    [Senate Hearing 118-717]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 118-717

                       U.S. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS,
                              PERSONNEL AND SAFETY
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION SAFETY,
                             OPERATIONS, AND INNOVATION

                                     OF THE

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                               DECEMBER 12, 2024

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                    Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    61-703 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                       MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair
    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             TED CRUZ, Texas, Ranking
    BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts         ROGER WICKER, Mississippi
    GARY PETERS, Michigan                DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             JERRY MORAN, Kansas
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois            DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    JON TESTER, Montana                  MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              TODD YOUNG, Indiana
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  TED BUDD, North Carolina
    BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico            ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
    JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado          J. D. VANCE, Ohio
    RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia             SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
    PETER WELCH, Vermont                     Virginia
                                         CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming
                       Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
                     Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
                         Jonathan Hale, General Counsel
                     Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
               Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
                         Liam McKenna, General Counsel
                                     ------

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION SAFETY, OPERATIONS, AND INNOVATION

    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois, Chair     JERRY MORAN, Kansas, Ranking
    JON TESTER, Montana                  JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              ROGER WICKER, Mississippi
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado          TODD YOUNG, Indiana
    RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on December 12, 2024................................     1
    Statement of Senator Duckworth...................................     1
    Statement of Senator Cruz........................................     3
    Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................     4
    Statement of Senator Rosen.......................................    50
    Statement of Senator Klobuchar...................................    52
    Statement of Senator Sullivan....................................    54
    Statement of Senator Welch.......................................    56

                                   Witnesses

    Kevin Walsh, Director, Information Technology and Cybersecurity,
      United States Government Accountability Office.................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................     8
    Dean Iacopelli, Chief of Staff, National Air Traffic Controller
      Association (NATCA)............................................    16
        Prepared statement...........................................    18
    Captain Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
      International..................................................    24
        Prepared statement...........................................    26
    Dave Spero, National President, Professional Aviation Safety
      Specialists, AFL-CIO (PASS)....................................    29
        Prepared statement...........................................    31
    Marc Scribner, Senior Transportation Policy Analyst, Reason
      Foundation.....................................................    36
        Prepared statement...........................................    37

                                    Appendix

    Response to written questions submitted to Kevin Walsh by:
        Hon. Jerry Moran.............................................    59
        Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................    62
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................    63
    Response to written questions submitted to Dean Iacopelli by:
        Hon. Jerry Moran.............................................    64
        Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................    65
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................    66
        Hon. Tammy Duckworth.........................................    67
        Hon. Amy Klobuchar...........................................    69
    Response to written questions submitted to Dave Spero by:
        Hon. Jerry Moran.............................................    70
        Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................    72
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................    73

             U.S. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS, PERSONNEL AND SAFETY

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2024

                                   U.S. Senate,
      Subcommittee on Aviation Safety, Operations, and
                                            Innovation,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:24 a.m.
    EST, in room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Tammy
    Duckworth, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Duckworth [presiding], Cantwell,
    Klobuchar, Rosen, Hickenlooper, Welch, Moran, Cruz, and
    Sullivan.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

        Senator Duckworth. Good morning. The Subcommittee on
    Aviation Safety, Operations, and Innovation will come to order.
    I want to welcome everyone to our hearing today, United States
    Air Traffic Control Systems, Personnel and Safety. This hearing
    is of vital importance to ensure the safety of our national
    airspace, and I want to thank our Chairwoman Cantwell, Ranking
    Member Cruz, and Ranking Member Moran for their help in making
    this hearing happen.
        Too much of our Nation's air traffic control equipment,
    technology, and infrastructure is outdated. Today we will have
    an opportunity to hear from stakeholders about the challenges
    these aging systems create for our air traffic controllers and
    what needs to be done to keep our airspace safe.
        We will be hearing from the Government Accountability
    Office of Information Technology and Cybersecurity Director,
    Kevin Walsh--thank you for being here; National Air Traffic
    Controller Association Chief of Staff, Dean Iacopelli--
    hopefully I said that correctly, thank you; Air Line Pilots
    Association President, Captain Jason Ambrosi--welcome;
    Professional Aviation Safety Specialists President, Dave
    Spero--thank you; and Reason Foundation Senior Transportation
    Policy Analyst Marc Scribner--thank you for being here.
        Before I proceed to my opening statement I want to just
    make a comment that I am saddened to learn of FAA Administrator
    Whitaker's plan to resign next month. His leadership has been
    invaluable during this critical time in aviation safety. His
    oversight of Boeing production has been essential, and I hope
    the efforts he spearheaded on that front will continue. Our
    aviation system is safer because of his service, and we are
    grateful to him for it.
        I will recognize myself for the opening statement.
        In the years immediately following the pandemic, we
    witnessed an alarming series of close calls in commercial
    aviation. Last year, we saw a terrifying image of a JetBlue
    flight attempting to land in Boston that came within 400 feet
    of a Learjet taking off. In Austin, we saw a FedEx cargo plane
    attempt to land on the same runway where a Southwest 737 was
    about to take off. The two aircraft came within less than 200
    feet of each other.
        Our Committee held hearings and worked in a bipartisan
    manner to pass an FAA Reauthorization Act to make our skies
    safer. The new law, which is still being implemented, makes
    important investments in air traffic controller staffing and
    surface detection technology.
        But we cannot rest on our laurels. Safety requires constant
    vigilance, which leads me to today's hearing. The safety of the
    flying public depends upon well-equipped air traffic control
    systems. Our air traffic controllers work tirelessly to manage
    our national airspace, but they rely on increasingly outdated
    facilities and equipment. Following the January 2023 NOTAM
    system outage, which resulted in 1,300 flight cancellations,
    nearly 10,000 delays, and a shutdown of the national airspace,
    the FAA conducted an operational risk assessment to evaluate
    the sustainability of all aircraft, all air traffic control
    systems.
        In September, drawing upon that work, the Government
    Accountability Office, the GAO, conducted its own analysis and
    issued a report warning, FAA actions are urgently needed to
    modernize aging systems. Fifty-one of our Nation's 138 air
    traffic control systems are unsustainable. That is more than
    one-third.
        According to the GAO, 17 of these systems are critical for
    safety and efficiency, yet FAA will not be able to modernize
    some for 10 to 13 years, and as of May 2024, did not even have
    investments planned for four of them. Some ATC equipment is
    getting so sold, service and replacement parts are no longer
    available. For example, replacement antennas are no longer
    available for beacons used to determine the location of some
    aircraft during the en route portion of their flight.
    Manufacturer support is no longer available for the most common
    types of equipment and instrument landing systems, which FAA
    maintains at our airports. Worse, when FAA replaces aging
    equipment, the process sometimes takes so long, the new
    equipment is outdated by the time it actually gets deployed.
        To be clear, keeping FAA properly equipped is not an
    entirely new issue. It has challenged lawmakers and
    administrations from both parties for decades. What is new,
    however, is the context in which we find ourselves. Our air
    traffic control equipment and facilities are aging while our
    system is still under post-pandemic stress and contending with
    rising demand.
        Close calls are still happening. A few notable examples
    from this year demonstrate the type of safety risks that we are
    seeing. In April, a JetBlue Embraer 190 had to abort takeoff at
    Reagan National Airport when a Southwest 737 was about to cross
    the same runway. In May, an American A319 had to abort takeoff
    at DCA after reaching about 100 miles per hour because a
    smaller plane was on a final approach to an intersecting
    runway. In September, an Alaska Airline 737 aborted takeoff in
    Nashville to avoid a Southwest 737 that was about to cross the
    same runway. The Alaska plane braked so hard its tires blew
    out, reportedly.
        There is a growing consensus across a wide range of
    aviation stakeholders that Congress needs to address this
    issue. We need modern, sustainable air traffic control systems
    to keep the flying public safe, and I look forward to hearing
    from our witnesses about how best we can achieve that.
        And since Ranking Member Moran is not here for his
    statement, I will recognize our Chairwoman, Chairwoman
    Cantwell, for her opening statement. Oh, is he here? Oh,
    Senator Cruz.

                      STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair. Before I begin I want
    to comment on the announcement this morning that Michael
    Whitaker will resign on January 20. I want to thank him for his
    service. He was confirmed without a single no vote, a testament
    to his experience, his judgment, and his apolitical nature.
    When he took the job I asked him to focus on keeping the flying
    public safe and to stay out of politics, and he has ably led
    the agency during a challenging period, and I want to thank him
    for his public service.
        On January 11, 2023, the Nation experienced its first
    nationwide ground stop of air travel since 9/11. This ground
    stop resulted in roughly 10,000 flights being canceled and days
    of delays for travelers. What could have prompted this
    grounding of air travel? It was not weather or some airline
    experiencing operational difficulties. It was because the FAA's
    NOTAM system, which delivers crucial safety information to
    pilots, experienced a technical glitch.
        NOTAM has been used since 1947, and while the technology
    has evolved from the original telephone system, the current
    system has not been updated in over a decade. In fact, the most
    recent change to NOTAM was when the Biden administration
    changed Notice to Airmen to Notice to Air Missions. I think the
    American people would have preferred the Administration focus
    on modernizing the antiquated system over obsession on gendered
    language.
        In response to this massive failure, the FAA conducted a
    review of more than 100 critical systems for air traffic in
    this country. Notably, of the systems the FAA evaluated,
    roughly a third of these systems were unsustainable. Even more
    concerning, the Government Accountability Office, the GAO,
    looked at the FAA's assessment and discovered that the FAA did
    not have plans to modernize 17 systems that were, quote, ``most
    at risk.'' This is completely unacceptable.
        Air traffic facilities and radars need improvement. Based
    on FAA data, the reliability of the FAA's radar fleet is
    declining. They are online less often, unscheduled and
    scheduled outages last longer, and it takes longer to restore
    service when radar does break down. The United States should be
    a leader in aviation technology. Sadly, this is often not the
    case.
        Not only does the report deliver a harsh assessment of
    decades of sustainment efforts, it also presents a bleak
    picture when one considers the funding wasted on doomed
    projects. For example, the GAO identified one ATC system that
    needed additional funding for modernization just two years
    after it was completed. Other projects took more than 10 years
    to complete, becoming obsolete almost as soon as they were
    deployed.
        The FAA has long been plagued by difficulties in
    maintaining and modernization ATC systems, especially the
    NextGen project. NextGen was first developed in the early
    2000s, and has largely failed to deliver on the promised
    benefits. As projects finish, they quickly become outdated,
    underscoring the problem of such slow modernization. The FAA
    Reauthorization Act of 2024 addresses the problems with
    NextGen, requiring the FAA to finish development of NextGen and
    to sunset the office by the end of next year.
        Before the FAA can embark on another wholesale
    modernization project, the law requires the FAA to present the
    business case for the project to Congress, ensuring that the
    FAA conducts the analyses necessary to identify feasible
    benchmarks for the NAS before starting the next big project.
    The breadth, scale, and sheer number of these challenges should
    cause us to question the fundamental structure and operations
    of the FAA. Is this the right model for air traffic control?
        Experts across the political spectrum agree that there is a
    need for stakeholders to come together and discuss the path
    forward. In November 2023, the National Airspace System's
    Safety Review Team, appointed by the FAA, submitted an
    independent report to the FAA and to Congress focused on
    improving safety in the NAS, which included evaluating the
    reliability of the air traffic organization and the NAS.
        Administrator Michael Whitaker has also said the aviation
    community should be evaluating alternatives to insulate the
    agency from political disruptions. I agree. Congress should
    discuss and consider creative alternatives to ensure that the
    national airspace system reliably works for all users,
    particularly as new aviation transportation technology enters
    the market.
        The conclusions from the GAO report are numerous, but they
    all point to one clear conclusion: the status quo of how the
    FAA modernizes our ATC is unacceptable. Our nation should be
    the leader in the field, and instead we are stuck with
    technology that is outdated almost as soon as it is introduced
    into the airspace.
        I applaud the thousands of air traffic controllers who
    safely manage thousands of flights, but broader conversations
    about how we modernize our air traffic system are desperately
    needed. The American people deserve an operation that uses its
    funding wisely, is innovative while ensuring safety, and is
    also world-leading in reliability. As Chairman next year, I
    intend to focus heavily on the status of the airspace and what
    changes may be necessary to enhance its efficiency and
    reliability. Thank you.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Ranking Member Cruz. I now
    recognize Chairwoman Cantwell.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

        Chair Cantwell. Thank you, Senator Duckworth, for having
    this important hearing this morning on aviation safety. Like
    you, I am saddened and surprised to hear of Administrator
    Whitaker's decision to step down in January 2025.
        I know this, that if you want to be the leader in aviation
    you have to be the leader in aviation safety. I think
    Administrator Whitaker was living by that motto. I hope that
    the next Administrator will live by it as well. The next
    Administrator needs to be ready on day one to continue the job
    of restoring the FAA's safety culture and providing real
    oversight of the aviation sector.
        This Committee has done good work looking at not just what
    manufacturers must do, but making sure that the FAA does its
    oversight role and responsibility.
        So we look forward to this opportunity to continue the work
    with Chairman-to-be Cruz in January, and with you, Senator
    Duckworth, on the very, very important technology challenges
    that we face in the FAA. And I will have more to say about
    Administrator Whitaker later today.
        Last year's outage of the FAA NOTAM system underscored that
    the FAA, like airlines, must have a backup system and
    redundancy. We need to have the FAA meet the same standards.
        So this hearing--and I want again to thank you for your
    leadership during the 118th Congress, Senator Duckworth,
    because serving as an aviator yourself, and certainly the
    intelligence that you bring to these technology issues, have
    helped us solve many issues.
        Getting aviation infrastructure right, whether it is the
    air traffic controller system, sustainable aviation fuel, next
    generation, or important issues like thermal plastics and
    composites, all of these are about winning the next 100 years
    of aviation.
        Our country has been blessed to be leaders in aviation, but
    we can see the competition coming, and we can see the
    challenges of implementing safety.
        According to the Airports Council-North America, every
    dollar invested in aviation infrastructure yields $2.5 dollars
    in aviation infrastructure growth, and importantly, it helps us
    stay on top of those aviation safety priorities.
        We have been spurred to action obviously by the horrible
    crashes that we witnessed with both Ethiopian Airlines Flight
    302 and the Lion Air Flight 610, which pushed us to pass ACSAA.
    And in the aftermath of that, the Alaska Airlines 1282 flight
    blow out renewed the focus even more on production quality.
        On January 12, several days after the incident, the FAA
    Administrator chose to strengthen its oversight of
    manufacturing and initiated an audit. Four days later, Senator
    Duckworth and I made sure that we petitioned the 737 MAX-7's
    deicing system, and Boeing withdrew that and pledged to work on
    fixing that, and we are still seeing this play out.
        Today's hearing marks the 12th hearing that our Committee
    has had, building on 7 hearings in the 117th Congress. So it is
    safe to say, with Senator Cruz's remarks, that we will continue
    to be laser focused on aviation safety and technology.
        NTSB Chairman Homendy and others testified on the spike of
    near misses and close calls that we were seeing, and Chair
    Homendy has been before the Committee several times to discuss
    the continued investigation of the Alaska Airlines door plug
    blowout.
        We brought in airline CEOs, labor leaders and talked about
    the success that we have seen, and what we need to do to keep
    going past our COVID-19 pandemic considerations.
        We put our money where our mouth is and set a table for a
    FAA reauthorization law, and all of the Committee worked very
    diligently to get that over the goal line. Again, I want to
    thank Senator Cruz for his work on that.
        The FAA law reauthorized both the FAA and NTSB for an
    additional five years to help keep safe 3 million daily
    passengers in the United States. It gives the FAA the resources
    it needs and makes sure that the Nation's aviation safety
    regulator does set that gold standard.
        The law provides NTSB, the Nation's safety watchdog, with
    the highest funding authorization it has received, to make sure
    that we hire the investigators needed to complete their
    mission. And the reauthorization invests in the well-being of
    our aviation workforce, giving them new tools, training, and
    platforms to thrive.
        Senator Duckworth, again, thank you for holding this
    hearing this morning. I look forward to your continued
    leadership in this very important role of aviation technology
    advancement and meeting our safety standards. Thank you.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Chair Cantwell. We will now
    proceed to witness testimony. First I would like to recognize
    Mr. Kevin Walsh from the Government Accountability Office for
    his statement.

