran already possesses the region's largest arsenal of
conventional ballistic missiles, which threaten U.S. regional bases and
are capable of reaching as far as Southern Europe. Iran also continues
to proliferate advanced conventional weapons to non-state militia
groups across the Middle East--which have been used in countless
attacks against U.S. and partner personnel and interests across the
region, undermining regional stability.
accomplishing the mission: the triad and other core functions
To address these threats, the United States is undertaking a multi-
generational, decades-long modernization of our entire nuclear
deterrent, including all three legs of the triad, as well as our
command, control, and communications capabilities. The comprehensive
modernization programs we are currently undertaking have not occurred
on this scale since the 1980's. Throughout this period, we will retain
credible forces to deter strategic attacks, assure our Allies and
partners, and provide options to the President if necessary. USSTRATCOM
remains vigilant and will continue to posture available forces
throughout the triad's transition to ensure we will continue to be able
to meet our requirements. I urge Congress to continue supporting these
critical national security capabilities and associated infrastructure.
nuclear command, control, and communications (nc3) enterprise
modernization
The President's ability to command, control, and communicate (C3)
with the Nation's nuclear forces is critical to the entire nuclear
enterprise, and it must remain effective and resilient under all
circumstances. Our NC3 Enterprise is a key component of strategic
deterrence, and with congressional support, the DOD is focused on
improving our NC3 capabilities while addressing potential threats. Our
efforts are based on innovation and collaboration, partnering with
various sectors--including government, industry, and academia--to
incorporate advanced concepts into NC3 projects. This collaborative
approach is vital for safely integrating new technologies into our NC3
architecture and for identifying and addressing potential strategic
gaps.
To ensure a viable NC3 capability in support of Strategic
Deterrence, there are numerous efforts underway in the space, aerial,
and terrestrial layers. Regarding the space layer, the Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) space constellation is fully deployed,
and the command post terminals leveraging it are nearing fully fielded
status. This modernization effort will permit the transition away from
our legacy capability, provide enhanced missile warning, increase
national-level conferencing connectivity and security, and improve
Presidential decision dissemination to our nuclear forces.
We are also in the process of replacing aging aerial layer command
and control nodes like the E-4B and E-6B in support of future senior
leader communications and force direction
messaging. The E-4B Nightwatch aircraft currently serves as the
National Airborne Operations Center and is an essential National asset.
Its recapitalization program, the Survivable Airborne Operations
Center, will serve as the next generation airborne command and control
center platform for the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
The E-6B Mercury serves two roles. It is responsible for the Take
Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) mission, serving as an Emergency Action
Message (EAM) relay to all legs of the nuclear triad. It also serves as
an alternate USSTRATCOM Command Center (Looking Glass), providing EAM
origination and ICBM secondary launch capability. The E-6B follow-on
platform, the E-XX, will execute the EAM relay (TACAMO) mission only,
and must be operational by the E-6B's projected end of service life in
fiscal year 2038.
The terrestrial layer is undergoing modernization efforts that
round out the Nation's ability to provide a more diverse communication
architecture that provides additional resiliency to our nuclear force
assets and ensures flexibility and survivability from emerging threats.
In pursuit of this enhanced architecture, the Air Force and Navy are
modernizing the Strategic Automated Command and Control System and Nova
nuclear messaging transports to better integrate these complementary
critical Service systems, providing high priority direction to all
three legs of the triad. In addition, the Defense Information Systems
Agency is funding and pursuing a modernized means of Senior Leader
conferencing during national events.
These NC3 system upgrades will ensure an integrated, secure, and
survivable strategic nuclear communication capability that meets
stringent nuclear, cyber protection, and cryptographic certification
requirements. Urgently needed, these recapitalization and improvement
programs must continue without interruption for on-time fielding to
meet operational requirements and to deter adversaries from seeking to
gain strategic advantage from non-nuclear attacks on the Nation's NC3
architecture.
joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (jemso)
The electromagnetic spectrum is a critical maneuver space in modern
warfare, and our reliance on it to conduct operations is paramount. As
the EMS environment grows more contested and congested, it is vital to
understand the threats we face and how they impact our ability to
operate. The USSTRATCOM Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
Center (JEC) was established at the direction of the Secretary of
Defense, with bipartisan congressional support, on July 26th, 2023. In
addition, CCMDs created Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Cells
(JEMSOCs) in their headquarters to improve EMSO readiness and to
address evolving adversary threats. The JEC trains and assesses the
progress of these JEMSOCs, maintains governance over JEMSO training,
and analyzes the operational impact of U.S. EMSO policy discussions
related to spectrum management.
Through participation in joint exercises and wargames, the JEC
improves joint force interoperability and coordination and provides
superior military advice. The JEC identifies improvement areas by
assessing current capabilities and appraising future force concepts,
ultimately enhancing our superiority in the EMS environment. These
initiatives are critical for assessing the Department's mission
performance and ensuring readiness against diverse threats.
Key to maintaining this readiness is our capability to conduct
training in realistic EMS environments. This is a significant challenge
with the increased demand from non-DOD users. To address this,
USSTRATCOM will continue to work closely with Joint Staff and DOD Chief
Information Officer (CIO) to ensure operational risks to the
mission are understood when decisions are made on spectrum allocation.
land-based triad component
As the triad's land-based component, the Minuteman III (MMIII) ICBM
system is our most responsive strategic deterrent option. It is a
geographically dispersed, reliable, and highly responsive force with
the most robust and ironclad NC3 system enabling direct communication
with the President of the United States. Our ICBMs raise the bar for an
adversary considering a counterforce strike against the United States;
no adversary can be confident in its ability to destroy our ICBMs via
limited attack or prior to their being launched.
The MMIII missile initially deployed over 50 years ago with a
planned 10-year service life. Its supporting infrastructure of silos
and Launch Facilities is even older. The missile's robust design,
combined with judicious investments, and the dedication of our airmen,
have permitted the MMIII to operate well beyond its original design
life. It remains a formidable deterrent, but asset attrition, aging,
parts obsolescence, and sustainment shortfalls present increasingly
significant operational challenges. To address this, the Air Force has
identified comprehensive capabilities to keep the MMIII weapon system
viable until end of life; Centralized Asset Management (CAM) funding
increases will ensure the MMIII weapon system meets USSTRATCOM alert
requirements in the near term, and support equipment acquisition
program investments will help reduce weapon system sustainment risks.
The LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM Program is intended to replace the MMIII
weapon system with a modern land-based deterrent, and the program is
synchronized with MMIII decommissioning to avoid operational
shortfalls. Sentinel constitutes an incredibly complex mega-project to
replace every facet of the MMIII weapon system. The program includes a
secure and robust command, control, and communications capability, a
new missile, and hundreds of infrastructure projects, including
hardened facilities spread across thousands of miles in five states.
The command and launch segment is the most complex segment of the
Sentinel program. It includes 450 refurbished and modernized Launch
Facilities, thousands of miles of modern fiber optic networks, the
acquisition of permanent and temporary real estate easements with
hundreds of landowners, and operational site activation efforts
necessary to support the workforce responsible for converting the
Launch Facilities.
The Sentinel program is unique in size and scope--with no recent
comparisons in terms of magnitude. It is critical that the Air Force,
with the support of Congress, continue investments to ensure
sustainment of MMIII to manage end-of-life margin until it is fully
replaced by a modern ICBM weapon system.
sea-based triad component
As the triad's sea-based component, the Ohio-class SSBN fleet,
paired with the Trident II D5 Strategic Weapon System (SWS), operates
virtually undetected in the world's oceans, providing a resilient,
reliable, survivable, and assured second-strike capability vital to the
defense of the United States and our Allies and partners. Despite the
fleet's accomplishments, and its ability to achieve the mission today,
it faces continuing sustainment challenges that could impact its
availability until fully replaced by the Columbia-class in 2042.
The Columbia-class SSBN is the Navy's top priority strategic
deterrent program for USSTRATCOM. This new submarine must achieve its
first strategic deterrent patrol by 2030 to avoid an unacceptable
capability gap. To address this potential gap, the Navy is investing
heavily in the Submarine Industrial Base (SIB) in order to ensure
delivery of Columbia hulls 2-12 meet required timelines. These efforts
will help maintain SSBN availability until the Columbia-class
submarines are all available.
The Columbia Program of Record (POR) delivers at least 12 SSBNs,
which is the absolute minimum required number of SSBNs to meet today's
at-sea deterrence requirements. The Columbia-class will feature
improved tactical and sonar systems, electric drive propulsion, and
advanced hull coating to improve acoustic performance and maintain U.S.
undersea dominance. In addition, the longer life span of the reactor
and reduced maintenance requirements will increase SSBN availability
compared to the Ohio-class SSBNs.
Shore infrastructure readiness is fundamental to supporting SSBN
operational readiness requirements. This includes Navy NC3 systems,
facilities, and the SSBN maintenance facilities in Bangor, WA, and
Kings Bay, GA. Provision of military construction funding, as well as
operations and maintenance funding, facilitates the Navy's
modernization of shore infrastructure supporting the nuclear deterrence
mission. One immediate example of this modernization is the Columbia-
class expansion for the Kings Bay Trident Refit Facility (TRF), which
is on track to begin in fiscal year 2025. Columbia-class submarines
require industrial processes that TRF facilities are not currently
capable of supporting. The TRF expansion project will provide the
modernization and capacity required to support the Columbia-class SSBNs
in Kings Bay.
The Columbia-class will continue to carry the Trident II missile,
and the D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) program will upgrade the Trident II
to maintain a modern, reliable, flexible, and effective missile with
advanced technology capable of adapting to emerging threats for many
years to come. D5LE2 is essential to support Columbia-class SSBNs and
requires timely and appropriate funding to maintain a viable SSBN
deterrent; underfunding D5LE2 would impact technology readiness and
program milestones. The success of the Columbia-class depends on a
capable and flexible missile to safeguard credibility in both present
and future threat environments.
The Navy's commitment to sustaining and modernizing its SSBN fleet
underscores its dedication to maintaining the sea-based portion of the
triad. Although there are challenges and risks associated with these
efforts, the Navy's efforts to address sustainment concerns and
modernize its fleet will ensure the Nation's strategic deterrence
capabilities will remain reliable, survivable, and resilient in the
future.
Anti-Submarine Warfare
Adversaries can increasingly challenge our acoustic superiority and
SSBN survivability through advancements in undersea quieting, acoustic
arrays, and processing capabilities. Our submarines are formidable
weapon systems, but we need to address potential adversaries' undersea
advances to maintain an effective and viable SSBN fleet in the long-
term.
The Navy's Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) provides
vital information with respect to adversary submarine and surface ship
operations, providing the theater anti-submarine warfare commander with
battlespace awareness that is critical to defeat the threat to our own
submarines. IUSS has been a crucial component of U.S. naval operations
and its recapitalization is a national imperative.
Undersea dominance is critical to national security, and we must
maintain our advantage through the evolving threat environment and Ohio
to Columbia transition. In addition to IUSS, the U.S. Navy must
continue its efforts in the Acoustic Superiority Program. Advanced
emerging technologies in this program must be delivered. By doing so,
we can maintain our tactical and strategic advantage in the undersea
domain, thereby ensuring the safety and security of our Nation.
air-based triad component
As the triad's air-based component, our bomber fleet is the most
flexible and visible leg; it represents a crucial component of our
Nation's strategic deterrent and responsive assurance to United States
Allies. Enabled by our tanker fleet, the United States is the only
country with the ability and capacity to provide bombers to support
U.S. operations and Allies and partners around the world.
The U.S. bomber force represents an incredibly versatile set of
tools. Our bomber and tanker fleets support both nuclear and
conventional operations, enabling the execution of strike options to
support national objectives worldwide. The bomber fleet's dynamic force
employment versatility makes it an indispensable triad component. I
strongly encourage Congress to continue to support our budget requests
for the bomber fleet, including its associated weapons and
communication systems.
B-52H Modernization
The B-52 has served as the backbone of our bomber fleet for over 60
years, and with congressionally supported modernization and sustainment
programs, it is set to remain viable and effective for another three
decades. Achieving this milestone poses several maintenance and
operational challenges, requiring dedicated technical solutions,
resources, and the hard work of our remarkable airmen.
The B-52H requires critical upgrades, including the Commercial
Engine Replacement Program, which replaces the outdated and inefficient
engines with modern variants offering longer flight range, lower
emissions, less tanker requirements, and improved supply chain
management for the Air Force. The Radar Modernization Program will
enable USSTRATCOM and Air Force Global Strike Command to effectively
employ B-52 nuclear and conventional weapon capabilities, as well as
enhance navigation and weather avoidance functions. Finally, the
Advanced Extremely High Frequency integration will enable a survivable,
two-way command and control communications system as well as provide a
path for future growth and polar communications integration. These B-
52H recapitalization and improvement programs are urgently needed and
must continue without interruption to ensure on-time fielding of a
modernized B-52J fleet to meet operational requirements.
B-2 Modernization
The B-2 fleet is a crucial delivery platform, as it is the only
low-observable bomber in the world that can penetrate denied
environments and deliver a wide range of munitions against high-value
strategic targets. We must preserve this unique operational advantage
as the Air Force transitions from the B-2 to the B-21 fleet.
To ensure a seamless and successful transition, Congress must
continue to fully fund B-2 sustainment and modernization programs until
the B-21 achieves full operational capability for both conventional and
nuclear missions. In particular, B-2 modernization must include the Low
Observable Signature and Supportability Modifications program, which
will enhance its ability to penetrate anti-access area-denial (A2AD)
combat environments. To enable reliable C2 pathways, the B-2 Advanced
Communications Program will provide secure satellite connectivity
beyond line-of-sight, ultra-high frequency line-of-sight, high-
frequency anti-jam, and encrypted voice communications. This
modernization will allow our aircrews to communicate securely with our
Allies and partners.
By investing in these modernization efforts, the DOD can ensure the
B-2 fleet remains a formidable force in the face of evolving threats.
This will enhance the Air Force's operational capabilities and
significantly boost national security.
B-21 Raider
The B-21, along with the B-52J, will be the mainstay of the triad's
air leg, making it an essential part of the Nation's defense strategy.
The Raider will provide long range, exceptional access, and diverse
payload wherever necessary to help deter and win wars. The program is
on track to meet operational requirements set by USSTRATCOM, with
flight testing under way and the first operational aircraft scheduled
for delivery in the late 2020's.
The Raider POR delivers a minimum of 100 aircraft. As the national
security environment evolves, the Air Force may require additional B-21
aircraft to meet future global conventional and nuclear warfighting
needs. It is crucial this advanced bomber program remains fully funded,
stays on track, and delivers on time to prevent any potential
shortfalls in the bomber strategic deterrent force.
Air-Launched Cruise Missile / Long-Range Standoff Missile and Nuclear
Gravity Bombs
Today, the air-delivered weapons portfolio consists of the Air
Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and nuclear gravity bombs. This
combination provides an appropriate mix of standoff and direct attack
munitions to meet near-term operational requirements while the DOD and
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) explore options for
future capabilities. Longer-term, the ALCM will be replaced by the
long-range standoff (LRSO) cruise missile as our Nation's only air-
delivered nuclear standoff capability--offering the President more
flexible and scalable options to penetrate and survive advanced air
defense systems. The B61-12 will complete fielding in fiscal year 2026;
along with the B61-13, it will extend the service life of the B61. The
flexibility of these air-delivered systems is a key attribute in all
USSTRATCOM operational plans. The on-time delivery of these weapons is
the critical risk mitigation component for potential delays in the
fielding of other modernization programs.
Tanker Support
The U.S. tanker fleet is the primary enabler of airborne strike
platforms, providing global reach without relying on intermediate
basing locations. A robust tanker fleet is essential to sustain
USSTRATCOM missions, but the aging KC-135 is currently our only
nuclear-certified refueling platform.
To address this, the Air Force is working to revitalize the tanker
fleet through the rapid nuclear certification of the KC-46 and the
acceleration of the Next Generation Air-refueling System program. These
initiatives are vital to continued long-range air operations.
We must modernize and acquire more tankers to enable simultaneous
global operations across the spectrum of conflict involving multiple
CCMDs. Full congressional and Service commitment to tanker sustainment
and modernization efforts will ensure the United States maintains a
global strategic advantage, even in simultaneous conflicts.
accomplishing the mission: industry, infrastructure, and security
We cannot accomplish our mission without the industry,
infrastructure, and security that supports the triad and our core
functions. These key enablers ensure that our weapons and weapons
platforms are designed and manufactured to fight, and win, today and in
the future.
defense industrial base
A healthy defense industrial base (DIB) that can provide advanced
technology, capability, and capacity is fundamental to our ability to
compete strategically. The strength of our defense capabilities is
directly linked to the talents of the American workforce and the
robustness and innovation of our industrial base. Building a strong and
resilient workforce and supporting infrastructure to execute PORs on-
time, while modernizing and sustaining current forces, is one of the
most important issues we face today.
It is imperative to develop the DIB and workforce capable of
creating the infrastructure necessary to support all our modernization
programs, particularly the Sentinel ICBM program, the Columbia-class
SSBN program, and future follow-on programs for the Trident II D5 SLBM.
This includes ensuring the right throughput for trade schools and
producing skilled technical labor, such as technicians proficient in
concrete work, welding, and rebar fabrication. The success of the major
levels of effort in ballistic missile programs in the 1960's, like the
Polaris missile program and the Minuteman project, driven by an
energized whole-of-government approach, serves as a historical
precedent for the current national imperative.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) and the Navy have dedicated considerable
study efforts toward maximizing efficiency and identifying substantial
SIB programmatic gaps; these studies have resulted in real efforts to
assess shortfalls and address growing industrial base demand. Continued
congressional support is critical to overhauling the SIB to advance the
Navy's shipbuilding efforts. Execution of the 1+2 (1 Columbia-class
SSBN + 2 Virginia SSNs per year) submarine build plan is a national
imperative. Currently, the shipbuilding industry only delivers one
Virginia-class submarine every 10 months instead of the targeted 6
months. Achieving required production levels will shape our Nation's
undersea dominance and sea-based strategic deterrence well into the
2080's. Continued support for the DIB and SIB is key to sustaining
current capabilities and ensuring we remain at the forefront of defense
technology.
nuclear security enterprise (nse) and weapons infrastructure
The Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile is currently safe, secure,
effective, and credible. The NNSA workforce achieved significant
milestones in fiscal year 2023 with initial fielding of the B61-12
gravity bomb and the W88 Alt 370 warhead. Progress also continues
toward achieving the first production of a war reserve plutonium pit in
2024. These accomplishments notwithstanding, work remains on our aging
nuclear stockpile and its supporting enterprise as our nuclear
competitors accelerate fielding of advanced capabilities.
While I am confident that we can meet objectives today, performance
degradation and increasing uncertainty reduces the operational
flexibility I have in providing options to the President. As the
Nuclear Posture Review makes clear, a resilient and adaptive nuclear
security enterprise is key to managing geopolitical as well as
operational, technical, and programmatic risks. Our success depends on
executing stockpile and infrastructure PORs to maintain the current
stockpile, modernize weapons where practicable, develop and field
modern replacements when required, and enhance the NSE with additional
residual capacity to enable a responsive and resilient weapons program.
As our weapons stockpile ages beyond its planned service life, the
margins in our fielded weapons decrease. The confidence in our
deterrent over time has been sustained by the exceptional performance
and knowledge provided through the stockpile surveillance program,
which gives us insights into the design margins built into these
systems. This is a testament to the work of past designers, engineers,
and production staff, but we cannot rely on this approach indefinitely.
We need to find alternative methods to become more predictive in our
surveillance programs to ensure the continued safety and effectiveness
of our aging strategic stockpile.
Modernizing a new or significantly updated weapon in today's
enterprise takes a decade or more. As we look ahead, considerable work
needs to be done to modernize weapons across all three legs of the
triad. The first wave of modernization is the current POR that includes
the W80-4 for the LRSO, the W87-1/Mk21A for the Sentinel, and the W93/
Mk7 for the SSBNs. Subsequent nuclear weapons stockpile modernization
will follow, with programs required through the 2040's and beyond.
It is important to note that we do not have residual NSE capacity
to manage emerging risks. For example, we have little capacity to
respond to unforeseen issues in our aging stockpile without impacting
the POR or planned future modernization programs. We must not lose
sight of the larger need for modern weapons development and fielding
for the warfighter. Only the NNSA can provide this capability.
As in past years, our priority remains the establishment of a
credible plutonium pit manufacturing capability. However, modernizing
the stockpile requires more than pit production. To improve future
readiness and implement the flexibility to respond to the changing
geopolitical environment, we must also establish necessary capacities
and capabilities to manufacture and produce uranium, tritium, high
explosives, lithium, and radiation-hardened electronics.
I strongly endorse the efforts of NNSA and Service partners to
ensure a modern stockpile, responsive infrastructure, and a robust
science and technology base for our strategic deterrence force. As a
critical partner to integrated deterrence, I strongly endorse the
Services and NNSA's efforts to recover lost schedules, create margin,
reduce USSTRATCOM's mission risk, and decrease the Nation's strategic
risk.
nuclear security
Our defense-in-depth strategy for the safety and security of U.S.
nuclear weapons begins with each weapon and extends outward to protect
systems, bases, structures, and personnel. Any failure in their
protection can raise questions about the credibility of our national
deterrent. As we continue to assess and analyze threats to fielded
forces and strategic capabilities, we will shape and advocate for
programs to close security gaps and maintain our stringent security
standards to deter, detect, delay, deny, and defeat threats.
MH-139A Grey Wolf Helicopter
The Joint Force achieved a significant ICBM security milestone with
the contract award for the MH-139A Grey Wolf. This helicopter increases
the overall protection of our nuclear arsenal by providing an enhanced
rapid response against threats to our land-based ICBM infrastructure.
When compared to the legacy UH-1N, the MH-139A provides our forces
enhanced speed, range, endurance, payload, and survivability. These
attributes ensure our strategic advantage by protecting assets vital to
national security. We look forward to achieving operational capability
and employing these highly capable platforms.
Weapon Generation Facility
As we modernize nuclear weapons and platforms, the Air Force is
replacing aging weapon storage areas with weapons generation facilities
(WGFs). These WGFs are vital to security, sustainment, and fielding of
the Sentinel, B-21, and LRSO triad modernization programs, and their
associated weapons. The Air Force will conduct weapon maintenance,
storage operations, and weapons generation activities in a single
reinforced WGF at each strategic base. The WGFs enhance weapon security
by consolidating maintenance and sustainment activities into one common
facility, and are a key part of the nuclear modernization effort that
must deliver on time to meet weapon and platform POR delivery
schedules.
Uncrewed Systems
The proliferation of uncrewed systems with increasing technological
sophistication poses a challenge to the Department and our Nation's
nuclear enterprise. We are in a rapidly accelerating technological race
with our adversaries. USSTRATCOM executed assessments in 2022 and 2023
to validate the effectiveness of our counter-uncrewed aircraft systems
as a step toward refining requirements, tactics, techniques, and
procedures to advance future capabilities. Investing smartly and
leveraging partnerships with academia and industry are crucial to
secure our technological advantage and protect our ability to preserve
strategic deterrence. I urge Congress to continue supporting these
areas so we can meet the challenges of a rapidly changing technological
landscape and compete into the future.
integrated air and missile defense
Although the Missile Defense mission was recently transferred from
USSTRATCOM to USSPACECOM, the protection of our fielded forces from air
and missile threats remains a critical responsibility of USSTRATCOM.
Moreover, integrated air and missile defense is an enduring component
of integrated deterrence. The missile defense enterprise continues to
evolve in a dynamic, increasingly complex and challenging threat
environment. USSTRATCOM's ability to deter and respond to strategic
attack requires response to adversary cruise, ballistic, hypersonic
missile, and other delivery systems. The breathtaking pace of
development, testing, and fielding of these weapon systems demonstrates
adversaries' investment and commitment to advanced capabilities.
USSTRATCOM continues to work with CCMDs, Services, and Agencies to
posture U.S. Forces while working to field responsive, persistent,
resilient, and cost-effective sensor capabilities able to detect,
characterize, track, and engage current and projected threats.
USSTRATCOM also supports improvements in early warning, identification,
tracking, discrimination, and attribution for the range of air and
missile threats to the Homeland and our strategic forces.
hypersonic weapons
USSTRATCOM provides nuclear and conventional options to support
deterrence objectives and global strike responsibilities. USSTRATCOM
relies on Conventional-Nuclear Integration planning, which includes
planning for employing conventional HSWs capable of holding time-
sensitive, high-value targets at risk. These weapons could allow
mission planners to tailor specific effects to better complement the
planning and use of nuclear forces, while enhancing Presidential
decision space. HSWs could provide potential flexible strike options to
influence adversary decisionmaking and potentially restore deterrence
before reaching the nuclear threshold.
The Services continue to develop and plan for operational fielding
of hypersonic weapon systems to support multiple CCMDs. The Army and
Navy are developing a common all-up round weapon to deploy in the near-
and far-term on mobile transporter erector launcher batteries, Zumwalt-
class destroyers, and Virginia-class submarines, respectively. The Air
Force is completing the Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon flight test
program and working on high Mach and hypersonic cruise missiles.
USSTRATCOM will continue working with partners to develop responsive,
affordable strike systems for national security needs in support of our
deterrence and global strike responsibilities.
conclusion
USSTRATCOM remains steadfast in its mission. We are focused on
advancing our capabilities while maintaining a credible strategic
deterrent today. To ensure we can deliver, we are diligently
modernizing our capabilities and adopting a dynamic, integrated
approach to strategic deterrence. I am proud to lead a team of
dedicated soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, guardians, and civilians
committed to our mission. We are eager to bolster integrated deterrence
as we continue our work with Congress, the Department of Defense, the
interagency, industry, academia, and our Allies and partners.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General Cotton.
General Whiting, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN N. WHITING, USSF, COMMANDER OF
UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND
General Whiting. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and
Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to
testify, and I am pleased to be joined beside my longtime
friend, General Tony Cotton. I am honored to represent the
18,000 joint military and civilian professionals of United
States Space Command and our five service components. Indeed,
our people are the most valuable asset of national space power.
U.S. Space Command, working with allies and partners, has a
moral responsibility to the Joint Force, the Nation, and our
allies to provide space capabilities through all levels of
conflict. Since Desert Storm, the Joint Force has become
reliant on these systems, and force sized according to the
assumption of always having access to space capabilities. This
is why U.S. Space Command must protect and defend our space
systems to ensure they are available in the face of the growing
threats arrayed against us.
Inherent in this responsibility is our ability to protect
the Joint Force from space-enabled attack. Our principal
strategic competitors, the People's Republic of China and the
Russian Federation, now hold at risk United States and allied
space capabilities because they know our Joint Force relies on
space to fight the way we want--precisely, lethally,
effectively, and efficiently. To put it plainly, the PRC's and
Russia's actions have transformed space into a contested,
warfighting domain.
Additionally, PRC military operations, in particular, have
become increasingly enabled by space at all levels of warfare,
and the People's Liberation Army is improving their terrestrial
forces' lethality and effectiveness by leveraging space
capabilities. As of January 2024, the PRC's intelligence
satellite fleet contained more than 359 systems, more than
tripling its on-orbit collection presence since 2018. With
their space and counterspace systems they have dramatically
increased their ability to monitor, track, and target U.S. and
allied forces, both terrestrially and on orbit.
Russia also continues to develop, test, and demonstrate
their counterspace capabilities, despite not having achieved
their war aims from their invasion of Ukraine. This ongoing
ground war has revealed military reliance on space and space-
enabled capabilities. To be sure, Russia's war in Ukraine has
established space as an indelible enabler of terrestrial
warfare.
Today United States Space Command seeks to expand
competitive advantage over PRC and Russia by leveraging every
available asset of the interagency, the rest of the Joint
Force, our allies, and our partners in U.S. commercial industry
and academia. The United States remains the best military space
power in the world, yet our current architecture is optimized
for operations in a benign space environment. To ensure success
in the contested space environment we now find ourselves in, it
is vital that U.S. Space Command is delivered improved
capabilities and capacities, fully tested, and with trained
personnel by 2027. While a conflict in space is not inevitable,
it would certainly be devastating and disrupt our use of space
for decades, so we must be ready if deterrence fails.
Simply put, the PRC is moving breathtakingly fast in space.
America must rapidly increase the timeliness, quality, and
quantity of our critical national space and missile defense
systems to match China's speed and maintain our advantage. With
the U.S. Space Force as well as the Army, Air Force, Navy, and
Marines, and other combatant commands and other agencies, U.S.
Space Command has determined priority military capabilities
required by 2027 to dominate in space.
Specifically, U.S. Space Command's top five priority
requirements that are key to delivering on our unified command
plan responsibilities are (1) resilient and timely operational
command and control; (2) integrated space fires and protection;
(3) modernized, agile electronic warfare architectures; (4)
enhanced battle space awareness for space warfare; and (5)
cyber defense of space systems. Absent commitment to long-term
investment in these integrated requirements, we risk ceding
advantage to our principal strategic competitors in the space
domain.
With delivery of increased capability and capacity assured,
U.S. Space Command will attain the required enduring advantage
over any adversary determined to conduct war in outer space,
thus ensuring defense of our Homeland, the protection of the
Joint Force, and our allies.
I am grateful for Congress' support to U.S. Space Command
and investments to advance America's leadership in space. With
your continued backing, United States Space Command will ensure
space remains sustainable, safe, stable, and secure for all.
Chairman, I have submitted my posture statement for the
record, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Stephen N. Whiting
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Stephen N. Whiting
introduction
For millennia space has been a mystery that inspired dreamers to
imagine what lay beyond our terrestrial environment and how it would 1
day impact our pursuits and prosperity upon Earth. Bold visionaries
still have sufficient room to dream, but enough mysteries have been
solved so that virtually every human being on Earth now relies upon and
benefits from capabilities and resources obtained in or generated from
space. U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) and our network of national and
international teammates protect vital American interests in space
against our strategic competitors with malign intent to hold our
critical space-based capabilities at risk. Additionally, freedom of
action in space is fundamental to all Joint military operations as
outlined in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy,
and National Military Strategy. The space domain's tremendous
scientific and commercial promise demands the United States continued
global leadership. To ensure we fulfill our role in these national
security imperatives, USSPACECOM is focused on four main lines of
effort: posturing and preparing to prevail; understanding and
offsetting threats; expanding and strengthening key relationships; and
expanding a competitive warfighting advantage.
In terms of the space domain, we are standing in a period of
history that is marked by challenges and opportunities much like the
Interwar Period between World Wars in the twentieth century. Just one
hundred years ago, technology advancements made the air domain
essential for overarching strategic advantage. Human's ability to
conquer the skies created entirely new security challenges that
demanded air superiority relative to strategic competitors. Today, this
Command faces strategic competitors who aim to deny space's inherent
benefits from us, our Allies, and Partners. Space, unlike the skies
over land and sea, has no physical limit and presents an expanding
security challenge that is now central to all-domain security
activities. Although Earth's orbits remain the primary focus of today's
space security concerns, we are expanding space domain awareness
capabilities to monitor for potential threats beyond the geosynchronous
orbit.
There is an urgency for our Command to advocate for delivery of new
space capabilities and capacity to retain an enduring competitive
advantage. To ensure the United States--and by extension, our Allies,
Partners, and the rest of humanity--continues to derive prosperity and
security from space, the Command postures and prepares to maximize
combat readiness, offset competitor threats to the space domain,
strengthen our relationships with Allies, Partners, international
organizations, and industry to deliver on new space capabilities.
There is also a vulnerability window communicated by our
competitors and highlighted as we watch conflict unfold in Ukraine and
Israel where missile defense and space capabilities have been tested by
the quantity and quality of missile and counterspace systems. To be
postured to meet this threat, USSPACECOM must sustain enduring
advantage over any determined adversary threatening our national
security in space. Insufficient focus and a lack of imagination to
appreciate how devastating a future conflict involving space will be is
a significant risk to all.
posturing and preparing to prevail
USSPACECOM remains focused on all our USC Title 10 and Unified
Command Plan (UCP) missions, in keeping with a clear legal basis for
this military organization to defend and secure the space domain
against continuing and immediate threats to this Nation, our Allies and
Partners. This Command upholds a moral obligation to support the rest
of the Joint Force by executing our specific mission responsibilities,
whether in, from, or to space, reflecting the complex realities of
modern conflict. We validate our readiness to conduct our UCP missions
through deliberate certifications and mission assessments. To
accomplish this, USSPACECOM will continue Joint training exercises,
further enable integration of our multi-mission sensors with commercial
and non-traditional sensors, educate Joint Warfighters in the
application of comprehensive spacepower, and facilitate diversity of
thought by leveraging our Joint workforce to increase our lethality as
Joint-minded space professionals.
A highly trained and cohesive workforce of dedicated uniformed and
civilian warfighters enables all that we do, and thus it is essential
to begin with acknowledging the incredible group of professionals
composing this organization. It is an honor to lead the 1,700 Joint
Force professionals assigned to the USSPACECOM headquarters and the
nearly 18,000 Joint Force warfighters postured worldwide to support our
efforts. This team, in partnership with the rest of the broader
national security space enterprise, is responsible for conducting
dynamic, responsible, and integrated space operations and provides
missile defense support to deter, and if necessary, prevail in
conflict.
While USSPACECOM has a unique and vital relationship with the
United States Space Force, given that both of our organizations are
focused on the space domain, we also enjoy tremendous support from the
Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as the other Combatant
Commands and Defense Support Agencies. The synergy of Joint Force
solutions is key to developing and employing combat-ready forces and
presenting integrated deterrence options to national leadership. This
synergy also underpins development of space warfighting requirements
that inform holistic and critical capabilities.
Similarly, strategic deterrence depends on Combatant Commands and
components communication and synchronization to achieve Joint Force
unified action across multi-domains. The Nexus of U.S. Special
Operations Command, U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and
USSPACECOM supports mutually supported/supporting relationships between
combatant commanders required for Joint, all-domain dominance. The
space and cyber domains, now more than ever before, are increasingly
central to any multi-domain national security approach and require new
thinking and collaboration beyond precedent.
USSPACECOM is focused on employing our combat-ready forces and
capabilities to accomplish our missions and responsibilities as
assigned in the Unified Command Plan: space operations, global sensor
management, global satellite communications management, operational
planning and support to trans-regional missile defense, and our role as
the space Joint Force provider. Excellence in these core areas will
deter aggression, ensure continued access to space, deny adversary
freedom of action in space, and protect the Joint Force from adversary
space-enabled attacks. To increase resiliency, redundancy, and
interoperability, we are building a coalition of Allies and Partners to
maintain collective advantage over strategic competitors.
understanding and offseting the threat
The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation
continue to field systems and engage in behavior that threaten U.S.,
Allied, and Partner access to space and space-based capabilities. The
Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
have demonstrated terrestrial-based, electronic warfare capabilities
that threaten friendly space-based communications and navigation
capabilities. These states' persistent actions demonstrate they are
committed to denying American and Allied forces the benefits of our
space assets. This is why USSPACECOM must ensure that we can protect
and defend our space architectures and protect the Joint Force from
space-enabled attacks.
People's Republic of China: Pacing Strategic Competitor
The PRC poses the most comprehensive and considerable challenge to
U.S. national security. Beijing has made clear it seeks to become the
preeminent power in East Asia and a major power on the world stage,
armed with a world-class military to be able to secure its sovereign
interests and decide regional affairs to the PRC's advantage. By 2030,
the PRC will, by many estimates, achieve world-class status in all but
a few space technology areas. The PRC seeks to match or surpass the
United States by 2045. The PRC is growing its military space and
counterspace capabilities at breathtaking pace to deny American and
Allied space capabilities when they so choose, while extending its
ability to conduct long-range fires improving the precision and reach,
thus the lethality, of its terrestrial forces. The modernized People's
Liberation Army (PLA) monitors military forces worldwide, including
U.S. forces. The PLA is focused on offsetting U.S. military advantages
and rapidly advancing and integrating its forces across all domains to
support its comprehensive approach to joint warfare. The PRC is using
its growing military strength to undermine U.S. alliances and security
partnerships while seeking to coerce their neighbors in the Indo-
Pacific region.
PRC Space Capabilities: Challenge to Space Superiority
The PRC are making advances in areas such as satellite meteorology,
human spaceflight, and robotic space exploration, some of which have
dual-use capability. The PRC is also aggressively pursuing advances in
military areas that are concerning. As of January 2024, the PRC's
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) satellite fleet
contained more than 359 systems, more than tripling its on-orbit
collection presence since 2018. The PRC has also dramatically increased
its ability to monitor, track, and target US and Allied forces, both
terrestrially and on orbit. Substantial improvement in PRC domestic
space launch capabilities, including nascent progress on reusable
rockets and mass production of sophisticated space systems, will lower
its cost of entry to space. PRC has a continued pattern of uncontrolled
reentries of space systems, despite their contributions to
international guidelines regarding responsible satellite disposal.
People's Liberation Army Counterspace Capabilities: Threats to Space
Architecture
The PLA understands counterspace operations to nullify U.S.,
Allied, and Partner satellites and systems must be part of their
broader strategy. The PRC openly acknowledges applying commercial and
civilian aerospace technology for military purposes. For example, the
corporate mandate of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Center
declares the intent to ensure ``military-civilian integration
development'' to strengthen the PRC military and ``secure peace with
aerospace technology'' in accordance with PRC's stated strategic
ambitions. The PRC prioritizes space and building international
partnerships that advance PRC goals, including through their Belt and
Road Initiative, to develop its space intelligence and military
capabilities.
The PRC's counterspace weapons programs seek to provide options for
destructive and nondestructive disruption of our systems in all orbits
through proliferation of jammers and the PRC's rapid fielding of new
ground-and space-based antisatellite weapons. Beijing has deployed
several satellites, at least some of which could function as a weapon,
that could pose significant risk to our own in geosynchronous orbit.
The PRC is further developing and testing hypersonic glide vehicles
along with advanced space weaponry. These capabilities are intended to
overcome U.S. traditional missile warning and ballistic missile defense
systems.
PRC International Influence: Building Spacepower
The PRC seeks to expand its influence over nascent space nations
beyond East Asia. Beijing is currently expanding its engagements with
national space programs in Algeria, Venezuela, and South Africa through
signing data sharing agreements, providing satellite manufacturing
services, installing satellite ground stations, and seeking cooperation
on the International Lunar Research Station. The PRC's space intentions
and capabilities are often obscured through its focus on dual-use
technologies, academic programs that use ambiguous research tracks and
efforts, and overlapping space activities in exploration and commerce
that can also enable the PLA's military programs and effectiveness.
Russian Federation: Acute Threat
Russia's struggles following their invasion of Ukraine should not
create a false sense of confidence that Moscow is fading in the space
domain. Russia will remain a formidable and less predictable challenge
to the United States in key areas over the next decade, while still
facing many challenges. Their losses in the Ukraine conflict will take
years to rebuild in terms of terrestrial offensive capabilities which
will likely encourage Russia to become more reliant on nuclear, cyber,
and space capabilities, including disruptive technologies and actions
they believe hold the promise to provide asymmetric pathways to achieve
their strategic goals.
Russian Space Capabilities: Challenge to Space Superiority
International sanctions and export controls have impacted Russian
space aspirations. As a result, Moscow will likely prioritize
integrating space services they deem critical to their national
security. They will continue to maintain their ISR fleet of over 87
satellites providing electro-optical imagery, missile warning, and
signals intelligence to provide warning of threats to the Russian
homeland. Their recent launches of Arctic satellites able to monitor
the Northern Sea Route provide robust all-weather and round-the-clock,
weather radar remote sensing, essential for command and control (C2) of
military and paramilitary activities, a clear national security
requirement for Russia. These capabilities can also support worldwide
military and paramilitary deployments. They are updating and improving
space launch capabilities to enhance reliability and otherwise find
ways to offset the burdens imposed by sanctions and export controls
levied by the international community. Despite impacting limited supply
chain and partnerships, Russia is finding ways to circumvent sanctions
to maintain their capacity to be aggressive and disruptive in space.
Russian Counterspace Capabilities: Threats to Space Architecture
Russia's counterspace capabilities represent real threats to the
space domain, our national security, and this Command's ability to
respond decisively to protect and defend our interests and those of our
Allies and Partners. Despite their struggles in Ukraine and economic
sanctions, Russia continues to pursue a suite of counterspace weaponry,
from electromagnetic warfare systems, including directed energy weapons
and satellite communications jammers, offensive cyberspace
capabilities, and on-orbit and ground-based anti-satellite systems that
exist for one clear purpose. These weapons are intended to disrupt,
threaten, and destroy space targets or otherwise deny freedom of action
in space. Russia views its counterspace capabilities as a means to
deter aggression from adversaries reliant on space.
Russian International Influence: Building Spacepower
Russia is collaborating with Iran and various African nations and
establishing ties to Belarus' nascent space program. Russia and the PRC
are moving forward in their work on Beijing's International Lunar
Research Station and have reiterated their plans for Lunar exploration
and research. Russia attempted and failed in their Luna-25 automated
interplanetary station mission which crashed into the Lunar South Pole
in August 2023. Russia will continue collaborating with the PRC, Iran,
and other strategic competitors in space and that collaboration might
provide effective means to compete, challenge, or threaten the United
States and its Allies and Partners.
Islamic Republic of Iran: Threatening International Order
Iran threatens U.S. interests in the space domain. Possessing the
largest ballistic missile inventory in the Middle East, Iran's strategy
of improving the accuracy, lethality, and reliability of these missiles
provides a dual purpose that includes potentially extending threats
into space itself. Their strategy includes the longstanding desire to
erode U.S. influence in the Middle East and threaten regional stability
and order. Without monitoring and appropriate action, future Iranian
space capabilities present emerging security concerns if they continue
to develop space systems that possess capabilities that expand their
offensive capabilities or otherwise challenge the safety and access to
space.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Challenge to Space Superiority
North Korea continues to develop space and ballistic missile
programs. In November 2023, they successfully launched a satellite into
orbit. Although all nations have a right to peaceful operations in
space, the launch involved ballistic missile technology, which is a
clear violation of multiple United Nations Security Council
resolutions. Pyongyang's continued intercontinental ballistic missile
launches point to a dual-use capability. Long-range missile development
threatens the United States and our Allies, and space system
developments utilizing ballistic missile technology violate United
Nations resolutions on such practices. Despite their frequent missile
and satellite program failures, North Korea has demonstrated the
ability to sustain a high number of missile launches, and has fielded
capable cyber and electronic warfare weapons that present disruptive
potential to the space domain.
Given the accelerating pace of threats to the space domain, it is
critical that USSPACECOM be an intelligence-led organization to fully
understand our changing operating environment. Our intelligence
personnel and capabilities are integrated across our headquarters and
our subordinate units, at echelon, and they ensure we are fully
integrated with all facets of the broader Intelligence Community to
avoid operational surprise and improve all our strategies, plans, and
operations. Space intelligence enables this Command to take the
initiative when necessary and exploit potential adversary
vulnerabilities. Yet USSPACECOM's military capability and capacity
alone are challenged to counter growing threats to the space domain.
To counter this increased security threat and enable integrated
deterrence so that we can continue to support all-domain operations in,
from, and through space, we also need to continue strengthening our
relationships with existing Allies and attract new Partners to defend
our freedom of action in space and for the advancement of all humanity
as we continue to be an increasingly space-dependent civilization.
expanding and strengthening key relationships
Space is rapidly becoming more contested and congested due to the
overlap of the threats described above, a quickly expanding commercial
space sector, and growing governmental and civil use of space, all made
possible by the decreasing cost to build satellites and access space.
Given these complexities, our Nation cannot secure the space domain in
isolation. Space is a team sport, and no one nation, Command, Service,
or Department can do alone all that is required to meet our objectives
there. Rather, collaboration with like-minded Allies, interagency
Partners, and commercial stakeholders is not only necessary but one of
our key asymmetric advantages.
USSPACECOM will prioritize our operations, activities, and
investments to deter and, if necessary, defeat threats against our
Nation and Allies today, while outpacing growing threats that challenge
the space domain tomorrow. Our recent work with U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command on the draft Regional Partnerships Strategy is one example of
cooperation among the Joint Force and with Allies and Partners to link
cooperation in space with regional and strategic national objectives.
USSPACECOM also continues to take advantage of National Guard
relationships through the State Partnership Program (SSP), leveraging
relationships with nearly 100 nations. Future SPP space security
cooperation plans include a multinational space exercise with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Space Center and other European Allies and
Partners.
USSPACECOM has expanded the number of our formal Allies and Partner
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) agreements to 31 nations, two
intergovernmental organizations, seven academic institutions, and over
130 commercial satellite owner-operators and service providers. The
Command also signed governmental SSA data sharing agreements with
Poland, Peru, and Qatar in fiscal year 2023. USSPACECOM signed 10
sharing agreements with commercial aerospace companies registered in
the United States, Brazil, France, India, and Poland in the same time
period. This key work will ensure we remain the partner of choice for
conveying vital space information, leading to greater domain awareness
and transparency, and furthering spaceflight safety. By providing
advanced information and services to space-faring Partners, we display
U.S. leadership in the space domain, promote transparency in the
responsible and peaceful use of space, and support the eventual
transition of civil and commercial spaceflight safety services to the
Department of Commerce (DOC).
The collaboration highlighted above enables more effective
integrated deterrence through all-domain operations. Our Combined Space
Operations enterprise currently includes Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Combined Space Operations improve coordination of space
defenses and enhance individual and collective space capabilities.
Through Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER, our standing named operation in
which we operate in space alongside our Australian, British, and
Canadian Allies, we improve mission assurance and enhance our
collective resilience. We are continually honing this cooperative and
collaborative edge through training, exercises, simulations, and
modeling to increase our collective security goals.
USSPACECOM's Exercise GLOBAL SENTINEL (GS) campaign series
continues to be the gold standard to exercise and expand key
partnerships. GS24 included representatives from 25 nations
collaborating in one central location for 2 weeks in February 2024. The
GS24 capstone modeling and simulation event employed a multinational
concept of operations focused on space domain awareness, supporting the
protection of capabilities, and promoting shared multinational
operational space security interests. Since its inception in 2014, GS
has evolved from a small-scale table-top exercise with seven nations
into an ongoing annual series. This year's series included multiple
live events during the year, wargames focused on current operations,
and the modeling and simulation capstone exercise. USSPACECOM continues
to increase interoperability with our Allies and Partners through
security cooperation, information sharing, exercises, and knowledge
curation on space security activities.
Integrating Commercial, Inter-Agency, and Academic Partners
To remain on the cutting edge of capability development,
application, and shared understanding of space as they relate to
national security interests, USSPACECOM partners with a growing team of
commercial, interagency, and academic partners. While we have
accomplished much with these partnerships, we see untapped
opportunities to continue developing and delivering with these partners
more robust and varied options to national leadership to deter
aggression and ensure stability.
USSPACECOM's Commercial Integration Center (CIC) includes ten
commercial mission partners who provide our Combined Space Operations
Center information to improve our ability to collectively defend
satellite constellations in collaborative partnerships. Information
sharing is not only a security requirement across the Department of
Defense (DOD), Allies, and Partners, but also so that all enterprises
from national to commercial can safely operate in the increasingly
congested space domain. The way forward for USSPACECOM's CIC includes
growing the number of commercial mission partners to participate in the
mutual exchange of information on threats to the space domain and
shared insights into the operations of member constellations, leading
to enhanced safety and security as we conduct space operations.
USSPACECOM's Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) effort now includes
eight commercial mission Partners in the Americas, Europe, and the
Pacific. Altogether, they provide Space Domain Awareness information to
the Joint Force, Allies, and Partner nations' warfighters. In October
2023, JCO provided early unclassified reporting on the separation of
additional objects from the newly launched, Russian COSMOS 2570
satellite. JCO coordinated with commercial sensors ahead of this launch
to track the orbital insertion. On October 30, 2023, JCO's Public
Satellite Research and Analysis team was the first to alert the rest of
the JCO to a possible separation event from COSMOS 2570. Afterward, the
separating object appeared in the public satellite catalog as OBJECT C.
In November 2023, JCO detected an object in the very early stages of
separating from OBJECT C. They were able to track and analyze this
newly separating object from commercial observations and publish it in
a notice to space operators, which later was cataloged as OBJECT D. We
must continue to buildupon this fusion of commercial and military
information to increase our understanding of actions in space.
USSPACECOM is also working closely with the DOC, whose personnel
are now observing the U.S. Space Force's Space Delta 2 to learn how we
perform Space Situational Awareness operations. This is a vital
partnership as the DOC prepares to assume from the DOD the Space
Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management missions in support
of commercial and civil customers. USSPACECOM is committed to
facilitating the seamless transfer of these missions to the DOC in the
near future because it will allow us to focus on the military-unique
aspects of Space Domain Awareness, and progress has been made toward
finalizing necessary memorandums of agreement for the transfer of data,
roles, and responsibilities between the organizations.
Tri-Seal Strategic Framework
On July 12, 2023, USSPACECOM co-signed a Commercial Space
Protection Tri-Seal Strategic Framework with the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
to better protect commercial remote space sensing assets and
information vital to national intelligence. This key partnership will
offset the efforts of our principal strategic competitors seeking to
disrupt and challenge our ability to leverage space using commercial
capabilities.
To mitigate such aggression and disruption in space, this Command
leads the coordinated effort to share threat information with NRO-
contracted commercial imagery providers and the NRO Operations Center
for space events, counterspace threats, and indications and warning.
The Tri-Seal Strategic Framework presents this organization and the DOD
with superior information sharing and collective defensive capability
with commercial space companies that have existing relationships with
this Command, the NRO and NGA. With increased space activities, new and
emergent space-faring nations, and space having become a contested,
warfighting domain, our hybrid enterprise of governmental and
commercial space systems and stakeholders represents the correct
strategy of sharing information and improving our ability to defend
commercial space for collective national security, scientific, and
commercial interests.
NASA and Human Space Flight Support Improvements: Partners in Space
USSPACECOM is the lead military support agency to the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In this capacity, we
provide human space flight support and global airlift coordination. Our
terrestrial rescue and recovery forces, provided by our Air Force
Service Component, 1st Air Force, have supported every NASA crewed
space flight since the Command's reestablishment.
Leveraging the collective strength of commercial, interagency, and
academic enterprises has been critical to USSPACECOM since its
establishment four and a half years ago. It will remain foundational to
our success moving forward and its continued growth and development
remains a key focus area for our command.
building and maintaining competitive advantage
Our principal space competitors--the PRC and Russia, along with
other aggressive nation states and proxies--seek to hold at risk free
access to space for the United States, our Allies, and our Partners.
Therefore, we must develop and field capabilities to mitigate threats
posed by space-enabled attack and by counterspace capabilities, and we
must do so in a way that promotes integrated deterrence in accordance
with the National Defense Strategy.
USSPACECOM has identified five priority requirements that are key
to delivering our Unified Command Plan responsibilities: (1) resilient
and timely operational C2; (2) integrated space fires and protection;
(3) modernized agile electronic warfare architectures; (4) enhanced
battlespace awareness for space warfare; and (5) cyber defense of space
systems. Additional important objectives include investment in
persistent and resilient intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities; communications and data transport capacity; enhanced
global sensor management tools to include integrated tasking and data
retrieval; resilient satellite C2 architecture at the tactical edge;
and, improved operational intelligence. Absent commitment to long-term
investment in these integrated requirements, we risk ceding advantage
to our principal strategic competitors in the space domain.
These five priority requirements address how this Command continues
to build and maintain a competitive advantage. These new capabilities
must deliver in a timely manner that encompasses all testing and
training requirements so that USSPACECOM possesses improved
capabilities. The prioritization of increased funding for the Space
Force and other Services to deliver the space capabilities we need to
support the Joint Force from space in the face of the growing threats
now arrayed against us, and to protect the Joint Force from space-
enabled attack, is paramount to USSPACECOM's 2027 delivery deadline.
This will enable the Command to be ready for anticipated space security
challenges and place new, critical systems into operations to provide
policymakers and national leadership the necessary options for
challenges and crises that may threaten long-term peace and prosperity.
Resilient, Timely Space Command & Control
Resilient, timely operational C2 is key to deterring and defeating
hostile action in the space and the terrestrial domains. Space C2
enables us to protect our space capabilities from the threats we now
face and protect the Joint Force from space-enabled attacks by an
adversary. Rapid and robust communication between space activities,
space assets, and partner Combatant Commands enables decisive action.
The increasingly dynamic space environment requires a resilient C2
architecture to synchronize space forces and effects for space domain
operations as well as in support of traditional terrestrial areas of
operations. Congress's continued investment in this Command, the
Services' space C2 programs, as well as the Consolidated Space
Operations Facility, addresses that need and will remain critical
moving forward.
Integrated Space Fires and Protection Capabilities
The services provided by space-based assets have become
foundational to modern life and the way the Joint Force operates. These
capabilities face rapidly increasing risk from our principal
competitors. Although conflict is not inevitable and while we remain
staunchly committed to peaceful competition and deterring conflict, it
is prudent and necessary to expand our ability to protect and defend
critical space assets. Integrated fires, across all domains,
synchronized in timing represent an increasingly foundational
capability for USSPACECOM's pivotal role in national security.
Investment in this area must be wide reaching and interweave both
defensive systems and the capability of commercial partners to achieve
mass and scale, and we must deliver and present these capabilities on a
meaningful timeline--by 2027.
Modernized, Agile Electronic Warfare Architectures
A modern and agile electronic warfare architecture is vital to
protect U.S., Allied, and commercial assets from interference or
outright attack while preventing an adversary's hostile use of space.
Investments in space electromagnetic warfare will enable the Joint
Force to protect space-based critical communications and intelligence
capabilities while presenting Joint Force commanders a wide array of
deterrence options within the space domain. Congress's continued
support of a modern suite of electromagnetic spectrum capabilities is
vital to the protection of key U.S., Allied, and Partner interests.
Enhanced Battlespace Awareness for Space Warfare
USSPACECOM increasingly relies on a near-real time, comprehensive
understanding of the congested and complex space operational
environment. Space Domain Awareness data, operational C2 automation,
and incorporation of artificial intelligence/machine learning
capabilities will allow us to better understand and outpace the threat
in our unique area of responsibility. This critical task requires more
accurate, robust, resilient, and timely Space Domain Awareness and
operational intelligence data from all interoperable sensors. This will
produce highly accurate, rapidly available detection, tracking, and
characterization of space objects, regardless of their origin. Legacy
Space Domain Awareness systems are disaggregated and lack the agility
to meet the need for increasingly dynamic tasking. Congressional
funding of programs to enhance battlespace awareness for contested
space operations is crucial to ensuring the Command can best protect
and defend our vital space assets.
Space Systems Cyber Defense
Digital superiority is key to building and maintaining our
competitive advantage for the space domain. The PRC, Russia, and other
cyber actors work tirelessly to infiltrate our defense industrial base,
academic research, mission equipment, and military networks. These
strategic competitors and actors seek to monitor and exfiltrate data,
and reduce, degrade, and deny our ability to command, control, and
communicate with on-orbit space assets and supporting ground systems.
The compromise or loss of U.S., Allied, or Partner space systems would
degrade our ability to conduct operations in space and support
operations in the terrestrial domain. Much of the digital
infrastructure for these space mission systems requires modernization.
Given the dynamic and constantly evolving nature of our adversaries'
offensive cyber capabilities, we must rapidly develop, deploy, and
maintain proactive cyber defense capabilities to effectively respond to
and deter adversarial malicious cyber actions while also outpacing them
in the cyber domain. We will continue to collaborate with the U.S.
Space Force on their plans to strengthen cyber requirements and cyber
defenses of our vital space systems, as well as working with the other
Services, U.S. Cyber Command, Combat Support Agencies, and other
government partners to deploy and integrate defensive cyber systems and
tactics to maintain safe, secure, and reliable network operations.
Increased funding for cyber experts, cybersecurity systems, and
persistent defensive cyber capabilities is critical to maintaining
dominance in the space and cyber domains.
Planning and Operational Support to Trans-Regional Missile Defense
USSPACECOM was tasked with trans-regional missile defense planning
and operational support in April 2023 via the updated Unified Command
Plan. The transfer was the culmination of a comprehensive study on the
roles, responsibilities, and authorities associated with the missile
defense enterprise and represents an alignment to the 2022 Missile
Defense Review. The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated
Missile Defense is well integrated into USSPACECOM's formation and will
help ensure the Nation approaches trans-regional missile defense in the
most effective, collaborative manner. Moving forward, development and
inclusion of multi-use or expanded sensors will increase resiliency of
this critical network, and USSPACECOM is working with the Missile
Defense Agency and the Services to bring this to fruition.
Rapid Reconstitution and Resilient Space Architecture
The trajectory of our strategic competitors' actions necessitate we
build capacity and resiliency to defend our critical space systems to
preserve freedom of action in space. A key portion of this resiliency
will be the ability to rapidly reconstitute key components when
necessary. We continue to examine the resiliency of the space
enterprise. We will identify and articulate strengths and weaknesses of
our current architecture, challenges to interoperability, and
limitations of current policy. We are examining end-user interfaces,
terrestrial systems, and communications links to orbital assets. In
collaboration with the Services, other Combatant Commands, and our
Allies and Partners, USSPACECOM is developing the requirements for a
modern, integrated space architecture capable of operating in an
increasingly contested space environment.
USSPACECOM's exercises and wargames challenge participants to
develop new ways of thinking about space operations and addressing
future crises. Our space exercise GLOBAL SENTINEL-24 involved 25
national participants, plus three observer nations and one multi-
national organization. Another USSPACECOM exercise, NIMBLE TITAN,
enhances trans-regional missile defense and stimulates international
cooperation while strengthening integrated deterrence. Twenty-five
member states and three international organizations will participate in
the capstone NIMBLE TITAN exercise for 2024.
Our operational C2 requirements begin with our ground segment,
ensuring critical operational nodes have reliable and adequate
redundant capabilities, including back-up facilities or contingency
operations sites and a mobile augmentation capability. New space
systems and programs should pursue spiral software upgrade methodology
to better protect our link segment and ensure new capabilities and
vulnerability mitigation can be implemented in a rapid and continuous
fashion. Finally, satellite development must continue including
autonomous defensive capabilities, such as auto-maneuver, system load
shed protections, and on-board electromagnetic pulse detection and
protection capabilities.
Dynamic Space Operations
On-orbit refueling, in-space assembly, modular hardware change-out,
and urgent orbital resupply would enable dynamic space operations and
change how this Command achieves and maintains space superiority.
Legacy space systems, constrained by the technological limitations of
their time, were launched to space with only the fuel and payloads they
would have for their lifetimes; thus, they have minimal operational
maneuverability, flexibility, or inherent defensive capability. Modern
systems, beginning today, must provide greater flexibility through
maneuver, upgradability, or re-supply. Dynamic space platforms purpose-
built to support space maneuver will provide far greater capability and
capacity to deter, surprise, maintain initiative, and conduct other
operations required today and in the near future. The PRC is moving
forward in this area. The urgency with which we must approach, and
appropriately fund, this critical endeavor cannot be overstated.
shaping the future for victory
Through our assigned professionals and network of key stakeholders,
USSPACECOM will continue to fulfill our vital role to protect and
defend an essential domain for maintaining national and global
security, while continuing to support the Joint Force, the Nation, and
our Allies and Partners with space capabilities. All humankind benefits
from space-enabled capabilities and resources. As we receive the new
capabilities funded by Congress, USSPACECOM will continue to ensure
integrated deterrence alongside our teammates in the Joint Force and
our expanding team of Allies and Partners, and, when directed,
decisively defeat any aggression that threatens our national security
interests in space. A keystone of our national security strategy now
rests 100 kilometers above Earth, underpinned by the assumption that we
will maintain free access to and freedom of action in a secure and
stable space domain. Our national security and our way of life depend
on our continued leadership and enduring advantage in this critical
area of responsibility. But to be clear, given the threats now arrayed
against us in space, we will not sustain the freedom of access and
action we require in space unless we are prepared to defend those
freedoms.
The delivery of essential space capabilities and capacities will
provide this Command with the ability to attain an enduring advantage
over any otherwise determined adversary aggressive enough to threaten
the stability, safety, sustainability, and security of space. We cannot
attain an enduring advantage without the rest of the Joint Force,
interagency stakeholders, our Allies and Partners, along with
commercial and academic development and collaboration. We cannot attain
an enduring advantage without recognizing the threatening aspirations
our principal strategic competitors have to hold at risk our space
interests, to include denying us the freedom to access and operate in
the space domain. Finally, we cannot attain an enduring advantage
without continued dedication, support, and initiative from our brave
military and civilian workforce, their families, and the policymakers
representing our Nation along with those of our Allies and Partners.
USSPACECOM deeply appreciates Congress's continued support to our vital
national security mission.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Whiting.
General Cotton, what force structure changes do you
anticipate in order to maintain our deterrence now that we have
a trilateral nuclear competition with Russia and China? Can you
comment on that, please?
General Cotton. Chairman, that is the dilemma that I walked
into when I took command of STRATCOM. As I said in the last
posture hearing and even at my confirmation, that was one that
I was going to jump on as soon as I took command and took the
flag.
What we have done is, along with the comments of the
Ranking Member and what we are seeing in the Strategic Posture
Commission results, we have done work internal to STRATCOM to
see what is going to be the requirements in regard to what we
need as a fighting force.
The NPR actually gives me the opportunity to do just that.
So I am staying within the confines of the Administration. When
the NPR says what we want to have is a triad, I absolutely
agree with that notion that we must maintain a triad. I
absolutely agree that there is now time for us to look to see
what do we do with the program of record that we currently have
to ensure that I can cover not only one nuclear adversary but
two.
So within all legs of the triad we are having that
conversation right now, and there are actually studies that are
going on in which my teammates are part of at STRATCOM within
the Department of Defense that goes after looking at the
recommendations that the Strategic Posture Commission, that
validates many of the notions that STRATCOM came up with even
before the release of the Posture Commission.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. General Whiting, you reached full
operational capability in December, which is welcome news.
Congratulations. However, the question is adequate readiness
posture to support your operational capabilities. They are two
different topics. Are there particular areas that the Committee
should be aware of where readiness must be enhanced?
General Whiting. Senator, thank you for the question. Yes,
my predecessor, General Jim Dickinson declared full operational
capability, as you noted, and that was really to say that our
headquarters now can function as the other combatant commands
and execute our primary responsibilities as laid out in Title
10 and in the Unified Command Plan.
But as I noted in the opening statement, our forces today
are optimized for a benign space environment. The systems were
either built, or the requirements were largely laid down during
a time when we didn't face the threats we now see. So now we
really have to focus on making sure we have the systems to
protect and defend our existing architectures, even as we make
our current architectures more resilient, and that we have the
systems the protect the Joint Force from the space-enabling
capabilities we now see the PRC developing, for example. Then
we have to have the testing capabilities to assure us those new
systems will work, and the training capabilities so our
personnel have the reps and sets, if you will, to be ready to
go.
So that is really where we need to focus is on continuing
to deliver capability to allow us to operate in the contested
domain we now find ourselves in.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. General Cotton, the Sentinel
program is encountering difficulties. The Columbia program is
slowing down rather than speeding up. We have, I think, some
good news with the B-21. But the basic mission is to maintain a
triad, not something less.
Can you comment, particularly with respect to the Sentinel
program, in terms of what we have to do at this juncture? I
know they are still evaluating it.
General Cotton. Chairman, thank you for the question. In
regard to Sentinel and where it stands with Nunn-McCurdy, I
think I will answer it this way. There is no change in the
requirements that I currently on the modernization of all three
legs of the triad. That absolutely has to be done. I think what
is really important for folks to understand is I think I am
probably the only combatant command that can't have a gap in my
capabilities, because a gap in my capabilities, credibility as
well as safe, secure, and effective weapons systems, is key and
foundational to deterrence.
So as you talk about all three legs going into potential
delays we must ensure that we never have a gap in the
capabilities amongst those three legs of the triad, and that is
what I look and study every single day to ensure that we don't
create a gap in that mission set, whether it is land, sea, or
the air leg.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General Cotton. Senator Wicker,
please.
Senator Wicker. Well, let's just followup on that with
regard to the triad, General Cotton, and I appreciate you
meeting with us earlier to discuss this.
So we have got the land-based and the air-based. Let's talk
about sea-based, and your testimony points out that it involves
the Ohio-class SSBN fleet, right, and the Trident II D5
strategic weapon system, SWS. Are we where we need to be on
that?
General Cotton. So all three legs of the triad are past
system lives. The good news is the men and women that are
maintaining those systems are doing an incredible job to do
that. The problem we face, and the problem that I have to
encounter every single day with legacy systems is to ensure
that I have the required numbers of SSBNs that are available as
well as the required number of weapons that are available for
the SSBN fleet.
As we make the transition to the Columbia-class, as I
mentioned to the Chairman, what is going to be incredibly
important, Senator, is that we ensure that there is no gap
between the transition of the Ohio-class weapon system to the
Columbia-class weapon system.
Senator Wicker. Well, yes, and so at least with regard to
this there is no feeling in your mind that we can divest so we
can later invest. That is nonsense when it comes to what you
are talking about.
General Cotton. That is correct. That is why I make that
statement on ensuring that I don't create a gap as we do the
transition from legacy to a modernized system. I will always
have to be able to cover down a requirement with the legacy
systems----
Senator Wicker. On page 11 of your testimony, ``Despite the
fleet's accomplishments and its ability to achieve the mission
today it faces continuous sustainment challenges that could
impact its availability until fully replaced by the Columbia-
class in 2042.'' Are we asking for enough resources for you to
get where you need to get on time?
General Cotton. I don't know that resources is necessarily
the issue here. I think what I really see is the ability for
the industrial base to be able to produce and not drive the
gaps. So as we look to modernize systems----
Senator Wicker. To the extent that we are proposing to
appropriate some $3.4 billion extra for submarine industrial
base, that will be helpful, will it not?
General Cotton. It will be helpful, absolutely, sir, on the
modernization.
Now, to your point, we also need to ensure that the legacy
systems have the sustainability that is available to them so I
can maintain the legacy systems as well until the new systems
arrive.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Thank you very much. Serious
challenges in your bailiwick, I would say.
General Whiting, you talk about a vulnerability window on
page 3 of your testimony. ``There is a vulnerability window
communicated by our competitors and highlighted as we watch
conflict unfold in Ukraine and Israel.'' What are we learning
there, and state for our audience what the vulnerability window
is.
General Whiting. Ranking Member, the vulnerability window
is the fact that our competitors, PRC and Russia, have invested
in counterspace capabilities, having studied us for decades, to
hold at risk our ability to fight the way we would like. Now we
have to make our current space capabilities, that provide
satellite communications, positioning navigation and timing,
missile warning, those kinds of functions, we have to make them
more resilient against those threats and provide protect-and-
defend capability to help protect them.
Those investments have been made, but we need to make sure
those programs deliver and that we continue to invest to assure
that we can support the Joint Force with those kind of
capabilities in the face of these threats.
Senator Wicker. Until they are delivered there is a window
of vulnerability.
General Whiting. That is correct, Ranking Member.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Are the requestors asking for enough
resources to address this vulnerability window?
General Whiting. Senator, I think we have laid out all of
the requirements that we need, and we know the programs that we
need, and now we need to make sure those are delivering on time
and pulling them as much to the left as we can.
Senator Wicker. They need to be pulled to the left.
General Whiting. Yes, sir. I would like to have all the
capability I could----
Senator Wicker. Explain to people who aren't accustomed to
Washington-ese what ``pulling it to the left'' means?
General Whiting. Senator, that means to deliver it even
earlier than we expect.
Senator Wicker. That is a very important need, is it not?
General Whiting. Sir, I would like to have as much
capability as I could right now. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our
witnesses.
General Cotton, in your posture statement you mention that
continued congressional support is critical to overhauling the
sub industrial base to advance the Navy's shipbuilding efforts,
and you also noted that the execution of 1+2 submarine build
plan is a national imperative, following up on Senator Wicker's
questions. I completely agree with this, especially given the
additional commitments we have now taken on with AUKUS Pillar
1. How critical are the submarine industrial base investments
like those that we included in the supplemental to ensuring
that the Columbia-class submarines are delivered on time?
General Cotton. Thank you for the question, Senator. Kaine,
and I would like to say thank you to--I know there was a SASC
hearing even yesterday in regards, and many of the Members that
are before us today were part of that. So thank you for the
support in addressing the industrial base problem, and using
the Northeast, it is a wicket problem.
I do not have capacity to lose one leg of the triad, and
the SSBN and the SLBN weapon system is critical to the triad
and my operational plans and the forces that I must present to
the commander in chief, if warranted. Critical.
So as I would state for the land-based leg as well as the
air leg, absolutely critical that we continue to press and
ensure, just like my colleague said, you know, if we can get
things earlier that would be incredibly advantageous to us as a
fighting force.
Senator Kaine. We did have a hearing yesterday on manpower
issues generally, and when you were asked the question by
Senator Wicker about whether you needed more resources and you
said it is not a resource problem my colleague here said, ``It
is a welder problem.'' I mean, there is a manpower problem, and
we are experiencing it, Australia is experiencing it, the U.K.
is experiencing it. So we are going to have to be very, very
creative in addressing this manpower issue if we are going to
maintain the pace that you need to keep the triad intact and
effective.
You talked, General Cotton, in your testimony here about
the four allies, principally Russia and the PRC, but also in
the nuclear space, Iran and North Korea, and then you said,
``and the growing relationships between these four nations.''
Do you see those relationships growing in ways that really
impact the STRATCOM domain, or are there growing activities in
concert more in other military demands?
General Cotton. Senator, no. I see it in my domain as well
because remember, part of my portfolio is strategic deterrence.
That includes nuclear deterrence. But eve in the nuclear
deterrence space, let's just have a conversation in regard to
the relationship that we see. That transactional relationship
between Russia and the DPRK has manifested itself in different
ways here over the past 8 months.
So we are looking at that differently on what that
relationship is actually--you know, what does DPRK gain with
that new relationship that they have with Russia, as an
example.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. General Whiting, in your written
testimony you highlighted collaboration with allies,
interagency partners, and commercial stakeholders as a key
asymmetric advantage that we have in space. I was at Wallops
Island recently and I had a great visit with NASA, the NRO, and
the Navy, and a private commercial provider, Rocket Lab, to
discuss government capabilities in this area.
How are you thinking about the importance of collaboration
with the commercial space industry?
General Whiting. Senator, thank you for the question. I
think U.S. commercial space industry is not just an advantage
in space. It is an advantage for this Nation, period, and it is
an advantage that is widening over our competitors. So we
absolutely need to continue to partner with U.S. commercial
space industry to leverage the cost curves that they are on, to
leverage the speed at which they are operating, to take
advantage of as much of that capability as we can.
The Space Command is partnered with the Space Force as they
look at new ways of contracting with commercial industry such
as the Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve that they are
looking to start next year, and we are very excited about those
opportunities.
Senator Kaine. I will just offer this question for the
record, but if in the course of us working on the NDAA this
year there are any policies that you think we should embrace in
the NDAA that would enhance our ability to collaborate in the
ways you described we would love to hear that from you.
With that I will hand it back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine. Senator
Fisher, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last October the
bipartisan, bicameral congressional Commission on the Strategic
Posture of the United States released their final report on
America's strategic posture. Its findings were sobering. We
face two major nuclear adversaries for the first time in
history, and we are woefully underprepared to address this
future threat environment.
In their report, the commissioners also unanimously
endorsed 81 recommendations. If we can act upon most of these
the United States should retain the capability and the capacity
to maintain a safe, reliable, effective, and credible nuclear
deterrent throughout the next several decades. Over the coming
months I am going to be working with my colleagues on this
Committee to include many of these recommendations in fiscal
year 2025 NDAA.
General Cotton, I appreciate our earlier conversations
about the Strategic Posture Commission's report, and your very
careful review and consideration of their findings and
recommendations. Do you agree with the commissioners' statement
that, quote, ``The nuclear force modernization programs of
record is absolutely essential, although not sufficient to meet
the new threats posed by Russia and China, and that the
elements of the programs of record should be completed on time,
expedited wherever possible, and expanded, as needed''?
General Cotton. I do, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Can you please provide the Committee with
your views on which of those commissioners' recommendations you
think are the most important or that we should be prioritizing?
General Cotton. Thank you for the question, Senator
Fischer. You know, I was probably one of the first to receive
the outbrief from Honorable Creedon and Senator Kyl when it
came to the results of the Commission, and it validated many of
the things that we were looking inhouse and Strategic Command
in regard to what do we do with the current arsenal and the
stockpile.
I have memorized what I would consider pages 48 and 49 of
the Commission, which has the 81 recommendations. Of those, I
have prioritized what I think should be the things that we get
after first. I do believe that we need to take serious
consideration in seeing what uploading and re-MIRV-ing the ICBM
looks like and what does it take to potentially do that. I do
believe that we need to have a conversation in regard to how do
we have--because part of that report also says the importance
of having a credible and effective conventional force.
Part of that is looking at and ensuring that we have the
right long-range standoff conventional weapons as well, that
can be placed on a bomber, as an example. Then the look at what
does all legs of the triad look like in regard to capacity, and
how can you expand capacity, and how do you build the
modernized force that has modularity in where we can always
keep pace, as opposed to the current system that we have, that
it is really hard to do that.
Senator Fischer. You know, Senator King and I often refer
to NC3 as the fourth leg of our nuclear triad, and the
President's ability to command, control, and communicate with
our nuclear forces, that is essential in maintaining that
credible nuclear deterrent that we must have. If NC3 fails then
the deterrent fails.
We have previously discussed, General, the importance of
moving forward quickly with NC3 modernization and building out
that roadmap with a clear and achievable, near-and long-term
goals, and I appreciate you briefing our subcommittee on that
earlier this week about your plan. But in this setting, can you
please share with the Committee how STRATCOM is working with
the services, with the Under Secretaries of Acquisition and
Sustainment and Research and Engineering to integrate new
technologies and new systems into that NC3 architecture?
General Cotton. Senator, I would love to. One of the things
that was first on the agenda for us was to ensure that as we
articulate the modernization of the NC3 force that we look at
it in different bins. The first thing we must do, to your
point, is ensure that the NC3 system that is currently
available to the President of the United States and to
decisionmakers of the United States has the ability to fight
through. So we want to make sure that we look at systems today
and ensure that we are taking care of systems today.
The other piece that we wanted to make sure that we did is
look at the midterm, and to your point we have collaborated--
and thank you for hosting us to present that, you and Senator
King, for allowing us present that to the subcommittee--and
show the relationship that I have with ANS, with our
acquisition and sustainment, Dr. LaPlante. The increased
relationship that I have with R&E, Dr. Heidi Shyu, that was
actually missing prior, and then the relationship that I have
with our CIO, Mr. John Sherman. Because of that we are able to
coalesce and be able to come up with a plan that is executable.
We were able to brief that to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
last summer, in which the service components were also in the
room, and now they have measured milestones to grade themselves
against, where that was missing in the past.
We still have a lot of work to go, Senator, but I am
pleased with the work that we have done so far.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fisher. Senator King,
please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When we think about
what is going on here in this room, this hearing is undoubtedly
being watched in real time in Moscow and Beijing. General
Cotton, the focus of this hearing will naturally be on gaps and
work that is under progress and what the problems are, but I
want you to restate what you stated in your opening testimony
for the benefit of our audience far away. You are ready to
fight tonight with an awesome response to anyone who attacks
this country. Is that correct?
General Cotton. The men and women that represent United
States Strategic Command are ready to defend if a strategic
deterrence failure happens, tonight. We are ready today.
Senator King. The capacity of the triad right now is at an
actionable level. I don't want anybody to get the impression
that we are somehow crippled in terms of our nuclear deterrent.
You have the forces you need to defend the country and also to
impose unthinkable costs on a potential adversary. Isn't that
correct?
General Cotton. I do.
Senator King. Thank you. One of the problems on the budget
that we have here, that has always surprised me, we don't have
a capital budget. Our budget of the U.S. Government is a cash-
flow budget, and really the recapitalization of the nuclear
triad is a capital investment. We are talking 40-and 50-year
assets, and so one of the problems we are facing in our budget
is it all comes out--it looks like it is in the defense budget,
but I call it the ``pig in the python.'' There is this bulge of
nuclear modernization that really should be considered capital
investment.
So I think that is important for people to realize when you
look at the defense budget there is a piece of it that is
really something that probably should have been done over the
past 30 years that we are trying to do in a hurry. Is that your
reading, General?
General Cotton. It is, sir. You know, the way I like to
describe it is I am responsible for maintaining, and the
components under me are responsible for maintaining national
systems on behalf of the President of the United States.
Senator King. Thank you. General Whiting, we have the best
space capability, and have for many, many years. That is the
good news. The bad news is the dependency that we have on
space, which makes us asymmetrically vulnerable in terms of the
relationship with these potential adversaries.
What are we doing to think about alternatives to space? For
example, I understand recently they are now teaching celestial
navigation at Annapolis again. We need to be thinking about how
do we reduce our reliance on space assets, given the
development of anti-space capabilities of our adversaries. Talk
to me about how we mitigate this risk.
General Whiting. Senator, thank you for the question. We
have gone to space because of the advantages it brings us. It
allows us to operate globally, untethered to terrestrial
network.
Senator King. We were unopposed for years.
General Whiting. Yes, sir, and that gives us a unique
advantage. But to your point--and I know all the services are
thinking about this--what do we do when our primary capability
may not be available? Now in Space Command it is our job to
make sure that that doesn't happen, but no doubt the services
have to train what their secondary plans are, and all of them
have those plans in place, and to our point are training those
to their people.
Several of services, such as the Army, the Navy, and the
Marines, also have relatively small but dedicated cadres of
space personnel to help their commanders understand the
benefits and the vulnerabilities of space so they can
understand when those times might be that they would have to go
to those secondary or tertiary plans.
Senator King. Well, now I am going to talk about those gaps
that I mentioned at the beginning, that I don't want to
overemphasize. But you have partial responsibility for missile
defense. It bothers me that we have been very slow on the issue
of directed energy. We are using $5 million missiles to knock
down $200,000 or $300,000 drones. This should be a task for
directed energy. I hope that is part of missile defense,
missile awareness, and all branches, not just you necessarily,
but all the branches should be working on two things: missile
defense and hypersonic defense. Those are strategic game-
chambers that I think we have been slow to develop.
Is directed energy going to be part of the future of
missile defense?
General Whiting. Sir, just 2 weeks ago I was in Huntsville,
meeting with the Missile Defense Agency, and we talked about
directed energy, and I know that is something they are looking
at, and I agree with you, Senator. I think it needs to be part
of our future.
Senator King. I want more than looking at. I want
development, and soon. I think we should be having a capability
in the Red Sea right now. This is an opportunity to use that
capacity.
Finally I just want to associate myself with my co-chair,
Senator Fischer, on NC3. That is part of the triad. I
congratulate you on the work that you are doing, but urge you
to accelerate and continue. Because the whole idea there, the
cornerstone of the defense of this country is deterrence, and
should the adversary detect a weakness in our deterrence--and
NC3 is the glue that holds it all together--we are vulnerable.
So as I say, I congratulate you, but want to prod you to keep
going earnestly, and accelerate the progress on that issue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. General Cotton and General Whiting,
welcome. Thank you for your testimony this morning, and I
extend my thanks to all the men and women who serve under your
commands.
General Cotton, Since Xi Jinping took power a little over a
decade ago China's nuclear arsenal has increased by more than
100 percent. By 2035, the Department anticipates that China's
nuclear arsenal will have increased by 500 percent. How would
you characterize the threat posed to the United States by
China's rapidly growing nuclear arsenal?
General Cotton. As my predecessor said--and I love using
his terminology because it is--the breakout that we saw and the
advancements and how quickly the advancement that we are seeing
in China to rapidly create a viable triad is breathtaking.
Senator Cotton. Unprecedented, the pace at which they are
expanding?
General Cotton. It is.
Senator Cotton. Okay, and your statement says that they
have a triad today. Is that correct?
General Cotton. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Cotton. It may not be the most cutting edge
versions of it, the bombers may require standoff weapons, but
they are working on stealth bombers. Is that correct?
General Cotton. That is correct.
Senator Cotton. Do you think that a nation that multiplies
its nuclear arsenal as rapidly as China does, especially when
governed by communists, is doing so with peaceful intent?
General Cotton. I think the minimum deterrent strategy that
we used to hear that China links themselves with as far as
their strategic policy, I find hard to believe that that can
still be a policy with the way that they are building out their
arsenal.
Senator Cotton. For years China had pursued so-called
minimum deterrence, but they also are well-known for a policy
called ``hide and bide''--hide your strength and bide your
time. Do you think it is fair to say that China is heeding the
``hide and bide'' strategy now?
General Cotton. Senator, they are showing us their
capability and shown us how fast they can grow.
Senator Cotton. They also have had a long declared, at
least formal, policy of ``no first use.'' Does it make sense to
expand your nuclear program by 500 percent and retain a ``no
first use'' policy?
General Cotton. I will go back to using that as the opening
for a minimum deterrent strategy. That probably is in
alignment. But what we are seeing, probably not so much.
Senator Cotton. Pretty big investment of national resources
to expand your nuclear weapons by so much if you are planning
to keep a ``no first use'' policy, wouldn't you say?
General Cotton. Even though we haven't heard them say that,
you are absolutely correct.
Senator Cotton. No shock everyone to hear that Chinese
communists have a history of lying, not just about their
nuclear weapons. The Tibetans would probably have something to
say about that.
Let's look at what we are doing to counteract this threat.
Well first, actually, let's stay on the threat.
How does China's nuclear arsenal compare to ours today?
General Cotton. Today we are still superior in there, but
like I said, I think the reality is we are going to have to
continue to modernize our current systems. We are superior to
them today.
Senator Cotton. Today, yes. If China continues on the pace
in which the Department projects, by 2035 will they have
achieved parity with the United States?
General Cotton. In the realm of their land-based systems,
yes.
Senator Cotton. Okay, and what if you combined the total
forces of China and Russia by 2035. Would those two countries
combined have nuclear overmatch against the United States on
the current pace?
General Cotton. Well, the weapons count would be larger
than our weapons count.
Senator Cotton. Okay. What we are doing. Is the B-21 moving
quickly enough to meet your future deterrence requirements?
General Cotton. The limited production rate of the B-21 is
the only thing that I wish we could do a little quicker. The
fact that that is an incredible sixth-generation platform, all
indications are that that weapon system is moving along at a
great pace as far as delivery. The ability for production and
the number of products, as a warfighter obviously I would love
to have more----
Senator Cotton. It would be nice to have more than 100.
General Cotton. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Final topic. Let's look at a, I guess
you would call it a first-generation aircraft, the B-52. I
think it is 79 years old now.
General Cotton. Seventy.
Senator Cotton. Seventy. All right. Almost as old as some
Senators. But, you know, we often hear criticism and like,
``Well, we are flying aircraft that are older than General
Cotton. We are flying aircraft that started when these pilots'
grandparents were flying it.'' I kind of subscribe to if it
ain't broke, don't fix it philosophy. It can't go into denied
environment, but once air defenses have been reduced, and with
extended-range standoff weapons it is highly effective.
Why is it critical that the Air Force also re-engine the B-
52 for your deterrence needs?
General Cotton. Senator Cotton, thank you for that
question. Surface is absolutely an imperative as part of the
nuclear modernization. As you mentioned, yes, it gets picked on
quite a bit on its age, but as we look at what the capacity and
what the capability is of that weapon system, that platform, it
is amazing. What that will be able to do for us--and I said
earlier--we need to think about the ability for it carry LRSO.
It is the platform that will LRSO. It is the platform that has
a lot of mass as far as capability. I want it to be able to
have a long-range strike standoff capability even greater than
it has today.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. It is old, but if it is well
maintained and modernized, it seems to me that it is still a
vital part of our triad.
General Cotton. You are absolutely correct, Senator.
Senator Cotton. A lot of your troopers would probably love
to drive a Chevy Belair or a Ford Thunderbird from the 1950's,
as well.
General Cotton. Well, I call it a restomod, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Warren,
please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So Strategic
Command is responsible for strategic deterrence including our
nuclear weapons. We were already planning to spend $2 trillion
to modernize and maintain those weapons over the next 30 years.
Now we are learning that the cost for those programs is going
to be even higher than we anticipated.
General Cotton, I know that you are not responsible for
managing these programs, but we turn to your command for your
best military advice on what these programs will mean for our
national security. General Cotton, do you agree that decisions
about how to build our nuclear posture should be based on the
most accurate information we have at the time?
General Cotton. Senator, can you rephrase--I don't quite
understand what you are saying.
Senator Warren. I know. It sounds so easy. The point is
should we base our decisions based on the most accurate
information we have got when we are making the decision.
General Cotton. Absolutely.
Senator Warren. Okay, good, because DOD did not do that for
the Sentinel program, which will replace all land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Air Force has already
concluded that the basic assumptions for the program's cost
estimates, quote, ``weren't particularly valid.''
When I requested that DOD contract with a respected group
of outside experts in 2021, to determine the technical
feasibility of extending the Minuteman III missile program
instead of buying expensive new weapons, I was told that they
didn't have contract authority to do so. That was not true.
They just didn't want an honest assessment of the real risks of
Sentinel.
Since then the cost of the program has soared. We initially
thought the price for Sentinel would be about $95 billion. Now
the Air Force reports that it will be $132 billion, nearly 40
percent more. By law, that kind of increase triggers a
mandatory review of the program's viability.
Now I am glad that this review is happening, but we need
independent experts, people who will ask hard questions. We
need to ask about the Sentinel program, taking a look as well.
General Cotton, would you oppose an outside review of the
Sentinel program if it helps enhance our national security?
General Cotton. Senator Warren, I agree with the previous
assessments that were done with the last three Administrations
in regard to where we are on the replacement of the Minuteman
program. As I said earlier, in my opening comments, what I
cannot endure as a combatant commander that has to provide COAs
to the commander in chief is I cannot endure having a gap or a
drop in the reliability of a current platform that we currently
have that is part of the triad.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that. What I am talking about
here is I want to make sure that what we are going to be
replacing it with has been fully vetted and is the right
direction for us to go.
You know, even before this latest cost breach there were
bright, blinking warnings that this program was not on track.
The Air Force's aggressive schedule meant they were relying on
immature technology, which the GAO warned at the time created
additional risks of cost increases and schedule delays.
Now best practices for budgeting these types of complex
programs is to develop what is called an integrated master
schedule, an analysis that is going to break down the project
into steps, resources, and budget needed to complete it, sort
of Budgeting 101. Sentinel did not have that.
General Cotton, you have warned that the complexity of the
Sentinel program--I am quoting you here--``will challenge Air
Force and industry partners in ways not seen for a
generation.'' So let me ask, do you think it is important to
have basic program management guardrails in place to help us
prevent delays and cost overruns?''
General Cotton. Senator, the rest of the statement was--you
are absolutely right because I have said it numerous times,
that that is going to be a mega project that we haven't seen
since actually the onset of the Minuteman III in placement in
the early 1960's.
You know, I am a taxpayer as well, and I want to ensure
that, one, I have a weapons system that can deliver the
capabilities that I need to deliver. I also need to make sure
that we don't create a larger gap in having assessments that
would drive us to now question one leg of the triad in regard
of how it can produce or have forces go to it.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that, General, but we have got
to have a plan here that is actually going to work. We can't
just keep burning money and saying at some point we hope we are
going to be able to deliver this thing. I am very concerned
that Pentagon officials are already saying--they are already
saying--quote, they ``will make the trades it takes to keep the
Sentinel program funded, analysis be damned.''
I will be watching closely to see if the DOD takes this
review that is required now by law because of the cost
overruns, I will be looking to see if they take this review
seriously or if it is just another paperwork exercise to
justify throwing more money at more expensive nuclear programs.
Thank you, General.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Rounds,
please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, let
me just say to both of you thank you for your service to our
country and to your teams as well. Today we are talking about
some of the most strategic weapons systems that our country
has, and while our conventional forces are absolutely critical,
our conventional forces are only effective because we have the
nuclear deterrence in our strategic weapons systems to support
them.
General Whiting, China and Russia both understand how vital
our space capabilities are to the Joint Force, and they have
been developing capabilities to counter our space assets for
years. Are we currently postured to win a conflict that begins
in or extends into space? I mean, when we take a look at this
right now--and I really appreciated Senator King's comments
with regard to the fact that we are ready to fight tonight--but
can we win that battle, and what about 5 and 10 years from now
on the current trajectories?
General Whiting. Senator, thank you for the question. Today
I am completely clear in saying we do have the world's best
military space capabilities. I will use the same word that
General Cotton used when we look at what China and Russia are
doing, particularly building with their counterspace weapons.
They are moving breathtakingly fast.
We must ensure that the investments that have been made--
and we thank the Congress for those investments--those programs
continue to execute and that we continue to invest to make sure
that we keep pace with that breathtaking pace.
Senator Rounds. Part of that, I suspect, you had provided,
and you will provide, an unfunded priorities list that will
likely be sent to Congress over the next month or so. If we
were to fully fund that UPL, that unfunded priorities list, how
would that impact your readiness in the near term?
General Whiting. Yes, sir. The priorities that I expect
will be on our unfunded priorities list are about improving our
posture for the contested domain and to move at the pace, and
ahead of the pace that Russia and China are moving. So that
will give us the capacity and the capabilities that we believe
we need in 3, 5, and 10 years.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Cotton, I understand
that by law the Department of Defense services cannot invest
funds into a program that is going to be retired within 5
years. This is known as a sunset provision. Do you have any
concerns about your legacy systems potentially being divested
too early? The service secretaries can offer a waiver but are
not required to, and your replacement programs will not start
to come online until the 2030's, if they are on time. If this
policy is not changed, how will it impact strategic deterrence?
General Cotton. Senator Rounds, thank you for that
question, and you are referring to Title 10 U.S. Code 2244A----
Senator Rounds. I imagine that you were waiting for that
one, or something.
General Cotton.--that talks about equipment scheduled for
retirement and dispersal. You are absolutely right because we
have been talking about it all morning. You know, you always
have plans that show overlap between legacy systems and new,
modernized systems, and as I stated earlier, when it comes to
strategic deterrence, credibility is foundational to that.
Credibility is ensuring that the transition from legacy system,
that there is no gap between a transition between a legacy
system and a modernized system.
Senator Rounds. We are talking about modernizing
significant parts of the triad right now, and there is going to
be a time period in which we are going to have to have both
systems, the legacy system and the new system, operating, and
it may be for more than 5 years. Correct?
General Cotton. That is correct, sir. So right now that law
would stipulate that you wouldn't modernize components of the
legacy system if you are within 5 years of what you initially
saw as a transition to the new system, and that could be
troublesome.
Senator Rounds. The Sentinel program is critical to our
deterrent capability. Correct?
General Cotton. A modernized replacement to the Minuteman
III system is actually foundational to the triad.
Senator Rounds. Can we afford to delay the implementation
of the Sentinel program?
General Cotton. We are late to need on all three legs of
the triad.
Senator Rounds. What do you mean by being late to need?
General Cotton. I would much rather--and I think all my
colleagues would agree--I would much rather not have to have a
transition of legacy systems to modernized systems that already
passed their service dates.
Senator Rounds. So I want to just get back in, and I know
my time is running out, but I am going to ask this. I don't
think that you necessarily had the opportunity to completely
respond to the last comments with regard to the Sentinel
program and the reason why it needs to move forward. Even if
the cost goes up and the review is completed, this not
something that we can simply sit back and take our time on.
Could you respond, please, if the Chairman would allow
that?
Chairman Reed. Please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
General Cotton. We cannot, Senator Rounds. The analysis and
assessments have been done. We need to make the decision in
regard to what we want to do as far as the modernization of a
very important leg of the triad, and that is the land leg and
the ICBM leg of the system.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Hirono,
please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is for, well,
both of you, both of the witnesses. The 2024 NDAA directs the
DOD to develop a plan for the missile defense of Hawaii and
military construction projects that will enable the timely
deployment of missile defense capabilities across all locations
in the INDOPACOM. I believe the President signed the NDAA in
December, so you have some 90 days or so to complete and
provide this plan. How is that plan coming along? For either
one of you.
General Whiting. Senator, I will take that question. Since
last year we took on unified command plan responsibility for
transregional missile defense, operation support, and planning.
Ma'am, at this time I am not familiar with where that plan is,
and if I could take that question for the record I could get
back to you with specifics on where that is.
Senator Hirono. I have been very concerned, over time,
about the missile defense of Hawaii, so I would also like you
to contemplate whether we need to mitigate any potential risks
from our near-peer competitors, as you both have discussed,
before we have this missile defense plan in place. Because as
you know, we had a major mishap in Hawaii, which led to my
ongoing concerns about missile defense of Hawaii.
For General Whiting, the 2024 NDAA required a study on the
consolidation or transfer of the space functions of the
National Guard, which must include a cost-benefit analysis for
each of the potential futures of these units. The options are
the creation of a Space National Guard, keeping the status quo,
or transferring the space functions into the Space Force.
General Whiting, what is the current role of the National
Guard in space, and how would you transfer the space functions
into the Space Force, and what would you need if that is the
finding of the study?
The reason for the study was that there was some decision
made as to what would happen to National Guard space, well, you
could call it space units. There were some decisions made
without this kind of plan or study, a cost-benefit analysis,
that would lead to the three options that I mentioned. So what
is being contemplated for the National Guard Space Force?
General Whiting. Senator, thank you for the question. From
a Space Command perspective, we very much appreciate the great
support we get from a number of states that their Guard units
have space missions, and it is vital to us that however those
options are resolved that we don't have an interruption to
those missions.
I would have to defer to the United States Space Force for
the specifics of what options are being analyzed and where they
are headed, but it is vital to us that we not have any
interruption to those missions.
Senator Hirono. As you are probably aware, we do have a
space function in the National Guard in Hawaii. These are very
skilled people. So I think we need to make sure that whatever
decisions are made based on an assessment that takes all of
these issues into consideration.
For General Whiting, previously, space was only used by the
government, but it has become the domain for new waves of
commercial satellites for broadband communications and remote
sensing. General Whiting, are DOD and U.S. Space Command
specifically and appropriately leveraging commercial space
capabilities?
General Whiting. Senator, thank you for the question. I
think U.S. commercial space industry is one of our absolute
national advantages, and we have leveraged that in the past. I
think we can find even better and more innovative ways to
leverage it going forward. U.S. commercial space industry is
moving incredibly fast. They are widening their lead in
commercial space services over other countries. We want to make
sure that we are partnered with them as tightly as possible.
Senator Hirono. What protections exist for the commercial
satellites against physical or cyber attacks?
General Whiting. Yes, ma'am. As part of my unified command
plan responsibilities I do have responsibility to protect and
defend commercial assets, as directed. So as we work with these
commercial companies we already have information-sharing
agreements with the companies that we are already contracted
with for capability. They actually sit with us at one of our
operation centers in California, at the highest levels of
intelligence, to know what those threats are, and we share that
information. Then we want to work with them as well to help
them harden their cyber infrastructure so that they are not
denied through the cyber domain, because that would impact our
ability to leverage their services.
Senator Hirono. I think that aspect of protections and the
cyber domain, I have talked with private entities where they
need to be sure that they are up on what kind of protections
they need to put in place as they work with you, to make sure
that we are all on the same page in terms of cybersecurity
issues. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Hirono. Senator
Cramer, please.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Generals, for your service. Thank you for being here, and thank
you to all of the troops under your command.
I want to get right to it because I need a little more
context on a couple of previous points. I am going to start
with you, General Cotton. In response to sort of a general
question from Senator Fischer you said something to the effect
of adequate standoff capability. Could you drill down on that a
little bit? In other words, are we short in that capacity,
particularly in the conventional weapons, and if so, do you
have a solution in mind?
General Cotton. Senator Cramer, thank you for the question.
So I can get a little more detailed in what I meant by that. I
think, as we look at who our adversaries are, I think we would
all agree that having standoff fires and long-range strike
capability will be beneficial for us against the adversary.
What I mean by that, more specifically--and this is not a
parochial statement; it is just a matter of fact--is that I
think the utilization of bombers, and being able to have a
bomber carry a long-range strike weapon, because range is
dependent on size because it is fuel capacity of the weapon,
would be very beneficial for us, as a Nation, to be able to
have that type of capability for our bomber force, not just
weapons that could be used for a myriad of weapon systems but
one that could be specifically used in a conventional sense for
the bomber that gives it incredible standoff and incredible
range.
What that does for us, that actually makes it so it doesn't
have to hit a tanker as often, as well, and actually keep the
air crew and the platform out of harm's way.
Senator Cramer. Well said. Thank you for that.
Then in response to something that Senator King used, in
his usual great illustrations, of a pig in a python, I believe
it what it was, referencing the lack of capital budgeting in
our system, the transparency of budgets is something that has
always frustrated me on this Committee, particularly as it
relates to my favorite service, the Air Force. Thank you very
much.
You referenced the role of your command as a national role.
Understandably, you are a united command. Can you flesh that
out a little bit for me as well, because I have long been
concerned that we are not adequately, I don't want to say
appropriating, but appropriating credit where credit is due and
then cost where cost is due?
General Cotton. Thank you, Senator Cramer. I think, you
know, there are a lot of times where there can be confusion,
even within a component, service component, that they are
advocating for a weapons system or a platform that is utilized
in their operational domain. It absolutely is. But when it
comes to strategic deterrence weapons and strategic deterrence
platforms I think that those are national systems.
What I mean by that is that we are doing the care and
feeding on behalf of the systems that ultimately belong--and I
have got it, all weapons systems belong to the President of the
United States. But in particular, when we talk about strategic
deterrent weapons that it is much more than the Columbia being
part of the United States Navy or the bomber, ICBM, becoming a
part of the United States Air Force. I think there is probably
room for conversation on how do we make that so we can now have
these conversations on funding.
Senator Cramer. That was therapeutic for me because if
silos within the same services are confused I feel better about
my confusion now. But thank you for that clarification.
You know, I can't look at both of you without noticing,
General Cotton, that there is a lack of space folk in your sort
of leadership chart. Can you speak to that a little bit, as I
looked at the two of you side by side, and realizing the
history of both commands.
General Cotton. Well, I will start off real quickly. As the
UCP changed we lost our space billets, if you will, and the
majority of our airmen who were space-specific. I will tell you
that my colleague here, General Whiting, does have a joint
force team that assists us.
What I am missing, though, is a space component officer,
you know, like a one-star general that is a component linkage
to the space component. My components are I have a direct
linkage with the air component, and Air Force Global Strike
Command, and I have a direct linkage with the navy component,
with the Joint Force Maritime Command. I do not have a direct
linkage.
We are in works, though. I am in works with General
Saltzman, for example, to fill that billet, because you are
also part of the NC3 meeting that we had here recently, and
what we really want to do is, you saw a lot of that was the
space layer, and I want to be able to have an expert and one
that is at a general officer level to be able to articulate the
requirements, especially when it comes to NC3, if you will, on
the space layer.
Senator Cramer. Well, and General Whiting, I talked about
the vulnerability of SATCOM, for example, to space warfare.
Generally, I am over time, but if you could elaborate a little
bit to General Cotton's point, if you would.
General Whiting. Senator, yes, it is important that we
ensure that Strategic Command has all the insights they need as
they rely on the space layer for early warning and for
protected communications. As General Cotton noted, today U.S.
Space Command provides a joint integrated space team in his
headquarters. They sit in Omaha to assist with that planning
and make sure that he has insight into what we are doing so
that we can best coordinate our plans together.
Senator Cramer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer. While I recognize
Senator Kelly I want to apologize because I did not realize you
were in the room prior to recognizing Senator Hirono. Senator
Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Okay, Mr. Chairman. I was actually about 10
feet away, so I wasn't actually at my seat.
I want to followup on what Senator Cramer was asking about,
standoff capability, General Cotton. So 2 years since Russia
invaded Ukraine we have been forced to rethink our nuclear
posture and how our own deterrence works with growing nuclear
capability of our adversaries. Russia has recently rejected a
proposal to reopen bilateral nuclear arms control talks. Their
behavior, their rhetoric, along with Chinese aggression, North
Korea's regular testing of ballistic missiles and those kinds
of capabilities, Iran increasing its supply of enriched
uranium, I mean this underscores the importance of having a
strong deterrence ourself.
The LRSO, the long-range standoff missile system that is
developed in Tucson, Arizona, at Raytheon, this is going to be
a critical feature of our future deterrence. The ability to
forward deploy this missile on U.S. bombers is a powerful
message to our allies.
So General, beyond what Senator Cramer was asking just
about standoff more broadly, can you expand on the importance
of the LRSO to our overall deterrence, and give any updates you
have on its fielding.
General Cotton. Senator Kelly, thank you for the question.
You know, when we talk about the air leg of the triad, the air
leg of the triad is composed of two mission-essential tasks
that the bombers are supposed to do in regard to what my
mission set is. That is gravity bomb deployment and release and
the ability to have a long-range standoff strike weapon. LRSO
is absolutely critical for my mission set as a long-range
standoff nuclear weapon. It will replace the ALCM that we
currently carry.
From the reports that I am receiving from the component is
that Raytheon is doing a great job in manufacturing that weapon
for us. Once again, just like everything else, you know, if I
get it sooner than later, Senator, that is good for us.
Senator Kelly. Is the IOC of this weapon, is it public or
is it something we would have to talk about downstairs?
General Cotton. I would rather have that conversation with
you downstairs, and then we can talk about that, if it is okay
with you, sir.
Senator Kelly. Beyond LRSO, what else do you think we could
be doing to deter our adversaries that we are currently not
doing?
General Cotton. Well, there was an earlier conversation on
what do we look at as far as posture and sizing of the current
triad, and what does that look like. It is in alignment with
the study results of the Posture Commission. It is also in
alignment that the work, that to be frank, that the Pentagon is
doing in response to the Posture Commission, and it is work
that we are doing in STRATCOM. I can elaborate in incredible
detail in the secure session, to let you know the work that we
are doing in that regard.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. Thank you, General.
General Whiting, a different subject here. The Space
Priorities Framework aims to secure our space industrial base,
including improving supply chains for crucial satellite
components like traveling-wave tubes and traveling-wave tube
amplifiers. In the United States here we have faced some
challenges in this area with limited domestic capabilities and
also competition from China that is often heavily subsidized.
This situation leads to supply chain risks for essential
national security and commercial satellites.
I have got an amendment to the Defense Bill to support the
development of a competitive U.S. source for these components,
and I am going to keep working on that this year.
General, do you believe it is important for the Department
of Defense to have reliable U.S. source for these critical
satellite components to ensure quality, timely delivery, and
fair pricing, and what other risks do you see from having
inadequate domestic supply chains for key satellite components?
General Whiting. Senator, thank you for the question. Yes,
I do think it is important that we have robust supply chains
from trusted sources in the United States. If we don't have
that I think the risk is that this widening lead that our
commercial space industry has created for us, that might be
stymied, and then that would give our competitors a chance to
catch up. So we want to ensure that doesn't happen.
Senator Kelly. Yes. Traveling-wave tubes and wave tube
amplifiers are kind of obscure components. Most folks have not
actually heard of them. But they are important to us
maintaining our edge in space technology. So thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, thanks to
both of you for being here. Thank you for what you do.
General Whiting, can you talk about how much dependence our
defense capabilities or our offensive capabilities are on our
satellite systems?
General Whiting. Yes, Senator. Thank you for the question.
The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines are terrestrial forces,
if you will, are sized with the implicit assumption they will
have access to space capabilities. Because of that we have been
able to reduce the number of forces that we have, and we can
now prosecute targets with much fewer assets than we would have
decades ago.
If we don't have access to those space capabilities, if
those forces do not have access to those space capabilities we
don't have the force structure that we would need to fight
without them. So that is why we have to protect and defend
these space capabilities against the threats we now see arrayed
against us.
Senator Scott. How many different satellite systems are we
dependent on?
General Whiting. Senator, I don't have a number but I can
talk to you just quickly about the capabilities. It is our
satellite communications, it is our global positioning system,
it is our intelligence systems, it is our weather systems, it
is our missile warning systems. There are a host of different
capabilities we provide from space.
Senator Scott. So if our adversary was able to demolish 10
of them, would it create much debris?
General Whiting. Almost certainly, yes, Senator.
Senator Scott. If that debris was floating out there, how
much of our satellites would be at risk because of just the
debris hitting them?
General Whiting. Senator, that is a concern, and it is why
we monitor the 45,000 trackable objects on orbit, to watch for
potential conjunctions. But we don't want to proliferate debris
on orbit, which would increase the risk to our systems.
Senator Scott. So if you were an adversary, wouldn't that
be the cheapest thing to do? If you wanted to cripple our
ability, would the cheapest thing to do is go blow up 10 or 12
of these large satellites that are out there?
General Whiting. Sir, I don't know the cost of that, but it
would certainly be incredibly reckless because it would pollute
the very domain they are probably trying to operate in
themselves, because it is indiscriminate. It impacts
potentially our satellites, their satellites, other countries'
satellites, and it would be incredibly reckless behavior.
Senator Scott. Let's take Russia's forces. So if you look
at our forces as compared to Russia's forces, how dependent are
they on the satellite systems as compared to us?
General Whiting. Senator, they are less dependent for the
reason that they are a continental power and they expect to be
able to run fiber and to do microwave shots and those kinds of
thing, and they don't have the same global type of military
that we do, so they are less dependent.
Senator Scott. How about China?
General Whiting. Sir, they have replicated, in many ways,
what we have done in space, because as they tried to push us
out from the first island chain and the second island chain in
the Pacific they have gone to space for the advantages it
brings. So in many ways they are working to replicate the
dependency that we have.
Senator Scott. So if they were able to, you know, hamper
our abilities or our satellite system--let's take China--and
they were only focused on Taiwan or Japan or, well, for sure
Korea, right? They need their satellite system to do anything
with regard to Korea, right?
General Whiting. Senator, I think China, they are getting
to the point where all of their forces are becoming space
enabled, and so I think in any conflict they would be reliant
on space capabilities.
Senator Scott. Okay. But if only the power they wanted to
project was Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and that is all they cared
about, then they probably wouldn't need their space
capabilities as much, would they?
General Whiting. Senator, I think they would need those
space capabilities because they are looking beyond those
countries and looking at the U.S., and looking at where the
U.S. would be flowing forces from, and that has required them
to go to space.
Senator Scott. Okay. How about Iran. They don't need it,
right?
General Whiting. Iran is not a space-enabled military.
Senator Scott. Do they even have the ability to have any
impact on us in space today?
General Whiting. They have not demonstrated that
capability, but certainly we are watching their space program
and their ballistic missile program very carefully, and can
only think about what they might be thinking about in the
future.
Senator Scott. What about North Korea?
General Whiting. North Korea has demonstrated an
electromagnetic warfare capability that could have impact
against our space systems, and then we are also very carefully
watching their space systems. Of course, they should not be
launching into space because of the U.N. resolutions that say
they can't use ballistic missile technology for that. Again, we
are having to keep an eye on what they might be thinking of in
the future.
Senator Scott. Our troops in Korea, they need access to
space capabilities. In North Korea they probably don't.
General Whiting. North Korea is not a space-enabled
military today.
Senator Scott. But our troops in South Korea would need it.
General Whiting. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Rosen,
please.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, and of
course Ranking Member Wicker, for holding this hearing, and I
would like to thank General Cotton and General Whiting for
testifying today and for your great service to our country.
I am going to continue on this electromagnetic spectrum, on
the operations we have, because General Cotton, in your
nomination hearing, you indicated that electromagnetic spectrum
operations are a top priority. So your forces have done amazing
work at the Joint Center for Electromagnetic Readiness at
Nellis Air Force Base in my home State of Nevada. We are very
proud of Nellis.
But even with the efforts made so far I am sure that there
is probably more work to be done. So what actions do you need
to take to ensure that the United States can deter, if needed,
and defeat threats across the electromagnetic spectrum, and how
can we help with that?
General Cotton. Senator Rosen, thank you for the question,
and thanks for acknowledging the incredible that team is doing.
I would like to highlight some of that work that that team is
doing, and that includes specifically the support to the Yukon
commander and what we are seeing in the Ukrainian efforts, as
well as the support to Israel in the fight that we are seeing
there. So that team is coming out of the blocks, doing
incredible work, so thank you for acknowledging them.
As you know, on the 26th of July last year is when we stood
up the JEC, and that is when I was given the responsibility on
EMSO. As you have heard throughout the testimony today,
electromagnetic spectrum is incredibly important for us. It is
a domain that was uncontested for us over the past 30 years.
Now that we have a fight, a potential fight with adversaries
that, one, understand that that is a domain that we rely on,
and two, have the capability to do something to counter having
dominance in that domain and spectrum, it is incredibly
important.
As the lead combatant command to ensure that we have the
proper training, the proper live, virtual, and collaborative
training techniques because as you know, some of what we want
to be able to test and train to can't be done in the live
environment. So we continue to work on how do we--I call them
reps and sets to our men and women in the armed forces--how do
we give them the reps and sets in a virtual environment that
shows all range of how they can contest that environment.
Senator Rosen. My team is going to followup with you on
that as we work on next year's NDAA, thinking about what we
need to do here. Incredibly important what we do at Nellis.
I am going to move on to reps and sets, and of course that
is modeling and simulation. We have that for space too, right?
So General Whiting, I am going to keep on Nellis here for a
bit. As you know, Space Delta 1 trains weapons officers, again
Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. These weapons officers
graduate from the pinnacle of training offered by the Space
Force to prepare guardians for what they may need, and more.
So building on what you may need, what you have now, the
ability to model and simulate, how does this prepare your
forces and what can we continue to do to give you that
simulation you need, because you may not be able to go up
there.
General Whiting. Yes. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
I know exactly the great work that happens at Nellis as I was
stationed there a decade ago as the Vice Commander of the Air
Force Warfare Center, a vital capability.
Modeling and simulation are absolutely foundational for us
in space because, as you allude to, it is expensive for us to
get there and so we can't just launch all sorts of things just
to do training, although there is an aspect of that we need to
do. But modeling and simulation allow us to do multiple
iterations of various activities and to simulate the threats
that we now see arrayed against us so that these weapons
officers have the skills that when they go back to their
operational squadrons they can share that among the crew force.
So that modeling and simulation is absolutely critical to
us, and we want to continue to grow that capability for all
space forces, because that will support Space Command as we
move forward.
Senator Rosen. Perfect. Look, we will work with you on
that, moving forward. But speaking of space I am going to
continue with you General Whiting. Considering the reported
collaboration between Iran and Russia is space activities that
could potentially challenge our U.S. interests and security,
can you elaborate a little bit on what is happening in Iran,
given Iran's progress on their ballistic missiles and space
programs. How might additional sharing between the United
States and our partners in the Middle East--we know there are
increasing challenges going on there, the emerging threats, and
particularly the Iranian threat. Can you speak to that?
General Whiting. Yes, Senator. Our relationships across the
globe with our allies and partners is truly one of our
asymmetric advantages. We have signed a number of space
situational awareness sharing agreements, as you allude to,
with over 30 countries. Three of those are in the Middle East,
and we have ongoing discussions to expand that.
But as we partner more closely with those countries in the
Middle East it helps us to have a better understanding of what
is going on in space, so that when we see potential bad actors
acting we can call out that behavior. It also builds a set of
partnerships to deny those partnerships to countries like
Russia and Iran. So those are very important for us, that we
continue to grow them, Senator.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Schmitt,
please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So I believe this
is if not certainly one of the most important committees in the
Senate, for a variety of reasons. Certainly our role in
advocating for the national defense is important. But I also
think, you know, going back home and talking to constituents
and having those conversations about what are the threats,
hearing from them, but also explaining the things that we learn
up here. So my two questions are related to that, that would be
more sort of conversational about maybe a question I would get
from somebody home that I would like both of you to address.
First, and we heard earlier, you know, as far as nuclear
modernization, the price tag of $2 trillion potentially over 30
years, a number something like that. Could both of you sort of
address--you know, I think the perception is that the United
States has, right now, all the nuclear weapons we need to blow
up the world into oblivion a thousand times over, right? So if
you were trying to explain the importance of this modernization
effort how would each one of you describe that to folks back
home, why it is important, and specifically why it is
important.
General Cotton. Senator Schmitt, I will start off, and
first of all I want to say thank you because the men and women
of Tinker Air Force Base and the work that they are doing in
regard to just the bomber campus that is being built out there
for one leg of the triad is incredibly important.
Going back to your comment, I think the way we should be
able to frame it is, one, it is not a one-for-one. So it is not
one of these conversations where we are talking about how you
have to have a one-for-one or overmatch or those type of
things. As we already know, the Russians have more weapons than
we have today, but we absolutely hold them at risk.
So the way I would describe it to people is you need to
understand, you know, it is a proposition in regard to a cost
analysis. I want to be able to deter because my adversary
understands that the risk of the taking action would fail upon
arrival for them to be able to meet their ultimate needs. So it
is a cost-benefit analysis model, if you will, and that is what
strategic deterrence truly is, and the way we use that cost-
benefit analysis is three legs of the triad.
Senator Schmitt. But as far as the modernization itself,
how would you describe why that is important, if the perception
is that we have everything we need to deter, because we can
wipe out a country off the face of the earth?
General Cotton. Because we must have the ability to have
weapons systems and platforms, a training environment, et
cetera, that the adversary--because for deterrence the
adversary always gets a vote--for the adversary to understand
that the cost-benefit of them taking action won't outweigh and
that the modernized systems can hold them at risk.
General Whiting. Senator, thank you for the question. For
space the challenge is that the American people can't look up
and see the space systems, so they don't even realize the way
it is enabling the modern way of life. I think it is important
that we remind the American people of all the great advantages
space gives us, that we are never lost anymore because of GPS,
that we can synchronize global stock markets and point of sale
and precision farming. If we lost all of that really our modern
way of life would be at risk, and that is why we have to
protect and defend those capabilities and make those
investments.
So I think it is incumbent on all of us to help the
American people understand how space truly is a part of their
life, even if they can't see it.
Senator Schmitt. For each one of you then, in your domains
here, if you could identify one thing in an unclassified
setting, of course, here, one thing that really keeps you up at
night about China's capabilities, if you wanted to explain that
threat to folks back home who maybe don't understand the
specifics, what would that be?
General Cotton. For is their capacity, capability to build
out their weapons systems and their arsenal. It is that simple,
sir.
Senator Schmitt. So the pace at which they are----
General Cotton. The pace at which they can, or the levers
that they drive or do not drive on whether they go idle or they
accelerate. They control that throttle.
General Whiting. Senator, my answer is very similar. What
is most concerning is the way China has clinically studied us
and our dependency on space and figured out exactly what they
think our architecture looks like and now are rapidly building
systems to hold that architecture at risk.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt.
Senator King. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest the simplest
answer is we want our adversaries to be scared so they don't
try anything.
Senator Schmitt. No, I agree with that. I just want to make
sure that, because we talk about the modernization, right, like
how does that fit into that discussion.
Senator King. We want them to stay scared.
Chairman Reed. Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
General Cotton, General Whiting, to both of you for being here
this morning and for your service.
Senator Kelly asked what we could be doing to deter our
adversaries, what else we could be doing to deter our
adversaries. General Cotton, I appreciated the time we spent
yesterday. One of the things we talked about was just how
critical passing the supplemental bill and getting a budget
process that is regular, that can be depended on, is to
ensuring that you can accomplish your mission. Is that correct?
General Cotton. Senator Shaheen, yes, it was great speaking
with you yesterday, and you are right. I think I would even
capture, you know, CRs, continuing resolutions for us,
especially in my platform where everything that I own is being
modernized. I think folks are quick to not realize that there
are New START programs that are embedded in these large
programs that folks will think are already underway.
I had just mentioned it to Senator Schmitt, for example,
they are building a new bomber campus for sustainment not only
of the B-52 but the B-21, moving forward. A continuing
resolution could actually perturb that. If you perturb anything
within a larger program it actually subsequently can affect the
program overall, and then we have the conversations of a
program slipping.
So yes, a stable budget, on-time budgets are incredibly
critical for us as we are baking this modernization, not only
across my portfolio but across the entire Department of Defense
portfolios.
Senator Shaheen. Can you speak to what is in the National
Security Supplemental Bill that we passed out of the Senate
that is critical to our defense industrial base and why that
matters as you are looking at rebuilding, ensuring that the
nuclear triad remains credible?
General Cotton. Yes, Senator. As we had the conversation,
embedded in that, even though the majority of that is not
necessarily part of my portfolio, but it does touch on the
industrial base, the defense industrial base, which touches all
of our portfolios, if you will, in regard of how do we
strengthen that. Because I think that is foundational for our
Nation. It is more than even a Department of Defense issue.
Senator Shaheen. One of the things that I think you alluded
to was the sort of end game that we are at with Russia in terms
of bilateral negotiations on any sort of a New START treaty or
an effort to reduce nuclear weapons. But can you talk about
Putin's recent rhetoric around using nuclear weapons and how
concerned you are about that?
General Cotton. Yes. Thank you, Senator. You know, the
conversation we had is I absolutely am a proponent of treaties,
but everyone has to play, and you have to follow the rules. So
yes, what I would love to see is China step up and want to have
a negotiation with us. Would I love to see Russia come back?
Absolutely. But I am also a realist, to understand that that
may or may not happen, so as a combatant commander my job is to
understand how do I build a force that I can present to the
President if that doesn't happen.
But to your point on what we are seeing in the rhetoric, I
think what we are seeing is the President of the Russian
Federation sees that he can use that as a coercion tool to
threaten in regard to what he has as far as a nuclear force.
Senator Shaheen. General Whiting, Starlink and other
commercial satellite ventures have been a complement to our
operations in space, but of course there have been some issues
around how those are being used, and we have to ensure that we
have the appropriate mechanisms in place to guarantee access.
So how should we be thinking about that, and what are you
doing to mitigate the risk that we might have by relying on a
commercial source for some of those services?
General Whiting. Senator, thank you for the question. I
would point to two aspects, I think, which help mitigate that
risk. number one is in all of my experience I have only known
that every company we have contracted with for satellite
communications and other space services, they have always
fulfilled their contractual obligations to us. I would expect
that going forward, and so we want to make sure we are writing
those contracts smartly on what we need and ensure that we are
getting that.
The second, Senator, I would point to the fact, for
example, in satellite communications we want a hybrid
architecture where there are some constellations we need
purpose-built for the government, exclusive use of the
government. For example, in our work in support of General
Cotton, as we provide nuclear command and control, protected
communications to assure the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and General Cotton always can communicate to their
forces, we want that to be a government-owned constellation.
But then there are other communication requirements that we
absolutely can go to commercial for.
So I think it is understanding what those highest priority,
unique military requirements are and then satisfying those
through our own systems, and then using commercial to the max
extent we can, that is how we can help mitigate risk.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I have some other
questions, but I will save those for the closed session.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Budd, please.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. Again, thank you both
for being here today.
General Whiting, your predecessor, General Dickinson, told
this Committee last March that SPACECOM is creating concepts to
further integrate space, cyber, special operations to generate
asymmetrical advantages around the globe. In a press release
from your recent visit to U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
Command it mentions that Army space professionals are operating
across multiple domains, including cyber and space, to support
warfighters, especially forward deployed special operations
forces. Can you briefly talk about the nexus between space,
cyber, and SOF?
General Whiting. Yes, Senator. Thank you for the question.
We do see it as a unique opportunity to bring together these
three capabilities to help us all three achieve our missions.
For example, there are times that using space we can create
accesses for cyber forces who then can support special
operations forces, or special operations forces, through their
unique ability to gain access to certain geographic locations,
can help us in our space mission by executing functions that
support us.
So I have spoken to the Commander of Special Operations
Command about that. As you noted, I have spoken to our Army
component about that. We also leverage the fact that our Navy
and Marine Corps components are also cyber components, so that
gives us a unique pairing there as well.
Senator Budd. Thank you for that. So it sounds like it is a
two-way street, right? I mean, just as much as space enables
SOF and the entire Joint Force, the physical access that SOF
provides also enables critical space operations. Is that
correct?
General Whiting. Senator, that is absolutely correct.
Senator Budd. Given proposed cuts to Army SOF there will be
reduced capacity to fill combatant commander requirements. So I
know that the demand for SOF is up, and that likely will
increase across geographical combatant commands. So do you
anticipate any impacts on your command's operation should those
cuts to SOF move forward over the next few years?
General Whiting. No, Senator, I don't.
Senator Budd. So it is a two-way street, but you don't see
that it will impact you if there are SOF cuts.
General Whiting. Sir, I have not been briefed on any of the
work we have been doing with Special Operations Command that
will specifically impact us.
Senator Budd. Switching gears a bit, General Whiting, last
year I asked your predecessor how he would characterize the
current resiliency of our satellite constellations,
particularly given that constellations are also being deployed
with a minimum number of satellites available, or necessary.
How would you answer that same question today, particularly
given recent revealed advance threats?
General Whiting. Senator, thank you for the question. I
would today our constellations are optimized for a benign
environment, and as we see these threats now growing we have to
now protect and defend those constellations until we develop
the next generation of resilient constellations. That work is
ongoing to deploy those next generation of resilient
capabilities, but we are still going to have to protect and
defend our current ones for years to come, and so that is why
we have to also focus on this protect-and-defend capabilities.
Senator Budd. Thank you. General Cotton, I think we can all
agree that Sentinel's delay has greatly emphasized the need to
ensure Minuteman's continued operational readiness. As such,
how important is it to conduct regular test launches of
Minuteman to demonstrate that the United States nuclear
deterrent is safe, secure, reliable, and effective?
General Cotton. Senator, thank you for the question. I
think the answer is I want to be able to have an ability to
surveil all three legs, to include the Minuteman, as well as my
bomber forces and my SLBM force as well.
Senator Budd. Thank you. General Whiting again, you have
spoken publicly about the need to maximize partnerships with
allies, partners, our interagency teammates, commercial
industry, and even academia. So why is this partnering so
crucial to our national security space capabilities?
General Whiting. Senator, all the things we have to do in
space is so much that no one department, service, command, even
country can do all the things we need to do. It is an
asymmetric advantage of ours to leverage all of these
stakeholders to get unit of effort to achieve our goals. So
that is why we want to partner as widely as we can with like-
minded countries and organizations because it maximizes our
ability to execute our mission.
Senator Budd. Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Budd. Senator
Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cotton, in
your written testimony you acknowledge the importance of the
Air Force's refueling tanking fleet, accomplishing STRATCOM's
global strike missions so we don't have to rely on intermediate
basing installations. You also highlight the Air Force's
upcoming refueler tanker acquisitions being critical to enable
simultaneous global operations, including those involving
multiple combatant commands.
So my question for you, sir, is how does a robust refueling
tanker fleet sustain STRATCOM missions, if you could elaborate
on that, and also elaborate on how the Air Force's acquisition
of the new KC-46 tankers will expand your global reach and
expand your current capabilities.
General Cotton. Senator Peters, thank you for the question.
You know, something that makes us incredibly unique as a
fighting force is we have the ability to fly the entire globe.
Even at its onset, the tanker and the bomber were both
complementary acquisitions. It gives us incredible reach. That
being said, that is why it is such a unique relationship
between the tanker force and our bomber force on my air leg,
and absolutely critical to my mission set with regard to
ensuring that we have sustainable and enough tankers to be able
to make that a requirement that can be enduring.
So I pay attention to what the availability is of the
tanker force. We have a great relationship with USTRANSCOM, and
General Jackie Van Ovost is a dear friend as well, to ensure
that there is no disconnect in the requirements.
But you are right, that can be stretched with the
requirements that the tanker force has on non-weapons system
movement, munitions, missions that don't include bombers but
includes providing forces forward, et cetera, et cetera. So we
always have to make sure that we pay attention and see that
those acquisitions, not only the nuclear triad but those
acquisition programs are on time and are in healthy, as well.
Senator Peters. I suspect the new KC-46 will probably be
around a long time. That mission is not going to go anywhere
soon, and I have told folks this could be a 50-year mission for
this aircraft. Then I was reminded the B-52s are likely to be
well in excess of 50 years. Is that an accurate statement in
regard to the KC-46?
General Cotton. Well, I don't know how long the tanker
community plans on having the KC-46, but if we use legacy as a
measure, the KC-135 has been around a long time, as well.
Senator Peters. It is. Yes, absolutely. Absolutely. General
Cotton, as you likely know, Northern Strike in Michigan is the
DOD's largest annual joint Reserve component readiness exercise
that takes place in the country. Over 7,000 servicemembers from
over 25 states and several international partners converge at
the National All-Domain Warfighting Center, which is also known
as NADWC, for critical training focused on future multi-domain
conflict.
It is one of my top priorities to ensure that Northern
Strike continues to receive robust funding to support realistic
Joint Force training with our global allies and partners. Part
of this realistic preparation for a future conflict requires
training for our armed forces to fight and win in the
electromagnetic spectrum.
What role do you see state-of-the-art training centers like
NADWC will play in preparing for this very unique
electromagnetic challenge that will likely get only more
significant?
General Cotton. Thank you for the question, Senator. I
think what is going to be key is ensuring that the participants
of those exercises are given the true challenges that they
could potentially face, and then they can drive the techniques,
tactics, and procedures, because some of it is as simple as
that, to be able to counter that threat.
I think having live, virtual, and constructive
opportunities on training venues are going to be incredibly
important, as well, understanding that probably having a live
training venue might not be feasible but having a virtual one
is. So continued support in having push for that type of
training venue would be incredibly important.
Senator Peters. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Before
recognizing Senator Mullin let me remind everyone that we will
convene immediately after this open session in a closed session
in SVC-217, and I will, at this time, pass the gavel to Senator
Shaheen, who will preside here and there.
Senator Mullin, please.
Senator Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both
for being here today.
First off I want to thank Senator Cotton for emphasizing
the importance of modernization of the B-52 fleet and keeping
it in the air, especially since all that work is being done in
Oklahoma, right at Tinker Air Force Base. Tinker will also be
the maintenance center for the new B-21s, and they are rapidly
building up the capacities and capabilities today to take on
that new mission. We are very proud of that.
General Cotton, a question for you. Oklahoma is very proud
to invest in the investments we have made to support the bomber
modernization and the maintenance at Tinker Air Force Base. Can
you speak to the benefit this brings to the leg of the triad?
General Cotton. Absolutely, Senator. It is absolutely
foundational. Tinker and the teammates that are there, Tinker
Air Force Base to support that mission leg on behalf of men and
women of Air Force Global Strike Command, that provides that
leg to me, is absolutely critical. The fact that we are
expanding and building a bomber campus, if you will, in
preparation of B-21 is going to be extremely important, but
even more so the production of the B-52J, as we go through the
commercial engine replacement program for that jet.
Senator Mullin. Thank you. In addition to the nuclear
deterrent, STRATCOM is also tasked with electronic warfare.
What is the next technological frontier for protecting our
electronic communications and weapons systems?
General Cotton. Well, sir, obviously it is protection
systems, and my colleague to the left also plays an important
role in that. But more so one of the things that we are
finding, and it was noted through both Northern Edge 21 and
Northern Edge 23 exercises that it really having adequate
training so the men and women that are put in those situations
understand that there are techniques, tactics, and procedures
that can avoid being susceptible to the interference that you
might see in that spectrum domain.
I had mentioned earlier, but the realities of us
recognizing that that domain is going to be contestant with the
peers that we have, the near peer adversaries that we have now
and being able to identify and find ways to ensure that we can
fight in that domain at our choosing is going to be incredibly
important.
Senator Mullin. General Whiting, do you want to speak about
that too?
General Whiting. Yes. Thank you, Senator. The
electromagnetic spectrum is vital to us. It is the only way to
get information back from space. That is our satellite
communications, our missile warning, our positioning navigation
and timing, so we absolutely have to ensure that we can operate
there free of hindrance, or at least be able to operate through
any hindrance that we see.
We definitely want to look to technologies that can help us
reduce that susceptibility to jamming, for example. I think
things like laser communications can help with that, and I
would like to see those investments continue, moving forward.
Senator Mullin. Currently we have a company in our state
who is working on quantum-and physics-based communications
techniques. Is that a help, a big role for you guys?
General Whiting. Senator, I think it could be. I think that
is one of those new technologies that would give us a way,
perhaps, to defeat traditional jamming techniques. I certainly
would encourage the research lab and the science and technology
community to continue to work on that and for companies to
bring mature capabilities forward in that area.
Senator Mullin. Is our defense industry capable to make
those changes? When we are working on a system that they say is
3 years, 4 years out, in some cases most of time it is 7, are
they able to pivot when new technology comes on? Because
obviously this is a growing space and a growing concern. So
there are new finds, new technology that is coming on
constantly. Are we able to pivot--and I will hold that for both
of you all--in defense to say yes, we want to start moving this
direction?
General Cotton. For us, as we are looking at modernization
programs across the portfolio what we are seeing that is
different in the way we want to do business, Senator, is
through modularity. So having the opportunity for modularity is
going to be critical for us and crucial for us, because then we
can outpace and stay ahead of the adversary.
General Whiting. Senator, I would just add that we want to
work with the companies that have existed for a long time and
help them to see the requirements and make the pivot. But also
we want to make sure we have a relationship with new startup
companies that may not be burdened by the way things have
happened in the past and can now move right to the future. We
want to make sure they have an opportunity to compete for our
requirements, and we can help move them through that ``valley
of death,'' they call it to bring successful programs forward.
Senator Mullin. Thank you guys. I will see you here in just
a minute in the SCIF. I yield back.
Senator Shaheen. [Presiding.] Thank you. Senator King, did
you have a second round that you wanted to do?
Okay. We are going to adjourn for 15 minutes so that
Senators can vote, and go into closed session in the SVC. So at
this point we will close the open session.
[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the hearing was recessed, to be
continued in closed session.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
national guard state partnership program
1. Senator Gillibrand. General Whiting, New York Air National
Guard's 222d Command & Control Squadron is a proud State Partnership
Program (SPP) partner with Brazil. Your written testimony talked about
the importance of the National Guard State Partnership Program and
plans for future SPP security cooperation. If the current space-related
Air National Guard units are moved into a single component of the Space
Force, how will that impact Space Command's ability to leverage the SPP
program for space security cooperation?
General Whiting. USSPACECOM has substantially benefited from the
enduring relationships that State Partnership Program states maintain
with their international counterparts, especially within the space
domain. Were the current space-related Air National Guard units to be
moved into a single component of the USSF, it will not change the State
of New York's SPP relationship with Brazil. USSPACECOM would work with
the USSF and other Military Services to ensure subject matter experts
are available to support space-related SPP engagements and security
cooperation activities with Brazil and other countries in the SPP.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
missile defense
2. Senator Hirono. General Whiting, the 2022 Unified Command Plan
transferred integrated missile defense responsibilities from STRATCOM
to SPACECOM and SPACECOM has undergone several reorganizations in the
last 2 years. Now that SPACECOM has responsibility for integrated
missile defense capabilities, do you anticipate needing any new
technologies?
General Whiting. The Unified Command Plan Transregional Missile
Defense (TRMD) mission encompasses 23 Missile Defense roles,
responsibilities, and authorities (RRAs) that focus primarily on TRMD
Combined and Joint coordination, capability assessments, and continuity
of TRMD operations. USSPACECOM and our functional component for
integrated missile defense (the Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense), are currently working an RRA assessment
and Concept of Operations development. We continue to pace the threat
and as new technologies become known or available, we collaborate with
the Services and the Missile Defense Agency to assess if these new
developments can improve our systems.
submarine production
3. Senator Hirono. General Cotton, there are many concerns about
the Columbia-class submarine program, including risk of cost growth in
the program, potential industrial-base challenges of building both
Columbia-class submarines and Virginia-class attack submarines at the
same time, and design delays that could jeopardize the goal of
deploying the first Columbia-class submarine in 2031. General Cotton,
how are you working with the Navy and the submarine industrial base to
help ensure the development and production of the Columbia-class
submarine, and what do you see as the biggest challenge to production?
General Cotton. The submarine industrial base remains a top concern
to the Navy and United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).
USSTRATCOM tracks program status very closely and helps influence
priority decisionmaking through established formal processes with our
Navy partners. The industrial base must be able to simultaneously
sustain existing nuclear triad and conventional forces and deliver the
future modernization programs throughout the spectrum of conflict. I am
deeply appreciative of the investment from Congress which will enable
recapitalization and rebuilding the Nation's shipyards.
4. Senator Hirono. General Cotton, are you concerned about meeting
the timeline for the first Columbia-class submarine deploying in 2030?
General Cotton. Yes. I am expecting the first hull will likely
deliver approximately 12--16 months late; however, the Navy has robust
mitigation plans in place to ensure USSTRATCOM requirements are met
during the Ohio to Columbia transition. USSTRATCOM will continue to
assess modernization delays impacting requirements and consider all
transition mitigation options to reduce my operational risk.
spacecom relationship and coordination with indopacom
5. Senator Hirono. General Whiting, in November 2022, U.S. Space
Forces, Indo-Pacific was activated to integrate space with the airborne
capabilities of Pacific Air Force. Your command is the only combatant
command that physically touches every geographic command and your
capabilities rely on systems from every service. How is the
relationship between U.S. Space Forces and INDOPACOM?
General Whiting. The USSF's component to USINDOPACOM (U.S. Space
Forces, Indo-Pacific [USSPACEFOR-INDOPAC]) has no formal relationship
to USSPACECOM. While I cannot speak for the USSF or Commander,
USINDOPACOM, my observation as Commander, USSPACECOM, is that the
relationship between USSPACEFOR-INDOPAC and the USINDOPACOM staff is
strong. Additionally, when considering the broader space relationships
in the region, I also assess that the integration of USSPACECOM's Joint
Integrated Space Team, as my liaison element to HQ USINDOPACOM,
complements the USSPACEFOR-INDOPAC and USINDOPACOM partnership,
improving the overall integration and effectiveness of space
capabilities.
6. Senator Hirono. General Whiting, is there still a plan to have a
Space Force component at every overseas combatant command and is there
a notional timeline?
General Whiting. As Commander, USSPACECOM, I cannot speak for the
USSF on its plans for allocating forces to the Combatant Commands. To
the best of my knowledge, the Chief of Space Operations continues to
plan for a USSF component supporting each of the Combatant Commands. I
would also like to add that from my observations, when working in
tandem with the USSPACECOM Joint Integrated Space Teams, my liaison
elements to the other Combatant Commands, Combatant Command-aligned
USSF components have been instrumental in improving the integration of
space capabilities into other Combatant Commands. This improves the
overall combat effectiveness of the Joint Force, and thus, I would
encourage the USSF to continue fielding components to the Combatant
Commands.
7. Senator Hirono. General Whiting, how do you balance the
competing requirements of each combatant command?
General Whiting. In accordance with the priorities described in the
National Defense Strategy and other strategic guidance documents,
USSPACECOM balances competing space-related requirements of each
Combatant Command by leveraging our Joint Integrated Space Teams, our
liaison element to each of the Combatant Commands, to integrate into
their Headquarters processes so that we fully understand what they
need, when they need it, and how USSPACECOM capabilities need to be
integrated into their operations. We then use this knowledge to
continually prioritize our space capabilities to meet the other
Combatant Commands' space-related requirements, while adhering to
policy and codified roles, responsibilities, and authorities.
inclusion of commercial satellites and the defense industrial base
8. Senator Hirono. General Whiting, previously space was only used
by the government but has become the domain for a new wave of
commercial satellites for broadband communications and remote sensing.
Are Department of Defense and SPACECOM specifically and appropriately
leveraging commercial space capabilities?
General Whiting. USSPACECOM and the DOD are using commercial space
capabilities appropriately today. The USSPACECOM staff ensures
appropriate use through its implementation of our Commercial
Integration Strategy, which is guided by DOD's Commercial Space
Integration Strategy, and which is aligned with USSF's Commercial
Integration Strategy. Both USSPACECOM and the Department specifically
leverage commercial space capabilities to provide needed capabilities
and innovations to meet specific mission requirements. The USSPACECOM
staff will continue to work within the Department to identify
innovative technological capabilities, mission needs, and threats, to
maintain appropriate use of commercial space capabilities matched to
specific warfighting requirements.
9. Senator Hirono. General Whiting, what protections exist for the
commercial satellites against physical or cyber-attacks?
General Whiting. The USSPACECOM staff has built and maintains
relationships with industry partners so that USSPACECOM can provide
those industry partners with situational awareness and threat data to
mitigate against the threat of physical, electronic warfare, or cyber
attack. We actively integrate industry partners in a collaborative
government and commercial mission-based partnership; this collaboration
occurs principally through the Commercial Integration Cell (CIC) inside
USSPACECOM's Combined Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Space Force
Base.
In the CIC, we share appropriate information at the classified
level with specific commercial partners, who then can use this
information to better defend themselves against the wide variety of
threats to which they may be vulnerable. Additionally, we integrate
industry partner assets into our prioritized Critical Asset List, the
list of friendly space assets that we are postured to defend when so
directed. At a more strategic level, the DOD and U.S. Government as a
whole increase the protection of commercial space operations by
establishing partnerships with allies, partners, and other interested
entities that agree to adhere to DOD's tenets of responsible behavior
in space.
Additionally, we coordinate with the National Security Agency
(NSA), whose Cybersecurity Collaboration Center (CCC) works with
industry and the U.S. Interagency, including with the CIC and other
commercial partners, to provide relevant threat information to the U.S.
Defense Industrial Base, operationalize NSA's unique insights on
nation-State cyber threats, jointly create mitigation guidance for
cybersecurity challenges, and secure emerging technologies. The NSA CCC
also offers a variety of no-cost cybersecurity services to industry
partners that help to drive down risk, identify and fix technical
issues, and stay ahead of adversary activities.
nuclear weapon production and the defense industrial base
10. Senator Hirono. General Cotton, the nuclear weapon productions
schedules are highly dependent on the availability of suitable
facilities, but many are outdated or obsolete. How are the Department
of Defense and SPACECOM addressing the issues with production
infrastructure and the defense industrial base?
General Cotton. Today's infrastructure will be challenged to meet
the Program of Record (POR) and lacks residual capacity and
capabilities to respond to the evolving geopolitical environment and/or
technical issues in the stockpile. While I support National Nuclear
Security Administration's (NNSA) prioritization of plutonium pit
production and uranium manufacturing within the infrastructure POR, we
cannot lose sight of the fact there are other shortfalls across the
enterprise that must also be addressed to deliver the needed POR.
Delivering these capabilities and capacities will be expensive, but the
investments are necessary to sustain a credible deterrent for the
Nation.
Defer to Department of Energy (DOE)/NNSA for specifics on nuclear
weapons production facilities issues.
11. Senator Hirono. General Cotton, are there any opportunities for
non-traditional companies to help contribute to the production and
infrastructure shortfalls?
General Cotton. I believe we need to consider a ``business model''
for the enterprise and stockpile designs that emphasizes continuous
improvement of weapons over their lifetime to ensure we can pace
adversary threats and evolve weapon capabilities to achieve objectives.
Going forward, placing a consistent demand signal on industry and the
nuclear enterprise will lead to constant production, which will in turn
prevent us from having to relearn these processes every 40 years.
Defer to DOE/NNSA for specifics on nuclear weapons production and
facilities issues.
12. Senator Hirono. General Cotton, how are you working with
civilian companies to develop the ability for their capabilities to
integrate with existing Department of Defense systems?
General Cotton. In my role as the Combatant Commander, I ensure the
operational requirements are clearly stated for both nuclear weapons
and delivery platforms to enable the fielding of an integrated system
to achieve national-level deterrent objectives. Although USSTRATCOM
does not coordinate directly with civilian companies to develop
capabilities, USSTRATCOM has always worked with NNSA through the
Nuclear Weapons Council on nuclear weapon requirements. Furthermore, in
accordance with the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, USSTRATCOM
has now taken an active role in the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint
Capabilities and Integration Development System by providing nuclear
weapon performance requirements for validation by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, in order to provide a common basis to
guide the development of modernization and sustainment programs for
NNSA weapons and DOD delivery platforms.
Defer to DOE/NNSA and Services for specifics on how these
performance requirements are integrated into acquisition and
development decisions for nuclear weapons and delivery platform
programs.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
expeditionary shelters
13. Senator King. General Cotton, Compotech, a Maine company, is an
incredibly important contributor to the defense industrial base. One of
their key products, MINATORS, is a re-deployable, enduring hard shelter
that offers the comfort and features of a permanent structure with the
capability to deploy rapidly in the world's harshest environments while
meeting all requirement to operate as a sensitive compartmented
information facility. MINATORS can be assembled without tools or
material handling equipment by 3-6 individuals in 30-90 minutes and
offer multiple mission-specific configurations, including act forward
command and control node. Could STRATCOM benefit from an expeditionary,
affordable, all weather, TS/SCI-certified structure such as MINATORS?
General Cotton. While USSTRATCOM has the required facilities needed
to meet continuity of operations requirements via alternate command
center sites and other assets, it is possible the Services could best
benefit from creative solutions, such as MINATORS, to better facilitate
operations in austere environments. Tools like this could offer a range
of capabilities to enhance a Service's or Command's ability to respond
to emerging threats and support U.S. strategic objectives around the
world. Defer to the Services.
nuclear deterrence
14. Senator King. General Cotton, Bangor, Maine is home to the
101st Air Refueling Wing (ARW), the Mainiacs. This Air National Guard
base is strategically located and has seen a significant increase in
transient flights, providing support to military aircraft not based in
Maine but transitioning through Bangor. Its critical position as the
northeastern-most air refueling base in the continental United States
means that Bangor will be of strategic importance for the foreseeable
future. What role has the 101st ARW--and Bangor, Maine--served in the
801X execution/nuclear deterrence mission?
General Cotton. USSTRATCOM relies on a number of Air Force Reserve
and Air National Guard (ANG) tanker units, including the 101st ARW, to
enable its global mission of strategic deterrence and assurance of
allies and partners. The unique attributes of our tankers stationed at
Bangor ANG base make them exceptionally well suited to support
USSTRATCOM air operations, including bomber forces to the U.S. European
Command and U.S. Central Command areas of responsibility. Without these
tanker units, USSTRATCOM bomber missions would be significantly more
challenging to execute.
15. Senator King. General Cotton, what have been the results of the
101st ARW's inspection reports, including the Nuclear Operational
Readiness Inspection (NORI)?
General Cotton. [Deleted.]
on-orbit refueling
16. Senator King. General Whiting, in a recent Air University
paper--``Dynamic Space Operations: The New Sustained Maneuver
Imperative''--Lt. General John E. Shaw (ret), former Deputy Commander
of U.S. Space Command stated, ``Perhaps the most obvious--and, in the
near-term, most viable--approach is on-orbit servicing to replace
consumables such as fuel as they are depleted-on-orbit servicing could
employ space maneuver itself to be more analogous to aerial refueling
or underway replenishment at sea-moving to the place of need in the
space domain to keep the serviced spacecraft closer to their missions
and objectives.'' What efforts does SPACECOM have toward operational
deployment of on-orbit refueling capabilities and the usage of U.S.
Government-accepted refueling port standards? What is your view on
commercial industry's role in this effort?
General Whiting. The USSPACECOM staff is actively working with the
USSF, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, NASA, and various
commercial entities on the development and deployment of on-orbit
refueling capabilities. Part of this collaborative effort is the
advocacy for the wide-spread adoption of common re-fueling
technologies. USSPACECOM supports the USSF's inclusion of Rapidly
Attachable Fluid Transfer and Passive Refueling Module in its
Demonstration Refueling Architecture. The USSPACECOM staff is also
aware of commercial space efforts to develop refueling standards and we
hope that industry partners will rapidly develop and iterate on on-
orbit servicing technologies to identify the most effective and
efficient methods possible. We will continue to communicate and
advocate for USSPACECOM's unique requirements related to on-orbit
refueling so that industry partners incorporate those requirements into
their on-orbit servicing efforts.
commercial refueling lessons for military application
17. Senator King. General Whiting, as Gen. Shaw states, the future
of in-space refueling is analogous to aerial refueling today.
Currently, commercial airlines choose to refuel on the ground because
the costs of aerial refueling is prohibitive to commercial operations.
However, the U.S. Air Force has leveraged commercial aircraft platforms
to deliver military refueling aircraft like the KC-135 and the KC-46.
Do you believe that SPACECOM should advocate for a similar approach on
in-space refueling? What investments do you expect commercial industry
to make and what investments should the Department of Defense make to
develop and operate these capabilities?
General Whiting. Yes, the USSPACECOM staff will continue to
advocate for capabilities like on-orbit refueling, which enable
sustained space maneuver, and we are hopeful commercial partners'
current investments will continue. Whether a robust commercial market
emerges for in-space refueling remains to be seen, however.
Additionally, DOD investment will also be needed to satisfy
USSPACECOM's unique military requirements, which range from maneuver to
protection, and we will continue to advocate for funding with the USSF
and others to accelerate development and fielding of on-orbit servicing
capabilities, including those satisfying military-unique requirements.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
datalinks
18. Senator Cotton. General Whiting, based on the SPACECOM's key
programs list for 2024, joint space communication layer programs seem
to be very important. Do you have the authority you need to use on-
orbit systems implementing tactical datalinks, known as Link-16, in
congested parts of the spectrum?
General Whiting. When delivered, USSPACECOM has the authorities in
place to employ space-based Link-16 capabilities consistent with my
responsibilities under the Unified Command Plan as the Global Satellite
Communications Operations Manager. Regarding spectrum congestion, the
USSPACECOM staff will continue to work within the DOD and via
interagency processes to address U.S. Government spectrum regulations,
as well as those of other countries, to ensure USSPACECOM can exercise
authorities to deliver needed effects to the Warfighter, while
remaining aligned with U.S. laws and international agreements.
19. Senator Cotton. General Whiting, are there policy changes you
need to rapidly certify and use these systems operationally?
General Whiting. The Military Services present certified and ready
forces to Combatant Commands, such as USSPACECOM, who then direct the
operational use of those Joint Forces. We therefore do not require any
policy changes to ensure we can employ such systems once they are ready
for use, but I will defer to the USSF to highlight any policy changes
they may require to certify that these new systems are ready for
operations.
20. Senator Cotton. General Whiting, are the fielded space-based
datalinks available for use by tactical platforms like fighters and
frigates?
General Whiting. Today, tactical platforms use space-based tactical
data links, such as those provided by the Mobile User Objective System
(MUOS) satellite constellation. The DOD has conducted limited space-
based Link-16 testing with tactical aircraft and maritime platforms,
but the Military Services have not yet fielded this capability and it
is not yet available for operational use. When operational use is
achieved, the Department plans to incorporate Link-16 capability into
tactical platforms, such as fighter aircraft, aircraft carriers, other
surface combatants, and submarines.
21. Senator Cotton. General Whiting, if not, what authorities or
resources do you need to make these space-based datalinks available?
General Whiting. Some datalinks, such as those transmitted over the
MUOS satellite constellation, are available today and do not require
new authorities or spectrum resources to utilize. The Space Development
Agency is actively developing and demonstrating space-based Link-16
specific capabilities through its Proliferated Warfighter Space
Architecture. Continued congressional support and stable funding for
this program is critical for this space-based Link-16 capability to be
fully realized and rapidly provided to warfighters.
Additionally, the DOD does not have the spectrum authority needed
to test and operate space-based Link-16. The DOD is currently limited
to testing and operating the Link-16 systems it has on orbit to
international waters and over some parts of Australia via International
Telecommunication Union waivers granted by the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). This
authorization is set to expire at the end of 2024.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires all Link-16
equipped systems to complete Electromagnetic Compatibility Features
(EMCF) validation before any testing over the United States. The NTIA
has the authority to allow testing, but it has deferred to the FAA.
This FAA requirement for full EMCF validation by the DOD, often a
multi-year process, ahead of testing has greatly slowed the fielding of
all Link-16 equipped weapon systems. The requirement to complete EMCF
validation before conducting on-orbit testing over the United States
has delayed fielding of these tactical space-based systems by at least
a year. With no authorities to test and operationalize space-based
Link-16, development of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures has been
restricted and available DOD combat power has been reduced. The FAA has
previously granted a Temporary Frequency Assignment for the purpose of
testing terrestrial Link-16 systems without EMCF validation-space-based
Link-16 systems should be afforded similar opportunities for domestic
testing.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Michael Rounds
nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile
22. Senator Rounds. General Cotton, how would having a nuclear-
capable sea-launched cruise missile such as the SLCM-N improve our
ability to deter an adversary in a regional conflict?
General Cotton. A low-yield, non-ballistic nuclear capability to
deter, assure, and respond without visible generation offers additional
options and supports an integrated deterrence approach; SLCM-N meets
this requirement. This capability will offer the President additional
response choices in a regional conflict, does not require host nation
support, and provides additional diversity in platforms, range, and
survivability. It will enhance extended deterrence by messaging to
adversaries that coercion of the United States, Allies, and partners is
untenable at any level of conflict while, at the same time,
strengthening assurance of our Allies and partners.
nuclear deterrence--duel threat global landscape
23. Senator Rounds. General Cotton, one of the Strategic Posture
Commission's central recommendations is that we must simultaneously
prepare to deter Russia and China. Do you agree that we have to posture
our nuclear deterrence toward both Russia and China and can no longer
treat China as a ``lesser included case''?
General Cotton. Yes. Today the United States and its Allies and
partners are confronted by two major nuclear powers--Russia and China--
as well as the growing nuclear threat posed by the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea. Further, these nations are increasing their level of
coordination and cooperation with one another. This threat environment
raises the possibility of near-simultaneous conflicts with multiple
nuclear-armed, opportunistic adversaries. USSTRATCOM and the DOD
continue to study, evaluate, and implement integrated deterrence
approaches to address this unprecedented challenge.
24. Senator Rounds. General Cotton, are you confident in the range
of options the U.S. and NATO possess today for deterring Russian
nuclear use in Europe?
General Cotton. Our strategic triad deters large-scale attacks and
bolsters regional deterrence in the European theater supplemented with
capabilities, such as dual capable fighter aircraft. However, a low-
yield, non-ballistic, stand-off nuclear capability would significantly
enhance our ability to assure our Allies and deter Russian nuclear use
in Europe. U.S and North Atlantic Treaty Organization planners will
continue to work closely together to address potential scenarios
throughout the spectrum of conflict.
commercial capabilities supporting spacecom
25. Senator Rounds. General Whiting, given the increased threats in
space, the capability to detect, track and easily visualize potential
threats is a foundational building block for space operations,
including command and control. Do you support continuing to leverage
existing commercial capabilities to support SPACECOM's command and
control operations?
General Whiting. USSPACECOM continues to leverage existing
capabilities, including commercial capabilities, to execute command and
control (C2) operations. Reliance on commercial applications for some
aspects of C2 will continue for the foreseeable future. Additionally,
we continue to research new commercial C2 capabilities while
simultaneously improving our DOD C2 systems, to maximize our multi-
mission sensors, both those available today and those onboarding in the
future. We continue to work toward faster integration of commercial
data into our C2 systems.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
alaska strategic advantage for bombers
26. Senator Sullivan. General Cotton, in July 2023, a Bomber Task
Force conducted training missions out of Joint Base Elmendorf-
Richardson (JBER) with the expressed purpose of getting those crews
familiar with operating in Alaska. Last month, B-21 Raider Bombers were
approved to start low-rate initial production. Both JBER and Eielson
Air Force Base can handle all bombers in the fleet, including the new
B-21. KC-135s are based in Alaska to handle aerial refueling needs.
What advantages does operating B-21s out of Alaska provide you as the
STRATCOM Commander as you seek to deter adversaries, including the PRC
which is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal?
General Cotton. The B-21 offers a highly flexible, technically
advanced deterrent against our adversaries, including China. Operating
B-21s and other bombers out of Alaska helps neutralize China's anti-
access, counter-intervention strategy and enhances our deterrence
posture by increasing the range, flexibility, survivability and
resilience of our air-leg as well as complicating adversary planning.
It would enhance a flexible deterrence strategy and force posture
that continues to convey to our adversaries, including China, that the
United States will not be deterred from defending every inch of its
territory as well as that of our Allies and partners. In short, B-21
and other bombers operating out of Alaska would demonstrate our
ability, stake, and will to conduct long-range strike operations at the
time and place of our choosing.
Bombers operating out of Alaska would augment both nuclear and
conventional operations, and improve Joint Force integration and
partner interoperability to better enable the execution of strike
options to support national objectives worldwide.
27. Senator Sullivan. General Cotton, do you see value in Bomber
Task Force-type rotations through Alaska outside of scheduled exercises
like Northern Edge and Red Flag?
General Cotton. Yes. Our bomber teams actively train and operate
out of non-traditional forward locations away from their home or main
operating bases. Strategic force agility and resilience demonstrates
strategic unpredictability and enhances effective deterrence. Bomber
Task Force missions transiting through or staging out of Alaska yield
added combat readiness value through routine integrated joint-combined
air and maritime homeland defense operations.
appropriations
28. Senator Sullivan. General Cotton and General Whiting, how
important is the funding included in the Fiscal Year 2024 National
Security Supplemental to your command's ability to accomplish its
mission?
General Cotton. One of my top concerns is ensuring the defense
industrial base has sufficient capacity and capability to
simultaneously sustain the existing nuclear triad and conventional
forces while delivering future modernization programs throughout the
spectrum of conflict. While not specific to the USSTRATCOM headquarters
mission, I greatly appreciate the $3.3 billion Congress allocated for
the submarine industrial base that adds funds for advanced procurement
of the Columbia-class submarine and the Virginia-class submarine.
General Whiting. The Fiscal Year 2024 National Security
Supplemental included investments for USINDOPACOM, which directly
support USSPACECOM's Unified Command Plan missions. Further details can
be provided at a higher classification. USSPACECOM recognizes the
importance of investments in the USINDOPACOM, USCENTCOM, and USEUCOM
areas of responsibility, and USSPACECOM will continue to provide space-
enabling support to these Geographic Combatant Commands while
leveraging their capabilities to fulfill our missions.
29. Senator Sullivan. General Cotton and General Whiting, how would
a full-year Continuing Resolution impact your command's ability to
accomplish its mission?
General Cotton. Continuing resolutions (CRs) are extremely
disruptive and corrosive to the nuclear modernization effort. The
greatest risk of deterrence failure and threat to strategic stability
is a lack of consistent, stable funding necessary every year throughout
the next decade at least. We must be able to continue to invest in
modernizing our strategic forces by recapitalizing the triad, NC3,
weapons complex, and supporting infrastructure in order to maintain a
viable, flexible, and full-spectrum deterrent force.
More specifically, a full-year CR would negatively impact
USSTRATCOM's Components and the Services' ability to execute the
majority of their Procurement and Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation budget allocations due to embedded new starts (unless
exceptions were previously authorized).
General Whiting. A year-long continuing resolution (CR) would
degrade the Joint Force's readiness, hinder acceleration of critical
space programs, and curb modernization in the face of a motivated and
accelerating threat. Any loss or delay in capability delivery due to a
CR would adversely impact USSPACECOM's ability to execute
Presidentially assigned missions and affect the Command's ability to
provide space-enabling support to other Combatant Commands. A full-year
CR would cause additional, unnecessary risk in multiple space mission
areas.
submarine industrial base
30. Senator Sullivan. General Cotton, as you mentioned in your
prepared statement, there are gaps in the Trident Refit Facility's
ability to carry out certain industrial processes needed to produce the
next generation of SSBNs. This is one example of the industrial base
challenged impacting both our submarine production and nuclear triad
modernization. Is the Trident Refit Facility adequately resourced and
staffed to avoid being a bottleneck in Columbia-class production?
General Cotton. Trident Refit Facility (TRF) Kings Bay (KB) and TRF
Bangor currently support the repair and maintenance of Ohio-class
submarines. The TRF KB expansion is on track to begin in fiscal year
2025 to support Columbia-class submarines. The TRF Bangor projects,
which are in the early planning and design process, are on schedule to
execute in fiscal year 2027. Continued congressional support is
critical to bringing the facilities online to support Columbia.
Defer to the Navy for resourcing and staffing specifics.
northern latitudes domain awareness
31. Senator Sullivan. General Whiting, in your testimony you wrote
about Russian space capability investments in the Arctic and northern
latitudes. What demand signal has SPACECOM created for the Department
of Defense and Intelligence Community to increase our GPS and
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities for the
northern latitudes?
General Whiting. [Deleted.]
32. Senator Sullivan. General Whiting, are the services providing
you with adequate equipment and personnel to meet your domain awareness
requirements for the northern latitudes?
General Whiting. USSPACECOM staff strongly endorses the USSF's
efforts to innovate both space and ground architectures that support
multi-domain operations. The USSF has requested and begun fielding
additional space assets capable of monitoring and deterring threats
across the globe.
The USSF currently plans to present the Long Range Discrimination
Radar (LRDR), which has both Missile Defense and Space Domain Awareness
capabilities, to USSPACECOM in fiscal year 2025. With the Upgraded
Early Warning Radar at Clear Space Force Station and COBRA DANE also
operational, these USSF assets will improve Space
Domain Awareness in the Arctic region while also tracking
hypersonic and ballistic missile threats to the Homeland.
When on orbit around 2030, the USSF's Next-Generation Overhead
Persistent Infrared satellites will provide additional space-based
sensor coverage in the northern latitudes that is planned to
effectively identify and track hypersonic and ballistic missile threats
to the Homeland.
spacecom detection and tracking capabilities
33. Senator Sullivan. General Whiting, in your Strategic Vision
released earlier this month, you highlighted that your Warfighting
Command achieved full operational capability in December 2023, to
include now taking on the missile defense mission from STRATCOM. In
order for SPACECOM to accomplish this mission, you must maintain multi-
domain awareness with both space-and earth-based sensors. How will the
Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) at Clear Space Force Station
improve your domain awareness when it reaches initial operating
capability later this year?
General Whiting. When at initial operating capability, LRDR will
significantly improve USSPACECOM's Space Domain Awareness by providing
precision tracking information on space objects. The president has
assigned Commander, USSPACECOM the role of Global Sensor Manager via
the Unified Command Plan; in this role, we will leverage the LRDR's
data to enhance Space Domain Awareness when it is not engaged in
missile defense operations.
34. Senator Sullivan. General Whiting, how are space-based assets
complementing the ground-based systems in Alaska to make sure we can
effectively employ the 40 missile interceptors at Ft. Greely?
General Whiting. Space-based assets complement ground-based sensors
by providing initial early warning of the launch of threat missiles,
and providing information needed to characterize the nature of an
attack before threat missiles enter ground-based sensor coverage.
Space-based sensors also complement specific ground-based systems by
cueing those radars with threat track information to decrease the time
needed for those ground-based radars to acquire and track threat
missiles. Different sensor assets operate in different portions of the
electromagnetic spectrum; this fusion of inputs creates the needed
fidelity to detect, track, and discriminate threats. This synergy
enables the Ground Based Midcourse Defense system to effectively employ
missile interceptors.
35. Senator Sullivan. General Whiting, can you explain how ground
and space-based sensors must be modernized in Alaska to effectively
identify, track, and engage cruise, hypersonic, and ballistic missile
threats?
General Whiting. DOD must modernize its ground-and space-based
sensors both to improve sustainment costs and to contend with
increasing detection and tracking challenges posed by advanced threats.
Modernization of legacy ground-based radars will decrease long-term
maintenance costs associated with aging equipment and parts
obsolescence. DOD sensors require modernization to hardware and
software to ensure readiness to identify and track adversary
capabilities that include larger threat missile salvos, higher threat
missile velocity, increased maneuverability, smaller/dimmer targets,
and, in the near future, to detect and track systems in non-traditional
orbital regimes such as Very Low Earth Orbit and Cislunar/beyond
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit.
36. Senator Sullivan. General Whiting, can the sensor network in
and above Alaska effectively identify, track, and engage cruise,
hypersonic, and ballistic missile threats?
General Whiting. While there are many factors involved, in general,
USSPACECOM can identify and track hypersonic and ballistic missile
threats using sensors in and above Alaska and elsewhere. Our capability
is not infallible, and some advanced threats still present a challenge.
Commander, NORAD-USNORTHCOM is the supported commander for Homeland
Defense and is best positioned to provide you an assessment from the
engagement perspective for the Homeland Defense mission. I also defer
to the USAF, as the lead Service for cruise missile defense of the
Homeland, to provide their perspective. To increase the DOD's
capability against advanced threats, USSPACECOM recently submitted an
Integrated Priority List to the Joint Staff that includes missile
defeat effects that will enhance our ability to defeat ballistic,
cruise, and hypersonic missile threats, as well as air-launched or
ground-launched, direct ascent threats.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
spacecom budget
37. Senator Budd. General Whiting, SPACECOM's fiscal year 2024
budget request increased 13 percent over fiscal year 2023 levels. How
much of this increase is growth in investments in space capabilities
versus shifting budget responsibility across the Department as SPACECOM
matures?
General Whiting. None of the increase to USSPACECOM's headquarters
budget in fiscal year 2024 was for growth in space capabilities. Part
of USSPACECOM's budget increase supported the transfer of Joint
Functional Component Command-Integrated Missile Defense from USSTRATCOM
to USSPACECOM, which aligns with USSPACECOM's newly assigned Unified
Command Plan mission for Transregional Missile Defense operations and
support. Another portion of the headquarters budget increase addressed
procurement for the fit out of the Consolidated Space Operations
Facility, a fully funded Military Construction project on Schriever
Space Force Base that, when completed, will host USSPACECOM's National
Space Defense Center, our Nation's operations center for protecting and
defending the space domain. Finally, additional increased fiscal year
2024 funding was for civilian pay to enable USSPACECOM to reach its
civilian manpower full-end strength that supports Full Operational
Capability.
sof/space/cyber triad
38. Senator Budd. General Whiting, in response to a question during
the posture hearing about the nexus between space, cyber, and special
operations forces (SOF), you stated, ``we do see it as a unique
opportunity to bring together these three capabilities to help us all
three achieve our missions. For example, there are times that using
space we can create accesses for cyber forces who then can support
special operations forces, or special operations forces through their
unique ability to gain access to certain geographic locations, can help
us in our space mission by executing functions that support us.'' You
also confirmed that the physical access SOF provides enables critical
space operations. What impacts, if any, will planned reductions to Army
SOF capacity have on SPACECOM's operations and, if you or your staff
haven't studied the issue, will you commit to analyzing any impacts and
providing an update to my office?
General Whiting. Consistent with my previous testimony, I do not
see any current impacts. Should an issue arise in the future, I commit
to analyzing those impacts and providing updates to your office.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 2024
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE POSTURE OF UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AND UNITED STATES AFRICA
COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:59 a.m., in
room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
receive testimony from General Michael Eric Kurilla, Commander
of United States Central Command, and General Michael Langley,
Commander of United States Africa Command.
Thank you both for your service, and I am grateful to the
men and women serving under your command, and please convey
that to them. The CENTCOM area of responsibility has always
been fraught with complexity, but I am concerned that we have
faced with a uniquely dangerous moment.
With Israel and Hamas engaged in a violent conflict in
Gaza, Iran is seeking to exploit the chaos as an opportunity to
force the United States out of the region. Iran appears to have
calculated that the best strategy to achieve this is by
directing its proxy forces to attack American, Israeli, and
allied interests in the Middle East.
To date, the Iranian linked Houthi rebels in Yemen have
launched more than 50 drone and missile attacks against United
States and international vessels in the Red Sea, including a
strike yesterday on Liberian commercial ship that killed three
innocent civilians.
The Houthis have disrupted nearly 15 percent of global
commercial trade, driving up cost and inflation around the
world. Similarly, Iranian linked Shia militias in Iraq, Syria,
and Jordan have conducted more than 175 attacks against United
States and coalition forces, including a drone attack that
killed three Americans in Jordan. In response, the American led
coalition has carried out hundreds of airstrikes against
Iranian proxies across the region, significantly degrading
their capabilities.
The United States should continue to take appropriate
military actions, but I must underscore there is no ultimate
military solution to our conflict with Iran. Direct war with
Iran would have devastating second and third order consequences
and would likely engulf the entire region in war.
President Biden has balanced these considerations by
synchronizing military operations with strong diplomacy,
economic sanctions, and tools of statecraft. I am encouraged
that Iranian linked militia attacks against United States
Forces in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan have paused for a significant
period of time.
We have to remember that Hamas ignited this regional
conflict exactly 5 months ago, on October 7th, when it
murdered, kidnaped, and committed unspeakable atrocities
against thousands of innocent Israelis. Israel launched its own
campaign to defend itself and degrade and defeat Hamas, and the
United States deployed troops and assets to the region to
support our ally and prevent a wider regional war.
Five months into this campaign, Hamas has been degraded,
but the Palestinian people in Gaza are suffering extreme force.
Unless there is a pause in the fighting, the humanitarian
situation will continue to worsen, Israeli hostages will
continue to be held captive, and Israel's long-term security
could be weakened.
General Kurilla, these challenges are compounded by many
others, including Iran's nuclear enrichment activities and
Hezbollah's attacks in Northern Israel, all of which must be
addressed, while maintaining the counterterrorism mission in
South and Central Asia.
I understand that you just returned from the region, and I
would ask for an update on how CENTCOM is postured to meet
these challenges, and what resources and support you need to be
successful.
General Langley, AFRICOM remains an important theater in
the United States' strategic competition with China and Russia.
Many African countries have longstanding military ties with
Russia and even deeper economic ties with China.
As the United States manages relationships across the
continent, we must be mindful of these preexisting ties and
avoid taking a with us or against us approach, or we will risk
alienating the very nations we seek to engage with. I would
welcome your thoughts on how best to calibrate the United
States approach to the region in light of these factors.
Over the past year, the security situation in West Africa
has continued to decline. Violent extremist organizations have
expanded across the region and are now threatening to push down
into the lateral states in the Gulf of Guinea.
Partner nations are working hard to address these
challenges, and AFRICOM is working in collaboration with many
security forces in the region to enhance their capability to
respond effectively.
At the same time, military coups in places like Niger,
Mali, and Burkina Faso have required the cessation of United
States training and advising in those countries. Given these
challenges, I understand that AFRICOM must explore new methods
to maintain United States security interest in the region.
To do so, it is important that your command becomes more
synchronized with the United States interagency and that
AFRICOM receives the resources it needs to maintain situational
awareness. This must include adequate intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance support, and the capabilities
to continue to work by, with, and through our regional partners
and allies.
General Langley, I would appreciate your thoughts on this
wide ranging set of challenges and what plans you have to
address them. Again, let me thank our witnesses. We look
forward to your testimony.
As a reminder for my colleagues, there will be a closed
session immediately following this hearing in room SVC-217.
Now, let me turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. China, Russia,
Iran, and North Korea are banding together. They hope to weaken
American resolve and shift the global balance of power away
from the United States.
The effects of their sinister activities are on full
display in both CENTCOM [United States Central Command] and
AFRICOM [United States Africa Command] theaters, which we are
discussing today. I begin with a particularly acute example.
Hamas's barbaric October 7th massacre was not merely a
Palestinian terrorist attack on Israel, it was also an Iranian
proxy attack on the United States.
The Palestinians attacked Israel. They were proxies of Iran
attacking the United States, Thirty-three of our fellow
Americans were killed and 12 were taken hostage. Iranian
proxies then began near-daily attacks against United States
troops in the region.
They attacked Israel with missiles, and they tried to close
maritime shipping routes in the region. It is indisputable that
Tehran controls its proxies, and those proxies have killed
Americans. Iran's objective is and has always been to evict the
United States from the Middle East so it can achieve regional
hegemony.
We will not be evicted from the Middle East. I believe the
Biden administration should address Iran's culpability head on,
and we can do this without going to war against Iran. The
Administration spent its first 3 years offering Iran billions
of dollars in sanctions relief to restore the Obama era nuclear
agreement.
President Biden ordered minor counter strikes on Iran's
proxies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, apparently hoping to manage
escalation through pinprick responses. This approach has failed
and will fail because it assumes that we can deter terrorist
groups without causing pain to their chief sponsor, Iran.
General Kurilla, I hope you will share your assessment of
what it would take to end Iran's terrorist proxy attacks on our
Forces. China and Russia view the African continent as a power
projection platform. They use the region to flex their muscles,
undermine Western influence, and bolster their economic
interests.
Beijing and Moscow do all this through exploitive practices
that often come at the expense of African communities. China,
in particular, approaches Africa as a critical terrain for its
global military expansion.
Its first overseas military base was established in the
strategically located country of Djibouti. According to public
reports, this base is now capable of hosting some of China's
most advanced naval vessels.
Additionally, we know China is actively pursuing a naval
base on Africa's Atlantic Coast. General Langley has said this
would, ``change the whole calculus of the geo strategic
campaign plans of protecting our Homeland.''
General Langley, I hope you will tell the Committee what is
being done to address this disturbing development. Russia's
destabilizing activity in Africa is to trade security
assistance for access to African natural resources.
Putin does this by spreading disinformation and propaganda
to sow unrest, prop up sympathetic regimes, and undermine
support for Western engagement on the continent. We cannot lose
sight of the continued threat al Qaeda and ISIS [Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria] pose in Africa. Political instability and
weak security institutions have allowed these groups to expand
territorial control.
We must maintain sufficient force posture and resourcing in
Africa to support our national interests there. At the same
time, we must develop more effective non-defense tools in
Africa. These would include our ability to use private sector
financing in non-development contexts through DOD's Office of
Strategic Capital.
The world has changed drastically since the publication of
the National Defense Strategy. This is particularly true in the
Middle East, but the strategy that drives our investments and
force posture in both these command theaters must reflect those
changes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. General
Kurilla, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL E. KURILLA, USA COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
General Kurilla. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker,
ladies and gentlemen of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today. I am joined today by
Command Master Chief Fleet Derek Walters, the Command Senior
Enlisted Leader of U.S. Central Command.
I am proud to testify next to my good friend Mike Langley.
On behalf of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast
guardsmen, and guardians who serve this command and our Nation,
I welcome the opportunity to talk to you today. I just returned
from my 27th trip to the Central Region.
As I sat here just a year ago, the region was on the verge
of improbable, unprecedented, and transformative progress.
Today, the central region faces its most volatile security
situation in the past half century. This is not the same
central region as last year.
The events of 7th of October not only permanently changed
Israel and Gaza, it created the conditions for malign actors to
sow instability throughout the region and beyond. Iran
exploited what they saw as a once in a generation opportunity
to reshape the Middle East to their advantage.
Iran has worked for decades to strategically encircle the
region with its proxies, and in the past 6 months, we have seen
every proxy in the Iranian threat network operationalized in
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, the West Bank, and Yemen.
Iran's expansive network of proxies is equipped with
advanced, sophisticated weaponry, and threatens some of the
most vital terrain in the world, with global and United States
implications. Houthi attacks on international shipping and an
Iranian aligned militia attacks on our forces in Iraq and Syria
are direct result of an Iranian threat that has been
incrementally spreading.
However, Iran knows that its decade long vision cannot be
realized if countries in the region continue to expand
integration with each other and deepen their partnership with
the United States. Violent extremist organizations have also
seized on this opportunity. ISIS surged their attacks in Iraq
and Syria earlier this year, and the risk of an attack
emanating from Afghanistan is increasing.
ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) retains the capability and will to
attack United States and Western interests abroad in as little
as 6 months and with little to no warning. Strategic
competition has also continued to evolve across the region.
China and Russia are quick to capitalize on destabilizing
influences. They have shown meager interest or capability to
reduce regional tensions, but rather they have increased their
efforts to pressurize regional partners across all elements of
national power.
Collectively, Iran, Russia, and China are strengthening
their relationships and fostering a chaotic landscape favorable
for their exploitation. Iran continues to sell 90 percent of
its oil to China, funding Tehran's subversive activities across
the region, and Iran has developed a full scale production
pipeline for supplying weapons to Russia, fueling their war on
Ukraine.
The ramifications of this partnership have global
implications. The convergence of crisis and competition makes
CENTCOM the area of responsibility, the most likely region to
produce threats against the United States Homeland, trigger a
regional conflict, and derail the National Defense Strategy
(NDS).
The CENTCOM region also remains critical to the world's
energy supply and remains essential for the flow of global
commerce. But CENTCOM provides strategic depth to our defense
of the Homeland, and American security and prosperity are at
risk if we cede this space to Iran, terrorism, and China.
The stable future envisioned by our National Security
Strategy and shared by our partners supports broader United
States national interests and is worth striving for. Our
partners in the Levant, Arabian Gulf, and Central and South
Asia are committed to advancing the region, and the United
States remains the partner of choice for now.
The degree of U.S. investment in the central region will be
decisive in shaping this future. Our years of a continuous
engagement throughout the region serve as the foundation for
this investment.
The U.S. Central Command strategic approach of people,
partners, and innovation reinforces the vision of an integrated
central region and supports the whole-of-government effort to
secure our regional and global interests.
Our people are the bedrock of everything we do. We are
laser focused on optimizing their talents and highlighting
their character and competence to our partners. Our strategic
advantage remains our strong military-to-military partnerships,
while our adversaries and competitors rely on parasitic
transactional relationships.
We also innovate with our partners and are developing
approaches, concept, and technologies to address the threats we
face protecting our forces and creating strategic depth in our
force posture. These efforts have saved lives.
We are clear eyed about the task before us. The shock waves
of the past year continue to reverberate globally, and our
servicemembers are standing to watch side by side with our
regional partners right now.
They operate in harm's way every day, whether at a small
outpost in Syria fighting ISIS, or on a destroyer knocking down
a barrage of ballistic and cruise missiles fired by Iranian
backed Houthis, and they do so with honor and courage.
Five of our teammates gave the last full measure of
devotion as they lived out the oath we swear and the freedoms
we cherish. They represent the very best of us and it is the
honor of my professional life to serve as their commander, and
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Michael Kurilla
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Michael ``Erik'' Kurilla
i. introduction
The Central Region faces its most volatile security situation in
the past half century. Just a year ago, the region was on the verge of
improbable and transformative progress. The strategic investments in
our partners were transforming the security calculus in the region in
ways unthinkable just 10 years ago. The vision of an integrated and
modernized region was on the precipice of actualization. The events of
7 October 2023 not only permanently changed Israel and Gaza, they also
set off a series of reactions that have created the conditions for
malign actors to sow instability throughout the region and beyond.
Today, a convergence of crisis and competition have enabled
revisionist powers to fuel violence seeking a return to an
unfortunately predictable pattern in the region's history. Iran and its
expansive network of proxies saw a once-in-a-generation opportunity to
reshape the region to its advantage. They have accelerated their
efforts to expel Western presence and neutralize our influence in the
region, enabling a long-term strategic goal to further their revolution
and establish regional hegemony. Iran knows that its decades-long
vision of dominating the region cannot be realized if the region's
states continue to expand integration with each other and deepen
partnership with the United States. ISIS and al Qaeda, despite
tremendous losses, remain committed to inflicting violence and
suffering on anyone not aligned with their extremist ideology. ISIS
retains the capability to threaten United States interests and is
attempting to reconstitute in Syria. The People's Republic of China
(PRC) and Russia demonstrate that they have little capability or will
to reduce regional tensions and are quick to capitalize on instability.
Collectively, Iran, Russia, and the PRC are strengthening their
relationship, creating a chaotic landscape favorable for their
exploitation and the spread of extremism.
However, the region is not predestined to this fate. The path of
integration and partnership remains open to us if we remain committed
to following it. The stable future envisioned by our National Security
Strategy (NDS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) and shared by our
partners can support broader U.S. national interests and is one worth
striving to achieve. Despite Iran's best efforts, the region is holding
open its doors to security cooperation with the United States. It is
modernizing at an incredible rate, seeking to shake free from the
turmoil of its past, and looking toward a future of security,
stability, and prosperity. Our partners in the Levant, Arabian Gulf,
and Central and South Asia, remain committed to advancing the region--
preferably with the United States. The degree of U.S. investment across
the instruments of national power and the success of security
integration in the Central Region will be decisive in determining
whether its future supports U.S. national interests. Our years of
continuous engagement throughout the region serve as the foundation for
this investment.
U.S. Central Command's strategic approach of People, Partners, and
Innovation, codified in our Theater Strategy, reinforces the vision of
a modern and integrated Central Region and supports a whole-of-
government effort to secure our regional and global interests. Our
strategic advantage in the region remains strong military-to-military
partnerships, while our adversaries and competitors rely on parasitic
and transactional relationships. We seek to integrate our partners,
while Iran seeks to leverage instability to its advantage. We enable
our partners to defeat violent extremists by catalyzing unified
responses, while Iran threatens national sovereignty and regional
stability by supporting and enabling sectarian militias. In concert
with our partners, we drive innovative approaches, concepts, and
technologies to address the many threats we face, developing solutions
for real time decision advantage and creating strategic depth in our
force posture.
USCENTCOM is clear eyed about the task before us. The shockwaves of
the past year will reverberate across the Central Region for some time.
Iran intends to seize on its opportunity, and it will not be easily
deterred. The fight against violent extremism is not complete. The PRC
and Russia will exploit instability at every turn to undermine United
States interests and advance their own strategic positions. Beyond the
region, we acknowledge there are a myriad of global challenges that
require deliberate risk and resourcing decisions by our national
leaders. USCENTCOM remains committed to the vision of a prosperous and
integrated Central Region in which U.S. national interests are
advanced.
ii. strategic context
The Central Region remains vital to our national interests.
USCENTCOM protects the security of the American people and supports the
expansion of American economic prosperity and opportunity. We benefit
from deep diplomatic ties and military-to-military relationships
throughout the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), with many of the
United States' most steadfast partners resident in the region or
astride it. We also have critical economic interests to protect. The
Arabian Gulf contains around 800 billion barrels of proven oil reserves
and 2,800 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves--nearly half the
world's oil and natural gas. Twelve percent of our imported oil comes
from the region, and it supplies the world with 15 million barrels per
day--much of which goes to our global partners and allies through the
Strait of Hormuz. Many of the resources that do not originate in the
region traverse it, along shipping routes between Asia and Europe,
passing through strategic chokepoints in the Bab al Mandeb Strait and
Suez Canal.
There are also significant security challenges in the region. From
Iran's regional hegemonic ambitions to the world's biggest
concentration of violent extremism, the security of America's Homeland,
its interests, and the security of our partners are under threat from
an array of actors seeking to prevent the vision of a free and
prosperous Central Region from coming to fruition. We must ensure
malign actors do not proliferate regional violence around the globe and
to our shores. We must also be cognizant that our partners are weighing
their options as they interpret signals that suggest we will reduce our
commitment. Meanwhile, the burgeoning military alliance between Russia
and Iran threatens to amplify their aggression across multiple
theaters. USCENTCOM secures United States national interests and
addresses these destabilizing influences through three lines of effort:
Deterring Iran, Countering Violent Extremist Organizations, and
Competing Strategically.
Deterring Iran
For several decades, Tehran has pursued a three-pronged strategy
for regional dominance: achieve a threshold nuclear weapons capability,
advance and proliferate its standoff weapons arsenal, and leverage a
vast proxy network to sow instability throughout the region. It is that
proxy network, known as the Iranian Threat Network (ITN), that provides
Iran operational reach throughout the region and enables its offensive
actions against our regional partners and global interests.
Iran continues to use its nuclear program for international
blackmail. Last year, Iran continued to produce and stockpile highly
enriched uranium well beyond what is needed for commercial use in hopes
of gaining economic concessions from the international community. On 10
February 2024, the International Atomic Energy Agency announced Iran
had amassed a 121.5-kilogram stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium,
and 5,525.5 kilograms of enriched uranium overall. Should Iran decide,
it could enrich enough uranium for three nuclear devices within weeks.
A nuclear-armed Iran would transform the region overnight and forever,
likely igniting a regional race for nuclear weapons and creating a
security umbrella for its hegemonic ambitions.
Iran also projects power through its ballistic missiles, unmanned
aerial systems (UAS), and other advanced conventional weapons. Over the
last 12 months, Iran continued to expand its arsenal of precision
guided weapon systems including ballistic and cruise missiles with
ranges up to 2000km and one-way attack UAS with ranges up to 3000km.
These capabilities enable Iran to strike every country in the Central
Region and to range key United States allies as far away as Europe.
Iran distributes many of these weapons to proxies in the region,
presenting a high-end, multi-axis threat to United States Forces and
those of our allies and partners. Iran's advanced weapons have been
used by its proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen continuously in
the past 5 months, and they continue their illicit shipments--in
violation of U.N. sanctions--on a daily basis. Finally, HAMAS's
barbaric attack on Israel would not have been possible without years of
Iranian material and training support.
Not only does Iran actively undermine the sovereignty of
neighboring states in the region by providing sophisticated lethal aid
to its various militias, it also supplies countries like Russia,
Venezuela, and Sudan with attack and surveillance UAS, with more
customers lining up globally. Regardless of who pulls the trigger, Iran
is unconcerned with ensuring its weapons are employed in accordance
with the Law of Armed Conflict. Iran displays its growing UAS
capabilities by attacking commercial shipping, striking merchant
vessels more than 1,000 nautical miles into the Indian Ocean. In fact,
since 2021, Iran attacked or seized 19 merchant ships in international
waters, and still illegally holds five vessels and their crews against
their will in Iranian ports.
Tehran has long driven instability in the region with its proxies,
but 2023 saw an unprecedented activation of virtually every facet of
the ITN across the entire region. After HAMAS attacked Israel, the
Houthis in Yemen targeted the global economy, Iranian Aligned Militia
Groups (IAMG) waged a campaign of violence to force the Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS out of Iraq and Syria, and Lebanese
Hezbollah's increasingly escalatory attacks held Israel's northern
border at risk. Iran saw an opportunity to demonstrate the capabilities
of its so-called ``Axis of Resistance,'' and manifested decades of
conditioning, provisioning, and preparation. Since 7 October 2023,
IAMGs like Kata'ib Hezbollah and Harakat al Nujaba, enabled by Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force, have attacked Coalition
Forces 71 times in Iraq, 102 times in Syria, and twice in Jordan,
killing three United States servicemembers on 28 January 2024. The
Houthis have attacked international shipping and Coalition warships
over 50 times, sparking supply chain issues reminiscent of those during
the COVID-19 pandemic and contributing to food aid delays in hunger-
stricken Yemen.
Through the ITN, the proliferation of its ballistic missile and UAS
capabilities, and the threat of nuclear breakout, Iran is executing a
strategic encirclement of the region. They are emplacing forces,
ideology, and weapon systems that can threaten U.S. interests, allies,
and partners from multiple vectors and at critical chokepoints with
little-to-no warning. Now, more than ever, Tehran has the capability to
advance its regional goals and threaten global interests. Houthi
attacks threaten the free flow of 15 percent of the world's commerce,
while Iran itself repeatedly attacks and seizes international merchant
vessels. IAMG attacks and Iranian political pressure jeopardize the
hard-earned gains of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Iran's
proliferation of advanced conventional weapons fuels conflict on three
continents. All of this is underscored by Iran's status as a threshold
nuclear State. With conditions now set, we assess Tehran perceives an
opportunity to force the United States out of the Central Region,
divide its neighbors, and take substantive steps to eradicate the State
of Israel.
Opportunities for Deterring Iran
In line with the NSS and NDS, USCENTCOM leverages the United
States' unparalleled ability to integrate partners in pursuit of mutual
interests. USCENTCOM's role is gradually shifting from security
guarantor to security integrator, and many of our regional partners are
increasingly willing to coordinate with their neighbors to enhance the
defense of their borders. Behind this trend is a growing recognition
that Iran is their greatest threat. In response, we develop competitive
overmatch among our partners by enhancing our collective capabilities
and leveraging our network of regional security constructs. Middle East
Air Defense (MEAD) is an example, as the regional integration of our
partners' air defense capabilities has helped detect and intercept the
unprecedented wave of missile and UAS attacks coming from the ITN.
Multinational organizations aligned against individual domains,
such as the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) help to
address specific Iranian threats, like illegal ship seizures and arms
smuggling. Even groups designed to counter other threats, such as the
Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and the 41-nation Combined Maritime
Forces (CMF) bring the world together in common cause to defend the
rules-based international order, which Iran is actively working to
undermine.
We must continue to strengthen our longstanding bilateral military-
to-military relationships. Just as our partners count on our support,
we depend on our partners. Faster and more transparent foreign military
sales (FMS) will underwrite the trust among our partners and help
bolster their capabilities relative to Iran as well as protect their
own sovereignty. Beyond materiel contributions to any fighting force,
our close partnerships enable access, basing, and overflight that will
be critical to mission success. For example, our close relationship
with Egypt allowed us unique access to expedite humanitarian aid at the
outset of the Sudanese Civil War, in addition to our daily operations.
Going forward, we must continue to develop the partner-enabled Western
Access Network, which provides alternate routes to transport equipment
and personnel throughout the USCENTCOM AOR. You cannot surge trust in
crisis, and our partners must know we are there for them before we need
something in return.
Risks to Deterring Iran
Iran believes it has the momentum to force a premature withdrawal
of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, allowing them opportunity to
expand its land bridge to the Mediterranean Sea and revive the
narrative of abandonment in the region. Further, the PRC and Russia
would undoubtedly capitalize in the information environment by
characterizing our withdrawal as a demonstration of American
unreliability, hoping to drive a wedge in our global partnerships and
assault a core premise of the NDS and NSS.
Iran's potential pursuit of a nuclear weapon could significantly
alter our risk assessment. Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon remains a top priority with global implications. While we have
not seen indications that Iran's Supreme Leader has changed his
calculus to pursue a nuclear weapon, we will continue to develop
military options for the Secretary of Defense and President, should
they be necessary.
Countering Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)
Five years after the fall of the physical ISIS caliphate, the
group's extremist ideology endures. It endures in more than 5,000
fighters and operatives still at large throughout the Central Region
and beyond. It endures in detention facilities, guarded by our Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF) partners, which hold approximately 9,000
detainees. Finally, it endures in pockets of camps for displaced
persons like Syria's Al Hol, which currently holds approximately 43,000
men, women, and children. ISIS remains resolute in its quest to plunge
the region into sectarian violence, impose its ideology, and eventually
spread its influence globally.
Without the Global Coalition's continued focus, ISIS resurgence
remains a threat. In 2023, Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent
Resolve (CJTF-OIR) conducted 475 total ground operations and 45 total
airstrikes, resulting in 164 ISIS fighters killed and 619 detained. We
assess our high volume of partnered operations has kept ISIS at bay;
however, IAMG attacks on United States and Coalition forces degrade the
D-ISIS campaign. Eliminating ISIS's ability to conduct terrorist
attacks requires sustained investment in Iraqi security forces,
partners on the ground in Syria and a robust counterterrorism apparatus
consisting of intelligence community and interagency elements.
The barrage of Iranian-sponsored attacks after 17 October 2023
forced CJTF-OIR to come off plan as we prioritized protecting our
forces in Iraq and Syria. The ensuing spike in ISIS attacks
demonstrates the gravity of disruptions to the international effort to
permanently defeat the group. In the first 2 weeks of 2024, ISIS
conducted 275 attacks in Iraq and Syria, the highest rate of attacks in
the last 2 years. The Government of Iraq is rightly concerned that ISIS
is taking advantage of the Global Coalition temporarily letting up due
to IAMG attacks. Furthermore, Tehran is exerting incredible political
pressure on Baghdad to expel the Coalition, which would all but
guarantee ISIS' return if it occurred before Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) were ready to stand on their own. We would also be challenged to
support our Syrian partners without a military presence in Iraq. In
Syria, we saw ISIS increase intensity of activity across multiple
provinces, as it enjoyed more freedom of movement due to SDF conflicts
with local tribes and Turkish airstrikes that restricted SDF
operations. A spate of ISIS attacks in late 2023 drove up the annual
average casualties per attack to twice the rate of the previous year.
Disruptions in Syria also forced temporary delays in training
guards for detention facilities and displaced persons camps. We must
ensure the SDF can sustainably hold ISIS detainees who have no prospect
of rehabilitation while the international community repatriates foreign
fighters. In addition to training guards, we assist with the
maintenance and refurbishment of the detention facilities to eliminate
vulnerabilities ISIS may exploit in attempts to free detainees.
We also train our partner forces in Syria, many of whom are women,
to guard the displaced persons camps. The training is key to keeping
the residents safe, enabling access for aid organizations, and
preventing the spread of extremism. Nonetheless, the longer that
displaced persons remain in camps like Al Hol and Al Roj, the more
likely they will succumb to ISIS ideology. Alongside our partners, we
continue to identify and detain ISIS facilitators operating in the
camps. To prevent the next generation of ISIS, the international
community must sustain the recent momentum in repatriating and
reintegrating displaced persons in their home countries.
Our Central and South Asian partners repeatedly share their concern
over ISIS' pursuit of opportunity and capability to conduct external
operations. The Taliban targeted some key ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K)
leaders in 2023, but it has shown neither the capability nor the intent
to sustain adequate counterterrorism pressure. In fact, this lack of
sustained pressure allowed ISIS-K to regenerate and harden their
networks, creating multiple redundant nodes that direct, enable, and
inspire attacks. Additionally, the Taliban has shown little interest to
apply counter-terrorism pressure against the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan
(TTP), presenting a significant threat to stability in Pakistan's
border regions. We do not expect that dynamic to change.
These groups have leveraged poor economic conditions, lax
governance in Afghanistan, and a sophisticated network to recruit,
train, and sustain an expanding cadre of fighters.
Tragically, even as Iran undermines the Global Coalition in Iraq
and Syria, ISIS-K killed 91 Iranians and injured 284 others in Kerman
on 3 January 2024. This was the deadliest terror attack in Iran since
1979 and it is part of ISIS' efforts to exploit the war in Gaza to
rejuvenate its global attacks. In retaliation, Iran further
destabilized the region by carrying out strikes in Pakistan, Iraq, and
Syria, drawing harsh condemnation from both Pakistani and Iraqi
Governments and reportedly causing civilian casualties in two of these
incidents.
Al Qaeda, while weakened, still enjoys safe havens in Afghanistan
and Yemen. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) operates training
camps, safehouses, and religious schools in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) launched a counter-offensive against
Republic of Yemen Government forces in September 2023, likely to regain
access to historically supportive areas in the southern Governorates.
Both AQIS and AQAP continue to call for lone wolf attacks on United
States and Western interests via their global digital reach.
Opportunities to Counter VEOs
The enduring defeat of the ISIS depends on the repatriation and
reintegration of displaced persons from camps like Al Hol and Al Roj,
and our efforts to encourage this process gained traction in 2023. The
international community repatriated 6,396 displaced persons from Syria,
helping to reduce the population of Al Hol, the largest of the camps,
by 18 percent. Iraq and Syria led the way on repatriating their
citizens, while nations like the Kyrgyz Republic also set the example,
conducting 332 repatriations in 2023. The government of Iraq stepped up
its efforts to shorten the average stay in its rehabilitation centers,
like Jeddah 1, which hold returning citizens until they can be
reintegrated into society. This is also a moral imperative. In my six
visits to Al Hol, I have met adolescent children who arrived in the
camp as infants.
Our partners in Iraq and Syria, including Iraq's Counterterrorism
Service and the Syrian Democratic Forces, continue to demonstrate
improving capability, capacity, competency, and will. In 2023, the ISF
conducted five independent D-ISIS operations without Coalition
assistance. Funding mechanisms like the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip
Fund (CTEF) are key to sustaining this progress and fully transitioning
Iraq's security to Iraqi hands.
In August 2023, the D-ISIS mission in Iraq took a major step
forward when the United States and Iraqi Governments agreed at the
Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue to form a Higher Military
Commission (HMC), a consultative mechanism for the Coalition's
transition. The HMC will enable the transition to an enduring bilateral
security partnership between Iraq and the United States, on a timeline
that factors in the threat from ISIS, operational and environmental
requirements, and the capability of the ISF. CJTF-OIR, in lockstep with
NATO Mission Iraq, will continue to train and develop the ISF until it
is fully capable of independent operations.
In Central and South Asia, we can partner with countries like
Pakistan, Tajikistan, and others to help them address the growing
threat from the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. Our
partners in the region consistently cite counterterrorism as one of
their highest priorities for cooperation and combined training.
Risks to Countering VEOs
Despite gains in the Counter-VEO fight, various groups in the
Central Region retain the capability and will to target U.S. interests
abroad in under 6 months with little to no warning. We assess an attack
on American soil would likely take longer. The reprioritization of
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), targeting expertise,
and linguists creates gaps and seams in our ability to detect and
disrupt plots, increasing freedom of movement for VEOs to plan a strike
against the Homeland. This could be partially mitigated by additional
and alternative ISR assets and cooperation with our Central and South
Asian partners.
Taliban pressure against ISIS-K temporarily disrupted the group's
ability to plan and conduct attacks against the Homeland and Western
targets, but that pressure has been intermittent and insufficient.
ISIS-K and its allies retain a safe haven in Afghanistan, and they
continue to develop their networks in and out of the country. Their
goals do not stop there. They have called for attacks globally on
anyone not aligned with their extremist ideology, and Taliban efforts
to suppress the group have proven insufficient. The recent ISIS attack
in Kerman, Iran demonstrates the group's resiliency and indicates that
they retain the capability and will to conduct spectacular external
operations.
Safe havens like Afghanistan also increase the risk of VEOs
inciting regional conflict. VEOs killed at least 2,300 Pakistanis in
2023, with TTP in particular attacking Pakistan 881 times, the highest
rate in over 5 years. In addition to hundreds of attacks by TTP, ISIS-K
conducted at least three high profile bombings in Pakistan in 2023 and
plotted to conduct more attacks throughout Central Asia. The Taliban's
inability, or unwillingness, to rein in VEOs could destabilize Central
and South Asia.
We must also prevent a premature Coalition departure from Iraq and
Syria. If Iran and Russia were to succeed in their goal of pushing us
out before our partner forces can operate independently, it is my
assessment that ISIS would reconstitute the ability to seize territory
within 2 years. The Global Coalition's sustained presence not only
helps our partners in their fight against ISIS, it also prevents the
reemergence of a physical caliphate and ensures the group does not have
a safe haven in Iraq or Syria to plan global attacks. The eventual
transition to a traditional security cooperation framework must be
predicated on Partner Force Development and Security Sector Reform in
Iraq, and continued repatriations, secure detention facilities, and a
political pathway for the SDF in Syria.
Competing Strategically
Strategic competition is a contest of visions. The United States
and our partners promote a vision in which the rules-based
international order respects the sovereignty of nations and shared
interests are advanced through the strength of partnership. The PRC,
Russia, and Iran have deepened their partnership and collaboration as
Iran seeks to strengthen its regional position, Russia leverages
Iranian military support in Ukraine, and the PRC aims to exploit
tensions in the region to afford them a position of advantage and
diminishes United States interests. According to public reporting,
Supreme Leader Khamenei said in November 2023 that ``death to America''
is not just a slogan, it is a policy. The PRC and Russia increasingly
contribute to Iran's goals through direct assistance or refusing to
apply their own instruments of national power to discourage Iran's
malign behaviors.
For nearly eighty years, since President Roosevelt met with King
Ibn Saud aboard USS Quincy, the United States has formed a network of
hard-earned security partnerships with the Central Region. These
partnerships are more than just objects to be guarded from competitors
like the PRC and Russia, they must be nurtured and reinforced. Our
partnerships are strategic high ground and represent a core strength of
the United States. This is evidenced by our rapid response to recent
trade disruptions caused by Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. The United
States. Fifth Fleet leveraged its decades-long relationships under CMF
to bring together more than 20 nations under Operation Prosperity
Guardian, which protects shipping through the critical Bab al Mandeb
Strait in response to the Houthis' indiscriminate attacks. No other
nation on Earth could generate an international response so quickly,
and it would not have been possible without the trust and
interoperability we have fostered among our allies and partners.
Our partnerships in the Central Region will become even more
valuable as the transformation toward modernization and prosperity
continues. Our partners want the United States to be part of this
transformation, and our competitors know this. In 2023, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (KSA) continued to diversify its economy, exemplified by
Western tourists strolling through massive shopping centers in Riyadh
and ambitious megaprojects, while remaining dedicated to seeking
peaceful coexistence with its neighbors. The United Arab Emirates (UAE)
catapulted itself to global prominence in space, sending an astronaut
to the International Space Station for 6 months and providing the world
with a new map of Mars from its Hope Spacecraft, the second probe ever
to successfully enter Mars orbit on its first try. Just a few months
earlier, in November 2022, Qatar hosted the world's largest sporting
event, the FIFA World Cup, for the first time ever in the Central
Region. American engagement has contributed to this transformation, and
the Central Region of the future will remain open to those who continue
to help it.
Strategic Competition with the People's Republic of China
With telecommunications and physical infrastructure, diplomacy, and
security cooperation, the PRC is rapidly penetrating the Central Region
and feeds misperceptions of American disengagement to try to supplant
the United States as the security partner of choice. In late October
2023, the PRC's outgoing Naval Escort Task Force (NETF), which
ostensibly counters piracy in the Gulf of Aden on rotational
deployments since 2008, visited Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, and Pakistan before
departing the theater. This unprecedented series of port calls was a
milestone in the PRC's nascent campaign to gain security influence and
access.
The term ``security partner'' means something very different to the
PRC than it does to the United States. The PRC offers discounted sales
and rapid delivery of military equipment, and the region is learning
the hidden cost associated with these quick sales. When Chinese
equipment performs poorly, there is no maintenance, logistics, or
training architecture in place. Furthermore, the PRC shows no desire to
support the region's security or stability with military forces. For
example, the PRC's NETF in the Gulf of Aden has done nothing in the
defense of international shipping under Houthi attack, nor has it
responded to the recent series of piracy events in the Somali Basin,
instead solely focusing on the protection of Chinese assets and
interests.
Meanwhile, the PRC has also done little to rein in Iran's
destabilizing behavior since the much-touted rapprochement it brokered
between Tehran and Riyadh in March 2023. Unfortunately, perhaps as
evidence of the lack of depth of the arrangement and tepid commitment
toward actual stability, Iran's actions following the agreement,
including the continued arming of the Houthis, have undermined the very
stability the relations were intended to achieve. It is noteworthy that
the PRC buys 90 percent of exported Iranian oil, which they could use
to influence Iranian lethal aid to the Houthis if they chose to.
Instead, Beijing only helps Tehran evade sanctions and accelerate its
destabilization of the region. The PRC's unwillingness, or inability,
to enforce the terms of its own deal has contributed to Iran's
disruption of the free flow of international commerce.
The Central Region is vital to the PRC achieving its goal of
refashioning the international system to suit its interests and
authoritarian preferences and become the world's leading power.
Increased cooperation between the PRC and the Central Region advances
its Belt and Road projects, strengthens bilateral relations, and helps
regional countries diversify their economies. Trade between the PRC and
the Central Region surpassed $436 billion in 2022, and its investments
in the region under the Belt and Road continued apace in 2023, with
projects in telecommunications, construction, transportation, and more.
A key element of the Belt and Road seeks to create overland
shipping routes between the PRC and Europe through Central and South
Asia, which could bolster regional economies but also carries risk. For
example, Pakistan is the world's third largest recipient of Chinese
loans (behind Russia and Venezuela), receiving over $67 billion to fund
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Now, amid its ongoing economic
crisis, Pakistan is vulnerable to PRC influence.
We have also seen an incremental increase in Beijing's political
investment in the region. In the past 2 years, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait,
KSA, Qatar, and UAE became dialog partners in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, while Iran joined as a full member last year. This year,
Egypt, UAE, and Iran formally joined BRICS. We now routinely see
People's Liberation Army (PLA) general officers serving as Senior
Defense Officials (SDO) or Defense Attaches, whereas just a few years
ago, these would have been mid-grade officers.
The PRC relies on the region for its energy, importing 56 percent
of its crude oil and 43 percent of natural gas from USCENTCOM AOR
countries. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)
announced last year by President Biden, along with six other countries
and the European Union, offers a promising counterbalance to the PRC's
Belt and Road. USCENTCOM's military-to-military relationships can
provide critical and timely insight on projects that could be
incorporated into IMEC. Time and time again, our partners tell us they
would prefer to contract with U.S. or Western companies if a viable
option were available.
We are at risk of deterioration in our strategic relationships and
losing influence to Beijing in the Central Region if we cannot
effectively assist our partners with their security needs. Our partners
recognize the superior quality of our military equipment but, as the
advent of drone warfare has demonstrated, even a third-rate product
employed rapidly and in large quantities can be effective. Often, our
partners cannot accommodate our FMS timelines and are forced to look
elsewhere, opening doors for competitors like the PRC, who has
increased arms sales to the region by 80 percent in the last decade.
We are also monitoring the potential expansion of PLA basing in the
Central Region, beyond their current naval base in Djibouti and border
outpost in Tajikistan. If the PRC were to secure additional PLA naval
bases, it could give them the ability to hold our strategic lines of
communication at risk. Even in ports where they have no intention of
establishing a naval base, Chinese state-owned enterprises that own or
operate terminals could give them considerable political influence to
present us with logistical challenges in a future conflict.
Strategic Competition with Russia
Russia's goals in the Central Region are different from those of
the PRC, but they are no less intent on diminishing American influence
in the region. Russia's primary security interests in the region are
maintaining its access in Syria, preserving its legacy Soviet status in
Central Asia, and developing its military cooperation with Iran.
Russia's two largest foreign bases are in Tajikistan and Syria, both in
the USCENTCOM AOR. Further demonstrating the region's importance to
Russia, Vladimir Putin's only international visits since he launched
the invasion of Ukraine--outside of the PRC, Iran, and the former
Soviet states--were to KSA and UAE.
Over the past year the collaboration between Russia and Iran grew
into a nascent military alliance. Iran has delivered at least 1,000
attack drones, and dozens of multipurpose UAS, to Russia for use in
Ukraine. With Iran's help, Russia plans to build 6,000 UAS domestically
by 2025. After U.N. sanctions on Iran's missile program expired in
October 2023, Russia now intends to purchase hundreds of Iranian
ballistic missiles in the coming months, significantly increasing the
risk of prolonging its war in Ukraine. In return, Russia agreed to
supply Iran with its advanced Su-35 fighter jets, attack helicopters,
and training aircraft.
Our partners in Central Asia observed Russia's unprovoked invasions
of Ukraine and Georgia, and its military's subsequent performance,
raising doubts about its reliability as a security partner.
Furthermore, the lack of intervention by the Russian-led Collective
Security Treaty Organization in the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, despite multiple Armenian requests, underscored the
ineffectiveness of the alliance among the Central Asian states, many of
whom are members. As a result, USCENTCOM has a generational opportunity
to strengthen and expand our partnerships with Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
We also have the opportunity to support U.S. European Command by
coordinating across theater boundaries. When Russia uses the Central
Region to evade sanctions or transport illicit war materiel, we can
work with willing partners to frustrate its logistics. In addition,
when we seize lethal aid that Iran smuggles to its proxies throughout
the region, and when authorized by applicable law, we will work with
the Interagency to transfer it to our Ukrainian partners, just as we
did with 1.1 million rounds of seized rifle ammunition in October 2023.
The growing military alliance between Russia and Iran is expanding
to new domains. Apart from Iran's proliferation of advanced weaponry
with no export controls or end use monitoring, they are also
cooperating in cyber and space. In March 2023, Russia sent Iran digital
surveillance software, and Tehran is seeking more assistance. As of
December 2023, the two countries are reportedly on the verge of signing
a new long--term comprehensive cooperation agreement covering defense,
energy, and space sectors.
Russia welcomed Syria's reintegration into the Arab League in 2023,
which boosted the status of one of its key regional partners while
simultaneously ramping up pressure for the D-ISIS Coalition's
withdrawal. Syria's reintegration was a lifeline for Assad, who has
depended on a mixture of Russian and Iranian support and funding from
drug smuggling to sustain his regime. Additionally, Russia's continued
irresponsible and unprofessional behavior in Syrian airspace and on the
electromagnetic spectrum needlessly raise the risk of miscalculation.
iii. strategic approach
USCENTCOM seizes the opportunities and mitigates the risks that
arise in the Central Region through our strategic approach: People,
Partners, and Innovation. My first 2 years in command reinforced the
value of these three pillars. We've outlined this approach in our
Theater Strategy, new Campaign Plan, and our approach to current
operations. Our approach aligns with the 2022 NDS, which is a call to
action to incorporate our unparalleled network of allies and partners.
USCENTCOM will continue this approach as a security integrator in the
region.
People
Our People--our servicemembers, civilian workforce, contractors,
and supportive families--serve as the bedrock of everything we do. They
are our greatest asset and our most critical resource. Our goal is to
instill in them a sense of accomplishment, purpose, identity, and
belonging. We recognize that the top talent in the workforce, both in
and out of uniform, have many options. As an actively engaged Combatant
Command, we require the best, but also develop and cultivate expertise,
so that the best want to work here.
We seek to attract and retain premier talent to meet our evolving
needs. For example, we hired a team of experts to critically analyze
our operations to ensure we do everything possible to preserve innocent
life, in line with the Department's guidance to mitigate civilian harm.
We also maintain a cadre of Interagency liaisons to support a whole-of-
government strategy in the region, such as our USAID team that enables
us to support humanitarian aid and disaster relief missions.
Our partners see the professionalism of our Service Members as we
engage with them on a daily basis and seek to emulate their example
through investment in reforms across their military formations. Our
Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps is the envy of all other
militaries, and we are working with many of our partners across the
Central Region to build world-class NCO development and education
systems. In Central Asia particularly, our partners are increasingly
seeking our help with NCO development, as we've done with Kazakhstan
over the past 30 years.
Our People are not just in our headquarters and in our subordinate
commands, but across the enterprise that supports our operations,
activities, and investments in the Central Region. Piecemeal reductions
over time, such as rank reductions in our defense attache positions and
reallocation of analytical support across the intelligence community,
have a cumulative effect. As necessary and logical resourcing decisions
have been made to reprioritize assets against other emergent
challenges, risk accumulates over time if cuts are made too quickly or
deeply. Much like blocks being removed from a Jenga tower, the impact
may not be obvious at first, but eventually the tower will fall.
Finally, we are committed to bringing on individuals who can help
accelerate innovation in USCENTCOM. In addition to our Chief Technology
Officer, last year we hired our first Chief Data Officer and an AI &
Robotics Advisor, both of whom will enable our digital modernization
and shift toward data-centric operations. We then initiated our
Technology Residency program in January of this year. The program will
bring in exceptional talent from across the industrial base throughout
the year to support us on a three to 6-month timeline. The Residents
will partner with elements of USCENTCOM staff and components to help
tackle the friction points we encounter in our experimentation, aid in
our data modernization efforts, and contribute key skillsets that are
not organic to the Department of Defense.
Partners
Both the NSS and NDS emphasize the importance of partnership. The
trusted relationships we've built with our partners over decades give
us an advantage over competitors like the PRC and Russia, and
sustaining that advantage is key to our strategic approach in the
Central Region. We help our partners achieve competitive overmatch
versus Iran and suppress VEOs through security integration and
dependable cooperation, such as timely FMS and Foreign Military
Funding. FMS in particular is a double-edged sword that can increase
interoperability and strengthen partnerships, but the slow pace and
complexity of the process often leads to resentment. Our partners
consistently express frustration with delays, issues, and insufficient
explanations. In many cases, delays in our system--coupled with their
security requirements--have led them to look to other nations to fill
their needs.
Our fight against ISIS depends on multilateral constructs like NATO
Mission Iraq and CJTF-OIR, and on our bilateral partnerships in Iraq
and Syria. Our Coalition remains in Iraq at the invitation of the
government. The Government of Iraq faces immense pressure from Iran to
withdraw its invitation for Coalition presence, but they have resisted
external manipulation thus far, even holding their first provincial
elections in a decade in December 2023. Iraq is committed to
cooperating with the United States, reforming its security sector, and
realizing the full development of the ISF, which made strides in 2023.
We are planning for an orderly transition to a normalized military-to-
military relationship featuring traditional security cooperation. In
Syria, the SDF remain committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS, in
detention facilities, in displaced persons camps, and at large--despite
facing an existential threat on their northern border and pressure from
the Assad regime.
Our relationships with the militaries of the Levant Region helped
keep HAMAS' attack on Israel from spiraling into a wider regional
conflict. We have stood side by side with Israel, ensuring it has what
it needs to defend itself, deter Iran and its proxies like Lebanese
Hezbollah from getting further involved, and plan for a transition to
post-conflict. Close coordination with our counterparts in Egypt,
Jordan, and Lebanon allowed us to expedite the flow of humanitarian aid
and facilitate safe operations for organizations like the U.N. Interim
Force in Lebanon. Our partners in the Levant also contribute valuable
forces and expertise to regional security constructs like MEAD and CMF.
Integrating the security efforts of our Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) partners is the linchpin of our strategy to deter Iranian
aggression. GCC members are moving toward operational coordination in
the defense of their territorial airspace and waters, bilaterally and
via multilateral constructs like MEAD, CMF, and IMSC. Specifically, KSA
is enabling interoperability by transforming its Ministry of Defense to
more closely mirror the United States model for national defense.
Qatar's Air Force contributes aircraft to our daily operations
throughout the region. The UAE just completed its second company-level
rotation to our Joint Readiness Training Center, with the goal of
fielding a brigade completely interoperable with United States Forces
by 2028.
Together, the GCC countries can stand strong against Iran. Still,
the strategic importance of the GCC goes beyond any singular adversary.
GCC countries host the United States. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, the
headquarters for CJTF-OIR in Kuwait, and our theater air operations
center and the largest United States military base in the region in
Qatar. The Gulf is also home to the region's economic power centers in
KSA and UAE, and the diplomatic efforts of partners like Qatar and Oman
have helped resolve multiple crises and return American citizens home
safely.
In September 2023, USCENTCOM held its Central and South Asian
Chiefs of Defense Conference in Uzbekistan for the first time in 2
years, an indication of our steadily growing relationships. Our Central
Asian partners are cautiously optimistic about the prospect of
increased security cooperation, especially border defense,
counterterrorism, institutional capacity building, and military
medicine. We are also beginning more advanced training like
cybersecurity and special operations with some partners. With the
region's strategic location between Iran, Afghanistan, the PRC, and
Russia, this momentum in our military-to-military relationships is
invaluable to our national security but it also places constraints on
our partners. We intend to continue cooperation, via programs like
International Military Education and Training and the State Partnership
Program, at a pace with which our Central Asian partners are
individually comfortable.
In South Asia, Pakistan has had a deep and multi-faceted strategic
partnership with the PRC since the 1960's. Ties between the two
countries deepened further in the early 2000's as the two countries
developed shared concerns about the rise of India as a regional power.
Since 2015, nearly 75 percent of Pakistani arms imports came from the
PRC, which represents 40 percent of Chinese arms exports, making
Pakistan Beijing's largest security customer. Nevertheless, Pakistan
seeks United States security and economic assistance. Considering the
weight that Pakistan carries throughout Asia, we must approach our
relationship from the perspective of its own merits. Any security
strategy in Afghanistan will require Pakistan's help. They have
invaluable expertise, access, and geographic location for countering
ISIS-K, and they are willing and capable counterterrorism partners as
they face persistent threats from VEOs like TTP.
Finally, our global partners provide invaluable contributions to
USCENTCOM operations in support of our mutual interests. Our ``Five
Eyes'' partners (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and New Zealand)
share intelligence and commit forces across all three of our lines of
effort. In addition, France continues to be a ready and willing
military partner in defeating ISIS, countering Russia, and deterring
Iranian aggression at sea.
Innovation
In USCENTCOM, we are not just experimenting with new technologies--
we are developing innovative processes, building innovative teams while
encouraging individual contributions, and responding to emerging
threats in innovative ways. Importantly, our personnel use the
capabilities that we are developing in real world operations today. We
are helping to create America's military of the future, not waiting for
it.
USCENTCOM has implemented a wide range of mechanisms and processes
to drive innovation. The Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control
(CJADC2) software suite USCENTCOM employs today is drastically
different from the C2 systems used in counterinsurgency operations of
the past 20 years. The persistent and multidomain threat created by
Iran's ongoing proliferation of advanced weaponry to its proxies
necessitates decisionmaking tools that enable seamless command and
control functions from the tactical to the strategic level in real
time. The importance of speed and a holistic approach in seeing,
understanding, and acting cannot be overstated. The CJADC2 software
suite we have tested, and now use daily, enabled us to thwart numerous
ITN attacks. This momentum must be continued and accelerated through
the Combatant Commands under the Department's strategy. These efforts
are complementary to ongoing work across the Department, and we have
hosted senior officials from across the entire enterprise to share our
lessons learned and help the Joint Force modernize.
Since January 2023, we have conducted a series of quarterly digital
exercises, preceded by month-long software sprints, to develop the
tools needed for CJADC2. CJADC2 is more than just a concept for us, it
is a daily activity that we are improving with each exercise. By
pairing operators with software developers, we are proving that we can
use digital tools to improve our situational awareness, make our
targeting more efficient and effective, improve our planning and
sustainment processes, and embody true digital warfighting. Exercises
like these demonstrate the value of hands-on training with live data
and the centrality of robust networks in CJADC2. We nest our exercises
and experimentation under DOD efforts such as the Global Information
Dominance Experiment series.
In addition to quarterly CJADC2 exercises, we have driven other
events to encourage innovative thinking and solutions. In 2023, we
continued our Innovation Oasis, a ``Shark Tank'' style competition open
to the entire USCENTCOM enterprise. The winning ideas are rapidly
introduced to the force, such as an intuitive software tool for
managing force flow into theater that won last year's competition and
is already in use across the Command. This is indicative of how we look
for innovative responses to our most pressing challenges. For the
counter-UAS problem, we developed a series of tailored ``SANDS''
exercises to address the problem's many unique aspects, and established
an integrated experimentation center in KSA where we can test the
newest technology alongside our partners. Another example is
cybersecurity. In 2023, we held a ``Best Cyber Warrior'' competition in
Oman. Exercises and training events with our partners in rapidly
developing fields like counter-UAS and cybersecurity are key to
establishing regional competitive overmatch versus Iran.
We also organized our subordinate commands to encourage innovation,
with each now operating an innovation task force tailored to their
unique domain. On land, Task Force 39 is experimenting with additive
manufacturing, counter-UAS technologies, and unmanned logistics
vehicles.
At sea, Task Force 59 has not only revolutionized how the U.S. Navy
incorporates robotic and AI systems, but now contributes daily to
regional maritime security, and encourages partner investments in
unmanned surface and subsurface vehicles. Last year we launched
Operation GATEKEEPER, the largest operational employment of
multinational unmanned surface vessels in the world. GATEKEEPER allows
us and our partners to not only increase maritime domain awareness
across 18,000 square kilometers in the North Arabian Sea, but unlike an
operation with manned assets, it enables continuous presence.
In the air, Task Force 99 is testing a wide range of new
technologies to expand our air superiority, including long endurance
ISR platforms that can fly for days and low-cost 3D-printed UAS, some
built for as little as $3,000 in 8 hours. Task Force 99 is also
experimenting with new tools for expeditionary aviation logistics and
exploring new ways to detect and counter jamming.
Our special operations innovation task force, TF 179, is developing
digital and unmanned solutions for ISR, target information sharing,
electronic warfare, and payload delivery. For example, TF 179 takes
advantage of USSOCOM's rapid acquisition capabilities to field
disposable, swarming unmanned systems that can be employed unilaterally
or through a surrogate force as a one-way attack platform, electronic
warfare delivery, or tactical ISR.
iv. conclusion
The United States cannot just articulate a vision of integration
and partnership for a brighter future that aligns the interests of the
United States and our partners; we must match that vision with the
commitment necessary to give partners the confidence to continue on
that path with us. There is a narrative that the Central Region is too
fraught with turmoil to be considered worthy of American investment.
Twenty-plus years of American military engagement in both Iraq and
Afghanistan play to this narrative. But the past, while it may serve as
prologue, does not predetermine the future. The vision, the hopes, and
the ambitions of our partners throughout the Central Region are
palpable and they are real. Equally real are those recidivist forces
attempting to undermine those who seek progress, pulling them back into
a past checkered with violence and disorder.
We are and should remain engaged in every corner of the Central
Region, from Egypt to Kazakhstan and from Lebanon to Pakistan,
strengthening our partners and securing our vital national interests.
Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, and coast guardsmen
are executing critical operations that contribute to the collective
security of the U.S. and our partners. They operate in harm's way each
day: whether it is an F-15 pilot flying missions in support of our
Iraqi partners; the USS Carney patrolling the Red Sea and defeating
Houthi attacks; a Patriot Battery protecting our forces and those of
our partners; a Marine Task Force ready to respond to crisis; a U.S.
Space Force detachment combatting adversary attempts at jamming; or a
United States Coast Guard boarding team interdicting a shipment of
Iranian weapons. The women and men of U.S. Central Command remain
committed to the vision of a stable Central Region in which U.S.
national interests are secure and our partners prosper.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Kurilla.
General Langley, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL E. LANGLEY, USMC COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES AFRICA COMMAND
General Langley. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker,
distinguished Committee Members, it is an honor to appear
before you today representing the outstanding servicemembers,
civilians, and families of the United States Africa Command.
I am proud to testify with my good friend General Kurilla,
the Commander of United States Central Command. Now, today I am
also joined by my USAID advisor, Ms. Maura Barry Boyle, and
also my State Department foreign advisor, Mr. Phil Nelson. They
represent AFRICOM's whole-of-government team and integrated
approach to Africa.
In the last year, thanks to your authorities, resourcing,
and support, AFRICOM all-star team responded to numerous crises
and conflicts across the continent. They performed flawlessly,
and I am honored and proud to serve among them.
Today's global events, ranging from Russian Federation's
war in the Ukraine to the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea,
directly impact the lives of millions of Africans. Terrorism,
poverty, food insecurity, climate change, and mass migration
shatter African lives.
These factors sow the seeds of extremism and Russian
exploitation across entire regions of the continent. AFRICOM's
campaign revolves around central themes of ensuring strategic
access, countering threats to the Homeland and U.S. interests,
preparing for and responding to crises, and last, bolstering
our allies and partners.
This campaign places our African partners at the center,
achieving positive change by executing African led and United
States enabled operations focused on our shared objectives. In
today's dynamic environment, our whole-of-government partners
require appropriate resourcing.
I strongly advocate for our State Department and USAID
partners to receive the resources they need to guarantee our
combined success. I would also like to highlight a campaign
that benefits from our Congress, which supports the African
Center of Strategic Studies, which is celebrating its 25th
anniversary.
In Africa, modest investments and resources go a long way
toward achieving our National Security interests. Africa faces
many challenges, but also offers even more opportunities.
With our African partners at the forefront, reinforced by
our efforts and the efforts of our allies, we will continue to
gain ground toward achieving lasting stability, security, and
prosperity on this crucial continent.
Thank you for giving me an opportunity to be here today,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Michael E. Langley
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Michael E. Langley
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, distinguished Committee
Members, United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is steadfast in
protecting America's interests across a vast and dynamic continent.
This Combatant Command is committed to our shared values--including
civilian control of armed forces, the rule of law, and respect for
human rights--while responding to fluid situations in Africa. To
accomplish our mission, USAFRICOM weaves together a community of
military professionals who work in concert with America's allies and
partners.
USAFRICOM's team is synchronized across the executive branch to
achieve whole-of-government effects alongside the U.S. Department of
State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the
Intelligence Community, and other U.S. agencies. This Command views
itself as one part of a three-part team of diplomacy, development, and
defense professionals--what we call the ``3D'' approach. Using this
approach, we operate at the intersection of the interests of the
American and African peoples. These common interests provide fertile
ground for cultivating multinational collaboration focused on achieving
peace and prosperity throughout the continent.
We work together with our sovereign African partners as they
implement their own solutions to achieve a just, secure, and prosperous
future. Such a future is a common aspiration of the United States,
African states, and the international community. We work together
because no organization or nation--African or otherwise--has the
resources to overcome these challenges alone. America's lead for that
collaboration is the Department of State and its diplomats at embassies
throughout Africa. USAFRICOM stands in support of our diplomats, just
as we support USAID officers who lead development and humanitarian
efforts. Representing the `defense' component of our 3D approach, we
manage security cooperation and other missions in Africa in ways that
support diplomacy and development activities. Ultimately, sustainable
long-term progress relies on governance and development, which enable
African nations to lay firm foundations to achieve economic and
security self-reliance. The need is most acute in partners like Libya,
where--in the wake of tragic flooding last year--USAFRICOM joined the
United States Special Envoy to Libya and USAID officials on the ground
to deliver 13 metric tons of humanitarian aid and engage with senior
Libyan leaders. By itself, this event was small. Yet it illustrated how
this Command works within the interagency in accordance with the
National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy.
The adversities facing America on today's global stage constrain
the resources available to USAFRICOM, making us an ``economy of force''
theater. USAFRICOM carefully stewards modest funds and personnel to
maximize effects in close alignment with other Combatant Commands and
the U.S. interagency. Our efforts build on each other. Where USAFRICOM
helps cultivate security, State and USAID resources can cultivate
economic and human development, so African Governments have more
resources for security independence. To describe how we allocate our
limited resources, we begin by setting the stage: a vast continent with
a diverse security State of play.
The contrasts across Africa's operating environment are stark. Some
of the continent's governments are struggling to stave off State
failure, while others enjoy the benefits of modern development and
reliable governance. While Africa has some of the least developed
countries in the world, more than 20 African countries have space
programs. Our newest Component Command, U.S. Space Forces Europe and
Africa (SPACEFOREUR-AF), activated in December at Ramstein Airbase,
Germany, will drive our defense space collaboration. Challenges on the
continent cover a spectrum from natural disasters to corruption to
terrorism. This spectrum of challenges requires a spectrum of solutions
spearheaded by African peoples and authorities. Given its vast size--
three times the landmass of the continental United States--we consider
the continent region by region.
The recent military takeovers in West Africa are giving space to
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) and our strategic adversaries.
In East Africa, al-Shabaab and ISIS bring violence to peoples already
struggling with inter-ethnic clashes and climate-related food and water
shortages. Conflict and climate challenges also loom over the vast
populations and natural resources of Central Africa, while Southern
Africa faces economic and energy shortfalls, combined with an ISIS
insurgency in Mozambique. Our support to several partners, most notably
those in North Africa, is complicated by differences over the conflict
in Gaza, along with Libya's long-running struggle to achieve a united
government and military force.
Use of kinetic military force is a last resort that can produce
fleeting or counterproductive outcomes. Therefore, USAFRICOM's approach
is to help African peoples address underlying conditions. We
operationalize the toolkit of security cooperation through the Security
Force Assistance Brigade and medical team deployments, institutional
capacity building, multinational exercises like AFRICAN LION,
intelligence and information sharing, and logistical assistance. The
United States National Guard Bureau's State Partnership Programs in
Africa complements our operations. Last year, the National Guard
launched State Partnership Programs that joined North Carolina's
National Guard citizen-soldiers with Malawi and Zambia, which look
forward to decades of mutually beneficial training and relationship
building. Our naval assets--especially the USS Hershel ``Woody''
Williams and the USNS Trenton--fly the Stars and Stripes during joint
patrols and maritime engagements in strategic ports along Africa's
19,000 miles of coastline. Partner counterterrorism forces benefit from
American equipment and training in combat skills, support to
operations, the law of armed conflict and civilian harm mitigation.
These programs flow into the USAFRICOM Enlisted Development Strategy,
which reinforces Africa's Non-Commissioned Officer Corps--the backbone
of all professional military forces. At the forefront of our campaign,
USAFRICOM senior leaders crisscross the continent conducting defense
diplomacy to reinforce relationships with governments that are crucial
to our ability to defend America's interests, both today and in the
future.
west africa
During the past 3 years, national defense forces turned their guns
against their own elected governments in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali,
and Niger. These juntas avoid accountability to the peoples they claim
to serve. An understanding of West Africa's spike in coups--and
potential remedies--requires an appreciation for the underlying
conditions that laid the groundwork for coups in the first place.
The drivers for coups in Africa include endemic corruption, lagging
development, weak democratic institutions, and a shortage in strategic
patience. Criminal groups and terrorists aligned with al-Qaeda and ISIS
exploited underdeveloped, under-governed areas to prey on vulnerable
populations. Popular grievances grew against historical colonial
powers. Centralized national governments lacked the ability to defeat
extremists, purge corruption, provide basic services, and mediate
inter-ethnic conflicts over limited resources like access to land and
fisheries. Coup leaders overthrew elected governments claiming they
will fix these problems.
Having overthrown legitimate governments, however, these coup
leaders find themselves distanced from security partners like
USAFRICOM, European allies and United Nations peacekeeping missions.
Instead of making progress, the junta leaders and their constituents
see their security problems only get worse. African mechanisms for
multinational collaboration--like the G5 Sahel--dissolve. Violence
against civilians increases. As security worsens, coup states need
international partners more than ever, and they turn to partners who
lack restrictions in dealing with coup governments: our strategic
competitors--particularly Russia.
We work with all African partners to improve security training and
assistance to help safeguard sovereign nations that share our values of
constitutional, civilian-led government. We do not give orders to--or
otherwise control--our partners, including graduates of U.S. military
training programs. Yet, USAFRICOM activities have helped to prevent
coups by educating military leaders about the negative consequences for
security partnerships with competitors. If America ceased providing
training to African militaries in reaction to a handful of trainees
becoming involved in coup attempts--usually years after their
training--the risk of more military takeovers would only grow. Our
whole-of-government approach, including persistent engagement with
problematic partners, is the best way America can help mitigate the
risk of future coups and encourage military juntas to rejoin the rules-
based international order. When Africa's military officers understand
the painful security, diplomatic and development penalties levied
against coup states, and they participate in defense education that
strengthens their already ingrained aversion to coups, they are less
likely to view a military takeover as a viable path to solving
disagreements with democratically elected civilian leadership.
USAFRICOM needs to stay in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea to
limit the spread of terrorism across the region and beyond. Amid
withdrawals of European and United Nations missions--often directed by
the host nation, we have remained because West African leaders ask for
our continued assistance and presence. They value our security
cooperation because it is both effective and politically neutral.
Recent history shows that Moscow and Beijing jump to fill the void when
American engagement wanes or disappears, and we cannot afford to do
that in West Africa.
Even where our engagement is restricted, we continue key tasks,
such as surveilling VEOs and supporting USAID's unfaltering
humanitarian assistance. The 2019 Global Fragility Act enables
collective U.S. effort to assist coastal West African states, which are
facing growing threats from Sahel-based VEOs and illegal, unregulated,
and unreported (IUU) fishing that saps a priceless national resource
for food and employment. USAFRICOM support is key to stemming the rise
of Russian disinformation, human rights abuses, and private military
company expansion that exploits sovereign resources and fosters violent
extremism.
east africa
USAFRICOM's main effort in the Horn of Africa is supporting the
Somali Government's fight against al Qaeda's largest franchise--al-
Shabaab--as well as ISIS-Somalia. We returned to a persistent deployed
presence in Somalia in 2022. We are providing training, logistical
support, medical evacuation, and intelligence to vetted units in the
Somali National Army (SNA)--the Danab commandos--and collaborating with
the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Last year, we
conducted 18 air strikes requested by SNA commanders and removed a
global ISIS facilitator and leader in Somalia, Bilal al-Sudani. None of
these operations caused a single civilian casualty.
With the SNA at the helm, we have seen progress in Somalia, but we
also see mounting challenges. ATMIS is expected to be phased out by
2025 and the SNA is not currently prepared to defeat al-Shabaab, even
though their training, firepower, and ability to muster resources
outmatches al-Shabaab. Where the SNA most needs help is in reinforcing
battlefield gains and providing resilient security for development of
sustainable local governance that can root out lingering al-Shabaab
influences. Al-Shabaab dominates swaths of Somali territory and
regularly launches attacks into Mogadishu and other cities. Al-Shabaab
is poised to exploit any reduction in counter-terrorism pressure by
rejuvenating their ability to attack the United States Homeland and our
facilities in East Africa.
Our largest facility in Africa is in Djibouti, a few minutes' drive
from the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) only overseas military
base. Beijing is deeply invested in the Horn of Africa, as it is across
the African continent. USAFRICOM does not offer African partners
``United States vs PRC'' ultimatums, because our partners rely heavily
on China's economic and infrastructure investments. We seek to out-
compete the PRC in the security cooperation arena--and African
militaries see the difference. In comparing the quality of training and
equipment, USAFRICOM's partnership offers stark advantages over PRC
partnership. African partners consistently prefer United States defense
assistance, but they often have to turn toward Beijing when United
States timelines do not meet their urgent needs.
Being a trusted partner in East Africa allows USAFRICOM to respond
to crises. For example, a civil war unexpectedly broke out in Sudan
last April--and USAFRICOM was ready when the State Department called.
Within hours, we were coordinating with the U.S. interagency, both
parties in the civil war, and our allies and partners. Within days we
were joining forces with those allies and partners to rescue Americans
and others in need who were caught in the crossfire. Within weeks,
Embassy staff and Americans in need of evacuation had safely crossed
the Red Sea. While the evacuation last year was a success, the Sudanese
people still face protracted fighting, displacement, ethnic cleansing,
and potential famine.
The world is watching conflicts across East Africa. Inter-ethnic
clashes involving Ethiopia and Eritrea have defined the ever-shifting
landscape of opportunistic alliances that leave civilians in jeopardy.
Eritrea's alignment with Russia risks establishing a Russian base on
the Red Sea, endangering global commerce and freedom of movement in
this critical maritime highway. Houthi attacks on commercial shipping
in the Red Sea demonstrate that threats to African partners don't have
to originate in Africa to have an effect in Africa. Even though the Red
Sea marks a geographic boundary between United States Combatant
Commands, USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM seamlessly coordinate to help inform
and protect our African partners from these threats. This relationship
demonstrates the interoperability USAFRICOM has with all Geographic and
Functional Combatant Commands in support of the Department's globally
integrated construct.
We can't overlook the progress in East Africa. Kenya is a leading
force behind regional security efforts, including the African Union's
ATMIS mission in Somalia. Last year, the Tanzanians hosted our annual
pan-Africa communications and cyber symposium AFRICA ENDEAVOR, and this
year they will host our annual African Directors of Military
Intelligence Conference. Tanzania is charting a non-aligned course
between us and the PRC to maximize development and economic
opportunities to support their emergence as a hub for continent-wide
defense collaboration. With continued USAFRICOM support, East Africa as
a region can also progress toward security self-reliance and full
participation in global defense of the rules-based order.
north africa
Our partnership with North Africa dates to just after the American
Revolution--America's longest treaty relationship is with Morocco.
USAFRICOM is proud to build on that legacy. Morocco and Tunisia are
significant contributors to regional security along NATO's southern
flank. Algeria is a highly capable partner often aligned with United
States objectives. Our continual engagement with these predominantly
Muslim countries has created resilient bonds. One engagement in
particular, USAFRICOM's flagship annual exercise AFRICAN LION, relies
primarily on our North African partners as they make game-changing
contributions in training their African neighbors. Morocco and Tunisia
also joined USAFRICOM at last year's Exercise PHOENIX EXPRESS, which
trained Africa's maritime forces to combat IUU fishing and criminal
smuggling. Empowering female sailors was a cornerstone of that
exercise, driven by 2017's Women, Peace and Security Act.
Libya is struggling to realize the vast potential of its people and
natural wealth. Competition between rival political stakeholders
poisons Libyan prospects for development and internal security. The
solution lies with the Libyan people, but USAFRICOM's role is to
contribute within our whole-of-government 3D approach alongside allies
and partners. USAFRICOM is on the United States State Department's team
to facilitate trust between Libya's factions and close the fissures in
their security leadership. USAFRICOM is on USAID's team to provide
life-saving humanitarian aid and development assistance. Our goal is to
facilitate the establishment of legitimate, unified governance that
answers to its people while protecting Libyan sovereignty and resources
from VEOs and Russian encroachment. The emergence of a strong Libya
will be a victory for the stability of North Africa and the national
security of the United States.
central and southern africa
As in Libya, the solutions to Central and Southern Africa's
security challenges are not military, but are diplomatic and
developmental. The tragic conflict between the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Rwanda has long threatened to descend into a full-scale
war, and America is joining with African partners to provide mechanisms
that build trust and de-escalate tensions.
Our Central and Southern African partners have little trust in our
strategic adversaries, but these partners need what Chinese and Russian
companies offer: infrastructure, inexpensive equipment, and quick
financial incentives. These countries are in a dilemma: they must
balance their development needs against risks to national sovereignty.
Chinese and Russian companies have used predatory tactics to entangle
African states in debt and extractive contracts that leave local
populations in the lurch. America offers an alternative. U.S.
diplomatic, development, and defense support does not hold their
peoples and natural resources hostage, so we do not impose a moral
balancing act on our partners. Instead of demanding financial and
political concessions, we demand accountability on the fundamentals:
respect for human rights and the rule of law. These are interests we
share with peoples throughout Central and Southern Africa.
In this region, the stakes are high. Its wealth of critical
minerals contrasts sharply with its vulnerability to natural disasters.
USAFRICOM's approach is to enable information sharing and to support
our State Department and USAID colleagues to cultivate climate
resilience in governments and security forces. Geospatial data sharing
is a low-cost, high-impact way to equip our partners' forces to deal
with the criminal and terrorist elements that prey upon our partners'
safety and sovereign natural resources. Those resources include staple
local food sources--notably fish--and minerals designated by the U.S.
Department of the Interior as critical for our national security.
Chromium, cobalt, manganese, tantalum--the list is long. If we don't
support host nations in securing these resources, the implications for
America's defense edge will be grim. These are critical minerals for
our adversaries too.
When we look at partners in southern Africa, we see a bright and
secure future for the peoples of southern Africa. Angola is moving away
from its historical partnership with Moscow to embrace United States
military cooperation. This puts them on the fast track for becoming a
regional security exporter in its own right. South Africa is the
leading contributor to the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)
military force that is overcoming ISIS-Mozambique's insurgency in Cabo
Delgado. In a historical `first' for USAFRICOM--this year's iteration
of our flagship annual Chiefs of Defense Conference will be on the
African continent, co-hosted by the Botswana Defense Force. USAFRICOM
looks forward to this and numerous other senior leader conferences in
Africa during coming years, because these events culminate in the
multinational defense collaboration that paves the way toward our
common security objectives.
conclusion
The outcome for which we all strive in Africa--the outcome most
important to America's national security--is a continent of free, safe,
prosperous, and resilient nations that hold their peoples' interests at
heart. We seek to foster nations that are self-reliant for domestic
defense and are able to provide defense assistance to their neighbors
through bilateral, multinational, and international security
collaboration frameworks. The nations of Africa are on the road to
achieving this goal, and some have arrived. For those that have not,
they need USAFRICOM support more than ever.
It is sobering to see our international allies downsizing in
Africa. France's considerable counterterrorism presence is at a low
point. The U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali has departed, and the
mission in DRC is drawing down. International funding for African Union
peacekeepers in Somalia beyond this year is unresolved. Because of this
trend, USAFRICOM will continue to reinforce security cooperation
programs that reenergize partnerships with African militaries. Those
forces are the world's first line of defense against technologically
savvy VEOs, and they need to build capacity to keep pace in this 21st
century contest.
The second-order value proposition of USAFRICOM's capacity-and
relationship-building effort is competition with America's strategic
adversaries. While our allies are moving out, our adversaries are
moving in. Last year, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
completed its first circumnavigation of the continent since 2018. In
the last few years, Russian military forces--both public and private--
have made in-roads in West Africa's coup states, the Central African
Republic, and Libya. Russian fighters claim to fight terrorists, but
they do so at a grave human and financial cost to their host nations.
Moscow's disinformation machine is adept at obfuscating their
atrocities, and the Kremlin's agents are keen to spread disinformation
and meddle in their African clients' domestic political affairs while
claiming to provide ``security.''
Information sharing is a key component of USAFRICOM's campaign on
the continent. It goes to the core of our value proposition to Africa's
defense forces. Maritime domain awareness and geospatial intelligence
enable our partners to take the fight to terrorists, smugglers,
pirates, and IUU fishing operations. We shed light on Russian
disinformation and the risks of partnership with unregulated Chinese
industries. The information we provide trainees on human rights, civil-
military relations, law of armed conflict, and civilian casualty
avoidance is our best means of deterring our military partners from the
pitfalls of operating on a continent as diverse and dynamic as Africa.
Africa is big, and so are its challenges. There is high potential
for strategic-level national security threats to grow this year.
Africa's critical minerals and maritime shipping lanes become more
important to America's technological and energy independence every day.
Coups in West Africa have distracted local security forces from
fighting VEOs, giving branches of al Qaeda and ISIS room to expand,
modernize, and reconstitute capabilities to threaten the United States
Homeland. America's fastest-growing partners for trade, space
exploration, and scientific exchange are in Africa, and its young and
fast-growing populations are the key to safeguarding the global rules-
based order. USAFRICOM is shoulder-to-shoulder with our State
Department and USAID colleagues to do America's part in helping Africa
address its challenges. If we fail in Africa, our strategic competitors
will move in. If we succeed, so do the peoples of Africa.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Langley.
General Kurilla, you are facing numerous and complex threats,
and that is probably an understatement. Is there a purely
military solution to the complex threat you face?
General Kurilla. Thank you, Chairman, for that question.
There is no purely military solution to all the complex threats
that we face.
We need not only a whole-of-government, all the instruments
of national power between diplomatic, informational, military,
and economic. We need an international solution to a lot of the
problems that we are seeing in the Middle East.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, and how are you trying to
integrate these efforts? I know you were just in the region. I
know personally you are engaging. What are you doing to get the
whole team on the field?
General Kurilla. What we do is, we have a lot of regional
conferences that we bring people together. I spend the majority
of my time either talking to my partners or over in the region,
physically looking at them eye to eye.
We work together to be able to try and solve a lot of these
problems. I try and look at the problems and their challenges
in the region through their eyes, because they understand the
region far better than we ever will, and they provide some
interesting solutions and very helpful solutions on how we
should approach certain aspects of that.
We do have a regional security construct that we get
together and we discuss these on.
Chairman Reed. The Houthis have and are continuing to
disrupt significant trade and threaten our ships and
international ships. It seems difficult to deter them. I know
we spoke about the lack of intelligence. Could you indicate
some of the obstacles you are facing in deterring the Houthis,
or taking them out, if you will?
General Kurilla. Chairman Reed, our campaign in the Red Sea
is to restore freedom of navigation in the Red Sea Bab al-
Mandab and the Gulf of Aden. It focuses on protecting the ships
that are there.
We have 24 nations that are part of the operation
protecting those ships. Seventeen of them talk about it
publicly, and then we also want to degrade the Houthis'
offensive capability, anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship
cruise missiles, and a myriad of other systems that they are
using, all provided by Iran.
But to degrade that capability means nothing if Iran is
able to resupply them. So, we have an effort to deny Iran the
ability to resupply them, and that is where we need more of an
international and a whole-of-government approach to be able to
stop Iran from resupplying the Houthis.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Kurilla.
General Langley, last year you spoke about the Wagner Group's
activities. I know there has been some changes in the Wagner
Group. They are still a presence in the AOR I assume.
General Langley. Yes, Chairman, there is.
Chairman Reed. Last year, you indicated how they are really
extorting these countries rather than helping them in any way,
shape, or form. The question arises, what are we doing in terms
of information campaign to try to inform governments and the
people of the dangers that these groups, not just Wagner
groups, but other entities are posing?
General Langley. Chairman, thanks for that question,
because I would say the Russian Federation's narrative drowned
out the United States Government's in the past years. They were
accelerant.
The Russian Federation, not just through Wagner, stoked a
lot of the instability across the Sahel. They did this through
misinformation, disinformation campaigns. So, I see how we
could double down in our efforts is through our own information
campaign but matched with our assurance efforts--assurance
efforts across a whole-of-government.
Just not building military and security capacity, but the
story needs to be told about the successes of USAID and State
Department collectively and all of our operations, activities,
and investments.
Chairman Reed. That requires additional resources, I
presume?
General Langley. Yes, Chairman, it certainly does.
Especially in the information operations.
Chairman Reed. I also will presume that timely passage of
the supplemental appropriation, as well as the regular
appropriations would be critically important to your Command.
Is that correct?
General Langley. Absolutely, Chairman. Because, you know,
as we are looking at a CR [continuing resolution], and during
this period of the continued resolution, we are canceling a
number of operations, activities and investments, and also my
biggest capstone exercise in Morocco, African Lion, is going to
have effects.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. General Kurilla, passing the
supplemental as well as the budget is critical to Central
Command?
General Kurilla. It is absolutely critical on the
supplemental Chairman, $2.4 billion, $531 million of which is
for counter unmanned aerial system defense, the very systems
that are shooting down a lot of these systems. It is for our
command and control systems. It is for a lot of the
modernization efforts that we need.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do
appreciate the Chair and the General pointing out the
importance of passage of the supplemental. I would gently make
this point about the regular appropriation bills.
In the Senate, they were all reported by the Democratic
Chairman and the Republican Ranking Member. For reasons not
clear to many of us, the distinguished Democratic leader has
chosen not to bring the bills up to the floor before the end of
the fiscal year in regular order, and that is mystifying to me.
There is no one else on the face of the earth that can
bring an appropriation bill to the floor other than the
Democratic leader, and I certainly share the unhappiness and
disappointment on both sides of the dais about the fact that we
have not been able to get our appropriations done on time.
General Kurilla, we would like to avoid war with Iran, correct?
General Kurilla. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Now, does Iran seek war with the United
States?
General Kurilla. They do not, Senator.
Senator Wicker. They would like to avoid a head to head war
with the United States, and so, they use proxies. From October
2023 through January of this year, Iranian backed militia
groups targeted United States Forces in Iraq and Syria more
than 150 times. Iranian backed militia groups attacked our
forces more than 150 times. That is correct, is it not?
General Kurilla. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Wicker. We responded just eight times militarily.
Is that correct, General?
General Kurilla. That number sounds correct, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Now, unfortunately, the proxy attacks
continued and on January 28th of this year, 3 United States
servicemen were killed and more than 30 were injured at Tower
22 in Jordan. That is also correct, isn't it?
General Kurilla. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Okay. My understanding is that with a
little bit of extra luck, the Iranian backed militias would
have been able to inflict earlier casualties. Is that correct?
General Kurilla. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Okay. So, before the deadly attack on Tower
22, how many instances were there in which Iranian backed
attacks came close to killing United States personnel?
General Kurilla. I don't have the exact numbers, Senator,
but there are several incidents where UAVs [unmanned aerial
vehicles] coming into a base, hit another object, got caught up
in a netting or other incidents where had they hit the
appropriate target that they were targeting, it would have
injured or killed servicemembers.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, in your military judgment to us
as members of this branch of Government, what type of military
action might we have taken to prevent the attack on Tower 22
and earlier ones that you just referred to?
General Kurilla. Specifically on Tower 22 and the other
ones specifically, there was action taken, as we said, on that
eight times that were taken. My job as the Combatant Commander
is to provide options ranging from kinetic to cyber, and I
balance the risk of those options against escalation when I
provide those to the Secretary of Defense and the President.
Senator Wicker. Sure, and I would not ask you what advice
you gave up the chain to the Commander in Chief, but what are
you telling us your opinion is as to whether we should have
responded more than seven times?
General Kurilla. I think the key to establishing deterrence
is Iran has to understand there are consequences to their
actions. I think on the last attack that we did against 85
targets, our messaging matched our actions, and then we killed
an individual name, al-Saadi.
He was the Kataib Hezbollah overall commander for Syria,
and I think that sent a very strong deterrent message, and we
have not had an attack in 32 days in Iraq and Syria. But I will
tell you that deterrence is temporary.
Senator Wicker. General, in 1988, Operation Praying Mantis,
you are familiar with that, are you not?
General Kurilla. I am, Senator.
Senator Wicker. That involved the United States destroying
much of the Iranian navy. That did not lead to a war between
the United States and the navy, but it pretty much put a stop
to what they were doing at the time. Is that correct?
General Kurilla. That is accurate, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Do we have the capability to degrade either
the Houthi maritime security or the Iranian maritime security?
General Kurilla. Well, the Houthis don't really have a
maritime force. They do have explosive unmanned surface vessels
and underwater unmanned vessels. We hit those when we see them.
In fact, we hit three of them yesterday and destroyed them. In
terms of the Iranians, we do have the capability in the
Department of Defense (DOD) to do that.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and thank you, General Kurilla
and General Langley for your service and for being here this
morning. Thank you for the maps. I love the maps the DOD gives
us. Picking up on that, I thought it would be helpful for us to
have a map of AFRICOM and most of CENTCOM I think is in there,
with respect to where we don't have Ambassadors.
I really appreciated both of you talking about a whole-of-
government approach that you are doing in your areas of
responsibility, because, as you point out, there isn't a
military solution in these countries. I wanted to show this
map. You can see by the pins where we do not have Ambassadors
in Africa and also in Turkmenistan.
We have eight open missions in Africa, the African Union,
in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, the biggest most populous country in
Africa, Cabo Verde, Djibouti, where Senator Wicker pointed out
the Chinese have a base, Liberia, Somalia, Burundi, and Burkina
Faso. We also do not have an ambassador in Turkmenistan, in
CENTCOM.
How important is it for us to have Ambassadors in the
countries where you are operating to help us move the missions
that we have in these countries? I would ask both of you to
respond to that.
General Langley. Senator, it is very essential that we
have, especially with our whole-of-government approach. These
African partners understand that we are here to help them reach
their overall national goals of stability and security.
But when we bring our assurance actions and our African
campaign plan and say three D, they say, okay, then why are we
important enough to have an ambassador? So, it doe draw a
strategic communication that can be exploited and leveraged by
the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China
(PRC). It is certainly essential.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and I would point out that the
PRC has Ambassadors in all of those countries. General Kurilla.
General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator. Actually, it has been
a great year for CENTCOM in terms of getting Ambassadors
confirmed, so I thank this body for that. In Turkmenistan, the
recent Ambassador did recently leave so we actually had a
very--it is critical to have an ambassador. I talked to the
Ambassador from Afghanistan--from Iraq just this morning.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I would hope that our
colleagues on both sides of the aisle, but particularly those
Republican colleagues who have been blocking these Ambassadors,
will help us get this done. It is in our National Security
interest to have Ambassadors in these countries.
It helps not just with your mission, but with other efforts
that Americans are making in those countries. General Kurilla,
I just returned from a trip to Turkey. I met with President
Erdogan.
We were the first congressional delegation to meet with
President Erdogan since 2019. It seems like there may be an
opening for a new--to reset somewhat our relationship with
Turkey. One of the things we talked about with Syria and the
potential for us to cooperate more going forward in Syria.
I recognize we have challenges in trying to do that. But as
we look at the role that Iran and Russia are playing in Syria,
it seems like that might be an opportunity for us. Can you talk
about what we are doing currently to maintain military-to-
military deconfliction relations with Turkey and how we might
benefit from more cooperation there.
General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator. I welcome the
opportunity to collaborate more with Turkey. As you know, that
is part of the EUCOM Combatant Command. But we are in Turkey--
or sorry, we are in Syria for the enduring defeat of ISIS and
that is the whole reason that we are inside of there.
What I do look forward to is the ability to cooperate with
Turkey in a more wholesome manner going forward on that.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. What is CENTCOM doing to
try and ensure the repatriation of ISIS fighters who are a real
threat in that region?
General Kurilla. Senator, last week I was in Syria. I was
at the Al-Hol detention--IDP camp, and I was in the Al-Roj IDP
[internally displaced people] camp. We have been making quite--
good progress. I think almost 7,000 have been repatriated in
2023.
When I was in there, what we try and do--the large
population of those are Iraqi. We are trying to move those back
into a place called Jeddah one. It is the throughput there
before they go back into the communities. There has been other
countries that have done a tremendous job on repatriating their
people.
Kyrgyzstan is one of them, and we have gone from a high of
70,000 in Al-Hol camp, we are down to 43,000 right now. So, we
are making progress. We would like to make faster progress. The
other thing is the ISIS army in detention.
Over 9,000 detainees across 27 different detention
facilities in Syria. We need to repatriate those detainees for
either to face prosecution or reintegration and rehabilitation
back into their societies.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you both very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer--excuse me,
Senator Shaheen. Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for being here today. General Kurilla, in your written
testimony, you stated that, ``despite gains in the counter VEO
fight, various groups in the central region retain the
capability and will to target U.S. interests abroad in under 6
months with little or no warning.''
I remain deeply concerned about our ability to conduct over
the horizon counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. We have
conducted only one strike against a target in Afghanistan since
that withdrawal. We don't have reliable partners on the ground
or basing agreements with neighboring countries, and we rely on
Pakistan for access to Afghan airspace.
Despite these challenges, your mission of preventing ISIS-K
or other terrorist groups from successfully conducting another
large scale attack on the United States or our partners remain
an integral part of our National Defense Strategy.
General, in your written testimony, you also stated that,
``the reprioritization of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance targeting expertise and linguists creates gaps
and seams in our ability to detect and disrupt plots,
increasing freedom of movement for VEOs to plan a strike
against the Homeland.''
That, ``this could be partially mitigated by additional and
alternative ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance)
assets and cooperation with our Central and South Asian
partners.'' Have you requested any additional or alternative
ISR assets from your chain of command that have not been
provided?
General Kurilla. Senator, I have made the assessment of
order required to accomplish all of these missions, and I have
passed it up to the chain of command.
Senator Fischer. Have you been provided those assets?
General Kurilla. I don't think any combatant commander has
all of the assets that they have. As you look at the Secretary
has to balance this globally across all the combatant commands.
We have received some and there is some that I have asked for
that I have not received.
Senator Fischer. Have you been able to do an analysis when
you do not receive those assets on negative impacts that has
had on any of your forces or strategic plans?
General Kurilla. Senator, what I do is I turn the--if I
don't get these resources, we measure that in terms of risk. We
look at the consequence of an action happening should we not
get that resource and the probability of that action happening
based on that. We look at that across all the different
resources and missions that we have.
Senator Fischer. I would hope that you would make use of
your unfunded priorities list in the future so that Congress
has a better idea of what you need and what we need to do in
order to provide you with the resources that you and your men
and women need.
General Kurilla. I look forward to doing that, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. Also, would you--can you
tell us if a mix of kinetic and directed energy weapons in
CENTCOM would provide you with better options to defend against
the Houthis attacks that Senator Reed was talking about and
asked you about that we are seeing in the Red Sea?
General Kurilla. We do want to get----
Senator Fischer. Senator King and I love this.
General Kurilla. We do want to get--it is a layered
defense, and whether that is on a ship, or it is on a base. We
do have directed energy. The Army's transformation in contact
for it, they have sent us some directed energy, mobile short
range air defense that we are experimenting with right now over
in the Middle East.
I would love to have the Navy produce more directed energy
that can shoot down a drone, so I don't have to use an
expensive missile to shoot it down. But what is worse than not
having that expensive missile shoot it down is hitting that $2
billion ship with 300 sailors on it.
Senator Fischer. Agree. I hope that we can see some further
usage of those developmental systems that are out there. But as
you said, your first and most important priority is to protect
the men and women that are serving this country. So, thank you,
sir.
Also, how is CENTCOM supporting the Israeli military as it
seeks to root out Hamas? Are you--and in conjunction with that,
working with Israelis, are you also working to continue to
develop partnerships with our Arab allies, friends, neighbors
as well?
General Kurilla. So, that is one of the biggest things that
we work. I will tell you up until October 7th, we were on a
trajectory that we had not seen any time in the past, and that
was in developing these relationships with our Arab partners,
and also with our Israeli partners there.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Fischer.
Senator Manchin, please.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for your service. I appreciate it very much. General Langley,
if I could, on this--I hope you have been made aware of the
just--I think it has just been brought out in the case of West
Virginia National Guards announced yesterday a new State
partnership with Capone. I don't know if that has been brought
to your attention on----
General Langley. Yes, Senator.
Senator Manchin. Okay. I am biased, but I confirm the
National Guard of West Virginia specifically got asked to take
on the partnership giving their close relationship that they
have built with Qatar and Peru.
We have been working there very strategically. Part of the
reason that I believe West Virginia was selected was due to the
seven countries in Africa having gone to a military coup in
recent years. However, the August military takeover of Gabon
saw positive reactions from the public due to previous Gabonese
Government's corruption.
So how productive have your previous engagements with Gabon
been, and how do you plan to use the new partnership to expand
the relationship? Or how will the West Virginia National Guard
fall into that?
General Langley. Thanks for that question, Senator. Because
I will tell you that the State Partnership Program writ large
is something that is unrivaled. When I say it is unrivaled,
because this is not offered by the People's Republic of China,
nor is it rivaled by the Russian Federation.
So, we are continuing to engage through this authority--is
going to be able to assist Gabon into being--increasing their
partnership and capacity. We are going to operate within the
imposition of 7008 sanctions because there was a coup.
But I think there is enough on notwithstanding authorities
to increase their overall capacity in their security construct
and also get them back on the road to democracy.
Senator Manchin. Does the military have--their military has
taken over. The coup was done with the military. Do they still
have control and they are running the country?
General Langley. Yes, they do, and General Nguema says that
he is laying out a plan. State Department, our African Bureau,
Assistant Secretary Phee is going to ensure that they lay out
the benchmarks that will be acceptable to the United States
Government for them getting back to that end State.
Senator Manchin. General Kurilla, if I may, Iran continues
to fund their terrorist organizations and all their allies that
they have been working with there, and they have killed United
States troops.
They are backing more recent destabilization activity with
Hamas. It goes on and on. Despite a State sponsor of terror,
they continue to evade sanctions. How knowledgeable have we
been of the go ships and turned a blind eye to that?
General Kurilla. Senator, that is actually Department of
Justice and Treasury in terms of the go ships. But in a closed
session, I can tell you what I know of the number and how they
operate when.
Senator Manchin. When we go into that session, I would love
to hear more about that. Alongside of our partners and allies
in the region, are you able to prevent Iranian vessels from
selling sanctioned oil used to finance terrorism, or do you
have to have approval from Justice to do that?
General Kurilla. The Department of Justice is the one that
then does the----
Senator Manchin. Unless they give you the order, you don't
get the order directly. You cannot stop?
General Kurilla. We don't seize those ships, Senator.
Senator Manchin. You don't seize them or stop them?
General Kurilla. Generally, what happens is they talk to
the master of the ship, and they take it to a port. But what I
would highlight is that 90 percent of that oil is going to
China. So, China is funding that, and the very dollars are then
going out to fund Iran's malign activity through their proxy
network.
Senator Manchin. It is a lose, lose proposition for the
United States of America and all of our allies and freedom
loving countries around the world to allow what is happening to
happen.
Putting that oil into that market, such as that, makes it
much more challenging and difficult for us, and just makes no
sense at all. Are you worried about the delays and theft in
equipment deliveries from the Kurds in both Syria and Iraq?
General Kurilla. The vast, vast majority of all the
equipment makes it up to the Kurdistan Region and the
Peshmerga. There has been some delays of some of that equipment
in Baghdad as they work through some of their own process.
Senator Manchin. You have to close that loophole. I mean--
--
General Kurilla. I am sorry?
Senator Manchin. Were you able to stop--are we able to stop
that from happening?
General Kurilla. What we do is, we work with the government
in Baghdad to be able to make sure that that equipment makes it
up to the Peshmerga.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Manchin.
Senator Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. General Kurilla, General Langley, welcome.
Thank you for your service and the men and women who serve in
your commands.
General Kurilla, last year at the same hearing you said
that Iran was undeterred. You have touched on this a couple of
times today. What is your current assessment? Iran deterred or
not deterred?
General Kurilla. I would tell you Iran is undeterred in
support to the Houthis. They are undeterred in their support to
Hezbollah, their support to Hamas, to some more support into
the West Bank.
They are deterred right now in Iraq and Syria and their
support to the Iranian aligned militia groups, but not--in
terms of attacks, but not necessarily in terms of their funding
and equipping.
Senator Cotton. Okay. I think in response to Senator
Wicker, you said there hasn't been an attack in Iraq and Syria
in 32 days?
General Kurilla. Thirty-two days.
Senator Cotton. That is what you judged, they are deterred?
General Kurilla. I also base it--based on the intelligence
that I read.
Senator Cotton. Okay. But you also used the term temporary.
That is----
General Kurilla. Deterrence is always temporary.
Senator Cotton. Okay. But they are still training and
equipping those militias and other proxies in Iraq and Syria?
General Kurilla. One hundred percent.
Senator Cotton. If you raise and train a Pitbull and then
you let it off the chain in the neighborhood, do you think you
are responsible for the actions of the Pitbull?
General Kurilla. Senator, I do.
Senator Cotton. Okay, thank you. Talking about those
attacks, Senator Wicker asked you how many occurred since
October 7th? What was that number?
General Kurilla. Number of attacks in Iraq and Syria or
where?
Senator Cotton. I think he asked Iraq and Syria.
General Kurilla. Iraq and Syria is approximately 175.
Senator Cotton. Okay.
General Kurilla. One hundred and seventy-three.
Senator Cotton. How many times since October 7th have we
struck Iran proxy positions in Iraq and Syria?
General Kurilla. I believe it is eight.
Senator Cotton. That doesn't seem like a very good balance,
173 to 8. What is up with that?
General Kurilla. I think the--when we strike, we are
hitting it. On the last strike that we did, we hit 85 targets,
and we killed them, and we waited. Then we killed their top
commander for Syria, for Kataib Hezbollah.
Senator Cotton. Unfortunately, though it wasn't just
attacks on October 7th and since. Do you know the number of
attacks from January 20th, 2021, to last October 7th?
General Kurilla. I don't have the number, but it is up
there, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Would it surprise you that Secretary Austin
testified to this Committee last year that it was 83 attacks?
General Kurilla. That would not surprise me.
Senator Cotton. How many retaliatory strikes had we
launched in those 2 years and 9 months?
General Kurilla. I don't have the exact number at the tip
of my fingers.
Senator Cotton. He testified that it was four. Would that
surprise you?
General Kurilla. No, that would not surprise me.
Senator Cotton. Again, not a very good balance, if you ask
me. Okay, so you said they are not deterred with Houthis, which
I think we can see obviously since the Houthis keep sinking
ships and killing people every day in our global chokepoint
that accounts for one-sixth of the world economy. Have you
offered strike options against the Houthis that go beyond the
current strikes that have occurred?
General Kurilla. I provide options, a wide variety of
options, everything from cyber to kinetic, and with the risk of
escalation based on those.
Senator Cotton. Can you tell me a little bit about the
campaign to compel?
General Kurilla. The campaign to compel is when we wrote
back in October, and that is to compel Iran to cease their
support and attacks through their proxies. It is to hold Iran
accountable for those.
Senator Cotton. Are you currently implementing that
campaign?
General Kurilla. We are implementing portions of that
campaign, but it requires a whole-of-government. There is no
just big military and our instruments of national power beating
diplomatic information, military and economic.
Senator Cotton. Okay. You testified or you stated that one
of your priorities is limiting Iranian resupply of the Houthis.
What about striking their indigenous manufacturing capabilities
that Iran has built up substantially over the years?
General Kurilla. Where--internal to Iran?
Senator Cotton. No, in Yemen. Yemen is making a lot of its
own drones and----
General Kurilla. Absolutely, Senator, and I can talk to you
in a closed session some of the challenges with that.
Senator Cotton. Those are fake sites, aren't they?
General Kurilla. They are, if you know where they are.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Do you think it is a good idea to
remove the Houthis from the Foreign Terrorist Organization list
in February 2021?
General Kurilla. That was a policy decision, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Do you think that embolden the Houthis or
encouraged them to think they could get away with this kind of
action?
General Kurilla. I am not certain how much that changed
their current action.
Senator Cotton. Okay. They were recently designated,
specially designated a global terrorist organization, which is
a pale simulacrum of being designated a foreign terrorist
organization. That doesn't seem to have changed their calculus,
does it?
General Kurilla. It does not.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. One final followup on a
statement you made earlier. You said, and this is close to a
direct quote, that we could see attacks against United States
or Western interests abroad with little to no warning in as
little as 6 months. Are you speaking there about ISIS and al
Qaeda from Afghanistan?
General Kurilla. ISIS-Khorasan specifically, and also out
of Syria, which they are trying to factor into predominantly
European countries.
Senator Cotton. So, ISIS out of either Afghanistan or
Syria, attacks against United States interests and Western
interests abroad in as little as 6 months. Now abroad can mean
a lot of things. Abroad could mean our embassy in Tajikistan.
It could also mean Western Europe or North America. Can you be
more specific?
General Kurilla. Europe and Eurasia.
Senator Cotton. Okay. What is the timeline you foresee in
which those terrorist organizations could launch an attack with
little to no warning against the American Homeland?
General Kurilla. I think it is that a lot more difficult
for them to be able to do that and requires substantially more
resources.
Senator Cotton. Okay, so 6 months anywhere across Eurasia
and indeterminate time in North America?
General Kurilla. Yes.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator
Duckworth, please.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I slid right in
there, didn't I, John?
[Laughter.]
Senator Duckworth. Good morning, General Kurilla, General
Langley. Thank you for appearing today. I have the honor of
being a Member of both the Senate Armed Services and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committees.
Because of this, I have a responsibility in ensuring strong
inter-agency coordination to address pressing National Security
challenges. We continue to see increasing PRC investments in
the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs [area of responsibility] that
involve economic, diplomatic, and military activity.
This poses a threat to our National Security, requiring
strategic coordination across the interagency. So, we must also
leverage our allies and partners to counter this PRC activity.
General Kurilla, General Langley, can you explain the
importance of DOD working across the interagency, especially
with the State Department and USAID, to counter maligned PRC
activity in your AORs, and how can Congress help you?
General Langley. Thanks for the question, Senator.
Collectively at our headquarters, we have representation across
the interagency and also USAID and Department of State.
Collectively, when we campaign with our African partners,
we take this into effect. We do this to counter, one, the
information space. There is a number of things by Russia and
China that are pushing and shaping on to our African partners,
especially across our society, that changes ways in a departure
away from international norms.
So, what we are doing is, with activities and investments
across USAID and the State Department to employ type of efforts
that are unmatched, such as in global health. You know, just
strategic health and is unmatched, but what--just one thing.
When I was with, Minister Counselor Mark Berry, we went to
Zambia. We went to Zambia because we knew that they had already
put out information about the helicopters that we delivered
there for crisis response were all about fighting a war.
That was a skewed message, but what it was--I was with,
Minister Counselor Berry, and she used to say, tell what the
numbers for PEPFAR [President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief]
are about. We saved 25 million lives. We increased the life
expectancy by 20 years when we started this 20 years ago with
President Bush.
This was--and others that supported this Congress's
supporting funding of PEPFAR. That is something that is
unmatched by our partners, by our competitors.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator. Very similar in that
we also have interagency representation across all of CENTCOM.
Really it takes a whole-of-government approach to solve all of
the challenges we have in the region.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, and General Kurilla, the PRC
has continued to target the United States relationship with our
long standing allies. How can we strengthen our military--our
mil-to-mil engagement with our partners in the CENTCOM AOR?
General Kurilla. One of the challenges we have sometimes is
the bureaucratic process of our foreign military sales, which
goes across all of our elements of the Government. What China
does is they come in and they provide basically like Amazon,
anything in the catalog, express shipping.
They give them funding, which they don't know there is a
little bit of a catch sometimes in their funding with no end
user agreement. The time it takes for us sometimes to bring
foreign military sales to actually deliver is a challenge for
some of our partners because they have real security needs.
So, anything that we can do, and there are elements in the
Department of Defense, State, Congress, and industry, to be
able to get that to happen faster would be helpful.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Since October 2023, there has
been a significant increase of missile and drone attacks in the
CENTCOM AOR, leading to the tragic death of three
servicemembers in Jordan back in January.
I worked with my colleagues to add a provision to the
Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that
would provide an assessment of the Iraqi security forces,
including the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, air and missile defense
capabilities, and would provide a training and equip plan.
Kurdistan has been targeted with missiles and drone attacks for
hosting United States Military Forces.
That plan was due February 1st. The required implementation
timeline for the training is 90 days after the development of
that plan. General Kurilla, can you provide my office an update
on the status of this training plan and what you are doing to
ensure its full implementation within the required timeline, or
are you going to miss the timelines?
General Kurilla. Senator, I will get that to you.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General. How is CENTCOM
working to ensure that it has an integrated air and missile
defense system to counter the increased threats posed to U.S.
servicemembers in the region?
General Kurilla. That is one of our top things that we are
working on, Senator, through our regional partners. One of the
first things that we are trying to do is come up with a common
air picture.
You have to be able to see the threat before you can defeat
it, and where there is many elements that we are doing in terms
of radar sharing agreements with a lot of our regional
partners.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. First off, thanks to
both of you for being here. Thank you for your service and the
men and women that serve with you. Thank you for what you do.
First, General Kurilla, can you talk about, what is the cause
for all these assets in the Red Sea area--why are you there?
General Kurilla. So, the U.S. economy relies on open sea
lanes. Right now, when you look at the Red Sea, 30 percent of
all container traffic travels through there. 12 to 15 percent
of the entire global economy flows through there. By our
National Security strategy, we will not allow a State or non-
State actor to affect the freedom of navigation in the Strait
of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb, or the Suez Canal.
Senator Scott. How many of those container ships come to
states?
General Kurilla. I can't give you the exact number of those
container ships, but right now what we are seeing is a
diversion of not going through the Red Sea.
For instance, if you are talking oil that comes through, we
have seen a diversion of that, and it goes around the Cape of
Good Hope. What that is going to do is bring products late to
need, to market, and price increases as well.
Senator Scott. Do you have a feel for how much money we are
spending right now with all the assets we have added since the
Houthis started shooting at us?
General Kurilla. I don't have an exact number for you,
Senator.
Senator Scott. Do you have any feel for how much they are
spending?
General Kurilla. I don't have an exact number for you,
Senator.
Senator Scott. So, the attack on the ship that killed the
Filipinos, how is that--how is that going to change anything?
General Kurilla. In what sense, Senator?
Senator Scott. Are going to get more international support
or--are you getting that much international support or is this
really borne by the American taxpayer?
General Kurilla. There's 24 countries right now that are
providing support in Operation Prosperity Guardian. The first
ship that responded to that was an Indian ship, an Indian
destroyer.
There was an Iranian ship 30 nautical miles away from that
that sat and watched. Another thing I have never seen is a
Chinese ship respond to a safety of life.
All these ships that we have out there from all these 24
different nations, whether it is ships or servicemembers
participating in this, we work together to be able to defend
those ships or respond.
Senator Scott. Do you have any feel for what percentage of
the cost is being borne by our military versus the Indian
military, the British, anybody else?
General Kurilla. I am assuming that the cost of a ship is
roughly the same to operate. So, I would have to look at that
by the number of ships that are out there. We see several
Indian ships that are out there right now. There are several
European ships that are out there as well.
Senator Scott. So, what we have done so far, do you feel
like--it is not stopping anything, right? The Houthis haven't
changed.
General Kurilla. So, if we look at the campaign of
establishing freedom of navigation, protect those ships and we
protect--our United States ships, we are escorting, to degrade
Houthi offensive capability. One of the challenges is
determining the exact number of what they had to start with,
and I can talk about that in a closed session.
Then really, the most important thing is to deny their
ability to resupply from Iran. The Houthis are not building--
they are putting it all together and assembling, but they don't
create inertial navigation systems.
They don't create medium range ballistic missile engines.
They don't create the stage separations on these medium range
ballistic missiles or the anti-ship cruise missiles.
Senator Scott. Do you know of any products that we would
miss if the Red Sea was--there was no travel through the Red
Sea?
General Kurilla. I think you would have a lot more
expensive products and it would affect the global economy.
Senator Scott. Do you have any examples?
General Kurilla. I think the stuff that flows through the
Red Sea in terms of products. I think you would see products
late to need. You also have shipping containers that--there
will be a shortage. The market will adjust. Free markets
adjust. What you will see is a higher price of commodities.
Senator Scott. Yes. Thank you. General Langley, can you
talk about why we have--why we care about what is happening in
Africa right now. I mean, can you tell the American taxpayer,
why are we there? Why are we spending the money we are spending
there?
General Langley. Thanks for the question, Senator. For
access and influence. I would say that a number of countries
are at the tipping point of actually being captured by the
Russian Federation, as they are spreading some of their false
narratives across Libya.
From a strategic answer of peace, access, influence across
the whole Maghreb, that is NATO's Southern flank. We need to be
able to maintain access and influence across the Maghreb from
Morocco all the way to Libya.
The PRC and Russia are also remaining exploitative where
possible and coercive when necessary. They want that ground.
They want power projection capabilities. So, for the most part,
the rest of the continent is also for mining concessions,
whether it be gold or rare earth minerals.
Both of them have a long range plan, but I think at the
accelerated pace, a Russian Federation is really trying to take
over Central Africa as well as the Sahel.
Senator Scott. Thanks both of you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator
Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for your service and all the men and women who serve under your
command. I recently visited the region, particularly our base
in Jordan, the MSAB [Muwaffaq Salti Air Base] base jointly
manned by our Air Force and Armed Services and the Jordanians.
I also read Tom Friedman's piece in the New York Times
detailing his travels with you, General Kurilla, through
Western Jordan and Syria. What I saw there and heard from our
commanders was about the small, nimble Iranian drones, Shahed
101s, that were apparently used in the attack that killed three
of his service people, and the potential for those small, cheap
drones to swarm and to strike targets because of their number
and because of the difficulty of detecting them.
They fly low and they are slow. We have apparently a
counter weapon called the Coyote, which has been produced
apparently in limited numbers. I wonder if you could talk a
little bit about the use of these small drones in that setting
and elsewhere in the region where our forces and our allies
forces may be at risk because of those small, inexpensive
Iranian drones like the Shaheds that are being shipped all
over, and what we can do to counter that threat.
General Kurilla. Thanks, Senator. Appreciate that. That is
one of the top threats because it is inexpensive. It is a
precision guided weapon. Iran produces some that can go over
2,000 km with those weapon systems.
The bigger concern is if you start talking about swarms.
So, we need to continue to invest in things like high powered
microwave to be able to counter a drone swarm that is coming at
you. I mean, in a classified setting, I can talk about some of
the activities also that we can do against them.
But when you look at things like the Coyote missile has
been very effective. I mean, nothing is 100 percent, and at
some point the law of statistics will come up because you have
to have a layered defense. Certain systems cost more than
others. What we want to get to also is directed energy where it
costs $1 or $2 a round.
We do have those right now in the Middle East that the Army
has provided us. What we are going to do is, they are
transforming in contact and be able to provide that feedback
back to them of what is working well.
What I asked the Chief of the Army is, don't give me
something to replace it. Give me something to augment and I
will tell you how it works, because it is a pretty rough and
harsh environment to operate there.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you think that there are sufficient
countermeasures underway right now, or should we be focusing
more resources to develop?
General Kurilla. One of the things I would ask is to pass
the supplemental, because I have $531 million in counter UAS
[unmanned aircraft system] technology that I need to get
forward into the theater that will save lives. There is the
technology. There are things out there. We have to continue to
experiment.
We are experimenting right now with a system that actually
can go after both UAVs and land attack cruise missiles, because
it can go 300 knots. But if you go out there and you decide not
to engage, you can bring it back and have it land. What we have
to get better at is the cost curve on that, to get those
systems to be less expensive.
Senator Blumenthal. In response to some of my colleagues'
questions about Iranian oil, you have rightly observed that it
is not simply or solely a military problem. Obviously, a lot of
it is sold to China. So, it is an export control or sanctions
issue. But at the same time, this regime employs a fleet of
rogue vessels that use a myriad of evasive technologies.
Those practices include, for example, turning off GPS
[Global Positioning System] trackers before docking in Iran, at
sea transfers of oil between tankers, repainting vessels mid
journey, labeling oil as different types of fuels.
I think that clamping down on these practices to intercept
the shipments requires investment of American military
resources, correct me if I am wrong. Do you think we have
invested enough?
General Kurilla. So right now, we do not do any of the
seizure of any of that oil. It is generally done by the
Departments of Justice and Treasury.
But Justice then usually contacts the master of that ship
and tells that ship that they are carrying--if it is on a
larger commercial ship, they tell them they are carrying
sanctioned Iranian oil. But then there is this whole ghost
fleet that you mentioned that is out there, and we can talk
about that, I think, best in a closed session.
Senator Blumenthal. Wouldn't our interceptions be more
effective if it were more than just the Department of Justice?
I worked for the Department of Justice as a prosecutor. I
have great faith in the lawyers there. But they are not
military people. I don't know how much they understand the
logistics or the force requirements.
General Kurilla. Senator, if I was given that mission and
the appropriate resources to accomplish it, I am certain that
we could accomplish the task given to us.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you both again for
your service. Thanks.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Good morning. How are you?
Commander Langley, you stated that you seamlessly integrated
CENTCOM regarding activity with the Red Sea. What type of
support are you giving them? Would you support an increase if
the activity continued to increase?
General Langley. Senator, I can get more explicit in closed
session, but I can tell you both myself and General Kurilla can
always use more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
assets.
That is something that is in high demand globally, with the
challenges and the emergent threats are across the globe. That
is just one of the areas that would actually help us in
protecting the force, and also indications and warnings against
attacks on America.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. China has been investing in
economic infrastructure developments in Africa since the 1990s.
What are the operational advantages that China has over our
efforts in Africa, and what are we doing to help out on that?
General Langley. So, Senator, right now, China has a plan,
a long range plan, but they are coming in with their Belt and
Road initiatives. I think they do have global aspirations for a
security construct to get a decisive advantage over the United
States.
We need activities and investments to deter that,
especially engaging with our partners, our African partners,
telling them to ensure that they are not militarized. This
takes information campaign that is successful, but also
assurance actions of building partnership capacity where they
won't need China and their false offerings of security
construct.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General Kurilla, I feel your
pain on needing more money. We are all--most of us for the
Israeli supplemental. I know we have a disagreement on all of
it up here, but we surely want to help. I am going ask you, you
might not want to answer this one, ask about your rules of
engagement for our military forces. They appear to be very lax.
What is your thoughts on that?
General Kurilla. Senator, in terms of where or what?
Senator Tuberville. Engagement with----
General Kurilla. The Houthis?
Senator Tuberville. Anybody that attacks our Forces in the
Middle East.
General Kurilla. Senator, when I look at the Houthis, for
instance, I think in the last 72 hours we have destroyed under
my authorities and really all the way down to the individual
self-defense authorities, we have destroyed probably 8 anti-
ship missiles, shot down one way attack UAS explosive, unmanned
surface vessels.
They have all the authority they need to protect
themselves. The other strikes that we do, those are
Presidentially approved strikes.
Senator Tuberville. Any other bases in the Middle East we
have different rules of engagement?
General Kurilla. The rules of engagement--everyone has the
right to self-defense. Those are the strikes that we take.
Other than that, those are Presidentially approved strikes.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. You know, most of us up
here, we don't really get it when it comes to this
Administration's support of Iran.
Seems like we are fighting on both sides of the coin here.
I have talked with a lot of people that have been in the fight
for Israel, been in Gaza, and it is horrific. We all know that.
But I think they need to focus more on survival than they do
winning, because there is going to be a gang up here and, you
know, we need to fund this fight. There is no doubt about it.
So, and I don't think either--and I am going to ask you to
comment on this. This is not an Israel problem when it comes to
Palestine, this is an Arab problem. Arabs need to take care of
their business over there. If they want to help the people of
Palestine, they can help them. They need to get them out.
I totally agree with the problem of genocide. That is all
the questions I have, but I have a few in classified. Thank
you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator King,
please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for joining us this morning. General Kurilla, one of my
nightmares is terrorists getting hold of nuclear weapons.
Deterrence has been our strategy for 80 years and it has
worked, but it doesn't work if somebody doesn't have a capital
city or care about dying.
What are we--share some thoughts. I mean that is one of the
things that worries me about Iran moving toward a nuclear
weapon, North Korea, countries that may not be as responsible
as others in regards to the security of their nuclear weapons.
Thoughts on that issue?
General Kurilla. Senator, I will just speak for CENTCOM in
terms of Iran. As you know, Iran has kind of a three pronged
approach. One is to remain a nuclear threshold country. They do
not have a nuclear weapon right now and I don't believe they
have made the decision to go to a nuclear weapon.
There are advanced standoff weapons and then use of their
proxies. They have, and this is open source and unclassified,
their production of 20 percent enriched uranium has increased
by 64 percent. Their production of 60 percent highly enriched
uranium has gone up 39 percent over the last year.
That is all creating the highly enriched uranium, but it is
not the nuclear weapon. You would then have to weaponize that.
But is the assessment that they could create enough highly
enriched uranium, i.e. 90 percent, in a matter of weeks of
approximately three systems, and then they would have to
weaponize that going forward.
Senator King. Then the question if they go--if they take
those steps, what about Hezbollah, Hamas? I mean, that is--the
danger that I am worried about is, Iran has to worry about
Tehran and deterrence is a factor. If it gets into the hands of
a terrorist, that is--then deterrence doesn't work.
General Kurilla. That is a great concern. But a nuclear
armed Iran would change the Middle East overnight and forever.
Senator King. It would probably lead to nuclearization of
other neighboring states.
General Kurilla. One hundred percent.
Senator King. Of course, one of the issues in Gaza right
now is humanitarian aid. Very complicated, difficult to get in,
checkpoints, trucks lined up. What about the option of seaborne
humanitarian aid? Also, Admiral Stavridis suggested a hospital
ship coming to Gaza to provide medical care, which would avoid
some of these problems of Hamas being embedded underneath
hospitals.
General Kurilla. Senator, I was in the region last week. I
will tell you the suffering in Gaza is significant, the human
suffering. I was in Al Arish in the Rafah gate. I saw 2,500
trucks loaded with humanitarian aid waiting to go in.
The challenge is the security and distribution internal to
Gaza. Just this morning, about several hours ago, we did
another third drop to the Northern part of Gaza. That is where
the human suffering is the greatest. That is North of the Wadi
Gaza. That is an area that kind of cuts the Gaza in half.
There is about 300,000 individuals that live there. There
used to be 1.4 million. There is no Israeli presence in the
North. They have predominantly defeated that by getting the
distribution of the aid up to there.
So, I have also stood at the Arabs Crossing last week, and
I was down at the central crossing into Gaza to look at options
of how do we increase the land based trucks going into there,
then can get into the North.
Then we have provided options of a maritime based option to
be able to bring humanitarian aid into Gaza as well.
Senator King. A hospital ship would be an option?
General Kurilla. I mean, there are obviously many wounded.
If that is a direction, I know that there is a hospital ship on
the East Coast. If I was given that, I would figure out the
best way to utilize that.
Senator King. Let's move to Yemen for a minute. I have been
surprised, frankly, that once identified that Yemen was firing
these missiles into the Red Sea, that it has taken so long to
disable them, and I understand they are continuing to make
those kind of attacks.
First question is, why is it taking so long? I thought we
had fantastic intelligence and targeting ability. How come a
small country like Yemen is still at it?
General Kurilla. So, what I would tell you, the Houthis,
well they are a tribal force up in the Northwest of Yemen, they
are fighting with the most advanced weapons that Iran has, and
they are being provided by Iran.
So, we are basically fighting the Iranian weapons through
the hands of the Houthis. In the closed session I will go into
great detail the challenges right now internal to targeting
inside of Yemen.
Senator King. Well, I think Senator Fischer mentioned this,
but directed energy--this is a place where directed energy
would really pay off, because those missiles that we are firing
to knock down their relatively inexpensive missiles are $2, $3,
$4, $5 million a pop. Directed energy is about $0.50. So, I
think that is something--I hope that there can be an
acceleration of the development of that capacity.
General Kurilla. I am 100 percent supportive of that,
Senator.
Senator King. When he is 100 percent supportive of
something I suggest, I will--that is a good time to stop. Thank
you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Warren,
please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The United States
has put a number of rules in place to ensure that we don't
inadvertently contribute to civilian casualties. But rules on
the books are not enough.
I want to make sure that these rules work and that our
military leadership is putting the protection of civilians at
the forefront. Defense Secretary Austin has said preventing
civilian harm is, ``a moral and strategic imperative.''
During your confirmation hearing, General Kurilla, you
agreed, and you said you would work to improve those processes.
The DOD has taken an important step in that direction when it
issued the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Instruction
last December to provide guidance on how the Department should
prevent and respond to civilian harm, and I want to thank you
for that.
Among other things, the guidance directs the Department to
identify whether the partners and allies we provide weapons to
will mitigate civilian harm. Now, General Kurilla, can we get
an accurate picture of whether U.S. arms transfers contribute
to civilian harm if we don't collect information about how
these weapons are actually used?
General Kurilla. Yes. So, Senator, I am not involved in the
advising of the ground operation----
Senator Warren. I understand that. I understand. But do you
need information about how the weapons are used to figure out
if the rules are effective?
General Kurilla. To be able to answer that last question,
we would.
Senator Warren. Yes. All right. It would seem to me to be
crucial, but the Government Accountability Office identified
significant gaps in our oversight about how the weapons are
used, particularly in Yemen.
In response, the Department of State established a civilian
harm incidence response guidance to investigate, and it created
an internal data base to track reports of partner governments
suspected of using U.S. weapons against civilians.
Yet, the Department of Defense has not created a similar
process or committed to work with the State Department on its
efforts to get the information needed for civilian harm.
General Kurilla, why is that? Why wouldn't DOD want the
information on whether our partners are using U.S. weapons
against civilian populations?
General Kurilla. I can't speak for why the Department of
Defense does not have that, Senator.
Senator Warren. But I take it you would like to see it?
General Kurilla. I think any time we can do anything to do
civilian harm mitigation--so once, as you mentioned, we stood
up our own civilian harm mitigation response team. We have
hired 9 of the 10 individuals----
Senator Warren. I am grateful for that. I am just asking
about getting the data. More data helps us make more and better
decisions.
General Kurilla. Better data always does. I will tell you
it will be difficult data to get though.
Senator Warren. Okay. I understand that but the State
Department is committed to that. I would like to see DOD
committed as well. Now, another tool that we have for
preventing civilian harm is Leahy Laws, which require DOD and
State to vet foreign forces for any gross violations of human
rights before providing U.S. funded assistance.
This vetting process is a cornerstone of our human rights
policy, and it is supposed to ensure that we don't contribute
to human rights abuses abroad. However, DOD seems to find ways
around it.
I just want to take one example. General Langley, should
the U.S. provide assistance to a military that is notorious for
targeting civilians, or that recently overthrew its
democratically elected government?
General Langley. Senator, no.
Senator Warren. No. Good. I like that answer. That is
exactly right. Yet, the U.S. military's exercises last year and
planned exercises for this year included Mali and Sudan, where
that has occurred.
DOD claims that under the Leahy Law, it does not need to
fit that foreign forces for human rights abuses when it engages
in activities such as joint military exercises because DOD does
not technically categorize that help as assistance.
Now, when Secretary--when Senator Cardin and I found out
about this practice, we sent a letter to DOD raising our
concerns, and I am glad that DOD stopped its exercise plans in
Mali and Sudan. But we need to proactively close this gap and
protect civilians going forward. The protections that we have
for civilians, both in the statute and in guidance can't just
be pieces of paper.
They need to have a real impact. We need to strengthen our
tools for preventing civilian harm and I look forward to
working with the Committee and with you to do that. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Peters,
please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome
and thank you for your service. General Langley, you briefly
mentioned earlier the State Partnership Program that the
National Guard has and how they work with our global allies and
partners to make sure we have stronger relationships between
them.
As part of the State partnership with Liberia, the Michigan
National Guard engineers have trained and they built critical
military infrastructure, as well as help to combat infectious
diseases in Liberia. That has gone through some significant
challenges, as you know, in years past.
These partnerships advance State partnership priorities as
well as objectives of combatant commands, including AFRICOM.
So, my question for you, General, is if you would expand before
this Committee on your earlier comments about the strategic
importance of the National Guard State Partnership Program and
your command, and specifically, how have Liberia and other
countries benefited from this ongoing relationship with the
Guard, and how do you see that developing in the future?
General Langley. Senator, thanks for that question because
what myself and General Hokanson have been laying out into the
rest of the decade is a plan that will get more State partner
programs across the continent.
Here is how it helps. In our overall competition with the
PRC and Russian Federation, they can't match that. The way we
build and partner with our countries--build with our African
partners, builds capacity and capabilities, and also gives them
an appreciation for the rule of law, law of armed conflict in
working with our partners. It makes them even more resilient in
getting into their own civil society and closer to closing the
gap between civ-mil, some of the drivers of instability.
Partnering with it--just California and Nigeria, and
others, have been the bedrock of stabilizing and increasing
capability in our African partners. That is unmatched by our
competitors.
Senator Peters. That is great to hear. Great. Thank you,
General. General Kurilla, CENTCOM has become a proving ground,
I think, for new operational concepts, for technologies, weapon
systems as well as formations.
Whether it is deterring the Houthi attacks that were out of
Yemen, or countering Iranian proxies, CENTCOM provides a
valuable operational environment for experimenting with some
cutting edge innovations.
What is, without question, as realistic and as relevant as
you can possibly get, CENTCOM Task Forces 39, 59, and 99 are
combining AI, they are combining that with unmanned systems, as
well as some commercial technologies that clearly will give the
DOD an edge in future conflicts.
My question for you, sir, is what lessons learned are you
sharing with other combatant commands as they stand up similar
task forces, and how are you helping to accelerate the adoption
of these commercial technologies into the broader DOD mission?
General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator. Appreciate that. When
I look at something like Task Force 39, what we are doing with
robotic logistics, or what they are doing, they have just stood
up an additive manufacturing 3D printing center in the CENTCOM
AOR, and how we are going to then use that to distribute so I
don't have to do a logistical convoy to get parts out somewhere
when I can actually build those parts right onsite.
They don't have to wait for those parts to come. Or Task
Force 59, which right now we have dozens of unmanned surface
vessels out on the ocean right now, providing indications and
warnings in real time back to our maritime operations center to
help feed that intelligence picture.
What we can do in the central region sometimes--right now,
if you were to put some of the systems out in the middle of the
South China Sea, they might not last very long right now, where
we can put those out and be able to learn and experiment and
then figure out how best to use them in all the combatant
commands, and we do share our lessons learned.
Senator Peters. Right. Thank you, General. General Langley,
African military leaders are enrolled, to my understanding, in
many of China's 34 military officer academic institutions and
their associated noncommissioned officer schools.
In fact, I think the PLA annually educates roughly 2,000
African military leaders, currently. I am certainly troubled by
that and concerned that these training efforts are clearly part
of the PLA's broader efforts to have control or have
significant influence in Africa.
So, my question for you is, how is AFRICOM establishing
military academic partnerships with African nations to counter
China's efforts in this area?
General Langley. Senator, thanks for that question, because
that leads into my request for more international military and
education training for our African partners. They treasure our
values.
They acknowledge and best practices of a civilian led
military. What we offer in our value proposition is why they
keep asking me for more seats. Morocco, I was there a few weeks
ago and talked to their higher learning of their command and
staff and top level schools.
They said, we are replicating what you guys do in the
United States because they keep asking us for more seats,
because the United States doesn't offer enough. That is also
competing with the Russian Federation.
They are beating us 12 to 1, Senator. Well, so 12 to 1, and
then all the statistics you just stated there and the PRC
trying to get influence. They are trying to unseat us as a
security answer of building capacity and capability to meet all
the threats these African countries have to endure.
Senator Peters. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator Sullivan,
please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sullivan. General Kurilla, I want to go into our
approach toward Iran and the region. Thomas Friedman, a very
astute observer and a New York Times piece entitled, A Titanic
Geopolitical Struggle Is Underway. Mr. Chairman, I would like
to put this in the record. This Thomas Friedman article.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Sullivan. He says that today, while the United
States is indirectly degrading Russia's capabilities through
its proxy, Ukraine, things are different in the Middle East.
There, it is Iran that is sitting back comfortably,
indirectly at war with Israel, at war with the United States,
at war with Saudi Arabia by fighting through Tehran's proxies,
Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon,
Syria, and Shia militias in Iraq.
Iran is reaping all the benefits and paying virtually no
costs for the work of its proxies, and the United States,
Israel, and their tacit Arab allies have not yet manifested the
will or the way to pressure Iran back. Do you agree with that,
General?
General Kurilla. I think Iran is using all of its proxies
in the region.
Senator Sullivan. But are they paying no cost?
General Kurilla. I think they are not paying the cost.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Well, let me get into some
specifics, and one that I just cannot fathom we have not
undertaken yet. Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, the former Commander
of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, now the Deputy Commander at CENTCOM,
recently appeared on 60 minutes.
When asked if the Houthis could execute these attacks
against United States Navy vessels in the Red Sea and
international shipping without Iran's support, he said, ``no,
Iranians have been supplying the Houthis, resupplying them,
they are advising them, and they are providing them target
information. This is crystal clear.''
So let me go into that. I have raised this with the
Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, we have the biggest terrorist group in the world
providing targeting information on the USS Eisenhower, the
Carney. The Carney shot down three different missiles from the
Houthis.
Why are we not sinking those Iranian ships? If there is an
Iranian spy ship providing targeting information to kill
sailors from Alaska and North Dakota, why aren't we sinking
those ships? By the way, isn't that part of ROEs [Rules of
Engagement]? You don't even have to ask the President for that
permission.
General Kurilla. That is not accurate, Senator, that I
wouldn't have to ask the President to do that.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. That is not part of your ROEs,
third party targeting? You have third party targeting Americans
to kill them. You don't have the authority to take that target
out?
General Kurilla. Not on the Iranian ships.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Have you made a recommendation to
take out and sink these Iranian ships that are targeting our
sailors?
General Kurilla. I provide options ranging everything from
cyber to kinetic. I also identify the risk of escalation in all
of those options.
Senator Sullivan. We always talk the risk of escalation.
The Iranians are escalating on us. We have it backward. I
talked to the Chairman about this. This is not useful when you
guys start by saying the risk of escalation.
The Iranians are killing our servicemembers. They are
escalating. Hamas is escalating. I think we need to drop that
talking point. In your personal opinion, do you think the best
way to get the Houthis and the Iranians to stop shooting at
American ships is to covertly or overtly announce that the next
time you target an American ship with an Iranian spy ship, we
will sink that ship. In your personal opinion, what do you
think that will do from a deterrence standpoint?
General Kurilla. Senator, I think there needs a whole-of-
government approach----
Senator Sullivan. I know, but I am asking about.
General Kurilla.--to--on Iran.
Senator Sullivan. I am going to get to the whole-of-
government here. I got 50 seconds left. On that issue, in your
personal opinion, is that how you heard the Ranking Member talk
about Operation Praying Mantis. Are you familiar with that
operation?
General Kurilla. I am very familiar with it.
Senator Sullivan. What is your personal opinion on getting
the Houthis and Iran to stop trying to kill our sailors? I had
a meeting with the CNO [Chief Naval Officer] recently. She
mentioned that the Navy worries about one of these missiles
slipping through.
General Kurilla. As do I.
Senator Sullivan. Okay, so how do we get them to stop doing
it? It is obviously not working.
General Kurilla. There has to be cost imposition on Iran.
Senator Sullivan. There hasn't been. Thomas Friedman and
all of us believe there has been no cost. I am not blaming you,
General. I am sure you have had strong meetings where you say,
of course we should sink these ships. They are targeting our
sailors.
But so, I am asking you not what advice you have given to
the President. Remember, when you got confirmed here, we gave
you a letter saying we can ask you in your personal opinion.
You don't have to talk to us about what you said to the
President.
What are you, as a 40 year General, decorated, knows about
combat, what is your personal view on whether we should be
sinking intel ships from Iran who are providing targeting
information to the Houthis to kill American sailors and
marines?
General Kurilla. I think it is best if in a closed session,
I can talk you through the intelligence of what we know Iran is
providing and the implications and what we can do about that.
Senator Sullivan. I think this is a scandal and to me, it
is shocking, and I am sure you probably in the closed session
will tell me, of course you think we should sink their ships.
But I just don't understand it.
One final question. I have talked to the President directly
and Jake Sullivan and their whole team about non-kinetic
actions like reimposing sanctions on the oil and gas regime of
Iran. At the end of the Trump administration, the Iranians had
$4 billion in foreign reserves. That is not a lot.
Now they have about $75 billion because we lifted sanctions
in essence. Have you recommended--and by the way, the President
said he thought it was a good idea. Said look, there is the
National Security Advisor. Talk to Senator Sullivan and the
team on this. That was in December. We are not doing that.
Have you recommended non-kinetic options like stronger
sanctions against the Iranians and their oil and gas regime?
General Kurilla. My recommendations are military in nature,
but I do recommend a whole-of-government approach for cost
imposition on Iran.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Langley,
General Kurilla, good to see both of you again. So AFRICOM and
CENTCOM have seen conflicts involving extremist terrorist
organizations for decades now.
The recent wave of coups, especially in West Africa, is
creating some fertile ground for VOEs , and it is creating a
big problem. I was there in the region last January. Iranian
backed extremists continue to wreak havoc in the Middle East as
Senator Sullivan, was talking about.
It is a problem that I think requires some new solutions.
As we are currently pivoting to fifth generation fighters for
readiness against pure adversaries like China, it is critical
that we don't lose sight of the very real threat that we face
every single day from extremists in Africa and the Middle East.
General Langley, you have previously highlighted the need for
more ISR capability, calling ISR an active deterrent in Africa.
Yet there are limited number of ISR aircraft to go around.
They are also limited number of assets that can provide any
kind of close air support in the region. Then SOCOM has begun
its acquisition of the new light attack aircraft, the OA-1K for
armed overwatch and close air support.
It seems to be capable and filling some of this gap, and it
does seem to be an aircraft that is uniquely positioned to
excel in AFRICOM. Just a few months ago, I was flying an F-16
in Arizona, and I was reminded how difficult it is to do close
air support in a really fast moving airplane like an F-16, F-
35.
So, can you talk a little bit about how platforms like
Armed Overwatch can provide some important capability against
extremist groups?
General Langley. Yes. Yes, Senator. Because as I was saying
that in my statements that, we need more capability, capacity,
and especially in our positioning on the continent and
especially in the Sahel.
Because like I said, we are at a tipping point and there is
modest investment for us to do the whole tasking for
indications and warnings, especially with the Metaxas, with the
violent extremist groups, Jama'at and ISIS-Sahel, bordering
toward the Northern borders of the Gulf of Guinea countries.
Any increased ISR, expanding my ability to give a
persistent stare, if you will, Senator, is going to be helpful.
Senator Kelly. What do you have now doing that mission?
General Langley. Right now, we just have like--contractor
owned, contractor operated ISR, and a B350, which is actually a
co----
Senator Kelly. So, how many aircraft total?
General Langley. Right now--I would cover that with you in
closed session, and as far as how many a platform we have----
Senator Kelly. Do you feel what you have is enough?
General Langley. At this time, given this emergent threat,
Senator? No, I don't.
Senator Kelly. General Kurilla, can you talk a little bit
about the importance of an armed overwatch capability in
CENTCOM?
General Kurilla. Yes. Anytime you can have armed overwatch
overhead that also provides an ISR, and intelligence capability
is beneficial. The only thing we have to watch for is the
ability of the air defense systems that could take that down
because it is a slow mover.
Senator Kelly. Do both of you think that the air tractor,
the OA-1K K is appropriate for this mission?
General Langley. Senator, I would have to do a full
assessment on it based on the threat that we have, because
there are other characters on this AOR, especially in the West.
General Kurilla. It depends on the region we would operate
it with.
Senator Kelly. I was in Jordan about 6 weeks ago. Saudi
Arabia, Israel as well, but in Jordan they had some of these on
the flight line. Not ours, but the Jordanian Air Force, and
they had a lot of stuff hanging on it.
General Kurilla. The King's daughter flies one of them.
Senator Kelly. Oh, really? I did not know that. Yes, and it
seemed like you could hang a lot of stuff on it and it has a
lot of loiter time and can fly to pretty low altitude even. An
airplane like that that is designed initially as a crop duster
can fly around and turn really effectively, you know, below
50ft.
So I was, just looking at it. I haven't flown it either,
but it seemed quite impressive. For the kind of missions that
you are involved in, in your AORs, it seems appropriate. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Cramer,
please.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Generals, for being here. I am just, I am going to followup
with Senator Kelly's line of questioning and going back a
little bit to Senator Fischer's with regard to ISR, now that we
are getting a little more specific.
I will try to avoid having to get into secrets, but you
mentioned in your opening statement, General Kurilla, that the
continued threat from Afghanistan.
Have you had to divert ISR from Afghanistan or from
anywhere else to cover other areas? I mean, remember
Afghanistan was to be protected by Over the Horizon. I mean, I
just, I worry that we are so thin. Give me some specifics about
diversion of ISR, providing gaps.
General Kurilla. So, every day, Senator, I have to provide
I have to determine where the risk is. I have to move
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets around,
just like I do with my defensive counter air fighters.
The only places I was being shot at the time were Iraq and
Syria and in the Red Sea. So, for a period of time, I did
divert ISR out of Afghanistan to be able to cover down on those
areas that are most critical.
I do know that when Iran-aligned militia groups or Houthis
are out and they are trying to launch UAVs, rockets, missiles,
that when we have ISR, we have determined that has a deterrent
effect. So, we do need, and this is something that I do think
we need to continue to fund is additional capabilities.
Senator Cramer. I worry about that because we are going
just the opposite direction. I mean, we are retiring
particularly unmanned systems at a very fast rate and not
building more of them nearly fast enough.
I worry that we are leaving a lot of really expensive
assets out there unprotected, the survivability of the sea
fleet, in some cases the carrier fleet, as well as the men and
women on the ground.
With regard to AFRICOM, General Langley, now the MQ-9
Reaper is pretty important in your AOR. Can you just maybe
elaborate a little bit on the importance of that system?
General Langley. In comparison to the MQ-1, it just has
more on station time, let's just put it that way,
exponentially.
Given the tyranny of distance, especially across the Sahel
and even in East Africa, is--that platform is in dire need to
continue with that.
I understand that there is going to be a transition coming
up, so we need other type capabilities that are equivalent or
even more given the emergent, threat that we have across
Africa.
Senator Cramer. What you just said is really, really
important. That the best we have is older maybe than the threat
requires, and we ought to continually be developing more
modern, more durable, perhaps more sustainable, more lethal, as
well as covert.
Maybe in the later session, we can talk more specifically
about potential solutions. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Cramer. Senator
Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, for holding
this hearing. I would also like to thank General Kurilla and
General Langley for testifying today, and always for your
service to our country. Thank you.
I want to talk a little bit about Iran and the long term
strategy to deter Iran, because our brave servicemembers in the
Central Command area of responsibility, well, they are facing
drone and rocket attacks on a regular basis from both land and
sea.
Recently, three United States soldiers were killed, dozens
more injured in an attack against our troops in Jordan. They
were Staff Sergeant William Rivers, Sergeant Kennedy Sanders,
and Sergeant Breonna Moffett. They all made the ultimate
sacrifice for our Nation and their service will never be
forgotten.
I am going to add, may their memories be a blessing to all
those who knew and loved them. But we know where these attacks
are originating, Iran's hostile regime and its deadly proxies.
Yet, we lack a sufficient deterrence strategy. That is why
Senator Ernst and I have successfully led initiatives to
mandate CENTCOM air and missile defense and maritime strategies
to defend against Iran's regional aggression and protect United
States servicemembers. So, General Kurilla, please.
While recent United States strikes on Iranian aligned
militias may have degraded their short term capabilities, what
is our long term strategy to deter Iran and proxies? For what
we can say here, I am sure we can have a classified as well.
General Kurilla. Well, thank you, Senator. I mean,
deterrence is always temporary whenever you do establish it.
But we need to have a whole-of-government approach in our
ability to deter Iran's malign behavior. They are the epicenter
of instability in the Middle East.
Senator Rosen. What are we doing proactively to prevent
these militias before they attempt to harm us? I think that
is--deterrence is one thing, but how do we proactively stop
what they are doing, try to cut them off before they can do
anything?
General Kurilla. So, part of that comes with the use of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets,
defensive counter--we know that has an effect. On a classified
session, I can tell you exactly how that works.
But in terms of our ability to stop them, we have struck
back. The last strike we did in Iraq and Syria hit 85 targets,
and then we waited several days, and then we killed the
commander of Kataib Hezbollah in Syria, in downtown Baghdad.
He was directly responsible for conducting attacks on U.S.
servicemembers. That has had a temporal deterrent effect. Right
now, there has not been an attack in over 32 days in Iraq and
Syria.
Senator Rosen. Well, good. I look forward to the classified
briefing so we can hear more.
I want to also talk about CENTCOM's support for Israel,
because Israel is our closest and most reliable ally in the
Middle East, and in recent years, the Abraham Accords and
Israel's absorption into CENTCOM have enabled unprecedented
regional security cooperation between the United States,
Israel, and some of our Arab partners.
At the same time, Israel faces, as we know, we are seeing a
coming from Iran, mounting threats from Iran and its proxies.
General Kurilla again, how can CENTCOM support Israel's
defensive needs as they face a war with Hezbollah up North?
General Kurilla. I think you are seeing that right now in
terms of the material support we are able to find for their
ability to defend themselves.
Senator Rosen. When you think about the Abraham Accords and
what that means and what we have been able to do so far--of
course, I started the Abraham Accords caucus. We have traveled
to the Abraham Accords countries. How do you think that you can
leverage Abraham Accords and grow that relationship between
Israel and CENTCOM?
General Kurilla. I think we do that through encouraging the
relationships between those countries and Israel.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I am going to kind of keep on
this issue here and thinking about water and food insecurity.
There is a lot of things that make the region unstable, right,
terrorism, water and food insecurities.
What are the security implications of the scarcity of water
and food in CENTCOM? How might a regional--when we think about
the Abraham Accords, that is what some of these things are
built on. How might a regional water and food security working
group help CENTCOM act and reduce the security risk caused by
lack of good, clean water and food?
General Kurilla. Water and food insecurity drive migration
which drives instability. I think a working group could
identify where the greatest need is, when we work with our
USAID partners and others to be able to provide that aid to
their.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I think there
is a lot to do with soft power, like food and water and
security, intelligence, and other things that we do. I look
forward to just having both of you come in classified settings
so we can ask some more detailed questions.
General Kurilla. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Schmitt,
please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. During the first
few weeks in office, the Biden administration ended the sales
of--the sale of offensive arms to Saudi Arabia and focused on
achieving a cease-fire in Yemen.
They also reversed the previous Administration's--the Trump
administration's designation of the Houthis as a terrorist
organization. To what extent do either one of you believe that
the Houthis exploited that cease-fire to increase their missile
arsenal and other capabilities?
