[Senate Hearing 118-730]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-730
FAA OVERSIGHT OF AVIATION MANUFACTURING
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 13, 2024
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-869 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota TED CRUZ, Texas, Ranking
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts ROGER WICKER, Mississippi
GARY PETERS, Michigan DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin JERRY MORAN, Kansas
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JON TESTER, Montana MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado J. D. VANCE, Ohio
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
PETER WELCH, Vermont Virginia
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming
Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
Jonathan Hale, General Counsel
Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Liam McKenna, General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on June 13, 2024.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 1
Prepared statement of Senator Duckworth...................... 36
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 3
Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 10
Statement of Senator Blackburn................................... 14
Statement of Senator Welch....................................... 15
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 18
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 20
Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................ 24
Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 26
Statement of Senator Tester...................................... 27
Statement of Senator Capito...................................... 32
Witnesses
Hon. Michael Whitaker, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration................................................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Michael Whitaker
by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 39
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 43
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 46
FAA OVERSIGHT OF AVIATION MANUFACTURING
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THURSDAY, JUNE 13, 2024
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Maria
Cantwell, Chairwoman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cantwell [presiding], Klobuchar, Markey,
Peters, Baldwin, Tester, Rosen, Hickenlooper, Welch, Cruz,
Moran, Blackburn, and Capito.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
The Chair. Good morning, everyone. The Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation will come to order.
We are having a hearing this morning with FAA Administrator
Michael Whitaker to discuss the FAA'S oversight of aviation
manufacturing including the FAA'S plans to ensure that Boeing
follows through on the commitments made in its 90-day action
plan.
What this committee and the flying public wants to know is
what is the FAA doing to strengthen its oversight on the planes
that we fly on every day and to make sure that they are safely
built.
We need to know what change under your watch, Administrator
Whitaker, will restore the proper oversight to manufacturing to
achieve the excellence that we want to see at Boeing and other
manufacturers and to assure that the FAA is setting the gold
standard for safety oversight.
A week after the door plug incident, I sent the FAA a
letter reiterating my request from a previous FAA Administrator
a year before for the FAA to conduct a special audit to
determine whether Boeing was in compliance with FAA's safety
requirements for aircraft production.
The next day, Mr. Whitaker, you did start an audit process
and that FAA-conducted hundred-plus audit from January and
February of things like employee training, quality control
procedures, records retention, both at Boeing and its suppliers
is what we are here to discuss.
I have to say, Mr.--Administrator Whitaker, the results are
major safety concerns and are very concerning to me and, I
think, to the flying public. You have identified, according to
news reports, 97 instances at Boeing and 21 instances at Spirit
of where the products did not meet FAA standards. We will get
into this in the Q&A.
Also in part of the information is that the engineers
themselves had trouble responding to most basic questions about
quality control policies and quality management systems.
We find these challenges frustrating. We need to have an
FAA who is going to implement the very recommendations we heard
from the ODA expert review panel who testified before this
committee in April.
The panel's report observed that there is a disconnect
between senior leadership and frontline employees on building a
safety culture and found that Boeing employees did not
demonstrate--that the overall system did not demonstrate a
foundational commitment to safety.
To your credit, Administrator Whitaker, you told Boeing
they needed to give you a plan to reform its production quality
and you gave them 90 days to do so. Boeing has now delivered
that plan to you and we want to ask questions and get comments
from you on where we are.
I am struck by a sense of is this deja vu. Are we just back
here or can we really have a new day in creating a safety
culture that is so critical for the United States to be the
leaders in manufacturing.
In 2022 and 2023 as part of individualized FAA-conducted
audits of Boeing and Spirit AeroSystems production lines
required Boeing to correct and identify any--correct any
identified problems. Yet, your new special audit still found
problems.
So it begs a question about the audit process itself at the
FAA, and I know that is in the past--a past Administrator, but
still what do we need to fix in our audit process if we did in
2022 and 2023, 298 individualized audits?
And I will just point out that the--when I sent the letter
to the previous Acting Administrator he said, ``we do not need
to do an audit because we have all these specialized audits''
and, yet, we did this audit now and found out that the
specialized audits did not help us correct the problems that we
see today.
In 2015 the FAA settled an agreement, required Boeing to
adopt a safety management system. Yet, they are still not quite
there on that commitment. The same settlement agreement
required Boeing to create a regulatory compliance plan to
correct all safety failings and, yet, we know that we have
these--sorry, plug door incidents.
So the question is what can you do to change this culture?
You were overwhelmingly confirmed to be the agent in charge of
the FAA and the system. We know that you had an overwhelming
vote in the U.S. Senate so we are counting on you to be that
agent of change.
We know that this begins at taking a hard look at the
agency itself. In January 2024 former NTSB Chairman Jim Hall
wrote in an op-ed to the Seattle Times titled, ``FAA's safety
culture has not changed either.'' He wrote, ``While both Boeing
and FAA have issued words of assurances that they will use
investigations and find to correct flaws in the manufacturing
safety regulations and quality assurances of those industries,
past pronouncements we have heard about changing their safety
culture appear to be--have been lip service.''
Administrator Whitaker, we must prove Mr. Hall wrong. We
must demonstrate the FAA is a strong oversight regulator and
that the agency can ensure that manufacturers implement safety
management systems.
Both Boeing and the FAA need a strong safety management
system, not just in name only but one that actually saves
lives. That is why Section 102 of the Aircraft Certification
Safety and Accountability Act demanded that the FAA develop a
real SMS standard for aviation manufacturers. So I will have
more to ask about that when we get to the Q&A.
But in our recently signed FAA bill by President Biden we
have given your agency clear direction, clear resources, and
new tools to carry out that mission.
I look forward to questioning you about how we are going to
achieve that. Thank you for being here today, and I turn it
over to Ranking Member Cruz for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate you
holding today's hearing on this critically important topic,
FAA's oversight of aviation manufacturers.
I want to thank Administrator Whitaker for appearing before
us today, especially as his agency is busy implementing the
bipartisan, bicameral FAA Reauthorization Act that this
committee authored and passed just last month.
Our crucial bipartisan legislation gives the FAA much
needed long-term stability and allows it to refocus on its
primary mission, the safety of our national aviation system. It
directs the FAA to conduct risk-based inspections of
manufacturers like Boeing to ensure that there is no repeat of
the Alaska Airlines incident.
Further, it provides FAA with important tools for
developing a workforce with the technical know-how necessary to
overseeing complex aircraft manufacturers and it includes key
protections for whistleblowers who play an important role in
the aviation system so that employees can speak out freely when
raising safety concerns.
On January 5 of this year just minutes into its trip,
Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 experienced a rapid cabin
decompression at 16,000 feet when a plug door flew off the
plane.
Thankfully, miraculously, the pilots landed the plane
safely with no critical injuries. We are very fortunate that no
passengers were seated in the seat next to the plug door and
the plane was still climbing to its cruising altitude.
Had either of these factors been different the results
would have been catastrophic. The aircraft in question was a
Boeing 737 Max 9 delivered to Alaska Airlines just a few months
prior. For many of us it raised concerns once again of the
safety of Boeing aircraft.
In the weeks that followed the NTSB accident investigation
and the FAA's audit discovered unsettling details about
Boeing's production lines. Reports from airlines of untightened
bolts or overtightened bolts on Boeing 737 Max aircraft have
borne the phrase from passengers ``if it is a Boeing I ain't
going.'' That is not good.
Even more alarming, NTSB stated the reason the plug door
flew off the aircraft was because an employee at the Boeing
facility opened the plug door and forgot to put the bolts back
in. Such a fundamental lapse in the production line is
inexcusable and should never have happened.
I was very glad to see that the FAA took swift action to
ground the 737 Max after the accident. However, I remain
concerned that the FAA's oversight of Boeing failed to spot
serious production gaps.
The FAA, through their oversight of manufacturers, is
responsible for ensuring that when a passenger gets on a plane,
he or she can have the utmost confidence in that plane's
safety.
The FAA must guarantee that not only are they certifying
that an aircraft is safely designed, but that the manufacturer
is building them to that safe design. Clearly, that was not
always happening at Boeing.
Today we are going to hear from Administrator Whitaker on
what actions the FAA is taking to ensure their oversight of
Boeing's production prevents further mishaps.
I am interested in hearing his impressions of Boeing's
actions in response to the FAA audits of the Boeing production
line. It is clear that the safety culture at Boeing needs to be
reinforced, something that does not happen overnight.
I look forward to hearing on the FAA's long-term efforts to
ensure that Boeing is following through on its improvement
plan. The safety of the flying public is vital and it is our
job to ensure the FAA and Boeing are taking safety
responsibilities seriously.
I hope that we will hear directly from Boeing about how
they are going to address production failures. I understand
that Boeing's CEO Dave Calhoun will be appearing very soon
before the U.S. Senate, but I am disappointed it will not be
before this committee.
We have a responsibility as the Committee of jurisdiction
for civil aviation to conduct oversight on these matters and I
trust that we will hear very soon from Boeing's senior
leadership.
Boeing is a great American company and it is critically
important for our Nation that Boeing remains strong and
continue producing excellent aircraft.
These safety lapses have caused serious questions in the
flying public about the safety of Boeing's planes and it is
critical for Boeing, it is critical for the FAA, and it is
critical for this committee that those safety lapses be
corrected and corrected promptly.
Thank you.
The Chair. Thank you. I think--Senator Moran, did you want
to make a statement?
Senator Moran. No, Chair and Ranking Member. I will forgo
that, but I consider this one of the most important hearings
that--we have lots of important hearings. This is a very
important hearing and I am pleased that you are conducting it.
The Chair. Thank you.
Administrator Whitaker, thank you again for joining us.
Please proceed with your statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL WHITAKER, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you, Chair Cantwell and Ranking Member
Cruz, Committee members. Good morning.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss
the agency's oversight of Boeing's production and manufacturing
processes.
Let me first express my appreciation for your efforts in
passing the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. The FAA has begun
implementation of this important legislation and we will keep
you and your staffs updated on the progress.
In mid January I had the opportunity to brief this
committee on the January 5th door plug incident involving an
Alaska Airline 737 Max 9. Today I want to provide an update on
where we are now.
In February I asked Boeing to develop within 90 days an
integrated, comprehensive plan to fix its quality control and
production issues. This plan was required to address the
findings of FAA's special audit as well as the recommendations
of the Section 103 panel.
Boeing provided that plan to the FAA on May 30. This plan
does not mark the end of FAA's increased oversight of Boeing
and its suppliers. In fact, it is the beginning of a long
journey.
There must be a fundamental shift in the company's safety
culture in order to holistically address its quality and safety
challenges. This is about systemic change and there is a lot of
work to be done.
Our goal is to make sure Boeing implements the necessary
changes and has the right tools in place to sustain those
changes in the long term.
Since January 5, we have added more safety inspectors at
the Boeing and Spirit facilities to closely scrutinize and
monitor production.
Our enhanced oversight activities include: more direct
engagement of company employees, additional inspections at
critical points of the production process, and ongoing audits
of the quality systems and build process.
The FAA will monitor Boeing's performance metrics, or KPIs,
as well as our own metrics to assess the overall health of the
company's production and quality systems. This increased
visibility will play a vital role in identifying emerging
safety trends before they become problems.
The FAA will continue to hold Boeing accountable for
producing and delivering safe aircraft. We have capped
production and we will not grant any production expansion of
the MAX above that level until we are satisfied they can do so
safely.
As part of our enhanced oversight the FAA will maintain an
increased presence on the Boeing factory floor. We will monitor
the data, the KPIs, and Boeing's progress in implementing its
comprehensive plan and we will utilize the full extent of our
enforcement authority to ensure Boeing is held accountable for
any noncompliance.
We currently have multiple active investigations into
Boeing and are processing a number of reports filed by
whistleblowers and through our safety hotline. Boeing employees
are encouraged to use our FAA hotline to report any safety
concerns and we take each and every report seriously.
Let me also acknowledge the FAA should have had much better
visibility into what was happening at Boeing before January
5th. FAA's approach was too hands off, too focused on paperwork
audits, and not focused enough on inspections. We have changed
that approach over the last several months and those changes
are permanent.
We have now moved to a more active, comprehensive oversight
model, the audit plus inspection approach, which allows the FAA
to have much better insight into Boeing's operations.
I will personally remain engaged to ensure Boeing executes
the necessary changes to transform its safety culture and
address its production quality issues.
This includes visiting Boeing's Charleston facility
tomorrow, returning to Renton in September, and continuing to
meet with Boeing's senior executive team on a quarterly basis
to oversee implementation of the plan.
We will also take the learnings of the events of January
5th and apply them to our approach in overseeing all
participants in our safety ecosystem. We can no longer afford
to remain reactive.
We must develop a more dynamic oversight protocol that
allows us to anticipate and identify risks before they manifest
themselves as events. The key to this transformation is data.
The FAA is already taking steps to improve our internal
data management analysis. But safety is a team sport. We need
the entire industry to work together to better collect,
integrate, and analyze data from a broad range of sources. We
must also leverage advanced data analytics to better monitor
aviation systems across the entire system.
In closing, let me stress our number-one priority is the
safety of the flying public. The FAA will always take
appropriate action whether that action is against a
manufacturer, toward an airline, or enhancing our own oversight
of our operations.
So thank you again for the opportunity to be here today,
and I look forward to questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Whitaker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael Whitaker, Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration
Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and members of the committee
thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today to discuss the
agency's oversight of Boeing's production and manufacturing processes.
But first, I want to thank the committee for your hard work in passing
the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. The FAA has already started
implementation, and we will keep you and your staff updated on our
progress.
Alaska Airlines Flight 1282
On January 5, shortly after departure, Alaska Airlines Flight 1282
experienced rapid depressurization after the left mid exit door plug
blew out of a Boeing 737-9 MAX. The next day, on January 6, the FAA
took immediate action and issued an emergency airworthiness directive
grounding all 737-9 MAX airplanes with that particular door plug
configuration.
We mandated and oversaw a thorough inspection and maintenance
process on each of the grounded airplanes before allowing them to
return to service. Our findings during those inspections showed that
the quality system issues at Boeing were unacceptable and required
further scrutiny. That is why we increased oversight activities
including:
Capping production expansion of new Boeing 737 MAX airplanes
to ensure accountability and full compliance with required
quality control procedures.
Launching an investigation scrutinizing Boeing's compliance
with manufacturing requirements.
Enhancing oversight of the production of new airplanes with
more FAA safety inspectors on-site at all Boeing manufacturing
facilities.
Increasing data monitoring to identify significant safety
issues and mitigate risks early in the process.
Launching an analysis of potential safety-focused reforms
around quality control and delegation.
Boeing's Comprehensive Action Plan
This past February, I directed Boeing to develop a comprehensive
action plan within 90 days to address its systemic quality control and
production issues. During the subsequent months, the FAA worked closely
with Boeing as it developed their roadmap and plan for the path
forward. This plan was required to incorporate the results of the FAA's
special audit as well as the findings and recommendations from the
expert review panel report required by Section 103 of the Aircraft
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act of 2020 (ACSAA). Boeing
provided its comprehensive plan to the FAA on May 30, 2024, marking the
beginning of the next chapter of ensuring implementation and a renewed
focus on safety at Boeing.