                  STATEMENT OF KEVIN WALSH, DIRECTOR,

               INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CYBERSECURITY,

             UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Mr. Walsh. Chair, Ranking Member, and members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for inviting GAO to testify on this
    important issue.
        The FAA's air traffic controllers rely on 138 systems that
    monitor weather, conduct navigation and surveillance, and
    manage communications. More than half of these systems are
    older than 20 years. Some are more than 60 years old. As a
    reminder, 20 years ago Facebook was launched, and 60-year-old
    systems may have been active when JFK was President.
        Unsurprisingly, these FAA systems have long-standing issues
    with the availability of parts and the retirement of
    knowledgeable technicians. Generally, legacy systems contribute
    to unmet mission needs, staffing issues, and increased costs.
    That matches with what we are seeing at the FAA.
        Further, their prior modernization efforts have been
    fraught with unrealistic baselines, cost and schedule overruns,
    unanticipated requirements, and poor oversight. The expected
    growth in air travel over the coming years will not help those
    issues.
        As part of our recent report we reviewed selected efforts
    to modernize dozens of air traffic control systems and found
    that, on average, the FAA took more than four years to create a
    baseline, that is expected cost, schedule, and performance of a
    project. We also noted that such pre-baseline investments
    received limited oversight from FAA. After establishing a
    baseline, these modernizations plan to take a further 12.5
    years to complete deployment, on average.
        Prolonged timeframes like this will impact FAA's mission.
    For example, the En Route Automation Modernization was
    completed in 2015, after a 10-year effort, but it was deployed
    without data technology, which required a major refresh soon
    thereafter.
        Back to the 138 air traffic control systems. To its credit,
    the FAA reviewed the systems to gauge how easy they are to
    maintain, as well as the operational impact of those systems.
    The FAA expects to use this assessment going forward to
    prioritize its modernization efforts. That assessment found
    that 33 of the air traffic control systems, 24 percent, had
    adequate funding and spare parts. The remaining 105 had
    differing degrees of shortages or potential shortages in spares
    and funding. Many of them also had limited staff expertise and
    did not meet mission needs.
        Confirming those issues, Mr. Spero's organization kindly
    asked its members some questions on our behalf, and their top
    issues were also obsolete systems, difficulties finding parts,
    and staffing shortfalls.
        Worryingly, FAA's assessment showed that 58 of the systems
    with shortages or shortfalls have a critical operational
    impact. Amongst them we identified 17 that we felt were
    especially concerning given their age, sustainability, and
    operational impact. Of those, the earliest of those 17
    modernizations is planned to finish in six years. Some are
    planned to be completed in 10 to 13 years, and four do not have
    ongoing modernization efforts.
        We also found that the FAA's Acquisition Oversight Council
    had not ensured that investments delivered functionality in
    smaller segments, and had not consistently monitored high
    risks. We also noted the Council made decisions based on
    incomplete data and documentation.
        Despite this, flying is safe. But continuing to rely on
    these legacy systems diminishes the margin of safety and adds
    stress to the national airspace. To that end, FAA needs to
    break modernizations into smaller pieces, deliver functionality
    quicker, and improve accountability.
        I hope that this hearing is a catalyst for action, but
    there is no easy answer or quick fix. A snap of Ironman's
    fingers cannot fix this. This will be the work of many years
    and billions of dollars.
        This concludes my statement, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Walsh follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Kevin Walsh, Director, Information Technology and
         Cybersecurity, United States Government Accountability Office

        Chair Duckworth, Ranking Member Moran, and Members of the
    Subcommittee:

        I am pleased to participate in today's hearing on the impact of the
    Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) aging systems supporting the
    national airspace and air traffic control (ATC). As an agency of the
    Department of Transportation, FAA's mission is to promote the safe,
    orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic in the national airspace.
    To ensure FAA's mission is met, air traffic controllers are to manage
    communications; monitor weather, navigation, and surveillance; and
    direct aircraft from takeoff to landing. Controllers manage up to
    50,000 flights per day. FAA anticipates continued growth and congestion
    in the airspace, forecasting that air travel will increase annually on
    average by 6.2 percent.
        Over the past several decades, FAA has been experiencing challenges
    with aging ATC systems. These challenges are due to, among other
    things, unavailability of parts, reduced technical expertise in
    outdated technologies, and growth in airspace demand.
        My statement today discusses the results of our recently issued
    report that, among other things, (1) identified FAA's unsustainable and
    potentially unsustainable ATC systems, (2) assessed the extent to which
    FAA has ongoing investments to modernize unsustainable and potentially
    unsustainable systems, and (3) examined the progress FAA has made in
    baselining and implementing selected modernization investments.\1\
    Detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology for that
    work can be found in the issued report. In addition, we followed up
    with Department of Transportation and FAA officials in December 2024 to
    determine what actions they had taken to implement our recommendations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA Actions Are Urgently Needed to
    Modernize Aging Systems, GAO-24-107001 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23,
    2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
    standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
    sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
    findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
    the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
    conclusions based on our audit objectives.
    Background
        To ensure FAA's mission is met, air traffic controllers rely on
    numerous complex systems to monitor communications and weather and
    provide navigation and surveillance services during the various phases
    of flight. Figure 1 provides a simplified view of air traffic control
    within the national airspace.

        FAA has had longstanding challenges with maintaining aging ATC
    systems.\2\ According to FAA officials, these challenges are due to the
    unavailability of parts and retirement of technicians with expertise in
    maintaining the aging systems. In addition, there has been dramatic
    growth in airspace demand since the older systems were initially
    implemented. This has adversely impacted the ability of those systems
    to continue to support mission needs.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ ATC systems support a variety of air traffic control
    operations, including navigation, weather, surveillance,
    communications, and air traffic optimization.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These challenges can impact FAA's ability to meet its mission. For
    example, the Notice to Air Missions system, which enables air traffic
    controllers to provide real-time updates to aircraft crew about
    critical flying situations relating to issues such as weather,
    congestion, and safety, is over 30 years old. On January 11, 2023, the
    system became unavailable to users. To ensure safety, FAA grounded all
    departing aircraft for about 2 hours to fix the system. The outage
    caused cancellations of over 1,300 flights and delayed almost 10,000
    other flights throughout the day. Some airlines took several days to
    fully recover.
        For over 4 decades we have reported on challenges facing FAA's
    modernization of its ATC systems.\3\ In February 1982, FAA released its
    first comprehensive plan for improving ATC services. At that time, FAA
    estimated that implementation of this national airspace modernization
    plan would cost about $10 billion with full benefits realized by the
    late 1990s.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ GAO, Examination of the Federal Aviation Administration's Plan
    for the National Airspace System--Interim Report, AFMD-82-66
    (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 1982).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As we subsequently reported in several products, FAA faced
    challenges with this modernization. Due to the many delays and overruns
    that FAA encountered, we designated FAA's ATC modernization as a new
    high-risk area in 1995.\4\ In doing so, we noted that the estimated
    cost of the overall modernization had ballooned to $36 billion, and the
    largest component had to be dramatically revamped. In continuing to
    identify FAA modernization as a high-risk area, in 2003 we reported
    that after 2 decades, FAA's ATC modernization was far from complete.
    Among the reasons for FAA's performance were that it did not (1)
    recognize the technical complexity of the effort, (2) realistically
    estimate the resources required, (3) adequately oversee its
    contractors' activities, and (4) effectively control system
    requirements.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Overview, HR-95-1 (Washington, D.C.:
    Feb. 1, 1995). We updated our concerns in subsequent high-risk reports
    in 1997 through 2007. For example, see GAO, High-Risk Series: An
    Overview, HR-97-1 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 1997); and High-Risk
    Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007). In
    2009, we noted that continued focus on ATC systems modernization was
    warranted as FAA began new modernization efforts. GAO, High-Risk
    Series: An Update, GAO-09-271 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 2009).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In 2003, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development Office
    to plan for and coordinate a transformation from the current ATC system
    to the next generation air transportation system (NextGen). NextGen is
    a multidecade, multibillion-dollar program to increase the safety and
    efficiency of air travel by transitioning from a ground-based ATC
    system that uses radar, to a system of systems based on satellite
    navigation and digital communications.\5\ FAA released its initial plan
    to implement NextGen in 2004.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ In 2003, the Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization
    Act mandated that FAA create and carry out a plan for modernizing its
    ATC systems. Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub.
    L. No. 108-176, Sec. 709, 117 Stat. 2490, 2582-2585 (2003).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We have reported that NextGen has had the following challenges: (1)
    software development complexity, (2) unanticipated system requirements,
    (3) insufficient stakeholder involvement during system development, and
    (4) unanticipated events, such as government shutdowns.\6\ These
    challenges have contributed to significant schedule delays.
    Specifically, while NextGen was initially planned to be completed by
    2025, as of November 2023, FAA did not anticipate completing NextGen
    until at least 2030.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ See examples of reports we have previously issued on NextGen:
    GAO, Air Traffic Control Modernization: Progress and Challenges in
    Implementing NextGen, GAO-17-450 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2017); Air
    Traffic Control Modernization: Management Challenges Associated with
    Program Costs Hinder NextGen Implementation, GAO-12-223 (Washington,
    D.C.: Feb. 16, 2012); and Next Generation Air Transportation System:
    Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the
    National Airspace System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Most recently, in November 2023, we reported that FAA had spent at
    least $14 billion on NextGen from Fiscal Years 2007 through 2022 and
    expected to spend about $22 billion in total through 2030.\7\ We found
    that FAA had made mixed progress meeting milestones in its ongoing
    effort to modernize air traffic management through the NextGen
    initiative.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ GAO, Air Traffic Control Modernization: Program Management
    Improvements Could Help FAA Address NextGen Delays and Challenges, GAO-
    24-105254 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2023).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This mixed progress has slowed FAA's NextGen efforts to improve the
    safety and efficiency of air travel and address growing congestion in
    the national airspace. For example, FAA met its milestone for deploying
    more reliable digital communication services at ATC towers. However, it
    did not deploy initial modernized services to all 20 facilities serving
    en route flights by its September 2021 milestone.
        We also reported that FAA officials and stakeholders stated that
    the COVID-19 pandemic was a major cause of schedule delays and cost
    increases, as it required FAA to redo work that had been completed
    prior to the pandemic. In March 2023, FAA officials estimated the
    financial impacts of COVID-19 to the NextGen program were $225 million.
        We further reported that while FAA officials noted that another key
    contributor to the program's mixed progress was that NextGen had a flat
    budget for several years, we found that the actual budget reported in
    FAA's congressional budget justification generally aligned with the
    amounts in the President's budget request. For example, as reflected in
    FAA's congressional budget justifications for Fiscal Years 2012 through
    2023, FAA's budget requests and actual budget for NextGen--including
    system deployment--have remained relatively constant at about $1
    billion annually.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ We used the actual budget amount FAA reflected in its
    congressional budget justification for each Fiscal Year, but for Fiscal
    Year 2022 used the continuing resolution budget amount FAA reported
    because the actual budget was not yet available at the time the
    congressional budget justification was developed.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    About One-Third of FAA ATC Systems Are Considered Unsustainable
        Lastly, we found that FAA's efforts to implement NextGen met four
    leading practices in program management but fell short in fully meeting
    five other practices. We made four recommendations to address the five
    deficiencies to improve FAA's management of NextGen. As of November
    2024, FAA had not implemented three of the four recommendations.
        During Fiscal Year 2023, FAA determined that of its 138 ATC
    systems, 51 (37 percent) were unsustainable and 54 (39 percent) were
    potentially unsustainable.\9\ Specifically, after the January 2023
    shutdown of the national airspace following the Notice to Air Missions
    outage, FAA officials conducted an operational risk assessment to
    evaluate the sustainability of all ATC systems.\10\ In addition, the
    assessment was intended to inform where FAA should focus future
    investments, funding, and risk reduction activities associated with ATC
    systems.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ The assessment identified 181 total systems. We excluded 43 of
    these systems that were classified as the responsibility of the
    Department of Defense or building facilities.
        \10\ FAA plans to continue conducting operational assessments of
    existing ATC systems on an annual basis. As of May 2024, FAA was
    developing a draft order to formalize this process.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The officials rated each of the 138 systems by their sustainability
    levels on a scale of A through E (rating A represented the least
    sustainable and rating E represented no sustainment issues). Systems
    with ratings A and B are unsustainable and C ratings are potentially
    unsustainable. Figure 2 summarizes the sustainability ratings of the
    ATC systems.

        FAA categorizes its ATC systems by criticality. Of the 105
    unsustainable or potentially unsustainable ATC systems,

       29 unsustainable and 29 potentially unsustainable systems
            have a critical operational impact on the safety and efficiency
            of the national airspace,

       16 unsustainable and 9 potentially unsustainable systems
            have a moderate operational impact on the safety and efficiency
            of the national airspace, and

       6 unsustainable and 16 potentially unsustainable systems
            were mission support systems and were not considered critical.

        See figure 3 for a summary of the 105 systems by criticality and
    sustainability.

        Moreover, the ages of the 105 systems vary significantly.
    Specifically,

       73 were deployed over 20 years ago, with 40 being deployed
            over 30 years ago, and six of those deployed over 60 years ago.

       32 systems were implemented within the past 20 years, with
            four as recently as 2020.

        FAA also reported that of the 105 unsustainable and potentially
    unsustainable systems, 74 systems (70 percent) face one or more
    challenges that are historically problematic of aging systems. These
    challenges include no longer meeting mission needs, difficulty finding
    spare parts, and limited technical staff with expertise in repairing
    the aging system. Specifically, the agency reported that 11 systems no
    longer met FAA mission needs, 62 systems were difficult to maintain due
    to challenges in finding employees with the requisite knowledge and
    expertise, and 61 systems involved difficulty in finding spare or
    replacement parts.
    FAA Has Ongoing Investments to Modernize At-Risk Systems but Did Not
            Always Establish Near-Term Plans
        These challenges pose risks to the operations of key ATC systems.
    According to a February 2024 response from FAA technicians, the top
    issue facing the agency is system obsolescence and difficulty in
    finding replacement parts.\11\ The response also indicated that
    inadequate staffing of FAA facilities posed a challenge to maintaining
    systems because some technicians were responsible for areas spanning
    hundreds of miles.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ In response to discussions with us, the Professional Aviation
    Safety Specialists (a labor union that represents, among others,
    national airspace safety inspectors and technicians) used a survey tool
    to solicit responses to our questions from member FAA employees who
    maintain the national airspace.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As of December 2023, the agency had 64 ongoing investments to
    modernize 90 of the 105 unsustainable and potentially unsustainable ATC
    systems. Collectively, the systems are intended to be modernized
    between 2023 through 2038. FAA did not have an associated modernization
    investment for the remaining 15 systems.
        However, FAA has been slow to modernize some of the most critical
    and at-risk systems. Specifically, when considering age, sustainability
    ratings, operational impact level, and expected date of modernization
    or replacement for each system, as of May 2024, FAA had 17 systems that
    were especially concerning. The 17 systems range from as few as 2 years
    old to as many as 50 years old, are unsustainable, and are critical to
    the safety and efficiency of the national airspace. However, the
    investments intended to modernize or replace these 17 systems are not
    planned to be completed for at least 6 more years. In some cases, they
    were not to be completed for at least 10 years.
        In addition, of the 15 systems that FAA does not have an associated
    ongoing modernization investment, four are critical systems and it is
    unknown when the associated systems will be modernized or replaced.
    (The remaining 11 systems were of moderate to low operational impact or
    only potentially unsustainable and not as much of an immediate
    concern.) Table 1 provides the key factors of the most critical and at-
    risk ATC systems.

        a This table omits the official names of the 17 systems
    due to sensitivity concerns. We used generic designations instead.

        b In 2023 FAA officials conducted an operational risk
    assessment to evaluate the sustainability of all ATC systems. The
    officials rated each of the 138 systems by their sustainability levels
    on a scale of A through E (rating A represented the least sustainable
    and rating E represented no sustainment issues). Systems with ratings A
    are considered unsustainable because they have significant sparing
    shortages, shortfalls in sustainment funding, and little or no
    technology refresh funding is available. System with ratings B are
    considered unsustainable because they have significant shortfalls in
    sustainment funding or capability.

        c According to FAA officials in May 2024, the agency is
    taking steps to mitigate priority deficiencies for this system. These
    efforts are being addressed in operations, rather than through a
    technical refresh or sustainment investment.