General Kurilla. I am certain that Iran exploited that and
continue to provide funds and equipment to the Houthis.
Senator Schmitt. Would you agree with that?
General Langley. Yes, Senator.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. If the Administration had continued
to sell Saudi Arabia offensive weapons, do you think that the
Houthis would be stronger or weaker now?
General Kurilla. I think Saudi Arabia would be stronger
right now.
Senator Schmitt. In effect, do you think that that would
have weakened the Houthis?
General Kurilla. Are you talking if they did not stop them,
Senator?
Senator Schmitt. Yes. If we didn't stop the sale, if Saudi
Arabia continued to have offensive weapons that we stopped
selling them, and then we lifted the terrorist designation from
the Houthis, do you think the Houthis would be stronger or
weaker today?
General Kurilla. I mean, I think that is a hypothetical
without knowing exactly how they were going to implement.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Was this a mistake--like, right now,
15 percent of the world's commerce is being disrupted by the
Houthis.
I don't pretend to know all the considerations the Biden
administration put into this decision to do those two things,
which was to not sell arms to Saudi Arabia and also lift the
terrorist designation, but it hasn't worked out.
They have been emboldened. What is it that you think,
General, we should do right now to--this can't go on. This
terrorist organization cannot hold 15 percent of the world's
commerce hostage. What is it that you suggest that we do?
General Kurilla. I think we need a whole-of-government and
an international approach to this.
Senator Schmitt. Maybe like sanctions? Maybe like selling
arms to Saudi Arabia? Would those two things be included in
your whole-of-government approach?
General Kurilla. I think that would be something to for the
State Department and the Department of Justice and Treasury. I
can talk about the military aspects of this, and what we do
need though, as the international community, just like we did
for counter piracy, to stop the flow of Iranian arms. But there
must be a cost imposition on Iran for what they are providing.
Senator Schmitt. I agree with you on that, and you would
agree that there is no cost right now on Iran for any of this,
correct?
General Kurilla. There is some, but not enough.
Senator Schmitt. Right. Like enforcing sanctions as relates
to them selling oil would be one of them, a whole-of-government
approach, right?
General Kurilla. Well, I think sanctions have to be
international. There is one unit--I mean, their oil is
sanctioned. All the oil they are selling to China right now, 90
percent of Iranian oil that goes to China--China buys 90
percent of Iran's oil. That is all sanctioned oil.
Senator Schmitt. Yes, and I guess I have a limited time, so
I want to sort of turn the attention to Israel for a second.
What more can be done or what can be done to bring our hostages
home?
This sort of this gets lost, I think, a lot in the news
cycle, but there are Americans there. What more can be done to
bring them home?
General Kurilla. I mean, our hope is that all of them will
be coming home. In the classified session, I can give you a
little more details of what is being done.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Schmitt.
Senator Budd, please.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you
for being here today. General Kurilla, as you know, the United
States must take a firm stance against Iran and its proxies.
This is essential to get Iran to back down and to stop its
barbaric and destabilizing activities in the Middle East. But
how we achieve that goal is important--as important as
achieving it in the first place. Europe and the Middle East are
at war. The Indo-Pacific looks like it may not be far behind.
So, if we are going to avoid a war in the Indo-Pacific,
then we must defend United States interests in other theaters
without using up capabilities that are needed to deter China.
So, we know that long range missiles like Tomahawks will be
needed to deter or defeat Chinese aggression. Other things like
air and missile defenses will be equally vital.
We also know that based on DOD and CENTCOM's public
statements, that CENTCOM is using significant numbers of all
these capabilities in its ongoing operations. So, General, are
you concerned that CENTCOM's use of these capabilities, such as
critical munitions, air and defense missiles, and the like is
coming at the expense of America's ability to deter China?
I know not in your AOR, but, the materials you use may be
of concern.
General Kurilla. I am concerned with defending our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, and coast guardsmen out
there right now. What I would encourage is that our defense
industrial base ramps up production of these systems.
I would like cheaper systems that we can use that are just
as effective. Things like directed energy and other systems
that can bring down the demand--but there is only one thing
that can bring down a ballistic missile right now from a ship,
and that is an SM-6 missile.
Senator Budd. Thanks for that. General, continue on, can
CENTCOM achieve its objectives against the Houthis and others
in the region without using Tomahawks or other weapons that are
vital to deter China that already in short supply? You touched
on that a bit, but if you would expand, please.
General Kurilla. Yes. In a classified session, I can tell
you the exact number we used. I can tell you why we used them
and when we did. But I don't think we fired a Tomahawk missile
any time recently.
Senator Budd. Has OSD or the Joint Staff directed CENTCOM
to stop or reduce the use of weapons required for China
contingency in CENTCOM's ongoing operations against the
Houthis?
General Kurilla. They have not.
Senator Budd. Can you provide this Committee with a full
list of munitions--I think you may have mentioned that in the
confidential setting, that CENTCOM has used during operations
in the aftermath of the October 7th attack. Would you be
willing to share that with us?
General Kurilla. Yes, I will provide that through the
Department.
Senator Budd. Yes, thank you. General Langley, I am very
proud of the North Carolina National Guard State Partnership
Program.
As you mentioned in your written testimony, the North
Carolina National Guard recently expanded this program in
AFRICOM to include both the Republic of Malawi and the Republic
of Zambia, in addition to its current partnership on the
African continent with the Republic of Botswana.
Can you please provide an update on the State Partnership
Program in AFRICOM, particularly on the new partnership with
Malawi and Zambia?
General Langley. Yes, Senator. I was just talking to
General Hokanson, and especially at the anniversary last
summer. We see that outsized effects of the Institution of
State Partnership Programs.
I wish we had more, because in competing with our
competitors, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic
of China, they have nothing to match that. So, these are
assurance actions that really solidifies us as a partner of
choice. Other countries see this, and they ask, when are they
are going to get their country partnership.
So, this vastly outweighs some of their rhetoric, and when
I say their, I am talking about the competitors, of how they
are trying to replicate what we are trying to do. Because we
already know that Africa, within Africa, now the Russian
Federation wants to establish a grounding that resembles a
State Partnership Program, but it doesn't have the values--it
doesn't have the democratic values of what we bring.
That is intrinsic values for stability, security--and
security and prosperity with our African partners.
Senator Budd. Thank you, General. So how do short term
continuing resolution, CRs, how do they impact the execution of
the State Partnership Program?
General Langley. They participate in building resiliency
and getting on the continent and partnering with them. So,
there is no new starts.
So, if they are going to be part of an exercise such as
like African Lion, I am not sure if the Utah National Guard can
actually come this year because that is on this--next budget's
money that hasn't been appropriated yet.
Senator Budd. Thank you both. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd, and thank you,
gentlemen, for excellent testimony. For the benefit of my
colleagues, there is a vote on the floor now. We will go to
that vote.
We will reconvene in SV-217 at 2:15 p.m., which will allow
people to stop along the way--12:15 p.m., I am sorry. I was
going to give you a long break. You need it after this session.
But we will recess until 12:15 p.m. at SVC-217. Thank you,
gentlemen.
[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
civilian harm mitigation and response action plan
1. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, the
Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP) and DOD
Instruction on Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR DOD-I)
require the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to establish civilian harm
mitigation and response as a component of security cooperation
programs, develop baseline assessments of partner capabilities to
mitigate and respond to civilian harm, and leverage ``tailored
conditionality'' to set expectations with partners. What progress has
each of your commands made toward establishing civilian harm mitigation
and response as a component of security cooperation programs?
General Kurilla. Our civilian harm mitigation and response efforts
remain an integral and important part of command efforts. The CHMR-AP
and CHMR DODI promote our long-term strategic and mission success. To
date, the majority of our CHMR progress thus far has been to support
our military operations, RED Teaming, planning, and responding to
CIVHARM reports resulting from CENTCOM military operations, however we
remain fully aligned in and supportive of the Department's CHMR-AP work
related to security cooperation programs.
CENTCOM, along with the rest of the DOD and DOS, have been
coordinating the development of an Interim Policy Guidance on
Supporting U.S. Ally and Partner Forces in Their Efforts to Mitigate
and Respond to Civilian Harm (IPG). Properly developing and
coordinating this document is critical for CHMR Security Cooperation
implementation. I would like to highlight that we want to use this
process to strengthen our relationship with our Allies and Partners
which the USG has worked very hard to build over the decades. If not
carefully crafted, it could inadvertently push them toward competitors
in our AOR including PRC and Russia which is why we are thoroughly
developing this policy to achieve the right end-state in a complex
region.
Our CHMR team has begun coordination with our security cooperation
division to begin inclusion of CHMR and ensure our next round of
significant security cooperation initiatives (SSCI's) will include how
we effectively promote CHMR with our Allies and Partners.
General Langley. U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is making
significant progress in establishing Civilian Harm Mitigation and
Response (CHMR) as a component of security cooperation, in accordance
with DODI 3000.17. USAFRICOM's CHMR team will lead briefings with its
security cooperation counterparts to provide guidance on incorporating
CHMR activities into security cooperation programs. The CHMR team is
also working with the security cooperation enterprise to review Fiscal
Year 2026 Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives (SSCI) and
ensure that they include CHMR considerations. Per the CHMR-AP,
USAFRICOM will conduct Civilian Harm Baseline Assessments of Allies and
Partners with all countries that receive security cooperation.
USAFRICOM has also begun incorporating CHMR into our Title 10
programming, particularly those under section 333 Authority to Build
Capacity. In accordance with Executive Order 13732 and DOD policy,
foreign military sales (FMS) in Africa of air-to-surface, surface-to-
surface, and ship-to-shore munitions, and their delivery systems,
require training on advanced target capability to ensure Allies and
Partners employ U.S. munitions in a manner that reduces the risk of
civilian harm.
Additionally, USAFRICOM is using the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program to provide CHMR training to
Allies and Partners. Through the IMET program, the Department of State
and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) currently offer one
course through the Institute of Security Governance, one through
distance learning, and four through mobile training teams. Section 1210
of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA also establishes a ``Legal institutional
capacity building initiative for foreign defense institutions.''
USAFRICOM will seek to leverage this authority to, among other things,
provide for the protection of civilians consistent with the Law of
Armed Conflict, and to assess potential incidents of civilian harm.
2. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what
progress has each of your commands made toward developing baseline
assessments of partner capabilities to mitigate and respond to civilian
harm?
General Kurilla. The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) team just
concluded a process for developing the pilot CHMR Baseline Assessment
for Allies and Partners (CBAPs). The CHMR community will further
develop and use this baseline assessment as a guide.
General Langley. USAFRICOM, in coordination with the Center for
Naval Analysis, will conduct its first pilot Civilian Harm Baseline
Assessment of Allies and Partners (CBAP) with Kenya in June 2024.
USAFRICOM will also include Ally and Partner capability assessments
during planned Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation (AM&E)
activities. USAFRICOM is developing a list of prioritized countries for
fiscal year 2025 to fiscal year 2026 CBAPs to meet this requirement.
3. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what
progress has each of your commands made toward leveraging ``tailored
conditionality'' to set expectations with partners?
General Kurilla. CENTCOM, along with the rest of the DOD and DoS,
have been coordinating the development of an Interim Policy Guidance on
Supporting U.S. Ally and Partner Forces in Their Efforts to Mitigate
and Respond to Civilian Harm (IPG). This work will provide important
guidance on tailored conditionality.
General Langley. As established in Objective 9 of the CHMR-AP,
USAFRICOM will leverage tailored conditionality in security cooperation
programs, where appropriate. USAFRICOM will also use the CBAPs to
inform CHMR security cooperation programs. USAFRICOM has deliberately
included events that support CHMR, as well as International
Humanitarian Law themes, into security cooperation activities. These
events are tailored to the needs of the partner nation and the content
of the security cooperation initiative. Tailored conditionality options
will be refined upon publication of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (Global Partnerships) final DOD Interim Policy Guidance on
supporting allies and partners.
4. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, how many
Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) in each of your commands are dedicated to
supporting assessments of partners' capacity, willingness, norms, and
practices to adhere to International Humanitarian Law to prevent and
mitigate harm to civilians in the course of military operations?
General Kurilla. CENTCOM currently has one (1) dedicated FTE Allies
& Partners Civilian Harm Mitigation & Response Officer (A&P CHMRO). The
A&P CHMRO coordinates with our J-5 Security Cooperation Division and
Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for all matters concerning allies and
partners CHMR efforts. Our CHMROs also coordinates with DoS and NGO's.
CENTCOM, along with the rest of the DOD and DoS, have been coordinating
the development of an Interim Policy Guidance on Supporting U.S. Ally
and Partner Forces in Their Efforts to Mitigate and Respond to Civilian
Harm (IPG).
General Langley. As of March 2024, the USAFRICOM CHMR team includes
one FTE dedicated to supporting the Allies and Partners (A&P)
portfolio. Due to workload requirements, USAFRICOM is augmenting the
single-authorized A&P FTE with a part time FTE from the Civilian Harm
Assessment Cell. Additionally, USAFRICOM has a six-person Assessment,
Monitoring, and Evaluation (AM&E) branch which assesses the
effectiveness of security cooperation programs, including the
application of CHMR themes, when needed. USAFRICOM also has 21 Country
Desk Officers dedicated to designing, implementing, and assessing
security cooperation programs with African partners. Country Desk
Officers will be trained to assess partners' capacity, willingness,
norms, and practices to prevent and mitigate harm to civilians during
military operations.
5. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, how many
civilian harm prevention and mitigation recommendations have each of
your commands made regarding partners' capacity, willingness, norms,
and practices to adhere to International Humanitarian Law to prevent
and mitigate harm to civilians in the course of military operations?
General Kurilla. We have not made any new recommendations pending
implementation of the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response DODI
3000.17.
General Langley. USAFRICOM has made a deliberate effort to include
CHMR engagements in security cooperation plans and activities.
USAFRICOM has included 41 recommendations for activities that support
CHMR themes in fiscal year 2026 security cooperation programs,
including activities that complement ongoing International Humanitarian
Law, Law of Armed Conflict, and similar capability developments.
6. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what were
these recommendations?
General Kurilla. N/A.
General Langley. USAFRICOM's recommended activities are aligned
with CHMR-AP and DODI 3000.17 guidance to incorporate CHMR objectives
into security cooperation. Recommendations include developing partner
nation military justice capabilities; integrating CHMR into operational
planning; legal aspects of CHMR; legal advisor training; compliance
with the Law of Armed Conflict; legal and responsible employment of
military force; and military justice and civilian harm mitigation
training.
CHMR is often approached from a legal perspective when discussing
concepts with Allies and Partners. However, a holistic view is required
in order to be most effective. Strong legal frameworks and
institutions, in particular related to compliance with human rights and
the Law of Armed Conflict, are foundational. Achieving meaningful CHMR
outcomes, though, requires addressing operational doctrine and
processes such as intelligence and target development, command and
control, and force development. Consequently, an effective approach
tailored to the partner may require support from multiple DOD
institutions.
7. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, to which
partners did you provide these civilian harm prevention and mitigation
recommendations?
General Kurilla. N/A.
General Langley. These recommendations are part of 41 Significant
Security Cooperation Initiatives (SSCI). The SSCIs are for Angola,
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros,
Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Libya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique,
Nigeria, Sao Tome, Seychelles, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa,
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, and three multinational SSCIs. USAFRICOM will
leverage tailored conditionality options, as needed, particularly for
those countries experiencing holds.
8. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, assuming a
country commits to the recommendations you provide, how does your
command plan to measure and assess effective implementation of the
commitments?
General Kurilla. Once appropriate recommendations are developed, we
could utilize the assessment, monitoring and evaluation process within
our security cooperation enterprise.
General Langley. Each security cooperation program includes an
Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation (AM&E) plan designed to measure
its effectiveness. AM&E plans for programs that include CHMR, Law of
Armed Conflict, and International Humanitarian Law components will
include dedicated assessments, when applicable.
9. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, how does
your command plan to monitor and assess the impacts of U.S. security
assistance on human rights, civilian harm, and corruption?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
General Langley. Military equipment sold or granted to USAFRICOM
Allies and Partners includes routine inspection requirements as a term
of the transfer. Inspections are designed to ensure the Partner Nation
is using the item according to the terms of the transfer, is properly
storing the item, and has not improperly sold or transferred it.
Sensitive and highly lethal items, such as night vision devices,
munitions, and weapon systems, have enhanced annual inspection
requirements, carried out in country by the U.S. Office of Security
Cooperation.
Security assistance cases that provide air-to-surface, surface-to-
surface, and ship-to-shore munitions also include training on how to
prevent and mitigate civilian harm when employing these munitions.
leahy law
10. Senator Warren. General Langley, title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 362 bars
the United States from providing assistance to foreign military units
that have committed gross violations of human rights. In recent years,
DOD has invited countries with significant human rights and rule of law
concerns--some of which are subject to U.S. coup-related sanctions--to
participate in U.S. military training exercises and receive the benefit
of training with U.S. Forces. DOD has also provided U.S. taxpayer
dollars and support for them to attend exercises under title 10 U.S.C
Sec. 321. The United States has trained numerous forces that have gone
on to commit coups in Africa. How is U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
reassessing vetting, risk assessments, training programs, and post-
training monitoring to understand and address this risk?
General Langley. Ally and Partner Nation units and commanders
nominated for any U.S. funded Security Cooperation training must first
undergo Leahy Vetting, conducted by the Department of State, to screen
for gross violations of human rights and human trafficking violations.
Individuals and units that do not pass Leahy Vetting are not allowed to
participate in US-led training. State and DOD both use a ``One Year
Good For'' policy for individuals or units found to have no derogatory
information for this screening. Partner nation units/personnel that
participate in training are included in the annual Foreign Military
Training Report (FMTR) input. With regard to units previously found
ineligible, resuming assistance can occur when the Secretaries of
Defense and State determine that the government of that country has
taken, or is taking, effective measures to bring those responsible to
justice.
11. Senator Warren. General Langley will you commit not to invite
foreign security force units from countries committing gross human
rights violations, or countries in which the duly elected government
has been deposed by coup d'etat to AFRICOM exercises?
General Langley. USAFRICOM supports a ``Whole of Government''
approach when engaging with Allies and Partners. A decision to continue
engaging with an Ally or Partner after a serious human rights violation
would be done in close consultation with our Department of State
partners.
Regarding countries in which the duly elected government has been
deposed by coup, it is based on the situation. Changes made to Section
7008 in 2022 now allow the U.S. Government to engage with Partner
Nations following a coup to ``support a democratic transition.'' Where
appropriate, USAFRICOM will engage with Partner Nations to support
their transition back to democracy, along with other U.S. strategic
interests.
Additionally, Section 7008 restrictions do not apply to climate,
humanitarian assistance, Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP),
and law enforcement activities. Consequently, USAFRICOM has included
countries that do not participate in security cooperation programs in
these activities, such as our Security Implications of Climate Change
conference. USAFRICOM recognizes climate change, humanitarian
assistance, and global health as trans-regional threats that
significantly affect neighboring African countries with whom we
actively collaborate.
12. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley what
factors would U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and AFRICOM, respectively,
weigh prior to waiving the requirement that the United States should
not provide assistance to foreign military units that have committed a
gross violation of human rights?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
General Langley. USAFRICOM supports a ``Whole of Government''
approach when engaging with Allies and Partners. A decision to continue
engaging with an Ally or Partner after a serious human rights violation
would be done in close consultation with our Department of State
partners. Important considerations include strategic and national
security interests to the U.S., whether the Partner Nation has taken
steps to improve their civilian harm mitigation and response
capabilities, and whether they welcome USAFRICOM engagement to build
International Humanitarian Law and CHMR capacity.
USAFRICOM is committed to working with our partners to reduce the
risk of civilian harm caused by military operations. We find that with
such a large number of Partner Nations with varying levels of
capabilities, a variety of factors cause and/or contribute to civilian
harm. As a result, we must tailor our CHMR approach to our Partners'
reality, and to the specific roles and capabilities being developed.
13. Senator Warren. General Langley, will you commit to ensuring
that foreign security force units receiving assistance pursuant to
section 321 are subject to Leahy vetting, as required by law?
General Langley. Yes, USAFRICOM will continue to support and
enforce Leahy Vetting requirements in coordination with the Department
of State.
ex gratia payments
14. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, Congress
has repeatedly authorized $3 million for ex gratia payments for
civilian victims and survivors of civilian harm caused by the United
States and its partners. Yet, CENTCOM and AFRICOM have largely failed
to use this authorization. How many cases of civilian harm have been
deemed credible by your command's assessments and investigations each
year for the past 3 years?
General Kurilla. In 2021 there were two reports of CIVHARM, in 2022
there are 0 reports of CIVHARM and in 2023 four reports of CIVHARM that
all ``more likely than not'' resulted from US military operations. Ex
gratia payments remain an important tool for the Department. Under
Section 1213, these payments are intended to be a nominal expression of
condolences rather than a form of compensation. Individual payments
will often be significantly less than the maximum allowed.
Considerations to offer and pay ex gratia include local economic
realities and cultural norms; the victims' status (e.g., place in the
extended family, age, gender, tribal affiliation, friendly toward U.S.
Military, etc.); feasibility of meeting with recipients in an
appropriate setting; whether the offer will materially help obtain and
maintain friendly relations and support of the local population;
whether the offer will counter adversary information operations; and
whether the offer will promote legitimacy of U.S. military operations.
General Langley. The December 2023 DODI 3000.17 established the
``more likely than not,'' standard, using the best understanding of the
information available at the time of the assessment. Prior to that,
USAFRICOM used the term ``unsubstantiated,'' to describe incidents that
did not meet the ``more likely than not,'' threshold. Since 2021,
USAFRICOM has received 16 reports of civilian harm, with one deemed
credible. The annual numbers are as follows:
2024--three reports, none passed the ``more likely than not''
threshold
2023--eight reports, all unsubstantiated
2022--three reports, all unsubstantiated
2021--two reports, one substantiated
15. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, for over 2
decades, U.S. operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia,
Libya, and elsewhere caused significant civilian harm, often with
little public acknowledgement or redress. In light of these
shortcomings, the CHMR-AP rightly commits to improving DOD policies for
investigating, responding to, and learning from civilian harm. How will
you establish an effective process for the civilian survivors of U.S.
and partnered operations and their families to seek acknowledgement and
ex gratia payments?
General Kurilla. With the publication DODI 3000.17 and refining our
processes in CENTCOM, every report of CIVHARM that is determined to be
``more likely than not'' a result of our military operations will
contain a recommendation for ex gratia based on current authoritative
guidance.
General Langley. USAFRICOM has made progress in establishing its
CHMR team, which is a critical requirement to mitigate and respond to
civilian harm. Team members are actively building processes and
policies to receive, review, and respond to claims of civilian harm,
such as a public-facing portal to receive claims of harm. USAFRICOM is
also building relationships with civil society organizations that are
on the ground in the AFRICOM area of responsibility. These
organizations are well positioned to share information on potential
claims of civilian harm. Additionally, on the USAFRICOM public facing
webpage, there is a link accessible to report allegations of civilian
harm. These reports are sent directly to our CHMR team.
16. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, the CHMR-
AP and CHMR DOD-I commit the DOD to improving its processes for
responding to civilian harm, including with ex gratia payments, and
clarifies that the fundamental purposes of acknowledgements and
responses to harm include expressing condolences to civilians affected
by U.S. operations and helping to address the direct impacts
experienced. Will you commit to using the $3 million ex gratia
authorization for cases where it is more likely than not that U.S.
operations have resulted in civilian harm?
General Kurilla. Yes. Ex gratia is an important tool and I will
continue to utilize this authority consistent with the considerations
to offer and pay ex gratia to include local economic realities and
cultural norms; the victims' status (e.g., place in the extended
family, age, gender, tribal affiliation, friendly toward U.S. Military,
etc.); feasibility of meeting with recipients in an appropriate
setting; whether the offer will materially help obtain and maintain
friendly relations and support of the local population; whether the
offer will counter adversary information operations; and whether the
offer will promote legitimacy of U.S. military operations.
General Langley. USAFRICOM takes all claims of civilian harm
seriously, and conducts thorough reviews of all available information
when conducting civilian harm assessments. For assessments that meet
the ``more likely than not'' threshold, USAFRICOM must consider the
context of the operating environment when developing response options,
including ex gratia payments. Important factors include the safety and
security of personnel making a payment, confirming identities of
individuals receiving payments, and potential affiliations with
adversary forces. As established in DODI 3000.17, section 5.2,
USAFRICOM will conduct a country-level assessment in consultation with
Department of State (DoS) to analyze these factors before finalizing
response options for confirmed civilian harm incidents.
saudi border guard human rights abuses
17. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, an August 2023 Human Rights
Watch report revealed highly disturbing reports that Saudi Arabian
border guards have systematically and brutally targeted, assaulted,
raped, and killed Ethiopian migrants and asylum seekers who tried to
cross the Yemen-Saudi border. Has CENTCOM trained or assisted in
providing training for any of the troops alleged to have committed
these human rights violations and in what capacity did it do so?
General Kurilla. No. USCENTCOM does not provide training or assist
in providing training to Saudi Arabia's land border guards.
18. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, how many CENTCOM personnel are
embedded with Saudi forces or Saudi defense agencies and what is their
role?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
19. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, have any of these embedded
personnel been asked to report on any knowledge of Saudi abuses?
General Kurilla. The DODD 23211.01, Joint Staff, service and
CENTCOM regulations all require all DOD personnel, military, civilian
employees, contractors and sub-contractors accompanying a DOD component
to report through their chain of command all reportable incidents which
based on credible information, potentially involves/includes: a war
crime; other violations of the law of war; or conduct during military
operations that would be a war crime if the military operations
occurred in the context of an armed conflict. As mentioned in earlier
comments related to Allies and Partners, DOD guidance is being
developed which will provide additional instruction on the reporting
requirements as defined in the DODD.
20. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, what training does CENTCOM
provide to Saudi forces to reduce civilian harm?
General Kurilla. As part of routine engagement with all partners,
USCENTCOM emphasizes the importance and value of International
Humanitarian Law (IHL), the Geneva Convention and the prevention of and
mitigation of civilian harm. Engagements have included Air Forces
Central Command (AFCENT) conducting two courses on Combating Civilian
Casualties in the past calendar year. Subjects discussed during these
seminars included Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Plans (CHMRAP).
USCENTCOM also conducts Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) that
include discussions on the Law of Armed Conflict, Target Development,
Positive Identification, No Strike Lists, Collateral Damage Estimates/
Assessments, and Crisis Communications.
21. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, what steps has CENTCOM taken
to support any investigations into these reports and when will any such
investigation be complete?
General Kurilla. We are not currently involved in any investigation
of allegations against the Saudi Arabian border guards. That said,
USCENTCOM supports the development of investigative review processes
and procedures that improve the effectiveness of military operations
and minimize civilian harm for all our partners. These efforts also
encourage a system that captures and utilizes lessons learned and
transparency in public reporting. USCENTCOM can support partners in
their efforts with expertise and releasable information if available.
may 2023 syria strike investigation
22. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, my office has repeatedly
requested a briefing regarding the investigation into the May 2023
strike in Syria that resulted in a possible civilian casualty as
followup to a July 2023 letter I sent with Senator Van Hollen and
Representative Jacobs. Has this investigation been completed, and when
will we receive this briefing?
General Kurilla. Yes, the investigation was completed and were
briefed to Professional Staff Members of the SASC, HASC and SAC-D in
May 2024.
23. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, in February 2022, you
committed to prioritizing reforms to mitigate civilian harm and agreed
that credible reports of civilian casualties deserve a thorough
investigation. Despite this commitment, why did you announce just hours
after the strike that CENTCOM targeted a Senior al Qaeda (AQ) leader in
Syria in May 2023 without having confirmed the identity of the
individual killed?
General Kurilla. The results of the investigation were briefed to
Professional Staff Members of the SASC, HASC and SAC-D in May 2024.
Timely acknowledgement of U.S. counter-terrorism operations,
particularly in today's information environment, prevents confusion on
attribution and the spread of misinformation. Final confirmation of the
effects of an operation may take time and is provided in follow on
reports. The statement was accurate in that we were indeed targeting
the Senior al Qaeda leader named.
24. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, why does CENTCOM still have a
statement on Twitter that it targeted a senior AQ leader despite
CENTCOM having opened an investigation into whether the strike killed a
civilian instead amid defense officials' uncertainty over the identity
of the individual killed?
General Kurilla. The results of the investigation were briefed to
Professional Staff Members of the SASC, HASC and SAC-D in May 2024. The
statement is accurate in that we were indeed targeting the Senior al
Qaeda member. DODI 5400.17 states removal of social media content
should only be done in the event there is a factual or typographical
error; violation of a law, policy, term of service, or user agreement;
or an operations or information security concern.
25. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, when did CENTCOM first become
aware of the report from the White Helmets that it likely killed a
civilian in the May 2023 strike?
General Kurilla. CENTCOM was made aware of allegations that the
strike may have resulted in a civilian casualty first raised in a tweet
by a White Helmet on 03 May 2023. The results of the investigation were
briefed to Professional Staff Members of the SASC, HASC and SAC-D in
May 2024.
26. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, why didn't CENTCOM consider
that report credible and why did CENTCOM wait to open a civilian-
casualty credibility assessment report until 14 days after the strike?
General Kurilla. The CIVCAS review process started with the unit's
submission of a First Impressions Report (FIR). Initial public
reporting and intelligence sources were in conflict and required
additional research and clarification and its initial report of
civilian harm was on May 8. The results of the investigation were
briefed to Professional Staff Members of the SASC, HASC and SAC-D in
May 2024.
27. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, please provide CENTCOM's
civilian-casualty credibility assessment report for this investigation.
Will you ensure the assessment is made public with minimal necessary
redactions?
General Kurilla. The results of the investigation were briefed to
Professional Staff Members of the SASC, HASC and SAC-D in May 2024.
28. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, what is the average length of
time from an incident to opening a civilian-casualty credibility
assessment within CENTCOM, the other combatant commands, and across
DOD?
General Kurilla. The facts of each event will drive the specific
timeline for initiating the assessment process. This process is
typically started within 48 hours of receiving a report or discovering
a report of CIVHARM from open-source Non-Government Organizations
entities, the Civilian Harm Assessment Cell (CHAC) personnel will begin
their assessment of the report to determine initial credibility. Each
report will have unique requirements that could range from a few days
to several weeks to close with a CIVHARM determination. In some
complicated cases, the assessment will require an Army Regulation 15-6
investigation that could take months to close. Most reports are
assessed with a closure recommendation within 2 weeks. The results of
the investigation were briefed to Professional Staff Members of the
SASC, HASC and SAC-D in May 2024.
29. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, how have CENTCOM assessment
procedures changed since the findings of the 2022 RAND report on ``U.S.
Department of Defense Civilian Casualty Policies and Procedures'' and
Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan?
General Kurilla. Since approval of the DOD Instruction 3000.17,
effective 21 December 2023, Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response, the
CENTCOM Commander and staff, Components, JTF 94-7, and CJTF-OIR have
instituted several changes to improve processes and procedures.
Collectively, these measures will help ensure future military
operations, to the extent feasible, minimize potential harm to
civilians and, if errors occur, to take appropriate steps to respond.
CENTCOM has hired ten full-time personnel CHMR branch, including
CHMROs, Assessment Cell Personnel, and a Red Cell and Civilian
Environmental Team.
CENTCOM has updated the Positive Identification (PID) Policy in
February 2024 which incorporates lessons learned from this and other
investigations.
Recommendations have been implemented, including cognitive bias
training for the target engagement authority training program, red
teaming and enhanced pre-mission coordination to improve communications
between the organizations.
30. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, what procedures is CENTCOM
applying to its investigation into the May 3d air strike?
General Kurilla. The results of the investigation were briefed to
Professional Staff Members of the SASC, HASC and SAC-D in May 2024.
31. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, do you support DOD providing
amends in accordance with the families' wishes, including offering an
ex gratia payment, to the family of any civilian killed in the May 3d
air strike?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
january 2024 al-shabaab strike
32. Senator Warren. General Langley, reports have emerged with
claims that a U.S. drone strike killed two Cuban doctors who were held
as hostages in Jilib after they were kidnapped in 2019. Was AFRICOM
aware of the possibility of civilian casualties before conducting
strikes in Jilib in February 2024?
General Langley. USAFRICOM goes to great lengths to mitigate harm
to civilians during operations, including the operation in question.
33. Senator Warren. General Langley, a spokeswoman for AFRICOM said
they are aware of the reports regarding the two Cuban doctors and are
assessing the results of the operation. What is the timeline for
AFRICOM to complete its assessment of the report regarding the death of
the two Cuban doctors?
General Langley. The final assessment will be completed shortly.
USAFRICOM is conducting a thorough review of all available information
regarding the reported civilian harm. Once complete, the results of the
review will be posted on the USAFRICOM public-facing website.
34. Senator Warren. General Langley, will AFRICOM inform my office
of the results of the assessment?
General Langley. Yes. Once complete, the final assessment can be
shared at a higher classification.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
support to the kurds
35. Senator Manchin. General Kurilla, the Kurds in both Syria and
Iraq have not only stood should-to-shoulder with us but have also done
a majority of the fighting and dying against ISIS [Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria] and Iran's terrorist proxies. Their role is so
important that we have specifically authorized and appropriated
substantial funding for military equipment intended for the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) to combat terrorist organizations. It has
come to my attention that the equipment we have been providing to the
Kurds either never makes it to them or is cannibalized before it gets
to them because it must stop in Baghdad before going to Erbil. What is
the estimated time of these delays of equipment being delivered to the
KRG?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
36. Senator Manchin. General Kurilla, of the equipment that we have
sent to the KRG, what pieces have not been delivered and what is the
reason for missing equipment?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
37. Senator Manchin. General Kurilla, of the equipment delivered,
what is the condition of the equipment upon delivery to the KRG?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
38. Senator Manchin. General Kurilla, how does CENTCOM oversee the
transit of equipment from the United States, through Baghdad and then
to Erbil?
General Kurilla. USCENTCOM has no report of any undelivered or
missing CTEF equipment. CTEF equipment does not transit through
Baghdad.
39. Senator Manchin. General Kurilla, how is timely, complete and
undamaged equipment shipments ensured throughout the delivery process?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
preventing iranian financing
40. Senator Manchin. General Kurilla, Iran continues to fund
terrorist organizations who have killed U.S. troops while also backing
the more recent destabilizing activities caused by Hamas. Despite being
a State Sponsor of Terror, they continue to evade sanctions imposed by
the United States in addition to other nations such as the United
Kingdom and the European Union. We must stop Iran's black-market oil
sales used to support Hamas, Hezbollah, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC), and other Iranian aligned terrorist groups. How are you,
alongside our partners and allies in the region, preventing Iranian
vessels from selling sanctioned oil used to finance terrorism?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
41. Senator Manchin. General Kurilla, specifically, how does
CENTCOM support the seizure of Iranian oil whether through collecting
evidence, intelligence, or other means?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
42. Senator Manchin. General Kurilla, in your opinion, what other
sources of Iranian financing could we be going after to make their
terrorist resourcing much harder?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
normalization arrangement between the united states, israel, and saudi
arabia
43. Senator Manchin. General Kurilla, I believe the only pathway
forward toward a constructive peace in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank
is to complete the negotiations around a security, economic, and energy
treaty between Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States. This treaty
should also incorporate security and economic guarantees that promote
the prosperity of the Palestinian people while providing the security
needed by Israel. This type of agreement is necessary to ensure Iran
fails in their objective of continued destabilization in the Middle
East while opening the possibility for other Middle East nations to
join the agreement. What do you see as the necessary conditions or
necessary steps forward to achieving such a treaty?
General Kurilla. USCENTCOM continues to support and implement the
National Defense and Military Strategies, working with regional
partners and coalitions to deter external malign influencers like Iran
and its proxies and violent extremist organizations from undermining
U.S. vital national interests.
relationship building in africa
44. Senator Manchin. General Langley, Africa is a constant
battlegroup where the freedom of the African people and their
democratic values consistently comes under attack by Russian propaganda
and Chinese financial exploitation. A prime example of this was in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. As mentioned in your statement,
Africa has critical resources vital to national security but are at
risk of being leveraged by our adversaries to gain strategic advantage.
As Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
how can my staff work alongside your command to identify, prioritize,
and protect critical resources vital to the African people and our
national interests?
General Langley. We recognize the priority our global competitors
have placed on gaining access to critical mineral resources in Africa
as evidenced by the recently renegotiated mining-for-infrastructure
deal the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) signed with China.
However, our African partners are less interested in who they work
with, and more interested in ensuring fair terms in any such
agreements. The Lobito Corridor agreement is a strong example of this.
This trans-African rail line will enhance opportunities to offer
alternatives to partner nations, so they do not have to rely on global
competitors, particularly China, which intends to use the degraded
TAZARA railway to ship minerals from central Africa to Dar es Salaam on
the Indian coast.
Regarding how we can work together, our critical minerals of
national interest are defined by the ``Critical Minerals List''
published by the Department of Interior and the ``Critical Materials
List'' published by the Department of Energy. The DOD also determines
which minerals and materials are strategic and critical for defense
applications and weapon systems. We welcome the opportunity to
collaborate and coordinate across the Interagency to compete in this
sector and secure the range of minerals and materials critical to
defense applications and national interest. For example, work with U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) offers opportunities to
engage. In March 2024, the U.S. Government (USG) announced the opening
of an implementing office of Power Africa in Kinshasa, DRC, and the
launch of a new activity called ``Empowering East and Central Africa
program.'' Power Africa, a flagship USG initiative coordinated by
USAID, enhances access to reliable, sustainable energy power across
Africa.
Our African partners also struggle to monitor, regulate, and
benefit economically from the artisanal mining enterprises responsible
for a large volume of the rare earth mineral mining conducted on the
continent. These partners would probably benefit from U.S. expertise on
developing and implementing regulations for small mining operations,
which your staff may be positioned to support.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
iran
45. Senator Rosen. General Kurilla, while U.S. strikes on Iranian-
aligned militias may have degraded their short-term capabilities, what
are you doing to proactively target Iranian-aligned militias before
they injure and kill Americans, not just responding after they
successfully conduct an attack and how do we do that without risking
expulsion of U.S. troops by the Government of Iraq?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
46. Senator Rosen. General Kurilla, taking into consideration our
force posture in CENTCOM, do you have the forces required to
continuously be engaged with Iran and its proxies, while also being
able to deter Iran from further aggression?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
israel
47. Senator Rosen. General Kurilla, how would CENTCOM support
Israel's defensive needs in the event they face a war with Hezbollah?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
islamic state of iraq and syria
48. Senator Rosen. General Kurilla, given our partnership with the
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the Defeat-ISIS campaign, including
security training, what contingency plans does CENTCOM have to shore up
SDF-run prisons and displaced persons camps to ensure that captured
ISIS fighters do not return to the battlefield?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
49. Senator Rosen. General Kurilla, how does the continued
elimination of ISIS leadership--which your forces impressively keep
executing--impact ISIS's ability to plan and carry out attacks on U.S.
Forces and SDF-run prisons and displaced persons camps?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
china
50. Senator Rosen. General Langley, last year you described the
security risks if China were to open a base in Western Africa. Given
the economic slowdown in China, have you seen any change in plans from
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to create a base in Western Africa?
General Langley. We have not observed any indications that China's
domestic economic conditions have affected the PLA's basing ambitions.
51. Senator Rosen. General Langley, do you assess they are closer
today to building one than they were last year?
General Langley. [Deleted.]
cooperation between iran and algeria
52. Senator Rosen. General Langley, Iran and Algeria recently
signed several agreements to strengthen bilateral economic relations.
This partnership is concerning, as deeper ties between the two
countries could undermine regional stability. For example, in late
2022, it was reported that Iran transferred, through Algerian
mediation, kamikaze drones to the Polisaro Front. Since that time, Iran
has only increased the sale and transfer of its unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV) around the world. What is your assessment of Iran's
malign actions in North Africa, and can you discuss the impacts of
Iranian UAV sales to the region?
General Langley. We have no confirmation that Iran sold UAVs to any
nation or non-State actor in North Africa. Tehran has increased its
diplomatic and economic outreach to North Africa since the 2023 Iran-
Saudi rapprochement. In March 2024, Former Iranian President Raisi
visited Algeria and signed MOUs to expand bilateral relations.. In July
2023, Iran reopened its embassy and an Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines (IRISL) merchant vessel docked in Libya for the first
time in 10 years.
Despite the increased Iranian engagement with North African
nations, there is currently no significant Iranian malign activity in
North Africa to note, and Algeria would very likely view any Iranian
malign activities in the North Africa region with serious concern.
Algiers views continued normal diplomatic relationship with both Iran
and the West as important to maintaining Algeria's non-aligned status.
Regarding the Polisario, Algeria likely seeks to maintain control of
the group and to avoid allowing any nascent conflict to expand into a
greater conflict. The U.S. currently has a revised MOU in staffing with
the Department of Defense for expanded cooperation with Algeria.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
counter unmanned aerial systems (c-uas)
53. Senator Cotton. General Kurilla, on January 28th a drone attack
killed 3 U.S. soldiers and injured more than 30 at Tower 22 in Jordan.
Tower 22 had electronic warfare capability to counter drones, but media
reporting suggested it lacked the ability to kinetically engage drones.
Do you believe all U.S. bases within your area of responsibility should
have kinetic air defense systems?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
54. Senator Cotton. General Kurilla, should Army invest in
additional counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) capabilities?
General Kurilla. USCENTCOM advocates to the U.S. Army, as well as
the rest of the services, to prioritize counter-unmanned aerial systems
in their investment priorities. Investments in counter-UAS technology
are vitally important to defend U.S. servicemembers in the USCENTCOM
area of responsibility as well as our regional Allies and partners.
Specifically, USCENTCOM advocates for improved sensing, fire and forget
improvements, and the ability to defend against swarms.
55. Senator Cotton. General Kurilla, we have been repeatedly told
that DOD needs authorities to engage these kinds of drones over
military installations; what do you need?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
56. Senator Cotton. General Kurilla, are your manuals and guidance
documents fully up to date with current law?
General Kurilla. USCENTCOM continues to review and update guidance
we provide to our forces to ensure they have the training, current
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) informed by lessons learned.
We are working closely with the Department and the Services to ensure
we provide the most effective capabilities and training to our forces
facing this rapidly evolving threat. As detailed in CJCSI 3121.01B, our
forces have the inherent right to self-defense to counter threats from
UAS. We also continue to work closely with our partners where we have
forces deployed to ensure an integrated defense to counter UAS threats.
57. Senator Cotton. General Kurilla, what are you doing to update
guidance to expand authority to defend your bases?
General Kurilla. U.S. Forces currently have sufficient authority to
respond in self-defense against attacks against bases or personnel. We
continue to assess and update guidance to the force as necessary on how
to best defeat specific threats.
58. Senator Cotton. General Kurilla, is there current guidance
prohibiting defenders from employing lethal force to defend against
drone threats?
General Kurilla. All U.S. Forces have the inherent right of self-
defense and can respond to hostile threats, including those posed by
drones, in self-defense, to include lethal force. In non-combat
locations, we work closely with our host nation partners to ensure
there is an integrated defense.
59. Senator Cotton. General Kurilla, are you encouraging your
defenders to use lethal force, if necessary?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
60. Senator Cotton. General Kurilla, are you limiting defenses
against drones to non-lethal or non-kinetic means?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Michael Rounds
army corps of engineers' international civil works authorities
61. Senator Rounds. General Langley, your posture statement and our
previous conversations clearly outline the importance of infrastructure
development in the AFRICOM area of responsibility. I introduced a
provision in this year's Water Resources Development Act to increase
the Army Corps of Engineers' international civil works authorities to
provide water resources and other infrastructure support, while
building partner capacity, that could serve as an effective tool in
AFRICOM and other combatant commands. How would gaining authorities of
this type impact your ability to execute your mission?
General Langley. Infrastructure projects such as water resource
management, renewable energy systems, and climate-resilient
construction methods can directly counter climate change, promoting
peace and security. By empowering our partners, we ensure local
ownership and long-term impact. These endeavors will strengthen
relationships with combatant commands and international organizations,
enhancing interoperability and shared commitment to climate-resilient
development and peacebuilding. I firmly believe in the potential for
collaborative and innovative approaches within the U.S. Government and
with international partners to address the interconnected challenges of
climate change and security.
USACE Civil Works capabilities are a key enabler for working with
African partners when addressing water resource and climate change
challenges. These capabilities can support U.S. whole-of-government
efforts on the African continent and are an effective tool for
integrating military and civil engagement. AFRICOM believes existing
security cooperation authorities and authorities of the interagency
(DOS, USAID) are sufficient to support the AFRICOM Campaign Plan
requirements for water resource management and climate change
initiatives that support Access and Influence and Strengthening
partnerships.
62. Senator Rounds. General Langley, are there any other ``soft
power'' authorities that might help you to provide incentives to
compete more favorably against Chinese Belt and Road initiatives?
General Langley. USAFRICOM leverages a number of programs and
authorities to compete against Chinese Belt and Road initiatives. The
Global Fragility Act (GFA) offers a coherent framework for addressing
fragility in priority regions, countering the Chinese Belt and Road
Initiative by targeting root causes of conflict. Additionally, programs
such as Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) and the
Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) assist
foreign partners, build trust, improve health outcomes, and create
durable partnerships. Combined with efforts of our Civil Affairs
projects, these efforts strengthen our strategic position and influence
in the region, combating Chinese Belt and Road initiatives. While
additional ``soft power'' authorities are not requested, continued
funding of existing programs is critical to compete against Chinese
Belt and Road initiatives.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
conflict in the red sea
63. Senator Sullivan. General Kurilla, in your personal opinion, is
the M/V Behshad, or any other Iranian state-owned vessel, providing
targeting information to the Houthis, a legitimate military target?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
64. Senator Sullivan. General Kurilla, do you assess that Iran has
the ability to stop the Houthis form attacking commercial shipping and
U.S. Navy vessels in the Red Sea?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
65. Senator Sullivan. General Kurilla, why did the European Union
find it necessary to establish their own naval task force--Operation
Aspides--with near-identical goals as the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity
Guardian?
General Kurilla. I refer you to the European Union for their
rationale.
66. Senator Sullivan. General Kurilla, have any members of
Operation Prosperity Guardian left to join Operation Aspides?
General Kurilla. No members (members defined as countries that have
publicly announced support for OPG) have publicly withdrawn from
Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG), but all European Union (EU)
members who provided direct materiel support to OPG prior to the
establishment of Operation ASPIDES have transitioned all materiel
support to Operation ASPIDES. These EU nations continue to provide
limited staff support to OPG.
67. Senator Sullivan. General Kurilla, has there been an increase
in maritime traffic through the Red Sea since the establishment of
Operation Prosperity Guardian?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
68. Senator Sullivan. General Kurilla, in your opinion, is our
current munition expenditure rate to defend against Houthi anti-ship
ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and drones sustainable?
General Kurilla. Although there is no immediate risk to our
operations to counter-Houthi threats to maritime shipping, munitions
requirements outside of planned mission stocks do represent risk to
mission and readiness posture. If a wider regional conflict were to
occur resulting in a dramatic increase in munitions expenditures, then
the decrement will need to be reexamined at that time to determine the
sustainability of expenditures. CENTCOM fully supports increased
investments in the defense industrial base and manufacturing to achieve
the planned for level of munitions as quickly as possible in support of
operational planning and global readiness requirements. We should also
continue to invest in innovative and non-kinetic weapons and options
that will reduce our reliance on traditional manufactured munitions.
69. Senator Sullivan. General Kurilla, have any People's Republic
of China (PRC) naval vessels responded to merchant ships distress calls
in the Red Sea since October 2023?
General Kurilla. I am unaware of any instance of PRC naval vessels
responding or rendering aid to any merchant ships' distress calls in
the Red Sea.
70. Senator Sullivan. General Kurilla, have any PRC flagged
merchant ships been targeted by Houthi forces since October 2023?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
u.s. central command counter-unmanned aerial systems capabilities
71. Senator Sullivan. General Kurilla, counter-UAS systems was your
top unfunded priority in fiscal year 2024. Given the rise in injuries
and deaths from UAS since October 2023, should we expect to see that in
the budget as a funded requirement this year?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
72. Senator Sullivan. General Kurilla, what can you tell us about
new counter-UAS capabilities--like those tested in Red Sands 23.2--that
are in the region to defend against UAS attacks?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
russia in africa
73. Senator Sullivan. General Langley, beyond shedding light on
Russia's exploitative treatment of African nations, what resources do
you need to counter Russia's misinformation campaign and growing
presence across the continent?
General Langley. As the Russian military has taken control of
private military company Wagner, Yevgerny Prigozin's former
organization, it has continued to conduct foreign information
manipulation and interference throughout Africa. Russia remains engaged
in an active campaign of information manipulation and interference
against the West. USAFRICOM requires the authorities and tools to build
partner capacity to counter foreign information manipulation and
interference. We also require both funding and forces to participate in
a whole-of-government approach.
74. Senator Sullivan. General Langley, have you seen the Wagner
group's influence across Africa wane since the death of Yevgeny
Prigozin?
General Langley. Yes, Russian Wagner's influence in Africa has
decreased since the death of Prigozhin. While Wagner continues to
conduct combat operations in the Central African Republic and Mali, we
do not see the group attempting to expand its efforts in Africa as we
once did. The Russian Ministry of Defense's new ``Africa Corps'' unit
has taken over Wagner's role as the primary tool for expanding Russian
military influence on the continent. Since the beginning of the year,
Africa Corps has deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, two countries
which previously did not host Russian expeditionary forces, and to
Libya, where Africa Corps took over Wagner's previous mission.
75. Senator Sullivan. General Langley, how has the relationship
between Wagner forces and Russian Ministry of Defense personnel changed
in your area of responsibility (AOR) since the death of Yevgeny
Prigozin?
General Langley. After Prigozhin's death, the Russian government
began assuming control over the Wagner group's military, business, and
information operations. The various Wagner elements were placed under
the supervision of Russia's formal military and intelligence
structures. In Africa, the Russia Ministry of Defense developed the
Africa Corps, which is gradually increasing its control over Wagner
operations. Wagner still operates in Mali and Central African Republic,
but Africa Corps likely will move to subsume remaining Wagner personnel
and take over these operations within the next year. Some Wagner
personnel across Africa have already signed new contracts with Africa
Corps.
76. Senator Sullivan. General Langley, have you seen any armed
conflict between Russian and Ukrainian military personnel or
mercenaries in your AOR?
General Langley. Yes. In 2023, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro
Kuleba promised his country would ``free Africa from Russia's grip''
during an interview. Shortly after Sudan's civil war commenced in April
2023, there were indications Ukrainian special operations forces
targeted Russian and non-Russians working for Wagner elements
supporting Sudan's Rapid Support Forces.
countering chinese influence in africa
77. Senator Sullivan. General Langley, China seeks to expand its
military presence on the African continent. Chinese investment through
its Belt and Road initiative was initially welcomed by many African
nations, but some--like Angola--now see that it hasn't delivered the
quality that was promised. The Wall Street Journal reported a few weeks
ago that the Chinese missteps have created an opening for the United
States to step-in. Where else across the continent have you seen a
willingness to pivot away from China and toward the United States and
the West more broadly?
General Langley. In Southern Africa, we have seen countries like
Zambia embrace U.S. military partnership because of the superior
experience, knowledge, and programs we can offer when compared to our
competitors. We also see countries with maritime interests seek U.S.
assistance to counter illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU)
fishing activities, often perpetrated by Chinese fishing fleets, in
their waters. These countries have consistently asked for maritime
domain awareness capabilities, rule of law institutional capacity
building, and expansion of our exercises to enhance interoperability.
We also see partner willingness to pivot toward the U.S. regarding
Foreign Military Sales. There is a willingness and interest among
partner nations to acquire U.S. produced ISR aircraft such as MQ-9s or
UAVs instead of procuring Chinese produced equipment. U.S. willingness
to support such acquisitions would significantly open further Security
Cooperation opportunities with those partners and further undercut
competitor efforts. This could provide an opportunity to leverage
partners to share ISR products from areas where the U.S. lacks organic
ISR coverage.
78. Senator Sullivan. General Langley, how is AFRICOM combatting
Chinese influence efforts in the AOR?
General Langley. USAFRICOM competes with Chinese influence efforts
on the continent by contributing to a whole-of-government approach with
partner focused operations, activities, and investments. Through our
Campaign Plan and Campaign Order, we sequence and overlap events that
demonstrate our value proposition to our partners. Activities such as
military expertise exchanges, training teams, exercises, conferences,
Foreign Military Sales, and key leader engagements all show the value
of U.S. partnerships.
79. Senator Sullivan. General Langley, how are you assessing the
military implications of Chinese infrastructure investment in your AOR?
General Langley. Chinese infrastructure investment in the AOR
supports a key Chinese effort in the region: exportation of critical
minerals, which can be used for defense purposes. Beijing has mining
interests throughout the continent and Africa has key minerals, which
can be used in military applications. These include, but are not
limited to: tantalum, used in aircraft and spacecraft; manganese, used
in jet engines, batteries, and steel production; and iron ore, critical
to producing steel for military uses. Chinese infrastructure investment
on the continent, particularly in the transportation sector, including
ports, highways, bridges, railways, and tunnel construction, is key to
these exportation efforts. It also is important to note that Chinese
entrenchment in the African mineral sector allows Beijing to diversify
its mineral resources away from Western suppliers and promotes its
ability to monopolize the mineral supply chain, including refining and
processing. China also can leverage its position as one of Africa's key
infrastructure development partners to influence policy, including to
garner political support on the international level with its ``one-
China principle.''
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
air base air defense
80. Senator Tuberville. General Langley, given the threat in the
region and increased threat to U.S. military overseas, I'd like to turn
attention to base installation protection. It is my understanding that
United States Air Forces in Europe--Air Forces Africa (USAFE-AFAFRICA)
has developed and demonstrated an air base and air defense prototype
with multi-national sensor integration capabilities that can be
deployed quickly to provide crucial all-domain awareness of cruise
missile and unmanned aircraft system threats. How could this be
expanded to field, train, and operate advanced air base air defense
(ABAD) capabilities as quickly as possible?
General Langley. USAFE-AFAFRICA is fielding a wing-level C2 system
to give commanders threat awareness. Three U.S.-only systems are
operational in Europe. The capability consists of a sensor and data
feeds displayed on a common operating picture. Plans to incorporate
host nation radars, US sensors, flight data, and NATO datalink
continue. One partner nation is currently sharing air picture, with 6
more planned. This emerging fused radar picture has been tested in
live-fly exercises against simulated cruise missiles and integration
with allied nation surface-based air defenses (SBAD) has been
demonstrated during live-fire events.
USAFE AFAF indicates that additional funding will support fielding
air defense sensors along with kinetic and non-kinetic effectors to
establish a self-defense capability at all critical locations in Europe
and Africa.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Markwayne Mullin
unmanned aircraft systems threats
81. Senator Mullin. General Kurilla and General Langley, over the
last few years, we have seen rapid rise in drone events in both of your
areas of responsibility. Over that last 3 years, we have seen
approximately 200 separate drone attacks within the Middle East. Over
that past 5 months, U.S. Forces have encountered over 150 drone attacks
drone attacks from Iranian proxies. Do you think you have the proper
number of tools and resources to combat this frequency in threat?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
General Langley. The threat from un-crewed aerial threats is
increasing worldwide, and no Combatant Commander will ever have all the
tools they want to uphold the sacred obligation of force protection.
United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) has a layered approach to
countering un-crewed aerial threats which include small drones, larger
one-way attack drones, and cruise and theater ballistic missiles. We
are seeking more innovative, easily integrated, and persistent
capabilities, as well as the ability to tie them into an assured
command and control capability. Without persistent capabilities and
assured command and control systems, seamless coordination, sensing,
warning, and response to air threats is very challenging. Training is
also a major challenge when attempting to deploy and employ non
programs of record. However, we are working directly with the Joint
Staff and the Services to leverage their training capabilities as they
come online. While we're gaining ground, we have also been forced to
supplement our rotational National Guard forces with USAFRICOM training
programs designed to ensure U.S. personnel can effectively identify and
respond to un-crewed threats.
82. Senator Mullin. General Kurilla and General Langley, what do
you need from Congress to help provide you rapidly the resources needed
to combat this threat?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
General Langley. Congress must address the critical gaps in
USAFRICOM's readiness to combat drone threats through increased
resources to develop technology aimed at enhancing integration among
counter-drone technologies and systems. Additional legislative measures
should prioritize the allocation of resources toward comprehensive
training programs tailored to counter-drone operations, ensuring
personnel readiness and proficiency.
Congressional oversight should ensure sustained funding and support
for the maintenance and enhancement of drone defeat capabilities within
USAFRICOM, enabling effective responses to emerging threats in the
region.
83. Senator Mullin. General Kurilla and General Langley, as the
capabilities of drones and accessibility of drone's advance (i.e. drone
stacks and swarms), how are you working with the Services to quickly
field new capabilities and adapt to the evolving threat?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
General Langley. We regularly participate in, and have found great
support from, the Warfighter Senior Integration Group forums and work
hand in hand with the Services and other Combatant Commands to
identify, and in many cases share resources to defend against, the
increasing and evolving uncrewed threat.
Within the command, we work closely with the Joint Staff J8 Science
and Technology Office, with industry, and service funded Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) communities and Joint
Solutions (i.e. Joint C-UAS Office) to quickly field new capabilities
in order to adapt to evolving and increasing UAS technologies.
counter unmanned aircraft systems
84. Senator Mullin. General Kurilla and General Langley, 89 percent
of counter unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) technology investments in
fiscal year 2023 was split among four key companies. These companies
are focused on kinetic effects for counter UAS. The proposed
supplemental for aid also focuses on replenishment of kinetic based
weapons. What is your planned investment strategy to meet your future
counter-UAS requirements?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
General Langley. USAFRICOM requires the prioritization of
acquisition and deployment of low-cost precision C-UAS kinetic defeat
capabilities that can neutralize small to medium-sized drones. These
capabilities must be intuitive to operate and maintain, enabling rapid
proficiency among personnel with varying levels of technical expertise.
USAFRICOM aims to select kinetic defeat options that have undergone
rigorous testing and evaluation protocols to validate the effectiveness
and reliability, while prioritizing scalability and interoperability.
In addition, USAFRICOM allocates funding toward supporting operational
assessment initiatives that advance cost-effective kinetic defeat
technologies, emphasizing interoperability, precision interception, and
low collateral damage capabilities.
85. Senator Mullin. General Kurilla and General Langley, how are
you working with the Services to bring in new counter-UAS capabilities
that meet your requirements to include lowering costs and risks while
increasing sustainability and capability?
General Kurilla. At the Departmental level, the Warfighter-Senior
Integration Group and Counter-VEO Working Groups have been great venues
to communicate priorities to Services, resource solutions to urgent
needs, and solicit potential solution pathways for our warfighters.
Other focus areas include project proposals with OUSD R&E, A&S and
participation in the Chief Technology Officer's Counsel. Internal to
USCENTCOM we are growing our Modeling & Simulation efforts and
experimentation programs. Additionally, we consistently partner with
Industry and Academia at the local and national level to assist
Services in generating solutions.
General Langley. Annually, USAFRICOM advocates on behalf of our
Service components needs through Program Budget Review (PBR)/Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP) submissions. Our effort is to prevent
threat actor's use of small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (S-UAS) against
U.S. and partner forces on the continent. We work closely with the
Services to determine their needs and I have invited Services and
academia to use our area of operations as a collaborative innovation
workspace to test and refine C-UAS capabilities. My goal is to at least
keep pace with the speed of technology and to mitigate emerging un-
crewed aerial threats.
USAFRICOM is collaborating closely with the Services to procure C-
UAS capabilities designed to meet our threats and cost reduction
targets without compromising operational effectiveness. This initiative
aims to integrate advanced C-UAS systems that not only enhance kinetic
and non-kinetic defeat capabilities, but also prioritizes ease of
deployment, training, and maintenance, thereby reducing logistical
burdens and increasing operational flexibility across Africa's diverse
environment.
By fostering collaboration across the Services, USAFRICOM seeks to
expedite the adoption of scalable and interoperable C-UAS solutions
that address evolving threats while maximizing the efficiency and
affordability of defensive operations in the region.
86. Senator Mullin. General Kurilla and General Langley, what can
Congress do to help?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
General Langley. Congress sustains current fiscal and legislative
support to effectively advance C-UAS technology amongst the Department
of Defense and commercial industry in order to align capabilities to
current S-UAS tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by extremist
groups. Moreover, sustained support to Service's force protection
efforts through the congressional budget processes enables Service
components to execute their missions safely at future posture
locations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
group 3 unmanned aircraft systems threat
87. Senator Budd. General Kurilla, we have heard from the Services,
and from you, that you are considering a variety of options to combat
the evolving Group 3 threat. Outside of the legacy programs of record,
which were not developed to counter the unique attributes of the Group
3 threat, what kinds of capabilities do you need to provide advanced
force protection to deployed servicemembers in the region?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
88. Senator Budd. General Kurilla, what specific attributes do you
need to better enable CENTCOM to detect, track and defeat more complex,
multi-salvo attacks like the ones we've see in Ukraine?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
special operations forces
89. Senator Budd. General Kurilla and General Langley, can you
please explain the value of Special Operations Forces in your AOR?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
General Langley. United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) cannot
overstate the value of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in our Area of
Responsibility (AOR). SOF provides a substantial amount of the forces
required to execute our tasks as described in the National Defense
Strategy (NDS). SOF conducts counter-violent extremist organizations
(C-VEO) operations on the continent to deny, degrade, and defeat
threats to the U.S. Homeland and other U.S. interests. SOF is also a
key component used to counter our near-peer adversaries throughout
Africa. SOF's unique operational capabilities and ability to operate
without larger logistic trains and in isolated / denied environments
have provided us C-VEO successes and yielded valuable intelligence on
adversaries. As USAFRICOM continues to shift toward considering
operational effects countering our Global Competitors, SOF will
continue to play an essential and expanded role.
90. Senator Budd. General Kurilla and General Langley, what
impacts, if any, do you expect to theater operations given planned
force structure and personnel cuts to Army Special Operations Forces?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
General Langley. As a resource constrained theater, USAFRICOM
already lacks access to many essential enablers. Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations forces are some of our most critical assets.
We anticipate planned force structure and personnel cuts to further
reduce the fill rates for the units supporting our operations and
exercises. We also anticipate staff reductions at all echelons that
will further complicate our ability to plan, prepare, and assess civil
military operations and military information support operations.
91. Senator Budd. General Kurilla and General Langley, have you or
your command been consulted on the assessment of optimal force
structure for special operations forces required by section 1075 of the
Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act?
General Kurilla. Yes, I submitted a risk assessment addressing the
planned ARSOF reduction to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
15 September 2023.
General Langley. While we have not been formally consulted yet, we
are aware of DOD Inspector General proposals to study the USAFRICOM
area of responsibility to gain essential information about the issue.
We have also participated in a series of USSOCOM table top exercises to
mitigate risk associated with future force structure changes.
gulf partners
92. Senator Budd. General Kurilla, the United States has long
sought to strengthen our Gulf partners' ability to defend themselves
against air, missile, drone, and other attacks by Iran and its proxies.
Can you provide an update on these efforts--are we seeing improvements,
and what can we do to keep building on progress that has already made?
General Kurilla. [Deleted.]
air force budget
93. Senator Budd. General Kurilla, as you know, the U.S. Air Force
is the combatant command agent which has the primary responsibility for
funding CENTCOM's headquarters. Do Air Force budgetary constraints or
CENTCOM's lack of budgetary control impact mission accomplishment and,
if so, how?
General Kurilla. The nature of the USCENTCOM AOR remains dynamic
and often requires unpredictable resources. During periods of
additional mission requirements, USCENTCOM does place a strain on
limited USAF resources. While the USAF strives to support our missions,
USAF is tasked to support other Combatant Command missions which limits
their ability to provide adequate resource flexibility for USCENTCOM
requirements.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 2024
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin, Rosen, Kelly,
Wicker, Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, and
Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
receive testimony from General Gregory Guillot, Commander of
U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense
Command, and General Laura Richardson, Commander of U.S.
Southern Command. This is General Guillot's first posture
hearing as NORTHCOM commander, and we welcome you, sir. I would
also note that this is General Richardson's last appearance
before the Committee in her current role. General, I would like
to express my appreciation for your decades of admirable
service to the Nation, including your outstanding leadership of
our SOUTHCOM forces. Thank you very much, ma'am.
I would like to take a moment to acknowledge the ongoing
crisis in Haiti. The situation is very concerning, and I
understand that United States Military Forces have been
deployed to augment security at our embassy in Port-au-Prince
and evacuate non-essential personnel. This crisis involves both
of your commands to varying degrees, and I would like to know
what resources or support you need to respond.
U.S. Northern Command is key to our national security, as
the principal command for protecting the American Homeland.
Indeed, the first of the four priorities outlined in the
National Defense Strategy is, quote, ``Defending the Homeland,
paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the People's
Republic of China (PRC).'' As we consider threats from China
and other competitors, our very concept of homeland defense
must evolve. General Guillot, I understand NORTHCOM published
the first Homeland Defense Policy Guidance to meet this
challenge, and I would ask for an update on the status of its
implementation and how it will transform the homeland defense
plans of the Department.
The urgency of this mission has been made clear over the
past year with the incursions of a Chinese surveillance balloon
and other unidentified aerial phenomena in our airspace. These
events raised concerns that NORTHCOM and NORAD may have an
awareness gap that needs to be resolved. America's skies and
seas must be secure to protect our citizens, and the Department
must pursue technologies that provide forward detection.
General, I would be interested in your assessment of these
potential awareness gaps and what additional tools or resources
are needed to overcome them.
Regionally, NORTHCOM also provides support to the U.S. law
enforcement mission by helping to counter cartels engaged in
drug smuggling, human trafficking, and money laundering across
the southwest border. The Committee would appreciate your views
on the success of security cooperation efforts with the Mexican
Army and Navy, and what role NORTHCOM has in supporting the
Department of Homeland Security in border security operations.
Turning to Southern Command, General Richardson, your
command faces growing challenges from China and Russia in Latin
America. The political and economic instability in the region
presents a situation that our adversaries are seeking to
exploit to increase their own influence. China, in particular,
is expanding its presence in the region, including through
investments in strategic infrastructure such as the Port of
Balboa in Panama, 5G telecommunications, and an expanding
network of space tracking installations. General, I am
interested in your assessment of the challenge from near-peer
competitors in Latin America, and how we might work
strategically with our partners in the region to build
resilience against these activities.
SOUTHCOM, like NORTHCOM, continues to work closely with the
U.S. interagency to support counter-narcotic and counter-
transnational criminal organization, or TCO, missions. I am
concerned about the growing threats from TCOs and synthetic
opioid trafficking, including fentanyl, which are contributing
to more than 100,000 overdose deaths each year in the United
States. General Richardson, I would ask for an update on
SOUTHCOM's work with partner nations and other U.S. Government
agencies in counter-narcotic and counter-TCO efforts, given
SOUTHCOM's limited force posture and resources.
Finally, we know that insecurity throughout the SOUTHCOM
area is contributing to the flow of migrants north to the U.S.
border. Economic instability, violence, and corruption continue
to be a major source of insecurity in much of the region,
especially in the Northern Triangle countries of Honduras,
Guatemala, and El Salvador. General Richardson, I would like to
know your views on what more can be done to help improve the
situation and strengthen border security throughout the region.
Thank you, again, to our witnesses. I look forward to your
testimonies.
As a reminder for my colleagues, there will be a closed
session immediately following this hearing in room SVC-217.
Let me now turn to my colleague, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank our witnesses for being with us here.
Our adversaries, particularly China and Russia, are
actively working to exploit America's vulnerabilities. They are
doing so here at home and seeking to expand their influence in
this Western Hemisphere.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy establishes homeland
defense as its top priority. That was a year and a half ago.
But the Biden administration has not matched that goal with
action.
Year after year, the Biden administration has declined to
fund NORTHCOM's request for the radars and sensors it needs for
proper air defense. Numerous bases on American soil remain
unable to protect themselves against small drones. This
presents a clear and significant vulnerability. On top of it
all, our war games continue to ignore crucial domestic
resilience problems that would arise in a potential conflict.
The Biden administration also refuses to learn from its
homeland defense mistakes. Last year's Chinese surveillance
balloon lapse--the lapse of last year's defenses with regard to
the Chinese surveillance balloon--is a case in point. Senior
Biden administration defense officials responded evasively to
congressional oversight, and they leaked classified information
selectively to deflect blame. The President's staff declined to
conduct an internal review of the major air defense failure.
They finally did so when this Committee mandated it in the
NDAA, as presided over by our distinguished Chair.
The spy balloon was a significant failure, but the most
pressing homeland defense crisis is the one at our southwest
border. Approximately 70,000 Americans are dying annually from
fentanyl overdoses. Most of the supply is synthesized in Mexico
using Chinese precursor chemicals. Then it is trafficked to the
United States by Mexico's criminal cartels. The crisis can only
worsen as more deadly drugs flood the market.
The cartels are also executing an unprecedented human
trafficking operation across our open border, and it is
lucrative. The gangs are charging thousands of dollars for each
person they traffic. The human tragedy is severe and so is the
risk of terrorist infiltration. As CNN reported this past
summer, a human smuggling network with ties to ISIS helped more
than a dozen individuals enter our country illegally. In
October, two Iranians who were on a security threat list were
caught as they tried to cross the border from Mexico.
General Guillot, I recognize that many agencies have
responsibility at the southwest border, but DOD [Department of
Defense] is one of them. I hope you will explain how DOD's
border security contributions could be improved.
We also have challenges further south. I remain concerned
about the growing Chinese threats in Central America and South
America. The Chinese Communist Party continues to use its well-
known playbook in the SOUTHCOM theater. It aggressively uses
predatory economic and diplomatic practices to influence
governments.
Simultaneously, it sets conditions to enhance its military
presence, gather intelligence, and limit U.S. access and
influence. Great power competition is happening right here in
the Americas. We cannot ignore it.
Two quick examples underscore the urgency. Beijing is
making Latin America dependent on Huawei for communications
technology--something they tried to do in our country--an
example of China's economic influence campaign. We see the
CCP's military influence in Cuba, where we discovered a large
Chinese intelligence collection center.
General Richardson, I look forward to hearing how these
practices directly impact the stability of our region. We
should understand the threat they pose to our national
security. How real is it? How important is it?
Of course, there are other malign influences in this
theater. Venezuelan President Maduro recently asserted a
provocative, extra-territorial claim of sovereignty over a
large, oil-rich portion of the neighboring nation of Guyana.
This type of instability so close to our Homeland is troubling.
Even more troubling is the consistent mismatch between the
requirements SOUTHCOM has and the resources it receives. We
need to find cost-effective ways to exert influence in this
theater. For example, let's explore the use of the Office of
Strategic Capital in the future.
I look forward to General Richardson's candid assessment of
SOUTHCOM's most pressing resource and capability shortfalls,
and I am eager to learn what Congress can do to help.
General Guillot, I note that your name rhymes with hero. Is
that right?
General Guillot. Yes, Senator, it does.
Senator Wicker. Okay, good. Well, we expect both of you to
live up to these expectations. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker, and now let me
recognize General Guillot, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, USAF, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
DEFENSE COMMAND
General Guillot. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. It is a profound honor
to command and represent the men and women of North American
Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command.
As we speak this morning, American and Canadian military and
civilian personnel from both commands are actively defending
our Homelands against significant, persistent threats from
multiple vectors in all domains.
Although I have only been in command a few weeks, it is
readily clear to me that the United States, Canada, and our
expansive network of partners are facing an extraordinarily
complex strategic environment. Competitors seeking to diminish
our military and economic advantage have fielded advanced
kinetic systems designed to strike civilian military
infrastructure in North America, both above and below the
nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, competitors have rapidly advanced
and routinely used non-kinetic capabilities targeting our
critical infrastructure and our essential networks.
Threats to the Homeland are present in all domains and
along all avenues of approach to include the Arctic Region. As
stated in the National Defense Strategy, the People's Republic
of China remains our pacing challenge as the People's
Liberation Army modernizes and grows at a rapid pace. The PRC's
expanding nuclear capability and capacity, alongside its
development of modern submarines, missiles, hypersonic weapons,
all present significant challenges for homeland defense.
While the PRC's capabilities are growing quickly, Russia
remains a threat to the Homeland today and is an immediate
nation state concern. Russia retains the world's largest
stockpile of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons along
with significant capacity to strike inside North America with
air-and sea-launched precision conventional weapons. Despite
heavy losses to its ground forces in Ukraine, Russia has
invested heavily in systems that can threaten the United States
such as advanced guided missile submarines, hypersonic live
vehicles, ICBMs, as well as significant cyber and undersea
capabilities, as well as developmental systems such as nuclear
torpedo and a nuclear-powered cruise missile.
Meanwhile, North Korea continues its bellicose rhetoric
while test launching increasingly advanced long-range missiles
and expanding its ties with China and Russia. While Iran
currently lacks the capability to strike North America with
long-range missiles, it is investing in that capability. Iran
also supports violent militant groups in the Middle East and
maintains a worldwide network of operational surrogates. The
most prevalent and growing threats include cyber and small,
unmanned aerial systems that are being employed inside the
United States and Canada against civilian and military
infrastructure in ways that were not possible even just a few
years ago.
With those risks firmly in mind, NORAD and NORTHCOM strive
to begin homeland defense well beyond North America. To do so,
both commands are working with the services and Congress to
improve domain awareness in order to detect, track, and defeat
threats, ranging from long-range ballistic missiles to small,
unmanned aerial systems.
The defense of North America is an active endeavor that
requires NORAD and NORTHCOM to campaign against threats in all
domains, along all approaches. That effort requires seamless
exchange of information with combatant commands, conventional
and special operations forces, the intelligence community, and
the spectrum of interagency and international partners.
The importance of collecting and disseminating information
quickly cannot be overstated. I strongly support the
Department's work to advance the Combined Joint All-Domain
Command and Control concept as we seek to detect and track
potential threats and share information as quickly as possible
with analysts, operators and decisionmakers around the world.
Finally, upon taking command, I began a 90-day assessment
to inform the Department, the Joint Force, and Congress on
NORAD and NORTHCOM's ability to execute assigned tasks and make
recommendations on where the commands could or should do more.
Once complete I look forward to sharing my findings and updated
vision on how NORAD and NORTHCOM will best execute the noble
mission of homeland defense.
The challenges facing our Homelands are real, but there
should be no doubt about NORAD and NORTHCOM's resolve to
deterred aggression and, if necessary, defeat threats to our
Nation and our citizens.
Again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear this
morning. I look forward to working with the Committee, and I am
happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Gregory M. Guillot
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Gregory M. Guillot
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished Members of
the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to testify today and for
the honor of representing the men and women of United States Northern
Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD). Since assuming command in early February, my initial actions
and priorities have included maintaining our vital homeland defense
mission throughout a seamless leadership transition; strengthening
USNORTHCOM and NORAD's vital network of Department of Defense (DOD),
international, private sector, and interagency mission partners; and
conducting a thorough assessment of the Commands' personnel, missions,
and resourcing. I look forward to establishing personal relationships
with leaders throughout the commands' area of responsibility and across
the U.S. Government as those ties are critical to the successful
execution of USNORTHCOM and NORAD's no-fail missions.
It is already apparent that the strategic environment facing the
United States and Canada--and our allies and partners--presents
significant risks to our Homeland, our citizens, and our vital national
interests. Across all domains and avenues, competitors are exploiting
conflicts and crises around the world to undermine U.S. global
leadership and our democratic institutions. Our competitors continue to
develop and deploy highly advanced kinetic and non-kinetic weapons
systems capable of disrupting or defeating military and civilian
targets in North America. These threats are difficult to detect and can
strike with limited warning, which reduces the time and response
options available to our national leaders and increases the risk of
miscalculation and escalation during periods of heightened tension,
crisis, and conflict.
As recent events have made clear, overseas crises increasingly
carry significant implications for homeland defense. Regional conflicts
routinely have the potential to expand into broader crises that
directly impact U.S. and allied interests. Russia's unprovoked war
against Ukraine and the horrific October 7th Hamas terrorist attacks
against Israel demonstrate how seemingly isolated events, regardless of
whether the United States and our allies are directly involved, have
the potential to reach our own shores. Those ripple effects can include
competitor information operations directed against the American public
and civil unrest and violence within the United States, or attacks
directly targeting the United States and our interests.
Competitors like the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia
are well aware that the U.S. military is the strongest in the world and
highly capable of deploying forces anywhere on the planet to deter
aggression and de-escalate potential crises. Accordingly, those
competitors have sought to hold defense critical infrastructure in the
United States at risk with kinetic and non-kinetic systems intended to
impede our ability to flow forces overseas. That strategy must be taken
into account in planning for the forward deployment of U.S. forces and
resources, as moving assets overseas has the potential to affect the
availability of assets assigned to homeland defense or force
mobilization missions.
The realities of the 21st century strategic environment require a
flexible, adaptive global approach that recognizes the fact that our
competitors can hold the U.S. Homeland--and the Homelands of our allies
and partners--at risk with conventional, nuclear, and non-kinetic
capabilities as part of a broad effort to force the United States to
accept increased risk when deploying forces in support of overseas
operations. Preserving the full range of options for defending U.S.
national interests requires homeland defense to remain a fundamental
consideration at every stage of DOD planning, policy, and budgeting.
A globally integrated approach to planning and actions must also
extend beyond the Department of Defense and should be embraced by the
whole of the U.S. Government. Success in competition, crisis, or
conflict continues to rely on a ready, modern, and capable joint force
reinforcing the other core elements of our national power. Our
diplomatic corps is essential to shaping the strategic environment and
cultivating the network of alliances and partnerships that provide the
most significant U.S. advantage against isolated and authoritarian
competitors seeking to expand their territory and influence at the
expense of their sovereign neighbors. The successful execution of
USNORTHCOM and NORAD's missions relies on cohesive strategies,
integrated planning, and collaboration across the whole of government,
and I look forward to working closely with the Members of this
Committee as we work together to meet the formidable challenges facing
our Nation.
the threat environment
The threat to the Homeland continues to grow in complexity. Our
primary competitors are developing new ways to hold North America at
risk, both above and below the nuclear threshold. Designed to constrain
our options in a crisis, the capabilities our potential adversaries are
pursuing will challenge strategic deterrence and erode strategic
stability by limiting our ability to provide actionable warning and
narrowing the decision space available to senior leaders. The conflict
in the Middle East has also amplified the risk that Iran or a foreign
terrorist organization will conduct attacks in the Homeland, either
directly or by inspiring homegrown violent extremists to act in their
stead.
People's Republic of China (PRC)
The PRC remains the Department's pacing challenge as identified in
the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Beijing has embarked on a
wide-ranging military modernization program that is advancing the PRC's
homeland-threatening capabilities at an urgent pace. At the strategic
level, the PRC is pursuing a rapid quantitative and qualitative
expansion of its nuclear arsenal, which now numbers over 500
operational warheads and is on pace to exceed 1,000 by the end of the
decade. The PRC probably intends to place a significant portion of
these weapons--including over 300 newly constructed intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) silos--in a launch-on-warning posture that
could increase the risk of miscalculation in a crisis or conflict.
Beijing's strategic modernization program includes a variety of
novel weapons designed to bolster the credibility of the PRC's
strategic deterrent by ensuring its ability to overcome U.S. missile
defenses and retaliate following a strike. These weapons include ICBMs
equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles, whose high speed, low
trajectory, and maneuvering capabilities challenge our ability to
detect, characterize, and warn of inbound threats. The PRC is also
developing a fractional orbital bombardment system, designed to further
challenge our early warning radars and ballistic missile interceptors.
The Department of Defense's annual report to Congress on PRC
military developments states that the PRC may also be exploring the
development of conventionally armed intercontinental-range missile
systems that could allow Beijing to strike targets in Alaska and the
continental United States without crossing the nuclear threshold. Such
systems, if fielded, would further erode strategic stability by
challenging our ability to characterize an inbound attack and
complicating our decisionmaking about an appropriate response.
Turning to the maritime domain, in the last 2 years, the PRC has
launched the first two hulls of its new Shang III class of nuclear-
powered guided-missile submarines (SSGN). If the PRC arms the Shang III
with land-attack cruise missiles, the new SSGNs could provide Beijing a
clandestine land-attack option beyond the Indo-Pacific region,
potentially holding at risk critical infrastructure in Alaska and the
U.S. West Coast. While Beijing's intent for employing these long-range
conventional strike capabilities is not fully known, in a future
crisis, the PRC could use these weapons--along with its world-class
offensive cyber capabilities--to threaten or attack our critical
defense infrastructure in an attempt to dissuade or frustrate our force
flows across the Pacific and degrade the effectiveness of our forward
combat operations.
Meanwhile, the PRC continues to expand its influence and activity
in the Arctic. Last summer, Beijing again employed its Xue Long 2 ice-
hardened research vessel to conduct the country's 13th scientific
expedition to the Arctic. During its voyage, the vessel deployed
autonomous underwater vehicles, floating ice stations, and an acoustic
monitoring buoy system in waters off Alaska and Canada to collect data
that could inform future PLA Navy deployments to the region.
Concurrently, the PRC and Russia conducted their second combined naval
patrol to the Bering Sea in as many years. More than 10 vessels--
including cruise missile-capable surface combatants--participated in
the patrol, which included anti-submarine exercises and other combat
training near the Aleutian Islands.
Russia
While the PRC's strategic capabilities are growing quickly, Russia
remains the greatest military threat to the Homeland today. Despite the
degradation of its ground forces resulting from two disastrous years of
combat in Ukraine, Russia seeks to rapidly rearm and retains the
world's largest arsenal of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons
and a still formidable capability to threaten North America with
precision-strike conventional weapons. Russia has gained extensive
operational experience with its most advanced non-nuclear weapons in
Ukraine, and has had the opportunity to refine tactics, techniques, and
procedures that it could employ in a direct conflict with the United
States or our NATO allies. Moreover, Russia's illegal and unprovoked
full-scale invasion of Ukraine and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric have
demonstrated to like-minded autocrats that nuclear coercion remains a
tool of statecraft in the 21st Century.
Russia's leaders regularly exercise strategic conflict with the
West and are investing heavily to develop new weapons to ensure their
ability to hold our Nation at perpetual risk. In the last year, Russia
has expanded its force of ICBMs armed with the Avangard hypersonic
glide vehicle, designed to evade missile defense radars and
interceptors. It is also preparing to deploy the Sarmat heavy ICBM,
which Vladimir Putin has claimed will feature a fractional orbital
bombardment capability that could enable it to approach North America
via a nonstandard trajectory over the South Pole. Russia also continues
to develop and test novel experimental weapon systems, like the
nuclear-armed Poseidon transoceanic weapon and the Burevestnik nuclear-
propelled cruise missile. Russia intends for these systems to challenge
US defenses and guarantee Russia's ability to retaliate after a first
strike.
Meanwhile, Russia continues to hone a wide range of non-nuclear
capabilities--including cyber weapons and conventionally armed air-,
sea-, and ground-launched cruise missiles--to provide options below the
nuclear threshold. Russia plans to use these non-nuclear capabilities
to strike Western economic and military infrastructure in an attempt to
degrade our political will and compel negotiations to terminate an
escalating conflict. Russian public statements and military deployments
near North America over the last several years make clear that, in the
event of war with the United States, Moscow's targeting strategy for
these weapons would include critical infrastructure in the Homeland.
Despite the heavy commitment of its aviation forces in Ukraine,
Russia has continued to fly regular out-of-area patrols with its heavy
bombers and other military aircraft in multiple areas around the
globe--including numerous flights into the North American air defense
identification zone since February 2022. Meanwhile, the Russian Navy
has increased its long-range operational deployments of cruise missile-
capable surface and subsurface vessels above pre-February 2022 levels.
In January, Russia deployed a Gorshkov-class frigate to the western
Atlantic, where the Russian Defense Ministry claimed the crew rehearsed
``delivering a missile strike against an enemy surface target'' using
its Tsirkon hypersonic missiles. In September, the Russian Pacific
Fleet conducted its Finval-2023 exercise, which demonstrated Moscow's
ability to control access to the Arctic through the Bering Strait and
included live cruise missile launches by coastal defense units as well
as surface and subsurface vessels operating within the U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone off Alaska.
Finally, in late 2022, the Russian Pacific Fleet received its first
Severodvinsk-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarine (SSGN),
introducing a land-attack cruise missile threat to the U.S. West Coast
similar to that faced by the East Coast since the first Severodvinsk
entered service in the Russian Northern Fleet in 2014. Russian media
indicates that Moscow now plans to field a total of 12 Severodvinsk
hulls, split evenly between the Atlantic and Pacific, enabling the
Russian Navy to pose a persistent conventional threat to critical
infrastructure throughout most of North America. The threat will only
become more acute later in the decade when Severodvinsk SSGNs are armed
with the Tsirkon hypersonic missile.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
Over the last 2 years, the DPRK has conducted nearly 100 ballistic
missile tests, including 13 ICBM flight tests, as well as three space
launch attempts using ICBM-class boosters. Its most recent space launch
in November successfully placed a rudimentary intelligence satellite
into orbit--capabilities that could advance quickly if Moscow were to
offer space cooperation in exchange for North Korean arms deliveries
for the war in Ukraine. Ballistic missiles that the DPRK has
successfully tested since 2022 include a new and more capable liquid-
propellant ICBM as well as the country's first solid-propellant ICBM,
which will further compound warning challenges due to its smaller
logistical footprint.
Both systems likely have sufficient boost to deliver a nuclear
payload to the entire United States. The DPRK's closed society and
robust security apparatus make it one of our most vexing intelligence
challenges and prevent us from confidently assessing the number of
ICBMs in its inventory. Nonetheless, I am concerned that Kim Jong Un's
growing ICBM stockpile could approach our capacity to defend North
America--a challenge that will only expand in the coming years if Kim
Jong Un looks to add multiple reentry vehicles to his missiles and
transition his ICBM program from research and development to serialized
production and deployment.
Iran
Iran's materiel support to Russia's war in Ukraine and political
support to Hamas before and following its October 7th attack on Israel,
along with Iranian support to Houthi forces challenging commercial
shipping, underscore Tehran's entrenched hostility to the Western-led
international order. Iran remains committed to retaliating for the
January 2020 death of former IRGC Qods Force Commander Qassem
Soleimani, potentially with attacks against current and former senior
U.S. officials. Iran also poses a growing cyber threat to U.S. and
allied networks and critical infrastructure. Last November, Iranian
cyber actors targeted several U.S. water and wastewater facilities,
likely in response to U.S. support for Israel. In the last 2 years, the
FBI has disrupted two Iranian plots inside the United States to kill
U.S. citizens of Iranian origin that have criticized the regime's
autocracy and disregard for human rights. Finally, Iran continues to
invest in its nuclear energy and space launch programs, which could
provide a potential breakout option should Iran's leaders decide to
pursue a Homeland-threatening ICBM.
Violent Extremist Organizations
The likelihood of a significant terrorist attack in the Homeland
has almost certainly increased since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas
conflict. Multiple terrorist groups--including ISIS and al-Qa'ida--have
leveraged the crisis to generate propaganda designed to inspire
followers to conduct attacks, including in North America. The
increasingly diffuse nature of the transnational terrorist threat
challenges our law enforcement partners' ability to detect and disrupt
attack plotting against the Homeland and leaves us vulnerable to
surprise. Commercial and general aviation likely persist as preferred
targets due to the disproportionate economic and psychological impact
such attacks would generate. I also continue to watch the Israel-Hamas
conflict for signs that escalation is expanding beyond the region and
remain concerned with the threat from Lebanese Hizballah--a group with
international reach and a history of conducting attacks in the Western
Hemisphere that continues long-term contingency planning in the
Homeland.
Regional Security Threats
Transnational criminal organizations in Mexico and elsewhere in the
Western Hemisphere continue to foster instability and challenge the
rule of law, creating potential opportunities for our State and non-
State adversaries to expand their access and influence along our
southern approaches. Irregular migration through Mexico reached record
levels in the last year, and drug-related violence has escalated as
rival cartels fight for control of lucrative drug and human trafficking
routes. Cartels have also demonstrated a growing willingness to
directly engage Mexican military, security forces, and government
officials, highlighting the need for continued theater security
cooperation with our partners in Mexico.
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS)
We continue to see a rapid proliferation of sUAS technology and
usage in the Homeland, including near our military installations. While
most of this activity can likely be attributed to hobbyists, sUAS could
be exploited by nefarious actors for surveillance, illicit trafficking,
or--in a worst case--attacks on domestic critical infrastructure.
Unauthorized sUAS flights over government installations and civilian
infrastructure have the potential to disrupt critical services and
threaten force protection and mission assurance. Given the growing
prevalence of sUAS available for military, commercial, and recreational
use, NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and our interagency partners face mounting
challenges in early detection and threat characterization, owner and
operator attribution, and--when necessary--mitigation and interdiction.
By all indications, sUAS will present a safety and security risk to
military installations and other critical infrastructure for the
foreseeable future. Mitigating those risks requires a dedicated effort
across all Federal Departments and agencies, State, local, tribal and
territorial communities, and Congress to further develop the
capabilities, coordination, and legal authorities necessary for
detecting, tracking, and addressing potential sUAS threats in the
Homeland.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD PRIORITIES
Against the backdrop of expanding and expansive threats, USNORTHCOM
and NORAD remain dedicated to defending the U.S. and Canadian homelands
today and well into the future. My key priority remains improved domain
awareness in the approaches to North America and around the globe. The
ability to detect, classify, and track potential threats to the
Homeland from the seafloor to space and in the cyber domain is a
critical need for USNORTHCOM and NORAD--and for my fellow combatant
commanders and international partners. Our core missions, to include
defending critical defense infrastructure, require USNORTHCOM and NORAD
to see and respond to threats through a globally integrated layered
defense extending as far from our shores as possible. That capability
is needed to ensure national leaders have as much time as possible to
decide the best course of action for deterring, de-escalating, or
defeating potential hostile acts.
Investments in capabilities such as Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR)
and the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) will
significantly enhance domain awareness in the air and maritime domains
while limiting competitors' ability to approach North America
undetected. Likewise, USNORTHCOM and NORAD's ability to track and
defeat inbound DPRK long-range ballistic missiles will be significantly
enhanced with the Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), currently
planned for integration into the United States' ballistic missile
defense architecture in the near future. I remain grateful to this
Committee for your support of these important initiatives, and I urge
continued emphasis on improving our Nation's ability to find and
monitor potential aggressors well before they could target our
Homeland.
The rapid pace of change in the strategic environment, to include
advancing kinetic and non-kinetic threats and the increasing
exploitation of the information space, give reason to believe that
successful defense of the Homeland tomorrow requires new approaches,
technologies, and perspectives. As competitors increasingly focus on
holding the Homeland at risk in an effort to influence U.S. and allied
decisionmaking and limit our options for intervention in overseas
crises, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are taking active measures today to ensure
the ability of the commands to defend the Homelands in the future.
The United States retains the world's most powerful military and a
global network of immensely capable allies and partners. However,
information flow between organizations and commands remains stifled by
technological and institutional barriers, which too often results in
delayed delivery and processing of critical information. Improving
global domain awareness is absolutely necessary, but the Department
must also expedite the processing and sharing of information between
combatant commands, allies, partners, and the interagency community.
The Department's prioritization of the Joint All-Domain Command and
Control concept highlights the increasing importance of quickly sharing
information between sensors, decisionmakers, and effectors. For
USNORTHCOM and NORAD, the ability to detect potential threats, make
well-informed recommendations to leaders, and take appropriate
defensive measures is vital, and I will work closely with the
Department and the Services to develop this critical capability.
Our Nation must also continue to invest wisely in the military and
civilian personnel responsible for planning and executing every one of
USNORTHCOM and NORAD's no-fail missions. The demands of defending the
Homeland are significant and require an experienced and innovative
professional workforce from a broad range of experiences and
backgrounds. Our commands continue to prioritize recruiting and
retaining exceptional talent from a broad and deep talent pool. Just as
our Nation makes substantial investments in cutting-edge technology to
outpace our competitors, we must also invest in the dedicated
servicemembers and public servants who stand watch over our Nation.
homeland defense design next
In recognition of the multi-domain threats to North America,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD have prioritized operationalizing the commands and
institutionalizing active campaigning in the Homeland. Homeland defense
begins well beyond our shores and relies on a layered, integrated
defense conducted in full cooperation with our fellow combatant
commands and our allies and partners. Rather than simply reacting to
the actions of our competitors, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are taking active
measures to assess the emerging threats and associated requirements of
the near future in to ensure our ability to defend critical assets and
safeguard the Nation's ability to project forces forward.
The actions and ambitions of our competitors require the United
States and Canada to demonstrate the capability to fight in and from
North America, and the commands' homeland defense design will ensure
our ability to defend the Homeland in the coming decades. USNORTHCOM
and NORAD's focus on campaigning and operationalizing the commands
reflects competitors' growing capability and capacity to hold targets
throughout North America at risk and to force U.S. and Canadian leaders
to defend the continent while projecting forces overseas.
It is a near certainty that homeland defense in the coming years
will rely less on point defense and traditional kinetic defeat
mechanisms in favor of area defense and left-of-launch effects that
take full advantage of multi-domain capabilities. While the future of
homeland defense may look vastly different than the current
architecture, it will continue to depend on the pillars USNORTHCOM and
NORAD use today--all-domain awareness; information dominance; decision
superiority; and global integration. I look forward to working with the
Department and Congress on these pillars.
The necessity of campaigning in and from North America has been
made clear in recent years as competitors have repeatedly demonstrated
the capability, capacity, and intent to hold the Homeland at risk.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD will continue to advance the commands' ability to
conduct globally integrated joint operations in defense of the
Homeland. The commands will also benefit from the recent transition
from the legacy USNORTHCOM and NORAD Command and Control Center (N2C2)
to a Joint Operations Center (JOC) that mirrors the capabilities of
fellow geographic combatant commands and allows for real-time, all-
domain communications and coordination with the commands' DOD and
interagency partners.
Finally, the success of Homeland and continental defense requires
capability and capacity to conduct sustained multi-domain operations in
the Arctic. The challenges associated with communicating, operating,
and surviving in the Arctic are well documented, and investment by the
U.S. Government, the Department, and the military Services reflect the
need to compete in the region now and well into the future. I am
encouraged by national-level commitments to improving the Port of Nome
and building the U.S. Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet; both efforts are
visible signs of the U.S. commitment in the region that will support
the economic and national security interests of the United States. The
DOD and Services have readily acknowledged the importance of operating
in far north in their respective Arctic strategies, and further
emphasis and investment is necessary to field the Arctic-capable
platforms, properly trained and equipped forces, and infrastructure
necessary to succeed in a region of enormous strategic consequence.
USNORTHCOM's Special Operations Command-North (SOCNORTH), has
demonstrated both the value and challenges associated with Arctic
operations through Combined and Joint Operations, activities, and
investments in the High North. Most recently, SOCNORTH executed
Exercise Arctic Edge 24, readily integrating over 600 USSOF, Partner
Nation SOF, and LEAs across the entire North American Arctic.
security cooperation
Global alliances and partnerships based on mutual trust and
interoperability provide the United States and our allies with a
distinct advantage over our competitors. Our competitors continue their
relentless efforts to increase presence, economic leverage, and
influence in our region, proving the necessity of security cooperation
with USNORTHCOM's exemplary military partners time and again.
USNORTHCOM's relationships with military partners in Mexico, Canada,
and The Bahamas boost our ability to operate, communicate, and share
information for common benefit and are integral to homeland defense.
The reputation of the United States and the Department of Defense
as steadfast and reliable partners is critical to each of those
relationships, and USNORTHCOM security cooperation efforts continue to
generate significant benefits for regional security and burden sharing
with our neighbors. As instability and conflict arise overseas, it is
essential to safeguard the security cooperation investments that have
an outsized role in defending our Homelands and vital interests,
including through continued attention to the thriving strategic,
economic, social, and defense partnerships close to home.
Mexico
It is already apparent the military-to-military relationship
between the United States and Mexico is robust and expanding as both
nations address the challenges posed by common threats to our citizens
and shared interests. The bonds between USNORTHCOM and our Mexican
military partners are broad, resilient, and focused on expanding our
combined capability to defend and secure North America from myriad
State and non-State threats. Countering competitor influence in the
region remains a key priority for USNORTHCOM and our Mexican military
partners, and as a direct result, the U.S. and Mexican militaries are
more operationally compatible than at any point in our shared history.
This burgeoning bilateral defense relationship is a result of
focused, direct, strategic-level defense engagement and confidence
building measures, to include routine senior-leader dialogs such as the
North American Defense Ministers conference, combined training like we
have witnessed at the U.S. Army Joint Readiness Training Center,
exercises such as EXERCISE AZTEC ALLIGATOR, and longstanding efforts to
promote shared strategic interests.
Assisting our partners in meeting shared security challenges will
require modernizing Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales
(FMS/DCS) by improving institutional responsiveness to partner requests
and demonstrating greater agility in fulfilling those requests. The
demonstration of timeliness and strategic responsiveness serves to
reinforce lines of effort in my campaigning while simultaneously
presenting opportunity to outcompete revisionist and revanchist powers
present throughout the region.
The growing strength of this vital defense relationship has been
made evident through our collaborative approach to common defense
challenges, and I am extremely proud of USNORTHCOM's bilateral defense
partnership with our Mexican military partners. Those efforts and
investments have simultaneously strengthened our common security while
helping to reduce Mexico's reliance on Russian and PRC equipment and
contracts that often come with costly strings attached.
Canada
As has been made clear by the unique NORAD relationship, Canada has
been a steadfast ally for decades and remains our essential security
partner in the defense of North America. Canadian investments in domain
awareness capabilities, advanced air and maritime platforms, and the
Canadian Armed Forces' routine participation in multinational efforts
such as Operation NOBLE EAGLE and Exercise Arctic Edge provide an
unmatched continental defense architecture. This unique and steadfast
partnership, based on common ideals and interests, continues to gain
strength and will serve both the United States and Canada for
generations to come. Canadian commitment to robust support to NORAD and
meeting shared security challenges with the United States and our
allies, along with investments in a robust continental defense is key
to the success of the bi-national alliance that has successfully
deterred aggression against the United States and Canadian homelands
for over 65 years.
The Bahamas
The Bahamas is a growing and willing partner in maritime security
and associated intelligence and information sharing, and USNORTHCOM's
programs with The Bahamas improve disaster response and climate
resiliency for both nations. The USNORTHCOM bilateral frameworks with
the Royal Bahamian Defence Force (RBDF), and with other U.S. partners
such as the United States Coast Guard and the Rhode Island National
Guard are important to advancing mutual defense and security
objectives. USNORTHCOM will continue to work closely with the RBDF to
enhance shared maritime domain awareness and cooperation, and I look
forward to building further on an already strong and beneficial
relationship.
defense support of civil authorities (dsca)
USNORTHCOM's support of lead Federal agencies in the aftermath of a
natural or human-caused disaster remains a core mission that directly
bolsters our homeland defense enterprise while delivering rapid relief
to American citizens in times of great need. USNORTHCOM works year-
round with our interagency partners to ensure plans, communications,
and interagency relationships are always ready to deliver the right
military-unique capabilities at the right time and place. Whether
providing military personnel to supplement Department of Homeland
Security and Customs and Border Protection's mission along our
southwest border, assisting U.S. Federal law enforcement agencies
efforts to illuminate illicit trafficking networks, or speeding
military-unique capabilities to support Federal Emergency Management
Agency-led disaster relief, USNORTHCOM is always ready to support our
lead Federal agencies. I look forward to establishing and maintaining
partnerships with the National Guard Bureau, State, local, tribal, and
territorial partners in support of vital DSCA roles.
In addition to delivering life-saving capabilities and resolute
support to our fellow Americans and interagency partners in times of
crisis, USNORTHCOM's DSCA mission also routinely demonstrates a degree
of resilience and well-exercised cooperation that should cast serious
doubt in the minds of potential aggressors who may be considering
kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure.
Over many years and multiple significant events, USNORTHCOM and our
Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial partners have proven the
ability of communities and agencies across the United States to recover
quickly from major disasters. The same lessons learned in those diverse
scenarios would apply following an attack against the United States,
and competitors must know that an attack would be certain to fail and
result in only limited disruption.
As multi-domain threats to critical defense, transportation, and
commercial networks and facilities continue to mount, the United States
and Canada will face a growing need for resilient, defensible
infrastructure. Following the release of the Department's policy
guidance regarding defense of critical infrastructure, USNORTHCOM and
NORAD have worked with a host of intergovernmental and industry
partners to capture the capabilities and relationships necessary to
safeguard national infrastructure from attack. This vital effort will
continue to present a significant challenge that requires a whole-of-
government approach and strong cooperation with Congress and the
interagency community to ensure our national ability to deter, defend,
and, if necessary, recover quickly from attacks against key
infrastructure.
conclusion
USNORTHCOM and NORAD's activities, operations, and investments
directly reflect the reality of the strategic environment and the
threats and challenges that will continue to face our Homeland into the
foreseeable future. Based on my ongoing initial assessment of the
commands and the challenges we must face, I am confident in our
Commands' ability to defend North America, but I am extremely mindful
of the mounting threats and challenges presented by determined and
well-resourced competitors.
It is a profound honor to lead the extraordinary U.S. and Canadian
Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Guardians, Coast Guardsmen, and
civilians of USNORTHCOM and NORAD in defense of our great nations.
Those dedicated men and women continue to work tirelessly to defend our
Constitution, our citizens, and our shared values. In return, our
warriors rely on the resources and support necessary to succeed in
their no-fail missions. There should be no doubt that the United States
military is the strongest, most capable professional force in history,
and that our men and women stand ready today to vigorously defend our
Nation against any threat. Thank you for your support and for the
opportunity to serve alongside them. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General Guillot. General
Richardson, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL LAURA J. RICHARDSON, USA, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
General Richardson. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker,
and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today with General Guillot. I
am honored to represent the dedicated men and women of United
States Southern Command to discuss the challenges we share with
our neighbors in Latin America and the Caribbean. Our national
security strategy recognizes the direct link between this
region's security and our own security.
We are harnessing the power of partnership from Team USA in
support of Team Democracy by leveraging all instruments of
national power--diplomacy, information, military, and
economics--to expeditiously assist partner nations in
addressing the challenges that impact our collective security.
This region, which is our shared neighborhood, remains
under assault from a host of cross-cutting, transboundary
challenges that directly threaten our Homeland. I have seen
these challenges intensify since I met with you last year, and
this remains a call to action.
In almost 2-\1/2\ years in the command I have made it my
priority to meet partners where they are, and to listen and
understand the challenges that affect us all. The world is at
an inflection point. Our partners in the Western Hemisphere,
with whom we are bonded by trade, shared values, democratic
traditions, and family ties, are increasingly impacted by the
interference and coercion. I have learned that our presence
absolutely matters.
The People's Republic of China has exploited the trust of
democracies in this hemisphere, using that trust to steal
national secrets, intellectual property, and research related
to academic, agriculture, and health care. The scope and scale
of this espionage is unprecedented. Through the Belt and Road
Initiative, the PRC aims to amass power and influence at the
expense of the world's democracies.
Here in the Western Hemisphere, Latin America and Caribbean
have the potential to feed and fuel the world. Understanding
this, the PRC has already, and is already busy extracting and
exploiting. Predatory investment practices, construction of
megaports and dual-use space facilities, and criminal cyber
activities are just a few of the PRC's malign activities that
jeopardize the sovereignty and safety of the region.
Russia remains an acute threat and seeks to increase its
foothold by bolstering authoritarian regimes in Cuba,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela. In the last year, China, Russia, and
Iran have increased their presence diplomatically,
economically, and even militarily in the region. These
activities undermine democracies and challenge their
credibility.
Both China and Russia exploit the presence of transnational
criminal organizations and amplify their destabilizing impacts
on democratic governments. TCOs traffic weapons, drugs, people,
gold, lithium, rare earth minerals, commodities, and
counterfeit goods while contributing to the surge of fentanyl-
related deaths here at home.
The good news is working with our very willing partners
leads to the best defense. We must use all available levers to
strengthen our partnerships with the 28 like-minded democracies
in this hemisphere who understand the power of working together
to counter these shared threats. The United States remains the
preferred and most trusted security partner in the region. We
build trust through investment and security cooperation
programs that train and equip our partners, our partner
military and security forces, a robust joint exercise program
to build interoperability, and the development and employment
of emerging technologies. Moreover, we maximize the resources
allocated by the Department of State's International Military
Education and Training Program for military financing, for
military sales, to build that interoperability and
counterbalance PRC military engagements and investments.
As the National Defense Strategy states, the U.S. derives
immense benefit from a stable, peaceful, and democratic Western
Hemisphere, that also reduces security threats the Homeland.
USSOUTHCOM continues to innovate and adapt, putting
integrated deterrence into action every day. We remain
committed to working across all domains with allies and
partners, combatant commands, the Joint Force, the U.S.
interagency non-Federal entities, and the U.S. Congress to
guarantee safety, security, and prosperity throughout the
Western Hemisphere.
This is the work and promise of USSOUTHCOM, as part of Team
USA, in support of Team Democracy. Thank you for your
assistance in resourcing this team.
I would also like to recognize behind me in the audience
the Interamerican Defense College class that is here today to
see how the power of our U.S. Congress and how the Department
of Defense, and us as combatant commanders talk about our
regions.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Laura J. Richardson
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much. At the suggestion
of my colleague, would all the students please stand to be
recognized.
[Applause.]
Chairman Reed. On behalf of my colleagues let me say
bienvenidos, gracias.
Please be seated.
General Guillot, we have had widely reported penetrations
of our airspace by unmanned vehicles. Has DOD developed defined
standard operating procedures for individual base commanders in
dealing with these vehicles, because they could show up and be
detected minutes before they would be penetrating the space. Do
we have a system or SOPs to deal with them?
General Guillot. Chairman, shortly after taking command and
beginning my 90-day assessment I realized that the challenge of
the large increase in the number of incursions by UASs was
something that was going to drive and change probably the
direction of my first year in command because of that acute
number.
The services do have authorities, but work remains to be
done to ensure that they are resource equipped, and that we
have standardized operating procedures to address those
threats. Also work remains to be done, Chairman, to be able to
use especially the non-kinetic capabilities that can bring down
those systems safely without interfering with our airspace
structure.
At this present time, NORAD and NORTHCOM do not have a
designated role in that, but in my recommendations at the end
of the 90-day assessment I will point out ways that I think
that NORAD and NORTHCOM could and should play a role in
bringing that standardization that you mentioned.
Chairman Reed. This process would involve other agencies
such as the Department of Justice, the FBI, Homeland Security?
Are we working at that joint agency level?
General Guillot. Yes, Chairman. They have some authorities
now, and then as you alluded to, we would need to bring them
all together. So we are bringing each capability together
against the same incursion threat.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. General Richardson, the situation
in Haiti is deteriorating rapidly. On March 10th, we sent in
augmentation forces to the embassy. There has already been some
extractions of personnel from the embassy in Haiti, and then on
March 11th, the Secretary of Defense increased DOD's
contribution of up to $200 million to provide logistics support
for a security force to come in to Haiti.
Could you just give us your sense of the implications of
the situation in Haiti for the United States and the region?
General Richardson. Thank you, Senator and Chairman. Thank
you for the question. So certainly USSOUTHCOM has a wide range
of contingency plans, so we are ready for whatever would be
required for a Department of Defense response. We have
conducted two missions that have been widely publicized of
increasing security, and it is routine actions that would take
place for any of our embassies across the globe.
The situation in Haiti has been deteriorating over the past
couple of weeks. So with the announcement that has come and the
political negotiations that have been happening and occurring,
the violence has been tamped down somewhat over the past couple
of days. So certainly the political solution seems to be
working, and hopefully that continues on a positive path. But
if not, we have, as I said, the contingency plans ready to
respond from USSOUTHCOM.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. You pointed out the penetration
of your AO by China and Russia. It seems that one of the
leading edges of China's activities is economic--buying ports,
getting the Belt and Road project underway. There is one other
area too, and that is their willingness or their eagerness to
acquire more interest in the Inter-American Development Bank. I
understand that Congress must pass legislation to authorize the
United States to buy the shares before the Chinese do. Is that
accurate? If the Chinese beat us out, would that be a problem?
General Richardson. That would be a problem, Chairman, and
I think through the United States Government's initiative with
the American Partnership for Economic Prosperity, APEP, where
the Administration hosted 11 Latin American heads of State in
Washington, DC, in November 2023, and this would be part of
that, our ability to invest in critical infrastructure through
the Inter-American Development Bank and the Development Finance
Corporation, DFC. So these shares that are coming up, $75
million in shares for the U.S. to purchase those shares in the
Inter-American Development Bank. This bank has been established
in 1959, to do exactly these things, to invest in critical
infrastructure within the region.
Chairman Reed. If we do not do it, the Chinese will.
General Richardson. Exactly right, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. Let's just stay in SOUTHCOM.
Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro took unprecedented steps to
establish control over the contested Essequibo region of
neighboring Guyana. This violated an International Court of
Justice ruling. The region accounts for two-thirds of Guyana's
territory and extensive offshore oil riches.
How has this impacted the security of the region, and
particularly the fact that Venezuela has deployed light tanks,
armored carriers, and missile-equipped patrol boats along the
affected border?
General Richardson. So, Senator, it absolutely has, and in
terms of our relationship with Guyana, who is a very willing
partner and a democracy in the region, very important partner,
and we see that what the Maduro regime and Venezuela are doing
and the activities they are taking against this democracy with
an unjustified claim. Our support for Guyana, we have shown
that from the U.S. Government, and through all the instruments
of national power, the diplomacy, the military, and certainly--
--
Senator Wicker. Do you have directions from the White House
or from your superiors in the Department as to what we should
do?
General Richardson. So as we work my engagements and what
we do with security cooperation we have a very robust plan with
Guyana, and we have continued on that plan, and that has been
coordinated with our U.S. Government.
Senator Wicker. Can you briefly describe the plan?
General Richardson. So it consists of visits by folks
within my command and the engagements that we do, the
exercises, the subject matter exchanges. We have continued with
all of those. Not trying to exacerbate the situation but
continued on path with our regular engagements that have been
scheduled, and we have not halted any of that.
Senator Wicker. Is the international community assisting us
in that regard?
General Richardson. The international community is very
much assisting, and I would say our allies, as part of our
Western Hemisphere Framework that we signed in USSOUTHCOM with
our allies that work in the region--the U.K., Canada, the
Netherlands, and also France. So as we work together to
coordinate our activities they also have activities and
engagements that they do in the region and are doing in Guyana,
and those are also coordinated.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Let me switch to General Guillot, deployment of National
Guard troops on the border. I think maybe a lot of American's
do not understand how often we do this. But it has worsened
considerably. The problem is not the lead agency but it has
deployed troops there in 18 of the previous 21 years. They are
called temporary deployments, but it is beginning to look like
permanent.
There is a difference in the way we deploy and notify those
units, is there not, in the sense that if it is a temporary
deployment they get 180 days' notice in advance. If it is
regular deployment it is a year and a half. So could you
discuss that with us, and is my understanding correct there,
General?
General Guillot. Senator, your understanding is correct.
The primary difference that we see in Northern Command is we
are in support, as you mentioned, so therefore we wait for the
request from the lead agency--in this case Customs and Border
Protection--and a request for assistance that is reviewed and
then has ultimately been approved by the Department of Defense.
Then at that point we can start trying to match, through the
joint staff, and the National Guard, the correct unit to
support that, based on the needs that are in that request for
assistance.
As you alluded to----
Senator Wicker. Would it be helpful if we treated it as a
permanent deployment?
General Guillot. Senator, I think more than treating it as
a permanent deployment would be earlier notification of the
requirements. Since those change that allows us to tailor the
National Guard force to meet the changing requirements of the
Customs and Border Protection, whereas if we had a permanent
force we might have permanently the wrong type of unit to
support.
However, to your point, what we have established, and we
must maintain, is having a permanent command and control
structure over there so we have continuity and predictability
in how we present the forces and work with the Customs and
Border Protection.
Senator Wicker. Do we need to give you different authority
in that regard, or is it just a matter of the Department----
General Guillot. Senator, I think we have the--I am sorry.
Senator Wicker. Okay.
General Guillot. Senator, we have the authorities that we
need. The thing that we would most benefit from, as you alluded
to, is time, time to pick and train and prepare the National
Guard units that are going to go down there and support the
CBP.
Senator Wicker. Well, to both of you, tell us what you need
and we will try to get it for you. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Senator
King, please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my notes, since
you have been talking, I have written the word ``gap'' about
five times, so I am going to talk about gaps. General Guillot,
do we have a censor gap at NORAD? We learn more from failures
than we do from successes. What did we learn from the balloon
incursion about the adequacy of our sensors, which is
essentially the basis of NORAD?
General Guillot. Senator, we learned a great deal. To the
gaps, what we have is we had some gaps in the layered approach,
where we want to be able to detect with domain awareness from
satellites down to traditional air----
Senator King. One of the problems is low altitude, isn't
it?
General Guillot. That is right, sir--all the way down to
the surface, and then even in the undersea.
We were able to address many of those on initiatives that
were started by my predecessor, General VanHerck, by changing
the sensitivity of the radars that we do have, and that has
allowed us to have better domain awareness in that regime that
you mentioned.
However, there are some gaps that will be manifesting in
the near future. Those are currently scheduled to be addressed
by the over-the-horizon radar, by the HPTSS, which is the
Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor system. Those
capabilities are essential to fill gaps that are growing
because of the increased capability of the adversaries.
Senator King. I would suggest that that is an urgent need,
given the experience that we have had but also given the
incredible militarization of the Arctic coast by Russia and the
development of drone by. All those things added together create
a significant risk. I hope you can come to us with what you
need because this is something we need to do in a hurry. We
can't wait 5 years to develop this capacity.
General Guillot. Senator, we will.
Senator King. We also have an icebreaker gap----
General Guillot. Yes, sir.
Senator King.--in terms of our ability to operate in the
Arctic. As the Arctic Ocean opens up it is becoming, as I
mentioned, more militarized by the Russians, and a much more
important body of water. It is like we have suddenly discovered
the Mediterranean Sea. Talk to me about icebreakers. We only
have one and a half icebreakers, heavy icebreakers in the
Arctic.
General Guillot. That is correct, Senator, and we are
severely outnumbered. We appreciate the Coast Guard----
Senator King. Yes, I would say 40 to 1 is outnumbered.
General Guillot. Yes.
Senator King. That is the approximate number that the
Russians have.
General Guillot. Yes, Senator, and the Chinese declaring
themselves a near-Arctic nation, they intend to bring more.
Senator King. Yes, I noticed when the Chinese declared
themselves a near-Arctic nation my position is that Maine is a
near-Caribbean State.
[Laughter.]
General Guillot. I share your view, sir. We do appreciate
that the Coast Guard is procuring more icebreakers, but even
with those we will be severely outnumbered, and that does limit
our freedom of maneuver in that region.
Senator King. It is basically like not having a road to get
where you need to get.
General Guillot. Yes.
Senator King. General Richardson, let's talk about another
gap--drugs. Since we have been sitting here about 10 Americans
have died of drug overdoses, just since we began this meeting
45 minutes ago. One person a day is dying in my home State of
Maine. Do you have the capacity to interdict drug shipments
coming in by sea, that we know of? I have asked this question
every year for about the past 10 years and I am afraid I know
the answer.
General Richardson. Senator, so in USSOUTHCOM we have
detection and monitoring mission, and that is to gain the
intelligence for drug shipments----
Senator King. I should not have said do ``you'' have the
capacity. Do we, does the country? You have the terrific
capacity for intelligence and identification. My concern is
once we know about a dangerous shipment then do we have the
capacity to interdict it?
General Richardson. We pass that intelligence over to law
enforcement, or our partner nations, and it depends on who is
close enough to do that. So in terms of the capacity, we
anticipate that we are able to, of what we know is out there,
interdict about 10 percent of the known problem, with the
resourcing and capabilities that we currently are given.
Senator King. I would emphasize that figure to our
colleagues. We can interdict 10 percent of what we know of.
That is inexcusable. I do not mean it is inexcusable for you.
But one of the problems, it strikes me, is when everybody is in
charge, nobody is in charge. You have got yourself, DEA, DHS,
the intelligence community, and the problem is Americans are
dying. In about every 10 days we have September 11th. Three
thousand people die in this country every 10 days. You used the
word, in your testimony, ``assault,'' and that is what it is.
It is an assault. But we are treating it as a kind of domestic
law enforcement problem when it is an assault, and most of it
is coming from outside of our country.
So I hope that you will work with your colleagues, perhaps
form a task group to get after this problem of interdiction,
and if we do not have capacity, if we do not have enough Coast
Guard cutters or DHS does not have the capacity, tell us. Tell
us, because we cannot solve a problem if we do not know what it
is. We know the general shape of the problem, but you are in a
position to tell us what is missing and what you can do in
order to help protect this country.
General Richardson. Senator, I would offer that we cannot
interdict our way out of this problem, and we have got to be
able to go after the networks. We have got to be able to go
after the drug labs. We have got to be able to follow the money
and the money laundering, which is fueling this very rich
environment that the transnational criminal organizations----
Senator King. Well, we agree, and we have to talk about the
demand side here, and treatment, and prevention. I totally
agree with that. But this is a discrete problem that I think we
do have some capacity to deal with.
Final question, and this is not about a gap. What is your
overall assessment of the Chinese incursion into Latin America,
specifically they have been doing this for some time, doing
infrastructure projects. In other parts of the world there is
some development of buyer's remorse, that the Chinese have not
performed as they were expected, that the debt colonialism is
becoming a problem. Is that occurring in Latin America, in your
view?
General Richardson. Absolutely, Senator, and my concern, as
a combatant commander for the region, and 22 of 31 countries in
the region have signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative, but
it is all investment, a lot of investment in critical
infrastructure where the big money projects are. That is
deepwater ports, 5G, space, safe city smart city technology to
be able to spy on the populations.
So with these state-owned enterprises from the RPC, and my
concern is being able to use those for military application, if
required, and it is in all of the critical infrastructure.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Fischer,
please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for being here today.
General Guillot, I have appreciated our discussions on the
challenges of detecting, characterizing, and tracking potential
threats to our Homeland. Most Americans are fully aware of the
incident with the Chinese balloon, but NORTHCOM has other
responsibilities as well, especially with protecting the
Homeland from the more advanced threats that are out there,
which would include ballistic and cruise missiles.
Why is having that improved domain awareness, which is the
ability to detect and track the threats and also to provide a
clear threat picture of what is out there and to be able to
discriminate what you are seeing, why is that so important to
defending our Homeland?
General Guillot. Senator, it is important because it gives
us time, time to inform leaders, make decisions, and enact
defeat mechanisms to defeat these threats that are coming in.
You mentioned the discrimination capability. As the threat
becomes more advanced and they can put out decoys, we could
needlessly shoot interceptors at objects that are not a threat,
but having the discrimination radar makes sure that we can
actually shoot and kill the warhead that would be a threat.
The other thing I would quickly say, Senator, is the
capabilities are growing so much by the adversary that domain
awareness that you mentioned needs to push out further away
from our shores, detect earlier, characterize them earlier, as
you mentioned, so we have more time to employ the defense
capabilities that we have.
Senator Fischer. Are we moving quickly enough?
General Guillot. Senator, we are right on the edge. I think
that we are moving quickly, and I appreciate all the support
from this body and the services. But we cannot pause at all
because the adversary, and multiple adversaries, not just one,
are growing very, very quickly, and it really is at an alarming
rate.
Senator Fischer. I am concerned about what we are seeing in
the President's budget request for fiscal year 2025. The
Administration decreases spending for the glide-phase
interceptor program, and it is stating that it is going to be
delivered in 2035. Yet in the NDAA of fiscal year 2024, in
Section 1666, that requires the Missile Defense Agency to
achieve an initial operational capability of that program by
December 31, 2029. How do you respond to my concerns?
General Guillot. Senator, my response is that I view
hypersonics as perhaps the most destabilizing threat that we
have out there because of the fast speed, and more than that,
the maneuverability and the unpredictability on where it will
impact, as opposed to a ballistic missile which is fairly
predictable.
I have worked very closely, in my short period of time,
with MDA. I am pleased with some of the efforts that they are
doing to intercept in the glide phase, and then also using
existing systems such as the SM-6 to adapt against that threat.
Then I am also very pleased with what MDA is doing with the
HBTSS, the satellite capability to detect and track
hypersonics.
Senator Fischer. You know, just yesterday we heard from a
senior analyst with the National Air and Space Intelligence
Center. He told Congress that, quote, ``China now has the
world's leading hypersonic arsenal.'' So given the pace that we
are seeing with Russia and with China as they advance their
hypersonic weapons programs, should the Department accelerate
the development of those hypersonic defense systems, really,
when it is technically feasible to do so?
General Guillot. Senator, I support moving all of our
capabilities against the strategic threats that you mentioned
as far left as possible, based on the growing and consistently
growing capabilities of our adversaries.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Richardson, thank you
for all the work that you have done and your service to this
country. When we talk about China and the Belt and Road
Initiatives, you answered Senator King on that. But when you
are looking at the longer-term strategies that China has in the
buying that they continue to do in your area of responsibility,
how series a threat is it?
General Richardson. I look at it as a serious threat
because of the ability of these state-owned, controlled by the
government, companies. If I just take the Panama Canal and the
five state-owned enterprises that are along either side of the
Panama Canal, and that is a very important, strategic line of
communication. So there are a lot of large implications there
in terms of all the critical infrastructure, the deepwater
ports, the 5G space, safe city smart city technology. So very
concerning.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, and thank you, General Guillot.
You made comments, I think it was yesterday, before the House
committee, or 2 days ago, before the House Armed Services
Committee, about the possibility of seeing, in the very near
future, Chinese aircraft's closeness to our Homeland. I thank
you for bringing that to our attention.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Hirono,
please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
being here.
General Guillot, I remain concerned about the DOD's missile
defense posture, I guess you can call it, and that the DOD does
not have a plan to address the current and future missile
defense needs of Hawaii. It is an issue that I have brought up
with just about everybody who comes to testify from the DOD.
The 2024 NDAA directs a plan for the missile defense of Hawaii,
which INDOPACOM is leading.
General, your predecessor told me last year that NORTHCOM
is responsible for protecting Hawaii against ballistic missile
threats from North Korea, but of course, we also need to
concern ourselves with the missile threats, cruise missiles and
hypersonics. Have you been coordinating with INDOPACOM
regarding the development of the missile defense plan?
General Guillot. Senator, I have. We work very close with
INDOPACOM on all defense of our entire Homeland. I also agree
with the characterization that General VanHerck did on our
specific role in that.
Senator Hirono. So I have some concerns that there are so
many different commands involved in the missile defense of
Hawaii and missile defense, in general. So we have you, well
NORTHCOM, INDOPACOM, SPACECOM, STRATCOM, Missile Defense
Agency. Do you have some concerns about how all of you are
coordinating and coming up with the kind of plan that we need
for missile defense?
General Guillot. Senator, I think that we communicate very
well with each other. I think that we all understand the
priorities. So I have not seen any place where having multiple
agencies responsible for a common area presenting a seam or a
challenge. But I am very acutely aware of the potential, and I
watch for that very closely.
Senator Hirono. The 2024 NDAA, as I mentioned, directs a
plan from INDPACOM. So that plan is going to be presented to
us, I hope, by next month, which is the timeframe for that
plan. So I assume that plan will reflect the coordinated input
from all of you.
General Richardson, China is building a deepwater port in
Peru that is expected to open this November, and it will be the
first South American port controlled by China. This is just one
example of China's growing influence in Latin America through
economic ties, controlling critical minerals, and establishing
port and space facilities. This presents unique strategic risks
to U.S. national security and global order.
General, what changes are you seeing in the region as a
result of the growing influence of the PRC, and what steps are
you taking to counter China's influence in Latin America?
General Richardson. So thank you, Senator, and we have
doubled down, and with the increase of finding last year from
the U.S. Congress, us and SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM received some
funding that went to secure the cooperation of programs, and
then also with flexible authority. So that was extremely
helpful, and it allows us to be very responsive in terms of
being able to help our partner nations to counter the influence
of China. So I want to thank you for that.
Our ability to be able to respond and be responsive, these
heads of State are generally in the seat for one term of 4
years so they are working on a stopwatch, not a calendar, and
they are trying to show progress within months, not years. So
we really appreciate that resourcing.
Senator Hirono. So you mentioned that we have provided
additional resources. Do you think that we are doing enough to
counter? Because China is, from my perspective, everywhere, and
especially, of course, in the Indo-Pacific area. We know what
their influences are with the Pacific Island nations, for
example. So now they are in Latin America. Are we doing enough
to really address all of the kind of long-term focus that China
has throughout your part of the world?
General Richardson. Senator, through all of the instruments
of power of Team USA, and bringing those together, and
synchronizing and integrating better, the Chairman brought up
the APEP, the American Partnership for Economic Prosperity, and
the IDBM Invest program, that through that initial program to
invest in the Western Hemisphere is huge. It is just a start,
and I would recommend that that is something very similar, this
program, to the Economic Recovery Act of 1948, which was so
instrumental in terms of the economic recovery. I see that this
economic recovery for the region, due to the impacts of COVID,
what it did to the economies of the region, and now the
transnational criminal organizations taking advantage of this.
So this is a first start with these 11 heads of State from
Latin America that were here in Washington, in November
23, for this program that was rolling out billions of
dollars for critical infrastructure investment by the U.S.
Government. So we are on a very good path with a third of our
Latin American leaders with this economic investment. I would
say that national security rests on their economic security,
and we can do more, and through this program, if we can build
this out, we would be on a good path with our partners in our
shared neighborhoods so close to our Homeland.
Senator Hirono. Well, that aspect of working with our Latin
American allies I think is really critical because that is what
we are doing in the Indo-Pacific area.
Could I just ask one more question relating to some
questions from Senator King?
Chairman Reed. Yes. Keep it short.
Senator Hirono. Keep it short. I will keep it short.
You mentioned that regarding the interdiction of drugs that
it requires us to really pay attention to some other aspects
such as going after these criminal forces. Is there an
intergovernmental task force of some sort that you are all
working together that would include DOD, DOJ, Coast Guard to
counter the drug threat?
General Richardson. We are working together. I would say
that there needs to be more focus, more resourcing on this
particular grouping to get after the problem sets. I would say
from the money laundering to the drug labs, and following where
not just the small, semi-submersible that is loaded with
counter-narcotics, but actually getting to where it is produced
and getting in there.
The work that we have done in Colombia has been very
effective, but the amounts are only increasing, and so we have
got to figure out, we have got to follow this money, and we
have got to get after the TCOs as a holistic, more filled-out,
robust program.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Rounds
has yielded to Senator Budd. Senator Budd, please.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Rounds, for yielding. Senator
[sic] Guillot, thank you both for being here, by the way.
It is my understanding there have been a lot of drone
incursions along our southern border. How many drone incursions
have we had, and what are they doing?
General Guillot. Senator, the number of incursions was
something that was alarming to me as I took command last month.
I do not know the actual number. I do not think anybody does.
But it is in the thousands. I have talked to Customs and Border
Protection, who are responsible for the UAS incursions and the
border, along with DOJ, and they put the number at thousands.
Senator Budd. Over what period of time is that thousands?
General Guillot. I would say in probably over a month. We
could probably have over 1,000 a month.
Senator Budd. General, do they, in your view, represent a
homeland defense threat?
General Guillot. Senator, they alarm me, from being the
person responsible for homeland defense. I have not seen any of
them manifest in a threat to the level of national defense, but
I see the potential only growing.
Senator Budd. General, continuing on with a different
topic. Do you consider the F-15E Strike Eagle to be a capable
aircraft, and are there particular characteristics for the F-15
that make it ideal for homeland defense?
General Guillot. Senator, I think the F-15E Strike Eagle is
a phenomenal aircraft. What makes it applicable in our theater
is the same thing that makes it applicable around the world, is
its versatility. It is, in many ways, unmatched air to ground,
and in many ways it is unmatched air to air. It has a
phenomenal radar. It is an AESA radar, electrically scanned,
which allows it to pick put low, slow, moving, and also low
radar cross-section such as drones or other threats like cruise
missiles. So the Strike Eagle is a fantastic aircraft.
Senator Budd. Thank you. So in its fiscal year 2025 budget,
the Air Force plans to divest 26 F-15 Strike Eagles at the same
time that it is buying less than expected F-35s, F-15EXs, and
other fights. So it has got me very concerned, not just for
homeland defense, and the descriptions that you shared a moment
ago, but including potential conflict with China, and also for
responses to crises in other geographic combatant commands.
So if you would agree to keep your eye on that and share
with us concerns as they arise related to the F-15.
General Guillot. I will, Senator.
Senator Budd. Thank you. Changing topics, General
Richardson and General Guillot both, you mentioned TCOs just a
minute ago, General Richardson, like the Mexican drug cartels.
They often move not just drugs and lethal fentanyl but they
move people. Many of these activities proceed without
interruption in both of your areas of responsibility.
Section 1068 of the fiscal year 2024 NDAA requires the
Secretary of Defense to submit a plan for coordinating with
defense partners in North and South America and supporting
interagency departments and agencies to counter human
trafficking, including human trafficking by these TCOs.
So have either of you been consulted on developing that
plan? General Richardson, we will start with you>
General Richardson. So, Senator, we work migration every
day in United States Southern Command, and for this past year
with the trilateral agreement that the U.S. Government signed
with Panama and Colombia, so we are very aware of the
migration.
Senator Budd. General, if I may, beyond just general
awareness, the Secretary of Defense is required to submit a
plan for coordinating with defense partners. Are you working on
that plan?
General Richardson. I am not specifically working on that
plan for the Department of Defense. The OSD and the Joint Staff
will be working on that.
Senator Budd. Thank you. General Guillot?
General Guillot. Senator, the same answer. We are not
working directly. We are in support of the Department.
Senator Budd. You know, not to you but to the Department of
Defense and the Secretary, that is disappointing. So I would
like to followup with both of you and the Department on this to
make sure that begins to get implemented so we can begin
stopping the illegal flow of deadly fentanyl and other drugs
and the tragic trafficking of humans.
You know, that is big business for the cartels, and it is
contributing to instability in countries across our hemisphere.
So what efforts, beyond that plan since that is not yet being
developed, what efforts are already underway, with you or your
partners, to address human trafficking? General Richardson?
General Richardson. Thank you, Senator, and I am not aware
that the report not--the report could very well be well along
its way. We are just not actively working on it from our
levels. A lot of times the Joint Staff and OSD will work those
things to allow us to continue to execute our daily missions.
But we are working very closely, because I have the Darien
in my AOR, which is a huge human trafficking area, and you are
exactly right in terms of the transnational criminal
organizations have only gotten more powerful. Over $300 billion
annual revenue business. They traffic humans, drugs, gold,
lithium, all kinds of counterfeit goods, and so only getting
more powerful.
So the work that we do, the Colombian military and their
operation, Hefesto, to go after the criminal networks that are
doing these criminal activities as well as the Panama SENAFRONT
and SENAN border forces that are going after the criminal
networks in Panama.
Senator Budd. In the interest of time, Chairman, I will
yield, but I would love to continue discussions, perhaps
offline, about your efforts in regard to human trafficking in
NORTHCOM. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd. Senator Kelly,
please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guillot,
General Richardson, great to see both of you.
General Richardson, yesterday we were talking a little bit
about Haiti and the situation on the ground being chaotic,
gangs running rampant in their capital. This week the prime
minister of Haiti announced he would resign, and then Kenya
paused the agreement to send 1,000 police officers until a new
government would be put into place.
SOUTHCOM has successfully airlifted embassy staff out of
the country, but a number of Americans still remain in Haiti,
and some may be looking to leave. Some are concerned that the
U.S. has not initiated a noncombatant evacuation order, a NEO,
to get Americans out of Haiti.
General, have you been tasked to operate an evacuation?
General Richardson. So, Senator, as part of the wide range
of contingency plans that USSOUTHCOM has we are ready for a NEO
activation, if required, and have other plans ready to go, as
we always do, and keep those plans refreshed over and over. So
we are ready at any time for any type of crisis.
Senator Kelly. You say you are ready now, but are there any
additional preparations in the event that this becomes a
necessity?
General Richardson. I think the two missions of increasing
the security at the embassy and a little bit of my capability
as well, expanding that, is the platform that we would use if
we need to expand from there. So we put in all of the necessary
measures that are necessary for any of the plans to be
activated.
Senator Kelly. So it would be true to say that there is
mission planning currently underway in case you have to do
this.
General Richardson. Senator, we always do mission planning
in the military, so absolutely.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you. Thank you, General.
General Guillot, just on Monday morning I got back from a
trip to the Arctic, where I was able to see firsthand some of
the efforts by the Navy to pursue our Artic strategic
objectives. The Arctic is an area of concern and a great
example of the intersection between defense policies, climate,
and strategic partnerships. Melting ice is making the Arctic
more accessible to everyone, including Russia and China. It is
rich with oil, minerals, fishing, other natural resources, and
we have to ensure that a free and peaceful Arctic benefits the
United States and our partners and allies.
Russia seeks to use the Arctic as a staging ground for
power projection in addition to it being a critical defense and
deterrent for their homeland. But they also seek to control the
region.
We have made real progress in combating Russian influence
in the Arctic over the last year, with Finland and Sweden
joining NATO. Now every country with a border on the Arctic is
part of NATO, with the exception of Russia, and we must not
miss this opportunity to advance our interests in the Arctic
while Russia is focusing on their illegal and brutal invasion
of Ukraine.
General Guillot, I would like to hear, in more detail, what
you think the U.S. and NATO's strategy should look like in the
Arctic.
General Guillot. Senator, first thanks for visiting our
forces up there during Ice Camp. As you alluded to, it is an
extremely important operation that demonstrates our capability
up there with the submarines and the LC-130's, and all the
other aircraft and forces.
As far as what we could do, or should do, with NATO in the
Arctic, you described exercises that we are doing on the, what
I will call the Alaska side, or the ten o'clock approach. We
have also had some success working with NATO and European
command on the two o'clock, the northeast approach. Just last
week, for the first time in over 2 years, the Russians sent two
Bear bombers down along that avenue through what we call the
GIUK gap, Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom,
approaching the Canadian and the United States air defense
identification zones. I have not seen this activity in over 2
years.
We were able to track them the entire time, thanks to the
radar network and the information sharing between countries
within EUCOM--Norway is one that I will point out--and Northern
Command. So we were able to track this activity----
Senator Kelly. What range were you able to intercept them?
General Guillot. Senator, we did not have to intercept them
because we had aircraft flying to the point where we would
intercept them before they crossed the identification zone, and
the Russians turned around prior to reaching that zone. So we
had aircraft, both Canadian and U.S. fighters, postured along
the line, which I think is probably disheartening to the
Russians to fly all that way to find out that we are waiting
for them, and that is due to NATO cooperation.
Senator Kelly. So the Russians are pretty good operating in
the Arctic. Have you seen advancement by the Chinese?
General Guillot. What I have seen, Senator, is a
willingness and a desire by the Chinese to act up there. We
have seen them in the maritime. We have seen them under the
cloud of a technical or scientific research, but we think it is
certainly multi-mission, to include military, and then I expect
to see air activity in the Alaska part of the Arctic as soon as
this year, potentially. It is a very big concern of mine.
Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you, General.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Rounds,
please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guillot
and General Richardson, first of all thank you to you and your
teams for your service to our country.
I would like to followup just a little bit with what
Senator Kelly began talking about with regard to Haiti. So
General Richardson, it seems to me that it rather surprises me
that there may not have been any advanced notice requesting
additional or followup with regard to the possibility of a NEO
operation in Haiti. Wouldn't that seem to be kind of an
advisory that would be appropriate if you received something,
at least from the Administration, indicating that it is
possibility? Wouldn't that maybe give you the opportunity to
notify those individuals responsible for providing you with the
resources necessary to do your duty to be ready to go? I mean,
it doesn't not seem to me that they can be on high alert all
the time. Could you just expand on that a little bit, please.
General Richardson. So, Senator, I did not mean to give the
perception that we are not ready or that nobody has asked us to
be ready, or anything like that. We have been discussing that
and talking about that, and I have been talking with our Joint
Staff, our Chairman and our Secretary of Defense over the past
2 weeks about all of the range of plans that we might have to
do--an evacuation, a NEO, a mass migration, all of those
things. So those missions of extracting some non-essential
personnel from the U.S. embassy----
Senator Rounds. Okay, so it is not just a matter of being
ready to fight tonight as much as, yes, we are aware of it and
we are doing some pre-planning, just in case that call is made.
General Richardson. Absolutely, Senator. We are ready to
go. We have all of our plans ready to go.
Senator Rounds. Okay. Thank you, and then also I noted with
regard to discussions earlier here about the transnational
criminal organizations, the drug cartels, and so forth south of
our border. Both of you have some responsibilities with regard
to whether it is in other parts of the NORAD command or SOCOM.
Just a reminder once again that under the NDAA we have already
authorized the use of our cyber teams to be able to find out in
advance and to know who these people are, where they bank, how
they communicate, and so forth. So hopefully we will not just
authorize but now we will fund that part of the operation so
that we can assist those countries who want our expertise and
finding out more about these organizations, that that is
available to them, and simply that it is available to you for
your use.
Let me also just, General Guillot, with the potential
divestments of fighter aircraft by the Air Force there are
concerns about how the Air National Guard, who shoulder a
significant portion of the burden of homeland defense, how they
will be able to continue to support you in that capacity while
also fulfilling their obligations under the National Defense
Strategy.
I bring this up because the resourcing that the Air
National Guard receives appears to be incongruent with their
mission assignments, which include both the Aerospace Control
Alert defense strategy, using the same resources, and then also
supporting the Joint Force in that national defense strategy. I
am just curious, are you involved in any planning or
discussions with Secretary Kendall and General Loh as they
discuss the plan for long-term Air Force fighter force
structure, and if not I would encourage your involvement.
Could you share just a little bit about your communications
with them?
General Guillot. Yes, Senator, and first thanks for
pointing out the outstanding contributions of the Air National
Guard. We cannot conduct our air defense mission without them.
They are not only the cornerstone, they provide, at 20
different ACA sites that you mentioned, our 24/7 capability to
respond.
Because of their importance I have talked directly with the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Alvin, about the
commitment of the Air Force to that mission and then also what
is going to happen with the future as we draw down some
capabilities and bring on new capabilities to include the
collaborative combat aircraft, the next-generation air
dominance. General Alvin was very clear that he fully supports
our mission and he understands the no-fail nature of our
mission, and then he invited me to be a part of the future
discussions on how they incorporate these capabilities.
Senator Rounds. Excellent because we have to be able to
incorporate the Air Guard, and they have got to have the
resources to do that successfully.
General Richardson, we discussed China's growing footprint
and the influence throughout SOUTHCOM and how important it is
that the U.S. remain engaged in the region. One of the main
tools that you have at your disposal, as we discussed in my
office, is Section 333 of Title 10, which lets the DOD help
build the security capacity of friendly nations. Unfortunately,
Section 333 requires you to navigate a ponderous bureaucracy in
both the Department of Defense and the Department of State
before you can make use of this authority. It is not agile, and
it clearly is not very quick. Ironically, the Chinse Communist
Party is not bogged down by the same bureaucratic inertia.
How important is Section 333 authority to your mission, and
how can it be improved?
General Richardson. It is my main lever in security
cooperation, Senator, and so the Triple 3, as we call it, and
the ability to be able to--I have a Triple 3 package right now
that is navigating all of the wickets that it needs to go
through for a counter-PRC effort on port scanners, for example,
and the stealing of data that the PRC does, and to be able to
put a U.S. company in there to be able to do the scanning for
in and out cargo is extremely important because, again, it is
about the data.
So the Triple 3 and flexible authorities and being
responsive is extremely important, so I appreciate the help and
the assistance on those authorities.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Peters,
please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General
Guillot and General Richardson, thank you for all your service
and all the men and women who serve along with you. We
appreciate that.
General Guillot, you mentioned the importance, or the
challenges, I should say, the significant challenges we face in
the Arctic in a previous question, and how we need to seek ways
to address that, make additional investments into Arctic
resilient platforms as well as cold weather training, which is
essential for our troops.
A key portion of CONUS cold weather training is completed
every winter during Northern Strike at the National All-Domain
Warfighting Center in Michigan. We are blessed with cold
weather during the winters, and it provides a great training
opportunity.
So my question for you, General, is while the summer
training portion of Northern Strike is extensive, we believe
that the exercises' winter iteration of that training that we
conduct there has some great expansion opportunities to provide
cost-effective cold weather training for men and women who may
be tasked to serve up there. So my question for you is how can
we grow CONUS Arctic training through exercises like Northern
Strike to support the priorities of our national security
strategy?
General Guillot. Senator, I would be a strong proponent of
doing exactly as you stated. One of the concerns I have as I
visited Alaska about a week into my command to assess many of
the areas that you just discussed was that the forces up there
are extremely well trained and equipped with the right
equipment to operate in the Arctic, but the backfill forces are
probably very well trained but they are not equipped and they
have not trained in that environment.
So anything that we could do for the supplementing forces
or the backfill forces that would go into the Arctic, training
them either in the Arctic environment or in something as you
described that would replicate that will be very important, not
only to give them those skills but to identify what are the
pieces of kit and equipment that we need to develop and issue
so they could seamlessly operate in that strategic environment.
Senator Peters. Very good. Thank you. General Richardson,
as you know the National Guard State Partnership Program links
our State National Guard units with global partners, and the
program certainly has been invaluable, I believe, in
strengthening our relationship with partner nations, including
SOUTHCOM's 29 active SPP participants. As part of the State
Partnership Program, U.S. embassies ideally have a bilateral
affairs officer working as a conduit between the State as well
as the partner country. But despite what I believe is a
critical role, these billets unfortunately often sit vacant,
forcing the COCOM commanders to use their assigned billets to
pay for these BAOs.
So my question for you, General, is first, what role do
bilateral affairs officers play in successfully implementing
these State partnership programs, and how can we address the
gaps that exist in the billets to ensure that they are filled
and we can get the maximum utility out of these partnerships?
General Richardson. Thank you, Senator, and I would say
that the SPP program, I have the largest SPP program amongst
all the geographic combatant commands, and we are very grateful
for that program. It is a huge enabler. We have got to keep
those BAA slots filled with those officers. They organize and
synchronize the activities of the National Guard SPP program
with the operations activities and investments that I have in
USSOUTHCOM. So it is a critical role, and we have got to keep
those filled.
With the Theater Maintenance Partnership Initiative, which
is a program that we are rolling out to put nine centers of
excellence in the region, and this is partnering with the
partner nation militaries and their military academies with
program of instruction to teach and train maintenance and the
culture of maintenance. But it is a tactical-level program, all
the way up to an operational level, into the ministries of
defense, where you can anticipate logistics and teach
logistics, and that culture of maintenance to keep equipment
ready and increase the readiness of capability for these
partner nations.
Senator Peters. I appreciate that. A question that I have
for you, as well, General Richardson, is that my understanding
is that right now the Chinese military is training about five
times more Latin American and Caribbean military officers than
the United States. I have some concerns that these Chinese
professional military education exchanges may have an outsized
impact on our allies, particularly in SOUTHCOM.
So my question for you is what are the risks associated
with continuing to allow Chinese education exchanges to outpace
what we are providing, and how can Congress support your
command in countering this challenge?
General Richardson. So the PRC is using our playbook
against us, in terms of these exchanges and these all-expense-
paid training exchanges for a year to 2 years to China, and the
aegis that we are able to provide through the IMET program for
professional military education. But the difference that it
makes when they come to our schools, in the United States, for
example, when you don't speak the language or speak in the
language, and I would say there are 3 ministers of defense and
about 15 chiefs of defense that have been to our United States
schools, and so you have already built the trust. I do not have
to build the trust over a year with these leaders. So if they
have been to our U.S. schools I would say that we need to
continue to sustain that and even increase our IMET program.
Senator Peters. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Before I begin my
remarks and questions for each of you I want to say something
about what Majority Leader Chuck Schumer is saying on the
Senate floor right now. The Majority Leader, on the
U.S. Senate floor, is calling for a new Israeli Government.
This is coercion, it is dangerous, it is undemocratic. If Chuck
Schumer does not like Netanyahu it does not matter. The Israeli
Government should be respected by the American Government.
Americans should stand strongly with Israel's elected
leadership, not threaten it as it fights terrorism. I hope that
Israel destroys, kills every Hamas terrorist there is.
First off, thanks to both of you for your service. So I
want to say a few things before I ask you a couple of
questions.
Protecting our national security interests means that the
military must be laser-focused on the cold, hard facts, and not
only what our adversaries are doing but what they are capable
of doing. The violence and unrest in Haiti is heartbreaking. It
is a symptom of political unrest that has only continued to
grow under this Administration. Not only has the Biden
administration taken an active role in destabilizing the region
by appeasing Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, but it appears
that the White House is totally unprepared to deal with the
consequences of the political unrest these regimes create and
support.
The policy in the United States should not be that we just
let everyone into our country, totally unvetted, any time there
is trouble around the world. That is what President Biden has
done at the border with eight million people pouring across,
and after the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan with 90,000
unvetted people coming in.
Not only does this Administration open the floodgates for
people who do not know anything about what we believe in to
come to our country, President Biden and Democrats at every
level of government give these individuals cash, phones,
lawyers, and everything else, paid for by the U.S. taxpayer.
The entire Biden administration can be summed up as this:
Biden creates a magnet for illegal immigration here, appeases
evil regimes, and forces the American people to pay for the
unrest, humanitarian crisis, and mass border crossings that
result. It does not work, and it cannot be our answer to the
chaos in Haiti.
It is also worth knowing that all of this works to the
benefit of our adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran. Our
enemies thrive on our chaos. These evil regimes are working
every day to expand their foothold in the Western Hemisphere
and increase the ability for their proxies to threaten the U.S.
and destabilize the region.
For SOUTHCOM we see Iran infiltrating the region and
Communist China using initiatives like Belt and Road to spread
their influence and saddle poor countries in Latin America with
massive debt. For NORTHCOM we see Russia and Communist China
using unconventional warfare, especially cyberattacks, going
after our supply chains or taking advantage of the open border.
We are even seeing our adversaries undermine U.S. security
while expanding their reach in places like the Arctic, bringing
their militaries closer to the U.S.
So I have a couple of questions. General Richardson, let's
start with Haiti. The people of Haiti have reached a breaking
point. Florida families, we have a lot of Haitian families in
our State, are compassionate, for they are worried about how
this instability in the region, to not only include Haiti but
all of SOUTHCOM theater, could possibly stroke a mass
immigration event in my State.
I spoke with the Coast Guard last night. I would like to
hear from you. What is your plan to address the possibility of
a mass migration event which may not only impact Florida but
also our bases within the Caribbean? What are the options
available to us with DOD assets and capabilities?
General Richardson. So in terms of a mass migration we have
our contingency plan at USSOUTHCOM and we did a train walk last
summer on Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, and that was with all
of the interagency to walk through all the processes and ensure
that all the steps that are necessary to take place are
actually in place, everything is refreshed, the equipment,
everything is ready to go.
As we work through all of our contingency plans I assure
you that USSOUTHCOM and the Department of Defense are ready to
go.
Senator Scott. Second question for General Richardson. I
worked on, and a lot of us worked on, getting the dual-use
amendment for Homestead Air Force Base in the fiscal year 2023
NDAA. This base allows us to project power in the hemisphere
where our enemies China, Russia, and Iran and its proxies are
present and they are active. I asked Air Force leadership about
the future of Homestead and having a permanent flying mission
at the base. General Brown assured me that he was committed to
having a platform operate out of Homestead. Can you talk about
the strategic value of the base and why we need it?
General Richardson. So Homestead Air Reserve Base actually
is a great staging platform. When I was in NORTHCOM in my
previous job as Army North Commander we staged out of Homestead
for the response into the Bahamas for the damage that was done
by Hurricane Dorian. We launched our missions--my theater of
Special Operations Command is at Homestead Air Reserve
SOCSOUTH, and we staged our two missions that we conducted into
Haiti this past week from Homestead.
So the ability for the Department of Defense to have
Homestead as a staging base in South Florida, to be able to
jump to respond to humanitarian assistance and disaster
response type activities is very hugely helpful.
Senator Scott. I thank both of you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to our
witnesses for your great service. General Guillot, I want to
begin with you. My colleagues and I on this Committee have
recently discussed installation security with respect to drone
threats at bases in the United States. Recognizing that we are
in an unclassified setting, what can you tell me about how
NORTHCOM is addressing this issue and with what partners are
you working this challenge?
General Guillot. Senator, NORTHCOM, as part of my 90-day
assessment, to tell the truth, the counter-UAS mission has
dominated that so far in the first month. Of course, I knew it
was an issue, coming from another combatant command where we
faced that threat in a very different way because of the
environment, but I was not prepared for the number of
incursions that I see. I have gone into the events at Joint
Base Langley-Eustis, and I am using that as the centerpiece of
my 90-day assessment to see where NORAD and NORTHCOM can and
should do more as this emerging capability outstrips the
operational framework that we have to address it.
Senator Kaine. Can you talk about other partners that you
are working with, because obviously there is sort of a law
enforcement component of this. So who else is working with you
on this problem, sir?
General Guillot. Yes, sir, absolutely. So primarily
Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice along
the border have the primary responsibility. That is who I am
working with there. In the interior it is the services that
have the responsibility for defending their bases, so working
with each individual service, and then again also Department of
Homeland Security and Department of Energy for specific
critical infrastructure locations. Those are the primary ones
that I am working with.
Senator Kaine. Thank you for that. Now a question for both
of you about FMS. The importance of FMS was mentioned by
General Kurilla last week. General Guillot, you mentioned it in
your written statement. General Richardson, you and I talked
about it a little bit last week when we were together. The FMS
programs not only increase interoperability and strengthen
partnerships but it can help reduce our partners' reliance upon
strategic competitors, as well.
What are you hearing from your counterparts about FMS? I
want to particularly direct that to General Richardson,
recognizing General Guillot's short tenure that has been
dominated by other issues. But General Richardson, could you
talk about this?
General Richardson. So FMS is a critical enabler, and
obviously with being able to have our equipment, to have up-to-
date equipment, and then having U.S. equipment and being
interoperable and that sort of thing is an imperative.
So what Secretary Austin and the Chairman have instituted
to speed up the processes within FMS over the past 2 years have
taken place. But I would say that we have got to streamline
that to the interagency, because it is not just the Department
of Defense that has a stake in that and that approves things.
So we have got to streamline that process a little bit better
and speed it up.
Senator Kaine. We talked last week in my office about the
potential synergy between the State Partnership Program, that
Senator Peters was discussing, and the Theater Maintenance
Partnership Initiative. Could you talk a little bit about that
and whether it could support or complement the FMS priorities
that we have?
General Richardson. Well, absolutely. I mean, that is the
whole reason for it, where we have U.S. equipment in these
countries. So maintenance is hard for our U.S. military, and it
is hard for our partner nations as well. So with turnover, we
always, in our U.S. military, have people coming in and going
out and leaving the military, so there is a constant turnover.
So you have to have a really good training, teaching and
training program at the tactical level.
So the TMPI program, the Theater Maintenance Partnership
Initiative that you mentioned, the nexus with the National
Guard State Partnership Program, there are tons of maintainers
in the National Guard. This makes a very simple, easy way to
teach and train, it fits right in line with the institutional
capacity building as well.
Senator Kaine. Last question I would like to ask you,
General Richardson, one of the best advantages we have in your
region is the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda. You have made
this a real priority in your travels. Can you speak on the
impacts that the WPS initiatives are having within our partner
countries?
General Richardson. Huge impact, so thank you for the
question, Senator, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 for
Women, Peace, and Security. So in every visit I do in the
countries we have a Women, Peace, and Security event. The great
thing is that we get what I call a ``twofer'' with our enlisted
leader professional development program as well. We have many
women enlisted leaders that are in our military formations in
the region. So that dovetailing nicely with our different
programs. They are both rock star programs, if I must say. Our
partner nations doing that, and seeing the diversity and the
ability to increase readiness within their forces, they have
realized that and they continue on a really good path.
Senator Kaine. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator
Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both
of you for being here today and your service to the most
important combatant commanders. Everybody is important, but one
of you guards our front door and one guards our back door. We
know how important that is in this day and time.
General, we have seen the change in the government in
Canada, maybe the direction that they are going, which is very
important, should be very important to all of us. Have you seen
any change with the military in terms of how they are helping
us, you know, in NORTHCOM?
General Guillot. Senator, on the first day of my command I
met with the Military of National Defense, Minister Blair, and
the Chief of the Defense Staff, General Eyre, in Colorado
Springs, and we talked about Canada's commitment to NORAD and
NORAD modernization. They told me at that time that they were
committed, with funding aligned, for over-the-horizon radar, F-
35, P-8, and MQ-9. All those systems will immediately have
benefit to us in the homeland defense mission that we share in
NORAD.
Since the first day I have seen nothing but strong
commitment from our Canadian partners for modernizing NORAD and
working together to defend our Homelands.
Senator Tuberville. Great. That is good news. What about
the border? Are you getting any pushback from the northern
border? We hear a lot about the southern border, but northern
border is very important. We hear a lot of people are coming,
especially terrorists, through the northern border. Have you
had any conversations with any of your counterparts there?
General Guillot. Senator, I have. Although the Customs and
Border Protection and Homeland Security have not requested DOD
or NORTHCOM's support on the north border it is something I
watch very closely, for a number of reasons. One is the
potential threats entering our country through the north, and I
have frequent discussions with CBP and with the intel community
to see if there are any threats that are coming through. Then,
of course, it is shared border with a strong partner like
Canada. So from mil-to-mil with Canada we talk about. So it is
something I watch.
Senator Tuberville. So you are getting cooperation?
General Guillot. Absolutely getting cooperation and keeping
a strong sense of situational awareness on the activities at
the northern border.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General Richardson, the
Panama Canal is one of the most important resources for us in
Central America. Give us an update right now on that. If we had
some kind of conflict all over the world would we be able to
use the Panama Canal?
General Richardson. We have a very strong partnership with
Panama, and that only continues to improve. But my concerns are
the PRC state-owned enterprises that are along either side of
the Panama Canal, the five. So that strategic sealine of
communication, the Panama Canal, I would be extremely concerned
about that, and am, and as a result we watch that very closely,
Senator.
Senator Tuberville. Do you think the security there is
adequate, above and beyond where we would be able to use it?
General Richardson. Again, my concern is being able to use
those state-owned enterprises for military application, if
required. So the proximity that that has to the Panama Canal is
a concern to me. I have no doubt in Panama's ability to secure
that and our ability to help defend that, if required.
Senator Tuberville. Is the expansion on target? I know the
last time I was down there they were doing a lot of work at the
Panama Canal. I do not know whether you keep up with that or
not.
General Richardson. That is the PRC, Senator?
Senator Tuberville. Yes.
General Richardson. Yes, and they are building a fourth
bridge across the Canal. So we absolutely track everything that
is done with the Panama Canal and work with our Panamanian
authorities and our partners as we watch all of this activity
that takes place and continues to take place.
Senator Tuberville. Have you or any of your staff visited
the Darien Gap, where we have all the immigrants coming from
South America to North America?
General Richardson. Senator, I visited the Darien several
times, both on the Colombian side and on the Panama side, and I
have been to the binational base that Colombia and Panama share
together and conduct joint operations.
Senator Tuberville. Where is the funding coming from for
that?
General Richardson. For the Darien, sir?
Senator Tuberville. Yes.
General Richardson. So in terms of the operations that
Colombia conducts comes from Colombian resourcing that they
have for their military. The ones for Panama come from the
Panama security forces. Our activities, OAIs--operations,
activities, and investments--that we do with Panama are from my
security cooperation funds in SOUTHCOM.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. I saw your budget and there is no
doubt both of you are so important to the protection of the
American citizens and our country. You know, we just voted to
give $60 billion to Ukraine. I wish it would have gone to you
all. I am sure you all could have used it. I have seen your
budgets and your things that you use to work in both of your
NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. What you do is amazing, but we need to
help you. We really do.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, of course Ranking
Member Wicker, for holding this hearing, and I would like to
thank General Guillot and General Richardson for testifying
today and of course for your service to our Nation. I really
appreciate it.
I am going to hit a little bit on countering Chinese and
Russian forces because as Russia continues its war in Ukraine
and China acts with increasing aggression in the Indo-Pacific,
both countries are also taking steps that pose a direct threat
to our national security right here at home.
General Guillot, how can NORTHCOM adapts its force posture
to proactively deter and respond to the increasing presence and
capabilities of Russian and Chinese assets off our cost and
actually within North America?
General Guillot. Senator, the best way for us to counter
them is to have presence of our own. So the execution of
exercises, patrols in all domains is extremely important, off
all of our coasts, primarily focusing right now in the region
of Alaska because of the number of incursions by Russian
aircraft and then the number of maritime, the strong presence
that both the Chinese and the Russians have there.
The same thing applies on what we call the two o'clock
approach off on the northeast, making sure that we have
presence there. That is what I think is the best way to
counter. Then part of that presence being exercises, a strong
exercise program, multinational, a lot of partners, showing
that we have the resolve to defend that most strategic area.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I am going to move on again,
General Guillot, on talking about cybersecurity because this is
a big part of our Homeland security system, as well. Can you
talk to us about how NORTHCOM is currently addressing
cybersecurity threats to the Homeland? You are talking about
other kinds of posturing. In your opinion could the creation of
a new subordinate unified command specifically responsible for
defense cyber operations could ensure a better comprehensive
and actually a cohesive defense posture against our cyber
adversaries?
General Guillot. Senator, in my previous response I should
have mentioned cyber because it is the most prevalent and
consistent threat that we see on a daily basis. You know, sure
we see the maritime and the air occasionally, and they are
important, but every day we have State actors, including Russia
and China, that are attempting to get on our Department of
Defense networks. The strength that we have through Cyber
Command in detecting and defeating those threats is what is
keeping us operational.
Northern Command's role is, first and foremost, to protect
the systems that we use inside our NORAD and NORTHCOM to
operate, and we have four different networks that we protect.
Beyond that is anything with a Department of Defense nexus we
work with Cyber Command to make sure that all of those are
addressed. Then the third thing that we do, we work with the
FBI and CISA, strong partnership with both of them, and in my
short command I have already met with both of their leadership
about how do we help other members of the critical
infrastructure community, and if they need DOD support it is
synchronized and presented through NORTHCOM to protect them.
For your question about a separate command, I would need to
look into it. But my initial response would be that in the two
combatant commands in which I have served the relationship and
support from Cyber Command has been phenomenal. I would really
hesitate to do anything that bifurcated or separated them from
their seamless ability to do operational offensive cyber and
defensive cyber under the same leadership, because it has
worked really well for us in my previous job in Central Command
and is certainly working well for us in Northern Command.
So always looking to improve, but it is something I would
look at very closely because Cyber Command, in my opinion, has
been a tremendous partner in this realm.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. That is really valuable
input. I appreciate it.
I am going to move on to you, General Richardson, and talk
a little bit about linguists, with the Department of Defense
increasingly making investments focused on countering the
People's Republic of China. Do you have concerns regarding a
lack of language expertise for countries in the SOUTHCOM area
of responsibility, or is this gap sufficiently addressed by the
diversity of the force that we recruit?
General Richardson. I think with Spanish predominantly and
Portuguese with Brazil, we have enough linguists, Senator, but
because a lot of our linguists will speak Spanish as well as
other languages, as well. So it is just a matter of making sure
that we register our personnel demand and our requirements all
the time, that this region is important and that we have got to
keep these positions filled.
Senator Rosen. Well, you speak about the Panama Canal and
the PRC investments around there, so it is important to have
possibly more than Spanish and Portuguese even in that area,
because we know our adversaries are also there, as well.
So thank you. I appreciate it. My time is up.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen. We
anticipate that Senator Schmitt will arrive shortly, and I will
take this opportunity to ask questions.
General Guillot, as you know Congress has been considering
taking S band, which is known exclusively for military use, and
begin to share or sell it to private entities. Can you tell the
Committee the impact that would have on your operations?
General Guillot. Senator, sharing or yielding the spectrum
between 3.1 and 3.45 gigahertz would have a significant impact
on our homeland defense systems.
Chairman Reed. Is there a possibility of sharing? I know
some folks have come back and said that we can use it mutually.
Is that something that you could do?
General Guillot. Chairman, I would say that in our initial
review I have not found a way that we could share, especially
because with Northern Command, the 24/7 on-alert responsibility
for defending the Homeland, I would need full access to that,
for all the various systems, which are sea-based, land-based,
and air-based systems that use that frequency range.
Chairman Reed. I would assume, too, that in a sharing
arrangement there would be a period of time where some of your
systems could not effectively operate as they modified
themselves. Is that fair?
General Guillot. As we negotiate the potential to share we
have made it very clear that we would need 24/7 access to those
frequency ranges.
Chairman Reed. General Richardson, the Chinese influence,
and Russian influence, to a degree, in your area of command is
focused on many things, but one of the things they are focused
on is strategic minerals, which could, in fact, be the oil of
the next generation as we move to more electric power, to
vehicles, homes, et cetera. Have you seen a noticeable
concentration of focus by the Chinese on trying to identify and
control these strategic minerals?
General Richardson. Yes, Chairman, and especially with the
work that I have done to partner with our United States
Ambassadors in Argentina and also Chile, and as we know, the
Lithium Triangle is comprised of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile.
So 60 percent of the world's lithium is in that region, so the
aggressive nature of which the PRC works to extract that
lithium, as well as gold and copper from the region too.
Chairman Reed. As we spoke before, resources in the Inter-
American Development Bank could help non-Chinese companies
acquire these mines and begin processing. Is that accurate?
General Richardson. This would all be part of that
initiative, similar to what I mentioned before, Chairman, on
the Economic Recovery Act of 1948, which was the Marshall Plan,
and that APEP initiative, American Partnership for Economic
Prosperity, through the IDBM Invest program at the Inter-
American Development Bank and also Developmental Finance
Corporation, and the infusion of billions of dollars into
critical infrastructure, clean energy, and digital technology.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, ma'am. I will recognize
Senator Schmitt, and if Senator King has additional questions I
will recognize him after Senator Schmitt.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I wanted
to ask about the increase, and by some accounts a tenfold
increase, in the number of Chinese nationals that have come
across our southern border. It is 50 times--I mean, whatever
account, there are a lot of Chinese nationals coming across in
the last year, and, you know, flying in and out of China is not
like getting out of DCA back home to St. Louis. It is a much
different ordeal.
I guess I just want to ask, and 60 Minutes had a report
about some content that is being pushed through social media
channels of vulnerabilities with the border. I am certainly
concerned about espionage operations. What information do we
have about who these people are, what activities are taking
place when they cross our southern border? It seems like this
is happening now at a rate that just does not feel natural, to
the extent that any of what is happening on our southern border
makes any sense. But certainly the number of Chinese nationals
coming across is of great concern to me, and I wonder if you
could speak to that.
General Guillot. Senator, the number of Chinese that are
coming across the border is a big concern of mine. In fact, in
the short period of time that I have been in command I have
gone down to the southern border to talk to the agents and
leadership about that, and then I have also spoken with the
Acting Commissioner of the CBP on this subject.
What concerns me most about specifically the Chinese
migrants is, one, is that they are so centralized in one
location on the border, and two is while many may be political
refugees and other explanations, the ability for
counterintelligence to hide in plain sight in those numbers. So
therefore, we have a very strong and robust relationship with
the interagency intelligence community, and I receive frequent
briefings in the headquarters on the disposition of who has
been apprehended and the potential of that threat that you
described.
Senator Schmitt. Do we have any--and if some of this is in
a closed setting I am happy to--but what kind of coordination
is taking place here? Because you are right. I think there were
21,000 just in the last 4 months in California alone, were the
numbers that I have seen recently. So there seems to be a
concentration and it seems to be coordinated. Again, getting in
and out of the People's Republic of China is a different deal.
What have you heard about sort of coordinated activities,
and are we aware of specific efforts on their part to be in
parts of the interior United States with sensitive military
locations?
General Guillot. Senator, I had some of the same questions
that you brought up. What I have been told by our partners in
CBP is that the reason that California is the focal point is
just simply ease of flying from China into Tijuana and then
across.
I am concerned, and I think you were alluding to, and have
talked to our partners about this, is how the surges seem to be
coordinated and command and controlled using social media,
primarily by the cartels, to drive the migrants to areas where
we might not be, similar analogy to squeezing the balloon.
Where we squeeze down, they, with command and control,
primarily through social media, I am told, know to go to the
other areas.
So our role in NORTHCOM is we are in support of the Customs
and Border Protection for detection and monitoring along the
site with about 2,500 military members, primarily from the Army
and the Marine Corps. They work very closely to pick up where
those surges are as well as where the gaps are with the
monitoring equipment, to alert the law enforcement side of
Border Protection to make the apprehensions.
Senator Schmitt. I look forward to working with you on that
and continuing that dialog about what is happening, because I
think it is potentially a very dangerous situation.
Then with my limited time one last question. As far as the
drone activity that we see at the southern border, presumably
being coordinated by the cartels, maybe other actors, what
information can you share about what is it that they are doing?
Are they tracking Border Patrol agents? What is sort of the
drone activity? What are they seeking to discover with these
drones that are coming across?
General Guillot. Senator, again I asked those very same
questions to the Commissioner. He said the overall majority of
the activity that they see, the incursions, are spotters,
trying to find gaps, finding out where we are so they can be
where we are not. That is the majority. There is a smaller
number that are probably moving narcotics across the border.
Senator Schmitt. The drones themselves.
General Guillot. That is right. That is right, Senator, and
then the last thing I would say, there is a lot of activity
that is our own, that is doing the same thing to try to find
where that activity is and make sure that we are prepared to
stop it.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Senator King,
you have another question?
Senator King. Just one brief question to followup with
General Richardson on our conversation about coordination. I
understand there is an Interdiction Committee that is led by
the Coast Guard. Could we followup together on upgrading that
to a task force to include all the other agencies and really
talk about how to better coordinate our response at the border?
Is that something you are willing to work with us on?
General Richardson. Absolutely, Senator. The Interdiction
Committee meets regularly, and actually the meeting is coming
up, and that includes all of the interagency.
Senator King. Well, I would like to meet with you to talk
about the activity and to further operationalize the activity
of the committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Thank you to the witnesses for your excellent testimony. I
will adjourn the open session, and we will reconvene in SVC-217
at, let us say, 11:40. That would give people time to rest and
recuperate.
But again, thank you for your service, and General
Richardson particularly, your remarkable service over a career
that has really sustained this Nation and set an example that
we admire. Thank you, ma'am.
General Richardson. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. With that I will adjourn the open session.
[Whereupon, at 11:23 a.m., the Committee recessed, to be
continued in closed session.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
tactical airlift
1. Senator Gillibrand. General Guillot, the Russian military has an
inventory of 195 Antonov An-74, which can operate in any climatic
conditions ranging from -60 to 45+C (-76 to 113 +F) and at any
latitude, including the North Pole, and high altitudes. What steps is
U.S. Air Force taking to counter this capability given the increased
Russian activity in the Arctic and its geopolitical implications?
General Guillot. The successful execution of NORAD and USNORTHCOM's
missions require a Joint Force capable of operating in all conditions
and environments throughout the Commands' areas of responsibility,
which certainly includes the Arctic. Over the last decade, Russia has
steadily increased its presence in the Arctic, and the PRC has even
declared itself a ``near-Arctic'' nation with the intent to operate in
the High North, and the actions of both competitors are likely to have
significant strategic implications. I would have to refer you to the
Department of the Air Force regarding Service planning for future
capabilities, however as the Arctic advocate for defense capabilities I
will continue to vigorously advocate for designated forces that are
trained and equipped to operate in this critical region.
2. Senator Gillibrand. General Guillot, please validate that the
U.S. military requires a tactical airlift capability to support in
austere arctic requirements, and that currently the only capability
which exists is the LC-130H ski birds operated by the Air National
Guard.
General Guillot. Yes, USNORTHCOM maintains a validated requirement
for tactical airlift capable of operating throughout the Command's
entire Area of Operations, to include the Arctic. The LC-130J and H
model aircraft and their disciplined crews have admirably filled that
role for years.
3. Senator Gillibrand. General Guillot, please address the nature
of today's validated requirement for this capability in the
Administration's updated Arctic Strategy as we increase our training an
operations in the Arctic Region. What is our fallback if the LC-130H is
no longer operational due to delays in recapitalization of the fleet?
General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM's missions require airlift
platforms that are capable of operating throughout the command's entire
area of operations, to include the
Arctic. The LC-130, operated solely by the New York Air National
Guard, continue to perform admirably in support of training and
operational mission in austere environments, and NORAD and USNORTHCOM
will continue to work with the Air Force to ensure there is no gap in
this important mission area.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
counter-unmanned aerial system authorities
4. Senator King. General Guillot, given the complexity of the
National Airspace System (NAS) and multiple Federal, State, local,
tribal and territorial jurisdictional boundaries within the continental
United States (CONUS), there are key Counter-Unmanned Aerial System (C-
UAS) policy limitations that hinder timely response by respective
authorities. This suggests a potential gap in domain awareness and
capabilities, integration and interagency coordination in the
detection, authorities, attribution, and potential engagement of
Counter-small Unmanned Aerial System (C-sUAS). Additionally, outside of
a national self-defense response, C-UAS activities are primarily the
responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in support of their law enforcement and
domestic security missions. Are the correct authorities in place for
effective C-UAS, and what is your plan to close capability gaps
regarding our capacity to defend against UAS and swarm missions?
General Guillot. Given the rapid proliferation of commercial UAS
and an increased number of UAS incidents and incursions, further
reviews of counter-UAS authorities and coordination processes should be
made to enable increased effectiveness through a true whole-of-
government approach to mitigating this emerging challenge. As you know,
there are unique constraints within the United States when it comes to
counter-UAS; however, I am confident a whole-of-government approach and
greater interagency collaboration can overcome such gaps and
challenges.
To defend against sUAS, as directed by the Secretary of Defense,
NORAD and USNORTHCOM are working with the Joint C-sUAS Office (JCO) and
the Services to develop and field systems that can detect, track,
identify, and engage sUAS, to include those operating autonomously and
in swarms, while observing unique constraints of operating within the
United States. The distribution of these capabilities will be
prioritized based on the criticality of the defended asset, its
vulnerability to sUAS, and the assessed threat to the installation.
joint counter-small unmanned aerial system office
5. Senator King. General Guillot, the Joint C-sUAS Office (JCO),
working in consultation with the combatant commands and the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment,
completes assessments of fielded C-sUAS systems and makes
recommendations for further investments. JCO has produced a Joint
Capability Development Document outlining operational requirements for
future systems and, in January 2021, released a Department of Defense
(DOD) C-sUAS strategy. Section 1074 of the Fiscal Year 2021 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 116-283) requires a series of
reports to Congress, including a report on and independent assessment
of the JCO's C-sUAS activities and a report on the threat posed by UAS.
Section 162 of the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) directs the
Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of the threats posed by
UAS swarms and of DOD counter-swarm capabilities. It additionally
directs the Secretary to ``develop and implement a strategy to field
capabilities to counter threats posed by unmanned aerial system
swarms.'' How effective has the JCO been in streamlining C-sUAS policy,
and what implementations need to be made to utilize this organization
to its fullest capacity?
General Guillot. The JCO has been highly effective in leading and
directing DOD doctrine, requirements, materiel, and training to
establish joint solutions to address current and future small UAS
threats. I applaud their work and look forward to partnering with the
JCO as we work on c-UAS challenges in the Homeland. Beyond the scope of
the JCO mission, much work remains; a whole-of-government approach is
needed given level of proliferation we are observing globally.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
deployment of united states marines to haiti--coordination and support
for humanitarian aid
6. Senator Warren. General Richardson, is the main priority of DOD
and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to evacuate United States citizens
from Haiti?
General Richardson. Regarding Haiti, the SOUTHCOM mission is to
enable the UN-authorized Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission
by providing logistics, supplies, services, and support. As done
elsewhere in the world, if directed, DOD would coordinate the
protection and evacuation of United States citizens in Haiti with the
Department of State, who is the lead for such efforts. SOUTHCOM stands
ready to execute this mission if required.
7. Senator Warren. General Richardson, beyond this effort, what are
DOD and SOUTHCOM's other strategic priorities?
General Richardson. DOD, including SOUTHCOM, supports the United
States Government's strategic goals of addressing immediate insecurity
and creating the necessary security conditions for Haiti's long-term
stability and growth. We are doing this by enabling the MSS mission,
which is supporting the Haitian National Police as they increase their
anti-gang operations, build their capacity to maintain public safety,
and provide humanitarian assistance to those in need. Looking ahead,
SOUTHCOM stands ready to support USG long-term efforts to assist Haiti
as it moves toward a more secure and prosperous future.
8. Senator Warren. General Richardson, what is the capacity of
SOUTHCOM to help coordinate and support humanitarian aid to the Haitian
people?
General Richardson. USAID is the lead Federal agency for
humanitarian assistance overseas, and SOUTHCOM is prepared to support
USAID and Department of State efforts if requested to provide it.
SOUTHCOM has a longstanding and strong partnership with USAID, as well
as with numerous NGO's through our Command's public-private partnership
program. Our Command also has numerous liaison officers and interagency
partners on staff who work closely with us on this issue, to ensure
that we successfully coordinate and support humanitarian aid if
required.
9. Senator Warren. General Richardson, how will SOUTHCOM help
coordinate and support humanitarian aid to the Haitian people?
General Richardson. If requested by USAID and if directed, SOUTHCOM
will coordinate with and support USAID and Department of State efforts,
and leverage our extensive public-private partnership network, to
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Haitian people. As
part of our support to the MSS mission, we have coordinated with local
NGO's to deliver humanitarian aid to Haiti. In coordination with USAID
and other agencies, we will continue to support the USG's efforts to
help address the humanitarian needs of the Haitian people.
10. Senator Warren. General Richardson, what efforts have been made
to connect with aid organizations--local and international--available
to support providing humanitarian aid to Haiti?
General Richardson. We have longstanding public-private
partnerships with a variety of NGO's, including many that work in
Haiti. Our experience supporting USAID to deliver humanitarian aid
after the devastating earthquakes in Haiti (2010 and 2021) are examples
that demonstrate our commitment to support the provision of
humanitarian assistance to Haiti. The deployment of the USNS COMFORT
Hospital Ship visit to Haiti to provide medical care in 2022, has
helped forge strong, lasting partnerships with many different groups.
In coordination with USAID and the Department of State, we remain in
constant contact with key NGO partners and stakeholders to understand
the scope of humanitarian need in Haiti and enable delivery of aid when
directed.
11. Senator Warren. General Richardson, have these efforts been
successful?
General Richardson. Yes--our public-private partnerships are
robust. NGO's continue to play a critical role in addressing Haiti's
most pressing humanitarian needs.
12. Senator Warren. General Richardson, what discussions or
planning efforts have been made with the State Department to facilitate
providing humanitarian aid to the people in Haiti?
General Richardson. USAID is the lead Federal agency for the
provision of humanitarian assistance overseas. Our Command also has
numerous USAID liaison officers and interagency partners on staff, who
work closely with us on this issue, to ensure that we successfully
coordinate and support humanitarian aid if required. SOUTHCOM maintains
regular consultations with the Department of State, in coordination
with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
regarding Haiti. We coordinate with the Interagency Working Group (IWG)
that coordinates USG support to the MSS Mission, and includes the
Department of State, other components in the Department of Defense, and
others to execute support to the MSS Mission.
supplement haiti's collapsing health system
13. Senator Warren. General Richardson, how can SOUTHCOM help
coordinate and support humanitarian aid in the form of health care for
the Haitian people?
General Richardson. Reestablishing security and stability in Haiti
are crucial for the health and welfare of the Haitian people. In
coordination with USAID and other agencies, we will continue to support
the USG's efforts to help address the humanitarian needs of the Haitian
people. As part of this effort, we also coordinated with local NGO's to
deliver humanitarian aid to Haiti, including oral electrolyte solution
and much-needed medications.
14. Senator Warren. General Richardson, does SOUTHCOM communicate
to DOD and the Haitian people its capacity to provide humanitarian aid
directly to the Haitian people?
General Richardson. The White House and the Department of State
have the lead in communicating USG support to Haiti. SOUTHCOM is in a
supporting role to USAID as the lead Federal agency for the provision
of humanitarian assistance in Haiti. Our Public Affairs team works to
ensure a coordinated and unified message of solidarity with the Haitian
people.
15. Senator Warren. General Richardson, the SOUTHCOM press
statement on March 13, 2024 stated ``The Department of Defense is
postured to provide enabling support for MSS [Multinational Security
Support], including planning assistance, information sharing, airlift,
and medical support.'' Do those airlift and medical support efforts
extend to Haitians who are not United States citizens?
General Richardson. The airlift and medical support provided is
directed to the MSS Mission, which is there to support the Government
of Haiti.
16. Senator Warren. General Richardson, what are the specific
resources that will be used to support this humanitarian aid and
security enforcement mission in Haiti?
General Richardson. In February-March 2024, the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Defense pledged $300 million total in support to
the MSS mission in Haiti. DOD logistical support is being conducted
under DOD's Section 10 USC Sec. 331 authorities and is being resourced
through Service operation and maintenance accounts. Within my Combatant
Command authorities, I have also used military airlift and contracted
commercial airlift to deliver supplies and equipment to support the MSS
mission.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
use of spectrum for 5g and national defense
17. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, you testified that sharing or
yielding the spectrum between 3.1 and 3.45 GHz would have ``significant
impact'' on Homeland defense systems and that your initial review has
determined that sharing the spectrum between 3.1 to 3.45 GHz is not
possible. Would you identify Homeland defense systems that operate in
the 3.1 to 3.45 GHz range that would be impacted?
General Guillot. [Deleted.]
18. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, for each system identified
above, can the system operate between the 3.1 to 3.3 GHz range and is
there reduction in capability if operating in a more limited band?
General Guillot. [Deleted.]
19. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, for each system that is unable
to operate between 3.1 to 3.3 GHz, describe the nature of the system
(e.g. ground, air, sea).
General Guillot. [Deleted.]
20. Senator Cotton. General Richardson, you testified that China is
investing in 5G technology proliferation throughout South America. What
should the United States do to counter this proliferation of Chinese
based 5G technology?
General Richardson. This requires whole of U.S. Government and
private sector collaboration to provide a United States or other
alternative to Chinese-based 5G technology. We must encourage and
incentivize U.S. and other companies from Allied and partner nations to
compete on tenders in the region.
21. Senator Cotton. General Richardson, can the United States
counter Chinese 5G proliferation in South America if United States
based companies are not operating in the mid-band spectrum for
broadband services (3.1-3.45 Ghz)?
General Richardson. Yes, by influencing international 5G treaty
guidelines through the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) at
the World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRC).
counter small unmanned aircraft systems
22. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, you testified as to an
``alarming number'' of drone incursions across the border. Would you
please provide a specific number of drone incursions tracked across the
border by North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)/ U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in the span of month and in the span of the
past year (i.e. all of 2023)?
General Guillot. As I testified before the SASC in March, the
number of UAS incursions at the U.S. southwest border was alarming to
me; I don't know the actual number, but it's in the thousands per
month. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) is the Federal agency
responsible for tracking and countering small Unmanned Aircraft Systems
incursions along the border. I defer to the Department of Homeland
Security and CBP regarding the number of incursions they detected.
23. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, has DOD or NORTHCOM guidance
been updated since 2018 on the ``Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems in U.S. National Airspace''?
General Guillot. Yes, both DOD and USNORTHCOM have published
updated guidance. On 31 October 2023, DOD published ``Guidance for the
Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the U.S. National Airspace,'' which
superseded the 2018 memo. On 5 June 2024, I published my Policy for
Approval of Unmanned Aircraft System Support. Additionally, the NORAD &
USNORTHCOM J5 plans directorate participates in the quarterly UAS
Subgroup of the DOD Policy Board for Federal Aviation (PBFA). As
recently as 26 Jul 24, the subgroup coordinated on the MOU between DOD/
FAA For UAS Operations In the National Airspace.
24. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, what changes would you
recommend to title 10, title 50, or title 32 authorities to allow
NORTHCOM forces to counter the Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems threat?
General Guillot. As I noted throughout my March testimony,
demonstrated adversary UAS advances must be countered and require
increased attention from the whole-of-government. Presently, NORAD &
USNORTHCOM do not have any recommendations for changes to Title 10,
Title 50, or Title 32 authorities. I commit to you and this committee
to provide such recommendations if our position changes during my time
in command. However, I do recommend changes and advances in
capabilities internal to DOD and are working with JCO and the Joint
Staff to improve c-UAS capability and fielding. Both commands place a
very high priority on mitigating these threats and are working closely
with mission partners from across the Department of Defense, industry,
and the interagency community to protect installations and critical
infrastructure from sUAS.
25. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, does your unfunded priority
list for fiscal year 2025 include sufficient funds and programs to
address the Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems threat you highlighted in
your testimony?
General Guillot. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Fiscal Year 2025 Unfunded
Priority List (UPL) did not include a request to address small UAS
threats when submitted, as c-UAS authorities exist solely with the
military services. That said, I commit to you and this committee to
request any such sUAS/c-UAS unfunded requirements during my time in
command, if NORAD & USNORTHCOM are given c-UAS authorities and
responsibilities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
u.s. southern command maritime resourcing
26. Senator Sullivan. General Richardson, the U.S. Fourth Fleet,
which serves as the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander for U.S.
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), has only been allocated one U.S. naval
ship for persistent presence. Are you sufficiently resourced in the
maritime domain to address the increasing naval presence of Russian and
PRC [People's Republic of China] vessels in your area of responsibility
(AOR)?
General Richardson. No, we are not sufficiently resourced. In fact,
we must request assets from other Geographic Combatant Commands to
shadow Russian ships when they enter the SOUTHCOM AOR.
27. Senator Sullivan. General Richardson, do you have sufficient
resources from Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Defense to counter the 200-600 PRC fishing vessels in your AOR that are
conducting Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported (IUU) fishing?
General Richardson. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is the
lead Federal agency to conduct counter-IUU fishing operations. As part
of our continuous support to U.S. departments and agencies and law
enforcement partners, SOUTHCOM, shares information on IUU fishing
trends and activities within the SOUTHCOM AOR to raise awareness of
this threat, and to help enable counter-IUU operations by the USCG and
our partner nations.
28. Senator Sullivan. General Richardson, have you explored an
unmanned surface vessel task force, similar to Task Force 59 in U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM), to increase Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) in the maritime domain in your AOR?
General Richardson. Yes, the Secretary of the Navy tasked 4th Fleet
to operationalize the Hybrid Fleet concept in the SOUTHCOM AOR. 4th
Fleet has been operating unmanned vehicles for the past year and a half
to accomplish this task. We see great potential in new technology to
improve the efficacy of our detection and monitoring efforts to offset
chronic asset shortfalls.
joint interagency task force-south authorities
29. Senator Sullivan. General Richardson, what additional
authorities does Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) need
to conduct counter-Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported (IUU) fishing
operations?
General Richardson. JIATF-South is statutorily tasked with the sole
focus on the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of
illegal drugs into the United States. The USCG is the lead Federal
agency to conduct counter-IUU fishing operations.
30. Senator Sullivan. General Richardson, what additional
authorities does JIATF-South need to conduct counter-violent extremism
operations?
General Richardson. Multiple Federal agencies, including the
Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, and USAID
are involved in this critical mission to counter-violent extremism.
JIATF-South conducts detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime
transit of illegal drugs into the United States, and facilitates
information and intelligence sharing with law enforcement partners
regarding illegal drug trafficking and transnational organized crime
(TOC) operations in the AOR.
31. Senator Sullivan. General Richardson, what additional
authorities does JIATF-South need to conduct counter-weapons
trafficking operations?
General Richardson. We greatly appreciate the continued support
Congress has provided to DOD's and SOUTHCOM's efforts to support other
agencies' efforts to counter not only drug trafficking, but also other
forms of transnational organized crime (TOC). Current statutory
authorities, 10 U.S.C. 284 authorizes DOD to provide intelligence
analysis support authorizes when certain conditions are met, DOD to
provide intelligence analysis support to other U.S. Government
departments and agencies in support of their efforts to counter other
activities by TCOs. This includes the trafficking of illegal drugs and
weapons, human trafficking, illicit financial flows, illegal trade in
natural resources and wildlife, and other forms of illegal means as
determined by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to statutory authority.
JIATF-South conducts detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime
transit of illegal drugs toward the United States by air or by sea, and
facilitates information and intelligence sharing with law enforcement
partners regarding illegal drug trafficking and TCO operations in the
AOR.
32. Senator Sullivan. General Richardson, what additional
authorities does JIATF-South need to conduct counter-illegal migration
operations?
General Richardson. DOD is the single lead Federal agency for the
detection and monitoring (D&M) of the aerial and maritime transit of
illegal drugs toward the United States. By statute, the U.S. Coast
Guard is the lead Federal agency to conduct migrant interdiction
operations at sea. If migration flows or movements are detected as part
of routine D&M operations, JIATF-South may share this information with
the USCG, but JIATF-South plays no statutory role in migrant
interdiction.
33. Senator Sullivan. General Richardson, what additional
authorities does JIATF-South need to conduct counter-trafficking in
human persons operations?
General Richardson. We greatly appreciate the continued support
Congress has provided to DOD's and SOUTHCOM's efforts to support other
agencies' efforts to counter not only drug trafficking, but also other
forms of TOC. Current statutory authorities, 10 U.S.C. 284 authorizes
DOD to provide intelligence analysis support authorizes DOD to provide
intelligence analysis support to other U.S. Government departments and
agencies in support of their efforts to counter a broader continuum of
illicit activity by TCOs. This includes the trafficking of illegal
drugs and weapons, money, human trafficking, illicit financial flows,
illegal trade in natural resources and wildlife, and other forms of
illegal means as determined by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to
statutory authority. JIATF-South conducts detection and monitoring of
aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs toward the United States
by air or by sea, and facilitates information and intelligence sharing
with law enforcement partners regarding illegal drug trafficking and
TCO operations in the AOR.
34. Senator Sullivan. General Richardson, section 124 of title 10
makes DOD the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial
and maritime transit of illegal drugs for drugs transiting into the
United States. Under this existing statute, are you able to cue
partners and allies to illegal drugs headed to their shores?
General Richardson. Current authorities limit our ability to detect
and monitor movements of illicit drugs other than those headed toward
the United States. However, under section 284(b)(9) of title 10 we can
provide intelligence analysis to U.S. interagency law enforcement
partners on the movement of drugs to locations other than the U.S.
improvements in alaska for the homeland defense mission
35. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, what specific infrastructure
improvements in Alaska would most benefit NORTHCOM's mission to monitor
and defend the Homeland?
General Guillot. Alaska Command is currently leading development of
an Area Development Plan that will assess infrastructure requirements
at main operating bases that serve as power projection platforms in the
Alaska Theater of Operations (AKTO). Infrastructure improvements in
Alaska that would most benefit NORTHCOM's mission to monitor and
respond to threats to the Homeland are those that provide earlier
warning of threats, greater decision space, and quicker response with
capabilities to deter and defend against aerospace threats in and
through the Arctic approaches to North America. For example, NORAD &
USNORTHCOM would benefit from the ability to operate fighter aircraft
and search-and-rescue rotary wing platforms north of Eielson AFB. As
the Arctic advocate for defense capabilities, I commit to you to make
such infrastructure recommendations and requests to the Department for
consideration in the annual budget process. If such requirements go
unfunded, I will assess whether to include it in the NORAD & USNORTHCOM
UPL.
countering russia and china in the arctic
36. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, China and Russia are
increasing military activities in the Arctic, where both countries have
a persistent presence. You have stated that the best way for the United
States ``to counter them is to have a presence of our own''. The United
States conducts several exercises in Alaska, such as Northern Edge,
Arctic Edge, and Red Flag-Alaska. In your opinion, should those
exercises grow in size, include allies and partners, in response to
increased Chinese and Russian activity?
General Guillot. I appreciate your focus on the Arctic and the
activities of competitors such as Russia and the PRC in that region. In
line with strategic guidance, I am working to increase presence and
campaign in all parts of the Arctic, through operational patrols,
training, and exercises. Increases in size of exercises in the region
is not outright necessary, however I would like to explore expanding
the window of time we conduct the exercises. As you indicated,
including our Allies and Partners is essential to countering Russian
and PRC influence. Finally, I strongly support designating forces that
are trained and equipped to operate in the Arctic.
37. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, in August 2023, the PRC and
Russia conducted a combined naval patrol in the Bering Sea. This is the
third patrol in the last few years conducted by the PRC and Russia off
the coast of Alaska. We responded with four DDGs and a P-8, which was
far more robust than the one Coast Guard cutter that responded in 2022.
Are you satisfied with the availability of United States Navy resources
to your command to counter joint PRC-Russian naval patrols with larger
numbers of vessels and aircraft?
General Guillot. Yes, I am satisfied with the availability of US
Navy resources to counter recent PRC-Russian naval patrols in the High
North. That said, during crisis or conflict, such Navy resource
availability will be a concern when considering the vast and varied
USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM maritime requirements. We have validated the
``One Pacific'' force employment and force sharing concept with
USINDOPACOM and apply the concept frequently. NORAD & USNORTHCOM must
continue to maintain maritime warning capabilities in this area, which
requires close coordination between both Combatant Commands and the
Joint Staff. I commend the ongoing maritime presence of the US Coast
Guard in waters off Alaska, and the ongoing maritime cooperation and
coordination with our Canadian allies.
38. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, last year when the Joint
Chinese-Russian Naval Task Force approached Alaska, our United States
destroyers had to re-route to refuel because of lack of infrastructure
to refuel medium size U.S. surface combatants. What benefits would a
Naval Support Activity or other type of shore infrastructure to
resupply and refuel U.S. Navy ships provide you as the NORTHCOM
Commander as you develop plans to counter joint PRC-Russian task
forces?
General Guillot. Currently, the use of Dutch Harbor, AK to support
fueling of US Navy assets operating in the waters off Alaska is
sufficient; however, such refueling activities requires leaving station
for several days. I understand the planned expansion at the Port of
Nome will reduce time off station and provide deep-water porting
capabilities to our Navy. Once operational, this will significantly
improve US Navy stationkeeping presence in the Alaska Theater of
Operations (AKTO).
39. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, do you believe that
increasing the number of locations in Alaska that can refuel DDGs
improves your ability to respond to future Russian or PRC naval
patrols?
General Guillot. Yes. An increase in the number of locations in
Alaska that can refuel DDGs would enhance the Joint Force's ability to
respond to Russian and PRC naval activity in the region and would also
serve as a deterrent. I support the planned expansion of the Port of
Nome which, when completed, will meet these requirements.
40. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, are the Russians and Chinese
capable of accessing points in the Arctic that we are not capable of
accessing due to a lack of United States icebreakers in your AOR?
General Guillot. In terms of capabilities, the answer is no.
However, Russia has a greater capacity with seven ``heavy'' icebreakers
that are rated capable of year-round operation in all polar waters or
moderate multi-year ice conditions. PRC does not have heavy icebreakers
but has one ``medium'' icebreaker capable of year-round operation in
ice up to 2.5 meters thick. By comparison, I understand the United
States Coast Guard has one heavy icebreaker and one medium icebreaker.
The lack of capacity risks a situation when no U.S. icebreaker is
available with the requisite capability to reach all areas in the
Arctic, putting us at a disadvantage.
service arctic strategies
41. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, the Pentagon will release an
updated DOD Arctic Strategy this spring, which will highlight how the
Arctic has changed in the last 5 years, both in terms of climate change
and its impact as well as Russia and China increasingly acting alone
and together to destabilize the region. Was NORTHCOM consulted in the
course of this strategy update?
General Guillot. Yes, OSD consulted with USNORTHCOM throughout the
DOD Arctic Strategy development process. USNORTHCOM also welcomes the
continued direction to serve as the Arctic advocate for defense
capabilities and will continue to inform the Department and Congress of
such requirements and capabilities. We need greater physical presence
in the Arctic, both military and civilian, and we need infrastructure
in the Arctic to support that presence.
42. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, do you believe the Services
are adequately resourcing their Arctic strategies to provide you with
Arctic-capable forces to defend the Homeland?
General Guillot. Currently, due to competing requirements, the
Services have aligned resources to provide limited Arctic-capable
forces to support homeland defense. However, capability gaps remain in
domain awareness, communications, and infrastructure. I am seeking
cooperation with the military services to designate forces and units
that are trained and equipped to operate in the harsh environments of
the Arctic.
43. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, do you believe it would be a
helpful forcing function for the Services to label which investments
were applicable to their respective Arctic strategies?
General Guillot. I do not necessarily believe labeling Arctic
investments would be helpful but support other ways of identifying
commitment to Arctic strategy resourcing. There are investments in
capability such as aircraft and ships that can operate in many regions
to include the Arctic but are not tied to the Services' Arctic
strategies. Labeling investments that support Arctic strategies does
not necessarily identify capabilities specifically designated for the
Arctic region.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
44. Senator Cramer. General Richardson, roughly what percentage of
your airborne ISR requirement went unfilled in fiscal year 2023?
General Richardson. SOUTHCOM received approximately 2 percent of
the DOD ISR planned allocation. The DOD allocation provided, plus our
use of contract airborne ISR, leaves approximately 70 percent of our
requirements unfulfilled. In support of JIATF-South's aerial we utilize
established Global Force Management processes to request forces when
required. SOUTHCOM will continue to build partner capacity, and
maritime detection and monitoring mission, however, work with the DOD
counterdrug program provides four (soon to be six) government-owned,
contractor-operated maritime patrol aircraft U.S. interagency, to
employ the full range of tools to build operational awareness and
promote security and funds the operation and maintenance of stability
in the Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar.
45. Senator Cramer. General Richardson, do you expect to be
allocated enough airborne ISR in fiscal year 2024 to meet your
requirement?
General Richardson. No, our requirement is almost two thirds more
than what we receive through DOD allocation and contracted ISR. We
utilize established Global Force Management processes to request forces
when required. SOUTHCOM will continue to build partner capacity, and
work with the U.S. interagency, to employ the full range of tools to
build operational awareness and promote security and stability in the
region.
46. Senator Cramer. General Richardson, is the MQ-9 effective
enough and survivable enough to contribute to your ISR requirements in
SOUTHCOM?
General Richardson. The MQ-9 could support SOUTHCOM ISR
requirements and contribute to our counternarcotics /counter-
transnational criminal organizations missions and to our humanitarian
assistance/disaster response missions. However, the MQ-9 would need to
be outfitted with the appropriate sensor packages to be useful in the
SOUTHCOM AOR.
47. Senator Cramer. General Richardson, are you allocated enough
space based ISR to negate the need for airborne ISR?
General Richardson. SOUTHCOM is not currently allocated DOD space-
based ISR and will need to rely on airborne ISR to meet its unique
requirements for the foreseeable future. Even with space-based ISR, we
will always have a requirement for airborne ISR based on the terrain
and adversary capabilities. We utilize established Global Force
Management processes to request forces when required.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
special operations forces
48. Senator Budd. General Richardson, can you please explain the
value of Special Operations Forces in your AOR?
General Richardson. Our Special Operations Forces are among the
most qualified, culturally sensitive, and linguistically capable
trainers in the U.S. military. Above all, they excel at building trust
and forging personal relationships that are essential to supporting our
national interests and maintaining both our strategic partnership and
access in the region. Rotations of small SOF teams provide a light
footprint, but also a persistent presence, which not only builds trust
and interoperability with our partners, but it also provides us with a
better understanding of regional dynamics and the convergence of
various threats, which are disrupting regional stability. The unique
capabilities that SOF provide in the AOR have directly contributed to
our ability to counter strategic competitors and malign activities,
provided unique expertise that supports our partners in countering
emergent threats that threaten regional stability, such as threats
posed by TCOs. Improved regional stability in the AOR and supported
global contingency planning and integrated deterrence.
49. Senator Budd. General Richardson, what impacts, if any, do you
expect to theater operations given planned force structure and
personnel cuts to Army Special Operations Forces?
General Richardson. I anticipate these cuts will have long-term
second-and third-order implications. We will have to make very tough
decisions about where we can employ SOF, and where we will be forced to
accept risk. SOF has been invaluable to offsetting our longstanding
lack of assigned forces and assets. Cuts to force structure will be
painful and would directly affect our ability to engage with our
partners, as well as their ability to address emergent threats that
threaten regional stability, such as TCOs, but we will be creative and
find ways to minimize impacts and risks as much as possible.
50. Senator Budd. General Richardson, have you or your command been
consulted on the assessment of optimal force structure for special
operations forces required by section 1075 of the Fiscal Year 2024
National Defense Authorization Act?
General Richardson. I have responded with my assessment of risk to
proposed force structure changes during my tenure in command. Those
responses were received by SOCOM and Joint Staff, and then weighed
against competing requirements in other Geographic Combatant Commands.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 2024
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m., in
room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
receive testimony from Admiral John Aquilino, Commander of U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command, and General Paul LaCamera, Commander of
U.S. Forces, who are here.
Gentlemen, please convey my thanks to the men and women
serving under your command. I must, at this point, stop. I
think there is an interesting--yes, we have a communications
problem. So, let me----
[Technical problems.]
Chairman Reed. Admiral--on behalf of the Committee----
[Technical problems.]
[Applause.]
[Technical problems.]
Chairman Reed. His ambition in the region continues to
grow, as does his aggressive behavior. Chinese leadership seeks
greater power and influence around the world, and it is
leveraging a wide range of military, economic, and political
pressures against its neighbors and other vulnerable nations to
advance these goals.
As our defense leaders have made clear, the United States
does not seek conflict with China and strategic competition is
not an inevitable march to conflict. America has long been a
Pacific nation, and we have deep economic and security interest
in the region.
During today's hearing, I look forward to discussing how
our Forces can continue to improve our military posture and
capabilities, while also supporting whole of Government efforts
to compete effectively in the region.
To that end, the Defense Department released a joint
concept for competing last year, which made clear the objective
of China and our adversaries is to win without fighting. The
concept warns that if we do not adapt to the realities of long
term competition, the United States risk ceding strategic
influence, advantage, and leverage while preparing for war that
never occurs.
I am interested to hear from our witnesses how they plan to
utilize the joint capabilities in the Indo-Pacific and Korea to
address these challenges. Recognizing the challenges in the
Indo-Pacific, President Biden has requested considerable
funding for INDOPACOM in the fiscal year 2025 budget.
This includes $9.9 billion for the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative, or PDI, to strengthen the posture, infrastructure,
and capabilities of our Forces. In addition, this PDI
investment will help build the capabilities of our allies and
partners through military to military training exercises,
freedom of navigation operations, and infrastructure
improvement.
The PDI request is a subset of broader, Department wide
investments to modernize and equip the force, much of which is
focused on China as the Department's pacing challenge. I am
also encouraged by the progress we have made with our allies
and partners in the region.
These efforts captured in new agreements with Japan, Korea,
the Philippines, and an initiative like AUKUS [Australia,
United Kingdom, United States] and the Quad are truly our
asymmetric advantage in the long term strategic competition
with China.
However, the most dangerous flashpoint that could turn our
competition with China into a conflict remains Taiwan. In the
past several years, we have seen a surge of aggressive Chinese
military exercises around Taiwan's airspace and territorial
waters, as well as an escalation in combative language from
Beijing.
The world has a right to be concerned. To help strengthen
our posture and develop Taiwan's capabilities, the 2024
National Defense Authorization Act included a number of
important security assistance tools.
The bill established the Indo-Pacific Campaigning
Initiative to facilitate INDOPACOM's campaigning activities in
the region, including increased frequency and scale of
exercises, freedom of navigation operations, and partner
engagements.
The bill also established a comprehensive training,
advising, and institutional capacity building program for the
Military Forces of Taiwan. I understand INDOPACOM is continuing
to help Taiwan to advance its defense capabilities consistent
with the Taiwan Relations Act, and I expect Congress will
continue to support this effort.
Admiral Aquilino, faced with his wide ranging challenges, I
would like to know your assessment of INDOPACOM's preparedness
to carry out the United States strategy in the region. Key to
our success in competition with China, the posture of our
forces in South Korea is another vital factor.
I am encouraged by the recent progress we have seen in the
trilateral relationship between South Korea, Japan, and the
United States. In particular, last year's historic cooperation
announcement between South Korea and Japan, and the remarkable
transformation in Japan's new defense strategy bode well for
the future of this relationship.
In addition, last spring, South Korean President Yoon
addressed a Joint Session of Congress here in Washington as
part of his State visit, just the second of President Biden's
term. I understand that Japanese Prime Minister Kishida will do
the same next month.
I hope that developments like these will provide more
opportunities to engage other regional partners. General
LaCamera, I would ask for your views on the partnership between
the United States, Japan, South Korea, and other regional
partners in addressing China, as well as North Korea's
destabilizing activity.
We must continue to manage the threat posed by North Korea.
We know that Kim Jong-un continues to view nuclear weapons as,
in his words, the ultimate deterrent against foreign
intervention and intends to gain international acceptance as a
nuclear armed State. The goal of United States policy remains
the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but we are not
taken on an all or nothing approach.
Instead, the Biden administration has pursued what it
describes as a calibrated, practical approach to diplomacy with
the North, with the goal of eliminating the threat to the
United States.
Gentlemen, I would appreciate your view on the current
threat from North Korea, and how your forces are maintaining
readiness through training and exercises with their South
Korean counterparts.
Again, let me thank the witnesses for their testimony and
let me recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER
Senator Wicker. Well, we will try this. What do you say?
Chairman Reed. Yes. I say, good.
Senator Wicker. Admiral Aquilino and General LaCamera,
thank you both for your service to our country. It is hard to
feel good about the Indo-Pacific. The balance of power is
tipping away from the United States in this region.
As we confront this uncomfortable dynamic, this Committee
needs honest feedback and the best military judgment, and I
think we are going to get that today. The Biden administration
has completely taken its focus off North Korea, even as
Pyongyang becomes a major enabler of Russia's brutal war in
Ukraine.
Some experts believe that North Korea is preparing for war.
We will be interested in your thoughts on that. On the other
hand, there is total consensus that China is preparing for war.
Beijing just announced another 7.2 percent increase to its
defense budget, which already rivals ours in size.
The Chinese Communist Party continues to modernize its
military at a breathtaking pace. China has the largest navy in
the world. Last year, Beijing added 30 ships, while the United
States reduced our fleet by 2. But China is improving more than
just its numbers.
Every week, we receive more sobering news of emerging
Chinese capabilities, improving Chinese force training. Beijing
likes to flex this newfound strength, particularly against our
Filipino allies and against Taiwan.
Chinese ships coerce and harass Filipino vessels,
conducting regular resupply missions on Second Thomas Shoal.
The Chinese military conducts aggressive military exercises in
the Taiwan Strait, simulating a blockade scenario of that free
and democratic island.
Chinese jets regularly engage in unsafe and unprofessional
maneuvers against United States and allied aircraft, a problem
Admiral Aquilino has publicly highlighted last year. These
activities are not surprising.
In public comments, Beijing has clearly stated its
intentions to surpass the United States. Just last year in San
Francisco, Xi Jinping directly told President Biden that he
intends to take Taiwan. We need to pause for a moment and let
that sink in.
Xi Jinping told our President, our Commander in Chief, that
he intends to take Taiwan. The Chinese leader warned the
American President, warned the American President face to face,
in person that he intends to take Taiwan.
What should we do in response? Our position needs to be
clear. We do not have a moment to waste. We need to do
everything we can right now to deter conflict in the Indo-
Pacific. At the moment, it is plain that we are not doing
everything that we need to do. Last year, INDOPACOM's unfunded
requirements list totaled $3.5 billion.
This year's unfunded requirement list is $11 billion,
compared to $3.5 billion last year. We are asking our military
to prepare for a potential war against China without giving
them all the tools necessary to accomplish that objective. That
is unacceptable. We must do better. We must do better so we can
avoid war.
So, we can be strong enough to avoid what might happen. The
Committee needs to come together, as it has done in the past,
to authorize sufficient, robust funding levels for our
military. There are clear consequences if we fail to do so. The
needs are vast in the Indo-Pacific theater.
We need more capable munitions. We need better networked
command and control systems, additional submarines, additional
destroyers, more amphibs, and military construction for
distributed basing. There are more needs, but those are the
great starting place.
Without sufficient funds to implement the National Defense
Strategy, which the chair referred to, the regional balance of
power will continue to tilt away from America.
I look forward to hearing these distinguished witnesses,
their testimony and a candid discussion of what this Committee
can do this year to begin addressing these challenges. Thank
you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Admiral
Aquilino, please.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN C. AQUILINO, USN COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Aquilino. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker,
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for allowing
me the opportunity to come before you today to talk about the
Indo-Pacific region, and as Chairman Reed said, this will be
the last time I testify as Commander of USINDOPACOM.
I would like to take a second and thank my family for their
support during these last three incredibly demanding years and
for over 40 years of time in uniform, and after that time, I
can say unequivocally that the sacrifice of our
servicemembers--make is equally shared by their families. So
again, I couldn't have been successful without the support of
mine.
I would like to thank them. The last 3 years have been an
honor of my lifetime to serve with our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, guardians, coast guardsmen, and the civilians
who work tirelessly alongside our allies and partners to keep
our Nation safe and ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific.
I would also like to thank Congress and all of you. Your
support, especially in establishing the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative, has been incredible. The American people should
know that your efforts to focus our country's resources on
addressing our most pressing national security challenge is
making a difference.
But we all have much more to do and we need to go faster.
When I assumed command 3 years ago, we established the Seize
the Initiative approach to implement the National Defense
Strategy.
In order to deter our adversaries, we challenged the Joint
Force to think, act, and operate differently, and while
progress has been made, we still have high risk, and we are
trending in the wrong direction. Seize the Initiative has been
challenged by the delay in delivery of military construction,
advanced capabilities, and resources to persistently project
and maintain forces West of the International Date Line.
While modernization of the force and the development of new
concepts are essential to our ability to deter, we need to move
at the speed and pace required to address this rapidly evolving
security environment. As required by the NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act], I provided my independent assessment of
INDOPACOM's resourcing requirements to inform PDI.
That was delivered to your offices on Monday with the
delivery of the budget, and for the last 3 years these
requirements have been transparent and consistent, and I
acknowledge, however, that those increased--those requirements
have increased. Now, that is due to a few things.
First, previously unfunded requirements don't go away and
they roll over into the request. Second, inflation. Third, as
we work toward military construction, the cost has increased
from initial planning and design, and that is maturity.
Then last the threat has changed, and it continues to
increase and deliver quality capability and increased capacity
from our security challengers. So, as I have said many times,
conflict is neither imminent or inevitable, but our adversaries
have to become--they have become increasingly aggressive and
emboldened.
The PRC's [People's Republic of China] unprecedented
military buildup and campaign of coercive actions destabilize
the region, and they challenge our values and the institutions
that support a free and open Indo-Pacific. We must buildupon
the progress achieved in the last few years to accelerate the
fielding of these key joint capabilities that I have described
in the independent assessment.
They include the Guam defense system, things that deliver
joint and decision superiority, specifically the Joint Fires
Network, the INDOPACOM mission network, and they have to
advance our relationships, specifically AUKUS and all of the
other efforts, trilateral cooperation between Japan and the
Republic of Korea.
As I prepare to depart again, I want to thank Congress for
your focus and your support for the challenges in Indo-Pacific.
I also value many of the warm interactions and counsel I have
had with all of you, so I thank you for the frank
conversations, the guidance, and the assistance.
My successor will need that same support. This challenge is
not going away, nor will it get easier, and Chairman, Ranking
Member, thank you for, again, the opportunity to be here. I
look forward to having--your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral John C. Aquilino
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral John C. Aquilino
introduction / opening statement
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the Indo-Pacific Region. This will be the last time I testify
as the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). I want to
thank my wife, Laura, and the rest of our family for their support.
After 40 years of service, I can say unequivocally that the sacrifice
servicemembers make for our Nation is a family affair, and I could not
have done it without mine. These last 3 years have been the honor of a
lifetime. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, coast
guardsmen, and civilian warriors work tirelessly alongside our allies
and partners daily to keep our Nation safe while ensuring a free and
open Indo-Pacific.
I also thank Congress for your support, especially in establishing
the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI). The American people should
know that your efforts to focus our country's resources on addressing
the most pressing national security challenge our Nation has ever faced
are making a difference, but we have much more to do. The United States
cannot spend its way to a position of preeminence as our economic and
technological advantages over the PRC continue to narrow. While
modernization of the force and the development of new concepts are
essential to our ability to deter, we need to move at the speed and
pace required to address the rapidly evolving security environment.
The complexity of the threats we face requires the U.S. to mobilize
the whole-of-government and use all elements of national power to
counter revisionist powers and their proxies committed to overturning
the rules-based order for the benefit of themselves and at the expense
of everyone else. However, we must recognize that the most dangerous
national security challenges are evolving faster than our current
government processes allow us to address them. Each of our three major
State threats in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility (AOR)--the
People's Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK)--are taking unprecedented actions that
challenge international norms and advance authoritarianism. These
adversarial regimes are increasingly interconnected, which is evident
in Xi and Putin's declaration of a ``no limits friendship'' as well as
Kim Jong-un's materiel deliveries to Putin in support of the illegal
invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the PRC is the only country that has
the capability, capacity, and intent to upend the international order.
Even amidst slowing economic growth, the PRC continues its aggressive
military buildup, modernization, and coercive gray-zone operations. All
indications point to the PLA meeting President Xi Jinping's directive
to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Furthermore, the PLA's actions
indicate their ability to meet Xi's preferred timeline to unify Taiwan
with mainland China by force if directed.
When I became the Commander, I established Seize the Initiative as
USINDOPACOM's approach to implement the National Defense Strategy (NDS)
with a focus on deterring our adversaries by challenging the Joint
Force to think, act, and operate differently and synchronizing four
lines of effort in the near-,
mid-, and long-term. While some progress has been made, the risk we
assume is high and trending in the wrong direction, specifically due to
delayed delivery of military construction, advanced capabilities, and
resources to persistently project and maintain forces west of the
International Date Line (IDL).
Pursuant to Section 1302 of the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA, this
Committee was provided USINDOPACOM's resourcing requirements needed to
deter the PRC. The content of this posture statement and the 1302
Report has been provided to the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. More than ever, USINDOPACOM needs your support to
deliver the sustainable solution outlined in my Independent Assessment.
Without a credible deterrent, China, Russia, and other revisionist
powers will be emboldened to take action to counter United States
interests. This testimony focuses on how Seize the Initiative enables
the U.S. to deter conflict while reassuring our allies and partners.
This testimony describes the four focus areas and highlights the
critical investments required to strengthen deterrence, which is within
our reach. We must establish a forward-deployed, defense-in-depth
posture to defend the U.S. Homeland and interests abroad, deter
aggression, assure allies, and provide the President and Secretary of
Defense flexible response options should deterrence fail. The four
areas that will enable our warfighters to rapidly operate within the
first island chain with the capabilities to blind, see, and kill are as
follows:
1) Distributed Force Posture. A distributed force posture that is
persistently forward-based, west of the IDL, makes U.S. Forces more
effective, responsive, and survivable. USINDOPACOM's Independent
Assessment (1302 Report) provides a prioritized list of MILCON and
access agreements and required capabilities for each desired force
posture location. With the support of Congress and the Department of
Defense, USINDOPACOM has worked diligently to accelerate construction
and action of $50 million of advance planning. This includes Joint Area
Development Plans, site surveys for the Guam Defense System (GDS), and
employment of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Field Force Engineering
Teams to the Philippines to rapidly develop projects at existing and
new agreed Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites. We have
also worked with special authority via 2807 notifications to implement
$169 million of design work to adequately program for $2.75 billion in
construction. Once construction is appropriated, these projects will
provide an operational airfield, port, and fuel storage projects needed
to sustain the Joint Force west of the International Date Line.
2) Campaign of Joint and Combined Operations. A joint and combined
campaign allows the combatant commander to conduct full spectrum
military operations in combination with the exercise and
experimentation program to enhance what is currently provided by the
Services. Our campaign now includes persistent operations, synchronized
across the Joint Force in all domains and with allies and partners,
linked over space and time. Key highlights include ground forces
operating in Northern Luzon of the Philippines and Japan's Southwest
Islands and combined Taiwan Strait Transits with Canada. USINDOPACOM
campaigning is combined with and built around an exercise program
supported by experimentation and enhanced through scale, scope, timing,
and location changes. We have brought high-end capabilities to
exercises like Balikitan hosted by the Philippines and increased the
number of multilateral exercises such as Super Garuda Shield hosted by
Indonesia, Cobra Gold hosted by Thailand, Keen Edge hosted by Japan,
and Talisman Sabre hosted by Australia. To better address campaigning
requirements and improve our military positioning in the theater to
respond to crisis and conflict, USINDOPACOM is evolving its command and
control to be ready to fight tonight, thereby improving joint
warfighting proficiency.
3) Advanced Warfighting Capabilities. Maintaining our joint
warfighting advantage requires us to outpace our challengers and
urgently deliver advanced capabilities. With homeland defense as our
number one priority, the Guam Defense System (GDS) is a critical
capability USINDOPACOM seeks to accelerate by fusing our most advanced
missile defense capabilities from Army, Navy, and Air Force systems.
Maintaining decision superiority to blind, see, and kill any threat
provides a strong deterrent effect and enables us to be prepared to
fight and win if tasked. The Joint Fires Network (JFN) is USINDOPACOM's
mechanism to integrate, command, control, synchronize, and deliver
effects across the battlespace. JFN has evolved expeditiously via an
experimentation campaign starting in 2019, yielding initial capability
in 2024. The USINDOPACOM Mission Network (IMN), formerly the Mission
Partner Environment, is a secure, zero-trust data-centric environment
that allows USINDOPACOM to rapidly share information and a common
operating picture with allies and partners. Additionally, the Pacific
Multidomain Training and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) enhances
U.S., allied, and partner training by enabling realistic, joint, and
combined training ranges to improves our future operations and
exercises using Stormbreaker, an AI-based gaming and simulation
capability. To further accelerate capability development and fielding,
USINDOPACOM established the Joint Mission Accelerator Directorate
(JMAD) in 2023 to identify emerging Department technology and
commercial content able to mitigate capability gaps with near-term
technical solutions.
4) Enhanced Network of Allies and Partners. Our robust network of
allies and partners is our most significant asymmetrical advantage in
long-term competition. Our alliances, multilateral arrangements,
partnerships, friendships, and Five Eyes relationships are essential to
this network and play an important role in enhancing regional security.
Over the past 3 years, our network of strong, resilient, and mutually
reinforcing relationships have strengthened cooperation in
unprecedented ways. AUKUS was established, and the trilateral partners
have since announced the Optimal Pathway for Australia's acquisition of
conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. A new phase in United
States-Japan-Republic of Korea trilateral cooperation facilitated the
activation of 24/7 real-time DPRK missile warning data sharing last
year. The new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites with
the Philippines have reinvigorated the bilateral relationship with the
Philippines, and provided the opportunity to make significant bilateral
advancements, including in economic projects in the Philippines. We
have also launched the India-United States Defense Acceleration
Ecosystem (INDUS-X) and signed a defense cooperation agreement with
Papua New Guinea.
While there has been progress in all four areas, we MUST move
faster to reduce the risk of conflict in the near and mid-term. Each
line of effort is integral to deterrence in the USINDOPACOM area of
responsibility. USINDOPACOM requests increased support to make progress
across these four lines of effort, allowing us to continue to Seize the
Initiative.
key adversarial challenges
Since I took command in 2021, our potential adversaries have become
increasingly aggressive in seeking to impose their will at the expense
of all others. The PRC has coupled its massive military buildup with a
campaign of coercive actions designed to force more vulnerable nations
to bend to their will. Russia's illegal, illegitimate invasion of
Ukraine exposed it as an irresponsible actor uninterested in upholding
international commitments. DPRK continues to develop weapons it plainly
articulates as threats to both the region and the United States
Homeland. Individually, each poses its challenges.
People's Republic of China (PRC)-
Strategic Intent
The PRC's strategic goals remain unchanged from those it held even
before 2021. It remains the only competitor with the military strength,
will, and intent to change the world order with authoritarian
characteristics and displace the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The PRC
uses all elements of its ``comprehensive national power'' to attempt to
elevate China to the world's ``indispensable power'' and to alter the
international system to one that encourages repressive, authoritarian
governance and protectionist economic practices that distort markets by
avoiding openness and transparency.
The PRC's aggressive military buildup underpins its drive to
supplant United States security leadership in the region, enabling the
PRC to subjugate Taiwan, exert control over the South China Sea through
its excessive maritime claims, and oppress those who believe in a free
and open Indo-Pacific. While the PRC military focuses on regional
issues, Beijing is setting the stage for a more significant global role
through its global society, civilization, and development initiatives.
Military Modernization
The PRC continues to advance its comprehensive military
modernization program to transform the PLA into an integrated, joint,
high-tech, network-centric military force. Modernization has remained
aggressive, and China remains committed to delivering the capabilities
needed to achieve its objective by 2027.
On a scale not seen since WWII, the PLA's buildup is occurring
across land, sea, air, space, cyber, and information domains. Despite
challenges presented by COVID-19 and an economic downturn, the PRC's
official defense budget has risen over 16 percent from 192 billion USD
to 223.5 billion USD. In the 3-years since I took command, the PLA has
added over 400 fighter aircraft (almost all 4th and 5th generation
variants), more than 20 major warships (guided missile cruisers,
destroyers, frigates), and has more than doubled its inventory of
ballistic and cruise missiles. Likewise, China has increased the number
of satellites launched by over 50 percent during this period, yielding
a fivefold increase since 2020. Perhaps most concerning has been the
rapid pace at which the PRC has bolstered its nuclear arsenal,
increasing its warhead inventory by well over 100 percent since 2020.
During my tenure, we have observed the PRC's growing focus on
developing the capability and capacity to project power and challenge
adversaries beyond the First Island Chain (FIC). The rapid expansion of
the PLA Navy's (PLAN) guided missile cruiser and destroyer inventories
and advances in ballistic missiles will enable the PLAN to contest
adversaries increasingly farther outside the FIC. The subsurface fleet
has also grown in volume and capability, notably with the launch of
nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (the PLAN's first SSGNs).
PLA aviation has also undergone a significant transformation since
2021. Combined, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation constitute
the largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific. Over half of the PLA's
operational fighter force is 4th and 5th generation, enabling longer-
range A2/AD and counter-air operations across the western Pacific
Ocean. The PLA is also developing a stealth bomber that can cover the
Second Island Chain and the Western Pacific.
The PLA's investment in modern, long-range weapons, almost
certainly focused on countering third-party intervention, is
underscored by the rapid expansion of its ballistic missile inventories
and technologies. During my tenure, the PLA increased its inventory of
intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles by over 60 percent
while continuing to develop new longer-range capabilities, such as the
DF-27 ballistic missile that will be able to reach targets well beyond
the Second Island Chain.
The continued development of supporting space and communications
technologies is steadily increasing the lethality and precision of PLA
systems. In addition to the sharp increase in space launches over the
past 3 years, the PRC is steadily delivering capabilities that seek to
deny the use of our space architecture. Despite statements opposing the
weaponization of space, the PRC is developing a range of counter-space
capabilities and related technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles,
ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots.
Like other domains, the PLA's nuclear force has proliferated in the
last 3 years. Upon taking command, the number of nuclear warheads was
in the low 200's, and its nuclear triad was nascent, with the air
component operationally fielded only in 2020. Now we see a PLA nuclear
force with 500+ warheads, missile systems employing multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), three new ICBM silo
fields, and a nuclear-capable, air-to-air refuelable bomber.
Unfortunately, this is not the end of the PRC's nuclear buildup; the
PLA has plans for 1,000 warheads by 2030, accompanied by new air and
sea-launch platforms.
Destabilizing Actions
Taiwan
Xi Jinping continues to view unification with Taiwan as a
``historical inevitability'' and ``indispensable for the realization of
China's great rejuvenation.'' As such, Beijing is employing all
elements of national power to lead Taiwan and the international
community to believe that unification is, in fact, inevitable. Although
the PRC claims it prefers to achieve unification through peaceful
means, Xi will not renounce the use of force.
China's pressure campaign, ongoing in earnest since 2016, spiked in
2022 when the PLA executed a large-scale military exercise following
the United States House Speaker's visit to Taiwan. The well-documented,
multidomain operation established a new, more dangerous status quo for
PLA activity and posture around Taiwan, normalizing warship patrols
around Taiwan and military flights crossing the Taiwan Strait
centerline, routinely entering the PRC's self-declared Air Defense
Identification Zone, and executing legal actions to validate their
objectives.
Equally concerning, the PLA is systematically rehearsing critical
tasks associated with military operations against Taiwan. In 2022 and
2023, the PLA rehearsed the encirclement of Taiwan, simulating a
maritime and air blockade of the island while bracketing the island
with ballistic missile launches. Subsequent exercises in 2023 focused
on rehearsing counter-intervention and amphibious assault operations,
the latter featuring extensive use of civilian Roll-On Roll-Off (RORO)
ferries and vehicle carriers. This operational strategy leverages
civilian capabilities to prepare its forces for seizing Taiwan.
Coercive and Risky Operational Behavior
Since 2021, the PLA has increasingly employed coercive tactics in
response to activity the PRC deems provocative, significantly raising
the risk of an incident or accident that could lead to loss of life or
spark a wider, unintended conflict. The Department of Defense's 2023
China Military Power Report stated, ``The PLA appears to have been
engaged in a centralized, concerted campaign to perform risky behaviors
to coerce a change in lawful U.S. operational activity and that of U.S.
Allies and partners.'' These activities include reckless and dangerous
maneuvers in the air and at sea in response to our activities that are
well within international law.
Excessive Maritime Claims in the Region
The PRC is challenging the regional status quo through increasingly
coercive tactics to pressure Taiwan and to force acceptance of
Beijing's excessive maritime claims. The PRC accompanies its direct and
clear claims with pointed warnings, most clearly, but not exclusively,
in its Taiwan-focused rhetoric. In the ongoing dispute with the
Philippines in the South China Sea (SCS), the PRC has significantly
increased its aggression against the Philippines claiming
``indisputable sovereignty'' over Philippine waters. These actions are
inconsistent with the conclusions of the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal
convened pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.
During my tenure, the PRC has become increasingly assertive in
enforcing its illegitimate sovereignty claims in the SCS. The PRC
continues to militarize its South China Sea outposts, enabling Beijing
to threaten all nations operating nearby. It is quietly undertaking
land reclamation at unoccupied features--a strikingly provocative act
that clearly violates the spirit of the DOC. Over the last 2 years, the
PRC utilized SCS-based CCG and maritime militia to water cannon, laser,
and ram Philippine vessels that were, attempting to lawfully resupply
the Philippine outpost at Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC's lawfare
strategy is underpinned by increasingly assertive domestic laws,
portrayed as being consistent with international law that they use to
justify the enforcement of their excessive claims.
In the East China Sea, the PRC attempts to legitimize claims over
the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands with a continuous presence of
PRC fishing and Maritime Militia vessels, escorted by Chinese Coast
Guard (CCG) ships, with PLAN ships nearby. CCG ships routinely enter
territorial waters surrounding the Senkakus, frequently harassing
Japanese fishing vessels. Other actions, such as its annual, unilateral
summer fishing ban, threaten China's neighbors and clearly illustrate
an attempt to change the existing international order in its favor. In
2021, amid its long-running border dispute with India, the PRC passed a
land border law, asserting ``which asserted that the ``sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the [PRC] are sacred and inviolable''
sovereignty that and provided a legal framework for greater PLA
involvement in border security.
PRC-Russia Cooperation
Since declaring a ``no-limits'' partnership in 2022, combined
Russia-China military activities and PRC support for Russia's defense
industrial base have become more concerning. Last summer's combined
naval exercise in the Sea of Japan and followup on distant naval patrol
highlight this growing military cooperation. The PRC has helped Russia
rebuild and reconstitute its defense industrial base, with real world
battlefield impacts in Ukraine. Beijing has become the largest consumer
of Russian oil and natural gas, essentially keeping the Russian economy
afloat as it suffers from the economic consequences of its illegal
invasion of Ukraine.
The relationship is strengthened by the personal relationships
between Xi and President Putin and their shared antipathy for the
United States and our allies. While Xi has voiced support for Russia's
justifications for its Ukraine war, the PRC has sought to avoid the
appearance of direct support for Russia's military operations.
The Russian Federation
Strategic Intent
Russian President Vladimir Putin's blind ambition to reclaim the
clout and influence of the Soviet Union has been fully displayed in my
3 years at USINDOPACOM. With disastrous results for all involved,
Putin's illegal invasion of Ukraine exposed weakness in the Russian
economy and further damaged its international standing. The Russian
economy has been exposed as one-dimensional and increasingly dependent
on oil and natural gas exports. Internationally, Russia has become
further isolated, only explicitly supported by authoritarian regimes
like the PRC, the DPRK, and Iran.
Russia's inability to achieve its war aims continues to have
disastrous consequences for its military, decimating large swaths of
its ground forces and seriously depleting stores of ammunition and
armaments. Even so, Russia remains a formidable potential adversary in
the Indo-Pacific, intent on improving its ability to defend Russian
territory in the Northern Pacific, strike United States and Allied
targets, and sustain military engagement as a significant component of
regional influence.
Military Modernization
Even with its immediate attention fixed on Ukraine, the Russian
Naval Doctrine published in 2022 prioritizes the Pacific and Arctic
regions above all others. Its main goal of ``strategic stability'' (a
euphemism for mutual nuclear deterrence) delineates the Sea of Okhotsk
and much of the Arctic as ``areas of existential importance'' alongside
Russian territorial seas and its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). It is
within this context that Russia has pursued the modernization of its
strategic assets in the region, even as its conventional forces are
engaged in Ukraine.
Since 2021, Russia's Pacific Fleet has added several modern surface
ships and submarines to increase Moscow's combat capability. Russia
fielded new nuclear-powered ballistic and cruise missile submarines and
upgraded Kilo-class diesel submarines. Armed with dual nuclear and
conventional capable Kalibr cruise missiles and the Tsirkon hypersonic
cruise missile (still in testing), the Russian Pacific Fleet is
increasing its ability to threaten United States and allied land and
maritime targets.
Russia also continues to invest in modernizing its nuclear triad's
land and air legs. This past January, Moscow identified the completion
of the deployment of the Sarmat strategic missile system, which
replaces legacy ICBMs with the new system capable of carrying multiple
warheads. Russia also continues to upgrade its strategic bomber force
in pursuit of Russia's aim to be able to effectively strike every
United States installation in the Pacific, Alaska, and the United
States West Coast.
Destabilizing Actions
Power Projection
Russia uses its Pacific-facing forces as a power projection tool,
signaling that it has retained the capability and capacity to use
military force in the region if it so chooses despite significant
losses in Ukraine. In addition to strategic air patrols that skirt the
coasts of Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam, the Russian military also uses
exercises near United States and allied territory to reinforce
perceptions of military might. The Russian exercise FINVAL 2023
reportedly involved 10,000 Russian Navy Pacific Fleet personnel, and
numerous ships, submarines, aircraft, helicopters, and coastal missile
systems. It deliberately messaged Moscow's intent to control its
declared Northern Sea Route, including areas near Alaska.
Combined Exercises and Naval Diplomacy
The increasing frequency of combined activity is cause for concern.
In addition to naval drills, Russia continues to partner with the PLA
in strategic bomber patrols in the western Pacific near Guam. Russia is
also increasingly collaborating with the PLA to execute combined air
patrols that regularly cross into Japan and the Republic of Korea's Air
Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ), further threatening our allies.
Arms Transfers from the DPRK
One of the many unfortunate outcomes of Russia's illegal invasion
of Ukraine is a growing relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang. In
addition to the ammunition the DPRK supplied last year, DPRK provided
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) that Russia is presently using
in Ukraine. In return, Kim Jong-un probably seeks technical support for
his growing strategic weapons program and Moscow's political support
through its veto power at the United Nations Security Council.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
Strategic Intent
The DPRK's primary strategic priority--regime security--has
remained fixed for decades. What has become increasingly evident over
the past 3 years is that Kim Jong-un is unwilling to slow the
development of strategic weapons, even in the face of blistering
sanctions, to possess a credible strategic deterrent. The DPRK's laser
focus on developing technology and weapons that enable its strategic
strike capability is evidenced both by the statements coming from
Pyongyang and the well-publicized tests of systems intended to deliver
nuclear strikes against the United States Homeland and its regional
neighbors.
Military Modernization
Over the past 3 years, the DPRK has primarily focused its military
modernization efforts on strategic capabilities. At the DPRK's 8th
Party Congress in 2021, Kim Jong-un articulated his intent to further
develop strategic weapons and supporting technologies. Kim specifically
highlighted preemptive and retaliatory precision nuclear strike
capabilities, developing tactical nuclear weapons, solid-fuel ballistic
missiles, and fielding a military reconnaissance satellite as
priorities.
The DPRK has made significant progress toward its 8th Party
Congress goals. In 2023, the DPRK unveiled what appear to be
miniaturized warheads that can be employed on shorter-range missiles
and conducted drills simulating tactical nuclear strikes and a nuclear
counterattack. Since 2021, Pyongyang has also publicized multiple
advancements in delivery platforms, now claiming the ability to launch
weapons from subsurface, rail, and silo-based launchers.
Modernization of the DPRK's vast conventional force has been slower
in comparison but progressing nonetheless. Ballistic missile
submarines, associated SLBMs, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
closely resembling U.S. systems highlight recent developments.
Destabilizing Actions
Missile Launches
Since 2021, the DPRK has launched over 100 ballistic and cruise
missiles, including an IRBM that overflew Japan. In 2022, the DPRK
restarted ICBM testing--paused since 2017--and tested a new solid-
propellant ICBM in 2023. In 2024, DPRK launched a solid-propellant
ballistic missile loaded with a hypersonic mobile control warhead. The
advancements in solid-propellant rocket motors potentially enable DPRK
to launch missiles with much less warning than their liquid-propellant
counterparts.
Escalatory Behavior
The DPRK increasingly messages its aggressive behavior as a
response to the actions of its adversaries. In an address to the United
Nations, the DPRK accused the United States of a ``sinister intention
to provoke a nuclear war'' and attempting to create an ``Asian NATO.''
These comments come in a year that saw Pyongyang's actions compel the
Republic of Korea to suspend the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement,
designed to lower military tensions and accidental military clashes
between the two countries. Among other provocations, Pyongyang
threatened to shoot down any United States reconnaissance aircraft
breaching its claimed airspace, fired more than 200 artillery rounds
near a disputed maritime border with the ROK [Republic of Korea],
launched an intercontinental ballistic missile into waters near Japan,
and simulated a missile strike on the ROK in protest of military drills
conducted by ROK with the United States.
Satellite Launch
The DPRK also took significant steps to advance its space and
satellite reconnaissance capabilities to meet the goals identified in
the 8th Party Congress. In 2023, DPRK successfully used its ballistic
missile technology to launch its first reconnaissance satellite
following two high-profile failures. The successful launch occurred
only months after a Kim-Putin summit in Russia. Putin reportedly
promised to help DPRK build satellites, almost certainly in return for
support for Russia's war effort.
Support to Russia
In addition to ballistic missiles, the DPRK has probably provided
over one million artillery shells and scores of missiles to Russia.
Pyongyang almost certainly hopes to leverage Russian technological
expertise to bolster its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. These
benefits are in addition to the diplomatic cover Moscow provides DPRK,
using its U.N. Security Council vote to frustrate efforts to increase
sanctions against Pyongyang.
Sanctions Evasion
DPRK's efforts to evade U.N. imposed sanctions intended to curtail
funding for its nuclear and other WMD programs are nothing new. In
2023, a U.N. Panel of Experts found that the DPRK continues to employ
various evasion measures to import refined petroleum products. The
report states that, after a record-breaking level of cyber thefts in
2022, estimated at $1.7 billion, the DPRK continued to successfully
target cyber cryptocurrency and other financial exchanges globally to
support its sanctioned development programs. Even as DPRK takes more
aggressive steps in these programs and tests more weapons in
contravention of Security Council resolutions, Russia and China
continue to resist efforts to strengthen sanctions.
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)
Transnational and ethno-nationalist violent extremist organizations
remain active across the Indo-Pacific region. The December 2023 bombing
of a Catholic Mass in the southern Philippines that killed four is only
the most recent reminder. While VEO strength as a whole in the region
is far from its pinnacle, and security forces throughout the region
have thinned VEO ranks, we must remain vigilant in our efforts to
prevent violent extremists from planning and executing attacks.
implementing seize the initiative
USINDOPACOM developed the Seize the Initiative approach to
transform the needed force posture, operational campaign, advanced
capabilities, and partnerships to defend the Nation and deter our
adversaries. Essential to this approach is the imperative to think,
act, and operate differently. With the support of Congress, USINDOPACOM
has made progress in the last 3 years in preparing and planning for a
distributed force posture, implementing an integrated, operational
campaign of joint operations, activities, and investments (OAIs) with
advanced capabilities specifically designed to enhance deterrence, and
strengthening relationships with our allies and partners.
Distributed Force Posture
Deterrence depends on the ability of the Joint Force to act quickly
and decisively, which requires an increasingly flexible and distributed
force posture and logistics network. Central to Seizing the Initiative
is shifting from the ``As Is'' posture of 2021 to a near future ``To
Be'' force posture of forward-based and rotational joint forces. By
creating a distributed force posture west of the IDL, U.S. Forces are
more responsive, survivable, and interoperable with our allies and
partners. This effort also provides the Secretary and the President
with increased options to respond to a crisis.
A distributed force posture also requires new approaches to
sustainment and logistics, as well as definitive access, basing, and
overflight (ABO) agreements with allies and partners. USINDOPACOM's
Joint Posture Management Office (JPMO), established in 2023,
synchronized theater posture planning, design, and construction to
streamline and coordinate priorities. Across the Indo-Pacific,
USINDOPACOM has been pursuing distributed force posture aligned across
four posture ``clusters.'' Specific site information and planning
efforts are described in detail in the classified 1302 Report.
Congressional funding and support have allowed USINDOPACOM to
progress with design and planning. However, many of these projects
still need to be prioritized by the Services. We have only completed 12
of over 200 required infrastructure projects in my 3 years in command.
Forty-seven (47) high-priority MILCON projects still need to be funded.
However, we can now create gains with the support from the additional
authorities and funding provided by Congress. We seek the programming
and budgeting necessary to implement significant construction efforts
as early as fiscal year 2025.
The Guam Cluster
The Guam cluster--comprised of the forward-most United States
territories of Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands
(CNMI)--as well as the Freely Associated States (FAS), which include
the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of Palau and the
Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI)--is the cornerstone of the U.S.
security architecture west of the International Date Line. In a crisis,
bases and infrastructure in these territories and states will be
crucial to sustain the Joint Force. USINDOPACOM has worked diligently
to build local political support across the region over the last 3
years. The national and territorial governments have welcomed the
increased transparent communications and our willingness to incorporate
local concerns into our plans.
USINDOPACOM continues to work toward rapid implementation of
priority posture projects in the region, an enabling component of the
``To Be'' posture. The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) is on
plan. It continues to develop infrastructure on Guam and CNMI,
including Marine Corps Base Camp Blaz, where marines will begin
movement from Okinawa by the end of the year. USINDOPACOM and Congress
have successfully identified ways to accelerate posture processes to
meet the Guam cluster's emerging operational infrastructure development
requirements. The funding Congress enacted for USINDOPACOM in fiscal
year 2022 and fiscal year 2023 funded the necessary planning and
development for critical Joint Force-enabling projects not prioritized
by the Services. Leveraging these targeted investments and authorities,
USINDOPACOM was able to advance infrastructure needs in FSM, Palau, and
CNMI on a faster timeline than traditional MILCON and better position
projects for funding within the budget cycle. USINDOPACOM and the FAS
continue discuss potential ways to negotiate on additional defense
sites for use by all Services. These sites will significantly enhance
our logistical lines of communication and add to our aviation dispersal
and other combat capabilities, while providing attendant economic
benefits to the local governments.
Our increasing military capabilities strain local infrastructure
and sustainment networks in the U.S. territories and the FAS. The
remote nature of many of the posture project locations in this region
results in a massive demand for limited materials, contracting, and
housing resources. In Guam and CNMI, the totality of military
construction projects is too large to be supported solely by local
labor. Congress has provided much-needed relief from the H-2B temporary
work requirement extending through 2029 for projects directly connected
to military realignment. Additional relief is necessary to enable
prolonged extensions of H-2B visas and direct relief for typhoon
recovery and resilience projects in Guam and the CNMI. Absent
additional relief before fiscal year 2027, the loss of an assured
workforce will result in cost and schedule impacts to both military
relocation and typhoon resilience projects; impacts will increase until
the workforce collapses in fiscal year 2030.
Under the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) agreements with the
Freely Associated States (FAS), the U.S. has full authority and
responsibility for security and defense matters in and related to the
FAS, including extensive access to operations in their territories. In
May 2023, the U.S. signed agreements with FSM and Palau to extend
economic assistance for 20 years, and in October 2023, the United
States signed a similar agreement with the RMI. I want to thank
Congress for recently approving legislation to implement and bring
agreements under COFA into force. The President signed these 20-year
assistance agreements into law this month, reaffirming the perception
of the United States as a reliable partner for all Pacific Island
nations.
The Japan Cluster
USINDOPACOM has worked closely with the Government of Japan to
optimize Alliance force posture based on improved operational concepts
and enhanced capabilities to address increasing security challenges in
the region, including for the defense of Japan's Southwest Islands. In
October 2022, the United States completed a deployment of MQ-9s to
Japan's Kanoya Air Base, followed by movement to Kadena Air Base in
November 2023. In April 2023, USINDOPACOM established the Composite
Watercraft Company at Yokohama North Dock to strengthen Alliance
maritime mobility. In addition, as part of our commitment to
strengthening Japan's defense, the United States began the first
deployment of a TPS-80 radar system to the Sakishima Islands in October
2023.
We continue to work with the Government of Japan to position more
resilient and mobile forces with increased intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR), anti-ship, and transportation capabilities.
To strengthen deterrence and response capabilities, we are optimizing
the posture of United States Forces in Japan, alongside enhanced Japan
Self-Defense Force (JSDF) capabilities and posture in areas including
the Southwest Islands. Further, we are continuing close consultation
with Japan to expand joint use of United States and Japanese facilities
and enhance bilateral exercises and training focusing on Japan's
Sakishima Islands.
The Philippines Cluster
In 2023, to allow both countries to address shared challenges in
the Indo-Pacific region, the United States and the Philippines
designated four additional EDCA in addition to the five existing EDCA
sites. The four new announced EDCA sites will expand United States
rotational access across the Philippines, strategically strengthening
the interoperability of United States and Philippine armed forces and
facilitating the rapid provision of humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief in the Philippines.
The U.S. has allocated over $109 million toward infrastructure
improvements at the five existing EDCA locations and two new EDCA
locations. This investment, and forthcoming additional allotment, will
complete twenty-three projects, enabling the United States and the
Philippines to continue to build lasting security infrastructure to
fill short-term capability gaps, promote long-term modernization,
establish a credible mutual defense posture, maintain humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief capabilities, and enhance the strength
of the alliance. We anticipate making significant progress in the
Philippines this year. Once appropriations are received, we have
several projects ready for rapid execution. We will streamline
construction at the EDCA locations using a design-build acquisition
approach that employs new and recently provided authorities for smaller
projects (up to $9 million) using Unspecified Minor Military
Construction.
The Australia Cluster
To ensure an Indo-Pacific region that is free, open, stable,
peaceful, prosperous, and respectful of sovereignty, the United States
has completed 12 construction projects in the Indo-Pacific region worth
$146 million; three of these projects support our bilateral alliance
with Australia. These efforts have been carried out in close
partnership with the Australian Department of Defense's United States
Force Posture Initiatives (USFPI) program, which focuses on Marine
Rotational Force--Darwin, enhanced air cooperation, enhanced land
cooperation, enhanced maritime cooperation, combined logistics
sustainment, and maintenance enterprise, and enhanced space
cooperation. There are three large MILCON projects in Australia to
improve the early phases of Darwin/Tindal airfield improvements and
ammunition and fuel storage. USINDOPACOM is working to identify
alternatives which might enable accelerated execution of other posture
initiatives.
Over the past few years, the United States and Australia have
expanded posture coordination beyond Australia. The United States has
recently added several initiatives to our posture planning efforts to
support AUKUS and mutual operational requirements. Australia has been a
valuable partner in coordinating posture initiatives and other
cooperation activities across the Pacific Island region, including with
the government of Papua New Guinea. In May 2023, the United States and
Papua New Guinea signed a bilateral defense cooperation agreement (DCA)
enabling the modernization and strengthening of this important security
partnership in the region. The DC will enhance security cooperation,
further strengthen our bilateral relationship, improve the capability
of the PNG Defence Force, and increase stability and security in the
region.
deterrence campaign of joint and combined operations
Through a persistent campaign in the Indo-Pacific, USINDOPACOM
deters adversaries by demonstrating U.S. capabilities, responsiveness,
and commitment to the region. USINDOPACOM's deterrence campaign
normalizes U.S. operations in the AOR, builds warfighting advantage
through rehearsal of concepts, and strengthens interoperability with
allies and partners. Since 2021, USINDOPACOM has actively worked to
expand its campaign of joint and combined operations, including phased
surges that increase our positions of relative advantage by
concentrating OAIs in time and tempo to maximize effects. Improvements
to OAIs include expansion of operational complexity across all domains
and enhanced coordination of global activities with other combatant
commands. Additionally, to strengthen O A.I.s with allies and partners,
USINDOPACOM is conducting new flexible response options and
multilateral operations to increase the complexity of our activities,
create new dilemmas for adversaries, and reassure like-minded countries
within the theater.
The key to our deterrence campaign is maintaining our forward
stationed and rotational forces to maintain our military strength to
respond quickly to any contingency. The removal of capability or
capacity of the Joint Force sends the wrong message to our potential
adversaries, allies, and partners. Additionally, the Navy, Army, and
Marine Corps still need to procure the types and quantities of the
munitions required to defeat threats in the Indo-Pacific region. These
Service decisions continue to increase the risk to USINDOPACOM and its
men and women while reducing our forces' overall deterrent effect in
theater.
To meld Service capabilities into an integrated Joint Force,
USINDOPACOM is evolving its operational command and control to be
prepared to ``fight tonight,'' thereby improving joint warfighting
proficiency and effectiveness. As the updated command structure
executes operations, activities, and investments throughout the region,
we will capture lessons learned and identify known shortfalls in
personnel, facilities, and equipment. These lessons and shortfalls will
inform future USINDOPACOM resource requirements.
The first step in this process was forming a joint force
headquarters on Guam, Joint Task Force-Micronesia (JTF-M). JTF-M
integrates joint, all-domain command and control effects and mission
command and control in Guam. As of January 2024, an initial staff for
the JTF is on Guam and setting the conditions to establish an enduring
headquarters. USINDOPACOM will identify additional resources and
staffing requirements as planning efforts and joint exercises refine
operational concepts.
Exercise, Experimentation, and Training
USINDOPACOM's Joint Exercise Program has been integrated into our
deterrence campaign plan and is critical to a trained and ready joint
force. Major joint exercises put aggregated combat formations with
advanced capabilities in a position to conduct all-domain operations
and activities. With allies and partners, these exercises demonstrate
interoperability and warfighting proficiency, contributing to combat
credibility and bolstering deterrence.
Since 2021, USINDOPACOM has evolved the exercise program to
increase multilateral participation, facilitate experimentation with
advanced concepts and technologies, and demonstrate the ability to
execute high-end all-domain warfighting in the theater. In 2023,
USINDOPACOM oversaw an annual exercise program consisting of 19 joint
and more than 90 Service exercises involving participants from the
United States and allies and partners across the globe.
Bilateral exercises such as KEEN Edge with Japan and Balikatan with
the Philippines have expanded to multilateral events and have increased
in complexity, interoperability, and scope. Additionally, USINDOPACOM
expanded previously unilateral exercises such as Northern Edge and
Valiant Shield to integrate other combatant commands and allies such as
Australia and the United Kingdom. Continued and additional investment
in USINDOPACOM's Joint Training Exercise and Evaluation Program (JTEEP)
will further advance the Command's ability to exercise large-scale,
all-domain joint and combined exercises in contested environments,
improving joint force training, readiness, and interoperability.
USINDOPACOM developed the Pacific Multidomain Training and
Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) to enhance U.S., allied, and partner
training. PMTEC enables realistic joint, combined all-domain training
across a live-virtual-constructive environment via networked ranges,
simulation centers, and mobile training support systems. PMTEC
resourcing in fiscal year 2023 delivered substantial contributions to
transition the Joint Exercise Program into operationalized training,
experimentation, and rehearsal events through the Balikatan, Northern
Edge, and Talisman Sabre exercises, among others. Through PMTEC, these
previously geographically focused exercises enjoyed greater theater-
wide participation due to linking capabilities across the theater and
adding more Combined Joint All Domain Operations (CJADO) in the events.
CJADO activities were supported by CONUS-based constructive and virtual
support to provide more realistic common operational pictures,
including increased emulation of space, cyber, and electronic warfare
effects. PMTEC reached Initial Operational Capability for exercise
enhancement through these initiatives in September 2023.
advanced warfighting capabilities
Over the past 3 years, the PRC has continued the most extensive and
rapid buildup since World War II. With the Department focused on the
PRC as the pacing threat, delivering capabilities enables us to sustain
credible deterrence. This budget cycle is a critical opportunity to
focus concertedly on providing the right capabilities in the suitable
capacity on the proper timelines to strengthen deterrence.
Guam Defense System (GDS)
As the most forward United States territory in the Western Pacific,
Guam is a strategic outpost critical to projecting power, maintaining
deterrence and stability, and responding to regional crises or
conflicts. Establishing the GDS--a 360-degree, persistent, layered, and
integrated air and missile defense on Guam--remains the top homeland
defense priority for USINDOPACOM to protect more than 170,000 United
States citizens on the island. The United States has programmed
billions of dollars in defense capability on Guam to advance these
capabilities, including offensive capabilities, command and control,
and sustainment.
In June 2023, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD A&S) as the
senior DOD official responsible for the Integrated Air and Missile
Defense of Guam, the Army as the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE),
and GDS as an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program. USINDOPACOM
joined multiple war games and exercises in the past 3 years that have
refined and optimized the GDS defensive capabilities. Although field-
testing of the initial elements of GDS will begin in 2024, USINDOPACOM
continues to advocate for and work with the larger defense enterprise
to accelerate the fielding of the entire GDS ahead of the current
delivery timelines. As of today, USINDOPACOM believes the completion
and integration of the GDS will be late to need and continues to
advocate for prioritizing and accelerating the necessary operations,
activities, and investments (OAIs) to complete the initiative this
decade.
DECISION SUPERIORITY
Decision superiority requires us to operate in contested space
safely, sustain target quality, real-time battlespace awareness, and
deliver multidomain joint fires. A Persistent Targeting-Quality Common
Operating Picture (PT-COP)--the visualization of fires command and
control drawing from a common data layer and pairing the best weapons
against adversary targets--is necessary to enable BLIND--SEE--KILL
effects. JFN provides decision superiority by fusing sensors across all
domains and platforms with intelligence and other information to
provide target guidance simultaneously to commanders across the
battlefield.
Combined warfighting also requires rapidly sharing information and
a common operating picture with allies and partners in a secure and
resilient data-centric environment. IMN is an agile environment that
modernizes command, control, communication, computer, and information
technology (C4IT) systems by shifting USINDOPACOM from 13 separate
coalition systems into one system to deliver combined C2 in a contested
environment. IMN increases coalition access to data, improves mission
assurance west of the IDL, and enables campaigning and coalition
operations by getting the correct information to the right partner at
the right time. Without full resourcing, the modernization and fielding
of this more resilient and effective mission partner communication in
the theater will be delayed.
BLIND: Operate in Contested Space and Domains
Deterring conflict requires the U.S. to demonstrate the ability to
operate in all contested spaces and dominate all domains, especially in
space and cyberspace. Our competitors recognize the importance of space
and cyberspace and have invested heavily to advance their capabilities
in these domains. Over the last 3 years, the U.S. has made the
investments necessary to maintain its advantage in space and
cyberspace, and we must continue to focus resources and talent in these
domains to stay ahead. USINDOPACOM's mission depends on U.S. dominance
in space and cyberspace through resilient and flexible capabilities
integrated and exercised with our allies and partners.
SEE: Battlespace Awareness Across the Joint Force
Since 2021, USINDOPACOM has advocated for resources to fund
critical future space-based intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems explicitly designed to support warfighting
requirements and improvements in signals intelligence collection
capability. These capabilities combine to enable a complete
understanding of the battlespace throughout the Joint Force and share
that understanding with key allies and partners.
KILL: Synchronizing Joint Fires
USINDOPACOM's Joint Fires Network (JFN) initiative seeks to
integrate Joint Force capabilities into a coherent architecture to
provide a Persistent Targeting Common Operating Picture (PT-COP), a
Common Data Layer (CDL), a standard set of integrated Battle Management
and Command and Control Applications (BMC2), and a resilient, secure
transport-agnostic communications infrastructure. JFN is USINDOPACOM's
mechanism to integrate, synchronize, and deliver effects across the
battlespace.
Since USINDOPACOM established the JFN initiative in 2022, we have
made tremendous strides thanks to our close partnership with OSD
Acquisition and Sustainment (OSD A&S); Research and Engineering (OSD
R&E); the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO); the
Defense Innovation Unit (DIU); the Services; the Intelligence
Community; and industry. We developed and deployed 15 JFN
experimentation kits in 2023 in 8 months. With these kits, we conducted
experimentation in three joint exercise and experimentation venues in
calendar year 2023, successfully scaling up from eight nodes in
Northern Edge 23-1 to 20 nodes in Northern Edge 23-2. To further
accelerate our progress, we successfully integrated with the OSD-led
Global Information Dominance Exercise in December 2023(GIDE 8). Further
integration in exercises, including a JFN live fire demonstration
during Valiant Shield 2024, will deliver an initial JFN combat credible
capability to the Joint Force in calendar year 2024.
Joint Mission Accelerator Directorate (JMAD)
To identify and accelerate solutions that enhance the
interdependencies between required strategic capabilities, USINDOPACOM
established the JMAD in October 2023. JMAD is driving the acceleration,
integration, and interoperability of the most critical and strategic
needs across the Department and the Joint Force. JMAD has already
initiated the integration of JFN and IMN architectures. JMAD also
oversees Stormbreaker, USINDOPACOM's program to develop a Joint
Operational Planning Toolkit (JOPT) enabled by advanced technology that
will include advanced data optimization capabilities, machine learning,
and artificial intelligence to support planning, war gaming, mission
analysis, and execution of all-domain, operational-level course of
action development. Stormbreaker is optimizing alignment with
operational and wartime planning requirements and objectives.
enhanced network of allies and partners
Over the last 3 years, USINDOPACOM has trained, operated,
exercised, experimented with, and engaged allies and partners from
across the region and the globe to enhance the security and stability
of the Indo-Pacific. The relationships we have developed are built upon
respect, trust, and shared values that are not just enduring but
transformative. Our network of allies and partners is an unmatchable
asymmetric advantage, and our work together is critical to delivering
integrated deterrence.
Multilateral Cooperation, Coordination, and Integration
Strengthening our bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral defense
relations is one of USINDOPACOM's highest priorities, whether through
capacity building, security cooperation, increasingly complex
exercises, or advanced capability development. Developing stronger
multilateral relationships in the region has been one of our greatest
successes in the last 3 years, resulting in increased multilateral
deterrence effects and the creation of relationships and activities
among U.S. allies and partners to pursue a more stable order in the
region.
AUKUS
AUKUS embodies a generational opportunity to modernize the
longstanding relationships among the United States, Australia, and the
United Kingdom (U.K.), guided by a shared commitment to global
security. The trilateral AUKUS partnership consists of two pillars:
Submarine Consultation (Pillar I) and Advanced Capabilities (Pillar
II).
On Pillar I, we are working to deliver a conventionally armed,
nuclear-powered submarine capability to Australia as soon as possible,
upholding while setting the highest nuclear non-proliferation
standards. We have already made significant progress in operator and
industry training for Australia, and we look forward to having
Australian sailors commence duty in Guam this year to build their
maintenance skills. We are also increasing the number of visits of
nuclear-powered attack submarines to Australia, including the visit by
the USS North Carolina in 2023 and the visit going on right now by the
USS Annapolis.
We are working to accelerate and deepen cooperation on advanced
defense capabilities through Pillar II. The Chiefs of Defense from
Australia, the U.K., and I have made specific recommendations to the
respective ministers and the Secretary of Defense on the priority areas
that can deliver advanced capability in the near term while we also
pursue maritime autonomous systems, anti-submarine warfare: undersea
vehicles; positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); artificial
intelligence (A.I.); space capabilities; and integrated air and missile
defense (IAMD). We appreciate the NDAA's establishment of national
exemptions for Australia and the United Kingdom from United States
defense export control licensing and adding these two allies to the
U.S. Defense Production Act. These provisions are crucial to enable
accelerated delivery of advanced capabilities.
United States-Japan-ROK
Trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and the
ROK is a priority for the United States and crucial for security in
northeast Asia. The relationship between our three nations is the
strongest it has ever been. As the DPRK continues its provocations, we
are committed to enhancing our deterrence by responding in concert with
our allies through improved intelligence and missile defense
information sharing, combined operations in response to DPRK actions,
and strengthening our interoperability across all three nations. In the
last 3 years, we advanced a new era of trilateral cooperation by
activating a 24/7 real-time DPRK missile warning data-sharing
mechanism. The efforts improve our shared ability to ensure the safety
of our people by trilaterally detecting and assessing DPRK missiles. We
expanded our trilateral exercise program's scope and scale in recent
years through successful trilateral ballistic missile defense, anti-
submarine warfare, air exercises, and exercises with our Canadian and
Australian partners. In 2023, we negotiated a multi-year trilateral
exercise program, which formalized our trilateral cooperation in
exercises for the next 2 years.
The Quad
The Quad nations, represented by Australia, India, Japan, and the
United States, is a diplomatic network supporting a prosperous, Free,
and Open Indo-Pacific. The Quad is not a military alliance, but rather
a diplomatic network committed to a peaceful, secure region, free from
intimidation and committed to the rule of law. The Quad nations
collaborate on matters such as maritime awareness, disaster response,
and counterterrorism to enhance stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
Including all Quad nations in India's Exercise MALABAR demonstrates
commitment of Quad nations to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The chiefs
of defense of Australia, India, Japan and I now meet annually for the
Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue to discuss common security challenges.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
ASEAN advances critical works to uphold the rules-based order,
advance respect for international law, and peacefully resolve disputes
through consultation, diplomacy, and consensus-based decisionmaking. At
the 2022 U.S.-ASEAN Summit, President Biden announced the launch of the
U.S.-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. USINDOPACOM is
committed to supporting maritime security cooperation with ASEAN,
including significant support via the U.S. Pacific Fleet to a second
ASEAN Maritime Exercise in 2025. USINDOPACOM is also co-chairing a
Medical Expert Working Group with Indonesia and is developing concepts
to support Laos' initiatives in environmental resilience; women, peace,
and security; and cyber efforts.
Blue Pacific Cooperative
The Blue Pacific Cooperative (BPC) is a USINDOPACOM-led initiative
to support the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent and, the
Pacific regional framework laid out by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF),
and ultimately address critical issues for Blue Pacific nations, such
as combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and
building climate resilience. The BPC provides the 17 partner nations
with enhanced maritime domain awareness and seamless information
sharing and supports the Forum Fisheries Agency based in the Solomon
Islands and the Fiji Maritime Surveillance Rescue Coordination Center.
Additionally, as a member of the Pacific Quad with Australia, France,
and New Zealand, we work to build the capacity of Blue Pacific nations'
maritime security forces, assist in the protection of central and
western Pacific fisheries, and provide access to maritime domain
awareness technology and best practices to counter IUU fishing assets.
U.S. cooperation with Blue Pacific nations without militaries focuses
on improving relations through engineering projects, combating
transnational crime, and enhancing coordination and collaboration. In
July 2023, Samoa joined the State Partnership Program with the Nevada
National Guard.
Northeast Asia
Our relationships with allies and partners in Northeast Asia are
crucial to deterring aggressive action by the DPRK, Russia, and the
PRC, as well as securing the support needed to transition to conflict
if necessary. Increasing bilateral interoperability and growing
multilateral relationships and operations have significantly improved
our strategic position and deterrence within the First Island Chain.
Alliances with Japan and the ROK are the cornerstone of regional
peace and security. Beyond trilateral cooperation, bilateral relations
with each country are consistently being modernized to prevail in the
new era of strategic competition and underpin a shared vision of a free
and open Indo-Pacific.
The United States and Japan made significant progress in
modernizing the alliance in the last 3 years, including expanding
bilateral planning efforts for contingencies and exploring more
effective alliance command and control relationships to enhance
interoperability. We are rapidly expanding our multilateral cooperation
efforts by including partners such as Canada, the Philippines, the ROK,
and the U.K. in Exercise Keen Sword 23 and Australia in Keen Edge 24.
The United States and Japan continue to optimize force posture,
including for the defense of the Southwest Islands, by forward-
deploying more resilient and mobile capabilities. Japan continues
demonstrating its resolve to take a more active role in maintaining
regional peace and stability. Japan has committed to doubling its
defense budget from 1 percent to 2 percent by 2027, resulting in
unprecedented defense spending. This spending includes counter-strike,
integrated air and missile defense, multidomain, sustainment, and other
capabilities.
The United States-ROK military-to-military relationship is one of
the world's most robust and interoperable alliances. Exercise Ulchi
Freedom Shield continues to significantly improve our bilateral crisis
management and war execution capabilities. As part of our commitment to
extended deterrence, USINDOPACOM facilitated the first U.S. SSBN port
visit to ROK in 40 years, the port visit of the USS Ronald Reagan
Carrier Strike Group; the first 5th Gen aircraft deployment to Korea,
and the first B-52 landing in Korea in decades. The United States and
the ROK are committed to modernizing our capabilities to strengthen our
combined defense; at nearly $43 billion, the 2023 ROK Defense budget is
its most significant defense budget ever--a 4.4 percent increase over
2022, which was previously a record-high year. USINDOPACOM continues to
work toward transitioning wartime Operational Control (OPCON) to the
ROK through the Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP).
The United States is proud to be Mongolia's strategic ``Third
Neighbor'' and partner. Continued military-to-military relationship
with Mongolia is one of the most active aspects of our Strategic
Partnership and a contributor to regional security. USINDOPACOM and
Mongolia cooperate on improving HA/DR response, defense modernization,
developing professional military education (PME) programs, expanding
Special Operations Forces capability, and enhancing air operations. We
also continue to support Mongolian participation and leadership in U.N.
Peacekeeping operation (UN PKO) missions, including expanding the scope
and depth of Exercise KHAAN QUEST to include participation by Japan and
the Republic of Korea.
United States policy on Taiwan is consistent and unchanged. We will
continue to support Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, consistent with
the Taiwan Relations Act. This aligns with our one China policy, which
is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and
the Six Assurances. The United States is committed to cross-strait
peace and stability and the peaceful resolution of differences, free
from coercion and pressure.
Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia continues to be a region that sees significant
coercive action from the PRC. These actions include the increasing
militarization of their South China Sea outposts and further coercive
gray zone actions against the Philippines in their Exclusive Economic
Zone, including around Second Thomas Shoal, and other attempts to
enforce domestic laws in international spaces, including using Chinese
law enforcement entities to harass nations operating legally within
their exclusive economic zones. Increased aggressive behavior by the
PRC has led nations in this area to rethink and adjust their
relationships with China, the United States, and each other.
The Philippines and Thailand, as allies of the United States,
continue to grow closer bilaterally, as well as increase multilateral
activity to ensure the defense of their nations against external armed
attack in the Pacific. For the Philippines, the four new sites were
announced for proposed inclusion under Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA) sites, with the United States allocating over $109
million in infrastructure projects to improve bilateral military
modernization and expand training opportunities, as well as position
for response to HA/DR events. Exercise Balikatan increased in scope to
include plan-based command posts and combined joint field training
exercise events, including live fire maritime strikes, integrated air-
missile defense activities, and the Australian Defence Force as a part
of the exercise. In support of the Philippines' sovereign rights and
its maritime security, USINDOPACOM conducted a bilateral sail and air
patrol campaign in the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone and Northern
Luzon Strait, with five bilateral sails executed as of March 2024 and
nearly 500 bilateral activities planned for the rest of the calendar
year.
In Thailand, USINDOPACOM is committed to building an interoperable
ally and supporting its military modernization efforts, including
welcoming the first permanent Thai Liaison Officer in April 2024.
Exercise Cobra Gold continues to grow in scope and scale, featuring a
staff exercise, a field training exercise, humanitarian civic
assistance programs, and cyber operations, and includes forces from
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the ROK, and Singapore.
Other nations in Southeast Asia remain essential to ensure regional
stability. Singapore provides substantial support to the United States
military, including offering United States Forces the use of facilities
near the Strait of Malacca. The United States-Singapore defense
relationship has advanced over the last 3 years, with the Singapore
Armed Forces (SAF) USINDOPACOM and USCYBERCOM signing an MOU in August
2021 to advance cybersecurity information sharing, exchange of threat
indicators, combined cyber training and exercises, and other cyber
cooperation. In February 2023, Singapore hosted a rotational deployment
of United States unmanned aerial systems, and we are exploring options
to deploy United States maritime vessels based out of Singapore. SAF
uses four CONUS locations, including three flying training programs and
an annual live fire training with High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS) launchers. By 2026, Singapore's F-16 training facility at Luke
AFB will relocate before their F-35B deliveries in October 2026.
Singapore hosts the multinational maritime Information Fusion Center
(IFC), which coordinates efforts to support regional maritime security,
and the Counterterrorism Information Facility (CTIF), which uses
network analysis and multilayer analytics to identify trends,
aberrations, and terrorist threats.
The United States and Brunei made significant strides in
strengthening our military relationship, signing a new Acquisition
Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in April 2023 to enable greater
military interoperability and a 505 Agreement in December 2023 that
provides a conduit for defense articles and training grants.
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) is the largest United
States-Brunei annual exercise, marking its 30th iteration in 2024.
Brunei also participates in Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training
(SEACAT) and the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise. In
September 2022, in the first multilateral training in Brunei, the U.K.
Special Boat Service (SBS) joined U.S. Navy SEALs and the Brunei
Special Forces Regiment in Exercise NEPTUNE WARRIOR. In March 2023, His
Royal Highness Prince Mateen visited the United States and engaged with
Naval Special Warfare and others, strengthening military-to-military
ties.
Indonesia's location stretching between the Indian and Pacific
Oceans and the southern edge of the South China Sea means it occupies a
critical strategic position regionally and globally. The United States
has worked closely with Indonesia over the last 3 years to advance our
strong defense cooperation. In November 2023, Presidents Biden and
Widodo elevated our relationship to a comprehensive strategic
partnership. This effort resulted in a mutual commitment to advance
space cooperation, cyber capacity building, maritime security,
exercises, and other areas. Super Garuda Shield grew from an Army
service exercise to one of the most extensive joint and multinational
exercises in the Indo-Pacific, featuring a joint bilateral CPX and FTX
conducted with the Indonesian military and multinational participants
from Australia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and France.
The United States-Laos military relationship continues to advance
as lingering mistrust from the legacy of war issues subsides. Laos and
the United States resumed a Bilateral Defense Dialogue (BDD) in 2023 to
advance cooperation efforts, resulting in the delivery, supported by
the U.S. Department of Defense, of 619 various-sized cold-chain
freezers capable of storing Pfizer COVID vaccines, distributed
throughout the provinces in January 2024. USINDOPACOM has supported
Laos via the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in their
traditional advisory role, as well as through the provision of computer
equipment. INDOPACOM continues to support ASEAN's central role in the
region and Laos' ascension to the chairmanship of ASEAN for 2024.
Bilateral security cooperation tripled in scope and scale after the
United States-Malaysia relationship was elevated to a Comprehensive
Partnership in 2014 and revalidated in 2017. USINDOPACOM and the
Malaysian Armed Forces will hold the first-ever execution of KERIS
STRIKE in Sabah (East Malaysia) in fiscal year 2024 and are developing
BERSAMA WARRIOR (BW) into a multilateral exercise through a Five-Year
Plan. To augment Malaysia's intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capability, the U.S. delivered 18 UAS ScanEagles
by November 2022 for maritime domain awareness and counterterrorism
(C.T.) missions. Since 2017, the U.S. has invested approximately $220
million in Maritime Security Initiative/Building Partner Capacity (MSI/
BPC) programs.
In February 2023, Timor-Leste, the Rhode Island National Guard
(RING), and Timor-Leste Defense Force signed a State Partnership
Program agreement, resulting in RING's participation in several
exercises and exchanges with Timor-Leste in 2023. The Baucau MOU signed
in June 2021 was a milestone in U.S.-Timor-Leste bilateral relations,
paving the way for more significant security cooperation and expanded
access. The $23 million airfield rehabilitation and maritime security
program will allow Timor-Leste to monitor its EEZ and conduct maritime
security operations.
Vietnam is a leading regional voice supporting freedom of
navigation and adherence to international law and the rules-based
international order. The United States and Vietnam upgraded our
relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership during President
Biden's visit in September 2023, resulting in progress in maritime
security and opportunities to expand cooperation in HA/DR, PKO,
aviation, cyber, and personnel accounting (POW/MIA). This year, we will
host a Vietnam delegation to conduct the US-VNM bilateral defense
dialog.
Cambodia's new government, appointed in August 2023, has expressed
a desire for an improved bilateral relationship with the United States,
to include the possible restoration of security cooperation. In January
2017, Cambodia imposed a moratorium on all military exercises with the
United States, followed by the State Partnership Program (SPP)
termination in 2020. Currently, the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency
(DPAA) mission continues, allowing for the continued search and
recovery of 48 United States personnel still declared missing in
Cambodia. We are seriously concerned about the PRC's military presence
and construction of facilities at Ream Naval Base.
Relations with Burma remain strained. We condemn the military coup
in 2021 against the democratically elected government in Burma and the
subsequent widespread violence perpetrated by the Burma military regime
against the people of Burma. USINDOPACOM does not engage with Burma's
military but monitors the information space to support and assist the
State Department in the protection of United States facilities and
American personnel in Burma.
In January 2017, Cambodia imposed a moratorium on all military
exercises with the United States, followed by the State Partnership
Program (SPP) termination in 2020. Currently, the Defense POW/MIA
Accounting Agency (DPAA) mission continues, allowing for the continued
search and recovery of 48 United States personnel still declared
missing in Cambodia. While USINDOPACOM desires military engagement with
Cambodia where policy allows, we remain seriously concerned about the
PRC's military presence and construction of facilities at Ream Naval
Base.
Oceania
The many nations of the Oceania region include staunch allies and
strong partners but are continuously under threat from diplomatic,
economic, and security coercion by the PRC. Consequently, many of our
relationships in this area have expanded and strengthened to address
pernicious Chinese behavior and coercive pressure.
The United States and Australia have worked to enhance all-domain
cooperation, integrate ranges, improve posture, and expand multilateral
exercises across the theater, including hosting Marine Rotational
Force-Darwin (MRF-D). The alliance continues to demonstrate combined
operational capability executed in two Bomber Task Forces, submarine
and United States Army watercraft rotations to Australia, and the
deployment of U.S. Navy Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft
(MPRA) from Australia to strengthen maritime domain awareness.
Australia and the United States continue to expand the scope and scale
of our robust exercise program, including PACIFIC SENTRY 23, featuring
combined United States-Australia planning and combat operations against
an all-domain, near-peer adversary, and TALISMAN SABRE 23 emphasizing
interoperability and expeditionary logistics from 11 additional
partners from across the globe. Increased trilateral opportunities with
Australia and Japan allowed for increased complexity of our operations
while improving partner interoperability throughout the region at the
joint level. Australia's importance as an anchor of United States
security in the Indo-Pacific remains unequivocal.
The Freely Associated States (FAS)--the Republic of Marshall
Islands (RMI), the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and Palau--
occupy a strategic location linking the United States to the rest of
the Indo-Pacific region, and they have the highest military service per
capita in the U.S. military. We greatly appreciate that Congress
recently passed the legislation that will allow the new COFA-related
assistance agreements to be brought into force.
In addition to the COFA-related agreements, the United States must
fully fund the Economic Assistance Agreement associated with the South
Pacific Tuna Treaty. The treaty provides the United States access to
tuna fisheries across Oceania and provides a mechanism for the United
States to support economic development in the region. Failure to fund
the Economic Assistance Agreement undermines U.S. credibility and opens
the door for other countries to gain influence over these strategically
important partners.
New Zealand is an essential leader in Oceania, with a mature
network of mentors, instructors, and technical advisors supporting a
pan-regional security cooperation program. New Zealand is part of DPRK
U.N. Security Council Resolution enforcement efforts, part of the
Headquarters Integrated Area Defense System under the Five Powers
Defense Arrangements, and contributes to the Counter Terrorism
Information Facility in Singapore. Exercise TEMPEST EXPRESS 23 featured
a joint multilateral exercise conducted in New Zealand with 20
participating nations where planners examined New Zealand's earthquake
response plan and HA/DR operations planning. In addition, New Zealand
routinely engages in a broad range of United States-led exercises
across the Indo-Pacific, including Rim of the Pacific, PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP, MOBILITY GUARDIAN, and CARTWHEEL.
Fiji, Papua New Guinea (PNG), and Tonga are essential partners in
the region to ensure continued defense relationships, access, and lines
of communication into the First Island Chain. Through Fiji's Blackrock
training center, the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) regularly
deploys personnel supporting U.N. peacekeeping operations across the
globe. Nevada National Guard's State Partnership Program and Exercise
CARTWHEEL, Exercise TAQOMACA, the United States-Fiji Bilateral Defense
Dialogue (BDD), the U.S. Shiprider Program, and the Oceania Maritime
Security Initiative improve bilateral coordination of maritime domain
awareness in support of Fijian sovereignty.
In May 2023, the United States and PNG entered into a bilateral
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). This foundational agreement
enhances access and security cooperation and further strengthens our
bilateral relationship, improves the capacity of the PNG Defence Force,
and increases stability and security in the region. Capacity building
and training are advancing through the SPP's Wisconsin National Guard,
and a ship rider program is set to expand U.S. Coast Guard elements
into a maritime security line of effort.
The United States opened a new United States Embassy in Nuku'alofa,
Tonga, in May 2023. It conducted a United States-Tonga Bilateral
Defense Dialogue (BDD) that examined non-commissioned officer (NCO)
developmental training opportunities and improvements to State
Partnership Program initiatives between Tongan forces and the Nevada
National Guard.
South Asia
South Asia is at the nexus of global trade and commerce, with
nearly half of the world's 90,000 commercial vessels and two-thirds of
global oil trade traveling through the Indian Ocean. The region boasts
some of the fastest-growing economies on Earth and is home to a quarter
of the world's population. While the region offers unprecedented
opportunity, it also confronts many security challenges, including a
growing Chinese presence, static or declining defense budgets,
terrorism, and climate change effects. To combat these challenges, the
United States seeks opportunities to broaden and strengthen
partnerships with India, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.
A strong United States-India Comprehensive Global Strategic
Partnership is essential to a free and open Indo-Pacific. In 2023, the
United States and India launched INDUS-X and completed a Roadmap for
U.S-India Defense Industrial Cooperation to enhance bilateral defense
industrial cooperation and innovation. The proposed deal between G.E.
Aerospace and Hindustan Aeronautics for domestic Indian production of
F-414 jet engines exemplifies this approach. The United States and
India are seeking unprecedented levels of interoperability by expanding
cooperation in the air domain through the participation of United
States B-1B Bombers in India's biennial air show AERO INDIA and
bilateral air exercise COPE INDIA. Additionally, in the land domain, we
conducted the largest-ever bilateral joint amphibious exercise with
India, TIGER TRIUMPH, improving our cooperation on maritime domain
awareness and strengthening service-to-service ties. USINDOPACOM seeks
to deepen cooperation under the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of
Agreement (LEMOA) to enable more regular and flexible engagements in
the Indian Ocean Region, including U.S. ship repair in Indian
shipyards. Two new Master Ship Repair Agreements were signed in 2023,
and three U.S. Navy vessels have recently received maintenance and
repair in Indian shipyards.
USINDOPACOM conducted the 10th Bilateral Defence Dialogue with the
Bangladesh AFD in August 2023 to strengthen military-to-military ties
further and explore opportunities for collaboration on training,
exercises, and equipment exchanges. USINDOPACOM seeks a General
Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Bangladesh to
improve cooperation between our countries on defense matters.
The United States is committed to our longstanding defense
relationship and supporting Maldivian sovereignty, safety, and
security. USINDOPACOM continues seeking opportunities to enhance our
relationship with the Maldives, including building maritime security
and counterterrorism capacity. In 2021, the Maldives signed an
arrangement with the Montana National Guard to join the State
Partnership Program. As the Maldives looks toward establishing a
maritime fusion center in the future, USINDOPACOM stands ready to
leverage capabilities through our Joint Interagency Task Force--West
(JIATF-W) and the U.S. Coast Guard to support those efforts.
USINDOPACOM supports Nepal in becoming a premier contributor to
global PKO through Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) funds and
exercises. In February of this year, the United States and Nepal co-
hosted the largest-ever military exercise in Nepal, the Multinational
Peacekeeping Exercise SHANTI PRAYAS IV, which included over 1,000
participants from 20 countries. Beyond PKO, USINDOPACOM partners
closely with Nepal on HA/DR, border security, and special operations
cooperation.
USINDOPACOM continues to support Sri Lankan defense reform and
equipment divestiture efforts within the bounds of current legal
constraints, as well as opportunities for institutional capacity
building, maritime security, HA/DR, and U.N. PKO. In the past 3 years,
United States-Sri Lankan defense relations built upon a successful
CARAT exercise, the transfer of the 3d USCG cutter, and Sri Lanka's
hosting of the 2023 USINDOPACOM Environmental Security Forum. We
welcome Sri Lanka's decision to participate in Operation Prosperity
Guardian utilizing a Coast Guard cutter previously transferred through
the EDA program. It is a valuable reminder that our security assistance
programs advance U.S. and global security. We will continue
strengthening our relationship with the upcoming King Air Maritime
Patrol Aircraft delivery in 2024.
Other Indo-Pacific Nations
Many other Indo-Pacific nations have continued to increase their
activities unilaterally and bilaterally with regional governments and
multilaterally to strengthen the rules-based international order. Key
among these nations are Canada, France, and the United Kingdom (U.K.).
Canada continues to deploy competent forces to the region to support
freedom of navigation and sovereignty, including through several
combined Taiwan Strait Transits with the United States in the last 3
years. French armed forces maintain commands in French Polynesia
(FAPF), New Caledonia (FANC), and South Indian Ocean Zone (FAZOI), as
well as keeping an active role in regional security, protecting
fisheries, and countering transnational crimes. The U.K. sustains a
regional defense posture, including the Brunei Garrison and two
permanently deployed Royal Navy Offshore Patrol Vessels. A broad
program of bilateral and multilateral operations and activities
complement their posture, including exercises and training
contributions from the British Army and Royal Air Force. The U.K.
invests in the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) with Australia,
New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore; continues a Global Combat Air
Programme with Japan and Italy to develop 6th generation fighter
aircraft; and supports defense programs through the Hiroshima Accord
with Japan, the Downing Street Accord with the Republic of Korea; a
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with India; and the Partnership
Roadmap with Indonesia, and Strategic Partnership with Singapore.
USINDOPACOM continues to benefit from basing and access to the British
Indian Ocean Territory at Diego Garcia and from the British Defence
Singapore Support Unit.
other areas of cooperation
Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Program
USINDOPACOM executes a robust WPS program as part of the Department
of Defense's (DOD) implementation of the U.S. Women, Peace, and
Security Act 2017. This is done by mainstreaming a gender perspective
into theater plans, programs, and policies to enable USINDOPACOM to
develop inclusive security strategies that advance a Free and Open
Indo-Pacific. WPS-themed security cooperation engagements with partner
nations are an innovative approach for strategic competition that is
non-escalatory, less costly than conflict, enables values-based
choices, and helps the United States maintain an asymmetric advantage.
WPS builds resilience capacity and self-reliance, demonstrating a
commitment to investing in our partners, not extracting from them.
In 2023, USINDOPACOM designed and delivered a tailored gender focal
point training to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) at the
request of the recently established PNGDF Gender Committee. This work
with the PNGDF Gender Committee is currently the only DOD initiative in
the Indo-Pacific Region supporting the U.S. Strategy to Prevent
Conflict and Promote stability (also known as the Global Fragility
Act). USINDOPACOM also supported a United States-Malaysia Trafficking
in Persons workshop with WPS-related programming. Finally, USINDOPACOM
developed and held the inaugural Indo-Pacific Regional Military Gender
Advisor Course, part of a 5-year initiative to create a fully trained
network of certified military Gender Advisors within the region. Course
participants included representatives from Australia, Bangladesh,
Canada, Fiji, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,
the Philippines, and Thailand.
Climate Change
The national security impacts of climate change are a priority
concern to many allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. These
impacts may exacerbate existing challenges, including growing
geostrategic competition and maritime boundary disputes. Our partners
and allies in Oceania, Southeast Asia, and South Asia are increasingly
vulnerable to extreme weather and the food and water security
challenges that result.
Climate change mitigation, adaptation, and resilience
considerations are essential to long-term planning for U.S. operating
locations, critical facilities, and capabilities in the Indo-Pacific
region. USINDOPACOM is committed to increasing the resilience of its
infrastructure, facilities, and forces and assisting allies and
partners in resiliency efforts. The military's role in disaster
preparedness and response will be increasingly needed as climate change
impacts become more frequent and severe. Enhancing disaster
preparedness and response is an opportunity for the USINDOPACOM to play
a significant role in supporting efforts to build resilience.
Red Hill
Secretary Austin tasked USINDOPACOM to establish Joint Task Force-
Red Hill (JTF-RH) in recognition of the need to safely and
expeditiously defuel the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility and to
rebuild trust with the State of Hawaii and the local community on Oahu.
Through collaboration and transparency with the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Hawaii Department of Health, JTF-RH
accelerated the defueling schedule by 6 months. On 16 December 2023,
JTF-RH completed gravity defueling of over 104 million gallons of fuel,
fulfilling the Department's commitment to remove the threat to one of
Oahu's primary aquifers as quickly and safely as possible. JTF-RH is
presently removing residual fuel from the facility, simultaneously
conducting a methodical turnover with a newly established Navy Closure
Task Force as the Department transitions the main effort from defueling
to closure and long-term environmental remediation. As DOD notified
Congress in September 2023, defueling the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage
Facility will not adversely impact the Department's ability to support
military operations in the Indo-Pacific theater. The Defense Logistics
Agency repositions fuel across the Indo-Pacific to better support
USINDOPACOM requirements.
conclusion
Conflict is not imminent or inevitable, but our potential
adversaries have become increasingly aggressive and seek to impose
their will at the expense of like-minded nations that embrace a rules-
based order. The PRC's actions, which include a massive military
buildup accompanied by a campaign of coercive actions, destabilize the
region and challenge the ideals that support a free and open Indo-
Pacific.
Through Seize the Initiative and in concert with the Department of
Defense and the U.S. Congress, USINDOPACOM has delivered a
comprehensive plan that provides a more distributed force posture, a
synchronized campaign of joint/combined operations across all domains,
the capabilities needed to fight and win, and the relationships with
allies and partners needed to maintain a free and open INDOPACIFIC.
However, my successor will need your support to continue making
progress across all of these efforts with a sense of urgency. We must
buildupon the progress achieved in the last few years to accelerate the
fielding of the initiatives described in the Section 1302 Independent
Assessment. These initiatives include the defense of Guam, decision
superiority capabilities, our security cooperation actions, AUKUS, and
bilateral international agreements such as [those related to] the
Compacts of Free Association (COFA) to ensure the United States remains
the security partner of choice in the Indo-Pacific.
Last, I want to thank Congress for your continued focus on our
challenges in the Indo-Pacific region and your commitment over the last
3 years. Your focus and leadership have never been more important.
Congress must pass timely appropriations. Continuing resolutions result
in cumulative and detrimental effects on our buying power, delay the
fielding of much-needed capability and capacity, and increase the level
of operational risk that I am forced to assume. If we are not vigilant
in aligning our resources to address the most critical national
security priorities, our ability to ensure the safe and prosperous
future of the U.S. and our children and grandchildren will be in
jeopardy.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral Aquilino. General
LaCamera, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL J. LACAMERA, USA COMMANDER, UNITED
NATIONS COMMAND, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, UNITED STATES FORCES
KOREA
General LaCamera. Chairman Reed, and Ranking Member Wicker,
and distinguished Members of the Committee, it remains my
distinct honor to sit before you today as the Commander of the
United States Forces Korea, Combined Forces Command, and United
Nations Command.
I want to express my sincere appreciation for your
unwavering support to our servicemembers, our civilians, our
contractors, our interagency colleagues and all our families
overseas and those who wait at home. We can never take our eye
off the solemn responsibility to care for those who have raised
their right hand to defend our Constitution and our way of
life, including their families who do not volunteer, but serve,
nonetheless.
I am prepared to discuss those in the security environment
on the Korean Peninsula. It was just over 7 years ago that
China supported, Russia spurned, an opportunistic communist
North Korea decided to illegally invade the South, plunging
Korea into a very costly armed conflict that is ongoing today.
22 United Nations states came to the aid of the Republic of
Korea then, and 17 of them continue to support armistice
enforcement today through the United Nations Command. Defending
forward in this strategic location allows us to better protect
our people, the Korean people, our Homelands, and reinforce the
United States' ironclad commitment to the Republic of Korea.
Situated on the Asian continent, the Korean Peninsula shares a
Northern border with both China and Russia.
Although U.N. Security Council resolutions have levied
strict sanctions against the DPRK, they have found refuge in
their alliance with the People's Republic of China and their
revitalized partnership with Russia. In the last year, the DPRK
has continued developing its military capabilities, including
solid fuel ballistic missile technology, which violate
sanctions.
Some of the missile systems that North Korea has been
testing threaten countries worldwide. North Korea has also been
providing military material support to Russia, assisting in
Russia's illegal and indefensible invasion of Ukraine.
These relationships have allowed the DPRK to circumvent
sanctions, build their weapons program illegally, further
missile technology, sustain their cybercrime derived economy,
and threaten the international rules based order.
During the same time, the United States ROK Alliance
continue to adapt to meet the evolving challenges. In April
2023, the Presidents of the two countries signed the Washington
Declaration reaffirming our commitment to mutual defense. They
also announced the establishment of a Nuclear Consultative
Group to strengthen extended deterrence, discuss nuclear
strategic planning, and manage the DPRK threat.
We have taken substantial and concrete steps to follow
through on these commitments. The Republic of Korea has
organized its own strategic command, giving us another arrow in
our quiver. There have been multiple strategic asset
deployments to the Republic--to the Korean Peninsula, including
a nuclear ballistic missile submarine and the first B-52
landing in the last 40 years.
In August 2023, the Presidents of the United States, ROK,
and Prime Minister of Japan met at Camp David for a trilateral
summit. This historically significant meeting recognized the
importance of advancing the security and prosperity of our
people.
We have made significant progress in following through on
the commitments made during the summit, including steps toward
sharing of real time missile warning data, increased trilateral
exercises on the sea, and the introduction of trilateral air
and cyber exercises.
Over the past 3 years, my thinking on operations,
activities, and investments has--continues to evolve. However,
what has not changed is my focus on protecting the homelands,
preparing for combat, and taking care of people. Since
readiness is perishable, I will never be satisfied with our
level of training and preparedness.
As the ROK and United States conduct regular military
training activities on the Peninsula, I am convinced that the
DPRK is not only reacting to our activities, but in many ways
mirroring them. We must continue to build physical, mental, and
spiritual readiness through operations and activities designed
to compete in the gray zone with the DPRK.
To defend the Republic of Korea, we must continue to invest
in 28,500 servicemembers, including by, tri, and multilateral
exercises on and off the peninsula. Multi-domain training
integrating live, virtual, and constructive entities, and
continue to experiment with next generation capabilities in the
exact environment where they will be employed.
To maintain the armistice agreement, our ironclad
commitment to maintain our combat readiness, we need your
continued support and recognition of the threat to the
Homeland. It has been an honor to serve in these three
commands.
It has also been an honor to serve with Admiral Aquilino
these past four and a half years in multiple commands. My best
to him and his family. Fair winds and following seas. Once
again, thank you for all your support and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Paul J. LaCamera
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Paul J. LaCamera
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and Distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide a written
statement on the security environment in the Republic of Korea (ROK)
and Northeast Asia. I appreciate your unwavering support to the
servicemembers, civilians, contractors, and their families who work
with our Korean allies and United Nations Command Member States to
maintain security on the Korean Peninsula. The United States-ROK
Alliance serves as a linchpin for peace and prosperity in Northeast
Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Our two nations share common values and
democratic norms, value human rights, and abide by the rules-based
international order. We also share significant economic and cultural
ties that benefit both nations. The ROK sits at the heart of Northeast
Asia, a region of significant security and economic interest for the
United States. The presence of United States Forces in the ROK and
Japan demonstrates our ironclad commitment to the people of Korea and
protects our strategic interests in Northeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific
region.
This past year has seen significant strides in United States-ROK
relations. President Biden hosted President Yoon for a State Visit in
April 2023, leading to the issuance of the Washington Declaration, in
which the two nations expressed our bilateral commitment to develop an
ever-stronger mutual defense relationship and reaffirmed commitment to
the Mutual Defense Treaty. As a result, the Washington Declaration also
established the Nuclear Consultative Group as an enduring, bilateral
consultative body focused on strengthening extended deterrence,
discussing nuclear and strategic planning, and managing the threat
posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). President
Yoon noted the importance of the United Nations Command (UNC) in his
August 15, 2023, National Day Address, stating that UNC is a great
example of international solidarity that has played a key role in
firmly safeguarding the ROK's freedom. In November 2023, in
commemoration of the 70 years of the Alliance and in recognition of the
changing security environment both on the Korean Peninsula and the
broader region, Secretary Austin and Minister Shin issued a ``Defense
Vision of the United States-ROK Alliance'' outlining a transformational
way forward for the security and defense of the two countries, while
also contributing to the security of the region and the world. Our
Alliance with the ROK and their growing cooperation and coordination
with Japan is bolstering regional security in Northeast Asia.
Additionally, moving beyond the bilateral framework, President Biden
and President Yoon met with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida during the
Camp David Summit, the first-ever summit of the leaders from the United
States, ROK, and Japan, yielding broad trilateral military and
diplomatic progress.
As the United States-ROK Alliance strengthens, the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has responded with continued
destabilizing activities. The mission of the UNC is to enforce the
terms of the Armistice Agreement and to restore peace and security on
the Korean Peninsula. The mission of the United States-Republic of
Korea Combined Forces Command (CFC) is to deter aggression and if
necessary, defend the ROK to maintain stability in Northeast Asia. The
mission of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) is to deter aggression
and protect the ROK against any adversary or threat, ultimately
maintaining stability in Northeast Asia.
My priorities and focus as the Commander for these three commands
are the same. My lines of operations are: Defend the Homeland(s),
Strengthen the Alliance, Prepare for Combat, and Build Coalitions in
order to ensure we achieve our strategic, operational, and tactical end
states. My lines of effort, which are interwoven and connect my lines
of operations are: taking care of the servicemembers, civilians,
families, and contractors who support the Forces on the Korean
Peninsula, and working to gain and maintain our Information Advantage
which is critical in Armistice and vital in Conflict.
defend the homeland(s)
Northeast Asia, which includes the Korean Peninsula, is vital to
global peace and stability. It is home to four of the world's most
powerful and largest economies: the United States, ROK, Japan, and the
People's Republic of China (PRC). The United States has also had an
enduring economic presence in the region for decades. It is also
important to acknowledge Russia's growing presence in Northeast Asia.
Due to geographic proximity, there is significant potential for
third party intervention and influence on the Korean Peninsula, should
a crisis occur specifically from the PRC (Korea lies within the PRC's
Anti-Access / Area Denial defensive layers) and Russia. Both are
mindful that there is a premier Joint Force of 28,500+ American
servicemembers forward deployed to the ROK. These geographic realities,
combined with powerful economic interests, make the ROK the linchpin of
security in Northeast Asia and a treaty ally we must defend.
It is imperative for us to remember that the Korean War has not
ended; the Korean Peninsula is in armistice and the DPRK continues to
develop capabilities that threaten not only the region but nations
around the world. These capabilities include nuclear weapons, ballistic
missiles, orbital launch capabilities, cyber threats, and chemical and
biological weapons. The persistent DPRK threat looms far beyond the
Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and into multiple domains including
cyber and space. Furthermore, recent DPRK collaboration with Russia is
also an indicator of growing bilateral relations between the two
nations which is manifested in the DPRK's continued supply of artillery
and ballistic missiles for use in Ukraine. It has delivered more than
10,000 shipping containers--the equivalent of 260,000 metric tons--of
munitions or munitions-related materials to Russia since September
2023, which undermines regional security beyond Northeast Asia. In
confronting the DPRK's actions, the United States and the ROK will
continue to stand together to maintain peace and security on the Korean
Peninsula and stability throughout Northeast Asia. This commitment is
vital to stability in the region and is an example to other like-minded
nations.
We must maintain our ironclad commitment to the Alliance which has
endured since the Korean War and never take it for granted. Pursuing
our goal of the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, deterring the DPRK from using nuclear weapons, and defending
our Homelands requires all three Commands in Korea: United Nations
Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea.
strengthen the alliance
We have shared a Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROK since 1953, but
we should never take our Alliance for granted. The Washington
Declaration and the Camp David Summit have helped to expand our
cooperation and reinforce our extended deterrence commitments.
President Yoon articulated his vision for the ROK to become a
``global pivotal state'' and the ROK government released its own Indo-
Pacific strategy. The strategy is a comprehensive vision for the entire
region and is not limited to just Northeast Asia or economics. It is
reflective of a rules-based international order founded in cooperation
rather than coercion. As the ROK aims to ``increase engagement and
cooperation with the Indo-Pacific'' (Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and
Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, 2022), protected under the security
umbrella of the United States military and interagency, I expect
Northeast Asia will remain vital to global stability and security.
Of these powerful economies, the ROK is, by Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), the 13th largest economy in the world and 4th largest in Asia.
It is a leading producer of semi-conductors, vehicles, and many other
consumer electronics. It is also the 6th largest defense exporter in
the world and President Yoon has set a goal for the ROK to become the
4th largest during his tenure. The advances within the Korean defense
sector have yielded exports in aircraft, warships, and ground combat
vehicles and weapons; the presence of Korean weaponry within the
international community has trended higher since 2000 (Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute).
The ROK is also the 6th largest United States trading partner
(United States is now the ROK's largest trading partner), and the 6th
largest United States agricultural export market. Between 2019-2022,
the ROK directly invested $74 billion, and ROK firms have announced $98
billion of new planned investments in the United States, concentrated
in semiconductors, electric vehicles, and battery technology.
The ROK's success is due to our shared values, democratic ideals,
and market-based economies within the rules-based international order.
Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is important to
global stability and to the global economy, including the United
States.
prepare for combat
While we remain focused on a diplomatic resolution, the military
missions of UNC, CFC, and USFK are to be prepared for combat so our
governments can negotiate from a position of strength. Each of the
three commands has separate sets of authorities, separate chains of
command, and each continues to adapt to meet emerging security
challenges. Our goal is to prevent an outbreak of hostilities, but we
remain prepared to react and respond to any form of aggression across
all domains.
Combined Forces Command has been the heart of the United States-ROK
Alliance for over 45 years and is a unique, bilateral warfighting
command charged with the dual missions of deterrence and defense.
Combined Forces Command receives its direction and guidance from both
United States and ROK national leaders, through ministerial and general
officer level forums. During Armistice, I, as the Commander of CFC,
have Combined Delegated Authority of designated ROK forces to maintain
deterrence and to prepare forces to execute combined missions and
plans. This starts and ends with tough, realistic training--executed in
combined and joint environments alongside our interagency partners
across all domains using live, virtual, and constructive environments.
In addition to our strategic asset deployments to Korea, including
carrier strike groups, strategic bombers, and nuclear submarines, our
routine, defensive training events, such as Ulchi Freedom Shield and
Freedom Shield are critical to our ability to maintain readiness and
provide extended deterrence in Northeast Asia. Finally, bilateral,
trilateral, and multinational operations, activities, and investments
on and off the Korean Peninsula allow us to Fight Tonight.
United States Forces Korea remains the premier Joint Force, capable
of operating in all domains with our allies and partners and committed
to defending the security of the ROK. It is a critical part of the
United States' approach to providing extended deterrence in Northeast
Asia. As United States Indo-Pacific Command's (USINDOPACOM) sub-unified
Joint Force on the Korean Peninsula, USFK is primarily responsible for
the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration of combat
forces to the peninsula, as well as the sustainment of those forces. As
the USFK Commander, I support UNC and CFC by coordinating and planning
among United States component commands in the ROK, exercising
operational control of United States forces as directed by USINDOPACOM,
and coordinating United States military assistance to the ROK.
United States Forces Korea continues to demonstrate new and
innovative capabilities that provide our forces advantages across
multiple domains. Everything the Department of Defense (DOD) is doing
to modernize is occurring on the Korean Peninsula--in a combined,
joint, interagency environment in multiple domains. We are pursuing
opportunities in artificial intelligence and machine learning. We are
also working with all U.S. military services on improving our aging
network and cybersecurity posture for our Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance, and Targeting (C5ISRT). Additionally, the Northeast
Asia Regional Fusion Cell is USFK's mechanism and environment through
which we will aggregate understanding of DPRK's nuclear and weapons of
mass destruction kill web. Our Fusion Cell capability ensures unity of
efforts with the U.S. Intelligence Community and identifies effects-
based options to deter aggression.
Our ability to provide forward deterrence is dependent upon
conducting regular, robust, and challenging training in addition to
proper manning. Readiness for combat--at the unit and operational
levels--must be built and continuously maintained; USFK has a high
turnover rate and many of our servicemembers serve 2 years or less in
Korea. Additionally, due to geographical space constraints, current
ranges and availability for collective live-fire training requirements
are limited. Components must train outside of Korea throughout the year
to maintain unit readiness. These constraints impact our ability to
execute fixed and rotary wing live fire exercises. Training off
peninsula, while costly, is critical to maintaining our combined and
joint force operational readiness. These are the steps we must take to
ensure a Fight Tonight posture on the Korea Peninsula; we cannot afford
to wait to train.
While assignment lengths of permanent party pose challenges to
reactivity and unit readiness, our rotational units and units that
train in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula build readiness. The
Services provide trained and ready forces, but we build their
operational readiness to fight in the Korean Peninsula environment. We
are not a readiness consumer.
build coalitions
Our network of allies and partners on the Korean Peninsula
represents our greatest asymmetric advantage in supporting regional
stability. These coalitions are bilateral, trilateral, and
multilateral. In support of our efforts to build coalitions, UNC
continues to represent the mechanism for collective security on the
Peninsula. Our collective action ensures we are strategically
predictable to our allies and partners, while being tactically and
operationally unpredictable to adversaries and competitors. Managing
and responding to crisis is the most consequential thing we do as an
Alliance.
Since 1950, U.N. Member States under the UNC have collectively
supported the ROK's security and sovereignty alongside United States
forward deterrence. UNC provides three enduring functions.
First, UNC enforces the Armistice Agreement by executing the
functions necessary to maintain and enforce the terms of the Armistice
through close coordination between the United States, the ROK, U.N.
member states, as well as coordination with the Korean People's Army
(KPA). Furthermore, UNC informs the DPRK prior to the start of United
States-ROK Alliance large-scale training exercises, such as the
defensive Freedom Shield and Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises, to ensure
training events are not misinterpreted as aggressive actions.
Second, UNC coordinates the multinational contributions for
securing the Korean Peninsula. Today, 17 countries contribute to UNC's
mission. These U.N. Member States come from every corner of the globe,
offering a visible reminder of the international community's resolve to
defend the ROK and the global nature of the DPRK threat. I am thankful
for each countries' contributions, and it is an honor to serve with
their countrymen and women.
Finally, UNC executes functions as assigned by U.S. National
Authorities through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. United Nations Command
is a one-of-a-kind, multinational military command under U.S.
leadership. The UNC is not a United Nations peacekeeping organization.
United Nations Command is critical to our mission and provides
international legitimacy through multinational contributions; it is a
``ready-made'' combined joint task force that adds value across the
Korean Peninsula. We continue to welcome Member States to join our
coalition and increase participation through exercises and liaison
officer programs to our headquarters in the ROK.
taking care of people
Servicemembers, civilians, families, and contractors who support
the Force are our most precious resource; taking care of our people is
a no-fail task.
Those who volunteer to bring their families to the Korean Peninsula
normally spend at least 2 years there defending the ROK and deterring
the DPRK. Ensuring those personnel and their families the best quality
of life possible while they are away from the United States Homeland is
of great importance and something I stress with leaders at every
echelon. For those serving in Korea accompanied with their families, we
are recommending tour length normalizations to 3 years that will
enhance family stability while keeping unaccompanied tours at 1 year.
We continue to look for ways to build our community to ensure the ROK
remains an assignment of choice for our personnel and their families.
Our families also include the dependents of U.N. Member States who
live on our installations. Currently, the school aged children of the
U.N. Member State personnel are not guaranteed spaces at the on base
schools, which creates an often-stressful planning challenge for the
families who are headed to Korea to share in the mission. We are
working with relevant organizations and agencies to mitigate these
challenges, and ensure we do all we can to take advantage of these
multinational and multigenerational relationship building
opportunities.
The well-being of our servicemembers is also dependent on
addressing systemic issues such as sexual assault and harassment in our
ranks. I have a zero-tolerance policy for any action that destroys unit
cohesion. Our senior leaders continue to impress the importance of
these initiatives upon their subordinates. This is not just about
combat readiness; it is simply doing right by our people.
Finally, our people live and work across the entire ROK, from
Panmunjom near the Demilitarized Zone to the southern port of Busan.
Being a responsible ally means being a good steward of the places where
we operate. United States Forces Korea continues to conduct bilateral
engagements with the ROK to appropriately posture our presence while
also returning valuable land for use by the Korean people. We could not
do this without military construction support from Congress.
information advantage
Our newest line of effort, ``Gain and Maintain Information
Advantage'' is critical. The UNC/CFC/USFK must protect operations
security-related critical information while leveraging information to
achieve our missions during Armistice and conflict. Our ability to
integrate and synchronize UNC/CFC/USFK strategic communication and
Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAIs) across the information
environment is contested by adversaries. Competition in the information
environment increases the risks associated with strategic
miscalculation; our ability to affect adversary perceptions in support
of deterrence and protection of UNC/CFC/USFK forces and domestic
populations is vital.
Today's information environment requires fewer resources to contest
than other aspects of the operational environment. Our competition in
the information environment encompasses activities across the
informational, cognitive, and cyber dimensions to gain military
advantages. This enhances efforts to deter by synchronizing our
communication, actions, images, and intentions to send clear and
credible signals to our adversaries. During conflict, leveraging
information is critical to maintaining global support and legitimacy
among the international community.
Each component of the UNC/CFC/USFK provides a different function
and capability needed to exploit opportunities in the information
environment in support of deterrence. While we can operate across all
domains, I am concerned about our ability to compete in the information
environment in Northeast Asia in light of PRC, Russia, and DPRK's
aggressive investments in information warfare technology and
operational practices. As the largest United States force on the Asian
continent, USFK is uniquely positioned to counter many of the
disinformation, misinformation, and mal-information efforts of our
competitors and adversaries, and defeat enemies during conflict.
conclusion
United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States
Forces Korea, will deter and, if necessary, defeat our adversaries. Our
collective actions will advance a free and open Indo-Pacific that is
more connected, prosperous, and secure. The men and women working
toward that goal are motivated, capable, and postured to do so while
forward deployed in Korea alongside our ROK Allies and U.N. Member
State Servicemembers. Our presence within Korea is advantageous; it is
better to be prepared from within Korea rather than to fight our way
in. We train to fight in a combined, joint, interagency, and multi-
domain environment simultaneously. In doing so, we will preserve peace
and stability on the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and the Indo-
Pacific. I am grateful for this Committee's continued support, and I am
honored to lead this dedicated multinational, combined, and Joint Force
deployed to the Asian mainland.
Thank you to the United States Congress, Armed Service Components,
USINDOPACOM, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Under One
Flag! We Go Together! Fight Tonight!
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General LaCamera, and
before I begin, let me remind my colleagues that we had a
closed classified session before this. No information discussed
in that session may be discussed here in the open session.
Admiral Aquilino, CIA Director Burns recently published an
article in which he said, ``no one is watching United States
support for Ukraine more closely than Chinese leadership.''
What message does that send to China if the United States fails
to support Ukraine and allows the Russians, as a result, to
succeed?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Chairman. You know, in today's
integrated, world and this closely aligned global environment,
it is clear to me that based on the comments by President Putin
and President Xi and their desire for a no limits relationship,
and in President Xi's words, a relationship that we haven't
seen in 100 years, that the two authoritarian nations are
aligned more closely than ever.
So, in the lens that we look at it, a strategic win in
Ukraine for Russia is a strategic win for President Xi in
China, and allowing those authoritarian nations to move
forward, to change the world order in ways that favor
authoritarian nations and infringe upon the freedoms and our
values that the United States and our likeminded nations and
allies and partners share, that is a dangerous new world.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. The supplemental that we are now
currently trying to pass contains not only the necessary
support for Ukraine, but also support for the Indo-Pacific
region. So, we would need to pass that supplemental to help you
also. Is that correct?
