[Senate Hearing 118-717]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-717
U.S. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS,
PERSONNEL AND SAFETY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION SAFETY,
OPERATIONS, AND INNOVATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 12, 2024
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-703 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota TED CRUZ, Texas, Ranking
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts ROGER WICKER, Mississippi
GARY PETERS, Michigan DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin JERRY MORAN, Kansas
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JON TESTER, Montana MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado J. D. VANCE, Ohio
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
PETER WELCH, Vermont Virginia
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming
Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
Jonathan Hale, General Counsel
Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Liam McKenna, General Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION SAFETY, OPERATIONS, AND INNOVATION
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois, Chair JERRY MORAN, Kansas, Ranking
JON TESTER, Montana JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona ROGER WICKER, Mississippi
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado TODD YOUNG, Indiana
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on December 12, 2024................................ 1
Statement of Senator Duckworth................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 3
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 4
Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 50
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 52
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 54
Statement of Senator Welch....................................... 56
Witnesses
Kevin Walsh, Director, Information Technology and Cybersecurity,
United States Government Accountability Office................. 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Dean Iacopelli, Chief of Staff, National Air Traffic Controller
Association (NATCA)............................................ 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Captain Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International.................................................. 24
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Dave Spero, National President, Professional Aviation Safety
Specialists, AFL-CIO (PASS).................................... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Marc Scribner, Senior Transportation Policy Analyst, Reason
Foundation..................................................... 36
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Kevin Walsh by:
Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 59
Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................ 62
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 63
Response to written questions submitted to Dean Iacopelli by:
Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 64
Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................ 65
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 66
Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 67
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 69
Response to written questions submitted to Dave Spero by:
Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 70
Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................ 72
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 73
U.S. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS, PERSONNEL AND SAFETY
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THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2024
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation Safety, Operations, and
Innovation,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:24 a.m.
EST, in room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Tammy
Duckworth, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Duckworth [presiding], Cantwell,
Klobuchar, Rosen, Hickenlooper, Welch, Moran, Cruz, and
Sullivan.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Duckworth. Good morning. The Subcommittee on
Aviation Safety, Operations, and Innovation will come to order.
I want to welcome everyone to our hearing today, United States
Air Traffic Control Systems, Personnel and Safety. This hearing
is of vital importance to ensure the safety of our national
airspace, and I want to thank our Chairwoman Cantwell, Ranking
Member Cruz, and Ranking Member Moran for their help in making
this hearing happen.
Too much of our Nation's air traffic control equipment,
technology, and infrastructure is outdated. Today we will have
an opportunity to hear from stakeholders about the challenges
these aging systems create for our air traffic controllers and
what needs to be done to keep our airspace safe.
We will be hearing from the Government Accountability
Office of Information Technology and Cybersecurity Director,
Kevin Walsh--thank you for being here; National Air Traffic
Controller Association Chief of Staff, Dean Iacopelli--
hopefully I said that correctly, thank you; Air Line Pilots
Association President, Captain Jason Ambrosi--welcome;
Professional Aviation Safety Specialists President, Dave
Spero--thank you; and Reason Foundation Senior Transportation
Policy Analyst Marc Scribner--thank you for being here.
Before I proceed to my opening statement I want to just
make a comment that I am saddened to learn of FAA Administrator
Whitaker's plan to resign next month. His leadership has been
invaluable during this critical time in aviation safety. His
oversight of Boeing production has been essential, and I hope
the efforts he spearheaded on that front will continue. Our
aviation system is safer because of his service, and we are
grateful to him for it.
I will recognize myself for the opening statement.
In the years immediately following the pandemic, we
witnessed an alarming series of close calls in commercial
aviation. Last year, we saw a terrifying image of a JetBlue
flight attempting to land in Boston that came within 400 feet
of a Learjet taking off. In Austin, we saw a FedEx cargo plane
attempt to land on the same runway where a Southwest 737 was
about to take off. The two aircraft came within less than 200
feet of each other.
Our Committee held hearings and worked in a bipartisan
manner to pass an FAA Reauthorization Act to make our skies
safer. The new law, which is still being implemented, makes
important investments in air traffic controller staffing and
surface detection technology.
But we cannot rest on our laurels. Safety requires constant
vigilance, which leads me to today's hearing. The safety of the
flying public depends upon well-equipped air traffic control
systems. Our air traffic controllers work tirelessly to manage
our national airspace, but they rely on increasingly outdated
facilities and equipment. Following the January 2023 NOTAM
system outage, which resulted in 1,300 flight cancellations,
nearly 10,000 delays, and a shutdown of the national airspace,
the FAA conducted an operational risk assessment to evaluate
the sustainability of all aircraft, all air traffic control
systems.
In September, drawing upon that work, the Government
Accountability Office, the GAO, conducted its own analysis and
issued a report warning, FAA actions are urgently needed to
modernize aging systems. Fifty-one of our Nation's 138 air
traffic control systems are unsustainable. That is more than
one-third.
According to the GAO, 17 of these systems are critical for
safety and efficiency, yet FAA will not be able to modernize
some for 10 to 13 years, and as of May 2024, did not even have
investments planned for four of them. Some ATC equipment is
getting so sold, service and replacement parts are no longer
available. For example, replacement antennas are no longer
available for beacons used to determine the location of some
aircraft during the en route portion of their flight.
Manufacturer support is no longer available for the most common
types of equipment and instrument landing systems, which FAA
maintains at our airports. Worse, when FAA replaces aging
equipment, the process sometimes takes so long, the new
equipment is outdated by the time it actually gets deployed.
To be clear, keeping FAA properly equipped is not an
entirely new issue. It has challenged lawmakers and
administrations from both parties for decades. What is new,
however, is the context in which we find ourselves. Our air
traffic control equipment and facilities are aging while our
system is still under post-pandemic stress and contending with
rising demand.
Close calls are still happening. A few notable examples
from this year demonstrate the type of safety risks that we are
seeing. In April, a JetBlue Embraer 190 had to abort takeoff at
Reagan National Airport when a Southwest 737 was about to cross
the same runway. In May, an American A319 had to abort takeoff
at DCA after reaching about 100 miles per hour because a
smaller plane was on a final approach to an intersecting
runway. In September, an Alaska Airline 737 aborted takeoff in
Nashville to avoid a Southwest 737 that was about to cross the
same runway. The Alaska plane braked so hard its tires blew
out, reportedly.
There is a growing consensus across a wide range of
aviation stakeholders that Congress needs to address this
issue. We need modern, sustainable air traffic control systems
to keep the flying public safe, and I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses about how best we can achieve that.
And since Ranking Member Moran is not here for his
statement, I will recognize our Chairwoman, Chairwoman
Cantwell, for her opening statement. Oh, is he here? Oh,
Senator Cruz.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair. Before I begin I want
to comment on the announcement this morning that Michael
Whitaker will resign on January 20. I want to thank him for his
service. He was confirmed without a single no vote, a testament
to his experience, his judgment, and his apolitical nature.
When he took the job I asked him to focus on keeping the flying
public safe and to stay out of politics, and he has ably led
the agency during a challenging period, and I want to thank him
for his public service.
On January 11, 2023, the Nation experienced its first
nationwide ground stop of air travel since 9/11. This ground
stop resulted in roughly 10,000 flights being canceled and days
of delays for travelers. What could have prompted this
grounding of air travel? It was not weather or some airline
experiencing operational difficulties. It was because the FAA's
NOTAM system, which delivers crucial safety information to
pilots, experienced a technical glitch.
NOTAM has been used since 1947, and while the technology
has evolved from the original telephone system, the current
system has not been updated in over a decade. In fact, the most
recent change to NOTAM was when the Biden administration
changed Notice to Airmen to Notice to Air Missions. I think the
American people would have preferred the Administration focus
on modernizing the antiquated system over obsession on gendered
language.
In response to this massive failure, the FAA conducted a
review of more than 100 critical systems for air traffic in
this country. Notably, of the systems the FAA evaluated,
roughly a third of these systems were unsustainable. Even more
concerning, the Government Accountability Office, the GAO,
looked at the FAA's assessment and discovered that the FAA did
not have plans to modernize 17 systems that were, quote, ``most
at risk.'' This is completely unacceptable.
Air traffic facilities and radars need improvement. Based
on FAA data, the reliability of the FAA's radar fleet is
declining. They are online less often, unscheduled and
scheduled outages last longer, and it takes longer to restore
service when radar does break down. The United States should be
a leader in aviation technology. Sadly, this is often not the
case.
Not only does the report deliver a harsh assessment of
decades of sustainment efforts, it also presents a bleak
picture when one considers the funding wasted on doomed
projects. For example, the GAO identified one ATC system that
needed additional funding for modernization just two years
after it was completed. Other projects took more than 10 years
to complete, becoming obsolete almost as soon as they were
deployed.
The FAA has long been plagued by difficulties in
maintaining and modernization ATC systems, especially the
NextGen project. NextGen was first developed in the early
2000s, and has largely failed to deliver on the promised
benefits. As projects finish, they quickly become outdated,
underscoring the problem of such slow modernization. The FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2024 addresses the problems with
NextGen, requiring the FAA to finish development of NextGen and
to sunset the office by the end of next year.
Before the FAA can embark on another wholesale
modernization project, the law requires the FAA to present the
business case for the project to Congress, ensuring that the
FAA conducts the analyses necessary to identify feasible
benchmarks for the NAS before starting the next big project.
The breadth, scale, and sheer number of these challenges should
cause us to question the fundamental structure and operations
of the FAA. Is this the right model for air traffic control?
Experts across the political spectrum agree that there is a
need for stakeholders to come together and discuss the path
forward. In November 2023, the National Airspace System's
Safety Review Team, appointed by the FAA, submitted an
independent report to the FAA and to Congress focused on
improving safety in the NAS, which included evaluating the
reliability of the air traffic organization and the NAS.
Administrator Michael Whitaker has also said the aviation
community should be evaluating alternatives to insulate the
agency from political disruptions. I agree. Congress should
discuss and consider creative alternatives to ensure that the
national airspace system reliably works for all users,
particularly as new aviation transportation technology enters
the market.
The conclusions from the GAO report are numerous, but they
all point to one clear conclusion: the status quo of how the
FAA modernizes our ATC is unacceptable. Our nation should be
the leader in the field, and instead we are stuck with
technology that is outdated almost as soon as it is introduced
into the airspace.
I applaud the thousands of air traffic controllers who
safely manage thousands of flights, but broader conversations
about how we modernize our air traffic system are desperately
needed. The American people deserve an operation that uses its
funding wisely, is innovative while ensuring safety, and is
also world-leading in reliability. As Chairman next year, I
intend to focus heavily on the status of the airspace and what
changes may be necessary to enhance its efficiency and
reliability. Thank you.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Ranking Member Cruz. I now
recognize Chairwoman Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Chair Cantwell. Thank you, Senator Duckworth, for having
this important hearing this morning on aviation safety. Like
you, I am saddened and surprised to hear of Administrator
Whitaker's decision to step down in January 2025.
I know this, that if you want to be the leader in aviation
you have to be the leader in aviation safety. I think
Administrator Whitaker was living by that motto. I hope that
the next Administrator will live by it as well. The next
Administrator needs to be ready on day one to continue the job
of restoring the FAA's safety culture and providing real
oversight of the aviation sector.
This Committee has done good work looking at not just what
manufacturers must do, but making sure that the FAA does its
oversight role and responsibility.
So we look forward to this opportunity to continue the work
with Chairman-to-be Cruz in January, and with you, Senator
Duckworth, on the very, very important technology challenges
that we face in the FAA. And I will have more to say about
Administrator Whitaker later today.
Last year's outage of the FAA NOTAM system underscored that
the FAA, like airlines, must have a backup system and
redundancy. We need to have the FAA meet the same standards.
So this hearing--and I want again to thank you for your
leadership during the 118th Congress, Senator Duckworth,
because serving as an aviator yourself, and certainly the
intelligence that you bring to these technology issues, have
helped us solve many issues.
Getting aviation infrastructure right, whether it is the
air traffic controller system, sustainable aviation fuel, next
generation, or important issues like thermal plastics and
composites, all of these are about winning the next 100 years
of aviation.
Our country has been blessed to be leaders in aviation, but
we can see the competition coming, and we can see the
challenges of implementing safety.
According to the Airports Council-North America, every
dollar invested in aviation infrastructure yields $2.5 dollars
in aviation infrastructure growth, and importantly, it helps us
stay on top of those aviation safety priorities.
We have been spurred to action obviously by the horrible
crashes that we witnessed with both Ethiopian Airlines Flight
302 and the Lion Air Flight 610, which pushed us to pass ACSAA.
And in the aftermath of that, the Alaska Airlines 1282 flight
blow out renewed the focus even more on production quality.
On January 12, several days after the incident, the FAA
Administrator chose to strengthen its oversight of
manufacturing and initiated an audit. Four days later, Senator
Duckworth and I made sure that we petitioned the 737 MAX-7's
deicing system, and Boeing withdrew that and pledged to work on
fixing that, and we are still seeing this play out.
Today's hearing marks the 12th hearing that our Committee
has had, building on 7 hearings in the 117th Congress. So it is
safe to say, with Senator Cruz's remarks, that we will continue
to be laser focused on aviation safety and technology.
NTSB Chairman Homendy and others testified on the spike of
near misses and close calls that we were seeing, and Chair
Homendy has been before the Committee several times to discuss
the continued investigation of the Alaska Airlines door plug
blowout.
We brought in airline CEOs, labor leaders and talked about
the success that we have seen, and what we need to do to keep
going past our COVID-19 pandemic considerations.
We put our money where our mouth is and set a table for a
FAA reauthorization law, and all of the Committee worked very
diligently to get that over the goal line. Again, I want to
thank Senator Cruz for his work on that.
The FAA law reauthorized both the FAA and NTSB for an
additional five years to help keep safe 3 million daily
passengers in the United States. It gives the FAA the resources
it needs and makes sure that the Nation's aviation safety
regulator does set that gold standard.
The law provides NTSB, the Nation's safety watchdog, with
the highest funding authorization it has received, to make sure
that we hire the investigators needed to complete their
mission. And the reauthorization invests in the well-being of
our aviation workforce, giving them new tools, training, and
platforms to thrive.
Senator Duckworth, again, thank you for holding this
hearing this morning. I look forward to your continued
leadership in this very important role of aviation technology
advancement and meeting our safety standards. Thank you.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Chair Cantwell. We will now
proceed to witness testimony. First I would like to recognize
Mr. Kevin Walsh from the Government Accountability Office for
his statement.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN WALSH, DIRECTOR,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CYBERSECURITY,
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Walsh. Chair, Ranking Member, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for inviting GAO to testify on this
important issue.
The FAA's air traffic controllers rely on 138 systems that
monitor weather, conduct navigation and surveillance, and
manage communications. More than half of these systems are
older than 20 years. Some are more than 60 years old. As a
reminder, 20 years ago Facebook was launched, and 60-year-old
systems may have been active when JFK was President.
Unsurprisingly, these FAA systems have long-standing issues
with the availability of parts and the retirement of
knowledgeable technicians. Generally, legacy systems contribute
to unmet mission needs, staffing issues, and increased costs.
That matches with what we are seeing at the FAA.
Further, their prior modernization efforts have been
fraught with unrealistic baselines, cost and schedule overruns,
unanticipated requirements, and poor oversight. The expected
growth in air travel over the coming years will not help those
issues.
As part of our recent report we reviewed selected efforts
to modernize dozens of air traffic control systems and found
that, on average, the FAA took more than four years to create a
baseline, that is expected cost, schedule, and performance of a
project. We also noted that such pre-baseline investments
received limited oversight from FAA. After establishing a
baseline, these modernizations plan to take a further 12.5
years to complete deployment, on average.
Prolonged timeframes like this will impact FAA's mission.
For example, the En Route Automation Modernization was
completed in 2015, after a 10-year effort, but it was deployed
without data technology, which required a major refresh soon
thereafter.
Back to the 138 air traffic control systems. To its credit,
the FAA reviewed the systems to gauge how easy they are to
maintain, as well as the operational impact of those systems.
The FAA expects to use this assessment going forward to
prioritize its modernization efforts. That assessment found
that 33 of the air traffic control systems, 24 percent, had
adequate funding and spare parts. The remaining 105 had
differing degrees of shortages or potential shortages in spares
and funding. Many of them also had limited staff expertise and
did not meet mission needs.
Confirming those issues, Mr. Spero's organization kindly
asked its members some questions on our behalf, and their top
issues were also obsolete systems, difficulties finding parts,
and staffing shortfalls.
Worryingly, FAA's assessment showed that 58 of the systems
with shortages or shortfalls have a critical operational
impact. Amongst them we identified 17 that we felt were
especially concerning given their age, sustainability, and
operational impact. Of those, the earliest of those 17
modernizations is planned to finish in six years. Some are
planned to be completed in 10 to 13 years, and four do not have
ongoing modernization efforts.
We also found that the FAA's Acquisition Oversight Council
had not ensured that investments delivered functionality in
smaller segments, and had not consistently monitored high
risks. We also noted the Council made decisions based on
incomplete data and documentation.
Despite this, flying is safe. But continuing to rely on
these legacy systems diminishes the margin of safety and adds
stress to the national airspace. To that end, FAA needs to
break modernizations into smaller pieces, deliver functionality
quicker, and improve accountability.
I hope that this hearing is a catalyst for action, but
there is no easy answer or quick fix. A snap of Ironman's
fingers cannot fix this. This will be the work of many years
and billions of dollars.
This concludes my statement, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walsh follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin Walsh, Director, Information Technology and
Cybersecurity, United States Government Accountability Office
Chair Duckworth, Ranking Member Moran, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I am pleased to participate in today's hearing on the impact of the
Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) aging systems supporting the
national airspace and air traffic control (ATC). As an agency of the
Department of Transportation, FAA's mission is to promote the safe,
orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic in the national airspace.
To ensure FAA's mission is met, air traffic controllers are to manage
communications; monitor weather, navigation, and surveillance; and
direct aircraft from takeoff to landing. Controllers manage up to
50,000 flights per day. FAA anticipates continued growth and congestion
in the airspace, forecasting that air travel will increase annually on
average by 6.2 percent.
Over the past several decades, FAA has been experiencing challenges
with aging ATC systems. These challenges are due to, among other
things, unavailability of parts, reduced technical expertise in
outdated technologies, and growth in airspace demand.
My statement today discusses the results of our recently issued
report that, among other things, (1) identified FAA's unsustainable and
potentially unsustainable ATC systems, (2) assessed the extent to which
FAA has ongoing investments to modernize unsustainable and potentially
unsustainable systems, and (3) examined the progress FAA has made in
baselining and implementing selected modernization investments.\1\
Detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology for that
work can be found in the issued report. In addition, we followed up
with Department of Transportation and FAA officials in December 2024 to
determine what actions they had taken to implement our recommendations.
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\1\ GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA Actions Are Urgently Needed to
Modernize Aging Systems, GAO-24-107001 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23,
2024).
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We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background
To ensure FAA's mission is met, air traffic controllers rely on
numerous complex systems to monitor communications and weather and
provide navigation and surveillance services during the various phases
of flight. Figure 1 provides a simplified view of air traffic control
within the national airspace.
FAA has had longstanding challenges with maintaining aging ATC
systems.\2\ According to FAA officials, these challenges are due to the
unavailability of parts and retirement of technicians with expertise in
maintaining the aging systems. In addition, there has been dramatic
growth in airspace demand since the older systems were initially
implemented. This has adversely impacted the ability of those systems
to continue to support mission needs.
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\2\ ATC systems support a variety of air traffic control
operations, including navigation, weather, surveillance,
communications, and air traffic optimization.
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These challenges can impact FAA's ability to meet its mission. For
example, the Notice to Air Missions system, which enables air traffic
controllers to provide real-time updates to aircraft crew about
critical flying situations relating to issues such as weather,
congestion, and safety, is over 30 years old. On January 11, 2023, the
system became unavailable to users. To ensure safety, FAA grounded all
departing aircraft for about 2 hours to fix the system. The outage
caused cancellations of over 1,300 flights and delayed almost 10,000
other flights throughout the day. Some airlines took several days to
fully recover.
For over 4 decades we have reported on challenges facing FAA's
modernization of its ATC systems.\3\ In February 1982, FAA released its
first comprehensive plan for improving ATC services. At that time, FAA
estimated that implementation of this national airspace modernization
plan would cost about $10 billion with full benefits realized by the
late 1990s.
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\3\ GAO, Examination of the Federal Aviation Administration's Plan
for the National Airspace System--Interim Report, AFMD-82-66
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 1982).
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As we subsequently reported in several products, FAA faced
challenges with this modernization. Due to the many delays and overruns
that FAA encountered, we designated FAA's ATC modernization as a new
high-risk area in 1995.\4\ In doing so, we noted that the estimated
cost of the overall modernization had ballooned to $36 billion, and the
largest component had to be dramatically revamped. In continuing to
identify FAA modernization as a high-risk area, in 2003 we reported
that after 2 decades, FAA's ATC modernization was far from complete.
Among the reasons for FAA's performance were that it did not (1)
recognize the technical complexity of the effort, (2) realistically
estimate the resources required, (3) adequately oversee its
contractors' activities, and (4) effectively control system
requirements.
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\4\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Overview, HR-95-1 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 1, 1995). We updated our concerns in subsequent high-risk reports
in 1997 through 2007. For example, see GAO, High-Risk Series: An
Overview, HR-97-1 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 1997); and High-Risk
Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007). In
2009, we noted that continued focus on ATC systems modernization was
warranted as FAA began new modernization efforts. GAO, High-Risk
Series: An Update, GAO-09-271 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 2009).
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In 2003, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development Office
to plan for and coordinate a transformation from the current ATC system
to the next generation air transportation system (NextGen). NextGen is
a multidecade, multibillion-dollar program to increase the safety and
efficiency of air travel by transitioning from a ground-based ATC
system that uses radar, to a system of systems based on satellite
navigation and digital communications.\5\ FAA released its initial plan
to implement NextGen in 2004.
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\5\ In 2003, the Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization
Act mandated that FAA create and carry out a plan for modernizing its
ATC systems. Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub.
L. No. 108-176, Sec. 709, 117 Stat. 2490, 2582-2585 (2003).
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We have reported that NextGen has had the following challenges: (1)
software development complexity, (2) unanticipated system requirements,
(3) insufficient stakeholder involvement during system development, and
(4) unanticipated events, such as government shutdowns.\6\ These
challenges have contributed to significant schedule delays.
Specifically, while NextGen was initially planned to be completed by
2025, as of November 2023, FAA did not anticipate completing NextGen
until at least 2030.
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\6\ See examples of reports we have previously issued on NextGen:
GAO, Air Traffic Control Modernization: Progress and Challenges in
Implementing NextGen, GAO-17-450 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2017); Air
Traffic Control Modernization: Management Challenges Associated with
Program Costs Hinder NextGen Implementation, GAO-12-223 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 16, 2012); and Next Generation Air Transportation System:
Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the
National Airspace System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).
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Most recently, in November 2023, we reported that FAA had spent at
least $14 billion on NextGen from Fiscal Years 2007 through 2022 and
expected to spend about $22 billion in total through 2030.\7\ We found
that FAA had made mixed progress meeting milestones in its ongoing
effort to modernize air traffic management through the NextGen
initiative.
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\7\ GAO, Air Traffic Control Modernization: Program Management
Improvements Could Help FAA Address NextGen Delays and Challenges, GAO-
24-105254 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2023).
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This mixed progress has slowed FAA's NextGen efforts to improve the
safety and efficiency of air travel and address growing congestion in
the national airspace. For example, FAA met its milestone for deploying
more reliable digital communication services at ATC towers. However, it
did not deploy initial modernized services to all 20 facilities serving
en route flights by its September 2021 milestone.
We also reported that FAA officials and stakeholders stated that
the COVID-19 pandemic was a major cause of schedule delays and cost
increases, as it required FAA to redo work that had been completed
prior to the pandemic. In March 2023, FAA officials estimated the
financial impacts of COVID-19 to the NextGen program were $225 million.
We further reported that while FAA officials noted that another key
contributor to the program's mixed progress was that NextGen had a flat
budget for several years, we found that the actual budget reported in
FAA's congressional budget justification generally aligned with the
amounts in the President's budget request. For example, as reflected in
FAA's congressional budget justifications for Fiscal Years 2012 through
2023, FAA's budget requests and actual budget for NextGen--including
system deployment--have remained relatively constant at about $1
billion annually.\8\
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\8\ We used the actual budget amount FAA reflected in its
congressional budget justification for each Fiscal Year, but for Fiscal
Year 2022 used the continuing resolution budget amount FAA reported
because the actual budget was not yet available at the time the
congressional budget justification was developed.
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About One-Third of FAA ATC Systems Are Considered Unsustainable
Lastly, we found that FAA's efforts to implement NextGen met four
leading practices in program management but fell short in fully meeting
five other practices. We made four recommendations to address the five
deficiencies to improve FAA's management of NextGen. As of November
2024, FAA had not implemented three of the four recommendations.
During Fiscal Year 2023, FAA determined that of its 138 ATC
systems, 51 (37 percent) were unsustainable and 54 (39 percent) were
potentially unsustainable.\9\ Specifically, after the January 2023
shutdown of the national airspace following the Notice to Air Missions
outage, FAA officials conducted an operational risk assessment to
evaluate the sustainability of all ATC systems.\10\ In addition, the
assessment was intended to inform where FAA should focus future
investments, funding, and risk reduction activities associated with ATC
systems.
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\9\ The assessment identified 181 total systems. We excluded 43 of
these systems that were classified as the responsibility of the
Department of Defense or building facilities.
\10\ FAA plans to continue conducting operational assessments of
existing ATC systems on an annual basis. As of May 2024, FAA was
developing a draft order to formalize this process.
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The officials rated each of the 138 systems by their sustainability
levels on a scale of A through E (rating A represented the least
sustainable and rating E represented no sustainment issues). Systems
with ratings A and B are unsustainable and C ratings are potentially
unsustainable. Figure 2 summarizes the sustainability ratings of the
ATC systems.
FAA categorizes its ATC systems by criticality. Of the 105
unsustainable or potentially unsustainable ATC systems,
29 unsustainable and 29 potentially unsustainable systems
have a critical operational impact on the safety and efficiency
of the national airspace,
16 unsustainable and 9 potentially unsustainable systems
have a moderate operational impact on the safety and efficiency
of the national airspace, and
6 unsustainable and 16 potentially unsustainable systems
were mission support systems and were not considered critical.