        In addition, the key goals of the 2023 operational risk assessment
    were to identify where FAA should focus future investments, funding,
    and risk reduction activities associated with ATC systems. FAA
    officials stated that they used the assessment to determine that the
    agency had sufficient backup systems and redundancies in place to
    enable it to avoid a catastrophic incident.
        However, according to officials, FAA did not use the results of the
    2023 operational risk assessment to prioritize or establish near-term
    plans to modernize all unsustainable and critical systems identified in
    its assessment. Specifically, as mentioned previously, FAA has four at-
    risk systems that do not have any near-term plans for modernization.
    Officials stated that they did not use the 2023 assessment to
    prioritize modernization investments because it was not completed in
    time to inform a 2024 enterprise architecture update.\12\ Officials
    stated that they plan to use the results of the 2024 operational risk
    assessment to inform future budget decisions and plans for
    modernization.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ Each year, FAA updates the national airspace enterprise
    architecture roadmaps that highlight a 15-year view of modernization of
    the national airspace and a list of investments associated with each
    roadmap. The roadmaps include acquisition milestones as defined by the
    FAA acquisition management policy and any interdependencies between the
    investments. This helps to facilitate planning and scheduling for the
    approval, funding, acquisition, and deployment of related systems,
    equipment, or capabilities. Proposed capital investments must be
    presented to the JRC for review and approval before they begin. Once
    approved, an investment will be added to the national airspace
    enterprise architecture and be included in the President's budget
    submittal to Congress.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Without near-term modernization plans for these systems, critical
    ATC operations that these systems support may continue to be at-risk
    for over a decade before being modernized or replaced. Specifically,
    FAA can take well over a decade to implement modernization investments
    once initiated. Of the nine investments that we reviewed that had
    established cost, schedule, and performance baselines, FAA plans to
    take an average of 12 years and 8 months to complete all deployment
    activities. In addition, four of these investments plan to take as long
    as 15 to 19 years to implement. For example, while the Terminal Flight
    Data Manager modernization investment was initiated in September 2010,
    as of May 2024, FAA estimated it will not be completed until 19 years
    later, in February 2030.\13\ Similarly, the Common Support Services-
    Weather system modernization investment was initiated in December 2010,
    but is not estimated to be completed until April 2026 (over 15 years
    later).\14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ The Terminal Flight Data Manager modernization investment is
    intended to support new services that provide automation to current,
    manually intensive operations and replaces critical, outdated systems
    in the national airspace. It shares electronic data among controllers,
    air traffic managers, aircraft operators, and airports. It also enables
    stakeholders to more efficiently stage arrivals and departures and
    manage surface traffic flow. As of May 2024, this investment was in the
    process of rebaselining, which may impact planned time frames.
        \14\ The Common Support Services-Weather project is intended to
    offer weather products for integration into air traffic decision
    support systems, improving the quality of traffic management decisions
    and reducing controller workload during severe weather. Products will
    be provided via a set of common web services for weather, using
    internationally recognized data access and data format standards.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 requires that by February 2026,
    FAA conduct an audit and report to Congress on the results to, among
    other things, determine the level of risk and impact associated with
    outdated, unsafe, or unstable legacy systems.\15\ The act also requires
    that the report provide recommendations for system replacements or
    enhancements.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ Pub. L. No. 118-63, 138 Stat. 1025 (2024)
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Selected Modernization Investments Took Years to Baseline and
            Progressed Slowly
        However, in the interim, Congress may not have important
    information on how FAA is mitigating risks related to critical systems.
    Accordingly, we recommended that FAA report to Congress on how it is
    mitigating risks of all unsustainable and critical systems that are
    identified in the annual operational risk assessments. Transportation
    concurred with our recommendation.
        According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), diligently
    tracking the execution of well-crafted plans can provide early warning
    of potential problems and enable timely and effective mitigation before
    problems spiral out of control.\16\ Baselined plans act as a guide
    throughout the life of an investment to provide a basis for measuring
    performance.\17\ In addition, according to FAA acquisition policy, once
    an investment establishes a baseline, the investment receives
    additional oversight from the Joint Resources Council (JRC)--FAA's
    executive acquisition governance board.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ OMB, Information Technology Investment Baseline Management
    Policy, M-10-27 (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 28, 2010).
        \17\ Baseline is defined as the approved costs, schedule, and
    performance goals for a given investment.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Of the 20 selected investments we reviewed, 11 of the investments
    were required to establish an acquisition program baseline, and nine of
    them did so accordingly.\18\ However, it often took several years after
    investment initiation to accomplish this. Specifically, eight of the 11
    selected investments took longer than 4 years to establish a baseline.
    The Next Generation Very High Frequency and Ultra High Frequency Air-
    to-Ground Communications Phase 2 investment took the longest amount of
    time at 6 years and 8 months.\19\ As another example, the Offshore
    Automation Phase 1 investment took 5 years and 6 months to establish a
    baseline.\20\ In addition, while the Aeronautical Information
    Management Modernization Enhancement 1 \21\ and FAA Enterprise Network
    Services\22\ investments were initiated over 6 years ago, as of May
    2024, neither had established an approved acquisition program baseline.
    FAA officials explained that some investments take a while to develop a
    baseline because of the complexity of the requirements or large number
    of affected stakeholders.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ We selected 20 of the 65 investments intended to replace
    unsustainable and potentially unsustainable ATC systems. Specifically,
    we selected the 20 investments based on, among other things, the
    operational impact on the safety and/or efficiency of the national
    airspace, acquisition type, and lifecycle cost. For each investment, we
    compiled cost, schedule, and descriptive information from investment
    planning and oversight documents, such as the acquisition program
    baselines, execution plans, and quarterly investment metrics from a
    centralized investment data repository. We performed reliability checks
    on the data against other data sources, such the IT Dashboard.
        \19\ The Next Generation Very High Frequency and Ultra High
    Frequency Air-to-Ground Communications Phase 2 modernization investment
    is intended to replace and modernize aging and obsolete air-to-ground
    analog radios that allow direct voice communication with pilots. These
    radios are to support Voice Over Internet Protocol and meet modern
    requirements.
        \20\ The Offshore Automation Phase 1 investment aims to develop
    system enhancements to increase the productivity, capacity, flight
    efficiency, safety, and system availability of the offshore sites in
    Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and Puerto Rico.
        \21\ The Aeronautical Information Management Modernization
    Enhancement 1 modernization investment is expected to consolidate
    redundant sources of aeronautical data (i.e., navigational aids and
    notices to air missions) and systems and provide the foundation to
    expand aeronautical information exchange among existing applications,
    air traffic management automation systems, and national airspace
    stakeholders.
        \22\ FAA Enterprise Network Services modernization investment is
    intended to provide FAA with modern ethernet/internet protocol
    telecommunications infrastructure (e.g., cabling) to, among other
    things, enable highly available and secure voice and data
    communications and networking capabilities needed to enable critical
    operations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As a result, these pre-baselined investments receive limited
    oversight from the JRC for several years. Specifically, while FAA
    acquisition policy states that baselined investments are required to
    attend quarterly oversight meetings with the JRC, these oversight
    requirements do not exist for investments that have not been baselined.
        In April 2024, FAA officials stated that they were in the initial
    phase of planning to establish greater accountability for investments
    prior to establishing a baseline. Specifically, officials stated that
    they are considering providing investments increased oversight when
    requesting additional resources for investment activities, beyond what
    was initially allocated, or when pre-baseline milestones are delayed.
    In May 2024, officials stated that FAA has not taken any further steps
    toward this goal.
        To address the lack of accountability of pre-baselined investment,
    we made two recommendations:

       FAA should establish a time frame for developing and
            implementing guidance to increase JRC oversight of pre-
            baselined investments that require additional resources or time
            prior to establishing a baseline.

       FAA should ensure that ATC modernization investments
            establish baselines in an expeditious manner.

        Transportation partially concurred with the first recommendation.
    To clarify our intention and address comments from Transportation, we
    added contextual language to this recommendation. The agency's planned
    actions should help meet the intent of our recommendation, if
    effectively implemented. Transportation concurred with the second
    recommendation. In December 2024, FAA officials stated that they do not
    have an update on actions they have taken to address these
    recommendations. They stated they would provide an update in March
    2025.
        In addition, we found that selected investments have progressed
    slowly. As discussed earlier, most of the selected modernization
    investments we reviewed plan to take many years before first deploying
    functionality and completing all deployment activities--with some
    taking as many as 15 to 19 years. Among other things, a key risk of
    slow system implementations is that the technology may be out of date
    by the time systems are implemented. For example, a November 2023
    National Airspace System Safety Review Team report found that while En
    Route Automation Modernization was initiated in 2004, it was not
    delivered until 10 years later.\23\ This process led to En Route
    Automation Modernization being deployed with outdated technology that
    needed a major technology refreshment within 5 years of implementation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \23\ National Airspace System Safety Review Team, Discussion and
    Recommendations to Address Risk in the National Airspace System
    (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2023).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We have previously reported that segmenting large complex system
    development and implementation efforts into smaller and more manageable
    increments has the potential to reduce risk and deliver capabilities
    more quickly.\24\ Since 2000, OMB has directed agencies to incorporate
    an incremental development approach into their policies and ensure that
    investments implement them.\25\ Further, since 2012, OMB has required
    that functionality be delivered to users at least every 6 months.\26\
    Consistent with OMB's guidance, FAA's acquisition management policy
    states that the JRC is responsible for reviewing and approving
    investments that are organized as manageable segments.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ GAO, Information Technology Reform: Agencies Need to Improve
    Certification of Incremental Development, GAO-18-148 (Washington, D.C.:
    Nov. 7, 2017); and High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-15-290 (Washington,
    D.C.: Feb. 11, 2015).
        \25\ OMB, Management of Federal Information Resources, Circular No.
    A-130 Revised, Transmittal Memorandum No. 4. OMB's 2012 and 2013
    guidance reaffirmed and strengthened these requirements. Executive
    Office of the President of the United States, OMB, Analytical
    Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2014,
    (Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2013), p. 354; and OMB, Contracting
    Guidance to Support Modular Development (Washington, D.C.: June 14,
    2012).
        \26\ OMB, FY 2016 IT Budget-Capital Planning Guidance (Washington,
    D.C.: May 23, 2014); Guidance on Exhibits 53 and 300--Information
    Technology and E-Government (2013); Guidance on Exhibits 53 and 300--
    Information Technology and E-Government (2012).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        However, the Council had not ensured that selected investments
    deliver functionality in manageable segments. For example, the JRC
    allowed two investments (i.e., Enterprise Information Display System
    phase 1 and NextGen Weather Processor), to proceed even though neither
    was organized in manageable segments to deliver functionality
    incrementally.\27\ Specifically, the Enterprise Information Display
    System phase 1 investment was initiated 8 years ago and had not
    delivered any functionality to users. Similarly, NextGen Weather
    Processor was initiated 14 years ago and had yet to deliver any
    functionality to users.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ The Enterprise Information Display Systems is intended to
    replace information display systems that display aircraft,
    aeronautical, and other types of information that are currently in use
    at approximately 400 facilities (e.g., air traffic control centers)
    with about 5,000 display systems. It was initiated in June 2016 and is
    estimated to be completed in December 2027. The NextGen Weather
    Processor is intended to replace FAA's aging weather processor systems
    and provide new capabilities, such as developing a common weather
    processing platform. This platform uses algorithms to create and
    display aviation-specific current and predicted weather. It was
    initiated in December 2010 and is estimated to be completed in April
    2026.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        FAA officials acknowledged that they should do more to identify
    opportunities to segment investments and deliver functionality to users
    more rapidly across all ATC system modernization investments.
        Specifically, in March 2024 the agency established a working group
    to develop guidance on segmenting investments. However, FAA officials
    did not provide specific time frames for developing and implementing
    this guidance.
        Accordingly, we recommended that FAA establish a time frame for
    developing and implementing guidance that the JRC ensures that ATC
    system modernization investments are organized as manageable segments.
    Transportation concurred with our recommendation. Similar to the
    previously discussed recommendations, in December 2024, FAA officials
    stated that they do not have an update on actions they have taken to
    address the recommendation. They stated they would provide an update in
    March 2025.
        In summary, FAA's reliance on a large percentage of aging and
    unsustainable or potentially unsustainable ATC systems introduces risks
    to FAA's ability to ensure the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of
    up to 50,000 flights per day. In our September 2024 report, we
    emphasized that while FAA has ongoing investments aimed at modernizing
    aging ATC systems, the agency's progress to modernize some of the most
    critical and at-risk systems has been slow. As such, in our report we
    made seven recommendations to FAA aimed at, among other things,
    improving accountability of the replacement of these systems and
    reducing the amount of time the agency takes to modernize them. FAA
    officials were unable to demonstrate any actions they are taking to
    address our recommendations; however, expeditious implementation of our
    seven recommendations will be vitally important to help the agency
    manage risks while it addresses its unsustainable systems.
        Chair Duckworth, Ranking Member Moran, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
    to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Walsh.
        I now recognize Mr. Dean Iacopelli from the National Air
    Traffic Controllers Association.