Admiral Aquilino. Chairman, thank you to the Committee and
the Congress for working through this supplemental, and I
respectfully request that it gets passed as soon as possible.
What is in that is beneficial not only for my partner, General
Cavoli in EUCOM, as it applies to the capabilities that Ukraine
needs.
To our previous point, a strategic win for President Putin
is a strategic loss for the United States. It is also a
strategic win for China. But I thank you specifically for the
things you put in there that directly support INDOPACOM. The $3
billion that has been identified for increased submarine
industrial base maintenance and support, that is critically
important.
Second, the FMF support for Taiwan, also critically
important and directly aligned with the Taiwan Relations Act
and the responsibilities that we execute in support of that
law. Then last, those capabilities provided to INDOPACOM--and I
have had multiple engagements with many of you.
Senator Sullivan and I had some conversations on those
capabilities that are critically important, and I know those
are in that supplemental. I thank all the Members, the
Committee, and the Congress for pushing that forward. But it is
critically important, and it is important to go fast.
Chairman Reed. I should note that the major proponent of
the submarine industrial base funds was my colleague, Senator
Wicker, and we all should thank him for that.
General LaCamera, we have been talking about a transfer of
operational control in Korea for as long as I think I have been
here. Quickly, what are the obstacles? Is that something that
is now being essentially postponed because of the increasing
threat?
General LaCamera. Thanks, Chairman. No, I mean we are on
the trajectory to complete it, but it is standard space, not
time based, and I have gotten that directly from the President
of the Republic of Korea. So, we are working on it, and we are
moving forward.
Chairman Reed. But the cooperation between, I assume from
comments that we have heard, between not only South Korea but
Japan and the United States together is at a historic level of
integration and cooperation. Is that correct?
General LaCamera. Yes, Chairman, and I would like to thank
Admiral Aquilino for the tremendous support we get and getting
at the strategic assets, and also working the cooperation
between the three countries.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. One issue, for both of you, a
conflict in the Pacific, perhaps our weakest link is congested
logistics. It is a long way from the United States to the areas
of operation, and just Admiral Aquilino, very quickly, since my
time is running out, your quick comments and then General
LaCamera on congested logistics and what must we do.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. Thanks. So, supporting the
force over half the globe is the task in the Indo-Pacific AOR.
It is one of the reasons that we have highlighted the need for
significant posture initiatives in the form of support and
development to our friends and allies and partners in the
region.
That is one of the critical aspects. But I also have to
thank Congress for your support for the additional fueling
tankers that you provided to General Van Ovost to be able to do
that. We are going to need more of those, and as we distribute
our logistics capabilities, we are going to do them on land.
We are going to do it at sea. We move some Army watercraft.
So bottom line is it is critically important. That said, the
United States is the only nation that can sustain this type of
force across the globe. So, it is critically important. We need
to do more.
Chairman Reed. Very--General, comment, please.
General LaCamera. Yes. The question I continue to ask both
TRANSCOM and INDOPACOM is when is strategic movement become
operational maneuver? I think our adversaries have learned if
you let us build the Iron Mountain, you are in trouble. So,
there is that piece of the fight.
The other part of the fight is that the fact that I sit
inside the A2/AD bubble, and that we are actually on the Asian
continent, in South Korea. It is not a Third World country. It
is a first world country that can have production--that has
production capabilities, and I think we are looking at all
avenues of what can we do to sustain ourselves.
But we have got to keep the air and the sea lines of
communications open in the fight. It will be a different fight
for a fight on the Korean Peninsula in the future.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Admiral Aquilino, you just talked a little
about the supplemental. If Putin is successful in Ukraine, I
think you said that is a strategic win for the Chinese
Communist Party, and you just nodded your head in the
affirmative.
Can I conclude from your testimony that failure to pass the
supplemental, being a strategic win for Putin and being a
strategic win for the Chinese Communist Party, makes conflict
in the Indo-Pacific more likely?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. Again, with the linkage
of the PRC and Russia as--that we have watched now over the
past 2 years, again, I have--I do believe that a strategic win
for Putin is a strategic win for President Xi. It certainly
makes our problem of deterrence more difficult, and it makes
the potential for conflict more likely.
Senator Wicker. You said, I believe I am quoting you
correctly a few moments ago, things are trending in the wrong
direction for the United States in the Indo-Pacific. Could you
enlarge on that?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. What I said is that things are
trending in the wrong direction based on their capability,
capacity, defense industrial base, their actions and intent by
the People's Republic of China.
So, they are continuing to develop their military machine
despite an economy that has significant problems. They have
increased their defense budget 7.2 percent this year. That is 3
years in a row they have increased it, and I am not sure that
is a very transparent number. My assessment is they are
actually spending more on defense than they articulate.
So, capability and capacity are increasing. Their actions
are becoming much more belligerent. Their rhetoric is more
clear. They have now articulated that the feature at Second
Thomas Shoal is sovereign territory of the People's Republic of
China.
It is not, as validated by the 2016 arbitral ruling that
concluded China has no legal claim to that feature, and then on
top of that, their enforcement is becoming concerning.
The fire hosing of our Philippine allies, the ramming of
their ships, and preventing their ability to resupply their
sailors on the Sierra Madre, as well as restricting their
ability to utilize the resources inside their exclusive
economic zone is all counter to international law, and it is
counter to what all nations interpret as the rightful
interpretation of UNCLOS.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, that leads me then to ask about
the unfunded requirements. Last fiscal year, the Navy asked for
$3.5 billion in unfunded requirements. This year, it has
skyrocketed to $11 billion in unfunded requirements. Now, it is
my understanding this is way more than a simple wish list on
your part.
Because we have required in the NDAA a couple of years ago
an independent assessment. We have required it specifically of
INDOPACOM. Look at the National Defense Strategy that is in
place for the United States. Look at what you have and give us
an independent assessment of what you need. Is that independent
assessment report instructive to you in telling us what your
unfunded requirements are?
Admiral Aquilino. Well, yes, Senator, first, it is law, so
I will deliver that report until you tell me to stop. We have
advocated for those capabilities now for 3 years. They have
been about 90 plus percent consistent. So, in other words, we
haven't shifted the target. We believe we have the right
strategy.
We believe we have the right approach, and we have
delivered those requirements. Additionally, for the 2-years
prior to me, my predecessor was required to deliver a similar--
or the same report. Those requirements have been consistent,
specifically with, you know, approach to the Guam defense
system, the munitions capabilities that we need to sustain our
deterrence effects, and then many of the other capabilities,
so----
Senator Wicker. We have told you to give us this report,
and we have specifically directed that in our NDAA to
INDOPACOM, and yet, this Congress has not given you what you
have needed, so much of that requirement rolls over to the next
Fiscal Year and is--and contributes to the $11 billion which
you have asked for this year.
Admiral Aquilino. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you, Admiral and General, for
the years of service to our country and for the commitment of
your families as well. Admiral, we will miss you probably more
than you will miss us, actually.
But I think this is a question for you, General LaCamera,
and although you both talked about the growing relationship
between North Korea and Russia, that has developed since Putin
invaded Ukraine, and, but can you elaborate on what that means
for the regional reaction and what we are seeing in terms of
that ability to empower both North Korea and Russia?
General LaCamera. Yes, thanks, Senator. It is all--the
relationship has always been there. I mean, the Korean War goes
back to when both Mao and Kim Il-Sung went to Stalin and asked
for permission to invade. Then it fell off when the Soviet
Union collapsed, and that relationship or that assistance,
which I think contributed to the arduous march of the 90's for
DPRK, now it is--there is an opportunity for KGU to have its
weapons tested and to provide that support.
He has always gotten support from Russia and China and the
United Nations. Over the last couple of years, they have
continued to veto any kind of new sanctions, and so
diplomatically, he has gotten that support.
Informationally, he has gotten the support. Both have
provided exchanges of congratulations, and then militarily,
there is now that relationship and they have contributed to the
ability for DPRK to avoid sanctions.
Senator Shaheen. Are we seeing any reaction from our allies
and the other countries in the Indo-Pacific to this
relationship, and any greater concern about what is going on
there?
General LaCamera. I meet with the member nation Ambassadors
once a month doing an ambassador roundtable and we talk about
it, and it is very concerning, that relationship.
Senator Shaheen. China and Russia have both gained a
strategic advantage over us in terms of information operations
and are fighting irregular warfare campaigns against us and our
allies. Can you speak to what we need to do to better leverage
our ability to combat those information campaigns? I guess,
Admiral, this is for you.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator, thanks. You know, the
execution of propaganda, misinformation and disinformation, is
a real concern for me. It should be a real concern for all of
the United States. The PRC's ability to influence our
information environment is concerning. I will give you this
example, right. So, 2 years ago, you heard a lot about the West
is declining, the United States is in decline, and the East is
rising. China is rising. All right, that is Chinese propaganda.
Our economy continues to grow. Theirs is in the cellar. So,
the actions in the information space--ultimately, it was being
reported all over the United States. That is the expansive
ability of mis and disinformation to influence the United
States.
We ought to understand that it is occurring, and we ought
to understand that our free and open media, and the truth that
we project is a critical value of the United States. It is one
to be protected. But we have to call out the mis and
disinformation to stop that ability to influence.
Senator Shaheen. Do you think we need more authorities, we
need more leadership on responding to that? We need a better
strategy? Why have we not done better as China and Russia have
both really expanded their disinformation operations.
Admiral Aquilino. Well, when you say we I am going to talk
about what we do in INDOPACOM. So, the strategic approach we
have taken is to expose the bad and amplify the good. We must
continue to tell the story that is right.
The actions that occurred at Second Thomas Shoal at the
Philippines is a good example there. The media that the
Philippine--our Philippine allies put on the ships to show the
PRC actions are important for the world to see. You will not
see those videotapes in mainland China.
Their story is completely different, which is, you know,
this is an agreement that the Philippines have balked on, and
they are taking their action. So again, it is just a good
example of what happens.
We have to understand how media is used in the People's
Republic of China. Oh, by the way, and in Russia, because it is
a similar problem, and in the DPRK. But it is not what we see
in our media. We have to understand what is occurring and the
differences, we have to value it, and then we have to expose
it.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am out of time, but I did
want to thank INDOPACOM for being the leading combatant command
on women, peace, and security because I think it gives us a
real advantage. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Ernst, please. Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for being here today. Admiral, thank you for your many
years of service. As you mentioned, families are important in
this too, so my thanks to them as well. Thank you for
providing, Admiral, the Committee with your unfunded
requirements list.
Its sheer size indicates a significant gap in what
INDOPACOM is being asked to do and what this Administration's
Fiscal Year 2025 budget request would equipment to do. Can you
highlight some of your missions that would be more challenging
to achieve without the items on that unfunded requirements
list?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. You know, first, it
is worth highlighting that, I don't take lightly when we
develop that list and identify the requirements and we also
understand the magnitude. But what we all have to understand is
we haven't faced a threat like this since World War II, okay.
The largest military, again, as Senator Wicker said, the
world's largest navy, soon to be the world's largest air force.
So, the magnitude, scope, and scale of this security challenge
cannot be understated. All the missions would be challenged,
but some examples. The defense of Guam system is designed to
deliver homeland defense to 170,000 American citizens in Guam,
as well as the need to deliver combat power if required from
Guam.
So, there is a military force generation mission. There is
a defense of our allies and partners mission as applied through
the mutual defense treaties of the Republic of Korea, Japan,
Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
Those requirements and our commitment to our allies is the
highest level of commitment. The ability to deliver deterrent
effects and ensure I am prepared to fight and win if tasked,
that is what we have identified on that list.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. I appreciate that it is a, I
think, very complete list as well and it is very realistic. I
do appreciate your honesty in the information you provide on
what you need to keep this country safe and keep the world
safer.
So, thank you for that. In your written testimony, you note
that the Navy, Army, and Marine Corps still need to procure the
types and quantities of munitions required to defeat threats in
the Indo-Pacific region.
As a Combatant Commander, how do delays in munitions
production or decisions to procure lower quantities of
munitions than you require by the operation plans that we have
out there, how does that inhibit your ability to field an
integrated Joint Force that will be effective against a pure
adversary?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. You know, I would say
the number one lesson learned for the United States as we
watched what the Russians have done in the illegitimate,
illegal invasion of Ukraine, the number one lesson we learned
is that munitions of the right type and magnitude in the right
place, a, delivers a deterrent effect, and b, if we get in a
fight will be absolutely needed.
So, this is a lesson learned over many, many years, but
highlighted in this recent history as it applies to Ukraine.
Those same lessons learned applied in the Indo-Pacific command.
So, we need the right numbers and the right types for the
problem set that the United States will have.
Those are capabilities, not only the land attack
capabilities, but the anti-ship capabilities, anti-air
capabilities, and in the magnitude that we need. So critically
important, and, you know, I don't want to learn the lesson
again.
Senator Fischer. Sir, in that unfunded priorities list, you
included a requirement for an additional $580.7 million for
INDOPACOM campaigning. When you testified before this Committee
last year, we discussed the value of campaigning and having
persistent forward forces operating with our allies and
partners forward every single day.
So, I understand the importance of these types of
exercises. Clearly the budget doesn't align with that
campaigning though. So, what happens if there are continued
delays and the resources needed to persistently project and
maintain forces in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. So critically important and
aligned to the strategy in the theater and in the national
defense strategy is the theory of campaigning, which is pushing
to turn forces forward, operating, exercising and, you know,
working every day with our allies and partners forward to
deliver those deterrent effects. If those funds are not there,
I will just be doing less.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator
Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. As I said in the
closed session that we had, I want to express my appreciation
for both of your service and the tremendous service of
everybody who works under your commands.
I would like to ask a couple of questions about submarines,
in particular AUKUS. How important is AUKUS in our defense
going into the future in deterring China and also providing the
capability that the United States needs to defend our allies
and ourself?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, again, additionally, part of our
strategy is to bring together and strengthen our alliance and
partnerships.
So, AUKUS is a critically important aspect of that. It is a
once in a lifetime, once in a generation increase in capability
of the Australians. It is worth me highlighting that the
Australians are a mutual defense treaty ally. There are
critical partner.
The Australians have shared blood and treasure with the
United States in every fight we have been in for the last 100
years. So, strengthening their defense. Having them with the
exact same capabilities that we have to be interoperable. You
know, I see no break in that linkage.
For the Australians to have Virginia-class submarines and
additional capabilities, we identify in pillar two of the AUKUS
agreement, tied with our UK counterparts, that is a
critically--let's put it this way, that is a really strong team
that if we need to come together, that is very valuable.
Senator Blumenthal. Doesn't our reducing the rate of
production of submarines send the wrong signal at this point?
Admiral Aquilino. Well, Senator, I have certainly advocated
for increased capability of our Joint Force. I have advocated
for increased capacity of our Joint Force in all domains. Our
undersea capabilities are a significant advantage for the
United States, and we ought to consider expanding.
Senator Blumenthal. I know you are in a tough position, and
I am not asking you for your personal opinion or what the
deliberations were that went into the rate--the reduction in
the rate of submarine production from two to one per year.
But I think it sends exactly the wrong signal to our
allies, not only Australia, but others in the region when we
reduce the output of such a critical weapons platform that is
vital not only to our own defense, but to deterrence and
defense of others in the region.
Would you agree that we ought to increase the rate of
production, if possible?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, again, I would--the undersea
capabilities that you have articulated, I absolutely need, and
I need them at scale, and I need them at speed. This is a whole
of nation problem.
Number one, we should resource the requirements as it is
needed to deliver those capabilities. But we also need to
deliver those capabilities on the timelines that we desire and
that we pay for.
So again, I think there is lessons for all of the Nation
here as it applies to this specific capability and others. So
again, I need the assets operationally, there is no doubt.
Senator Blumenthal. How would you compare, question for
both of you, our capability in the artificial intelligence
sphere as compared to the PRC?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I am tracking this very closely.
I think the United States clearly has an advantage. We need to
maintain that advantage, and, you know, when we talk about AI,
I always articulate, let's speak more precisely instead of
saying AI, right.
So, whether it is target recognition, whether it is
autonomous command and control, we have to be specific. That
said, we do have an advantage. I work a lot with, Mr. Doug Beck
from the Defense Innovative--you know, Innovation Unit.
He supports my efforts to deliver capabilities that we
need, and he is a really good asset to help push this forward.
But we do have an advantage and we need to maintain it.
Senator Blumenthal. General.
General LaCamera. Senator, I would agree with that, and we
are continuing to work with INDOPACOM, also with the commercial
industry, and academia to make sure that we do maintain that.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you both. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, let me
just begin by thanking both of you for your service to our
country.
Admiral Aquilino, I understand this is the last time you
are going to be before our Committee, and we thank you very
much for your years of service to this country. I have most
certainly appreciated your candidness in our closed session
regarding the challenges that you face and the need to continue
to invest.
Everything that we can do to deter the forces in that
region, means that our young men and women are not in harm's
way as much as they would be otherwise. So, thank you for that.
Let me just begin, Admiral Aquilino, the way that you have
discussed the Joint Fires Network makes it sound like an actual
joint solution to the problem--to the problem set that the
Department has identified and which the JADC2 is supposed to
solve.
If so, I am glad that you are leaning forward on this and
have submitted it as an unfunded priority. My question to you
relates to my concern that each service is apparently deciding
its own approach to the joint all-domain command and control
program.
We are talking air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. How
and when do you see the Department bringing all of these
separate lines of effort together?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. So first, the
services are doing some good work to figure out how to close
and maintain the ability, through a kill web mechanism, to
close their kill chains.
From the combatant command perspective, we don't do
anything in stovepipes. We fight as a Joint Force. So, the
approach we have taken with the Joint Fires Network is to pull
together a best of breed approach of Project Convergence from
the Army, Overmatch from the Navy and Marine Corps, and then
ABMS from the Air Force, along with the DARPA aspect of Assault
Break II, to pull all those together and deliver a real near
time, best of breed solution to be able to command and control
the Joint Force and ultimately close the kill chain.
I think what this is--the way we have articulated it and
linked it with the building, Senator is, you know, we are going
to kind of provide some insights into the further development
of JADC2 as it goes forward.
So, we are completely linked. We participate in utilize it
in the guide series of experiments that Deputy Secretary Hicks
has been running. We think it will be informative, but
ultimately I am going to produce a prototype, if you will, that
will be demonstrated in our next big exercise this year to see
where we are, what we are doing, is it right, is it at scale?
We have also pulled in what CENTCOM has been doing, and we
have pulled in what General Cavoli has been doing in EUCOM in
support of Ukraine. So, our lens is this is a best of breed and
a pretty good indicator on what we think the future should look
like.
Senator Rounds. When we talk about all of the domains, we
are assuming that our adversaries in the region will do their
best to limit our capabilities in multiple domains, whether it
is cyber or whether it is space. In our particular case, we
have adversaries who prepare to fight and in an armed conflict
there will be no limitations with regard to any domain.
We will be at war, and the war will be in all domains,
including cyberspace and space itself. Accurate to say? The
reason why I ask that is because we talk about a kill web now
rather than a kill chain, recognizing multiple ways.
Can you expand a little bit on that? I am going to ask you
to be a little bit brief because I have one question that I
really want to get to, to General LaCamera on as well.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. The kill web is critical,
right, because we do expect the adversary to try to break our
kill chains. We need multiple paths, multiple dimensions. We
need to be resilient. We need to deliver and close those kill
chains. So. Absolutely required.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Admiral, and I appreciate your
directness on that. General LaCamera, from where I said a quiet
day on the Korean peninsula is truly a great day.
Our relationship with the Republic of Korea and with the
United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission, is a
large credit to why we have had a lasting peace since 1950. We
have been there, but we have been there, and we have been able
to maintain peace.
While these relationships have been established for
decades, are there any policy barriers that hinder your
command's ability to fully integrate partner nation family
personnel into your community programs such as schools.
General LaCamera. Thanks, Senator. It is not a policy. It
is really I need the NDAA changed to read a space--from space
available to space required for our schools for our UNC member
nations.
Senator Rounds. It is a simple change, but it is one that
would be very important in terms of maintaining that
relationship.
General LaCamera. We haven't had to turn anybody away, but
we can't guarantee it for them. Obviously the families are
important and there is angst in those families until we can
tell them that, yes, we have a school slot for them.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Appreciate it. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Rounds. On behalf of
Chairman Reed, I recognize Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. I would like to ask some questions about
alliances. First, I will stress the questions that Senator
Blumenthal asked about the capacity that AUKUS helps deliver us
in the region.
I won't go into it because I thought, Admiral Aquilino,
your answer was very robust there. I have worked with many of
the colleagues on this Committee and on the Foreign Relations
Committee to get the AUKUS framework in law, and I am really
happy with the first set of authorities we put in the NDAA, but
we do need to get the supplemental passed, as you indicated.
Let me ask a question about another alliance that I think
the Committee understands, but sometimes the public doesn't,
and General LaCamera, I would like to ask you about Japan and
South Korea. When the President, President Biden, had the Camp
David summit with the political leadership of the two
countries, it was a headline in the United States, but most
people saw it and thought, well, Japan is an ally and Korea is
an ally.
So, in the U.S., I don't think it was seen as a big deal.
But it is a big deal because Japan and South Korea have had a
lot of challenges based on tough, tough history, and the--in
closing--the increasing closeness of that relationship, both at
the political level and at the military level, is a big deal.
I would like you to talk a little bit about how this
relationship getting closer and the U.S. role in helping
achieve a rapprochement is giving us a strong set of alliances
and an increasing deterrence capacity in the Indo-Pacific.
General LaCamera. Thanks, Senator. I will open with, we
have got to have the humility to know that we can't solve the
historical differences between the two nations, but we have to
do our best to continue to work together with them.
We have to have the emotional intelligence to see it from
both sides as we go forward. The true existential threat to the
Republic of Korea and Japan is not World War II imperial Japan,
it is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with nuclear
weapons pointed at both countries, and quite frankly, our
country.
So, I think, you know, that and our ability to train and it
is, you know, what do we reveal and what do we conceal? You
know, how do we reassure, the South Korean people? How do we
reassure the people of Japan of the importance of that
relationship?
The Korea theater of operations is pretty tight. The
Admiral has been talking about some of these weapons systems
that are out there. We are all inside an A2/AD /bubble, both
countries, and we have got to continue to work together for the
security of all three nations.
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, can I--comment. So, it is
absolutely worth highlighting the leadership of President Yoon
and Prime Minister Kishida to move to where we are today with
the trilateral relationships.
Without their leadership--and I sat with both of them, and
I thank them for it, but the security environment dictates we
are stronger together. We can defend each other's nations. As a
matter of fact, as we sit here today, we have a United States
ballistic missile defense ship, a Japanese ballistic missile
defense ship, and a Korea, South Korean ballistic missile
defense ship operating in the area with the expectation of a
potential launch by North Korea to defend all three of our
nations.
That is where we move this ball, and again, Genera
LaCamera's work has been critical, but the President and Prime
Minister's leadership cannot be understated.
Senator Kaine. I am glad you emphasize that. Let me move to
another topic. 2024 is the 30th anniversary of the effective
date of the U.N. convention on the law of the sea. It was
written in the 1980's.
Sufficient nations ratified by 1994 for it to go into
effect. The U.S. follows the convention but has never ratified
it. The fact that we haven't ratified it means that we lose
opportunities, for example, to claim mineral rights at deep
seabed. Those opportunities have shrunk while other nations
have grown, even at our expense.
The fact that we haven't ratified also means that we are
unable to take enforcement actions or press against illegal
activities by nations like China that would violate the
convention.
There has been a pretty steady drumbeat of support for the
U.N. convention from defense secretaries, DHS secretaries,
Secretaries of State, military leadership under Administrations
of both parties over the last 30 years, but it has particularly
picked up in the last 10 years, indicating that it would be
wise, it would be in the U.S.'s interest if we join the more
than 150 nations that acceded to that convention.
Is that, Admiral Aquilino, as you finish, you know, 40 plus
years of service, including service in the INDOPACOM in this
most recent important chapter of your professional career, do
you share the view that the U.S. joining the convention would
be a smart thing for us to do?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. So, for 3 years, INDOPACOM
and all of my hearings and meetings with Congress, I have
advocated for the ratification of UNCLOS. For the 3-years
before that, as the Pacific Fleet Commander, I have advocated
for it, and in the years before that as well. So, it absolutely
puts us on the right foot as it applies to the security
environment, there is no doubt.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Ernst,
please.
Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks,
gentlemen, very much for being here today. Admiral Aquilino, we
wish you the best in your next chapter, and thank you so much
for your service. Admiral Aquilino, as the Combatant Commander
for INDOPACOM, you do have a lot on your plate. You have heard
from my colleagues.
We understand the threat that China poses as our pacing
threat. In July, I have received back some RFIs from SOCOM, and
they stated that global Combatant Commanders will require more
SOF forces in great power competition.
That same RFI stated that the United States Army's force
structure cuts to SOF enablers will increase risk to
operational commanders. Specifically, cuts to the SOF formation
decrease our ability to meet Combatant Commanders'
requirements.
Admiral, do you agree with SOCOM's assessment that you will
need more SOF forces in great power competition?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. It is good to see you
again. So, General Fenton has been a great partner for a number
of years.
So, as we look at laying down the correct posture and Indo-
Pacific Command in order to deter conflict, there is an
absolute SOF component of that, and it has increased as we have
laid out, what do we believe we need in place. General Fenton
has supported that.
So, our posture has increased. Again, I can't speak to the
other combatant commands. But I have also put my money where my
mouth is because I have a--my senior enlist advisor is sitting
behind me is a Navy Seal, so I needed some SOF too in the
headquarters.
Senator Ernst. Absolutely. Thank you. So, you would agree,
Admiral, that those relationships that those SOF personnel
develop in your region are extremely important. Is that
correct?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, ma'am. Their ability to operate
persistently with our partners for training, for increasing of
combat capability, and then ultimately, should there be
conflict, to have them in the right place is critically
important to me.
Senator Ernst. Very good, and throughout the morning, I
have heard my colleagues talk about relationships and how
important they are. Whether that is nation to nation, member to
member, mil to mil, all of that is very important.
So, I have worked with a number of members in a bipartisan
way here on some of the COFA nations and the Convene Act. Can
you speak to the relationship that those COFA nations have and
how that help stabilize the region?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, ma'am. Before I do that, I do want
to thank you for passing the COFA agreement with the funding
required. That was critically important to our national
security.
We defend those islands like they are our Homeland. Those
COFA states contribute more military members per capita than
anywhere else. We value their service and their importance. But
bottom line is the right force in the right place at the right
time to deliver the right effect. That is what we look at.
In many cases, those are SOF forces. Especially with
smaller nations, they can go in. Or if they don't have
militaries, there is an opportunity for our SOF to work with
police forces and other island capabilities that provide
benefit.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, and General LaCamera,
kind of staying on the theme of these relationships, I am going
to throw you a little bit of a softball. This was not a
scripted question but because I know that you have a personal
relationship with the person I am going to reference, and he is
a hero to many.
The last remaining Medal of Honor recipient from the Korean
War is Colonel Ralph Puckett, and the Korean President,
President Moon, South Korean President, President Moon was here
in May 2021 during that ceremony at the White House where
Colonel Puckett was given his Medal of Honor.
Can you speak just briefly in the minute I have left about
the significance of the President being here from South Korea
during that award ceremony? Tell us a little bit about Colonel
Puckett and his service to South Korea and the United States so
that we can honor him today.
General LaCamera. Thanks, Senator. Yes, Colonel Puckett, if
there is one thing he taught me many years ago as a Lieutenant
all the way up as my Honorary Colonel of the regiment, the
ranger regiment is that combat is simple blocking and tackling.
So, picture yourself, brand new, Second Lieutenant, sail
over to South Korea. Land in the Pusan Perimeter and are told
to stand up a ranger company as a Second Lieutenant. He stands
it up, he fights.
He is wounded. He tells his folks to leave him there. He
still, from his wounds, I think he still had many surgeries,
and they still leak. He is a national treasure. Hard as
woodpecker's lips.
[Laughter.]
General LaCamera. We would always find him down there in a
snowstorm correcting the machine gunners on what to do going
forward.
So, the fact that the President of the United States and I
believe was President Moon was there to present him the Medal
of Honor--or he was there when he got the United States Medal
of Honor, and then last year, during the State visit, he
received the Korean version of that.
His service is legendary all the way through. I think if
you were to talk maybe even to Chairman Reed who probably
remembers Colonel Puckett at the Academy, Ranger Puckett. He is
probably starting to sweat right now.
So, he has mentored and tormented many of us to this
location, and he is a national treasure, so thank you.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, General LaCamera. I think he is
pretty outstanding, and I had you tell his story because I want
folks to recognize that so many of these relationships through
so many eras of conflict, that the United States has always
been a leader. The men and women that serve in uniform have
been recognized by so many nations around the globe. We do face
eras of isolationism as well.
It is incredibly important that we maintain leadership
around the globe. Our sons and daughters are going forward.
They are sacrificing so much for our Nation. But we are being
recognized by those nations as well.
Those relationships matter. They will always matter. So,
thank you for taking time to honor Colonel Puckett today. Thank
you very much. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator King,
please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, how does
Kim hang on? GDP per capita in North Korea is $2,000, and in
South Korea it is $35,000. If you go back to the time of the
Korean War, the GDP per capita in North Korea is essentially
flat and South Korea is a hockey stick. Do the people in North
Korea not know the extent to which they are being compromised
by their government?
General LaCamera. Simple answer is, Senator, they have no
idea what is on the outside world. He maintains power because
he controls information in and controls information out.
Senator King. They literally don't--they don't have access
to the internet or radio broadcasts from other countries? I
mean, it is hard to believe that--the border, I mean, the
border of North Korea is about 30 miles from Seoul, as you
know, and it is hard to believe that they just don't--they
don't know the extent to which, as I said, they are being
compromised. I am being polite by using the word compromised.
General LaCamera. Senator, I have read several books on the
defectors and met a couple of them, and even knowing what they
know right now to go back, they would still go back. I mean, it
is tremendous. He is treated as a deity. The brainwashing that
has occurred is pretty powerful.
Senator King. It is astonishing. Admiral Aquilino, I want
to give you a hypothetical. You were talking a few minutes
about--a few minutes ago about disinformation of the Chinese
Communist Party.
What if the Chinese Communist Party came to this country
and said, we would like to create an app that 150 million
Americans will use, we will have access to all of their data,
and it will give us a platform for information and
disinformation and propaganda.
Do you think that would be a good idea for us to welcome
that hypothetical idea?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. I am incredibly, cautious
of anything that comes out of the People's Republic of China,
specifically in the information space. It is a forum for them
to take advantage of our freedom of speech and information, to
push and sell their thoughts, ideas, and ability to influence
the American public.
Senator King. This is their policy, is it not? This isn't
just something that is random. They have a concrete, deliberate
policy of trying to influence us and other countries through
information and disinformation.
Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely it is a part of their
strategy--are using the information space to achieve their
strategic objectives, and the information space is incredibly
strong. The irony of it is their system is so closed without
freedom of speech that they are taking advantage of our system
of freedom of speech to further their strategic objectives.
Senator King. It is geopolitical jujitsu. They are using
our strength against us, and to go back to my hypothetical, do
you think would be a good idea to allow that app to be on 150
million Americans' phones?
Admiral Aquilino. I can tell you that in INDOPACOM, I would
not allow any of those apps on any of our systems.
Senator King. I think that speaks volumes. Thank you very
much, Admiral, and thank you both for your service. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. Gentlemen, thank you both for being here,
and Admiral in particular, thank you for your final appearance.
I know that is really bittersweet that you won't get to
testify before Congress anymore, but I will have you back as a
civilian expert 1 day in the future. We have heard a few
questions this morning about lessons that Xi Jinping might be
taking from the war in Ukraine. I don't think we have heard yet
about what is happening in the Middle East.
In particular General--or Admiral Aquilino, I would like to
know what lessons you think the Chinese may have learned from
watching our largely defensive response to the Iranian backed
Houthi attacks on freedom of navigation and commerce in the Red
Sea?
Admiral Aquilino. I think what they have--what they are
leveraging and what they learned, Senator, is that the United
States is a global power designed to protect the international
rules based order in a way that benefit all of the globe,
right.
So, the free flow of commerce through the Bab-el-Mandeb,
the Red Sea, is an important issue for all nations, and the
United States, as the enforcer and supporter of that, they have
watched us deliver that effect.
They have taken no action to do that, despite the fact that
having--they have three ships there and they have not
contributed to the benefit of the global flow of commerce or
what it means to all nations.
That ought to be pretty telling to all of us, and they are
perfectly comfortable with us doing it. At the same time trying
to articulate the United States as an aggressor around the
globe, right. It is the example of real, or what is real,
versus what they are portraying in the information space that
we talked about.
Senator Cotton. Do you think they are fearful or emboldened
by the response we have had against the Houthi aggression
there?
Admiral Aquilino. I think they are happy that we have had
to take action, and they view it as any distraction for the
United States is a benefit for the People's Republic of China.
So that is how I think they are looking at it.
Senator Cotton. Okay, let's turn to Taiwan. Do you think
the existing Presidential drawdown authority for Taiwan is
adequate?
Admiral Aquilino. I think it is a good start. I think we
have identified a lot of the capabilities that are needed to
meet the responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act.
I think that--I know for a fact that the Secretary and the
Deputy, we have a process in place to review those and ensure
that we are getting to the right capabilities at the right
magnitude.
Hopefully, again my advocacy is for at the right speed, and
I thank the Congress for including that in the supplemental. It
is critically important.
Senator Cotton. We have provided $1 billion in drawdown
authority. So far, the Administration has only used $345
million of that. Do you think they should use the full $1
billion?
Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely. I think there is a plan for
that. I think there is an ability to produce some of those
things that might be part of the slowdown, Senator, and this is
about, like I said before, right, all parts of our Government
and our industry have to get together and move faster.
Senator Cotton. The 2023 NDAA provided authority to
establish a regional contingency stockpile of American weapons
in Taiwan. Would that be helpful?
Admiral Aquilino. I think that would certainly be helpful
toward our responsibility under the Taiwan Relations Act.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Let's get to the bottom line about
Taiwan and why it matters. Some people might say, well, Taiwan
is just a tiny island, it is so far away, and Communist China
claims it as part of its own territory.
Why would it really matter? Like, why should the United
States be willing to risk our sons and daughters? Why should we
make the massive investment in deterrent capability in your
region to stop China from invading and annexing Taiwan? What is
the big deal? Could you explain why it matters, Admiral?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. There is a variety of reasons
why it matters. First, as it applies to the rules and the rule
of law that we follow and adhere to, that has made the world a
better place, that has allowed for the prosperity of all
nations in the post-World War II environment, that would be
under attack, first of all.
That ties all the way to the illegal invasion of Ukraine,
right. That is an assault on the rules based order. So,
critically important. Second, the democracy, the thriving
democracy that exists there, the values, freedom of navigation,
all of the things that we value, and the United States'
interests are tied to that.
Third, the ability of the United States in the current way
semiconductors are laid out is critically important for all
industry and all the things that we have inside the United
States, when you look at 90 plus percent of high end chips emit
from Taiwan. So, those are just three quick reasons on why it
is important.
Senator Cotton. Douglas MacArthur, in a famous memorandum
at the outset of the Korean War, referred to Taiwan as an
unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender. Could you
explain a little bit to why General MacArthur thought Taiwan
was such critical terrain from a military standpoint?
Admiral Aquilino. Well, certainly it is strategic in its
location, fairly close to Japan, close to the Philippines, and
in a place where two thirds of the global economy transits in
the vicinity of--as it applies to the global need for transport
of goods and services.
So, again, it is a strategic location that could have
advantages if you were to plant excess of military capabilities
on it to restrict or potentially restrict the flow of goods and
services.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Cotton. Senator
Hirono, please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
being here, and Admiral Aquilino, thank you very much to you
and your family for your decades of service. My very best to
you in your future endeavors.
Also, thank you for the courtesies extended to me and my
staff during your leadership in INDOPACOM. You noted several
times about the linkage between the PRC and Russia, and just as
that alliance is very important to those two nations, our
allies are very important. In the INDOPACOM area, we have
Japan, South Korea, Philippines, India, the United Nations.
Our allies are very important to us, and that is why it is
important for us to stand with our allies. You have been asked
a number of questions about the need for us to support Ukraine,
and that is because our allies are important to us and that--
every day that goes by that we are not providing the needed
support for Ukraine strengthens Putin's hand and therefore,
also, Xi Jinping's. Would you agree with that?
Admiral Aquilino. I do, Senator. Again, a strategic win for
President Putin in Ukraine is a strategic win for President Xi
in China, and the allies are so important. We are stronger when
we are together. There is no doubt. The linkage of our values,
our beliefs are critically important.
Senator Hirono. That is why are not funding Ukraine is very
much of interest to Xi Jinping, not to mention Putin, of
course. You also mentioned that the PRC's military buildup,
which has been going on for quite a while.
I think our asymmetric advantage, if you want to describe
it that way, in terms of our assets, our planes, our ships, et
cetera, has been our technological capabilities and our assets.
So do you think we are doing a good job in maintaining our
technological advantage in terms of we may have fewer ships, we
may have fewer planes, but our technological advantage is
there. Do you think we are doing a good job to maintain our
technological advantage?
Admiral Aquilino. I do believe, Senator first let me just
say, we have the world's greatest fighting force that has ever
been seen. That advantage has helped us keep the peace in many
places for decades.
We do have a technological advantage that is second to
none, and the key is maintaining it, because the People's
Republic of China intends on closing that advantage and
ultimately moving in front of us.
Senator Hirono. I think you know that over the years I have
been very a focus on the missile defense of Hawaii, and I would
just ask you very quickly, there is a provision directing the
DOD to develop a comprehensive plan for missile defense of
Hawaii. Do you think that Hawaii is currently protected from
ballistic cruise and hypersonic threats?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, as you know, it is my
responsibility to defend Hawaii. I take that responsibility
very, you know, clearly and of critical importance. Hawaii is
defended from ballistic missiles. Hawaii will be defended from
cruise missiles should there be a threat that shows itself in
the vicinity, and no one is defended from hypersonic missiles
as we sit here today.
Senator Hirono. Not yet. Working on it, I know. I also note
in your written testimony that you address the establishment of
the Joint Task force, regarding Red Hill.
I want to commend you for the leadership that you have
provided and working with the community, and you acknowledge
the importance of rebuilding trust in the local community with
regard to Red Hill. But it goes for our military installations,
not just in Hawaii, but everywhere and the need to build
community support, and so, I commend you for your acknowledging
that.
You were also asked about our recent support for the COFAs.
Now, that agreement took many years to reside. Is there
anything more we can do to support, in addition to the funds
that are--will be provided to Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and
Palau in this agreement, are there more things we can do to
support these island nations, which serve as a bulwark against
China in the Indo-Pacific AOR?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. Thanks. You know, we have
worked with all of those island nations to do a couple of
things. Number one, make sure that they can understand their
maritime domain awareness and have situational awareness when
threats might be in their vicinity. So that is one aspect.
Second, we have provided some understanding on, you know,
what might it mean for increased storm severity and other
environmental issues that would impact, and we have helped on
the construction side to ensure that anything that the
Department of Defense builds is resilient against any of those
threats.
Third, we provide assistance like in Palau, we have a
deployment of Seabees that go there and support the future
cooperation that we do militarily, as well as from other
community service events. So that is what right looks like to
me, and we got to continue to do that.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Hirono. Senator
Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Admiral, I
want to thank you and your wife, Laura, for your exceptional
service over the years. I want to extend my wife and I, our
appreciation to you and your family, and your daughters. You
have done a really, really exceptional job.
So, you are going to be miss. I hope you don't go very far
away, and General, thank you for your continued great service
as well. I want to dig into the supplemental a little bit more.
I know you have gotten a lot of questions on it, but I ended up
supporting that bill. It wasn't perfect.
There is a lot of things I didn't like about it, but I did
it primarily because if you look at it, it is actually
primarily focused about rebuilding our brittle industrial
capacity to produce weapons and weapon systems for our own
military, for our own defense, and enhance our industrial base,
which unfortunately has atrophied. It includes the capacity to
produce everything from subs. $3 billion for subs, but with
AUKUS, it is actually $6 billion--$6 billion.
It is $5 billion for 155 millimeter Howitzers ammo, and it
is everything from anti-ship systems, Harpoons, Tomahawks,
HARMSs, switchblades, it has all in this. 60 percent of this
bill goes to building our industrial base.
So, with that, would our military and Taiwan's, and our
industrial ability to deter a war in the Taiwan Strait be
enhanced by passing this defense industrial bill?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, absolutely, and I appreciate the
support of you and the Congress to identify those needs, again,
both whether they are for Ukraine or directed toward the Indo-
Pacific, as you point out. They absolutely, that bill
absolutely supports the increased industrial base requirements
for ships, submarines, weapons, and other things. Critically
important.
Senator Sullivan. General, on the Korean Peninsula as well?
I mean, $5 billion for 155 millimeter Howitzer rounds produced
in America. That is not insignificant.
General LaCamera. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. So without it, you would think we would
have less deterrence in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean
Peninsula?
Admiral Aquilino. The funding in that bill is absolutely
critical.
Senator Sullivan. General.
General LaCamera. Yes, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. You know, one criticism of the defense
supplemental is it does not prioritize the correct demand
signal for the threats we face, including in the INDOPACOM
theater. I find a little curious, since I worked directly with
you and your team, Admiral, to shape the bill to give you the
weapons systems that you think you need.
I would say you are probably the most expert person
probably in the world on what you need to deter a war in the
Taiwan Strait. So, you think that criticism is accurate, that
it doesn't hit the correct demand signal that you need since
you shape the bill? I know that for a fact since we worked on
it.
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, from my review, again, as it
applies to the items I have required or asked for in the
independent assessment for 3 years, 1,254 last year, and a
1,302 this year, that bill absolutely gets after my
requirements.
Senator Sullivan. Another, one of the views of some of the
critics is that we shouldn't focus on assisting Ukraine because
that takes away from defending and deterring a war in the
Taiwan Strait. So, Putin can roll over Ukraine, but will be
strong in the Taiwan Strait. Does deterrence work that way in
your experience?
Admiral Aquilino. No, sir. As I have testified, the global
threats are inextricably linked.
Senator Sullivan. So, deterrence isn't divisible. You can't
be strong in the Taiwan Strait but let an authoritarian role
over someone we are trying to support in other part of the
world. Do you think that works?
Admiral Aquilino. No, sir.
Senator Sullivan. General, do you think that works that
way? Deterrence? It is divisible? We will be strong here, but
weak over there, but everything is going to be good.
General LaCamera. No, Senator. The world is getting
smaller, not larger.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question, and it
goes to this Administration's focus on these issues. Admiral,
you have, I think, done a great job in this billet, so thank
you again. But you have been talking about overmatched. You
have been talking about trending in the wrong direction. You
just said we haven't faced a threat like this, that is China,
since World War II. To me, this is the 1930's all over again.
Authoritarian dictators are on the march. They are very
aggressive. We have seen this movie before. The big differences
in the late 30's and early 40's, before Pearl Harbor, President
Roosevelt undertook a massive rebuilding of our military,
tripled the size of the U.S. Navy. A lot of people don't know
that.
By December 1941, we had actually tripled the size of the
U.S. Navy. So, we were on the way. Unfortunately, this
Administration and this President are putting forward budgets
that shrink the Navy year after year.
President Biden recently in the State the Union said, hey,
this is a really dangerous world. I am like President
Roosevelt. No, he is not. No, he is not. He is going in the
exact wrong direction. He is shrinking the Navy, shrinking the
Army, shrinking the Marine Corps.
This budget pushes the building of a new carrier by 2
years. As Senator Blumenthal mentioned, it goes to one sub a
year, which nobody thinks is a good idea.
So what kind of message do you think, as we are talking
about deterrence, to Xi Jinping or Putin, a Biden
administration budget, third year in a row, that shrinks the
military, shrinks the Navy, is sending to our adversaries and I
know it is difficult question for you, but did you support of a
budget that pushes the carrier industrial base building out and
brings us down to one sub a year, which again, nobody on this
Committee thinks is a good idea?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, as I have laid out to the
Committee that, you know, my view of the threat and it has
increased both capability and capacity with no signs of slowing
down. I certainly have advocated for a couple of things. Number
one, no reduction in combat power from the Indo Pacific
theater.
Senator Sullivan. Are you game being overmatched right now?
Admiral Aquilino. Right now, again, I am confident in our
forces that in crisis or conflict now, the United States would
prevail, but the trend is going in the wrong direction. So, I
have advocated for increased capability, the modernization we
need and the capacity we need to maintain overmatch.
Senator Sullivan. One final question, and you mentioned 7
percent increase, I agree with you, of the Chinese budget. It
is probably much more. We had a hearing with the DNI and the
DIA Lieutenant General. It was classified, but I am going to
say what they said because they have not gotten back to me.
They actually said they thought it was over $700 billion. I
have asked them to come and help make that public and explain
it. Really important for the people of this country to know
$700 billion from the Chinese probably, or maybe more.
They have never gotten back to me, so if the DNI or the DIA
Director, they are listening, they should get back to me on
this, make this public. Do you have an estimate of what they
are producing, either of you, annually? I know they say 7
percent. It is probably double that. What do you think?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. I don't know if I have an
estimate. Again, I don't know if it is even worth comparing,
right. The issue is what is coming off the assembly line, and
it is significant. You know, 10 warships, high end warships
alone this year. Cruisers, destroyers. Full rate production for
J-20's. Increased missile system, satellite systems. To me,
that is the metric. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Senator Warren, please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, you two are no
strangers to the threat that cryptocurrency poses to our
national security. As both of you have previously testified,
North Korea is using crypto to steal money, evade sanctions,
and to fund its nuclear weapons program. In 2022 alone, North
Korea stole at least, at least $1.7 billion worth of crypto.
That is about 6 percent of North Korea's entire economy and
as much as a quarter of their annual defense budget. You know,
that is a lot of weapons that North Korea is able to build and
fire off, paid for by crypto crime. In fact, let's put this in
terms of missiles.
Admiral Aquilino, help me out here, do you know how many
intercontinental ballistic missiles North Korea can test with
$1.7 billion?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I don't have that specific
calculation, but it is more than we would like.
Senator Warren. It is more than we would like. I like that,
but let's do a little math just because it is fun to look at
these numbers and eye opening. So, it cost North Korea about
$30 million to test an ICBM.
These are long range missiles that North Korea desperately
wants because it could give them the ability to target the U.S.
mainland. At $30 million a test, $1.7 billion is enough to pay
for more than 56 ICBM tests. So, does that surprise you,
Admiral?
Admiral Aquilino. It does not.
Senator Warren. So North Korea is stealing about 56 ICBMs
worth of crypto in a single year, and the threat is not letting
up. Just last week, in a span of 2 days, North Korea laundered
more than $23 million worth of crypto that it stole.
Now, North Korea isn't the only one using crypto to
threaten the United States and its interests. Dangerous actors
all over the world are using crypto to steal and to finance
their illegal activities. One example, pig butchering.
Pig butchering is a crypto scam where scammers, often based
in China or Southeast Asia, use fake identities to lure people
into weeks and even months long online relationships, fattening
them up like hogs for slaughter, before tricking them into
sending crypto.
General LaCamera, I think you have some experience with
this crypto scam. Would you be willing to talk about it for
just a minute?
General LaCamera. Thanks, Senator. Not necessarily with
crypto scamming me personally, but I do have some experience
with being swatted and the number of social media
impersonations that are out there. But I have seen that my face
has been used for scamming.
Senator Warren. Yes, to try to lure people in and think
they are dealing with you on this, you know. You have lots of
company on this. Last year, more than 40,000 people in the
United States lost more than $3.5 billion in pig butchering
crypto scams that we know of.
Now, pig butchering is just one scam. There are many more.
A recent study found that these criminal gangs have stolen and
laundered more than $75 billion in crypto in just the last 4
years.
So General LaCamera, would making it more difficult for
criminals and rogue states to use crypto to steal and to
launder funds strengthen our national security?
General LaCamera. That would be a qualified yes, but yes.
Senator Warren. Yes. Okay. I will take yes. Admiral
Aquilino, do you agree with that?
Admiral Aquilino. I do, Senator. I have over 200 fake
websites put out on me every month, of which many are
soliciting dollars from people who can be fooled.
Senator Warren. Yes, yes. You know, crypto is the way the
stuff is financed and it us helping rogue states. It is helping
terrorists. It is helping criminal organizations fund their
operations on a scale like we have never seen before.
I have got a bipartisan bill, Republicans and Democrats,
with 20 Senators that would put a stop to it. I think it is
time to pass this bill. One last note, I am almost out of time
but General Aquilino, your command failed to provide this
Committee with the information required by law to justify your
wish lists.
I remain deeply concerned that unfunded priorities lists
are distracting us from making the most of our resources and
focusing on grabbing more money for defense contractors. So, we
need to get that cleaned up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On time.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Chairman. Admiral, General, thank
you for your service. Admiral Aquilino, thank you for--good
luck with your retirement.
I am sure you will be moving to Florida soon. Hope you
enjoy it. Price is a little high right now, so I would be
patient on buying a house. Last August, had the opportunity to
visit to INDOPACOM, hear firsthand how threats posed by
Communist China are impacting the United States, especially the
Philippines. I had the opportunity to go look at what the
Chinese are doing out in the Shoals, so.
On that visit it was clear that America cannot take its
eyes off of the regional increased aggression shown by
Communist China. It reinforced my confidence that we got the
best military in the world, but we got a pretty--we got we got
a pretty formal opponent, and they are out to destroy our way
of life.
I am increasingly interested in the congested logistics
fight, and not just in Pacific, but globally. We are going to
have to--if we end up in a conflict, we are going to have to
resource critical capabilities and we are going to need--in the
first few hours and few days of a conflict, they are going to
be decisive, probably in a great power war.
Our goal is, I think all of us want to make sure INDOPACOM
is ready to get everything they need for the fight. The last
time we fought a great power war in the Western Pacific, we
were surprised and not ready. Navy reserve logistic squadrons
were not even established until 5 days after the attack on
Pearl Harbor.
But finally, transport squadrons grew to 540 aircraft and
26,000 personnel devoted to the Navy's airborne logistics
mission and defeating the Japanese. In the case of the Navy,
are you counting on Navy transport squadrons to move logistics
into and throughout the Western Pacific, which is thousands of
miles?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I am actually counting on all
logistics capabilities to support this problem across half the
globe. I want to thank Congress for the authorization for the
10 additional tankers, the console tankers. We intend to use
those as well.
So maritime sealift, the MSC forces that the Navy provides
a critically important. I have also advocated with General Van
Ovost for not only the tankers, but for strategic airlift at a
capacity that will be acceptable. As well as airborne refueling
capability. All three of those have been identified as critical
needs for INDOPACOM.
Senator Scott. So, the Air Force has recapitalized about 50
percent of their C-130's. The Marine Corps has done 100
percent. The Navy hasn't had the opportunity to recapitalize
any of its 32 year old fleet. Does that concern you?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, the need for intra-theater lift--
again, when you talk about half the globe, the modernization of
those airplanes is important, and I certainly advocate for all
the services to be able to provide those capabilities when
needed.
Senator Scott. Do you think overall that we are heading in
the right direction?
Admiral Aquilino. I think as we work toward modernization,
we have the right view. We have to work at speed, and we have
to all get on board.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Scott. Senator
Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,
thank you both for your service. Admiral Aquilino, I want to
echo the comments made by many of my colleagues here. Thank you
for your 40 plus years of service to the Nation.
We wish you well in your next endeavors wherever they lead
you but appreciate your service. This question is really is for
both of you, and it deals with the continuing need for global
stability with all of the challenges that we have, particularly
in INDOPACOM. But the Army's new multi-domain task force, I
believe, is probably the centerpiece of the Army's efforts to
respond to these varied global challenges, as I said,
particularly in the Indo-Pacific.
When forward positioned, these task forces will enable the
U.S. military to freely operate within a very contested
environment. So, I would like both of you to respond, if you
can elaborate a little bit, on the critical role that these
multi-domain task forces are going to have in the Indo-Pacific
region and how do they facilitate your ability to safely
maneuver Joint Forces within your commands?
Chairman Reed. Yes, thanks, Senator. So, first, I will
thank General George, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General
McConville for it, before him on, developing and having the
vision for an MDTF, critically important in my theater. As we
implement it, the key for that task force is to deliver all the
capabilities that have been designed to go with it.
So, the anti-air capabilities, the anti-ship, and anti-land
attack capabilities that go with it. Those are some of the
things we have to go faster and deliver to those MDTFs to
realize the entire warfighting capability of that force. But I
am absolutely supportive of what the Army has done to
contribute to my theater.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you. General.
General LaCamera. Thanks, Senator. Well, I don't own one of
the MDTFs. We do think of it--and, you know, that is the noun.
I do, do the verb, multi-domain operations, and since we
already sit inside the A2/AD bubble, it is a little bit of a
different problem set for me to solve. But the next fight is
going to be combined, joint, interagency, and it is going to be
multi-domain, and, you know, I will probably be asking the
Admiral for one of them, if hostilities begin again.
Senator Peters. Very good. Thank you, General. Admiral, the
Air Force plans to invest $5.8 billion over the next 5 years
with the goal of fielding 1,000 collaborative, combat aircraft
by 2030.
Now, these CCAs will clearly play a significant role in any
future combat, particularly in a contested environment, and
successfully operating in these impermissible areas will
require joint training across Active Duty, Reserve, as well as
guard components in a wide range of environments, which will,
mimic potential conflict zones.
So, my question, for you, sir, is how do you envision these
collaborative combat aircraft being utilized and integrated
into the Indo-Pacific? Then specifically drilling down a little
bit, how could active duty, reserve, and guard components best
prepare for this CCA integration and training, given the near-
term threat that we have in your command now?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. So, when I think about
CCAs, that is one aspect of the all-domain, unmanned,
collaborative, cooperative, and ultimately integrated all
domain capabilities to be able to prevent conflict in my
theater.
So along with the CCAs, right, there is unmanned undersea,
on the sea. Those are above the sea, and that is absolutely
aligned with the approach that we believe will be valuable to
both deter and then fight and would, if need be.
So, I am certainly supportive of the CCA piece. Again, on a
common theme, faster, faster, faster. I am not sure 2030 is
soon enough. So, we have to do that. As it applies to the
training, I am confident that the Air Force will design an
approach such that all Forces, Active, Reserve, Guard, can be
trained and ready to employ.
From my seat, I don't separate those. We have a total force
concept, and in my perfect world, it doesn't matter if it is an
Active Duty, Reservist, or a Guardsman. When they show up, they
are ready to fight, and they are ready to execute their mission
set. So that is what I rely on Air Force to deliver.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator Budd,
please.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. Admiral, again, and
General, good to see you both. Go to an Air Force asset, do you
consider the F-15 Strike Eagle to be a capable aircraft? Is
there a use case for F-15s in the Indo-Pacific operating in
concert with Gen-5 fighters?
Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Budd. In its fiscal year 2025 budget, Air Force
plans to divest 26 F-15 Strike Eagles, and at the same time
buying less than expected F-35, F-15EXs and other fighters. So,
are you concerned about the increasing fighter gap, or the
fighter capacity gap with China?
Admiral Aquilino. I am absolutely concerned.
Senator Budd. Different topic, Admiral. The 2023 NDAA
required the DOD to establish a standing Joint Force
headquarters at INDOPACOM. That requirement included a deadline
for the JTF to be set up by October 2024. Could you give us a
status on the efforts to establish that JTF and any obstacles
you might be facing, and any assistance that we could provide?
Admiral Aquilino. At this point, Senator, I think we are on
path. My view of the command and control in the theater has
evolved over 3 years, and we can talk about some of that in the
classified level.
That I can tell you is, I advocated and stood up JTF
Micronesia as a way to, number 1, align our capabilities in
Guam. number 2, that was in the near term. In the mid-term it
was designed to be a forward station warfighting JTF
headquarters, and what I have learned is that I don't think
that happens soon enough.
So, I have proposed and am briefing out throughout my
leadership an approach to put in place a permanent joint task
force headquarter construct. At this point, I haven't
identified any needs, but I will always inform Congress as it
applies and goes forward, and you will see that in any follow
on report requirements that you direct me to deliver.
Senator Budd. Thank you for that. Now, my colleagues have
already asked about funding for munitions, and I believe that
you have requested $3.3 billion for military construction in
the Indo-Pacific Area of Responsibility. So, what kind of
projects will this request money go toward and where will it be
located?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I will give you all the details,
but right now we are looking at 212 projects across the entire
theater in almost every nation.
Those fundings are required, and they support our partners
and allies' ability to build out their infrastructure such that
we can operate with them in places that are needed. But it
applies to runways, seaports, fuel capability, munitions
storage. Those are the key aspects of it.
Senator Budd. You mentioned in runaways, but is it fair to
say that these investments, particularly in things like
airfields for dispersed operations, will be key to deterring
China?
Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely.
Senator Budd. So why weren't these items included as part
of the Air Force, Army, and Navy's respective budget request?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator, that is a better question
for the service components.
Senator Budd. Admiral, the Administration says that it's
prioritizing China in its pace--as its pacing challenge, but
you have just sent us a list of unfunded requirements totaling
more than $11 billion. It is nearly three times more unfunded
requirements than you had last year. It seems like something
doesn't add up.
So, how can the Administration say that it is prioritizing
China if it won't provide you and INDOPACOM with the resources
you need to deter Beijing? That is Admiral, a bit of a
rhetorical question. So, the Biden administration, they just
sent over an $895 billion defense budget request.
Your unfunded requirements is just an $11 billion total,
and just 1 percent of that, that is 1 percent nearly of the
total amount requested by the Biden administration. Yet the
Administration seemed that they couldn't find the money. I am
even told that there is $11 billion in unused Pentagon funds
that just expired.
So, I think we all understand that this is a very dangerous
time with China on a war footing and conflict increasingly
likely in the Indo-Pacific. The only way that we are going to
avoid war or win if it comes, is if we put our money where our
mouth is.
That means that if we say China is the priority, then we
have got to act like it. So, thank you for your testimony and
thank you for your many years of service.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Budd. Senator
Duckworth, please.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
Admiral Aquilino, General LaCamera. Thank you for being here
today, and, of course, thank you for your many decades of
service. I am concerned about the needed investments in our
medical ecosystem and infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific
region.
As INDOPACOM prepares the Joint Force for conflict with a
near adversary, our ability to provide lifesaving care for
servicemembers must remain a priority. The conditions in the
Indo-Pacific with remote islands will strain our ability to
medivac wounded servicemembers to row three and four medical
facilities.
The golden hour for providing critical medical care won't
exist, and to improve the outcomes for servicemembers who will
likely receive critical medical care near the frontlines, we
must pre-position lifesaving supplies like blood and class
eight medical supplies as far forward as possible.
Admiral Aquilino, how is INDOPACOM working across the Joint
Force to ensure critical medical supplies such as blood and
class eight medical supplies are pre-positioned across the
region?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. You know, we have
incorporated this aspect in the medical care of our forces in
our last set of exercises. We rehearsed some of it. We moved
some medical capability forward as a part of exercises.
So, again, we take it very seriously. We need to make sure
that we can do it and execute at the time of need, which is why
we practice and rehearse. Additionally, we do have allies and
partners in the vicinity, and we have to make sure that the
medical care that is available there, a, we have access to it
at the scope and scale needed, and we coordinate with our
allies and partners to do that. So that is how we are taking it
on.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. You actually addressed my
next question somewhat, and in fact, we have allies and
partners like the ROK, like Japan, like Singapore that have
medical facilities that meet JACO standards, which is the Joint
Accreditation Agency for the United States hospital system.
Admiral, allies and partners, as you said, will be
critical. Given the amount of--now given the amount of blood
that would be needed during a potential conflict, how are you
coordinating, how is INDOPACOM coordinating with other
interagency partners to gain access to blood supplies in
foreign countries across the region?
Admiral Aquilino. I think those discussions are ongoing
with my--from my doctor across the region and our allies and
partners. As a part--we highlighted it as a part of those
exercises and assets. We have not certainly pre-positioned at
this point in time, but we have to have the places to do it
when needed, and we are doing those assessments.
Senator Duckworth. Well, the blood cannot really be pre-
positioned, but having established agreements to access those
blood supplies--but it also means that those blood supplies
have to be certified to be given to U.S. servicemembers, which
some of them may not if they don't have--if they have not
complied with our requirements.
So, I think all of that is critically important. It is good
to hear that you are addressing the issue. As you all know, I
have been a vocal advocate for a combat credible logistics
network, shifting a little bit. The ability for the United
States to project to Joint Force in the Western Pacific would
depend on our intra-theater lift capabilities.
INDOPACOM will have to grapple with moving troops,
supplies, and equipment across a complicated island chain
network, and you and I have had conversations on this,
requiring significant investments in watercrafts, floating
piers, and roads.
Admiral, where do you see how current gaps in intra-theater
lift in the Indo-Pacific region, and what role do you foresee
the Army Corps of Engineers having in tackling this issue?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. Again, the approach--the
Army component has actually moved some watercraft. Some have
gone to Japan now.
So, to probably put those forces in the right place,
posture wise, is critically important. The intra-theater lift
piece, I have concern on the overall capacity aspect of it,
whether it be C-130's, you know, C-17s, or C-5s, as it applies
to the lift--the airlift piece.
Then on the sealift piece, those forces have to be ready to
be shot at, right. So, the contested aspect of it, they have to
be able to operate in ways where they can't be targeted, and we
have to train and rehearse those aspects. So, those are the
things that concern me.
Senator Duckworth. That is also true for the medivac piece,
right. We are going to have to fight in. We can't just go in
and pick up our wounded the way we have in other theaters. I
think we are going to have to fight our way in to pick up our
wounded and fight our way back out as well.
One final question. In peacetime, leveraging our civil
works program, and the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Coast
Guard are important for building cooperation. What new areas
can we collaborate with our allies and partners using examples
like the successful Sister Rivers Exchange Program as a model?
For example, the Mekong River and the Mississippi River
initiatives are a good example.
Admiral Aquilino. I think it is. Our construction forces,
and not just the Army Corps, but the, you know, the Air Force
red teams, the Navy Seabees.
Again, those provide some significant training for those
allies and partners to build their capacity to help themselves
more often. So, we have seen some benefits there, and we will
have to continue to do that.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Admiral. I yield back,
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
both of you. Admiral, thanks for your service. You came here
about the same time I did 3 years ago. Time flies when you are
having fun, right.
It goes by quick. This is for both of you. After President
Trump's summit with Kim Jong-un, we announced that we were
suspending large exercises like Foal Eagle. Given North Korea's
escalation, is it time to go back to that, or are we going to
continue to do the small ones? General.
General LaCamera. Thanks, Senator. I would say we are doing
large exercises. Just finished Freedom Shield. Added live,
virtual, and constructive training to it, and then given the
training--we talked about the strategic assets that visit the
peninsula. Those are all training events for me, and
incorporating and making sure that we know how to properly
employ them if we need to.
Senator Tuberville. Admiral.
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, as it applies to the DPRK,
again, we support General LaCamera to ensure that he has got
all the assets needed to do a full scale, full blown exercise
set. Across the rest of the theater, we have increased the
scope and scale of all of our exercises with our allies and
partners.
For example, Keen Edge was perceived--was a bilateral
United States, Japan exercise in the past. We just executed
that full blown event as a trilateral event with the
Australians, and we have done that across all of the critical
exercise, Balikatan with the Philippines, Cobra Gold with
Thailand, Talisman Saber with Australia. So, scope and scale is
increased everywhere.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Admiral, on your way out the
door, we need a tanker in the Indo-Pacific. KC-46, I always ask
about this. Are you confident in the 46, the availability and
the durability?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. I am confidence the right
tanker to fill our holes, but I am concerned about the
magnitude and our ability to deliver enough tankers in this
theater in time of crisis.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, thank you. I think we all agree on
that. You know, China conducts these circling around Taiwan
quite often. Is there going to be a giveaway to one of these
days when one of them is not an exercise, it is an actual
attack? I mean, will we be able to distinguish that, and how
will we be able to do that?
Admiral Aquilino. Well, we watch the behavior and actions
of the PRC each and every day. We do have some concerns on what
it would look like and how it would look like. But again, we
watch it every day. I would like to--if you want a different
conversation, we have to do in a classified level.
Senator Tuberville. All right. Are you concerned about
nickel for submarines? I know that in our State, we make
submarines, and it is very hard to find, and it is going to be
a problem as we go along. Are you familiar with that?
Admiral Aquilino. So critical minerals across the United
States is an issue that I am watching. It is not in my job jar.
What is required for me is for that warfighting capability to
be ready, available, sustainable, and be able to execute when
needed. If there is critical minerals or supply chain issues,
that certainly concerns me.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, and I know this is not
either one of your purview. You might not want to answer this.
I just like to ask you, most of you, because you have a huge
job in our military. We are looking to pass more supplemental
money, and obviously for Ukraine, for Taiwan, for Israel.
Admiral, can Ukraine beat Russia?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. Absolutely. I think they
are demonstrating that in each and every day.
Senator Tuberville. What does a win look like at the end of
the day?
Admiral Aquilino. I think that the Ukrainian territory is
restored.
Senator Tuberville. Including Crimea?
Admiral Aquilino. Again, I will leave that to General
Cavoli and to the policy side. But, you know, a place where the
Ukrainians can operate in their sovereign territory, with the
freedoms and values that they want to project, that is what
right looks like.
Senator Tuberville. General.
General LaCamera. Yes, I think they can win. I will leave
it at that.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, earlier
today downstairs, we talked a little bit about militarization
in the South China Sea. They now have the world's--the Chinese
have the world's largest Coast Guard.
They use--it as part of a strategy to assert dominance. You
talked about how they are now claiming it as territorial
waters. They use coercion and intimidation tactics to bully
countries including the Philippines and a country we have a
mutual defense treaty with.
The Chinese are regularly intimidating Philippine vessels
at the Second Thomas Shoal and continue dangerous and
escalatory actions that threaten peaceful shipping in one of
the world's busiest waterways.
Late last year, China was upset when the USS Gabrielle
Giffords, named after my wife, continued routine operations in
the area after conducting joint patrols with the Philippine
Navy, lawful patrols.
So as you finish your time as the INDOPACOM Commander and
prepare to hand the reins to Admiral Paparo, can you talk about
what you have learned about China's actions in the South China
Sea and what would happen--we discussed this a little bit
downstairs, some concerns about if there was actually, you
know, some engagement, like escalatory, between China and the
Philippines, and if maybe somebody had gotten hurt.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. So again, we continue to
articulate that Article 5 of the Mutual Defense Treaty applies
if the Philippine--as our allies, the Philippines, were to be
attacked, and then that would change a bit of the scope of what
is happening there at Second Thomas Shoal.
So, I articulate that the bullying behavior is broad, and
it is across the region, from India to the--Malaysia, to
Vietnam, all across the region. I think that it would be
beneficial for China to be able to interweave into the
international order that all countries have defined. I believe
there is a peaceful way out of this.
There is a place for China in this world. They are just
going to have to understand that the nations of the globe
require a set of international standards and behaviors that are
acceptable, and what they are executing now is not.
Senator Kelly. How do you feel our relationship is with the
Philippine government with regards to Second Thomas Shoal and
anything we could work on there. I am going to be in the region
next week and that is something--if there was something that
you specifically would raise with President Marcos or the
Philippine Navy, what would that be?
Admiral Aquilino. I have sat with President Marcos twice in
the last three and a half months. Number 1, I thanked him for
his leadership, for articulating what is acceptable and what is
not. Incredibly impressed by Minister of Defense Todoro's
leadership as well, as well as my counterpart, General Broner.
So, they are fighting for their sovereignty. They are
fighting for the international rules based order, and we
continue to support them both, in legal domains, in the
information space, and in the military space as we execute
joint patrols and other cooperation activities in the form of
maritime domain awareness.
So, again, my message to the Philippines is always, you are
our ally, we are with you, and we are here to help maintain the
peace, as well as their sovereignty.
Senator Kelly. Just for my own, you know, personal,
information, what is going on around Scarborough Shoals? I
spent a lot of time down there when I was, in Westpac. Is there
similar Chinese activity in that area?
Admiral Aquilino. There is absolutely similar coercive, and
actions being taken to prevent Philippines from being able to
fish there and operate in that vicinity.
Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Schmitt,
please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and both of you,
thank you for your service. I mean it sincerely. I think the
candor by which you answer these questions and your
availability or accessibility to the Members of this Committee,
and I know others is very much appreciated.
For me, as a newer member and certainly focusing a lot of
my time on this Committee on the Indo-Pacific issues, your
expertise, your service is--the people from Missouri appreciate
it, too.
So, just wanted to say that. Following up, I feel like I--
Senator Kelly stole the question that I wanted----
[Laughter.]
Senator Schmitt. We have recently written a letter actually
to Secretary Austin about this ongoing harassment that happens
with the fishing in the South China Sea and particularly the
Filipino vessels.
It just feels like this thing is--that there is a
trajectory to all of this. Currently these are, you know, not
technically PRC Navy vessels, Coast Guard--I mean, they are all
sort of one in the same in many ways, right.
But where do you see--I mean, if you were to predict where
this is going and what we need to do to deter--this is sort of
a followup to the previous question is, you know, in a concrete
way, what are a couple of things that we could do tomorrow to
help discourage this, because it does feel like we are headed
down a road here and we have got a obviously mutual defense
agreement with the Philippines, that this thing could escalate
quicker than people probably realize.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, thanks, Senator. So militarily,
again, we execute joint patrols. We operate with our Philippine
partners in the vicinity, in order to ensure that we can
demonstrate resolve. But I have also advocated for a broad set
of the global nations to identify and speak out against this
belligerent bad behavior that is not in accordance with the
international community's interpretation of UNCLOS (United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea).
To validate the 2016 tribunal against China's illegal claim
that that is Chinese sovereign territory, it is not. So,
articulating that and not just from the Philippines, not just
from the Philippines and the United States. I am talking about
the EU nations.
I am talking about the UK. I am talking about the Middle
Eastern nations, and I am talking about the Pacific nations,
right. This is one step today. This is not an Indo-Pacific
problem. This is going to be a global problem.
Senator Schmitt. Right, and there also, the CCP is now
making claims, additional claims in Vietnam, right, and they
are sort of marking additional territory.
Who else do you see--sort of I mean, you clearly by China
showing their fangs here, there are some folks who maybe didn't
want to pick a team, are certainly coming our way.
Which, who else? We got the Philippines, you know, Vietnam.
Who are some other--Australia, of course, in the South China
Sea there. Who else do you think has sort of seen this
aggression for what it is?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. First, a comment on your
first point. Number one, the United States doesn't ask any
nations to choose. We support the rights of all nations to have
sovereign territory as defined by law.
We support their freedoms, their voice in the international
community, where everyone gets an equal voice, to be able to
articulate their needs and security needs. So that is what we
stand for. Again, we are not asking them to pick sides.
Senator Schmitt. Yes, you are not. I know, I know.
Admiral Aquilino. That said, all of them, right. I have
asked for this discussion globally, and I have worked with
General Cavoli to help identify this, and we are seeing it from
United Kingdom and the European Union (EU) nations.
More of them are going to deploy to the Pacific. The ASEAN
[Association of Southeast Asian Nations] are critically
important. The centrality of ASEAN is important to the region,
and it is not that they are not seeing it. It is a concern
about speaking out and being at risk for follow on PRC economic
coercion and other behaviors that will negatively impact their
nation.
So, the concern is not do they see it. It is, will they be
able to talk about it.
Senator Schmitt. Well, it is certainly my hope that whether
it is a Belt and Road Initiative or BRICs, that other countries
are seeing this and the levers that China has and once they
have got their hooks into you, they are real.
General, I want to ask you, I know that traditionally there
has been, you know, sort of a--the Korean Peninsula was its own
sort of thing. The South China thing was its own sort of thing.
I think that we have, realized that this is all obviously very
interconnected. What--how do you see this moving forward?
Because clearly, what we do, our friends and our allies,
and the support that we have in the Korean Peninsula, and those
strategic alliances that we do have matter, I think, for
deterrence with China. How do you see that as a development? I
think you have been a great leader on this point.
General LaCamera. Thanks, Senator. I think that what starts
locally goes regional and globally pretty quickly, and we are
seeing it. You know, there have been--there were impacts with
COVID.
There were impacts with Ukraine globally that we feel on
the peninsula, and you know, our focus is on protecting the
Korean people, my United Nations--as the United Nations
Commander, it is to maintain the armistice.
But it is to react. You know, the inherent right of self-
defense never goes away. So, we will protect ourselves.
Response requires consultation with our Korean allies, and then
any kind of retaliation or further escalation, I think we have
always got to be prepared for if somebody tries to take
advantage of an incident or crisis someplace else in the Indo-
Pacific.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you both, again. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Senator Rosen,
please.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. Thank you, Chairman Reed,
for holding this hearing. I would like to thank you, Admiral
Aquilino, for your service.
Of course, I wish you so well in your forthcoming
retirement, and you and your family will maybe get to travel
for fun now that you are going to retire, and that will be a
little bit different.
Of course, General, we thank you for being here today and
for your service as well. I want to talk a little bit about
autonomous capabilities, because during one of my visits to
Central Command, I visited Task Force 59, and I was deeply
impressed at just amazing things that are doing. Their ability
to utilize autonomous capabilities to quickly apply lessons
learned, it is not only innovative, it is also really
effective.
So, Admiral Aquilino, can you elaborate how Indo-Pacific
Command is integrating these autonomous capabilities and
leveraging that commercial off the shelf technology to enhance
our strategic posture? How do these initiatives like Task Force
59 really help us in managing costs and compete with China?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. So, we have been
experimenting and rehearsing and practicing with unmanned
capabilities in the Pacific Fleet and in INDOPACOM now for
going on 6 years. We didn't generate a separate task force to
do it. It is run out of the Pacific Fleet headquarters.
So, those efforts are critical to our approach for both
deterrence and then for our ability to fight and win. As a
matter of fact, Admiral Perot is a Pacific Fleet Commander. As
we sit here as executing an integrated battle problem that's
got about 20 different unmanned capabilities being integrated
into our exercise.
So, pulling those together, being able to deliver them,
being able to command and control them through the required
autonomous and command and control links that we need, that is
where the focus is. So not just what does that thing do. It is,
how do you take a thousand of them and be able to employ them
in a way that is effective.
Senator Rosen. That is fantastic. Thank you. I am going to
keep with you, Admiral, and talk about, assisting our partners
because it has been widely reported that during Taiwan's recent
democratic election, they experienced a wide range of cyber-
attacks throughout their networks. It is why I led the Taiwan
Cyber Security Resiliency Act.
This legislation is included--was included in last year's
NDAA, and it helps Taiwan prepare to counter exactly this kind
of attack that they faced, and so, it is, again, just another
step in assisting our partners and allies to defend against
their potential vulnerabilities. So do you think--you know,
Taiwan supply chain.
We have seen so many supply chain issues in the last few
years for various reasons. Do you believe Taiwan supply chain
is another potential area that could be targeted by bad actors.
How would taking actions to firm up Taiwan's defense supply
chains, including through enhancing our cooperation between our
defense industrial bases, maybe help deter China from future
aggressive actions?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. I wouldn't limit the issue.
It doesn't just apply in one place. It applies all across the
region against all our allies, partners, and friends. The
ability to protect both our civilian critical infrastructure as
well as our military critical infrastructure is important.
Our security challengers intend and are rehearsing and
practicing and attempting to go after all of it. So, my
partnership with the Commander of USCYBERCOM--General Hawk has
been to my headquarters. He understands our priorities.
He has got forces cooperating with all our allies and
partners and friends to be able to tighten up their networks
such that they can't be intruded against or used against us.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I am going to continue on this
chain a little bit, but going over to you, General, I want to
talk about defending ourselves against unpredictable
adversaries, because the September 11th Commission report
famously identified, and I am going to quote, a failure of
imagination as a critical shortfall of our defense at that
time.
I think our ability to create and innovate, we think about
Task Force 59, using things commercially available, what we
develop, what we invest in, and so North Korea has really
proven to be resourceful and unpredictable adversary.
How is United States Forces Korea, excuse me, actively
working to foster a culture of creativity, of imagination,
innovation, critical thinking, and anticipation of what North
Korea might be doing in its strategic planning and defense
operations so we can better understand what we think the new
and emerging threats are there.
General LaCamera. Thanks, Senator. I don't think DPRK is
unpredictable. He's laid out his goals of what he is going to
do, and we are not surprised by that.
So, he is on a trajectory to accomplish those. We just
finished Freedom Shield, our exercise, and I can assure you
that taking lessons learned from different places on--around
the globe and throwing different curveballs at the staffs and
the Component Commanders on how to think and act differently,
as the Admiral has challenged us to do.
I have quoted that we cannot have a lack of imagination. We
can't think that the attack is going to come from one
direction. We have got to think about it in different
directions. Our big challenge is turnover and making sure that
we are constantly going back and revisiting.
I have also challenged him. It is either adapt or perish,
and so we have got to continue to focus on what the threat is
going forward.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is
up, but I have a question for Admiral Aquilino about his
retirement. It is kind of a fun one. Could we give him the last
word for that?
Chairman Reed. Absolutely.
Senator Rosen. Admiral Aquilino, you know, your commitment,
service to our Nation, deeply appreciated. We are so grateful
for your sacrifice. So, what is your advice for the next
command as you leave? What insights do you have and what would
you tell us that we should be paying attention to?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I think, first of all, I have
been working with Admiral Paparo now for 3 years here and for
the last 30. He understands the theater. I would give him a one
word set of guidance, and that is deliver.
Senator Rosen. I think that is a good word. Thank you. It
is great to end on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen, and gentlemen,
thank you for your testimony. I want to make one point before I
conclude, and that is, several of my colleagues have criticized
President Biden for sending up a budget of $886.35 billion.
Which, by simple arithmetic, increases the unfunded
priority list. What they fail to recognize or ignore, that the
President was legally required to send that number up. There
was a limit established from the Fiscal Responsibility Act of
2023, and the reason we passed that act was because there was
serious threat of a default on our national debt.
I can assure you, if we default on our national debt, the
issues and the problems and the questions you would be getting
today would be much more, indeed exponentially more difficult
because it would have set off an international economic
collapse.
So, it is Congress that has established a limit, and it is
Congress that must deal with that limit, and I think that has
to be made. Finally, let me add to the commendation and
congratulations to you, Admiral Aquilino, and your family for
distinguished service, for--and I think direct might be the
word we would use as your nickname if it wasn't long, and it
would be direct, and we appreciate that very, very much, sir.
General LaCamera, I have had the privilege of working with
you since you were a Battalion Commander in the 10th Mountain
Division. Thank you for your service and your courage. Please,
thank the families that are so important, and the men and women
who serve in uniform in the United States in your Commands.
With that, I would adjourn the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
exercises and campaigning
1. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, campaigning in the Pacific
plays a key role in our National Defense Strategy to deter China. The
Services are responsible for providing the forces and funds for your
execution in the priority theater, but there is a $580 million
campaigning shortfall in fiscal year 2025, which you have listed as #3
on your unfunded priorities list. Can you talk about the role
campaigning plays in the Pacific, and in particular, how important it
is to our overall strategy in the region?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, campaigning is the centerpiece to our
overall strategy in the region; it normalizes our presence and
strengthens and stabilizes our relationship with our allies and
partners. Campaigning also allows me to move my assigned forces
throughout the theater to create a deterrent effect and be postured to
respond to crisis. Without it, I am not able to fully employ the
assigned forces.
indo-pacific command infrastructure
2. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, across your theater,
facilities are in a State of disrepair, impacting our readiness and
ability to mobilize forces quickly. In particular, Guam is still trying
to recover from the damage of Typhoon Mawar, which is in the billions
of dollars, and I noticed you have over $3 billion dollars in military
construction projects on your unfunded priorities list. How does
crumbling infrastructure in the Pacific impact your ability to conduct
deterrence?
Admiral Aquilino. Infrastructure in the Pacific cannot support the
joint force across the continuum of response options. If priority
infrastructure requirements defined in INDOPACOM's Independent
Assessment are not resourced, INDOPACOM will not have the flexible,
resilient, distributed force posture needed to deter aggressors and, if
deterrence fails, fight and win.
Coastal infrastructure in the Pacific must withstand uniquely harsh
conditions including humid, saline-rich environments and coastal
erosion, storm surge, and increasingly frequent extreme weather events
such as Typhoon Mawar. In addition to building new capability,
INDOPACOM is working to repair and restore aged infrastructure
throughout the theater, much of which dates back to WWII. This
challenge is further complicated by the fact that in the Pacific,
construction, repair, and maintenance materials and workforce are more
costly and time intensive to obtain and employ.
3. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, what additional risk is
introduced when the Department of Defense (DOD) fails to adequately
resource necessary military construction projects in the region?
Admiral Aquilino. INDOPACOM's prioritized military construction
projects are required to deliver joint posture requirements to the
force. Without timely planning, design, implementation, and
construction of key infrastructure, INDOPACOM and the joint force would
not have the footprint to deliver integrated deterrence and achieve our
mission.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
artificial intelligence and investments in data
4. Senator King. Admiral Aquilino, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine
has changed the nature of warfare, specifically regarding the
application of AI and other significant technology to efforts by the
Ukrainian Defense Forces. It is important that these considerations are
utilized across other areas of responsibility (AOR), to include U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), to
maintain pace with strategic and near-peer competitors.
The war in Ukraine has shown us that investments in data,
artificial intelligence (AI) and computing are what's going to allow us
to stay ahead of the curve in a future conflict. How is your AOR
thinking about taking a more data-driven and AI-enabled posture?
Admiral Aquilino. Maintaining our joint warfighting advantage
requires us to outpace our challengers and urgently deliver advanced
capabilities. Some examples of how we're approaching this in the
USINDOPACOM AOR include the Joint Fires Network (JFN), the USINDOPACOM
Mission network (IMN), and the Pacific Multi-Domain Training and
Experimentation Capability (PMTEC).
JFN is USINDOPACOM's mechanism to integrate and synchronize effects
across the battlespace. The IMN is a secure, zero-trust, data-centric
environment that allows USINDOPACOM to rapidly share information and a
common operating picture with allies and partners. Finally, PMTEC
enhances U.S. allied and partner training by enabling realistic, joint,
and combined training ranges to improve our future operations and
exercises by using Stormbreaker, an AI-based gaming and simulation
capability.
5. Senator King. Admiral Aquilino, how are Combined Joint All
Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) efforts going?
Admiral Aquilino. We are making progress toward partner integration
in line with the CJADC2 Campaign Plan 2030 FVEY Addendum. INDOPACOM's
Mission Network (IMN) proved successful during Keen Edge 24 by
integrating two partners, enabling trilateral operations.
mission data platform
6. Senator King. Admiral Aquilino, Mission Data Platform (MDP) is
INDOPACOM's proven coalition warfighting environment that supports over
7,000 users from 6 countries with live data integrations to numerous
authoritative DOD and partner data sets. It delivers data-centric
application security to a large suite of applications, including real-
time chat with automated language translation, a multi-domain Community
of Practice (COP) with capabilities for geospatial analysis, and
document generation. We commend the success of Mission Data Platform to
enable partner collaboration. What is your plan to scale this
capability?
Admiral Aquilino. INDOPACOM decommissioned the MDP in April 2024.
The MDP pilot began on Combined Enterprise Regional Information
Exchange System (CENTRIXS) as a method of providing data-centric
collaboration and mission data sharing across multiple network-centric
security domains. The MDP demonstrated promise in this area, but cost
and cybersecurity policy limited full-scale theater deployment. The
development of the INDOPACOM Mission Network (IMN), our zero trust,
data-centric approach for mission partner information sharing, reduced
our reliance on a third-party data-centric capability. In addition, we
assessed that the MDP would not fully integrate with security
principles in our new architecture that conform to Department of
Defense guidance. At the same time an INDOPACOM review of our
modernization efforts identified potential duplication of effort in the
mission data space, specifically in common operation picture (COP)-like
capabilities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
power beaming
7. Senator Manchin. Admiral Aquilino and General LaCamera,
currently, the DOD's Operational Energy Office is focused on wireless
power beaming technology. Wireless power beaming offers amazingly
flexible energy supply by transferring power from a battery to a device
of ones choosing. This technology, combined with Space Solar, offers
promising, powerful renewable energy to anywhere on the globe. For
example, power beaming an unmanned aircraft that performs intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations would provide ISR
collection capabilities around the clock without the requirement to
refuel or the risk of being denied power. However, the Chinese
Communist Party is already accelerating research on the topic investing
$30 million in facilities alone. The military application of this
technology is numerous especially in the Pacific and it is crucial we
have first mover advantage to prevent our adversaries from leveraging
the influence that comes with such a technology. Considering the
importance of this emerging technology and the capabilities it offers,
I am requesting a point of contact from your staff to work with my
staff on this matter.
Admiral Aquilino. Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM supports the
continuous development of new and innovative technology, such as
wireless power beaming, to solve logistical challenges presented in the
theater. Your staff may work with Mr. David Cox, the USINDOPACOM
Director of Legislative Affairs, on this matter.
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
small modular microreactors
8. Senator Manchin. Admiral Aquilino and General LaCamera, we
expect our servicemembers to perform in austere, challenging
environments and completely disconnected if need be, but modern warfare
relies more than ever on resilient energy production. China knows this
and already has countermeasures for targeting both commercial and
military fuel shipping vessels. To help alleviate this vulnerability, I
believe small modular microreactors are a strategic energy source
necessary in this contested logistics environment. Project Pele is the
only microreactor being built by DOD that can close this gap. Housed in
one 20-foot shipping container, and providing 5 megawatts of power
continuously for 5 years, Pele can replace 6 diesel generators that
require over 3 million gallons of fuel annually. How can my staff work
with Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea to ensure
Project Pele and similar technology is being incorporated into United
States operational plans and exercises to better equip our Forces to
gain advantage in a contested logistic environment such as the Pacific?
Admiral Aquilino. We are working in close coordination with the DOD
Strategic Capabilities Office and understand that the earliest
INDOPACOM could see fielding of Project Pele is fiscal year 2030.
Certainly, alternate energy solutions, such as hydrogen fuels that our
regional Allies and Partners have heavily invested into, would reduce
strain on our logistics requirements, but for now, I would emphasize
the need for increased investment in forward fuel storage,
expeditionary power generation, and distribution systems to support our
operational requirements. Additionally, it is critical that if approved
for use, any such mobile nuclear reactors be placed in resilient and
safe locations that are not susceptible to damage from regional weather
threats such as se level rise, earthquakes, or tsunamis. Moreover,
should there be a crisis or conflict, my forces would be tasked with
securing all mobile nuclear reactors, possibly distracting them from
more pressing operational missions.
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
ridge runner
9. Senator Manchin. Admiral Aquilino and General LaCamera, in my
State of West Virginia, the West Virginia National Guard hosts the
irregular warfare exercise, Ridge Runner, every year that brings
foreign partners to West Virginia to exchange lessons they've learned
deemed beneficial in a potential conflict against a peer adversary such
as Russia or China. The exercise offers a wide range of training
scenarios including simulated cyber threats and attacks on critical
infrastructure, which continue to be increasingly relevant. This past
year, Ridge Runner had over 420 participants including from Estonia,
Lithuania, Poland, Moldova, Georgia, and the United Kingdom. This year
we've expanded participation to partners in the Pacific including
Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Mongolia, and Nepal. How could Ridge Runner
offer value to both of your commands in future exercises, and would
your training commands be willing to touch base with our folks that run
the exercise?
Admiral Aquilino. Exercise RIDGE RUNNER provides value to INDOPACOM
by affording us the opportunity to synchronize with partners and allows
for reciprocal access for US SOF into countries within the INDOPACOM
region. The West Virginia National Guard's Ridge Runner Irregular
Warfare Training Program offers the ability for US SOF to train its
partners in irregular warfare supported entirely through the West
Virginia National Guard with dedicated funding for staff and
programmatic elements. Most recently, in Ridge Runner (RR) 24-01,
executed 03APR-26APR24, SOF partners from Mongolia received academic
Irregular Warfare Center classes, as well as high caliber tactical
training, providing them critical irregular warfare and resistance
knowledge and training to bring back to Mongolia.
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Manchin. Admiral Aquilino and General LaCamera, prior
to the posture hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, I
personally spoke to you both requesting your thoughts on Ridge Runner
and whether you would be interested in a principal level meeting or to
observe a portion of the Ridge Runner exercise in the future. Please
repeat your responses for the record.
Admiral Aquilino. Admiral Aquilino. I have encouraged my successor
to observe a portion of Ridge Runner in the future.
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
united states indo-pacific command resourcing and posture
11. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, as you pointed out in your
testimony, this decade presents a period of increased risk highlighted
by the People's Republic of China's (PRC) nuclear and conventional
buildup, malign behavior, and ``no limits'' partnership with Russia.
While INDOPACOM has done much to posture our Nation to counter China's
aggression, there is still more to do as indicated by the
unprecedentedly large Unfunded Priorities List (UPL). What are the
risks if the INDOPACOM UPL is not resourced?
Admiral Aquilino. Leaving the UPL unfunded hampers our ability to
be postured in the right location, with the right capabilities to
provide creditable deterrence. This would further embolden the PRC's
dangerous, coercive, escalatory, and unlawful behavior and push our two
nations toward crisis. In the event of conflict, the risk to our
ability to fight and win increases.
12. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, what United States, allied,
and partner military capabilities do the Chinese believe are most
threatening to their ability to conduct a successful invasion of
Taiwan?
Admiral Aquilino. The PRC is most threatened by capabilities that
would undermine the PLA's numerical overmatch, obstruct their joint
island landing, and impede PLA's ability to conduct a military campaign
against Taiwan. The PRC will rely on speed and overmatch as key
elements of their Taiwan landing campaign and are sensitive to any
United States and allied capabilities that could delay or slow the
invasion's progress and allow for counter-intervention forces to
marshal. PRC's concerns would include systems that would bring both
kinetic and non-kinetic effects, which could affect their operations.
enhanced defense cooperation arrangement with the philippines
13. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, what is the State of
infrastructure in the communities around Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Arrangement (EDCA) sites in the Philippines?
Admiral Aquilino. Infrastructure around the nine EDCA sites in the
Philippines is underdeveloped. While DOD investments are expressly at
EDCA sites, DOD construction activities may generate economic activity
that will benefit the surrounding communities. DOD is also working with
DOS, DOC, USAID and other international partners to generate economic
and infrastructure development in the Philippines, including a USAID
funded pharmaceutical manufacturing facility near Basa Air Base.
14. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, is the United States
building infrastructure around EDCA sites that both benefits the local
community and makes access easier for United States and Philippine
Forces?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, DOD projects at the EDCA locations have the
collateral benefit of supporting the local economy and creating jobs.
To date, the United States has awarded all of our infrastructure
contracts to Philippine or Philippine joint-venture companies,
generating economic growth in local communities, and employing local
labor. Our primary focus at EDCA locations is to improve bilateral
military modernization and to expand training opportunities, as well as
position our forces for response to HA/DR events.
15. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, have you seen any evidence
of PRC influence operations focused on communities near EDCA sites?
Admiral Aquilino. The PRC continues to conduct a wide spectrum of
influence operations globally with the intention of undermining United
States alliances and partnerships and to promote the PRC's agenda and
objectives. The PRC frequently works to co-opt regional or local
organizations as part of these efforts and we see this activity occur
throughout the region, including in the areas near our EDCA sites.
marine littoral regiment and multi-domain task forces in united states
indo-pacific command
16. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, the Marine Corps artillery
regiment based in Okinawa, Japan is in the process of being re-
organized as a Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) by 2025. 3d MLR,
stationed in Hawaii, has participated in Exercise Balikatan since 2022
in the Philippines. Under Marine Corps Force Design 2030, MLRs are
postured to serve as a stand-in force and execute Expeditionary
Advanced Base Operations. This requires them to disperse along the
First Island Chain to provide strike and surveillance capabilities.
What feedback have you received on MLRs from allies and partners in the
region?
Admiral Aquilino. Allies and partners in the region have been able
to see and interact with both the 3d Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) in
Hawai.i and the 12th MLR in Japan. The 3d MLR was employed during the
recent Rim-of-the-Pacific exercise, and elements of it were deployed to
the Philippines for last spring's Exercise Balikatan. While in the
Philippines, they directly interacted with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, as well as with other participating allied nations, to
include the French and Japanese. Elements of the Japan-based 12th MLR
were recently deployed to Japan's Southwest Islands within Exercise
Resolute Dragon with the Japan Ground and Air Self-Defense Force. We
have received only positive feedback from our allies and partners on
the MLR's usefulness within the Indo-Pacific, as well as their ability
to work with our allies and partners.
17. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, what are the most import
capabilities that USMC Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR) and Army Multi-
Domain Task Forces (MDTF) bring to deter and, if necessary, defeat a
PRC attack on United States, allied, or partner forces in INDOPACOM?
Admiral Aquilino. Both the Marine Corp's Marine Littoral Regiments
(MLR) and Army's Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF) provide us a tactical
level capability to find, fix, track and target hostile units, and most
importantly, rapidly share that information across the entire joint
force so other units can also strike those targets. When located near
allied or partner forces, they can also share that information with
them, serving as a force-multiplier.
18. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, how important are Landing
Ship Medium (LSM) and Army watercraft to solving the contested
logistics problem and moving combat power around the AOR?
Admiral Aquilino. Landing Ship Medium (LSM) and Army Watercraft
Systems (AWS) represent a portion of our requirement for overcoming the
complex logistical challenges presented by the Indo-Pacific's
archipelagic terrain. These vessels provide access to both traditional
and non-traditional sea lines of communication enabling operational
movement and maneuver from land to sea and back to land. Without
capabilities delivered by U.S. Transportation Command, Military Sealift
Command and our allies and partners, and the robust presence of LSM and
AWS capabilities, the joint force would be heavily reliant on movement
of forces and materiel by aircraft. Heavy use of aircraft as a
contested logistics solution for the movement of combat power is
limited in capacity, costly in dollars, and poses an increased risk to
mission and forces. LSM and AWS enhance operational flexibility and
resilience by providing a stand-in capability bringing intra-theater
distribution and lessening burdens on air and sea movement of combat
power.
19. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, the Navy's fiscal year 2025
budget forecasts orders for eight LSMs over the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP), none of which would deliver before 2028. Each MLR
requires nine LSMs for organic mobility. Until the requisite number of
LSMs arrives, MLRs will use a mix of leased commercial vessels,
Expeditionary High Speed Transports, and Landing Crafts Utility (LCU),
none of which has the capability and capacity of the LSM. Will MLRs
equipped with this mixed type of organic mobility change the way you
employ them in your AOR?
Admiral Aquilino. All our land and air forces require mobility to
get into place before or during a time of crisis. The entire joint
force will require mobility to sustain themselves once a crisis begins.
There is a paucity of air and sea lift available for the entire joint
force, not just the Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR). The sooner we can
get additional lift into the western Pacific, the better. That includes
the Landing Ship Medium (LSM.) Until they come online, we will use
everything that is available, to include a mix of leased commercial
vessels, Expeditionary High Speed Transports, and Landing Crafts
Utility (LCU). Our employment of the MLRs would likely remain the same,
but the response time would be slower.
united states' wavering support of ukraine as viewed by china
20. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, some of my colleagues have
argued that deterrence is divisible--that you can let an authoritarian
regime roll over a friend in one part of the world without dangerous
repercussions elsewhere. I disagree. The Taiwan Relations Act requires
us to be capable of defending Taiwan. We publicly promised to support
Ukraine, yet we have not delivered timely military assistance by
failing to pass the National Security Supplemental. How does this
affect the PRC's view of our resolve to defend Taiwan if they attack
the island?
Admiral Aquilino. The CCP has closely watched events in Ukraine to
gauge the potential international response for any future military
action in Taiwan. Beijing understands Ukraine and Taiwan are different
situations and actions taken vis-`-vis Ukraine would not necessarily
apply to Taiwan. However, they will repeatedly message that the United
States is an unreliable partner and Taiwan would be foolish to rely on
United States or international support, hoping to translate that
message into reality. I think our continuing efforts to support
Taiwan's self-defense needs send the right message about United States
resolve to PRC leaders.
south korean military industrial capacity
21. Senator Sullivan. General LaCamera, South Korea has drastically
increased its munitions production since the renewed Russian invasion
of Ukraine in 2022. It has also completed several large foreign
military sales of modern weapons systems produced in South Korea to
many of our European partners and allies. All indicators are that South
Korea's defense industrial base is strong and it seems to have a lot of
excess industrial base capacity to cover its domestic military needs
and while simultaneously exporting record amounts of military
equipment. It is producing very high quality tanks, self-propelled
howitzers, aircraft, and ships. In fact, the Secretary of the Navy was
in Korea earlier this month to learn more about their naval
shipbuilding industry. I know Secretary Del Toro toured two South
Korean shipyards recently and has encouraged South Korean and Japanese
companies to invest in shuttered United States shipyards. Should we
look to South Korea to address some of our manufacturing bottlenecks,
particularly on munitions and equipment that we need to field quickly
on the Korean Peninsula and in INDOPACOM more broadly?
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
ballistic missile defense trilateral agreement
22. Senator Sullivan. General LaCamera, does the Trilateral Missile
Data sharing agreement between the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the
United States now mean that any of the three countries can cue the
other with target-quality data to shoot down an incoming missile off of
another's sensor data?
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
south korean military modernization
23. Senator Sullivan. General LaCamera, do advances in South
Korea's military power factor into its decisionmaking to help defend
Taiwan should a conflict occur in the Taiwan Strait?
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
24. Senator Sullivan. General LaCamera, is South Korea's military
expansion aimed solely at deterring and defeating an attack from North
Korea?
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
25. Senator Sullivan. General LaCamera, has South Korea's military
modernization changed any planning factors as you seek to deter, and if
necessary defeat, North Korea?
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
26. Senator Sullivan. General LaCamera, have any recently fielded
South Korean systems created a significant capability gap compared to
North Korea?
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
submarine construction and maintenance
27. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) is working hard to erode our strategic advantage in the
undersea domain by launching new nuclear attack and guided missile
submarines. There are justified concerns that we will diminish our
submarines' advantage by not building enough new attack subs and not
getting the ones we have into and out of maintenance on time. Something
like 40 percent of our sub fleet isn't deployed because of maintenance
backlogs. In light of the PLA Navy's numerical superiority how
important is submarine construction and maintain to deter and defeat
the PRC in a conflict?
Admiral Aquilino. Our submarines are critical to both deterring
adversaries and prevailing in conflict. The United States. currently
enjoys an asymmetric advantage in the undersea domain which is
essential to our National Defense Strategy. Delays in the delivery of
new submarines, or from maintenance to operation, increase the risk of
adversary miscalculation, and erode our strategic advantage.
Hence, completing new construction and maintenance on time is
crucial to our undersea dominance and to deterring the PRC's expansion.
Near-term submarine industrial base (SIB) investments are critical
to reduce the backlog in attack submarine (SSN) maintenance and new
construction to meet the 2.33 Virginia-class (VACL) per year production
rate needed to support Navy's requirement, while also delivering
Columbia-class SSBNs on time to support our strategic deterrent.
deterring chinese invasion of taiwan
28. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, I know that some senior
officials in the Biden administration are wary of your campaigning
initiative. They consider it too provocative because we are operating
in the First Island Chain. Your critics believe that we need to
emphasize stand-off capabilities and operate from the Second Island
Chain. Do you agree with the criticism that INDOPACOM's campaigning
initiative is too provocative?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I do not believe INDOPACOM's campaign
initiative is too provocative. A key tenet of the INDOPACOM strategy is
supporting a free and open Indo-Pacific region, and the only way to
truly do that is to sail and operate across the totality of
international airspace and waters. Additionally, operating within the
First Island Chain assures our key allies and partners by demonstrating
our resolve and willingness to meet them on their home terrain.
If we elect to stay out of the First Island Chain, we deter
ourselves, undermine our allies and partners, and implicitly support
the PRC's illegal claims. By safely operating within the First Island
Chain, within international airspace and waters, alongside our allies
and partners, we demonstrate the presence and resolve necessary to
limit provocative adversary activity.
29. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, do you think that we can
deter and, if necessary, defeat the PLA operating primarily from the
Second Island Chain?
Admiral Aquilino. No. Operating exclusively from the Second Island
Chain puts us at a distinct disadvantage and jeopardizes mission
success. Our ability to deter/defeat PLA while operating primarily from
SIC requires additional capacity in air refueling, long range fires,
fighters and bombers. Forward basing increases on station time during
competition which enhances deterrence and sortie generation rate during
conflict.
30. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, has the PRC's response to
our operations and exercises in the AOR changed over the past year?
Admiral Aquilino. The PLA continually monitors our military
activities in the AOR. In general, the nature and type of reactions has
remained relatively consistent. The one exception to this was a notable
increase in non-standard intercepts of U.S. and allied military
aircraft operating in international airspace throughout the first 10
months of 2023. We believed this was an intentional effort by the PRC
to shape our activities. After President Biden and Chairman Xi agreed
during their November 2023 summit to reduce tensions, these non-
standard activities ceased, supporting our assessment they were
intentional.
31. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, is there a difference with
how the Chinese military responds if we are inside the First Island
Chain compared to other areas in the South China Sea?
Admiral Aquilino. In short, the degree of PRC angst and the
assertiveness of their physical and messaging responses are
proportional to the distance we operate from the mainland. In part,
this is a reflection of our proximity to activities the PRC considers
more sensitive, such as exercises, new equipment testing, or weapons
testing that generally occur closer to the mainland. It is also part of
the PRC's attempts to re-characterize international air and maritime
spaces as ``Chinese territory.'' PLA and para-military elements
repeatedly assert the notion we are intruding on sovereign Chinese
territory without their permission. Beijing also uses what is often
called ``lawfare'' to apply domestic law in international spaces or to
manipulate legal constructs to supports their excessive claims. It is
critical we not accede to these unwarranted and illegal excessive
claims and continue to operate wherever international law allows, even
if the PRC objects.
32. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, the Wall Street Journal ran
an article on March 19, 2024 about training assistance the United
States military is providing Taiwan on Kinmen Island. Should there be
caps that limit the number or types of United States personnel on
Taiwan's territory?
Admiral Aquilino. As a general matter, without getting into
specific locations, I don't think we should place arbitrary limits on
the employment of forces anywhere in the AOR. We should have the
flexibility to base those kinds of decisions on the requirements of a
given situation.
33. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, what is the current State
of interoperability and joint planning between the United States and
Taiwan militaries?
Admiral Aquilino. Multiple USINDOPACOM offices, plus our service
components, conduct regular engagements focused on assisting Taiwan
through our responsibilities as a part of the Taiwan Relations Act.
34. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, as you noted at your
hearing, the PLA is on schedule to meet Xi's directive to be ready to
invade Taiwan by 2027. Do you see changes in PRC military exercises
that indicate Xi's confidence level in the PLA is growing?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes and no. I think we have to be honest in
acknowledging the strides the PLA is making in several areas. I suspect
Xi Jinping sees and acknowledges that as well. But I think Xi also
understands just how difficult a Taiwan invasion would be, how many
complex pieces would need to fit together, and how many variables he
wouldn't be able to control. In this realistic view, Xi almost
certainly understands the PLA is not ready to invade Taiwan. His
confidence may be growing, but not to the level where he is likely to
order a military option in the next couple years. We also should
consider the negative impact the extensive and ongoing corruption cases
have on his confidence in the PLA.
35. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, you and I have talked about
economic deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Are we doing enough now to
send the message to Beijing that military action against Taiwan will
incur a massive economic cost for them?
Admiral Aquilino. Economic deterrence is an important element of
integrated deterrence, which requires a whole-of-government approach.
We have demonstrated superiority at sea, with an ability to control all
sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Chinese leaders recognizes this,
and, by extension, that China's trade is fully held at risk, allowing
USINDOPACOM to offer our capabilities to underpin economic tools of
deterrence in the trade space that the rest of the interagency might
consider. More can always be done and we stand by ready to support.
repairing damaged ships in theater
36. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, offsetting the PLA Navy's
numerical superiority means we have to keep our ships in the fight
after sustaining battle damage. I am concerned by the lack of major
ship repair yards in your AOR. In the event of a conflict, bringing a
battle-damaged ship all the way back to Hawaii or the West Coast for
repair is not a winning strategy. What groundwork is being laid now--or
needs to be laid--to conduct in-theater repairs for ships and
submarines?
Admiral Aquilino. The Navy has implemented a Ship Wartime Repair
and Maintenance (SWaRM) exercise program to advance repair and
maintenance capabilities with in-theater partners. These exercises
consist of more complex work packages for the local private sector,
expeditionary maintenance from a U.S. Regional Maintenance Center, and
battle damage assessment and repair table-top exercises with submarine
crews and in-theater Navy engineering and production personnel.
37. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, there are statutory and
regulatory obstacles to conducting more complex maintenance and repairs
to United States ships overseas, even in ports of our closest allies
like Japan. In your opinion, what are the advantages and disadvantages
in using our allies' labor force and infrastructure for in-theater ship
repair during both peacetime and war?
Admiral Aquilino. 10 USC 8680 prohibits execution of ship repair or
maintenance in foreign shipyards, except for Forward Deployed Naval
Forces and Voyage Repairs. During peacetime, the primary advantage of
using our allies' labor force and infrastructure for in-theater ship
repair and maintenance is developing processes and relationships that
will be required to efficiently execute repair and maintenance during
wartime. Other advantages include visibly (information environment)
exercising these partnerships and providing some minor relief to in-
theater Navy repair capacity during peak workload periods. During
wartime, the advantages of reduced transit time and distributed repair
and maintenance capabilities across the region will ensure more mission
ready ships for the fight. As for disadvantages, executing large work
packages at allies' facilities, outside of our fleet concentration
areas, can be cost-prohibitive due to required security, quality of
life services, transportation and temporary lodging, at these
locations. Adverse impacts to crew quality of life in off-base, foreign
locations preclude executing long, complex maintenance at such
facilities. Currently, the only suitable locations for complex
maintenance and repair availabilities are the United States Navy
facilities at Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan.
tyranny of distance in the indo-pacific area of responsibility
38. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, Alaska is closer than
Hawaii to many of the potential areas of conflict, yet there is no U.S.
Navy infrastructure for ships or submarines in Alaska. Given the
considerable talk of the ``tyranny of distance,'' what are your views
on a Naval Support Activity or other permanent Navy infrastructure in
Alaska that could support Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) ships?
Admiral Aquilino. Additional support in Alaska has potential to
align with the overarching INDOPACOM posture strategy of distribution
and diversification but would require more study to determine the exact
locations and capabilities that might be needed to best support the
joint force.
alaska specific concerns
39. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, will you encourage Admiral
Samuel Paparo to bring a carrier strike group to Northern Edge 2025?
Admiral Aquilino. PACFLT is currently reviewing their ability to
support PACAF with a full carrier strike group (CSG) in Alaska for the
exercise.
40. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, in your personal opinion,
what force posture and/or capabilities are missing in Alaska that would
put the INDOPACOM Commander in a better position to deter and defeat
the PLA?
Admiral Aquilino. The value of forces in Alaska to deter and defeat
the PLA reside in our ability to deploy forward in competition and
conflict. We assess the assigned force posture in Alaska is adequate at
this time.
chinese posture in the indo-pacific
41. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, what is the military
significance of the Solomon Islands-PRC pact?
Admiral Aquilino. Unless the agreement has secret elements we don't
know about, I would say the pact has minimal military significance for
the PRC. The importance of the pact is mostly about the PRC's growing
influence and ability to shape Solomon Islands' decisionmaking,
investment priorities, and external relations. It also advances the
PRC's Belt and Road initiative in the region. As a sovereign nation,
Solomon Islands certainly can decide for themselves who they should or
should not have relationships with. However, they would be wise to
consider whose best interests Beijing has in mind.
chinese maritime energy and natural resource imports
42. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, is it important for the
United States military to be able to conduct sea control and sea denial
operations against PLA Navy vessels and Chinese oil tankers and
merchant ships in the various straits that lead to the South China Sea
and Pacific Oceans?
Admiral Aquilino. I think the answer is clearly yes. Any sound
strategy for countering a PLA military campaign anywhere in the region,
whether it is Taiwan, the Senkakus, or the South China Sea, will
require sea control and sea denial of these critical waterways.
Moreover, the ability to execute sea control and sea denial is critical
to ensuring secure maritime trade and logistics routes and enable joint
force maneuverability against any potential adversary.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
special operations forces
43. Senator Budd. Admiral Aquilino, can you please explain the
value of Special Operations Forces in your AOR?
Admiral Aquilino. SOF value proposition in an Indo-Pacific conflict
is to create strategic, asymmetric advantages for the United States.
SOF possess discrete, tailored, and highly technical expertise to
perform highly specialized missions. SOF also builds upon our
persistent global access to provide us with flexibility and agility for
trans-regional effects to counter strategic competitors. SOF are ready
and capable to respond on extremely short notice to execute core
activities that are as relevant today as ever for a conflict scenario.
Importantly, SOF leverages relationships and practical experiences in
working with the interagency and a wide array of allies and partners to
better understand the Indo-Pacific environment and contribute to
integrated deterrence and, if required, prevail in conflict.
44. Senator Budd. Admiral Aquilino, what impacts, if any, do you
expect to theater operations given planned force structure and
personnel cuts to Army Special Operations Forces?
Admiral Aquilino. Proposed ARSOF cuts increase risk to INDOPACOM's
mission to deter and respond to crisis. Due to ARSOF's widespread
influence with INDOPACOM's partners and allies, they are critical to
campaigning and setting the theater in a warfighting stance. SOF are
critically important to training our partners and increasing combat
capability and play a very important role in the INDOPACOM AOR.
45. Senator Budd. Admiral Aquilino, have you or your command been
consulted on the assessment of optimal force structure for special
operations forces required by section 1075 of the Fiscal Year 2024
National Defense Authorization Act?
Admiral Aquilino. ASD SO/LIC and USSOCOM established three 1075
working groups co-led by DASD SOPP and the Joint Staff J8, with members
from across the USSOCOM staff to develop responses to the six elements
listed in section 1075 of the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA. SOCPAC represents
INDOPACOM in these working groups.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 2024
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin,
Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. The Committee will come to order. Good
morning. The committee meets to receive testimony on the
President's Budget Request for the Department of Defense for
Fiscal Year 2025.
Witnesses this morning are Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin, Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, Mike McCord,
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General C.Q. Brown,
Jr.. I would like to take a moment to recognize that this is
General Brown's first posture hearing before the committee as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
We are grateful for our witnesses, for their service, and
for their testimony today. This is a critical moment for our
National Security. There is broad consensus among Congress, the
White House, and the Department of Defense about the threats we
face.
We know that China seeks to challenge the security and
economic interests of the United States and our allies, and
that it increasingly has the ability to do so. We know that
Vladimir Putin is committed to recreating a vision of the old
Soviet empire, and that his war against Ukraine is one step
toward that vision.
We know that Iran is seeking to exploit the war between
Israel and Hamas, and expel the United States from the region,
and further sabotage the free world rule in the Middle East. It
is worth noting that each of these threats I just mentioned can
be addressed through the National Security supplemental that
the Senate passed nearly 2 months ago.
The bill would support Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan, provide
humanitarian relief in Gaza, and replenish the U.S. defense
industrial base. Indeed, the dire humanitarian crisis in Gaza
and the separate fight for freedom in Ukraine demand our
immediate attention.
The most important step Congress can take right now is to
pass this legislation, and I urge the House to vote on it. Last
month, President Biden released his fiscal year 2025 budget
request for the Department of Defense with a top line of $850
billion.
I understand that this budget is below what the Department
had planned for fiscal year 2025, but it adheres to the cap set
by last year's debt ceiling agreement, known as the Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 2023.
In effect, the Department of Defense had to follow the law
and submit this level of funding to the Congress. I expect--we
will stand in recess for a moment.
[Recess.]
Chairman Reed. We will resume. Senator, it's a liability of
being unusually tall.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Reed. Again, the Department is responding to the
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 in terms of the budget they
had to present, and I expect there will be a discussion today
about whether the top line is adequate to meet the National
Security challenges we face.
This was a demand by Republicans in the House in order for
us to pass the debt ceiling, and that has constrained your
operations and your budgeting, and we understand that. With
those limits in mind, the President's defense budget request
well to the national--aligns well to the National Security
threats before us.
As the National Defense Strategy makes clear, the United
States is in a long term strategic competition with China and
Russia, and we will continue to face persistent threats from
Iran, North Korea, violent extremist groups, and issues like
climate change.
During today's hearing, I would ask for witnesses to
explain how the President's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request
supports the National Defense Strategy, the Nuclear Posture
Review, and the Missile Defense Review.
Keeping our competition with China front and center, this
budget request includes $9.9 billion for priorities covered by
the Pacific Defense Initiative, or PDI. I am encouraged by the
progress we have made through PDI thus far, and this committee
will continue working to help improve the design and posture of
the Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific region.
This should include strengthening logistics, modernizing
infrastructure, conducting exercises and training, and building
the capabilities of our allies and partners. Indeed, our
approach to the Indo-Pacific should continue to be informed in
part by lessons drawn from the European Defense Initiative, or
EDI, which has played a decisive role in strengthening U.S.
force posture and enhancing the readiness of allies and
partners in Europe over the last 10 years.
The Department's fiscal year 2025 budget request includes
$2.9 billion for EDI related investments and $300 million for
the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. I am encouraged
that the President's budget request would provide significant
funding to strengthen America's cyber defenses and develop
cutting edge technology such as hypersonics, microelectronics,
artificial intelligence, 5G, and quantum computing.
Our strategy toward China and Russia should not be defined
in dollars by how much, but rather where and why we are
investing to achieve the greatest comparative advantage. I am
also pleased to see that this budget request prioritizes taking
care of our men and women in uniform by providing a 4.5 percent
pay raise and increase in basic needs allowance eligibility,
expanding the benefits for military families.
These actions are an important message to the force at a
time when recruiting is particularly challenging. With regard
to our nuclear strategy, this budget request supports important
steps for the modernization of our nuclear triad.
Given Putin's reckless behavior and China's rapidly growing
nuclear capabilities, we must continue to modernize our
strategic forces to reassure our allies and deter aggression
from our nuclear arms competitors. Even as we modernize, we
should seek ways to promote strategic stability, reduce the
risk of miscalculation, and if possible, reduce nuclear
stockpiles.
Finally, the proposed investment in next generation combat
aircraft, tactical vehicles, and naval vessels is a prudent
decision. However, there are a number of long standing
challenges for our defense acquisition system that must be
addressed to effectively field these platforms.
I understand that the military services have made difficult
but practical decisions in this budget request to identify
supply chain problems, pinpoint shortages of critical
materials, and to reinvigorate the defense force.
In particular, the Navy has requested $2 billion to improve
the capabilities of the submarine industrial base, and I would
appreciate our witnesses' views on how Congress can help to
overcome these issues.
Again, I thank the witnesses for their participation today,
and I look forward to their testimoneys, and now, let me
recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today's hearing is
an opportunity to take stock in our National Security over the
past year and examine how the Department of Defense is
preparing for the future. Unfortunately, the security
environment, as we all know, has deteriorated significantly
since we last had this hearing.
Armed conflict is ongoing in multiple continents. Regional
instability threatens peace and prosperity and freedom around
the world, and several malign nations are forming a new axis of
evil. We are approaching a window of maximum danger.
Despite this, our Government is failing to modernize our
defense capabilities and to provide sufficient resources to
fund our National Defense Strategy. XI Jinping will continue
China's historic military modernization with another 7.2
percent defense budget increase this year.
China's military production rates, advanced training
improvements and innovation strategies are troubling, and they
are stunning. In addition to Xi's designs in Taiwan, there is a
very real prospect of Chinese action against our Filipino
treaty allies in the South China Sea. Both will test American
resolve.
Outgunned and outmanned, the brave defenders in Ukraine
have exceeded expectations in holding the line against the
Russian dictator, Putin's army. If Congress passes a
supplemental, we can help Ukraine win. But to make that happen,
the Biden administration will need to articulate a real plan
for provisioning and training Ukrainian forces at scale once
Congress passes the supplemental appropriation bill.
I share the chair's comments about the decision that the
House of Representatives, led by the speaker, will have to make
this week. This is an occasion that history will look back on.
This is a time for statesmanship and bipartisanship, and I
certainly share the chair's hope that this supplemental will be
enacted and signed into law very, very soon.
I am disappointed in the drip, drip, drip approach to
military aid that has characterized this Administration's
policy thus far. As to General Brown, I would appreciate your
comments on the situation in Ukraine, and whether a more
timely, aggressive posture toward training and equipping the
Ukrainians is called for after the hopeful passage of the
supplemental.
U.S. strikes in Iraq and Syria led to a temporary pause by
Iran backed terrorist groups, but those attacks have restarted.
By contrast, we have still not figured out how to compel the
Houthis to stop attacking maritime trade.
I would remind my colleagues that Central Command for
National Defense Strategy was supposed to be an economy of
force theater in which we relied upon our allies. Instead, the
Administration has ignored our allies and partners for the most
part in the Middle East, and the damage to long term U.S.
interests could be profound.
We face threats on multiple fronts. On top of that, the
threats are worsening at a pace that our National Defense
Strategy simply does not contemplate. Secretary Austin and
General Brown, I would welcome both of your comments on whether
you think it is time to actually rewrite that National Defense
Strategy.
Is it adequate for the threats that I have mentioned? Let
me say this with regard to my good friend's comments with
regard to the caps in the Fiscal Responsibility Act. I disagree
that the Administration was prevented from asking more for
National Security and national defense than is contained in the
Fiscal Responsibility Act cap.
As a matter of fact, the President's budget request for
fiscal year 2025 with regard to domestic spending is some $76
billion over the fiscal responsibility cap, and for some
reason, the Administration chose to adhere to that cap only
with regard to our most important duties, and that is defending
this country and making sure our National Security is in order.
So, we will have a discussion about that, and I do have
confidence that working together with Members on either side of
the dais, the chair and I will be able to work alongside the
Committee Members and get closer to where we need to be with
regard to defending our country and keeping the peace.
What is alarming more than that, and it should be clear to
Members on both sides of the aisle, is that our budgetary
resourcing does not meet even the inadequate defense strategy
we do have. We are dealing with a recruitment crisis, a
languishing industrial base, an acquisition bureaucracy, and
massive maintenance backlogs.
We need to invest more, and we need to invest more wisely.
We should cut red tape, speed up the acquisition process, guard
against unnecessary requirements, creep and use more innovative
companies, which can respond to defense needs at the speed of
relevance. More military spending is absolutely necessary, but
it alone will not fix our problems.
We can never directly outspend the Chinese Belt and Road
Initiative, for example, and there are other forms of predatory
investment. However, we have the deepest and broadest capital
markets in the world.
They can be used on behalf of the American people living
inside the United States, and we should actively work to bring
those capital markets to bear outside the United States for
National Security purposes. Mr. Secretary, you championed the
Office of Strategic Capital, and the team there can do this
work if you direct them to it.
Mr. Secretary, we have much work to do. No time to lose.
Unfortunately, the time--the last time we were together, we
discussed what I can only describe as, and I must say this, the
contempt with which the Administration has treated Congress.
When we pass a law and the President signs it into law, that is
the law of the land, and we would appreciate it being adhered
to by the Administration.
Your responsiveness to many of my simple inquiries, Mr.
Secretary, has been lacking, to say the least. To take but two
examples, you failed to follow the law and canceled the sea
launched cruise missile again. We will of course have to
revisit that in the NDAA.
You have decided not to implement my provision from the
Merit Act, again, which has been enacted by both houses and
signed by the President. Your Department has also failed to act
on simple provisions of the law, which would help repair the
relationship between you and the elected representatives of the
public in Congress.
I hope we can fix these issues this year. Thank you,
Senator Reed.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker, and
now, let me recognize Secretary Austin for your testimony. Mr.
Secretary, please.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
Secretary Austin. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, thanks for the
opportunity to testify in support of President Biden's proposed
fiscal year 2025 budget request for the Department of Defense.
I am pleased to be joined for the first time by our
outstanding Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General C.Q.
Brown, and I am also glad to be back with Under Secretary of
Defense Mike McCord, the Department's comptroller.
[Protest interruption.]
Chairman Reed. The committee stands at ease until the
Capitol Police restore order.
[Pause.]
Chairman Reed. The committee will be in order. Secretary
Austin.
Secretary Austin. Let me start by thanking this committee
for all that you do to support the U.S. military, our troops,
and our military families. As Secretary, I have always been
guided by three priorities, defending our Nation, taking care
of our people, and succeeding through teamwork.
Our budget request for fiscal year 2025 will advance all
three of these priorities. First, the President's request will
invest in cutting edge capabilities across all domains, and
that includes $48.1 billion for naval and shipbuilding
capabilities to strengthen and modernize our fleet, and $61.2
billion to reinforce U.S. air dominance, and $13 billion to
bolster Army and Marine Corps combat capabilities.
Our request will also provide $33.7 billion to strengthen
our space architecture, and $14.5 billion to develop and field
cyber security tools. It will direct $49.2 billion to modernize
and recapitalize all three legs of our nuclear triad, and it
will sharpen our tech edge through a $167.5 billion investment
in procurement and $143.2 billion in R&D.
Second, this budget request will support our outstanding
troops and their families, and that includes raising base pay
and housing allowances, investing in better housing, and making
childcare more accessible and more affordable.
The request will also fund vital work to prevent sexual
assault and suicide in the military. Third, this request will
help the Department further deepen our teamwork around the
globe.
Our network of allies and partners remains a strategic
advantage that no competitor can match, and you can see its
power in our strengthening ties across the Indo-Pacific, in
today's expanded and united NATO, and in the 50 country Ukraine
Defense Contact Group that I convened to ensure that Ukraine
can repel Putin's aggression.
Our budget remains rooted in our 2022 National Defense
Strategy. Our request positions the United States to tackle
that the Department's pacing challenge, the People's Republic
of China, with confidence and urgency.
We will also provide resources to meet the acute threat of
Putin's increasingly aggressive Russia. It will help us tackle
the persistent danger from Iran, North Korea, and global
terrorist organizations, and other malign actors.
It will help us continue to deter aggression against the
United States and our allies and partners, and to prevail in
conflict if necessary. Now, today I want to underscore three
key messages. First, even as our budget request----
[Protest interruption.]
Chairman Reed. The committee stands at recess until the
Capitol Police can restore order. The committee is in recess.
[Recess.]
Chairman Reed. Let me once again reiterate that is not
appropriate for comments or demonstrations by the spectators
and audience here. We are conducting a hearing, and we will do
so. We are----
[Protest interruptions.]
Chairman Reed. I will direct the Capitol Police to remove
the demonstrators. Mr. Secretary, you are recognized for your
remarks.
Secretary Austin. Thank you, Chairman. Again, I want to
underscore three key messages. First, even as our budget
request abides by the mandatory caps set by the Fiscal
Responsibility Act, it is aligned to our strategy.
We made tough but responsible decisions in this budget that
prioritize near-term readiness, modernization of the force, and
support our tremendous troops and their families. Our approach
dials back some near-term modernization for programs that are
not set to come online until the 2030's, which will require top
line growth and on time appropriations in future budgets.
Second, we can only fully reach the goals of our strategy
with your help. I am grateful that Congress passed the fiscal
year 2024 appropriations in March, and the single greatest way
that Congress can continue to support the Department of Defense
is to pass predictable, sustained, and timely appropriations.
My third and final message today is that the price of U.S.
leadership is real, but it is far lower than the price of U.S.
abdication. As the President has said, we are in a global
struggle between democracy and autocracy.
Our security in these turbulent times relies on Americans'
strength of purpose. We remain determined to meet this moment,
and that is why our budget request seeks to invest in American
security and in America's defense industrial base.
It is also why the Administration has requested nearly $60
billion in a National Security supplemental for the Department
of Defense, and that supplemental would support our partners in
Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan, while making investments to
increase submarine production.
About $50 billion of this supplemental would flow through
our industrial base, rushing aid to our partners while creating
good American jobs in more than 30 states. I would like to
thank all those who have worked to pass an effective funding
package. Now we are more than 2 years into the Kremlin's war of
aggression against Ukraine, and Putin is betting that the
United States will falter and abandon our friends and leave
Ukraine in mortal danger.
If the Kremlin prevails in Ukraine, it would embolden would
be aggressors around the globe. The United States would be far
less secure if Putin got his way in Ukraine. President Biden
has warned that Putin will not stop at Ukraine.
If America walked away, we would put the free world in
peril and risk unimaginable cost and dangers, and we know that
China and others are watching and learning from what Putin does
and how we respond. We look to our partners in Congress to help
us make the investments needed to strengthen America's security
through both the supplemental and the President's Fiscal Year
2025 Budget Request.
The U.S. military is the most lethal fighting force on
Earth, and with your help, we are going to keep it that way. I
am grateful for your support for our mission and for our
troops, and with that, I look forward to taking your questions.
Thank you, Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III
follows:]
Prepared Statement by The Honorable Lloyd J. Austin III
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, distinguished Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify in support of
President Biden's proposed fiscal year 2025 budget for the Department
of Defense.
I am joined for the first time by our outstanding new Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General C.Q. Brown. I am also glad to be
back with Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Mike McCord. We are
grateful for the partnership of Congress and of this Committee in
sustaining the most formidable fighting force in history. We remain
deeply committed to our mission of keeping the United States secure in
a rapidly changing global security environment. Above all, we are
constantly mindful that our greatest strategic asset is our people--
especially the more than 2 million extraordinary Active Duty, National
Guard, and Reserve servicemembers who step up every day to keep America
safe.
As always, we understand our duty to be the best possible stewards
of hard-earned taxpayer dollars. Our request for resources is rooted in
our strategy, even as it recognizes fiscal reality. For the third
straight year, the President's defense budget request builds on the
2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). To responsibly and effectively
implement the NDS and tackle the complex challenges we face, the budget
hews to the performance-improvement initiatives that we established to
improve the Department's capabilities, organizations, and management
processes.
This budget request is consistent with the mandatory caps directed
by Congress under the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, allocating
$849.8 billion for DOD programs and initiatives for the coming fiscal
year. Under these caps, we made difficult but responsible decisions
that focus on maintaining our readiness and taking care of our people.
I am confident that our budget request will continue to make the United
States more secure. It will continue to bolster our ability to defend
our country, paced to the growing, multi-domain challenge posed by an
increasingly aggressive People's Republic of China (PRC). It will
better prepare us to prevent strategic attacks against the United
States or our allies and partners. It will strengthen the unmatched
global network of alliances and partnerships that magnify our power and
deepen our security. It will expand our ability to deter aggression,
even while it prepares our forces to prevail in conflict if necessary.
And it will pave the way toward a more resilient joint force and
defense ecosystem, built for the security challenges of the 21st
century.
The NDS identifies the PRC as the Department's pacing challenge.
This budget request therefore focuses on the need to strengthen our
integrated deterrence and position the United States to prevail in
strategic competition with the PRC.
The budget request will also help us meet additional challenges we
face in today's shifting global security environment. The NDS singles
out President Vladimir Putin's increasingly aggressive Russia as an
acute threat. In February, Russia's unprovoked and indefensible full-
scale invasion of Ukraine entered its third grim year. The United
States has been the essential nation in rallying support for Ukraine's
fight against Putin's aggression and atrocities.
The NDS also highlights the persistent dangers posed by Iran,
global terrorist organizations, and other malign actors. Ever since
Hamas's vile terrorist assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, the United
States has steadfastly supported Israel's right to self-defense; worked
to prevent the conflict in Gaza from igniting new eruptions on Israel's
northern border; pushed to protect innocent Palestinian civilians and
get far more humanitarian aid into Gaza; and moved decisively to deter
Iran and its proxies from taking action that would escalate into a
broader regional conflict.
Above all, the NDS demands even deeper investments in the
Department's people, who remain the bedrock of America's security. We
rely on the service and the sacrifice of our troops and our civilian
workforce, and the President's budget request will dedicate the
resources, services, policies, and programs needed to faithfully
support them and their families.
Our commitment to maintaining enduring advantages for the United
States is reflected in the Department's requests for procurement and
for research and development--$167.5 billion and $143.2 billion,
respectively.
Provisions of the Fiscal Responsibility Act forced tough choices
related to further military modernization. The law's topline limitation
requires the Department to make targeted reductions to programs that
will deliver key capabilities in later years to preserve the joint
force's ability to fight and win in the near term. This approach
assumes some risk on mid-and long-term modernization efforts not
intended to be delivered until the 2030's, but achieving our strategy
will require making up for these funding delays with growth in future
years.
Meanwhile, I take seriously Congress's goal for the Department to
get a clean audit opinion by 2028. Americans should expect us to
account for our dollars and our inventory. That is why this budget will
continue to invest in the controls we put in place to ensure that we
spend taxpayer resources as intended by Congress. And it is why I
directed senior leaders to tie performance results to their
organizations' audit objectives.
Notwithstanding our efforts at responsible fiscal management, the
lack of timely enactment of full-year appropriations has seriously
hindered the Department's operations and planning. I am grateful for
congressional action to pass fiscal year 2024 appropriations, but when
we are forced to operate under continuing resolutions, at the previous
year's appropriations levels, the Department cannot start new
initiatives or increase the rate of production for many high-priority
programs. Stop-gap funding measures delay badly needed investments in
our military infrastructure, inflict unnecessary disruptions on our
servicemembers and their families, undermine our recruitment efforts,
and give an unnecessary boost to our strategic competitors.
The single greatest way that Congress can support the Department of
Defense and our troops is to pass predictable, adequate, sustained, and
timely appropriations.
Since my first day as Secretary of Defense, I have been guided by
three priorities: defending our Nation, taking care of our people, and
succeeding through teamwork. As detailed below, President Biden's
fiscal year 2025 budget request will advance all three of these
overarching priorities, providing the most lethal fighting force on
Earth with the means to defend the American people in turbulent times.
As Congress develops authorization and appropriations legislation
in the months ahead, I am grateful for your support of our budget
request and the mission and the people of the Department of Defense.
defending the nation
To tackle the evolving challenges and threats from the PRC, Russia,
Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and global
terrorist groups, as well as transnational challenges such as climate
change and pandemics, we must upgrade not just our weapons systems but
also our ability to quickly field new capabilities. Today's rapidly
shifting security environment demands that the Department ruthlessly
prioritize to strengthen our warfighting capabilities, build a skilled
and innovative defense workforce equipped for tomorrow's challenges,
and work together more powerfully with our indispensable allies and
partners.
Outpacing the PRC
As the NDS notes, an increasingly aggressive PRC is trying to shape
the global system to suit its authoritarian preferences. This is a
generational challenge, and the Department will continue to meet it. We
also seek a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region in which all
countries are free from coercion. The fiscal year 2025 budget request
will help us realize that goal.
In fiscal year 2025 and beyond, we will strengthen U.S. integrated
deterrence by advancing new operational concepts, investing in cutting-
edge capabilities across all domains, and deepening our cooperation
with our outstanding allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. Across
the region, we are experimenting with new technologies to expand our
warfighting advantages and refine the way that we operate.
We have made historic improvements to our force posture in the
Indo-Pacific. Last year was the most transformative year in a
generation for U.S. force posture in Asia. In 2023, we made major
infrastructure improvements in airfields, logistics, and domain
awareness across the region.
Meanwhile, we are modernizing U.S. posture in Japan and have
deployed additional forces in Japan, Australia, Guam, and, on a
rotational basis, in the Philippines.
Through a $9.9 billion request for the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative, the Department continues to prioritize investments in our
activities and infrastructure to reinforce security and stability in
the Indo-Pacific region and bolster our advantages and those of our
allies and partners west of the International Date Line. With our
allies and partners, we will continue to increase the complexity and
the scale of our exercises, which will boost deterrence and enhance
interoperability. We also continue to staunchly support Taiwan's self-
defense, consistent with our longstanding policy anchored in the Taiwan
Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.
Answering the Acute Russian Threat
Putin's unprovoked and unjust 2022 invasion of Ukraine has taken a
harrowing toll on the Ukrainian people and threatened security in
Europe and beyond. Putin's war is a frontal assault on the hard-won,
post-World War II rules-based international order that has produced
decades of prosperity without great-power war. If Putin prevails in
Ukraine, it would embolden would-be aggressors everywhere. The world of
chaos and conquest that Putin seeks--one in which autocrats think they
can rewrite borders by force--would leave the United States far less
secure. The price of U.S. leadership remains far lower than the price
of U.S. abdication. There is no good reason to think that an emboldened
Putin would stop with Ukraine, which could mean unthinkably high costs
for the United States. This is not just about Ukraine's survival; it is
also about America's security.
The United States has therefore rallied a broad coalition of allies
and partners to support Ukraine's brave fight against Putin's war of
choice. The fiscal year 2025 budget request will position the
Department to continue to oppose the Kremlin's aggression, while
bolstering U.S. force posture in Europe and reinforcing our allies and
partners.
As Putin's forces continue their attacks against Ukraine's front
lines, cities, and civilians, support from Congress is more crucial
than ever--especially the supplemental funding that Ukraine's brave
defenders so urgently need. A supplemental would strengthen American
security and save Ukrainian lives; it would enable us to meet Ukraine's
urgent self-defense requirements, even as we maintain our own readiness
and advance our military modernization; and it would meet our
commitments to our partners in Israel and in the Indo-Pacific region.
Moreover, because the additional arms and ammunition provided to
Ukraine would be produced by our own defense industrial base, the
supplemental would invest billions of dollars in the U.S. economy,
creating quality jobs for Americans and increasing the resilience of
our vital supply chains.
Persistent Security Threats
Other malign actors, including the DPRK, Iran, and global terrorist
organizations, continue to threaten the security of the United States
and our allies and partners. Russia has deepened its ties to Iran, the
DPRK, and the PRC--all of which seek new ways to undermine U.S.
interests across the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and Africa. The
fiscal year 2025 budget request ensures that the United States is ready
to deter and respond to these persistent threats.
In the Middle East, the Department remains committed to Israel's
right to self-defense; to ensuring that Israel never has to endure
another assault like October 7th; to the swift return of all hostages
in Gaza, including American citizens; and to preventing the further
spread of conflict. At the same time, we continue to press Israel to
protect Palestinian civilians and to increase the flow of urgently
needed humanitarian assistance into Gaza.
The Department is also focused on Iran, whose nuclear ambitions,
dangerous proxies, support for terrorism, and threats to freedom of
navigation undermine regional security and threaten U.S. forces,
allies, and partners. Through investments including integrated air-and
missile-defense systems, maritime domain awareness, and counter-
uncrewed aerial systems, the fiscal year 2025 budget request will help
us strengthen our partnerships in the region and preserve our ability
to deploy combat-credible forces when needed.
On the Korean Peninsula, we will continue to shore up peace and
security, despite the DPRK's ongoing provocations. With our allies in
the Republic of Korea and Japan, we are reinforcing our extended-
deterrence commitment and strengthening bilateral and trilateral
cooperation. That includes information sharing, joint exercises, new
missile-warning data-sharing systems, and increased U.S. rotations. The
fiscal year 2025 budget request will ensure that U.S. forces in and
around the Korean Peninsula remain ready to respond to aggression by
the DPRK.
Our ability to monitor and disrupt terrorist threats to our country
and our citizens has grown dramatically in the two decades since the
September 11, 2001, attacks by al-Qaeda. The fiscal year 2025 budget
request will continue to sharpen our over-the-horizon counter terrorism
capabilities. The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS--now in its tenth
year, with 87 members--is a lasting example of the value of working
with allies and partners toward our common counter terrorism goals
Investing to Win Across All Domains
We continue to strengthen our capabilities across all domains of
potential conflict. To strengthen our sea power, this request includes
$48.1 billion for naval and shipbuilding capabilities to enhance and
modernize our fleet. The Navy's commitment to stable acquisitions
remains the foundation of a healthy shipbuilding base. The Department
plans to invest more than $9 billion over the next 5 years to improve
public repair yards through the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization
Plan.
We are also making a historic investment in our submarine
industrial base to develop supply chains, attract and retain skilled
workers, and ensure the on-time delivery of Columbia and Virginia Class
submarines. The fiscal year 2025 budget request includes $4 billion for
the submarine industrial base, which follows the nearly $1.2 billion
requested in fiscal year 2024 and a supplemental request of $3.3
billion. These investments account for existing production capacity at
our shipyards and represent an investment strategy that will allow us
to support both our domestic production goals and our commitments under
the AUKUS initiative. These investments will enable the Navy to
maintain undersea dominance, keep a strong presence in key regions,
respond effectively to emerging PRC threats, and continue the
transition to Distributed Maritime Operations.
The fiscal year 2025 budget also requests $61.2 billion in key
areas to assure U.S. air dominance. This includes continued funding for
the modernization and sustainment of the F-35 and F-22 fleets, while
developing the next-generation fighters and autonomous collaborative
combat aircraft critical to maintaining superiority in the skies. Our
request also prioritizes long-range fires, including hypersonic
weapons; a modern air command-and-control framework; rapid global
mobility; and preeminent electromagnetic-warfare capabilities. To
further increase strategic deterrence, the fiscal year 2025 budget
request will invest in the development, production, testing, and
deployment of the B-21 strategic bomber and the Long-Range Standoff
Weapon, which will enhance the Air Force's penetrating strike
capability.
On land, the fiscal year 2025 budget requests $13 billion to
bolster Army and Marine Corps combat capabilities. It will continue to
strengthen and modernize the Army's Organic Industrial Base, including
improvements to its arsenals, maintenance depots, and ammunition
facilities. It also invests in electromagnetic-warfare capabilities and
command-and-control systems, as well as air-and missile-defense systems
and land-based long-range fires. Additionally, the budget request will
invest in technology to counter small uncrewed aerial systems,
including sensors, a common operating picture, data libraries, and both
kinetic and non-kinetic mitigation capabilities. And once again, we ask
Congress to provide necessary flexibility for a portion of this funding
to enable the Department to rapidly respond to emergent operational
needs and evolving force protection requirements.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request includes a $29.8 billion
investment in munitions, including procurement for critical weapons
such as Maritime Strike Tomahawk and Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles at
or near maximum production-capacity levels. The Department is committed
to boosting the variety and quantity of our air-, sea-, and ground-
launched munition inventories and to maintaining a consistent and
predictable demand signal for our industry partners. Congressional
support of the Department's previous requests for multi-year
procurement authority would help grow the advanced munitions industrial
base.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request will support the Department's
pursuit of base-resilience and base-hardening initiatives to protect
our forces and installations from air and missile threats--and to
recover quickly if struck. This request will continue to strengthen our
missile-defense capabilities, including multiple new radars and launch
systems for the Guam Defense System.
We are also seeking resources to improve infrastructure for our
joint forces across the Indo-Pacific. We will increase the lethality
and the survivability of our Army and Marine deployments in the Indo-
Pacific by providing them with the capabilities they need to operate in
distributed and contested environments. For our Air Force, this budget
request will improve the resilience of our forward basing by funding
hardening and dispersion activities.
In the space domain, we will continue to invest in the systems and
the capabilities to build advantages over any competitor. The
Department will commit $33.7 billion to strengthen our space
architecture, including strategic and tactical missile warning and
tracking; communications; positioning, navigation, and timing; space
sensing; and the supporting ground architecture. The budget request
will also fund upgrades to our launch infrastructure to support more
government and commercial launches.
Beyond our cooperation with the American commercial space sector,
this budget request will also allow the Department to enhance our
engagement with our allies and partners in the space domain. Consistent
with the Space Strategic Review, these investments continue to focus on
deterring hostile uses of space and ensuring that the United States can
prevail should deterrence fail in this critical domain.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request proposes an investment of $14.5
billion in cyber security and other investments in cyberspace. This
includes, among other things, developing and fielding advanced cyber
security tools and techniques to protect our networks and critical
infrastructure; expanding data-centric and artificial intelligence
programs; upgrading our cyber-operations training platform; and
accelerating our use of cloud-based capabilities.
Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic--which killed more than 1.1 million
Americans--underscored the national-security risks from biological
threats. It is important, therefore, that in August 2023, the
Department released the Biodefense Posture Review. This foundational
document outlines key reforms to posture the Department to prevail in
the face of future threats, including from adversaries who seek to
disrupt U.S. military operations. Building on these reforms, the
President's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request will further enhance our
ability to keep America safe from biological threats.
Innovating and Modernizing
A safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent is the
ultimate check on strategic attacks against our country and our allies.
The Department is committed to maintaining and modernizing all three
legs of the U.S. nuclear triad even as we remain ready to pursue arms-
control measures that enhance U.S. and allied security. The fiscal year
2025 budget request includes an investment of $49.1 billion to fund our
nuclear enterprise and invest in U.S. nuclear command, control, and
communications. This budget request will enable the Department to
maintain our reliable and effective legacy systems while building and
fielding their replacements.
The replacement for the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad, the
Sentinel weapon system, remains one of the largest, most complex
programs within the Department. The Department notified Congress in
January that Sentinel had experienced a critical cost overrun, and we
are now reviewing the program, as required under the Nunn-McCurdy Act.
This robust review will be completed within 120 days after the
submission of the President's budget. The Department remains determined
to prevent gaps in capability as we modernize our intercontinental
ballistic missile fleet.
The Department also continues to invest in cutting-edge defense
capabilities, from uncrewed systems and smarter munitions to advanced
energetics and manufacturing. We are integrating human-machine teaming,
developing autonomous systems, and fielding reliable and resilient
networks and data. At the same time, we are taking steps to optimize
the practices and systems that are working best, while phasing out our
technical debt--those quick fixes that we know will be costly or
obsolete in the future. All this will make our operations faster, more
lethal, and more survivable for our forces, allies, and partners. As I
have repeatedly said, when we sharpen our tech edge, we expand our
military edge.
In this sustained period of record or near-record low unemployment,
the Department is finding new ways to develop and recruit the talent
that will help us maintain America's position as the global leader in
research and development. We are cultivating skilled scientists and
engineers through the Science, Mathematics, and Research for
Transformation scholarship-for-service program and other initiatives.
This budget request will also continue to pilot the Defense Civilian
Training Corps and civilian cyber-workforce-incentive programs to
strengthen skills in other critical fields such as acquisition, digital
technologies, Zero Trust, and cyber security.
We are also investing in research partnerships focused on critical
technologies with our allies and partners. Our unparalleled network of
alliances and partnerships is key for technological development, co-
investment in combined capabilities, and production capacity.
The Department continues to vigorously develop and test advanced
weapons prototypes. The fiscal year 2025 budget request will foster the
development of several hypersonic weapons programs, prioritizing
surface-launched boost-glide capabilities and air-launched cruise
missiles. Also in fiscal year 2025, the Army will field its third
Medium-Range Capability battery and its second Long-Range Hypersonic
Weapon battery. Our budget request will also invest in further
improvements to our subsonic cruise missiles to keep them effective
against rapidly evolving threats and targets.
To sustain U.S. technological superiority for the future force, the
public and private sectors must work even more closely together. The
fiscal year 2025 budget will advance the work of the Defense Innovation
Unit, which is working with venture-capital firms and tech innovators
who are often doing business with the Department for the first time. By
building bridges with private industry, we can acquire commercial
technologies that will deliver game-changing capabilities at speed and
scale. In 2022, I established the Office of Strategic Capital to
provide the Department with new, loan-based tools to catalyze private
investment in domestic production and manufacturing of the crucial
technology supply base, at limited cost to the Department and the
taxpayer. The recent passage of the fiscal year 2024 appropriations
bill will empower this new office to help attract and scale private
capital to invest in the critical technology components that underpin
our most important weapons systems.
We also continue to invest in programs to test and scale emerging
technologies, such as the Strategic Capabilities Office, the Rapid
Defense Experimentation Reserve, and the Accelerate the Procurement and
Fielding of Innovative Technologies program.
Additionally, the Department will continue to work with Congress to
tackle emerging concerns through the new Replicator initiative to
accelerate capabilities from prototype to scale. The Department is
currently focused on producing thousands of attritable autonomous
systems over the next 18 to 24 months, creating a repeatable process
that will enable the rapid delivery of future capabilities.
To improve the speed, quality, and accuracy with which commanders
make decisions, we are actively pursuing the Combined Joint All Domain
Command and Control capability, which seeks to integrate and deploy
information across all domains and the electromagnetic spectrum. As
Deputy Secretary Kathleen Hicks recently announced, the Department has
delivered its initial iteration of this capability, an important step
in scaling it across the joint force. The fiscal year 2025 budget
request will help the United States maintain our edge in command and
control across all domains, as the pace and amount of information in
warfare increases.
Improving Our Resilience
As the NDS warns, the climate crisis is reshaping the Department's
strategic environment and threatening U.S., allied, and partner
interests. Climate change is placing new demands on the joint force and
challenging our readiness. Extreme weather events have inflicted
billions of dollars of damage on DOD installations and assets. And in
places such as the Arctic, climate change is creating new potential
points of friction.
By working with allies and partners to enhance climate resilience,
we strengthen our defense relationships and bolster our ability to
respond to instability and humanitarian emergencies. Meanwhile, by
reducing the operational energy demand of our platforms, we can act
more nimbly and freely in contested logistics environments and sustain
distributed operations.
This budget request will invest in enhancements to our operational
capabilities, mission resilience, and readiness. This includes programs
that reduce or avoid the risk of energy and water supply disruptions to
military facilities--whether caused by extreme weather, cyber
operations, or kinetic attack. The budget request also includes funding
to improve the energy efficiency of combat operations and platforms, to
enhance the joint force's agility, and to reduce logistics risk in
contested environments like the Indo-Pacific region. Throughout, our
focus is on maximizing our operational advantages--and, when necessary,
preparing to fight and win under any conditions.
taking care of our people
Doing right by our people is a readiness imperative. This budget
request therefore will enable the Department to invest in significant
additional quality-of-life improvements, military pay raises, and
benefits for our outstanding servicemembers and their families.
Furthermore, it helps to implement historic military-justice reforms,
counter the scourge of sexual assault, build positive command climates,
and deepen our efforts to prevent suicide in our ranks.
Strengthening Support to Service Members and Families
Our servicemembers and their families deserve competitive
compensation packages that make the Department an employer of choice.
After troops received a basic-pay increase of 5.2 percent in 2024--the
largest in more than 20 years--the fiscal year 2025 budget request will
support a 4.5 percent pay raise in the coming year. At the President's
directive, we will continue to examine compensation through the
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation.
The places where we work and live affect our people's ability to
carry out their missions and the overall recruitment and retention of
the force. The fiscal year 2025 budget request will build on recent
investments in construction, maintenance, cleanup, and conservation,
including $2 billion for family housing construction and operations and
more than $1 billion in military construction for unaccompanied
housing. This continued investment reflects the commitment in our
``Resilient and Healthy Defense Communities'' strategy to ensure that
our people live, work, and train in healthy, functional, and resilient
spaces.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request will provide additional
economic support to our servicemembers and families across a range of
programs. The Department is making childcare more accessible and
affordable, and we are expanding the availability of childcare-fee
assistance through the Military Child Care in Your Neighborhood PLUS
initiative. Additionally, in 2023, the Department established the
opportunity for servicemembers and their families to contribute to
dependent-care flexible spending accounts, which make the costs of
childcare and other forms of care for family members easier to bear. I
have also taken direct action to reduce commissary prices and to
increase opportunities for our military spouses to excel in their own
careers.
With thanks to Congress, the Department has implemented expanded
parental-leave benefits for our servicemembers. New parents now receive
12 weeks of paid, non-chargeable leave, whether they become parents by
birth, adoption, or long-term foster care. And when a servicemember
suffers the tragedy of the death of a spouse or child, DOD has
implemented a bereavement leave benefit that Congress provided, which
allows servicemembers who have not yet accrued significant annual-leave
balances to take up to 14 days of non-chargeable leave in these times
of grief.
Protecting Our Teammates and Ensuring Accountability
As I said on my first full day in office, sexual assault in the
military is a scourge, and ending it is a leadership issue. Every
member of the force deserves a workplace free of sexual assault, sexual
harassment, and personal fear, which erode cohesion and trust within
our units. The fiscal year 2025 budget request will ensure that the
Department will have the capabilities, the programs, and the integrated
prevention workforce needed to implement the recommendations I approved
from the 2021 Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the
Military.
The Department also recently reached a milestone in strengthening
accountability and increasing servicemembers' trust in the fairness and
integrity of the military justice system. In December 2023, the Offices
of Special Trial Counsel within the Military Departments reached full
operational capability, shifting prosecutorial discretion for 13
serious criminal offenses away from commanders to specially trained and
independent judge advocates who report directly to the Secretaries of
the Military Departments. This landmark change to the U.S. military
justice system significantly strengthens the independent prosecution of
sexual assault and other serious criminal offenses, such as domestic
abuse and child abuse and neglect. It is the most important reform to
our military justice system since the creation of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice in 1950, and I am grateful to Congress for passing
this important law.
The Department also remains laser-focused on preventing suicide in
our ranks, and we are committed to implementing enabling actions
informed by the work of the Suicide Prevention and Response Independent
Review Committee. In September 2023, I announced a comprehensive
suicide-prevention campaign plan implementing more than 80 actions,
including steps to improve suicide-prevention training, reduce the
stigma associated with seeking help, expand access to support services,
and promote the safe storage of guns and potentially dangerous
medications.
Addressing the Recruiting Challenge and Growing Our Talent
The Department of Defense must recruit and retain the best of
America, building pathways of opportunity for all qualified patriots
who seek to serve. Many factors can affect recruiting, including a
competitive economy, shifting attitudes toward institutions, limited
familiarity with the military, and the aftermath of the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars. To push past the headwinds in meeting the recruiting
mission, we must clearly convey the full range of opportunities and
benefits offered by military service. Recent legislation and ongoing
activities by the Services are opening pathways for recruiters to reach
more young people while upholding our standards. Amid today's
challenging recruiting environment, retention remains high. The
Department has moved effectively to incentivize members to remain in
the military, to strive for promotion and increased responsibility, and
to enhance their skills and abilities. This budget request envisions
additional ways to tap into the full range of talent across America.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request will also support a properly
sized, highly capable civilian workforce aligned to the Department's
mission and workload. The Department will continue to work to make the
best possible use of our deeply dedicated people, including our troops,
our civilian workers, and our contractors.
The Department continues to provide exceptional opportunities for
service and professional development. This means attracting more
personnel with technological skills, foreign-language abilities, or
other talents. We are investing in training and education, as well as
creating scholarships for science, technology, engineering, and math.
The Department is committed to attracting, retaining, and developing
the best talent in America, especially rising stars with expertise on
emerging technologies and cutting-edge capabilities such as AI, data
analytics, digital modernization, and cyber operations.
succeeding through teamwork
Our long-term security and success demand teamwork--across the
Department and beyond. That means working closely and effectively with
our interagency colleagues, Congress, industry, and our peerless
network of allies and partners worldwide. The fiscal year 2025 budget
request will enable the Department to deepen our cooperation with the
allies and partners who magnify our power and advance our shared
security interests.
The NDS is rooted in the immutable military reality that
strengthening our work with allies and partners deepens our common
security and lets us share the burden of forging a safer and more
prosperous world. For example, the Defense Security Cooperation Service
that I established in May 2023 will improve the way the Department
trains, organizes, and equips itself for security cooperation, which in
turn will let us more swiftly and effectively deliver capabilities to
our allies and partners. This budget request will support the initial
phases of the establishment of this service, which will put our
embassy-based Security Cooperation personnel on par with those in the
Defense Attache Service.
The AUKUS Partnership
I am grateful to Congress for its support of the historic AUKUS
partnership, including passing legislation to allow for more seamless
defense innovation and trade with two of our closest allies, Australia
and the United Kingdom. The fiscal year 2025 budget request will
support the AUKUS initiative to forge a more secure balance of power in
the Indo-Pacific region. Our three proud democracies are jointly
tackling the threats of the 21st century, building on our proud work
together in the 20th century.
Last year, the President announced our plans for the first major
initiative of AUKUS: providing Australia with a conventionally armed,
nuclear-powered submarine. The phased approach to that initiative will
allow us to provide this capability on the fastest possible timeline,
while strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The first
phase of that initiative is on track: the first Australian submariners
have graduated from our nuclear-power school; two of our submarines
have conducted port visits in western Australia; and Australian workers
are building their skills alongside Americans in our ports in Hawaii
and Guam. In December 2023, I hosted my U.K. and Australian
counterparts at the Defense Innovation Unit in Silicon Valley, where we
committed to seeking even greater innovation and interoperability among
our defense industries. This AUKUS initiative will deepen trilateral
cooperation in several areas, including artificial intelligence and
autonomy, quantum technologies, cyber capabilities, hypersonics, and
more.
We are also expanding our bilateral defense and security
cooperation with Australia, particularly on force posture and
capabilities development. In 2023, our two governments entered into an
arrangement to collaborate on a flexible guided weapons production and
maintenance capability to be located in Australia.
Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific
Our network of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific is deep,
wide, strong, and committed to a shared vision of peace, prosperity,
stability, and deterrence. The fiscal year 2025 budget request will
ensure that the United States can continue to strengthen these key
alliances and partnerships.
To deter the threat that the DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic-
missile programs pose to the American Homeland, we have increased
rotations of strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula and returned to
large-scale, combined, live-fire exercises with the Republic of Korea.
We are working closely with our Japanese allies to forward-deploy
more versatile and resilient U.S. capabilities, to enhance Japan's
counterstrike capabilities, and to modernize our alliance's command and
control.
We are modernizing the U.S.-Philippines alliance by enhancing
maritime cooperation, strengthening Philippine capabilities, and
improving interoperability and information sharing. Under the Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement, we have expanded our rotational presence
to four new strategic locations in the Philippines. These steps
underscore our unwavering commitment to our Mutual Defense Treaty with
our allies in the Philippines.
Our annual Cobra Gold exercise with Thailand helps strengthen
relationships among participating regional partners. Last year's
exercise saw the largest U.S. contingent in a decade, as well as the
participation of dozens of other countries, in a welcome return to pre-
pandemic levels.
With this budget request, we are beginning a new chapter in U.S.-
India relations, under our Major Defense Partnership. Our militaries
are accelerating joint exercises, information-sharing, and other
operational activities to boost maritime security in the Indian Ocean.
By bolstering the Indian military's capabilities, we can work together
to uphold a more stable balance of power across the wider Indo-Pacific.
We are committed to ensuring that the growing U.S.-India partnership
supports the efforts of our broader network of allies and partners,
especially the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among Australia, India,
Japan, and the United States.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request will also enable the Department
to remain engaged across the Pacific Islands region, in alignment with
our Indo-Pacific strategy. That includes building on the Defense
Cooperation Agreement that we secured last year with Papua New Guinea,
as well as increased security cooperation and closer bonds with the
Freely Associated States--Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau.
Strong multilateral cooperation, including with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), underpins all these efforts to foster
a free and open Indo-Pacific. As I have said, the Indo-Pacific remains
our center of strategic gravity.
European Security and Support to Ukraine
The United States continues to work closely with our allies and
partners to support Ukraine's fight for freedom. The engine of our
efforts is the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, the coalition of some 50
countries that I regularly convene to meet Ukraine's immediate
battlefield needs and support its long-term security and sovereignty.
Members of the Contact Group have organized new, multinational
``capability coalitions,'' focused on supporting such areas as
Ukraine's air force, integrated air and missile defense, artillery,
maritime security, armor, information technology, de-mining, and
drones.
Putin's war of choice poses the largest threat to European security
since the height of the cold war, and NATO is more united than ever.
The greatest alliance in history has gained two more highly capable
defense partners with the recent accession of Finland and Sweden, and
the United States has moved urgently with our allies to further fortify
NATO and bolster its defenses on its eastern flank.
Allies are also increasing investments in their own militaries at
levels not seen since the end of the cold war. More allies than ever
are meeting their pledges to invest at least 2 percent of their GDP in
defense--including, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has
noted, a real increase of 11 percent in defense spending in 2023 across
our European and Canadian allies. This is historic progress, and we
will continue to encourage further investments and urge every member of
NATO to meet its obligations under the Defense Investment Pledge.
Our commitment to Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty remains
ironclad. We will not be dragged into Russia's war of choice, but we
will stand with Ukraine as it fights to defend itself, and we will
continue to strengthen NATO's collective defense and deterrence. We
cannot have a secure America without a strong NATO.
The Kremlin's war poses a direct threat to security in Europe and
beyond. The world will only become more dangerous if Putin and his
fellow autocrats conclude that they can wipe democracies off the map
and force free people to live in fear. So we will continue to support
Ukraine's brave defenders--both because it is the right thing to do
and because it is central to America's continued security.
Investing in America's Defense Industrial Base
The United States needs an adaptive, resilient, and robust defense
industrial base to meet its 21st-century defense challenges. Today, our
defense industrial base still relies heavily on foreign production and
vulnerable supply chains. Providing military capabilities at the speed
and scale necessary to maintain our competitive advantage--without
relying on competitors for capital, technology, or raw materials--will
require cooperation and investment from both the private and public
sectors to build a modern defense industrial base.
In January, the Department published the National Defense
Industrial Strategy, which will guide DOD actions--in partnership with
industry and our allies--to meet the production demands posed by
evolving threats. This budget request will shore up critical domestic
and allied supply chains for sectors such as microelectronics, casting
and forging, and batteries and energy storage. It will also help secure
upstream supplies of rare earth elements essential to U.S. economic and
national security, including by supporting programs to boost innovative
manufacturing methods, the use of alternate materials, and strategic
stockpiling.
The budget request also outlines investments to revitalize our
submarine industrial base. That will create good American jobs, grow
our manufacturing capacity, and strengthen our submarine supply chains.
When we invest in America's defense industrial base, we do not just
strengthen our national security; we also boost our economy. The
defense sector can catalyze innovation, create jobs, and make
technological advances. Our relationships with industry can strengthen
America's defense even as they sustain America's economic growth.
Such progress relies on a fully funded defense budget. Dependence
on short-term funding measures damages our ability to invest in our
defense industrial base. Under continuing resolutions, critical
national-security programs are delayed or put on hold, and the fiscal
uncertainty destabilizes the U.S. economy. The only clear path for the
United States to maintain our global strength and continue to outpace
our rivals is for our valued partners in Congress to provide full-year
appropriations. Building on Congress's meaningful investments over the
past 3 years, the Department is committed to working with Congress to
ensure that our industrial base can continue to meet the needs of our
warfighters--and ensure continued security for the United States.
conclusion
As the President has noted, we stand at ``an inflection point in
world history.'' Amid a global battle between democracy and autocracy,
our friends, our rivals, and our foes are all looking to America. Our
security in these turbulent times relies on American strength of
purpose. We remain determined to meet this moment.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request will ensure that the Department
will be able to continue building the most lethal, resilient, and
responsive military on Earth. We hope that our valued partners in
Congress will help us make the critical, targeted investments to
strengthen America's security in this time of historic challenge. To
that end, the single best thing that Congress can do to strengthen our
national defense is to pass a full-year appropriation. Our competitors
do not have to operate under continuing resolutions. When the
Department does, it erodes both our country's security and our ability
to compete--today and in the future.
We make this request mindful of the need to be faithful stewards of
taxpayer dollars. The American public, including of course our
extraordinary troops and veterans, should never expect anything less.
Finally, I want to thank our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
and guardians; their families, caregivers, and survivors; and our
civilian employees. They are our greatest strategic asset--and they
never waver in their drive to make our union more perfect, our country
more secure, and our world more just.
Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. General
Brown, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHARLES Q. BROWN, JR., USAF, CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Brown. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, I am honored to join
Secretary Austin and Honorable Mike McCord to appear before you
today.
On behalf of the Joint Force, the Department of Defense
civilians, and our families, I want to thank Congress for your
steadfast support and the opportunity to testify on the fiscal
year 2025 defense budget request, which reflects our shared
commitment to our new security. The global security environment
is increasingly complex.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy identifies five key
challenges, the People's Republic of China, our pacing
challenge, continues its risky behavior around the globe, a
really aggressive Russia with its unprovoked war against
Ukraine, a destabilizing North Korea and Iran, which threaten
regional security, and violent extremist organizations which
leverage instability to advance their cause.
These challenges are interconnected, which demands a
strategic approach addressing the immediate threats, while also
preparing for future contingencies. Days after becoming the
Chairman, I laid out three expectations in my message to the
Joint Force. Honing our warfighting skills has primacy in all
we do. Modernizing and aggressively leading with new concepts
and approaches.
Trust is the foundation of our profession. Our military
exists to fight and win our nations wars. We train every day to
ensure we are so good at what we do that we deter any adversary
from engaging the U.S. in conflict. This budget requests $147
billion to sustain readiness and ensure the Department can
counter near-term threats.
We are also focused on better integrating our allies and
partners in our planning and operations by investing in
critical programs and capability, expanding security
cooperation, exercises, training, interoperability.
Our investments in readiness ensure the Joint Force can
respond when the Nation calls. While we remain focused on our
readiness for the day, it is critical to modernize and leave
with new concepts to prepare for tomorrow. The Department
continues to invest in capability and capacity to outpace our
competitors, while transforming from costly legacy platforms
that are no longer relevant to the threat.
This budget strategically invests $167.5 billion in
procurement, underscoring our commitment to equip the Joint
Force with unparalleled combat capabilities across every
domain. This budget also invests $143.2 billion in research,
development, test, and evaluation of future capabilities that
will retain our strategic edge.
Finally, this budget invests significantly into nuclear
modernization, digital innovation, multi-year procurement of
critical munitions, and to strengthen the defense industrial
base. With rapidly evolving threats and technologies,
accelerating our modernization is crucial. Last, trust is the
foundation of our profession.
The Joint Force must buildupon and uphold trust in each
other, trust with our families, trust of our elected leaders,
and trust of our Nation. Enhancing the quality of service and
quality life for our personnel is not just a moral obligation,
but a strategic imperative.
This budget includes investments in quality service efforts
such as advanced training, educational benefits, and career
development, while also investing in quality of life projects
like housing, medical clinics, and childcare facilities, as
well as funding spouse employment initiatives, enhance mental
health resources, and robust programs to combat sexual assault.
We must create an environment where all can reach their
full potential. Trust that our Joint Force stands ready. Ready
to defend our national interests. Ready to deter aggression,
and ready, if necessary, to fight and win our Nation's wars.
I thank you for your support and collaboration in our
shared commitment to face the security challenges of today and
prepare for tomorrow. We are living in consequential times and
there is no time to waste. Thank you, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Charles Q. Brown, Jr.
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., USAF
overview
I am honored to represent our dedicated Joint Force, Department of
Defense civilians, and their families who are focused on ensuring and
supporting our national security. I thank Congress for your support and
collective commitment to addressing our most pressing national security
challenges. The Joint Force acknowledges and appreciates the diligent
efforts of our congressional members in securing the vital resources
necessary to train, equip, and maintain our readiness, while also
modernizing to prepare for the future.
The President's $849.8 billion defense budget for fiscal year 2025
reflects our shared commitment to facing today's security challenges
head-on, while also laying the groundwork to confront the uncertainties
of tomorrow. This budget includes targeted program reductions to meet
funding levels approved by Congress under the Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 2023. Under these caps, this budget prioritizes Joint Force
readiness and taking care of our people while reducing programs that
will deliver future combat capability in the 2030's.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identifies the evolving
security challenges that the Department must address to safeguard our
national interests. Implementing the NDS requires the Joint Force
address these challenges while simultaneously accelerating
modernization to maintain our strategic advantages. This budget
resources our strategy and enables the Joint Force to invest in
capabilities to remain the most capable military force in the world for
decades to come. The NDS articulates four key priorities essential to
our national security:
Defending the Homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain
threat posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC)
Deterring strategic attacks against the United States,
Allies, and partners
Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in
conflict when necessary
Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem
The NDS makes it clear that the PRC remains our pacing challenge
and ``our most consequential strategic competitor for the coming
decades.'' The PRC is the only State with the intent as well as the
economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to reshape its
region and the global order. The Joint Force will focus efforts on
addressing our pacing challenge while simultaneously preparing for and
responding to the acute Russian threat and the challenges posed by
North Korea, Iran, and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs).
This budget is threat-informed and built to ensure that our
strategic planning, resource distribution, and capability development
are responsive to current challenges as well as future threats. Through
aligning this budget with the strategic and operational landscape, the
Joint Force is postured to remain versatile, resilient, and capable to
protect the American people, our prosperity, and our way of life.
Each branch and component of our Armed Forces plays a pivotal role
in supporting and upholding these priorities. The connections from this
budget request to the NDS, National Military Strategy (NMS), and the
Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) are clear and deliberate. The JWC,
informed by the current threat environment, has linkages to our
resource allocation and requirement planning processes.
The current strategic environment requires that our force continue
to advance and adapt to the changing character of war. We must always
be prepared to fight and win our Nation's next war. Our current
strategic advantage gives us confidence against any adversary. We must
continue to strengthen our national security and our warfighting
advantage because our competitors and adversaries have not stopped
advancing their capabilities.
I am confident in our Joint Force. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, guardians, and civilian teammates form the most capable
fighting force in the world--bar none. In my 2 October 2023, Message to
the Joint Force, I articulated my expectations for the Joint Force:
Honing our warfighting skill has primacy in all we do
Modernizing and aggressively leading with new concepts
and approaches
Trust is the foundation of our profession
The Joint Force can only remain the world's most capable force if
it is supported by the necessary resources to organize, train, equip,
exercise, and employ the Total Force. We can only accomplish our
mission and maintain our advantage with stable, predictable, and timely
budgets. By passing an on-time budget, Congress enables the Department
to execute our strategy with a full-year appropriation. We are
challenged to implement our strategy and stay ahead of our pacing
challenge when we are not resourced with an on-time full-year
appropriation and funding is delayed due to another Continuing
Resolution.
Our servicemembers and their families sacrifice for our Nation and
we owe them the tools they need to be successful in a dynamic, evolving
strategic environment.
strategic environment
The global security environment is extremely complex. The
international order and its principles of sovereignty, democracy, and
rule of law have underpinned global security for almost 80 years.
Today, this system is under threat. The NDS identifies five key
challenges that threaten U.S. national interests and our way of life:
the PRC, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and VEOs. All five of these
challenges are currently active at the same time and in some cases
working together.
I have served as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for more
than 6 months and during this time, each of our NDS challenges have
confronted our defense and security goals. The PRC continues to
undertake coercive and risky military behavior in the South China Sea,
across the Indo-Pacific, and around the globe. Russia's unprovoked war
of aggression in Ukraine has entered its third year seeking to
overthrow a sovereign neighbor that posed no threat. Iran sponsors and
supports militia groups and terrorist activity threatening regional
stability and U.S. Forces. North Korea continues to test ballistic
missiles and technology while also transferring ballistic missiles to
Russia in direct violation of multiple United Nations Security Council
resolutions. VEO activities around the globe spread violence, sow
terror, and cause unnecessary suffering. These actors work to exploit
perceived gaps in U.S. military might, seeking to expand their
influence and challenge the global order.
Today's current global strategic environment requires the Joint
Force to both address the pacing challenge of the PRC and focus efforts
on the rest of the globe. We can and will do both.
People's Republic of China: The PRC's increasingly aggressive
military actions in the South China Sea; actions to assist Russia,
North Korea, and Iran; and increasing economic influence around the
globe threaten to destabilize the global security environment. The PRC
continues to expand military capabilities across multiple domains. We
are entering a decisive decade where the PRC is challenging the future
of the international order and the United's States' place in the world.
Though the Joint Force focuses on being ready for conflict, our
goal is to deter and stay in competition. On 21 December 2023, I held a
video teleconference with my PRC counterpart to discuss the importance
of responsibly managing competition and avoiding miscalculations.
Communication lines have reopened with the PRC across various levels
across the U.S. Government, engaging in substantive dialog which can
reduce the likelihood of misunderstandings and inadvertent escalations.
Russia: Russia's war in Ukraine not only threatens European
stability but also aims to undermine the global order to benefit its
interests. The international community's support for Ukraine has been
pivotal, emphasizing the global commitment to sovereignty and deterring
future aggression around the world. Russia's focus on expanding and
modernizing its nuclear arsenal further complicates the global security
dynamic.
North Korea: North Korea's advancing nuclear program threatens U.S.
interests and regional stability. Its ongoing and increasingly
aggressive ballistic missile research and testing represent a threat to
our Homeland and to our Allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Additionally, recent information has indicated that North Korea
provided Russia with ballistic missile launchers and ballistic
missiles, which is a notable and concerning escalation in North Korean
support for Russia.
Iran: Iran-backed militia groups have used the HAMAS terrorist
attacks of 7 October 2023 to increase attacks on U.S. forces in Syria,
Iraq, the Red Sea, and across the region. Iran's support for and
involvement in these attacks contributes to larger regional
instability. Additionally, Iranian aid has enabled the Houthis to
initiate a campaign of missile attacks, since November 2023, against
commercial ships in the Red Sea. Iran is also taking actions to improve
its missile forces and continues to retain programs that would enable
nuclear weapon production. Finally, Iran provides support to Russia's
aggression and continues to operate across the gray zone with coercive
and malign activities.
Violent Extremist Organizations: Against the backdrop of these
State actors, VEOs continue to sow terror and instability, with recent
escalations further threatening regional peace. On 7 October 2023,
HAMAS conducted a heinous and brutal attack on the people of Israel.
The U.S. remains committed to supporting Israel's right to defend
itself while actions to protect and provide humanitarian aid to the
civilians in Gaza must increase. The threat landscape is further
complicated by transnational extremist organizations such as ISIS, al
Qaeda, and others across Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Indo-
Pacific. Despite experiencing significant setbacks, these groups
persist in their violent campaigns, leveraging instability to expand
their presence, manipulate populations, and disseminate radical
ideologies.
The interconnectedness of these challenges necessitates a strategic
approach that addresses the immediate threats while also preparing for
future contingencies. The U.S. and its Allies must navigate this
complex environment with a combination of military readiness,
diplomatic engagement, and a commitment to the principles that have
historically underpinned global order.
warfighting
Our military exists to fight and win our Nation's wars. That is why
I'm adamant, honing our warfighting skill has primacy in all we do. We
train and prepare every day to ensure we are so good at what we do,
that we deter any adversary from engaging the U.S. in conflict. The
fiscal year 2025 budget will enable our force to train across the full
spectrum of operations at varied levels of scope, scale, and
complexity. The Joint Force works to implement the NDS through
campaigning by linking together training, exercises, and activities to
reach our defined objectives. This budget enables the necessary
investments to carry out our Joint Force's crucial work and to do so
with tactical and technical proficiency.
First and foremost, our servicemembers are expected to master the
warfighting skills of their individual service. Our servicemembers must
focus on being an adversary's worst nightmare in a fight. As the
tactical expert in each domain of warfare, our servicemembers are then
required to integrate individual mission areas into a cohesive fighting
force. With the changing character of war, future conflicts will be
fought across all warfighting domains--land, sea, air, space, and
information. Therefore, eliminating gaps and seams in Joint Force
readiness will be a priority. This requires proper resourcing for
training aides, employment ranges, and equipment to be able to practice
like we fight across events from daily training evolutions to fully
integrated high fidelity international exercises. This budget requests
$147 billion to sustain readiness and ensure the Department can counter
near-term threats and prevail in long-term strategic competition.
In addition, any future armed conflict will be fought alongside
Allies and partners, necessitating our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and guardians be able to integrate across the joint and
combined force. My expectation is that America's servicemembers are
able to execute tactically while also understanding the larger
operational context and geostrategic environment in which they operate.
Finally, our servicemembers understand that the United States
military is only one component of our whole of government efforts to
support and protect our interests in the global order. The U.S. must
act with one end goal in mind and holistically bring together all our
elements of national power.
Allies and Partners: The United States has an incredible network of
Allies and partners with whom we integrate to achieve our security
objectives. We can better leverage their contributions and capabilities
by building them into our plans from the beginning. We cannot expect
success when we focus on building U.S.-only capability and then adding
on Allies and partners at the end. We must start at the beginning with
the end in mind and account for our Allies and partners earlier in our
planning, requirement, and acquisition processes. The fiscal year 2025
budget will enable the Joint Force to plan, train, and exercise
alongside our Allies and partners worldwide. It will also enable
further research, development, and testing for joint capabilities and
the integration of partner capabilities to collectively address global
security challenges. Our Allies and partners are a powerful force
multiplier and are crucial for our continued security.
Working together as a combined force enhances our capabilities
immensely, demonstrated by the collective effort of Allies and partners
around the world in delivering more than $88 billion in security
assistance to Ukraine since Russia's invasion in 2022. This security
assistance has not only supported Ukraine, but it has also reaffirmed
our resolve to work with our Allies and partners around the world as
closely as ever. We have strengthened NATO, enhanced and recommitted
our support to Israel and Taiwan against regional threats, and advanced
efforts in the tri-lateral security partnership between Australia, the
United Kingdom, and the U.S (AUKUS). This budget includes $2.9 billion
for the European Deterrence Initiative and $9.9 billion for the Pacific
Deterrence Initiative. This will fund capabilities to expand security
cooperation with Allies and partners across Europe and the Indo-
Pacific, ballistic missile defense activities in support of Guam,
improved infrastructure, exercises, training, and experimentation
activities. The $4.0 billion for the submarine industrial base will
strengthen the health and capacity of the submarine force and further
advances AUKUS. In our globally interconnected world, relationships
matter. None matter more than our close-knit ties with our Allies and
partners.
During my more than 6 months in this job, I have had more than 145
engagements with my counterparts from around the world. My engagements
have revalidated a well-known fact. U.S. leadership is wanted, needed,
and watched. U.S. efforts are a catalyst for change--what we do drives
action.
modernization and new concepts
Our Nation needs us to both be ready to fight today's battles and
prepare for tomorrow's wars. We must prepare by modernizing and
aggressively leading with new concepts and approaches. The JWC provides
a framework for how the Joint Force will modernize and how we will
fight in a future conflict. The JWC guides the Department's future
force development, design, and warfighting approach to ensure we have
the right people, equipment, training, roles, and doctrine to deter and
if necessary, win in a future conflict. We must modernize our force,
through innovation and by building a bridge to the defense industry to
deliver capability in a timely manner.
As we work to shorten the timeline between prototype and program of
record, there is growing importance for collaboration between the
Services and our industry partners to deliver at scale, develop
training programs, and provide required sustainment so our warfighters
can operationalize the delivered capabilities. With rapidly evolving
threats and technologies, accelerating our modernization is crucial.
Our adversaries are advancing quickly, and it is imperative that we
equip our Joint Force with the most advanced tools and capabilities
available.
Readiness and modernization depend upon consistent on-time, full
year appropriations. We thank Congress for passing fiscal year 2024
appropriations and we will work with Congress to deliver on-time
appropriations for fiscal year 2025. Continuing Resolutions of any
length have long lasting impacts on the Joint Force. They significantly
impact and degrade our ability to defend the United States. They slow
progress, prevent new starts of programs, and delay our force
modernization efforts. They damage our relationships with the defense
industrial base, eroding trust and driving up costs as industry hedges
against funding inconsistency. We have operated under Continuing
Resolutions for 14 of the last 15 years, totaling 5 years' worth of
lost time. Time we cannot get back.
Force Modernization: We continue the execution of several programs
essential to Joint Force modernization, focusing on advanced platforms,
long-range fires, and uncrewed systems. The Department continues to
invest in capabilities and effects to outpace our competitors while
divesting costly legacy platforms that no longer best meet our needs.
While these choices may be challenging, they are crucial for directing
resources toward the optimal mix of programs to fill the portfolio of
requirements essential for our security.
In the fiscal year 2025 budget, $167.5 billion is strategically
allocated toward procurement, solidifying our commitment to equip the
Joint Force with unparalleled combat capabilities across every domain.
Our air power will be elevated through a fleet of advanced fighter
aircraft, the B-21 bomber, and tanker aircraft. Our sea power is
strengthened with the construction of six battle force ships as well as
the continued production of Ford-class aircraft carriers and Columbia
ballistic missile submarines. Our combat force in the land domain will
be modernized and reinforced with the most advanced equipment available
including the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, Amphibious Combat Vehicle,
and the XM30 Combat Vehicle. This budget also includes significant
development in uncrewed and autonomous systems to expand reach, access,
and payload for operations across all domains. Together, these systems
along with advanced weapons will challenge, target, and neutralize
adversary capabilities while also affirming our technological edge in
an era of strategic competition.
Additionally, this budget significantly advances our long-range
fires capabilities with $9.8 billion for the development and
procurement of multi-domain hypersonic weapons and the improvement of
long-range survivable subsonic weapon systems. These strategic
investments ensure our Joint Force maintains a decisive edge in
delivering precise strikes over vast distances to outpace emerging
threats and support future warfighting concepts.
Across all domains, we continue to invest in the capabilities and
technologies that will position the Joint Force to meet the pacing
challenge of the PRC and the acute threat of a newly aggressive Russia.
Furthermore, the Joint Force recognizes the importance of the space and
cyber domains and is focused on those areas promising the largest
return on investment in the near-term, such as space domain awareness,
space command and control, space resiliency, cyber security, and the
Cyber Mission Force. The $143.2 billion fiscal year 2025 budget request
for research, development, test, and evaluation will enable the
Department to develop the technology, innovative capabilities, and
modernized approaches for the Joint Force to gain and exploit positions
of advantage.
Nuclear Modernization: In alignment with our overarching strategy
for Joint Force modernization, the fiscal year 2025 budget underscores
our commitment to the comprehensive recapitalization of our Nation's
strategic deterrent. This deterrent not only protects the United States
but also many Allies who depend on extended deterrence and assurance.
We are in the midst of a generational change, undertaking the
modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad simultaneously
with the development of the sea-based Columbia-class submarine, the
airborne B-21 bomber aircraft, and the land-based Sentinel
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). These systems will form the
backbone of our Joint Force's ability to maintain a safe, secure,
effective, and credible nuclear deterrent. Concurrently, we are
enhancing and modernizing our Nuclear Command, Control, and
Communications (NC3) systems to ensure they remain secure and reliable
amidst evolving threats.
This concerted effort in nuclear modernization is foundational,
enabling the broader strategic capabilities that underpin our national
defense. It fortifies our extended deterrence commitments, amplifying
the strength and cohesion of our global alliances and partnerships. A
modernized, safe, secure, and effective nuclear triad provides an
outsized return on investment to assure our Allies, deter aggression,
and preserve our national security.
Our investment in nuclear capabilities reflects a judicious balance
between advancing cutting-edge technologies and phasing out legacy
capabilities. Nuclear modernization is a critical component of our
strategy, ensuring the Joint Force remains equipped to navigate the
complexities of modern warfare and emerging global threats.
Digital Innovation: The Joint Force is also advancing our digital
modernization, acknowledging decision advantage will be a key offset in
future conflicts. The Joint Force remains committed to realizing a
fully capable Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2)
environment and leveraging initiatives being demonstrated today in our
Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE). A modernized and
technologically advanced Joint Force will communicate seamlessly across
platforms in all domains. This will ensure we quickly identify viable
paths capable of delivering command and decision dominance. CJADC2 will
enhance warfighting readiness through improved access to and the
interoperability of joint data at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels. This budget requests over $1.3 billion to develop and
improve our CJADC2 capabilities.
With investments in digital innovation, from command and control to
modeling and simulation, digital modernization can improve all
Department work, advance intelligence collection, streamline processes,
and enable better data-informed decisionmaking. The fiscal year 2025
budget prioritizes artificial intelligence (AI), investing $1.8 billion
in research, development, test, and evaluation funds and in operations
and maintenance funds, highlighting the strategic importance of AI to
our Joint Force for both the near-and long-term.
Additionally, this budget allocates $14.5 billion for cyberspace
activities, supporting the Joint Force's defensive and offensive
cyberspace operations capabilities and cyber strategy. This funding
will enable the Joint Force to move at the pace of technology.
Investments and relationships help the Joint Force accelerate software
and technology production to scale ideas and move from concept to
combat capability.
Munitions: This budget sends a strong signal to the defense
industrial base through $29.8 billion for munitions and the use of
multi-year procurement authorities for critical munitions. Russia's war
in Ukraine and Israel's operations in Gaza highlight the strategic
nature of how munitions stockpiles directly impact battlefield
operations. Producing advanced munitions can take years and depends on
complex production lines with a skilled workforce that cannot be
started overnight. To ensure the Joint Force is prepared for challenges
around the globe, we must build out robust production capacity to stay
ahead of need to address any emerging crisis. This budget continues to
strengthen the defense industrial base and will support several
investments to improve its capacity to meet current and future demands.
This budget prioritizes addressing our pacing challenge, the PRC,
with procurement of the most relevant munitions--long-range cruise
missiles, anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, torpedoes, and
air-to-air missiles. The Joint Force takes a holistic approach to
ensure we have the optimal balance of capabilities and capacity
including hypersonic as well as subsonic, survivable, and large payload
weapons. We continually manage and assess our stockpiles and
procurement to ensure we have the munitions that our warfighters need.
Expanded multi-year procurement authorities for critical munitions
will continue to enable us to deepen our inventories and decrease
operational risk. Multi-year procurement authorities are essential to
proactively address challenges with complex supply chains, long lead-
time components, obsolescence, workforce shortages, and infrastructure
shortfalls that must be overcome. These authorities directly support
the capabilities we need to execute our strategy while managing and
mitigating risks during crisis and conflict.
Defense Industrial Base: A strong and robust defense industrial
base including logistical systems and global supply chains will enable
the production of technologies and capabilities critical for our
national defense. To fully modernize the Joint Force, we must provide a
consistent demand signal to the defense industrial base through clearly
articulated priorities and resourcing. Doing so activates the defense
industrial base to expand capabilities and capacity helping to enable
contract performance and on-time deliveries.
This budget allocates investments toward revitalizing and expanding
the defense industrial base, ensuring it is prepared to meet production
demands required for current and future operations. Over $8 billion is
requested to fund several key defense industrial base sectors,
including $375 million for microelectronics, $369 million for castings
and forgings, $193 million for strategic and critical materials, $243
million for kinetic capabilities, $3 million for energy storage and
batteries, $125 million for bio-manufacturing, $4.0 billion for the
submarine industrial base, and a $112 million investment into a skilled
industrial workforce.
A strong and robust defense industrial base contributes to
deterrence and provides a foundation for surging in the event of crises
or conflicts.
trust
Trust is the foundation of our profession. The Joint Force must
buildupon and uphold the trust in each other, the trust with our
families, the trust of our elected leaders, and the trust of our
Nation. I am proud to lead a Joint Force that continually demonstrates
dedication to the oaths we took to serve our Nation and to the
professional standards expected by our Nation and its leaders. We
strive every day to reinforce the trust placed in us, by the American
people, to safeguard our country's values and interests.
Our Joint Force leaders have a responsibility to foster a cohesive
environment where every servicemember has the opportunity to reach
their full potential. I am committed to removing barriers to success,
such as any type of discrimination, harassment, or assault, especially
sexual harassment and sexual assault. The profession of arms is based
on trust. We must maintain that trust by serving with integrity and
professionalism.
Force Development: Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
guardians, civilians, and their families are the Joint Force's
asymmetric advantage against our adversaries. Technology and
capabilities are important, but the mission cannot be accomplished
without a professional, organized, and trained Joint Force. The
proposed budget includes strategic investments in critical areas such
as advanced training programs, health and wellness initiatives, and
career development opportunities to ensure our forces are not only
prepared but also thriving. This includes improved pay to reflect the
dedication and risks undertaken by our servicemembers, enhanced
healthcare services, and continued educational benefits for them and
their families. We also remain committed to supporting spouse
employment initiatives, career guidance, and licensure reimbursement.
These investments are a clear signal of our unwavering commitment to
maintaining the readiness and resilience of our forces.
Quality of Service and Quality of Life: Our servicemembers and
their families sacrifice a great deal for our Nation. It is our
obligation, as leaders, to take care of them and ensure their success.
Our Quality of Service efforts support and enable our servicemembers by
providing them the means and capability to hone their warfighting
skills and to be ready when the Nation calls. Our Quality of Life
investments support our servicemembers when they are outside of work
and takes care of their families.
I am committed to improving Quality of Service and Quality of Life,
through proper force development initiatives mentioned above, various
housing initiatives, improved childcare programs, enhanced mental
health resources, and robust programs to combat sexual harassment and
sexual assault. The fiscal year 2025 budget dedicates $1.2 billion to
sexual assault prevention and response efforts, including building a
full-time workforce of over 2,500 dedicated prevention personnel. We
remain committed to suicide prevention and this budget allocates $547
million to reinforce and expand suicide prevention strategies, ensuring
every servicemember feels supported in seeking help. Additionally, this
budget includes $2.3 billion for construction of barracks, dormitories,
medical clinics, and childcare facilities as well as another $2.0
billion for family housing construction and operations to ensure we
have quality facilities for our servicemembers and their families. It
is our duty to provide our servicemembers and families with
comprehensive support and resources for their well-being and success.
Recruiting and Retention: We must provide the right capabilities,
training, and education to recruit and retain a talented workforce. To
be as effective as possible on the battlefield, we must leverage the
strengths of everyone on our Joint Team. While the Services continue to
encounter a challenging, but improving recruiting environment,
retention remains high, indicating that our people are finding
fulfillment and meaning as they proudly serve their Nation. We can make
an impact on recruiting by engaging with the public. Only 1 percent of
our society has served in the military and much of our society is not
as connected to the Armed Forces as they once were. Our Joint Force and
our veterans have an obligation to engage in their communities,
providing an important connection between our military and the society
that we serve. Whether in uniform or in some other capacity, we all
have the responsibility to inspire the next generation to serve to the
benefit of our Nation and our security.
conclusion
Our Joint Force is the most capable and lethal fighting force in
the world, and they will defend, deter, and if necessary, fight and win
our Nation's wars. They are ready to respond to the myriad of
challenges that currently exist across the globe. Our military strength
is a crucial element of our national security, and it is most effective
when used in concert with the full spectrum of our national power.
The PRC continues its expansion of its military, pursues
increasingly aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific region, and
threatens the international order. Russia remains an acute threat as it
seeks to impose its imperial order and expand its sphere of influence.
Continued unrest in the Middle East also represents a challenge to our
Joint Force, as we withstand and respond to attacks against our forces.
The fiscal year 2025 budget ensures that the Joint Force can
effectively address these challenges and all our NDS priorities. I
thank Congress for its continued support and partnership in our shared
mission to defend our Nation, protect our citizens, and preserve our
way of life. This budget request is not just a financial document; it
is a clear statement of NDS implementation and our collective resolve
to face the challenges of today and prepare for those of tomorrow. It
is a commitment to our servicemembers and their families, ensuring they
have the tools, training, and support necessary to succeed. Given the
convergence of the five NDS challenges, our Joint Force depends on
long-term, stable, predictable, and timely funding. We are living in a
consequential time. There is no time to waste.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General Brown. General Austin,
the most pressing issue is the supplemental in my view because
of the consequences, not just in Ukraine, but throughout the
world.
In fact, CIA Director Burns recently stated, no one is
watching U.S. support for Ukraine more closely than Chinese
leaders. One of the surest ways to rekindle Chinese perceptions
of American fecklessness and stroke Chinese aggressiveness
would be to abandon support for Ukraine.
Do you think that is an accurate assessment?
Secretary Austin. I do, Chairman. I think we would ask that
Congress pass the supplemental as soon as possible, because
Ukraine matters, and the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine
will have global implications for our National Security as
well, so.
We take a look at what Ukraine has done with the support
that we provided them, Chairman, has been quite remarkable. You
know, not only have they stopped a much superior force in terms
of quality of equipment and numbers. They have taken back some
50 percent of the ground that the Russians initially occupied.
So, they are not asking for someone to fight the fight for
them. They are asking for the means to sustain their efforts,
and without security assistance, they won't be able to resupply
the much needed air defense interceptors and air defense
systems that they need to protect their skies and protect their
people.
So, we would see things continue--begin to atrophy in a
very meaningful way in a short period of time. I think it is
really important that we pass this--that Congress pass this
legislation as quickly as possible. I would remind everyone
that, you know, we don't give--the military doesn't give
Ukraine money.
It provides security assistance in the form of weapons and
ammunitions, and we replace those weapons and ammunitions by,
you know, buying new weapons and ammunitions for our inventory,
and that flows through our industrial base. So, some $50
billion of this request would flow through our industrial base,
and it would create good jobs for Americans in some 30 states.
This is about--as much about our National Security and our
industrial base capacity as anything else. But Ukraine matter
is not only for Europe, it matters for the entire world.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Shifting gears to another area of
contention, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza is something that
is obvious to the whole world.
The United States is trying to assist, and for many people,
this is a moral principle, but it is also, I think, an
operational principle, because unless you can separate the
Palestinian people from Hamas, you will never defeat Hamas, in
my view.
That this is something that operationally we encountered in
Iraq, and you served there, Mr. Secretary, and let me
emphasize, Mr. Secretary, rather than your former rank, Mr.
Secretary, and you understand, I think these dynamics, as well
as General Brown.
I assume you concur with that comment.
Secretary Austin. Absolutely, Chairman. If we want to--if
Israel wants to create lasting effects, then it must address
the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people, and not in a
marginal way, in a meaningful way.
We continue to encourage the Israeli leadership, and I talk
to my counterpart on a weekly basis. I just talked to him
yesterday. And encouraged him to increase the volume of
humanitarian assistance that is going into Ukraine. We have
seen him do that most recently. But we need to sustain that.
The United States continues to do everything that we can to
assist. You have seen airdrops on our part, and you see us
working to provide a maritime corridor to provide additional
assistance as well.
Chairman Reed. That maritime corridor, in your opinion, is
a legitimate mission for the United States military. Both you
and General Brown consider that to be a legitimate mission?
Secretary Austin. I do, Chairman. It is--you know, we are
using a capability that we have, joint logistics over the
shore, and certainly our troops are trained to be able to put
this into place.
We expect that the initial operation capability will
probably be there--be in place by the third week in--of this
month, and so, it is something that we have the ability to do,
and we should do.
Chairman Reed. The number one priority is force protection.
Secretary Austin. It is, and it always will be, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator
Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. Secretary Austin, did
a genocide occur around the Gaza region, and around the Gaza,
Israeli border on October 7th of last year?
Secretary Austin. What we witnessed on October 7th,
Senator, was a horrific terrorist attack by Hamas.
Senator Wicker. But was it a genocide?
Secretary Austin. Well, it----
Senator Wicker. Well, let me be more specific. When
noncombatant Israelis were killed, when their families were
burned alive, was that a genocide?
Secretary Austin. Well, I--again, Israel suffered a
terrific blow when----
Senator Wicker. Okay, so you are not willing to call it a
genocide. Was it a war crime?
Secretary Austin. It certainly is a war crime.
Senator Wicker. When noncombatant Americans were taken
prisoner by Hamas, was that a war crime?
Secretary Austin. All of that, you know, the rape, the
murder, the taking of hostages or prisoners, all of that was a
war crime.
Senator Wicker. Was a war crime, and that on October 7th,
that was--the war crime was entirely committed on the part of
Hamas that day, was it not?
Secretary Austin. It was.
Senator Wicker. Since that time, General, is it true that
Hamas has, in violation of international law, placed civilians
in places that they knew would be vulnerable to attack and use
the civilians as a human shield?
Secretary Austin. We have consistently seen Hamas use
civilians as----
Senator Wicker. During the times since October 7th and in
Gaza, right?
Secretary Austin. That is right.
Senator Wicker. That is a continuation of war crimes, is it
not?
Secretary Austin. It is.
Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, if Hamas laid down their
arms today, would the conflict stop in and around Gaza? It
would stop, would it not?
Secretary Austin. We certainly would hope so. But, you
know, that is left to be seen, and I don't want to speculate,
but that is the goal.
Senator Wicker. Well, who started the conflict on October?
Secretary Austin. Hamas initiated this conflict, Senator.
Senator Wicker. If Israel laid down its arms today, would
Hamas stop their aggression against Israel?
Secretary Austin. I seriously doubt that.
Senator Wicker. They wouldn't, would they? All right, I
think we--I think we have made that clear. Let me ask this,
Secretary Austin, with regard to INDOPACOM. Admiral Aquilino
has convinced, I think, convinced us that a standing joint task
force of--a separate standing joint task force for operations
is needed. Are you in support of Admiral Paparo going forward
as soon as possible with the standing joint task force?
Secretary Austin. Let me just say that, you know, it is
clear from our strategy and our budget request, which is linked
to our strategy, that the PRC remains our pacing challenge. We
have done a lot to, in terms of force posture and investments
in the region, to ensure that----
Senator Wicker. I am aware of that, but my question is
specifically about the joint task force. So, we are going to go
forward with it with all due speed.
Secretary Austin. Command and control is really important
to me because it is important to all of us. So, what I have
asked my team to do is look at this and do our assessment to
make sure that we get--you know, we get it right and we
understand the operational and cost issues associated with
this. They are doing that, and they will come back to me
shortly on that.
Senator Wicker. How soon will they come back to you?
Secretary Austin. They will--in a couple of weeks.
Senator Wicker. How soon do you think we can then move
forward with actually implementing this plan?
Secretary Austin. Really depends on what their assessment
is. But as soon as we have a readout, I will come back and
brief you on it.
Senator Wicker. Then finally, do you agree with my opening
statement that the Defense Department and the Administration
could have asked for more? That under the law, they were not
constrained to ask to for the number, much as the defense part
of the Administration did not feel constrained by the caps.
Secretary Austin. Again, we have to comply with the law
and----
Senator Wicker. Why did the domestic Departments of the
Biden administration not comply with those caps?
Secretary Austin. I can't answer that, Senator, but----
Senator Wicker. Will you acknowledge that the
Administration asked for far more money, above the caps, than
was provided in that statute, and they did not ask for more
money with regard to defense spending. Will you acknowledge
that?
Secretary Austin. Well, again, with $850 billion budget--
again, what we try to do, what we have done is link our budget
request to our strategy----
Senator Wicker. It is okay if you answer the question.
Secretary Austin. I support the President's budget,
Senator.
Senator Wicker. Would you acknowledge that the President's
budget request with regard to domestic spending was far in
excess of the fiscal responsibility cap?
Secretary Austin. I can't speak to the domestic budget. I
can only speak for the defense budget.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Secretary Austin,
General Brown, and Under Secretary McCord for your service to
the country. One of the things that I think we would all agree,
as we are talking about budgets, is that if Congress would pass
the budget bills on time, with certainty, it would make the job
of budgeting a lot easier. Is that--do you agree with that,
Secretary Austin? I think you made that point in your opening
statement.
Secretary Austin. I absolutely agree with that, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and Chairman Reed talked about
this, and I think you made it pretty clear, but Senators
Gillibrand, Kelly, and I just returned from a trip to the Indo-
Pacific, and what we heard from our partners was concern that
our failure to follow through on our commitment to Ukraine
would embolden the PRC.
Again, I think you made that pretty clear in your earlier
statement, but can you speak again to what the impact would be
for global security if we fail to live up to our commitment to
Ukraine?
Secretary Austin. It would be a signal that the United
States is an unreliable partner, and that would encourage and
embolden autocrats around the globe to do the types of things
that Putin has done.
Senator Shaheen. It would have an impact not only on Xi,
but on Iran as well, would it not, given that they are the
major contributors of drones to Russia, and they are benefiting
from this war in Ukraine?
Secretary Austin. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. So, if we care about what is happening in
Iran, this is a good way to address what is happening there as
well, correct?
Secretary Austin. I believe so, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Last week and thank you for
taking time to talk with me last week, but one of the things we
saw last week was a CBS news investigation, which was the first
public report that pointed to evidence of Russia's
responsibility in the anomalous health incidents, also known as
Havana syndrome.
Our office has been in touch with victims almost since the
first reporting of those incidents and what we have heard from
a number of those victims is that they believed that there was
an adversary who was involved in those incidents.
So, can you tell me, in light of the reports, do you
believe that the intelligence community should take another
look at its assessment? You have oversight over two
intelligence agencies, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the
National Security Agency.
Have you encouraged them to take another look at the
reports and provided any resources toward that action?
Secretary Austin. Let me just say that I take the health
and well-being of the force extremely seriously, and, I have
spoken to leaders in the intelligence community and addressed
this issue with them.
They have assured me that they will continue to address and
investigate any new evidence that presents itself, and they
will continue to assess. The intelligence agencies that are
part of the Department of Defense will continue to support that
overall effort. But yes, to answer your question.
Senator Shaheen. Do you consider the revelations from that
CBS report that included several other news outlets and a fair
amount of real investigation, do you consider that new
information that would warrant that kind of an investigation,
further investigation?
Secretary Austin. They do, and they are looking into those
things, each element that of that report.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and do you have any sense of
when you might be able to report back to the committee on what
they have found? Do you have any kind of a timeline for that?
Secretary Austin. I don't, but I certainly will get with
the leadership of the intelligence community and get a feel for
the progress that they are making.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I would appreciate hearing what
they expect and what they are finding out. I think this is both
for you, Secretary, and for General Brown. One of the things
that we continue to hear about is Russia's maligned activities
in the information space.
In fact, just this week, we heard from two Members of the
House, the Chair of the Intelligence Committee and the Foreign
Relations Committee in the House that they see Russian
disinformation being parroted by Members of--Republican Members
of the House.
Is this a concern that you all share? How do the Russian
tactics in the information domain address or impact what is
happening in Ukraine?
Secretary Austin. Well, the Russians have always endeavored
to use--to be effective in the information space, and we have
seen that from the very beginning here with the Russia, Ukraine
conflict, and that work continues to today.
They will also seek to influence attitudes and operations
in countries that are supporting Ukraine, not only in the
United States but in other Western countries, and that work
continues. But I expect that we will see that in the future and
there will be a greater effort on the part of Russia to take
advantage of what they consider to be an opportunity here.
I think anything that we can do to burst Putin's bubble
is--in terms of providing support to Ukraine, would be very,
very helpful. The big thing that we could do is pass the
supplemental.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for being here today. Six months ago, the
congressional Commission on Strategic Posture of the United
States released their final report on America's strategic
posture.
This bipartisan, bicameral commission found that our Nation
is on the cusp of having not one but two nuclear power
adversaries, each with ambitions to change the international
status quo by force if necessary, a situation which the United
States did not anticipate and for which it is not prepared.
These conclusions are not surprising. Our planned nuclear
force posture was decided in 2010, when the United States
considered Russia to be a partner, and back before China's
nuclear breakout, the scale and speed of which were called
breathtaking by the Commander of USSTRATCOM before this
committee just 2 months ago.
In order to ensure that we have a safe, reliable,
effective, and credible nuclear deterrent as we look to the
2030's and beyond, we need to start laying the groundwork for
significant changes now.
I strongly encourage, Mr. Secretary, the Department to take
seriously the recommendations made in the Strategic Posture
Commission report, and I am also working with colleagues here
to address many of these recommendations through upcoming
legislation.
So, Secretary Austin and Chairman Brown, do you agree with
the commissioner's statement that ``the nuclear force
modernization programs of record are absolutely essential,
although not sufficient, to meet the new threats posed by
Russia and China, and that the elements of the program of
record should be completed on time, expedited wherever
possible, and expanded as needed''?
Secretary Austin. Thank you, Senator, and thanks for your
sustained support for our efforts to modernize our nuclear
triad.
We agree with the Strategic Posture Commission that U.S
deterrence remain sound, and we have been taking a fresh look
at the assumptions that are underlying our modernization
program. We also agree with the Commission's assessment that
the program of record is necessary but may not be sufficient.
To the point that you made, we need to be looking forward
and making sure that we have the agility to adjust our
modernization program as we go forward to make sure that we
keep--not only keep pace but maintain a competitive edge.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Brown.
General Brown. Well, thank you, Senator Fischer. I had the
real pleasure to have the Commission come to my office to sit
down and brief me here about 6 weeks ago, and I do agree with
their assessment that our nuclear migration is necessary but
not sufficient.
One of the areas we did talk about when it comes to
deterrence was not only our nuclear capability, but also our
conventional capability. So, it is all things we are doing to
modernize our force.
They will be important to support our nuclear portfolio,
but also our unconventional portfolios as well.
Senator Fischer. Did you discuss with Madelyn Creedon and
Jon Kyl any specific recommendations that are put forward by
the report that you would support?
General Brown. We did. I don't have them off the top of my
head, but we did kind of--we came to a pretty good agreement on
it. We see--I saw the report very much in a way that I think--
and I really do appreciate the work that they did to highlight
the key areas we need to focus on for the Joint Force.
Senator Fischer. Yes, they have a number of really great
recommendations, and we are working on those. Hopefully, we
will get by and by this committee, and look forward to working
with you as well on that.
Also, I recognize that the White House tied the
Department's hands through the Fiscal Responsibility Act, and
as soon as the deal was made, we knew that the President's
Budget Request for fiscal year 2025, it just wasn't going to
cut it. It is not sufficient, and to be clear, a 1 percent
increase in defense spending is not sufficient.
So let me say it is difficult for Congress to budget, to
pass appropriations bills to meet those threats that this
country faces when your Department, Mr. Secretary, and this
Administration do not even acknowledge those threats in the
President's budget request that he sends us. Our adversaries,
they don't constrain themselves like this.
In fact, China has announced it would increase its defense
budget by 7.2 percent, and this is despite significant
challenges that the Chinese are now facing in their economy.
So, Secretary Austin and Chairman Brown, do you assess that the
threats from China, Russia, and our other adversaries are more
likely to increase in complexity and severity in the future
years? I assume you do.
So, I would ask, when will you step forward and
appropriately offer your concerns on what we need in order to
meet those problems, those existential threats that this
country faces?
Secretary Austin. Well, thanks, Senator. Again, our budget
request is linked to our strategy, and we look at our
adversaries over periods of time and not just in the moment. We
know that our adversaries, to your point, will continue to
evolve, and the challenge is will--it will increase.
Again, we--give the constraints that we were faced with, we
had to make some tough choices, and we made those tough but
responsible choices to invest in near term readiness and to
take care of our troops and our families.
So, I think, again, based upon where we are, our budget
request addresses our needs that are outlined in our strategy.
Senator Fischer. I thank the chairman of this committee and
the Committee Members for 2 years of going beyond what the
budget was that you presented from President Biden to this
committee. It is a responsibility of Congress. I agree with
Senator Shaheen. I am also on Appropriations Committee.
We as Senator Shaheen, Senator Reed, and I advocate for
what we need, but you also have to be an advocate there. You
also have to bring forward a sincere, a thoughtful, a
reasonable budget from this Administration that addresses the
threats that this country faces.
We hear it from you, from others within the Department on
those threats in classified briefings. This country needs to
realize it as well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much, Senator Fischer.
Senator Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Austin, I recently returned from a bipartisan congressional
delegation to Asia, where we met with key allies and partners
and with U.S. forces in the region.
I can say that each of the countries where we met with
leaders, they were very grateful for the posture in the Indo-
Pacific and very eager to grow it, to expand it, and to deepen
it. So, I wanted you to know, the feedback was extremely
positive of the commitments that you have already made and the
great work that our servicemembers are already doing in the
region.
So, thank you for that. With the National Security
Supplemental stalled in the House, can you speak to how the
lack of funding impacts our strategic posture in the Pacific,
and what are we losing in the region by failing to get the
Senate passed bill to the President?
Secretary Austin. Well, as you know, Senator, this
supplemental not only provides us the ability to provide
security assistance to Ukraine, but also our partners in the
Indo-Pacific, specifically Taiwan.
There are provisions in this supplemental request to
continue to help Taiwan attain the capabilities to be able to
defend itself. So, I think it is for that reason, it is really
important to make sure that we continue to press forward and
get the supplemental across the goal line.
Senator Gillibrand. Our military representatives from the
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command met with PRC military representatives
for the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Group
in Honolulu, Hawaii, on April 3d and 4th.
This was the first meeting of its kind since the Virtual
Working Group meetings in 2021. What is the goal of the
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, and what progress is
being made with the PRC to prevent miscalculations and possible
escalation within the INDOPACOM?
Secretary Austin. I think you have heard me say a number of
times, Senator, that it is really important in this competitive
relationship, and it is a relationship based upon competition,
that we have guardrails and that we can prevent incidents from
spiraling out of control and causing a conflict at any one
point in time.
So, that dialog between military professionals, I think, is
really important. We have seen very aggressive behavior in the
region on by the PRC, and we continue to raise these issues to
the PRC. This forum allows military professionals to meet and
really talk in detail about those issues and talk about things
that, you know, we can put into place to prevent accidents from
happening.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Secretary Austin, over the
last two NDAA cycles, I have created the Cyber Service Academy
Scholarship program to provide students with a free education
in exchange for post-graduation service in DOD and the
intelligence community. As you look at the Department's cyber
and digital needs, how does this scholarship help DOD meet its
mission?
Secretary Austin. Well, I think it is going to help in a
significant way. I mean this is some--working with some 420
institutions and providing 100 scholarships this year alone.
That increases the pool of qualified youngsters that can come
on board and be--and contribute to our efforts in the cyber
domain.
Senator Gillibrand. You may not have this data, but do you
know whether we are on target to fill the 1,000 slots that are
provided for this program this year? This year was the first
year students could apply, and I think the application period
concluded in March. Do you have any information about whether
we are on target?
Secretary Austin. I don't have that specific information,
but I will get it for you right away.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, and do you have any
information about how many additional schools have applied to
be part of the program?
Secretary Austin. I don't have that either. But again, the
number that we have, the 420, is really impressive, and it will
continue to grow.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Austin. Currently there are approximately 450
designated institutions that are eligible to participate in the
DOD CSA. Each designated institution is invited to participate
in the DOD CSA. Any institution that achieves its designation
between now and January 15, 2025 will be eligible to
participate in the 2025 scholarship cycle. For the 2024 cycle,
14 new institutions nominated students for the DOD Cyber
Scholarship Program, and 95 National Centers for Academic
Excellence in Cyber (NCAE-C) submitted proposals to support
scholars.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. The military services have
started to look at privatizing barracks in order to address
barracks that are outdated and in need of repair. Given the
problems that the military privatized housing initiative has
encountered, how will the Department ensure that those problems
are not recreated in the barracks?
Secretary Austin. Well, we number one have to invest in
making sure that we create the right kind of unaccompanied
housing for our troops. Then number two, we got--we have to
make sure that we invest in the resources required to supervise
the maintenance of these facilities.
We are doing both of those. In this budget, we are asking
you for $1.1 billion for unaccompanied housing, $2.2 billion
for family housing, and $171 million for housing oversight.
So, I think, you know, there is--we have to--there is a lot
of work that we need to do going forward. I think, we are
investing in the right things, and we will continue to keep--
maintain an emphasis on this.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. Secretary Austin, thank you for
acknowledging, in response to Senator Wicker, that Hamas
committed war crimes on October 7th and has been committing
them every day since about using human shields. I want to
address what the protesters raised earlier, is Israel
committing genocide in Gaza?
Secretary Austin. Senator Cotton, I--we don't have any
evidence of genocide being created.
Senator Cotton. So, that is a no. Israel is not committing
genocide in Gaza.
Secretary Austin. We don't have evidence of that to my
knowledge, yes.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. Better than Director Burns and
Director Haynes did last year--last month at the Intelligence
Committee when they dodged that question. You stand accused by
those protestors of greenlighting genocide. Would you like to
respond to that accusation?
Secretary Austin. What I would say is, Senator Cotton, from
the very beginning is that we committed to help assist Israel
in defending its territory and its people by providing security
assistance.
I would remind everybody that, you know, what happened on
October 7th was absolutely horrible, and, you know, numbers of
Israeli citizens killed, and then a couple of hundred Israeli
citizens taken hostage.
Senator Cotton. American citizens as well.
Secretary Austin. American citizens as well.
Senator Cotton. So, you deny the accusation that you
greenlit genocide?
Secretary Austin. I absolutely do not.
Senator Cotton. For the record, I don't think Israel is
committing genocide. I don't believe you greenlit genocide,
either. You talked a lot with Senator Reed about Israel's
responsibility to provide aid in Gaza. Why does Israel have a
responsibility to provide aid to Gaza?
Israel was the victim of an unprovoked, vicious attack on
October 7th. Why should they provide aid to the aggressor
nation or aggressor--Gaza is not a nation--to the aggressors on
October 7th. We didn't provide aid to Germany and Japan during
World War II.
Secretary Austin. We did provide aid to and assistance to
many of the countries that we have operated in recently.
Senator Cotton. But not in World War II. If you had would
been in George Marshall's or Dwight Eisenhower's position in
World War II, would you have wanted to provide aid to Germany?
Secretary Austin. I really do believe, Senator, that if
they want to create a lasting effect in terms of stability,
then I think that something needs to be done to account--to
help the Palestinian people.
Senator Cotton. Again, I get that, but they are in the
middle of the war. We believed that too after World War II.
That is why we had the Marshall Plan and that is why we rebuilt
Japan. But that was after the war was won, not in the middle of
it.
In the meantime, like it is not Israel's responsibility to
provide aid, certainly not our responsibility, but we are
spending our tax dollars to build this giant pier as an aid
into Gaza. Who is going to accept that aid? Who is going to be
at the end of the pier on the shore taking aid from American
forces?
Secretary Austin. That is still being worked out. But there
will be NGO's that that will help to distribute that aid.
Senator Cotton. Hamas is in charge of Gaza. When aid goes
to Gaza, Hamas doesn't divert it or commandeer it or steal it,
it accepts it, and anybody operating in Gaza is under the thumb
of Hamas. I just think it is very ill-considered, and I don't
think it is going to end very well. Let me move on to Ukraine.
The Biden administration has discouraged Ukraine from
launching refinery strikes against Russia. Why is the Biden
administration discouraging Ukraine from undertaking some of
the most effective attacks on Russia's war making capabilities?
Secretary Austin. Certainly, those attacks could have a
knock on effect for--in terms of the global energy situation
and--but quite frankly, I think Ukraine is better served in
going after tactical and operational targets that can directly
influence the current fight.
Senator Cotton. It sounds to me like the Biden
administration doesn't want gas prices go up in an election
year based on all the other actions it has taken to drive up
gas prices further. But anyway, I want to turn to one final
point about the recruiting crisis our services face.
The Army is the most acute. It is challenging all services,
though. I have spoken to numerous recruiters, front line
recruiters, heads of recruiting battalions. Two of the most
common things I hear is Genesis and a lack of medical providers
to process new recruits. Do you have a memo on your desk from
the services to place a pause on Genesis?
Secretary Austin. No, not----
Senator Cotton. Have you received that, because my sources
tell me you have received a request from the services to pause
the Genesis.
Secretary Austin. You know, I talked to the services
about--the service secretaries about Genesis, and also have
talked to the service chiefs about Genesis as well. I don't
have knowledge of any--of that memo, but what I will tell you
is that, you know, we are doing everything we can to improve
the number of health care providers that are available and to
streamline the operations with Genesis.
Now, Genesis is a, you know, it is an issue that our
recruiting force had to work through, but it is not the sole
cause of----
Senator Cotton. No, I know it is not the sole cause. There
is a lot of other causes. I just, it comes up constantly, and
just for those listening from home, Genesis is not just the
first book of the Bible, it is this giant medical records
system that now catches everything that has ever happened to
you.
So, you know, every drill sergeant accuses recruits of
lying to their recruiters so they can get into the service. But
now Genesis catches all that. So, if you broke your arm and you
are 12 playing peewee football, Genesis knows it. If you were
prescribed an SSRI because you were depressed when you are 13,
because your parents were getting a bad divorce, Genesis knows
it.
You got to go through a whole lot of rigmarole to get a
waiver. Now, look, we can't have psychotics join the military,
but if the kid was on an SSRI when he was 13, does that really
matter? Does that really matter? If he broke his arm when he
was 13--he can't have a degenerate bone condition, but he broke
his arm.
I know you will say, because I have heard it before, that
there is waiver approvals here. It takes a long time, and like,
if you are like a super gung ho Captain America kid who wants
to serve above everything else, you will wait that time.
But if it is going to take 120 or 150 days to join, when
you get a job at Amazon for $20 or $25 an hour, you are going
to lose those people. I think you really need to look at the
way Genesis works and the approval authority.
Even if you have approval authority, you know, whether it
is an E8 out on the front lines--or a lieutenant colonel at the
headquarters, you are counting on them to take what they might
see as some serious personal risk that doesn't have a lot of
reward.
That is why I think this has to be written into policy. My
time is over, but I do think this is a serious question for all
the services, and that I would encourage you to look at it and
take action sooner rather than later.
Secretary Austin. I don't disagree with you, Senator. I
have been a recruiter, and I know how important this is to
recruiters.
What we need to continue to do is upgrade what requires a
waiver and make sure that we are doing everything we can to
provide enough medical professionals to be able to shorten the
time that it takes to get that waiver.
I think there are a number of things that that we can do
and should do, and we are doing some of those things. We will
continue to press on this to shorten the time that it takes for
recruiters to get these packets through.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Hirono,
please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary McCord,
Secretary Austin, and General Brown, thank you very much for
your service. Senator Austin, I want to thank you for your
leadership regarding Red Hill in Hawaii, and it was the right
decision to close this massive World War II fuel storage
facility.
Admiral Wade and the Joint Task Force have worked
diligently alongside the State and Federal partners to safely
remove all of the fuel from the facility in recent months, but
of course, more work remains.
What is your view regarding the Department's long term
responsibility for the environmental restoration and
remediation efforts following the closure of Red Hill, to
ensure that no contamination of the aquifer that the people of
Oahu rely on for drinking water occurs now and in the future
attributable to military installations or actions?
Secretary Austin. Thanks, Senator. Protecting public health
and the environment in the communities where we have our troops
stationed is a Department priority, and, you know, we made a
promise to the citizens of Hawaii to conduct any and all
necessary environmental remediation around the Red Hill
facility.
We are going to live up to that promise. As you know, as
you just pointed out, last month, JTF Red Hill completed the
fueling. So, the work has transitioned to the Department of the
Navy now for the Red Hill closure, efforts. We are going to
stay focused on that.
I will continue to make sure that I get briefed on this
routinely, and make sure that we are doing the right things to
meet our timelines. But most importantly, make sure that we do
the right things in terms of environmental restoration.
Senator Hirono. Thank you for your continuing commitment,
because there will be long term, I would say, requirements as
to monitoring, et cetera. So that brings me to another question
that I have for you.
I am concerned about the Department's ability to hold
senior officials accountable following major incidents such as
the fuel leak at Red Hill and the fire onboard the USS Bonhomme
Richard.
I am including a provision in this year's NDAA that would
create a new investigation category to provide consistency when
there is a catastrophic incident resulting in a significant
loss of life or billions of dollars in taxpayer money, to
ensure those responsible are held accountable for their
actions.
Would you be amenable to changes in this area, especially
for catastrophic incidents such as the ones that I cited, so
that really the investigation and the responsibility issues are
before the Department as opposed to the services that are
involved?
Secretary Austin. Thank you, Senator. I have seen your
correspondence on this issue, and I have asked my people to
take a look at this, and certainly we will do so, analyze it
and come back and have a discussion with you on where we are.
But I really appreciate your continued focus on this.
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much. I have talked about
how important infrastructure is to readiness, and I know that
during the last year's posture hearing, you agreed that the
military services need to invest in infrastructure to make sure
our servicemembers have the facilities they need to execute
their mission.
However, even in the INDOPACOM priority theater, there are
billions in infrastructure projects in Hawaii alone and the
rest of the region, either on a service or INDOPACOM's unfunded
priority list.
Secretary Austin, how does the Department ensure the
infrastructure maintenance and modernization needs are met if
there are multiple critical projects in Hawaii and throughout
the region that are not being funded in the President's budget?
Secretary Austin. Well, there--we have, as you know
Senator, invested a lot into infrastructure and throughout the
region, and our--the PDI, Admiral Aquilino's request for the
Pacific Deterrence Initiative this year is some $9.9 billion,
and it includes infrastructure projects. That is on top of the
$20 billion that we have requested over the last couple of
years in support of the PDI.
So, we continue to invest in this, and again, in terms of
specific projects, you know, the services will have to continue
to rank order what, you know, their priorities are based upon,
you know, what their specific budget--what is available in
their budget. But this is very important to us, and it is
something that we will continue to work on.
Senator Hirono. Well, you testified today that tough
choices need to be made in near term readiness, which is also
making sure that our infrastructure is maintained. I just want
to note one more thing.
I am concerned about the cost overruns for the Critical
Drydock 3, which is the biggest infrastructure project within
the DOD replacement at Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam. Despite
the lessons learned from Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, the cost of
Pearl Harbors' drydock recently increased by over $800 million.
No sooner did I go and give a speech about how important
this drydock is, that I am confronted by this, what I consider
to be a massive cost overrun. How can we--I mean, I just want
to note that I would like to hear from you.
I am out of time right now, but we need to be a lot more
accurate in planning for infrastructure projects from the
beginning to enable us to better estimate how much these costs
are going to be because to go from 1 week to say that, you
know, this is great where we learn lessons from Portsmouth, and
then 2 weeks later, it is $800 million more.
So, Secretary Austin, I really would like to be assured
that we are going to keep track of what is going on with this
drydock infrastructure project in Hawaii, because I have a
feeling that I may be confronted with even more costly
increases. It is a statement that I am making, and I expect to
be apprized as we go forward.
Secretary Austin. Absolutely, and you mentioned that this
drydock is important. It is absolutely important. One of the
things that happened here was that we didn't fully appreciate
the impact of COVID on the supply chains and some other things.
So, those effects have lasted longer than we anticipated, and
that is part of what is going on here.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Rounds,
please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Austin,
Secretary McCord, General Brown, thank you for your service to
the Nation at such a time in history.
Close coordination between Congress and the Administration
is critical to making sure that our troops are resourced and
postured in a way that deters conflict and enables them to
dominate our enemies if deterrence fails.
Mr. Secretary, the--Secretary Austin, the assessment of the
DOD, NTIA led study on the electromagnetic spectrum, which was
completed last fall, was that the adoption of dynamic spectrum
sharing is the only way that the DOD can share the portions of
the critical bands it uses to defend our country and our
forces.
Developing that capability is one of my highest priorities.
I am aware of coordination between this committee and the DOD
CIO, which is centered around a demonstration project to
investigate dynamic spectrum sharing being executed sometime at
the end of 2025.
I applaud the effort, but I am also aware of a simultaneous
transmit and receive capability, or STAR, that is ready for
test and evaluation right now. Can you give me your commitment
that you will investigate the STAR capability and accelerate
testing and evaluation if you discover that it is promising? I
can assure you that I would work with you and the committees of
jurisdiction to address any hurdles that need to be overcome to
fund such an acceleration.
Secretary Austin. Senator, you have my commitment that, you
know, we will investigate and make sure that, if there is
capability there, then we will work to take advantage of it.
But I just want to re-emphasize the point that you made,
and that is that it is really important that we have access to
the spectrum so that we can provide--continue to provide
security for this country and that we can--we have the
capability to enable all of our platforms here.
I understand that there will continue to be a demand from
the commercial sector to access more of the spectrum, but we
have to do everything that we need to do to make sure that we
have the provisions to protect this country.
I appreciate your support, and I am also committed to
working with the Secretary of Commerce and with anybody else
that can create a capability to allow--to enable that dynamic
sharing. So, thanks for your efforts on that.
Senator Rounds. Well, thank you, sir, and once again, I
think this new capability may very well be a key to addressing
this issue in an expedited basis, and I appreciate your
agreement to work with us on that. Thank you, sir. General
Brown, the B-21 Raider and the next gen air dominance platform
will be critical in a fight against a near peer adversary. Can
you briefly share why these platforms are so essential to the
Joint Force when it comes to fighting a capable enemy in a
contested environment?
General Brown. Well, we have an advancing threat, and if
you think about the areas we have been operating in the course
of the past several decades, we do not have advanced threat. It
was mostly a violent extremist or other countries without
advanced threats.
What I see going forward is that with that advancing
threat, we have to modernize and bring in capabilities that
will not only match that threat but exceed that threat and stay
ahead of the threat. That is why these particular platforms are
so important.
Senator Rounds. I think it says without question that both
of these two programs need to move forward, fully funded. Right
now, I think we have identified that we are going to purchase a
minimum of 100 B-21s. I suspect that you would agree with me
that that number may very well have to go up if we
appropriately take care of the needs that our men in uniform,
men and women in uniform require.
General Brown. I know in my last job, we--as the Air Force
chief, we did talk about the aspect that we may need to go
above 100. I will defer to the Air Force, but I will just say
that I am focused as a chairman to make sure that we have the
joint capabilities for the force and making sure that we are
working very closely together with all the services to bring
that capability forward.
Senator Rounds. How important is it that NGAD be fielded as
a full program of record?
General Brown. That is also important. You know, as you are
aware, you know, the Air Force is also looking at a
collaborative combat aircraft as well to increase capacity at a
cost and create more dilemmas for our adversaries.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. I see my time has expired, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds. Senator
Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you to our witnesses for your service.
I want to return to the heartbreaking tragedy in Israel and
Gaza. Israel, of course, must defend itself against those who
would annihilate it. No one asked the question about whether
the United States had a right to defend itself after 9/11.
Israel has that right, and that would include Hamas. It
would include Hezbollah. It would include Iran. It would
include militias connected to Iran. It would include the
Houthis. But in the days after the October 7th attack, I
offered this advice to the Israeli Ambassador, the United
States Ambassador Herzog, learn from our own mistakes and
confine your vigorous defense to a defense against Hamas, and
don't let it look like it is a war against Gazans or
Palestinians who are not the same as Hamas, who often are under
the thumb of Hamas.
I gave advice to the Ambassador then that the world would
be watching to see what happened, and there is various bits of
evidence that you look at to determine whether this is a
defense against Hamas or whether it is a war against Gazans or
Palestinians. First, the extent of civilian casualties. The
civilian casualties in this war have been heartbreaking.
Yet, because Hamas chooses to embed with civilian
populations, it is extremely difficult to defend against Hamas
without that heartbreak. Second, how you talk about the war?
Are you talking about it as a war against Hamas, or are you
more broadly talking about it as a war against all Gazans and
Palestinians?
In the weeks after the October 7th attack, yes, there was
trauma. You don't necessarily say the most precise thing when
you are traumatized, but there were too many statements from
Israeli leadership, the President, the defense minister
suggesting we are going to shut off all water, all food, all
everything into Gaza, collectively punishing Gazans who are not
necessarily part of Hamas. That is unfortunate.
Third, the allowance of humanitarian aid, 500 trucks a day
were supplying the needs of these 2 million people into Gaza.
Aid was throttled off immediately. Water was turned off. Just 2
days ago, the amount of aid into Gaza hit 300 trucks, and
yesterday it got near 500 trucks 6 months into this.
If you are not allowing what you were allowing before, food
and medicine to get to a civilian population, you are making
the situation worse, not better. There is no reason the United
States should have to build a pier in the Eastern
Mediterranean. There is no reason we should have to airdropped
supplies, often endangering people who have to go out into the
water and get them.
I applaud the President for convincing finally President--
Prime Minister Netanyahu to open the crossing from Erez after
it took months to get them to open the crossing from Kerem
Shalom. But the pace of humanitarian aid is insufficient. The
widow of our former chair, Senator McCain, Cindy McCain, said 2
days ago that we are on the verge of a catastrophic famine in
Gaza, and we may not be able to recover.
If you wanted to maintain a vigorous war against Hamas, but
not against Palestinians, you would protect Palestinians from
violence on the West Bank. It was shocking to me to hear
reports from our own U.S. military officials that settlers'
violence against Palestinians on the West Bank is not only
increasing, but in many instances, the violence is accompanied
by escorts from IDF reservists and Israeli border officials who
are protecting settlers committing violence against
Palestinians.
My understanding is that the escort phenomenon has abated,
but the violence against Palestinians on the West Bank has not.
Finally, if you wanted to make plain that it was a war against
Gaza, not against Palestinians, you would hold out some hope to
Palestinians that they might have a future of autonomy, as they
were promised in 1948.
The world made a promise to two people in 1948, that there
would be a State of Israel and a State of Palestine living side
by side peacefully. One promise the world has kept. One promise
the world hasn't kept. There is a million reasons for that.
There is a million reasons for that, but the fact is, 75 years
later, one promise has been kept and one hasn't.
It is important for Palestinians to believe they might have
a future with autonomy. It might look different than 1948, but
they should believe it. Instead, Israeli leadership in their
statements has essentially closed that off. It is so very
important that we provide assistance to Israel to allow itself
to defend against those who would annihilate it.
It is so very important that we take dramatically more
steps to encourage Israel, to push Israel, to urge Israel and
other nations to make plain that a war against Gazans or
Palestinians is going to make this worse. Cindy McCain predicts
that there will be a famine, a mass famine in Gaza.
Secretary Austin, if that were to occur, if women and
children who are already dying but start to die in great
numbers because of lack of access to food or medicine, will
that improve or will that de-escalate the violence in the
region, or will that accelerate violence in the region?
Secretary Austin. It will accelerate violence, and it will
have the effect of ensuring that there is a long term conflict
because of, you know, the Palestinian people have been
disadvantaged to such a great degree.
It doesn't have to happen, I think to your point. I think,
you know, we should continue to do everything we can, and we
are doing this to encourage the Israelis to provide
humanitarian assistance, to open up more land routes, and to
and to separate the Palestinian people from Hamas. Failure to
do so, I think, would just create more terrorist----
Senator Kaine. I am going to close and say, we already see
dangerous escalation. The U.S. has had to wage 460 strikes
against the Houthis who are firing into the Red sea. They
weren't really doing that in any significant quantity until the
war in Gaza started.
The U.S. has put our own personnel on high alert in the
Middle East, because there is the expectation that Iran will
retaliate against Israel for an Iraqi attack on--for an Israeli
attack on Iranian positions in Syria. We have got to find a
path to de-escalation here. The world is depending on us to do
so. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Sullivan,
please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you for your testimony. I appreciate the discussion of the
supplemental, and I would encourage you to continue to talk
about it, not as a Ukraine aid package, but as a package that
actually builds out our own industrial base to protect our own
country, because that is what it is.
As you mentioned, Mr. Secretary, it is actually closer to
60 percent of that entire bill goes directly into the defense
industrial base. When you look at the AUKUS dollars, it
actually unlocks about $6 billion to build subs, the weapons
system that Xi Jinping is scared to death of. So, I think, you
know, labeling it as Ukraine aid isn't helpful. It should be
called the Fighting Authoritarian Aggression Supplemental or
the Defense Industrial Base Enhancement Act.
So, I would encourage you to continue to talk about it in
that regard, and the amount it focuses on Israel and Taiwan.
So, I think that is important, particularly this week with the
House. I want to get to the defense budget, which is what you
are testifying here.
Would you both agree, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, that
we are facing one of the most dangerous times in our history
since World War II?
Secretary Austin. This is one of the most complex times
that I have seen, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. General.
General Brown. The 39 years I have been wearing uniform,
this has probably been the most complex I have seen.
Senator Sullivan. So, I know these are hard questions, but
I am going to ask them. You know, the President has put forward
defense inflation adjusted cuts to the Department of Defense
every year. Now, the chairman mentioned well this was a House
Republicans. This is the Commander in Chief's leadership, and
he is failing on it. Every year he puts forward Defense
Department cuts during one of the most dangerous periods.
Right now, this budget, if it continues in the direction
the Biden administration is pushing, will get us below 3
percent of GDP for our defense. We have only done that four
times since World War II. Do you think being at 3 percent of
GDP, or below 3 percent of GDP for the Department of Defense,
meets the moment in terms of the dangers we are seeing right
now? Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Austin. I think, again, operating within the
guidelines of the law----
Senator Sullivan. But I am not asking about the law. I am
just saying, if we go to below--3 percent or below, do you
think that meets the--we have been there four times. It was
mostly in the late 90's when we have the so-called peace
dividend. Is 3 percent of GDP for our Department of Defense
what we need during these very dangerous times?
Secretary Austin. No, we are--again, we have linked our
request to our strategy, and again, I think we had to make some
tough choices, as I said earlier----
Senator Sullivan. General--I am sorry to interrupt you, Mr.
Secretary. General, in your personal opinion, do you think that
below 3 percent of GDP spending is what we need to meet these
dangerous times, which we all agree are dangerous times?
General Brown. Well, Senator, what I really believe on this
is that we have to get a budget on time. For the past 15 years,
we have been----
Senator Sullivan. I agree with that. Talk to Senator
Schumer----
Senator Sullivan. We have had 5 years in continued
resolutions. When the budget is on time, it actually impacts
our buying power.
Senator Sullivan. I agree with that. But can you answer my
question? Three percent of GDP--it is pretty easy to answer.
The answer is no, right.
General Brown. Senator, as a warfighter, I don't----
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit this
chart for the record. It just shows where we have been--four
times since World War II, we have been at 3 percent of GDP or
below. The answer is no. I think we all know that. This
Committee knows that. It is important--I respect both of you
very much. Have a lot of experience. But it is important to
come before this Committee and tell us what you believe.
None of you believe going below 3 percent of GDP is good
for the Department of Defense. I know that. I know it is hard.
The President clearly thinks it is good for Department of
Defense. He cuts the budget every year. It has got to make your
job really tough.
Let me go to an area that you understand very well, both of
you, and that is deterrence with regard to Iran. Tom Friedman,
The New York Times columnist, recently observed that fighting
through Tehran's proxies, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen,
Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria, Shia militias in Iraq, Iran is
reaping all the benefits and paying virtually no costs of the
work of its proxies.
I asked General Kurilla if he agreed with that. He said
yes, I think they are not paying the cost. That is your CENTCOM
Commander with regard to Iran. Vice Admiral Brad Cooper
mentioned on 60 minutes that the Houthis are actually
supplied--being supplied by the Iranians, advised by the
Iranians, trained by the Iranians, and very importantly, they
are receiving targeting information on American warships in the
Red sea.
So, the Iranians are providing the Houthis targeting intel
to shoot and sink the USS Carney and USS Eisenhower. Both of
you are, I think, very clear eyed on the threat that Iran
poses. You have seen them killing our troops over the years.
General, you have had an up close--I am sorry, Mr. Secretary,
you have seen that very up close with the EFPs in Iraq. Why are
we not sinking Iranian warships, intel ships that are providing
targeting intel to kill marines and sailors from Alaska or
North Dakota?
I mean, I find this outrageous. Why are we not doing that?
Why are we not telling the Iranians, overtly or covertly, next
time you send intel to target an American warship through the
Houthis, we will sink your ships. Why aren't we doing that?
That is so basic to me. Mr. Secretary, you have been very
strong against Iran your whole career.
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Secretary Austin. I maintain the point that Iran needs to
be held accountable for what it is doing--continues to do.
Senator Sullivan. Providing intel to kill American sailors
in the Red sea. Why don't we sink their ships?
Secretary Austin. Attacking Iran is a different issue and I
think----
Senator Sullivan. They are attacking us.
Secretary Austin. Their proxies are attacking----
Senator Sullivan. No, they are providing intel to kill
Americans. General, your advice on this, in your personal
opinion?
General Brown. As the Secretary said, we will continue to
hold Iran accountable for much of this activity. I can talk to
you more in a classified session about some of the options that
we are working through should one of our attacks--our ships get
attacked.
Senator Sullivan. This is not an unreasonable position that
I am proposing. Here is the problem, and I have talked to the
CNO of the Navy. There was this barrage against the USS
Carney--28 missiles and drones recently from the Houthis.
If one of those slipped through and sunk that ship, the
President would have pressure to go to war with Iran. My view
is we should just tell them right now, enough. Operation
Praying Mantis, I know you are both familiar with that.
That was very successful operation. We sank Iranian
warships when they were mining the Persian Gulf. So, I would
like to talk to you more about this in the classified setting,
but I don't think it is even a difficult decision. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the quotes
attributed to Mark Twain, which has never been verified, but if
he didn't say it, he should have, which is that history doesn't
always repeat itself, but it usually rhymes.
In the late 1930's, there was a very deliberate and
sophisticated Nazi propaganda effort in the United States up to
and including Members of Congress to affect American opinion
and political opinion toward the Nazi regime and the defense of
Europe, and it worked until Pearl Harbor.
Today, Chairman McCaul and Chairman Turner in the House
have both acknowledged a very sophisticated and concentrated
Russian misinformation and propaganda attempt here in the
United States to affect our public policy toward Ukraine.
Indeed, both of them acknowledged that this has, up to and
including Members of Congress. Do you see, Mr. Secretary, a
danger to this country from this kind of concerted, conscious,
misinformation campaign on the part of the Russians?
Secretary Austin. Absolutely, Senator, and that danger
increases on a daily basis. To your point, it is sophisticated
to the degree that people don't know that--you know, where the,
the information is coming from and how Russia is doing these
kinds of things. But, again, there is a danger.
Senator King. Well, it is one of the vulnerabilities that
we have is also our greatest strength, which is the openness of
our society, the First Amendment, free speech. The
vulnerability is that our democracy is based upon information,
and if the information stream is compromised by a foreign
actor, that endangers our country.
One of my concerns is that it is very difficult to defend
against such attacks. We don't want to be censoring the
internet. We don't want to be censoring free and--free flow of
information. Our whole defense strategy in every other area is
deterrence. In other words, that is--deterrence is the key to
our defense strategy. It has been for 75 years. Except in cyber
and misinformation.
I would hope that you would take back to CYBERCOM and the
NSA the necessity of a deterrent. That is the adversary, in
this case Russia, if you are going to meddle in our politics,
in our system, in our information pool, in a deliberate and
conscious way, you will pay a price for that. Not necessarily
kinetic, but it could be cyber, it could be sanctions, it could
be others. But one of my problems is that there doesn't seem to
be a deterrent in this field, which indeed is the new frontier
of warfare.
Mr. Secretary, I hope you will take that thought back. If
deterrence works in nuclear policy, in conventional kinetic
policy, it also can work in this new frontier of misinformation
to undermine the National Security of this country.
Secretary Austin. I will take that back and we will take it
for action. We will drill on possibilities to create that
deterrent effect that you are talking about.
Senator King. I am afraid if we don't do that, it is just
going to continue. There is no reason why it shouldn't. It is
cheap for them, and it is very damaging to this country. With
regard to Gaza, Senator Kaine laid out the situation very
effectively. It has become apparent--I met with Prime Minister
Netanyahu in January.
The President has talked to him repeatedly. You use the
word encourage. It has become apparent to me that the current
government of Israel needs more than encouragement. I was
surprised that at the very week that the World Kitchen attack
occurred and the continuing humanitarian crisis, that the
Administration approved the transfer of additional munitions to
Israel, particularly offensive munitions. 2,000 pound bombs are
not defensive, they are offensive, and they are not very
precision.
Why did the Administration make that decision? It seems to
me the President's hand would be strengthened significantly if
he had said, we are going to pause this planned conveyance of
these offensive weapons until we see some serious attention to
the humanitarian crisis and also to the problem of civilian
casualties.
Secretary Austin. So, I had the opportunity to speak with
my counterpart on his attack, and I was very upfront in terms
of, you know, how horrific this was and the fact that they
needed to be investigated and people held accountable.
We are seeing some of that activity. In terms of--as the
President engaged the Prime minister, I won't speak to that,
you know, the contents of that conversation, but it clearly had
an effect. We have seen changes in behavior, and we have seen
more humanitarian assistance being pushed into Gaza.
There needs to be more still. But, again, I think, you
know, the President's conversation did have a positive effect.
Now, hopefully that trend will continue but that's left to be
seen.
Senator King. Well, again, I think all of us feel Israel
absolutely has a--not only a right, but a responsibility to
defend itself. But it is the conduct by which they are doing so
that is actually hurting Israel. That is what bothers me.
I consider myself a friend of Israel, and by not separating
the Palestinian civilians from Hamas, they are playing into
Hamas's hands. When you kill a civilian child, their parents
are not going to be very sympathetic to the people that let
that bomb loose.
My concern is that particularly when those bombs are coming
from this country, we have a responsibility as well in terms of
that--the way that war is being conducted, because we are
engaged also in terms of the supply of the weapons.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Let me recognize
Senator Cramer, please.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for being here and for your service to our country.
General Brown, I am going to start with you. I am going to
followup on a number of things that my colleagues have brought
up, but I want to ask you very specifically, is it your best
military advice to the Commander in Chief, and the Secretary of
Defense to cut--continue to cut the defense budget to the point
where we are now below 3 percent of our GDP? Is that your best
military advice?
General Brown. You know, I give more advice on our
operational capability, but----
Senator Cramer. You guys are very good at not answering
questions.
General Brown. But I will also tell you, one of the things
we will do is actually continue to advocate for the resources
required for the Joint Force. This is an area that I will
continue to work on not only with the--my boss, the Secretary,
but also with this committee.
Senator Cramer. Mr. Secretary, Senator Cotton asked you
about, you know, striking energy assets in Russia, particularly
refineries. Isn't--and you sort of said maybe there is a better
place. I don't want to say that is what you said, but better
places for them to strike. Isn't energy--hasn't energy become a
weapon in the war in Russia and Ukraine, and frankly, in Iran?
In fact, regarding Iran, I think somebody said that the
position of the Administration is to make Iran pay for what
they have done, and we will talk about, you know, some of those
options, General, in the other session. But aren't sanction
waivers for Iran--I mean, that doesn't seem like a great way to
make them pay.
They have now been able to use oil to build their reserves,
their financial reserves, some $4 billion, which is what they
had at the end of the Trump Administration to $75 billion
today. So, isn't energy, aren't energy assets actually almost
like hitting say, you know, a military side?
General Brown. They can and will have, eventually have an
impact on a country's ability to produce military capability.
There is no question. The question is, if you are in a fight
and you are fighting for your life, is that most important to
you or is something--can something else be addressed that is,
that can affect the battlefield, the current battlefield, more
effectively?
Senator Cramer. Okay. If I buy that, couldn't we be doing
at least more on our part to provide some of those much cleaner
energy resources rather than letting Iran, for example,
continue to sell to China, another adversary, and buildup their
reserves?
Leaving that for a minute, I want to get to something even
more specific and something that I was planning to bring up
before all this came up, and that is and won't surprise either
one of you, that I continue to be concerned, and your Combatant
Commanders are sounding the alarm about the Air Force
continually not only eliminating legacy and current ISR assets,
but now future ISR assets, with the hope that somehow lower
earth orbiting satellites are going to solve the day.
I know you will say, because we always hear, well, the
Combatant Commanders never have enough ISR. They will always
say they don't have enough. But their concern is escalating
along with the deterioration of our airborne ISR assets.
I know about the priorities, and we need to do more, but
could General Brown maybe, now that you have this broader
responsibility than just the Air Force, maybe you could speak
to that a little bit for me and help me feel better about it,
and again, we can talk about it in more detail later.
General Brown. Senator, I appreciate the question, and I
will just tell you, based on experience, having been a Deputy
Commander to Combat Command, Air Command Commander, as well as
a Service Chief, and now as a Chairman, I do think about all
the capabilities that we have and ISR is one of those.
This, I will just say, is one of the more contentious
issues that we have across the Joint Force. The things we are
going to have to continue to do is this, not only look at the
ISR that we do have to keep that moving, but at the same time,
look at opportunities, particularly--and you mentioned space
based capabilities.
That is going to give us access into areas we can't get
with some of the ISR that we have today. It is a combination of
things of how we work together with the Joint Force, and this
is an area that I am focused on with the Joint Chiefs and the
Combat Commands to ensure that we are making best use of the
resources that we do have, the capabilities in ISR, but I would
also say all the other capabilities that we provide for the
Joint Force and how we balance that out to make sure we are
putting it in the right place at the right time, to provide
those gateways.
I am having pretty deep conversations with the combat
commanders and with the Joint Chiefs on these very topics about
how do we ensure that we are identifying areas, like ISR, that
we need to continue to resource, and how we best do that across
the service and across the Joint Force.
Senator Cramer. Earlier--I can't remember who was asking
the questions, but you brought up CCA as a force multiplier. My
term, not yours, but I think that is the term commonly used. I
think it was in responses to NGAD.
But I just want to wrap up with this maybe admonition or--
please, please, please, as you--whether we are talking about
CCA or we are talking about something new in space, we have got
to find a way to move at the speed of China.
We have talked a little bit about that with regard to R&D,
with regard to procurement. We have got to knock down some of
these barriers, and please ask us for help if we need to do
some things from a policy standpoint so that our innovators are
in the fight with you, rather than just the three or four
primes that have the same bureaucratic traditions that,
frankly, the military has. We have got to become faster. With
that, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Cramer. Senator
Warren, please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Austin,
under your leadership, the United States has made preventing
civilian harm a top priority. You have repeatedly said that it
is both a moral and a strategic imperative.
I have pressed the DOD to take this issue more seriously
for years. In 2022, DOD issued its Civilian Harm Mitigation and
Response Action Plan, which directs the Department to
systematically take steps to prevent, mitigate, and respond to
civilian harm. Policy makes clear that we expect our military
partners to prioritize civilian harm prevention as well.
Since October, Israeli strikes have killed over 30,000
Palestinians, the majority of them are women and children.
Rafah has become the latest refuge of Palestinian civilians, is
now home to more than 1.4 million people.
Given the number of civilians there, the Biden
administration has repeatedly urged Israel not to attack Rafah,
saying that doing so would be ``a disaster. Secretary Austin,
do you think an attack on Rafah that kills another 30,000
civilians would enhance either U.S. or Israeli security?
Secretary Austin. Thank you, Senator. There is no question
that there have been far too many civilian casualties in this
conflict, far too many.
What we continue to emphasize to the Israelis is that, you
know, civilians in that battle space need to be not only
evacuated but properly taken care of once they are evacuated
out of that battle space, before anything is contemplated.
This is a point that I have stress with my counterpart on a
number of occasions just recently as yesterday--and again, it
cannot be, going forward, what we have seen in the past in
terms of the type of activities that we have seen in Gaza City
and in Khan Yunis.
Far too many civilians have been killed as a result of
combat operations, and they need to get civilians out of that
battle space around Rafah.
Senator Warren. All right. So, the United States has an
important responsibility here, because we are the ones giving
the Israeli Defense Forces the bombs that they are using to
destroy homes and hospitals and refugee camps.
At the President's direction, through his February National
Security memorandum, the Department of Defense and the State
Department are currently assessing whether Israel is in
compliance with international humanitarian law. There are
serious concerns that Israel is not complying with the
international humanitarian law.
According to recent investigations by Plus 972 and The
Guardian, Israeli intelligence officials allege that the IDF
often deliberately prefers to wait until its targets are at
home, among their children and neighbors, to launch a strike.
Secretary Austin, I understand that civilians are often at
risk in a time of war, but would the United States
systematically choose to execute on military strikes that are
more likely to kill civilians, including children?
Secretary Austin. Absolutely not. Just the opposite. You
know, we routinely go out of our way to make sure that we do
everything we can to minimize civilian casualties. Even with
that, even with extraordinary efforts, there will be collateral
damage and casualties from time to time. But it is something
that we really work hard to prevent.
Senator Warren. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. U.S. policy
explicitly states that we expect our allies to meet the same
standards that we do to prevent and mitigate civilian harm.
Israel is failing to do that in its bombing campaign.
Under your leadership, DOD has made significant progress in
putting policies in place to protect civilians. But we also
need to push our closest allies to meet the same standard and
to cutoff U.S. support if they refuse to do so. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Warren. Senator
Scott, please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you each of
you for being here. Thank you for your service. First, I want
to talk about Homestead. I am from Florida. The--we watch what
China's doing in Latin America.
We watch what Russia is doing. We watch what Iran is doing.
We know we have a Chinese spy station in Cuba. I have talked to
Chairman Brown, Secretary Kendall, General Richardson about the
importance of Homestead Air Force Base, and it is from a
standpoint of power projection, and the need to have a flying
mission.
I think all of them have agreed the importance of
Homestead. So, Secretary Austin, do you believe that homestead
is important for power projection to Latin American, and should
we have a flying mission there? Will we get a flying mission
there?
Secretary Austin. Homestead Air Reserve Base is
strategically located, and it provides valuable contributions
to our efforts in the SOUTHCOM AOR, and--we continue to be
grateful for your support for Homestead. I know that there has
been questions about whether or not we are going to close
Homestead. I can tell you that that is not under consideration
right now.
Senator Scott. Right. number two, China. China has elected
to be our enemy. No ifs, ands, or buts about it. We finally got
through the NDAA an elimination of the Federal Government's
ability to buy Chinese drones, but I don't personally
understand how the Department of defense would ever buy
anything made in China.
Specifically, to you, Secretary Austin, do you believe that
we ought to be buying Chinese lighter systems to use on our
vehicles or Chinese computers, which are connected to our top
secret networks?
Secretary Austin. I do not, and we will work hard and are
working hard to make sure that our supply chains are not
vulnerable to manipulation by adversaries. So, it is important
to us to make sure that we don't have, you know, elements from
our adversaries included in our weapons systems and repair
parts and you name it. So, this is something that we pay very,
very close attention to.
Senator Scott. Right. So, I will take that if we propose
things where we are going to prevent DOD, our Federal
Government to buying Chinese products, you will be supportive.
Next, let's talk about Israel.
I just got back from Israel. Met with the Prime Minister,
met with the war cabinet. I went to the Nova Film Festival. I
talked to families that lost their loved ones there. I went to
a kibbutz that I had been to in 2019, where 63 people were
murdered by Hamas. Hamas, about half a mile from there.
There is a video of a young lady that was about to be and
was murdered by Hamas. I went to a house where a mother was
burned alive. I went where babies were killed. It is
disgusting.
What I found in my conversation there is that the--in
contrast to what some of my colleagues have said, the IDF is
absolutely committed to the safety of Palestinians. They have
zero interest in killing civilians.
Actually, they put a lot of effort into making sure that
that doesn't happen. My takeaway, this was--they don't
understand why the Biden administration doesn't try to hold
Qatar accountable. Why they don't--because everybody believes
that Qatar can get the hostages out today. I met with American
hostage families.
I met with them--you know, some have families alive and
some that have bodies still in, in Gaza. They don't--they
there's not a lot of understanding of what the Biden
administration has actually done to get our American hostages
home.
Then the last thing is that a lot of people I have talked
to don't understand why they would--the Biden administration
would attack Israel for the civilian deaths, which were
horrible on the humanitarian effort that was done. We are
including where the Kitchen program was done, where even
American was killed.
At the same time, the Biden administration has done nothing
to hold anybody accountable for the 13 service warriors death
at the Kabul airport or the death of innocent Afghan family,
killed in a U.S. drone strike during the withdrawal.
So, three questions, do you believe that we ought to demand
accountability by Qatar? Should the Biden administration do
more to get our hostages home? Three, why do we demand--why
does the Biden administration demand accountability--which
actually Israel did do an investigation, but to my
understanding, we have never done an investigation to hold
anybody accountable for the drone strike that killed an Afghan
family or do anything about the 13 servicemembers that died at
the Kabul airport.
Secretary Austin. Regarding the recovery of hostages in
Israel, this has been a priority for the United States since
the very beginning. The President and all the senior leadership
have been focused on this and doing everything possible to try
to get these hostages released, and that work continues.
I know you have seen Director Burns go back and forth to
the Middle East, working with his counterparts on this issue.
We remain hopeful that we will see movement at some point in
the future. But this is very, very important. Again, Hamas is
responsible ultimately for, you know, what has--for the
beginning--for the start of this war.
This brutal attack on Israel and the killing of Israeli
citizens and Americans, it was just--it is unthinkable, quite
frankly. But having said that, there have been far too many
civilian casualties, and you know, I think there is a way to be
successful operationally and tactically, and also protect
civilians.
The two are not mutually exclusive, Senator, and I think we
just need to see a better job in terms of being more precise
and protecting the civilian population.
Senator Scott. How about Qatar?
Secretary Austin. I am sorry?
Senator Scott. How about Qatar holding them--demand
accountability. I mean, they have got Hamas leaders sitting
in--living in luxury. The Biden administration, as far as I can
tell, has done nothing to hold them accountable. We have a
military base.
Secretary Austin. We do have a military base there, and it
is very important to us, and Qatar has done a lot to help get
hostages released, and they continue that work.
So, you know--and I--you know, I have talked to the
leadership in Qatar. I know the leadership there, and I can
tell you, they are intensely focused on making sure that we can
get hostages released as soon as possible.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Peters,
please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Austin,
General Brown, as you know very well, the Air Force plans to
field several different types of collaborative, combat aircraft
with varying capabilities, including surveillance, jamming, and
deception.
These CCAs, combined with both fifth and sixth generation
fighters, will certainly play a significant role in disrupting
as well as defeating our adversaries counter air operations in
any future conflict.
However, maintaining air superiority is also going to
require that all components, including the National Guard,
train with CCAs in real world training environments. These
training opportunities found in locations like we have in
Michigan, the National All Domain Warfighting Center, I think
will be likely to play a very key role in realizing that
potential.
So, my question for both of you, Secretary Austin and then
General Brown, with this in mind, how can active duty, reserve
and guard components, best prepare for CCA integration and
training, given the near term acquisition of these uncrewed
autonomous systems that we are going to see in the near future.
Secretary Austin, if you would answer first, please.
Secretary Austin. Well, as you would imagine, Senator, I
remain focused on making sure that we have the right mix of
capabilities to execute our strategy. I will just speak to the
point that the CCA capability is really, really important, and
it will ensure that we maintain a competitive edge in the
future. This is something that our Air Force has been working
on for quite some time.
We are asking to invest in this, continue to invest in this
in this budget. But your specific question about the training
of reserve pilots, you know, perhaps I will let the chairman
speak to that, because he is a pretty good F-16 pilot and
understands that--the training requirements, very, very well.
But I would just emphasize that this is a tremendous
capability. We are investing in the right things, and the Total
Force at some point needs to have that capability.
Senator Peters. Thank you. General Brown.
General Brown. Senator Peters, thanks for the question, and
as--I think about the Joint Force--as a joint warfighter, I
often think and address the total force and its active guard,
reserve, and our civilians.
In my role as--my previous role as an Air Force Chief, as
we started the path on collaborative combat aircraft, we looked
at it from a total force perspective and will apply that
capability to make sure it is in all three components across
United States Air Force.
I would also add, as we go down the path of uncrewed
systems, not only in the air but maritime and other areas, how
we leverage that capability with our--aspects of Air Force will
be most important to ensure we are able to, you know, have the
full capability, you know, not only from our active force, but
also from our guard and reserve as well.
Senator Peters. Right. Well, General Brown, as a former
fighter pilot, you know better than anyone that aerial
refueling is a foundation of global mobility and power
projection for the U.S. Air Force.
I am thrilled that Michigan will continue to support this
mission as we welcome a squadron of 12 KC-46 refueling tankers
to Selfridge Air National Guard Base. The capabilities of the
KC-46 will support our current and future fighter and bomber
missions for decades to come.
I think their value to the Joint Force was again
highlighted in last year's multinational mobility exercise,
Mobility Guardian 2023. But my question for you, General Brown,
is what strategic role do you see the KC-46 is playing in the
Indo-Pacific, and how will they really contribute to our
broader National Security goals?
General Brown. Well, as you highlight the--our tankers are
strategic assets, and it actually allows us to be able to move
combat power around the world like no other country and--to
include the Indo-Pacific.
What it does is it increases our combat reach and our
combat effectiveness with these tankers, and having flown the
KC-46, it is an outstanding airplane. It arises where--you
know, bring it in on, we are learning some things about the
airplane.
But, as you highlight, Mobility Guardian last year was a
great opportunity for us to show not only what we could do with
the KC-46, but with the rest of our mobility force in support
of a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific.
Senator Peters. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. For the knowledge
of everyone, the first of two votes has begun. Let me recognize
Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
gentlemen. How are you all? Secretary Austin, glad to have you
back. You look like you are in good playing shape. So, I know
you have had a tough couple of months, but we are glad you are
back.
Secretary McCord don't go to sleep onus over there, and I
am going to ask you a question. It is my understanding, the
work that we have done, my staff, we have spent $300 billion
since 2014 in Ukraine. Does that sound about right to you? I
know that is before your time.
Mr. McCord. That does sound high to me. We did about $300
million a year for Ukraine for a number of years, and then just
in the last 2 years, we have done about $40. So, if you are
talking whole of Government, it might be--I would have to
check. But for DOD, that does sound high.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. Well, my staff looked into it. It
is about $300 billion, their best guesstimate. Right now, we
are we are printing or borrowing $80,000 per second. $4.6
million a minute.
We can't sustain that much longer. We got to find the best
ways to spend our money. The DOD Inspector General has said
that there is 50 criminal investigations going on right now
from money sent to Ukraine.
By the way, one of the most corrupt countries in the world.
Are you familiar with that, Secretary Austin?
Secretary Austin. What I am familiar with is that we have
given our Inspector General the access that he needs to be able
to exercise oversight. We have just increased his authorization
in terms of number of people to have forward there.
That is really important. But in terms of moneys, specific
moneys that are being provided to Ukraine, we don't--as you
know, Senator, we don't provide money. We provide, security
assistance in a way of equipment, munitions, and that sort of
stuff.
We replenish--when we replenish the things that we have
taken out of our own stock to provide to Ukraine, that work
comes through our industrial base. You know, our companies in
Alabama are helping to create the weapon systems to replace
those systems that we provided to Ukraine.
Senator Tuberville. But I want to----
Secretary Austin. In terms of specific cases that the IG
may be referring to, I don't have knowledge of that.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. I also want to remind you, we are
building munitions in our country and in Alabama we do build
quite a few, boats, submarines, missiles, and those things. But
we do spend a lot of money out of the country on munitions,
because our industrial base is not what--near what it used to
be. General, can Ukraine win?
Secretary Austin. Yes, yes.
Senator Tuberville. What does that look like?
Secretary Austin. Well, what we have said all along is we
want to see Ukraine remain a sovereign, independent, and
democratic State that has the ability to defend its sovereign
territory and deter aggression. That has been our aim from the
very beginning, and it remains our aim. But yes, they can be
successful.
Senator Tuberville. I heard Secretary Blinken say last week
in Brussels that Ukraine will soon be a NATO. Do you agree with
that?
Secretary Austin. That is the goal of the NATO members is
to at some point bring Ukraine into NATO, and that is certainly
something that Ukraine wants to see.
Senator Tuberville. If you are Russia, would you want that?
I am just asking. I mean, we are playing games with Russia
right now. I just want to understand why we would do that.
Secretary Austin. Certainly, if I was Russia, I would not
want that, Senator. I would also not want Finland and Sweden to
be a part of NATO, and they are, and the reason that they are
is because Putin invaded his neighbor, without provocation,
without justification. So, that is why we want--well, that is
where we are where we are. Instead of making things better for
himself, he enlarged--he had the effect of enlarging NATO,
which obviously creates worse conditions for him.
Senator Tuberville. Do we have 12 CIA bases in Ukraine? Can
you answer that in this setting?
Secretary Austin. CIA bases? Before----
Senator Tuberville. I got this out of The New York Times,
which I don't read very often, but----
Secretary Austin. I will defer that question to the
Director of the CIA, Senator.
Senator Tuberville. All right. Thank you. General Brown,
just a quick question. I had the opportunity to travel bases
all over the world since I have had this job 3 months--or 3
years. Our morale is not very good.
Our recruiting is really dropping. What are you doing to
help solve that problem? We need a strong military. A lot of
them tell me, they say basic, Coach, listen, we are taking all
these classes.
It has nothing to do with killing our adversary. It is
about getting along with each other. I can understand part of
that. But we also need a killing machine. What is your answer
to that?
General Brown. Well, as I said in my opening statement,
honing our warfighting skills has primacy in all we do. Part of
building a joint warfighting team is being able to build a
team. I know you are fully aware of that based on your
background.
So, it is the work that we do with each one of those
servicemembers to bring them and give them all the opportunity
and full potential to make this most lethal combat, credible
force in the world.
Senator Tuberville. How do we stop people from getting out
of the military?
General Brown. Senator, I will tell you, I can give you the
numbers, but our retention right now across all the services is
really good. Our recruiting is----
Senator Tuberville. I would love to see that.
General Brown. Our recruiting is also trending up here. In
the course of the past several weeks, I have sat down with
recruiters from all the various services. I went to a military
entrance processing station here to talk to them about their
process as well.
Genesis was highlighted earlier. It is a system, and there
is some things we can do better, and I gave them some feedback
while I was here.
So, recruiting is on the upswing, and the thing I would--
last thing I will close on is, we need to talk about the value
of service and talk about what it is to wear the uniform, and
the great opportunity, whether you spent 4 years or four
decades, is really important.
What serving in our military or serving at all within our
Nation and the impact it can have. I think that those are
things that we can continue to do together.
Senator Tuberville. I totally agree with you. Our military
is about people. It is not really about machines and all those
things. It is about people. So, thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman--Chairman Reed,
and thank you, Ranking Member Wicker is not here, but we thank
him in his absence.
I want to thank Secretary Austin, Secretary McCord, and, of
course, General Brown for being here, for testifying, and for
all your service and hard work. I want to start to talk a
little bit about Israel and defending against Iran, because the
October 7th terrorist attack on Israel must never be allowed to
take place again.
The U.S. security assistance to Israel must therefore
continue unimpeded. But Israel's security has only become more
complicated in recent weeks and months, as it not only works to
defeat Hamas and free the hostages, but also faces frequent
threats and attacks by Iran and its proxies like Hezbollah and
of course so many others.
So, Secretary Austin, beyond the House finally passing the
Senate passed supplemental security package, which I am
fighting for, what more can be done to help Israel defend
itself, including from what are reportedly imminent threats
from Iran?
Secretary Austin. We are doing a lot, Senator. First of
all, thanks for your support for the supplemental, and like
you, I hope, sincerely hope that we can get this across the
goal line in the near future here.
The Chairman and I talk to our counterparts frequently and
assess what additional things that we could be doing to help
Israel, try to understand, you know, what their priorities are,
and our direction of travel is.
Again, we do in those conversations, talk about the
necessity to protect civilians, as you would expect, and to
provide humanitarian assistance. But we are doing everything we
can to make sure that we get them what they need, as quickly as
possible. Again, I would expect that things would, as the
nature of this fight begins to change to become a more
precision fight, their requirements will--should change a bit.
So, we will stay abreast of their needs, and we will
continue to provide security assistance as quickly as we can.
But we remain committed to helping Israel defend itself, but we
expect that they, you know, would execute operations
responsibly.
Again, these are constant conversations that we have.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to move on to, Secretary
McCord, and talk about remote bases and incentive pay/ and, of
course, General Brown, you know, about Creech Air Force Base a
little bit outside of Las Vegas, remote.
But Secretary McCord, I want to ask you about this issue
facing Nevada servicemembers stationed at Creech Air Force Base
and at Naval Air Station Fallon, and of course, everyone who is
stationed at other rural or remote installations who have to
commute many, many miles to get to the base from where they
live.
Creech and Fallon have very limited housing nearby, so the
vast majority live either in Las Vegas or in the Reno region,
respectively, each or both about an hour away. It is an even
longer commute for Creech airmen who have to drop off their
kids for childcare, utilize other services at Nellis Air Force
Base, which is on the opposite end of town.
So, Secretary McCord, given the long travel distances and,
of course, the challenges that servicemembers have to face when
they travel these distances between their home and their duty
station, is the Department considering providing a stipend to
alleviate the cost?
If not, how can Congress ensure that it does? We have a lot
of challenges, and our remote bases is just one.
Mr. McCord. Senator, I will need to consult with my
colleagues in Personnel and Readiness as well, who will often
make the final recommendation to the Secretary and where we
might go on benefits that we are authorized to do.
Of course, we need to work with the committee if it is not
something we have the authority to do. First things we tend to
look at, of course, are housing costs in the area where you are
stationed.
You know, in some cases there is a CONUS COLA. Your issue
is a little more unique to a couple phases, and I don't know
that we have a particular proposal on the table working, but I
will check with my colleagues and get back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. McCord. In general, outside of congressionally approved
programs such as the Mass Transit Benefit Program (MTBP) [5
U.S.C. Sec. 7905], commuting costs are considered a personal
expense of the servicemember.
In addition, a stipend, as suggested, would be considered
taxable income for servicemembers under the Internal Revenue
Code. The Department does not provide reimbursement for single-
occupant motor vehicles used for daily commuting from
servicemembers' domiciles to their assigned duty stations.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. We will look forward to that. I
want to continue with you, Secretary Austin, on some of these
challenges that our servicemen and women have with affordable
housing and childcare, because in order to build a resilient
military force, we have to meet the critical needs of
servicemembers' families.
Two of the greatest areas they face in these challenges are
affordable housing, like I said, affordable childcare. So, what
additional authorities or funding does the Department of
Defense need to improve this access to affordable housing and
really importantly, affordable childcare?
When we talk about Creech, those drones go 24 hours a day,
365 days a year. They need childcare. So how do we ensure that
our servicemembers can fully focus on their duties?
Secretary Austin. Regarding housing, as you may have heard
me say earlier, Senator, we--in terms of family housing, we are
investing--we are asking to invest some to $2 billion in this
budget.
Then, $1.1 billion in unaccompanied housing, and it is
important to note that $171 million is being carved out for
oversight of our housing efforts. So, this is very important.
We are also increasing the basic allowance for housing. We have
increased the BAH some 20 percent since 2023.
I think that is material. That is meaningful to our troops,
and I go out and talk to them about it and they really
appreciate that. So, thanks for your support in that regard.
Your comments on childcare, I could--I absolutely agree with.
Just had our senior enlisted leaders together and we meet
on occasion to talk about what is important to the force, and
this is one area that they continue to raise that, you know, we
need to work together to improve, and we have made some
improvements. We have provided additional assistance in terms
of helping them with childcare fees.
We are investing in childcare facilities, you know, some--I
think some $4 billion or so that we are asking for new
childcare facilities in the 2025 budget. Also, we are investing
in the quality of the workforce.
We have seen that the more we can do to recruit the right--
a better quality of workforce, is going to continue to help us.
So, we have invested in that as paying dividends. We need to do
more.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Senator Budd, please.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for being here. Mr. Secretary, in your written
testimony, you state that, and I quote, ``the Department
continues to prioritize investments in our activities and
infrastructure to reinforce security and stability in the Indo-
Pacific region.''
So, I am all about prioritization, but it is hard to square
that when the Department has done so and properly prioritized
deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, when we are told that there is
at least $11 billion in unfunded requirements for the
INDOPACOM.
Over the weekend, this committee received a letter from
Secretary McCord in fulfillment of your, Mr. Secretary,
responsibility to submit a report that prioritizes matters
identified as unfunded priorities by the senior military
officers of the services and combatant commands.
So, Mr. Secretary, is there a reason that you chose not to
rank prioritize the list of unfunded priorities submitted to
this Committee?
Secretary Austin. Our most pressing priority currently,
Senator, is to try to get the supplemental passed. If we can
get that through, I think that will help us in a number of
ways. So, I certainly appreciate the Senate's help in terms of
the bill that you passed, and I would hope that we would see
some progress on this going forward.
Our commanders are required by law to submit unfunded
priority list. We encourage and require commanders, and service
chiefs, and secretaries, to invest in their base budget. What?
You know what, what's needed to, to make sure that we can
maintain a credible fighting force.
This year, we chose to invest in readiness, and also in
taking care of our people. That caused us to make sure--they
have to make some choices about modernization for, you know,
for the longer term. But those are choices that I think with a
higher top line in the future, we can certainly recover from.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I want to cut in.
Now, you mentioned that it is required by law. That is actually
section 222(a) of Title 10. I would just like to point out that
it requires rank prioritization, and that was not ranked with
priority.
The letter that this Committee received further states that
he, meaning you, Mr. Secretary, has determined it is not
necessary to fund these programs in fiscal year 2025 to execute
the defense strategy at an acceptable level of risk.
So, my question you with Secretary is what is an acceptable
level of risk to you as described in this letter?
Secretary Austin. Well, you know, and as you may have heard
me say earlier, Senator, we go through great pains to link our
budget request directly to our strategy, and so, we are
confident that we can execute the strategy with the things that
we have asked for, even though we have had to make some tough
choices because of.
You know, a top line has been mandated. So, again, I think
we have every ability to execute the strategy. Certainly, in
the out years we are going to need an increase in top line. We
certainly would appreciate Congress's support in that endeavor.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Secretary. General Brown, again,
thank you for being here. Would you agree that ships, aircraft,
munitions form the basis of military capacity, capability?
General Brown. Well, Senator, thanks for the question. I
think there is two parts that, yes, that capability is
important, but it is just as important to have our
servicemembers.
Senator Budd. Thank you for----
General Brown. Every one of those is defense.
Senator Budd. Thank you for including them. I appreciate
that. So here is what is concerning me about that first part,
ships, aircraft, munitions, of course, in addition to our all-
important servicemembers.
I am a little bit confused because the budget request
simultaneously divests ships and aircraft while making smaller
than expected buys of newer platforms. Another concern is that
it leaves slack in the production lines of critical munitions.
So, if I had to take our best aviator, and perhaps General, you
are one of those.
We had to put them up against our adversaries' best
aviators, I would take our guys, our men and women, 10 out of
10 times. But at some point, any conflict becomes a numbers
game. It becomes about mass.
So, if China were to decide to invade Taiwan next year
instead of 2027 or 2035, are you concerned, General, at all
that we are leaving ourselves with a massive capacity gap?
General Brown. Senator, one of the things I focus on as a
chairman and as a warfighter is to be ready at all times, no
matter what because you can't predict the future, but we have a
responsibility to shape the future, and that is why we are here
to testify on this budget. It is also the reason why, you know,
for example, the multi-year procurement that was put out in the
2024 NDAA is so important.
To be able to continue that with consistent funding in the
industrial base, so we don't have that slack in the system. So,
getting the budgets on time help to decrease that slack, to
increase the trust and bring down the cost, and to keep it in
the hands of our warfighters much faster than we do today.
Senator Budd. Thank you, General. Just briefly, the
committee heard--and you and I have talked about the F-15, the
Strike Eagle. The committee heard from the Commander of
INDOPACOM that there is a role for Strike Eagles in the
scenario in INDOPACOM.
Now the head of NORTHCOM told this committee just recently,
in many ways that the F-15 Strike Eagle is unmatched air to
ground, and in many ways it is unmatched air to air. It is a
phenomenal--it has a phenomenal radar that can pick out low,
slow moving, and also low radar cross-sections such as drones
or other threats like cruise missiles. Do you agree with their
assessments, General?
General Brown. The F-15 Strike Eagle is a very capable
platform, I would agree.
Senator Budd. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I keep highlighting
these issues, Mr. Chairman, because the Air Force plans to
divest 26 of these Strike Eagles, at the same time buying less
than expected F-15 EXs and F-35s.
Meanwhile, China is rapidly expanding their air force. So,
I am seriously concerned about the growing fighter gap. Thank
you for the additional time. Thank you, gentlemen, for being
here.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd. Senator Kelly, and
we are in a vote, so if you would adhere to 5 minutes, it would
be much appreciated.
Senator Kelly. I will. Senator Budd, fantastic question. I
am going to have some follow-ons to your question with General
Brown.
So, General, on the munitions, so the war in Ukraine has
exposed real concerns about our industrial base. Even during
this limited conflict, that is an air conflict, industry is
struggling to produce the number of munitions that we need even
to replenish our stores.
If we had a conflict with a peer adversary, we would expend
munitions at--possibly at a higher rate than we are seeing with
Ukraine--in a higher rate than they might be able to be
replaced.
So, it is clear that more needs to be done to prepare our
defense industrial base for a possible future conflict.
General, last year, I asked your predecessor about the
importance and impact of multi-year procurement on replenishing
our munitions stockpiles.
So, General, how have the multi-year procurements that we
passed out of this committee impacted our munitions stores to
date?
General Brown. Well, they will have an impact. The
challenges that came--the NDAA in 2024 gave us the multi-year
procurement. We didn't get a budget for 2024 until 170 days in.
But I do see the opportunity going forward and the future of
how multi-year procurement will assist us first to create a
concept demonstrable to industry.
So, industry then can get facilities, get a workforce.
Gives us some consistency, which builds trust, which brings
down costs. Then there is a steady stream of munitions. These
are the things we need to work on, in addition to get the
budget on time. All those together are going to help us
increase our stocks.
Last thing I would add to that, you know, the supplemental
that has been talked about several times today, that doesn't
only help our partners in Ukraine, it helps to build out a
defense industrial base that will help us in the future to make
sure we have the capacity ammunition that we will require for
any future contingency.
Senator Kelly. Okay. So, beyond what you just mentioned in
the supplemental, is there anything else we could be doing to
make sure we have the right types and quantity of munitions
going forward?
General Brown. Well, you know, I guess the other piece that
I would talk to you about is having gone out to visit some of
our industry partners just recently, one of things we talked
about is the workforce.
That can be a long lead item, to make sure we have the
engineers, the skilled workforce to bring in that capability.
That is why consistent funding and all that, so you can
actually--you know, once they have that workforce, they can
maintain that workforce, to continue to move forward as well.
Senator Kelly. All right. Well, thank you. Separate
subject, drones, the drone problem. Incursions on military
installations have gone up and is a real threat to our National
Security. I think some of it is, you know, hobbyists, but there
are also foreign actors that are certainly involved here.
In December, we saw a large number of drone incidents at
Langley. We still don't know who was behind those. We had an F-
16 about a year and a half ago in the Barry Goldwater range
strike a drone. Not a lot of damage to the F-16.
If it would have went down, the intake, General, as we both
know, that could have been catastrophic for that airplane and
possibly the crew member on board if he couldn't get out. We
see consistent incursions around sensitive Government
facilities.
So, General, you know, why are the current drone detection
and defeat systems that we currently have, why are they
failing? could you maybe go into why we need to continue to--
why we continue to field these outdated measures?
General Brown. Senator, one of the things we have to
continue to work on is to continue to understand the
technologies moving forward and then move at the same pace, as
it was highlighted. We do have to move faster.
If you go back to what happened in December, one of the
things I did as a chairman was establish a cross-functional
team that wasn't just from the military, but also with the
interagency, to work together on this particular problem set.
Because it is a combination of factors. It is not only the
detection, but it is the defensive systems that you use and how
those may impact aviation and other areas. So, it is an area
that we collectively have to continue to work on, not only here
in defense here, in the United States, but also in our forward
locations where we have many of our servicemembers deployed.
Senator Kelly. Okay. Well, we are prepared to work with you
on that to make sure we have the right technology moving
forward that we could do more to solve this problem. So, thank
you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Right on time..
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Right on time, Senator Kelly.
L.D., you crossed it. Senator Schmitt, we are trying to adhere
to 5 minutes because of the votes.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. That is what happens when you are
last, right, on this dais.
Chairman Reed. Yes, sir.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Austin,
the United States has appropriated $112 billion previously for
Ukraine aid. $60 billion in the supplemental that is being
considered. Based on this budget, am I to assume then that as
of September 30th, there will be no more Ukraine aid from the
United States?
Secretary Austin. This request takes us out through the end
of month September.
Senator Schmitt. Right. But there is no money, so there--I
can only be left to assume one of three things. One is the war
is over, two or B, the United States won't be allocating any
more dollars, or C, that this is a dishonest request.
So, I guess the question is, are we going to--it is not in
this, but we are going to get another supplemental because
members of this committee had been told there could be another
request for $100 billion.
So, I guess I am just trying to understand the totality of
the request of the American people for this war that does not
seem to be represented in this request.
Secretary Austin. Well, I assure you that the request is
not dishonest, Senator. It is based upon, for this fiscal year,
what we see Ukraine needs and our ability to provide security
assistance and replenish our stocks. Again, this is not--this
goes through our industrial----
Senator Schmitt. I understand the argument, but I would
also make the argument that the weapons that are being procured
for Ukraine aren't necessarily the weapons that our industrial
base would produce to defend the United States, or even in the
Indo-Pacific. Those are more long range fires. That is really
not what Ukraine needs.
With an industrial base that does not have the capacity to
do all of these things, we are making decisions about what is
produced and what is sold, and those may not be in the interest
of the United States. I mean, do you understand the point?
Secretary Austin. I do, Senator, and I think you are right.
I think, you know, there are munitions that we will need for a
peer competitor fight that we are not using in Ukraine right
now. But having said that, Ukraine needs air defense
capabilities, weapons systems and interceptors. It needs
artillery munitions.
Of course, our industrial base produces all of that, and we
have worked to expand our capacity in our industrial base to
produce anti-tank weapons systems, you know----
Senator Schmitt. I appreciate the point. I don't mean to
cut you off. I just, as you have heard, I have limited time. I
just want to get through a couple more questions. So, what does
victory look like for Ukraine? How do you define victory?
Secretary Austin. You may have heard me say this earlier,
Senator, but we have said from the very beginning that what we
want to see is a Ukraine that is a democratic country, that
has--that is independent and has the ability to protect its
sovereign territory, to defend its sovereign territory, and to
deter aggression.
Senator Schmitt. Does that mean Crimea is part of Ukraine?
Secretary Austin. Crimea is a part of Ukraine.
Senator Schmitt. Well, okay. Right. But in order for the
war to be over, doe Ukraine have to control Crimea?
Secretary Austin. In terms of how things transition, going
forward, you know, I would not, want to predict what President
Zelensky will decide.
Senator Schmitt. I think part of the problem, with all due
respect, is that this Administration has not articulated what
an exit strategy is. To me, this is a blank check for a war
that, without any clearly defined goals, will be endless.
That is--so the skepticism among--I didn't vote for the
supplemental because I don't think that we have--we don't have
adequate controls on how the money is being spent. Victory
hasn't been defined.
So, for America's interests, I understand America's
interest, we are continuing to head down this road, and now we
are getting a budget request that doesn't--isn't reflective of
the Administration's, for however long it takes, statement.
So that is part of the objection. I guess one of the
issues, too, is and I want to make sure I am clear, is it the
Administration's position that Ukraine should be admitted into
NATO?
Secretary Austin. It is NATO position overall that----
Senator Schmitt. No, the United States of America. What is
the Administration's position on Ukraine's admission to NATO?
Secretary Austin. I think you have heard the President say
that--and of course, NATO has an open door policy. So, all of
the countries have worked toward----
Senator Schmitt. I am really not trying to put you in a
weird spot. I just heard Secretary Blinken say, or maybe it was
a mistranslation, so I am just looking for clarity. If it is
the position of the United States of America that Ukraine
should be admitted into NATO?
Secretary Austin. Was that question as to whether or not
they should be admitted right now or in the future?
Senator Schmitt. Either, or.
Secretary Austin. Well, right now they are in a war,
Senator----
Senator Schmitt. Right, so that would be a disastrous
result because we would go to war. Right. But let's say the war
ends tomorrow, or September 30th based on this budget--in
September 30th. Is it the position of this Administration that
Ukraine should be admitted into NATO?
Secretary Austin. It is unlikely that the war will end on
September 30th, but again, it is the goal of the alliance to
bring Ukraine into the alliance at some point in the future.
Senator Schmitt. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am
out of time. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator. Senator Duckworth,
please.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say
that a free, independent, democratic Ukraine that can defend
itself is in America's national interest.
In fact, should Russia overrun Ukraine, it will not stop
with Ukraine and then Article V of NATO will be invoked,
bringing United States troops. So, this is about keeping United
States troops out of a war in Europe. Good morning to our
witnesses.
Secretary Austin, I want to applaud your engagement in the
Indo-Pacific. Your nine official visits to the region
underscores the United States deep commitment to our allies and
partners.
It is so important that the Department of Defense continues
to make the region a priority for investments, including in
Guam, Hawaii, and addressing contested logistics in the region.
Next month, I am leading a CODAL with my colleague, Senator
Sullivan, to the Shangri-La dialogs, where we will engage with
our partners on a range of National Security issues. Secretary
Austin, I have long been an advocate for strengthening our mil
to mil partnerships in Southeast Asia.
What investments do you plan to make in the fiscal year
2025 DOD budget to implement the U.S., ASEAN Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership, and how can Congress help you in that
effort?
Secretary Austin. By the way, I will see you at the at the
dialog. As you know, the Secretary of--the U.S. Secretary of
Defense has supported that every year. Again, I think we have
made great progress in strengthening our relationships with
partners in the region.
In terms of ASEAN, we have continued to develop our
relationships with ASEAN members. Every year we attend the
defense ministerial meeting members plus. So, I think we have
gained a lot of ground in reassuring partners in the region. We
also recognize the primacy of ASEAN.
Again, I think, relationships are as strong as they have
ever been based upon the continued efforts of not only the
Department, but leaders like yourself who continue to go out to
the Indo-Pacific.
I suspect you have more than my nine visits to the Indo-
Pacific since you have been in office. So, thank you for
everything that you are doing.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I have
discussed the need to improve DOD's medical readiness in the
Indo-Pacific with every service chief and Combatant Commander
who comes before this committee.
It is our collective responsibility to ensure that the DOD
has adequate military treatment facilities for servicemembers
and their families during peacetime and in the event of a
conflict. I would like to discuss an NDAA proposal for fiscal
year 2025 that is a priority for me.
The golden hour for saving lives will be rarely achievable
due to the great distances within the Indo-Pacific, should
there be conflict in the region. So, I would like the DOD to
establish a medical readiness program in the Indo-Pacific to
address current gaps in DOD's medical capacity, allowing DOD to
access accredited foreign medical facilities for patient care,
while also creating a medical readiness strategy within the
region.
DOD already does a version of this in the Republic of
Korea, and we need to expand this concept across the region
where appropriate. In fact, the DOD helped to set up, among
others, Ajou Trauma Center, which is designed--and to be
exactly like the San Diego Trauma Center. I met the doctor
there, Dr. Lee Cook-jong was trained by U.S. surgeons.
In fact, that is where the Korean--North Korean dictator--
defector was sent in 2018 and his life was saved because he was
able to be operated on at that center. Secretary Austin, DOD
has a limited number of military treatment facilities West of
the International Date Line.
Do you think working with our allies and partners in the
Indo-Pacific can help DOD improve its medical readiness, both
in peacetime, but also in the event of a large scale conflict
where we are not able to medevac servicemembers back to the
United States?
Secretary Austin. I do, Senator, and I agree with you, I
think Korea is a great example from talking to our troops and
family members. They really appreciate having the ability to do
what you describe and take advantage of existing capabilities.
So, there is no doubt, possibilities to do those types of
things in other places, and I think we should explore that.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Secretary Austin, and Under
Secretary McCord, and General Brown, can you work with my staff
and me to refine this proposal with a goal of potentially
establishing this medical readiness program in the fiscal year
2025 NDAA?
Secretary Austin. We will, Senator.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Blumenthal will be recognized. He will terminate the
hearing. I must go vote.
We will reconvene at 12:30 p.m. in SVC 217, on or about
12:30 p.m., for the closed session. So, we will see you again
in the closed session, SVC 217. I will recognize Senator
Blumenthal as the last Member, and he will adjourn the open
session. Senator Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
I want to thank you all for your service, as I am sure my
colleagues have, and apologize that I haven't been here for the
full hearing. I was here earlier.
I want to ask about Navy shipbuilding, and particularly
submarines, and the industrial base. As you know, the Navy's
recently released 45 day shipbuilding review offered a pretty
sobering look into the future of procurement efforts by the
Navy.
According to this assessment, every major program faces
multiple years of delays, including the Columbia and Virginia
class submarines, which give the Navy an essential edge in
undersea warfare over our competitors. Russia and China are
trending in the opposite direction. They are building more.
They are developing more, and more advanced submarine.
The decision to fund the production of just one Virginia
class submarine seems highly alarming. In addition, it sends a
signal to our key AUKUS partner that the United States may not
fulfill its commitment to providing a key capability.
So, I am troubled that this decision seems to undermine
procurement stability, the workforce development, and our
credibility in this area with some of our key allies. So, I
would, appreciate your comments, Mr. Secretary, on how we are
going to correct any potential loss of capability, loss of
progress in undersea warfare, and the kind of respect from our
allies that we need to continue in this area of undersea
superiority.
Secretary Austin. Thanks, Senator. Our undersea supremacy
is indeed a strategic advantage that no country in the world
can match, and we are going to work to keep it that way.
The current issue is one of capacity, and there is a
backlog currently in terms of, industry's ability to produce,
submarines on time. So, we could increase the backlog, or we
could choose to invest in the industrial base to expand
capacity so that they can speed production up, and that is what
we are doing.
In fiscal year 2023 and 2024, we requested some $1.9
billion to invest in the submarine industrial base. In this
budget, we are asking you for a total of $4 billion. In
addition to that, the supplemental that we have spoken so much
about today, includes a $3.3 billion request to also invest in
the industrial base, and that will help us strengthen supply
lines and it will also help industry recruit and retain the
workforce that it will need to produce these really
sophisticated platforms.
You know, I just met with the CEOs of General Dynamics and
Huntington Ingalls, and we talked about the challenges that
they were facing and, you know, what we are going to do to--
with the resources that we are providing them to expand their
capability and capacity.
So, it was a good discussion, and they are investing some
of their own, capital to do that as well. So, in terms of,
Australia and, and the signal that it sends to Australia, you
know, I have--I remain in contact with my counterpart, the
Australian minister of defense, and we have talked about this
issue, and they get it.
So, and by the way, Australia is investing in our submarine
industrial base as well. So, we are doing the right things and
investing in the industrial base, and hopefully--but that will
get us on the right path in the mid to longer term.
But increasing the backlog is probably not the right thing
to do at this point in time. Investing in capacity and
capability is the right thing to do, I think.
Senator Blumenthal. I respect that answer because it
recognizes the realities of what we face. Electric boat has
hired 5,300 more people in the next year or so--5,300 skilled
welders, pipefitters, electricians. Not just people hired off
the street.
I know that on paper you could easily say, well, we are
going to build two submarines a year, but it wouldn't happen. I
think that the candor and realism are very much to be
respected.
My urging would be that we make the investment of
sufficient size to meet the reality of the challenge, because,
as you have said so well, our undersea warfare supremacy is a
key capability, and I would hope the Congress would support you
in this effort.
Thank you. I am going to respect the 5-minute rule, even
though there is no one to discipline me. Thank you for your
testimony on behalf of the committee and adjourn the Committee.
Thank you very much.
Secretary Austin. Thanks, Senator.
[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
allies and partners--secretary austin
1. Senator Hirono. Secretary Austin, our asymmetric advantage in
the Indo-Pacific is our strong network of allies and partners. This
week we look forward to welcoming Japanese Prime Minister Kishida and
strengthening the already close bond between our two countries. My
understanding is the President is planning to assign a four-star
military officer to oversee all of our forces in Japan alongside their
Japanese counterpart. How would establishing a joint command
headquarters in Japan improve deterrence in the Indo-Pacific?
Secretary Austin. During my time as Secretary, we have expanded and
strengthened our alliance with Japan, and we will continue to do so. As
I said during my travel to Japan with Secretary of State Blinken, the
July 2+2 ministerial meeting added momentum to our shared vision for a
free and open Indo-Pacific region. During these meetings, we made four
historic decisions. First, we decided to modernize the command-and-
control structures for our alliance. Second, we discussed ways to
increase our bilateral presence in the Southwest Island. Third, we
reaffirmed the importance of cooperation and cyber security. Fourth, we
discussed new areas for defense industrial cooperation. In addition, we
had a separate 2+2 ministerial meeting to discuss extended deterrence.
The United States-Japan alliance is stronger than ever today, and I
look forward to building on this momentum for years to come.
We are continuing to work with our allies and partners to do what
we need to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific region. I am committed
to ensuring that we have the right command-and-control structures in
the Indo-Pacific region. I have directed my leadership to review this
issue thoroughly and expeditiously, and I expect to have input on the
path forward soon.
artificial intelligence
2. Senator Hirono. Secretary Austin, the Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence Office, or CDAO, is responsible for
accelerating the Department's adoption of data, analytics, and
artificial intelligence. We have heard from multiple witnesses this
year that the rapid pace of advancement in information technology
suggests these are likely to have a transformative effect on warfare,
and investments in these capabilities should be prioritized by the
Department of Defense. Do you think the Department and CDAO are moving
at the right pace to keep up with our adversaries who are capitalizing
on applying information technologies in warfare?
Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense (DOD) is moving at a
rapid pace to deliver artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities that
meet the needs of our warfighters and the Department as a whole. We are
doing this with a firm commitment to the responsible use of AI. While
CDAO leads this effort for the Department, this is a whole-of-DOD
effort that extends across the Military Departments, the Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, Combatant
Commands, other Components within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Defense Agencies, DOD Field Activities, and all other
organizational entities within the DOD, as well as across the executive
branch in accordance with Executive Order 14110, to ensure that we are
developing and deploying AI capabilities at speed and scale--while
doing so responsibly. As with every capability we develop, we are
taking the necessary steps to test, evaluate, and manage these
technologies to ensure that they are safe, secure, and effective.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
end-use monitoring on munitions in israel
3. Senator King. General Brown, the Biden administration recently
authorized new aid packages to Israel that includes billions of dollars
in munitions and aircraft. In continuing to support Israel's right to
self-defense, the particular issuance of MK84 2,000-lb bombs raises
concerns given their previous linking to mass-casualty events. This
raises concerns regarding end-use monitoring, specifically for ensuring
that the munitions and equipment provided for Israel is utilized for
its intended purpose. How is Israel utilizing the munitions provided by
the US, and is this usage in accordance with conditions of issuance?
General Brown. Israel is bound by the standard terms and conditions
of security assistance provided via the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
program. These conditions include written agreement that the munitions
would only be sold for internal security, self-defense and preventing
the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Israel also must
agree that the U.S. Government (USG) retains the right to verify
reports to determine if defense articles have been used for
unauthorized purposes and to permit scheduled inspections or physical
inventories, unless other means of End Use Monitoring have been
mutually agreed upon. Inventory and accountability records must also be
made available to USG personnel. Second, our Targeting Infrastructure
Policy (TIP) applies specifically to air-to-ground and indirect
munitions. Israel must prove that they have the capabilities to
precisely deliver the munitions, while also minimizing risk to civilian
casualties.
4. Senator King. General Brown, what systems are in place to
account for usage, particularly regarding the above-mentioned 2,000-lb
bombs?
General Brown. Israel is bound by the standard terms and conditions
of every Foreign Military Sale (FMS). This includes written agreement
that the bombs would only be sold for internal security, self-defense
and preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Israel
also must agree that the U.S. Government (USG) retains the right to
verify reports that defense articles have been used for unauthorized
purposes, and to permit scheduled inspections or physical inventories,
unless other means of End Use Monitoring have been mutually agreed
upon. Inventory and accountability records must also be made available
to USG personnel. USG security standards must apply throughout the
lifecycle of the weapon system (e.g. transportation, delivery, testing,
operational use, storage and destruction processes).
Second, our Targeting Infrastructure Policy (TIP) applies
specifically to air-to-ground and indirect munitions. Israel must prove
that they have the capabilities to precisely deliver the munitions
while also minimizing risk to civilian casualties.
5. Senator King. Secretary Austin, what oversight measures do you
intend to implement to improve end-use monitoring to ensure that
munitions are used for their intended purposes?
Secretary Austin. I take end-use monitoring (EUM) of weapons
provided to allies and partners extremely seriously. This is an issue
that we consider with the provision of any weapon to any nation. We
consider information through intelligence reporting as well as open-
source reporting, where applicable.
The objective of the EUM program is to provide a factual basis to
conclude reasonably that a foreign partner is meeting its end use
requirements. DOD implements EUM for Foreign Military Sales while the
State Department implements EUM for Direct Commercial Sales. DOD's EUM
program, Golden Sentry, ensures compliance with technology control
requirements to minimize security risks to the United States and our
allies and partners.
Additionally, DOD conducts a thorough technology release process
before approving transfers of defense articles and services to foreign
partners. Prior to the transfer, foreign partners must agree to secure,
maintain accountability for, and use the defense articles for intended
purposes in accordance with applicable law.
DOD provides oversight of end-use monitoring efforts through leader
engagements, post-delivery monitoring by U.S. personnel assigned to
U.S. Embassies worldwide, compliance assessment visits, and discussions
with our foreign partners in coordination with the State Department.
Any reported allegations of end-use violations are reported,
investigated, and addressed.
audit
6. Senator King. Secretary McCord, in December 2023 you provided an
update on the Department's efforts to achieving a clean audit. What
substantive goals do you have for fiscal year 2024 and what is the
progress toward achieving those goals and a clean audit by October 1,
2024?
Secretary McCord. The Department of Defense (DOD) is committed to
meeting the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024
requirement to achieve an unmodified audit opinion on the DOD-wide
financial statements by December 31, 2028. In fiscal year 2024
Department leaders have already taken several actions to achieve this
goal, including:
On February 22, 2024, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)
achieved an unmodified audit opinion on its fiscal year 2023 financial
statements. making it the first DOD Service to achieve this important
goal. We are using lessons learned from the USMC audit to accelerate
progress toward achieving an unmodified opinion on the DOD-wide
financial statement audit.
In October 2023, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) issued
a memorandum articulating expectations for the Secretaries of the
Military Departments and Principal Staff Assistants (PSA) on
contributions and responsibilities for achieving an unmodified
financial statement audit opinion. In response, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense established an implementation plan with 38 performance measures
for tracking and reporting PSA progress against the SecDef's
expectations. Thirty-two of the 38 performance measures are on target
for completion in fiscal year 2024. The remaining six performance
measures are targeted for fiscal year 2025.
In November 2023, the SecDef issued his Fiscal Year 2024
Financial Statement Audit Priorities memorandum, setting goals and
metrics for four audit remediation priorities: Improving Fund Balance
with Treasury, Strengthening Internal Control Environment, Creating a
Universe of Transactions, and Optimizing Asset Valuation. The Deputy
Secretary is briefed quarterly on progress against these audit
priorities.
In January 2024, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness issued supplemental guidance for Senior
Executive Servicemembers to include relevant SecDef annual financial
statement audit priorities in their performance plans.
In February 2024, the Deputy Chief Financial Officer
issued the ``Deputy Chief Financial Officer Fiscal Years 2024-2025
Financial Statement Audit Priorities and Expectations for Other Defense
Organizations'' memorandum. This memorandum lays out audit remediation
priorities with expectation for Other Defense Organizations to partner
with sponsoring PSAs and relevant stakeholders to achieve progress.
During quarter 2 of fiscal year 2024, each Military
Department and DOD Component under standalone audit holding a
disclaimer of opinion revised its audit roadmap, where necessary, to
fully align with the December 31, 2028, requirement for the Department
to achieve an unmodified financial statement audit opinion. These audit
roadmaps include revised milestones, dependencies, root causes, and
resource impacts. The roadmaps will be used to further prioritize
enterprise remediation and assess and report component progress in
achieving the DOD-wide unmodified opinion by December 31, 2028.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
readiness
7. Senator Rosen. General Brown, our military readiness depends on
meeting immediate warfighting needs while preparing for future
challenges. That requires evolving and changing how we train our
servicemembers. What does the future look like in terms of readiness?
General Brown. Department of Defense modernization efforts are
directly tied to the future outlook of readiness. The Services have
enacted efforts to modernize their formations to maintain our
competitive advantages. These efforts mean that not only are we
developing and purchasing the newest equipment, but we are also
implementing new and innovative training methods (such as threat based
and Live-Virtual-Constructive training) to empower our servicemembers
and enable those echelons to coalesce into a combat-credible Joint
Force.
Within the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC), we envision a future
Joint Force that is an agile, highly lethal, and survivable
organization, enjoying decisive advantages due to the integration of
emerging technologies and concepts.
The evolution of our weaponry, doctrine, training, organization,
and professional development will ensure the Joint Force achieves this
vision. Success depends on timely, cost-effective programs that include
a whole of nation approach and achieve the capability overmatch we
envision.
8. Senator Rosen. General Brown, how do we efficiently and
effectively reform policies and the Department to enable those changes?
General Brown. The Department of Defense executes strategic
discipline to ensure we adequately modernize and prepare for the future
while continuing to deter and support our allies and partners today, as
outlined in the National Military Strategy (NMS).
The Joint Force continues to integrate training with campaigning,
to include large-scale exercises with allies and partners, that provide
opportunities to improve our interoperability, demonstrate capabilities
to enhance deterrence, and hone warfighting skills.
9. Senator Rosen. General Brown, how does each service need to
change how they train and prepare servicemembers for future conflicts?
General Brown. Honing and mastering our warfighting skill starts
within each Service. Services must be trained and prepared to fight as
a Joint Team that can operate and execute mission tasks seamlessly
across all domains globally. Additionally, with the adversary's
increasingly advanced collection capabilities, Service investments in
virtual training and Joint Live, Virtual, Constructive (JLVC)
Modernization projects are foundational to our ability to train in a
way that leaves room for decisionmakers to strategically reveal and
conceal critical capabilities for deterrence. Further investment in
emerging domains such as space, and in Joint connectivity are necessary
to fully leverage JLVC technologies for Joint use. Services' training
must be increasingly realistic and rigorous to improve Joint readiness
goals and will be further enhanced through programs such as the Joint
National Training Capability (JNTC) to ensure consistency. Joint
exercises are informed by globally integrated wargames and executed by
the Services and Combatant Commands to ensure emerging capabilities are
effectively integrated with those of our allies and partners. These
training events remain critical to accelerating change and ensure we
are ready to meet the future together.
childcare
10. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, to build a resilient military
force, it's crucial to meet the needs of servicemembers' families. One
area where military families are facing challenges today is affordable
child care. In-Home Childcare Fee Assistance Pilot, which helps provide
childcare solutions for regions with exceptionally high demand, was
expanded to Las Vegas but has been reported to my office to have so
much red tape and difficult requirements which essentially renders it
unavailable. What can be done to make this program more accessible to
Nevada's military families?
Secretary Austin. Taking care of our tremendous military families
is one of my top priorities. The Department has focused in recent years
on lowering the cost of childcare for our servicemembers and expanding
childcare options for military families. One of our key initiatives to
improve access to childcare is Child Care in Your Home. This is a 5-
year pilot program that provides childcare fee assistance to
servicemembers who utilize in-home childcare providers. Recognizing
that there are no State or Federal licensing requirements for in-home
providers, the Department implemented safeguards and protections for
children as part of this pilot program. For example, the Department has
instituted comprehensive background checks, periodic oversight in the
form of home visits, and mandated initial and annual training. Each
year, the Department applies lessons learned to improve the pilot and
to improve customer experience. We have also listened to families
utilizing the program and made additional enhancements. We hope to
expand this pilot program as it is further developed.
workforce
11. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, the Department of Defense has
the privilege of training and educating the most highly capable
military force in the world. Servicemembers receive some highly sought-
after trade and technical skills while also receiving immediate and
demanding experience on the job. Typically, these trade and technical
skills don't transfer easily to the civilian workforce because of a
lack of proper certification. What can the Department do better to
ensure the skills and certifications our servicemembers receive in the
military are immediately transferable to the civilian market?
Secretary Austin. The Department is fully committed to supporting
our servicemembers as they transition from military to civilian life.
We have worked with Federal, State, and public organizations to ensure
that every military occupation is aligned with one or more
credentialing opportunities that are directly relevant to civilian-
sector employment.
In addition to ensuring that servicemembers ``get credit'' for the
skills they have honed through their military occupations, we are also
working to expand their skillsets to enhance their effectiveness in
uniform and facilitate their transition to civilian life. Specifically,
we provide a large and diverse set of credentialing opportunities to
servicemembers, including professional certifications, apprenticeships,
and occupational licenses. To date, more than 1,700 unique credentials
have been mapped to enlisted military occupations. These opportunities
continue to expand as military occupational specialties pivot to both
optimize the force and protect the Nation. All five Services sponsor
credentialing program opportunities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
secretary of defense work from home policy
12. Senator Ernst. Secretary Austin, GS-scale employees' official
worksite that defines their location-based pay requires them to show up
to the office at least twice a week, but this standard is waivable on
an employee-by-employee basis. How many exceptions to the standard
twice-in-a-pay-period attendance requirement has the DOD issued since
the pandemic and has the agency revoked any of these exemptions?
Secretary Austin. We are committed to providing flexibility to our
workforce while also following applicable law and policy. Under a
telework arrangement, an employee's locality pay is based on the
location of the regular worksite. An employee with a telework
arrangement must physically report to the regular worksite on a regular
and recurring basis for a full workday at least twice each bi-weekly
pay period. The Department recently issued Department of Defense
Instruction 1035.01, ``Telework and Remote Work,'' (January 8, 2024),
which provides that this requirement may only be waived in certain
temporary situations, such as an office closure or weather emergency.
Temporary waivers, which are based on local circumstances, are not
tracked at the enterprise level.
13. Senator Ernst. Secretary Austin, based upon IT login
information, office swipe-ins, and other measurable and observable
factors, how many civilian employees spend the majority of their
working hours in a region with a lower locality pay rate than where
their designated primary workstation is located, but continue to
receive the higher locality pay associated with the primary
workstation?
Secretary Austin. House Report 118-125, page 289, accompanying H.R.
2670, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024,
requests a review of the Department of Defense's (DOD) telework policy
compliance. DOD is currently working on this report to Congress, which
will include information on locality pay for employees in a telework
status. DOD has approximately 280,000 of 785,000 telework-eligible
Federal employees authorized to telework, and it will take time to
conduct a thorough review of all telework agreements. Nevertheless, we
are working diligently to provide the Congress this information later
this year.
14. Senator Ernst. Secretary Austin, what is the typical daily
onsite attendance in the agency's office buildings as a proportion of
its total workforce?
Secretary Austin. The Department does not routinely collect daily
onsite attendance in its office buildings. However, the Department is
currently preparing a report to Congress as required by the joint
explanatory statement accompanying the National Defense Authorization
Act for fiscal year 2024 in which the Department will provide occupancy
data on facilities with more than 3,500 occupants.
15. Senator Ernst. Secretary Austin, has the DOD measured the
monetary and environmental cost of maintaining underutilized space in
terms of energy usage and emissions? If so, what has it found?
Secretary Austin. The Department conducted preliminary analysis in
Fiscal Year 2021 to understand the impacts of reducing DOD's leased
footprint through increased telework. The study concluded that if
leased office space was reduced by 25 percent, the Department could
potentially save $268 million across the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP) (5 years) as well as reduce emissions associated with the
building space and worker commuting.
16. Senator Ernst. Secretary Austin, what, if any, actions are
being taken or planned to reduce the underutilization of building and
office space?
Secretary Austin. In February 2024, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
released the Resilient and Healthy Defense Communities Strategy. The
strategy emphasizes the need to optimize the Department's footprint and
to create a smaller, higher quality infrastructure portfolio to meet
the needs of the joint force and their families. We will keep Congress
apprised of our activities as the Department finalizes the strategy's
implementation plan.
17. Senator Ernst. Secretary Austin, has DOD's overall office space
increased, decreased, or remained relatively the same since April 1,
2020, and by how much?
Secretary Austin. Between the beginning of fiscal year 2020 and
fiscal year 2024, DOD's office space increased by 1.6 percent.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
aligning budget to strategy documents
18. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCord, could the DOD have
submitted a budget proposal above Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) caps
like other executive branch Departments?
Secretary McCord. The Department's request reflects the reality
that the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA), which was signed into law
(Public Law 118-5) on June 3, 2023, capped fiscal year 2025 funding for
most agencies.
19. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and Secretary McCord, if the
FRA caps were higher, say $900 billion for Defense, would the
Department have made different choices for things like ship
procurement?
Secretary Austin. To meet the budget caps approved by Congress
under the Fiscal Responsibility Act, we made tough but responsible
decisions to prioritize near-term readiness at the expense of some
modernization that will not be delivered until the 2030's. It is
critical that we regain topline growth in the out years to ensure we
meet our modernization goals.
Secretary McCord. If the fiscal year 2025 budget cap was at least
$50 billion higher for Defense, the Department would have revisited
many of the tough choices required in modernization. However, given the
current capacity and production issues within the United States
shipbuilding industrial base, it is not certain that the Department
would have significantly increased ship procurement in Fiscal Year
2025--particularly the procurement of an additional Virginia-class
Submarine due to the existing production backlog. To specifically
address these issues, the Department requested and received $3.3
billion in the Fiscal Year 2024 National Security Supplemental and
requested an additional $4.0 billion in the Fiscal Year 2025 budget
request to invest in the submarine industrial base, increase production
rates, and position the industry to meet the needs of the United States
and our allies and partners in the years to come.
20. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, General Brown, and
Secretary McCord, can you explain how the Congress' failure to pass the
fiscal year 2024 national security supplemental impacted the choices
you made in the fiscal year 2025 budget?
Secretary Austin. As I have stated many times, this is a strategy-
driven budget, tightly aligned to the National Defense Strategy. The
National Security Supplemental request from the Administration was also
aligned with that strategy. We appreciate that Congress passed the
President's National Security Supplemental in April 2024.
General Brown. The Fiscal Year 2024 National Security Supplemental
funding continues to be critical to invigorate the defense industrial
base and to modernize and replenish U.S stockpiles. The delay in
passing of supplemental funding also drove uncertainty and delayed the
vital resupply of military assistance to our Allies and Partners in a
critical time of need.
Secretary McCord.Given that the Department was well into the fiscal
year 2025 budget review when the fiscal year 2024 National Security
Supplemental request was submitted, the delay in passing the
supplemental legislation did not have a significant impact on the
choices made in the Fiscal Year 2025 budget. Further, we cannot, and
should not, fund the extraordinary needs for Ukraine and Israel out of
the
Fiscal year 2025 budget. The Fiscal Year 2024 National Security
Supplemental addressed critical and pressing needs, which cannot wait
until fiscal year 2025 and are funded more appropriately through
supplemental legislation.
21. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, General Brown, and
Secretary McCord, in your opinion, does the historical incidence of the
United States spending 3 percent or less of its GDP on defense
correspond to times when threats from other nation states are high or
low?
Secretary Austin. The budget continues to be strategy-driven. The
budget request includes $147.5 billion in readiness accounts. We
shifted some modernization that will not be delivered until the 2030's.
This will enable us to operate in a constrained budget environment
while protecting and enhancing our ability to fight and win.
General Brown. The Fiscal Year 2025 President's Budget request,
like those of the two previous fiscal years, continues to align to the
2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The budget prioritizes
investments that address the pacing challenge presented by the People's
Republic of China (PRC) and the acute threat posed by Russia. Our
national strategy documents are threat-informed; and therefore, our
budget request is too. For emergent threats, supplemental
appropriations request continue to be the Department's most agile and
responsive method to get resources into the hands of our servicemembers
and our allies and partners during rapidly evolving contingencies.