However, this plan does not mark the end of the FAA's increased
oversight of Boeing and its suppliers. There must be a shift in the
company's safety culture in order to holistically address its systemic
quality assurance and production issues. Our goal is to make sure
Boeing implements the necessary changes and has the right tools in
place to sustain those changes in the long term. We anticipate that
Boeing's roadmap will be part of an iterative process as it receives
feedback and implement improvements to their design, manufacturing, and
production processes.
Thanks to the ACSAA, and as reemphasized in the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2024, Boeing is now required to have a mandatory Safety
Management System, which will ensure a structured, repeatable,
systematic approach to identifying hazards and managing risk. A robust
Safety Management System is the foundation and structure of a safe
manufacturing operation and will be a key factor in improving Boeing's
safety culture.
Boeing has also committed to the following:
Increasing and enhancing employee training, engagement, and
communication;
Encouraging their employees to speak up without fear of
reprisal;
Boosting supplier oversight;
Increasing quality oversight at every step of the production
process, and ensuring things happen in the right sequence and
are approved before moving forward;
Getting more input from users of the system;
Simplifying production processes and procedures; and
Bringing state-of-the-art technology to Boeing tool and
parts management.
To monitor the health of Boeing's production and quality system, we
also directed Boeing to identify key performance indictors (KPIs).
These KPIs directly correspond to the targets outlined in their roadmap
to improve their safety and quality systems and will help assess the
effectiveness of their proposed initiatives. The KPIs provide real-time
visibility into the production system with specific control limits that
will trigger corrective action if needed.
FAA's Oversight Activities
Boeing must do their part and the FAA will continue to hold them
accountable for producing and delivering safe aircraft. As part of the
FAA's enhanced oversight of Boeing and its suppliers, we have added
more safety inspectors in the Boeing and Spirit AeroSystems facilities,
and we will maintain our increased on-site presence for the foreseeable
future. Our surveillance activities include:
More engagement with company employees to hear directly from
them and gauge the effectiveness of changes outlined in
Boeing's plan;
Additional inspections at critical points of the production
process; and
Increased auditing of quality systems, build processes, and
changes outlined in Boeing's plan.
Our aviation safety inspectors will also monitor each of Boeing's
sub-teams tasked with implementing the key focus areas of the plan. The
safety inspectors will provide direct feedback on Boeing's proposed
changes and will be able to validate the reported results of the KPIs.
In addition to reviewing Boeing's KPIs, the FAA will utilize its own
metrics to monitor their production health and independently assess any
early indicators of risks in the system.
The FAA is committed to continuously improving our oversight
practices to ensure each design and manufacturing organization meets
all regulatory requirements and produces safe and compliant products.
Following the lessons learned from January 5th, the FAA changed its
oversight approach and those changes are permanent. We have now
supplemented our audits with more active, in-person oversight--the
``audit plus inspection'' approach, which allows the FAA to have much
better visibility into operations at all OEMs, including Boeing.
Continuous Safety Improvement
Recent events, especially the incident involving the Boeing 737-9
MAX, have shown us we cannot become complacent when it comes to
maintaining safety and public confidence in the nation's aviation
system. Aviation safety is a collaborative effort, and we must all work
together to ensure we continue to maintain and build on the agency's
safety record. We must all continuously improve and reexamine our
processes and procedures that support our shared safety mission by
collecting, sharing, and using data to detect risks, simulate outcomes,
and optimize our decision-making to ensure the safety of the flying
public.
Maintaining the safest aviation system in the world requires
rigorous oversight over the entire aviation system, including
ourselves--ranging from our own workforce to pilots, air carriers,
manufacturers, and airport operators. Since being confirmed as
Administrator, I have committed to looking internally within the FAA
and improve our own processes and procedures. We already have taken a
number of actions over the last several months to strengthen our safety
culture and mitigate risk in the system.
From an oversight perspective, the FAA has multiple monitoring
tools that we are actively leveraging across different parts of the
agency. For example, the risk index utilized as part of our assessment
of an air carrier's operations has been an effective tool in
identifying emerging safety trends before they become significant risks
in the system. This data-driven process recently led us to conduct more
rigorous oversight and an in-depth examination of an air carrier
following an indication of an increase in the level of risk in their
operations.
We are working to bring similar types of monitoring principles
across the board to the entire aviation system. We can apply these
types of principles to evaluate risk, regulatory capture, and other
safety concerns to how we oversee manufacturers, air carriers, airport
operators, air traffic controllers, pilots, and other aviation users.
As we leverage different tools and best practices internally and
externally, we will continue to look for ways to improve and refine our
safety oversight activities at the FAA.
In closing, let me stress: the agency's number one priority is
safety. The FAA will always take appropriate action to protect the
flying public--whether that action is against a manufacturer, toward an
airline, or enhancing oversight of our own operations. As we carry out
our regulatory responsibilities and oversight activities, safety will
always inform our decision-making.
I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
The Chair. Thank you, Administrator, and, again, I should
also thank you for your hard work on the FAA bill in helping us
get the technical questions answered so we could get this over
the goal line and implement it, and while ACSAA was safety
implementations so was this FAA reauthorization. So I
appreciate your characterization as more work to be done
because, clearly, there is.
I want to dive into safety management systems in general
and in specific about what we are doing here. In ACSAA we
required the FAA to issue a final rule on airplane
manufacturers for an SMS system and in April of this year you
did that, requiring manufacturers to submit an implementation
plan within 6 months and to fully implement SMS within 36
months.
Boeing, as a manufacturer, has had a voluntary SMS in place
for years. So the expert panel--the ODA expert panel identified
serious deficiencies in that system.
I do not want to say it is SMS in name only, but clearly
there are a variety of reporting structures there and confusion
and, let us just say, not sure that there is an SMS lifeblood
in the system that everybody understands and is acting by.
In response to your recent audit Boeing identified several
action plans to take to address deficiencies in the current
system including better integrating the quality management
system in SMS.
We are all here to talk about the safety culture so we are
drilling down here in a way. I am sure there is a lot of
details for somebody maybe just listening at home, but these
are the tools by which we establish a safety culture that all
the employees know that, that you oversee it, that you hold
them accountable.
So having the system and having it work effectively for
everyone including on the factory floor is critical. So I am
curious that this--what you think of their compliance with the
FAA's rule and whether--I am concerned that where we are is
that your oversight is just merely--you are just looking at
that and verifying the plan as opposed to--what I am saying is
a checklist. Oh, they said they were going to do these five
things. Yes, they did those five things. As opposed to really
guaranteeing to the public that it is a true safety management
system, that they are adhering to it.
Now, why does somebody not want to adhere to a safety
management system? I will tell you why. Because at some point
in time you have to say we are stopping the line and fixing
this problem, or, safety requires us to have documentation--we
are going to get documentation. So it is a continuous cultural
issue.
So I am very concerned that your oversight is not strong
enough. So how does this comply--how does your rule now comply
with both ACSAA and what the expert panel is saying, which is a
regular oversight of the safety management system by the FAA?
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you. I think it is--that question hits
at the core of safety.
So the safety management systems really are what drive the
safe outcomes that we get. The airlines have had these systems
and they are very mature, and I think it has been a journey for
the airlines to maybe initially reluctantly accept these
systems and over time really grow to appreciate how effective
they are in finding all risks in the system and being able to
mitigate those risks.
One of the things that has happened over the last 6 months
is at our encouragement the airlines have spent a lot of time
with Boeing to discuss their safety management systems and why
it is the secret sauce to having a safe outcome, and I view it
as the core of these changes that are coming.
Now that the system is mandatory it requires it to be more
robust. So it will--we will now have regulatory standards by
which to judge the mandatory system whereas when it was
voluntary we did not have any compulsory standards to impose.
So we know it will be broader. It will go down to suppliers
and it will also go deeper and really get at what the audit--
what the Section 103 panel found, that disconnect you mentioned
between leadership and employees.
The safety management systems have to have a culture where
employees are free to speak up, identify risks, and have those
risks taken seriously.
The reason safety management systems work is because they
are a risk analysis tool and it allows you to find risks that
might not be obvious, and one way you get that is by hearing
from your employees who are on the front lines.
So that is going to be a focus. We will be reviewing that
implementation very closely. Our inspectors who are on the
ground will be focused on watching that implementation roll out
and I would say it is a centerpiece of what needs to happen.
The Chair. So voluntary unacceptable?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, it is now mandatory but it gives us
more--it certainly gives us more leverage to ensure that it is
a very robust system.
The Chair. I need to know that the FAA Administrator
believes that SMS is not a voluntary system for us to have a
safe flying system.
Mr. Whitaker. That is correct, yes.
The Chair. Thank you. Do you believe that the FAA should
have its own safety management system?
Mr. Whitaker. Absolutely, and we have an umbrella system
which is required by ICAO and the air traffic organization has
an SMS system and our flight operations have SMS systems.
But we are taking a fresh look at that and how to make sure
those systems are integrated and hold our own system to the
same standards that we hold the rest of----
The Chair. Do you believe the FAA needs an overall SMS
system?
Mr. Whitaker. We have an overall system now but it is maybe
not as fully integrated as it needs to be and we are looking at
that.
The Chair. I am not sure what to make of that answer. So my
time is up, but we will come back to this discussion.
Senator Moran.
STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Moran. Chairwoman, thank you very much.
Administrator, thank you for your presence and your efforts.
Your testimony, which I think I wrote down, perhaps as you
said it but close to what you said capping production expansion
of new Boeing 737 Max airplanes to ensure accountability and
full compliance with required quality control measures.
Is Boeing operating under that cap now or--I am confused. I
followed this as best I know how. Or does Boeing have its own
cap that is actually lower than the cap that is placed on them
by FAA?
Mr. Whitaker. They are operating below that cap.
Senator Moran. So what standard are they utilizing to make
a determination about when they can increase production?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, we have had a direct conversation with
them about that. So these five KPI metrics are in place now. We
are monitoring those and we are monitoring the deployment of
the steps in this plan.
The plan is not merely a theoretical plan for the future.
That is actually being implemented in real time. So a lot of
the work that used to travel from Wichita to Renton is now done
in Wichita.
Those changes--in Wichita--those changes have already taken
place. They are deploying tool management and part management
procedures. So we are monitoring that as well and we will
continue to monitor that as they start to ramp up production
and make sure that those metrics stay in the green as that
happens.
Senator Moran. Are you--you would be informed--FAA would be
informed if there was an intention of increasing--ramping up
production. Is that true?
Mr. Whitaker. We would, and we actually issue the
airworthiness certificates so we have direct oversight of that.
Senator Moran. And is there an intention on the part of
Boeing to increase that production at this point?
Mr. Whitaker. They have not discussed with us a specific
intent to increase, but the expectation is they will start to
increase back toward that cap as time goes on.
Senator Moran. I am going to go to as time goes on. Can you
in any realistic way tell me what the path is to returning to
levels of production that are consistent with the market demand
for that aircraft?
I am looking for is there a month by month expectation of
how Boeing returns to production levels to meet the demand of
their customers.
Mr. Whitaker. There is not and that has not been part of
our discussions. Our discussions have been focused around
making sure these safety metrics are in place, understanding
that as they reach those metrics and strengthen their quality
programs they will begin to increase production. But we have
not had specific conversations about time line.
Senator Moran. And is there anything that--we are having
this discussion about Boeing. Is there anything that you would
tell me about Spirit and what is occurring there?
Any additional concerns or greater concerns, or are they
doing what is expected to be in a position to take advantage of
the circumstance when Boeing returns to additional production?
Mr. Whitaker. We have visited Spirit and we have inspectors
at Spirit. I think Spirit was the focus because they
manufactured the fuselage and one of the early problems
identified that was associated with the plug door was having
the fuselage leave Wichita with errors that needed to be
corrected later in Renton.
That process has changed. Boeing has sent their inspectors
to Wichita to make sure the fuselage is without significant
errors before they ship. So that has been a major rework of the
process. That has, largely, been completed.
Senator Moran. You met with--I have a date here. I think
all of the data is probably irrelevant. You met with employees
at Renton----
Mr. Whitaker. Yes.
Senator Moran.--Boeing employees at Renton, visited with
them. I did the same thing in Wichita at Spirit a couple weeks
ago. What was your take? What did you learn from the employees
about where they think they are and where they are going and
what needs to be done?
Mr. Whitaker. So the visit to Renton was very early in this
process and the feedback from the frontline employees was very
similar to the feedback from the 103 panel and very similar to
the feedback from our audit, which was the focus had been on
production and that was the driving factor and the driving
force in that shop. So this has really been about changing that
dynamic and having safety be the driving force.
Senator Moran. Almost every week I am told next Monday
there is going to be an announcement of the merger or
acquisition of Boeing--of Spirit by Boeing. Are you involved in
any way in that discussion?
Mr. Whitaker. I am not involved in that discussion. My only
conversations with Dave Calhoun have been about making sure
Boeing is exercising its control over its key suppliers to make
sure they are pushing down quality management programs, SMS, to
make sure those parts are coming in as they need to. But I am
agnostic on how they do that, whether it is through acquisition
or contractual.
Senator Moran. So you are looking for the results--the
safety requirements being met and have no--at least public or
maybe not even on your personal opinion as to whether
reacquiring Spirit lends itself toward a safer manufacturing
process?
Mr. Whitaker. That is correct.
Senator Moran. OK. Thank you, Chairwoman.
The Chair. Thank you, Senator Moran. Thank you for your
leadership on the Subcommittee.
I know we are expecting several members, but while we are
waiting for them I am going to go back to SMS and the question.
I want to go back to the FAA but I also want to ask about
another part of this system for manufacturers is the employee
and the employee reporting system.
The expert review panel recommended that Boeing implement
the Aviation Safety Action Program at all production sites.
Unlike the current reporting system, Speak Up, this system is a
tri-party process for the FAA, Boeing, and union
representatives to jointly file reports and address problems
early.
So it is kind of an identification system. Speak Up lacks
that role for the FAA and union to review the concerns
employees are submitting.
So we have, obviously, talked to the workforce about these
issues and I want to hear from you what you believe on this
expert review panel and the input employees and your visibility
into this? You talked about more data and information.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes. I think the ASAP program is a very
robust tool for hearing from the employees and, as you
indicated, the FAA is part of that process. So we are
supportive of that and we would like to see that extended
throughout the workforce with that same transparency and
participation by FAA. We need to have visibility into the
reporting that is coming from the employees.
The Chair. So is that--do you have that now currently in
other manufacturers?
Mr. Whitaker. I can respond separately with some more
detail about that from other manufacturers and information
about their programs.
The Chair. I think, again, some people might not understand
or think that this might be an over requirement when in reality
you think it should be part of a basic system that you have?
Mr. Whitaker. It does, and we have our own redundancy by
having an FAA hotline and we have requested to Boeing's CEO
that they communicate our hotline information to their
employees, which they have done, and we have had hotline
reports come in through FAA.
The Chair. So you do not think there is anything
deleterious here about having FAA have some insight to this?
Mr. Whitaker. No, I think it is quite necessary.