              STATEMENT OF DEAN IACOPELLI, CHIEF OF STAFF,

             NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION,

                                AFL-CIO

        Mr. Iacopelli. Good morning, Chair Duckworth, Chair
    Cantwell, and Ranking Member Cruz. Thank you for the
    opportunity to testify before you on this important subject.
        My name is Dean Iacopelli. I am Chief of Staff for the
    National Air Traffic Controllers Association, NATCA. I am a
    retired air traffic controller with over 30 years of
    experience, having been assigned to a facility responsible for
    separating aircraft in and around the New York City area.
        NATCA takes pride in our role as an aviation safety
    organization that stands shoulder-to-shoulder with Congress,
    the executive branch, and industry stakeholders to ensure that
    the national airspace system remains the safest and most
    efficient in the world. The 20,000 air traffic controllers and
    other aviation safety professionals represented by NATCA
    throughout the FAA, Department of Defense, and the Federal
    Contract Tower Program, are vital to the U.S. economy, ensuring
    the safe and efficient movement of millions of passengers and
    tons of cargo every day. Our mission is to ensure the flying
    public arrives home to their vacation, their business
    destination, without delay and while maintaining the highest
    margins of safety.
        I know that much of this hearing will be focused on safety
    and technology as well as funding for facilities and equipment,
    but I would be remiss if I did not first mention air traffic
    control staffing, which is the foundation of the air traffic
    control system. The national airspace system requires a
    sufficient number of trained air traffic controllers to meet
    the FAA's operational, statutory, and contractual requirements.
        Certified air traffic controllers are also vital to
    participating in the modernization, equipment, and procedures.
    We would like to thank this Committee for passing the FAA
    Reauthorization Act of 2024 with overwhelming bipartisan
    support. That law includes many critical provisions on hiring,
    training, and staffing, including directing the FAA to conduct
    maximum hiring for controllers for its duration. Congress has
    consistently provided the FAA with the resources it requests
    through both authorization of top-line numbers and the annual
    appropriations process.
        Currently one of the highest priorities for the FAA is to
    address the outdated FAA telecommunications infrastructure
    network, known as FTI. The FTI network affects radar displays
    that depict air traffic in real time and air-to-ground
    frequencies used to communicate with pilots. The network is
    largely comprised of copper wiring, which can no longer
    reliably meet the demand of the national airspace system.
    Recently, ground stops at airports in the New York City and
    Washington, D.C., areas highlight the consequences of a failure
    of the FTI network. The FAA must transition 4,600 sites away
    from copper wire and onto fiberoptic network to avoid extensive
    flight delays.
        The FAA operates more than 300 air traffic control
    facilities. The FAA's 21 air route traffic control centers were
    built in the 1960s, and have an average age of 62 years old.
    Fort Worth, Seattle, Kansas City, Chicago, and Houston centers
    are each between 59 and 64 years old.
        Our terminal facilities also require attention. The average
    FAA-operated tower is 36 years old. For example, Dallas-Fort
    Worth Airport has three air traffic control towers, which
    service one of the busiest airports in the country, the oldest
    of which is 50 years old.
        Many FAA facilities have exceeded their expected
    lifecycles. Others require new roofs, windows, HVAC systems,
    plumbing, and elevators. When major systems fail or facilities
    have structural problems, it can lead to flight delays or
    temporary airspace shutdowns. It is implausible to build the
    air traffic control system of the future in outdated and
    inadequate buildings.
        The national airspace system needs and deserves the best
    facilities and equipment to move this Nation's passengers and
    cargos. To sustain many of our legacy systems as well as to
    enhance and deploy new safety and modernization programs, the
    FAA projects that it will need $6 billion annually for its
    Facilities and Equipment account, which is a significant
    increase compared to recent years. Without this funding, along
    with continued focus on air traffic controller staffing, the
    FAA will struggle to maintain its capacity of the system, let
    alone modernize or expand it for new users and emerging
    technologies.
        NATCA's continued involvement as a productive and
    collaborative partner will ensure the FAA continues to deliver
    these initiatives to industry stakeholders and the flying
    public on time and at cost savings to the American taxpayers.
    If NATCA's trained and experienced representatives were not
    involved, many modernization programs would be delayed and
    experience cost overruns because they would need to go through
    costly and time-consuming revisions following the development,
    testing, and even after implementation.
        We look forward to working with this Committee, the
    Appropriations Committee, and the incoming administration to
    build on our successes and continue the safest period in
    aviation industry. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Iacopelli follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Dean Iacopelli, Chief of Staff, National Air
                    Traffic Controllers Association, AFL-CIO
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the National
    Air Traffic Controllers Association, AFL-CIO (NATCA) at today's hearing
    titled ``U.S. Air Traffic Control Systems, Personnel, and Safety.''
        NATCA is the exclusive representative for nearly 20,000 employees,
    including the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) air traffic
    controllers, traffic management coordinators and specialists, flight
    service station air traffic controllers, staff support specialists,
    engineers and architects, and other aviation safety professionals, as
    well as Department of Defense (DOD) and Federal Contract Tower (FCT)
    air traffic controllers.
        NATCA takes pride in its role as an aviation safety organization
    that stands shoulder-to-shoulder with government and industry
    stakeholders to ensure that our National Airspace System (NAS) remains
    the safest and most efficient in the world. The air traffic controllers
    and other aviation safety professionals who NATCA represents throughout
    the FAA, DOD, and the private sector are vital to the U.S. economy,
    ensuring the safe and efficient movement of millions of tons of cargo
    annually within the National Airspace System (NAS).
        The NAS moves over 45,000 flights and 2.9 million passengers, and
    more than 59,000 tons of cargo every day across more than 29 million
    square miles of airspace. Although it is the safest, most efficient,
    and most complex system in the world, we should always strive to
    bolster safety, mitigate risk, and improve efficiency.
    Executive Summary
        The FAA's two primary accounts for running the U.S. air traffic
    control system are its Operations\1\ (Ops) and Facilities and Equipment
    (F&E) budgets. Although the size of the F&E budget is roughly one-
    fourth of its Ops budget, F&E funding is critical for developing,
    testing, deploying, and enhancing the systems that air traffic
    controllers and other aviation safety professionals use every day to
    ensure that more than one billion passengers annually arrive safely at
    their destinations.
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        \1\ NATCA supports the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Fiscal
    Year 2025 Operations budget request, which included an increase to
    $13.6 billion from the 2024 Continuing Resolution level of $12.729627
    billion, in recognition that the FAA will experience several
    uncontrollable cost increases of over $500 million, from personnel
    costs such as government-wide pay increases and annualized hiring from
    Fiscal Year 2024. The DOT's Fiscal Year 2025 budget request also
    accounts for a $43 million increase to hire and train at least 2,000
    new air traffic controllers to rebuild the controller staffing levels
    and meet current and projected traffic demands. This hiring target was
    established in accordance with the maximum hiring requirement in the
    FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 and must increase in future years as
    the FAA Academy expands its capacity. In July 2024, the Senate
    Appropriations Committee approved this budget request in its Fiscal
    Year 2025 THUD appropriations bill, while the House THUD bill was
    slightly below that budget request amount.
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        These safety-critical systems must be continuous monitored,
    maintained, upgraded, and enhanced even after they are fully deployed
    across the NAS, while many contain physical components that have
    lifecycle expiration dates. Software enhancements and cyber security
    upgrades are also necessary to meet the growing demands of the NAS. In
    addition to increased commercial passenger and cargo traffic, the rapid
    proliferation of space launches and unmanned aerial systems must be
    integrated safely into the system by the workforce that keeps it
    running.
        F&E funding is also used to repair, update, and replace the FAA's
    rapidly aging physical infrastructure. Air traffic control facilities
    across the U.S. range from two to 82 years of age. Many controllers and
    other aviation safety professionals go to work every day in facilities
    that are plagued by leaking roofs, flooding basements that contain
    electronic systems, broken-down elevators and HVAC systems, and
    chronically backed-up bathroom toilets.
        NATCA's written testimony will focus these issue including: (1)
    controller staffing challenges and how they negatively affect
    infrastructure and modernization initiatives; (2) the concerns with
    FAA's rapidly-aging physical infrastructure; (3) the FAA's F&E budget
    requests to Congress understated its needs in previous years; and (4)
    illustrate how we, as a nation, are falling behind in our efforts to
    maintain and modernize the system.
        Importantly, this testimony will explain why NATCA must continue to
    be involved as a productive and collaborative partner across a wide
    range of safety, technology, and modernization programs to ensure that
    the FAA can deliver these initiatives to industry stakeholders and the
    flying public on-time and at a cost-savings to the American taxpayers.
    I. Controller Staffing Challenges Continue to Hinder Infrastructure and
                           Modernization Advancements
        NATCA continues to be focused on improving the system-wide
    controller staffing shortage. A properly-staffed controller workforce
    is necessary in order to safely and efficiently meet all of its
    operational, statutory, and contractual requirements, while also having
    the personnel resources to research, develop, deploy, and then train
    the existing workforce on new processes, technology, and modernization
    initiatives. Without a sustainable hiring, training, and staffing model
    like the one outlined in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, which
    passed both chambers with overwhelming bipartisan support, the FAA will
    struggle to maintain the current capacity of the system, let alone
    modernize or expand it for new users.
        NATCA thanks the members of this subcommittee, as well as all
    Senators who championed the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. That law
    included many first-time provisions including directing the FAA to
    conduct maximum hiring for controllers for the duration of the bill and
    implementing expansion of the capacity of the FAA's Training Academy in
    Oklahoma City.
        After reaching its hiring targets for air traffic controller
    trainees three consecutive years, including increased targets of 1,500
    and 1,800 respectively the past two Fiscal Years, the FAA is finally
    starting to make some progress. After a decade of steady losses, in
    Fiscal Year 2023, the FAA added 15 additional Certified Professional
    Controllers and 15 additional trainees. In Fiscal Year 2024, the FAA
    added 140 CPCs and 189 trainees after accounting for attrition. Maximum
    hiring for the full duration of the bill will greatly assist the FAA
    achieve a staffing level required to meet all of its needs.
        The law also requires the FAA to implement the Collaborative
    Resources Workgroup's (CRWG) new, more accurate operational staffing
    targets on an interim basis, until the Transportation Research Board--a
    part of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine--
    completes a study to determine which staffing models and methodologies
    best account for the operational staffing needs necessary to meet
    facility operational, statutory, contractual and safety requirements of
    the air traffic control system. Proper and timely implementation of
    these provisions is essential to the safety, efficiency, and
    technological modernization of the NAS for the years to come.
        Congress must make the necessary investments in the FAA's rapidly
    aging physical and technological infrastructure, which need significant
    attention and additional funding. But, staffing and infrastructure are
    inextricably linked, because it requires fully certified controllers to
    develop, test, deploy, and train new technology, while at the same time
    meeting the safety and efficiency requirements of the system.
    II. FAA's Physical Infrastructure is Rapidly Aging and Many Facilities
                    Have Exceeded Their Expected Lifecycles
        The FAA operates more than 300 air traffic control facilities of
    varying ages and conditions. The FAA's 21 Air Route Traffic Control
    Centers (ARTCCs) located in the continental United States were built in
    the 1960s and are more than 60 years old. The FAA's Terminal Radar
    Approach Control facilities (TRACONs) are on average more than 25 years
    old. In addition, the FAA has 132 combined TRACON/towers, which, on
    average, are approximately 35 years old. Finally, the FAA has another
    131 stand-alone Towers which average more than 30 years old.
        Many FAA facilities have exceeded their expected lifecycles. Others
    have major systems that have exceeded their expected functional
    lifecycle such as roofs, windows, HVAC systems, plumbing, and
    elevators, which no longer perform their necessary functions. Some of
    these issues have led to periodic airspace shutdowns and many others
    have led to safety concerns for the workforce. When these major systems
    fail, or facilities have integrity problems, it can lead to increasing
    delays, which negatively affect the flying public and our economy.
        The FAA is addressing its aging infrastructure through a
    combination of realignments, sustaining and maintaining some
    facilities, and replacing a handful of others. However, that process
    has been slow and hampered by funding constraints. The FAA will need a
    substantially increased investment in its F&E budget to adequately
    maintain, let alone, replace its aging infrastructure.
    III. Congress Has Always Met FAA's Stated Budgetary Need For Facilities
                                 and Equipment
        The FAA, like much of the Federal government, has faced an unstable
    and unpredictable funding stream for the better part of two decades.
    Whether due to the risks of lapsed appropriations or authorizations,
    such interruptions have negatively affected all aspects of the FAA,
    making it increasingly difficult to maintain the safety and efficiency
    of the NAS. Even when the Agency is not facing the threat of a
    shutdown, multiple administrations from both parties have submitted
    insufficient FAA budget requests to Congress. FAA's requests have often
    fallen well-short of what it truly needs to adequately address the
    infrastructure needs of the NAS.
        Congress has consistently provided the FAA with the resources it
    requests through both authorization of top-line numbers and the annual
    appropriations process. However, because FAA has consistently requested
    too little, there are significant backlogs of NAS system sustainment
    and ATC facility sustainment, in addition to mounting delays in the
    implementation of NAS modernization and system improvements as well as
    ATC tower and radar facility replacement.
        The budgetary shortfalls also have not kept up with inflation over
    the past 15 years. For instance, the FAA has consistently requested
    only about $3 billion in annual appropriations for F&E throughout that
    period, even though in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 the Agency's internal
    budgetary estimates showed that it needed at least $4.5 billion, with
    that need quickly approaching $6 billion. This loss of spending and
    buying power for F&E programs forced FAA into a ``fix-on-fail'' model
    by requiring it to prioritize mandatory costs, leaving little to no
    money for modernization and infrastructure programs.
        Currently, NATCA believes that the Department of Transportation's
    FY25 Budget Request ($3.6 billion) for F&E is insufficient to meet the
    Agency's modernization and technological needs. To sustain many legacy
    systems, as well as to enhance and grow critical safety and
    modernization programs, the FAA projects that it will need $6 billion.
    At minimum, the NATCA projects that the FAA will need at least $4
    billion to simply sustain these programs and the rest of the NAS.
    Investments that merely cover the costs to sustain current equipment
    will be insufficient to develop and implement new technologies and
    integrate new users into the system.
        The FAA's FY 2025 budget request, for the first time in over a
    decade, acknowledges its true need, although not entirely through its
    F&E request. In addition to the $3.6 billion F&E request, FAA cites the
    $1 billion in funds authorized for 2025 through the Infrastructure
    Investment and Jobs Act as supplementing its facilities and
    infrastructure funding needs. It also proposes a new Facility
    Replacement and Radar Modernization fund that would dedicate $8 billion
    over the next five years--beginning with $1 billion in 2025--to replace
    or modernize aging air traffic control facilities. This includes
    modernizing 377 critical radar systems and more than 20 air traffic
    control facilities. We, along with a wide array of industry
    stakeholders, support this request.
        Recently, the FAA publicly shared its facilities and systems
    sustainment backlog, ongoing needs for both, and facilities and systems
    replacement and improvement funding requirements looking forward 30
    years into the future.

        The FAA must continue to be transparent with its need for increased
    F&E funding so that it can meet its own equipment sustainment,
    replacement, and modernization needs. If not, it will continue to
    exacerbate the FAA's significant sustainment and replacement backlog.
    Failing to maintain and replace critical safety equipment that has
    exceeded its expected life introduces unnecessary risk into the system.
    These funding limitations also have prevented the FAA from designing
    and implementing new technologies that will improve safety.
     IV. FAA is Lagging Behind in its Efforts to Sustain and Modernize the
                                      NAS
        In the coming years, the FAA will face unprecedented safety and
    technological challenges. The continued development and rapid
    proliferation of commercial space operations, advanced air mobility,
    unmanned aerial systems (drones), and other new entrants could
    jeopardize the safety and efficiency of the NAS if they are not
    properly integrated into the existing system. It is critical that NATCA
    remain involved with the safe and efficient integration of these new
    technologies.
        For the past 15 years, the FAA and NATCA have worked together to
    develop and implement safety-critical modernization programs that would
    not be possible without our joint efforts. For instance, NATCA and the
    FAA have achieved collaborative and cost-saving successes on
    modernization programs such as En Route Automation Modernization
    (ERAM), DataComm, and Metroplex. Recently, the Agency and NATCA have
    been able to fast-track a surface surveillance situational awareness
    tool that will help controllers mitigate the risks associated with
    wrong-surface landings and runway incursions. These types of programs
    and initiatives enhance safety and produce efficiencies that reduce
    delays and save fuel, while also preserving the United States' position
    as the world leader in aviation.
        However, under-funding for F&E will jeopardize sustainment and
    significantly hinder progress for many safety and modernization
    programs including, but not limited to: FAA Telecommunications, En
    Route Automation Modernization (ERAM), Standard Terminal Automation
    Replacement (STARS), DataComm, Voice Switch, Airborne Surveillance,
    Ground Surveillance, Airport Lighting, Space Integration, Aeronautical
    Information, Information Management, Terminal Flight Data Management
    (TDFM), and Facility Replacement and Radar Modernization (FRRM).
    A. The FAA's Looming Telecommunications Crisis
        FAA telecommunications are the backbone of the air traffic control
    system. The FAA needs extensive telecommunications services and
    networking capabilities to support the operation of the NAS and other
    agency functions. The FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI)
    program currently provides these services and networking capabilities
    through a service-based contract, in which the service provider
    continually updates the underlying technologies. The majority of FTI's
    telecommunication lines function on an aging copper wire
    infrastructure, which is an outdated and no longer readily supported,
    as many local phone companies are discontinuing service to copper wire
    equipment throughout the country.
        As a result, air traffic controllers throughout the U.S. are
    experiencing a steady increase in unexpected outages of air traffic
    systems. Recent ground stops at airports in the New York and
    Washington, D.C., areas highlight the risks and consequences of
    telecommunication network failures. To date, there are over 30,000
    services at over 4,600 FAA sites that must transition away from copper
    wire and onto a fiber optic cable network in order to avoid severe
    service disruptions and extensive flight delays.
        The FAA's Enterprise Network Services (FENS) program will replace
    existing copper wire infrastructure with a fiber optic network. As a
    result, FENS will be able to provide reliable and secure
    communications, information services, and networking capabilities to
    support NAS operations and agency administration functions. This will
    not only help to stabilize the telecommunications network but also pave
    the way for cloud-based services and reduce program development and
    sustainment costs. However, any discontinuation or disruption to the
    existing copper wire services without first transitioning to fiber
    optic services would lead to potential safety risks and/or significant
    delays in air traffic services.
        Because this is both a time-sensitive and a safety-critical
    program, the FAA is currently moving money from other safety-critical
    programs in order to replace legacy copper wire on a case-by-case
    basis. The FAA is also spending an additional $7 million per month just
    to maintain the legacy copper wire as they delay the fiber optic
    upgrades due to insufficient funding. Other FAA programs will continue
    to suffer funding cuts if this program is not adequately funded.
    B. The NOTAM Crisis Harbinger of Future Disruptions
        Even before the FAA's telecommunications crisis, the FAA was
    working to mitigate the risks associated with its faltering Notice to
    Airmen (NOTAM) system, which has been the source of significant
    disruptions throughout the NAS. The NOTAM system is vital for sharing
    and disseminating safety-critical flight information between both air
    traffic controllers and pilots.
        However, in early 2023, a complete failure of the NOTAM system
    caused nationwide ground stop causing significant flight delays.
    Despite the known vulnerabilities and risks associated with the current
    system, the FAA will struggle to fund this program without increased
    F&E funding. At minimum, the FAA will need $154 million just to conduct
    further research on a replacement NOTAM system, but will need $354
    million to replace the broken NOTAM system.
        Much like the FAA's looming telecommunications crisis, the NOTAM
    crisis was not at the top of any F&E priority lists until after the
    2023 collapse resulted in cascading nationwide delays and ground stops.
    We need to learn the lessons from similar events in the past and chart
    another course, rather than repeat the same mistakes.
    C. FAA Must Continue to Sustain and Enhance Automation Platforms
        Automation platforms such as ERAM and STARS deliver flight plan and
    surveillance information to air traffic controllers on a real-time
    basis. These platforms are the foundational systems that keep our NAS
    operating safely 24-hours a day, 7-days a week, 365-days a year.
        Over the past four years, air traffic levels have continued to grow
    at a rate of 6.2 percent per year post-COVID, excluding new entrant
    operations. Air traffic automation systems have components reaching
    end-of-life that need to be replaced. Due to historically flat F&E
    funding, as a result of the FAA requesting less than it needs to
    maintain the system, air traffic automation has been unable to meet the
    growing needs of the NAS reducing the efficiency of the system.
        In the near future, controllers will have to rely on this
    inadequate technology to maintain the safety and efficiency of the NAS.
    Without fully funding these programs, the FAA will need at least $265
    million just to maintain current functionality in FY25. However, at
    that level, the FAA would not be able to make additional enhancement
    upgrades for any of the current automation systems and some hardware
    replacements would be at risk. Because these platforms require
    continuous maintenance, it will cost the FAA $400 million in FY25 to
    update the hardware for these systems and enhance functionality
    controllers desperately need.
    D. Surveillance Programs
        Air traffic surveillance systems encompass Radar, ADS-B, and GPS.
    Although ADS-B and GPS have been extremely beneficial for improving
    safety and efficiency, they do not replace the need to maintain legacy
    radar infrastructure. Modern radar technology is more cost-effective,
    requires less maintenance, and offers an increase in range visibility
    which will allow the deployment of fewer assets and maintain the same,
    if not improve, surveillance visibility throughout the system.
        At minimum, the FAA will need $212 million just to sustain current
    surveillance systems. Many components of legacy radars are past their
    end-of-life cycles and are no longer manufactured, while some other
    suppliers of ground radar equipment went out of business. Without
    replacing and upgrading these systems, the flying public is at risk of
    experiencing unexpected and significant flight delays and other
    disruptions to the system whenever these systems breakdown. The FAA
    requires $1 billion to modernize radar technology throughout the
    system.
    E. NATCA Involvement Critical in Every Phase
        It is critical that NATCA remain a productive and collaborative
    partner throughout development, testing, training, and implementation
    across a wide range of safety, technology, and modernization programs.
    NATCA's continued involvement will ensure that the FAA continues to
    deliver these initiatives to industry stakeholders and the flying
    public on-time and at a cost-savings to the American taxpayers. If
    NATCA representatives were not involved throughout the entirety of the
    process, many modernization programs would be delayed and experience
    cost overruns, because they would need to go through extensive, costly,
    and time-consuming revisions following development, during testing, and
    even after implementation.
                                 V. Conclusion
        In order to enhance aviation safety, efficiency, and modernize FAA
    physical and technological infrastructure, Congress must prioritize
    investment in F&E funding. Meeting the FAA's F&E budgetary needs for
    Fiscal Year 2025 and beyond will finally allow the Agency to address
    its significant backlog of facility and equipment maintenance, repair,
    and replacement. This increased funding also will allow the FAA to fund
    critical modernization programs that enhance safety while continuing to
    expand the NAS to account for the development and rapid proliferation
    of commercial space operations, advanced air mobility, unmanned aerial
    systems (drones), and other new entrants that must be properly
    integrated into the existing system.
        It is critical that NATCA remain directly involved throughout the
    safe and efficient integration of new technologies including research,
    development, testing, deployment, and training. NATCA's continued
    involvement will ensure that the FAA continues to deliver these
    initiatives to industry stakeholders and the flying public on-time and
    at a cost-savings to the American taxpayers.
        Of course, none of this is possible without adequate staffing of
    the system. FAA must continue to hire and train the next generation of
    air traffic controllers. Congress' mandate to maximize controller
    hiring over the next five years can only be accomplished if FAA's
    Operations budget needs are also met.
        NATCA looks forward to working members of this Subcommittee, the
    full Committee, the appropriators, as well as all other Members of
    Congress, aviation stakeholders, the incoming Administration, and the
    FAA to achieve these and many other mutually beneficial goals.
        Thank you for holding this important hearing and providing the
    opportunity to testify.