See figure 3 for a summary of the 105 systems by criticality and
sustainability.
Moreover, the ages of the 105 systems vary significantly.
Specifically,
73 were deployed over 20 years ago, with 40 being deployed
over 30 years ago, and six of those deployed over 60 years ago.
32 systems were implemented within the past 20 years, with
four as recently as 2020.
FAA also reported that of the 105 unsustainable and potentially
unsustainable systems, 74 systems (70 percent) face one or more
challenges that are historically problematic of aging systems. These
challenges include no longer meeting mission needs, difficulty finding
spare parts, and limited technical staff with expertise in repairing
the aging system. Specifically, the agency reported that 11 systems no
longer met FAA mission needs, 62 systems were difficult to maintain due
to challenges in finding employees with the requisite knowledge and
expertise, and 61 systems involved difficulty in finding spare or
replacement parts.
FAA Has Ongoing Investments to Modernize At-Risk Systems but Did Not
Always Establish Near-Term Plans
These challenges pose risks to the operations of key ATC systems.
According to a February 2024 response from FAA technicians, the top
issue facing the agency is system obsolescence and difficulty in
finding replacement parts.\11\ The response also indicated that
inadequate staffing of FAA facilities posed a challenge to maintaining
systems because some technicians were responsible for areas spanning
hundreds of miles.
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\11\ In response to discussions with us, the Professional Aviation
Safety Specialists (a labor union that represents, among others,
national airspace safety inspectors and technicians) used a survey tool
to solicit responses to our questions from member FAA employees who
maintain the national airspace.
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As of December 2023, the agency had 64 ongoing investments to
modernize 90 of the 105 unsustainable and potentially unsustainable ATC
systems. Collectively, the systems are intended to be modernized
between 2023 through 2038. FAA did not have an associated modernization
investment for the remaining 15 systems.
However, FAA has been slow to modernize some of the most critical
and at-risk systems. Specifically, when considering age, sustainability
ratings, operational impact level, and expected date of modernization
or replacement for each system, as of May 2024, FAA had 17 systems that
were especially concerning. The 17 systems range from as few as 2 years
old to as many as 50 years old, are unsustainable, and are critical to
the safety and efficiency of the national airspace. However, the
investments intended to modernize or replace these 17 systems are not
planned to be completed for at least 6 more years. In some cases, they
were not to be completed for at least 10 years.
In addition, of the 15 systems that FAA does not have an associated
ongoing modernization investment, four are critical systems and it is
unknown when the associated systems will be modernized or replaced.
(The remaining 11 systems were of moderate to low operational impact or
only potentially unsustainable and not as much of an immediate
concern.) Table 1 provides the key factors of the most critical and at-
risk ATC systems.
a This table omits the official names of the 17 systems
due to sensitivity concerns. We used generic designations instead.
b In 2023 FAA officials conducted an operational risk
assessment to evaluate the sustainability of all ATC systems. The
officials rated each of the 138 systems by their sustainability levels
on a scale of A through E (rating A represented the least sustainable
and rating E represented no sustainment issues). Systems with ratings A
are considered unsustainable because they have significant sparing
shortages, shortfalls in sustainment funding, and little or no
technology refresh funding is available. System with ratings B are
considered unsustainable because they have significant shortfalls in
sustainment funding or capability.
c According to FAA officials in May 2024, the agency is
taking steps to mitigate priority deficiencies for this system. These
efforts are being addressed in operations, rather than through a
technical refresh or sustainment investment.
In addition, the key goals of the 2023 operational risk assessment
were to identify where FAA should focus future investments, funding,
and risk reduction activities associated with ATC systems. FAA
officials stated that they used the assessment to determine that the
agency had sufficient backup systems and redundancies in place to
enable it to avoid a catastrophic incident.
However, according to officials, FAA did not use the results of the
2023 operational risk assessment to prioritize or establish near-term
plans to modernize all unsustainable and critical systems identified in
its assessment. Specifically, as mentioned previously, FAA has four at-
risk systems that do not have any near-term plans for modernization.
Officials stated that they did not use the 2023 assessment to
prioritize modernization investments because it was not completed in
time to inform a 2024 enterprise architecture update.\12\ Officials
stated that they plan to use the results of the 2024 operational risk
assessment to inform future budget decisions and plans for
modernization.
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\12\ Each year, FAA updates the national airspace enterprise
architecture roadmaps that highlight a 15-year view of modernization of
the national airspace and a list of investments associated with each
roadmap. The roadmaps include acquisition milestones as defined by the
FAA acquisition management policy and any interdependencies between the
investments. This helps to facilitate planning and scheduling for the
approval, funding, acquisition, and deployment of related systems,
equipment, or capabilities. Proposed capital investments must be
presented to the JRC for review and approval before they begin. Once
approved, an investment will be added to the national airspace
enterprise architecture and be included in the President's budget
submittal to Congress.
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Without near-term modernization plans for these systems, critical
ATC operations that these systems support may continue to be at-risk
for over a decade before being modernized or replaced. Specifically,
FAA can take well over a decade to implement modernization investments
once initiated. Of the nine investments that we reviewed that had
established cost, schedule, and performance baselines, FAA plans to
take an average of 12 years and 8 months to complete all deployment
activities. In addition, four of these investments plan to take as long
as 15 to 19 years to implement. For example, while the Terminal Flight
Data Manager modernization investment was initiated in September 2010,
as of May 2024, FAA estimated it will not be completed until 19 years
later, in February 2030.\13\ Similarly, the Common Support Services-
Weather system modernization investment was initiated in December 2010,
but is not estimated to be completed until April 2026 (over 15 years
later).\14\
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\13\ The Terminal Flight Data Manager modernization investment is
intended to support new services that provide automation to current,
manually intensive operations and replaces critical, outdated systems
in the national airspace. It shares electronic data among controllers,
air traffic managers, aircraft operators, and airports. It also enables
stakeholders to more efficiently stage arrivals and departures and
manage surface traffic flow. As of May 2024, this investment was in the
process of rebaselining, which may impact planned time frames.
\14\ The Common Support Services-Weather project is intended to
offer weather products for integration into air traffic decision
support systems, improving the quality of traffic management decisions
and reducing controller workload during severe weather. Products will
be provided via a set of common web services for weather, using
internationally recognized data access and data format standards.
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The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 requires that by February 2026,
FAA conduct an audit and report to Congress on the results to, among
other things, determine the level of risk and impact associated with
outdated, unsafe, or unstable legacy systems.\15\ The act also requires
that the report provide recommendations for system replacements or
enhancements.
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\15\ Pub. L. No. 118-63, 138 Stat. 1025 (2024)
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Selected Modernization Investments Took Years to Baseline and
Progressed Slowly
However, in the interim, Congress may not have important
information on how FAA is mitigating risks related to critical systems.
Accordingly, we recommended that FAA report to Congress on how it is
mitigating risks of all unsustainable and critical systems that are
identified in the annual operational risk assessments. Transportation
concurred with our recommendation.
According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), diligently
tracking the execution of well-crafted plans can provide early warning
of potential problems and enable timely and effective mitigation before
problems spiral out of control.\16\ Baselined plans act as a guide
throughout the life of an investment to provide a basis for measuring
performance.\17\ In addition, according to FAA acquisition policy, once
an investment establishes a baseline, the investment receives
additional oversight from the Joint Resources Council (JRC)--FAA's
executive acquisition governance board.
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\16\ OMB, Information Technology Investment Baseline Management
Policy, M-10-27 (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 28, 2010).
\17\ Baseline is defined as the approved costs, schedule, and
performance goals for a given investment.
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Of the 20 selected investments we reviewed, 11 of the investments
were required to establish an acquisition program baseline, and nine of
them did so accordingly.\18\ However, it often took several years after
investment initiation to accomplish this. Specifically, eight of the 11
selected investments took longer than 4 years to establish a baseline.
The Next Generation Very High Frequency and Ultra High Frequency Air-
to-Ground Communications Phase 2 investment took the longest amount of
time at 6 years and 8 months.\19\ As another example, the Offshore
Automation Phase 1 investment took 5 years and 6 months to establish a
baseline.\20\ In addition, while the Aeronautical Information
Management Modernization Enhancement 1 \21\ and FAA Enterprise Network
Services\22\ investments were initiated over 6 years ago, as of May
2024, neither had established an approved acquisition program baseline.
FAA officials explained that some investments take a while to develop a
baseline because of the complexity of the requirements or large number
of affected stakeholders.
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\18\ We selected 20 of the 65 investments intended to replace
unsustainable and potentially unsustainable ATC systems. Specifically,
we selected the 20 investments based on, among other things, the
operational impact on the safety and/or efficiency of the national
airspace, acquisition type, and lifecycle cost. For each investment, we
compiled cost, schedule, and descriptive information from investment
planning and oversight documents, such as the acquisition program
baselines, execution plans, and quarterly investment metrics from a
centralized investment data repository. We performed reliability checks
on the data against other data sources, such the IT Dashboard.
\19\ The Next Generation Very High Frequency and Ultra High
Frequency Air-to-Ground Communications Phase 2 modernization investment
is intended to replace and modernize aging and obsolete air-to-ground
analog radios that allow direct voice communication with pilots. These
radios are to support Voice Over Internet Protocol and meet modern
requirements.
\20\ The Offshore Automation Phase 1 investment aims to develop
system enhancements to increase the productivity, capacity, flight
efficiency, safety, and system availability of the offshore sites in
Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and Puerto Rico.
\21\ The Aeronautical Information Management Modernization
Enhancement 1 modernization investment is expected to consolidate
redundant sources of aeronautical data (i.e., navigational aids and
notices to air missions) and systems and provide the foundation to
expand aeronautical information exchange among existing applications,
air traffic management automation systems, and national airspace
stakeholders.
\22\ FAA Enterprise Network Services modernization investment is
intended to provide FAA with modern ethernet/internet protocol
telecommunications infrastructure (e.g., cabling) to, among other
things, enable highly available and secure voice and data
communications and networking capabilities needed to enable critical
operations.
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As a result, these pre-baselined investments receive limited
oversight from the JRC for several years. Specifically, while FAA
acquisition policy states that baselined investments are required to
attend quarterly oversight meetings with the JRC, these oversight
requirements do not exist for investments that have not been baselined.
In April 2024, FAA officials stated that they were in the initial
phase of planning to establish greater accountability for investments
prior to establishing a baseline. Specifically, officials stated that
they are considering providing investments increased oversight when
requesting additional resources for investment activities, beyond what
was initially allocated, or when pre-baseline milestones are delayed.
In May 2024, officials stated that FAA has not taken any further steps
toward this goal.
To address the lack of accountability of pre-baselined investment,
we made two recommendations:
FAA should establish a time frame for developing and
implementing guidance to increase JRC oversight of pre-
baselined investments that require additional resources or time
prior to establishing a baseline.
FAA should ensure that ATC modernization investments
establish baselines in an expeditious manner.
Transportation partially concurred with the first recommendation.
To clarify our intention and address comments from Transportation, we
added contextual language to this recommendation. The agency's planned
actions should help meet the intent of our recommendation, if
effectively implemented. Transportation concurred with the second
recommendation. In December 2024, FAA officials stated that they do not
have an update on actions they have taken to address these
recommendations. They stated they would provide an update in March
2025.
In addition, we found that selected investments have progressed
slowly. As discussed earlier, most of the selected modernization
investments we reviewed plan to take many years before first deploying
functionality and completing all deployment activities--with some
taking as many as 15 to 19 years. Among other things, a key risk of
slow system implementations is that the technology may be out of date
by the time systems are implemented. For example, a November 2023
National Airspace System Safety Review Team report found that while En
Route Automation Modernization was initiated in 2004, it was not
delivered until 10 years later.\23\ This process led to En Route
Automation Modernization being deployed with outdated technology that
needed a major technology refreshment within 5 years of implementation.
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\23\ National Airspace System Safety Review Team, Discussion and
Recommendations to Address Risk in the National Airspace System
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2023).
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We have previously reported that segmenting large complex system
development and implementation efforts into smaller and more manageable
increments has the potential to reduce risk and deliver capabilities
more quickly.\24\ Since 2000, OMB has directed agencies to incorporate
an incremental development approach into their policies and ensure that
investments implement them.\25\ Further, since 2012, OMB has required
that functionality be delivered to users at least every 6 months.\26\
Consistent with OMB's guidance, FAA's acquisition management policy
states that the JRC is responsible for reviewing and approving
investments that are organized as manageable segments.
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\24\ GAO, Information Technology Reform: Agencies Need to Improve
Certification of Incremental Development, GAO-18-148 (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 7, 2017); and High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-15-290 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 11, 2015).
\25\ OMB, Management of Federal Information Resources, Circular No.
A-130 Revised, Transmittal Memorandum No. 4. OMB's 2012 and 2013
guidance reaffirmed and strengthened these requirements. Executive
Office of the President of the United States, OMB, Analytical
Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2014,
(Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2013), p. 354; and OMB, Contracting
Guidance to Support Modular Development (Washington, D.C.: June 14,
2012).
\26\ OMB, FY 2016 IT Budget-Capital Planning Guidance (Washington,
D.C.: May 23, 2014); Guidance on Exhibits 53 and 300--Information
Technology and E-Government (2013); Guidance on Exhibits 53 and 300--
Information Technology and E-Government (2012).
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However, the Council had not ensured that selected investments
deliver functionality in manageable segments. For example, the JRC
allowed two investments (i.e., Enterprise Information Display System
phase 1 and NextGen Weather Processor), to proceed even though neither
was organized in manageable segments to deliver functionality
incrementally.\27\ Specifically, the Enterprise Information Display
System phase 1 investment was initiated 8 years ago and had not
delivered any functionality to users. Similarly, NextGen Weather
Processor was initiated 14 years ago and had yet to deliver any
functionality to users.
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\27\ The Enterprise Information Display Systems is intended to
replace information display systems that display aircraft,
aeronautical, and other types of information that are currently in use
at approximately 400 facilities (e.g., air traffic control centers)
with about 5,000 display systems. It was initiated in June 2016 and is
estimated to be completed in December 2027. The NextGen Weather
Processor is intended to replace FAA's aging weather processor systems
and provide new capabilities, such as developing a common weather
processing platform. This platform uses algorithms to create and
display aviation-specific current and predicted weather. It was
initiated in December 2010 and is estimated to be completed in April
2026.
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FAA officials acknowledged that they should do more to identify
opportunities to segment investments and deliver functionality to users
more rapidly across all ATC system modernization investments.
Specifically, in March 2024 the agency established a working group
to develop guidance on segmenting investments. However, FAA officials
did not provide specific time frames for developing and implementing
this guidance.
Accordingly, we recommended that FAA establish a time frame for
developing and implementing guidance that the JRC ensures that ATC
system modernization investments are organized as manageable segments.
Transportation concurred with our recommendation. Similar to the
previously discussed recommendations, in December 2024, FAA officials
stated that they do not have an update on actions they have taken to
address the recommendation. They stated they would provide an update in
March 2025.
In summary, FAA's reliance on a large percentage of aging and
unsustainable or potentially unsustainable ATC systems introduces risks
to FAA's ability to ensure the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of
up to 50,000 flights per day. In our September 2024 report, we
emphasized that while FAA has ongoing investments aimed at modernizing
aging ATC systems, the agency's progress to modernize some of the most
critical and at-risk systems has been slow. As such, in our report we
made seven recommendations to FAA aimed at, among other things,
improving accountability of the replacement of these systems and
reducing the amount of time the agency takes to modernize them. FAA
officials were unable to demonstrate any actions they are taking to
address our recommendations; however, expeditious implementation of our
seven recommendations will be vitally important to help the agency
manage risks while it addresses its unsustainable systems.
Chair Duckworth, Ranking Member Moran, and Members of the
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Walsh.
I now recognize Mr. Dean Iacopelli from the National Air
Traffic Controllers Association.
STATEMENT OF DEAN IACOPELLI, CHIEF OF STAFF,
NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION,
AFL-CIO
Mr. Iacopelli. Good morning, Chair Duckworth, Chair
Cantwell, and Ranking Member Cruz. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you on this important subject.
My name is Dean Iacopelli. I am Chief of Staff for the
National Air Traffic Controllers Association, NATCA. I am a
retired air traffic controller with over 30 years of
experience, having been assigned to a facility responsible for
separating aircraft in and around the New York City area.
NATCA takes pride in our role as an aviation safety
organization that stands shoulder-to-shoulder with Congress,
the executive branch, and industry stakeholders to ensure that
the national airspace system remains the safest and most
efficient in the world. The 20,000 air traffic controllers and
other aviation safety professionals represented by NATCA
throughout the FAA, Department of Defense, and the Federal
Contract Tower Program, are vital to the U.S. economy, ensuring
the safe and efficient movement of millions of passengers and
tons of cargo every day. Our mission is to ensure the flying
public arrives home to their vacation, their business
destination, without delay and while maintaining the highest
margins of safety.
I know that much of this hearing will be focused on safety
and technology as well as funding for facilities and equipment,
but I would be remiss if I did not first mention air traffic
control staffing, which is the foundation of the air traffic
control system. The national airspace system requires a
sufficient number of trained air traffic controllers to meet
the FAA's operational, statutory, and contractual requirements.
Certified air traffic controllers are also vital to
participating in the modernization, equipment, and procedures.
We would like to thank this Committee for passing the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2024 with overwhelming bipartisan
support. That law includes many critical provisions on hiring,
training, and staffing, including directing the FAA to conduct
maximum hiring for controllers for its duration. Congress has
consistently provided the FAA with the resources it requests
through both authorization of top-line numbers and the annual
appropriations process.
Currently one of the highest priorities for the FAA is to
address the outdated FAA telecommunications infrastructure
network, known as FTI. The FTI network affects radar displays
that depict air traffic in real time and air-to-ground
frequencies used to communicate with pilots. The network is
largely comprised of copper wiring, which can no longer
reliably meet the demand of the national airspace system.
Recently, ground stops at airports in the New York City and
Washington, D.C., areas highlight the consequences of a failure
of the FTI network. The FAA must transition 4,600 sites away
from copper wire and onto fiberoptic network to avoid extensive
flight delays.
The FAA operates more than 300 air traffic control
facilities. The FAA's 21 air route traffic control centers were
built in the 1960s, and have an average age of 62 years old.
Fort Worth, Seattle, Kansas City, Chicago, and Houston centers
are each between 59 and 64 years old.
Our terminal facilities also require attention. The average
FAA-operated tower is 36 years old. For example, Dallas-Fort
Worth Airport has three air traffic control towers, which
service one of the busiest airports in the country, the oldest
of which is 50 years old.
Many FAA facilities have exceeded their expected
lifecycles. Others require new roofs, windows, HVAC systems,
plumbing, and elevators. When major systems fail or facilities
have structural problems, it can lead to flight delays or
temporary airspace shutdowns. It is implausible to build the
air traffic control system of the future in outdated and
inadequate buildings.
The national airspace system needs and deserves the best
facilities and equipment to move this Nation's passengers and
cargos. To sustain many of our legacy systems as well as to
enhance and deploy new safety and modernization programs, the
FAA projects that it will need $6 billion annually for its
Facilities and Equipment account, which is a significant
increase compared to recent years. Without this funding, along
with continued focus on air traffic controller staffing, the
FAA will struggle to maintain its capacity of the system, let
alone modernize or expand it for new users and emerging
technologies.
NATCA's continued involvement as a productive and
collaborative partner will ensure the FAA continues to deliver
these initiatives to industry stakeholders and the flying
public on time and at cost savings to the American taxpayers.
If NATCA's trained and experienced representatives were not
involved, many modernization programs would be delayed and
experience cost overruns because they would need to go through
costly and time-consuming revisions following the development,
testing, and even after implementation.
We look forward to working with this Committee, the
Appropriations Committee, and the incoming administration to
build on our successes and continue the safest period in
aviation industry. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Iacopelli follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dean Iacopelli, Chief of Staff, National Air
Traffic Controllers Association, AFL-CIO
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the National
Air Traffic Controllers Association, AFL-CIO (NATCA) at today's hearing
titled ``U.S. Air Traffic Control Systems, Personnel, and Safety.''
NATCA is the exclusive representative for nearly 20,000 employees,
including the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) air traffic
controllers, traffic management coordinators and specialists, flight
service station air traffic controllers, staff support specialists,
engineers and architects, and other aviation safety professionals, as
well as Department of Defense (DOD) and Federal Contract Tower (FCT)
air traffic controllers.
NATCA takes pride in its role as an aviation safety organization
that stands shoulder-to-shoulder with government and industry
stakeholders to ensure that our National Airspace System (NAS) remains
the safest and most efficient in the world. The air traffic controllers
and other aviation safety professionals who NATCA represents throughout
the FAA, DOD, and the private sector are vital to the U.S. economy,
ensuring the safe and efficient movement of millions of tons of cargo
annually within the National Airspace System (NAS).
The NAS moves over 45,000 flights and 2.9 million passengers, and
more than 59,000 tons of cargo every day across more than 29 million
square miles of airspace. Although it is the safest, most efficient,
and most complex system in the world, we should always strive to
bolster safety, mitigate risk, and improve efficiency.
Executive Summary
The FAA's two primary accounts for running the U.S. air traffic
control system are its Operations\1\ (Ops) and Facilities and Equipment
(F&E) budgets. Although the size of the F&E budget is roughly one-
fourth of its Ops budget, F&E funding is critical for developing,
testing, deploying, and enhancing the systems that air traffic
controllers and other aviation safety professionals use every day to
ensure that more than one billion passengers annually arrive safely at
their destinations.
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\1\ NATCA supports the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Fiscal
Year 2025 Operations budget request, which included an increase to
$13.6 billion from the 2024 Continuing Resolution level of $12.729627
billion, in recognition that the FAA will experience several
uncontrollable cost increases of over $500 million, from personnel
costs such as government-wide pay increases and annualized hiring from
Fiscal Year 2024. The DOT's Fiscal Year 2025 budget request also
accounts for a $43 million increase to hire and train at least 2,000
new air traffic controllers to rebuild the controller staffing levels
and meet current and projected traffic demands. This hiring target was
established in accordance with the maximum hiring requirement in the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 and must increase in future years as
the FAA Academy expands its capacity. In July 2024, the Senate
Appropriations Committee approved this budget request in its Fiscal
Year 2025 THUD appropriations bill, while the House THUD bill was
slightly below that budget request amount.
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These safety-critical systems must be continuous monitored,
maintained, upgraded, and enhanced even after they are fully deployed
across the NAS, while many contain physical components that have
lifecycle expiration dates. Software enhancements and cyber security
upgrades are also necessary to meet the growing demands of the NAS. In
addition to increased commercial passenger and cargo traffic, the rapid
proliferation of space launches and unmanned aerial systems must be
integrated safely into the system by the workforce that keeps it
running.
F&E funding is also used to repair, update, and replace the FAA's
rapidly aging physical infrastructure. Air traffic control facilities
across the U.S. range from two to 82 years of age. Many controllers and
other aviation safety professionals go to work every day in facilities
that are plagued by leaking roofs, flooding basements that contain
electronic systems, broken-down elevators and HVAC systems, and
chronically backed-up bathroom toilets.
NATCA's written testimony will focus these issue including: (1)
controller staffing challenges and how they negatively affect
infrastructure and modernization initiatives; (2) the concerns with
FAA's rapidly-aging physical infrastructure; (3) the FAA's F&E budget
requests to Congress understated its needs in previous years; and (4)
illustrate how we, as a nation, are falling behind in our efforts to
maintain and modernize the system.
Importantly, this testimony will explain why NATCA must continue to
be involved as a productive and collaborative partner across a wide
range of safety, technology, and modernization programs to ensure that
the FAA can deliver these initiatives to industry stakeholders and the
flying public on-time and at a cost-savings to the American taxpayers.
I. Controller Staffing Challenges Continue to Hinder Infrastructure and
Modernization Advancements
NATCA continues to be focused on improving the system-wide
controller staffing shortage. A properly-staffed controller workforce
is necessary in order to safely and efficiently meet all of its
operational, statutory, and contractual requirements, while also having
the personnel resources to research, develop, deploy, and then train
the existing workforce on new processes, technology, and modernization
initiatives. Without a sustainable hiring, training, and staffing model
like the one outlined in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, which
passed both chambers with overwhelming bipartisan support, the FAA will
struggle to maintain the current capacity of the system, let alone
modernize or expand it for new users.
NATCA thanks the members of this subcommittee, as well as all
Senators who championed the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. That law
included many first-time provisions including directing the FAA to
conduct maximum hiring for controllers for the duration of the bill and
implementing expansion of the capacity of the FAA's Training Academy in
Oklahoma City.
After reaching its hiring targets for air traffic controller
trainees three consecutive years, including increased targets of 1,500
and 1,800 respectively the past two Fiscal Years, the FAA is finally
starting to make some progress. After a decade of steady losses, in
Fiscal Year 2023, the FAA added 15 additional Certified Professional
Controllers and 15 additional trainees. In Fiscal Year 2024, the FAA
added 140 CPCs and 189 trainees after accounting for attrition. Maximum
hiring for the full duration of the bill will greatly assist the FAA
achieve a staffing level required to meet all of its needs.
The law also requires the FAA to implement the Collaborative
Resources Workgroup's (CRWG) new, more accurate operational staffing
targets on an interim basis, until the Transportation Research Board--a
part of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine--
completes a study to determine which staffing models and methodologies
best account for the operational staffing needs necessary to meet
facility operational, statutory, contractual and safety requirements of
the air traffic control system. Proper and timely implementation of
these provisions is essential to the safety, efficiency, and
technological modernization of the NAS for the years to come.
Congress must make the necessary investments in the FAA's rapidly
aging physical and technological infrastructure, which need significant
attention and additional funding. But, staffing and infrastructure are
inextricably linked, because it requires fully certified controllers to
develop, test, deploy, and train new technology, while at the same time
meeting the safety and efficiency requirements of the system.
II. FAA's Physical Infrastructure is Rapidly Aging and Many Facilities
Have Exceeded Their Expected Lifecycles
The FAA operates more than 300 air traffic control facilities of
varying ages and conditions. The FAA's 21 Air Route Traffic Control
Centers (ARTCCs) located in the continental United States were built in
the 1960s and are more than 60 years old. The FAA's Terminal Radar
Approach Control facilities (TRACONs) are on average more than 25 years
old. In addition, the FAA has 132 combined TRACON/towers, which, on
average, are approximately 35 years old. Finally, the FAA has another
131 stand-alone Towers which average more than 30 years old.