The Chair. OK. So what can the FAA do to ensure that that
actually happens?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, as part of this plan--part of the SMS
rollout under the comprehensive plan will include a robust
system for employee reporting so that will be one of the things
that we are monitoring and we will make sure that that is
transparent.
The Chair. OK. So appreciate that if you could help lean
into that. I think your point about data, whether it is SDRs or
whether it is--we and ACSAA put this risk report that is
required every year because we want to see what we think are
the developing top risks.
I think it was effective when NTSB called out that one of
the number-one risks they were seeing was near miss and lack of
implementation of technology and shortly thereafter the
Administrator at that time, Acting Administrator quickly said,
``let us get a rule and get something done.'' So those are the
kinds of system improvements that we would like to see.
A large part of the FAA's oversight is making sure there
are enough safety inspectors and we recognize the importance
that the safety workforce is and that is why enacting the
recent law--we basically authorized $66.7 billion over 5 years
to help boost the FAA's workforce and to make sure that we have
an increase in the number of aviation safety inspectors. This
is to be done across all shifts, obviously, at manufacturing
sites.
How does the FAA know what the right number of safety
inspectors are? How do we use metrics to measure their success?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, the interaction between what the
inspectors are finding and what the staffing needs are is sort
of a continuous feedback loop.
So with respect to Boeing, as we do the audit and we find
gaps in the production process that gives us insight into where
we need the inspectors and they continue to deploy and continue
their audits and inspections and we redeploy assets as needed.
So, for example, there are a lot of issues around tool
management and part management, and we would expect as Boeing
deploys newer state-of-the-art technologies to manage their
tools and parts once we see that successful we will not need as
many inspectors there and they might be redeployed to some
other aspect of production.
So it is designed to be a flexible system based on
feedback. We initially deployed 24 inspectors. I think we are
up in the low 30s now to Boeing and Spirit and our target is
55. So we are continuing to increase--train and increase
inspectors to deploy.
The Chair. How do you know that 55 is the right number?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, we--that is our best estimate at this
point based on where we think we need to deploy them. But that
number could change over time and I think a key to how we want
to do oversight, going forward, is to have flexibility to make
sure we are putting our assets where they need to be and
removing them from less risk areas to deploy them more
effectively.
The Chair. Thank you. I see Senator Blackburn on the
screen. Senator Blackburn, are you ready?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Blackburn. Yes, indeed, I am.
The Chair. Thank you.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it,
and I am so grateful that we are having the hearing today and,
Mr. Whitaker, always appreciate your time.
I want to go to an issue you and I have discussed before
and it deals with these Chinese drones and the fact that we
have had some of these drones in the country.
We have--as you know, I have worked on this making certain
that Federal funds are not used, and the President has signed a
law, a provision that I had championed, that would mean that we
stop using--we would be explicit in not using our Federal funds
or allowing our Federal agencies to operate these Chinese
drones.
So what I would like for you to do is just give me an
update. Where are you on this? Have we ceased using the Chinese
drones and what is your time line for moving away from these?
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you, Senator.
I will have to revert back and provide that answer to you
separately. I will look into where we are in complying and what
that timeframe is so happy to respond to that later.
Senator Blackburn. And are you coordinating with CISA and
the FBI as you are moving away from these drones?
Mr. Whitaker. We have very strong coordination with all
agencies that are involved in this so that is a strong yes, we
are.
Senator Blackburn. OK, wonderful.
I was disappointed in the FAA during the reauthorization
debate and I had worked on the issue to raise the pilot
retirement age to 67, and we all know that due to the pressure
from the pilot union's leadership and my colleagues on the
other side of the aisle that it seems the FAA caved to
political pressure from big labor and a letter was sent on
February 5 of this year in your name to Chair Cantwell opposing
raising the pilot retirement age, and when questioned by
Representative Nehls over in the House you correctly implied
that the role of the FAA was to give technical assistance, not
take policy decisions, and during that exchange you seemed to
be unfamiliar with the letter itself.
And all this leads me to ask you who was in charge of
writing that letter? Were you aware the letter went out and
will you commit to keeping politics out of the FAA and focus
instead on safety and oversight?
Mr. Whitaker. I certainly review every letter that I sign
so I am familiar with the letter. Our intention with that issue
as with all issues was to provide technical advice, which in
that case was around compliance with international standards
and the need for data if we are going to have a change to the
retirement age.
So my intention is to not become involved in political
disputes and focus on safety so you do have my word on that.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you. Thanks, Madam Chair.
The Chair. Thank you.
Senator Welch.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER WELCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VERMONT
Senator Welch. Thank you very much.
You had the chance to be working with Boeing and I want to
give you an opportunity to explain your view of their level of
cooperation and how that extremely important process went?
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you for the question, sir.
We have had very intensive interactions with Boeing since
this incident on January 5th including a meeting with the
entire executive team early after and then just a couple weeks
back.
I will say there has been a shift in tone over that period
of time and, of course, there have been some personnel changes
over that period of time as well. We have worked closely with
Boeing throughout that period on the comprehensive plan.
It was not an assignment to slide under the door at the end
of the 90 days so we had a lot of input into that process and I
think we have ended up with a comprehensive plan. It covers all
the elements we think needs to be covered.
But it is a roadmap. It is going to adjust to circumstances
as we--as it gets deployed, and I think the other dynamic I
will mention is that my focus has been on making it clear this
is a very long-term journey.
You do not change the culture of an organization quickly,
and so we have seen an increasing recognition that this is a
long journey ahead.
Senator Welch. All right. So the bottom line here is there
is an absolute need for there to be a culture change in order
for us to have confidence?
Mr. Whitaker. No question. No question.
Senator Welch. The second thing is the 90-day plan they put
in place that is good but what is the accountability? How will
we know that there has been follow through and they just do not
kind of walk away from the follow through to make it work?
Mr. Whitaker. That is really the core issue and Chair
Cantwell mentioned that in her opening comments. I think there
are a number of things that we are doing. We have not--we are
not putting together a plan and then setting them off and
hoping that it gets executed.
We will be closely working with them. We will have boots on
the ground at their facilities so we will be able to interact
with the employees directly and have a sense of what is going
on.
We will be able to monitor the deployment of the SMS and
quality assurance programs. We will continue to have audits
and, importantly, we have cap production so we have an ability
to ensure that they are executing.
Senator Welch. Thank you. I want to ask you a little bit
about the electric aircraft infrastructure pilot program. That
is very important to us in Vermont and, as you know, the FAA
reauthorization established a new five-year plan.
I just want to ask you where you stand with respect to
being supportive to stand up the pilot program at the FAA to
improve the electric aircraft infrastructure at our airports?
Mr. Whitaker. I think that is a very important part of
encouraging this new industry, advanced air mobility and
related industries. We have to have the infrastructure, not
only the physical infrastructure but also the regulatory
infrastructure.
So we are also working to make sure we have the operating
rules in place in time so when these vehicles are certified
they know how to operate them. So I think that is an important
piece.
Senator Welch. Thank you.
My last question is about the FAA efforts to try to improve
the availability of air traffic control and that is important
to us.
It is important to everybody. But we lost our flight to New
York City, which is--we have got to correct that and my
understanding is that the lack of air traffic controllers was
relevant to that.
With respect to the changes that were made in the
authorization act what is your assessment of where we are going
to be on addressing that shortage of air traffic controllers?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, there are two pieces to that particular
question. One has to do with our hiring generally. So we have
increased our efforts to hire across the board by making it
easier for military controllers to hire directly into the
agency by putting together a program to allow aeronautical
universities to train students to the same standards as the
academy so they can come--after taking the exam come directly
into facilities.
So we have able--we have been able to really open up the
pipeline for new controllers. It takes a long time to make a
controller so there is a little bit of a lag but we are making
really good progress.
With respect to the service to Burlington, I think that was
largely a reduction because we have reduced capacity on the
East Coast corridor by 10 percent because of staffing problems
specifically in New York.
We are in the process of moving some of that airspace to
Philadelphia. That has been a long process but we were hoping
to have that cut over in July--end of July, and Philadelphia is
a very healthy facility so we should be able to staff up much
more effectively there.
So it is going to take some time to get that elephant
through the boa but we think it is going to be a solution to
this problem.
Senator Welch. OK. Thank you. I would like to commend you
on a good start in your new job, and I yield back.
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you, sir.
The Chair. Thank you.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Good morning, Administrator Whitaker.
Mr. Whitaker. Good morning, sir.
Senator Cruz. Welcome.
In March during my questioning of NTSB Chair Jennifer
Homendy when she appeared before this committee she told me
that Boeing was missing key documents and records about the
specific MAX 9 aircraft involved in the Alaska Airlines Flight
1282.
Has your investigation determined whether the documents
specific to that MAX 9 plane whether they even exist?
Mr. Whitaker. That is part of our overall investigation of
this incident and my understanding is that is true that they do
not exist.
Senator Cruz. If I understand correctly, the security
camera footage was overwritten. Boeing does not know who
performed work on the door plug and no paperwork exists. Is
that all right?
Mr. Whitaker. That is my understanding.
Senator Cruz. That seems remarkable and shocking. Is there
concern at the FAA that an employee at Boeing is hiding key
information about this?
Mr. Whitaker. That investigation is ongoing and I know the
Justice Department has a separate investigation underway. So I
think too early to have an opinion about that, but we will
thoroughly investigate those circumstances.
Senator Cruz. Prior to the Max crashes Boeing was a storied
company with a rich history of building the best and the safest
planes in the world. During the pandemic Boeing conducted
employee buyouts and involuntary layoffs. Once travel picked up
and airplane orders resumed Boeing hired to fill the workforce
gap.
According to a Wall Street Journal article published this
week, of the more than 30,000 Boeing employees represented by
one of the unions, roughly, half have less than six years
experience. That is double the level before the pandemic.
During your investigation to what extent has the
inexperience of engineers or inspectors contributed to some of
the observations made in the FAA's audit?
Mr. Whitaker. I think significantly and I would say that
this lack of transfer of knowledge from early retirements and
the impact of COVID has been a risk throughout the aviation
ecosystem and I think the better companies have used their SMS
system to identify the risk and put specific programs in place
to mitigate that, either bringing retired employees back to
monitor, giving more training or having fewer requirements for
new employees. Boeing did not have a program like that in place
and that is a gap that was identified and is part of the new
plan.
Senator Cruz. That same Wall Street Journal article went on
to say that Boeing executives, quote, ``Did not realize the
extent of the knowledge loss until after the Alaska accident.''
What requirements will the FAA impose on Boeing to compensate
for the inexperience on the factory floor?
Mr. Whitaker. So the plan includes a number of employee
specific initiatives focused on training, increasing the amount
of training but also their instructions and installation
protocols are extraordinarily complex and they have recognized
that.
So they are going through a process to simplify and then
they are going to be able to measure proficiency of employees
to perform tasks. So that is a part of the KPI measurements
that we will be looking at.
Senator Cruz. In January you announced that Boeing would
not be allowed to produce more than 38 Max 9 aircraft each
month. Right now Boeing is producing around 32 each month. My
top priority in this regard, as is yours, is ensuring that
these planes are safe, but we also want Boeing to be
competitive worldwide.
What metrics will Boeing have to meet in order for it to be
able to make more planes?
Mr. Whitaker. So there are a variety of metrics. There are
the five or six KPIs that we will be monitoring. Those are up
and running. We are establishing what is the green zone, what
is the yellow zone, and what is red. So those need to stay in
the green zone while they are increasing production.
And then we have progress that we are monitoring on the
other elements of the plan, the rollout of tool management
systems and training and things of that nature and we will
measure that through the audit. So it will be a combination of
those factors.
We will be able to watch that as they start to increase
production from the current level and make an evaluation as
they get to that 38 number.
Senator Cruz. As you know, the Boeing Max airplane crashes
in 2018 and 2019 shocked and scared pilots and passengers
alike. Boeing made terrible mistakes that killed hundreds of
people and shattered the company's reputation. Likewise, the
FAA was caught flat footed with shoddy oversight.
In this latest crisis of confidence, what is the FAA doing
differently to hold itself accountable for the oversight the
agency is required to conduct?
Mr. Whitaker. So it is a good question and a fair question,
and I think it is--we have been too much in reactive mode,
waiting for some event to occur and analyzing the events to
find out what to do differently.
So we are shifting to a much more proactive approach. So on
the manufacturing side it is introducing inspectors and coming
up with clear indices to monitor performance.
We are also taking a look at our own risks including
controllers, which is why we did this fatigue study, and we are
building in more rest for schedules that should not have
existed, frankly, before.
And, really, the ultimate goal is to get to data and to get
the data that we can analyze up front to try to see these
things before they happen, and that is not an easy lift but it
is achievable and that is going to be really one of my main
focuses, going forward.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
The Chair. Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Chair, and thank
you very much for your work, Administrator.
I am going to start with one quick thing. I think we all
know it is critical for safety and security that we upgrade our
aviation system, and I am kind of stepping back from a lot of
the good questions that have been asked, looking back at the
outage to NOTAM, which, as you know, alerts personnel to
potential safety hazards along a route and grounded when that
happened--last year grounded the flights nationwide, and
Senator Moran and I worked together with Senator Capito and
Representative Stauber over in the House to pass a bill that
directs the FAA to upgrade the NOTAM system by September of
this year.
Could you tell me where FAA is on that deadline?
Mr. Whitaker. So that progress--that program is on track,
and in response to those events we have taken a look at the
resilience of the system generally to make sure that we can
come up with a protocol so that we do not have a single system
go down and have it bring the whole NAS down.
So we are focusing on the resiliency of our systems and
also our ability to operate among cybersecurity threats and the
like. So there is a body of work around that.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
There have been an alarming number, as you know, of close
calls on runways. This year FAA reported 23 runway incursion
events that occurred in 2023, a collision in January at the
Tokyo Airport where people died, and we worked with the
Chairman and the Ranking Member on the FAA reauthorization to
include provisions to ensure planes are equipped with
technology that alert pilots to the presence of other planes on
the runway.
How will these technologies improve safety?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, the runway safety paradigm involves
multiple layers of safety. So it involves the human factor, the
workforce, the controller's eyes on the situation, the pilot's
eyes, the controller's supervisor's eyes on the situation.
So training and staffing are important, and then the
technologies provide layers of safety as well. So we are
deploying a number of technologies out there. One of the most
promising ones is installed in our TRACONs that give alerts if
there is an approach that is coming into a runway that is in
use. That has been deployed.
We have other surface awareness initiatives that give
controllers tools to get alerts if there is a potential
conflict.
So we are continuing to look at individual situations
because all these airports have their unique challenges but
trying to find more layers that we can insert into that.
Senator Klobuchar. Good. I was going to ask about the air
traffic control hiring, something I care a lot about and have
worked with my colleagues on.
I know you were already asked that by Senator Welch, and if
there are follow-ups I will put it in writing. Aviation
workforce in general--the Wall Street Journal reported earlier
this week that Boeing is facing a dearth,--this is a quote--``a
dearth of experience on the factory floor after legions of
senior machinists retired when the pandemic hit and in the
years since.'' I think we are seeing that in other workplaces
as well.