Secretary McCord. National defense discretionary outlays as a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were in the 3 percent range
in the late 1990's and early 2000's and have been in the 3 percent
range since 2015, with the exception of 2020 when the GDP grew by only
0.1 percent due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
22. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, General Brown, and
Secretary McCord, in your opinion, does the historical incidence of the
United States spending 4 percent or less of its GDP on defense
correspond to times when threats from other nation states are high or
low?
Secretary Austin. For the third year in a row, we delivered a
strategy-driven budget that invests in what we need to maintain our
competitive edge. The most important thing Congress can do to support
the Department is to deliver on-time appropriations. Predictable,
adequate, sustained, and timely funding is critical to successfully
implementing the National Defense Strategy and ensuring our mission to
Defend the Nation.
General Brown. The fiscal year 2025 President's Budget request,
like those of the two previous fiscal years, continues to align to the
2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The budget prioritizes
investments that address the pacing challenge presented by the People's
Republic of China (PRC) and the acute threat posed by Russia. Our
national strategy documents are threat-informed; and therefore, our
budget request is too. For emergent threats, supplemental
appropriations requests continue to be the Department's most agile and
responsive method to get resources into the hands of our servicemembers
and our allies and partners during rapidly evolving contingencies.
Secretary McCord. National defense discretionary outlays as a
percentage of GDP have been 4 percent or less since 1994 except for a
spike from 2009 through 2012, reflecting the impact on the GDP of the
2008 housing bubble collapse and subsequent recession, coupled with
increased spending during the Afghanistan war troop surge.
23. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, General Brown, and
Secretary McCord, would you prefer a budget that is tied to a percent
of GDP every year rather than the current annual budget process?
Secretary Austin. For the third year in a row, we delivered a
strategy-driven budget that invests in what we need to maintain our
competitive edge. The most important thing Congress can do to support
the Department is to deliver on-time appropriations. Predictable,
adequate, sustained, and timely funding is critical to successfully
implementing the National Defense Strategy and ensuring our mission to
Defend the Nation.
General Brown. The Department has the authorities and resources it
needs to deter our adversaries and prevail in conflict. Aligning budget
to strategy continues to be an effective method for resourcing our
national security.
Secretary McCord. Predicable, adequate, sustained, and timely
funding is more critical to securing our Nation's defense than a budget
tied to a percentage of GDP. Defense spending as a percentage of GDP is
helpful in comparing relative investments over time and among
countries. GDP is a measure of overall economic activity and it has
little to do with defense requirements. While spending a specific
percentage of GDP represents a commitment to defense, both GDP and
defense spending needs change over time.
assessment of current threat environment
24. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Brown, do you
believe that the threats posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea
are significantly greater than anything our country has faced since the
cold war?
Secretary Austin. We are living in one of the most complex security
environments that I have seen in my lifetime. Nevertheless, we continue
to assess that conflict with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is
neither imminent nor inevitable. We will continue to strengthen our
alliances and partnerships around the world to deter aggression from
any actor who might wish to challenge us, including the PRC, Russia,
Iran, or North Korea. The alignment we have seen among these actors is
concerning, particularly following Russia's illegal and immoral
invasion of Ukraine. The United States is committed to deterring these
actors, defending our troops and our interests against provocations or
use of force, and, above all, keeping the American people and our
allies and partners safe. For our part, we will continue to invest in
our own capabilities and resilience, to ensure we remain the most
combat capable force in history.
General Brown. In the 39 years I have worn this uniform, this is
the most dynamic and challenging I have seen the global environment.
Our adversaries are advancing cooperation among themselves to
strengthen their military capabilities and ability to challenge U.S.
leadership and the rules-based international order. They are aligned in
their goal to blunt our influence and fracture our alliances and
partnerships. We have seen significant improvements in their
coordination and notable areas of strengthened support. Yet, there are
also hard limits to that support and their relationships remain highly
transactional with deeply embedded point of friction and distrust. In
contrast, this global environment has driven increased dialog with our
allies and partners, as well as an increased focus on the threat.
25. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Brown, do you
believe that our defense spending is sufficient to address a potential
PRC invasion of Taiwan in the next 3 to 5 years?
Secretary Austin. As I have stated before, we continue to assess
that conflict with the PRC is neither imminent nor inevitable. The
President's Budget Request for fiscal year 2025 enables the Department
to field combat-credible capability to deter PRC aggression in the
near, mid-, and long-term, consistent with our commitments under the
Taiwan Relations Act. We continue to provide defensive capabilities to
Taiwan as quickly as possible via Foreign Military Sales, while also
executing newly granted authorities, including Presidential Drawdown
and Foreign Military Financing. This year we are also asking Congress
for a broader defense cooperation authority known as the Indo-Pacific
Security Assistance Initiative (IPSAI), which will provide the
Department with a faster, more flexible mechanism to provide critical
support to Taiwan.
General Brown. An invasion of Taiwan by the People's Republic of
China (PRC) is neither imminent nor inevitable. We're using every tool
at our disposal, consistent with longstanding U.S. policy, to ensure
that deterrence across the Strait remains real and strong, as it has
for more than four decades. Defense spending levels ensure we maintain
the capacity to resist any force or other forms of coercion that would
jeopardize the security of the people of Taiwan, and the fiscal year
2025 President's Budget request expands the scale and scope of our
activities in the Indo-Pacific. With your support, the U.S. and our
large network of Allies and Partners stand ready to defend ourselves
and our interests in the region and worldwide. Continued peace and
stability in the Indo-Pacific region are vital to U.S. national
security.
In line with the Taiwan Relations Act, we continue to support
Taiwan's efforts to improve their capability and capacity to deter
cross-strait aggression and delay or disrupt an invasion. In recent
years, with United States security assistance, Taiwan has made
significant strides in improving their self-defense capacity,
demonstrating commitment to defense reforms at the highest levels of
their political and military leadership.
In addition to Taiwan's already substantial Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) portfolio, we have utilized new Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
and Presidential Drawdown Authorities (PDA) to further address their
critical capability gaps. With the passage of the Fiscal Year 2024
National Security Supplemental funding and additional appropriations
for FMF in fiscal year 2024, we can begin to address capability gaps
that improve Taiwan's warfighting capacity and enhance deterrence.
Additional funding authorities, similar to the Ukraine Security
Assistance Initiative (USAI), enable accelerated procurements and
contribute to energizing the Defense Industrial Base to meet Taiwan's
defense capability requirements.
26. Senator Sullivan. General Brown, are all Combatant Commanders'
request for naval ships resourced fully?
General Brown. The demand for maritime forces continues to exceed
the capacity of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. The Joint
Staff carefully reviews every Combatant Commander's request for forces
and provides the Secretary an informed outlook of the short and long-
term risk associated with each demand. Consistent, adequate, and on-
time funding and prioritizing the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan are
essential to ensure we keep pace with our adversaries.
recruiting efforts
27. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Brown, service
recruiters are authorized under law to have access to student
information on par with potential employers and colleges. Given our
significant recruiting challenges, would you support an effort to raise
the level of access to something greater than parity with potential
employers and colleges?
Secretary Austin. Yes. Recruiter visits to high schools provide
students with the opportunity to hear accurate information about
military service options. We are working every day to recruit America's
best talent, and the data is trending in the right direction. Many
schools are supportive of our recruiting efforts, though unfortunately
others present unnecessary challenges. Our Military Services are doing
all the right things, including advertising, getting back into the
right markets, and returning to schools. They are also making the right
investments and improving processes. This is a challenging market, but
I am optimistic that we are starting to see progress. We appreciate
Congress's support and partnership in achieving our recruitment goals.
Congress can further assist DOD's recruiting efforts by supporting the
Department's fiscal year 2025 legislative proposal that would increase
recruiter access to high schools and communicate the opportunities and
benefits of military service.
General Brown. We need to execute a whole of government approach to
encourage citizens to serve both in and out of uniform. Some ways to
connect with the recruitment pool are through the Value systems,
opportunities the military provides, pride, and service. Young people
only aspire to be what they see or know about. We need to better
connect with the next generation. Some of the influencers which affect
recruitment are Marketing & Advertising, robust partnership with DOE,
Joint Advertising, Market Research & Studies (JAMRS). Current
recruiting data shows positive indicators of sustained improvement, and
retention remains above high across the Services.
28. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, what would optimal or ideal
access to high schools look like for military recruiters?
Secretary Austin. Optimal access would include frequent access to
students to facilitate meaningful interactions and discussions about
the benefits of military service, as well as access to student contact
information in a complete and timely manner. Additionally, recruiters
should have an opportunity to attend high school career fairs and
sporting events free of cost and be allowed a minimum of two recruiter
visits per month. While this level of access is optimal, we recognize
the challenge of balancing what recruiters need and want with what
school officials are able and willing to provide.
29. Secretary Austin, are there any efforts to expand the footprint
of ROTC units at colleges and universities that have demonstrated a low
propensity for military service?
Secretary Austin. The Secretaries of the Military Departments
consistently conduct thorough assessments of their 1,800+ ROTC programs
at more than 1,300 colleges and universities nationwide. These reviews
are instrumental in ensuring that the programs are strategically
positioned to fulfill the officer accession needs of the respective
Military Services. Moreover, they provide the necessary information for
the Military Departments to optimize program locations. Throughout this
process, careful consideration is given to various factors, including
budgetary constraints and other pertinent variables, ensuring a
balanced and effective approach.
shipbuilding
30. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and Secretary McCord, can
you explain how the defense spending caps forced the Department to make
hard choices related to underinvesting in shipbuilding?
Secretary Austin. The U.S. Navy remains the most combat credible
maritime force in the world, which is demonstrated on full display in
our recent actions across the Middle East. The fiscal year 2025 budget
includes $48.1 billion to modernize our naval forces, including new
construction of six battle force ships this year. We had to make tough,
responsible choices to comply with the Fiscal Responsibility Act's
budget caps, and we focused on investing in what American industry can
produce. Over the last 3 years, the Department has made critical
investments in the shipbuilding industrial base to ensure that American
industry can meet our national security needs far into the future.
Congress has helped these efforts by providing submarine industrial
base funds in the National Security Supplemental. These investments
will support supplier and workforce development and infrastructure
improvement to support increased production and reduce maintenance
backlogs. The Navy is making critical improvements to ship maintenance
and construction to ensure we maintain the fleet as effectively as
possible. It also is developing new uncrewed platforms to complement
our existing fleet. I look forward to working with Congress to ensure
that we continue to build the capabilities that we need to Defend the
Nation.
Secretary McCord. To meet the budget caps approved by Congress
under the Fiscal Responsibility Act, we made tough but responsible
decisions to prioritize near-term readiness at the expense of some
modernization that will not be delivered until the 2030s. It is
critical that we regain topline growth in the out years to ensure we
meet our modernization goals. Executing the National Defense Strategy
requires that we realize outyear investments through outyear growth.
31. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and Secretary McCord, would
a larger budget have allowed you to procure two Virginia-class
submarines while simultaneously making additional investments in the
submarine industrial base?
Secretary Austin. For the third year in a row, we have developed a
strategy-driven budget. That includes our investments in submarine
production. No other country can match our undersea warfare
capabilities. We are committed to making the necessary investments in
our submarine industrial base to ensure that it can meet demand. That
is why the President's National Security Supplemental request included
$3.3 billion primarily for the submarine industrial base, and the
fiscal year 2025 budget requests $4 billion. This funding is necessary
to build to an annual production rate to meet our own requirements and
place us on a path to fulfill our AUKUS commitments. This funding will
also enable us to invest further in supply chain development,
infrastructure, and workforce development. These investments rely on
on-time, full-year appropriations, so Congress's continued support is
critical.
Secretary McCord. The Department's decision to procure one
Virginia-class submarine, instead of two, is not tied to the fiscal
year 2025 budget caps. The procurement of one submarine will allow for
the industrial base to reduce the backlog and allow for the submarine
industrial base investments to increase production to two Virginia-
class submarines by 2028.
Removal of the second Virginia-class submarine in fiscal year 2025
was a difficult choice, but the Department is optimistic that this will
provide an opportunity to reduce the backlog within the production line
and for submarine industrial base investments to take greater effect.
32. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, the delays identified by
the Secretary of the Navy's 45-day shipbuilding review paint a damning
picture. Do you believe the regular congressional authorization and
appropriation cycle and DOD PPBE process can deliver ships on time and
on budget?
Secretary Austin. The best way that Congress can support the
Department is to pass on-time appropriations. We need predictable,
adequate, sustained, and timely funding. Our budget is designed to
carry out the National Defense Strategy. We cannot implement the
strategy unless and until Congress funds our budget request.
33. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and Secretary McCord, what
is your personal involvement in the DOD's efforts to address
significant cost and massive time overruns in the Navy's major ship
procurement programs?
Secretary Austin. It is crucial that we ensure timely and efficient
delivery of the Navy's major ship platforms to maintain our advantages
at sea. Major programs are experiencing an increase in demand across
the enterprise but are also facing supply chain shortages and labor
force challenges.
Secretary McCord. My personal involvement in addressing
shipbuilding challenges is to advocate for on-time appropriation bills
each and every fiscal year so that contracts can be award on-time.
Continuing resolutions limit the Navy's ability to properly increase
production and funding to match the budget request instead of
maintaining funding levels of the previous year that are not
synchronized with the latest budget request.
I meet regularly with Navy leadership and my staff, as well as with
industry leaders, to discuss these issues and ways to improve our
shipbuilding efforts to overcome these challenges. The Department is
taking proactive measures to build stable and reliable acquisition
profiles that promote development and retention of highly skilled
workforces and investment in world-class manufacturing and shipbuilding
facilities. We are also working to expand supplier base capabilities
and capacity and shipyard infrastructure. Stable demand signals,
efficient build profiles, and affordable acquisition strategies are
critical to the industrial base. Multi-Year Procurements also can
provide further stability to shipbuilders.
34. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, the Constellation-class
frigate program is based off an existing FREMM design used by NATO
allies. The purpose of using an existing, mature design was to prevent
delays and reduce cost. NAVSEA took an initial design that had 85
percent commonality with versions in use by European navies and made so
many changes that the final version approved for production has only 15
percent commonality with the FREMM design. Were you aware that the Navy
was making such significant changes at the risk of incurring delays in
the procurement timeline?
Secretary Austin. The U.S. Navy is procuring a warship that adheres
to Navy Standards and incorporates the latest Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) combat system programs of record. Since awarding the
contract, the Navy has taken tremendous care not to add or change the
established requirements so as not to impact cost or schedule. Ongoing
design efforts are driven in large part by challenges in both the
engineering workforce and industry-wide hiring and retention, combined
with issues the shipbuilder has encountered in adapting the design to
meet the requirements reflected in the system specification used in the
competition. To mitigate ongoing delays, the Navy and the shipbuilder
are jointly pursing program-wide process improvements and mitigations
across multiple program risk areas.
failed integrated deterrence with iran
35. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Brown, Iranian-
backed Houthi terrorists continue to attack U.S. Navy warships, U.S.
commercial ships, coalition navy warships, and coalition commercial
ships in the Red Sea despite multiple kinetic strikes on drone and
anti-ship missile infrastructure. Clearly, deterrence is not working.
If a Houthi missile strikes a U.S. Navy ship and kills or injures U.S.
sailors, we will obviously respond. Do we have a list of targets to
strike should that event occur that we have not already struck?
Secretary Austin. We have taken significant steps to deter
aggression and respond to threats in the Red Sea and surrounding
region. This includes multiple force posture adjustments to deter and
defend against potential threats. We will do what it takes to protect
our forces against the Houthis' air and maritime attacks. Since January
11, we conducted six joint strikes, frequently alongside the United
Kingdom against several targets in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. We
did so consistent with the U.N. Charter, with support from a coalition
that includes the Netherlands, Canada, Bahrain, Denmark, Australia, and
New Zealand. We have also conducted dozens of strikes targeting Houthi
weapon systems that we determined presented an imminent threat to
United States and coalition forces and merchant vessels in the region.
We also launched Operation Prosperity Guardian--under the umbrella of
the Combined Maritime Forces alongside more than 20 partner countries--
to increase patrols in the Red Sea and deter additional Houthi attacks.
Our coalition has successfully escorted commercial vessels and engaged
Houthi munitions in the air in defense of navigation freedoms. We have
made clear that this is not a moment for any group to escalate the
situation. I will never hesitate to take action or provide the
President with options to respond to an attack on our forces or
interests.
General Brown. Yes, Combatant Commands, particularly during times
of conflict, continually update potential target prioritization lists
to provide the President with response options. This process considers
how striking the targets would achieve national security objectives,
the availability of appropriate offensive systems and forces to strike
the targets, and how to assess effects once the strikes are complete.
36. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Brown,
commercial shipping continues to avoid the Red Sea and therefore the
Suez Canal because our efforts to stabilize the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait
are not working. What does Operation Prosperity Guardian, perhaps in
coordination with the EUNAVFOR Operation Aspides, need to do to assure
commercial shipping that it is safe to transit?
Secretary Austin. The Houthis pose a serious threat to U.S. forces
and our allies and partners in the region, to global commercial
shipping, and to freedom of navigation. We have taken significant steps
to deter aggression and respond to threats in the Red Sea and
surrounding region. Our defensive effort--Operation Prosperity
Guardian--deconflicts and coordinates operations with Operation ASPIDES
to patrol the Red Sea and surrounding waters, deter illegal activity,
and promote safe navigation while protecting the free flow of
international commerce on the high seas. Our coalition has successfully
escorted commercial vessels and engaged Houthi munitions in the air in
defense of navigation freedoms. We have been clear from the start that
our goal is safe and free navigation for all legitimate maritime
traffic in accordance with international law.
General Brown. Operation Prosperity Guardian, in coordination with
EUNAVFOR Operation Aspides, are critical in demonstrating our shared
commitment to freedom of navigation, international commerce, and
defending the lives of mariners from illegal and unjustifiable attacks.
Defensive military operations under Operation Prosperity Guardian and
the EUNAVFOR Operation Aspides aim to deter and respond to commercial
shipping from Houthi attack, as well as defending themselves against
such attacks.
The whole-of-government effort, aided by international cooperation,
seeks to reduce Houthi capabilities to re-arm by interdicting smuggling
from Iran in order to impede Houthi ability to continue to threaten
shipping.
Additionally, international diplomatic pressure continues to
further isolate Iran and the Houthis, expose their malign behavior, and
impose economic sanctions and other designations, in order to press the
Houthis to halt these attacks.
37. General Brown, are Iranian Revolutionary Guard--Navy (IRGNC,
also known as Sepah Navy) and Iranian Navy ships that provide targeting
to Houthis considered legitimate military targets?
General Brown. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is
inside Yemen, and they are serving side by side with the Houthis,
advising them and providing targeting information. Houthi targeting has
been overwhelmingly directed at internationally flagged merchant ships,
and a small percentage directly at US Navy ships.
We have and will continue to hold Iran and the Houthis accountable
for their actions at a time and a place of our choosing. We have and
continue to degrade their capability, and every single day they attempt
to attack us, we're eliminating and disrupting them in ways that are
meaningful.
38. Senator Sullivan. General Brown, is there sufficient ROE for
Commanders of United States Navy warships to target vessels confirmed
as carrying munitions to re-supply the Houthis?
General Brown. All Regional Combatant Commands maintain plans to
respond to a range of activities and are constantly adjusting them
based on achieving intended effects. These plans do include routing
additional authority, including ROE, requests through the Department of
Defense. The Joint Force remains committed to protecting international
maritime lanes.
red sea self-defense & munitions
39. Senator Sullivan. General Brown, U.S. and coalition ships
continue to expend costly missiles in exercise of their inherent right
of self-defense to shoot down comparatively inexpensive inbound
unmanned systems and anti-ship missiles. Have we been able to bring
down the cost-per-intercept since October 2023?
General Brown. Air defense interceptors are far more expensive
compared to the multiple Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) threats United
States Forces face, most notably the Iranian Shahed-series one-way-
attack UAS.
Since March 1, 2024, the Joint Staff and Undersecretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSD A&S) have been co-chairing a
Warfighter Senior Integration Group (W-SIG). The W-SIG is looking
closely at this problem, taking into account Combatant Command
requests, and invest in existing capabilities that can help to solve
the capacity concerns of more affordable air defense interceptors at a
more feasible cost-ratio to the threat.
In addition, there are also effective non-kinetic capabilities that
we continue to develop and employ that significantly change this cost
paradigm. The US engagement of inbound unmanned aerial vehicles and
systems have been executed primarily via non-kinetic effects. The
Department continues to explore and invest in non-kinetic capabilities
to intercept unmanned systems and anti-ship missiles.
40. Senator Sullivan. General Brown, the United States has
interdicted weapons from Iran meant for the Houthis and then sent those
weapons and munitions to Ukraine for their use against the Russians.
Are our collation partners assisting with this interdiction effort?
General Brown. Several of our coalition partners have previously
interdicted Iranian weapons bound for the Houthis and continue to
assist with those interdiction efforts today. United States and United
Kingdom Naval Forces regularly conduct combined maritime security
operations to disrupt the flow of illicit cargo in Middle Eastern
waters.
In February 2023, the United Kingdom Royal Navy confiscated anti-
tank guided missiles and missile components from a vessel in the Gulf
of Oman that originated from Iran. France has also assisted with
interdiction efforts and, in January 2023, French naval forces seized
thousands of assault rifles, machine guns, and anti-tank missiles in
the Gulf of Oman.
aukus
41. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Brown, in the
proposed fiscal year 2025 defense budget, you cut procurement of the
Virginia-class submarine from two to one. This obviously creates doubt
in Australia that we can deliver 3-5 Virginia-class submarines as part
of the optimal pathway for Pillar II. What are you telling your
Australian counterparts to assure them of our commitment to increasing
Virginia production and executing the optimal pathway?
Secretary Austin. Our undersea supremacy is a key strategic
advantage. Supporting Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered,
conventionally armed submarines only reinforces that advantage and
strengthens our national security and stability in the Indo-Pacific
region for decades to come. In order to build the submarines needed for
ourselves and Australia, we must improve the submarine industrial base
(SIB), which currently faces significant backlog challenges. That is
why the fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2024 budget requests included
$1.9 billion for the SIB, and the fiscal year 2025 budget requests $4
billion to develop supply chains and attract and retain skilled
workers. Additionally, we requested $3.3 billion for the SIB as part of
the Fiscal Year 2024 National Security Supplemental. Australia will
also contribute to our SIB.
We are fully committed to fulfilling the President's promise to
deliver a new-construction Virginia-class submarine to Australia by
2038 as part of the Optimal Pathway. Currently, we are focused on
uplifting the SIB to meet our commitments for submarine procurement and
sustainment. With continued annual U.S. SIB investments, coupled with
Australia's contribution, we are working hard to get our SIB on track
to meet a Virginia-class construction cadence of 2.33 boats per year to
meet both United States and Australian requirements.
General Brown. We execute regular exchanges with our Australian and
United Kingdom counterparts on the timing and investments in the US
Submarine Industrial Base (SIB). It's an open dialog, and the message
remains the same: The United States is committed to support the
creation of a sovereign Australian conventionally armed, nuclear-
powered submarine capability regardless of the number of submarines
procured in fiscal year 2025.
The annual United States SIB investments, coupled with Australia's
infusion of $3 billion, will be used to support the SIB to meet the
Virginia-class Submarine (VCS) construction cadence of 2.33 boats per
year and meet both United States and Australian requirements. This
deliberate approach demonstrates a commitment to advanced procurement
and ensures that the supplier's industrial base is fully funded and
able to expand to meet future submarine requirements.
attack submarines
42. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Brown,
recognizing that attack submarines are one of our biggest advantages
compared to the PRC do you agree that our inability to produce at least
two submarines per year (and deliver them on time) increases risk in
the Indo-Pacific during this decade?
Secretary Austin. The PRC remains our number 1 pacing challenge,
but it cannot match our strategic advantages, including our undersea
capability. I continue to be laser-focused on building the right mix of
capabilities to keep deterrence real and strong long into the future.
This is why our budget continues to be driven by our National Defense
Strategy. With respect to building submarines, our submarine industrial
base (SIB) faces significant challenges. That is why the fiscal year
2023 and fiscal year 2024 budget requests included $1.9 billion for the
SIB and the fiscal year 2025 budget requests $4 billion to develop
supply chains and attract and retain skilled workers. Additionally, we
requested $3.3 billion for the SIB as part of the Fiscal Year 2024
National Security Supplemental.
Rather than procuring a second submarine in fiscal year 2025 that
the SIB could not produce in a timely way, the President's Budget
invests additional funds in the SIB that will enable the SIB to support
a more robust rate of submarine construction in future years. This will
increase our ability to meet both United States Navy demand for
Virginia-class submarines as well as AUKUS requirements in an enduring
way.
General Brown. The United States Navy's priority remains undersea
warfare capabilities and the Submarine Industrial Base (SIB).
The Department's Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) budget invests
in 9 out of 10 planned Virginia-class Submarines (VCS) between fiscal
year 2025 and fiscal year 2029 with additional SIB investments directly
supporting AUKUS partnerships that strengthen Indo-Pacific security.
To achieve the Navy's desired production rate of two VCS by 2028,
the fiscal year 2025 President's Budget request procures one VCS this
year, rather than the two previously planned. The decision to procure
one VCS vice two was a difficult choice, but we believe it provides the
SIB an opportunity to recover the backlog within the submarine
production line and for SIB investments to take greater effect in
future years to meet the two VCS per year demand.
Procuring one VCS in fiscal year 2025 enables workforce efforts,
manufacturing, outfitting, assembly, and delivery efforts to all be
synchronized and efficiently functioning, thereby ensuring that the
ramp to ``1+2'' is executable and can be achieved in calendar year
2028.
arctic strategy
43. Senator Sullivan. Secretary McCord, the Department is planning
to release an updated Arctic Strategy this spring. Recognizing that
each service has unique mission requirements and acquisition needs
related to Arctic operations and presence, how is the DOD working with
COCOMs to address priorities for Arctic operations?
Secretary McCord. DOD is committed to ensuring that the Arctic
remains a secure and stable region where United States national
interests are safeguarded, the United States Homeland is defended, and
nations work cooperatively to address shared challenges. The Arctic is
an evolving security environment. We must present a credible deterrent
to conflict and maintain flexibility to respond promptly and
effectively to contingencies there.
In an effort to strengthen partnerships, the Joint Staff is
utilizing international forums such as the Arctic Security Forces
Roundtable (ASFR), to draft a framework for a holistic, comprehensive
approach to increasing domain awareness and synchronizing campaign
operations in the Arctic.
To increase strategic competition, the Department's components, in
conjunction with the Combatant Commands and Military Services, are
working with allies and partners to improve domain awareness, including
through advancing capabilities in the challenging Arctic environment by
replacing outdated systems, upgrading current capabilities, expanding
regional coverage, investing in emerging technologies, and improving
interoperability in both unclassified and classified programs.
Decisions concerning force structure, logistics, and infrastructure
require thorough assessments--often in collaboration with other U.S.
Government agencies and entities--to ensure alignment of multiple
national priorities.
44. General Brown, Alaska is the only U.S. State in the Arctic.
What advantages do you see in having multiple ports in the Aleutians
and Western Alaska that can refuel U.S. Navy ships?
General Brown. Aleutian and Western Alaskan ports provide enhanced
access to the Arctic. United States military operations in the Arctic
are crucial for national security and Homeland defense. Having a deep-
water port will enable the country to maintain a persistent presence in
the Arctic and serves as a strategic countermeasure against the
presence of Russian and Chinese ships. Failing to maintain an Arctic
presence will significantly limit the country's ability to exert
influence on the region.
45. Senator Sullivan. General Brown, homeland defense is the NDS'
top priority, yet in the event of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific, the
one hundred 5th generation fighters based in Alaska would flow into
theater, along with KC-135s, leaving a capability gap in our Homeland
defense capability. While fighter aircraft can surge from the Lower 48
to execute the Homeland defense mission, their ability to operate in
the middle of winter is uncertain at best. What steps have you taken to
identify Lower 48 fighter units that would backfill the Alaska-based F-
35s and F-22s if they deploy into combat and make sure their pilots and
maintenance crews are capable of year-round operations in Alaska?
General Brown. The backfill of Alaska-based fighter aircraft would
be sourced by Contiguous United States-based fighter squadrons. Pilots
from multiple Contiguous United States alert aircraft locations would
be identified that have completed arctic survival training (through
previous assignment to Alaska, or rapid training), and receive
augmentation of their air crew flight equipment (survival gear).
46. Senator Sullivan. General Brown, the Arctic is becoming an
increasingly contested environment. For the last two summers, Russia
and China have sent a combined naval task force to the coast of Alaska.
In 2022, our response was to send one small Coast Guard cutter to
intercept the PRC-Russian flotilla. In 2023, the Navy sent four DDGs
and a P-8, a much more robust response. How is the Department
synchronizing availability of ships and aircraft to respond to a PRC-
Russian naval flotilla off the Alaskan coast in 2024?
General Brown. The Department routinely conducts threat assessments
to determine the risk that People's Republic if China (PRC) and Russian
deployments pose to the Homeland. That risk is evaluated against other
operational requirements to determine resourcing priorities, which
would include a broad array of integrated military capability focused
on defending the Homeland and holding those PRC and Russian resources
at risk.
47. Senator Sullivan. General Brown, has military sealift command
trained for cold weather replenishments at-sea to ensure U.S. Navy
ships can sustain Arctic operations if needed?
General Brown. The USNS Robert E. Peary (T-AKE-5), USNS William
McLean (T-AKE-12), USNS Medgar Evers (T-AKE-13), USNS Big Horn (T-AO-
198), USNS Arctic (T-AOE-8) and USNS Supply (T-AOE-6) have all
successfully supported operations in the Arctic in recent years (2016-
2022). Prior to cold weather events, Military Sealift Command (MSC)
ensures its vessels are outfitted with cold weather gear, conducts
training on exposure, and ensures operations can be sustained,
including fuel type, and conducting material checks on sea chest
heaters, as well as fire main, fuel, and lube oil heating systems.
The T-AO and T-AKE ship classes have an American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS) Ice Class of ``1C.'' This identifies that the vessel is certified
to operate year-round, safely and independently, in areas of open
first-year light ice coverage (less than .6m). The T-AKE has an ice
belt, but no reinforced bow or hull below it.
dod spectrum sharing
48. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, the United States was the
global leader in 4G deployment and now has the opportunity to continue
that leadership in 5G deployment. How do you envision a collaborative
relationship between the U.S. wireless industry and DOD to bolster our
Nation's long-term leadership in next generation deployment?
Secretary Austin.
Ensuring that we have the technical capability necessary to
maintain and strengthen our warfighting efforts is always a key
priority. We must do this alongside partnership with industry,
including the U.S. wireless industry. Collaboration is key to the
deployment of next-generation information communications technology.
This involves working together, being open to innovation, instituting
ground rules, clearly communicating, and establishing the roles and
responsibilities necessary to implement and deploy next-generation
technologies.
DOD is pushing the boundaries of what commercial industry can
deliver, focusing on advancing critical capabilities that will be
beneficial for both defense and commercial applications. This will
provide market advantage to the U.S. telecommunications industrial base
and stimulate new revenue generation for these vendors.
DOD is also working closely with U.S. mobile network operators on
commercial coverage buildout at our military installations within the
continental United States. We have set an ambitious target date for the
deployment of 5G infrastructure at all military installations by the
end of calendar year 2028.
49. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, are the ways the Department
is exploring to leverage 5G an asset that can be used for national
security?
Secretary Austin.
5G will support numerous national security functions, requiring the
DOD and the U.S. national security establishment to consider
requirements for a U.S. supply chain to consistently preserve capacity
within the U.S. telecommunications market. Integrated communication and
networking technologies, including future generation wireless networks,
are one of the White House's designated critical and emerging
technologies (per the National Science and Technology Council's
February 2024 report). Missions and functions will increasingly
transition to 5G to take advantage of its increased network speeds,
bandwidth, and capacity.
DOD is also evaluating ways for 5G to support drone missions and
communications across a spectrum of military and civilian functions.
This could provide commanders with timely access to actionable
intelligence data, in turn improving operational decisionmaking.
Standards bodies and users of commercial systems have increasingly
focused on the security of wireless technology. The trajectory of
security has been steadily increasing through successive generations,
and native 5G is significantly more secure than prior generations.
Security enhancements focus on core security, edge device integrity,
traffic segmentation, and malicious system detection.
50. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, do you agree that a U.S.
wireless industry-DOD collaboration is a critical opportunity to help
the United States continue to outpace our foreign adversaries?
Secretary Austin. Yes, for example, engagement between the U.S.
wireless industry and DOD is critical to ensuring that we can identify
and address vulnerabilities in equipment that can be used to conduct
malicious cyber activities targeting the United States and our allies.
Additionally, more efficient use of limited spectrum resources will
drive technological innovation, boost U.S. industrial competitiveness,
and foster scientific advancements, while enabling DOD to dominate in
an increasingly congested and contested environment.
u.s. energy and our allies
51. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, the Biden administration
recently decided to halt the approval process for liquefied natural gas
(LNG) exports to non-Free Trade Agreement countries. At a time when war
is ongoing in Ukraine and tensions are rising in the Middle East and
Asia, it is particularly important that allied nations can rely on the
United States for a reliable, long-term fuel supply. What do you see as
the implications from this stop in the approval process for our allies,
like Japan, who rely on a steady flow of United States LNG?
Secretary Austin. I defer to the Department of State and Department
of Energy to address the Administration's actions related to liquified
natural gas.
52. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, where might our allies and
partners turn if U.S. LNG exports are restricted?
Secretary Austin. I defer to the Department of State and Department
of Energy to address partners and allies' access to liquified natural
gas.
ukraine
53. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Brown, when I
met with President Zelenskyy at the Munich Security Conference this
year, he explained how important longer range ATACMS were to striking
Russian positions in Crimea, including airfields, naval bases, and
logistics nodes. Have we been able to free up ATACMS for transfer to
Ukraine through procurement of replacement systems such as the
Precision Strike Missile or new orders of ATACMS?
Secretary Austin. Yes, the President authorized the provision of
long-range ATACMS to Ukraine as part of a Presidential Drawdown package
announced on March 12. We were able to provide this capability to
Ukraine while maintaining the readiness of United States Forces given a
limited number of new ATACMS coming off a production line, as well as
initial quantities of the Precision Strike Missile--the replacement
munition for ATACMS--entering production.
General Brown. We are in constant communication with Ukraine
leadership and synchronize with them on their battlefield requirements.
We will continue to provide Ukraine with the support and capabilities
needed to defend their sovereign nation against Russian aggression. The
effects of every munition we send to Ukraine is analyzed against
impacts to United States readiness and we constantly balance current
risk against future requirements.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
recruitment
54. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Austin, a March 2023 GAO report
noted that the Department of Defense is facing its most challenging
recruitment environment in 50 years. As the report notes, there are
many aspects to recruitment and retention that deserve our collective
attention. What effect do you see the comprehensive compensation and
benefits package for uniformed service personnel having on recruitment
and retention rates?
Secretary Austin. A comprehensive compensation and benefits package
for servicemembers remains important to our recruiting and retention
efforts. Today's military compensation package is robust and highly
competitive with the private sector, and the military benefit package
exceeds private-sector benefit packages by a wide margin. I take the
health and well-being of the force and our military families extremely
seriously, and this includes making sure our troops get the pay they
deserve.
While we are conducting an extensive review of military
compensation, the 14th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, we
are not waiting to take action to strengthen the economic security of
our force. The President's Budget Request includes a 4.5 percent
military basic pay raise for 2025; increases funding for housing and
subsistence allowances by 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent, respectively;
invests in childcare ($33.5 million for redesigned childcare provider
compensation and $293 million in child development center new
construction); commissaries (adds $120 million above the amounts added
in the fiscal year 2024 budget); safe, quality housing (e.g.,
approximately $1.1 billion for new unaccompanied housing construction);
and much more.
Our troops are driven to service because of their desire to protect
and defend the Nation. We are grateful for their service, and for the
contributions and sacrifices of our tremendous military families.
55. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Austin, what effort is the
Department making to enhance the total compensation package for
military personnel?
Secretary Austin. Over the last year, we have worked to reduce
costs and increase resources for our servicemembers and their families.
We reduced the cost of childcare for most families with a total income
under $120,000 and helped ease the burden of permanent change of
station moves. We also have worked hard to increase opportunities for
employment for military spouses. Through the Spouse Education and
Career Opportunities Program, we expanded educational and career
support to military spouses around the world. In addition, we launched
the Military Spouse Career Accelerator Pilot.
Furthermore, with Congress's help, we delivered a historic 5.2
percent basic pay raise in January 2024. That is the largest raise in
over 20 years for our military. The fiscal year 2025 budget request
recommends a 4.5 percent basic pay raise for servicemembers and
increases in the basic allowance for housing and subsistence to ensure
military compensation remains competitive, so we are able to recruit
and retain the force we need. We need to stay focused on this issue.
We also expanded eligibility for the Basic Needs Allowance,
ensuring that we are helping those servicemembers with families who are
the most financially challenged and in need.
This year, the 14th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation is
conducting an in-depth review of many forms of compensation, and I have
directed my team to move with speed and bring actionable
recommendations forward as soon as possible.
56. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Austin, are there areas Congress
could consider beyond the benefit structure currently in place?
Secretary Austin. We appreciate Congress's support of this year's
basic pay raise of 5.2 percent. That is the biggest raise in over 20
years for our military. The fiscal year 2025 budget recommends another
4.5 percent increase for our servicemembers, to start in January 2025.
If Congress supports this pay raise, then servicemembers will have
received an approximately 15 percent pay raise over the past 3 years.
It is important to recognize that, in addition to starting pay of
over $20 per hour and increasing to over $25 per hour by the end of the
first year, our military provides a very significant benefit package
for our servicemembers--one that exceeds private-sector benefit
packages by a wide margin. This notably includes free health, dental,
vision care, and pharmacy benefits; 30 days of paid leave per year;
Post-9/11 GI Bill educational assistance; highly subsidized childcare;
a fully inflation-protected lifetime retirement plan that begins paying
out after only 20 years of service; and a 401(k)-type plan with a
government contribution and match.
I look forward to reviewing the recommendations of the 14th
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, which are expected toward
the end of this year, regarding any additional improvements we can
implement.
camp lejeune
57. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Austin, the Camp Lejeune Justice
Act was signed into law in 2022. The purpose of the law is to provide
an equitable and swift path to compensation for victims of toxic water
exposure at Camp Lejeune. Nearly 2 years later, our understanding is
that very few claims have been paid. While I support any veteran's
desire to fully litigate this matter, I know some veterans may prefer a
speedier administrative payout, especially if they are of advanced age.
How many CLJA related claims have been filed by servicemembers and
dependents with the Department of the Navy?
Secretary Austin. As of May 10, 2024, there are approximately
227,309 Camp Lejeune Justice Act administrative claims on file with the
Department of the Navy.
58. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Austin, how many CLJA claims have
been processed by the Department of the Navy?
Secretary Austin. As of May 10, 2024, there are approximately
227,309 Camp Lejeune Justice Act administrative claims on file with the
Department of the Navy, which are under review or about to commence
review.
59. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Austin, what information is
required by the Department of Navy in order to process a claim?
Secretary Austin. Before the Camp Lejeune Claims Unit can
adjudicate a claim, the filer must submit sufficient evidence to enable
the Department of the Navy to investigate the factual basis for the
claim. For any claim submission to be considered properly presented,
the file must initially include, at a minimum, the following
information in writing:
1. Name of the injured person (i.e., the claimant);
2. The basis of the claim (basic description of harm/injury as a
result of presence at Camp Lejeune);
3. The demand of the claim stated as a ``sum certain;''
4. If an agent/representative files on behalf of the injured
person, the basis of the filer's authority to act on behalf of the
injured person; and
5. Signature of the individual filing the claim.
Once properly presented, the claimant bears the burden of proof to
substantiate the claim by providing the documentation necessary to
prove the allegations set forth in the claim. The Camp Lejeune Justice
Act sets forth the eligibility requirements for an individual to
recover damages because of exposure to contaminated water at Camp
Lejeune during a specified timeframe. To adjudicate a claim, the
Department of the Navy must first determine if a claimant meets those
eligibility requirements to include documentation showing when and for
how long a claimant was exposed to water at Camp Lejeune and what harm
or injury, if any, the claimant sustained as a result. The Camp Lejeune
Claims Unit may request documentation from claimants to substantiate
and adjudicate a Camp Lejeune Justice Act claim, but no documentation
is required to file a claim.
60. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Austin, how would you
characterize the working relationship between the Department of the
Navy and the Department of Justice on this matter? What formal
arrangements are in place to ensure coordination?
Secretary Austin. The working relationship between the Department
of the Navy and the Department of Justice is collaborative. The
Department of Justice currently serves as the settlement authority for
Camp Lejeune Justice Claims. For that reason, the Department of the
Navy submits all settlement recommendations to the Department of
Justice for review and approval. Additionally, the Department of the
Navy and the Department of Justice hold recurring coordination meetings
to discuss litigation impacts to the claims process, processing
discovery requests as part of the litigation, and other areas of
coordination as appropriate.
61. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Austin, based on the information
available to the Department of Defense, how many total claims have been
paid pursuant to CLJA?
Secretary Austin. To date, 551 Camp Lejeune Justice Act claims
contain all the evidence necessary to support a claim settlement
decision (e.g., medical and housing documentation). Law firms filed
more than 200,000 Camp Lejeune Justice Act claims, and the Department
of the Navy is actively communicating with the attorneys representing
claimants to identify the types of documentation necessary to
substantiate a claim. The Department of the Navy is also communicating
with individual claimants to identify additional documentation
necessary to substantiate their claims.
The Department of Justice approved 63 settlement recommendations
with the remaining recommendations still pending review and approval.
As a result, the Department of the Navy made 63 offers to settle Camp
Lejeune Justice Act claims, of which 33 settlement offers were
accepted, three were declined, and the remainder are pending a decision
by the claimant. The Department of the Navy expects settlement numbers
to increase with the introduction in early April 2024 of the Claims
Management Portal, which enables filers to securely upload evidence
directly into their digital claims file. This capability significantly
reduces the time required for receipt and review of substantiating
documentation as well as the overall time required to review a Camp
Lejeune Justice Act claim.
62. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Austin, from your perspective, do
you have any objection to the appointment of a Special Master or a
Claims Administrator to provide veterans a speedier path to
compensation?
Secretary Austin. The Department of Justice is currently
interviewing candidates for a Special Master position and proposing
names to the court for consideration. The Department of Defense will
continue to support Department of Justice efforts, as appropriate.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Markwayne Mullin
china
63. Senator Mullin. Secretary Austin, we know that Chinese
President Xi Jinping has directed his military to be ready to invade
Taiwan by 2027. If we somehow knew that the United States would be
forced to enter a high intensity conflict with China in 2027, and you
had the next 2\1/2\ years to spend the DOD's annual budget over that
time, let's say 1.7 to 2 trillion dollars; are we spending money in the
precise fashion we need to in order to provide the right training and
equipment readiness of what we have, and the sustainment to see that
fight through to victory?
Secretary Austin. The Department continues to assess that conflict
in the Indo-Pacific region is neither imminent nor inevitable.
Nevertheless, we are realistic about the pacing challenge posed by the
PRC, and about the importance of meeting the challenge with focus and
resources. That is why the Department is laser-focused on building the
right mix of capabilities to strengthen deterrence today and into the
future. Our strategy-driven budget request for fiscal year 2025
demonstrates this commitment. This budget request makes targeted
investments in the missions and capabilities that enable us to meet our
pacing challenge with the urgency, attention, and resources we need.
64. Senator Mullin. Secretary Austin, do we have any metrics that
we are doing better on getting contracts to innovative companies that
are not prime contractors, who are not performing well in many cases?
Not small businesses, but larger mid-sized businesses who are competing
against the primes--like Anduril. Aren't more procurement contracts how
we get more competition in the industrial base and stop consolidation?
Secretary Austin. Our defense industrial base is critical to our
ability to protect American national security interests, and our small
and mid-sized companies are a core part of it. We have several programs
that work to address this part of our industrial base directly. The
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology
Transfer Programs provide funds to enable small businesses to build
dual-use technology. APFIT provides initial procurement funding to help
transition successful small business innovation research and technology
transfer programs and other small, mid-sized and non-traditional
efforts from development to production. The Department's Defense
Innovation Unit (DIU) further enhances our engagement with non-
traditional commercial technology providers by identifying and
acquiring dual-use technologies. From June 2016, to September 2023, 38
percent of DIU prototyping contract awards were first-time DOD vendors,
87 percent were non-traditional vendors, and 80 percent were small
businesses. Over the next year, we will build on this progress by
expanding outreach to companies, labs, accelerators, academic partners,
and investors, and we will continue to provide more resources to small,
mid-sized, and non-traditional providers. We appreciate Congress'
continued support in providing the authorities and resources we need to
do this important work.
65. Senator Mullin. Secretary Austin, while our mutual work has
improved the picture on munitions, there's still much more to do. I
look at this budget and I see plenty of places where we are not maxed
out on munitions. Would you buy those back if you had a higher topline?
Secretary Austin. I am laser-focused on building the right mix of
capabilities to execute our National Defense Strategy. The most
important thing Congress can do is pass the President's full budget on
time. Multi-year procurement is one proven and powerful tool to deliver
critical capabilities to the warfighter at speed and scale, support the
defense industrial base, and maintain munitions procurements.
Continuing resolutions prevent us from executing on many multi-year
procurement contracts, robbing us of valuable time needed for the
industrial base. For example, during fiscal year 2024, we lost nearly
half a year's time under a continuing resolution. That is time we could
have spent ramping up our production through multi-year contracts that
were authorized by Congress for critical munitions--and, specifically,
the seven munition multi-year procurements requested in the fiscal year
2024 budget request. Our adversaries do not operate under continuing
resolutions.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request prioritizes long-range and
precision munitions most needed across multiple domains and builds off
of procurement of critical munitions through multi-year procurement
efforts requested in fiscal year 2024. Specifically, this request
includes $29.8 billion for munitions and prioritizes the most critical
Indo-Pacific relevant munitions. Passing the full fiscal year 2025
budget on time will help stabilize the demand signal to the defense
industrial base and ensure that capacity exists and will strengthen our
ability to respond quickly to future contingencies.
66. Senator Mullin. Secretary Austin and General Brown, how useful
are our advanced fighter and bomber aircraft or our nuclear submarines
if they lack precision guided munitions?
Secretary Austin. While advanced fighter and bomber aircraft and
nuclear submarines remain powerful weapons platforms, their
effectiveness is greatly multiplied using precision guided munitions
(PGMs). PGMs improve accuracy, reduce collateral damage, and allow for
a wider range of mission types. Most U.S. military aircraft and
submarines are equipped to carry and use PGMs. The Department has and
continues to invest in PGM development and deployment.
General Brown. While advanced fighter and bomber aircraft and
nuclear submarines remain powerful weapons platforms, their
effectiveness is greatly multiplied by the use of precision guided
munitions (PGMs). PGMs improve accuracy, reduce collateral damage, and
allow for a wider range of mission types. Most US military aircraft and
submarines are equipped to carry and use PGMs. The Department has and
continues to invest in PGM development and deployment.
67. Senator Mullin. Secretary Austin and General Brown, regarding
the previous question, have we studied how many times we could rearm
our fleets, and are you comfortable with that number?
Secretary Austin. Readiness of the Joint Force is one of my top
priorities. We are constantly evaluating our current inventory of
precision guided munitions and future requirements. The Joint Force
conducts various studies of U.S. inventories, force readiness,
effectiveness, and projections to ensure that we are adequately
postured to respond to any contingency against any actor, focusing in
particular on a near-peer adversary. In those studies, we include
results of wargames, exercises, and Joint Force Rehearsals to validate
assumptions and ensure we have the most accurate picture possible.
General Brown. Readiness of the Joint Force is one of my top
priorities. We are constantly evaluating our current inventory of
precision guided munitions (PGMs) and future requirements. The Joint
Force conducts various studies of U.S. inventories, force readiness,
effectiveness, and projections to ensure we are adequately postured to
respond to any contingency against any actor, especially focusing on a
near-peer adversary. In those studies, we include results of wargames,
exercises, and Joint Force Rehearsals to validate assumptions and
ensure we have the most accurate picture possible.
dod posture
68. Senator Mullin. Secretary Austin and General Brown, with
potential war with China in 2 to 3 years, does it make sense to be
shrinking our Air Force and Navy by divesting capable airframes and
ships when, in reality, we should be building up both the Air Force and
Navy to provide deterrence, and a force capable at defeating any
competitor?
Secretary Austin. I am laser-focused on building the right mix of
capabilities to execute our National Defense Strategy. Divestments
represent a potential for around $3.3 billion in savings. Under the
budget cap required by the Fiscal Responsibility Act, we will need help
from Congress this year to prevent significant drag on our topline. As
we look to our key challenges, we must divest vulnerable platforms that
can no longer be affordably modernized or maintained to provide
credible combat power. The fiscal year 2025 budget request will allow
us to balance resources and mitigate risk to current missions to an
acceptable level as we develop and field the next generation of
capabilities.
Divestment priorities include the A-10 and older Ticonderoga class
cruisers. These platforms suffer from frequent breakdowns, sustainment
challenges, and high operating, maintenance, and refurbishment costs.
The A-10 is a legacy single-role fighter. It is not effective in a
high-end fight. We need its funding, aircrew, and maintenance manpower
for emerging 6th-generation fighters. Older Ticonderoga-class cruisers
are phasing out as the mission transitions to Flight III guided-missile
destroyers. Funding and personnel devoted to sustaining a legacy
platform can often be used for the replacement capability, but only
after the legacy platform has been retired.
General Brown. I am aggressively leading with new concepts and
approaches to advance Joint Force design, modernization, and
development of our capabilities. But we must transition by divesting
outdated platforms no longer relevant to the threat to make way for
newer capabilities and a trained Joint Force that can deliver credible
deterrence and a force capable of defeating any adversary.
69. Senator Mullin. Secretary Austin and General Brown, can you
defend the Air Force divesting of 250 airframes and replacing with 91,
and is that setting us up for failure?
Secretary Austin. The Department conducts rigorous analyses across
DOD components, the Military Departments, the Joint Staff, and
Combatant Commands to determine the right mix of capabilities for the
Joint Force. The constraints of the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023
forced tough choices, and the President's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget
Request balances the needs of the current force and investments needed
to develop and field the next generation of capabilities.
General Brown. The Air Force is divesting aircraft that are older
and not as effective against the pacing threat, in accordance with the
2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The 2022 NDS reoriented the Joint
Force toward strategic competition with our pacing threat; many of our
existing legacy systems are no longer credible in a future fight. The
Department must pivot from aging weapons systems and shift resources to
contemporary high'end battle systems. Legacy aircraft cannot accomplish
the full spectrum of missions required to compete with an advanced
adversary. The Fiscal Year 2025 President's Budget Request reflects
tough but necessary choices and enables a capable, sustainable, and
affordable Joint Force that can operate across the entire range of
mission sets.
70. Senator Mullin. Secretary Austin and General Brown, the Navy is
also getting rid of 19 ships and ordering 6. As a business owner, I can
tell you that the way to signal demand is by placing orders. Why are we
only ordering one Virginia-class submarine?
Secretary Austin. No other country can match our undersea warfare
capabilities. We are committed to making the necessary investments in
our submarine industrial base to ensure that it can meet demand. That
is why the President's National Security Supplemental included $3.3
billion primarily for the submarine industrial base, and the Fiscal
Year 2025 budget requests $4 billion. This funding is necessary to
build to an annual production rate to meet our own requirements and
keep us on a path to fulfill our AUKUS commitments. This funding will
also enable us to invest further in supply chain development,
infrastructure, and workforce development. These investments rely on
on-time, full-year appropriations, and Congress's continued support is
critical.
General Brown. The United States Navy is the most lethal Navy in
the world and our submarines are unmatched in undersea warfare. The
shipbuilding industry and specifically the Submarine Industrial Base
(SIB) has proven unable to meet production timelines to produce
submarines at two Virginia-class submarines per year. Analysis through
various studies, such as the SIB-25, show that bolstering the SIB is
the necessary foundation to regain momentum and sustain building two
Virginia-class submarines per year production and 1 Columbia-class
submarine in the future. The fiscal year 2025 President's Budget
request includes a $4 billion investment into the SIB, and the Fiscal
Year 2024 National Security Supplemental includes an additional $3.3
billion in funding allocated toward bolstering the SIB.
71. Senator Mullin. Secretary Austin and General Brown, if we want
to build capacity in the Defense Industrial Base, don't we need to
order at least two Virginia-class submarines?
Secretary Austin. We continue to enjoy the strongest Navy in human
history. And I intend to keep it that way. There is significant funding
across the submarine enterprise associated with material procurements.
Nevertheless, Virginia-class submarine production is currently below
the two per year rate. Removal of the second ship from the fiscal year
2025 budget request was a difficult choice, but the Navy is optimistic
that this provides an opportunity to reduce the backlog within the
production line and for submarine industrial base investments to take
greater effect. Shipbuilders are currently delivering the equivalent of
just 1.3 nuclear-powered attack submarines per year. To support Navy
requirements and AUKUS commitments, the industrial base will need to
improve its production rate to 2.33 Virginia-class submarines per year,
plus one Columbia-class per year.
General Brown. We are working closely with the Defense Industrial
Base (DIB) to provide stability, predictability, and adequately signal
requirements for combat capabilities. By continuing to provide Joint
Force requirements early and often to our commercial partners, the DIB
can build a sustainable production schedule that will meet the Joint
Force needs. We concur for the need to improve production rate to 2.33
per year but need to ensure we assist the industrial base in building
production capacity and developing realistic schedules.
recruiting
72. Senator Mullin. Secretary Austin and General Brown, did either
of you graduate with student loan debt and why not?
Secretary Austin. I attended the United States Military Academy,
and was required to complete an initial Active Duty service obligation
upon graduation. I have remained in public service for over 40 years.
The Military Service Academies provide an outstanding education and
will continue to create future leaders and public servants, potentially
even future Four-Star generals and Secretaries of Defense.
General Brown. I was fortunate to have earned my degree and
commission through a 4-year Air Force ROTC scholarship at Texas Tech
University. Education benefits are and continue to be a highly valued
benefit of United States Military Service, whether through
commissioning programs, enlisted education programs, tuition
assistance, or the GI bill post-Military Service.
73. Senator Mullin. Secretary Austin and General Brown, I think the
services are struggling with recruiting because, in some ways, the DOD
has been politicized. Would either of you say that one of the main
recruiting incentives the DOD offers is education?
Secretary Austin. Data show that one of the top reasons young
people join the military is for the education it provides. Education
incentives, such as the Student Loan Repayment Program, Tuition
Assistance, and the Post-9/11 GI Bill, remain important to achieving
our recruiting goals.
General Brown. Education benefits are one of the main recruiting
incentives the DOD offers amongst many other benefits. Educational
assistance is not only ``vital for recruiting,'' but it helps
servicemembers continue to grow as individuals and bring enhanced
knowledge and skills to their respective units.
74. Senator Mullin. Secretary Austin and General Brown, I'm
tracking DOD has service academies, a robust ROTC program and the GI
Bill. Don't the services also offer programs to cancel student debt in
exchange for enlisting?
Secretary Austin. Military personnel can apply for the Public
Service Loan Forgiveness Program offered under the Department of
Education after serving 10 or more years in the military. The Military
Services also offer the Student Loan Repayment Program as an incentive
to encourage enlistment, affiliation, and retention in designated
military career fields, skills, or services for specified periods of
obligated service.
General Brown. Yes, Military enlistees can receive student loan
repayment assistance. Federal student loans and even some private
student loans may be forgiven. While each program has unique processes
and requirements, they're all enlistment incentives designed to help
recent college graduates manage education debt.
75. Senator Mullin. Secretary Austin and General Brown, I think now
of all times is an especially poor time for the Administration to
``forgive'' student load debt as it undercuts recruiting for the DOD
besides being illegal and unfair. Would you say forgiving student loan
debt helps or hurts recruiting for the DOD?
Secretary Austin. Our data show that education benefits continue to
top the list of reasons that youth enlist in the military. The Military
Services offer many education programs, including the Post-9/11 GI
Bill, the Student Loan Repayment Program, and Tuition Assistance, to
assist military members in their pursuit of education and to help them
manage their student loan debt.
General Brown. Education benefits are one of the main recruiting
incentives the DOD offers amongst many other benefits. In a competitive
job market, the military offers a robust compensation package, whether
enlisting or commissioning. Although recruiting has been a challenge,
we are seeing positive trends across the Services. Retention across the
Services also remains high, which indicates that servicemembers enjoy
the many benefits of military service.
f-35
76. Senator Mullin. General Brown, you once called the F-35
Lightning the ``cornerstone of our fighter capability'' and yet the DOD
continues to ask for fewer and fewer planes each year. That is worrying
to me. Why did the DOD decide to reduce the number of F-35's ordered
across the service branches?
General Brown. The F-35 is the best multi-role aircraft in the
world, the capacity fighter for the joint force, and offers the
survivability and lethality that we need. We need to get the Block 4
aircraft into the fleet; however, acceptance is on hold as the tech
refresh is struggling to deliver the hardware and software upgrades as
required. The decrease in quantity allows the Department to use those
funds to confront key development, interoperability, sustainability,
and affordability challenges to acquire, upgrade, and retrofit the F-35
fleet to obtain the required capability and capacity as quickly as
possible within projected resource constraints. The Fiscal Year 2025
President's Budget Request funds the Block 4 upgrades with Tech Refresh
3, which includes the technology and capabilities we need in our F-35
to deter our pacing challenge. The F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and
Lockheed Martin (LM), the prime contractor for the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter, announced that deliveries of the first Technology Refresh-3
(TR-3) configured F-35 aircraft resumed in mid-July.
77. Senator Mullin. Secretary McCord, not only are we reducing the
number of planes, but we are reducing their capability. Is it accurate
to say that the F-35's alternative mission equipment has gone unfunded
for the last couple of budget cycles?
Secretary McCord. The F-35 alternative mission equipment (AME)
program, included in the Ancillary Equip cost element of the P-5 Cost
Analysis budget justification document, has been funded in prior budget
submissions. F-35 AME requirements and budgets are reassessed each
fiscal year to include managing existing inventory and funding new
requirements to keep the F-35 AME program solvent.
78. Senator Mullin. General Brown, this equipment, including bomb
racks and adaptors, provides options that we are currently lacking in
other aspects of our fleet. Why has this line item gone unfunded?
General Brown. The Department is committed to providing adequate
Alternative Mission Equipment (AME) for F-35 while balancing
procurement quantities against other Service and DOD requirements.
While risk exists, it is managed within existing AME inventories. For
example, in fiscal year 2023, the Department preserved the production
portion of sustainment support for F-35 (which included depot
activations and AME) at the expense of purchasing more tails that came
in over their original estimate in Lot 17. The F-35 Joint Program
Office and the Services continue to prioritize operations and
sustainment through the Global Support Solution framework and the Air
Vehicle Sustainment Strategy.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 2024
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND UNITED STATES CYBER
COMMAND POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan,
Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
receive an update on the readiness and posture of U.S. Special
Operations Command and U.S. Cyber Command. Our witnesses are
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict, Christopher Maier; Commander of U.S.
Special Operations Command, General Bryan Fenton; and Commander
of U.S. Cyber Command and Director of the National Security
Agency, General Timothy Haugh. I would like to welcome General
Haugh to his first posture hearing.
On behalf of the Committee I would ask our witnesses to
convey our appreciation to the men and women you represent and
their families for their service and professionalism.
The elite capabilities of our special operations and cyber
forces have never been more important. We live in a complex
world, most clearly defined by threats from China, Russia,
Iran, North Korea, and non-State actors that are working around
the clock to find ways to undermine America's interests.
Prevailing in this environment will require the tailored and
often clandestine capabilities that only our special operations
and cyber forces consumer provide.
The United States has been reducing its footprint in
conflict zones around the world for several years. As such, the
special operations community is evolving to match new threats.
The skills, knowledge, and perhaps more importantly, the
relationships with foreign partners that our Special Operations
Forces have developed over the past 20 years of combat make
them well positioned to contribute significantly to our long-
term strategic competition with China and Russia.
Our special operations have also been learning from our
allies and partners, including in Ukraine and Israel. Since the
Hamas attack on October 7th, the United States has deployed
special operators to the region to provide crisis evacuation
options and to work with Israeli partners on hostage recovery
operations. These forces have also been critical in countering
attacks from Iran's proxies in the region.
Assistant Secretary Maier and General Fenton, I would ask
for an update on the role of our special operators in advising
you as partners in Europe and the Middle East and what lessons
you are drawing to help focus and prepare our special
operations for future challenge. I would also ask that you
provide the Committee an update on efforts to strengthen the
ability of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict to fulfill its
service secretary-like responsibilities for the oversight of
the organization and readiness of our special operations.
Turning to Cyber Command, I would like to commend our cyber
forces and the intelligence community for their performance
over the past several years in exposing Russia's activities and
helping Ukraine defend itself against both kinetic and cyber
assaults. These efforts have made a tremendous difference on
the battlefield and in deterring broader conflict.
Some of the tools in our toolbox, like section 702
authority from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or
FISA, are critical to our ability to counter our adversaries'
malign activities. General Haugh, the Committee would
appreciate your views on the importance of section 702, which
expires next week, and why you believe it is essential that we
renew the authority immediately. We would also like to know
what guardrails are in place to give the public confidence that
the authority is being used judiciously.
CYBERCOM has been working to make sure the cyber force
advances its capabilities to conduct defensive, offensive, and
supporting intelligence operations. It is widely recognized
that our cyber mission forces are struggling with shortfalls in
personnel readiness. We know that addressing this issue is your
highest priority, and that the private sector has realized the
immense value of our cyber operators and is offering them very
high compensation to leave the military. The service must
adjust accordingly by providing a creative combination of
incentives to compete for and retain these personnel.
Finally, over the last decade a recurring debate has been
waged over whether to sustain the ``dual hat'' arrangement,
whereby the Commander of Cyber Command also serves as the
Director of the NSA. Last year an independent panel,
established by the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense, and led by former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Joe Dunford, concluded that the ``dual
hat'' arrangement should be sustained. We would welcome your
thoughts on this issue.
Thank you again to our witnesses for your service and
appearance before us today. I look forward to your testimony.
As a reminder to my colleagues, there will be a closed
session on SVC-217 immediately following this session.
Now let me turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me say,
Mr. Chairman, that you and I are shoulder to shoulder on almost
all of this--concern about the shortfalls that you mentioned,
renewing section 702 and doing so in a timely manner, and the
support for the ``dual hat'' concept.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today, and let
me say, since we met last year, we have seen a troubling rise
in cyberattacks, targeting critical infrastructure across the
country and in U.S. territories. Foreign adversaries are
exploiting vulnerabilities in our networks, they are evading
detection while carrying out malicious activities, or
prepositioning themselves for future malicious activities and
attacks.
Today's hearing is an opportunity to discuss CYBERCOM's
efforts against these dangers, to tell us areas where we need
to bring immediate attention. We will talk about CYBERCOM's
work with Federal partners in the U.S. Government and in the
defense industrial base. We will talk about their collective
endeavors to improve our cyber resilience and to defend against
threats to military systems and networks as well as public and
private critical infrastructure.
I also look forward to hearing about building CYBERCOM 2.0.
The Committee recognizes that cyber threats evolve quickly. We
therefore need CYBERCOM to be equipped to address new
challenges rapidly as adversaries consistently shift tactics
and strategies in this domain. As part of this discussion I
hope to learn more about how international cyber cooperation
activities, improvements to cyber military personnel readiness,
and investments in cyber intel can help U.S. cyber forces
generate an enduring advantage in this dynamic threat
environment.
General Haugh has been both the Commander of CYBERCOM and
the Director of the NSA for only a very short period of time.
So we hope to hear his early analysis and ideas gained from
this early experience with the ``dual hat'' arrangement and the
importance of maintaining leadership over both agencies to meet
mission objectives more effectively, and again, the Chair and I
are in the same place on this issue.
Separate but no less important are our special ops forces.
The men and women serving under General Fenton at U.S. Special
Operations Command, SOCOM, are responsible for some of the
Nation's most sensitive and complex missions, and are often the
first to respond to urgent and unforeseen emergencies around
the world. Yet SOCOM is facing a daunting challenge. It is
being asked to build a force capable of combatting State actors
like China and Russia, simultaneously, while remaining fully
engaged in the fight against violent Islamic terrorist groups
operating from Africa to South Asia. At the same time, special
operators must be ready to respond, with little to no notice,
as our Nation's preeminent crisis response force. So we need to
know what you need to accomplish this mission.
The demands on SOCOM are increasing. Meanwhile, it is being
asked to accept significant risk because it is undersourced.
Its budget has remained flat since 2019. When you adjust that
for inflation, this amounts to roughly a 14 percent budget cut
in purchasing power. At the same time, SOCOM is in the midst of
implementing two rounds of cuts to its force structure.
This Committee will want to ensure that General Fenton's
command is fully resourced so that it can mitigate risk. I
would like to ask Secretary Maier whether their authorities and
resources in the upcoming year are sufficient for mission
requirement. Gentlemen, tell us what you need to get the
mission done.
It is clear to me that the role and importance of Special
Operations Command is greater today than at any time since its
establishment back in 1987. The resource we provide should
reflect that necessity.
So thank you, gentlemen, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Now let me
recognize Secretary Maier. Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER P. MAIER, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY
CONFLICT
Mr. Maier. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and
distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the global posture of our Nation's
Special Operations Forces, or SOF. I am honored to appear
alongside General Fenton and General Haugh, who have dedicated
their careers to safeguarding U.S. national security interests
against unconventional threats. I thank General Fenton and
Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter for their continued
partnership as we posture SOF to address many of our Nation's
most pressing and complex challenges.
I would like to begin by recognizing the dedication,
service, and sacrifice of the men and women of SOF. There is no
starker reminder of the sacrifices of this community than the
15 teammates we have lost in recent months, as they prepared
for and executed high-risk missions in support of integrated
deterrence, crisis response, and counterterrorism in Europe,
the Middle East, and the Pacific. Their service and sacrifice
are emblematic of the dedication, professionalism, and
selflessness of our SOF warriors, many of whom continue to bear
visible and invisible wounds from their service.
As a direct result of your leadership on the SASC, we
provide comprehensive services for our teammates through the
preservation of the Force and Family Program and the Warrior
Care Program. SOF continues to lead in the development of new
strategies and technologies to protect brain health and enhance
cognitive performance, including partnering with academia and
private entities to prevent and address traumatic brain injury.
I would also like to acknowledge this Committee's foresight
in establishing SOLIC, the organization that I run, and U.S.
Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, and for your continuing
strengthening of SOLIC's service secretary-like
responsibilities. In this role, I remain focused on ensuring
SOF's value is accounted for in the Department's planning,
resourcing, and decision processes. In partnership with SOCOM,
SOLIC is enhancing our analytic capabilities to ensure the
Department's wargaming processes are informed by SOF-focused
data and insight, especially related to our critical role prior
to conflict.
I appreciate Congress authorizing a second principal deputy
to help me lead our service-like responsibilities. A recent GAO
report noted SOLIC's expanded role in senior leadership fora
and our progress in strengthening the Secretariat for Special
Operations. Within the Secretariat, we have established a
directorate dedicated to SOF's most important asset, our
people.
In another sign of progress I am joined today by SOLIC's
first Senior Enlisted Advisor, Navy SEAL Command Master Chief
Brad Rylander, who adds a SOF-unique perspective alongside the
Pentagon's service senior enlisted leaders.
Over the past year we have seen an increase in demand for
SOF, including evacuating U.S. personnel from high-threat
environments, responding to attacks on our allies, maintaining
pressure on ISIS and al Qaeda, and campaigning in support of
integrated deterrence. As we modernize and transform to meet
the challenges of our global competitors, we remain vigilant
for threats to Americans across the globe, including from ISIS
and al Qaeda.
Representing less than 2 percent of the defense budget, SOF
provide an outsized role in the National Defense Strategy. SOF
creates dilemmas for our adversaries, dismantles their proxy
and illicit networks, and provides options for the joint force
through unique understanding of the operational environment
that benefits from generational relationships with allies and
partners. We do this in more than 80 countries at any given
time, and in all domains and environments.
In the Pacific, I have seen firsthand the tangible impact
of SOF in strengthening the resilience of our regional
partners. As China seeks greater regional and global influence,
SOF's unique placement and access provide the foundation of
integrated deterrence. Working with natural partners, CYBERCOM,
SPACECOM, and STRATCOM, SOF is well-positioned to
operationalize integrated deterrence against the PRC globally.
In Europe, SOF draw on generational relationships with
Ukraine in aiding its fight against Russian aggression and
build resilience in other vulnerable frontline states. We are
also deepening integration in the High North, with Norway, a
founding NATO member, and with Sweden, our newest NATO member,
improving interoperability and addressing unique challenges of
operating in the Arctic.
In addition to my service role I am also responsible for a
range of policy issues that directly impact SOF, such as
irregular warfare, counterterrorism, information operations,
counternarcotics, counterthreat finance, and civilian harm
mitigation. Of note, SOLIC led the development of the most
comprehensive approach to addressing civilian harm by any
military in the world. I see SOLIC's roles as mutually
reinforcing, allowing for enhanced integration of policy and
strategy with the allocation of resources and capabilities.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this Committee and your
partnership and support. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Fenton, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL BRYAN P. FENTON, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
General Fenton. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and
distinguished members of this Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today. Joining me is Command
Sergeant Major Shane Shorter, a two-time COCOM Command Senior
Enlisted Leader with over three decades of service in special
operations. He represents our incredible noncommissioned
officer corps that is without equal. Our NCOs stand at the very
center of our command, making us the envy of militaries across
the world and the object of fear among our foes.
Together, CSM and I are honored to represent the 70,000
uniformed and civilian members of SOCOM, including 28
international special operations teammates and our interagency
team at our headquarters. I am equally honored to testify
alongside Secretary Chris Maier and General Tim Haugh.
Secretary Maier's leadership and the SOLIC team's advocacy are
vital for the readiness, modernization, and well-being of our
Special Operations Forces and families.
As Secretary Maier mentioned, we lost 15 of our special
operations teammates over the last 5 months. They made the
ultimate sacrifice and remind us of the utmost devotion to duty
present in our formations. Never forgetting our fallen and
supporting their families remains our sacred obligation.
In this decisive decade, our Nation faces autocrats and
terrorists that threaten our world. From the People's Republic
of China to Russia, from Iran to North Korea and violent
extremist organizations, our adversaries seek to divide and
weaken the United States, our allies, and our partners. The
PRC's global coercion, debt diplomacy, and cyber intrusions are
common practice in their pursuit to rewrite the international
order.
Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine grinds into its
third year with attacks on innocent civilians, abductions, and
other crimes fueling their objectives in Europe, all while
their disinformation campaign spreads chaos across the globe.
The DPRK is increasingly belligerent on the peninsula and
complicit in supporting Russia's untoward aggression in Europe.
Iran, a long-time malign actor, leverages its proxies, Hamas,
the Houthis, Hezbollah, and militias to sow instability in the
Middle East, all while Al-Shabaab, al Qaeda, and ISIS still
seek to threaten our Homeland and interests abroad.
To combat these threats, your SOCOM team delivers
asymmetric and asynchronous advantage for DOD, through our
enterprise priorities of People, Win, Transform. Our people,
the competitive and comparative advantage, and your special
operations attract the most talented men and women, driven to
solve the most complex problems in politically contested and
sensitive environments. With them we win, by asymmetrically
deterring our adversaries, tearing apart violent extremist
organizations, and rapidly responding to crisis.
To be clear, DOD's main effort, integrated deterrence, is
SOCOM's main effort. Since 1942, your SOF have accumulated six
decades of strategic competition experience, now combined with
over 2 decades of hard-earned combat experience in the global
war on terror. Those 8 decades make your special operations
tailor-made for this era, providing integrated strategic
options to prevent great power war, winning before conflict,
simultaneously preparing the environment to ensure the joint
force prevails if conflict occurs. Those eight decades
highlight that integrated deterrence and strategic competition
are in our DNA--always have been, always will.
Added to this, your SOCOM team preserves strategic focus
through our sacred duty to maintain exquisite capabilities to
degrade violent extremist organizations, denying them their
goals, while continuing to rescue U.S. citizens and diplomats
anywhere in the world.
Our final priority is Transform, to address the rapidly
changing environment and character of war. Here, we start with
our people, enhancing warfighter performance in education, then
wrapping technology around them, like AI and uncrude systems to
solve problems for the joint force with agile innovation. With
Congress as the architect of Special Operations Command, in
1987, we thank you for your foresight, leadership, and
continued support.
To those listening today, considering service through our
Nation, know the profound sense of calling, purpose, and
fulfillment those serving in uniform share. Because within our
formation you will meet people from every background and every
walk of life. If you want to serve in jobs like cyber,
intelligence, operations, and more, join our ranks.
We appreciate being here today. Thank you, and I look
forward to taking your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Christopher P. Maier
and General Bryan P. Fenton follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Christopher P. Maier and
General Bryan P. Fenton
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished members of
this committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the posture
of our Nation's Special Operations Forces (SOF). We are honored to
highlight the priorities, activities, and investments that ensure SOF
remain a decisive advantage for the Nation and Joint Force to meet
current and future challenges.
On behalf of the special operations community, we thank you for
your leadership and steadfast support. Both the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
(ASD(SO/LIC)) and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) were
established through the foresight and determination of Congress. Your
support ensures our SOF remain the world's most capable and credible,
safeguarding and advancing U.S. national interests.
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) identifies the People's
Republic of China (PRC) as the pacing challenge and Russia as the acute
threat, both seeking to upend the rules-based international order.
State-sponsored proxies and violent extremist organizations (VEOs)
present immediate challenges to global stability. State and non-State
actors seek advantage through coercive and malign activities in the
``gray zone,'' below a threshold they perceive as likely to prompt a
U.S. military response. Rapid technological advances and a complicated
security environment place our Nation in what President Biden has
described as a ``decisive decade.''
For an annual investment of less than 2 percent of the Defense
budget, SOF provide scalable, tailorable, and asymmetric options for
our senior leaders and present dilemmas for our adversaries. We do this
by:
Strengthening Partnerships. SOF cultivate a global
network of generational relationships, building partner force capacity
and assisting allies and partners in countering aggression, addressing
malign influence, and deterring conflict.
Preserving Strategic Focus. SOF prevent attacks on the
Homeland and respond to crises allowing the Nation to focus on the
pacing challenge and acute threats.
Preparing the Environment. Strategic competition is in
SOF's DNA with decades of extensive access and placement to shape the
future operating environment.
Enabling the Joint Force to Prevail. SOF enable the
Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Warfighting Concepts across the
spectrum of conflict.
Through our civilian-military partnership, SO/LIC and USSOCOM
ensure the force is well-prepared for current and future challenges
through three priorities: People, Win, and Transform.
advancing civilian-military partnership
SO/LIC and USSOCOM make up the SOF enterprise, and we continue to
strengthen our civilian-military partnership to ensure SOF are fully
integrated into the Department's analytical, planning, programming, and
budgetary processes. With responsibilities for oversight of SOF
organization, training, and equipping, the ASD(SO/LIC) reports directly
to the Secretary of Defense and represents the SOF enterprise in a
variety of decisionmaking bodies alongside the Secretaries of the
Military Departments and other Office of the Secretary of Defense
components. At the same time, the ASD(SO/LIC) serves as the
Department's principal advisor for a range of issues relevant to SOF,
such as counterterrorism, irregular warfare, information operations,
civilian harm mitigation and response, counter-small unmanned aerial
systems (C-sUAS) prior-to-launch, counternarcotics, counter-
transnational organized crime, counter threat finance (CTF),
stabilization, civil affairs, and peacekeeping. With these mutually
supporting roles, SO/LIC is uniquely positioned within DOD to optimize
the integration of SOF capabilities into defense planning and
analytical processes that shape SOF's role within the Joint Force.
Over the past year, SO/LIC has continued to enhance the Service-
like side of its organization. For example, SO/LIC has realigned its
Irregular Warfare Technical Support Directorate under its Service-like
functions, enhancing its integration with SOF and leveraging its
extensive international partnerships. The Deputy Secretary has
allocated additional Senior Executive Service (SES) positions to SO/
LIC, which will materially enhance how SO/LIC can execute its Service-
like responsibilities. Within the next few months, SO/LIC will have
grown from one to four SES leaders dedicated to its Service-like
responsibilities. With USSOCOM's support, we have added the first-ever
SOF senior enlisted advisor in SO/LIC to contribute a SOF-specific
perspective to departmental decisionmaking on the welfare of our
servicemembers and civilian personnel, alongside the senior enlisted
leaders of the Services. Reinforcing our priority on people, SO/LIC has
also established a new directorate focused exclusively on Manpower and
Force Resiliency. Through a reinvigorated Special Operations Policy
Oversight Council and participation in other DOD decisionmaking bodies,
we continue to deepen our engagement with the Military Departments and
Combatant Commands in caring for our people and in addressing shared
challenges.
People: Strengthening the Resilience of the Force
Consistent with the first SOF Truth that Humans are More Important
than Hardware, our people are our comparative and competitive
advantage. Ensuring the readiness, resilience, and well-being of our
men and women and their families remains our #1 priority. The unique
nature of the SOF mission demands an extraordinarily talented workforce
capable of operating in remote and austere environments, working
alongside our global allies and partners, and harnessing advanced
technologies to succeed in any warfighting domain. USSOCOM embraces,
educates, and empowers our people to tackle the Nation's most complex
problems.
Embracing America's Greatest Resource
America's core advantage over its adversaries is its dynamic,
diverse, and innovative society. To generate a force that can succeed
in today's complex security environment, SOF embrace the best of our
Nation by recruiting, assessing, selecting, training, and employing the
Nation's most talented and committed men and women. We continue to
invest in thorough assessment, selection, and SOF-peculiar training
programs to generate the most advanced fighting force in the world.
These efforts depend upon the support of the Military Services for
recruiting and critical enablers as most special operations require
non-SOF support.
In SOF, quality is more important than quantity. Our Component
Commands continue to maintain rigorous assessment and selection
standards amidst current recruiting challenges. They are also working
closely with their parent Services to help address shared recruiting
challenges. For example, Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Command began
outreach engagements with a new recruiting cell, which increased
contacts by more than 80 percent in fiscal year 2023. SOF-specific
recruiting efforts continue to enable the Services by providing high-
quality military servicemembers to the Joint Force. For instance,
approximately 75 percent of the 1,000 sailors that annually assess for
NSW go on to serve in conventional Navy units. Similarly, approximately
80 percent of the 3,000 annual Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF)
Ranger and Special Forces recruits go on to serve in conventional Army
units.
Diversity in our SOF formations provides an asymmetric advantage.
SOF teammates with unique skillsets, experiences, and backgrounds can
devise culturally attuned and innovative solutions to key operational
problems. USSOCOM employs ``big data'' analytics from recruitment,
assessment, selection, and retention to better understand and harness
the talents of servicemembers and civilians. Similarly, to capitalize
on unique language and cultural expertise,
U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has initiated a pilot
program that allows legal permanent residents who meet SOF standards to
be assessed directly into SOF units.
USSOCOM continues to develop and retain a talented workforce while
fostering an inclusive organizational climate and maintaining our high
standards. For example, to ensure that SOF draws upon the broadest pool
of talent, we remain committed to supporting our women servicemembers'
ability to serve and advance within the SOF community. USASOC continues
to implement the recommendations from its Women in ARSOF Study, such as
enhancing mentorship, leadership opportunities, childcare, and gender-
specific equipment. Across the SOF enterprise in 2023, we saw an
increase of more than 12 percent in women joining the community. USASOC
is leading efforts for the Army with tailored uniforms and body armor
specifically designed for use by our ARSOF Servicewomen. Furthermore,
NSW expanded female instructor billets in 2023 to normalize the
presence of women in the training pipeline. Finally, USSOCOM units
hosted several events for the interagency and Joint Force to
demonstrate how women are integrated into SOF and the operational
impacts of their service.
Educating to Solve the Nation's Hardest Problems
We continue to invest in our personnel with SOF-specific education
and training, which we constantly adapt to address current security
challenges. Our men and women who are entrusted to perform special
operations must be equipped to succeed in an ever-evolving operational
environment in close coordination with interagency, international, and
industry partners. Because SOF's tactical actions often carry strategic
and political consequences, our educational programming and training
remain critical for preparing our forces.
Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) is the focal point of
our Joint SOF education. Through engagement with academia, the
interagency, and international partners, JSOU provides accredited
resident and distance learning to prepare SOF professionals to solve
novel problems.
JSOU's Senior Enlisted Academy introduces strategic thinking to
tactical action for SOF non-commissioned officers renowned for their
creativity, disciplined action, and understanding of the strategic
environment. Additionally, JSOU assists Theater Special Operations
Commands (TSOCs) with programming focused on integrated deterrence and
works closely with allies and partners. As a priority effort, JSOU is
increasing course offerings regarding the Indo-Pacific region. In
support of our European partners, JSOU promotes interoperability across
NATO and provides instruction regarding the intricacies of countering
Russia's malign influence on a global scale. Similarly, JSOU continues
to update its counter-violent extremist organization (C-VEO) courses to
reflect the evolving nature of global terrorist networks.
Likewise, USSOCOM's components are also updating training curricula
based on the ever-evolving character of warfare. In 2023, ARSOF added
several training programs based on lessons learned through Ukraine's
resistance efforts against Russia's illegal invasion. Examples include
Slavic and Baltic language instruction, air defense training, robotics
and unmanned systems integration, and the integration of artificial
intelligence and machine learning into operations. Similarly, USASOC's
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School is establishing an
Irregular Warfare Academy at Fort Liberty, NC. NSW is integrating
modern underwater demolition tactics and near peer scenarios into
training. Last, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command is
emphasizing special reconnaissance training in littoral environments.
These training updates provide relevant tactical expertise, while
ensuring training is conducted in accordance with rigorous safety
standards.
Empowering Those Who Serve at the Tip of the Spear
SO/LIC ensures that the care and well-being of the men and women of
SOF are elevated in leadership venues such as the Deputy's Workforce
Council, management meetings with the Deputy Secretary, and the
Secretary of Defense's bi-weekly meetings with the Service Secretaries.
SO/LIC and USSOCOM continue to take a holistic approach to optimizing
performance and enhancing readiness through SOF-unique support
programs. The Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) and the
Warrior Care Program are the Command's premier programs to strengthen
readiness and resilience for SOF personnel and their families by
addressing SOF-unique challenges for a performance-based organization
that cannot be met through Service-common support resources.
The POTFF program exemplifies DOD's focus on taking care of people
and is a model for similar programs, such as the Air Force's True North
and the Army's Holistic Health and Fitness programs. POTFF focuses on
five domains to optimize readiness and strengthen resiliency: physical,
psychological, cognitive, social (family), and spiritual. POTFF focuses
on holistic engagement to identify and address chronic issues before
they impact performance. Recent data shows that SOF personnel who use
the POTFF strength and conditioning program return to duty from non-
surgical injuries after an average of 5 treatments, compared to 12
treatments by non-POTFF users. Over the past decade, USSOCOM has seen a
steady increase across several mental health diagnoses, with a
substantial rise in recent years particularly with post-traumatic
stress and traumatic brain injuries. We attribute this to an increased
emphasis on mental health, brain health, destigmatizing care, and SOF
utilization of available programs. In the psychological domain, POTFF
provides evidence-based interventions that fit within SOF training and
deployment schedules with access to providers typically available on
the same day.
Responsive and effective care that extends careers is an enterprise
priority. For SOF personnel who are wounded, ill, or injured, the
USSOCOM Warrior Care Program provides recovery care coordination
services to ensure they have a comprehensive plan to get the treatment
and resources they need. The primary objective is retaining talent and
returning our personnel to their unit so they can continue serving. The
combination of POTFF and the Warrior Care Program provides a continuum
of support for our personnel through performance enhancement, injury
recovery, and transition assistance. Over the past year, the program
supported more than 7,000 cases, resulting in the retention of nearly
70 percent of wounded, ill, and injured Active Duty SOF.
USSOCOM also collaborates with various non-profit organizations to
preserve our forces and their families, particularly when faced with
complex injuries and illnesses. For example, the Warrior Care Program
collaborated with a non-profit organization dedicated to healing the
invisible wounds of war to develop the Comprehensive Brain Health and
Trauma Program. This intensive clinical program documents symptoms,
histories, and exposures while providing a comprehensive treatment
plan. The program has improved and saved the lives of our SOF
personnel. One testimony from a senior Navy SEAL explained how through
participation in the program, providers found malignant tumors that
turned out to be life-threatening. He received care coordinated through
the Warrior Care Program that saved his life and ultimately allowed him
to continue to serve.
Because SOF warfighters have higher rates of repeated blast
exposures and blast-related injuries, USSOCOM continues to lead efforts
to identify methods to protect warfighter brain health in close
collaboration with academia. In partnership with Massachusetts General
Hospital and Harvard Medical School, USSOCOM concluded The Repeated
Brain Blast Exposure Study, the most comprehensive work of this kind to
date. As part of this effort, in September 2023, USSOCOM published the
Comprehensive Strategy for Special Operations Forces Warfighter Brain
Health, which focuses on monitoring brain health and cognitive
performance, optimizing cognitive capacity, advancing brain health
science, and connecting wounded, ill, and injured with resources to
seek treatment. This USSOCOM Directive is in alignment with the
Department's Warfighter Brain Health Comprehensive Strategy and Action
Plan. USSOCOM appreciates the support from the James M. Inhofe National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2023 that provides resources
to conduct traumatic brain injury research.
Determined to prevent suicide and other forms of self-harm, the SOF
enterprise has engaged the Nation's leading experts to identify novel
suicide prevention approaches and address the underlying cognitive and
emotional health of our personnel. Through quarterly events with SOF
leaders from the tactical to strategic levels, the SOF enterprise has
worked to ensure the force is aware of all the resources available and
has destigmatized seeking help. Additionally, USSOCOM is modernizing
suicide prevention by developing virtual reality training tailored to
SOF-specific scenarios to help members of our formation identify and
respond to teammates in crisis. As a member of the Department's Suicide
Prevention and Risk Reduction Committee, ASD(SO/LIC) ensures that
Department-level, Service, and USSOCOM-specific efforts are closely
aligned. SO/LIC has also directed funding to support and implement
rapidly the most promising suicide prevention training technologies for
the SOF enterprise.
Maintaining a professional and healthy culture is essential to the
well-being of our teammates and their families along with the
accomplishment of their operational responsibilities. USSOCOM has zero
tolerance for any behaviors that would undermine a positive work
environment. Sexual assault, sexual harassment, and other harmful
behaviors erode cohesion and trust. DOD's establishment of the Office
of Special Trial Counsel helps cement accountability across the
formation and ensures that serious offenses are handled fairly within
the military justice system. USSOCOM completed the implementation of 16
Comprehensive Review recommendations in 2023. Despite the official
close out, the Command will continue follow-on actions to foster a
healthy climate and culture across the SOF enterprise.
win: decisive advantage for the nation
SOF provide a decisive advantage for the Nation as an integral part
of DOD's approach to integrated deterrence. In 2023 and early 2024, we
have seen an increase in the Combatant Commands' demand for SOF
capabilities and our critical enablers in support of campaigning toward
NDS priorities. We regularly review and prioritize these requests due
to demand exceeding capacity. Representing less than 2 percent of the
Defense budget, and less than 3 percent of DOD personnel, SOF provide
an exceptional return on investment in supporting NDS priorities. SOF
prepare the global operating environment to enable the Joint Force to
prevail in the event of conflict by providing options to senior leaders
and dilemmas to our adversaries--all based on years of persistent
campaigning. Additionally, USSOCOM preserves strategic focus for the
Nation by countering VEO and responding to crises with agile and
tailored capabilities. We have learned failure to maintain persistent
pressure on extremist elements may allow them to reconstitute and pose
a renewed--and sometimes greater--threat. Moreover, USSOCOM continues
strengthening relationships and leveraging unique authorities to
operate alongside our unrivaled global network of allies and partners.
Preparing the Environment and Enabling the Joint Force to Prevail
SOF's operations, activities, and investments in support of
integrated deterrence can undermine an adversary's confidence in its
capabilities and shape its decision and risk calculus to our advantage.
The access, placement, and influence generated by SOF's long-term
engagements improve interoperability and provide the Joint Force with
expanded, low-cost options to gain awareness prior to conflict. SOF's
unique access enables the Joint Force to prevail in conflict by
building civil-military resilience, supporting resistance elements,
facilitating operations in the information environment, enhancing kill
webs, and working alongside regular and irregular forces.
SOF's placement and access are unique in breadth and depth. On any
given day, SOF personnel are deployed to more than 85 countries
conducting special operations missions, training, and exercises
supporting the Joint Force while campaigning for military advantage in
all domains. Our active duty force is bolstered by National Guard and
Reserve SOF, supporting wide-ranging operations in approximately 30
countries, making them ideally suited to identify a competitor's
coercive activities and counter them with precise, scalable, and
credible all-domain options for the Joint Force. Through our Civil-
Military Engagement program, USSOCOM-assigned Civil Affairs Soldiers
provide a persistent SOF presence in priority countries with small
teams of highly trained and culturally attuned professionals who advise
and support military forces, host nation institutions, and indigenous
populations to increase resilience to malign influence.
SOF campaigning activities are focused on enabling partners and
deterring aggression by the PRC and Russia, while emphasizing the PRC
as our pacing challenge. Over the past 4 years, SOF support to
Combatant Command activity to counter coercion and deter aggression has
more than tripled--comprising nearly 50 percent of SOF's deployed and
forward presence in fiscal year 2023.
In the Indo-Pacific theater, SOF have leveraged generational
relationships to support and reassure partners and allies vulnerable to
PRC aggression. SOF form the core of joint training efforts that
integrate civil and military resilience to deter and, if necessary,
resist external aggression. In the Philippines, longstanding SOF
partnerships developed over years of counterterrorism efforts continue
and have expanded to ensure maritime domain awareness and support the
lawful exercise of navigational rights and freedoms in the South China
Sea. Through our persistent presence and partnerships, we have
demonstrated that we stand ready to support and defend a free and open
Indo-Pacific.
In Europe, SOF's decades-long commitment to building capacity and
enhancing interoperability with allied and partnered SOF continues.
Three decades of training with Ukrainian Forces contributed to the
development of a non-commissioned officer corps and special operations
capability. Following the start of Russia's aggression against Ukraine
in 2014, SOF supported multinational training efforts that included
critical resilience and resistance capabilities. SO/LIC and USSOCOM
remain steadfast partners with NATO SOF and contribute to U.S. European
Command's response and deterrence options. We continue to support
Ukraine's defense, fully aligning these activities with the Security
Assistance Group-Ukraine. Multinational SOF have provided expert
capabilities in countering Russian disinformation, as well as training
and materiel support to Ukrainian SOF partners.
Competing with the PRC and Russia extends beyond the Indo-Pacific
and Europe. The PRC and Russia seek resources and partnerships
globally, competing with us, our allies, and our partners for influence
in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Arctic. SOF provide
critical support to broader United States Government efforts to address
this challenge. For example, DOD counterdrug-funded analysts across
DOD, including at USSOCOM, support interagency efforts to illuminate
transnational organized criminal groups aligned with Russian private
military companies that have led to the denial of visas, sanctions, and
seizure of assets and currency. USSOCOM also supports these regional
partners by exposing malign environmental and illicit encroachments by
PRC actors and their state-owned enterprises. As an example, SOF
support partner nations' efforts to prevent PRC illegal fishing
throughout the Western Hemisphere and Africa, an issue of enormous
economic concern to many countries in those regions.
Our servicemembers, civilians, and their families will face
increasingly sophisticated misinformation and disinformation at home
and in every operating environment. It is imperative to
equip them with the skills and tools to protect themselves and
conduct their missions in virtual and physical domains. To that end,
SO/LIC led the development of the Department's Strategy for Operations
in the Information Environment (SOIE). The 2023 DOD SOIE identifies
four lines of effort to enable the Department to integrate and
modernize operations in the information environment to strengthen
integrated deterrence: People and Organizations; Programs; Policies and
Governance; and Partnerships. This strategy recognizes that internet-
based Military Information Support Operations (MISO) are indispensable
in 21st century warfare, which includes the development of critical
information force capabilities such as civil affairs and psychological
operations.
As DOD's Joint Proponent and Coordinating Authority for Internet-
based MISO, SOCOM is focused on the evolving information environment--
to enable the Joint Force during competition and conflict. MISO to
counter strategic competitors have more than tripled in the past 3
years--comprising more than 60 percent of SOF's worldwide MISO
activities in fiscal year 2023. The USSOCOM-hosted Joint MISO WebOps
Center (JMWC) enables Combatant Commands' MISO campaigns conducted via
internet platforms, actively engaging foreign audiences to illuminate
and counter hostile propaganda and disinformation. The JMWC provides
Combatant Commanders with options to generate desired effects globally,
especially in countering propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation
from Russia, the PRC, and C-VEOs. Due to the increased demand signal
from across the Joint Force, the number of Combatant Command
representatives in the JMWC doubled in 2023.
Modernized and updated authorities enable SOF to campaign
effectively against State and non-State actors and achieve an outsized
impact across multiple mission sets and domains. We greatly appreciate
Congress' support in codifying section 1202 authority under 10 U.S.C.
127d (Irregular Warfare), which will improve the range of options to
impose costs on malign actors. Other authorities, such as 10 U.S.C.
Sec. 127f (Clandestine Operational Preparation of the Environment and
Non-conventional Assisted Recovery) and Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA Section
1057 (Intelligence / Counterintelligence) are valuable in illuminating
and countering malign influence and preparing for potential future
military operations.
Irregular warfare is a critical tool for campaigning across the
spectrum of conflict, enhancing interoperability and access, and
disrupting competitor warfighting advantages while reinforcing our own.
To further institutionalize irregular warfare across the Joint Force,
SO/LIC is updating policy, informing doctrine, and modernizing
irregular warfare education and training. As part of this effort, in
close coordination with the Joint Staff, SO/LIC recently updated DOD's
definition of irregular warfare to better reflect the role of the Joint
Force. Irregular warfare activities impose costs on our adversaries,
strengthen our network of allies and partners, and interrupt our
adversaries' decision cycle.
Irregular warfare is a fundamental component of the DOD's
contributions to a larger whole-of-government approach to strategic
competition. Through the conduct of irregular warfare education and
training, along with joint and combined activities and operations, our
allies and partners are better equipped to deter and resist aggression
from the PRC, Russia, Iran, and other malign actors. Irregular warfare
enhances posture and options to counter an adversary's gray zone
activities and their counter-intervention strategies. Consequently, an
enhanced understanding of irregular warfare will bolster deterrence and
make large scale conflict less likely. While SOF may perform the
preponderance of the DOD's irregular warfare operations and activities,
it remains the responsibility of the entire Joint Force. Shared
investments in irregular warfare across the DOD will enhance
interoperability and disrupt our competitors' advantage.
Preserving Strategic Focus
SOF preserve DOD strategic focus on NDS priorities by executing
crisis response and counter terrorism missions. This focus allows the
Nation to direct efforts on the pacing challenge of the PRC and the
acute threat of Russia. SOF continue to play a critical role in
degrading VEOs--including those supported by our adversaries--and
disrupting plots to attack Americans and our interests. SOF's crisis
response capabilities remain a strategic hedge in no-fail missions to
protect U.S. citizens and our vital national security interests
globally.
USSOCOM is optimizing its global posture while sustaining the
ability to respond to crises worldwide. In the past 3 years, the
requirement for USSOCOM to fulfill its crisis response remit has
increased more than 130 percent over the previous decade's annual
average. Repeatedly during 2023, SOF provided vital forces and command
and control for global crises requiring rapid deployment, complex
problem-solving, and synchronized effects. For example, SOF executed an
emergency evacuation of United States Embassy personnel from Khartoum,
Sudan, when conditions deteriorated and placed American lives at risk.
More recently, SOF postured to prepare for a wide-range of contingency
operations in Israel and Lebanon following the Hamas attacks on Israel
and subsequent regional instability.
Presidentially directed crisis response and C-VEO operations are
inherently unpredictable and vary year-to-year in terms of timing,
duration, and total cost. With an increase in the frequency of crises
and compounded cost increases, reimbursement via supplementals is
inefficient. Paying for previous crisis response deployments draws
resources away from modernization efforts that aim to meet future
challenges. We look forward to working with the committee to address
these challenges.
USSOCOM is the DOD's Coordinating Authority for C-VEO through our
Department-wide campaign planning, assessments, and recommendations.
The conflict in Gaza, combined with perceived anti-Islamic sentiment,
risks making certain populations more vulnerable to extremist appeals.
Iran and aligned regional groups are leveraging the conflict to promote
anti-United States sentiment and impose costs on the United States
across the Middle East and Africa. Ongoing geopolitical, technological,
economic, and climate change challenges exacerbate regional
instability, threatening effective governance and fueling
radicalization. As a result, violent extremism and terrorism persist as
a threat to the United States, our partners, and our allies.
After sustained global pressure since 2001, the threat to
Americans, to include the United States Homeland, posed by VEOs based
in the Middle East and Africa is less acute but more diverse and
amplified by destabilizing activities from nation-states like Russia
and Iran. No individual organization is as great a threat to the United
States Homeland as al Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) when they were at their peak; however, the number and operating
areas of VEOs with intent to threaten the Homeland and interests abroad
have increased. Additionally, the continued availability of safe havens
and under-governed spaces provide opportunities for continued threats
against U.S. interests overseas. We must continue to pressure VEOs
wherever they emerge, to prevent them from having the time and space to
develop into threats to Americans, the Homeland and U.S. interests
abroad. We have learned from the past and cannot become complacent.
In East Africa, Somalia has emerged as a critical hub for both al
Qaeda and ISIS. Al-Shabaab presents an ongoing risk to United States
interests both in Somalia and throughout the region while maintaining
ties to the larger al Qaeda organization. For its part, ISIS-Somalia
has emerged as a prominent element of the larger ISIS enterprise. We
are working closely with our Somali counterparts to push back on and
prevent these organizations from establishing safe havens for future
operations. In West and Central Africa, socio-political instability and
the operations of Russian private military companies exacerbate the
threats posed by al Qaeda's affiliate Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal
Muslimin (JNIM) and ISIS in the region. SOF are providing indications
and warnings of threats from these regions and posturing to respond
when directed.
In Afghanistan, ISIS Khorasan is strengthening its connections to
the broader ISIS enterprise and is increasing attacks across the region
while exploiting links into Central Asian diasporas abroad to encourage
attacks against the West. Despite the removal of key leaders since
2019, ISIS continues to demonstrate the intent to target United States
interests in the Middle East and reconstitute military capabilities.
Since the Hamas attack on October 7th, 2023, the United States has
leveraged SOF heavily in our response. SOF deployed quickly and stood
ready in nearby countries to provide our Nation with crisis evacuation
options. SOF continue to work closely with Israeli counterparts to
locate and rescue the American citizens suspected to have been taken
hostage by Hamas. Moreover, in the subsequent regional unrest, SOF
often have the lead to counter the malign influence of Iran and its
proxies. Due to their unique placement and capabilities, SOF are on the
front lines of these efforts.
With the Secretary of Defense's priority to protect civilians
during military operations, SO/LIC and USSOCOM are leaders in
implementing DOD's civilian harm mitigation and response (CHMR)
efforts. SO/LIC spearheaded the effort to develop the Civilian Harm
Mitigation and Response Action Plan, and USSOCOM continues supporting
its ongoing implementation through best-in-class innovations and
approaches. USSOCOM proactively revised kinetic strike protocols and
implemented mandatory target engagement authority training across the
enterprise. The CHMR policies and procedures outlined by the Department
assist with C-VEO efforts as they prevent underlying dynamics from
creating more extremism.
As we focus our campaigning to address the priorities of integrated
deterrence, SOF continue to pursue a sustainable approach to C-VEO
operations. A sustainable approach consists of prioritizing threats to
the Homeland, modernizing ways to degrade VEOs' capabilities, and
working closely with international and interagency partners. For
example, now celebrating its tenth year, United States leadership of
the 87-member Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS has undermined a well-
understood strategy of globally aspiring extremist groups. These groups
seek to overextend individual governments into resource-intensive
commitments that eventually deplete national resolve and popular will.
Against individual countries, this global strategy can be effective.
Against a unified group of like-minded countries, it cannot, and our
leadership of the Coalition since 2014 has been a cornerstone of a
sustainable United States approach to defeating ISIS. Following
National Security Memorandum-13 guidance, SOF embrace a ``partner-led,
U.S.-enabled'' campaign approach to C-VEO, built on a disciplined
prioritization of risks to drive decisionmaking. During operations over
the past year to counter ISIS, SOF have worked closely with
international and interagency partners to disrupt illicit financing,
interdict foreign fighters, and illuminate propaganda with the
operation in January 2023 to capture the ISIS financier, Bilal Al
Sudani as an example. Our interagency efforts also have included close
cooperation with the Department of State and U.S. Agency for
International Development with the implementation of the Global
Fragility Act in Coastal West Africa--fundamentally focused on
preventing crises and failed states before they can occur.
Now in its tenth year, Operation Gallant Phoenix (OGP)--a U.S.
interagency and multinational C-VEO initiative--has enabled
international and interagency partners to share information from
battlefield captures to asymmetrically disrupt 16 distinct al Qaeda and
ISIS groups in fiscal year 2023. Coupled with counter threat finance
authorities and analytical expertise, operations like OGP provide
expanded and cost-effective ways to disrupt illicit financing and deter
activities. Operations for U.S. and OGP partners contributed to more
than 1,500 investigations, in excess of 6,000 foreign disclosure
releases, and support to partners repatriating more than 60 individuals
in fiscal year 2023. DOD counter-threat finance analysts also supported
numerous Treasury designations against VEO finances and facilitators.
The OGP model could apply further to countering coercive activities and
deterring aggression.
Violent extremists continue to incorporate new technologies and
adapt their tactics, posing an ongoing global threat to our citizens.
Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) pose a pressing challenge, exhibiting a
rapid evolution in employment and lethality exceeding that of
improvised explosive devices over the past two decades. In addition to
the evolving UAS threat from VEOs, capable State adversaries and their
aligned paramilitary forces have also successfully employed UAS to
target American, allied, and partner forces--most notably in the
Arabian Sea along with Iraq, Jordan, and Syria over the past year.
In its longtime role as the Coordinating Authority for Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), USSOCOM draws upon its
international, interagency, and joint relationships to deter weapons of
mass destruction proliferation by State and non-State actors. USSOCOM
hosts annual CWMD Senior Leader Seminars to bolster support for DOD-
wide strategies, plans, and policies while improving interoperability
with our international partners. USSOCOM incorporated select allies and
interagency partners in planning for the updated DOD Functional
Campaign Plan for CWMD. The forthcoming plan will drive
interoperability and strengthen deterrence to defend the Homeland, our
allies, and our partners' interests.
Strengthening Partnerships
Extensive partnerships are the cornerstone of SOF's contributions
to integrated deterrence, C-VEO, and crisis response. Unparalleled
integration and interoperability with allies and partners, the
interagency community, and the Joint Force are all characteristics that
SOF have strengthened over the past two decades. While the shared
challenge of countering violent extremism facilitated unprecedented
levels of operational partnerships, these mutually beneficial
relationships have now extended to the full range of SOF operations
globally, including integrated deterrence and irregular warfare
capabilities. Small footprint and persistent low-cost SOF deployments
allow our allies and partners to build capacity and bolster their
security to prevent wider conflict.
SOF's generational partnerships across the globe provide the Joint
Force an asymmetric advantage. In 2023, SOF formations executed 168
Joint Combined Exchange Training iterations in 76 countries, training
more than 2,000 U.S. SOF personnel alongside more than 7,500 allies and
partners. Through persistent engagement, SOF have fostered extensive
interoperability with allied and partner SOF, deepened by operating
shoulder-to-shoulder during combat and other high-risk operations for
over two decades. Authorities under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 333 (Building
Partner Capacity) and 10 U.S.C. Sec. 322 (SOF Training) are the
foundation of SOF's generational relationships to further enhance
collaboration and promote interoperability. Additionally, Headquarters
USSOCOM hosts 28 foreign liaison officers who provide a level of trust
that cannot be surged during a crisis.
An enduring advantage for the United States is its unrivaled
network of CT partners who continue to bring bespoke capabilities and
remain committed to countering terrorists that threaten all our
citizens. SO/LIC and USSOCOM closely coordinate with these partners to
ensure unity of effort, streamlined communication, and common
priorities. In every CT campaign, we find capable and willing allies,
dedicated to the defeat of terrorist organizations, and ready to
partner with us in our efforts. Operations supported by 10 U.S.C. Sec.
127e (Counterterrorism) are an example of partner forces providing
flexible options to apply pressure against violent extremists in
otherwise inaccessible, contested, and ungoverned areas--while reducing
risk to U.S. Forces.
Moreover, SOF serve as added connective tissue to the interagency
community for the Department and a force multiplier for integrated
deterrence. Integration with U.S. interagency partners--such as the
Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Department of the
Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Agency for
International Development, and the National Counterterrorism Center,
among many others--enhances the U.S. Government's response to various
threats and efforts to mitigate instability over the past year. As an
example, USSOCOM CTF analytical support led to high-level indictments
of Chinese companies that import fentanyl precursors to the Homeland
and was lauded by the Drug Enforcement Administration for supporting
the identification and distribution of fentanyl and other drug
trafficking, including a global money-laundering network. FBI
recognized CTF analysts at Special Operations Command-Pacific for their
support to investigations involving Chinese transnational organized
crime groups linked to PRC malign influence networks.
USSOCOM serves as the DOD's lead component for synchronizing CTF
activities. Since the DOD counterdrug program funds the great majority
of DOD CTF activity, USSOCOM uses Title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 284 (Support to
Counterdrug Activities and Activities to Counter Transnational
Organized Crime) authorities and the associated Fiscal Year 2004 NDAA
Section 1022 authorities to support interagency partners in identifying
and countering competitors' illicit activities. In 2023, USSOCOM
supported dozens of transnational criminal investigations. Notably,
these included the Attorney General's prioritized investigations
involving Mexico-based cartels, China-based chemical companies,
investigations involving international money laundering associated with
narcotics, and several other cases involving high-priority interagency
targets. As discussed, DOD counterdrug authorities provide options to
illuminate and counter malign activity by VEO networks along with PRC
and Russian-affiliated transnational organized criminal networks, which
are often closely tied to drug trafficking organizations. However, SO/
LIC recognizes that the DOD counterdrug program should not underwrite
all of the Department's CTF capability. We are working to establish a
standardized training program to enable other parts of DOD to develop
their own CTF analysts and expand the reach of this critical
methodology.
As the DOD Global Coordinator for C-sUAS prior to launch, USSOCOM
has coordinated numerous DOD and U.S. Government actions to disrupt
adversaries' networks and organizations responsible for sUAS
production, proliferation, and use. USSOCOM continues active
coordination with the Joint Force and partners to synchronize
intelligence collection and analysis, technology development, plans,
and operations to disrupt and degrade adversary sUAS operations. These
efforts have enabled law enforcement partners to directly affect
criminal networks procuring U.S. components for use in UAS production.
DOD support to these cases last year helped to disrupt more than $46
million of revenue in illicit part procurement and assisted partners,
such as the Departments of Treasury and Commerce, to designate entities
involved in evading U.S. financial sanctions and export controls.
Despite this significant progress, our adversaries' rapid advancement
of sUAS technology continues, challenging DOD's future ability to
protect, project, and employ forces. To assist USSOCOM in synchronizing
DOD C-sUAS prior-to-launch efforts, SO/LIC stood up the Counter Small
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Prior To Launch Executive Committee to serve
as the senior forum to develop and recommend policy, develop strategy,
and oversee DOD's C-sUAS prior-to-launch mission to address critical
gaps and issues. SO/LIC also understands that partners in the
interagency community have critical roles in the effort to curb the
production and distribution of C-sUAS among our adversaries and has
also led the effort to build on DOD's collaboration with partners such
as the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security.
USSOCOM also maintains collaborative, mutually supporting
relationships across the Joint Force. Close coordination with
regionally aligned Combatant Commands enables SOF to support regional
and transregional campaigning efforts--particularly important as the
PRC and Russia pursue malign strategic objectives globally. USSOCOM's
TSOCs, are each aligned with a specific Combatant Command to coordinate
SOF campaigning in their respective theaters to ensure activities both
support regional strategic objectives and maximize transregional
efforts. Operating transregionally is critical for both C-VEO efforts
and countering our strategic competitors' coercive gray zone
activities.
Strong collaboration in support of SOF, space, and cyber operations
with other Combatant Commands ensures synchronization across
warfighting domains. The nexus of USSOCOM, U.S. Cyber Command, U.S.
Space Command, and U.S. Strategic Command, each with a specific
functional focus, creates synergy with complementary capabilities to
support the Joint Force. This nexus specifically enhances kill webs--
the integration of sensors from seabed to space and the options to
eliminate targets. It also creates new opportunities to degrade an
adversary's confidence and capabilities before conflict. For example,
SOF often require cyberspace and space capabilities to see and sense
the operational environment and, if needed, conduct strikes against an
adversary. Likewise, cyberspace and space operations often rely on
SOF's physical access to deliver effects to enhance Joint Force
targeting.
SOF produce groundbreaking tactics, techniques, procedures, and
materiel solutions. However, in the absence of specific doctrine or
standard operating procedures, traditional force modeling and
projections are inadequate. This is a problem we share with our
colleagues wielding cyber and space capabilities. SO/LIC and USSOCOM
are working together to model SOF effects and to better integrate into
Joint Staff wargames and analysis--especially below the threshold of
armed conflict. ASD(SO/LIC) has issued the establishing order for a new
Center for Special Operations Analytics to organize and direct the
growth of the SOF enterprise's analytic capabilities. Beginning in
2023, USSOCOM's Title 10 Wargame, SHADOW WARRIOR shifted from an
internal missions focus to how SOF can best support the Joint Force in
overcoming key operational problems in conflict. We further saw the
utility of SOF enabling the Joint Force during the past two Globally
Integrated Wargames. SOF as a force in the deep area produced tangible
benefits for the Joint Force's performance. SOF have identified vital
concepts to assist the Joint Force and will integrate those concepts in
Joint and Service-specific Wargames in 2024. The SOF enterprise is
scrutinizing our internal force structure to optimize our efforts to
support integrated deterrence. Optimization includes divestment of some
legacy counterterrorism-only capacity, while streamlining our force to
prepare for the next conflict. Integrating SOF capabilities into
Service planning will ensure that the Joint Force can improve resource
utilization in long-term planning.
Last, USSOCOM is fully integrated with Joint Force training and
exercises critical to achieving NDS objectives. As a notable example,
Special Operations Command Korea revitalized biannual exercises to
support the training of Korean Joint and Combined Forces with Freedom
Shield. ARSOF participation in Pacific Sentry 2023 supported the Joint
Force in the exercise of large-scale combat operations. In 2023, USASOC
participated in Project Convergence and will participate again in 2024
to promulgate lessons learned to assist in the development of the
Army's Information Advantage doctrine and training. Also in 2023, AFSOC
hosted Emerald Warrior with international partners from France,
Germany, and Lithuania to support the United States Air Force's
approach to operations and Agile Combat Employment.
transform: modernize for the future
USSOCOM is building an enduring advantage through investment in our
people, technologies, and organizations with a commitment to evolve,
modernize, and optimize for the future operating environment. With the
direction of ASD(SO/LIC), USSOCOM is accelerating its wide-ranging
modernization efforts and capitalizing on our Nation's innovation
ecosystem. Our innovation efforts emphasize surface and subsurface
maritime platforms; C-UAS; next-generation intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance; mission command systems; and collaborative and
autonomous unmanned systems. USSOCOM is a trailblazer for data-driven
decisionmaking to both inform and execute our Service-like and
Combatant Command responsibilities, focused on the talent,
architecture, and processes needed to capitalize on data and Artificial
Intelligence (AI)-related technologies.
Building an Enduring SOF Advantage
The SOF enterprise continues to modernize its capabilities and
incorporate emerging technologies to build an enduring advantage. The
Command leverages our acquisition authority to modernize special
operations capabilities in five key technical challenge areas:
battlespace awareness, emplacement and access, all-domain
communications and computing, scalable precision effects, and
warfighter performance.
Supported by SO/LIC through the Department's programming and
budgetary processes, USSOCOM has coordinated closely with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)), the
Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), and the Services to collaborate and
experiment in each of these focus areas. Twice a year, the SOF
enterprise holds a joint summit with the USD for Acquisition and
Sustainability as well to ensure the Department is benefiting fully
from SOF's agility and ability to operationally test new concepts and
technologies. USSOCOM's acquisition authorities, along with its unique
attributes of being inherently joint, partnered, and globally deployed,
position it to greatly contribute to the overall modernization of the
Joint Force. Specifically, the Command is well-positioned to be the
partner of choice supporting three of USD (R&E)'s technology
priorities: within cyber, focusing on MISO capabilities; within
directed energy, focusing on electronic warfare/electronic attack, and
biotechnologies. USSOCOM also partners with DIU on several projects to
demonstrate and accelerate the vetting of commercially proven
technology for operational use.
Battlespace awareness enables finding and fixing targets in
contested environments and effective decisionmaking at the tactical
edge supporting the Joint Force. Technologies fuse operations and
intelligence information from multiple data streams to enhance tactical
commanders' domain awareness and connect warfighters to small
autonomous and collaborative unmanned systems. In the cyber domain, we
are integrating tools to provide an open architecture mission command
system optimized for SOF's role in integrated deterrence. We are also
leveraging the full range of open-source data to ensure SOF can access
timely, geo-rectified, and accurate data to inform their decisions. To
harness advances in space, USSOCOM has established a collaborative
arrangement with United States Space Force and the Space Development
Agency to experiment with payloads that will provide its forces with
space-based capabilities at the tactical level. Finally, we are
aggressively pursuing collaborative autonomy through our AI for small
unit maneuver efforts across our ground, air, and maritime unmanned and
unattended sensor portfolios.
As part of our emplacement and access efforts, we continue to
modernize our platforms to prevail in contested environments while
working closely with the Services. We are equipping our existing
aviation platforms with advanced infiltration and penetration
capabilities, including the Silent Knight terrain-following/terrain-
avoidance radar, which enables our rotary-and fixed-wing fleets and
radio-frequency countermeasures for our MC-130's. In close partnership
with the Navy, we are investing in modernized surface and undersea
maritime platforms. These efforts in developing, testing, and fielding
a range of maritime capabilities will strengthen deterrence in the
Indo-Pacific and across the globe.
Within all-domain communications and computing, USSOCOM is
advancing technologies for influence operations in the cyber domain and
hyper-enabling Joint SOF and partner forces to provide decision
advantage. We focus on optimizing information processing and sharing
for individuals and teams conducting partnered operations with the goal
of enhancing effectiveness across all domains in contested and
congested environments. The Mission Command System/Common Operating
Picture deployed after a single year of development due to embracing
agile software development techniques. This system is our gateway to
DOD's Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2).
As SOF operate in increasingly contested environments, USSOCOM must
provide identity management capabilities to protect our personnel,
their families, and our SOF partners. Acknowledging the criticality of
network infrastructure, USSOCOM implements a zero-trust architecture,
providing greater information security across the SOF enterprise. To
ensure alignment, we work closely with partners across DOD, including
the National Security Agency and the Defense Information Systems
Agency. We also seek to accelerate the transition to cloud-based
architectures with modern data science environments. These efforts are
integral to advancing CJADC2 and ensuring resilient networks. Finally,
USSOCOM will continue to modernize internet-based and other MISO
efforts through automation and AI-enabled capabilities to operate more
effectively in the rapidly evolving information environment.
Precision and scalable effects are not limited to kinetic fires.
USSOCOM explores cyber and electromagnetic effects through expanded
experimentation, and it remains in close coordination with SO/LIC and
the Army's Joint C-sUAS Office to detect and defeat any UAS that poses
a threat to deployed SOF and our partners. USSOCOM has taken a unique
software-centric, open architecture, system of systems approach to C-
sUAS that will allow for the rapid integration of both proven and
emerging technologies.
The final modernization area, warfighter performance, focuses
largely on developing human-centric technologies, enabling SOF to
deploy promising capabilities rapidly. These efforts are closely
aligned with the POTFF program to address the physical and cognitive
well-being of SOF, including the effects of blast exposures on brain
health. We are combining leading-edge data with nutrition, health, AI,
and industry partnerships while leveraging commercial scientific and
academic labs.
Across all areas, USSOCOM leverages acquisition pathways such as
Middle Tier Acquisition and contracting strategies including Commercial
Solutions Openings that leverage Other Transaction Authorities.
Additionally, USSOCOM is exploring novel solutions to get warfighters
what they need. Acquisition agility enables USSOCOM to benefit from
rapidly changing technologies, many of which are evolving quickly in
the commercial sector and are often produced by small businesses. As
the DOD focuses on modernizing the defense industrial ecosystem,
USSOCOM seeks to bridge gaps with industry and the private investment
community to maximize available disruptive technology for the SOF
warfighter. Educating the private investment community on current and
future capability gaps will provide alternative finance streams and is
crucial to energizing this vital portion of the defense industrial base
to act akin to tech scouts for our warfighters.
Accelerating Momentum
SOF has been a pathfinder for the Department in leveraging AI to
support tactical operations against VEOs. SOF pioneered some successful
capabilities the Services incorporate today, such as the Project Maven
Smart System. To meet the demands of the NDS, SOF view the relationship
of data, analytics, and AI as a strategic imperative that will not only
create advantages in integrated deterrence for the Joint Force and
international partners but also improve our management functions
associated with organizing, training, and equipping SOF in the future.
In line with the Deputy Secretary of Defense's 2021 memorandum
``Creating Data Advantage,'' SOF has invested in making our data
accessible, linked, and secure. USSOCOM has also deployed more than 50
data stewards throughout the SOF formation, implementing the SOF Data
Strategy and establishing initial digital talent capacity in each
Headquarters Directorate, USSOCOM Components, and TSOCs. This includes
cataloging more than 1,300 SOF data assets in 2023 alone. USSOCOM
deployed a mobile education team to provide basic data literacy at the
Headquarters and each of our subordinate Commands. Additionally,
USSOCOM has invested in modernizing our digital infrastructure to scale
SOF's ability to leverage modern data management platforms and tools.
SOF are exploring the application of data, analytics, and AI for
mission and management impact. USSOCOM recently developed a capability
to internalize, transform, and transport data to fuse with intelligence
and enhance analysis. USSOCOM CTF analysts are using advanced
commercial tools to identify illicit cryptocurrency transactions and
combine that analysis with other types of government and commercial
data to illuminate and disrupt illicit networks globally. The
operational application of AI focuses on augmenting human capacity in
the tactical environment. Additionally, SOF intelligence units seek to
develop machine learning and AI as a force multiplier for processing,
exploiting, and disseminating multiple forms of information.
SOF data needs and use cases remain nested with the rest of the
Department. This partnership and additional investment drive insights
on various use cases across logistics, readiness, acquisition, force
planning, financial and budget issues. Most importantly, SOF are
closely aligned with Departmental policy on developing trustworthy AI.
Specifically, algorithmic development in support of autonomy efforts
will closely adhere to Departmental policy. As SOF pursue advanced AI
models, such as large language models and generative AI, SO/LIC and
USSOCOM will ensure it does so in full compliance with test and
evaluation requirements. AI capabilities can provide a decisive
advantage; as a result, SOF is committed to the ethical development and
incorporation of these capabilities for the Nation.
conclusion
Your SOF stand ready to meet the complex challenges of this
decisive decade with specially assessed and selected personnel, enabled
by cutting-edge capabilities and training. Decades of problem-solving,
courage, and relentless determination, attest to SOF's ability to
prepare the global operating environment, contributing to integrated
deterrence. SOF's unique capabilities generate options that enable the
Joint Force to prevail while preserving the Nation's strategic focus.
Whether creating dilemmas for our competitors, countering coercion,
reassuring allies and partners, disrupting VEOs or responding to
crises, SOF provide a decisive advantage for the Nation. SO/LIC and
USSOCOM will continue to provide the leadership and advocacy necessary
to ensure that your SOF remain the world's most highly skilled and
capable special operations force. The men and women of Special
Operations are grateful for your continued support.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General Fenton.
General Haugh, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL TIMOTHY D. HAUGH, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES CYBER COMMAND; DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY;
CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
General Haugh. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and
distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to
testify beside Hon. Chris Maier and General Bryan Fenton.
Joining me today is Chief Master Sergeant Kenneth Bruce,
the U.S. Cyber Command and National Security Agency's senior
enlisted leader. We are honored to represent the men and women
of U.S. Cyber Command.
In an era defined by rapid technological advancement and
increasing interconnectedness, cyberspace has emerged as a
vital domain for protecting our national security. The People's
Republic of China is our greatest strategic competitor and
poses unique challenges due to its advanced cyber capabilities,
state-sponsored cyber operations around the globe, and a
strategic focus on leveraging cyberspace for military,
economic, and political purposes.
Russia's cyber espionage campaigns prioritize sensitive
U.S. Government and military infrastructure and information and
spread disinformation campaigns to influence public opinion and
undermine our democratic processes.
Iran, North Korea, terrorist organizations, and
transnational criminal groups also challenge U.S. interests in
cyberspace and are engaged in ongoing efforts to exploit
vulnerabilities in U.S. networks, conduct influence operations,
and erode our national security interests.
With cyber operations becoming more sophisticated and
frequent it is vital to evolve our capabilities against new and
novel threats. I am confident Cyber Command is well postured to
meet the ever-evolving challenges we face today, creating
advantage for the Department and for the Nation.
Our mission is to direct, synchronize, and coordinate
cyberspace planning and operations to defend and advance
national interests in collaboration with domestic and
international partners. We defend forward by countering cyber
threats, before they can reach U.S. networks and critical
infrastructure. These proactive defensive measures, ranging
from network hardening and threat hunting to information
sharing bolster the resilience of our systems and foil
potential cyberattacks before they can materialize.
We are aligned with the National Defense Strategy and the
DOD's Cyber Strategy to protect Department of Defense
information systems, support joint force commanders with
cyberspace operations, and defend the Nation from significant
cyberattacks.
I am excited with what 2024 means for the maturation of
U.S. Cyber Command. This is a year of opportunity for us, and I
would like to thank Congress for the service-like enhanced
budgetary control authorities grated by the 2022 NDAA, and
enacted in the 2024 appropriation. This authority creates
tighter alignment between requirements in acquisition, which
results in faster capability and fielding to our cyber mission
force.
Since Cyber Command's elevation in 2018 to a unified
combatant command, Cyber Command has worked hard to make the
most of its authorities, resources, and support. Of those
authorities, none is as vital to national security and the
command as Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, which is essential for identifying malicious cyber actors
and protection of the Nation and the Department of Defense. I
am confident we are successful in our mission each and every
day, thanks to our people, our innovation, and our
partnerships.
My top three priorities that ensure we deliver outcomes
against national priorities in foreign intelligence and
cybersecurity. First, our strength lies in our people, skilled
cyber warriors who are dedicated to protecting the Nation from
threats posed by our rivals and adversaries in cyberspace. We
win because of our people.
Second, Cyber Command remains committed to a relentless
approach on innovation, to strengthen our military now and into
the future. Our investment in technological innovation is key
to maintaining our overmatch against our adversaries.
Last, Cyber Command maintains our competitive advantage
through sustained and deliberate partnerships. In addition to
the unique partnership with the National Security Agency, Cyber
Command further embraces a team approach, working with my
fellow combatant commanders and our agency partners,
collaborating with academic and industry experts, and
cooperating with our allies and partners by establishing
collective security around the globe.
I am extremely proud of the efforts that Cyber Command has
achieved and the direction we are headed. I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Timothy D. Haugh
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Timothy D. Haugh
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for your support and for the opportunity to
represent the men and women of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). I am
honored to appear beside Hon. Christopher Maier, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and General
Bryan Fenton, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the current strategic
landscape, the accomplishments of the Command in 2023, and the
opportunities ahead in 2024. This is a year of opportunity for
USCYBERCOM as we create enduring advantage for the Joint Force, our
partners, and the Nation. Our Command is maturing and innovating to
perform its missions as threats and technology change. Authorities
granted by Congress and the progress made by my predecessors are
foundational to the Command's current and future success. Advantage in
cyberspace goes to the entity postured to understand and anticipate
changes in the environment and act on fleeting opportunities with
speed, scale, agility, and precision. Understanding changes across the
threat and technology landscapes will continue to drive Command
initiatives.
In that context, we have worked hard to make the most of the
authorities, resources, and support that USCYBERCOM has received since
its elevation to a unified Combatant Command in 2018. We optimized our
force and operations to contest adversaries working to gain strategic
advantage in and through cyberspace below the level of armed conflict.
Recent events have shown how quickly new technologies can change the
dynamics in cyberspace and also how rapidly competition can escalate
into conflict. USCYBERCOM must be ready, which means added expectations
for our force and capacity. I will explain in more detail what we are
doing to address this challenge.
who we are
The Cyber Mission Force (CMF) is the premier cyberspace force. Each
of the Armed Services contributes servicemembers to the CMF and they
are the key to its success. Each one of the Service Cyber Component
Commanders also serve as Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber Commanders
reporting to the Commander of USCYBERCOM. Additionally, the command
works closely with Coast Guard Cyber Command within the Department of
Homeland Security. Finally, it is important to note our DOD-wide
components: our sub-unified command--the Cyber National Mission Force-
Headquarters (CNMF-HQ)--along with our Joint Task Force Ares, and our
Joint Force Headquarters-DOD Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN).
The National Security Agency (NSA) is our closest partner; our
roles, missions, and responsibilities of USCYBERCOM complement those of
the NSA, and vice versa. In 2022, the Secretary of Defense and Director
of National Intelligence sponsored a study of the dual-hat leadership
arrangement under which I serve as both the Commander of USCYBERCOM and
the Director of the NSA. The study concluded that protecting our
national security would be more costly and less decisive if NSA and
USCYBERCOM were led by two different leaders, and that the dual-hat
arrangement produces better outcomes for the Nation. The Secretary of
Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently determined to maintain the
arrangement and we are now focused on ensuring an enduring and
sustainable dual-hat arrangement.
Our servicemembers and civilians are aligned to the National
Defense Strategy. We foster Integrated Deterrence through campaigning
and building enduring advantage across the force by reviewing force
generation, accelerating needed technology, and investing in our
people. Our Code is ``we win with people.'' USCYBERCOM personnel come
to work every day to counter highly capable and determined adversaries
who seek to harm the United States and its allies above and below the
threshold of armed conflict. We strengthen warfighting advantage so we
are prepared for conflict; strategic advantage below armed conflict,
and decision advantage for policymakers and military commanders in
strategic competition. We amplify the impact of Federal, military,
foreign, and private sector partner activities and synergize how our
Nation applies all instruments of national power against adversaries.
USCYBERCOM executes four assigned missions. We defend the Nation
from malicious cyberspace actors who threaten critical infrastructure
and democratic processes. We defend Department of Defense Information
Networks (DODIN) to ensure mission advantage for the DOD. We integrate
options and capabilities into Combatant Command campaigns and plans,
posturing to support the Joint Force across the conflict spectrum, and,
we increase DOD cyber effectiveness through collaboration with allies
and partners.
shifting threats
The United States and our allies face sophisticated cyber threats
from both State and non-State actors. Malicious cyber actors are
difficult to observe and attribute. The People's Republic of China
(PRC) and the Russia Federation have integrated cyber attack
capabilities into military planning and operations to gain advantage
during a crisis or conflict. In addition, Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran
increasingly use social media and state-sponsored disinformationsites,
both overt and covert, to shape narratives and sow confusion. We are
particularly concerned with adversaries probing and exploiting our
military and intelligence networks, compromising the U.S. defense
industrial base networks in order to steal weapon system technology and
accessing or attempting to compromise U.S. critical infrastructure.
Additionally, our adversaries are targeting social media to coerce our
personnel and monitor troop movements of U.S. Forces.
People's Republic of China (PRC)
The PRC is our pacing challenge. The PRC is the only competitor
with the intent and, increasingly, the capacity, to reshape the
international order. The PRC is our closest competitor in cyberspace
and central to the global technology supply chain; it employs the
world's largest cyberspace operations workforce and an even larger set
of enablers in its defense, cybersecurity, and information technology
industries.
USCYBERCOM is laser focused on the strategic and operational
challenge the PRC presents in cyberspace. We seek in particular to
support USINDOPACOM deter conflict and defend its area of
responsibility, and to give ADM Aquilino the tools he needs to perform
his missions. Additionally, we work daily to counter PRC-based cyber
threats to our Homeland, allies, and partners. We are particularly
focused on defending against the PRC's persistent access and pre-
positioning for attack on U.S. critical infrastructure systems. We will
do everything we can to deter the PRC from using these accesses to
attack the United States. Our Command understands the value our allies
and partners bring and will continue to work closely with them to
counter PRC strategic intent. We have prioritized deterring and
countering aggression both in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility
and globally. Overseeing this effort is the China Outcomes Group (COG),
a USCYBERCOM-NSA collaboration illustrative of the value of our dual-
hat command relationship. The COG enhances intelligence insights,
improves cybersecurity, and delivers operational outcomes in support of
Joint Force commanders and for the Nation.
Russia Federation
Russia is an acute threat to the free and open global system.
Moscow violates international norms with its continuing aggression in
Ukraine, threatening the peace and stability of Europe. Moscow's need
for more weapons and munitions has Russia buying arms from Iran and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in violation of
international sanctions. Indeed, Russia is strengthening ties with the
PRC, Iran, and the DPRK to bolster its defense and commercial
complexes, and this growing alignment poses a major challenge to the
United States and our partners.
Russia's military and intelligence cyber forces are capable and
persistent. Their focus on the conflict in Ukraine has diverted, but
not ended, their worldwide intelligence and operational efforts in
support of Moscow's foreign policy. Russian actors also attempt to
divide Western allies and undermine them both abroad and internally.
Moscow likely views the upcoming U.S. election as an opportunity for
malign influence and has previously targeted elections in the United
States and Europe. We assess they will most likely do so again in this
year's elections.
In collaboration and coordination with USEUCOM, USCYBERCOM works
with allies and partners to support Ukraine's independence and the
success of its resistance to the Russian invasion. USCYBERCOM has
collaborated with military and civilian partners since the crisis began
in order to strengthen the DODIN's security and defenses, enhance the
resilience of our NATO Allies, and assure the defense of our critical
infrastructure, especially our nuclear command and control.
Islamic Republic of Iran
Iran's growing expertise and willingness to conduct malicious cyber
operations make it a threat to the security of U.S. and allied
networks. Iranian actors aggressively collect intelligence via the
cyber domain, and back Tehran's objectives through cyber attacks,
cyber-enabled propaganda, and regime control of domestic Internet
access. We assess Iran particularly seeks to increase operations and
targeting of industrial control systems to disrupt critical
infrastructure.
USCYBERCOM supports USCENTCOM in its work to deny and deter Iran.
In addition, from the outset of the Israel-Hamas war, USCYBERCOM has
supported significant efforts to bolster the cyber defenses of Israel
and other regional partners. The Command has focused on securing key
networks in the region, and provided actionable information, insights,
and options to policymakers.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
The DPRK maintains increasingly capable cyber forces comprising
both a growing cyber force within its borders and DPRK information
technology workers living abroad. Pyongyang's use of cyberspace to
collect intelligence, circumvent sanctions, and generate illicit
revenue through cryptocurrency exploitation likely supports the
regime's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, affecting regional and
global security.
Much as with Iran, USCYBERCOM works in alignment with USINDOPACOM's
regional objectives of deterring war on the Peninsula and impairing the
DPRK's ability to violate sanctions. In addition, the Command is
working in support of national security objectives wherever DPRK cyber
actors are seeking to counter allied global security interests.
Non-State Actors
Non-State actors remain a threat in cyberspace. Cyber criminals,
some operating from Russia and with ties to Russian military and
intelligence services, continue to find new victims in the United
States and globally. USCYBERCOM and the NSA enable efforts by the
Department of the Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and other partners to disrupt ransomware, cryptocurrency theft, and
other criminal activities. In addition, violent extremist groups still
operate in cyberspace. Though their capabilities have been eroded, the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al Qaeda, and other terrorist
groups maintain the intent to target Americans. Our Joint Force
Headquarters-Cyber (Marines) works in conjunction with U.S. military
and diplomatic efforts, and with allies and partners, to disrupt
propaganda and mobilization online as well as to provide critical
intelligence.
Technology Change
Technologies change rapidly, with the private sector driving many
innovations. Automation, autonomy, and artificial intelligence proceed
apace, boosting collection, detection, exploitation, maneuver, and
command and control at ever greater speed and scale. Our allies,
partners, and adversaries are all tracking and propelling this
progress. For example, PRC investments in AI, cloud computing, 5G, and
related technologies, coupled with the PRC's smart cities initiatives
and extensive industrial base, guide its development and deployment of
big data and AI for strategic advantage. Finally, we project that both
the PRC and Russia will use artificial intelligence to develop
autonomous cyber weapon systems to optimize offensive cyber operations.
uscybercom in 2023
USCYBERCOM's overarching responsibility is to defend the Nation in
and through the global and interconnected domain of cyberspace. Over
the last 2 years we expanded our ``Set the Theater'' efforts to defend
military systems and the data that they convey and store, which in turn
provide warning, situational awareness, and synchronization and
sustainment for our fellow Combatant Commands in their respective
geographic and functional areas of responsibility. In addition, we now
work more intensively across the Joint Force and with a variety of
partners to secure networks and the critical infrastructure that enable
national security--what we call ``Setting the Globe.'' Every Combatant
Command operational plan across the Department assumes that our leaders
and commanders can communicate orders and data securely. It is our job
to ensure that foreign adversaries cannot impair that connectivity or
decisionmakers' trust in its security.
The Cyber National Mission Force conducts missions to counter
malicious cyberspace activities, supporting all aspects of our defend-
the-nation mission set. CNMF personnel have deployed 22 times to 17
countries in partner-enabled, hunt forward operations that constrained
adversary freedom of maneuver, supported our partners' efforts to
increase cyber defenses, and generated important insights for our
defense. For the first time in the history of the Command there were
active hunt forward operations occurring simultaneously in all
Geographic Command AORs. These missions led to public releases of more
than 90 malware samples for analysis by the Nation's cybersecurity
community. Such disclosures can make billions of Internet users around
the world safer on-line, and frustrate the military and intelligence
operations of authoritarian regimes.
Enhancing the security of government, private sector, and critical
infrastructure systems grows ever more imperative. Foreign adversaries
continuously update how they operate, and frequently work through
American-owned networks and devices. USCYBERCOM works in partnership
with the Military Departments Counterintelligence organizations, the
FBI-led National Counterintelligence Task Force, and DHS's
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), sharing
actionable intelligence that helps counter adversary activities, making
them more expensive and less consequential. Consistent with
congressional support, USCYBERCOM is sharing information with industry
to help bolster their ability to defend themselves against exploitation
by malicious cyber actors, and to share more broadly the insights that
both our industry partners and we gain from our collaboration. Our
UNDERADVISEMENT program, a voluntary collaboration with dozens of
private partners, links cybersecurity expertise across industry and
government. It has led to dozens of operational successes to impose
cost on our adversaries, and enabled network owners to eradicate the
threats from their systems. Due to the foresight of Congress,
USCYBERCOM has enhanced authority to share information with private
sector information technology and cybersecurity entities, enabling
industry to defend itself better.
USCYBERCOM and NSA are working with partners to counter foreign
influence or interference in our upcoming elections. The prospect of
undermining our democratic processes is too tempting for some foreign
regimes and actors. The combined USCYBERCOM-NSA Elections Security
Group (ESG) began working well before the start of the primary season
to coordinate cybersecurity, intelligence, and operations, to better
enable domestic partners to defend electoral processes. We are
committed to supporting the interagency effort to ensure election
contests across our states and territories proceed from caucuses to
certifications without effective foreign influence. Let me assure you
that our mission focus is foreign actors overseas. We shall work with
scrupulous regard for the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons
and in an objective, non-partisan manner as we have for the past 6
years.
uscybercom in 2024
USCYBERCOM campaigns in and through cyberspace to support national
strategic goals in competition and set conditions for the Joint Force
to deter and prevail in crisis and armed conflict. In 2024, we will
create advantage for the warfighter, the Department, our partners, and
the Nation through enhancing readiness, implementing Service-like
authorities, and advancing mission partnerships. Sustaining cyberspace
operations at-scale against determined and capable adversaries was a
requirement not fully projected when the Department established
USCYBERCOM in 2010. We needed and received additional authorities and
resources for this effort from 2018 onward. The foundation has been
set, but now we must build on it.
We have undertaken an initiative we call ``CYBERCOM 2.0'' to
develop a bold set of options to present to the Secretary of Defense on
the future of USCYBERCOM and DOD cyber forces. To maximize capacity,
capability, and agility, we are addressing readiness and future force
generation. Provisions on readiness and force generation in recent
National Defense Authorization Acts provide an opportunity for the
Department to define the next decade of growth, impact, and warfighting
outcomes by modernizing the cyber force, enshrine mechanisms for
services/secretary-like oversight, and shape the future of USCYBERCOM.
The Enhanced Budgetary Control (EBC) authority granted by Congress
is transformational for the Command. When fully implemented with our
fiscal year 2024 appropriation to USCYBERCOM, it entrusts more than $2
billion in DOD budget authorities to USCYBERCOM, and streamlines how we
engage the Department's processes. EBC is already paying dividends in
the form of tighter alignments between authorities, responsibility, and
accountability in cyberspace operations. Greater accountability, in
turn, facilitates faster development and fielding of capabilities.
Agile acquisition is crucial to creating advantage for our
commanders, component elements, and operators. The most important
effort in this regard is our Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture
(JCWA), an integrated system of systems with associated capabilities
that facilitate the full-spectrum of cyberspace missions and foster
overmatch against evolving, sophisticated, and motivated adversaries.
JCWA is accelerating tool development and data flows within and across
the Command and mission partners. In 2024, the Command will partner
with the Services and DARPA (among others) to ensure our acquisition
strategies can achieve agility, scale, and precision at cyber-relevant
speed.
USCYBERCOM recently received the JCWA systems engineering and
integration (SE&I) authority from the Office of the Under-Secretary of
Defense for Acquisitions & Sustainment (OUSD (A&S)). The SE&I authority
will allow USCYBERCOM to define the interoperability standards between
the subcomponents of JCWA, currently managed by the Services. In
addition, OUSD (A&S) is working with USCYBERCOM to establish Program
Executive Office (PEO) JCWA and provide milestone decision authority/
decision authority at the appropriate point as the PEO grows in size
and capability.
All of these efforts begin with people. We must hire and retain the
right talent and keep our personnel ready to meet the challenges of
competition and conflict in and through cyberspace and the information
environment. We are working to grow uniformed cyber leaders at all
levels, up to and including the officers who will eventually succeed me
in this post. The staffing and training of our teams improves every
year, and the Command's cyber readiness system is now able to ingest
data directly from the Defense Readiness and Reporting System without
manual input. USCYBERCOM's authorities as Joint Cyberspace Trainer will
enable Joint training standards across the entire Department, boosting
its ability to defend networks while enabling CMF teams to focus on
hunting and contesting foreign adversaries. Additionally, over the past
year, we have worked to fill our civilian billets, driving down
security and personnel processing times by 25 percent and accelerating
hiring actions to fill more than 250 vacancies across the Command. We
are using special hiring authorities offered in 10 U.S.C. 4092 to
attract top technical talent to join USCYBERCOM. We have made job
offers to key experts and look forward to hiring more in 2024. Indeed,
we are maximizing use of DOD Cyber Excepted Service authority to
streamline civilian hiring and offer competitive employment incentives.
This year will mark the first year in which the Department of the
Army is acting as the Combatant Command Support Agent (CCSA) for
USCYBERCOM. The Army's military and civilian leaders have been superb
in managing this transition and making sure our civilians experience
this as a seamless and transparent process. USCYBERCOM is also
exploring innovative ways to enhance our operations using the expertise
resident in the National Guard and Reserves. We operate side-by-side
daily with activated members of the Reserve Component integrated into
our teams, and we engage National Guard units on State Active Duty and
State Partnership Program engagements.
Strong partnerships with government, industry, academia, and
foreign colleagues amplify our effectiveness and create advantages in
turn for our partners. Our Components, when working in unison with
diplomatic, military, law enforcement, homeland security, and
intelligence capabilities, make a powerful combination that can disrupt
the plans of malicious cyber actors wherever they hide. In addition,
our Regional Cybersecurity and Engagement Strategy in the Indo-Pacific
will guide efforts with partners such as Australia, Japan, and South
Korea to counter and contest foreign adversaries.
Our Academic Engagement Network (AEN) of more than 120 institutions
is unlocking new partnerships and bringing fresh ideas to our mission
challenges. The AEN is able to tap into a broad knowledge base to
encourage in-depth analysis in areas where we lack expertise. Through
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) and Education
Partnership Agreements (EPAs), USCYBERCOM is formalizing and enhancing
its AEN relationships. USCYBERCOM signed its first EPA with Norwich
University in November 2023, and USCYBERCOM signed an EPA and a CRADA
with the University of Missouri--Kansas City (UMKC) this January.
Finally, in an environment transformed by Artificial Intelligence
and big data, operational and strategic advantage will accrue to the
side that achieves and sustains superiority in collecting and ingesting
data, building models and algorithms, and deploying and updating them
at-speed and scale--while also denying the same to adversaries. We are
focused on ensuring our data and analytic infrastructures deliver
advantage over adversaries, and that those systems have deep resilience
that enables them to function even under attack. The Fiscal Year 2023
National Defense Authorization Act called on DOD and USCYBERCOM to
develop a 5-year AI Roadmap for adoption of AI for cyberspace
operations. Finalized in September 2023, this AI roadmap enables DOD
and USCYBERCOM to accelerate adoption and scale capabilities across the
Joint Force. We have employed forms of AI for years now in various
aspects of our work, and we know that people, data, organization, and
infrastructure are critical elements to future success. Our
collaboration with more than a dozen partner organizations has fostered
a community to drive Roadmap implementation in three main areas:
delivering AI capabilities for all cyberspace mission sets; countering
AI threats and exploiting emerging opportunities; and enabling AI
adoption. We recognize the need to employ multiple innovation
strategies to achieve speed, agility, and scale in operations,
capability development, data sharing, and procurement.
conclusion
USCYBERCOM creates advantage for the Joint Force, for the
Department, for our partners at home and abroad, and most of all for
the Nation. We work every day against capable and determined cyber
actors, many of them serving adversary military and intelligence
services. Our operational experience reinforces the importance of
campaigning globally in and through cyberspace across the conditions of
competition, crisis, and armed conflict. The Command now has ample
authorities to plan, program, budget, and execute the Program Objective
Memorandum; control budgets; and set and validate requirements. It has
a mandate to partner with the services to organize, train, and equip
the force. Fully executing the tasks assigned to us with the
significant new resources and authorities Congress and the executive
branch have provided is bringing us closer to operating with the speed,
scale, agility, and precision that the cyber strategic environment
demands. We must realize our full potential in creating advantage. We
will collaborate, innovate, and accelerate for future success.
The men and women at USCYBERCOM are grateful for the support this
Committee has given to our Command. Our servicemembers and civilians
look forward to demonstrating how well they can manage their
responsibilities and accomplish their missions to strengthen our
Nation's security. With continued strong partnership with Congress, I
know we will succeed. Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Haugh.
Mr. Secretary and General Fenton, you referred to, in your
opening statement, a GAO report, and they made several
recommendations, one to develop a staffing model for SOLIC,
two, implement a systematic approach for identifying necessary
updates to DOD policy, and third, clarifying the service
sector-like responsibilities.
Could you comment, both of you, on the progress that has
been made in those regards?
Mr. Maier. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question,
and again thank you, in particular, for your and this
Committee's continued support of the service secretary-like
role that SOLIC has under section 922.
I think the GAO report is on the mark. It highlights a
number of what might be seen as more tactical things we need to
do in terms of building out the force that works for me, that
is indeed the people who go in the room in the Pentagon and
talk to the programs and resourcing side. The SOF enterprise
has a great reputation on the operation and policy side. It is
much more challenging to characterize the impact of special
operations to the elements that are determining priorities of
budget, how to fit SOF into wargames, how to include SOF in
experimentation, and this is particularly important as we
develop a future warfighting concept.
So I think, as I have said in previous years in testifying
in front of you, Mr. Chairman, I think we are moving in a good
direction at this point. I think we seek irreversible momentum,
but even with the support of Secretary Austin and Deputy
Secretary Hicks I do not think we have achieved that degree of
momentum. Many of these advances are reversible, so I think I
would very much continue to support the advocacy of this
Committee and your partners on the House Armed Services
Committee who continue to, I think, see the value of SOLIC.
So we embrace all the comments in the GAO report, and
indeed have moved out on many of those, sir.
Chairman Reed. General Fenton, your perspective about the
value of the SOLIC, please.
General Fenton. Chairman, vital is what I would call it
from the perspective of the SOCOM Commander perspective. I
think it goes against really two parts. First, the service-like
side of SOCOM and SOLIC, which is a tide that in some ways
really lifts all boats, when we think about, in the SOCOM
enterprise, budget, advocacy, the work we are doing in
technology, and certainly relationships with not only the
Department writ large but the Congress, and the American
people. It is very, very important for us that SOLIC is at the
lead.
I think on the ops and policy side, as well, which we have
a huge stake in, as you know, critical, to have Secretary Maier
in those discussions, understanding what the SOCOM team has put
forward in terms of concepts and operations, and leading not
only OSD through how SOCOM is thinking about it but certainly
when we are required, with interagency coordination. So I would
just call all of that very, very vital or critical for the
SOCOM team in the way SOLIC does what it does.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. General Haugh, first let me
commend you for your rather clear support of Section 702. I
think also it is critical, and hopefully we can get it done,
and that is a feeling I think that is shared by everyone on
this panel.
One of the areas we have to look at it is the Cyber
Operations Forces, to improve their readiness and also enhance
budget control. Is that being used to accelerate that
readiness?
General Haugh. Senator, enhanced budget control is, from
the authority that you have now given us, it allows us to now
control the requirements--what are the things our force needs,
how do we allocate the resources from U.S. Cyber Command
against that, and then allows us to be able to prioritize how
that gets build and used, things like our persistent cyber
training environment, being able to increase that and be able
to focus on readiness, on the things that matter most to our
force.
Chairman Reed. You feel that you are making progress with
the operations forces?
General Haugh. Last year you required us to do a readiness
evaluation. We identified five things that were really around
personnel administration policies of the services. We have seen
them respond to those particular requests, and we have seen a
jump in our readiness. I look forward to being able to talk
through in more detail about how each service has been able to
respond to our requests.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. General Fenton, you made a great recruiting
statement in your opening remarks, and I do appreciate that.
Let me ask you, though, about the 14 percent cut in purchasing
power. This will be to both General Fenton and Secretary Maier.
Top line budget has remained flat since 2019. A cut of
approximately 14 percent, when adjusted for inflation. This
comes on top of multiple rounds of cuts to Special Operations
Force, approximately 700 beginning in 2023, and another
approximately 3,000 beginning in fiscal year 2025.
Agree or disagree and comment with this statement: On the
one hand, the rationale for reductions is that SOCOM grew
significantly in the aftermath of 9/11 to account for
counterterrorism requirements, and now counterterrorism is no
longer a priority. On the other hand, the reality is that SOCOM
is responsible for, number one, supported integrated deterrence
efforts against China, Russia, and Iran, and number two,
countering global terrorist groups, and number three, crisis
response.
So General, you first. Comment on that and tell us which
side you come down on.
General Fenton. Senator, I strongly come down aligned with
the side that says we have, at SOCOM, three big mission buckets
for the Department of Defense, given to us by the Secretary of
Defense--integrated deterrence, and all that entails, and I am
happy to talk a bit more about that; countering terrorism,
because we absolutely know that ISIS, al Qaeda, and Al-Shabaab
have not gone away, to include their ideology, which is still
running around unconstrained, and we are responsible in a big
way with partners to get after that; and then crisis response,
which we call a secret obligation, to be out the door very
quickly, as a SOCOM team, to either recover diplomats of ours
and partners and allies under duress, or rescue hostages, and
we have to do all three of those in a very big way, in an
environment where those requirements are going up on both
spectrums.
Senator Wicker. Well, does that mean that you are able to
absorb a 14 percent cut in purchasing power and in your budget?
General Fenton. Senator, I would say, probably like all
colleagues that have been here before me, a 14 percent reduced
buying power, whether based on inflation, supply chain, many
other things, absolutely hurts, and it causes us to move, as
you should expect us to do, toward making hard choices.
Certainly when those choices are finished, and we keep the
SOCOM enterprise in equilibrium, being more purposeful and
impactful with less, and I think that each and every day that
is what we remain focused on.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Maier. So Ranking Member, this is pretty
straightforward. I think if you look at even just the last
year, we have had a number of crisis response requirements that
we have had to meet. I think everybody knows that the
counterterrorism mission continues to be a priority. It says
that in our National Defense Strategy. You don't have to look
much farther than the attack in Moscow in recent weeks to know
that ISIS-Khorasan is out there, and then we have a mission to
help the Department and the joint force on the pacing threat of
China and the acute threat of Russia.
I think fundamentally when you look at the three things
that we have to balance--missions, we are going to do the
missions. We are going to carry out these missions, many of
them Presidentially directed. Readiness, we do everything we
can to make sure our forces go out the door exquisitely
prepared. That is what makes us so much better than our
adversaries. Then third is modernization. That is what gets
squeezed when there isn't as much to go around. We know that,
and we take a risk-informed approach to this. But that is the
real impact, sir.
Senator Wicker. Okay, and perhaps you want to supplement
that.
General Haugh, there is CYBERCOM 2.0. Is that a specific
program or is this just another name for what you are supposed
to do anyway, and that is top-to-bottom review of what you are
doing? Also, you have been at this for a short time, but why
didn't you ask for any unfunded requirements? I find it hard to
believe that there is nothing else important that you need that
isn't already being asked for.
General Haugh. Senator, I will take the second question
first. In terms of how we approached our budget, this is the
first year that we are going to execute enhanced budget
control. The President submitted a budget for around $2.9
billion for U.S. Cyber Command. We were marked down to around
$2.6 in that budget.
What we really have heard, uniformly, from various elements
of Congress, from the Administration, and from the Department,
they want us to demonstrate that we can successfully execute
the dollars that we have received. We are confident that we
will. We have got a strong plan, and within the Department,
leveraging the Washington Headquarters Service to execute the
dollars.
But we believe the President's budget and what has been
submitted for fiscal year 2025 is what we need. So a fully
funded budget that would eliminate those marks for 2025 would
really help us close the gap in terms of the dollars we need to
execute.
Senator Wicker. Take on the record because I am way over.
Are there any additional tools, resources, or hiring
authorities you need to help develop the next iteration of the
military cyber forces?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Manchin, please.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General
Fenton, I was surprised to learn during our discussion in my
office a few weeks ago that some believe our special forces
only perform a counterterrorism role. Nothing could be further
from the truth, as we spoke. For the public watching this
hearing, our special forces were created out of a need to fight
using unconventional tactics that we all call irregular
warfare.
While the counterterrorism fight is still ongoing,
countering our adversaries like Russia, China, Iran, and North
Korea, and the non-State actors is the bread and butter of
irregular warfare concepts, which our special forces
continually develop.
If you would like to expand on that, what we are doing and
the need for our special forces, in making sure that we have
the support to be able to compete on the highest level in the
world.
General Fenton. Senator, thanks first for the conversation
in the office that day. Really helpful for us to be able to
discuss with you where we have, as a SOCOM entity, incredible
capability across the full range of missions--the missions of
integrated deterrence, great power competition, where you would
see us, across the world today even, with 6,000 special
operations teammates in over 80 countries, developing
relationships, building capability and capacity for those
partners and allies. Frankly, also getting a great deal of
information and understanding themselves about that
environment, all in an effort to (a) prevent any great power
conflict by building partners and allies, and certain if,
indeed, at some point conflict is on the horizon, prepare----
Senator Manchin. If I could ask you one more question on
that, because we talked briefly. The cost-effectiveness of
using the National Guard, in the special ops we have in the
National Guard, how does that benefit you?
General Fenton. Senator, thank you for that, as well. I
would start with the National Guard across the Department of
Defense, with State partner programs and many other factors, it
is a blessing. It is a very unique capability; we have been
grateful. In special ops even more. With 19th and 20th Special
Forces Group, in particular, in the Army, and National Guard,
and Special Force Reserves throughout the other components, it
is a key part of who we are as a total component, special
operations organization.
Senator Manchin. Also we spoke multiple times about the
need for an East Coast training venue for special forces
instead of these units spending more time and half of their
training budgets on transporting themselves to the West Coast,
to other training venues where they have to jump through hoops
for approval on basic training needs to meet their readiness
goals.
Do you believe an East Coast training venue capable of
hosting readiness events would be beneficial, cost effective,
and current to the future Special Operations Force?
General Fenton. Senator, I think the Department--and I will
defer to Secretary Maier if there are certainly additional
comments--is doing a study to look at training events and
efforts across the continental United States. I would
absolutely align myself with we need all types of training
locations and events for multi-domain, interdisciplinary, and
certainly to see different environments and terrain.
Senator Manchin. Let me just say this. For states like
myself that don't have a military compound, but we are made up
of National Guard forces that are very strong and very
diligent, and I think Secretary Maier understands it very well,
they are committed to adding value and also readiness and
readiness operations and so many of your needs. So I hope that
you would look toward that.
General Fenton. Absolutely will, Senator.
Senator Manchin. General Haugh, Locked Shields is the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization cybersecurity and critical
infrastructure protection exercise that work with foreign
militaries around the world. Last April, the West Virginia
National Guard, under the leadership of the Defense Information
Security Agency, hosted, in Morgantown, West Virginia, more
than 180 technical cyber experts and supporting representatives
from the various Federal and State agencies to compete on
behalf of the United States, Romanian team in the world's
largest international cyber defense exercise, run virtually by
the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in
Tallinn, Estonia.
I don't know how much you are involved in that, you are
aware of that, participating. We want you to come. We want you
to take charge of this thing and run with it.
General Fenton. Senator, tracking this one very closely. I
think Locked Shields is a perfect example of what the DOD Cyber
Strategy has asked us to do, which is to focus on partners and
allies, and how do we grow the capacity of those partners and
allies with the threats that we face in cyberspace. We did have
deep involvement in it. We had our Commander of Joint Force
Headquarters DODIN was a part of that, and we see that as a
perfect example of what we want to do to grow the capacity of
our partners.
Senator Manchin. Thank you. Secretary Maier, to finish up,
I am so proud of you being involved in our National Guard in
the Martinsburg area. If there is anything that we can do, that
you can integrate our expertise that we have in the National
Guard. It is not the National Guard of our fathers or our
grandfathers, I can assure you. So if you want to comment on
that, what it has meant to you to be involved.
Mr. Maier. Yes, Senator. Thanks very much. Can you get me
out of drill this weekend because that would be great.
Senator Manchin. I don't think so.
Mr. Maier. Btu I very much appreciate you acknowledging
that, and thanks very much to the West Virginia Air National
Guard, of which I am a member, and it continues to support me
doing this job and that job.
Senator Manchin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Haugh, I
appreciate our discussion on the pressing topic of cyber
threats to the United States' critical infrastructure. I
appreciate the work that CYBERCOM and NSA have done to share
these threats with the public.
As you outline in your Cyber Advisory, cyber organizations
linked to China are compromising the communications, energy,
transportation, water, and wastewater organization in the
United States and its territories. Do you view these attacks as
primarily aimed as exfiltrating data or as Chinese cyber actors
positioning themselves to cause severe disruptions to U.S.
critical infrastructure in advance or during a potential
conflict?
General Haugh. Senator, thank you very much for the
question. I think one of the primary things that we see as
opportunity at U.S. Cyber Command is to expose these activities
to the broadest audience we can, and we do that with all of our
partners. Principal to that is the National Security Agency.
In this case I cannot see a reason, from a foreign
intelligence perspective, why anyone would target critical
infrastructure, so I am very concerned that these would be a
pre-positioning for a potential crisis.
Senator Fischer. As these attacks continue, how is CYBERCOM
leveraging its expertise and technical capabilities to alert
the Department and the American public and develop mitigation
strategies?
General Haugh. Senator, we start really everything that we
look at, if we are seeing a campaign, and how we approach a
threatening series of activities, we start with generating
insights. How do we understand what is happening and how do we
communicate that to the maximum number of organizations
possible? How do we enable defense, whether that is partnering
with another combatant command, like STRATCOM, when we think
about our strategic capabilities, or TRANSCOM, for global
logistics, or NORTHCOM, in terms of defense of critical
infrastructure, how do we enable their defense?
Then we also deliver options of how we would impose costs,
either directly or through our interagency partners. So we
approach that at every step, but really what we see as one of
the most impactful things is exposing and then giving the
techniques for how to identify these activities so they can be
countered by multiple organizations.
Senator Fischer. How is CYBERCOM working with our allies,
with our partners, to help them identify these threats, as
well, that they might be facing toward their critical
infrastructure?
General Haugh. First, we do the same thing, which is, you
will see on many of those cybersecurity advisories, it starts
with who do we bring in that will have information, that will
help illuminate this threat. In many cases that is industry,
and it is also our foreign partners. So on many of those seals
across the top of those advisories you will see many nations,
and that will include our Five Eyes partners. We have also done
them with Japan, and you will see that grow as we continue to
expand those partnerships and we share information.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Over the last few decades, U.S.
Special Operation Forces have been used primarily for
counterterrorism operations. A conflict in the Indo-Pacific,
however, would likely look much different.
General Fenton, can you explain to this Committee how you
envision Special Operation Forces being used prior to and in a
conflict with China?
General Fenton. Senator, I absolutely can, and I will start
by saying, in essence, that is what special operations was born
for, from the earliest of times, and I think for us we really
take it all the way back to the Office of Strategic Services in
1942. It was about giving the allies--and at that point both in
the European and Pacific theaters--an advantage, and giving any
adversary dilemmas, being behind enemy lines, developing
networks, building partners and allies.
That has absolutely transferred to today, and as I like to
think about it, with 80 years, or 8 decades of experience, 20
of those being in combat, in the counterterrorism piece, a bit
of a SOF renaissance. So what that looks like in many ways
today, with the changing character and certainly environment, a
number. Partners and allies build continues. Developing
capabilities forward, your special operators sensing the
environment, and bringing combatant commanders options and
advantages they may not otherwise have, in particular with my
teammate in CYBERCOM and in SPACECOM as sort of the nexus, that
will allow us to get synergy. Also presenting dilemmas and
disadvantage to any adversary, almost a thousand points of
friction, before conflict, to prevent conflict.
I think also hold the remit, as well, for crisis response
and counterterrorism, because we can never let those drop.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Secretary Maier, do you have
anything to add to that?
Mr. Maier. I would say, Senator Fischer, what SOF brings to
especially a large-scale combat operation type environment is
the ability to extend capabilities of the joint force, cyber,
space, others, and do in a precise and risk-managed way, and we
can do it in very small footprints. That, I think, is going to
be incredibly important in the Indo-Pacific, where everybody is
going to be looking at their magazine depth and figuring out
what is a higher priority target. If you can hide in the noise
you have an advantage, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to our
witnesses today for your service.
General Haugh, I want to start with you. Your predecessor,
General Nakasone, was very vocal about the need for FISA
reauthorization, and you have also talked about Section 702 and
the role it has played, for example, in identifying fentanyl
supplies from China. Often FISA discussions, when we have them
here, we have them in a classified setting, and that does not
educate the public about how FISA is helpful.
Recognizing that we are unclassified, can you talk about
examples like identifying fentanyl supply chains and others
where FISA 702 is extremely helpful?
General Haugh. Senator, thank you for the question. Section
702 is vital and it is indispensable. It is an authority that
has been granted by Congress that allows us to collect on
foreign intelligence targets outside of the United States. So
the example that we talk about from a fentanyl perspective is
our ability to use that authority when a communication is
transiting a U.S. service provider, that allows us to be very
focused on that foreign intelligence target to bring back
information. In this case it allows us to connect dots, connect
dots from the precursors as they start in China, and all the
way through to the potential criminal organization within
Mexico, in this case, where is most of that reporting.
We have produced significant amounts of reporting that
allow law enforcement to now look at that from a targeted
perspective, leveraging the data we have created in foreign
intelligence outside the United States, to be able to then take
action to limit risk to the American people.
Senator Kaine. General Haugh, I appreciate that answer. I
am glad that we could have that in an open discussion.
General Fenton, you closed your opening testimony very
strong, and one of my colleagues said it was promoting joining
the ranks, and I think that was the phrase you learned. We want
people to join the ranks. It was superb.
I have been running in recently, as I travel across the
commonwealth, with a phenomenon that troubles me, and I have
been raising it with key military leaders, and that is the
phenomenon of a young person who really wants to join the
military. It might be Special Forces, it might be any of the
branches of the military, and they go far through the process,
and they are qualified, but then they get turned down toward
the end of the process over a health issue that seems minor--
childhood asthma or a history of allergies. Senator Cotton
raised this point yesterday, and I think Senator Mullen raised
it, as well.
In my experience in talking to some of these folks is when
they get turned down it is just like a no, with no real
explanation, and also no encouragement. Because you say we need
people to join the ranks, the ranks in our military are
uniformed service personnel and DOD civilians, and Guard and
Reservists, and our contracting community that provide the
supplies and equipment that our military members need.
If somebody gets turned down on a health issue that
disqualifies them from serving in a particular service branch,
but they want to serve the country, there are still ways for
them to serve the country as a civilian or as a part of one of
our contractors. I have shipyards in Virginia that are
desperate for workers. We made a commitment to sell subs to the
Australians in the 2030's. How are we going to meet our own
need, much less theirs?
But what I find from a manpower standpoint is while we want
to attract the best and the brightest, we often are turning
people away who desperately want to serve the country without
giving them the other pass, where they can serve. This is not a
critique of you. I am just going off the closing argument that
you made that was so powerful, that we want people to join the
ranks. I sometimes think we don't necessary send that message
that the ranks include the broader ecosystem of those who serve
and also those who support those who serve, and I am just
hoping that all of you might take that to heart as you are
contemplating carrying out the important missions we entrust to
you.
General Fenton. Senator, I am happy to comment. First,
thank you for that, and I think it gets to the heart of why
that was in our statement. It really is about service writ
large, while, in particular, I can speak to service in the
military, but you have laid it out. I also work alongside our
incredible civilian teammates in the Department of Defense,
incredible teammates across the whole of the interagency of the
U.S. Government, from intel agencies and great teammates in
Commerce and Treasury, all fantastic, and I imagine having a
very valuable journey in their own particular way.
I think, as well, we are out very often, as Special
Operations Command, in the communities, seeing mayors, seeing
school board teammates, seeing folks who volunteer even for
various clubs, and all to make the Nation better.
So it really is a call to all of that and more, Senator,
and I appreciate you noting it, and I align myself with the way
you laid it out. We would love to see more folks who would give
us an opportunity to have their talents and skills, because it
goes to the heart of really what we believe in SOCOM--people
are number one. It is all about the people.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, General. I appreciate that, and I
have one more question for you, Secretary Maier. During the
posture hearings last year you submitted written testimony
talking about accelerating SOCOM's wide-ranging modernization
efforts. Could you briefly describe how you are doing on the
modernization side?
Mr. Maier. Senator, I think we are doing well. We have
distinct advantages in the special operations enterprise, in
particular, at SOCOM with an acquisition executive that sits
there and is integrated with the operators. So we are able to
modernize at a local level.
I think, as already addressed in the previous question
about budget, that ends up becoming a pacing function. It is
increasingly more expensive to do higher-end combat, higher-end
preparations. So we are looking for where we can do more
affordable modernization and really, in many cases, building on
what is already in the inventory and making it better. We call
it ``SOF peculiar.'' We rely on the services for the base and
then modernize on top of it for the SOF-specific mission, sir.
So I think we are moving in a good direction. Everybody
wishes it went faster. The adversaries are going to require
that we move faster so we remain very focused on that, sir.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Maier,
Federal Government, and General Haugh, thank you for your
service to our Nation. You are responsible for stewarding that
portion of our Nation's military that often operates in a gray
zone between peace and war. But the actions those men and women
under your command execute every day are extraordinarily
effective and can even be decisive.
General Fenton, with regard to Special Operations, they are
also very dangerous. Even though we talk about it being between
peace and war, when we talk about being left of a conflict you
still have young men and women that are in harm's way, as
evidenced by the loss of 15 of your teammate members most
recently.
We sometimes forget that even during those times in which
we do not have active and obvious conflict, these young men and
women are still in harm's way, and they not only should be
acknowledged and respected by not just this Committee but by
this country for their sacrifice and their service. I would
like to extend our thanks to you and to their families for
allowing them to serve when sometimes it looks like it is
peacetime but it is not, and that in a very dangerous world
they stand on the front line. So please extend to your extended
family our thanks for what they offer every single day.
General Fenton. Senator, thank you very much for that. I
appreciate any opportunity to talk about how our thoughts and
prayers, and now added with yours, and I absolutely know this
whole Committee, go out to the families, immediate and
extended, and certainly the units that suffer those losses.
While our teammates that you just noted gave their ultimate
measure of devotion, I think add to that that first, as I
mentioned in my opening, that is our sacred obligation to watch
after those families, stay committed to them in a way that you
would absolutely expect of us, and we execute, and we are
incredibly honored to do that.
On top of that, it is to continue to always, and safely,
and deliberately do the type of training we know they will see
in their activities in combat or overseas, and to do that in a
way that really gets after being almost a protective wrapping
around them as they go forward. They are that good, that
whatever they see downrange pales in comparison.
So all that and more. Thank you very much for that,
Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, General, and look, our
responsibility here is to provide them with all of the tools
and support that they need so that they are never in a fair
fight, that they always have, at every opportunity, the upper
hand, wherever possible. Nonetheless, it is a very dangerous
world, and part of what we sometimes talk about here we forget.
This has a real-world impact.
I am going to go right over to General Haugh now because I
appreciated your comments about a part of the law that
sometimes gets lost in the politics of the day, and that is the
reauthorization of 702, which is part of the FISA law that was
put in effect so that we could fight terrorism, and so that our
young men and women knew exactly what they were getting into
whenever possible when they were in harm's way.
General Haugh, you mentioned that it was critical that we
reauthorize 702, but I think sometimes, in an open setting, as
the Senator from Virginia indicated, we don't get a chance to
talk about how critical this is, and you are responsible for
cybersecurity and about what happens in terms of our fight.
Talk a little bit about what 702 does and what it does not do
to the American public.
Misinformation is rampant when we start talking about 702
and the fact that some people think that we spy on American
citizens. Can you clarify what is legal and what is not legal
to be collected under 702 provisions?
General Haugh. Yes, Senator, and I think first, I am really
comfortable talking about this in an open setting. This is the
most transparent intelligence authority we have. It is built
with protections for the American people that only things that
are authorized collection is foreign intelligence targets
operating outside the United States. This authority cannot be
used to collect against Americans.
Senator Rounds. Say that again. This authority cannot be
legally used to collect against American citizens. Is that
correct?
General Haugh. Correct, Senator, and as we collect
information against foreign intelligence targets, the way we
then operationalize that into intelligence reports is we query
that information. So we ask questions of the information,
structured in a way to ensure that we are not bringing back any
information that was about an American, that may have been
incidentally collected.
But there are times when we will do queries about U.S.
persons. I will give you an example from cybersecurity. So if
we see China attempting to hack something in the United States,
and we want to really quickly maneuver to stop that threat, and
we see that there is a U.S. company that is the target, in our
foreign intelligence collection, we would then query on that
company, on their IP address or on specific things we have seen
China target.
In doing that, that query about that U.S. entity allows us
to really quickly understand what is being attacked, how can we
rapidly identify it, and then how can we get that information
to that U.S. company so that they can mitigate the attack as
quickly as possible. So it allows us a set of protection of
civil liberties, it allows to ensure the privacy of Americans,
and then it has oversight built in, from the executive branch,
the legislative branch, and from the courts, to ensure that we
are using it properly.
If there is ever a misuse of that authority there are
specific provisions in the upcoming bills that mandate civil
and criminal penalties. We take every incident very seriously,
we report it to Congress, and we hold individuals accountable
if there is misuse.
Senator Rounds. I apologize. I see I am getting close on my
time here. But would you say that 702 is critical in defending
and allowing those young men and women who are in harm's way
today, serving overseas, does 702 help to protect them in their
day-to-day operations against our adversaries?
General Haugh. Absolutely, Senator, and when we go to
closed session I will give you a very specific example from the
last 2 months that it has saved lives.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
your indulgence.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds, for your
thoughtful questioning.
Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Mr. Chairman, I am going to defer to
Senator King, and then take the next one.
Chairman Reed. Senator King is recognized.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There is a human
tendency called the ``recency effect,'' and that is to pay most
attention to things that happened recently and then sort of
lose track.
To put it most bluntly, I am afraid we are taking our eye
off the terrorism ball, that because of September 11th is 20
years ago and now we are focused on China and Russia, which I
think is appropriate, I just worry that we are losing focus on
the threat of terrorism. The recent attack in Moscow indicates
that ISIS wants to attack in other countries. There is no doubt
that they would like to attack here, and the technology is
developing where they can do so.
The thing that keeps me awake at night is nuclear
terrorism. If one of these organizations gets their hands on a
nuclear weapon, deterrence does not work because they do not
have a capital city to worry about. They do not care about
dying.
Mr. Secretary, I just hope that you will advocate strongly
that we maintain the attention, both in the intelligence
community and the Defense Department on the risk of terrorism.
It has not gone away.
Mr. Maier. Senator, your concerns are ones that I share. I
have spent most of my career in the counterterrorism community,
and I think we have done great things in keeping that threat at
a low level. But I think you are recognizing some of the, if
you will, asymmetric capabilities in the lack of deterrence of
different groups if they get capability. It is something we
need to remain very focused on.
I think we sometimes forget that the National Defense
Strategy has five elements to it. We like to talk about the PRC
and Russia, but one of those is counterterrorism, and has been
across the Administrations for a long time.
So if we are taking our own direction, sir, it says that
counterterrorism remains a focus for this country.
Senator King. I just want you to be irritating in the
councils of the Defense Department on this issue, and I
understand that you are very capability of doing that, so
please keep pushing. Because I do not want a hearing here 5
years from now or 3 years that everybody says, ``What happened?
How did we miss this?''
Mr. Maier. Yes, sir. Well, I will certainly stay on it, and
hopefully I do not have a reputation for being that irritating,
but on this issue I think it is very important, sir, so I take
your guidance.
Senator King. Thank you very much.
General Haugh, one of the pillars of the Cyber Strategy is
disrupt and dismantle threat actors. My concern is we do not
have a deterrence strategy in cyber. We tend to patch, defend,
sanction after the fact, but we really do not have a deterrence
strategy. I hope that you will pursue ``defend forward'' and
make it ``defend aggressively,'' because if an adversary does
not have any concern that they are going to pay any price for a
cyberattack, whether it is misinformation in one of our
elections or a cyberattack on our financial system or our
electric grid, if they do not feel that they are going to pay a
price, they are going to go ahead. It is a low-cost option for
them. I believe that one of the weaknesses of our Cyber
Strategy over the years has been the lack of a credible
deterrent, which requires an offensive capability and the
adversary fearing the use of that offensive capability by
CYBERCOM.
General Haugh. Senator, I think this is exactly where the
Department wants us to go. So when we think integrated
deterrence and we think about in cyber space, it is about how
do we come together with a bunch of partners that all can make
it more difficult for an adversary to operate and to impose
costs, as necessary. That can be industry, in terms of ensuring
that they are a much more difficult target than they are today.
It is our international partners, so in the DOD Cyber
Strategy, which is how do we accelerate our partnerships with
those international elements that can be a teammate that
assists in the opposing costs, and then it is about how we use
the resources we have to generate capabilities that allow us to
have the effects that you are discussing. I think those are the
areas that we also view in how we think about Cyber Command
2.0, which is how we use all the authorities you have given us
to now have the greatest effect for the best interests of the
Nation.
Senator King. Well, as I say, I think the heart of
deterrence is capacity and will, but another piece of it is
that the adversary has to know about the capacity. Otherwise,
it does not deter them.
Right now we are experiencing a sophisticated, consistent,
and purposeful misinformation attack from Russia with regard to
Ukraine, and it is very reminiscent of the attack of the Nazis
in the late 1930's in terms of the pro-Nazi propaganda here in
the United States, which went up to and included Members of
Congress.
This is an attack. This is an effort to disrupt our
political process by a foreign agent, and this is one of the
things that the framers of this Constitution most feared, and
we have to be active and not just say, ``Oh well, it's just the
Russians again.''
I believe, again, I am advocating a strong response that
will make them think twice before they undertake such an
attack.
General Haugh. Senator, I understand, and I do believe that
both the PRC and Russia understand our capabilities, and I
would like to be able to walk through with you, in the closed
session, some examples of that.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks, gentlemen,
for being here today and for your continued service to our
Nation and for testifying in front of our Committee today. I
think the discussion has been very helpful. All of you are
playing a pivotal role in defending our country and deterring
threats abroad and threats to the Homeland. They are certainly
paramount.
So I want to take just a brief moment and recognize the
loss of a true American hero that is special to many people
within Special Operations Command. Earlier this week we saw the
passing of Colonel (Retired) Ralph Puckett, known as the
Ranger. He was an incredible human being and the last surviving
Medal of Honor recipient from the Korean War era. So I want to
give my sympathies--I know this Committee will extend them, as
well--to Jeannie and the rest of his family. So thank you for
that moment.
General Fenton, I am going to start with you. In the
current geopolitical landscape, our SOF capabilities are
absolutely indispensable in countering emerging threats and
advancing our national security interests. Now it is my
understanding, and it is something that I have discussed with
the Secretary, as well, that cuts to these forces risk
compromising our ability to effectively confront adversaries
and their actions and maintain stability in key regions.
So General Fenton, can you please speak to the critical
role that these forces play in the era of global power
competition and how these forces make decisive impacts in
strategic engagement.
General Fenton. Senator, I absolutely can, and first thank
you for the callout to our hero, Colonel Puckett, and the
family.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
General Fenton. We will pass that along to the entire SOCOM
team. Thank you.
I would start with similar to the incredible conversation
we had in your office yesterday--and I appreciate your time
with us and our Rangers from the Ranger Regiment--laying out
how they certainly see the world and integrated deterrence. I
think it is a far cry from where folks may believe we only do
counterterrorism, but they are intertwined.
Being in a location downrange, even if it is in a
counterterrorism capacity, or even for crisis response, also
very often has great power competition or integrated strategic
kind of knock-on effects that the world is watching, in
particular the adversaries, and they know we have the most
incredible military, the most incredible special operations in
the world.
I think specific to integrated deterrence--and I would be
happy to cover just some more details in the closed session--it
is about placement and access, partnerships and allies,
developing their capabilities, and then bringing that back as
operations and advantages to the Secretary of Defense combatant
commands, and as disadvantages and dilemmas to any adversaries
that oppose us.
Senator Ernst. That is a perfect segue into section 1202.
So we saw the section extended in the fiscal year 2020 NDAA,
and it will remain in effect until 2025. This has allowed the
Department to work with our partners and allies in the
irregular warfare space to achieve our U.S. objectives.
Can you briefly describe for the Committee how section 1202
has strengthened our partnerships?
General Fenton. Senator, I can, and first I do want to
thank this Committee for substantiating that in law. We
appreciate that very, very much. It is yet another option to
partner, and for SOCOM, in particular, and for the Department
of Defense, partnerships are the pacing item, and that his a
very different proposition when we think about what the PRC and
Russia do. They have client and customers. They are parasitic.
We like to build partners and allies, friends and family, if I
might, and I think this absolutely helps in that arena along
with what this Congress has authorized for counterterrorism and
127 Echoes. That authorization, what we do with 333 to build
security cooperation capability, all of it adds to a really key
piece for us, Senator. That is about the power of partnerships.
Senator Ernst. General Fenton, do you believe more
opportunities and support for provisions like section 1202 will
provide us an advantage in an era of great power competition?
General Fenton. Senator, I absolutely do, and I appreciate
that folks are thinking that way, along with the flexibility we
can build into them and that already certainly exists. SOCOM
has got a key part in bringing that type of information to this
Congress through the Department, but we are very grateful for
all of them. At some point I think the more of them, the
better, because the more partners, the better, when we get down
to it.
Senator Ernst. Absolutely. I agree wholeheartedly, and
thank you, gentlemen, very much for being in front of us today.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Haugh, as you know, our Federal executive agencies,
the military units, rely on the unique and highly specialized
workforce in order to support cyber missions. In response to
these unique needs the National Security Agency launched a
hiring surge in 2023 called the Future-Ready Workforce
Initiative. Its goal is to fill 3,000 positions alongside other
efforts to retain our current employees.
So my question for you, General, is how effective was this
hiring surge, and what are your specific plans to retain the
current NSA and CYBERCOM workforce, which is essential for your
mission?
General Haugh. Senator, there is no more important topic
than our people, in both National Security Agency and Cyber
Command. So when General Nakasone laid out the goals for a
future-ready workforce there were a couple of things. One was
related to overall the agency's hiring. The goal was 3,000. We
came short of that, but had one of the largest years of hiring
in the National Security Agency's history.
What Future-Ready was also built to do was really start to
think about our people. How do we do care for our people,
particularly those that are overseas? How do we develop
leadership training so that we have the best supervision and
create an environment that allows us to be innovative and take
care of our people and really use the strengths of how we
operate as part of our retention?
So I think from those objectives we have made strides in
how we onboard. We have reduced the amount of time for hiring.
We have got to continue to advance that. That has to be a
priority for National Security Agency.
For Cyber Command, we have been given additional
authorities from Congress, and now we are starting to leverage
those, whether that is hiring data scientists, or it is now
within using CES within our partnership with the Army, who is
now our responsible personnel element, to be able to fully
leverage those authorities. So we are pretty excited about what
we are seeing in the trends for both.
Senator Peters. Great. Great. General Haugh, at the start
of Russia's invasion of Ukraine we observed a series of high-
profile cyberattacks. In fact, according to reports, nearly 50
percent of the destructive Russian cyberattacks against
Ukrainian networks occurred in the first 2 months of the war,
and often in tandem with kinetic military actions. However, now
2 years later, we have not seen significant cyber operations
being deployed to impact the fighting on the ground.
So my question for you, sir, is what specific lessons from
the conflict in Ukraine have we learned regarding the Russian
employment of cyber operations to support their wider aims in
the war?
General Haugh. I think, Senator, what you saw from the
initial were two major things. One was the preparations that
Ukraine made. So the work that they did to be able to move
their data that was into Western clouds made them more
resilient. There are a number of lessons that we can learn from
that resiliency. The other is that cyber planning looked an
awful lot like all of Russian planning--not well thought out,
not integrated.
So I think what we have seen is that while Russia is not
quick to learn, they are learning. I think as we have seen the
evolution of how they have applied their cyber force,
increasingly that force is focused on collection and not trying
to destroy thing, in attempting to creating advantage in the
information environment. That is an area that we want to
continue to help our Ukrainian partners be able to be as
resilient as they can, with the best cybersecurity, and we will
continue to work closely with EUCOM to enable that.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, General.
Assistant Secretary Maier, we know that UAS operations are
rapidly evolving on the battlefield, and certainly DOD is well
positioned to quickly respond to this changing environment to
address these threats. But with this in mind, my question is
what internal DOD policy changes to airspace management,
operational concepts, rules of engagement or tactics are going
to be required to optimize the use of counter-UAS systems, and
also, how are you working with the rest of the Department to
address some of these acute threats?
Mr. Maier. Yes, Senator, I think it is one of the top
issues certainly for the Secretary of Defense and, of course,
me, as well. I think it becomes, in the first instances,
understanding what the threats are. They come from a lot of
different people, innocent citizens all the way up to malign
actors who are actively trying to exploit our defenses here.
I think we have put in place, in the Department, a
comprehensive approach to look at the external, outside the
United States piece. There are a lot more Federal partners that
we work with here domestically, and working out some of that is
really where some of the policy fissures are still being worked
through.
So we have certain areas where we can do things over U.S.
military bases that we cannot do in areas surrounding that, and
the ability to create defense in depth is far more challenging
because it brings in law enforcement, other Federal entities.
So I think in the first instance we are trying to bring
everybody online to understand what the threat is across the
entire Federal enterprise, and then from there really be
strategic in figuring out where we do need near-term policy
changes, sir.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Scott, please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Thanks to each of you
for being here. Let me just start with General Haugh.
When I go back to Florida I get asked a lot of questions
about the FBI's violation of 702 and how they surveilled
American citizens. I think all of us understand the value of
702, although not many people back home see the value, and all
they heard is what the FBI did. I think what frustrates people
is they do not hear of anybody being held accountable, and then
what they hear is nobody wants to make a change in the bill.
So as the Director of the NSA, how are you ensuring the
civil liberties and privacy rights of American citizens are not
infringed when your agency uses the 702 authorities, and if you
discover somebody made a mistake and did violate the rules, how
do you hold them accountable?
General Haugh. Senator, we think accountability is an
important part of the bill that is in front of Congress. It
will mandate that the Administration identify minimum penalties
from both a civil and a criminal perspective for intentional
misuse of this intelligence authority.
From our perspective, in the National Security Agency, we
are incredibly proud of our culture of compliance, and that is
ingrained. One of the first things I did when I came into the
role is I went and I sat with analysts and walked through this
process, from how they seek to target information, how they
query, how we review it, how we audit it, and how we report any
incidents to Congress and to the FIS Court.
As we do that every day, we want to ensure that we are
doing it for its intended purpose. It is our Americans that
serve every day in the National Security Agency are about the
defense of the American people, and that includes their civil
liberties, their privacy, and we will continue to be
transparent about how we use this authority to defend Americans
every day in collection against China, against Russia,
counterterrorism threats, and cyber threats that face the
Nation every single day.
Senator Scott. Have the governments of China, Russia, and
Iran decided to be our enemy?
General Haugh. So I think each of them are not operating in
the interests of the United States.
Senator Scott. So as a result of that would you recommend
that Americans stop buying products made in those countries?
General Haugh. I think when we look at where things are
produced, I think from my perspective that is something I look
at every day in terms of who gains benefit. So I think we
should definitely be really scrutinizing where those products
are coming from.
Senator Scott. So China, Russia, and Iran, they have highly
capable cyber operations. Do you think they are worried about
your offensive cyber capabilities?
General Haugh. I do, Senator.
Senator Scott. General Fenton, do you have the wherewithal
to get our hostages out of Gaza?
General Fenton. Sir, first, for your Special Operations
Command in concert with Central Command, that is our laser-like
focus, bringing those American hostages home, and we absolutely
have capabilities, as have been demonstrated for years, in that
arena to do just that. We train very hard to do that each and
every day. It is our sacred obligation, and we absolutely have
demonstrated those capabilities. No adversary should mistake
that we could do that anywhere in the world, but in Gaza it is
in concert with CENTCOM and our Israeli teammates.
Senator Scott. Do you think the President knows you have
the capability?
General Fenton. Senator, I am very sure, having briefed him
personally on a number of operations of the variety that we
have that capability, as does the Secretary of Defense, and
certainly as does Secretary Maier.
Senator Scott. So would you characterize the need for your
services, special operations, increasing or decreasing over the
last few years?
General Fenton. Senator, I would absolutely,
uncategorically categorize it as increasing, and I will give
you a bit of my thoughts on data to prove that. On the
combatant command requirements that go across, their desire to
have us either an integrated deterrence or in other form
factors prior to conflict, that has gone up by about 35 percent
over the last 3 years.
In the crisis response arena, defined as going out the door
very quickly to rescue someone, recover diplomats, or keep an
intense focus on U.S. hostages for future recovery, that has
gone up by 150 percent in the last 3 years.
So I absolutely see those requirements going up. I do not
think that is a blip on the radar screen. I think that is a
pattern that will continue.
Senator Scott. Does it frustrate you when your budget does
not increase, and I guess the Army just recently decided to cut
3,000 people from special operations. How do you deal with all
that?
General Fenton. Senator, first it is in conversation with
Secretary Maier and the Secretary of Defense presenting the
information that I just laid out for you and the team, in
concert with other services who have transformed objectives and
also recruiting challenges. We all work together to come up
with a final decision through a lens of modernization
readiness, making hard choices.
But I do remind folks, Secretary Maier is a key helper and
assistant, and all of us are in this together. Those requests
and requirements are absolutely going up, in a budget that is
flatter with a decreased buying power of 15 to 16 percent
because of inflation. It drives us through those hard choices
that we should make, and at some point we are, through a
threshold of a risk-based approach, we will have to report that
we will do less. Yet, at the same time, as resources become
available we are able to scale up very quickly. So hard choices
drive us to that, based on a fiscal and personnel environment.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield my time
for now to Senator Rosen.
Chairman Reed. Senator Rosen is recognized.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator
Kelly. I appreciate it. We have multiple hearings this morning.
I want to thank Secretary Maier, General Haugh, and General
Fenton for your service, for being here today, and of course
all the conversations we have had in the past.
General Haugh, I want to talk to you a bit. It is my
understanding that when the Nation faces a cyberattack there
are two forces under your operational control that respond--the
Cyber National Mission Force and the Joint Force Headquarters
DOD Information Network.
As you know, in 2022, the Cyber National Mission Force was
elevated to be a sub-unified command. General Haugh, how has
this elevation helped CYBERCOM's operational readiness to
respond to attack, and separately, how would also elevating the
DOD Information Network to a sub-unified command enable
CYBERCOM to be more resilient in future cyberattacks?
General Haugh. Senator, thank you for the question. So as
we looked to elevate the Cyber National Mission Force, that is
our sub-unified command that allows us to defend the Nation,
and they are really the mission that is responsible for
defending against adversary hackers and also generating options
against them.
So as we looked at that, we wanted to create that as a
unique command that allows it to start to grow its force and
also be able to start to drive how they acquire capability and
how they train their force for their unique mission.
As we look at Joint Force Headquarters DODIN, our element
that allows us to set the globe from a defensive perspective
across the entire Department, that is an area that we are
evaluating. So as we look at the studies that will make up our
response for Cyber Command 2.0, there are five studies that
Congress has asked us to do this summer, and they look at our
force, they look at our headquarters, they look at our
acquisition team, and they look at our architecture.
We wanted to bring those back as one, to be able to then go
to the Secretary and say here is what we see the vision of the
future force is. A part of that is evaluating, is Joint Force
Headquarters DODIN structured appropriately, does it have the
right resources to do the mission we have been assigned. So it
is an area that we are definitely going to look at.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. I want to build on that
because in order to do your work you need that foundational
cyber intelligence. That is really what you build everything
on. So having accurate, actionable threat intelligence is
really critical for the function of our Nation's cybersecurity
posture, but simply having the right intelligence, of course,
it is not the entire solution. It is important not only to know
what the threat is but also to know how to target our
adversaries' systems.
So that is why a dedicated, foundational cyber intelligence
capability could possibly enable the DOD to more effectively
utilize intelligence on cyber threat actors and their
capabilities.
Do you think that the establishment of a cyber-specific
foundational intelligence center would better prepare your
forces for these types of operations?
General Haugh. Senator, we think that growing the
foundational cyber intelligence of the Department is benefit
not to U.S. Cyber Command. It is all the other combatant
commanders that we partner with every day. For us to do multi-
domain integration it starts with our understanding of our
adversaries, and the way the process normally works for
foundation intelligence, that is our start point, particularly
in crisis, to generate options. Today that is largely falling
on Cyber Command and NSA. We want to see that grow across the
defense intelligence enterprise, and General Kruse, as the new
director, and I are kicking off some pilots together to be able
to look at how could we begin to expand within DIA's
architecture the amount of cyber intelligence focus that is out
there to meet the needs for not just us but the other combatant
commands, as well.
Senator Rosen. I will look forward to those pilots. But in
order to do all of this work, what do you need? You need a
cyber workforce, right. So last year's NDAA included my
bipartisan legislation authorizing a civilian cybersecurity
reserve to provide CYBERCOM with qualified civilian personnel
in reserve capacities to ensure that the U.S. Government has
the cyber talent it needs to respond to malicious activity, to
secure DOD's information, and of course, all of our system. So
I look forward, as we have spoken about, to reviewing this
implementation plan for the new pilot program when it is ready.
At the speed at which a future cyber war might be fought,
do you believe that the current traditional reserve models
would give you the necessary capabilities, the surge capacity
in times of a crisis and help us rapidly scale up?
General Haugh. Senator Rosen, thank you for that
legislation. I think what we would like to see is to be able to
do both. We want to leverage our traditional reserve and be
able to use that as part of our force, and we definitely want
to examine what is the best way to create a cyber Reserve
component that allows us to reach in to a broader portion of
our Nation's talent. We have two components that are interested
in executing pilots, and it is an area that we are excited to
come back with you to what that will look like.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
gentlemen. Thanks for your service.
Secretary Maier, you are doing a good job. I would like to
ask you this. With all these new conflicts popping up since you
have taken office, how has your approach changed and what
metrics do you have in place to oversee possibly new threats
getting ready to pop up? Have you done anything looking to the
future?
Mr. Maier. Yes. Senator Tuberville, thanks for the
question. It is really important because I think the world has
only become more complex, really, over the last couple of
years, and I think we look at it in a couple of different
perspectives. We look across the three different mission sets
that SOCOM has. General Fenton has already talked to the uptick
in crisis response requirements. So we are going out the door
more often for crisis response. Some of that is because we do
not have as many forces forward, but some of that is because we
are relying on this force more.
One of the metrics we have taken on board is determining
whether this is a blip, as General Fenton said, or a trend. We
think this is more likely a trend, so we are taking appropriate
action to make sure that we are resourcing it with that idea
that the requirement is going to be high and stay high.
I think counterterrorism, because it is something that the
special operations enterprise is being looked to carry more of
the burden on that, more of the mission space because the
services are moving to integrated deterrence, we need to ensure
that every time we are doing something in counterterrorism we
are getting as much benefit for some of the other mission sets.
So if we can do something against Russia while we are doing a
counterterrorism mission, if we can do something against China,
that is a twofer for us. That counts more.
Then I think we have already talked about the value we see
in, if you will, competition and the ability to really have an
outsized return on investment for limited force deployments. We
look at that all the time as a standard metric of are we
getting that high return on investment. If we are not, in many
cases we are going to pilot to a different approach or a
different TTP tactics, sir.
So those would be the three main areas I would look across
and give you a bit of a sampling of how we are looking at it,
sir.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General Haugh, you are the
new kid on the block, the new command. It is going to grow--we
all know that. It is very, very important. Do you see yourself
and your command privatizing, with all the competition we have
in the private field, in cyber?
General Haugh. Senator, we look at our industry partners as
teammates. Our domain is unique. It is created by industry that
builds out the cyber domain. So how we think about how we
leverage it, how we defend it is part of the partnership that
we will have with industry, with our international partners,
and all of our fellow combatant commanders who leverage
cyberspace every day, to conduct all the missions of the
Department of Defense.
Senator Tuberville. You have got all hands on deck. I mean,
you are using everybody you possibly can. Is that correct? Is
that what I am hearing?
General Haugh. We do, Senator.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. Thank you. General Fenton, thank
you for your service. We have had special operators deployed
everywhere in the last 20 years. Have we lost some of our
geographic standards across the country in terms of different
locations with special ops? Because I know, for instance, the
20th Command is in Auburn, Alabama, and they have been working
in different areas. They normally work the SOUTHCOM area. So
are we too spread out?
General Fenton. Senator, first thank you for the work that
all the National Guard teammates do in the special operations
community, and in the case of the 20th Group, fantastic.
What I would say is there has been, as we have noted,
increasing demand across the COCOMs for special operations, and
my sense is absolutely rightly so. In an area where we want to
prevent great power conflict, having special operators out
there, being part of the fabric of any nation, building
capability, teaching them to shoot, move, communication,
sustain, medicate, learn now to do staff training, that starts
a relationship, thickens it, and all builds toward partners and
allies prevent that type of piece. That demand has gone up, as
has the demand by the world voting for crisis response.
So my sense is the demand has gone up, and we have adjusted
accordingly through a risk-informed approach. But on every
given day everybody, all hands, total compo in SOCOM, active
National Guard, Reserve, and civilians are absolutely needed on
deck, and each and every time we make that risk-informed
decision we are bringing it back to the Secretary and then we
are moving out, because I see those demands continuing to grow
up.
Senator Tuberville. We just passed $60 billion in Ukraine.
We are up to $120 billion, and of course we all hope that they
can win. I know you are very involved in that, not physically
but mentally, and a lot of your people are in training in terms
of that. I wish we could give that $60 billion to you and your
people to build what we have.
Just one quick question to just get your thoughts. I ask
everybody this. Can Ukraine win, and what does that look like?
I know you are going to say yes, so what does that look like?
General Fenton. Senator, I absolutely will say yes. Ukraine
can absolutely win. As you mentioned, the whole SOCOM team, but
the command sergeant major and I, in particular, have been very
involved outside of Ukraine, based on policy. But we have had
the chance to visit with these Ukrainian special operators in
European locations, again, outside of Ukraine, watching them
train, watching them get better, watching them teach us,
especially lessons learned. I have got to tell you, at each and
every point they are incredible, committed, existentially
focused teammates, and they absolutely can win. They need our
help, for sure, as the Secretary and Chairman talked yesterday.
So I would say they absolutely can.
What does winning look like? First I am going to talk about
my own perspective, what it looks like losing for Putin. I
think it denies him the objectives he wanted in terms of
fracturing NATO. It is stronger than ever, and we will keep it
that way. I think it denies him the objectives of aggressing
against a smaller democratic nation and covering up that whole
territory, and we are working hard to keep it that way.
I think it also denies him the objectives that he might
have had in the rest of Europe as he is tied down in this,
losing equipment, general artillery pieces, everything else
that he was depending on.
I think winning for Ukraine, I believe the definition of
President Zelensky exactly, but I have got to feel it is a
sovereign, democratic, independent Ukraine that is able to
defend its borders, and is still partnered with NATO and with
the United States.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. One last thing, not a
question. I would love to get a report on those five special
ops that lost their lives I think in the Red Sea or in the
Mediterranean in a helicopter. One of them was an Alabama
soldier, and I would love to get a report on that if I could,
whenever you finish it. No hurry on that.
General Fenton. Senator, first I thank you. Our thoughts
and prayers again go out to those immediate families, the
extended families, the states which they come from, and thank
you, as well, for noting that, and our units. We are working as
fast as we can to go through the understanding of it, the
investigation, and I will stop there, but as soon as we have it
through the Secretary we will share it with the Department and
this Congress.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
Senator Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all of
our witnesses for being here today. General Haugh, good to see
you again. This year, INDOPACOM's number one unfunded priority
is the Guam defense system, and this system is going to protect
Guam from kinetic threats like hypersonic and ballistic
missiles. But Guam also faces some real non-kinetic threats as
well, and I am concerned there is not enough attention being
paid to the cyber defense of critical infrastructure on Guam,
both military and civilian.
China has made it clear that they want to hold critical
infrastructure at risk. They are not just stealing intellectual
property. They are clearly prepositioning on networks that
support infrastructure, and we need to make sure that Guam's
military systems have adequate cyber protection but also need
to ensure the systems that support electricity, water,
emergency response are adequately protected, as well.
We cannot let China ferment chaos if there is ever a
conflict, and it is important to find where adversaries like
China, where they are lurking on our systems, root them out,
and make sure we fix the vulnerabilities that they take
advantage of.
General Haugh, can you give us insight into how your cyber
mission force works to detect our adversaries who are present
on our critical infrastructure networks and how important it is
to protect this infrastructure on Guam?
General Haugh. Senator, I share your concern and the need
for how we think about Guam and how we think about the
infrastructure on Guam, both from the critical infrastructure
and how it supports the Department. From our perspective,
really the partnership that exists between NSA and Cyber
Command, and how we approach these kinds of problems, first we
want to generate insights that expose this activity. So you
will be able to go on our website and be able to see, in great
detail, exactly how the PRC has approached access on Guam, the
techniques they have used, how they have done it, and then it
also informs how elements, both within our government and
within industry, can detect those threats so that we can work
collaboratively to make it more difficult for the PRC to
operate, to pre-position in those infrastructure.
I think the other areas, then, that we think about,
enabling defense. How do we help everyone with strategies, and
in support of INDOPACOM, how do we use our force, our defensive
maneuver force, how do we apply it to ensure that we are
protecting the things that are most important to INDOPACOM.
Finally, we have to impose costs, and that is through our
interagency teammates as well. How do we make it more difficult
for PRC, and how do we make it that there is a cost for actions
like this?
Senator Kelly. Any more authorities or resources that you
need to do this?
General Haugh. Senator, you have given us a number of
authorities in this past year. One of those is enhanced budget
control, which now allows me to drive where these investments
go, and that is probably the most critical authority we needed.
We now have service-like authority and responsibility. We will
now be able to apply that in a way that allows us to be more
adaptive to what these changing threats look like.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, General. General Fenton, the Air
Force Special Opioids Command is establishing a new power
projection wing at DM in Tucson. The new wing is going to give
SOCOM a powerful wing, capable of strike, mobility, ISR. DM's
proximity to training ranges in Arizona, specifically the Barry
Goldwater Range, is going to ensure that the new wing has
access to the training it needs to be lethal and be ready to
deploy at any moment.
General, can you talk about the importance of these power
projection wings and your insight on the status of the standup
of the wing at Davis-Monthan?
General Fenton. Senator, like SOCOM is with the other
services we are closely aligned with our transformation
efforts, in this case the Air Force transformation effort that
really hits at the heart of the question you mentioned about
Air Force Special Operations Command. I think as we have gone
along on the journey, the gathering of that type of capability
you mentioned, in terms of ISR, strike, mobility, and bringing
it all together and allowing it to focus on a particular region
is at the heart of what we understand the Air Force and AFSOC
is doing out at Davis-Monthan. We are a key part of it with our
AFSOC team.
The timelines, I think we are still, in some ways, along
the journey with AFSOC, and the particulars might be best
answered by the Air Force writ large or maybe even I can get
back to you for the record, to give it to you exact. I would
not want to get out in front of my skis.
But the bottom line is your Special Operations Command team
is absolutely interlinked and they are wired in what AFSOC and
the Air Force is doing on those power projection wings.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, and could you also get back to me
on, in this year's budget request SOCOM has taken the Armed
Overwatch platform from 75 down to 62 aircraft. If you could
just get back to us on what you think the right number of
airplanes--if you think it is 62, I think that is a reasonable
answer, but if you think it is something different than that
could you please get back to me on it?
General Fenton. Senator, we absolutely will.
Senator Kelly. Okay. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
Senator Schmitt, please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Haugh,
having the CCP think twice before they mess with our critical
infrastructure or steal government officials' emails is
extremely important given the fact that they are only going to
continue to better their cyber operations and capabilities. The
Storm-0558 hack, you and I have visited about that, and China
burrowing into our critical I think is a big wake-up call in
many ways, and that more can be done.
So I guess I have got a couple of questions. The first, how
are you thinking about strengthening CYBERCOM's ability to
really put fear in the heart of China as you put your team
together in CYBERCOM 2.0? I think that is a very important
aspect of this as sort of a deterrence here. How are you
thinking about that?
General Haugh. Senator, as we think about Cyber Command
2.0, you have asked us to study a number of things this summer.
The most important of that will be our force generation study.
How do we generate ready forces within the Department of
Defense? That study requires us to do a number of things. One
is how do we evaluate our current structure. The structure now
has service-like authorities underneath what you have now given
us in the 2022 NDAA and the most recent appropriation, and then
evaluating whether we should have a cyber service. We will come
back to you with that.
We also are evaluating our overall architecture and our
acquisition. Inside that is how can we use our service-like
authorities to be more aggressive in the capabilities we have
to respond to each of these activities. We have a very solid
set of capabilities we use today. We want to be able to move
faster, and we want to be able to be more agile in terms of if
a new threat emerges how can we generate the capability, put it
in the hands of our cyber mission force to enable our portion
of an interagency response.
Senator Schmitt. That is a good segue to the followup
question, is obviously this is moving quickly, right. The
capabilities change. The technology changes. DOD is not known
writ large as adapting quickly, right, whether it is
procurement or whatever. What are you doing in that domain that
allows you guys to sort of adopt this cutting edge technology
quicker?
General Haugh. Senator, first the Department has now given
us a number of authorities for our own acquisition. That was a
step that allows us to move faster. When I first took over
command I met with each of the program offices that are
providing capability to U.S. Cyber Command. I saw each of them
as really having an agile opportunity because we deal in
software. We are not building large iron. We are building code,
and so we have the right program office structure to move
faster. We now needed the resources to do it. You have given us
the enhanced budget control, and we have to combine it with
that acquisition authority.
Senator Schmitt. So I think one of the challenges that we
have on this side of the dais is explaining to people, in a
non-classified setting, what the real risk is, what the
challenges are, the capabilities that the CCP has, say, for
critical infrastructure. This is new kind of warfare for many
people.
If you were going back to Missouri or Arkansas or Oklahoma
and you were talking to folks back home, how would you explain
what the capability is, what we need to be vigilant, you know,
for, and the best way for us to approach this?
General Haugh. Senator, I think the most recent things that
we have exposed across the interagency about how China has
established access in critical infrastructure is that wake-up
call. In terms of pre-positioning in the critical
infrastructure of Guam, other areas of the world, and in the
United States, that really is no other purpose than to pre-
position for a crisis. I think from our perspective we want to
be able to communicate that in as clear a language as possible,
and also in highly technical language that industry can
leverage and be able to then pursue and root them out of that
at every step along the way.
Senator Schmitt. You and I have talked about this one-on-
one too, but I just think it is absolutely critical that China
understands our capability, and much like with other sort of
platforms that have developed or weapons that have developed
over decades, that there is a real deterrence here, that they
understand that if they flip that switch, turning something
off, that we have the capability and we are willing to do it,
we will not hesitate ourselves. So that is, I think, a dynamic
that is really important as we enter this new world.
I guess I will just close with this. Clearly this is
happening here. We have got a lot of newer partnerships,
established partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. As China sort of
shows its fangs, many of those allies are coming our way
because they understand the ambition that China has. What are
you seeing in the Indo-Pacific, whether it is the Philippines
or wherever, that would raise the red flag here?
General Haugh. Senator, from our perspective those
partnerships that we are growing in the Indo-Pacific are
aligned with Indo-Pacific Command. So as we have talked to
Admiral Aquilino and in the future Admiral Paparo, the areas,
the nations that they are most concerned with is where our
partnerships are.
What we have seen is a demand signal from many nations in
the Indo-Pacific that are looking for assistance to counter the
China cyber threat. We are using our forces to defend forward
in some of those nations with our allies and partners to expose
to them how China is operating in their networks so that we can
root them out of their networks, but also then to be able to
expose it to a broader audience.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt.
Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Assistant Secretary
Maier and Generals Fenton and Haugh for being here today.
General Haugh, speaking to that partnership in the Indo-
Pacific, I just returned with a congressional delegation from
the Indo-Pacific. We went to the Philippines, Vietnam, the
Republic of Korea, and Japan, and everywhere we went we heard
an interest in partnering with the United States, concern about
what China is doing in the South China Sea, and real concern
about the passage of the National Security Supplemental,
because that includes support for the Indo-Pacific region, and
it also sends a very strong message to Xi. So thank you. I
totally agree with what you said.
Assistant Secretary Maier, on Monday there was a report
that highlighted the scale and methods that Vladimir Putin has
been using to sow distrust in the U.S. population and to
amplify destructive rhetoric that jeopardizes the passage of
important legislation like the National Security Supplemental.
We also heard from both the Chair of the House Intelligence
Committee and the House Foreign Relations Committee, who said
that there were members of the Republican Caucus who were
parroting Russian disinformation.
So can you talk about how those tactics further Russian
operations in Ukraine and how they work to undermine our
position in Ukraine?
Mr. Maier. Senator Shaheen, I think the Russians, and
probably the PRC as well, think they have a distinct advantage
in the information space, and while we can certainly overmatch
them conventionally, militarily, they see an asymmetric
advantage to themselves. So I think we are very focused on
denying them that advantage, where possible. Certainly I think
the Russians take a very--we would be much more careful, let's
just say. They are very not risk informed when they go about
their information operations, be those in Ukraine, be those in
the United States, be these elsewhere, and they are okay to
fail, but what concerns me is what gets through and what starts
to get traction.
I think the Ukrainians have been very adept at pushing back
at the Russian malign influence activities because they have
been familiar with it for a long time. I think one of the
challenges we have is understanding fully where the Russians
are attempting these types of malign influence activities. Some
of this has been well documented, as you mentioned, going back
to some of our elections. I think other places, though, we are
only beginning to understand where they can pair activity with
information, or they can use their information tools in a way
that really attempt to break down some of the cohesiveness that
we have as a Nation, and specifically how we approach it in a
warfighting capacity.
I think the Ukrainians have figured out much of that
because they have had to live with it. There are many lessons I
think we could take on board, Senator, to figure out how to
approach this from our own perspective.
Senator Shaheen. So can you speak more specifically in a
classified setting about what we are doing to push back?
Mr. Maier. Yes, Senator, I can.
Senator Shaheen. General Haugh, last week there was also a
news investigation on CBS 60 Minutes that pointed to evidence
of Russia's responsibility in the directed energy attacks, the
anomalous health incidents or Havana Syndrome. Our office has
worked with a number of victims from the earliest attacks
because we had some constituents who were affected, and what
they have asserted all along is that there was an adversary who
was responsible.
Can you talk about what you are doing, if anything, to
respond to those reports, and Secretary Austin, in his hearing
yesterday, assured us that the combat support agencies under
his oversight are remaining focused on this issue. Can you also
assure us the same and what you are doing?
General Haugh. Senator, I can definitely assure you that
any new evidence that we receive we will pursue. So as the
Director of the National Security Agency I am committed to
that, and I am also committed to the eight employees that we
have been designated as suffering from anomalous health
incidents and ensuring their care and ensuring that we maintain
our obligations to them, and also to continue to pursue and
understand any of the potential causes of anomalous health
incidents.
Senator Shaheen. So can you tell us if you are actively
pursuing any of the information that was shared in that news
report?
General Haugh. Senator, we would look at that information
and any other and routinely are looking to see if there is more
information that we can garner from any lead that we can get.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Mullin, please.
Senator Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Haugh, Mr.
Secretary, and General Fenton, thank you for taking the time to
meet with me individually, and thank you for the work you are
doing and for being here in front of us too. General Fenton,
thank you for bringing those three incredible Rangers by my
office yesterday. It was such a pleasure to meet them. It makes
you feel pretty secure about the future of the country with
young men like that ready to serve.
General Fenton. Yes, it does, Senator.
Senator Mullin. With that being said--and this is a
question for General Fenton and Mr. Secretary both--I mean, we
all know some truths about the SOF community, and one of them
is that a complement of special operations forces cannot be
created after an emergency. Correct? General Fenton, I think
you said something very similar to that in the past.
So with funding cuts, are we threatened by the training
capability for our SOF community, by numbers and by training,
to be able to meet the threats that this country may be facing
down the road?
General Fenton. Senator, yes certainly, and personally--and
again, thank you for that office call as well yesterday. I
appreciated you meeting with the Command Sergeant Major and I
and the Secretary, but mostly with those three incredible
Ranger that gave you the update on what they are doing, and I
know they appreciated that as well, so thank you for taking
your time on that.
I would say first our obligation to you and to this whole
august body and our Nation and Department is always to give the
best training, most rigorous, most arduous training to our
Special Operations Command teams, to better and to ensure that
they never see something downrange they have not seen back
here. In fact, it should be a lesser task, in many ways,
because of the training we are driving them toward. So you have
got my commitment on that.
As we look forward in terms of the Iron Triangle, as I like
to talk about it--modernization, training and readiness, and
operations--I think personnel reductions and a flat or
decreasing buying power of the budget, along with certainly
continuing resolutions, which always hurt all that works
together to help us make a risk-informed decision on where we
go. But you have got my commitment on training, Senator. It is
always going to be the toughest, hardest, and most arduous.
Senator Mullin. I like how you said ``risk-informed
decision.'' I understand you have to mitigate risk and do the
best with it. When we talk down the road again, let's visit
more specific about that in a different setting. Mr. Secretary,
the same thing. As I said yesterday, I am here to assist you
guys. You are taking care of all of us, and we want to make
sure that we are working together. As I like to say, we are on
the same boat, rowing in the same direction.
General Fenton, just because this is something that is very
important to me is TBIs. I know you have taken a lead with the
SOF community, making sure that there is a lot more knowledge
of the TBIs. Can you maybe explain to us a little bit more
about any steps of new equipment that may have been issued to
SOF to prevent or mitigate some of these TBIs?
General Fenton. Senator, I absolutely can, and that
question, and certainly my answer, point right to the heart of
our number one priority, as you and I and the Secretary
discussed yesterday, our people. They are at a competitive
advantage, and comparative advantage, and everything we do in
health, safety, and welfare is really pointed toward that.
I would say on TBI, and certainly concussive type events,
all affecting the brain, we are taking a number of steps. As a
trailblazer and pathfinder, I think SOCOM was the first to come
out with a brain health policy, that certainly has then been
adopted by the Department and many others. That is because, to
my point, we are committed to the focus of our people, and
being a trailblazer for the Department.
I think the other thing you will see us doing is really,
through a lens, we call trying to understand this, both a
concussive type event and blast type events, going to any
location that will do research for us. One of those was
Massachusetts General Hospital, the Command Sergeant Major and
I visited. We got an outbrief on that, and we were really able
to determine where we might want to go on a longitudinal study.
That was a shorter, probably 1-year study, against 30 of our
high-end teammates, but where we take that, along with some
studies we are doing out of other research locations in North
Carolina.
I think beyond that what you see us doing is learning to ID
it, through baseline assessments, similar in some ways to what
the NFL may be getting for concussive protocols. We are working
closely with the NFL on how they are doing the work they are
doing so we are informed by it, and we are sharing ours, as
well.
Then blast sensors, as you just may have intimated, in
terms of what we have for our teammates to wear. I think you
would see us across all that.
Last, mitigating it. We recognize a lot of this type of
concussive events, specifically the brain, comes in training,
for our force to be as lethal as they need to be and to win
every time downrange, when called upon. So you see us in places
like our shoot houses or our blast ranges with absorbent
material. You also see us doing a lot more, Senator, in the AR/
VR space, so we can get reps and sets before have to actually
get in the dirt and fire the weapon, though we have got to do
that in order to stay lethal. You would see us also looking at
the sensors, as I mentioned, to ID it, and then at some point
we are even looking at printing lower blast or pounds per
square inch charges, 3D printing charges we can use in the
breach. Then last I would just add suppressors. We are getting
after all that and more in order to protect our most incredible
investment, our people.
Senator Mullin. TBI is something very personal to me,
something I would love to work with you on. Recently at SHOT
Show, which I know a lot of your community is very familiar
with that, I came across some equipment that I thought was
extremely interesting, and I would love to maybe get it across
your desk at some point.
General Haugh, I do have a question for you but I am out of
time, Mr. Chairman, so I will submit it to the record.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Mullin.
Senator Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here, and thank you for your service.
General Fenton, I wanted to ask about Task Force 10, TF-10,
and the role that it has played in advising and training
Ukrainian forces, very, very commendably and ably done, as I
have seen on the five trips that I have made to Ukraine in the
last couple of years, and I know they have been there
continuously. They have been a critical source of advice and
training.
In your knowledge and perspective on the Ukrainian special
operators, have they increased in their abilities over these
last couple of years? What have you seen from the standpoint of
Task Force 10 in advising and aiding the Ukrainian forces
during that time?
General Fenton. Senator, thank you for visiting with our
teammates out there as many times as you have. I know they
really appreciate it, we all do, that you get to see it in full
motion when you are right next to them in the actual
environment.
I would tell you we are very proud of Task Force 10 and the
work it has done for almost 3 years now against the untoward
illegal invasion and aggression of the Russian Federation. I
would say that as I think about that, at its heart it is about
the power of partnerships, the partnership between U.S. Special
Operations, while we do it outside of Ukraine, with Ukrainian
special operations teammates who come out to get training on
shooting, moving, communicating, staff, and communications, and
many other things. That little task force is at the heart of
all that.
I think the partnership extends beyond just the U.S. and
Ukrainian special operations. As you saw, Senator, in there,
there is a very robust, across-the-globe bunch of teammates in
there from the special ops community in Europe, outside of
Europe, who all, as well, are looking to help the Ukrainian
special operators. So we are very proud of that. Thank you for
giving me an opportunity to talk about it, and I think at its
heart partnership, but it is a partnership for a consequence,
for Ukrainian SOF to win alongside their Ukrainian military.
They absolutely have increased in capability and capacity, as
you have asked me, not only since JTF-10 arrived as a part of
SOCEUR and our theater Special Operations Command request
through us to put something out there for them and General
Cavoli, but since 1994, because that is the very first time
U.S. Special Operations had an opportunity to meet Ukrainian
military. We have gone on the journey to build their special
operators, noncommissioned officers, and that entire special
ops since 1994.
Senator Blumenthal. I assume that the failure to approve a
supplemental package of aid for Ukraine would have affected
special ops aid for those Ukrainian special operators as well,
just as they would the entire Ukrainian force.
General Fenton. Senator, it absolutely would. I think I
will start first by, as the Secretary and others have said,
Secretary of Defense, the message it sends across the world
about democracy and where we stand.
The second thing is if Ukraine ever was just fighting
Russia alone, that is not the case now, I think as you and the
Committee here know. It is Ukraine versus Russia, plus Iran,
plus North Korea, and tangentially even the PRC. So even the
supplementals are woven together because the adversaries are
linking themselves in that way I laid out.
Then last, it certainly backfills the stock that Special
Operations Command has spent money on already in order to be
part of the contingency that is all things Ukraine.
Senator Blumenthal. On another topic, I know that the Army
recently announced significant reductions across the force to
include billets the Cavalry Scout, military police, and special
ops community. I believe that no Green Berets will be cut, but
instead the Army plans to cut enablers. I also am aware that
recruiting efforts, obviously, are an issue for the Army.
I wonder, number one, how the cuts in those billets will
affect the special operations community, and number two, how
are recruiting efforts going for special operations?
General Fenton. Senator, I will make a couple of comments
and certainly defer to Secretary Maier on this. I would say you
rightly pointed, the heart of all this, I assess, the
reductions, specifically against the backdrop of increasing
demands that I have laid out previously in crisis response and
many others, was the recruiting challenges that the Army--and
many services, but the Army--acutely is facing in a big way,
along with fiscal challenges, and I think even at the heart of
it, just the desire all of us have to transform.
I think as a result of the Secretary of Defense's decision
we are still assessing the impacts, what that looks like across
5 years as we layer that into the 5-year defense plan against
the skill rates and specialties we have been directed,
communications, intelligence, logistics, and I think we are
still assessing that.
But already I am getting a sense our theater of Special
Operations Command that we will be able to meet less of what
they demand, and I think we owe certainly the Secretary and the
Secretary of Defense our assessment as we go forward.
I defer to Secretary Maier.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. My time has expired so if
there are further responses perhaps you could provide them in
writing. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. General Fenton, I want to
continue down that line of questioning from Senator Blumenthal
about the cuts to Army special operations forces, about the
logic behind that, in particular, which I think may be faulty.
You testified to the House recently the Army's proposed
cuts to special operations forces are occurring, and this is
your quote, ``against the backdrop of ever-increasing demands
from our combatant commands.'' Then Admiral Aquilino from PACOM
testified that special operations in PACOM are critically
important for training our partners and increasing combat
capability.
So both of you are making the point that special operations
forces play a very important role, not just in fighting and
winning a war but in deterring conflict, both in the Pacific
and around the world. Is that correct?
General Fenton. Senator, that is absolutely correct. We see
those demand as not only I, but not even just the INDOPACOM
Commander, I think others in testimony throughout the last
couple of months----
Senator Cotton. Because one justification for these cuts,
coming from the Secretary of the Army, is that special
operators are supposedly less important right of boom. To put
that in English, boom is when shooting war starts, people start
returning fire. Left of boom then would be leading up to any
kind of conflict.
In that space that you just talked about, aren't special
operators in contact with U.S. partners and in some cases the
enemy almost every day left of boom, so to speak? Why is that
contact important? Could you explain that a little bit more?
General Fenton. I can, Senator. I will start by saying that
SOF and SOCOM have a very important part to play for almost
eight decades, starting right at World War II and the coming
forward, it not only in-boom, in conflict, in high-end
operations, but in particular where our value, my estimations
is the highest is left of that, preventing it, preventing
conflict, as our NDS and many other documents direct us to do.
I think our skill sets are perfectly apportioned for that.
Frankly, it is our DNA.
If, while we are out there, there is a potential for the
rough edges of a conflict, we are also preparing the
environment--developing options, different ways of doing
business for our combatant commands that present challenges to
any adversary. So there is a whole bunch of value left of
conflict.
SOF has got value in conflict as well, and then I would
just offer, Senator, additionally in a protraction, because you
and I both know that no conflict is 30 days or 40 days. Those
things protract, and I think SOF has got value there, as well.
Senator Cotton. Let's be even more concrete. Let's look at
a specific case study with Ukraine. After the first invasion of
Ukraine in 2014, our Army Special Operations Forces, well, U.S.
special operators more generally, were in routine contact with
Ukraine. Can you explain the payoff that pre---well, in this
case it was post-conflict and pre-conflict--post-'24 invasion,
pre-2022 invasion, and the dividends it paid when Russia
invaded in 2022, for that 8-year period?
General Fenton. I can, Senator, and I will try to make it
quick. I will wind it back just a tad. Our contact with
Ukrainian military started in 1994 by special operations, maybe
when no one else was looking, but special ops was. Our ability
to be with the Ukrainian military since 1994, and in particular
build SOF, did a couple of things. It built a noncommissioned
officer corp. I think you and the Committee here know better
than anybody that is the incredible value proposition our whole
military brings across the world. They did not have that. We
changed them from a Soviet-style anything into a more Western-
based approach military, specifically in special ops.
I think all that came together certainly after 2014, but on
the second invasion in 2022, when we knew that the Russian
Federation understood how important Ukrainian SOF was, when a
couple of the first targets during their attacks had Ukrainian
SOF implications.
I think that continues, and I think that, in many ways,
almost looks like a mutual fund--small investments over time
with a high payoff when called upon, that continue to grow, and
I think I do not see that just in Ukraine. I have seen that in
Colombia, during Plan Colombia, when U.S. SOF was there in
support of SOUTHCOM, doing what we did with Colombian SOF and
Colombian military. I have seen it many other places.
But I think there high value left of conflict that
certainly SOF plays a part of.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Mr. Maier, in the time I have
remaining I have got to ask you a question. I am kind of
surprised it has not come up, frankly, in the last 2 hours. It
is the matter of Ariane Tabatabai, your chief of staff. She was
allegedly part of an Iranian foreign ministry information
operation. She used to work for Rob Malley, a well-known Iran
sympathizer who has had his security clearance revoked by the
State Department, is under investigation. That is all we know
because the State Department has stonewalled us on this. When
we raised concerns about Ms. Tabatabai last fall, the
Department of Defense assured us that protocols were followed.
We do not have any more information about it. I mean, I am sure
protocols were followed for all Aldrich Ames and Robert
Hanssen, as well. I think it is a basic function of our
oversight responsibility for us to have more information about
Ms. Tabatabai and how someone with these ties to a well-known
Iranian influence operation ended up working for you.
Now, I almost want to express my regret to you personally,
because I do not think you hired her. I think she was hired
into your office, so I do not think you were the person that
made the decisions. But she is working for you in your office,
and we have not heard much about it all since we inquired in
the fall. So I have to ask you, what is the status of Ms.
Tabatabai, and how can we be confident that even if protocols
were followed they got the right decision made, given Mr.
Malley's status of still being suspended and having his
clearance provoked?
Mr. Maier. Senator Cotton, Ms. Tabatabai still is employed
in my office. She is part, like all the other civilians,
military, contractors in the Department, subject to continuous
vetting that is done by the Defense Counterintelligence and
Security Agency. That is about all that I can provide you in
this forum, and that is what I have been provided by the folks
that are really responsible for security in our Department,
sir.
Senator Cotton. Can you provide us more in another forum,
like maybe the closed one we have coming up?
Mr. Maier. I can provide a bit more, sir, yes.
Senator Cotton. All right. I will see you there.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Warren, please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So we know that
firing weapons can expose servicemembers to pressure from
blasts that can cause traumatic brain injuries and other harms.
The New York Times revealed last year that artillery units
fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria suffered from hallucinations,
seizures, depression, and suicides after firing more rounds
than any artillery units since the Vietnam War.
Special operations forces are one of the communities at
greatest risk, and SOCOM is now taking steps to protect special
operators, including by regularly testing their cognitive
health and requiring instructors to stand further away when
troops fire certain weapons. But there are gaps on the ground.
The New York Times observed a special operations training and,
quote, ``none of those safety steps could be seen.''
One concern is that we may miss operators suffering
injuries because we are only screening their cognitive health
every 3 years. General Fenton, would servicemembers benefit
from annual cognitive health testing to monitor the potential
impacts from blast exposure?
General Fenton. Senator, I think we would all benefit from
any increased periodicity on health screening and testing, and
we have got many ways to do that.
Senator Warren. Good. I am glad to hear that. I am also
concerned that these operators may be afraid to ask for help or
may not even know that they need help, so these regular
screenings are critical important to saving lives. I think
there is more that we can do. A commander is trained to know
how to guide their team through enemy territory, but it is hard
for a commander to take care of their troops if they do not
know the risks that the weapons pose to their troops' brain
health.
General Fenton, would commanders benefit from having more
accurate safety data on weapons systems that their operators
use, like the level of blast coming from the weapons?
General Fenton. Senator, absolutely. It hits right at the
heart of what we are all charged to do, which is, number one,
the health, safety, and welfare of our uniformed servicemembers
and everybody in our charge. SOCOM is moving out on that.
Senator Warren. Good. But we have got to get this
information to the people who are in these on-the-ground
leadership roles.
You know, I think we also need to make sure that troops who
are suffering from blast exposure injuries receive the care
that they need. I am proud that Massachusetts is home to a
nonprofit organization called Home Base that takes care of the
invisible wounds of veterans, servicemembers, military
families, and families of the fallen. Home Base's comprehensive
brain health and trauma program helps get 95 percent of our
servicemembers back into the field and makes it easier for
special operators to receive treatment mid-career rather than
waiting until they are leaving the service.
General Fenton, would special operators benefit from more
access to programs like Home Base?
General Fenton. Senator, absolutely, and if I might, first
of all, thank you for the conversation you and I had about this
and our desire to get more access to centers like this, and
Home Base is incredible. It is a blessing for your special
operators, as are some of the other centers as well that are
out there. We absolutely would benefit from getting more access
to it, because we see the results, the incredible outcomes,
where somebody goes in, has a number of musculoskeletal all the
way down to just the ability to need a new pair of glasses
because of some neuro things, and absolutely, we would love to
take more and leverage more.
Senator Warren. The work they are doing is truly amazing,
both to assess and diagnose the problems and successfully to
treat them, and that is the part we have to underline about
TBI.
This is one of the reasons that I am proud that I, along
with Senator Ernst and Senators Tillis and King and Kaine and
Scott and Duckworth and Cardin will be introducing the Blast
Overpressure Safety Act to require the DOD to take much-needed
steps to mitigate servicemember exposure.
There is one more place, I want to say quickly, where we
need to close the gap between policy and action. SOCOM said,
back in 2019, that it would start issuing blast exposure gauges
to all of its operators. Despite knowing about this need for
over 5 years, it was not included in your budget and was
relegated to your annual unfunded priorities list. When you do
not include critical programs like this in the base budget it
sends the messages to servicemembers and to their families that
it is not a real priority for your command. So I want to work
with DOD and with SOCOM on these issues. But you need to
clearly State in your budget that you take this issue
seriously. Budgets are a statement of our values.
General Fenton. Senator, if I might, thank you for that. We
absolutely will. I will say in this case, on this blast sensor
system that we put into our unfunded priority list this year,
it came in between two budget cycles. In 2019, as directed by
the NDAA, we went after in SOCOM a number of different blast
sensor opportunities and options. They did not meet our
standard. The majority of them were out in a commercial
variant.
Now we have zeroed in on a blast sensor, I will call it
system, and that is why in between two budget cycles I
absolutely wanted this Congress to see it, understand how
committed we are to it. But you have got my commitment. That
thing will be in our budget going forward next.
Senator Warren. Okay.
General Fenton. It just happened to be a timing and fact of
life change out in the commercial environment.
Senator Warren. All right. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Budd, please.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for being here.
General Haugh, it was good to see you yesterday and it is
good to see you today. From your perspective in CYBERCOM what
can you briefly tell us about the nexus between cyber and space
and SOF?
General Haugh. Senator, I think this is an area we continue
to explore, that each of us have the responsibility to be able
to deliver capabilities in support of the other combatant
commands and also to meet our unique mission requirements.
What we are finding is that as we partner there are things
that we can do together that we could not do independently, and
being driven by things like INDOPACOM requirements we have been
able to identify a number of those activities, and we see
increasing opportunity for our collaboration to be able to
advance all of our missions and really how we think about
integrated deterrence as we campaign together.
Senator Budd. Thank you for that. You know, I am looking at
that as a two-way street, right. I mean, you look at cyber-
enabled SOF and the entire joint force and the physical access
that SOF requires--that SOF provides, actually, SOF provides
the physical access--and that also enables critical cyber
operations. Would you agree?
General Haugh. We do, and I look forward to being able to
walk through some examples with you in closed session.
Senator Budd. Thank you.
Senator Maier and General Fenton, again, thank you both for
being here, as well. In your joint testimony you State that you
have, and I quote, you have ``seen an increase in the combatant
commands' demand for SOF capabilities and our critical enablers
in support of campaigning toward National Defense Strategy
priorities,'' end quote.
So how would you characterize that increase in demand as it
is across all combatant commands? Secretary?
Mr. Maier. Senator, I would start by saying that as we have
already testified we have seen an increase in crisis response
requirements because combatant commands are well versed in what
SOF brings in protecting American citizens, be those diplomats,
be those private citizens, and the ability to buy down risk
that SOF brings, that if there is a crisis, those combatant
commanders are going to reach for a SOF tool in the first
instance.
Many of our combatant commanders are still very focused on
the counterterrorism mission. They have still got ISIS. They
have still got al Qaeda. We have seen, in some cases, a
resurgence of ISIS in areas, both in Africa and the CENTCOM
AOR. So that is another requirement that continues to remain
steady, if not increase.
Then I think in the Indo-Pacific and certainly EUCOM we
have seen a lot more requirement for SOF to bring more of that
low-visibility, more precise capability, often in small, hard
to notice formations that combatant commanders have requested.
So I think as the world becomes more complex and there are
more requirements it is natural for the combatant commanders to
reach for that SOF tool because it brings a lot of different
capabilities, sir.
Senator Budd. General Fenton, I will just add to that
question. When I think of SOF, you used to think about just
counterterrorism, but now I think about great power
competition, regular warfare, something SOCOM has also been
doing for the last 20 years, and doing more of today. Would you
care to elaborate on that?
General Fenton. Senator, I would absolutely agree with you.
I think from our founding back really right in and after World
War II, great power competition and a great deterrence was at
the heart of all of that, as was strategic raids and rescuing
hostages, as we did in the Pacific theater even in World War
II. That has come forward. So it is really eight decades of
integrated deterrence and crisis response and 20 really hard-
earn combat of that 8 of counterterrorism experience, making us
an incredible force, and we are tailor made for this era.
Senator Budd. To both of you again, we have already
discussed at length in prior months that the Army proposes to
cut almost 3,000 special operations billets over the next 5
years. So now we see, and we talked about it today, the
increased demand for SOF, but what is the risk to mission and
the risk to force for those cuts? How do you prioritize? What
do you do with those requests? Secretary?
Mr. Maier. So Senator, I think fundamentally we have
attempted to remain focused on providing the unique capacity
that SOF can bring. So we have, in many instances, looked to
cut overall ability to provide those forces but retain aspects
of those forces. So said another way, we are keeping capability
even as capacity goes down. That is just less to meet some of
those requirements. What we remain laser-focused on, though, is
that those forces are all prepared to the right levels to go
out the door. So we are not going to take any risk in that
regard. We are going to make sure that they are prepared for
the mission they are going out to do.
Fundamentally, what it means is we have looked, in some
places, to reduce numbers of billets that are hard to fill, but
at the end of the day if that is in psychological operations or
civil affairs or some of our key enablers, intel, logistics,
communications, that means when we do hopefully have more
forces come in through recruiting and other means we will have
less billets to fill, sir.
Senator Budd. Thank you. General Fenton, anything in
closing you would like to add to that?
General Fenton. I would just add that we do it all through
a risk-informed approach, as the Secretary mentioned, thinking
about modernization, readiness, and operations, and keeping
that in equilibrium. Yet at some point we need to win today and
win tomorrow, and every opportunity we get we take a look at it
through that prism and really work forward from there.
Senator Budd. Thank you all.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd.
Senator Hirono, please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for your patience. I would ask each of you to speak very
directly into your mics so that I can more clearly hear you.
General Haugh, we have a growing need to incorporate small
businesses and nontraditional vendors to help strengthen our
defense industrial base to meet demands in the Indo-Pacific and
around the world. Last month, the Department of Defense
released its Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Strategy to
help protect these industry partners from sabotage and theft.
Can you talk about some of the steps you are taking to
defend our industry partners from cyberattacks, and
specifically, how your actions will encourage and assist the
incorporation of small business and other nontraditional
vendors to grow the defense industrial base?
General Haugh. Thank you, Senator. As we think about the
cyber defense of the defense industrial base we have been given
authorities both by Congress and Department, really through the
DOD CIO, to be able to grow our partnership with the defense
industrial base. We have done that through both NSA and Cyber
Command.
From an NSA perspective, the ability to establish the Cyber
Collaboration Center that has direct engagements with over
1,000 companies that make up the key leadership of the defense
industrial base and allow us to share information back and
forth about cyber threats, provide specific services to the
defense industrial base, and now increasingly thinking about
small businesses, particularly those that are involved in
artificial intelligence. How can we provide them an
understanding of threat as it relates to that?
Those are key areas, and then as the Cyber Command, as we
increasingly leverage our acquisition authorities, our ability
to move agilely with those small businesses is one of the areas
that we think will give us advantage as we go forward.
Senator Hirono. I think this is an area that needs to be
constantly attended to because I serve on the Small Business
Committee also and I have talked with small businesses who
would like to be able to work with DOD, but the DOD has all
these, and rightly so, these requirements that need to be
updated, where these small businesses need to be certified,
they are protected from cyberattacks. So I hope that you are
paying the appropriate attention to help the small businesses
be able to comply with all of these cybersecurity requirements
that do change quite frequently.
General Haugh. I understand, Senator, and I think this is,
from our perspective, why we have such a close partnership with
the DOD CIO in terms of the work that they do to set those
standards. We want to be able to reinforce and partner with
those small businesses.
Senator Hirono. Yes. Thank you. Secretary Maier and General
Fenton, I was pleased to see you highlight in your testimony
and your prepared remarks that diversity in our special forces
provide us an asymmetric advantage. Can one or both of you
speak more about why diversity is so important to solving
operational problems our special operations forces deal with on
a daily basis?
Mr. Maier. Senator Hirono, we think diversity is important
because it has an operational imperative and indeed continues
to provide outsized effects in the strategic environment as
well. One of the things that SOF is known for is, as you said,
problem solving. If you have people who come at this problem
from a different perspective, different backgrounds, different
way of looking at it, we are going to be inherently better
across the force in solving these problems.
But even if we put it in the context of the integrated
deterrence mission set, whether that is in the Indo-Pacific,
whether that is in Europe, having people from different
backgrounds, they speak different languages, maybe different
genders, can blend in in different ways and be more effective
in different societies with different partners, that is
something that we are asked to do every day, and so we cannot
all look the same and think the same. That fundamentally, I
think, is something that has been a tenet of the special
operations community for decades, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. I very much agree with you that diversity
is not something that should be supported because it is the
right thing to do, but there are very pragmatic reasons that we
should do that, and it makes our operation forces that much
better. Obviously it is also in the corporate arena that there
are studies and analyses that show that the more diverse the
corporate sector is, in terms of their hierarchy of employees,
the better the outcomes for them. So I think that is very much
the case in our DOD.
One more question, regarding workforce development. General
Haugh, your predecessor, General Nakasone, previously testified
that one of his highest priorities was maintaining a skilled
cyber workforce. What are some of the things that you are doing
to encourage people to get into cyber training? Particularly I
am interested if you are doing anything special to encourage
women and minorities in contemplating these kinds of jobs.
General Haugh. Senator, I think from our perspective where
it really starts for us is our academic engagement. How do we
partner with universities across the country to be able to draw
talent that is going to allow us to have the most qualified
force that is really representative of our nation? We want to
bring them into our force. We want them to come to an
environment that allows them to meet their full potential and
to develop. So we see those academic partnerships as
foundational, and we have grown those across both the National
Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command to take advantage of
that.
Once they are in our force, we also want to ensure they are
very well trained. So one of the things that the authorities
that we have been given in U.S. Cyber Command, as the joint
force trainer of the Department, setting the training standards
for anybody that does cyberspace operations in the Department.
We really started with those cybersecurity service providers of
our weapons systems and of our service networks. So we want to
keep raising the bar of the training that we are giving to
everybody in the Department that serves in cyberspace.
Senator Hirono. I hope you are reaching out to women and
minorities in your efforts. Yes?
General Haugh. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Budd is recognized again.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman, in allowing for the
followup question. General Fenton, I think you were starting on
this just a moment ago. Would requiring SOF-specific guidance,
that be issued as part of OSD's annual defense planning
guidance, would that help the services better account for SOF's
value proposition as they determine their size, their
structure, and their posture? We will start with you, General
Fenton, and Secretary Maier, if you have anything to add.
General Fenton. Senator, as you stated I will make a couple
of comments and pass this to the Secretary.
I will start by saying we absolutely, as a Department, have
to go be focused on sizing for conflict. In my estimation, that
is our worst day, when we are at high-end conflict and we have
got to absolutely understand the requirements across the
services in SOF that we need for that.
I think what I would offer now, since SOCOM is diving into
this at our level is that with the changing character and
environment of war against the backdrop of primary mission,
prevent great power conflict, there is a whole bunch in left-
of-conflict before conflict that SOF does, that we, as SOCOM
first, along with Secretary Maier, need to really go through an
analytical, rigorous process to say we have got to be able to
bring that to the Department as part of that construct, as well
as what happens when you protract, you go beyond maybe a 30-or
40-day scenario that we recognize has been very rare in this
world, that it is 30 or 40 days.
On top of that, I think we are also exploring how that,
plus what we do in the crisis response arena and the
counterterrorism arena, is all wrapped up into SOF value
contribution in support of the Nation.
Senator Budd. Thank you.
Mr. Maier. Senator, I think it would be helpful because I
think it would help to continue a process we are already on in
the Department which is really twofold. It is looking at a very
challenging element of trying to measure elements of conflict
and what you are preventing, which is very challenging and I
think where SOF plays.
Then I think the second part to your core question is one
of the things my office is particularly focused on is being
able to articulate to the programs and resourcing side of the
Department the value of SOF. We often say we want our SOF
operators to be silent professionals, but we do not want them
to be not having a voice when we do exercises, when we
experiment, when we build a construct for a future fight. That
is really important and I think something that continuing to
focus, whether it is defense planning guidance or any of the
other guiding documents in the Department, reminding the
services, in fact, reminding the entire Department to account
for that value proposition. It helps me, it helps SOCOM to have
that voice so that we can articulate that value proposition,
sir.
Senator Budd. Thank you all. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd, and gentlemen,
thank you for your outstanding testimony.
We will reconvene at approximately 12:20 in SVC-217 for the
classified portion of this hearing. I will remind my colleagues
there is a vote going on now, and they should vote. But until
then I will adjourn the open session of this hearing, and thank
you very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the Committee was recessed, to
be continued in closed session.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
defending critical infrastructure
1. Senator Hirono. General Haugh, I continue to be concerned about
out of date and in many cases crumbling critical DOD infrastructure.
One alarming aspect of this is the risk posed by cyberattacks,
especially in light of FBI Director Wray's recent warnings about the
growing threat of Chinese cyberattacks on the United States' civilian
electrical grid and other critical infrastructure. How is CYBERCOM
defending against threats to critical DOD infrastructure, and are you
collaborating with other Federal agencies like the FBI in this effort?
General Haugh. USCYBERCOM is leading the Department of Defense's
efforts mandated by Fiscal Year 2022 NDAA Sec. 1505 to complete mapping
of DOD Mission Relevant Terrain in Cyberspace (MRT-C) for Defense
Critical Assets (DCAs) and Task Critical Assets (TCAs). This
comprehensive and methodical approach to mapping the DOD 's MRT-C
encompasses operational assets, security controls, and data sets as
outlined in USCYBERCOM MRT-C Cyber Warfare Publication Operational
Guidance. It establishes a standardized framework for identifying MRT-C
by aligning key terrain concepts with joint cyberspace operations
concepts, and sets the conditions for DOD components and supporting
elements to better plan, protect, operate, and control MRT-C. For the
DOD 's defense of critical infrastructure and mandate of Fiscal Year
2022 NDAA Sec. 1505, the emphasis has been on the 45 DODIN Areas of
Operation (DAOs) to identify and map their mission relevant terrain in
cyberspace (e.g. defense critical assets and task critical assets) for
the Department.
The Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) 's Hunt Forward Operations
are defensive cyber operations where CNMF hunt teams operate on a
network of a partner's choosing to detect, monitor and analyze tactics,
techniques and procedures of malicious cyber actors. This information
improves collective cyber resilience and defenses, and these operations
help bolster the security of partner nations and provide the U.S.
advanced notice of adversary tools and techniques. \1\
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\1\ Shared Threats, Shared Understanding: United States, Canada and
Latvia Conclude Defensive Hunt Operations; Cyber National Mission Force
Public Affairs; IO MAY 2023.
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USCYBERCOM is entering into CRADA agreements with key critical
infrastructure providers in order to: (I) Develop cyber tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for OT/JCS network defense, (2)
Conduct joint red/blue exercising, (3) Threat information sharing, and
(4) Explore the effectiveness of current USCYBERCOM cyberspace
capabilities on OT/JCS networks.
USCYBERCOM is in close collaboration with the FBI to not only
defend DOD infrastructure, but to add to the resiliency of key United
States civilian critical infrastructure as well. China, other nation
states, and criminal actors try to exploit United States critical
infrastructure domestically and overseas that are critical to our
national security. On a daily basis, FBI and USCYBERCOM coordinate and
deconjlict efforts so that FBI domestic law enforcement authorities are
complemented by USCYBERCOM authorities to act in cyberspace outside the
United States. For instance, in fiscal year 2024, the FBI and CNMF
partnered to publish eight cybersecurity advisories that inform the
public of nation State malicious cyber activity and mitigate threats to
U.S. critical infrastructure and the election information environment.
countering disinformation and misinformation
2. Senator Hirono. General Fenton, We have heard testimony from
several other Geographic Combatant Commanders about how influential
misinformation campaigns by adversary nations can be in stoking public
distrust--Russia's actions in Ukraine are a prime example. General
Fenton, how is Special Operations Command involved in countering
disinformation and misinformation operations by our adversaries?
General Fenton. As the Joint Proponent for Military Information
Support Operations (MISO), the U.S. Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) leads the joint capability development for technologies that
enable the Department to prevent and counter malign information both on
the internet and in traditional information mediums. As the
Coordinating Authority for Internet Based MISO, USSOCOM established an
organization to centralize all Department of Defense internet-based
MISO efforts--the Joint MISO Web Operations Center (JMWC). The JMWC
supports Combatant Commands' utilization of internet-based technologies
for the purpose of countering adversary misinformation and
disinformation. Additionally, our Theater Special Operations Commands
work with partners and allies across the globe to ensure local credible
voices are enabled to provide enduring solutions to countering the
misinformation and disinformation threat.
future technologies (e.v.s)
3. Senator Hirono. General Fenton, our Nation's Special Operations
forces are trailblazers in operationalizing new technologies to solve
difficult problems. To do this though, members of your team must have
the right next generation platforms--including electric and hybrid-
electric vehicles. These vehicles are quieter, can accelerate faster,
and can have increased onboard power for additional capabilities, such
as directed-energy weapons and jammers, along with a reduced thermal
and acoustic signature. They also are better for the environment. What
place do tactical electric and hybrid vehicles have in enabling your
future mission success?
General Fenton. USSOCOM is evaluating hybrid-electric ground
mobility vehicles to determine if they can provide extended range,
exportable power, lower logistics burdens, and reduce acoustic and
thermal signatures. USSOCOM is using a phased approach to characterize
improvements over traditional fuel powered solutions with plans for
limited user assessments of operational utility in the first quarter of
fiscal year 2025. Specifically, USSOCOM is converting a Ground Mobility
Vehicle 1.1 from fuel-powered to hybrid-electric to assess how it
extends the range and reduces the signature. USSOCOM is monitoring the
efforts of the Armed Services for hybrid-electric technologies that
could provide base vehicle power export and mobility propulsion for
applications, such as autonomous operations, kinetic packages,
communication relays, unmanned aerial systems storage and re-charge,
and subterranean missions.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
ridge runner
4. Senator Manchin. General Fenton, you and Assistant Secretary of
Defense Maier both spoke during the hearing about the importance of
integrated partnerships and the pivotal transition to prioritizing
irregular warfare activities. From my understanding, large numbers of
SOCOM personnel attend international training exercises focused on
irregular warfare. Should we be upscaling our own organic exercises on
United States soil to increase international partner participation and
provide a cost-effective additional training venue for our special
operations forces? As an example, the Ridge Runner exercise in WV is
facilitated by West Virginia National Guard Special Forces personnel
and sources international and conventional force partners for the U.S.
based exercise. Participants and observers include Ukraine, Georgia,
Poland, Japan, Taiwan, Georgia, and Croatia. Who on your staff is the
best point of contact for our Ridge Runner cadre to discuss additional
partner nation participation with? Can this staff followup with us to
be put in contact with our cadre?
General Fenton. Our J3 International Division (J3-I) has Special
Operations Forces (SOF) representatives from 29 Allied and Partner
Nations (A/PNs) and has a strong relationship with the RIDGE RUNNER
Committee. The Committee has been showcasing training opportunities to
our A/PNs for the last few years which has generated considerable
interest. The J3-I has sent observers from Germany, Slovakia, Hungary,
Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Finland to previous
events; Lithuanian SOF previously participated in RIDGE HEALER.
Hungarian SOF are participating in RIDGE RUNNER 24-2 this year with
approximately 50 personnel due to last year's visit. Our J3-I will
continue to send A/PNs as observers and will expand State Partnership
Program (SPP) opportunities with respective Theater Special Operations
Commands' coordination. I will ensure the Exercise and International
Divisions continue to coordinate directly with the West Virginia
National Guard for RIDGE RUNNER participation by our A/PNs.
joint training in west virginia
5. Senator Manchin. General Fenton, we've spoken multiple times
about the need for an East Coast training venue for special forces
instead of these units spending more than half their training budgets
on transporting themselves West to other training venues where they
have to jump through hoops for approval on basic training needed to
meet their readiness goals. If an all domain training venue were
constructed utilizing labor and funding separate from SOCOM do you
believe this facility would be utilized heavily by SOCOM units to meet
their training and experimentation goals? What current training
limitations exist and what characteristics of an East Coast venue would
mitigate such gaps?
General Fenton. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness (P&R) is sponsoring a study on East Coast
training venues. When complete, the study should highlight
transportation cost savings and the recoupment of training time as
benefits to East Coast training venues. Since 2019, USSOCOM has
leveraged a partnership with the West Virginia National Guard. This
collaboration has proven invaluable in enhancing our training and
rehearsal capabilities. The unique topography, terrain, and climate of
West Virginia provide nearly unparalleled opportunities to conduct SOF
full mission profile exercises. We'd refer you to USD P&R for timeline
of study completion and their overall assessment. USSOCOM, in constant
pursuit of multi-domain training venues, is always available to review
such facilities and determine potential utilization.
Senator Rosen
preventing captured isis fighters from returning to the battlefield
6. Senator Manchin. General Fenton, with the threat of a Turkish
incursion into northern Syria, or Turkish military operations against
our Kurdish partners, we know that SDF personnel guarding ISIS prisons
and displaced persons camps will likely need to leave their posts in
order to defend their territory, opening the door to the possible
escape of captured ISIS fighters and their families--just as we saw
play out in 2019. Given our partnership with the SDF in the Defeat-ISIS
campaign, including security training, what contingency plans does
CENTCOM have to shore up SDF-run prisons and displaced persons camps to
ensure that captured ISIS fighters do not return to the battlefield?
How does the continued elimination of ISIS leadership--which your
forces impressively keep executing--impact ISIS's ability to plan and
carry out attacks on U.S. forces and SDF-run prisons and displaced
persons camps?
General Fenton. USSOCOM defers to the U.S. Central Command to
provide an update on their planning related to SDF support. Against the
questions posted, U.S. Special Operations Forces' (USSOF) continual
pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leadership and
network is vital to disrupting current threats and identifying emerging
threats within the region and on the Homeland. USSOF is also postured
with CENTCOM in training the guard forces for the ISIS detention
facilities and displaced persons camps. It is also important to note
the continued work done by our Coalition partners and vetted local
partners in fighting ISIS as well. Though USSOF do conduct unilateral
operations, we work closely with our partners every day to ensure the
enduring defeat of ISIS. Our presence is a key enabling function of
those activities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
7. Senator Kelly. General Fenton, can you talk about the importance
of these power projection wings and your insight on the status of the
standup of the wing at Davis-Monthan?
General Fenton. The U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command's
(AFSOC) on-going and future approach will transform its organizational
structure, alignment, and force posture into Power Projection Wings
that present all four AFSOC mission areas: SOF Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, SOF Strike, SOF Mobility, and SOF
Air-to-Ground Integration, and are aligned geographically to Geographic
Combatant Commands and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).
Aligning Power Projection Wings by Geographic Combatant Commands /TSOCs
builds working relationships (both within the Department of Defense and
partner relationships), increases familiarization of area of
operations, and increases opportunities for AFSOC force development.
Currently, the Department of Air Force, USSOCOM, and AFSOC leadership
are conducting site visits; validating movement and planning
assumptions (information technology, ammunition and magazine
requirements, manpower, construction, ramp space, hangers, etc.); and
programming funding to support the buildup of Power Projection Wings.
Based on current planning and operations, USSOCOM anticipates initial
permanent party arriving to Davis-Monthan AFB in fiscal year 2025.
8. Senator Kelly. General Fenton, in this year's budget request
SOCOM has taken Armed Overwatch Platform from 75 down to 62 aircraft.
What do you think is the right number of airplanes are?
General Fenton. The approved AO program Full Operational Capability
(FOC) requirement is for 75 aircraft to support one Air National Guard
and three Active-Duty squadrons. This enables a 4-cycle force
generation for reconstitution and individual training, unit training,
joint training, and deployment with the necessary support to sustain
five persistently deployed units of three aircraft and seven crews.
This force structure, and the mission requirements driving this fleet
size, are regularly reviewed as USSOCOM regularly analyzes force
structure and mission requirements to meet the National Defense
Strategy, to include the requirements and fleet size for Armed
Overwatch. Per the Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report No.
GAO-24-106283 titled ``Special Operations Forces: DOD Should Slow
Acquisitions of Armed Overwatch Aircraft Until It Conducts Needed
Analysis,'' USSOCOM will provide the results of this analysis as part
of the GAO Corrective Action Plan that will culminate with a report to
Congress upon completion. The results will also inform USSOCOM's
decision regarding aircraft quantity and phasing and will make any
necessary adjustments to future budget requests and/or the fiscal year
2025 Lot buy in April 2025.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
cybercom authorities
9. Senator Wicker. General Haugh, are there additional tools,
resources, or hiring authorities you need from Congress to help develop
the next iteration of the military's cyber forces?
General Haugh. USCYBERCOM does not currently assess there to be a
need for any additional operational authorities. However, while
USCYBERCOM has broad hiring authorities, we continue to pursue
expansion of authorities that drive competitiveness with the private
sector. As an example, we advocate for parity across all Services for
hiring under 10 USC Sec. 4092 to maximize our talent pool and tackle
hard-to-fill positions created by low inventory and often influenced by
pay. Additionally, expanding authorities to grant cash awards to
uniformed servicemembers, akin to the novel Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA Sec.
1531(P.L.117-2.63), Cyber Operations Peculiar Award, supports rewarding
innovation.
center for narrative intelligence
10. Senator Wicker. General Haugh, narrative intelligence refers to
the combined use of human intelligence and artificial intelligence to
analyze the origins, motivations, intentions, evolution, and outcomes
of narratives. How can narrative intelligence help CYBERCOM fulfill its
national security mission in cyberspace?
General Haugh. The exponential growth of online narrative content
challenges individuals, organizations, and governments to rapidly
consume, comprehend, and engage with narratives circulating on global
digital media. Narrative intelligence is predicated on a holistic
understanding of the complex web of stories, beliefs, and motivations
that drive individual and collective actions. In the realm of national
security, narrative intelligence has the potential to inform
USCYBERCOM's understanding of the foreign threat environment, including
adversaries' attempt to gain an advantage in the information
environment.
11. Senator Wicker. General Haugh, as you are aware, the Fiscal
Year 2024 NDAA directed the Department of Defense to assess and make
recommendations on the need to establish a dedicated task force or
center for narrative intelligence. The Commander of CYBERCOM is to be
consulted as part of this assessment. To date, have you been consulted
about the need to establish a dedicated task force or center for
narrative intelligence?
General Haugh. To date, USCYBERCOM is not aware of a request for
consultation on establishing a dedicated Task Force or center for
Narrative intelligence. However, we are aware of growing interest
within Academia, related to narrative intelligence, which aligns well
with current USCYBERCOM missions, and previous congressional intent.
Specifically, we understand a small number of academic institutions
have combined efforts to partner in a newly established National Center
for Narrative Intelligence (NCNI) based at the University of
Mississippi. This offers a potential opportunity for government-
academia-industry partnership and collaboration related to narrative
intelligence, though other opportunities likely exist. The DOD CIO
office is aware of the NCNI efforts and is working to expand academic
engagement on matters like this.
As part of USCYBERCOM's mission, we seek to understand and counter
US. adversaries and their actions in cyberspace, including malign
influence actors, who use malign narratives against the US., its Allies
and Partners. Within USCYBERCOM, the Cyber National Mission Force
(CNMF) has focused on countering such adversary organizations, as a
routine part of their operations over the past 6 years. USCYBERCOM also
partners with NSA, and the IC to tackle adversary cyber activities,
including malign influence and narratives.
12. Senator Wicker. General Haugh, how can CYBERCOM leverage
expertise in narrative intelligence at U.S. colleges and universities
to help the Cyber National Mission Force detect and mitigate malicious
influence campaigns aimed at the United States?
General Haugh. USCYBERCOM values academic partnerships to foster
research and innovation on critical mission problems and inspire
service in DOD cyber cadre. USCYBERCOM is actively expanding academic
partnerships to enhance our technical activities. There are likely
other academic partnership opportunities for USCYBERCOM enterprise
engagement.
Additionally, USCYBERCOM can leverage the expertise in narrative
intelligence at US. colleges and universities by entering into
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) with those
universities focused around collaboratively researching and developing
new algorithms and capabilities to detect and mitigate malicious
adversary influence campaigns.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
special operations forces training in the arctic
13. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Maier and General Fenton, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arctic and Global Resilience
Ferguson announced that DOD will release an updated Arctic Strategy
this spring. This is timely as SOCOM forces just demonstrated and
tested new capabilities during Arctic Edge 2024. Were you consulted in
the creation of the updated Arctic Strategy to ensure lessons unique to
special operations and low-intensity combat were incorporated?
Secretary Maier. Yes. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD(SO/LIC)) were significantly involved
in developing the 2024 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy. The
Arctic Strategy outlines the Department's approach to the Arctic as the
region undergoes rapid geophysical and geopolitical change. The
strategy aligns with and nests under the 2022 National Security
Strategy, the 2022 National Defense Strategy, and the 2022 National
Strategy for the Arctic Region. It also aligns with and implements the
2023 DOD Homeland Defense Policy Guidance. U.S. Special Operations
Command North's Arctic Edge 2024 and other Special Operations Forces
(SOF) Arctic exercises are a key facet of the DOD Arctic Strategy's
implementation, and the lessons learned from these exercises will
inform future operations in the region.
General Fenton. Yes. The latest iteration of the Arctic Strategy is
significantly improved over the original version from several months
ago. The value of Special Operations Forces to the Joint Force is well
expressed in this update, which highlights how collaboration with our
Allies can provide the U.S. distinct advantages in the Arctic, and
USSOCOM had a large part in creation of this strategy. Continued
exercises in the Arctic will strengthen multilateral resolve, highlight
global allied integration, and lead to improved U.S. Special Operations
Forces (USSOF) proficiency operating in this austere domain. Ongoing
USSOF Arctic efforts include a standing Capability Development Working
Group currently focused on high-latitude communications; collaboration
with Norway, Sweden, and Finland in the U.S. European Command area of
responsibility and via liaison officers at HQUSSOCOM; TSOC (i.e.,
Special Operations Command North and Special Operations Command Europe)
Arctic-related exercises (e.g., Arctic Edge) and support plans; and a
HQUSSOCOM-led Arctic Special Operations Capabilities-Based Assessment.
14. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Maier and General Fenton, what
additional resourcing do you require to field arctic-rated equipment
for SOCOM forces operating in Alaska and the European Arctic?
Secretary Maier. New or emerging SOF capabilities and requirements
needed to support the Arctic Strategy will be thoroughly considered and
vetted through USSOCOM's corporate Program Objective Memorandum process
for consideration, and we will work with colleagues throughout the
Department to ensure those capabilities are ``Arctic rated'' against
validated standards.
General Fenton. USSOCOM is doing several actions to accelerate and
enhance artic-related equipment for USSOCOM forces to increase size of
deployable force/extent of mission durations. The SOF-peculiar Military
Alpine Reconnaissance System (MARS) is a newly fielded system of cold
weather clothing layers that provide protection to the operator at
extreme low temperatures. However, this system was not designed for
sustained arctic operations; rather, MARS is intended primarily for
limited duration arctic mission sets. To provide true arctic
protection, SOF will experiment with and pursue additional layers and
extended protection to the extremities without sacrificing mobility and
lethality. Improved over-boot and over-glove/mitt solutions are being
evaluated for near-term transition to the force to increase the
duration SOF can sustain operations in Arctic environments.
Further, USSOCOM is prepared to accelerate efforts to improve our
ground mobility fleets for cold-weather mobility operations through
purchase of commercial snowmobiles, associated payload expansion sleds,
and wheel modifications for Lightweight All-Terrain Vehicles. USSOCOM
is monitoring the Army's effort for the purpose-built Cold Weather All-
Terrain Vehicle, which could represent Service-provided capability for
SOF units if the Army supports purchases for USSOCOM. Additional
funding details associated with these requirements will be provided to
the Committee.
15. Senator Sullivan. General Fenton, does SOCNORTH have plans to
expand number of operators with cold weather and Arctic training to
meet the increased Russian Arctic presence?
General Fenton. Currently, Special Operations Command North
(SOCNORTH) continually assesses its requirements for SOF in arctic
environments. SOCNORTH supports NORAD and USNORTHCOM's exercise
``Arctic Edge,'' the premiere field training venue to improve combined
joint special operations capabilities in extreme cold and high latitude
environments. Artic training presents challenges for USSOF given no
assigned forces in the Arctic, coupled with the constrained reliance on
USNORTHCOM's exercise budget. However, our Naval Special Warfare (NSW)
and U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Components are
developing Arctic capability within their formations to improve their
ability to compete in cold weather environments.
16. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Maier and General Fenton, are there
plans to increase multi-national training with our Arctic allies and
partners in Alaska?
Secretary Maier. Yes. Partnerships are the cornerstone of SOF
contributions toward integrated deterrence. Increasing multinational
training with our Arctic allies is critical to bolstering deterrence in
the Arctic, and we are seeking more opportunities to train with our
Arctic allies and partners. The Department continues to participate in
exercises like Arctic Edge that allow SOF to increase its capabilities
in the Arctic, and strengthen relationships with Alaskan natives,
allies, and partners who share our concerns and interests in the Arctic
region.
General Fenton. Yes. Arctic Edge 24 included Special Operations
Forces partners from Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the UK with observers
from Finland, Sweden and Poland. It also included activities with the
U.S. Navy's Arctic Sub Lab, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, United
States Coast Guard, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and United States
Marshals Service. We regularly offer the venue to A/PNs to improve
combined joint special operations capabilities and demonstrate
commitment to mutual strategic security interests. We also promote
Arctic Edge exercise events in Canada and Greenland (coordinated
through Canadian SOF and Special Operations Command Europe) to expand
the scope of Arctic Homeland Defense activities along gaps and seams.
socom lessons from ukraine
17. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Maier and General Fenton, does
SOCOM have a formal mechanism to generate lessons learned from how
Ukraine is employing its SOF in combat with Russia?
Secretary Maier. Yes. Our operations research teams (part of the
newly established Center for Special Operations Analysis) are leading a
formal analytic effort. We believe the wealth of data collected from
Ukraine can guide our analysis of potential future conflicts with
Russia and China.
General Fenton. Yes. USSOCOM Lessons Learned currently has two
Lessons Learned Specialists in the USEUCOM AOR, one at Special
Operations Command Europe and one forward deployed to Combined Joint
Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF)-10. Their primary focus is
collecting and analyzing data from Ukrainian Special Operations Forces
combat operations, as well as USSOCOM support mechanisms to Ukrainian
partners. USSOCOM utilizes the Joint Lessons Learned Information
System, available to the entire DOD enterprise. Additionally, HQ
USSOCOM Lessons Learned compiles the data from the war in Ukraine into
annual reports distributed to the entire SOF enterprise. USSOCOM
Lessons Learned is currently finishing the second iteration of the
Ukraine Year in Review for publication. Last, USSOCOM was a key part of
the DOD lessons learned team focused on Ukraine's employment of multi-
domain and open source capabilities in their effort to counter Russian
aggression.
18. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Maier and General Fenton, what is
the most significant difference between how SOCOM thought about its
role in large scale contingency operations in January 2022 and now?
Secretary Maier. The biggest difference between now and January
2022 is our improved understanding of how SOF can enable the Joint
Force to prevail in the conflict phase. We remain focused on SOF
activities ``left of conflict,'' both to deter our adversaries and to
prepare for conflict should deterrence fail. Now, by working with the
Joint Staff on the Joint Warfighting Concept and through USSOCOM and
Joint Staff-led wargames and analysis, we have developed a more mature
understanding of SOF's key role as part of the ``inside force'' to fill
gaps within the Joint Force to help counter adversary command, control,
computing, communications, cyber, electronic warfare, space,
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities;
close kill webs; and bolster resilience in conflict. SOF can play an
outsized role in the execution phase of conflict by virtue of our
access and placement (both physical and virtual) and our innovative
concepts and capabilities. Doing this, however, takes persistent
operations, activities, and investments that must begin well before
conflict. In addition, events such as the Sudan noncombatant evacuation
operations, Israel's war in Gaza against Hamas, and ongoing
transnational violent extremist organization threats have reinforced
SOF's role in preserving strategic focus so that the general purpose
forces can maintain their focus on preparing for large-scale combat
operations. SOF maintains a global presence, often deployed where
conventional forces are not or cannot be deployed and are the
Department's eyes and ears, buying down risk by providing indications
and warning of, and responding to, emerging crises.
General Fenton. Over the past 2 years, USSOCOM has significantly
evolved and matured in understanding the role of Special Operations
Forces (SOF) in large-scale contingency operations. Initially, in
January 2022, we recognized the importance of SOF capabilities in a
potential conflict with a near-peer adversary, primarily focusing on
their role in competing with adversaries prior to conflict to prevent a
great power war. While SOF remains critical in this space, we have
since broadened our perspective on the SOF value prior to conflict in
enabling the Joint Force to prevail in conflict, should it occur. We
have also done a majority of this thought change in concert with DOD's
work on the Joint Warfighting Concept.
SOF provides the Joint Force with access, placement, and
preparation prior to conflict, while offering significant advantages as
an inside force during conflict. This partnership enables the support
of self-defense and resilience for our A/PNs who may be vulnerable to
adversary attacks. The integration of SOF capabilities allows the Joint
Force to target adversary assets, hold critical adversary systems and
resources at risk, and ensure the Joint Force operates from a position
of advantage in the information space.
socom missions and recruiting
19. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Maier and General Fenton, the 2022
NDS established the People's Republic of China at the pacing threat
followed by Russia. These threats require different capabilities than
the counter-terrorism fight most SOCOM entities have conducted for the
past 20 years. This also means SOCOM will conduct different missions at
different scales. Can you explain, with examples, how SOCOM's global
force posture has changed to reflect the shift from CT operations to
deterring Chinese and Russian aggression?
Secretary Maier. The Special Operations Forces (SOF) enterprise
provides inherent strategic agility for the combatant commands. We have
increased SOF deployments to the INDOPACOM AOR to support the
objectives outlined in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, and the
Department is systemically shifting SOF force posture over time,
including creating a Joint Special Operations Task Force and three new
Special Operations Task Forces to support integrated deterrence and
strategic competition with the People's Republic of China in the
INDOPACOM area of responsibility. SOF also retains the agility to surge
to respond to crisis, exemplified most recently by the post October 7,
2023, surge in SOF support to USCENTCOM.
General Fenton. Since the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS),
USSOCOM has been re-indexing back to its roots in Integrated
Deterrence. In fiscal year 2022, 60 percent of USSOCOM's force posture
was allocated toward countering violent extremist organizations (C-
VEO), with 34 percent allocated toward Integrated Deterrence. In fiscal
year 2025, more than 60 percent of Special Operations Forces (SOF) will
be allocated toward Integrated Deterrence, while allocating 33 percent
of SOF to force posture to maintain pressure on VEOs capable of
attacking the Homeland. USSOCOM additionally leverages its counter
terrorism relationships with NDS priority countries to advance
Integrated Deterrence objectives. SOF's commitment to Integrated
Deterrence has yielded a 48 percent increase in SOF demand from fiscal
year 2022 to fiscal year 2025: specifically, Combined Joint Special
Operations Task Force-10 in EUCOM, and Special Operations Task Forces
in the INDOPACOM area of operations.
20. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Maier and General Fenton, has the
shift from a CT focus to great power competition impacted retention
within SOCOM components?
Secretary Maier. The Department's focus on great power competition
has not impacted retention within USSOCOM Service components. Retention
remains high thanks to the tremendous support of Congress in providing
authorities and continued funding for programs aimed at improving
quality of life and support for our force and their families.
General Fenton. SOF Retention, bolstered by targeted reenlistment
and continuation bonus incentives, remains strong within our formations
despite changes in mission focus areas. Our first SOF Truth is that
Humans are more important than hardware and in making People our #1
priority, USSOCOM attracts, develops, supports, and retains its force
thereby maintaining our greatest comparative advantage. One example,
our largest SOF Component, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command,
experienced its strongest retention levels since 2019 and achieved
their Army retention goals within the first 4 months of the Fiscal
Year. Within the SOF enterprise, we emphasize PEOPLE-centric
initiatives and have established the Preservation of the Force and
Family program dedicated to serve our forces. Our SOF career fields are
closely monitored by our SOF Components who in turn directly and
regularly interact with their Service counterparts. Critical skills,
and reenlistment bonuses are Service-based and tailored to each career
field. The full funding of these programs is critical to maintain
current levels of SOF retention.
21. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Maier and General Fenton, have you
changed any aspect of your recruiting effort as the SOCOM focus has
shifted from CT to great power competition?
Secretary Maier. While neither ASD(SO/LIC) nor CDRUSSOCOM have
recruiting or retention authorities, we are impacted by the recruiting
challenges. The SOF enterprise supports the Military Departments'
recruiting and retention efforts by providing SOF personnel and SOF-
peculiar displays that help generate interest and excitement about
military service. While increased retention helps reduce the impact of
recruiting challenges, we must ensure recruitment, assessment,
selection, and overall production of SOF personnel remains on track to
maintain the health of the force. USSOCOM Service components are
implementing preparatory courses prior to SOF assessment and selection
courses to improve SOF selection rates and maintain quality standards.
General Fenton. USSOCOM does not retain direct recruiting
authorities, however, via our SOF Components we remain an engaged
partner in Armed Services recruiting efforts providing SOF expertise,
personnel, and SOF peculiar displays or equipment at numerous local and
national level events. SOF active participation allows us to ``tell our
story'' and generate higher levels of interest and attract more of our
Nation's talent to a career in military service. The mission shift to
strategic competition with the People's Republic of China has coincided
with other labor and economic trends in what is widely regarded as the
most challenging recruiting environment in recent history. Adapting to
this landscape, our SOF Components have become increasingly active with
their Service counterparts and have formalized their partnerships via
outreach and mentorship Commands and teams that educate, attract, and
identify the best talent to assess for our SOF training pathways. The
SOF assessment and selection standards remain high across all
Components. Services have been successful in expanding the eligibility
to serve in SOF career fields with many of our career fields recruiting
from both non-prior service and in-service veterans to maintain
adequate levels of candidates.
cyber lessons from ukraine
22. Senator Sullivan. General Haugh, what has CYBERCOM learned from
Russian operations to shape the cyber battle space prior to the renewed
Russian invasion of Ukraine?
General Haugh. Russia's invasion of Ukraine provides three key
lessons related to Russian operations to shape the cyber battlespace.
First, the effects of Russian cyber operations were blunted by
Ukraine's ability to disperse and distribute digital operations and
data assets. Soon after the invasion, Ukraine passed new laws
permitting Ukrainian data to be migrated to foreign servers. This
allowed Ukraine to successfully sustain its civil and military
operations, and disperse its digital infrastructure into the public
cloud. Second, Ukraine's cyber defense was enabled by partnerships with
private sector entities. After Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014,
Ukraine worked with Western cybersecurity companies to improve its
cybersecurity practices and harden its cyber infrastructure, making
Ukraine much less vulnerable to Russian cyber operations in the current
conflict. Third, Ukraine's ability to adapt to evolving Russian cyber
threats has been substantially bolstered by joint and partner
information sharing. Sharing by Western partners has provided Ukraine
knowledge of Russian operations and capabilities, and of Ukraine's own
vulnerabilities, that it would not have known otherwise.
23. Senator Sullivan. General Haugh, how have Russian cyber
operations changed after 2 years of conflict in Ukraine?
General Haugh. Since the start of the conflict in 2022, Russia has
increasingly shifted from its initial focus on destructive operations
against critical Ukrainian computer networks to a multi-pronged
approach, using both State cyber actors and hacktivist groups to
conduct cyber espionage supporting Moscow's military objectives in
Ukraine. Russian cyber actors are using sophisticated social
engineering techniques to target frontline endpoint devices used by
soldiers and gain access to Ukrainian military networks that enable air
defense command and control (C2). \2\ Additionally, various hacktivist
groups suspected of having ties to Russia's Main Intelligence
Directorate (GRU) have disseminated disinformation, performed
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, leaked Ukrainian
personally identifiable information, and claimed credit for attacks
performed by State actors. \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Royal United Services Institute, Russia's Cyber Campaign Shifts
to Ukraine's Front Lines, 22 JUL 2024.
\3\ Russia Threat Actors Dig in, Prepare to Seize on War Fatigue;
Microsoft; 7 DEC 2023.
24. General Haugh, have you seen that cyber adaptation cycle
compress in the Ukraine war?
General Haugh. Currently we do not know if the speed at which
Russian actors adapt their cyber operations tactics, techniques, or
procedures has measurably increased since the start of the war in 2022.
The increased operations tempo brought about by the Ukraine war may
initially have negatively impacted Russian cyber actors' abilities to
perform long-term, labor-intensive operations. A cybersecurity
company's analysis of an October 2022 disruptive event against the
Ukrainian energy sector noted that the incident was less disruptive
than previous attacks in 2015 and 2016, and lacked many of the
previously used disruptive components, possibly due to a lack of
resources and time. \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Sandworm Disrupts Power in Ukraine Using a Novel Attack Against
Operational Technology; Mandiant; 9 NOV 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, it is clear that Russian cyber actors continuously adapt
their operations against Ukraine. According to the same cybersecurity
company report, as of November 2023, suspected GRU actors were
increasingly using tactics which enabled them to increase the speed and
scale of their operations. The same report also observed that some of
the ma/ware used by Russia had been improved over previous variants,
though it is unlikely that all such adaptations are due solely to
Russia's experiences in Ukraine. \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Sandworm Disrupts Power in Ukraine Using a Novel Attack Against
Operational Technology; Mandiant; 9 NOV 2023.
25. Senator Sullivan. General Haugh, there has been a lot said
about compliance-based cyber defenses, particularly at the unit level,
like an individual navy ship. Compliance-based cyber defenses, however,
don't allow rapid fielding of new defenses. It also limits tailored
solutions that might fit better than an enterprise-wide solution. Is
CYBERCOM changing this approach to compliance-based defense?
General Haugh. USCYBERCOM is not changing this approach to
compliance-based defense. The question highlights the challenges
between cyber standardization and cyber innovation.
USCYBERCOM will continue to drive compliance-based defense to
ensure unification of the cyber infrastructure for the sake of
evaluating variances, highlighting areas that need focus, and to drive
the Department to a common lexicon. This compliance-based method is
essential for properly monitoring unique behaviors in our Defensive
Cyber Operations.
cyber in space
26. Senator Sullivan. General Haugh, how has the proliferation of
commercial space, specifically satellite constellations providing real
time imagery and internet connectivity, changed CYBERCOM's perspective
on what needs to be defended and attacked?
General Haugh. Doctrine, policy, information-sharing structures,
and data-processing capabilities, while not always the most visible
components of space strategy, can be a driving force for competitive
advantage in war. The space enterprise is not confined to satellites in
orbit. The ground and link segments that facilitate networked data
dissemination methods, along with innovative application of satellite
data, arguably have allowed Ukraine, with no satellites of its own, to
make better use of space than Russia. Information and services
developed by others have enabled Ukraine to close the gap in space
capability, while Russian forces have apparently struggled to provide
sufficient space-derived information to their warfighters in a timely
fashion. \6\ The Ukraine war has demonstrated that operational and
strategic impacts can be vastly magnified by properly leveraged
terrestrial hardware and software, and by a networked, distributed
approach to using and sharing information. Planners, strategists, and
analysts should consider how threats have manifested against these
ground segments and links, and not just against in-orbit satellite
capabilities.1A\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Michael P. Gleason, Space Power and Security, ``Space and War
In Ukraine Beyond The Satellites'', Vol. 3 NO. I, Spring 2024.
\7\ Michael P. Gleason, Space Power and Security, ``Space and War
In Ukraine Beyond The Satellites'', Vol. 3 NO.I, Spring 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
cyber workforce generation
27. Senator Sullivan. General Haugh, are there any initiatives
happening with secondary and post-secondary education to generate a
trained cadre of people who have the skills to contribute to CYBERCOM's
missions?
General Haugh. USCYBERCOM believes in the strength and diversity of
our workforce. ``Winning with People II is not just a catch phrase, but
a philosophy we embrace and live. The cornerstone to this way of
thinking is the continued development and training of our workforce.
The cyber domain evolves rapidly, and we must operate at the speed of
relevance to outpace our adversaries.
To address this, USCYBERCOM partners with the National Defense
University's College of Information and Cyberspace (CIC). Through this
close partnership, we have developed two continuing education courses
that are open to our staff--the Cyber Leader Development Plan (CLDP),
and the Chief Information Officer course (CIO). Both courses provide
our workforce a challenging and rigorous academic environment that
allows them to sharpen their skills and bring that knowledge back to
USCYBERCOM where they can put it to use.
We also offer our staff the opportunity to attend the CIC's year-
long Joint Professional Military Education Course (JPME II) where
students earn a Master's Degree in Cyber Security.
We do not currently have secondary education initiatives; however,
USCYBERCOM has an Academic Engagement Network (AEN) that enables
outreach opportunities for US-based Colleges and Universities. Through
our AEN, we have partnered with institutions like Purdue University to
provide our staff access to their catalog of Cyber Certificates, free
of charge to USCYBERCOM staff. We are also partnering with Canisius
University, who is developing a new closed loop method of instruction
that will be implemented as a Cyber Range, and utilized across numerous
academic institutions, to include secondary institutions. This will
prepare the next generation of cyber warriors.
USCYBERCOM also enters into Educational Partnership Agreements
(EPAs) with targeted Universities to provide: assistance in Cyber
Curriculum development, involvement of students in Laboratory research
programs, providing career counselling to students, and more.
Additionally, we partner with the National Security Agency (NSA) to
host summer internship programs for Military Service Academies, and
offer a civilian collegiate summer internship program, law student
volunteer program, and a recent graduate fellowship program to help
prepare future cyber warriors for potential outplacement within the
Command or DOD enterprise.
28. Senator Sullivan. General Haugh, what gaps are there in the
uniformed cyber workforce?
General Haugh. Recruiting and retaining high demand low density
cyber talent is a challenge across the Department, but the Services are
investing in significant improvements to the forces presented to
USCYBERCOM
29. Senator Sullivan. General Haugh, what is being done by the
services to generate a ready uniformed cyber workforce to fill your
gaps?
General Haugh. Recruiting and retaining high demand low density
cyber talent is a challenge across the Department, but the Services are
investing in significant improvements to the forces presented to
USCYBERCOM.
Air Force Readiness
The Air Force has implemented several initiatives to markedly
improve their CMF Readiness Rating:
To maintain high fill rates, Special Duty Assignment Pay
(SDAP) has been increased to the maximum ($450/month) for E-1 to E-9.
Furthermore, Cyber Assignment Incentive Pay (CAIP) for CMF work roles
and skill levels ($200 to $1500/month) is in legal review with the
Judge Advocate/General Counsel.
To increase retention, the Air Force implemented the
Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) again in fiscal year 2023. The new
SRB multipliers, based on time in service, are fully funded and the
highest in the Air Force, equal with Special Warfare AFSCs.
On 23 February 2024, Headquarters Air Force signed a CMF
Consecutive Tour Policy Memo for Regular Air Force Cyberspace
Operations Officers (17X), Cyberspace Warfare Enlisted Operators (IB4)
and Cyber Intelligence Enlisted Analysts (IN4XIA) in order to cultivate
the skill sets of their high-demand, low-density airmen across the CMF.
Starting in January 2024, the IB4 Initial Skills Training
pipeline was revamped for optimal training throughput, aiming for full
slot utilization and a higher number of Offensive Cyber Operations
(OCO) airmen. Additionally, the IB4 Career Field Management Office has
increased its oversight of class rosters. The combination of these
efforts yielded a 830 percent increase in throughput.
The Air Force changed assignment policies to leave
students in training status while completing foundational 2000-level
work role specific courses. This change ensures an assignment clock
does not start until an airmen is battle-rostered, maximizing the
return on investment by getting a full 48 months of battle rostered
team time for airmen. We encourage other Services to consider adopting
the Air Force ``Train Before Report'' model.
The Air Force reinstated its long-dormant Warrant Officer
corps to specialize in cyberspace operations with up to 60 candidates
to be selected this summer in addition to developing a direct
commissioning program. Both of these efforts are significant retention
and career development tools.
Marine Corps Readiness
The Marine Corps has implemented several initiatives to increase
their CMF readiness:
The Marine Corps has exceeded CMF assignment standards
since January 2021 because of successful alignment of accession and
retention policies, incentive pays, and retention bonuses.
The Marine Corps has instituted Active Duty service
obligations (ADSOs) for Operators and Exploitation analysts that will
ensure 36-months of operational time within the CMF following advanced
training completion and created an 8-year ADSO for cyber officers.
The Marine Corps is not limited in their ability to
schedule, receive or complete courses or deliver a fully 2000-level
trained force. The force remains limited in achieving fully trained and
qualified standards by a growing critical cadre of CMF Trainers and a
reliance on live missions for final certification in Operator and
Exploitation Analyst work roles.
In March of 2024, the Marine Corps initiated the ``Marine
Corps Talent Acquisition Pilot'' program to provide select candidates
within the Cyberspace and SJGJNT aligned occupational fields with
direct accession opportunities at a rank commensurate with their
expertise up E-7.
Army Readiness
The Army has focused on several initiatives:
Cyber Mission Force units remain at the highest priority
fill rates in Army Personnel Manning Guidance. Army Cyber Command is
working with The Department of the Army Personnel Directorate and the
Human Resources Command to continue to prioritize CMF assignments.
The Army created the Cyber Operations Specialist (17C)
focused occupational specialty and extended its enlistment terms to 6
years.
The Army has led the way for incentivizing proficiency
through both SDAP and CAIP based on proficiency levels to incentivize
assignment to CMF units. We encourage other Services to consider
adopting the Army proficiency incentive model.
The Army's implementation of personnel developmental
skill identifiers for select cyber officers, warrant officers, and
enlisted servicemembers will enable precise tracking of personnel
certified to perform cyber work roles, regardless of military
operational specialty. We encourage other Services to consider adopting
skill identifiers in their personnel systems of record that allow
tracking of trained and qualified former CMF members.
Army successfully converted approximately 2,500 civilian
positions to the DOD 's Title IO Cyber Excepted Service (CES) across
five (5) DOD CJO/Army identified CES-eligible Commands and
organizations. This has allowed the Army to compete with Federal and
private sectors for recruitment and retention of top cyber talent.
These flexibilities include Targeted Local Market Supplements (TLMS)
and the additional steps 11 and 12 in each grade.
Navy Readiness
The following changes have had a positive effect on the Navy's
cyber forces:
Navy implemented policy change to designate the CMF as
"Critical National Shore" which has an authorized fill rate of 100
percent. Fleet Cyber Command directed realignment of sailors to fill
critical CMF billets and work roles in an effort to better retain
talent and proficiency.
For Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA Section 1532, Navy created the
Maritime Cyber Warfare Officer (MCWO) designator with 289 billets
converted so far and 167 MCWOs selected. MCWOs will have repeat tours
in CMF ensuring increased proficiency and skill sustainment.
For the first time, the Navy is delivering foundational
training/or Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) work roles prior to
operational assignment.
Navy created of student training organization on Fort
Meade to allow sailors to complete advanced operator training prior to
being assigned to a CMF team allowing them to arrive in operational
roles fully trained.
The Navy created a Cyber Warfare Technician (CWT) rating/
or sailors and a Maritime Cyber Warfare Officer designator for
personnel dedicated to cyber work roles. The Navy is evaluating options
to incorporate additional work roles into the CWT rating to ensure
better alignment to the consecutive tour requests and training
availability.
The Navy continues to offer very high SRB rates for the
CWT rating in an effort to retain cyber talent, as well as SDAP for the
Cyberspace Operator work role. SRBs enable concentrating financial
incentives at the point of decision for a sailor to reenlist in the
Navy. CWT Cyberspace Operator and Cyberspace Capabilities Developer
NECs are eligible for $100,000 and meets the Navy's maximum career SRB
cap $300,000, the highest SRB in the Navy.
30. Senator Sullivan. General Haugh, the same cyber talent pool
that DOD is competing for is also being recruited by Silicon Valley
tech businesses who can offer more money and quality of life
incentives. What initiatives is CYBERCOM or NSA taking to recruit and
retain the highest quality cyber warriors for military employment?
General Haugh. Title 10 U.S.C. 4092 enables the Command to
hire scientific and engineering experts and pay them at rates above the
GG pay scale. This authority is critical to bringing top talent to the
Command and postures us to have a seat at the negotiation table and
better compete with industry salaries. Additionally, the Command offers
Recruitment, Retention and Relocation incentives (over $2.5 million
spent since Cyber Excepted Service implementation), Target Local Market
Supplement (average 28 percent salary increase), situational telework,
student loan repayment, and training/developmental education
opportunities to our workforce.
31. General Haugh: Given the cyber workforce recruiting challenges,
do you think we should shift to a public-private model for some of our
defensive cyber operations?
General Haugh. At this time we do not believe USCYBERCOM would
benefit from shifting to a public-private model. Hiring defensive
cyberspace operators with unique skills and requirements requires
government oversight and access to classified systems and facilities.
Therefore, a change to private-public would not decrease recruiting and
hiring challenges.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Markwayne Mullin
china
32. Senator Mullin. General Haugh, recent news articles have
uncovered claims that encrypted storage devices built with Chinese
chips are available for purchase on GSA catalogs. Are any of these
devices in use on DOD networks and what threat do they pose?
General Haugh. Unfortunately, there is not enough information to
answer the question posed. We will followup with the committee to
identify the specific encrypted storage devices referenced and provide
a more complete answer at the earliest opportunity.
33. Senator Mullin. General Haugh, each day we see news stories
about the rise of AI, as well as stories about our adversaries
exploiting the technology for bad. What are you doing in the AI space?
How do you assess our capabilities against the PRC?
General Haugh. We are laying the foundation for our 5-year AI
Roadmap and Implementation Plan to accelerate AI adoption and scale
capabilities across the Joint Force, which we built with more than a
dozen other stakeholders in response to Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA Sec.
1554. The Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) is the Executive Agent
for the Command's AI Task Force, charged with leading our AI efforts
under the three roadmap thrusts: deliver AI capabilities for all
cyberspace missions; counter AI threats and exploit emerging
opportunities; and enable broader AI adoption. The main focus now is
immediate employment and operationalization of Al/ML capabilities to
the force in order to maintain and ensure superiority in the Cyber
Warfighting domain against both peer and near-peer adversaries. Our
approach is to conduct multiple operationally relevant focused rapid
pilots enhancing the mission while learning lessons to enable full
force employment across all aspects of full spectrum Cyber Operations
from the data center to the edge. Current AI operational pilots include
leveraging Open Source Generative AI models in classified environments,
using AI to reveal policy and implementation mis-alignments in network
security, rapidly generating tailored content for refinement and use in
information operations, filtering and summarizing intelligence to more
rapidly guide our ability to defeat malicious cyber actors, and
degrading adversary Al models.
The PRC has rapidly adopted Al for domestic surveillance and
military applications, and Al has the potential to dramatically expand
their malicious cyber activities, posing an increasing threat that is
not bound by the rule of law. They have larger scale government-related
use of AI, while the USG has more sophisticated Al and analytic
capabilities, we are not positioned to leverage US. innovation to the
fullest. The PRC government has invested $31E in Al since the beginning
of 2022, outpacing US. public investment, and is growing their domestic
production of Al chips and supporting technologies. Chinese defense
experts claim that the PLA is facing barriers to developing and
deploying Al and related emerging technologies, in a similar fashion to
USG efforts to adopt Al.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
cybersecurity industry partners
34. Senator Budd. General Haugh, please discuss the work you're
doing with industry partners to enhance the cybersecurity of the
defense industrial base and how the fiscal year 2025 budget supports
that work. How many partners are leveraging these services, and how are
you looking to expand those efforts this year?
General Haugh. USCYEERCOM develops partnerships directly with
industry and as part of larger, Department-wide initiatives. Some
specific USCYEERCOM efforts to provide services to our DIE partners are
through the Cyber National Mission Force's (CNMF) UNDERADVISEMENT
program, which is a voluntary, collaborative, and reciprocal
information sharing activity designed for partnerships with private
sector entities. They partner heavily with NSA 's Cybersecurity
Directorate (CSD) Cybersecurity Collaboration Center to share
information on cyber threats that enable industry defense and pursuit
options. NSA CSD also offers free cybersecurity services to DIE
partners.
USCYEERCOM is entering into Cooperative Research and Development
Agreements (CRADAs) with key critical infrastructure providers in order
to: (1) develop cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for
OT/JCS network defense, (2) conduct joint red/blue exercising, (3)
share threat information, (4) explore the effectiveness of current
USCYEERCOM cyberspace capabilities on OT/JCS networks, and (5) jointly
research and develop new cybersecurity capabilities. The secondary
benefits of these CRADAs are: (1) provide Cyber Protection Team (CPTs)
with opportunity to gain familiarization and training with different
types of OT/JCS environments, and (2) harden critical infrastructure
supporting military installations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Eric Schmitt
35. Senator Schmitt. General Haugh, please evaluate whether or not
we should have a cyber service?
General Haugh. With respect to a Cyber Service, that is an option
being studied under the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization
Act Sec. 1533, which is an evaluation of all options available for
total force generation. Collectively, those options, to include an
evaluation on the advisability of separate Cyber Service, and their
implementation plan are what we call ``CYBERCOM 2.0'' and are due to
Congress no later than June 1, 2025. Our intent is to work with the
newly confirmed Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy to
assess future needs and ensure the Cyber Mission Force is able to
generate the personnel it needs, that is provided with the necessary
training to operate at the appropriate speed and scale, and is able to
appropriately leverage technology to be decisive in cyberspace. Until
those recommendations are finalized, USCYBERCOM will continue to
utilize the Service-like authorities provided to us by Congress.
Already, we've seen the Services respond positively to readiness
initiatives, for example the assignment policies and personnel policies
designed to ensure trained individuals stay within the Cyber Mission
Force.
IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 2024
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 7:59 a.m., in
room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Peters, Rosen, Kelly,
Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Sullivan, Scott, Tuberville,
Mullin, Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. We will begin the hearing.
Welcome, General Cavoli, General Van Ovost. Senator--I will
defer from giving my opening statement and submit it to the
record. I believe that the Ranking Member will do so also so we
can expedite questioning. With that, General Cavoli, let me
recognize you.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHRISTOPHER G. CAVOLI, USA COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
General Cavoli. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Reed, Ranking
Member Wicker, distinguished Members of the committee, it is my
honor to testify before you today on behalf of the brave men
and women and families of U.S. European Command.
Before we start, I would like to publicly recognize our
servicemembers' shared sacrifice and praise their devotion to
the mission, and I would like to thank you for the support you
give them every day. They are represented here today by my
Command Sergeant Major Rob Abernathy, who I am lucky to serve
with.
I am delighted to testify next to my friend Jackie Van
Ovost. We are facing challenging times in the European theater,
ladies and gentlemen. Russia's brutal, unprovoked war has
ravaged Ukraine for over 2 years. Their forces are demolishing
cities, destroying innocent lives at a scale we have not seen
since the Second World War.
Moreover, Russia is turning to the People's Republic of
China, to Iran, and to North Korea to sustain its campaign in
Ukraine. Those countries are forming interlocking strategic
partnerships in an attempt to challenge the existing order from
which we benefit. This is profoundly inimical to U.S. national
interests, and it is important to note that Russia shows no
signs of stopping, nor does Russia intend to stop with Ukraine.
Russia presents to us a chronic threat. USEUCOM has
responded to this threat by enhancing our deterrence posture
across Europe. We have strengthened our Eastern flank with
rotational force deployments.
We have expanded pre-positioned stocks. We have modernized
our infrastructure to enable rapid reception of forces, and we
have demonstrated our ability to reinforce in all domains
through dozens of multinational training exercises.
So, we are ready to defend, and this allows us to deter,
and we have deterred Russia from attacking our alliance.
USEUCOM is also proud to lead the international effort in
support of Ukraine. We do this, as you know, through the
Security Assistance Group Ukraine, SAG-U, which is led by
Lieutenant General Tony Agudo.
In the past 26 months of war, the U.S. and our partners
have delivered vast amounts of critical munitions and equipment
to our Ukrainian colleagues. SAG-U has been in the lead, and
they have facilitated a full range of training to promote unit
readiness. We have ensured that Ukraine knows how to use their
new equipment, and just as important, how to maintain it.
Nevertheless, Russia persists in its vicious campaign.
Meanwhile, Ukraine remains almost entirely dependent on
external support to stay in the fight. The severity of this
moment cannot be overstated. If we do not continue to support
Ukraine, Ukraine could lose.
So, our efforts are great, but in all of this, EUCOM is not
alone. War in Europe has also given our allies and our partners
clear purpose and unity. They have seized this opportunity
which has been presented by this catastrophe, and over the past
year or two there have been profound changes in NATO.
We have new war plans for the first time in 35 years. We
have new force and readiness models. They make 700 percent more
European troops available to me as the Supreme Allied Commander
than just a couple of years ago. We have streamlined and
focused new command structures. We have new authorities that
give me, as SACEUR, the ability to respond to crisis in a
timely fashion.
European governments are backing these organizational
changes with a concrete uptick in investment. In 2024, at least
20 nations are expected to meet the 2 percent of GDP defense
spending, compared to only 3 who met it in 2014. Nevertheless,
continued U.S. leadership is essential. Our allies are stepping
up, but they require our leadership and our example.
By upholding our commitment to Ukraine and by demonstrating
steadfast cohesion with the NATO alliance, we provide a clear
deterrent to our adversaries. Of course, should deterrence
fail, USEUCOM, along with our allies is ready to fight and win.
We thank you for Congress's unwavering support to USEUCOM
servicemembers missions, to their safety, and to their well-
being. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, on behalf of the
entire European Command, thank you for this opportunity today.
I very much look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Christopher G. Cavoli
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Christopher G. Cavoli
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished members of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, it is my distinct honor to testify
before you again on behalf of our brave servicemembers and their
dedicated families in the European Theater. As the Commander, United
States European Command (USEUCOM), I have the honor to lead a dedicated
group of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Guardians, Coast
Guardsmen, civilians, and defense contractors who work alongside our
NATO Allies and partners to secure the peace and advance American
interests. My posture statement will: offer my assessment of the
threats in the Euro-Atlantic security environment; describe our
strategic approach to address these threats; detail USEUCOM's force
posture throughout Europe; explain our operations, investments, and
activities; and, in all of this, highlight the importance to America of
NATO's modernization of its system of collective defense. The Euro-
Atlantic Security Environment The United States faces a combination of
challenges and threats in the Euro-Atlantic area that we have not seen
in more than thirty years. Russia is waging a full-scale war in Europe
and shows no signs of stopping. This presents the real potential for
escalation into a wider war, and is cause for significant strategic
concern to the United States. But when we view Russia's illegal and
brutal invasion of Ukraine together with Russia's rapid military
reconstitution; Russia's deepening ties with the People's Republic of
China (PRC), Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); Russia's continual machinations and
malign influence in the Balkans and other sensitive areas; and Russia's
persistent efforts to undermine allied cohesion, U.S. global influence,
and Western values, we find a chronic and growing threat to American
interests and to the security of our NATO Allies and all residents of
the Euro-Atlantic area. This Russian threat is exacerbated by China's
continued malign influence in the European Theater, continuing regional
instability both inside and outside the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility
(AOR); the ever-present threat of violent extremist organizations; and
climate change. In all, we see a Euro-Atlantic area that faces more
threats and dynamic challenges than at any time in the past thirty
years. Nevertheless, there are opportunities for the United States in
this environment.
russia
Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally altered
the Euro-Atlantic security environment. It is clear that we have a
long-term ``Russia problem,'' and the war in Ukraine is but one
example.
This ongoing conflict is the largest war on the European continent
since World War Two. The Ukrainian people are fighting hard, from
Kharkiv to Kherson, against a formidable and ruthless Russian
adversary. With the help of the United States, and invaluable help from
other allies and partners, Ukraine has inflicted significant damage
upon the Russian military. However, Russia relies on the mass and
quantity available to a large country, and despite its military's
evident deficiencies and dysfunctions, continues to pose an existential
threat to Ukraine. Ukraine cannot sustain this fight alone. The United
States, our allies, and partners must continue to provide Ukraine with
munitions, weapons, and materiel.
Russia remains a capable threat beyond Ukraine, and it's necessary
to examine what has and has not happened to the Russian military in
Ukraine. Russia poses the most stressing nuclear, biological, and
chemical threat in the near-term and will continue to retain WMD
capabilities in the medium and long term. First and foremost, Russia's
nuclear forces have been unaffected by the conflict, and Russia retains
the largest arsenal of deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons in the
world. These continue to present an existential threat to the U.S.
Homeland, our Allies, and our partners. Additionally, Russia continues
to modernize its nuclear forces, and continues to pursue efforts to
develop nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile systems,
nuclear-armed hypersonic boost glide vehicles, nuclear-powered cruise
missiles, nuclear-powered underwater drones, anti-satellite weapons,
and orbital nuclear weapons.
Moreover, during this conflict Russia's strategic forces, long
range aviation, cyber capabilities, space capabilities, and
capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum have lost no capacity at
all. The air force has lost some aircraft, but only about 10 percent of
their fleet. The navy has suffered significantly in the Black Sea--but
nowhere else and Russian naval activity worldwide is at a significant
peak. Russian long range precision fires have increased in production,
and Russia has also begun to buy ballistic missiles, cruise missiles,
and long-range drones from third countries who were previously outside
this fight. In fact, it is mainly only in the land forces that Russia
has suffered, losing over 2,000 tanks and 315,000 soldiers wounded or
dead. However, Russia is reconstituting that force far faster than our
initial estimates suggested. The army is actually now larger--by 15
percent--than it was when it invaded Ukraine. Over the past year,
Russia increased its front line troop strength from 360,000 to 470,000.
Russia's army increased the upper age limit for conscription from 27 to
30, which increases the pool of available military conscripts by 2
million for years to come. Russia has announced plans to pursue an
ambitious ground forces restructure, increasing to 1.5 million
personnel with an expanded footprint. This restructure includes plans
to transform seven motorized rifle brigades into divisions and a new
army corps. Russia plans to base some of these new formations in
Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, as well as Karelia in the High
North, opposite Finland. Perhaps most concerning, the Russian military
in the past year has shown an accelerating ability to learn and adapt
to battlefield challenges both tactically and technologically, and has
become a learning organization that little resembles the chaotic force
that invaded Ukraine 2 years ago.
Russia continues to display a resilient economy and an ability to
withstand sanctions and export controls. Last year, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasted a 2.1 percent drop in Russia's 2023
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, by the end of the year, the IMF
revised its estimate that Russia's GDP increased by 3 percent,
primarily due to heavy investments in defense. Currently, the IMF
outlook predicts Russia's GDP will increase by 2.6 percent in 2024.
Russia is on track to spend 6 percent of its GDP on the military, with
defense spending exceeding social spending for the first time since the
end of the Soviet Union. This defense spending includes new
manufacturing plants and factories for weapons production. Russia is on
track to produce or refurbish over 1,200 new main battle tanks a year,
and to manufacture at least 3 million artillery shells or rockets per
year--over triple the amount the U.S. estimated at the beginning of the
war--and more ammunition than all 32 NATO Allied combined. Moreover,
Russia has responded to international sanctions by adopting evasion and
import substitution strategies that have allowed it to overcome
challenges in acquiring key components, including microelectronics and
machine tools. This has allowed Russia to continue to invest in high-
end, exquisite weapon systems to offset United States strategic
advantages, several of which were successfully tested this year.
In sum, Russia is on track to command the largest military on the
continent and a defense industrial complex capable of generating
substantial amounts of ammunition and materiel in support of large
scale combat operations. Regardless of the outcome of the war in
Ukraine, Russia will be larger, more lethal, and angrier with the West
than when it invaded.
Diplomatically, Russia has used the past 2 years to attempt to
alter the global security architecture by creating relationships that
challenge the existing order. Russia, the PRC, Iran, and DPRK are
forming interlocking strategic partnerships across the world's largest
landmass. This block of adversaries is more cohesive and dangerous than
any threat the United States has faced in decades. As of March 2024,
the DPRK provided Russia with roughly 6,700 containers that could
contain up to three million artillery shells. Iran has provided Russia
with drones, artillery, and missiles that have enhanced Russia's
lethality in Ukraine. Russia and Iran have a billion-dollar weapons
deal that includes domestic production of 6,000 drones by the summer of
2025. The PRC provided Russia with nonlethal assistance ranging from
drones to computer chips, and increased its imports of Russian goods by
12 percent to $117.8 billion in the last year. The PRC, Iran, and DPRK
are sustaining Russia's economy and enabling it to continue its
aggression in Ukraine. This new axis of adversaries will create
strategic dilemmas within an increasingly challenging international
security environment.
peoples republic of china
Getting China right is critical for European stability. PRC's
expanding influence in Europe and its deepening partnership with Russia
create complex challenges within this theater. PRC attempts to sow
division and exert influence across Europe. China employs media
manipulation and disinformation campaigns to subvert democratic
institutions and sway public opinion. It employs trade coercion,
boycotts of European goods, and export controls on critical raw
materials to coerce policymakers in European states.
PRC's strategic approach undermines political cohesion in Europe.
This includes investments in dual-use infrastructure directly impacting
our collective security. China makes economic investments that
superficially appear to be benign, but turn out to have pernicious
effects on our security. PRC has spent the last decade investing in
European ports, airports, utility companies, and telecommunications,
putting at risk our collective sustainment and communication systems.
For example, PRC's ownership of critical seaport infrastructure could
seem purely commercial, but has been used to deny allied navies port
calls, and calls into question the reliability of use for military
reinforcement of the NATO Alliance. Similarly, the inclusion of
Huawei's 5G technology in some NATO members' networks could necessitate
their exclusion from vital communication and intelligence networks,
decreasing interoperability among Allies and partners.
Certainly, PRC is closely watching the conflict in Ukraine--
learning military lessons, political lessons, and trying to project
those onto China's own interests. Moreover, PRC's increased support for
Russia reveals the depths of the Chinese Communist Party's commitment
to partnerships that challenge our collective security. The continued
``No-Limits'' partnership between PRC and Russia positions PRC as a
formidable adversary to European interests. This partnership is not
just diplomatic; it extends to informational, economic, and military
realms, aiding nations that exhibit hostility and aggression. For
example, through its global propaganda machine, PRC directly parrots
Russian disinformation narratives on Ukraine. The partnership between
Beijing and Moscow raises questions about PRC's broader strategic
objectives in the European Theater. As PRC continues to position itself
in support of Russia, it is foreshadowing its long-term position as a
challenger to Euro-Atlantic security.
the balkans
The situation in the Western Balkans has grown more tense in the
past year. Negotiations to resolve internal political and social issues
have not made progress. Russian malign influence to incite tension
contributes to this regional instability. Violence has worsened--both
spontaneous violence and that which is fomented from outside the
country. Last autumn, attacks on Kosovo police and a Serbian troop
buildup on the border of north Kosovo presented the highest threat of
interState violence since the end of the war in 1999, and illustrated
the worrisome level of instability in the region. In response to the
escalating tension, NATO sent troops from the United Kingdom (UK) and
Romania to reinforce its peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. Additionally,
the Alliance is reevaluating its force posture in the Kosovo
peacekeeping mission to respond to the new threat environment.
Ethnic tension in Bosnia and Herzegovina also has the potential to
escalate and destabilize the Western Balkans region. Russia's
activities to foment the tension between ethnic Bosniaks, Serbs, and
Croats aim to weaken the country and prevent deepened ties with the EU
and NATO. Ethno-nationalist politics prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina
from adopting much-needed political, legal, and economic reforms that
would advance its Euro-Atlantic integration. Bosnia and Herzegovina's
Serb-majority entity, Republika Srpska, seeks to weaken State
authorities and weaken relationships with the EU and NATO while
maintaining close ties to Russia.
Finally, active Russian influence operations in North Macedonia,
Montenegro, and other West Balkan countries continues to present
challenges to alliance unity, as well as to general stability in the
region. The narratives Russia promulgates stoke inter-ethnic tensions,
and degrade support for the rule of law and democracy in general.
Russia may not be alone; Serbia's role in these influence operations
remains open to question, none of which is good for the region.
the sahel
In the Sahel, economic instability, extreme poverty, and climate
change are deeply intertwined with rapid population growth, youth
unemployment, political and social fragility, corruption, and the
pervasive threat of terrorism. These issues are not isolated; they are
inextricably linked and have significant repercussions for European and
NATO security. A key manifestation of this instability is the rise in
irregular migration toward Europe. Large influxes of people entering
European countries are straining resources, fueling political debates
over immigration, and raising legitimate concerns about border security
and the potential for extremist infiltration. The recent withdrawal of
United Nations (UN) peacekeepers from Mali marks a significant shift in
the regional security dynamic. This development poses serious questions
about the future stability of Mali, the broader Sahel region, and the
void left by French and U.N. forces being filled by non-Western actors,
notably Russia and PRC. Russia's increasing involvement in the region
challenges our counterterrorism efforts and broader security interests.
Meanwhile, PRC's expanding role, driven by its economic agenda,
includes a growing presence in security affairs, contributions to U.N.
missions, and arms trade. Russia and PRC's expanding influence in the
Sahel is one example of how they are influencing the global south to
seek advantages.
the levant
The conflict in Gaza introduces complex security challenges for
NATO and USEUCOM. The increasing violence in the region and its
consequent humanitarian crises raise the specter of mass displacement
and broader regional destabilization. Europe has struggled in the past
with issues related to mass migration; more would not help right now.
Moreover, almost all nations in Europe have significant expatriate
populations in the Levant, and would be eager to safeguard them in the
event of a wider war. Finally, various NATO nations have diverse
current and historical relationships to the nations in the Levant, and
a wider war could produce fissures in the Alliance regarding an
external issue at a time when unity is of paramount importance.
violent extremist organizations
Violent Extremist Organizations continue to pose a threat to NATO
Allies and U.S. security interests in our AOR. Europe has suffered 18
terrorist attacks since 2018. Groups like ISIS, despite territorial
losses in Iraq and Syria, persist with their global agenda. ISIS'
sustained network and capacity for high-profile operations make them a
resilient and dangerous adversary. Along with the continuing challenge
of lone actors and small groups, inspired by foreign terrorist
organizations, the threat posed by VEOs continues to challenge our
European Allies and even threatens U.S. personnel abroad.
climate change
Changes in the climate continue to pose security challenges in the
Euro-Atlantic area. The retreat of the Arctic ice cap has been opening
waterways in the High North, a phenomenon Russia and China are eager to
exploit. Extreme weather events strain resources, disrupt economies,
and increase the likelihood of conflicts in states with already fragile
governments. Climate change can worsen floods, fires, water shortage,
and migration, and challenge regional stability and security. Moreover,
climate-related loss of agricultural productivity, shifts in fish
stocks, and water variability can lead to heightened geopolitical
tensions and potential resource conflicts.