Many FAA facilities have exceeded their expected lifecycles. Others
have major systems that have exceeded their expected functional
lifecycle such as roofs, windows, HVAC systems, plumbing, and
elevators, which no longer perform their necessary functions. Some of
these issues have led to periodic airspace shutdowns and many others
have led to safety concerns for the workforce. When these major systems
fail, or facilities have integrity problems, it can lead to increasing
delays, which negatively affect the flying public and our economy.
The FAA is addressing its aging infrastructure through a
combination of realignments, sustaining and maintaining some
facilities, and replacing a handful of others. However, that process
has been slow and hampered by funding constraints. The FAA will need a
substantially increased investment in its F&E budget to adequately
maintain, let alone, replace its aging infrastructure.
III. Congress Has Always Met FAA's Stated Budgetary Need For Facilities
and Equipment
The FAA, like much of the Federal government, has faced an unstable
and unpredictable funding stream for the better part of two decades.
Whether due to the risks of lapsed appropriations or authorizations,
such interruptions have negatively affected all aspects of the FAA,
making it increasingly difficult to maintain the safety and efficiency
of the NAS. Even when the Agency is not facing the threat of a
shutdown, multiple administrations from both parties have submitted
insufficient FAA budget requests to Congress. FAA's requests have often
fallen well-short of what it truly needs to adequately address the
infrastructure needs of the NAS.
Congress has consistently provided the FAA with the resources it
requests through both authorization of top-line numbers and the annual
appropriations process. However, because FAA has consistently requested
too little, there are significant backlogs of NAS system sustainment
and ATC facility sustainment, in addition to mounting delays in the
implementation of NAS modernization and system improvements as well as
ATC tower and radar facility replacement.
The budgetary shortfalls also have not kept up with inflation over
the past 15 years. For instance, the FAA has consistently requested
only about $3 billion in annual appropriations for F&E throughout that
period, even though in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 the Agency's internal
budgetary estimates showed that it needed at least $4.5 billion, with
that need quickly approaching $6 billion. This loss of spending and
buying power for F&E programs forced FAA into a ``fix-on-fail'' model
by requiring it to prioritize mandatory costs, leaving little to no
money for modernization and infrastructure programs.
Currently, NATCA believes that the Department of Transportation's
FY25 Budget Request ($3.6 billion) for F&E is insufficient to meet the
Agency's modernization and technological needs. To sustain many legacy
systems, as well as to enhance and grow critical safety and
modernization programs, the FAA projects that it will need $6 billion.
At minimum, the NATCA projects that the FAA will need at least $4
billion to simply sustain these programs and the rest of the NAS.
Investments that merely cover the costs to sustain current equipment
will be insufficient to develop and implement new technologies and
integrate new users into the system.
The FAA's FY 2025 budget request, for the first time in over a
decade, acknowledges its true need, although not entirely through its
F&E request. In addition to the $3.6 billion F&E request, FAA cites the
$1 billion in funds authorized for 2025 through the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act as supplementing its facilities and
infrastructure funding needs. It also proposes a new Facility
Replacement and Radar Modernization fund that would dedicate $8 billion
over the next five years--beginning with $1 billion in 2025--to replace
or modernize aging air traffic control facilities. This includes
modernizing 377 critical radar systems and more than 20 air traffic
control facilities. We, along with a wide array of industry
stakeholders, support this request.
Recently, the FAA publicly shared its facilities and systems
sustainment backlog, ongoing needs for both, and facilities and systems
replacement and improvement funding requirements looking forward 30
years into the future.
The FAA must continue to be transparent with its need for increased
F&E funding so that it can meet its own equipment sustainment,
replacement, and modernization needs. If not, it will continue to
exacerbate the FAA's significant sustainment and replacement backlog.
Failing to maintain and replace critical safety equipment that has
exceeded its expected life introduces unnecessary risk into the system.
These funding limitations also have prevented the FAA from designing
and implementing new technologies that will improve safety.
IV. FAA is Lagging Behind in its Efforts to Sustain and Modernize the
NAS
In the coming years, the FAA will face unprecedented safety and
technological challenges. The continued development and rapid
proliferation of commercial space operations, advanced air mobility,
unmanned aerial systems (drones), and other new entrants could
jeopardize the safety and efficiency of the NAS if they are not
properly integrated into the existing system. It is critical that NATCA
remain involved with the safe and efficient integration of these new
technologies.
For the past 15 years, the FAA and NATCA have worked together to
develop and implement safety-critical modernization programs that would
not be possible without our joint efforts. For instance, NATCA and the
FAA have achieved collaborative and cost-saving successes on
modernization programs such as En Route Automation Modernization
(ERAM), DataComm, and Metroplex. Recently, the Agency and NATCA have
been able to fast-track a surface surveillance situational awareness
tool that will help controllers mitigate the risks associated with
wrong-surface landings and runway incursions. These types of programs
and initiatives enhance safety and produce efficiencies that reduce
delays and save fuel, while also preserving the United States' position
as the world leader in aviation.
However, under-funding for F&E will jeopardize sustainment and
significantly hinder progress for many safety and modernization
programs including, but not limited to: FAA Telecommunications, En
Route Automation Modernization (ERAM), Standard Terminal Automation
Replacement (STARS), DataComm, Voice Switch, Airborne Surveillance,
Ground Surveillance, Airport Lighting, Space Integration, Aeronautical
Information, Information Management, Terminal Flight Data Management
(TDFM), and Facility Replacement and Radar Modernization (FRRM).
A. The FAA's Looming Telecommunications Crisis
FAA telecommunications are the backbone of the air traffic control
system. The FAA needs extensive telecommunications services and
networking capabilities to support the operation of the NAS and other
agency functions. The FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI)
program currently provides these services and networking capabilities
through a service-based contract, in which the service provider
continually updates the underlying technologies. The majority of FTI's
telecommunication lines function on an aging copper wire
infrastructure, which is an outdated and no longer readily supported,
as many local phone companies are discontinuing service to copper wire
equipment throughout the country.
As a result, air traffic controllers throughout the U.S. are
experiencing a steady increase in unexpected outages of air traffic
systems. Recent ground stops at airports in the New York and
Washington, D.C., areas highlight the risks and consequences of
telecommunication network failures. To date, there are over 30,000
services at over 4,600 FAA sites that must transition away from copper
wire and onto a fiber optic cable network in order to avoid severe
service disruptions and extensive flight delays.
The FAA's Enterprise Network Services (FENS) program will replace
existing copper wire infrastructure with a fiber optic network. As a
result, FENS will be able to provide reliable and secure
communications, information services, and networking capabilities to
support NAS operations and agency administration functions. This will
not only help to stabilize the telecommunications network but also pave
the way for cloud-based services and reduce program development and
sustainment costs. However, any discontinuation or disruption to the
existing copper wire services without first transitioning to fiber
optic services would lead to potential safety risks and/or significant
delays in air traffic services.
Because this is both a time-sensitive and a safety-critical
program, the FAA is currently moving money from other safety-critical
programs in order to replace legacy copper wire on a case-by-case
basis. The FAA is also spending an additional $7 million per month just
to maintain the legacy copper wire as they delay the fiber optic
upgrades due to insufficient funding. Other FAA programs will continue
to suffer funding cuts if this program is not adequately funded.
B. The NOTAM Crisis Harbinger of Future Disruptions
Even before the FAA's telecommunications crisis, the FAA was
working to mitigate the risks associated with its faltering Notice to
Airmen (NOTAM) system, which has been the source of significant
disruptions throughout the NAS. The NOTAM system is vital for sharing
and disseminating safety-critical flight information between both air
traffic controllers and pilots.
However, in early 2023, a complete failure of the NOTAM system
caused nationwide ground stop causing significant flight delays.
Despite the known vulnerabilities and risks associated with the current
system, the FAA will struggle to fund this program without increased
F&E funding. At minimum, the FAA will need $154 million just to conduct
further research on a replacement NOTAM system, but will need $354
million to replace the broken NOTAM system.
Much like the FAA's looming telecommunications crisis, the NOTAM
crisis was not at the top of any F&E priority lists until after the
2023 collapse resulted in cascading nationwide delays and ground stops.
We need to learn the lessons from similar events in the past and chart
another course, rather than repeat the same mistakes.
C. FAA Must Continue to Sustain and Enhance Automation Platforms
Automation platforms such as ERAM and STARS deliver flight plan and
surveillance information to air traffic controllers on a real-time
basis. These platforms are the foundational systems that keep our NAS
operating safely 24-hours a day, 7-days a week, 365-days a year.
Over the past four years, air traffic levels have continued to grow
at a rate of 6.2 percent per year post-COVID, excluding new entrant
operations. Air traffic automation systems have components reaching
end-of-life that need to be replaced. Due to historically flat F&E
funding, as a result of the FAA requesting less than it needs to
maintain the system, air traffic automation has been unable to meet the
growing needs of the NAS reducing the efficiency of the system.
In the near future, controllers will have to rely on this
inadequate technology to maintain the safety and efficiency of the NAS.
Without fully funding these programs, the FAA will need at least $265
million just to maintain current functionality in FY25. However, at
that level, the FAA would not be able to make additional enhancement
upgrades for any of the current automation systems and some hardware
replacements would be at risk. Because these platforms require
continuous maintenance, it will cost the FAA $400 million in FY25 to
update the hardware for these systems and enhance functionality
controllers desperately need.
D. Surveillance Programs
Air traffic surveillance systems encompass Radar, ADS-B, and GPS.
Although ADS-B and GPS have been extremely beneficial for improving
safety and efficiency, they do not replace the need to maintain legacy
radar infrastructure. Modern radar technology is more cost-effective,
requires less maintenance, and offers an increase in range visibility
which will allow the deployment of fewer assets and maintain the same,
if not improve, surveillance visibility throughout the system.
At minimum, the FAA will need $212 million just to sustain current
surveillance systems. Many components of legacy radars are past their
end-of-life cycles and are no longer manufactured, while some other
suppliers of ground radar equipment went out of business. Without
replacing and upgrading these systems, the flying public is at risk of
experiencing unexpected and significant flight delays and other
disruptions to the system whenever these systems breakdown. The FAA
requires $1 billion to modernize radar technology throughout the
system.
E. NATCA Involvement Critical in Every Phase
It is critical that NATCA remain a productive and collaborative
partner throughout development, testing, training, and implementation
across a wide range of safety, technology, and modernization programs.
NATCA's continued involvement will ensure that the FAA continues to
deliver these initiatives to industry stakeholders and the flying
public on-time and at a cost-savings to the American taxpayers. If
NATCA representatives were not involved throughout the entirety of the
process, many modernization programs would be delayed and experience
cost overruns, because they would need to go through extensive, costly,
and time-consuming revisions following development, during testing, and
even after implementation.
V. Conclusion
In order to enhance aviation safety, efficiency, and modernize FAA
physical and technological infrastructure, Congress must prioritize
investment in F&E funding. Meeting the FAA's F&E budgetary needs for
Fiscal Year 2025 and beyond will finally allow the Agency to address
its significant backlog of facility and equipment maintenance, repair,
and replacement. This increased funding also will allow the FAA to fund
critical modernization programs that enhance safety while continuing to
expand the NAS to account for the development and rapid proliferation
of commercial space operations, advanced air mobility, unmanned aerial
systems (drones), and other new entrants that must be properly
integrated into the existing system.
It is critical that NATCA remain directly involved throughout the
safe and efficient integration of new technologies including research,
development, testing, deployment, and training. NATCA's continued
involvement will ensure that the FAA continues to deliver these
initiatives to industry stakeholders and the flying public on-time and
at a cost-savings to the American taxpayers.
Of course, none of this is possible without adequate staffing of
the system. FAA must continue to hire and train the next generation of
air traffic controllers. Congress' mandate to maximize controller
hiring over the next five years can only be accomplished if FAA's
Operations budget needs are also met.
NATCA looks forward to working members of this Subcommittee, the
full Committee, the appropriators, as well as all other Members of
Congress, aviation stakeholders, the incoming Administration, and the
FAA to achieve these and many other mutually beneficial goals.
Thank you for holding this important hearing and providing the
opportunity to testify.
*FAA reduced its FY 2019 hiring target from 1,431 to 907 following
the 35-day government shutdown.
**FAA reduced its FY 2021 hiring target from 910 to 500 due to the
COVID-19 pandemic and increased its hiring targets for FY 2022--2024.
These data are prior to the Collaborative Resource Workgroup's
recommendation to establish new CPC staffing targets for FAA's 313 air
traffic control facilities.
CPC: Certified Professional Controller
CPC-IT: Certified Professional Controller in Training (fully
certified elsewhere, transferred to a new facility and began training
there)
DEV: Developmental (trainee)
AG: Graduate of the FAA Initial Classroom Training Academy in
Oklahoma City, newly hired, and started at their first facility as a
trainee
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Iacopelli.
I will now recognize Captain Ambrosi with the Air Line
Pilots Association.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JASON AMBROSI, PRESIDENT,
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Ambrosi. Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, Chair
Duckworth, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify and to present the perspective of 79,000
commercial airline pilots of the Air Line Pilots Association
International. My name is Jason Ambrosi. I am current and
qualified 767 captain, and since January of last year I have
been President of ALPA, the largest pilot union and the largest
nongovernmental safety organization in the world.
Our association's history of safety and security advocacy
spans more than 90 years, and I am honored to continue that
tradition by participating in today's discussion. Congress, as
guided by this Committee, made important investments in the
future of our aviation system when it passed a strong safety-
focused, five-year FAA reauthorization bill. By furthering the
Federal commitment to modernizing our system, enhancing the air
traffic controller and aviation workforce, and investing in
technology, we are positioned to remain the global aviation
leader.
As operators in the system, pilots have a vested interest
in the FAA sustaining legacy systems and advancing
technological and infrastructure improvements to ensure the
national airspace system remains safe and efficient. One of the
biggest modernization initiatives in recent history is NextGen.
The capabilities that have been implemented with NextGen have
increased situational awareness and provided tools to help
pilots make safe decisions through performance-based
navigation, data communication, and ADS-B implementation.
However, the system's potential is not being fully
realized, in part because many airliners are not properly
equipped to take advantage of these updated capabilities. As a
result, pilots and air traffic controllers are forced to use
work-arounds that allow us to operate aircraft with outdated
equipment in today's complex system, all of which runs counter
to the anticipated benefits of NextGen. Implementing
communications, navigation, and surveillance with air traffic
management, data communication systems, and ATC automation
systems will allow controllers to monitor aircraft, improve
communication between pilots and controllers for clearance and
reroutes, and ensure aircraft line up on the correct runway.
To the latter point, ALPA is pleased the FAA
reauthorization addresses the need for terminal airspace
automation display at small airports that have traditionally
operated without these technologies.
As I have testified previously before this Committee, we
have seen several near miss incidents, including a particularly
close call, as you mentioned, in Austin in February of last
year, in which pilots were the final line in defense in
ensuring safety.
Time and time again, similar examples highlight that the
presence of at least two highly trained and well-rested pilots
on all commercial airline flight decks, at all times, is a
major factor in why airline travel remains the safest form of
transportation. The human element of pilots working together on
the flight deck is irreplaceable. We are able to see, hear,
feel, and react to issues in real time. As the Austin incident
showed, we save lives.
To respond to these concerns and augment the critical role
of pilots on the flight deck, the Committee has helped ensure
that legacy systems, including ASD-X, remain fully operational
to provide air traffic controllers with timely alerts that
prevent accidents and near misses.
Similarly, the Committee has responded to these incidents
with greater focus on runway incursions through the
establishment of a policy for not tolerance for near misses,
which expands FAA's focus on improving the ground operation of
aircraft at airports, establishing the Runway Safety Council,
and supporting discretionary airport grant programs for runway
safety projects.
Unfortunately, underinvestment, including for facilities
and equipment account, is affecting the systems pilots and air
traffic controllers use to ensure safe and efficient
operations. While Congress has provided the funding requested
each year by the FAA during the annual appropriations process,
there remains a significant shortfall in numerous maintenance
and modernization efforts. Resources have not kept up with
inflation, and effectively require the agency to prioritize
sustainment to the detriment of modernization and
infrastructure needs. The FAA must ask Congress for its true
needs in order to sustain the legacy systems and make greater
headway on NextGen to improve the NAS for pilots and all users.
As a current and qualified airline captain with ongoing,
firsthand experience in the National Airspace System, I can
tell you that our commercial aviation system is safe, and I
look forward to working with the Committee and the FAA to
continue to improve aviation safety. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ambrosi follows:]
Testimony of Captain Jason Ambrosi, President,
Air Line Pilots Association, International
Chair Duckworth, Ranking Member Moran and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify and present the
perspective of the more than 79,000 commercial airline pilots of the
Air Line Pilots Association, International. My name is Jason Ambrosi,
and I am a current 767 Captain at Delta Air Lines and president of ALPA
since 2023. ALPA is the largest pilot union in the world and the
largest non-governmental aviation safety organization with a history of
safety and security advocacy spanning more than 90 years. I am pleased
to participate in today's discussion about air traffic systems,
personnel, and aviation safety.
Let me affirm that as a current and qualified airline captain with
a seat on the flight deck, our commercial aviation system is safe.
However, while the U.S. aviation system remains the safest in the
world, this outcome is not guaranteed. Safety is a matter of relentless
vigilance, and our current success stems from decades of industry-wide
efforts, and commitment to collaboration, data collection and analysis,
hazard identification and mitigation, and congressional support.
However, for the National Airspace System (NAS) to remain the safest
and most efficient system, continuous improvements are needed to ensure
that growth in traffic levels and new users do not threaten airline or
system safety.
Technological and infrastructure improvements are required to
efficiently manage current NAS operations, with emphasis on NextGen
automation tools and airport infrastructure improvements to provide
safe and efficient gate to gate operations, reduced airborne reroutes,
ensure that on time arrivals proceed directly to their gate, and cargo
is delivered on time. Modernization must continue to keep ahead of the
demand from the wide variety of aviation users. The technologies and
procedures that are needed must also contemplate new entrants into the
NAS. The future of air transportation will bring a combination of
commercial air carriers, unmanned aerial vehicles, general aviation,
urban air mobility devices, and commercial space flight. The airspace
system of the future will involve a wider and more complex variety of
operations that our air traffic control infrastructure must manage
safely and efficiently. Additionally, many FAA facilities exceed their
lifecycles and have deficient systems that create airspace and carrier
delays.
To the meet the challenges of an increasingly complex airspace,
ALPA has worked with the FAA, our labor partners, airlines, and the
industry to deploy air traffic control modernization. One of the
biggest modernization initiatives in recent history is NextGen. The
capabilities that have been implemented with NextGen have increased
situational awareness and provided tools to help pilots make safe
decisions through performance-based navigation, data communication, and
ADS-B implementation. However, the system's potential isn't being fully
realized--in part because many airliners aren't properly equipped to
take advantage of its updated capabilities. As a result, pilots and air
traffic controllers are forced to use ``workarounds'' that allow us to
operate aircraft with outdated equipment in today's complex system.
Increasing safety and updating air traffic control systems requires
increased resources, stable and reliable funding to ensure continuous
FAA operations, and greater use of the Airport and Airways Trust Fund
(AATF) to allow the FAA to more effectively leverage the Trust Fund's
balance. This Committee did a phenomenal job with passage of five-year
bipartisan FAA reauthorization bill that helps augment and develop
advanced technologies, including new surface safety technologies,
equally important so-called ``low tech'' safety technologies for
runways, lighting and signage, as well as increasing air traffic
controller hiring.
Underinvestment, including for the Facilities and Equipment (F&E)
account, is affecting the systems pilots and air traffic controllers
use to ensure safe and efficient operations. While Congress has
generally provided the funding requested each year by the FAA during
the annual appropriations process, there remains a significant
shortfall of funding in numerous maintenance and modernization efforts.
These shortfalls have not kept up with inflation and effectively
required the agency to prioritize mandatory spending to the detriment
of modernization and infrastructure needs. The FAA must ask Congress
for its true needs and Congress should avoid unnecessary and damaging
government shutdowns, threatened shutdowns, and lengthy Continuing
Resolutions (CRs) that delay these critical efforts.
Aircraft Equipage to Support NextGen Procedures
The NextGen modernization initiative has resulted in the creation
of new performance-based navigation departures, arrivals, and
instrument approaches. These procedures safely reduce noise, aircraft
greenhouse gas emissions, and airspace congestion. However, not all of
the airline aircraft can fly these new procedures. In some
circumstances there may be 15-20 percent of the airline aircraft that
are unable to utilize the new procedures. Unfortunately, air traffic
controllers are unable to maintain the integrity of these operations
with such high levels of non-equipped aircraft.
For the NextGen procedures to become the standard, instead of the
exception, the commercial airline aircraft fleet needs standardized
equipage capabilities that meet the navigational requirements for
flying the NextGen procedures. In recent years, there have been
attempts to implement NextGen procedures with the assumption that
pilots will utilize workarounds to offset the limited navigation
capabilities on some of the aircraft. These workarounds often add
complexity and workload, which is counter to the anticipated benefits
from NextGen. In reality, pilots in lesser equipped aircraft are
working harder to make the aircraft comply with the NextGen way of
navigating. At times, instead of flying approaches with both precision
lateral and vertical guidance that is automated with the assistance of
an autopilot, pilots are also asked to hand-fly non-precision
approaches on some of today's airline aircraft that lack the necessary
NextGen navigation capability.
While NextGen initiatives provide support for the NAS and augment
pilot flying, a minimum of two pilots on the flight deck ensure
redundancy that provides added awareness, expertise, and experience,
factors that established and maintain today's safety standard. There is
no technological or procedural pathway today or in the future that can
overcome the risks introduced by reducing the flight deck compliment,
including technological failures or anomalies, incapacitation, and
issues associated with the human-machine interface. ALPA views flight
deck technology and automation as a human support tool, not a
replacement. Given an FAA-Industry Working Group found that 20 percent
of ``normal'' flights experience aircraft malfunctions that require
human intervention, the premise of transport category aircraft
operation--including FAA's scientific study of fatigue, sleep inertia,
and related regulation and guidance--must be based on a minimum of two
well-trained plots on the flight deck.
CNS/ATM Improvements Would Benefit All
When Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS)
capabilities are integrated with Air Traffic Management ATM) systems,
airspace management and air traffic operations become safer and more
efficient. Surveillance technologies enable air traffic controllers to
monitor aircraft and track their positions in real-time, increasing
situational awareness and enabling proactive airspace management.
Precise navigation systems enhance navigation accuracy and support
optimized flight routing, attendant fuel savings, and reduced flight
times. CNS/ATM contributes to increased airspace capacity, reduced
delays, improved safety, and enhanced operational efficiency.
Similarly, ADS-B, and ADS-C, as well as surface detection systems
like Airport Surface Detection System Model X (ASDE-X) and Airport
Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) are currently deployed runway
safety systems that help prevent surface collisions and wrong surface
landings. However, ASDE-X and ASSC are fully deployed at only 43
airports. Our air traffic controller workforce needs these capabilities
to be fully functioning at all of the airports where ASDE-X and ASSC
are installed. ALPA has called upon the FAA to install surface safety
systems at all airports with airline services. ALPA is pleased the
FAA's efforts to rapidly develop a new surface capability, the Surface
Awareness Initiative (SAI), has made significant progress this year.
After fielding a SAI system at four airports this summer to validate
the system's readiness for expansion, the FAA has expanded deployment
to 14 more airports by the end of 2024. ALPA continues to call on the
FAA to have a surface safety system installed at all airports with an
air traffic control tower and where there are airline operations, as
quickly as possible.
ADS-B represents a major advance in efficient air traffic
management and pilot situational awareness, with the potential to
safely increase the capacity of the NAS. However, the use of ADS-B in
oceanic airspace has lagged due to the severe difficulty of deploying
ground stations on the water. Therefore, the FAA's original ADS-B
program never planned for ADS-B in oceanic airspace. A solution
currently available to the FAA is a service called space-based ADS-B.
Simply put, the aircraft's ADS-B information is received by a satellite
constellation instead of ground stations and relayed to air traffic
controllers. Space-based ADS-B has the potential to provide
surveillance information equivalent to en route radar surveillance over
the ocean. In addition to surveillance, there is the safety benefit
where the space-based ADS-B continuously tracks all aircraft. Should an
aircraft be required to conduct a ditching into the ocean the precise
location of the aircraft will be immediately known. Some have observed
that with space-based ADS-B, there may no longer be the need for
``search'' in ``search and rescue''. ALPA would support an FAA
investment into Space Based ADS-B capabilities, as a supplement to the
ground-based ADS-B network. The safety benefits we foresee would
provide significant value.
ATC Automation
There are many automation systems in the NAS that provide air
traffic controllers with critical tools for the safe and efficient
movement of aircraft, and they must continue to be updated. A recent
update to the terminal airspace automation system has resulted in being
able to track aircraft to ensure that they are lined up for the correct
runway. This new capability is called the Approach Runway Verification
(ARV) and is a significant safety advancement. ALPA was also pleased to
see that the FAA reauthorization addresses the need for a terminal
airspace automation display at small airports. Historically smaller
airports have operated without any display of aircraft in the air
traffic control tower, so that air traffic controllers can increase
awareness of aircraft that are in the vicinity of the airport. The
addition of a display in all air traffic control towers where there are
airline operations is an important step in advancing safety across the
NAS.
Voice and Data Communications
NextGen's Data Communications system (Data Comm) supplements radio-
based voice conversations between pilots and air traffic controllers
with digital, text-based messaging in the en route phase of flight.
This often reduces the likelihood of missing or misunderstanding air
traffic control clearances. Further, there is no need for the pilot to
read back a message for accuracy. Data Comm also facilitates faster
communications and can help increase operational efficiency in the
national airspace. While the FAA has deployed Data Comm at air traffic
control towers, the last shutdown cost taxpayers up to $8 million to
repeat training for controllers at several facilities and further
delayed implementation by 18 months. Beyond fiscal support, the
vicissitudes of shutdowns interfere and plague NextGen implementation.