Could you talk about the importance of investing in a
steady pipeline of skilled aviation workers? The bill that
Chairwoman Cantwell and Senator Cruz worked on included the
bill that I led with Moran, Duckworth, and Thune to boost the
FAA's 625 grant program. But just talk about that pipeline.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes, I think that is very important
legislation and this is a--the workforce challenges are present
in all aspects of our industry. There has been a significant
loss of experienced workers and a lack of that natural transfer
of knowledge.
So what we are encouraging operators in the system to do is
recognize that as a risk and build programs around that to
mitigate that risk, which means more training, more mentoring,
and more time to complete tasks.
Senator Klobuchar. Last, you talked about in your testimony
that the FAA has permanently changed its oversight approach
following the January 5th incident with Alaska Airlines, and do
you believe that action plan is sufficient to change the safety
culture, not just Boeing but also suppliers?
Mr. Whitaker. So the action plan it is comprehensive but it
has to be implemented. It is just a plan. It is just a roadmap.
So I think the difficult part is in that implementation part of
that does include making sure that suppliers are pulled into
the SMS process so that they can mitigate risk and recognize
the supply chain is a risk that needs its own separate
mitigations.
Senator Klobuchar. And just along the lines, how have the
FAA been coordinating with international regulators on that
supply chain issue with safety?
Mr. Whitaker. So our--my coordination internationally since
taking this role has been fairly limited. We did have a EASA
conference this week so I was able to spend some time with the
new head of EASA.
So we have agreed to try to work together on some areas and
safety is really the bedrock of what that is going to be and we
specifically talked about how to cooperate on data sharing and
analytics.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. And on the good news front I wanted
to thank you for the work that has been done on getting
approvals for some of our runways.
You and I have talked about some super small airports and
some of the things that had to be done and the funding that is
going out as a result of the bipartisan infrastructure law that
has been really helpful on that front. So thank you.
Mr. Whitaker. Great. Great. Glad to hear it. Thanks.
The Chair. Thank you. And thank you, Senator Klobuchar, for
both your leadership on the NOTAM and on the near-miss language
that was in the FAA bill. So much appreciate that.
Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Administrator Whitaker, today I just want to thank you for
the work you have been doing. I have been impressed with the
speed and the aggressiveness with which the FAA has responded
to Boeing's safety crisis and I wanted to thank you for your
leadership.
Boeing recently presented its 90-day plan to the FAA
detailing how it would get its safety culture back on track.
The plan looks extensive but we know that Boeing's safety
problems are deeper than missing bolts and poor documentation.
The problem is the lack of a safety culture, a culture that
was eroded by decades of profit-driven decisions. Administrator
Whitaker, do you agree that Boeing's plan must have buy-in from
everyone in the organization, especially the employees
designing and building the planes?
Mr. Whitaker. I do agree with that. Yes, sir.
Senator Markey. I agree with you, and, in that case, in
drafting its 90-day plan do you know whether Boeing consulted
the unions representing the engineers and machinists doing this
work?
Mr. Whitaker. I do not have specific information on that. I
believe that they have and I know that we have had
conversations to get that frontline feedback. I do know that
they have had several safety stand downs where they have heard
from all of their employees, and so they have reached out to
get input from them.
Senator Markey. Well, did the FAA ever indicate to Boeing
that certain stakeholders including unions representing its
workers should be involved in the plan?
Mr. Whitaker. Yes, in the sense that that is part of a
robust SMS system. So you need to have avenues for that
employee--that frontline employee.
Senator Markey. Well, here is what I have heard. I have
heard that unions were not significantly involved in developing
the plan. This does not make sense to me. Over and over again
Boeing's business decisions have undermined safety.
These decisions have mostly been made by corporate
executives in cushy corner offices without any input by the
engineers and workers who have historically defined Boeing's
engineering and safety excellence.
Now you are telling me the same people who steered Boeing
off the flight path of safety are the ones developing the plan
to make things right with no input from workers, as I have been
talking to the workers.
It should be obvious that the workers charged with
designing and building our planes should be included in
developing the plan to transform Boeing's culture.
Boeing does a lot of actual rocket science but this is not
rocket science. To be honest, the lack of union involvement in
developing the safety plan is not surprising. It exposes
Boeing's deep and longstanding hostility toward organized labor
to the direct detriment to safety for all of us.
And do not take my word for it. Take Boeing's. I have here
screenshots from an internal Boeing training document that
describes unions as something to be contained and encourages
managers to limit interactions between union and nonunion
employees and it even has a map that shows Boeing's concerted
efforts to move critical Boeing safety functions away from the
union's stronghold in Everett, the location where Boeing's
engineering and safety excellence culture was built. Boeing
treats unionization like a virus that needs to be contained.
Now, the company is surprised when employees fear they lack
protection from retaliation, when they stick their neck out on
safety issues. Boeing is surprised that a culture of trust has
been eroded across the organization.
At every turn Boeing has undercut unions' ability to
protect workers from retaliation or facilitate trust between
workers and management. The turbulence today should have been
on their radar for years and, personally, I think the FAA has a
role to play in ensuring that workers are at the decisionmaking
table to transform Boeing's safety culture.
So, Administrator Whitaker, as the FAA oversees the
implementation of Boeing's oversight plan can you commit to
ensuring Boeing's unions have a voice at the table during the
planning process?
Mr. Whitaker. I can certainly commit that the SMS program
will not work without extensive employee feedback and open
channels of communication. So that will be part of the--that
will be part of the plan, going forward.
Senator Markey. Thank you. Well, I think it is vital that
the FAA use the full extent of its authority here to ensure
Boeing's employees are involved and have a voice when it comes
to reviving the company's safety culture, and I look forward to
continuing to work with you at the FAA and all interested
parties on those issues.
And I thank you, Madam Chair, for your great leadership on
all of these issues.
The Chair. Thank you. And while you were not in the room
the FAA Administrator did commit that an SMS system should
include an input from employees. That would include the FAA
getting access to that information.
I think that has been one of the contentious discussions
there, at least with SPEEA, that they want these issues to be
brought up as soon as possible and to be recognized by the FAA.
So I appreciate Administrator Whitaker's commitment to
making sure that that happens as part of a safety management
system, just one aspect of what Senator Markey brought up.
Senator Moran.
Senator Moran. Thank you again, Chair.
Administrator, production is capped, we talked about on the
Boeing 737 Max. What do you know about the procedures and
policies in place at Boeing and/or Spirit about other aircraft?
Are the necessary--is the necessary oversight occurring to
make sure that the manufacturing of those aircraft is safe and
sound?
Mr. Whitaker. So our approach here has been to, first and
foremost, focus on the Max but the comprehensive plan and our
new model of oversight will cover the entire Boeing commercial
aircraft lineup and my visit to Charleston tomorrow is part of
that expansion.
Senator Moran. And as Senator Cruz was talking about the
workforce and the relatively--relative young age tenure of
those new employees we have really worked hard, Senator
Duckworth and I, on increasing the opportunities for greater
education and training of an aviation workforce.
Do you have suggestions of any ideas that we ought to be
pursuing in regard to safety as we train and educate engineers
and mechanics and others in the aviation world? What should we
be--what kind of training and education should occur in regard
to safety procedures and process?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, I would say, first, I think the
outreach to younger people is key in developing this workforce
and keeping it broad and the sooner--the earlier the better in
that regard.
But I think the lack of understanding around safety
management systems is a gap and we have seen that with airlines
who were initially reluctant but ultimately have embraced this
technology enthusiastically and I think that is the gap we
really need to focus on.
Senator Moran. Administrator, there are lots of jobs in
Kansas and across the country that are related to aviation and
aerospace. I am anxious for workforce opportunities to continue
and to grow.
None of--I would again highlight, as I have said in every
setting that I have spoken about this topic, is there is no
future for the aviation aircraft industry if the flying public
is not safe and knows that they are safe and so anything that
short circuits that would be very short sighted.
But I am anxious when those protocols and safety is as
certain as it can be that our workforce has the opportunity to
return to the levels of--to meet market demands. This is also
in addition to an employment issue.
Boeing and its suppliers are hugely important to our
manufacturing base and hugely important to our national defense
and security. So the work that you are doing has significant
consequence in many aspects of our Nation's lives.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes, sir.
Senator Moran. And I thank you for your partnership with
this committee and with me in regard to strengthening aviation
security.
I would indicate to you as we work on our Fiscal Year 2025
appropriation bill please make certain that--I guess I will
have to ask you because you cannot overcome--well, I guess you
are an independent agent. You need to tell me what needs to be
done in the appropriations process to make sure that you have
the tools for that safety environment.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes, we will do that.
Senator Moran. And, finally, do you feel that the--do you
feel confident in the safety of the flying public today and
planes that many Americans are on every week and certainly
throughout the year--summer travel season? Can Americans feel
safe about their circumstance as they fly across the country
and around the globe?
Mr. Whitaker. Yes, they can, and air travel continues to be
the safest way of travel by a very, very large margin. We keep
it that way by not resting on our laurels and I think in this
case shifting from a reactive approach to a more aggressive
approach that focuses on data to find those risks.
There are a lot of redundancies, a lot of layers of safety,
but we do not want to test the layers. We want them to be there
in case we need them, not to use them. So it is--it does remain
safe and we are going to keep it that way.
Senator Moran. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you.
The Chair. Thank you.
Senator Hickenlooper.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Hickenlooper. Great. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Whitaker, thank you so much for being here. Thank you
for your service. I appreciate that and I will----
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you.
Senator Hickenlooper. I will restrain myself and not
continue talking about Boeing. The issue has been pretty well
covered.
We did have four emergency landings that were due to Boeing
malfunctions at Denver International Airport. Obviously,
canceled flights, significant delays. But I think you have
navigated that terrain successfully.
Let us move on to regional airlines struggling to hire
enough qualified pilots and, obviously, we need to continue
training a new generation of pilots to make sure that rural
areas have reliable connections through air travel.
Many flight schools offer flight time for pilots to train
at general aviation airports like Rocky Mountain Metropolitan
Airport and Centennial Airport down in south metro Denver.
Some of the residents near these airports are concerned
about the noise--the continuing escalation of airport noise and
how that impacts their communities. Airports, community
members, FAA representatives have been coming together at
community noise roundtables to try and identify solutions that
can work for everybody.
So how does the FAA engage at a local level to ensure that
we accomplish the twin goals of maintaining a workforce
pipeline of trained pilots and at the same time meaningfully
addressing the concerns of the community about the noise--
increases in noise?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, on the pilot hiring issue I there is
some good news. I think that the pipeline has expanded and we
are seeing less pressure in that space. There does seem to be
particularly a shortage of experienced pilots who wear the
captain's uniform so that is still a challenge.
But I think it is a pretty robust pipeline and it has
become a much better career than it was 20 or 30 years ago,
much more stable and better paid than it had been.
So I think market forces are turning out more people
interested in that space and with some of the new technologies
coming on board I think it will continue to be a fruitful
career path.
Noise--I think you have described it well. It needs to be a
community discussion and it needs to happen early in any
process whether it is changing airspace or changing
configuration of an airport to make sure you are adequately
capturing noise.
It cannot just be after the fact where you are only hearing
from the people who have been harmed by it. So FAA has been
very forward leaning on making sure they engage early with
communities to gather viewpoints.
Senator Hickenlooper. All right. Thank you on that.
And this is almost more of a shout out for the FAA.
Northern Colorado Regional Airport, like many small airports,
faces unique challenges managing the airspace near other
regional airports along the Front Range in Colorado.
The airport has adopted innovative and efficiency--
efficient technology to address these challenges including the
Colorado remote tower project which is a joint effort with the
state of Colorado and the FAA.
The airport has also installed what is called a STARS
surveillance system that gives air traffic controllers
additional situational awareness to safely manage flights. FAA
has been a partner in this right from the start.
How does the FAA work with airports like Northern Colorado
Regional Airport to identify and use this kind of innovation
technology to improve safety and reliability?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, we have a fairly regimented process
with respect to towers, how they are equipped and what
technologies come in based on the traffic demand and projected
growth.
But the contract tower program is one of the main tools we
have for smaller airports and we have flexibility in that
program to allow towers to transition to Federal towers.
I know there have been some interesting pilot programs on
remote towers. I think the economics have been a little
challenging for that program but it is still a technology that
is being evaluated.
Senator Hickenlooper. Great. And then you guys have an
important role in overseeing the safety of passengers across
the national airspace system including space launches, and
spaceports are being built now across country.
As you know, there is one in Colorado called the Colorado
Air and Space Port and these facilities provide economic
opportunities for their communities while supporting the growth
of the aerospace industry, a lot of small businesses filling
this space.
Our bipartisan Space Port Act provides targeted
infrastructure resources through the FAA space transportation
infrastructure matching program to help some of these new
spaceports succeed.
Administrator Whitaker, how is the FAA working to balance
the interests of space ports with general aviation airports
nationwide?
Mr. Whitaker. It is a good question and the space ports--I
think when I was here last time there were a handful of
launches a year and now we have a handful of launches a week.
So it has grown really exponentially.
Those vertical operations are a little disruptive to our
horizontal NAS so it has created some challenges but I think we
have managed to work around how to integrate those services
without disrupting traffic.
So we coordinate very closely with the space launch
operators to try to avoid busy seasons or congested areas so we
do not have to close much airspace. But that is a balance that
we work.
Senator Hickenlooper. We appreciate all the effort on that.
I yield back to Madam Chair. Thank you.
The Chair. Thank you, Senator Hickenlooper.
Senator Rosen.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Madam Chair, and really an
important hearing and I want to thank you, Administrator
Whitaker, for being here today to really discuss how Congress
and FAA can work together.
We have to be sure American skies can continue to be safe
and proper oversight mechanisms--that they are in place and
always being improved.
And so I want to talk about Boeing pilot input a little
bit. In April this committee held a hearing to discuss the
findings and recommendations issued by the Organization Design
Authorization--we will just say ODA--an expert review panel.
In that hearing I asked a question about how the ODA report
found that input from Boeing's pilots was neither consistently
nor directly delivered to the highest levels of decisionmakers
in an organization and I said it then and I am going to say it
again.
I believe it is essential to make sure pilots have a seat
not just in the cockpit but at the table, and so we ensure that
their expertise--well, they are not boots on the ground. They
are pilots in the air. But that their expertise guides and
enhances air safety.
So in the summary of the new safety and quality plan Boeing
committed to elevating human factors and strengthening the role
of pilots in the design process.
So does this plan go far enough to elevate pilot input in
the design process and how will the FAA actually really ensure
there is meaningful and consistent input from pilots that are
integrated and prioritized in Boeing's design process? Both
meaningful and consistent, I think, is a key there.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes, that is really a key question for this
entire plan, making sure that there are avenues and meaningful
avenues for frontline employee input so pilots but also people
on the floor, people who are building aircraft.
That is an important feature of this. It is something that
we are able to monitor through culture surveys that are ongoing
to make sure the employees feel that they are empowered and
they have a voice and so we can take the findings from those
surveys and look at changes.
The comprehensive plan is really a roadmap and I think we
all understand it will have to be adjusted as we go forward so
if that input is not meaningful we will make adjustments.
Senator Rosen. Well, this really leads me to my next
question because perhaps there could be retaliation, right, and
that has an impact on safety as people make their--voice their
concerns, right?