As we look to the future, the security of the region, and by
extension, the interests of the United States and NATO, are intricately
linked to the health of the environment and the stability of the
climate. USEUCOM will continue to engage in a comprehensive approach
that includes monitoring climatic changes, assessing the strategic
impact climate change has on Euro-Atlantic security, working with NATO
on interoperability and energy security, and deterring our adversaries
from exploiting the climate crisis. Additionally, USEUCOM continues to
develop relationships and work with both United States and European
climate change organizations to develop innovative solutions. Through
strategic planning, collaborative efforts, and proactive measures, we
aim to safeguard our interests, promote regional stability, and
contribute to the global effort against climate change.
opportunities to expand influence
Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, in many ways, has had the
opposite effect of those intended. Indeed, it has actually produced
opportunities to expand U.S. influence abroad, both through NATO and
through bilateral relations.
It's well known that where Russia wanted to get less NATO, it got
more: USEUCOM celebrates the accession of both Finland and Sweden to
the Alliance and notes that these nations both increased our collective
defense capabilities from Day One.
More opportunities exist in the neighborhood.
Georgia, historically a bridge between East and West and a stalwart
NATO partner, raised concerns in 2023 with actions that seemed to
indicate a departure from its Euro-Atlantic trajectory. However, today
the government is taking steps to reform Georgia's economic and
political institutions to meet prerequisites for EU membership. There
is strong evidence that the government of Georgia desires to move
closer to the West, just as the overwhelming majority of the Georgian
population has desired for three decades. Georgia's defense
establishment maintains a close relationship with USEUCOM and is taking
steps to modernize its forces. Maintaining this positive relationship
underpins U.S. influence in this important region and creates
opportunities that extend beyond Georgia.
The situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan remains tense following
Azerbaijan's military actions in Nagorno-Karabakh this past September.
Azerbaijan's military success and Russia's failed role as a cease-fire
guarantor have altered the regional balance of power. Importantly,
Russia refused to aid Armenia during Azerbaijan's offensive, creating a
significant rift between Armenia and Russia, and giving Armenia a
strong impetus to move closer to the West. As a result, USEUCOM is
strengthening its military relationship with Armenia, and the command
conducted training exercises in Armenia for the first time in many
years in 2023. USEUCOM applauds efforts to reach a peace agreement
between Azerbaijan and Armenia. We see an opportunity to establish
stability in the region while giving nations an opportunity to move out
of Russia's coercive orbit.
Finally, Moldova has seized the opportunity to realize its West-
leaning ambitions. The nation has intensified its efforts to rid itself
of Russian coercive influence, and has embraced closer partnerships
with Europe. USEUCOM has redoubled our efforts to help Moldova develop
the resiliency and reform necessary to follow their chosen path.
These opportunities, when taken together, represent a chance to
diminish malign and coercive Russian influence throughout Europe.
opportunity in nato
At the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius, allied Heads of State and
Government approved the three Regional Plans and gave NATO Allied
Command Operations the approval to proceed with implementing and
developing the Alliance's modernized collective defense system.
With approval of those plans, the first formal plans the Alliance
has had in more than three decades, the Alliance is finally armed with
a comprehensive blueprint for modernizing its system of collective
defense. First, the plans have produced a force structure requirement,
and NATO now has an objective, reality-based driver for nations'
defense planning and procurement. Second, NATO is now able to tie that
force to specific geography and tasks, giving focus to the Alliance's
operations, activities, and investments. Third, the force is now able
to exercise against the requirements of our plans, instead of fictional
scenarios. Fourth, the force now has objective readiness requirements
that each one will be held to. On top of these enormous changes, Allied
Command Operations will also emplace an updated Command and Control
design, transforming headquarters once fit for peacetime and out-of-
area-operations into warfighting headquarters ready to defend allied
territory.
Throughout this fundamental change, the Alliance continues to
exhibit unprecedented cohesion, focus, and determination. It is a
strong statement of NATO unity that in considering the three Regional
Plans--which cover 8 percent of the globe and over one billion people--
there were no military or operational disagreements among the 31
Allies. More, the Alliance is backing up its ambition with money. In
2023 NATO saw a real increase of 11 percent in defense spending across
European Allies and Canada. In 2024, NATO expects 18 Allies to spend 2
percent gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. In total, European
Allies will invest a combined total 280 billion U.S. dollars in
defense, which amounts to 2 percent of their combined GDP--a far cry
from the three members who met the 2 percent goal in 2014.
This renewed sense of purpose and definitive plan of action give us
the opportunity to create a more effective alliance with a more
sustainable division of labor and effort, which will in turn give the
U.S. opportunity to face all global challenges while still ensuring the
deterrence of Russia and security of Europe. We need to be with NATO
every step of the way through this transformation, which is so clearly
in our interests.
useucom's strategic approach
Our strategic approach to these challenges and opportunities
centers on assisting Ukraine, deterring Russian aggression,
strengthening the NATO Alliance, and responding to crises while
actively shaping the operational environment. It ensures the security
and prosperity of the Euro-Atlantic region while preserving our shared
values and interests with our Allies.
supporting ukraine
United States support for Ukraine demonstrates our commitment to
upholding the principles of national sovereignty and international
law--principles that underpin global stability and security. Failure to
assist Ukraine poses a grave threat to its survival. Inaction will
embolden Russia and establish a precedent that threatens the global
security environment. The United States and our European Allies lead
the global effort to enhance Ukraine's military capabilities through
comprehensive training and arming. Continued U.S. leadership is
essential for enabling Ukraine to defend its sovereignty and preserving
stability, security, and democracy throughout Europe and beyond.
Deterring Russia from expanding its aggression into alliance
territory is essential to preserve the rules-based international order,
safeguard the sovereignty of nations within our AOR, and protect U.S.
strategic interests. Russia's aggression poses a direct threat to the
peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. Now is the time to
capitalize on Russia's failures in Ukraine by accelerating our
modernization of capabilities, posture, and security cooperation to
outpace Russia's reconstitution.
A strong and cohesive NATO is the cornerstone of deterrence, and
therefore is the basis for peace in the Euro-Atlantic. The Alliance is
more unified than at any point since the cold war and is undergoing its
most significant transformation in three decades as it modernizes its
system of collective defense. In line with the Nuclear Posture Review,
the United States is modernizing systems to strengthen strategic
deterrence to ensure a strong extended deterrence capability and
assurance to European Allies. Positioning the right U.S. forces
throughout Europe to support this transformation is a necessary
investment in our future security. As the Alliance continues to
modernize, U.S. leadership is more important than ever.
While we assist Ukraine and work with NATO to deter Russia, we
remain always ready to respond to unexpected crises within and beyond
our AOR. Concurrently, through the proactive shaping of the operational
environment, we create strategic dilemmas for our adversaries,
neutralize potential conflicts, and establish conditions conducive to
U.S. interests. These are interconnected, with crisis response
delivering immediate security benefits, and shaping the operational
environment ensuring long-term stability and deterrence.
We are poised to respond to the Euro-Atlantic's complex security
challenges. USEUCOM's force posture is an extension of our strategic
approach. It enables us to have the right forces, in the right
locations, at the right time, with the right capabilities.
useucom postured across europe
USEUCOM's posture is the baseline for executing our strategy. It is
both a reflection of our commitment and a testament to our ability to
respond. Strategically positioned, we spearhead the U.S. Government's
efforts in support of NATO, ensuring our forces are not just present,
but combat-ready, adaptable, capable of deterring, and if necessary
defeat any threat. Our operations span the European Theater, utilizing
the capabilities of our seven service components. From the Black Sea,
where our efforts bolster Ukraine's defense, to the Baltic Region,
where large-scale U.S.-NATO exercises enhance our interoperability, our
posture is clear: we stand united with our Allies, ready to face and
overcome any challenge.
The key to deterring Russia is having combat-credible forces in the
right position. U.S. Force posture in Europe includes 83,000 members of
the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Space Force, and
Coast Guard, many of whom moved their families across the Atlantic
Ocean to become part of communities throughout Europe. The footprint
for these forces includes main operating bases, forward operating
sites, and cooperative security locations from Spain to Estonia, and
from Iceland to Turkiye.
USEUCOM's land force consists of five U.S. Army brigade combat
teams and two division headquarters. These forces enhance our
deterrence posture along the Eastern Flank. United States Army Europe
and Africa and V Corps' Forward Command Post in Poland provide command
and control of our ground forces. We have positioned long-range fires,
anti-air defense, sustainment, and communications equipment across
Europe to support and protect our ground forces. U.S. continued
investment in Army Prepositioned Stocks and facilities enable rapid
integration of rotational combat units into the USEUCOM AOR.
In the air domain, USEUCOM will complete the stand-up of one U.S.
Air Force squadron of fifth generation F-35 fighters at RAF Lakenheath
this month and is on track to receive a second squadron by August 2025.
The United States Air Forces in Europe and Africa provides command and
control for these forces as well as for fourth generation fighters,
bombers, tankers, and transport aircraft positioned in the UK, Italy,
Germany, Iceland, Norway, and other European countries. Additionally,
USEUCOM is working closely with our Allies and partners to decentralize
the physical infrastructure required to generate air power by
operationalizing the concept of Agile Combat Employment (ACE). ACE
enables the sharing of infrastructure and capabilities necessary to
support air platforms with our Allies and partners. Decentralized
infrastructure located throughout Europe enables our Air Force to be
more dynamic, survivable, and lethal.
USEUCOM's maritime command and control is provided by U.S. Naval
Forces Europe and Africa and the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet from Naples,
Italy, which controls Carrier Strike Group and Amphibious Ready Group/
Marine Expeditionary Units, guided missile destroyers and other naval
assets. Sixth Fleet will also receive one more guided missile destroyer
in Spain this summer, with another arriving in 2 years. In addition,
United States Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa provides command
and control for Marine air and ground forces to conduct exercises,
training, and operational support to USEUCOM missions. Finally, the
U.S. Second Fleet reinforces NATO's Western Flank in the Atlantic Ocean
and into the waters of the High North.
USEUCOM formally added the Department of Defense's fourth Space
Force service component, United States Space Forces Europe and Africa
(USSPACEFOR-EURAF), this past December. The component stood up at
Ramstein Air Base and will serve both the European and African
Theaters. USSPACEFOR-EURAF is integral in creating networked, joint-
space architecture, and deepening relationships with allies and
partners in the space domain. Furthermore, this component enables us to
respond to our adversaries as they find innovative ways to threaten our
national interest and security from space.
USEUCOM's Cyberspace Operations Division defends our cyber
architecture from our adversaries, hackers, and threat actors seeking
to undermine our networks. Additionally, each service component has a
robust cyber capability to protect its networks from external threats.
USEUCOM also coordinates with U.S. Cyber Command to assist in
bolstering the offensive and defensive cyber capabilities of our allies
and partners and in countering malign influence.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) maintain a persistent presence
throughout Europe. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) continues
to train Ukrainian SOF and support joint operations in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Special Forces stationed at Stuttgart and Baumholder,
Germany are focused on USEUCOM-directed tasks designed to counter
Russian aggression. Additionally, SOCEUR is expanding its relationships
with Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. NATO Special Operations
Forces Command and SOCEUR are working closely together and building
interoperability that expands the U.S. and NATO Special Operations
footprint.
Our posture in Europe is a clear signal of our commitment and
readiness to protect U.S. interests, support our Allies, and maintain
regional stability. USEUCOM's forces located throughout Europe enable
us to execute our strategy. Our success will be defined by our
operations, activities, and investments in the European Theater.
useucoms operations, activities, and investments
USEUCOM's operations, activities and investments (OAIs) are aligned
with our strategic approach, and our success will depend on how well
we: support Ukraine; deter Russia; strengthen the Alliance; and respond
to crises, all while shaping the environment in the Euro-Atlantic area.
useucom support to ukraine
USEUCOM's comprehensive support to Ukraine, which comprises
military aid, training, and logistics, all of which is coupled with the
contributions of our Allies and partners, forms the backbone of
Ukraine's defense against Russian aggression. The Ukrainian people are
acutely aware their fate as a free and independent nation hinges on our
assistance to help them defend their Homeland. Ukraine depends on our
effort, and our responsibility to assist them is a driving factor in
our daily operations. The security of the Euro-Atlantic area also
depends on it, as does the sustainment of a United States-led global
order that has produced prosperity and peace for our country for
decades.
Since February 2022, the United States has committed more than
$44.2 billion in security assistance to Ukraine through Presidential
Drawdown Authorities, the Ukrainian Security Assistance Initiative, and
Foreign Military Financing. Our Allies and partners, meanwhile, have
also risen to the task: their collective contributions of our Allies
are substantially more than those of the United States. In some cases,
Allied countries are donating large portions, if not all, of their own
military inventory and a disproportionate amount of their budgets. When
measured as a percentage of GDP, the U.S. ranks 14th in the top 25
nations that have donated to Ukraine. EU institutions provided over $80
billion in financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.
Nevertheless, it is the leadership of the United States--our adherence
to and defense of our ideals, our strategic perspective, and above all
our ability to convene and influence other nations--that makes us the
critical nation in this effort. It is the United States that leads all
like-minded nations to support Ukraine and to give them a viable chance
to defend their sovereignty.
Materiel contributions from the United States enable the Ukrainian
Defense Forces to defend their country against the larger Russian
force. In 2022, the Department of Defense authorized USEUCOM to
activate the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U). SAG-U includes
a large non-U.S. component and aggregates Ukrainian requirements, works
with the Department of Defense, our allies, and partners to resource
them, and then delivers those to our Ukrainian partners. SAG-U also
trains Ukrainian Defense Forces to operate and maintain the complex
weapons systems we provide, such as the M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank, F-
16s, and HIMARS.
SAG-U's efforts do not end with providing training and materiel.
SAG-U also leads a multinational effort to support the maintenance and
repair of the donations we have given to Ukraine, so the Nation can
continue to prevail in the grueling combat they are engaged in.
Critical to all these efforts is the sustainment and logistics
support network established within the borders of our NATO Allies. This
network is the lifeline for the flow of equipment, munitions, and
material support to the Ukrainian front lines. It would be impossible
to sustain this without the mature logistical ``footprint'' and systems
that exist in the USEUCOM AOR. This logistics system is the envy of the
Department of Defense, and is a key capability that we must sustain
even as we enjoy its benefits.
Our experience supporting Ukraine has shown that a healthy Defense
Industrial Base (DIB) and a strong Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program
are just as important as ready forces to generate enough combat power
to sustain large scale combat operations. For example, aligning the DIB
to produce critical munitions and replenish stocks requires buy-in from
industry and a clear demand signal these munitions are needed.
Vulnerable global supply chains and competition for resources can
quickly lead to production delays and, therefore, impair the fielding
of equipment at the time of need. We will keep helping the Services
work with Congress on streamlining and de-risking these processes as we
continue supporting Ukraine and modernizing the DIB and FMS processes
to enhance our long-term collective defense capability.
useucom's deterrence of russia
USEUCOM seeks to deter Russian aggression by denying Russia its
ability to gain advantage over NATO in geography, readiness, or domain.
Our efforts are expressed as OAIs and are virtually always embedded in
the context of NATO efforts.
USEUCOM is the Department's coordinating authority for the Russia
problem set. Our leadership of the Department's Russia Strategic
Initiative is crucial in providing a cohesive understanding of Russia's
intentions and shaping our collective strategic response. Congressional
appropriations play a vital role here, enabling us to build and
maintain a robust force structure, conduct vital training exercises,
develop necessary infrastructure, and sustain combat credible force
levels required to ensure the U.S. and Alliance defense posture can
deter Russian aggression.
The forces within USEUCOM are the essential building blocks for
deterring Russia, so investing in these capabilities sends a clear
message to Russia about the U.S. resolve to respond to aggression and
defend its interests globally. The presence of five brigade combat
teams and two division headquarters within the USEUCOM AOR forms a
robust defense against the unpredictable Russian threat. The presence
of seven fighter squadrons is essential, and the upgrade of our air
power to 5th generation technology enhances the ability to deliver
precise effects in the complex battle space we face today. The
strategic positioning of air and missile defense capabilities to
safeguard our forces ensures our combined air, ground, and sea power
can withstand an initial attack. Moreover, the readiness of our AOR for
the rapid reception and mobilization of forces is essential for
conducting large scale operations or sustaining any prolonged conflict.
Modernizing and expanding USEUCOM's long-term prepositioned stocks
enhances our readiness and positions us to fight and win against any
adversary if deterrence fails. We are working with our NATO Allies to
create long-term storage facilities and maintenance complexes to host
prepositioned equipment. For example when complete in May, the storage
facility in Poland will be outfitted with M1 Tanks, Bradley Fighting
Vehicles, artillery, and support equipment that contributes to the
equipment sets of 2 armored brigade combat teams in Europe. Investment
in prepositioned infrastructure and maintenance facilities ensures our
equipment will remain in peak war-fighting condition.
The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has been vital to this
posture. EDI allows USEUCOM to maintain combat credibility by
supporting rotational force deployments, infrastructure investments,
and delivering the right capabilities at key locations throughout
Europe. Continued congressional support of EDI is an investment in
Euro-Atlantic security and U.S. military capability. The FY24 EDI
budget allocation of $3.6 billion allows USEUCOM to support force
presence, training exercises, and infrastructure projects that are
enduring investments in U.S. and European security. Activities
supported by EDI are clear demonstrations of the United States
commitment to NATO and the collective defense of our Allies.
USEUCOM's exercise program demonstrates our war-fighting
capabilities to fight anywhere in the AOR alongside our Allies. While
USEUCOM conducts dozens of training exercises every year, there are
three recent exercises that stand out as demonstrations of our combat
credibility.
First, as I testify to you today STEADFAST DEFENDER 24 is on-going;
it is the largest live exercise NATO has done since 1988, and is
focused completely on building readiness to defend the territory of the
Alliance. More than 90,000 servicemembers from all 32 NATO Allies are
participating in the exercise to enhance interoperability and
strengthen the deterrence posture of the NATO Alliance.
Second, the U.S.-led, multinational maritime exercise in the Baltic
Sea, BALTOPS 23 in June 2023 demonstrated the collective power of 17
nations. Over 6,000 servicemembers trained on anti-submarine, anti-
surface, mine warfare, and naval coordination and shipping guidance.
The exercise strengthened combined response capabilities critical to
preserving the freedom of navigation and security in the Baltic Sea.
Third, USEUCOM participated in the annual German-led, air training
exercise, AIR DEFENDER 23. This is one of many success stories that
show how our NATO Allies are taking larger leadership roles to
strengthen the Alliance. AIR DEFENDER 23 was the largest air-training
exercise in European history and involved the deployment of the most
aircraft into the European Theater since World War Two. USEUCOM
participated in AIR DEFENDER 23 along with 16 other nations to
demonstrate our collective ability to reinforce the Eastern Flank with
air power.
useucom's support to nato
USEUCOM's primary reason for being located inside Europe is to
enable NATO, and enabling NATO to deter, and if necessary defeat,
Russia is the most important thing we do on a daily basis. Our
comprehensive commitment to the Alliance--through the deployment of
forces, rigorous training programs, and strategic investments--bolsters
our collective defense and enhances the interoperability of the
Alliance. The more the U.S. invests to strengthen the Alliance now, the
less we will need to provide in the future.
Our commitment to NATO's new focus on Deterrence and Defense of the
Euro-Atlantic Area is evident in both our relation to the Alliance's
command structures and our participation in its activities. There are
more U.S. Forces assigned, allocated, apportioned or affiliated with
NATO structures and plans than at any time in the past four decades.
U.S. Forces assigned to Europe can now be tasked directly by USEUCOM to
support the NATO's new defense plans. This is a huge win for European
and United States security. Rather than waiting for conflict to arise
before U.S. forces can be tasked to support NATO, USEUCOM can now
provide predictable and consistent forces in support of collective
territorial defense. This supports NATO's ability to execute its plans
and helps influence Allies to contribute their own forces.
Our commitment to NATO defense plans is also evident in our active
participation in allied planning and training exercises, which are
transitioning from a focus on deployment to a focus on deterrence and
large-scale territorial defense. Last year, USEUCOM participated
broadly in NATO's flagship exercise, Steadfast Jupiter 23. Steadfast
Jupiter 23 included the largest and most complex computer-assisted,
command post exercise conducted in the 21st century. The exercise
included more than 7,000 people from 17 NATO countries training on the
Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area. Future iterations of
the STEADFAST series of exercises will continue to build
interoperability as well as train on requirements outlined in the new
NATO defense plans.
USEUCOM also leads our own flagship training exercise, Austere
Challenge. Last year's event, Austere Challenge 23, included
participants from Allied Joint Forces Command Brunssum, along with 15
other allied and partner countries. AUSTERE CHALLENGE 23 demonstrated
our collective ability to project power across the USEUCOM AOR,
integrating a diverse array of foreign forces in a multi-week training
operation. We have just completed Auster Challenge 24, which included
an unprecedented level of allied participation, and tied together U.S.
plans with NATO's new Regional Plans for the very first time.
Moreover, USEUCOM's service components actively participate in
training exercises organized by the militaries of our NATO Allies.
These exercises are smaller in scope, but large in impact. For example,
Finland led an asymmetric warfare exercise called Southern Griffin
which built special operations capability among NATO Allies. SOCEUR
trained alongside Special Forces from Finland, France, the United
Kingdom, and NATO's newest Ally Sweden. Other exercises such as
Lightning Strike/Spring Storm, Neptune Strike 23-2, and Atlas Guardian
present additional opportunities for USEUCOM's service components to
train alongside our NATO Allies and strengthen our collective defense
and relationships.
Finally, USEUCOM supports the Alliance's effort to collaborate on
innovative, modern opportunities that build defensive capabilities. For
example, USEUCOM's air component supported the first-ever NATO Weapons
and Tactics Conference (WEPTAC), which developed the framework for the
first-ever ``Ramstein Flag'' exercise. This exercise, modeled on U.S.
Red Flag exercises, will provide realistic, advanced, aerial combat
training. Representatives from 24 NATO Allies attended WEPTAC and the
inaugural ``Ramstein Flag'' exercise is scheduled to take place in the
fall of 2024 in Greece.
respond to crises
While we work with allies and partners to prevent crises, USEUCOM
maintains the ability and responsibility to respond to any crisis in
our AOR. USEUCOM's power projection capability enables U.S. forces to
deploy anywhere in the world. In addition to combat forces, we can also
project logistical and medical organizations that provide essential
resources during times of crisis or instability. USEUCOM works closely
with our interagency and international partners to maintain readiness
to prevent and respond to crises.
USEUCOM's geographical position enables us to support other
Combatant Commands in crisis. For example, during the current conflict
in Gaza, USEUCOM supported USCENTCOM with air and maritime forces for
operations in the Middle East. Likewise, we routinely support AFRICOM's
operations on the African continent. The constant interaction among our
three commands allows us to solve ``boundary problems,'' and ensures
that in a crisis USEUCOM will be positioned and able to support either
command to further U.S. interests.
USEUCOM values our interagency partners and collaborates with our
offices located around the European Theater. For example, our work with
the Department of State on removal and abatement of unexploded ordnance
and explosive remnants of war in Ukraine contributes to the safety of
civilians caught in the war's crossfire. USEUCOM also works with the
Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well
as the Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center, to enforce
sanctions levied against Russia by the United States. Our support to
the Department of Energy and U.S. Agency for International Development
in Europe provides winterization and infrastructure to areas in Ukraine
effected by the damage caused by Russia's war.
useucom shaping the operational environment
USEUCOM deliberately engages in an array of activities and
investments that shape the operating environment. Significant Security
Cooperation Initiatives funded out of the International Security
Cooperation Programs (ISCP), military sales, military construction, and
key leader engagements (KLEs) inform the activities and attitudes of
our Allies and partners. Our goal is to build support for U.S.
interests that will have a positive impact on Euro-Atlantic security
while simultaneously strengthening relationships with our Allies and
partners.
USEUCOM's use of ISCP funding is critical to meeting our security
requirements throughout the AOR. Our deliberate use of the $295.08
million allotted to us by the Office of the Secretary of Defense goes
directly to fulfilling critical requirements in the Baltics, Bulgaria,
Georgia, Poland, and Romania. These funds will improve facilities,
enable countries to purchase military equipment, and increase training
of host-nation militaries.
Leaders from throughout USEUCOM have conducted over 800 KLEs in the
past year. These engagements, and years of similar engagements before
them, have been instrumental in fostering deep, enduring, trust-based
relationships. One cannot surge trust at the time of need; the
investment needs to be made beforehand and over time. USEUCOM's
relationships in this AOR are fundamental in developing common
understanding of the security environment; in reassuring our Allies and
partners; in demonstrating our commitment to partnerships; and in
realigning productive relationships with foreign countries. They are
the bedrock of our efforts to maintain security in the Euro-Atlantic
region, ultimately contributing to the security of the United States.
improving nato's deterrence and collective defense capabilities
As we continue to implement our strategy through OAIs, our greatest
strategic opportunity lies in the Alliance's transformation of its
collective defense system. This transformation is not just about
responding to current threats. It is a wholesale transformation of the
operational forces and procedures of the Alliance, and represents a
proactive step toward a future where collective defense of the Euro-
Atlantic is more integrated, resilient, adaptable, and resilient to
emerging challenges.
conclusion
The bond between the United States and Europe is fundamental to
American security. Our shared history, values, and objectives form the
bedrock of this relationship. As we approach the 75th anniversary of
the North Atlantic Treaty, we are reminded of the enduring strength of
the NATO Alliance and its impact on regional and global security. With
the continued support of Congress, our NATO Allies, and our partners,
we will ensure European security remains synonymous with American
security. Together, we will face the challenges of the future and
continue to build a free, prosperous, and secure Euro-Atlantic area.
Thank you, again, for your continued support to our servicemembers
stationed throughout Europe and your commitment to protect our shared
values and interests. Taking advantage of the opportunity to help
Ukraine fight Russia sets the conditions for Ukrainian success on the
battlefield and for the United States, our allies, and our partners to
outpace Russia's reconstitution, and secure the future of the Euro-
Atlantic. With support to deter Russia, continued progress on the
development of a resilient defense industrial base, and a more
streamlined foreign military sales program, the United States will have
every advantage as it supports NATO's transformation and sets the
conditions for long-term security in the Euro-Atlantic.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General Cavoli. General Van
Ovost, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACQUELINE D. VAN OVOST, USAF COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General Van Ovost. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker,
and distinguished members of the committee, it is my honor to
join you today with my Senior Enlisted Leader, Chief Master
Sergeant Brian Kruzelnick, to represent the men and women of
the United States Transportation Command as we defend the
Nation, take care of our people, and succeed through teamwork.
I am extremely proud of our team of logistics professionals
who lead the joint deployment and distribution enterprise,
continually exceed expectations, and ensure hope, deterrence,
and victory are assured as we underwrite our Nation's defense.
From competition to crisis, the entire enterprise proudly
deliver for our nations, our allies, and partners. We know our
success around the globe would not be possible without the
steadfast support of this committee and the whole of Congress.
The Fiscal Year 2025 budget request continues to make strides
in closing gaps in our mobility areas as we prepare for global
operations in a contested environment.
A contested environment is the reality of today. Whether in
the Homeland or abroad, we cannot presume freedom of maneuver
to execute our operations with full access to our lines of
communication.
Our organic fleets, coupled with the vital capacity
provided by our commercial transportation partners, must
continue to present credible capacity. Meaning, we must
modernize our mobility capabilities to include cyber resiliency
and digital modernization.
A connected, aware, and survivable mobility fleet and
network is needed to maintain our advantage against a capable
and determined near peer adversary. My top readiness concerns
remain sealift and air refueling. Sealift is the backbone of
our ability to deliver a decisive Joint Force.
However, the age of the fleet is dragging readiness to
alarming levels. 17 of the 47 organic reserve force ships are
50 years or older. To address readiness and decrease in
capacity due to the planned retirement of 27 ships in the next
8 years, we must add younger ships to the fleet.
TRANSCOM supports Navy strategy to acquire used sealift
vessels from the commercial market, and further request to
provide the Secretary of Defense discretionary authority to
purchase foreign built used ships under favorable market
conditions without restrictions.
We acknowledge Congress's intent to include domestic
newbuild sealift ships to recapitalize the ready Reserve Force,
and we are working with the Navy and Maritime Administration to
create an acquisition strategy for new construction that will
complement the buy used program.
I greatly appreciate your support for timely, predictable,
and stabilized funding to meet our sealift requirements.
Similarly, our refueling is foundation to our Nation's power
projection advantage. It is our most stressed capability.
We must ensure continuous modernization and
recapitalization of the aging fleet to meet the operational
requirements of the modern battlespace. TRANSCOM supports the
Air Force's strategy for the uninterrupted tanker
recapitalization and accelerated fielding of the next
generation air refueling system.
Over the past year, we have made great strides in
synchronizing global fuel management and delivery in
collaboration with our key partners in the Joint Petroleum
Enterprise, leading to robust planning, posture, operations,
and capability development to assure end to end fuel
distribution in a contested environment.
This includes diversifying our distribution and delivery
posture by having an increased forward presence with fuel
afloat in contracted maritime tankers and increasing capacity
and access to the U.S. flagged maritime tanker fleet through
the Tanker Security Program.
In addition, we fully support the Maritime Security
Program, the Jones Act, and cargo preference laws that all work
to ensure that we have the necessary U.S. flag capability and
U.S. merchant mariners to move sensitive defense materials
during a national emergency.
Maritime stakeholders have been experiencing challenges
with recruiting and retaining qualified mariners, and we
support MARAD and industry efforts to identify strategies that
address the mariner shortage and ensure their readiness.
To effectively sense adversary threats and activities in
our logistics networks, the Nation must utilize all available
resources. Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act provides me insights into adversary intent, capabilities,
and activities to contest our logistics flows. The loss of this
authority adds risk to my mission.
Additionally, passing a national defense supplemental is
vital for the health of the Transportation Working Capital
Fund, which preserves essential readiness and ensures response
options for the Secretary of Defense. I am honored to join
General Cavoli today, where we stand firmly with Ukraine and
its fight for democracy, sovereignty, and territorial
integrity, that in turn delivers success and stability for our
allies and our Nation.
I would like to thank you once again for your leadership
and the support you provide our workforce. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Van Ovost follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Jacqueline D. Van Ovost
who we are--our mission
U.S. Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) enduring purpose is to
project and sustain combat power whenever and wherever the United
States chooses. Within the ever-changing strategic and operational
landscape, our logistics and mobility enterprise continues to play an
integral role in assuring our Nation's defense, as well as aiding
leaders at all echelons to preserve time and create better options--a
decision advantage. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) envisions
a future force as lethal, sustainable, resilient, survivable, agile,
and responsive--our logistics and mobility enterprises will meet this
call. USTRANSCOM, its components, and its commercial partners are
advancing efforts in connectivity, data-driven decisionmaking, and
creating options to support integrated deterrence, campaigning efforts,
and an enduring advantage for our joint force.
As one of 11 combatant commands, our warfighting team is a diverse
force, composed of our component commands, as well as a subordinate
command, interagency, and commercial partners of the broader Joint
Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) and the Joint Petroleum
Enterprise (JPE). The entire enterprise works together to move the
right capabilities to the right place, at the right time. Our assigned
Unified Command Plan responsibilities are executed through three
component commands (U.S. Army's Military Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command (SDDC), U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command, and
U.S. Air Force's Air Mobility Command), and one subordinate command,
the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC). Our key mobility
mission areas include sealift, strategic seaports, airports, air
refueling, airlift, patient movement, domestic rail, global bulk fuel
management, and motor transport. The JDDE operates as a Total Force,
harnessing the unique skills of Active Duty, Reserve, National Guard,
government civilians, contractors, and commercial industry teammates
who are vital to our ability to bolster warfighting readiness.
Annually, USTRANSCOM spends approximately 9.5 billion dollars in
organic and commercial transportation services to execute Department of
Defense (DOD) mission requirements. The Transportation Working Capital
Fund (TWCF) is the lifeblood of USTRANSCOM's mission to deploy and
sustain the joint force. TWCF fiscal resources provide the agility
necessary to rapidly respond to complex and unplanned operations. We
have been below our cash thresholds for several years and are working
closely with the Department to return the TWCF to our normal boundaries
while not hindering Services' buying power. An essential part of that
solvency plan is to receive a supplemental reimbursement for support to
Israel. The TWCF has already expensed $172 million for transportation
costs for Israel and projects total costs at $550 million for fiscal
year 2024 as of 4 March 2024. The TWCF cannot absorb this amount and
requires reimbursement to ensure our ability to rapidly respond to
emerging needs as requested in the Administration's October 2023
supplemental appropriations request.
The DOD's ability to project military forces inextricably is linked
to commercial industry, what we like to call our fourth component. Our
industry partners provide critical transportation capacity, petroleum
infrastructure, global networks, and contracts, to meet day-today and
wartime requirements. USTRANSCOM also partners with other U.S.
Government Departments and Agencies, such as the U.S. Department of
State and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), especially the
Maritime Administration (MARAD), who operates and maintains the
Government-owned sealift fleet. We also partner with the Federal
Highway Administration and Federal Railroad Administration within DOT
to evaluate the readiness of key road and rail transportation networks
to support defense requirements, and we collaborate closely with other
key logistics partners and Defense Transportation System customers,
including the Defense Logistics Agency, the General Services
Administration, and U.S. Coast Guard, to establish supportive policies
and guide our efforts.
where we are--strategic environment
Strategic competition is a daily reality, and our Nation's
competitors are maneuvering fluidly between conventional and gray-zone
activities. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the Houthi
attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, and Israel's ongoing
conflict in Gaza confirms that this is still a ``decisive decade.''
Mobility obstacles exist at every step in the deployment and
distribution process, from the Homeland to the destination. The
increasing focus of foreign intelligence entities to map and penetrate
the U.S. military/commercial logistics and critical infrastructure
systems requires an amplified, coordinated response from all Government
counterintelligence agencies. Over 85 percent of the Joint Force is in
the Continental United States, and our mission of moving the warfighter
to the fight will continue to be threatened by competitors that are on
a trajectory to present increasingly challenging threats across
multiple domains. We acknowledge that the Homeland is not a sanctuary.
The President's National Security Strategy (NSS) makes clear that
the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are working
aggressively to undermine democracy and export a model of governance
marked by repression at home and coercion abroad. The PRC continues to
refine and develop its means to contest American power projection and
sustainment operations in the Pacific. The PRC is carefully studying
how the United States sustains our Allies and partners in Europe and
the Middle East during two of this century's most destabilizing
conflicts. Without question, the PRC has identified what they perceive
to be our vulnerabilities and will attempt to exploit them in a future
crisis with the West.
In Europe, the war in Ukraine remains at the forefront. Moscow
seeks to fracture Western unity and diminish our resolve. Our
sustainment operations, particularly crucial supplies of artillery and
air defenses for Ukraine's military, will remain a vital lifeline for
them. Of note, the war strengthened Russia and PRC ties, as well as
ties between Russia and the DPRK, and they view their deepened
relationship as a strong counterbalance to the United States.
The Middle East is one of our most enduring security and stability
challenges. Iran and its threat network pose risk to sustainment
operations throughout the region. Recently, we have witnessed numerous
attacks on our facilities in Iraq and Syria. The ongoing war between
Israel and Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (Hamas) is a powerful
reminder of the highly unpredictable nature of conflict in the region.
The character of this violence and instability guarantees that we must
remain prepared to conduct mobility and sustainment operations in this
volatile part of the world with almost no warning. We must assure
Israel and our other Middle East partners that we can, and will, move
decisively and rapidly when and where we are needed to protect our
interests in the region.
Furthermore, regional instability in places such as Africa, Central
and Latin America, as well as transborder issues like natural disasters
and pandemics, will continue to challenge the Joint Force and create
formidable hurdles for USTRANSCOM.
The JDDE is accustomed to sustaining forward-deployed forces across
largely uncontested environments. Logistics realities are changing and
the JDDE cannot presume it will enjoy similar freedom of maneuver to
execute operations with full access to our lines of communication on
the ground, in the air, and at sea. The PRC has developed a
sophisticated cyber capability for collection and attack and expanded
its electronic warfare and counter space capabilities to degrade our
Command and Control. The PRC has fielded hypersonic missiles like those
used by Russia in Ukraine. These long-range weapons threaten our ports,
fuel storage sites, stockpiles, warehouses, and marshalling areas
throughout the Pacific. Additionally, mass drone attacks can overwhelm
the battlefield and have caught the world's attention--from Russia
using Iranian Shahed drones against Ukraine, to terrorist groups using
one way attack drones in the Middle East as seen in the Bab-el-Mandeb
strait. Air power is now available to any actor who has the means and
will to challenge us.
Our Nation's strategic network of Allies and partners provides
capacity, logistical capabilities, intelligence, and Access, Basing and
Overflight (ABO) agreements that empower the United States to compete
successfully against global challenges. Assured access to and through
foreign nations is cultivated through sustained engagement and
agreements with our Allies, partners, and geographic combatant
commands. This network of Allies and partners enables assured force
projection and freedom of maneuver, reducing the challenges associated
with maintaining operational reach over extended distances. This can be
seen in action during OPERATION PROSPERITY GUARDIAN, which saw
collaboration between United States Naval Forces Central Command, U.S.
Central Command (USCENTCOM), USTRANSCOM and an international coalition
protecting the free flow of commerce through the Red Sea.
The JDDE relies on the diverse and expansive capacity of global
infrastructure, both government-owned and commercially owned and
operated, to deliver an immediate force tonight and a decisive force
when needed. We intend to make our supporting systems more resilient
and agile in the face of tomorrow's peer threats to preserve
operational capability and protect key systems. The collective
influence of our enterprise and Nation to shape the strategic
environment can provide competitive advantage, senior leadership
decision space, and complicate the decision matrix of any potential
adversary.
where we are going
In the decades after World War II, most transportation and
logistics activities have been conducted in uncontested environments,
however, the strategic environment has changed dramatically. We must
grow our capabilities to ensure that logistics never becomes the weak
link. We will set the conditions for a strategic environment where the
JDDE can project and sustain the Joint Force, at the time and place of
the Nation's choosing, under persistent, all domain attack.
Our competitors' threats are real and the imperative to change is
urgent. This decisive decade demonstrates the importance of the NDS's
priorities of defending the United States Homeland; deterring strategic
attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners; deterring
aggression and being prepared to prevail; and building a resilient
Joint Force and defense ecosystem. USTRANSCOM's capabilities will be
the engine that propels the NDS, underwriting the Joint Warfighting
Concept, ensuring the viability of deterrence operations, and providing
our national leadership with strategic flexibility.
The command will enable our national priorities through the NDS's
strategic ways of Integrated Deterrence, Campaigning, and Building
Enduring Advantages. By nesting our strategic priorities and campaign
objectives within the NDS framework, USTRANSCOM is focused on ensuring
the JDDE is effectively postured to accomplish its mission when called
upon.
Integrated Deterrence is predicated on making the adversary doubt
they can achieve their objectives. It requires working seamlessly
across domains and theaters, and leveraging our unmatched network of
Allies and Partners, in order to demonstrate capability and will.
USTRANSCOM remains laser-focused on projecting and sustaining the Joint
Force by cultivating robust global mobility posture and credible
strategic capacity. Strengthening relationships with Allies, partners,
and commercial industry continues to expand friendly access, basing,
and overflight, thus creating positional advantage across all domains.
Maintaining ready, credible capacity through recapitalization,
modernization, and a robust multi-national exercise schedule maintains
our global power-projection capability while demonstrating collective
resolve. When used in concert, posture and capacity provide a true
asymmetric and strategic advantage for the Nation.
Campaigning includes the Globally Integrated Exercise, Pacific
Pathways, Keen Edge, and other joint exercises that put a premium on
closing operational gaps to strengthen deterrence and develop new
concepts to prevail. Large-scale exercises, fleet readiness
activations, and focused wargames will enhance logistics
interoperability and trust across the Joint Force, with Allies,
partners, and the commercial industry.
Building Enduring Advantages begins by addressing critical
vulnerabilities and accelerating force development. Investing in and
hardening a resilient defense ecosystem will strengthen our commercial
and military transportation and bulk fuel management networks across
multiple domains. These investments will modernize our forces for
increased agility, survivability, and battle space awareness in a
contested environment. We expect disruption to our operations and are
focused on cyber mission assurance and digital modernization to ensure
our ability to conduct globally integrated command and control, and to
generate decision advantage. With significant volumes of data and
advanced analytics, we expect to posture efficiently, recover quickly,
and accelerate our decision advantage.
Finally, our people will make the difference between victory and
defeat. We acknowledge the challenges present today and continue to
develop our warfighting team with a competitive mindset. By embracing
the imperative to be ready now and in the future, our people understand
the mission and are continually adapting to maintain our Nation's
competitive advantage in power projection.
how we will get there--warfighting framework
USTRANSCOM is focused on shaping and directing the capabilities and
concepts necessary to operate in future contested environments, which
will include multi modal solutions for transloading cargo, fuel, and
personnel, including patients, between commercial and military capacity
and delivering the last tactical mile. Our analysis goes beyond the
mobility platforms and integrates key warfighting functions, current
wartime demands, and future concepts entailing maneuver and distributed
operations. We have advanced significantly in our analytic framework to
better conduct globally integrated mobility operations, manage global
bulk fuel delivery, and synchronize our Global Mobility Posture, Global
Mobility Capacity, and Global Command, Control, and Integration. These
critical elements create USTRANSCOM's warfighting framework through
which we carry out our missions.
Global Mobility Posture
The foundation of USTRANSCOM's power projection mission is our
Global Mobility Posture. Domestic agreements and diplomatic alignment
with our Allies and partners enable a globally distributed and scalable
logistics network capable of the rapidly deploying personnel and
equipment at the time and place of our choosing. This requires a whole-
of-government approach to solidify and amplify our established nodes
and routes. These dense layers of contacts and contracts--both military
and commercial--are critical to rapidly advance our national security
interests, deter adversaries, and when necessary, win decisively. While
this provides the United States a comparative advantage, we must
continually strengthen and diversify our global basing, infrastructure,
and agreements to maintain this advantage, especially as new concepts
and operations drive us to evolve.
Deterrence and our ability to project and sustain the Joint Force
begins in the Homeland. Domestically, USTRANSCOM works closely with the
DOT on numerous transportation programs including three National
Defense Programs: Highways, Railroads, and Ports for National Defense.
Although USTRANSCOM assesses that our Nation's infrastructure is
currently capable of supporting military transportation requirements,
substantial public and private sector investment is needed to sustain
the current transportation infrastructure. For sea transportation we
rely on a collection of DOD and commercially owned U.S. Strategic
Seaports. The Strategic Seaport Program ensures the DOD has access to
sufficient seaport infrastructure to meet the Nation's objectives.
Military Ocean Terminal Concord (MOTCO), on the West Coast, is the sole
strategic ammunition seaport serving the Indo-Pacific region. With our
U.S. Army Component, SDDC, we have identified the need for significant
investments in MOTCO to facilitate the safe handling of ammunition and
to mitigate the effects of climate change. At Military Ocean Terminal
Sunny Point on the East Coast, major enabling infrastructure components
are approaching the end of useful life and must be replaced to allow
the terminal to meet ammunition throughput requirements. We continue to
work with the Department of the Army to preserve and modernize both
seaports to reduce risk and prevent capability gaps.
Assured access to and through foreign nations may be incorporated
into virtually any ype of agreement, ranging from an exchange of
Diplomatic Notes to a comprehensive Mutual Defense Treaty or Defense
Cooperation Agreement of indefinite duration. The reciprocal exchange
of Logistic Support, Supplies, and Services, including airlift,
sealift, air refueling, and related services, is usually addressed in
Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) with Allies,
partners, and international organizations. USTRANSCOM has the authority
to negotiate and conclude function-or event-specific ACSA Implementing
Arrangements with Allies, partners, and international organizations.
For treaties, protection agreements, services agreements, ABO
agreements, diplomatic notes, and implementing arrangements, USTRANSCOM
relies on each geographical combatant command to initiate negotiations,
working closely with the Department of State, and conclude agreements
with host nations within their areas of responsibility (AORs).
USTRANSCOM also participates with geographic combatant commanders
in other host nations' and regional alliances' infrastructure planning
that could be beneficial to our command's mobility mission. For
instance, the interface between U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM)
development of theater posture and North Atlantic Treaty Organization's
(NATO) efforts to provide capabilities necessary for its war planning
provides USTRANSCOM visibility on NATO-built or planned infrastructure
possibly available for the command's deployment and distribution
mission.
Finally, USTRANSCOM engages with Allies and partners through its
Security Cooperation program. This program promotes interoperability
with partner nations and requires persistent engagement with the
Security Cooperation Functional Community. Tools used for engagement
include forums, information sharing, exercises and wargames, key leader
engagements, participation in lift-sharing consortiums, Mobility
Support Advisory Squadrons, and the Aerial Refueling Systems Advisory
Group.
Global Mobility Capacity
Our capacity includes sealift, air refueling, airlift, patient
movement, rail, motor transport, bulk fuel, and the ability to fully
mobilize the Total Force at the time and point of need. Our commercial
partners provide significant mobility capacity; however, integrated
planning is critical to ensure conditions are set to best enable
successful Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
Agreement (VISA), and Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA) operations. Our
available capacity, including emergency preparedness programs,
continues to represent a credible option for delivering fuel,
munitions, personnel, and materiel or evacuating patients--regardless
of the environment.
In August 2023, USTRANSCOM completed the 2023 Mobility White Paper
that assessed the capability and associated risk in meeting warfighting
demands as outlined in the 2022 National Defense Strategy. The study
emphasized that ensuring sufficient and credible strategic airlift
capacity (C-17 and C-5), continuous modernization of our air refueling
aircraft (KC-135 and KC-46), and sustained recapitalization of our
mobility lift platforms (RO/ROs, airlift, and air refueling) is
critical to ensure USTRANSCOM can continue to project and sustain the
Joint Force. The organic sealift fleet is currently sufficient to meet
wartime needs at an acceptable level of risk, but an aging fleet makes
recapitalization an urgent priority. The air refueling fleet remains
increasingly challenged in terms of threat-driven basing, increasing
joint force demands, and adversary actions complicating air refueling
output. USTRANSCOM has worked with the US Air Force to continue funding
over the long term to replace aging aircraft to sustain fleet capacity
while pursuing critical modernization efforts. The strategic airlift
fleet of 275 aircraft (223 C-17 and 52 C-5M aircraft) remains vital to
rapid global mobility. Recent mobility studies validated our current
strategic airlift capacity is sufficient at elevated risk but will be
stressed to meet wartime requirements. Low readiness is a key concern
across the airlift and air refueling fleets; failure to maintain the
current fleets or to modernize them to improve survivability in an
increasingly contested logistics environment will lead to diminished
mobility capacity. The theater airlift fleet of 271 C-130 aircraft is
heavily stressed to meet the demand for globally integrated plans,
which include transload movement from commercial aircraft, time-
sensitive movement of forces and supplies, and battlefield aeromedical
evacuation (AE).
Long, contested lines of communications, and the tyranny of
distance with a distributed footprint in the Indo-Pacific region,
present challenges for the JDDE to project, maneuver, and sustain the
Joint Force. Analysis highlights a tight coupling between intra-theater
airlift and sea-lift assets required to maneuver and sustain fielded
forces given the scarcity of ground lines of communication. Increased
investment in theater sealift is needed. Absent sufficient shallow-
draft sealift vessels and bulk fuel tankers, mobility requirements
shift to intra-theater airlift, exacerbating significant demands
already levied on the airlift fleet. The challenges of satisfying
competing, simultaneous demands across significant distances at
increasing velocity are compounded by an increasingly contested
operational environment. This places a premium on the credibility of
our capacity: ready, capable mobility forces prepared to scale from
campaigning to crisis and ensure global power projection requirements
are met.
Connectivity is foundational to the air mobility enterprise's
ability to project, maneuver, and sustain the Joint Force. Without it,
our air mobility fleets will continue to lack the battlespace awareness
necessary to survive in the increasingly complex and contested
operational environment projected in conflict against a peer adversary.
Connectivity is vital to the credibility of our air mobility capacity,
and our ability to meet joint force demands at the time and place of
our choosing. After decades of operations in permissive environments,
our air mobility fleets lack the ability to leverage current and future
Air Force and Joint Battle Networks, leaving them blind to friend and
foe alike. Our asymmetric advantage to globally project and sustain
power on demand depends on air mobility to demonstrate our readiness
and national will--in crisis or conflict--at relevant velocity and
mass. Successful prosecution of this mission is a strategic imperative:
it relies on the survivability of our air mobility enterprise, for
which battlespace awareness is a pre-requisite, and unachievable
without connectivity. This is an issue of utmost consequence; I fully
support Air Mobility Command's efforts to rapidly connect its fleets.
Global Command, Control, and Integration
Malign actors in cyberspace pose a real and persistent threat to
USTRANSCOM systems. Our global enterprise of transportation and
logistics services depends on the connectivity these networks provide.
Global Command, Control, and Integration is the exercise of authority
and direction to plan, coordinate, synchronize and control operations
at-echelon. Expanding vulnerabilities due to data saturation, demand
fast and informed decisionmaking at an unprecedented scale and scope.
Indeed, the rapidly changing character of war means that turning data
into decisions more quickly and accurately than our adversaries is our
new center of gravity. As USTRANSCOM transforms into a data-centric
organization, we have partnered with the DOD Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence Office to strengthen our ability to treat data
as a strategic product, becoming a data-driven organization with the
capabilities, tools, and culture to gather and analyze information for
better business and operational decisions.
Cyber resiliency and digital modernization enable our ability to
conduct globally integrated command and control, generate decision
advantage, enhance response actions to threats posed by cyber
adversaries, and reduce vulnerabilities across the JDDE.
USTRANSCOM's contribution to daily campaigning and wartime power
projection, inherent in integrated deterrence, stems from connecting
the three elements in the command's mobility warfighting framework: (1)
global mobility posture through a robust network surface infrastructure
and nearly 90 key enroute international airfields and seaports in 44
host nations for access, basing, and overflight, (2) credible global
mobility capacity leveraging both organic and commercial assets for
strategic airlift, sealift, air refueling, theater airlift, aeromedical
evacuation, and enablers for end-to-end connectivity, and (3) global
command and control and integration of all elements necessary to
rapidly align scarce mobility resources to meet the DOD's highest
priorities. USTRANSCOM is investing resources and leadership focus to
adapt to the operational environment's changing conditions. Our goal is
to be able to sustain mission outcomes under attack and recover rapidly
from disruptions that adversaries hope will impair our command's role
in global logistics. The implementation of Zero Trust principles
remains foundational to ensuring we can execute our mission, especially
as we drive toward our objective of ``TRANSCOM Anywhere'' providing
operational, reliable, scalable, and secure access on-demand everywhere
and at all times.
In addition to our internal initiatives and as is the case with
most organizations, USTRANSCOM is dependent upon numerous external
capability providers. A key example with profound impact on
USTRANSCOM's ability to maintain effective command and control while
operating globally are the space-based intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, satellite communications and positioning, navigation,
and timing capabilities provided by the Intelligence Community,
Services and USSPACECOM. To meet our global operations demands, the DOD
must procure Satellite Communications (SATCOM) as an enterprise system-
from on-orbit down to the ground segment and warfighter terminals. To
win in a multi-domain fight, future SATCOM systems must have improved
system resilience, on-orbit endurance through refueling and extended
maneuverability, and improved environmental situational awareness.
Essentially, the systems need to be able to detect and respond to both
natural and adversarial threats. To provide navigation and positioning
information central to effective command and control, USTRANSCOM fully
recommends that the services are allocated appropriate funding for
acquisition of military signal (M-code) enabled receivers to ensure
connectivity to the Global Positioning System (GPS) capabilities that
are critical to the warfighter's effectiveness. This funding will allow
the services to operate in a GPS contested environment and meet
congressional directives in the 2017 National Defense Authorization
Act.
Finally, and continuing the theme of coordination with external
capability providers, USTRANSCOM is strengthening partnerships with our
transportation service providers to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and
increase resiliency. Last year marked the sixth year of contractually
requiring our transportation service providers to conduct annual
cybersecurity self-assessments to track compliance with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology security guidelines. We are
increasing information-sharing and collaboration initiatives with our
commercial partners, to include no-cost tools and services available
from various government agencies, such as the National Security Agency,
and Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency.
year in review
Last year, USTRANSCOM continued to demonstrate the positive impact
a dedicated logistics combatant command can have on global operations.
In fiscal year 2023, USTRANSCOM delivered over 289,000 passengers and
over 330,000 short tons (STONs) by airlift, over 13.1 million square
feet of cargo by sealift, and conducted 5,518 patient movements,
outpacing our fiscal year 2022 operations. USTRANSCOM's logistical
prowess remains on full display as we balance the rigors of our global
mission.
In 2023, USTRANSCOM delivered more than 325 million pounds of
security assistance equipment to Ukraine, resulting in more than 650
million pounds total delivered since the command began this effort in
January 2022. USTRANSCOM delivered $9 million worth of Department of
Energy equipment to the embattled nation early in the year to reinforce
and reconstitute its critical power grid infrastructure, as well as
more than 250 air defense systems and 2,800 missiles in defense of
Ukrainian population centers. Eight Armored vehicle bridges, 78
breaching vehicles, 341 personnel-carrying vehicles, 33 tanks, and more
than 1.1 million artillery rounds--combined with Allied and partner
nation donations--have allowed the Ukrainian Armed Forces to maintain
battlefield parity across a wide front. USTRANSCOM continues to
expedite high-priority equipment to the point of need while also
balancing security assistance requirements within the U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command (USINDOPACOM) and USCENTCOM AORs.
The command also supported USINDOPACOM's Operation PACIFIC PATHWAYS
23 (OP23), encompassing 13 exercises in eight countries, by
transporting over 660,000 square feet of cargo aboard four Ready
Reserve Force (RRF) vessels. In support of OP23, we transported over
2,100 personnel and 800 STONS of cargo via organic and commercial
aircraft into the region. Our support to USINDOPACOM highlights our
interconnectedness with the command and enhances our relationships with
Allies and partners, enabling the United States to counter the PRC
influence in the region and exercise our capability to surge sealift.
USTRANSCOM remains postured to surge in the event of crisis in
support of all combatant commands. In U.S. Africa Command and USEUCOM,
we transported 2,000 passengers and 2,500 STONs in support of multiple
crises. In February, we supported our NATO ally the Republic of Turkiye
with humanitarian assistance and disaster aid in response to the 7.8
magnitude earthquake. In April, we supported the military assisted
departure of our Department of State teammates in Sudan. Finally,
following the coup in Niger, USTRANSCOM delivered critical support to
counter violent extremist operations in the Sahel region. We project
and sustain the Joint Force, and our Allies and partners, at the speed
of need.
USTRANSCOM, as directed in the Unified Command Plan, is the sole
provider, through the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, of rapidly
deployable Joint enabling capability packages of communications,
planning, and public affairs. This force enables combatant commanders
to rapidly establish Joint Task Force Headquarters that exercise
command and control in crisis and contingency. In fiscal year 2023 the
JECC deployed multiple small teams with a total of 47 communicators,
planners, and public affairs professionals in support of Security
Assistance Group-Ukraine, Joint Task Force-Red Hill defuel operations,
DHS Southwest Border Operations, and the crisis in Niger. As we began
fiscal year 2024, the JECC rapidly deployed the same capabilities at
home and abroad in response to the Israel's war against Hamas. In
addition to crisis response, the JECC provided over 21,000 man-days in
support to Joint and service exercises, Joint capability development
initiatives, and Joint strategic planning efforts primarily focused on
the pacing challenge.
Throughout fiscal year 2023, USTRANSCOM conducted extensive global
operations, delivering over 86.2 million gallons of fuel during air
refueling missions, which resupplied over 49,000 receiver aircraft on
over 26,000 missions (31,779 sorties). Furthermore, USTRANSCOM
supported 42 bomber task force missions, reassuring our partners across
all six theaters, and reminding adversaries how quickly we can project
combat power. These missions in the USINDOPACOM and USEUCOM AORs
displayed combat credibility and furthered multilateral integration,
ABO efforts, and deterrence. USTRANSCOM also supported multiple fighter
aircraft movements and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
support missions for USINDOPACOM, USEUCOM, and USCENTCOM solidifying
our global campaign plan and signaling support to our Allies and
partners.
risk mitigation efforts
Proactive mobility recapitalization efforts are crucial for us to
effectively operate in a future contested logistics environment.
USTRANSCOM's assessment of mobility sufficiency under the NDS found our
current mobility capacity sufficient, but at increased levels of risk
due to the focused and persistent efforts of our adversaries. Risk is
further heightened by an erosion of readiness and capacity in key
mobility areas.
National Maritime Strategy
We appreciate and encourage the efforts to develop a national
maritime strategy. Our pacing challenge, the PRC, has not only
developed a robust maritime strategy, but their strategy also seeks to
dominate the maritime industry worldwide enhancing both economic and
national security advantages. It is estimated that the PRC has
controlling stakes in 96 foreign ports in 53 countries; the PRC builds
100 times the number of ocean-going vessels as compared to the United
States, makes 80 percent of ship-to-shore cranes used in the United
States and produces 85 percent of the world's shipping containers.
Additionally, the PRC invests $132 billion in subsidies for shipping
and shipbuilding. The PRC is militarizing its merchant marine force,
not only to compete with Western powers, but also to dominate maritime
activity in the Pacific. I echo the sentiments of Secretary of the Navy
Del Toro where he argues, ``no great naval power has ever existed
without also being a dominant commercial maritime power, encompassing
both shipbuilding and global shipping . . . It is imperative that we
take decisive action to reclaim America's position as a leading
maritime power.''
USTRANSCOM is collaborating with the Center for Naval Analysis and
MARAD on a study that will inform a U.S. National Maritime Strategy.
This is a whole of government strategy that should be coordinated,
staffed, and issued from the highest level of government and endorsed
by the National Security Council.
Sealift
One of my highest concerns is the reduction in capacity and
readiness in the organic RRF. Our organic sealift fleet and commercial
transportation partners must continue to present credible deterrence
and require proactive efforts to recapitalize and modernize. Seventeen
of the 47 ships are 50 years old or older, with the oldest being 56
years old. Therefore, USTRANSCOM supports the Navy's strategy to
recapitalize the government-owned fleet by acquiring foreign-built used
sealift vessels from the commercial market and further requests to
provide the Secretary of Defense discretionary authority to purchase
foreign built ships to expeditiously replace the aging ships under more
favorable market conditions. This includes removing the overall limit
on the number of used sealift vessels DOD can procure, currently
authorized at nine ships. We acknowledge Congress' intent to include
domestic new build sealift ships to recapitalize the RRF and look
forward to plans from the Navy and MARAD that will complement the Buy
Used program and expeditiously renew the fleet. We are already a
generation late in recapitalizing a ready sealift fleet to meet our
national objectives.
Working with MARAD, we have purchased two used RO/RO vessels and
three used rollon/container ships with over one million useful square
feet capacity. However, the process must be accelerated to keep pace
with the retirement schedule. To maintain sealift capacity and preserve
sealift readiness, we are advocating to accelerate used vessel
purchases and to continually refine the current retirement plan to
manage risk within program resources.
Furthermore, we will remain a strong advocate for continued funding
for secure communications capabilities to support the organic RRF.
Continued Navy and MARAD investment in secure data and voice
communications capabilities will enhance our ability to Command and
Control our organic sealift in the most challenging environments.
Additional investment is required to field and sustain comparable
secure communications capabilities to support our commercial partners
in sufficient quantities to meet the demands of contested operations,
and to ensure the entire logistics enterprise remains fully capable
into the future.
The VISA and the VTA, together with their complementary peacetime
programs the Maritime Security Program (MSP) and Tanker Security
Program (TSP) provide assured access to a fleet of U.S. flagged
sustainment sealift vessels and product tankers for use during armed
conflict or national emergency. The recently implemented TSP ensures we
have access to industry fuel distribution capabilities for defense
needs. Together with MARAD, we successfully awarded the initial ten
operating agreements with a primary focus on support to underway
refueling of the U.S. Navy's combat fleet. Though not yet appropriated,
the fiscal year 2023 NDAA authorized the expansion of TSP from 10 to 20
vessels. We are working with MARAD and industry partners and intend to
target shallow draft tanker vessels to address intra-theater bulk fuel
distribution in the Indo-Pacific.
In addition to the TSP, we fully support the MSP which provides the
DOD with assured access to 60 U.S flag sealift vessels. The RRF, the
TSP and the MSP are pivotal to enhancing global readiness and
safeguarding our Nation's supply chains. These sealift programs
underscore our Nation's steadfast commitment to national security and
economic stability and exemplify the indispensable partnership between
MARAD and USTRANSCOM, and industry.
The Merchant Marines
The U.S. maritime industry is confronting manpower shortages that
create a national security risk. Merchant Mariner readiness requires
continued assessment to ensure an adequately trained supply of merchant
mariners to crew our surge fleet while minimizing impacts to commercial
industry. USTRANSCOM and Military Sealift Command depend on the U.S.-
flag merchant marine fleet, with the security benefits of American
crews, to move sensitive defense materials. Unfortunately, due to a
confluence of factors including complications from the COVID-19
pandemic, the workforce is shrinking. We look forward to the outcomes
of the recently started, congressionally mandated, Merchant Mariner
Workforce Working Group to find means to mitigate and possibly reverse
trends.
We are encouraged by MARAD's efforts to collaboratively identify
issues, potential solutions, and support a whole-of-government approach
to address this national security matter. We will employ Navy Reserve
tactical advisors on commercial vessels when appropriate and expand our
consolidated cargo capability. This will include providing regular
training opportunities to expand mariner proficiency in consolidated
cargo operations and utilize multi-modal solutions to deliver across
dispersed locations in compressed timelines.
Air Refueling
The air refueling fleet remains our most stressed fleet under
wartime conditions. It is critical to rapid global mobility and is the
lifeblood of the Joint Force's ability to deploy and employ the
immediate and surge forces across all NDS mission areas including the
Department's top priorities--defense of the Homeland and strategic
deterrence. Credible air refueling capacity must simultaneously cover
multiple high priority global demands, which causes daily and wartime
concerns within the current air refueling fleet. With the last of the
KC-10 aircraft being retired, the programmed air refueling fleet of 466
total aircraft will consist of the KC-135 and the KC-46.
When the last KC-46 on contract is accepted into the Air Force, the
average age of the remaining KC-135s will be 67 years old, emphasizing
the need for continued recapitalization and investment in the Next
Generation Air-Refueling System (NGAS). While USTRANSCOM is solution-
agnostic, the nature of global demand continues to emphasize the time
and space aspect of the problem, requiring sufficient booms and drogues
in the air at any given time to meet the significant number of
simultaneous requirements.
It is critical that the Air Force continues to modernize the KC-135
and invest in the NGAS to maintain credible capacity and provide the
persistent connectivity, improved survivability, and increased agility
necessary to operate in future contested environments.
Strategic Airlift
The combined output of both the C-17 and C-5M fleets is necessary
and consequential with no replacement capability on the horizon. Fiscal
reality indicates that constraints on availability of the significant
resources necessary to develop a Next Generation Airlift aircraft, or
C-X, will limit our ability to replace the C-5M until at least the
2040's; therefore, sustaining these platforms into the 2040's is a
national security imperative. Strategic airlift is a unique U.S.
capability, necessary to implement our NDS requirement to rapidly
execute and sustain power projection globally. The distances required
to face our pacing challenge in the Pacific warrant velocity at scale
and our strategic airlift fleet provides that advantage. Our capacity
is significant, with 275 C-17 and C-5M aircraft producing only
approximately 10 percent less output than the Desert Storm fully
mobilized fleets, despite a 30 percent decrement in aircraft over that
same period.
The C-5M fleet is challenged by maintenance issues that makes its
availability constrained to confront the scale and tempo required for
near-peer combat operations in the Pacific. USTRANSCOM applauds efforts
by the Air Force to enhance this critical asset's reliability which
will enhance availability for wartime requirements.
Modernizing the airlift enterprise to deliver, maneuver, and
sustain the Joint Force against a peer adversary at relevant velocity
and location means prioritizing connectivity, which directly enhances
battlespace awareness and thus survivability. Improving threat-agnostic
self-defense will reduce the potential for attrition while enhancing
our ability to dynamically apply appropriate airlift capabilities to
emergent demands across a spectrum of increasingly contested
operational environments. For example, when supporting Israel in their
ongoing war with Hamas that started last Fall, C-17s were prominent in
the movement of critical materials and humanitarian support as the C-17
was the most suitable platform for those missions. What was unseen was
the increased use of C-5Ms at the same time. When put to the test under
these surge conditions in 2023, the C-5M fleet doubled the number of
normal daily missions and the operational reliability improved.
Nevertheless, had the US been in direct conflict with a peer adversary
during that time, mission accomplishment would be severely challenged
without secure connectivity and battlespace awareness.
Underpinned by national policy, our ability to leverage commercial
partnerships to rapidly expand capacity by hundreds of aircraft for
both cargo and passenger airlift is a necessary and cost-effective way
to meet national defense needs. Our commercial partners remain a
critical element of our strategic airlift capacity. While both cargo
and passenger carriers continue to fully subscribe to the CRAF program,
sufficient organic capacity remains paramount based on an inability to
utilize civil assets in projected contested environments.
Intra-Theater Airlift
Intra-Theater airlift is critical to sustaining and supporting the
force to meet time-sensitive and mission critical requirements for
cargo and passengers. Consistent with previous budget cycles and the
fiscal year 2023 NDAA, the President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2025
maintains a fleet of 271 C-130 aircraft across the Future Years Defense
Program, which USTRANSCOM supports with elevated risk. C-130's provide
airlift support necessary to operate within any theater to support a
sizable, deployed force engaged in combat operations. Future Joint and
Service operating concepts entail the maneuvering of forces across long
distances and sustaining of forces across broadly distributed operating
locations, which elevates demands for Intra-Theater lift. Lack of
theater sealift shifts demand to theater airlift, which in turn
increases demand on strategic airlift. The interconnectedness of
multimodal theater and strategic lift is foundational to global force
projection, maneuver, and sustainment.
USTRANSCOM's ability to command and control mobility forces, to
include C-130's, is contingent on secure networks and continuous IT and
platform modernization efforts to retain the advantages needed in the
cyber and space domains.
Patient Movement
With constrained resources and the contested logistics environment,
we are at risk meeting Global Patient Movement (PM) requirements in
conflict. Innovation and mitigation efforts can only reduce this risk
so much. Fundamentally, our forces are not ready, postured, or scaled
to optimize these limited strategic assets. PM is an integral function
of the JDDE and provides essential support to the geographic combatant
commanders. The ability to move wounded, ill, and injured
servicemembers to lifesaving care emboldens our Commanders, reduces
negative outcomes, and decreases risk to force and mission. The
casualty evacuation estimates in current planning scenarios demonstrate
the volume of patients requiring evacuation every week during a future
peer or near-peer conflict will exceed the total of patients moved in
fiscal year 2023. In fiscal year 2023, USTRANSCOM conducted 5,518
patient movements, comprised of 3,809 individual patients and eight
battle injured patients. The foundation of PM remains the AE system.
With our strong partnership with the Air Force, we have increased
qualified AE crews and critical care air transport teams. While
doctrinally, the Air Force executes ``care in the air,'' the PM
enterprise should not be mistaken as an Air Force-only mission. A Joint
Force effort is required to increase capacity through the en-route care
system. The continuum of patient care must be emphasized to increase
survivability, to include initial medical response, forward medical
resuscitation and stabilization, integrated theater casualty movement,
and prolonged casualty care capacity. In addition, we must leverage our
Allies and partners for large scale combat operations and continue
development of a joint, multimodal approach to PM. The entirety of the
Military Health System must make an exhaustive effort to eliminate
traditional Military Service and functional boundaries and utilize all
available resources to preserve American lives and our fighting force.
We will continue to broadcast the risk to conduct end to end PM for
expediency in funding decisions.
Global Bulk Fuel Management and Delivery
The appointment of USTRANSCOM as the Single Manager for Global Bulk
Fuel Management and Delivery (GBFMD) has already resulted in positive
progress toward closing acknowledged strategic gaps in the DOD bulk
fuel supply chain since the command achieved Initial Operational
Capability on 1 February 2023. Over the past year, in collaboration
with our key partners in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, DLA
Energy, and the Joint Staff, we have led the Department to synchronize
bulk fuel planning, posture, operations, and capabilities development
to ensure assured end-to-end distribution of bulk fuel to project and
sustain the Joint Force in a near-peer fight.
USTRANSCOM is utilizing a holistic approach across the Joint
Petroleum Enterprise to close strategic gaps. Some of these cross-
agency initiatives include increasing maritime tanker capacity and
establishing fuel afloat storage in the Indo-Pacific, as well as
operationalizing the Tanker Security Program. Additionally, our command
developed new wartime fuel modeling and assessments to better
understand the fuel requirements behind the toughest strategic problem
sets facing our Nation. Furthermore, we implemented new command and
control concepts and structures across our combatant commands to
facilitate decision advantage and global prioritization. These are just
a few examples of how USTRANSCOM is leading the Joint Petroleum
Enterprise to deliver positive change today and ensure the Department
is postured to win a contested environment.
Over the next 12 months our focus will continue to align the
Department toward closure of identified gaps in assured access to
shallow draft maritime tanker capacity, increased integration of allied
and partner nation capabilities, enhanced collaboration with industry,
and an enterprise-level resilient and integrated bulk fuel data
architecture to ensure the Department can provide increased options at
the pace and tempo required in a high-end fight. USTRANSCOM is postured
to leverage every opportunity available to continue closing strategic
gaps and ensure we have the capacity and distribution capabilities
needed to ensure our national objectives are met.
Joint Communications Support Element Modernization Program
As a subordinate element of USTRANSCOM's JECC, the Joint
Communications Support Element (JCSE) is the only joint communications
organization in DOD that supports the conventional force. Its
Modernization Program executes tri-service procurement funding for
lifecycle recapitalization of JCSE's equipment to meet emergent
combatant commander's operational mission requirements and the joint
force's evolving tactical mission communication demands. Current
initiatives include modernizing tactical high frequency radio systems,
commercial cloud services, supporting Allies and partner
interoperability, and developing communications diversity and
resilience by incorporating cellular, terrestrial Internet, and high
throughput commercial satellite terminals. JCSE, through the JECC, is
working closely with Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office's
Global Information Dominance Experiment to operationalize the tactical
edge aspects of Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control Concept
and is heavily involved in Mission Partner Environment development. For
a relatively small investment, this Modernization Program provides the
DOD tremendous value as it enables JCSE to rapidly prove concepts and
technologies in support of joint warfighters, assist in the resolution
of service capability gaps, and to be effective at the point of crisis.
Defense Personal Property Program (DP3)
Our Defense Personal Property Program team continues to move
forward in transforming how DOD provides moving services to customers.
Servicemembers, DOD civilians, and their families are our most critical
asset, and we continually seek to improve DP3 processes through all
venues possible. The Global Household Goods Contract (GHC) is our
flagship DP3 transformation effort. In the past year, we have been
working closely with the military departments and the contract awardee,
HomeSafe Alliance (HSA), to bring GHC online.
As I described in our report to the Committees submitted in
January, a deliberate, conditions-based phase approach of GHC services
will allow us to control the volume of shipments to assure continued
quality customer service, which remains our top priority during the
phase-in period. We remain committed to driving the transition at the
appropriate pace ahead of the upcoming peak moving season, continuing
Government and HomeSafe Alliance integration with a focus on positive
outcomes for customers and their families.
Addressing the information technology challenges we've identified
is critical to ensuring an improved experience for servicemembers and
their families. Limited IT integration testing conducted in July and
August of last year identified issues with HomeSafe's software
(HomeSafe Connect), on top of known government IT system (MilMove)
limited initial operating capabilities. Integration must be addressed
before we can consider deploying the systems to government personnel
and customers. In the Fall of 2023, we replaced our lead MilMove IT
developer, and continue to build on the government's systems initial
operating capability.
In mid-January, we brought together personal property
representatives from all branches of service to conduct end-to-end
testing between DOD's MilMove and HomeSafe Alliance's HomeSafe Connect
systems. The users validated the functionality of both systems and
confirmed resolution of previously identified issues. The locations
where we plan to begin issuing GHC task orders have been selected and
finalized in coordination with the military departments. These
locations are designated by selected zip codes in the Camp Lejeune,
Camp Pendleton, Norfolk, San Diego, and Seattle metro areas. We plan to
start with a small number of local shipments later this spring and
continue through the summer at limited locations, before expanding the
program this fall once peak season is complete. I would like to
reiterate that a quality customer experience is our top priority during
this transition and will inform the pace determined by USTRANSCOM and
the military services.
Joint Transportation Management System (JTMS)
In an ever-changing threat environment, cutting edge logistics
information technology solutions are critical to supporting our Global
Mobility Posture, Global Mobility Capacity, and Global Command,
Control, and Integration. The JTMS will provide the JDDE one primary
system to integrate end-to-end transportation operations to deliver and
sustain the Joint Force. Through the JTMS, USTRANSCOM will connect to
the Service and agency logistics systems and provide a common platform
to integrate global combatant command operations into the JDDE for a
warfighter competitive advantage--while providing auditability,
transparency, and optimized resource allocation. Decision advantage
will be strengthened by providing warfighters timely, costed options
for transportation, effectively matching requirements to available
commercial and military capacity. Near real-time visibility of Total
Force movements, to include last tactical mile delivery, will instill
operational confidence and maintain competitive advantage for combatant
commanders as they complete their missions. JTMS will also enable
improved logistics network resiliency through integrated capability to
react to changing logistics environments, allowing maximized diversion
and challenge mitigations. Implementation of a commercial Enterprise
Resource Planning solution will position USTRANSCOM and the Department
to strategically address the decades-old challenge of transportation
auditability. Integrated internal controls and transaction level
transparency will support mitigation of existing material weaknesses
and lead to an unmodified audit opinion. USTRANSCOM is collaborating
with OUSD(A&S) for the procurement and implementation of the JTMS
solution.
conclusion
To remain successful, USTRANSCOM must be ready to project power
today and tomorrow, and we will only achieve this together. Continued
success in the delivery of substantial aid to Ukraine as well as the
rapid deployment of forces and equipment to the Middle East have
validated our reputation and generated momentum. While we have achieved
success over our 35-year history as a combatant command, we know we
must continue to innovate and accelerate the changes necessary to
remain ready now and into the future. We cannot rest on our laurels--
the risks are too great. Our competitors are watching our every move
and quickly digesting lessons learned to improve their own power
projection capabilities while also enhancing their ability to disrupt,
degrade, or deny our capabilities. Contested environments highlight
that our actions to deliberately recapitalize organic mobility
capabilities, and to modernize the JDDE, must continue for the DOD to
maintain asymmetric advantages and deliver on our national security
requirements.
Our command has always met challenges and delivered success with
innovation, determination, and professionalism. Time after time, when
the United States called, we delivered. To deliver in the future
requires focused attention today. Powered by dedicated men and women,
USTRANSCOM underwrites the lethality of the Joint Force, advances
American interests around the globe, and provides our Nation's leaders
with strategic flexibility to select from multiple options, while
creating multiple dilemmas for our adversaries. I thank Congress for
your continued support to the men, women, and mission of USTRANSCOM. We
remain dedicated to fight, deliver, and win!
Together, We Deliver!
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Van Ovost.
Before we begin, let me remind everyone that we must stop at 10
a.m. for the Joint Session. So, please limit your questioning
to 5 minutes, and the closed session will begin at noon after
the Joint Session in SVC-217.
Thank you. General Cavoli, you indicated the severe
consequences of a failure to support Ukraine, and those
consequences, I presume, are not localized, but global. Could
you elaborate?
General Cavoli. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. So, the--if
Ukraine fails in this fight, I think problems radiate outwards,
beginning with Europe. So, there will be the possibility, the
probability that Russia will continue aggressive behavior that
will certainly be emboldened. They are certainly building a
military that is going to be capable of it.
They are replenishing what they have lost so far, and they
are working very hard to build a larger army. They have
announced their plans for it, and they are on track to do that.
There are other nations in the neighborhood that Russia
publicly covets--has publicly stated that they are not really
nations.
The same sort of rhetoric that led up to the invasion of
Ukraine. Beyond Europe, which is critical to our security,
beyond Europe, there are other places and people are watching
all over the world, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, the People's
Republic of China we know is watching very closely, and all
other nations are watching very closely.
First, to gauge what is the value of a partnership with the
United States. Second, to see what happens if it fails, and the
those who would be our friends would be made nervous by a loss
in Ukraine, and those who would be our adversaries would be
emboldened by it, sir.
Chairman Reed. I had the opportunity to stop in
Grafenwoehr, Ramstein, and several other places, and we are
teaching the Ukrainians, but we are also learning a lot. So,
this effort has allowed us really to significantly increase our
insights into the way Russia particularly conducts operations,
and also others who are aiding Russia----
General Cavoli. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
thank you and all members for your visits to Grafenwoehr and
elsewhere. They help us a great deal and we appreciate them.
Yes, absolutely, we are learning from the Ukrainians every day.
We learn in a variety of different ways.
First of all, just talking to them, we get their
experiences. This is very valuable for our younger troops
especially because it keeps them galvanized. It keeps them
focused on the mission. They understand the import of it.
But in a more practical way, we practice tactics and
techniques with them and refine them, things that they have
developed under fire. We bring them out and we work on those
things. These can be technical specific things about
electromagnetic interference and things like that. They can be
tactical.
The how to negotiate new forms of Russian obstacles and
defensive fortifications. We have both the incidental benefit
of working with them, but we also have very specific, focused,
structured programs to call out that information. We also have
a couple of other programs, Mr. Chairman, that would be
delighted to talk about on closed session that are also
extremely useful.
But overall, yes, we benefit significantly from this. We
are watching them adapt to Russia's adaptations. So it is, you
know, warfare as it goes on is a series of moves and counter
moves, and Russia's military has evolved significantly during
this conflict, and this is helping us to keep up with that as
well.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you. General Van Ovost, you have
already been delivering a substantial amount of materiel to our
forces in Europe, which is transshipped to the Ukrainians. So,
you have got a lot of money tied up in the supplemental. Is
that accurate?
General Van Ovost. Senator, thanks for asking that
question. Indeed, about $550 million of the supplemental is
earmarked for U.S. Transportation Command, mainly in response
to unreimbursed work for the Middle East after the events of
October 7th.
However, we work very closely with EUCOM and the Secretary
of Defense to deal with transportation costs associated with
Ukraine.
Chairman Reed. So, if the supplemental doesn't pass, you
have to find ways to pay for that internally, which would be
very disruptive, I assume.
General Van Ovost. Senator, that is absolutely correct. Not
just TRANSCOM, but all the services and Combatant Commands of
it have costs that are unreimbursed at this point.
The issue with Transportation Command is it comes out of
our Working Capital Fund, and our Working Capital Fund is there
in case we have an emergency where we have to go somewhere
around the globe.
Not having funds in there would slow down any response and
certainly reduce the options for the Secretary.
Chairman Reed. I will yield that my 6 seconds to the
Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, and I will take it. General
Cavoli, you just said, if we don't come forward with assistance
from the United States, Ukraine could actually lose this war.
That implies that Ukraine could also actually win this war.
I would remind you, and you don't need to be reminded but
anyone listening, that there were voices in the United States,
well-intentioned Americans, in the late 30's and early on in
watching the European war that said there was no way that the
United Kingdom could win the war against Germany, against
Hitler's Germany.
Respected, well intentioned Americans like Charles
Lindbergh, who I still hold in high regard, said that there was
no way we should help because the war was already lost. Can
Ukraine win this war?
General Cavoli. Yes, Senator. Absolutely.
Senator Wicker. Is it also true that while we are being
asked and our allies are being asked to help Ukraine, Russia is
seeking help also from other countries on their side, is that
correct?
General Cavoli. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Those countries include countries that have
a malign intent toward the United States. Who are those
countries?
General Cavoli. Absolutely. First in line is the People's
Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
and Iran, sir.
Senator Wicker. Now, we have the Japanese, Prime Minister,
in this capital city today, and I will be attending, along with
most of my colleagues, his joint address to the Congress. What
do the Japanese leadership have to say, and what tangible
indication have they given as to the importance of the Ukraine,
Russia conflict?
General Cavoli. Senator, in my role as the Supreme Allied
Commander for Europe, I recently traveled to Japan about a
month ago, sir, and met with their Chief of Defense and a
number of high--highly placed officials there. It is a part of
NATO's burgeoning relationship with key Indo-Pacific allies.
They are focused on the Ukraine question. They are watching it
very closely. They understand that the stakes are high.
Senator Wicker. Are they helping in a tangible way?
General Cavoli. They are helping in intangible ways and
some tangible ways. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. What about South Korea? What about
Australia?
General Cavoli. Sir, they are all focused on this question,
and all of them are rendering intangible help and some tangible
help, and some of it like----
Senator Wicker. They are rendering help in terms of dollars
and cents, are they not?
General Cavoli. Absolutely.
Senator Wicker. Yes. Well, Ukraine seems to have a lot of
fight in them. Is it true that they have retaken over half the
territory seized by Russia 2 years ago?
General Cavoli. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. How is it that they have been so successful
in the Black Sea? How is it that Ukraine has been so successful
against one of the most powerful countries in the world in the
Black Sea, and how so?
General Cavoli. It starts with their determination to have
access to the Black Sea. So, they are determined. Second, they
have extremely talented engineers and extremely talented
scientists who have devoted this portion of their lives----
Senator Wicker. Some people in the audience may not be
aware to what extent they have been successful. So, what has
their success in the Black Sea been?
General Cavoli. They have sunk more than 20 percent of the
Black Sea Fleet. But more to the point, they have damaged
critical infrastructure associated with its sustenance and its
maintenance, and the net effect has been we do not see Russian
surface ships West of Crimea ever anymore.
Senator Wicker. Okay, well, let's talk about burden
sharing. Are we being asked to do more than anybody else in
terms of our capacity?
General Cavoli. No, sir. We are doing a fair share. If you
measure by percentage of GDP how much assistance we are giving,
we actually rank well below 15----
Senator Wicker. We are down around 14, 15.
General Cavoli. Yes----
Senator Wicker. Of our economy as compared to all of the
other allies who see the importance there. What do our friends
and people we want to be more friendly with, what do they think
about the likelihood of America keeping its word long term?
General Cavoli. Sir, they believe in America. They believe
in America's leadership. They believe in America's consistent
dedication to global security and to European security, because
they understand it is in our interest. However, when they hear
things or see things from our country, they can get nervous
sometimes.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. General Cavoli, General Van Ovost, thank
you both for your service and for being here this morning.
Senators Reed and Wicker have been very broad and expansive in
covering Ukraine, which I appreciate their comments and your
responses to that.
So, I want to focus on the Western Balkans, where we are
seeing tensions rise. I appreciate your attention to that,
General Cavoli. A persistent problem is ensuring that EUFOR and
KFOR missions are adequately prepared to respond to those
security concerns.
I think so far we have been--the missions have been relying
on each other as reserve forces. I think this dual heading is
concerning, and especially as we see tensions increase in both
Kosovo and Bosnia.
So, can you talk about how EUCOM is engaging with our
European partners to emphasize the need to establish separate
reserve forces for EUFOR and KFOR?
General Cavoli. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely, because it is an
extremely important question, and as you know, NATO is not a
one problem an alliance. We are not a one problem country. So,
it is important to recognize that there are other things going
on in Europe that are not good for US national interests.
They are also not unrelated to the conflict in Ukraine, as
you well know, Senator. The first thing USEUCOM did was get the
EUCOM Commander to persuade the Supreme Allied Commander to do
something about this inside of NATO with regard to the reserve
forces and everything. So, we have done a complete O plan
review for KFOR specifically, and it is revealed that we need
not just more forces, but we need heavier forces.
We are in the process of sourcing that right now. Nations
are being quite generous, but we will put heavier equipment on
the ground as well as more people. The second thing we are
doing is we are untying the relationship between the reserve
forces for the EU mission Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the
KFOR mission, because as you pointed out and I agree, that was
an economy that we can no longer afford to share the strategic
reserve force there.
I would like to call out France for being especially
generous. As you know, the Commander of the Althea mission is a
French Lieutenant General, Hubert Cottereau. He is also my Vice
Chief of Staff at the Supreme Headquarters, and so, in that
dual hatted role, just like I can dual hat his benefits from
his relationship with France.
France has put the Charles de Gaulle offshore in the
Adriatic and has recently deployed a battalion on an
operational deployment for a medium term. So, they have up
their forces. Especially important right now, as you
understand, because this week in particular, the tensions are
significantly higher.
So, I am satisfied that we are in a good position right
now, Senator, but it is always necessary to keep a very close
eye on it. We have run at least two focused collection missions
to increase our intelligence collection and understanding of
what is going on in both of those countries, and I have
supported that from USEUCOM with aerial ISR and other things we
could talk about in closed session, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Great. I have several other questions,
specifically about the situation there, but I will save those
for closed session so I can ask General Van Ovost a question
about the National Guard Bureau's decision to level Air
National Guard units and the impact that that is going to have
across the country.
We are concerned about that impact on the 157th Air
Refueling Wing in New Hampshire, where we have the KC-46s. So,
can you--have you been briefed by the Guard Bureau on what they
are planning, and are you concerned about the impact that will
have on TRANSCOM?
General Van Ovost. Thanks, Senator. You know, as you know,
two-thirds of our area fueling force are in the Guard and
Reserve. They bring such a great capability and absolutely
required. We could not do our mission without them.
So, this is an issue that is emerging that I am tracking. I
have not been briefed by the Air National Guard. However, we
have looked at--I have no immediate concerns. But as we look
into the out years as how this is going to be leveled out and
where the capabilities are going, we are going to track that
very carefully for the Guard.
Senator Shaheen. Well, again, we are concerned that the
157th is going to be affected and they have major
responsibility for refueling over the North Atlantic, and they
have been called in the past to help with missions in Europe.
So, I hope you will track that closely and that we can make
sure that doesn't affect their ability to do their jobs.
General Van Ovost. Yes, ma'am. The 157th has led the way
for the Guard for integration of the KC-46, which is absolutely
the future of air refueling.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Fischer,
please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for being here today and thank you for your service.
General Van Ovost, the California Air Resources Board has a
proposal that would significantly impact the ability of the
National Rail Network to support the movement of Department of
Defense equipment and materiel deployment to the West Coast.
This proposal would impose unrealistic emission standards
and require zero emission locomotives, which do not exist
because that technology is not even commercially available at
this point in time.
This means that about 65 percent of the Nation's
locomotives would be prohibited from operating in California
starting in 2030. What would the operational impact be if
railroads could not service routes in California, or had to
divert cargo to other areas to meet the DOD logistics
requirements?
General Van Ovost. Senator, we rely every day on this
Nation's transportation network, whether its seaports, its
rail, or its roads.
So, and I think about the reduction in capacity across
California and think about--I have 15 nodes in California that
we use different--from two different railroad lines. We have
five ports, one of which is our only West Coast ammunition port
for containerized ammunition, which is critical to our
operational plans.
Of course, we have close relationships with the railroad
industry, and so we are working with them as this is a merging
and they are understanding what the implications are.
Initially, I believe that any increased costs will be passed
directly on to the customer, but I am concerned about the
technology and their ability to recapitalize between now, the
readiness of now, and the readiness of future if they have to
transition.
Senator Fischer. Have you expressed these concerns to the
Administration?
General Van Ovost. I have not.
Senator Fischer. Do you plan to?
General Van Ovost. In my normal course of action through
the Secretary of Defense, if this is going to impact national
security, I absolutely will.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. When we look at the
requirements that you have in the plans that you have, if we
are seeing conflict take place in the Indo-Pacific, how would a
surge of forces be impacted?
General Van Ovost. When we think about options every day,
and we rerun several planning events in several simulations
that occur around the globe, these globally integrated plans,
should we have to surge for an event like the events after
October 7th--and so we think about it, and we run these
simulations, and we ensure that we have readiness for the
fleet.
The most important thing is to ensure not only do we have
the capacity, but it is a credible capacity to operate in the
environment we expect to be in. We expect it to be contested,
and an example right there is the Red sea.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Cavoli, I am concerned
about the increasing cooperation between Russia, China, Iran,
and North Korea, which we are seeing the impact of in real
time, with Russia's war against Ukraine. How is EUCOM altering
its posture to address the strategic dilemmas created by these
partnerships?
General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator. The first thing we have
done is we have responded to the Russian aggression by
bolstering our presence along with NATO's presence on the
Eastern flank. We did that over the last 2 years.
NATO moved very quickly after the invasion to establish new
battle groups and to increase the size of the existing battle
groups on the Eastern flank, and to thicken the air policing--
that is the air defense efforts that we were doing. USEUCOM was
a part of that.
In fact, USEUCOM led some of that with U.S. unilateral
deployments to that sort of seed corn to get things going. We
have continued that, and we have actually regularized the
procedures, and those are going to become long term deployments
that our allies have out there.
The second thing we have been doing is tightening our air
and missile defenses. I am under instruction from the 32 heads
of State and government to tighten our air and missile defense.
With regard to the connections among the countries, we worked
very closely with the--that is these adversarial countries who
have formed this network that is, you know, profoundly against
our interests.
We are working very closely with the interagency across all
the instruments of national power to try to interrupt that and
to hinder their ability to cooperate. We have, based on my
intelligence section, my J2 section, something called Task
Force Champion, which focuses on this question, those
relationships, and feeds information to the interagency to take
action through a variety of different means.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Fischer.
Senator Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our
witnesses. To General Van Ovost, in your written statement you
say, the DOD's ability to project military forces is
inextricably linked to the commercial industry, what we like to
call our fourth component. TRANCOM's relationship with the
commercial sector is pretty unique.
Talk about the importance of our commercial sector and
challenges you have with--in working with commercial companies.
General Van Ovost. Thank you, Senator. We cannot do our job
every day without our strong commercial partnerships. In fact,
90 percent of our passengers flow through commercial
operations, and day to day, 97 percent of our sustainment goes
through commercial sealift. So, it is absolutely significant.
When--while that is--the opportunity to use them and use
their networks is significant and provides us an asymmetric
advantage, the top vulnerability concern I have with them is
through cyber, frankly.
We have heard even from the CIA Director that the PRC has
infiltrated some of the logistics networks of our commercial
partners. So, we have been working with them on how to secure
their systems through the no cost cybersecurity collaboration
center and the defense industrial base work that we have been
doing, and they are paying attention at the CEO level.
Senator Kaine. That is great. In your written statement,
you also mention the joint communication support element, which
is part of the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command in Norfolk.
Why do you mention them specifically, and how important is it
that they be recapitalized?
General Van Ovost. A joint communication support element
provides deployable communications on air, land, and sea in
support of standing up joint task forces. So, if we go into a
crisis mode, they need to have the modernized equipment to be
able to support the joint task force commander around the
world--and we have done that multiple times here, I would say,
in the past couple of years. So, we need to make sure that our
equipment is modernized.
Senator Kaine. Thank you for that. General Cavoli, talk to
us a little bit about how Sweden and Finland are integrating
into the existing NATO military structure.
General Cavoli. Absolutely. Thanks, Senator. So, first, I
think it is important to note that Finland and Sweden have been
cooperating for years with NATO, not just in training, but in
operations.
They have also been very close--closely tied to the United
States and bilateral agreements. They are also closely tied
among the Nordic countries through multilateral arrangements
that they have among themselves.
All of those things made it extremely easy to integrate
those two nations militarily into the alliance, sir. They--
Supreme Allied Command Transformation is formally responsible
for the integration effort and the integration documentation.
That was completed in record time for Finland and will be for
Sweden as well. They have already been incorporated into the
regional plans that NATO has approved in the past year.
In fact, it took less than 5 days for us to bring the
inclusion of Sweden forward to the North Atlantic Council and
register that as an amendment to the plans. So overall, it has
all been extremely easy because we have such a long history
with them and because they have invested in defense over the
years.
So, you know, defense investment has not been the strong
suit of many nations in Europe over the last 40 years, but it
has been in Finland in particular, and Sweden has radically
stepped up defense budget right now.
So, both of them have maintained high capabilities and good
capacity, and they are really welcomed in the alliance, sir.
Senator Kaine. Well, I know everyone on this committee
understands this, but for the public, if you are going back 5
years and polled in Sweden or Finland about whether they wanted
to join NATO, you would have been lucky to get to 25 percent
yes.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused the scales to
fall from folks eyes about what the likely threat scenario is,
and the deep desire of Sweden and Finland to join NATO
demonstrates a reality we have to be aware of, and also
demonstrates the vitality of NATO and other organizations of
like-minded democracies.
Let me ask you one other question. The Radford Arsenal in
Virginia produces munitions that are critical to the battle in
Ukraine, but I think it is also important that munitions be
produced closer to theaters of war. Talk about your discussions
with our NATO allies about munitions production ramping up in
Europe.
General Cavoli. This is something we talk about a lot,
Senator, as you might imagine. Right now, Ukraine for 155
millimeter shells is mainly dependent on U.S. production.
European production has just not gotten up and running yet. It
is increasing.
It is increasing, and there are certainly plans and
investments to make it go faster, but they are still ramping it
up. Some countries have converted former factories very
rapidly. Slovakia, I would point to here, is producing a
significant amount of 155 NATO standard ammunition right now.
But really, there is a lot of work left to be done. The EU
and NATO are cooperating closely on lifting production, and I
believe they are going to break down some barriers and get that
going. I do think it is going to be a few months before we see
U.S. levels of production though. Related to that, Senator, is
the----
Senator Kaine. Okay, I am over time, so----
General Cavoli. I am sorry. Sure, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Kaine. Senator
Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, General
Van Ovost, and thank you, General Cavoli for being here today.
I want to thank both of you for your continued service and
commitment to Ukraine.
It has been a very difficult time. General Cavoli, I will
start with you because I did just return from a trip to Poland,
Ukraine, where I spent 3 days with a delegation traveling
across the country and to many different areas, and then onto--
into Moldova, which is one of those other areas that is pretty
tenuous right now.
It is pretty darn clear that the American political system
has been very ineffective in providing the needed support to a
fellow democracy there in Ukraine. So, as we await the House's
finalized decision on a supplemental package, what more can you
do in your role to leverage assistance from friends and allied
nations in Europe or other areas to provide support for
Ukraine?
General Cavoli. We work that very, very hard, Senator, as
you know.
First of all, I would point out that the principal
coordinating mechanism for aggregating Ukrainian demand and
presenting it to allies and partners, and soliciting their help
and their contributions has been led by Secretary Austin since
the very beginning with the UDCG, the Ukraine Donors
Coordination Group, sometimes known as the Ramstein Group
because it sometimes meets there. 50 nations, just over 50
nations come together about every 6 weeks, and we coordinate at
a ministerial level.
That is preceded by weeks of hard work between our policy
staffs and their policy staffs. USEUCOM with the SAG-U works
very hard to get the specifics of the Ukrainian demand and
their needs and consult with them about what they need to bring
that forward. However, it is difficult.
A lot of this is dependent on production levels at this
point. How much ammunition we can produce, how many missiles we
can produce, and so, in that regard, I spent a lot of time
working with the Secretary General and the Secretariat at NATO
to increase--to work with national armaments directors to
increase the amount of production we can do.
Senator Ernst. Well, thank you. I appreciate that, and I am
glad that we do have partners that are stepping up and
assisting. They understand how significant this is and what
could happen to all of us if Ukraine falls.
Oftentimes Americans are very short sighted. You know, what
is our immediate need today? What is our immediate want? But I
think there are very long term repercussions to our country
should Ukraine fall.
I think we need to keep our eyes open as we are looking to
the future and what will happen if we continue to allow
countries like Russia, like China, like Iran, like North Korea,
to continue to spread around this globe and the pressures it
puts on our own nation. So, I--thank you for being such a great
leader in this fight.
I know that in the lead up to the Russian invasion of
Ukraine, the intelligence community did declassify a number of
reports which shed light on Russia's true intentions. It was a
very proactive approach, and I am I am really thankful for
that. It helped us counter a lot of that Russian disinformation
that was being pushed out there.
We still see a lot of Russian propaganda. Can you speak to
how various information sharing programs are assisting us in
pushing back against some of the common security challenges
that are faced by Europe and our friends?
General Cavoli. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely. First of all, in
terms of collection, you know, the variety of ways we collect,
we have to--we rely on access and geographical access to--other
countries in order to be able to collect information.
Nations have been very generous with us, and not just
allies but partners as well, in allowing us to operate with and
from their countries. That has been invaluable. Frequently that
leads to very high level and detailed information sharing
programs. We have allies who have accesses that we do not, and
we have accesses that they do not.
It is very much mutually beneficial. The last thing I would
say, ma'am, is that the interaction with Ukraine and their
security services has provided us a vast amount of information
as well.
Senator Ernst. Well, and I will yield back my 5 seconds,
Mr. Chair. But thank you both for being here today.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator King,
please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before beginning my
questions, I would like to ask unanimous consent to submit to
the Committee a graph which represents the contribution by GDP
of the various countries that has been updated by the Kiel
Institute.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
Senator King. Thank you. What this graph shows is that, in
fact, Senator Wicker made the point, we were 15th in the in the
world in terms of contribution as a percentage of GDP.
It is actually more like 29th now in according to updated
data from this past January, and it is interesting to look the
countries, the contribution.
The number one is Estonia, then Poland, then Latvia. I
don't think it is any coincidence that the two out of the first
three are countries that border Russia, and they understand
what the risk is. I commonly hear on the street in Maine, why
are we doing this?
Putin isn't really going to keep going, and my response is,
ask the Finns. General Cavoli, what is the level of anxiety in
Eastern Europe about Putin's intentions beyond Ukraine?
General Cavoli. Very high, Senator. Very high. You are
correct, I agree, it is reflected in the number of donations
they have given. So Eastern European countries have emptied
their pockets for Ukraine.
Many countries in Europe share that, and the contributions
from nations in Europe are very significant. Some of them have
given 100 percent of what they have in a given category. One
nation has given 100 percent of its mobile artillery.
Another nation has given all of its jet fighters and all of
its tanks. Another nation has given 40 percent of its high end
air defense systems. So, these are significant contributions.
Senator King. So, the idea that the United States is the
only person carrying the burden here is just absolute nonsense.
General Cavoli. That is correct.
Senator King. It is--you know, when Switzerland is giving
more to the cause than the United States in terms of percentage
of GDP, I think that makes a statement. Cyprus, countries, just
going down the list, Sweden, Croatia, Hungary, Finland,
Romania. These are the countries that know Russia and that is
why they are in so deeply in this conflict. Is that correct?
General Cavoli. Yes.
Senator King. Going down some of the other arguments that I
hear, Ukraine can't win. It really appears to me that this is a
battle between industrial capacity and being able to supply
weapons. Russia has vastly increased its capacity to generate,
for example, artillery ammunition. Can the Ukrainians win if
they have sufficient material to carry this fight?
General Cavoli. Absolutely, Senator. They have the skill,
but most importantly, they have the determination to accomplish
their goals. They need external support until they are able to
generate their own industrial production.
I agree with you that in a long war like this, it is in
large part a matter of industrial production, of output. Once
that output is achieved, the side with the greater
determination will win, and that would be Ukraine.
Senator King. If we fail to pass the supplemental and
essentially walk away from our commitment to Ukraine, that is
exactly what Putin wants. Is that not correct?
General Cavoli. Oh, absolutely, Senator. Because we are now
in critical areas, munitions especially, their main provider--
without our help right now, they will not be able to stay in
the fight.
Senator King. The Russians are--have an active
disinformation campaign to convince our political system to
essentially support Putin's war, isn't that correct?
General Cavoli. Senator, the Russians maintain extremely
active disinformation programs. They always have and they
always do, but they are in overdrive right now and we know that
definitively.
Senator King. Thank you very much, General. Your testimony
is very important. General Van Ovost, I am afraid I don't have
a lot of time, but one thing you--as you were testifying, I was
writing, do we have adequate logistics for conflict in the
Pacific?
You said we are at alarming levels. Perhaps, for the
record, you could give us more detail on the dangerous level if
there is conflict in Pacific, because it is all going to be all
about logistics, and I am very concerned about the decline of
the sealift capacity. So, I am out of time, but if you could
give us that on the record, I appreciate it.
General Van Ovost. Yes, certainly. I take it for the
record.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Well, first of all,
thanks to both of you for being here. Thank you for your
service. It is a tough time in the world. Scary time. So,
General Cavoli, can you just talk about our troop posture in
Europe?
When I first came up here, the--I was at the Munich
security conference, and Germany basically said they are not
going to meet their 2 percent. They don't have any interest in
meeting the 2 percent. They are not going to ever meet their 2
percent. They didn't care about meeting their 2 percent.
We still have a lot of our allies in Europe, they are not
willing to meet their 2 percent, and so, they are completely
dependent on our troops. So, do you think we have troops in the
right places, or do you--how do you deal with the fact that you
supposedly have these allies that say they care about their own
defense, and they wouldn't actually in theory come to our
defense, but they are not even willing to invest even the 2
percent that they are investing.
General Cavoli. Thanks, Senator. Obviously, an extremely
important question. So, there is, there remains a gap between
say and do in parts of the alliance. However, that gap has been
closing over the last couple of years.
In 2014, there were three nations that met 2 percent. Last
year there were 11 nations that met 2 percent. This year there
are 20 as of today, who meet 2 percent. Norway just dropped a
letter declaring its intention to close that gap by June.
I believe there will be three or four more before June of
this year who meet 2 percent. That is not everybody, though.
That is not everybody.
Senator Scott. Not the biggest ones.
General Cavoli. Some of the biggest ones, and they should
meet 2 percent, and we encourage them every day to meet 2
percent. The Secretary General is extremely active in that
regard, and I believe they will, but they need to.
Senator Scott. When you look at the map and you look at
where, you know, the Soviet Union is located, and then you look
at where our troops are, does it make sense where our troops
are? I mean, should they--should we have troops closer to maybe
in Latvia and Lithuania or Estonia rather than so many troops
that we have in Germany?
General Cavoli. Sure. So, we have troops in Estonia and
Latvia and Lithuania and Romania and Bulgaria and Hungary and
Slovakia and Poland, sir.
So, we do have troops and those. Specifically, the troops
that we surged for after the invasion, they all went to the
front, as did large parts of the organizations that are already
located in Europe.
The ones that are already assigned to Europe, I believe, is
the ones you are asking me about, though. Guys like the Second
Cavalry Regiment, 31st Fighter Wing and people like that. Those
organizations routinely get deployed from their home station to
other places to include to Central Command.
They are advantageous where they are right now because they
are sitting on excellent infrastructure for training,
readiness, and deployment. So those are the forces that I can
move to unpredictable points of trouble, and they are centrally
located on really good deployability infrastructure, so it
makes sense to me.
However, the center of gravity of where our combat force in
Europe is, net has moved significantly Eastward, and that goes
not just for USEUCOM, but that is true for the alliance as
well.
Senator Scott. What about Poland? Are you going to get more
troops in Poland?
General Cavoli. Sir, we got a ton of troops in Poland right
now. They are someplace just shy of 10,000, which is up. As you
know, we have a defense cooperation agreement with them. They
will build us infrastructure.
They are in the process of building it right now. As it
comes online, we will push forces in there, up to a brigade
combat team.
Senator Scott. So, the Air Force and Marines have done a
good job planning and recapitalizing their reserve C-130 fleet,
yet the Navy has even started to recapitalize their C-130
fleet. So, what do you think about that? Do you think it is a
mistake? Is that--are we--we are not positioned properly with
that?
General Cavoli. Sir, I am not really familiar with the
topic, and I think maybe the service could answer that a little
bit better. If you would like, I could take it for the record
or defer to them, sir.
Senator Scott. I will ask them. Thank you. Thanks, both of
you, for your service.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Scott. Senator
Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Good morning, General--Generals. Thank
you very much for your service, and thanks for being here
today.
I know that you have talked a bit about the impact of the
failure to pass the supplemental on the prospects for Ukraine
and the likelihood of failure if the supplemental isn't passed.
I wonder if you could look ahead a little bit beyond this
supplemental, and perhaps tell us in the longer range whether
you think additional aid is necessary and what form it would
take.
General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator. It will depend on
production rates inside Ukraine and in other allies. So, as
this hearing is--has evolved, sir, I think it has become clear
that really that level of industrial production is the key
thing right now.
Nations have given a lot from existing stocks, but as those
go down, production becomes more and more important, not just
in terms of capital items like large end items like tanks and
things, but also more importantly consumables like ammunition
and missiles and things like that.
So, the rate of industrial production is going to be the
real answer to that question. How much more will be required to
win, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. My understanding is that the attack
last night, or maybe it was--I guess it was last night in
Ukraine, showed again the real dearth of air defense and the
impact of the ongoing reign of terror from the skies. Is there
not any possibility of right away providing more Patriot
missiles, more air defense?
Since as I traveled around Europe and in Poland, there were
a lot of Patriot missiles guarding sites, and obviously they
need to be there, but I am just wondering whether, you know,
three, four, or five of those Patriot missiles facilities would
make a big difference.
General Cavoli. Certainly. You know, three parts to the air
defense question, radars, launchers, and the missiles to shoot
out of the launchers. We approach all of those sometimes
together and sometimes in part.
Right now, the Ukrainians could use--their launchers aren't
the most important thing, the missiles are the most important
thing, and we are soliciting those around--the Office of the
Secretary of Defense is extremely actively looking for Patriots
right now. You are correct, the attack last night did--was an
illustration of why it is so important for us to keep funding.
Right now, the main source of high end interceptors against
ballistic missiles on high end cruise missiles is the United
States, because we have the inventory and the production
capability.
Therefore, that supplemental is so important. Without it,
the attack last night, which included at least TU-10, TU-95
heavy bombers launching everything they had simultaneously--an
attack like that last night would go totally, almost totally
undefended until machine guns tried to shoot down the cruise
missiles. So, this is vital, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Separately, I am, chairman
of a subcommittee of the Homeland Security committee called the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which is conducting
an investigation of American chips, semiconductors, parts and
components that are commonly found in Russian missiles, drones,
and I am sure you are familiar with this issue.
President Zelensky on my last trip, the chairman was with
me, literally handed me a folder of photographs and charts
showing the different components in Russian ballistics, drones,
and missiles. We had a hearing yesterday in the Homeland
Security Committee showing how porous our export controls are.
We have had a hearing and that has come to our attention
showing how American companies, four or five in particular, are
selling goods with these parts and components that then find
their way into Russian munitions.
Is that your experience, and do you have any suggestions
for us as to what can be done about it?
General Cavoli. So, we work that very hard in the
interagency, sir. I don't have specific suggestions for how to
do it better, but I can tell you that it is absolutely
critical.
If the current war is a competition of production, our
ability to handle the Russian threat in the future is going to
depend on us being able to constitute forces faster than they
can. Part of that is preventing them from constituting forces
quickly, and to the extent that they are using components that
should be sanctioned and banned, it is regrettable, and we need
to fix it, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Really appreciate your
answers to my questions, and to my colleagues, and your very
excellent service to our Nation. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.
Good morning to both of you. General, since the Crocus
massacre--I guess that was in Moscow. Somewhere around there.
They have picked up--Russia has picked up their pace in
Ukraine. Is that correct?
General Cavoli. Yes. I am not sure it is a consequence of
that though, but yes, sir.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. With Secretary Blinken coming up a
couple of weeks ago basically saying that Ukraine will be in
NATO, I am sure that didn't fly too well in Russia.
So, it is obvious to me, just being in all these meetings
and hearings, not just you, other people, we are getting ready
to go to war with Russia.
Have we got a game plan for that, for how many people we
are going to need on the ground, young men and women from
United States when this war starts?
General Cavoli. Sir, we have standing operational plans
around the globe for a variety of problems and I----
Senator Tuberville. How many do you think it is going to
take for us to beat Russia, because Ukraine can't beat Russia--
--
General Cavoli. Can I take that in closed session, please,
sir?
Senator Tuberville. Yes. Okay.
General Cavoli. Thank.
Senator Tuberville. What about the budget? $60 billion is
going to be a drop in the bucket to the American taxpayer. We
are $35 trillion debt. What is this going to cost us? I know
you all have surely put the numbers to that, of our conflict
versus Russia when this all starts. Have we done that?
General Cavoli. Sir, the number I would have to talk in
closed session about also. But I agree, if we were to go to war
with Russia, it would--the money we are spending in Ukraine
would be a drop in the bucket.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. Where are we going to get our
energy from when this starts? Because they don't have any in
Europe. The Saudis, I don't know whether they are going to help
us out. We are going to back to Ukraine, I guess.
I mean, Iran, because we are not pumping the oil and gas
that we need. Where are we going to get our fuel for a war like
this?
General Cavoli. Sir, that is outside of my area of
expertise, but I am sure I can get you the----
Senator Tuberville. Do we have enough right now, you know,
to get a war started on the ground there for our troops?
General Cavoli. Yes, we do, sir.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. Who is Turkey going to fight with
when this war starts between the United States and Russia?
General Cavoli. Turkey will fight with the alliance is my
prediction. But all nations have their sovereign right to make
that decision when the time comes.
Senator Tuberville. Hungary?
General Cavoli. The same.
Senator Tuberville. You think most everybody else will
stick with us in this fight?
General Cavoli. I do.
Senator Tuberville. Everything that I read over the past
few months is most of the militaries in the--in NATO are
boutique militaries. Do you agree with that?
General Cavoli. I am not sure what a boutique military is,
sir----
Senator Tuberville. All a shadow of what it used to be.
Haven't been preparing.
General Cavoli. Yes----
Senator Tuberville. In terms of----
General Cavoli. Sure, I would agree with that. For
instance, the U.S. Army is now 450,000. When I joined it, it
was 785.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. So, with Ukraine fighting right
now as they are, do we have any count of numbers of how many
soldiers that they have actually fighting, that they have in
their military against Russia?
General Cavoli. Yes, absolutely, Senator.
Senator Tuberville. Do you have a number of that?
General Cavoli. Yes, it is between 900,000 and 1 million
right now.
Senator Tuberville. Ukraine?
General Cavoli. Yes, sir.
Senator Tuberville. How about Russia? How many do they have
deployed within Ukraine? Not on the borders, but how many do
they have deployed in Ukraine?
General Cavoli. Inside the country, 470. Outside the
country, more, and then they have the rest of their military.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. My understanding is after the
massacre, that they have been growing at 40,000, soldiers a
month that are volunteering for the military. Is that pretty
good Intel or not?
General Cavoli. I am tracking 30,000, but yes.
Senator Tuberville. 30,000. So, growing more than it was--
more than it was before the massacre. Is that correct?
General Cavoli. The size of the Russian military is bigger
today than it was when the war started, and it is bigger today
than when the massacre started, yes.
In fact, I think what you are pointing to is they have
initiated their annual spring conscription, Senator. That is--
they do that every spring. This year they did 150,000, they
announced that they intend to take in under the draft. That is
right about average for a spring conscription.
The difference is, this year they are offering those
conscripts after 1 month of service, the option to sign a
contract, get paid, in exchange for being able to be sent to
Ukraine to fight.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. Do you feel a sense of urgency in
our supply chain now, of building the munitions that we need?
Because they have not been there. I know in my State of
Alabama, there has not been a lot of sense of urgency of
building javelins and things like that. I mean we are building
them as fast as we can, but there is no sense of urgency.
General Cavoli. Sir, I sense an increased urgency in
demand. I can't speak to whether there is an increased urgency
in the base itself to produce.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, General.
General Cavoli. Thank you sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Tuberville.
Senator Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with
Senator Tuberville's remarks about building the munitions that
we need. I mean, it is critical that we restock our supplies of
the munitions that we have shared with our Ukrainian allies.
We have depleted stockpiles and the--by passing the
emergency supplemental, we have an opportunity to resupply our
forces with new munitions, some of which could be made in
Alabama. I think what I don't agree with is the definitive
language about, we are getting ready to go to war with Russia.
I don't feel that is the case, and using language about
when this war starts. My view is that we should do everything
we possibly can to avoid going to war with a near peer
adversary like Russia or China. It is not in our best interest
to do that.
So, General Cavoli, first of all, thank you for your
service. I am interested to hear just a little bit more about
what you feel the best way in Europe right now is for us to
avoid a conflict with Russia.
General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator, and yes, I agree. My
job is to deter, both in my NATO role and in my U.S. role, my
primary job is to deter aggression and to avert a war, not to
fight one. Now, there is the paradox, of course, that
historically we deter by preparing, you know, Si vis pacem,
para bellum.
We are certainly prepared militarily to fight whoever we
need to. How to do it? First of all, by training. But second, I
think inside the alliance, the most important way to deter is
by doing it together.
So, the comments from members of the committee about the
lamentable fact that some very wealthy nations inside the
alliance are not yet spending what they should be is an
important fact and we have to close that, because we have to
have a capable alliance that will fight together.
The alliance fighting together is far greater than the sum
of its parts, because of the political unity and the
representation of such a mass of humanity and its will. So, it
is--the most important thing is for us to deter as part of an
alliance, and that alliance has to be fit in order to do that.
I have been charged by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization to make the operational force of the Alliance fit,
fit for the purpose of collective defense, of large scale
defense of Europe. We are well along on that. We have produced
the plans necessary, the requirements necessary, and we are
going through the process of getting nations to fulfill those
requirements.
I believe that that process is one of the things that has
stimulated at least 10 additional countries to meet 2 percent
this year compared to last year, because they have a list now,
they have a blueprint. This is how to get ready.
This is the things we need to do to get ready, and they can
bring tangible things back home to the political leadership and
say, these are the things we need to go by. So that is what we
are doing to get ready and that is, I think, the best way to do
this, sir.
Senator Kelly. What is the best thing, the most appropriate
thing that we can do here as Members of Congress right now to
deter--to continue to possibly deter Russian aggression into
another country?
General Cavoli. I think the first thing is to continue the
discussion about the malign intent of Russia, sir. I think it
is important for the members of the U.S. Congress to recognize
the malign intent of Russia and to talk about the malign intent
of Russia.
That is the principal thing to do. After that, funding the
various different programs that we have and authorizing us to
do certain things will be necessary, but I think the primary
thing is to help us all recognize and keep our eye on the real
threat.
Senator Kelly. How significant is the emergency
supplemental in the list of things that we could do to deter
Russia?
General Cavoli. It is vital. I think, if Ukraine fails, and
Russia succeeds, it will be a big setback for deterrence.
Russia will be emboldened. They will be geographically in a
better position from a military perspective.
So, there are many things that will be damaged in our
ability to deter. One of the things that would be damaged in
our ability to deter is, it is likely that the number of
nations who want to side with us could shrink, and so, I think
it is absolutely imperative for all of those reasons.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, General, and Mr. Chairman, I have
a question to submit for General Van Ovost on maritime
security. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Budd,
please.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you both again
for being here. General Van Ovost, the collapse of the Francis
Scott Key Bridge, horrible, but it highlights the larger issue
I think that we need to address, and that is how a single piece
of destroyed infrastructure can shut down multiple modes of
transportation.
If I am not mistaken, a number of critical military supply
ships are stuck in Baltimore harbor, in addition to road
traffic that has been diverted. So how resilient are our ports
of embarkation, and for instance like in North Carolina,
military ocean terminal Sunny Point, in the event of a
conflict, and if our adversaries should decide to conduct
cyber-attacks or sabotage infrastructure?
Then, if you would follow that up with how we can be
helpful here, securing these critical nodes.
General Van Ovost. Yes. Thanks for your question. As I
mentioned, we cannot do without the substantial private
infrastructure here in the United States, roads, rails, and
seaports. With respect to the Francis Scott Key Bridge, a
tragic event, and but we think about how do we recover very
quickly and the fact that we had a few ships that were
essentially blocked in. But that is why we have so many ports.
We can afford to lose a port and some capacity. We can't
afford to lose them all. So we do many efforts to ensure the
resiliency of the ports. We work directly with the port
managers on all of our strategic ports, on our alternative plan
should there be problems there, as well as in a State of
emergency, how would we use their resources.
But it also comes to the fact that those--some of the ships
that were behind the lines that couldn't get out, actually, we
wouldn't use them anyway because they are in such a State of
disrepair, that we wouldn't call upon those ships.
It goes back to how old these ships are and how we need to
continue with the recapitalization program, which is one of the
number one things we can do here, is to assure the readiness of
the force, not just the capacity, the credible capacity to
fight in the contested environment.
Senator Budd. Thank you. Slightly different topic. In your
opening statement, you argued for the need for a supplemental,
correct. General Van Ovost?
General Van Ovost. Correct.
Senator Budd. Here is what I am trying to reconcile. For
the third year in a row, I see that you didn't submit a single
unfunded requirement. Why was, even though it is required by 10
U.S.C. 222(a), why are you asking for supplemental and then yet
didn't submit unfunded requests?
General Van Ovost. Certainly. Supplemental is critical for
the Department of Defense, and for U.S. Transportation Command,
it is critical because we have not been reimbursed for funding
associated with the events after October 7th in the Middle
East, and that is eating away in our reserves.
Those reserves are there, our working capital fund is there
to be able to respond at a moment's notice to meet our Nation's
most critical priorities. So that is--that is associated with
authorization to spend transportation funding in that area.
With respect to the unfunded list, we worked very hard with
the Department of Defense to balance the resources to meet
today's rigorous requirements and to be able to transition into
the future, and this budget directly addresses our
recapitalization requirements, it begins to address our
contested logistics requirements, to include posture forward
and cybersecurity needs.
Senator Budd. Thank you, General. General Cavoli, last
week, Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, he said that
Russia had almost completely reconstituted its military. Do you
agree with that assessment, and what can you tell the committee
about the current State of Russia's conventional and industrial
capacity? If you speak broadly here in as many details. Also,
in the closed session, if you could add to that.
General Cavoli. Yes, absolutely, Senator. I will add to it
in the closed session, first of all, but Generally speaking,
Russia has been working extremely hard on reconstituting its
forces. They are being quite successful, especially in the
ground forces.
So, the attrition that they have suffered so far has been
very significant, but it has been localized. It has been mainly
in the ground forces. They lost a couple thousand tanks in the
ground forces. They lost as many as 75,000 killed from the
ground forces. But they have replenished those. They have got
tank production going on.
They have got tank refurbishment going on, and they have
got tank repair going on, and they have managed--they still
have as many tanks functioning inside Ukraine as they
introduced at the beginning of the war.
Senator Budd. So, if you look at Generally their capacity
in February 2022, as a percentage 0 to 100, where would you say
they are today? If there were 100 in February 2022 and it has
been diminished, and then they have reconstituted according to
Kurt Campbell, where are they now?
General Cavoli. Numbers of soldiers have----
Senator Budd. Just in total capacity.
General Cavoli. Well, that is a really hard thing to do
because----
Senator Budd. Are they back where they started, or are they
more, are they less?
General Cavoli. They are little bit behind where they
started, but not by too much, sir. But it is really hard to
give a numerical an answer to something like that. I could go,
you know, function by function, or I could go arm of the
service by arm of the service and give you a good, rich answer
that gave you a good feeling.
But the overall message I would give you is, they have
grown back to what they were before. They have got some gaps
that have been produced by this war, but their overall capacity
is very significant still, and they intend to make it go
higher, Senator.
Senator Budd. Thank you both. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd. Senator Peters,
please.
Senator Peters. Mike issue there, so. Over here. Well,
welcome, both of you. Thank you for your service. General
Cavoli, the State Partnership Program has an incredible history
of building trust and capability with important allies over the
past 30 years. I know you are well aware of that.
Two key Arctic allies, Finland and Sweden, will soon join
the State Partnership Program to be paired with National Guard
units. These State partners will certainly play a critical role
in integrating these countries into NATO, and in particular, I
would argue that pairing Sweden with an experienced EUCOM
partner like the State of Michigan National Guard would
facilitate a seamless transition into NATO.
But my question for you, sir, is with us in mind, how is
EUCOM planning to take advantage of the expansion of the State
Partnership Program into both Sweden and Finland? Are there
certain capabilities that would be particularly helpful to you
as you think about this expansion?
General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator, for the great
opportunity to talk about the State Partnership Program. You
would have to look pretty far and wide to find somebody who is
a bigger fan of State Partnership than I am.
In fact, Rob Abernathy, my Command Sergeant Major here,
routinely visits those troops and goes back to the States to
talk to their senior leadership about this program. It is
vital. It is expanding, as you point out, but not just among
our allies.
As you know, the State Partnership Program has been vital
to our ability to bring partners into the alliance, and to take
countries that didn't consider themselves to be partners and
make them partners. This has been especially valuable lately.
Austria has become a State partner this year, a nation that has
had a post-World War II tradition of neutrality.
So, it is a big step forward in terms of their
understanding of their responsibilities for collective defense.
You can't just sit in the middle of a bunch of safe countries.
You have to be part of that. Switzerland also.
In fact, this morning I received an email from Ambassador
Miller telling me that Switzerland had sent its letter to me
asking me to endorse their State Partnership request, and I
have talked to Dan Hokanson about that, and I think we are
going to go forward with that.
Specifically with regard to Finland and Sweden, Michigan
and the various other States have very broad based
capabilities, and we would just like them to continue to pull
Sweden and Finland toward the alliance.
As you know, both of those militaries are quite capable
and, you know, they don't need coaching on this or that. They
just need continued partnership, Senator.
Senator Peters. Yes. Great. Thank you, General. General Van
Ovost, as you know, contested logistics and sustainment during
a potential conflict is clearly a significant challenge for our
forces in the Indo-Pacific.
Despite our forward position units, pre-positioned stocks
and regional allies and partners, our ability to refuel, rearm,
and repair under fire will be severely tested in any conflict.
In preparation,
I believe that we would argue we need to do more exercises
like Talisman and Saber with large scale sustainment rehearsals
and major fuel offloads to test our contested logistics. So, my
question for you, General, is what role does TRANSCOM play in
rehearsing contested logistics as part of large exercises?
Is it your intent to make sure that logistics plays a
central role in all future major exercises, particularly in the
Indo-Pacific area?
General Van Ovost. Yes, thanks for that question, Senator.
Across the entire joint deployment distribution enterprise, we
have seen how everyone has mobilized to support our partners,
like Ukraine, with fuel, ammunition, equipment, supplies.
So, when I think about the lessons we have learned in the
Middle East and in Europe, we are absolutely translating them
out into the Indo-Pacific. With respect to posture, you see
multiple posture initiatives in the Indo-Pacific.
Forward stationing of equipment. More resilient bases that
we are using and seaports, as well as more fuel forward, and an
ability to distribute that fuel forward. So again, this is not
merely about moving supplies forward like we have done with
unfettered access.
We work very closely with our allies and partners to ensure
that we have multiple resilient ways to come at the problem to
ensure that our geographic Combatant Commands will be
successful in any future fight.
Senator Peters. Right. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator Mullin,
please.
Senator Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the both of
you all, thank you so much for taking the time to come visit
with us. I know it is important to us, and I know we give you
an important mission to carry out every day. I don't take it
lightly that you take the time to come up here and visit with
us. General Van Ovost, is that how you say it?
General Van Ovost. Van Ovost.
Senator Mullin. Okay. I am sorry. We don't pronounce it
that often. I am from Oklahoma. I understand you are familiar
with Altus Air Force Base, and we really appreciate that. They
speak very highly of you.
You know, as someone who has commanded various aspects of
manning, training, equipping, and mission of air mobility, I
just want to know, are you getting what you need from the Air
Force to carry out that mission still?
General Van Ovost. Thank you. First of all, Altus is a
really important base for us. It is the home of mobility of all
of our training. Of course, you have our assets there to
include our new KC-46, which is really critical when I think
about transitioning and the future of air refueling in that
type of airplane.
So, I support the Air Force. We are on a journey to try to
ensure that our assets are able to communicate, they have
battlespace awareness, and they are survivable in the
environment where we are expected to go into, and so, as we as
we embark upon that journey, we are providing the requirements
to the Air Force to ensure that we can continue to maintain
credible capacity.
Senator Mullin. Is there anything we need to be doing on
our behalf from Congress to help with that?
General Van Ovost. Certainly, supporting the Air Force's
budget with respect to modernization and recapitalization. It
is just not of air refueling, but also of the airlift fleet. We
have 275 strategic airlift aircraft, and we will consume all of
that, should we have to go into a large scale combat operation.
So, the work done there to modernize those, and frankly, to
think about the future and where we are going with that. So, we
are supporting the Air Force as they look into the future of
strategic airlift.
Senator Mullin. So, specifically dialing down on that, when
we are looking toward possible conflicts--and God forbid that
actually happens, but, you know, we are doing what we can to
prevent it. However, we need to be strengthened and preparing
for it.
What is the biggest hold back. Is it the DOD defense
contractors? Is it requirements? If is it regulations? Is it
the slow flow of money? What is it that is the biggest hiccup?
General Van Ovost. I think the biggest thing, when you
think about it, is the aging fleet that we have, and we have to
modernize them to ensure that they can survive out into the
future. So, you know, just looking at the capacity, ensuring
that it remains credible.
That is--it is an ability to fund it and have a stable
funding that we know that we can count on to lay in those
contracts to gain the capability.
Senator Mullin. Moving forward, if something comes up that
we can be of assistance, please, holler at us and let us know
how we can help. So, looking toward, you know, some of our
biggest adversaries, especially in geopolitics, you know, China
is obviously playing a big role in that, and ever strengthening
their relationships with Russia and obviously Iran, how are we
seeing that play out in Ukraine?
General Cavoli. Thank you very much, Senator. Yes, so we
see direct military support from some of those countries that
goes to Russia, and then the Russians employ that material in
combat. A great example is the Shahed 136 drone.
It is a one way attack drone. It was created by Iran. It
was developed by Iran. It was produced by Iran. It was given to
Russia. It was used with great effect. Iran helped Russia build
a factory for them in Russia, and Russia now produces them, and
they call them the Geran-10.
Those are used. They were used early this morning to strike
Ukraine. That is just one example. So, I could go into dozens
of examples like this in closed session with you. Some of what
we know about this is classified. But some of it is very
visible right out there, just like the 136s.
Senator Mullin. Are you able to talk about the cost of
what--in this session, of what it costs them to produce one of
those drones?
General Cavoli. Sir, I could probably talk about it in this
session, but I don't have the money figure right off the top of
my head. I can take that for the record gladly. But Generally
speaking, the cost of the drones is far less than the cost of
defending them, which might be your deeper question.
Senator Mullin. It is. The defense that we are using, and
then plus, looking at what we are producing in the United
States and the cost of what it cost us. Because obviously what
they have is being, you know, fairly effective, and the cost
ratio to me, I see that Russia is--they are adapting.
We have got sanctions on Russia. I don't see that they are
being effective. I would love to hear your comment on that. It
seems like their economies growing. It said that their company
is going to maybe grow by 2.4 percent, which is a full
percentage higher than it was last year.
It seems like they have actually adapted to their
techniques, and as you are saying, they are almost back to full
capacity. So, the sanctions we are having that we put on--or
not we are having--that we put on Russia, are they--do they
seem to be effective?
General Cavoli. So, obviously this is outside my field of
expertise, Senator, the sanctions, how they work, and how
effective they are. In some things, as noted previously during
the discussion today, there have been instances where clearly
sanctioned components have still gotten into Russia weapons
systems.
With regard to the overall cost ratios between, you know,
the sorts of drones we produce and the sorts of drones that we
see there, it is a complicated question. I am not the expert on
it, but I can certainly talk to you about it.
Senator Mullin. Yes, sir. Absolutely. Thank you so much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Mullin. Senator Rosen,
please.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, for holding
this hearing, and, of course, I would like to thank and welcome
General Cavoli and General Van Ovost, of course, for your
commitment, your passion, your service to our country, and for
being here to testify this morning.
So, General Cavoli, we are working to provide Ukraine with
critical air and missile defense capabilities, and my concern
is that defense alone is not going to solve this conflict--or
win this conflict.
So can you speak to how the integration of additional long
range systems would impact the operational effectiveness of
Ukraine forces, and what strategic advances could these--that
these capabilities might provide them.
General Cavoli. Sure, Senator. The additional long range
capabilities for Ukraine would clearly allow them to reach
farther back and to hit and destroy systems that are shooting
at them. Of course, you know, the Russians carefully measure
the ranges of the things they believe are available to the
Ukrainians, and then move their important stuff outside of that
range.
The ability to move in and out of the farther range would
be an important addition to Ukraine's capabilities. When we
think about long range fires though, you know, there are really
three components to effectiveness. The first is the range
itself. The second is the precision with which it can strike.
The third is the survivability of the munitions so that you
know it gets to the target.
So, as Ukraine goes around trying to work on its longer
range capabilities, they have a lot of drones, for instance,
that they are using, longer range. They try to balance those
things and get the sweet spot for the given target that they
are looking at.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I just think offense is as
important as defense.
General Cavoli. It is ma'am.
Senator Rosen. Speaking of offense, General, we are going
to talk a little bit more about--General Cavoli. We have
multiple Generals here, excuse me. How are you working with
CYBERCOM, because cybersecurity so important to provide that
cybersecurity support to our NATO allies.
Particularly there are some nations with lesser
capabilities, and we have--they are vulnerable from these
cyber-attacks from Russia, China, and Iran. Can you share to us
the real value to the United States of the multilateral cyber
exercises with our European allies, such as Locked Shields?
General Cavoli. Absolutely, Senator. You know, it raises an
ancillary question, by the way. So, Tim Hawk at CYBERCOM runs a
lot of that. I field all the Russia questions, it seems like,
but there are so many people working on this problem.
Jackie--I mean, I wouldn't be giving anything to the
Ukrainians if it weren't for Jackie's splendid ability to
deliver. Tim is the same with CYBECOM. He sponsors and co-
sponsors with us these multilateral exercises that allow us
primarily to illuminate vulnerabilities in networks, in our
allies and our partners, and for the alliance's own proper--you
know, the networks we own as an alliance proper.
They are very, very valuable. But then we followup with
cyber protection teams that go forward and do what Tim calls
hunt forward operations, and we help them defend their networks
forward. It has been tremendously successful, not just with
allies, but with partners as well, and with commercial
enterprises.
As you know, a lot of our transportation works on
unclassified systems, and they can be vulnerable. So, it is a
very valuable thing, ma'am. Offensive stuff we could talk about
in closed session, if you desire.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, and I fully support the idea that
Jackies can deliver. So, General Jackie Van Ovost, welcome.
I want to ask you about logistic operations in the Pacific.
Because from the Berlin airlift in 1948 to the chaotic
evacuation of Afghanistan by air, history really has shown us
the extensive resources that we really need to undertake a
complex airlift operation, even in a relatively permissive
environment.
So how is TRANSCOM, are you actively testing the forces to
conduct a long scale--a large scale, prolonged, logistical
operation? Should there be a blockade of Taiwan in the future,
especially given the threats, we know regional threats in the
Indo-Pacific?
General Van Ovost. Well, thanks. That is one of the key
things we do in exercises around the globe, as well as in an
Indo-Pacific. Scenario agnostic, our ability to deliver at a
time and place of our Nation's choosing is a strategic
advantage.
I think about the differences between the Middle East and
Europe and Indo-Pacific is we are going to rely more upon the
airlift because of the, you know, the dearth of ground lines of
communication.
As we do analysis on the intra-theater movement necessary
to get those supplies that will last tactical thousand miles,
we are exercising sealift capacity, which is shallow draft
sealift running essentially a network or below the network of
airplanes, because it will fully consume our airlift fleet if
we fly everything. So that is an important part of what we are
exercising.
Things like Talisman and Saber, where we are moving around
with ships and moving pre-positioned around is very important.
Pre-positioning capability to include fuel forward is
important, as well as ensuring resilient ports and airports for
defense and our ability to survive, essentially to aggregate to
fight and disaggregate to survive and regenerate.
Senator Rosen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. General Cavoli, General Van Ovost, thank
you both for your appearance. General Cavoli, you have been
asked on occasion, to include by the chairman's very first
question, about the lessons that other nations might learn from
Ukraine, like China in particular, if America falters.
I agree with that because we underpin global stability and
security if American will falters anywhere, the adversaries
everywhere will take lessons from it. The one thing you haven't
gotten asked about is what is happening right now in the Red
Sea.
An outlaw gang of brigands and rebels is shooting at U.S.
Navy vessels on a routine basis, dozens of times now. Now,
fortunately, our air defenses have intercepted those, but that
is the only thing that stopped our sailors from being killed.
Yet all we are doing is shooting down those drones and
missiles in the air, or maybe when they are on the launchpad.
What lessons do countries like China, or for that matter,
Russia, learn when we just let our sailors sit in the Red Sea
and become sitting ducks for an outlaw band of rebels?
General Cavoli. Thanks, Senator. So, just to be clear, that
is not my area of responsibility----
Senator Cotton. Not your area, but you comment is to
Chairman Reed that people outside your area take lessons from
what is happening there. So what lessons are people in your
area take from the fact that, again, we are doing nothing----
General Cavoli. Sure. The lessons that European nations are
taking from this----
Senator Cotton. That Vladimir Putin is taking from it.
General Cavoli. Well, I don't know what Vladimir Putin is
taking from it, sir, because he has got his hands pretty full
right now inside Ukraine, where he is learning some of the same
lessons, right.
Senator Cotton. The lesson is that President Biden can be
deterred from taking decisive action to protect our interest.
For 2 years, he pussy footed around and didn't provide Ukraine
what it needed to stop the invasion earlier and to roll it
back, and now we are at this unsatisfactory moment in time.
Okay, let me come to that. So, Ukraine is a pretty big
country compared to some countries. It is small compared to
Russia. Some people say like, well, Russia is always going to
win, Russia always wins because Russia is a big country. Is it
the case in history that smaller nations always lose to bigger
nations?
General Cavoli. No, it is not the case, especially if the
smaller nation can make sure that they accomplish their
objectives in the fight quickly. I think over time, as we see
in history, as we see conflicts get protracted, typically that
favors the larger nation.
Senator Cotton. I agree, that is why it was such a terrible
mistake for President Biden to pussyfoot around for 2 years and
not provide Ukraine the weapons it needed, when it could have
had a decisive advantage. But it is not even case in Russia's
history, right? Russia lost the Russo-Japanese War.
Russia lost the war in Afghanistan. I guess you could say
Russia won the Winter War against Finland in 1939 and 1940, but
it got very little for an extraordinarily high cost. So, it is
not the case that just because you are a bigger nation, you are
fated to win a war against a smaller nation. But as you say,
you have got--the smaller nation has to be more nimble and
aggressive, maybe take risks that it otherwise wouldn't.
One thing that Ukraine needs to do, therefore, in my
opinion, is conduct more strikes against the facilities and the
sites and the resources that Russia is using to wage this
unprovoked war of aggression.
So, for instance, General Cavoli, what is the military
value of striking refineries on Russian territory for Ukraine?
General Cavoli. The military value of that is producing a
deficit in fuel available for the fielded force, that is for
the combat force, someplace downstream of the strike, right.
So, there is a time lag in its effect, Senator, as you well
know.
Senator Cotton. The military value of, say, of striking
drone factories on Russian soil.
General Cavoli. The same. It has an affect--it is a
downstream effect, but of course, it has an effect.
Senator Cotton. The military value of striking the Kerch
Strait bridge.
General Cavoli. That would have a downstream effect that
took effect sooner.
Senator Cotton. Okay. The Administration has urged Ukraine
not to launch these kind of strikes though. In your
professional military judgment, would Ukraine be more likely to
win or at least get a satisfactory outcome in this war if it
was striking those sites and other sites that right now are
safe haven for Russia's military?
General Cavoli. So, I think Ukraine would be very well
advised to strike the operational level targets that are
supporting the fielded force. They have some urgent challenges
right now on the front line, as we have spoken about.
The fighting is active along the forward line of troops,
and so, those things that contribute most directly that have
the shortest downstream effect right now, I think should be
struck. Kind of feeding the wolf closest to the sled, I think
is what they need to do right now.
Senator Cotton. Is it your military judgment that we should
provide Ukraine with more and more variants of the ATACMS
missiles than we have already?
General Cavoli. It is.
Senator Cotton. Okay. One final question on this small and
large point, it has been reported that Russia has about a 3 to
1 advantage in artillery production right now over Ukraine. Is
that accurate?
General Cavoli. No, sir. They have a 3 to 1 production
advantage over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Senator Cotton. Ukraine and the good guys, let's put it
that way. Okay. So, but isn't it also the case that Ukraine is
destroying four Russian Howitzers for every one that Russia
destroys?
General Cavoli. Something about like that.
Senator Cotton. A pretty big mismatch. If you Russia can
make three times as many big rounds that we all can make
collectively, yet Ukraine is able to kill four times as many
guns as Russia has, what explains that?
General Cavoli. What explains their ability to kill more?
Because the Russians are not as precise in their targeting.
Senator Cotton. So, it is not just a matter of having a lot
more stuff, although it is nice to have more stuff and we
should certainly have more stuff and be able to make it faster.
It is also that you got to be able to use it. Or to put it in
simple terms, you have got to be able to hit the targets that
you shoot at in a timely fashion.
General Cavoli. Of course.
Senator Cotton. Ukraine is doing that much more effectively
than Russia is doing that.
General Cavoli. Typically, but not uniformly.
Senator Cotton. So, while the a 3 to 1 production advantage
is unsatisfactory, it needs to be reversed. It is also not a
sign that Russian victory is inevitable.
General Cavoli. There is no such thing as, you know, of
inevitable victory, sir. If your question is, can Ukraine win
this war? They can win this war. Can they win it without
achieving Russian levels of production? Sure, they can. But
right now, they are in a very critical moment.
Senator Cotton. Well, what would be best is if we achieve
Russian levels of production and we maintain the 4 to 1
advantage on targeting. So, let's try to get there.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Schmitt,
please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cavoli,
thank you for being here. A couple of questions about NATO, and
then I do want to ask about the Gaza pier. There was a lot of
discussion today about lessons learned from the Ukraine war.
One of the lessons, I suppose that we could all learn is
that our European allies in NATO have come very accustomed to
us subsidizing their social welfare programs in Europe because
they refuse to meet their 2 percent obligations.
There is only 11 countries that do it, and I think, you
know, we represent American taxpayers, the United States, and
that is who we represent. I want to ask about that. So, what
in--so 2 percent is the target--why is 2 percent the target.
Why not 3 percent?
General Cavoli. Sir, because that is what was agreed to at
Wales some years ago. Is it an appropriate target? Is it an
arbitrary target? I leave those questions to somebody else.
What I can tell you is that I know what the alliance needs
to do to modernize and to get fit for its collective defense,
its new purpose, its reestablished purpose in the wake of the
invasion of Ukraine, and it is at least 2 percent.
That is why the alliance at the last summit adopted the
phrase floor, not a ceiling. I think over time, we will see our
allies realize that it is--at 2 percent it is inadequate for
the cost, at least in the near and mid-term.
Senator Schmitt. Yes, I am glad that they make these
pronouncements. But--our allies and NATO allies. But they don't
seem to ever meet the obligations.
So, I guess, at what point, you know, when you only have 11
countries doing it--and by the way, many of them fudge these
numbers. They are not dollars related to military readiness.
Here we are now, the taxpayers are again being asked to
spend another $60 billion on top of the $112 billion. We have
been told there could be another $100 billion request, although
that is not reflected in this budget.
So, we don't really know. This is an ongoing war and a
blank check. I believe my job is to try to find out what does
victory look like and what is the cost going to be, because I
feel like we are in this mode now where this dominates
discussion but there aren't really a whole lot of details.
So again, I question whether 2 percent is even enough for
our European allies. I don't think that it is. I think I hear
you saying that, but we also only have 11 of them meeting those
obligations, and again, I think those numbers are being fudged.
I also, have come to learn that, is it your understanding that
Hawaii is actually not included in Article V obligations under
NATO?
General Cavoli. Sure. So, the number right now is 20 are
meeting--20 allies are meeting 2 percent as of June, they will
be projected. Norway just sent the Secretary General a letter
on Monday saying that and there are a couple more coming up.
But the point, Senator, your point that the rich countries
of Western Europe that are not at 2 percent are in the wrong
place, I agree with absolutely and fundamentally. But I would
point out that the trajectory is moving very rapidly in the
right direction, and it is doing that because our allies have
learned the lesson of the invasion of Ukraine as well.
We still do need to close to say, do gap, however. Yes, so,
with regard to----
Senator Schmitt. Hawaii, if Hawaii is attacked by China.
General Cavoli. Article VI defines--of the Washington
Treaty, defines what the territory covered in the treaty is.
South of the Tropic of Cancer is not included. So, French
Polynesia is not in there. The UK's Pitcairn Islands are not in
there.
Senator Schmitt. Hawaii is not in there----
General Cavoli. Hawaii and are not in there. However,
Article IV gives any nation that has been attacked the right to
call consultations with other nations and to say, I want you to
do something about this, and Article V gives them all the same
sovereign right to decide on that. It is just not automatic.
But Article VI can----
Senator Schmitt. One would believe that our European allies
would have no objection to Hawaii being included, correct?
General Cavoli. I would expect not. Article VI can----
Senator Schmitt. What about Guam?
General Cavoli. Article VI can be amended. The United
States has never asked to amend it.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. I am deeply troubled by Macron's
comments, I guess about a year ago, that Europe doesn't need to
be dragged into a war in the Pacific and follow the United
States--something to that effect. In America's strategic
interest, China is by far and away our biggest threat. Do you
believe that our NATO allies, if Taiwan is attacked, would join
us in that cause?
General Cavoli. I believe that many of them would. I do not
believe that NATO as an alliance has that purpose right now. It
could adopt that purpose, but that is not part of the purpose.
Senator Schmitt. Is anyone in this Administration talking
to them about that?
General Cavoli. Oh, this Administration talks a great deal
to----
Senator Schmitt. About that specific issue?
General Cavoli.--to our allies about being active in the
Pacific. Are you asking is--?
Senator Schmitt. Well, I guess I will just close with this
because I am out of time. I am very concerned that our NATO
allies don't meet their obligations, depend on the generosity
of the American taxpayer to a degree that--it is very
concerning to me.
When you hear comments from the leader of France that they
don't want to follow the United States into potentially a war
in the Pacific, potentially with our chief adversary, China,
that raises a lot of concern.
So, anyway, I appreciate your service and what you do, but
again, I just don't think that our European allies have stepped
up. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Senator King
requested additional time.
Senator King. One brief question. We talk a lot about air
defense. Are there--and perhaps this has to go to the closed
session, are there directed energy air defense facilities in
Ukraine? Because the bullet on a bullet is a very expensive way
to defend.
Directed energy is a lot cheaper and I know there are
systems now that are in development or actually in testing. Is
that an option that we should be pursuing in terms of our
support for air defense in Ukraine?
General Cavoli. It is an option that we could pursue,
Senator. Your points about the cost ratios and the reload speed
of directed energy is very--you know, very important. It is
obviously a big part of the future of missile defense
specifically, and counter drone defense specifically.
There are some systems that we are working with out there.
There are a lot of power problems, as you know, associated with
still. We haven't fully realized its potential. With regard to
Ukraine, it would be great to speak to you just a moment about
that in closed session.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King, and Senator
Schmitt, for additional questions.
Senator Schmitt. Yes, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
did not get to the Gaza pier, so I apologize. General Van
Ovost, I do want to ask you, I know there has been discussion
about this effort to--this Gaza pier for humanitarian aid.
I have concerns, and I don't think they are alone--I don't
think I am alone in concerns about what that means for our
American troops or personnel that would be engaged in this
activity. What is your understanding of what this looks like?
What could be done--if this is happening, what can be done
to ensure that American lives are protected?
General Van Ovost. Yes, thanks. I think about what we do at
Transportation Command, we provide transportation for these
capabilities around the globe. We have exercised them. We do it
almost every year.
As we bring all of the elements together to do joint
logistics over the shore or even airdrop through humanitarian
aid, we put processes, and we exercise these things. So, we
have a great understanding of what it takes to build a pier and
a discharge facility, and to offload and to move monitoring
goods, because we have done this actively for the Haiti
earthquake in 2010.
So, when we think about the new, you know, what is the
strategic environment associated with doing this in Gaza?
Obviously, I forward that to the geographic Combatant
Commander, to CENTCOM. So, we are working diligently with them
on the planning. I can tell you that force protection is our
number one concern.
General Cavoli. If I could add to that, Senator. So,
obviously, with the transfer of Israel from the EUCOM area of
responsibility to the CENTCOM area of responsibility, we get a
combined effort there now.
So, the protection is combined between USEUCOM and CENTCOM,
depending on which exact part of the operation we are talking
about. Eric and I, about Eric Kurilla and I have been in very
intense conversation about this.
More importantly, in our maritime components, we have been
in very close planning on this. It is not without danger, but
we know how to handle it, sir.
Senator Schmitt. Well, and I guess just to color in a
little bit of detail to the extent. I know it has just been--
the Gaza pier has been certainly talked about, but what is your
understanding of who is receiving the aid.
I guess we have vaguely heard of NGO's, but again, this is
in a very dangerous part of the world right now with a lot of
people who don't like the United States of America. So, I
guess, what is your understanding of more the details as it
stands today?
General Cavoli. Sir, so that part is inside General
Kurilla's AOR, inside CENTCOM. I know that this is a fast
moving story as we go forward and I hesitate to give you a
name.
Senator Schmitt. That is fine.
General Cavoli. I can refer to him for you.
Senator Schmitt. We will followup on that. Thank you. Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. I am informed
that Senator Sullivan is on his way, but I have an additional
question.
There has been discussion back and forth and a very I think
useful one about what happens if the Ukraine Government fails.
My sense, and I just ask for your opinion, General Cavoli, is
that if we fail in Ukraine, Russia is more likely to conduct
operations against other countries.
So, if we really want to diminish a potential conflict
between NATO, United States, and Russia, succeeding Ukraine is
a fundamental obligation, or----
General Cavoli. Sir, I agree. I think the biggest single
change we can make in our deterrent posture for the better is
for Ukraine to win.
Chairman Reed. There has been comments about the
contribution of our allies, but the reality is that in many
other ways, which are absolutely critical to the success of
Ukraine, our allies are far outpacing us in humanitarian
assistance and absorption of immigrants, very costly programs.
But without those programs, essentially, Ukraine would not
be able to concentrate on the battle. Is that accurate?
General Cavoli. Yes, absolutely, Chairman. The amount of
humanitarian assistance, the amount of support for the
electrical grid, which is under constant attack, and on and on.
The not inconsequential act of taking on board at least 4
million refugees for 2 years without a bump, these are
important contributions. Some of them are less tangible, sir,
but they are contributions.
Inside the military sphere, I really have to point out,
there are some things that we provide a lot of, and in the
aggregate, we are certainly providing an awful lot. But there
are some things that are 100 percent provided by people other
than the United States. Petroleum products for the use, the
fuel for the force, 100 percent from allies, all of it.
Tanks, more than 90 percent of the tanks that we have given
to the Ukrainians came from allies, not from us. Fighter jets,
100 percent of them have not come from us, and I could go on
and on.
So, it is really important for us to recognize the value of
our contribution and to justify--it is important for me to be
able to justify to members and constituents the value
proposition for America in these contributions, but we
shouldn't lose sight of the fact that our allies are
contributing as well.
Chairman Reed. In fact, just my impression it might be
yours, is that the European allies and NATO and other countries
in Europe have far exceeded any expectations we had when this
fight began. I am impressed, I think, in the terms of--and it
is for their own self-interest and self-protection, but it is--
--
General Cavoli. I agree with that, not just in terms of
what they are giving to Ukraine and the support they are giving
to Ukraine, but in terms of what they expect of themselves to
contribute to the alliance. So, both of those tracks. It is--I
would never have guessed this in 2021, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. I was in the same sense of disbelief as you
were. So, let me recognize Senator Sullivan. We are trying to
keep to 5 minutes. We have to adjourn at 10 a.m..
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Generals, good
to see both of you. Thanks for your great work. General Cavoli,
I want to dig into a little bit more about a couple issues. One
is the extent to which the authoritarian regimes in the world
who are all on the march, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, are
cooperating.
I am sure you are seeing this, but can you spell that out a
little bit more? I mean, one of the things that I talk about
with this national security supplement--I don't even like
calling it the Ukraine supplemental or the Ukraine aid bill,
because it is actually not accurate.
The more accurate way to pick that bill is we have
authoritarians all working together, clearly aimed at us. They
hate us, and we need to be strategic in our response.
We also need to recognize that our own industrial base has
atrophied dramatically. It has, and so, I like to call this
national security bill the Revitalizing America's Industrial
Base Act, because 60 percent of it, 60 percent of it goes
directly into our ability, America's ability to produce weapons
for us.
Everything from nuclear subs, which Xi Jinping is scared to
death of, to one 55 millimeter Howitzer round. So, can you talk
a little bit more about how these dictatorships who don't like
us now, we don't like them, are all working together, and what
that means in terms of strategy.
General Cavoli. Absolutely, Senator. First of all, I think
the way you have characterized this is spot on. These are not
our friends. These are countries, these are regimes that wish
us ill and are taking active measures to deliver us ill.
So, there is practical cooperation. There is practical
cooperation on an economic level that. That is, China becomes
Russia's salvation economically, right, by absorbing its gas
output. Other countries----
Senator Sullivan. And oil--and oil.
General Cavoli. Other countries do the same. There is
direct military support, right. DPRK loads up train loads of
artillery shells and sends in them, and those artillery shells
are exploding over Ukrainian heads every day.
On the earlier we discussed the creation of an Iranian
based drone factory to reproduce the Shahed 136 inside Russia.
Those were exploding over Ukraine this morning early. So, it is
very practical.
More distressing, though, is the fact that these countries
seem to be forming an intensifying bond that they intend to use
geopolitically to weaken our position in the world, which will
inevitably hurt our own interests and our own citizens.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask a related question. You know,
you read about it in some commentators, actually, some of my
colleagues have kind of come up with this new theory about
deterrence being divisible.
Let me unpack that a little bit more. So again, with these
authoritarians working together, you could have a situation
where Putin rolls over Ukraine eventually, but if we don't
provide any more military aid--by the way, do you think that
will happen?
I mean, if at the end of the day, the U.S. is pretty much
right now, like, hey, sorry, we are going to build out our
industrial base, which we need to do, but we are not we are not
sending anything else to you. Good luck. What do you think
happens?
General Cavoli. If we don't continue to support Ukraine?
Senator Sullivan. Let's say we stop--a couple of my
colleagues just want to stop everything right now. Nothing.
What will happen?
General Cavoli. Sure. That is easy. They run out of 155.
They run out of air defense interceptors, and you know, as I
said yesterday in the House, the side that can't shoot back
loses.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. So, but there is this notion out
there--I don't think it really works with the facts on the
ground. I don't think it works with history. If you read it, I
don't think it works at all.
But that deterrence is divisible. You can let Putin roll
over Ukraine, but we are going to--we are going to send that
signal to Xi Jinping in the Taiwan Strait. We are going to be
really strong with Taiwan. You think deterrence is divisible
like that? Now, look, I don't think it--no offense to President
Biden, but I think it is not divisible at all.
His Afghanistan withdrawal signaled to the world that, hey,
game on, let the authoritarian regimes role. What do you think
about this idea that somehow deterrence is divisible? You can
be weak in Ukraine, but still strong in the Taiwan Strait,
particularly when all these authoritarians are working
together?
General Cavoli. Senator, I think that every action or every
inaction we take sends a message, and I think that people all
over the world listen for that message, and those messages are
always global. They cannot be sent to one audience at a time.
So, I agree.
Senator Sullivan. My final question, General. You are an
undisputed Russian expert. One thing that always kind of--and I
pressed the DNI on this. I don't understand why we don't do
this. These are authoritarian regimes, one of the things that
they are starting to do is messing with our most precious
institution and that is elections. We are a Republic--a
democracy. We elect our leaders.
These dictators would never stand for fair elections
because they probably wouldn't win. Certainly, Xi Jinping,
Putin, one of their biggest vulnerabilities--the Ayatollahs in
Iran--is they fear their own people, but they come after us on
elections with, you know, cyber and things like that.
Don't you think that if Putin is coming after our
elections, trying to disrupt our elections, when he won't stand
for election, we should do everything we can to counter by
getting out all the information we have on this guy? I mean, he
is one of the richest people in the world. Literally, he stole
$80 billion from the Russians.
We probably have the Swiss bank account numbers to where he
has stashed all the money. These poor Russians, you know, are
starving and drinking vodka for breakfast, and Putin steals
from them. Shouldn't we get that out to the world the way
Navalny did and say, you want to mess with our elections, we
are going to let the people--same with Xi Jinping, these guys
are all corrupt.
Should we do that when they are messing with the most
precious thing we have in America, our elections?
General Cavoli. Senator, if you don't mind, I will leave
that sort of strategy to civilian policymakers. But I would
like to agree with you strongly that Putin fears open
elections. He fears them in his own country, and he fears them
elsewhere. He fears them, and he therefore seeks to undermine
them.
I also agree with your opinion that the--that our
elections, our ability to choose who governs us, our
Government, by the consent of the governed, is the most
precious thing we have in this country.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Thank you,
General Cavoli and General Van Ovost for your excellent
testimony. This will conclude the open session. We will
reconvene at 12 noon in SVC-217 for the closed session and
thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 9:57 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
proposed national guard bureau leveling initiative
1. Senator Shaheen. General Van Ovost, the 157th Air Refueling Wing
(ARW) Maintenance Group conducted an analysis based on its fiscal year
2023 aircraft availability of how the National Guard Bureau's proposed
leveling initiative would impact its future operations. In 2023, the
New Hampshire Air National Guard's 12 KC-46 experienced a 48 percent
aircraft availability rate. With a loss of 12 maintainers, they expect
that to drop by 5.75 percent. How will a reduction in the 157th ARW
aircraft ability affect TRANSCOM's requirements?
General Van Ovost. While USTRANSCOM is closely monitoring the
maintenance availability of the KC-46 fleet, the potential for aircraft
availability at Pease Air National Guard Base to drop from 48 percent
to 842 percent will not significantly impact the USTRANSCOM mission.
The 157 ARW and its associated Active Duty squadron support USTRANSCOM
with 3 to 4 aircraft on a daily basis. The 157th is on track to fulfill
all requirements for its planned mobilization in fiscal year 2025.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
sealift recapitalization
2. Senator Hirono. General Van Ovost, as we have seen from the
conflict in Ukraine, our ability to execute logistics maneuver is
without equal and an asymmetric advantage. However, we risk our
capability in the priority theatre at the most critical moment due to
the aging ships of the Ready Reserve Fleet. As the end-user of the
capabilities these ships provide, what do you see as the best way
forward for maintaining our lift abilities in the Pacific?
General Van Ovost. The best way forward to maintain our critical
sealift capability is to expeditiously replace aging ships with newer
and more reliable technology. Currently, 17 of the 47 Roll-on/Roll-off
ships in the Ready Reserve Force are 50 years of age or older.
USTRANSCOM supports the Navy's strategy to acquire used sealift vessels
from the commercial market, and acknowledges Congress's intent to
include domestic newbuild sealift ships in the recapitalization plan.
Timely, predictable, and stabilized authorities and funding are
critical to the recapitalization effort.
refueling
3. Senator Hirono. General Van Ovost, we know that China's plans
emphasize targeting logistics enablers, such as airfields, refueling
aircraft, and Military Sealift Command ships. To enable contested
logistics, we must find ways to improve the tanker fleet's efficiency
and survivability both in the air and at sea. What investments in fuel
distribution capacity and capability do you see as most critical this
decade and what future platforms will ensure our success in the long
terms?
General Van Ovost. USTRANSCOM's focus is on this Nation's unique
capability to project power. We are dedicated to enhancing the
strategic readiness of mobility forces and modernizing mobility assets,
including our strategic Aerial Refueling tanker fleets and fuel
distribution enablers. In terms of our future air refueling platforms,
the most important focus should be on continued and uninterrupted
recapitalization of our aging fleet of KC-135 aircraft. Each new tanker
aircraft delivered, whether it be a KC-46 or one of the alternatives
from the Next Generation Air Refueling Systems program, must be fully
capable of refueling current and future receiver aircraft as well as
being securely connected to battlefield command and control systems.
Leveraging newly developed tools and processes such as Bulk Fuel
Feasibility Assessments and Petroleum War Reserve Requirement
generation, we have begun to significantly refine the Department's
understanding of the bulk fuel supply chain's risk and capacity, while
driving toward fuel distribution gaps and needed capabilities for the
Joint Petroleum Enterprise in contested environment operations.
For maritime tanker vessels, we now have a clearer understanding of
the wartime requirement due to these new tools and processes. Current
planning assumptions are that the Department will need to leverage
commercial vessels for nearly all inter-theater and much intra-theater
movement of fuel, and we have dramatically improved our understanding
of the commercial tanker sector's ability to meet these requirements.
The Tanker Security Program (TSP) is, and will continue to be, crucial
as the baseline to meet a portion of these demands and we continue to
refine requirements for the planned expansion of the program beyond the
initial tankers currently enrolled. Assured tanker access is the
primary goal, and we are currently working on several initiatives to
close gaps for both capacity and access.
4. Senator Hirono. General Van Ovost, what role does posture play
in creating resiliency and how is the Department of Defense expanding
investments in dual use facilities in places like the Compact States?
General Van Ovost. The Department's Global Posture is the
foundation of power projection and includes both domestic and
international installations, seaports, railways, and airfields that
connect us to the fight. Global mobility depends on access, basing, and
overflight (ABO) and strong relationships and agreements with Allies
and partners to facilitate flexible and resilient options. We must
expand and strengthen our global transportation networks to facilitate
our ability to aggregate force packages to initiate the fight, and then
disaggregate to survive during brief periods of domain superiority by a
neer peer competitor. Expanding investments in dual-use facilities
(military and civilian/commercial) not only provides options in time of
need, but also creates opportunities for enhanced security cooperation
with partner nations and expands usable capacity for host nations.
USTRANSCOM remains actively involved with USINDOPACOM on developing
infrastructure investment requirements throughout the Indo-Pacific,
including in the Compact States, with a key focus on dual-use
facilities outside of established military bases.
patient movement
5. Senator Hirono. General Van Ovost, during a meeting last month,
I was happy you raised the issue of patient movement. Can you talk more
about your command's efforts to overcome the difficulties you would
face related to patient movement, especially during a potential
conflict in the Indo-Pacific?
General Van Ovost. [Deleted.]
cyber resiliency of commercial partners
6. Senator Hirono. General Van Ovost, many of our ports, airports,
rail networks, and shipping companies are more vulnerable to
cyberattack than Department of Defense owned systems, yet they are
integral to your ability to move and sustain the Joint Force. How are
you working with your commercial partners to ensure cyber resiliency?
General Van Ovost. USTRANSCOM continues to strengthen partnerships
with commercial Transportation Service Providers (TSPs) to mitigate
cybersecurity vulnerabilities and increase resiliency by increasing
information sharing and collaboration each year, to include briefing
our TSPs on no-cost tools and services available from various
government agencies, such as the National Security Agency, Department
of Defense Cyber Crime Center, and the Department of Homeland
Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.
Additionally, we have voluntary one-on-one collaboration sessions
with TSPs to discuss their annual self-assessments and offer expertise
and advice on implementing the National Institute of Standards and
Technology Special Publication 800-171 security controls. These
meetings are held with TSP government business leads, but they are
often also attended by the TSPs' Chief Information Officer and/or Chief
Information Security Officer (CISO).
Our Cybersecurity Service Provider also provides technical
exchanges with our industry partners to share best practices in
technical innovations, creating a more collaborative relationship. This
effort also provides our TSPs with real-time reach back to the
USTRANSCOM cybersecurity team to answer questions and receive feedback
regarding the security of their networks and systems.
USTRANSCOM has taken a lead role in sharing best practices with
industry through recurring CISO newsletters with cyber relevant open-
source intelligence, as well as participating in the Department of
Homeland Security's Aviation Cyber Initiative, National Defense
Transportation Association meetings, and engagements across various
events and conferences (for example, regularly scheduled executive
working groups) throughout the year.
Last, our acquisition experts review all contracts, ensuring
cybersecurity language is included during Performance Work Statement or
Statement of Work reviews prior to Request for Information or Request
for Proposal. All USTRANSCOM contracts include DFARS clause 252.204-
7012, Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident
Reporting, which mandates baseline protections for contractor
information systems and establishes reporting requirements for
cybersecurity incidents. As well, USTRANSCOM incorporates additional,
enhanced cybersecurity requirements into transportation contracts by
expanding the scope of incidents to be reported and adding a direct
notification requirement to USTRANSCOM.
Overall, cybersecurity compliance continues to improve each year,
highlighting our partners' understanding of the importance of
implementing sound cybersecurity practices.
7. Senator Hirono. General Van Ovost, I want to make sure small
businesses are also able to work with the Department of Defense. How
you and the rest of the Department of Defense ensuring smaller
companies are have access to the same resources as larger companies?
General Van Ovost. USTRANSCOM ensures fair and equal opportunity
for all small business concerns by providing notice of our upcoming
acquisitions. The USTRANSCOM Small Business Office maintains the
acquisition page on the Command's ``Doing Business with U.S.
Transportation Command'' website and publishes the Procurement Forecast
twice a year. Dissemination as required by the Small Business Act about
the publications is made to Industry through the Systems for Award
Management website. Our website also includes an Industry Resource tab
which contains information about the USTRANSCOM Acquisition
Directorate, the Small Business Office, the DOD Approval Process for
air and surface carriers, Government agency and training links, Cyber
Security resources, and other information. The DOD Office of Small
Business Programs (OSBP) maintains its own website, https://
business.defense.gov, which serves as DOD common point of entry for
small business and includes a guide to working with DOD and links to
all DOD Small Business offices to help small business concerns
understand each agency's mission and requirements. Across the country,
OSBP provides roughly 100 APEX Accelerators to counsel and train small
businesses to become capable of participating in DOD contracts. OSBP
also establishes Small Business prime and subcontracting goals and
ensures the small business professional workforce is engaged in
acquisition planning to enable more small business set asides in DOD
contracting. OSBP also provides no-cost cybersecurity resources, tools,
and training. Through strategic communication, events, and activities,
OSBP engages and informs small businesses. The Mentor Protege Program
pairs small businesses with industry mentors. The Indian Incentive
Program promotes DOD contract opportunities for Native American-owned
businesses. OSBP also has programs to mitigate cybersecurity and
Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI) risks for small
businesses through educational resources and tools.
ukrainian civilian protections
8. Senator Hirono. General Cavoli, as we have seen around the
world, in war it is often the most vulnerable who pay the highest
costs--the elderly, women, girls. As the conflict between Russia and
Ukraine enters its third year, our support of the civilian population
also speaks to our country's values and stands in stark contrast with
Russia and other malign actors. General Cavoli, how is EUCOM continuing
to support and protect the people of Ukraine?
General Cavoli. We are deeply concerned with how the war in Ukraine
harms the civilian population, and strive to provide the maximum
support possible. USEUCOM, in a unified effort with other U.S.
Government Agencies, has provided various forms of support, from
physical hardening of critical national infrastructure and
reconstructing schools, to designing additional levels of
infrastructure protection and training. The USEUCOM Humanitarian
Assistance program, along with United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), has provided equipment to protect power plants and
other critical national infrastructure, rebuilt schools and orphanages,
provided food, safe drinking water, medical supplies, and related
materiel. The Department of Energy (DoE) and the Army Corps of
Engineers are designing plans for passive protection equipment to
better protect Ukrainian energy-related critical national
infrastructure, and USEUCOM supports various DOE technical advising
programs for Ukrainian grid operators.
9. Senator Hirono. General Cavoli, how is EUCOM working with
Ukraine and other U.S. Government agencies to the monitor human rights
abuses of Russia?
General Cavoli. The Department of Justice, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and USAID are the U.S. Government Agencies
that have primacy in the effort to track and monitor human rights
violations by the Russian military. USAID partners with Ukrainian civil
society groups to track crimes of the Russian government, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) works with DHS to investigate
human rights violations. USEUCOM assists these departments and agency
through information sharing and battlefield awareness and has shared
intelligence with the FBI and DHS to support investigations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
improving the contested logistics enterprise
10. Senator Duckworth. General Van Ovost, thank you for your
leadership in ensuring TRANSCOM is ready to project and sustain the
joint force at a time and place of our Nation's choosing. This ability
is key to our strategic deterrence. The work TRANSCOM is doing in
Illinois at Scott Air Force Base in support of operations around the
globe including in Ukraine, the Middle East and in the Indo-Pacific
region is second to none. The United States has unmatched power-
projection capabilities, with an unequalled number of cargo aircraft,
aerial tankers and support ships, but the tyranny of distance in the
Indo-Pacific will require us to make significant investments to
maintain our advantage. How are you informed about investments the
services are making in improving our contested logistics enterprise,
including in RDT&E, procurement and military construction?
General Van Ovost. Requirements for Military Construction (MILCON)
projects are initially informed by annual Posture Plan submissions from
the Regional and Functional Combatant Commands (CCMD) for projects
within their theater or functional area, respectively, or directly from
our component and subordinate commands. As projects move through the
programming cycle, we are engaged with and receive updates from the
Global Posture Executive Council (GPEC), Service MILCON prioritization
efforts and Program Objective Memorandum (POM) updates, Program Budget
Reviews (PBR), and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) reviews.
Per the Unified Command Plan (UCP), USTRANSCOM is responsible for
the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) operations
across all domains. Established in 2006, the USTRANSCOM research
program is dedicated to enhancing the Department's ability to globally
project and sustain our Nation's forces into contested/austere
environments at a time and place of our Nation's choosing. It allows
the command to effectively collaborate with Service labs, Combatant
Commands, select Defense Agencies (e.g., DLA, DARPA), the Defense
Innovation Unit, multiple OUSD(R&E) (e.g., Defense Innovation
Accelerator, Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve) and OUSD(A&S)
programs (e.g., Coalition Warfare Program and Operational Energy &
Innovation) programs, as well as the Joint Staff, in partnership with
industry and academia, to pursue contested logistics innovation in
support of the National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy,
the Joint Warfighting Concept, and the Joint Concept for Contested
Logistics. Sample innovations currently being explored include ability
to deliver and autonomously derig fully mission capable vehicles,
reducing exposure of traditional airlift assets by extending the range
of aerial delivery systems to deliver from outside the threat bubble, a
low-cost kit to support aerial delivery from manned and unmanned
platforms in a GPS-denied environment, a lightweight deployable system
for the at sea transfer of vehicles/equipment, provide a submersible
conduit to support over-the-shore fuel delivery from vessels of
opportunity, etc. Since inception, USTRANSCOM's program has
transitioned over 90 percent of all research projects. USTRANSCOM
informs DOD innovation investment decisions through our participation
in various programs/forums such as the Defense Innovation Working
Group, Chief Technology Officer Council Working Group, Joint Test &
Evaluation, Accelerated Procurement and Fielding of Innovative
Technologies (APFIT), National Defense Industrial Association, National
Defense Transportation Association.
Additionally, the command leverages the Department's Integrated
Priority List (IPL), Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEONs) and Joint
Capabilities Integrated Development System (JCIDS) processes to address
JDDE challenges.
11. Senator Duckworth. General Von Ovost, how much influence and
input does TRANSCOM have in these decisions?
General Van Ovost. As an active participant in multiple processes
(e.g., Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Functional Capability
Boards, Defense Management Action Group, Defense Innovation Steering
Group, Chief Technology Officer Council, Program Budget Review, Global
Posture Executive Council, etc.), USTRANSCOM, in partnership with
fellow Combatant Commands, can influence Department of Defense
investment decisions.
Regarding MILCON, USTRANSCOM influences project funding through a
process of prioritizing Regional CCMD MILCON projects with USTRANSCOM
equities and through project submission to the annual MILCON GPEC
hosted by OSD. The GPEC performs its own prioritization of CCMD MILCON
projects, informed in part by CCMD priorities, and submits those
projects to the Services for potential inclusion in their annual POM
submission. The more CCMD advocacy a project has, the more likelihood
the project has of receiving Service funding.
medical readiness in the indo-pacific
12. Senator Duckworth. General Van Ovost, I recently announced a
proposal that I am pushing to include in the Fiscal Year 2025 National
Defense Authorization Act. The proposal would improve the Department of
Defense's medical readiness in the Indo-Pacific. TRANSCOM is the
Department of Defense's single manager for patient movement. How can
working with our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific to gain access
to foreign medical facilities provide life-saving care during a
conflict for servicemembers needing to be medically evacuated?
General Van Ovost. [Deleted.]
ukraine security assistance
13. Senator Duckworth. General Van Ovost and General Cavoli,
TRANSCOM's vital contribution to national security is evident in the
command's ongoing support to Ukraine and EUCOM's efforts in support of
our NATO allies. The ability to rapidly deliver security assistance to
Ukraine is crucial to Ukraine's effort to defend itself against
unprovoked Russian aggression. I will continue to reiterate the
importance of additional U.S. support for Ukraine and emphasize that
supporting our Ukrainian partner does not only help them but is in
American's own national security and strengthens the U.S. defense
industrial base. As Russia has demonstrated in their invasion of
Ukraine, failing to maintain sound logistics and maintenance systems
can easily lead to consequential strategic failures. What lessons in
logistics have we learned from Russia's failures and how can we avoid
repeating them?
General Van Ovost. At the strategic level, Russia made three major
mistakes that we can learn from. The first was to assume it could
accomplish its goals regarding Ukraine in a few days. Russia allocated
resources to its ``special military operation'' accordingly, which left
its forces grossly under-resourced when success was not achieved as
anticipated. To compensate, Russia had to convert its economy for
wartime production and has made gains on the battlefield because of it,
especially when U.S. military aid to Ukraine temporarily decreased. The
lesson we take from this situation is the same that the Russians have
learned the hard way: Production, sustainment, and logistics
capabilities must be set up and executed in a way that provides
advantages even when situations and outcomes do not occur as
anticipated. Congress must pay careful attention to the balance of
economic and industrial power between the U.S. and any potential
adversaries to ensure the U.S. does not fall short.
Second, Russia failed to isolate Ukraine politically, or secure
strong support from its own allies or partners before attacking
Ukraine. While Russian allies like China, North Korea, and Iran have
provided economic support in evading sanctions, Russia finds itself
increasingly reliant on them for materiel support as the war goes on.
The United States must maintain and enhance our relationships,
strategic alignment, and supporting agreements with allies and partners
that enable and ensure crucial access to key nodes, infrastructure, and
transportation in crisis or conflict. Our ability to project power will
depend on our allies and partners.
Third, Russia failed to set conditions for its logistical flow,
which allowed Ukraine to intercept and disrupt Russia's logistics flow
and commandeer Russian materiel especially in the early days of the
war. In the world of constant surveillance, drones, and precision
guided munitions, logistical lines need more protection and redundancy
than ever to be robust enough to support combat operations. Redundancy
of routes, modes, nodes, and the materiel itself is one of the most
effective ways to produce resiliency in a logistical system. Redundancy
is extremely effective, but it is often the opposite of efficiency and
is expensive.
General Cavoli. Russian failures highlight the necessity of a
logistics capability that is postured and ready to sustain prolonged
combat operations into and through a contested environment. This
includes a force structure that is organized, trained, equipped, and
ready to move, refuel, and rearm forces under fire, provide medical
care to wounded troops, and protect logistics forces, sustainment
networks, and lines of communication. We are reminded that modern war
is also a contest of industrial production, so it is vital that we have
forward-positioned stockpiles of equipment, munitions, and supplies,
backed by a robust and interoperable transatlantic defense industrial
base that can support the U.S. warfighter and our NATO Allies.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
commercial maritime capacity
14. Senator Kelly. General Van Ovost, being the only U.S. Merchant
Marine Academy graduate in Congress, I pay close attention to our
maritime strength. China is the world's largest shipbuilder and
controls the most merchant ships in the world with over 5,500 vessels.
There are just 80 merchant ships flying under the American flag in
international commerce. I am concerned that the size and status of the
U.S. merchant fleet is a danger to our national security. That's why I
am working to develop legislation to rebuild our commercial maritime
industry and U.S.-flagged international fleet. I know that there is an
acute need for more U.S.-flagged tankers, which is why Congress created
the Tanker Security Fleet program. Right now, there are 10 vessels in
the program--is that the right size for the program? What is the ideal
size of the program?
General Van Ovost. The Tanker Security Program (TSP) was
established to provide an active, commercially viable, militarily
useful fleet of privately owned U.S.-flag tanker vessels engaged in
international trade. This program ensures the Department of Defense's
assured access to U.S.-owned, U.S.--flagged, and U.S.-crewed commercial
product tankers. With the inception of the TSP, the Department gained
an expanded pool of U.S.-flagged tankers operating globally,
facilitating dependable and committed fuel transportation during times
of crisis.
However, a gap remains between the capacity that the U.S.-flagged
tanker fleet can bring to bear, and the capacity required in our most
strenuous plans. The size of the U.S.-flagged tanker fleet is
inadequate to meet domestic requirements and concurrently and
unilaterally respond to needs in a contingency. The issue is especially
acute for intra-theater tankers necessary to operate in shallow waters.
A larger and more diverse fleet will help mitigate the risks associated
with over-reliance on foreign-flagged vessels and improve our ability
to mobilize strategic resources in times of crisis. USTRANSCOM outlined
the issues and residual risks in the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA Fuel Tanker
Study delivered to Congress in June 2021.
15. Senator Kelly. General Van Ovost, what is your assessment of
the Maritime Security Program?
General Van Ovost. The Maritime Security Program (MSP) provides a
fleet of active, commercially viable, militarily useful, privately
owned vessels to help meet national defense and other security
requirements. MSP is a critical component of our strategic sealift
portfolio, enabling the command to project and sustain forces globally.
MSP is fully subscribed at 60 dry cargo ships including 20 Roll-On/
Roll-Off ships, 34 Container ships, and 6 multipurpose ships. The
current U.S.-flagged commercial fleet, and in particular the Voluntary
Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), which includes MSP vessels, , when
combined with the capacity of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), has
sufficient capacity to meet initial sealift requirements to project
forces into the Indo-Pacific.
16. Senator Kelly. General Van Ovost, are there programmatic
changes which Congress could consider to make the program more
attractive--such as raising the annual payment or increasing the number
of vessels enrolled?
General Van Ovost. The Maritime Administration, as the
administrator of the Maritime Security Program, is better postured to
suggest programmatic changes. However, a robust, healthy U.S.-flagged
fleet that attracts a strong mariner workforce will always rely on
sufficient cargo opportunities. We support initiatives to expand
Government-impelled and commercial cargo opportunities for participants
in the MSP as well as other sealift programs (i.e., the Voluntary
Intermodal Sealift Agreement, Voluntary Tanker Agreement, and the
Tanker Security Programs).
17. Senator Kelly. General Van Ovost, one of the biggest challenges
U.S.-flagged carriers face is a lack of demand. If we required more
government cargo to sail on U.S.-flagged vessels or gave tax breaks to
retailers for shipping cargo on U.S.-flagged vessels, what benefits
could that provide to our strategic sea lift capabilities?
General Van Ovost. We support a robust and resilient U.S.-flag
fleet, and cargo preference laws such as the Military Cargo Preference
Act of 1904 and the Cargo Preference Act of 1954. Any measures Congress
can take to ensure a steady flow of cargo for American merchant vessels
will help sustain our maritime industry, preserve vital jobs for
American mariners, and maintain a strong and capable fleet for national
defense. This approach not only supports economic growth by securing
domestic shipping routes but also bolsters our global military reach
and operational readiness, allowing us to rapidly deploy and sustain
our forces anywhere in the world. This strategy aligns with my belief
in the critical role of the U.S.-flagged Merchant Marine fleet as part
of our national defense strategy and our unwavering commitment to
safeguarding our national interests.
18. Senator Kelly. General Van Ovost, one big challenge the
maritime sector faces is a workforce shortage. How would you
characterize the risk of an insufficient number of American mariners?
General Van Ovost. The Department of Defense's ability to project
military forces is inextricably linked to the commercial industry and
we rely on the Maritime Administration (MARAD) to evaluate the
sufficiency of the mariner pool to support operations. For major
contingencies, we rely on the same pool of commercial merchant mariners
to provide commercial sealift capacity through the Voluntary Intermodal
Sealift Agreement and simultaneously man and activate the Maritime
Administration's Ready Reserve Force (RRF).
Past assessments indicated sufficient mariners to activate the RRF
and operate both fleets, but prolonged concurrent operations
necessitating crew rotations would cause mariner deficits. MARAD is
currently administering the congressionally mandated Mariner Workforce
Working Group to reevaluate mariner sufficiency and operational risk
and we look forward to the results.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
u.s. manufactured drones
19. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, the Wall Street Journal ran
an article on April 10, 2024 called, ``How American Drones Failed to
Turn the Tide in Ukraine.'' The article highlighted how badly U.S.
industry lags Chinese drone manufacturers. Is your staff receiving
lessons learned from Ukraine that are being passed back to the
Department of Defense to improve unmanned systems like those being
produced under the Replicator Initiative?
General Cavoli. Yes, USEUCOM continually collects observations and
lessons learned related to the employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems
in Ukraine through both classified and unclassified channels. These
observations and lessons learned are documented and shared with
Department of Defense (DoD) agencies through official channels
including the Joint Lessons Learned Information System and Office of
the Secretary of Defense for Policy meetings. In addition to official
channels, there are direct channels for USEUCOM to share these lessons
with entities such as the National Ground Intelligence Center, Naval
Postgraduate School, and others.
20. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, another reason that Ukraine
has turned to Chinese components for drones they domestically
manufacture is because China has the raw materials needed to create
those components. Many of those raw materials are also available in the
United States, but blocked by regulatory restrictions put in place by
this Administration. Would you support exceptions to U.S. environmental
and land use laws for defense production to access strategic and
critical minerals domestically?
General Cavoli. As the USEUCOM Commander, my responses are limited
to matters within my scope of authority. I am not able to provide
information regarding exceptions to U.S. environmental and land use
laws related to defense production and access to strategic and critical
minerals. For such inquiries, I recommend reaching out to the relevant
U.S. Government authorities or agencies that handle these matters.
artillery in ukraine
21. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, the US and NATO allies have
transferred a variety of self-propelled and towed 155mm howitzers to
Ukraine. Based on your observations and feedback from Ukraine, which
systems are the most effective?
General Cavoli. Based on observations and feedback from the Ukraine
Armed Forces, the most effective 155mm howitzers transferred by the
U.S. and NATO Allies include the M777, the M109, and the FH-77 Archer.
22. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, are the Ukrainians employing
self-propelled and towed howitzers differently in this conflict?
General Cavoli. Yes, the M777 Howitzer is being employed for long-
range and high-precision effects, while the M109 Howitzer is being
employed when superior mobility and protection are required. The FH-77
Archer, a self-propelled howitzer, provides a different option when a
prime mover (heavy transport vehicle) is unavailable to reposition
M777s. It's ability to ``shoot-and-scoot'' make it ideal in situations
that demand tactical movement and maneuver flexibility and an automated
high rate of fire during rapid engagement scenarios, counter-battery
fire, and precision strikes.
large scale global exercise 2024
23. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, what lessons related to
operating equipment and weapons systems in the high north have been
identified from Arctic Shock, BALTOPS, and Nordic Response?
General Cavoli. The lessons learned from exercises like Arctic
Shock, BALTOPS, and Nordic Response are crucial for understanding the
challenges and best practices for maneuvering units and equipment and
employing weapons systems in the high north. The extreme cold
undermines equipment reliability, making frequent maintenance checks
and regular servicing essential to prevent failures. The remote and
harsh environment presents new challenges for transporting and
resupplying personnel and equipment, underscoring the need for all-
season mobility. It also creates challenges for the employment of
aviation assets due to constantly shifting terrain related to the
accumulation of snow, melting ice, etc. The Arctic's mobility
challenges, in particular, present opportunities for developing new
vehicles designed for snow and ice, as well as enhancing capabilities
for communication, navigation, search and rescue, targeting, and
commanding and controlling operations. Importantly, while NATO Allies
like Norway have sufficient over-the-snow transportation capabilities
for self-preservation, there is a pressing need to develop similar
organic United States military capabilities to improve mobility across
all seasons in order to effectively compete with and deter Russia and
the PRC in the diverse environment of the high north.
24. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, what lessons related to cold
weather training and resourcing were identified from Arctic Shock,
BALTOPS, and Nordic Response?
General Cavoli. The recent accession of Sweden and Finland into
NATO, which expanded NATO's Western Flank into the European high north,
reinforced the need to assess forward posture and training
requirements. For resourcing, deployed Marine Corps forces utilized
pre-positioned equipment from both Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-
Norway and Maritime Prepositioned Ships to support rapid deployment.
Use of this equipment with Arctic specifications highlighted the need
for forward postured equipment sets and a review of the capabilities
and quantities required. Regarding training, cold-weather operations
demand specialized training for personnel, including survival skills,
managing cold-weather gear, and mitigating health risks such as
frostbite and hypothermia. Furthermore, NATO's Cold Weather Winter
Instructor Course serves as a force multiplier to USEUCOM service
components, supporting USEUCOM's ability to operate in high north
conditions.
integrated deterrence
25. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, do you assess the NATO &
EUCOM posture as sufficiently strong to deter further Russian
aggression elsewhere in the region, regardless of outcome in Ukraine?
General Cavoli. The recent accession of Finland and Sweden into
NATO, along with the approval of NATO's regional plans, has reshaped
the theater's geography and posture requirements. Consequently,
USEUCOM, in collaboration with our NATO Allies, continually reassesses
and refines the placement of forces with the right capabilities in
strategic positions to deter further Russian aggression. Adapting
theater posture to meet this challenge is an ongoing process that
requires NATO and USEUCOM to creatively align resources and strategies
and share information. Expanding our intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), ground maneuver, long-range fires, and protection
capabilities through a long-term investment strategy will help guide
NATO and USEUCOM's force posture in the right direction. Additionally,
energizing the Euro-Atlantic defense industrial base and modernizing
platforms--such as the Army's Long Range Fires Battalion and advanced
5th generation fighter squadrons--are essential to meeting evolving
requirements.
26. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, some have argued that
deterrence is divisible; meaning, the United States can lessen or stop
support for Ukraine, but still send a strong signal that we will stand
with Taiwan should the PRC invade. Do you assess that our adversaries
view deterrence as divisible?
General Cavoli. No, deterrence is not divisible. Russia's ongoing
aggression in Ukraine poses a direct threat to the peace and stability
of the Euro-Atlantic area. Meanwhile, the PRC's hostility toward Taiwan
threatens peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. It is increasingly
clear that the United States does not have the luxury of sequential
threats, requiring the DOD to simultaneously deter both Russia and the
PRC. The U.S. strategy to bolster deterrence in the European and Indo-
Pacific theaters is grounded in our global priorities to constrain
Russia and out compete the PRC. As global competitors, Russia and the
PRC are very attentive to changes in U.S. defense policy and military
activities. With respect to supporting Ukraine, the U.S. and our NATO
Allies are providing significant and much needed support, with the
overall contribution by our European Allies and partners exceeding that
of the United States. Reducing U.S. support to Ukraine--while our NATO
Allies and European partners lack the capacity to offset the
difference--would undermine deterrence, diminish our global image, and
signal to our adversaries that military force is a viable option to
counter U.S. interests. If Russia succeeds in Ukraine due to a lack of
Western resolve, the PRC may view it as an opportunity to act against
Taiwan.
27. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, what shortfalls need to be
addressed to posture NATO to deter Russian aggression?
General Cavoli. NATO is a defensive Alliance. In order to deter,
deny, and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression, it is imperative
for the NATO Alliance to generate the military capabilities and
capacity necessary for collective defense of the Euro-Atlantic area.
Increases in defense spending, coupled with the Allies' unprecedented
commitment to military modernization, present a near-term strategic
opportunity to modernize NATO's collective defense systems for the long
term. More specifically, Allied investments in logistics and
sustainment, command and control, integrated air and missile defense,
maneuver forces, fighter aircraft, undersea warfare, electronic
warfare, and cyber and space--as well as intelligence, surveillance,
target acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities--will improve the
executability of NATO's regional plans, thus deterring adversaries and
assuring Allies and partners. However, realizing this ambitious
modernization agenda will take time, even for our most capable Allies.
As such, the Euro-Atlantic defense industrial base, as well our U.S.
foreign military sales programs, must increase production capacity and
streamline processes to deliver systems and munitions to our Allies and
partners in a timely manner. Forward positioning the right forces, with
the right capabilities, in the right locations--such as the Eastern
Flank--is another important element of NATO's defense plans.
army multi-domain task force
28. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, how have Army's Multi-Domain
Task Forces supported your operations in EUCOM?
General Cavoli. The U.S. Army's Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs)
have significantly supported operations within USEUCOM by enhancing the
integration of land, cyber, space, air, and maritime capabilities to
address complex security challenges. Specifically, the 2d MDTF,
activated in Wiesbaden, Germany, plays a crucial role in synchronizing
precision effects in support of USEUCOM and U.S. Africa Command
objectives. The MDTFs provide USEUCOM with advanced capabilities
including intelligence, cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and
space operations, enabling USEUCOM to enhance deterrence, shape the
security environment, and prevail in large-scale combat operations.
These capabilities are designed to penetrate adversary anti-access/area
denial environments, which are essential in countering sophisticated
threats posed by adversaries such as Russia.
marine corps
29. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, how has the Marine Corps
supported EUCOM operations since Russia renewed its invasion of Ukraine
in 2022?
General Cavoli. The Marine Corps supports the Security Assistance
Group--Ukraine with 55 marines, conducts limited duration Ukrainian
Special Forces training events, and provides military equipment and
resources through Presidential Drawdown Authority. Eleven Marines
partnered with British and Dutch Marines for forty-five days to provide
reconnaissance, medical, and infantry training to Ukrainian soldiers in
the Netherlands. Beginning in September 2024, the Marine Corps will
provide a small contingent of Marines in support of a Maritime Regional
Training Hub in Braila, Romania. The Program of Instruction will train
Ukrainian Marines on individual skills and platoon and company
collective skills, to include day and night amphibious operations
training.
black sea access
30. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, a potential next area of
conflict if Russian aggression isn't effectively deterred is in the
Black Sea region. Turkey, a NATO member, controls access to the Black
Sea for warships. Would U.S. or non-Black Sea State unmanned surface
vessels be allowed access given the Montreaux Convention restrictions?
General Cavoli. The application of the Montreux Convention to
unmanned surface vessels is unclear. Whether such vessels are
considered warships is an unsettled area of the law, and the analysis
would likely depend on the specific characteristics of the vessel
(e.g., displacement, armaments, and navigational capabilities).
Further, it is not clear whether Turkiye would continue to restrict
U.S. and NATO access to the Black Sea through the strait following
further Russian aggression in the region. Regardless, unmanned surface
vessels shipped to the region via other air, land, or surface routes
could potentially be introduced to the Black Sea through the territory
of other Allies and partners.
31. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli and General Van Ovost, have
you explored land-based transportation routes by rail or road to get
materials to the eastern side of the Black Sea should the maritime
routes be closed to military cargo?
General Cavoli. Yes, USEUCOM's relationships with NATO Allies are
fundamental in building resilient lines of communications, to include
ground transportation routes that support engagements with partners on
the eastern side of the Black Sea. In the past, military cargo has been
successfully moved via Turkiye's ports and ground lines of
communication in support of U.S. and NATO activities.
General Van Ovost. USTRANSCOM is responsible for ensuring strategic
connection to Intra-theater distribution networks and is aligned with
EUCOM on expanding maritime access, synchronizing on major movements
now through fiscal year 2025. The dynamic nature of contested logistics
demands this forward thinking and flexibility. Additionally, we have
commercial contracts that provide multi-modal and land-based services
which reach through the eastern part of Turkey, and a long history with
partners in Georgia and Azerbaijan. We remain nested with EUCOM as they
continue to develop more expansive Lines of Communication with in their
AOR, and as the supporting Command, we stand ready to support USEUCOM's
land distribution network initiatives and provide EUCOM with movement
solutions that best fit their needs.
contested logistics
32. Senator Sullivan. General Van Ovost, how much does TRANSCOM
rely on commercial companies to move military supplies and equipment by
air?
General Van Ovost. By air, for fiscal year 2023, 57 percent of
shipments (41 percent by weight) were moved by our commercial partners.
33. Senator Sullivan. General Van Ovost, how much does TRANSCOM
rely on commercial companies to move military supplies and equipment by
sea?
General Van Ovost. By sea, for fiscal year 2023, 97 percent of
shipments (also 97 percent by weight) were moved by our commercial
partners.
34. Senator Sullivan. General Van Ovost, the increased use of long
range sea-based drones and long range aerial drones to attack merchant
ships underscores the susceptibility to the Ready Reserve Fleet's lack
of self-defenses. There are likely to be insufficient amounts of naval
vessels to provide escort protection in the event of a large scale
conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Has TRANSCOM explored bolt-on/carry-on
self-defense options to protect military cargo while it is transported
on the high-seas?
General Van Ovost. USTRANSCOM has not explored bolt-on/carry-on
self-defense options to protect military cargo while it is transported
by merchant ships on the high-seas. However, U.S. FLEET FORCES is
leading an Asymmetric Warfare Team currently studying (1) options that
can be employed to address Urgent Operational Needs Statement (UONS)
timelines in the next 18 months, and (2) options that could constitute
a more comprehensive solution within the FYDP or possibly out to
FYDP+2. While there have been great strides in capabilities to counter
long-range sea-based drones and long-range aerial drones, they all
require queuing from an air search radar system. There are currently no
bolt-on air search capabilities being reviewed that would enable
merchant ships to employ anti-aerial drone weapons. NAVTRANS is linked
into this study and has expressed the desire for it to review a
complete self-defense system for the defense of merchant-like vessels.
MSC ships are naval auxiliaries and may be armed without legal
issue, although it has been policy to only arm such ships with
defensive weapons when they are crewed by civil service mariners.
Vessels of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) are considered public vessels
and may be armed under the authority in 10 U.S.C. Section 261, when so
ordered by the President. All commercial merchant vessels have an
inherent right of self-defense and may use weapons for that purpose,
despite being private vessels. By tradition, the weapons are general
small arms only.
35. Senator Sullivan. General Van Ovost, what lessons have we
learned by proxy from the Russian-Ukraine conflict with transporting
equipment by rail in a contested environment?
General Van Ovost. The logistics lessons from the Russian-Ukraine
conflict are not new and highlight again the necessity of examining
logistics in detail. Rail is an effective means of transporting
material in bulk, but less adaptive to barriers that are presented in a
contested environment. Over the past year, we rapidly moved rail
shipments throughout the United States in support of the war in
Ukraine, consisting of more than 2,559 containers and 640 rail cars.
USTRANSCOM did not oversee the rail transport in the European theater
and defers to USEUCOM (specifically the 21st Theater Sustainment
Command) for lessons learned from that portion of the transport.
Rail remains a strategic multiplier in theater for Geographic
Combatant Command (GCC) Lines of Communication (LOCs) by moving more
volume to staging locations for final onward movement by truck or
convoy. Utilization of rail in the USEUCOM theater has been inhibited
by lack of dedicated capacity to plan and manage rail operations. The
U.S. Army Expeditionary Rail Center (ERC) was developed specifically
with that mission in mind. Members of the ERC would deploy to support
GCC LOCs by acting as the coordinator with the local Host Nation (HN)
rail carriers to ensure rapid movement of logistics by rail in theater.
Barriers in a contested environment would not physically impact rail
movement except for actual destruction of rail networks. Barriers would
likely be overcome through coordination with the HN throughout the
theater to ensure delays were minimized or eliminated through
agreements and thorough understanding of DOD Foreign Clearance Guide
and HN customs clearance requirements. Rail capacity in theater remains
vital to supporting LOCs and providing the rapid movement of bulk
materials and heavy equipment to support GCCs and partner nations.
status of the maritime administration's ready reserve fleet
36. Senator Sullivan. General Van Ovost, the Pentagon's sealift
plan for conflict currently relies on mobilizing the roughly 50 Ready
Reserve Fleat ships to get our forces and equipment to the fight. The
average age of the ships of the Ready Reserve Force--which make up the
bulk of the military sealift fleet--is 45 years old. Seventeen of the
ships are 50 years or older. Sealift vessels under the Military Sealift
Command face similar issues. Can you describe in detail the twin risks
of a sealift fleet that is both too small and too old?
General Van Ovost. Fleet sufficiency can be viewed from both a
capacity and a operational readiness standpoint. The current combined
commercial (VISA/MSP) and organic (RRF) fleets have sufficient capacity
to meet initial sealift requirements to project forces. However, the
RRF is experiencing significant operational readiness issues due to the
age of the fleet. The strategy for improving strategic readiness is
recapitalization of the fleet through the purchase of newer, less-
expensive-to-maintain, vessels into the RRF.
The current recapitalization strategy is supported with funding in
the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) to buy and convert two vessels
per year, while executing the current planned retirement schedule.
While the congressional support is encouraging, at the current rate of
retirements, purchasing two ships per year does not maintain our
required capacity. We also remain constrained by law to a total of nine
used ship purchases (10 U.S.C. Sec. 2218), a limit we expect to reach
in fiscal year 2025, contingent on available appropriations, after
which time no additional purchases are authorized.
37. Senator Sullivan. General Van Ovost, have you been able to
address the aging and small Ready Reserve Fleet by acquiring used ships
that, while not new, are younger than those they replace?
General Van Ovost. The Navy and the Maritime Administration (MARAD)
are executing the strategy to recapitalize the Ready Reserve Force
(RRF) by acquiring newer used ships from the commercial market and
retiring older ships from the force. MARAD acquired two (2) used ships
in 2022 and three (3) additional ships in 2023, for a total of five (5)
of the nine (9) ships authorized by Congress in 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2218.
MARAD is currently seeking additional ships for purchase using funding
from previous fiscal years, and they expect to reach the congressional
limit in Fiscal Year 2025. We must continue to add younger ships to the
RRF as planned retirements will remove 27 ships in the next eight (8)
years.
jones act
38. Senator Sullivan. General Van Ovost, The Jones Act was intended
to preserve a robust domestic shipbuilding base but that has simply not
occurred. The number of oceangoing ships of at least 1,000 gross tons
that transport cargo and meet Jones Act requirements has declined from
193 to 99 since 2000 and only 78 of those 99 can be deemed militarily
useful. One of the main causes of that decline is the domestic'build
requirement of the Jones Act, which prohibits U.S. shippers from
operating vessels constructed abroad. American'built coastal and feeder
ships cost between $190 and $250 million, whereas the cost to build a
similar vessel in a foreign shipyard is about $30 million. Accordingly,
U.S. shippers buy fewer ships, U.S. shipyards build fewer ships, and
merchant mariners have fewer employment opportunities to serve as crew
on those nonexistent ships. Facing exorbitant replacement costs, ship
owners are compelled to squeeze as much life as possible out of their
existing vessels. That means the Jones Act fleet is not only shrinking,
but rapidly aging. The atrophied State of U.S. commercial shipyards
indicates there is no domestic capacity to immediately recapitalize the
Ready Reserve and Military Sealift Command Fleets. Do any of our
partners and Allies have the capacity to immediately produce new ships
for these fleets?
General Van Ovost. Allies such as South Korea and Japan build ships
with features that are militarily useful to Department of Defense
operations. Additionally, a large number of ships participating in the
Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) and the Maritime Security
Program (MSP) were built in these two countries.
However, regarding the Ready Reserve Force, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2218(f)
prohibits purchase of new vessels built in foreign shipyards and only
allows a limited number (currently nine (9)) of used vessels to be
purchased with funds in the National Defense Sealift Fund unless
specifically authorized by law.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
special operations forces (eucom)
39. Senator Budd. General Cavoli, can you please explain the value
of Special Operations Forces in your area of responsibility?
General Cavoli. Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a critical
role in enhancing deterrence across Europe. SOF maintain a continuous
and strategic presence throughout the region, providing invaluable
capabilities and flexibility. Special Operations Command Europe
(SOCEUR) is at the forefront of this effort, actively training
Ukrainian SOF to strengthen their defensive capabilities and supporting
joint operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. SOCEUR, in collaboration
with NATO Special Operations Forces Command, is not only leveraging
lessons learned from the conflict in Ukraine but also enhancing
interoperability between U.S. and NATO forces. This cooperative
approach significantly amplifies our collective operational footprint
and capability. By integrating these advanced SOF capabilities, we
effectively bolster our deterrence posture, ensuring a robust response
to potential hybrid threats and demonstrating a united and resilient
defensive stance throughout the USEUCOM area of responsibility. These
examples illustrate how SOF's specialized capabilities and their
integration with conventional U.S. and allied forces contribute
significantly to regional stability and deterrence.
40. Senator Budd. General Cavoli, what impacts, if any, do you
expect to theater operations given planned force structure and
personnel cuts to Army Special Operations Forces?
General Cavoli. The planned force structure and personnel cuts to
Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) are expected to have several
significant impacts on theater operations, to include: 1) Placing
strain on operational capacity and resources; 2) Reducing the capacity
of major force program enablers; 3) Impacting strategic deterrence
through decreased capacity to execute high-profile training and
advisory missions that deter adversaries, project power, and strengthen
allied integration; 4) Disrupting established Allied integration
exercises; and 5) Potentially degrading flexibility and rapid response
to hybrid or emerging threats without robust program enablers and
sufficient end strength. Careful planning and resource management will
be essential to mitigate these risks in order to maintain effective
theater operations.
41. Senator Budd. General Cavoli, have you or your command been
consulted on the assessment of optimal force structure for special
operations forces required by section 1075 of the Fiscal Year 2024
National Defense Authorization Act?
General Cavoli. U.S. Special Operations Command, alongside partners
at Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations/Low
intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), led the working group to produce the 1075
report, which currently is under review with SO/LIC, OSD, and the Joint
Staff. Upon completion of that review, USEUCOM, along with the other
Combatant Commands, anticipate an opportunity to review and provide
feedback on the report. USEUCOM does continuously register special
operations forces requirements through Global Force Management
processes and procedures.
fighter aircraft (eucom)
42. Senator Budd. General Cavoli, do you consider the F-15E Strike
Eagle to be a capable aircraft and are there particular characteristics
that make it ideal for your area of responsibility?
General Cavoli. Yes, the Strike Eagle is a very capable aircraft
ideally suited for the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). The F-15E,
its aircrew, and maintainers continue to generate a proven on-call,
all-weather, combat power capability. The F-15E has the largest weapons
payload capacity of any assigned U.S. fighter aircraft in the European
theater. Additionally, the two USEUCOM assigned F-15E squadrons
represent 830 percent of the total U.S. fighter force relied upon
daily, not only across Europe, but able to range quick action
contingency responses in U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command
areas of responsibility. Last, the aircraft will continue to hold Dual
Capable Aircraft certification to perform nuclear surety missions.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2024
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
AIR FORCE POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., in room
216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed (Chairman
of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin, Rosen, Kelly,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott,
Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me bring the hearing to order. For my
colleagues' awareness, we intend to conclude today's hearing by
12 noon due to possible floor proceedings, and also the
possibility that any one of our colleagues may object to
proceeding past 12 noon.
So, this will require us ending the open session at--by 11
a.m. and then moving immediately to a closed session at SVC-
217. I ask that Members strictly adhere to the 5-minute
timeline, and I will have my gavel to remind people. In that
spirit, I will submit my opening statement for the record.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would submit my
statement for the record as well.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Fischer. Let me
recognize Secretary Kendall. Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANK KENDALL III, SECRETARY OF THE
AIR FORCE
Secretary Kendall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Reed,
Senator Fischer, Members of the Committee, General Saltzman,
General Allvin, and I thank you for the opportunity to testify
today on the Department of the Air Force's fiscal year 2025
budget submission.
The Department of the Air Force budget request supports the
National Defense Strategy. We appreciate the Committee's
support for the recently enacted fiscal year 2024 budget and
your efforts to secure timely passage. As you are aware, the 6-
month delay has had a real impact.
That time cannot be recovered, but at least we can now move
forward with our urgent modernization priorities. As I have
testified before this Committee repeatedly, time is my greatest
concern.
We are in a race for military technological superiority
with a capable pacing challenge. Our cushion is gone. We are
out of time. As we have briefed the Committee on the classified
level, the pacing threat moves steadily forward. I appreciate
the opportunity to have a classified session today, Mr.
Chairman, as well.
Continued failure to provide on time authorities or
appropriations will leave the Air Force and Space Force
inadequately prepared. We know the Committee recognizes this,
and we appreciate your strong bipartisan support.
Our fiscal year 2025 budget request complies with the
Fiscal Responsibility Act. We are requesting $217.5 billion for
the Department of the Air Force, which includes $188 billion
for the Air Force and $29.4 billion for the Space Force.
The fiscal year 2025 budget reflects an increase of about
1.5 percent over the enacted fiscal year 2024 budget and does
not keep pace with inflation, or with the 7 percent publicly
acknowledged growth of China's military budget.
To stay within the levels of the FRA, the Department of the
Air Force had to adjust our previous plans. The 2025 budget
request seeks to preserve the momentum behind our modernization
efforts, particularly the work on operational imperatives that
we initiated, and that this Committee supported in fiscal year
2024.
In order to preserve modernization, we have marginally
reduced procurement and we have sustained our foundational
accounts at levels we deemed acceptable but no more. Because
the Space Force budget is dominated by research and development
accounts, we have had to marginally reduce the pace and scope
of our Space Force modernization programs.
Our first priority in the National Defense Strategy remains
differential Homeland, which the Department of the Air Force
primarily supports through investments in domain awareness, air
and space defense, early warning, and cyberspace defense
programs. Our second National Defense Strategy priority is to
deter strategic attack against the United States, our allies,
and our partners.
The Department of the Air Force's 2025 budget request
prioritizes nuclear modernization to maintain a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear deterrent. Notably, the Sentinel ICBM
program has experienced unacceptable cost and schedule
increases and is currently undergoing a Nunn-McCurdy review.
The Department Air Force will work closely with the
Committee as that review reaches its conclusions. The third
National Defense Strategy priority is to deter aggression and
be prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary.
The Department of the Air Force needs immediate and
significant capability and modernization to keep pace with the
growing military capabilities of the PRC. The Department of the
Air Force operational imperatives and the closely related
cross-cutting operational enablers continue to guide our
modernization program.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request includes $6.1 billion
for these efforts. Finally, the fourth National Defense
Strategy priority is to build a resilient Joint Force and
enduring advantages.
This budget request invests to ensure that we can recruit
and retain the force we need, so that our airmen and guardians,
and their families, have the quality of life they deserve and
can serve to their full potential.
As we have briefed the Committee, the Department of the Air
Force is also currently undertaking a department wide effort to
re-optimize to meet the needs of great power competition.
The intent is to minimize both cost impacts and personnel
or unit movement. We will work closely with the Committee as we
develop detailed plans. We do not anticipate any significant
impact on the fiscal year 2025 budget, and we have not
requested funds for this purpose.
The DAF also appreciates the Committee's support for the
DOD Quick Start Initiative that was enacted last year. The
Department of the Air Force has obtained approval from the
Secretary of Defense for two programs that will be initiated
under this new authority.
They are, a more resilient national GPS position and
navigation and timing capability, and C-3 battle management for
moving target indication. Time matters, but so do resources.
The United States is facing a competitor with national
purchasing power that exceeds our own, a challenge we have
never faced in modern times.
China is actively developing and expanding capabilities to
challenge strategic stability, attack our critical space
systems, and defeat our ability to project power, especially
airpower. Conflict is not inevitable, but it could happen at
any time.
General Allvin and I just returned from a trip to some of
our key bases in the Indo-Pacific. We should all be very proud
of our men and women serving in harm's way and doing everything
they can to deter and to be ready for a conflict unlike any we
have seen before.
The Department of Air Force's fiscal year 2025 budget
request is focused on addressing these realities. We commit to
working with the Committee to secure timely enactment of this
budget request. Thank you. We look forward to your questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. General
Allvin, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID W. ALLVIN, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE AIR FORCE
General Allvin. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Senator
Fischer, and distinguished Members of this Committee.
Today, I am proud to represent the 677,000 total force
airmen serving our Nation. I want to thank you for your
unyielding support, not only for those airmen, but for their
families as well. I would like to open by stating my immense
pride in the exemplary performance of our airmen this past
weekend.
As part of a joint coalition effort, they successfully
thwarted the massive air attack by Iran on Israel's home soil.
Their professionalism and skill turned a potentially
catastrophic event for Israel into a strategic defeat for Iran
and its proxies. As we look across the strategic landscape, we
find ourselves in a time of significant consequence.
The simultaneous demands of strategic competition with an
aggressive and increasingly capable PRC, and persistent acute
threats from around the globe, require the Air Force to
maximize the readiness of today's forces, while adapting our
structures and processes to offer the best opportunity to
prevail in an environment of enduring competition. Time is not
on our side.
The fiscal year 2025 Air Force budget request reflects
difficult choices. We have made tradeoffs to keep the Air
Force's operational readiness today at the minimum acceptable
to meet the Nation's demands, while seeking to preserve the
previous years' advances in modernization.
The Air Force budget request also invests in the Air
Force's most precious asset, its airmen, to ensure they remain
the decisive advantage upon which the Nation defends. Strategic
deterrence is a key priority in our National Defense Strategy,
and the United States Air Force remains committed to the
recapitalization of our nuclear force.
We are actively supporting the process triggered by the
Nunn-McCurdy breach of the Sentinel program and will continue
to pursue the path of a safe, secure, reliable, and effective
ground lake of the nuclear triad well into the future.
Our ability to support the National Defense Strategy
priority of deterring aggression and prevailing in conflict
demands a modern Air Force that is connected to the Joint Force
and can close multiple kill chains in minimal time to control
the tempo of a complex fight with a competitor.
To that end, the fiscal year 2025 budget proposes continued
investments in the F-35 and F-15EX, albeit with fewer than
preferred quantities dictated by the constraints of the Fiscal
Responsibility Act.
We remain committed to the Advanced Battle Management
System, C3 Battle Management, and to the NGAD family of
systems, particularly collaborative combat aircraft, which will
allow the Air Force to deliver the affordable mass required to
be effective against a very capable PRC.
We are also committed to building forward based resiliency
enough to enable continued sortie generation even while under
attack. To arrest the decline in our readiness, we have
proposed modest increase investment in flying hours and the
weapon system sustainment funding to support them, while
prioritizing investments in critical, physical, and cyber
infrastructure.
Our airmen are and will always be the deciding factor in
any conflict our Air Force faces, and we are committed to their
health, development, and quality of life. We have made
significant progress thanks to Congress's support to increase
basic pay, adjust the basic allowance for housing and
subsistence, to account for macroeconomic factors. There is
still work to be done.
During our recent trip to the Indo-Pacific, Secretary
Kendall and I saw dedicated airmen eager to accomplish the
mission despite infrastructure degradation caused by natural
disaster and persistent environmental challenges, as well as
limited access to the health care enjoyed by many CONUS spaces.
The job of your Air Force has not changed since its
inception, support and defend this Nation through credible
deterrence and unmatched combat prowess. To preserve that level
of deterrence, we must maintain our readiness today, modernize
our forces for tomorrow, and provide the absolute best support
for our airmen.
Success on any battlefield is a team effort. I want to
thank the Members of Congress and this Committee for your past
and continued support. Thank you, and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General. General Saltzman,
please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL B. CHANCE SALTZMAN, USSF, CHIEF OF SPACE
OPERATIONS
General Saltzman. Chairman Reed, Senator Fischer,
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for your
continued support and for the opportunity to testify on the
Space Force's posture for fiscal year 2025.
As the Space Force prepares to celebrate its fifth
birthday, we are wholly dedicated to the work of forging a
service purpose built for great power competition. Space has
never been more critical to the security of our Nation, and the
success or failure of the Joint Force depends heavily upon the
capabilities we present.
It is our responsibility to contest and control the domain,
to defend U.S. space capabilities, and to protect the Joint
Force from space enabled attack. Gaining and maintaining space
superiority is the purpose for which the Space Force was
established. With about 3 percent of the Department of
Defense's budget, the Space Force offers a tremendous value
proposition to the Nation.
Every dollar invested in space brings asymmetric returns,
but that means every dollar cut creates asymmetric risk.
Against a near peer adversary, space superiority is the
linchpin. Without it, we cannot deter conflict. Without it, we
cannot provide vital effects. Without it, we cannot protect the
Joint Force.
Until we have built the infrastructure to achieve space
superiority, the Space Force is a work in progress. The Space
Force's theory of success includes three parts, avoiding
operational surprise, denying the benefits of attack in space,
and conducting responsible counter space activities.
The Space Force budget request is designed to support the
National Defense Strategy by building, training, and equipping
the forces the Nation needs to perform each activity,
preserving freedom of action in space, while deterring and
denying adversarial objectives.
Avoiding operational surprise requires us to maintain an
accurate understanding of the space domain at all times. 8.3
percent of our budget is dedicated to the same. Operating
across disaggregated sensor frameworks, the Space Force
provides the maximum information possible to decisionmakers
from the tactical to the strategic level.
Denying the benefits of attack in space demands that we
make any attack against U.S. space capabilities impractical and
self-defeating. 43.4 percent of our budget is devoted to this
objective. Investing in resiliency for missile warning and
tracking, satellite communications, and precision navigation
and timing.
Hybrid architectures and proliferated constellations impose
a heavy cost on aggression. Finally, responsible counter space
activities describes the mechanism by which the Space Force
contests and controls the space domain. The fiscal year 2025
budget dedicates 24.7 percent of the Space Force's budget to
space superiority.
Within the constraints of the FRA, fiscal year 2025 Space
Force budget reflects hard choices to maintain legacy space
services and preserve current readiness, but it also slows the
fielding of a modernized force. Addressing these challenges
depends on guardians that are trained and ready to meet the
high tech demands of space operations.
For that reason, I would like to personally thank the
Committee for its support for the Space Force Personnel
Management Act. This will be a major force multiplier in the
Space Force's efforts to modernize the way we recruit, build,
and retain talent. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
Space Force's fiscal year 2025 budget and posture.
Even in the face of accelerating threats, the Space Force
remains the preeminent military space organization in the
world. With the support of this Committee, our guardians will
preserve and expand our strategic advantage, and we will step
up to meet the challenge of our facing threat.
So as long as you continue to trust and invest in your
space service, the Space Force will respond with unparalleled
value for the Nation. I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Kendall, General
Allvin a General Saltzman follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Frank Kendall, General B.
Chance Saltzman, and General David W. Allvin
overview
The President's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget request continues the
Department of the Air Force's (DAF) implementation of the 2022 National
Defense Strategy (NDS), while striking alignment with the 2023 Fiscal
Responsibility Act (FRA). The DAF remains focused on the Department of
Defense's mission to defend the U.S. Homeland, safeguard and advance
vital United States national security interests, and meet growing
threats to a stable and open international system, especially those
posed by our pacing challenge, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and
the Chinese Communist Party. In line with the priorities of the
Secretary of Defense, this budget request supports that mission and
invests in the people and teams that are our decisive advantage.
The DAF is currently undertaking a Department-wide effort to
optimize how we organize, train, and equip the Air Force and Space
Force to meet the PRC pacing challenge. These efforts are necessary for
us to remain competitive and are being undertaken with a strong sense
of urgency. They cannot, however, substitute for the resources the DAF
needs to execute its missions.
The total DAF budget request for fiscal year 2025 is $217.5 billion
which includes $188.1 billion for the Air Force and $29.4 billion for
the Space Force. This is an approximate 1.5 percent increase from the
DAF fiscal year 2024 enacted budget. The DAF had to implement some
difficult tradeoffs and take risk in certain areas to stay within the
funding levels provided under the FRA.
A forced reliance on funding through Continuing Resolutions has
already significantly hampered the DAF's ability to keep pace with
evolving threats by withholding authorization and appropriations to
initiate new programs of record or increase spending on existing
programs. Unfortunately, the time we have ceded cannot be recovered.
Timely and consistent authorizations and appropriations for defense
spending in line with this budget request are necessary to deter and,
if required, defeat threats to our national security. Continued failure
to provide on-time authority and appropriations will leave the Air
Force and Space Force inadequately prepared for the dramatic
geopolitical, technological, economic, and environmental challenges we
are facing. To keep pace with the threats in the changing strategic
landscape, we urge the Congress to enact this budget request without
delay.
Responding to Increasing Threats
The threats to our national security are dramatically increasing.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy identified the PRC as the only
country with the will and increasing capability to reshape the
international order. In 2023, the PRC increased its annual military
budget by approximately 7 percent with estimates showing it can support
continued defense spending growth for at least the next 5 to 10 years.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) already fields the largest
aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region. It has combined a growing
arsenal of long-range precision weapons with improving space-based
capabilities to expand the capability of its long range kill webs and
enable strikes against U.S. and Allied Forces, air bases, carriers, and
high-value airborne assets.
In addition to using space capabilities to target United States and
partner terrestrial forces, the PLA is rapidly increasing its fielded
suite of kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace capabilities. These
include antisatellite missiles, ``inspection and repair'' systems that
can grapple and disable satellites on orbit, laser weapons and jammers,
and reusable spaceplanes with a range of potential military uses.
The PRC is also advancing its electronic warfare and cyberspace
attack capabilities to threaten U.S. bases and capabilities in the
region and the United States Homeland. For example, the PRC has
targeted critical infrastructure in Guam that could be used to disrupt
United States air operations.
The PRC has also continued its rapid nuclear expansion, on track to
exceed previous projections, with more than 500 operational nuclear
warheads and a nascent nuclear triad. China is moving ahead of
expectations to field a nuclear arsenal comparable to that of the
United States. The PLA Rocket Force has at least 2,800 theater class
ballistic missiles and 350 international-range ballistic missiles,
including hypersonic missiles, highlighting its approach to diverse
potential nuclear-delivery systems. Many of these systems have dual-use
(conventional or nuclear) potential.
We must keep pace with the growing military capabilities of the PRC
while also managing the acute threat from Russia, deterring threats
from other regional actors, while remaining vigilant to potential
Violent Extremist Organization threats. Russia continues to place a
strong emphasis on modernizing strategic weapons that will allow it to
hold the United States Homeland at risk, particularly with hypersonic
and other next-generation weapons. Russia is developing and deploying a
range of counterspace systems including surface-launched, air-launched,
and orbital anti-satellite weapons, laser weapons, electronic warfare
systems, and cyber capabilities that can threaten military and dual-use
space assets. Both Iran and North Korea are also working to expand
their military capabilities.
In the midst of these growing threats, the capabilities of the
Department of the Air Force are integral to the four priorities of the
NDS: defending the Homeland; deterring strategic attacks against the
United States, our Allies, and our partners; deterring aggression and
being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary; and ensuring our
future military advantage by building a resilient joint force and
defense ecosystem. With budgetary pressure, the DAF budget request
balances short-term risks and readiness against the need to rapidly
modernize capabilities required to deter future threats and meet NDS
priorities.
Complying with FRA
The DAF's budget is aligned with the FRA. The global obligations
and enduring missions of the DAF have not changed. Our global
commitments have not changed. As a result, our force structure and
human capital structure remain roughly constant from fiscal year 2024.
The requirements to maintain adequate operational readiness, support
global deployments, and meet immediate mission requirements were met,
but funded to the highest level of risk considered acceptable. For
example, the so-called ``foundational accounts'' for Weapons Systems
Sustainment, Facilities, and Flying Hours were funded at the lowest
level considered acceptable in both the Air Force and the Space Force.
This practice can be tolerated in the short term under the constraints
of FRA.
With these ``current force'' related elements of the budget
allocated, investments in the ``future force'' were adjusted to manage
risk. The DAF budget request protects essential modernization,
especially the investments derived from our work on Operational
Imperatives and Cross-cutting Operational Enablers, and chose to
marginally reduce procurement of systems already in production in order
to sustain as much as possible the planned pace of research and
development funding for capabilities necessary to keep pace with
existing and imminent pacing threats. Procurement accounts were
adjusted downward in the Air Force from previously planned levels for
some key programs, including F-35 and F-15E/X. Procurement accounts
also decreased with fact-of-life delays in T-7 and E-7 production. The
fiscal year 2025 Air Force procurement account request is $29.0 billion
and the Space Force procurement account request is $4.3 billion. These
adjustments generally allowed research and development accounts to keep
pace with inflation. They did not permit the desired growth over time.
This is particularly true for the Space Force where transformational
modernization is needed urgently.
Meeting National Defense Strategy Priorities
Defense of the Homeland
Our first priority remains defense of the Homeland. The DAF
supports this priority through investments in domain awareness, air and
space defense, early warning that increases strategic deterrence and
enables defense of critical infrastructure, and cyberspace defense
programs. These investments are closely tied with the DAF Arctic
Strategy and position the DAF to support implementation of the 2023
Homeland Defense Policy Guidance.
Deterring Strategic Attacks
Our second priority is to deter strategic attacks against the
United States, our Allies, and our partners. The DAF provides two legs
of the Nuclear Triad and 75 percent of Nuclear Command, Control, and
Communications (NC3). The DAF's full-scope nuclear modernization
program recapitalizes all current systems and supporting infrastructure
to deliver modern and credible deterrence capabilities, which are
essential in today's increasingly uncertain international environment.
Decades of deferring modernization of cold war-era systems, combined
with adversary nuclear modernization, make it imperative to modernize
U.S. nuclear forces to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent to protect the U.S. Homeland, as well as Allies and partners.
DAF nuclear capabilities provide unique, complementary, and
credible options in support of integrated deterrence. Decades of
deferred modernization have left little room for error in our
recapitalization program if we are to maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent. The fiscal year 2025 budget requests more
than $19.4 billion for nuclear modernization efforts including the
Sentinel Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, B-21 Raider, Survivable
Airborne Operations Center (SAOC), Long-Range Standoff Weapon, Next-
Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared programs, and the Evolved
Satellite Communication System. Additionally, the Space Force is in the
early stages of developing and fielding a more resilient missile
warning and tracking capability focused on tracking advanced threats by
integrating new critical missile tracking capabilities. While B-21 and
LRSO are currently close to planned cost and schedule profiles, other
programs are experiencing difficulties, and these programs have not
completed development. Sentinel is undergoing a critical Nunn-McCurdy
review due to cost and schedule increases. The SAOC cost estimate has
also increased and is putting pressure on the DAF's budget.
Deterring Aggression and Prevailing in Conflict
The third priority of our NDS is to deter aggression and be
prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary. The DAF needs immediate
and significant capability modernization to keep pace with the growing
military capabilities of the PRC. Each year, the threat continues to
advance as does our effort to define cost effective competitive
operational innovation. The DAF deeply appreciates the ``Quick Start''
provision placed in the fiscal year 2024 NDAA and will take full
advantage of this opportunity to save precious time. Our effort to
Reoptimize for Great Power Competition is intended in large part to
create institutions with the mission of ensuring continuous
competitiveness against our pacing challenge. The seven DAF Operational
Imperatives and the Cross-cutting Operational Enablers body of work
continues to guide the DAF's modernization effort. The fiscal year 2025
DAF budget request includes $6.1 billion for these efforts, $4.0
billion in the Space Force and $2.1 billion in the Air Force excluding
B-21 investments available at a higher classification.
Building a Resilient Joint Force and Defense Ecosystem
The fourth NDS priority is to build a resilient Joint Force and
defense ecosystem to ensure our future military advantage. Our airmen,
guardians, and civilian teammates are the decisive advantage in our
strategic competition, and this budget request invests to ensure they
can serve to their full potential. Programs that respond to the most
pressing problems of our airmen, guardians, and their families are
detailed for each DAF Military Service in the sections below.
united states air force
Strategic competition with the PRC while also managing acute and
persistent threats requires the Air Force to modernize to maintain its
preeminent status in the world. The Air Force continues to implement
the programs identified under the Operational Imperatives and follow
through on initiatives designed to maintain the Air Force's qualitative
advantages over any competitor. The Air Force is investing in force
structure and capabilities aligned with the NDS. As the strategic
environment is rapidly changing and technology fundamentally alters the
character of war we are in a time of consequence. The Air Force is
determined to maintain its position as the leader in speed, agility,
and lethality upon which the joint team, the Nation, and allies rely.
The fiscal year 2025 Air Force budget request is $188.1 billion.
The Air Force budget invests in foundational accounts in an attempt to
arrest the year-over-year degradation of the capabilities, operational
readiness, and supporting infrastructure necessary to implement the
NDS, but doing so mandates a slower rate of needed modernization which
increases the risk to the DAF's overall readiness. The budget fully
funds nuclear modernization programs to deter strategic attacks,
continuing the most extensive recapitalization effort of the nuclear
enterprise in the Air Force's history. (The recently announced Nunn
McCurdy cost breach on the Sentinel ICBM program is still being
addressed and final estimates are not available at this time.) It also
continues investment in modernization focused on critical long-range
kill webs ($310.6 million) and affordable mass ($719.8 million) central
to the ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression. This is
in clear recognition of the PRC pacing challenge and Russian acute
threat. The Air Force budget request also invests in the Air Force's
most precious asset--its airmen--to ensure they remain the decisive
advantage the Nation depends upon.
Air Force's Role in Defending the Nation
For fiscal year 2025, the Air Force must make difficult choices to
balance risk today and into the future. Today, the Air Force is
accepting risk across the Service's modernization accounts in order to
maintain minimally acceptable near-term operational readiness. This
places additional risk on the Air Force's ability to deter and defeat
any adversary going forward.
The fiscal year 2025 Air Force budget request prioritizes
operational readiness in the current year and seeks to preserve
previous years' substantial advances in modernization and procurement.
The Air Force's operational readiness is near the minimum level
acceptable for the Service to meet the Nation's demands.
While this budget attempts to sustain the modernization momentum
created by the Operational Imperatives and Cross-cutting Operational
Enablers, it takes risk in the medium term to balance immediate
operational readiness needs at the level of maximum tolerable risk. The
medium-term risk most noticeably impacts the Air Force's ability to
field the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) Family of Systems, as
well as a mature Command, Control, Communications, and Battle
Management (C3BM) system, the Air Force contribution to JADC2.
The Air Force is requesting $2.1 billion to meet the immediate
Operational Imperatives required to maintain the Air Force's
qualitative advantage and ability to deter and, if necessary, win
whenever called upon by the Nation. The Operational Imperatives provide
the Service with critical capabilities, readiness investments, and the
foundation required to transition and sustain a wartime posture against
our pacing threat. Notably, the USAF fiscal year 2025 budget request
continues progress toward fielding an operationally optimized Advanced
Battle Management System (ABMS) ($174 million) that will improve
situational awareness and provide decision-support tools to close
hundreds of kill chains within relevant timelines while operating in a
highly contested environment. The fiscal year 2025 Air Force budget
supports achieving moving target engagement at scale ($177 million),
which will be decisive in a conflict with a well-resourced peer-or
near-peer adversary. Fielding the NGAD Family of Systems ($675
million), particularly Collaborative Combat Aircraft, will allow the
Air Force to augment current and future platforms with lower-cost
complementary systems that can cost-effectively achieve control of the
air in highly contested environments. The B-21 and its Family of
Systems (details available at a higher classification) will be the
backbone of the Air Force's bomber force and provide critical
operational capability for both conventional and nuclear missions and
provide precision effects en masse against targets worldwide. The Air
Force is committed to building resilient forward basing ($594 million)
that ensures sustainable and networked bases capable of sufficient
sortie generation and mission execution in a contested environment. The
Service is also investing toward securing the critical readiness
required to mobilize and move the Air Force and Joint Force into
theater ($232.9 million), including hardening mobilization and support
capabilities against cyber and non-cyber threats. These investments
represent significant efforts in critical systems and assets required
by the increasingly challenging threat environment.
Among the Air Force's highest priorities is achieving
electromagnetic spectrum dominance and an information advantage in
highly contested environments. The Air Force's budget includes a $50
million budget request in fiscal year 2025 for investment in EA-37B
Baseline 4 capability enhancements and advanced waveform development.
Furthermore, the Air Force is investing in mission resilience and
adaptability efforts such as the 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing's rapid
reprogramming to ensure effective electronic attack, support, and
defensive capabilities; synchronization efforts such as Air Combat
Command's Electromagnetic Battle Management (EMBM). The Air Force's
investments in electromagnetic spectrum dominance are vital to ensuring
that the Nation's warfighters, Joint mission partners, and Allies
build, achieve, and maintain mission effectiveness, survivability, and,
ultimately, warfighting advantage over the Nation's adversaries. These
efforts aid in maintaining the Air Force's credibility in both
assurance and deterrence roles.
As the Air Force adapts to the changing strategic environment, we
are reoptimizing every aspect of the Service around meeting the PRC
pacing challenge. The Air Force is focusing organizations responsible
for strategic readiness on current operational readiness, creating and/
or elevating organizations that are critical to this strategic
environment such as cyber and the nuclear enterprise, and creating a
single command to focus on future capabilities. These reoptimization
decisions make changes that are within the current authorities and, to
the extent possible, the resources of the Department of the Air Force.
As we strive to keep pace in a strategic environment where the
competition has sustained and consistent growth in funding, these
efforts alone will not be enough.
Air Force's Role in Taking Care of People
The Air Force is committed to attracting and retaining the best
airmen in the world. In fiscal year 2024, the Active Duty Air Force is
currently on track to meet its recruiting goals. Air National Guard and
Reserve recruiting are trending upward but continue to remain a
challenge for the Service. The Air Force has continued to break down
barriers to service and made progress thanks to Congress's significant
support to provide requested pay increases and increasing economic
security for airmen through cost-of-living adjustments to basic pay,
BAH, and BAS. Additionally, the Air Force is opening its bases to local
communities to showcase the service to the public and connect with the
Nation's possible recruits. The then VCSAF's cross functional team on
Barriers to Service implemented 18 policy changes since January 2023 to
expand future recruiting opportunities and increase eligibility to
serve. These changes include accelerated naturalization at BMT,
aligning the body composition to the DOD standard, and expanding the
tattoo policy. These changes have provided tangible improvements
without sacrificing quality. The CFT will continue to review and adjust
DAF policies and initiatives to best address future recruiting
challenges and amplify efforts to increase propensity to serve for all.
To maintain talent, the Air Force has focused on quality-of-life
impacts for its airmen, investing to ensure they have the resources
required to thrive. The Air Force has concentrated on improving access
to childcare; this budget request includes a $40.0 million MILCON
submission for a CDC at Mountain Home AFB, on top of 11 CDC MILCON
projects that the Air Force is executing in fiscal year 2025, and $50
million in Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization
focused investment in CDCs. The Service is also on track to implement
the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military's
recommendations and programs as approved by the Secretary of Defense,
expanding victim care and support for victims of sexual assault.
Specifically, the Air Force is increasing the presence of embedded
mental health personnel in line units to prepare for contingency
operations. Demand for these mental health services has increased
twofold over the last decade while mental health manning has remained
relatively unchanged. To offset the lack of providers, the Department
of the Air Force is training servicemembers at every level on basic
mental health skills. The Air Force has also invested in Interpersonal
and Self-Directed Violence Prevention and Response with $451 million in
the fiscal year 2025 budget request to implement initiatives supporting
and protecting airmen.
Quality of life also demands the best living and working facilities
possible. Due to fiscal constraints resulting from the FRA, the Air
Force was unable to reduce the $46.8 billion of deferred maintenance
and repair backlog, nor achieve the 2.3 percent plant replacement value
(PRV) reinvestment goal envisioned in the Infrastructure Investment
Plan. The fiscal year 2024 budget request set this goal at 1.58 percent
and the fiscal year 2025 budget request reduces it to 1.5 percent.
Additionally, the existing CR has directly impacted the Air Force's
ability to release funds and award dormitory contracts in the current
fiscal year. The inability to release funds increases risk to meet the
Air Force's dormitory investment goal of $1.1 billion by 2026, and the
inability to fund and award dormitory projects in fiscal year 2024 will
roll into fiscal year 2025. However, with this budget request, the Air
Force will meet the Fiscal Year 2022 NDAA requirement to invest at
least 5 percent of the estimated replacement cost of the total
inventory of permanent party dormitories for facility improvements. The
Air Force is deliberately investing to sustain adequate dormitories.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request includes a planned investment of
$250 million for future prioritization of dormitory repair, but that
does not include fiscal year 2024 rollover due to funding delays. The
Air Force is also engaging with local leaders to increase the
availability of affordable housing options for families. These moves,
along with the substantial increase in BAH for many localities, have
increased housing opportunities and living facilities for airmen.
To be the best, we must manage our airmen's talent. The Air Force
is defining new Total Force skills required to meet the demands of Air
Force Force Generation (AFFORGEN), Agile Combat Employment, and Future
Force Design. As part of reoptimization, the technical tracks for
officers and enlisted airmen as well as the introduction of Warrant
Officers for Cyber and IT, seek to attract and retain the critical
talent needed in fast-paced and rapidly evolving critical technology
sectors that are shaping the modern battlefield. We are also improving
talent management by investing in processes and systems that increase
agility, flexibility, and data access. The Air Force is exploring ways
to identify the most innovative airmen, network them, and ensure they
can field innovative solutions to meet the Air Force's most significant
challenges.
Air Force's Role in Succeeding Through Teamwork
Teamwork is critical in the total Air Force, including the Reserves
and the Air National Guard, all as part of the Joint Force meeting the
NDS objectives. That teamwork begins within the DAF, where the Air
Force relies on and supports the Space Force. Both Services depend on
each other in developing and fielding the Operational Imperatives and
achieving the Department's reoptimization efforts. Cooperation of both
the Space Force and Air Force is required to meet the challenges posed
by the Nation's adversaries. The ability to conduct precision strikes,
engage moving-targets, close kill chains, and build situational
awareness in a highly contested environment requires the seamless
integration of both Services. The Air Force and Space Force are
inexorably intertwined, ensuring that both services, the Joint Force,
and our allies and partners will prevail wherever called upon.
Meeting our pacing challenge also demands that the Air Force
seamlessly integrate with the larger Joint Force, the combatant
commands, and our allies and partners. This is the essence of
Integrated Deterrence. As part of the reoptimization efforts, the Air
Force is executing large-scale exercises to test its capabilities
against peer threats in highly contested environments and re-designing
force presentation models to ensure combatant commanders most stressing
operational needs are met. The fiscal year 2025 budget includes $428
million in investment to support the integrated priority lists of the
combatant commanders. The Operational Imperatives and capability
investments across the Service are critical to ensuring the Joint Force
can succeed against the pacing challenge.
While the Air Force focuses on supporting the Joint Force in
meeting the NDS priorities, the Service also realizes that Allies and
partners are a center of gravity for United States national security.
Allies and partners facilitate access, basing, and overflight. The Air
Force is committed to working with our Allies and partners, especially
in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East, to advance an
international order grounded in rules and norms. The Air Force
continues to streamline FMS programs and work with allies to develop
interoperable capabilities beginning from the initial design of
systems.
Teamwork is also required with the Defense Industrial Base to
ensure a robust industry that is the world leader in technology and
production capacity that can adapt at speed and scale. As we promote
the strength of the Defense Industrial Base, the Service is working
with industry partners on delivering relevant capabilities with
increased speed and capacity and ensuring mission-dependent supply
chain and logistics resilience.
Teamwork inside the Department of the Air Force; the Joint Force;
the Defense Industrial Base; and Allies and partners will be the
cornerstone of integrated deterrence and combat capability in strategic
competition with the PRC. The interdependence of these forces demands
constant attention to drive seamless integration and interoperability.
Unity in action and capabilities developed between the Air Force, Joint
Force, and Allies and partners will provide our Nation and our Allies
an advantage that no potential adversary can match.
Perhaps as much as any time in history, teamwork is required across
the whole of our government to tackle the increasingly complex and
dangerous challenges that face our Nation. The Air Force will continue
to work transparently and collaboratively through the Department of the
Air Force, Department of Defense, executive branch, and Congress to
field and maintain the most ready and dominant Air Force for the
Nation.
united states space force
Since its establishment in 2019, the United States Space Force has
focused on one, overarching imperative: to secure the Nation's
interests in, from, and to space. As the threats in space to American
prosperity and security both increase and become more sophisticated,
the Space Force must transform and therefore, it is prioritizing
investments that prepare the Joint Force and the Nation to confront the
dangerous operating environment that space already has become. This
transformation is severely complicated by the constrained fiscal
environment, which has forced the DAF and the Space Force to make hard
choices.
Space Force's Role in Defending The Nation
The world's use of space is growing at an accelerating rate, making
space simultaneously more important and more dangerous. The domain is
no longer the benign expanse of the past. Counterspace threats continue
to destabilize the environment, and space-enabled attack increasingly
holds the Joint Force and our Homeland at risk. The PRC, and to a
significant extent Russia, have operationalized space. The United
States has not kept pace. With space undeniably defined as a
warfighting domain, the Nation depends upon the Space Force to secure
its interests in, from, and to space.
To meet this challenge, the Space Force has organized its
modernization efforts around a theory of success that aims to protect
the Nation and its interests, while also preserving stability and long-
term usability of the domain. This approach adheres to three guiding
principles: (1) avoid operational surprise in the space domain, (2)
deter attacks against U.S. interests in space and (3) prevent an
adversary from using space to attack our Homeland or the Joint Force.
The destruction of forces in space risks creating long-lasting hazards
and indiscriminate risks. For this reason, the Space Force's concept of
space superiority seeks to protect U.S. interests without jeopardizing
the future of the space domain.
Avoiding operational surprise in space requires the Space Force to
maintain constant awareness of the battlespace, supplemented by a
robust capability to accurately produce indications and warnings for
malign behavior. Over 8 percent of the Space Force's fiscal year 2025
budget is dedicated to this purpose. Specifically, the Space Force
budget invests $1.25 billion into the space domain awareness mission
area, including funding for the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability,
SILENTBARKER, and Space Data Fusion. These programs extend the Space
Force's umbrella of awareness in the space domain, by establishing a
clear picture of the operating environment and denying adversaries the
ability to strike U.S. assets without warning.
To deny the benefits of a preemptive counter-space strike, the
Space Force must build resilient space capabilities that guarantee
continuity of critical services to the Joint Force despite current and
growing adversary counterspace forces. These critical services include
missile warning; communications; targeting; and Position, Navigation
and Timing. The Space Force must transform these services to make them
resilient to attack. As airborne systems providing communications and
targeting have become more vulnerable and as threat long-range
precision strike systems have proliferated, the Joint Force dependency
on space is significantly increasing. To that end, the Space Force
budget invests $2.58 billion, or 55 percent of the total space-based
missile warning budget, to field a proliferated multi-orbit missile
warning network. Operating across different orbital regimes and sensor
types, this hybrid approach complicates an adversary's attack options
against U.S. space assets, enhances resiliency of a no-fail warning
mission, and assures critical decisionmaking data will be available at
the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The Space Force is
procuring two additional GPS-IIIF vehicles. Presently, there are 31
satellites in orbit with four in storage and two slated for launch in
fiscal year 2025. Simultaneously, the Space Force is researching more
resilient PNT options. The fiscal year 2025 budget also devotes $4.4
billion to developing satellite communications (SATCOM) systems capable
of operating through contested and degraded environments. The Space
Force is working to ensure that all of its capabilities can deter,
overcome, and operate through enemy action.
$7.25 billion--nearly a quarter of the Space Force's fiscal year
2025 funding--invests in the ability to counter an adversary from using
space to attack the U.S. Homeland or the Joint Force. This set of
investments, which cannot be discussed in detail in an unclassified
setting, is a major transformational effort for the USSF because it
enables the newest Space Force mission, space superiority. The need to
gain and maintain space superiority over peer adversaries is the
distinguishing characteristic of a transformed Space Force and it is a
top priority. Unfortunately, the compounding effects of Continuing
Resolutions and the fiscal year 2025 top-line funding constraints under
the FRA have had significant impact on the Space Force's ability to
meet the demands of this critical mission.
Finally, to reoptimize for the pacing challenge, sustain our long-
term competitive advantage, and ensure the relevance of our technical
investments, the Space Force is establishing a Space Futures Command.
Overseeing the forward-looking force design process by which we
determine our objective force, Space Futures Command will provide vital
structures and processes for our force development activities. Working
closely with the Air Force Research Laboratory this Command will
routinely assess the relevancy of and make recommendations on the
priority of areas of scientific research. This will provide a clear and
consistent demand signal to all partners, unambiguously identifying the
technologies we consider to be essential to our success.
The Space Force is in the early stages of a major transformation,
from a force focused only on peacetime capabilities to a force that
also includes the full range of warfighting capabilities. The Space
Force we have today, no matter how ready it is, does not have the range
of capabilities needed against the pacing challenge. Preserving current
force capabilities is necessary but not sufficient. We must invest to
transform our legacy space capabilities into a credible warfighting
force to deter and, if needed, to defeat our adversaries; and we must
do so with a sense of urgency. This requires on-time and stable
funding. Continuing Resolutions force the Space Force to rearchitect
programs, miss launch windows, and break delivery timelines, spreading
mission delays across the FYDP. For example, hypothetical year-long CRs
can force the Space Force to slow its launch procurements,
precipitating impacts for years to come by reducing the capability it
can get on orbit, creating industrial base challenges, delaying test
and training activities, and generating more barriers to its
transformation.
Space Force's Role in Taking Care of People
The Space Force's small but technologically sophisticated workforce
means the Space Force must deliberately manage talent on an individual
basis. In 2023, Congress passed the Space Force Personnel Management
Act. This landmark legislation will enable the Space Force to build a
modern personnel management system that will better allow the Space
Force to develop and retain the elite military cadre it needs to be
competitive and successful. The permeability between full-time and
part-time military service the single component creates will allow
guardians of the relatively small Space Force to flexibly manage their
careers and better meet their personal and professional goals while
meeting Space Force operational needs.
The Space Force is also piloting the Defense Civilian Training
Corps in fiscal year 2025. This program, which will act as a civil
service counterpart to the Reserve Officer Training Corps program, will
recruit civilian guardians with desirable backgrounds following the
completion of their undergraduate education. Additionally, fiscal year
2025 resourcing will allow the Space Force to expand developmental
opportunities for all guardians. Here, the first step will be a
redesigned Officer Training Course. Under this program, all newly
accessed officers will attend the same initial skills training course
to learn the fundamentals of cyber operations, intelligence, and space
operations. This combined initial skills training will ensure all
officers have a comprehensive operational background prior to pursuing
more specialized duties like acquisition. The Space Force is truly
committed to being operationally focused.
The demands placed on guardians continue to grow as space becomes a
more dangerous operating environment. To prepare for this challenge,
guardians must be able to develop, train, and exercise their
operational tradecraft in a secure environment against high-fidelity
simulated threats. To meet these requirements, the Space Force is
building the necessary test and training infrastructure from scratch.
In fiscal year 2025, the Space Force budget invests $438.7 million into
the Operational Test and Training Infrastructure (OTTI) program. The
Space Force is also expanding its investments in the test enterprise to
account for the electromagnetic and orbital warfare mission areas.
Recently, the DAF organized all of these activities under a single
Program Executive Officer, ensuring resourcing transparency,
accountability, and interoperability across the test and training
enterprise.
One personnel challenge the Space Force faces as a small service is
creating the organizational capacity to perform current operations
while simultaneously building operational readiness for a high-
intensity conflict. To better balance these two, the Space Force is
formalizing how it builds operational readiness in combat force
elements. The Space Force is accomplishing this by implementing the
Space Force Generation model for readiness, which is made possible by a
requested additional $344.2 million invested across several accounts.
This investment enables a rotational model for Employed-in-Place
missions, allowing personnel to accomplish threat-focused combat
training before they are presented to the combatant commanders for day-
to-day operations.
Space Force's Role in Succeeding Through Teamwork
The Space Force is not just an important teammate, but an essential
one to the Joint and Combined Force. Broader operational success across
all domains and theaters will depend on the Space Force succeeding in
its missions. First, the Space Force provides services that the Joint
and Combined team must have, or they will fail. Achieving that requires
not just fielding effective capabilities joint warfighters need, but
also securing those capabilities from adversarial attack. Second, the
Space Force protects the Joint and Combined team from space-enabled
attack. The Space Force cannot succeed in either regard without robust
relationships across the U.S. enterprise and with indispensable Allies
and partners.
To that end, partnerships with the other Services and throughout
the Joint Force is a top Space Force priority. In fiscal year 2024, the
Space Force established several service components to integrate Space
Force capabilities and expertise into the Combatant Commands. For
example, the Space Force established U.S. Space Forces Europe and
Africa, giving both USEUCOM and USAFRICOM a dedicated team of experts
in space planning and operations. The fiscal year 2025 budget invests
an additional $27.8 million to build service components in support of
every Combatant Command. Once fully implemented, this program will give
every Combatant Command access to guardians who can help integrate
space capabilities into their joint operations.
Nationally, there are many agencies and organizations with equities
in the space domain. This is why the Space Force is partnering with a
variety of government agencies to unify effort and leverage common
interests for mutual benefit in space. For example, space-based
surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting is a critically important
emerging mission area for the Space Force. Therefore, the Space Force
is working with the intelligence community, as well as industry
partners, so that the Space Force can accomplish this important mission
as part of the Joint Force.
As a highly technical service, the Space Force depends on a strong
industrial base. An eighth of the Space Force fiscal year 2025 budget
is dedicated to commercial space services which will help reinforce and
energize the space industrial base our Nation depends upon. Moreover,
the Space Force is continuing to develop its commercial space strategy
within the larger DAF and Department of Defense industrial policy
framework to identify areas for deeper partnerships with the diverse
commercial space market.
The Space Force can no longer afford to delay its necessary
transformation. Space capabilities are foundational to how the Joint
Force projects power across the world and are increasingly at risk--
they are old, vulnerable, and already not fully meeting joint
warfighter needs. Lessening these risks requires transformational
change--transcending the status quo and making smart investments in not
just new systems, but also people--America's guardians
conclusion
The Department of the Air Force is in a race for technological
superiority against a well-resourced strategic competitor. The United
States is now facing a competitor with national purchasing power that
exceeds our own, a challenge we have never faced in modern times The
PLA is actively developing and expanding capabilities to challenge
strategic stability, attack our critical space systems, and defeat our
ability to project power, especially air power. Conflict in the Indo-
Pacific region is not inevitable. The United States is actively working
to prevent conflict by strengthening combat-credible deterrence.
However, acute and persistent threats still exist, and the security and
prosperity undergirded by the United States military for decades is
increasingly challenged. The DAF fiscal year 2025 budget request is
focused on addressing this reality. The DAF has funded current
readiness accounts at the lowest acceptable level while investing
remaining resources in essential modernization. Some Air Force
procurement has been deferred to free up funding for new
capabilities in development. The Space Force lacks similar tradeoff
options, forcing delays in needed systems, especially counterspace
systems. The DAF fiscal year 2025 budget request is aligned with the
NDS. It addresses mission requirements while taking care of people and
fulfilling our role in the Joint, interagency, and combined team. We
urge timely approval of this budget request to allow us to keep pace
with the challenges facing the United States.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Saltzman. Mr.
Secretary, we have been endeavoring for the last several years
to replace the E-3, AWACS, aircraft, which has certainly served
well but is reaching its limits. Could you fill us in on the
progress toward getting the E-7 in the air to replace the E-3?
Secretary Kendall. Yes, we are still moving ahead with the
E-7. It is funded in the 2025 budget. We had a slip production
of one more aircraft a year to the right.
The price that we got from the prime came in much higher
than we had anticipated, and we have been involved in
negotiations to try to get it down. We have come much closer,
but we are not really at closure yet, so we have some
additional work to do there.
So, I am anticipating--I am maybe being optimistic here,
but hopefully that will get to an agreement very shortly and
then be able to move on with the program. We are still
committed to the program, but we have got to have an affordable
aircraft.
Chairman Reed. The Australians, among others, have the E-7.
Our version would be more sophisticated or quite different?
Secretary Kendall. It would be. It would have to include
all of our communication systems and so on. So, there are a
number of modifications from the original E-7, which are
several years old, that have to be made to meet our
requirements. So that is part of the problem with the cost.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. General Allvin, a significant
part of the lifecycle cost of an aircraft is sustainment cost.
I think around here, we--our first reaction is the sticker
shock. You mean, it costs x?
But we don't realize how much it really cost to keep
flying. For example, the F-35 is, I think, about $39,000 per
hour for flying. Can you tell us what progress the Air Force
has made in reducing the lifecycle cost of the F-35 system in
particular?
General Allvin. Thank you, Chairman, and of course, the F-
35 will be the backbone of our force into the future. So,
having it sustainable is certainly required for us to be able
to afford it and all the other things.
The Joint Program Office has been undertaking this, what
they are referring to is a war in readiness, trying to
understand each of the individual elements and segments that
are driving the cost up. I think that program is underway. We
expect to see some results from that in the very near future.
The other thing is that when you purchase the new weapon
systems, you also have to purchase the contract logistics
supply system as well, which adds a bit of an additional cost
to it. So, digging into that and understanding how we might be
able to transition to this performance based logistics is
another way into the future.
As you know, we have been working back and forth with the
prime on how to do that. We couldn't come to a conclusion that
was satisfactory for both sides to be able to have all of the
things that we needed, so we are going to reenter that as well
to ensure that in the future we can have a performance based
logistics system that will drive down the cost of sustainment
as well.
Chairman Reed. There has been a determination, I presume,
over time that contractor based sustainment is more efficient
than uniform sustainment by military personnel?
General Allvin. That was certainly the premise when they
put it into the CLS, and so, now we are looking at adjusting
that to the current environment, how we may be able to adapt to
ensure that we can get some of the efficiency and
affordability, but also the operational responsiveness that we
need.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. General Saltzman, your chief task
is to provide the trained and equipped Space Force guardians,
and you can you sort of give us a sense of what are the
obstacles you are facing in that?
General Saltzman. Yes. Thank you, Senator. The conditions
have changed radically in space over the last 10 years or so.
One of the analogies Secretary Kendall and I use is it is akin
to going from a merchant marine and transforming into a U.S.
Navy. That requires different equipment, that requires
different training.
So, what we are working on currently is advancing the
training of our guardians. We have invested in fiscal year 2025
about $438 million to enhance the training infrastructure. This
includes new simulators, new ranges, aggressor forces to
simulate the threat, all to give them realistic training for
the competitive environment they are going to face.
But maybe more importantly, and certainly more in terms of
investments, is giving them the equipment they need, resilient
architectures that are going to be more capable, more effective
in the contested environment, and looking for the counter space
capabilities to deny an adversary the ability to use space
enabled targeting against our Joint Force.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank
you for your testimony. Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
gentlemen. I share with many of my colleagues a deep concern
regarding the future of the United States Air Force. Its
fighters, bombers, tankers, and cargo aircraft are in constant
rotation around the world, ready to combat any threat.
I understand that we must modernize our forces and divest
when it makes sense to do so. However, many of the aircraft
that the Air Force has requested to divest in this year's
budget, such as the F-15Es, are among the most combat capable,
with expensive upgrades and thousands of flight hours remaining
on the aircraft. In the event of conflict, we need not only
capability but also capacity.
Not every place in which the Air Force is expected to
operate is a high end threat environment. I am especially
concerned about the impact of these budget caps on the Space
Force, whose programs form the backbone of every other services
combat capability.
Communications, command and control, and guidance for
weapon systems all rely on space, and more vital mission sets
are expected to move to space in the near term, though not fast
enough to justify such rapid divestment of airborne programs.
Yet, this budget request does not include the resources
necessary for the Space Force to grow its capability at scale
and at the speed of relevance. Indeed, your request for Space
Force is $600 million less than what the Department requested
last year.
General Saltzman, in your opening statement, you stated,
``the Space Force lacks similar tradeoff options, forcing
delays in needed systems, especially counter space systems.'' I
am concerned about the level of risk we are accepting by
delaying development of these systems.
If Congress were to provide additional funding for
development of these counter space systems, would you be able
to execute that funding?
General Saltzman. Yes, ma'am. We have a series of programs
that are still in R&D, but there is a good, solid program that
with additional resources, we would be able to accelerate and
deliver capability in this DP.
Senator Fischer. We have also heard a lot about what the
Air Force is doing related to re-optimizing the great power
competition, General Saltzman. What does that look for--look
like for the Space Force, please.
General Saltzman. Thank you for that. We are very excited
about the re-optimization, and like I started in the previous
question to Senator Reed, it is about recognizing that the
environment has shifted and that we have to train differently.
So, we have reestablished new advanced training standards
for our guardians to be able to respond in this contested
environment. We have also created a new force presentation
model, which creates both the time and the tools for our
guardians to be able to train against this adversary.
Most importantly, probably most recognizable, you will see
the establishment of a space futures command. This is in
recognition that there is a great many efforts that are going
on in science and technology, in operational concepts, new
missions, and we wanted to make sure we could get our arms
around that as quickly as possible and really focus delivery of
the right kind of systems with the right prioritization in
time, so that we can continue to have an enduring advantage
over our threats as we go into the future.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. General Allvin or
Secretary Kendall, what are additional updates that you can
share in this setting on new developments in the B-21 program?
Secretary Kendall. The B-21 is moving forward. I am always
very careful about saying positive things about programs in
development. They all have risk. But at this stage, the B-21
has been performing close to original scheduling and costs, and
delivering capability is in testing. We just had the milestone
CE approval to enter low rate production. So, the program is
moving forward. At this point in time at least, we are pretty
happy with the progress.
Senator Fischer. Great. Thank you. General Allvin, it is my
understanding that one of the changes at the Air Force Nuclear
Weapons Center is establishing that two star general as PEO for
international ballistic missiles. What benefits will this bring
to the Air Force's capability to help them execute that
Sentinel program?
General Allvin. Thank you, Senator, and this is really part
and parcel to what things we were looking at with the re-
optimization, understanding--keeping the main thing, the main
thing. Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of our national
defense, and so, the ability to oversee at the right level,
with the right authorities to do integration of the ICBM leg of
the triad is very important. So, elevating that to the two star
level gives more seniority and more authority to be able to
integrate the nuclear material management and all of the
systems that will be able to support the ICBM.
Like we think that is going to be pivotal regardless of
what comes out of the Nunn-McCurdy review. Going forward, that
ground leg of the triad, that recapitalization is going to take
years upon years, and so we want to ensure we have the right
level of leadership and oversight to see this massive program.
Senator Fischer. Correct. We need to make sure we have what
we need and continue to move forward on that program. Thank
you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Hirono,
please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
testifying today. This is for General Allvin. The agile combat
employment strategy requires the appropriate posture and
supporting infrastructure at locations throughout the Pacific.
For example, just last week, the Air Force awarded a $409
million contract to rebuild an airfield used during World War
II on the island of Tinian.
General Allvin, does the Air Force have the appropriate
forward basing it needs to execute agile combat employment? Are
there plans for more reclamation efforts at Pacific airfields
similar to Tinian and the runway upgrade of--Air base, Basa Air
Base in the island of Luzon?
General Allvin. Well, Senator, thank you for that question.
Secretary Kendall and I were there for about 2 weeks ago. We
are on the island of Tinian, and certainly it holds not only a
historic place, but it also is going to be part of the future
as far as our agile combat employment scheme of maneuver.
So direct answer to your question, Senator, is we are on
the path. We have the wing commanders and the Commander of
Pacific Air Force with a very strong understanding of what it
takes to do our agile combat employment, and they continue
through their wing level exercises to sort of to build that
out, at least intellectually and conceptually.
As we continue to fight for the resources to do that, we do
have designs on several of these clusters, these spoke bases to
include Tinian, that the Secretary and I were on. You mentioned
a couple of the other ones but building out not only the runway
but the necessary, not overly necessary, just what we need to
operate those hub and spoke locations.
We have a ways to go in the funding, but we are designing
the requirements, prioritizing them, and we do intend to
exercise to ensure we have everything we need to execute that
that scheme of maneuver that is going to be required.
Senator Hirono. But as part of the--or maybe a major part
of the reason that we need to have these facilities in the
Indo-Pacific is because of recognizing that China is definitely
having--they are reaching out to a number of these island
nations to influence them. Is that one of the reasons that we
want to do this?
General Allvin. Senator, that is correct. We want to ensure
that we have the agility and be able to complicate their
targeting calculus to ensure survivability and success in that
theater.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. I support your effort. Secretary
Kendall, last year's NDAA included a provision directing the
Secretary of Defense to conduct a feasibility study regarding
the advisability of transfer--transferring all covered space
functions of the National Guard to the Space Force.
The results of this study have not been released, but I am
concerned that you are already pursuing, apparently, or DOD is,
a provision in this year's NDAA that would move all space
missions out of the National Guard.
So, how does this change--by the way, I think it is
important for us to actually have the results of this analysis,
and I would hope that the analysis is also including outreach
and the input of these National Guard units that are performing
some of the space functions that I am sure you know, Mr.
Secretary, there are about 1,000 National Guardsmen in states,
not just Hawaii but there are about 100 in California,
Colorado, Florida, New York, Ohio, Alaska.
So, while that study has not even been completed, I hope
that you have gotten--reached out to these National Guard
units. Have you, in conducting this study that we do not have
the results of yet?
Secretary Kendall. The study is in final draft. First of
all, let me just say that we deeply value the units that are
part of essentially our space capabilities. We are looking at
which ones will be covered under the act.
Consulting with General Saltzman, and we have looked at the
functions of those units to see if they fit into the Air Force
or Space Force architecture more appropriately. Most of them do
fit within the Space Force, or a couple that I think may be
more appropriate in the Air Force, but they are all valued and
they are all important.
We want to have them continue to serve. We are looking at
how to best make that happen. General Saltzman and I are both
very strongly of the opinion that the right way to do that,
from the point of view of national capability and for the
ability to manage the Space Force, is to bring those units into
the Space Force, ultimately under the Space Force Personnel
Management Act that was just passed by the Congress last year.
The Space Force is incredibly small, and it was designed to
be lean and mean I guess is a way to put it to be very
efficient in how it operated and to have as minimal amount of
bureaucracy associated with it.
We are very grateful that this Committee and your
colleagues on the other side of the Hill supported the Space
Force Personnel Management Act that allows the Space Force to
have full time and part time people in it, and to be very
flexible in how it manages people. So, we want to bring these
hard units into that same structure. That is clearly, from the
point of view of the Space Force, the best solution.
Senator Hirono. Mr. Secretary, I am glad to hear that.
Although transferring these units into the Space Force might
mean transferring these part time people who are located in all
the States that I mentioned away from their States and other
functions, so I have a concern about that.
General Saltzman just testified today that it is very
important in terms of the recruiting and retention of the
people who are going to be doing these functions. So, I have
concerns that--of the movement. I do have other questions, Mr.
Chairman, that I will submit for the record. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Hirono. Senator
Rounds, please.
Secretary Kendall. Mr. Chairman, if could have 1 minute to
respond to Senator Hirono.
Chairman Reed. Yes. The only 1 minute you will get.
Secretary Kendall. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There is no intention to move anyone. So, there is some
concerns out there that I think are overblown.
People will basically have stability if they transition. We
are doing this now with some of the Reserves. There are about a
thousand people in the Reserves, essentially, that are going to
be moving under the Space Force Personnel Management Act.
We are going to handle the Space Guard people the same way,
basically. So, they would have stability, and they will be able
to continue to serve in the way generally that they currently
would serve.
There should not be a lot of concern about dramatic changes
as far as any of them are concerned. General Saltzman may want
to add a quick word on it.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. That
helps clarify the issue very much. Senator Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Kendall,
General Allvin, General Saltzman, thank you for your service,
and thank you for being with us today to share your testimony.
I would also like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the
actions of the pilots and aircrews of the 494th and the 335th
Fighter Squadrons, who performed so magnificently over the
weekend.
We are all proud and humbled by their clear excellence, and
to the entire Joint Force for the job, they did in responding
very, very quickly. Secretary Kendall, given the events over
this past weekend, it seems clear to me that there is no
substitute for military hardware and that divesting platforms
in the short term to pay for future capabilities is not
necessarily the most desirable option or choice.
Congress must fund the Department at levels commensurate to
the global threat environment. Broadly speaking, in this open
setting, where does your fiscal year 2025 budget assume the
most risk?
Secretary Kendall. If I were to look over at the Department
of the Air Force's budget, I am most concerned about the pace
at which we are moving forward in space, particularly counter
space. I am not uncomfortable with where the Air Force is in
terms of force structure or capabilities globally.
We have a large Air Force, and it is very capable. It is
not as large as it once was, but we have a lot of units, and
the two you mentioned I think did a fantastic job, but we have
a lot of other units who could do very similar things if called
upon to do that.
Our average aircraft is about 30 years old, and we need to
move forward with the next generation of capabilities as
quickly as we can. On the Space Force side, though, as General
Saltzman mentioned, we are going from a country that had space
capabilities designed to operate in space with impunity and
very little in the way of counter space capabilities.
So, we are moving from a merchant marine like arrangement
to a military naval force arrangement, which means we have got
to have resilient assets in space that will survive and attack
and provide the services that are so important to the Joint
Force, and we have got to protect the Joint Force from similar
systems that the other side has that would threaten us and
target us.
So, we need to do both of those things, and those are
transformational capabilities compared to what we currently
have in the Space Force for the most part. My greatest concern,
again, is time and moving forward as quickly as possible with
the kind of space capabilities we need, particularly counter
space.
Senator Rounds. I guess just to followup on that, and once
again I suspect this is one that all of you would probably
participate in responding to, but ISR is critical, and right
now we have got platforms that do a great job, but they are not
necessarily space based.
Space based is critical long term, but it would appear that
right now, we are still building those ISR capabilities for the
Combatant Commander to have in order to finish that kill web.
General Allvin, would it be clear--would you, at least in your
professional military opinion, would you share with this
Committee where we are right now with regard to our ISR
platforms that the Combatant Commanders are requesting at this
time?
General Allvin. Absolutely, Senator. Of course, you know,
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance absolutely critical
to be able to close those kill chains and have the situational
awareness that Combatant Commanders need.
I would say that where we are is we are in a transition. I
think there is a comfort with the level of the capacity that
airborne ISR has been able to provide, and during our
transition to space, air mix I think is, from air----
Senator Rounds. General Allvin, I am going to I am going to
cut right to the chase on this. Fair to say we are assuming
risk in this transition?
General Allvin. Senator, I would say we assume risk in any
of the transitions. We are trying to manage that risk to the
platforms we have, retaining the platforms that we have through
the RQ-4 through 2029 and those that we have in the airborne
layer until we get more resilience through the spaceborne
layer, because that is where the future is.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Allvin, also with regard
to the family, the B-21 family. Right now, the actual platform
itself, we have ordered or were prepared to purchase 100. Would
you say that that is the minimum number needed of the base
platform?
General Allvin. It certainly is the future of our bomber
force. Before--100 is the program of record. I think we are not
going to reach that number until probably the mid 2030's and
beyond, and before we commit to that as being the platform
beyond that, I think there are other technological advancements
that we would see to be able to augment that and have a better
mix because, as you know, there, there also--there is a price
to pay for them. They are going to be very capable.
Senator Rounds. But the 100, sir, is the minimum?
General Allvin. That is the program of record, absolutely.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Let me recognize
Senator King, please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you
began your testimony talking about the Nunn-McCurdy process and
Sentinel. Very expensive program designed years ago. Make the
case for the ground based leg of the triad.
Secretary Kendall. I should mention that I am recused on
Sentinel itself, but I can definitely answer your question
about ground based leg. For as long as I have been in this
business, about 50 years, the country has relied upon the triad
for nuclear strategic deterrence. It presents an adversary with
a very difficult problem if it is contemplating an attack
against the United States.
The ICBM leg in particularly, which is our largest and most
responsive leg of the triad, presents a dilemma because if it
is attacked, it basically can be very responsive and respond
immediately with a large scale counterattack.
The submarine part of the fleet provides a more secure
Reserve, if you will, that is smaller in size but more
survivable. Then, of course, the bomber leg provides additional
flexibility and the ability to present an adversary with
another way in which they can be attacked.
That triumvirate, that triad has been enormously effective
in preventing a nuclear war for more than half a century--
almost approaching a century now. At one point, I think you
could have had a debate when the only nuclear powers were
Russia and the United States and our arsenals were declining,
that we could have gone to some other arrangement.
But the thing that has happened in the last few years that
really reinforces the need for the ICBM leg is China's breakout
and their expansion of their nuclear force, which is truly the
progress----
Senator King. China is making huge investments in a land
based----
Secretary Kendall. China is making a large investment, and
they are going to an inventory within the next few years that
is comparable to that of the United States and Russia.
So, for the first time in our history, we are going to live
in a world in which there are three large scale nuclear powers.
That is a very dangerous world, and I think reducing our
capability, reducing our options in the face of that would be a
serious mistake.
Senator King. Of course, the fundamental of our entire
defense policy is deterrence.
Secretary Kendall. Exactly.
Senator King. In order to maintain deterrence, the ground
leg is an important factor. Thank you. When we buy a major
weapon systems, B-21, F-35, do we acquire the IP?
What I am leading to here is the ability of our military to
3D print parts so that we are not subject to a long supply
chain delays and also potentially additional cost.
Do we have the--I believe that every hangar should have a
3D printer and every Navy ship should have a 3D printer so that
we are not tied to that long tail of parts. What is the status
of our acquisition of the IP so that that can be effectuated.
Secretary Kendall. Our history is mixed on IP acquisition.
The F-35 is a good example of a program where we didn't do
that. It was acquired initially under a philosophy of total
system procurement, which essentially left in the hands of the
prime contractor a lot of control of the program.
Makes it very hard to upgrade. It makes it very hard to
make changes and do them in a cost effective way, and to take
advantage of competition. Our more modern programs generally
are built where we acquire the intellectual property we need to
control both upgrades and maintenance so that we have a lot
more flexibility in how we manage. The B-21 is being done that
way.
The NGAD program is being done that way. It is one of the
lessons we have learned very painfully over our history in
acquisition. I am not sure that we always get it right today,
but my--I am not doing acquisitions anymore. I am in a
different role now.
But my guidance, when I was doing that, was that when we
still have the benefits of competition, we need to get the
intellectual property rights we are going to need for the life
of the program.
If we can get reasonable prices for those rights at that
time, and then be in a position to manage the program
effectively going forward. That is the way we should be doing
this. I can't say that we do it in every case.
Senator King. General Saltzman, we may need to talk about
this in a classified setting, but you used the term denying the
benefits of attacks in space. Secretary Kendall used counter
space. Clearly we are playing catch up in this situation. Is
there anything you can say in the open setting to provide some
reassurance that we are not totally vulnerable in space right
now?
General Saltzman. Yes, Senator. Thank you for that. The
fiscal year 2025 budget, I think, continues to advance us on a
pretty solid timeline for adding resilient architectures to the
critical missions like missile warning, satellite
communications, data transport.
I am pretty comfortable with where we are headed in terms
of denying the benefits of an attack on our systems to some
degree. The problem, again, as the Secretary mentioned, was the
fact that the PRC, in particular, has built a very robust,
space enabled targeting system and have continued to do so at a
very rapid rate.
So, scaling up to develop not just the type of counter
space capabilities that we need, but the quantity of those
capabilities to hold those targets at risk is where we are
falling behind in the timeline, and we are not just moving as
quickly as I think we should.
Senator King. Thank you. General Allvin, I am going to
submit this question for the record, but I would like some
thoughts from you about the Transition Assistance Program and
how it is being implemented in the Air Force.
I worry about the transition process from Active Duty to
veteran status. Very dangerous moment, and so, you don't need
to respond now, but I will look forward to your response on
that question. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Tuberville,
please.
Senator Tuberville. Good morning, gentlemen. General
Saltzman, fiscal year--the President's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget
contains a new program for space access, mobility, and
logistics. It is only $20 million. What is your plan for this?
General Saltzman. Sir, that type of money is used to study
to figure out if there is military utility, and so, for
example, we are looking at a concept called dynamic
maneuvering, if we can have unlimited fuel in our spacecraft
because we have the ability to service them on orbit, then we
can have more dynamic orbits which are harder to target.
That is the concept, that is the idea, but we really need
to evaluate that to figure out if there is serious military
utility there before we invest heavily in a program, and the
$20 million gets us along that line.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, $20 million for 5 years, that is
not a lot of money. I mean, is that going to get the job done?
General Saltzman. I believe we will have the answers to our
basic questions on military utility with that, and then we can
make a determination whether we need more funding.
Senator Tuberville. How is your recruiting and retention?
General Saltzman. We are doing great. We still get
thousands of applicants for hundreds of positions, and we are
above 90 percent in terms of the people that we want to retain.
So, I am not convinced that that is going to last forever,
and so, we are working hard to make sure we provide our
guardians with high levels of challenges and opportunities to
enhance their own competencies, to make sure we can retain that
workforce.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Secretary Kendall, recently,
I guess you decided to cut in half to MH-139s, and we have got
1 or 2. I think we got eight total eventually coming to
Montgomery, in Maxville. What is your plan on this?
Secretary Kendall. I Maxville has one already, and another
later this year, and then the full eight about a year after
that. We did cut the buyback. We cut it from about 80 to about
40. The reason for that was that the threat change and the
areas in which we expect to operate have changed.
So, it is a fairly expensive special purpose helicopter
that isn't--doesn't have that much utility in some of the
theaters where we would have to operate given the threats are
there. There are a number of other assets and in many cases can
be used for personnel recovery.
So, we basically downsized it to have what we think is a
reasonable force to meet our needs given the changes in the
threat. That has been the fundamental driver.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. I was at the Tyndall Air Force
Base recently. How is that coming? That was a disaster, what
happened to Tyndall, but we are rebuilding it back. Is it
coming along pretty good?
Secretary Kendall. I would have to get your detailed answer
for the record, but yes, is a basic answer to your question. A
lot has been put into Tyndall to restore it.
Secretary Kendall. There are 37 National Disaster Recovery
(NDR) projects at Tyndall Air Force Base, and five (5) projects
are complete. Thirty (30) projects are in construction. The
status for the remaining two (2) projects is below, and
timelines are subject to receiving additional funds:
1. Air Force Civil Engineer Center Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Facilities and Gate: The estimated
award date is May 11, 2025.
2. Deployment Center/Flight Line Dining/Army-Air Force
Exchange Services (AAFES): The estimated award date is December
31, 2025.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General Allvin, F-35s. We
are putting a lot of eggs in a basket on this. Are we getting
enough flying time knowing the cost of F-35s, of operating and
maintaining?
General Allvin. Well, Senator, we are certainly trying to
manage that to get as many as we can. You know, we--as the
weapons system sustainment accounts and the flying our program
accounts are very much interrelated, and so, as we try and
drive down the costs of what it costs to sustain that, we can
put more of that into flying hours. No pilot thinks he or she
ever has enough flying hours, but we certainly are augmenting
that with our synthetic training.
Our joint synthetic environment is also helping us
understand the things that we don't necessarily want to do an
open air because of security. I would say, though, that every
pilot wants to fly more, but we are trying to manage that well
to keep that proficiency up, to keep up with the pace and
threat.
Senator Tuberville. We want to make sure our pilots are
safe, obviously. In the confrontations we have been having
lately, the F-35 have been used, that you know of?
General Allvin. The F-35 has been a part of--some of the
recent ones, like over the weekend, it was not required for
that capability, and it actually wasn't in the theater. But the
assets that we had in the theater, they come through request
from the Combatant Commander, and we provide the assets for
which they request.
Those were satisfactory in that permissive environment. In
the highly contested environment, the contested environment,
that is really where this fifth generation capability of the F-
35 provides today, but even more so into tomorrow with the Tech
Refresh 3 and Block 4 capability to upgrade capabilities.
Senator Tuberville. General, how is our recruiting in the
Air Force?
General Allvin. Recruiting in the Air Force is doing quite
well. It is really improving. On the Active Duty side, we
actually just recently increased our goal, and we think we are
going to make that increased goal.
On the Reserve side, they are going to be within 1 percent.
They think they may actually make it as well. The National
Guard had a deeper deficit to recover from. I think last year
they were well below. They are going to be within 5 percent.
So, we are gaining on all fronts. We are certainly not resting
on our laurels.
In the 2025 budget, we asked for another $50 million to be
able to distribute out to more recruiting centers to have more
digitization of records and things so we can also have the
recruiters do more recruiting rather than just admin work.
So, we are not giving up that we have got it all linked
right now, but we certainly are on the right path.
Senator Tuberville. We are increasing numbers?
General Allvin. Absolutely.
Senator Tuberville. Is that what you said?
General Allvin. Yes.
Senator Tuberville. What percentage, do you know?
General Allvin. Well, I would say right now we are----
Senator Tuberville. The goal.
General Allvin. What percent of the goal? The Active Duty
Air Force right now is reaching 100 percent of its goal--101
percent, quite frankly, which allows us to bank a few. The
Reserves, 99 percent, and the Air National Guard, about 95
percent.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen,
welcome. It is good to see all of you here today. Secretary
Kendall and General Allvin, as you know, this past January, the
Air Force announced that Selfridge Air National Guard Base will
be receiving 12 new KC-46 refueling tankers in 2029.
I just want to say, I don't think I can emphasize enough
how grateful I am to the Air Force for making this
announcement. Certainly, a very big deal for our area, and the
community is very excited to receive these critical refueling
tankers that will continue to play really a tremendous
strategic role for us for decades to come.
At the same time, and I have talked to both of General
Allvin and Secretary Kendall, I also remain committed to
securing a future fighter replacement for the retiring A-10's
that are currently flying at Selfridge.
The Air Force basing announcement clearly stated at the
time that the KC-46 decision does not preclude Selfridge from
``being considered for a future fighter aircraft mission or
other potential missions in the future.''
I would just like both of you, if you would, could reaffirm
and commit on the record that Selfridge is still in
consideration for a future fighter basing decision at some
point. Secretary Kendall.
Secretary Kendall. Senator, thank you. Selfridge would be
in consideration for future fighter basing decision,
potentially. But at the current time, we don't have an option
to do that. The reason we made the programmatic decision to put
the KC-46 there was in part at least because of the divestiture
of the A-10.
So, those two are linked together. Our general policy is to
replace a flying mission that is divested with a like flying
mission where we can. If we can't do that, we try to apply it
with another flying mission, and then if we can't do that, we
try to replace it with an enduring mission. In the case of
Selfridge, the KC-46s are basically to replace the combination
of the KC-135s and the A-10's.
In the future we may be at a very different place. General
Allvin mentioned in his opening statement the CCAs that we are
acquiring. We don't know the final inventory number there, but
we expect it to be large, so there is a possibility there.
We are looking as we build our 2026 budget at our overall
fighter modernization plan overall. So, there is a possibility
in the future, but none that we can point to right at this
time.
Senator Peters. General Allvin, you want to add any to that
comment?
General Allvin. I, just to answer the specific question, it
does not preclude, but the Secretary has really laid out with
respect to the basing decision and criteria.
Senator Peters. Right, but it doesn't preclude future, as
we continue to work. General Allvin, and I appreciate the time
that we took yesterday, or last week rather, to meet. As part
of that conversation, we discussed the critical importance of
the collaborative combat aircraft, which Secretary Kendall just
referred to.
We also talked about a potential pilot program to study
drone operations in medium and high intensity airspace, which
right now is problematic with unmanned aircraft. This pilot
program would allow the Department of Defense to experiment
with existing unmanned systems like the MQ-9 Reaper, to pave
the way for the employment of future platforms like CCA.
So, my question for you, sir, is what benefits and lessons
learned would the Air Force--would the Air Force gain from this
kind of pilot program? Would you support a pilot program of
that nature?
General Allvin. Thank you, Senator. I certainly would. I
think as we look forward to the arc of where the contested
environment in which we are going to need to fight, that arc is
one that requires us to really investigate all the options for
how we maintain survivability at the right risk, to be able to
penetrate, to be able to survive and to be able to close these
kill chains.
It has increasingly become apparent to me that there is
ripe for study how we do it in the uncrewed area where we are
developing the autonomy as well. We have a current program in
parallel that we are looking at the length of--the portfolio to
which you can put autonomy in these collaborative combat
aircraft, as well as how we utilize them and base them. So, we
are trying to go as fast as we can into the human, machine
teaming play.
Senator Peters. Yes, if I can build on that. We discussed
last week the importance of the KC-46 refueling tanker, as well
as the need for some out-of-the-box thinking when it comes to
collaborative combat aircraft employment.
As part of that discussion, you mentioned the possibility,
the possibility of employing KC-46s a command and control node
for future CCA aircraft. You know, I understand that those
decisions are in the very early stages, but what steps with the
Air Force needed to explore this KC-46 and CCA command and
control concept?
General Allvin. Senator, I think the first step that we
need to do is to get better situational awareness on the KC-
46s. That is something that we are looking into very strongly.
General Minihan has done some experiments out in the Indo-
Pacific showing that if you just have a C2 node, the ability to
communicate in ways that the tanker right now can't, that
starts your ability to have a more resilient command and
control network.
Now, whether that next step is to go from just being a
communications node relay to actually doing airborne battle
management is something that can be investigated. But the first
start is to ensure that you have the connectivity of your
mobility platforms in a way that you didn't before.
That opens up the opportunity to do more than just being a
comms relay, but maybe doing more command control.
Senator Peters. Right. Thank you. Appreciate it.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator Schmitt,
please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Kendall, a sort of a followup on Senator Peters' question.
Missouri is home to Whiteman Air Force Base, and the 442d
Fighter Wing is there.
The A-10, you know, the Air Force is moving on from the A-
10, and that will be--really come to fruition in 4 years. You
know, it has some really experienced pilots and maintainers,
and we are already starting to see the retention issues because
there hasn't been a follow on mission.
What can you tell me today about how you are approaching
that? Because there are some options, but there has really just
not been a lot of movement.
Secretary Kendall. I don't think we have an option yet for
the A-10 replacement.
Senator Schmitt. Can I make a suggestion?
Secretary Kendall. Yes.
Senator Schmitt. The F-15EX would be a great option.
Secretary Kendall. We will take that under consideration,
Senator.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Second, Rosecrans, which is in Saint
Joseph, Missouri, is home to the aging fleet of C-130Hs.
Interestingly--and, you know, some have said that the last
round was pretty political based on where they went. I just
want to make the point, Rosecrans trains people from all around
the world.
For example, the Indian Air Force comes in with their C-
130Js to be trained by the folks at Rosecrans who have Hs from
the 1980's. There have been eight, you know, appropriate in
this next round. So, I guess just for either one of you, where
do you see this headed?
General Allvin. Senator, those eight Hs that were
appropriated, certainly they go through the basing process, and
the candidate bases, I understand that Rosecrans is going to be
considered as one of, I believe, four candidate bases for
those.
Obviously, it meets the criteria. That is the first part of
the strategic basing process, and it does meet the criteria,
obviously, because they are flying 130--but the expectation is
it will be under consideration. The Director of our Air
National Guard Bureau works closely with the Secretary on
making those decisions, but it should be in the consideration.
Secretary Kendall. Let me just add that I delegated the
last C-130 trade basing decision to the head of the Air
National Guard, and I will probably do the same with this one.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Secretary. Kendall, I do want to ask
you, I sent a letter to Secretary Austin, you know, asking for
some accountability with these DEI positions that have found
their way throughout the Pentagon and our Armed Services.
Secretary Kendall, do you know how many DEI positions exist in
the Air Force--full time positions?
Secretary Kendall. It is a relatively small number,
Senator. We are in the process of complying with the law, and
we will comply with it. I think the due date to have this done
is about the middle of June, if I remember right. So, we will
get you the exact----
Senator Schmitt. Well, the answer is 70--70. The Navy has
18. The Army has 19. Those are 18 and 19 too many, as far as I
am concerned. But 70, what do these people do all day long?
Like I am asking because what do these DEI coordinators do all
day long, 70 of them, in the Air Force?
Secretary Kendall. I think--I thought the number was higher
than that, actually.
Senator Schmitt. Well, that is full time position, so
maybe--I am actually very curious now what you are going to--
what your report might show. But 70 full time positions, what
do they do?
Secretary Kendall. They oversee programs that are in that
area. They oversee our training in that area. They are
responsible for some of our data collection that will be
related to that. We did two disparity reports in the Department
that were started before I came in, and probably shortly
afterwards.
They are responsible for that. Those report showed pretty
significant disparities in results of things like the criminal
justice system, in promotions and command selection rates, and
then senior school selection, and those pointed us at actions
we could take to try to address some of those concerns.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Well----
Secretary Kendall. They had they have done, I think,
valuable work----
Senator Schmitt. Well, I look forward to your full report,
and I could make a suggestion how you could be a real leader
for the country. You should fire them all, every single one of
them. It is so divisive.
Senator Tuberville has talked about recruiting. The
elephant in the room is, the truth is that this is dividing our
folks in the military by race. It is taking us backward. It is
cultural Marxism and somehow you are, you know, you are here
today defending this. So, you know, I have got legislation to
get rid of them all.
You could take a real leadership position by firing
everybody tomorrow. That would be great. I do have time for one
quick question. I know that we are moving a lot of ISR
capability to space, and I am generally supportive of that.
But are you guys concerned at all that we are maybe moving
too quickly away from some more traditional capabilities?
Secretary Kendall. Just as a quick comment on--I think we
have a fundamental difference of opinion about DEI.
Senator Schmitt. We do. We certainly do.
Secretary Kendall. Regarding ISR, we are moving, we are
transitioning into space because of the vulnerability of some
of our airborne platforms. AWACS and JSTARS are great examples
of that.
The same is true with some of our UAVs, unmanned aerial
vehicles that operate--can operate in a contested environment.
We will always have a balance between airborne capabilities and
space based capabilities.
We want to confront our adversaries with a more difficult
problem than just having to deal with one of those. But because
of the range at which--and the sophistication of which our
adversaries are reaching out to engage some of those platforms,
they are pushed back so far that they can't be effective in
many cases, or they have to operate in a way which limits their
effectiveness in order to be survivable.
So, we are moving a lot of that capability in the space,
and we are doing it with the resilient architectures that
General Saltzman talked about earlier.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Schmitt. Senator Warren, please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our military is
the best and the strongest in the world, so it is no surprise
that foreign governments have been recruiting both Active Duty
and retired officers.
The Washington Post found that hundreds of foreign
governments have hired hundreds of retired officers, from Saudi
Arabia, to Libya, to the United Arab Emirates. General Allvin,
is there a National Security risk when our trained military
personnel work for foreign governments?
General Allvin. Senator, there certainly is.
Senator Warren. So retired officers working for foreign
governments could endanger our military competitiveness. That
is why we require retired officers who want to work for foreign
governments to receive approval from their military service and
from the Secretary of State.
Now, we tightened up that process last year in the National
Defense Authorization Act, but there are still some loopholes
in this space. For example, Active Duty servicemembers are
allowed to start negotiating employment with foreign
governments before they leave the military.
General Allvin, could allowing Active Duty airmen to
negotiate work on behalf of another government while still
wearing their U.S. uniform pose risks to our National Security?
General Allvin. Well, Senator, there is--while they are
still in uniform, they are still subject to the policies, the
restrictions, and the UCMJ----
Senator Warren. I understand that, but they are also
permitted to negotiate with foreign governments for their
future employment. What I am asking is, does that potentially
pose a conflict of interest that threatens our security, at
least potentially?
General Allvin. I say potentially, could, yes.
Senator Warren. All right, I agree. You know, we need to
strengthen our rules so that Active Duty personnel aren't
selling their services to foreign governments while they are
still in uniform.
There is another loophole that we need to close. Last year,
the Air Force issued a memo raising concerns about China's
recruitment of both current and recently retired Air Force
personnel like pilots, maintainers, and other technical experts
that have a lot of insight into United States air tactics.
Now, in many cases, these individuals are hired by private
entities and actually may not know that they are signing up to
work for a foreign government, and our laws requiring retired
personnel to get approval before working for a foreign
government are much less clear if the officers are hired by a
private company that is doing work for that foreign government.
General Allvin, from your perspective, are we in a better
position to protect classified information and U.S. National
Security when we know if a retired officer is working for a
contractor that works for a foreign government?
General Allvin. Senator, we are, and I think, as you know,
my predecessor, now Chairman Brown, put out that NOTAM really
to raise awareness, and also to serve as a deterrent. Both of
those I think are having good effect.
The--our AFOSI is getting good reports back, but it is not
only about educating those within the force, but also the
mandatory now as you transition out--also that we are making
sure we do that as well.
Senator Warren. Yes, and I appreciate that and treat this
as awareness is raised on this. You know, these arrangements
can pose serious conflicts of interest, and in fact, the Air
Force rejected two retired generals' requests to work for an
Azerbaijani cargo carrier because it would raise concerns about
potential conflicts given previous contracts the Air Force had
awarded to the airline.
So last year I secured a position--a provision in the
Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act to
require work on behalf of foreign governments, even indirectly
through a private company, to be approved by the U.S
Government.
I think it is foolish not to use our National Security
expertise to help retired servicemembers identify if their
potential employer is asking them, potentially, to break the
law here. So, I look forward to working with my colleagues and
the Air Force to close any additional loopholes that allow
foreign governments to target and exploit our servicemembers.
Thank you all, and thank you in particular, General Allvin,
for your work in this area.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Ernst,
please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you,
gentlemen, very much for your service to our Nation and to your
teams as well. We appreciate you being here today.
First, Secretary Kendall, we know the Iowa National Guard
is really important to me, and so I am going to address to you
some of the questions coming from our great Iowa Air Guard.
Secretary Kendall, when the National Guard's 185th Air
Refueling Wing in Sioux City, Iowa, converted from its F-16
fighters to the KC-135 tankers way back in 2003, the United
States Air Force said that they would upgrade the airfield at
the Iowa National Guard facility.
Now the 185th Air Refueling Wing might, nothing confirmed,
but might lose its mission because the runway, which has not
yet been upgraded, here we are 20 plus years later, is
insufficient for the KC-46s, which will eventually replace the
135s.
Secretary Kendall, why do you feel that it has taken so
long to begin the airfield expansion? Do I have your commitment
to work with the National Guard to assess the runway upgrade
situation of the airfield at the Iowa National Guard facility
in Sioux City?
Secretary Kendall. Thank you, Senator. We have started the
architectural and engineering activities associated with three
projects at the airfield, and I think the Congress has been
notified of that. So, we are moving forward with those
upgrades.
There is a runway repair project at $45 million, runway
extension at $47 million, and an aircraft parking apron at $45
million. They are not all the way through the process yet. This
is the earlier phases, but the process has begun, and we will
work with you on that.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Can you outline maybe the timeframe
that we might see some of that work done? Walk me through that
assessment and when we could actually see work begin----
Secretary Kendall. I will get you the details for the
record, but essentially we have to get to a 35 design, percent
design maturity before we put a MILCON project down. So, we are
in the earlier stages of that process, and I will get you the
dates as to when different phases of it might be completed.
Secretary Kendall. The Architecture and Engineering (A&E)
notification for three (3) military construction (MILCON)
projects at Sioux Gateway Airport was signed by the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Energy, Installations, and
Environment on March 21, 2024, and notified to the Readiness
Subcommittees on House Armed Services Committee and Senate
Armed Services Committee. The three (3) projects are Repair
Runway ($45 million), Extend Runway ($47 million), and Add/
Alter Aircraft Parking Apron ($45 million). The A&E contract
for all three (3) airfield projects has been awarded, and
criteria review conference and design charrette was held at the
end of April 2024. The estimated completion date of the design
is August 15, 2025.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you so much, Secretary, and I do
understand the importance of transitioning to a more capable
aircraft like the 46. Do we also have your commitment that any
change to the 185th Air Refueling Wings' mission set will be on
pause until a full and proper MILCON assessment is completed?
Secretary Kendall. I am not aware of any changes that would
be--would occur in the interim. I will double check that and
get back to you on that, but I am not aware of any.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Secretary. It is just important
that I get that on the record. So, again, we have got such a
great unit. The 185th has been so engaged around the globe, we
want to make sure that they are taken care of.
So, Secretary Kendall, as we are now in an era of great
powered competition, the urgency of modernizing and
recapitalizing our air refueling and strategic airlift
capabilities is absolutely paramount.
If you could walk us through how you are ensuring our
transition from the older KC-135s to the newer 46s is conducted
without compromising mission readiness.
Secretary Kendall. Essentially, as we retire 135s, we are
replacing them with 46s on a one for one basis, generally
speaking. It is not always exactly the case. We are trying to
make sure we have a smooth transition so that we don't have a
gap in capability for the tanker fleet, and we are required to
maintain the general fleet at a certain level. So, we have to
stay within those statutory constraints.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you, and General Allvin, SOF
continues to play a vital role in strategic competition,
particularly in irregular warfare. So, what is your view on the
role of the Air Force Special Warfare and AFSOC in great power
competition and future conflicts?
General Allvin. Yes, thank you for that, Senator. I think
they are doing a tremendous job in really adapting. That is one
of the things Special Operations has always done. They have
really adapted to the missions that have been laid out in front
of them. But in their transition really also to great power
competition, they have adjusted some of their AFSCs to be more
relevant.
What was the Special Operations Weather Team? Now they are
more special reconnaissance, and they are part of this newly
formed Special Tactics Team, which includes the combat control
teams, the pararescue, the tactical air control party, and now
the strategic reconnaissance.
They are really forming--sort of the way they did when they
used to be in the old great power competition, understanding
how to operate ahead of main force elements, in this case in a
more electromagnetic spectrum contested environment.
They are really doing some pathfinding work in helping to
find those--take their niche capabilities and do things at
speed and agility that maybe the standard, conventional forces
couldn't do. I think I am really impressed with how they are
moving along.
Senator Ernst. Yes. Thank you, and General, and I was
excited to learn from you about the Air Force special
reconnaissance, airmen and airwomen, and we appreciate their
service. It is a great opportunity for them and for us. Thank
you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Kelly,
please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Secretary
Kendall, General Allvin, General Saltzman, thank you for being
here today. Secretary Kendall and General Allvin, I want to
thank you for your continued collaboration as we secure a long
term future for Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson.
During last year's hearing, I asked you about the stand up
of the new power projection wing at DM, and I would like to
followup on that today, and also followup on Senator Ernst's
discussion with you, General Allvin.
In the last year, we brought new search and rescue and
advanced electronic platforms to DM, and I would like to hear
any updates on the power projection wing that you can provide.
General Allvin, starting with you, you have just embarked on
this ambitious plan to reoptimize the Air Force for great power
competition.
A key component of this is the creation of deployable
combat wings. The power projection wings provides just such a
force for Air Force Special Ops command. Can you talk about the
wing's overall importance in the Air Force's strategy?
General Allvin. Yes, thank you for that, Senator. In some
ways, some of the things that the Special Operations community
have been doing have been a little bit of pathfinders with our
deployable combat wings, reorienting to where you have the
ability to train with support teams in garrison in the way you
expect to deploy with that unit together.
Training together, doing individual training, then
consolidated training, certification training, all those things
are paving the way. With this power projection wing at Davis-
Monthan, it is oriented toward the Indo-Pacific.
So not only in its structure is it designed to be able to
address the pacing challenge, but in its orientation as well. I
think there will be lessons that we learn in the structure and
the make up of those sort of wings that will apply to the
larger Air Force.
Senator Kelly. Right. Thank you, and Secretary Kendall,
your new strategic strategy here is ambitious and I support
your efforts. But there are a lot of moving parts here and
still a lot to be done to get all the units in place at Davis-
Monthan.
Can you provide assurances that you will still be able to
manage all of these movements and stick with the timeline to
stand up the power projection wing?
Senator Kelly. Senator, we got to do everything we can to
make that happen. Right now, we are on track. The site
activation task force--I was out there in February, as I think
you know, and the EIS is on track for completion in 25, through
quarter 25.
Those are kind of the governing events. So, I think we are
moving forward on schedule, but we will continue to monitor
that and make sure that we do.
Senator Kelly. So, you are not anticipating any new delays?
Secretary Kendall. Not at this time.
Senator Kelly. Do I have your continued commitment here to
ensure full transparency on this process?
Secretary Kendall. Absolutely, Senator. I will work closely
with you on it.
Senator Kelly. If any issues come up, would you please
bring them to my attention as soon as you possibly can?
Secretary Kendall. Yes, I will.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, and on electronic warfare,
Secretary Kendall, it is--EW is a cornerstone of any modern
conflict, and it is only going to increase in importance as we
prepare for great power competition.
The Air Force and DOD need to continue to focus on
electronic warfare, because achieving EW superiority is going
to be the key to getting air superiority. I am encouraged by
systems like the new Compass Call airplane that is being
deployed at Davis-Monthan. But also, the new F-15 EW systems.
But I am also concerned that our training ranges aren't
able to replicate the threat sufficiently. If we want to
succeed in the Indo-Pacific, we need to ensure that our
military is prepared for operations that are realistic because
of the training being realistic. The emitters available for
training, and our ranges, aren't quite realistic enough to fool
a fifth generation aircraft.
This is--so it is no way to train for pacing challenges. In
my view, the exercises and the training we do should be the
hardest thing we do here, so that when it is time to fight, we
are more than ready to go. It is imperative that DOD expand its
training ranges to provide more realistic training.
Achieving that level of readiness is going to require
coordination across the branches. That is why I have advocated
for DOD to assess the capacity for testing and training of EW
operations and identify areas where multiple ranges can be used
to simulate the Pacific Deterrence Initiative.
For example, at the Fort Huachuca's Electronic Proving
Ground with its restricted airspace, favorable terrain, access
to frequencies and spectrum, and bands of spectrum, and the
authorities required to conduct EW training, it offers great
potential for advanced and dynamic electronic warfare testing,
experimentation, and training.
Secretary Kendall, how important is it to find
opportunities for realistic EW training, and how can the Air
Force benefit from EW testing and training in an environment
like Fort Huachuca?
Secretary Kendall. It is critical, Senator. I haven't
looked at Fort Huachuca specifically. General Allvin may have
some information on that, but for Nellis and for JPARC in
Alaska, and for the exercises, I think you are aware of that we
really see--down in the Pacific.
Having ability to emulate both the threat and the space and
time constraints that are applicable against the pacing
challenge are really important to us. So, if Huachuca offers
some additional opportunities there, we would be happy to
pursue those.
Senator Kelly. Yes----
Secretary Kendall. I am not familiar exactly with what we
are doing there.
Senator Kelly. What it offers is it has got geography. It
is a bowl. You can emit at orders of magnitude, I think a
couple orders of magnitude power compared to what you can emit
on the Barry Goldwater range. So, it offers--you know, F-35s
can detect the sensor at a much greater range, more realistic
training. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
Secretary Kendall. We will take a look at it.
Chairman Reed. Let me recognize now, Senator Budd.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning,
gentlemen. Secretary Kendall, we have spoken at length
regarding the Air Force budget, my concerns with the Air Force
plan divestment of fighter aircraft, including the F-15 Strike
Eagles from Seymour Johnson, my State of North Carolina.
So, I am deeply concerned about what a growing fighter
capacity gap could mean for the fight in the Indo-Pacific. But
also, as was made clear over this past weekend, our fighter
aircraft are also playing major roles in other regions,
including U.S. Central Command every single day. So, I would
like to turn to you, General Allvin, for just a moment, and
again, thank you for being here.
The Committee heard from the Commander of INDOPACOM this
year, and just recently in fact, that there is a role for
Strike Eagles in scenarios in the Indo-Pacific. The head of
NORTHCOM also told this Committee the F-15E is in many ways
unmatched air to ground, and in many ways, it is unmatched air
to air.
It also has a phenomenal radar that can pick out low and
slow moving, and it has got a great radar cross-section, which
is useful for drones and other threats like cruise missiles. It
was the 335th Squadron at North Carolina's Seymour Johnson Air
Force Base to prove that out on Sunday when they helped shoot
down dozens of drones fired at Israel from Iran.
The Supreme Allied Commander of Europe told the House Armed
Services Committee last week that Strike Eagles and, I quote,
``figure heavily in his plans at EUCOM.'' He also said it would
be very important not to have a gap between the retirement of
one aircraft and the arrival of the next.
Most recently, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs agreed with
these assessments of the F-15E and asserted that it is indeed a
very capable aircraft. General Allvin, do you agree with these
officers' assessments of the capability and importance of the
Strike Eagles in scenarios across the Combatant Commands, yes
or no, sir?
General Allvin. I absolutely do agree with those
assessments. I would offer that those assessments are part of--
first of all, I want to echo what you said about what happened
over the weekend. Brilliant cruise skill and courage. That
skill and courage in those aircraft also had a connection with
a command and control system.
Brilliant stuff done in the AOC, an air battle management
system, and all of those systems are what made it successful.
The platform is very capable, but it has to have the systems
around it in order to be effective and combat effective, and so
going into the future, we would imagine that that platform is
going to have to fire weapons longer range.
That range has to have target custody for that munition to
be able to track the target all the way. It needs to be able to
be--to defend itself in that theater. It needs to be able to
have a base from which it can move around.
All those things are what is going to make it successful
against a pacing challenge. So that capability in and of itself
is very impressive. But when you are in a fiscally constrained
environment, we try and manage how many of those, and those
with respect to other platforms, what is the mix of the entire
system beyond just the weapon and the aircraft to make it
effective against--in the highly contested environment against
the PRC? But it is a highly capable aircraft.
Senator Budd. Thank you, General, and I will just note that
many of those, including those at Seymour Johnson, have been
upgraded or soon to be upgraded, or can be upgraded to be
useful into the 2030's or 2040's. Secretary Kendall, turning to
you, sir, where is the fighter roadmap required by the NDAA. We
have heard, Secretary, that it is sitting with you.
Secretary Kendall. It is in final review. Should be over
here shortly, Senator.
Senator Budd. We look forward to receiving that report.
When should we expect the congressionally required report on
divestment of F-15 aircraft? Will it be compliant with Section
131 of last year's NDAA?
Secretary Kendall. Right now, our plans are to take out
additional F-15s in the out years, but of course we will be
complying with the current law and our 2025 budget is
consistent with that.
Senator Budd. Hopefully in compliance with 131 of last
year's NDAA. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I hope the Committee
takes note of the testimony it has received this year and
seriously considers prohibiting divestment of the F-15 Strike
Eagles, particularly 26 F-15 Strike Eagles next year. Thank
you, sir. Thank you very much, Senator Budd. Senator Rosen,
please.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, for holding this
important hearing. I would also like to thank Secretary
Kendall, General Allvin, and General Saltzman, for testifying
today, and of course, for your service to our country.
Secretary Kendall, I know we have had so many meetings, but
I really appreciated our phone call last week, and I just want
to take a moment to emphasize the importance of the Nevada Air
National Guard and their mission, which they do so well.
Not only does 152d Airlift Wing in Reno provide rapid
global mobility and are currently preparing for deployment, but
they are also--they also protect the Homeland by fighting those
horrific wildland fires in Nevada and throughout the West with
legacy C-130Hs.
This mission is extremely dangerous as they fly heavy, low,
and slow over these fires in challenging mountainous terrain.
Upgrading to the C-130Js would provide increased power and
cargo capacity for fire retardant, which would result in
increased flight safety, and of course, firefighting
capability.
Mr. Secretary, now that the Fiscal Year 2024 Defense
Appropriations Act has provided funding to procure eight
additional C-130Js, funding that I fought to secure, can I have
your commitment to seriously consider Reno when making a basing
decision due to their obvious operational need?
Secretary Kendall. Yes, Senator, I think we are proceeding
with that basing selection, and I believe Reno is one of the
units being considered.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, and can I have your commitment
that the Air Force will strongly consider location and the
mission served in particular regions of the country when making
their basing decisions to ensure that the Air National Guard is
best equipped to respond to these emergencies?
Secretary Kendall. I think we have a list of basing
considerations that will be consistent with what we have done
in the past.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I am going to move on now to
housing and our dorm shortages, because at Nellis and Creech,
we have--actually, Senator Kelly was talking a little bit about
Nellis over there.
But in Nevada, home to Nellis and Creech Air Force bases, I
have observed firsthand the unique challenges that each base
faces, particularly when it comes to affordable housing and
dorm availability for our airmen and our guardians.
Given the widespread and distinct nature of these shortages
across the Department and the Air Force, a one size fits all
solution is really insufficient to address the issues.
Secretary Kendall, what additional authorities, if any, could
be granted to Service Secretaries to address the current
housing and dormitory shortages, thereby improving really the
welfare and readiness of our personnel across the Force?
Secretary Kendall. We are looking at some innovative ways
to do that through public, private partnerships in various
forms. The Navy has a project in San Diego, I think, which is
an example of how to do that. I am not aware of additional
authorities we need at this time, but if there are any, then I
will get back to you with that.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, appreciate that. I am going to
stay on you and stay on Creech Air Force Base a little bit. We
love Creech, and with the experimental operations unit
considering Creech Air Force Base as the eventual deployment of
the collaborative combat aircraft--I am going to say CCA.
That is a little bit easier. We must address the
complexities of the new systems' basing. Decisions about where
to house these systems needs considerations beyond, again,
conventional requirements such as employment options,
infrastructure adaptations, airspace control, and of course,
electromagnetic spectrum availability.
So, given the challenges posed by these new systems, could
you elaborate on the variables that the Air Force might--that
you might be considering in the CCA basing decision?
Specifically, what unique characteristics and complications
might we anticipate?
Secretary Kendall. Senator, that work is going on now to
decide what the considerations will be. We are a little bit
early in the process. Creech is, I think, a very reasonable
candidate, however.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you. Well, I am going to
move on. We are going to keep on Creech in particular, but
Nellis as well, to General Allvin. You know the sacrifices,
each one of you really know the sacrifices and challenges that
airmen and their families make during their permanent change of
station.
One of the difficulties that is really challenging for us
is finding and accessing childcare at each new location, and
so, you know, childcare remains one of the most needed services
for our military members. But it is still in such short supply,
it is too expensive and difficult.
So currently, General, in your role as Chief of Staff of
the Air Force, what can you do to help increase access to
affordable childcare that is flexible, particularly Creech,
they go to 24--well, all of them, they go 24/7, 365. We need
some help out there.
General Allvin. Well, thank you, Senator, and I couldn't
agree with you more. A lot of times we put things into a band
called quality of life, but it is actually a readiness issue as
well, to make sure that our airmen can focus on the mission at
hand, understanding that they know that their families and
children are well cared for.
Specifically, I think we--what I can do as Chief of Staff
is continue to advocate for the programs at the Department of
Air Force is really already undertaking with respect to going
above and beyond staffing those child development centers that
we actually have. We have increased the staffing through the
incentivization of 100 percent reduction--free for the first
child, 25 percent off for the other children, for those are
working on staff there.
That has actually increased our staffing from 61 to 63
percent to 81 percent. So that is helping staff the existing
one. But to your point, Senator, specifically in some of these
nontraditional areas where you have not normal business hours,
this requirement, the increase in the family childcare centers,
the ones that can be done at home, are those that are actually
certified to do such.
We have increased funding and incentives for that, about 21
percent from where it was in fiscal year 2023. So, we continue
to do that, and in other areas for facility restoration and
modernization, we have put a lot of money into that as well.
On the MILCON side, overall, sometimes we just need more
facilities. On the MILCON side, we have had 35 MILCON projects
under consideration. Already 11 of them are at appropriation
and design--or and delivery. The other 24 in design.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. I look forward to
continuing to work with you on all of that. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Cramer,
please.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for your service and for being here, and I look
forward to the next session as well, the classified section.
No hearing with the Air Force would be complete without me
sort of jumping on board with some of my other friends who have
asked about ISR. Secretary Kendall, I am going to go more at it
from the re-optimization plans that were released in February,
and my office has sent an RFI asking about how the new Air
Force structure might affect the 319th Reconnaissance Wing in
Grand Forks, specifically.
I mean, this is a very high demand air force base with very
few people and assets. At least how do--I guess to put it
pointedly, how do these low density, high demand units like the
Global Hawk Wing in Grand Forks, or other ISR units, for that
matter, on the Air Force fit into the plan for re-optimization,
and I just add, you know, I mean, I read all 12 pages on the
airplane this morning. There is not a mention of ISR. There is
lots of mentions, 16 of China RPC, 8--anyway, no ISR in 12
pages. So, how does Grand Forks fit into re-optimization?
Secretary Kendall. It doesn't directly. The re-optimization
of great power competition is largely about focusing our
readiness units on readiness, creating units who are focused on
the future, and sustaining advantage over time.
Developing our people. Some of the things we are going to
do in terms of their skill sets and so on, their readiness for
that kind of conflict. Also, some changes in the Secretariat.
So, specific units are not directly addressed.
As we form units of action that are either deployable or
fight in place or are supporting, there may be some changes on
the margin as a result of that. That is work that is going to
take place over some time. There is no direct correlation
between what we are doing under re-optimizing and specific
units.
Senator Cramer. Okay----
Secretary Kendall. Yes, we do have plans----
Senator Cramer. I understand but maybe not specific units,
but ISR at large is not even mentioned as a priority, where it
used to be always mentioned as a priority.
Secretary Kendall. ISR is a very high priority under our
operational imperatives and under cross-cutting operational
enablers. So, it is a very big part of our modernization
program, which is separate from the re-optimization.
As we talked about earlier, we are moving a lot of our ISR
capacity into space because our airborne platforms, many of
them are too vulnerable to attack. They are not survivable
enough. We want to keep a balance. We want to keep some
airborne platforms and some space base capabilities as well. We
have requirements to have ISR for less contested environments,
more benign environments, as well as highly contested
environments.
So, we are trying to have a balanced mix of capabilities
and sustain that while we move forward. Some of our legacy
capabilities, if you will, are less valuable to us against the
pacing challenge. We are just not effective against a pacing
challenge----
Senator Cramer. You know, I get all--I understand all that.
Modernization is important everywhere and in every mission, and
space is obviously critical to it. Obviously, I am--I have a
bias for space.
But I also have talked to enough people both in space and
especially COCOMS, especially recently, especially very
recently, who are frightened to death about the gap between,
their ability to find a target, identify a target, hit a
target, today, or over the course of the next few years, and
the day that space is not so vulnerable that it can stand
alone.
General Allvin, did you want to speak to that? Then I do
have a question about----
General Allvin. Yes. The only thing I will add to what the
Secretary said is specifically within reference to a great
power competition. We are aligning our wings in order to be
able to deploy how we expect to fight.