Future Demands on the NAS
Higher fidelity CNS data and the ability to exchange this data in
real time would allow better definition, geographically and temporally,
of the protected airspace needed for space launch and reentry
operations (both commercial and government-sponsored), and to
disseminate this information to ATC and other airspace users.
ATC modernization is necessary to support the integration of UAS.
Small UAS (sUAS) will operate in airspace at altitudes that are
generally considered to be ``below the NAS.'' The low altitude sUAS
operations will need some form of assistance in ensuring safe
separation to avoid collision with manned aircraft, other sUAS,
terrain, and obstacles. The FAA's work in Unmanned Traffic Management
is just getting started, and certain foundational decisions need to be
made about the role of the FAA in offering low-altitude separation
services. ALPA recommends that the air navigation services at low
altitude be provided by the same service provider of all other airspace
in the NAS. In other words, the FAA should be providing separation and
surveillance services. This ensures consistent application of safety
risk mitigation policies and procedures.
Funding Challenges
Although Congress has authorized the FAA with funding for multiyear
modernization projects, such as automation improvements or system
upgrades, the FAA has underestimated its ongoing needs for facilities
and equipment funding. This dynamic has built up over more than a
decade, and it creates enormous challenges for the FAA to keep
massively complicated projects on course and bring them to completion.
Continuing resolutions, government shutdowns, authorization extensions,
and other disruptions hinder the infrastructure modernization process.
With all these issues at play, modernization of a critical system
becomes a series of stop, replan, and restart. This is not a reliable
or efficient approach to effectively plan and execute the modernization
plan for our Nation's air traffic control infrastructure, which also is
the world's largest and busiest airspace system. As called for in the
2024 FAA reauthorization legislation, the FAA has the opportunity and
the requirement to now provide Congress with a more accurate picture of
its budgetary needs for facilities and equipment. Providing the FAA the
resources it needs to complete the mission, across multiple
appropriation cycles, is a key area where Congress can assist in
ensuring that our Nation's air traffic control system will meet the
needs of the millions of Americans who depend on safe and reliable air
transportation.
Near Misses and Technology
Last year I testified before this Committee on addressing near
misses. First, I would like to commend the Committee for important
provisions to improve safety and prevent near-miss incidents. The bill
not only provides funding and stability for the FAA and FAA programs,
but also for the latest safety technology on runways, for the hiring of
more air traffic controllers, for workforce development, and a host of
technological additives related to this hearing. Notable provisions of
the legislation related to aviation safety, modernization, and
expansion of additional capabilities for more airports, include:
ALPA is pleased to see that the FAA authorization included
guidance to the FAA to ensure that legacy surface safety
systems including the ASDE-X system remain fully operational.
When fully functional the ASDE-X system provides air traffic
controllers with timely alerts that prevent accidents and near-
misses.
ALPA is also appreciative of the Committee's greater focus
on runway incursions through the establishment of a policy for
No Tolerance for Near Misses, which expands FAA focus on
improving the ground operation of aircraft at airports,
establishing the Runway Safety Council, and supporting
discretionary airport grant programs for runway safety
projects.
ALPA looks forward to continued collaboration with the Committee to
sustain and enhance safety. Thank you for the invitation, your
continued focus on safety, and the opportunity to testify.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Captain Ambrosi.
I now recognize Mr. Dave Spero from the Professional
Aviation Safety Specialists for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DAVE SPERO, NATIONAL PRESIDENT,
PROFESSIONAL AVIATION SAFETY SPECIALISTS, AFL-CIO (PASS)
Mr. Spero. Good morning. Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member
Cruz, Subcommittee Chair Duckworth, thank you for inviting me
to testify on behalf of PASS. PASS represents approximately
11,000 FAA and Department of Defense employees throughout the
United States and abroad. These employees install, maintain,
support, and certify air traffic control and national defense
equipment, inspect and oversee the commercial and general
aviation industries, develop flight procedures, and perform
quality analyses of complex aviation systems used in air
traffic control and national defense at home and abroad. Every
day they work to ensure the safety and efficiency of an
aviation system that transports over 2.9 million passengers
across more than 29 million square miles of airspace. Their
work is essential to the safe and effective operation of the
aviation system.
Unfortunately, challenges unrelated to employee expertise
are limiting that effectiveness. PASS appreciates the
opportunity to share information and recommendations regarding
air traffic control systems, personnel, and safety.
The largest PASS FAA bargaining unit is the Air Traffic
Organization in the technical operations unit. There are
approximately 4,000 technicians responsible for installing,
operating, maintain, and repairing more than 74,000 radar,
communication, automation, navigational aids, airport lighting,
backup power, and HVAC systems at FAA facilities in support of
the national airspace system. In February, PASS was asked to
provide the Government Accountability Office with information
regarding 135 FAA programs and services.
To provide accurate, current information, PASS shared that
list with Tech Ops employees nationwide and asked them to
complete a survey. Their feedback was extensive and concerning.
The challenges our technicians face range from dealing with
aging equipment, navigating through cumbersome procedures, and
limited availability of parts. The complexity of the systems,
compounded by staffing and training inadequacies further
exacerbates the situation.
For instance, outdated technologies like Time Division
Multiplexing hinder the swift implementation of new systems,
while reliability concerns plague critical systems such as the
advanced lighting systems for aircraft runways and fiberoptic
transmission systems. The maintenance is increasingly
challenging as systems become obsolete, necessitating
specialized training and expertise. That being said, the
technicians also interface with highly technical, state-of-the-
art cloud-based solutions, which is often overlooked.
The most significant result of our survey was the clear
indication that FAA employees, if adequately staffed, are
capable and willing to perform the work to ensure successful
implementation of new systems and equipment while also
maintaining the aging systems as efficiently as possible.
The biggest challenge from our perspective is a lack of
vision on behalf of the agency. Compounding this challenge is
the lack of an appropriate technician staffing model. The FAA
has been developing the Tech Ops staffing model for over a
decade, yet they are fully aware that today they are short at
least 800 technicians. While PASS does not agree that the model
is factoring in all the necessary data to determine the optimum
number of technicians, it clearly reveals an understaffed
workforce.
The directives outlined in the FAA reauthorization bill are
a roadmap for improvements. However, timely implementation is
critical to their success. PASS thanks the lawmakers for
including language in the 2024 reauthorization bill directing
the agency to install 15 instrument landing systems that are in
storage in Missouri. PASS-represented technicians are ready and
capable of doing this. While the language in the
reauthorization directs FAA to install the ILS within 18 months
of the law's passage, our attempts to coordinate with the
agency have gone unreturned. As far as PASS knows, the
equipment, paid for by taxpayers, is still not in service.
The FAA is simply not effectively using a key resource to
address some of these challenges. The agency is ignoring the
skill level and potential of more than 4,000 employees. The
resources for the FAA to be effective are there. The FAA is not
taking advantage of them.
PASS thanks the Subcommittee for holding this important
hearing. As always, the union stands ready to assist lawmakers
and the agency to ensure the safety of the American flying
public.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Spero follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Spero, National President, Professional
Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO (PASS)
Chair Duckworth, Ranking Member Moran and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify on behalf of the
Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO (PASS).
PASS represents approximately 11,000 Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and Department of Defense employees throughout the
United States and abroad. PASS-represented employees in the FAA
install, maintain, support and certify air traffic control and national
defense equipment, inspect and oversee the commercial and general
aviation industries, develop flight procedures, and perform quality
analyses of complex aviation systems used in air traffic control and
national defense in the United States and overseas. PASS members work
to ensure the safety and efficiency of the aviation system that
transports over 2.9 million airline passengers across more than 29
million square miles of airspace (domestic and U.S. airspace over
oceans) at over 65,000 facilities every day. The diversity of the PASS-
represented workforce provides insight into the safety of the system
they maintain and the industry they oversee. PASS members are tasked
with ensuring that the U.S. air traffic control system remains the gold
standard of aviation safety. In fact, there has not been a major
aircraft accident in the U.S. since the Colgan Air crash in 2009. That
is a record for the FAA, its employees and the aviation community
should be proud of this accomplishment.
The work PASS members do every day is essential to the safe and
efficient operation of this country's aviation system. Unfortunately,
challenges unrelated to employee talent and professionalism are
limiting the agency's efficiency and effectiveness. These obstacles
include the aging air traffic systems and facilities essential to air
traffic control operations as well as related impacts on the technical
workforce represented by PASS.
PASS appreciates the opportunity to share information and
recommendations regarding air traffic control systems, personnel and
safety.
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION AND IMPACT OF AGING SYSTEMS
The largest PASS bargaining unit at the FAA is the Air Traffic
Organization (ATO) Technical Operations unit, consisting of technical
employees who install, maintain, repair and certify the radar,
navigation, communication and power equipment that comprises the U.S.
National Airspace System (NAS).
Within Technical Operations, PASS represents FAA airway
transportation systems specialists, more commonly referred to as
technicians. Technicians ensure the functionality of communications,
computers, navigational aids and power systems vital to safe air travel
and the mission of pilots and air traffic controllers. Technicians
maintain aging systems while simultaneously interfacing with highly
technical, state of the art cloud-based solutions, and this is often
overlooked. PASS-represented employees in Flight Program Operations
(AJF), Mission Support Services (AJV) and Air Traffic (AJT) also
provide critical support to the system by conducting flight
inspections, developing instrument flight procedures, handling
administrative tasks and other important work.
There are approximately 4,000 FAA technicians responsible for
installing, operating, maintaining and repairing more than 74,000
radar, communications, automation, navigational aids, airport lighting,
backup power, heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) at FAA
facilities.\1\
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\1\ Federal Aviation Administration, Airway Transportation Systems
Specialists, updated October 6, 2022. Accessed December 10, 2024:
https://www.faa.gov/jobs/career_fields/aviation_careers/atss_join. This
number does not reflect the number of technicians that are fully
certified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technician Input Regarding Aging Systems
In February, PASS was granted the opportunity to provide the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) with information regarding 135
FAA programs and services. In order to provide the GAO with the most
accurate and current information, PASS shared the list of programs and
services with Technical Operations employees throughout the country and
asked them to complete a survey. In addition to providing information
on systems not on the GAO's list, the results of the survey indicate
top concerns are related to aging equipment, cumbersome procedures,
parts that are unreliable or unavailable, system complexity, and
staffing and training of the workforce. At the rapid pace with which
technology changes, the FAA is getting further behind in replacing
aging systems.
However, the most significant result of the survey was the clear
indication that FAA employees are capable and willing to perform the
work to ensure successful implementation of new systems and equipment
while also maintaining the aging system as efficiently as possible. The
biggest challenge is a lack of vision on behalf of the agency.
The length of time it takes the FAA to implement new systems is
directly related to the fact that current NAS systems and equipment are
becoming obsolete. As stated by the GAO, ``During Fiscal Year 2023, FAA
determined that of its 138 ATC systems, 51 (37 percent) were
unsustainable and 54 (39 percent) were potentially unsustainable.'' \2\
According to PASS members who were surveyed, a key reason for ATC
system sustainment issues is the inability to implement new systems
quickly enough.
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\2\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, Air Traffic Control: FAA
Actions Are Urgently Needed to Modernize Aging Systems, GAO-24-107001,
September 23, 2024, p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For instance, many facilities are still relying on an aging
communications technology known as Time Division Multiplexing (TDM).
TDM is a method of combining multiple data streams into a single
communication channel by allocating specific time slots for each data
stream. Use of this antiquated technology is not only inefficient, but
it is unnecessarily costly. Telecommunication companies now use carrier
ethernet and are not required by the Federal Communications Commission
to support TDM technology. The FAA was aware of the change and that
PASS-represented employees could assist in the transition.
Unfortunately, the FAA is still relying on TDM and is being charged a
premium by communications companies that no longer regularly use the
technology. The agency has been informed by a communications company
that maintaining the current technology is going to cost $85 million a
year. According to the FAA, it was an unanticipated expense that will
come from operational funds. This will most certainly delay the
implementation of the FAA Enterprise Network Services program (FENS)
since the agency cannot progress on FENS until TDM is phased out and
other infrastructure is upgraded as well.\3\
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\3\ Federal Aviation Administration, ``FAA Enterprise Network
Services Program,'' updated July 25, 2023. Accessed December 10, 2024:
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/technology/cinp/fens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another member who was surveyed cited key concerns with the High
Intensity Approach Lighting System with Sequenced Flashing Lights
(ALSF-2). The ALSF-2 is an approach lighting system (ALS), which
provides the basic means to transition from instrument flight to visual
flight for landing. This provides visual information on runway
alignment, height perception, roll guidance and horizontal references
for Category II/III instrument approaches.
ALSF is critical for an airport in low visibility weather
situations. If it is not working, the airport is downgraded, which
means some aircraft cannot land. An ALSF system failure would
constitute significant delays to an airport and the NAS overall in
instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions. However, due to the age of
this system, light rebuild kits for ALSF are not reliable. Lighted
navigational aids require regular parts replacement and fail often. If
an outdated replacement part is either unreliable or unavailable, the
impact on the system could be far-reaching.
PASS is also concerned with the FAA's Fiber Optic Transmission
System (FOTS) and the associated complications with the system due to
its age. FOTS is an electronics architecture for using fiber optic
telecommunications equipment and systems at major airports. According
to a PASS-represented employee at one of those airports, the system
faces several challenges due to aging parts, which are not readily
available. When a failure occurs, an airport loses access to the system
until technicians can travel to the sites and correct the issue. This
is not something that will be resolved by the eventual implementation
of FENS as it is considered `inside the fence' (within the actual
airport fence). Furthermore, due to the age of FOTS, no FAA training
exists for the related equipment. The number of technicians who were
trained are retired or approaching retirement.
Technical Operations Staffing and Training
It is impossible to discuss any issue related to the technician
workforce at the FAA without highlighting the importance of staffing
and training.
Insufficient technician staffing can result in increased
restoration times and more air traffic delays during an outage. It can
also make it difficult to ensure adequate shift coverage by
technicians, another scenario that increases the risk of major air
traffic issues. PASS has long called attention to not only the need for
sufficient technical staffing but also the lack of a reliable staffing
model on which to base staffing decisions and placement.
However, hiring and training new technicians is not a quick or easy
process. FAA technicians must be skilled and proficient on multiple
systems. It can take up to three years to fully train an FAA technician
to perform all necessary duties related to the position. In addition,
the FAA is still playing catch up after its training academy in
Oklahoma City was shuttered during the COVID-19 pandemic. According to
the Department of Transportation Inspector General (IG), ``Most FAA
systems require specific training and certification, and FAA does not
typically train maintenance technicians on every equipment type.
Therefore, individual maintenance technicians cannot work on all
equipment, increasing the complexity of the technician workforce
planning effort.'' \4\ In addition, the FAA does not hire new
technicians before experienced technicians retire. That training and
expertise walks out the door without mentoring the next generation of
employees. In 2024, 33 percent of the technicians PASS represents were
age 55 or older.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Department of Transportation Inspector General, Opportunities
Exist for FAA To Strengthen Its Workforce Planning and Training
Processes for Maintenance Technicians, Report No. AV2023027, May 2,
2023, p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In discussions with the FAA, staff have been developing the
Technical Operations staffing model (TSM) for over a decade and are
aware that the workforce is short at least 800 technicians. While PASS
does not agree that the TSM is factoring in all the necessary data to
determine the optimum number of technicians, it nonetheless reveals an
understaffed workforce. PASS stands ready to assist the FAA with a
staffing plan that will take into consideration all the elements of the
position, including the responsibility of ensuring the safe and
efficient operation of aging and new systems and equipment.
RECOMMENDATIONS
PASS is extremely proud of the work our members do every day in
Technical Operations. These dedicated public servants go above and
beyond the usual call of duty to ensure the safety of the American
flying public and should not be hampered by challenges because of
outdated or aging systems and equipment.
Expediting new systems into the NAS is the obvious solution to the
issue at hand. This has been the solution for years. Using resources
outside the agency to upgrade aging systems has been neither efficient
nor cost effective. By utilizing the workforce it already has, the FAA
could repurpose funds being spent on costly contractors and bring the
work in-house. Unfortunately, the FAA has lacked the motivation to do
so.
PASS strongly emphasizes that the FAA technical workforce could be
ready to assist the agency with updating and/or replacing its aging
systems and equipment if the workforce was properly staffed around the
country for such a task. They are uniquely qualified and have the
expertise to accomplish this work if the workforce was augmented.
PASS thanks lawmakers for including language in the 2024 FAA
reauthorization bill directing the agency to install 15 taxpayer-
purchased instrument landing systems (ILS) that are in storage in
Independence, Missouri. The technicians PASS represents are ready and
capable of completing this task.\5\ This is a prime example of the FAA
taking steps toward identifying a solution but then failing to complete
the work to implement it. While the language in the reauthorization law
directs the FAA to install the ILS within 18 months of the law's
passage (May 2024), PASS's attempts to coordinate with the agency to
begin the project have gone unreturned. As far as PASS knows, the
equipment--paid for by the taxpayer--is still not in service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ MCO NAV, ``ORL Glideslope Shelter Replacement,'' July 12, 2021.
Accessed December 10, 2024: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UKP1o5Pl_w.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PASS has additional concerns related to the agency's procurement
processes, some of which go back decades. However, pinpointing the
FAA's procurement and decommissioning strategy is not the
responsibility of PASS. The union believes that the agency must conduct
a full safety review and analysis before making any major changes to
the operation of the NAS. As part of that process, the FAA should meet
with PASS and other impacted labor unions.
Furthermore, the Airport and Airway Trust Fund is underutilized.
Given projections by the Congressional Budget Office, the Fund is
likely to triple over the next 10 years and have a balance of over $17
billion that should be utilized for the modernization of the NAS.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Congressional Budget Office, Airport and Airway Trust Fund
Baseline Projections, June 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PASS-represented employees are the solution to the issues
surrounding FAA aging systems and equipment. FAA technicians are the
only individuals with the skill and knowledge to ensure the safe and
efficient operation of this country's air traffic control system. These
employees are also able to assist the agency in updating the current
system and addressing any challenges with aging systems and equipment
if the workforce is properly staffed.
Quite simply, the FAA is not effectively using a key resource to
address some of these challenges. The agency is ignoring the skill
level and potential of more than 4,000 employees stationed across the
country. The resources for the FAA to be more effective are there; the
FAA is not taking advantage of the opportunity.
CONCLUSION
The FAA must address aging systems and equipment throughout the NAS
based on careful analysis combined with efficient and effective action.
Given the pace of technology, many systems and equipment are on the
path to becoming outdated every day. The technician workforce can be
instrumental in assisting the agency in ensuring successful
implementation and updates throughout the NAS.
Congress must give FAA access to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund
in order to fund the critical upgrades necessary to maintain the gold
standard of the U.S. air traffic control system.
PASS thanks the subcommittee for holding this important hearing. As
always, the union stands ready to assist lawmakers and the agency every
step of the way to serve the needs and safety of the American flying
public.
______
ADDENDUM A
FAA Technical Operations Workforce
The Technical Operations workforce at the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has diminished to a level that may lead to crises
regarding the maintenance, repair, and certification of the National
Airspace System (NAS). According to the FAA, in October 2014, there
were approximately 5,810\7\ technical employees (consisting of
occupational series 2101, 856, and 802). Since then, the numbers have
steadily declined, to approximately 5,360,\8\ the COVID-19 pandemic
slowed training for these highly skilled employees. The 2101
occupational series makes up the bulk of the Technical Operations
workforce.
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\7\ FAA collective bargaining contract data, 21st pay period of
2014.
\8\ FAA collective bargaining contract data, 21st pay period of
2024.
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The current staffing of 2101 employees (21st pay period of 2024
sent to PASS from the agency) is as follows:
The workforce can be broadly defined in three categories.
Apprentices, also known as trainees, or developmental employees are
auxiliary to the workforce because they are still officially in
developmental training. Journeymen have been recently certified but
will continue years of ``on-the-job training'' to then specialize in
skills and do the bulk of certification and restoration work on the
NAS. However, there is no clear definition of progression for a
journeyman. Lastly, specialists have been working in their field for a
significant time and are experts in their given skill or subject area.
The data suggests that the journeymen portion of the workforce has
decreased substantially, by 960 employees, and represents the bulk of
attrition of the 2101. Alternatively, the percentage of apprentices has
almost tripled since 2014. These trainees should be certified at a
higher rate and join the workforce as journeymen in a much timelier
manner.
This potential crisis is exacerbated by the fact that training has
slowed considerably due to the pandemic. As a result, the percentage of
trainees has increased to a level that is unacceptable. Journeymen are
left to handle the bulk of the work. This has led to a workforce that
is understaffed, under-trained and overburdened.
The FAA needs to engage with PASS to create long-term staffing
goals through a Workforce Plan. Simply developing a Technical
Operations staffing model based on the current workforce does not take
into consideration the growth of the NAS through Next Generation Air
Transportation Systems (NextGen) technologies nor does it take
advantage of the skills and abilities of this highly technical group of
employees.
Recommendation: The FAA needs to engage with PASS to create long-
term staffing goals through a Workforce Plan as it has for controller
and safety inspectors. Simply developing a Technical Operations
staffing model based on the current workforce does not take into
consideration retirements or the growth of the NAS through Next
Generation Air Transportation Systems (NextGen) technologies nor does
it take advantage of the skills and abilities of this highly technical
group of employees.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Spero.
I now recognize Mr. Marc Scribner from the Reason
Foundation for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MARC SCRIBNER, SENIOR TRANSPORTATION POLICY
ANALYST, REASON FOUNDATION
Mr. Scribner. Chair Duckworth, Chair Cantwell, Ranking
Member Cruz, and members of the Subcommittee, good morning and
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
My name is Marc Scribner. I am a Senior Transportation
Policy Analyst at Reason Foundation, a national 501(c)(3)
public policy research and education organization with
expertise across a range of policy areas, including aviation.
Throughout its 46-year history, Reason Foundation has
conducted research on air traffic management, emerging aviation
technologies, and their interactions with public policy. My
testimony today focuses on institutional problems that are
undermining efforts to modernize the infrastructure needed to
support the continued air traffic volume growth in the national
airspace system.
GAO's September report adds to the reams of studies
documenting wide-ranging problems facing FAA's air traffic
control modernization efforts, which have been plagued by
delays and cost overruns for decades. I commend GAO for its
excellent analysis and support its recommendations.
However, I believe the problems facing FAA run much deeper.
A decade ago, my Reason Foundation colleague, Robert Poole,
conducted an in-depth study on the relationship between
innovation and the structure of and culture at FAA. He selected
seven innovations in air traffic control and did brief case
studies on each, observing how each innovation has been dealt
with by FAA's Air Traffic Organization and its counterparts
overseas.
He identified an agency culture resistant to innovation and
then developed five explanations as to why ATO status quo bias
exists, which were subsequently validated by a panel of more
than dozen expert peer reviewers.
First, the ATO self-identifies as a safety agency rather
than a technology service provider. Second, it faces a lack of
or loss of technical expertise. Third, it faces a lack or loss
of management expertise. Fourth, excessive agency bureaucracy
is labeled as oversight. And fifth and finally, there is a lack
of customer focus.
These cultural problems reflect an underlying flaw inherent
in ATO's institutional design. It exists as a service provider
within the national aviation regulator that is, in turn, housed
within the Department of Transportation. Its capital needs must
compete with broader DOT and Executive Branch priorities and
budget requests and then rely on inadequate annual
appropriations.
The ATO's institutional design was historically the
dominant model for air navigation service providers globally.
This picture has changed dramatically since 1987, when New
Zealand became the first country to separate air traffic
control from its Transport Ministry. Since then, nearly all
industrialized countries have adopted a public utility model
for air traffic control, and separating the provision of air
navigation services from the Civil Aviation Authority has been
a globally recognized best practice by the International Civil
Aviation Organization for more than two decades.
This organizational separation allows air traffic control
to be regulated at arm's length, just like every other aviation
player, and it resolves the fundamental conflict of interest of
having a regulator also operate a service that it is tasked
with regulating.
Under the public utility model, air navigation service
providers assess cost-based user fees paid directly to the
providers. Providers can then issue revenue bonds based on
their projected revenue streams, just as airports do today in
the United States. It is through predictable user-based revenue
collection that air navigation service providers outside the
U.S. have been able to successfully finance large-scale capital
modernization efforts. Air navigation service providers that
operate as public utilities, funded by user fees, now number
62, and serve 83 countries worldwide. In contrast, just 18
countries besides the United States, mostly developing
countries, continue to operate air traffic control as part of
legacy civil aeronautics authorities that also regulate
aviation safety.
The modernization of existing air traffic management
infrastructure in the United States continues to fall behind
peer countries, and is straining from the continued operations
and growth of conventional airspace users. The prospect of new
airspace entrants raises even more questions about the ability
of the U.S. to accommodate the future of aviation.
The bottom line is this. Successfully modernizing air
traffic control technology and service provision in this
country will require institutional modernization.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I
welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Scribner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marc Scribner, Senior Transportation Policy
Analyst, Reason Foundation
Chair Duckworth, Ranking Member Moran, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today. My name is Marc Scribner. I am a senior transportation policy
analyst at Reason Foundation, a national 501(c)(3) public policy
research and education organization with expertise across a range of
policy areas, including aviation.\1\ Throughout its 46-year history,
Reason Foundation has conducted research on air traffic management,
emerging aviation technologies, and their interactions with public
policy. My testimony today focuses on institutional problems that are
undermining efforts to modernize the infrastructure needed to support
the continued air traffic volume growth in the National Airspace
System.
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\1\ My biography and writings are available at https://reason.org/
author/marc-scribner/.
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I. Introduction
The United States was once the global leader in airspace
management. However, in recent decades, we have fallen behind peer
countries that have modernized their air traffic control practices and
technologies. The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) modernization
program, known as the Next Generation Air Transportation System
(NextGen), has been plagued by cost overruns and delays. This bodes
poorly for anticipated traffic growth from conventional airspace users
and raises serious questions about long-term efforts to integrate
emerging aviation technologies and operations--such as unmanned
aircraft systems and advanced air mobility--into the National Airspace
System (NAS).
Our increasingly obsolete air traffic control system is preventing
airspace users from realizing benefits today while also threatening the
future integration of emerging aviation technologies into the NAS.
While there are many problems facing FAA's Air Traffic Organization
(ATO) generally and NextGen specifically, they can be grouped into
three categories:
Funding: uncertain, unstable, and poorly suited to paying
for large-scale capital modernization programs such as NextGen.