So the ODA expert panel report found instances where Boeing
supervisors when they worked on annual assessments and self-
audits or an investigative process that could present conflicts
of interest or erode independence or even compromise Boeing's
commitment to a nonretaliatory and impartial environment for
its workforce.
So throughout the report those interviewed gave--those
folks that were interviewed gave examples of the consequences
of just raising concerns about potential interference and
potential retaliation for managers and supervisors.
So what confidence do you have? We think about the report.
We want everyone to be included. We want them also to be--feel
free from the fear of retaliation, losing their job.
And so what confidence do you have that Boeing is taking
the necessary steps to be sure that provider--workers have
proper channels to go through and are protected?
Mr. Whitaker. We will be monitoring the execution of that.
The employee feedback loop and the ability to speak up without
retaliation is one of the core pillars of an SMS system.
The SMS system is not only mandatory for Boeing now, but it
is the core of our entire safety system. So if they are not
able to achieve that then they have not achieved the SMS
system.
I will also mention that all of the recommendations and
findings of the 103 panel are--Boeing was required to
incorporate into the plan so each one of those has to be
addressed in that plan.
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
I want to move on now to FAA's certification workforce
because in 2019 in the wake of the 737 Max 8 crashes the Joint
Authorities Technical Review recommended that the FAA conduct a
workforce review of its Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight
Office.
Among other requirements, the Aircraft Certification,
Safety, and Accountability Act of 2020 that we passed the
following year directed the FAA to carry out the review of its
certification on workforce to determine whether the agency had
expertise and capability.
And so I am sure you agree that a well trained workforce is
paramount to an effective certification process. So with that
in mind is there anything you can share about FAA's current
certification workforce needs and how we here in Congress can
help you meet those needs?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, we have been--I would say that the
ACSAA legislation was very comprehensive, very effective, and
very spot on. So I have been very impressed with the scope and
focus of that legislation. FAA, I think, has done a good job
since that time in executing.
Its focus was, largely, on certification but it is the same
organization that does the oversight of production. So we are
making some additional changes beyond ACSAA to make sure we
have a more inspector-focused approach to overseeing what is
going on at Boeing on the production side.
Senator Rosen. I will ask this off the record but we want
to be sure that you have the workforce that you need in order
to keep us safe and we will ask the remainder of our questions.
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Tester.
STATEMENT OF HON. JON TESTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Tester. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you,
Administrator Whitaker, for being here. I appreciate it. I am
sorry I did not get here earlier to ask--to listen to the
questions because I do not want to be repetitive but I probably
am. OK.
So Boeing's got some challenges. Boeing is very important
to this Nation both from an economic standpoint and a military
standpoint. They are really pretty damn important. I have my
concerns if they continue the way they are going that they will
be able to continue to exist. That is just my opinion.
When we have failures within the production process it
tends to lead for people not to trust the company. The FAA
plays an important role in this because you do--you oversee the
people who inspect. Is that correct? And are those people
employees of Boeing or are they employees of the FAA?
Mr. Whitaker. So the delegated employees tend to, largely,
be on the design side of the house. So there are a few on the
manufacturing side so the inspectors who are there are FAA
employees.
Senator Tester. They are FAA employees?
Mr. Whitaker. Yes.
Senator Tester. So if that is the case--because I thought
it was the other way around. I thought it was the FAA
certifying Boeing employees to do the inspection. What is going
on in the FAA? Why are these kind of failures happening?
Mr. Whitaker. So we did not have the inspectors on the
ground in the factories before January 5th so that is a change.
Senator Tester. Why is that?
Mr. Whitaker. It was, largely, viewed as an audit process
to make sure that the quality assurance programs were being
executed and the appropriate paperwork was in place.
Senator Tester. So post January 5th the rules of the road
had changed?
Mr. Whitaker. That is correct.
Senator Tester. OK. And so that is good, by the way. I
think that is very, very good.
So when the inspection is done now there are people that
report directly to you?
Mr. Whitaker. Absolutely.
Senator Tester. They have no connection with Boeing
whatsoever?
Mr. Whitaker. That is correct, and that is a change and I
have met with those employees. They go around, they talk to the
Boeing employees. They conduct audits. They verify work has
been done. We started with about two dozen. We are up to about
three dozen now and we are going to get up to a higher number,
going forward.
Senator Tester. And are those three dozen Boeing-specific
inspectors or is that overall inspectors that were hired by the
FAA?
Mr. Whitaker. These are inspectors that we have moved to
the Boeing facilities and also to the Spirit facilities.
Senator Tester. And long term how many inspectors you think
you are going to need for that to be able to be where you think
the safety violations or whatever you want to call them are
that you are comfortable that Boeing is doing what they need to
do to put out a superior product, by the way, like they used to
do?
Mr. Whitaker. Right. Right.
Our current target is 55 but we will adjust that as we go
forward based on need.
Senator Tester. OK. And these folks are in the plant. I
assume they are running production 24/7, correct?
Mr. Whitaker. They go to the plant. That is their place of
work now and they are on all three shifts.
Senator Tester. OK. OK.
Well, I am all in where I--I think that by what you said
today you are taking the issues with Boeing very, very
seriously and you are applying your people that you can hold
accountable to make sure that the certification and inspections
are done correctly. That is a fair statement to make?
Mr. Whitaker. That is correct, sir.
Senator Tester. OK. So you believe the oversight process
right now, assuming we get to 55 in a proper myriad of time, is
adequate or more than adequate?
Mr. Whitaker. I do. We will continue to monitor that and we
will make adjustments as we go forward.
Senator Tester. And can I ask if during the production
process since January 5th you have made recommendations to
Boeing on how they can change or how they can do things
different to meet the safety requirements?
Mr. Whitaker. We have made a lot of recommendations. We
have been in constant contact. When we requested the--in
February that they create a plan within 90 days----
Senator Tester. Yes.
Mr. Whitaker. We have been in constant contact. It was not
a homework assignment that they slid under the door. So we have
given them----
Senator Tester. And they did reply within 90 days?
Mr. Whitaker. They did, and they provided a comprehensive
plan.
Senator Tester. And are they following that plan?
Mr. Whitaker. They have already begun executing portions of
the plan and we are monitoring that execution.
Senator Tester. OK. Good enough. Thank you very much. Thank
you, Madam Chair.
The Chair. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Tester, for those
important questions, and has been brought up by some of the
witnesses here there is a big distinction between our past work
on certification oversight, which is a lot of what ACSAA
covered, and now this production problem.
And so the Administrator is outlining what that production
requirement oversight needs to look at. But we need both the
certification oversight and the production oversight. We need
both. We need both.
So but I thank you for illuminating that, Senator Tester,
very, very much.
I was going to go here anyway. So you call these aviation
safety inspectors, correct?
Mr. Whitaker. Yes.
The Chair. And aviation safety inspectors do we have them
well defined and trained and--both on the education side and do
we have enough even people to educate them at our community
colleges and other places, and are we paying them enough?
Mr. Whitaker. So the teams that I met with at the factory
were senior inspectors with a lot of experience--decades of
experience. So we had a very senior team there. We are
continuing to hire engineers and inspectors.
We have created an augmented training program just because
we are--the workforce is a little bit thin on experienced
folks--to give them augmented training and work with some of
the more senior folks to bring them on board.
So the ones who have been on board have been very
experienced but some of the ones we are bringing in are less
so.
The Chair. So what do you think the standard is? What do
you think the standard is we should be adhering to as it
relates to an ASI--an aviation safety inspector? What level of
training and experience should they have in aviation
specifically to do that job?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, we often draw from qualified, certified
mechanics who have experience actually working on aircraft--
that is one of the richest veins that we can tap--and train
them into the inspection protocols.
We want people who understand how these airplanes are put
together and what the purposes of the quality checks and that
they can verify that these checks are taking place.
The Chair. And do you think, again, that we have enough
education programs at the community? The reason I am bringing
this up is I am hearing something different than what you are
saying today.
I am definitely hearing we do not have enough aviation
inspectors, that we do not have enough qualified aviation
inspectors, and we do not even have enough qualified
instructors at schools to train the aviation inspectors, and
one story I heard was that they said, yes, I have safety
experience but it is in the dairy industry.
So we need an aviation inspector on the floor who has
aviation experience, not just safety experience.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes. Well, I think with respect to Boeing we
are certainly putting our most experienced and best people on
this. It is certainly the most important issue that we are
dealing with right now.
I think it is true writ large that there is across the
board a lack of experience and a lack of fewer--many fewer
qualified people to pull from. So we are competing with the
rest of the industry for those folks.
The Chair. And so you are saying you have moved people
around?
Mr. Whitaker. We have, absolutely.
The Chair. OK. So and in this existence of a door plug
issue you would have had a safety inspector from the FAA on the
ground that would have been monitoring these processes?
Mr. Whitaker. So the----
The Chair. I just want to get a little bit granular here
about what the safety inspector is.
So they would be verifying compliance to the specifications
of what someone on production should be doing. They are not
doing the production work but they are verifying something has
been done the way it was supposed to be done and then it meets
the requirements of design and certification. Is that correct?
Mr. Whitaker. That is correct, and in the case of the door
plug it would be identified as a critical safety component. So
the inspectors would focus on those more critical aspects of
production to make sure that those are being done properly.
The Chair. So where was--if Boeing is saying, well, we do
not have the documentation and we do not know who removed it,
where was the aviation safety inspector?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, we would not have had them on the
ground at that point.
The Chair. And why not?
Mr. Whitaker. Because at that point the agency was focusing
on auditing the internal quality programs at Boeing.
The Chair. So what role did FAA having a lighter touch do
to create this kind of system with a lack of safety culture?
Mr. Whitaker. I think this has been a long evolution at
Boeing. Not having been there I can only speculate. But I think
it has been a long evolution and I think it was exacerbated by
the workforce challenges of COVID.
But we clearly did not have enough folks on the ground to
see what was going on in that factory.
The Chair. So an aviation inspector on the ground now--
just, again, to go back to the clarity--would be in this case,
in this exact case, certifying that the door removal process
and reinstallation was done correctly to the specifications of
the manufacturing requirements. Is that right?
They would have--they would not have been doing the work
but they would have been double checking.
Mr. Whitaker. They would have a process in place. It might
be spot inspections. It might be a systematic inspection of
certain parts based on the importance of that particular part
and then randomly watching assembly process and ensuring that
the proper instructions are there, the proper steps are being
followed, the proper tools are being used, really a quality
assurance oversight.
The Chair. And I so appreciate my colleagues showing up
today and asking these questions because you are hearing the
same theme. We want to know that the workforce is being
listened to and that they are backed up.
And so when you have enough FAA oversight and they are
there and communicating and double checking that it is a
reinforcement. They become even a redundancy to the system even
though their job is to make sure that there is true compliance.
Mr. Whitaker. That is correct.
The Chair. And so I look forward to hearing how many people
you actually think you need for the future to make sure this
culture gets it right.
And so I do not know if that is 55. I do not know what the
number is. That is why I asked earlier in the hearing what is
the exact number. But I also want to--I also want to understand
what the pay is for these individuals and I want to understand
the education requirements and, again, what gap you think that
we have so that we can accurately fill this.
I am--I see my colleague is here and I want to give her a
chance to ask questions since I have had a couple of rounds
here.
But I am very excited about the world demand of aviation,
40,000 planes. Very excited about thermal plastics, next-
generation manufacturing that could put the United States in
even a more competitive, aggressive position for getting the
next generation technology right.
So there iare lots of great things that we can do for the
United States to be world leaders here and really grow
manufacturing jobs but we have to get this safety right.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes, absolutely.
The Chair. And the NASA participant in our ODA panel I
think she said it best. She said on NASA safety is not the
mission but it is what makes the mission work, and that is what
we have to do here.
We have to make--there are lots of things to do to be
competitive in aviation and grow jobs but safety is what allows
us to actually achieve that.
Senator Capito.
STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Capito. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Mr.
Administrator, for being here today.
I want to quickly touch on something I think you have
alluded to or talked talk a bit about in terms of workforce.
The Boeing quality chief said experience on the factory
floor in Renton is--was the number-one problem with employees
and that half of the employees had less than six years of
experience.
So Boeing is committed to enhance its training program,
increasing it from an eight week minimum to a ten week minimum.
Is more training a replacement for experience? And how do
we grow that next generation when we are so thin up top? Do you
have any ideas on that or any comments to make on that?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, it is certainly a problem and I would
say it has been a problem across the industry. I think all of
the players, whether it is at FAA hiring folks or airlines
there is a shortage of experienced folks and we are all
competing for the same team.
In a world of safety management systems it is a risk that
gets identified and needs to be mitigated. So the best
companies identify that risk and put in programs in place to
mitigate it, which in some cases is funding training schools.
In some cases it is bringing back retired employees to mentor
on the floor.
There are steps that you can take but it is incumbent upon
the companies to take those steps, identify that risk, and
mitigate that risk.
Senator Capito. I mean, actually I like that idea of
bringing people back, maybe a contractor part time to try to
mentor that next generation coming through.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes, because you cannot replace that deep
experience that you get from those decades.
Senator Capito. No. No.
There are six key performance indicators that are going to
be monitored closely as part of Boeing's plan. If certain of
these, like the employee proficiency shows a big problem, what
would the corrective action look like on this as you are
overseeing this?
Mr. Whitaker. So each of the KPIs is different and there
are other measurements that we are also keeping track of, and
the idea would be that we have two levels of concern. So, if
you will, if it goes from green to yellow or yellow to red,
yellow is we need to work this, figure out what the problem is,
and get it back to green, and red would be, OK, stop. We need
to kind of do a reset here.
Each of each of them will be different and problem solving
will be different, but these would be risk identifiers and then
the program would be to put together mitigation.
Senator Capito. Is this a new program or is this just a
refinement of a program that has been in effect for a while?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, the overall plan is new. I think most
components of it, frankly, are new.
Senator Capito. Right. Good. Good.
I am going to go local with you here. I think when we
talked when your nomination was up the airport that I fly into,
Charleston, West Virginia, Yeager Airport, the FAA formally
paused the environmental review of Yeager Airport for our
runway extension.
It was quite extensive to try to do this--we are in the
mountains and have some issues--but we do have a 77-year-old
terminal which we are trying to assist them with.
Are you familiar with the terminal project? And we could
certainly use your help on that one.
Mr. Whitaker. I am happy to look into it. As we discussed
before my confirmation, I think small community airports are an
important part of our infrastructure so we are very supportive.
But as we go through the AIP funding and other pieces we
will certainly get back with your office and talk about that.
Senator Capito. Yes. Some of the issues that they brought
forward, which I thought were sort of interesting like the
gates that we have, some of them--we do not have a whole lot of
gates. We always say our international flights are in another
terminal.
But we do not have a lot of gates but they cannot
accommodate certain modifications to different planes. We
cannot bring a bigger plane in--all these kinds of things. So
if we are actually going to grow our economy and grow our
ability to compete we are going to have to renovate here and
modernize.
Mr. Whitaker. Happy to look into that.
Senator Capito. Thank you. Thank you.
The last question I have is--this has happened to me more
than once where you are late or you are delayed or for one
reason or another, and it usually has to do with going in and
out of Florida.