        *FAA reduced its FY 2019 hiring target from 1,431 to 907 following
    the 35-day government shutdown.
        **FAA reduced its FY 2021 hiring target from 910 to 500 due to the
    COVID-19 pandemic and increased its hiring targets for FY 2022--2024.

        These data are prior to the Collaborative Resource Workgroup's
    recommendation to establish new CPC staffing targets for FAA's 313 air
    traffic control facilities.

        CPC: Certified Professional Controller

        CPC-IT: Certified Professional Controller in Training (fully
    certified elsewhere, transferred to a new facility and began training
    there)

        DEV: Developmental (trainee)

        AG: Graduate of the FAA Initial Classroom Training Academy in
    Oklahoma City, newly hired, and started at their first facility as a
    trainee

        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Iacopelli.
        I will now recognize Captain Ambrosi with the Air Line
    Pilots Association.

            STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JASON AMBROSI, PRESIDENT,
               AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL

        Mr. Ambrosi. Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, Chair
    Duckworth, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify and to present the perspective of 79,000
    commercial airline pilots of the Air Line Pilots Association
    International. My name is Jason Ambrosi. I am current and
    qualified 767 captain, and since January of last year I have
    been President of ALPA, the largest pilot union and the largest
    nongovernmental safety organization in the world.
        Our association's history of safety and security advocacy
    spans more than 90 years, and I am honored to continue that
    tradition by participating in today's discussion. Congress, as
    guided by this Committee, made important investments in the
    future of our aviation system when it passed a strong safety-
    focused, five-year FAA reauthorization bill. By furthering the
    Federal commitment to modernizing our system, enhancing the air
    traffic controller and aviation workforce, and investing in
    technology, we are positioned to remain the global aviation
    leader.
        As operators in the system, pilots have a vested interest
    in the FAA sustaining legacy systems and advancing
    technological and infrastructure improvements to ensure the
    national airspace system remains safe and efficient. One of the
    biggest modernization initiatives in recent history is NextGen.
    The capabilities that have been implemented with NextGen have
    increased situational awareness and provided tools to help
    pilots make safe decisions through performance-based
    navigation, data communication, and ADS-B implementation.
        However, the system's potential is not being fully
    realized, in part because many airliners are not properly
    equipped to take advantage of these updated capabilities. As a
    result, pilots and air traffic controllers are forced to use
    work-arounds that allow us to operate aircraft with outdated
    equipment in today's complex system, all of which runs counter
    to the anticipated benefits of NextGen. Implementing
    communications, navigation, and surveillance with air traffic
    management, data communication systems, and ATC automation
    systems will allow controllers to monitor aircraft, improve
    communication between pilots and controllers for clearance and
    reroutes, and ensure aircraft line up on the correct runway.
        To the latter point, ALPA is pleased the FAA
    reauthorization addresses the need for terminal airspace
    automation display at small airports that have traditionally
    operated without these technologies.
        As I have testified previously before this Committee, we
    have seen several near miss incidents, including a particularly
    close call, as you mentioned, in Austin in February of last
    year, in which pilots were the final line in defense in
    ensuring safety.
        Time and time again, similar examples highlight that the
    presence of at least two highly trained and well-rested pilots
    on all commercial airline flight decks, at all times, is a
    major factor in why airline travel remains the safest form of
    transportation. The human element of pilots working together on
    the flight deck is irreplaceable. We are able to see, hear,
    feel, and react to issues in real time. As the Austin incident
    showed, we save lives.
        To respond to these concerns and augment the critical role
    of pilots on the flight deck, the Committee has helped ensure
    that legacy systems, including ASD-X, remain fully operational
    to provide air traffic controllers with timely alerts that
    prevent accidents and near misses.
        Similarly, the Committee has responded to these incidents
    with greater focus on runway incursions through the
    establishment of a policy for not tolerance for near misses,
    which expands FAA's focus on improving the ground operation of
    aircraft at airports, establishing the Runway Safety Council,
    and supporting discretionary airport grant programs for runway
    safety projects.
        Unfortunately, underinvestment, including for facilities
    and equipment account, is affecting the systems pilots and air
    traffic controllers use to ensure safe and efficient
    operations. While Congress has provided the funding requested
    each year by the FAA during the annual appropriations process,
    there remains a significant shortfall in numerous maintenance
    and modernization efforts. Resources have not kept up with
    inflation, and effectively require the agency to prioritize
    sustainment to the detriment of modernization and
    infrastructure needs. The FAA must ask Congress for its true
    needs in order to sustain the legacy systems and make greater
    headway on NextGen to improve the NAS for pilots and all users.
        As a current and qualified airline captain with ongoing,
    firsthand experience in the National Airspace System, I can
    tell you that our commercial aviation system is safe, and I
    look forward to working with the Committee and the FAA to
    continue to improve aviation safety. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Ambrosi follows:]

                Testimony of Captain Jason Ambrosi, President,
                   Air Line Pilots Association, International
        Chair Duckworth, Ranking Member Moran and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify and present the
    perspective of the more than 79,000 commercial airline pilots of the
    Air Line Pilots Association, International. My name is Jason Ambrosi,
    and I am a current 767 Captain at Delta Air Lines and president of ALPA
    since 2023. ALPA is the largest pilot union in the world and the
    largest non-governmental aviation safety organization with a history of
    safety and security advocacy spanning more than 90 years. I am pleased
    to participate in today's discussion about air traffic systems,
    personnel, and aviation safety.
        Let me affirm that as a current and qualified airline captain with
    a seat on the flight deck, our commercial aviation system is safe.
    However, while the U.S. aviation system remains the safest in the
    world, this outcome is not guaranteed. Safety is a matter of relentless
    vigilance, and our current success stems from decades of industry-wide
    efforts, and commitment to collaboration, data collection and analysis,
    hazard identification and mitigation, and congressional support.
    However, for the National Airspace System (NAS) to remain the safest
    and most efficient system, continuous improvements are needed to ensure
    that growth in traffic levels and new users do not threaten airline or
    system safety.
        Technological and infrastructure improvements are required to
    efficiently manage current NAS operations, with emphasis on NextGen
    automation tools and airport infrastructure improvements to provide
    safe and efficient gate to gate operations, reduced airborne reroutes,
    ensure that on time arrivals proceed directly to their gate, and cargo
    is delivered on time. Modernization must continue to keep ahead of the
    demand from the wide variety of aviation users. The technologies and
    procedures that are needed must also contemplate new entrants into the
    NAS. The future of air transportation will bring a combination of
    commercial air carriers, unmanned aerial vehicles, general aviation,
    urban air mobility devices, and commercial space flight. The airspace
    system of the future will involve a wider and more complex variety of
    operations that our air traffic control infrastructure must manage
    safely and efficiently. Additionally, many FAA facilities exceed their
    lifecycles and have deficient systems that create airspace and carrier
    delays.
        To the meet the challenges of an increasingly complex airspace,
    ALPA has worked with the FAA, our labor partners, airlines, and the
    industry to deploy air traffic control modernization. One of the
    biggest modernization initiatives in recent history is NextGen. The
    capabilities that have been implemented with NextGen have increased
    situational awareness and provided tools to help pilots make safe
    decisions through performance-based navigation, data communication, and
    ADS-B implementation. However, the system's potential isn't being fully
    realized--in part because many airliners aren't properly equipped to
    take advantage of its updated capabilities. As a result, pilots and air
    traffic controllers are forced to use ``workarounds'' that allow us to
    operate aircraft with outdated equipment in today's complex system.
        Increasing safety and updating air traffic control systems requires
    increased resources, stable and reliable funding to ensure continuous
    FAA operations, and greater use of the Airport and Airways Trust Fund
    (AATF) to allow the FAA to more effectively leverage the Trust Fund's
    balance. This Committee did a phenomenal job with passage of five-year
    bipartisan FAA reauthorization bill that helps augment and develop
    advanced technologies, including new surface safety technologies,
    equally important so-called ``low tech'' safety technologies for
    runways, lighting and signage, as well as increasing air traffic
    controller hiring.
        Underinvestment, including for the Facilities and Equipment (F&E)
    account, is affecting the systems pilots and air traffic controllers
    use to ensure safe and efficient operations. While Congress has
    generally provided the funding requested each year by the FAA during
    the annual appropriations process, there remains a significant
    shortfall of funding in numerous maintenance and modernization efforts.
    These shortfalls have not kept up with inflation and effectively
    required the agency to prioritize mandatory spending to the detriment
    of modernization and infrastructure needs. The FAA must ask Congress
    for its true needs and Congress should avoid unnecessary and damaging
    government shutdowns, threatened shutdowns, and lengthy Continuing
    Resolutions (CRs) that delay these critical efforts.
    Aircraft Equipage to Support NextGen Procedures
        The NextGen modernization initiative has resulted in the creation
    of new performance-based navigation departures, arrivals, and
    instrument approaches. These procedures safely reduce noise, aircraft
    greenhouse gas emissions, and airspace congestion. However, not all of
    the airline aircraft can fly these new procedures. In some
    circumstances there may be 15-20 percent of the airline aircraft that
    are unable to utilize the new procedures. Unfortunately, air traffic
    controllers are unable to maintain the integrity of these operations
    with such high levels of non-equipped aircraft.
        For the NextGen procedures to become the standard, instead of the
    exception, the commercial airline aircraft fleet needs standardized
    equipage capabilities that meet the navigational requirements for
    flying the NextGen procedures. In recent years, there have been
    attempts to implement NextGen procedures with the assumption that
    pilots will utilize workarounds to offset the limited navigation
    capabilities on some of the aircraft. These workarounds often add
    complexity and workload, which is counter to the anticipated benefits
    from NextGen. In reality, pilots in lesser equipped aircraft are
    working harder to make the aircraft comply with the NextGen way of
    navigating. At times, instead of flying approaches with both precision
    lateral and vertical guidance that is automated with the assistance of
    an autopilot, pilots are also asked to hand-fly non-precision
    approaches on some of today's airline aircraft that lack the necessary
    NextGen navigation capability.
        While NextGen initiatives provide support for the NAS and augment
    pilot flying, a minimum of two pilots on the flight deck ensure
    redundancy that provides added awareness, expertise, and experience,
    factors that established and maintain today's safety standard. There is
    no technological or procedural pathway today or in the future that can
    overcome the risks introduced by reducing the flight deck compliment,
    including technological failures or anomalies, incapacitation, and
    issues associated with the human-machine interface. ALPA views flight
    deck technology and automation as a human support tool, not a
    replacement. Given an FAA-Industry Working Group found that 20 percent
    of ``normal'' flights experience aircraft malfunctions that require
    human intervention, the premise of transport category aircraft
    operation--including FAA's scientific study of fatigue, sleep inertia,
    and related regulation and guidance--must be based on a minimum of two
    well-trained plots on the flight deck.
    CNS/ATM Improvements Would Benefit All
        When Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS)
    capabilities are integrated with Air Traffic Management ATM) systems,
    airspace management and air traffic operations become safer and more
    efficient. Surveillance technologies enable air traffic controllers to
    monitor aircraft and track their positions in real-time, increasing
    situational awareness and enabling proactive airspace management.
    Precise navigation systems enhance navigation accuracy and support
    optimized flight routing, attendant fuel savings, and reduced flight
    times. CNS/ATM contributes to increased airspace capacity, reduced
    delays, improved safety, and enhanced operational efficiency.
        Similarly, ADS-B, and ADS-C, as well as surface detection systems
    like Airport Surface Detection System Model X (ASDE-X) and Airport
    Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) are currently deployed runway
    safety systems that help prevent surface collisions and wrong surface
    landings. However, ASDE-X and ASSC are fully deployed at only 43
    airports. Our air traffic controller workforce needs these capabilities
    to be fully functioning at all of the airports where ASDE-X and ASSC
    are installed. ALPA has called upon the FAA to install surface safety
    systems at all airports with airline services. ALPA is pleased the
    FAA's efforts to rapidly develop a new surface capability, the Surface
    Awareness Initiative (SAI), has made significant progress this year.
    After fielding a SAI system at four airports this summer to validate
    the system's readiness for expansion, the FAA has expanded deployment
    to 14 more airports by the end of 2024. ALPA continues to call on the
    FAA to have a surface safety system installed at all airports with an
    air traffic control tower and where there are airline operations, as
    quickly as possible.
        ADS-B represents a major advance in efficient air traffic
    management and pilot situational awareness, with the potential to
    safely increase the capacity of the NAS. However, the use of ADS-B in
    oceanic airspace has lagged due to the severe difficulty of deploying
    ground stations on the water. Therefore, the FAA's original ADS-B
    program never planned for ADS-B in oceanic airspace. A solution
    currently available to the FAA is a service called space-based ADS-B.
    Simply put, the aircraft's ADS-B information is received by a satellite
    constellation instead of ground stations and relayed to air traffic
    controllers. Space-based ADS-B has the potential to provide
    surveillance information equivalent to en route radar surveillance over
    the ocean. In addition to surveillance, there is the safety benefit
    where the space-based ADS-B continuously tracks all aircraft. Should an
    aircraft be required to conduct a ditching into the ocean the precise
    location of the aircraft will be immediately known. Some have observed
    that with space-based ADS-B, there may no longer be the need for
    ``search'' in ``search and rescue''. ALPA would support an FAA
    investment into Space Based ADS-B capabilities, as a supplement to the
    ground-based ADS-B network. The safety benefits we foresee would
    provide significant value.
    ATC Automation
        There are many automation systems in the NAS that provide air
    traffic controllers with critical tools for the safe and efficient
    movement of aircraft, and they must continue to be updated. A recent
    update to the terminal airspace automation system has resulted in being
    able to track aircraft to ensure that they are lined up for the correct
    runway. This new capability is called the Approach Runway Verification
    (ARV) and is a significant safety advancement. ALPA was also pleased to
    see that the FAA reauthorization addresses the need for a terminal
    airspace automation display at small airports. Historically smaller
    airports have operated without any display of aircraft in the air
    traffic control tower, so that air traffic controllers can increase
    awareness of aircraft that are in the vicinity of the airport. The
    addition of a display in all air traffic control towers where there are
    airline operations is an important step in advancing safety across the
    NAS.
    Voice and Data Communications
        NextGen's Data Communications system (Data Comm) supplements radio-
    based voice conversations between pilots and air traffic controllers
    with digital, text-based messaging in the en route phase of flight.
    This often reduces the likelihood of missing or misunderstanding air
    traffic control clearances. Further, there is no need for the pilot to
    read back a message for accuracy. Data Comm also facilitates faster
    communications and can help increase operational efficiency in the
    national airspace. While the FAA has deployed Data Comm at air traffic
    control towers, the last shutdown cost taxpayers up to $8 million to
    repeat training for controllers at several facilities and further
    delayed implementation by 18 months. Beyond fiscal support, the
    vicissitudes of shutdowns interfere and plague NextGen implementation.
    Future Demands on the NAS
        Higher fidelity CNS data and the ability to exchange this data in
    real time would allow better definition, geographically and temporally,
    of the protected airspace needed for space launch and reentry
    operations (both commercial and government-sponsored), and to
    disseminate this information to ATC and other airspace users.
        ATC modernization is necessary to support the integration of UAS.
    Small UAS (sUAS) will operate in airspace at altitudes that are
    generally considered to be ``below the NAS.'' The low altitude sUAS
    operations will need some form of assistance in ensuring safe
    separation to avoid collision with manned aircraft, other sUAS,
    terrain, and obstacles. The FAA's work in Unmanned Traffic Management
    is just getting started, and certain foundational decisions need to be
    made about the role of the FAA in offering low-altitude separation
    services. ALPA recommends that the air navigation services at low
    altitude be provided by the same service provider of all other airspace
    in the NAS. In other words, the FAA should be providing separation and
    surveillance services. This ensures consistent application of safety
    risk mitigation policies and procedures.
    Funding Challenges
        Although Congress has authorized the FAA with funding for multiyear
    modernization projects, such as automation improvements or system
    upgrades, the FAA has underestimated its ongoing needs for facilities
    and equipment funding. This dynamic has built up over more than a
    decade, and it creates enormous challenges for the FAA to keep
    massively complicated projects on course and bring them to completion.
    Continuing resolutions, government shutdowns, authorization extensions,
    and other disruptions hinder the infrastructure modernization process.
    With all these issues at play, modernization of a critical system
    becomes a series of stop, replan, and restart. This is not a reliable
    or efficient approach to effectively plan and execute the modernization
    plan for our Nation's air traffic control infrastructure, which also is
    the world's largest and busiest airspace system. As called for in the
    2024 FAA reauthorization legislation, the FAA has the opportunity and
    the requirement to now provide Congress with a more accurate picture of
    its budgetary needs for facilities and equipment. Providing the FAA the
    resources it needs to complete the mission, across multiple
    appropriation cycles, is a key area where Congress can assist in
    ensuring that our Nation's air traffic control system will meet the
    needs of the millions of Americans who depend on safe and reliable air
    transportation.
    Near Misses and Technology
        Last year I testified before this Committee on addressing near
    misses. First, I would like to commend the Committee for important
    provisions to improve safety and prevent near-miss incidents. The bill
    not only provides funding and stability for the FAA and FAA programs,
    but also for the latest safety technology on runways, for the hiring of
    more air traffic controllers, for workforce development, and a host of
    technological additives related to this hearing. Notable provisions of
    the legislation related to aviation safety, modernization, and
    expansion of additional capabilities for more airports, include:

       ALPA is pleased to see that the FAA authorization included
            guidance to the FAA to ensure that legacy surface safety
            systems including the ASDE-X system remain fully operational.
            When fully functional the ASDE-X system provides air traffic
            controllers with timely alerts that prevent accidents and near-
            misses.