Governance: a system with so many legislative branch and
Executive Branch overseers that it focuses ATO management
attention far more on overseers than on ATO's aviation
customers.
Culture: an organizational culture that is status-quo
oriented.
These are all interrelated. The uncertain nature of the annual
appropriations process makes it difficult for the ATO to complete major
procurements in a timely fashion. As a governmental entity charged with
regulating safety while providing air navigation services,
unfortunately, FAA focuses on remaining accountable to its many
political and administrative overseers rather than the users of its
navigation services. FAA's dual regulator/service provider mission also
presents a fundamental conflict of interest.
II. Problems Identified in the GAO Report and Responses
September's Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
catalogued a lengthy list of problems plaguing FAA efforts to modernize
aging, outdated air traffic control (ATC) systems.\2\ GAO researchers
identified 138 ATC systems, and its assessment found that 37 percent
are unsustainable (i.e., need to be replaced) and 39 percent are
potentially unsustainable. And 58 of those systems ``have critical
operational impacts on the safety and efficiency of the national
airspace.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Government Accountability Office, ``Air Traffic Control: FAA
Actions Are Urgently Needed to Modernize Aging Systems,'' GAO-24-107001
(Sep. 23, 2024). Available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-
107001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even worse, GAO found that FAA has 64 ongoing efforts aimed at
modernizing 90 of the unsustainable and potentially unsustainable
systems. But current FAA plans show that many of these systems will
still be in operation for between six and 13 more years before being
either replaced or modernized. Table 3 in the report lists 17 of the
``most critical and at-risk'' ATC systems, all of which are
``unsustainable'' and shows that 13 of them are not projected to be
replaced until the 2030s--and that four of them have no modernization
investment underway at all. GAO notes that the reason four at-risk
systems have no modernization plans is because the 2023 operational
risk assessment was not completed in time for those four to be
included.
GAO referenced the November 2023 report of the National Airspace
System Safety Review Team,\3\ which highlighted several aging systems
as indicative of broader problems:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Discussion and Recommendations to Address Risk in the
National Airspace System,'' National Airspace System Safety Review Team
(Nov. 2023). Available at https://www.faa.gov/
NAS_safety_review_team_report.pdf.
Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model-X (ASDE-X),
deployed in the early 2000s to track surface movements and
alert controllers to potential conflicts, is no longer in
production and ``spare parts are extremely limited.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Government Accountability Office, supra note 2, at 7.
Beacons used for en-route surveillance, with 20-year-old
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
transponders and no available replacement antennas.
Instrument landing systems (ILSs), most of which are at
least 25 years old and for which manufacturer support is no
longer available.
GAO highlighted comments from the Safety Review Team and from both
the National Air Traffic Controllers Association and Professional
Aviation Safety Specialists that ``should be timelier in identifying
and addressing concerns with unsustainable systems given the length of
time it takes to move through the acquisition process.'' \5\ Table 4 of
GAO's report shows that it can take between two and nearly nine years
``to establish an acquisition program baseline'' once a candidate
system has been identified. This means that the time from the start of
program planning to delivery of a modernized or replacement system can
range from 5.5 years to as much as 19.5 years, by which time many
selected technologies will be obsolete.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Id. at 22
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to GAO's September report, numerous stakeholders
contacted Reason Foundation to share their experiences with FAA's ATC
modernization efforts.\6\ These responses offer insight into FAA's
particular failures. I highlight three below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Robert W. Poole, Jr., ``Responses to GAO Report on Aging FAA
Systems,'' Aviation Policy News, No. 228, Reason Foundation (Nov.
2024). Available at https://reason.org/aviation-policy-news/spirit-
bankruptcy-space-launches-and-response-to-report-on-aging-faa-systems/
#a.
A recently retired FAA engineer explained a general cultural
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
problem within the agency:
Political overseers have made over FAA in their own
image, putting people in charge of things for which
they are not qualified: engineering programs run by
non-engineers, operations run by non-operational
people, logistics run by non-logisticians. The systems
engineering that FAA once had has been destroyed. . .
. I hope the GAO report elicits some positive action,
but I wouldn't bet on it. It's an accident waiting to
happen, but until it does, the current ``leadership''
is just making sure they don't get blamed for it.
A consultant who has worked within and external to FAA wrote
in with disturbing details on specific aging ATC systems,
including Mode-S:
Mode-S (secondary surveillance radar) is in such poor
condition that it is operated in violation of FAA's own
commissioning orders for technician certification of
its operational performance. As many as half of current
Mode-S systems are operated in ``IBI,'' meaning they
have zero Mode-S accuracy and capability. Accuracy of
these radar systems drives the separation criteria of
three and five miles near airports and in en-route
airspace. The lack of this radar input makes the
surveillance fusion with ADS-B less accurate and
reliable. This data is what feeds the automation inputs
of both en-route and terminal airspace.
An engineering manager at a European aviation technology
company compared FAA's modernization efforts and procurement
process to those of gold-standard ANSP Nav Canada:
Look at Nav Canada. How many primary radar types do
they have for terminal surveillance? One. How many does
FAA have? Three, dating back to the 1980s. The
manufacturers of two of them are out of business. FAA
has four types of secondary/beacon radars. Nav Canada
does a wholesale replacement, launching a project at
the end of life to replace them all at once. Nav Canada
has one primary switch for all systems: tower,
approach, and en-route. One backup switch for all. They
just did a replacement tender for them all . . . FAA is
never a single buy. All are indefinite quantity
contracts. So suppliers deliver 10 to 20 systems a
year. It is the [indefinite delivery/indefinite
quantity] type of contract process, related to funding,
that does not allow for a realistic replacement.
GAO also reports that FAA budget requests for facilities and
equipment ``have remained relatively constant at about $1 billion
annually.'' \7\ While NextGen's flat budget is indeed a problem, GAO
does not mention the two reasons why FAA has been unable to request
adequate financial support for modernization. First, FAA's budget
request must be approved by the Secretary of Transportation. Second,
the Office of Management and Budget has the last word on how much the
Department of Transportation (and hence FAA) can request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Government Accountability Office, supra note 2, at 10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is not how critically important public utilities operate,
whether government-owned or investor-owned. Utilities plan their
capital spending needs and obtain approval to set their rates to
provide the needed revenue streams to pay off bonds used to finance
large facility and equipment investments. That is true of Federal
government utilities like the Tennessee Valley Authority, but nothing
like that process exists for FAA's ATC system. It has no bonding
authority, must compete against unrelated Department of Transportation
and broader Executive Branch priorities, and then depend solely on
inadequate annual appropriations from Congress.
III. Problems with FAA ATO's Institutional Design
A decade ago, my Reason Foundation colleague Robert Poole conducted
an in-depth study of the structure of and culture at FAA and their
relationship to innovation.\8\ He selected seven innovations in air
traffic control and did brief case studies on each, observing how each
innovation has been dealt with by the ATO and its counterparts
overseas. In each of these, he found that ATO's approach was far more
hesitant than that of air navigation service providers (ANSPs) in other
countries that are structured as public utilities. He then developed
five explanations of why this status-quo bias exists, which were
subsequently validated by a panel of more than a dozen expert peer
reviewers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Robert W. Poole, Jr., ``Organization and Innovation in Air
Traffic Control,'' Reason Foundation Policy Study 431 (Jan. 2014).
Available at https://reason.org/wp-content/uploads/files/
air_traffic_control_organization_innovation.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These five identified detrimental institutional deficiencies at
FAA's ATO are as follows:
1. Self-identity as a safety agency rather than as a technology
provider. This stems from the ATO being embedded within FAA,
whose mission is safety. Nearly all the innovations relevant to
NextGen come from the aerospace/avionics industry, which has a
much more innovative, dynamic culture. Those companies are
regulated at arm's length by FAA--but the ATO is embedded
inside the regulator.
2. Lack of, or loss of, technical expertise. Partly due to its
status-quo culture and partly due to civil service pay scales,
the FAA has a chronic problem with not attracting or not being
able to retain the best engineers and software professionals.
This means that a lot of the detailed requirements for new air
traffic control and aviation systems end up being defined by
contractors, which can lead to costly additions that make the
systems more complex and costly than necessary.
3. Lack of, or loss of, management expertise. For the same reasons
that FAA has limited technical expertise, it also has trouble
attracting and keeping top-notch program managers who are used
to being held accountable for results.
4. Excessive bureaucracy labeled as oversight. Inherent in being a
large government agency that is spending taxpayers' money, the
FAA must be held accountable to all the normal government
overseers. The ATO must respond to oversight by the FAA
Administrator, the Secretary of Transportation, the Office of
Inspector General, the Office of Management and Budget, the
GAO, and up to 535 Members of Congress. While safety is the top
priority, responding to the requests and whims of all these
overseers takes up a large amount of senior management's time.
5. Lack of customer focus. Because the ATO gets its funding from
Congress, it ends up--de facto--acting as if its customer is
Congress rather than the aviation customers it is supposed to
serve.
IV. The Global Air Navigation Service Provider Landscape
The status-quo ANSP model in the United States was historically the
dominant model globally, whereby air traffic control was provided by a
civil aviation authority within the transport ministry. That model has
undergone major change since 1987 outside of the United States,
starting when the government of New Zealand removed its air traffic
control system from the transport ministry by restructuring it as
Airways New Zealand, a self-supporting government corporation. Within
10 years, more than a dozen other countries had followed suit.
Separating the provision of air navigation services from the civil
aviation authority and putting the ANSP at arm's length from its safety
regulator, like all the other key players in aviation--airlines,
business aviation, general aviation, airframe manufacturers, engine
producers, pilots, mechanics, and so forth--is now the globally
recognized best practice. For more than two decades, this has been
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) policy.\9\ The United
States is among the last industrialized countries that have not taken
this step to eliminate the fundamental conflict of interest of having
an aviation regulator also operate a service it is tasked with
regulating.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ International Civil Aviation Organization, Safety Oversight
Manual, Doc. 9734, Part A, Paragraph 2.4.9 (2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The revenue source for ANSPs operated as public utilities is
globally accepted cost-based user fees in accordance with the airport
and air traffic control charging principles promulgated by ICAO.\10\
Prior to the conversion of these ANSPs to public utilities, those
revenues were nearly always paid by airlines and other airspace users
to the respective national governments. In most cases, once an ANSP has
been converted to a utility, the user-fee revenue flows directly to the
ANSP as its primary source of revenue. This makes it possible for the
ANSPs to issue revenue bonds based on their projected revenue streams,
just as airports do today in the United States and elsewhere. It is
through their predictable streams of revenue that come directly from
users that ANSPs outside the United States can successfully finance
large-scale capital modernization efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO's Policies on
Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services, Doc. 9082 (9th
Edition, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Globally, three ANSPs have been moved out of the government
entirely under either an independent nonprofit user cooperative model
or as partially privatized companies. Another 55 operate as wholly
owned government corporations. Just 19--mostly developing countries,
but also including the United States, Japan, and Singapore--operate as
part of legacy civil aeronautics authorities that also regulate
aviation safety. ANSPs that operate as public utilities funded by user
fees now number 62 and serve 83 countries globally.\11\ Appendix A
lists ANSPs around the world by governance model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Marc Scribner, ``2024 Annual Privatization Report: Aviation,''
Reason Foundation (May 2024) at 26-29. Available at https://reason.org/
wp-content/uploads/annual-privatization-report-2024-aviation.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. Conclusion
The modernization of existing air traffic management infrastructure
in the United States continues to fall behind peer countries and is
straining from the continued operations and growth of conventional
airspace users. The prospect of new airspace entrants raises even more
questions about the ability of the United States to accommodate the
future of aviation, which would have significant negative impacts on
the economy and safety. Evidence suggests that successfully modernizing
the technology and service provision of air traffic management of the
National Airspace System will require institutional modernization.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee,
and I welcome your questions.
Appendix A: Air Navigation Service Providers, by Type of Organization
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Country ANSP Organization Type Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Canada Nav Canada Nonprofit
corporation
Italy ENAV Part investor-owned
UK NATS Part investor-owned
UK Serco Shareholder-owned
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Albania ALBCONTROL State-owned company
Argentina DGCTA State-owned company
Armenia ARMATS State-owned company
Australia Airservices State-owned company
Australia
Austria Austro Control State-owned company Also regulates
Belgium Skeyes State-owned company
Botswana CAAB State-owned company
Bulgaria BULATSA State-owned company
Cambodia CATS State-owned company
Croatia Croatia Control State-owned company
Curacao DCANSP State-owned company
Czech Republic ANS CR State-owned company
Denmark Naviair State-owned company
Egypt NANSC State-owned company
Estonia EANS State-owned company
Fiji Airports Fiji State-owned company
Ltd.
Finland Finavia Corp. State-owned company
Georgia Sakaeronavigatsia State-owned company
Germany DFS State-owned company
Hungary HungaroControl State-owned company Also regulates
Iceland ISAVIA State-owned company
India Airports State-owned company
Authority of
India
Indonesia AirNav Indonesia State-owned company
Iran Iran Airports State-owned company
Company
Ireland AirNav Ireland State-owned company
Israel Israel Airports State-owned company
Authority
Kazakhstan Kazaeronavigatsia State-owned company
Latvia LGS State-owned company
Lithuania Oro Navigacija State-owned company
Macedonia M-NAV State-owned company
Maldives Maldives Airports State-owned company
Co.
Malta MATS State-owned company
Moldova MoldATSA State-owned company
Mozambique Aeroportos de State-owned company
Mocambique
New Zealand Airways New State-owned company
Zealand
Nigeria NAMA State-owned company
Norway Avinor State-owned company
Papua New PNG Air Service State-owned company
Guinea
Portugal Nav Portugal State-owned company
Romania ROMATSA State-owned company
Russia State ATM State-owned company Also regulates
Corporation
Serbia & SMATSA State-owned company
Montenegro
Slovak Republic LPS SR State-owned company
Slovenia Slovenia Control State-owned company
South Africa ATNS State-owned company
Spain ENAIRE State-owned company
Sri Lanka AASL State-owned company
Sweden LFV State-owned company
Switzerland Skyguide State-owned company
Thailand AEROTHAI State-owned company
Turkey DHMI State-owned company
Uganda CAA Uganda State-owned company
Ukraine UkSATS State-owned company
Vietnam VATMC State-owned company
Zambia NACL State-owned company
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bangladesh CAAB Civil aviation Financially
authority autonomous
Cyprus DCA Cyprus Civil aviation
authority
Dominican IDAC Civil aviation
Republic authority
Ghana Ghana CAA Civil aviation
authority
Greece HCAA Civil aviation
authority
Japan JCAB Civil aviation
authority
Jordan CARC Civil aviation Financially
authority autonomous
Kenya Kenya CAA Civil aviation
authority
Mongolia CAA of Mongolia Civil aviation
authority
Myanmar DCA Myanmar Civil aviation
authority
Nepal CAA Nepal Civil aviation
authority
Saudi Arabia GACA Civil aviation
authority
Singapore CAAS Civil aviation
authority
Swaziland SWACAA Civil aviation
authority
Taipei FIR ANWS Civil aviation
authority
Tanzania TCAA Civil aviation
authority
Trinidad & Trinidad & Tobago Civil aviation
Tobago CAA authority
Tunisia OACA Civil aviation
authority
United States FAA Civil aviation
authority
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Azerbaijan AZANS Government
department
Brazil DECEA Government
department
France DSNA Government
department
Mexico SENEAM Government
department
Netherlands LVNL Government Financially
department autonomous
Poland PANSA Government
department
United States DOD Policy Board, Government Military
Aviation department
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Belgium MUAC Intergovernmental Upper airspace
Honduras COCESNA Intergovernmental 6 countries
Senegal ASECNA Intergovernmental 17 countries
Angola ENANA-EP uncategorized
Haiti OFNAC uncategorized
Luxembourg ANA uncategorized
Sudan Sudan ANS uncategorized
Dubai DANS uncategorized
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Scribner. I will now
recognize myself for five minutes of questions.
GAO found 17 of the 51 unsustainable air traffic control
systems are critical, yet investments to modernize some of
these will not be completed for more than a decade. Worse, as
of May 2024, there was not even any modernization investment
underway for four of these systems.
Mr. Walsh, how worried should we be about these four
critical and unsustainable systems for which there were not any
modernization investments underway?
Mr. Walsh. So as myself and the other witnesses have said,
the national airspace is safe. It is safe to fly. But this is
stressing the system, and the longer we wait, the worse it will
get. So I am worried, but again, it is still safe to fly.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Mr. Iacopelli, how worried
are air traffic controllers about unsustainable critical air
traffic control systems for which there are no modernization
investments underway?
Mr. Iacopelli. I will reiterate what has been said. The
national airspace system is safe. We represent 15,000
professional, trained, dedicated air traffic controllers who
will do everything they can to maintain the safety of the
system. They are the failsafe, along with the pilots and the
technicians to oversee it. So very similar to Mr. Walsh, we
believe the system is safe. We are obviously concerned about a
number of these issues, not the least of which is the FTI
network. But as far as the systems go, we would like to work
with the FAA. We have talked to the FAA about working with them
in addressing those issues, and we will continue to do so.
Senator Duckworth. I feel that it is the personnel, the air
traffic controllers and the pilots, who are keeping us safe,
despite systems and technology that keeps going further and
further behind, and you are having to adjust more and more in
order to keep the flying public safe. Would that be an accurate
statement?
Mr. Iacopelli. That is an accurate statement.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I see you nodding, Captain
Ambrosi. Would you like to comment on this? And how do pilots
feel about these aging systems and systems that do not have
plans to be updated?
Mr. Ambrosi. Well, as my colleagues have said, the system
is safe. We have never been happy with current safe. If we said
in the 1980s that we are safe but we are safe enough, think of
how many accidents we would be enduring today. So you can never
say we are safe enough. We always need to push forward. As Dean
said, we do a lot of work-arounds to make sure that the system
is working as intended, and we keep the traffic, the passengers
and cargo, moving.
There needs to be that next step forward in safety where we
get the technology that supports the human element--the air
traffic controllers, the pilots. We absolutely need that next
investment and that push forward to the next level for all of
us, to continue the safe operation and make it safer.
Senator Duckworth. Can you speak a little bit about how
having the two pilots helped with the reaction time to some of
the near misses, and why it was critical to have two pilots as
opposed to one?
Mr. Ambrosi. I mean, as we talked about the Austin
incident. If there was only one pilot there, the first officer
would not have identified the Southwest jet on the runway.
Let's take the Alaska incident. While there is still an
investigation underway, can you imagine having a door panel
come off an airplane in flight, with only one person in the
flight deck at that time to manage that situation.
Let's take ground operations, surface operations, where you
have two people, at least--some of our international operations
more. Somebody needs to have their eyes outside at all times--
you are a pilot and you understand that--eyes outside while
somebody else may be looking down at a chart, you know, how do
we get from A to B. We do not work at the same airport every
day, so we will go to an airport and it may be our first time
there. Somebody's head is down and another pilot needs to be
heads-up, looking out and seeing where we are going and
monitoring the technology. You know, there is technology right
around the corner that will give us more situational awareness
on the ground. But if someone is looking at that situational
awareness display to see where other airplanes are, that means
somebody else needs to be looking out the window.
Senator Duckworth. And in the Alaska Airline door plug
incidents, one of the pilot's headsets was actually ripped off
in the middle of that incident, from the wind gusts.
Mr. Spero, if we are stuck relying on these unsustainable,
critical air traffic control systems for many more years, how
much harder will it be for your personnel to maintain them? And
are you confident we will have enough parts and a workforce
with enough experience to do so?
Mr. Spero. Senator, thank you for the question. So I will
start out by saying I like the way Captain Ambrosi talked about
work-arounds. That is essentially what our folks do every day
when they do not have spare parts. They find ways to make these
systems work. They look for the spare parts. They have to dig
into the FAA system to see if they can get them refurbished.
It will become more difficult as times goes on. Moving
forward, they have to have the ability and the training, and
the staffing, as well. We have had incidents in various places
where we have the equipment, we have the spare parts, yet we do
not have the right people in the right place at the right time
to restore systems. In Chicago earlier this year we had a
ground stop because we did not have a trained technician
available on shift to be able to exclude a software problem
that effectively caused the controllers to not know where the
aircraft were. Once that person came in, they fixed it in two
minutes.
But all of these things fall together. It is going to
become more difficult as time goes on. We have to have the
personnel. We have to have the parts. We have to have the
training. It breaks our members' hearts to not be able to
sustain the air traffic control system the way they want.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I now recognize Ranking
Member and incoming Chairman Cruz for his question line.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to each
of the witnesses for being here today on this very important
topic. Mr. Walsh, let me start with you. The GAO report paints
a grim picture of the FAA's sustainment plans for the air
traffic system. More than 100 ATC systems, meaning radar,
software, and hardware, were unsustainable or potentially
unsustainable. With air travel expected to continue to grow,
breakdowns and disruptions will only get worse.
Mr. Walsh, your expertise is in procurement and
modernization of legacy systems. How would you summarize the
current state of air traffic control?
Mr. Walsh. The easy summary is this is what happens if you
take the ``if it isn't broke, don't fix it'' or perhaps if it's
still somewhat working, don't fix it, just sustain it, over
many, many years. So we are seeing the ramifications of that.
We need to invest more money and more funds to get us back on
track.
Senator Cruz. How do you fix it? And I suspect the answer
is not going to be just more money, because that answer has
often failed to solve the problem.
Mr. Walsh. You are correct. Throwing money at the problem
won't fix it. You need adequate oversight. You need the right
people in the right place. You need training. You need to have
more of the good people that are keeping things running with
bandaids and patches.
So as I said in my opening statement, this is not a quick
fix. There is no silver bullet. This is going to be the work of
years and billions of dollars and thousands of people.
Senator Cruz. All right. Mr. Scribner, in your testimony
you mentioned that former FAA employees responded to your
analysis of the GAO report. One stakeholder wrote that the
ongoing reliability of existing surveillance technology like
radar and ADS-B is in jeopardy, and the replacement for these
existing technologies likely will not be deployed for 15 years.
Why do you think FAA employees reacted so powerfully to the
GAO report and your analysis, and what does it say about the
FAA's acquisition strategy that it takes 15 years to deploy a
new surveillance system?
Mr. Scribner. Well, thank you for those questions, Senator
Cruz. On the first, I think the reaction that Reason Foundation
received from FAA stakeholders on the GAO report, it was not
really anything new. A lot of these types of complaints we have
heard for many years. I think they saw the thorough, and I
think the excellent analysis, in the GAO report as an
opportunity for Congress, for FAA, for Department of
Transportation leadership to really take another close look at
some of these issues that, again, are not new.
When it comes to the delays that they are specifically
complaining about, again, those are not new, and as documented
by GAO quite thoroughly, this is quite common. I think
especially stakeholders who have contractors who have worked
abroad with air navigation service providers outside the
country, and then they come back and work with ATO, can see the
night-and-day situation when it comes to technology procurement
and technology development. Some of the larger ANSP's globally
are able to develop their own technology effectively in-house
and then market it globally. That is something that the FAA
used to specialize in developing technology in-house, but
increasingly it is relying too much on outside contractors
without adequate internal controls, and that is helping add to
the delays and cost overruns for a variety of systems.
Senator Cruz. My understanding is that the FAA has
concurred with the majority of the GAO's recommendations,
ranging from better reporting requirements and budget baseline
practices to more regular reviews from the Joint Resources
Council. Are those recommendations, in your judgment,
sufficient, or should Congress consider more creative solutions
to ensure that the U.S. air traffic control system is the best
in the world?
Mr. Scribner. As I said in my opening statement and as I
detail in my written testimony, I think the problems run much
deeper. It is structural. It is institutional design that is
ultimately the root cause here. There is a reason why the vast
majority of countries, of air navigation service providers
globally, have moved toward the public utility model, the self-
supporting public utility model, to avoid some of the political
problems that the FAA continues to experience. And we have seen
a lot more success outside the U.S. in modernizing air traffic
control technologies and practice than we have here. And again,
I think it is institutional.
Senator Cruz. And finally, Mr. Iacopelli, in your judgment,
what is the biggest challenge outside of funding facing the
FAA's air traffic control system?
Mr. Iacopelli. Thank you, Senator. I would say, you know,
we have recently--I will answer it this way--we have recently
met with the COO of the ATO, and we talked about this
equipment. Right now the way it is set up is, unfortunately,
that there is a program office that goes out and looks for and
acquires new technologies. And they take that equipment idea
and bring it over to the ATO, and say, hey, we have acquired
this. How do you want to use it?
It does not make a whole lot of sense to us. We would
rather, as the experts in running the air traffic control
system, and the COO, Tim Arel, has agreed, we should get
together, talk about what do we need, look at all of the
systems that are out there, prioritize what we need, prioritize
what would make it better, go through that, and move forward
together and saying this is what the ATO needs. This is what
air traffic control needs to maintain the safety of the NAS and
improve and increase the efficiency of the NAS.
Senator Cruz. So what you are saying makes a lot of sense.
Is there anything that prevents the FAA from doing that now?
Mr. Iacopelli. There is not, and it is a goal that we are
going to start doing in the coming weeks and month, certainly
in 2025, to move--and this is not a NATCA issue. It is an FAA
issue--moving those pieces around to put the office that goes
out and acquires technology for air traffic control under the
ATO so that we are acquiring systems that make sense to air
traffic control.
Senator Cruz. Very good. Thank you.
Senator Duckworth. Chairwoman Cantwell.
Chair Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair. And following on
Senator Cruz's line of questioning, because I think the issue
here is we want to know what modernization takes, and we,
obviously, have seen a lot of events. So the workforce training
and hours also matter to us, and the experience of those air
traffic controllers. If you listen to the Alaska flight audio,
it was really critical that the communication between the pilot
and the air traffic control system had the best you could
possibly have in that situation.
So Captain Ambrosi, let's just say you are the most active
user of the air traffic controller system. So you said
something in your statement, at the very end. I do not see it
in your written statement. But you were referring to the FAA's
tendency to do what is required within their budgeting but not
come to the table with the right amount of technology
investment. Am I making sense there, when you were talking
about your resources? I do not know if you have that line and
you could re-read it again.
Mr. Ambrosi. If you like.
Chair Cantwell. Yes, please.
Mr. Ambrosi. Sure.
Chair Cantwell. Because I thought it was a very telling
statement about this dilemma.