So, there will be three different types of wings. One will
be deployable combat wings, one will be in place combat wings,
think missile wings, but the other are combat generation wings.
These are very, very important, and this is where the 319th
falls in.
It needs to be able to generate the combat power that can
fall into a wing, because you are not going to deploy the
entire wing at once. That wouldn't be it. That would be, for
some of the other types of wings.
So, while ISR may not be mentioned specifically, neither is
probably air mobility, or neither is maybe air refueling, those
are the parts--they are called the combat generation wings
because they will feed into the larger deployable construct,
but we wouldn't expect the entire 319 to take--to be able to go
and deploy the entire wing because it is such a HTLD asset,
right. It needs to be able to be distributed all across.
So that is why it is part of these combat generation wings,
and I am ready to talk at length, and I am going to go with my
time.
Senator Cramer. Yes, and as am I. So, real quickly then
speaking of modernization, and I will just cut to it. I mean,
we picked up some rumors in the last couple of days that the
commercial engine replacement program might be in some doubt.
Of course--that would be the reengineer of things like the
B-52, which has only been around about 60 years, and we expect
to be around another 30 or so. Just to just confirm for me that
that is just a vicious lie that somebody is spreading, then I
will be happy.
Secretary Kendall. No, the commercial--the reengineering of
the B-52 is proceeding, if that is what you are asking about,
Senator.
Senator Cramer. That is what I am asking, thank you.
Secretary Kendall. It is proceeding----
Senator Cramer. Appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, General Allvin, thank
you for appearance today. I want to add my congratulations to
the brave men and women of the force who were involved in the
defense of Israel over the weekend, to include two former
Senator Cotton defense fellows, Budd and Raldy. I am told I am
not supposed to say anything more than that, but I am glad to
see that their skills have not atrophy while they were desk
molesters up here for me.
Now, it is very important that we not just have our own
capabilities, but that we train our foreign partners and
capabilities. We can't be everywhere all the time at once.
So, I want to respond to Senator Warren's questions,
General Allvin, about retired flag officer supporting foreign
militaries. I have a slightly different perspective.
I think it is a great thing when America's retired generals
and admirals go overseas, take the skills and the knowledge
they have learned, and help train foreign military partners to
be more proficient, to be more respectful of the laws of war,
to be more professional in their own services.
So far from taking steps to restrain retired flag officers
serving under contractual relationships with nations like Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, or emerging nations in
Eastern Europe who are recent NATO members, I think we should
encourage it. General Allvin, I don't know what you plan to do
in retirement.
Maybe you plan to just go fishing all the time, but if you
want to do that, I think that would be a great thing for you to
do. This Committee carefully considered that matter last year
in our markup, and those markups aren't public. You don't know
what happened.
But this was a serious debate then, and Senator Warren
called one of these measures a loophole. It is not a loophole.
It is specifically how we wrote it, because we think it is a
good thing for our retired flag officers to be advising partner
nations whose militaries may not yet be as skillful or as
professional as ours, but whose militaries we should want to be
as skillful or professional as ours.
So, General Allvin, can I get your commitment that we will
continue to ensure retired flag officers can, in fact, work
with partner and allied nations?
General Allvin. Yes, Senator. I certainly don't want to
weigh into the--how the legislative process works, but I think
that those two positions are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, which is why we have the approval process.
There are only certain nations against which you are
disapproved, and those--we understand which those are. But
there is still, that stopgap requires the approval of the
Secretary and Secretary of State in order to do that.
So, I believe that stopgap helps to mitigate your position,
from Senator Warren.
Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, you look like you had
something you wanted to add on this topic.
Secretary Kendall. I just want to say, I think we are
talking about apples and oranges here. I think Senator Warren
is concerned about, very understandably, pilots who were hired
by China, for example, indirectly through----
Senator Cotton. Let me stop you there because we are not
talking about apples and oranges. She raised two different
topics.
I do want to say I am concerned about the second topic she
raised, which is the practice of not just American, but Western
trained pilots, mechanics, maintainers, and others going to
work, often indirectly, through private military contractors
for, say, China and South Africa, let's say. That is something
we definitely need to crack down on and something that we took
steps with.
Senator Kelly and I have worked on this challenge as well.
We need to make sure that all those pilots and those
maintainers and mechanics that we have trained are not using
their skills that the taxpayers paid for to indirectly or
directly help our adversary.
So, I am glad to hear that you are counseling all those
people as they leave the service to be aware of their
obligations. I mean, I frankly think should be strictly
prohibited if not made a crime to work for a foreign military
like China's.
The contrast to her first point, which is, again, military
officers, usually flag officers, sometimes field grades, going
to work for friendly nations like Saudi Arabia or Jordan or the
United Arab Emirates, some fruits of which we saw over the
weekend.
So, I just want to say, it is good when they go to work for
pro-American countries. It is bad when they go to work for
anti-American countries. It is pretty simple. I don't see what
the complication is here.
Secretary Kendall. We don't have any disagreement with
that, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. One final point, since we are
talking about making sure that foreign partners have strong
capabilities, so we don't have to carry the load everywhere.
Secretary Kendall, General Allvin, you know that a top priority
for Senator Boozeman, for me is, foreign military sales
training mission at Ebbing Air National Guard base in Fort
Smith, Arkansas.
We know that they are still working out a few things in
terms of the construction in the airspace. Secretary Kendall,
you have committed me in the past on several occasions you are
going to make sure that this stays on time and that we have the
sound of freedom return to the river valley later this fall.
Can I get your commitment again, given whatever the latest
developments on your end, that that is still going to happen on
time this fall?
Secretary Kendall. Before I give you a commitment about on
time, let me go double check and see exactly where we are. I
know we are moving forward on this, and I haven't had any
reports that we are just slipping schedule but let me----
Senator Cotton. I haven't either, but you never know when
you are dealing with the real world of building this thing or
moving that thing. I just don't want to have--not dealing with
the real world, but the bureaucratic world of red tape. So, I
just want to make sure that you have got a sword over the
Gordian knot. You are ready to cut if you have to.
Secretary Kendall. The Department of the Air Force is
scheduled to have Ebbing ready for the First Aircraft Arrival
from Poland in September 2024. However, a production slip by
Lockheed Martin will likely delay the aircraft delivery to
Poland and Ebbing until December 2024. Poland will operate its
mission in its entirety at Ebbing out of temporary facilities
(estimated 2.5 to 3 years).
Funding for two projects is under the fiscal year 2024
section 137 spend plan:
Fiscal year 2024 Squadron Operations Mission
Planning is 35 percent design ($34 million)
Fiscal year 2024 Foreign Military Sales 3-Bay
Hangar is also at 35 percent design ($42 million)
Secretary Kendall. We will do whatever we can to stay on
schedule, absolutely.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Mullin,
please.
Senator Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General Saltzman, Secretary Kendall, and General Allvin, for
being here, and for everybody that is your support staff that
we know does the heavy lifting behind you, thank you for
sitting through this hearing. I obviously showed up late, so I
am back to clean up here.
Secretary Kendall, I just want to tell you thank you for
your attention to the cadet that you and I visited about. It
seems like it is working out. I know that seems like a small
thing for what you deal with, but it is important, and I
appreciate you taking the time to visit with me about it.
Secretary Kendall. That is good to hear, Senator. Thank
you. I am glad it is working out.
Senator Mullin. I hope 1 day you get a meeting, and you
understand why I want to do everything I can. Great, great
young man. like I said, you guys, your attention really pushed
things.
Secretary Kendall. He has been through quite an ordeal, and
he is doing really well. It is encouraging to see. Amazing
story.
Senator Mullin. Really, it is. Secretary Kendall, I want to
stay with you for just a second. Listen, I know you are up
against a budget, and ideally, everybody at the table right
now, you guys would like to have as many airframes as you
possibly can in the air. Because of budget overruns with the E-
7s--you know, we are divesting to invest. I think that is the
term you guys are using. Is that correct, General Allvin?
General Allvin. I would say to modernize.
Senator Mullin. Divest, invest, modernize. But we are going
from--I mean, just what is on you all's docket right now. You
are going from 250 airframes to 91 airframes. We know during
time of war, attrition plays a huge role.
We have got our new planes that are coming out that is, you
know, double the cost at $2.5 billion per plane that is going
to be in the air, and we are talking about the maintenance of
the E-3s, which is why we are bringing them out of the sky.
If I understand correctly, the chairman and I, we were at
Tinker Air Force Base this last Saturday and Friday both, and
they brought up the concerns about being to continue their
mission. They say, you know, we will do what is handled to us,
but just to keep their mission capabilities right now, it takes
16 planes in the sky.
To secure the current mission, there is going to be a lag
between the delivery of the E-3s and the E-7s. We are not even
talking about the fighting jets right now, but just in that
frame alone, what are we--is it just about the money, or we are
divesting ourselves of so many airframes and going to so few,
and it seems like we are in a--pretty interesting times right
now, and I am really concerned, and I am not trying to just get
on to you and tell you how to do you all's jobs. I am saying,
what do we--what do you need from us? Mathematically looking at
this, it doesn't make any sense.
General Allvin. Senator, I think specifically with the E-3,
they are starting to divest themselves. This is one of those
where just in order to keep them flying is a challenge. The
capabilities that we are anticipating in the future--this is
the constant that we have, trying to understand how do we
maintain the readiness for today and still not leave my
successors or my successor's successor in this seat saying, why
don't you have an Air Force that can compete with, you know,
where China is right now?
We are trying to skate to where the puck is going to be
with China. At the same time, preserve the readiness, and so,
this is some of the challenge that we have, and so that
managing this readiness is never easy, but I will tell you
that, at some point the statement of quantity has a quality on
its own, it is only good if that quantity can survive. It is
only good if that quantity can be effective.
Now, we saw over the weekend it can be effective against
one type of adversary, in one type of environment, in one area.
But in order to meet what our National Defense Strategy wants
us to do in the highly contested environment against a pure
adversary, some of those capabilities, it really is just you
have more quantities that might be left in the bottom of the
Pacific Ocean.
We need to ensure that those crews can survive. They can
execute their mission. So that is where this tension between
retaining enough for today and preserving enough for the pacing
threat.
Senator Mullin. I totally understand that, and when you
start talking about, you know, what is going down to E-3s--they
referred to us as the motors, which I know frames, airframes
can be upgraded with new motors put on the side of them
constantly. Is it even a possibility?
You don't have to answer that. I am just trying to think
outside the box. But still yet, when we start talking about
just sheer numbers, we start looking at what our adversaries
are doing, they are coming out with planes with a lot less
technology on them, but the sheer numbers can overwhelm what we
have.
When we are dropping this many airframes, we are not going
to have the numbers, and I don't care--it is like a drone
swarm. I don't care what you have in defense, eventually they
are going to start poking through because ours do end in the
bottom of the Pacific, and we cannot replace a $2.5 billion
plane fast enough.
Secretary Kendall. Senator, the problem we have is that
these aircraft--E-3 is a really good example. I was on one at
Nellis a couple of years ago, and it was built in 1972.
Senator Mullin. Sure.
Secretary Kendall. The radar on it is an obsolete radar,
basically. Our crews are working very, very hard to try to keep
these airplanes operational, and it is a really uphill fight.
So, by retiring some of the E-3s, we are able to free up
some parts to at least keep some of the remaining aircraft more
operational. But they are not effective against the pacing
threat, and they are going to die very quickly. They just don't
have the resilience or the capability to survive.
We have really got to get to the next generation. So,
keeping airplanes around that are going to be ineffective and
are essentially very vulnerable to attack in the early stages
of the conflict, this is not putting us in a better position.
Senator Mullin. But--and Chairman, I will wrap up right
here, excuse me. But the gap between the delivery of the new
plane and the old plane is what has me concerned. We are
divesting faster than we are getting them in, and the cost runs
continue to go mind blowing over cost. I mean, double.
At some point, the math actually doesn't add up either. But
how are we going to keep the mission capability there all the
way through the transition? I mean, we haven't got to the Air
Guard that we are going to be losing and not be able to control
our Homeland by divesting of them too.
But there is a real concern there, and I know that is a lot
more to unpack than we have time here, but I don't want to be
part of the problem and I don't want to try telling you how to
do your job. I want to work with you to make sure that we can
stay mission capable.
So, I look forward to working with everybody here. Thank
you again for your time. Really appreciate the work.
Secretary Kendall. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Mullin. Senator Sullivan,
please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you for your testimony today. Mr. Secretary, I want to
compliment you. You have been one of the voices. It's, put it
pretty bluntly about the challenges with China, and we need to
be ready actually for a war with China, if they choose to do
so.
So, I appreciate your, your directness on that. Let me ask,
so, you know, this is a tough question for all of you generals,
tough question for you. The President talks a big game on the
challenges, and then 4 years in a row, he puts forward
inflation adjusted cuts to the Department of Defense--4 years
in a row. That is the Biden legacy. Now, he always expects us
to boost it up.
The left wing of his party doesn't like defense spending.
So, they, you know, double digit increases in every other
Federal agency. I think this year, $7.5 trillion. But once
again, the Biden administration, the Commander In Chief says,
nope, you guys get a cut. Shrinking the Army, shrinking the
Navy, shrinking the Marine Corps.
This budget right now does that. I don't think it shrinks
the Air Force. But do you think inflation adjusted cuts to the
Department of Defense is what Xi Jinping and Putin should be
seeing? I mean, is that how you prepare for war or enhance
deterrence, by cutting you guys?
Secretary Kendall. Senator, we have been very pleased to
have significant increases in the Air Force budget, Department
of the Air Force budget, in 2023 and 2024 in particular. The 2-
year budget deal that we have, you know, does limit--the Fiscal
Responsibility Act in 2025.
Senator Sullivan. General, I am in--look, these are hard
questions for you guys, I know, because I know our military
leaders. You go in there. You fight for a bigger budget. OMB,
the President, they tell you, sorry, I am going to increase
Department of Interior by 25 percent. You guys get a cut. But
in terms of our adversaries. China is building out a huge
military. They keep saying 7 percent increases.
We all know that is not true. I was in a classified
hearing. I am going to just mention it because the DNI and the
DIA head, the Lieutenant General, won't get back to me. They
actually said in that hearing--it was a classified hearing.
I am just going to publicly say that it was about $700
billion that China puts toward its military, all in. It is a
pretty big number. I think the American people should know that
which is why I am saying it right now.
But what do you think in terms of our adversaries when they
see defense cuts. What do you think that does for deterrence?
Secretary Kendall. We are continuing to move forward,
Senator, with our modernization program. Not quite at the rate
that we would like to have this year because of the Fiscal
Responsibility Act, but we are moving forward.
We are trying to manage the risk across time with the
current force, the more immediate force, and the future force,
but I think we are at acceptable risk with the budget that we
are presenting to the Congress.
Senator Sullivan. Let me turn to one of my favorite topics.
Billy Mitchell, the father of the U.S. Air Force, called Alaska
the most strategic place in the world. I appreciate the Air
Force's focus on that, on our State and how important it is.
There has been a significant buildup in Alaska.
We have over 105th generation fighters located in Alaska
now. The Air Force's fiscal year 2025 budget requests $250
million for the Joint Integrated Test and Training Center at
JBER. This represents a significant new training capability in
how it will enable the Air Force to plug in to live fire
exercises at JPARC, probably the most advanced training range
in the world, to give pilots across the U.S. Military an
unrivaled training venue.
Can you just talk a little bit about why that JITTC is so
important? That is to you, General, as well.
General Allvin. You know, Senator, I will start by saying
it is--like many of our fifth generation capable testing
training centers, it is providing the opportunity to test
advancements in a synthetic environment in ways you couldn't
actually do in a physical environment.
But with this increase, we are able to look at the models
for how we believe that the threat is going to act. We take
these models, we can validate them in the JPARC, which is why
the integration of these two, between the live environment and
the synthetic environment, it allows you to test some
hypotheses and maybe in a place where you wouldn't want--the
adversary to see you in open air.
Senator Sullivan. So that is a top priority in our
preparation for a China conflict?
General Allvin. Absolutely, and when you can replicate
those through the JPARC modernization that we are doing with
those emitters, then you can have a better chance of looking at
those models, validating those, and maybe tweaking them back
in. Between the two, the synthetic and the live, you get better
than either of them individually when you can connect them.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question. My time is
up, but Mr. Chairman, if I may. We have been back and forth,
this Committee, me, the Air Force, on tankers and the strategic
importance of having them located not just in one place in the
lower 48.
I was a little bit disappointed that after many years, I go
back and forth with Air Force leadership, the final decision
was, well, we are going to put all our tankers in the lower 48
at certain bases.
I can't remember which ones, but it seems to be more of a
budget driven idea than a strategic driven idea. Mr. Secretary,
you and I, and the previous Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
who is now the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, got to a
resolution on that where we said, well, we are going to be
bringing more KC-135 tankers to Eielson.
How are we doing on that? I want to make sure in this
hearing you are still committed to that. It seems like that
timeline has kind of moved to the right, and it is really
important not just for Alaska, but for the strategic ability to
move aircraft anywhere in the world, but particularly to the
INDOPACOM theater, if there is a conflict.
Secretary Kendall. Sir, you know, that capability is
important to us, but as you are aware and we have discussed, we
have an issue with housing at Eielson that we are trying to
address, and we are concerned about the quality of life of our
people that we have to assign there. So, that is an issue that
we are working as we try to move forward on the tankers, I
think.
Senator Sullivan. But you are still committed to move those
tankers there, as you and I----
Secretary Kendall. We have to address--the situation for
our people as part of that process.
Senator Sullivan. Are you walking this commitment back to
me, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Kendall. I don't think so, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. You have committed to this to me
like several times. So, this is a little concerning. We are
going to work on the housing issue, but can I just get a
commitment again? I got it from the--heck, he is the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs now, to be four KC-135s at Eielson.
Secretary Kendall. We haven't changed our plans as far as I
know. Do you have anything to add to that? I think we are still
in the same place, but we do need to address this issue.
Senator Sullivan. General.
General Allvin. That is still on our plan, Senator. But as
we were just at Eielson as well, we know we do need to ensure
that we don't have the aircrew and the support going up there,
as it is an austere location, because we know the quality of
life, we need to be able to retain those families up there as
well.
So, the plan is, as it is written, hasn't changed, but the
determination of how and when we can get housing and quality of
life is going to be dispositive on how fast the pacing can go
up----
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Gentlemen, I thank you for your testimony.
At this point, we will recess the open portion of the hearing
and reconvene SVC-217. Let's try to be there in about--between
11:05 a.m. and 11:10 a.m., which would allow for a moment to
recollect and refresh. With that, I will adjourn the open
portion.
[Whereupon, at 10:52 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
air force restructuring
1. Senator Hirono. Secretary Kendall, in February you announced big
changes to the Department of the Air Force to be more competitive in
the era of Great Power Competition and maintain a more predictable
deployment cycle for airmen and their family members. Does this budget
request adequately prioritize your proposed restructuring efforts,
specifically changes to how operational wings are structured?
Secretary Kendall. Reoptimizing for Great Power Competition does
not change our fiscal year 2024 or fiscal year 2025 budget requests. We
are reoptimizing how we present forces at the Wing level to provide
more effective combat capability through more coherent warfighting
teams, and we will continue to engage Congress throughout the
implementation process. We expect to have more specific cost
information with the President's Fiscal Year 2026 Budget Request.
2. Senator Hirono. Secretary Kendall, how is the transition
progressing and are you confident this approach will build more capable
teams, especially to support operations in the Indo-Pacific?
Secretary Kendall. Progress is on schedule with our implementation
plans, emphasizing the reoptimization of force presentation to foster
more capable teams that can compete effectively in a dynamic
environment, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. I am confident this
approach will yield more capable teams better equipped to navigate the
challenges of our pacing threats. By prioritizing investments in
capabilities and readiness tailored to this strategic theater, we are
not only positioning ourselves to meet the demands of the evolving
environment effectively, but we are also ensuring continued supremacy
in our respective domains and better posturing the Department to deter
and, if necessary, prevail in an era of Great Power Competition.
e-7 procurement
3. Senator Hirono. General Allvin, with the ongoing retirement of
the E-3 aircraft, Pacific Air Forces has identified an urgent need to
field the E-7 Wedgetail as soon as possible. The President's Fiscal
Year 2025 Budget includes over $400 million to continue Rapid
Prototyping of the first two E-7 Wedgetail aircraft in support of a
production decision in fiscal year 2026. What is the updated
procurement schedule for the E-7 Wedgetail?
General Allvin. The Fiscal Year 2025 President's Budget requested
$418.5 million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
to continue the E-7A Rapid Prototyping Program, which designs the U.S.
system and build two operationally representative E-7A prototype
aircraft. The Air Force plans to define the E-7 Rapid Prototyping
contract in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2024. Both prototype
aircraft are scheduled for delivery in the fourth quarter of fiscal
year 2027. The Air Force is planning for a follow-on production
decision in fiscal year 2026. We will continue to analyze necessary E-7
production and deliveries to ensure the capability is fielded at the
needed pace within the budgets provided.
4. Senator Hirono. General Allvin, how is this delay impacting the
mission of Pacific Air Forces, and what is the contingency plan if
there are further procurement delays?
General Allvin. The E-7 is a more capable airborne Air Moving
Target Indicator (AMTI) and Battle Management Command and Control
(BMC2) platform than anything in the current Air Force inventory in
terms of reliability and performance. However, the E-3 AWACS is still
present in the Pacific Theater and will be so for at least the next few
years. Additionally, the Air Force is fielding improved hardware to
expeditionary battle management nodes in the Pacific. This improved kit
will enhance the capacity and agility of BMC2 execution in support of
the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
The Air Force is working hard to prevent further delays in E-7
procurement. If there are further E-7 delays, the E-3 AWACS may have to
be extended.
space mission conducted by air national guard
5. Senator Hirono. Secretary Kendall, you testified that the Air
National Guard members who are currently conducting space missions
would be afforded geographically stability and would not have to move
or be relocated if they transition to the Space Force instead of
creating a separate Air National Guard. Is there any formal
acknowledgement of this policy that is in writing or do you have an
anticipated date of when to expect a formal guarantee that they will
not have to move?
Secretary Kendall. The report submitted pursuant to Section 924 of
the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act identifies the
Secretary of the Air Force's intent that Air National Guard members who
volunteer for transfer would be able to continue serving in the same
location upon joining the Space Force. The Chief of Space Operations
has also made this commitment in congressional testimony.
6. Senator Hirono. Secretary Kendall, if the Air National Guard
personnel conducting space missions are absorbed in the Space Force,
how will this affect the State Partnership Program?
Secretary Kendall. The State Partnership Program is a value-added
National Guard program of significance to the Nation. If Air National
Guard personnel conducting space missions transition into the Space
Force, they will continue to engage and provide outreach as the mission
dictates. Only six (6) states have space-related elements subject to
potential transfer. On average, these elements constitute approximately
four (4) percent of the total authorized end-strength for the affected
states; as such, we anticipate no significant impact to State
Partnership programs. State Partnership programs will continue to be
executed by States with the Army and Air Guard. A close partnership
will continue to exist between the Defense Department, the Services,
and the States.
missile defense systems
7. Senator Hirono. General Saltzman, the Department of Defense is
increasingly turning to space-based systems for its ballistic, cruise,
and hypersonic missile defense sensing needs. These technologies will
be critical to future plans to defend Hawaii. I remain interested in
evolving missile defense and know there is $4.7 billion in the fiscal
year 2025 budget to proliferate a multi-orbit missile warning
architecture to counter near-peer threats. These space systems come
with their own unique risks. How is the Space Force ensuring these
capabilities are resilient in the face of disruption, whether through
cyber or kinetic attack?
General Saltzman. The fiscal year 2025 budget allows the Space
Force to continue to pivot to a proliferated Resilient Missile Warning
(MW)/Missile Tracking (MT)/Missile Defense architecture in Low Earth
Orbit and Medium Earth Orbit. The proliferation of more satellites in
various orbits increases resiliency to kinetic attack. We are also
implementing a cybersecurity posture that requires a stringent level of
cryptographic protection for messages being passed between the two
segments using National Security Agency-certified crypto equipment to
increase resiliency against cyber-attacks. Meanwhile, the Next-
Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared programs are key to maintaining
global MW coverage as the Resilient MW/MT architecture delivers. These
programs are instrumental to providing capabilities for wartime
scenarios and in defense of the Indo-Pacific theater, to include
Hawaii.
joint and partner exercises
8. Senator Hirono. Secretary Kendall and General Allvin, conducting
exercises with allies and partners is the cornerstone of integrated
deterrence and our asymmetric advantages in the Indo-Pacific. Pacific
Air Force Agile Combat Employment exercises are listed as the number
one priority on the Air Force's Unfunded Priority List. Can you talk
about why these exercises are so important in the Indo-Pacific?
Secretary Kendall and General Allvin. Operating with our allies and
partners is a cornerstone of integrated deterrence and one of our
asymmetric advantages. Against a pacing challenge, this
interoperability will be critical to meeting our mutual objectives and
displays strength in unity. Exercising this capability will better
enable us to prepare for and execute with our regional allies and
partners. These exercises also offer the opportunity to build
relationships and increase access to basing and overflight, which is
critical in the Indo-Pacific.
9. Senator Hirono. Secretary Kendall, why was funding for these
exercises not included in the President's Budget?
Secretary Kendall. Our plan is highly sensitive to changes in our
topline. The budget caps approved by Congress under the Fiscal
Responsibility Act's topline limit required us to make some tough,
responsible choices. During the fiscal year 2025 budget cycle, the
Department of the Air Force focused on transforming for the future.
General Allvin's Unfunded Priorities List addresses areas where the Air
Force would have applied additional funding had it been available,
where emerging analysis on Great Power Competition showed an area of
need, and where the Service can provide additional forces to Combatant
Commanders.
andersen air force base recovery efforts
10. Senator Hirono. Secretary Kendall, in May 2023, Typhoon Mawar
struck the island of Guam. It was the strongest storm to affect Guam in
more than 20 years. Guam remains an essential strategic site for the
U.S. military in the Indo-Pacific but still has a significant way to go
with rebuilding. Now that we are approaching 1 year since the
devastation of Typhoon Mawar, do you have an update on the recovery and
rebuilding efforts at Andersen Air Force Base?
Secretary Kendall. The Department of the Air Force planned $126
million in fiscal year 2023 for Facilities Sustainment, Restoration,
and Modernization (FSRM) to provide immediate damage response and
clean-up at Andersen Air Force Base. Since then, the Department has
refined and prioritized FSRM and military construction (MILCON)
requirements across the Future Years Defense Program. Additionally, the
Air Force Contract Augmentation Program was set in motion with an
additional $176 million in fiscal year 2024 FSRM to tackle repairs to
building envelopes, roofing, doors, windows, and HVAC systems.
Similarly, the 356th Expeditionary Civil Engineer Group was recently
activated and assists with recovery efforts. We estimate that $1.3
billion in FSRM and $7.9 billion in MILCON are needed for recovery,
including improved resilience projects. That is approximately two times
the Natural Disaster Recovery supplemental used to recover Tyndall AFB
following Hurricane Michael in 2018 and Offutt Air Force Bases
following flooding in 2019.
11. Senator Hirono. Secretary Kendall, is the Air Force
coordinating recovery efforts with DOD's new lead senior defense
official for Guam, Undersecretary of the Navy Raven?
Secretary Kendall. Yes, we coordinate recovery efforts in Guam with
the Undersecretary of the Navy, Mr. Raven, by the Guam Military
Synchronization Governance Structure. Specifically, the Undersecretary
of the Air Force participates in the Guam Synchronization Oversight
Council, which Mr. Raven chairs. The Council is informed through
monthly work by the Guam Installation and Community Support Working
Group, in which the Department of the Air Force also actively
participates.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
implementation of the transition assistance program (tap)
12. Senator King. General Allvin, the fiscal year 2019 NDAA
required pre-separation counseling to be completed by transitioning
servicemembers at least 365 days prior to leaving the service, yet a
GAO report found that only 11 percent met this requirement.
Additionally, GAO found that only 25 percent of servicemembers have met
statutory TAP requirements. What are you doing to increase these
numbers within the Air Force to take care of transitioning
servicemembers? What new initiatives are you implementing this year to
address these dismal rates?
General Allvin. The Department of Air Force (DAF) initial
counseling (IC) and pre-separation rate for servicemembers before 365
days from separation/retirement is 32 percent. Our rate would rise to
53 percent if we do not count exclusions. The issues impacting
compliance are servicemembers cannot apply for retirement more than 365
days out and all voluntary retirement dates are established on or after
the 365-day window, making the member non-compliant even if they
register for IC the same day they apply for retirement. Also, the
retirement date for involuntarily retired members is not within the
member's control. It is usually less than 365 days, which automatically
makes the servicemember non-compliant. Last, Air Reserve members are
not eligible to register for IC until the order start date, and the
order length is usually 365 days or less, again automatically making
the member non-compliant.
While the current DAF IC and Pre-Separation completion rates before
365 days remain low, overall Transition Assistance Program (TAP)
completion rates are higher. The TAP completion rate for Active Duty
servicemembers remains approximately 96 percent, while the Air Force
Reserve and Air National Guard's compliance rates are 79 percent and 38
percent, respectively. Many Air Reserve members are automatically in
default due to the timing of orders.
We track installations' TAP compliance monthly and strive to
increase our TAP completion rates. In April 2023, the DAF added
compliance factors linked with the inspection program for commanders to
ensure members begin TAP at least 365 days from projected retirement or
separation. We forwarded a Commander Fact Sheet to the field, shared it
at the Military & Family Readiness Center installation, and provided it
during leadership training. Finally, we are connecting with
servicemembers on the DAF and Air Force Personnel Center Facebook
pages.
This year we are implementing several new initiatives to address
TAP completion and are engaging with unit commanders to address
deficiencies. We are also utilizing monthly installation loss-rosters
to identify and connect with members 24 months prior to their projected
retirement date or 18 months prior to projected date of separation. We
are adding a TAP reminder message to the required annual military
record review. Finally, we have a project to create a commander's
dashboard to provide unit leadership visibility on TAP projects and
completions.
13. Senator King. General Saltzman, what are you doing to increase
these numbers within Space Force to take care of transitioning
servicemembers? What new initiatives are you implementing this year to
address these dismal rates?
General Saltzman. The Space Force will continue to amplify
messaging to encourage guardians to start the Transition Assistance
Program process 24 months before retirement and 18 months before
separation ensuring mission requirements are not the reason for a late
start. We will assess why transitioning guardians are not receiving the
required preparation for post-military planning and connect with unit
leadership of those members to address root causes and mitigate future
non-compliance. Finally, launching the Space Force Personnel Management
Act will provide guardians with an alternative option to separation
altogether to continue serving when personal situations arise.
bangor, maine's contribution to air force additive manufacturing
14. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, the Maine Air National Guard's
101st Air Refueling Wing (ARW), located in Bangor, has one of the most
capable 3D printing capabilities in the Air Force in terms of
capability, capacity, and trained technicians. What has the Air Force
learned from the 101st ARW, and how have you applied lessons from their
experience?
Secretary Kendall. The Air Force has leveraged lessons learned from
all units, including the 101st Air Refueling Wing, on developing and
scaling Advanced Manufacturing expertise to include 3D printing.
Recently, units participated in the Spring Advanced Manufacturing
Program Office Technical Interchange Meeting to share lessons learned,
innovative techniques, and training ideas across the entire community.
I visited the Wing recently and was impressed by their innovation and
expertise.
15. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, what ways are you developing
this at the Wing level across the Department (Active and Reserve
Component) to include:
a. investments in capability (e.g. devices/machines and software),
b. capacity (e.g. number of devices),
c. number of personnel being trained,
d. retaining those trained personnel,
e. developing and expanding training, and
f. developing certification requirements.
Secretary Kendall. The Air Force has approved large-scale printer
investments, including Fortus-series polymer printers and EOS-series
metal printers. Additional printers are approved, and other low-cost
polymer printers are in use. The Air Force's current inventory includes
nearly 300 3D printers at a variety of bases throughout the world. Over
650 Air Force personnel have graduated from Advanced Manufacturing and
Cold Spray courses, and over 100 personnel are certified operators for
large-scale 3D printers. The Air Force is committed to ensuring Wing-
level access to 3D printers and expanding access to training
opportunities for our airmen in the field.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
f-35 basing decisions
16. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall, last year the Air Force
selected the Massachusetts Air National Guard's 104th Fighter Wing for
the next F-35A Lightning II squadron. When do you anticipate the
environmental impact statement to support this decision will be
complete and made available to the public?
Secretary Kendall. We anticipate the Massachusetts Air National
Guard 104th Fighter Wing F-35A Lightning II squadron's final
environmental impact statement will be completed and available to the
public in the first quarter of fiscal year 2025.
17. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall, when do you expect to sign a
record of decision selecting the Massachusetts Air National Guard's
104th Fighter Wing for the next F-35A Lightning II squadron?
Secretary Kendall. We anticipate the first quarter of fiscal year
2025 for competition of the environmental impact statement and the
final strategic basing decision will immediately follow.
102d intelligence wing
18. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall, what is the status of the
Air Force's review of whether to reinState the 102d Intelligence Wing?
Secretary Kendall. The 102d Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance Group has been reinstated. Air Combat Command (ACC)
deployed a recertifying team from the 480th Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance Wing (ISRW) on May 5-18, 2024, to conduct a
functional mission assessment. The 480th ISRW recommended to return the
102d Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Group to its Title
10 mission, to which ACC's commander concurred. The 102d ISR Group
returned to its operational Title 10 mission and the 102d ISRW
reinstated on June 1, 2024.
19. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall, when do you expect the Air
Force's review of whether to reinState the 102d Intelligence Wing to be
completed?
Secretary Kendall. The review of the 102d Intelligence Wing
concluded on May 18, 2024.
20. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall, are there any outstanding
recommendations from the Air Force Inspector General review of the 102d
Intelligence Wing?
Secretary Kendall.The offices of the Secretary of the Air Force
Inspector General, Air Combat Command Inspector General, and Air Force
Intelligence Directorate reinspected the unit on April 3 and April 4,
2024, to review four (4) remaining open deficiencies. The reinspection
concluded that the 102d Intelligence Wing satisfactorily addressed all
open deficiencies through its corrective action plans and formally
closed all deficiencies.
21. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall, if there are outstanding
recommendations from the Air Force Inspector General review of the 102d
Intelligence Wing, what steps does the Massachusetts National Guard
need to take to close those recommendations?
Secretary Kendall. The 102d Intelligence Wing addressed all open
deficiencies.
sentinel program
22. Senator Warren. General Allvin, the Navy has developed non-
destructive techniques to measure Trident motor properties and assess
aging. Will you apply these techniques to Minuteman to collect more
data or estimate aging effects for individual motors? If not, why not?
General Allvin. The Navy conducts non-destructive testing in
addition to destructive tests like Minuteman III. Annually, the Navy
performs four (4) live-fire flight tests, while the Air Force conducts
three (3) operational test launches each year. Like the Navy, the Air
Force employs non-destructive and destructive testing methods to
evaluate performance and safety.
23. Senator Warren. General Allvin, one objection to extending the
life of Minuteman III is that flight testing will deplete the number of
available missiles below that needed to operationally deploy 400
missiles. To account for this concern, will you reduce the number of
tests or reduce the number of deployed missiles, e.g., by reducing the
number of Minuteman to 350 and increasing the number of warheads on
Trident to compensate for the difference?
General Allvin. The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment (USD(A&S)) signed an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)
as part of the certification decision following the Nunn-McCurdy
review. The ADM directs the Air Force to restructure the Sentinel
program and provide USD(A&S) an outline of a modified acquisition
strategy within 60 days. As this modified acquisition strategy is
developed, the Air Force will work with the operational community to
optimize deployment timelines and ensure a transition between Minuteman
III and Sentinel that considers risk, mitigations, and trades across
cost, schedule test strategy, and performance. We will share the
decisions and supporting rationale with your office as they become
available.
24. Senator Warren. General Allvin, given the Sentinel program's
delays, are there steps you are planning to take to extend the life of
the MMIII missiles and at what point would you consider it necessary to
do so?
General Allvin. As part of restructuring the Sentinel program,
preserving schedule will be a key consideration; however, a delay of
several years is currently estimated from the original initial
operational capability (IOC).
The Air Force has been and will continue to sustain the Minuteman
III (MM III) system until a replacement capability is available. The
Air Force continues to invest in replacing the Minuteman III system's
aging and obsolete components to ensure the nuclear triad's land leg is
ready and reliable for nuclear deterrence. The Fiscal Year 2025
President's Budget allocates approximately $1 billion annually to MM
III sustainment activities (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation,
Procurement, and Operations and Maintenance). In the Fiscal Year 2025
President's Budget, the Air Force is initiating four (4) new MM III
sustainment programs: Stage One Battery Replacement, Depot Re-entry
Support Equipment, Little Mountain Test Facility Updates, and Missile
Transport Equipment.
25. Senator Warren. General Allvin, can pit production at Los
Alamos meet the initial requirements of the Sentinel program? For how
long?
General Allvin. Pit production is a National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) responsibility and NNSA should provide an
official response. However, the initial requirements of the Sentinel
program will be satisfied with the W87-0/Mk21 re-entry vehicle which is
operational on Minuteman III today and are not impacted by Los Alamos'
pit production capabilities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
cybersecurity posture
26. Senator Manchin. General Allvin, after looking at the fiscal
year 2025 budget, there seems to be consistent decreases in funding
regarding cybersecurity. This includes cutting funding on cybersecurity
related to operational communications to cybersecurity underpinning
nuclear deterrence programs. These cuts in cybersecurity are occurring
right when numerous officials have testified and open source reporting
has indicated China and other State actors are consistently targeting
our networks seeking to exploit our cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Can
you go into detail on how this decrease in cybersecurity funding right
as malign actors seeks to find and exploit such vulnerabilities won't
cause increased risk to national security?
General Allvin. The Air Force continues to invest in cyber and
enterprise information technology (IT) and has increased its programmed
investment by 2.6 percent in fiscal year 2025 from $7.78 billion to
$7.98 billion. The increase invests in the Department of the Air Force
Data Fabric, Integrated Cyberspace Defense System, and Zero Trust
efforts, including Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Identity,
Credential, and of Access Management. Additionally, the Air Force has
invested in the sensoring and monitoring of the Air Force network,
which will allow our Cyber Security System Provider to have increased
awareness of threats to the network.
drone incursions
27. Senator Manchin. General Saltzman, the use of drones continues
to be leveraged by our adversaries with increased quantity and
complexity. Drone incursions and their lethality continues to be a
threat. The cost incurred by our adversaries is far less than the risk
these drones pose and the cost the U.S. incurs with counter measures.
Drones have been a threat in the Middle East since the early 2000's,
now more prevalent than ever in the Red Sea and also continue to
threaten our military installations at home and aboard. It has taken
too long and resulted in too many lives lost. We must find a low cost,
reliable solution to deal with this persistent threat. There has been a
lot of talk about directed energy weapons but overall minimal results.
Are you aware of any solutions in development to provide our troops
proper force protection against drone incursions?
General Saltzman. Yes, we are aware of and are participating in
examining several capabilities that may enhance the joint community's
defensive capability. Directed energy has high potential for inclusion
in counter-drone systems, but there are limitations on currently
available technologies. The Air Force is currently spending $13 million
for continued development of the Mjolnir weapon. The system will go
from a preliminary design review to a critical design review to a fully
realized demonstrator. It will be the Department of Defense's first
Exportable High Powered Electromagnetic-based Directed-Energy Weapons.
The Department of the Air Force (DAF) works with other Services
through the joint Counter-small UAS (C-sUAS) Office to prioritize C-
sUAS developmental efforts, including potential directed energy
capabilities. The DAF can also defend against Group 3 and larger UAS
using fighter aircraft, as recently demonstrated in the Middle East.
The DAF is also investing in enhancements to lower-cost munitions, such
as 2.75-inch rockets, to provide more affordable air-to-air engagement
options.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
unmanned aerial systems (uas) and counter uas
28. Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, three American soldiers were
killed at a United States military installation in Jordan by air
attack. It is my understanding that many United States forward bases,
including the largest in the Middle East, are Air Bases. So, what
changes to base protection and defense did the Air Force make after
Iranian proxy groups attacked our servicemembers?
Secretary Kendall. The Air Force has fielded tailored systems-of-
systems to seven (7) Air Bases throughout the Middle East that include
radars, electronic warfare systems, radio frequency (RF)-based library
jamming, library-based detection, and library-based defeat systems.
Additionally, the Air Force deployed a small number of Air Battle
Managers to air bases in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)
area of responsibility to support local battle management, airspace
deconfliction, and counter-drone operations. The Department of the Air
Force is working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Combatant Commands, and the Services to find and pursue joint solutions
that are quickly scalable for forward bases and installations in the
Homeland to further fielding efforts.
29. Senator Cotton. General Allvin, public reporting now indicates
that Langley Air Force Base Virginia was swarmed by drones for weeks
back in December 2023. NORTHCOM Commander, General Guillot, testified
in March 2024 that he was still studying this problem. What is the Air
Force role in defending Air Bases at home from air attacks?
General Allvin. Langley was not attacked, but its airspace was
violated by drones. The Air Force, through its Installation Commanders,
is responsible for protecting and defending the personnel and assets
within our Air Bases. We retain the authority under the Department of
Defense's Standing Rules of Force to apply the necessary force to
protect those personnel and assets from immediate hostile threats.
Additionally, the Department of the Air Force has the role of defending
our bases from small-unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) threats at all
locations in conjunction with Joint operating doctrine.
30. Senator Cotton. General Allvin, does the Air Force have a
validated requirement and sufficient resources to defend bases against
drones where we stage stealth fighters and bombers?
General Allvin. The Air Force has validated requirements for
countering small drones in the 2021 rapid prototyping requirements for
counter-small unmanned aircraft systems (C-sUAS) and larger threats in
the 2022 strategic requirements document for Air Base Air Defense
(ABAD).
As envisioned, this counter small-unmanned aircraft system (sUAS)
capability will provide a tailorable, layered defense that, based on
risk analysis, may be scaled, to protect a single asset up to and
beyond airfield approach and departure corridors, across the full
spectrum of the counter-sUAS engagement sequence.
Competing threats and requirements have resulted in stark budgeting
decisions that limit the program office to sustaining currently fielded
systems only and limited research and development of new systems in
coordination with the Army's Joint Counter Small Unmanned Aerial
Systems Office. The program is developing the capability for scalable
C-sUAS solutions but cannot currently field increased capacity or
capability due to a lack of dedicated funding for increased investment
in procurement, sustainment, and research, development, testing, and
evaluation.
Air Base Defense remains a problem within the larger Joint
Integrated Air Missiles Defense (IAMD) architecture. The ongoing IAMD
mix study and the Air and Cruise Missile Defense of the Homeland
Analysis of Alternatives are expected to yield valuable insights into
the appropriate mix of capabilities relevant to air base defense at
home and abroad. The Air Force will continue contributing to this
architecture using existing counterair tactics, fighter aircraft, and
air-to-air munitions to contend with larger Group 3-5 unmanned aircraft
systems and drones.
31. Senator Cotton. General Allvin, are you in the process of
updating Air Force policy to address the growing threat from drones?
General Allvin. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) expects to
release an updated policy by the end of fiscal year 2024. This
publication will clarify many processes and procedures for counter-
small unmanned aircraft systems (C-sUAS) operators focused on base
defense. As always, the Air Force will update relevant policies as the
DAF releases new or updated policies and guidance.
The DAF 2050 analysis, as directed and outlined in Section 923 of
the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, is ongoing,
with a report due later this year. Part of that analysis includes
examining the Air Force's future roles and intent for the full range of
air and missile threats. The Air Force is examining its future role in
the Joint Force solutions against challenges that UAS pose to airbase
defense. UAS will continue to proliferate and challenge the Air Force.
Those challenges will be met by an ever-evolving Air Force.
force design and department of the air force plans
32. Senator Cotton. General Allvin, does the United States Air
Force have enough aircraft and weapons to establish Air Superiority in
a defense of Guam scenario?
General Allvin. The threat to Guam is largely cruise and ballistic
missiles launched at long range. This is a joint problem that goes well
beyond local air superiority or Air Force capabilities alone. The Air
Force must continue to evolve its force to meet the pacing challenge
posed by the National Defense Strategy to meet worldwide capability and
capacity demands today. Extensive gaming and analysis using the most
challenging and complex scenarios show that the Air Force must adjust
the future force structure by changing investment priorities to provide
the capability, capacity, and affordability required to defeat any peer
threat.
Retaining and modernizing our current fleets alone will not achieve
air superiority in defense of Guam. While we have and will continue to
modernize the air defense capabilities of the island, there will always
be a cost imposition due to the sheer scale and flexibility of
adversary attacks in multiple domains that can be amassed on the island
of Guam. For air superiority, we will have to continue developing and
fielding capabilities that can deny enemy long-range kill chains to
reduce the ability to target U.S. Forces and territory. The right
balance of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities will have to be pursued
to provide air superiority in the defense of Guam sufficiently. A more
complete answer would require a classified discussion.
33. Senator Cotton. General Allvin, does the United States Air
Force have enough aircraft and weapons to establish Air Superiority if
we aid the defense of Taiwan?
General Allvin. Our study of future conflict with the People's
Republic of China suggests that the Joint Force will achieve and
leverage transient superiority in all domains differently than in past
conflicts, including the air domain. Based on updated threat
assessments and capability determinations, we will continue to assess
future requirements for sensing, battle management, platforms, weapons,
and enablers like electronic warfare. A more complete answer would
require a classified discussion.
34. Senator Cotton. General Allvin, if Air Superiority options are
limited in the Pacific, then what resources would help the Air Force
decisively win an Air Superiority fight in a highly contested
environment?
General Allvin. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) Operational
Imperative investments directly address these needs. To stay ahead of
our pacing challenge, it is a DAF operational imperative for the Air
Force and Space Force to integrate and modernize Command, Control,
Communications and Battle Management (C3BM) to provide operational
forces key data and decision support with greater speed, adaptability,
and resilience. The DAF must develop and migrate to an architecture
that includes resilient, distributed battle management, as well as the
operational ability to disaggregate C3BM execution to reduce or
eliminate single points of failure for optimal survivability against
emerging threats. These efforts must be performed at speeds and scales
never before achieved.
Moving target engagement at scale must provide identification,
tracking, and engagement support of numerous moving or mobile targets
simultaneously in a highly contested time compressed multi-domain Joint
environment. To accomplish this, a mix of resilient air and space-based
capabilities will be necessary to conduct long-range, beyond line-of-
sight sensing, and support integrated beyond line-of-sight fires
against moving air, land, and sea surface targets in a Joint and
combined environment. Developing these critical capabilities are the
heart of our Operational Imperative and Cross-cutting Operational
Enabler efforts to eliminate these future capability gaps.
35. Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, I understand that some of my
colleagues received a briefing on the force design of the Air Force in
December; the overall number of fighter aircraft were discussed. Does
the Air Force want to decrease the number of mission ready fighter
aircraft below the current floor of 1,145?
Secretary Kendall. Current plans would reduce fighter inventory
temporarily during the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Our fighter
capacity recommendation for the 2030's is classified, but the total
aircraft inventory in that timeframe is above 1,145. The mix of
capabilities is also classified.
In realistic budget projections, we must balance the need for high-
end technology with affordable capacity. To attain the desired fighter
fleet, the Air Force must continue to right size current aircraft
inventories to expedite the transition from less capable, aging
aircraft and emphasize investment in future capabilities such as
Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) and F-35 modernization. As part of
its force structure change over the next decade, the Air Force must
transition its fighter fleet from seven (7) platforms (F-35, F-22, F-
16, F-15E/EX, F-15C, A-10) to four (4) (F-35, F-15E/EX, F-16, plus
CCA.) The Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) platform, which had
previously been considered a follow-on to the F-22, is under review.
The NGAD Family of Systems is continuing.
On the path to achieving the desired future fighter fleet, the
budget continues to seek opportunities to divest systems inconsistent
with pacing challenges and focus on the key capabilities required to
execute the National Defense Strategy. Moving away from outdated and
less capable legacy platforms allows us to redirect the workforce to
our newest aircraft and platforms, many of which require experienced
maintainers and pilots to maintain our competitive edge. These
divestitures are critical to building a relevant future force that
meets the pacing challenge. Modernization programs cannot transform our
current fourth-generation fighters into fifth-generation fighters.
Resourcing those future capabilities and modernizing our remaining
force requires funding and a workforce currently tied up in our legacy
systems and platforms.
36. Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, is divesting current
capabilities like the F-15E the right call after what they were able to
accomplish defending Israel on 13 April?
Secretary Kendall. I agree that the F-15E is a competent platform,
which is why the Air Force is transitioning to a fighter enterprise
that includes F-15Es with the more capable PW-229 engine, modified with
the Eagle Passive Active Warning and Survivability System (EPAWSS),
complementing F-15EX, F-35, F-22, and F-16 to provide the Joint Force
with a capable, sustainable, and affordable force that can operate
across the entire range of mission sets. To pivot to operations in the
highly contested environment, we must transition the mix of our fighter
fleet.
The United States Central Command team's defense of Israel was a
tremendous achievement. However, that operation was conducted in a
permissive environment without the highly advanced technological
threats we expect to face in deterring or defeating our pacing
challenge, the People's Republic of China (PRC). While the F-15E
capability is significant, it is the future mix of systems that will
make our force effective in a highly contested environment, compared to
the PRC.
37. Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, would you consider reversing
your position on divesting the F-15E and F-22 if funds were available
to keep these aircraft long term?
Secretary Kendall. We must continue to pivot to the future. The F-
22 Block 20 and F-15E with the older PW-220 engines have served us well
over the years, but it is time to transition away from these aging and
less capable platforms. Maintaining our current force structure while
pursuing modernization creates an unsustainable drain on our resources,
including money and our airmen. To meet our pacing challenges and focus
on the key capabilities required to execute the National Defense
Strategy in a fiscally responsible way, we must pursue a capable,
sustainable, survivable, and affordable force that can operate across
the range of mission sets needed to meet those priorities.
platform modernization and munitions
38. Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, will the budget request for
this year ensure sufficient funds to deliver key capabilities as
quickly as possible such as the CCA we discussed last year?
Secretary Kendall. The Air Force is committed to fielding an
operational Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) capability as quickly
as possible. Fielding the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) Family
of Systems, particularly CCA, will allow the Air Force to augment
current and future platforms with lower-cost complementary systems that
can cost-effectively increase air control in highly contested
environments. The Department of the Air Force is expecting the
Experimental Ops Unit to stand up this year and the first CCA
deliveries in fiscal year 2027.
39. Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, are you having to source
funds within your own budget from other major fighter programs to pay
to keep the CCA on time?
Secretary Kendall. Our plan is highly sensitive to changes in our
topline. The budget caps approved by Congress under the Fiscal
Responsibility Act's topline limit required us to make some tough,
responsible choices. We are working within our budget to modernize
while remaining compliant with restrictions related to the size of our
force.
40. Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, will you having to source
funds within your own budget from other major fighter programs to pay
to keep the NGAD on time?
Secretary Kendall. Our plan is highly sensitive to changes in our
topline. The budget caps approved by Congress under the Fiscal
Responsibility Act's topline limit required us to make some tough,
responsible choices. We are working within our budget to modernize
while remaining compliant with restrictions related to the size of our
force.
41. Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, if you're relying on space-
based battle management then how has the Department moved beyond
conceptual demonstrations within the budget constraints that have
delayed the E-7 in the first place?
Secretary Kendall. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) delivers a
distributed, multi-domain command and control architecture by
developing the DAF Battle Network, which integrates 50 acquisition
programs of record to provide decision superiority. We use an
incremental delivery model, leveraging agile acquisitions authorities
such as software pathway programs to rapidly prototype and deliver
operational capability. In fiscal year 2024, we delivered 16 tactical
operations center--light prototypes to Air Combat Command. We are on
track to deliver cloud-based command and control software to five (5)
air defense sectors for North American Aerospace Defense Command and
United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), with more incremental
deliveries planned for fiscal year 2025 and beyond. Recognizing the
challenges of contested environments, the DAF is adding space-based
ground moving target indication capability to the suite of sensors that
feed data into the DAF Battle Network.
42. Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, if your plan is to offboard
significant air-to-air capability to CCA and for battle management to
space, then what is the fielding timeline for a resilient network in
accordance with fiscal year 2024 NDAA section 1527 for all these things
to talk together?
Secretary Kendall. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) has
developed an aerial networking roadmap that aligns with our
architecture for the DAF Battle Network. This roadmap includes
enhancements to existing legacy datalinks, the development of an
advanced tactical datalink, and beyond-line-of-sight satellite
communication capabilities. Incremental fielding of capability will
begin in 2027. Additional details can be provided in a classified
setting.
43. Senator Cotton. General Allvin, I noted $1.0B less in Air Force
missile procurement compared to last year even though we know our
munitions stockpiles are not where they need to be. Was this decrease a
result of insufficient top line available?
General Allvin. The decrease is a result of the fiscal year 2024
initiation of multi-year procurement for joint air-to-surface standoff
missiles and long-range anti-ship missiles. $870 million of funding for
these programs was pulled from fiscal year 2025 to fiscal year 2028
into fiscal year 2024 to accommodate advanced procurement of missile
material and components to gain economy of scale buying power under the
multi-year procurement construct. When controlling for this factor in
comparing the fiscal year 2024 and fiscal year 2025 funding levels,
there is a net increase of more than $350 million in fiscal year 2025.
44. Senator Cotton. General Allvin, since the Air Force is using
multiyear procurement for critical munitions like AMRAAM, LRASM and
JASSM, can the Air Force buy more of these munitions with additional
fiscal year 2025 funds?
General Allvin. The advanced medium-range air-to-air missile
(AMRAAM) and joint air-to-surface missile (JASSM) programs are at
capacity and cannot increase in fiscal year 2025. A small amount of
additional capacity is available in the long-range anti-ship missile
(LRASM) program, for approximately 37 missiles. The Department of the
Air Force (DAF) is coordinating with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to leverage fiscal year 2025 excess facilitization capacity via
the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) replenishment funding process
based on the recently passed supplementals. In coordination with the
Department of the Navy, the DAF proposes maximizing the fiscal year
2025 Lot 9 production for LRASM via PDA replenishment. If approved,
there would be no excess capacity for LRASM procurement in fiscal year
2025.
45. Senator Cotton. General Allvin, what do you need to scale up
production of missiles and munitions in fiscal year 2025?
General Allvin. In line with the National Defense Strategy, the
Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget munitions portfolio prioritizes
lethal weapons mix that provides ``anti-access/area-denial-insensitive
strike capabilities that can penetrate adversary defenses at range.''
Key munitions include advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles
(AMRAAM), joint air-to-surface standoff missiles (JASSM), long-range
anti-ship missiles (LRASM), and stand-in attack weapons (SiAW). In
fiscal year 2024, Congress appropriated $77 million for the Department
of the Air Force (DAF) and $53 million for the Department of the Navy
requests for JASSM and LRASM facilitization to increase total missile
production. AMRAAM is currently at maximum procurement, and the Program
of Record will be completed in 2027-2028. SiAW is in the rapid
prototyping phase and is scheduled to finish prototyping in the fourth
quarter of CY26. Therefore, the DAF does not require additional
resources to scale up the production of missiles and munitions in
fiscal year 2025.
46. Senator Cotton. General Allvin, if survivability of 4th
generation platforms is a problem, and the Air Force isn't fully
funding survivability programs like electronic warfare suites on the F-
16 then how are you changing doctrinal mission sets for the F-16 while
they remain in the inventory?
General Allvin. The Air Force must evolve its fighter force to meet
the threat posed by China and Russia and to provide the capability and
capacity to meet worldwide demands. The F-16 will be the Air Force's
affordable capacity for the next decade at least in competition,
homeland defense, and more permissive combat environments.
The Air Force budget request reflects tough, responsible choices.
The Air Force seeks to preserve the substantial advances in
modernization and procurement in previous years. Still, the
survivability of older platforms is limited, regardless of the amount
of modernization. However, survivability is not determined only by a
platform's mission systems, such as electronic warfare suites, or by a
platform's characteristics, such as stealth, range, or payload.
Survivability also depends on the environment and family of systems in
which each platform intends to operate.
The National Defense Strategy lays out the defense of our Homeland
as the number one Department of Defense priority. The F-16 has and will
continue to play a key role in this mission set, and in less contested
environments, and the Air Force will continue to support the F-16's
ability to execute those mission sets.
47. Senator Cotton. General Allvin, we can't afford to make
everything exquisitely survivable and stealthy, so what is the place of
force multipliers for survivability like the new Compass Call
electronic warfare aircraft?
General Allvin. To be successful in future conflicts, we must be
able to disrupt and confuse adversary kill chains while securing and
scaling our own. We will need to leverage force-multiplying
capabilities like uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA),
electronic attacks, and counter-targeting capabilities. The EA-37B
Compass Call brings such capabilities, but to win in a contested
environment, we will require a systems-of-systems approach that
includes affordable mass, like CCA.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
jparc and joint integrated test and training center
48. Senator Sullivan. General Allvin, what advantages does JPARC
provide for live-fly training compared to other live-fly locations
across the U.S.?
General Allvin. The Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) is
one of the Air Force's premier training ranges for live air combat
training and one of only two ranges that the Air Force is modernizing
to a Threat Matrix Framework Level 4 peer adversary capability. With
approximately 70K+ square miles of airspace, JPARC provides an
environment unavailable at other Air Force primary training ranges for
large force exercises such as Red Flag-Alaska and Northern Edge while
supporting the daily training requirements of numerous 4th and 5th
generation squadrons at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson and Eielson Air
Force Base. Investment in replicating peer-adversary capabilities and
the continued modernization of the legacy airspaces will offer the best
possible live-fly training environment at JPARC for modern fourth-
generation+, fifth generation, and anticipated sixth generation
aircraft and their weapon system capabilities.
49. Senator Sullivan. General Allvin, can you explain what
advantages integrating training between the virtual training at JITTC
and the live-fly training at JPARC will provide the Air Force and the
Joint Force?
General Allvin. Air Force and adversary capabilities have advanced
to a point where we must leverage a combination of live and synthetic
training to adequately prepare for the Great Power Competition.
Locating a Joint Integrated Test and Training Center at Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson provides the Joint Force with the best synthetic
and unique live training opportunities in the same location. It will
allow crews to optimize the strengths of each environment for more
relevant and realistic high-end training.
18th fighter interceptor squadron
50. Senator Sullivan. General Allvin, what is the Air Force
resourcing plan to upgrade the F-16s in the squadron with newer AESA
radars, avionics, and sensor pods?
General Allvin. At Eielson Air Force Base, the Alaska-assigned F-
16s (18th Fighter Interceptor Squadron) are not programmed to receive
active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars or modernized
avionics. They are equipped with five (5) two-way down link sniper pods
and six (6) enhanced listening digital port advanced targeting pods,
representing the most capable targeting pods compatible with their
Block-30 aircraft. Further modernizing these aircraft does not fit
within Air Force priorities.
51. Senator Sullivan. General Allvin, the squadron requires more
pilots and maintainers with its new designation. What is timeline to
get those personnel to Alaska?
General Allvin. The unit's current pilot manning is at 96 percent.
Due to the mission change, the Air Force continues to identify the
necessary talent. However, six (6) pilots have been identified for
assignment to the squadron by early 2025. No additional maintenance
manning requirement is associated with this redesignation.
52. Senator Sullivan. General Allvin, is the Air Force considering
upgrading the aircraft to a newer F-16 model?
General Allvin. The Air Force does not currently intend to replace
Eielson Air Force Base assigned F-16s with a newer F-16 model.
re-optimizing for great power competition
53. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall and General Allvin, unlike
most locations in the continental United States, Alaska routinely
conducts real-world homeland defense missions. How has the Air Force
factored balancing the training aspect and mission readiness in Alaska
within the construct of the Air Force's Reoptimization for Great Power
Competition?
Secretary Kendall and General Allvin. Alaska and its enduring real-
world homeland defense (HD) mission will not be impacted by the
Department of the Air Force's Great Power Competition reoptimization
efforts. Units with an in-place real-world mission, like the 18th
Fighter Interceptor Squadron, help us highlight tensions between the HD
mission and other deployed missions. The work we are doing in
reoptimization will help the Air Force ensure we provide the
appropriate resourcing for those units to continue training and
executing effectively.
54. Senator Sullivan. General Allvin, in the event of a Taiwan
invasion or other large-scale event in INDOPACOM, the 100 fifth
generation fighters in Alaska would likely flow into theater to support
combat operations. That means that the experience those units have with
operating in Alaska's challenging environment to defend the Homeland
will be lost as units from the lower 48 states will have to flow to
Alaska to fill the gap. How are you ensuring that the units that would
flow to Alaska are trained to deal with cold weather maintenance and
operations?
General Allvin. In the event Alaska-based fighter squadrons are
pulled further into the Pacific, it would be done in full coordination
with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Commander of North American
Aerospace Defense Command. If backfill to Alaska is warranted, we have
Northern Tier Reserve component fighter squadrons and Active component
fighter squadrons that train in Alaska at the Joint Pacific-Alaska
Range Complex in large-force exercises and have basic training for
operations in cold weather conditions.
air national guard proposed pec-leveling impact on alaska missions
55. Senator Sullivan. General Allvin, was the Air Force consulted
on the impact of the Air National Guard's proposed PEC-leveling effort
on Alaska-based air refueling and combat search and rescue missions?
General Allvin. Under the authority of the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau, the Air National Guard Director directed a ``Full-Time
Leveling'' initiative to distribute full-time funding equitably across
like units throughout the Air National Guard. The National Guard Bureau
has operated under a congressional cap on Active Guard Reserve
personnel for three (3) years, each year substantially below the
President's Budget request. The National Guard Bureau has frequently
messaged the States about the implications of this continuing limit.
Furthermore, over the past 30 years, unit conversions and Defense
Department programming choices resulted in an imbalance of funded,
full-time percentages across units funded under the same program type.
The National Guard has agreed to delay Alaska's full-time leveling
actions for one (1) year to conduct an internal review. Any
discrepancies found during the internal review will be addressed and
implemented with a new effective date of October 1, 2025.
56. Senator Sullivan. General Allvin, can you describe how Alaska
Air National Guard personnel support Air Force missions in Alaska?
General Allvin. Alaska Air National Guard personnel conduct
aerospace warning and aerospace control, personnel recovery, air
refueling, and finally, space warning at Clear Space Force Station.
e-7 wedgetail program
57. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall, we need to field the E-7
as rapidly as possible but there is a limit to what the Air Force can
spend on these airframes. It is my understanding that with a $2.4
billion investment over the next 2 years, Boeing can deliver four
aircraft, in addition to the two already ordered, by 2029. If the Air
Force considering making this financial commitment?
Secretary Kendall. The Air Force plans to define the E-7 rapid
prototyping contract in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2024 and make
a production decision in fiscal year 2026. As such, the Air Force has
not released a request for a proposal for E-7 Production or received an
unsolicited E-7 Production proposal from Boeing. We plan to pursue
production details after we define the development contract.
58. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall, is the Air Force
considering a block-buy or multi-year procurement for the E-7 program?
Secretary Kendall. The Air Force plans to define the E-7 rapid
prototyping contract in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2024 and make
a production decision in fiscal year 2026. As such, the Air Force has
not released a request for a proposal for E-7 Production or received an
unsolicited E-7 Production proposal from Boeing. We plan to pursue
production details after we define the development contract.
59. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall, has the Navy's E-2D
Hawkeye been considered as a potential stop gap given the delays in the
E-7 production?
Secretary Kendall. Our prior market research considered L3 Harris,
SAAB, and Northrop's E-2D Hawkeye potential options to fill the
capability. Each has limitations, and none are as capable as the E-7
solution we are currently pursuing. The E-2D Hawkeye was assessed as an
alternative but failed to meet various mission requirements, including
the radar detection range, overall mobility and reach, and aerial
refueling configuration. The E-2D is optimized for protecting the
carrier battle group instead of battle management command and control
of a massive force engagement. Also, the E-7 service ceiling is over
5,000 feet higher than the E-2D, directly affecting the maximum radar
detection range. We can provide additional details regarding the radar
at the classified level.
60. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall, what does the Air Force
view as the most significant issues affecting the timely production of
the E-7?
Secretary Kendall. The Air Force's E-7A Rapid Prototyping Program
will design the U.S. system and build two (2) operationally
representative E-7A prototype aircraft. The Air Force plans to define
the E-7 Rapid Prototyping contract in the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2024 and is preparing for a follow-on production decision in fiscal
year 2026. Execution challenges as part of a production program include
the approximately 4-year lead-time to deliver each production aircraft.
It will take two (2) years to get the ``green'' 737 host aircraft and
two (2) years to convert it to an E-7A, including concurrent lead-time
for the multi-role electronically scanned array sensor.
long range discrimination radar
61. Senator Sullivan. General Saltzman, did the MDA's canceled test
flight numbered FTX-26 for the LRDR at Clear Space Force Station delay
the transfer of the LRDR to the Space Force?
General Saltzman. The transfer of LRDR to the Space Force is still
planned for fiscal year 2025 after LRDR is added to the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) Operational Capability List in December 2024 and the
completion of Flight Test Other-26a (FTX-26a) in June 2025. Due to the
Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) target anomaly, FTX-26 was a no
test event. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is conducting another
operational test, FTX-26a, in June 2025 to complete transfer
requirements to the Space Force. Flight Test Other-26 (FTX-26) remains
within the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) funding and control.
62. Senator Sullivan. General Saltzman, can you explain how the
LRDR will enhance the missile defense mission while simultaneously
helping the Space Force track a rapidly proliferating number of objects
in orbit?
General Saltzman. The long-range discrimination radar (LRDR)
provides persistent long-range midcourse discrimination, precision
tracking, and hit assessment to support the ground-based midcourse
defense capability against long-range missile threats. The LRDR also
supports the Space Force Space Domain Awareness mission by providing
operationally relevant space surveillance (metric observations) in
Missile Defense System Increment 6B.1. The LRDR will provide Space
Object Identification data by September 2026 in Missile Defense System
Increment 6C/7.
63. Senator Sullivan. General Saltzman, what is the manning
composition between Active, Reserve, and Guard personnel required to
operate the LRDR?
General Saltzman. The long-range discrimination radar (LRDR) is
government-owned and contractor-operated, reducing the personnel needed
to operate and maintain the weapon system.
Manning composition:
AD: 0
Reserve: 0
Guard: 25 (Security Forces)
DAF Civilians: 2 (Quality Assurance & Oversight)
Contractors (in AK, CO & CA): 88
--------
Total: 115
64. Senator Sullivan. General Saltzman, did the Air National Guard
consult you about the impact of its proposed PEC-leveling program on
the Space Force missions at Clear SFS?
General Saltzman. The Air National Guard is not required to consult
with me on aligning State National Guard manpower resources. I
understand that the Director of the Air National Guard, under the
authority of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, directed a full-
time leveling initiative to equitably distribute full-time funding
across like units throughout the Air National Guard. All full-time
leveling initiatives within Alaska are on hold until October 1, 2025,
further permitting the Air National Guard staff to coordinate with
Alaska National Guard leadership to address their concerns on the
proposed manpower changes.
eielson housing
65. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall, does the Air Force want to
build additional on base housing at Eielson Air Force Base to alleviate
what it describes as a shortage of suitable housing in the surrounding
community?
Secretary Kendall. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) policy is
to rely on the private sector as the primary source of housing. The
recent Housing Requirements Market Analysis from 2022 concluded that
there is a current shortfall in family housing, and the KC-135 beddown
would exacerbate the issue. The Eielson commander is working with the
U.S. Army Garrison Alaska Commander and local officials to advise the
community on the types and quantities of additional housing required to
address the DOD family housing shortfall.
66. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall, if the Air Force is
considering building additional on base housing at Eielson, when can we
expect to see that request in the Air Force budget?
Secretary Kendall. The Department of the Air Force and the
privatized family housing company on Eielson are not planning to build
additional family housing.
67. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall, can you explain what
housing criteria must be met for the first KC-135 to arrive at Eielson?
Secretary Kendall. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) will
reassess housing availability to meet KC-135 beddown requirements when
the community communicates new housing development and can ensure an
availability timeline when vacancy rates consistently exceed 10 percent
over consecutive quarters. The DAF is currently tracking two proposed
housing developments in the North Pole, Alaska area.
The DAF continues to track new housing construction and vacancy
metrics through engagement with the Fairbanks North Star Borough
Housing Task Force and the U.S. Army Garrison Alaska. The DAF must
ensure that we have enough affordable market-comparable housing for the
aircrew and the support staff to provide the quality of life for our
servicemembers and their families that we need to be able to retain
those families.
68. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall, are any personnel
associated with the four additional KC-135s slated to arrive at Eielson
already on base?
Secretary Kendall. There are no Department of the Air Force (DAF)
personnel assigned to Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, to support the
addition of four (4) KC-135s, pending a solution for adequate housing
at Eielson and in the Fairbanks area. The DAF must ensure we have
enough affordable market-comparable housing for the aircrew and the
support staff to provide the quality of life for our servicemembers and
their families that we need to be able to retain those families.
69. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall, what is the current
timeline for each of the four KC-135s to arrive at Eielson?
Secretary Kendall. A timeline has yet to be established for the
arrival of the four (4) KC-135s, and a solution for adequate housing at
Eielson and in the Fairbanks area is pending outcome of discussions
with the community and the U.S. Army Garrison Alaska.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
homestead air reserve base
70. Senator Scott. Secretary Kendall, we have a real, underutilized
asset in South Florida--Homestead Air Reserve Base. Last week,
Secretary Austin told me that ``Homestead Air Reserve Base is
strategically located and provides valuable contributions to our
efforts in the SOUTHCOM AOR.'' General Richardson, the SOUTHCOM
Commander, talked about the value of Homestead and how it was used as a
staging base for humanitarian efforts after the earthquake in Haiti in
2021. Additionally, during General Brown's confirmation hearing last
year he talked about the importance of Homestead and told me he was
committed to having a platform operate out of Homestead. Secretary
Kendall, this time last year you said and I quote ``I'm not aware of
any desire to close Homestead''. I appreciate all the positive
commentary, but that doesn't mean a thing when there's nothing in the
budget and the Air Force has not provided an update on the plan or even
a future plan for Homestead. Secretary Kendall, what is the Air Force's
plan for a flying mission at Homestead and what are the future plans
for the base?
Secretary Kendall. The Department of the Air Force has no force
structure changes in fiscal year 2025 for Homestead and no plans to
close Homestead Air Reserve Base. Homestead will continue to be
considered as a candidate in future strategic basing actions, as
applicable, based on specific mission beddown requirements. Due to its
strategic location, Homestead Air Reserve Base will remain Active.
electronic warfare spectrum dominance
71. Senator Scott. General Allvin, during your confirmation hearing
last year, I asked you about the importance of the 350th Spectrum
Warfare Wing at Eglin. You said ``spectrum warfare is really
integrating with the other traditional parts of warfare and ensuring
that we can have our air superiority, we can support our strike
missions, all those by not just managing spectrum but protecting our
own vulnerabilities and exploiting those of our adversaries.'' Do we
need to dominate the Electronic Warfare spectrum to win a war with
Communist China?
General Allvin. Yes, the United States needs to dominate the
Electromagnetic Spectrum at times and places of our choosing to win.
The Electromagnetic Spectrum is a maneuver space and physical
environment linking all military operations in and across the air,
land, maritime, cyberspace, and space warfighting domains. We need the
spectrum to deny adversaries long-range kill chains and enable ours. We
must be able to operate in the spectrum without prohibitive
interference while also denying our adversaries' ability to operate
effectively.
72. Senator Scott. General Allvin, I believe we do need to dominate
the spectrum to win a war against any adversary and I want to protect
servicemembers. I don't see anything in the budget this year for the
350th to build the Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Superiority
Complex. I also don't see anything in the budget for the Electronic
Warfare Center of Excellence, these are also not on the unfunded
priorities list. If we have to dominate the spectrum to win, shouldn't
we invest in the infrastructure and the people that we need to dominate
the EW spectrum?
General Allvin. The 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing's (SWW)
Electromagnetic Superiority Complex is moving forward. The SWW received
$8 million in fiscal year 2023 to reach 35 percent of the design
milestone, the initial requirement for consideration of military
construction funding. The Army Corps of Engineers awarded the 350 SWW
MILCON 35 percent design contract on 24 Jul 2024; the 35 percent design
is expected to take approximately 120 days. After 35 percent of the
design is accomplished, we expect to fund the construction of the
Electromagnetic Superiority Complex.
The 350th SWW is the focal point within the Air Force for curating,
developing, testing, integrating, and promulgating algorithms and
techniques for Electromagnetic Warfare across the force. The Department
of the Air Force is committed to funding the necessary infrastructure,
people, and capabilities. In addition to money from classified
programs, the Fiscal Year 2025 President's Budget invests $55 million
directly into the 350th SWW.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
air force fighter plan
73. Senator Budd. Secretary Kendall, section 148. of fiscal year
2024 NDAA requires the Secretary of the Air Force, in consultation with
the Director of the Air National Guard and the Commander of the Air
Force Reserve to develop a long-term tactical fighter force structure,
recapitalization, training and sustainment plan for the Active and
Reserve components of the Air Force and submit a report to Congress no
later than April 1, 2024 that includes this plan. This plan is 15 days
past due. What specific date can we expect this report?
Secretary Kendall. The Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense
Authorization Act unclassified fighter report has been delivered to
Congress. The classified annex is awaiting clearance for submission.
f-15ex fleet
74. Senator Budd. Secretary Kendall and General Allvin, the Air
Force claims it is replacing its aged F-15C fleet with F-15EX, and that
is reflected in the budget documents. However, the F-15EX is built as a
two-seat, multirole platform. It also appears that the fighter roadmap
is projecting an air to ground role for F-15EX in the future. Which one
is it? Air superiority, or multi-role? Will there be Weapons Systems
Officers (WSO, or ``wizzos'') in the backseat?
Secretary Kendall and General Allvin. The F-15EX is a short-
duration procurement to rapidly recapitalize the F-15C/D airframe for
air superiority and homeland defense missions. Unlike the F-15E, it is
engineered to be fully operated single-seat, with an optional second
aircrew member. The Department of the Air Force (DAF)'s plan for the F-
15EX is to provide air superiority capability in contested environments
and outsized weapon support to the long-range kill chain. We will
continue evaluating future modifications and resources required to
field and employ multi-role capabilities like the F-15E.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2024
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:59 a.m., in
room G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Scott, Tuberville, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. Just for
my colleague's awareness, so we intend to conclude today's
hearing, as we did yesterday, by 12 noon due to Senate floor
business.
This will require us ending the open session by 11 a.m. and
then moving immediately to the closed session in SVC-217. As
such, I would ask that members adhere to the 5-minute rule. I
will enforce it.
Then, I will waive my opening statement, and I--Senator
Wicker also has graciously agreed to waive his opening
statement. So, with that, let me recognize Secretary Granholm
for her statement, and then Administrator Hruby. Madam
Secretary.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM, SECRETARY OF
ENERGY
Secretary Granholm. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and I
will be quick about my opening statement to try to be in the
spirit of moving with alacrity.
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, of course, esteemed
Members of the Committee, honored to be here representing the
Department of Energy before you today. I thank this committee
for the strong, consistent, bipartisan support the committee
has shown the Department of Energy, the NNSA on our collective
mission.
For the past 3 years, Congress has entrusted DOE with
significant resources to buildup America's manufacturing
capacity, to create jobs, to lead global clean energy markets,
and those endeavors are critical to energy security and
economic competitiveness in the 21st century, and at the same
time, the American people have long counted on the Department
to meet essential National Security missions.
The geopolitical shifts around us have made clear that
those missions are urgent as ever. The growing cooperation
between Russia, China, Iran, North Korea has created a more
unstable and less predictable international environment,
increased saber rattling aggression against our allies, and
cyber-attack threats reinforce the imperative to maintain a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
Meanwhile, more and more countries around the world are
embracing the potential of civil nuclear power for sustainable
development, for zero carbon energy, and for climate security.
In fact, in December, 22 nations pledged to triple civil
nuclear generation capacity by 2050, and interest is only set
to grow as these small modular reactors and advanced reactors
continue to progress.
All of this underscores a need for deeper investment and
innovation in nonproliferation and counterterrorism measures,
and as nuclear technology continues to develop, we must uphold
our pledges to the communities that have lived alongside those
programs for decades.
So, the Department has worked urgently to deliver on each
of these priorities over the past year, and the President's
Budget Request for 2025 will empower us to make even greater
progress. I just want to detail quickly some of the key
elements, starting with the NNSA. The fiscal year 2025 budget
calls for $25 billion, which is a 3.6 percent increase over the
2024 enacted level.
That includes a roughly 4 percent increase for weapons
activities, which will allow us to move more swiftly toward
modernizing the nuclear stockpile and restoring production
capacity. This request would also empower the NNSA to respond
to new threats and opportunities under nuclear nonproliferation
and counterterrorism.
It will allow us to continue providing the Navy with
nuclear propulsion systems, while developing the next
generation of nuclear powered warships. Both are vital to our
technological advantage over our adversaries and preserving
free global oceans.
Importantly, the budget will also allow the NNSA to build
the Federal workforce that is needed to meet our increasing
mission requirements. Further, the President has requested $8.2
billion for our Office of Environmental Management, which
oversees the largest environmental cleanup operation in the
world.
Last year, our teams across the country made great progress
on key demolitions and treating and relocating millions of
gallons of tank waste, addressing contamination issues across
our sites.
The fiscal year 2025 request will allow us to build on
those results and deepen our engagement with tribes and
communities as they plan for the future of those sites, and it
will help us recruit and train a new cohort of legacy
management workers and leaders.
Over the past 3 years, we have made important progress on
each of these crucial missions, yet challenges do remain. This
budget request prepares us for the depth of the work that is
still ahead.
I am proud to lead such a gifted and dedicated teams,
starting with the great leader to my left, Dr. Jill Hruby, who
heads the NNSA and who is here to answer questions about the
weapons program.
We are both grateful to have your partnership and support
on these indispensable matters, and I look forward to answering
your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
Administrator Hruby, please.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JILL M. HRUBY, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Hruby. Thank you. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Wicker----
Chairman Reed. Can you bring that microphone as close as
possible?
Ms. Hruby. Thank you, and Members of the Committee for the
opportunity to appear before you with Secretary Granholm to
discuss the Department of Energy's enduring National Security
missions.
NNSA appreciates the consistent, strong support for our
work and our workforce from the Secretary and from the
Committee. In today's complex and dynamic security environment,
NNSA is delivering.
Last year, we provided the Department of Defense over 200
modernized weapons on schedule. The life of ship nuclear
reactor for the Columbia-class submarine is on track for lead
ship delivery.
Our nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs
are advancing technologies and partnerships that are responsive
to the evolving global environment. In all our programs, we are
preparing for the future by revitalizing our infrastructure and
staying at the cutting edge in select science and technology
areas.
NNSA's Fiscal Year 2025 budget request of $25 billion
reflects these priorities. The nuclear weapons program of
record grew from five to seven systems this past year. The B61
and the W88 Alt 370 programs are in production.
The W80-4 remains aligned with the Air Force schedule for
the long range standoff missile, and we expect a first
production unit in September 2027. The W87-1 is currently
scheduled to begin production in fiscal year 2031 or 2032, and
the W93 remains on track for production starting in the mid
2030's.
With the fiscal year 2024 budget enactment, NNSA began
working on the B61-13 program, with the first production unit
expected in fiscal year 2026. Although the nuclear se launched
cruise missile, or SLCM-N, is not in the budget request for
fiscal year 2025 due to the timing of the Fiscal Year 2024
NDAA, NNSA is committed to fulfilling this requirement.
These seven systems represent modernized weapons for all
three legs of the triad and new capabilities responsive to
today's security environment. NNSA is also modernizing our
infrastructure alongside our programs.
We have prioritized investments to deliver the most
urgently needed capabilities, while pursuing a longer term
strategy of responsive, flexible, and resilient enterprise.
Tangible progress on both large and smaller scale projects is
being made.
A milestone anticipated this year is the first diamond
stamped war reserve W87-1 plutonium pit from the Los Alamos pit
production facility. In short, NNSA is delivering on programs
that holistically support nuclear deterrence and strengthen
relationships with our allies and partners.
There is much work ahead. We are fully committed, and we
appreciate your support. Thank you. I look forward to your
questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Jennifer M.
Granholm and Ms. Jill M. Hruby follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Secretary Jennifer M. Granholm and
Administrator Jill M. Hruby
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and esteemed Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on
behalf of the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA). We recognize and appreciate the
Committee's consistent support for DOE's enduring national security
missions.
As the Secretary of Energy and Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security, we recognize the unique challenges posed by a deteriorating
international environment and remain committed to strengthening our
nuclear deterrent while reducing global nuclear and cyber risks,
promoting the peaceful use of nuclear technology to combat climate
change, strengthening the cybersecurity of our critical energy
infrastructure, and engaging in responsible environmental stewardship
and cleanup.
The Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile remains the cornerstone of
our strategic deterrent and a key tool in reassuring our allies. The
Department is aware that we have no margin for error and that we must
remain committed to our nuclear modernization efforts. This commitment
must be paired with further progress on nonproliferation and
counterterrorism measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear
and radiological material and expertise. This is especially significant
as the global civilian nuclear power sector expands, and new nuclear
technologies are introduced as a means of providing secure, clean power
and fighting climate change. Additionally, the Department will continue
to provide the U.S. Navy's submarines and aircraft carriers with
militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants and is looking forward
to being an effective contributor to the new trilateral Australia-
United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partnership.
We are also actively addressing the increasing cyber threat to U.S.
energy infrastructure. The recent cyber activity called ``Volt
Typhoon'' conducted by state-sponsored cyber actors from the People's
Republic of China (PRC) should alarm all of us. The United States
Government assesses that PRC state-sponsored cyber actors are seeking
to pre-position themselves for disruptive or destructive cyberattacks
against United States critical infrastructure in the event of a major
crisis or conflict with the United States.
The fiscal year 2025 Budget reflects the Administration's
commitment to these priorities, allowing the Department to enhance our
national security, engage in cleanup from our legacy nuclear
activities, and promote American leadership on the safe and peaceful
use of clean energy.
nnsa's fiscal year 2025 budget overview
The fiscal year 2025 budget request reflects the urgent demands on
the nuclear security enterprise to deliver and adapt while exercising
fiscal restraint and increasing efficiency. NNSA's fiscal year 2025
budget request is $25 billion. The fiscal year 2025 budget request
prioritizes executing the nuclear weapon program of record, including
the development of the B61-13, advancing naval nuclear propulsion
systems, and revitalizing the infrastructure across the enterprise. In
addition, our requested budget supports development and application of
emerging technologies such as digital engineering and artificial
intelligence (AI) that will increase our efficiency and innovation. The
fiscal year 2025 budget request affirms the Administration's steadfast
commitment to a strong national defense and NNSA's critical and
evolving missions.
weapons activities appropriation
The Weapons Activities fiscal year 2025 budget request of $19.8
billion, supports stockpile management; production modernization;
stockpile research, technology, and engineering; infrastructure and
operations; defense nuclear security and secure transportation; and
information management and cyber security.
Stockpile Management
The Stockpile Management budget request of $5.14 billion, supports
stockpile modernization, stockpile sustainment, weapons dismantlement,
production operations, and nuclear enterprise assurance.
The stockpile modernization program budget request of $2.84 billion
supports six systems in the expanded program of record: B61-12 LEP,
B61-13, W88 Alt 370, W87-1, W80-4, and W93. Although SLCM-N is not in
the budget request due to the timing of the fiscal year 2024 NDAA and
fiscal year 2024 budget enactment compared to the development and
submittal of the fiscal year 2025 budget request, NNSA will continue to
work with DOD and Congress to assure accordance with fiscal year 2024
NDAA Section 1640.
NNSA has achieved 100 percent on-time delivery of the W88
Alteration (Alt) 370 Program and B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) to
DOD. This represents consistent production progress since our
announcement of First Production Units (FPU) in fiscal year 2021 and
fiscal year 2022, respectively.
Starting with the fiscal year 2024 budget enactment, NNSA began the
B61-13 program in response to the decision to strengthen deterrence and
assurance by providing the President with additional options against
certain harder and large-area military targets. In coordination with
DOD, NNSA will decrease the number of B61-12s built by the number of
B61-13s manufactured, resulting in no change to the number of weapons
in the stockpile. NNSA appreciates Congress' authorization and
appropriation of $52 million in fiscal year 2024 for the B61-13,
allowing us to take advantage of active B61 production capabilities. In
fiscal year 2025, the B61-13 program will progress into Phase 6.4,
Production Engineering, with FPU expected in fiscal year 2026.
The W80-4 warhead for the long-range standoff missile entered Phase
6.4, Production Engineering, in fiscal year 2023 and remains on track
for FPU in September 2027, aligned with the Air Force schedule for
initial and final operational capability dates.
In fiscal year 2023, the W87-1 entered Phase 6.3, Development
Engineering, a major milestone. The W87-1 will replace the aging W78
warhead, one of the oldest in the stockpile. The FPU for the W87-1 is
currently scheduled for fiscal year 2031-32. The W87-1 is the first
modernized weapon that will have a newly manufactured pit, which will
be built at Los Alamos National Laboratory and certified by Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory.
In May 2022, the W93 entered Phase 2, Feasibility Study and Design
Options, and remains on track for production starting in the mid-
2030's. The Nuclear Weapons Council has directed effort to accelerate
the W93 FPU and the fiscal year 2025 budget request supports this
effort. The W93 is a new warhead program based on existing designs that
will not require new underground nuclear explosive testing. The W93
will meet DOD requirements to enhance operational effectiveness of the
U.S. ballistic missile submarine force. The W93 will have new pits
produced at Savannah River. The program is being undertaken in parallel
with the United Kingdom's Replacement Warhead program continuing our
coordination through the United States-United Kingdom Mutual Defense
Agreement.
The fiscal year 2024 NDAA required a SLCM-N as part of NNSA's
program of record. As mentioned earlier, NNSA is coordinating with DOD
to determine warhead requirements and meet congressional direction for
this new program. We will continue to keep Congress informed as program
offices in NNSA and the Navy are stood up and requirements are better
defined.
In addition to the seven modernization programs mentioned here,
NNSA has also requested $69 million in the Stockpile Research,
Technology, and Engineering program to support two ``Phase 1'' system
studies for early exploration of hard and deeply buried target defeat
and non-ballistic reentry systems.
In order to continue to increase efficiency and enable future on-
time delivery of weapons, NNSA has initiated two efforts: digital
engineering and agile product realization. It is our intent to lower
the time and cost to deliver a new weapon as we improve our processes
and increase the experience level within the enterprise.
The Stockpile Management budget request for Stockpile Sustainment
and Production Operations reflects the increased demands of the
existing and modernized stockpile efforts. The Nuclear Enterprise
Assurance budget request reflects a response to growing threats
associated with cyber and digital advances. NNSA has requested over a
50 percent increase since fiscal year 2023 to respond to this growing
reality. Last, the fiscal year 25 budget request for Weapons
Dismantlement balances the needs of the enterprise.
Production Modernization
NNSA's $5.9 billion budget request for production modernization
reflects disciplined priority decisions in the portfolio and the
overall Weapons Activities budget, as well as the availability of
carryover to address fiscal year 2025 requirements. The FYNSP includes
production modernization budget requests that grow at a faster pace in
future years to meet stockpile modernization demands as the program
spends down excess carryover, particularly in major projects.
NNSA's highest production modernization priority is re-establishing
the capability to produce new plutonium pits that was lost in 1989 when
production at Rocky Flats was halted. The pit production plan includes
a redesign and refurbishment of Los Alamos plutonium facilities to
support a production capacity of 30 pits per year (ppy) while
simultaneously establishing the processes to achieve war reserve (WR)
qualified pits for the W87-1.
As work continues at Los Alamos, the building designed and
constructed to house the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at
Savannah River is being modified and re-purposed to manufacture at
least 50 ppy. The W93 pits will be the first manufactured at Savannah
River. Although the W87-1 and W93 programs are setting the quantity and
schedule of pit production now, other future weapons will also require
newly produced pits. Pit production will be needed to support the
stockpile as long as nuclear weapons exist.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request for plutonium modernization is
$2.89 billion. The request for Los Alamos reflects the use of carryover
funding to support increased activity in fiscal year 2025. The budget
request for Savannah River offsets the decreased request for Los
Alamos. Additionally, the request for Infrastructure and Operations
supports increasing operations and maintenance requirements associated
with the pit production mission.
The fiscal year 2025 $1.5 billion budget request for Los Alamos pit
production and the associated line-item projects reflects the use of
carryover balances and consistent with projected execution rates of the
line-item projects.
In fiscal year 2023, more development pits were produced at Los
Alamos than ever before--nine full W87-1 development pit builds, with
five more partial builds. Los Alamos is on track to ``diamond stamp''
the first fully qualified WR pit in the second half of this year. The
budget request supports the increased pace of manufacturing work
associated with the ramp from FPU to rate production, as well as the
increased pace planned for equipment installation. It is expected that
Los Alamos will achieve the minimum capability needed to produce 30 ppy
in or near 2028 with increasingly dependable capability attained each
year through 2032.
The requests for Savannah River Pit Production and Savannah River
Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) sum to $1.28 billion. The request
for SRPPF supports the increasing pace of work to support completion of
construction and turnover to operations in 2032. We thank Congress for
the strong support of this critical project. Fiscal year 2023 funding
was used for contract awards for the first set of gloveboxes on the
critical path for construction, as well as significant early site and
building preparation work. Fiscal year 2024 funding will be used for
contract awards for additional long-lead critical-path procurements and
preparations. SRPPF's Process Design is now 90 percent complete with
the 60 percent overall project Preliminary Design completion
anticipated before the first quarter of fiscal year 2025.
Last year NNSA committed to generating an updated SRPPF cost and
schedule estimate, recognizing that there would be large uncertainties
because the 60 percent design is not yet complete. Savannah River
Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) has produced a ``bottom-up'' cost and schedule
estimate based on information that was available near the end of fiscal
year 2023. SRNS estimates turnover to operations will occur in 2032 or
2033, with a total project cost of $18.5 billion. NNSA's cost range for
Savannah River based on the SRNS estimate, an independent estimate from
our Cost Estimating and Project Evaluation (CEPE) office, and our
Office of Infrastructure cost review is $18 billion to $25 billion.
These figures represent the macrolevel results of the review. The
details continue to be refined and will be briefed to the Nuclear
Weapons Council in the coming months.
Finally, the successful transition of SRS management to NNSA is
important to our efforts on SRPPF. NNSA is working closely with our
colleagues at the Department of Energy's Office of Environmental
Management, the Savannah River Field Office, the SRNS leadership team,
and local stakeholders to ensure a smooth transition.
The NNSA Integrated Master Schedule (NIMS) has been updated and
improved as requested by Congress. Additional logic and linkages are
included for LAP4, schedules between LAP4 and SRPPF are better
integrated, and the paths to FPU and rate production at SRPPF are
incorporated. The NIMS contains integrated detailed site schedule logic
from Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and the Kansas City National
Security Campus (KCNSC) for program scope focused on pit manufacturing
and production efforts to attain first production unit at Los Alamos.
There is less detail in the schedule for SRPPF projects and the later
phases of equipment installation at LAP4 since equipment and system
designs for this work are less mature. NIMS will continue to integrate
higher fidelity schedule logic for those programs and projects as their
designs and schedules mature. The current NIMS makes it an effective
management tool for the program and continuous updates will allow NIMS
to continue to be an effective tool.
Additionally, NNSA has directed an external review of our Plutonium
program by the Advisory Committee for Nuclear Security, a Federal
Advisory Committee Act group reporting to the Administrator. The
initial report from this committee is expected in May 2024.
Alongside pit production, the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at
Y-12 is a top priority. The fiscal year 2025 budget request for UPF is
$800 million. We greatly appreciate congressional actions to support
reprogramming in fiscal year 2023.
The construction of the overall UPF project is now over 60 percent
complete. Gloveboxes are installed in the main process building, and
over 97 percent of all procurements have been delivered. The current
focus of work is bulk electrical installation, with over 60 miles of
electrical conduit and cable installed in the last half of calendar
year 2023. However, due to a variety of issues, including direct and
indirect impacts from COVID, deficiencies in contractor performance and
planning, overly optimistic assumptions on productivity, repeated
delays on procurements, and funding uncertainties, the most current UPF
project cost estimate is $10.3 billion and the estimated date for
construction completion is late fiscal year 2027 with beginning of
operations expected in October 2031.
In addition to making progress on UPF, NNSA is advancing its
development of centrifuges and cascades for domestic uranium enrichment
and its production of tritium with a fiscal year 2025 budget request of
$662 million.
Other large-scale projects are either starting or moving forward in
line with NNSA's weapon modernization and/or safety and security needs.
In late calendar year 2023, NNSA broke ground on the Lithium Processing
Facility (LPF) at Y-12 with construction expected to start in fiscal
year 2026 and a fiscal year 2025 budget request of $260 million. The
High Explosives Science and Engineering facility at Pantex continues
construction with a fiscal year 2025 budget request of $15 million, and
the Power Sources Capability at Sandia has a budget request of $50
million. the Kansas City Non-Nuclear Expansion Transformation (KCNExT),
a new real estate acquisition approach to meet NNSA's space needs that
will break ground in Summer 2024. KCNExT is critical to increase
capacity of the non-nuclear components. Each of these projects is key
to modernizing facilities to avoid infrastructure failure and to
increase capacity.
NNSA recognizes the fiscal year 2024 NDAA statutory language for
completion of the High Explosives Synthesis, Formulation, and
Production Facility (HESFP) at the Pantex Plant, and the Tritium
Finishing Facility (TFF) at SRS. Funding for these project schedules
was not factored into the fiscal year 2025 request as NNSA's strategy
was to prioritize funding of a reduced number of critical projects, and
both HESFP and TFF are of a lower priority.
Science, Research, Technology, and Engineering
The Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering (SRT&E)
portfolio develops and delivers the tools used every day for design,
certification, and assessment of the stockpile without underground
nuclear explosive testing; evaluates and accelerates future concepts;
improves understanding of weapon response to environmental conditions;
and matures technologies for warheads and manufacturing processes. The
SRT&E budget supports the infrastructure and workforce to deliver
scientific and engineering advances, including both experimental and
computational capabilities. The fiscal year 2025 budget request for
SRT&E is $3.17 billion.
In fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2024, Lawrence Livermore
repeated its 2022 fusion ignition breakthrough at the National Ignition
Facility (NIF) four times, improving gains and achieving a yield of 5.2
MJ in February 2024. We were excited to have the first NNSA Ignition
result highlighted by Google as the ``most searched breakthrough'' in
the past 25 years. Also, in In fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2024,
NNSA started significant efforts to mature technologies to manufacture
radiation cases, evaluate new explosives formulations, implement AI in
science and engineering programs, and establish AI models and testbeds
for unclassified and classified work.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request of $880 million for Advanced
Simulation and Computing enables transitioning LANL's Crossroads system
to classified service for weapons assessment and certification,
bringing on line the first exaflop computer El Capitan at Lawrence
Livermore, and expanding the application of Artificial Intelligence to
stockpile stewardship.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request for Inertial Confinement Fusion
(ICF) program of $683 million will allow NNSA to address near-term
weapons physics challenges and build on its repeated success of
reaching fusion ignition in the laboratory. The ICF program gives NNSA
experimental access to extreme temperature and pressure regimes
characteristic of nuclear weapons to support design, certification, and
assessment of the stockpile without resuming underground nuclear
explosive testing. NNSA is currently recapitalizing and sustaining
existing facilities in line with the ICF 10-Year Facility and
Infrastructure Plan delivered to Congress in March 2023. The highly
visible successes of the ICF program enhances the deterrent by
demonstrating world-leading expertise in high energy density science
and technology and providing experimental access to weapons-relevant
physical conditions previously unattainable in the laboratory.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request for Enhanced Capabilities for
Subcritical Experiments (ECSE) of $240 million coupled with the $73
million U1a Complex Enhancements Project (UCEP) request will support
expansion, construction, and system installations at the Principal
Underground Laboratory for Subcritical Experimentation (PULSE) at the
Nevada National Security Site. ECSE includes development of the Z-pinch
Experimental Underground System (ZEUS) and Advanced Sources Detectors
(ASD) Scorpius instruments. Experiments with these tools at PULSE will
provide capabilities for system-level plutonium aging experiments at
the end of the decade and will provide an important capability to
assess system designs for ongoing modernization programs.
Academic Programs and Community Support
The budget request for Academic Programs and Community support is
$128 million. It is critical for NNSA to support external mission-
relevant research, generate a talent pipeline in key areas of science
and engineering, and support our communities. This funding is targeted
at workforce needs projected to be the most critical.
infrastructure and operations
The NNSA budget request for Infrastructure and Operations is $3.3
billion, including $3.16 billion for operations and $144 million for a
portfolio of smaller infrastructure projects. The Operations request,
which includes operations of facilities, safety and environmental
operations, maintenance and repair of facilities, and recapitalization,
is essential to be able to deliver our stockpile program from our
legacy infrastructure base, especially while revitalization and new
construction are underway. As noted above, significant investments in
both operations of facilities and maintenance and repair of facilities
are tied to increased requirements associated with plutonium pit
production. The Operations request also reflects the transition of
management of the Savannah River Site from Environmental Management to
NNSA. Funding throughout operations of facilities, maintenance and
repair of facilities, and recapitalization is critical to ensure that
NNSA can transition SRS to an enduring missionsite to support pit
production and the broader nuclear modernization program. Additionally,
$240 million of the $778 million requested for Recapitalization will
fund the second phase of KCNExT, including real estate acquisition of
the first manufacturing facility in the KCNExT portfolio.
NNSA continues to innovate on mission-enabling construction of
commercial-like projects to save time and taxpayer dollars while
upgrading key capabilities. In calendar year 2023, NNSA successfully
completed the final three projects initiated under the 2019 Enhanced
Minor Construction and Commercial Standards (EMC2) pilot project: new
emergency operations centers at Y-12 and Sandia National Laboratories
and a new fire station at Y-12. NNSA experienced up to a 30 percent
cost avoidance on these pilot projects. In August 2023, NNSA
established a new policy institutionalizing the streamlined oversight
and management practices from EMC2 for line-item construction projects
up to $100 million, opening the door for future cost and time savings
in smaller-scale non-nuclear construction.
To better understand, synchronize, and communicate the enterprise's
infrastructure needs, NNSA is developing an Enterprise Blueprint. The
Blueprint will describe in detail the facilities needed across the
enterprise and their ties to mission needs. This will help reinforce
NNSA's underlying philosophy of responsiveness, flexibility, and
resiliency required to meet dynamic demands. A fully developed
Enterprise Blueprint is expected in the latter half of 2024. The
Blueprint will guide future investment priorities and budget requests.
defense nuclear security and secure transportation
The fiscal year 2025 budget request of $1.18 billion for Defense
Nuclear Security reflects both the transition of responsibility for
safeguards and security at the Savannah River Site from EM to NNSA, as
well as the need to keep pace with new threats, particularly uncrewed
aerial systems. The budget request also includes funding for the West
End Protected Area Reduction (WEPAR) project.
NNSA is transitioning to a next-generation counter uncrewed aerial
system (CUAS) that will employ an open architecture systems-based
approach to address the evolving threat uncrewed aircraft systems
present to NNSA facilities and personnel. Open architecture provides
the data fusion and integration of open and proprietary sensors to
allow NNSA to select the best available mitigation capabilities: radio
frequency, directed energy, kinetic, and radar. Combining these
approaches will prevent NNSA from relying on a single capability and
allows for swift adjustments to incorporate advanced technology. The
flexibility gained by this approach allows security planners to
customize systems for each management and operating contract mission
partner lab, plant, or site, based on unique location conditions. In
fiscal year 2025, NNSA will finalize the development of a permanent
facility at the Idaho National Laboratory for CUAS testing and
evaluation to help security planners identify possible next-generation
solutions, outline continuous testing requirements, and improve NNSA's
existing CUAS platform.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request for Secure Transportation is
$371 million. NNSA's Secure Transportation is essential to assure the
security of weapons during delivery and return from the DOD and to meet
our schedule commitments.
information technology and cybersecurity
The fiscal year 2025 budget requests $646 million for Information
Technology (IT) and Cyber Security recognizes the increasing threats to
cyber security and the ever increasing needs to improve information
technology, including technology to support our digital engineering
initiative. This request is 45 percent above the fiscal year 2023
enacted to provide increased security to this high security enterprise.
NNSA faces an increasingly sophisticated and targeted cyber threat
environment. We are recapitalizing our information technology (IT) and
cybersecurity environments to provide a more resilient and flexible set
of capabilities. The fiscal year 2025 budget request prioritizes
investments in the IT and cybersecurity workforce, enterprise-scale
cyber infrastructure, implementation of zero trust architecture,
digital transformation, classified and unclassified commercial cloud-
based technologies, and classified wireless systems to improve mission
outcomes across the nuclear security enterprise. NNSA is also
conducting cyber exercises, including red teaming, to stress test
NNSA's cybersecurity posture. We are making these investments to remain
poised to address any cyber threat.
defense nuclear nonproliferation
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request of $2.46
billion continues critical investment for our nonproliferation,
counterterrorism, and emergency response programs at this difficult
time in global strategic stability.
The Material Management and Minimization fiscal year 2025 budget
request is $377 million. The budget reflects the decision to delay the
design and construction of a Pit Disassembly and Processing (PDP)
Facility as part of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) program.
The PDP delay, to be re-evaluated in 10 years, allows us to prioritize
the removal of material from South Carolina. Real progress in SPD has
been made. We are especially pleased that, following years of extensive
planning and coordination, last year the first shipment of down-blended
surplus plutonium was transported from K-Area at the SRS in South
Carolina to Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico for final
disposition, and shipments have continued regularly. A total of 111.6
kgs of NNSA surplus plutonium was dispositioned during fiscal year
2023.
Another key activity over the past several years has been assisting
the final major global producer of the medical isotope molybdenum-99 to
convert from using highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched
uranium, helping to ensure a stable supply of a critical medical
isotope while eliminating an associated proliferation risk. A related
effort to establish a reliable supply of domestically produced Mo-99 in
the United States received a one-time increase in fiscal year 2024, and
a plan to execute is being established in consultation with Congress.
NNSA continues to work with partners who have converted research
reactors and medical isotope production processes by supplying the
high-assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU) they need to operation. This
increasingly includes countries that are looking to wean themselves
from Russian supplies of HALEU.
In fiscal year 2025, we plan to use the Mobile-Melt-Consolidate
system developed by NNSA to begin to eliminate inventories of excess
HEU in Norway that previously lacked a disposition pathway. To date,
NNSA has eliminated over 7,340kg of HEU and plutonium globally; the
material equivalent to eliminating hundreds of nuclear weapons.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request for Global Material Security is
$544 million. The GMS request prioritizes funding for the nuclear
smuggling detection and deterrence portfolio. NNSA has increased focus
on Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa to counter Russian and
Chinese activity and influence in those regions. NNSA began cooperation
with 16 new partners in the past 2 years, and by the end of fiscal year
2025, NNSA will deploy 78 new counter nuclear smuggling systems.
NNSA also remains on track to meet the congressionally mandated
deadline to replace all cesium-based blood irradiators in the United
States by 2027. NNSA's success here goes beyond just cesium-based blood
irradiators. In fact, NNSA removed over 100 devices in fiscal year
2023, with another 85 removals expected by the end of fiscal year 2024.
NNSA has expanded its work to find technical capable tools to replace
those materials posing the greatest risk of radiological terrorism with
a greater focus on alternatives to cobalt-60 replacements.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request for Nonproliferation and Arms
Control is $225 million. The budget request will support new activities
to improve safeguarding uranium enrichment plants and develop policy
and technical solutions to address risks associated with the global
expansion of nuclear energy.
The budget includes funding for Project Carousel, a unique
multilateral capability that will allow the IAEA to test and validate
technologies and train safeguards inspectors.
NNSA personnel have been closely involved in efforts to counter
Russian and Chinese disinformation and illegal actions while promoting
United States and allied interests. This includes working with the
Department of State (DOS) and other interagency partners to counter
Chinese disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining the AUKUS
security partnership. NNSA will continue collaborating with the DOS and
DOD to advance the goals of the partnership while adhering to our
obligations as both a responsible nuclear power and under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. NNSA has also lent its expertise to the Global
Export Control Coalition to improve the detection of Russia's attempted
sanctions evasion to acquire war material to support its ongoing
invasion against Ukraine.
NNSA supports the expansion of civil nuclear energy to responsible
partners globally. Last year, NNSA was instrumental in forging a civil
nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and the
Philippines and provides support to DOS on the negotiation and
implementation of these agreements. NNSA also helps U.S. companies
manage their international engagements without sharing sensitive
technology. Finally, NNSA is working directly with nuclear reactor
developers to build in international safeguards concepts from the
beginning, lowering the costs to long term deployment, increasing
safeguards effectiveness and improving the competitiveness of American
industry for foreign deployment.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request for Nuclear Nonproliferation
Research and Development is $803 million.
The fiscal year 2025 request will continue to support the
Nonproliferation Stewardship Program and the Forensics R&D research
life-cycle plans
NNSA delivered to the U.S. Space Force (USSF) the first newly
completed next-generation Global Burst Detector (GBD IIIF) payload for
space-based nuclear detonation monitoring. This new sensor will provide
an order of magnitude increase in capabilities at reduced size, weight,
and power.
Building from this sensor capability, the R&D budget in fiscal year
2025 request includes support for monitoring and verification
capabilities for space situational awareness to reinforce arms control
and verification missions in support of current treaties, like the
Outer Space Treaty. This work protects our national interests and
assets, providing information on activities all the way to the lunar
surface and beyond.
While Russia routinely violates its arms control commitments and
exhibits norm-violating behavior and China has been unwilling to engage
in meaningful bilateral or multilateral arms control, NNSA continues to
invest in developing infrastructure, human capital, and advanced
technologies to meet current and future monitoring and verification
needs and prepare for potential future arms control negotiations. Last
year, NNSA reached an important scientific and engineering milestone by
successfully conducting a chemical explosive test in P Tunnel at the
Nevada National Security Site. This experiment advanced our ability to
detect very low-yield underground nuclear explosive tests around the
world.
The R&D request also includes $15 million for developing
capabilities to produce assessments of how AI models may present
nuclear proliferation risks and provide recommendations for mitigating
the potential AI threats to national security in light of the rapid
pace of rapid technological advancement and innovation.
nuclear counterterrorism and incident response
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation's (CTCP) core
capabilities are to counter nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation
and respond to any nuclear or radiological incident or accident
worldwide. The fiscal year 2025 budget request of $536 million for the
Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response program supports planned
investments for the second phase of the Capability Forward initiative
by developing a standardized Nuclear Emergency Support Team technical
training program focused on actions to secure and defeat weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) devices for Federal Bureau of Investigation
field office responders. The fiscal year 2025 request also supports
technical and policy solutions to counter nuclear proliferation,
capability enhancements to counter nuclear and radiological threats--
including improved tools to locate, characterize, defeat and conduct
forensics on these threats--and training delivery and capacity building
for domestic and international partnerships on nuclear counterterrorism
and emergency preparedness and response.
NNSA is advancing the Administration's Executive Order on the Safe,
Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence.
As outlined in the Executive Order, NNSA is working with our colleagues
across DOE to tools to better understand and mitigate the risk of AI
being misused to assist in the development or use of CBRN threats. As
Russia's full-scale invasion against Ukraine enters its third year,
DOE/NNSA's Ukraine Task Force, comprised of experts from DNN and CTCP,
is working to reduce nuclear risks in Ukraine. This includes providing
equipment, training, and technical guidance to enable the safe and
secure operation of Ukraine's nuclear power plants remaining under its
control, protect its critical infrastructure, particularly the electric
grid, provide situational awareness of any nuclear emergency that
occurs in the country, and enhance the emergency preparedness and
response capacity of our Ukrainian partners to respond to a nuclear
event.
naval reactors appropriation
The Naval Reactors budget request of $2.1 billion supports NNSA's
close partnership with the U.S. Navy in key areas. The agency is
advancing naval nuclear propulsion capabilities to keep the U.S.
nuclear fleet on the cutting edge of warfighting capability,
maintaining the assured second-strike capability of the sea-based leg
of the nuclear triad, and building the next generation of
infrastructure to enable continued operational success.
With 78 warships, or more than 40 percent of the U.S. Navy's major
combatants,\1\ maintaining and expanding the United States' competitive
edge in the field of naval nuclear propulsion remains critical to our
national security. Providing the Nation's submarines and aircraft
carriers with unparalleled mobility, flexibility, responsiveness, and
endurance is vital in today's geopolitical environment. Continued
support for the Naval Reactors program in the fiscal year 2025 request
enables the Navy to project robust fleet capabilities on long-term
missions that are essential to the security of the nuclear triad,
continued global presence, and the security of global trade and free
navigation of international waters.
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\1\ ``Major combatants,'' in this instance, include aircraft
carriers, submarines, and surface combatants based on the ``Active in
Commission'' column from the Naval Vessel Register
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The fiscal year 2025 request supports technology development work
critical to delivering improvements in reactor performance and
reliability, and to support in-service and future submarines and
aircraft carriers' obsolescence and capability needs. The fiscal year
2025 request for Naval Reactors Development is $868.4 million.
The fiscal year 2025 request supports the continued safe and
reliable operations, maintenance, and oversight at Naval Reactors' four
Naval Nuclear Laboratory sites and the associated contractor workforce.
The fiscal year 2025 request for Naval Reactors Operations and
Infrastructure is $763.2 million. Funding also supports requirements
for major initiatives: Columbia-class reactor systems development;
development of future advanced submarine technology to support next
generation designs; and continued progress on base technology
development, infrastructure recapitalization at program sites, and
decontamination and decommissioning efforts.
Finally, Naval Reactors continues to support the trilateral AUKUS
partnership with work through reimbursable agreements with Australia
and the U.K. NNSA will continue its collaboration with DOS and DOD to
advance the goals of the agreement while adhering to our obligations as
both a responsible nuclear power and under the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty.
nnsa workforce
The Federal Salaries and Expenses budget request of $565 million,
supports the recruiting, retention, and development of high-quality
Federal staff required to meet NNSA's growing mission requirements and
commitments, maintain the overall health of the Federal workforce, and
ensure NNSA is able to provide effective oversight, which is essential
to controlling costs and schedule. The increased request helps address
the perennially lowest score that NNSA receives in the Federal Employee
Viewpoint Survey question that states ``my workload is manageable.''
A portion of the increased request is associated with the SRS
landlord transition from DOE Environmental Management (EM) to NNSA. We
anticipate the SRS transition will include a transfer of 85 FTEs.
NNSA aims to recruit and retain a highly skilled workforce by
offering a compelling mission, collaborative work environment, and
incentives to compete with the private sector for a limited pool of in-
demand talents. NNSA is adjusting its hiring practices to be more
proactive to get the right people in the right timeframe.
NNSA appreciates Congress's support to raise the Excepted Service
cap in the fiscal year 2024 NDAA.
steady progress in environmental management mission
As important as the missions of today and tomorrow are, the cold
war left an indelible mark on America. It is the mission of the Office
of Environmental Management (EM) to address the legacy of nuclear
weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research
that has played a significant role in domestic security and prosperity.
As the largest environmental cleanup program in the world, EM plays
a key role in the Department's overarching mission to protect the
planet. The Department's fiscal year 2025 budget request of $8.2
billion will help EM continue to make progress in fulfilling the
government's responsibility to clean up the environment in communities
that supported nuclear weapons programs and government-sponsored
nuclear energy research. EM's vital mission also helps to support and
enable DOE's ongoing national security and scientific research
missions. For nearly 35 years EM has achieved significant progress for
the environment, completing cleanup at 92 out of a total of 107 sites.
That progress continues today. In 2023, EM teams across the country
crossed the finish line on key demolitions, treated and relocated
millions of gallons of waste, and deepened our engagements with local
Tribes and communities all while curbing pollution.
Deactivation and demolition work at the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory and the Y-12 National Security Complex is reducing
environmental risks and enabling research and national security
missions. In Washington State, EM has treated radioactive and chemical
waste from large underground tanks at the Hanford Site where work is
progressing toward startup of a system that will convert this waste
into glass for disposal. Both Waste Treatment Plant melters have been
successfully heated to operational temperature and the first container
of nonradioactive test glass has been poured. The Integrated Waste
Treatment Unit has treated over 68,000 gallons of tank waste in Idaho
since the start of operations in 2023. At the Savannah River Site in
Aiken, South Carolina, EM is processing record amounts of tank waste
and continues to construct the Advanced Manufacturing Collaborative
facility which will help meet the needs of the Department's cleanup
mission and help develop a diverse and talented next generation
workforce.
More than 400 transuranic waste shipments were received last year
at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico, double the amount
from 2022. Demolition of the West Valley Demonstration Project's Main
Plant Process Building is underway, will continue this year and will
further advance under the Fiscal Year 2025 budget request. The Nevada
National Security Site completed demolition of four buildings that
supported development and testing of nuclear rocket engines during the
cold war Era and will continue to reduce the cleanup footprint there in
Fiscal Year 2025.
The fiscal year 2025 request includes $7.1 billion for defense
environmental cleanup activities, which covers most major EM sites, and
$385 million for the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and
Decommissioning Fund contribution. The request builds on recent
progress, reflects the Department's strong commitment to protecting the
environment, enabling national security and scientific research
missions, as well as delivering for communities most impacted by the
legacy of the past. The request supports a ramp up in EM's ability to
tackle tank waste--one of the Department's largest environmental
challenges and financial liabilities. The request will also enable
continued progress in infrastructure improvements at the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant and support waste shipments from across the EM
program. In addition, EM will continue to advance facility demolition
and risk reduction projects across the program.
The request of $2 billion for the Office of River Protection will
enable EM to advance commissioning and startup of the Direct Feed Low
Activity Waste system and includes a $608 million investment to ramp up
work on the Waste Treatment Plant's High Level Waste facility. Also at
Hanford, the request of $1.1 billion for the Richland Operations Office
will enable continued risk reduction activities including advancing the
transfer of cesium and strontium capsules to dry storage and treating
another 2 billion gallons of contaminated groundwater.
At the Savannah River Site, the request of $1.6 billion supports
continued efforts to fully utilize capabilities to advance the tank
waste mission. The request also supports continued progress in
disposition of nuclear materials stored at the Site and maintains a
high State of readiness for H Canyon, the only chemical separations
facility remaining in operation in the United States. In recognition of
the maturation of cleanup at the Savannah River Site and the increasing
role the Site will play in ongoing national security missions, EM will
transfer Site responsibilities to the National Nuclear Security
Administration in fiscal year 2025, while remaining focused on
completing the remaining legacy cleanup activities there. At the Idaho
Cleanup Project, the request of $471 million supports the Department's
continued commitment toward operations of the Integrated Waste
Treatment Unit which will ultimately treat about 900,000 gallons of
liquid waste by turning it into a granular solid. Along with providing
for continued Waste Isolation Pilot Plant operations, the budget
request supports key modernization and infrastructure recapitalization
priorities. Shipments of defense transuranic waste to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant will progress from sites across the DOE complex,
including the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.
EM's fiscal year 2025 budget also facilitates the Department's
broader national security and scientific research missions. Perhaps
nowhere is this more evident than in Tennessee where large-scale
cleanup operations are firmly underway at the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (ORNL) and the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12).
Building on previous demolition work, EM transferred the Biology
Complex at Y-12 to NNSA which is using it to build a new Lithium
Processing Facility. In 2023, EM tore down the Low Intensity Test
Reactor located in ORNL's central campus. This year EM will initiate
demolition of Y-12's Alpha 2 Building. With $658 million for Oak Ridge,
the fiscal year 2025 budget request supports additional cleanup of
high-risk excess facilities at the ORNL and Y-12. This steady progress
is part of a broader vision focused not only on cleaning up the past,
but also helping prepare for expanding national security and research
missions in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
In addition to enabling impactful progress at EM sites, the fiscal
year 2025 request helps position EM for the future. Recognizing the EM
mission will span several decades at some sites, the budget request
invests in building a workforce for the future that promotes diversity,
equity, inclusion, and accessibility. That includes high quality jobs
in environmental cleanup where workers from all backgrounds can make a
living and make a difference. The budget request includes $56 million
to continue EM's Minority Serving Institutions Partnership Program. The
budget request also supports science-based advancement that provide
opportunities to meet the Department's cleanup commitments safely,
quickly and efficiently. The request supports an integrated approach to
EM technology development, targeted R&D investments, the continued
evaluation of additional waste treatment options, and partnerships with
regulators and engagement with communities to apply effective
solutions.
While the mission is rooted in the environmental legacy of the
past, EM is also focused on the possibilities for the future. As
cleanup progresses, EM is opening up possibilities for a clean energy
future, good paying jobs and thriving communities and Tribal Nations.
The fiscal year 2025 request represents a significant investment in
helping these communities grow and thrive. The budget request includes
support for the Tribal Nations, Alaska Native communities, and
communities near EM sites ensuring they are safe, providing
opportunities for local input into clean up priorities and helping
build a vibrant future. The request includes Payment in Lieu of Taxes
funding for communities near Hanford and Savannah River to support
schools, roads and other local priorities. A $40 million investment is
also included for the Community Capacity Building Grant initiative. The
Department will continue to work hand-in-hand with workers, unions,
Tribal Nations, local communities, and Congress to protect the
environment, plan for continued cleanup and foster successful visions
for the future.
conclusion
At DOE, we continue to make progress in fields that enhance
American national security during a time of significant global
challenges. NNSA's weapons activities, nonproliferation and
counterterrorism, and naval reactors programs all play key roles in
reducing global nuclear threats and supporting our nuclear deterrent
which remains the cornerstone of our national defense. The Department
faces an expanded mission at a time of supply chain disruptions,
inflation, great power competition, and increased impacts from climate
change. We are determined to succeed and continue providing for the
American people. We appreciate the trust and resources the Committee
has placed in us to meet this moment and are thankful for the continued
support of the public and the rest of Congress.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Administrator Hruby. As
I indicated before, my statement and Senator Wicker's statement
will be put in the record, without objection.
Secretary Granholm, the construction programs at the
National Nuclear Security Administration and the clean-up
programs at the former defense sites have been faced with large
increases in cost due to shortage of skilled workers and
especially materials. You, like everybody else, have been
caught up in the post pandemic supply disruption.
What we are seeing now, however, is the effects of the last
several years seem to be spreading to the workforce where there
is indications that people are leaving faster than normal
retirements suggest.
Last year, as you know, we provided special authorities for
the Department to hire engineers and scientists. Can you fill
us in on how serious this problem is, and if you need
additional help?
Secretary Granholm. Yes. Thank you for the question, and
thank you for the ability to use that flexibility, 400
additional accepted service hiring positions allowed us to be
much more flexible.
We have been focusing on bringing aboard the additional 500
Federal employees over the last 2 years that we have been able
to hire, but unfortunately, double digit attrition has eaten up
those gains.
That is largely due, as I am sure you can imagine, to
incredible competition from the private sector and salaries
from the private sector, remote work that the private sector is
able to offer that we are not able to, but also because the
employees feel--many employees have reported that they feel
overworked because of the loss of fellow employees.
So, to answer your question, yes, support for what we have
requested in our budget, which is the full Federal salaries and
expenses appropriation request of $564 million in fiscal year
2025 would be most welcomed. Because the appropriations for
NNSA, as measured by enacted appropriations have really--the
National Security program has really doubled in size, we have
not been able to keep up in terms of hiring.
The STEM workers are obviously very special and very, well-
educated. We have got to do everything we can to keep the
greatest minds in the Federal Government, and so, the ability
to hire and through--as evidenced through support for that
appropriation would be much appreciated.
Chairman Reed. Do you need additional support in that
exemption from government rules?
Secretary Granholm. You are good right now, right?
Ms. Hruby. Yes. We appreciate what you have done to date,
and when we--if we get a budget appropriated--we also have made
changes to our hiring practices to lean forward more, so we are
hopeful we can help solve this shortage.
Chairman Reed. Director Hruby, many of your production
facilities date from 1940's and 1950's, and you are still
relying on, for example, for the production of depleted
uranium, World War II era rolling mill. What, and more
importantly, when will you bring modern production capabilities
and methods into your complex to save time and money?
Ms. Hruby. Yes. Thank you, Senator Reed. Our production
facilities are, in fact, very old, and we are making great
strides in replacing them, but we have a lot of work to do.
I want to talk about, in particular, modernizing our
capabilities and not just our infrastructure. I am sure we will
get lots of questions on infrastructure, but this issue of what
our production capabilities are is really important, because
any change we make in the manufacturing process changes the
microstructure of materials and we need to make sure that that
is okay through our science programs.
But we have some great examples. In fact, we have a special
polymer part that we produce using additive manufacturing for
the W80-4 that is making a huge difference in that program. We
have a current pilot project for new manufacturing technologies
for radiation cases, which is a collaboration between our
design and production agencies.
We have asked our advisory committee to look at--it is
called the Advisory Committee for Nuclear Security, to study
materials and manufacturing and look for other places that we
can make changes in our processes and our materials.
Of course, as we build new facilities, we are looking to
put modern new equipment in those facilities. We have a lot of
work to do. It is, in fact, true that we have very old
equipment and very old facilities, but we are very focused on
changing that.
Chairman Reed. I can't resist. If you watched the movie
Oppenheimer, did you recognize facilities that are still
working?
[Laughter.]
Ms. Hruby. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Madam Administrator, how many times did you
see Oppenheimer?
Ms. Hruby. Three so far.
Senator Wicker. Okay.
[Laughter.]
Senator Wicker. On the SLCMs, the NDAA was passed in
December. It signed into law immediately. That didn't give you
time to put the SLCMs in the budget?
Ms. Hruby. Yes. We--that is exactly right. We intend to
resolve this problem with Congress. It is in our unfunded
requirements letter. But we didn't get the--we submitted the
fiscal year 2025 budget before the NDAA and before the
enactment of the 2024 budget.
Senator Wicker. So, you don't mean to slow this down
another year?
Ms. Hruby. Absolutely not.
Senator Wicker. Okay.
Ms. Hruby. We have established a program office. We are
working with the Navy----
Senator Wicker. Good. Well, that is very positive news.
Now, I bet you read this congressional Strategic Posture
Commission Report more than three times. Studied it thoroughly.
Is that right?
Ms. Hruby. That is correct.
Senator Wicker. Indicates to some of us that our nuclear
forces are undersized, under prioritized, and incapable of
adapting to modern times. What do you say to that? Undersized
is right.
Ms. Hruby. Well, I believe that the Strategic Posture
Commission Report is right on the fact that we have to prepare
for two near peer adversaries or two peer adversaries, and we
need to do it with a sense of urgency. We have taken steps
already. In fact----
Senator Wicker. Undersized right now, seriously.
Ms. Hruby. What the report said, and I think this is
important, is we need more and, or different kinds, and I agree
with that. I don't think just more is going to solve the
problem. So, I think it is the combination of those two things.
Senator Wicker. What about incapable of adapting to modern
threats?
Ms. Hruby. We--there is lots of evidence that we are slow
to adapt to modern threats. But I think we are proving we are
capable, and we are making some changes now to do that.
I think the insertion of the two programs within the
program of record in the last 8 months shows that we are able
to do some adaptation, but we do need a stronger industrial
base, and we need a stronger government base in the NNSA to
enable us to do more as we go forward.
Senator Wicker. Well, amen to that. Do you worry that
tardiness on our part might encourage our allies to move
forward independently of us and that would have a negative
effect?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, I would say I do think about that, and I
worry about that. So far we--I mean, we are actually
modernizing. The first program, you know, off the block since
we started re--doing life extension programs is the B61-12, a
forward deployed weapon, which is being placed in Europe now.
But we need to keep up with--we need to take to address our
allies' concerns. I think we have, and we will continue to. But
yes, we ought to be watching it closely.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. Madam Secretary, you agree that
making nuclear power part of the solution is a priority, do you
not?
Secretary Granholm. I do.
Senator Wicker. To make this work, we need to rebuild the
domestic nuclear fuel cycle. What steps can we take to
accelerate our efforts to restart a uranium enrichment
capability that can meet our civilian energy and military
requirements?
Secretary Granholm. Thank you for the question, and I am so
grateful to Congress for supplying $2.7 billion that has been
repurposed from the civil nuclear credit part of the bipartisan
infrastructure law for the buildup and the creation of a
uranium cycle in the United States, a fuel cycle.
But we can't access that funding unless there is a ban on
import of Russian uranium into the United States, and so, to
the extent that Congress can adopt a ban, I think, one has been
passed in the House and hopefully the Senate can take that up
as well. That will enable us to access that funding to create a
domestic supply.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Senator
Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and it is good to see
both of you. Secretary Granholm, I always enjoy our
opportunities to do events in Virginia together. We have had
some good ones.
I want to ask about a topic that you raised in your joint
written testimony, and that is trying to develop strategies to
counter uncrewed aerial systems. We have had testimony in this
hearing, public testimony from General Guillot of NORTHCOM
about the drone swarms around Langley, which are troubling.
Those have been publicly reported and discussed in open
session. But I noticed in your joint written testimony that you
talked about NNSA trying to kind of up its game in developing
counter UAS strategies. Can you talk to the Committee a little
bit about that?
Ms. Hruby. Absolutely. Thank you for that question. This
has been an issue at some of our sites. We have identified the
UASs near areas where--that are sensitive. Here is what we--we
have UAS detection systems deployed at all of our sites. They
have some limited capability to counter those systems.
We are updating the current systems, and we are evaluating
a new system that has much more counter capability. We are
testing that. We are establishing a test site at Idaho so that
we can keep up with the threat.
My intention, and I have been very clear about this, with
the complex is as soon as a UAS crosses the line that we have
declared as this is dangerous, we need to counter it. We can't
just say we see it. We have to counter it.
We are positioning ourselves in this budget request and in
the work that we are doing to make sure we can do that.
Senator Kaine. Can I ask you, as we are trying to grapple
with this threat, I have sometimes not been satisfied as I have
asked questions about sort of who is in charge of this. I mean,
on domestic soil, the FBI is involved, and DHS is involved, but
then DOD is involved.
You have to work with, you know, the cities and towns and
counties where facilities are located. Is the NNSA sort of at a
table of stakeholders with others trying to figure this out
from a whole of government standpoint?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, we do work closely, especially with the
FBI. I will say that we benefit from having large remote sites.
So, again, we have clearly delineated where the lines are in
terms of our sensitivities, and so, we are working toward
policies that allow us to take action without needing to get--
we need that policy approved by everybody, but once we have the
policy approved, we can take action without getting additional
approvals. That is the end goal that we are looking for.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. Switching gears, this Committee
and the Foreign Relations committee have been pretty involved
in putting into law the AUKUS framework, both pillar one and
pillar two.
Talk to me about NNSA's involvement in working with the
Australians on the pillar one, equipping them with the capacity
to operate and maintain and eventually construct nuclear subs.
Ms. Hruby. Well, we have two activities in NNSA on pillar
one. There is the activities that we do in naval reactors, and
there is the activities we do in nonproliferation. In the Naval
Reactors Program, they--we have Australian sailors now taking
nuclear reactor training.
That is the--for us, for our role, that is the most
important thing is to make sure that the Australian navy has
the capability and the complete thorough training that we enjoy
in the United States to operate these boats effectively.
On the nonproliferation side, our goal is to have this be a
model program for nonproliferation. We have lots of work with
the Australians to help them understand what that is and to
work with the IAEA to create systems to make sure that there
could be absolutely no diversion.
We are going to--we are going to deliver sealed nuclear
reactors that power these boats, but still we will need to make
sure there is no material diversion, no potential for any
material being stolen in any way.
We feel very confident that the Australians are taking
those seriously and are working very closely with us.
Senator Kaine. Excellent. Well, I don't want to exceed my
time after having been warned by the chair that we are going to
try to move quickly. But Secretary Granholm, I am going to ask
you a question for the record.
Last year you talked about some initiatives the Department
of Energy is doing to find talent at HBCUs and minority serving
institutions, and partnership you are creating. I will ask for
the record, and we will look forward to seeing what is the
progress on that front. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Fischer,
please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Chairman Reed, and thank you,
Ranking Member Wicker. Nuclear deterrence is the backbone of
our National Security. It underpins every operational plan that
we have, and every Administration since 1960's has validated
the need for our nuclear triad.
While the Air Force and the Navy are responsible for the
bombers, ICBMs, missiles, and submarines, it is the NNSA and
the Department of Energy who are responsible for the designing,
manufacturing, and certifying of the nuclear weapons
themselves.
Transitioning back toward a production mindset has its
challenges, but I understand NNSA delivered over 200 modernized
nuclear weapons last year, and I am glad to see that progress
is being made, Administrator, and that NNSA is reprioritizing
the production and delivery of nuclear weapons.
Administrator, how would this budget request help NNSA to
meet their requirement to increase the number of modernized
nuclear weapons produced and delivered in fiscal year 2025 and
beyond?
Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Senator Fischer. We appreciate your
recognizing that we have made significant accomplishments. I
would--this budget request for fiscal year 2025 has about--has
actually more money for production modernization than it has
for stockpile modernization in it.
That is not because we are not doing stockpile
modernization. We are very focused on that. But we recognize to
meet the demands over the next decade and beyond, we really
have to get after our production enterprise.
In particular, a lot of the emphasis is on making sure we
can bring up pit production at both Los Alamos and Savannah
River, complete the uranium processing facility, and other high
priorities in the system.
So, I think that the most important thing that NNSA can do
to secure the future for the nuclear enterprise is to develop
success like we are in modernizing weapons and then modernize
our infrastructure.
Senator Fischer. When we visited before this hearing, we
talked about balancing those seven modernization programs and
how we really can't afford any further delays on any of those.
To avoid similar boom and bust cycles in the future, we
have to have that groundwork laid now, the foundation laid now.
Can you tell me how NNSA is working with STRATCOM to assess
future threats in the late 2030's and beyond, to be able to
identify the likely requirements for future nuclear weapons
programs?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator. Thank you. This is one of the
things I am very proud to say that we have made a significant--
working with General Cotton, we have agreed that we really need
to define those needs beyond the mid 2030's, which is where the
program of record today. We have got seven things going on
between now and the mid 2030's, but we have--we know we have
needs beyond that.
We have reestablished a process that had gone--that used to
exist, it had gone quiet, to have STRATCOM staff who understand
and think about deterrence needs on a daily basis to work with
our staff, who think about and understand capabilities on a
daily basis, to work together more closely on--to meet
regularly, to define, hey, what is the gap and what is the best
way to fill it that will exist in the late 2030's and 2040's.
Senator Fischer. You know, I really appreciated our
discussions on how we can accelerate the delivery of SLCM, and
I have appreciated that you have that request in the unfunded
priority list for $70 million for SLCM.
I think that does demonstrate a really clear commitment to
meeting the requirements that are now set in law.
Administrator, can you provide us with an update on how the
NNSA is moving forward with the development of the warhead?
Ms. Hruby. Yes. We are looking, working very closely with
the Navy as they define their delivery platform, to define the
warhead that will match well to that.
Our objective, because we are trying to do this in the
program of record, we are trying to, you know, squeeze it
between some programs that we are already working on, is to
find the most effective and simplest way that won't disrupt the
rest of the program of record to meet the requirements for
SLCM-N.
So, we are looking at the W80-4, as was in the authorizing
language. We are also looking at other options that might, we
don't know yet, be simpler to do in terms of disrupting our
current production flow.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Fischer.
Senator Manchin, please.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for your service and for being here. I appreciate it very
much. Secretary Granholm blessed us yesterday with her presence
and we had a good meeting, except for a little interruption.
But other than that, it was good. But I want to thank you all.
I have been a long supporter and a fan of nuclear--and
basically with nuclear propulsion has been used in nuclear--in
weapons, but mostly in propulsion for our military fleet,
Department of Defense, and how we have done in such a safety
record for many, many, many, many years.
But yet we haven't been able to get it right in the private
sector, or we haven't been able to employ it with the same--I
think, the same veracity and also the assurance from the public
that we can do it in a very safe manner, and I think that has
been a mistake on our part. I am concerned really, and to both
of you, how you might feel about this, the production of highly
enriched uranium, and its primary fuel source for the Navy
submarines, aircraft carriers, as we know. According to the
NNSA, enriched uranium stockpile run out in 2040. Is that
accurate? Is those timelines accurate and are you concerned?
What do you plan to do to, make sure that we don't have a
deficiency there?
Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Let's see, we have
two needs in NNSA for enriched uranium. We have the need for
low enriched uranium to make tritium. That is a focus for the
2040's.
We that have a need for highly enriched uranium for naval
reactors and weapons, which is out beyond the 2040's timeframe.
We do not have the capability to enrich uranium for defense
purposes in the U.S. today.
Senator Manchin. Can I--for a little bit of history, it
might help us out a little bit of history here. Why did we
allow ourselves to get in a situation that we were dependent
upon Russia, or we went to that? That was after the cold war.
I have heard different scenarios. In the cold war they were
trying to all just kind of work together, but why did we
believe--was it basically from an environmental standpoint, or
do we have a lot of advocates who were opposed to nuclear, and
we thought, well, out of sight, out of mind, we will go
somewhere else and get it.
They didn't want to produce it here and enrich it. What was
the purpose? What was the problem?
Ms. Hruby. Well, I think there are a couple of issues. So,
with respect to defense needs, we have a lot, and we had a
lot--you know, we had a stockpile of 30,000 weapons. In the
nuclear weapons stockpile, highly enriched uranium doesn't get
used.
So, it stays highly enriched. It has very long lifetime.
So, we felt there was plenty of highly enriched uranium that
could be used, and in fact, even down blended to low enriched
uranium to use for other purposes. That is what we have been
doing now for many decades. In the civil sector, of course, it
is a different issue, which is cost competition and
environmental issues. It was hard to create a steady base for
civil nuclear LEU.
But on the defense side, we have been using our stockpile
of HEY for weapons, and it is just now as we plan out that we
feel like we cannot continue to do that forever and that we
need to think about reestablishing these capabilities.
Senator Manchin. Senator Granholm, if I may ask you on
this, from this Administration standpoint and where you all
stand, DOE, are you all concerned about our ability to get back
into production or be able to do it in a sufficient way that
the public will support it, but also know the needs that we
have for defense of our country?
Secretary Granholm. I think we can definitely do it, and we
are grateful for Congress's support on creating a uranium
strategy inside the United States by repurposing some of the
civil nuclear credit to get $2.7 billion to create our own fuel
cycle here. However, as I was mentioning to Senator Wicker
earlier, the only way that we can access that funds is if
Congress passes a ban on the import of Russian uranium, and we
are hoping----
Senator Manchin. We are trying very hard.
Secretary Granholm. Very good. That is great. I will say
one other thing, on the civil side, the high assay, low
enriched uranium, of course, is necessary for the small modular
reactors and the advanced reactors, and that is a very
important part of our cycle and our strategy to be able to have
more nuclear power, in addition to----
Senator Manchin. My final question would be along those
lines. With the onslaught, basically, and we have the
development of SMRs and micros, to be coming into the
workforce, if you will, into the production of the private
sector. Is that taking into consideration, by 2040 we are
running in a depletion or basically in the need, or it would be
accelerated like 2030 maybe, or 2035----
Secretary Granholm. We need to accelerate. We need--there
is no doubt that the development of these----
Senator Manchin. There is a concern--the number we are
using, 2040, does that take in consideration what we are
talking about here?
Secretary Granholm. I think that is mostly on the defense
side.
Ms. Hruby. It is.
Secretary Granholm. Yes. On the civilian side, I mean,
these reactors are being developed right now.
Senator Manchin. Very, very quickly. Rapidly.
Secretary Granholm. They have access to Russian HELU, and
we need that capability here, which is why we have to act with
urgency.
Senator Manchin. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you so much, Senator Manchin. Senator
Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Thank you
both for being here today to testify in front of the Committee.
Secretary Granholm, we will start with you. Secretary Granholm,
should taxpayer dollars be granted to U.S. sanctioned countries
or institutions, yes or no?
Secretary Granholm. You mean through the buy--through the
DOE?
Senator Ernst. Through DOE.
Secretary Granholm. No.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you. Because, as you know, the
Department of Energy distributes billions of dollars in grants
and awards. In February, a magazine published a research
article acknowledging support from a taxpayer funded DOE award.
The same article credits an Iranian researcher employed by
Iran's State linked Sharif University of Technology. U.S.
authorities have sanctioned multiple Sharif University entities
due to their ties to Iran's nuclear program.
Britain and EU have also sanctioned the university due to
similar concerns. So, Secretary Granholm did taxpayer dollars
in this grant to support the Iranian researcher?
Secretary Granholm. I am not familiar with this grant, but
perhaps you can share that article and I can followup.
Senator Ernst. We will definitely do that, and thank you
for that response. We will share that because this is of great
concern to us.
The reports are cause for concern, no matter how those
grants are distributed, because Iran builds up their nuclear--
as they are building up their nuclear arsenal, we must be
absolutely certain that taxpayer dollars are not funding a
researcher working for a university linked to Iran's nuclear
program.
We just witnessed, of course, Iran attack our ally Israel
and their proxies have taken American servicemembers' lives. At
tower 22, here within the last several months, we lost three
American servicemembers, members of the 718th engineer company
of Georgia. They were U.S. Army Reserves.
They were--their lives were lost at the hands of Iranian
proxies. So, the capabilities cannot even remotely be
strengthened by American taxpayer dollars, and so, those
answers will matter. Secretary Granholm, we will provide you
with that information and will expect a response back. Thank
you, Secretary, and kind of on that same theme then. Do you
know what safeguards the Department has in place to ensure that
our Department of Energy funded American researchers do not
share sensitive information about technology with academics
working for sanctioned university located from adversaries?
Secretary Granholm. We have a very robust
counterintelligence strategy inside of the Department, which
is, looking both at lab research, partnerships, et cetera, to
ensure that we are securing American IP.
That we are not endangering, obviously, by releasing
certainly any sensitive information from our--from the defense
side of our operation. We have also set up a whole strategy
inside the Department for vetting requests coming in from those
whom--from companies who might want to access DOE grants or
loans.
It is research, technology, and economic security effort
that is similar to CFIUS inside the Department. We have beefed
up our efforts on that to ensure that we are being extra
cautious on both, making sure that we are not--that we are not
partnering with entities that will create a problem for the
United States, but also that we are viewing those who with whom
we are working to ensure that sensitive information is not
going in the wrong direction.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate that. We have seen
other Departments that have, through contracts and
subcontracts, sent dollars overseas to other entities.
So, all we have to do is look at the COVID-19 issue that we
had and how American taxpayer dollars were funneled to China
for research. So, as you know, talking through this, is it your
view then that taxpayer dollars are not going to those areas
that might be benefiting our adversaries?
Secretary Granholm. Well, you know, you have to sort of
carve this with a scalpel and not with an ax when you are
talking about the civilian side, because supply chains in the
manufacturing base have been so intertwined, for example, with
China that it--that to say that a supply chain in an EV company
that has a component that may have been re-shored from China,
that may have actually started with the United States, but we
get it back, but there may be some kind of connection.
What we want to do is to mitigate the potential damage to
the U.S.. We do want to re-shore, obviously, IP and companies
that were sucked overseas with intentional industrial strategy
by other countries to be able to get that.
So, we try to really balance what is going to be in the
interests of America and security, to ensure that both taxpayer
dollars are spent for--in a way that will serve American
interests. That is very important.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Secretary, and thank you so much
for the time, Mr. Chair. I do think it is important that we
acknowledge that we need to bring that supply chain back to the
United States of America, but especially sensitive research. We
need to ensure that no taxpayer dollars are going to entities
that we would consider adversaries. Thank you, Secretary.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Rosen,
please.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed. I really
appreciate the hearing. I want to thank Secretary Granholm and
Administrator Hruby, of course, for your service, for your hard
work, and your knowledge.
Of course, I am going to talk a little bit about Nevada,
because Nevada has, of course, played a critical role in
nuclear weapons development, but often at a very high cost.
From 1951 to 1992, 928 nuclear weapons were actually detonated
in Nevada.
It is causing people and land to be exposed to toxic levels
of radiation, and it is why I firmly oppose any policies that
would put Nevadans at risk again, from returning to the days of
explosive testing, nuclear testing, out to the shipping of
nuclear waste to be stored at Yucca mountain, and a dangerous--
Yucca mountain is a dangerous and misguided proposal that some
of our colleagues in the House, well they just raised it again
last week.
That is one of the reasons why, of course, I strongly
support the mission of the Nevada National Security Site, which
verifies the reliability and the effectiveness of our nuclear
stockpile through advanced scientific experiments and modeling
so that nuclear weapons will never have to be tested again.
So, to both of you, as you know, mining and construction
continue at the principal underground laboratory for
subcritical experimentation, or PULSE, formerly known as the
U1A complex. This expansion is going to allow the lab to house
two machines that will improve our ability to assess
performance, safety, and reliability of our nuclear stockpile.
So, Secretary, can you provide us an update, and then
Administrator, on the project and speak to some of the other
key projects currently underway at the site, please.
Secretary Granholm. Great. Thanks. I think I am going to
defer the question to the Administrator since she has got her
finger on the pulse of all this.
Senator Rosen. Okay. Perfect. All Righty, thank you.
Ms. Hruby. Thanks, Senator Rosen. We enjoy a great
relationship with you and the State of Nevada, and we are
grateful for the work that is being done there. Let's see, you
referred to the PULSE facility, formerly known as the U1A, and
the things we are doing there, which is extremely important to
our stockpile.
So, this concerns subcritical testing that are consistent
with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty but retain our knowledge
of how to work underground and how to work at NNSS. These
experiments are--will allow us to look at aging of plutonium
materials and plutonium pits, both aged ones and then new ones
to verify that they perform as we would expect them to perform
from our previous test, so that we will never have to test
again.
That is our goal. Other important things we are doing at
NNSS are these tests, the chemical explosive tests, that
simulate very low yield nuclear explosive tests that might be
done by others that we want to detect the seismic signatures so
we can be sure that all countries around the world are--that
say they are Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty compliant are in
fact complying with the Test Ban Treaty.
We are doing some very important work at Nevada, and that
has become a very key facility for us.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Well, we are very proud of what
we do, and we are proud of the remote sensing lab that helps
with that as well. But of course, we need the workforce to work
out there.
So, there has been a steady rise in the workforce
requirements in the Department of Energy and more specifically
at the NNSA, and the recurring challenge has always been the
development of that skilled workforce, particularly in critical
feels like physics, mathematics, computer programing, and
chemistry.
So, I am excited about the proposed Nevada National
Security Site Fast Start Program and its potential for
recruiting, educating, and training these entry level
technicians to begin careers in nuclear security related jobs
right at home in Nevada.
So, the Fast Start Program is going to support the NNSS,
which has identified, of course you know this, the growing need
to have skilled technicians, really skilled employees from
diverse background to work on our National Security programs,
even in construction, maintenance, business operations, as well
as the science and technology.
So, Administrator, given these dynamics, how is the
Department of Energy, and of course, Secretary, you can answer
too, and the NNSA actively engaging with our academic
institutions to grow the future workforce?
Can you talk about the Fast Start Program and how our local
students might begin careers working at the Nevada National
Security Site--or we still call it the test site in Nevada?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, we try to call experiments now. It is an
important distinction, but here is what we do. We work
intensely on our pipeline. We have university programs that are
for recruiting.
We have university programs that are for research. Both are
great pipeline programs for us, and we have extended those two
programs for our technologist and for craft workers, and others
that we need desperately in our complex as well, to be very
highly skilled workers.
What we do is we identify skills that are needed across the
complex, and we have national programs for that, and we have--
we identify skills that are needed locally, and we have local
programs for that, that we support.
The program, the Fast Program in Nevada is one where it is
aimed to support the needs of that site locally, where people
tend to--we tend to recruit people from the region. We would
like to keep them in the region, and that program is aimed to
do just that. So, thank you for your nice words about it.
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
Ms. Hruby. Can I just jump on that?
Senator Rosen. Yes, yes.
Secretary Granholm. Because of course, once we recruit--
once we recruit and train, we don't want to lose them.
Senator Rosen. Right.
Secretary Granholm. We were just discussing a little bit
earlier, and I just want to foot stomp the need for NNSA and
the whole scientific enterprise of the United States, so much
of which is embedded in the Department of Energy, to have the
ability to compete with the private sector by ensuring that we
have got decent work conditions, not overloaded folks, the
ability to pay what they are worth, et cetera.
So, the support that this Committee can offer to our
appropriations request to hire additional people so that we
don't have burnout and attrition before retirement would be
greatly appreciated.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you so much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chair. Thank you all for being
here. Secretary Granholm, the Biden administration announced
that they were going to pause pending LNG export projects,
which seems like the stupidest decision I could imagine. So, in
my State, we export LNG. We have through our ports.
We put a lot of money when I was Governor into our ports.
We export it, and so, if you look around the world, they want
our LNG. We have got a war going on in Europe. We don't want
people dependent on Russia.
So, we are exporting to Europe. We are exporting to Asia,
right. The people, the bad guys are the ones that produce the
oil, a lot of them, Russia, Iran, right. So, if we don't do the
exports, right, so where do our allies buy it?
They have to buy more from Russia. They have to buy more
from Iran, okay, so, Iran has invaded Ukraine. Iran is trying
to destroy Israel. So, this makes it, one, economically, it
hurts my State. But number 2, from the standpoint of what is
going on in the world, this is the stupidest decision ever. So,
can you explain it to me?
Secretary Granholm. Yes. Just to clarify a point, this is a
pause, it is not a halt.
Senator Scott. Why did we pause?
Secretary Granholm. So that we can evaluate as we do, and
are required to do, what is in the public interest. We do a
study every few years, and right now is when we are doing the
study, to determine whether the enormous increase in----
Senator Scott. Did Russia pause in Ukraine?
Secretary Granholm.--authorizations----
Senator Scott. Did Russia pause going into Ukraine? Has
Iran paused?
Secretary Granholm. All of the current exports are still
happening. All of the current authorizations, which goes up to
48 billion cubic feet, are all proceeding----
Senator Scott. Did you pause the new pending exports
project?
Secretary Granholm. We did. But everything that is--we are
currently the largest exporter of liquefied natural gas, and we
will remain the largest exporter of liquefied natural gas. It
is a temporary pause----
Senator Scott. Do you understand what you are doing to our
allies?
Secretary Granholm.--solely to understand the impacts.
Senator Scott. Secretary, what are you doing to our allies?
Secretary Granholm. We have talked with our allies about
this. They very well understand that this is a temporary pause
while we do an analysis of what the impacts are in the United
States----
Senator Scott. What would the analysis be? I mean, what do
you have to----
Secretary Granholm. I am happy to tell you.
Senator Scott. I mean what is--just stop and think about it
for just a second.
Secretary Granholm. Let me----
Senator Scott. The world is at war. They need our energy.
Secretary Granholm. They will continue to get it, sir.
Senator Scott. You are telling them, no, we are going to
slow it down.
Secretary Granholm. No, that is not what we are telling
them.
Senator Scott. That is what a pause means.
Secretary Granholm. No, a pause means on future approvals.
We have so much approved that we are well saturating the globe
if those authorizations are built out. We have 14 billion cubic
feet of capacity right now. That makes us the largest in the
world right now. Another 12 billion cubic feet that are under
construction.
Senator Scott. What do you have to study?
Secretary Granholm. None of that is stopping.
Senator Scott. What do you have to study?
Secretary Granholm. It is only a pause for a study.
Senator Scott. Okay. What do you have to study?
Secretary Granholm. That will be completed in months.
Senator Scott. Okay. What do you have to study? What is
there to study? We want to do--we want to sell LNG----
Secretary Granholm. There are four things we are studying.
To be able to answer your question, there are four things we
are studying. One is what is the impact domestically on our
manufacturers if we export almost half of our capacity for
producing natural gas. What is the impact in terms of cost,
number one.
Number two, what is the impact the life cycle analysis on
the export of LNG. number three what is the impact on our
allies overseas? What is the demand we are going to be seeing
to make sure that they are well supplied and that they have the
energy that they need. And----
Senator Scott. Have you heard any manufacturer call you and
say, gosh, I am worried because we are selling LNG overseas?
Secretary Granholm. There are a lot of domestic concerns.
In fact, we have gotten letters on both sides of the aisle here
about what does it mean for costs at home if you export almost
half of what you currently produce. What is the impact from a
supply and demand point? It is a question, and that is--we are
only----
Senator Scott. We should export nothing?
Secretary Granholm. We are going to--no, I am saying----
Senator Scott. Should we do that we all--everything we
export?
Secretary Granholm. As we authorize massive amounts of
exports, we need to know what is the impact on America, on our
American manufacturers, on our homeowners. What is the cost----
Senator Scott. Secretary, with that analysis, do you think
we ought to put pauses on exporting anything else we
manufacture in this country?
Secretary Granholm. The reason why we are doing this is
because there has been such an extraordinary increase in
authorizations. When we did our last study, we were only
exporting 4 billion cubic feet. Now we have authorized 48
billion.
Not all of that will be built, but the point is, we need to
go eyes open to see what is the impact on us at home, as well
as on our allies, and to have our labs do a modeling to make
sure that we follow the science and understand what the impacts
are before we start to approve a whole bunch more.
Senator Scott. So, if you were head of Commerce, then you
would start--you would start pausing exports of manufacturing
goods because you think, man, that is going to cause the cost
of manufacturing goods for Americans to go up. That makes--it
makes zero sense, and it is having a dramatic impact on my
State. So, I think you made a horrible decision and I hope you
will change.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Peters,
please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Granholm, good to see you again.
Secretary Granholm. Good to see you, Senator.
Senator Peters. Administrator Hruby, welcome to the
committee. My first question is to both of you. As you both are
well aware, the availability of low cost drones has
dramatically increased the risk of weaponizing unmanned aerial
systems being used against our critical infrastructure.
This threat is unfortunately particularly acute at our
national laboratories, plants and installations responsible for
both maintaining as well as sustaining our nuclear stockpile.
So, my question for both of you, I understand you have been
working to mitigate threats by drones and UAS to our nuclear
infrastructure.
As these risks continue to evolve, what enhanced
authorities do you need to protect that critical
infrastructure? Administrator Hruby, we will start with you.
Ms. Hruby. Okay. Thank you, Senator. We do already deploy
UAS detection and counter UAS systems, but they are not good
enough for the future threats that we are already beginning to
see.
So, we are upgrading those, and we are upgrading also--so
we are going to upgrade our systems, especially to help us
counter threats that are evolving. In addition, we are looking
at our policies and we are creating a new test range.
So, the test range will be in Idaho, where we can make sure
that we fully understand the systems, the counter UAS system,
and we can train people to do that. Then we are updating our
policies that will be--we will we will get a look across the
interagency in the U.S., and there are a lot of people who have
impact on policy, but that we will change--we are trying to
change our policy so that our protective forces, as they detect
a UASs that cross a line to the things that we are really
trying to guard, our crown jewels, if you will, that they can
counter those systems without additional approvals.
Senator Peters. Right. Secretary Granholm.
[Technical problems.]
Senator Peters. Very good. Since the beginning of the
unprovoked invasion by Russia, Russia has targeted Ukrainians'
energy infrastructure, including its nuclear power plants.
In the process, they have deprived millions of Ukrainians
of heat, as well as electricity. In response, DOE and NNSA have
assisted our Ukrainian partners in stabilizing their energy
markets and safeguarding their nuclear infrastructure.
So, my question for the both of you is, how has DOE and
NNSA support allowed the Ukrainians to continue their
resistance against Russia? Do your organizations have the
resources that you need to continue these efforts, specifically
in support of Ukraine's nuclear power plants?
Secretary Granholm. Thank you for this question and for
recognizing that we are partners with Ukraine in trying to
preserve and rebuild their energy infrastructure.
NNSA, and I am sure Dr. Hruby can say a word about this,
has been an incredible partner in providing, for example,
radiation detection technology training on that.
The Department of Energy has also identified where the gaps
are in their electricity system, for example, transformers, et
cetera, what do you need, and we have delivered, scores,
hundreds of components that we have actually gotten donated
from either around the United States or our allies so that
their grid can be rebuilt.
We are also focused on war proofing the existing grid and
the future grid as well. So, what are the ways to harden the
existing grid? We have worked with them on connecting their
grid to the EU.
So, it is now connected to the EU and not reliant upon
Russia. But clearly we also have to pursue President Zelensky's
goal of being much--having a much more distributed and clean
energy system, which is less vulnerable to attacks. So,
planning for that future is part of what we are engaged in now.
Hopefully, you know, this conflict gets resolved in
Ukraine's favor soon, but we want to be partners with them in
building the grid of the future there as well.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
Ms. Hruby. Just let me say a few words about the nuclear
side.
So, we have installed, since the start of this conflict,
many radiological and nuclear detectors in Ukraine and the
surrounding areas to make sure that we can detect as soon as
possible independently any radiological or nuclear release from
an incident at a nuclear power plant or any other kind of
incident.
We have spent a lot of time training our Ukrainian
colleagues so that in the event of an incident, they would have
a proper--an effective response, a public health response to
that incident.
Senator Peters. Right. Thank you. Thank you to both of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator
Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, both,
for being here.
In Alabama, we are the fifth largest producer of nuclear
with two nuclear plants and five nuclear reactors. I know a lot
of people in our neck of the woods are very concerned about our
power grid in the future.
Just a quick question about building new nuclear plants.
The Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental
Policy Act, you know, if we are looking to build a nuclear
plant, just a review has lasted four to 7 years.
We should probably take about one to 2 years, and if we are
going to combat China, if we are going to build a new power
grid, Secretary, do you see the average timeline to complete
these environmental studies as normal? How can we go around
this?
Secretary Granholm. Well, I am not sure about normal, but I
do agree with you. At least what I assume you are getting at,
which is that we need to speed up times for permitting, both
nuclear as well as transmission, as well as other energy
generation, including clean energy.
Senator Tuberville. How do we get bogged down in this? I
mean, it just doesn't make any sense to me because we are
getting overrun, you know, by other countries.
Secretary Granholm. I know our office would be eager to
work with you or anyone on the committee, and I know a number
of people have been working on permitting reform to accelerate,
because we believe that that is important for the reliability
of our grid.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Over 40 percent of our U.S.
Navy's combat capable warships are nuclear powered.
The Office of Naval Reactors has a cradle to grave
responsibility for designing, maintaining, and disposing the
spent fuel from vital nuclear reactors.
But much of these facilities and infrastructures the Navy
is using is aging. I know for a fact we are spending tens of
millions of dollars with ships that are at dry dock that we are
having to pay just to have them dry docked instead of taking
the fuel off, having it replenished, or disposed of.
So, we are having delays in the spent fuel handling
recapitalization project, and it is affecting all of our
nuclear plants. It is my understanding from the Navy--what do
you see as a problem, and how do we fix that, Secretary? Either
one of you, if you want to answer that.
Ms. Hruby. Yes. Senator, thank you for that question. We
are building a new spent fuel handling capability in Idaho.
It is sized so that it can handle all nuclear reactors on
all of our Navy ships, which today's facilities can't, and it
is very old. We had a lot of, honestly, we had a lot of trouble
post-COVID with this construction project, just like we did
with many of our other construction projects, but it has really
turned around.
I was there not too long ago. All the concrete is in, rebar
is going up. It is really coming along, and I think we are on a
path now that will get this facility built and operational,
just as we--you know, we intend to.
We are working this problem hard, and our naval reactors
folks, I think, have done a really good job of taking a project
behind schedule and trying to catch up as much time as
possible.
Senator Tuberville. Am I correct, it is costing us millions
of dollars just to drydock these to store?
Ms. Hruby. Senator, I don't know the cost of the dry
docking, but I can talk to my colleagues in naval reactors----
Senator Tuberville. I would love to get some kind of report
on that, because my understanding is, it is costing tens of
millions just to have them parked and not anything done to
them.
We don't have the capabilities of dispensing or doing
whatever we do with this fuel on, whether it is a flattop,
whether it is a submarine. We need to figure this out if it is
costing us that much money.
Ms. Hruby. Right. Understood. We will get back with you on
the cost, but you can--you have my word that we are working as
hard as possible to get this new facility up and operating so
that----
Senator Tuberville. We only have one that we are working
on?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, sir. Yes,
Senator Tuberville. Yes. I know we have a shipyard in
Mobile that is looking to do the enterprise in the very near
future. Hopefully that happens, but you can imagine how old the
enterprise is, how long it has been setting dry docking, and
the money that it costs the country and the taxpayers for--you
know, to be just sitting there. Nothing done with it. So, thank
you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to both
of you today, Secretary Granholm, Administrator Hruby. It
actually feels more comfortable to say Governor Granholm, but,
those are the good old days, but thanks for both for being
here.
Secretary Granholm, before we move on to the matters
pertaining to nuclear deterrence, I would like to briefly
discuss the Sanford Underground Research Facility in Lead,
South Dakota, its relationship with Fermi Laboratory.
This facility has been an important partner for the
Department of Energy in conducting critical research in the
fields of particle physics and dark matter. Sometimes I think
people wonder what in the world we are doing in the Department
of Energy in working on these particular areas of expertise,
but this is a pretty important deal for our Nation.
Can you talk a little bit about the importance of the
funding for this type of a facility in terms of our long term
strategies?
Secretary Granholm. Yes. Thank you so much for that. We are
very proud of this, too. It is the deepest lab in the United
States, and in the experiment with Fermi----
Senator Rounds. Four thousand, eight hundred fifty feet.
Underground.
Secretary Granholm. Amazing, and of course, trying to
understand the secrets of the universe, the secrets of matter,
the secrets of neutrinos in this case, is super important to
basic fundamental science.
The thing we say about basic research is that you may not
know where it leads, but when you look back, you realize that
so much, whether it is in materials science or, you know,
medicine, et cetera, has--stems from the research that is being
done in these massive user facilities, like at SURF.
I am pleased to say that, and you probably know this, but
that in July of this year, that the excavation sub project is
going to be completed. The outfitted portion will be done by
September 2026.
The cosmic rays in the first sight detector at SURF will be
in 2029, and first neutrinos in 2031. So, we are going to
continue to support this. Hopefully, Congress will continue to
support it with your leadership as well.
Senator Rounds. I totally agree, and I just think the
message that we need to be sending is, is neutrinos are very
important.
Secretary Granholm. Neutrinos are very important.
Senator Rounds. Great. Thank you. Administrator Hruby, can
you update us on the current issue, and this may be getting
into the weeds a little bit, but I think it is important to
bring it to our attention, the current issue with the
availability of high explosive binders and how this could
affect our current modernization plan.
Specifically, it is a chemical that binds these high
explosives together, and apparently it is associated, those
that are available to us, have a PFAS component to them. Since
we are trying to eliminate PFAS, we really have a problem when
it comes to this type of a product which needs that particular
component in it. Can you talk a little bit about that and what
our plans are?
Ms. Hruby. Yes. Thanks, Senator Rounds. Let's see. It is
true that we buy a PFAS binder from the commercial sector, and
this product is no longer going to be made by the primary
manufacturer.
It does then mean that we need to develop another binder or
another source for this binder, and we are working hard on
that. So, we have several lines of effort. The first and most
important, I think, is that we are going to recycle as much as
we can the current binder that we have in this system to stay
on schedule for our weapon delivery programs.
We are looking at also potentially--well, we are going to
buy as much binder as we can from the supplier before they stop
making it.
Senator Rounds. The reason why they are stopping making it
is because we have all identified that PFAS is really dangerous
to the environment, but most of that is from firefighting, not
necessarily from a plastic component that we would be using in
this type of a binder. Correct?
Ms. Hruby. That is right. This is a complicated
environmental issue. The particular PFAS material involved in
the binder that we care about has not been shown to have an
adverse effect on human health. However, it does last a long
time, and as a result, the EPA is, you know, lumping these
together into a system that they don't want in the environment.
So, we have to find an alternative and we have to use all
the things that we currently have to get through our current
program. We have a very active group of people who are working
this intensely, so that we can stay on schedule. But obviously
we can't have nuclear weapons without effective explosive.
Senator Rounds. Or perhaps, as an alternative, getting an
exception for this type of a use for a PFAS that is not hurting
the environment.
Ms. Hruby. Yes--that----
Senator Rounds. I know it gets into policy areas, but it is
a real problem for you----
Ms. Hruby. It is in the policy area, correct.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator King,
please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Nice to see both of
you this morning. Administrator Hruby, some questions.
I am worried about pit production and the capacity to meet
increasing demand for weapon grade material given the fact that
we are refurbishing the entire triad, plus AUKUS. Tell me where
we are in terms of pit production at the two facilities.
Ms. Hruby. Yes. Thank you, Senator King. Let's see, just to
level set, we are reestablishing pet production, which was
stopped in the United States with the closure of Rocky Flats.
We are doing that at two locations, Los Alamos National
Laboratories, and the Savannah River site. Los Alamos already
had an existing facility to work with plutonium, but it is
limited in size, and it was that making pits.
That is moving along nicely. We expect that our first fully
certified, war reserve pit will be produced at Los Alamos in
this year. Then we are working toward a goal of 30 pits per
year at Los Alamos.
Those pits will be in the W87-1 warhead, which is for the
Sentinel. We expect to be getting 30 pits per year by 2028,
with do reliability by 2030.
Senator King. Is the pit production schedule running in
parallel with the renewal of the triad? In other words, you
don't see a gap in terms of having the capacity for Sentinel,
for example, and not having the warheads?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, we have a plan that is fully consistent
with the schedule with the Department of Defense to put new
pits in our warheads. Now, in some cases, the Savannah River
is--we are targeting completion of construction of the Savannah
River plutonium processing facility in 2032.
Then we have to introduce plutonium. We have to introduce
the processes and the rate production. That will take a few
more years. But our plan is to be able to produce pits for the
new W93 warhead, and we are targeting at least half of that
population.
We don't think we can get that facility up in time to do
all of the W93 builds, but it is important that we have a fair
number of those new pits, because our option is to reuse pits,
which introduces some uncertainty, but more importantly, we
just--it limits what else we can do in our stockpile when we
reuse those pits.
Senator King. So, do you feel we are on a reasonable,
predictable schedule at Savannah River? Are you confident that
we have--you know, the contractor and the plans are moving
forward adequately?
Ms. Hruby. I am increasingly confident. You know, we have a
lot of work in front of us. But we--I feel much better about
where we are. I think we have turned the corner in terms of
what we are doing at Savannah River, and we have a good team in
place.
Senator King. Let me change the subject for a moment. One
of my nightmares is a terrorist organization getting a hold of
a nuclear weapon, and we have got North Korea, Iran. North
Korea would probably sell anything if they can get cash for it.
Talk to me about the technology of detection.
Deterrence doesn't work with 15 people who don't care about
dying and don't have a capital city. In other words, the whole
theory of deterrence doesn't work with terrorists. So, the
first line of defense has to be detection and understanding
what is going on.
Do we--are we working in that direction? How do we know
that there might be a nuclear device in a container that is on
its way to Miami?
Ms. Hruby. Yes. Well, a lot of the responsibility for
detection is also with the Department of Homeland Security. But
we develop technologies, and we place those technologies around
the world.
We have a lot of those in place. They are operating and we
are increasing the countries that we are working with because
of their neighborhood, and because we want to make sure that
the U.S. is their go to partner for that. So, we have increased
the number of countries we are working with in terms of
detection.
Senator King. Well, this should be a very, very high
priority because there are people--if those people on September
11th could have killed 3 million people instead of 3,000, they
would have. As sure as we are sitting here, there are people
that are adversaries that are thinking about how to acquire a
nuclear weapon.
Ms. Hruby. I agree, Senator. It is a very high priority for
us.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. Secretary Granholm, last September,
President Biden said, ``the only existential threat humanity
faces, even things more frightening than a nuclear war, is
global warming.'' Do you agree?
Secretary Granholm. I strongly believe that climate change
is an existential threat to the planet.
Senator Cotton. Okay, so that is not exactly my question.
President Biden said the only existential threat humanity
faces, even things more frightening than a nuclear war, is
global warming. Do you believe that nuclear war is an
existential threat?
Secretary Granholm. Of course.
Senator Cotton. Okay, so that is not what the President
said. What is more frightening about global warming than
nuclear war?
Secretary Granholm. Well, I am not in a position to compare
the two, but I can say that climate change is having a
dastardly impact across the globe, particularly in areas that
are subject to heat. We have had record heat years now,
consecutive year after year, which has devastated that----
Senator Cotton. Do you agree--sounds like you don't agree
with the President that global warming is more frightening than
nuclear war?
Secretary Granholm. I am not in a position to characterize
what the President was saying. I am just saying that it is an
existential threat.
Senator Cotton. Okay. So, as the Secretary of Energy, your
most important job is our Nation's stockpile of nuclear
weapons, which is the backbone of our entire national defense.
Every military operations by the Department of Defense is
underwritten by that strategic deterrent.
But last year, you testified that ensuring we have enough
lithium for electric vehicle batteries is more urgent than
ensuring the Nation's stockpile for nuclear weapons--that
nuclear weapons are adequate.
Do you still believe that our lithium supply, as important
as that is and I grant you, is more important than the Nation's
nuclear weapons stockpile?
Secretary Granholm. I don't recall saying that.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Do you believe that?
Secretary Granholm. I believe that the lithium supply is
important, but the Nation's nuclear stockpile is very important
as well.
Senator Cotton. Is it the most important thing you do in
your job?
Secretary Granholm. I don't rank things in my job.
Senator Cotton. Not at all? So, making sure that the annual
picnic comes off well is as important as the Nation's nuclear
stockpile?
Secretary Granholm. That I would rank lower, yes.
Senator Cotton. All right. Ms. Hruby, can you discuss what
you are doing to recruit agents to the Office of Secure
Transportation? Do you have enough agents to accomplish your
current nuclear weapons transportation requirements?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, thank you for this question, Senator.
We are--this is a very important function that we have that
a lot of people don't understand that we do transport nuclear
weapons that are still in the custody of the Department of
Energy or when they are coming back to the custody of the
Department of Energy, and these agents are amazing.
They have a hard job, and they do it very well, and they do
it--they have done it safely and securely for a long period of
time, and of course, we have a great training facility at Fort
Chaffee. We are always trying to recruit people.
This is--we have enough. We do our job. But we have to work
hard to recruit, and as importantly, train the agents as we get
them. So, it is a constant concern for us, but we are paying
attention to it.
Senator Cotton. These are highly specialized roles and
equipment, right? You can't just throw a nuclear warhead in the
back of your F-150 and drive it between military bases.
Ms. Hruby. Not in the United States of America. We have
very specialized trucks, vehicles, convoys that transport
materials that these agents are responsible for. They go
through rigorous testing, both physically and mentally, to be
capable of doing these jobs. They are a hugely important part
of our workforce.
Senator Cotton. Okay. I believe you have 370 positions
authorized. You know how many currently you have filled?
Ms. Hruby. I don't off the top of my head. I can get back
to you----
Senator Cotton. My understanding, it is only about 280, and
with the upcoming modernization plans, I have concerns about
the office's ability to fulfill its mission and the strain it
is going to put on those agents.
So, I would encourage you and the Department to look at
what you can do to recruit more folks into that office. I see
that the clock has disappeared, so I guess I have an indefinite
amount of time to ask as many questions as I want, but I will
yield back to the Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Cotton, and let
me recognize for 5 minutes, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for being here today and for your very extensive public
service.
I would like to ask Secretary Granholm, the standards for
PFAS that you have adopted, the Department of Energy, and that
you now implement, are they different from the standards that
the EPA just announced as applicable to municipalities and the
major initiative that President Biden has started to rid our
Nation's water serving citizens around the Nation of this
really dreaded threat?
Secretary Granholm. I would have to get back to you on
that. Obviously, we don't want to see different standards being
applied across Departments differently. I am sure there will be
an effort to realign, if it is, in fact, different.
Senator Blumenthal. Yea, I think it is important that the
standards be uniform, because--and I frankly don't know the
answer to that question myself.
Secretary Granholm. EPA sets this, so we would follow their
lead.
Senator Blumenthal. Great. Administrator Hruby, I am
concerned about--I know you have been asked about, I think, by
Senator Kaine about AUKUS and the nuclear reactor program
there.
But I am concerned about whether from your perspective, the
naval reactors are on track to support the AUKUS commitments
that we have made to production delivery of the Virginia Class
boats over the next 10 to 15 years relating to Australia. Do
you think that program is on track?
Ms. Hruby. Yes. The Naval Reactors Organization has worked
very hard to evaluate the options that we provided to the
Australians to support, and I am confident with the proposed
plan that our Naval Reactors Organization can support that.
That is separate, naval reactors are separate from
shipbuilding, so really just speaking to, will we be able to
provide the naval reactors needed for the AUKUS deal, and I am
confident that we can.
Senator Blumenthal. I want to ask you and maybe Secretary
Granholm on the issue of security for the reactor facilities in
Ukraine and the danger that is posed by the Russian aggression
there. Have you--do you know whether there is money in the
supplemental that is specifically allocated to nuclear safety
in Ukraine?
Ms. Hruby. Yes. Our requests in the supplemental for an
NNSA, Department of Energy is $149 million, and we very much
hope that we get that----
Senator Blumenthal. I apologize if you have already
answered this question, but in terms of that supplemental
request, do you view it as important to the safety of those
reactors and of the region from possible disruption?
Ms. Hruby. I do. I think it is important for the
consequences and for the safety. So, we watch for radiological
release, so it is important to recognize it immediately. We
have trained with the Ukrainians, and we meet with them on a
regular basis to make sure that they would know how to respond
in the event of a radiological release.
We have ways to help protect, if the Ukrainians adopt them,
the important electrical nodes, grid nodes around the reactors.
But we can't prevent. We have no role in preventing a drone
strike or an attack on the plant.
So, I just--but what--we are trying to lower the
consequence in the event that anything would happen or that--
and hopefully that wouldn't happen.
Senator Blumenthal. In in my trips to Ukraine, I have been
there five times over the last couple of years, I have talked
to President Zelensky and his energy and his military team
about this issue, and you are absolutely right. You can't
guarantee the air defense. That is a military function, and
obviously self-defense from missile and drone attacks is part
of this supplemental, so I think it is important to energy
security as well as other forms of security in the country. I
noticed the clock is back on, Mr. Chairman, and my time has
expired, so I am going to yield.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Schmitt, please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Granholm, when was the last time you spoke to a representative
from the Chinese Communist Party?
Secretary Granholm. I spoke with a member of the Chinese
delegation at the APEC conference last summer.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. A report released in August 2023
mentions that you would consult with your counterpart at the
Chinese Communist Party about potential Strategic Petroleum
Reserve sales. Is that true?
Secretary Granholm. Oh, yes, I did.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Was your--what was the nature of
that conversation?
Secretary Granholm. I tried to, but we couldn't connect.
But I was intending to speak with him.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Have you had conversations outside
of what--the instance I just mentioned?
Secretary Granholm. When we go to an APEC summit, which is
the Asian Pacific Conference where we talk with countries, and
of course, China is a member, we often meet with our
counterparts. Last, I think, last summer, the APEC conference.
I can't remember the exact date. I know that I had a
conversation with my counterpart from China on energy.
Senator Schmitt. Was your decisionmaking process on
decisions related to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve influenced
by the conversations you had with the Chinese Communist Party--
?
Secretary Granholm. That is at a different time.
Senator Schmitt. Yes, I want to get back to 2021.
Secretary Granholm. Okay. So, the International Energy
Agency had a global stockpile release in response to the war in
Ukraine, and we were all encouraging other countries to release
from their stockpiles so that we could replace the barrels that
were pulled off the market as a result of Russia's invasion of
Ukraine.
Senator Schmitt. Well, two things have happened since then.
We have not replenished our Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and
China has an enormous stockpile now. They have their own
strategic petroleum reserve. Do they call you to talk to you
about decisions related to their strategic petroleum reserve?
Secretary Granholm. Again, this was just a decision to get
a number of countries to release----
Senator Schmitt. But I am really just curious, why----
Secretary Granholm.--globally----
Senator Schmitt.--why would you be reaching out to a
representative from the Chinese Communist Party about our
decision to release oil from the----
Secretary Granholm. It was not about our decision. It was
asking them to release, as we were asking other countries to
release as well.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. It was our decision to release. We
still are governed by--you know, we are not governed by a world
government yet. Like we make that--the Biden administration
made that decision. So, it was your call to inform them of our
decision to persuade them to release their own strategic--?
Secretary Granholm. It was not about our decision. It was
about their decision, asking them to release, along with all of
these other countries, from their strategic stockpiles, and in
fact, a very large release did happen.
Senator Schmitt. They bought a lot of that oil, didn't
they?
Secretary Granholm. I have no idea what----
Senator Schmitt. You don't know if China bought a lot of
our oil from that Strategic Petroleum Reserve release in 2021?
Secretary Granholm. I don't----
Senator Schmitt. You are the Energy Secretary.
Secretary Granholm. Our release. Obviously releases happen
on a global market----
Senator Schmitt. No, I am talking about our release. They
bought from our release.
Secretary Granholm. It is my understanding that China has
purchased a tiny amount, like under 3 percent, from our
Strategic Petroleum Reserve. That was before the ban. They are
no longer purchasing. Again, this is all pursuant to what
Congress requires us to do as an agency.
Senator Schmitt. There was no directive from Congress for
you to release that oil.
Secretary Granholm. No, I am talking about who we sell to.
Senator Schmitt. Right. But you don't need to talk to a
representative from the Chinese Communist Party about our
decision to release oil.
Secretary Granholm. Perhaps I am not making myself clear. I
did not talk to a member of the Chinese Communist Party----
Senator Schmitt. You tried, though. You tried.
Secretary Granholm.--about our decision to release. It was
about encouraging them to release, along with all of these
other countries, so that----
Senator Schmitt. Did they do that? Did they do that?
Secretary Granholm.--we could make up for the Russians
barrels that were pulled off the market.
Senator Schmitt. Did they do that?
Secretary Granholm. They said that they did. I don't have
evidence that they did.
Senator Schmitt. Yes, because they have an enormous
stockpile now, and ours is at historically low levels.
I want to point out that around 900,000 barrels of oil were
sold to Unipec America, subsidiary of the Chinese government
owned gas company Sinopec, which in turn had received billions
of dollars from BHR Partners.
Who is BHR Partners? BHR Partners is a private equity firm
co-founded by Hunter Biden, who held a 10 percent stake. Were
you aware that Hunter Biden benefited from the sale of our
Strategic Petroleum Reserve by an affiliated Chinese company?
Secretary Granholm. No.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. You have not replenished the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve since, right?
Secretary Granholm. We are in the process of doing that.
Part of that is to repurchase barrels. Part of that--at
taxpayer----
Senator Schmitt. It is too expensive now, wasn't that your
statement?
Secretary Granholm.--at rates favorable to taxpayers. At
the moment, it is above what we want it to. We sold barrels at
$95 a barrel. Right now, the price for purchase is around $90,
or maybe a little bit less, if you look at WTI.
Senator Schmitt. As the Secretary of Energy for the United
States of America, do you regret depleting our Strategic
Petroleum Reserves to historically low levels, which they
currently stand at?
Secretary Granholm. I would like to just set the----
Senator Schmitt. I would like for you to answer the
question because I am out of time. Do you regret that decision?
Secretary Granholm. I am going to set--no, I don't regret
doing what is right to be able to help replenish the global
supplies.
Senator Schmitt. What about for the United States of
America? I am talking about our country.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator. You are out of time.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can she answer
the question?
Chairman Reed. Senator Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Granholm, thank you for your
testimony today. Despite the FBI's takedown of a Volt Typhoon
botnet late last year, says the director, Jen Easterly--said
there have been no big changes to the group's activity.
As the sector risk management agency for the energy sector,
how is the Department of Energy working to help critical
infrastructure providers identify and mitigate threats on their
networks?
Secretary Granholm. Yes, thank you for that question. It is
such an important one as we perceive cyber threats to be really
increasing.
The Volt Typhoon example is one that we are particularly
concerned because Chinese cyber actors are pre-positioning
themselves on the networks in order to be ready to strike in
case of a conflict.
So, we have, ETEC, which we have set up to be able to work
with our partners in the private sector, in the utility space.
To be on high alert for these kind of cyber activities. We have
set out--we have convened, we send out learnings.
We are in very close contact to make sure that we are
providing the best information we have about where one might
find some of these pre-position efforts. So, we are--we have
set up a whole new infrastructure associated with cyber through
our CESER office.
We are really pleased with the coordination that we are
seeing as a public, private partnership manner with the private
sector and with utilities.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you believe you need more
authorities or resources to do this outreach successfully?
Secretary Granholm. Well, we could certainly always use
more resources to be able to do that, but we believe that
Congress has sufficiently, at this moment, supplied us with
what we need through our CESER budget and our partnership with
CISA as well.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you believe that there should be a
mandatory participation for the private sector with regard to
critical infrastructure? Because from your answer and from
previous hearings, my understanding is CISA can only provide
best practices and encouragement and guidance, but certainly
can't mandate anything.
I imagine you are under the same lack of authority. Are you
concerned at all that you can't guarantee safety, security, or
even best effort by any provider in the energy sector, and that
would leave us vulnerable to a cyber-attack, because there is
no way for you to make sure that they have the best defenses or
have invested the right amount of cybersecurity in our critical
infrastructure.
Secretary Granholm. Yes, we have a very good relationship
with all of the major utilities, but there are a lot of smaller
utilities, munis, et cetera, and we have relationship with
their associations. We send out--we disseminate information and
hope that that gets, you know, pressed down through is the
system.
Senator Gillibrand. So, the word you just use is you hope
that they get pressed down. That is a very----
Secretary Granholm. Yes.
Senator Gillibrand. That is a very inadequate frame, and I
am very concerned about it. So, I am concerned that you don't
have the authorities that you need and that you don't have the
resources you need to properly safeguard the electric grid in
the event of a cyber-attack by China or other adversaries.
Secretary Granholm. Well, mandating would certainly
strengthen that.
Senator Gillibrand. Correct. Can you tell us in this
setting about the cyberattack on the electric grid in Guam? Can
you tell us about what you would have done differently or what
authorities, if you had, could have been implemented because
this is the Armed Services committee.
We want to make sure our warfighters have the capacity to
defend this Nation in the event of attack and to project our
power. Without an electric grid at a base of operations that is
owned by the private sector, we can't do our job. So, I would
like any thoughts or comments you have on that.
Secretary Granholm. Yes, and I would respectfully request
that I get back to you on that so that I can have a fulsome
response for you.
Senator Gillibrand. That would be helpful. Last, do you
have any recommendations about what kind of authorities, or can
you, for the record, create some recommendations about what
kind of authorities would be useful for you if you were given
the task of making sure our electric grid does not go down in a
cyberattack by China or any other adversary?
Secretary Granholm. Here, too, I would love to get back to
you on this, on some specifics.
Senator Gillibrand. Recommendations----
Secretary Granholm.--authority wise, that I could consult
with CESER to see how we might additionally strengthen, and the
resources that it might take to do that.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Secretary
Granholm and Director Hruby, thank you for being here today.
Director Hruby, I would like to ask you two related questions
regarding the development of new nuclear warheads. I think this
is something that has already been addressed in the committee
today.
But so, the National Nuclear Security Administration is
developing the W80-4 warhead for the long range standoff
munition, LRSO. You have also been tasked to develop the
variant, the W80-4 alternate, for the submarine launched cruise
missile. I understand the Administration has been reluctant to
start the development of a nuclear armed cruise missile for
Navy submarines.
I was aboard the USS Indiana under the ice just about 6
weeks ago or so, and we discussed some of the challenges, both
from an engineering and operational standpoint for them. The
Secretary of the Navy has been rather vocal in his opposition
to this.
However, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment has issued an acquisition decision memorandum
directing the Navy to establish the program and requesting NNSA
support for the warhead development. Director Hruby, your
Administration has a lot on its plate right now.
You currently have five warhead modernization programs
underway and now a potential six with the SLCM-N, and in an
open hearing, which we are in today, can you comment on how
much extra burden the development of a W80-4 alternate warhead
puts on your workforce and budget?
Ms. Hruby. Yes. Thank you, Senator Kelly. We did. Obviously
there was NDAA language on SLCM, and there was an appropriation
in 2024. So, we are working hard on SLCM-N, in concert with the
Navy.
We are looking at W80-4 and potentially other warheads that
will be at least disruptive to the program of record and do the
job that we need to do, consistent with the Navy's selected
platform when that is done.
So, we have established a program office where we are going
to work on how to do this so that it will fit in and not
disrupt the program of record as best as we can, looking at all
options, again, in close coordination with the Navy.
Senator Kelly. Do you, prioritize these programs like----
Ms. Hruby. Absolutely.
Senator Kelly.--for infrastructure and workforce?
Ms. Hruby. Well, infrastructure--we have to--we prioritize
a lot of things simultaneously. The situation we are in is
where modernizing warheads while we modernize our
infrastructure side by side, in some cases in the same
building.
We worry about it every day. We concentrate on it every
day. We are making progress. But it is not an ideal situation,
but we are certainly committed to doing it, and it is--and
showing progress.
Senator Kelly. Do you have a pits going in new warheads
today?
Ms. Hruby. No. We--the first new pit that will go into
warheads is the W87-1, which is for the Sentinel ICBM. It is
the system after the long range standoff system. But we are on
schedule to make pits for that, and then the following weapon,
the W93, also needs new pits.
Senator Kelly. When do you when do you believe--if it is
not--if we can say it here in an open hearing, when a pit goes
into a Sentinel missile?
Ms. Hruby. Where are scheduled--well, it depends on the
schedule of the--right now, for the W87-1, we will be--yes,
2031 or 1932 is the first production unit for that system.
Those should have new pits in them.
Senator Kelly. When will that--and where will that be?
Where does that work take place?
Ms. Hruby. The pits will be produced at Los Alamos. The
assembly will be done at Pantex in Texas.
Senator Kelly. Okay. Well, thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kelly. For the
second amendment, I will yield for a question to Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Granholm,
I want to give you a chance to answer the question from the
Senator from Missouri, why was the--why were we working on a
worldwide effort to release oil from Strategic Petroleum
Reserves after the invasion of Ukraine?
Secretary Granholm. Because after the invasion, and
rightfully so, so many countries put sanctions on Russian oil.
Their Russian oil was taken off the market, which caused a huge
supply crunch.
Senator King. Which in turn would cause a huge price spike,
is that correct?
Secretary Granholm. Which in turn causes a huge price
spike, which explains in last--or the June before, in June
2022, why the prices were close to $5 a gallon, is because,
purely because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It was
happening across the world, and everyone, at least at the
International Energy Agency, wanted to see if people who had--
countries that had stockpiles could release.
Senator King. So, this was what the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve was for, was to release at a time when there was a
worldwide crisis in energy supply in some way in order to
stabilize the market. Is that correct?
Secretary Granholm. Precisely.
Senator King. Thank you. To get back to nuclear power and
the NNSA. I am concerned about uranium, and we are still buying
uranium from Russia. We don't have much, if any, enrichment
capacity for future needs for the submarine fleet, for small
modular reactors.
Where are we, Administrator, on developing capacity for
uranium supply? If there is anything we have learned in the
last 10 years is that we shouldn't be depending on Russia for
essential--an essential commodity like uranium.
Ms. Hruby. Yes. Thanks, Senator. Well, the--we have--we are
trying to coordinate across that Department. We have a
coordinated plan across the Department for uranium, both for
defense needs and for civil needs.
The civil needs are for LEU for our current operating
reactors and also for our high assay LEU for the advanced
reactor program. Secretary Granholm has mentioned in the
hearing that the money that has been allocated to the
appropriated to the Department to use to help spur domestic
uranium enrichment is dependent on a ban on Russian uranium.
So, as a Department, we are anxious to see that happen.
From a defense needs perspective, if we can start enriching
uranium and specifically high assay, low enriched uranium in
the U.S. using all domestic supplies, that will become a very
important feed material to us for naval reactors to produce
highly enriched uranium.
Senator King. I am going to have to--I am going to move on
to another question. But the point is, we need to develop the
domestic capacity for the production of uranium and enrichment,
not be dependent upon Russia, is that correct?
Ms. Hruby. Absolutely. Madam Secretary, waste disposal. Not
Yucca mountain, just so Catherine Cortez Masto doesn't come
down on me.
But on the other hand, we now have what amount to 100 high
level nuclear waste sites scattered around the country, one of
which is in Maine, where there is stranded nuclear waste from a
commercial plant that is there.
This is all over the country. Where are we in the search
for a more permanent, secure solution to that problem?
Secretary Granholm. Yes. Thank you for that question. We
have begun a consent based siting process across the country.
We have, to that end, funded 12 different consortia who are
having conversations with communities that might be willing to
raise their hand. Of course, depending on the--how the
community is compensated for the service of disposing safely of
nuclear waste. So, there is three phases to it.
We are in the first phase. The second phase will be
identifying actually and talking to the volunteers. The first
phase is sort of laying the groundwork, and the third phase is
actually beginning the storage process.
Senator King. This process is actively underway?
Secretary Granholm. Actively underway right now.
Senator King. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Gillibrand,
I will yield for one question.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Granholm, I want to thank you for visiting the Brookhaven
National Lab on Long Island, where our new electron ion
collider is being constructed.
I think these national labs are playing such an important
role for our National Security, and I want to invite you to
perhaps come see at the University of Rochester's Laboratory
for Laser Energy, the work they are doing there for the
National Nuclear Security Administration's inertial confinement
fusion program. It has already helped achieve major fusion
ignition breakthroughs, December 2022.
As DOE builds off of that historic milestone and continues
to work toward a future powered in part by fusion energy, what
role do you see labs like Rochester's Laboratory for Laser and
Energetics, as well as the Brookhaven National Lab, are playing
in your vision for our Department of Energy, but also for our
Nation's security?
Secretary Granholm. Yes. Thank you for that, and we have,
obviously, a bold decadal vision to achieve commercial fusion
within 10 years. The fusion strategy that is being deployed at
Rochester is with lasers. Obviously there is others, magnets.
The Los Alamos National--Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore
National Lab is the lab. Obviously that did achieve ignition in
December 2022 and has achieved ignition multiple times after
that, by the way. Thanks for the partnership.
These partnerships are critical. The tools are critical.
These user facilities are absolutely fundamental. The electron
ion collider is so exciting.
It is the first collider that will be built in the next 10
to 20 years globally to be able to determine what is inside of
a proton, and how we can collide, and spin, and create,
perhaps, and understand the, you know, the strongest force in
physics.
So, it is very exciting what is happening in New York, and
thanks to New York State for actually having contributed $100
million to that electron ion collider as well.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Madam
Secretary, thank you. Madam Administrator, thank you for your
testimony. We will adjourn the open hearing and reconvene as
close to 11 a.m. as we can in SVC-217. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 10:47 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
department of energy compliance with environmental protection agency
pfas standards
1. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Granholm, are the Department of
Energy's Per-and polyfluroalkyl substance (PFAS) mitigation standards
in alignment with the Environmental Protection Agency's National
Primary Drinking Water Regulation? If not, please provide the
Department of Energy's plan of action to achieve compliance with this
rule.
Secretary Granholm. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is
committed to protecting human health and the environment by assessing
and addressing PFAS at DOE sites while deploying the Department's
scientific expertise to solve PFAS challenges. The Department follows
all applicable Environmental Protection Agency PFAS regulations,
including its primary drinking water standards.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
cost overruns
2. Senator Hirono. Secretary Granholm, almost every construction
project with a cost estimate of $100 million is currently facing cost
increases and schedule delays. While some of these increases are
attributable to COVID-related workforce and supply chain challenges,
others are not. Secretary Granholm, what are other reasons for these
increases and delays, and what steps is the National Nuclear Security
Administration taking to hold contractors accountable for project
performance?
Secretary Granholm. Increased cost drivers for Capital Asset
acquisition Projects valued at $100 million and greater include
insufficient upfront planning, changes in project requirements, post-
COVID supply chain issues, construction escalation, lack of qualified
craft workers, poor contractor performance, and funding uncertainties
due to continuing resolutions. To improve performance, NNSA is taking
the following actions to hold contractors accountable for project
performance:
a. The Management and Operating (M&O) Contractors' Performance
Evaluation Measurement Plans (PEMP) are updated annually to provide the
criteria to evaluate performance and determine at-risk award fee. The
fiscal year 2025 PEMPs are currently in negotiations to include a new
goal specifically for infrastructure including Capital Asset
acquisition Projects valued at $100 million and greater. Contractors
will be evaluated on project execution, including schedule and risk
management.
b. NNSA has launched Separate Fee Plans for certain key Capital
Asset Line Item Construction Projects (i.e., Uranium Processing
Facility and Savannah River Pit Production Facility) to further
incentivize delivery performance and budget management.
c. Hybrid Partnering Sessions with NNSA and M&O leadership
continue with a focus on key production project delivery and M&O
actions necessary to stay on schedule.
d. NNSA's Integrated Infrastructure Planning (IIP) process
connects mission priorities with timely, attainable infrastructure
solutions in documented plans. The IIP process is executed through an
enterprise-wide team and sub-teams that are focused on early stage
line-item project prioritization, modeling and visualization, and cost
estimating.
2. Secretary Granholm, the Enhanced Mission Delivery Initiative was
launched in 2022. Have the 21 recommendations been implemented and do
you think any have been effective in addressing obstacles in
contracting and procurement?
Secretary Granholm. NNSA is actively implementing numerous
initiatives as a result of the 21 EMDI recommendations. NNSA has
achieved contracting and procurement efficiencies by implementing
changes under EMDI. For example:
EMDI recommendations #1 and #2--Award Fee Contracting Model and the
Management and Operating (M&O) Contract Base and Extension. On June 13,
2024, NNSA announced the new Pantex contract award to PanTeXas
Deterrence, LLC with a 5-year base period, three 5-year options and a
hybrid fee structure with both fixed and award fee. This represents an
important step toward improving NNSA's M&O contracting to be more
strategic, less disruptive to the mission and workforce, and more of a
true partnership.
EMDI recommendation #3--Streamlining Contracts. Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory and the Livermore Field Office worked together to
revise contract clauses, revise the Statement of Work (SOW), and pilot
changes to streamline Emergency Management, Cybersecurity, and
Purchasing programs. This has resulted in increased efficiencies to
support mission delivery, including:
Significant savings in emergency management activities,
equivalent to 82 FTEs or nearly 4,300 hours annually.
Major reductions in approval cycle time for cybersecurity
deliverables ranging from 50 percent to 96 percent.
Substantial reduction in approval cycle time for award of
major procurements between $3 million and $5 million YTD in fiscal year
2024 of up to 96 total days.
EMDI recommendation #9--Improving M&O Subcontracting Efficiency.
NNSA significantly reduced the review and approval time for subcontract
consent packages through the Subcontract Consent Pilot. Prior to the
pilot, these packages took an average of 8-10 weeks to go through the
Federal review and approval process. After implementation of the pilot,
the average time decreased to 2 to 4 weeks.
EMDI recommendation #10--Waiving DOE Order 413.3 billion
requirements for low-risk commercial-like construction. NNSA
streamlined the non-complex, non-nuclear construction process by:
1) Completing the final three of four Enhanced Minor Construction
and Commercial (EMC2) pilot projects in fiscal year 2023 (i.e. Y-12
Emergency Operations Center (EOC), Y-12 Fire Station, SNL EOC)
2) Initiating the construction subcontract consent pilot on August
2, 2023
3) Issuing Supplemental Directive 413.3-7 on September 8, 2023,
which institutionalizes the EMC2 process based on results from the
pilot projects
3. Senator Hirono. Secretary Granholm, the Enhanced Mission
Delivery Initiative was launched in 2022. Have the 21 recommendations
been implemented and do you think any have been effective in addressing
obstacles in contracting and procurement?
Secretary Granholm. NNSA is actively implementing numerous
initiatives as a result of the 21 EMDI recommendations. NNSA has
achieved contracting and procurement efficiencies by implementing
changes under EMDI. For example:
EMDI recommendations #1 and #2--Award Fee Contracting Model and the
Management and Operating (M&O) Contract Base and Extension. On June 13,
2024, NNSA announced the new Pantex contract award to PanTeXas
Deterrence, LLC with a 5-year base period, three 5-year options and a
hybrid fee structure with both fixed and award fee. This represents an
important step toward improving NNSA's M&O contracting to be more
strategic, less disruptive to the mission and workforce, and more of a
true partnership.
EMDI recommendation #3--Streamlining Contracts. Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory and the Livermore Field Office worked together to
revise contract clauses, revise the Statement of Work (SOW), and pilot
changes to streamline Emergency Management, Cybersecurity, and
Purchasing programs. This has resulted in increased efficiencies to
support mission delivery, including:
Significant savings in emergency management activities,
equivalent to 82 FTEs or nearly 4,300 hours annually.
Major reductions in approval cycle time for cybersecurity
deliverables ranging from 50 percent to 96 percent.
Significant savings in emergency management activities,
equivalSubstantial reduction in approval cycle time for award of major
procurements between $3 million and $5 million YTD in fiscal year 2024
of up to 96 total days.
EMDI recommendation #9--Improving M&O Subcontracting Efficiency.
NNSA significantly reduced the review and approval time for subcontract
consent packages through the Subcontract Consent Pilot. Prior to the
pilot, these packages took an average of 8-10 weeks to go through the
Federal review and approval process. After implementation of the pilot,
the average time decreased to 2-4 weeks.
EMDI recommendation #10--Waiving DOE Order 413.3B requirements for
low-risk commercial-like construction. NNSA streamlined the non-
complex, non-nuclear construction process by:
1) Completing the final three of four Enhanced Minor
Construction and Commercial (EMC2) pilot projects in fiscal year 2023
(i.e. Y-12 Emergency Operations Center (EOC), Y-12 Fire Station, SNL
EOC);
2) Initiating the construction subcontract consent pilot on
August 2, 2023;
3) Issuing Supplemental Directive 413.3-7 on September 8, 2023,
which institutionalizes the EMC2 process based on results from the
pilot projects.
future of deterrence
4. Senator Hirono. Administration Hruby, several countries continue
to pursue nuclear proliferation at a rate not seen since the end of the
cold war at a time when arms control treaties seem to be falling by the
wayside. Administrator Hruby, how is National Nuclear Security
Administration working to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation
worldwide?
Administration Hruby. The National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) plays a pivotal role in implementing the President's National
Security Strategy through its nonproliferation, counterproliferation,
and counterterrorism activities. These programs are necessary for
reducing nuclear threats and extending U.S. defenses globally. By
preventing additional states and non-State actors from obtaining
nuclear weapons, materials, technology, and expertise, and by
responding to nuclear or radiological incidents domestically and
internationally, NNSA significantly enhances global stability. NNSA
shares knowledge, accrued through the United States' longstanding
experience in managing special nuclear materials, with partners around
the world to achieve international nonproliferation and nuclear
security goals. Utilizing the technical knowledge from the Stockpile
Stewardship Program, NNSA assesses foreign weapons programs, manages
proliferation risks from civil nuclear applications, and prevents
terrorist access to nuclear materials and technology.
DOE/NNSA collaborates globally to identify and eliminate excess
weapons-usable nuclear material, including developing solutions to
downblend highly enriched uranium (HEU) in-country. At home, NNSA
remains committed to the permanent disposition of 34MT of surplus
defense plutonium through the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD)
program, despite Russia's purported unilateral suspension of the
Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement. NNSA also works to
minimize the civilian use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by
converting research reactors to high assay low-enriched uranium
(HALEU). Collaborations on new and advanced reactor designs aim to
reduce special nuclear material production and diversion pathways.
NNSA leads hundreds of technical and policy experts in maintaining
high nonproliferation standards and regulating nuclear technology
export through 10 C.F.R. Part 810. As new challenges in the
nonproliferation space emerge, NNSA finds creative ways to consider,
test, and implement nuclear safety, security, and safeguards
technology. The newest example of this is the first-of-its-kind
safeguards testing and demonstration facility with the United Kingdom,
Netherlands, Germany, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
that will allow safeguards technologies to be practiced and perfected
prior to use at nuclear sites around the world.
NNSA's important investments include the Advanced Reactor
International Safeguards Engagement (ARISE) program, which provides
advice to industry about integrating safeguards by design in new
reactors. NNSA strengthens global capacity to detect and prevent
weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related transfers, builds
capabilities in vulnerable countries, and provides technical measures
and policy options for nuclear warhead reductions. NNSA continues
investments to develop the next generation of arms control
technologies, including space-based monitoring and verification, and
experts to help mitigate against emerging and evolving national
security risks. It is paramount that the United States is prepared for
arms control negotiations in the future, and the NNSA's Arms Control
Advancement Initiative (ACAI) works to ensure that the U.S maintains
the expertise and technical capabilities required to address future
strategic stability, nuclear deterrence, and arms control issues. A
critical piece of ACAI is the Next Generation Arms Control Experts
(NextGen ACE) Program. NextGen ACE works to prepare a new generation of
experts who are technically trained to support and implement monitoring
and verification for both traditional, and potentially novel, arms
control and other nuclear threat reduction agreements. Another critical
component of ACAI is the development of the Pantex Monitoring and
Verification Test Facility (PMVTF). PMVTF is a test bed that supports
high-fidelity testing, demonstration, and exercising of warhead
monitoring and verification capabilities. Finally, NNSA develops
programs and strategies to address emerging nonproliferation
challenges, ensures the United States remains a global leader in
civilian nuclear cooperation by entering into binding civil nuclear
cooperation agreements (123 Agreements), and by contributing to the
development and implementation of U.S nonproliferation policy at the
national and international level through technical support to U.S
participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
5. Senator Hirono. Administration Hruby, deterrence is the bedrock
of our nuclear strategy. Are there gaps in capability that are not
currently addressed that would help maintain deterrence against our
nuclear peer competitors?
Administration Hruby. Although the global security landscape is
more dynamic today than in recent years, our nuclear deterrent remains
safe, secure, and effective. DOE/NNSA's seven warhead modernization
programs, along with DOD's modernization programs for delivery
platforms across all three legs of the triad, are designed to maintain
deterrence effectiveness into the future. As NNSA and DOD execute
current modernization programs, we are actively engaged with the
interagency to identify deterrence gaps that might arise in the future
and are developing plans to close those gaps should they arise. While
we remain confident in our capabilities today, we are examining ways to
reduce risks that might arise in the future.
nuclear infrastructure
6. Senator Hirono. Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby, like
much of the Defense Department's infrastructure, our nuclear weapons
labs, production facilities, and storage complexes are aging to the
point it will now take around $250 billion over the next 30 years to
modernize. Does this budget request buy down enough of this backlog to
adequately recoup our nuclear facilities?
Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby. This budget request
continues the Administration's efforts to adequately recoup our nuclear
facilities by equitably weighing all of the risks throughout the
nuclear security enterprise. The Enterprise Blueprint effort underway
will lay out a roadmap for future investments.
national nuclear security administration--environmental clean up
efforts
7. Senator Hirono. Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby, I
have worked hard to ensure the Department of Defense upholds its
environmental cleanup responsibilities, whether incurred from fuel and
chemical spills or unexploded ordnance. Too commonplace in
environmental restoration are missed deadlines and un-reliable cost and
schedule estimates. For both of you, there have been multiple
Government Accountability Office reports citing similar obstacles in
your department's cleanup efforts as to those embarked by the
Department of Defense. What are you doing to improve the cost and
schedule estimates of your environmental restoration projects?
Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby. While DOE's Office of
Environmental Management will respond separately, NNSA conducts limited
environmental cleanup work. Examples include managing pump-and-treat
systems at Pantex in Texas, Y-12 in Tennessee, and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in California; and post-closure monitoring
(groundwater) at all sites. Pursuant to authority provided in the
Fiscal Year 2022 NDAA, NNSA funds some facility disposition projects
(less than $75 million) of process-contaminated excess facilities to
reduce the risk those facilities pose to mission, people, and the
environment. So far, those projects have completed successfully.
8. Senator Hirono. Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby, what
are the largest sources of delays for these projects and how do we
solve them?
Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby. While DOE's Office of
Environmental Management will respond separately, NNSA is not managing
any large cleanup projects. None of NNSA's limited environmental
cleanup activities are experiencing delays.
non-proliferation initiatives
9. Senator Hirono. Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby, the
Department of Energy has routinely supported research into new reactor
designs for commercial use, many of them for much smaller reactors than
those mostly used today. In the near future, do you see national
security rationale--in addition to the green energy benefits--to build
additional nuclear reactors?
Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby. NNSA believes it is
crucial for national security to build additional U.S. nuclear
reactors. First, in light of the link between energy security, energy
resilience, and national security, ensuring we support secure U.S.
Advanced /Small Modular Reactor (A/SMR) technology development and
deployment is a national nuclear security imperative to avoid reliance
on foreign entities in any part of the A/SMR supply chain, which can
impact our own energy security. A/SMRs can provide critical
infrastructure resilient energy for several years amid the threat of
physical or cyberattacks, extreme weather, pandemic biothreats, and
other emerging challenges that can all disrupt commercial energy
networks. Second, A/SMRs developed and deployed by the U.S. industry
will likely have strong safeguards and security concepts designed into
them, creating a national security rationale for deploying as many of
these U.S. products globally as possible instead of allowing Russia and
China, who are far less likely to consider strong safeguards and
security in their A/SMR designs or their supply agreements, to take
that market. It also makes the United States a trusted partner in the
100-year relationship that comes with being a reliable supplier of
nuclear technology, and to have a leading role within international
bodies where controls and guidance are being developed. NNSA has
programs and resources supporting all of this now with U.S. industry,
the IAEA, and nuclear newcomer countries.
10. Senator Hirono. Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby,
what efforts has the National Nuclear Security Administration
undertaken to address advanced reactor and fuel cycle technologies in
terms of nonproliferation policy and technology?
Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby. In anticipation of the
emerging reactor and fuel cycle technologies, NNSA has established two
programs focused on the security and safeguards challenges these
advancements present. These initiatives also assist U.S. industry in
incorporating security and safeguards by design early in the
development process, paving the way for future exports. NNSA has the
resident expertise to understand novel risks posed by advanced nuclear
technologies when it comes to new fuel types, deployment models, and
applications, and is working with domestic partners to include
industry, the Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy, and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to help U.S. technology prepare for
international requirements in safeguards and security. Many of the
countries around the world looking to build advanced reactors have
never operated a nuclear power plant and do not have the infrastructure
do so. NNSA is working closely with international partners and the IAEA
to promote strong safeguards and security infrastructure guidance as
well as building capacity in regulatory bodies and operators in nuclear
newcomer countries to strengthen the security and safeguards regimes
globally.
The Advanced Reactor International Safeguards Engagement (ARISE)
program is a key component of this strategy, addressing the needs of
the evolving advanced reactor and fuel cycle technology sectors. ARISE
works with advanced reactor designers and other stakeholders to combine
safeguards by design through both policy and technical support. The
program also assists the IAEA in adapting to new safeguards challenges,
ensuring future nuclear technologies adhere to the highest safeguards
standards and policies. NNSA facilitates regulatory harmonization to
improve the ``safeguardability'' of future U.S. nuclear technology
exports, ensuring these advanced technologies remain under U.S.
oversight. Within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, NNSA ensures that export
controls for nuclear and related technologies are updated to reflect
advancements in reactor and fuel cycle technologies. These export
controls are vital for preventing the diversion of nuclear materials
and technology to weapons programs, ensuring their peaceful use.
Through these comprehensive measures, NNSA reinforces its commitment to
global stability, nuclear nonproliferation, and the secure development
and deployment of advanced nuclear technologies.
naval reactors and columbia
11. Senator Hirono. Administrator Hruby, Naval Reactors is leading
the effort in the important AUKUS Agreement to train Australia in the
handling and operation of naval nuclear fuels and reactors.
Administrator Hruby, is there a step-by-step plan for training and
certifying Australia for operating nuclear powered submarines?
Administration Hruby. Working with our Australian and UK partners,
the U.S. Navy, in consultation with Naval Reactors, has developed a
plan to train and certify the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) officers and
enlisted personnel who will operate RAN's future submarines.
Specifically, RAN personnel are enrolled in the U.S. Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Training Program in Charleston, SC, where they undergo the
same training program required for U.S. naval nuclear propulsion
operators and are certified to the same standard. Upon completion of
the training, they report to Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs),
where they are expected to meet the same qualification and
certification standards as U.S. sailors while assigned as augments to
the U.S. crews.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
recruitment initiatives and partnerships
12. Senator Kaine. Secretary Granholm, what progress has your
department made with regard to recruiting initiatives?
Secretary Granholm. DOE establishes annual hiring goals for the
employment of veterans and people with disabilities, and strongly
encourage the use of the non-competitive hiring authority for military
spouses. In fiscal year 2024, we have met or exceeded three of our four
hiring goals. In addition, we improved the percentage of veteran hires,
disabled veteran hires, persons with disabilities, and persons with
specific disabilities compared to fiscal year 2023.
In fiscal year 2024, we also established a Pathways Executive
Champion who promoted utilization of the Pathways Programs and sent a
call to action to departmental elements (DEs) to increase Pathways
Intern hiring. We have exceeded the number of Pathways Intern new hires
compared to fiscal year 2023. Also, we have exceeded the number of
Pathways Program participants onboard compared to fiscal year 2023.
DOE's Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer spearheaded 5 DOE-
wide information sessions in fiscal year 2024 with expanded outreach to
diverse potential candidates in mission critical occupations, those who
are early in their careers, and those with disabilities. These events
had a combined total of 12,601 registrations. We provided job seekers
with information on the Federal application and hiring process, pay and
benefits, Federal resume writing, and special hiring authorities and
initiatives.
Persons with Disabilities Information Session--1,485 registered
DOE Careers in Engineering & Physical Science--3,565
registered
DOE Careers in Data & Computing--3,756 registered
DOE Early Career Programs--1,473 registered
DOE Careers in Contracting & Grants Management--2,322
registered
In addition, HC attended 52 recruitment and outreach events
focusing on the following audiences:
Veterans & Military Spouses--28 events
People with Disabilities--7 events
Diversity & Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math
(STEM) events--17 events
DOE markets vacancy announcements and events widely on social media
platforms; diversity associations; professional associations; veteran,
military spouse, and disability employment partners; and to colleges
and universities, particularly Historically Black Colleges and
Universities (HBCUs) and Minority Serving Institutions (MSIs). These
efforts resulted in thousands of event registrations and a surge in
candidate applications to our vacancy announcements in USAJOBS.
In fiscal year 2024, DOE developed a Recruitment Survey that is
administered to new hires during their onboarding. The survey attempts
to capture the programs and/or events that had the most influence on a
new hire's decision to apply for Federal employment with DOE. The
survey will help us to better assess the return on investment on
specific recruitment and outreach strategies and to make informed
decisions on where to best invest in talent acquisition.
DOE has robust recruitment, outreach, and retention programs to
attract and retain the next generation of STEM and early career
workforce from all segments of society.
We participate in national recruitment events and host our own
events focused on STEM professionals. In fiscal year 2024, we hosted
and participated in events such as the CyberForce Virtual Career Fairs,
National Tech to Gov Virtual Job Fair, Society of Women Engineers
Career Fair; National Urban League's Black History Month Engineering,
IT, & Cybersecurity Virtual Career Fair; Engineering & Science Virtual
Career Fair; STEM Job & Internship Virtual Career Fair; Women's History
Month Virtual Career Fair in Engineering & Technology; and the Energy
and Environmental Virtual Career Fair.
DOE's CyberForce Program hosts annual cyber defense competitions
for collegiate teams to experience the challenge of securing critical
energy infrastructure. In addition, the program hosts CyberForce
Virtual Career Fairs to provide students and career professionals
information on available networking, mentorship, internship, and career
opportunities across DOE.
DOE recognized the recruitment, hiring, and retention challenges,
and increasing competition with private sector companies for top
cybersecurity talent. To address these challenges, the Department
developed a retention incentive program that provides an enterprise-
wide approach to retaining, developing, and supporting the continued
enhancement of DOE's cybersecurity workforce. These incentives allow
for qualifying cybersecurity professionals to receive group retention
incentives of 10 percent or alternatively, individual retention
incentives of 25 percent of their salary.
DOE Departmental Elements continue to develop and maintain
strategic partnerships with HBCUs and MSIs across the U.S. to promote
numerous non-Federal internships and fellowships in the STEM for
students of diverse backgrounds and geographies. The focus of these
partnerships is to equip early career talent with the technical and
professional experience to excel in successful careers and be able to
compete for Federal employment. DOE promotes these opportunities on our
various DE webpages on our website, https://www.energy.gov. Although
these internships and fellowships do not directly lead to Federal
employment, DOE provides participants with information on the Federal
application process and encourages them to apply to DOE's vacancy
announcements on USAJOBS that can lead to Federal employment.
DOE's efforts to improve agency branding and awareness, and
recruit, employ, advance, and retain veterans contributed to the
Department's recognition as a workplace where veterans can thrive. In
November 2023, Forbes named DOE #1 overall in ``America's Best
Employers for Veterans 2023'' list, ahead of publicly traded companies
including Google, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon,
and General Dynamics. DOE also ranked ahead of other Federal agencies
including NASA, General Services Administration, Internal Revenue
Service, and Department of Treasury.
In May 2024, DOE ranked in the top 10 for the second year in a row
among midsize Federal agencies in the Best Places to Work in the
Federal Government 2023 by the Partnership for Public Service. In 2023,
we landed the number 6 spot, two spots higher than in 2022.
13. Senator Kaine. Secretary Granholm, how is your department
partnering with historically black colleges and universities and
minority serving institutions to improve recruitment?
Secretary Granholm. The Department of Energy (DOE) continues to
design and implement specific engagement and outreach plans in
collaboration with Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU)
affiliated organizations and associations to help build awareness of
opportunities for HBCUs to engage in programs, projects, and
initiatives across the DOE complex. For instance, DOE has taken the
following actions:
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)
established the Office of Integrated Strategies (IS) which is dedicated
to advancing equity for underserved individuals and communities across
the country. The work done by EERE and IS provides more pathways for
HBCU students to find careers within clean energy industries and serve
the communities from which they come.
Through the MSI STEM Research and Development Consortium
(MSRDC) partnership, EERE will continue to look for opportunities to
bring all partners to the table in putting together creative research
partnerships that will allow HBCUs to grow in their capacity and help
their students gain valuable research experiences and potential career
options afterwards.
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) NNSA
Predictive Science Academic Alliance Program (PSAAP) currently has
their PSAAP IV Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) out which is
requiring that applicants describe how they will attract a diverse
group of students and postdocs and make efforts to broaden the
workforce pool through outreach to historically underrepresented
communities. This has also been a requirement for previous NOFOs for
the Stewardship Science Academic Alliance (SSAA) and Joint Program in
High Energy Density Laboratory Plasmas (JHEDLP) programs. This means
that applicants must provide a detailed plan that describes the
activities and strategies they will incorporate to promote diversity,
equity, inclusion, and accessibility. As an Equal Opportunity Employer,
the NNSA encourages applications from diverse and inclusive groups of
Principal Investigators and co-Investigators.
DOE has incorporated Community Benefits Plans into its
funding opportunity announcements. Consequently, in fiscal year 2023,
DOE has successfully recruited more reviewers with diverse backgrounds
to participate in merit review panels and will continue to make efforts
to recruit more HBCU faculty and staff to participate in this process.
NNSA engagement activities and outreach plans in collaboration with
HBCUs and Minority Serving Institutions (MSIs) builds awareness of
opportunities for HBCUs and MSIs to engage in programs, projects, and
recruitment initiatives across the NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise.
Specifically in fiscal year 2024:
The Minority Serving Institution Partnership Program,
(MSIPP) increased the number of funded projects through the Consortia
Grants Program. This program expanded academic efforts in STEM
capacities, recruits and supports a diverse workforce, provides
experiential learning opportunities for students and faculty in MSIs
and Tribal Colleges and Universities (TCUs) and increases
collaborations between MSIs, TCUs, and the NNSA national laboratories,
plants, and sites from 30 in fiscal year 2023 to 35 in fiscal year
2024. Recipients of this program consist of 20 HBCUs, 26 HSIs, 1
Primarily Black Institution (PBI), and 7 TCUs, in collaboration with
the NNSA's nuclear security enterprise. Through collaborative
partnerships between the enterprise and TCUs, The Tribal Education
Partnerships Program (TEPP) develops opportunities for students to
strengthen skills and talents, broadening possibilities for future
career paths. TEPP centers on advancing equity and opportunity between
Tribal nations and NNSA while upholding and reinforcing the importance
of Tribal sovereignty to ensure that Tribal knowledge is valued and
protected.
TEPP efforts at NNSA National Laboratories, Plants and
Sites. Engagement activities involve:
Through the Minority Serving Institutions Internship
Program (MSIPP), NNSA provides summer and year-long internship
opportunities for undergraduate and graduate students. MSIPP
facilitated its annual technical meeting in April 2024, which provided
an opportunity for over 160 faculty and staff members from HBCUs, MSIs,
and TCUs to collaborate on best practices for student recruitment. The
event was held at Florida's largest public HBCU and showcased the White
House HBCU Initiative Director as the Keynote Speaker.
MSIPP increased the number of students supported through
the MSI Internship Program from 96 in fiscal year 2023 to 151 in fiscal
year 2024.This opportunity is open to all students enrolled in a
Minority Serving Institution.
MSIPP collaborates with National Laboratories Plants and
Sites to broaden MSI/HBCU awareness of facility initiatives, including
``Securing Top Academic Research & Talent (START) at HBCUs'' at Sandia
National Laboratories and the ``Underrepresented Minority Partnership
Program'' (URMPP) at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
**Virginia Specific: In fiscal year 2023, MSIPP's
Consortium for Research and Education in Materials Science and
Photonics Engineering sponsored students from three HBCUs, Norfolk
State University, Virginia State University, and Elizabeth City State
University on a week-long visit at the Lawerence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL) to increase awareness of summer internship
opportunities and the career pathway available at LLNL.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
nuclear pit production schedule
14. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, when does the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) anticipate it will be able to
produce 80 pits per year? How confident are you in that assessment?
What factors could put that timeline at risk?
Administration Hruby. We expect to achieve the capability to
produce 80 pits per year in 2035 or soon thereafter, which is when that
capability will be needed to support stockpile plans. The Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL) is projected to achieve a 30 pits per year
(ppy) production capability in or near 2028, with equipment
improvements continuing after this to provide an increasingly
dependable capability through 2032.
Our plan is to complete Savannah River Plutonium Processing
Facility (SRPPF) construction, systems testing, and turnover to
operations in 2032. This will require a high rate of work execution in
the second half of the 2020's. After turnover to operations, Savannah
River must introduce nuclear material, establish pit manufacturing
processes, perform detailed engineering evaluations, work with design
laboratories to qualify the processes, and buildup to a 50 ppy ``rate
production'' capability. To minimize time to rate production, NNSA is
building a High-Fidelity Training and Operations Center to train
employees in a realistic operational environment before occupying the
processing facility. At this time, SRPPF is projected to achieve a
production capacity of at least 50 ppy between 2035 and 2038.
Factors such as supply chain issues, construction cost growth,
underestimates of required construction labor, unexpected problems
arising during testing of complex systems, and natural disasters have
the potential to impede existing schedules for these ongoing, complex
nuclear projects.
15. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, Congress has requested a
pit production master schedule for nearly a decade. A 2023 Government
Accountability Office (GAO) study on this issue found that NNSA still
does not have a comprehensive schedule or cost estimate for the pit
production program. Does NNSA now have a master schedule for pit
production that meets GAO's best practices? If not, when does NNSA plan
to have a master schedule that meets GAO's best practices?
Administration Hruby. Yes, NNSA has an integrated master schedule
for pit production to address program planning needs while meeting the
intent of GAO best practices. The first version of NNSA Integrated
Master Schedule (NIMS) on pit production was implemented in October
2021. The NIMS improved on the original milestone schedule by
incorporating detailed schedule logic for the First Production Unit
(FPU) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), while retaining all
other milestones supporting the full 80 pits per year (ppy) mission.
The current version of the NIMS includes detailed, multi-site
schedule logic from LANL, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and
the Kansas City National Security Campus for pit manufacturing and
production efforts to attain FPU at LANL. Schedule logic with less
detail is included for programs and projects at the Savannah River Site
and those associated with later phases of equipment installation at
LANL. NIMS will continue to integrate higher fidelity schedule logic
for those programs and projects as their designs and schedules mature.
In this way NIMS capabilities will keep pace as more programs and
projects develop detailed schedules, and it will remain an effective
management tool for the program, in alignment with GAO best practices.
16. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, does NNSA have the ability
to complete an integrated master schedule and lifecycle cost estimate
now, with existing information, and update it as higher fidelity
information becomes available, as prescribed by best practices?
Administration Hruby. Yes. NNSA's NIMS was established in 2021 and
will continue to integrate higher fidelity schedule logic for pit
production program and projects as designs and schedules mature. In
past years, NNSA has completed various lifecycle cost estimates for
both LANL and SRS pit production. The largest variable of those
lifecycle cost estimates has been the capital investments needed to
support the pit production mission. The 2024 initial Pit Production
Total Acquisition Cost Estimate (PPTACE) was completed to focus on
those capital investments that are needed and will continue to be
refined as projects are baselined. The remaining elements of our
lifecycle cost estimate are the programmatic costs from inception until
achievement of rate-production capability at each facility and the
annual operating cost once each facility achieves rate-production
capability. We are developing these elements now.
pit production cost
17. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, what does the NNSA
estimate as the total life cycle cost of the pit production program?
Administration Hruby. The 2024 initial Pit Production Total
Acquisition Cost Estimate (PPTACE), which includes capital investments
(e.g., minor construction, recapitalization) necessary to achieve the
80 ppy capability beyond just line-item projects, forecasts pit
production project costs in the range of $28B-$37B. The PPTACE
continues to be reviewed and will become more precise as facility
designs progress, additional scope at the Savannah River Site is
identified following transition of management responsibility to NNSA,
and the sites' ability to execute pit production scope is factored into
the estimates. The remaining elements of our lifecycle cost estimate
are the programmatic costs from inception until achievement of rate-
production capability at each facility and the annual operating cost
once each facility achieves rate-production capability. We are
developing these elements now, with the understanding that the
underlying information from the sites continues to solidify, and there
are large uncertainties in those cost ranges.
18. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, NNSA suggested in its
fiscal year 2025 budget request that the Savannah River Pit Production
Facility may cost $18-25 billion to construct. This funding would
include multiple line-item construction projects, office space,
facility modifications, infrastructure improvements, and over $1
billion annually in plutonium modernization program funding. Does the
NNSA believe this estimate is accurate for the Savannah River site?
Administration Hruby. Yes, NNSA believes the current estimate
ranges bound the likely cost of the SRPPF construction project. These
cost estimates will continue to be reviewed and will become more
precise as facility designs progress, additional scope at the Savannah
River Site is identified following transition of management
responsibility from DOE's Office of Environmental Management to NNSA,
and the site's ability to execute pit production scope is factored into
the estimates. An improved baseline total acquisition cost estimate,
expected in 2026, will follow project baseline estimates for SRPPF.
NNSA, working with SRS, will continue to refine the cost and schedule
for pit production at SRPPF as the design continues to mature. Point of
clarification: The estimate of $18 billion to $25 billion is for the
construction project and does not include plutonium modernization
program funding.
19. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, what is the total life
cycle cost estimate for the pit production program, including multiple
line-item construction projects, office space, facility modifications,
infrastructure improvements, and plutonium modernization program
funding, for the Los Alamos Site?
Administration Hruby. We are still developing estimates for the
programmatic costs from inception until achievement of rate-production
capability and the annual operating cost afterward. These elements will
be included in the lifecycle cost estimate when they are developed.
Once all major line-item projects included in the PPTACE are baselined,
NNSA will complete a more accurate pit production lifecycle cost
estimate to include annual pit production operations costs at both LANL
and SRS and supporting activities at other sites, expected no later
than 2026.
20. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, when will NNSA have a
reliable independent cost estimate for the total cost of pit
production?
Administration Hruby. The 2024 initial Pit Production Total
Acquisition Cost Estimate (PPTACE), which includes capital investments
(e.g., minor construction, recapitalization) necessary to achieve the
80 ppy capability beyond just line-item projects, forecasts pit
production project acquisition costs in the range of $28 billion to $37
billion. NNSA's cost range was based onsite estimates, an independent
estimate from NNSA's Cost Estimating and Project Evaluation (CEPE)
office, and NNSA's Office of Infrastructure's cost review. NNSA,
working with the sites, continues to refine the cost and schedule for
pit production.
Once all major line-item projects that are included in the PPTACE
are baselined, NNSA will complete an overall pit production lifecycle
cost estimate that will include an independent estimate analysis from
NNSA's CEPE and will encompass pit production operations costs at both
LANL and SRS and supporting activities at other sites. This more
reliable acquisition cost estimate is expected no later than 2026. The
remaining elements of our lifecycle cost estimate are the programmatic
costs from inception until achievement of rate-production capability at
each facility and the annual operating cost once each facility achieves
rate-production. We are developing these elements now and will have
more reliable versions of them no later than 2026.
21. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, what is the total cost for
all pit production activities in NNSA's fiscal year 2025 to 2029 future
years nuclear security plan?
Administration Hruby. The fiscal year 2025 President's Budget
included roughly $18.93 billion for Plutonium Modernization under the
Weapons Activities' Production Modernization budget line, which
includes operations activities as well as related line items for LAP4,
TRP-III, CMRR, and SRPPF. Combined with plutonium production-related
line items within Infrastructure and Operations (Operations of
Facilities, Maintenance and Repair of Facilities, and Recapitalization)
and mission-enabling construction (Plutonium Modernization Operations,
Plutonium Mission Safety & Quality Building LANL, Plutonium Program
Accounting Building LANL, Plutonium Engineering Support LANL, and
Protective Forces Support Facility LANL), the total cost for all pit
production activities in fiscal year 2025 to 2029 is $21.53 billion.
These totals do not capture the other costs of ongoing site operations
that enable the pit production mission, such as security, information
technology, and cybersecurity activities.
pit production alignment
22. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, since at least one of the
biggest Department of Defense weapons programs, the Sentinel, which is
supposed to be a beneficiary of the pit production program, is being
delayed there would presumably be a misalignment with this program's
deadline and the pit production deadline. NNSA officials involved in
the W87-1 modernization program have suggested that the Los Alamos
Site, alone, can meet pit production needs for the program. Would
schedule delays or slowing down pit production at the Savannah River
site impact NNSA's ability to meet the Sentinel program's requirements?
Administration Hruby. Pit production efforts and schedules at SRS
do not impact NNSA's ability to meet Sentinel program requirements, as
LANL will produce the plutonium pit for the W87-1. The Savannah River
Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) will first manufacture plutonium
pits for the W93. Schedule delays or slowdowns at SRPPF would seriously
degrade NNSA's ability to meet requirements for the W93 warhead and
subsequent warheads.
23. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, will new pits be required
for the new W93 warhead?
Administration Hruby. Yes. New pits are needed not only to complete
the W93 warhead program but to produce pits for future warhead
programs.
24. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, you confirmed in the
committee's hearing that the Los Alamos site alone can meet the pit
production needs of the W87-1 warhead needed for the Sentinel program.
Yet, the NNSA's fiscal year 2025 budget shows a significant ramp up of
the Savannah River site. Will this aggressive ramp up of the Savannah
River site risk other NNSA infrastructure priories?
Administration Hruby. In crafting the fiscal year 2025 to 2029
budget request, NNSA worked to carefully balance risks across programs
and projects related to infrastructure, warhead sustainment, warhead
modernization, science, engineering, technology, physical security and
cyber security. This is a challenge every year, and every year the
requested budget carries some mission risks. The budget ramp up for
Savannah River Site--which is needed to support pit production for the
W93--combined with constraints imposed by the Fiscal Responsibility Act
make the fiscal year 2025 budget particularly challenging. NNSA with
DOD input has carefully balanced risks across the broad set of weapons
activities. While pit production modernization remains NNSA's highest
infrastructure priority at present, NNSA continues to fund and support
the full range of infrastructure requirements across multiple mission
areas in order to deliver on NNSA's commitments.
25. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, how is NNSA holding
maintenance and operations (M&O) contractors accountable for pit-
related project performance? Have any contractors' annual performance
evaluations been affected by these projects' schedule delays and
increasing costs?
Administration Hruby. NNSA is holding M&O contractors accountable
for pit-related project performance through the following:
a. For fiscal year 2025, NNSA will emphasize project performance
by incorporating a new Infrastructure Goal in the M&O contractors'
Performance Evaluation Management Plans (PEMPs). This new goal will
evaluate progress on Capital Asset acquisition Projects in the
contractors' annual Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs). For the
LANL/Triad fiscal year 2025 PEMP, this new goal will incorporate a
specific objective for pit production projects.
b. NNSA will continue to hold partnering sessions with M&O
leadership with a focus on key pit production project delivery and
actions necessary to stay on schedule. The NA-90 partnering session's
attendees include leadership from NNSA program and field offices and
M&O senior leadership to ensure decisionmakers who are directly
accountable for cost, schedule, and performance are in alignment and
have an open and honest discussion on issues/concerns and
accomplishments. During, and in between sessions, actions are taken and
followed up on, resulting in quicker communications and holding NNSA
and M&O contractors accountable for stated deliverables. The sessions
have built up a team synergy amongst pit production locations by
sharing lessons learned and expanding the network of subject matter
experts.
c. The PEMP for the M&O contractor at Savannah River includes a
standalone NNSA Capital Line-Item Award Fee Plan for SRPPF that holds
the M&O contractor accountable for schedule delays and increasing
costs. For example, The NNSA Project Management Executive (NA-10,
Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs) decided on June 21, 2024, to
remove the SRPPF Administrative Building (ADMIN) Subproject (baselined
at $92 million) from the M&O contractor and transfer it to the United
States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) due to lack of M&O performance.
26. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, Congress has directed NNSA
to formulate a ``Research Program Plan for Plutonium and Pit Aging.''
The plan states that in ``fiscal year 2023, a lifetime assessment using
the updated and advanced age-aware physics models developed within the
National Plutonium Aging Plan will be conducted.'' Has NNSA conducted
this study? If so, what were the results of that fiscal year 2023
lifetime assessment? If not, why has NNSA not conducted the study?
Administration Hruby. NNSA continues to improve our understanding
of plutonium and pit aging through multiple research and development
activities, and recently completed a lifetime assessment using updated
and advanced age-aware physics models developed within the National
Plutonium Aging Plan as identified in the Research Program Plan for
Plutonium and Pit Aging delivered to Congress in 2021. NNSA would be
happy to provide a classified briefing for Members of Congress on a
need-to-know basis concerning plutonium aging and NNSA's pit production
approach, including the results of the above assessment, which are a
vital element of our strategy to modernize the United States' nuclear
capabilities.
27. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, the JASON Defense Advisory
Group (JASON) concluded, in 2006, that plutonium pits last at least 85
years without specifying an end date. The average pit age is now
slightly more than 40 years. In 2019, the JASONs issued a ``letter
report'' that said they were not given time to do a full updated pit
aging study and listed the criteria that should be used for one. Will
NNSA direct the JASONs to complete a full updated pit aging study
before 2030? If so, when will NNSA direct the JASONs to do that study?
Administration Hruby. Yes, NNSA will ask the JASONs to complete a
full updated pit aging study before 2030.
The 2006 JASON report on pit aging was more nuanced than is
commonly reported. It did not State that all pits in the stockpile will
meet military requirements until they are at least 85 years old.
Estimating how long a given pit type will meet requirements, in a given
weapon system and environment, is an extrapolatory exercise involving
considerable uncertainty. The answer is different depending on warhead
designs and environmental factors.
Of possible interest, the NNSA Federal Advisory Committee Act
independent review committee (also known as ``Advisory Committee for
Nuclear Security'') recently completed an evaluation of NNSA's pit
aging research and development efforts. This report is unclassified and
was provided to Congress in December 2023.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
best practices to share with aukus partners
28. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, an October 2023
International Atomic Energy Agency report on Australia's nuclear and
radiation safety that there were areas for improvement, which stands to
reason since Australia does not have any nuclear power plants.
Recognizing the importance for our AUKUS partners to be successful in
all aspects of the program, can you describe the coordination that is
happening at the civilian regulatory and oversight levels between the
Department of Energy and the Australian Radiation Protection and
Nuclear Safety Agency?
Secretary Granholm. NNSA works closely with Australian nuclear
regulators and the technical community including the Australian
Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA), the
Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office (ASNO), and the
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO). NNSA
has a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to enable nonproliferation
cooperation with and assistance to ASNO and recently entered into a new
MOU with ANSTO to further cooperation in nuclear security and nuclear
nonproliferation. The Australian government has authorized ARPANSA to
issue required nuclear licenses for AUKUS activities in Australia
pending the establishment of a new regulatory body via legislation
under consideration by the Australian Parliament. NNSA's Office of
Naval Reactors and Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control are
working with the Australian Submarine Agency to enhance Australia's
ability to effectively ensure the safe and secure operation of
conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines through the AUKUS
partnership.
recapitalizing the nuclear triad and slcm-n
29. Senator Sullivan. Administrator Hruby, if authorized, will the
$70 million requested for SLCM-N in your unfunded requirements list
allow the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to
concurrently work on the modernization efforts across air, land, and
sea components of the nuclear triad?
Administration Hruby. Yes, NNSA will work with the Nuclear Weapons
Council to find the most effective solution for SLCM-N requirements so
it does not disrupt the rest of the Program of Record, which is
currently undertaking the full scope modernization of the U.S. nuclear
Triad. NNSA continues to coordinate with the Department of Defense and
U.S. Navy to identify warhead requirements as they define their
delivery platform. As previously relayed to Congress,
NNSA is evaluating the W80-4, as directed by the initial
authorizing language, but is also considering other options that may
meet requirements without disrupting current planned production flows.
30. Senator Sullivan. Administrator Hruby, do we have the capacity
in the United States to recapitalize the sea, air, and land based
aspects of the nuclear triad concurrently?
Administration Hruby. Yes, through our continued partnership with
the Department of Defense and consistent support from Congress, NNSA
can succeed in modernizing the U.S. nuclear stockpile with successful
execution of our ongoing warhead modernization programs, in addition to
the recapitalization of our production and design, certification, and
assessment infrastructure.
acquisition workforce
31. Senator Sullivan. Administrator Hruby, NNSA recently
reorganized important functions regarding acquisition and project/
program management (PM), specifically in July 2022 when it reorganized
the Office of Acquisition and Project Management into two offices.
Since that time, however, NNSA has witnessed an exodus of acquisition/
PM professionals without any apparent replacements. What caused all
these acquisition professionals to leave?
Administration Hruby. Since the reorganization in 2022, the Office
of Partnership and Acquisition Services (PAS) has seen a seen a 20
percent increase in staff. It is critical to PAS to recruit and retain
stellar acquisition talent. Since the reorganization, PAS has filled
many critical positions through internal promotions. This not only
retained critical talent and historical knowledge, but also offered
growth opportunities to PAS staff. Acquisition professionals are always
in demand and can pursue career opportunities in the government and
private sector offering remote work and higher compensation. However,
PAS has seen a decrease in attrition by becoming a model for
acquisition organizations and being an employer of choice. NA-PAS is
committed to staying an employer of choice, offering career development
opportunities to retain our workforce. The Office of Infrastructure
(NA-90) has experienced 80 vacancies with an 87.5 percent fill rate
since the 2022 reorganization, with 27 being internal promotions/
reassignments. In the past 12 months, NA-90 has onboarded 32 full-time
equivalents and the attrition rate has lowered significantly.
32. Senator Sullivan. Administrator Hruby, what are you doing to
hire replacements to keep NNSA projects on track?
Administration Hruby. The Federal Salaries and Expenses (FSE)
request is $564,475,000 and supports a Federal staff of 2,084 FTEs to
provide appropriate oversight to ensure NNSA can meet growing mission
requirements and commitments, including modernizing the nuclear
deterrent and recapitalizing the aging infrastructure, while continuing
to meet the requirements of nonproliferation and counterterrorism
programs.
NNSA's growing mission requirements have mandated an aggressive
strategy to monitor and attract the next generation of skilled workers,
who are critical to meeting the mission. As our recruitment and
succession programs build the workforce of the future, our strategic
leadership and workforce development programs are building the next
generation of NNSA leaders and working to close the knowledge and skill
gaps between our less experienced new hires and our more tenured
employees.
Through the NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP), the Minority
Serving Institution Partnership Program (MSIPP), and the Minority
Serving Institution Internship Program (MSIIP), NNSA strives to not
only identify and recruit new talent into the enterprise but also to
ensure that talent is prepared to meet the challenges ahead of them.
The NGFP hires over 70 fellows annually, serving nearly all NNSA
program offices. Of the 700 plus fellow alumni, approximately 85
percent go onto serve in other roles within NNSA or Managing and
Operating (M&O), with ties to national security. From fiscal year 2020
to fiscal year 2023, NNSA hired 89 fellows as Federal employees.
Additionally, NNSA's MSIIP plays a pivotal role in cultivating the
future workforce of scientist and professionals across the nuclear
security enterprise. Eighty-seven interns were part of the inaugural
2022-2023 cohort, followed by 96 interns in the class of 2023-2024.
This summer, the cohort totaled 151 interns from minority serving
institutions (MSIs).
In addition to being a critical piece of NNSA's succession planning
strategy, NGFP and MSIIP place a significant emphasis on training and
development to prepare participants for potential careers in nuclear
security and as future NNSA leaders. The leadership and career
development opportunities include:
Leadership development courses tailored to aspiring
leaders;
Hands-on experience working on nuclear security and
nonproliferation issues;
Mentorship, professional networking, and extensive
interaction with nuclear security professionals and leading
researchers;
Senior leader shadowing; and
Other specialized training opportunities.
NNSA investment in the MSIPP builds a sustainable STEM pathway that
develops a diverse workforce of world class talent through strategic
partnerships between MSIs and the nuclear security enterprise. MSIPP
supports 35 consortia consisting of 54 Institutions of Higher Education
and 14 nuclear security enterprise (NSE) facilities.
To further advance hiring and early career pipeline development
within the Federal workforce, NNSA continues to leverage the
Presidential Management Fellows Program. NNSA has adopted a strategy of
having experienced staff work alongside newer hires to transfer
knowledge and ensure a smooth transition. Moreover, we have increased
our use of detail opportunities, allowing employees to gain diverse
experience and perspectives while fostering a culture of knowledge
sharing across generations. By combining these initiatives, we are
effectively preparing our workforce to manage attrition and meet the
demands of an increased workload in our enterprise.
33. Senator Sullivan. Administrator Hruby, of NNSA's major line-
item projects, how many have a fully qualified, Federal project
directors in a permanent capacity?
Administration Hruby. All major line-item projects (100 percent) in
design or construction phases have a qualified and/or highly
experienced FPD assigned in a permanent capacity.
strategic & critical minerals
34. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, do you agree that one of
America's greatest strengths over our adversaries is our energy and
critical mineral resources?
Secretary Granholm. The United States possesses a wide variety of
energy and critical mineral resources. These resources, combined with
the extraordinary talent and imagination of the domestic workforce,
will allow the United States to prosper and thrive.
35. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, does an increased
proliferation of electric vehicles require increased critical mineral
production?
Secretary Granholm. Increased adoption of electric vehicles will
require greatly increased supplies of certain critical materials,
including graphite, lithium, neodymium, and copper. For example, it is
estimated that the domestic demand for graphite could increase by a
factor of eight by 2030 in order to meet the needs of the electric
vehicle market. According to the IEA's Global Critical Minerals
Outlook, battery demand is expected to increase fivefold by 2030,
driven by EV sales and growth in deployment of electric trucks. There
is currently overcapacity of battery manufacturing. There is some
uncertainty on which battery critical materials will be needed. The use
of lithium iron phosphate (LFP) cathodes, manganese-rich chemistries,
and silicon-doping of graphite anodes may reduce the demand for
materials like cobalt, nickel, and graphite in batteries. \1\ \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Argonne National Laboratory estimates there is ample mineral
resource globally to meet future electric vehicle demand. https://
iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ee01701d-1d5c-4ba8-9df6-abeeac9de99a/
GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2024.pdf
\2\ https://www.osti.gov/biblio/2319240
36. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, what critical minerals
does the United States currently import, particularly from China?
Secretary Granholm. The United States imports many metals,
minerals, and materials, from various countries including China. The
annual Mineral Commodities Summaries from the USGS (U.S. Geological
Survey, January 31, 2024, Mineral commodity summaries 2024: U.S.
Geological Survey, 212 p., https://doi.org/10.3133/mcs2024) is a
reference detailing production, imports, exports, and uses of metals,
minerals, and materials. The net import reliance, as well as the
leading import sources, is summarized by the USGS in the Mineral
Commodities Summaries and is shown below:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
China is a major supplier of many critical materials to the United
States, including but not limited to graphite, gallium, antimony,
germanium, arsenic, rare earth elements, and rubidium.
37. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, do you believe that the
Administration's denial of Federal permits for mining projects will
lower our dependence on foreign adversaries like China?
Secretary Granholm. The DOE does not permit mining projects. There
are many factors that contribute to the long times often needed to
start production at a domestic mine, including thorough
characterization of the mineral deposit, which involves collecting and
characterizing numerous samples; obtaining the financing; construction
of the mine and processing facilities; obtaining the trained workforce
as well as acceptance from the local community; and obtaining the
necessary permits for both the mining and processing. DOE collaborated
with the Department of the Interior (DOI) as part of the DOI-led
Interagency Working Group on Mining Laws, Regulations, and Permitting
to release a report, ``Recommendations to Improve Mining on Public
Lands.''
38. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, how impactful would
producing 1.9 billion pounds of copper, 2.3 billion pounds of zinc, 388
million pounds of lead, 386,000 ounces of gold, and 40.6 million ounces
of silver be in bolstering our domestic critical mineral capabilities?
Secretary Granholm. According to the USGS Mineral Commodity
Summaries (U.S. Geological Survey, January 31, 2024, Mineral commodity
summaries 2024: U.S. Geological Survey, 212 p., https://doi.org/
10.3133/mcs2024), the United States consumed approximately 1.8 million
metric tons of copper; 970 thousand metric tons of zinc; 1.6 million
metric tons of lead; 250 metric tons of gold; and 6,700 metric tons of
silver.
1.9 billion pounds of copper represents a 6-month supply of copper
for the United States at the current rate of consumption.
2.3 billion pounds of zinc represents a year supply of zinc for the
United States at the current rate of consumption.
388 million pounds of lead represents a 40-day supply of lead for
the United States at the current rate of consumption.
386,000 ounces of gold represents a 9-day supply of gold for the
United States at the current rate of consumption.
40.6 million ounces of silver represents a 26-year supply of silver
for the United States at the current rate of consumption.
These are significant quantities of the metals, especially for
silver.
39. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, what are the Federal
regulatory barriers hindering domestic critical mineral projects?
Secretary Granholm. The DOE is not a regulatory agency. There are
many factors that contribute to the long times often needed to start
production at a domestic mine, including thorough characterization of
the mineral deposit, which involves collecting and characterizing
numerous samples; obtaining the financing; construction of the mine and
processing facilities; obtaining the trained workforce as well as
acceptance from the local community; and obtaining the necessary
permits for both the mining and processing. The recent incorporation of
critical minerals projects into the FAST-41 program, administered by
the Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council (FPISC), may help
alleviate permitting delays for some critical mineral projects. \3\[1]
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\3\ Permitting Council Moves to Designate the Critical Minerals
Supply Chain as a FAST-41 Sector--Permitting Dashboard
40. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, would having access to a
domestic source in one of the largest copper and zinc belts in the
world help decrease our dependence on foreign adversaries like China?
Secretary Granholm. In 2023, the U.S. net-import reliance of
refined copper was 46 percent with leading import sources being Chile,
Canada, and Mexico. In 2023, the U.S. net-import reliance of refined
zinc was 77 percent with leading import sources being China, Belgium,
India, and Boliva. \4\ Diversification and expansion of critical
materials is one of four pillars that provide the foundation for DOE's
Critical Materials Strategy. New domestic sources of metals can be very
helpful in securing supplies, especially if they can be produced
economically and responsibly from these sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/mcs2024
41. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, what are the national
security implications of the Biden administration halting critical
mineral projects throughout the country?
Secretary Granholm. Critical material research projects are being
supported by the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and
the Department of the Interior, with many projects proceeding from lab
through commercial scales. DOE maintains a project data base of DOE-
supported critical minerals and materials projects that span research,
development, demonstration, and commercial deployment. \5\
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\5\ https://www.energy.gov/cmm/critical-materials-project-search.
42. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, what is this
Administration doing to encourage private investment in domestic
critical mineral projects?
Secretary Granholm. The DOE's Loan Programs Office (LPO) greatly
facilitates private investment in domestic critical material projects.
The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and Inflation Reduction Act
(IRA) have supercharged DOE investments in critical materials,
expanding the Department's critical materials work to include
commercial deployment, including at LPO. A key part of LPO's focus on
critical materials and the EV supply chain is the Advanced Technology
Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) Loan Program. Under the ATVM program, as
of the end of October 2024, LPO has approximately $45.3 billion in
authority to provide direct loans for commercial-scale facilities
involved in vehicle supply chains. \6\
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\6\ https://www.energy.gov/lpo/articles/updates-estimated-
remaining-loan-authority-lpo-programs
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In July 2022, LPO issued a $102 million ATVM loan to Syrah
Technologies LLC to expand its facility in Vidalia, Louisiana, which
processes natural graphite-based active anode material (AAM) used in
lithium-ion batteries. This is the only vertically integrated, large-
scale AAM manufacturing facility outside China, making it a supply
chain trailblazer for U.S. clean energy technologies. At the time of
closing, the direct loan to the Syrah Vidalia Facility was estimated to
support 150 construction jobs and nearly 100 permanent jobs. The
facility's expanded capacity is expected to produce natural graphite-
based AAM for enough EVs to save 52 million gallons of gasoline per
year.
The ATVM program has issued conditional commitments or closed loans
to another $5.4 billion to four other critical minerals and materials
(CMM) projects. This includes up to $700 million for Nevada-based
Ioneer Rhyolite Ridge LLC to develop onsite processing of lithium
carbonate for EV batteries.
In addition to ATVM, LPO has approximately $67.2 billion in
authority under the Title 17 Clean Energy Financing Program-Innovative
Energy Projects, Innovative Supply Chain Projects, and State Energy
Financing Institution (SEFI) Projects to guarantee loans for
commercial-scale energy projects, including critical minerals projects.
DOE's Critical Materials Program funds numerous public-private
partnerships and consortia such as the CORE-CM Initiative, Critical
Materials Innovation Hub (CMI Hub), and ReCell Center. Such
partnerships increase the likelihood that industry will bring
innovative technological solutions to market. For example, Momentum
Technologies licensed a CMI Hub-developed technology for efficient,
cost-effective, and environmentally friendly recovery of battery
critical materials from end-of-life batteries. Momentum Technologies
have successfully attracted private capital investments to deploy the
technology. The partnership with Cirba Solutions, funded through the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, has accelerated their pace of
deployment.
The Office of Manufacturing & Energy and Supply Chains supports
projects mid-and downstream. Midstream and downstream investments can
provide demand certainty for upstream operations. For example, DOE
recently announced $3 billion from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law,
which will spur more than $16 billion in total investment, to boost the
domestic production of advanced batteries and battery materials
nationwide. DOE, in partnership with the U.S. Treasury and Internal
Revenue Service, administers tax credits for investments in advanced
energy projects, including critical materials projects. Six critical
materials and minerals project have been disclosed by applicants.
43. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, do you acknowledge
Alaska's potential to ensure the United States has a robust, secure
supply chain that doesn't rely on foreign adversaries with little
environmental protection?
Secretary Granholm. Alaska has extraordinary critical material and
talent resources. The DOE has recently organized three well attended
workshops on Alaska's critical material resources in 2023 and in 2024
and supports projects in Alaska on critical materials through the
Fossil Energy and Carbon Management CORE-CM Program and the Arctic
Energy Office.
44. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, given the clear national
security implications, do you acknowledge the need for a resilient,
domestic critical mineral supply chain as a priority?
Secretary Granholm. Critical Minerals and Materials is a
crosscutting budget priority for DOE. DOE established a Critical
Materials Program with the vision to build resilient, affordable,
diverse, sustainable, and secure domestic critical mineral and
materials supply chains that support the clean energy transition and
decarbonization of the energy, manufacturing, and transportation
economies while promoting safe, sustainable, economic, and
environmentally just solutions to meet current and future needs.
45. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, what is the Department of
Energy doing to ensure that national security considerations remain
paramount in your critical mineral strategy?
Secretary Granholm. The Critical Minerals Subcommittee (CMS) of the
National Science and Technology Council coordinates Federal science and
technology efforts to ensure secure and reliable supplies of critical
minerals to the United States. DOE co-chairs the CMS in partnership
with USGS and OSTP. The CMS focuses on key issues including R&D,
strengthening supply chains, international engagement, mapping and
quantifying domestic resources, permitting and standards, and education
and workforce development--with the lens of national economic and
security interest.
The Department of Energy collaborates closely with the Department
of Defense in developing strategy on critical materials, with frequent
regular meetings between the DOE and DOD arranged through the DOE
Critical Materials Collaborative, as well as holding regular joint
seminars on critical materials.
46. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, how does the Department
of Energy work with other agencies, particularly the Department of the
Interior, to ensure coordination to develop critical mineral projects?
Secretary Granholm. DOE established the Critical Materials
Collaborative (CMC) in September 2023 to accelerate DOE's critical
materials applied research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) and
achieve domestic clean energy manufacturing, climate, and national
security goals by: building a robust innovation ecosystem; enabling
industry adoption of novel, cutting-edge technology; training the
critical materials leaders and workforce across multiple sectors; and
laying the scientific and technological groundwork needed to address
emerging challenges. DOE is in the process of inviting other Federal
agencies and departments including DOI, DOD, and the National Science
Foundation to engage in the CMC. DOE collaborated with DOI as part of
the DOI-led Interagency Working Group on Mining Laws, Regulations, and
Permitting to release a report, ``Recommendations to Improve Mining on
Public Lands.'' \7\ The report identified 60 recommendations to reform
and improve the way mining is conducted on Federal lands to increase
domestic supplies of critical minerals and uphold the strongest
environmental, labor, and community engagement standards.
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\7\ https://www.doi.gov/sites/default/files/mriwg-report-final-
508.pdf
47. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, China processes 75
percent of the minerals used in batteries for electric vehicles; what
is this Administration doing to ramp up domestic processing
capabilities?
Secretary Granholm. The DOE recently developed a critical material
list for clean energy technologies, including batteries for electric
vehicles. These materials, called the electric eighteen, include
graphite, nickel, and lithium required for batteries in electric
vehicles, and are detailed in the report titled ``Critical Materials
Assessment'', USDOE, July 31, 2023, available on-line https://
www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/doe-critical-material-
assessment_07312023.pdf. The DOE has many projects, including some at
pilot and commercial scales, for production of graphite, lithium, and
nickel from domestic sources.
DOE's Loan Programs Office (LPO) finances next-generation U.S.
energy infrastructure, serving as a bridge to bankability for
breakthrough projects and technologies and de-risking them at early
stages of investment. LPO can finance critical materials projects
through several avenues including the Advanced Technology Vehicles
Manufacturing Program, the Title 17 Clean Energy Financing Program--
Innovative Energy and Innovative Supply Chain, the Title 17 Clean
Energy Financing Program--Energy Infrastructure Reinvestment Program,
and the Tribal Energy Finance Program. Several awards for battery
processing have been made, as described in the response to Question 43.
DOE's Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains (MESC) has
stewarded the ``Battery Materials Processing and Battery
Manufacturing'' funding opportunities, which support BIL Sections 40207
(b) and (c).
Funding Opportunity DE-FOA-0002678 ``Battery Materials
Processing and Battery Manufacturing''
o Round 1 specifically focused on commercial and large-scale
demonstration applications to address priorities in the BIL regarding
battery material processing and battery component manufacturing and
recycling.
o Of the 21 projects selected in Round 1, 12 were awarded and
are moving forward to build production capacity for battery-grade
materials, such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, cathode active
materials (NMC and LFP), electrolyte salt, silicon anode materials, and
PVDF.
o These 13 awarded projects represent a combined $1.7 billion in
Federal dollars and $3.5 billion in cost share provided by industry for
12 companies to build and expand commercial-scale facilities across 10
states.
Some additional highlights of these award projects
include:
o Developing enough battery-grade lithium to supply
approximately 1.3 million EVs annually
o Developing enough battery-grade graphite to supply
approximately 600,000 EVs annually
o Producing enough battery-grade nickel to supply approximately
400,000 EVs annually
o Installing the first large-scale, commercial lithium
electrolyte salt (LiPF6) production facility in the United States
o Developing an electrode binder facility capable of supplying
45 percent of the anticipated domestic demand for binders for EV
batteries in 2030
o Creating the first commercial scale domestic silicon oxide
production facilities to supply anode materials for an estimated
390,000 EV batteries annually
o Installing the first lithium iron phosphate cathode facility
in the United States
48. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, is it logical to add more
hurdles to accessing one of our country's biggest deposits of much-
needed critical minerals?
Secretary Granholm. The DOE is actively working to secure supply
chains for critical materials through its research, development,
demonstration, and commercial deployment efforts as part of its
Critical Materials Program. These efforts are described on the DOE CMM
website: https://www.energy.gov/cmm/critical-minerals-materials-
program. Many of these efforts . Many of these efforts promote
environmentally friendly, efficient, and cost-effective solutions to
facilitate compliance with the high environmental and social governance
standards for domestic critical materials production, processing, and
manufacturing in the U.S.
49. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, if China has a monopoly
on critical mineral processing while simultaneously being the world's
greatest polluter, and this Administration denies domestic mining
projects from moving forward, are electric vehicles truly cleaner?
Secretary Granholm. Life cycle analyses, which take into account
the emissions from production of the vehicle and battery, including
mineral extraction, of plug-in electric vehicles and internal
combustion engine vehicles consistently show that electric vehicles
result in lower life cycle emissions compared with a similar internal
combustion engine vehicle. The DOE is actively working on securing
domestic and clean supply chains for battery critical materials such as
graphite, lithium, cobalt, nickel, and copper. In addition, the DOE is
sponsoring research on new batteries that employ abundant materials
available domestically, as well as research on more efficient,
lightweight batteries and vehicles that can use less material overall
on a per kWh basis.
50. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, how does the Department
of Energy plan to ensure a sustainable and reliable supply chain for
critical minerals in the long term?
Secretary Granholm. It typically takes many years to start
operation of a new metal mine in the United States, due to the time
required for prospecting and resource delineation, the large capital
cost (raising of capital), and the often long permitting processes.
Similarly, it can also take many years to start operation of a new
domestic metal refinery or smelter, because of the high capital costs
and long times needed for obtaining permits. The construction and
startup of new mines and metal refineries/smelters are two rate-
limiting steps in securing increased domestic production of energy
critical materials. DOE research, development, deployment, and
education/workforce development efforts, including efforts on abundant
domestic wastes and byproducts as novel sources of critical materials,
as well as intensive interagency collaborations, will work toward
increased domestic critical material production. DOE's investments in
mid-and downstream projects also bolster the demand for minerals
upstream, which can spur and sustain upstream projects.
51. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, how does the Department
of Energy justify the slow progress in incentivizing domestic critical
mineral production while other countries race ahead?
Secretary Granholm. Large-scale production of metals typically
involves mining and refining (smelting) operations. These are expensive
long-term projects. There are many factors that contribute to the long
times often needed to start production at a domestic mine, including
thorough characterization of the mineral deposit, which involves
collecting and characterizing numerous samples; obtaining the
financing; construction of the mine and processing facilities;
obtaining the trained workforce as well as acceptance from the local
community; and obtaining the necessary permits for both the mining and
processing. The United States has high standards for protecting both
worker and community health and welfare and this contributes to
stringent permitting requirements for mining and refining operations.
52. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, what concrete steps is
the Department of Energy taking to challenge the dominance of foreign
adversaries in the critical mineral market?
Secretary Granholm. DOE recently released a request for information
on critical materials market dynamics to better understand market
dynamics and price volatility in critical materials processing,
refining, and recycling and how the Federal Government can play a role
in supporting market stability and price transparency. \8\
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\8\ https://www.energy.gov/mesc/articles/request-information-
critical-materials-market-dynamics-office-manufacturing-and
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DOE conducts a suite of enabling activities, cross-cutting
functions to enable and enhance the DOE Critical Materials Strategy.
These enabling activities include analysis and advanced tools, market
assessment and development, international engagement and standards, and
education and workforce development. In addition to establishing and
bolstering domestic supply chains, these activities are vital to U.S.
global competitiveness. For example, the global adoption of high
environmental and social governance standards is one avenue to level
the playing field for global competitors. DOE coordinates with EPA and
NIST to support standards development through the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) Technical Committees on rare
earth elements (298) and lithium (333).
53. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, what accountability
measures does the Department of Energy have in place to ensure it is
actively working toward reducing our dependence on foreign adversaries
for critical minerals?
Secretary Granholm. The DOE has a goal to reduce the overall U.S.
critical material import reliance by at least 10 percent by 2035. The
DOE supports numerous projects, from lab through commercial scales,
aimed at producing critical materials in the United States, in a cost
competitive and environmentally friendly manner.
The DOE Critical Materials Strategy includes four pillars to:
Diversify and Expand Supply to identify and secure a wide
variety of feedstocks.
Develop Alternatives to reduce component and system
reliance on critical materials.
Improve Materials and Manufacturing Efficiency to reduce
the waste of critical materials throughout the supply chain and promote
environmentally friendly practices.
Build the Circular Economy to extend the lifetime of
critical materials in use and recover them at end-of-life to partially
offset the need for virgin materials.
54. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, can you elaborate on your
agency's approach to consultation with Alaska Native people?
Secretary Granholm. DOE takes seriously our trust responsibility
and our government-to-government relationships with Alaska Native
entities (villages and corporations). Specifically with respect to
critical minerals, DOE is co-chairing an interagency working group
focused on Tribal Nations and the domestic critical minerals supply
chain. The working group held two consultations in Anchorage, Alaska,
August 20 and 21, to hear Alaska Native entities' perspectives and get
feedback on recommendations published in the September 2023 ``Improving
Mining on Public Lands'' report. DOE worked in collaboration with
Department of the Interior, Land & Minerals Management (Co-Chair) and
Bureau of Indian Affairs to reach out to Alaska Native entities about
the consultations and will publish a summary report. Environmental
Protection Agency, Department of Commerce, and U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers are also participating in the sessions.
More broadly, DOE is in the final stages of updating the agency's
Tribal consultation policy (Policy and Order 144.1) which was last
updated in 2009. The updated policy recognizes the uniqueness of Alaska
Natives among Indian Tribes and affirms that it is agency policy to
consult with Alaska Native Corporations on the same basis as federally
recognized Indian Tribes to the extent permitted by law.
Simultaneously, DOE has finalized new financial assistance rules that
will help proactively identify DOE funded projects that could impact
Alaska Native Villages, Alaska Native Corporations, and other Indian
Tribes to assist DOE in conducting Tribal consultation earlier in the
financial assistance process.
In addition to formal consultation, DOE has robust engagement with
Alaska Natives, through the Arctic Energy Office (AE), the Office of
Indian Energy, and other offices, including regular participation in
community conferences, and inclusion of Alaska Native Villages in the
Indian Country Energy and Infrastructure Working Group which advises
DOE. AE has established a framework for engaging Alaska Native
communities designed to incorporate a wide array of perspectives that
includes DOE staff from various regions nation-wide visiting indigenous
Alaskan communities. AE has also launched the Arctic Energy Ambassadors
program, which is supporting 12 Ambassadors, located throughout Alaska,
to assist rural communities, including Tribes, in locating Federal
energy funding opportunities, and convening and uplifting voices at the
regional level.
Additionally, the DOE Office of Indian Energy has significant
outreach and programming in Alaska. The Office recently closed job
openings for four additional staff to be based in Alaska. The work of
this new staff will build on the Office of Indian Energy's 2015 MOU
with the Denali Commission for the delivery of energy programs to
Alaska Native villages and corporations in support of rural Alaska
communities. As a follow on to the MOU, in 2019, both parties entered
into an Interagency Agreement, to be used for Alaska-based technical
assistance through a local network jointly managed by the Denali
Commission and DOE. The technical assistance is primarily carried out
through a subaward to the Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium
(ANTHC) and more recently the Rural Alaska Community Action Program,
Inc., (Rural CAP). The second component of the agreement is for multi-
year K-12 STEM energy education. Several DOE offices meet with the
Denali Commission on a bi-weekly basis, including Indian Energy, Arctic
Energy, Office of State and Community Energy Programs, and others, to
discuss these efforts and maintain collaboration on rural energy
engagement.
55. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, how is the Department of
Energy working with American investment companies to encourage public-
private partnerships into domestic critical mineral supply chain
resiliency?
Secretary Granholm. DOE makes substantial contributions in the
critical materials space by funding cutting edge research, coordinating
consortia, fostering public-private partnerships, and engaging
participants as it carries out the CMM Strategy.
In its first two 5-year phases, CMI research produced over 500
publications, 195 invention disclosures, 47 awarded patents, 20
technologies licensed to industry, and 12 R&D 100 Awards, as well as
more than $80 million in follow-on funding secured by research
partnerships to mature CMI-developed technologies.
In 2023, through a merit review process, EERE's AMMTO renewed CMI
for a third 5-year phase under a new name: the Critical Materials
Innovation Hub (CMI Hub). In Phase III, the CMI Hub will play a central
role in the CMC, both as an innovation engine that grounds the
development of early stage S&T solutions and as a convener for shared
ideas and best practices.
56. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, how does increasing
domestic production of critical minerals align with the Department of
Energy's broader energy and economic security objectives?
Secretary Granholm. Metals and materials play a vital role in the
U.S. economy. According to the USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries (U.S.
Geological Survey, January 31, 2024, Mineral commodity summaries 2024:
U.S. Geological Survey, 212 p., https://doi.org/10.3133/mcs2024), the
value added to Gross Domestic Product by major industries that consume
processed mineral materials was over 3.8 trillion dollars in 2023, out
of a total GDP of 27 trillion dollars. Diversification and expansion of
critical materials is one of four pillars that provide the foundation
for DOE's Critical Materials Strategy.
57. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, what role does
international cooperation play in securing access to critical minerals?
Secretary Granholm. International cooperation is vital in securing
access to critical materials. Allied countries will play a role in
providing access to critical materials. Domestic sources are not always
sufficient, at least in the near term, to satisfy U.S. critical
material needs. Even in the long term, it is important to have a
diversified network of supply. The United States is working with close
and like-minded countries to help expand the locations and quantities
of responsible supplies of critical materials. As part of this process,
it is important to build capabilities that allow the tracing and
verification of mineral provenance for batteries, magnets, and other
manufactured products.
58. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, how is the Department of
Energy engaging with allies and partners to address critical mineral
supply chain vulnerabilities?
Secretary Granholm. For the United States and its allies to be
successful in creating manufacturing capabilities and building domestic
capacity throughout the supply chain, it must ensure that all countries
have the same quality, environmental, and labor standards. The United
States can no longer allow the rest of the world to bear the brunt of
pollution from these industries while it reaps the benefit of the
finished products. DOE will work with the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
in the Department of Commerce, and other U.S. and international
organizations to help develop effective international standards across
the supply chain for CMM production and use. These efforts promote
market transparency to support U.S. industry's competitiveness and
material traceability to support the development of responsible supply
chains--both within the United States and globally.
In early 2022, DOE's Office of International Affairs led
coordination of the first-ever ministerial mandate on critical minerals
and materials under the International Energy Agency (IEA). Secretary of
Energy Jennifer Granholm, the 2022 Ministerial Chair, and the other 30
ministers of member countries approved this language as part of the
2022 IEA Ministerial Communique. Recognizing the importance of secure,
reliable CMM supply chains to clean energy, the communique directed
IEA's Governing Board and Secretariat to assess and compare methods of
``ensuring the availability, security and responsible sourcing of
energy-specific critical minerals and materials,'' informing future
investments in sources of supply and the eventual realization of a CMM
circular economy. Recycling, stockpiling, and enhanced RD&D into
developing alternatives were among the approaches mentioned in the
document.
The communique also noted that, at the meeting where the final
document was announced, some member countries had launched an IEA
Voluntary Critical Minerals Security Program (CMSP) to facilitate
further cooperation on the topic. Participating members pledged to
share data and experiences from their national critical mineral
stockpiling, recycling, resilience, and transparency efforts. In Phase
1 of implementation, countries that choose to participate will make
specific operational decisions for carrying out the voluntary program.
59. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, can you expand on the
Department of Energy's strategy about diversifying supplies of critical
minerals and materials and the role Alaska can play?
Secretary Granholm. The Department of Energy is committed to
diversifying the supply of critical minerals in the
United States and believed Alaska could have a vital role to ensure
our supply of these minerals.
The Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, in coordination
with the Arctic Energy Office, has held two workshops in Alaska since
2023 exploring the technological, regulatory, and financial resources
necessary to extract and process critical minerals in Alaska. In
addition, the Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management has funded
the CORE-CM program at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, and ARPA-E
has funded critical mineral research efforts in SE Alaska.
60. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, what steps is the
Department of Energy taking to address the challenges that currently
exist to expand domestic production of critical mineral production and
processing?
Secretary Granholm. Several DOE offices are supporting large-scale
projects on processing and production of critical materials such as
graphite, lithium, and rare earths. In addition, numerous smaller
projects are being supported that will develop next generation
technologies for domestic production of critical materials.
In July 2022, LPO issued a $102 million ATVM loan to Syrah
Technologies LLC to expand its facility in Vidalia, Louisiana, which
processes natural graphite-based active anode material (AAM) used in
lithium-ion batteries. This is the only vertically integrated, large-
scale AAM manufacturing facility outside China, making it a supply
chain trailblazer for U.S. clean energy technologies. At the time of
closing, the direct loan to the Syrah Vidalia Facility was estimated to
support 150 construction jobs and nearly 100 permanent jobs. The
facility's expanded capacity is expected to produce natural graphite-
based AAM for enough EVs to save 52 million gallons of gasoline per
year.
The ATVM program has issued conditional commitments to loan another
$2.9 billion to three other CMM projects. This includes up to $700
million for Nevada-based Ioneer Rhyolite Ridge LLC to develop onsite
processing of lithium carbonate for EV batteries.
In addition to ATVM, LPO has approximately $72 billion in authority
under the Title 17 Clean Energy Financing Program--Innovative Energy
Projects and Innovative Supply Chain Projects, to guarantee loans for
commercial-scale energy projects, including critical minerals
facilities. All told, LPO is actively evaluating $7 billion of critical
minerals project loan applications across the ATVM and Title 17 loan
programs, foreshadowing a massive investment in building out domestic
CMM capacity.
61. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, how is the agency working
with the Department of Defense to have sufficient independence of
critical minerals to successfully implement the National Defense
Strategy?
Secretary Granholm. The Department of Energy collaborates closely
with the Department of Defense in developing strategy on critical
materials, with regular meetings between the DOE and DOD through the
DOE Critical Materials Collaborative, as well as having regular DOD-DOE
seminar series. DOD, DOE, and State executed a memorandum of agreement
in early 2022 to lay the foundation for a U.S. critical minerals
stockpile by creating a new interagency process for stockpiling
minerals for the clean energy transition.
62. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, how is the Department of
Energy supporting the ``National Strategy for the Arctic Region'' and
the opportunity it highlights by `significant deposits of in-demand
minerals'?
Secretary Granholm. The Department of Energy is one of the key
contributory agencies to the development of the National Strategy for
the Arctic Region. The Arctic Energy Office has played a substantial
role in the development and implementation of the strategy. Since the
publication of the NSAR in 2022 DOE has raised awareness of Alaska and
the wider North American Arctic as a source of critical minerals, has
funded research and education on accessing these minerals (see Q60),
and has supported innovative efforts to develop these resources through
both traditional and advanced methods.
63. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, as a member of the
interagency working group on Federal hardrock mining laws, how does its
recommendation to authorize Federal land managers to withdraw lands
from availability for mineral development conducive to increasing our
domestic critical mineral supply?
Secretary Granholm. The DOE conducts and supports research and
serves as an unbiased source of technical information. The DOE does not
comment on policy decisions of the working group.
64. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, as recycling critical
minerals alone will not be sufficient fill the demand required under
the Biden administration's proposed 2030 climate goals, what is the
Department of Energy doing to ensure we have a long-term strategy to
address the growing demand for critical minerals?
Secretary Granholm. The DOE is pursuing several areas to increase
the supply of critical materials, including development of next
generation mining techniques with a lower environmental impact;
identification of abundant wastes and byproducts as sources of critical
materials; and recycling. DOE also pursues avenues to reduce reliance
on critical materials by developing alternative materials, components
and systems that use minimal to no critical materials.
65. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Granholm, a National Renewable
Energy Laboratory (NREL) report titled, ``Materials Used in U.S. Wind
Energy Technologies: Quantities and Availability for Two Future
Scenarios'' highlights vulnerable materials, including 16 critical
minerals, necessary for renewable energy projects. How is the
Department of Energy working with NREL to address these
vulnerabilities, particularly as it relates to renewable projects being
developed?
Secretary Granholm. WETO works with NREL on multiple topics related
to critical and vulnerable materials. NREL researchers are often the
lead analysts for our material assessment and modeling activities,
including for the development of the Renewable Energy Material
Properties Data base, which assessed current and future material supply
vulnerabilities across the wind space. They are also leading a
substantial analysis effort, in cooperation with ORNL and SNL, to
assess the State of practice for wind materials recycling and to
identify emerging technologies and needs in order to recycle wind
materials (including and emphasizing critical materials) more
efficiently and at a higher rate. Additionally, NREL administers the
Wind Turbine Materials Recycling Prize, which recently closed Phase 2
submissions and will award cash prizes to accelerate the development of
wind material recycling technologies, including for critical materials.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
critical minerals
66. Senator Scott. Secretary Granholm, we understand that there are
many challenges to the U.S. and our allies accessing and developing
critical minerals and rare earths. Aside from the permitting issues we
are all aware of, there is a complete inability to process these
minerals outside of reliance on Communist China. What are you doing to
develop processing abilities and partnerships outside of CCP-controlled
China?
Secretary Granholm. In early 2022, DOE's Office of International
Affairs led coordination of the first-ever ministerial mandate on
critical minerals and materials under the International Energy Agency
(IEA). Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm, the 2022 Ministerial
Chair, and the other 30 ministers of member countries approved this
language as part of the 2022 IEA Ministerial Communique. Recognizing
the importance of secure, reliable CMM supply chains to clean energy,
the communique directed IEA's Governing Board and Secretariat to assess
and compare methods of ``ensuring the availability, security and
responsible sourcing of energy-specific critical minerals and
materials,'' informing future investments in sources of supply and the
eventual realization of a CMM circular economy. Recycling, stockpiling,
and enhanced RD&D into developing alternatives were among the
approaches mentioned in the document.
The communique also noted that, at the meeting where the final
document was announced, some member countries had launched an IEA
Voluntary Critical Minerals Security Program (CMSP) to facilitate
further cooperation on the topic. Participating members pledged to
share data and experiences from their national critical mineral
stockpiling, recycling, resilience, and transparency efforts. In Phase
1 of implementation, countries that choose to participate will make
specific operational decisions for carrying out the voluntary program.
DOE's Loan Programs Office (LPO) greatly facilitates private
investment in domestic critical material projects. BIL and IRA have
supercharged DOE investments in critical materials, expanding the
Department's critical materials work to include commercial deployment,
including at LPO. A key part of LPO's focus on critical materials and
the EV supply chain is the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing
(ATVM) Loan Program. Under the ATVM program, LPO has approximately $50
billion in authority to provide direct loans for commercial-scale
facilities involved in vehicle supply chains.
In July 2022, LPO issued a $102 million ATVM loan to Syrah
Technologies LLC to expand its facility in Vidalia, Louisiana, which
processes natural graphite-based active anode material (AAM) used in
lithium-ion batteries. This is the only vertically integrated, large-
scale AAM manufacturing facility outside China, making it a supply
chain trailblazer for U.S. clean energy technologies. At the time of
closing, the direct loan to the Syrah Vidalia Facility was estimated to
support 150 construction jobs and nearly 100 permanent jobs. The
facility's expanded capacity is expected to produce natural graphite-
based AAM for enough EVs to save 52 million gallons of gasoline per
year.
The ATVM program has issued conditional commitments to loan another
$2.9 billion to three other CMM projects. This includes up to $700
million for Nevada-based Ioneer Rhyolite Ridge LLC to develop onsite
processing of lithium carbonate for EV batteries.
In addition to ATVM, LPO has approximately $72 billion in authority
under the Title 17 Clean Energy Financing Program-Innovative Energy
Projects and Innovative Supply Chain Projects to guarantee loans for
commercial-scale energy projects, including critical minerals
facilities. All told, LPO is actively evaluating $7 billion of critical
minerals project loan applications across the ATVM and Title 17 loan
programs, foreshadowing a massive investment in building out domestic
CMM capacity.
Complementing DOD's DPA Title III investments, DOE has been
investments in research, development, and demonstration efforts to
advance rare earth separation and processing capabilities. DOE has a
demonstration project to produce neodymium and praseodymium oxide using
ore sampled from the Bear Lodge deposit in Wyoming, a Rare Earth
Element Demonstration Facility to produce rare earth oxides and other
intermediate critical material commodities from deleterious materials,
and several pilot projects advancing the production of rare earth
elements from coal-based sources including fly ash and acid mine
drainage. The Critical Materials Innovation Hub has developed several
efficient and environmentally friendly technologies produce rare earth
oxides and metals needed for magnet production--several of which are
being advanced by industry partners. DOE also established the Critical
Materials Accelerator Program to bridge innovative solutions from the
benchtop to industrially relevant scale.
67. Senator Scott. Secretary Granholm, what authorities are you
lacking for the Department of Energy to pursue these abilities with
great urgency?
Secretary Granholm. The DOE is aggressively supporting research and
development activities through the Critical Materials Collaborative and
Critical Materials Institute that will enable secure domestic supplies
of critical materials.
solar cells
68. Senator Scott. Secretary Granholm, will the Administration
rescind its June 6, 2022 Declaration of Emergency and Authorization for
Temporary Extensions of Time and Duty-Free Importation of Solar Cells
and Modules from Southeast Asia and if not, why not? Is this
proclamation under review?
Secretary Granholm. The 2-year temporary moratorium on the
Declaration of Emergency and Authorization for Temporary Extensions of
Time and Duty-Free Importation of Solar Cells and Modules from
Southeast Asia will expire on June 6, 2024. \9\ The purpose of the
temporary bridge ensures robust deployment while the domestic solar
manufacturing base ramped up.
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\9\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/
2024/05/16/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-takes-action-to-
strengthen-american-solar-manufacturing-and-protect-manufacturers-and-
workers-from-chinas-unfair-trade-practices/
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__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
us dependence on russian nuclear fuel
69. Senator Budd. Secretary Granholm, Congress has appropriated
significant funding to help transition the U.S. commercial nuclear
power industry away from a heavy reliance on Russian fuel. I understand
that the Department plans to issue a Funding Opportunity Announcement
(FOA) for novel and innovative nuclear enrichment technologies. Can you
provide a timeline on when that FOA might be released?
Secretary Granholm. The FOA is being developed. We anticipate
releasing the FOA as soon as January 2025.
70. Senator Budd. Secretary Granholm, how can that FOA be best
tailored to encourage the commercialization of new technologies like
laser enrichment?
Secretary Granholm. The objective of the FOA is to improve the
domestic high-assay low-enriched uranium fuel supply chain with
innovative technologies that could reduce technological risks, increase
production, or reduce costs. Technologies could span the front end of
the uranium supply chain including uranium production (mining and
milling), conversion, enrichment, and deconversion. We believe that
laser enrichment technologies would fit within the scope of the FOA.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 18, 2024
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
ARMY POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., in room
216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed (Chairman
of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds,
Ernst, Sullivan, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. I will call the hearing to order. I thank
everyone for this early start, and the floor has developed so
that we can proceed as we typically do with opening statements,
and I want to thank all of my colleagues over the last few days
for making special arrangements, being brief and concise, so
that we could ensure we could get to the floor.
Good morning. The Committee meets today to receive
testimony in the President's Budget Request for the Department
of the Army for fiscal year 2025. Witnesses today are Secretary
of the Army Christine Wormuth and Chief of Staff for the Army,
General Randy George.
I would note that this is General George's first posture
hearing before the Committee. Welcome, General. Thank you both
for your service, and please convey this Committee's
appreciation to the men and women serving under your command.
This is a challenging but important period for the Army.
Even as the Army navigates the most difficult recruiting
environment in half a century and the most dangerous global
security environment since the Second World War, it is also
undertaking a thorough, service wide modernization effort. It
is critical that this effort is successful as the threats
before the Army are significant.
We know that China seeks to challenge United States'
interests and leadership in the world, that Vladimir Putin
views Ukraine as a steppingstone in his imperialist vision, and
that Iran seeks to exploit the war between Israel and Hamas to
expel the United States and other countries from the region.
The United States Army, the most combat credible ground
force in the world, is fundamental to successfully deterring,
and if needed, confronting these threats. It is worth noting
that each of these challenges I just mentioned can be addressed
in part through the National Security Supplemental that the
Senate passed more than 2 months ago.
The bill would support Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan, provide
humanitarian relief in Gaza, and replenish the United States
Army with the stocks and resources it so urgently needs, and I
urge the House to pass this supplemental funding immediately.
Indeed, if we have to once again counter--that we do so
immediately. In its fiscal year 2025 budget, the Department of
Defense (DOD) has requested $186 billion for the Army,
continuing multiple years of planned budget for the service.
I am concerned that inadequate investment in the United
States primary land component may create vulnerabilities and
complicate decisions about how to use the funding. We risk the
Army's combat strength if we do not provide it with the
resources it needs to continue full modernization.
Secretary Wormuth, General George, I am interested in
hearing about the Army's view, its mission globally, especially
in the Indo-Pacific, as well as how the service is adjusting
its operating concepts and force posture within its budget
constraints. To remain competitive with China and Russia, we
must prioritize investments in the cutting edge technologies
that will define future battlefields across all domains.
The Army specifically has been pursuing modernization in
key areas like long range fires, air defense, vertical lift,
and deep sensing, among others. These are ambitious and far
sighted objectives. I am also encouraged by the Army's efforts
on its new cross-functional team focused on contested
logistics.
This team, under the direction of Army Futures Command, is
addressing the need for more resilient and agile logistics in
dangerous environments like the Indo-Pacific. I recently
visited a number of Army posts, including Grafenwoehr training
area in Germany, and Fort Sill in McAllister Army Ammunition
Plant, Oklahoma.
I have been impressed by the work that these soldiers and
Army civilians are doing to not only train and equip our
warfighters, particularly for counter UAS missions, but also
the lessons and knowledge gained from our foreign partners,
including the tens of thousands of Ukrainians who have
conducted training at Grafenwoehr.
I would like to know what lessons and tactics the Army is
learning from the conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, and
what resources are needed to implement them. As I mentioned,
the Army's most valuable asset has always been its people.
I am pleased to see this budget request places a priority
on taking care of our soldiers by providing a 4.5 percent pay
raise and committing more than $2 billion per year for the next
several years to improve barracks and family housing.
The Army is also making significant investments and
improvements to its recruiting enterprise. For the past several
years, the service has fallen far short of its recruitment
goals, but recent program initiatives, including a major new
marketing campaign and expansion of the Future Soldier Prep
Course appear to be gaining some ground. I would ask for an
update on your efforts to recruit a broader pool of potential
recruits and grow back end strength in the coming years.
Finally, the Army must continue to improve its readiness in
the context of long term strategic competition. The Army's
focus on increased training exercises, including Defender
Europe, Pacific Pathways, and its leadership in the projects'
Convergence series demonstrate commitment to broad
experimentation and regional preparedness.
I would ask for an update on how the Army is designing
exercises to support its forces on our pacing threats, China
and Russia. Again, I thank the witnesses for their
participation today. Look forward to the testimoneys.
As a reminder to my colleagues, there will be a closed
session immediately following this hearing in room SVC-217. Let
me now recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
witnesses for being here today and for briefing so many of us
before this hearing.
The chair mentioned that this is General George's first
testimony before the Committee in this capacity. It is
noteworthy that Secretary Wormuth actually administered the
oath of office to the General via cell phone while he was
visiting the 11th Airborne in Alaska.
Since then, these two leaders have worked together to
reform their service branch, and I commend both of our
witnesses for their shared leadership. In October, the Army
announced a series of overhauls to its recruiting structure and
strategy in an effort to combat the recruitment crisis. I hope
to learn more about this today.
When implemented, the entire Army recruiting enterprise
will reside under a single three star commander. This person
will serve for 4 years and report directly to the Secretary of
the Army. The service is now targeting prospective candidates
in the college age range, embracing modern data collection
methods and professionalizing the Army recruiter role.
So, I look forward to hearing an update from the Secretary
about these reforms, as well as current recruiting progress.
These recruiting overhauls directly impact the new total Army
analysis released in February. The Army rightfully reduced
force structure to align better with the number of soldiers in
its formation.
The service plans to stand up a new counter UAS--some new
counter UAS batteries, fire protection battalions, and multi-
domain task forces to adjust to current trends in warfare.
While I support these decisions, I remain cautious about the
reductions in Special Operations forces, and we would like to
hear from General George about the service's proposed force
structure changes.
All of the units and soldiers in the total Army analysis
will rely on current Army modernization efforts. I am
encouraged that the Army's fiscal year 2025 budget request
contains more than double its purchase year over year of
precision strike missiles, a critical capability in the Indo-
Pacific.
Further, the Army tripled its request for coyote counter
drone interceptors to help protect our soldiers in overseas
bases from Iranian attack drones. I also thank the witnesses
for using congressionally provided multiyear procurement
authority to procure both GMLRS and Patriot missiles.
However, I must say it is disappointing to see additional
Patriot and Stinger missiles on the unfunded requirement list
rather than fully funded in the base budget. Unfortunately, the
Biden administration has again done a disservice to the Army in
the fiscal year 2025 budget submission. When accounting for
inflation, this year's budget is more than a 2 percent cut
compared to last year.
Madam Secretary and General George and Members of the
Committee, I appreciate the Chairman of the Committee just a
moment ago, expressing concern that we are not providing
adequate resources to the Army to get the task done.
General George submitted a list of over $2.2 billion worth
of unfunded priorities the Army needs, including more counter
UAS capabilities like roadrunner and reconnaissance systems. I
think that is a low figure. I am convinced the Army actual
unmet needs far exceed this $2.2 billion.
So, General, I am going to ask you to comment on that. U.S.
Army Pacific has $430 million of unmet needs, of which only
$100 million are covered in the unfunded list. Plus, we know of
significant shortfalls elsewhere, such as nearly $1 billion
missing to update the Army pre-positioned stocks this year.
The Army plays a leading logistical role in the Western
Pacific, and I would like to hear from both of our witnesses
about what else we can do to improve our ability to operate
there. Tell us what you need, please, and we will try to get it
for you.
Congress must correct this budget request to ensure the
Army has the resources to meet the needs and meet our Nation's
challenges. Thank you to my teammate, Mr. chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Madam
Secretary, please.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY
Secretary Wormuth. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking
Member Wicker, distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank
you, first of all, for your continued support of our soldiers,
their families, and our Department of Army civilians. General
George and I appear before you this morning at a period of
profound transformation for the United States Army.
We are transforming our capabilities, our force structure,
and our recruiting enterprise to ensure that the Army is ready
and able to defeat evolving threats, keep pace with technology,
and attract the very best talent.
As we pursue this transformation, we are also taking care
of our people, ensuring that our soldiers and their families
have the quality of life they deserve to sustain our readiness
now and in the future.
This is my fourth year before the Committee, and like last
year, the fiscal year 2025 budget continues to support the most
ambitious modernization effort the Army has undertaken in over
40 years. We are making significant progress transforming our
capabilities by staying consistent in our goals and meeting key
milestones for development and fielding.
The next generation squad weapon, integrated battle command
system, the mid-range capability, and the precision strike
missile are examples of just some of the critical new systems
we have recently delivered.
As we bring new systems into our inventory, we are also
transforming our force structure to meet the priorities of the
National Defense Strategy. We are building out new formations,
like our multi-domain task forces, to make sure that they are
equipped with the capabilities we need to conduct large scale
combat operations against advanced military powers.
We are shrinking excess force structure so that the units
we do have are manned and ready. While these force structured
decisions will bring down authorized troop levels by about
24,000 spaces, our goal is to increase the Army's authorized
end strength from 445,000 to 470,000 by fiscal year 2029.
To meet that goal, we are working around the clock to
overcome our recruiting challenges. Building on successful
initiatives like the Future Soldier Prep Course, we are
fundamentally transforming our recruiting enterprise to better
compete in the 21st century job market. Most significantly, we
are redesigning our recruiting workforce by creating new
permanent talent acquisition specialties for both enlisted
soldiers and warrant officers.
Actually, the assessment and selection of the first cohort
of warrant officers is complete, and the first group will be
going out into the field later this summer. But while we
transform, we can't afford to lose sight of our soldiers and
their families and what we need to do to take care of them.
A key part of that responsibility is providing safe, high
quality housing and barracks, and over the next 5 years, as the
chairman I think noted, the Army is going to invest an average
of $2.1 billion annually in the construction, sustainment,
restoration, and modernization of barracks for our soldiers.
This investment will include barracks sustainment at 100
percent for the first time in years. We are also going to
leverage the expertise of the Army Corps of Engineers to
stabilize our project cost as much as possible, and we will be
hiring civilian barracks managers so that our soldiers can
focus on warfighting.
Physically and emotionally healthy soldiers are more
resilient, higher performing, and less likely to engage in
harmful behaviors. To build resilient soldiers, we are
expanding our health and holistic fitness programs to 71 Active
component brigades. We are investing in financial counseling to
make sure that our soldiers and families know how to manage
their money.
We are encouraging programs in our divisions to focus on
soldier well-being. Our goal has been and remains building
cohesive teams that are ready to fight and win. Throughout this
transformation, which we absolutely have to do because as you
all know it is a very dangerous world out there, we are
continuing to provide Combatant Commands with what they need,
trained and ready formations.
This year's budget seeks $1.5 billion for activities tied
to the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, and we have asked for
$460 million for Operation Pathways, the series of exercises we
conduct in the Indo-Pacific to strengthen deterrence and also
build regional interoperability with our partners and allies.
In Europe, our troops are demonstrating our commitment to
deterring Russian aggression. The Army is leading support to
Ukraine. We have trained over 17,000 Ukrainian troops, and we
provided, as you all know well, hundreds of vehicles, weapons
systems, and millions of munitions.
In the Middle East, our soldiers are mission focused and
standing ready to provide further support for Israel's defense
and to enhance broader regional stability. The chief and I
strongly urge the passing of supplemental appropriations that
will maintain this critical support to Ukraine, support
partners in Asia and the Middle East, and invest in our own
readiness, all while creating jobs for Americans all around the
country.
With your support, we will continue to take care of our
people and sustain the transformation that will keep our Army
the best in the world. I am proud of all that our soldiers and
Army civilians do and look forward to your questions this
morning.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
General George, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL RANDY A. GEORGE, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMY
General George. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Reed, Ranking
Member Wicker, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank
you for the opportunity today to talk about our Army.
The world is more volatile today than I have seen it in my
36 year career, and there is clear cooperation between
adversaries than we have seen in a while. A spark in any region
could have global impacts.
Meanwhile, the character of war is changing rapidly, which
we see from what is happening on battlefields in the Ukraine
and in the Middle East. Our Army is as important to the Joint
Force as has ever been. We must deter war everywhere and be
ready to respond anywhere.
So, we are focused on providing the best Army with the
budget we are given. Our soldiers deserve it, the joint team
deserves it, and our Nation deserves it, and that means making
some tough decisions and finding ways to get better every day.
As the Secretary already highlighted, our planned
investments reflected in our fiscal year 2025 budget will help
our Army win the future fight and ensure that our soldiers and
their families remain ready and resilient.
Across the Army, we are learning from global events and
continuously transforming how we operate, how we train, and how
we equip, and I would like to highlight a handful of things. We
are learning that designs for things like unmanned systems must
be modular, adaptable, and software defined.
We are working to get relevant technology in the hands of
our soldiers immediately. We are learning that counter unmanned
systems must evolve, as the threat does, to protect our
formations and critical infrastructure. We are also moving out
on that while being mindful of the cost curve.
We need cheaper solutions. We are learning that in some
cases, the right tech already exists to support transformation.
For instance, the tech exists to make our command and control
nodes more mobile, low signature, and more effective, and we
are fixing our network.
We are building our magazine depth and modernizing our
organic industrial base, because we know that wars never end as
quickly as we hope. They take a lot of ammo.
We are also transforming how we recruit, ensuring that we
have the right talent and right tech, and that we are getting
the word out about how our Army is a great place to serve
because of our mission and our people.
Finally, we are also looking at where we need to reimagine
our processes and where we can afford to stop doing things that
don't support our warfighting mission or building cohesive
teams. I am proud of what our soldiers are doing around the
world. We appreciate your support, and we look forward to your
questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Christine
Wormuth and General Randy George follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Secretary Christine Wormuth and General
Randy George
the need for continuous transformation
Today's security environment is both complex and volatile. The
contemporary battlefield is increasingly transparent. The inescapable
prevalence of internet-enabled sensors, from cell phones to satellites,
makes it possible for our adversaries to see and target U.S. interests
anywhere in the world. Advances in commercial technology have outpaced
military technology in many areas, and the innovative use of simple and
inexpensive commercially available systems provides a tactical
advantage to forces that can procure and adapt faster than their
opponents. Conflict is migrating into cities and dense population
centers and is extending into new domains, with space and cyberspace
enabling global effects. Developments in Ukraine, the Middle East, and
elsewhere around the world have highlighted the volatility of this
landscape, and regional conflicts carry the potential to ignite a
firestorm with global impacts.
To meet these challenges successfully, the Army must transform
quickly. We will ensure continued progress on long-term efforts that
improve our warfighting on current and future battlefields in support
of the National Defense Strategy, but our readiness cannot wait for
arbitrary time horizons. The Army must continuously transform to adapt
to the rapid pace of change occurring now. This need drives our $185.9
billion budget request for fiscal year 2025.
Army transformation is well underway, but we must accelerate and
intensify our efforts. We must transform our capabilities, force
structure, and recruiting enterprise. We must deliver ready combat
formations and take care of our people, ensuring the quality of life
for our soldiers, Army civilians, and families.
transforming our capabilities
As we adapt to the changing environment, we are steadfast in
developing advanced, long-term modernization programs to ensure that
the Army maintains the overmatch required for future battlefields. The
Army has made significant progress in our most ambitious modernization
effort in more than 40 years by maintaining continuity across budgets
and meeting major milestones for development and fielding. The success
of this effort has been marked by the recent delivery and fielding of
the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV), Integrated Air and Missile
Defense Battle Command System (IBCS), Mid-Range Capability (MRC), Next
Generation Squad Weapon, and Precision Strike Missile (PrSM).
The Army continues to develop counter-unmanned aircraft system
(UAS) capabilities as the Department of Defense's lead agency for
countering small-UAS (C-sUAS). From the testing and fielding of systems
such as Mobile Low, Slow, Small-Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat
System (M-LIDS), Fixed Site Low, Slow, Small-Unmanned Aircraft
Integrated Defeat System (FS-LIDS), or Coyote, to the operational
deployment of Directed Energy Maneuver Short Range Air Defense System
(DE-MSHORAD), the Army and the Joint Counter-UAS Office (JCO) are
exploring novel concepts and accelerating system development to meet
the challenges of the advancing threat.
Building on the requirements for long-range precision fires, the
Army fielded the first prototypes of the MRC to its 1st Multi-Domain
Task Force (MDTF) in 2023 and is in the process of completing flight
testing of the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, which is intended for
delivery by the end of 2024. The Army awarded the contract for the
development of the Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node (TITAN)
in 2Q fiscal year 2024 to produce the targeting data needed for these
advanced capabilities and provide battlefield commanders with advanced
decisionmaking tools in a rapidly evolving battlespace.
The Army is transforming the network to enable these capabilities
and ensure our forces are lean, mobile, and low signature. We will
begin a pilot for satellite-as-a-service in early fiscal year 2025
while making continued progress on a zero-trust architecture. These
efforts will form the security backbone of the Unified Network and
enable the Army's integration into Combined Joint All-Domain Command
and Control (CJADC2).
The Army is re-balancing aviation investments, shifting away from
capabilities that are not survivable on the modern battlefield while
investing in effective new technology. We are ending the development of
the Future Attack and Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) and the production
of the UH-60V version of the Blackhawk helicopter while also phasing
out the operations and sustainment of the Shadow and Raven unmanned
systems. We are delaying entering into production of the Improved
Turbine Engine but remain committed to developing that program for
integration into the UH-60 Black Hawk and AH-64 Apache helicopters. We
will deliver needed capabilities by relying on a mix of enduring,
unmanned, and space-based assets that are survivable and effective for
current and future fights.
We are investing in our aviation capabilities by beginning
production of the CH-47F Block II Chinook helicopter and continuing
development of the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA). We are
also continuing to develop advanced unmanned systems, such as the
Launched Effects family of systems and the Future Tactical Uncrewed
Aircraft System, while leveraging opportunities to use commercial
technology in innovative ways.
As we transform our capabilities, we will explore new ways to
validate our systems as we introduce them into our formations. One way
we will do this is by transforming in contact, using ongoing
deployments and troop rotations as opportunities to explore new
techniques and equipment. Transforming in contact ensures we validate
systems and processes in their intended environments with the soldiers
who will employ them. Infusing commercial technology that is ready for
employment will improve our lethality and readiness to face the
challenges ahead.
These developments require the continued support of industry,
underpinned by the ingenuity and drive of the American people.
Investments in the modernization and workload of our organic industrial
base are essential to meeting the requirements and scale of the modern
battlefield. Current commercial production is insufficient to meet
global demand. Multi-year procurement authority will significantly
improve the production rates of critical munitions such as 155mm
artillery rounds and Patriot missiles. However, further investment is
necessary to ensure that the Nation can scale the production of these
and other munitions and systems to meet current and future
requirements.
transforming our force structure
The Army is transforming our force structure to incorporate new
capabilities and refocus on large-scale combat operations. The legacy
structure from the past two decades focused on counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism operations and maintained authorizations to
accommodate 494,000 Active Duty soldiers. Our transformation will
reduce the unfilled and excess positions and create space for new
capabilities supporting large-scale combat operations in a multi-domain
environment. The success of this restructuring will rely on the Army's
ability to gradually increase end strength from the current 445,000
soldiers to 470,000 by fiscal year 2029 to meet the requirements of the
future force.
This transformation includes a reduction of some 32,000
authorizations across the Active-Duty force structure and an addition
of 7,500 new authorizations, leading to a net decrease of about 24,000
authorizations. The overall reduction in authorizations will more
closely align the structure to the authorized end strength to improve
the readiness of formations while increasing their capabilities for the
future fight. Our restructuring efforts focused on creating lethal,
flexible formations that can adapt to large-scale combat operations and
decreasing the number of authorizations that were designed for a
counterinsurgency mission, not frequently deployed or unfilled. New
additions to the Active Component force structure include the
completion of five MDTFs, four additional Indirect Fire Protection
Capability (IFPC) battalions, nine C-sUAS batteries, and four
additional M-SHORAD battalions. All these formations bring advanced
capabilities to meet current requirements and ensure that we maintain
overmatch against adversaries in the future.
transforming our recruiting enterprise
Transformation will only take place through the hard work of
talented and dedicated soldiers, Army civilians, and the support of
their families. The Army is a great place to serve: we are retaining
talented soldiers, finishing fiscal year 2023 at 102 percent of our
retention mission. Even so, the challenges to Army recruiting pose an
existential threat to the all-volunteer force, and addressing these
challenges has been one of our most comprehensive efforts over the last
year.
The Army is making fundamental changes to its recruiting approach.
This starts with redesigning our recruiting workforce, moving away from
a model that places soldiers outside of their primary military
occupational specialty (MOS) into temporary recruiter positions for
only a few years at a time. To do this, we are creating new talent
acquisition specialties for both enlisted soldiers and warrant
officers, allowing our recruiters to develop skills to succeed in a
competitive hiring environment. These new recruiters will expand their
focus on the prospect market beyond those with a high school degree and
will aim to recruit a third of new trainees from the ``college or some
college'' population by 2028. This shift requires our recruiters to
become more active on the campuses of junior colleges and technical
institutes and increase Army recruiting presence in online forums.
We are also creating a significant innovation capability within
U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) to quickly identify and scale
promising new approaches and discard recruiting practices that are no
longer successful in a competitive and rapidly changing labor market.
Finally, we are seeking to elevate USAREC to become a three-star
command that oversees enlisted recruiting, Army Cadet Command, and the
Army's Enterprise Marketing Office and reports to the Secretary of the
Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army in light of its critically
important mission. The leadership of USAREC will serve for an extended
tenure, building stability and expertise and decreasing the impact of
frequent leadership changeover.
Although fiscal year 2023 was a challenging year, it showed a
marked increase of 5,200 recruits over fiscal year 2022, in large part
due to the outstanding work of our 8,000 recruiters and the successful
implementation of initiatives across the Army. As this transformation
begins, our goal for fiscal year 2024 is 55,000 Regular Army recruits
and 5,000 commitments to the Delayed Entry Program. We will also
continue successful initiatives like the Future Soldier Prep Course,
which has brought more than 18,000 new soldiers into the Army since its
inception in the summer of 2022.
delivering ready combat formations
Despite recruiting challenges, the Army is meeting our global
requirements. Over 140,000 soldiers from all components are deployed or
stationed in 143 countries worldwide to defend the Nation's interests
and maintain security with our allies and partners.
The Army provides the operational endurance, reach, and
survivability necessary for joint force success in the Indo-Pacific.
For fiscal year 2025, we are requesting $1.5 billion for Pacific
Deterrence Initiative activities to exercise and campaign with our
allies and partners, building and demonstrating shared readiness to
deter Chinese aggression and ensure regional stability. This readiness
begins in Hawaii and Alaska, where U.S. Army
Pacific has established the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness
Center (JPMRC). JPMRC allows the Army and our partners to train in a
variety of environments, from tropical jungles to the high arctic.
Funding for Operation Pathways will support partnered, all-
component, multinational exercises such as TALISMAN SABRE. Last year's
exercise included over 30,000 participants from 15 nations and provided
the Army with the opportunity to construct and operate Joint Logistics
Over the Shore (JLOTS), the largest such operation in over two decades.
We continue to train, exercise, and collaborate with our long-standing
allies, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. Last summer, the Army
deployed a combined arms battalion on short notice from CONUS to the
Korean Peninsula to demonstrate rapid crisis response and our resolve
to deter DPRK aggression. In Japan, the Army supported Japan's Ground
Self Defense Forces through the annual YAMA SAKURA exercise series.
The Army will continue to prioritize the Indo-Pacific as we
transform our force structure and introduce new capabilities for
strategic competition, including the 1st, 3d, and 4th MDTFs, the 5th
Security Forces Assistance Brigade (SFAB), and the 11th Airborne
Division, the Army's newest division focused on cold weather and high-
altitude operations in the Arctic.
In Europe, the Army is requesting $2.1 billion to support European
Deterrence Initiative activities to maintain rotational deployments,
train with our NATO allies, build readiness, and demonstrate our
ability to rapidly project combat forces into the theater. This was
recently on display during Exercise ARCTIC SHOCK when U.S. Army
paratroopers and their Norwegian counterparts flew over the North Pole
from Alaska and conducted a combined airborne operation into Norway. In
the coming months, over 16,000 of our soldiers will train with more
than a dozen other countries in Exercise DEFENDER 24.
We continue our full support of Ukraine and its fight to repel
Russia's invasion of its sovereign territory. Our troops have trained
over 17,000 Ukrainian soldiers in Germany. We have sent major combat
systems and munitions to Ukraine, including 21 High Mobility Artillery
Rocket Systems (HIMARS), 1 Patriot air defense battery, 131 Strykers,
31 Abrams tanks, 162 Bradley fighting vehicles, and over 1.5 million
artillery
munitions. This support is an investment in our own national
security: it deters potential aggression elsewhere in the world and
strengthens our defense industrial base. Supporting Ukraine is also
critical to our military readiness. The lessons we have learned from
Ukraine have allowed us to develop new methods, techniques, and
capabilities for future conflicts. We have also seen how U.S. equipment
is both effective and survivable, even in degraded or contested
environments.
Now more than ever, the Army is leading efforts to support Ukraine
in its fight to regain its sovereign borders, but that support is at
risk the longer we operate without a supplemental appropriations bill.
Every day that passes without funding for support to Ukraine is one
that Russia will use to its advantage against Ukraine, against Europe,
and against our NATO allies. We urge Congress to pass on-time
appropriations bills and supplemental appropriation bills when required
to support unforeseen crises.
In the Middle East, Iranian-aligned militia groups have
increasingly threatened and attacked United States Forces and
interests, invigorated by Hamas's attacks against Israel in October
2023. U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) has assessed the force protection
requirements of facilities and units, and we have deployed advanced
counter-UAS capabilities, including DE M-SHORAD, to the region to
defeat the ongoing use of sUAS and expand the network of defense for
U.S. troops and bases. We are also supporting U.S. Central Command with
JLOTS, which will provide the Joint Force with the capability to
increase the viability of large-scale maritime shipments of
humanitarian aid into Gaza.
Soldiers from all components of the Army are serving the Nation
around the globe, including 2,500 soldiers supporting the Department of
Homeland Security at our southwest border. Regionally aligned Special
Operations Forces and SFABs provide access and presence in each
geographic combatant command, including 2d SFAB's support over the last
year to partner forces in Kenya, Tunisia, Gambia, and other partners in
Africa. Army National Guard units support 30 nations in Central and
South America as part of the State Partnership Program, training and
building enduring relationships that improve mutual readiness.
readiness of soldiers and families: quality of life investments
Our readiness depends not just on recruiting, equipping, and
training the force but also on the individual health and fitness of
every soldier. This readiness begins in the barracks, and the Army is
dedicated to providing safe, high-quality housing and barracks for our
soldiers. The Army will invest an average of $2.1 billion annually in
the construction, sustainment, restoration, and modernization of
barracks for unaccompanied soldiers across Future Years Defense Program
25-29.
For fiscal year 2025, the Army is budgeting $935 million for nine
unaccompanied housing construction projects across Active Duty and Army
Reserve at multiple installations, a 325 percent increase in
construction from fiscal year 2024. Barracks sustainment has been
funded at 100 percent of the requirement, an investment of $680 million
in fiscal year 2025. We are also leveraging the expertise found within
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to stabilize project cost growth
through early involvement in the planning and design processes.
Additionally, the Army is allocating $35 million to hire civilian
barracks managers at multiple installations, which will decrease the
requirements for soldiers to serve as barracks managers and allow them
to focus on their primary warfighting duties.
For accompanied soldiers, the Army is investing $403.7 million into
Government-owned Army family housing in fiscal year 2025. This
investment will address facility sustainment, construction of 173 new
homes, and renovation of 252 homes. Across all installations, the Army
is committed to increasing oversight of privatized housing and
combating environmental hazards within both Government-owned Army
family housing and privatized housing through consistently applied
maintenance and inspection programs.
The Army remains committed to reducing instances of sexual assault
and sexual harassment, ensuring impartial justice, and encouraging
healthy behaviors that strengthen the trust between the Army and the
American people. During early fiscal year 2024, the Army established
the Office of the Special Trial Counsel (OSTC), which is staffed by
specially trained, independent military attorneys (``special trial
counsel'') who make prosecution decisions for sexual assault, domestic
violence, and other covered offenses. Beginning in December 2023, the
OSTC gained the authority to make case dispositions. This increases
transparency and ensures that impartiality is inherent within the
military justice process.
The Army is implementing a comprehensive, integrated prevention
plan (CIPP) at all commands across the Army, which details actions to
improve command climate. In particular, at the United States Military
Academy, CIPP incorporates character development with proactive
approaches to prevent sexual assault and other harmful behaviors.
Additionally, we have instituted dedicated instruction during initial
entry training that reinforces the shared trust required to form
cohesive teams and provides education on prevention and response
resources. These proactive approaches and many others will inform the
creation of the Army's Sexual Harassment and Response Program (SHARP)
regulation, which will be published this fiscal year.
The Army continues to combat the risk of soldier suicide through
multiple approaches, acknowledging that every suicide impacts families,
teammates, and the readiness of the force. The Army published its
Suicide Prevention Regulation in September 2023, and we are ensuring
that soldiers are aware of and have clear access to mental and
emotional health resources. The Army is investing in programs that help
soldiers maintain financial stability, mental health, strong
relationships, and physical well-being, including expanding the
Holistic Health and Fitness (H2F) program to 71 brigades in fiscal year
2025 and budgeting $24.4 million for financial counseling services.
This holistic approach to soldier wellness is taking form at every
installation in the Army, with many garrisons consolidating the
resources needed to combat suicide and increase soldier fitness at a
single accessible location. Tailored programs like 1st Infantry
Division's ``Operation Victory Wellness,'' 10th Mountain Division's
``Mountain Care,'' and 11th Airborne Division's ``Mission 100'' are
prioritizing engaged leadership and providing a wide range of location
and community-specific resources to soldiers and their families.
Ensuring that Army families have the resources they need to thrive
is vital to our force's readiness and a driving factor behind soldier
retention. The Army's fiscal year 2025 budget requests funding to
construct three new child development centers (CDCs) at Fort Liberty,
North Carolina, Fort Meade, Maryland, and Wiesbaden, Germany. We are
testing and implementing incentives to maintain high staffing levels at
existing CDCs by providing recruitment and retention bonuses, tuition
assistance, and access to on-post resources such as commissaries at 16
installations.