But the reason that is given--and I always like it when I
get a reason, by the way. I think it is good when airlines,
instead of just saying, well, see you in 15 minutes, you know,
they tell you why.
But is because of air traffic. Is there a shortage in the
air traffic in Jacksonville? Is there too much traffic in
Jacksonville and what are we going to do to solve this problem?
Because it is--in my view, it is clogging up the East Coast,
obviously, if you are going up the East Coast.
Is that a fact that I am dealing with there or----
Mr. Whitaker. It is. A lot of it is geography and
demographics. So during COVID a lot of people moved to Florida
so the demand in Florida has gone up really significantly over
the past several years.
The air traffic routes to Florida are as narrow as Florida
is and so during peak seasons around the holidays we will get
airspace back from the military and be able to open new routes
through the military airspace off the coast.
But it is a fairly narrow strip of land and a lot of
thunderstorms. So usually what you are dealing with is
thunderstorms compressing that superhighway that is----
Senator Capito. Is the capacity at full abilities with the
air traffic controllers? That is not the issue, it is more----
Mr. Whitaker. It is more of a physical limitation. Unless
we were to have more airspace available to us that came out of
the military----
Senator Capito. How does that work? How much airspace do
you get off the coast?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, I do not have an exact number but it is
not far, and when we come down through during Thanksgiving, for
example, we get other routes that go out further over the ocean
to create other pathways.
But we get those by getting it released from the military.
Senator Capito. Well, it just clogs up the--I do not have
to tell you this but it clogs up everything----
Mr. Whitaker. Absolutely.
Senator Capito.--even flights coming into West Virginia,
certainly, up into the major cities along the East Coast.
And so anything we can do to help with that, certainly,
think it would be a benefit to the system.
But thank you for your service and thanks for answering my
question. We will follow up on Yeager.
Mr. Whitaker. Great. Thank you.
Senator Capito. Thanks.
The Chair. Thank you. I have one more question before--I do
not know if anybody else is coming but we will have one more
question, and it is more on the certification side.
Section 343 and 344 of the authorization bill that we just
passed changes making sure we have accountability and
transparency in the certification process, requires that
applicants certify their design compliance when they submit
data for the FAA approval.
What are your plans for implementing these reforms and how
are you going to make sure that they actually are meeting these
standards?
Mr. Whitaker. So on Section 343 we have begun a gap
analysis to see if our current procedures are sufficient and if
not where do we need to make changes in those procedures to be
compliant with that new provision.
And on the change product rule the plan is to meet that 18-
month time-frame to have a notice of proposed rulemaking on
that.
The Chair. What about in recent years there were a lot of
certification submissions that just had a first pass quality,
meaning the FAA approved them without revision?
Mr. Whitaker. That is something I will have to inquire
about and respond to your office.
The Chair. So how would you--how do you think we hold the
applicant accountable? I know you are saying you are working on
the larger rule.
Mr. Whitaker. So that is something that we are----
The Chair. I mean, how do you make sure you are receiving
data for compliance as opposed to, again, just the process of
did you get--just to check mark you got this, you got that, you
got that? How are you making sure that the data for submission
actually meets the compliance?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, I think certification and having
responsible individuals sign off on that and certify that is an
important step. But other than that, I think we need to look at
the process and see what our options are.
The Chair. Having individuals you mean at the FAA?
Mr. Whitaker. No, in the applicant.
The Chair. No, this is what we are trying to get away from.
Mr. Whitaker. Right.
The Chair. OK. We are trying to get away from you having
the applicant just check, check, check, and then you just say,
yes, check, check, check. We are trying to make sure that you
get the accountability from the data and certification that it
complies with the standard that has been set and that you know
that it actually meets that standard.
We do not have to revisit MCAS but this is the example
where that did not happen. So----
Mr. Whitaker. Yes. Let me look into that and I will come
back to you with----
The Chair. OK. Well, this is something we are going to want
to review with you and make sure we get right.
Back to this SMS for the FAA, I want an answer from you.
Mr. Whitaker. Sure.
The Chair. You do not have to give it today if you do not
want, but the point is we need the--first of all, most
importantly we need you to hold them accountable on a real SMS.
Mr. Whitaker. Right.
The Chair. Whether that is Spirit or Boeing or any other
manufacturer.
Mr. Whitaker. Right.
The Chair. This is the international standard. We all know
it works. We all know that it means you have to continue to
improve the process.
But, most importantly, make those safety culture
improvements so the whole culture is robust and continues to
thrive around that. So I want to hear what the FAA is going to
do to make sure that you are doing that as well.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes. I will come back to you with the plan. I
know you and I have spoken about this in the past. We do have
SMS programs in place but we need to verify that they are as
robust as they need to be. So we are looking at some more
revisions and we will report that back.
The Chair. Well, if we had had a mandatory instead of
voluntary program there might be some people alive----
Mr. Whitaker. Right.
The Chair.--is the bottom line. So we need an SMS that is--
we have the workforce asking for it. We have safety experts
asking for it. We now have ODA people asking for it.
So let us get it done. It is the gold standard. A voluntary
system does not get it done.
I have a statement I am going to enter into the record
since Senator Duckworth was not able to be with us today, and I
think we just need a closing statement. Let us see here.
[The information referred to follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tammy Duckworth, U.S. Senator from Illinois
Thank you, Chair Cantwell.
In the wake of two deadly Boeing 737 MAX crashes--preventable
tragedies caused by Boeing's disgraceful prioritization of putting
profits before people--Congress directed the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to convene a panel of outside experts to review
Boeing's safety culture.
According to the panel's report, which our committee examined
earlier this spring, when the experts asked Boeing to produce evidence
of the company's oft-stated commitment to prioritize safety above all
else, the panel found Boeing, ``did not provide objective evidence of a
foundational commitment to safety that matched Boeing's descriptions of
that objective.'' Or in plain language: Boeing talked a big game on
safety, but when it came to taking concrete action, there was nothing
to be found.
Of course, a detailed and comprehensive independent panel review
was not necessary to reveal the disturbing reality that despite being
exposed through the deadly MAX crashes of 2018 and 2019, roughly four
years later, the emperor still had no clothes.
In January, a door plug fell out of an Alaska Airlines 737 MAX 9
mid-flight. If anything, it appears Boeing has regressed from failing
to disclose to pilots critical aircraft features necessary to mitigate
a design flaw, to simply being unable to build a fuselage capable of
holding together for the duration of an otherwise uneventful flight.
Worst of all, the Alaska Airlines flight was not an isolated
incident. In March, the New York Times reported Boeing failed 33 of 89
product audits of its 737 MAX production with a total of 97 instances
of alleged noncompliance. The newspaper also reported Boeing's fuselage
supplier, Spirit Aerospace, failed 7 of 13 product audits.
The National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) preliminary
analysis of the Alaska Airlines incident not only found bolts missing
on the 737 MAX 9, but also that Boeing failed to inform 737 MAX 9
pilots that the cockpit door was designed to automatically swing open
during this kind of emergency. In a post 9/11 world, where flight crews
are trained to prioritize keeping the cockpit door closed, this
surprise added unnecessary confusion to already chaotic environment.
Even worse, this marked the third time Boeing had failed to inform
flight crews about a cockpit feature on the 737 MAX.
Boeing is promising to do better, and so is the FAA. As our
committee conducts oversight, however, we need to look at their
actions, not just their words. When the dust settles on the current
crisis, we cannot allow a return to business as usual. If the 737 MAX
has taught us anything it is that deep, lasting, cultural change is
needed, and there needs to be a way to verify it. Reforms must include
appropriate transparency and accountability.
Under the new FAA Administrator Michael Whitaker, the agency has
taken important steps to protect the flying public, including imposing
caps on Boeing 737 MAX production and requiring Being to develop a plan
to address its systematic quality-control issues, which we will hear
more about today.
This is a welcome change. Prior to Whitaker's arrival, the FAA was
far too reluctant to hold Boeing accountable for its lapses. That sent
a dangerously permissive message to Boeing which is now coming home to
roost.
Weeks after a door plug blew out of a 737 MAX 9, Boeing was still
petitioning the FAA for a safety exemption to rush its next 737 MAX
variant into service--despite the fact that it had a known, potentially
catastrophic safety defect.
To its credit, when I complained to Boeing's CEO, Boeing withdrew
its petition.
But the fact that Boeing filed it in the first place speaks volumes
about the lack of a proper safety culture at Boeing, and, until
recently, the lack of a proper regulatory culture at FAA.
Boeing filed this petition because the company thought FAA would
grant it.
The manufacturer had good reason to think this. FAA had let
Boeing's bad actions on the 737 MAX slide for years.
When, after two deadly 737 MAX crashes, investigators uncovered an
internal Boeing memo showing Boeing employees had been planning to
downplay the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) to
avoid regulatory scrutiny, FAA did not investigate.
MCAS was a major contributing factor to the two deadly 737 MAX
crashes. It was a new and novel system that Boeing had successfully
persuaded FAA to permit Boeing to remove from its flight manual. Pilots
were furious they weren't told MCAS was on the plane.
FAA's failure to investigate this memo effectively told Boeing this
type of conduct is perfectly fine.
Likewise, FAA took no enforcement action when Boeing knowingly and
repeatedly produced 737 MAX aircraft without a functioning Angle of
Attack (AOA) disagree alert--in blatant violation of the plane's
approved type design. By not enforcing its rules, FAA effectively told
Boeing, conformance with type design doesn't matter.
Inaction has consequences, and we're now living with them.
Long-term reform is clearly needed, and FAA appears to finally have
the critical, principled leadership that is required to sustain tough
and at times, challenging, transformation. And to its credit, Boeing
has even taken major steps that its critics previously would have
thought unlikely, such as implicitly acknowledging its mistake in
outsourcing the manufacturing of its aircrafts' fuselages and
announcing that Boeing would implement the dramatic step of bringing a
fundamental supply chain back in-house. As we continue our oversight,
however, I will continue to look for appropriate transparency and
accountability.
I yield back.
The Chair. Administrator Whitaker, we much appreciate you
being here today. We know there is a lot to implement. There is
a lot to do in aviation safety but we are confident that you
are going to continue to lead major transformation here. So
thank you for today.
I want to say the record will be open for four weeks until
July 11 and any senators wishing to submit their questions for
the record should do so before June 27 and we ask that the
responses be to the Committee by July 11.
With that, that concludes our hearing today. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. Michael Whitaker
Boeing's Safety Management System
In its response to FAA's recent audit, Boeing identified several
actions it plans to take to address deficiencies in its current SMS,
including better integrating its Quality Management System into its SMS
and preventing aircraft from prematurely moving from one workstation to
another on the factory floor, also known as ``traveled work''.
Boeing has had a ``voluntary'' SMS in place for years, but the ODA
Expert Review Panel mandated by section 103 of ACSAA identified serious
deficiencies in Boeing's voluntary SMS program.
Many of the corrective actions identified in the Plan are similar
to corrective actions Boeing agreed to in previous settlement
agreements, such as implementing a SMS that complies with ICAO Annex
19. This suggests that Boeing either didn't fulfill its past
commitments or didn't sustain any improvements made.
Question 1. Is the FAA satisfied that these planned actions would
bring Boeing into full compliance with FAA's new SMS rule?
Answer. Safety Management Systems (SMS) provide a means for a
structured, repeatable, systematic approach to proactively identify
hazards and manage safety risks. The actions Boeing is taking
appropriately focus the changes in their production system on both
safety and quality, incorporating safety risk assessment processes,
monitoring the production system for safety, ensuring a clear safety
policy within the quality system, and initiating steps to develop a
mature safety culture by promoting safety first and non-punitive
reporting systems. The FAA will closely monitor Boeing's performance
and ensure its SMS program meets the requirements of the rule.
Question 2. I am concerned about FAA's oversight of Boeing's
compliance with the new SMS requirement for manufacturers. How is FAA's
implementation of the new SMS final rule complying with ACSAA section
102 and the Expert Panel's recommendations, which demand regular
oversight of SMS from FAA?
Answer. The FAA is formalizing and maturing our oversight of
Boeing's SMS with a new regulatory framework including structured
guidance. SMS oversight includes:
Performing assessments of Boeing's SMS for verification and
ongoing evaluation of its performance.
Introducing new data streams with the interoperability of
operator and supplier SMSs to identify issues with newly
delivered aircraft, adverse trends, and potential safety risks
for early mitigation action.
Conducting meetings with factory managers to review safety
risk determinations for upcoming changes to the quality and
production system.
Asking Boeing employees questions to gauge the changes in
quality and safety culture.
Expanding data streams to improve our risk-based certificate
management plan.
To ensure that the FAA's oversight of the new final rule complies
with ACSAA section 102 and the Expert Panel's recommendations, the FAA
issued Order 8120.24, Implementation Plan Approval, Verification, and
Evaluation of Safety Management Systems for Design and Production
Approval Holders. The Order assigns responsibility for Aircraft
Certification Service (AIR) personnel to review and approve an SMS
implementation plan, verify SMS development, and evaluate SMS operation
for a design and production approval holder in accordance with part 5,
title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
The FAA also issued a series of supporting work instructions,
guidance materials, and training content to align with the requirements
for design and manufacturing organizations in 14 C.F.R. part 5.
Additionally, the FAA is developing an order for conducting regular
and comprehensive oversight of organizations' SMS. This new order on
SMS oversight will comply with ACSAA section 102 and meet the
expectations of the Expert Panel Recommendation.
Requirements for FAA's Own Safety Management System
For the FAA's own SMS, ICAO's Annex 19 outlines a minimum
requirement for its members to establish a State Safety Program (SSP)
addressing 4 key pillars: safety policy, safety risk management, safety
assurance, and safety promotion. According to Annex 19, the regulator
within the member state is required to have a SSP and the air
navigation service provider (ANSP) that operates within the state is
required to have a SMS. Since the FAA performs both regulator and
services provider functions, the agency is required to have a SMS.
Question 1. Please provide a full description of FAA's SSP,
otherwise known as its own SMS, specifically detailing how it complies
with ICAO Annex 19 requirements. Please describe the lines of business
withing the FAA that have their own SMS. In addition, please provide a
description on how FAA's agency-wide SMS differs from ICAO's
requirements for a SSP.
Answer. The United States currently meets the ICAO State Safety
Program (SSP) elements through its mature regulatory framework; well-
defined roles and responsibilities; advanced accident and incident
investigation capabilities; and effective certification, surveillance,
and enforcement processes. In addition, our capacity for data
collection and analysis gives us the ability to focus on areas of
greatest safety risk and use established means to communicate with
service providers, government representatives, and other stakeholders.
Specifically, the United States meets the ICAO requirement for an SSP
through Federal Aviation Regulations (including 14 C.F.R. part 5); an
agency-level SMS, which establishes the SMS policy and requirements for
the FAA (FAA Order 8000.369, Safety Management System); and 49 C.F.R.
Sec. 831.20--Authority of NTSB in aviation accident investigations. The
U.S. SSP meets the requirements of ICAO's Annex 19, Chapter 3, State
Safety Responsibilities, except that the United States does not
currently require the implementation of SMS for training and
maintenance organizations.