Mr. Ambrosi. Let's see. While Congress has provided the
funding requested each year by the FAA during the annual
appropriations process, there remains a significant shortfall
in the numerous maintenance and modernization efforts.
Resources have not kept up with inflation and effectively
require the agency to prioritize sustainment to the detriment
of modernization and infrastructure needs. The FAA must ask
Congress for its true needs in order to sustain legacy systems,
and make greater headway on NextGen and improve the NAS for all
users.
Chair Cantwell. Sustainment to the detriment of----
Mr. Ambrosi. Modernization.
Chair Cantwell.--modernization. OK. That is what I wanted
you to focus on.
So how do we deal with this dilemma? Because sustainment,
you know, there was much debate between, I think, NATCA and
others about what they thought the FAA should do. But if the
FAA is sitting over here looking at sustainment instead of
modernization, and modernization is absolutely capable, as the
NTSB Chairwoman has said, on near-miss technology at the
airports or these systems, how can we be better informed that
that is no tradeoff when safety is concerned? Trading off
sustainment for modernization is no tradeoff when safety is
concerned. How do we better understand this?
Mr. Ambrosi. Well, I will use this second to do a shout-out
for Administrator Whitaker and thank him for his leadership. It
will be sad to see him go. We obviously need an FAA
Administrator that is going to be a leader, and we need long-
term, stable leadership at the top of the FAA to tackle this
exact challenge. It was under his leadership that the FAA did
request a significant increase in budget last year to address
the facilities and equipment and improvement. But yes, they
need to ask for what they need, absolutely.
Chair Cantwell. OK. I am not sure I quite got the--here is
how we are dealing with it. We, in the ACSAA, said, we want a
Top 10 trend list. We want to know what the top safety trend
concerns are, so that you are elevating that to us. We also,
obviously, had the Chair testify here, and then Acting
Administrator heard her, and a few days later ended up finally
putting out an order on near-miss technology deployment for
most large airports in the United States.
But you are asking us to do our oversight role, but it is a
lot of times way deep down that there is this disagreement. Now
you have captured it--sustainability versus modernization. But
what else can we do to crystalize that that modernization
equals safety, and that Congress needs to understand where
dollars go when they are prioritizing safety?
Mr. Ambrosi. All I can answer is by working together and
highlighting the problems that may be there. I believe that the
people at the FAA want to modernize. They believe they have a
path forward. It is just a case of saying, ``All right. We have
got to really ask for what we need and go out and do it.''
They have the data. There have been miraculous things over
the last two decades----
Chair Cantwell. Not--I have to interrupt--no, no, no, not
if people are sitting there arguing over formula models for
staffing. That is what we argued over. I see everybody
nodding--formula models for staffing. That is what we argued
over. Nobody argued over you need this technology modernization
now, so that you can prevent X, Y, and Z from happening, or the
risk of whatever that risk was, 30 percent change. I don't
know. Some percent chance of that happening.
Instead it came down to this is a disagreement over
staffing models, and I do not really think that is what it was
about. I think it was about sustainability of an organization
versus modernization, just as you crystallized it.
So anyway, I will stop there, Madam Chair. But I do think
this is--we here are--I am really proud of what our Committee
has done on oversight, and by that I mean the whole Committee
has really taken a more aggressive role and position and input
in really understanding these.
But you guys all have to help us. You have to help us
crystallize these opportunities in ways that Congress can fully
see the tradeoffs without, you know, having to spend hours and
hours and hours digesting the nuance here of staffing models.
And I do not know, Mr. Iacopelli, if anybody else has any
thoughts about that. But the way we have dealt with it so far
is to use the NTSB, and to say you be the watchdog whistle here
and tell us, and be louder about it.
But look, these technology shifts are major in innovation
and they are also critical to our competitiveness. So we want
to get it right, and we want to understand it. So I don't know.
If I could have one more minute, if anybody else has a comment
on that.
Mr. Iacopelli. So if I may, thank you, Senator. So it is an
interesting perspective that the staffing question was
sustainment versus modernization. On one side was we have a
model that barely keeps the system alive and runs it as
inexpensively as we can. On the other side you had the air
traffic experts who looked at it and said, ``If we are building
the air traffic control system for the future, and we want it
to be safe, we need to do these things.''
And when we talk about sustainment and modernization I
think Mr. Walsh said it. There is not an easy fix. There is not
an easy solution. And I would liken it to any--you know, when I
talked about the buildings, when I talked about anything that
we are trying to improve, if we are installing high-definition
TVs in a building that is run on an electric generator, powered
by gasoline, it is not sustainable.
So we have to have the equipment that is out there work
while we modernize, and modernization, in a lot of instances,
is improving efficiency. And I know your focus, and I think it
is an excellent question, what are the modernization tools that
we need that focus on safety. We have to deal with efficiency
and capacity, but we need to focus first and foremost on
safety.
And I think that in our conversations with the FAA, and I
will also follow up with what Captain Ambrosi said, thank Mike
Whitaker for his leadership because he has been, much as I
heard from all of you say, hey, he has been focused on safety.
It has been an important part of his charge. And we have worked
together to try to identify those systems we need to make the
system safe, but we have to figure out a way to do both,
because we cannot let go of the things we have until we have
the replacement, and those things take time.
But the safety issues in the modernization do need to be
separated out from the capacity and efficiency issues.
Chair Cantwell. Well, I see many of my colleagues here who
probably want to jump in on these things. But I would say this
Committee has the capacity. I think it has demonstrated it has
the capacity. So I think we just have to get this debate
elevated. It was not a staffing model discussion. It was about
what do you need to do. And again, Captain Ambrosi being the
end user of all of this, you know, I am sure they were the
loudest in saying this is what we need, because they are the
ones every day who have to get up there and rely on this.
Mr. Ambrosi. And with your leadership and the leadership of
this Committee saying to them, ``Is this really what you need?
Does this budget have what you need to modernize?'' and put
them on the spot. So I thank this Committee----
Chair Cantwell. Well, I think air traffic controllers were
saying yes, but a larger FAA discussion was saying no, and then
we are in the middle, trying to digest and help. But anyway, we
got what we needed, which was important, but more to do. More
to do because technology and modernization are going to
continue.
Again, thank you, Chair Duckworth, for this very important
hearing, and thank you for your leadership on aviation, in
general.
Senator Duckworth. Senator Rosen very patiently joining us
remotely.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chair Duckworth. I appreciate you
and Ranking Member Moran. Today's hearing is critically
important to all of us, and I appreciate all the witnesses for
being here and for your work.
You know, safe and efficient travel, I do not have to tell
you. I was Chair of the Tourism, Trade, and Export Promotion
Subcommittee on Commerce, and safe and efficient travel is key
to Nevada's tourism economy, and it begins with our Nation's
air traffic controllers. And we do have the safest skies in the
world.
And I want to build a little bit on what Senator Cantwell
is talking about with staffing issues and a lot of these
systemic issues that we have with modernization, because today
air traffic controllers are working longer hours, longer than
ever before, fewer breaks, for more consecutive days. And we do
agree, every one of us, this is not sustainable, and it must be
addressed.
In May, the FAA sent a letter on the controller shortage
that argued its own staffing targets would produce the same
hiring levels for the next 3 years, as what the recommended
targets from the Collaborative Resource Working Group.
So Mr. Iacopelli, has the FAA sufficiently taken into
consideration the Collaborative Resource Working Group's
staffing model, which NAFDA helped inform, when crafting its
own workforce plan? Because we cannot burn out the workforce we
have, and we have to grow folks faster than we are doing.
Mr. Iacopelli. Thank you, Senator. Those are all true and
very accurate points. The men and women, the professionals that
we represent, are working longer, and they are working harder,
and they are handling more aircraft than they have, likely in
most of their careers because we do have a relative new
turnover in our workforce.
As far as the CRWG goes, the Collaborative Resource Work
Group, the ATO, the Air Traffic Organization, has fully
embraced it. They were partnered with NATCA in the creation of
those certified professional staffing targets, because we
partnered and worked through it collaboratively with the ATO.
When you get to the FAA--and again, we do thank Mike
Whitaker for his service and his commitment to safety--but it
has been a challenge convincing the FAA as a whole that the
CRWG numbers are the correct number that we need to adequately
and safely staff the air traffic control facilities in the
country, that allow them to take sufficient breaks, that allow
us to participate in the modernization efforts and moving the
air traffic control system into the future.
We are expecting that part of the FAA Reauthorization Act
of 2024--again, thank you all for passing that--requires a
study of the two different models. In the meantime----
Senator Rosen. We need more than a study. We need to take
some action. I think we have studied an awful lot, and
somebody's safety is on the line.
I have just a little over a minute. I will take some more
of your answer off the record because I just want to pair this
with modernizing our aging technology, as it is going to
alleviate some of the strain on the air traffic controllers
because they are working oftentimes with older equipment or
things that are not as technically good as they could be. And
it also will help expedite and increase air traffic controller
graduation rates.
And one of these pieces of technology that will help us,
help the air traffic controllers and their workload are the
Terminal Flight Data Manager and the FAA's Surface Safety
Portfolio. So I am going to ask you--like I said, I just have
about a minute left--what impact, Mr. Iacopelli, you think the
TFDM or Surface Safety Portfolio systems had on airports that
have installed this equipment, particularly when it comes to
controllers' morale and retention. You know, workers, we
partner with technology to be better at our job, so it is
really important, right, it's a partnership between humans and
technology that gives us a safe space, a safe airspace in this
regard.
Mr. Iacopelli. Well, thank you again, Senator. So we did
deploy the Surface Awareness Initiative, and I know several
times Austin was brought up. That was the first location that
we worked with the FAA, and we collaboratively developed this
new tool that, again, we call it the Surface Awareness
Initiative. And we deployed it at Austin first, and we put it
in seven other locations.
It is overwhelmingly, positively received. In fact, the
leadership of the FAA, including Administrator Whitaker, from
the ATO and NATCA, went to Austin, talked to the folks there,
and they are very appreciative, and it has made a difference.
And we are continuing to try--well, not try, we are continuing
with our deployment schedule to get that out. It is in eight
facilities now. We are going to another nine facilities in the
coming months. So it has made a difference.
And this is an interesting point between those things that
are modernization that are for safety and those things that are
modernization for capacity. The TFDM is more a capacity tool.
All things that we modernize have some effect on safety. But
the Surface Awareness Initiative is a direct tool that directly
affects safety.
Senator Rosen. And if it is a very short answer, how can we
help you speed up the deployment of some of these tools that we
know help, because we need to speed up the deployment. It is
going to really help us all across this Nation. If you want
just like a 10-second answer, I could take it off the record,
but what do you need to help speed up your deployment schedule?
Mr. Iacopelli. What we need to do is be adequately funded
so that the FAA does not have to choose between deploying this
and something else and make this a prioritization issue.
Senator Rosen. Thank you very much, and I yield back, Madam
Chair.
Senator Duckworth. Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. Thank you very much, Madam
Chair. Mr. Walsh, it is critical, as you have talked about in
this hearing, that our safety and security, for our safety and
security that we upgrade our aviation system. The NOTAM system
outage, way back, as you know, caused a delay, major delay, and
in July the FAA confirmed that there is now a backup system in
place, but there is still more work to do.
Could you talk about the challenges that airports and air
traffic controllers face when trying to transition away from
their old legacy systems?
Mr. Walsh. So I think the National Airspace System Safety
Review Team did a great job in their recent report on the
topic, and I would highlight some of the things that they said.
In particular, it is very difficult right now to turn off the
legacy systems once you have built the new system that is
intended to replace it. We have a lot of users. In particular,
if you read between the lines, the military, that does not
easily transition over to newer technology, and FAA is then
left holding the bag with two systems rather than one. And then
they have to sustain both of those systems rather than focusing
entirely on their new system, which again, takes up an
increasingly large piece of the not growing pie.
So I think as our air traffic controllers, our pilots, and
our technicians work with these older systems it makes their
life harder, and again, it makes it more upon them to catch
things when they go wrong or when these systems have outages.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Very good. Thank you.
Mr. Iacopelli, thank you for being here. As you know, we
have a shortage of air traffic controllers. We have a major hub
in Minnesota. I know how important the air traffic controllers'
work is, and we have seen flight disruptions and the like. The
bill that we passed back in May, with Senator Cantwell's
leadership, the FAA Air Traffic Controller's Hiring Act,
focused on boosting FAA training capacity.
Do you believe that we should focus on training and hiring?
How is it going? What is the latest?
Mr. Iacopelli. Well, thank you for the question, Senator,
and absolutely, yes, we need to continue to focus on hiring. We
know that the FAA has just met their hiring goal for the Fiscal
Year, so we are in a new Fiscal Year. And based on the FAA
Reauthorization Act that they are required to do max hiring.
And we have partnered with the FAA and our Public Affairs
Department to go out and promote that.
If you ever scroll through Facebook you see hundreds of air
traffic controllers promoting this profession and how great it
is and how much they want people to get in it, for two reasons.
One, it is a great profession, and two, we need more air
traffic controllers.
We do need to focus on the training. We have recently
agreed to some new initiatives within the FAA to focus on
training, increase the success rate, the TSS provision in the
FAA Reauthorization Act, the training simulator. Again, it is a
funding issue. It has been authorized. We need the
appropriations part, and hopefully the FAA is going to ask for
the right amount of money so, again, we are not choosing
between which thing is more important. We need all of it.
Senator Klobuchar. Right. You know, the air traffic control
tower up in Duluth is 70 years old, in northern Minnesota. The
weather is rather harsh there. We also have an incredible Guard
base there, and Cirrus is right near there. So there is a lot
of it, a great synergy of air travel and air manufacturing. It
is one of the three oldest towers in the country. It does not
make the line-of-sight requirements. It is in need of
significant repairs. It actually gets under water somehow, even
though it is on a hill, quite a bit. We got some funding for it
but not enough to get it going.
So is the biggest obstacle here infrastructure, and just
talk about the rural communities. And this is not even that
rural, right. It is quite a big city, Duluth, Minnesota, where
Bob Dylan came from. The biopic is coming out, so I want to get
it on everyone's mind.
Mr. Iacopelli. We have been working, using the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law as the base, to go through and look at a lot
of our facilities. And, I mean, we have our folks sending us
pictures of flooded basements, mold, decay. When I mentioned
plumbing, just upgrading the plumbing in the facility, so that
the restrooms and the water work, so that our folks who are air
traffic controllers can do that.
I know up in Alaska they have space heaters. We have gone
through where the air conditioning this past summer in several
locations around the country just stopped working. And we have
had our folks in the elevators stopped and it was 90-plus
degrees in the tower, and they had to go to remote sites.
So all of those little things, in those rural communities,
where you do not hear about it, it does not necessarily make
the news. We certainly hear about it. I am assuming you hear
about it from your constituents.
So it is an enormous task to go out and upgrade the entire
infrastructure of the national airspace system. And I think Mr.
Walsh said it--it is not a quick fix. It is not something that
happened over the past 3 years. It is something that has been
building for 50 years of, if it's not broke--and I forget how
you said it--but if it's not broke, we don't need to fix it. If
it is working, that is good. Let's keep going.
And I do not want to take up too much time, but we have
radar sites right now that the FAA is going around trying to
decommission because they do not have the means by which they
can maintain it. That is not improving safety. That is simply a
matter of taking down a radar site so you can use those parts
someplace else, because they do not have the means by which to
maintain those radar sites, and that is another big issue we
are going through.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Very good. Anything else, Captain,
that you would like to add?
Mr. Ambrosi. I think Dean covered it pretty well there. But
it is an all-of-the-above strategy. We need to keep it working
so we can keep moving passengers and cargo. But it is time to
make that next leap and finally put the people, resources, the
money in place to move our--it is the safest aviation system in
the world, but we need to keep it that way and move it forward.
So I would agree with everything he said.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you. I will send questions in
writing. There are many things going on today around here, so
thank you. Thanks.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I hear they are tough in
Alaska about those space heaters there, Senator Sullivan.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Sullivan. Well, thank you, Madam Chair, and it is
always good to follow my friend from Minnesota, who has similar
issues, cold, rural----
Senator Klobuchar. Space heaters.
Senator Sullivan.--space heaters needing upgrades. We do
not have--was it Bob Dylan? We do not have him, but we have a
lot of other famous people.
So I want to thank the Chair for holding this really
important hearing, and Mr. Iacopelli, I want to begin with you,
first doing a shout-out to all the air traffic controllers
across the country, in Alaska in particular. These are really
heroes, in my view. They keep us safe. We have a lot of
aviation challenges in Alaska. You guys do such a great job. I
am a giant fan of your workers and members.
You know, even the whole issue, a lot of Americans do not
know if you are flying to Asia, you know, even from Chicago or
somewhere, you come over the Alaska airspace. Our air traffic
control kind of gets them safely to Tokyo or Seoul. So I really
just want to do a great shout-out to them.
And I want talk to you. You know, as we were developing the
FAA Reauth I supported the Air Traffic Control Hiring Act to
require the FAA to set a minimum of hiring targets for new air
traffic controllers. We got a lot of this in the bill, but is
there more Congress can be doing on this really important
issue?
Mr. Iacopelli. Well, thank you, Senator, and I appreciate
the compliment to our brothers and sisters who work up in
Alaska.
You know, the Reauthorization Act and the requirement to
conduct max hiring, the success of that depends on having it
sufficiently funded. So we are hopeful that the FAA requests
the money that they need to continue the hiring. We are working
with the FAA, and I am sure you are aware, sir, that we have
expanded the enhanced CTI program, the College Training
Initiative. So we are working on that.
We are working on a number of initiatives in-house, if you
will, to enhance and improve the training, to enhance and
improve the success rate, most importantly, of that training.
Because any time we take someone, we know if we hire 2,000
people, we are not getting 2,000 through our training course
out in Oklahoma. Then once they hit the field, again, there is
more attrition.
But to maintain that focus and not lose sight of the
importance, and again, we have all Priority 1A things here.
Everything is a 1, 1, 1 priority. But to continue to focus and
ensure we have the funding to stay with it. Because it is not a
one-year task. It is a multiyear, long-term commitment.
Senator Sullivan. Well, thank you on that, and I again, we
will continue to stay very focused on this Committee on those
issues.
Captain Ambrosi, it is good to see you again, sir, and I
want to do a shout-out to your members too. They are great
Americans. A lot of them live in Alaska. We have more pilots
per capita than any state in the country, as you probably know,
more veterans per capita too--I know our Chair cares a lot
about that--per capita.
But we also have challenges with regard to having enough
pilots, particularly for regional airlines, because they get
recruited up to the major airlines so quickly. So one of the
things that I worked on with you and others, that had
bipartisan support, and both labor union support and industry
support, was focusing on education for our pilots. And one
thing that just kind of--I just do not understand why it still
exists--that we have this kind of unequal treatment for, loan
treatment between traditional college students and students
seeking a professional airline pilot, who shoulder very costly
loans for training.
So I am trying to fix that. As you know, we had a bill that
unfortunately did not make it in the FAA Reauth that I thought
was kind of a no-brainer to get in there, to help our pilot
situation. Can you explain the barriers a prospective pilot
faces for assessing flight education and training and what you
think Congress should be doing to right-size the existing
programs?
And oh, by the way, on Federal loan payback, you know, the
pilots who go through this kind of training, they get Federal
loans. They will have a great record of paying back those
loans, unlike some of the others who do not, because they will
go get an aviation job or a pilot job, and those are good-
paying jobs.
So what more can we do to level that playing field?
Mr. Ambrosi. Senator, good to see you. Thank you again, as
you did with the shout-out for our members. They work hard
every day.
Senator Sullivan. Yes, we have a lot in Alaska, as you
know.
Mr. Ambrosi. Keep our people safe. Thank you for your
leadership on this issue. As I may have said in former
testimony that I would not be able to be a pilot today with
what it costs.
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
Mr. Ambrosi. It has gotten out of hand. It is a wonderful
profession. I am proud to be an airline pilot. And we need to
do more to open the doors.
We have a robust pipeline. The schools are full. But there
are the best and brightest still out there that do not have the
resources that enable them to do this.
Senator Sullivan. Yes. Do you think that limits the number
of pilots in America, just because it is so expensive?
Mr. Ambrosi. It certainly limits--it takes away the ability
for a lot of people that would like to get into this
profession, if they do not have the ability to get the
resources, the Federal loans, that could help. It does not make
sense that if you can get those loans for other professions,
that we cannot do it for ours.
Senator Sullivan. To get a philosophy degree, you can get a
Federal loan, but pilot training, you cannot. That seems
backward.
Mr. Ambrosi. Yes. Well again, thank you for your leadership
on it. I believe that opening the doors of opportunity for all
those that would like to get into this profession, it is an
important step in the right direction.
Senator Sullivan. Great. And Madam Chair, I want to work
with you on that too. I know you care a lot about this issue.
I see my time has expired, so I will submit additional
questions for the record. But the one that I am going to
submit, just to make a very quick comment on, is this idea of
air traffic control privatization. I know we have differing
views on the panel, but I am going to submit that.
I do not support that. I think that the small, rural
airports, that my state has an enormous number of, they are
going to kind of lose out on any kind of, you know,
privatization that would be run by a private entity. I think in
this case the government is best equipped to make sure smaller
airports, smaller populations, who need infrastructure, do not
get missed out. So I will submit that for the record, Madam
Chair. I appreciate the hearing. Thanks again.
Senator Duckworth. Without objection. Senator Welch.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER WELCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VERMONT
Senator Welch. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I
share the concern about small airports that Senator Sullivan
just mentioned.
I want to start by thanking Mr. Whitaker. He had a short
time but a big impact. And it is extraordinary to hear from
everyone, from Senator Cruz to folks who are on the panel
paying tribute to the excellent job he did as the FAA
Administrator. And I am very sorry to lose him. We are proud of
him, he is a Vermonter, but primarily because of the
extraordinary job that he did in creating confidence among all
of the folks who are keeping our skies safe.
I have a few questions, Mr. Iacopelli, I want to ask you.
On these shortages that we are trying to deal with, I know the
FAA is really hard at work at implementing changes to deal with
the air traffic controller shortage. And it takes time,
especially 3,000 ATC staffers overnight cannot be hired.
But the ongoing shortage is really hurting us in
Burlington, Vermont, at the Leahy International Airport in
Burlington, and it has resulted--we understand in the slot
waivers for the New York area airports, that has been really
detrimental to us but also to other small airports around the
country.
Last year, JetBlue terminated service routes from Leahy
Burlington International Airport to JFK. That is a real problem
for us. We had a lot of folks that wanted to come from JFK to
Burlington and from Burlington to JFK.
So I want to just ask, what is your confidence about the
capacity for swift implementation of the ATC workforce
provisions included in the FAA Reauthorization Act, and will
the FAA be able to lift the New York City slot waivers by the
end of the waiver period, which is slated for October 2025?
Mr. Iacopelli. Thank you, Senator. To start with the slot
question, we do not know. I do not know that they will be able
to do that. I do not know if it is based solely on staffing or
through some commitment with the airlines. NATCA is not
involved in the----
Senator Welch. But we are sort of in it now. Do you have
any assessment of the progress that is being made that gives
you any capacity to be confident that the target will be met?
Mr. Iacopelli. So the training and hiring of air traffic
controllers is an ongoing effort. It is going to take years of
sustained focus to ensure that we continue to hire. Now, the
FAA Reauthorization bill requires max hiring for 5 years,
because that is the length of the bill. And honestly, if it was
a 10-year bill it would have to be 10 years. Because as we
hire, and we lose through attrition, as we hire we lose, for
retirement and those who are unsuccessful.
But to your question, Senator, we are focused along with
the ATO and the FAA in ensuring that those who do get hired
receive the best quality training we can, to ensure the most
success that we can, to address those issues that you are
talking about.
Senator Welch. Well, I will just implore you to stay on it,
because you were not able, obviously, and I respect that, to
give us confidence that those slot waivers will be dealt with
so that we can get service back to New York City. So it is
really, really important to us in Vermont.
There is also, you know, with the smaller airports, the
need for upgrades of equipment and facilities. At our airport
in Burlington the tower was built in the 1980s, and it is
considered to be relatively new for a small airport. But we
have had significant expansions at the airport, and at the
tower you cannot see the entire airport. We have got $17.8
billion in the FAA Reauthorization Act to fund the
modernization of key technologies.
My question to you is, as we continue to implement the FAA
Reauthorization Act, how can the FAA better coordinate with
smaller regional airports to ensure its technology and
facilities are being consistently maintained and upgraded?
Mr. Iacopelli. Well, thank you for that, Senator. I think
the best way for us to do it is continuing to stay involved
with the FAA and having our experts work with the FAA, whether
it be in the ATO or any other line of business that oversees
the deployment of new technologies.
We do have a good number of professionals out there working
with the FAA now, and their counterparts who are either in the
engineering or the other modernization departments. And we do
make sure we are focused on where does it need to be deployed
and are we getting it to where it needs to be, as quickly as we
can. But there are limitations to how much we can get
accomplished, as was previously discussed.
Senator Welch. OK. Thank you. I yield back.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you to our witnesses for your
participation today. They have called a vote so we are going to
end the hearing.
The hearing record will remain open until January 13, 2025.
Any Senators that would like to submit questions for the record
should do so by December 20, 2024. I again thank the panel for
being here. I thought this was a very good discussion. We ask
that responses be returned to the Committee by January 13.
And that concludes today's hearing. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
Kevin Walsh
1. FAA Budgetary Processes
Over the course of the last decade, Congress has consistently
provided funding in excess of that requested by the FAA to support its
modernization and sustainment needs, particularly for legacy systems.
The GAO report implies this level of investment is inadequate to
support the safety and capacity of the airspace.
What recommendations do you have that would enable the level
of investment that is more in line with the needs and short
comings identified in your report?
Answer. We previously reported that the amount Congress has
invested in NextGen generally aligned with the amounts in the
President's budget request.\1\ For example, as reflected in the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) congressional budget justifications for
Fiscal Year 2012 through 2023, FAA's budget requests and actual budget
for NextGen--including system deployment--remained relatively constant
at about $1 billion annually. We did not assess FAA's budget requests
in relation to NextGen priorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Air Traffic Control Modernization: Program Management
Improvements Could Help FAA Address NextGen Delays and Challenges, GAO-
24-105254 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonetheless, representatives from an association representing air
traffic controllers told us that FAA's budget requests for implementing
NextGen have not kept up with the growing costs of materials and labor
over time. We also reported that FAA has not updated its full NextGen
life cycle cost estimate since 2017. Updating this estimate could help
better inform and justify budget requests. Accordingly, we recommended
that FAA develop an updated life cycle cost estimate for NextGen,
measure FAA's performance against it, and create a schedule for
updating the life cycle cost estimate regularly.