Building on the Veterans Auto and Education Improvement Act of
2022, the Army continues to work with the Defense State Liaison Office
to ensure military spouses can achieve portability of their
occupational license as they undergo a permanent change of station.
Army spouses may also take advantage of new opportunities provided by
updates to the Military Spouse Employment Act, which grants Federal
agencies the authority to hire military spouses for remote work and
allows military spouses to retain their positions should they relocate
to another location. We are also continuing to coordinate with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to implement new policies that
further expand employment opportunities for our Army spouses as
directed by the Executive Order on Advancing Economic Security for
Military and Veteran Spouses, Military Caregivers, and Survivors.
The Army spends over $1.3 billion annually to provide soldier and
family support programs at installations around the world, but we
recognize that each installation, unit, and community is unique and has
discrete needs. We are empowering senior installation commanders with
the authority to scale successful programs and close programs that do
not meet the needs of each individual community. We are piloting this
tailored, localized approach to soldier programs at Fort Cavazos, TX,
and will expand to other installations pending the results of the
pilot.
maintaining the strategic path
Today's security environment is volatile and evolving quickly. The
battlefield is increasingly transparent, commercial technology is
advancing rapidly, and new capabilities allow adversaries to reach
around the world. The Army is transforming to meet the needs of this
rapidly changing environment. With congressional support, we will keep
the Army on a sustainable strategic path as we transform for the
future. We will deliver ready combat formations with advanced
capabilities to defend our Nation and its interests. We will transform
our recruiting enterprise to guarantee the longevity of the All-
Volunteer Force. We will invest in the quality of life of our soldiers,
civilians, and their families. We will build cohesive teams and foster
climates of trust grounded in our shared Army values. We will serve
with the discipline and professionalism that the Nation demands of its
Army, just as we have done for the past 249 years. This We'll Defend.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General. Both for the
Secretary and Chief of Staff, the obvious point is you are
operating under a flat budget, essentially, and that makes your
decisions of how you spend the money more and more critical.
Secretary Wormuth, the Army has made some shifts in its
priorities this year. Can you describe the overall guidance for
building this ready and modernized Army, and the shifts you
have made?
Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, Chairman. You know, the chief
and I are very focused on spending every single dollar that we
have in the most effective way, and I think the broad direction
of our modernization program has remained the same.
You know, we continue, as you said in your statement, to
focus on investing in air and missile defense, in long range
precision fires, in advanced aviation and a number of other
categories. You know, I think we did make, obviously, a
significant decision in choosing to not pursue further the FARA
reconnaissance aircraft.
But in doing that, we basically came to the realization
looking at, you know, what is happening on the battlefield in
Ukraine, for example, what is happening with technology. We
felt we could meet that requirement in a different way, and we
also wanted to make sure we kept our aviation industrial base
healthy.
So, that led us to the multiyear procurement of additional
but more modernized Blackhawks. But beyond that, I would say,
you know, again, the broader goals of our modernization program
are looking at the large scale combat operations study that we
did several years ago now.
I think the things that that led us to invest in, frankly,
have been validated to a large degree by what we see happening
on the battlefield in Ukraine in particular. So, we are going
to continue, I think, with all of those important portfolios,
and they are they are going to give us capabilities that we
need to be able to deal with the challenges in the Indo-
Pacific, but also in Europe and elsewhere.
Because, as the chief says, you know, we are a globally
deployable Army. We are not focused on one theater.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Madam Secretary. General George,
again, on the context of this budget and the context of the
strategy that the Secretary has laid out, how are you
maintaining ready combat formations, which is essential to the
mission?
General George. Yes, Chairman, and that is, every month I
chair the readiness update and there is nothing more important
than having a ready Army, and so, we are completely focused on
that.
To carry on a little bit with what the Secretary was
talking about, what we are--I mean, we owe it to get every--
make sure that every dollar that we are spending. So, we are
looking at processes. I will give you a couple examples of--and
I mentioned up front in my opening remarks about how we got to
get after cheaper solutions, and I think unmanned systems is a
good example of that.
Countering unmanned systems as well. We can't keep--you
know, we can't afford to just keep lobbing very expensive
missiles out of that, so we are working on and those kinds of
things through R&D and then getting stuff forward to do it.
Then the battlefield is changing really quickly.
So, one of the things that I have been--that we have been
talking about is I think that what will help us in that is
having more flexible funding that would allow us to make some
of those adjustments as rapidly as the battlefield is changing.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. The issue of recruiting always
comes up. Can you give us an update, Madam Secretary? I think
we are making a little more progress.
Secretary Wormuth. We are. We still have 6 months left to
go in the fiscal year, so the chief and I don't want to be
overconfident. But right now, we are on a very good pace, I
think, to meet this year's recruiting goal, which is 55,000 new
contracts, plus 5,000 in the delayed entry program.
So that is, you know, that is very good news. February and
March were very good months. The chief and I actually just
chaired yesterday a meeting with all of the senior leaders from
our recruiting enterprise. You know, I think we continue to see
very good success with the Future Soldier Prep Course, our
advertising campaign.
I don't know if you all saw some of the ads during the
March Madness basketball tournament. We, as I said, you know,
we have selected our first cohort of new warrant officers. We
are doing some things to leverage better data to give our
recruiters stronger leads, and we are looking at how to break
into the college market.
So, I think we are doing well. We have also, I would say,
we are selecting our existing recruiters in a different way
that is more attribute focused, looking at sort of
personalities, and we are also, we have overhauled the
curriculum at our recruiting college. About 40 percent of the
curriculum has changed.
So, the recruiters that we surged kind of last--late last
year have gone through that, and they are in the field now, and
I think they are part of the reason why we are seeing our
contracts per month go up.
Chairman Reed. One layer you just mentioned is focusing on
college students. I have always felt that junior colleges are
an excellent place to recruit, you know, people who are mature
more so than in high school. Then--I hope, and then you have
also people who have made a conscious decision not to go to a
4-year school. Are you finding success there?
Secretary Wormuth. Well, I would say, chairman, we are
absolutely looking at junior colleges, community colleges. You
know, we are looking at kids maybe who did a couple years of
college but then dropped out for whatever reason. I would say,
candidly chairman, we are still in the early days.
We--actually chief and I just talked about this yesterday.
We really need to do some more market research on that some
college, college market. We just haven't been focused on that
market for so long, so we really need to dig into that more,
and we are actually going to engage a private sector company to
help us with that.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General George,
you said I believe this is the most volatile international
security situation in, did you say 37 years?
General George. In my 36 years.
Senator Wicker. 36 years, okay, and also, your prepared
statement with the Secretary says the Army must transform
quickly.
Chairman Reed said that the budget that has now been
proposed is essentially a flat budget. I think he might not
take issue with my statement that it is a 2 percent cut when
you consider inflation and purchasing power.
I understand what the Secretary said about using every
dollar carefully and making sure that it is--that we squeeze
every bit of value, but we are not going to meet this threat
simply by being more efficient with the dollars that have been
asked for, either in your budget submission or the unfunded
requirement.
There are $430 million in unmet needs in U.S. Army Pacific,
and only $100 million of that $430 million is covered in the
Army unfunded list. We need almost $1 billion to update Army
pre-positioned stocks this year. This budget is not adequate
for this most volatile situation in 36 years, is it, General
George?
General George. I am Senator, what I was focused on in the
unfunded priority list, first and foremost, was everything that
we could potentially execute. So, there was two things in the
unfunded priority list that we put in there, and it was very
extensive process that we went through.
One was a lot of things that were in our base budget but
we--next on the list, to maximize production. So, there is some
of those that took us out to production, and then the other
example is facts of life changes. What happened on October 7th
and what we needed to do.
Senator Wicker. Okay, well, you know, we only have just a
brief, brief moment, but the $330 million that aren't covered
of U.S. Army Pacific, you are going to need that, aren't you?
Are you say you can't execute that in the next fiscal year?
General George. I know what was included on there was
specific to U.S. Army Pacific was some additional campaigning
that we are doing.
Senator Wicker. But there is a $430 million in unmet needs
and only $100 million recovered in the Army unfunded list. You
could use that entire $430 million in this next fiscal year,
could you not?
General George. Senator, I would have to go back and look.
I don't know what the other, you know, additional funding that
you are specifically referring to.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Let me just say, I do appreciate the
fact that we have to be efficient. We have got to get the
absolute value out of every single taxpayer dollars that we
entrust with you.
But we are going to need--if we are going to keep the peace
and have peace through strength, which has always worked, we
are going to have to--we got to make sure that you tell us what
you need. Let me ask you this, General George, the Secretary
mentioned the things that we are doing to help the effort of
our friends in Ukraine.
What lessons are we learning that we can use later on,
should we be asked in another theater to go into combat?
General George. Senator, I could go on for a long time. I
would love to come over and talk to you about lessons. We have
a big work with formation that is over there.
Senator Wicker. We will----
General George. I will give you a couple of quick--I will
give you some really quick examples. We are learning the
effectiveness of ground based long range fires. We are learning
that UAS unmanned systems and countering unmanned systems is
rapidly evolving.
We are learning that the EW landscape is changing
everywhere between 3 weeks and 3 months, and so that we need to
be more flexible in our approach, and this is why are----
Senator Wicker. EW being?
General George. Electronic warfare. So, the battlefield is
changing really rapidly. We are learning about how well
additive manufacturing is going to work and reduce our--can
help us reduce our footprint.
We are learning that you can be seen anywhere on the
battlefield, and you are going to have to become more mobile,
lower signature. That is why we are focused on our network,
because if you can be seen, you can be killed.
We are doing all of those things and training all of those
things, and we are taking those lessons. They are not lessons
learned until we have actually changed how we trained, change
how we operate, change how we equip, and then change how we buy
things.
Senator Wicker. General, there is no way to learn that
other than actually watching actual combat. Is that correct?
General George. I think we are watching a lot of that
unfold, and we have got a lot of combat experience inside our
formation.
Senator Wicker. We are doing that without any of our guys
and gals having to actually be in combat. We are doing--we are
watching someone else who is our----
General George. Yes. Watching. Exactly.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. Good morning. Thank you, Secretary Wormuth
and General George both for being here and for your service to
the country. Secretary Wormuth, I am sure you won't--probably
won't be surprised to know that I am still focused on night
vision devices.
This is the second year in a row in which the budget has
included very little for procurement of night vision devices,
and it makes it hard for me to understand what the Army's plans
are for the future. The budget for 2025 suggests that the Army
plans to both--to buy both L3 Harris's ENVG-B and Microsoft's
IVAS systems, but it doesn't really justify how it is going to
sustain both. Can you give us some more detail on what you are
planning?
Secretary Wormuth. Yes, Senator Shaheen. As you know, we
are planning to buy both capabilities, and I think, you know,
we don't see it as an either, or. They each bring some
different things to the table.
If I am not mistaken, I think there is more in the budget
this year for the enhanced night vision goggles than last
year's budget. I think we have money in there for about 2,300
additional sets of goggles.
We also have money in the budget for 3,000 of the 1.2
version IVAS, you know, hologram had headsets, as you know very
well because you and I have talked about this over a number of
hearings. You know, we are continuing to work with Microsoft on
that program. We have some additional testing coming up this
year. We are going to be doing a lot of testing on the 1.2
version.
We did--the last test that we ran looking at IVAS was much
more successful. The soldier feedback we got was much better.
You know, the form factor for the headset was more comfortable.
They weren't having as much neck strain.
I think the resolution on the--for the vision piece was
better. So, we are planning to continue with both programs, but
of course we are going to look and see what the results are for
the 1.2 version later this year, before we decide further on
the IVAS.
Senator Shaheen. According to the budget justification
materials, the IVAS system heads up display is designed to work
within their network to provide situational awareness and
synthetic training environment capabilities. I am quoting, so
hopefully I am going to get that correct. Are all Army
situational awareness devices interoperable with the IVAS
network? Do we know that?
Secretary Wormuth. Well, what that means, really, and it
has been a little while since I have actually worn IVAS, but
the--you know, one of the things that is unique about IVAS is
that it allows our soldiers to have sort of a virtual training
environment so that they can plan, you know, tactical missions,
for example, wearing the headsets, and also to use that for
training.
That is not a capability that we have right now on any of
our other systems. So, it is--that is why it is a bit of a
pathfinder in wearable technology for us, and one of the
reasons why we are interested in it.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I certainly look forward to seeing
more of what the experiment and the record shows that IVAS can
do. General George, in your opening comments, you talked about
wanting more flexibility for budget.
What specifically--I know we have we have done a lab, the
multi-year procurement, but are there other things that you are
suggesting that you need in order to better manage the funding
that you have?
General George. Senator, yes, first, the multi-years for
155 GMLRS, PAC-3 have been extremely helpful to us. On the--
there is three areas and I kind of mentioned those briefly with
Senator Wicker, but how we are changing in unmanned aerial
systems or unmanned systems overall and encountering those and
EW is, the battlefield is changing in weeks and months.
So, the point is for our systems--and I will give you an
example. When October 7th happened, Hamas attacked Israel,
situation changed in the Middle East, and we needed to do
additional things with counter UAS. We did not have the
flexibility because of a continuing resolution to move money,
make adjustments, go from R&D to procurement for certain
systems.
So, I do think in those three areas just is how fast--and I
am we are not talking big systems. That we need more
flexibility in those areas because of how things are changing,
and I am confident that we could do that in a way where we
would notify and wait, and to tell inside those systems. So
those are the three areas that I think we would need the
flexibility.
Senator Shaheen. But just to clarify, the fundamental
problem there is budget certainty and making sure that you are
not operating on a continuing resolution on an ongoing basis.
General George. That is--right. That was--we could not make
adjustments and we couldn't up our production level for Coyote,
for example, and had to go to things. But I do think in those
three areas that we do need some flexibility. For counter--like
counter UAS systems, we are in R&D and have the ability to
procure some of those. I think it is also going to help for a
lot of the small technology firms that are doing great things
here in the States.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Fischer,
please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for being here today. General George, your unfunded priority
list included several counter UAS systems that you just touched
on with Senator Shaheen. Can you tell us why it is important to
acquire these systems in fiscal year 2025, if not sooner?
General George. Senator, I think that you have seen with
just what happened last weekend with a number of, you know,
systems and unmanned systems in one way attack and loitering
munitions.
I think every formation out there is going to have to
operate these unmanned systems inside of our own formation, and
we are going to have to be able to counter them.
So, we need to--I think that is one area where I think we
are going to have to speed up, and we are attempting to do
that, wanting to do that inside the Army.
Senator Fischer. Well, I appreciate it that you put it on
your unfunded priority list because it is extremely important,
extremely helpful. As you said, we just witnessed some of that
last week.
General and Madam Secretary, we have seen the unmanned
aerial systems, we have seen the counter UAS systems to be used
to great effect. We have seen them particularly in Ukraine.
So, how is the Army taking what it has learned specifically
in that conflict about drone warfare and incorporating those
lessons learned into the development of new tactics,
techniques, and procedures for soldiers?
Secretary Wormuth. Sure, Senator Fischer. First of all, we
are aggressively collecting lessons learned from what we are
seeing in Ukraine across the board.
I was actually in Grafenwoehr in February and saw some of
the training we were doing with the Ukrainians, and frankly, I
felt like our soldiers might have been learning more from them
than they were learning from us.
What we are doing is, you know, taking all of those lessons
and infusing them into our combat training center, so at Fort
Irwin and at Fort Johnson, and you are actually seeing what we
call the OPFOR, you know, the opposition force that our
brigades train against.
They are attacking our brigades that are in the box with
drones and with drone swarms. So, we are already, you know,
testing our brigades against the kinds of things that we are
seeing in Ukraine. They are--that is causing them to adjust
their tactics, techniques, and procedures.
As the chief said, they are having to move their command
posts, you know, more frequently. They are having to camouflage
them. We are having to find ways to reduce the footprint, both
physical and sort of signature.
But we are very much trying to learn those lessons. As
someone said, you know, a lesson observed is not the same thing
as a lesson learned.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Also, all of the data that we
are seeing indicates that military recruiting remains a
challenge. You also touched on that in your openings. I do
appreciate the efforts that you have made, those ongoing
efforts, and to help create solutions so that we can maintain
our all-volunteer force.
Madam Secretary, your joint written testimony outlines the
Army's plan for transforming the recruiting enterprise, in part
through a focus on innovation. How will the Army work to
quickly take the successful approaches and incorporate them
into a wider recruiting enterprise?
Secretary Wormuth. Well, we are creating an innovation
essentially cell or directorate that will be part of U.S. Army
Recruiting Command. They are doing everything from helping us,
you know, figure out how to develop the pipeline to train the
new, what we call Forty-Two Tango. That will be the kind of
specialized enlisted recruiters that will come in.
So, they are involved with curriculum development. They are
involved with helping us figure out how to apply artificial
intelligence and machine learning to, again, looking at large
data sets of potential prospects and really trying to help our
recruiters focus on the most--the best leads, if you will.
They are helping us look at basically what we would call
the recruiting station of the future. We really think we need
to sort of fundamentally relook everything from sort of the
storefronts to kind of how our recruiting stations operate. So
those are just a few examples of how the innovation cell will
help us.
Senator Fischer. You know, I am really concerned about what
I perceive as a growing distrust of institutions in our
society, and especially with our younger generation. Are you
looking specifically at ways to address that as well and to be
able to communicate better about the strength of a commitment
and dedication and how important that is--and just the value of
the institution?
Secretary Wormuth. We are, Senator. You know, I share your
concern about the decline of trust that our young people have,
and frankly, a lot of Americans have in our institutions.
You know, I think what we can do in the Army is, you know,
continue to do more to talk about the value of service and what
it means to be part of an institution that is about something
larger than yourself and about protecting this great country.
But I think, frankly, is something that we need your help
on, all of you, because I think we need more voices in
leadership talking about the value of service. It can't just
be--you know, the fact that 83 percent of our recruits come
from military families, that is wonderful in many ways, but it
is also a little concerning.
You know, we need to--we can't rely on just military
families to give their kids to the Army. So, the more all of
you, I think, can talk about the value of service, that will
help us.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Hirono,
please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
your testimony. Secretary Wormuth, the Army is negotiating
renewals for several training, very important training area
land leases in Hawaii, particularly for Koloa on the Big
Island.
That training area, that would be the Army and the Marines,
not to mention our civil--our civilian people. So anyway, we
are in the midst of negotiating, although those leases do not
expire for a number of years, but we do need to be already in
the process.
The lands that this training area, and particularly Koloa,
hold cultural significance to the Native Hawaiian community and
it is imperative that you and your team conduct frequent and
respectful engagements with the local community leaders,
especially the Native Hawaiian community, because truly we need
to avoid a situation where there is major conflict in terms of
our ability to extend these leases.
So, I included a provision in last year's NDAA that
requires the Secretary of Defense to designate an official
responsible for coordinating these negotiations. Has that
individual been identified, and could you provide an update on
the lease renegotiation efforts and community outreach?
Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, Senator Hirono. I am tracking
that requirement in the last NDAA. I do not believe that OSD
has yet hired that individual. I know that, you know, we have
had discussions with them about the attributes that would be
helpful in that kind of person. You know, obviously someone who
has deep ties to the community and relationships with all of
the different stakeholders.
But I think OSD is still working to identify the right
person for that. You know, we certainly think it would be
helpful to have someone be a single belly button, if you will.
What we are doing in the Army is really to try to have exactly
the kinds of conversations that you are referring to, with all
of the different stakeholders. So General Flynn has been very
engaged.
My Assistant Secretary, our Assistant Secretary for
Installations and the Environment, Rachel Jacobson. We have had
our General Counsel, Carrie Ricci, has been out to Hawaii to
have conversations.
You know, as you said, the leases don't expire until 2029,
but we need to be having discussions about what the options
are. I think there are discussions informally with the
Department of Land and Natural Resources, for example. So, we
are trying to continue to stay focused on that.
Senator Hirono. I cannot overState the importance of
finding the right person to be that liaison with the community.
Let me give you an example. The Maui wildfires has resulted,
and the family of--what I describe as the family of Federal
agencies there, over 1,000 Federal people have been there on
Maui, and FEMA, of course, is very much there.
As FEMA is conducting its cleanup operations and all of
that, they have hired dozens, dozens of cultural advisors to be
there when they are actually cleaning out individual lots. That
is how critically important the sensitivities are.
I would say that if we do not renegotiate these leases
successfully, that is going to have a major impact on the
continuing presence of the military in Hawaii, and therefore
our National Security.
So, we have talked a lot about recruiting, and all of the
services are having recruiting challenges, except possibly the
Air Force. So, some of the new things that you are doing, is
this something that is being shared with the other services,
because they are all facing recruiting challenges?
Secretary Wormuth. Yes. I am proud to say the Army is
leading the way in this space and our sister services are
taking, you know, a page from our playbook.
So, I believe the Navy, for example, has started their own
version of the Future Soldier Prep Course. Secretary Austin has
regular conversations with the service chiefs and secretaries,
and we are sharing our lessons learned and what is working for
us, and what is not working in some cases.
Senator Hirono. Well, when you noted that we can't continue
to rely on the recruits coming from military families, over 80
percent, and that the value of service, it needs to be
something that all of us talk about and express our support
for.
Civic education is, I would say, very much a part of all of
this, and as you are recruiting, I assume that you are
recruiting from a diverse population. So, frankly, diversity,
equity, inclusion, those are important aspects of what I
consider to be the military's approach to how they are going
to--how you are going to successfully recruit even as we are
facing challenges to exposing our military people to DEI.
So, I am among those who are very much support of the DOD's
efforts to expand populations who are underrepresented I would
say. One more thing, I am focused very much on the need for
repairing our frankly crumbling infrastructure in the military.
The Indo-Pacific region, U.S. Army Pacific estimates the total
cost of repair of all of their facilities runs in the billions.
While I am encouraged to see the Army's overall budget for
military construction has increased by $1 billion this year,
there is still obviously a lot of more work we have to do. So,
what is the Army's long term plan to replace our--and repair
our crumbling infrastructure in Hawaii and the Indo-Pacific?
Secretary Wormuth. Very briefly, Senator, we have $200
billion a year in this year's budget request for
infrastructure, specifically in Hawaii. As you noted, that is a
down payment, I would say, and the--you know, the Army has an
enormous inventory of infrastructure worldwide.
So, we don't have the resources to tackle everything
everywhere, all at once, and we use our facilities investment
planning process every year to try to help us prioritize, and
that is a 15 year plan. But we are--we do have a focus on
infrastructure in Hawaii.
Senator Hirono. Well, one of the things that I notice is
that although----
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Oh, I am sorry. I will send some questions
for the record.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Hirono. Senator
Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, General
George and Secretary Wormuth, for being here today. I do
appreciate your leadership and your dedication in maintaining
the readiness of our great United States Army.
We know we are in a very tough security environment, so
thank you both for being here. General George, I will start
with you, and it is going right back to Iowa. As you know, the
Iowa Army ammunition plant means a lot to our Iowans, and we
are proud of the men and women who served there daily.
They continue to indirectly support our efforts alongside
those of our allies and partners all around the globe,
including Ukraine and Israel. As we recently discussed, the
Army introduced a significant modernization plan to the
facility in Middletown, Iowa.
How confident are you that these initiatives will
adequately meet the Army's and our future needs, and serve as a
foundational step in and harnessing our domestic industrial
base from Iowa?
General George. Senator, I think if there is a silver
lining in all the--what has been happening in the world, is
that we have realized that we need to improve our organic
industrial base, and we are moving out on that. I have been to
the Iowa ammunition plant. We are going to--it is planned to
invest $280 million to modernize.
It is a good example of what we need to do, and I was
recently down in Radford. The same thing. You can modernize,
have the same workforce, but you can greatly expand your
production, which is what we need to be able to do. We are
really proud of our OIB workforce everywhere we go. They are
just so patriotic, and those communities are so patriotic, and
we need them.
Senator Ernst. Absolutely, and it is, for those that might
be watching or catching this later on, the Iowa Army ammunition
plant produces the 155 munitions that are so talked about
through the news today. General George, I would like to focus
on commercial technology as well.
So, we just recently saw the cancellation of the FARA
program, our future attack reconnaissance aircraft, and that
came as a big surprise to a lot of folks. But the lessons that
we are learning in Ukraine are really demonstrating the
significance of embracing a much lighter, more agile, and cost
effective aerial reconnaissance solution.
Again, for perspective, what we are seeing in Ukraine with
smaller unmanned drones, it makes sense. This is one of those
times that I know we have spent a couple billion dollars on
this program, but I would rather see it stop right there if it
is not going to meet the needs of tomorrow.
So, General George, can you describe innovative ways that
Army partners with the commercial sector to field and leverage
commercial technology, technology that will work for us
tomorrow?
General George. Senator, there is a lot of examples, and I
think what we are seeing in the world today is that there is a
lot of areas where commercial tech is outpacing what we are
doing in the military. You look at unmanned systems and Amazon,
Home Depot, people that are building these things. The network
is another example and--of how we can do with transport and
satellites.
So, we are trying to embrace all of that, and I think the
biggest changes that we are doing are with our network, what we
are doing to reduce the systems that we have, make sure that we
are more mobile, more low signature, and we are doing that with
a lot of commercial off the shelf capabilities, because you can
now have a tablet with apps and software. It is also cheaper
than to update that. Unmanned systems is another one that we
are doing.
I think we are getting to the point because other people
are out there, you can also 3D print. So, we want modular open
systems, architecture systems that we can adjust sensors with.
A lot of that is happening, you know, the actual--or the UAS
commercial technology is moving very rapidly on that. So, I
think we can learn a lot from that and pull that into our
formation.
Senator Ernst. Right. I appreciate that, and I think it is
important that we take a look at the constrained budgetary
environment that we operate in today and try and do more with
what already exists out there.
We are seeing this in many instances with the constrained
budgetary environments that we see in Ukraine, in Israel, and
other places around the world. So, I am running out of time,
but Secretary Wormuth too, I really appreciate you asking all
of these great folks to be a voice as well.
There are a lot of really incredible young men and women
that are out there. We need to be able to reach them and
encourage them into service. But thank you both very much for
your service, and I appreciate you. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator King,
please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
start with three data points, $10,000, $4.3 million, and $12.
$10,000 is the high end estimate of the cost of the drones that
Iran and the Houthis are using. $4.3 million is the cost of one
SM-6 missile--$4 million for the Patriot. $12 is the cost of a
directed energy shot that can take down one of these drones.
Yet, the entire Defense Department has cut its directed
energy budget in this budget. The Army has cut its directed
energy budget in this budget. Every agency and department in
the Department of Defense has cut its directed energy budget in
this budget. What in the hell are you people thinking?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator King, as we talked about, we are
pursuing directed energy----
Senator King. Why the budget cut?
Secretary Wormuth. I will have to look at the specifics of
whether we have made cuts. I know you know, we have shifted
money from RDT&E into procurement because in many cases a lot
of our systems are coming online now.
So, we are not--this year's budget doesn't show as much in
RDT&E, but we are--our four prototypes for our directed energy
M-SHORAD system are out in CENTCOM right now. General Kurilla
is testing them in that environment for exactly the reasons
that you allude to. You know, they have a lot of promise in
terms of being much more cost effective----
Senator King. We are shooting down $10,000 drones with $4
million missiles. They can drain our bank account on that ratio
in not too long. The same thing with--in Israel. I mean, three
of the conflicts we are observing right now are--indirectly
engaged in, Ukraine, Iran, and the Houthis are all about air
defense.
Yet I just can't understand the Defense Department not
having its hair on fire about directed energy, and since 2023,
the directed energy budget has declined Department wide. I
appreciate that you are testing some of these units, but this
ought to be one of the highest, most urgent priorities, both in
terms of cost but also in terms of effectiveness.
General, would you be able to effectively use directed
energy if it were available to take down some of these aerial
attack vehicles?
General George. I think what we are looking at, Senator, is
a lot of different options to include high powered microwave
lasers. I mean, we are looking at--it is going to be a layered
defense of what we are doing.
As the Secretary mentioned, we have put the prototypes that
we have--we are sending everything that we have available over
to the Middle East and testing it in those kind of
environments. We are still working through, I will tell you,
you know, some of this stuff on the directed energy----
Senator King. Unfortunately, there is a naval facility
called Helios and that is being tested off of San Diego instead
of in the Red Sea. I just don't understand why this isn't a
higher priority.
Budgets are policy, and if the budget for directed energy
in the Department has gone down substantially over the last
four or 5 years, that is an indication of a policy that I just
don't understand.
Let me move on to a couple of other topics, more specific.
I hope that you will continue research on the effects of blasts
on your people. We had a tragedy in Lewiston, Maine last year,
and it turns out that the fellow was a munitions test
instructor. He experienced blast after blast after blast.
Analysis of his brain indicates that it was severely
damaged. So, please attend to that risk because it is now
clearly contributing to the tragedy that we had, but also
suicide, and long term damage to our soldiers.
Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I would say, a couple of things
on that. One, starting this June, we will be doing a cognitive
assessment on every new soldier coming into basic training so
that we set----
Senator King. You have baseline.
Secretary Wormuth. To set a baseline, exactly, to what--you
know, to where they are before they start getting exposed as
they go do training----
Senator King. High school football teams have been doing
that for years, by the way. It is nice that we are----
Secretary Wormuth. Well, we are going to start doing it
this June, again, every single new soldier. We are also looking
at what additional personal protective equipment we can provide
to our folks, especially instructors and others who are
routinely exposed to blast pressure.
We are also looking into wearable gauges that would allow
us to continuously track what soldiers are being exposed to.
The challenge we have had to date is we haven't been able to
find sufficiently ruggedized gauges, so we need to do some more
work on that. But I----
Senator King. If the gauges can't stand the blast, what
does that say about the soldier's brain?
Secretary Wormuth. Well, it is more that the gauges, as I
understand it, you know, didn't do very well in sort of field
environments. But I know, Special Operations Command has some
wearable gauges on their UPL list, and I think we will be
looking at sort of what they are hoping to invest in. But we
are very attentive to the brain induced injury issues.
Senator King. I am very delighted to hear that. Thank you
very much and keep up that emphasis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Tuberville,
please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks both of you for your service. I am worried more about
our people.
You know, I came from a team oriented background, and we
are going to have the weapons. We are borrowing $80,000 a
second right now to pay for all those weapons, so I don't know
what our kids are going to have to do in the future, but we
need to protect us, our country, and our allies.
But I am very concerned about the people that are within
our military. I have had a chance to go to bases all over--in
country and out of country, all over the world and I try to ask
for kind of a group session with officers and noncommissioned
officers and talk to them. A lot of good things.
A lot of things that are not so good. A lot of them
concerned in the last few years about some of their fellow
servicemembers that didn't make the cut because they didn't
take the vaccine.
Secretary Wormuth, we lost 1,861 servicemembers and 200
people that basically were mechanics in the military. Did we
have a backup plan for that, especially for the mechanics that
we lost, going--you know, that we very desperately need in
times like this?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I think, you know, again, one
way we try to deal with shortfalls in any particular MOS is to
increase our recruiting in that area. You know, obviously, none
of us anticipated the pandemic.
None of us anticipated many of the different effects. But
the percentage of soldiers who were released from the Army
because they didn't take the COVID vaccine was very, very small
out of our formation.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. Well, 2,000 people is a lot of
people, as we look at it today in recruiting, and I think it is
important. We need to look at our shortfalls when it comes to
that. Also talk to a lot of our servicemembers that are out of
the military as we speak, a lot of special ops, a lot of
rangers.
A lot of them are very disgruntled about the things that
they were being taught at the end of their service, DEI. If I
had to use DEI when I was coaching, I would have been fired a
long time ago. I don't think you can run a military off of
diversity, equity, and inclusion.
I think you do it with the best, the meanest, the people
that are--that we need to train to fight to defend this
country. What is your thoughts on that, General George?
General George. Senator, I would----
Senator Tuberville. Be honest about this now.
General George. Yes----
Senator Tuberville. We are in trouble.
Secretary Wormuth. I will tell you, and you can ask any of
the formation we go out and I am talking to them, we are
focused on building warfighting, you know, increasing lethality
in our units and building cohesive teams.
So, as you know from being a coach, when you are bringing
everybody together too, you also bring--you got we got people
coming from all over the country. So, I have been, you know,
talking and talking about building cohesive teams since I was a
brand new private, when I was instructed on that coming right
out, all the way of being a leader.
So, I think that those are the two things that we are
focused on. It is obviously different in every form--you know,
in different formations that I have been in different levels,
but that is what we need to be focused on.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, and you are finding out that it is
hard to bring people from different backgrounds, put them
together to make them mesh as a unit, as a team, and their
lives are at stake. It is not a football player, you know,
playing to win or lose a game. It is, you know, their loss in
the military is losing their life.
I just want to make sure we--you know, we live in a
dangerous world, as we all know. I think that I would love to
be giving you all this $100 billion that we are getting ready
to send overseas to our military, to the people--to try to get
more people in the military.
I think we need to look more at us than we do at other
people. I can understand why we are doing this, but I think we
are going to have shortfalls in the long run when it comes to
that. General, are we taking illegals into our military--in the
Army?
General George. You know, I think what we are taking in--
you have to be a legally--legal permanent resident or a
resident of our country to enlist in the Army, Senator.
Senator Tuberville. Do you know, Ms. Secretary? Are we
taking illegals--in the Army?
Secretary Wormuth. As the chief said, you have to be a
lawful permanent resident or a resident of the United States to
join the military.
Senator Tuberville. Resident or a citizen?
Secretary Wormuth. Lawful permanent--you know, I am not the
State Department, but lawful permanent resident, I think is an
immigration status that is not full citizenship, but it is
certainly not an undocumented person.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. Well, I would just hope that we
would take people that love this country. I know there is
probably a lot of people come across the border that is going
to end up loving our country. I can understand that.
But, you know, having people that really understand, you
know, what that flag means is pretty important in our military.
So, I would hope that we would really consider the options, you
know, if it came down to that. So, thank you. Thank you. Thank
you, both.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our
witnesses. General George, I appreciate our visit to Radford a
couple weeks back, looking at that World War II era old
facility, but cutting edge work is being done there.
You spoke with Senator Ernst a bit about this but talk
about the need to increase our capacity to produce munitions.
General Cavoli was here the other day and was talking about the
European nations upping their production capacity.
But talk about what we are doing in the Army to increase
munition production.
General George. Senator, same as in Iowa. What we are, you
know, down the patriots that are down there in Radford.
For example, what it does down there just with energetics
and explosives is critical not only just to the Army, but
really the Joint Force. So that all of our base, organic
industrial depots and arsenals are critically important.
It is important--a lot of what is in the supplemental is
actually going to go back to improving those facilities, which
we need to do. So, we are investing in our own base. I think we
have $640 million that is in there to get after projects.
I know there is one down at Radford, but we have to
modernize those, and we are starting to do a little bit of that
at Radford, but we got more work to do.
Senator Kaine. You raise a good point. The supplemental
isn't just about overseas support. About $130 million in the
supplemental is going to Radford for munitions production, and
there are similar investments being made at munitions
facilities around the country.
I do want to start by recognizing the men and women of the
7th Transportation Brigade at Joint Base Langley-Eustis in
Virginia. They are on their way to answering the call and
deploying into the Mediterranean in support of the humanitarian
aid efforts on the pier construction in the Eastern
Mediterranean, and I just wanted to mention them.
Future Soldier, I want to ask you, Secretary Wormuth and we
have talked about this before. Share a little bit more about
this program. As I understand it, and you really are, the Army
is leading in this way, taking folks who want to be in the
military but who may not meet some of the physical criteria.
But you are doing good work in designing this pre-course
that enables somebody to meet the physical criteria to enter
the Army. What are you finding out about their ability to not
just meet, but then sustain the physical capacity as they have
enlisted?
Secretary Wormuth. Thanks, Senator Kaine. Yes, there is--
first, there is two tracks in the Future Soldier Prep Course.
There is an academic track for young people who haven't quite
scored high enough on the test that we use, and then there is a
physical track if you are not quite within the body fat
standards.
So, young people can take one or the other. We now have
expanded it, and they can take them in parallel. We have
graduated, I think, almost 18,000 young people out of this
program. It is like a 95 percent success rate. They often are
going into basic training and taking on sort of leadership
roles in basic training.
So, it has been very, very successful so far. We are doing
a longitudinal study to follow graduates from the prep course,
you know, as they go to their first duty station and have their
first set of assignments to see how they perform.
But right now, it has been a very good program at both Fort
Jackson and Fort Moore.
Senator Kaine. Excellent. We had a hearing about a year ago
sticking on the recruiting, and the Army had done a really good
survey of reasons people will join or not. One of the things
that surprised me was the sort of top listed reason why someone
might not join the military is the fear of falling behind their
peers.
There is sort of an attitude of, look, I am an 18 year old,
I have got some friends maybe going off to college or others
that may be starting careers. I would like to serve my country.
I see that it has a patriotic advantage, but I worry that 5 or
10 years down the road when I exit the military, or 20 years
down the road, my peers will have moved farther ahead, and I
won't.
So, making the case to young people that a military career
isn't a cul de sac or detour from life success, but it enhances
possible future careers, seems to be really, really important.
As you are approaching retooling, recruiting, how are you kind
of factoring that in?
Secretary Wormuth. Well, one of the things we are trying to
do is really get the word out in part through our marketing
about, you know, how that is basically a myth that you are
going to be left behind.
I mean, we have the GI Bill. We have certification programs
so that soldiers can earn, you know, certificates that are
marketable when they leave. What we have really tried to do is
to have some of our marketing efforts really focus on that and
kind of getting that information out there, and that is
obviously something that we make sure that our recruiters are
well versed in so they can talk to young people, and frankly,
their parents and other important influencers about all of the
benefits to joining the Army.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine. Senator
Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Wormuth,
General George, thank you for being with us today. We
appreciate your service to our country.
Secretary Wormuth, the Army will play a pivotal role in the
Western Pacific as the Department lead for the contested
logistics problem set. Congress has been providing bipartisan
support and funding for Project PELE Micro Nuclear Reactor.
Does the Army have any plans to transition the PELE
technology and regulatory approach for either operational or
installation energy resiliency solutions?
Secretary Wormuth. Well, we certainly are very focused on
energy and resilience at our installations and being able to
operate in a more resilient manner.
We are interested, I think, in the potential of micro
nuclear reactors, and I am familiar with the Project PELE
project. I think, you know, we are looking at and I think we
will soon be entering into some discussions, some informational
discussions with industry to learn more about what might be
possible.
Because certainly, to the extent that we are able to have a
reliable source of energy, if we have--you know, if the
electric grid in many of our communities goes down for some
reason, it certainly would be appealing to have something that
is dependable and reliable.
So, we are interested in exploring that, but I would say we
are still in the early stages.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. General George, can you describe
for the Committee how the fiscal year 2025 budget request takes
into consideration the Army's lead role in addressing the
contested logistics problem for the Department and the Joint
Force's sustainment needs?
I am thinking particularly with regard to the year 2027. I
would like your professional military opinion. Do you see--do
you believe that the Army will be able to fulfill its role and
meet those requirements?
General George. Senator, I do. Obviously, this is something
that we are working on very diligently. We are increasing--we
just stood up a watercraft company, for example, over in Japan
throughout this next TAA, Total Army Analysis.
We are looking at two additional. We are investing in the
LSV, you know, some of the same capability that is getting
ready to go over--that is out in the Mediterranean right now. I
will say that this is a joint mission that we are--you know
that we are getting after with that, just like we are doing
that mission. We have rehearsed those.
So that is I think the other thing that we have to do. We
have--in this next budget, 200 percent increase in our
exercising, obviously testing, doing all these things. Through
exercises is where we learn. We are going to be also doing it
with partners and allies. Then we are also taking a look at
overall what we need to do with, for example, on watercraft,
what can unmanned systems provide? What can we do with leasing?
Pre-positioned stocks is a part of this. So, I think we are
looking at this holistically. We have stood up here this--just
this last fall, a contested logistics cross-functional team
that is really focused on that for the whole Army.
Senator Rounds. How about with regard to the different
nations involved in the status of forces agreements and so
forth, are those coming together?
General George. Are you talking, Senator, like where we
would maybe station something or what our forward posture would
be?
Senator Rounds. Yes, and I am curious whether the--with
regard to the agreements themselves and so forth. The Army
takes a role, but does the State Department participate in
those discussions as well?
General George. Obviously that would--a lot of that is
going to be led by the Ambassador, by the State Department. It
is going to happen across the interagency, and I think, you
know, a good example of, you know, a great partnership that we
have right now is what--you know, how we have expanded with the
Philippines or what we have continue to do with those partners,
but----
Senator Rounds. Those particular agreements and so forth
are in line for being able to meet the needs by the year 2027.
General George. Obviously that is our focus, is moving out
quickly in all of those. I think that is--I know it is a
Department led and INDOPACOM, and--but really it is the whole
interagency, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Very good. Thank you. Secretary Wormuth,
the Army established the Joint Counter Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Office back in 2019 to coordinate counter UAS
development across the force.
The top two items on your unfunded priorities list are the
counter UAS items. Now, Senator King makes a really good point
when he talks about the costs involved. Can you share any
information about the JCO's role in General Brown's Counter UAS
Task Force?
Secretary Wormuth. Sure. First of all, I want to say, you
know, since 2020, the Army's invested about $3 billion in
counter UAS. So, we are very focused on that. We have spent
more than any other service. The Joint Capabilities Office is
really--their job is to go out for the whole Department and
work with industry to kind of bring forward what is possible so
that we can start investing in sort of the best available
technology, and then each service decides what they want to
buy. But it is playing a key role. We are also standing up a
joint counter UAS University at Fort Sill in Oklahoma, again to
help us learn, and I would let the chief speak to sort of the
UASs that are on his unfunded priority list.
General George. Yes, Senator. So, what we did--again, I
mentioned up front on the unfunded priorities list, it is stuff
that is executable, and specific to the counter UAS, it is what
we have seen change since October 7th, last fall, and, you
know, we have had some advancements in some of that.
We know that that environment and those systems are
changing very rapidly. So, there was one system on there
specifically that we wanted--was Roadrunner. We want to--there
is additional missiles that we need, like Coyote missiles that
we know are very, very effective, but we need to increase our
magazine depth. So those are the kinds of things that were on
there.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Warren,
please.
Senator Warren. So, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our military
families sacrifice a lot to serve their country and to keep
Americans safe. One thing they shouldn't have to worry about is
whether they are going to have a safe and affordable place to
live. We provide basic housing allowance and other assistance
to make sure that military families have what they need, but
often that is just not enough.
For example, the Commander at Fort Carson in Colorado has
26,000 people working on post, but he is able to offer only
3,100 family housing units. What is available off base is often
very expensive or requires a very long commute to get there,
all because we simply don't have enough housing for our people.
So, Secretary Wormuth, you oversee everything for the Army,
from personnel to equipment. Do you think that meeting military
families' housing needs is important both for recruiting and
retaining a strong military?
Secretary Wormuth. Absolutely. It is very important.
Senator Warren. Okay, I agree with you, and that is why
Congress created the Defense Community Infrastructure Program
to help communities address, and I am going to read,
deficiencies in community infrastructure supportive of a
military installation.
Now, DCIP provides grants to local governments for
transportation, building, and other infrastructure projects.
Secretary Wormuth, would you support using this program to
build more housing in communities near bases in order to help
us continue, excuse me, to attract the best and brightest to
serve in our military?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator Warren, this is a program that
is run by OSD, and like you said, it is Generally grants to
community. So, I know we do use it for things like assessments
of utilities and things like that in partnership with
communities where we have our installations.
You know, I think additional authority for housing is
always helpful. The real challenge, though, with housing is
money. You know, at the end of the day----
Senator Warren. I understand that. But you don't get what
you don't ask for here. So, let's start with the idea of
recognizing we are in a housing crisis, and making this a
priority in terms of getting funding in for housing for our
military, does that work for you?
Secretary Wormuth. Yes, and we are certainly trying to
find--you know, for example, with our privatized housing
partners, we are trying to find more ways to help get money
into that portfolio.
Senator Warren. Okay. I am coming to them. Let me mention
one other problem here. I have concerns about the safety of the
housing we provide to servicemembers and their families.
Now, Congress recently adopted reforms to address housing
deficiencies, including requiring the DOD to create a public
complaint data base to put a stop to Government contractors
acting like slumlords and then hiding settlements when they get
caught. I got that bill passed 5 years ago, 5 years, and today
DOD still does not have that data base up and operational.
Even worse, these Government contractors continue to muzzle
military families by requiring them to sign nondisclosure
agreements. So, there is no record of the mold, or the broken
windows, or the water damage, or the rats, or any other unsafe
housing conditions that military families are forced to put up
with.
Secretary Wormuth, do you think it is appropriate for
Government contractors to ask military families to stay silent
in return for those companies meeting their basic obligations
to provide safe housing?
Secretary Wormuth. We encourage our soldiers and their
families to use the dispute resolution process to the max----
Senator Warren. Yes, but the part I am worried about are
the nondisclosure agreements that come out of that, the NDAs.
Secretary Wormuth. What I would say about that, Senator, is
I think, you know, we appreciate the provision that you put in
that basically requires that their soldiers have 10 days before
they are even asked to sign an NDA.
What we do is offer a lawyer that the Army will pay for to
advise our soldiers and family members of their rights before
they contemplate signing an NDA.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that that is better than it
used to be, but it is not as good as it ought to be.
Last year's NDAA put in restrictions on the use of non-
disclosure agreements. I just think we are going to have to set
a much brighter line. No landlord should be able to make
military families sign NDAs in exchange for providing basic
housing, period. No NDAs on that. Before I close, I want to say
one other thing and I will just say it quickly, and that is to
you, General George.
There is a significant disconnect between Army rhetoric and
action. When you were confirmed, you told this Committee, ``I
will make every effort to honor our commitment by providing
quality barracks to our soldiers.''
Sounded great. But on your unfunded priorities list, the
list of things that you were not willing to fight for funding
in your basic budget, right near the bottom of your unfunded
priorities list is money to repair the barracks in Fort Devens,
Massachusetts. You can't stand up and say you care about
housing your people and then not make housing repairs a part of
your base budget.
There is no surprise here. It was deteriorating and
deteriorating over a long period of time. So, I want to work
with the Army on this. I know I am over time, but we got to
stop playing games on this and follow through. We have to
deliver better housing for our people. Thank you. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Budd,
please.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you
both for being here. Secretary Wormuth, I sent you a letter
regarding the Joint Deployment Warfighting Complex at Fort
Liberty.
You sent me a prompt response, so thank you for that. It
was really about consolidating the 18th Airborne Corps
headquarters into a single modern building.
The 18th Airborne Corps, it is spread out over 26
facilities, some 40 acres, and it really wasn't designed to
support the headquarters? current mission to rapidly respond to
contingencies around the world, particularly not with the IT
systems and cyber resiliency requirements that we have today.
So, I understand this project, it is slated to reach 35
percent planning and design over the next 6 months. So, my
question to you is, will you commit to keeping this Committee
updated on this project's timeline?
Secretary Wormuth. Yes, certainly, Senator Budd.
Senator Budd. Thank you, and I understand it is going to
compete with other Army requirements, but this is a top
priority not just to North Carolina and to Fort Liberty, but
from an operational and readiness perspective for the whole of
Army.
So, if you would, please. Thank you. General George, again,
thank you for being here. I appreciated our discussion earlier
in the week. The Army has selected Fort Liberty as home of its
5th Multi-Domain Task Force. Is that correct, sir?
General George. That is correct, Senator. Yes.
Senator Budd. Thank you. Can you elaborate on the
capabilities of these multi-domain task forces and where we are
in building these out?
General George. Yes. So, we are at various stages. Right
now, I was actually the Commander up at the JBLM and we had the
first MDTF.
So, what--and the big piece that will go in and that we
will build, and I think will be important for 18th Airborne
Corps, the 82d, really everybody that is there, is the effects
battalion that will go in that will have the cyber, space, EW.
So, all lethal targeting and non-lethal that is part of that,
which I think is critically important.
Also, part of MDTFs, and we are stationing these in
different areas, but there is also long range fires, indirect
fire protection capabilities, and support battalion. Liberty is
really important to us. Obviously, what you were just talking
about with what it does to support the Joint Force and rapid
response.
Looking--so having that capability there, in the space that
you have, and we also get some economies of scale with all of
the--given it is a large base with all the other MLs that we
are going to put there.
Senator Budd. Thank you. You know, on a different topic, we
have talked a lot about counter UAS. So, to add on to that,
clarify for me, is it purely additional resources that you
need, General, or are there new authorities there that would be
helpful? I know we talked a little bit about this on Monday.
General George. I think--well, there is two aspects of
this. For some of the authorities, for us specifically, is
being able to, you know, go from research and development to
actually procuring things, what I was talking about.
I think if you are coming back stateside and you are
looking at actually defending airfields and critical
infrastructure, there are some additional things. I think
NORTHCOM right now is doing a study kind of on what that is,
because there is obviously--it is an interagency challenge when
you are looking at, you know, small UASs that are operating
here stateside.
But for us and forward, I think we are in a good place.
Senator Budd. Thank you. You know, North Carolina is also
proud home of the 30th Armored Brigade Combat Team, and I am
aware of planned upgrades to their Abrams tanks, but also I am
interested in whether we will see a replacement for Bradley
infantry fighting vehicles. What is the status of the XM-30
program?
General George. I have had--we just went through the, you
know, the requirement and go into this. It is--we do need to
upgrade our infantry fighting vehicle. We are going through the
process of that. I do think that that will be a significant
leap forward for us, and I will have somebody come over and
kind of brief you the detailed timeline on what we are looking
at that.
Senator Budd. If you would, please. Thank you. Madam
Secretary, I would like to talk about munitions that are going
to be critical in the conflict in the Indo-Pacific. I am
thinking the precision strike missiles and guided MLRS rockets.
My first question is, have you identified any production lines
that have additional capacity? If so, which ones?
Secretary Wormuth. Well, we do--you know, we are using
multiyear procurement authority that you all gave us for GMLRS.
So, I think there is more capacity there. Precision strike
missile, we have funding in this year's budget for sort of the
first wave of precision strike missile. I think at this point
we don't have additional capacity. We are still sort of--that
program is still in the beginning of its effort.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd. Senator Kelly,
please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Wormuth,
I want to followup on Senator Budd's question about munitions.
But, you know, really, you know, concerns we have with our
defense industrial base and, you know, industry struggling to
produce enough to support even the limited conflict in Ukraine.
In a conflict with a near our adversary, we will use munitions
much faster than we are having to replace the ones we are
sending to Ukraine today. That is clear.
It is also clear that more needs to be done to prepare our
industrial base for possible future conflict. One of the keys
to bridging this gap is what Senator Budd mentioned, which is
the multiyear procurement, which allows DOD to send a steady
demand signal to companies and leads to long term reductions in
acquisition costs.
The Army has been taking advantage of multi-year
procurement to help replenish stockpiles and ensure that we are
well postured for future conflicts. So, Secretary Wormuth, can
you talk about--a little bit more broadly about multi-year
contracts and how the Army is currently taking advantage of
them to save money and invest in the future? General, please
feel free to add anything to her comments.
Secretary Wormuth. Certainly. Thanks, Senator Kelly. We
have found the multi-year procurement authority to be very
helpful for exactly the reason that you said, which is
essentially that it sends a very strong demand signal to
industry that there is a consistent need for that investment,
and they are more willing, frankly, to invest in their own
facilitation when they have essentially a guaranteed buy, you
know, over multiple years. So, I think that has been very
helpful with both GMLRS and the Pac-3s.
Senator Kelly. What else are we buying in multiyear
procurements?
Secretary Wormuth. Right now, if I am not mistaken, I think
those are the two sets of munitions for which we are using the
multiyear. You know, we are spending over $3 billion a year on
munitions more broadly, but I think those are the two that we
have multiyear authority----
Senator Kelly. Do you plan on expanding that to other
munitions?
Secretary Wormuth. I think we have been in conversations at
the staff level about a couple more places where that might be
applicable.
If I am not mistaken, I think we have to demonstrate, you
know, a certain amount of cost savings. There is a threshold
that one has to meet to be able to get multiyear procurement
authority. So, I think that is kind of where the conversation
has been with some of the professional staff.
Senator Kelly. Then General, do you see our stocks going up
at a higher rate than you would have expected without a
multiyear on those two items?
General George. I think, Senator, the multi-years are
definitely very helpful to us, and we appreciate it. I think
one of the challenges, and I will just go back to the--you
know, during the continuing resolution, if we wanted to
increase any, you know, new productions, new starts, we
couldn't do--you know, we couldn't do any of that.
So, we lost time with that. It is why also for the Army,
the supplemental is very important to them because we have got,
you know, more than $3 billion worth of, of munitions we need
to put in there. So, I think it is a combination of all of
those things that are going to help us move forward.
Senator Kelly. Then, General, another subject. The Army is
working to modernize its airborne ISR capability, divesting in
older turboprop planes and investing in more, you know, some
more modern aircraft.
The new HADES system is going to be a significant increase
in range and capability. It is vital that this new capability
is based at a location where the aircrew can train for any
threat environment that is similar to what they would face in
combat. The new signals intelligence capabilities will require
that your pilots have regular access to ranges that can
simulate the threat they will face in combat.
So, General, do you agree that access to electronic testing
ranges will be vital to ensure that the continued--ensure the
continued development and success of HADES?
General George. Yes, I agree with you 100 percent, Senator.
I was down--I mean, the John R. Fox Range is one of those that
has incredible capability for us, for the whole Army.
Senator Kelly. The, you know, Fort Huachuca in Southern
Arizona. I mean, it is uniquely positioned to support this
mission. It already does RC-12 training. It has got the
electronic range, the electronic proving ground.
You don't need to go very far to train because it is right
there. You know, it is not like, you know, other bases that I
have been at. You have to, you know, make up a pretty long trek
to the range. I just want to get your assurances from both you
and the Secretary that the Army will consider these factors
when deciding basing operations for HADES.
General George. We will definitely consider all of those,
and just on the HADES, it is from all of the COCOMS are very
positive about having that asset supporting them.
Senator Kelly. Okay. Secretary.
Secretary Wormuth. Same.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Sergeant Kelly. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, I want to return to the
line of questioning earlier about recruiting. You have said
that you don't want to be overconfident, but you think we have
a good shot at making that goal this year, the goal being
55,000.
But isn't it the case that you dropped your goal this year
because not many people are joining the Army since you joined,
or since you became the Secretary?
Secretary Wormuth. It is true that our goal last year,
Senator Cotton, was 65,000. General McConville and I set that
as a stretch goal. That is how we characterized it. So, this
year, between 55,000 new contracts and 5,000 in the DEP, it is
60,000.
Senator Cotton. Last year, you forecasted that you would
need 62,600 for this year. Why did you cut that?
Secretary Wormuth. Again, we look at what is possible, and
we set a goal that we think is both----
Senator Cotton. Do you look at what is possible or what is
needed?
Secretary Wormuth. Well, we--General George and I----
Senator Cotton. Possible is pretty low since you became the
Secretary----
Secretary Wormuth. Actually----
Senator Cotton. The question was needed for our Army to
defend our Nation.
Secretary Wormuth. Senator Cotton, the chief and I are both
committed to growing back our end strength. We are aiming to
get up to 470,000 by 2029, and our recruiting is improving,
consistently.
Senator Cotton. Well, if it is improving because you are
throwing a dart at the wall and then drawing the bullseye
around it. In your first full year on the job, the target was
60,000. You didn't even get 45,000.
Last year it was 65,000. You got 55,000. You had projected
last year for it to be 62,600 this year, and conveniently, you
decided to change the goal to 55,000, which is exactly what you
got last year.
You don't think that is a little suspicious that you are
simply trying to avoid negative headlines once again for your
failure to meet basic recruiting goals, goals that we have met
almost every single year since 2005?
Secretary Wormuth. I am not focused on headlines, Senator
Cotton. What I am doing is doing everything possible to help
the Army improve its recruiting, and that is what we are doing.
Senator Cotton. Does the Army need 7,600 fewer soldiers
than you expected this year, and than you expected it would
need last year?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army has been able to meet all of
the requirements that the Combatant Commands have levied on us
at our current end strength, and our end strength is going to
start going up.
Senator Cotton. What are the requirements that have changed
in the last year from those Combatant Commands that allowed you
to drop your goal, not just from the 65,000 it was last year to
55,000 this year, but from the 62,600 that you predicted last
year that you would need this year. What requirements have
decreased on the Army's--?
Secretary Wormuth. The requirements haven't changed, and we
were able to----
Senator Cotton. You would think so since the world is going
up in smoke because of Joe Biden's failed policies.
Secretary Wormuth. Were able to meet all of the Combatant
Command requirements last year. We have been able to meet them
this year. But we are still focused on growing our end
strength.
Senator Cotton. I mean, we met our recruiting goals at the
height of the pandemic in 2020 and 2021. You can't meet your
recruiting goals now without dropping them by 10,000 from what
they were last year?
Secretary Wormuth. All of the services are facing
challenges, but I am proud to say we have----
Senator Cotton. Your service is acute--the challenges of
your service are acute.
Secretary Wormuth. Yes, we because we have the biggest
force, and we have to recruit the largest number. But we are
doing considerably better this year.
Senator Cotton. I am looking at every single year here,
62,500, 68,500, 76,500, 68,000, 61,200. This is not a systemic
problem until you became the Secretary.
Secretary Wormuth. Senator Cotton, I don't think that there
is a correlation between me becoming Secretary and the
recruiting headwinds that the entire Department has been
facing.
Senator Cotton. Okay, I want to touch on another recruiting
matter, or I guess a force strength matter. I noticed a story
in Stars and Stripes from January that there is a shortage of
about 250 officers in adjutant General, finance, and signal
corps, and the Army was going to ask infantry and armor
officers to transfer. Has that happened?
Secretary Wormuth. I will have to take that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Wormuth. For year group 2021, the Army identified
it would be overstrength in IN and AR officers at the rank of
Captain. Rather than losing talented officers, U.S. Army Human
Resources Command hosted a volunteer Officer Requirements
Rebranching Program (ORRP) that allowed all YG21 IN & AR
officers the opportunity to volunteer to branch transfer from
their basic branch to either AG, FC, or SC by submitting their
preferences for these branches within a special officer market.
No officers were forced to transfer from combat arms as part of
this process.
Senator Cotton. General George, do you know any more
details?
General George. Yes, I can--yes, typically, as you know,
Senator, we typically have more combat arms, lieutenants----
Senator Cotton. So that is----
General George. Typically, we do VTIP. This was a done a
little bit earlier that we knew because of our structure. We
are actually growing some additional MDTF, which came up
earlier. Signal is, for example, is one of them or MI, where
you typically have more captains and majors than you do
lieutenants.
So that was what that was, and what we did is took
volunteers. We just put the message out, because we want to
keep talent, and it is actually really good for us to infuse
those branches with people that have experience in the combat
arms.
Senator Cotton. Yes, normally things like signal and AG are
our donor branches at the lieutenant ranks to infantry. But it
is infantry officer ranks, whatever the Army as whole.
Infantry, armor officer ranks are healthy right now at the
company level?
General George. We are very healthy for lieutenants,
Senator. We are doing well on that.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you. One final issue, Secretary
Wormuth, the Caisson Platoon. The Army just acknowledged that
they are not on track to get Caisson operations back up at
Arlington National Cemetery.
This has been an ongoing issue now for more than a year. We
directed you in the NDAA to make sure the Caisson Platoon
remains in existence. You fought that tooth and nail last year.
What is the issue here? It is horses pulling wagons.
It has been happening since before recorded time. Why can't
these families who have a right to a horse drawn case on their
funeral expect that is going to happen?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator Cotton, first of all, we didn't
have any plans to get rid of the Caisson Platoon. We have
actually spent a lot----
Senator Cotton. You fought my amendment tooth and nail
about it, so I don't know what--I mean, I don't know if you
have an animal rights activist from PETA on your staff handling
this issue. But why can't you get horses pulling wagons in the
cemetery?
Secretary Wormuth. There is a range of challenges, and we
can come and talk to you in detail.
Senator Cotton. Old guard did this for decades.
Secretary Wormuth. Yes, and the horses that did that for
decades are now old and lame.
Senator Cotton. They have always been old. They have always
been retired from other activities.
Secretary Wormuth. Well, we are now trying to grow the
herd. We have been focused on this incredibly hard. We are
looking at additional pasture land. We are going to have to
rebuild the stables that you probably remember. But we are very
focused on trying to get to a point where we are able to offer,
again, the Caisson service with the funerals.
Senator Cotton. If the Army under your leadership can't
figure out horses pulling wagons, it is not a surprise they
can't figure out increasing munitions manufacturing or drone
warfare.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Peters,
please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Wormuth,
General George, welcome to the Committee and thank you both for
your service to our country. In response to a question asked by
Senator Budd, it seems clear that the Army knows that the
future conflicts that we are going to face, we are going to
require some new units, with example is the Army's Multi-Domain
Task Forces at the very center of those modernization efforts
that you are undertaking now.
When forward positions, these MDTFs will ensure freedom of
operations for U.S. forces in what are going to be heavily
denied environments. As you stand up--so my question for both
of you is, as you stand up additional MDTFs, I hope that the
Army will pursue a similar force structure to the Security
Force Assistant Brigades, SFABs.
Currently Active Duty SFABs are aligned with Combatant
Commands, while a National Guard SFAB is globally aligned. So,
my question specifically to both of you is, are you in
conversations with the National Guard about a guard based MDTF,
and if so, what additional analysis is going to be needed prior
to making an informed decision on future MDTF force structure?
Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Senator Peters. Right now,
our plan is to develop five multi-domain task forces, as I
think you noted. We aren't currently thinking about yet having
an MDTF in the Guard.
The MDTFs are very, very new. I think the first MDTF had
come online right as I became Secretary, you know, more than
three and a half years ago. We have--it has been a journey. We
have been learning.
You know, right now we think the five is what we are going
to need, but we are very much a total Army, and we are always
in conversation with our colleagues in the Guard about, you
know, changes to their force structure as well.
So, I think it is something that we will remain open minded
to, but right now our plan is for the five in the Active.
Senator Peters. So, there are no active discussions beyond
that?
General George. Can I jump in?
Secretary Wormuth. Sure.
General George. Yes, I would not--I think the Secretary
exactly--you know larger MDTF just because of what we require.
What we are--I have had some discussions, and I would say these
are initial discussions with a lot of the Guard leaders is
there is a lot of space capabilities, cyber.
I mean, we get, you know, a lot of capability from that,
not just for MDTFs, but in the Guard and Reserve, and COMPO 2
and COMPO 3. How do we maximize that capability? You know, how
could we have plugs?
For example, when I went over to Afghanistan as a division
commander, I took--there was a large number of National Guard
folks that were--that built out our intel and targeting just
because of their expertise. So that is what we are talking
about.
I would just say that those have been preliminary
conversations because we know we have capability in the Guard
and the Reserve, how could they maybe augment some of this
stuff that we are doing already.
Senator Peters. Yes. Great, and that is important. A lot of
these members of the Guard have extensive civilian experience
and some very high level of skill sets that they can bring to
their duties.
So, it is good to hear that that is happening. Secretary
Wormuth, last week, the EPA issued Federal drinking water
standards for six PFAS chemicals. These standards include PFAS
chemicals previously used by the Army and National Guard in
firefighting foams at many installations across the country,
but one in particular that I am focused on is Camp Grayling in
Michigan, where PFAS contaminated drinking water is a serious
and real concern for the local community--something that folks
around the country are dealing with right now.
So, my question for you, ma'am, is what is the Army's plan
and timeline for conforming with these new EPA standards? When
can impacted residents, in Grayling, Michigan in particular,
expect to see some action to conform to these new EPA
standards?
Secretary Wormuth. Thanks, Senator Peters. Yes, I am
broadly aware of the new standards that the EPA has set for
PFAS. I think, you know, we have already been working closely
with folks at Camp Grayling, which is a great training area, by
the way, to work on eradicating PFAS at the previous levels.
I think what I would say is I would love to send our
installations and our environment team over to talk to your
office in detail about sort of how we will be approaching the
new raised level and what the timelines associated with that
will be.
But we want to continue to be proactive with you all about
getting into compliance with the EPA standards.
Senator Peters. Well, it is good. Could we arrange that
meeting sooner rather than later?
Secretary Wormuth. Yes. Happy to do that.
Senator Peters. Right. We appreciate that commitment. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator
Duckworth, please.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to
both of our witnesses. I am glad we are having a conversation
about the role of the Guard and the Reserve, because I think
they are an important part of our overall force.
Right now, as you have already acknowledged, National Guard
and Reserve servicemembers have specific qualifications and
specific skills that are highly needed. Yet those who have
specific qualifications are only paid a fraction of what their
Active Duty counterparts are paid in incentive pay, although
they maintain the same skill sets.
I have consistently advocated for fixing this problem and
passed legislation to address this incentive pay disparities
several years ago, and we even updated it in last year's NDAA.
Bottom line, you get the same two paratroopers who make their
three jumps in a single day. The Active Duty one is going to
get a full month's worth of incentive pay.
The guard or reservist will get 1/30th of that incentive
pay for the same three jobs that they took. This is
fundamentally unfair. Last year's update, Section 612 of Fiscal
Year 2024 NDAA, was meant to clarify Congress's intent that
special and incentive pays should be paid equally to members of
the Active and Reserve components.
If these pays are intended to encourage Reserve component
servicemembers to maintain a skill or proficiency identical to
that required of the member in the Active component, or to
compensate the reservist for exposure to hazards or risk
identified to hazards or risk faced by an Active Duty
servicemember.
My update from last year requires the Service Secretaries
to go back and review each type of special and incentive pay
individually and certify that those pays that meet this
criteria to be paid out to members of the Reserve component
equally, if doing so will not hurt retention. It is starting to
feel like I am being slow rolled.
We need to get these paid. I mean, these folks have earned
it. They should get the same amount of pay as the Active Duty
folks. The pilots who go out there and maintain their minimum
flying hour requirements that are the same as Active Duty
pilots should get a full month's worth of pay.
Those paratroopers, they should get a full month's worth of
jump pay, just like the Active Duty troops do. Secretary
Wormuth, do you commit to completing this review to ensure that
servicemembers within the Army Reserve components are paid the
same special and incentive pays as their Active Duty
counterparts when they maintain the same critical skills or
face the same risk. What is your timeline for doing so?
Secretary Wormuth. Thanks, Senator Duckworth. Yes, we are
working with RAND right now to basically help us develop a
framework to be able to assess--you know, as you know very
well, there are many different types of special pays and
incentives, but there is also many different types of duty
statuses for Guard and Reservists.
So, we have been working with RAND to come up essentially
with a framework that is going to be a tool for us to be able
determine which special pays and incentives may qualify for the
full pay. I will have to take for the record the exact timeline
when the RAND work will be completed, but I can assure you, we
are not trying to slow roll.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Wormuth. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Personnel & Readiness) anticipates the report in August 2025.
Meanwhile, Office of the Secretary of Defense has formed a
working group, with stakeholders from across the Department, to
develop a process for assessing special or incentive pays for
Reserve component members without adversely affecting the
regular component. OSD aims to conduct this work in parallel
with the RAND study. As you know, 37 U.S.C 1001 states, ``a
Secretary of a military department may not prescribe a
regulation under this title or any other law, relating to the
pay and allowances of members of an Armed Force under that
department, unless it has been approved under procedures
prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.''
Senator Duckworth. All right. I will get back in touch with
you in 90 days to get that timeline. Secretary Wormuth, in your
opening statement, you communicated you would continue to
prioritize the Indo-Pacific.
The Indo-Pacific region is also a priority for me. As the
Army continues its modernization efforts, I am ready and
available to lend my support to ensure the Army's resource and
postured for any future conflicts in the region.
In fact, along, with Senator Sullivan we will be leading a
CODEL to the Shangri-La dialogs that are coming up in just over
a month. The Army would need to operate in a distributed but a
connected manner for survivability, placing greater demands on
enablers such as logistics, force protection, and command and
control.
The Army's current backbone of its intra-theater lift in
the Indo-Pacific, consists of Army watercraft systems like the
LSV and the MSB. But I am concerned that the Army is not
dedicating enough funding to these platforms in its fiscal year
2025 budget, which can only lead to a capacity gap in our
intra-theater sealift.
Secretary Wormuth, how does the Army plan to fund and
continue to modernize Army watercraft systems over the next few
fiscal years?
Secretary Wormuth. Thanks, Senator. As you noted, first of
all, we have a composite watercraft company in Japan. I am
actually going to get to see that in July myself. We have money
in the budget for the MSB Lite version that I think will begin
fielding, if I am not mistaken in fiscal year 2028.
We also have a requirement for a heavy version of that. As
the chief alluded to earlier, we are exploring with Army
Materiel Command, what we can do in terms of offshore supply,
vessels, things that the commercial sector is using that may be
more cost effective for us, because we do see the requirement
for contested logistics as substantial.
But as is the case with many things, our challenge is
having enough resources to be able to do that, but then also
invest in air and missile defenses and other things that we
need. But that is broadly the outlines of our plan.
Senator Duckworth. I am all for buying off the shelf if it
is cheaper and it could work, and it is to keep our troops safe
and accomplish the mission. General George, I am going to pass
it over to you.
Can you describe the Army's current capabilities for intra-
theater sealift in Indo-Pacific? How is the Army working with
other services, and Combatant Commands like TRANSCOM, to
develop a unified intra-theater sealift strategy for the Indo-
Pacific?
General George. Thank you, Senator. You kind of summed it
up at the end there. These, you know, any time we are going to
do any anything out there, it is going to be a joint mission.
We are going to have to work with everybody. Just, and I know
the Secretary got to see the JLOTS when it went in for Talisman
Saber down in Australia.
So, we are looking at all the different aircraft or the
watercraft, and we are looking at how the oil industry, for
example, send stuff. They do a lot of unmanned systems and
leasing. I also think this gets after also what are we doing
with 3D print. It is the whole contested logistics.
How are we doing tele-maintenance, what do we have for pre-
positioned stock, where we are doing it. Then the other thing I
just wanted to highlight that you kind of set up front as far
as being distributed. A big part of that too is making sure on
our network that we are also low signature.
You know, this is important for all of us, and that will
tie all of that together. Our contested logistics, CFT, we
would love to have them come up and brief you, on what they are
doing in advancing all of these areas, was stood up last fall,
and they are getting after all of this.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, just one quick
thing. I would like to submit for the record a question for--on
aeromedical evacuation in the Indo-Pacific. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Senator Duckworth. Senator
Schmitt, please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General George, I
do want to give you a shout out here. I think that looking for
those new and innovative ways to recruit is sometimes a
challenge but always welcomed.
I saw recently that the Army has entered into a partnership
with the UFL, which is the new spring football league. I am a
little biased here. The Saint Louis Battle Hawks have the
highest by far and away, highest attendance numbers. They
averaged 35,000 people at these games.
I think that is a smart way to reach a new audience. I
think there is going to be a lot of opportunities there. Can
you walk me through how this kind of came to be and what you
expect from it?
General George. Sure, Senator. The--and I agree with you.
We do think it will be a good audience. People love watching
football. I am top of that list.
The part of this with the UFL that I like about the
comparisons are these are a bunch of last year, I think there
was 100 that came out of the UFL that went into the pros. I
mean, what we need to get out to everybody, it is the same
thing in the Army, you can come into the Army, and you can
accelerate your life.
You are going to advance your life. So, they were
interested in this partnership with us, and we studied it with
our marketing agency, and we are in a 1-year, you know,
agreement to see how this works.
But so far, it has been really good, and we have had
troopers telling their stories at every one of these games
across all campus. I am sure we have had soldiers out there on
the sideline doing that, which I think is great.
Senator Schmitt. That is good. Yes, maybe we will have to
followup and get you the--a t shirt, the call is the law, which
is the call is for the Battle Hawks. Anyway, all right. So,
Secretary Wormuth, I do want to ask you a question. You know, I
enjoyed our visit at Fort Leonard Wood.
I guess it was around a year ago. It was in August, maybe.
As you know, in last year's NDAA, it required certain criteria
and certifications be made by you before the Army can relocate
the Army CID special agent training course or any of its
training cadre. Despite that, our office has learned recently
that the Army is already in the midst of a comprehensive
overhaul of CID training and composition.
Maybe most concerning, the Army Times reported that ``in
the Army, the lowest retention job specialties for men were
criminal investigation division special agent, with a retention
rate of 38 percent for fiscal year 2023.'' We also learned that
CID agents are already flowing through pipelines in the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center, the FLETC.
So, this was one of the things that we were trying to
address in the NDAA, and it feels like--and I would like for
you to maybe give some explanation. It feels like this is an
effort to get around the law because there is supposed to be a
process before what appears to be happening is actually
happening.
So, I wanted to give you an opportunity to walk me through
this because it feels like a workaround.
Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, Senator Schmitt. We do not
want to try to do a workaround. You know, I think, as you know
very, very well, we are in the process of transforming the
criminal investigative division, and it is our intent to have
60 percent of those agents become civilian.
That is a big change, and I think--I am not intimately
familiar with the retention statistics for CID, but I think
part of what you are seeing a little bit is change is hard. I
am certainly aware, you know, and I know that there is some
anxiety from our uniformed folks about the transformation.
But we want to comply with the law, and what I would like
to do is make sure that we have Director Ford come and brief
you on how he is proceeding. You know, certainly we continue to
plan to have our MPs and agents trained at Fort Leonard Wood.
There is also, I think, some training they are doing with
FLETC, but what I would like to do is have Director Ford come
and talk with you in detail about what they are doing.
Senator Schmitt. Okay, let's do that. Because that is a
very important role that Fort Leonard Wood plays. I think one
of the reasons why we wanted to make sure before there is any
real change, that it is a real process.
It appears as though maybe some things are being moved
away, whether it is without those certifications or not. So, we
will work with you on that and look forward to that briefing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Schmitt. I have
been informed that Senator Rosen also would like to return and
ask her questions, so let me take this opportunity to continue
the theme of congested logistics.
Critical to that is fuel efficiency of every moving
platform, together with improved maintenance. General George,
can you comment on the progress for making and the plans you
have in that regard? Then I will ask Senator Wormuth.
General George. Chairman, I think hybridization is
important to us. One for the--reduce our logistical tail for
our formations. So, I think we are looking at hybridization for
all of our vehicles that are out there, specifically any of our
newer platforms.
We are--the other big advantage that you get with this is
that you also get silent watch and silent approach. So, they--
also these vehicles are going to be more lethal on the
battlefield. So, I mean, that is really what we are looking at
in total with some of this effort.
We are looking at, there may be some sensors out there that
may be--you know, that would be strictly electric, because then
we could do the same thing on the ground, get them out there,
silent approach and put them out there.
But I think all of those things combined are going to make
us more lethal and more mobile on the battlefield, on lower
signature.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, and your comments, Madam
Secretary.
Secretary Wormuth. Chairman, the only thing I would add is
two things, maybe one. I think an additional benefit of some of
the hybrid vehicles that we are looking at is that in addition
to fuel efficiency, silent watch, they offer, in some cases,
the ability to power other devices that we have so we can
actually hook, you know, other systems that we have up to those
batteries.
Then the second thing I would note is just, you know, this
is an area where the commercial sector has done a lot of work.
So, we are trying to partner with companies in the commercial
sector to leverage all of the investment they have already made
to see how it can benefit us in the Army.
Chairman Reed. One topic that has come up in your
conversations, discussions is the notion of maintenance in the
field, employing 3D printing, and also having the intellectual
property to do that effectively. Is that a specific goal and
program you have in place, Madam Secretary?
Secretary Wormuth. We are certainly looking at everything
we can do with 3D printing in terms of helping us with
contested logistics--helping us get, you know, parts much
closer to the tactical edge, if you will.
We are looking at, you know, what we can do with that. You
know, obviously, one of the issues there with 3D printing is
making sure that the components that are being fabricated meet
our safety standards.
So, there is some work that we have to do there. I think
another thing that we are doing is tell a maintenance. You
know, that is something we have seen be very, very effective in
Ukraine. So, thinking about how we can apply tele-maintenance
for ourselves.
The other thing I would add, again, that we have also seen
with the Ukrainians is the importance of predictive analytics
when it comes to logistics. So, we are now doing much more to
be able to see where everything we need is and to be able to
anticipate what future requirements may be.
Chairman Reed. General George, you have any comments?
General George. Sure. I will add on the 3D printing. The
other thing that we can look at, I think for the future, is UAS
is something else that we are looking at.
So, whether or not you are producing kind of the bus or the
body part of an unmanned system, whether it was ground or air
or that you could also replace it. So much like the Secretary
said, we are--I think we are trying to look at this at scale
to--out in Rock Island, there is one of the largest, you know,
additive manufacturing capabilities that we have in the Army.
So, you know, when we struggle with long lead time parts, I
think that that is definitely something that could fill that
in.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. I just want to add a
comment. I was out at Fort Sill on Friday and was at the
university designed to develop tactics against drones.
I was impressed, but I think we have a long, long way to
go, in terms of the devices to engage them and also just to
tactics too. But I will command both of you for establishing
that facility.
We are thinking ahead rather than reacting to something
that is facing us. So, my commendation to both. Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Oh, thank you, Chairman Reed. I really
appreciate you are holding it open for me. I would also like to
thank Secretary Wormuth and General George for testifying today
and for following through on your commitments to me to build
Nevada's first certified small arms training range so the
Nevada National Guard will no longer have to travel out of
State to fulfill their annual weapons qualification.
It is at an average cost of half a million dollars per
unit--$500,000. So, saving money too, and the inclusion of the
range in the President's Budget request is greatly appreciated,
because this range is going to improve the readiness of the
National Guard, their ability to answer the Nation's call at a
greater convenience, and like I said, lower cost to the
taxpayer. So, we have cyber workforce development issues.
So, in the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA, it included my bipartisan
legislation authorizing the Army to create a civilian
cybersecurity Reserve to provide CYBERCOM with qualified
civilian personnel to serve in Reserve capacities to support
operations in cyberspace.
So, Secretary Wormuth, what is the status of the
implementation plan for the civilian cyber Reserve?
Senator Rosen. Thanks, Senator Rosen, and we are very
pleased that we were able to get that range in the budget.
On the Civilian Cyber Corps, you know, we absolutely want
to make sure we are taking as much advantage as we can of all
of the available cyber expertise. I think what we have been in
discussions with USCYBERCOM is to think of--is to work with
them.
First of all, NSA does the badging and the credentialing
that would be required for those civilians. So, we don't
control that. But I think what we can do is talk to CYBERCOM
about what are their requirements.
We can look at our requirements and see if there's a way to
structure a pilot to think about exactly where would we need to
have civilians fill in and sort of how to do that. But I think
we are a service that would like to have a pilot to look at
what can be done.
Senator Rosen. As a former computer programmer, I would
have--now I am doing this, but in my younger days and in my--
even as I got into my 40's or 50's, I would have liked to have
been able to serve at this point to do what I did as a
programmer.
So, I think it is important to have that. But I want to
move on, Secretary, with the impact of the EPA ruling on
Hawthorne Army Depot. So, Hawthorne Army Depot, it is in
Northern Nevada, and we demilitarized one-third of the
Department of Defense obsolete munitions via open burn and
detonation.
As you are aware, the Environmental Protection Agency
recently proposed a new rule to revise regulations that allow
for open burning and detonation of certain explosives like
munition and propellants. The rule does not consider the
National Security implications for DOD facilities, or the lack
of available technology for large scale disposal, and this
could have serious impacts on Hawthorne.
The rule is now open for public comment after going through
interagency review process, and from conversations that my
office has had with your staff and with Hawthorne, I know the
Army has serious concerns with the impact of this rule on your
ability to fulfill DOD's munitions demilitarization
requirements, should it take effect.
Maybe you could speak to us about what would happen if the
implementation is written, as the way they want to do it now.
What challenges would this rule create for facilities like
Hawthorne to be able to accomplish the critical mission we have
of ensuring the readiness of the munitions stockpile and also
the impact on the workforce at Hawthorne?
Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Senator, and I am broadly
aware of the EPA rule that is out there right now for comment
right now.
I would agree with you, I think it could have significant
implications for Hawthorne. Actually, the chief and I were over
on the House side earlier this week, and one of your colleagues
in the delegation raised it. You know, we need to be able to
dispose of the munitions that are there that are being stored
at Hawthorne.
There is a lot of important work that is done there. In
some cases, in the past, we have been able to find alternative
technologies that we can use----
Senator Rosen. There isn't alternative technologies for
most of it yet.
Secretary Wormuth. So, yes--so that is one of the concerns
that we have. So, what I would like to do is, you know, do some
consultations with the Army Materiel Command and look in more
detail at what this might mean for Hawthorne, and then proceed
from there. But it certainly we need to have that munitions
disposal capability.
Secretary Wormuth. I think we need to be working with the
EPA because once they finalize this rule, it is going to be
much more difficult. So, I am going to have my office contact
you to see how we engage in this process while they are doing
this, before they make a determination. We have to find some
other way around it. That is going to have an impact on this
important mission.
Secretary Wormuth. Certainly.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I see that my time is up, and I
see Senator Sullivan is here. So, thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Sullivan,
if you could stay within the 5-minute mark because we want to
go and start a closed session.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, I always stay within the 5-
minutes.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Reed. Your imagination is profound.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Just, that is a little inside joke
here with me and the chair. Well, Madam Secretary, thank you,
General. Good to see you guys again. I would like to get an
update on the Army's formalizing the 11th Airborne MTOE. I know
that you have been both really big supporters. I think it is
great we got another airborne division, right.
Probably the best in the Army right now. No offense to the
82d Airborne Division, Mr. Chairman. But the 11th Airborne
Division in Alaska is gaining quickly on the 82d. It is always
good to have inner service or inner Army competition, but I am
hoping that the MTOE will--alleviates the self-funding burden
that the division has shouldered since it stood up a few years
ago.
As you know, some of the ops, some of the training, some of
the elements of operating in the cold weather in Alaska cost
more. I think we want to make sure that that unit is getting
resource in a very realistic way, so they are not having to
kind of undertake this self-funding burden on them.
So, can you give me either of you an update on that?
Secretary Wormuth. Sure. Why don't I start and then turn it
over to the chief, who I know has been very focused on this.
One thing we are doing--first of all, I would note to your
comments about the Airborne, as you probably know, elements of
the 11th Airborne did an airborne drop over Norway, I think
just in February or March, that was very successful.
Senator Sullivan. There were some very serious cold weather
training. It was done all winter.
Secretary Wormuth. Yes. In February. Exactly.
Senator Sullivan. Yes, 40 below. I mean, people were
getting on. It is not easy to operate in 40 below zero.
Secretary Wormuth. Yes. I can only imagine, literally as
someone who grew up in Texas. But we are doing two war games
this year, specifically to help us better understand kind of
what are the needs of the soldiers in terms of their cold
weather gear, cold weather equipment. So that is one initiative
we have underway to help us look at the MTOE but let me let the
chief build on that.
General George. So having been up in Alaska in February,
March, I mean, surviving is tough, and so, we are really proud
of the 11th Airborne. The big exercise that the Secretary was
talking about, I mean, not only surviving but thriving.
So, we have increased their training. You know, we had the
joint multi-purpose training up there. You can do almost
anything in Alaska, and that is a real advantage to us. India,
for example, was also out as our partners and trained up in
Alaska. We are doing an MTOE review right now.
As you know, Senator, what works in Texas for systems
doesn't necessarily work or won't work when it is 40 or 50
below up in Alaska. So, and the Vice is kind of under and I
think you have met with him recently.
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
General George. It is going to go through exactly. What we
want to do is make sure that they have the right equipment for
operating in the Arctic. Then how do we kind of put--set some
aside, because the other great thing about that unit, they are
very physically hard. They can operate anywhere in the world.
We have that capability to do that.
Senator Sullivan. Well, General, I appreciate you directly
addressing this because as you know, when you are looking at
the difference in operational capability, no matter what it is,
it is harder and more expensive to operate in that kind of
environment.
Sometimes in the past, I was worried that that just got
fairy dust, and oh, well, you are going to get the same amount
of money as the units down in the lower 48. Don't worry about
it, being tough in the Arctic. But it is tougher.
You guys are seeing it. So, I think they need to be
resourced in that way that addresses that. Would you agree?
General George. I would agree, and what we are trying to do
as well, like for resourcing, and make sure that they are also
not taking care of equipment that isn't going to work. So, we
are going to pull some of that out.
So, I think it is a combination of things to make sure we
have given them the cold weather equipment. I think what we are
trying--what we got to do now is make sure we have--it is
sustainable, that we can give it to them. We are buying
additional CATVs. As you know, that is what you need to be
operational, that is up there. We are reviewing all of that,
Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Let me turn to the topic the three of us
discussed in my office a couple months ago on the Army force
structure changes. Some big articles in Alaska. Some people
actually had some concerns about kind of the overall kind of
top line numbers.
You know, we went through that whole 425 issue where the
Obama administration was going to get rid of the 425, and that
was actually us here in the Congress who stopped that. But in
our meeting, you two both mentioned to me that the force
structure changes that the Army's doing overall are going to
mean an increase of 1,469 more soldiers in Alaska by 2030.
Can I just, in this Committee, kind of in the hearing room,
can I just get your recommitment to that number?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I will say, I don't have the
number off the top of my head, but we do have those numbers,
and I am certainly willing to--you know, I am confident that
what we explained to you before was accurate. So, we commit to
that.
Senator Sullivan. Okay.
General George. I just was going to add, Senator, I think
part of it was too--was that we have the force structure up in
Alaska. We need to recruit now which we are in, and we are
doing better, to fill out those formations, which is what we
really are trying to get after immediately.
Senator Sullivan. Great. I had several more questions, but
being true to my word to the Chairman, I am going to yield my
time.
Chairman Reed. Senator, we welcome you to join us in a
closed session.
Senator Sullivan. Oh, good. Okay.
Chairman Reed. You may ask those questions there.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan, and thank you,
Madam Secretary and General George. We will close the open
session and reconvene in SVC-217 at approximately 11:30 a.m..
Thank you very much. With that, I will deem the open session
closed.
[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
army infrastructure issues in the indo-pacific
1. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wormuth, we have talked several times
about the State of the Army's crumbling infrastructure in the Indo-
Pacific Region. U.S. Army Pacific estimates the total cost to repair
all their facilities is over $4 billion. While I am encouraged to see
the Army's overall budget for military construction has increased by $1
billion this year, there is still a lot of work to do, especially in
the Indo-Pacific. What is the Army's long-term plan to replace or
repair crumbling infrastructure in Hawaii and the Indo-Pacific?
Secretary Wormuth. Enabling the Army's mission in the Indo-Pacific
through targeted investment in our critical infrastructure, especially
in Hawaii, is a top priority for the Army. We have requested to invest
$537.9 million in Active Component Military Construction to
recapitalize Hawaii infrastructure as well as over $1 billion for other
Indo-Pacific investments for fiscal years 2025 through 2029.
Investments vary from the recapitalization of water supply
infrastructure to the construction of a combat aircraft maintenance
facility, as well as live fire range modernization to sustain training
readiness.
The Army has also requested $268 million in facility restoration
and modernization funding for fiscal year 2025 to support the Multi-
Domain Task Force (MDTF), repair critical utilities, and restore
permanent party barracks. Additionally, facility sustainment funding in
Hawaii equals almost $200 million annually to help minimize facility
degradation and address failed building components.
In addition to the Hawaii investments, for fiscal year 2025 the
Army requested over $600 million in facility funding for the rest of
the Indo-Pacific region.
recruiting challenges
2. Senator Hirono. General George, the Pentagon completed a study
recently that found 80 percent of new recruits have at least one family
member or close friend that served in the Armed Forces--given that tie,
is the Army leveraging the extensive veteran and military retiree
population to boost recruiting?
General George. The Retired Soldier mission, ``Hire & Inspire,''
urges retired soldiers to tell their Army stories to inspire the next
generation to serve in the military. Other means for communicating with
retired soldiers include though annual Retiree Appreciation Days on
Army installations and through installation retiree councils.
The Army also engages in outreach and engagement with military/
veteran support organizations to build partnerships that help raise
awareness about military service. At the installation level, we work
directly with local Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), American Legion,
and other veteran organizations to encourage veterans to share their
Army story and help raise awareness about the benefits of joining the
Army.
renewal of training land leases
3. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wormuth, the Army is negotiating
renewals for several training area land leases in Hawaii that are set
to expire in 2029, including the Pohakuloa Training Area. I would like
to followup with your testimony regarding the provision in the fiscal
year 2024 NDAA requiring the Secretary of Defense to designate an
official responsible for coordinating land lease negotiations in
Hawaii. In addition to the criteria included in sub-paragraph (b) of
section 364, what additional criteria, if any, is the Department of
Defense using to identify a qualified individual to fill this extremely
important position?
Secretary Wormuth. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has
identified the individual to fill this position and is in the hiring
process. The position is expected to be filled by January 2025. The
professional has a comprehensive understanding of the legal and
technical aspects of the land lease issues and is experienced in
working with elected officials, policymakers, regulators, community
organizations, including Native Hawaiian communities and organizations.
This individual also has a deep understanding of the evolving landscape
in Hawaii and the multitude of issues that influence the future
footprint and posture of military forces in Hawaii. The professional
has an extensive network in Hawaii, is experienced in working with the
military services, and has a deep appreciation for the significant
cultural and historical issues that will inform these negotiations.
4. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wormuth, will the person identified
have a background level of knowledge on the sensitivity of this subject
with the Native Hawaiian community?
Secretary Wormuth. Yes, based upon in my discussions with OSD, the
professional has comprehensive understanding of the historical actions
taken by the Federal Government in Hawaii and subsequent impacts which
underlie the sensitivity of the subject within Native Hawaiian networks
and communities. Having that key perspective is considered essential.
5. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wormuth, what will the identified
person's title be, and what level/scale will they be within DOD's
civilian hierarchy?
Secretary Wormuth. OSD's identified title for this individual will
be Principal Advisor, Hawaii Coordination Cell (HCC) for Energy,
Installations, and the Environment (E&E). The grade is ``Highly
Qualified Expert,'' which is between Senior Executive Service (SES) and
General Schedule (GS) 15.
aviation incidents
6. Senator Hirono. General George, the Army has experienced 12
aviation related incidents in fiscal year 2024, resulting in the deaths
of nine soldiers and one border patrol agent. While five of the
investigations are still ongoing, the Army has implemented an Aviation
Safety ``Stand-Up'' in which all units are executing additional safety
training for rotary wing pilots and aircraft maintainers. Do you think
the additional training is sufficient to curtail these incidents in the
future?
General George. The additional mandatory training will have an
impact to curtail aviation incidents by enhancing aviation units' focus
on safety in general and on specific aviation maintenance and aviator
training to address emerging issues that are contributing factors in
recent incidents. After completion of the Aviation Safety Stand-Up,
reducing the rate of aviation accidents in the future requires a
continuous effort to improve the understanding of operational risk
within Army aviation formations, increase the safety margins of Army
aircraft where possible through materiel solutions, and address a known
decrease in the experience levels of the aviation force due to
shortages of mid-career aviation warrant officers. Rebuilding
experience in the aviation force will take time, the shortage did not
develop overnight, and we cannot expect to fix it overnight. To
mitigate the impact the Army continues to offer the Aviation Bonus to
retain our most experienced and skilled pilots with 3- to 5-year
contracts ranging from $30,000 to $35,000 per year. Additionally, the
Army will continue to drive down risk in aviation operations and
training through ongoing modernization of Army aircraft, reviewing and
revising the aviation training strategy, and sharing lessons learned
across the Army aviation force and with our sister services.
7. Senator Hirono. General George, do you think this is an issue
that goes beyond just Army helicopter units, and if so, are you sharing
lessons learned with your sister military services?
General George. The Army will continue to manage and reduce risk,
however, military aviation remains inherently dangerous. For that
reason, the Army shares aviation safety lessons learned with the other
military services through the Joint Safety Council (JSC) and benefits
from the other services sharing lessons learned as well. Monthly each
of the Services' Safety Centers produce a Joint Mishap Information
Share (JMIS) report of all mishaps of common platforms--ground and
aviation--that they share amongst each other. The JSC meets on a
quarterly basis to discuss the lessons learned from mishap
investigations in extensive detail and decides if specific mishaps/
lessons learned need to be shared with larger audiences. For example,
the U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center (USACRC) recently briefed
aviation mishap lessons learned to the Air Force A3, the Marine Corps
Airboss, and Navy instructor pilots and students at Whiting Field in
Pensacola, Florida. The Army has even taken the step to share lessons
learned with our Allies. This past December, USACRC traveled to the
United Kingdom to share aviation mishap lessons learned with the U.K.
Joint Aviation Command and recently traveled to Canberra, Australia to
participate in the Inaugural International Combat Aviation Safety
Summit.
the army's long-range missile programs
8. Senator Hirono. General George, the Army is focused on
developing and fielding long-range missiles, including hypersonics, to
deter our adversaries. Can you talk about the importance of the Army's
Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, and whether that capability will be
available at the end of the year as previously planned?
General George. The Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) continues
to be a top priority for the Army. In calendar year 2023, three
iterations of Joint Flight Campaign 2 were conducted but did not
conclude as planned. Due to the criticality of this strategic
requirement, the Army, along with our Navy partner, has worked
diligently to evaluate the system holistically so confidence is
ensured, risk is reduced, and the program can return to flight test
quickly. Following a successful end-to-end flight test at the end of
CY2024, LRHW will begin delivery of missiles to the Army and the
program will transition to Program Executive Office (PEO) Missiles and
Space.
9. Senator Hirono. General George, U.S. Army Pacific recently
deployed the Typhon Missile System to the Philippines as part of a
Multi-Domain Task Force deployment to train with our allies in the
Region--can you discuss why this system and its mobility is so
important to deterrence?
General George. The Mid-Range Capability (MRC) Typhon provides a
credible maritime strike capability from a mobile land-based delivery
system. Deployment enhances maritime defense capabilities while
bolstering interoperability and readiness within the United States-
Philippine Alliance. As such, the MRC highlights Army contributions to
the joint force and enables sister services by targeting critical
assets that hold air and maritime platforms at risk, strengthening
integrated deterrence in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Area of
Responsibility.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
implementation of the transition assistance program (tap)
10. Senator King. General George, the fiscal year 2019 NDAA
required pre-separation counseling to be completed by transitioning
servicemembers at least 365 days prior to leaving the service, yet a
GAO report found that only 11 percent met this requirement.
Additionally, GAO found that only 25 percent of servicemembers have met
statutory TAP requirements. What are you doing to increase these
numbers within the Army to take care of transitioning servicemembers?
General George. In fiscal year 2023, the Army Transition Assistance
Program built, implemented, and executed an online Career Readiness
Standards (CRS) Commanders Dashboard and a quarterly Transition
Assistance Program (TAP) Completion and Timeliness Quarterly Report
reportable to the Chief of Staff of the Army. Army Commanders now have
access to review the number of soldiers who started and completed TAP
through an online dashboard. The quarterly TAP Report requires Army
Commanders to provide comments on steps taken to improve soldiers CRS
completion and timeliness standards, as required by law. In 1st quarter
fiscal year 2024, 60 percent of soldiers completed all CRS before
transition and 30 percent are starting the TAP before their 365-day
mark. In 2nd quarter fiscal year 2024, 60 percent of soldiers completed
all CRS and 33 percent starting TAP before the 365-day mark.
The Adjutant General Directorate continues to message Transitions
Centers, Commanders, and General Officers through annual TAP
Symposiums, Quarterly GO Update, and quarterly TAP Townhalls.
Additionally, the Company Commander and First Sergeant Course includes
training on requirements for TAP, which all Army installations use
while teaching new commanders about various responsibilities. These are
also available on the Army Training Network.
11. Senator King. General George, what new initiatives are you
implementing this year to address these dismal rates?
General George. We have committed to a broad messaging and
engagement campaign.
Six military personnel messages and the Army's
interactive online forum (called S-1 Net) assists human resources
professionals by informing the community on the importance of sending
soldiers to TAP:
Quarterly GO Updates on Transition Assistance Program
sent by the Adjutant General.
Two messages sent to Army Service Component Command
(ASCC), Army Commands (ACOM), and Direct Reporting Units (DRU) G-1s on
the new TAP reporting requirements and Commanders Dashboard.
Eight TAP Talks Podcast Series with the Transition
Division Chief hosted on Defense Visual Information Distribution
Service (DVIDS), Spotify, YouTube, and Apple for Leaders and Soldiers.
Significant TAP social media to include Facebook, DVIDS
Channel, LinkedIn, and the Army TAP Website.
The Army Transition Assistance Program has a system of record that
every TAP Center employee has access to create a soldier's record and
track their Career Readiness Standards and all other data. The Army TAP
also sends an eligibility roster to commanders, which is a list of
soldiers who have a separation date in the next 720 days.
additive manufacturing initiatives to aid the defense industrial base
12. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, the State of Maine has many
organizations that contribute immensely to the defense industrial base,
particularly regarding 3D printer technology and additive
manufacturing. How can the Army better utilize these technologies to
enhance additive manufacturing for overall readiness, and what will be
the impact on the Army's modernization priorities?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army recognizes the significant benefit of
additive manufacturing in modernizing weapon systems, improving
operational readiness, and addressing logistical challenges. Initiated
several years ago, the Army continues its effort to evaluate candidate
parts for additive manufacturing and has developed a centralized
database for additive manufacturing part data that is available to
authorized users. In order to better leverage these technologies, the
Army is working with the broader Department of Defense community and
external partners to: develop standards for qualification and
certification of printed parts, which is currently a lengthy and
cumbersome process; develop appropriate training and education
resources across the DOD leadership and workforce to ensure appropriate
awareness of these technologies; and share best practices and lessons
learned.
13. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, what additive manufacturing
initiatives does the Army plan to implement in the coming year?
Secretary Wormuth. A Battle Damage Repair/Fabrication (BDRF) effort
to review and quickly address supply chain challenges for the Bradley
fighting vehicle and M777 towed howitzer was initiated in mid-fiscal
year 2024 and will continue into fiscal year 2025. Future efforts will
include the M113 armored personnel carrier, M109 self-propelled
howitzer and other critical systems, as needed. As part of the BDRF
effort, the Aviation and Missile Center of Excellence at Rock Island
Arsenal--Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center is printing
temporary replacement parts to be shipped to field. The Army continues
to participate in broader Department of Defense efforts focused on
accelerating advanced manufacturing capabilities for Joint and
Coalition forces.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
tuition assistance
14. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, according to public
reporting, the Army is considering cuts to its Tuition Assistance
program. Congress created the Tuition Assistance program to allow the
Department of Defense to cover tuition expenses for servicemembers at a
range of educational programs, including undergraduate, graduate,
vocational, licensure, certificate, and language programs. How many
soldiers have used Tuition Assistance benefits in each of the last 5
years?
Secretary Wormuth. The number of soldiers who have used Tuition
Assistance is as follows:
Fiscal Year 2019: 95,584
Fiscal Year 2020: 101,592
Fiscal Year 2021: 96,293
Fiscal Year 2022: 100,891
Fiscal Year 2023: 100,566
Fiscal Year 2024 (as of 13 May): 81,119
15. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, how much has the Army spent
on Tuition Assistance benefits in each of the last 5 years?
Secretary Wormuth. The amount Army spent on Tuition Assistance
benefits is as follows:
Fiscal Year 2019: $198,511,000
Fiscal Year 2020: $216,151,000
Fiscal Year 2021: $217,994,000
Fiscal Year 2022: $243,718,000
Fiscal Year 2023: $220,298,000
Fiscal Year 2024 (as of 13 May): $166,200,000
16. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, the Army has stated that
Tuition Assistance supports ``educational objectives of the Army and
soldiers' personal self-development goals'' and ``directly contributes
to retaining quality soldiers, enhancing their career progression,
improving Army readiness, and preparing soldiers for meaningful
employment in the transition from military service.''1 Does the Army
continue to believe that Tuition Assistance offers these benefits to
the Army and to soldiers?
Secretary Wormuth. Yes, we do.
17. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, please describe the nature
of the cuts that the Army is contemplating making to Tuition
Assistance.
Secretary Wormuth. We are currently conducting a thorough program
review of our voluntary education programs, both Credentialing and
Tuition Assistance, to ensure their long-term sustainability. The Army
has not completed its assessment, made any decisions, or implemented
any changes to our voluntary education programs. We will continue to
assess options and when decisions are made, we will ensure they support
soldiers, are fiscally responsible, and fully compliant with the law.
When our review is complete, I am happy to have Dr. Schaefer
(ASA(M&RA)) and her team brief you on our results and possible next
steps.
18. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, what prompted the Army to
consider cutting Tuition Assistance?
Secretary Wormuth. Very high usage rate and demand for our
Credentialing Assistance Program prompted us to review it for fiscal
sustainability, although as noted above, no decisions have been made.
Our review of the Tuition Assistance Program was not prompted by
particular concerns, rather it is a normal program review.
19. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, how much is the Army
considering cutting to Tuition Assistance by each year?
Secretary Wormuth. We are currently conducting a thorough program
review of our voluntary education programs, both Credentialing and
Tuition Assistance, to ensure their long-term sustainability. The Army
has not completed its assessment, made any decisions, or implemented
any changes to our voluntary education programs. As a part of the
assessment, the Army recognizes that the CA program is particularly
crucial for servicemembers interested in high-demand fields such as
electricians, plumbers, mechanics, drivers, cyber fields and
technicians. Credentials in these areas are valuable both during active
duty and in civilian transition. We will continue to assess options and
when decisions are made, we will ensure they support soldiers, are
fiscally responsible, and fully compliant with the law. When our review
is complete, I am happy to have Dr. Schaefer (ASA(M&RA)) and her team
brief you on our results and possible next steps.
20. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, how many servicemembers
would receive cuts in Tuition Assistance under the Army's potential
plans to cut the program?
Secretary Wormuth. We are currently conducting a thorough program
review of our voluntary education programs, both Credentialing and
Tuition Assistance, to ensure their long-term sustainability. The Army
has not completed its assessment, made any decisions, or implemented
any changes to our voluntary education programs. We will continue to
assess options and when decisions are made, we will ensure they support
soldiers, are fiscally responsible, and fully compliant with the law.
When our review is complete, I am happy to have Dr. Schaefer
(ASA(M&RA)) and her team brief you on our results and possible next
steps.
21. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, how many servicemembers
would entirely lose access to Tuition Assistance under the Army's
potential plans to cut the program?
Secretary Wormuth. We are currently conducting a thorough program
review of our voluntary education programs, both Credentialing and
Tuition Assistance, to ensure their long-term sustainability. The Army
has not completed its assessment, made any decisions, or implemented
any changes to our voluntary education programs. We will continue to
assess options and when decisions are made, we will ensure they support
soldiers, are fiscally responsible, and fully compliant with the law.
When our review is complete, I am happy to have Dr. Schaefer
(ASA(M&RA)) and her team brief you on our results and possible next
steps.
22. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, does the Army plan on
cutting Tuition Assistance across the board or targeting the cuts to
specific portions of the program?
Secretary Wormuth. We are currently conducting a thorough program
review of our voluntary education programs, both Credentialing and
Tuition Assistance, to ensure their long-term sustainability and
balance these programs as professional development and force shaping
opportunities. The Army has not completed its assessment, made any
decisions, or implemented any changes to our voluntary education
programs. We will continue to assess options and when decisions are
made, we will ensure they support soldiers, are fiscally responsible,
and fully compliant with the law. When our review is complete, I am
happy to have Dr. Schaefer (ASA(M&RA)) and her team brief you on our
results and possible next steps.
military child care centers
23. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, in 2021 you directed the
Army to strengthen its regulations on day cares reporting incidents of
sexual behavior to parents. It's my understanding that policy has never
been publicly released because it was marked as controlled unclassified
information. If the current policy is marked as controlled
unclassified, will the Army release a non-controlled version of the
policy?
Secretary Wormuth. Yes. On May 7, 2024, The Army decontrolled
Headquarters, Department of the Army Executive Order (HQDA EXORD) 111-
21, Installation Response to Problematic Sexual Behavior in Children
and Youth, along with copies of Fragmentary Orders 1 and 2.
On May 17, 2024, The Army published updated policy, HQDA EXORD 201-
24, Implementation Guidance for the Installation of Problematic Sexual
Behavior in Children, to include the status of PSB-CY program
implementation and clarification on parental notification timelines.
The Army will distribute memos to families to clearly explain
changes to policies in the future. The memo and the policy changes may
also be found on the Army's quality of life microsite at www.army.mil/
qualityoflife.
24. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, when will the Army publicly
release this policy?
Secretary Wormuth. As stated above, the Army released its new
policy on May 17th, 2024.
dod contractors' arms and ammunition sales
25. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, please provide an update on
implementation of the President's March 2023 Executive Order that
directed DOD to ``develop and implement principles to further firearm
and public safety practices through Department of Defense acquisition
of firearms.''
Secretary Wormuth did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in Committee file.
26. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, how many rounds of
ammunition produced at Lake City were sold commercially in each of the
past 5 fiscal years? Please list all major types of ammunition sold,
and the quantity and caliber of each, including any armor piercing,
armor piercing incendiary (API), or tracer ammunition.
Secretary Wormuth did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in Committee file.
27. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, hat operational plan, if
any, does DOD or Olin Winchester maintain to prevent diversion of
firearms or ammunition produced at Lake City into the illegal market?
Secretary Wormuth did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in Committee file.
28. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, please provide a list of all
firearm manufacturers and retailers from which DOD procures firearms
that also commercially sell semi-automatic firearms that can carry over
10 rounds of ammunition or accept detachable ammunition feeding
devices, and/or ammunition that is .22 caliber or larger, including
.223 Remington ammunition and 7.62x39mm ammunition.
Secretary Wormuth did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in Committee file.
29. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth, aside from Olin Winchester,
do any of the other private firms with contracts to operate government-
owned, contractor-operated plants producing ammunition, firearms, or
the materials used to make ammunition or firearms sell items produced
using government-owned equipment or facilities to non-Federal
customers?
Secretary Wormuth did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in Committee file.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
project pele [pay-lay]
30. Senator Manchin. Secretary Wormuth, I hope that you're
personally tracking that the Department's microreactor program, Project
Pele [Pay-Lay], is in the process of being transferred to the Army as a
program of record. I cannot overState the importance of this program
for energy supply of our own forces in a contested environment, and for
lending to vulnerable foreign partners that are feeling China's
predatory pressure on cheap energy projects. How is the Army's
Contested Logistics cross functional team looking to integrate Pele
into their planning?
Secretary Wormuth. Project Pele is not in the process of being
transferred to the Army as a program of record. At present, the Army
has no formal Requirement for a mobile microreactor. However, the Army
is considering a fixed facility advanced nuclear power as one potential
solution to deliver assured access to energy for our critical missions
through a deliberate and thoughtful planning process. We are beginning
to formally engage with the advanced nuclear power industry to explore
potential solutions that will enhance the Army's energy resilience.
These efforts are distinct from Project Pele, which serves as a proof
of concept to enable and inform requirements for a future domestic
mobile nuclear reactor program of record. Project Pele is being led by
DOD's Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO), will be Authorized by the
Department of Energy (DOE), constructed, tested, operated at DOE Idaho
National Lab by 2027. While this is a potentially valuable technology
with many applications across the Army and DOD, the technology needs to
mature and the policies and regulations affecting international
deployment must be coordinated with the State Department. The Contested
Logistics Cross Functional Team (CL CFT) has evaluated the use of
nuclear power to offset the required fuel needed to sustain deployed
forces in a contested environment but does not feel that mobile nuclear
power is currently feasible given its current power output capability,
policy constraints, and lack of rapid mobility.
31. Senator Manchin. Secretary Wormuth, can you also followup with
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Security on how beneficial this program could be for our competition
efforts with China? It's about time we start being as aggressive as
China has been on economic and energy partnerships with vulnerable
nations, and I believe Pele [Pay-lay] is a massive opportunity we can
roll out for that purpose.
Secretary Wormuth. We understand the need and national security
implications for a vibrant and globally competitive U.S. advanced
nuclear energy industry that will help the United States outcompete
Russia and the PRC. An aggressive Federal investment for advanced
nuclear power industry will enable the United States to ensure planning
for key issues, such as nuclear fuel, licensing and financing. Doing
this will posture the U.S. to achieve the highest standards of safety,
security, reliability, and nonproliferation that are critical as our
adversaries continue to advance the deployment of this technology. The
Army has put in place a cross-cutting team led out of the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installation, Energy, and
Environment that is actively exploring the potential for advanced
nuclear power solutions for our installations, where there is a
requirement for reliable and resilient base load power.
army national guard support in cyber
32. Senator Manchin. Secretary Wormuth and General George, as we
have all recently seen with this latest wave of cyberattacks, every
level of government and each section of our critical infrastructure is
at risk, and I believe the Army National Guard is already filling a
critical domestic defense and response role to cyber incursions.
Specifically, I would encourage you both to look at the work being done
in a joint capacity by our Critical Infrastructure Protection Battalion
at the Army Interagency Training and Education Center (AITEC) in West
Virginia. They already support a number of DOD and DHS programs, and
are being integrated into DOD's Mission Assurance program that we
mandated be stood up in last year's NDAA. Has any consideration been
given to a more direct role for the Army National Guard in cyber?
Specifically, utilizing them as a liaison force between the Federal
Government, their states, and the critical infrastructure in their
states so we're able to more effectively respond to cyber-attacks in
the future.
Secretary Wormuth and General George. The National Guard is a
critical enabler of cyber operations for the Department of Defense. For
the Army, the National Guard generates forces for a National Guard
Cyber Brigade and 11 Cyber Protection Teams. They bring unique skills
and backgrounds to mitigating cyber threats. State-organized fusion
centers offer opportunities for the Guard to coordinate between State,
local, and Federal partners, as well as with private industry. The Army
looks forward to working with U.S. Cyber Command on additional areas
where the Guard can bring further competitive advantages to the joint
force in cyberspace.
ridge runner
33. Senator Manchin. Secretary Wormuth, last year I wrote a letter
to you and General George over concerns of potential spending cuts to
our Army National Guard Special Operation Forces. But I instead
received a reply from General Jensen in the National Guard Bureau. I
specifically wrote to you both to ensure the Active component is aware
of these issues and understands the need of maintaining our special
forces in the National Guard on parity with the Active component. Just
to prove the importance of our National Guard Special Forces I also
highlighted the work they're doing to bring our foreign partners to
West Virginia for the Ridge Runner irregular warfare exercise. This is
a cheaper option for us and allows more efficient relationship building
with a variety of European and Pacific allies here in the U.S. How
familiar are each of you with Ridge Runner, and would you commit to
coming to one of the Distinguished Visitor days for the second exercise
taking place later this year?
Secretary Wormuth. I know that Ridge Runner provides a dynamic and
realistic training environment for multi-echelon Irregular Warfare
exercises involving Special Forces Operational Detachments, Allies,
Partner Nation Special Operations Task Units and Groups (SOTUs--SOTGs),
and myriad other stakeholders to enhance joint force and combined
lethality to defeat adversaries in the Irregular Warfare domain. As you
note, these exercises facilitate advanced training with critical
partners and allies. I appreciate your invitation and will consider the
possibility of attending one of the Distinguished Visitor Days.
miniature high-altitude balloons
34. Senator Manchin. Secretary Wormuth and General George, my staff
was recently at Fort Liberty with General Braga [Brah-Gah] of Army
Special Operations Command and were made aware of a miniature high-
altitude balloon program in development there. This program would offer
low-cost capabilities for intelligence gathering and potentially
kinetic options as well with obvious value for the fight in Ukraine.
Are you both tracking this program and if so do you believe there's
value in testing this capability in Ukraine?
Secretary Wormuth and General George. We believe there is
tremendous value in testing the Micro High-Altitude Balloons (mHAB) in
Ukraine and elsewhere. U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command's Army Capability Manager
for Space and High Altitude and Space Prototypes and Experiment Branch
have worked tirelessly in improving the mHAB. Results of their combined
efforts include doubling the payload weight capacity and improving the
stationkeeping. They have continued developing and testing numerous
small form factor mHAB payloads and launched effects. Ukraine provides
the needed environment to testing this capability in a challenging
operational assessment.
The aforementioned collective group has been working on improving
mHAB over the last 18-months (2023-2024) through a series of demanding
demonstrations and field experiments. The small, zero-pressure, mHAB is
capable of mid-range ingress, very limited-stationkeeping, and is
capable of carrying different mission specific payloads of up to 30
pounds. The mHAB is a rapid deployable (5-10 minutes), 1 to 2 man
launch system. Current testing is focused on obtaining soldier touch
points to ascertain if this system could be an economical solution
versus the larger and more expensive super-pressure high altitude
balloon systems (HABS).
35. Senator Manchin. Secretary Wormuth and General George, I
recently met with the Deputy Director for Ukraine's Military
Intelligence and I can assure you they would be more than willing to
take on any capability that offers them a tactical advantage and
provides us with some lessons learned on what's effective in a modern
battlefield.
Secretary Wormuth and General George. We recognize the importance
of providing capabilities that offer tactical advantages and are
committed to supporting Ukraine in ways that are both effective and
sustainable. As we move forward, we remain open to further discussions
and considerations to ensure we are making informed decisions that
align with our overall objectives and resource availability.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
medical readiness in the indo-pacific
36. Senator Duckworth. Secretary Wormuth, I recently announced a
proposal that I am pushing to include in the fiscal year 2025 NDAA to
improve DOD's medical readiness in the Indo-Pacific. The Army's 18th
Medical Command is the Indo-Pacific Theater's medical enabler and works
to improve interoperability with allies and partners. Can you speak to
how working with our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific to gain
access to foreign medical facilities could provide lifesaving care
during a conflict for servicemembers needing to be medically evacuated?
Secretary Wormuth. By establishing agreements and collaborative
frameworks with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. is
addressing a critical medical gap, ensuring U.S. servicemembers have
quick access to high-quality medical treatment in times of both
competition and crisis.
Currently, under the Security Cooperation Framework, we have a
comprehensive Global Health Engagement strategy with about 350 annual
engagements, tailored to individual countries--leveraging unique
capabilities. These efforts aim to reduce the need for patient
movement, which we know will be challenged, and bolster medical
capacity through training, knowledge exchanges, and humanitarian
assistance.
Additionally, there are ongoing efforts to secure agreements with
partner countries that will enable U.S. providers to be credentialed to
work in host nation facilities, thereby enhancing overall readiness and
the ability to deliver lifesaving care closer to the point of injury.
This strategy not only saves lives but also strengthens diplomatic ties
and fosters mutual trust, reinforcing the importance of collective
security and shared commitment in the region.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
counter uas technology
37. Senator Rosen. General George, current events in Israel and
Ukraine have demonstrated the need for a layered approach to counter
UAS and airborne threats. One option the Army has been testing is the
DE M-SHORAD. This advanced capability allows a unit to employ an
affordable, directed energy laser instead of a costly intercept missile
to counter threats. While this technology is not fully mature, defense
small businesses in Nevada are part of the leading edge in developing
and deploying these technologies. We saw the successful employment of
these systems in some of the recent attacks in the Middle East.
Describe how useful an additional layer to counter airborne threats
would be to any fielded force.
General George. Layered Air Defense is critical to protect the
Joint Force from the full range of threats presented on today's
battlefield: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, helicopters, fixed
wing aircraft and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Based on the spectrum
and complexity of these threats, there is no one ``silver bullet'' or
singular solution that can defeat all threats. The Army deploys weapon
systems such as Patriot, Avenger, and Fixed and Mobile Low, Slow, Small
Unmanned Integrated Defeat System (FS-LIDS and M-LIDS) to provide the
warfighter with layered defeat capabilities. The Army is developing
Directed Energy capabilities and prototypes are currently deployed
worldwide. While these capabilities have demonstrated promise, the Army
continues to test and evaluate them through operational testing and
contingency deployments to inform future investment decisions.
38. Senator Rosen. General George, what has been the response and
feedback from the field regarding the DE M-SHORAD system?
General George. Since the arrival of three DE M-SHORAD prototypes
at the missionsite in February 2024, the DE M-SHORAD prototypes have
fully integrated into the Base Defense Operations Center's (BDOC)
layered air defense architecture supporting the U.S. Central Command c-
UAS mission. The prototypes have not been employed in a real-world
engagement and have been heavily focused on executing scenario-driven
tests of the system, which recently culminated with an evaluation by
the Army Test and Evaluation Command in June 2024.
As part of the ongoing DE campaign of learning, optimization lines
of effort are underway to maximize system lethality, reliability, and
availability while improving overall system performance in an extreme
and austere environment that requires the prototypes to operate for
extended periods. The system's average Operational Availability is 71
percent or 1,544 available hours with 445 unplanned maintenance hours
(Data as of 20 May 2024). Additional support equipment and the fourth
DE M-SHORAD prototype are pending arrival in June. The Program
Management Office is executing a plan that includes the shipment of
manufacturing-level jigs, spare parts, and the establishment of a
cleanroom at the missionsite to expedite laser optics repairs and
maintenance.
Soldier confidence continues to increase in the system's capability
to successfully defeat Groups 1-3 UAS targets as the unit's experience
with the DE M-SHORAD prototypes expands from their training/prototype
testing at Fort Sill, OK, before deployment. Real-time lessons learned
and continuous soldier feedback support ongoing DE technology
improvement efforts.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
caisson platoon
39. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, does the Army have a site
approved for the Caisson Platoon that meets the criteria laid out in
the Army's 1391 plan for horse farmland acquisition, including stables,
pastureland, a training area, and storage needed to assure the health
and continued service of the military working horses?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army has not yet secured an approved site
fully meeting the criteria outlined in the Army's proposed construction
plan for horse farmland acquisition. The criteria include stables,
pastureland, training area, and necessary storage ensuring the health
and continued service of military working horses.
40. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, if not, what is the Army's
plan to acquire a new plot of land at least 300 acres in size for the
Caisson Platoon?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army is actively pursuing options, informed
by highly qualified experts, to acquire a new plot of land,
coordinating with relevant stakeholders and using a comprehensive
assessment process to ensure the selected site fulfills the outlined
criteria in the construction plan. The Army's fiscal year 2025 Budget
Request included $8.5 million for this effort.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
11th airborne resourcing
41. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General George, the
11th Airborne Division in Alaska participates in exercises in INDOPACOM
as well as EUCOM, like ARCTIC SHOCK, where 11th Airborne soldiers flew
over the North Pole from Alaska and conducted a combined airborne
operation into Norway. As the Army's only arctic-rated division, 11th
Airborne has some unique equipment and supply requirements. The Army is
working to establish a formal Modified Table of Organization and
Equipment (MTOE) for the 11th Airborne, which will establish how many
Cold Weather All-Terrain Vehicles (CATVs), snow machines, and JLTVs the
division needs to conduct its diverse mission set. Part of this effort
includes the Army recognizing that 11th Airborne soldiers require more
than one set of cold weather clothing, given that they wear it daily
from October to April. Can you give me a preview of what the MTOE looks
like?
Secretary Wormuth and General George. The Army recognizes the
unique equipment demand associated with serving and operating across
the Arctic. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army is leading an Army
Requirement Oversight Council (AROC) to validate the personal
(uniforms, skis, snowshoes) and organizational equipment (CATVs, snow
machines, tents, heaters) required to ensure our soldiers have what
they need to accomplish the mission in an Arctic environment. Upon
completion of the Army Requirements Oversight Council process, the Army
will develop and produce Military Table of Organization and Equipment
(MTOE) and field new equipment as resources allow.
42. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General George, can you
explain how the Army will ensure the 11th Airborne division is
appropriately resourced and equipped to execute its missions?
Secretary Wormuth and General George. Alaska is essential to the
Army's Arctic Strategy. To ensure dominance in the Arctic, the Army is
developing doctrine, training, and equipment to meet the unique
requirements of cold weather, mountainous, and high-altitude
environments. As we develop capabilities for Army 2030 and beyond, this
key terrain remains an important part of our focus on the Pacific
theater. Therefore, the Army will ensure that 11th Airborne Division is
appropriately resourced with the soldiers, equipment, and training
needed to execute its missions.
The Army recognizes the unique equipment demand associated with
serving and operating across the Arctic. As noted above, the Vice Chief
of Staff of the Army is leading an Army Requirement Oversight Council
(AROC) to validate the personal equipment (uniforms, skis, snowshoes)
and organizational equipment (CATVs, snow machines, tents, heaters)
required to ensure our soldiers have what they need to accomplish the
mission in an Arctic environment. Upon completion of the Army
Requirements Oversight Council process, the Army will develop and
produce MTOEs and field new equipment as resources allow.
The Army continues to assess our training readiness resource
allocation for the 11th Airborne Division and its subordinate brigade
combat teams to account for the unique requirements and mission of the
organization. This assessment includes individual and collective
training at home station and our Combat Training Centers.
43. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General George, during
Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center Alaska 24-02, soldiers
reported to my staff that almost none of their tactical vehicles had
dedicated snow tires. Instead, they were running the normal tires that
would be installed on a tactical vehicle of that type and using chains
for extra traction. The problem is that the regular tires do not grip
well on ice, which frequently cover the roads on base and the highways
the unit uses to access training areas. This increases the occurrence
of accidents on and off base. Chains cannot be used on the public
highways, so all vehicles must stop and chain up before entering the
training area, a process that takes up to 45 minutes per vehicle. As
part of the 11th Airborne Division MTOE, or otherwise, does the Army
plan to equip tactical vehicles in Alaska with dedicated winter tires?
Secretary Wormuth and General George. The Army is aware of the
safety concerns from the 11th Airborne Division regarding Tactical
Wheeled Vehicles on ice-and snow-covered roads and has taken steps to
try to make the vehicles safer. High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV) winter tire development is complete, with a contract
having been awarded in May 2023 and delivery to Alaska February 2024.
Winter tires for the M915A5/ M915A3 Line Haul Trucks and M872A4 trailer
have been tested, are currently in the supply system, and are being
used in Alaska. For the new 16.00R20 winter tire for Heavy Tactical
Vehicles (Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck, Palletized Load
System, Heavy Equipment Transporter) and Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected vehicles, testing is scheduled to be completed June 2024,
with anticipated delivery this winter season 2024-2025. Tire
assessments showed marked improvements in traction and stopping
distance across ice and snow versus the currently fielded tire,
therefore increasing vehicle safety. The need for additional winter
tires is acknowledged for the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV)
and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) applications. Plans are in
place for Developmental Test and Evaluation for FMTV and JLTV winter
tires in support of DOD & Army Arctic Strategies and the 11th Airborne
Division.
44. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General George, can you
explain how the Army will ensure the 11th Airborne division is
appropriately resourced and equipped to execute its missions?
Secretary Wormuth and General George. Alaska is essential to the
Army's Arctic Strategy. To ensure dominance in the Arctic, the Army is
developing doctrine, training, and equipment to meet the unique
requirements of cold weather, mountainous, and high-altitude
environments. As we develop capabilities for Army 2030 and beyond, this
key terrain remains an important part of our focus on the Pacific
theater. Therefore, the Army will ensure that 11th Airborne Division is
appropriately resourced with the soldiers, equipment, and training
needed to execute its missions.
The Army recognizes the unique equipment demand associated with
serving and operating across the Arctic. The Vice Chief of Staff of the
Army is leading an Army Requirement Oversight Council (AROC) to
validate the personal equipment (uniforms, skis, snowshoes) and
organizational equipment (CATVs, snow machines, tents, heaters)
required to ensure our soldiers have what they need to accomplish the
mission in an Arctic environment. Upon completion of the Army
Requirements Oversight Council process, the Army will develop and
produce MTOEs and field new equipment as resources allow.
The Army continues to assess our training readiness resource
allocation for the 11th Airborne Division and its subordinate brigade
combat teams to account for the unique requirements and mission of the
organization. This assessment includes individual and collective
training at home station and our Combat Training Centers.
army equipment transfers to ukraine
45. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General George, can you
explain how previous equipment transfers to Ukraine allowed the Army to
procure more modern replacement equipment?
Secretary Wormuth and General George. Use of the of replenishment
authority, Section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C.
2318(d) has allowed the Army to procure more modern equipment as we
support equipment transfer efforts in Ukraine. As the Army has provided
equipment to Ukraine, the Army has been able to replenish its own
stocks with new and/or updated capabilities in many areas such as
ground combat vehicles, radars, munitions, and soldier equipment.
46. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General George, can you
provide specific examples of older equipment that was transferred to
Ukraine and replaced with a more modern variant in Army units?
Secretary Wormuth and General George. The accelerated modernization
of the U.S. Army is easily seen in the vehicles provided to Ukraine. To
date, we requested replenishment funds for:
500 Army Multipurpose Vehicles and 100 M2A4 Bradley
Infantry Fighting Vehicles to replace 600 provided M113 Armored
Personnel Carriers
232 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, and 420 M1151/M1152/
M1165 HMMWVs to replace 652 provided HMMWVs
186 newer model M2A4 Bradleys to replace 186 older M2A2
Operation Desert Storm-Situational Awareness (ODS-SA) Bradleys.
The Army also requested funding to procure upgraded radars,
munitions, and soldier equipment.
artillery in ukraine
47. Senator Sullivan. General George, the U.S. and NATO allies have
transferred a variety of wheeled, tracked, and towed howitzers to
Ukraine. Most of these are 155mm howitzers that shoot the same
ammunition. What has the Army learned about the effectiveness of
various Western-supplied howitzers in Ukraine, specifically including
mobility, rate of fire, range, and fire control?
General George. First and foremost, our equipment performs well and
as designed. The proliferation of drones and persistent observation
places Western supplied artillery at significant risk. Ukraine Armed
Forces (UAF) artillery crews operating towed systems with longer
emplacement and displacement times remain the most vulnerable. An
effective towed cannon survivability technique is for crew members to
keep their gun in a hardened position and only man the gun during fire
missions. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and M109
(155mm SP) platforms are more survivable than towed systems due to
their ability to hide in the clutter or cities and urban spaces. To
maximize counter fire standoff, UAF cannon artillery crews typically
fire the highest propellant charges at maximum ranges for each fire
mission. Artillery fire at maximum ranges increases tube wear which
requires tube replacement. Western supplied Field Artillery platforms
(cannon, rocket, and missile) remain the most casualty producing
weapons for the UAF. UAF are delivering unprecedented rates of fire for
artillery munitions. The need for maximum range and higher rates of
fire have highlighted that the industrial base must be able to ramp up
production of ammunition and parts quickly to keep artillery crews in
the fight.
48. Senator Sullivan. General George, Ukraine has integrated
various UAS platforms into their artillery fire mission processing. How
is the Army incorporating UAS into artillery fire mission processing?
General George. The Army is leveraging a combination of Ukraine
lessons learned, training exercises, and advanced technologies to
integrate UAS into the Field Artillery kill chain to conduct artillery
fire mission processing. The Army's Fires Center of Excellence at Ft.
Sill is developing UAS employment concepts at echelon, Program of
Instruction (POI) for institutional training, and certification
standards to incorporate UAS capabilities.
artillery modernization
49. Senator Sullivan. General George, I understand that the Army is
conducting a performance demonstration in fiscal year 2024 for
companies to bring existing 155mm self-propelled howitzer to Yuma for
testing. With the cancellation of the ERCA program, and mobility
mismatch between towed 155mm M777A2s and Strykers in SBCTs, there seems
to be a need to a mature, ready to deliver self-propelled 155mm
howitzer in the Army. Can you describe the Army's plan to test and
procure existing 155mm self-propelled howitzers after ERCA's
cancellation?
General George. The XM1299 Rapid Prototyping effort concluded in
October 2023 with the determination that further maturation and
redesign is required, but the requirement remains. The Army is planning
a performance demonstration of commercial-off-the-shelf like systems
that will inform both the requirements and a competitive evaluation
intending to down select and award to one vendor. The performance
demonstration is targeted for late fiscal year 2024, with the
competitive evaluation set to begin in late fiscal year 2025. This
approach aligns with the Army's cannon modernization strategy which
includes replacement of the legacy towed artillery fleet with a future
Mobile Howitzer, continued development of the M109 Family of Vehicles,
improving munitions capability, and increasing Division Artillery
lethality through fundamental organizational change and material
solutions.
50. Senator Sullivan. General George, new propellants and
projectiles were an important part of the ERCA program. I understand
the Army is investing is new chemical compounds that can increase both
range and Effective Casualty Radius for 155mm projectiles. How is the
Army investing in new chemical compounds to increase range and
lethality of 155mm projectiles?
General George. The Army is investing Research, Development, Test,
and Evaluation (RDT&E) in unique energetic chemical compounds which,
when combined with 3D printing technologies, are predicted to enhance
muzzle velocity and extend range for currently fielded weapon systems.
This enables new gun propulsion charge designs and complex
geometries that were previously unattainable by conventional processing
techniques. These chemical compounds are entirely new formulations
synthesized to be compatible with the novel manufacturing technology.
These formulations will create future opportunities to reduce the
demand on existing critical propellant ingredients such as
nitrocellulose (NC) and nitroguanidine (NQ) but will require
significant qualification and scale up before transition to the Organic
Industrial Base (OIB). In addition, the Army seeks to extend the range
of artillery ammunition by innovating at the round, incorporating
advanced air breathing post gun-launch propulsion systems such as
ramjets. Incorporating such systems will provide greater range than
conventional rocket motors while reducing demand on the already
extended supply of traditional rocket motor propellant ingredients such
as hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB) and ammonium perchlorate
(AP).
From a lethality perspective, the Army has qualified the IMX-104
explosive formulation for use in extended range artillery ammunition
which provides an overall increase in performance over traditional
trinitrotoluene (TNT). While reducing worldwide demand for TNT, IMX-104
can also be coupled with advanced warhead designs for even greater
lethality. Additional early technology readiness level research
investments have focused on designing, developing, and maturing
energetic compounds and technologies to increase lethality in smaller
payloads. These technologies enable a greater size, weight, and power
(SWAP) trade space for post launch propulsion systems, thus increasing
the effective casualty radius at extended ranges. Specific technologies
include (1) deposition of explosives through additive manufacturing for
advanced initiation to optimize detonation effects in a smaller
payload, (2) maturation of CL-20 based explosive formulations, (3)
development and demonstration of novel castable explosive formulations
even more powerful than IMX-104, and (4) an innovative category of
nano-amorphous energetics that enables the coating of one explosive
with another rather than lowering performance with non-energetic
coating binders; achieving both insensitivity and higher performance
formulations, (5) advancing industrial biomanufacturing of energetic
precursors to strengthen defense supply chains. From an environmental
perspective these emerging enhanced lethality energetic technologies
have been designed and developed without a dependency on perfluoroalkyl
and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), mitigating future risks
associated with pending restrictions on this group of synthetic
chemicals.
army watercraft
51. Senator Sullivan. General George, I understand that the Army is
finalizing development of its Watercraft Modernization Strategy. In
fiscal year 2025 and throughout the FYDP, it plans to procure one
Maneuver Support Vessel (Light) each year to replace Vietnam-era LCUs.
In fiscal year 2025 the Army will invest RDT&E money in the Maneuver
Support Vessel (Heavy) program, which will enable divestment of the
Logistics Support Vessel. Can you explain the consultation and
collaboration that occurred with the Navy and Marine Corps as you
developed the capability and survivability requirements for the MSV(L)?
General George. The Maneuver Support Vessel (Light) (MSV(L)) serves
as the replacement for the 50-year-old Vietnam-era LCM-8. The U.S. Army
collaborated with the US Navy's NAVSEA Carderock Division to provide
engineering assistance during the design and development of the MSV(L).
The vessel's unique capabilities, aligned with the Army's demanding
operational requirements, position it above other options. Operational
and survivability testing of the MSV(L) is scheduled to begin in the
summer of 2024.
52. Senator Sullivan. General George, does the Army plan on
operating the MSV(L) and MSV(H) in the INDOPACOM, EUCOM, or CENTCOM
AORs?
General George. The Army recognizes U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM) as the most challenging operational theater for our
vessels. The MSV(L) prototype is scheduled to undergo operational
testing in the INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) during the summer
of 2024. Successful testing in the INDOPACOM AOR will validate the
flexibility of the MSV(L) to operate in multiple AORs. The Approved
Abbreviated-Capabilities Development Document (A-CDD) and Key
Performance Parameters (KPP) are suitable for the MSV(H) to operate
worldwide.
53. Senator Sullivan. General George, what consultation and
collaboration is occurring between the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps as
the Army establishes requirements for the MSV(H)?
General George. The Army MSV(H) Program Manager (PM) and
Requirements Team have engaged with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine
Corps, directly reviewing their design requirements and solution sets.
The U.S. Army consistently seeks to incorporate advanced maritime
features into all our vessels. The MSV(H) development is approaching
the digital design phase upon completion of market research.
54. Senator Sullivan. General George, did the Army consider the
Navy/Marine Corps LSM to fulfill requirements for the MSV(H)?
General George. Yes, in line with the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council Memorandum (JRCOM) 2021 findings, the Army concludes the USN
LSM did not support the USA MSV(H) mission requirements. The Army
continues to participate in bi-weekly collaborative working groups
focused at identifying ``synergies'' between the LSM and MSV(H) sub-
systems. The U.S. Army requirement is predicated on moving larger
heavier formations and providing sustainment for longer durations to
widely dispersed units.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
army chaplains age waivers
55. Senator Scott. Secretary Wormuth and General George, I've had
over 30 Active and Reserve Army chaplains visit my office who were
direct-commissioned on age waivers during Operation Iraqi Freedom
understanding they would receive pro-rated pensions if they served to
Mandatory Removal Date. I understand the Army misinterpreted the law
and granted pensions before members reached 20 years of active service
and we had to fix that in the fiscal year 2021 NDAA. Now many of these
Chaplains are facing involuntary retirements without the pro-rated
pensions and official retirements. Can you clarify the situation and
what's going on with these Chaplains?
Secretary Wormuth and General George. Chaplains, like medical and
dental officers, often enter service at older ages due to the education
and work experience required for qualification. From 1981 until 1
February 2019, 10 USC Sec. 532 authorized an exception to commission
chaplains and medical and dental officers without the requirement that
they be able to serve 20 years of active Federal service prior to
reaching 62. Between 2008-2012, in particular, the Chaplains Corps
allowed these officers to commission with the understanding that the
Chaplain Corps would pursue extensions to these officers' Mandatory
Removal Dates (MRDs) under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1251. At the time, the
Chaplains Corps was in-need of additional officers due to help
alleviate personnel shortages exacerbated by the Global War on Terror.
In the intervening years, there were several statutory and
regulatory changes affecting our Chaplains' retirement benefits and
eligibility, and their understanding of those same benefits and
eligibility requirements. Specifically, the Temporary Early Retirement
Authority (TERA) under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 638b created expectations within
our Corps that all officers would be given the opportunity to retire if
they reached 15 years of active Federal service; concurrently,
misinterpretation and prior mis-application of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1251
caused officers to believe they were entitled to retirement benefits at
reduced rate when they reached MRD for age, regardless of the number of
years served. In 2021, Congress updated 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1251 to clarify
that retirement benefits were reserved for personnel who had served 20
or more years at MRD, but authorized separation pay for individuals
separated due to age MRD who served more than 6 but fewer than 20
years.
The Office of the Chief of Chaplains is beginning to identify and
notify the officers who entered service with the expectation of an MRD
extension to provide them the opportunity to apply. The CCH will work
closely with the ASA (M&RA) to review the suitability of each chaplain,
ability to continue service past age 62, and benefit to the Army to
make recommendations for the Secretary of the Army to consider
extending the MRDs of these officers.
These decisions are approved by the Secretary of the Army, so will
be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
56. Senator Scott. Secretary Wormuth and General George, Does the
Army have authority through the Army Board for Correction of Military
Records to help adjudicate these cases? It seems to me the Army messed
this up and the Army should fix it.
Secretary Wormuth and General George. The Secretary of the Army may
correct any military record when considered necessary to correct an
error or remove an injustice.
child care at camp bull simmons
57. Senator Scott. Secretary Wormuth and General George, as you
both know, there is critical need for adequate child care across the
force. I hear about it from parents in my State all the time who are
serving. In last year's NDAA, I was able to get more than $598.6
million in funding for construction projects, childcare, and training
facilities on Florida's military bases. We continue to hear from many
in the community about the lack of access to a Child Development Center
due to long distances and lengthy waiting lists. The stories are heart-
wrenching, and the impact this is having on both families and readiness
is unacceptable. That's why, when I hear stories that this isn't
happening and our military families aren't supported with childcare on
base even though the funding is there, I get upset. This is a priority
for our servicemembers with families and I am sure you hear it from
others. I do appreciate the good news you gave me on our phone call
about Camp Bull Simons and hopefully you can give me more details about
that. How is the Army prioritizing this issue amongst other
infrastructure needs within the force and what actions are being
considered to alleviate child care shortages at Camp Bull Simons?
Secretary Wormuth and General George. The Army prioritizes all
infrastructure investments through a deliberate process that includes
input from commanders and Army Senior Leaders. Although we seek to
balance investments in various types of Army facilities around the
globe, the Army continues to prioritize facilities that improve our
soldier's quality of life. This includes family housing, barracks, and
childcare. We believe we have collected almost all of the information
needed for the Army and Air Force to agree on the location for the new
CDC and look forward finalizing a memorandum of agreement soon.
In the meantime, the Army hired and placed a Parent and Outreach
Specialist at Camp Bull Simons in January 2023 to specifically support
families with childcare requests. The Army has also worked with OSD to
expand the in-home childcare pilot to include Eglin AFB and surrounding
communities, including Crestview. Additionally, the Air Force has
placed considerable emphasis on initiatives to increase the
availability of childcare support to Army families stationed at Camp
Bull Simons. We continue to work closely with Department of the Air
Force and the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict to finalize the way forward to
improve childcare support for Army families at Camp Bull Simons, and
look forward to briefing your office in the near future.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 16, 2024
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NAVY POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:15 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds,
Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, and
Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning, and since we have a quorum, I
will begin by asking the Committee to consider our list of
3,549 pending military nominations. All of these nominations
have been before the Committee for the required length of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report this list of 3,549
pending military nomination to the Senate?
Senator Wicker. So moved.
Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
Senator Shaheen. Second.
Chairman Reed. All in favor aye.
[Voice vote. Chorus of ayes.]
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
Committee follows:]
MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION ON MAY 16, 2024.
1. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to be major (Anthony
K. Onitsuka) (Reference No. 1171)
2. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Ronald J. Grimley) (Reference No. 1272)
3. In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 38 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Shawn E. AndomM00*erson) (Reference
No. 1281)
4. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Stephanie K. Hayes) (Reference No. 1282)
5. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Benjamin C. Waite) (Reference No. 1285)
6. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Benjamin D. Fitzharris) (Reference No. 1286)
7. In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Robert W. Brooks III) (Reference No. 1307)
8. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Glen R. Pond) (Reference No. 1310)
9. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Matthew T. Migliori) (Reference No. 1321)
10. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(Claudia L. Battle) (Reference No. 1328)
11. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Daniel A. Hancock) (Reference No. 1391)
12. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(James L. Clark III) (Reference No. 1392)
13. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Debra L. Sims) (Reference No. 1416)
14. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Peter S. Joo) (Reference No. 1417)
15. Capt. Lia M. Reynolds, USN to be rear admiral (Reference No.
1444)
16. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(William Selde) (Reference No. 1489)
17. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Edward L. Gungon) (Reference No. 1529)
18. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Dionne L. McMillan) (Reference No. 1598)
19. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Todd
A. Hasenstein) (Reference No. 1599)
20. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Ty R. Christian) (Reference No. 1617)
21. MG Jason T. Hinds, USAF to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commander, U.S. Air Forces Europe and Deputy Commander, U.S. Air Forces
Africa (Reference No. 1655)
22. Col. Lisa A. Nemeth, ANG to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 1656)
23. Col. Peter M. Boone, ANG to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 1657)
24. Col. Michael S. Shanley, USAR to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 1658)
25. In the Army Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with Kathleen A. Clary) (Reference No.
1659)
26. In the Air Force there are 398 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Geoffrey E. Adams) (Reference No. 1661)
27. In the Air Force there are 144 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Nicholas Alberto Aguilera) (Reference No. 1662)
28. In the Air Force there are 311 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Jessica M. Abbott) (Reference No. 1663)
29. In the Air Force there are 1,071 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Mariah C. Aceves) (Reference No. 1664)
30. In the Army there are 405 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Gregory J. Abide) (Reference No.
1665)
31. In the Army there are 502 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Jacob P. Absalon) (Reference No.
1666)
32. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Michael W. Struthers) (Reference No. 1668)
33. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Gary R. Weltman) (Reference No. 1670)
34. In the Army there are 43 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Daniel A. Abaldo) (Reference No.
1671)
35. In the Army there are 323 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Ji Y. Adams) (Reference No. 1672)
36. MG Jered P. Helwig, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (Reference No. 1697)
37. MG Gregory K. Anderson, USA to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Liberty (Reference
No. 1698)
38. In the Army there are 3 appointments to the grade of brigadier
general (list begins with Terri J. Erisman) (Reference No. 1699)
39. LTG Stephen D. Sklenka, USMC to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics (Reference No. 1700)
40. MG Calvert L. Worth, Jr., USMC to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force (Reference No. 1701)
41. RADM Michael J. Vernazza, USN to be vice admiral and
Commander, Naval Information Forces (Reference No. 1702)
42. VADM John F. Wade, USN to be vice admiral and Commander, THIRD
Fleet (Reference No. 1703)
43. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Paula M. Chavis) (Reference No. 1704)
44. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Frank J. Panebianco) (Reference
No. 1705)
45. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (James L. Schneider III) (Reference No. 1706)
46. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Zhibin Jiang) (Reference No. 1707)
47. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Bennet D. Krawchuk) (Reference No. 1708)
48. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Dariusz P. Barna) (Reference No. 1709)
49. In the Air Force there are 4 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Sally L. Cramer) (Reference No. 1710)
50. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Caroline M. Kolb) (Reference No. 1712)
51. In the Army there are 19 appointments to the grade of colonel
and below (list begins with Michael J. Browning) (Reference No. 1719)
52. In the Army there are 18 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Emily R. Bingham) (Reference No.
1721)
53. In the Army there are 111 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Ahmad B. Alexander) (Reference No.
1722)
54. In the Army there are 27 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Vanessa E. Bonner) (Reference No.
1723)
55. In the Army there are 87 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Elizabeth A. Aguirre) (Reference
No. 1724)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 3,549
Chairman Reed. The motion carries. Thank you very much.
Good morning. The Committee meets today to receive the
testimony on the President's budget request for the Department
of the Navy for fiscal year 2025. I'd also like to welcome
Secretary of the Navy, Carlos Del Toro, Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti, and Commandant of the
Marine Corps, General Eric Smith.
I would note that this is Admiral Franchetti and General
Smith's first posture hearing before the Committee, and General
Smith, on behalf of the Committee, I'm pleased that you are
joining us in good health and good spirits. Not surprising for
marine. So, thank you, sir. You and your family have been in
our thoughts since your medical emergency last fall, and we're
thrilled at your remarkable recovery.
We are grateful to each of our witnesses for your service
and for the service of the men and women under your command,
and for the support of all Navy and Marine Corps families.
Would you thank them for us, please?
The importance of the Navy and Marine Corps joint mission
has never been clearer. Just last month, Iran launched hundreds
of drones and missiles at Israel, prompting United States Navy
vessels in the region to work with the Air Force, Israel, and
partner nations to successfully shoot down the incoming
munitions.
In addition, Houthi rebels in Yemen have launched hundreds
of drone missile attacks against United States and
international vessels in the Red Sea disrupting nearly 15
percent of global commercial trade.
However, the American-led coalition has shut down the vast
majority of these attacks and has carried out hundreds of air
strikes against Houthi targets and other Iranian proxies
significantly degrading their capabilities. I commend the
servicemembers who have taken part in these operations as well
as the Navy and the Marine Corps leadership in facilitating
humanitarian support to Gaza.
Our adversary should take note of the capabilities of the
United States and our allies to bring to any conflict. Indeed,
in other seas and ports around the world, particularly the
Indopacom, the Navy, and the Marine Corps will continue to be
the first line of deterrence and defense against China and
other competitors' expanding ambitions.
The United States Navy remains the finest in the world, but
our maritime forces must adapt quickly to this changing threat
environment. To that end, President Biden's defense budget
request for fiscal year 2025 includes $257.6 billion in funding
for the Department of the Navy. Within this budget, the Navy
has requested a number of new ships. The procurement of several
new destroyers, frigates, and logistics vessels is well-
reasoned.
However, the Navy has requested to procure only one
Virginia-class submarine in fiscal year 2025, diverging from
the longstanding two per year plan. Instead, the Navy has
requested one submarine and roughly $2 billion to improve the
capabilities of the submarine industrial base. I understand
this was a difficult decision. I would ask our witnesses to
discuss their reasoning in detail.
Additionally, I would like to know how the recently passed
National Security Supplemental Appropriations Bill will help
improve the situation, particularly with regard to the
submarine industrial base and workforce, and let me commend
Senator Wicker for his efforts to include $3 billion in that
Supplemental.
Finally, I would like the witnesses to discuss their
expectations for the submarine production numbers in the
future. Challenges similar to the submarine program are being
experienced by other programs in both private and public
shipyards. The department has undertaking its shipyard
infrastructure optimization program, which represents more than
$25 billion in plant investment over the next 25 years to
modernize and improve our Navy shipyards.
The Navy recently completed a 45-day assessment of its
shipbuilding program. As the Navy's review makes clear, there
are significant hurdles facing the service and the Nation to
continue modernizing the fleet. Secretary Del Toro, I would
appreciate your outlook on the Navy's efforts to improve ship
building and ship maintenance programs.
General Smith, the Marine Corps is in the midst of a
substantial transformation focused primarily on competition in
the Indo-Pacific. The service is restructuring around
expedition and concepts that will provide a more flexible
amphibious force that can support a broader naval fight once
ashore. Indeed, the Marine Corps is much more than a ground
fighting force. It must help control the sea and air in support
of the joint force.
To achieve this, the Corps is prioritizing a number of
modernization efforts, including long range fires, enhanced air
and missile defense, and improved ground and amphibious combat
vehicles. These platforms should help AC equip the marines with
improved force, protection, lethality, and mobility. General, I
would ask for an update on the force's design, concept, and
progress.
There also may be discussions this morning about the
appropriate amphibious force structure. I understand that the
Marine Corps continues to seek 31 large amphibious ships to
meet its requirements in addition to smaller vessels to support
the expeditionary advanced base operation concept. Others have
asserted that amphibious ships are necessary. I would ask each
of the witnesses for an update on these discussions.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today,
and I look forward to their testimoneys. As a reminder for my
colleagues, there will be a closed session immediately
following this hearing in room SDC-217.
Now, let me recognize Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I'm grateful to our witnesses for appearing today, and like
you, Mr. Chairman, I want to extend an especially warm welcome
to General Smith. General Smith, I think that this, without
question, your first visit to this Committee since your heart
operation, my colleagues and I are very grateful for your
recovery.
I was interested to see the special report on one of the
news programs just a few days ago. My hat is off to the Good
Samaritan, Tim Leland, a CPR-trained bystander who happened
along, highly trained, and was willing and capable of keeping
you alive, helping you in your time of need.
I'm grateful, and this Nation is grateful to this young
man, and I know this experience has given you renewed
appreciation for your loved ones and for the marines you're
leading. So, glad to see you looking so good.
I want to join all of you in expressing our gratitude to
the men and women serving in our Marine Corps and in our Navy.
In the Red Sea and elsewhere, they execute missions of which
there are no other naval forces capable. For one example, our
Navy has been the first to shoot down an anti-ship ballistic
missile fired in conflict.
They are accomplishing feats like this so routinely that
our Nation could easily forget what an astounding
accomplishment that was and what astounding abilities we have.
Destroyers like the USS Gravely, which was built in my home
State of Mississippi, are protecting maritime commerce, our
allies, and our own forces.
For months on end, they operate persistently within range
of enemy weapons. Their skill and bravery are evident. But
these missions come at a cost, putting our young men and women
on extended deployments, places sailor welfare material
readiness, and weapons inventory at risk.
This Committee has a lot of work to do and we have a
quantum leap that we need to make and we need to do it soon.
The truth is that our naval fleet is too small and too old to
meet the demands of our combatant commanders and our national
defense strategy, particularly in the years going forward. The
urgent need to rebuild the Navy is not lost on this Committee.
The pertinent question becomes, how should we rebuild? It's
clear we will not be able to do so with the Navy's fiscal year
2025 budget request, which contains cuts to naval personnel,
ship building weapons, and military construction. We will not
be able to meet the needs of our Nation with that request.
We're going to have to address this by working across the
aisle, and I'm glad to be sitting next to a chairman who has
shown a willingness to do this over time.
Here are the facts. Compared to fiscal year 2023, President
Biden has asked the Navy to take a 3 percent cut. When
accounting for inflation, these cuts impact the capacity of our
force. The Navy is asking to retire 19 Battle Force ships and
procure only six is just a fact. This is completely
unacceptable. As I've done in the past, I want to work with my
colleagues in Congress, as I say, across the aisle and in the
other body to fix the Navy's budget.
The Navy has work to do internally while my colleagues and
I work on the budget. The secretary's 45-day ship building
review found delays across the entire portfolio. For example,
the Constellation-class frigate will be 3 years late and will
take nearly 10 years to deliver the lead ship. This is largely
because the Navy cannot keep its requirements steady. Almost 70
percent of the requirements have changed since the Navy signed
a contract. So, the outcome that we see today is no surprise.
This is not an example of the industry underperforming.
This is senior officials unable to manage a program. This is
acquisition malpractice and a terrible waste of time and
resources. I want to understand what urgent steps the Secretary
will take to improve the Navy as a customer, regulator, and
technical authority. The upcoming landing ship medium program
presents an opportunity for the Navy to avoid heading down the
same disappointing path as the frigate.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates a cost two to
three times greater than the Navy had budgeted. This new
program can apply lessons learned to ensure that the marines
get a ship at the capacity and schedule they need for
campaigning in the Pacific.
I appreciate the efforts of the submarine industrial base
community over the past 5 years, and I do appreciate the
chair's kind words about our efforts and our success recently
in getting over $3 billion for the industrial base. The
industrial base community is dealing in a holistic fashion with
structural workforce and supply chain problems.
That's why I insisted last year as a condition for the
office agreement that the Administration make a significant
down payment on the submarine industrial base. This resulted in
the $3.4 billion that was included in the National Security
Supplemental Appropriation. However, I remain concerned that
this approach has not been taken for other ship classes.
Finally, I want to touch on the continuing recruiting
crisis facing our military. Every service has struggled in
recent years, but the Navy has been unique in its response.
Other services have invested in reforms and new programs
without sacrificing quality. But the Navy has lowered
standards. That approach does not appear to be working.
Recent reports indicate the Navy could miss its recruiting
mission by nearly 15 percent this year. We need to know if
that's true. The Army and Air Force are now optimistic about
their ability to achieve their respective recruiting goals.
It's time for the Navy to learn from every other service and
reemphasize quality.
I hope our witnesses will explain to this Committee how
they plan to fix the Navy's recruiting crisis without
sacrificing basic standards, and that's just the beginning of
what I would like to say. We'll followup more on some
questions.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Mr. Secretary, please.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CARLOS DEL TORO, SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY
Mr. Del Toro. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Wicker, and distinguished Members of this Committee. It is
indeed an honor to appear before you this morning to discuss
the posture of the Department of the Navy.
First and foremost, I'd like to thank General Smith and
Admiral Franchetti for, again, answering the call of our Nation
time and time again. They, like all who devote their careers,
and in many cases, indeed sacrifice their lives in defense of
their fellow Americans, represent everything that makes this
country a beacon of hope and freedom around the world.
Together, our combined years of service to our country
totals over a century. A century marked by multiple
deployments, time away from home and sacrifices made by our
families. As we gather here this morning, tens of thousands of
our sailors, our marines, or civilians and their families are
either stationed or deployed all over the world, making the
same sacrifices and enduring the same trials that myself,
General Smith, and Admiral Franchetti have faced throughout our
own careers.
I think that gives us a special appreciation for their
service in the Indo-Pacific. Our Navy and Marine Corps are
sailing and operating alongside our international allies and
partners in support of free and open maritime commons, one
where nations are secure in their access to the seas, and where
their rights within our exclusive economic zones are respected
and upheld by all nations, including the People's Republic of
China.
Across Europe, we, in cooperation with our NATO allies, are
supporting our Ukrainian partners as they continue to fight to
restore their territorial and national sovereignty as Russia's
illegal, full-scale invasion is now into its third year. I
commend Congress for passing the National Security Supplemental
last month, allowing us to continue providing support to our
Ukrainian partners as they fight to restore peace in their
Homeland and indeed in defense of democracy for all countries
and all free nations.
In the Red Sea, as you have stated, Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member, our sailors and marines have countered hundreds
of missiles and drones launched by the Houthis these past 6
months, over 300, targeting merchant shipping, and the warships
of both the United States and our international allies and
partners.
We are confronting an adversary supported by Iran that has
absolutely no respect for the innocent lives of civilian
merchant mariners, and one that is actively targeting our
ships, attempting to harm our sailors and marines because we
dare to defend the defenseless. Last month, USS Carney and USSR
Burke both operating in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea,
intercepted several Iranian ballistic missiles heading toward
Israel.
For those who question why the American taxpayer should
provide for and maintain a Navy and a Marine Corps, look at
what is happening today in the Middle East, where we are
defending the free flow of international commerce, and actively
defending our international partners and allies.
Members of the Committee, we appear before you today to ask
for your continued support, thankful for the support you've
provided us in the past, your partnership and your commitment,
ensuring that nearly one million sailors, marines and civilians
of the Department of the Navy that we lead are ready on all
fronts at all times.
While the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 require us to
make extremely hard choices. The $257.6 billion in the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2025 for our
department adeptly balances, maintaining, modernizing the fleet
and force of today, against planning for the future force,
while also taking care of our people within those financial
restrictions.
This budget directly supports our department's three
enduring priorities of strengthening our maritime dominance,
creating a culture of war, fighting excellence, and enhancing
our strategic partnerships around the globe. We are acquiring
the most lethal, agile, and capable warships, submarines,
aircraft, weapons, and systems that our world has ever seen.
We are also funding the research and development of
transformational technologies and fielding them more quickly to
make our fleet more lethal and persistent within the current
fit up. We're investing billions of dollars in the industrial
base that supports us, while encouraging them to invest more in
resources themselves at the same time.
As responsible stewards of taxpayer money, we will enforce
accountability to ensure that our sailors and marines have the
platforms and the capabilities that they need, on time and on
budget. Above all else, we're taking care of our personnel and
their families by focusing and improving housing, expanding
childcare capacity, and increasing access to mental health
resources amongst other critical areas.
We are clear-eyed about the challenges that our Nation and
our Navy faces today in, in the maritime domain, both
commercial and naval. As a maritime nation, we must confront
the challenges of today and prepare for the potential conflict
of tomorrow by investing in a strong Navy and Marine Corps.
Again, it's an honor to appear before you this morning and
we look forward to discussing with you how best to deliver the
Navy and Marine Corps capability that our Nation requires.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carlos Del Toro follows:]
Prepared Statement by The Honorable Carlos Del Toro
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, I am honored to appear before you alongside General
Smith and Admiral Franchetti to discuss the posture of the Department
of the Navy (DON). We appreciate your trust and confidence in us to
lead the nearly one million sailors, marines, and civilians of our
Nation's naval services, and we value opportunities like this to
discuss our approach to recruiting, training, equipping, and preparing
our sailors and marines to defend our Nation.
For over 248 years, our Navy and Marine Corps have served as our
Nation's vanguard, representing our interests around the globe--on,
above, and below the sea, ashore, as well as in space and cyberspace.
Our Founding Fathers recognized the importance of a well-trained, well-
equipped naval force, and codified in our Constitution this legislative
body's obligation to the American people to provide for and maintain a
Navy and, by extension, a Marine Corps. Since the founding of our
Nation, we have relied on our naval services to secure the world's
oceans to sustain our economy through international trade, to engage
with allies and partners thousands of miles away, and to confront the
threats that have challenged our very way of life.
Today, our naval power is on full display around the globe,
especially in the Red Sea and in the Indo-Pacific. We are reassuring
allies and partners, deterring potential adversaries, and responding to
the actions of those who wish to threaten the lives of our sailors,
marines, and civilian merchant mariners engaged in lawful,
international commercial activities. American sailors and marines are
protecting the national security interests and prosperity of the United
States--all in line with the National Security and National Defense
Strategies.
As we confront global challenges, we remain laser-focused on
managing our strategic competition with the People's Republic of China
(PRC)--our pacing challenge. The PRC continues to behave provocatively
and unsafely across the Indo-Pacific region, especially in the Taiwan
Strait and the South China Sea. The PRC seeks to coerce its neighbors
and threaten their interests, while undermining our alliances and
security partnerships. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA(N)) is
just one element of the maritime force Beijing employs to challenge the
rules-based international order. As illustrated by ongoing PRC actions
against our Philippine ally at Scarborough Reef and Second Thomas
Shoal, the PRC uses its Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia as part
of an integrated, cumulative campaign designed to force nations to
submit to Beijing's excessive maritime claims despite international
law, as reflected in the 2016 South China Sea ruling under Annex VII of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Using these ``gray
zone'' operations, the PRC is attempting to illegally appropriate other
countries' offshore resources, threatening the peace, prosperity, and
ecological stability of the world's ocean. Our Navy and our Marine
Corps play a vital role--and have proven their effectiveness--in
supporting our allies and partners' civilian vessels in standing up to
the PRC's coercive maritime strategy in the South China Sea. While we
do not seek confrontation, we will continue to uphold a free and open
Indo-Pacific, and we will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever
international law allows.
In Europe, Russia's illegal war and full-scale invasion of Ukraine
has entered its third year. Our Ukrainian partners continue to display
incredible courage and bravery on the battlefield, in the air, and at
sea as they strive to restore their national and territorial
sovereignty. We are proud to stand by their side, along with our NATO
allies, and it is imperative that we continue to provide them with the
support required for them to achieve victory.
In the Middle East, the Iranian-aligned Houthis continue to launch
unprovoked attacks on civilian merchant ships sailing innocently
through waters where international law allows in the Red Sea and Gulf
of Aden, one of the world's busiest waterways that accounts for more
than 15 percent of the world's shipping traffic and connects Europe and
Asia. More than 20 countries have joined us in Operation Prosperity
Guardian to protect civilian ships and crews from harm. Acting in self-
defense, our Navy and Marine Corps, along with the navies of our allies
and partners, have shot down scores of anti-ship cruise missiles,
ballistic missiles, and drones launched by the Houthis. Our ships,
aircraft, and crews have performed admirably to both protect
international commercial ships from multi-domain threats and defend
themselves.
Following exhaustive diplomatic efforts to seek an end to the
Houthis' attacks without further damage and bloodshed, we and our
allies have conducted multiple rounds of combined self-defense strikes
against targets in parts of Houthi-controlled Yemen, including storage
sites and locations associated with the group's missile and air
surveillance capabilities. These strikes were in direct response to
Houthi actions that have demonstrated their callous disregard for the
lives of civilian merchant mariners, underscored by the anti-ship
ballistic missile attack that claimed the lives of three seafarers
aboard the merchant ship M/V True Confidence.
The Houthis' actions in the Red Sea are reverberating across the
global economy. Iran, through its proxies and partners, aims to exploit
the ongoing conflict in Gaza to exact a price on the rest of the world
by increasing shipping costs and maritime insurance rates, as well as
lengthening the time it takes goods to reach their intended ports.
These costs are borne by our own citizens, as well as citizens in
countries around the world, including those most vulnerable to
disruptions in maritime transportation. It is imperative that we and
our global network of allies and partners bring an end to the Houthis'
threat to United States Navy vessels and the disruption of the free
flow of maritime commerce. In the Red Sea, as elsewhere, we must not
hesitate to counter those who threaten the free and lawful use of the
sea by all nations.
The operations in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden over the past 3
months illustrate perfectly how technological investments and force
design decisions made by naval leaders in the past impact operations
for decades. The backbone of our air defense fleet, the Aegis Combat
System, first became a program of record as the Advanced Surface
Missile System 60 years ago this year. Launching from the flight deck
of the nearly 47 year-old USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) in the Red
Sea region, the workhorse of our air wings, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet,
is derivative of a strike fighter platform that first flew 45 years ago
this year, employing the latest version of an air-to-air missile, the
AIM-9 Sidewinder, which first entered service 68 years ago. The
platforms and weapon systems our sailors and marines have used with
great effect in shooting down Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles,
ballistic missiles, and drones can be traced back to development
efforts and disciplined investments from the 1960's, 1970's, and
1980's, as well as timely modernizations and upgrades that have enabled
these platforms and systems to be relevant in today's threat
environment.
Today, the decisions we make regarding shipbuilding, platform and
systems acquisition, cybersecurity and information technology,
maintenance, repair, and caring for our sailors, marines, civilians,
and their families will shape the future of the Navy and Marine Corps
in the
2050's and beyond. I fully support Admiral Franchetti's priorities
outlined in America's Warfighting Navy and General Smith's efforts to
modernize and increase the lethality of the Marine Corps under the
umbrella of Force Design. The guidance issued by our service chiefs is
aligned with my three enduring priorities of Strengthening Maritime
Dominance, Building a Culture of Warfighting Excellence, and Enhancing
Strategic Partnerships. With the support of Congress, we have made
tremendous progress over the past year to advance our three enduring
priorities.
progress update on the don's three enduring priorities
Strengthening Maritime Dominance
Over the past 12 months, we have delivered nearly a dozen new
battle force ships to the fleet and have nearly ninety under contract,
including our highest acquisition priority, the Columbia-class SSBN. We
continue to explore new block buys and multi-year contracts to procure
ships more efficiently and affordably while providing our industry
partners with clear and predictable demand signals for ships,
submarines, and munitions. The submarine industrial base faces an
increased demand as we ramp up production of Columbia-class SSBNs and
continue procuring Virginia-class SSNs. To augment our Fleet and our
Force, we have made significant strides in developing and deploying a
hybrid fleet (manned and unmanned) across the Fourth, Fifth, and
Seventh Fleet Areas of Operations. The Windward Stack and Gatekeeper
operations, led by Fourth and Fifth Fleet, respectively, and similar
activities in other theaters provide persistent presence and deliver
all-domain awareness across a total area covering tens of thousands of
square miles. The assistance provided to Ukraine by United States Naval
Forces Europe has demonstrated how to deliver combat power with a
hybrid fleet in battle with Russia's Black Sea Fleet. We are also on
track to conduct an at-sea test of the Transportable Re-Arming
Mechanism (TRAM) for Vertical Launch System at-sea reloading, which
will significantly increase the combat readiness of our surface fleet
by reducing combat reload times.
To keep our Fleet ready, we continue to modernize our four public
shipyards through the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program
(SIOP). Over the past year, we have completed renovations and
improvements of our dry docks at both Norfolk Naval Shipyard and Puget
Sound Naval Shipyard, and awarded a $2.84 billion construction contract
for the replacement of Dry Dock 3 at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. All
of this progress was made possible with the support of Congress, and I
appreciate your enduring commitment to ensuring the success of SIOP as
we contract, fund, execute, and complete these critical projects to
support our future requirements and keep our warships and submarines
mission-ready.
As we modernize our Fleet and our Force through several initiatives
to increase their lethality, mobility, and capabilities, we are also
increasing their resiliency in an effort to combat the effects of
climate change. In 2022, our Department released Climate Action 2030,
focusing our approach on this important issue. Actions we have taken in
line with our climate strategy include critical infrastructure upgrades
to increase the resiliency of our installations, which are central to
our ability to project naval power both at-sea and ashore. Through our
Chief Sustainability Officer, the DON has issued guidance on resilient
infrastructure, water security, acquisitions, and energy to ensure that
we make good use of the resources we have now and invest in the
resources we will need in the future. As a maritime nation, we cannot
afford to ignore how our world's changing climate impacts the
environments across which our sailors, marines, and civilians operate.
Our operational environment is directly impacted, increasing the
mission demands of our maritime forces and decreasing our ability to
respond to those demands.
Our partners and allies are seeing the same thing, and as we work
to reduce the threat of climate change and increase our resilience, we
are committed to working with them to ensure our collective naval
forces remain resilient and resourced to maintain their competitive
advantages in the decades to come.
Building a Culture of Warfighting Excellence
Our people remain our greatest strength. Personnel readiness and
resilience begin and end with them. Every sailor, marine, and civilian
deserves leadership at all levels that fosters healthy commands built
on trust, respect, and inclusion. We will ensure that both Quality of
Life and Quality of Service meet the standards expected by our sailors,
marines, civilians, and their families. We are prioritizing our most
pressing infrastructure problems, including facilities, barracks,
water, and energy.
We are acting on our commitment to provide additional services for
our sailors and marines who reside in unaccompanied housing. In
February, we launched a pilot program in Hampton Roads to provide
complimentary internet access to all sailors living in unaccompanied
housing. The feedback we receive from our personnel participating in
these programs will directly inform our future efforts to roll out this
service Department-wide, providing sailors and marines with access to
free internet services in unaccompanied housing.
We also remain committed to maximizing sailor and marine
development and are pursuing every available avenue to retain our best
and most fully qualified personnel while recruiting the next
generation. Our education institutions, including the Naval Academy,
Naval Postgraduate School, Naval War College, Marine Corps University,
and Naval Community College, remain world-class, and we released the
Naval Education Strategy last year to modernize our naval education to
meet our Nation's security needs.
Enhancing Strategic Partnerships
Our greatest asymmetric advantage is our global network of allies
and partners. We continue to foster strong security ties, pursue new
ways to link industrial bases, secure supply chains, and co-produce
technologies to boost our collective capabilities. For example, the
historic AUKUS trilateral partnership among Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, provides a generational opportunity to
strengthen our respective security and defense capabilities, uplift our
respective industrial bases, and contribute to peace and stability in
the Indo-Pacific.
Additionally, we are focused on advocating for national maritime
power--both commercial and naval--across the Federal Government. We
have collaborated with our inter-agency partners at the Department of
Transportation, Department of Commerce, Department of Homeland
Security, the U.S. Trade Representative, and with maritime stakeholders
throughout the Department of Defense, to build consensus and identify
actions that we can take in support of our Nation's shipbuilding and
ship repair capabilities and capacity in support of our naval services.
We are appreciative of the widespread interest and support these topics
have garnered in Congress, and we look forward to working with you in
the years to come to identify solutions that will improve the readiness
and health of our Nation's commercial maritime and naval fleets.
We likewise remain committed to bolstering our relationships with
the defense industrial base and academia. With congressional support,
Ship and Submarine Industrial Base investments have led to improved
hiring across our submarine shipbuilders and suppliers; establishment
of dedicated manufacturing trade centers and pipelines; and the
training and placement of over 5,000 people within the industrial base
since 2020. Over the next decade, our Nation will need 200,000 new
qualified workers to choose careers in fields like naval architecture,
engineering, and lifecycle management, as well as technical expertise
in nuclear welding, robotics, software management, and additive
manufacturing. Pre-apprenticeship, registered apprenticeship, and labor
management programs are critical tools to help fulfill this labor
demand.
Finally, we are strengthening our bonds with the communities we
serve across our Nation through outreach, Navy and Marine Corps Weeks,
Fleet Weeks, and other events. I am especially proud of the work we've
done to foster our connectedness with Tribal Nations. The Department of
the Navy is the first military department to have a full-time,
dedicated Director of Tribal and Indigenous Affairs. We are committed
to the enduring relationships and transparency in our work with Tribal
Nations to meet our shared goals, as well as all communities which our
sailors, marines, civilians, and their families work in and call home.
the fiscal year 2025 president's budget
Building on the successes and progress made along our three
enduring priorities during 2023, the President's Budget for fiscal year
2025 request to Congress for the Department of the Navy reflects
President Biden's faith in our vision for the United States Navy and
the United States Marine Corps, and advocates for the funding levels
required to maintain the Fleet and the Force that our Nation requires.
Our request this year for the Department of the Navy is $257.6 billion,
a 0.7 percent increase over the $255.8 billion in the President's
Fiscal Year 2024 Budget request, adhering to the defense spending
levels set by the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 (FRA). I will note
for the Committee that adhering to the FRA required us to make hard
choices, leading us to prioritize the readiness of our Fleet and our
Force today, as well as taking care of our people, over significant
investments in the future force. These choices are reflected throughout
President's Budget 2025.
Every dollar of this requested investment by the American taxpayer
will ensure that our sailors, marines, civilians, and their families
are provided for--from the continued acquisition of strategic platforms
and systems, investments in research and development as well as basic
science and technology, addressing critical infrastructure
requirements, to improving overall Quality of Life/Quality of Service
for our personnel. Most importantly, President's Budget for fiscal year
2025 will ensure the Department of the Navy's ability to continue to
invest in support of our three enduring priorities.
strengthening maritime dominance
Fleet Investments
For fiscal year 2025, we are requesting $32.4 billion to support
ongoing shipbuilding programs and allow for the procurement of six
battle force ships, each one bringing advanced warfighting capabilities
to the Fleet.
In the undersea domain, this budget provides funding for the first
boat in a new multi-year procurement contract for our Block VI
Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and provides
significant additional resources to increase industrial capacity for
submarine construction. Our request also continues funding for the
second of our Columbia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines (SSBN), as well as advance procurement and continuous
production supporting the remaining boats. The Columbia SSBN will
modernize the most-survivable leg of our country's nuclear triad and
remains our Department's highest priority acquisition program.
For our surface fleet, we look to procure two Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers (DDGs) and one Constellation-class frigate (FFG), each of
which will bring additional capacity and capability to our Fleet's
integrated air and missile defense, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and
naval strike operations. In support of the Marine Corps' Force Design,
President's Budget for fiscal year 2025 also provides funding for the
first-in-class Landing Ship Medium (LSM) to enable mobility and
sustainment for the Stand-In Force. Investments in our amphibious fleet
with the request for one Flight II San Antonio-class Landing Dock
Transport (LPD) in each of fiscal year 2025, fiscal year 2027, and
fiscal year 2029 are necessary to maintain the thirty-one amphibious
ships required by law and will give us the flexibility to retire older
and less-capable platforms.
Aviation Investments
As we continue to modernize our surface and undersea fleets, we
must also ensure that our aviation community has the right mix of air
frames and capabilities to support our sailors and marines in the
execution of their assigned missions. President's Budget for fiscal
year 2025 requests $16.2 billion to support aircraft procurement,
aircraft modification efforts, the acquisition of critical spare and
repair parts, and funding for aircraft support equipment and
facilities.
Our request for fixed-wing aircraft centers around the procurement
of twenty-six F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters--thirteen
carrier-based F-35s for the Navy and Marine Corps and 13 short-takeoff
vertical-landing F-35s for the Marine Corps--and our rotary wing
procurement request for the Marine Corps includes 19 CH-53K heavy-lift
helicopters as part of a new, 2-year block buy for airframes with
engines procured as a 5-year multi-year block buy.
President's Budget for fiscal year 2025 also includes funding to
begin low-rate initial production of the MQ-25, an unmanned, carrier-
based platform that will provide an organic, in-air refueling
capability to our carrier airwings. The MQ-25 is the ``pathfinder'' to
the Air Wing of the Future, and will increase the strike range,
capability, and lethality of both the Carrier Air Wing and the Carrier
Strike Group.
USMC Ground Investments
Equally as crucial to our Fleet and our Force are the investments
we make in the Marine Corps' ability to operate ashore. President's
Budget for fiscal year 2025 requests $4.2 billion in support of
critical investments that are key to the success of the Marine Corps'
Force Design transformation efforts. Highlights in platform and system
acquisition efforts include 80 new Amphibious Combat Vehicles, 674
Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, and 123 Javelin anti-armor missiles.
Also included are requests for funding to continue the procurement of
Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC) missiles and launchers and
support the sustainment of the Ground/Air Task Oriented RADAR (G/ATOR).
The dollars committed to these acquisition programs will
exponentially increase the mobility, survivability, and lethality of
our marines, giving them advantages over our adversaries in austere and
contested environments.
Munitions Procurement
As we consider how our Fleet and our Force fight in contested
environments, there is no better example than our operations in the Red
Sea and Gulf of Aden, where the strike and air defense capabilities of
our naval forces are in high demand by U.S. Central Command. However,
we are expending critical munitions from our stockpiles with every
engagement. Our $6.6 billion request continues our multi-year
procurement of the Standard Missile, Naval Strike Missile, Long-Range
Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-
Extended Range (AARGM-ER). We also intend to procure Tactical Tomahawks
for the Navy and Marine Corps, supporting their ability to strike
targets both from the sea and from the shore.
Further, this request increases production for both the LRASM and
AARGM-ER, both of which are critical munitions that allow our sailors
and marines to engage targets at an extended range, reducing risk to
personnel and platforms. We are also investing in systems designed to
provide ships with an ability to defeat unmanned aerial vehicles in a
way that both lowers the cost-per-kill and reduces the expenditure of
high-end missiles against relatively low-end threats. These systems
will help put us on the ``right side of the cost curve'' while also
increasing the ability of our ships to remain on station for longer
periods of time.
Cyber, Cybersecurity, and Information Technology
As we procure more advanced platforms, we continue the
modernization of our IT systems and the cybersecurity safeguards that
protect them. We continue to refresh and modernize our computer systems
and virtual environments to provide a better user experience, in line
with the ``Fix Our Computers'' initiative. We are also taking advantage
of the new capabilities for connectivity provided by proliferated Low
Earth Orbit (P-LEO) satellite networks to support our Fleet and our
Force, both at sea and ashore. By decreasing the time required for
users to log in and set up applications, as well as increasing data
flows and network accessibility, we are improving the quality of
service provided to hundreds of thousands of users across the entire
Department of the Navy.
At the same time, we are implementing our new, comprehensive Cyber
Strategy, published in November by our Chief Information Officer and
Principal Cyber Advisor. This strategy aims to ensure that the DON's
cyber posture positions our naval services for success during
competition, crisis, and conflict. The DON Cyber Strategy is directly
aligned to the National Defense Strategy and DOD Cyber Strategy and
outlines seven lines of effort for our Department to focus on,
including cyber workforce development; cyber readiness; defense of
enterprise IT; data and networks; defense of critical infrastructure
and weapon systems; partnering to secure the defense industrial base;
and fostering cooperation and collaboration. In addition to these
efforts, I have directed the Naval Criminal Investigative Service
(NCIS) to utilize other proactive initiatives under their authorities
as the Military Department Counterintelligence Organization (MDCO) to
better support and harden the industrial base from adversarial cyber
and traditional intelligence threats to ensure acquisition integrity.
Additionally, I am committed to supporting our Cyber Mission Forces
(CMF)--both Navy and Marine Corps--as they continue to gain advantage
in this critical warfare domain. President's Budget for fiscal year
2025 supports the continued development of our Department's CMF, both
in terms of manning and training, to ensure our personnel are prepared
to operate in cyberspace.
Through the investments requested in President's Budget for fiscal
year 2025 for our Department's information technology, cybersecurity
programs, and cyber personnel, we will continue to make progress to
secure our global networks from external and internal threats posed by
State and non-State cyber actors while maintaining the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of data for our users.
Funding for Operations and Maintenance
While acquisition of new platforms and capabilities is critical to
the modernization of the Fleet and the Force, we must always make
readiness our top priority. President's Budget for fiscal year 2025
requests $34.6 billion for Fleet readiness, with $7.6 billion for ship
operations such as training and deployment, $14.5 billion for fleet
upkeep--including fifty-eight ship and submarine maintenance
availabilities at our public and private yards, $10.6 billion for
875,000 flight hours for our Navy and Marine Corps flight crews, and
$1.9 billion for aviation maintenance to increase the number of
mission-capable aircraft. Additionally, we are requesting $4.5 billion
to ensure our Fleet Marine Force remains prepared to operate forward.
This amount includes $2 billion for field logistics, $2.1 billion to
maintain the operational readiness of marine units around the world,
$200 million for maritime prepositioning, and $200 million for depot
maintenance for ground platforms and systems.
Divestments
As we acquire new platforms and systems and focus on the
maintenance, upkeep, and operation of those that are in service, we
must also evaluate which platforms have outlived their service life and
are a drain on the force in terms of time, capital, pier space, and
personnel.
In the information technology (IT) realm, the DON continues to
realize progress through Operation Cattle Drive, our Department's
effort to accelerate the modernization and transformation of our IT
capabilities. Led by our Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial
Management and Comptroller and Chief Information Officer, we are
working to sunset unneeded, obsolete, unproductive, insecure, and un-
auditable IT systems and applications.
Operation Cattle Drive will accomplish two goals: 1) improve the
overall financial management and auditability of the DON, and 2)
eliminate unnecessarily redundant IT systems, resulting in increased
efficiencies, cost avoidance, and funding reallocation to close known
resource gaps, enabling better support to our sailors and marines.
President's Budget for fiscal year 2025 also requests the
divestment of several platforms, including the EP-3 Aries, U.S. Navy
MH-53E mine countermeasure and heavy lift helicopters, MQ-8C unmanned
rotary aircraft, and ten ships. As this Committee is aware, legacy
platforms that are costly to maintain and are ill-equipped to perform
their missions in contested environments must be retired in order to
invest in new, lethal capabilities.
Some of the ships we seek to divest have yet to reach their
expected service lives. Recognizing that the American taxpayer has
committed billions of dollars to construction, outfitting, maintenance,
and operation of these warships, allow me to provide a hull-by-hull
explanation of our request.
For USS Shiloh (CG 67) and USS Lake Erie (CG 70), both ships are
less than 3 years away from their end of service life, and will require
a significant amount of time and resources to improve their material
condition and upgrade their combat, hull, mechanical, and electrical
systems. Simply put, the costs associated with these upgrades and
continued operation of these ships post-modernization are too high to
yield a positive return on investment. Instead of returning these ships
to a ready State just in time for their normal retirement, the Navy
will apply the funding associated with these ships elsewhere either to
maintain or modernize in-service assets that provide a greater combat
capability to the Fleet and the Joint Force.
The same justification applies for USS Germantown (LSD 42), which
will reach the end of its expected service life in 2026. USS Germantown
currently has an unsatisfactory life cycle health assessment and is
proposed for divestment based on the cost and condition of the ship,
including her rotting wooden decks, limitations on the operation of her
cranes, and other material deficiencies. The funds required to maintain
USS Germantown for her final 2 years are better spent elsewhere in
support of our amphibious fleet. I will also highlight for the
Committee that retiring USS Germantown 1 year early does not impact our
ability to meet the 31 amphibious ship requirement as we continue to
procure new LPDs throughout the FYDP with the support of Congress.
USS Jackson (LCS 6) and USS Montgomery (LCS 8)--two of our
Independence-class variant littoral combat ships--have yet to receive
the Lethality and Survivability Upgrade, an investment of several
million dollars per ship that is beyond our current fiscal guidance.
Further, these ships represent an excess LCS capacity beyond our
revised requirement for 15 MCM and ten Surface Warfare Mission
Packages.
Much like USS Jackson and USS Montgomery, USNS Spearhead (T-EPF-1),
USNS Choctaw County (T-EPF-2), USNS Millinocket (T-EPF-3), and USNS
Fall River (T-EPF-4), represent excess capacity beyond what our Navy
and Marine Corps needs for expeditionary fast transport ships (T-EPF).
Currently, the Navy has 14 T-EPFs in service with two additional hulls
under construction, exceeding the revised, combined Navy and Marine
Corps requirement for 12 EPFs. By divesting these four T-EPFs to bring
our fleet size in line with service requirements, the Navy will realize
significant cost savings and will be able to use the available
financial and manpower resources to support higher priority programs.
Finally, we are requesting to divest the USNS John Glenn (ESD-2),
one of our Fleet's two expeditionary transfer docks which were
originally designed and configured around a specific concept of
operations for uncontested ship-to-shore maneuver that has been
obviated by the evolution of the threat environment. Operational
limitations, including low sea-state restrictions, lack of organic
surface connectors, and other challenges that limit the utility of this
platform as presently configured. By inactivating USNS John Glenn,
which is already in a reduced operating status, we project an annual
cost savings of $33 million in OMN funding.
While all ten of these ships, as well as the sailors and Merchant
mariners who have crewed them throughout their time in service so far,
have served our Nation admirably, their divestment during fiscal year
2025 will allow us to maximize our utilization of resources and
personnel in support of programs and platforms that better support the
Joint Force in countering our most pressing threats.
Research and Development (R&D) of Enhanced Capabilities
Beyond the acquisition of new platforms, systems, and munitions, as
well as the divestment of those that are no longer capable of
performing their missions, our Department is also focused on the
research and development of our next-generation capabilities.
President's Budget for fiscal year 2025's $25.7 billion for R&D
continues to invest in developing and fielding those very capabilities
that our sailors and marines of tomorrow will rely on in potential
future conflicts. These includes our next-generation fighter aircraft,
submarines, and large surface combatants, as well as unmanned systems
that will operate in the air, on the ocean's surface, and under the
sea. Over $3 billion of this request will also go toward enterprise
networks, cybersecurity, and electronic warfare systems to support our
personnel and bolster our current posture across the electromagnetic
spectrum.
As a part of our larger R&D funding request, $2.53 billion is set
aside for basic science and technology development that underpins our
future capabilities. Yesterday, we released our Department's latest
Naval Science and Technology Strategy, the execution of which will be
led by our Chief of Naval Research and his team. This strategy will
serve as the driving force behind how we invest the American taxpayers'
dollars on S&T and will directly contribute to ensuring that our Nation
leads the world in developing revolutionary technologies.
Our Department recognizes the importance of protecting the
investments we are making in basic S&T research to preserve the
competitive advantages they provide to our sailors and marines as
technologies mature into cutting-edge capabilities. In early February,
the Department of Defense (DoD) released the National Defense
Industrial Strategy, centered around four priorities--resilient supply
chains, workforce readiness, flexible acquisition, and economic
deterrence--to strengthen our industrial base's resilience and counter
threats posed by adversary capital investments and intellectual
property misappropriation to our Nation's innovation ecosystem. In
support of this strategy, the DON recently stood up the Maritime
Economic Deterrence Executive Council (MEDEC). This body will serve as
a coordinating mechanism to synchronize efforts to protect new and
novel technologies with naval applications, both across the Department
and in alignment with our inter-agency partners.
Over the past year, we have made structural changes throughout our
Department--from standing up and empowering new innovation-focused
units to elevating the Chief of Naval Research to be a direct report to
me--to better facilitate the rapid identification, experimentation,
prototyping, fielding, and adoption of new capabilities and
technologies that provide our sailors and our marines with competitive
warfighting advantages.
In September, we stood up the Department's Science and Technology
Board, chaired by former Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig, to bring
together leaders across various disciplines to help identify new
technologies and capabilities. I charged them to explore the impact of
asymmetric, cutting-edge technologies in both the near and distant
futures of warfighting, across all domains in which we operate. They
are working on improving surface ship cyber defense, shipboard additive
manufacturing, and lifecycle maintenance. Our ongoing project on
surface ship maintenance is investigating key issues that impact our
performance. I expect their recommendations on potential new technology
investments will improve all aspects of our operations, including
planning, condition-based assessments, additive/advanced manufacturing,
and IT modernization.
Likewise, our initiative on surface ship cyber defense is crucial
to executing complex missions in contested environments. We have a
world-class team performing this study that will benefit the Fleet. As
part of this initiative, we have integrated cybersecurity and defense
requirements into the new Constellation-class frigate as a critical
attribute at the onset of the program. The program has scheduled early
integration testing events at available land-based test sites. We
intend for these test events to assess network cybersecurity controls
and reduce shipboard integration risks for government and contractor-
furnished equipment.
This past year, we celebrated the 100th anniversary of the Naval
Research Laboratory, highlighting our Department's long history of
pioneering research with academia, the private sector and other
partners to develop and deliver naval superiority. We benefit from a
strong organic, national and global research ecosystem across the
entire Naval Research and Development Establishment (NR&DE).
Composed of our 15 Naval Warfare Centers, five Naval University
Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs), the Office of Naval Research, NRL,
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), Marine Corps Tactical
Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA), Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and
our Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), the NR&DE continues to be at the
forefront of our basic and applied research through technology
development, integration, operations, maintenance and sustainment. The
NR&DE unifies Naval R&D organizations to provide greater technological
advantage to U.S. warfighting.
This continuum of science, research, development, testing, and
evaluation is critical to transitioning ideas and concepts developed in
the lab to new capabilities for naval warfighters. Our long-view
approach provides our thought leaders the autonomy to produce the
scientific knowledge, capability improvements and disruptive
technologies able to address naval mission needs. ONR is investing in
science and technology projects alongside our international partners
and allies, each aiming to address common challenges we face as
maritime nations. Similarly, ONR, through NavalX, is working to deepen
our international and domestic relationships with industry via our Tech
Bridges, many of which are co-located with our Naval Warfare Centers.
We connect directly with companies and source commercial technologies
that complement and supplement our Fleet and our Force's existing
systems, tools, and research.
The Naval Innovation Center (NIC) at the Naval Postgraduate School
in Monterey, California, which I announced in December 2022, will
empower our next generation of warfighters by leveraging the unique
warrior talent at NPS to inform future operational concepts and
advanced technology development. The NIC will provide a space for
academic collaboration, defense-focused experimentation, and
demonstration of operational use cases to ensure the effectiveness,
technological leadership and warfighting advantage of the Naval
services. Meanwhile, the Marine Innovation Unit (MIU) is focused on
identifying, experimenting, and rapidly fielding technologies and
capabilities to address gaps identified by our marines. MIU leverages
the expertise and professional networks of our talented Reserve marines
to accelerate the development and fielding of key capabilities
throughout the Force. Their efforts are already reducing timelines
between identifying needs and delivering warfighting capabilities
supporting the Marine Corps' transformational Force Design, ensuring
our marines are agile, capable, and lethal.
The Navy's Disruptive Capabilities Office (DCO) is pushing the
bounds of rapidly identifying innovative applications of existing and
new systems by harnessing today's exponential growth in technology. The
DCO is collaborating with stakeholders from across our Department, DOD,
and industry, focusing on identifying solutions for our warfighters at
a pace and scale to close our Fleet's most critical capability gaps. It
works closely with the NR&DE to address the immediate and near-term
needs that require the rapid transition and integration of new and
innovative solutions.
Program Executive Office (PEO) Integrated Warfare Systems and PEO
Land Systems are conducting a pilot program to improve our business
practices, realigning their respective portfolios to a capabilities-
focused model. This pilot program explores how our Program Executives
can operate under a new portfolio-centric construct to increase the
capability development and fielding rate over our present timelines and
does so in a manner that leverages pre-existing authorities. The
lessons we learn throughout this pilot program will enable all our PEOs
to better address the emerging threats and requirements under their
respective purviews.
An essential element of our Department's approach to innovation is
the collaboration with our fellow services and throughout the DOD. We
work with our partners at the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and the
Office of Strategic Capital to ensure that our requirements for
critical technologies are illuminated to industry and investors for
their consideration. We are committed to close collaboration within our
own Department and with our fellow services, OSD, DIU, and the entire
Federal Government to ensure we are aligned. The Department of the
Navy's contribution to the ``Replicator Initiative,'' partnering
closely alongside joint efforts like DIU, will accelerate production
and delivery of the capabilities our Joint Force needs at scale.
Innovation is not solely about delivering material solutions. In
many cases, the solutions to real operational problems can be found by
changing warfighting doctrine or training approaches. As we re-focus
our efforts on addressing the challenges we face in the maritime domain
today and will face in the future, we must recognize that there are
still organizational changes which must be made to ensure we are
developing, adopting, and scaling at a rapid pace to deliver the
technologies and capabilities our sailors and marines require.
Working alongside our partners throughout the DOD, we will continue
to evaluate our approach to the rapid adoption and fielding of new
capabilities and technologies to ensure we are reducing barriers and
transition timelines, ensuring our sailors and marines are equipped
with modern systems and platforms to support their missions.
Investments in the Organic Industrial Base
As we continue to acquire the ships, submarines, aircraft, and
systems we need today and invest in the development of the next
generation of platforms and capabilities for the fight of tomorrow, we
will not be successful without substantial, consistent investments in
the infrastructure that enables these platforms. To that end,
President's Budget for fiscal year 2025 requests $2.8 billion to
continue making the necessary investments in our four public shipyards
that will ensure their sustainability and climate resiliency through
the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP). As I noted
earlier, SIOP will improve the operational availability of our Fleet by
providing modernized facilities, infrastructure, and equipment that
will undoubtedly increase our shipyards' capacity and capabilities to
complete maintenance availabilities. By recapitalizing century-old
infrastructure, we are also improving the Quality-of-Service for the
over 30,000 engineers, artisans, and sailors who work at our four
public shipyards, providing safer working conditions while creating
reliable, resilient, secure energy and water sources for this
infrastructure and its mission.
Infrastructure and Installation Resilience
DON installations and facilities are power projection platforms. In
order for our installations to remain safe, secure, effective, and
resilient, our Department has made it a top priority to tackle
infrastructure deficiencies that decrease our ability to support
mission requirements. This effort includes addressing facilities and
core utilities that are beyond service life and in poor condition as a
result of decades of under-investment and neglect. President's Budget
for fiscal year 2025 includes a request for $11.1 billion for the Navy
and $4.6 billion for the Marine Corps for installation and facilities
support, as well as $4.6 billion for military construction projects, to
support our worldwide infrastructure portfolio that our sailors,
marines, civilians, and their families rely on every day.
While the Department continues to invest in our most critical
infrastructure, we are initiating a thirty-year infrastructure plan to
guide future investments and resources to fully address the gaps in
modernization and recapitalization. This plan is an integrated,
informed, sustainable approach that recognizes our installations are
critical to our Navy and our Marine Corps' ability to project power on
a global scale as well as to defend the Homeland.
We also recently initiated a Critical Infrastructure
Synchronization Forum, which is designed to work through the challenges
and interdependencies of infrastructure resilience and address the
threats to our most critical facilities and core utilities. In support
of this effort, President's Budget for fiscal year 2025 includes
funding for cyber hardening, smart grids, facility-related control
systems, and black start exercises, directly bolstering our
infrastructure portfolio against hazards.
As I highlighted earlier, a major challenge that directly impacts
our infrastructure is climate change. Climate resilience is an
essential component of DON mission readiness, and the Department
strives to ensure installations and infrastructure are resilient
against extreme weather events, water scarcity, sea level rise,
recurrent flooding, wildfires, and other environmental considerations
and threats that present significant risk to our mission. Effectively
responding to climate impacts is a critical component of strengthening
maritime dominance and directly impacts the entire spectrum of military
operations. Our National Security Strategy highlights climate change as
the greatest and potentially existential shared problem for all
nations, and our National Defense Strategy rightly recognizes climate
change as a ``transboundary challenge'' that is transforming the
context in which the Joint Force operates. We are taking actions to
bolster the resiliency of our Department, while also working alongside
our international partners and allies. For example, next month the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and the
Environment will be hosting the Department's third climate-related
tabletop exercise.
This exercise will be focused on the challenges posed by climate
change throughout the Caribbean, and how we can work with and support
key regional partners on topics including health, safety, and
infrastructure. I look forward to sharing with you the outcome of this
exercise and what lessons learned can further enhance our Department's
approach to ensuring the sustainability of our worldwide infrastructure
portfolio and advance our collaboration with and support of key
regional partners.
Energy and energy security are critical to the DON's ability to
provide global presence and ensure stability, deter adversaries,
respond to crises, and, if necessary, fight and win our Nation's wars.
Energy security is necessary to address how we operate in a contested
logistics environment, as well as address the increasing demand for
clean and reliable energy to support electrification, support data
centers and power Artificial Intelligence, directed-energy weapons,
autonomous vehicles, and future technologies. In recent years, the DON
has begun development of the Next Generation-Medium Tactical Truck (NG-
MTT) to reduce bulk fuel logistics burdens and improve fuel economy.
The DON has also developed and patented a safety mitigation container
solution to enable the fielding of battery-powered ground vehicles, the
first step toward hybridization efforts for Navy ships. Additionally,
the Department continues to invest in analytic assessments to support
decisionmaking to meet fuel metering and monitoring requirements.
Red Hill
As we focus on our critical infrastructure portfolio, we remain
engaged with the communities that support our installations. One
example of this is the values we share with the people of Hawai'i in
the community we share with them--including our servicemembers,
civilians, and their families--who were affected by the fuel spill at
the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility (Red Hill). Since November
2021, our Department has been laser-focused on monitoring and
remediating the environmental impacts and addressing the effects this
spill had on the community that we committed to providing safe drinking
water to. Now, with over 99 percent of the previously held fuel
reserves removed 6 months ahead of schedule, we remain steadfast in our
resolve to close Red Hill permanently and conduct the long-term
environmental remediation and aquifer restoration efforts at this site
to ensure the health of the surrounding natural environment. Last
month, I was in Hawai'i to attend the transfer of responsibilities
ceremony from Joint Task Force-Red Hill (JTF-RH), which was responsible
for defueling Red Hill, to Navy Closure Task Force-Red Hill (NCTF-RH),
which will execute the permanent closure of that facility. NCTF-RH's
motto is ``Safe, Deliberate, Engaged, Committed,'' and we will continue
to engage with Red Hill stakeholders at all levels to rebuild the trust
between our Department and the people of Hawai'i in our ability to
provide safe drinking water to the communities we serve.
Safety
Safety is a critical component of our Navy and our Marine Corps
foundation and a key indicator of professionalism and discipline,
directly contributing to the combat readiness of our Fleet and our
Force. The Department of the Navy places the utmost importance on
building a culture of safety excellence, and we reject the notion that
safety mishaps are simply ``the price of doing business.'' Many mishaps
are preventable when we comply with established procedures and take
action to stop unsafe acts before they occur.
However, despite our best efforts, incidents do occur, and when
they do, we quickly respond. The Department of the Navy re-established
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Safety) position as a Tier
3 SES, elevating the DON's Safety portfolio commensurate with the
importance we place on safety. In addition, the Navy Executive Safety
Board, chaired by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, was reinitiated
in 2024 and took effective action on systemic issues noted by the Naval
Safety Command (e.g., Shore Fire Protection Systems, Enterprise Safety
Management System, and the LCS Small Boat Launch and Recovery System).
The DON also established the Shore Policy Board to highlight and
address infrastructure-related concerns. The Marine Corps directed the
assignment of a General Officer to lead marine service safety
initiatives and provide the requisite level of oversight and
leadership.
The DON takes every mishap seriously and properly investigates
causal and contributing factors to prevent future occurrences.
Additionally, we continue to improve our analytic capability to
facilitate identification of units that may be at risk of potential
mishap. We continue to refine the identification of occupational
exposures to things like chemicals, noise, and blast overpressure, to
better understand the effects of these exposures through science and
improve methods to limit exposure. We are executing efforts such as the
promulgation of Lessons Learned and a continuous evaluation and
refinement of safety policy and guidance.
Creating and maintaining a culture of safety within the Department
of the Navy ensures our warfighting readiness, and we remain committed
to prioritizing safety education and promulgation.
Building a Culture of Warfighting Excellence
Building a culture of warfighting excellence is focused on training
our sailors and our marines to be the very best warfighters they can
be, rooted in the principles of taking care of our people and enabling
strong leadership with an emphasis on treating each other with dignity
and respect. This pillar of our enduring priorities emphasizes not only
caring for our sailors and marines, but also our Navy and Marine Corps
families and civilians. Under President's Budget for fiscal year 2025,
we continue to invest in programs and infrastructure that support our
people and enable them to devote their maximum effort to mission
accomplishment.
Warfighting Expertise
In August 2023, the Navy and Marine Corps conducted Large Scale
Exercise 2023 (LSE 23), the third and most complex iteration of the
exercise, which included more than 25,000 sailors and marines across
the world. LSE 23 was a Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) exercise
which spanned 22 time zones and included USS Eisenhower (CVN 69) and
five other carrier strike groups (two live, four virtual), six
Amphibious Ready Group (two live, four virtual), and 25 live and 50
virtual additional ships. Based in real-world events, the Navy and
Marine Corps assessed and refined modern warfighting concepts such as
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), Littoral Operations in a
Contested Environment (LOCE), and Expeditionary Advanced Base
Operations (EABO) throughout the exercise.
The Navy is advancing warfighting tactics and development through
continued implementation of integrated training environments--live
platforms and simulators--across our Fleet, including Live, Virtual,
and Constructive (LVC), Link Inject-to-Live (LITL), Navy Continuous
Training Environment (NCTE), and Tactical Operational Flight Trainers
(TOFT).
The Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) remains
laser-focused on forging new and advanced surface warfare tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and training Warfare Tactics
Instructors (WTIs) who bring their warfighting expertise to the Fleet.
Surface WTIs, highly trained surface warfare officers, specialize in
Anti-Submarine and Surface Warfare (ASW/SUW), Integrated Air and
Missile Defense (IAMD), Amphibious Warfare (AMW), and Mine Warfare
(MIW) and are engaged at every stage of a ship's training cycle.
Our successes in the Red Sea are a direct reflection of our
investments in high-end tactical training and advanced TTP development,
spearheaded by SMWDC, Naval Air Warfighting Development Center (NAWDC),
Naval Information Warfighting Development Center (NIWDC), and the WTIs
in the Fleet.
We also continue to adapt the expertise of our people in uniform to
match the changing character of war. Similar to the establishment of
our Maritime Space Officer community in 2021 and the creation of our
Maritime Cyber Warfare Officer and the enlisted Cyber Warfare
Technician rating last year, earlier this year, we established the
enlisted Robotics Warfare Specialist (RW) rating to plan missions and
operate and maintain remotely operated and autonomous systems.
The RW rating is a major milestone in the Navy achieving a hybrid
fleet. These new areas of expertise are necessary to preserve our
warfighting advantage, and also require a strong foundation of
education.
Education Initiatives
We continue to prioritize education in support of force readiness.
We provide a range of learning opportunities for our sailors, marines,
and DON civilians to further develop their professional competencies
and intellectual skills that enable our Naval force to succeed against
competitors and adversaries, and effectively deter aggression. The DON
is taking an integrated, enterprise-wise approach to improve naval
education and prioritize programs that are critical for a competitive
warfighting advantage. The Naval Education Strategy provides my
guidance and vision to modernize naval education over the next 10
years, and to more effectively deliver relevant, engaging, competency-
focused, and outcomes-based education to the total force. The
Department is implementing a continuum of learning for the entire
force, integrating education into talent management frameworks for more
precise and agile talent management, and strengthening the education
institutions within our Naval University System.
For example, the DON is directing $25 million toward developing the
United States Naval Community College (USNCC). The USNCC ensures
enhanced operational readiness by providing world-class, naval-relevant
education entirely online to a globally deployable force. In September
2023, USNCC completed Pilot II and enrolled approximately 3,500
students, developed seven full associate degree programs in naval-
relevant concentration areas, and validated the five Naval Studies
Certificate courses that will be the core curriculum for every USNCC
associate degree program.
The USNCC is currently pursuing candidacy status and accreditation
through the Middle States Commission on Higher Education. USNCC
successfully navigated Phase 1 of the accreditation process and
submitted the Phase 2 readiness report at the end of September 2023.
The USNCC is on track to complete Phase 3 for academic accreditation by
Fall 2024. Through the USNCC Consortium Agreement, degrees are
currently granted to USNCC students through consortium partners
Alexandria Technical and Community College, Arizona State University,
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Northern Virginia Community
College, Tidewater Community College, University of Maryland Global
Campus, and Western Governors University.
The USNCC headquarters has been temporarily based in Quantico,
Virginia. In January 2024, the Naval Education Board (NEB), an internal
DON board that I established and Chair, voted unanimously to move the
USNCC's permanent headquarters to the Security Force building on the
campus of the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. At
Annapolis, the USNCC staff and faculty will be able to better
collaborate with the Naval Academy, and have access to the Nimitz
Library, IT support, and ample conference facilities. The USNCC
headquarters move will take approximately two and a half years to
complete, and will require $30 million for relocation of the building's
current occupants and $8 million for building renovation.
Education for Seapower Advisory Board (E4SAB)
Education is a key naval warfighting enabler, is essential for
force development, and is a top DON priority for building a culture of
warfighting excellence. Under the provisions of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, the Education for Seapower Advisory Board (E4SAB)
provides the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense, by
way of my role as the
Secretary of the Navy, with independent advice on matters relating
to the Naval Postgraduate School, the Naval War College, and the Naval
Community College. The E4SAB is a requirement for each institution's
academic accreditation and meets at least twice a year. Chaired by Hon.
Sean O'Keefe, a former Secretary of the Navy and NASA Administrator,
the board's membership includes leading experts in academia, business,
national defense and security, management, leadership, and research and
analysis. I have charged the E4SAB to provide recommendations regarding
the Naval Education Strategy's implementation. I expect that the
board's recommendations will inform the Department's efforts to improve
education across our entire Naval University System.
Recruiting/Retention
To maintain a combat-ready Navy and Marine Corps, we focus both on
recruiting motivated Americans and on retaining high quality sailors,
marines, and civilians to meet our personnel needs. Despite a
challenging and competitive environment, we are proud to highlight that
the Marine Corps met its recruitment goal in fiscal year 2023 and
projects making all fiscal year 2024 recruiting missions. While the
Navy fell short of its fiscal year 2023 recruiting goals for officer
and enlisted sailors, both Active and Reserve, it has placed an
increased emphasis on updating recruitment policies and expanding the
eligible population by opening the aperture of qualified individuals
within authorized parameters in an effort to address the continued
challenges presented by a strong economy, competitive labor market, and
other social and demographic factors.
High retention is a direct reflection of the value our members
place on their military service. In fiscal year 2023, the Navy and
Marine Corps exceeded their overall Active Duty enlisted retention
goals and are on track to meet fiscal year 2024 goals. We are
leveraging financial incentives and programs to include special and
incentive pays, early promotions, and assignment incentive pays to
attract and retain sailors and marines in undermanned or difficult-to-
fill positions and communities.
Benefits and Pay
To attract and retain top-tier talent, the DON understands the need
to care for its people through competitive benefits and pay. Initial
results of the Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation indicate
that enlisted sailors and marines earn more than 83 percent of
civilians with similar education and years working. In 2025, the
Employment Cost Index (ECI)-based pay raise for our sailors and marines
will be 4.5 percent, outpacing expected inflation for the second year
in a row. Along with competitive pay, the Navy and Marine Corps boast
attractive non-pay policies and programs, including childcare,
healthcare benefits, the Career Intermission Program, spouse employment
programs, graduate education, Tuition Assistance, focused geographic
stability, dual-military co-location, and other programs that
contribute to readiness and enhance quality of life. While the DON may
provide pay and benefits beyond that of many civilian employers, we
should--and will--always remember that we require our sailors and
marines to serve for a minimum number of years and at times in combat,
where they may make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives for our
defense.
To maintain our global posture and critical mission readiness, the
DON has put in place aggressive strategies to recruit and retain highly
skilled civilian employees. Currently, the DON uses multiple
compensation systems that cover approximately 220,000 civilian
appropriated fund employees to include General Schedule, Federal Wage
System, Senior Executive Service, Wage Marine Pay Schedule, and various
Demonstration Projects. In our effort to enhance our compensation
program for civilian employees, the DON is currently reviewing our
various pay systems with the goal to streamline or combine these to
enhance our capabilities and effectiveness. Additionally, to mitigate
challenges in recruitment and retention of our civilian workforce, the
DON is working to request approval for enhanced compensation, which
include special salary and wage rates as well as special pay incentives
above the normal thresholds.
Other available compensation strategies include accelerated
training and promotion programs, student loan repayment programs, and
advanced in-hire rates up to Step 10 for General Schedule employees and
Step 5 for Federal Wage System employees.
Quality-of-Service Improvements
The DON prioritizes the continuous improvement of Quality-of-Life
(QOL) and Quality-of-Service (QOS) advances. In May 2023, following the
investigation into the suicides aboard USS George Washington and at
Mid-Atlantic Regional Maintenance Center (MARMC), I released a joint
memo with then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gilday, Setting a New
Course for Navy Quality of Service, which prioritized a sustained
effort to correct the Navy's QOS. The memo established the Navy's QOS
cross-functional team (CFT), and clear Commander's Intent provided the
lines of effort focusing the CFT's efforts.
The Navy's CFT, led by Commander, Navy Installations Command, is
comprised of flag officers, senior civilians, and senior enlisted
personnel from approximately sixty Navy organizations across both the
Secretariat and the Fleet. The CFT is establishing standards and
measures for Navy QOS, bringing those standards and measures to Newport
News Shipbuilding prior to scaling them throughout the Fleet. We are
constantly evaluating areas in which we are missing the mark for QOL
and QOS enhancements and are finding new ways to improve how we support
our sailors and civilians.
Housing
Improving off-duty Quality of Life resources and initiatives for
our sailors and marines is a focal point for the DON. This effort
includes improving the quality of unaccompanied housing, with $1
billion over the FYDP for barracks construction and renovations and
$144 million allocated for housing sustainment and management. Under
President's Budget for fiscal year 2025, we are also investing $41
million in food and housing options for sailors assigned to ships
undergoing maintenance. We are investing $481 million in restoration of
unaccompanied housing, a 32 percent increase over President's Budget
for fiscal year 2024, and we are fully funding the sustainment of gyms.
We have also established that no sailors reside on-ship during
maintenance availabilities and that berthing barges are available for
duty section personnel.
The Marine Corps' Barracks 2030 initiative lays out an ambitious
plan to improve the Corps' management of the barracks, modernize the
barracks inventory, and update the refresh rate of the materials in the
barracks. With the support of Congress, the Marine Corps has
implemented the Capital Planning Tool to leverage a tiered approach to
facility lifecycle management that reduces footprint while prioritizing
investments for the most critical facilities.
We are committed to improving the living conditions for our sailors
and marines who reside in unaccompanied housing, and will continue to
work closely with Congress, including the House Armed Services
Committee's Quality of Life Panel, to ensure transparency and
collaboration on this important issue.
We are also focused on the continuous improvement of our Military
Housing Privatization Initiative program to maintain resident trust. We
are reinforcing DON oversight and exercising Active leadership to
ensure that the community residing in privatized housing feels heard
and supported. Over the past year, the DON Housing team has made great
strides in moving the privatized housing program into the next phase of
sustained oversight and dynamic leadership involvement. We continue to
improve the tools we have developed to perform better analysis of our
processes, policies, and the overall program to ensure higher levels of
service and satisfaction for our sailors, marines, and their families.
President's Budget for fiscal year 2025 includes requests for $245
million for construction as well as $377 million for operations--
including the management, services, furnishings, utilities,
maintenance, leasing, and privatization support--in support of our
family housing program.
The DON remains committed to the early identification and
resolution of housing issues, as well as improving processes and
oversight to improve our residents' experiences. We are dedicated to
providing suitable, affordable, and safe living quarters for our
sailors, marines, and their families, and President's Budget for fiscal
year 2025 directly supports our efforts to do so.
Family Readiness
The DON views childcare as a workforce enabler that directly
enhances the readiness, efficiency, and retention of our sailors and
marines. The Navy and Marine Corps operate Child Development Centers
(CDCs), Youth Centers for children ages 6-12, provide fee assistance
for in-home care providers, and subsidize commercial spaces under a
program titled Military Child Care in Your Neighborhood. There are
seven 24/7 CDCs to accommodate shift workers and watchstanders in Fleet
concentration areas and extended hours of operation at other locations.
Together, the Navy and Marine Corps have approximately 42,000
childcare spaces worldwide and employ over 8,400 child and youth
professionals.
However, the demand for childcare exceeds the available inventory
both on and off-base. Due to community and military capacity shortfalls
and staff hiring, there are approximately 4,300 children on the
waitlist. While this is a significant decrease from the 11,000 children
on the waitlist in July 2021, we remain laser-focused on continuing to
reduce our waitlist numbers. In fiscal year 2023, Navy Child and Youth
Programs (CYP) executed a contract with a commercial childcare provider
to open forty-eight additional spaces near Naval Air Station
Jacksonville, and the model will be replicated in San Diego and
Norfolk. We are also expanding our on-base childcare capacity through
ongoing military construction projects in Naval Base Kitsap, Naval Base
Point Loma, Naval Support Activity Hampton Roads, and Joint
Expeditionary Base Little Creek/Fort Story. The Marine Corps has four
projects in planning for fiscal year 2025o fiscal year 2026 in Marine
Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Anderson Air Force Base in Guam, Marine
Corps Base Quantico, and Marine Corps Base Camp Butler.
Due to frequent moves to new duty stations, spouse employment can
be a concern for military families and an obstacle to financial
security. The unemployment rate of military spouses is approximately 21
percent, and earnings are typically less than those of their
counterparts with equal experience in the private sector. They can be
at a disadvantage when it comes to finding gainful employment, from
occupational re-licensure to finding new schools or adequate and
affordable childcare. The Navy and Marine Corps Employment Assistance
Programs provide military spouses with information, referrals, and
guidance counseling to assist in making effective career and education
decisions. To address the challenges faced by military spouses and
lower the financial burden associated with relocating, the Navy and
Marine Corps provide reimbursement for Spouse Licensure and
Certification. As of February 2024, the Navy and Marine Corps have
reimbursed a combined total of 1,293 licensure claims to support the
careers of our military spouses.
Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP)
The DON is committed to providing our Navy and Marine Corps
families with necessary assistance and care at their assigned
locations. The Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) ensures sailors
and marines are assigned to locations where the required medical
services and educational support are available for families with
special needs. Navy EFMP employs 117 personnel to support 23,516
enrolled family members. The Navy has identified and initiated the
process of establishing its central/single-site EFMP office at Navy
Personnel Command under PERS-45 to coordinate health services,
permanent change of station order processing, identification/
enrollment/disenrollment, and educational support services; we expect
full operation of the office by 4th quarter fiscal year 2025. The
Marine Corps is compliant with the requirement for a central office
that reports to the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
While most Navy and Marine Corps families are satisfied with EFMP,
we continue to seek areas of improvement, namely in areas of medical
and educational support. The Marine Corps was the first service to
offer specialized legal support services to families to address
education needs, and the Navy has implemented the provision of special
education legal support to families. To address the medical issues, the
Defense Health Agency is working to reduce the long wait times for
specialty care.
Mental Health and Resiliency
Mental health is health. Mental health concerns remain a top
priority within the DON. Admiral Franchetti, General Smith, and I are
committed to ensuring our sailors and marines have access to the tools
available to strengthen their mental health. We are also committed to
ensuring that their leaders have the tools available to assist them in
recognizing personnel who may require a mental health evaluation.
Prioritizing mental health includes embracing a change in culture
and view toward accessing mental health services--one which
acknowledges that seeking help is a sign of strength. We are working to
ensure our commanders, leaders, supervisors, and civilian and uniformed
managers at all levels continue to normalize talking about mental
health issues to destigmatize seeking mental health care, and
ultimately encourage sailors and marines to make use of well-being
resources throughout their careers.
Brandon Act
In July 2023, under ALNAV 054/23 and in alignment with the DOD
Directive-type Memorandum 23-005, the DON implemented the Brandon Act.
The Brandon Act honors the life of Petty Officer Third Class Brandon
Caserta by allowing servicemembers to self-initiate a mental health
evaluation at any time, for any reason, and in any environment. There
is a direct tie between mental health, overall well-being, and combat
readiness. In order to ensure we are ready, we prioritize mental health
as we do physical health and will continue to increase awareness of
resources and services available to our sailors and marines. I will
stress again that seeking help is a sign of strength.
Military Justice Reform
The DON has answered the call for meaningful change to our military
justice practice. We are deliberately and comprehensively delivering
the most significant reforms to the system in more than seventy years.
The Fiscal Year 2022 NDAA military justice reforms and SECDEF's
Independent Review Commission (IRC) recommendations are top-priority
initiatives for the Navy and Marine Corps judge advocate communities,
and shortly after I became Secretary I established an Implementation
Advisory Panel comprised of senior DON leaders whom I directed to
oversee and expedite the adoption of the NDAA and IRC recommendations,
including the timely establishment of the Office of Special Trial
Counsel (OSTC) for each service, implementing independent prosecution
offices for personal violence offenses, known as covered offenses.
In October 2023, in advance of the December 2023 deadline set by
the NDAA, both the Navy and Marine Corps OSTCs became fully
operationally capable and are staffed by experienced, specialized, and
well-trained legal professionals to ensure independent review of the
most serious personal violence offenses in each service. The fiscal
year 2023 and fiscal year 2024 NDAAs expanded upon the military justice
reforms enacted by the Fiscal Year 2022 NDAA, and the budget request
for fiscal year 2025 includes funding to support the sustainment and
staffing of both OSTCs. My Implementation Advisory Panel proposed, and
I agreed, that the independent investigation of sexual harassment
allegations in the DON should be conducted by the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service. We have provided additional resources to NICS
for this important mission. We have also strengthened collaboration by
integrating local OSTC counsel with NCIS Family and Sexual Violence
squads.
The Naval Court-Martial Reporting System (NCORS) is the DON's new
electronic case management system, currently in its final stages of
development to meet statutory requirements. It is a modern, cloud-based
system that is easily configurable system and will enable the Navy and
Marine Corps to better track and analyze military justice data and to
respond to congressional requests. President's Budget for fiscal year
2025 includes additional funds for NCORS for expanded roles and
functionality.
Other important reforms include a new, military judge-alone
sentencing system with parameters and criteria, expanded access by
convicted servicemembers to the appellate court system, broader
notification rights for crime victims, randomized selection of
servicemembers detailed to court-martial panels, new procedures for
complaints of sexual harassment, and increased resources for defense
counsel.
Military justice reform remains an ongoing and evolving effort, and
both services are continually assessing the efficacy of new policies
and practices and are ready to adjust as needed. The Navy and Marine
Corps judge advocate communities, in close partnership with the OSTC
regarding covered offenses, are spearheading initiatives for the
Department of the Navy to develop a comprehensive, ongoing assessment
framework using a wide range of qualitative and quantitative factors.
These assessments include a newly developed military justice reform
survey to obtain victim and other user input on their perception and
confidence in the system as the significant military justice reforms
are implemented.
Audit Process
After a 2-year audit cycle across fiscal year 2022 and fiscal year
2023, the Marine Corps passed its financial statement audit with a
clean opinion, successfully accounting for more than $46.3 billion in
assets. The Navy is undergoing its seventh full financial statement
audit of the Navy General Fund (GF) and the DON Working Capital Fund
(WCF) in fiscal year 2024. We continue to execute our proven strategy
focused on transformational changes geared toward our most impactful
areas that includes consolidating the number of feeder and accounting
systems the Navy uses, accounting for and valuing the Navy's mission-
critical assets, supplying the warfighter, and enhancing cybersecurity.
In fiscal year 2023, the DON sustained all prior year material
weakness downgrades and downgraded three additional material weaknesses
ahead of schedule--GF Fund Balance with Treasury and GF and WCF
Oversight and Monitoring. In addition, the Navy closed 306 financial
and information technology audit findings, leading all Services in
fiscal year 2023 closures, and concluded the fourth year of 100 percent
physical inventory testing, achieving 99.5 percent inventory accuracy
for 11 million items. Even with the size and complexity of the DON, our
audit strategy is generating proven results validated by our auditors.
Enhancing Strategic Partnerships
In addition to Strengthening Maritime Dominance and Building a
Culture of Warfighting Excellence, the President's Budget for fiscal
year 2025 enables us to continue our work in enhancing our Strategic
Partnerships, both at home and abroad.
International Partnerships
In every region where our sailors and marines operate, we do so
alongside our international partners. The relationships we enjoy with
our allies and partners are unparalleled by our potential adversaries,
and we are proud to enjoy the friendship of like-minded nations who
share our commitment to upholding the rules-based international order
that has brought relative stability and prosperity to billions of
people over the last several decades. Foundational to our international
partnerships is the trust our sailors and marines share with their
counterparts--a trust that is developed through countless exercises and
operations.
Over the past year, I have been fortunate to attend several
bilateral and multilateral exercises in person, including Unitas 64 in
South America and Talisman Sabre in the Indo-Pacific. During every
exercise, I was impressed by the skills of our partners and the esprit
de corps shared between our sailors, our marines, and their
international counterparts. With each evolution, the power of our
combined maritime forces was on full display, and I look forward to
opportunities this year to observe the increasing interoperability and
cooperation with our allies and partners at events such as Rim of the
Pacific 2024, scheduled for this summer in Hawai'i.
Exercises are only one facet of our strategy to engage with our
international partners and allies. At a macro level, the United States
Navy and Marine Corps remain committed to supporting our longstanding
NATO alliance--an alliance which now includes Finland and Sweden--
especially as our European allies continue to address security concerns
presented on their borders by Russia. We also are committed to our
partners in Africa, where last year I attended the first-ever United
States-hosted African Maritime Forces Summit, held in Cabo Verde.
In the Indo-Pacific, we are focused on ensuring the success of
AUKUS, a generational security partnership that both provides our
Australian allies with a nuclear-powered, conventionally armed
submarine fleet and fosters advanced technology development among
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in several
critical areas, including undersea capabilities, artificial
intelligence, and machine learning, cyber, and hypersonics. As part of
AUKUS, the Australian Government's contribution to the United States
Submarine Industrial Base starting in fiscal year 2025 will supplement
our own SIB investments. These investments will facilitate increased
U.S. production of future Virginia-class submarines, which will offset
the impacts to the United States submarine fleet caused by the sales of
one in-service Virginia SSN in 2032 and a second in-service SSN in 2035
to Australia in accordance with congressional authorization, as well as
a new-construction submarine which will be sold to Australia in 2038.
We are grateful for the support of this Committee in our work to ensure
the success of the AUKUS partnership, which will further our goal of
maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region for decades to come.
Guam
As we continue to strengthen our international partnerships, we are
also focused on building and maintaining our relationships here in the
United States with the State, territorial, and local governments across
the many communities that support our sailors, marines, civilians, and
their families. As such, we are deeply involved with the government and
citizens of Guam. Our Department is on track to begin the movement of
marines from Okinawa to Guam in support of the Defense Policy Review
Initiative, with the relocation of marines slated to begin in the first
quarter of fiscal year 2025. The end State of this personnel movement
is projected to leave 11,500 marines on Okinawa, while stationing 7,000
marines on Guam. I am also pleased to highlight that our Under
Secretary of the Navy was appointed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense
to serve as the Senior Defense Official for Guam (SDOG). In this role,
Under Secretary Raven will serve as the DOD's senior representative
when meeting with key leadership and stakeholders in Guam. He will also
provide senior leadership oversight and support to Commander, Joint
Region Marianas in the execution of on-island activities and will
liaise with the Army, Air Force, USINDOPACOM, USD (A&S), USD (R&E) to
ensure we are aligned in the capability development and delivery of
logistics and infrastructure requirements.
As we face the unprecedented pace of our mission growth on Guam,
infrastructure and facilities are required to support the expansion of
our on-island infrastructure footprint. In support of our military
construction and family housing construction projects, totaling $2.9
billion across the FYDP, we greatly appreciate Congress' approval of an
extension of the H2B visa program through 2029, which will provide
measures to offset workforce capacity challenges in support of our
missions on Guam. We are committed to working with our government
partners and stakeholders on Guam, as well as our partners across the
DOD, to ensure the success of the transition of our personnel. We
appreciate this Committee's support as we carry out this process in a
disciplined, sustainable manner that will enhance the readiness of our
forces throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Industry Partnerships
Beyond international and local partnerships, we are also committed
to ensuring that the defense industrial base on which we rely remains
responsive to our acquisition requirements. President's Budget for
fiscal year 2025 invests $4.0 billion in our Submarine Industrial Base
to support submarine new construction and sustainment, as well as $227
million in the weapons industrial base to increase surge production and
suppliers for critical components. These investments are vital to
maintaining the health of key industries that play a significant role
in the lethality of our Fleet and our Force--industries from which we
cannot afford to accept production delays.
We continue to pay special attention to increasing our engagements
with small businesses throughout the defense ecosystem. As a former
small business owner, I know just how critical this segment is, and I
also know the incredible amount of expertise and know-how these firms
bring in support of our sailors, marines, and civilians. The DON
continues to explore all opportunities to increase prime awards to for
Small Businesses (SB), including but not limited to increased outreach
to the SB industrial base via conferences and Navy Weeks, monitoring
subcontracting performance and trends of our large prime partners, and
continuing to stress the importance of disaggregation of expiring
contracts to give a possible greater allocation to small businesses. As
a direct result of these strategic initiatives, the DON has increased
spending with SBs by 30 percent over the last three fiscal years, with
SDBs experiencing a similar 30 percent increase over that same time
period. Both SB and SDB set new records for prime awards in fiscal year
2023, with Small Businesses receiving over $20 billion in prime awards
from the DON (an increase of $1.5 billion over fiscal year 2022); Small
Disadvantaged Businesses received $7.6 billion in prime awards from the
DON (an increase of $680 million over the prior record of $6.9 billion
set in fiscal year 2022). For fiscal year 2024, we are on-track to meet
our Small Business goals and remain committed to doing so during fiscal
year 2025.
Beyond capital investments and engagements with small businesses,
we continue to partner with industry and academia in workforce
development initiatives. This past October, I attended the
groundbreaking ceremony for a new, purpose-built regional training
center in Danville, Virginia, that will expand workforce training
opportunities in ``new-collar'' trades--those that combine
traditionally blue-collar jobs with cutting-edge technologies--which
are crucial to submarine and ship construction. This regional training
center demonstrates the progress that can be achieved when local,
State, and Federal Governments, as well as industry and academia, come
together and collaborate in support of a noble cause. Danville can and
should serve as a model for nation-wide training programs that provide
Americans with the skillsets necessary to achieve employment in good-
paying jobs while also contributing to our national security.
Last month, I received the results of the 45-Day Shipbuilding
Review, conducted by my Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, and Acquisition and Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command.
This review illuminated the delays we are experiencing across several
major shipbuilding programs and highlighted the challenges faced by
both industry and the Navy to deliver ships and submarines on time. Our
Department undertook this review to both provide transparency to
Congress and identify steps we can take to develop a more realistic,
pragmatic approach to shipbuilding. We are building a process and a
team to reduce delays in ship and submarine deliveries with our
industry partners, and we appreciate the continued support of this
Committee as we endeavor to ``Get Real, Get Better'' on shipbuilding.
As we invest in the capacity, workforce, and capabilities of our
industry partners, we must also give due consideration to holding
industry accountable for the work they are contracted to perform. It is
of utmost importance that the American people receives the best value
for taxpayer dollars, and the Taxpayer Advocacy Project (TAP) ensures
just this. TAP leverages DON subject matter expertise to research
recurring contractor issues and legal solutions, educate Program
Executive Officers, Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and DON
attorneys on available legal tools to improve contractor performance,
and assist those same stakeholders in identifying and clearing any
Pentagon or vendor barriers to deliver contracted material and services
on behalf of the warfighter and the taxpayer. TAP supports my
priorities by positively impacting readiness improvement, ensuring that
our sailors and marines are well-equipped, that contract cooperation is
flowing both ways, and that the DON receives what it paid for on-
budget, on-schedule, and on-performance.
Maritime Statecraft
This past September, during my remarks at Harvard University's
Kennedy School of Government, I called for a new vision of Maritime
Statecraft to prevail in this era of intense strategic competition.
Maritime Statecraft encompasses not only naval diplomacy but also a
national, Whole-of-Government effort to build comprehensive U.S. and
allied maritime power, both commercial and naval. Our Nation's most
prominent naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, argued that naval
power begets maritime commercial power, and control of maritime
commerce begets greater naval power. The PRC's leaders have read Mahan,
and their actions show it.
As the PRC has built up its commercial and naval fleets and gained
influential ownership in ports around the world, United States
commercial maritime power has declined precipitously. Today, the PRC is
the world's largest builder of commercial, ocean-going ships, with over
40 percent of the global market being built in Chinese shipyards. More
concerning still, Beijing leverages its dominant commercial
shipbuilding capacity and modern commercial shipyards and
infrastructure to efficiently produce its naval fleet. Chinese shipping
firms have come to dominate the worldwide commercial shipping industry.
They have established an ownership stake in 95 ports across 53
countries worldwide, including in many of our own ports and those of
our allies. They also field the world's largest global fishing fleet
and the third largest merchant marine fleet with more than 7,000 ships,
compared to the United States--ranked 70th--with 178.
Since entering office in August 2021, I have engaged across our
Federal Government--with the White House, the Department of
Transportation, the Department of Homeland Security, Department of
Commerce, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and throughout
the DOD--to bring attention to this issue and explore what authorities
we can leverage to support the revitalization of our national
shipbuilding industry. For example, Secretary Buttigieg and I had a
productive discussion regarding our shared Title 46 authority in the
Construction Differential Subsidy that allows the U.S. Government to
offset the higher cost of building a commercial ship in the United
States relative to foreign shipyards provided the Secretary of
Transportation and the Secretary of the Navy certify a national
security purpose for the vessel. I have likewise welcomed the United
States Trade Representative's in-depth engagement on boosting the
proportion of U.S. international trade carried on U.S.-flag vessels--
today, less than one half of 1 percent of U.S. international exports
and imports sail on U.S.-flagged merchant ships, almost all of which
are foreign-built.
My team and I have toured private shipyards across our Nation, from
Bayonne, New Jersey, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Vallejo and
Richmond, California, to better understand the capacity and workforce
challenges these yards face. In February, I held engagements with the
leadership of major shipbuilders in Japan and South Korea to gain a
better understanding and appreciation for how they construct commercial
and naval vessels in modern shipyards. I was enormously gratified by
the strong interest expressed by the leaders of these world-class
shipbuilders in establishing U.S. subsidiaries and investing in
shipyards in the United States--and I could not be more excited at the
prospect of these companies bringing their expertise, their technology,
and their cutting-edge best practices to American shores.
In mid-November, I convened the inaugural meeting of the Government
Shipbuilders Council at the Coast Guard's only public yard in
Baltimore, Maryland. This new organization, comprised of
representatives from the Departments of Transportation, Commerce,
Homeland Security, and Defense, and our five government shipbuilding
partners--MARAD, Coast Guard, NOAA, and the Army--will discuss how we
can work together to collectively engage with industry, address common
challenges, and share best practices.
All of these are early steps, and there is still much work to be
done. We welcome Congress' collaboration and support as we continue our
Department's work on Maritime Statecraft with our counterparts in other
Federal departments and agencies, industry, academia, and our
international allies and partners. Revitalizing our comprehensive
maritime power is a generational endeavor, requiring sustained,
bipartisan commitment at the national level. Though the road ahead may
be long, not a moment's time should be lost in embarking on a task so
essential to our country's security and prosperity.
closing
As I close, it is important to remember that the missions we send
our sailors and marines on every day are anything but routine and, in
most cases, extremely dangerous.
In January, we suspended the search for two U.S. Navy SEALS we lost
at sea--Petty Officer First Class Christopher Chambers and Petty
Officer Second Class Nathan Ingram--during the seizure of lethal,
Iranian-supplied advanced conventional weapons to the Houthis.
In February, we lost five marines in a training accident--Lance
Corporal Donovan Davis, Sergeant Alec Langen, Captain Benjamin Moulton,
Captain Jack Casey, and Captain Miguel Nava--assigned to the ``Flying
Tigers'' of Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361.
As we mourn the loss of these brave Americans, their fellow sailors
and marines continue to deploy around the globe. We honor their legacy
by protecting the families they left behind and by upholding the ideals
and principles that they gave their lives for.
The investments we ask you to make in our Navy and Marine Corps
represent more than just buying ships, aircraft, and submarines,
developing new capabilities, or bolstering the resiliency of the
critical infrastructure we rely on. It is about supporting our men and
women, both uniformed and civilian, and their families, who have
committed their careers and indeed their lives in defense of our
Nation.
I am grateful for the continued bipartisan support of this
Committee, and I look forward to working with all of you to advance our
Nation's security with a Navy and Marine Corps that possesses the
enduring advantages required to uphold our Nation's interests in
peacetime, deter potential adversaries in crisis, and win decisively in
war.
May God continue to grant the United States of America and its
people fair winds and following seas. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Franchetti, please.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL LISA MARIE FRANCHETTI, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Franchetti. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker,
distinguished Members of the Committee, good morning and thank
you for the opportunity to testify on the posture of the United
States Navy.
On behalf of the sailors, Navy civilians, and their
families deployed and stationed all around the world, thank you
for your leadership, and your continued support in providing
and maintaining the Navy the Nation needs. I'd also like to
thank my teammate, General Smith for his exceptional
partnership and collaboration as we guide our services under
the leadership of Secretary Del Toro.
Flanked by two oceans, the United States is and always has
been a maritime nation whose security and prosperity rely on
access to the sea. For over 248 years, the U.S. Navy has
guaranteed that access, operating forward, defending our
Homeland, and keeping open the sea lines of communication that
fuel our economy and underwrite our Nation's security.
The events of this past year and the actions taken by our
Navy Marine Corps team in the Indo-Pacific, in the
Mediterranean, in the Red Sea, and beyond, underscore the
enduring importance of American naval power.
With an average of 110 ships and 70,000 sailors and marines
deployed at sea on any given day, the Navy Marine Corps team is
delivering power for peace, deterring potential adversaries,
and standing ready to fight and win our Nation's wars if
deterrence fails. I could not be more proud of this team. No
other navy in the world can train and deploy and sustain such a
lethal combat, credible force that operates from the seabed to
space at the scope, scale, and tempo that we do.
This year's budget supports the National Defense Strategy
and my priorities of war fighting, war fighters, and the
foundation that supports them. It enables the Navy to continue
to meet our congressionally mandated mission, both in peace and
war. It is strategy-driven, maintaining our focus on the
People's Republic of China as the pacing challenge, the acute
threat of Russia, and other persistent threats like the DPRK,
Iran, and VEOs.
Given the discretionary spending caps prescribed by the
Fiscal Responsibility Act, and a top line increase of 0.7
percent, the Navy had to make tough choices favoring near-term
readiness, investing in our industrial base, and prioritizing
our people, while assuming risk in future capabilities.
Within this fiscally constrained environment, the budget
request fully funds the Navy's top acquisition priority and the
most survivable leg of our strategic deterrence; the Columbia-
class submarine. It provides funds for six battle force ships,
incremental funding for two Ford-class aircraft carriers in
fiscal year 2025, and continues our support to Marine Corps
force design by maintaining 31 amphibious ships, procuring
three LPDs, 1 LHA, and 8 medium landing ships.
In total, the budget request procures 57 ships and
submarines across the fit up. This budget prioritizes war
fighting by funding our operations training and readiness
accounts. It invests in our foundation with funding for our
installations, for our shipyard infrastructure optimization
program, and for the broader defense industrial base, sending a
strong signal to our industry partners on the need to increase
our capacity to meet the growing demands of the present and the
future.
It continues our strong commitment to our war fighters and
our families through pay raises for our sailors and Navy
civilians, and investments in quality of service initiatives
such as unaccompanied housing, education, childcare, and sailor
resiliency. These initiatives, as well as others, enabled by
your steadfast support, have helped us maintain historically
high levels of retention, which is imperative given the current
recruiting environment.
While this environment remains challenging and our manning
requirements at sea have increased, we are 2,500 recruits ahead
of where we were last year at this time, and I remain
optimistic that our marketing and data analytics investments
will show additional progress throughout the year.
As chief of naval operations, I am committed to pulling
every lever available to me to put more ready players on the
field, platforms that are ready with the right capabilities,
weapons, and sustainment, and people who are ready with the
right skills, tools, training, and mindset to defend our
Nation's security and prosperity whenever and wherever it is
threatened.
I thank the Committee for your leadership and partnership
in ensuring the world's premier fighting force remains ready to
preserve the peace, respond in crisis, and win decisively in
war, if called.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Lisa Marie Franchetti
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral Lisa Marie Franchetti
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, distinguished Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the posture of
the United States Navy. On behalf of our sailors, Navy civilians, and
families deployed and stationed around the world, thank you for your
continued leadership and support. Thank you for ensuring our Navy-
Marine Corps team remains ready for prompt and sustained combat
incident to operations at sea as well as for recognizing in law our
Navy's role in the peacetime promotion of our Nation's national
security interests and prosperity. Your commitment guarantees that our
Navy is always postured and ready to deliver power for peace, respond
in crisis, and win decisively in war.
america's identity as a maritime nation
Flanked by two oceans, the United States is and has always been a
maritime nation. Our economy, like the world's economy, flows through
the sea. Ninety percent of global trade travels by sea. Ninety-five
percent of international communications and roughly 10 trillion dollars
in financial transactions each day transit via undersea fiber-optic
cables. In the U.S., seaborne trade carries more tonnage and value than
any other mode of transportation, generating 5.4 trillion dollars in
annual commerce and supporting 31 million American jobs. There is no
doubt: the seas are the lifeblood of our economy, our national
security, and our way of life.
For 248 years, Congress has provided and maintained a Navy-Marine
Corps team that has preserved America's access to the seas. From the
founding of our Nation to the World Wars of the 20th century, America's
naval forces have fought and won our Nation's battles to keep open the
sea lines of communication that guarantee our prosperity and security.
In every ocean, we uphold and protect the post-World War II rules-based
international order that we fought to establish and have continued to
defend for nearly three quarters of a century.
the geopolitical landscape
Our Nation's security and prosperity, and by extension the rules-
based international order, is under threat from multiple fronts across
all domains, including the maritime. The People's Republic of China
(PRC), Russia, Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK),
and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) desire to rewrite the global
rules-based order for their own political, military, and economic
interests. They threaten access to waterways, ports, and key logistics
hubs, which are critical to the U.S. and the global economy. They seek
to control key maritime chokepoints like the Taiwan, Hormuz, and Bab
al-Mandeb Straits in order to exploit sea control and subsequently deny
the United States Navy, U.S.-flagged, and other internationally flagged
commercial shipping freedom of maneuver. These challenges and others to
our maritime security underscore the importance of the United Nations
Convention on Law of the Sea.
As the National Defense Strategy (NDS) makes clear, the PRC is
America's pacing challenge, representing the most comprehensive and
serious challenge to our national security. It is the only country with
both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly,
the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so.
Its coercive and aggressive behavior threatens to refashion the Indo-
Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and
authoritarian preferences. Over the last 20 years, the PRC used its
considerable economic wealth to revolutionize its maritime capability
to rival and contest ours. In that short time, the PRC tripled the size
of its Navy and is on pace to surpass 400 ships by 2030.
Simultaneously, it has created a worldwide network of ports, railways,
and roads through its Belt and Road Initiative, expanded its strategic
nuclear capacity, advanced its offensive and defense cyber and space
capabilities, built up its rocket force, created man-made islands to
extend its vast territorial claims over the South China Sea, and
developed sophisticated munitions in an attempt to keep the United
States military and our Allies and partners at range.
Russia continues to challenge American interests and to pose an
existential threat to our Allies and partners in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) as evidenced by its unprovoked, unjust, and
reckless invasion of Ukraine. Russia has the world's largest nuclear
arsenal, is battle-hardened, and is on a wartime economic footing. It
continues to violate the core principles that uphold global peace and
security, seeking to change borders of sovereign countries by force. We
will continue to work with our Allies and partners to blunt Russian
aggression and support Ukraine in its fight for territorial integrity
and democracy.
Other persistent threats include the DPRK, Iran, and VEOs. The DPRK
continues to expand its nuclear and missile capability to threaten the
United States Homeland, deployed United States Forces, and our Allies
and partners in the region, most notably Japan and South Korea. Iran
continues to destabilize the Middle East with its support for militant
groups' malign activities, its advancing nuclear program, and its
harassment of maritime commerce in the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian
Sea. It continues to build and export missiles and missile
architecture, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) systems, and advanced
maritime capabilities to VEOs worldwide--not just in the Middle East.
Most notably this year, the world saw Iranian weapons used by the
Houthis to disrupt the free flow of maritime commerce in the Red Sea.
navy's fiscal year 2025 strategy-driven budget request
The Navy's budget request for fiscal year 2025 funds a strong,
global Navy that is postured and ready to deter potential adversaries,
protect our Homeland, respond in crisis, and, if called, win decisively
in war. Nested under the National Security Strategy (NSS) and NDS, the
Navy's fiscal year 2025 budget request is strategy driven with a focus
on the PRC as the pacing challenge, while keeping a weather eye on the
acute threat of Russia and other persistent threats like the DPRK,
Iran, and VEOs. It supports the United States Marine Corps Force
Design, implements Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), and executes
the 2022 Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan. It fully funds the
Columbia-class submarine and the nuclear architecture that underpins
it, allocates resources to our operations and readiness accounts that
will keep our naval forces forward to defend our global interests,
prioritizes resources to fund the Submarine Industrial Base (SIB), and
maintains 31 amphibious ships per our title 10 requirement.
However, the 2023 Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) imposed
constraints that required us to make hard choices. Given the
discretionary spending caps and the 0.7 percent topline increase, the
Navy's fiscal year 2025 budget request favors readiness for the near-
term fight and the need to meet our congressionally mandated peacetime
mission over the modernization we will need for the future.
As our Nation's founders recognized, naval power is--and will
continue to be--an essential element of our national security. The
actions your Navy has taken this year in the Indo-Pacific, the Eastern
Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, and elsewhere to defend American
interests are a direct result of years of readiness investments in our
Navy-Marine Corps team. Our actions illustrate how past investments and
decisions made by our leaders in Congress, the Navy, and industry
affect our ability to meet our mission today. More importantly, our
sailors' actions on, under, and above the seas to defend the rules-
based international order demonstrate the value of investing in a
strong naval force.
Within this constrained fiscal environment, we must continue that
investment in our Navy-Marine Corps team to meet the threats of this
challenging environment. We must put more ready players on the field--
platforms ready with the right capabilities, weapons and sustainment
and people who are ready with the right skills, tools, training, and
mindset--to ensure we are fully prepared to fight and win our Nation's
wars in this decisive decade. We cannot afford to keep players on the
field that can no longer contribute to our ability to win decisively.
The Navy's fiscal year 2025 budget reflects that need and reflects my
priorities of Warfighting, Warfighters, and the Foundation that
supports them that I set forth in my America's Warfighting Navy
document in January 2024.
warfighting: delivering decisive combat power
The Navy views everything through a warfighting lens. Operating in
support of the NSS, NDS, and National Military Strategy, the United
States Navy is a critical element of the Joint Force, upholding
international norms, providing access to free and open oceans, and
ready to deliver decisive combat power as part of a Joint and Combined
Warfighting Ecosystem. The fiscal year 2025 budget request ensures our
ability to execute globally distributed sea control and sea denial and
guarantees our ability to fight and win our Nation's wars, if called.
Strategic Deterrence Investments. The fiscal year 2025 Budget
Request fully funds the Nation's top defense acquisition priority and
the Navy's contribution to our strategic deterrence: the Columbia-class
ballistic missile submarine, the second life extension of the Trident
II D5 Ballistic Missile, and the Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO)
command, control, and communications suite.
Procurement Investments. With 88 ships on contract and 66 under
construction already, the fiscal year 2025 request invests $32.4
billion in shipbuilding, funding six battle force ships (one Virginia-
class submarine, two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, one Constellation-
class frigate, one San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock, and one
Medium Landing Ship) and providing incremental funds for two Ford-class
aircraft carriers (CVN 80 and CVN 81) and the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN
75) Refueling and Complex Overhaul. The budget request funds a total of
$189 billion across the FYDP for 57 total battle force ships.
Notably, the budget requests $7.3 billion for the procurement of
the first Virginia-class Block VI submarine and will initiate a nine-
ship planned multi-year procurement beginning in fiscal year 2025. It
funds two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, including completion funds
for three fiscal year 2023 and two fiscal year 2024 ships, and
continues investment in the Constellation-class frigate program, which
gets more players on the field with increased lethality, survivability,
and capability. Additionally, it bolsters our investment in the Navy-
Marine Corps team and our commitment to USMC Force Design and the
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept by maintaining 31
amphibious ships, providing $1.6 billion in fiscal year 2025 to the
fourth San Antonio-class LPD FLT II, adding funds across the FYDP to
support amphibious ship recapitalization in LPD Flight IIs in fiscal
year 2027 and fiscal year 2029, and funding 8 Medium Landing Ships
through the FYDP.
Ship Decommissionings and Divestments. The fiscal year 2025 budget
requests the decommissioning of 19 ships, 9 of which have completed
their normal lifecycle and 10 that are divestments before the end of
their expected service life. This is a return on investment decision,
based on a hull-by-hull assessment of each ship's material condition,
life remaining, cost and time to upgrade, and warfighting relevancy.
Readiness Investments. Our Navy must be able to put players on the
field that are ready with trained crews, ships and aircraft ready to
operate, and with capable weapons systems and munitions. Despite FRA
constraints, the Navy's fiscal year 2025 budget request provides $34.6
billion--an overall increase of $200 million from the fiscal year 2024
request--to Fleet readiness to support flying and underway steaming at
levels that support our Fleet's global operations. It funds the reality
that readiness is the key enabler for naval superiority and that ship,
submarine, and aviation operations are the Navy's core capability and
the foundation of maritime dominance.
The fiscal year 2025 request funds $7.6 billion--an increase of
$600 million from the previous year--in ship operations, providing the
fuel, parts, and support necessary to train the Fleet and deploy it
worldwide and investing in the critical maintenance for Military
Sealift Command's support ships. The budget request supports a Fleet
average of 58 days underway per quarter for deployed ships and 24 days
per quarter for non-deployed ships. Out of the total $10.6 billion in
Navy-Marine Corps flight operations funding, the budget request funds
$6.8 billion in Navy flight operations, funding approximately 600,000
Navy flying hours to resource Fleet preparation and execution of
training and operational requirements.
In regards to maintenance, we must get our ships, submarines, and
aircraft in and out of their availabilities on time and on cost. The
budget request funds $14.5 billion in ship maintenance, including 58
ship availabilities, and covers private contracted availabilities as
well as the Navy's four public shipyards, regional maintenance centers,
and intermediate maintenance facilities. It also provides $1.3 billion
in aviation maintenance that paces the Fleet Flying Hour Program,
funding 328 airframe and 1,486 engine events and sustaining aviation
investments in depot overhauls and aircraft spares to increase mission
capable aircraft numbers.
Sealift Investments. The Navy is committed to meeting Strategic
Sealift mobility requirements by recapitalizing the Ready Reserve Fleet
and the Maritime Prepositioning Force with a combination of used
vessels and new construction vessels. To achieve this, the Navy is
building a Sealift Campaign Plan to focus on a whole-of-strategic-
sealift approach across the entirety of sealift prepositioned and surge
assets. A key element of this plan is continued implementation of the
congressionally provided authorities to address strategic sealift
readiness and recapitalization through the Buy-Used Program, which
purchases used sealift vessels to replace older, aging vessels
currently in the Maritime Administration's (MARAD) Ready Reserve Fleet.
To date, the
Navy has procured five ships through the Buy-Used Program and plans
to procure two more in fiscal year 2024 and two more in fiscal year
2025, which will meet the congressionally mandated limit. The Navy
supports modifying the current congressional restrictions on the Buy-
Used Program to allow the Secretary of Defense authority to purchase
foreign built, used vessels without limitations. This authority would
allow the Navy to accelerate surge sealift Fleet recapitalization
immediately, while continuing to support U.S. shipyard industrial base.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request continues this current
recapitalization strategy to buy and modify two used vessels per year
across the FYDP, while executing the current planned retirement
schedule. The Buy-Used program provides a stable acquisition profile
with forecasted maintenance and repair costs to meet strategic mobility
requirements at a moderate level of risk. Additionally, the Navy is
partnering with MARAD and USTRANSCOM to develop requirements for a
range of new sealift construction options from basic sealift vessels
for the Ready Reserve Force to purpose-built Maritime Prepositioning
Force vessels.
Investments in the Hybrid Fleet. The Navy continues to invest in
its hybrid fleet and in the enabling capabilities that will support all
current and future unmanned programs of record. By leveraging America's
unmatched innovation base, the Navy intends to augment our highly
capable, existing platforms with a host of optionally manned and
unmanned platforms operating under, on, and above the seas. This will
extend our reach, expand our ability to distribute our forces, and
enable us to deliver larger volumes of kinetic and non-kinetic effects
across all domains to fully support the Joint Force. These technologies
are being developed in Navy laboratories, with industry partners, and
onboard the Navy's unmanned prototypes and tested in real-world
scenarios.
To deliver these capabilities at the speed of relevance, the Navy
is working to improve the acquisition process. The Navy's newly
established Disruptive Capabilities Office (DCO) is focused on the most
promising, game-changing technologies and getting them from prototype,
to scale, and into the hands of our warfighters as quickly as possible.
The DCO reports directly to me and the Secretary of the Navy.
Simultaneously, the Navy is fully supporting OSD's Replicator effort
and Defense Innovation Unit to rapidly procure and scale technologies
that will ensure our warfighting advantage.
Network Investments. In order to ensure warfighting advantage, we
must guarantee decision superiority for our warfighters. With this in
mind, the fiscal year 2025 budget request invests $140 million in
fiscal year 2025 with a total of $716 million across the FYDP in
Project Overmatch. Through Project Overmatch--the Navy's contribution
to Combined Joint All Domain Command & Control--we are fielding the
connective tissue for today's Fleet, while developing and experimenting
with what is needed for our hybrid fleet. Using modern software methods
and pipelines, we are fielding software-based networking technologies
to provide as many pathways to connect and share information as
possible, as well as software applications that aid decisionmakers and
planners in executing DMO. To date we have fielded our first increments
of Project Overmatch across multiple Carrier Strike Groups and shore
command nodes. The fiscal year 2025 budget request will fund our
follow-on increments of this capability, while growing the
architecture, adding resilience and redundancy to our communications
paths, and expanding into additional domains in conjunction with our
Joint partners and Allies.
To provide more secure, resilient, and reliable means to C2 our
naval forces, the fiscal year 2025 request continues procurement and
installation of satellite communications systems to include Satellite
Terminal (transportable) Non-Geostationary Terminals, and Portable
Receive Terminals as well as a wideband anti-jam modem system that
protects vital SATCOM links. Our investments will result in the
modernization of the Automated Digital Network System to a Software-
Defined Network that will increase capacity and capability afloat and
ashore for operational continuity. This investment supports our
operational architecture and creates tangible warfighting advantages by
providing access to resilient, high-speed, low-latency bandwidth at
sea.
Cyber Investments. The fiscal year 2025 budget requests invests
$1.55 billion in enhancing maritime cyber capabilities while also
maximizing our investment in joint cyber capabilities defined via U.S.
Cyber Command's goals and objectives. In 2023, the Navy released our
Cyber Strategy to ensure alignment with national strategic guidance and
to define context-specific lines of effort and outcomes across the
intersection of the maritime domain, information environment, and
cyberspace to enhance national security. The fiscal year 2025 request
executes that strategy and continues investment in cyber, which
includes procurement of software, upgrades, and technical support and
increased development of support for cryptologic modernization
solutions. These investments explore, test, and accelerate integration
of non-kinetic capabilities that provide our forces with cost-effective
offensive and defensive options.
The budget request also invests in cryptographic and cybersecurity
modernization, reducing the threat in the rapidly evolving digital
landscape. We have increased support for cryptologic modernization
solutions, upgrading all operational devices so we stand ready to
operate against future quantum computing threats. In cybersecurity,
network modernization will allow us to rapidly integrate learning from
initiatives like Project Overmatch in order to provide our sailors the
best-in-class technology, at speed, across all of our platforms. Our
Cyber Mission Forces stand ready to conduct full spectrum cyberspace
operations in all domains.
Workforce Modernization. The Navy is updating its human force
structure to ensure it has a workforce well-versed in cyber and
unmanned technologies. To advance a truly hybrid fleet, we need to
develop warfighters for the next generation who ruthlessly pursue
warfighting excellence, who can deliver the advantage of autonomous and
unmanned systems and who can operate and innovate alongside their
systems. To meet this challenge, the Navy established the maritime
cyber warfare officer designator and the cyber warfare technician
rating in fiscal year 2024. With this new designator and rating, the
Navy now has a holistic group of cyber warfighters trained to address
the most challenging cyber threats. We have also established
foundational Navy-provisioned offensive cyber training, adjusted tour
lengths, and maximized incentives, improving our cyber team readiness
by 20 percent over the last year. In February 2024, the Navy
established a new robotics warfare specialist rating to build and
develop a team with experience in sensors, platform autonomy, and
mission autonomy program. These sailors will serve as the operators,
maintainers, and managers of our hybrid fleet, planning and controlling
our future unmanned systems.
Allies and Partners Investments. The Navy recognizes that we will
never fight alone. Our Allies and partners are our true strategic
advantage and a fundamental component in putting more players on the
field. They are force multipliers. Moving forward, we will design and
drive interoperability with our Allies and partners into our systems
and processes to deliver combined lethality in support of the rules-
based international order we protect together. A cooperative deployment
program, combined with a robust international exercise program,
highlighted by the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise this year,
underscores our commitment to working alongside our Allies and
partners.
The Navy is committed to strengthening the bonds with two of our
closest allies and fulfilling our United States commitments to the
Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) enhanced security
partnership. This once-in-a-generation opportunity demonstrates our
shared interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific based on international
law and serves to uplift the warfighting capability of our three
nations. Through the establishment of a conventionally armed, nuclear-
powered attack submarine capability in Australia and the development
and operationalization of advanced technologies and warfighting
capabilities, we will build our collective technical and industrial
capabilities to deliver next-generation interoperable systems that
deter aggression and win in war, if necessary.
Investments in the Arctic. The Arctic is critical to America's
safety and economic prosperity. Maritime presence and competition in
the Arctic has grown to include many non-Arctic nations, as faster and
cheaper trade routes become available due to increasingly navigable
waters. To meet this challenge, the fiscal year 2025 budget request
provides $47 million in fiscal year 2025 and $252 million across the
FYDP for Arctic research, training, and operations. The Navy, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard must ensure all navigation and exploration--
fishing, oil, and natural gas--remains in accordance with
internationally recognized rules and norms. We will continue to work
with our Allies and partners in the region--Canada, Iceland, Denmark,
Sweden, Finland, Norway, and the United Kingdom--to ensure a peaceful
and stable Arctic. The U.S. Navy remains ready to respond to changing
geopolitical and climate conditions in the Arctic.
warfighters: strengthening the navy team
The Navy's Active and Reserve sailors, our Navy civilians, and our
families are our asymmetric advantage and give our Navy the decisive
edge. I could not be more proud of our Navy team, who executes our
Navy's mission every day. We must continue to build strong warfighting
teams, recruit and retain talented people from across the rich fabric
of America, and provide them world-class training and education. We
remain committed to improving our sailors' Quality of Service, which
includes Quality of Life and Quality of Work. Within FRA Caps, the
fiscal year 2025 budget request provides $41 billion--a 2 percent
increase over fiscal year 2024--for an Active Duty force of 332,300,
which includes a 4.5 percent pay increase for our sailors, and invests
$2.8 billion for 57,700 Reserve sailors, aligned with Fleet force
structure changes.
We appreciate the support of Congress and the commitment to
improving the Quality of Life of our sailors and their families. The
focus on ensuring appropriate pay and compensation, access to
affordable child care, adequate and safe housing, access to quality
medical care, and support to programs for military spouses is critical
to recruiting and retaining our world-class All-Volunteer Force. We
must continually review the entire compensation package to ensure we
are keeping stride in a competitive job environment and the Navy is
viewed as an employer of choice.
Manning. Simply put, the Navy needs more people to meet our mission
requirements around the world. Over the last year, we averaged more
than 18,000 manning gaps at sea, primarily in our apprentice ranks.
Because of this, the Navy continues to prioritize seagoing billets for
deployed and next-to-deploy forces to ensure all operational units are
fully ready to support national tasking. We are offering increased
incentives for our sailors to remain at sea or return to seagoing
billets through programs like the Advancement-to-Position program.
Retention. Our first line of effort in ensuring our Fleet is manned
is to retain the sailors we currently have. Overall, Navy retention
remains healthy, having maintained historically high levels of
retention over the past few years.
We ended fiscal year 2023 meeting or exceeding our retention
benchmark forecasts across most of our zones of service and are on-
track to meet fiscal year 2024 retention targets. To continue this
momentum, the fiscal year 2025 budget's personnel funding paces a
strong economy by offering our sailors a complete compensation package,
providing competitive pay and benefits as well as basic pay increases
and cost increases for housing, subsistence, and basic needs
allowances. It invests $84 million more than the fiscal year 2024
request in enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses. The Navy also extended
the High Year Tenure (HYT) Plus pilot program indefinitely, which
allows our sailors to negotiate new orders to valid, vacant billets, or
to extend their current assignment to the normal tour length to stay in
past HYT gates.
Recruiting. The root cause of our manning challenges is our
recruiting challenge. Although the Navy missed its fiscal year 2023
recruiting goal by 7,000 sailors, we contracted 6,000 more sailors than
we did in fiscal year 2022. While this environment remains challenging
and we have increased our recruiting goals to address our new work
requirements, we are 2,900 recruits ahead of where we were last year at
this time. To that end, we are using all available levers to maximize
the effectiveness of recruiting for fiscal year 2024 by seeking
innovative ways to attract individuals who are qualified and willing to
serve. This starts by connecting people that live in every zip code to
our Navy story and by spreading our message to areas of untapped
potential, far from our bases and installations, and with little or no
exposure to the Navy. We are recruiting in previously under-served
markets, presenting in new places like gaming events and in the virtual
world to create awareness beyond our traditional talent base, and
expanding our market penetration through enhanced marketing and
advertising via multi-channel means (social media, connected
television, and online presence).
The Navy is also evaluating organizational and policy initiatives
to improve recruiting and expand the pool of qualified, motivated, and
capable applicants that meet our standards. This past year, the Navy
established the Recruiting Operations Center to establish a more
effective enterprise approach to recruiting, elevated Commander, Navy
Recruiting Command to a seasoned 2-star Admiral position to provide
better oversight and direction, and increased recruiter manning for
greater reach and production. To expand opportunities to join our team,
we raised the recruiting age from 38 to 41 years old, established the
Future Sailor Preparatory Course, both Physical Fitness and Academic,
increased enlistment bonuses to attract high quality recruits for high
demand ratings, increased the number of Category IV recruits to match
rating demand, and began recruitment of Future Sailors without
educational credentials, but who score a 50 or above on the AFQT.
Education & Training. In an effort to prepare our warfighters for
the future fight, the Navy's fiscal year 2025 budget request
prioritizes sailor education by investing $25 million in the expansion
of the United States Naval Community College (USNCC) to 25,000 students
by fiscal year 2026 and by fully funding Tuition Assistance Programs.
The Navy is committed to Naval University System wholeness, giving our
Midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy, our officers at the
Naval War College, our officers, enlisted, and civilians at the Naval
Postgraduate School, and our enlisted sailors across the Fleet every
opportunity to succeed. We continue to see great results from the USNCC
with over 3,500 sailors, marines, and coastguardsmen currently enrolled
in eight different academic programs. Additionally, through other
initiatives like Live, Virtual, and Constructive training, Ready
Relevant Learning, and the Fleet Learning Continuum, the Navy is
ensuring our sailors have the professional knowledge, skills, and
training to be ready to meet and excel in its national security
tasking.
Quality of Service (QOS). QOS remains among my highest priorities
as CNO. The Navy remains resolute in our obligation to care for and
deliver QOS to our sailors, both Active and Reserve, our civilians, and
our Navy families because they are our most important resource. Within
a constrained budget environment, the fiscal year 2025 budget request
continues our significant investment in QOS with $816 million to
Quality of Life (QoL) and $536 million to Quality of Work (QOW)
initiatives. The budget request includes a $523 million increase in
Quality of Life initiatives over fiscal year 2024 and pulls every lever
to sustain deserved pay increases for our sailors, increase BAH and BAS
allowances, and fully fund barracks sustainment and operations.
To demonstrate the Navy's commitment to improving QOS, the Navy
established a QOS Cross Functional Team (CFT) to improve our sailors
and families' QoL. Reporting to the Secretary of the Navy and me, the
QOS CFT is sailor-centric and focused on achieving both short-term and
long-term goals to improve our sailors' QOS. The CFT has made
significant progress in addressing challenges faced by sailors serving
on ships and submarines at Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News
Shipbuilding, including off-ship berthing, the availability of quality
food, internet connectivity, and improved access to medical care and
resources. The Navy intends to scale these initiatives Fleet wide.
Unaccompanied Housing (UH). The Navy's fiscal year 2025 request
fully funds barracks operations and sustainment and fully funds
barracks recapitalization for fully scoped and ready projects. The
budget request invests $1.2 billion across the FYDP for barracks
construction and renovations to repair poor and failing UH facilities.
It invests $206 million in fiscal year 2025--an increase of $41 million
from fiscal year 2024--for UH repair and addresses repairs to five
CONUS facilities (Naval Air Station (NAS) Lemoore, NAS Oceana, Joint
Base Pearl Harbor, Naval Base Kitsap, and Submarine Base Kings Bay) and
one OCONUS facility (Naval Support Activity Bahrain). The fiscal year
2025 budget request commits $10 million in planning and development for
UH projects across the FYDP and is expanding privatized UH in San Diego
and Hampton Roads.
The budget also invests in adding Wi-Fi to all our UH. Beginning in
February 2024, we commenced a Wi-Fi pilot (12 facilities/4,000 sailors)
in unaccompanied housing facilities at Naval Station Norfolk,
Portsmouth Medical Center, and Norfolk Naval Shipyard. This pilot will
run through the end of the fiscal year and will ensure the program is
optimized to deliver connectivity and value to our sailors prior to a
wider roll-out across the Navy.
Child care. Childcare is a priority for the Department of Defense.
The Navy is committed to meeting Active Duty servicemember child care
requirements and is focused on recruitment, retention, and the
compensation and staffing model of the child care workforce through
targeted efforts. We are making steady progress on reducing the
waitlist. As of March 2024, Navy has a Child Development Center (CDC)
and School Age Care (SAC) waitlist of approximately 3,600 children,
down from 5,300 at the start of fiscal year 2023. To expand capacity
and drive down the waitlist, the Navy is focused on child care
workforce, facility expansion through military construction (MILCON),
and the Military Child Care in Your Neighborhood (MCCYN) Fee Assistance
Program for those on the CDC and SAC waitlist. Currently, all Active
Duty families on the waitlist have received MCCYN fee assistance. The
Navy is extending the MCCYN program to Navy civilians this year.
In regards to MILCON, the Navy's fiscal year 2025 budget request
adds $22 million in Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration, and
Modernization funding for CDCs, $23 million for CDC Planning and Design
for future MILCON, and $437 million for child care operations. The
following locations are areas of ongoing CDC construction projects:
Naval Base Kitsap, Naval Base Point Loma, Naval Support Activity
Hampton Roads, and Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek/Fort Story.
The Navy has 12 additional CDC MILCON projects programmed across the
FYDP.
Healthcare. The Navy remains committed to our families and the need
to provide affordable, high quality health care. Working closely with
the Defense Health Agency and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
for Health Affairs, the Navy's fiscal year 2025 budget request invests
$1.9 billion across the FYDP to stabilize the health system and fully
restore military medical manpower. This will ensure our ability to
generate Navy operational medical capabilities to support high end
competition, crisis, and combat, ensuring more players remain on the
field.
Mental Health. The Navy is committed to ensuring our sailors have
access to the full continuum of mental health resources with the right
care, at the right level, and at the right time. Our fiscal year 2025
request increases funding for Mental Health and Suicide Prevention
services by $52 million--a 173 percent increase from fiscal year 2024--
and fully funds the 21st Century Sailor Readiness and Resiliency and
Suicide Prevention and Response initiatives, which enable sailors to
seek help earlier and often, but before a crisis. We continue to assign
more chaplains to seagoing units and provide more mental health
specialists to Fleet concentration areas. Right now, 43 percent of our
mental health providers are embedded with the Fleet, providing
proactive prevention and treatment.
Additionally, in 2023, the Navy implemented the Brandon Act, which
honors the life of Petty Officer Third Class Brandon Caserta. The
Brandon Act streamlines access to mental health support for all our
sailors and reduces stigma by fostering a culture of support for those
seeking help. Also, in 2023, the Navy published the Mental Health
Playbook, which assists command leaders in preventing mental health
issues from occurring, and, when they do, shows them how to connect
sailors with the proper mental health care. We remain committed to
providing our sailors the support they need.
Sexual Assault Prevention & Response. The Navy is committed to
providing a safe work environment free of sexual assault and sexual
harassment for all our sailors and to advancing a culture of Great
People, Great Leaders, and Great Teams that drive healthy command
climates. The fiscal year 2025 budget request invests $353 million in
the recommendations made by the Independent Review Commission on Sexual
Assault in the Military (IRC-SAM) with a focus on prevention, climate
and culture, and victim care lines of effort. The budget requests
includes funding for the phased hiring of Integrated Primary Prevention
Workforce, the phased drawdown of collateral duty SAPR personnel, and
for training and education. On December 28, 2023, the Navy's Office of
Special Trial Counsel (OSTC), led by a rear admiral (O-7) who reports
directly to the Secretary of the Navy, became fully operational. This
independent prosecution office, staffed by experienced, specialized,
and well-trained professionals, now exercises disposition authority
over the Navy's most serious personnel violence offenses, including
sexual assault. Beginning in January 2025, the OSTC will also review
formal, substantiated complaints of sexual harassment further
supporting a safe and secure working environment for all sailors.
foundations: build trust, align resources, be ready
The Navy must have a robust, strong, and resilient foundation that
supports our warfighters and warfighting. This begins by recognizing
installations and shore infrastructure as warfighting platforms--as
aircraft carriers that do not get underway--and investing in the shore
as a weapons system. The fiscal year 2025 budget request continues our
investment in installations, shipyards, the SIB, and the weapons
industrial base to ensure they are resilient and mission-ready and can
generate and sustain our warfighters and our warfighting.
As in fiscal year 2024, the Navy's fiscal year 2025 budget request
provides large investments in the health of the industrial base,
providing clear headlights to industry on our build plans. In line with
the Secretary of the Navy's Maritime Statecraft initiative, we are
exploring additional ways to further invest in industry and increase
shipbuilding capacity through multi-year, block buy purchases and
investments in workforce development and supply chain resiliency. This
requires a whole-of-government effort. In order to deliver the Navy the
Nation needs, the Navy is pulling every available lever to expedite the
necessary ships, aircraft, and weapons to our warfighters--by
continuing to partner with industry, academia, interagency and allied
partners to solve our most pressing challenges and by improving our
ability to maintain existing platforms.
Installation Investments. The fiscal year 2025 budget requests
allocates $10.5 billion across the FYDP to piers, airfields, aviation
facilities, maintenance facilities, and core utilities to meet the
Nation's needs. Because shore infrastructure is vital in enabling
global logistics, the Navy is repairing and updating critical
waterfront utilities, making structural repairs to wharves and docks,
and building and repairing taxiways and hangars. We are investing in
our critical utility systems, upgrading water, wastewater, and
electrical generation, distribution, and treatment capabilities to
improve resiliency, quality, and reliability and minimize risk to
mission. In energy, we are pursuing micro grids and continuing to
aggressively conduct and learn from black start exercises, which are
designed to test an installation's ability to continue mission during a
total loss of commercial power. Because most of our power originates
off-base, the Navy continues to partner with local and State
communities and Allies and partners, to improve resiliency inside and
outside our fence line to support the Fleet.
Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) Investments.
Our fiscal year 2025 request invests $2.8 billion in SIOP and provides
$9.0 billion across the FYDP, continuing our commitment to this once-
in-a-generation investment in our four public shipyards. This is on top
of our fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2024 requests of $1.9 billion
and $2.7 billion. We must ensure our shore enterprise is fully funded,
reinforced, and upgraded to prepare for war. The average age of the
Navy's shipyard facilities and related infrastructure is 61 years old
and the average age of our dry-docks is 101 years old. SIOP is a needed
investment in repairs, modernization, and recapitalization to deliver
dry-docks that can support current and future classes of our nuclear-
powered submarines and aircraft carriers, optimize workflow through
changes in the physical layout of the shipyard, and increase
productivity through technology and equipment upgrades.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request funds the following: the fifth
increment of the P-381 Multi-Mission Dry Dock Extension ($401 million)
at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, the third increment for the P-209 Dry
Dock 3 Replacement at Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam ($1,199 million),
first increment for P-1062 Dry Dock 3 Modernization at Norfolk Naval
Shipyard ($54 million), P-859 CVN 78 Aircraft Carrier Electrical
Upgrades at Naval Base Kitsap ($182 million), and planning and design
requirements ($183 million) for future construction efforts.
SIB Investments. The Navy's fiscal year 2025 budget request
reflects our prioritization of and significant investment in our
undersea warfare capability. The Department of Defense's fiscal year
2025 budget request invests $4.0 billion and $11.4 billion in the FYDP
in the SIB, sending a strong signal to and increasing the health of
industry, building our supply chain resiliency, bolstering our long-
term capacity and supporting the AUKUS partnership, all while ensuring
readiness for today. The fiscal year 2025 request doubles the
approximately $2.0 billion SIB investment Congress provided in fiscal
year 2023 and fiscal year 2024. We appreciate congressional support for
the President's fiscal year 2024 supplemental request, which included
$3.3 billion for the SIB. These actions meet a generational demand for
an increase of at least 100,000 skilled workers over the next 10 years
to build the Columbia-class submarine, deliver the Virginia-class
submarine, and maintain our in-service submarines.
This is a national effort. The SIB, including the supply chain that
supports material and readiness for all submarine classes, consists of
over 15,000 industry partners spread across every State in the country.
The Navy will continue to partner with industry to make investments
that will deliver a production cadence of 1 Columbia and 2.3 Virginia-
class submarines per year to replace the aging Ohio-class submarine,
achieve our required force structure of 66 SSNs, and support our AUKUS
commitments.
Weapons Industrial Base (WIB) Investments. The Navy's fiscal year
2025 budget request invests $6.6 billion in critical munitions and
builds on the fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2024 weapons industrial
base and procurement investments. The budget request continues the
multi-year procurement for four critical munitions across the FYDP:
Standard Missile (SM), Naval Strike Missile (NSM), Long Range Anti-Ship
Missile (LRASM), and Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM).
The Navy remains committed to working with industry to identify
manufacturing challenges and provide investment opportunities to
streamline testing and increase production.
Additionally, the Navy is investing in industry and in its organic
industrial base to ensure we can ramp up munitions production in the
immediate future. Building upon the fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year
2024 requests, the fiscal year 2025 budget request invests $227 million
to expand capacity for Trident II, Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles,
Standard Missiles, and MK-48 torpedoes. We appreciate Congress' recent
support for supplemental funding help replenish munitions expended in
the Red Sea.
Typhoon Mawar. The Navy is committed to repairing the damages done
by Typhoon Mawar in Guam. Current estimates for damage exceed the $6
billion in facility repairs and reconstruction in fiscal year 2024 and
fiscal year 2025, complicating our ability to meet the NDS and
impacting QoL for residents and servicemembers. With the accelerated
degradation of our shore installations and infrastructure compounded by
the increased demands of our QOS investments, we also welcome
supplemental funding to support the Guam Disaster Recovery efforts from
the damage caused by Typhoon Mawar.
Red Hill. The Navy remains committed to rebuilding trust with the
people of Hawaii and servicemembers, civilians, and families affected
by the Red Hill fuel leaks. Joint Task Force-Red Hill has safely
removed 104.6 million gallons of fuel--over 99 percent of previously
held fuel reserves--6 months ahead of schedule, and turned over
responsibilities to Navy Closure Task Force-Red Hill (NCTF-RH) on March
28, 2024. Protecting the environment, the aquifer, and public health
are top priorities of the Navy as Navy Closure Task Force--Red Hill
(NCTF-RH) works toward remediation and eventual closure of Red Hill
Bulk Fuel Storage Facility. The Navy team in Hawaii continues to work
alongside the EPA and Hawaii Department of Health to provide water that
meets all Federal and State safe drinking water standards, while
transparently communicating with elected representatives, community
groups and the public.
Industrial Base Workforce Development. Our recruiting efforts are
about more than recruiting Active Duty sailors. It is about a broader
``call to service'' to Active Duty and Reserve sailors and workers
supporting the industrial base that covers the spectrum of support to
our Nation. The Navy appreciates Congress' continued support and is
working closely with industry partners to strengthen and grow the
defense industrial base workforce through the SIB, multi-year
procurement contracts, and SIOP to help build a comprehensive,
coordinated, and sustainable development system to deliver skilled
trade workers. For example, the SIB is working closely with regional
training partners across the country to improve workforce attraction,
recruitment, training, and retention in order to achieve the increased
capacity to design, build and sustain the platforms and systems the
Navy and Nation needs.
Additionally, the DDG 51 multiyear procurement contract for fiscal
year 2023 included a workforce development incentive that supports
essential enhancements, including workforce housing and transportation,
expansion of local talent pipeline programs, facilities modifications
in support of workforce development, attraction and retention bonus
programs, and augmented on-the-job training. And, through SIOP and our
recapitalization of century-old infrastructure, we are improving QOS
for our 30,000 shipyard employees. But, we must do more. Alongside
government and industry, we must explore ways to support QoL concerns
in order to ensure that these workers have affordable housing,
commutes, and food options.
conclusion
The Navy continues to meet its Title 10 mission to be organized,
trained, and equipped for the peacetime promotion of the national
security interests and prosperity of the United States and for prompt
and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. Our operations
around the world demonstrate that an investment in America's Navy is an
investment in America's security and prosperity. We answer the bell,
from the seabed to space, in cyberspace, and in the information
environment. No other Navy in the world operates at this scale and no
other Navy in the world can train, deploy, and sustain such a lethal,
globally deployed, combat-credible force.
As our Nation's founders recognized and as seen this year, naval
power is--and will continue to be--an essential element of our national
security. The Navy's fiscal year 2025 budget request invests in that
reality and prioritizes warfighting advantage to win in this decade.
Through our Performance to Plan, Get Real Get Better, and Culture of
Excellence 2.0 initiatives, the Navy is instilling a mindset that makes
the most out of each dollar we receive to build the best Navy possible.
We are committed to ensuring the American taxpayer knows that each
dollar invested in the Navy is a dollar well spent on their safety,
security, and prosperity.
The credibility of our Nation's deterrence rests upon ready and
capable ships, aircraft, and submarines. The investments we make now
will shape the global maritime balance of power for the rest of this
century. I could not be more proud of our Navy team that guarantees our
prosperity and security, deters our adversaries, and is ready to fight
and win if needed. The Navy will continue to work alongside all
stakeholders and our Allies and partners to deliver the Navy the Nation
needs. On behalf of our more than 600,000 Active and Reserve sailors,
Navy civilians, and Navy families, I am grateful to this Committee and
to your colleagues in Congress for your steadfast commitment to your
United States Navy.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
General Smith, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL ERIC SMITH, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
General Smith. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Wicker, ladies, and gentlemen. Thank you for the opportunity to
represent your marines today.
I'd like to start by sincerely thanking this Committee for
its enduring support and your advocacy for a timely,
predictable, and sufficient budget that enables the Marine
Corps to remain first to fight. I would also like to express my
deep gratitude for the partnership between Admiral Franchetti
and me as we lead our respective sea services under the
leadership of Secretary Del Toro.
Whether deterring, responding to crises, or in conflict, it
will be the Navy and Marine Corps' expeditionary forces who
make first contact with partners seeking help or adversaries
seeking a fight. Our partnership, collaboration and integration
is a decisive advantage.
Last month, I published my updated guidance to the Force
entitled Maintain Momentum. I chose this title as I firmly
believe the Marine Corps is on the right path under Force
Design. A few points from that document. First, I believe that
Marine Corps must continue to strike a balance between high-end
modernization and our commitment to persistent forward deployed
Naval expeditionary forces that campaign and respond to crises
globally. This effort is represented by our Marine
Expeditionary Units, the coin of the realm.
Second, we must prioritize our operations with the Navy and
its amphibious ships, and we must provide marines with the
organic mobility to rapidly maneuver from shore, as shore, ship
to shore and back again.
Third, on recruiting. Our performance speaks for itself.
We'll continue to make mission without ever diminishing our
standards. Additionally, our top performing marines are
reenlisting at record rates, and we must sustain this trend.
Fourth, we must maximize the capability of our Reserves to
ensure that our Nation has a ready bunch of warriors that
they've relied on since the founding of the Marine Corps Forces
Reserve in 1916.
Fifth, I'm dedicated to ensuring a quality of life for our
marines that matches the high demands we place on them every
day. That means nutritious food, high quality and accessible
gyms, and a safe, quiet place to recover from a hard day's
work. Our Barracks 2030 initiative is our most consequential
barracks investment ever, and it is sorely needed.
While aggressively pursuing these priorities, I commit to
you that our Corps will always be frugal and accountable with
the resources you and the American people provide. I'm
extremely proud of my marines and civilian marines who enabled
the Marine Corps to receive an unmodified audit opinion earlier
this year, the first of any service to do so. They told us what
we have long known that when you entrust us with the taxpayers'
money, it is money well spent and fully accounted for. All
these things are critical to maintaining the strength and
dominance of your Marine Corps.
This year marks 249 years since the founding of our Corps.
That is 249 years of battles won and peace upheld in the name
of democracy and prosperity for our Nation and for all nations
who abide by the international rules-based order.
But increasingly, world events demonstrate this order is
being challenged. Free trade, unrestricted access to the seas,
peaceful cooperation between nations, big and small, are under
assault. Our nation's prosperity is underwritten by a strong
Navy and Marine Corps who maintain a global presence and keep
malign actors at bay.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to represent your
marines today. I pledge to continue to work closely with each
of you to ensure your Marine Corps remains the most lethal
fighting force on the planet.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Eric Smith
Chair Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to report to you on your
marines and your Corps. Your support has been critical to your Corps'
ability to remain the Nation's Force-in-Readiness, all the while
modernizing to stay ahead of our adversaries and those who would seek
to threaten our Nation or its Allies and partners.
who we are and how we fight
The Marine Corps is, first and foremost, a warfighting
organization. We exist to fight and win our country's battles.
Everything we do is with that one goal in mind. The character of war
may change, but its essence never will--it is the violent struggle
between two irreconcilable wills. That struggle is where marines
thrive. We ask for nothing more than the chance to be First to Fight.
We are and will remain a naval expeditionary force that fights from
the sea as task-organized, multi-domain combined arms air-ground task
forces. With Force Design in progress, we continue our proud history as
our Nation's expeditionary shock troops who can deliver combat power
from sea to land--and we have added the additional capability to
project power from land to sea. As a globally present and persistent
force, we are inextricably linked to naval campaigns, and we are
forward deployed in competition, ready to respond in times of crisis at
a moment's notice.
Our foundation as our Nation's expeditionary force in readiness and
as its elite soldiers from the sea will not change. But the formations,
capabilities, and methods we use against our adversaries must evolve.
Combined arms operations today are more than coordinating ground
maneuver, indirect fires, and close air support--already the most
difficult task for any fighting force to master. To fight and win
against a peer adversary, combined arms must now be all-domain,
incorporating effects in and from cyberspace, space, and the
electromagnetic spectrum. The mastery of this evolution in warfare is
what allows us to punch above our weight class. It is what will keep
the Marine Corps--a relatively small service--respected by our friends
and feared by our enemies across the globe.
Maneuver Warfare, encapsulated in our Marine Corps Doctrinal
Publication (MCDP) 1, is integral to how we fight, but our
understanding of ``maneuver'' must evolve along with the changing
character of war. Marines at the tactical edge will maneuver under all-
domain supporting fires to seize terrain and destroy the enemy. This
challenge will require a greater proliferation of capabilities that can
provide those all-domain effects down to the lowest level. This
requirement includes autonomous systems; precision fires; intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR-T); integrated command
and control; and increased ground and maritime mobility.
Marine Stand-in Forces are task-organized, mobile, low-signature,
sustainable formations, built to maneuver across all domains, sense and
understand the battlefield, enable combined kill webs, and apply all-
domain combined arms. They persist forward in contested areas, operate
alongside allies and partners, contribute to deterrence, and, if
deterrence fails, fight to win. Adversaries will attempt to deny and
degrade the joint force's ability to see and sense. Marines at every
echelon are now using the platforms and capabilities that our
aggressive modernization efforts are delivering. Our Force Design
efforts have enabled our marines to conduct all-domain and multi-source
collections and intelligence in support of the joint force. We are the
eyes and ears for the joint force, ideally positioned within the
weapons engagement zone (WEZ) to conduct both reconnaissance and
counter-reconnaissance, to act as a joint tactical air controller for
the combined joint force, and to strike the enemy from land to sea with
organic sensors and precision fires.
Sustaining those forces will be both vitally important and
exceptionally difficult. Contested logistics can only succeed through a
combination of technology and tactics. Forces will have to coordinate
the deliberate application of multi-domain fires and maneuver to create
the physical and temporal conditions necessary to support logistics
networks. Make no mistake--a peer fight requires both the large
traditional avenues for supply as well as a global network of tailored
nodes to support specialized units distributed across the battlespace.
The Globally Positioned Network ashore, including Maritime
Prepositioned Forces afloat, will become nodes within a larger,
resilient sustainment web that will not rely on single points of
failure. This is a wicked problem to solve, but for marines, it is not
insurmountable. We became marines to do hard things.
Today, across the Indo-Pacific, approximately 23,000 marines are
forward-deployed or stationed West of the International Dateline.
Building upon the longstanding ability of III Marine Expeditionary
Force to deter, campaign, and respond to crises, I would like to
highlight several initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region: a new
integrated naval Task Force called TF 76.3; our Marine Littoral
Regiments--one of which will be forward postured in Japan's Southwest
Islands; an expanded Rotational Force in Australia; and a new
Rotational Force--Southeast Asia. This forward posture is a critical
requirement for integrated deterrence and reinforces a national source
of strategic advantage, our global network of Allies and partners. Just
as important, our forward posture contributes to the core mission of
the Naval Force--presence.
Marines with the I and III Marine Expeditionary Forces
continue to reinforce joint warfighting advantages through their
ongoing activities across the Indo-Pacific with our allies in the
region, including Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and
South Korea. Exercises Resolute Dragon and Iron Fist with the Japanese
Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) and Amphibious Rapid Deployment
Brigade are two of the best examples of our active campaigning in the
theater. Those operations and activities directly support Japan's
efforts to reinforce its maritime domain awareness in the Southwest
Islands, enhance its reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance
capabilities, and further develop its capability to use land-based
anti-ship systems to effect sea-denial. Some of this training occurs at
the JGSDF's Camp Ishigaki on a southwestern Japanese island
approximately 160 miles east of Taiwan.
In Australia, Marine Rotational Force--Darwin (MRF-D)
continues to demonstrate advanced interoperability between the Marines
Corps and Australian Defense Forces (ADF) across each warfighting
function, power projection with non-traditional assets, and the ability
to overcome mobility challenges in the littoral environment. Because of
the years of working closely with the U.S. Marine Corps to address the
changing threat, the ADF are developing two amphibious brigades that
have much in common with the Marine Littoral Regiment. This year, MRF-D
will integrate with the ADF in at least 13 operations, activities, and
investments (OAIs), including exercises that seek to validate theater
planning assumptions and enhance overall interoperability. The MRF-D
2024 rotation will further focus on simulating and overcoming the
logistical challenges we envision facing in a high-end fight in the
Pacific.
The largest bilateral military exercise between Australia
and the United States, Exercise Talisman Saber, is well known; what is
perhaps less well known is that TS23 integrated amphibious vessels from
the United States and Japan, as well as German naval infantry, and
introduced field training exercises with several Pacific Island
Countries for the first time. For the first time last year, we were
able to include the Indonesian National Armed Forces within our
combined training alongside the Australians. We look forward to
expanding upon this new opportunity to extend our campaigning.
In October 2023, we initiated the second rotation of our
newest expeditionary force--Marine Rotational Force--Southeast Asia
(MRF-SEA), to counter ongoing PRC maritime gray zone operations. MRF-
SEA operations and activities included coastal defense training, raid
and reconnaissance training, and amphibious operations training with
Allies and partners in the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Singapore.
Our most important campaigning event in support of
deterring North Korean aggression, Ssang Yong, resumed in 2023 and
involved an amphibious landing with elements of the ROKMC, 1st Marine
Division, and the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Ssang Yong 24
is planned for August 2024 to allow for the utilization of the America
ARG (LHA 6) and 31st MEU.
In August 2023, marines of the America Amphibious Ready
Group and 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) conducted humanitarian
assistance/disaster relief operations in the vicinity of Papua New
Guinea following the eruption of Mount Bagana on 31 July 2023.
Our efforts across the EUCOM AOR have also significantly expanded,
and now include tailored efforts with NATO's newest members--Sweden and
Finland. Since 2018, Exercise Archipelago Endeavor has been the primary
venue for Marine Forces, Europe, to develop interoperability with the
Swedish marines. Beginning in 2022, the Royal Swedish Navy also offered
the exercise as a medium for the Marine Corps to develop and evaluate
modern concepts such as maritime domain awareness. This generous offer
and the close relationship with America's newest Ally are further
evidence of the strategic impact of our network of Allies and partners.
In 2023, Low-Altitude Air-Defense (LAAD) marines participated in
exercise ADEX with the Finnish Navy, and Combat Logistics Battalion-6
(CLB-6) participated in Exercises Atrain and Freezing Winds with the
Nyland Brigade (naval infantry). This year, Exercise Freezing Winds
will be the primary bilateral exercise between the Marine Corps and
Finnish Navy and naval infantry forces. In addition to those exercises,
marines from 2d Marine Division conducted several HIMARS Rapid
Infiltration (HIRAIN) events throughout the theater, including Finland,
Poland, and Greece. These visible demonstrations of combat credibility
and operational reach involve inserting HIMARS via fixed-wing aircraft,
conducting fire missions using U.S. and NATO C2 architecture, and then
extracting via fixed-wing aircraft.
Your Corps' worldwide campaigning activities, alongside the Navy,
help nurture our Nation's source of strategic advantage on the world
stage: our network of allies and partners. Through our persistent
presence, we are forging close and lasting relationships--every day--
and building a network of friendly forces who have common operating
concepts and increasingly, interoperable systems and procedures.
Following the terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, the
26th MEU and BATAAN Amphibious Ready Group immediately responded and
provided simultaneous contingency support to EUCOM from the
Mediterranean Sea and CENTCOM from the Red Sea. Their rapid response
demonstrated the ARG/MEU's ability to provide expeditionary sea-based
contingency response packages during times of crisis without the
constraints and restraints of access, basing, and overflight.
Additionally, the 26th MEU(SOC) aboard the BATAAN ARG conducted
maritime security operations in vicinity of the Straits of Hormuz to
deter malign influence and assure free flow of commerce.
Throughout 2023, Marine Security Guard Augmentation Units (MSAU)
operating under title 22 authorities augmented security at designated
U.S. diplomatic facilities overseas to protect U.S. diplomats and
prevent the compromise of national security information and equipment.
MSAUs conduct on-compound security and defense at these facilities when
Department of State (DOS) deems there is a need to augment the resident
Marine Security Guard detachment due to an increased threat. In 2023,
there were 18 MSAU deployments in support of our diplomats in Ukraine,
Central African Republic, Ecuador, Mali, Haiti, Zimbabwe, Egypt,
Liberia, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Democratic Republic of Congo, and
Bangladesh.
All these examples, from maritime security to embassy
reinforcement, demonstrate the diverse range of missions that our
crisis response forces are ready to execute at any time and place. The
breadth of those capabilities is simply unmatched across the joint
force and continues to be a source of strategic advantage.
where we are going
Upon my assumption of duties as Commandant of the Marine Corps, I
outlined my top five priorities: 1) Balancing Crisis Response and
Modernization, 2) Naval Integration and Organic Mobility, 3) Quality of
Life, 4) Recruit, Make, and Retain Marines, and 5) Maximize the
Potential of our Reserves. Those priorities remain at the heart of my
direction to your Corps.
Balancing Crisis Response and Modernization
By balancing crisis response and modernization, we will continue
our modernization effort under Force Design while remaining unwavering
in our commitment to a persistent, global forward presence and to our
Marine Expeditionary Units.
Force Design and Modernization. I remain fully committed to Force
Design and all its supporting efforts. The following assumptions inform
our modernization efforts: (1) The long-standing trend of increasing
dispersion on the battlefield will continue and likely accelerate--
frontages will increase, battlefield depth will increase, and sanctuary
will be difficult to achieve; (2) winning the all-domain reconnaissance
and counter-reconnaissance fight provides significant warfighting
advantage and losing this fight will be increasingly difficult to
overcome; (3) the Marine Corps' ability to task-organize for specific
missions will continue to be a source of competitive advantage for the
service; and (4) the future operating environment requires threat-
informed modernization of Marine Corps capabilities.
We will continue to provide our Nation with forward deployed Marine
Forces who campaign and are prepared to respond to crisis alongside our
Navy shipmates. Employing our crisis response capability as a subset of
campaigning is how we will be postured to deter malign actors and
provide our Nation's leaders with strategic decision space. Despite the
threats from operating inside an adversary's WEZ, forward-deployed
marines can shape the operational environment and cause our adversaries
to think before committing to a course of action. Should our
adversaries foolishly choose to fight, marines will be ready with the
tools necessary to destroy and defeat them in combat.
Marine Littoral Regiments: As an example of our dispersed, task-
organized units that possess modern equipment for the future of
warfare, the 3d Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR)--headquartered at Marine
Corps Base Hawaii--reached Initial Operational Capability in 2023 and
is planned to reach Full Operational Capability in fiscal year 25. 3d
MLR is actively experimenting with innovative tactics, techniques, and
procedures to enable its unique mission as a distributed unit that must
possess resilient communications, air defense, and precision fires. On
the other side of the Pacific, the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment--
headquartered in Okinawa, Japan--stood up in November 2023.
Contested Logistics: The ability to conduct logistics in a
contested environment will underwrite the success of any future naval
campaign in the current age of ubiquitous counter-intervention
strategies. Contested logistics remains a service priority but will
require a combination of solutions from the Service, joint force, and
allies and partners. Connecting the industrial base, depots in the
United States, and ports of embarkation with forward nodes in theater
and tied to a resilient tactical level sustainment web, supported by
multi-domain distribution platforms, will take a monumental effort
across all the services. The Marine Corps will continue to work in
stride with the joint force, Allies, and partners to ensure we have the
integrated systems, architecture, global logistic awareness, doctrine,
and training to sustain our forces.
The Marine Corps, in close collaboration with the Navy, is
currently experimenting with over a dozen new manned and unmanned
technologies and potential future capabilities focused on enabling
logistics in a contested environment. These operational experiments
include well-known capabilities such as the CH-53K, the stern landing
vessel (SLV), as well as lesser-known, emerging capabilities like the
tactical resupply unmanned aircraft system (TRUAS), the Medium Aerial
Resupply Vehicle for Expeditionary Logistics (MARV-EL), and the
autonomous low-profile vessel (ALPV). Concurrently, the Marine Corps
has commenced the formal establishment of the first of three near-term
Global Positioning Networks located in the Western Pacific.
Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR)
Enterprise Transformation: As an essential element of transformative
efforts behind our modernization, the Marine Corps ISR Enterprise will
continue to expand and strengthen the Corps' dynamic--and growing--
cadre of ISR professionals. The Marine Corps exceeded our goals in
qualifying marines to expand signals intelligence and electromagnetic
warfare specialties. Integrated within our infantry battalions, some of
these marines have already begun contributing to the Joint and Naval
Forces' ability to sense and make sense in complex maritime and
littoral environments. Other groundbreaking efforts throughout the
Fleet Marine Force include integration and experimentation with
innovative maritime sensing capabilities such as surface-search radars,
automatic recognition software, advanced electromagnetic support
capabilities, and various tactical airborne platforms.
Autonomous Systems at Scale: The Marine Corps is actively engaged,
participating, and, in some instances, leading efforts within the
Department of Defense's Replicator Initiative, which aims to field
attritable autonomous systems at scale and in multiple domains. To
accomplish this task, the Marine Corps is aggressively leveraging AI,
robotics, and commercial technology. I see Replicator, if managed
carefully, as an opportunity to build on the momentum of Force Design
to accelerate modernization and alignment with the emergent needs of
the Joint Force. The USMC has worked tirelessly to scale some of the
identified capabilities already, so we appreciate Replicator's holistic
approach to breaking down policy barriers while we strengthen our
industrial base. As Replicator continues to rapidly develop, the
Service will emphasize unmanned systems that can support a range of
military operations in the Indo-Pacific and other geographic regions.
Complementing these efforts, the Marine Corps takes advantage of
the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve to rapidly transition
promising prototypes into production. An example of one such initiative
is the Marine Corps' XQ-58A Valkyrie, a highly autonomous, low-cost
tactical uncrewed air vehicle, which successfully completed two test
flights, one in October 2023 and the other in February 2024. These
flights mark key milestones in the Marine Corps' Penetrating Affordable
Autonomous Collaborative Killer--Portfolio (PAACK-P) experiment. Future
test flights will inform Marine Corps requirements for the Marine Air-
Ground Task Force Unmanned Aerial System Expeditionary (MUX) Tactical
Aircraft (TACAIR) program. The XQ-58A will complete six planned test
flights with objectives that include evaluating the platform's ability
to support a variety of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) missions; the effectiveness of autonomous electromagnetic support
to crewed platforms; the potential for AI-enabled platforms to augment
combat air patrols; and other manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T)
capability objectives. We are committed to the development of a robust
Combat Collaborative Aircraft capability and think this model of
manned-unmanned teaming is just as relevant on the sea and under the
sea. We are exploring options that would provide our future MEUs with
such capabilities.
Training and Education. Last summer, the Navy and Marine Corps team
conducted our most expansive and stressing live and virtual training to
date in Large Scale Exercise 23 (LSE 23) using Carrier Strike Group 2,
anchored on the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69), to help us better
understand how we would fight the next war at sea. We were able to
connect six carrier strike groups (two live, four virtual), six
amphibious ready groups (two live, four virtual), and an additional 25
live and 50 virtual ships. To add to the realism of the event, exercise
planners added 25,000 sailors and marines to the exercise with very
little additional preparation outside of normal training. All these
factors make both the learning and findings more authentic. LSE 23
required the use of nine Maritime Operations Centers. Testing
warfighting concepts and challenging ourselves at this scale is exactly
what is required to generate the warfighting readiness we need in the
future against a peer threat.
Readiness. Critical to our ability to remain forward postured and
ready for any crisis is our commitment to operations and maintenance
funding of ground and aviation training, maintenance, safety, and
readiness. This funding allowed us to respond to the many crises around
the world in 2023, and it will help ensure that we are organized,
trained, equipped, and forward-postured to do so again this year and
into the future. We will continue to emphasize the importance of a full
and predictable budget to fund modernization programs, advance our
logistics capability, which is the pacing function, and advance the
role of our installations as power projection platforms.
Unmodified Audit Opinion. As we invest in new platforms, barracks,
and training, it is our responsibility as good stewards of taxpayer
funds to continue to prove that when the Corps is provided a taxpayer
dollar, we can show exactly where and how it has been invested--a
responsibility I take very seriously. Following a rigorous 2-year
audit, the Marine Corps achieved an unmodified audit opinion, the best
possible outcome--and the first time in the Department of Defense's
history that any service has received an unmodified audit opinion.
These results demonstrate how seriously the Marine Corps takes its
stewardship of taxpayer funds and our ability to account for and put to
best use every dollar trusted to the service. This audit supports what
we have believed for a long time--when Congress provides the Marine
Corps a dollar, we invest it wisely, and we can tell you exactly where
and how it was spent to further our Nation's national security
objectives. The Marine Corps worked with Independent Public Accountants
to validate budgetary balances and records and to audit physical assets
at installations and bases across the globe. These actions included
counting military equipment, buildings, structures, supplies, and
ammunition held by the Marine Corps and our DOD Partners. The audit's
favorable opinion was only possible through the support and hard work
of numerous dedicated marines, civilian marines, and many other
partners across DOD. Nonetheless, we will not rest on our laurels; the
audit report pointed out some areas for improvement, and we will use
these recommendations to make our fiscal practices even better.
Naval Integration and Organic Mobility
The Marine Expeditionary Unit remains our crown jewel, and the
Navy's Amphibious Warfare Ships and surface connectors are key enablers
in campaigning, crisis response, and contingency response. Our MEUs
remain in high demand by Combatant Commanders, Allies, and partners
alike; our MEUs respond to crises all over the globe and prevent crises
from turning into a larger conflict. Amphibious Warfare Ships enable
our global, persistent presence--that presence has been the guarantor
of peace and worldwide prosperity for the better part of the last
century. No platform or unit is capable of a more diverse set of
missions from the low-end to the high-end of military operations. No
other unit is purpose-built for campaigning and deterring maritime
gray-zone operations. No other part of the fleet is purpose-built to
satisfy the naval presence mission. Bottom line, Amphibious Warfare
Ships with embarked marines are the only tool in the U.S. arsenal that
can strengthen our relationships with Allies and partners across all
domains while being capable of rapidly transitioning to crisis or
conflict. As an assurance for Allies and partners, the Navy and Marine
Corps ARG/MEU team has no equal and is a primary source of strategic
advantage.
Amphibious Warfare Ships. The CNO and I have locked shields, and
there is no space between us on the requirement for Amphibious Warfare
Ships--to include construction, maintenance, and modernization, and the
availability of ships for training and deployment. The Fiscal Year 2025
Thirty Year Shipbuilding Plan continues the LPD Flight II Program on 2-
year centers and LHA production on 4-year centers across the FYDP. This
includes full funding for LPD33 in this fiscal year 2025, the calendar
year 2024 delivery of LPD 29 USS McCool, and funding to maintain a
scheduled delivery of LHA 8 in fiscal year 2026--sustaining no fewer
than 31 amphibious warfare ships. The CNO and I continue to work to
improve amphibious warfare ship readiness to ensure global, persistent
presence of MEUs in support of Combatant Commanders' demands.
Amphibious warship procurement, like other Navy shipbuilding
programs, can benefit from multi-ship procurement contracts that
stabilize the industrial base and provide significant cost savings for
the Department. New ship acquisition using authorities already granted
by Congress yield potentially significant cost and schedule benefits,
accelerates delivery of amphibious warfighting capability to the Fleet,
and provides critical stability and predictability to the shipbuilding
industrial base. By procuring the amphibious warfare ships in the 30-
Year Shipbuilding Plan (3 LPDs and 1 LHA) on a multi-ship procurement
contract, the Department can save hundreds of millions of dollars for
the American taxpayer. Multi-ship procurement supports the industrial
base and is a critical tool for reaching and maintaining the amphibious
warfare ship requirement and meeting the objectives of the 2022
National Defense Strategy, as long as industry produces those ships on
schedule and on budget.
Littoral Mobility. Mobility is a critical requirement to enable the
dispersion and persistence of stand-in forces. In the case of MLRs in
the Indo-Pacific, littoral mobility will be essential to maneuver
through the complex geography of the region. We recognized this
capability gap early as we developed concepts for the Indo-Pacific and
designed the associated Medium Landing Ship (LSM) as a critical enabler
for this theater. Separate and complementary to the Amphibious Warfare
Ships, the LSM is a maneuver asset and, as a shore-to-shore vessel, is
unique and critical to expeditionary littoral mobility. LSMs facilitate
campaigning and can support diverse missions such as security
cooperation, humanitarian assistance / disaster relief (HA/DR),
logistics support, and the launch and recovery of uncrewed systems for
maritime domain awareness.
Quality of Life
When we improve our Marines' Quality of Life (QOL), we do right by
our Nation's most precious resource--our marines and their families--
and we retain our lethal edge by retaining our top talent. To this end,
we have recently undertaken several targeted efforts to improve our
marines' QOL and further promote the retention of our best marines:
Rapid execution of ``Barracks 2030,'' the most
consequential barracks investment plan we have ever undertaken.
Improvements in quality and accessible healthcare.
Acceleration of investments in Marine Corps Total Fitness
and focused investments in our gyms, chow halls, Child Development
Centers, and family housing.
Increased creative incentives for overseas and Pacific-
based marines.
Our recent Talent Management efforts are data-informed and
comprehensive. Additionally, we recognize that Quality of Life does not
just mean facilities and incentives. Talent Management drives us to
make better data-driven institutional decisions and personnel policies
for our marines and their families. All marine leaders know
instinctively that we have a sacred and personal responsibility to
lead, mentor, and care for our junior marines, but there is still more
the institution can do to help our youngest marines.
Barracks 2030. The Marine Corps has recently initiated Barracks
2030, our strategy to pursue improvements in our unaccompanied housing.
This strategy codifies many initiatives the Corps began in February
2023 and is certainly informed by the 2023 Government Accountability
Office report on barracks. The Marine Corps' Barracks 2030 strategy
takes an aggressive approach in improving housing for our marines along
three lines of effort: Management, Modernization, and Materiel. Our
strategy is data-driven--to the ``room level.'' I recently directed the
inspection of the over 58,000 barracks rooms in the Marine Corps--not
as a replacement to our junior leaders' weekly inspections for
cleanliness and repair--but to establish a systematic approach toward
barracks maintenance using a standardized repair checklist. In the
coming weeks, the data from this inspection will inform our
prioritization of efforts and future year budget requests.
As an example of our management efforts, and as directed by the
Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, we plan to
implement a civilian management structure in our Military Housing
Offices by October of this year, followed by civilian and contractor
management of each of our barracks in the next 2 years to improve
responsiveness to maintenance requests. Ultimately, we will return more
than 500 marine non-commissioned officer barracks managers to their
primary military occupational specialties. We further intend to
consolidate family housing and barracks oversight within the Military
Housing Offices, which will streamline leadership and management of all
Marine Corps housing.
Our Modernization plans extend beyond new structures and include
modernizing systems to enable right-size inventory and deliberate,
proactive maintenance. Over the last 6 years, the Marine Corps has
averaged over $200 million annually in restoration and modernization
projects for barracks exclusively. In fiscal Years 2022 and 2023, we
renovated 30 barracks, improving the quality of life of 8,116 marines.
In fiscal year 2024, we approached Congress with a funding request to
renovate 13 more barracks to improve the living conditions of 3,517
marines. We are leveraging a tier-based readiness approach to lifecycle
management to prioritize investments for the most critical facilities.
Every dollar spent will be targeted to where it will have the greatest
impact. Future modernization efforts include installing new air
conditioning systems for barracks in the warmest of climates and
targeted demolition to remove buildings not suitable for our marines.
In the near term for Material, marines can expect to see common
space furniture replaced three times faster than in years past and
replacement of lock systems across the entire barracks portfolio within
the next 2 years. We are also committed to replacing room furniture,
washers, and dryers at a much greater frequency through a centralized
procurement system.
Health Care. Quality healthcare for our marines is the minimum
standard for readiness and is vital to the All-Volunteer Force.
Overseas, and primarily in Japan, network care in the civilian
community is not as readily accessible at the standard set by the
Department of Defense for our marines and their families. In
recognition of this fact, the Marine Corps conducted a data-driven area
assessment on delayed access to care. Guided by the results of this
assessment, the Marine Corps is working with Navy Medicine and the
Defense Health Agency to identify the location and need of specialties
and develop a plan to address them. We are thankful for Congress'
support for the Defense Health Agency implementation and its support to
address the gap between DOD contract healthcare labor rates and the
civilian market.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response. Sexual assault is a crime,
and the Marine Corps always focuses on assisting victims with care and
support and holding alleged perpetrators appropriately accountable. As
of December 2023, the Marine Corps Office of the Special Trial Counsel
is fully staffed and operational worldwide. This program will
professionalize prosecution of special victims offenses and
strengthening victims' confidence in the military justice system. The
Marine Corps continues to hold its commanders and senior enlisted
leaders responsible for the command climate of their units and for
fostering a culture of respect for all.
Our Training & Education Command has undertaken a
comprehensive review and modification of our training covering the
career of a marine--from the first instance a poolee commits to the
Corps to training for our Colonel-level commanders. Foundationally,
this training review and implementation has leveraged the Independent
Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military (IRC) training
requirements.
In fiscal year 2023, the Marine Corps worked to hire 358
positions across the enterprise and another 92 in fiscal year 2024 in
support of IRC recommendations approved by the Secretary of Defense and
prevention efforts. This hiring is in addition to the previously
authorized 120 Marine Corps full-time equivalents (FTE) in prevention
and response. As of January 2024, 162 employees have been onboarded,
and another 273 hiring actions are in process. We remain unsatisfied
with the pace of our hiring, especially in certain locations where
labor and workforce factors limit our available pool of applicants. We
will continue to work with Congress to develop policy initiatives to
accelerate this effort.
Marine Corps Total Fitness. Marine Corps Total Fitness is the
summation of physical, mental, spiritual, and social fitness programs
that equip our marines with the tools of resiliency and fortitude
required to fight at their highest potential and prevent unnecessary
loss due to factors ranging from non-EAS attrition to the tragedy of
suicide. The Marine Corps takes a holistic approach to total fitness,
understanding that fitness is more than simply possessing high physical
fitness or mental aptitude scores. Upon assuming the duties of the 39th
Commandant, I immediately directed simple but effective measures to
supplement our already robust total fitness initiatives--a renewed
focus on Quality of Life by improving the quality of our living spaces,
our chow halls, and 24/7 access to on-base gyms. Further, I will
continue to ensure access to the programs available to our marines
using force-wide person-to-person engagement programs such as Unit
Marine Awareness and Prevention Integrated Training, which every marine
in the Corps receives annually.
As a Corps, we apply a public health approach to prevention,
focusing on ensuring the health, safety, and well-being of the entire
Marine Corps community. Our efforts aim to strengthen protective
factors that reduce the risk of individuals experiencing harmful
behaviors. For example, social connections, social support, and
positive social relationships are protective factors against a spectrum
of issues including child abuse, domestic abuse, hazing, sexual
violence, substance abuse, youth violence, and suicide-related
behavior. Skill-building is an essential component of prevention and
equips marines and their families with the tools needed to cope with
stressors before they become overwhelming. Examples of skill-building
include building problem-solving, coping, anger management, and healthy
relationship skills.