The FAA SMS Executive Council is composed of Lines of Business
(LOB) and Staff Offices with their own interoperable SMSs. Those
offices include Aviation Safety, Air Traffic Organization, Airports,
Commercial Space Transportation, Security & Hazardous Materials Safety,
and NextGen.
Question 2. It has been found in the past by the Department of
Transportation Office of the Inspector General that FAA has inadequate
training for its personnel on SMS and oversight of the airline
industry's implementation of SMS. What actions is FAA taking to address
these findings and implement improvements, especially when FAA will be
tasked with overseeing broader SMS requirements for regulated entities?
Answer. SMS Training for FAA Personnel--The FAA and NTSB currently
provide various types of safety-related training for their employees
and actively communicate safety information to their workforce.
Specific to SSP and SMS, agency-wide SMS training courses are
available, and FAA LOB have identified additional/targeted training
based on workforce needs. The curriculum for FAA personnel (including
executives and managers) consists of initial, recurrent, and specialty
courses such as: FAA Safety Management Overview, FAA Managing Safety,
Overview of Safety Management System, Safety Management System Theory
and Application, Safety Management System Fundamentals and Safety
Management System Practical Application Workshop.
FAA Oversight of Airline Industry SMS--The FAA has adjusted the
Data Collection Tool (DCT) questions used by our front-line employees.
These DCTs are now active in the FAA's Safety Assurance System (SAS).
SAS is the FAA's oversight tool to perform certification, surveillance,
and continued operational safety. It includes policy, processes, and
associated software that the FAA uses to capture data when conducting
oversight. Additional adjustments to the response detail selections for
these DCTs are also active. These changes are intended to aid FAA
personnel in assessing an organization's safety culture.
Formal training is being developed and is scheduled to be completed
in the second quarter of FY 2025. This training aligns with the updated
DCTs and will provide instruction on how to evaluate a certificate
holder's overall SMS (Course FAA21000137, Evaluating Safety Management
using SAS in Continued Operational Safety).
In addition, the FAA continues to develop Root Cause Analysis (RCA)
training, including a practical application workshop titled ``Root
Cause Analysis'' that will incorporate the most commonly used industry
RCA processes, with scenarios that will enable participants to apply
RCA principles to inspector duties. This RCA training will educate the
workforce on the relationship between RCA and risk assessments, both of
which are necessary components of a properly functioning SMS.
The FAA is also in the process of revising RCA course number
30120001 titled ``Root Cause Analysis Overview'' to become a
prerequisite for the new ``Root Cause Analysis'' training course
described above. The FAA anticipates the courses being available by the
end of December 2024.
In addition to the formal training courses being developed, Flight
Standards has developed and delivered just-in-time (JIT) products to
help the workforce prepare for oversight of SMS. These JIT products are
briefings, videos, job aids and Frequently Asked Questions documents.
These supplemental educational products provide a means for inspectors
to get answers quickly on how to oversee a service provider's SMS.
Through these actions, the FAA's policy, oversight tool, and
training will support a consistent and systematic approach to assessing
the effectiveness of an air carrier's SMS and technical processes.
Additionally, these actions are being expanded to address the changes
made by the FAA's SMS final rule issued in Spring of 2024 (89 FR 33068,
April 26, 2024).
Frontline Workforce--Safety Reporting Systems
A safety management system cannot function adequately without a
healthy, and voluntary employee reporting culture, in which frontline
workers feel that their safety concerns will be heard and meaningfully
addressed, without fear of retaliation.
Quesion 1. How will FAA's recently enhanced oversight model
guarantee that aviation manufacturing frontline workers will be
empowered to put safety first, even if that would mean slowing work on
the production line and reducing the production rate?
Answer. As part of their SMS, design and production approval
holders are required to implement policies and processes that place
safety accountability at the leadership level and ensure safety
concerns reported by employees are appropriately investigated and
assessed without fear of retribution. As part of the FAA's ongoing
surveillance of SMS at these companies, the FAA will review
confidential employee reports to assess the health of a company's
system for receiving, evaluating, and resolving safety issues reported
by their employees. The FAA will also routinely evaluate employees'
understanding of their roles and responsibilities related to safety,
including reporting hazards.
Question 2. What is FAA doing to ensure that Boeing's operation of
its voluntary reporting system for manufacturing employees, known as
Speak Up, does not filter out or silo legitimate complaints and
concerns and prevent them from being addressed?
Answer. The FAA is taking a multi-pronged approach. We observe
Boeing leadership meetings to review and address submitted Speak Up
reports, engage directly with onsite production system personnel, and
review Boeing's staff surveys for effectiveness and improvement. More
recently, we have facilitated partnerships with Boeing and union
leadership for joint participation in addressing employee safety
concerns through Speak Up or similar Aviation Safety Action Plan (ASAP)
reporting agreements.
Question 3. If Boeing adopts the ODA Expert Review Panel's
recommendation to establish an Aviation Safety Action Plan (ASAP) at
all production sites, why is it important for FAA to have visibility
into a filed ASAP report? How can this strengthen FAA's safety
oversight as it pertains to Boeing's product safety and quality control
issues?
Answer. The objective of an ASAP is to encourage employees of a
company to voluntarily report safety information that may be critical
to identifying potential precursors to safety-related events by
ensuring those reports are reviewed by a joint team of management,
employee, and FAA representatives. Under an ASAP, safety issues are
resolved through corrective action rather than through punitive action.
An ASAP provides for the collection, analysis, and retention of the
safety data obtained through the reporting process. ASAP participants
use ASAP safety data, much of which would otherwise be unavailable to
Boeing, to develop corrective actions for identified safety concerns,
and to educate the appropriate parties to prevent a recurrence of the
same type of safety event.
ASAP reports, and the corresponding approach of addressing
potential safety issues through corrective action as opposed to
punitive or other enforcement action, gives the FAA visibility into
potential safety issues that otherwise might not be disclosed.
Additionally, potential safety issues, such as those identified
through ASAP reports, can demonstrate the effectiveness of the
company's SMS and identify potential areas of Boeing's operation
requiring increased FAA oversight. Consistent with the ODA Expert
Review Panel's recommendation, the establishment of ASAPs at all
production sites will further encourage reporting of issues and provide
critical input into Boeing's SMS. Boeing's Speak Up program is intended
to meet the reporting requirements of the Part 5 SMS rule and can be
used across the Boeing enterprise to enable the creation of ASAP
reports. Additionally, the FAA is supporting ASAP agreements with
Boeing and its unions to engage in a formal review process that
includes all stakeholders.
Aviation Safety Inspectors
A large part of FAA enhancing its oversight of manufacturers must
include making sure enough FAA safety inspectors are working on the
factory floor during all shifts. We recognized the importance of the
safety inspector workforce in our recently enacted FAA law. We also
made it clear that FAA needs to hire more manufacturing safety
inspectors. These individuals are the eyes and ears of the FAA on the
production line to make sure aircraft are inspected, compliant, and
safe.
Question 1. As part of FAA's enhanced oversight model, how is the
FAA determining how many safety inspectors will cover each shift in
Boeing's production facilities?
Answer. The FAA's certificate management program is a system
approach to monitoring a production approval holder's compliance with
regulations that govern the manufacturing of its products or articles
and ensures appropriate corrective actions are taken when non-
compliances are identified.
The FAA determines workforce requirements for manufacturing
aviation safety inspectors based on workload demands driven by
processes (number, complexity, etc.) within the production quality
system. Each phase of the production quality system undergoes a
systematic review, and the workforce is adjusted as needed to ensure
FAA resources meet the needs of the system.
Question 2. How is the FAA determining how long it will sustain
additional safety inspector capacity on factory floors at Boeing as
well as Boeing's top tiered suppliers?
Answer. The safety of the flying public will determine how long we
will sustain additional safety inspectors on the factory floors at
Boeing and their top-tiered suppliers. Therefore, until Boeing
production and quality metrics demonstrate continued stability, the FAA
will maintain additional inspectors on the factory floors and at top-
tiered suppliers.
Question 3. How is the FAA ensuring that its enhanced oversight
model includes stronger individual oversight tasks for manufacturing
safety inspectors? What is FAA doing to move from what some may say a
``check the box'' safety inspection model to one that prioritizes
proactive identification of safety issues and defects before they
occur?
Answer. The FAA's certificate management program is a system
approach to monitoring a production approval holder's compliance with
the regulations that govern the manufacturing of its products or
articles and ensures appropriate corrective actions are taken when non-
compliances are identified. The FAA's audits determine if the selected
product or article conforms to approved data, whether a manufacturer
complies with their quality system requirements, including procedures
and special processes established to meet those requirements, and
whether a supplier is furnishing products, articles, or services that
conform to the manufacturer's requirements.
As part of our enhanced oversight of Boeing, we have personnel on-
site at each of its major production facilities. We conduct both
planned and unplanned audits, engage directly with machinists and
quality inspectors on the floor to continually assess Boeing actions
and safety culture, and assess the effectiveness of changes to Boeing's
systems and corrective actions.
Furthermore, the FAA is developing detailed plans and internal
requirements and guidance for our oversight of design and manufacturing
organizations' SMS. We are introducing new oversight activities
designed to assess and document the SMS effectiveness of the
organizations' management of safety.
Question 4. In the FAA law the Committee made it clear that FAA
needs to hire more manufacturing safety inspectors to strengthen FAA's
ability to conduct robust oversight of aviation production lines. What
is the FAA's current qualification criteria for selecting ASIs and what
is FAA's plan to build up this workforce and recruit and retain
qualified inspectors?
Answer. The FAA requires manufacturing Aviation Safety Inspector
(ASI) applicants to have experience in the areas of quality systems,
methods, and techniques in the manufacture of products and/or articles
and experience with the issuance of airworthiness certificates.
We also look for specialized experience in developing and
implementing quality systems and procedures and knowledge of
manufacturing, testing, and inspection. These requirements are listed
in the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Aviation Safety job Series
1825, and the individual job postings.
To build up this workforce, we are utilizing on-the-spot direct
hiring authority and actively pursuing various recruitment tools
including job posting websites, communicating with our existing staff,
and reaching out to stakeholders and our designees to ensure the
message about available manufacturing ASI positions is being
communicated. We are streamlining our resume review, interview, and
hiring process and collaborating across AIR to ensure candidates are
placed for the best fit for the FAA and for long-term retention.
ODA Expert Review Panel Recommendations and Boeing Response
You required Boeing to develop an action plan to correct the
problems identified by FAA's recent production audits in January and
February 2024 and to implement the recommendations of the ODA Expert
Review Panel, as established by Section 103 of ACSAA. Boeing submitted
that plan to FAA on May 30th. In response to FAA's request for data-
driven measures of success, the Plan's executive summary identifies
specific Key Performance Indicators (``KPIs'') that Boeing will use to
assess the safety and health of the production system but leaves out
additional methods of tracking Boeing's implementation progress.
Question 1. To my surprise, Boeing's Action Plan does not
specifically detail how each of the ODA Expert Review Panel's 53
recommendations will be acted on and implemented. How is FAA tracking
that those recommendations, ensuring they are being addressed one by
one and acted upon by Boeing?
Answer. Consistent with the ODA Expert Review Panel's
recommendation, the FAA has established an interdisciplinary team that
is working with Boeing to review, provide feedback, and ultimately
track the implementation of Boeing's actions to address the
recommendations contained in the report. Boeing has provided a detailed
action plan for each of the recommendations from the report. The
interdisciplinary team includes employees from the Aircraft
Certification Service, Flight Standards, and the AVS ODA Office.
Certification Reform in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024
Sections 343 and 344 of the new Reauthorization Act make important
changes to increase accountability and transparency in FAA's
certification process. Section 343 requires that applicants certify to
the FAA that their designs comply when they submit data for FAA
approval.
Question 1. Under this reform, if the FAA determines a submission
doesn't comply, how will you hold the applicant accountable? Do you
anticipate this will change applicant behavior, where under the current
process, FAA often receives data for approval that doesn't comply?
Answer. Section 343 is an important reminder of the criticality of
accountability at every stage of the aircraft certification process. We
note that the existing requirements in title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations address an applicant's data submittal certification as part
of an application. Specifically, sections 21.20(b), 21.97(a)(3),
21.303(a)(5), and 21.603(a)(1) require that an applicant for a type
certificate, amended type certificate, supplemental type certificate, a
major change in type design, and other types of approvals, provide a
statement certifying compliance with the applicable requirements, along
with the substantiating data. The FAA rejects any deficient data
submittals. We are examining our current processes as part of our
implementation of section 343.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Hon. Michael Whitaker
Boeing Whistleblowers
According to media reports, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) has heard from multiple Boeing whistleblowers with concerns about
the company's production processes. Bloomberg noted the FAA has already
received 126 tips in the first half of 2024 compared with only 11 tips
in the entire year of 2023.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Allyson Versprille, ``Boeing Whistleblower Tips to FAA Soar
Since Door Panel Blowout,'' Bloomberg, June 14, 2024, Available at
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-15/boeing-
whistleblower-tips-to-faa-soar-since-door-panel-blowout.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Testifying before the Senate on June 18, Boeing CEO David Calhoun
stated that he is aware Boeing has retaliated against whistleblowers,
saying, ``I don't have [the number of whistleblowers retaliated
against] on the tip of my tongue, but I know it happens.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Boeing's Broken Safety Culture: CEO Dave Calhoun Testifies,''
U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, June, 18, 2024,
Available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/
hearings/boeings-broken-safety-culture-ceo-dave-calhoun-testifies/.
Question 1. Is the FAA investigating retaliation against
whistleblowers? If not, why?
Answer. The Department of Labor has the sole authority to
investigate whistleblower retaliation by Boeing under 49 U.S.C.
Sec. 42121.
Question 2. How many reports of whistleblower retaliation has the
FAA received?
Answer. In FY 2024, the FAA has received 213 whistleblower
complaints. Of those complaints, 80 qualified as complaints of
prohibited discrimination under section 42121. Claims of whistleblower
retaliation are directed to the Department of Labor.
Question 3. Have whistleblowers raised concerns about production
lines beyond the 737 MAX?
Answer. Yes. Since January 2024, we have received reports related
to the 737, 747, 767, 777, and 787 aircraft.
Question 4. Has the FAA discovered, or received, any evidence of
whistleblower retaliation by Boeing or its suppliers?
Answer. When the FAA receives evidence of alleged retaliation in
connection with a whistleblower complaint, the FAA forwards that
evidence to the Department of Labor.
Question 5. What steps will the FAA take to ensure whistleblowers
are protected against retaliation and intimidation to discourage
reporting of safety concerns?
Answer. The AIR21 Whistleblower Protection Program (49 U.S.C.
Sec. 42121) protects U.S. air carrier and aircraft/component
manufacturer employees from retaliation by their employers when they
report safety or regulatory violations to authorities, ensuring that
employees can raise safety concerns without fear of adverse
consequences. AIR21 Whistleblower complaints are confidential and
protected from unauthorized disclosure under the Privacy Act. All
claims of whistleblower retaliation are directed to the Department of
Labor (Occupational Safety and Health Administration), which is
responsible for investigation. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024
clarifies the roles and enforcement authorities of the Administrator
and the Secretary of Labor and requires them to consult with each other
to determine the most appropriate course of action.