Finally, we recently initiated a new audit looking at, among other
things, the reliability of FAA cost and schedule estimation practices
for air traffic control (ATC) system modernization investments. This
new audit, coupled with our prior recommendation, may help to improve
the accuracy, reliability, and justification of the budget requests
submitted by FAA.
Are there added revenues, such as the Airport and Airway
Trust Fund, for Congress to explore for FAA to better leverage
investment in its infrastructure modernization programs?
Answer. FAA's funding for these investments generally comes from
the Facilities and Equipment account. We have not done work on other
possible revenue sources.
2. DOD Systems
The GAO report excluded 43 systems that were classified as the
responsibility of the Department of Defense or building facilities.
Can you speak at all to the sustainability of those DOD
systems? Are there lessons to be learned in how those systems
are sustained?
Answer. We have not done work on how the 43 systems and building
facilities are sustained. Of the 43, 16 were classified as systems
supporting national defense, and the remaining 27 were classified as
building facilities. FAA officials rated each of the 16 national
defense systems by their sustainability and criticality. The table
below is a summary of the 16 systems based on FAA's 2023 operational
risk assessment.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ These numbers were derived from the 2023 National Airspace
System operational risk assessment. FAA intended to perform the
assessment annually.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sustainability rating
Systems by Operational Impact --------------------------
Critical Moderate Low
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A: Unsustainable due to shortages in spares 0 0 0
and shortfalls in funding
B: Unsustainable due to shortfalls in funding 0 0 0
or capability
C: Potentially unsustainable due to possible 15 0 1
shortfalls in funding or capability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 15 0 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the four critical systems for which FAA does not have an
associated modernization investment underway is used by the Departments
of Defense and Homeland Security, as well as FAA.
How would you suggest these three agencies initiate
discussions regarding procurement of a replacement system?
Answer. While we have not done work on how these three agencies
might initiate discussions for the procurement of a replacement
system,\3\ we have developed best practices to be used by Federal
agencies to enhance Federal interagency collaboration.\4\ Specifically,
in May 2023 we issued a report that highlights eight leading
collaboration practices, including bridging organizational cultures,
identifying and sustaining leadership, clarifying roles and
responsibilities, and developing written guidance and agreements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ We omitted the official name of the system due to sensitivity
concerns. We used a generic designation instead.
\4\ GAO, Government Performance Management: Leading Practices to
Enhance Interagency Collaboration and Address Crosscutting Challenges,
GAO-23-105520 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, in March 2024 FAA provided us a few additional details
on the system that is used by FAA and the Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security. Specifically, FAA officials stated that the three
agencies intend to modernize the system, but no program is currently
underway. In March 2024, FAA officials stated that the Office of the
Secretary of Defense was working on an analysis of alternatives for a
new replacement investment, and that analysis was nearing completion.
FAA officials also stated that the National Airspace System (NAS)
Defense Program plans to begin tri-agency discussions to procure a
replacement system that meets the modern requirements of all three
agencies. Lastly, the officials stated that while it is unlikely that
they will be able to start the program in 2025, once they are able to
start, it will take at least nine years before the legacy system is
decommissioned.
Following the interagency collaboration best practices from our May
2023 report could be helpful to FAA, and the Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security in ensuring effective collaboration as they embark on
their future work.
3. Limiting Factors
Pages 37 and 38 of the report call attention to the limitations of
FAA's acquisition management oversight council, stating ``[it] is not
ensuring that the investments deliver functionality in manageable
segments to address the extended periods of time it takes FAA to
develop and deploy new systems.''
Has your investigation into these aging systems offered any
insight into why FAA is less agile in its procurement and
development of new systems than other Federal agencies--like
DOD?
Answer. While we did not perform an in-depth analysis of whether
FAA is less agile in its procurement and development than other Federal
agencies, in April 2024, we asked about reasons for FAA's lack of
agility. FAA officials did not give specific reasons for its lack of
agility but stated that in some instances it is not appropriate to
segment a system development effort. Specifically, officials stated
that when a system is providing functionality that is only useful when
it is deployed throughout the NAS, it is not appropriate for the system
to be segmented. The officials highlighted two examples of these types
of systems: the En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) system and the
Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS). The officials
stated that they could not realistically provide only a portion of the
full functionality to safely separate aircraft in the en route or
terminal airspace; nor could the FAA provide that functionality to half
of the country when the systems need to be able to communicate with
each other.
In April 2024, FAA officials acknowledged that they should do more
to identify opportunities to segment investments and deliver
functionality to users more rapidly across all ATC system modernization
investments. Specifically, in March 2024 the agency established a
working group to develop guidance on segmenting investments, where
feasible. Officials noted that the working group will be addressing the
types of investments that should apply this strategy. FAA anticipates
the working group will result in improved guidance and training
opportunities for segmentation. However, FAA officials did not provide
specific time frames for developing and implementing this guidance.
Accordingly, we recommended that FAA establish a time frame for
developing and implementing guidance that the Joint Resources Council
ensures that ATC system modernization investments are organized as
manageable segments.
4. Modernization Difficulties
The report shows a clear picture of the pressing needs of
modernization.
What are the primary difficulties the FAA has found to
execute the modernization programs?
Answer. In our September 2024 report, we identified individual
reasons why specific investments were delayed, but these reasons varied
by investment.\5\ In addition, we reported that segmenting large
complex system development and implementation efforts into smaller and
more manageable increments has the potential to reduce risk and deliver
capabilities more quickly. We also highlighted that the Office of
Management and Budget requires agencies to deliver functionality to
users at least every 6 months.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA Actions Are Urgently Needed to
Modernize Aging Systems, GAO-24-107001 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23,
2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, we found that FAA's acquisition oversight body--the Joint
Resources Council--does not ensure that investments deliver
functionality in manageable segments. For example, while the Enterprise
Information Display System (E-IDS) was initiated 8 years ago, it has
not delivered any functionality to users. Similarly, the NextGen
Weather Processor (NWP) system was initiated 14 years ago and had yet
to deliver any functionality to users.
As a result, we concluded that this lack of segmentation, at least
partially, contributes to the extended development time frames.
Accordingly, we recommended that FAA establish a time frame for
developing and implementing guidance that the Joint Resources Council
ensures that ATC system modernization investments are organized as
manageable segments.
In November 2023 we reported that closer adherence to five program
management practices could better position the agency's ongoing effort
to modernize air traffic management.\6\ Collectively, the gaps in
program management mean FAA has less assurance that it has taken steps
to avoid major course corrections in the future, contributing to
continued delays in deployment. We made four recommendations to improve
FAA program management operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GAO-24-105254.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to these program management challenges, FAA and
stakeholders cited varying levels of aircraft equipage, the changing
national airspace, and unanticipated events as challenges to
implementing its modernization efforts. More specifically, achieving
the level of equipage on aircraft needed to ensure that operators can
realize NextGen benefits has continued to be a barrier. While
foundational systems--such as ERAM and STARS--do not require aircraft
operators to install avionics, other NextGen systems do, and aircraft
operators have achieved different levels of aircraft equipage. Also,
cybersecurity risks posed by a more connected NAS, integration of new
entrants into the NAS (such as drones and commercial spacecraft), and
potential spectrum interference were cited as additional challenges.
Lastly, unanticipated events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have
affected modernization timelines. Although the COVID-19 public health
emergency ended in May 2023, FAA was continuing to modify plans and
schedules resulting from restricted access to facilities, testing
delays, and difficulties obtaining system components, as of November
2023.
Finally, we recently initiated a new audit, which will assess the
extent to which FAA follows leading practices for planning, selecting,
managing, and evaluating ATC modernization investments. We will also
assess the reliability of FAA's cost and schedule estimation practices
of ATC system modernization investments. This new audit is intended to
provide additional insights into the execution of FAA's ATC
modernization investment practices.
5. Federal Contract Tower Program
Kansas is home to the Kansas City Air Traffic Control Center and
eight (8) participants in the FAA's Federal Contract Tower program.
Can you provide the Subcommittee your perspective of the FAA
Contract Tower program, which continues to provide critical ATC
safety benefits to the 264 airports in the program?
Answer. We have not done work on this topic.
6. NOTAM Improvement Act
Following the January 2023 Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) outage, I
was pleased to introduce with my colleagues, Sens. Klobuchar and
Capito, a bill to require FAA establish a task force to strengthen the
resiliency and cybersecurity of the NOTAM system.
The bill was signed into law in 2023, and the task force's report
is expected early next year.
Are there particular themes you expect to find in the
report?
Answer. We have not examined the NOTAM outage or the work of the
taskforce, which would be needed to comment on this topic.
How do you anticipate the findings and recommendations from
this report to complement GAO's findings to help bolster safety
of the NAS ecosystem?
While we cannot speculate on the taskforce's future report, it will
be important for FAA to closely review their findings and
recommendations and work to implement ours and others' recommendations
aimed at strengthening the safety of the NAS.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to
Kevin Walsh
With the persistent challenges faced by Congress and the FAA to
budget for air traffic control modernization, there have periodically
been suggestions to spin off the air traffic control systems into a
private or quasi-private entity.
I have deep reservations about any proposal to transfer the FAA's
air traffic facilities to a quasi-private corporation and allow it,
rather than Congress, to make decisions on where funding should be
spent and how much tax general aviators should pay. This threatens to
leave rural communities largely ignored.
The 582 airports out of 600 in Alaska that do not have air traffic
control would receive little if any funding for upgrades and new
technology, and it is unclear what would happen to the 400 navigation
aids that Alaskans depend on. The largest hubs would receive the lion's
share of the funding leaving states like Alaska with no recourse.
Question 1. Do you agree that congress is in the best position to
allocate resources between the few dozen airports serving larger cities
and the thousands of general aviation airports and facilities serving
rural America?
Answer. Congress has the authority to determine how to allocate
resources or whether to separate ATC operations from FAA. In October
2016, we identified key transition issues associated with such a
change, including changes in user fees and their impacts on certain
users such as general aviation.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ GAO, Air Traffic Control: Experts' and Stakeholders' Views on
Key Issues to Consider in a Potential Restructuring, GAO-17-131
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 13, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, I have concerns over a non-public entity making
decisions regarding the allocation of airspace. In Anchorage for
example, airspace is shared among Ted Stevens International, Merrill
Field, one of the largest general aviation airports in the country,
Lake Hood, the world's largest floatplane airport, and major military
airfields which conduct air training activities.
With more licensed pilots per capita than any state in the union we
have (9,428 active pilots), we have an extremely active General
Aviation community in Alaska. Allocating air space among these diverse
users should be determined by a government entity, not a private
organization.
Question 2. Do you agree that airspace should be available to all
users, including those serving small towns and villages as well as
individuals as it is currently?
Answer. FAA regulations currently identify various classes of
airspace and requirements for those classes, which are, in part, based
on proximities to airports. While we have not done recent work on how
separating ATC operations between a government entity and private
organizations might specifically impact airspace users, as mentioned in
the prior question, our October 2016 report explores various issues
that are associated with separating ATC operations from FAA.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO-17-131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Kevin Walsh
Planning for Safe Transition Away from Aging Systems: In a 2019
report, GAO looked at legacy systems across the Federal government,
identifying the 10 most critical systems in need of replacement. The
report observed that three agencies, including the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), had ``no documented plans to modernize'' the
critical systems identified.
Five years later, Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) 2024
report found that FAA still did not have near-term modernization plans
in place for certain at-risk systems.
This is exactly why section 622 in the FAA Reauthorization law
mandates an outside audit of all FAA legacy systems in to determine the
level of risk and impact associated with operating outdated, unsafe, or
unstable older systems.
After the audit is complete, FAA must then implement a plan to
prioritize the drawdown, replacement, or enhancement of legacy systems
based on the risks such systems pose to aviation safety.
Question 1. Having multiple redundancies in systems can help delay
or even prevent air traffic control (ATC) system failures and
operational disruptions in the aviation system. To what extent has GAO
seen the FAA comprehensively incorporate redundancies in legacy ATC
systems?
Answer. We have not done in-depth work on this topic. However, when
we asked FAA about systems that are considered a single point of
failure or have associated redundancies, FAA stated that depending upon
the system, if there are not any direct or associated redundancies,
there are procedural contingencies in place to mitigate operational
risk. FAA officials explained that if one system goes down, another one
takes over, or the air traffic controller uses an alternative piece of
equipment or changes operational procedures to monitor air traffic.
Question 2. GAO's recent report points out that planning for ATC
systems should focus not just on upgrading legacy systems and
installing new technologies, but also on determining which aging
systems to decommission. In your view, is FAA taking a constructive
approach to phasing out the systems that have outlasted their useful
life?
Answer. The FAA Acquisition Management System includes a
sustainment phase referred to as In-Service Management, which entails
revalidating the need to sustain deployed assets or taking other action
to improve service delivery. During this phase, the service
organization or program office responsible for sustaining a system is
expected to periodically revalidate the need to sustain fielded assets
or recommend other action such as upgrade, replacement, or
decommissioning and removal.
The Acquisition Management System also includes a Service Analysis
phase which is intended to determine what capabilities must be in place
now and in the future to meet agency goals and the service needs of
customers. During this phase, the organization is intended to identify
differences between future service need and current capability. A
service shortfall is expected to be addressed by a sustainment action
for existing assets or a new service delivery idea.
We have not done in-depth work on FAA's decommissioning and
disposition processes. However, to the extent that FAA can
expeditiously complete its NextGen modernization efforts, the agency
will likely be in a better position to decommission aging systems. In
November 2023, we reported that closer FAA adherence to program
management practices was needed.\1\ Since that report was issued, the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 requires FAA to operationalize the
programs under NextGen by the end of 2025 and then sunset its Office of
NextGen. The act also requires FAA to establish an office within FAA
responsible for the modernization of NAS, including the development of
an information-centric NAS, improving the interoperability of NAS
systems, and developing an integrated plan for the future of NAS. As
FAA moves in this direction, we believe that full implementation of our
recommendations, related both to aging systems and NextGen program
management, will target critical improvements needed for the new office
to begin meeting the expectations of Congress in this vital area.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO-24-105254.
\2\ GAO-24-105254 and GAO-24-107001.
Question 3. I understand that in some cases, FAA will need to
operate legacy ATC systems until it can safely transition to newer
technologies. Based on the GAO report, is FAA undergoing effective
analysis and planning to determine when it is safe to transition away
from operating older ATC systems?
Answer. We have not done in-depth work on the decommissioning and
disposition processes or the transition from one operational asset to
another. However, FAA completed the 2023 operational risk assessment to
assist in identifying systems that present a risk to the NAS and may be
considered for decommissioning as part of the Acquisition Management
System processes described earlier. Nonetheless, as reflected in our
September 2024 report, FAA did not prioritize or establish near-term
plans to modernize unsustainable and critical systems based on its
operational assessment as originally intended.\3\ Officials stated that
they plan to use the results of the 2024 operational risk assessment to
inform future budget decisions and plans for modernization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO-24-107001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
Dean Iacopelli
1. NOTAM Improvement Act
Following the January 2023 Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) outage, I
was pleased to introduce with my colleagues, Sens. Klobuchar and
Capito, a bill to require FAA establish a task force to strengthen the
resiliency and cybersecurity of the NOTAM system.
The bill was signed into law in 2023, and the task force's report
is expected early next year.
Are there particular themes you expect to find in the
report?
Answer. NATCA is a participant in the NOTAM task force. We expect
themes to include acknowledgement of known vulnerabilities and risks
associated with the current system, including the need to reduce the
number of NOTAMs in the system, the need to prioritize the importance
of NOTAMs in terms of the safety of flight, and the need for more
stringent requirements for a replacement NOTAM system. Despite these
themes, the FAA will have a difficult time funding this program without
increased F&E appropriations. At minimum, the FAA will need $154
million just to conduct further research on a replacement NOTAM system.
It will need $354 million to replace the broken NOTAM system.
How do you anticipate the findings and recommendations from
this report to complement GAO's findings to help bolster safety
of the NAS ecosystem?
Answer. NATCA anticipates both reports will complement each other
in defining core issues that exist in the NOTAM program and throughout
the majority of FAA systems and programs.
Congress has consistently provided the FAA with the resources it
requests through both authorization of top-line numbers and the annual
appropriations process. However, because FAA has historically requested
too little, there are significant backlogs of NAS system sustainment
and ATC facility sustainment, in addition to mounting delays in the
implementation of NAS modernization and system improvements as well as
ATC tower and radar facility replacement.
The FAA's FY 2025 budget request, for the first time in over a
decade, acknowledges its true need, although not entirely through its
F&E request. In addition to the $3.6 billion F&E request, FAA cites the
$1 billion in funds authorized for 2025 through the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act as supplementing its facilities and
infrastructure funding needs. It also proposes a new Facility
Replacement and Radar Modernization fund that would dedicate $8 billion
over the next five years--beginning with $1 billion in 2025--to replace
or modernize aging air traffic control facilities. This includes
modernizing 377 critical radar systems and more than 20 air traffic
control facilities. We, along with a wide array of industry
stakeholders, strongly support this request.
The FAA must continue to be transparent with its need for increased
F&E funding so that it can meet its own equipment sustainment,
replacement, and modernization needs. If not, it will continue to
exacerbate the FAA's significant sustainment and replacement backlog.
Failing to maintain and replace critical safety equipment that has
exceeded its expected life introduces unnecessary risk into the system.
These funding limitations also have prevented the FAA from designing
and implementing new technologies that will improve safety.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to
Dean Iacopelli
With the persistent challenges faced by Congress and the FAA to
budget for air traffic control modernization, there have periodically
been suggestions to spin off the air traffic control systems into a
private or quasi-private entity.
I have deep reservations about any proposal to transfer the FAA's
air traffic facilities to a quasi-private corporation and allow it,
rather than Congress, to make decisions on where funding should be
spent and how much tax general aviators should pay. This threatens to
leave rural communities largely ignored.
The 582 airports out of 600 in Alaska that do not have air traffic
control would receive little if any funding for upgrades and new
technology, and it is unclear what would happen to the 400 navigation
aids that Alaskans depend on. The largest hubs would receive the lion's
share of the funding leaving states like Alaska with no recourse.
Question 1. Do you agree that congress is in the best position to
allocate resources between the few dozen airports serving larger cities
and the thousands of general aviation airports and facilities serving
rural America?
Answer. Congress has consistently provided the FAA with the
resources it requests through both authorization of top-line numbers
and the annual appropriations process. However, because FAA has
consistently requested too little, there are significant backlogs of
NAS system sustainment and ATC facility sustainment, in addition to
mounting delays in the implementation of NAS modernization and system
improvements as well as ATC tower and radar facility replacement.
The budgetary shortfalls also have not kept up with inflation over
the past 15 years. For instance, the FAA has consistently requested
only about $3 billion in annual appropriations for F&E throughout that
period, even though in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 the Agency's internal
budgetary estimates showed that it needed at least $4.5 billion, with
that need quickly approaching $6 billion. This loss of spending and
buying power for F&E programs forced FAA into a ``fix-on-fail'' model
by requiring it to prioritize mandatory costs, leaving little to no
money for modernization and infrastructure programs.
To sustain many legacy systems, as well as to enhance and grow
critical safety and modernization programs, the FAA projects that it
will need $6 billion. At bare minimum, the NATCA projects that the FAA
will need at least $4 billion to simply sustain these programs and the
rest of the NAS. Investments that merely cover the costs to sustain
current equipment will be insufficient to develop and implement new
technologies and integrate new users into the system.
The FAA's FY 2025 budget request, for the first time in over a
decade, acknowledges its true need, although not entirely through its
F&E request. In addition to the $3.6 billion F&E request, FAA cites the
$1 billion in funds authorized for 2025 through the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act as supplementing its facilities and
infrastructure funding needs. It also proposes a new Facility
Replacement and Radar Modernization fund that would dedicate $8 billion
over the next five years--beginning with $1 billion in 2025--to replace
or modernize aging air traffic control facilities. This includes
modernizing 377 critical radar systems and more than 20 air traffic
control facilities. We, along with a wide array of industry
stakeholders, support this request.
NATCA is not advocating to reform FAA or the Air Traffic
Organization's (ATO) structure.
NATCA will oppose any reform proposal that would transfer
management or operation of the air traffic control system to a for-
profit entity or to one that is co-owned, operated, and/or controlled
by for-profit entities. Moreover, any FAA reform proposal must adhere
to NATCA's core principles before we would consider endorsing it:
1. Ensure the frontline workforce is protected in their employment
relationship, including their pay, rights, retirement, health
care and other benefits, negotiated collective bargaining
agreements, and indemnification for acts within the scope of
their employment;
2. Ensure safety and efficiency remain the top priorities;
3. Provide for a stable, predictable funding stream that adequately
supports air traffic control services, staffing, hiring and
training, long-term modernization, preventative maintenance,
and ongoing modernization to infrastructure; and
4. Maintain a dynamic aviation system that continues to provide
services to all users, areas, and segments of the existing
aviation community as well as integrating new users.
NATCA will meticulously review the details of any reform proposal
before taking a position.
Similarly, I have concerns over a non-public entity making
decisions regarding the allocation of airspace. In Anchorage for
example, airspace is shared among Ted Stevens International, Merrill
Field, one of the largest general aviation airports in the country,
Lake Hood, the world's largest floatplane airport, and major military
airfields which conduct air training activities.
With more licensed pilots per capita than any state in the union we
have (9,428 active pilots), we have an extremely active General
Aviation community in Alaska. Allocating air space among these diverse
users should be determined by a government entity, not a private
organization.
Question 2. Do you agree that airspace should be available to all
users, including those serving small towns and villages as well as
individuals as it is currently?
Answer. NATCA is focused on the safety and efficiency of the system
for all users. NATCA takes pride in its role as an aviation safety
organization that stands shoulder-to-shoulder with government and
industry stakeholders to ensure that the NAS remains the safest and
most efficient in the world. The air traffic controllers, including in
Alaska Flight Service Stations, and other aviation safety professionals
that NATCA represents throughout the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), Department of Defense (DOD), and the FAA's Federal Contract
Tower (FCT) program ensure the safe and efficient movement of GA
aircraft and millions of tons of cargo annually, while simultaneously
ensuring that more than one billion commercial passengers annually
arrive at their destinations safely. In its role as a safety
organization, NATCA does not take a position on how access to airspace
is allocated or prioritized among existing users.
NATCA believes the National Airspace System must continue to be a
dynamic aviation system that continues to provide services to all
users, areas, and segments of the existing aviation community as well
as integrating new users.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Dean Iacopelli
FAA Facilities and Equipment Funding
The President's FY 2025 Budget included the establishment of a $8
billion Facility Replacement and Radar Modernization program to make
further investments in addressing FAA's aging infrastructure through FY
2029. Building upon the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law $5 billion
investment in air traffic facilities, the Administration proposal would
provide dedicated supplemental appropriations to modernize 377 radar
systems and more than 20 aging air traffic facilities nationwide.
In July 2024, NATCA joined a coalition of aviation industry leaders
advocating for the establishment of a separate annual funding stream
from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF), dedicated solely for
upgrading and replacing FAA air traffic facilities, systems, and
equipment.
While the Administration and industry coalition proposals are
different, both emphasize using additional AATF funding to upgrade air
traffic control system infrastructure in light of growing air travel
demand.
Question 1. How would air traffic controllers, air traffic support
specialists, and other ATC professionals represented by NATCA benefit
from additional funding to upgrade FAA systems, facilities, and
equipment in performing their job duties?
Answer. The FAA's FY 2025 budget request, for the first time in
over a decade, acknowledges its true need, although not entirely
through its F&E request. In addition to the $3.6 billion F&E request,
FAA cites the $1 billion in funds authorized for 2025 through the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act as supplementing its facilities
and infrastructure funding needs. It also proposes a new Facility
Replacement and Radar Modernization fund that would dedicate $8 billion
over the next five years--beginning with $1 billion in 2025--to replace
or modernize aging air traffic control facilities. This includes
modernizing 377 critical radar systems and more than 20 air traffic
control facilities. We, along with a wide array of industry
stakeholders, strongly support this request.
Disruptions to FAA funding and significant budgetary shortfalls
create a more stressful, less productive work environment for all
aviation safety professionals. Many controllers and other aviation
safety professionals go to work every day in facilities that are
plagued by leaking roofs, flooding basements that contain electronic
systems, broken-down elevators and HVAC systems, and chronically
backed-up bathroom toilets. Without sufficient funding the FAA will
continue to experience delays implementing vital modernization
technology, sustaining and repairing of existing safety-critical
equipment, and the hiring and training of new controllers and other
aviation safety professionals.
Additional funding, such as the Facility Replacement and Radar
Modernization proposed in the President's FY 2025 Budget, would not
only allow for an improvement in physical infrastructure and working
conditions, but it would also provide for desperately needed
modernization and technology updates to aviation systems and air
traffic control automation platforms that are used by controllers 24
hours a day, 7 days a week.
The FAA must continue to be transparent with its need for increased
F&E funding so that it can meet its own equipment sustainment,
replacement, and modernization needs. Failing to maintain and replace
critical safety equipment that has exceeded its expected life
introduces unnecessary risk into the system, such as the complete
failure of the NOTAM system in 2023 and the current unexpected outages
of the FAA's Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) program that are
plaguing air traffic facilities across the country.
Question 2. Given NATCA's support for the industry proposal, and if
more AATF funds are made available annually, what system upgrades would
you like to see FAA prioritize first in its modernization of air
traffic control systems?
Answer. NATCA has identified several automation platforms and
modernization programs that are the most critical to maintaining and
upgrading the National Airspace System (NAS) based on their
relationship and necessity to the continued safe and efficient
operation of the NAS. At the top of that list is maintaining,
repairing, and replacing RADAR systems, some of which date back to
1964. NATCA anticipates that RADAR failures are likely to occur in
2025, which could cause gaps in surveillance coverage throughout the
country. NATCA also believes that additional funding is needed for air
traffic automation platforms such as ERAM, STARS, and ATOP enhancements
to support new entrants, such as space launches and UAS/UAM/UTM
operations. The Agency and NATCA have been able to fast-track a surface
surveillance situational awareness tool that will help controllers
mitigate the risks associated with wrong-surface landings and runway
incursions. It needs to be deployed across all airports that do not
currently have an existing surface tool.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to
Dean Iacopelli
Question 1. Safety is the most important concern, but equipment
failures can also cause flight delays and disruptions. In June, a feed
from a long-range radar to the Chicago TRACON malfunctioned. Air
traffic controllers reported seeing multiple targets on their displays.