Over the last year, the Marine Corps Behavioral Programs Office has
implemented several efforts to combat the factors contributing to
harmful behavior and suicide. Their efforts include the third iteration
of our annual Wellness Symposium to inform unit Suicide Prevention
Officers, Suicide Prevention Program Coordinators, and uniformed
leaders. The office also partnered with the Lejeune Leadership
Institute to reinforce prevention efforts at our Marine Corps Recruit
Depots through leadership and ethics courses. Our Safety Division has
also updated our Cognitive Behavioral Therapy curriculum. We have
initiated a deliberate service-wide messaging campaign targeted at
Total Fitness and suicide prevention. In fact, the second message to
the entire force that the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps and I
recorded was specifically aimed at addressing mental health and suicide
prevention directly.
Safety. Safety is a critical component of our Corps and a key
indicator of a unit's discipline. Operational excellence is the
professional, efficient, and expert execution of our warfighting
missions, functions, and tasks. It demands a culture of continuous
improvement and the pursuit of the highest standards. Safety is not a
restriction or obstacle to realistic or challenging training--it is a
requirement. Many mishaps are preventable when we comply with
established procedures and take action to stop unsafe acts before they
occur. Our safety culture is strong but must be doggedly maintained and
actively inculcated into our youngest marines. When I became
Commandant, I directed the assignment of a General Officer to lead our
service safety initiatives and provide the requisite level of oversight
and leadership. I am grateful to Congress for the additional
authorization of a general officer that enabled this assignment.
Childcare. Our Child and Youth Programs (CYP) provide high-quality,
accessible, affordable care aboard 16 Marine Corps installations and
through contractual partnerships. Some of the benefits CYP offers
include Child Development Programs, the Community-Based Child Care Fee
Assistance Program, and Youth Programming. We continue to make progress
in recovering from the effects of COVID-19 on our childcare network.
The Marine Corps Child Development Center's (CDC) unmet needs list
continues to shrink, with the current total at 962 spaces.
We are addressing childcare waitlist issues by emphasizing hiring
efforts and a non-competitive childcare employee transfer program.
Beginning in fiscal year 2023, we added over $100 million
to the Child and Youth Program portfolio to hire more employees at
increased wages to help retain a professional workforce. Our average
CDC employee salary is now higher than those outside the gate at most
installations.
In fiscal year 2023, direct care employees' salaries were
increased beyond the federally mandated $15 per hour. The minimum wage
of an entry-level employee is $18.20 per hour. Childcare employees with
children enrolled in the program now receive a 50 percent reduction in
fees for the first child and a 20 percent reduction for subsequent
children.
Our current staffing turnover rate is 20 percent, a
marked improvement over the fiscal year 2021 and fiscal year 2022
turnover rates of 34 percent and 45 percent, respectively. Departing
employees listed ``relocation'' as the primary reason they resigned in
about a third of cases, which is explained by the fact that many CDC
employees are spouses who move alongside their servicemember. Military
spouses comprise 40 percent of the Marine Corps' Child and Youth
Programs employees. Spouse employment is important for many Marine
Corps families and can be a significant factor in their financial
security, readiness, and retention. Family Member Employment Assistance
Program is available at each Marine Corps installation and provides
employment related referral services, career and skill assessments,
career coaching, job search guidance, portal career opportunities, and
education centers referrals/guidance. We also reimburse eligible marine
spouses up to $1,000 for State licensure and certification cost arising
from relocation to another State. We appreciate Congress' recent
expansion of this program and continued support. To address the
challenge of PCS cycles, we have implemented a CDC employee non-
competitive transfer program that allows employees to transfer from
their current position more seamlessly to a similar one at a different
installation. This single initiative has enabled us to retain more than
180 spouse employees, whom we may have otherwise lost.
To mitigate waitlists, we also offer childcare fee
assistance for eligible marines assigned to an installation with a
significant waitlist. Over the last 3 fiscal years, the rate of fee
assistance utilization has increased steadily for both community-based
childcare providers as well as children served. In fiscal year 2023,
over 1,600 children were enrolled in the fee assistance program at over
620 community-based providers, at a total cost of $6.1 million. We
recently increased the maximum amount of fee assistance, which will
undoubtedly help our marine families, especially those in high-cost
areas.
We appreciate Congress's support to improve childcare delivery in
all its forms. Access to and affordability quality and reliable
childcare enables marines to focus on their duties, which directly
impacts our readiness and lethality.
Overseas and Pacific Marines. The Marine Corps has established a
Pacific cell to focus solely on improving the quality of life and
morale for our marines, civilian workforce, and families throughout the
Indo-Pacific. This cell is engaged with units stationed in the Pacific
and has solicited direct feedback. One idea we are studying is the
adequacy of policies regarding shipment and storage of privately owned
vehicles for marines stationed overseas. Those changes would improve
spouse employment, access to childcare, and other quality-of-life
priorities. We are considering other monetary and non-monetary
incentives to reduce the cost and stress of executing orders to
overseas locations.
Recruiting, Making, and Retaining Marines
Recruiting. Our success in maintaining an elite force begins with
recruiting young men and women who possess the character, mental
aptitude, physical and psychological fitness, and desire required to
earn the title, ``marine.'' Recruiters face a challenging environment.
Labor market challenges, historic lows in qualification rates, and
lower propensities to join have made it increasingly difficult to
maintain our recruiting momentum. Nonetheless, we do not ask young men
and women to join us, and we do not promise them an easy life--instead,
we challenge them to try out for and earn the privilege to wear the
Eagle, Globe, and Anchor. Those who meet and sustain our high standards
deserve our best leadership. We are a proud organization that welcomes
and judges all based on one standard--the Marine Corps standard.
There is no better visible example of our disciplined warriors than
our recruiters. We send our very best to recruiting--our recruiters are
often the first marine a young person ever meets. One in four of our
general officers have been recruiters during their career, and we pride
ourselves in assigning a sergeant major to every recruiting station. We
value the mission--not only for the immediate results of recruiting the
best fighting force for our Nation--but also for the professional
development and leadership that such rigorous duty instills in a marine
leader. As it is such a challenging duty, we are paying particular
attention to the quality of life for our recruiters. Incentives like
monetary bonuses help, but we understand that non-monetary incentives
often make the difference. Additionally, and in keeping with marines'
tenet of ``exploit success,'' I recently directed an increase of
several hundred recruiters to ensure our continued success in
accomplishing our mission and sustaining the momentum in re-building
our Delayed Entry Pool.
Our performance speaks for itself. As you know, Marine Corps
Recruiting Command achieved its fiscal year 2023 recruiting mission
while sustaining our high standards. Last fiscal year, over 98 percent
of our recruiting accessions were high school graduates, exceeding the
Department of Defense's standard of 90 percent. While we are authorized
up to 4 percent of accessions from the CAT IV mental group, we have
deliberately chosen not to do so and did not access any CAT IV
applicants in 2023. In addition, the average Armed Forces Qualification
Test (AFQT) score for marine recruits was over 60--which remains well
above the AFQT average score of 50; sixty-six percent scored in the top
three tiers of the AFQT, exceeding the DOD standard of 60 percent.
Marine Corps Recruiting Command has also successfully made our shipping
and contracting missions every month this fiscal year. Of note, we have
also surpassed the fiscal year 2023 total number of Prior Service
Enlistment Program (PSEP) re-accessions back into the Active component.
So far, in fiscal year 2024, we have already attained 126 PSEPs in
comparison to the 121 total in fiscal year 2023. For our Officer
mission, we have accessed 639 officers so far this fiscal year, which
is on-pace to meet or exceed the mission by category and component.
Retention. Over the past 12 months, we have implemented five major
reform initiatives: 1) the Commandant's Active and Reserve Retention
Program, 2) the Expanded First Term Alignment Plan (FTAP) Retention
Model, 3) the Small Unit Leader Initiative, 4) Promotion Allocation
Fulfillment, and 5) Marine Corps Graduate Education Program (MCGEP)
Enlisted Pilot. These programs provide demonstrable results, and I am
prepared to provide the Committee with detailed briefings on each. As
just one example of the impact these initiatives are having, we entered
fiscal year 2023 with a persistent shortfall of approximately 2,000
Sergeants across the force. Via implementing the Small Unit Leader
Initiative, we not only decreased that shortfall to 150, but also
secured the retention of the top talent within our E4 ranks for years
via early re-enlistment.
In fiscal year 2022, we successfully re-enlisted 5,918 (22 percent)
of the eligible first-term population of 26,221 marines. In fiscal year
2023, we expanded those efforts and successfully re-enlisted 7,070 (27
percent) of the eligible first-term population of 26,121 marines. Most
importantly, 5,670 of those re-enlisted remained in the FMF to provide
greater unit cohesion. With even greater goals in fiscal year 2024, we
anticipate continued high re-enlistment rates, particularly among
first-term marines. In fiscal year 2023, we initiated a pilot program
targeting our infantry community, seeking to create greater unit
cohesion and individual marine and family stability via 60-month
infantry-only enlistment contracts. Due to the success of that effort,
on 1 October 2023, all infantry contracts became 60-month contracts.
Within the first quarter of this fiscal year, we have already exceeded
our monthly mission goals, and for the year-to-date, we have shipped
149 percent of the requirement. We will meet and exceed our annual
infantry recruiting mission of 2,579 this year.
It is important to note that as the Marine Corps shifts from a
``Recruit and Replace'' to an ``Invest and Retain'' model, the service
must incentivize the retention of the highest quality marines,
regardless of occupational specialty. The idea that ``there is always
boat space for talent'' is our guiding principle. However, if not
diligently managed, MOS-agnostic retention may result in uneven
retention across occupational specialties. To ensure the even
distribution of retained talent across the force, we will continue
incentivizing lateral move opportunities for qualified marines by
reducing administrative barriers to lateral moves and offering targeted
bonuses for high-demand, low-density skills. Moreover, within the next
year, we can expect the delivery and enhancement of the Talent
Management Engagement Portal and AI/ML enabled models such as the
Retention Prediction Network, Talent Marketplace, and Modernized
Enlisted Staffing Goal Model that will allow us to better identify the
highest quality marines for targeted retention.
Optimizing Employment of our Reserves
By Maximizing the Potential of our Reserves, we continue to forge a
lethal Total Force that is greater than the sum of its parts while
taking stress off the Active component. To maximize the potential of
our Reserves, we must appropriately resource our AC end strength to
172,300 and RC end strength to 32,500; research the necessary policies
and authorities required to enable AC and RC permeability; and return
to historic National Guard Reserve Equipment Account funding levels to
ensure the modernization and readiness of our Reserves. The Selected
Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) is a service-retained force and reservoir
of capabilities similar to our three Active Duty MEFs. Our world-class
Marine Corps Reserve routinely provides forces to satisfy service needs
from training to generate readiness, build partner capacity in SOUTHCOM
and AFRICOM, and augment traditional global force management
requirements. Purpose-built to augment, sustain, and reinforce the
Active component, our SMCR units, Individual Mobilization Augmentee
(IMA) Detachments, and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) are sources of
competitive warfighting advantage.
conclusion
The Marine Corps will be ready to respond to any crisis or
contingency in the future, just as we have in the past. I remain
committed to ensuring the Marine Corps remains our Nation's Force-in-
Readiness. We will never lower our standards or sacrifice the
reputation associated with the sacred title, ``marine''--and will
remain innovative and agile in our approach to warfighting. With your
help, we will ensure your marines are provided with world-class
training and improved quality of life and are enabled with the
capabilities required to win our Nation's battles against any
adversary. I promise you that every dollar invested will give you the
greatest return to realize our modernization strategy, build a more
lethal force, and take care of your marines and their families. I thank
the Committee for your continued advocacy and support for your marines.
Semper Fidelis.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Smith.
Secretary Del Toro, the comments, both Senator Wicker and I
made indicate that the shipbuilding program in the Navy is in
disarray. The Columbia-class, which is the most critical
platform that the Navy, and perhaps the Nation, is trying to
build is behind schedule, and it might fall further behind.
He put extraordinary pressure on the Virginia-class
submarine construction. They're already behind 1.2 ships versus
two ships a year. You've responded by sending up a request for
one Virginia this year, and a significant investment in the
defense industrial base.
The first question I have, though, is there seems to be
management's problems in all these programs. Some of it is the
changing requirements on the ships so that the contractor is
suddenly back to square one in some cases. Others is to the
inability of subcontracts to produce, et cetera.
I must say that one of the jobs you have, and it's a tough
job, is to find out who's responsible and to take directed
action to correct it. So, could you tell us what you're doing
to ensure accountability in the programs to get them back on
track?
Mr. Del Toro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you suggest, there are a lot of challenges in the
shipbuilding industry and they actually date back to the 1980's
when we gave up on commercial shipbuilding in this country and
lost so much of the talent in the shipbuilding industry. That
was compounded tremendously so by COVID and the enormous
challenges that we have with regards to blue collar labor in
this workforce that actually impacts across all programs
because the industry and even the Navy and its public shipyards
simply don't have the people that are necessary to work in our
shipyards. That's sort of the base denominator of it all.
But the recent problems that we've actually seen here, and
I don't agree with the characterization that this is all about
management, by no means of the imagination, these are difficult
challenges that are presented to the Navy and as well the
shipbuilding industry that we have to deal with clear on.
So, the delay of major components for the construction of
Virginia-class, as well as the Eisenhower, is the major reason
for the delays in these programs. So, on the Eisenhower, for
example, you have Northrop Grumman that's building the main
reduction gear when General Electric used to do that, and they
are behind delivering the main reduction gear, in addition to
the high pressure and the low-pressure turbines to that
carrier, which is why it's behind. In the case of the Virginia-
class submarines, it's the turbine generators that are being
delivered by Northrop Grumman that are significantly behind.
In addition to the quality assurance challenges that have
been presented down in Norfolk, Naval Shipyard associated with
the nose cones of those submarines, that you're very well
familiar with as well, that has led to significant delays such
that the New Jersey that was just delivered a couple of weeks
ago was delivered 3 years late.
Now, some of this isn't just maintenance problems, it's
again, attributed to blue collar workforce challenges that
we're having, the degrading of the workforce. You could argue
that years ago, as you have stated before in another testimony,
you know, we had 50-year-old supervisors working with 50-year-
old naval engineers in the Navy. Today it's 35-year-olds
working with each other, right? That has led to significant
challenges with regards to quality assurance.
Now, in the case of the frigate, quite frankly, it's a
recruiting, and a retention problem in Wisconsin. So, what we
are trying to actually do is many things. One, $3.9 billion in
the submarine industrial base in fiscal year 2025, followed by
$11 billion of investment over the rest of the fed up. $750
million investment in the defense industrial base. Just in
Fincantieri alone, we provided a $100 million of resources to
the shipyard so they can provide $5,000 bonuses to their
shipyard workers for the first year if they stay in place, and
another $5,000 if they stay in place throughout the
construction of the ship itself.
So, we're doing everything that we possibly can to actually
help industry and work with industry to get there. Industry
also needs to do its part, we have too many stock buyback plans
that, you know, as we're investing $14 billion into industry,
you know, we've got billions of dollars that are going out the
other side of the door into stockholders. So, they've got to
focus more on the customer than just the stockholders as well,
too.
Chairman Reed. I concur with your final comment. We're
looking at companies that are not performing, but are still
being rewarded. As you point out, the contraction of our
defense industrial base and shipbuilding is such that
competition is not really there as it was perhaps 20 or 30
years ago. The need is great, and I think we have to put more
effort behind it.
My time is expiring. There's a capacity issue. I know you
have a shipyard infrastructure optimization program, $25
billion over 25 years, so that's a billion dollar a year. I
think we have to come to a real question of do we have enough
shipyards to function, particularly in this environment where
China has 16 major premier shipyards.
I've taken too much time. Let me recognize Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. I'm tempted to ask that you be given
another 5 minutes, Mr. Chairman, but I won't do that.
Let me ask General Smith and Admiral Franchetti about
medium-size landing ships. Now, let me start with you, General
Smith. It's my understanding the marines originally sought an
affordable landing ship of less than $150 million based on what
you saw with the logistics support vessel that Israel was
having built. Tell me what the landing ship mediums will do,
and again, we have only 5 minutes for this round of questions.
What will they do, in a nutshell?
General Smith. Senator, thanks for that question.
The landing ship medium transports are expeditionary forces
inter-island, it's beach-able, it can get up into low watermark
beaches, and it enables us to have access to the entire first
island chain.
Senator Wicker. So, we're talking Indo-Pacific Islands?
General Smith. Focused on the Indo-Pacific, but certainly
employable in the Mediterranean.
Senator Wicker. Okay. So, there's been requirements growth
and I think everyone on both sides of the dais are concerned
about this. The CBO now estimates that the landing ship medium
will cost two to three times more than this $150 million
Israeli landing ship.
How many of the original Israeli logistic support vessels
could you use, and what reason would we have for not being able
to use those? Where you're going to need them?
General Smith. Senator, the Israeli version does not meet
our requirements for beach gradients. The beach gradient of 1
to 40 is critical because it opens up----
Senator Wicker. 1 to 40?
General Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. That doesn't----
General Smith. It means the curvature of the beach, its
ability to beach itself, and then back itself off.
Senator Wicker. Are there islands where it would work?
General Smith. Senator, there are, but they would limit us
in our ability to spread throughout the first island chain to
counter the PRC.
Senator Wicker. Okay. So you are telling this Committee
that you really can't use any of these logistic support vessels
that the Marine Corps initially planned to use?
General Smith. Senator, they would not be purpose-built. We
could use them, but we would lose capability. We'd lose access
to parts of the Indo-Pacific that we currently need to have
access to in order to counter the PRC's continued aggression.
Senator Wicker. To what extent could they be modified
without going two to three times more than the original budget?
General Smith. Senator, I'll have to get back to you on
that, on the ability to modify them without increasing costs?
Senator Wicker. Well, obviously, it would increase cost.
But how is it that--I suppose, the Israelis are interested in
different kinds of different islands in different areas and it
works for them, but to what percentage of the islands in the
Pacific could you use the existing vessel?
General Smith. Senator, I don't have an exact number for
you. I can get back to you on that.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, please do. Let me ask Admiral
Franchetti to answer that question on the record.
Senator Wicker. Let me just ask you this in the time we
have, the minute we have, Secretary Del Toro. There's a lot of
interest in this Committee about a Force ship buy of Amphibs.
Will you commit to a multi-ship buy of amphibious warships?
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, I am highly enthusiastic for the 4-
year multi ship procurement. I always have been. We are in
final negotiations with the shipyard to actually put forward
the proposal, obviously, depending on what the numbers come
back. But we are aggressively pursuing all negotiations with
the shipyard to get to a 4-year multi ship procurement on
amphibious ships.
Senator Wicker. When will you be able to give us a more
firm answer there?
Mr. Del Toro. I hope within the next 30 to 60 days, sir.
Senator Wicker. All right. But can we assume that we're all
working toward a yes answer?
Mr. Del Toro. Absolutely, sir. We have the authorizations,
we have the appropriations, and I just want to move forward
with the final negotiations to get the best price on behalf of
the American taxpayer.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Good morning. Thank you all for being
here, and for your service to the country.
One of those initiatives that I think has been helpful to
expanding capacity are the Supplier Development Funds. They can
flow down to small businesses, which are so critical to the
innovation that we need if we're going to expand in the way
that we want to.
We have an important subcontractor in New Hampshire called
Granite State Manufacturing, who's been able to use those funds
to expand their capacity to support both the Virginia- and
Columbia-class submarines. As the direct result of receiving
this funding, they've also formed a partnership with the local
community college, which has been critical in providing skilled
workers.
So, can you speak, Secretary Del Toro, to the importance of
those submarine supplier development funds and how other small
businesses might be able to take advantage of them?
Mr. Del Toro. Very much so, Senator. They're extremely
important, and our PO SSPN actually is working very, very
closely with industry as we actually obligate the submarine
industrial-based moneys as well with small and medium-sized
companies to ensure that they have stable funding to be able to
sustain themselves. Extremely important, and we're highly
committed to it, and there's no reason to think otherwise.
Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you.
You mentioned along with Admiral Franchetti, the Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Plan, the SIOP, and the Navy's
called that a once in a generation investment. But what we're
seeing in the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, for example, is that
cost overruns have thrown that schedule off.
I wonder if you could speak, maybe Admiral Franchetti, to
your commitment to ensuring that that project stays on time, on
schedule, and how confident you are that that's going to
happen?
I should say, as part of that, how much I appreciate, as
the Chairman said, Senator Wicker's commitment to getting the
$3 billion for the submarine industrial base, that's been
really critical to a project like the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard.
Admiral Franchetti. Well, thank you, and the SIOP program
is incredibly important, as you said, once in a generation. A
100-year-old dry docks. This is really critical for our future,
both to improve the cadence and the throughput on maintenance,
but also to be able to fit our new platforms that we'll be
developing. So again, really thankful for the investment in
this.
I think I'm very committed. You know, Portsmouth is our
first big project that we're doing. I've been up to see it a
few times and they are about 47 percent complete. You know,
they are on track to meet their deadline in August of 2028, and
the really good thing is that they've been able to continue to
do maintenance while doing the optimization, and it's very
exciting.
So not only the dry dock, though, as you know, we're
looking across all four public shipyards to do the optimization
with both layout to increase, again, the efficiency of the yard
as well as in upgrading the industrial equipment.
So, the lessons that we're taking from Portsmouth are
already having a positive impact in Pearl Harbor, and we look
forward to continuing to learn.
Senator Shaheen. Well, the 2023 Inspector General audit on
environmental threats to naval dry docks at the four public
shipyards talked about the vulnerabilities and the need to
address sea levels and flooding. Portsmouth is one of the only
four to have implemented those requirements for resiliency.
But we saw in January in a storm that water levels came
within inches of the top of one of the caissons. So, it's not
clear that those resiliency plans are actually going to be good
long-term. Can you talk about how you're continuing to look at
maturing those climate action plans to address resiliency?
Admiral Franchetti. Resiliency not only of our shipyards,
but of also of all our bases. We're continuing to focus on
that. You know, all of those projects are designed to be
resilient to any sea level rise, as well as seismic, and we're
continuing to work to address those needs as we design the
remainder of the projects as well.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Finally, I just wanted to speak to the comments that you-
all made in the beginning about the Indo-Pacific and the
freedom of the seas. I just returned with Senator Gillibrand
and some other Senators from a trip to the Indo-Pacific.
One of the things we heard in our visits to the
Philippines, to Vietnam, to South Korean, to Japan, was great
concern about the PRC's continued incursion into the South
China Seas and their territorial waters, the importance of
maintaining that freedom of navigation, and their appreciation
for the work that our Navy has done to help them.
So, thank you very much for that. I think that's a very
important mission that we've got to continue to support.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Budd is recognized now.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman, thank you, Ranking
Member, for allowing me to go just a few minutes early, and
thank my colleagues as well as I'll be attending the unveiling
of the new statue of the Reverend Billy Graham. A great North
Carolinian, a great American. So, thank you all for being here.
General Smith, certainly glad to have you back with us for
many, many reasons.
General Smith, this year's Marine Corps' request, it
included significant investments in Cherry Point, North
Carolina. These projects support F-35 aircraft maintenance and
operational readiness. I visited the station in February, and I
was impressed by the great things the marines are doing there,
especially with VMFA-542, the East Coast first operational F-
35B squadron.
So, if I recall correctly, VMFA-542 recently achieved full
operational capability. So how will this capability impact the
Marine Corps' operational flexibility and technological edge?
General Smith. Senator, having a full-up round F-35B
squadron enables us to move to the next level of combat. Those
aircraft are able to collaborate through a classified system in
air to target adversaries. They're able to run at low
signatures, and they're able to penetrate enemy air defenses
like no other aircraft we have.
Senator Budd. Thank you, General.
Secretary Del Toro, thank you again for being here. So as
proud as I am proud of our marines, I have got deep concerns
with the Department of Navy, particularly when I hear about
some unfunded priorities.
So why was the F-35 Flightline Utilities Modernization
Project, why was that on the unfunded priorities list and not
integrated into the 2025 budget?
Mr. Del Toro. Well, sir, as I stated earlier, we've have
been pressurized by the Fiscal Responsibility Act in a
significant way, and we had to prioritize readiness over
modernization and capacity as well too, and also prioritize our
personnel, first and foremost. It led to very difficult
decisions that I otherwise perhaps might not have made if it
wasn't for constrictions. So that's the reason why.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. You know, my
concern is that the taxpayers have invested heavily in
facilities at Cherry Point, but it seems like you were hoping
that we here in Congress would pick up the tab to make sure
that the proper utilities were supported. So deep concerns
there.
General Smith, as you know, the 26 Marine Expeditionary
Unit from Camp Lejeune was extended during their deployment
back in March because of operational needs involving evolving
mission requirements. So how does the Marine Corps balance
maintaining crisis response readiness and at the same time
pursuing force modernization in these types of situations?
General Smith. Senator, it's not easy. Every time we extend
a marine expeditionary unit, we put an additional strain on
those ships, and we get the cycle out of balance. So when we
have a lack of ready shipping then you throw the cycle out of
balance and you get a misshape so to speak.
So it puts a strain on the forces that are forward deployed
because they're extended and it throws out balance the forces
who are home preparing to train because the ships they need to
train with are forward deployed.
Senator Budd. Thank you, General. If I understand
correctly, the 15th MEU was supposed to deploy aboard the USS
Boxer, and that's now unavailable, and the 24th MEU was from
Camp Lejeune is supposed to sail aboard the wasp, but that was
delayed. So what are the status of these amphibs, and do you
have enough ships to support pre-planned deployments and crisis
response? Then, what are the long-term impacts of ship
availability on these deployments?
General Smith. Well, Senator, the CNO and I have locked
shields. 31 is the appropriate number of amphibs. That's 10 big
decks and 21 LPDs, and through the SIOP, the ship optimization
program, we're working to increase the readiness of those
ships.
But again, the CNO and I have locked shields on the
required number, and we're working to get the readiness rates
up so that we can deploy as three ship amphibious-ready groups.
Senator Budd. General, if you would go specifically to the
Wasp and the USS Boxer, what is the status of those?
General Smith. Senator, I'll defer to the CNO on the status
of their maintenance and their readiness.
Admiral Franchetti. So the Wasp is underway doing her
certification exercise, probably be delayed from maybe just a
few days from her original plan deployment. The Boxer has a
material casualty on her rudder, which is being repaired right
now. We expect if the maintenance progresses as it is on track,
to be able to get her out on deployment later this summer.
Senator Budd. Thank you.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd.
Senator King, please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just last Friday, Senator Sullivan and I took a bipartisan
group of our colleagues to the battlefield at Antietam, which
was the deadliest bloodiest day in American history. One of the
units that day that suffered almost 50 percent casualties was
the 7th Maine Regiment led by a fellow named Thomas Hyde.
Thomas Hyde received the congressional Medal of Honor for
his bravery that day, leading basically an unsupported charge
into the Confederate lines. The relevance today is that after
the war, he came back to Maine and founded Bath Iron Works.
Bath Iron Works is the yard that built the Carney and the
Arleigh Burke that are now defending the freedom of navigation
in the Red Sea.
I just think that's a nice circular history right there,
and I can tell you from Senator Sullivan and I point of view,
it was a very moving and important day that we spent at
Antietam last week.
Mr. Secretary, you know what I'm going to ask? Whenever I
hear about what's going on in the Red Sea, I hear about
knocking down Houthi missiles, and my first reaction is, that's
great. Our Navy's doing a great job. My second reaction is, we
just shot down a $100,000 worth of missiles with about $15
million worth of our missiles directed energy. I hope that the
Department can reprioritize, because the entire defense
department has cut directed energy, R&D expenditures by 50
percent, by half over the last 3 years.
I see directed energy as a crucial part of the Navy's
future. Can you commit to me that you'll advocate for renewed
research development and deployment of directed energy weapons
to defend this country across the globe?
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, I took my first laser course at the
Navy Postgraduate School in 1986, and even back then, I thought
that we needed to invest far more significantly in laser and
high directed energy systems.
I regret that we haven't done that for the past 30 years or
so. We need to do that moving forward. There's no question in
my mind to get to a place perhaps 5 to 10 years from now where
we could actually start aggressively employing those
capabilities on our ships. We currently----
Senator King. I hope----
Mr. Del Toro. Go ahead, Senator.
Senator King. I hope it's on the 5-year range and not the
10-year range.
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir.
Senator King. I like it that you say we're going to move
forward. I want it to be urgently because, again, just from the
point of view of economics, shooting down a $20,000 UAV with a
$4 million missile does not--we can't do that very long. Plus,
we're talking about a very potentially powerful weapon in
defense against--as we've learned in recent conflicts, aerial
defense is what it's all about.
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, to the extent that I have
authorities to do so in Palm 26, I will absolutely do so.
Senator King. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, again, the DDX is
the next level of surface combatant. In our 2023 National
Defense Act, we talked about collaboration. That collaboration
is continuing between the shipyards and the Navy.
We can't let that falter because first-in-class ships tend
to be very expensive. One way to avoid that, and what I'm
looking for is, is collaboration still a priority for the Navy
between the Navy and the shipyards in the design and
conceptualization of this new service combat?
Mr. Del Toro. Certainly, Senator. Not only is there a
priority, but we're actually living it right now, and as we
actually had to shift DDGX to the right a bit. Partially
because we want to be able to fully develop the technologies
and the design of that ship so that we get it right.
So, greater collaboration between industry and the
government before we actually go to a full production on a
fully designed ship is absolutely the right answer.
Senator King. I couldn't agree more. Maturity of design is
critical. I'd rather move it to the right and not do the R&D
and design as it's being built. That's what we've learned in
the past.
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir.
Senator King. It does not bode well for the taxpayers or
the defense base. Also, I want to be sure there's a smooth
transition for the DDG Flight III to the DDX. We can't have a
gap, a trough, if you will, because as the Senator from
Mississippi knows, you can't turn off and on a workforce, the
kind of skilled workforce that's necessary to build these
ships. So I hope that that's part of your planning, is a smooth
transition between the two classes of ships.
Mr. Del Toro. Absolutely, Senator. If I'm afforded the
opportunity to be here another 4 years, I'd be more than happy
to do that. We have to ensure that whether it's me or another
secretary, that DDG Flight III actually overlaps with DDGX, so
that we don't repeat the mistakes of the past. We'd done that
years ago, for example, with regards between Columbia and Ohio.
We wouldn't be facing the gap that we currently have or may
have in the future.
Senator King. Final point, in 4 seconds. We've talked a lot
about shipbuilding. We need to focus and talk about maintenance
and improving the throughput of our maintenance facilities,
because ships that are sitting at the dock for a year or more
are not serving the taxpayers or the defense of the country.
So, I hope that can be something that we could discuss
further, perhaps take for the record.
Mr. Del Toro. Well, Senator, we're doing more than just
talking about it. From 2019 to the present, actually we reduced
maintenance delays on surface ships by 56 percent. That is a
significant, achievable milestone that we simply just don't
amplify, but we are making tremendous progress in terms of the
maintenance delays on our ships.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Smith, it's good to have you back with us in good
health, and I thank the rest of our witnesses for their service
and also for being here today.
However, I do share the concerns of many of my colleagues
about the Navy's performance across the board, and whether it's
adhering to the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA. Last year after months
of hearings and briefings on known capability gaps in our
nuclear deterrence, this Committee determined that SLCM-N was
the best option to fill this capability gap.
In the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA, Congress on a bipartisan and
a bicameral basis, formally established a program of record for
SLCM-N and appropriated significant funding to NNSA to develop
the warhead and to the Navy to develop the missile itself.
Admiral, during your nomination hearing last September, you
testified before this Committee that the Nuclear Armed Sea-
Launched Cruise Missile is, ``a tailored option that the
President should have.'' Do you still agree with this
statement?
Admiral Franchetti. Yes, I do.
Senator Fischer. Mr. Secretary and Admiral, I am deeply
concerned that the Navy did not request any funding for SLCM-N
in their base budget or in the Navy's unfunded priorities list
letter. This is a stark contrast to NNSA, which did include a
robust funding request for development of the SLCM-N, the
warhead, in their unfunded priorities list.
Although the production decision remains years away, let me
be clear, we expect the Navy to take all actions necessary to
develop this missile so that if a decision is made to move to
production, we can do so without delay. I expect to see this
program included in your base budgets moving forward.
For the first time since World War II, to shift gears here,
we have Navy ships continuously operating inside the weapon
engagement zone of enemy forces on a near daily basis. We're
expending significant, highly capable and expensive munitions
to defend against low-cost missiles and drones.
Mr. Secretary, we just heard concerns from Senator King,
and those concerns come from others as well, that we need to be
investing more in directed energy so that we can get on the
better side when it comes to the cost per shot curve.
But I am also concerned about our ability to reconstitute
the missiles that we're expending right now. So, Mr. Secretary,
how's the Navy reconsidering its industrial-based strategy to
account for higher-than-expected levels of munition and/or
weapon attrition?
Mr. Del Toro. Well, first and foremost, Senator, thank you
for your support of our Navy and Marine Corps. I know how
deeply passionate you are around these issues.
We just in the Red Sea, over the course of the last 6\1/2\
months, have expended close to $1 billion in missiles, and
thank you for the authorities that you provided us in 2024, for
example, for multi-year procurements for missile systems.
We actually are starting to make progress now working with
the industrial base, both the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment and myself, have been working with
industry. Those production rates are actually starting to come
up now so that we actually will see some increases in SM-2 and
SM-6 productions.
Obviously, the more sophisticated the missile, the harder
it is to produce them, but nevertheless, we are starting to see
some progress being made in the production base.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you. Also Mr. Secretary, I
understand that the next rim of the Pacific exercise, it's
scheduled for later this year, and that gives the Navy and the
Marine Corps an opportunity to demonstrate their maritime
combat capabilities. This is one of the many exercises that we
have with our global counterparts.
How's the Department of the Navy investing in these
exercises to prepare for a potential power competition in the
Pacific?
Mr. Del Toro. Exceptionally well, Senator. To give you just
two examples, the investments that we've made in Operation
Overmatch, and perhaps, you know, just talk a little bit,
although that is classified program, but will be exercised
during REPAC 24, basically. We've also increased our
collaboration with allies and partners for REPAC 24, which is
very, very exciting.
On the autonomous side of the house, the unmanned Navy side
of the house, we're actually looking to actually employ all for
overlord projects as well, too, in an incredible way. So we're
very excited about REPAC 24.
Senator Fischer. Thank, General.
How's the MRF-Darwin integrating with the Australian
Defense Forces
General Smith. Senator, the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin
are down there during the dry season. They're integrating very
well. They're exercising with them. They're in position to
forward deploy from the southern end of the first island chain
to secure those routes and to defend against the PRC's
aggression. So, they're doing very well.
It's a well-done program. It involves our CH-53s, and it
involves an infantry battalion worth of marines. It's task-
organized to distribute through the first island chain.
Senator Fischer. Good. A few years ago, I led a CODEL when
they were getting the containers ready for the first marines
that were going to be deployed there. So, good to hear. Thank
you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Warren, please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So, the Navy acquires everything from night vision goggles
to aircraft carriers through contracts with big defense
contractors. But the contractors often place restrictions on
these deals that prevent servicemembers from maintaining or
repairing the equipment. Won't even let them write a training
manual without going back through the contractor.
Now, the contractors say that since they own the
intellectual property and the technical data underlying the
equipment, only they have the right to repair that equipment.
These right-to-repair restrictions usually translate into much
higher costs for DOD, which has no choice but to shovel money
out to big contractors whenever DOD needs to have something
fixed.
So, take the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship. General Dynamics,
and Lockheed Martin considered much of the data and equipment
on the ship to be proprietary. So the Navy had to delay
missions and spend millions of dollars on travel costs just so
that contractor-affiliated repairman could fly in rather than
doing this ourselves.
Secretary Del Toro, when a sailor isn't allowed to repair
part of their ship at sea, and a marine isn't allowed to access
technical data to fix a generator on a base abroad, one
solution is for the Navy to buy the intellectual property from
the contractors. So, can you say a little bit about what the
benefits are of the Navy having technical rights for the
equipment that it is purchased?
Mr. Del Toro. The benefits are enormous, Senator, and we've
actually had tremendous success, I'd say, in the last year and
a half to 2 years through the Taxpayer Advocacy Program that we
initiated when I came in.
There have been three examples. One, gaining the
intellectual property rights for the new CV class of ships that
will replace the AAVs. The F-35 negotiations really proved
themselves out in a significant way as well, too, and last, the
20 F-18 ENFS that the Congress authorized in 2022 and 2023. We
were able to make significant gains in terms of the government
finally getting the intellectual property rights that were
necessary for us to be able to properly sustain those moving
forward.
Senator Warren. I am very, very glad to hear this. I like
the Taxpayer Advocacy Project and how you're training contract
officers to secure technical equipment that the Navy buys, but
I think you should have the support of Congress on this.
Senator Braun and I have introduced the Stop Price Gouging
the Military Act to give DOD more tools to get cost and pricing
data so that you'll be in a better position to negotiate better
deals with the contractors.
There's also more that we can do to ensure that the Navy
and the rest of the services have the rights they need to
bolster readiness. So let me ask you, Secretary Del Toro, would
having a stronger focus on right-to-repair issues during the
acquisition process, like prioritizing contract bids that give
DOD fair access to repair materials and ensuring that contract
officers are looking into buying technical rights early on,
would that help the Navy save costs and boost readiness at the
same time?
Mr. Del Toro. Very much so, Senator. In fact, one of the
things that we have prioritized since I came in as Secretary of
the Navy, given my acquisition background, is actually those
negotiations need to happen as early as possible even as we
developed the acquisition strategy for that contract to go out
to bid.
By doing so, we will reap tremendous returns, and in the
case of the LCS, Senator--by the way, and I applaud former CNO
Mike Gilday, now our current CNO Lisa Franchetti, for actually
moving the LCS maintenance strategy from a contractor service-
focused strategy to a sailor-focused strategy.
Senator Warren. Well, I very much appreciate the direction
you're going in this. I want Congress to be able to help you on
this. Ensuring that our servicemembers' equipment works
shouldn't depend on whatever price some contractor wants to set
after the fact. DOD should be able to follow your lead and
secure the rights to repair in all of its equipment early on.
So, thank you very much.
Mr. Del Toro. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all
of you for testifying in front of the Committee today.
I'm proud to have served for over 23 years in our Nation's
uniform, and I was first inspired actually by Ukrainians, and
these are the Ukrainians that I met on an agricultural exchange
program in 1989. Then under Soviet control, my Ukrainian
brothers and sisters asked me about what it was like to be free
and what it was like to be an American.
Those moments outside of the comfort of my rural Iowa
upbringing, my Iowa home, inspired me to give back to the
country that I love. I came back from that exchange, and I
joined Army ROTC at Iowa State University where my patriotism
was solidified. I'm grateful that my daughter and her husband
have followed in those footsteps, and both are proudly now
serving in the United States Army.
But today, folks, young people are not being inspired to
serve. Frankly, the perks of service are tarnished when an
Administration attempts to cancel everyone's student loans.
Others have witnessed and quite possibly been influenced by the
anti-American rhetoric they see and hear from the left, both on
campus and online.
Further, students who were kept out of the classrooms by
COVID lockdowns are still reeling from the consequences. We
have seen this by the lowering of ASVAB scores by as much as 9
percent. Currently, only 23 percent of 17-to 24-year-olds are
fully qualified to serve. Our military is facing a dire
recruiting crisis, and our service branches must address it.
So, Secretary, I will start with you, and let's focus on
this recruiting challenge. This year, the Navy is on track to
be short, roughly 16,000 sailors. Just a few years back in
November 2022, the Navy raised its maximum enlistment age to 41
years old. Now, I would consider that young, but that's a
little old for an initial enlistment. What is the Navy doing
right now to remedy these challenges and increase recruitment?
How do we overcome this?
Mr. Del Toro. Well, first and foremost, Senator, thank you
for the comments that you made with regards to Ukraine. Someone
who was born in a communist country myself, and lost my
Homeland to communists and autocrats, I cannot thank you enough
for your support.
With regards to recruiting, it does remain challenging for
many of the reasons that you mentioned, and it is all hands on
deck. But I want to be clear, we're not going to be 16,000
sailors short. We may be somewhere less than 6,200, and I think
it's going to be far less than that, in fact.
But we actually decided to actually raise our goal to
recruit more sailors this year unlike the other services. So we
set the goal at 40,600 because of the shortfalls that we will
have at sea. So therefore, it's all hands on deck. Perhaps the
CNO can comment briefly on the multiple steps that are being
taken to actually close that gap.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you. I'm going to go back to the
comments I made about education, because historically,
education benefits have produced more of our high quality
recruits, and there was a study that found the number of high
quality recruits increased after the passage of the Post 9/11
GI Bill.
Do you believe that extending similar benefits to that of
the GI Bill for non-serving individuals through the
Administration's so-called Student Debt Cancellation Plan has
impacted recruitment efforts and undermine the fundamental
principles of military service.
Mr. Del Toro. Ma'am, I'm focused on recruiting, you know,
recruits into the Navy and the Marine Corps. One of the--when
you talk to our recruiters, the biggest challenge that they
sometimes have is actually getting access to the high schools
themselves. So we're working very closely with the Department
of Education and with supervisors from across the Nation to try
to break down those barriers that our recruiters can actually
get access to the high schools.
Currently, they're being allowed two times a year. We want
to increase that to about four times a year. I've written over
thousands of letters to high school principals, in fact,
allowing our recruiters back in. That's the number one
challenge that our recruiters have in terms of getting to the
high school students themselves.
Senator Ernst. I am really glad you brought that up,
Secretary, because last year I did have an effort to force high
schools to allow recruiters into those high schools. It is law
that they be admitted into those high schools. 5 percent of our
high schools across this great United States of America don't
allow recruiters on their campuses. So we'll continue pushing
that effort for you, Secretary.
I'm going to double back because I will tell you that I've
had so many of my former soldiers come to me and say, I served
multiple deployments overseas for GI Bill benefits, for those
education benefits, and now others are getting them for not
serving.
I think it's absolutely unfair what is going on across the
United States today. I think we are wiping away the benefits
that we have promised to those that have stepped up and worn
the flag of these great United States. We have to do better,
and we need to reward those that serve.
I think part of our recruiting challenge is that we don't
reward those that serve enough, or we give their benefits to
others that don't deserve them. So, thank you all very much for
testifying today.
Chairman Tester. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Del Toro, I'll talk in a little bit more detail
about the Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, or SLCM-N.
I want to make sure that we're clear on the direction of the
system and understand the opportunity costs that may come with
fielding it.
You know, I get that there is an arms control rationale
here. That there is a possibly we could provide Russia with an
incentive to both reverse development of, you know, a new land-
based cruise missile that's nuclear armed. This could be part
of a negotiation, you know, I get that part of it. You know, at
the same time, my understanding is we're developing the W76-2
low yield SLBM warhead that could fill the same need for a low-
yield weapon.
My concern though is that fielding the SLCM-N would likely
necessitate removing some conventional munitions from our
submarines. I'm especially concerned about the Virginia-class
submarines and possibly having to sacrifice torpedoes for
cruise missiles.
You and I were aboard USS Indiana and we spent some time in
the torpedo room, and, the modification of weapon systems
aboard a ship is significant. There would have to be changes in
the safety system, security, storage, launch, communications,
command and control for nuclear weapons secure comms
authorization protocols.
So, Mr. Secretary, I know you've previously voiced concern
over development of a nuclear armed sea launched cruise
missile. Does the Navy currently have plans for how we would
integrate SLCM-N into a Virginia-class submarine? Have we
considered that, if we were to do this, we're likely going to
replace weapons that we would need and we are more likely to
use in a conflict with China?
I mean, when you consider the number of ships we're dealing
with and the number of torpedoes that we would need, we would
have to replace those torpedoes with nuclear-armed sea-launched
cruise missiles a board of subs. So, I just want to get your
take on where we're going with this plan.
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir. Well, I think you hit the nail on
the head, Senator, and to be clear, we are moving forward with
standing up the program management office as required by the
law.
But having said that, I'm concerned about how it will
operationally impact our submarine force and their ability
actually to conduct the tactical and operations that they
actually need to do in the Pacific and elsewhere around the
world.
That actually will prevent us, perhaps from doing the
things that we need to do tactically and operationally by
providing this SLCM-N capability to the submarine. It will
fundamentally change the mission of many of those submarines
themselves.
The second issue that I'm very concerned about is the
opportunity cost here associated with the cost of the missiles
themselves. This will be a multi-billion-dollar program that
will prevent us from doing other things that are equally
important, I think, throughout our naval enterprise.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you. The probability of us in
the future using a torpedo against a warship is much higher
than the probability of using a nuclear launch cruise missile
against a target. So, thank you.
In my remaining time, Secretary Del Toro, you've talked
about the need for a renaissance in American shipbuilding. You
mentioned a little bit as I was walking in the door here. I
think you labeled it maritime statecraft. I agree with that
wholeheartedly.
Right now, China, Republic of Korea, Japan, they build
about 98 percent of global ship construction. China's the
world's largest ship builder, controls most of the merchant
ships in the world, 5,500. We have about 80 or 85, I think,
merchant ships flying the U.S. flag.
I'm concerned with the size and the status of the U.S.
Merchant Marine and how it's a risk to our national security.
As you know, insufficient commercial maritime capacity impacts
peacetime trade and supply chains, but also has a great impact
on our ability to move things we need to move if we're engaging
in combat somewhere across the globe.
This isn't a capability that can be turned on overnight, as
you know. We need to invest in this now, so we're ready in the
future. That's why last week I released a bipartisan bicameral
report with Congressman Waltz, and Garamendi, and Senator Rubio
called the congressional Guidance for a National Maritime
Strategy.
Our report provides a comprehensive vision to revitalize
the Nation's maritime sector, and now we're working to turn the
recommendations from the report into legislation. I don't want
to go over my time, but I'm going to submit some questions for
the record to you on this subject.
Mr. Del Toro. I've read the recommendations and agree with
all 10 of them.
Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you.
Thank you, Senator Kelly.
Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank the witnesses today. General Smith, it's good to see you
back, sir. We're all really glad you're back.
By the way, little discussion on 31 Amphibs, what you're
talking about. Remember we directed that, so the debate is
over, right? That's a congressional direction. So, I think it's
important.
One of the themes from this hearing is the shipbuilding
crisis that we are facing. I met with the CRS experts,
Congressional Research Service experts, best in government.
Some have been doing this for decades. This was a quote from
them. ``This is the worst position the Navy has been in over
the past 40 years for designing, building, maintaining, and
crewing ships.''
That's what the Congressional Resource Service experts
said. Senator Wicker already said, this is acquisition
malpractice. The Chairman said it's in disarray. I want to get
more to the issue of who's responsible and what should be done
to fix it.
But let me begin, General Smith, would you agree that as a
leader in the Marine Corps, no matter what level you're serving
at, accountability and responsibility is critical component of
leadership?
General Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. So, if a marine platoon commander has a
marine who loses his rifle on an exercise, what typically
happens to that marine platoon commander?
General Smith. That platoon commander would be relieved.
Senator Sullivan. That's not a hypothetical issue. In 2020,
a battalion commander and a sergeant major were relieved after
two rifles went missing on a training exercise in Camp Lejeune.
Admiral Franchetti, paragraph 0802 of the Naval Regulations
titled ``Responsibility of a Commanding Officer'' says that the
responsibility of the commanding officer, his or her command,
is absolute. What happens in the Navy if a captain of a war
ship is asleep in her cabin and an officer standing watch
collides with another ship?
General Smith. Historically, they've been relieved of
command.
Senator Sullivan. So that's also not hypothetical. Since
2012, the CO of the USS Porter, USS Jacksonville, USS Antietam,
USS John McCain, USS Fitzgerald, USS Connecticut have all been
relieved. Mr. Secretary, Congress under title 10, has given you
the direction to, among other things, oversee the construction
of outfitting and repairing of naval ships in an effective and
timely manner.
One thing that I think hasn't been brought up here as my
assessment, respectfully, of your tenure is you haven't been
focused on that. One of the things you've actually been focused
on a lot on is climate change; where in your nomination
hearing, you devoted a full paragraph on climate change. You
never mentioned shipbuilding lethality or war fighting.
In your strategic guidance you issued to your Department,
you mentioned climate change nine times. You don't address
trying to increase the fleet. You got to this Committee, your
climate action plan, a year before your ship building plan. Can
you point to your title 10 responsibilities for climate change,
Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, I spend 75 percent of my time on
shipbuilding, so I don't agree with your characterization.
Senator Sullivan. Can you answer my question? Where's your
title 10 responsibilities on climate change?
Mr. Del Toro. On climate change, it actually impacts
everything. Senator, it impacts----
Senator Sullivan. Where are your title 10 responsibilities
that we gave you----
Mr. Del Toro. Manning equipment, training, sustaining----
Senator Sullivan. They don't exist.
Mr. Del Toro. No, they do exist. Senator, I disagree with--
--
Senator Sullivan. No, I'm looking at title 10 right now.
Mr. Del Toro. I'm telling you that climate change and the
impact that it has on installation-readiness actually has an
effect on readiness.
Chairman Reed. Senator Sullivan, let the witness answer the
question.
Senator Sullivan. I'm actually trying to ask questions.
Mr. Del Toro. Well, to suggest that climate change does not
have an impact on climate readiness and installation-readiness
is just not----
Chairman Reed. I would ask the Senator.
Senator Sullivan. I'm asking for a little more time here.
Chairman Reed. Actually, Senator, you usually have a little
more time. First ask the question----
Senator Sullivan. Let me answer the question----
Chairman Reed.--and allow the secretary to answer.
Senator Sullivan. No, I'm going to answer it for him. It's
not in title 10. There's nothing on climate change in title 10.
The shipbuilding crisis that we have right now is not just a
fiasco. It's amplified by this. Our main adversary, it was
building ships at the rapid rate in 2021. The PLA had 341
ships. This year, they have 370. In 2025, they will have 395.
By 2030, they will have 435 ships, 141 more ships than we have.
Our fleet, as we've discussed, is shrinking.
So, Mr. Secretary, I'm going to ask this final question.
Marines and sailors that you lead have a strong culture of
responsibility and accountability. In light of that, I feel
compelled to ask.
If a marine platoon commander gets relieved because one of
his marines loses a rifle, in the Navy, captain gets relieved
because his crew hits another ship while the captain is asleep.
Should the Secretary of the Navy be relieved or resign for
failing on his number one mission shipbuilding, particularly
when he's spending so much time on issues that are not even
part of his title 10 responsibility?
Mr. Del Toro. Actually, a good leader, what they do is they
actually take assessment of the conditions that exist when one
comes in, and, you know, well, Senator, that the acquisition
issues that we're dealing with go back decades. What I'm trying
to do and have been doing from the day that I became secretary
was to be honest, transparent, and deeply committed to turning
things around. That's exactly what I've done.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question.
Chairman Reed. No. I must say, Senator Sullivan, your time
has expired.
Senator Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
To Secretary Del Toro, and Admiral Franchetti, I want to
begin with a question that goes back a ways, and that is the
mental health of our sailors. Secretary Del Toro, I thank you
for accompanying me in the Hampton Roads area. In the last
couple years, we've had some serious issues with suicides among
our sailors.
We had two different units in Hampton Roads, very different
circumstances, but there were some commonalities. One folks who
were connected with the refueling of the George Washington,
which was in dock for a very long time.
Second, the Mid-Atlantic Regional Maintenance Center, two-
thirds of whose personnel are sailors assigned to that billet,
but one third of whose personnel were sailors in the fleet who
became assigned to the billet on a limited duty status because
they were pregnant, because they had a physical injury, because
they had a mental health issue, because they had a disciplinary
challenge in the fleet.
The suicides that happened at the Mid-Atlantic Regional
Maintenance Center were all among the limited duty staff who
were there for kind of an unknown period. They weren't, unless
it was for pregnancy, didn't know when or if they would be
returning to the fleet, and they didn't know when they would
know the answer to that question.
Folks on the George Washington had trained as a surface
officer, and then they end up in a long-term status where the
ship's in dock and they're not really doing the thing for which
they trained.
So in each instance, this grouping of suicides, and each
one was different of course, but the grouping of suicides
happened among people who were probably experiencing a little
bit of lack of purpose or confusion about their status. This
Committee has passed bills like the Brandon Act, and in other
ways tried to encourage more focus on mental health issues.
Can you give us the Committee a progress report on
implementation of the Brandon Act? The Navy was first to move
out on it, but also just more generally what you're trying to
do to make sure that people feel that sense of purpose, and
that their colleagues don't miss obvious signs that they need
help.
Mr. Del Toro. Well, thank you, Senator. Thanks for your
commitment to this cause, and it's a very important cause, the
mental health of our servicemembers, Marine Corps and the Navy.
First, it starts with treating people with dignity and
respect across the board, specifically in regards to the
limited duty status delays that existed. I would argue a year
ago or so, the CNO and the Commandant actually worked hard at
trying to limit the amount of time that personnel have to
actually spend in a limited duty status.
But we've done a long list of other investments thanks to
the lessons that we actually learned about sailors working in
shipyards, and particularly the George Washington, that have
led to tremendous improvements and perhaps the CNO can comment
on a few of those.
Admiral Franchetti. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and, you
know, mental health is health. We're really focused on all of
our sailors and being able to contribute to the best of their
ability every day to get after that war fighting spirit, and be
able to do the job that they came into the Navy to do.
You know, after that, we stood up at the direction of the
secretary, quality of service, cross-functional team to really
dive into a lot of the challenges that were experienced by the
sailors there in the Hampton Roads area, and we're continuing
to make good progress on those.
In terms of mental health, specifically, though, we put out
a mental health playbook. It's a really one stop shopping first
for sailors of every level of leadership to be able to provide
all the different resources available to someone to be able to
connect them, whether it's a chaplain, whether it's mental
health, whether it's military family life counselors, to really
no wrong door of folks being able to get assistance that they
need.
The other one is that we found, you know, to reduce the
stigma of potentially seeking assistance is to put the
assistance closer. So we have a lot, 43 percent of our mental
health and behavioral health techs are with our operating
forces right now.
But a couple of the things that we've done already are
establishing a coordinator at each command to be able to really
coordinate what each one of those people are doing. Then, we're
looking at what is the limited duty condition and what can they
actually do to give them meaningful jobs, meaningful work, and
that sense of purpose. That's helpful until that is remedied.
The other last one is on, you know, looking very closely at
our shipyard manning for extended overhaul periods to make sure
that a sailor doesn't do their entire first tour enlistment in
a 5-year overhaul. That they actually have an opportunity to go
and do what they came in the Navy to do. Those are just a
couple of examples.
Senator Kaine. One last question very quickly. The
industrial base is currently producing Virginia-class subs at
1.3 a year. We need to be two a year for our sake, and 2.3 a
year to meet our commitments to AUKUS. Based on the current
investment levels of ours and the Australian investment, when
will we hit two a year and when will we hit 2.3 a year?
Mr. Del Toro. Well, Senator, I'm proud to report that in
the immediate, actually, we're at one point--just slightly less
than 1.4 now, so the investments that we have made in the
shipbuilding industry and the submarine industrial base, for
example, are starting to finally pay off.
Keep in mind as well, too, the continuing resolution of 6
months delay prevented us from making those investments until
just recently as well. So, I'm hopeful that by 2028, 2029
period, hopefully, we'll be able to get back up to the 2.0,
2.33 production rate that's necessary to be able to support
AUKUS and support our submarine base as well, too.
Senator Kaine. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Kramer, please.
Senator Kramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all
of you for your service, and for being here.
I want to followup a little bit on the discussion, Mr.
Secretary, with Senator Sullivan. Would you admit that you have
said climate change is very high priority for you, whether it's
75 percent, or 25 percent, or 2 percent?
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, I will tell you exactly what I said.
That climate change is a top priority. I think anybody who
denies that climate is having an impact on our environment and
our operational readiness is just insane.
Senator Kramer. You've said it plenty already. So your
rationale for focusing on climate change is that climate change
is in everything, therefore you can focus on anything and
everything and justify----
Mr. Del Toro. But I don't.
Senator Kramer.--on climate change.
Mr. Del Toro. I don't. I'm focused actually on climate rise
along our sea bases and our Marine Corps bases.
Senator Kramer. Ah, different topic. That's an outcome
perhaps, but that's not a cause, and I think the tendency is
you focus on climate as though we're the cause of it or the
Navy is the cause of it, as opposed to how you defend against
it.
But here's what I want to get to. You rationalize focusing
on climate change because it's in everything and anything, and
therefore whatever you want to focus on, it all comes back to
climate change, and the message matters, Mr. Secretary. The
message matters.
Let me ask each of you this question. Other than climate
change, what is our most significant threat to the United
States, and to our freedom, and to our liberties, and let's
just keep it to nation states. What would those priorities--who
would those priorities be?
Mr. Del Toro. You'd like I start first?
Senator Kramer. Sure.
Mr. Del Toro. Sure. Look, the main threat, again, with
regards to climate change is installation-readiness and our
ability to actually be able to deploy our ships from the ports
that we still rely upon, and to train our marines, and bases
that are along the coast that we rely upon.
Senator Kramer. So do you think that China's going to wait
for us to fix all of that before they----
Mr. Del Toro. No.
Senator Kramer.--say, make a move?
Mr. Del Toro. Nor is it interfering with the things that
we're doing, actually, to deter China around the world as well.
Senator Kramer. How much do you think China worries about
climate change? How much does the China Navy worry about
climate?
Mr. Del Toro. Obviously, they don't worry about it a lot
because they're the biggest contributor in the world to climate
problems, right? So, if----
Senator Kramer. Yes.
Mr. Del Toro.--they don't care about their environment,
they don't care about the people. Those aren't the cultures and
values that our military actually commits themselves.
Senator Kramer. So while our military is sitting around,
you know, being focused on climate change and the Chinese
military is not, somehow we win because we've got more hydro?
Mr. Del Toro. No. We're focused on building very capable
ships. 57 of them. They have the best capabilities in the world
to deploy against the Chinese, in addition to all the things
that I can't talk about here that I'd be happy to talk about in
a closed session, which are the SAP Programs like Operation
Overmatch and everything else.
For the past six and a half months, our Navy and Marine
Corps has proved to the world how capable we are. We are the
very best, but that also includes worrying in the future about
the impact that climate has on our installation-readiness.
Senator Kramer. Well, when I look at this chart that
Senator Sullivan put up, I see a really big problem that's not
being addressed, nearly as enthusiastically as climate change,
is with the Navy.
Let me go to something that I think maybe you can all
answer for me. I've been focusing a lot with the various
services and asking them about, okay, we have a flat budget,
it's a cut. When you consider inflation, you are all trained to
say or required to say, well, it still meets the National
Defense Strategy. It allows us to increase capacity and, and
you pretend like it's all going to be okay, and I get it. You
have to. I got it. You've got a boss in the White House that
wants you to say those things. But could you tell me in what
areas do you think this flat budget presents the greatest risk,
the most risk?
Senator Kramer. Again, it's plenty.
Mr. Del Toro. Sure.
Senator Kramer. According to you-all, what areas are most
at risk because of this?
Mr. Del Toro. I think that given the difficult decision--
and I also like to, you know, point out that, you know, we just
didn't come to the Fiscal Responsibility Act.
Senator Kramer. I understand that.
Mr. Del Toro. It was members----
Senator Kramer. I'm not blaming----
Mr. Del Toro.--of Congress who actually were negotiating
the debt limit ceiling----
Senator Kramer. I not blaming----
Mr. Del Toro.--that led to the Fiscal Responsibility Act
that caps our funding.
Senator Kramer. I agree.
Mr. Del Toro. I can't spend. I have to follow the law.
Senator Kramer. I'm not blaming you. I'm asking you what
areas are the most at risk as a result.
Mr. Del Toro. Three areas, installation-readiness, the Air
Wing of the Future, and--well, those are the two primary ones.
Installation-readiness and the Air Wing of the Future, and just
MilCon in general.
Senator Kramer. Admiral Franchetti?
Admiral Franchetti. So, as I said, our budget focused on
current readiness people and we've taken risk in the future. So
Air Wing of the Future, SSNX, DDGX, CVNs, and a lot of our
money is going into SIOP. From a MilCon perspective right now,
60 percent.
Senator Kramer. General Smith?
General Smith. Senator, Barracks 2030 initiative is most at
risk, and that's a quality-of-life issue because the main thing
is the marines. Without the marines, the equipment is
irrelevant.
Senator Kramer. So if those of us on this dais and within
the chambers, and frankly in the other chamber, we're to try to
provide more than the FRA--which the FRA number was a mistake.
I wish we didn't have to deal with it, and we don't--if we
change the law, we're in the changing the law business, would
we reduce risk if we provided you with a lot more?
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, Senator, you would.
Senator Kramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kramer.
Senator Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed. I'd also
like to thank Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Franchetti, and
General Smith. Appreciate you being here testifying today.
I'm going to focus a little bit mostly on Nevada and Fallon
Naval Air Station. We're starting to implement Fallon
Modernization. So, Secretary Del Toro, you know, Nevada, we are
so proud to host Naval Air Station Fallon, home to Top Gun.
This our Nation's premier air carrier wing, and our SEAL
training centers.
Again, I want to offer you and your staff my personal
gratitude for working with me and the Nevada delegation on a
consensus proposal to modernize the Fallon Range Training
complex, which was included in the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA, as
you know, offer authorizing FRTC Modernization.
It was no small feat, and it was the result of input from
the Navy, the Department of Interior, Tribal Governments from
Nevada, local governments, and so many stakeholders. It was a
compromise that the Nevada delegation will continue to provide
support to so that we can ensure the proper implementation.
So, as you know, the Navy's currently working with other
Federal agencies and my constituents to meet the requirement of
making full payment to impacted grazing permit holders. We got
a lot of ranchers there.
So as the Navy goes through the process of appraising the
loss of these permits, it's critical that my ranching community
and Nevada stakeholders to really adequately be compensated.
So, this is going to include the loss of their impacted
ranching operation, improvements made to include water access,
and FSA loans that they might have associated with their
allotment.
So, I raise this because I've heard concerns from ranchers
in Nevada, Northern Nevada, the Navy isn't--they're not
considering all of the variables when it comes to payouts of
their grazing allotments.
So, Secretary Del Toro, can I get your commitment that the
Navy will ensure that all grazing permittees impacted by
implementation of FRTC Modernization are fairly compensated?
Mr. Del Toro. You have my commitment, Senator. It's my
understanding we've been working very, very closely with the
ranchers. I can't guarantee that every single one of them is
going to be satisfied with the negotiations, but we are
engaging with them very transparently and very seriously to
compensate them for all the reasons that you just mentioned.
I also want to thank you personally for your leadership.
Actually, the expansion of Fallon is critically important to
our current and future war fighters. By expanding that range,
we could expand the training associated with the F-35
associated with the advanced missiles that we've been focused
on as well.
That's what I've been focused on actually for a long, long
time now, and I thank you for your efforts to make this a
reality.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. We'll continue to work with
you, and I also am going to ask if you'll commit to briefing my
staff on the amount of funding you have today, and what----
Mr. Del Toro. Yes ma'am.
Senator Rosen.--you believe you'll need in fiscal year 2025
and beyond to meet some of these commitments, specifically as
it relates to Fallon. So, thank you for that.
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Rosen. I'm going to talk about housing. We've
talked about military housing. Fallon, again, a major asset,
provides a range space needed to ensure the fleet's deployable
and operationally ready. The base has been designated a remote
duty installation since 1989, and of course, the quality of
life challenges that accompany that.
So, we're the only Navy base naval, Air Station Fallon, in
the continental United States designated in a critical housing
area with housing in very short supply. So the vast majority of
those stationed at Fallon live in Reno or Carson City, which
are both at least an hour away.
So I understand the Navy anticipates entering into some
public-private ventures to build about 172 new homes in Fallon,
but we need a lot more infrastructure required to support them,
such as expanding existing wastewater treatment plants.
So, given the long distances sailors have to travel between
their home and Fallon's designation as a critical housing area,
remote duty installation, are you considering providing some
stipend or as assignment incentive pay to help alleviate the
costs? We also have to attract that civilian workforce you
need.
So, could you speak to those issues?
Mr. Del Toro. So, the challenges in Fallon have been
significant, and we're well aware of them. I so wish that we
actually, given the Fiscal Responsibility Act, had more
resources to devote to housing and everything else. We are
investing in 2025 a lot NFSRM to try to improve the existing
housing as much as we can.
We hope to make greater investments in MilCon in 2026 and
2027, but we are deeply focused on this, and we will look at
this specifically to see if there's anything that we can do to
alleviate the conditions in Fallon.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.
Thanks for being here.
General Smith, I was able to recently meet with some
marines that came from the Indo-Pacific. Great people. Let me
tell you, they're exactly what we need in our military. You
know, what resources can Congress assist with to better support
our mission in the Indo-Pacific?
General Smith. Senator, thanks for that question, and
thanks for the praise of our marines. I share it. My own son is
a marine although, you know, he's, he's still, he's still on
the on the----
Mr. Del Toro. Got a media recruiting call, right?
General Smith. He's got to meet his recruiting goals. He's
still on probation. What I would say, sir, is we need
predictable, steady funding for our amphibious warfare ships.
We need LHAs on 4-year centers and LPDs on 2-year centers,
because that provides us the operational flexibility and
mobility that's required to counter the PRC.
Senator Tuberville. I know you've kept an eye on the Middle
East, and we have seen unmanned drones, small unmanned drones.
Talk about what we've learned and what we can take from there
to the Indo-Pacific in this next in incursion.
General Smith. Yes, sir. What we've learned is that
directed energy weapons are going to be a thing of the future
because we can't get into a reverse cost curve where we're
expending, you know, million-dollar missiles to shoot down $100
drones. We've got to invest in the technology and the
capability to disable drones in flight, to disable their
targeting infrastructure, and to knock them down without
shooting a missile at them.
Because that's, again, putting us on the wrong side of the
cost curve, and we're working on that now at the Marine Corps
War Fighting Lab.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. I think Senator King would agree
with you on that. We've talked about it quite often.
Secretary of Del Toro, the Navy recent released their 45-
day ship building review last month, and there are significant
delays. The Columbia-class are now 12 to 16 months late.
We make components in Mobile for the Columbia-class, and we
hear a lot about studying this and doing a report on that. You
know, we need results, obviously, and I know you're on top
that. What are we doing to fix this?
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir. Well, just as one example, Senator,
and I know your commitment and passion for this. You know, down
in Austal, for example, the Navy actually worked very closely
with Austal over the last couple years to turn it into a steel
production facility. I have been encouraging the big primes
over the last two and a half years that I've been secretary,
aggressively, to actually outsource more of their work hours to
companies like Austal and the smaller shipyards so they can
help with production.
So, in 2023 alone, we had 3 million additional hours of
outsourcing that's taken place. We hope to increase that in
2024, hopefully to 6 million. It's the smaller shipyards that
actually help as part of the team to then increase the
production rates.
So that, along with all the other investments, the $14
billion over the fit up, basically, I think, we're going to see
production rates continue to grow in the future because of
those efforts.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, and we're also running into a
problem. You know, we budget it, we appropriate it, but we're
having a tough time allocating money for some reason.
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir.
Senator Tuberville. We're running in a stonewall of people
not doing their job, to be honest with you, and you know, if we
can't get the money allocated, we can't build anything. We
can't pay people for working. We're having a tough time now
getting people to work and people that are trained to work, and
it's getting worse and worse. It is not getting better. You
have obviously been addressing that.
Mr. Del Toro. No, sir, and I agree with you, and you know,
with the continuing resolution, we can't allocate those funds
until the funds are actually given to us. So I'm actually
increasing our contracting workforce in 2024 so that we can
actually provide resources to the vendors far quicker once we
get the authorizations and the appropriations in place.
Senator Tuberville. You know, we're working very hard to
train people. We're actually recruiting out of McDonald's,
Walmarts----
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir.
Senator Tuberville.--training welders and all those things.
I mean, we're in a tough time right now, getting people
actually off the couch, back to work, and getting them trained,
and you're obviously talking with people about that.
Mr. Del Toro. I think we need to get innovative, Senator.
I'll give you an example of something we just recently did over
the last few weeks in Ohio, for example. So, we met with the
Boiler Makers Union in Ohio because they have experienced
slowdowns basically in their, in their workforce. So Bartlett
Industries in Ohio, for example, is training those boiler
makers on how to actually work in their shipyards. So, then
hopefully we're going to be providing those to Wisconsin to
help with the Constellation-class frigate in Wisconsin.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, and Admiral, we're running low on
people, and you talked earlier about recruiting. Please tell me
we're not dropping our standards to recruit. That'd be the
worst thing that we possibly could do. We need well-trained,
obviously, a group that wants to do it for the right reasons.
Your thoughts?
Admiral Franchetti. Senator, we are not lowering our
standards. We are working really hard to improve our recruiting
enterprise, to improve throughput per recruiter, and really
look broadly at getting out to every Zip Code in America to
bring that talent that we need. People that meet our standards,
we want them on our team. Every single one of them.
Senator Tuberville. Are we taking non-citizens, non-
American citizens in the Navy?
Admiral Franchetti. We only take people that are legally
allowed to enter the Navy.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks Mr. Chairman. Thank you-all for
being here, and thank you for your service.
Secretary Del Toro, I know you visited Electric Boat a
number of times. You share my passion for undersea warfare. If
I were to propose an amendment to the NDAA increasing the
number of submarines for fiscal year 2025 to two instead of the
one, would you oppose it?
Mr. Del Toro. I wouldn't oppose it, Senator, but I
certainly would be hopeful that the resources aren't taken away
from other critical programs that we're trying to execute on
right now as well.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, would you agree with me that the
best way to increase the number of submarine production from 1
to 2.3 is not to cut, but to send a signal to the defense
industrial base, including suppliers, that we're going to be
making real steps toward that goal of 2.3?
Mr. Del Toro. I think we need to help industry by making
the investments that you have made in the submarine industrial
base of the tune of $15 billion. We have currently 11
additional submarines that are in construction, three
additional ones under contract in order to get the production
rate up. But if we can't deliver those submarines on time, that
also presents opportunity cost. Where in a year where we're
fiscally constrained, we basically won't be able to do other
things that are critically important to the enterprise as well.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I think you appreciate that the
suppliers, the defense industrial base take a very strong
signal from that cut. I'll give you an example. Collins & Jewel
in Bozrah, Connecticut is a critical supplier of structural
welding fabrication. Before the fiscal year 25 budget release,
they were preparing a $2 million investment with Micro
Precision, another critical Connecticut supplier to expand
their facilities in the State so they could hire more workers
from the manufacturing pipeline initiative in the State of
Connecticut. After that budget release, on hold.
Hillery Company in Groton. They specialize in solid
modeling software for advanced design fabrication, metal
welding, and joining. They plan to upgrade their water jet in
order to increase capacity to serve production at Electric
Boat. On hold. I could name so----
Mr. Del Toro. So that's exactly what the resources in the
submarine industrial base investment are designed to do to
actually help those companies. I'd be happy to reach out to
those companies and see where we could actually provide them
with the funds to make the CapEx investments that they need to
make.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, they need a signal that we're
moving from one submarine this year to two submarines, so they
can plan. They need dollars. They don't need words from me, or
with all due respect, from you.
Mr. Del Toro. But I'm not just providing words. We're
prioritizing resources in the submarine industrial base of $15
billion.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, they need purchase orders is what
they need.
Mr. Del Toro. Well, there----
Senator Blumenthal. They need purchase orders that come
from Electric Boat, which are using dollars that come from the
United States of America.
Mr. Del Toro. We have 11 submarines that are actually under
construction right now, and we have three additional submarines
that are under contract. 14 submarines is an enormous
investment in what we need for the future.
If the production rates had been, and if the industry
actually had invested more of their own money as well too, and
the CapEx investments and other investments they need to make
to get the production rates out, we'd be in a better place
overall.
Senator Blumenthal. I see no plan. I see an explanation for
why we're behind, but no plan to recover.
Mr. Del Toro. There is a plan, Senator. We are working very
aggressively with all those vendors and with the primes as well
to----
Senator Blumenthal. Can you give us a plan?
Mr. Del Toro. Absolutely, sir. We have plans in place, and
we'll show you exactly what we're doing with the entire
submarine industrial base investment you've been so helpful to
us in providing.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you about the Xavier Sandor
Act. It's named after a young man from Connecticut who
committed suicide because he was on the USS Washington, which
was under repair and maintenance. He was confined to the ship,
or he was on the ship living there while it was under
maintenance.
We passed a law that provides that base allowance can be
provided to enlisted men when they are on ships that are in
maintenance. Maybe you or Admiral Franchetti can update me as
to what progress is being made in implementing that law.
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir.
Admiral Franchetti. Yes, sir. We basically want to make
sure that our sailors have a separation from their work and
their life space. So when they are on the ship in the shipyard,
we've given the flexibility to move them off the ship to have
housing outside of the ship, and when it is not habitable----
Senator Blumenthal. My time has expired, but I would
appreciate in writing a update from you elaborating on that
answer.
[The information referred to follows:]
Admiral Franchetti. The existing Israeli Logistics Support
Vessel supports a beach gradient of 1 to 30 compared to the
Medium Landing Ship beach gradient which is required to be 1 to
40. The 1 to 30 beach gradient permits access to 13 percent of
the beaches in the Indo-PACOM region while the 1 to 40 beach
gradient permits access to twice as many beaches (26 percent)
in the theater.
Admiral Franchetti. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Schmitt, please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you.
Secretary Del Toro, I have a question. Recruiting is down
20 percent last year. So far it's on pace, it's down 30 percent
this year. Do you believe that the obsession that the political
leadership has right now with DEI has helped or hurt recruiting
efforts?
Mr. Del Toro. No, sir. I don't think DEI has hurt
recruiting efforts at all.
Senator Schmitt. You don't?
Mr. Del Toro. No, sir.
Senator Schmitt. You don't think it plays any factor at
all?
Mr. Del Toro. No, sir.
Senator Schmitt. You don't think your obsession with race
essentialism and immutable characteristics turns off a lot of
people?
Mr. Del Toro. I'm not obsessed with any of that, Senator.
Whenever you, on the record, heard me say anything to that
effect?
Senator Schmitt. Well, no, it's in your materials.
Mr. Del Toro. What materials?
Senator Schmitt. Your DEI 101 materials and the
indoctrination that you're putting through, this cultural
Marxism. You don't believe that it has any impact?
Mr. Del Toro. I'm not indoctrinating anybody, Senator.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Secretary, I want to read to you
from your materials what allyship is. ``Allyship is to take
intentional actions such as listening, learning, and uplifting
those who may be disadvantaged. To ensure all voices are heard
and respected, being an authentic ally is to form genuine
relationships to advocate for fair treatment and increase
feelings of inclusion and belonging for all.''
Do you believe that you----
Mr. Del Toro. Do you not want all the members of your team
to feel like they're included?
Senator Schmitt. Well, I have a question. Do you believe
that you were an ally for the 1,878 soldiers who were fired or
the 3,746 marines who were fired for not taking the COVID shot?
Were you an ally for them?
Mr. Del Toro. Sir, I followed the laws. They disobeyed the
law.
Senator Schmitt. Well, did they feel included?
Mr. Del Toro. They disobeyed a law.
Senator Schmitt. They were fired
Mr. Del Toro. They were fired because they disobeyed the
law.
Senator Schmitt. Do you regret that? Do you regret that?
Mr. Del Toro. As it currently existed--I have no regrets.
Senator Schmitt. You have recruitment challenges. You
refuse to----
Mr. Del Toro. You know what Senator----
Senator Schmitt. You refuse to admit, the DEI is a part of
this. You're firing qualified people who are well trained, and
you sit here so smugly to act like none of that has any impact
on the readiness of our Navy.
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, we recontacted 3,500 of the 4,800
people who were fired. You know how many actually decided to
come back to the Navy and report? Two.
Senator Schmitt. Shocker.
Mr. Del Toro. Two.
Senator Schmitt. Shocker, at the level of disrespect they
received from their government.
Senator Schmitt. General Smith, I understand that on May
3d, two individuals were detained by gate guards after lying to
gate guards, and then trying to forcibly bypass security
checks. Now, anonymous sources are reporting that one of the
detained individuals was a Jordanian national who recently
crossed the United States Southern border. Also, one of the two
is on the terror watch list. What do you know, what have you
been briefed by ICE on this?
General Smith. Senator, I'm not familiar with that. I can
get back to you on it after I check with NCIS.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. I don't have any other questions,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Schmitt.
Senator----
Senator Schmitt. Mr. Chairman, I do have one more question
before----
Chairman Reed. You have----
Senator Schmitt. I have some time remaining.
Secretary Del Toro, I do want to understand, based on your
previous conversations, I really do have to get you on the
record. Do you believe that climate change is a bigger threat
to the American people than Communist China's ambitions?
Mr. Del Toro. They are different.
Senator Schmitt. No, but do you--I'm asking you to weight
them. We all make decisions.
Mr. Del Toro. I'm not going to weigh them. One impacts the
other in different ways.
Senator Schmitt. So, you can't sit here and tell us that
Chinese Communist ambitions are more dangerous to the American
people than----
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, I don't think you've been following
all the things that I've been doing since day 1.
Senator Schmitt. I'm asking you a question.
Chairman Reed. Senator Schmitt, excuse me.
Senator Schmitt. I'm asking you a question.
Chairman Reed. Ask a question, Senator. The secretary will
respond, and then, I think you've yielded your time----
Senator Schmitt. I just have a couple more seconds because
I had about a minute and a half left.
Chairman Reed. This is not an argument. It's a question and
answer.
Senator Schmitt. That's fine. I'm asking a question. Do you
believe that climate change is a bigger threat to the American
people than a nuclear holocaust?
Mr. Del Toro. Of course not.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Well, thank you for actually being
courageous. Thank you. I just have to say that your comments
about this, Teddy Roosevelt and Admiral Nimitz will be rolling
in their grave the way that you equivocate on this.
Mr. Del Toro. No, actually, Admiral Nimitz cared deeply
about installation-readiness----
Senator Schmitt. He was a big climate alarmist?
Mr. Del Toro. It wasn't as big a problem than as it is now.
Senator Schmitt. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Schmitt.
But I think it's appropriate right now to make a point that
this Committee has operated for many, many years based on a
mutual respect for the witnesses and the Senators, and to ask
questions, receive answers, and if you disagree with the
answer, make a comment to the effect.
But the level of argumentation at this point, I think, is
something we haven't seen in a long time. It's not new, Senator
Schmitt. I think, it's been on both sides, and I hope we can
move on to more to your questions and answers. But I respect
your position very much, Senator.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Go ahead, Senator Manchin, please.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, and I do
agree as being a chairman of the Committee, the civility to how
we show the respect for what you all have done. We do have
agreements and we have disagreements. We can respectfully do
that. But with that being said, General Smith, I'm glad to see
you back in good health.
We've had many good discussions. Knowing you and the
marines, in general, I can't say I'm surprised that you're
fully back to work so quickly knowing you. I need to thank the
Marine Corps, and you in particular. I've been advised by six
marines during my time in the Senate, and this will likely be
the last opportunity. I'm going to have to recognize the Marine
Corps contribution to my office, particularly my Senate office
here in Washington.
I've had lieutenant Colonel Jason Lambert. I've had Gunnery
Sergeant Rob Moser. I've had Major TJ Byers. I've had Major
Sean Desenkowski. I've had Gunnery Sergeant Dane Ossoff, and I
now have Major Greg Carroll. They've become integral parts of
my staff.
During the time that I've been here in the Senate, I know
every member of my staff has benefited from their professional
and their personal experiences of interchanging interacting
with them. So, I want to thank the marines for allowing me to
have six absolutely outstanding individuals.
General Smith. Well, we thank you for the opportunity to
place them there, for them to learn how our system works.
Senator Manchin. Well, we learned as much from them as they
might have learned. I'm hoping they got as much in return as
they gave us. I really do.
General Smith. I guarantee they did, Senator.
Senator Manchin. Now, Secretary Del Toro, you oversee one
of the most unique national security assets in our country.
It's called the Allegheny Ballistic Laboratory, known as ABL,
and that's in what we call Rocket City, in West Virginia. It's
the only government-owned--the only one that we all own. The
government-owned contractor operated munitions facility.
To lay it out plainly, that means this infrastructure is
owned by taxpayers. All it may be holding to the Federal
Government, not the shareholders of a private defense
contractor. ABL builds components for more than 17 types of
munitions used by every branch of our military and a variety of
our allies and partners, including Ukraine.
However, and I'd say with us all due respect, they get
overlooked. ABL gets overlooked because they don't do the final
assembly for these weapons. You have the property there to do
it. You have the expansion there to do it. Instead, we ship
every single component out to another privately owned facility,
which has received more than $200 million in taxpayer funds to
subsidize and prop up production quality issues they're having.
They can't do what we're doing. We're sending them the
components. They are not adequately doing their job. I've also
learned that Navy, now, this is what I can't believe, now plans
to partner with that underperforming private company. The name
of that company is Aerojet Rocketdyne to build another
duplicate version of what we already own as a Federal
Government. They're going to do it at Indian Head in Maryland,
which is not that far from Rocket City. You already own all
that in Rocket City.
So my question is, ABL covers more than 1,500 acres that we
own, with more than adequate space for expansion? So we can't
figure out why is the Department in the Navy--it just seems
like they're determined, hell bent on spending more taxpayer
money--you can say wasting it--to prop up an underperforming,
truly under underperforming private company instead of
investing in the national assets you already have.
You can do it right there and do the assembly there. You
have total quality control. It's been excellent. So only thing
I can ask you, publicly, if you'll come, and if we can bring
Secretary LaPlante with you, I'll accompany you and we'll go,
and if something's wrong, tell me. I'll be the first to step
back.
But I see no reason why we can't continue to build out what
you have, what we own as a government, what we control, and to
expand there to do full--it's just that they can double
overnight. They're ready to go, but the money's all going
different--and only thing I can say is that the private
contractors have more umph than we have with our own.
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, I know we're deeply committed to
trying to reduce production tremendously. But I commit that
I'll go with you, and I'll invite Secretary LaPlante to come
with me as well, to meet with you, to take a look at the
division of labor as it applies to this situation.
Senator Manchin. We'll do it sooner than later. It's not
that far.
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir.
Senator Manchin. We can drive over, and if you maybe have a
helicopter, you may a ride in a helicopter. We'll jump over
real quick.
Mr. Del Toro. We'll, I'll be happy to drive.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
thank you to all of you for your service to our country.
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti, are you aware of
the 20-month Ember study authorized to study the sharing of the
electromagnetic spectrum in the critical 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz
band?
Mr. Del Toro. I am Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Are you aware of the finding of
this interagency study that found sharing in this band between
the Federal and commercial systems is not feasible unless, and
I quote, ``certain regulatory, technological, and resourcing
conditions are met and implemented''?
Mr. Del Toro. I have Senator. I'm very concerned about
the----
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Are you aware also that the
estimate of this interagency study was that implementing the
conditions could take 30 years and $260 billion if this portion
of the electromagnetic band alone, even under the very
stringent conditions were met, that could be the cost. Were you
aware of that?
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Are you also aware that the
current legislative proposals in the Commerce Committee call
for the use of the 7 to 8 gigahertz band where the Navy and
other services maintain similarly critical systems for the
defense of this country?
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir.
Admiral Franchetti. Yes.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, and can you tell this Committee
where you stand on these efforts, if followed through without
the most stringent conditions, such as the development and
implementation of dynamic spectrum sharing, interference
safeguards, and a massive influx of Federal resources to
maintain the defense of this country?
If those aren't included, what is your position on the
current proposals to not only look at the 3.14 or 3.45
gigahertz band, but also the 7 to 8 gigahertz band for
commercial production?
Mr. Del Toro. I'm extremely defensive in any infringement
on our spectrum band, and also very concerned about the
opportunity costs that it would create. I just don't feel we
have enough resources to be able to do what sometimes is being
suggested to be done.
Senator Rounds. Secretary Del Toro, we have not had a
single uniformed individual with any other opinion other than
what you have offered just now. The challenge that we have is
continuously from the Administration. There seems to be a push
because they recognize that there is a 5G and eventually 6G
needs, but the pieces that they're looking at involve areas
that are critical to the defense of this country because of the
physics involved.
There has to be within the Department of Defense, someone
who will stand up and make very clear to the Administration
that these proposals will be extremely expensive and
detrimental to the defense of this country. Have you expressed
those concerns to the Administration?
Mr. Del Toro. I've expressed the concerns to my chain of
command, yes, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Admiral Fratti, do you have anything to add to that?
Admiral Franchetti. Well, as you stated and the secretary
stated, this is a really critical spectrum for us. You know, it
would be incredibly detrimental and very expensive if we were
even able to adapt the systems to be able to do without that
spectrum.
So if there were to be an agreement, the sharing the
regulations, it would have to be very strict, as you described,
and there would always have to be opportunity for us to have
access to those spectrums to be able to both train, but
potentially defend our Homeland.
Senator Rounds. Which means that you have to have a dynamic
spectrum sharing product in place. It does not exist today.
We're working on it, but it is not there today.
Admiral Franchetti. Yes.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Secretary Del Toro--and I'm
going to change the subject a little bit for both you and
Admiral Franchetti. I think nearly everyone agrees that the
State of the Navy's shipyards is inadequate to face, you know,
the greater power competition.
To cite just one example, the USS Boise, you've heard me
talk about it before, it has been in and out of maintenance and
unavailable to our war fighters since June 2016. I know
Secretary Del Toro was able to meet with the leaders of HD
Hyundai and February this year and see firsthand how they are
using AI enabled capabilities to enhance and manage their
shipbuilding efforts.
To what degree are the Navy's public shipyards currently
using predictive analytics and AI to assist in optimizing the
workflows, operations, and scheduling at the shipyards?
Mr. Del Toro. So, Senator, we're finally making the
appropriate investments over the last couple of years to try to
get to a better place. They now actually have a platform that
they're using that does just this. But I'm also proud to say
that, finally, you know, we do have actually a contract in to
actually repair the Boise.
Thanks for your support as well, too, to make that happen.
Those efforts are underway, in addition to the two others that
were suffering problems over the long-term. These are the
issues that I've been trying to fix since I came in as
secretary. I'm proud to say that all three submarines now have
contracts on them to get them operational and be put back to
sea. Thanks for your support.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Admiral Franchetti
Admiral Franchetti. I just wanted to offer, that's again,
the critical reason we need to do SIOP, just in general. Our
public shipyards really need to be upgraded, both in terms of
the dry dock, but the industrial plant equipment, as well as
the modernization of the flow and the taking advantage of the
technology that we have today to modernize them.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, and General Smith, I just want
to say thank you for your service to our country. Thank you,
sir, and to your team as well, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to our three
witnesses. Thank you for your testimony today, and thank you
for your service to our country. It's appreciated.
Secretary Del Toro, as other senators have noted the Navy's
working hard to expand the submarine industrial base to support
the state-of-the-art Virginia-class and Columbia-class
submarines. Congress has supported these efforts allocating
billions of dollars to support submarine builders, suppliers,
and the workforce.
As part of these efforts, Secretary Guertin shared during a
recent Seapower hearing that the Navy's looking to expand the
submarine industrial base capacity outside of our existing
shipyards, including other states like the State of Michigan,
which has a great deal of industrial capacity, as you well
know.
So my question for you, Secretary, as could you elaborate
on Secretary Guertin's comments about expanding the submarine
industrial base in Michigan, and can you commit to work with me
to ensure that Michigan industrial base can provide world-class
products to solve these submarine supply chain and workforce
challenges? We have the ability to do that.
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, Senator. Actually, in 2023 alone, I
directed both the Marine Corps and the Navy to increase the
amount of investment we have in small businesses and medium-
sized businesses. We have pumped $1.7 billion of additional
moneys for those competitive areas to actually become more
healthy.
As a result of that, we've actually added 1,000 small
business companies to the Navy marketplace. These are the
efforts that have to be done systematically from the very
beginning to make things better, and that's what I've been
doing for the past two and a half years.
In the case of Michigan, we just met with your economic
development team in Wisconsin, and we actually talked to them
about how we could work closely together with you to take full
advantage of the submarine industrial base investments that are
being made in order to feed, particularly, Marinette Shipyard
in Wisconsin, so that we can get the Fincantieri Program back
on track.
Senator Peters. Great. Wonderful. I hope you continue those
efforts. Let me know how I can assist you in those efforts.
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir. I appreciate that.
Senator Peters. Admiral Franchetti, Secretary Guertin's
comments in that Seapower hearing also indicated the Navy's
commitment to surge capacity and personnel to move the
Constellation-class Frigate program in the right direction, in
tandem with the shipyard.
I certainly believe the additional funding Congress is
providing for the frigate industrial base and workforce is also
critical and will continue advocating for inclusion of
resources this fiscal year as well.
But my question for you, Admiral, is can you share the
Navy's long-term commitment to the frigate, and how we must get
this program right, and its role and importance to the future
fleet?
Admiral Franchetti. Well, thank you, and I just had the
opportunity, with the secretary, to go up to Marinette and talk
with the folks there, and really committed to supporting them
in addressing their workforce challenges that they have.
The frigate is an absolutely critical ship for our Navy. It
has, for a long time, and most of my career, we had frigates.
They were definitely the--one of the key workhorses of our
fleet. It provides lots of great capability, in conjunction and
married up with our destroyers, and supporting our carrier
strike groups.
But to be able to operate all over the world, with the
capability that it's going to bring, at a lesser cost than the
DDDGs, is very important to our Navy. So very excited to get
them on board and as quickly as possible.
Senator Peters. Wonderful. Great.
Secretary Del Toro, you recently completed a 45-day
shipbuilding review, highlighting the need to address the
shrinking national design and engineering workforce, and I am
sure you're aware the University of Michigan is the last
remaining, standalone, undergraduate, through doctoral, naval
architecture, and marine engineering department at an R1
university.
So, with this in mind, how are you supporting existing
naval architecture programs and growing the U.S. naval
engineering workforce, for the long-term?
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, I've been actually traveling quite a
bit to community colleges and universities around the world,
trying to get them to commit to our shipbuilding industry. I
just came back from the University of Michigan, where I was
very honored to actually give the commencement speech in the
engineering school, for example, and meet with the tremendous
staff and engineers that we have there, who provide--it's one
of the two institutions in the United States that provides the
naval architects to the United States Navy.
The Office of Naval Research actually made a more
significant investment in the program, as well, too. So we are
working all levers across the country, everywhere we can, to
try to get shipbuilding back on track.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Scott, please.
Senator Scott. Sure. Thank you, Chairman.
Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Franchetti, and General Smith,
I want to thank each of you for being here. I want to thank you
and everybody that works with you and all your hard work. I
respect everybody that serves in the military. But as a former
enlisted Navy sailor, a U.S. Senator, an American citizen, I am
extremely concerned about the accountability of our Navy.
I'll tell you why, and I loved my experience in the Navy.
The Navy failed in recruiting last year, and all indications
point that you're going to fail this year. The Navy projects
it's going to miss recruiting numbers by 6,000 sailors this
year, and currently performing worse than every other service.
This is happening while the Navy has reduced minimum
aptitude, education, fitness, and character standards to as low
as legally allowed. This stands in stark contrast to the Marine
Corps, which is exceeding expectations in recruiting, while
maintaining its high standards.
When you look at the readiness in the Navy, from an
equipment standpoint, things don't look much better. The first
Columbia-class submarine is 12 to 16 months late. The fourth
and fifth blocks of Virginia-class submarine are 36 and 24
months late. The first Constellation-class frigate is 36 months
late. The future aircraft carrier enterprise is approximately
18 to 26 months late. The Navy is retiring ships faster than
it's replacing them, and has a terrible record of getting ships
on maintenance done on time.
It's my understanding, the military has a plan to
recapitalize all the C-130's by 2028. These planes are critical
for logistics movements and to win a war in the Indo-Pacific.
The Indo-Pacific commander has stated they need them to move
fuel, sonobuoys, aircraft parts, supplies, people throughout
the Pacific. The Indo-Pacific commander has stated that they
count on this ability to prosecute a war with Communist China.
Air Force is on time with its recapitalization, which is
now at 50 percent. The Marine Corps has recapitalized 100
percent. But the Navy hasn't even started to recapitalize the
32-year-old fleet of aging 130's. I would assume that you would
say, if a ship runs aground leaving naval ports, Norfolk, San
Diego, that the captain would be held accountable.
Here's my concern. We've got delays in our yards. We've got
maintenance ended up being over budget delayed. We've got major
shipbuilding delays. We've got recruiting failures, and my
concern is, I've not heard anybody that's been held
accountable. I assume there's an admiral over each one of
these, and I've not heard that one's been held accountable, and
they're all continuing to get promoted. Is that true, either
Secretary Del Toro or Admiral Franchetti?
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, you mentioned a lot of challenges. I
see each challenge as an opportunity to make the world a lot
better. These often, are problems that have festered for
decades, without the right leadership, actually applying the
right lessons to avoid the mistakes that were made in the past,
of which there were many that I could actually highlight.
Yet, at the same time, our fleet actually has been battling
back the Houthis for 6 months in the Red Sea, more successfully
than any other Navy, or Marine Corps, for that matter, in the
Mediterranean, since WWII.
In the Indo-Pacific, we've actually been deterring the
Chinese, actually by establishing allies----
Senator Scott. Can you just back to my question real quick?
Who's been held accountable? You've got delays all over the
place. You've got recruiting failures. Has anybody been held
accountable? I'm a business guy. If anybody takes a job,
they're expected to perform the job, and if they can't, I mean,
it's their fault. I mean there's--you know, don't take the job,
if you can't do it.
So my question is, has anybody been held accountable for
shipyard delays, maintenance delays, recruiting failures.
Anybody held accountable?
Mr. Del Toro. Different people have been held accountable
at different times for different things. But we have--Senator
Scott: Give me one example more specific than just that.
Mr. Del Toro. I mean, how do I hold--I try to hold industry
accountable, as well, too. Look, Fincantieri is one example.
Their retention rate, actually, last year was atrocious. That
is part of the reason why we have actually established up to a
3-year delay in the delivery of the Constellation-class
frigate.
What we're trying to do is, actually put positive efforts
in place to help Fincantieri get to a better place. When in the
case of the Enterprise, the main reduction gear from Northrop
Grumman has been delayed, because they actually won the
contract, and it wasn't General Electric who had it before. You
know, that's created problems, as well, too.
Now, back to the case of the Constellation--maybe if the
Constellation, if that had not been underbid during the
previous Administration, and hadn't been delayed from the very
beginning, and they came in with a best value price for it, and
the Navy had not accepted it back then, we'd be in a better
place, with regards to the Frigate, as well, too.
Senator Scott. So, the answer is not one person in the Navy
has been held accountable.
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, there have been people held
accountable for different reasons at different times.
Senator Scott. I ask you for one. Just give me one.
Mr. Del Toro. I'm not going to invade people's privacy
either in terms of individuals who've been held accountable for
different problems in the Navy.
Senator Scott. So this is,
Mr. Del Toro. I have a record of holding even senior
leaders accountable when they falter in the United States Navy,
and my track record shows that.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Duckworth, please.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good
morning to our witnesses.
Secretary Del Toro, I want to discuss the housing issues at
Halsey Village at Naval Station Great Lakes. I understand
housing issues have plagued Halsey Village for years, even from
the previous Administration. I'm not here today to assign
blame, but I do want to work constructively with the Navy on a
path forward.
The Navy leased Halsey Village to Hunt Military Communities
under a 50-year lease, and Hunt is responsible for day-to-day
operations. The Lake County Board chair and mayor of North
Chicago, where Halsey Village is located, wrote to Hunt
Military Communities on October 2023, to express their concerns
regarding the physical condition of Halsey Village.
In their letter, they wrote, ``There is not a neighborhood
in all of Lake County that is in worse condition than Halsey
Village. The neighborhood has taken on the moniker of Zombie
Village, given the great numbers of homes in various states of
neglect.''
There are 353 housing units within Halsey Village.
Currently, 249 housing units are uninhabitable, with 44 of
these units so badly deteriorated that they are cordoned off
behind a chain link fence. It is unacceptable that the Navy is
renting housing units in Halsey Village to military families
and Illinois residents knowing the conditions of these homes.
The Navy also offers prorated rent for sailors to live in
Halsey Village. This creates an incentive for junior enlisted
sailors to live in substandard conditions. No one should be
living in Halsey Village, and the Navy should not be creating
an incentive for sailors to live there either.
I want to discuss the future of Halsey Village, and
communicate my expectations, as the Navy finalizes decisions.
One, the Navy must keep my office, Senator Durbin's office, and
the Lake County community and local elected leaders updated on
decisions being made regarding Halsey Village. The path to
remediate and redevelop Halsey Village will take years, and I
understand that. I will remain laser-focused on ensuring the
interests of the community are protected and heard.
Two, there are still 22 housing units in Halsey Village
being rented to military families, and 88 units are rented at
market rate to Illinois residents. Until a decision is made on
the future of Halsey Village, the Navy must continue to be
responsive to the needs of the residents, and force Hunt
Military Communities to address any maintenance issues.
Three, I understand that the Navy is discussing options to
redevelop the land after the homes in Halsey Village are
demolished. The Navy must ensure that no corners are cut, using
a commercially compatible developer, to avoid environmental
remediation costs, if such a solution would not be acceptable
to the Lake County community and local elected leaders.
For example, to avoid remediation, you can't just pour
concrete over it and say, okay, it's now commercial property.
That way, we don't have to deal with remediation, if the
community actually wants to have that property be used for
future residential housing, which is desperately needed in the
community.
Secretary Del Toro, I understand that remediating and
redeveloping Halsey Village will be costly, and this problem
preexists your tenure there. I understand that. I ask that you
work with me and my staff to ensure that remediating and
redeveloping Halsey Village remains a priority for the Navy,
and that we are resourcing these efforts appropriately.
Can you commit to that?
Mr. Del Toro. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Secretary Del Toro, once the Navy finalizes plans for
Halsey Village, can you provide my staff with a copy of the
Navy's plan to remediate and redevelop Halsey Village,
including any timelines associated with those plans?
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, Senator.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, and if you find yourself in
Illinois, in Chicago anytime this summer, I invite you to come
out to Halsey Village and I will tour it with you.
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, ma'am. Promise to do so.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Mullin, please.
Senator Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I just want to make an observation here.
This is not trying to be confrontational to you at all. You've
had enough of that. I don't really feel like doing that today.
I have eaten. So I'm trying to be in a good mood. But I just
say, first of all, you mentioned a while ago, and as a bragging
point, that you're battling the Houthis, a terrorist
organization.
You call that success, when they don't have a Navy. If we
want to eliminate them, we could. If we wanted to just stop
what they're doing, we could. By holding them back for 6
months, but yet they're still disrupting and still have the
ability to attack shipping freighters. That's not a win. That's
far from a win.
We are the United States Navy, and we were, at one time,
the largest Navy. But we've seceded that to China, which goes
back to what Eric Schmitt was saying about the idea of the
climate being the biggest threat to China. I really don't think
China is too concerned about the environment, at this point.
In fact, they're laser-focused on us, and in fact, they're
running circles around us. In fact, as you know, Mr. Secretary,
they have the largest navy in the world now. They built 30
ships last year alone. We barely completed two. That's a
problem. Don't you think?
Mr. Del Toro. That is a problem, sir?
Senator Mullin. That's a huge problem. We're retiring 50.
According to your records, you guys have roughly 50 that you're
going to retire or have to go in for maintenance, or is going
to be out of service, by 2028. We have 292 ships currently on
the fleet. Not all of them are actually out to sea. They have
370. I'm sure they're laser focused on the environment.
Our concern is, are we safer today than we were? The answer
to that is, probably not. Probably not, because we're trying to
balance the environment with world power, and your body
language would, just honestly, just aggravate people just by
the way you're behaving. I mean that sincerely, because you
don't take it serious.
In fact, it's serious to us, and you almost joke and laugh
about it, with your body language. I'm just saying, as a
constructive criticism, that could be a problem, because we
want you to succeed. The last thing I want you to do, is not to
succeed.
But even when you was pressed by Senator Scott over here,
Rick Scott, you made a reference to the previous, the last
Administration, why you're in the situation you're in today
because they had something under bid. But yet, we have current
things that are constantly coming under bid.
You've been in the position for how long now?
Mr. Del Toro. Two and a half years, Senator.
Senator Mullin. Two and a half years. How long has this
Administration been in place?
Mr. Del Toro. About three.
Senator Mullin. I think it's time to start owning your own
responsibilities, and stop blaming the previous Administration,
and yet, you sit there, and you go, nah, nah. That's the
problem, sir. It's not that we're just trying to be
confrontational with you. It's that I don't think you're
hearing us. It's like, you know best. We're just Senators up
here and we have no opinion. That's a problem.
So, if you want to try getting along so we can all get in
the same boat, and sing, and row together, then let's have
actual serious conversation about actually moving forward and
what our priorities are. The Navy's need to be focused on
winning fights. Let the EPA worry about the environment.
Now switching gears, totally. Admiral, good to see you. I
want to talk a little bit about Genesis, and I say this,
because we're having serious recruiting issues. I mean, I had a
conversation this morning with three people, that their sons
were all trying to get in the service.
One is a D1 track athlete, waited 8 months to finally get
in, and they were giving him a hard time, because of Genesis,
because he's broke a leg or two. You know, there were some
other ones that had some health concerns from his past when he
was a little kid, and he actually dropped out after 6 months of
trying to be in. By the way, all these are D1 athletes.
Another individual had had some issues with their shoulder.
Still competing, but couldn't get in the service, and I'd just
kind of go around. I mean, I was a pretty rambunctious kid. I
broke a lot of bones, and I would believe that, most boys, if
they haven't at least broke some bones, probably didn't live a
good life growing up, because you got to push yourself.
My son, currently, is a D1 wrestler for Oklahoma State. Got
cleared to wrestle internationally, got cleared to wrestle by
USA, by NCAA wrestling, and he's having a hard time getting
cleared in because he's supposed to report to boot camp this
summer, and yet he hasn't got cleared yet.
I'm not bringing it up for my son, for you to do anything.
I'm just saying, is Genesis actually helping us? Because they
start looking at an accident he had when he was 7 years old,
when he got bucked off a horse and he broke his arm, and they
asked him a question about--seven years old, broken arm? Is it
really working? I mean, I understand what Genesis is trying to
do, I get that. But at some point, is it getting in the way to
help us recruit, or is it actually hindering our ability to
recruit?
Admiral Franchetti. Well, thank you, and you know, we've
had a lot of discussions about Genesis. Actually, all of the
service chiefs and OSD, working with the DHA, which is the
owner of the system, to provide this kind of feedback, of where
it is potentially slowing things down.
I think, you know, just in my time as the CNO, that we've
made some definite improvements in streamlining the process, in
reducing the amount of times people have to go back and get
paperwork, and DHA continues to take this feedback. I will
provide this feedback right now, as well, to them, as we
continue to move that process forward.
So, I think, you know, it's a little bit of growing pains
with the new system. We're really committed to working with
DHA, to make sure that it does what it needs to do to get us
our recruits into the system as quickly as possible.
So again, I would like to get with your staff offline on
those, because it's always good to have examples, because it
helps illustrate exactly where some of the hold ups are and the
reasons.
Senator Mullin. We'd love to work with you on it.
Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Mullin.
Senator Cotton, please,
Senator Cotton. Admiral Franchetti, I want to start by
commending the sailors who have been under attack by an outlaw
band of rebels and brigands in Yemen, since October 7th. It's
the case that the Navy is now awarding them combat awards. Is
that correct?
Admiral Franchetti. Yes.
Senator Cotton. We heard testimony, we've had a briefing on
the Committee, from officials from Central Command, that those
sailors have now been in what was called the weapons engagement
envelope for longer than any sailor since World War II. Is that
the case?
Admiral Franchetti. Yes, it is.
Senator Cotton.
So, we should all be proud of their bravery and skill. But
I do not think that is a good news story. That is a bad news
story. When our sailors go into the weapons engagement
envelope, the point should be to destroy the envelope, in the
first place, so those outlaws don't have those weapons anymore.
Yet, it seems that all we're doing there is shooting down
missiles and drones that are flying at our ships, or other
ships in the region, or maybe shooting down missiles and drones
as they're being fueled on the launch pad.
Is that a fair assessment?
Admiral Franchetti. Well, Senator Cotton, I would say there
are two aspects to what we've been doing there. We have
Operation Prosperity Guardian, you know, working hard, with 20
other nations to keep the free flow of commerce going. That's
what you're talking about, defending against missiles.
We also have another operation, which is designed to
degrade the Houthi capability ashore. Again, those are policy
decisions, and the Navy's job is to provide options to the
CENTCOM commander and the CENTCOM commander's options do go up.
Senator Cotton. I know that the three of you are not in
charge of these warfighting decisions, and ultimately, they're
policy decisions. But I find it alarming that we have all these
sailors that are, in my opinion, sitting ducks.
It's great that we have the defense systems that we need to
keep them safe, but it only takes one of these missiles and
drones to get through and hit one of our ships and cause a mass
casualty event. That's what we saw a few months ago, in the
tri-border region of Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, when we lost
three soldiers.
So, I would encourage you all, as you're discussing these
policy matters inside of the Pentagon, to stress that you would
like to see your sailors not sit in the weapons engagement
zone, but destroy the weapons engagement zone.
General Smith, you haven't gotten to talk much today. So
why don't we talk about Marine Corps recruiting. There's been a
lot of talk about the challenges the Navy recruiting has faced.
We've had the same conversations with Army recruiting, which I
think is even more severe, so much so that they had to drop
their recruiting goals to meet them.
The Marine Corps is going to meet its goals, is that
correct?
General Smith. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Okay. So that is a good news story. So what
do you think the Marine Corps is doing right, that other
services can learn, not only the Navy, but especially the Army,
since its challenges are more severe, and it's more like the
Marine Corps?
General Smith. Well, Senator, our recruiting environment is
one that is professionalized. We have career recruiters, so
each of our recruiting substations are our recruiting stations.
Dallas, Fort Worth, San Antonio has a career recruiter, and we
reward our recruiters who are out there for one tour. They are
given their choice of duty stations when they finish a
successful tour, or they're given their choice of school.
If they don't meet their mission, they're relieved. I mean,
it's a Marine Corps mission. We're not selling anything. We're
offering an opportunity, and it's part of our branding, if you
will, that we're offering people an opportunity to earn the
title, marine, and that's the thing that we continue to
express.
While there are benefits to joining, there's the GI Bill,
and that's very important. You're competing for the title,
marine, and we hold that very, very dearly. You know, there's
an old recruiting poster, ``We don't promise you a rose
garden.'' We still believe in that, and we still believe in the
value of service to our Nation.
We're not lowering our standards, and people are attracted
to that.
Senator Cotton. I think that's wise advice to heed. There
are other problems, like Senator Mullin talked about, with
Genesis. We've heard testimony on this Committee before. I
think there's bipartisan agreement that Genesis has probably
swung too far in the direction of excluding people who could
serve, as opposed to making sure you don't have medical
washouts in initial entry training.
There's also an issue, I think, with your doctors at MET
stations around the country, and the throughput they have. But
I think at the end, it's what General Smith says. The armed
forces are here to defend the Nation.
They are not a skills training program for people who want
a civilian job. They're not a financing program for people that
want to go to college. It's not a daycare for people who have
kids or health care for people who are sick. It's not a travel
agency for people who want to see the world.
The armed forces may do all those things, but the armed
forces, first and foremost, are designed to fight and win our
Nation's wars. The one thing we will promise all of our
recruits, whatever service they enter, is hard and realistic
training that will enable them to win and survive in combat, in
defense of this Nation.
Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you, Senator Cotton, and your
words have been amplified by your own personal service. Thank
you.
Senator King requests additional round.
Senator King, please.
Senator King. Secretary Del Toro, I think there's some
confusion in this hearing about your interest in climate
change. My understanding is, it's not an academic interest in
climate change, writ large, it's an interest in how climate
change will affect the operation and readiness of the Navy. Is
that correct?
Mr. Del Toro. It is. That is my chief most responsibility
as Secretary of the Navy. Is to care for the mission readiness
of the Navy and the Marine Corps, and part of that is
installation-readiness.
Senator King. I went back and looked at Title 10.
One of your responsibilities is construction, outfitting,
and repair of military equipment, construction, maintenance and
repair of building structures, and utilities necessary to carry
out the responsibilities of the Department.
Then later on, it says one of your responsibilities is
carrying out the functions of the Department, so as to fulfill
the current and future operational requirements of the unified
and specified combatant commands.
Estimates are, sea level will rise about a foot in the next
15 to 20 years, as much as 6 to 8 feet by the end of this
century. I would suggest that, if you're not taking account of
that in your facilities, in everything from docks to all of the
coastal facilities, that would be a dereliction of duty.
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir. We won't be able to maintain the
ships, the submarines, everything else that we operate on these
bases, without paying attention to what might occur in the
future.
Senator King. In fact, some of your facilities--I've been
in Norfolk a couple of years ago--are already suffering the
effects of rising sea level. Is that correct?
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir, and the Marine Corps, as well, too.
We've had to expend an extraordinary amount of resources,
actually, to raise roads in Parris Island, for example, and
Camp Pendleton, and Camp Lejeune, and a lot of other
investments. So we have to pay attention to these things, or
otherwise, they'll get the best of us.
Senator King. Your responsibility, because of the effects
on readiness and operations are to mitigate and adapt to these
changes. That's correct is it not?
Mr. Del Toro. That's correct, Senator.
Senator King. Thank you.
I do want to change the subject just briefly. We talked
about directed energy. The other technology that I think we've
missed is hypersonics, particularly defense against
hypersonics. I hope that is an emphasis of your R&D, as you go
forward. We've got $12 billion aircraft carriers that we don't
want to be sitting ducks. We need, must develop defensive
mechanisms for hypersonics.
Mr. Del Toro. Very much so, sir, and that encumbers things
that we do in cyberspace and SAP programs. But investment in
CPS is also important for us, as well, too. As we address the
very difficult challenges that we've had in shipbuilding for
decades now, and you take a look at the Zumwalt-class
destroyer, for example, you know, in overcoming the challenges
with the advanced gun system.
Now trying to put CPS on it, it is one of my top
priorities, as well, and hopefully, we'll have it on the first
one, late 2025, and then, the second 2026, and the third one in
2029.
Senator King. Well, I hope that it's an urgent priority,
not just a priority, because the core of our deterrence is our
projected sea power, and we have to be able to defend it. If we
can't, the deterrence goes away.
Mr. Del Toro. We just lifted the first advanced gun system
on the Zumwalt just last week, sir. It's moving along well.
Senator King. Where was the Zumwalt built again?
Mr. Del Toro. Bath, Maine, sir.
Senator King. Thank you, sir.
Admiral, we talked a lot about recruiting. I want to thank
you for sending a ship to the coast of Maine this summer. One
of the problems with recruiting, if you look at the data
nationwide is, there are many parts of our country now who
never see a person in uniform. They never see military assets
in the northeast.
There are virtually no bases left. My own hometown of
Brunswick had a naval air station for 50 years, 60 years. Now
it's gone. The Navy people that were the--just, in many ways,
the heart of our community, are gone. So thank you for sending
the ship to Maine. I would urge you to do similar kinds of
deployments, because we need young people to see their
military, to see people in uniform, and I think that's an
important step.
Finally, Admiral, I just want to commend to you, following
up on work on mental health. This is a crisis, as you know. It
affects suicide, it affects readiness, it affects well-being of
your sailors. So, I hope that this is a continuing process on
the ships, on the shore.
Is that something that you see as a priority?
Admiral Franchetti. It definitely is a priority, and we'll
continue to focus on this. Earlier this year, we put out our
culture of excellence, where we look really broadly at our
entire culture, and all of the things that we are doing to
support our sailors. Mental health is one of them. There are a
lot of other programs that we pulled all together, again, to
create warfighters.
That's all about getting after their body, mind, spirit to
build great people, great leaders, and great teams, and we're
going to be focused on this for a long time in the future.
Senator King. Thank you.
General Smith, I want to welcome you back, and you fought
your own battle this year. You also rendered a service by
proving to the American people that Marine Corps Generals do,
in fact, have hearts.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. So that was a plus.
General Smith. I think some of my marines might debate that
point with you, sir, but I do in fact have a heart and it's
fully functional.
Senator King. Thank you. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, Senator King.
Well, thank you very much, Senator King. Just a few points,
as we close. First of all, I will relay to you that I was
speaking to General Kurilla, the CENTCOM Commander, commending
him on an extraordinary operation that defeated a huge missile
attack in the State of Israel, and he went out of his way to
commend the Navy.
I didn't bring it up, he brought it up, and for a West
Point grad and a paratrooper like General Kurilla, that--you
must have made an impression on him, your servicemembers.
Mr. Del Toro. Well, and thank you for your own service, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reeds. Well, thank you, and Admiral Franchetti,
you should be proud of that. In fact, frankly, I think, before
that attack, if you said that we could destroy, essentially
every missile that was being fired--there were hundreds of
them--and only have one casualty, unfortunately, a young
Bedouin child, you'd say no, that's not possible.
You did it. It was the U.S. Navy, as well as our Air Force,
our naval aviators, et cetera. So we are performing better than
any other service has ever performed. But we still have lots of
problems, and you're dealing with them.
The discussion on climate change here is interesting,
because, when I was a kid, the Arctic Ocean was frozen, and
now, I don't think the Arctic Ocean is frozen. In fact, I think
it's navigable.
So let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, does a navigable Arctic
Ocean prevent challenges to naval strategy?
Mr. Del Toro. Very much so, sir, and we're seeing it,
actually, with greater Chinese incursion and greater Russian
activity, as well, too. As you know, our Nation doesn't
necessarily have the icebreakers that are necessary to operate
freely in that zone.
I'm very proud of the fact that our Navy is also stood up,
and actually when Russian ships were deployed close to our
islands, we actually deployed necessary destroyers out there to
go meet them. That will continue to be even a greater challenge
in the future.
Chairman Reeds. That is the result of the accumulating
effects of climate change. So, from a strategic point of view,
we have to worry about it. From an equipment point of view, we
have to worry about it, because of icebreakers, which we've not
really invested in we have to worry about it.
In fact, I know the military has just--the Army, I should
say, excuse me, the Army is increasing its presence in Alaska,
with the new airborne unit training, the interagency training.
So, you know, it is an important concern. I hope that would be
obvious. But thank you-all very much for your service, for your
testimony.
We will adjourn the public open, session, and reconvene at
SVC 217, at 12:30, for the closed session. Thank you for your
testimony.
The open session is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
imminent danger and hostile fire pay for red sea area
1. Senator Reed. Secretary Del Toro, according to your April 24,
2024, announcement authorizing combat awards and devices for the Red
Sea Area, you noted that that imminent danger pay is not currently
authorized for this geographic area, and also noted that the CAR, for
example, could not be awarded unless the awardee received hostile fire
pay for the incident for which the award was made, or at some date
within the merit dates of the award. Why is the Navy not authorizing
either Imminent Danger or Hostile Fire Pay? Is this your decision to
make or that of the CNO?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. Imminent Danger Pay
(IDP) may be paid to a uniformed Service Member who is subject to the
threat of physical harm or imminent danger on the basis of civil
insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or wartime conditions in a foreign
area. Hostile Fire Pay (HFP) is awarded when a Service Member is
exposed to a hostile fire event or serves in a hostile fire area.
The approval authority to designate a geographic area as eligible
IDP is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs (ASD(M&RA)). Department of Defense Instruction 1340.09 ``Hazard
Pay Program'' requires IDP designation requests to originate from the
Combatant Commander and be endorsed by the Director of the Joint Staff
prior to submission to ASD(M&RA). A request to designate the Red Sea an
IDP area is currently in staffing.
Hostile Fire Pay (HFP) is awarded when a Service Member is exposed
to a hostile fire event. The approval authority in the case of the Red
Sea is Central Command. Central Command has approved HFP numerous times
in response to hostile fire events for vessels in the Red Sea.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
siop
2. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti, cost
overruns have previously thrown the SIOP's multi-mission dry-dock
project at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard off schedule. The National
Security Supplemental contains $3.3 billion for the submarine
industrial base, some of which will make up for these overruns. How
will you utilize the funds in the National Security Supplemental as
related to Portsmouth Naval Shipyard SIOP efforts?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. Of the $3.3 billion
National Security Supplemental, $100 million was applied to
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Dry Dock 1 (P381). The Dry Dock 1 project
is performing consistent with the cost notification made to Congress in
May 2024 and is expected to complete by its mission need date.
marine excess leave program
3. Senator Shaheen. General Smith, my office has heard from
constituents in law school that are currently receiving benefits from
the Marine Excess Leave Program and accepted an offer on the condition
of the Department of Veterans' Affairs confirmation of a monthly
stipend through the GI Bill. Unfortunately, the VA recently changed its
policy and is no longer allowing a stipend for marines participating in
the ELP. Do you commit to working with Congress on a legislative fix?
General Smith. The Marine Corps has funded legal education for
those officers who are statutorily eligible to switch programs from the
Excess Leave Program. Some Excess Leave Program Marines were precluded
from switching due to the statutory limit of 6 years' time in service.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
seaman xavier sandor support for sailors act update
4. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Del Toro, since the enactment of
the Seaman Xavier Sandor Support for Sailors Act, how many sailors
below the pay grade of E-6 and without dependents have received
authorization for a basic allowance of housing while assigned to
vessels engaged in a shipyard availability or maintenance period?
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy appreciates the additional flexibility
from expansion of authority to allow payment of BAH to junior sailors
without dependents while assigned to sea duty and their ships are in
the shipyard or extended maintenance. The Seaman Xavier Sandor Support
for Sailors Act included provisions removing the prohibition on paying
BAH to sailors without dependents on sea duty in paygrades E-1 through
E-3 while assigned to vessels engaged in a shipyard availability or
maintenance period. Those provisions were included in the Fiscal Year
2024 NDAA. Prior to the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA, the Navy had the
authority pay BAH to sailors without dependents in paygrades E4 and
senior.
The Navy has not yet needed to make use of the expanded authority.
E-1 through E-3 sailors without dependents are housed ashore in
government owned or leased quarters, which remain the Navy's preferred
housing alternatives for such sailors.
5. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Del Toro, since the enactment of
the Seaman Xavier Sandor Support for Sailors Act, what percentage of
sailors below the pay grade of E-6, without dependents, and assigned to
vessels engaged in a shipyard availability or maintenance period were
denied a basic allowance for housing after submitting a formal request?
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy has not compiled the data related to:
Requests for BAH from sailors in the paygrade of E5 are
approved at the installation level, as are requests from those in
paygrade E4 with at least 4 years of service. If unaccompanied housing
(UH) is at full occupancy, these requests will be approved. We do not
have data on how many requests may have been submitted and of those
requests how many may have been denied because UH was available.
Single sea duty sailors in paygrade E4 with less than 4
years of service are not authorized BAH and are required to live in UH
or government leased housing except in limited circumstances or if
authorized an exception to policy issued by the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Personnel Policy) or delegated
authority. We do not know how many sailors may have submitted a request
but were denied at the local level because UH or government leased
housing was available.
It remains Navy policy to house E-1 to E-3 sailors
without dependents in government housing and to only authorize BAH for
these sailors when government owned or leased housing ashore is not
available.
It is currently Navy policy to not house any sailors
aboard ship during shipyard availabilities or extended maintenance
availabilities. Denial of a BAH request does not equate to a sailor
living aboard ship; it equates to the sailor being assigned berthing in
government owned or leased housing ashore.
ch-53k block buy authority for fiscal years 2025 and 2026
6. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Del Toro and General Smith, if
Congress grants the Navy block buy authority for up to 37 CH-53Ks over
fiscal years 2025 and 2026, what are the projected impacts to the
program in terms of cost and delivery timelines?
Secretary Del Toro. The fiscal year 2025 to fiscal year 2026
Airframe Block Buy Contract (BBC) is estimated to yield a cost
avoidance of 3.75 percent, or $135.2 million, which is already
accounted for in the current budgetary documentation. This cost
avoidance is attributable to a reduction in labor, material, and
overhead rates, as a function of increased industrial base stability,
incentivized prime/supplier investment, improved production efficiency,
reduced administrative burden of annual contracts, and procurement
volume. Further, the BBC is expected to result in a more stabilized and
consistent aircraft build and delivery timeline, also reflected in
current budget exhibits.
General Smith. The fiscal year 2025 to fiscal year 2026 Airframe
Block Buy Contract (BBC) is estimated to yield a cost avoidance of 3.75
percent, or $135.2 million, which is already accounted for in the
current budgetary documentation. This cost avoidance is attributable to
a reduction in labor, material, and overhead rates, as a function of
increased industrial base stability, incentivized prime/supplier
investment, improved production efficiency, reduced administrative
burden of annual contracts, and procurement volume. Further, the BBC is
expected to result in a more stabilized and consistent aircraft build
and delivery timeline, also reflected in current budget exhibits.
review of training and administrative requirements for active duty and
reserve sailors
7. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Franchetti, on May 15th, the Army
announced the completion of a holistic review of online training
requirements for all enlisted and officers. In response to the review's
findings, the Army will cut 346 hours of online training. I am
concerned that the Navy requires unnecessary or redundant training
requirements. When is the last time the Navy conducted a holistic
review of required online training for the Active Duty and Reserve
components?
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy has an established Common Military
Training (CMT) Planning Board for Training (PB4T) Executive Steering
Group that convenes a bi-annually and quarterly working group of all
Navy stakeholders to review new and existing CMT requirements where
most of this training is completed online. The steering group has
reduced CMT annual mandatory topics from 23 in 2014 to eight currently
(six of which are required by legislation). The last review was May 14,
2024 to confirm fiscal year 2025 CMT.
8. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Franchetti, what efforts is the Navy
undertaking to identify and eliminate redundant, unnecessary, or
duplicative online training?
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy has an established Common Military
Training (CMT) Planning Board for Training (PB4T) Executive Steering
Group and supporting working group. This group is comprised of
requirement sponsors for CMT topics who take a thorough look at our
required training for quality and effectiveness annually. The PB4T
focus is to reduce the number of mandatory trainings to minimize the
administrative burden imposed on Navy commands and personnel.
Currently, all required training topics are mandated by Congress,
Department of Defense, or the Secretary of the Navy. The steering group
has reduced CMT annual mandatory topics from 23 in 2014 to eight
currently (six of which are required by legislation). We also have a
discretionary training category in order to manage topics that are not
required for all sailors. We encourage Commanders to use the
discretionary topics to incorporate training to best meet the needs of
their command.
9. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Franchetti, I appreciate the Reserve
component's goal of maintaining readiness and the ability to mobilize
at short notice if required. However, given the limited time Navy
Reservists are obligated to their duties (one weekend a month and 2
weeks of annual training per year), what is the Reserve component doing
to identify and eliminate redundant, unnecessary, or duplicative online
training and administrative duties?
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy Reserve continues to review its
administrative and training requirements, ensuring they align with
warfighting readiness while eliminating unnecessary administrative
requirements when able. The Navy Reserve is currently pursuing multiple
lines of effort to promote increased readiness and efficiency across
the mobilization enterprise. For example, Commander Navy Reserve Force
has implemented a web-based application called ZipServe to support
administrative readiness for SELRES activation. ZipServe is both a
routing tool and repository for all SELRES pay activation
documentation. This application reduces administrative burden on the
SELRES. To date, activation pay processing time has been reduced by 20
percent and eighty-nine percent on the force has initiated pay packets
with seventy percent fully verified and complete.
The Navy Reserve is also working to align medical mobilization
screening to the billet and specific combatant command requirements,
reducing medical provider support and time. Additional pilots are in
progress to assess the feasibility of moving components of the medical
screening process to billet assignment rather than waiting until a
reservist is called to Active Duty.
10. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Franchetti, please provide a
comprehensive list of online training and administrative requirements
that Navy reservists must complete at each rank and rate in order to be
deemed combat ready, along with the various Navy systems used to track
completion of these requirements.
Admiral Franchetti. Commander Navy Reserve Force (CNRF) maintains a
comprehensive list of online training and administrative requirements
that Navy Reserve Selected Reserve (SELRES) sailors must complete to be
combat ready. The list was last reviewed in its entirety in calendar
year 2020. CNRF conducted an expedited review from 1-2 July 2024, in
order to provide the best information possible pursuant to this
request.
The attached list bins these requirements into 4 different
readiness categories, from most to least critical. Each requirement is
listed with the source of the requirement (instruction, personnel/
medical manual, etc.), the affected population, the estimated time
commitment for the requirement (in hours), the training delivery
method, any associated web content, and the tracking system. The annual
online and administrative requirements for each SELRES totals
approximately 103 hours. Of this total, approximately 13 hours are Navy
Reserve-specific requirements, with the remainder Navy and DOD-level
requirements.
The total comprehensive list of online training and administrative
requirements that SELRES sailors must complete in order to be combat
ready cannot be copied here due to size constraints, but is attached
for viewing and use as desired.
**Please reference enclosure Navy Reserve 2024 Training
Requirements List in the Appendix**
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
cost overruns at dry dock and hawaii projects
11. Senator Hirono. Secretary Del Toro, I recently sent a letter
regarding the $834 million cost overruns for the Navy's dry dock
replacement project at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. Over $400 million
of this cost increase was a result of the Navy moving up the dry dock's
operational mission need date by 11 months after initial contract
solicitation. How did the operational mission need date get moved up
almost a year after contract solicitation when the Navy has an annual
statutory requirement to provide a 30-year shipbuilding plan to
Congress?
Secretary Del Toro. Regarding the cost variance report for the
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard Dry Dock 3 Replacement project, the updated
estimate reflects lessons from the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Multi-
Mission Dry Dock and other best practices from weapon system
acquisition programs, including bringing industry into the process
early and including a contingency for material escalation in our
contracts. One outcome of discussions with industry during the design
phase indicated that providing industry some schedule flexibility would
allow them to perform the work at less cost. As a result, the previous
estimate provided to Congress assumed there was flexibility in the
mission need date. More recent discussions with the fleet established
that there was no flexibility in the mission need date and thus those
projected savings were not possible.
Additionally, the period 2021 to 2023 was especially challenging
for the construction industry, with significant cost increases in the
labor and material market. The actual escalation experienced by our
contractors was more than that used to prepare the Fiscal Year 2023
President's Budget reflected in the previous estimate. Site logistics
within the operating shipyard were an additional factor in the cost
increase.
12. Senator Hirono. Secretary Del Toro, what steps are you and
other senior leaders taking to ensure the Navy incorporates long-term
planning requirements and considerations when conducting oversight of
large military construction projects?
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy has implemented organizational and
technical reforms to improve Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization
Program (SIOP) governance and execution. In April 2022, the Navy
established the Program Executive Office for Industrial Infrastructure,
placing a dedicated executive in charge of the program. In August 2023,
SIOP defined formal capability requirements and established key
performance parameters with the rigor, discipline and oversight
equivalent to the Navy's major weapons systems. Further, SIOP is
starting project designs earlier to increase estimate fidelity,
awarding key contract items early and/or separately to remove
completion risk, and using economic price adjustment clauses to share
material price volatility risk between the government and contractor.
13. Senator Hirono. Secretary Del Toro, how is the Navy planning to
incorporate GAO best practices on cost estimating and lessons learned
to avoid future cost increases?
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy is implementing Government
Accountability Office (GAO) guidance to ensure consistency and
completeness of SIOP cost estimates. Independent cost estimates are
being developed for all major projects in accordance with legislation.
In December 2022, the Department of Defense directed the use of the GAO
best practice of comparing cost elements to available historical data
for construction. Further, the Navy formalized SIOP cost estimating
expectations for escalation, risk, uncertainty, format, and
comprehensiveness. SIOP cost estimates, including Dry Dock 3 at Pearl
Harbor Naval Shipyard have implemented improved economic forecasting
and cost and schedule risk analysis that is updated throughout design
and construction. Construction contractors are now involved in the
design phase to improve estimates for logistics and constructability.
shipbuilding delays
14. Senator Hirono. Secretary Del Toro, your 45-day Shipbuilding
Review found delays of anywhere from one to 3 years for every major
ship program including the Columbia-class submarine, Virginia-class
submarine, and the future Enterprise-class aircraft carrier. You then
ordered a second 45-day shipbuilding review. What is the way ahead for
shipbuilding and specifically submarine production?
Secretary Del Toro. The 45-Day Shipbuilding Review highlighted
challenges facing shipbuilding programs and larger ship industrial
base, including lingering effects of COVID on the supply chain and
skilled workforce availability and proficiency. The Navy is actively
working together with industry on initiatives to drive improvement to
these challenges. Further, the Fiscal Year 2025 budget request
continues to seek support for investment in the submarine and
shipbuilding industrial base. This investment is key to restoring
timely delivery of our submarines and ships and strengthening the
Nation's defense capabilities.
The operational impacts due to delays with new major ship
construction will result in a general long-term necessity to extend the
service life of the current battle force. Service life extensions
increases ship maintenance requirements and costs and stresses public
and private shipyard repair capabilities required to support these
efforts.
PB-25 allocates resources to support the Navy's operations,
training, maintenance, and other readiness accounts to maximize players
on the field in the near term as well as strategic investments for
Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) to address
inadequate facilities and industrial plant equipment at the four public
shipyards to improve maintenance outcomes long term.
To simultaneously sustain and modernize the current fleet and
sustainably accelerate capacity growth of our fleet, the Navy will
require sustained budget growth above actual inflation as demonstrated
in the 30-year Shipbuilding Plan, to include recommendations from the
Chief of Naval Operations. The Navy will also need better performance
from the shipyards and other contractors to deliver capabilities and
capacity on time and on budget. Further, the Navy needs on time
appropriations to avoid disruption to programs due to continuing
resolutions.
15. Senator Hirono. Secretary Del Toro, what are the operational
impacts of these delays?
Secretary Del Toro. The operational impacts due to delays with new
major ship construction will result in a general long-term necessity to
extend the service life of the current battle force. Service life
extensions increases ship maintenance requirements and costs and
stresses public and private shipyard repair capabilities required to
support these efforts.
16. Senator Hirono. Secretary Del Toro, are you concerned about the
U.S. Navy's readiness or supporting the AUKUS commitment?
Secretary Del Toro. We prioritize our people and readiness to
deploy and fight today, while investing in our industrial base to build
and maintain our fleet. PB-25 allocates resources to our operations,
training, maintenance, and other readiness accounts to position forward
naval forces in defense of global U.S. interests.
I am not concerned about the U.S. Navy's readiness to support our
AUKUS commitment. We are going into this with our eyes wide open and
have an agreed-upon plan for how to deliver a sovereign conventionally
armed, nuclear-powered attack submarine capability to Australia. We
have made strides toward accomplishing milestones along the Optimal
Pathway to include integrating Australian submariners and uniformed
maintenance personnel into our submarine training and a submarine
tender to build their required knowledge, skills, and stewardship for
operating and maintaining SSNs.
17. Senator Hirono. Secretary Del Toro, what can Congress do to
help?
Secretary Del Toro. Continued congressional support is appreciated.
Timely enactment of appropriations to fund the President's Budget is
helpful.
wastewater discharge in kaneohe bay
18. Senator Hirono. Secretary Del Toro and General Smith, the water
reclamation facility at Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay has received
multiple fines for improperly discharging sewage into Kailua Bay and
exceeding permissible levels over the last several years. According to
the Hawaii Department of Health, the base has exceeded limits on
``numerous occasions'' between August 2020 and February 2022. In 2022,
the State of Hawaii fined the Navy $8.7 million after ``repeated
discharges of untreated or partially treated sewage to State waters.''
Secretary Del Toro and General Smith, why is it taking so long to
address the wastewater treatment plant that threatens the environment
and racks up millions of dollars in fines that will be incurred by
taxpayers?
Secretary Del Toro. The Marine Corps recognizes our role in
protecting the waters of Hawai'i and is taking steps to improve the
Marine Corps Base Hawai'i (MCBH) Kane.ohe Bay Water Reclamation
Facility (KBRF) by planning, programming, and executing projects to
improve the condition and capabilities of the system.
Work is ongoing for two major repair projects totaling
$15M in improvements to the KBRF secondary clarifier and primary
digester.
The USMC is designing a project to install a redundant
disinfection system, which will correct the deficiency noted in the
2022 Notice of Violation and Order.
The P-875 Water Reclamation Facility Improvement military
construction project will provide a parallel treatment system to
address maintenance and other system outages. With the $109M in funding
received from the fiscal year 2024 appropriations, the project is
scheduled for award in June 2025. We anticipate a projected completion
date of July 2028 subject to receiving the remainder of funding in
subsequent appropriations.
The cost of these facilities is significant, and we are
grateful for congressional action to incrementally fund the WRF from
the CMC's UPL. We appreciate Congress' continued support for the
remainder of the funding in future years.
General Smith. The Marine Corps recognizes our role in protecting
the waters of Hawai'i and is taking steps to improve the Marine Corps
Base Hawai'i (MCBH) Kaneohe Bay Water Reclamation Facility (KBRF) by
planning, programming, and executing projects to improve the condition
and capabilities of the system.
Work is ongoing for two major repair projects totaling $15M in
improvements to the KBRF secondary clarifier and primary digester.
The USMC is designing a project to install a redundant disinfection
system, which will correct the deficiency noted in the 2022 Notice of
Violation and Order.
The P-875 Water Reclamation Facility Improvement military
construction project will provide a parallel treatment system to
address maintenance and other system outages. With the $109M in funding
received from the fiscal year 2024 appropriations, the project is
scheduled for award in June 2025. We anticipate a projected completion
date of July 2028 subject to receiving the remainder of funding in
subsequent appropriations.
The cost of these facilities is significant, and we are grateful
for congressional action to incrementally fund the WRF from the CMC's
UPL. We appreciate Congress' continued support for the remainder of the
funding in future years.
waterfront production facility
19. Senator Hirono. Secretary Del Toro, I am also concerned about
the Waterfront Production Facility at Pearl Harbor. Last year we
appropriated $49 million for planning and design and this year there is
a request for an additional $105 million, also for planning and design
funds only. Secretary Del Toro, what concrete steps are you taking to
make sure that we stay on time and on budget?
Secretary Del Toro. The complexity of constructing the Waterfront
Production Facility for future resiliency and agility without impacting
Fleet readiness requires substantial planning and design which will
increase the fidelity of cost and schedule estimates prior to key
contract awards. To better manage the Waterfront Production Facility
and all shipyard infrastructure projects, the Navy has implemented
organizational and technical reforms to improve the Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) governance and execution.
The Navy established the Program Executive Officer for Industrial
Infrastructure and is establishing formal capability requirements and
key performance parameters for the Waterfront Production Facility with
the rigor, discipline, and oversight equivalent to the Navy's major
weapons systems.
20. Senator Hirono. Secretary Del Toro, I would like your
commitment that the $105 million will cover all of the planning and
design requirements to allow the facility to be built in fiscal year
2027 as currently planned.
Secretary Del Toro. If appropriated, the $105M requested in the
Navy's PB 25 Unfunded Priorities List for the Waterfront Production
Facility (WPF) at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (PHNS) is expected to
support planning and design requirements.
To better manage the PHNS WPF and all shipyard infrastructure
projects, the Navy has implemented organizational and technical reforms
to improve the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP)
governance and execution. The Navy established the Program Executive
Office for Industrial Infrastructure and is establishing formal
capability requirements and key performance parameters for the PHNS WPF
with the rigor, discipline, and oversight equivalent to the Navy's
major weapons systems. This will ensure the fidelity of cost and
schedule estimates prior to key contract awards.
pearl harbor surface ship piers
21. Senator Hirono. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti, the
surface ship piers at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard are in disrepair,
with a majority of the berths unavailable for use. Those that are
available also require a firefighting waiver for ships in maintenance
availabilities. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti, what is your
plan to repair the surface ship piers at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard
and eliminate the need for waivers?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. The Navy has developed
projects to address the surface ship pier condition in Pearl Harbor.
These projects include electrical capability enhancements (to award
this year), phased refurbishment of the depot-level surface maintenance
piers, and a floating dry dock in the mid-fiscal year 2030's.
22. Senator Hirono. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti, what
can be done to make pier-side maintenance more efficient?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. Investment in Joint Base
Pearl Harbor-Hickam is amongst the Navy's top priorities for investment
in surface ship infrastructure over coming years and has several
projects in various stages of planning and design to address pier
condition. Planned infrastructure projects also include pier side
workforce consolidation and pier laydown configuration improvements.
Investments in these infrastructure projects will collectively support
more efficient execution of pier side surface ship maintenance demand
in Pearl Harbor.
quality of life
23. Senator Hirono. General Smith, welcome back. It is good to see
you again. The Marine Corps' number one unfunded priority is the
restoration and modernization of unaccompanied barracks and housing as
part of the program Barracks 2030 that you mandated to help improve
quality of life. You formally approved the plan in November 2023 which
is why it is included in your Unfunded Priority List. How do you think
Barrack 2030 will affect recruitment, retention and readiness?
General Smith. Our Barracks 2030 investment is consistent with the
Marine Corps' promise to take care of our marines. The plan is an
actionable and visible sign of our commitment to providing comfortable,
clean, and well managed living spaces. This will provide marines living
conditions to maintain peak readiness, attract recruits who desire to
be a U.S. Marine, and ultimately influence a marine's decision to
remain in the Corps. The implementation, communication, and execution
of Barracks 2030 is a generational investment opportunity to provide
tangible actions to get after and maintain high levels of recruitment,
retention, and readiness.
quality of life
24. Senator Hirono. Admiral Franchetti, in the same vein, I am
happy to see that your budget includes funds to renovate or upgrade
housing at six key Naval Bases. Can you discuss what other actions the
Navy is taking to ensure quality of service issues are being addressed,
especially for our unaccompanied servicemembers?
Admiral Franchetti. Quality of Service (QOS) remains one of my
highest priorities as the Chief of Naval Operations. To codify our
commitment to improving QOS in Unaccompanied Housing (UH), the Navy has
developed an initiative called Forging Communities of Excellence. This
plan identifies three distinct lines of effort to improve QOS:
Facilities Improvement, Management, and Quality of Life.
In my testimony, I identified our facility investment request to
support facility improvement. Our focus is to improve facilities
condition, optimize inventory through military construction, and expand
privatization initiatives.
We are also improving delivery of our services through more
effective management practices and increased responsiveness. The Navy
will ensure consistent service through a well-sourced, adequately
trained, and sufficiently equipped civilian workforce by focusing on
career development, optimization, and resourcing.
In 2022, Navy introduced a QR code program that provides easy
access for military UH residents to report an issue with their
residence. This program has increased the number of service calls and
improved maintenance reporting since its implementation in fiscal year
2023. The expansion of this program will automate the interface between
enterprise Military Housing, the DOD Housing Information Management
System and MAXIMO, the Public
Works Maintenance Management System. Streamlining the data transfer
process will reduce redundancy, improve responsiveness and tracking,
and increase visibility to maintenance issues and status of resolution.
In February 2024, Navy initiated an Internet Connectivity Pilot
program to provide free Wi-Fi to sailors in 12 Hampton Roads area
permanent party UH facilities, located at Naval Station Norfolk,
Portsmouth Naval Medical Center, and Norfolk Naval Shipyard. The pilot
is offered through the Navy's Virtual Single Sailor Program under MWR
and provides a level of free high-speed connectivity sufficient to
permit streaming, web browsing, communications with family and friends,
remote learning, and professional training. It provides subsidized
options for those sailors who desire to buy additional speed in support
of advanced gaming requirements.
In addition to the Wi-Fi pilot to improve the Quality of Life for
our sailors, we have:
Expanded cooking capability within UH to facilitate and
increase access to healthy food options. Sailors can utilize more types
of personally owned cooking appliances in all UH rooms on Navy
installations. The list of permitted small cooking appliances is
approved at the installation level and is based on the buildings'
electrical load capacity and adequacy of fire suppression to ensure
resident safety.
Invested approximately $50 million this year in
furnishings, with the potential to provide full furnishing replacement
in over 63 buildings at 35 locations such as NAS Lemoore, NAS Key West
and NS Great Lakes.
Expanding 24/7 access to at least one MWR Fitness Centers
per installation across the enterprise with no restrictions on access
to certain fitness equipment such as free weights.
Relaxed requirements at our RV parks for length of stay.
We have increased prioritization of reservations and support for geo-
bachelors and sailors on temporary assignment who utilize the RV parks
as a cost-effective housing option when separated from their families.
Forging Communities of Excellence supports our covenant to provide
safe, quality housing for our sailors codified in the UH Bill of Rights
and Responsibilities released last year. This covenant sets clear
expectations regarding what the Navy guarantees to provide for sailors
and what the expectations are of residents. By setting a collaborative
tone with UH residents, we will continue to improve the quality of UH
accommodations as well as sailors' overall wellness and satisfaction
with life in the Navy.
uss boxer
25. Senator Hirono. General Smith, the 15th Marine Expeditionary
Unit is embarked on the USS Boxer. The Boxer left San Diego on April
1st to deploy to the Indo-Pacific to participate in exercises like
Cobra Gold off Thailand and another with the Philippines.
Unfortunately, the Boxer returned to San Diego on April 11th with a
damaged rudder and remains pier-side in San Diego. General Smith, do
you have concerns about the size and readiness of our amphibious fleet?
General Smith. The Marine Expeditionary Unit remains our crown
jewel, and the Navy's Amphibious Warfare Ships and surface connectors
are key enablers of our critical missions of campaigning and crisis
response. The MEU remains in high demand by Combatant Commanders,
partners, and allies; our MEUs respond to crisis all over the globe and
prevent them from turning into a larger conflict. Amphibious Warfare
Ships enable our global, persistent presence--that presence has been
the guarantor of the peace and worldwide prosperity for the better part
of the last century. No platform or unit is capable of a more diverse
set of missions from the low-end to the high-end of military
operations.
The CNO and I have locked shields, and there is no space between us
on the requirement for Amphibious Warfare Ships--to include
procurement, construction, maintenance, or availability. My best
military judgment is that the Fiscal Year 2025 Thirty Year Shipbuilding
Plan adequately commits to the continuation of the LPD Flight II
Program on 2-year centers--to include full funding for LPD33 in this
fiscal year, the calendar year 2024 delivery of LPD 29 USS McCool, and
LHA production on 4-year centers--sustaining the bare minimum of no
less than 31 amphibious warfare ships, of which not less than 10 shall
be amphibious assault ships. The CNO and I continue to work through
paths to improve amphibious warfare ship readiness to ensure global,
persistent presence of Marine Expeditionary Units in support of
Combatant Commander demands.
26. Senator Hirono. General Smith, how do the maintenance delays
impact the Marine Corps' ability to do its job?
General Smith. When there are gaps in global Amphibious Ready
Group/ Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEU) coverage, the Nation risks
not having the right assets capable of getting to the crisis in time to
matter. If the U.S. is not able to perform this role, our adversaries
would likely step in with their forces and their messaging. Marines
deployed forward as sea-based expeditionary forces, and regularly on
amphibious warfare ships, allow us to train with our partners in peace
and support them when they need help.
red hill
27. Senator Hirono. Secretary Del Toro, the Navy recently assumed
command of the Red Hill Closure Task Force. While I know Admiral Wade
and the Joint Task force worked diligently alongside State and Federal
partners to safely remove all of the fuel from the facility in recent
months, that is only the beginning--more hard work remains. What is
your view regarding the Department's long-term responsibility for the
environmental restoration and remediation efforts following the
permanent closure of Red Hill in 2027 to ensure Oahu's aquifer is
protected?
Secretary Del Toro. On March 28, 2024, authority over the Red Hill
Bulk Fuel Storage Facility (RHBFSF) transferred from the Joint Task
Force--Red Hill (JTF-RH), who completed their defueling mission, to the
Navy Closure Task Force--Red Hill (NCTF-RH). The mission of the NCTF-RH
is to execute the permanent decommissioning of the RHBFSF safely and
expeditiously, and continue long-term environmental remediation in
coordination with State and Federal stakeholders in order to protect
public health and the environment. Tank closure operations are expected
to take three to 4 years while the environmental remediation efforts
will be an enduring mission whose timeline will be initially defined by
the results of a Site Assessment that will begin conducting
environmental sampling in early 2025. The Site Assessment report will
define areas requiring further investigation and/or remediation.
More broadly, the Navy is working closely with State partners such
as the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) to implement
landscape scale watershed management projects, to improve water quality
and security and provide other environmental benefits. For example,
with $16 million in support from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Readiness and Environmental Protection Integration Program, the Navy is
partnering with DLNR to protect and restore over 7,000 acres in the
Waiawa watershed to improve aquifer recharge, enhance native forests
and conserve native species, and safeguard drinking water.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
sailor mental health
28. Senator Kaine. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti,
during your testimony, you mentioned efforts by the Navy to ``limit the
amount of time that personnel have to actually spend in a Limited Duty
status'' to address the mental health challenges sailors on Limited
Duty are more likely to experience. What are the most prevalent reasons
for sailors spending an extended period of time in a Limited Duty
status?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. Time spent in a Limited
Duty status depends on several variables, to include the nature of
injury or medical condition. In arriving at Limited Duty status
recommendations for patients, medical providers must also factor time
for appropriate treatment and recovery based on common medical
guidelines and the individual sailor's progression.
Similar to dynamics in the private healthcare sector, the
availability of medically necessary specialty care services at military
medical treatment facilities or within the civilian network may
sometimes be delayed and thus, extend the timeframe of Limited Duty
status. Additionally, treatment responses may vary between sailors
based on the individual's requirement for more time to heal.
29. Senator Kaine. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti, what
measures have been implemented to decrease the average amount of time
sailors spend in a limited duty status?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. The Navy no longer
places sailors on a ``standard'' 6-month period of Limited Duty. Navy
medical providers currently apply ``Condition Based Limited Duty''
where the recommended time placed in this status is based on the
expected recovery of the sailor's particular medical condition.
Navy also requires local Command Deployability Coordinators across
the Fleet to monitor the Limited Duty population. Deployability
Coordinators will be established at the regional or Type Command level
to provide support and guidance to local Command Deployability
Coordinators. The coordinators manage their assigned sailors, help
obtain appointments, and advocate on their behalf throughout the
Limited Duty process.
30. Senator Kaine. Admiral Franchetti, your focus on developing a
mental health playbook and pushing mental health and behavioral health
resources into the operating forces is encouraging. You mentioned
efforts to establish a Limited Duty Coordinator at each command, as
well as efforts to take a look at what duties sailors can actually
perform while in a Limited Duty status. Keeping these sailors engaged
with their unit's mission is key to reinforcing that they are a
contributing part of the team and instilling a sense of purpose. Are
these efforts bearing fruit?
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy must be able to assign sailors to
meaningful employment in support of accomplishment of mission
objectives while ensuring that they have connectedness, team
integration, and a continued sense of purpose throughout their medical
care plans. In an effort to provide enhanced quality of service to the
Fleet, the dynamic nature of LIMDU distribution warranted
transformation. Primarily, the changes focus on the targeted
distribution of sailors based upon their medical limitations and the
gaining command's capacity to support, as well as effectively leading
sailors while providing meaningful employment.
Since September 2023, BUPERS implemented targeted distribution of
sailors at each command based on tailored LIMDU percentage caps for
LIMDU sailors. In July 2024, 10 months after the implementation of
tailored percentages, 93.5 percent of commands were at or below their
LIMDU capacity. LIMDU sailors are now more evenly spread throughout the
Navy and therefore have better access to mentors, meaningful work, and
resources to improve their quality of life while also continuing the
path to wellness. The total number of sailors on LIMDU has dropped by 5
percent since the implementation of tailored LIMDU distribution
indicating the potential for improved patient outcomes as a result of
increased access to command support.
``Meaningful employment'' is an intentional shift from ``work in
rate,'' which proved to be a limiting factor in the enlisted LIMDU
distribution process. To support this shift, BUMED developed a
methodology to identify medical limitations of LIMDU sailors, which
helps inform the detailing process in order to achieve a better
coupling of the inbound LIMDU sailor and the gaining command. The LIMDU
Smart system has been updated to include LIMDU categories and BUMED
continues to train and promote the use of these categories in order to
continue toward the goal of matching the sailor to the Command where
both entities can thrive.
31. Senator Kaine. Admiral Franchetti, do all commands now have a
Limited Duty Coordinator and if not, when will all commands have one?
Admiral Franchetti. No. As of July 2024, roughly half of commands
with more than 25 personnel assigned have a Command Deployability
Coordinator identified in the MyNavy Assignment system. Command
Deployability Coordinators provide oversight and management of the
Limited Duty/Disability Evaluation System personnel to ensure that
these sailors are fully integrated into assigned commands and attend
all of their necessary medical and administrative appointments. Efforts
continue for all commands to have access to a Command Deployability
Coordinator by December 2024. Our intent is to provide this coverage by
harnessing the connectivity provided through the Regional Deployability
Coordinators at the type commander level.
32. Senator Kaine. Admiral Franchetti, how are you balancing the
risks of keeping injured sailors engaged in the mission with the
potential for re-injury?
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy has made significant changes to
Limited Duty (LIMDU) distribution in the past year. Through the
Disability Evaluation System (DES) and LIMDU Sprint, we have
incorporated seven Regional Deployability Coordinators (RDCs) that are
embedded into TYCOMs to oversee the disability system and ensure
appropriate level of service and implementation.
Since September 2023, PERS-4 implemented targeted distribution of
sailors at each command based on tailored LIMDU percentage caps for
LIMDU sailors. LIMDU sailors are now more evenly spread throughout the
Navy and therefore have better access to mentors, meaningful work, and
resources to improve their quality of life while also continuing the
path to wellness.
``Meaningful employment'' is an intentional shift from ``work in
rate,'' which proved to be a limiting factor in the enlisted LIMDU
distribution process. As part of this shift, the LIMDU SMART system has
been updated to include LIMDU categories with the goal of matching the
sailor to the Command where injured sailors can remain engaged in the
mission with minimal risk for reinjury, and the ability to best support
the Command in which they are assigned.
33. Senator Kaine. Admiral Franchetti, you mentioned efforts to
take a look at shipyard manning for extended overhaul periods to ensure
sailors don't spend their entire first enlistment in a 5-year overhaul.
This represents a significant personnel management challenge, given
deployment rotations and the need to ensure ships have enough sailors
to complete their requirements, even during an overhaul. What
strategies are you employing to ensure that all sailors have the
opportunity to serve on ships at sea during their initial period of
obligated service?
Admiral Franchetti. Navy is employing multiple lines of action to
ensure sailors can serve in operational assignments, not simply in
shipyards, during their first term of enlistment. First, we tasked the
Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) to perform a requirements
analysis of the manpower that is necessary for a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier (CVN) in a refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH),
during the period of time the CVN is actively undergoing maintenance.
This study was recently completed and will serve to reduce the number
of sailors required to be assigned to a CVN in RCOH during the
maintenance window.
In addition, the Navy is working on a system to phase-in 24 month
initial orders for first-term sailors who would be assigned to a CVN in
RCOH, and rotate them off the CVN to a follow-on operational sea tour.
Updated policy is being codified in the OPNAVINST 1300.21 and will meet
my and the Secretary of the Navy's direction that sailors can spend at
least half of their first enlistment in operational duty.
Finally, sailors may opt to remain on the ship in maintenance, so
Navy type commanders have already been sending sailors on shipyard duty
to temporary duty assignments on operational assets to allow them to
use the expertise we trained them for and keep them ready for follow-on
assignments. About 20-25 percent first-term sailors are away at a time
learning their rate, while their ships remain in availabilities.
overseas ship repair
34. Senator Kaine. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti, in
light of the issues our shipbuilding and ship repair industries are
facing, looking for ways to outsource work and increase our capacity
makes sense. However, there are some legitimate concerns that arise
when we talk about conducting ship repair overseas, even with our
partners. I'm sure you're aware of the competing narratives that are
building in response to your desire to leverage our partners,
particularly Japan and South Korea, to conduct more of these kinds of
repairs overseas. What would be the scope of these repairs, and how
would they deviate from work that has been conducted overseas in the
past?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. The Navy seeks authority
for the execution of limited maintenance overseas, for ships homeported
in the United States or Guam. The Navy submitted a legislative proposal
accompanying PB25 to this effect. These authorities provide the
mechanisms required for the Navy to exercise and improve the ability to
conduct preventative maintenance meant to extend military operations
within highly contested environments.
Current law (10 USC Sec. 8680) allows for the execution of
overseas maintenance, repair, or overhaul on ships in the following
cases: (1) maintenance and repair of ships homeported outside of the
United States or Guam (also known as forward deployed naval forces
(FDNF)), unless they are within a certain window of homeport change;
(2) corrective and preventative maintenance or repair and facilities
maintenance for Littoral Combat Ships while on deployment; (3) repair
and refurbishment of submarines involved in submarines security
activities between the AUKUS partners in specified circumstances; and
(4) voyage repairs or repairs necessary to correct damage sustained due
to hostile actions or interventions for vessels with a homeport in
United States or Guam. The exclusive use of FDNF ships for the purpose
of conducting such maintenance would increase the time FDNF sailors are
out of homeport (also known as personnel tempo); negatively impact
high-tempo FDNF operations; and fail to realistically exercise the
required capability.
This proposal would also support improved coordination with our
international partners in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and U.S.
European Command areas, such as: Australia, Japan, South Korea,
Republic of the Philippines, Oman, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, Greece, Croatia, Norway, United Kingdom, and others.
35. Senator Kaine. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti, how
do you plan to address the concerns of labor unions and the American
shipbuilding industry regarding the proposed expansion of overseas
repair?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. The Navy seeks authority
for the execution of limited maintenance overseas, for ships homeported
in the United States or Guam. These authorities provide the mechanisms
required for the Navy to exercise and improve the ability to conduct
preventative maintenance meant to extend military operations within
highly contested environments. The legislative proposal was drafted to
support wartime preparedness while also minimizing the impact on the US
repair industrial base by limiting maintenance duration and scope.
Accordingly, the proposed expansion of overseas maintenance is not
expected to reduce the quantity of domestic depot maintenance
availabilities.
virginia-class submarines: submarine industrial base
36. Senator Kaine. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti, the
Fiscal Year 2025 President's Budget Request includes procurement for
one Virginia-class submarine, which deviates from the two submarines we
signaled to industry and projected in the 30-year shipbuilding plan.
What impact will procuring just one Virginia-class submarine in fiscal
year 2025 have on our industrial base?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. The single SSN
procurement in fiscal year 2025 provides an opportunity for the
shipbuilders to balance production for Virginia-class Submarine Block
VI construction and serial Columbia production in fiscal year 2026 and
allows for maturation of improvements in manufacturing, outfitting and
assembly as well as industrial base investments.
The Fiscal Year 2025 President's Budget Request maintains prior
year Advance Procurement and Economic Order Quantity funding for two
SSNs to ensure industrial base stability with continued material
procurement activities. Additionally, Submarine Industrial Base (SIB)
investments proposed in the fiscal year 2025 budget expand upon the
foundational investments made in PB23 and PB24 and are critical to
shore up the SIB to reduce the current backlog in SSN production and
ramp up to the SSN production rate needed to support the Navy's SSN
requirement and the commitment to the AUKUS partnership.
The Navy values all vendors involved in our submarine industrial
base and will work with the shipbuilders to ensure stability across the
vendor base.
virginia-class submarines: aukus
37. Senator Kaine. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti,
Failure to keep the production of Virginia-class submarines on track
also has impacts to our international partnerships. To meet our
commitments under AUKUS Pillar I, we need to ramp up production to
provide Australia with the advanced submarine technology necessary to
support Indo-Pacific security. How are we reassuring our Australian
allies of our commitment to Pillar I?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. We are assuring our
allies of the United States' commitment to AUKUS Pillar 1 through our
actions, starting with Congress passing both the Fiscal Year 2024
National Security Supplemental Appropriations Act that included $3.0
billion in Submarine Industrial Base (SIB) funding, and the Fiscal Year
2024 National Defense Authorization Act that included four provisions
that explicitly support AUKUS Pillar 1. Additionally, we have inducted
more than eighty Australians into our submarine training pipelines,
assigned six Australian officers to operational Virginia-class
submarines, and more than 30 Australian sailors to a submarine tender
to broaden their skills.
Further, the Administration has programmed $11.4 billion over the
FYDP to uplift the U.S. SIB to meet our national requirements of
building one Columbia-class SSBN and two Virginia-class SSNs by 2028.
Australia's proportional investment into the U.S. SIB will serve to
increase Virginia-class production to 2.33 Virginia-class SSNs per year
to replace the submarines sold to Australia.
barracks 2030
38. Senator Kaine. General Smith, I understand you're taking a hard
look at your unaccompanied housing and have an initiative called
Barracks 2030. My concern is that your budget documents say that you
have $15.8 billion in deferred maintenance and you would need
approximately $1.5 billion per year just to bring some of your barracks
up to ``good or fair'' condition, yet only $274 million is slated to go
toward barracks in fiscal year 2025. How do you plan to tackle this
problem using the existing resources and authorities at your disposal?
General Smith. The Barracks 2030 initiative will improve the Marine
Corps' management of the barracks, right size and modernize the
barracks inventory, and update the refresh rate of the materials and
furnishings in the barracks. Significant investment in modernization of
facilities is planned to begin in fiscal year 2026. This allows the
Marine Corps to plan and align existing resources and authorities
toward our three primary lines of effort (management, modernization,
material). We are aligning existing resources and authorities to
execute Barracks 2030 now in a fiscally responsible manner. Investments
in fiscal year 2025 will address some of the Marine Corps' highest
priority barracks initiatives and reflect an increase in year over year
for restoration and modernization investments. Additionally, a U.S.
Army Corp of Engineer-led utilization study in fiscal year 2025 will
inform a multi-FYDP enterprise-wide modernization profile for our
barracks inventory.
39. Senator Kaine. General Smith, is it even feasible to approach
this strictly with MILCON and FSRM dollars or do you think there are
other methods that the Marine Corps hasn't typically leveraged, like
privatization, that would help you get to good faster?
General Smith. The Marine Corps is exploring all levels of
investment and authorities to implement Barracks 2030, to include
privatization. As privatization assessments continue, we will keep you
informed on the status and how privatization may fit into our ongoing
barracks efforts.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
kennebec river dredging
40. Senator King. Secretary Del Toro, there is a Federal Navigation
Project (FNP) with a control depth of 27' from the mouth of the
Kennebec River at Popham to the Sagadohoc Bridge just north of the
shipyard. In this 12-mile channel there are two areas that historically
have suffered shoaling which requires dredging to maintain this control
depth: Doubling Point area (south of the shipyard) and the Sugarloafs
(river mouth). Recently, a third area has required dredging, referred
to as North Channel Area (immediately to the east of General Dynamics
Bath Iron Works Pier 2). My understanding is that Bath Iron Works is a
customer of the FNP and does not have responsibility for the
maintenance of it, and that the FNP is the responsibility of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers. The USN has provided funding to the USACE for
dredging maintenance of the channel. Furthermore, the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers and the Department of the Navy signed a Kennebec River
Long-Term Dredging Memorandum of Agreement in January 2020 to detail
the responsibilities of each in the Kennebec River. In 2022, Emergency
Maintenance Dredging of the FNP in the lower Kennebec River was
conducted due to a Navy mission requirement--it was funded by the Navy,
using Operation and Maintenance funds. This year, winter storms have
exasperated the shoaling of the Kennebec. Does your budget request
include funding for USACE's dredging project?
Secretary Del Toro. The dredging project is planned for December
2024; and the funding required for contract award and dredging project
execution is already in place.
41. Senator King. Secretary Del Toro, what is the status of funding
this dredging project for fiscal year 2024?
Secretary Del Toro. The total funding requirement ($2.2M) has been
provided to Supervisor of Shipbuilding in Bath, ME. They will provide
the funding to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers who will commence the
bidding and contract award process within the next few weeks to support
the dredging project planned for December 2024.
readiness
42. Senator King. Secretary Del Toro, during the hearing you
testified regarding the improvements in shipyards' performance for
conducting repairs. Please provide a breakdown of how the Navy has
improved throughput of submarine and ship maintenance from fiscal year
2018 to the current fiscal year.
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy's performance for non-nuclear surface
ships and the nuclear fleet, which includes submarines and aircraft
carriers, has improved throughput since fiscal year 2018, using the
metric of Days of Maintenance Delay (DoMD). DoMD measures the total
number of days beyond the scheduled maintenance period that a vessel
remained in the shipyard.
For non-nuclear surface ships, DoMD, for depot level
availabilities, has decreased from over 7,000 days in fiscal year 2019
to 4,006 days, reflecting streamlined processes and improved planning.
For submarine and aircraft carriers, utilizing a 3-year
rolling average, DOMD has decreased from 1,462 days in fiscal year 2019
to 1,094 days.
Non-nuclear surface ships and the nuclear fleet rely on different
maintenance providers. The Navy contracts non-nuclear surface ships
work to commercial ship repair yards, while submarines rely upon the
public naval shipyards (NSY). As a result, their key levers for
improving maintenance differ:
Non-nuclear surface ship key levers include:
o Reducing unplanned work through improved planning and
execution practices
o Leveling port loading to improve contract changes cycle times
o Improving Weekly Integrated Production Schedule First Pass
Yield
Additionally, initiatives like early identification of unplanned
work and ensuring Long Lead Time Material availability by specific
milestones have proven pivotal in enhancing maintenance efficiency and
improving overall fleet operational readiness.
Nuclear fleet key levers include:
o Reducing NSY attrition rates: Improved Federal wage system
wage increases have resulted in a current corporate attrition rate of
less than 5 percent
o Implementing common operating systems across public naval
shipyards
o Improved planning, modernization, and material management
o Balanced public and private workloads, outsourcing, and
workforce development
o Implementing common operating systems across public naval
shipyards
43. Senator King. Secretary Del Toro, what are the key levers that
help improve maintenance throughput for ships, submarines, and
aircraft?
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy's maintenance operations for non-
nuclear surface ships, submarines, aircraft carriers, and aircraft have
achieved substantial efficiency gains. These approaches have minimized
downtime, optimized resource utilization, and ultimately enhanced
overall operational readiness. Through targeted reforms, data-driven
strategies, and collaborative efforts, the Navy ensures that its fleet
remains mission-capable and ready to meet the demands of national
defense.
Improving maintenance throughput for non-nuclear surface ships,
submarines, aircraft carriers, and aircraft hinges on several key
levers. These include optimizing the use of public and private
maintenance yards, implementing streamlined processes and advanced
planning techniques, and ensuring the availability of necessary
materials and parts. Additionally, enhancing workforce capabilities
through targeted training and retention strategies, leveraging
technology for predictive maintenance and efficient scheduling, and
fostering collaboration among stakeholders are crucial.
Non-nuclear surface ship maintenance in the Navy is driven by
Performance-to-Plan (P2P), focusing on key metrics and adherence to
schedules. Key levers include:
Reducing unplanned work through improved planning and
execution practices
Leveling port loading to improve contract changes cycle
times
Improving Weekly Integrated Production Schedule First
Pass Yield
With respect to the nuclear fleet, which includes submarines and
aircraft carriers, the Navy has actively pursued maintenance
improvements through the following key levers:
Reducing NSY attrition rates: Improved Federal wage
system wage increases have resulted in a current corporate attrition
rate of less than 5 percent
Implementing common operating systems across public naval
shipyards
Improved planning, modernization, and material management
Balanced public and private workloads, outsourcing, and
workforce development
Implementing common operating systems across public naval
shipyards
With respect to the nuclear fleet, which includes submarines and
aircraft carriers, the Navy has actively pursued maintenance
improvements through the following key levers:
For aircraft, the Naval Aviation Enterprise launched the Naval
Sustainment System-Aviation (NSS-A) readiness initiative to boost
aircraft maintenance throughput at Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs). A
major aspect, FRC Reform, aimed to cut Turn Around Times (TAT) for
repairs and maintenance to include the following key levers:
Utilizing data-driven approaches, root cause analysis,
and P2P to ensure accountability and timely actions.
Improved forecasting, collaboration with supply agencies,
and artisan utilization from below 65 percent to over 80 percent, which
led to a rise in component On-Time Delivery (OTD) from 850 percent to
100 percent, ensuring better part availability for the military.
44. Senator King. Admiral Franchetti, I appreciate your efforts to
bring ``more players to the field.'' Please explain how Navy has
improved operational availability of ship, submarine, and aviation
units since fiscal year 2018 to the current fiscal year, providing
specific data.
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy is concentrated on getting more
operationally ready, capable players on the field--people and
platforms. Since 2018, the Navy has been focused on readiness recovery
and our force is in a higher State of operational readiness today than
prior to 2017 with a healthier surge force, improved shipboard manning,
better training for our crews, and improved parts availability.
Increased funding starting in fiscal year 2018, combined with cultural
reforms throughout the fleet, have arrested the decline in our
operational readiness and put us on a path to recovery. For ship,
submarine, and aviation units specifically, we remain committed to
improving maintenance processes and reducing maintenance delays that
limit operational readiness through data driven approaches and learning
from industry best practices. Still, we have much work to do.
Our most significant progress in increasing operational
availability is with aviation units. In 2018 and the preceding decade,
the number of F/A-18 E/F mission capable aircraft was flat at 250
aircraft, below the required number of 341. In fiscal year 2019, using
Perform to Plan (P2P) and the Naval Sustainment System (NSS) processes,
we achieved the mission capable target of 341 Super Hornets and an 80
percent mission capable rate in our fleet squadrons. Navy has sustained
this mission capable rate for Super Hornet aircraft over the last 5
fiscal years to today, and is applying these P2P and NSS principles to
improve operational readiness across the aviation fleet. With this
increased aircraft availability, our aircrew are more ready to fly,
fight, and win than prior to 2017. These improvements enabled quick
response by Carrier Strike Groups over the past year in the
Mediterranean and Red Seas.
The Navy continues to apply a similar approach to improving ship
maintenance. Key efforts to improve ship maintenance include modifying
contract strategies, increasing dry dock capacity, improving
availability planning, procuring material, adjusting maintenance
durations to better align workload with shipyard capacity, prioritizing
the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program, and investing to
improve the overall health of the industrial base and supply chain.
The metric that most clearly demonstrates the severity of not
attaining an on-time delivery of an availability is Days of Maintenance
Delay (DoMD). For submarine maintenance, while DoMD for attack
submarines (SSN) is projected to increase in fiscal year 2024 due to
the re-baselining of several projects, there is a continuing reduction
in submarine idle time. In fiscal year 2019, SSNs had 1,536 DoMD. In
fiscal year 2023, this was down to 955 DoMD, a 38 percent reduction.
For surface ship maintenance, DoMD in private shipyards peaked in
fiscal year 2019 and has trended downward since then. From fiscal year
2022 to fiscal year 2023, the Navy reduced surface ship DoMD by 18
percent--from 3,456 days to 2,839 days--and saw a slight improvement in
on-time availability completion (from 36 percent in fiscal year 2022 to
41 percent in fiscal year 2023). The Navy's fiscal year 2025
President's Budget prioritizes and increases funding for ship
maintenance to further improve shipyard performance and reduce DoMD.
budgetary needs
45. Senator King. Admiral Franchetti and General Smith, marines and
sailors are responding in an impressive way to the critical operations
around the globe. The Navy and Marine Corps Team is contributing in a
significant way to international peace and stability. My observation is
that the Navy is increasing its presence globally, including extending
deployments of sailors aboard ships, aircraft, and aviation squadrons
this year as a result of wars in Gaza and Ukraine. Based on an apparent
increase in operations in fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2024, what
will the impact be on sailors and marines in terms of budgetary needs
for fiscal years 2025 and 2026 and other needs beyond budget authority?
Admiral Franchetti. We know that increasing the time ships spend at
sea, both due to longer deployments and increased days underway, drives
additional maintenance work at the shipyards after they return. We must
provide the full scope resources and afford the time to complete that
work and return these ships to the Fleet, ready to respond to the next
call for forces. The supplemental funding provided by Congress
supported our immediate operational costsWe currently estimate an
additional $300M will be required to perform the increased maintenance
work on the ships of the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group.
General Smith. Our Fiscal Year 2025 budget request highlights our
commitment to maintaining a balance between current and future
readiness to facilitate operations around the world. We're requesting
$17.4 billion in Fiscal Year 2025 for our Operation and Maintenance
accounts, 32 percent of our total budget request, to sustain our
current and projected operational requirements in support of the Joint
Force and national tasking. Our Fleet Marine Force, which is comprised
of all three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) and Marine Forces
Reserve (MARFORRES), are organized, trained, equipped, and postured to
conduct a variety of missions in support of Marine Corps Title 10
responsibilities. The Marine Corps maintains all organic crisis
response capabilities that enable the forward posture and rapid
deployment of flexible and tailorable forces to the needs of the
Combatant Commanders (COCOMs). The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) are the most common Navy-Marine Corps
tactical units that are forward deployed at the operational level and
can accomplish strategic level engagements--these MEUs are resident in
all MEFs. At the direction and request of COCOMs, units, such as the
Marine Littoral Regiment, can be organized, trained, and equipped to
conduct missions not normally assigned as core task.
46. Senator King. Admiral Franchetti and General Smith, similarly,
does your budget request for fiscal year 2025 and the FYDP account for
the maintenance demands for naval units by the Combatant Commanders?
Admiral Franchetti. Our budget request does account for the
baseline maintenance required to get ships through the shipyards and
back to the Fleet to meet our deployment commitments to the Combatant
Commanders. However, it does not encompass the increased maintenance
driven by higher deployed operating tempo and extended deployment
lengths to conduct ongoing combat operations in the Red Sea. We
currently estimate that $300 million will be required for increased
maintenance work in fiscal year 2025 on the ships of the Eisenhower
Carrier Strike Group.
General Smith. Bottom Line: Regarding fiscal year 2025 current
operations, training and readiness funding levels are on par with
required funding identified during POM-25, this equates to being
sufficiently funded to execute planned Global Force Management (GFM)
and Directed Readiness Table (DRT) requirements; additional funding
would be required to meet the inflated costs of training and deploying
the force for emergent requirements like crises and conflicts.
recruiting
47. Senator King. Admiral Franchetti and General Smith, during the
hearing, statements were made by my colleagues regarding the status of
recruiting for the Navy and Marine Corps. Please State for the record
the current status of your respective Service's recruiting goals for
fiscal year 2025, and how that compares to fiscal year 2021, fiscal
year 2022, and fiscal year 2023.
Admiral Franchetti. The fiscal year 2025 goals have not been
established, but the Active component (AC) Enlisted goal for fiscal
year 2024 is 40,600 which is higher than previous years as we took what
we missed last year and added it to what we need to do this year to
account for not just end strength, but also work requirements in the
Fleet that we need to maintain. The AC Officer goal for fiscal year
2024 is 4,235. The prior fiscal year AC enlisted goals were 37,700
(fiscal year 2023), 33,400 (fiscal year 2022) and 33,400 (fiscal year
2021). The prior fiscal year AC officer goals were 4,392 (fiscal year
2023), 4,529 (fiscal year 2022), and 4,570 (fiscal year 2021).
General Smith. Your Marine Corps remains on track for mission
success in fiscal year 2024. As of the close of June, Marine Corps
Recruiting Command has achieved 100.95 percent of our Active Duty
accession mission. This compares well with fiscal year 2021 at 100.39
percent, fiscal year 2022 at 100.11 percent, and fiscal year 2023 at
100.53 percent for the same date. The success of our hard-working
marines, sailors and civilians across the U.S. however remains perilous
due to the numerous headwinds faced in the current recruiting
environment. Our ability to achieve the mission and build back a
sufficient pool of delayed entry program applicants for fiscal year
2025 will be an incredibly difficult task, but one your marines will
work tirelessly to achieve. Timely, adequate funding for Marine Corps
recruiting, to include for advertising, will be key to mission
accomplishment.
48. Senator King. Admiral Franchetti and General Smith, Congress
authorized and appropriated additional funding to go toward recruiting
in fiscal year 2024. What has been the impact of delaying
appropriations for fiscal year 2024 on your respective Service's
recruiting efforts?
Admiral Franchetti. The delay in appropriations has directly
constrained our ability to develop and acquire recruiting leads and
associated new sailor contracts. Additionally, the number of career and
job fairs, conventions, and other recruiting events that the Navy uses
to reach discrete communities, such as Nuclear field, Medical, and
Civil Engineering, were reduced during the academic year due to the
inability to commit funds in a timely manner. Overall, the delayed
appropriations for fiscal year 2024 negatively impacted the Navy's
agility and capacity in implementing new and innovative strategies for
recruiting marketing and advertising and our ability to meet mission.
General Smith. Delays in appropriations funding causes uncertainty
across the force. They can impact recruiting and retention by hindering
the ability to pay bonuses and incentive pays. They also can impact
recruiting marketing and advertising efforts; persistent funding delays
and shortfalls lead to periods of media darkness and reduced lead
generation activity. We are always appreciative of Congress' efforts to
pay appropriations on time and to assist recruiting efforts with
additional funding. Additional funding this year was critical to assist
in covering shortfalls created by high inflation which continues to
degrade program effectiveness and overall capabilities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
navy and marine corps sexual harassment and assault procedures
49. Senator Warren. Admiral Franchetti and General Smith, the
Department of Defense Inspector General April 2024 report on ``Review
of the Navy and Marine Corps Policies Covering Sexual Harassment
Complaint Processes'' (DODIG 2024-071) revealed deeply alarming gaps in
Navy and Marine Corps policies regarding sexual harassment. Current
DOD, Navy, and Marine Corps policies do not require officials to
document legal advisor and Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) opinions
related to dismissing, downgrading, or withdrawing a complaint; or to
investigate all severe and pervasive allegations; or to complete
investigation-related training for investigating officers selected to
investigate formal complaints; and they do not track the necessary data
to assess all aspects of sexual harassment programs. Why has the Navy
and Marine Corps failed to establish these processes?
Admiral Franchetti. The Department of Defense (DoD), with input
from the Department of the Navy (DON) and the military services is
currently overhauling DOD policy and program procedures in reference to
sexual harassment.
Once completed, these reforms will ensure proper alignment with
statutory and Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the
Military (IRC-SAM) requirements and provide higher-level guidance to
address any remaining policy gaps, including those noted in the DODIG
report. This revised DOD policy, along with the inclusion of sexual
harassment as a covered offense that must be referred to the Office of
Special Trial Counsel, will directly impact respective service
policies. Once this policy is published, DON, Navy and Marine Corps
will update policies and procedures accordingly.
In the meantime, DON has developed the Misconduct Report Incident
Tracker (MRIT) case management system which will capture key data on
all Military Equal Opportunity complaints and include a tracking
mechanism for withdrawn or downgraded complaints, if there is still a
need for that process.
General Smith. The Marine Corps believes that no person should be
subject to sexual harassment and want anyone who believes they have
been harassed to report it so that it can be investigated.
The Marine Corps is in the process of updating our sexual
harassment prevention and response branch to better align with current
statutory and DOD policy, to include IRC recommendations. We have made
significant progress in aligning current policy with current statutory
and DOD requirements and will continue to do so. We reviewed the DOD IG
report through the lens of making potential changes that will improve
sexual harassment prevention and response. We recently published policy
guidance to implement some of the recommendations; for others, we are
collaborating with DOD on guidance. We are always looking to adopt best
practices.
50. Senator Warren. Admiral Franchetti and General Smith, I am
extremely concerned that despite these obvious gaps, the Navy or Marine
Corps disagreed or only partially agreed to several of the IG
recommendations. When will the Navy and Marine Corps implement all the
IG recommendations?
Admiral Franchetti. The Department of Defense (DoD) is currently
revising its sexual harassment and assault policies which will mandate
formal complaints of sexual harassment be investigated by an
independent investigator and adjudicated by the Office of Special Trial
Council. This updated policy guidance is expected prior to January 2025
in accordance with Public Law 117-263. This updated policy will inform
implementation or address all DOD IG recommendations.
General Smith. The Marine Corps is in the process of updating our
sexual harassment prevention and response branch to better align with
current statutory and DOD policy, to include IRC recommendations. We
have made significant progress in aligning current policy with current
statutory and DOD requirements and will continue to do so. We reviewed
the DOD IG report through the lens of making potential changes that
will improve sexual harassment prevention and response. We recently
published policy guidance to implement some of the recommendations; for
others, we are collaborating with DOD on guidance. We are always
looking to adopt best practices. Without exception, the Marine Corps
believes that no person should be subject to sexual harassment and want
anyone who believes they have been harassed to report it so that it can
be investigated.
51. Senator Warren. General Smith, the Inspector General found that
the Marine Corps does not have a requirement for commanders ``to
consult MEO and legal advisors before declining a complainant's initial
request for formal resolution and instead processing the complaint
under informal resolution process.'' How many times over the past 5
years has the Marine Corps denied a complainant's request for formal
resolution and downgraded the complaint instead? Under what grounds?
General Smith. Before May of this year, DOD policy did not require
Equal Opportunity Advisors (EOAs) to record informal complaints,
complaints dismissed by the commander, or complaints resolved using
conflict management. Service EOAs now acknowledge the receipt of the
informal complaint, create a case number in system of record, and
forward the complaint to the subject's commander. EOAs now also ensure
the complainant is informed on reporting options, investigation process
and progress, available support services, procedures for filing a
complaint of reprisal or retaliation, and appeal rights.
52. Senator Warren. Admiral Franchetti, the IG found there is no
process in the Navy to document an individual's decision to withdraw a
complaint to confirm that they are not withdrawing this complaint
because of inappropriate pressure and influence. An Office of People
Analytics report found that, ``47 percent of women and 43 percent of
men in the Navy who made a sexual harassment complaint were encouraged
to drop the issue.'' When will the Navy require this documentation?
Admiral Franchetti. In July 2024, the Secretary of the Navy issued
updated Sexual Harassment tracking and reporting guidance directing the
use of a Misconduct Reporting Incident Tracker (MRIT) system as a
centralized case management tool for all reports of harassment. The
MRIT system went live in July 2024 and includes tracking of complaint
withdrawals.
53. Senator Warren. Admiral Franchetti and General Smith, what
policies do the Navy and Marine Corps have in place to address and
prevent reporters of sexual harassment dropping complaints due to
inappropriate pressure and influence?
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy Harassment Prevention and Military
Equal Opportunity Program Manual includes a complaint retaliation
awareness appendix. This document reiterates that Service Members who
make a protected communication must be free from retaliation. It
directs the complainant's or alleged offender's chain of command to not
initiate any contact with the complainant, witness, potential witness,
or alleged offender; or solicit others to make contact on their behalf,
outside of that required by their official duties. The policy directs
that upon receipt and acceptance of a formal complaint this appendix is
required to be reviewed and signed by the chain of command of the
complainant, the chain of command of the alleged offender, complainant,
alleged offender, witnesses, and the command climate specialist or
command managed equal opportunity program manager. All Navy personnel,
military and civilian, receive annual mandatory training on harassment
prevention and equal opportunity, which emphasizes that anyone involved
remain free from retaliation, regardless of involvement in any
particular case. In addition, Command Climate Specialists (CCS) and
Command Management Equal Opportunity (CMEO) Program Managers, who are
the subject matter experts at the command and are responsible for
command advisory, receive additional training on retaliation prevention
and response procedures outlined in Navy policy.
General Smith. Marine Corps policy states that commanders ensure
all reports are addressed in a fair, impartial, and timely manner, and
are appropriately resolved without fear of reprisal, intimidation, or
retaliation. Equal Opportunity Advisors provide the complainant with
information on how to report retaliation in connection with sexual
harassment. The Marine Corps believes there is no place for
inappropriate pressure or influence in the process and is working with
the Department of Navy and Department of Defense to update retaliation
requirements and procedures in connection with sexual harassment to
ensure the same.
54. Senator Warren. Admiral Franchetti and General Smith, Navy and
Marine Corps policies ``do not require designated officials to complete
investigation-related training when selected for the role of
investigating officer for a formal complaint.'' On what basis,
including on experience and training requirements, do the Navy and
Marine Corps select the investigating officer?
Admiral Franchetti. Navy's policy directs the commander to
implement a preliminary inquiry or command investigation as
appropriate, in line with the Manual of the Judge Advocate General. The
Manual of the Judge Advocate General directs that personnel detailed to
investigate shall be individuals who, in the opinion of the convening
authority, are best qualified by reason of their age, education,
training, experience, length of service, and temperament. The proposed
DOD policy includes training requirements for independent investigators
of formal sexual harassment complaints.
General Smith. In accordance with JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN),
convening authorities detail investigating officers who, in their
opinion, are best qualified by reason of their age, education,
training, experience, length of service, and temperament.
55. Senator Warren. Admiral Franchetti and General Smith, how many
informal, dismissed, or withdrawn sexual harassment complaints have
been made to the Navy and Marine Corps over the past 10 years?
Admiral Franchetti. Current DOD policy does not address nor require
the Services to implement processes for the dismissal or withdrawal of
complaints. Navy policy does outline processes for the dismissal and
withdrawal of complaints, however, the policy does not mandate the
reporting and tracking of dismissed or withdrawn complaints. Navy
policy began requiring the reporting and tracking of informal
complaints in fiscal year 2022. The Navy Harassment Prevention and
Military Equal Opportunity Office received 28 informal sexual
harassment complaints in fiscal year 2022 and 13 informal sexual
harassment complaints in fiscal year 2023. Navy has not received any
informal sexual harassment complaints in fiscal year 2024 thus far.
General Smith. DoD policy does not require the services to
implement processes for the dismissal or withdrawal of complaints or
for the reporting and tracking of such complaints. Marine Corps policy
outlines processes for the dismissal (frivolous or without merit,
lateness, duplicative, failure to cooperate, not under purview) and
voluntary withdrawal of complaints. We began capturing informal sexual
harassment complaints in July 2024. Number of dismissed/voluntary
withdrawn complaints within the last 10 years:
Frivolous/without Merit-13
Duplicative-3
Failure to Cooperate-4
Lateness-4
Voluntary Withdrawal-2
Not Under the Purview*-35
*Complaints submitted by persons not covered by the MCO 5354.1G, or
those over which neither the command nor the Marine Corps has
jurisdiction to adjudicate or remedy, will be referred to the proper
agency/agencies with jurisdiction.
56. Senator Warren. Admiral Franchetti and General Smith, the Safe
to Report policy allows victims of sexual assault who have made
``unrestricted'' reports of the sexual assault to be protected from
retaliation and adverse action for collateral misconduct. How are
victims who do not wish to move forward with an investigation also
protected from being separated from military service for actions that
are the result of the victim's military sexual trauma?
Admiral Franchetti. Victims of sexual assault who have filed or
converted to an Unrestricted Report are not required to participate in
the official investigation of the sexual assault or may choose to opt
out of participating in any part of the investigative (or adjudicative)
process at any time.
Commanding Officers will forward all administrative separation
actions involving Service Member victims within 1 year of final
disposition of their sexual assault case to the first flag officer in
the separation authority's chain of command for review and concurrence
of the circumstances of and grounds for the separation prior to
effecting the separation action.
Additionally, Service Members who filed or converted to an
Unrestricted Report and report retaliation associated with the sexual
assault because they are being processed for an administrative
separation within 1 year of the final disposition of the sexual assault
case, or who believe that there were adverse impacts to their military
career because they reported retaliation, have the right to discuss
those career impacts with a Flag Officer. In cases involving
retaliation allegations against one's chain of command, the Service
Member may request review outside of their chain of command.
General Smith. The Safe-To-Report policy prohibits any member of
the Marine Corps from taking disciplinary action against victims for
minor collateral misconduct, including victims of sexual assault.
Standardized guidance is provided to Staff Judge Advocates to ensure
that commanding officers are given consistent advice on the Safe-To-
Report policy. The Marine Corps remains committed to a fair separations
process and to removing barriers that may prevent victims from
disclosing that they have been subjected to sexual assault. Sexual
Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs) and SAPR Victim Advocates are
also required to advise victims who reported a sexual assault or sought
mental health treatment for sexual assault that they have the
opportunity to discuss issues related to their military career with a
General Officer/Flag Officer that the victim believes are associated
with the sexual assault.
57. Senator Warren. Admiral Franchetti and General Smith, how do
the Navy and Marine Corps handle dual processing of victims of military
sexual trauma? Is there any heightened level of scrutiny to ensure the
Navy and Marine Corps protect against retaliation?
Admiral Franchetti. Dual processing typically refers to situations
in which a Service Member is subject to distinct administrative
separation processes simultaneously for both misconduct and medical
reasons. For these Service Members, which may include victims of
military sexual trauma, a review of the reasons for potential discharge
is conducted by proper medical personnel to ensure that the process is
fair, and the appropriate separate measures are taken for each
individual Service Member. For example, if a Service Member is pending
administrative separation based on alleged misconduct and has been
diagnosed with either post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or
traumatic brain injury (TBI), a mental health professional must
determine whether the diagnosed condition was a contributing factor to
the alleged misconduct. This determination is formally documented in a
letter to Navy Personnel Command. If the determination is that it was a
factor in the alleged misconduct, the Chief of Naval Personnel--not the
Service Member's commander--will determine whether a separation based
on misconduct remains appropriate. This heightened process for review
and decision protects the victim from retaliation at the command level.
In addition to the protections afforded to those with pending
medical separations or PTSD/TBI, the Navy further mitigates the risk of
retaliation against victims through elevated review of their potential
separation. Navy regulations require the first flag officer in the
chain of command to review all involuntary separations recommended
within 1 year of a final disposition of a Service Member's unrestricted
report of sexual assault. In these cases, the Service Member will not
be separated until the flag officer concurs with the circumstances and
grounds for the involuntary separation.
Navy Victims' Legal Counsel (VLC) are also available to assist
alleged victims that desire to seek an expedited transfer as well as
provide other covered support.
Additionally, on June 29, 2022, the Secretary of the Navy announced
the Department's ``Safe to Report'' policy to ensure that alleged
victims of sexual assault are not disciplined for minor collateral
misconduct. This process requires close coordination and advice from a
staff judge advocate, with the goal of ensuring we protect the process
to hold alleged offenders accountable while taking care of our
shipmates that have been harmed.
Recent military justice reforms have also increased the level of
scrutiny on retaliation offenses. Through the Fiscal Year 2022 NDAA,
retaliation is included as a covered offense under the exclusive
prosecutorial authority of the Office of Special Trial Counsel (OSTC).
As a covered offense, expert prosecutors within OSTC, and not the
victim or accused's command, will independently assess the evidence and
pursue criminal charges, as appropriate.
General Smith. The Marine Corps has implemented many positive
changes to its processes and procedures for dual processing victims of
military sexual trauma in order to protect against retaliation in
separations. In accordance with the Department of Navy Safe-to-Report
policy, minor collateral misconduct by a marine victim of an alleged
sexual assault must be reviewed and disposed of by the Sexual Assault
Initial Disposition Authority (SA-IDA). The SA-IDA is a Colonel, O-6,
Special Court-Martial Convening authority who has the non-delegable
responsibility for initial disposition. This individual, or someone
higher, has the responsibility for determining whether processing for
separation is appropriate. A marine who makes an unrestricted report of
sexual assault and who is recommended for involuntary separation from
the Marine Corps within 1 year of the final disposition of their sexual
assault case may also request a General or Flag Officer review the
circumstances and grounds for the involuntary separation. In addition,
any marine being processed for involuntary separation who has a ratable
disability can consult a health care provider for a medical opinion as
to whether the medical condition contributed to a basis for which the
marine is being separated. The Marine Corps also provides SAPR
advocacy, referrals, and support to victims throughout the separation
process to include referrals to Victims Legal Counsel.
58. Senator Warren. Admiral Franchetti, what steps is the Navy
taking to make sure that servicemembers are aware of the confidential
reporting option for sexual harassment announced in February 2024?
Admiral Franchetti. Commensurate with the release of the Naval
Administrative Message and Navy Fact Sheet announcing the confidential
reporting option, Navy hosted a series of town halls with military
equal opportunity professionals to outline this new process. The Navy
has revised the Harassment Prevention and Military Equal Opportunity
common military training to include the confidential reporting option.
All Navy military personnel will receive annual mandatory training on
harassment prevention and equal opportunity, which emphasizes the
multiple options available to make a complaint of sexual harassment,
now to include a confidential reporting option. In addition, Command
Climate Specialists (CCS) and Command Management Equal Opportunity
(CMEO) Program Managers, who are the subject matter experts at the
command and are responsible for command advisory, receive additional
training on complaint reporting options to include confidential
reporting.
sexual assault case involving captain karen holliday
59. Senator Warren. General Smith, my office has reached out to the
Marine Corps previously regarding the case of Captain Karen Holliday.
Was this case ever referred to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service
(NCIS), and if not, why not?
General Smith. [Deleted.]
60. Senator Warren. General Smith, my office has received reports
that Captain Holliday's doctor told the command about her alleged
sexual assault. Under what conditions does a physician provide this
information to the commander? Can this information be provided to the
commander without the victim's consent?
General Smith. [Deleted.]
61. Senator Warren. General Smith, reports indicate that Captain
Holliday's doctor prescribed her with high levels of benzodiazepines.
Are these reports accurate? If so, what was the rationale for the
doctor's decision?
General Smith. [Deleted.]
62. Senator Warren. General Smith, during Captain Holliday's Board
of Inquiry, her defense counsel submitted proffered testimony from
several witnesses that Captain Holliday was intoxicated and under the
influence of strong medication during the time of the misconduct for
which she was recommended for separation. If this was the case, then
this may have been an incident of sexual assault rather than
misconduct. Did the Marine Corps investigate whether this may have been
an incident of sexual assault rather than misconduct?
General Smith. [Deleted.]
ongoing naval criminal investigative service (ncis) investigation into
the death of lance corporal ronald valentin
63. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service continues to investigate the death of Lance
Corporal Ronald Valentin, USMC, who died in 2018. Please provide a
status update on this investigation.
Secretary Del Toro. The investigation into the death of Lance
Corporal Ronald Valentin, United States Marine Corps, currently remains
active. In the last year, NCIS completed numerous additional
investigative actions that were identified through multiple reviews of
the investigation. These actions include interviews/re-interviews of
personnel possibly having information related to the case, completion
of additional forensic testing, continued efforts to gain access to
digital media recovered during the investigation, and completion of a
biomechanical analysis that was performed by a contracted biomechanical
expert/engineer. The results of the biomechanical analysis are
currently being shared with the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System
for review and consideration. The analysis of the cellular phone
remains pending; however, all other identified investigative actions
have been accomplished. An additional comprehensive review process will
be performed upon completion of the consultation with the Armed Forces
Medical Examiner System in order to ensure all viable leads have been
pursued. The cellular phone analysis will continue until such time as
access is gained or until it's otherwise determined that the phone is
not accessible.
The NCIS family liaison officer has maintained regular contact with
Lance Corporal Valentin's mother, Mrs. Gloria Ortiz, and continues to
provide updates regarding the investigation on a regular basis.
64. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, when do you anticipate the
investigation into the death of Lance Corporal Valentin will be
completed?
Secretary Del Toro. The timeline for completion of this
investigation is not easily definable as the only identified
investigative action that remains pending is the analysis of Lance
Corporal Valentin's cellular telephone. NCIS Cyber digital forensic
experts continue to pursue all available methods to expedite accessing
the phone; however, at this time, there is no access solution that
provides a predictable timeline for when access to the phone will be
achieved. The method being employed currently is automated, so there is
no way to speed this to conclusion. Access could result at any time;
however, it may take years to gain access.
NCIS remains committed to pursuing all viable investigative leads
with potential to provide clarity to the circumstances involved in
Lance Corporal Valentin's death.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
small modular microreactors
65. Senator Manchin. Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Franchetti,
General Smith, as all of you know, we expect our servicemembers to
perform in austere challenging environments and completely disconnected
if need be, but modern warfare relies more than ever or resilient
energy production. China knows this and already has countermeasures for
targeting both commercial and military fuel shipping vessels. To help
alleviate this threat I believe small mobile microreactors are a
strategic energy source necessary in this contested logistics
environment. Project Pele is the only microreactor being built by DOD
that can fill this gap. The entire system is housed in four 20-foot
shipping containers, and providing 5 megawatts of power continuously
for 3 years, that replaces the equivalent of six diesel generators that
require over 3 million gallons of fuel annually. How is the Navy and
Marine Corps looking at combating contested logistics in the Pacific
ensuring that technology like Project Pele is being incorporated into
U.S. operational planning?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. The Department of the
Navy (DON) is approaching the challenges of contested logistics using
short-and long-term solutions that include improved fuel logistics
technology development and deployment, as well as energy demand
reduction measures. In the short-term, the DON is implementing energy
demand-reduction measures without reducing DON warfighting capability
by developing and fielding improved power generation and energy
management, storage, delivery and distribution technology solutions
across a spectrum of support activities essential to DON's multi-domain
capabilities. Longer-term, the DON is focused on Next Generation
Logistics Ships and other capabilities that can operate more
effectively in a threatened environment. While not particularly
applicable to a full contested environment, DON is also considering the
potential for technology under development such as the Department of
Defense's Strategic Capabilities Office's mobile microreactor
demonstration program, known as Project Pele. The DON continues to work
closely with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research
& Engineering, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission in their efforts to de-risk energy-related
technologies and work through the regulatory processes that would
govern shore-based small or microreactors at enduring installations. In
addition, working with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, the DON is engaging with allies and partners, to include those
in the Pacific, to understand the challenges and impacts of utilizing
next-generation energy technologies, and ensuring their
interoperability, as they become available. Ultimately, the DON is
working to ensure energy resilience for mission assurance at our bases
and for our forces to enable them to be ready using a variety of
solutions to address contested logistics.
General Smith. The Marine Corps recognizes the utility of small
mobile nuclear reactors that provide power to the more remote regions
in the Pacific. The Marine Corps was introduced to Project Pele in 2022
and has continued to follow the progress of Project Pele and other
micro-reactor projects. As currently configured, Pele is not considered
expeditionary, due to the size, weight, and time to set up and tear
down. The 5 mega-watt (MW) power output exceeds what is required to
support distributed operations. Although MW scale reactors may provide
critical energy capability outside the first and second island chains,
the Marine Corps requires a system that is more expeditionary (mobile),
easily transportable, and provides power in the 40 to 100 kilo-watt
range. The Marine Corps in partnership with NASA, the Department of
Energy and the DOD, Operational Energy Capability Improvement Fund
(OECIF) has invested in micro reactor technology research through
project VALKRE, or Versatile, Autonomous Lightweight Kilowatt-Class
Reactor Experiment. Marine Corps funding is focused on developing use
cases and reactor design as it relates to rapid mobilization and
demobilization. VALKRE focuses to provide operational flexibility for
the warfighter and enhanced energy production at remote sites while
maintaining minimal logistical footprint. The Marine Corps is also
closely following the progress of the Phoenix Fission Generator, a
product of Black Mesa Advanced Fission, LLC. The Phoenix is a mobile,
rugged, self-contained, and cost-effective, diesel-generator
replacement that is cost effective particularly when compared to the
``full burden cost of energy'' of fossil fuel distribution and use. The
Phoenix Fission Generator Project seeks to provide local electrical
power generation in environments not suited for diesel generators. The
Marine Corps will continue to research micro-reactor technology
solutions to provide power for distributed forces in contested
logistics environments.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
exercises
66. Senator Rosen. Admiral Franchetti, training exercises at Naval
Air Station Fallon are critical to preparing not only our naval
aviators, SEALs, and marines, but also our joint services and partner
nations, enabling our forces to operate together. Exercises like
Resolute Hunter display the importance of Fallon as it hosts DOD's only
dedicated battle management, command and control, and ISR exercise. You
have emphasized the escalating threat from China to the United States
military, especially as you continue to modernize the Navy and the
Marine Corps. Describe the importance of modernizing the Fallon Range
Training Complex for preparing our Joint Force and Coalition Partners
to meet the threats identified by the National Defense Strategy?
Admiral Franchetti. The Fallon Range Training Complex (FRTC),
associated with Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada, is the Navy's most
realistic live threat training, a critical part of both national and
international training exercises. Our focus is on cultivating skilled
warfighters through advanced integrated training, supported by Live,
Virtual, and Constructive tools which allows the Navy to prepare to
secure decisive victories against near-peer adversaries. Fallon
supports all Navy aviation ``graduate-level'' training, Navy Special
Warfare (NSW) ground mobility training, and Maritime Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (MISR) training.
Navy has invested in virtual and constructive training technologies
such as Link Inject to Live (LITL) and Tactical Combat Training System
(TCTS) II at Fallon. Modernizing the range complex ensures continued
relevance in support of naval aviation aerial combat maneuvering
training, MISR, and weapons deployment for training used by naval and
Joint warfighters to meet basic, intermediate, and advanced tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP).
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
deficiency of the fiscal year 2025 president's budget for the u.s. navy
67. Senator Wicker. Secretary Del Toro, in 2023, Congress added
peacetime functions to the responsibilities of the Navy. Our intention
with this language was that the Navy would be able to better compete
for budget growth. Mr. Secretary, why hasn't the Navy's budget
reflected these added responsibilities? I would appreciate if you do
not refer to the Fiscal Responsibility Act, since it did not prevent
President Biden from submitting non-defense agency budgets above the
caps.
Secretary Del Toro. The Department of the Navy appreciates the
support of this committee and particularly the committee's intentions
with language to better compete for budget growth by specifying
peacetime responsibilities of the Navy. I seek to build on the legacy
of the Navy's peacetime contribution to national security interests and
prosperity of the United States through the advancement of a new
maritime statecraft. As I have stated, maritime statecraft, in a broad
sense, encompasses not only naval diplomacy but a national, whole-of-
government represents a balance between the readiness of our Fleet and
Force today, taking care of our people, and investments in the future
force. The investments in readiness and our people absolutely represent
investments in the peacetime promotion of our national security
interests and prosperity of the United States.
multi-ship procurement of amphibs
68. Senator Wicker. Secretary Del Toro, the law requires 31 large
amphibious ships, when will you commit to a multi-ship buy of
amphibious warships? You have previously called on industry to invest
more in shipbuilding, and it is commitments like these that allow
industry to do so.
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy is committed to maintaining 31
amphibious warfare ships. On 24 September 2024, the Department of the
Navy awarded HII, Ingalls Shipbuilding Division (HII Ingalls) a fixed-
price incentive fee agreement to procure three San Antonio Class
Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD) and one America Class Amphibious
Assault Ship (LHA) as authorized by Section 129 of the James M. Inhofe
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (fiscal year
2023 NDAA) (P.L. 117-263). The Navy appreciates congressional support
to use innovative contracting approaches to fund, build and deliver the
most capable ships to support our fleet. This award allows for critical
investment and sustainment of our industrial base, helping to ensure
stability and more affordable acquisitions.
landing ship medium
69. Senator Wicker. General Smith, do you have a requirement for 35
medium-sized landing ships based on your need to maneuver three Marine
Littoral Regiments?
General Smith. Yes, the Marine Corps has a requirement for 35
Medium Landing Ships (LSM). These vessels are designed to support
Marine Littoral Regiments and stand-in forces operating in the Pacific.
Specifically, we need nine LSMs for three regiments, ensuring that 27
ships are available at any given time while accounting for eight ships
undergoing routine maintenance cycles.
70. Senator Wicker. General Smith, the 30-year shipbuilding plan
shows a requirement of 18 ships. Will you exercise your authority
granted in the last NDAA to set the requirement for vessels with the
primary mission of transporting marines?
General Smith. Yes, Initial inventory requirement is planned for 18
Medium Landing Ships (LSMs), with the understanding that through
experimentation and operational maturation, the final objective force
requirement will be determined (currently 35) based on the concept of
operations to provide littoral maneuver for three Marine Regiments. The
Marine Corps supports PB25 that initiates procurement of the first LSM
in fiscal year 2025 and eight total over the FYDP, maintaining a
procurement schedule of 1/1/2/2/2. Maintaining the current procurement
profile is critical for delivering the late to need platform necessary
to fill the void in current littoral mobility.
71. Senator Wicker. General Smith, if these medium-sized landing
ships are already late to need, what sort of risk are we incurring
today in the Western Pacific?
General Smith. Surface mobility is a critical gap in the Marine
Littoral Regiment scheme of maneuver supporting distributed maritime
operations. Several platforms comprise the Littoral Maneuver Bridging
Solution (LMBS), which is intended to close this gap in the near-term
until the Landing Ship Medium (LSM) is sufficiently fielded. Outside of
our single contracted Stern Landing Vessel (SLV) and several yet-to-be
fielded prototype platforms, our MLRs are heavily reliant on existing
platforms such as the T-EPFs and LCU 1610's. Until LSM, the spectrum of
platforms that comprise LMBS complement each other to cover various
operational requirements. While T-EPFs can be used for intra-theater
mobility, LCUs provide tactical maneuver. Current resource and manning
decisions require the very limited number of aging LCU-1610's to be
prioritized to our deploying Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), and
challenges with civilian mariners has delayed support from even a
single T-EPF. In short, the MLR is dependent on a confederation of less
than ideal platforms to support surface mobility in any sufficient
capacity until the 2030's.
72. Senator Wicker. General Smith, do you support accelerated
bridging solutions to Landing Ship Medium that allow you to move
marines and equipment directly to a beach?
General Smith. Due to the urgency of this void, the Navy and Marine
Corps have developed a Littoral Maneuver Bridging Solution (LMBS) as a
phased approach to add operational mobility and tactical maneuver
capacity for elements of the SIF until LSM are available to support one
Marine Littoral Regiment in the early 2030's. The purpose of LMBS is to
provide forward capacity now in direct support to MLR task organized
units of action with limited intra-theater mobility, tactical maneuver,
and sustainment. This effort is not to negate the late-to-need of the
LSM; this effort is to leverage what exists already, even if limited,
and experiment with chartered vessels to develop procedures for MLR
formations and future LSM employment.
The approved LMBS is four expeditionary fast transports (T-EPF) and
two landing craft utility (LCU) and experimentation craft such as the
four Marine Corps-funded charters and the two planned Ancillary Surface
Craft (ASC).
T-EPF will be used in support of intra-theater operational
mobility, and pier-to-pier support of units conducting Expeditionary
Advanced Base Operations (EABO) in an archipelagic environment. It is
important to note, here, that Military Sealift Command is experiencing
a shortage in civilian mariners, delaying even the first two of the
approved EPF sourcing for LMBS. It is possible all four may not be
provided due to this issue. LCU will be used in exercises for tactical
maneuver of smaller units and sustainment.
Experimental chartered vessels will be used to support 21st century
beaching operations in support of exercises and experimentation, adding
needed littoral mobility capacity in the Indo-Pacific region. These
chartered vessels will also assist in the refinement of tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in support of EABO. The TTP
development with these chartered vessels serving as surrogates for the
LSM is needed now as the program continues along the procurement path
and remains late-to-need.
ASC will be used for experimentation to provide enhanced maneuver,
littoral mobility, and sustainment to/from expeditionary advance bases
(EABs) and potentially Advanced Naval Bases (ANBs) within the
archipelagos.
In addition to the LMBS, six Army LCU-2000's were made available
for purchase in March 2024 following Army divestment interest, priced
at $2.5 million per vessel with an offer to hold them until the end of
June. This opportunity aims to enhance littoral maneuver and
sustainment for the SIF until the arrival of LSMs.
The capacity and capability of LMBS does not match or fulfill the
requirements and capability of the LSM program once all vessels are
delivered.
Although the LMBS addresses some current operational gaps, existing
platforms such as EPFs require both port services and exceptional sea
states.
Current and future manpower shortfalls within Naval Beach Groups
and Military Sealift Command, limit number of available LCUs and T-EPFs
available to support operational requirements.
Along with the operational demand comes a training requirement to
properly employ the LMBS in conflict.
73. Senator Wicker. General Smith, what percentage of islands in
the Western Pacific would the Israeli Logistics Support Vessel (LSV) be
capable of landing on?
General Smith. The Israeli Logistics Support Vessel (LSV) is
capable of landing on beaches with gradients of approximately 1:30.
Recently, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity completed a 1:30 vs
1:40 analysis and generally found that 1:40 gradient resulted in
increased access in key strategic locations. Furthermore, 1:40 offers
higher reliability in achieving a fording depth of 42'' at the toe of
the ramp. This factor is critical for vehicle off-loading
considerations.
74. Senator Wicker. General Smith, other than the 1 to 40 beach
gradient capability mentioned in your testimony, what other capability
shortfalls does the Israeli LSV have? What would be the total increase
in cost to the Israeli LSV to make modifications to attain those
capabilities?
General Smith. The viable options of LMBS, and others currently
being suggested, are stopgap measures with their own limitations that
would neither be cost-effective nor viable in the long term due to
service life. None have the capacity for expansion that could meet the
embarked force berthing, cargo square footage, and fuel capacity
requirements, while maintaining viable trim, stress, and stability of
the vessels, regardless of cost.
red sea engagements
75. Senator Wicker. Admiral Franchetti, based on data from the Red
Sea engagements, how are we rapidly updating software on our platforms
as well as our Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures?
Admiral Franchetti. We are using lessons learned from our many Red
Sea Engagements to rapidly update our combat systems and the Navy's
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). After every engagement, we
electronically return the combat system's data and crew's assessment
stateside as quickly as possible, where we have a dedicated team of
tactical and technical experts to extract all possible lessons learned.
Those lessons are then turned into software updates for installation on
ships or updated TTPs procedures for distribution to our crews. For
example, during the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group Composite Unit
Training Exercise (COMPTUEX), vignettes replicating recent Red Sea
operations were integrated into Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC)
training scenarios prior to deployment. The Navy has fundamentally
changed our processes, where previously updates took months or longer,
we are fielding new patches and capabilities within hours or days,
depending on the situation.
76. Senator Wicker. Admiral Franchetti, what digital infrastructure
do we need to build to compete in a high-end conflict in the Pacific?
Admiral Franchetti. We need a distributed digital infrastructure
which is interoperable with joint, Allied, and coalition forces; exists
across all echelons of command from the operational to the tactical
level; and enables end-to-end kill chains supported by the body of
actionable intelligence. It must have the means to process, store, and
transmit data at all security levels at the speed of warfighting and to
leverage the advantages that come from incorporating Artificial
Intelligence (AI) and other advanced analytics capabilities. It must
reliably provide the network connectivity, storage, compute, and
bandwidth necessary to support these functions, and it must be designed
and built so that these software-intensive systems can be updated over
the air while deployed.
Success hinges on: (a) an affordably sustainable infrastructure
that paces modernization and cybersecurity demands, and (b) the ability
to leverage newer technologies, including commercially available
technologies, e.g., proliferated low earth orbit satellites and the
corresponding terrestrial architecture, and ongoing enterprise
initiatives.
Such an infrastructure will allow Navy all domain forces (surface,
air, subsurface, and ashore) to find, fix, track, target, engage, and
assess threats in coordination with the Joint and Coalition Force in a
denied environment, and requires robust and resilient command and
control throughout the timeline of the conflict.
77. Senator Wicker. Admiral Franchetti, we have been talking about
cultivating digital talent in the services for years. I would
appreciate if you got back to me on how these efforts will leverage
uniformed personnel.
Admiral Franchetti. I am committed to recruiting, training, and
retaining personnel, officer and enlisted, with a wide variety of the
digital talent we need to transform our Navy--both today and in the
future.
Navy cultivates the digital talent of our sailors through focused
career fields and diverse development opportunities in undergraduate
and graduate level education, industry and military training, practical
experience, and military operations.
To develop deep digital expertise, the Navy also created the
Maritime Cyber Warfare Officer (MCWO) designator, the Cyber Warfare
Technician (CWT) rating, and the Robotics Warfare Specialist (RW)
rating. The Navy met its CWT recruiting goal in fiscal year 2023 and is
on pace to meet fiscal year 2024 recruiting goals. Navy Cyber Mission
Force readiness increased 20 percent over the past year. Additionally,
our Cyber Warfare Engineers (CWE) are key assets for the Navy in the
cyberspace domain and are well versed in the development of software
focused to the unique needs of a sea going service.
The United States Naval Academy (USNA) offers undergraduate degrees
in Cyber Operations, Computer Science, Data Science (DS), and Computer
Engineering, with the first DS graduates commissioning in 2025. Many of
the DS majors are participating in summer internships in DS and
artificial intelligence (AI) to broaden their experience.
Additionally, USNA maintains the Center for Cyber Security Studies
which advances the quality of education of Naval Academy graduates in
all areas of cyber warfare.
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) offers graduate degrees in
Computer Science, Applied Computing, Modeling Virtual Environments and
Simulation, Cyber Systems and Operations, Applied Cyber Operations,
Cyber Defense, Computer Engineering, Information Systems and
Technology, Information Sciences, Information Warfare, and Operations
Research. These degrees offer concentrations to include DS, AI,
autonomous systems, and robotics. NPS maintains the Center for Network
Innovation and Experimentation (CENETIX) and the Center for Cyber
Security and Cyber Operations, which are America's foremost centers for
defense-related research and education in the areas of network and
cyber capabilities. NPS is also expanding its work in AI with the
establishment of the Consortium for AI in Military Applications and
National Security (CAIMANS) that aims to connect AI efforts and better
leverage the work being done in various fields.
NPS partners with industry, academia, Army, Air Force, and other
Department of the Navy entities to advance digital education and
development of uniformed personnel. These efforts are creating the
institutional capability to provide a world-class education and
populate the Fleet with graduates with deep technical expertise able to
understand how evolving technology can be leveraged to create a more
lethal Navy able to fight and win the battles of tomorrow. This is part
of a broader NPS effort to drive Innovation in the Naval Services and
aligns with Secretary Del Toro's efforts to establish a Naval
Innovation Center at NPS.
The Navy is growing its digital industrial base by incorporating
non-traditional companies. Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare
Systems (PEO IWS) increased the number of combat systems contributors
to over 35, including non-traditional defense companies like Microsoft,
Amazon, Google, Red River, High Vision, etc. These companies work side-
by-side with Navy personnel to train the workforce on industry best
practices. Those same Navy personnel can do rotations with innovative
companies such as Amazon, Microsoft, and VMware. The Navy has placed
warfighters alongside industry AI/machine learning (AI/ML) subject
matter experts to code AI algorithms into surface combat systems.
The Navy is also sending select sailors to a 3-month detailed
software developer course--an industry prerequisite for software
developers prior to starting at modern technical companies. In the
network and cyber domain, we are training enlisted sailors to manage,
operate, and defend large scale afloat and ashore data centers and to
conduct network operations.
A significant outcome of Project Overmatch is our Data Science at
Sea (DS@Sea) program that provides sailors with data science tools to
develop their own software tools and analytics to better accomplish
their missions while deployed. This program has been extremely
successful, and sailors have created multiple tools that can be shared
across the Fleet to improve mission effectiveness.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
shipbuilding & fleet size
78. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, have any uniformed or
civilian Navy personnel been relieved, reassigned, or fired as a result
of the extensive delays with the Columbia-class, Virginia Block IV,
Virginia Block V, CVN-80, or Constellation-class ships?
Secretary Del Toro. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition, Honorable Nickolas Guertin, and
I hold every Program Executive Officer and Program Manager accountable
for their performance. However, the macro conditions challenging the
U.S. shipbuilding industry must be weighed in the assessment of their
performance. The Navy's officers and civilians that lead their programs
will be accountable for the actions they take to overcome those
challenges and restore Navy shipbuilding programs to on-cost and on-
schedule performance.
79. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, why did it take you 2.5
years to identify the extensive delays with the Columbia-class,
Virginia Block IV, Virginia Block V, CVN-80, or Constellation-class
ships?
Secretary Del Toro. The delays to each of these programs were
individually disclosed as they were realized by our industry partners
and the Navy. Concern over deliveries in these programs is what
prompted me to direct the 45-Day Shipbuilding Review and provide a
comprehensive assessment of the challenges facing these Navy
shipbuilding programs.
80. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, who in the Department of
the Navy is responsible for identifying delays in shipbuilding programs
and communicating those to Congress?
Secretary Del Toro. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition, Honorable Nickolas Guertin, is
responsible for the Navy's shipbuilding programs. Honorable Guertin was
sworn in on December 20, 2023 and, following an initial assessment of
the Navy's shipbuilding programs, promptly communicated the delays and
challenges facing the shipbuilding industry to Congress.
81. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, who in the Department of
the Navy is responsible for allowing five classes of ship to become
years delayed?
Secretary Del Toro. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition, Honorable Nickolas Guertin, is
the person I have made responsible for the Navy's shipbuilding
programs. The delays to each of these programs were individually
disclosed as they were realized by our industry partners and the Navy.
Honorable Guertin was sworn in on December 20, 2023 and, following an
initial assessment of the Navy's shipbuilding programs, promptly
communicated the delays and challenges facing the shipbuilding industry
to Congress. Concern over deliveries in these programs is what prompted
me to direct the 45-Day Shipbuilding Review and provide a comprehensive
assessment of the challenges facing these Navy shipbuilding programs.
82. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, have any shipbuilders
been assessed financial penalties or had contracts canceled as a result
of the extensive delays with the Columbia-class, Virginia Block IV,
Virginia Block V, CVN-80, or Constellation-class ships?
Secretary Del Toro. The construction of each of these ship classes
includes the use of contract terms that share the burden of cost
overruns between the Navy and prime contractor, increasing the
contractor's cost burden if shipbuilding delays increases the overall
contract costs. Conversely, the benefits of cost underruns are jointly
shared. The Navy has not canceled contracts as a result of the delays
with these programs, however the Navy is assessing its contracting
strategies to ensure an optimal risk balance between Navy and industry
and that requirements meet the Navy's needs at time of contract award.
83. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, what is the detailed plan
to eliminate the 12-16 month delay for the lead Columbia-class SSBN?
Secretary Del Toro. Together with industry, the Navy is working
initiatives to drive improvement across the Navy shipbuilding industry,
including those that will address Columbia-class SSBN challenges. Key
construction issues have been consistent across both shipbuilders and
the program has driven major actions to address those issues.
Additionally, the program and key Navy stakeholders have provided
additional oversight at both shipbuilders as well as key suppliers. The
Navy is making significant investments in key areas including supplier
development, infrastructure, strategic sourcing, workforce development,
technology opportunities and government oversight. These investments
are aimed at improving production throughput and readiness to support
future production.
84. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, what is the detailed plan
to eliminate the 36 month delay for the Virginia Block IV SSN program?
Secretary Del Toro. Together with industry, the Navy is working
initiatives to drive improvement across the Navy shipbuilding industry,
including those that will address Virginia Block IV challenges.
85. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, what is the detailed plan
to eliminate the 24 month delay for the Virginia Block V SSN program?
Secretary Del Toro. Together with industry, the Navy is working
initiatives to drive improvement across the Navy shipbuilding industry,
including those that will address Virginia Block V challenges.
86. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, what is the detailed plan
to eliminate the 18-26 month delay for CVN 80?
Secretary Del Toro. Together with industry, the Navy is working
initiatives to drive improvement across the Navy shipbuilding industry,
including those that will address CVN 80 challenges.
87. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, what is the detailed plan
to eliminate the 36 month delay for the FFG-62 class?
Secretary Del Toro. Together with industry, the Navy is working
initiatives to drive improvement across the Navy shipbuilding industry,
including those that will address FFG-62 Class challenges.
88. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, what is the length of
delay in the DDG 51 program?
Secretary Del Toro. Ship deliveries are expected to be up to 2
years late to contract delivery dates due to attrition related to
COVID-19 and associated increases in green labor at both Bath Iron
Works and Huntington Ingalls Industries; however, the delivery dates
are stable and tracking to the Program Manager's estimates.
89. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, what is the detailed plan
to eliminate the delay for the DDG 51 class?
Secretary Del Toro. Together with industry, the Navy is working
initiatives to drive improvement across the Navy shipbuilding industry,
including those that will address DDG 51 Class challenges.
90. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, what is the detailed plan
to eliminate the delay for the LPD 17 Flight II program?
Secretary Del Toro. Together with industry, the Navy is working
initiatives to drive improvement across the Navy shipbuilding industry,
including those that will address LPD 17 Flight II challenges.
91. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, what is the detailed plan
to address the cost overruns in each class of ship that is experiencing
delays?
Secretary Del Toro. Each Navy shipbuilding contract includes terms
that limit the government's exposure to cost overruns. However, some
cost overruns are expected because of projected ship construction
delays largely due to COVID 19 related impacts associated with
attrition and green labor, and supply chain disruptions. The Navy is
addressing cost overruns through more active Navy waterfront
management, evaluation of contract terms and incentives, and partnering
with industry to promote human and material resource availability. In
some cases, these cost overruns will result in required Cost To
Complete funding to finish construction and deliver a fully capable
ship to the Navy Fleet.
92. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, as a consequence of
Hurricane Katrina causing delays with the production of the LPD 17
class ships, production was shifted inland where major sections of the
ship were built inland and then assembled on the coast. A similar
practice has been adopted for sections of the Columbia-class. Has the
Navy explored manufacturing large sections of surface ships inland and
assembling on the coast as a way to speed up ship production?
Secretary Del Toro. Navy shipbuilders currently conduct targeted
outsourcing outside of the shipyard's immediate geographic area across
a number of programs. In order to meet schedule, cost, and performance
objectives of shipbuilding programs, the Navy remains focused on
identifying opportunities to generate resiliency and productivity in
the shipbuilding industrial base, workforce and associated supply
chain.
93. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, industry takes its cue
from the Navy's shipbuilding plans to determine capital investment and
workforce development strategies. When procurement profiles change
yearly, industry is hesitant to invest. If requirements haven't
changed, why are procurement profiles changing?
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy works resolutely to maintain a steady,
consistent demand signal to the shipbuilding industrial base. Key
drivers of variability include shipbuilder performance and capacity,
construction schedules, inflationary cost increases, appropriated
funding, and available resources within Navy topline. The Navy has
worked to mitigate the impact on primary and secondary vendors in the
industrial base by requesting resources to keep procurement of key
components on-track.
94. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, the most recent Battle
Force Ship Assessment and Requirement (BFSAR) indicates that the Navy
will need over 380 ships to meet fleet demand across the globe. How are
uncrewed surface and subsurface platforms included in that assessment
and requirement?
Secretary Del Toro. Requirements for uncrewed surface and
subsurface platforms are tracked separately and are additional to the
381 battle force ships in the BFSAR report. The June 2023 BFSAR report
required a total of 134 uncrewed vehicles (78 uncrewed surface vehicles
and 56 uncrewed underwater vehicles).
While uncrewed platforms are not counted in the battle force, they
are additive to Battle Force ships and will continue to be an important
part of the Navy's Hybrid Fleet. The Navy continues to focus on
uncrewed capabilities on, above, and below the sea with key investments
to field uncrewed technologies to increase the fleet's capability,
capacity, and lethality. As testing of these platforms and their
concepts of employment continue to evolve, when they are deemed capable
of contributing to combat operations, the CNO will recommend their
reclassification and inclusion in the battle force count for SECNAV
approval.
95. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, how will uncrewed large
and extra-large vessels be counted toward the fleet size?
Admiral Franchetti. While unmanned platforms are currently not
counted in the battle force, they are additive to Battle Force ships
and will continue to be an important part of the Navy's Hybrid Fleet.
The Navy continues to focus on unmanned capabilities on, above, and
below the sea with key investments to field unmanned technologies to
increase the fleet's capability, capacity, and lethality. As testing of
these platforms and their concepts of employment continue to evolve,
and deemed capable of contributing to combat operations, the CNO will
recommend their reclassification and inclusion in the battle force
count for SECNAV approval.
96. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti, if
you had a magic wand, how would you increase U.S. shipbuilding
capacity?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. Health and competition
in the shipbuilding industrial base and supply chain is vital to
meeting our National Defense Strategy. Strengthening the shipbuilding
and repair industrial base requires a whole of government approach to
rebuild the comprehensive maritime power of the Nation, both commercial
and naval.
The foundation of a healthy shipbuilding industrial base remains
stable, executable acquisition profiles that promote development and
retention of highly skilled workforces and investments in world-class
manufacturing and shipbuilding facilities, while maintaining proper
return on investment. The Navy would take measures on all fronts
through thoughtful acquisition strategies, targeted industrial base
investments, and increased collaboration with both Government and the
shipbuilding industrial base.
With the help of Congress, in coordination with local and State
governments as well as national organizations, the Navy and its
shipbuilders would continue identifying opportunities to generate
resiliency and productivity in the shipbuilding industrial base,
workforce and associated supply chain.
97. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti, is
the fiscal year 2025 budget sufficient to meet the Navy's commitments
globally?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. This budget is focused
on delivering resources to ensure America's maritime forces--our Navy
and Marine Corps team--are ready, resilient, flexible, and forward-
deployed to do our Nation's tasking--whether that's supporting Naval
diplomacy, crisis-response, building partnerships, or protecting the
world's global economy (which floats on saltwater). We need to compete
and be able to win during this time of great power competition.
The PB25 request is a strategy-driven budget and is nested under
the National Security Strategy/National Defense Strategy. This budget
builds upon the tenets of our national defense, which are integrated
deterrence, campaigning and building enduring advantages. Aligned with
Secretary Austin's priorities, our request demonstrates the
Department's commitment to providing a ready, modernized and capable
naval force, a force that continues to be the Nation's primary
instrument of seapower and maritime statecraft now and into the future
The PB25 request is reflective of what allows us to build,
modernize and maintain the right mix of capabilities to defend against
great-power competition, among other threats while also investing in
our future
PB25 prioritizes our people and readiness, and invests in our
industrial base to build and maintain our fleet. The department
continues to make significant strides across these areas, ensuring our
priorities are met.
98. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti,
imagine you weren't in a resource-constrained environment or operating
under FRA caps, what are the top five changes that the Navy needs to
build the fleet needed to effectively meet our worldwide commitments?
Please answer this question independently.
Secretary Del Toro. A healthy shipbuilding industrial base and
supply chain is vital to meeting our National Defense Strategy and
building those ships necessary to meet our worldwide commitments. To
accomplish this, Navy and industry must minimally have the below 5
items, each of which will require further investment, partnering, and
policy change to reach full potential.
1. World-class manufacturing and shipbuilding facilities,
2. a resilient and responsive supply chain,
3. availability of a highly skilled workforce,
4. a stable demand signal, and
5. contracts that reflect an optimized risk-share between Navy and
industry.
Admiral Franchetti. In a resource unconstrained environment with
the objective of supporting the overall Navy priorities of Warfighting,
Warfighters, and the Foundation that supports them, I would request the
following:
Sustained Budget Growth and agile authorities: To simultaneously
sustain and modernize the current fleet and sustainably accelerate
capacity growth of our fleet, the Navy will require 3-5 percent
sustained budget growth above actual inflation as demonstrated in the
30-year Shipbuilding Plan. Additional to any budget increase, the Navy
needs flexible authorities to develop, contract, procure, test and
employ minimally crewed/uncrewed/autonomous systems in all three
maritime domains: undersea, surface, and aviation. Changes to policy
with regards to Navy ownership of intellectual property of the systems
we procure will support better training and maintenance across the
Fleet.
Shore Infrastructure: An overhaul of our current facilities, at
home and aboard, to support warfighting, force generation and, Quality
of Service (QOS) improvements that support our warfighters and their
families in a competitive maritime great power conflict era.
Strategic Priorities: The Chief of Naval Operations'
recommendations for key investments to reduce risk in executing the
National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy should
more funding become available. These include Submarine Industrial Base
(SIB) workforce, infrastructure, and supplier development, Military
Construction, and acceleration and expansion of Surface Warfare
Priority Systems and Aviation Critical Planeside systems to support
increased operational demand. Expanded authorities to field innovative
unmanned systems with quicker turnaround in development, procurement,
testing, and deployment.
Support Forces: Increase operational support capacity by expanding
Military Sealift Command's (MSC) auxiliary fleet with Buy-Used
authorities and New Construction funding. This allows us to repair,
replenish, and rearm air, sea, and undersea resources, prolonging
battle survivability and sustainability of systems deployed overseas.
Additional support for Civilian Mariners is key to realizing and
utilizing a re-invigorated MSC.
Manning and Training: Authority and funding to expand the force to
man and execute missions with allies and partners across the globe.
Those additional forces will require additional world-class training
and facilities.
The objective is to maintain the U.S. Navy into the future as the
world's most powerful Navy to preserve the peace, respond in crisis,
and win decisively in war.
99. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, are all combatant
commander requests for naval ships filled to 100 percent?
Admiral Franchetti. No. Combatant Commanders' demands for naval
ships far exceeds the capacity of our naval force. Even with a larger
fleet, Navy force generation model design provides only a portion of
the fleet for routine operations and is a limiting factor to meet the
demand.
100. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, what initiatives are
being worked with private build yards to decrease shipyard worker
turnover rate, which in the last 4 years has jumped to an average of 13
percent from a pre-pandemic 8 percent?
Secretary Del Toro. Navy and shipbuilders are committed to
improving the turnover rate in shipyards. Below are some example
initiatives:
Partnering with K12 programs, community colleges, and
trade centers
Using technology and work practices that are more
familiar or preferred by workforce
Mentorships and on-the-job training programs to rapidly
upskill the workforce and encourage retention through job satisfaction.
Addressing wage disparity within the local and national
economy
101. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, does an increase in
commercial shipbuilding capacity translate into an increased capacity
for naval shipbuilding?
Secretary Del Toro. Yes, it can. Increases in commercial
shipbuilding can improve career stability for the workforce, increase
workforce efficiency, allow for growth of smaller yards, and distribute
overhead costs of the capital intensive industry through a larger
workload base.
102. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti,
given the 170,000 plus shortage in skilled labor for naval
shipbuilding, it is reasonable to assume that a national effort to
increase commercial shipbuilding could have a deleterious effect on
finding skilled labor for naval shipbuilding. What is your assessment
of that?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. Increases in commercial
shipbuilding do not translate directly into a deleterious effect on
naval shipbuilding. Instead, due to geographically dispersed labor
pools, multiple segments of naval maritime industrial base (public,
private, new construction, repair, etc.), and the possibility of
gaining access to previously untapped capacity, an increase in
commercial shipbuilding can create a larger skilled workforce.
103. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti,
given that labor markets near existing shipyards are close to, if not
completely tapped, does it make sense to invest in ship production
capacity in locations in the U.S. that have a larger labor pool?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. The Navy and its
shipbuilders currently conduct targeted outsourcing outside of the
shipyard's immediate geographic area across a number of programs. In
order to meet schedule, cost, and performance objectives of
shipbuilding programs, the Navy remains focused on identifying
opportunities to generate resiliency and productivity in the
shipbuilding industrial base, workforce and associated supply chain.
104. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Franchetti, and
General Smith, I understand that the LCU-1700 contract was signed in
2018 but not a single ship has been delivered. The shipyard that won
the original contract was awarded options in 2019, 2020, and 2021 and
the Navy issued it a stop work order in 2024. Another shipyard was
awarded a contract to produce three LCU-1700's in 2023. Open source
reporting indicates that the navy was still changing the LCU-1700
design 2 years into production, reflecting a troubling trend in
awarding contracts before requirements and designs were mature. What is
the length of delay in the LCU-1700 program?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. The Navy awarded the
Detail Design and Construction contract to Swiftships, LLC, Morgan
City, LA (Small Business Set Aside) in March 2018. Swiftships was under
contract for 12 craft, with options for up to 32 craft. Swiftships
faced challenges in completing the design, procuring material,
completing test procedures, developing sustainment products, and
maintaining the requisite labor resources to complete craft
construction by the original contract delivery dates. To simplify the
contract and settle claims submitted by Swiftships, a consolidated
settlement was reached in September 2022 to descope the contract,
increase unit cost, re-baseline delivery dates, and remove all
remaining options. Despite a re-baselined contract, Swiftships failed
to make meaningful progress post settlement as it continued to struggle
with the same issues experienced prior to the settlement. Estimates at
completion continued to grow throughout Fiscal Year 2023 in excess of
new contract targets and projected delivery dates continued to extend
well beyond the contractually required delivery dates. The contractor
failed to meet the contractual delivery dates and, in response to a
Contracting Officer's Show Cause Notice, did not present any excusable
basis for its failure to perform. The Navy terminated the contract with
Swiftships in February 2024.
To mitigate schedule delays, the Navy awarded a Detail Design and
Construction contract to Austal USA, Mobile, AL, for three craft and
options for nine additional craft in September 2023. The lead craft is
scheduled for delivery in June 2025, the second craft in March 2026,
and the third craft in July 2026.
General Smith. In September 2023 the Navy awarded a $91.5M Detail
Design & Construction (DD&C) contract to Austal USA, Mobile, AL for
three craft and future option for nine additional craft through fiscal
year 2027. Austal completed Production Readiness Review (Feb 2024) and
started construction on the lead craft in April 24. The lead craft
delivers in June 2025. The Marine Corps cannot emphasize enough that
the need for traditional displacement landing craft is imperative for
ship-to-shore, and shore-to-shore movement in support of amphibious
operations.
105. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti,
what is the current delivery timeline for each of the 32 LCU-1700's the
Navy has ordered?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Franchetti. The Navy awarded the
Detail Design and Construction contract to Swiftships, LLC, Morgan
City, LA (Small Business Set Aside) in March 2018. Swiftships was under
contract for 12 craft, with options for up to 32 craft. Swiftships
faced challenges in completing the design, procuring material,
completing test procedures, developing sustainment products, and
maintaining the requisite labor resources to complete craft
construction by the original contract delivery dates. To simplify the
contract and settle claims submitted by Swiftships, a consolidated
settlement was reached in September 2022 to descope the contract,
increase unit cost, re-baseline delivery dates, and remove all
remaining options. Despite a re-baselined contract, Swiftships failed
to make meaningful progress post settlement as it continued to struggle
with the same issues experienced prior to the settlement. Estimates at
completion continued to grow throughout Fiscal Year 2023 in excess of
new contract targets and projected delivery dates continued to extend
well beyond the contractually required delivery dates. The contractor
failed to meet the contractual delivery dates and, in response to a
Contracting Officer's Show Cause Notice, did not present any excusable
basis for its failure to perform. The Navy terminated the contract with
Swiftships in February 2024.
To mitigate schedule delays, the Navy awarded a Detail Design and
Construction contract to Austal USA, Mobile, AL, for three craft and
options for nine additional craft in September 2023. The lead craft is
scheduled for delivery in June 2025, the second craft in March 2026,
and the third craft in July 2026.
ship maintenance & readiness
106. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, There have been reports
that sailors on Freedom-class LCS don't have the technical manuals,
training, or tools to repair their own equipment, necessitating
contractors from foreign-owned companies to conduct repairs that would
normally be within the capability of those sailors but are otherwise
prohibited because of proprietary issues. Is this true?
Admiral Franchetti. In 2024 the Navy changed the LCS maintenance
strategy to conduct the majority of maintenance organically with ships
crews and has subsequently invested in the procurement of proprietary
technical documentation and required tools. However, despite the
strategy shift to organic maintenance, we expect some foreign Original
Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) will still be required for some
procurement and repairs through end of service life.
As part of the original LCS sustainment plan, contractors would
conduct a significant portion of maintenance and repairs therefore
technical manuals, tools, and proprietary property were not purchased
by the Navy for contractor maintenance. Since then, the Navy
implemented commercial sustainment options to provide improved access
to both foreign and domestic OEMs via contractual agreements. These
contracts also provide expanded training opportunities for Navy sailors
by including the option for OEM maintenance training.
107. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, what is the operational
availability of Freedom-class LCS?
Admiral Franchetti. As of 1 July 2024, the Navy has 8 Freedom-class
LCS in the active battle force inventory (LCS 3, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21,
23, 25). Of these 8 ships, 4 ships are in maintenance availabilities or
post-shakedown availabilities, resulting in a 50 percent material
availability.
108. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, how many Freedom-class
LCS have deployed on time in the last 3 years?
Admiral Franchetti. In the past 3 years, there have been ten
scheduled Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) deployments and none
have deployed on time.
109. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, how many amphibious
warships, by class, have deployed on time in the last 3 years?
Admiral Franchetti. Of the 28 total amphibious warships that
deployed in the last 3 years, 19 (68 percent) have deployed on time.
Amphibious warships include the LHA, LHD, LPD, and LSD classes.
The primary reason for amphibious ship deployment delays has been
emergent maintenance. These issues have occurred outside of normal
maintenance periods and are exacerbated by the ships' age and previous
deployment extensions. They have negatively impacted the Navy's force
generation capability, reduced maritime global operational presence,
and increased both operational and maintenance costs.
The below lists the numbers of amphibious warships deployed on time
over the last three fiscal years, with comments explaining reason for
delayed deployment.
LHA/LHD
o Fiscal year 2024--0 of 2; both late deployments caused by
emergent maintenance.
o Fiscal year 2023--1 of 2; late deployment caused by emergent
maintenance.
o Fiscal year 2022--1 of 1
o Fiscal year 2021--2 of 3; late deployment caused by emergent
maintenance.
LPD
o Fiscal year 2024--2 of 2
o Fiscal year 2023--3 of 4; late deployment caused by emergent
maintenance.
o Fiscal year 2022--2 of 2
o Fiscal year 2021--4 of 5; late deployment caused by emergent
maintenance.
LSD
o Fiscal year 2024--2 of 3; late deployment caused by emergent
maintenance.
o Fiscal year 2023--0 of 1; late deployment caused by emergent
maintenance.
o Fiscal year 2022--1 of 1
o Fiscal year 2021--1 of 2; late deployment caused by emergent
maintenance.
110. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, when will Congress
receive a report or be briefed on the readiness of the amphibious
warship fleet as directed in the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA?
Admiral Franchetti. The review of amphibious fleet readiness is
still in progress and is currently under review at the SecNav level. An
interim letter is being staffed to notify Congress of an adjusted
completion date.
Navy intends to provide a brief to Congress upon completion of the
review and subsequent analysis and review internal to DON.
111. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, the Navy's fiscal year
2025 budget shows that amphibious ships make up 76 percent of deferred
maintenance despite constituting 14 percent of the fleet. There are 31
amphibious ships with $352 million in deferred maintenance, 118 surface
combatants with $109M in deferred maintenance, 11 carriers with $4.6
million in deferred maintenance and 67 submarines with $0 million in
deferred maintenance. What explains this disparity?
Admiral Franchetti. Surface ships (surface combatants and
amphibious ships) are generally considered safer to deploy even if some
maintenance is deferred, leading to the higher level of deferred
maintenance in the surface fleet. Nuclear maintenance (aircraft
carriers and submarines) is typically required work before the assets
can deploy, especially for submarines that need to be certified to
dive. Thus, most nuclear maintenance cannot be deferred and if
necessary, the availability is extended to complete growth work.
Most of the amphibious ship deferred maintenance included in the
$352 million has either commenced their availabilities in fiscal year
2024 or is programmed to start their availabilities in fiscal year
2025. Age (30+ year old ships), high operational tempo, and
obsolescence of parts, systems, and specialized labor are contributing
factors to the higher deferred maintenance costs for amphibious ships.
Over $100 million of the $352 million is specific to two LHDs whose
ballast tank maintenance was previously deferred, but this work will be
done in their upcoming availabilities that begin in fiscal year 2024
and fiscal year 2025. In addition, Navy's previous proposals to divest
LSDs over the Future Years Defense Program resulted in some LSD
maintenance being deferred at the time. In compliance with the fiscal
year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, the Navy subsequently
revised our amphibious ship force structure plan to sustain 31
amphibious ships, and program for this deferred maintenance in the
fiscal year 2024 and fiscal year 2025 availabilities. The Navy
prioritized investments for ship maintenance and reducing deferred
maintenance and readiness in the fiscal year 2025 President's Budget.
112. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, it is now clear that the
Navy's decision to not address the rudder issue on the USS Boxer when
it was discovered during a maintenance period and instead granting a
waiver to depart from its design specifications (DFS) was a mistake. In
hindsight, this was a miscalculated risk-decision that is keeping the
lead ship in port while the other two ships in the ARG deploy. Who is
being held accountable for authorizing that DFS to not proceed with
repairs?
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy uses a process that takes technical,
programmatic and operational readiness priorities into consideration to
develop a risk position about operating a ship system with a material
non-conformance. The Departure from Specification (DFS) process is
outlined in the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual and is focused on
ensuring surface ships are ready for tasking.
In the case of USS Boxer, none of the adjudicated DFSs on the
rudder system during her last CNO maintenance availability contributed
to the failure of the starboard rudder's upper bearing. The upper
bearing, intended to be a life of ship component, materially failed in
the ship's 29th year of service. The Wasp-class was originally designed
with an intended 40 years of service life.
113. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, by class of ship, what
percentage are in each phase of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan
(OFRP) at a given time?
Admiral Franchetti. For each class of ship, the rule-of-thumb is
that a third are in maintenance and modernization, a third are in
training, and a third are in sustainment. Historically, for a class of
ship, the number of ships within each OFRP phase varies over time.
There is no guidance for each class of ship mandating that a certain
percentage be in a particular phase. The Optimized Fleet Response Plan
(OFRP) is the force readiness generation construct used to maximize
employability through a disciplined, repeatable, and predictable
process that balances mid-and long-term readiness production stability
for the fleet while supporting dynamic employment. The OFRP is
comprised of three phases: maintenance and modernization, training, and
sustainment, with deployment occurring in the sustainment phase.
114. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, what is the Navy's goal
for how many ships are supposed to be in each phase of the OFRP?
Admiral Franchetti. For each class of ship, the rule-of-thumb is
that a third are in maintenance and modernization, a third are in
training, and a third are in sustainment. Historically, for a class of
ship, the number of ships within each OFRP phase varies over time.
There is no guidance for each class of ship mandating that a certain
percentage be in a particular phase. The Optimized Fleet Response Plan
(OFRP) is the force readiness generation construct used to maximize
employability through a disciplined, repeatable, and predictable
process that balances mid-and long-term readiness production stability
for the fleet while supporting dynamic employment. The OFRP is
comprised of three phases: maintenance and modernization, training, and
sustainment, with deployment occurring in the sustainment phase.
115. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, are there sufficient dry
docks for the Navy's maintenance plans?
Admiral Franchetti. Surface Ships: In aggregate, the private sector
has sufficient dry dock capacity and capability to perform planned
maintenance and modernization work on non-nuclear surface ships. In
recent years, San Diego dry dock capacity was challenged to support
maintenance demands. The Navy has since invested in the upgrade/
procurement of two public dry docks and the private sector is currently
working to bring a third new dry dock to the region. Once complete,
these efforts will provide all San Diego based surface ships the
opportunity to execute dry dock maintenance within their homeport.
Nuclear Ships: In August 2023, the Navy established a Capability
Development Document (CDD) for the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization
Program (SIOP), establishing the baseline requirement for dry docks
across the four Naval Shipyards. The Navy's 15-year maintenance plan
schedules submarine and aircraft carrier availabilities within the
current dry dock capacity and capability established in the SIOP CDD.
In addition, the CDD establishes a process by which the Navy will
evaluate long-term dry docking needs for the nuclear fleet.
116. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, how many Navy ships and
submarines are waiting to enter dry dock?
Admiral Franchetti. Submarines: There are a total of four
submarines that are idle awaiting drydock availability, including three
that are waiting inactivation. USS Montpelier's (SSN 765) delay was
driven by delays to USS Toledo (SSN 769) undocking. The Toledo undocked
in May 2024 and the drydock required maintenance prior to Montpelier's
Engineered Overhaul (EOH). The three inactivation submarines, Key West,
Helena, and San Juan are idle with expired service lives (not able to
operate) waiting for dock availability at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
(PSNS) pending resolution of seismic concerns.
Ships: There are currently no ships waiting to enter dry dock.
117. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, what is the Navy's goal
for submarine readiness (i.e., what percentage of submarines should be
available for tasking at any time)?
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy's standing goal for attack submarine
(SSN) readiness is 80 percent material availability, defined as the
percentage of total battle force SSNs not undergoing maintenance,
testing, or pre-decommissioning activities and are available for
operations. Navy has achieved some improvement toward this goal and
continues significant efforts to reduce maintenance delays and improve
shipyard performance.
118. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, how many additional dry
docks are needed to get submarine maintenance out of the backlog to
meet the Navy's stated submarine readiness goal?
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy currently has all of the required 18
total dry docks to meet the current and future nuclear fleet for the
next 15 years as defined by the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization
Program (SIOP). While the number of dry docks required to satisfy
nuclear-powered ship maintenance is re-evaluated annually, there is no
current need for additional drydocks.
119. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, are there any plans to
open a dry dock capable of repairing a CVN on the West Coast?
Admiral Franchetti. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, WA has
a dry dock with the capability to repair NIMITZ-class CVNs on the west
coast.
120. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, what level of repairs
for conventional ships are allowed to be conducted at overseas
shipyards?
Admiral Franchetti. 10 USC Sec. 8680 limits what overseas
maintenance, repair, or overhaul can be performed on naval vessels
outside the United States or Guam. 10 USC Sec. 8680 allows for
overseas: (1) maintenance and repair of ships homeported outside of the
United States or Guam (also known as forward deployed naval forces
(FDNF)) unless they are within a certain window of homeport change; (2)
corrective and preventive maintenance or repair and facilities
maintenance for Littoral Combat Ships while on deployment; and (3)
voyage repairs or those necessary to correct damage sustained due to
hostile actions or interventions on a vessel with a homeport in the
United States or Guam. A voyage repair is solely for the accomplishment
of corrective maintenance of mission or safety essential items
necessary for a ship to deploy or continue on its deployment.
121. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, what, if any, additional
statutory authorities are needed to conduct more extensive repairs at
overseas shipyards?
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy seeks authority for the execution of
limited maintenance overseas, for ships homeported in the United States
or Guam. The Navy submitted a legislative proposal accompanying PB25 to
this effect. These authorities provide the mechanisms required for the
Navy to exercise and improve the ability to conduct preventative
maintenance meant to extend military operations within highly contested
environments.
Current statute (10 USC Sec. 8680) allows for the execution of
overseas maintenance, repair, or overhaul on ships in the following
cases: (1) maintenance and repair of ships homeported outside of the
United States or Guam (also known as forward deployed naval forces
(FDNF)), unless they are within a certain window of homeport change;
(2) corrective and preventative maintenance or repair and facilities
maintenance for Littoral Combat Ships while on deployment; and (3)
voyage repairs or interventions with a homeport in United States or
Guam. The exclusive use of FDNF ships for the purpose of conducting
such maintenance would increase the time FDNF sailors are out of
homeport (also known as personnel tempo); negatively impact high-tempo
FDNF operations; and fail to realistically exercise the required
capability.
This proposal would also support improved coordination with our
international partners in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and U.S.
European Command areas, such as: Australia, Japan, South Korea,
Republic of the Philippines, Oman, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, Greece, Croatia, Norway, United Kingdom, and others.
122. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, has the Navy studied if
there is any benefit (i.e., less time spent in an availability) in
public yards specializing in a particular class of ship instead of
nuclear powered vessels more generally?
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy does not officially classify specific
shipyards to individual ship classes but does recognize the value of
the efficiencies generated by the shipyard industrial workforce when
consistently assigned to repair the same ship classes. Therefore, we do
routinely schedule specific ship classes to the same shipyards in
support of maintenance efficiencies, availability and operational
requirements.
SSN (688/VACL) Submarines are assigned to Portsmouth and
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyards
SSN 21 Class and SSGN/BN Submarines and Aircraft Carriers
are assigned to Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
SSN (688/VACL) and SSGN/BN Submarines and Aircraft
Carriers are assigned to Norfolk Naval Shipyard
123. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, and General Smith, what
are the current readiness rates for EPFs and LCUs?
Admiral Franchetti. For Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPF),
Military Sealift Command (MSC) does not follow the Optimized Fleet
Response Plan (OFRP) model. The MSC force generation model maintains
the ships in theater, conducting maintenance and repair along with
operational tasking. As of July 2024, the Navy has 14 EPFs in the
active battle force inventory. Of these 14 ships, six ships are in full
operating status, six ships are in reduced operating status-45 (ROS-45)
and the two newest ships (EPF 13-14) are completing post-delivery
testing and trials. ROS-45 ships are intended to be made ready for
tasking within 45 days of notification.
Landing Craft Utility (LCU) are not battle force ships and also do
not follow the OFRP model. The Navy has 10 of 25 Landing Craft Utility
(LCU) 1610 class craft available for tasking. Industry-related
construction delays with the LCU 1700 class have delayed the planned
recapitalization and have forced the Navy to retain legacy LCU 1610
craft beyond their expected service lives. Four LCU 1610 craft are
awaiting service life extensions to bridge the delay until the LCU 1700
class are delivered. LCU 1700 class construction is now underway and
will functionally replace the LCU 1610 class upon delivery.
General Smith. For Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF), the Military
Sealift Command (MSC) does not follow the Optimized Fleet Response Plan
(OFRP) model; instead, the MSC Force Generation Model has the ships
remaining in theater and conducting maintenance and repair efforts in
coordination with operational tasking and crews rotating onto leave. In
addition, some EPFs are retained in reduced operating status-45 days
(ROS-45), which are intended to be made ready for tasking within 45
days of notification. This timeline may occasionally exceed 45 days if
ship material issues require additional time to repair before the ship
can be made ready. As of 1 July 2024, the Navy has 14 EPF in the active
battle force inventory (EPF 1-14), with EPF 1-4 proposed for
decommissioning in fiscal year 2025. Of these 14 ships, 6 ships are in
ROS-45 status and the 2 newest ships (EPF 13 & 14) are completing post-
delivery testing and trials. The remaining 6 ships are in full
operating status. Four EPFs are aligned to provide a considerable
portion of the Littoral Maneuver Bridging Solution (LMBS) to the Marine
Corps, which was developed to support the newly formed Marine Littoral
Regiments (MLR) with organic surface maneuver capability until Medium
Landing Ships are sufficiently fielded. The Marine Corps is a primary
consumer of EPF for intra-theater surface mobility, particularly in
USINDOPACOM. EPF availability impacts planning and execution of naval
campaigning activities and distribution and sustainment of the stand-in
force in crisis. A cost and time burden is imposed on Marine Forces
unable to utilize EPF.
124. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, and General Smith, I
understand that the Navy and Marine Corps recently signed a classified
memorandum agreeing to common terminology when referring to amphibious
ship readiness. Does that document include EPFs, LCUs, leased
commercial stern-landing vessels, and future LSMs?
Admiral Franchetti. The unclassified Joint Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between the Navy and Marine Corps, titled
Amphibious Warfare Ship Terms of Reference does not contain language
that refers to specific classes of ships such as EPFs, LCUs, leased
commercial stern-landing vessels, and future LSMs. Rather, the MOU
defines broader terms that explain whether or not a ship can support
Navy and Marine Corps training and operations. These terms have been
developed to prevent conflicts in data reporting to senior Department
of the Navy leaders, external commands and leadership, and Congress.
General Smith. The unclassified memorandum signed on 12 June
codifies new terms of reference for the readiness and availability
specific to Amphibious Warfare Ships (AWS). This includes Amphibious
Assault Ship (LHA / LHD), Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD), and
Amphibious Dock Landing Ship (LSD). Our current working group focused
on ARG / MEUs has discussed future iterations of the memorandum
potentially expanding on the definitions to include landing craft,
future Medium Landing Ship (LSM), as well as other naval platforms that
routinely support the Marine Corps.
navy design & procurement practices
125. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, what is the status of
NAVSEA implementing the eight recommendations made in GAO report 24-
105503 on the use of leading design practices to improve timeliness of
deliveries?
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy is currently developing Corrective
Action Plans (CAPs) for each of the eight recommendations from GAO
report 24-105503 on the use of leading design practices to improve
timeliness of deliveries. These CAPs and associated estimated
completion dates are due to GAO in summer 2025.
126. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, how many uniformed naval
architects work at NAVSEA?
Admiral Franchetti. As of July 2024, Naval Sea Systems Command has
79 uniformed naval architects across its enterprise as follows:
Headquarters (Directorates/PEO): 26
Supervisor of Shipbuilding: 26
Naval Shipyards: 19
Regional Maintenance Centers/Ship Repair Facilities: 8
127. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, how many civilian naval
architects work at NAVSEA?
Admiral Franchetti. Total NAVSEA civilians in the 0871 series is
472.
152 civilian naval architects at NAVSEA Headquarters.
1 civilian naval architect in NAVSEA affiliated Program
Executive Offices (PEOs).
44 civilian naval architects in NAVSEA Supervisors of
Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP).
274 civilian naval architects in NAVSEA Warfare Center
Divisions.
1 civilian naval architect at NAVSEA Carrier Planning
Activity.
128. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, how does NAVSEA
determine if it has a sufficient number of in-house engineers?
Admiral Franchetti. NAVSEA performs annual Capabilities Health
Assessments and Technical Capabilities Health Assessments to determine
the sufficient number of in-house engineers, identify shortfalls and
prioritize how to address them.
129. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, why did the Navy send
naval architects to work side-by-side with the FFG-62 build yard
architects?
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy has established a collaborationsite in
Marinette, WI and surged both the Navy and contracted engineering
design personnel to bolster and accelerate design stability completion
and support ramp up of production. The Navy has invested $15 million in
fiscal year 2023 Surface Combatant Industrial Base (SCIB) funding to
build engineering capacity in the fragile surface ship design and
engineering industrial base, and accelerate FFG design efforts.
Additional design engineers began reporting onsite at Fincantieri
Marinette Marine (FMM) on 15 January 2024 with 29 engineering designers
in targeted critical-need disciplines onsite through 15 August 2024.
These 29 designers are a supplement to FMM's full-time equivalent
engineers currently employed through direct or subcontracted resources
currently dedicated to the Frigate program.
130. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, how many naval
architects does the Naval Academy and ROTC graduate on average each
year?
Admiral Franchetti. Over the last 10 years, the Naval Academy had
an average of 29 Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering graduates each
year. (Note: The Naval Architecture major changed to Naval Architecture
& Marine Engineering starting with the class of 2017.)
Over the last 4 years, the Reserve Officer Training Corps students
have averaged 2.5 Naval Architecture degrees per year.
131. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, of the last 5 commanders
of Naval Sea Systems Command, what was the average length of time they
held command?
Admiral Franchetti. Aside from Rear Admiral Thomas J. Anderson who
served from September 2023 to January 2024 in an acting capacity, the
average duration of the last 5 commanders was 3 years and 7 months.
132. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, of the last 5 commanders
of Naval Sea Systems Command, how many proceeded to a subsequent tour?
Admiral Franchetti. All of the past five Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) commanders retired from the U.S. Navy following their command
tour. Across the Navy there are six Systems Commands (SYSCOMs), with
NAVSEA and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) led by three-star flag
officers. NAVSEA and NAVAIR are considered pinnacle career tours for
Engineering Duty Officers and Acquisition professionals; Flag Officers
in charge of these commands retire upon completion of their tour.
133. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, the Congressional Budget
Office and the Navy often have wildly different estimated costs for
ships. In fact, the Navy's estimate is historically 25-40 percent less
than the actual cost. CBO's estimate is historically 90 percent
accurate. What are the consequences to ship procurement timelines for
inaccurate cost estimates?
Admiral Franchetti. Inaccurate cost estimates, particularly where
growth is identified after contract award or budget submission, can
impact ship procurement timelines if funded late or left unfunded. The
Navy's cost estimating process is continually being refined, including
adjusting to the post-COVID cost environment, to ensure the most
accurate estimate for ships.
134. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, how does the Navy
determine ship cost estimates for the first-in-class (lead ship)?
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy uses a suite of cost estimating
techniques to determine lead ship cost estimates, including costs from
historical, analogous ships; factors for ship complexity and
capabilities; and projections of labor and material. Additionally, the
Navy involves industry through design efforts and information exchanges
to further inform the lead ship's cost estimate.
135. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, how does the Navy
determine ship cost estimates for subsequent ships in a new class?
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy's approach to estimating subsequent
ships in a ship class uses the lead ship cost estimate as a basis and
applies historical and industry informed factors to account for
efficiencies anticipated through learning and optimization efforts.
Additionally, projections for labor costs, material costs, and
capability differences are also applied.
136. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, why did the design
requirements for the FFG-62 change from its original concept that more
closely resembled the FREMM?
Admiral Franchetti. The design requirements for the FFG 62 have not
changed since prior to proposal solicitation. These foundational U.S.
Navy requirements for survivability, lethality, maintainability,
redundancy and habitability have existed on this program since its
inception.
To maximize schedule and cost-saving efforts, the Navy chose an
acquisition strategy that required interested shipbuilders to leverage
an existing parent vessel as the foundation from which to incorporate
these U.S. Navy requirements. Further, the Navy explicitly required the
use of current Programs of Record (PoR) to supply the Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE), such as the AEGIS weapons system, SPY-6
Radar, and Vertical Launch Systems (VLS), essentially pulling off-the-
shelf systems into the FFG 62 program to reduce overall risk.
Fincantieri Marinette Marine (FMM) was part of the original design
specification group that helped the Navy create the ship
specifications, which were then used to create the request for proposal
(RFP). FMM chose the FREMM platform as the parent vessel of their
proposed FFG(X) design, which was ultimately selected by the Navy.
Since award, the design details have been closely scrutinized to
drive design maturity and ensure these requirements are met, sometimes
requiring modification to gain compliance to the contract. Government-
driven requirement changes have occurred since award, such as
incorporation of Buy America Act provisions, but these are limited
impacts and negotiated and agreed with the shipbuilder.
137. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro and General Smith, why
did the design for the Landing Ship Medium change from the Marine
Corps' stated requirements?
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy and Marine Corps have worked
collaboratively through the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System process to define the required capabilities for LSM.
The detailed design proposals are currently being evaluated with the
intent to award a contract for design in early 2025. The design will be
based on JROC validated Navy and Marine Corps requirements.
General Smith. The Navy and Marine Corps have worked
collaboratively through the joint capabilities integration and
development system process to define the required capabilities for LSM.
The detailed design proposals are currently being evaluated with the
intent to award a contract for design in early 2025. The design will be
based on approved Navy and Marine Corps requirements.
officer training & qualifications
138. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, ROTC midshipmen graduate
with a minor in naval science, yet midshipmen from the Naval Academy do
not. Why not?
Admiral Franchetti. There is no pre-commissioning requirement in
the United States Navy for a Midshipman to complete a Minor in Naval
Science. Not all NROTC Midshipmen complete a minor in Naval Science.
The pre-commissioning training requirement for officer accessions
programs are based on the Professional Core Competencies Manual which
is used to develop appropriate curricula for future Navy and Marine
Corps Officers at the United Staes Naval Academy (USNA), Naval Reserve
Officer Training Corps (NROTC) and all programs at Officer Training
Command, Newport (OTCN). Based on those requirements each institution
develops their curriculum in accordance with regional accreditation
requirements.
Some academic host institutions have chosen to develop a Minor
degree in Naval Science, in addition to the requirements of the
Professional Core Competencies Manual.
USNA meets the requirements of the Professional Core Competencies
Manual by having all Midshipmen complete the USNA core curriculum as
part of their Bachelor of Science degree. The core curriculum ensures
graduates are dedicated to a career of naval service and have potential
for future development in mind and character to assume the highest
responsibilities of command, citizenship, and government.
139. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, does every midshipman
from USNA or ROTC get underway on a ship or submarine for a training
cruise at least once prior to commissioning?
Admiral Franchetti. No. While every midshipman will complete a
cruise prior to commissioning as outlined below, some midshipmen will
participate in a cruise that does not include physically embarking on a
ship or submarine. OPNAVINST 1530.8B requires that USNA and Naval
Service Training Command (NSTC), which oversees all 64 ROTC units, will
ensure midshipmen participate in at least one cruise prior to
commissioning. A cruise is defined as any surface, submarine, aviation,
hospital cruise, Leatherneck and marine air-ground task force (MAGTF)
training or 6-week United States Marine Corps (USMC) Officer Candidates
School (OCS) course, special warfare (SPECWAR), explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD), Information Warfare community (IWC) or foreign exchange
cruise. USMC OCS is the required cruise for all NROTC marine option
midshipmen. In line with OPNAVNOTE 1530, attendance at Leatherneck is
mandated for USNA midshipmen seeking a commission in the USMC. In the
event prospective USMC selects are unable to attend Leatherneck, a
waiver will be routed and the midshipman will be scheduled for a MAGTF
cruise.
140. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, Coast Guard officers who
operate ships are required to have a merchant mariner's credential
(USCG license). There is a shortage of merchant mariners in this
country. Navy Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs) receive a tremendous
amount of training and experience in ship driving and operations, yet
do not earn or test for a merchant mariner's credential. It seems that
one way to address the shortage of merchant mariners in the U.S. would
be to provide a transition program for SWOs to earn a USCG license so
they can easily transition to be a merchant mariner. Has the navy
considered implementing such a program?
Secretary Del Toro. The U.S. Navy has established the Military to
Mariner Program to provide a pathway for officers and enlisted
personnel to obtain USCG merchant mariner's licenses. We provide
awareness briefs and counseling sessions to the Fleet to assist in the
licensing process. The program is executed by the Surface Warfare
Schools Command. The USCG licenses require a certain number of days of
sea time, medical screening, drug testing, a Transportation Worker ID
Card (TWIC), and passing a licensing test. In the past 2 years, 844
Navy personnel have submitted applications to the National Maritime
Center, resulting in 714 individuals successfully obtaining a license.
The Military to Mariner Program has removed barriers to licensing
through registration fee waivers, drug testing waivers, medical
evaluation by military medicine, and the TWIC card costs for enlisted
personnel. We have worked with the USCG to credit Navy personnel for
time assigned to a sea duty command at 60 percent. The remaining
requirement for licensing is passing the exam. While many existing Navy
courses provide training on topics covered by the exam, a significant
portion of the exam material is specific to merchant mariner skills or
tasks.
Navy training covers 43 percent of the USCG 3d Mate's License Exam;
the remaining 57 percent is specific to merchant mariners.
Additionally, the U.S. Navy is working with the USCG to certify courses
to the Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW)
standards, which are endorsements to a mariner's license. This provides
rigorous training standards and prevents candidates from paying out of
pocket for a civilian course. Currently, 9 Navy courses are fully
approved to STCW endorsement standards with additional in the approval
process. We continue to review existing policies and course material
with the goal of further assisting military members interested in
obtaining mariner credentials.
recruiting
141. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, have Navy recruiters
been denied access to a public high school in the past year?
Secretary Del Toro. No, Navy recruiters have not been denied access
to public high schools in the past year.
142. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, at the posture hearing,
you spoke about increasing the number of recruiter visits to four per
year, but did not address the quality of the visit. What are your
recommendations on improving the quality of a recruiting visit?
Secretary Del Toro. Optimal access to high schools would involve
multiple visits monthly to reasonably unlimited locations within the
school/school grounds, and reasonably unlimited access to students. It
would revolve around the opportunity to conduct classroom presentations
for juniors and seniors, offering the ability to speak directly with
our target audience and discuss Navy opportunities. Additionally, the
ability to attend all high school career fairs and sporting events
would provide our recruiting force the opportunity to attend more
events in uniform and talk with both the high school students and their
families about the Navy experience and potential career decisions.
143. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, have Navy Weeks that
take place in communities that typically have low Navy presence shown a
statistically meaningful uptick in new accessions from those markets?
Secretary Del Toro. Statistically meaningful upticks in new
accessions occurred in 67 percent of the Navy Week events measured over
the last year.
144. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, what are the results of
the ``every sailor is a recruiter'' initiative?
Secretary Del Toro. The ``Every Sailor a Recruiter'' (ESAR)
initiative has yielded promising results thus far. As of 1 July, 472
commands across the Navy have submitted names of individuals they felt
would be a good fit for the Navy. This has led to 1,462 leads, yielding
322 contracts thus far. Data shows that a lead submitted through this
program is 2.7 times more likely to contract than a non-ESAR lead.
advanced manufacturing practices
145. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, what advanced
manufacturing practices have Regional Maintenance Centers (RMCs)
adopted to decrease the time it takes to procure or replace parts?
Admiral Franchetti. Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center
(CNRMC) utilizes advanced manufacturing technologies and processes to
support parts manufacturing and repair across the Enterprise. Examples
of the technologies and/or processes currently in use at the RMCs
include:
Additive Manufacturing (AM):
o DMG Mori Industrial Metal Hybrid Manufacturing Center
o Phillips Hybrid Industrial Metal Manufacturing Center
o Robust Polymer Capability--Various Polymer Machines
o Engineering interface with Metal and Polymer Parts Catalog--
Part development, certification, and promulgation
Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) Machines:
o OMAX Waterjet Cutting Machine
o 5-Axis Machining Centers
o Coordinate Measuring Machine
o Robust Machining Capability,--manual and CNC Lathes, Milling
Machines, Grinders
These capabilities enable CNRMC to address issues like long-lead
times, obsolescence, and the need for custom parts production or
repair, thereby facilitating improved equipment maintenance and service
readiness.
146. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, do large deck ships
(aircraft carriers and LHA/LHD) deploy with 3-D printers to make repair
parts?
Admiral Franchetti. The Navy currently has two large-deck
amphibious ships (LHD-1 and LHD-5) equipped with both metal and polymer
3-D printers and two aircraft carriers (CVN-72 and CVN-75) equipped
with desktop polymer units.
In fiscal year 2025, the Navy will continue expanding 3-D printing
capabilities across ships to include aircraft carriers and large-deck
amphibious ships to enhance self-sufficiency when operating in a
contested logistics environment.
mental health resources
147. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, when afloat units are
deployed, Navy chaplains who are often assigned to the aircraft carrier
or lead ship in the ARG rotate between ships to meet with sailors. Do
mental health counselors do the same?
Admiral Franchetti. The embedded mental health team (EMH) assigned
to an aircraft carrier consists of a clinical psychologist, licensed
clinical social worker, behavioral health technician, and two substance
abuse rehabilitation program counselors. These personnel can travel to
and board another ship in the carrier strike group (CSG) as requested/
needed; there is no formal rotation. However, other ships can request
that their sailors be transferred to the carrier for evaluation and/or
treatment with the EMH team. Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) include one
psychiatrist and one behavioral health technician on the large deck
amphibious assault ship. Providers from carriers or large deck
amphibious assault ships can call other ships within the CSG or ARG to
conduct evaluations or treatment when network bandwidth and
connectivity allow.
An additional avenue of support on carriers and large deck
amphibious assault ships are civilian Deployed Resiliency Counselors
(DRCs) who are licensed clinical professionals providing non-medical
clinical counseling while afloat and ashore. DRCs do not travel between
ships while underway. Furthermore, the Navy is assigning chaplains to
guided missile destroyers to provide confidential counseling while
ensuring spiritual readiness and resiliency of the Naval Force.
During the IKECSG's recent combat deployment, the EMH and chaplains
established a Planning Board for Resiliency (PB4R) which met weekly in
a coordinated effort across the strike group to identify trends and
collaborate on care. IKECSG had enough resources to provide tailored
Tiger Teams from the carrier to CRUDES. These tiger teams conducted 24
religious provision visits, 10 facility dog visits, and six mental
health support visits consisting of a psychologist, licensed clinical
social worker, and an Embedded Integrated Prevention Coordinator
(EIPC).
148. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, how do sailors assigned
to smaller surface combatants (LCS, DDG, CG, LPD, LSD) get access to
mental health professionals other than Navy chaplains while at-sea?
Admiral Franchetti. All smaller surface combatant ships have at
least one trained Independent Duty Corpsman (IDC), who is a highly
specialized Hospital Corpsman qualified to function as sole clinician
in locations that do not fully require a customary physician. All
Surface Forces (SURFOR) IDCs are trained in providing basic mental
health support, including assessment of common mental health disorders
and assessment of suicidality using the latest evidence-based tools.
For more complex mental health issues, IDCs consult shore based SURFOR
embedded mental health providers.
When smaller surface ships are operating within the range of a
carrier strike group or amphibious ready group, their IDCs can consult
mental health providers on these larger assets, which include medical
and mental health officers as crew. Telephonic evaluations and
treatment are also possible when network bandwidth and connectivity
allow.
Additionally, carriers and large deck amphibious assault ships have
civilian Deployed Resiliency Counselors (DRCs) while afloat and ashore.
DRCs are licensed clinical professionals who provide non-medical
clinical counseling and enable an additional avenue of support to
servicemembers.
The Department of Defense's Military and Family Life Counseling
Program augments the work of DRCs with licensed clinicians who also
provide non-medical counseling. Currently, Military and Family Life
Counselors (MFLCs) support 16 Navy ships while ashore in Hawaii, Japan,
and California. MFLCs have a highly flexible schedule to increase
servicemember access to care.
marine littoral regiment organic mobility
149. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, and General Smith, the
Navy's fiscal year 2025 LSM procurement plan only orders (but does not
deliver) eight vessels by fiscal year 2029. Since each MLR requires
nine LSMs to operate, it is clear the Navy will not be able to provide
enough LSMs to satisfy the organic lift requirements of the two MLRS
that will otherwise be fully operational by fiscal year 2029. To
provide an initial mobility solution, the Marine Corps will rely on a
small number of leased commercial vessels and an unknown number of EPFs
and LCUs. None of these three vessels meet the Marine Corps original
requirements for the LSM, which the Navy found objectionable because of
survivability concerns. The great irony is that the Navy's focus on
survivability created the time delay that will result in the LSM being
late to need by at least half a decade, forcing the Marine Corps to
rely on three platforms that are significantly less survivable than the
original LSM design. How many ships, exactly, of each type will be
available to support the 3d MLR and 12th MLR once each formation
achieves IOC and FOC?
Admiral Franchetti. The Littoral Maneuver Bridging Solution (LMBS)
is a phased approach to utilize existing Navy assets and Marine Corps
contracted vessels and craft to support the 3d MLR and 12th MLR. This
planned solution will provide 4 Expeditionary Fast Transports (T-EPFs),
2 Offshore Support Vessels (OSVs), 2 Landing Craft Utility (LCU)
1610's, 2 Stern Landing Vessels (SLVs), and 3 Ancillary Surface
Connectors (ASCs). Additionally, the LSM requirements were jointly
developed and agreed to by the USMC and the Navy then validated through
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.
General Smith. The Littoral Maneuver Bridging Solution (LMBS) is a
phased approach to utilize existing Navy assets and Marine Corps
contracted vessels and craft to support the 3d MLR and 12th MLR. This
approved solution is intended to provide 4 Expeditionary Fast
Transports (T-EPFs), 2 Offshore Support Vessels (OSVs), 2 Landing Craft
Utilities (LCU) 1610's, 2 Stern Landing Vessels (SLVs), and 3 Ancillary
Surface Connectors (ASCs). The only vessels currently available are
EPF, LCU and 1 SLV which is a modified chartered Offshore Support
Vessel. A foreign comparative test SLV will make up for the second
while the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab is considering options for the
ASC and other charter vessels. Negotiations for charters take time and
funding; therefore, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to
investigate further options for organic mobility and will rely on
commercial USTRANSCOM conveyances to ensure forces are forward
conducting campaigning activities. The LMBS square foot requirement was
based upon approximately 1 MLR operating forward. It is important to
note, here, that Military Sealift Command is experiencing a shortage in
civilian mariners, delaying even the first two of the approved EPF
sourcing for LMBS. It is possible all four may not be provided due to
this issue.
150. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, and General Smith, the
original vision for Landing Ship Medium was a risk-worthy ship that
could be produced in quantity at no more than $130 million. The current
CBO estimate is that the average LSM cost will be between $340 and $430
million. Given the Navy's recent history with delivery delays and cost
overruns, there is a real possibility the LSM procurement is curtailed
due to cost and delays. There is consequently short and long-term risk
with MLR mobility. Are there any ships currently in production in the
U.S. or an Allied nation that would fulfill more of the Marine Corps'
requirements than the interim mobility solution of leased commercial
vessels, EPFs, and LCUs?
Admiral Franchetti. There are no ships currently in production that
would fulfill more of the Marine Corps' requirements than the LMBS
combination of vessels. LMBS aims to provide a near term interim
littoral mobility capability but LMBS does not meet LSM requirements.
General Smith. There are no ships currently in production that
would fulfill more of the Marine Corps' requirements than the LMBS
combination of vessels. LMBS aims to provide a near term littoral
mobility capability, but LMBS fails to meet the capability criteria
established in the LSM analysis of alternatives.
151. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, and General Smith, do
you assume more operational risk using an existing LSM-type vessel
already in production that does not meet every Marine Corps
requirement, such as beach gradient, or using the interim mobility
solution of leased commercial ships, EPFs, and LCUs for the next
decade?
Admiral Franchetti. The combination of vessels that comprise the
LMBS are proven platforms with the least interim operational risk to
bridge the gap in the Marine Corps' ability to conduct littoral
maneuver and overcome challenges in sustainment, intra-theater
mobility, and tactical maneuver until the LSM is sufficiently fielded.
General Smith. The combination of vessels that comprise the LMBS
are proven platforms with the least operational risk to bridge the gap
in the Marine Corps' ability to conduct littoral maneuver and overcome
challenges in sustainment, intra-theater mobility, and tactical
maneuver until the LSM is sufficiently fielded. None of those solutions
meet the full requirement, necessitating a mix due to limitations in
capacity and capability of each. All other existing solutions would
require further modifications, such as fuel, berthing, etc. that would
increase cost and potentially incur engineering issues to those
designs.
152. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, and General Smith, has
the Navy determined that there are survivability concerns with the
leased commercial vessels, EPFs, and LCUs that constitute the MLR
interim mobility solution?
Admiral Franchetti. The interim mobility solution is acceptable to
the Navy until a fully capable LSM is delivered. The leased commercial
vessels, EPFs and LCUs, are proven, acceptable platforms for interim
MLR mobility as MLRs work toward Full Operational Capability.
General Smith. The interim mobility solution is acceptable to the
Navy until a fully capable LSM is delivered because the leased
commercial vessels, T-EPFs and LCUs are proven platforms and
appropriate for MLR mobility as MLRs work toward FOC
153. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, and General Smith, why
is the interim mobility solution acceptable to the Navy when the
initial LSM design was not?
Admiral Franchetti. LSM design will be determined in early 2025.
The LMBS does not replace the need for the LSM and no other vessel in
the Navy's inventory meets the LSM requirements. LMBS is a phased
approach to provide interim operational mobility and tactical maneuver
capacity until the LSM is available in sufficient quantities to support
an MLR.
General Smith. LSM design will be determined in early 2025. The
LMBS does not replace the need for the LSM and no other vessel in the
Navy's inventory meets the LSM requirements. LMBS is a phased approach
to add operational mobility and tactical maneuver capacity until the
LSM is available in sufficient quantities to support an MLR.
154. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Franchetti, and General Smith, the
Army is developing two new watercraft, the Maneuver Support Vessel
(Light), which will replace its LCU-8 fleet, and the Maneuver Support
Vessel (Heavy), which will replace its LSV fleet. Did the Army, Navy,
and Marine Corps coordinate or collaborate on a common set of
operational or survivability requirements for the MSV(L), MSH(H), and
LSM given that all three are expected to operate in the same theater
and face the same adversary?
Admiral Franchetti. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have
collaborated on the programs to determine areas of shared interest and
subsequently determined each of the programs have different sets of
requirements and timelines.
General Smith. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have collaborated
on the programs to determine areas of shared interest with all aspects
of DOTMLP-F; although, subsequently determined each of the programs
have different sets of requirements and timelines. MSV (L) is already
in production and is small in comparison to the requirements set forth
in the LSM design (i.e. 1 tank). MSV (H) is approximately 2 years
behind LSM. The LSM program office is sharing lessons from the
acquisition process, the Analysis of Alternatives, and from industry
engagements.
force design calibration
155. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps recently
announced it would reactivate one of the light helicopter squadrons it
deactivated in 2022. HMLA-269 will stand up again in July. The
helicopters will be brought back to operation from the sites where they
had been preserved since the deactivation. During the confirmation
process, you said you would not shy away from recalibrating the Force
Design modernization effort. The HMLA-269 reactivation seems to show
that you're doing that. What other personnel, equipment, and
organizational changes have you made to the Force Design initiative?
General Smith. HMH: east coast Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron
numbers will increase from 1x 1.0 squadron to 2x 0.75 squadrons.
HMLA: east coast Marine Light Attack Squadron numbers will increase
from 1x 1.0 squadron to 2x 0.75 squadrons.
Infantry Battalion: IBX30 iterative experimentation has resulted in
an 811x Marine sized battalion force structure.
Artillery: Initial actions had M777 battery reduction to 7x
batteries of 6x tubes; however, current initiatives are planned for 10-
12x batteries of 8x tubes.
Further refinements will be published later this year at the
completion of the Campaign of Learning Audit Group (COLAG). Currently,
COLAG 2024 outputs are being assessed by the DOTMLPF-C Working Group to
determine supportability and associated risk(s). The initiatives under
assessment span across the total force and aim to balance readiness
with modernization.
156. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, last year you responded to a
QFR after your confirmation hearing with the following: ``Pre-Force
Design 2030, the Marine Corps maintained 21 cannon artillery batteries
organized with 6 howitzers for a total of 126 howitzers. In fiscal year
2027, the Marine Corps will retain 7 batteries organized with 8
howitzers for a total of 56 howitzers, a roughly 56 percent
reduction.'' Is the Marine Corps still moving toward 7 Active Duty
cannon artillery batteries each with eight howitzers?
General Smith. No; While initial Force Design actions planned for a
reduction down to seven Active component cannon artillery batteries
with an increase from six to eight howitzers in each battery, after
additional analysis, the Service's artillery modernization plan now
retains 12 Active component cannon artillery batteries with six
howitzers each.
157. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, last year you responded to a
QFR after your confirmation hearing with the following: ``the Marine
Corps will retain 6 Reserve component batteries, which will also
increase to 8 howitzer batteries in fiscal year 2025.'' Has there been
any change to that plan?
General Smith. No; the Marine Corps will maintain eight reserve
batteries of six howitzers each.
158. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Army is conducting a
self-propelled howitzer performance demonstration later this year and
an evaluation in fiscal year 2026. Is the Marine Corps considering a
transition from towed cannon artillery to self-propelled cannon
artillery?
General Smith. No; While the Marine Corps will continue to
experiment with alternative indirect fire systems, the Service is
currently not considering a transition from towed cannon artillery to
self-propelled cannon artillery.
159. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, what is the total number of
infantry battalions in the total force and what are their manning
levels?
General Smith. As of 1 July 2024, within the Active component, the
Marine Corps possesses 21 infantry battalions with one of these
battalions established as a permanent Littoral Combat Team (LCT). All
21 of these battalions are manned at 100 percent, meaning that the
Marine Corps has fully funded those billets. While manning reflects the
number of funded billets, staffing numbers more accurately reflect the
numbers of marines filling those billets. Staffing of individual
battalions fluctuates based on available inventory of personnel and
where the units are in their deployment cycle.
160. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, what is the total number of
aviation squadrons in the total force, broken down by type and PAA?
General Smith. Within the Active component (AC) and Reserve
component (RC), the total number of aviation squadrons are depicted
below:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of AC
Aviation
Squadron Type T/M/S Squadrons as of 1 Number of PAA
July Fiscal Year
2024
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VMFA(AW)........................................ F/A-18C/D 6 12
VMFA............................................ F-35B 10 10\2\
VMFA (12 PAA)................. F-35B 2 12
VMFA.......................... F-35C 2\1\ 10
VMA........................... AV-8B 2 16
VMM........................... MV-22B 15 10
VMGR.......................... KC-130J 4 15\2\
HMH........................... CH-53E 4 16
HMH (.75)..................... CH-53E/K 2 12\2\
HMLA.......................... AH-1Z/UH-1Y 6 15/9
HMLA (.75)...................................... AH-1Z/UH-1Y 2 12/6
VMU........................... MQ-9A 2 6\2\
VMFAT......................... F-35B/C 2 25
VMMT.......................... MV-22B 1 20
HMHT.......................... CH-53E 1 16
HMLAT......................... AH-1Z/UH-1Y 1 15/9
VMUT.......................... MQ-9A 1 4\2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: Two VMFA (F-35C) Squadrons are C-5 and not counting toward AC numbers
Note 2: Not all Aircraft delivered
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of RC
Aviation
Reserve Squadron Type T/M/S Squadrons as of 1 Number of PAA
July Fiscal Year
2024
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VMFA............................................ F/A-18C/D 1 12
VMM........................... MV-22B 2 20
VMGR.......................... KC-130J 1 12
HMH (-)....................... CH-53E 1 8
HMLA(-)....................... AH-1Z/UH-1Y 2 10/8
HMLA DET A.................... AH-1Z/UH-1Y 1 5/5
VMFT.......................... F-5 13 12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 3: VMFT-402 Ceremonial Standup in 4th quarter of fiscal year 2024, currently borrowing (4) F-5s from VMFT-
401
training in the arctic
161. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, is it more expensive to move
personnel and equipment to Alaska or Norway to train?
General Smith. The Marine Corps spent approximately $2,250,000 in
2023 supporting Northern Edge, Artic Edge, and Red Flag exercises.
162. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, how much did the Marine Corps
spend on Exercise Nordic Response 24 in Norway?
General Smith. The Marine Corps spent approximately $24,000,000.00
in 2024 on Exercise Nordic Response.
163. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, how many marines participated
in Exercise Nordic Response 24 in Norway?
General Smith. Approximately 2,200 marines from II MEF and various
other units participated in Exercise Nordic Response.
164. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, what times of the year have
marines trained in Norway?
General Smith. Marines train episodically in Norway with over the
course of the year. Nordic Response 24 occurred 5 March to 22 March 24
and Northern Edge 25 is scheduled for 28 May to 18 June 25.
165. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, will the Marine Corps
contingent for Arctic Edge 25 be the largest training event the Marine
Corps has conducted in Alaska since 2018?
General Smith. Arctic Edge 25 is planned for approximately 350
marines from various units to include 7th Mar Reg, 2d Bn 4th Mar, MACS-
24, and CLR 45.
166. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, what is the approximate
timeline to change the SMCR unit type that is currently stationed at
JBER?
General Smith. Joint Base Elmendorf maintains an enduring SMCR
presence in the form of the Inspector and Instructor (I&I) staff and
assigned reservists. Time required to change the unit type would be
significant which and require detailed analysis of Home Training Center
(HTC) personnel impacts to include recruiting, technical schools and
supporting establishments.
Separate but more flexible are episodic JBER events that are manned
with Active Duty Operational Support (ADOS) orders in which rotation
timelines will vary dependent upon Reserve personnel availability.
There are additional episodic support staffs all of which utilize
Annual Training (AT) orders. AT orders are typically limited to 14 days
whereas the marines/sailors participating in Alaska based events are
allotted 22-day rotations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
accountability for recruiting
167. Senator Scott. Secretary Del Toro, The Navy discloses names of
Commanding Officers that are relieved of command. The Navy did not meet
their recruiting goals last year and will not meet their recruiting
goal this year. What is/are the names of the person or persons in the
recruiting chain of command that were held accountable and how were
they held accountable?
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy met its contracting mission of 40,978
recruits in fiscal year 2024. Due to a recovery in recruiter
performance as a result of several deliberate initiatives, Navy entered
fiscal year 2025 with a significantly greater number of recruits in the
delayed entry program than the previous 2 years (fiscal year 2023-12
percent (4,524), fiscal year 2024-12 percent (4,872), fiscal year 2025-
25 percent (10,150)). Some of the initiatives that resulted in this
include:
Detailing an experienced two-star admiral to lead Navy
Recruiting Command (was historically a one-star in their first flag
job).
Standing up Recruiting Operations Center, which was
created to monitor recruiting efforts in real time, focused on data
driven processes to increase production per recruiter and remove
variance among our 26 Talent Acquisition Groups.
The Every Sailor is a Recruiter initiative, which is a
program for currently serving sailors to share their experience and
provide leads of interested applicants to Navy recruiting.
Standing up the Navy Recruiting Reserve Command
Increasing recruiter manning, which enabled the Navy a
greater reach and engagement with the youth population.
Establishment of the Future Sailor Preparatory Course for
physical fitness (FSPC-P) and academic (FSPC-A), which provides pre-
boot camp support to potential future sailors to strengthen their
ability to succeed at boot camp.
While we have had recent success and are projected to continue
through fiscal year 2025, making recruiting mission remains one of the
Navy's top priorities. As such, this effort falls on all of us in
uniform to support--and every one of us is accountable to ensure
success in future years. Moreover, we continue to advocate for a
National Call to Service, and have appreciated the leadership from
Congress and other members of government, the private sectors and
academia that recognize the national security imperative of this
mission.
168. Senator Scott. Secretary Del Toro, was the Rear Admiral in
charge of recruiting held accountable?
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy met its contracting mission of 40,978
recruits in fiscal year 2024.
accountability for ship maintenance delays
169. Senator Scott. Secretary Del Toro, Ships are delayed getting
out of maintenance and major ship building programs are delayed. The
first Columbia-class submarine is 12 to 16 months late. The fourth and
fifth blocks of the Virginia-class submarine are 36 and 24 months late.
The first Constellation-class frigate is 36 months behind schedule. The
future aircraft carrier Enterprise (CVN-80) is approximately 18 to 26
months late. What are the names of persons in leadership at NAVSEA that
have been held accountable and how were they held accountable?
Secretary Del Toro. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition, Honorable Nickolas Guertin, and
I hold every Program Executive Officer and Program Manager accountable
for their performance. However, the macro conditions challenging the
U.S. shipbuilding industry must be weighed in the assessment of their
performance. The Navy's officers and civilians that lead their programs
will be accountable for the actions they take to overcome those
challenges and restore Navy shipbuilding programs to on-cost and on-
schedule performance.
170. Senator Scott. Secretary Del Toro, what are the names of
persons in leadership at PEO Team Aircraft Carriers that have been held
accountable and how were they held accountable?
Secretary Del Toro. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition, Honorable Nickolas Guertin, and
I hold every Program Executive Officer and Program Manager accountable
for their performance. However, the macro conditions challenging the
U.S. shipbuilding industry must be weighed in the assessment of their
performance. The Navy's officers and civilians that lead their programs
will be accountable for the actions they take to overcome those
challenges and restore Navy shipbuilding programs to on-cost and on-
schedule performance.
171. Senator Scott. Secretary Del Toro, what are the names of
persons in leadership at PEO Team Ships Leadership that have been held
accountable and how were they held accountable?
Secretary Del Toro. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition, Honorable Nickolas Guertin, and
I hold every Program Executive Officer and Program Manager accountable
for their performance. However, the macro conditions challenging the
U.S. shipbuilding industry must be weighed in the assessment of their
performance. The Navy's officers and civilians that lead their programs
will be accountable for the actions they take to overcome those
challenges and restore Navy shipbuilding programs to on-cost and on-
schedule performance.
172. Senator Scott. Secretary Del Toro, what are the names of
persons in leadership at PEO Team Integrated Warfare Systems Leadership
that have been held accountable and how were they held accountable?
Secretary Del Toro. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition, Honorable Nickolas Guertin, and
I hold every Program Executive Officer and Program Manager accountable
for their performance. However, the macro conditions challenging the
U.S. shipbuilding industry must be weighed in the assessment of their
performance. The Navy's officers and civilians that lead their programs
will be accountable for the actions they take to overcome those
challenges and restore Navy shipbuilding programs to on-cost and on-
schedule performance.
173. Senator Scott. Secretary Del Toro, what are the names of
persons in leadership at PEO Team Unmanned and Small Combatants
Leadership that have been held accountable and how were they held
accountable?
Secretary Del Toro. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition, Honorable Nickolas Guertin, and
I hold every Program Executive Officer and Program Manager accountable
for their performance. However, the macro conditions challenging the
U.S. shipbuilding industry must be weighed in the assessment of their
performance. The Navy's officers and civilians that lead their programs
will be accountable for the actions they take to overcome those
challenges and restore Navy shipbuilding programs to on-cost and on-
schedule performance.
174. Senator Scott. Secretary Del Toro, what are the names of
persons in leadership at PEO Team Ships Leadership that have been held
accountable and how were they held accountable?
Secretary Del Toro. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition, Honorable Nickolas Guertin, and
I hold every Program Executive Officer and Program Manager accountable
for their performance. However, the macro conditions challenging the
U.S. shipbuilding industry must be weighed in the assessment of their
performance. The Navy's officers and civilians that lead their programs
will be accountable for the actions they take to overcome those
challenges and restore Navy shipbuilding programs to on-cost and on-
schedule performance.
175. Senator Scott. Secretary Del Toro, what are the names of
persons in leadership at PEO Team Attack Submarines Leadership been
held accountable and how were they held accountable?
Secretary Del Toro. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition, Honorable Nickolas Guertin, and
I hold every Program Executive Officer and Program Manager accountable
for their performance. However, the macro conditions challenging the
U.S. shipbuilding industry must be weighed in the assessment of their
performance. The Navy's officers and civilians that lead their programs
will be accountable for the actions they take to overcome those
challenges and restore Navy shipbuilding programs to on-cost and on-
schedule performance.
176. Senator Scott. Secretary Del Toro, what are the names of
persons in leadership at PEO Team Strategic Submarines Leadership that
have been held accountable and how were they held accountable?
Secretary Del Toro. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition, Honorable Nickolas Guertin, and
I hold every Program Executive Officer and Program Manager accountable
for their performance. However, the macro conditions challenging the
U.S. shipbuilding industry must be weighed in the assessment of their
performance. The Navy's officers and civilians that lead their programs
will be accountable for the actions they take to overcome those
challenges and restore Navy shipbuilding programs to on-cost and on-
schedule performance.
177. Senator Scott. Secretary Del Toro, what are the names of
persons in leadership at PEO Team Undersea Warfare Systems Leadership
that have been held accountable and how were they held accountable?
Secretary Del Toro. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition, Honorable Nickolas Guertin, and
I hold every Program Executive Officer and Program Manager accountable
for their performance. However, the macro conditions challenging the
U.S. shipbuilding industry must be weighed in the assessment of their
performance. The Navy's officers and civilians that lead their programs
will be accountable for the actions they take to overcome those
challenges and restore Navy shipbuilding programs to on-cost and on-
schedule performance.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Appendix
Navy Reserve Training and Administrative Time Requirements Summary
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Ready Now Annual Requirements (Hours)... 35.77 Total Annual Requirements (Hours) 103.03
Tier 2 Deckplate Annual Requirements (Hours)... 45.07 Total Annual Requirements (Drill 12.88
Days)
Tier 3 Training Annual Requirements (Hours).... 10.50 Total Annual Requirement (DWE) 6.44
Tier 3A Navy RC-Specific Admin Annual 11.70
Requirements (Hours)..........................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TIER 1 REQUIREMENTS: READY NOW
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANNUAL TIME
SUBJECT REQUIREMENT DIRECTIVE AFFECTED ANNUAL TIME COMMITMENT COMMITMENT DELIVERY METHOD WEB CONTENT SYSTEM
POPULATION REQUIREMENT FOR EVENT (HOURS) (HOURS)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AT/FP Training Annual Anti-Terrorism / Force DODINST 2000.16 All SELRES 1.00 0.80 0.80 Online Training https://atlevel1.dtic.mil/at/signin FLTMPS
Protection Level I Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AT/FP Training Active Shooter Training (Drill/ NAVNORTHINST 10-222 USFF AT All SELRES 1.00 2.50 2.50 Online/ NOSC/ FLTMPS
Table Top) OPORD 3300-17 NRA/Unit-
Delivered
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BCA Biannual Measurement OPNAVINST 6110.1H All SELRES 2.00 0.50 1.00 NOSC/NRhttp://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/ PRIMS
Delivered 06000%20Medical%20and%20
Dental%20Services/06-100%20
General%20Physical%20Fitness/
6110.1H.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Common Access Card Maintain valid CAC. ID DODINST 1000.1 HSPD-12 of 27 All SELRES 0.33 1.10 0.37 Local DEERS DEERS
(CAC) required IAW Geneva Aug 04 Site
Conventions. DOD CAC-specific
requirement from HSPD-12.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dental Exam Dental Class 1 or 2 for DODINST 6025.19 MANMED P-117 All SELRES 1.00 1.00 1.00 MTF MRRS
deployment. Chap. 6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flu Shot Influenza Vaccination by 1 DODINST 6025.19 NAVADMIN 270/ All SELRES 1.00 1.00 1.00 MTF / NOSC MDR MRRS
January of calendar year. 09
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GTCC Annual GTCC Cardholder OPNAVINST 4650.16 Regular Travelers 1.00 1.00 1.00 Online Training https://www.navsup.navy.mil/site/ccpmd/
Training to maintain GTCC and mobilizers training/travel/tcchhtm/
account tcchhtmmainmenu.htm
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Immunizations Hepatitis A, Tetanus- DODINST 6025.19 All SELRES 1.00 0.50 0.50 MTF MRRS
Diptheria, MMR Vaccinations
current as well as
Tuberculosis screen and PAP/
Mammogram A/R. HIV test every
2 years.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information Assurance Annual Training to maintain DODDIR 8570.1 SECNAVINST All SELRES 1.00 0.50 0.50 Online Training http://iase.disa.mil/eta/iaav8/iaav8/ FLTMPS
Training access to DOD Computer 5239.3A OPNAVINST 5239.1C index.htm
networks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NMCI Documentation Verify signed user agreement COMNAVRESFAll SELRES0.1B 1.00 0.20 0.20 NOSC IThttps://private.navyreserve.navy.mil/
and SAAR Forms for access to Department- 3447B/n6/N61%20Project%20 Management/
NMCI network delivered SPAWAR%20Access %20Documents/
SAAR_OPNAV5239-14.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 2 Verification Annual Verification of Record MILPERSMAN 1070-200 All SELRES 1.00 0.10 0.10 Online https://private.navyreserve.navy.mil/ NSIPS
of Emergency Data within 180 Verification or 3447B/n1/CNRFC_N1C4/TOOLBOX/
days of AT. Can be verified NOSC/NRA/Unit Verify%20Page%202%20via%20
through NSIPS self-service Admin-delivered NSIPS%20ESR.ppt
account. Changes administered
by NOSC/NRA Admin.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PARFQ Biannual Completion + Medical OPNAVINST 6110.1H All SELRES 2.00 0.80 1.60 Online Form https://prims2008.bol.navy.mil/ PRIMS
Waiver if required Completion
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PFA Biannual Completion OPNAVINST 6110.1H All SELRES 2.00 2.55 5.10 Unit-Delivered http://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/ PRIMS
06000%20Medical%20and%20 Dental
%20Services/06-100%20
General%20Physical%20Fitness/
6110.1H.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHA Completion of Annual Physical DODINST 6025.19 SECNAVINST All SELRES 1.00 4.00 4.00 MTF http://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/ MRRS
by end of birth month. 6120.3 MANMED P-117 Chap. 16 06000%20Medical%20and%20
Includes Annual health Record Dental%20Services/06-100%20
Review as required by MANMED General%20Physical%20 Fitness/
6110.1H.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Physical Training (PT) Drill Weekend PT OPNAVINST 6110.1H All SELRES 12.00 1.00 12.00 Unit-Delivered http://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/ Local
06000%20Medical%20and%20
Dental%20Services/06-100%20
General%20Physical%20Fitness/
6110.1H.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PII Training Annual PII training by August DODDIR 5400.11-R SECNAVINST All SELRES 1.00 1.00 1.00 Online Training https://ile-lms.nko.navy.mil/Item FLTMPS
of each CY 5211.5E Details.asp?Display
Enroll=true&CourseRef=1067222
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seabag / Supply Complete Applicable Seabag COMNAVRESFAll SELRES 0.10 1.00 0.10 NOSC/NRA/- Local
Requirements Delivered
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security Clearance CNO-directed continuous SECRET SECNAVIAll SELRES (minus 0.10 3.00 0.30 Electronic http://www.opm.gov/e-qip/Phttp://
eligibility. NACLC required Seabee/CS/MU) Submisison of www.opm.gov/e-qip/reference.asp
every 10 years to maintain. Form
Electronic submisison via eQIP
system.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security Education Security Indoc Brief at SECNAV M-551All SELRESVINST 1.00 1.00 1.00 Unit-Delivered
Command. Security and CI 5510.30B
refresher annually. Security
debrief.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Urinalysis All personnel tested at least OPNAVINST 5350.4D All SELRES 1.00 1.70 1.70 Unit-Delivered
once per fiscal year (15% per
unit per month per OPNAVINST).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Annual Requirements (Hours) 35.77
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TIER 2 REQUIREMENTS: DECKPLATE NAVY BASELINE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANNUAL TIME
SUBJECT REQUIREMENT DIRECTIVE AFFECTED ANNUAL TIME COMMITMENT COMMITMENT DELIVERY METHOD WEB CONTENT SYSTEM
POPULATION REQUIREMENT FOR EVENT (HOURS) (HOURS)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADAMS ADAMS for Leaders--one-OPNAVINST 5350.4D First-time SELRES 0.05 4.00 0.20 External Class https://wwwa.nko.navy.mil/portal/ ADAMS
career class for CO/XO/SEA CO/XO/SEA personaldevelopment/home/adams
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advancement ExamP(E-1 Semi-Annual Advancement Exam BUPERSINST 1430.16F SELRES E-1 to E-6 2.00 3.00 6.00 NOSC/NRA/PUnit-
to E-6) Delivered
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advancement Exam Semi-Annual Worksheet BUPERSINST 1430.16F SELRES E-1 to E-5 2.00 0.20 0.40 NOSC/NRA/PUnit-
Worksheet Verification Delivered
Verification (E-1 to
E-6)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CDB Career Development Board Every OPNAVINST 1040.11CPNAVPERS All SELRES 2.00 1.00 2.00 Unit-Delivered
6 months minimum for RC 15878K
Sailors. Attend and serve on
CDBs.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CMEO/CAT Team Surveys Annual CAT Team Survey and OPNAVINST 5354.1F All SELRES 1.50 2.00 3.00 NOSC/NRA/PUnit-
within 3 months of COC Delivered
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Command Indoctrination Command/NOSC Indoc for newly NAVPERS 15878K OPNAVINST All SELRES 0.34 4.00 1.36 NOSC/NRA/PUnit-
reporting personnel 1740.3C Delivered
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enlisted Leadership ELD-Facilitated NAVADMIN 185/19 SELRES E-4 through 0.15 32.00 4.80 ELD Facilitator- FLTMPS
Development Training Training once per paygrade E-7 Selectees Delivered
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ESR Maintenance Establish / Maintain ESR. ESR NAVADMIN 292/06PNAVADMIN 043/ All SELRES 1.00 0.20 0.20 Individual NSIPS
maintenance requirements will 09
grow approaching FSR phase-out
30Sep10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EVALs/CHComplete personal input for BUPERSINST 1610.10B All SELRES 1.50 3.50 5.25 Unit-Delivered NAVFIT98A
FITREPS FITREP/EVAL. Rank assigned
personnel, chop their evals
and debrief.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Family Care Plan Establishment and annual OPNAVINST 1740.4D SELRES single 1.00 0.10 0.10 NRC/NRhttp://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/ NSIPS
Verification certification of Care Plan parents, dual mil Delivered 01000%20Military%20Personnel%20
Certificate and CarePlan spouses and A/R Support/01-700%20Morale%20
Arrangements Community%20and%20Religious%20
Services/1740.4D.PDFPhttp://
www.npc.navy.mil/Reference Library/
Forms/NAVPERS/FourColumn Details/
NAVPERS_1740-6.htmPhttp://
www.npc.navy.mil/Reference Library/
Forms/NAVPERS/FourColumn Details/
NAVPERS_1740-7.htm
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mid-Term Counseling Annual Personal Counseling BUPERSINST 1610.10B All SELRES 1.00 1.00 1.00 Unit-Delivered NAVFIT98A
Session
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enlisted Leader ELD training appNAVADMIN 254/21 All SELRES 0.20 32.00 6.40 Facilitator- FLTMPS
Development (ELD) years Enlisted delivered
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Officer Leadership Leadership TALNAVRESFOR 005/11 All SELRES 0.20 16.00 3.20 CPPD-Delivered FLTMPS
Training years Officers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ombudsman Appoint and coordinate OPNAVINST 1750.1F SELRES CO 0.04 1.00 0.04 Unit-Delivered Local
required actions and training
with unit Ombudsman
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reserve Affiliation Required course for all new OPNAVINST 1040.11D NAVPERS All New Affiliates 2.60 4.00 10.40 NRC/NRA/Unit-
Success Workshop affiliates to learn and 15878L Delivered
understand Reserve Policy and
procedures
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re-Enlistment Hazing Policy and Prevention, OPNAVINST 1500.22F NAVADMIN All Re-Enlistees 0.18 4.00 0.72 NRC/NRA/Unit- FLTMPS
Mandatory Training Fraternization Awareness and 098/10 Delivered
Prevention, Homosexual Policy,
Family Readiness Training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 2 Annual Requirements (Hours) 45.07
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TIER 3 REQUIREMENTS: GENERAL TRAINING
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANNUAL TIME
SUBJECT REQUIREMENT DIRECTIVE AFFECTED ANNUAL TIME COMMITMENT COMMITMENT DELIVERY METHOD WEB CONTENT SYSTEM
POPULATION REQUIREMENT FOR EVENT (HOURS) (HOURS)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combating Trafficking Annual CTIP refresher DODINST 2200.01 OPNAVINST All SELRES 1.00 1.0 1.0 Online Training https://ile-lms.nko.navy.mil/Item
in Persons (CTIP) training 5300.11 Details.asp?DisplayEnroll=true&
Training CourseRef=366000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety Training CNRFC-directed Non-Supervisor OPNAVINSTM 5100.23G 29 CFR All Military, 1.00 2.50 2.50 NRC-Delivhttps://esams.cnic.navy.mil/ESAMS ESAMS
Safety Training Baseline for 1910 OPNAVINST 5100.39C SELRES, Civilian Online Training _GEN_2/Login
all Reserve units: Safety Employees
Orientation, HAZCOM,
Ergonomics, Fire Prevention
and Fire Extinguisher, ORM,
Monthly Safety Talk.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GMT 1 Sexual Assault Prevention and ODI 6495.02, OPNAVINST 1752.1C All SELRES 1.00 1.00 1.00 Unit-Delivered NEL
Response (SAPR) Program
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GMT 2 Cyber Awarness Challenge SECNAVINST 5All SELRES 1.00 1.00 1.00 Online Training Navy eLearning (NeLNELDOD-CAC-2024.0)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GMT 3 Counterintelligence Awareness DODD 5240.06, DODD 5205.16 All SELRES 1.00 1.00 1.00 Unit-Delivered NEL
and Reporting
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GMT 4 Records Management SECNAVINST 5All SELRES 1.00 1.00 1.00 Unit-Delivered NEL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GMT 5 Suicide Prevention Program OPNAVINST 1720.4B All SELRES 1.00 1.00 1.00 Unit-Delivered NEL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GMT 6 Controlled Unclassified DODI 5200.48 All SELRES 1.00 1.00 1.00 Online Training TWMS-686564 NEL, TWMS
Information (CUI)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GMT 7 Operations Security SECNAVINST 3All SELRES 1.00 1.00 1.00 Online Training TWMS-717067 NEL, TWMS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 3 Annual Requirements 10.50
(Hours)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TIER 3A REQUIREMENTS: NAVY RC-SPECFIC ADMINISTRATION
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANNUAL TIME
SUBJECT REQUIREMENT DIRECTIVE AFFECTED ANNUAL TIME COMMITMENT COMMITMENT DELIVERY METHOD WEB CONTENT SYSTEM
POPULATION REQUIREMENT FOR EVENT (HOURS) (HOURS)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2N1 AQD Necessary IOT to compete for RESFORNOTE 5400/REFORINST SELRES Officers 0.1 28 2.8 NSIPS
an APPLY leadership billet 1412.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPLY BoResearch and apply for Reserve COMNAVOfficer SELRES1.5F CH-1 0.33 3.00 0.99 Online https://apply.navyreserve.navy.mil/ APPLY
Process Unit Billets via the APPLY COMNAVRESFORCOM NOTICE 5400
process Series
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AT/ADT/IDTT Complete and Route NROWS AT/ COMNAVRESFAll SELRES1.5F 1.80 0.30 0.54 Online https://nrows.sscno.nmci.navy.mil/ NROWS
Application ADT/IDTT Application (80% of nrows/secure/dod_consent.do
Submission via NROWS population)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AT/ADT/IDTT Travel Complete AT/ADT/IDTT Travel COMNAVRESFAll SELRES1.5F 1.60 1.30 2.08 Online https://dtsproweb.defensetravel.osd. DTS
Claim Submission / authorization and voucher and mil/dts-app/pubsite/all/view/
Liqusubmit for approval (80% of
population)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AT Waiver Generate and Route AT COMNAVRESFAll SELRES1.5F 0.20 0.30 0.06 Unit-Delivered
Participation Waiver (20% of
population)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Berthing Sign-Up Berthing sign-up for those COMNAVSELRES needing00.1 1.00 0.30 0.30 Unit-Delivered
granted berthing privileges by berthing
NOSC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CEI Verification Annual Verification of USD(P+R) Memo of 21 March 2003 All SELRES 1.25 0.20 0.25 NOSC/NRA/Unit- NSIPS
Employer Data or Update when DODINST 7730.54 BUPERSINST Delivered or
SELRES changes civilian 1001.39F Online
employers Verification
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MyNavy Assignments Research and apply for Reserve RESPERSMAN 1300 series Enlisted SELRES 0.33 1.50 0.50 Individual https://mynavyassignment.navy.mil/mna/ MNA
Unit Billets via the MNA Index.action
process (Enlisted only)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IDT Drill Pay Muster Complete IDT Muster (Avg per COMNAVRESFAll SELRES1.5E 12.00 0.45 5.40 Unit-Delivered EDM
member per unit)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IDT Operational Report unit OS data last COMNAVRESFORCSELRES CO 1001 12.00 0.10 1.20 Online Data https://205.85.24.104/
Support Data Capture Friday of each month (Unit CO Series Entry
only)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meal Signature Sheets NSIPS Meal Pass Log or Meal COMNAEnlisted SELRES00.1 12.00 0.03 0.30 Unit-Delivered
Signature Record (NAVRES 1291/
1) for meals consumed by
eligible SELRES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NROWS Budget Estimator Unit annual AT budget COMNAVRESFORCSELRES CO 1001 1.00 0.05 0.05 Online Data https://nrows.sscno.nmci.navy.mil/ NROWS
(BE) submission and maintenance Series Entry nrows/budget.do
(Unit CO only)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual Incentive Pay Submit recertifications for RESPERMAN M-1001.5 (CH-12Eligible SELRES 0.07 0.50 0.03 Online Data https://private.navyreserve.navy.mil/
Recertification Incentive Pays Entry cnrfc/N-Codes/N1/CNRFC_N11/Pages/
Default.aspx
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 3A Annual Requirements 11.70
(Hours)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[all]