Question 6. What steps will the FAA take to ensure safety is
prioritized when Boeing begins to increase production?
Answer. As required by 14 CFR part 5, Boeing must implement a
safety risk management process under its Safety Management System (SMS)
to ensure that all safety-related factors associated with production
rates remain within operational limits or are managed with mitigation
strategies deemed acceptable by the FAA. Additionally, the FAA is
leveraging key performance indicators (KPIs) outlined in Boeing's
comprehensive action plan as part of a risk-based decision-making
framework to guide considerations for future production rate increases.
Airline Safety Incidents
On April 11, 2024, Southwest Airlines Flight 2786 dangerously
descended toward the ocean, correcting with only 400 feet of clearance.
And then on May 25, 2024, Southwest encountered another concerning
safety incident when Flight 746 experienced a ``Dutch roll,'' which led
to ``substantial damage'' of the plane. On June 19, 2024, a Southwest
plane descended to 500 feet above an Oklahoma City suburb. Similarly,
United Airlines has faced a concerning 16 safety incidents in the month
of March alone and is under FAA investigation.
Question 1. How is the FAA responding to these incidents?
Answer. Regarding Southwest Airlines, the Southwest Certificate
Management Office (CMO) is investigating each of these safety incidents
including the actions of the flight crewmembers and the actions of
other personnel that interfaced with the flights, and evaluating
Southwest Airlines' operational procedures and training to determine if
there are any deficiencies or systemic failures that need to be
addressed. The Southwest CMO has also increased continuous operational
safety (COS) surveillance of the carrier due to each of these
incidents.
We also have initiated and are completing a focused Certificate
Holder Evaluation Process (CHEP) inspection that includes Safety
Assurance (SMS), Training of Flight Crew Members, Training of Check
Pilots, and Airman Duties/Flight Deck Procedures.
Additionally, the FAA established an internal Safety Issue Action
Team (SIAT) to investigate a potential safety issue associated with
low-altitude events that occurred in the first seven months of 2024.
The SIAT reviewed data from multiple sources, including the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, MITRE, and multiple FAA systems.
After reviewing the data, the SIAT is drafting recommendations that
address low-altitude events in the NAS.
The United Airlines CMO is actively engaged in investigating the
safety and regulatory compliance of United Airlines. During the past 18
months, the United Airlines CMO has been proactive in adding additional
COS oversight measures to mitigate any identified operational risk.
This included the initiation of a CHEP focused on three primary goals.
First, the CHEP team worked to verify whether United Airlines complies
with applicable regulations. Second, it worked to evaluate whether
United Airlines is effectively managing safety. Finally, the CHEP team
worked to identify hazards and assess risk and provide documentation to
the United Airlines CMO regarding mitigations for associated risks.
Question 2. What steps are these airlines taking to prevent future
incidents?
Answer. Southwest Airlines has been proactive in taking steps to
analyze each of these events and develop strategies to prevent future
incidents. The carrier has taken immediate training measures with
crewmembers and performed fleet-wide inspections of aircraft. The
carrier has also activated an Operations Review Team (ORT), which is a
part of the company's Safety Management System. This team analyzes
major events and identifies mitigation strategies. This work is
ongoing, and outputs are expected in the near future.
On May 15, 2024, United Airlines initiated a system-wide assessment
of its safety culture. In addition to United Airlines' normal quality
oversight and SMS programs, the carrier has also identified and
implemented 34 enterprise-level safety initiatives including evaluating
safety resources and the operational safety structure across the
organization and improving a pilot professional development program to
mitigate risks.
Question 3. Have any of these incidents led the FAA to change
oversight procedures to ensure passenger airlines are adhering to
proper maintenance standards? If so, in what ways?
Answer. The Southwest CMO has adjusted its safety assurance
comprehensive assessment surveillance plan to ensure Southwest is
appropriately managing operational risks. This data-driven approach
focuses surveillance on maintenance operations, tooling, and parts
control at maintenance locations to ensure Southwest's adherence to
proper maintenance standards.
In addition to the CHEP assessment, the United Airlines CMO has
adjusted its safety assurance comprehensive assessment surveillance
plan, which has resulted in an increase in COS surveillance activities
focused on ensuring the carrier's actions are comprehensive and
appropriate in response to these safety incidents.
Aviation Manufacturing Supply Chain
In September of last year, it was reported that counterfeit parts
had been identified on a CFM56 jet engine. In the investigations that
followed, it came to light that every year, hundreds of thousands of
counterfeit components and uncertified parts were installed on planes
around the world. Most recently, there were reports of ``potentially
fake titanium'' in aircraft parts currently in use. Use of faux parts
can risk accidents involving serious injury and death.
Last week, a report cited a Boeing whistleblower who claimed Boeing
had relocated, hidden, and then lost nonconforming aircraft parts ahead
of a FAA inspection.\3\ The whistleblower then said it is possible the
nonconforming parts have found their way back into the supply chain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Chris Isidore and Gregory Wallace, ``Boeing Hid Questionable
Parts from Regulators That May Have Been Installed in 737 MAX Planes,
New Whistleblower Alleges.'' CNN, June 18, 2024, Available at https://
www.cnn.com/2024/06/18/business/boeing-whistleblower-calhoun-testimony/
index.html.
Question 1. What flaws in the certification system have allowed for
these fabrication issues?
Answer. The FAA has extensive guidance on how suppliers and
maintenance facilities can prevent suspected unapproved parts (SUP)
from being installed. The FAA thoroughly investigates every SUP report.
If we determine a part is unapproved, we notify aircraft owners,
operators, manufacturers, maintenance organizations, parts suppliers,
and distributors. We also work closely with our foreign partners to
ensure unapproved parts do not enter their system.
Whether counterfeit parts or non-conforming parts intentionally or
unintentionally find their way into the system, the production approval
holder (directly or from their supplier) is required to monitor and
disclose instances to the FAA. The FAA reviews the nonconformance,
makes a safety determination, and determines whether suggested
corrective actions are acceptable. The production approval holder is
required to address affected products and identify and incorporate
corrective action to eliminate the potential for similar future
nonconformances.
Regarding the specific examples cited, GE Aerospace formed a
coalition to identify potential causes and corrective actions within
the supply chain consistent with safety management principles and
published its report in October 2024. The report is available at
https://aviationsupplychainintegrity.com/. Boeing has already
instituted changes in parts control within its quality system to ensure
that parts are more fully tracked and monitored. The FAA is conducting
oversight to assess the effectiveness of the changes that Boeing is
implementing.
Question 2. What is the FAA doing to respond to the current
titanium quality issue?
Answer. The FAA has not identified any safety issues to date for
the fleet associated with titanium quality. Boeing disclosed the issue
to the FAA and our first action was to assess any near-term safety
implications to the fleet and require corrective actions to ensure that
products within the quality system are conforming. We assess safety
implications by identifying the affected part and evaluating its effect
at the aircraft level. In addition, we are coordinating closely with
EASA as the supplier issue also affects Airbus. More recently, we
initiated an SUP investigation related to this issue based on our
initial investigation of a notice of escape from the production system.
Question 3. What steps is the FAA taking to improve its safety
oversight of manufactured aircraft components?
Answer. Events involving large commercial airplane manufacturers
led the FAA to take decisive action and emphasize risk-based oversight
practices and policy improvements by expanding manufacturing oversight
and hiring additional aviation safety inspectors with specialized
experience in aviation quality assurance inspection and aviation
production.
Additionally, recent Safety Management System (SMS) requirements
for design and manufacturing require the manufacturer to assess its
production process and supply chain risks and develop controls and
mitigations for safety risks.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Michael Whitaker
Quesion 1. Both the National Transportation Safety Board and Joint
Authorities Technical Review Board reports on the 737 MAX crashes
mentioned a need for greater consideration of crew workload when
designing flight control systems, similar to the findings of the recent
ODA expert review panel that made recommendations related to human-
systems integration and human factors considerations.
a. Can you describe how the FAA has worked to better understand
human factors and their relation to the aircraft certification process?
Answer. The FAA is thoroughly examining, through a comprehensive
Flight Test (FT)/Human Factors (HF) evaluation, all HF-related
assumptions with the system safety assessments under section 106 of the
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA). In
response to the expert review panel's recommendations, the FAA has
increased the number of HF specialists in both the Aircraft
Certification Service and Flight Standards. These specialists are
responsible for integrating HF considerations into the certification
process, including identifying and evaluating HF concerns in new
aircraft designs; directing research on key areas such as HF
considerations relative to new and novel technologies; and promoting
applicant awareness of the importance of a robust HF program.
b. How can the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) work with
manufacturers to ensure failure diagnostic tools be better designed to
improve the threat and error management used by crew members in
responding to system failures?
Answer. When a new technology or pilot system interface is
introduced, the manufacturers must thoroughly capture all of the
assumptions made about what pilots will do when faced with a possible
failure and ensure the design allows for safe operation and minimizes
the risk of pilot error. Failure and error diagnostic systems such as
detection, alerting, and checklist functions are part of these
interfaces. During certification, the FAA has the responsibility for
reviewing and validating those HF assumptions to ensure they are
appropriate and comprehensive, beginning with analyses that start early
in the design process and which typically drive progressive design
changes. In addition, the FAA is funding research to analyze pilot
responses to failures and errors from the perspectives of equipment
design, flight operations and procedures, and operations and training
considerations. The information from this research will support
additional refinement and validation of our related certification
guidance. The FAA is also working with manufacturers to adopt new
methods for assessing the effectiveness of pilot assumptions based on
in-service data analysis in support of our continued operational safety
process.
Question 2. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254)
included provisions to strengthen agency oversight of the Organization
Designation Authorization (ODA) program, such as establishing an ODA
office within the FAA's Office of Aviation Safety and creating a
centralized safety guidance database. The recent ODA expert review
panel report recommended improvements to minimize opportunities for
retaliation within Boeing and other manufacturers.
a. Can you describe what you believe those improvements would look
like?
Answer. The expert panel's recommendations regarding reducing
opportunities for retaliation were directed to Boeing. Boeing has
included its approach to addressing the recommendations in its plan and
we will monitor implementation of those actions to ensure that Boeing
has addressed the expert panel's concerns.
On the FAA side, we have assigned FAA Safety Advisors to ODA Unit
Members at Boeing, creating a direct line of communication between Unit
Members and the FAA to better ensure that we hear of any concerns of
interference with or retaliation for the performance of FAA functions
by ODA Unit Members.
b. Building on the improvements from the 2018 FAA bill and the
certification bill, how else can FAA oversight of this program be
strengthened?
Answer. The FAA is in the process of updating the order that
defines how we appoint, manage, and oversee ODA holders. The revision
to the order introduces risk-based oversight of our ODA holders,
meaning it sets a minimum level of oversight based on the size, scope,
complexity, and performance of an ODA holder. The approach will help
ensure an adequate level of supervision for our largest and most
complex ODA holders.
Question 3. The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability
Act (P.L. 116-260; Division V) required the FAA to pursue a more
holistic approach when it comes to certification, consistent with
recommendations from the Special Committee to review the FAA's Aircraft
Certification Process. This includes better coordination between
various FAA offices and adoption of a safety management system for
aircraft manufacturers.
a. How has the FAA improved coordination between offices--such as
the Aircraft Certification Service and Flight Standards--responsible
for different aspects of the certification process?
Answer. In 2018, the Safety Oversight and Certification Aviation
Rulemaking Committee (SOC ARC) completed a report focused on priority
areas aimed at improving FAA performance. Among several recommendations
later accepted by the FAA was Recommendation 3--Integrated Program
Management (IPM). With it, the SOC ARC recommended ``establishment of
an integrated program management framework with responsibility and
accountability for type certification and operational evaluation
project planning, coordination and performance among AIR [Aircraft
Certification Service], AFX [Flight Standards (FS)] and any other FAA
policy and field office necessary for issuance of design approvals and
entry into service. . .''
In response, AIR and FS have taken action to implement Integrated
Program Management as a comprehensive method to realize the safety and
performance benefits of effective coordination and collaboration
between AIR and FS. Specific examples where the FAA has improved
coordination between AIR and FS include the work through the Human
Factors and Flightcrew Coordinating Group to coordinate a
comprehensive, strategic approach to address human factors requirements
and recommendations, and coordination of disclosure of safety-critical
information and submittal of design and operational information between
AIR/FS team members during certification projects.
b. How has the adoption of a safety management system for
manufacturers benefitted FAA's oversight of the certification process
so far?
Answer. When the FAA's Aircraft Certification Service (AIR)
initiated the voluntary Safety Management System (SMS) program, it was
focused on the highest-risk manufacturers that are holders of
Organization Designation Authorizations (ODAs).
This experience has provided valuable insight for the industry's
mandatory implementation of SMS and how to approach our oversight of
SMS. With the voluntary SMS program and now the mandatory SMS
requirements in 14 C.F.R. part 5, we are seeing a significant interest
in how safety is managed as a system across all of our highest-risk
approval holders. These discussions are fostering new perspectives on
how we can collaborate to advance industry-wide safety.
Requiring SMS for design and manufacturing organizations introduces
additional risk-based evaluations and monitoring within these systems,
including certification processes. It also ensures closer integration
of safety and production-related changes during product certification.
This approach enables the FAA to concentrate its oversight on system-
level, safety-focused areas.
c. Can you describe FAA's efforts to better centralize data
collected from various offices to ensure oversight of manufacturers
remains robust and information sharing is being prioritized?
Answer. The FAA has implemented a comprehensive Enterprise Data
Management (EDM) strategy that defines how our agency collects, stores,
manages, and uses its data.
The EDM strategy establishes data standards, processes, and
governance mechanisms to manage data quality and availability of
authoritative safety data across the enterprise. The benefits of EDM
include providing high-quality data that is continuously available,
with enhanced security and scalability to share across the organization
to support effective decision-making and operational efficiency. The
FAA is applying the EDM strategy toward the integration and
centralization of safety data across the organization. This will enable
data democratization and self-service analytics across air traffic
operations, and aircraft manufacturing and aviation oversight.
Increased collaboration between these services utilizing enterprise
safety data will drive deeper insights to measure and improve the
safety of the NAS.
In support of the FAA EDM strategy, AIR has begun developing an
enterprise data system that will deliver a centralized data set and
analytics toolset for improved oversight of manufacturers.
Question 4. As you know, the Securing Growth and Robust Leadership
in American Aviation Act (P.L. 118-63) included section 372, a
provision I authored codifying the recommendations of the Air Carrier
Training Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ACT_ARC) create a two-month
Enhanced Qualification Program (EQP). This thorough, detailed course of
instruction, paired with advanced simulator training from seasoned
airline pilots, would expose trainees to the cockpits of the jets they
would actually be flying and, importantly, allow them to experience
what it's like to handle challenging and dangerous situations in those
cockpits, including those which lead to the close calls we've seen
recently.
The swift implementation of this program is critical to ensuring we
have an adequate supply of highly trained, qualified pilots. Can you
commit to ensuring this provision will be implemented as soon as
possible, consistent with the timelines established in the bill?
Answer. The FAA is working expeditiously to implement the
requirements in section 372 of the 2024 Reauthorization Act and the
recommendations in the ACT-ARC report.
[all]