       ALPA is also appreciative of the Committee's greater focus
            on runway incursions through the establishment of a policy for
            No Tolerance for Near Misses, which expands FAA focus on
            improving the ground operation of aircraft at airports,
            establishing the Runway Safety Council, and supporting
            discretionary airport grant programs for runway safety
            projects.

        ALPA looks forward to continued collaboration with the Committee to
    sustain and enhance safety. Thank you for the invitation, your
    continued focus on safety, and the opportunity to testify.

        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Captain Ambrosi.
        I now recognize Mr. Dave Spero from the Professional
    Aviation Safety Specialists for his opening statement.

              STATEMENT OF DAVE SPERO, NATIONAL PRESIDENT,

        PROFESSIONAL AVIATION SAFETY SPECIALISTS, AFL-CIO (PASS)

        Mr. Spero. Good morning. Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member
    Cruz, Subcommittee Chair Duckworth, thank you for inviting me
    to testify on behalf of PASS. PASS represents approximately
    11,000 FAA and Department of Defense employees throughout the
    United States and abroad. These employees install, maintain,
    support, and certify air traffic control and national defense
    equipment, inspect and oversee the commercial and general
    aviation industries, develop flight procedures, and perform
    quality analyses of complex aviation systems used in air
    traffic control and national defense at home and abroad. Every
    day they work to ensure the safety and efficiency of an
    aviation system that transports over 2.9 million passengers
    across more than 29 million square miles of airspace. Their
    work is essential to the safe and effective operation of the
    aviation system.
        Unfortunately, challenges unrelated to employee expertise
    are limiting that effectiveness. PASS appreciates the
    opportunity to share information and recommendations regarding
    air traffic control systems, personnel, and safety.
        The largest PASS FAA bargaining unit is the Air Traffic
    Organization in the technical operations unit. There are
    approximately 4,000 technicians responsible for installing,
    operating, maintain, and repairing more than 74,000 radar,
    communication, automation, navigational aids, airport lighting,
    backup power, and HVAC systems at FAA facilities in support of
    the national airspace system. In February, PASS was asked to
    provide the Government Accountability Office with information
    regarding 135 FAA programs and services.
        To provide accurate, current information, PASS shared that
    list with Tech Ops employees nationwide and asked them to
    complete a survey. Their feedback was extensive and concerning.
    The challenges our technicians face range from dealing with
    aging equipment, navigating through cumbersome procedures, and
    limited availability of parts. The complexity of the systems,
    compounded by staffing and training inadequacies further
    exacerbates the situation.
        For instance, outdated technologies like Time Division
    Multiplexing hinder the swift implementation of new systems,
    while reliability concerns plague critical systems such as the
    advanced lighting systems for aircraft runways and fiberoptic
    transmission systems. The maintenance is increasingly
    challenging as systems become obsolete, necessitating
    specialized training and expertise. That being said, the
    technicians also interface with highly technical, state-of-the-
    art cloud-based solutions, which is often overlooked.
        The most significant result of our survey was the clear
    indication that FAA employees, if adequately staffed, are
    capable and willing to perform the work to ensure successful
    implementation of new systems and equipment while also
    maintaining the aging systems as efficiently as possible.
        The biggest challenge from our perspective is a lack of
    vision on behalf of the agency. Compounding this challenge is
    the lack of an appropriate technician staffing model. The FAA
    has been developing the Tech Ops staffing model for over a
    decade, yet they are fully aware that today they are short at
    least 800 technicians. While PASS does not agree that the model
    is factoring in all the necessary data to determine the optimum
    number of technicians, it clearly reveals an understaffed
    workforce.
        The directives outlined in the FAA reauthorization bill are
    a roadmap for improvements. However, timely implementation is
    critical to their success. PASS thanks the lawmakers for
    including language in the 2024 reauthorization bill directing
    the agency to install 15 instrument landing systems that are in
    storage in Missouri. PASS-represented technicians are ready and
    capable of doing this. While the language in the
    reauthorization directs FAA to install the ILS within 18 months
    of the law's passage, our attempts to coordinate with the
    agency have gone unreturned. As far as PASS knows, the
    equipment, paid for by taxpayers, is still not in service.
        The FAA is simply not effectively using a key resource to
    address some of these challenges. The agency is ignoring the
    skill level and potential of more than 4,000 employees. The
    resources for the FAA to be effective are there. The FAA is not
    taking advantage of them.
        PASS thanks the Subcommittee for holding this important
    hearing. As always, the union stands ready to assist lawmakers
    and the agency to ensure the safety of the American flying
    public.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Spero follows:]

      Prepared Statement of David Spero, National President, Professional
                  Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO (PASS)
        Chair Duckworth, Ranking Member Moran and members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify on behalf of the
    Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO (PASS).
        PASS represents approximately 11,000 Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) and Department of Defense employees throughout the
    United States and abroad. PASS-represented employees in the FAA
    install, maintain, support and certify air traffic control and national
    defense equipment, inspect and oversee the commercial and general
    aviation industries, develop flight procedures, and perform quality
    analyses of complex aviation systems used in air traffic control and
    national defense in the United States and overseas. PASS members work
    to ensure the safety and efficiency of the aviation system that
    transports over 2.9 million airline passengers across more than 29
    million square miles of airspace (domestic and U.S. airspace over
    oceans) at over 65,000 facilities every day. The diversity of the PASS-
    represented workforce provides insight into the safety of the system
    they maintain and the industry they oversee. PASS members are tasked
    with ensuring that the U.S. air traffic control system remains the gold
    standard of aviation safety. In fact, there has not been a major
    aircraft accident in the U.S. since the Colgan Air crash in 2009. That
    is a record for the FAA, its employees and the aviation community
    should be proud of this accomplishment.
        The work PASS members do every day is essential to the safe and
    efficient operation of this country's aviation system. Unfortunately,
    challenges unrelated to employee talent and professionalism are
    limiting the agency's efficiency and effectiveness. These obstacles
    include the aging air traffic systems and facilities essential to air
    traffic control operations as well as related impacts on the technical
    workforce represented by PASS.
        PASS appreciates the opportunity to share information and
    recommendations regarding air traffic control systems, personnel and
    safety.
    AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION AND IMPACT OF AGING SYSTEMS
        The largest PASS bargaining unit at the FAA is the Air Traffic
    Organization (ATO) Technical Operations unit, consisting of technical
    employees who install, maintain, repair and certify the radar,
    navigation, communication and power equipment that comprises the U.S.
    National Airspace System (NAS).
        Within Technical Operations, PASS represents FAA airway
    transportation systems specialists, more commonly referred to as
    technicians. Technicians ensure the functionality of communications,
    computers, navigational aids and power systems vital to safe air travel
    and the mission of pilots and air traffic controllers. Technicians
    maintain aging systems while simultaneously interfacing with highly
    technical, state of the art cloud-based solutions, and this is often
    overlooked. PASS-represented employees in Flight Program Operations
    (AJF), Mission Support Services (AJV) and Air Traffic (AJT) also
    provide critical support to the system by conducting flight
    inspections, developing instrument flight procedures, handling
    administrative tasks and other important work.
        There are approximately 4,000 FAA technicians responsible for
    installing, operating, maintaining and repairing more than 74,000
    radar, communications, automation, navigational aids, airport lighting,
    backup power, heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) at FAA
    facilities.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Federal Aviation Administration, Airway Transportation Systems
    Specialists, updated October 6, 2022. Accessed December 10, 2024:
    https://www.faa.gov/jobs/career_fields/aviation_careers/atss_join. This
    number does not reflect the number of technicians that are fully
    certified.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Technician Input Regarding Aging Systems
        In February, PASS was granted the opportunity to provide the
    Government Accountability Office (GAO) with information regarding 135
    FAA programs and services. In order to provide the GAO with the most
    accurate and current information, PASS shared the list of programs and
    services with Technical Operations employees throughout the country and
    asked them to complete a survey. In addition to providing information
    on systems not on the GAO's list, the results of the survey indicate
    top concerns are related to aging equipment, cumbersome procedures,
    parts that are unreliable or unavailable, system complexity, and
    staffing and training of the workforce. At the rapid pace with which
    technology changes, the FAA is getting further behind in replacing
    aging systems.
        However, the most significant result of the survey was the clear
    indication that FAA employees are capable and willing to perform the
    work to ensure successful implementation of new systems and equipment
    while also maintaining the aging system as efficiently as possible. The
    biggest challenge is a lack of vision on behalf of the agency.
        The length of time it takes the FAA to implement new systems is
    directly related to the fact that current NAS systems and equipment are
    becoming obsolete. As stated by the GAO, ``During Fiscal Year 2023, FAA
    determined that of its 138 ATC systems, 51 (37 percent) were
    unsustainable and 54 (39 percent) were potentially unsustainable.'' \2\
    According to PASS members who were surveyed, a key reason for ATC
    system sustainment issues is the inability to implement new systems
    quickly enough.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, Air Traffic Control: FAA
    Actions Are Urgently Needed to Modernize Aging Systems, GAO-24-107001,
    September 23, 2024, p. 15.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        For instance, many facilities are still relying on an aging
    communications technology known as Time Division Multiplexing (TDM).
    TDM is a method of combining multiple data streams into a single
    communication channel by allocating specific time slots for each data
    stream. Use of this antiquated technology is not only inefficient, but
    it is unnecessarily costly. Telecommunication companies now use carrier
    ethernet and are not required by the Federal Communications Commission
    to support TDM technology. The FAA was aware of the change and that
    PASS-represented employees could assist in the transition.
    Unfortunately, the FAA is still relying on TDM and is being charged a
    premium by communications companies that no longer regularly use the
    technology. The agency has been informed by a communications company
    that maintaining the current technology is going to cost $85 million a
    year. According to the FAA, it was an unanticipated expense that will
    come from operational funds. This will most certainly delay the
    implementation of the FAA Enterprise Network Services program (FENS)
    since the agency cannot progress on FENS until TDM is phased out and
    other infrastructure is upgraded as well.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Federal Aviation Administration, ``FAA Enterprise Network
    Services Program,'' updated July 25, 2023. Accessed December 10, 2024:
    https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/technology/cinp/fens.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Another member who was surveyed cited key concerns with the High
    Intensity Approach Lighting System with Sequenced Flashing Lights
    (ALSF-2). The ALSF-2 is an approach lighting system (ALS), which
    provides the basic means to transition from instrument flight to visual
    flight for landing. This provides visual information on runway
    alignment, height perception, roll guidance and horizontal references
    for Category II/III instrument approaches.
        ALSF is critical for an airport in low visibility weather
    situations. If it is not working, the airport is downgraded, which
    means some aircraft cannot land. An ALSF system failure would
    constitute significant delays to an airport and the NAS overall in
    instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions. However, due to the age of
    this system, light rebuild kits for ALSF are not reliable. Lighted
    navigational aids require regular parts replacement and fail often. If
    an outdated replacement part is either unreliable or unavailable, the
    impact on the system could be far-reaching.
        PASS is also concerned with the FAA's Fiber Optic Transmission
    System (FOTS) and the associated complications with the system due to
    its age. FOTS is an electronics architecture for using fiber optic
    telecommunications equipment and systems at major airports. According
    to a PASS-represented employee at one of those airports, the system
    faces several challenges due to aging parts, which are not readily
    available. When a failure occurs, an airport loses access to the system
    until technicians can travel to the sites and correct the issue. This
    is not something that will be resolved by the eventual implementation
    of FENS as it is considered `inside the fence' (within the actual
    airport fence). Furthermore, due to the age of FOTS, no FAA training
    exists for the related equipment. The number of technicians who were
    trained are retired or approaching retirement.
    Technical Operations Staffing and Training
        It is impossible to discuss any issue related to the technician
    workforce at the FAA without highlighting the importance of staffing
    and training.
        Insufficient technician staffing can result in increased
    restoration times and more air traffic delays during an outage. It can
    also make it difficult to ensure adequate shift coverage by
    technicians, another scenario that increases the risk of major air
    traffic issues. PASS has long called attention to not only the need for
    sufficient technical staffing but also the lack of a reliable staffing
    model on which to base staffing decisions and placement.
        However, hiring and training new technicians is not a quick or easy
    process. FAA technicians must be skilled and proficient on multiple
    systems. It can take up to three years to fully train an FAA technician
    to perform all necessary duties related to the position. In addition,
    the FAA is still playing catch up after its training academy in
    Oklahoma City was shuttered during the COVID-19 pandemic. According to
    the Department of Transportation Inspector General (IG), ``Most FAA
    systems require specific training and certification, and FAA does not
    typically train maintenance technicians on every equipment type.
    Therefore, individual maintenance technicians cannot work on all
    equipment, increasing the complexity of the technician workforce
    planning effort.'' \4\ In addition, the FAA does not hire new
    technicians before experienced technicians retire. That training and
    expertise walks out the door without mentoring the next generation of
    employees. In 2024, 33 percent of the technicians PASS represents were
    age 55 or older.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Department of Transportation Inspector General, Opportunities
    Exist for FAA To Strengthen Its Workforce Planning and Training
    Processes for Maintenance Technicians, Report No. AV2023027, May 2,
    2023, p. 6.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In discussions with the FAA, staff have been developing the
    Technical Operations staffing model (TSM) for over a decade and are
    aware that the workforce is short at least 800 technicians. While PASS
    does not agree that the TSM is factoring in all the necessary data to
    determine the optimum number of technicians, it nonetheless reveals an
    understaffed workforce. PASS stands ready to assist the FAA with a
    staffing plan that will take into consideration all the elements of the
    position, including the responsibility of ensuring the safe and
    efficient operation of aging and new systems and equipment.
    RECOMMENDATIONS
        PASS is extremely proud of the work our members do every day in
    Technical Operations. These dedicated public servants go above and
    beyond the usual call of duty to ensure the safety of the American
    flying public and should not be hampered by challenges because of
    outdated or aging systems and equipment.
        Expediting new systems into the NAS is the obvious solution to the
    issue at hand. This has been the solution for years. Using resources
    outside the agency to upgrade aging systems has been neither efficient
    nor cost effective. By utilizing the workforce it already has, the FAA
    could repurpose funds being spent on costly contractors and bring the
    work in-house. Unfortunately, the FAA has lacked the motivation to do
    so.
        PASS strongly emphasizes that the FAA technical workforce could be
    ready to assist the agency with updating and/or replacing its aging
    systems and equipment if the workforce was properly staffed around the
    country for such a task. They are uniquely qualified and have the
    expertise to accomplish this work if the workforce was augmented.
        PASS thanks lawmakers for including language in the 2024 FAA
    reauthorization bill directing the agency to install 15 taxpayer-
    purchased instrument landing systems (ILS) that are in storage in
    Independence, Missouri. The technicians PASS represents are ready and
    capable of completing this task.\5\ This is a prime example of the FAA
    taking steps toward identifying a solution but then failing to complete
    the work to implement it. While the language in the reauthorization law
    directs the FAA to install the ILS within 18 months of the law's
    passage (May 2024), PASS's attempts to coordinate with the agency to
    begin the project have gone unreturned. As far as PASS knows, the
    equipment--paid for by the taxpayer--is still not in service.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ MCO NAV, ``ORL Glideslope Shelter Replacement,'' July 12, 2021.
    Accessed December 10, 2024: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UKP1o5Pl_w.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        PASS has additional concerns related to the agency's procurement
    processes, some of which go back decades. However, pinpointing the
    FAA's procurement and decommissioning strategy is not the
    responsibility of PASS. The union believes that the agency must conduct
    a full safety review and analysis before making any major changes to
    the operation of the NAS. As part of that process, the FAA should meet
    with PASS and other impacted labor unions.
        Furthermore, the Airport and Airway Trust Fund is underutilized.
    Given projections by the Congressional Budget Office, the Fund is
    likely to triple over the next 10 years and have a balance of over $17
    billion that should be utilized for the modernization of the NAS.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Congressional Budget Office, Airport and Airway Trust Fund
    Baseline Projections, June 2024.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        PASS-represented employees are the solution to the issues
    surrounding FAA aging systems and equipment. FAA technicians are the
    only individuals with the skill and knowledge to ensure the safe and
    efficient operation of this country's air traffic control system. These
    employees are also able to assist the agency in updating the current
    system and addressing any challenges with aging systems and equipment
    if the workforce is properly staffed.
        Quite simply, the FAA is not effectively using a key resource to
    address some of these challenges. The agency is ignoring the skill
    level and potential of more than 4,000 employees stationed across the
    country. The resources for the FAA to be more effective are there; the
    FAA is not taking advantage of the opportunity.
    CONCLUSION
        The FAA must address aging systems and equipment throughout the NAS
    based on careful analysis combined with efficient and effective action.
    Given the pace of technology, many systems and equipment are on the
    path to becoming outdated every day. The technician workforce can be
    instrumental in assisting the agency in ensuring successful
    implementation and updates throughout the NAS.
        Congress must give FAA access to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund
    in order to fund the critical upgrades necessary to maintain the gold
    standard of the U.S. air traffic control system.
        PASS thanks the subcommittee for holding this important hearing. As
    always, the union stands ready to assist lawmakers and the agency every
    step of the way to serve the needs and safety of the American flying
    public.
                                     ______