They saw two aircraft representing just one aircraft on their screen.
Worse, this was at a time when there was no qualified technician on
duty to fix the equipment. This resulted in a ground stop at O'Hare,
while they called in an off-duty technician. In August, air traffic was
halted in Newark due to a technology outage in Philadelphia. Ground
stops can have ripple effects.
When equipment failures result in ground stops--what does that mean
for air traffic controllers and what is the impact on air traffic
across the country?
Answer. As you rightfully noted, equipment failures that cause
ground stops are a tremendous burden and cause unnecessary stress for
air traffic controllers. For controllers and other aviation safety
professionals, an equipment failure is often treated as an emergency
and swift action is needed to ensure safety for all aircraft and the
flying public.
In recent years, these unexpected outages have occurred far more
frequently, placing an even higher workload and stress level on the air
traffic workforce. Depending on the outage, the effects are often felt
throughout the National Airspace System. In addition to the examples at
the Chicago TRACON and in Philadelphia, the complete failure of the
NOTAM system in 2023 and the anticipated outages of the FAA's
Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) program going forward are
recent examples of a long-standing problem.
Topic: Air Traffic Control Infrastructure
Question 2. While recently describing the need for FAA to upgrade
its facilities to keep up with technology, FAA Administrator Michael
Whitaker called some of the current efforts ``band-aid'' solutions with
``a lot of duct tape''.
Do you agree with Administrator Whitaker's characterization, and if
so, can you describe how this ``band-aid'' approach is impacting air
traffic controllers?
Answer. NATCA concurs with the statement from Administrator
Whitaker. Controllers are working in rapidly-aging facilities, using
outdated and unstable technology that lacks modern automation. These
issues can lead to significant delays and a tremendous increase in
workload.
Although the FAA has begun the process of upgrading its rapidly
aging infrastructure to improve technology, that process has been slow
and hampered by the Agency not requesting its full need for F&E funding
throughout the last 15 years. This loss of spending and buying power
forced FAA into a ``fix-on-fail'' model by requiring it to prioritize
mandatory costs, leaving little to no money for modernization and
infrastructure programs. The FAA's ``fix-on-fail'' philosophy has also
been applied to maintenance and repair projects, as the Agency stopped
stockpiling critical parts for essential operational equipment
resulting in a backlog of maintenance projects at facilities around the
country.
Congress has consistently provided the FAA with the resources it
requests through both authorization of top-line numbers and the annual
appropriations process. However, because FAA has consistently requested
inadequate resources, there are significant backlogs of NAS system
sustainment and ATC facility sustainment, in addition to mounting
delays in the implementation of NAS modernization and system
improvements as well as ATC tower and radar facility replacement.
Furthermore, the F&E budget has not kept up with inflation over the
past 15 years. For instance, the FAA has consistently requested only
about $3 billion in annual appropriations for F&E throughout that
period, even though in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 the Agency's internal
budgetary estimates showed that it needed at least $4.5 billion, with
that need quickly approaching $6 billion. This loss of spending and
buying power for F&E programs forced FAA into a ``fix-on-fail'' model
by requiring it to prioritize mandatory costs, leaving little to no
money for modernization and infrastructure programs.
The FAA's FY 2025 budget request, for the first time in over a
decade, acknowledges its true need, although not entirely through its
F&E request. In addition to the $3.6 billion F&E request, FAA cites the
$1 billion in funds authorized for 2025 through the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act as supplementing its facilities and
infrastructure funding needs. It also proposes a new Facility
Replacement and Radar Modernization fund that would dedicate $8 billion
over the next five years--beginning with $1 billion in 2025--to replace
or modernize aging air traffic control facilities. This includes
modernizing 377 critical radar systems and more than 20 air traffic
control facilities. We, along with a wide array of industry
stakeholders, strongly support this request.
Topic: Close Calls and Near Misses
Question 3. Coming out of the pandemic, we saw an alarming rise in
close calls in commercial aviation. Last year, FAA convened a safety
summit to bring stakeholders together to address it. We've done a lot
of work since then to help restore our margins of safety--including
passing an FAA reauthorization law with many safety enhancements. But
the new law is just starting to be implemented, and in the meantime,
our aviation system remains stressed.
Do you think modernizing our aging air traffic control systems
would improve our safety margins and if so, how?
Answer. Although it is the safest, most efficient, and most complex
airspace system in the world, we should always strive to bolster
safety, mitigate risk, and improve efficiency. NATCA believes that
investing in modernization and technology programs will improve the
margins of safety in addition to enhancing system efficiencies.
The FAA's aging radar surveillance infrastructure is in dire need
of modernization. NATCA anticipates in the near future, RADARs
throughout the U.S. will start to fail causing gaps in surveillance
coverage. Likewise, new RADAR technology could also allow for
surveillance coverage in areas where coverage does not currently exist.
In addition, emerging technologies and new entrant activity such as
UAS, UAM, and increased space launches will require updated automation
technology so controllers can continue to ensure as the system improves
safety margins rather than degrade.
The Agency and NATCA have been able to fast-track a surface
surveillance situational awareness tool that will help controllers
mitigate the risks associated with wrong-surface landings and runway
incursions. It needs to be deployed at facilities that do not have an
existing surface surveillance tool.
Topic: Fiber Optic Cables
Question 4. You noted in your testimony that FAA needs to upgrade
its telecommunications from copper wire to fiber optic cable but since
FAA only has enough funding to proceed on a case-by-case basis, FAA is
stuck spending $7 million per month just to maintain the old copper
wire that ultimately needs to be replaced. That's $85 million a year.
How important is this transition from copper to fiber optic cable
and is this something we should be accomplishing more swiftly?
Answer. FAA telecommunications are the backbone of the air traffic
control system, which makes the transition from copper wire to fiber
optic cable absolutely critical to the operation of the National
Airspace System (NAS). This network provides data to air traffic
control information and automation platforms in addition to air-to-
ground communications and facility-to-facility communications.
Presently, there are over 30,000 services at over 4,600 FAA sites
that must transition away from copper wire and onto a fiber optic cable
network in order to avoid severe service disruptions and extensive
flight delays. NATCA believes the current timeline to complete the
transition is insufficient when compared to the rate of copper wire
discontinuances.
One of FAA's three main service providers has advised the Agency
that it will be discontinuing copper wire services two years earlier
than originally planned. This requires the FAA to reallocate resources
to ensure that none of the affected facilities lose services during
2025 before the discontinuance occurs.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Dean Iacopelli
Air Traffic Controllers Hiring
Question 1. Our nation is facing a shortage of air traffic
controllers, causing flight disruptions and safety risks across the
country and seriously straining our air traffic controller workforce,
and putting travelers at risk. The Federal Aviation Administration
Reauthorization passed in May included my bill with Senator Braun, the
Air Traffic Controllers Hiring Act, to boost Federal Aviation
Administration training capacity and increase the Federal Aviation
Administration's use of its expedited hiring authority.
In your view, how should the Federal Aviation Administration focus
on training and hiring more controllers?
Answer. NATCA thanks Sen. Klobuchar and Sen. Braun for their
leadership in passing the Air Traffic Controllers Hiring Act as part of
the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. The FAA must take a holistic,
collaborative approach to resolving its staffing and training
challenges. The first step is implementing the Collaborative Resource
Workgroup's (CRWG) jointly-developed operational CPC staffing targets
for each facility as the basis for its annual Controller Workforce Plan
(CWP) as required by the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, while
continuing maximum controller hiring for at least the duration of the
Act.
The FAA also must continue to submit annual budget requests for its
Operations account that account for the increased cost to hire and
train at least 2,000 new air traffic controllers annually, in order to
rebuild controller staffing levels and meet current and projected
traffic demands.
NATCA supports the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Fiscal Year
(FY) 2025 Operations budget request, which included an increase to
$13.6 billion from the 2024 Continuing Resolution level of $12.72
billion, in recognition that the FAA will experience several
uncontrollable cost increases in addition to maximum controller hiring.
In July 2024, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved this budget
request in its FY 2025 THUD appropriations bill.
We were pleased the negotiators from the House and Senate agreed to
an anomaly in the December-passed Continuing Resolution to ensure the
FAA can maintain its hiring, training, and staffing plans until a full-
year appropriations bill can be passed.
Air Traffic Control Infrastructure
Question 2. Smaller regional airports provide a vital link to the
rest of the world for many rural communities, particularly for both
residents and businesses in my state that rely on them to connect to
the Twin Cities and beyond. At the Duluth International Airport, the
current air traffic tower is 70 years old, making it one of the oldest
towers in the country. It does not meet current Federal Aviation
Administration line-of-sight requirements, and it needs significant
repairs. I've been fighting to get them the funding to build a new one.
What do you see as the biggest obstacles for building out
infrastructure to support air traffic controllers?
Answer. The FAA operates more than 300 ATC facilities of varying
ages and conditions. NATCA has been and continues to advocate for
additional funding to repair and replace the FAA's physical
infrastructure. Although the FAA has begun the process of addressing
its rapidly aging infrastructure through a combination of realignments,
sustaining and maintaining some facilities, and replacing a handful of
others, that process has been slow and hampered by funding disruptions
and limitations. The landmark, bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and
Jobs Act (IIJA) was a huge step in the right direction in addressing
these issues, but it will not be enough on its own.
Some of the biggest hurdles, beyond funding limitations, include
significantly-high vendor costs, flawed FAA/vendor contracts, and
vendor inability to provide product that meets FAA's needs and
standards.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
Dave Spero
1. Pace of Modernization
The GAO report has highlighted that many of the safety critical
systems currently operating are well past their planned service life.
It is, though, clear to me the endurance of these systems is a
testament to the quality of the Kansas workforce that has been
manufacturing these systems for decades.
Congress has allocated $5 billion over 5 years for airspace system
infrastructure modernization, though the pace of deploying new
technologies, also produced in Kansas, could take years.
As an expert in the operations and maintenance of these
systems, is this a sustainable path forward?
Answer. The largest PASS bargaining unit at the FAA is the Air
Traffic Organization (ATO) Technical Operations unit, consisting of
technical employees who install, maintain, repair and certify the
radar, navigation, communication and power equipment that comprises the
U.S. National Airspace System (NAS).
Within Technical Operations, PASS represents FAA airway
transportation systems specialists, more commonly referred to as
technicians. Technicians ensure the functionality of communications,
computers, navigational aids and power systems vital to safe air travel
and the mission of pilots and air traffic controllers. Technicians
maintain aging systems while simultaneously interfacing with highly
technical, state of the art cloud-based solutions, and this is often
overlooked.
As emphasized in PASS's testimony, PASS-represented technicians in
the field have many concerns regarding issues with aging equipment and
the pace at which the equipment is being upgraded. Of utmost
importance, the correct number of technicians must be in place to
maintain the current equipment and assist in the implementation of new
equipment and technology. The amount of time it takes to upgrade one
system at hundreds of locations across the country can be considerable.
Without the right number of technicians in place to install the new
systems and equipment while also maintaining operations around the
country, the time to upgrade the system can take even longer.
While PASS appreciates the funding allocated by Congress for
airspace system infrastructure modernization, it is also essential to
recruit and retain the right number of employees to ensure a successful
modernization. For the FAA to do that, it needs to develop, in
collaboration with PASS, a workforce staffing model and implement it as
soon as possible. Once the staffing is appropriate a paradigm shift to
have our workforce install equipment across the NAS quicker and more
efficiently so it is not obsolete before it is completely installed
would accelerate aviation modernization.
2. NOTAM Improvement Act
Following the January 2023 Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) outage, I
was pleased to introduce with my colleagues, Sens. Klobuchar and
Capito, a bill to require FAA establish a task force to strengthen the
resiliency and cybersecurity of the NOTAM system. The bill was signed
into law in 2023, and the task force's report is expected early next
year.
Are there particular themes you expect to find in the
report?
How do you anticipate the findings and recommendations from
this report to complement GAO's findings to help bolster the
safety of the NAS ecosystem?
Answer. PASS expects the report to include themes that address but
are not limited to the following issues: ensuring NOTAMs are accurate,
timely, relevant, and contain pertinent information; best practices to
improve the accuracy and understandability of NOTAMs; how to educate
and work with air carriers, other airspace users and aviation service
providers; NOTAM cybersecurity, stability, and resiliency; and
training.
It is also likely that the report will determine if its
recommendations satisfy the National Transportation Safety Board's
safety recommendation A-18-024, which asks the FAA to ``establish a
group of human factors experts to review existing methods for
presenting flight operations information to pilots . . . to optimize
pilot review.'' \1\ By emphasizing human factors design, information
prioritization, stakeholder collaboration, and modernization of the
NOTAM system, these actions align with the NTSB's goal to enhance how
pilots receive and retain flight operations information, particularly
in critical situations such as what happened in the Air Canada 759
incident it references in the recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Taxiway Overflight Air
Canada Flight 759 Airbus A20-211, C-FKCK, San Francisco, California,
July 7, 2017.'' Report Number AIR-18-01. Adopted on September 25, 2018.
Published on October 11, 2018. https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/
recletters/A-18-023-029.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Limiting Factors
Page 7 of the GAO report highlights that a lack of spare parts for
certain systems is point of concern to maintaining these systems.
What are some of the limiting factors for part production?
Answer. In February, PASS was granted the opportunity to provide
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) with information regarding
135 FAA programs and services. In order to provide the GAO with the
most accurate and current information, PASS shared the list of programs
and services with Technical Operations employees throughout the country
and asked them to complete a survey. In addition to providing
information on systems not on the GAO's list, the results of the survey
indicate top concerns are related to aging equipment, cumbersome
procedures, parts that are unreliable or unavailable, system
complexity, and staffing and training of the workforce. At the rapid
pace with which technology changes, the FAA is getting further behind
in replacing aging systems.
For instance, a PASS member who was surveyed cited key concerns
with the High Intensity Approach Lighting System with Sequenced
Flashing Lights (ALSF-2). The ALSF-2 is an approach lighting system
(ALS), which provides the basic means to transition from instrument
flight to visual flight for landing. This provides visual information
on runway alignment, height perception, roll guidance and horizontal
references for Category II/III instrument approaches.
ALSF is critical for an airport in low visibility weather
situations. If it is not working, the airport is downgraded, which
means some aircraft cannot land. An ALSF system failure would
constitute significant delays to an airport and the NAS overall in
instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions. However, due to the age of
this system, light rebuild kits for ALSF are not reliable. Lighted
navigational aids require regular parts replacement and fail often. If
an outdated replacement part is either unreliable or unavailable, the
impact on the system could be far-reaching.
While PASS is not involved with the production of parts, the union
concurs that the lack of spare parts is concerning. PASS stands ready
to assist with a further review of issues related to the availability
of parts.
4. Workforce
The GAO report highlighted challenges not new to the FAA:
workforce--and difficulties recruiting technicians with the skills
required to maintain some of these older systems.
In your testimony, you indicated it can take up to three years to
fully train a technician to perform necessary duties related to a
position. As noted in the report, the systems your workforce is
responsible for maintaining are outdated and technologies no longer
commonly taught at technical schools.
To what degree does this situation exacerbate the training
challenge?
As indicated in PASS's testimony, hiring and training new
technicians is not a quick or easy process. FAA technicians must be
skilled and proficient on multiple systems. It can take up to three
years to fully train an FAA technician to perform all necessary duties
related to the position. Furthermore, the FAA is still playing catch up
after its training academy in Oklahoma City was shuttered during the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Exacerbating the issue is the fact that the FAA training for many
aging systems and equipment is not offered very often. This is another
reason the current workforce is essential. The knowledge and skills
these employees have are vital to the continued operation of the
system. We must utilize the technicians' knowledge working these
programs to provide on the job training to a new generation of
technicians before they retire. We cannot let this knowledge walk out
the door when they retire. FAA employees must be trained to maintain
and certify all systems and equipment in the aviation system--both
current and those newly introduced.
Are there ways industry and Congress can work together to
provide technical programs to better equip current and future
technicians for their jobs, with the systems-wide modernization
and replacement in mind?
Answer. The FAA must address aging systems and equipment throughout
the National Airspace System (NAS) based on careful analysis combined
with efficient and effective action. Given the pace of technology, many
systems and equipment are on the path to becoming outdated every day.
The technician workforce can be instrumental in assisting the agency in
ensuring successful implementation and updates throughout the NAS.
PASS believes there are many ways industry and Congress can
collaborate to better equip current and future technicians.
Congressional inquiry and legislation is essential to securing both
attention and funding for many aspects of the aviation system. But
without the FAA's commitment to action, little can be accomplished.
For example, PASS thanks lawmakers for including language in the
2024 FAA reauthorization bill directing the agency to install 15
taxpayer-purchased instrument landing systems (ILS) that are in storage
in Independence, Missouri. The technicians PASS represents are ready
and capable of completing this task when fully staffed. This pilot
program can be an example of how we can save time and taxpayer dollars
by utilizing the Federal workforce. This is a prime example of the FAA
taking steps toward identifying a solution but then failing to complete
the work to implement it. While the language in the reauthorization law
directs the FAA to install the ILS within 18 months of the law's
passage (May 2024), PASS's attempts to coordinate with the agency to
begin the project have gone unreturned. As far as PASS knows, the
equipment--paid for by the taxpayer--is still not in service.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to
Dave Spero
With the persistent challenges faced by Congress and the FAA to
budget for air traffic control modernization, there have periodically
been suggestions to spin off the air traffic control systems into a
private or quasi-private entity.
I have deep reservations about any proposal to transfer the FAA's
air traffic facilities to a quasi-private corporation and allow it,
rather than Congress, to make decisions on where funding should be
spent and how much tax general aviators should pay. This threatens to
leave rural communities largely ignored.
The 582 airports out of 600 in Alaska that do not have air traffic
control would receive little if any funding for upgrades and new
technology, and it is unclear what would happen to the 400 navigation
aids that Alaskans depend on. The largest hubs would receive the lion's
share of the funding leaving states like Alaska with no recourse.
Question 1. Do you agree that Congress is in the best position to
allocate resources between the few dozen airports serving larger cities
and the thousands of general aviation airports and facilities serving
rural America?
Answer. PASS has been opposed to any attempt to privatize the
aviation system. We have consistently maintained that the U.S.
government is the only entity that should be responsible for the safe
and efficient operation of this country's aviation system. This
country's aviation system is clearly valuable both in terms of economic
impact and services provided. It is obvious that such an asset should
be properly funded and overseen. Privatizing the air traffic control
system would do neither.
In fact, congressional oversight would be severely curtailed and
that congressional oversight ensures that the flying public has a voice
when it comes to aviation-related issues. This is even more essential
in Alaska and other rural or smaller environments. Many smaller
airports across the country are dependent on congressional involvement
and support in order to continue to operate. Under a private model,
local cities and towns could be increasingly saddled with the costs of
keeping their airports open and maintained properly.
PASS agrees that Congress should continue to allocate aviation
resources throughout the country.
Similarly, I have concerns over a non-public entity making
decisions regarding the allocation of airspace. In Anchorage for
example, airspace is shared among Ted Stevens International, Merrill
Field, one of the largest general aviation airports in the country,
Lake Hood, the world's largest floatplane airport, and major military
airfields which conduct air training activities.
With more licensed pilots per capita than any state in the union we
have (9,428 active pilots), we have an extremely active General
Aviation community in Alaska. Allocating air space among these diverse
users should be determined by a government entity, not a private
organization.
Question 2. Do you agree that airspace should be available to all
users, including those serving small towns and villages as well as
individuals as it is currently?
Answer. PASS firmly believes that airspace should be available to
all licensed and certified users throughout the system. Our air traffic
control system is a national public asset and PASS strongly believes it
should remain in the public trust.
Allowing any entity other than the U.S. government to allocate
airspace would place such decisions in the hands of a private entity
not focused on what is best for the country overall. Furthermore,
Americans in rural areas rely on their local, smaller airports for
employment, commerce and transportation. Many of these smaller airports
will not have a congressional advocate under a private model and it is
possible that a nongovernmental entity would do away with Essential Air
Service program. It is feasible that a corporation would not focus on
maintaining these facilities if they are not profitable, essentially
shrinking this country's airspace.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Dave Spero
Safety Risk Analysis of FAA's Technician Workforce: In addition to
aviation safety inspectors, Professional Aviation Safety Specialists
(PASS) represents FAA employees who play an integral role in operating,
maintaining, and certifying air traffic control systems. This includes
FAA's technical operations workforce made up of airway transportation
systems specialists, commonly referred to as technicians. However, as
air traffic systems age, so does the workforce that has the knowledge
and expertise to operate and maintain these systems.
Question 1. Has FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO) conducted a
safety risk management (SRM) analysis with respect to the technician
workforce to evaluate staffing challenges associated with operating
aging systems?
Answer. The Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO
(PASS) appreciates the opportunity to address these questions and
concerns. As indicated in the question submitted by Hon. Maria
Cantwell, the FAA's Technical Operations workforce is responsible for
maintaining and certifying this country's aviation system and, as the
system ages, so too does the workforce.
While the FAA has a process in place for conducting safety risk
management (SRM) analyses, the primary objective of SRM is to provide
information regarding hazards, safety risk and safety risk mitigations
to agency decision-makers. The target of such analyses is usually
safety risks outside of the makeup of the workforce. This means that
while the SRM is able to identify certain risks and hazards, PASS is
not aware of the agency using this method to examine its staffing
challenges. The FAA should apply SRM to workforce and staffing issues.
Question 2. Has ATO done such an analysis to determine the number
of technicians it needs per FAA facility to ensure the safe and
reliable operation of ATC systems in the National Airspace System? If
so, what has been the level of coordination between ATO and PASS in
assessing and developing solutions to this staffing issue?
Answer. PASS has long called attention to not only the need for
sufficient technical staffing but also the lack of a reliable staffing
model on which to base staffing decisions and placement. As stated in
PASS's written testimony, the FAA has been developing the Technical
Operations staffing model (TSM) for over a decade and the agency is
aware that the workforce is short at least 800 technicians.
PASS has concerns that the FAA's current strategy is not taking
into consideration all the necessary data to determine the optimum
number of technicians. PASS has provided input and assisted the FAA on
attempts to establish an adequate workforce plan, but the union feels
as if the agency is not fully cooperating with PASS to develop such a
plan. As always, the union stands ready to assist the FAA with a
staffing plan that will take into consideration all the elements of the
position, including the responsibility of ensuring the safe and
efficient operation of aging and new systems and equipment.
Air Traffic Specialist and Technician Workforce Shortages: Due to
severe FAA technician staffing shortages in some areas of the air
traffic control system, the responsibility of keeping some systems
running falls on one FAA employee. At the San Antonio System Support
Center,
for instance, at the hearing date there was just one full-time
certified technician responsible for servicing three long-range radar
sites within hundreds of miles from San Antonio. He has since been
promoted and there is not a certified technician in this area to
maintain the three long-range radars. And overall, the FAA is short at
least 800 technicians throughout the National Airspace System.
Question 3. While we are grateful to dedicated FAA employees who
make it possible to maintain aging systems that still perform key
safety functions, do you believe these technician workforce shortages
insert operational safety risks into the National Airspace System?
Would you agree short-staffed FAA facilities expose single points of
failure in how FAA operates air traffic systems?
Answer. PASS is extremely concerned that the technician staffing
shortages introduce additional risk into the National Airspace System
(NAS). Insufficient technician staffing can result in increased
restoration times and more air traffic delays during an outage. It can
also make it difficult to ensure adequate shift coverage by
technicians, another scenario that increases the risk of major air
traffic issues.
For example, as PASS discussed in testimony presented in July to
the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Aviation
Subcommittee, an incident over the summer with a radar system caused a
ground stop when no technician was on site with the requisite skills to
fix the issue. Just a few weeks later at the same airport, a power
supply failure led to another ground stop. The failure was resolved
quickly yet required an off-duty technician to intervene to restore it
to service. Again, there was no technician with that skillset on duty.
Even brief ground stops have a ripple effect across the NAS. These two
problems would have been resolved immediately if the agency had the
right number of people with the right training in place.
While the FAA acknowledges that it is short at least 800
technicians, PASS and the employees we represent have serious concerns
that this number is far higher. The FAA is not taking into
consideration many factors that go into a fully trained and capable
technician who is able to perform all duties required of the position.
PASS again emphasizes that we are prepared to assist the agency in
determining the right path forward to ensure adequate staffing at
facilities throughout the country.
Question 4. What is PASS doing in its own capacity to recruit more
FAA technicians, share knowledge about aging systems, and ensure they
receive proper training to enable them to respond in the event of a
system issue or outage?
Answer. FAA technicians must be skilled and proficient on multiple
systems. It can take up to three years to fully train an FAA technician
to perform all necessary duties related to the position. Unfortunately,
the FAA is still playing catch up after its training academy in
Oklahoma City was shuttered during the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition,
the FAA does not hire new technicians before experienced technicians
retire. That training and expertise walks out the door without
mentoring the next generation of employees. We encourage proactive
staffing so this expertise is taught to the next generation of
technicians.
PASS consistently expresses concern with the training of the
technician workforce and the ability of the FAA to keep current with
hiring and training new technicians. It is a long process because these
employees are tasked with such an important responsibility. However, in
order for the agency to function safely and efficiently, it is a
process that must be made a priority.
Furthermore, the membership of PASS is a diverse group of men and
women from across the country. PASS is focused on increasing efforts to
recruit new employees and retain the current workforce. Our members
serve on committees, organizations and boards tasked with building
interest and involvement in aviation. PASS members also participate in
tradeshows and events at schools specifically aimed at attracting youth
to a career in aviation. In addition, PASS worked closely with the FAA
to develop the Gateways Internship\1\ program to hire college and even
high school students as trainee technicians to receive practical, on-
the-job experience while still in school. But comprehensive training
for all technicians must remain paramount.
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\1\ Federal Aviation Administration, Gateways Program, https://
www.faa.gov/jobs/students/gateways, (accessed January 17, 2025).
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