                                   ADDENDUM A
                       FAA Technical Operations Workforce
        The Technical Operations workforce at the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) has diminished to a level that may lead to crises
    regarding the maintenance, repair, and certification of the National
    Airspace System (NAS). According to the FAA, in October 2014, there
    were approximately 5,810\7\ technical employees (consisting of
    occupational series 2101, 856, and 802). Since then, the numbers have
    steadily declined, to approximately 5,360,\8\ the COVID-19 pandemic
    slowed training for these highly skilled employees. The 2101
    occupational series makes up the bulk of the Technical Operations
    workforce.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ FAA collective bargaining contract data, 21st pay period of
    2014.
        \8\ FAA collective bargaining contract data, 21st pay period of
    2024.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The current staffing of 2101 employees (21st pay period of 2024
    sent to PASS from the agency) is as follows:

        The workforce can be broadly defined in three categories.
    Apprentices, also known as trainees, or developmental employees are
    auxiliary to the workforce because they are still officially in
    developmental training. Journeymen have been recently certified but
    will continue years of ``on-the-job training'' to then specialize in
    skills and do the bulk of certification and restoration work on the
    NAS. However, there is no clear definition of progression for a
    journeyman. Lastly, specialists have been working in their field for a
    significant time and are experts in their given skill or subject area.
        The data suggests that the journeymen portion of the workforce has
    decreased substantially, by 960 employees, and represents the bulk of
    attrition of the 2101. Alternatively, the percentage of apprentices has
    almost tripled since 2014. These trainees should be certified at a
    higher rate and join the workforce as journeymen in a much timelier
    manner.
        This potential crisis is exacerbated by the fact that training has
    slowed considerably due to the pandemic. As a result, the percentage of
    trainees has increased to a level that is unacceptable. Journeymen are
    left to handle the bulk of the work. This has led to a workforce that
    is understaffed, under-trained and overburdened.

        The FAA needs to engage with PASS to create long-term staffing
    goals through a Workforce Plan. Simply developing a Technical
    Operations staffing model based on the current workforce does not take
    into consideration the growth of the NAS through Next Generation Air
    Transportation Systems (NextGen) technologies nor does it take
    advantage of the skills and abilities of this highly technical group of
    employees.

        Recommendation: The FAA needs to engage with PASS to create long-
    term staffing goals through a Workforce Plan as it has for controller
    and safety inspectors. Simply developing a Technical Operations
    staffing model based on the current workforce does not take into
    consideration retirements or the growth of the NAS through Next
    Generation Air Transportation Systems (NextGen) technologies nor does
    it take advantage of the skills and abilities of this highly technical
    group of employees.

        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Spero.
        I now recognize Mr. Marc Scribner from the Reason
    Foundation for his opening statement.

       STATEMENT OF MARC SCRIBNER, SENIOR TRANSPORTATION POLICY
                       ANALYST, REASON FOUNDATION

        Mr. Scribner. Chair Duckworth, Chair Cantwell, Ranking
    Member Cruz, and members of the Subcommittee, good morning and
    thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
        My name is Marc Scribner. I am a Senior Transportation
    Policy Analyst at Reason Foundation, a national 501(c)(3)
    public policy research and education organization with
    expertise across a range of policy areas, including aviation.
        Throughout its 46-year history, Reason Foundation has
    conducted research on air traffic management, emerging aviation
    technologies, and their interactions with public policy. My
    testimony today focuses on institutional problems that are
    undermining efforts to modernize the infrastructure needed to
    support the continued air traffic volume growth in the national
    airspace system.
        GAO's September report adds to the reams of studies
    documenting wide-ranging problems facing FAA's air traffic
    control modernization efforts, which have been plagued by
    delays and cost overruns for decades. I commend GAO for its
    excellent analysis and support its recommendations.
        However, I believe the problems facing FAA run much deeper.
    A decade ago, my Reason Foundation colleague, Robert Poole,
    conducted an in-depth study on the relationship between
    innovation and the structure of and culture at FAA. He selected
    seven innovations in air traffic control and did brief case
    studies on each, observing how each innovation has been dealt
    with by FAA's Air Traffic Organization and its counterparts
    overseas.
        He identified an agency culture resistant to innovation and
    then developed five explanations as to why ATO status quo bias
    exists, which were subsequently validated by a panel of more
    than dozen expert peer reviewers.
        First, the ATO self-identifies as a safety agency rather
    than a technology service provider. Second, it faces a lack of
    or loss of technical expertise. Third, it faces a lack or loss
    of management expertise. Fourth, excessive agency bureaucracy
    is labeled as oversight. And fifth and finally, there is a lack
    of customer focus.
        These cultural problems reflect an underlying flaw inherent
    in ATO's institutional design. It exists as a service provider
    within the national aviation regulator that is, in turn, housed
    within the Department of Transportation. Its capital needs must
    compete with broader DOT and Executive Branch priorities and
    budget requests and then rely on inadequate annual
    appropriations.
        The ATO's institutional design was historically the
    dominant model for air navigation service providers globally.
    This picture has changed dramatically since 1987, when New
    Zealand became the first country to separate air traffic
    control from its Transport Ministry. Since then, nearly all
    industrialized countries have adopted a public utility model
    for air traffic control, and separating the provision of air
    navigation services from the Civil Aviation Authority has been
    a globally recognized best practice by the International Civil
    Aviation Organization for more than two decades.
        This organizational separation allows air traffic control
    to be regulated at arm's length, just like every other aviation
    player, and it resolves the fundamental conflict of interest of
    having a regulator also operate a service that it is tasked
    with regulating.
        Under the public utility model, air navigation service
    providers assess cost-based user fees paid directly to the
    providers. Providers can then issue revenue bonds based on
    their projected revenue streams, just as airports do today in
    the United States. It is through predictable user-based revenue
    collection that air navigation service providers outside the
    U.S. have been able to successfully finance large-scale capital
    modernization efforts. Air navigation service providers that
    operate as public utilities, funded by user fees, now number
    62, and serve 83 countries worldwide. In contrast, just 18
    countries besides the United States, mostly developing
    countries, continue to operate air traffic control as part of
    legacy civil aeronautics authorities that also regulate
    aviation safety.
        The modernization of existing air traffic management
    infrastructure in the United States continues to fall behind
    peer countries, and is straining from the continued operations
    and growth of conventional airspace users. The prospect of new
    airspace entrants raises even more questions about the ability
    of the U.S. to accommodate the future of aviation.
        The bottom line is this. Successfully modernizing air
    traffic control technology and service provision in this
    country will require institutional modernization.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I
    welcome your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Scribner follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Marc Scribner, Senior Transportation Policy
                           Analyst, Reason Foundation
        Chair Duckworth, Ranking Member Moran, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
    today. My name is Marc Scribner. I am a senior transportation policy
    analyst at Reason Foundation, a national 501(c)(3) public policy
    research and education organization with expertise across a range of
    policy areas, including aviation.\1\ Throughout its 46-year history,
    Reason Foundation has conducted research on air traffic management,
    emerging aviation technologies, and their interactions with public
    policy. My testimony today focuses on institutional problems that are
    undermining efforts to modernize the infrastructure needed to support
    the continued air traffic volume growth in the National Airspace
    System.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ My biography and writings are available at https://reason.org/
    author/marc-scribner/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                I. Introduction
        The United States was once the global leader in airspace
    management. However, in recent decades, we have fallen behind peer
    countries that have modernized their air traffic control practices and
    technologies. The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) modernization
    program, known as the Next Generation Air Transportation System
    (NextGen), has been plagued by cost overruns and delays. This bodes
    poorly for anticipated traffic growth from conventional airspace users
    and raises serious questions about long-term efforts to integrate
    emerging aviation technologies and operations--such as unmanned
    aircraft systems and advanced air mobility--into the National Airspace
    System (NAS).
        Our increasingly obsolete air traffic control system is preventing
    airspace users from realizing benefits today while also threatening the
    future integration of emerging aviation technologies into the NAS.
    While there are many problems facing FAA's Air Traffic Organization
    (ATO) generally and NextGen specifically, they can be grouped into
    three categories:

       Funding: uncertain, unstable, and poorly suited to paying
            for large-scale capital modernization programs such as NextGen.

       Governance: a system with so many legislative branch and
            Executive Branch overseers that it focuses ATO management
            attention far more on overseers than on ATO's aviation
            customers.

       Culture: an organizational culture that is status-quo
            oriented.

        These are all interrelated. The uncertain nature of the annual
    appropriations process makes it difficult for the ATO to complete major
    procurements in a timely fashion. As a governmental entity charged with
    regulating safety while providing air navigation services,
    unfortunately, FAA focuses on remaining accountable to its many
    political and administrative overseers rather than the users of its
    navigation services. FAA's dual regulator/service provider mission also
    presents a fundamental conflict of interest.
            II. Problems Identified in the GAO Report and Responses
        September's Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
    catalogued a lengthy list of problems plaguing FAA efforts to modernize
    aging, outdated air traffic control (ATC) systems.\2\ GAO researchers
    identified 138 ATC systems, and its assessment found that 37 percent
    are unsustainable (i.e., need to be replaced) and 39 percent are
    potentially unsustainable. And 58 of those systems ``have critical
    operational impacts on the safety and efficiency of the national
    airspace.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Government Accountability Office, ``Air Traffic Control: FAA
    Actions Are Urgently Needed to Modernize Aging Systems,'' GAO-24-107001
    (Sep. 23, 2024). Available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-
    107001.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Even worse, GAO found that FAA has 64 ongoing efforts aimed at
    modernizing 90 of the unsustainable and potentially unsustainable
    systems. But current FAA plans show that many of these systems will
    still be in operation for between six and 13 more years before being
    either replaced or modernized. Table 3 in the report lists 17 of the
    ``most critical and at-risk'' ATC systems, all of which are
    ``unsustainable'' and shows that 13 of them are not projected to be
    replaced until the 2030s--and that four of them have no modernization
    investment underway at all. GAO notes that the reason four at-risk
    systems have no modernization plans is because the 2023 operational
    risk assessment was not completed in time for those four to be
    included.
        GAO referenced the November 2023 report of the National Airspace
    System Safety Review Team,\3\ which highlighted several aging systems
    as indicative of broader problems:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ ``Discussion and Recommendations to Address Risk in the
    National Airspace System,'' National Airspace System Safety Review Team
    (Nov. 2023). Available at https://www.faa.gov/
    NAS_safety_review_team_report.pdf.

       Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model-X (ASDE-X),
            deployed in the early 2000s to track surface movements and
            alert controllers to potential conflicts, is no longer in
            production and ``spare parts are extremely limited.'' \4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Government Accountability Office, supra note 2, at 7.

       Beacons used for en-route surveillance, with 20-year-old
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            transponders and no available replacement antennas.

       Instrument landing systems (ILSs), most of which are at
            least 25 years old and for which manufacturer support is no
            longer available.

        GAO highlighted comments from the Safety Review Team and from both
    the National Air Traffic Controllers Association and Professional
    Aviation Safety Specialists that ``should be timelier in identifying
    and addressing concerns with unsustainable systems given the length of
    time it takes to move through the acquisition process.'' \5\ Table 4 of
    GAO's report shows that it can take between two and nearly nine years
    ``to establish an acquisition program baseline'' once a candidate
    system has been identified. This means that the time from the start of
    program planning to delivery of a modernized or replacement system can
    range from 5.5 years to as much as 19.5 years, by which time many
    selected technologies will be obsolete.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ Id. at 22
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In response to GAO's September report, numerous stakeholders
    contacted Reason Foundation to share their experiences with FAA's ATC
    modernization efforts.\6\ These responses offer insight into FAA's
    particular failures. I highlight three below.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Robert W. Poole, Jr., ``Responses to GAO Report on Aging FAA
    Systems,'' Aviation Policy News, No. 228, Reason Foundation (Nov.
    2024). Available at https://reason.org/aviation-policy-news/spirit-
    bankruptcy-space-launches-and-response-to-report-on-aging-faa-systems/
    #a.

       A recently retired FAA engineer explained a general cultural
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            problem within the agency:

                    Political overseers have made over FAA in their own
                    image, putting people in charge of things for which
                    they are not qualified: engineering programs run by
                    non-engineers, operations run by non-operational
                    people, logistics run by non-logisticians. The systems
                    engineering that FAA once had has been destroyed.  . .
                    . I hope the GAO report elicits some positive action,
                    but I wouldn't bet on it. It's an accident waiting to
                    happen, but until it does, the current ``leadership''
                    is just making sure they don't get blamed for it.

       A consultant who has worked within and external to FAA wrote
            in with disturbing details on specific aging ATC systems,
            including Mode-S:

                    Mode-S (secondary surveillance radar) is in such poor
                    condition that it is operated in violation of FAA's own
                    commissioning orders for technician certification of
                    its operational performance. As many as half of current
                    Mode-S systems are operated in ``IBI,'' meaning they
                    have zero Mode-S accuracy and capability. Accuracy of
                    these radar systems drives the separation criteria of
                    three and five miles near airports and in en-route
                    airspace. The lack of this radar input makes the
                    surveillance fusion with ADS-B less accurate and
                    reliable. This data is what feeds the automation inputs
                    of both en-route and terminal airspace.

       An engineering manager at a European aviation technology
            company compared FAA's modernization efforts and procurement
            process to those of gold-standard ANSP Nav Canada:

                    Look at Nav Canada. How many primary radar types do
                    they have for terminal surveillance? One. How many does
                    FAA have? Three, dating back to the 1980s. The
                    manufacturers of two of them are out of business. FAA
                    has four types of secondary/beacon radars. Nav Canada
                    does a wholesale replacement, launching a project at
                    the end of life to replace them all at once. Nav Canada
                    has one primary switch for all systems: tower,
                    approach, and en-route. One backup switch for all. They
                    just did a replacement tender for them all . . . FAA is
                    never a single buy. All are indefinite quantity
                    contracts. So suppliers deliver 10 to 20 systems a
                    year. It is the [indefinite delivery/indefinite
                    quantity] type of contract process, related to funding,
                    that does not allow for a realistic replacement.

        GAO also reports that FAA budget requests for facilities and
    equipment ``have remained relatively constant at about $1 billion
    annually.'' \7\ While NextGen's flat budget is indeed a problem, GAO
    does not mention the two reasons why FAA has been unable to request
    adequate financial support for modernization. First, FAA's budget
    request must be approved by the Secretary of Transportation. Second,
    the Office of Management and Budget has the last word on how much the
    Department of Transportation (and hence FAA) can request.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Government Accountability Office, supra note 2, at 10
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This is not how critically important public utilities operate,
    whether government-owned or investor-owned. Utilities plan their
    capital spending needs and obtain approval to set their rates to
    provide the needed revenue streams to pay off bonds used to finance
    large facility and equipment investments. That is true of Federal
    government utilities like the Tennessee Valley Authority, but nothing
    like that process exists for FAA's ATC system. It has no bonding
    authority, must compete against unrelated Department of Transportation
    and broader Executive Branch priorities, and then depend solely on
    inadequate annual appropriations from Congress.
               III. Problems with FAA ATO's Institutional Design
        A decade ago, my Reason Foundation colleague Robert Poole conducted
    an in-depth study of the structure of and culture at FAA and their
    relationship to innovation.\8\ He selected seven innovations in air
    traffic control and did brief case studies on each, observing how each
    innovation has been dealt with by the ATO and its counterparts
    overseas. In each of these, he found that ATO's approach was far more
    hesitant than that of air navigation service providers (ANSPs) in other
    countries that are structured as public utilities. He then developed
    five explanations of why this status-quo bias exists, which were
    subsequently validated by a panel of more than a dozen expert peer
    reviewers.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Robert W. Poole, Jr., ``Organization and Innovation in Air
    Traffic Control,'' Reason Foundation Policy Study 431 (Jan. 2014).
    Available at https://reason.org/wp-content/uploads/files/
    air_traffic_control_organization_innovation.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These five identified detrimental institutional deficiencies at
    FAA's ATO are as follows:

      1.  Self-identity as a safety agency rather than as a technology
            provider. This stems from the ATO being embedded within FAA,
            whose mission is safety. Nearly all the innovations relevant to
            NextGen come from the aerospace/avionics industry, which has a
            much more innovative, dynamic culture. Those companies are
            regulated at arm's length by FAA--but the ATO is embedded
            inside the regulator.

      2.  Lack of, or loss of, technical expertise. Partly due to its
            status-quo culture and partly due to civil service pay scales,
            the FAA has a chronic problem with not attracting or not being
            able to retain the best engineers and software professionals.
            This means that a lot of the detailed requirements for new air
            traffic control and aviation systems end up being defined by
            contractors, which can lead to costly additions that make the
            systems more complex and costly than necessary.

      3.  Lack of, or loss of, management expertise. For the same reasons
            that FAA has limited technical expertise, it also has trouble
            attracting and keeping top-notch program managers who are used
            to being held accountable for results.

      4.  Excessive bureaucracy labeled as oversight. Inherent in being a
            large government agency that is spending taxpayers' money, the
            FAA must be held accountable to all the normal government
            overseers. The ATO must respond to oversight by the FAA
            Administrator, the Secretary of Transportation, the Office of
            Inspector General, the Office of Management and Budget, the
            GAO, and up to 535 Members of Congress. While safety is the top
            priority, responding to the requests and whims of all these
            overseers takes up a large amount of senior management's time.

      5.  Lack of customer focus. Because the ATO gets its funding from
            Congress, it ends up--de facto--acting as if its customer is
            Congress rather than the aviation customers it is supposed to
            serve.
            IV. The Global Air Navigation Service Provider Landscape
        The status-quo ANSP model in the United States was historically the
    dominant model globally, whereby air traffic control was provided by a
    civil aviation authority within the transport ministry. That model has
    undergone major change since 1987 outside of the United States,
    starting when the government of New Zealand removed its air traffic
    control system from the transport ministry by restructuring it as
    Airways New Zealand, a self-supporting government corporation. Within
    10 years, more than a dozen other countries had followed suit.
        Separating the provision of air navigation services from the civil
    aviation authority and putting the ANSP at arm's length from its safety
    regulator, like all the other key players in aviation--airlines,
    business aviation, general aviation, airframe manufacturers, engine
    producers, pilots, mechanics, and so forth--is now the globally
    recognized best practice. For more than two decades, this has been
    International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) policy.\9\ The United
    States is among the last industrialized countries that have not taken
    this step to eliminate the fundamental conflict of interest of having
    an aviation regulator also operate a service it is tasked with
    regulating.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ International Civil Aviation Organization, Safety Oversight
    Manual, Doc. 9734, Part A, Paragraph 2.4.9 (2001).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The revenue source for ANSPs operated as public utilities is
    globally accepted cost-based user fees in accordance with the airport
    and air traffic control charging principles promulgated by ICAO.\10\
    Prior to the conversion of these ANSPs to public utilities, those
    revenues were nearly always paid by airlines and other airspace users
    to the respective national governments. In most cases, once an ANSP has
    been converted to a utility, the user-fee revenue flows directly to the
    ANSP as its primary source of revenue. This makes it possible for the
    ANSPs to issue revenue bonds based on their projected revenue streams,
    just as airports do today in the United States and elsewhere. It is
    through their predictable streams of revenue that come directly from
    users that ANSPs outside the United States can successfully finance
    large-scale capital modernization efforts.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO's Policies on
    Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services, Doc. 9082 (9th
    Edition, 2012).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Globally, three ANSPs have been moved out of the government
    entirely under either an independent nonprofit user cooperative model
    or as partially privatized companies. Another 55 operate as wholly
    owned government corporations. Just 19--mostly developing countries,
    but also including the United States, Japan, and Singapore--operate as
    part of legacy civil aeronautics authorities that also regulate
    aviation safety. ANSPs that operate as public utilities funded by user
    fees now number 62 and serve 83 countries globally.\11\ Appendix A
    lists ANSPs around the world by governance model.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ Marc Scribner, ``2024 Annual Privatization Report: Aviation,''
    Reason Foundation (May 2024) at 26-29. Available at https://reason.org/
    wp-content/uploads/annual-privatization-report-2024-aviation.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 V. Conclusion
        The modernization of existing air traffic management infrastructure
    in the United States continues to fall behind peer countries and is
    straining from the continued operations and growth of conventional
    airspace users. The prospect of new airspace entrants raises even more
    questions about the ability of the United States to accommodate the
    future of aviation, which would have significant negative impacts on
    the economy and safety. Evidence suggests that successfully modernizing
    the technology and service provision of air traffic management of the
    National Airspace System will require institutional modernization.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee,
    and I welcome your questions.

      Appendix A: Air Navigation Service Providers, by Type of Organization
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Country             ANSP          Organization Type        Notes
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Canada           Nav Canada         Nonprofit
                                         corporation
    Italy            ENAV               Part investor-owned
    UK               NATS               Part investor-owned
    UK               Serco              Shareholder-owned
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Albania          ALBCONTROL         State-owned company
    Argentina        DGCTA              State-owned company
    Armenia          ARMATS             State-owned company
    Australia        Airservices        State-owned company
                      Australia
    Austria          Austro Control     State-owned company   Also regulates
    Belgium          Skeyes             State-owned company
    Botswana         CAAB               State-owned company
    Bulgaria         BULATSA            State-owned company
    Cambodia         CATS               State-owned company
    Croatia          Croatia Control    State-owned company
    Curacao          DCANSP             State-owned company
    Czech Republic   ANS CR             State-owned company
    Denmark          Naviair            State-owned company
    Egypt            NANSC              State-owned company
    Estonia          EANS               State-owned company
    Fiji             Airports Fiji      State-owned company
                      Ltd.
    Finland          Finavia Corp.      State-owned company
    Georgia          Sakaeronavigatsia  State-owned company
    Germany          DFS                State-owned company
    Hungary          HungaroControl     State-owned company   Also regulates
    Iceland          ISAVIA             State-owned company
    India            Airports           State-owned company
                      Authority of
                      India
    Indonesia        AirNav Indonesia   State-owned company
    Iran             Iran Airports      State-owned company
                      Company
    Ireland          AirNav Ireland     State-owned company
    Israel           Israel Airports    State-owned company
                      Authority
    Kazakhstan       Kazaeronavigatsia  State-owned company
    Latvia           LGS                State-owned company
    Lithuania        Oro Navigacija     State-owned company
    Macedonia        M-NAV              State-owned company
    Maldives         Maldives Airports  State-owned company
                      Co.
    Malta            MATS               State-owned company
    Moldova          MoldATSA           State-owned company
    Mozambique       Aeroportos de      State-owned company
                      Mocambique
    New Zealand      Airways New        State-owned company
                      Zealand
    Nigeria          NAMA               State-owned company
    Norway           Avinor             State-owned company
    Papua New        PNG Air Service    State-owned company
     Guinea
    Portugal         Nav Portugal       State-owned company
    Romania          ROMATSA            State-owned company
    Russia           State ATM          State-owned company   Also regulates
                      Corporation
    Serbia &         SMATSA             State-owned company
     Montenegro
    Slovak Republic  LPS SR             State-owned company
    Slovenia         Slovenia Control   State-owned company
    South Africa     ATNS               State-owned company
    Spain            ENAIRE             State-owned company
    Sri Lanka        AASL               State-owned company
    Sweden           LFV                State-owned company
    Switzerland      Skyguide           State-owned company
    Thailand         AEROTHAI           State-owned company
    Turkey           DHMI               State-owned company
    Uganda           CAA Uganda         State-owned company
    Ukraine          UkSATS             State-owned company
    Vietnam          VATMC              State-owned company
    Zambia           NACL               State-owned company
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Bangladesh       CAAB               Civil aviation        Financially
                                         authority             autonomous
    Cyprus           DCA Cyprus         Civil aviation
                                         authority
    Dominican        IDAC               Civil aviation
     Republic                            authority
    Ghana            Ghana CAA          Civil aviation
                                         authority
    Greece           HCAA               Civil aviation
                                         authority
    Japan            JCAB               Civil aviation
                                         authority
    Jordan           CARC               Civil aviation        Financially
                                         authority             autonomous
    Kenya            Kenya CAA          Civil aviation
                                         authority
    Mongolia         CAA of Mongolia    Civil aviation
                                         authority
    Myanmar          DCA Myanmar        Civil aviation
                                         authority
    Nepal            CAA Nepal          Civil aviation
                                         authority
    Saudi Arabia     GACA               Civil aviation
                                         authority
    Singapore        CAAS               Civil aviation
                                         authority
    Swaziland        SWACAA             Civil aviation
                                         authority
    Taipei FIR       ANWS               Civil aviation
                                         authority
    Tanzania         TCAA               Civil aviation
                                         authority
    Trinidad &       Trinidad & Tobago  Civil aviation
     Tobago           CAA                authority
    Tunisia          OACA               Civil aviation
                                         authority
    United States    FAA                Civil aviation
                                         authority
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Azerbaijan       AZANS              Government
                                         department
    Brazil           DECEA              Government
                                         department
    France           DSNA               Government
                                         department
    Mexico           SENEAM             Government
                                         department
    Netherlands      LVNL               Government            Financially
                                         department            autonomous
    Poland           PANSA              Government
                                         department
    United States    DOD Policy Board,  Government            Military
                      Aviation           department
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Belgium          MUAC               Intergovernmental     Upper airspace
    Honduras         COCESNA            Intergovernmental     6 countries
    Senegal          ASECNA             Intergovernmental     17 countries
    Angola           ENANA-EP           uncategorized
    Haiti            OFNAC              uncategorized
    Luxembourg       ANA                uncategorized
    Sudan            Sudan ANS          uncategorized
    Dubai            DANS               uncategorized
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Scribner. I will now
    recognize myself for five minutes of questions.
        GAO found 17 of the 51 unsustainable air traffic control
    systems are critical, yet investments to modernize some of
    these will not be completed for more than a decade. Worse, as
    of May 2024, there was not even any modernization investment
    underway for four of these systems.
        Mr. Walsh, how worried should we be about these four
    critical and unsustainable systems for which there were not any
    modernization investments underway?
        Mr. Walsh. So as myself and the other witnesses have said,
    the national airspace is safe. It is safe to fly. But this is
    stressing the system, and the longer we wait, the worse it will
    get. So I am worried, but again, it is still safe to fly.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Mr. Iacopelli, how worried
    are air traffic controllers about unsustainable critical air
    traffic control systems for which there are no modernization
    investments underway?
        Mr. Iacopelli. I will reiterate what has been said. The
    national airspace system is safe. We represent 15,000
    professional, trained, dedicated air traffic controllers who
    will do everything they can to maintain the safety of the
    system. They are the failsafe, along with the pilots and the
    technicians to oversee it. So very similar to Mr. Walsh, we
    believe the system is safe. We are obviously concerned about a
    number of these issues, not the least of which is the FTI
    network. But as far as the systems go, we would like to work
    with the FAA. We have talked to the FAA about working with them
    in addressing those issues, and we will continue to do so.
        Senator Duckworth. I feel that it is the personnel, the air
    traffic controllers and the pilots, who are keeping us safe,
    despite systems and technology that keeps going further and
    further behind, and you are having to adjust more and more in
    order to keep the flying public safe. Would that be an accurate
    statement?
        Mr. Iacopelli. That is an accurate statement.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I see you nodding, Captain
    Ambrosi. Would you like to comment on this? And how do pilots
    feel about these aging systems and systems that do not have
    plans to be updated?
        Mr. Ambrosi. Well, as my colleagues have said, the system
    is safe. We have never been happy with current safe. If we said
    in the 1980s that we are safe but we are safe enough, think of
    how many accidents we would be enduring today. So you can never
    say we are safe enough. We always need to push forward. As Dean
    said, we do a lot of work-arounds to make sure that the system
    is working as intended, and we keep the traffic, the passengers
    and cargo, moving.
        There needs to be that next step forward in safety where we
    get the technology that supports the human element--the air
    traffic controllers, the pilots. We absolutely need that next
    investment and that push forward to the next level for all of
    us, to continue the safe operation and make it safer.
        Senator Duckworth. Can you speak a little bit about how
    having the two pilots helped with the reaction time to some of
    the near misses, and why it was critical to have two pilots as
    opposed to one?
        Mr. Ambrosi. I mean, as we talked about the Austin
    incident. If there was only one pilot there, the first officer
    would not have identified the Southwest jet on the runway.
    Let's take the Alaska incident. While there is still an
    investigation underway, can you imagine having a door panel
    come off an airplane in flight, with only one person in the
    flight deck at that time to manage that situation.
        Let's take ground operations, surface operations, where you
    have two people, at least--some of our international operations
    more. Somebody needs to have their eyes outside at all times--
    you are a pilot and you understand that--eyes outside while
    somebody else may be looking down at a chart, you know, how do
    we get from A to B. We do not work at the same airport every
    day, so we will go to an airport and it may be our first time
    there. Somebody's head is down and another pilot needs to be
    heads-up, looking out and seeing where we are going and
    monitoring the technology. You know, there is technology right
    around the corner that will give us more situational awareness
    on the ground. But if someone is looking at that situational
    awareness display to see where other airplanes are, that means
    somebody else needs to be looking out the window.
        Senator Duckworth. And in the Alaska Airline door plug
    incidents, one of the pilot's headsets was actually ripped off
    in the middle of that incident, from the wind gusts.
        Mr. Spero, if we are stuck relying on these unsustainable,
    critical air traffic control systems for many more years, how
    much harder will it be for your personnel to maintain them? And
    are you confident we will have enough parts and a workforce
    with enough experience to do so?
        Mr. Spero. Senator, thank you for the question. So I will
    start out by saying I like the way Captain Ambrosi talked about
    work-arounds. That is essentially what our folks do every day
    when they do not have spare parts. They find ways to make these
    systems work. They look for the spare parts. They have to dig
    into the FAA system to see if they can get them refurbished.
        It will become more difficult as times goes on. Moving
    forward, they have to have the ability and the training, and
    the staffing, as well. We have had incidents in various places
    where we have the equipment, we have the spare parts, yet we do
    not have the right people in the right place at the right time
    to restore systems. In Chicago earlier this year we had a
    ground stop because we did not have a trained technician
    available on shift to be able to exclude a software problem
    that effectively caused the controllers to not know where the
    aircraft were. Once that person came in, they fixed it in two
    minutes.
        But all of these things fall together. It is going to
    become more difficult as time goes on. We have to have the
    personnel. We have to have the parts. We have to have the
    training. It breaks our members' hearts to not be able to
    sustain the air traffic control system the way they want.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I now recognize Ranking
    Member and incoming Chairman Cruz for his question line.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to each
    of the witnesses for being here today on this very important
    topic. Mr. Walsh, let me start with you. The GAO report paints
    a grim picture of the FAA's sustainment plans for the air
    traffic system. More than 100 ATC systems, meaning radar,
    software, and hardware, were unsustainable or potentially
    unsustainable. With air travel expected to continue to grow,
    breakdowns and disruptions will only get worse.
        Mr. Walsh, your expertise is in procurement and
    modernization of legacy systems. How would you summarize the
    current state of air traffic control?
        Mr. Walsh. The easy summary is this is what happens if you
    take the ``if it isn't broke, don't fix it'' or perhaps if it's
    still somewhat working, don't fix it, just sustain it, over
    many, many years. So we are seeing the ramifications of that.
    We need to invest more money and more funds to get us back on
    track.
        Senator Cruz. How do you fix it? And I suspect the answer
    is not going to be just more money, because that answer has
    often failed to solve the problem.
        Mr. Walsh. You are correct. Throwing money at the problem
    won't fix it. You need adequate oversight. You need the right
    people in the right place. You need training. You need to have
    more of the good people that are keeping things running with
    bandaids and patches.
        So as I said in my opening statement, this is not a quick
    fix. There is no silver bullet. This is going to be the work of
    years and billions of dollars and thousands of people.
        Senator Cruz. All right. Mr. Scribner, in your testimony
    you mentioned that former FAA employees responded to your
    analysis of the GAO report. One stakeholder wrote that the
    ongoing reliability of existing surveillance technology like
    radar and ADS-B is in jeopardy, and the replacement for these
    existing technologies likely will not be deployed for 15 years.
        Why do you think FAA employees reacted so powerfully to the
    GAO report and your analysis, and what does it say about the
    FAA's acquisition strategy that it takes 15 years to deploy a
    new surveillance system?
        Mr. Scribner. Well, thank you for those questions, Senator
    Cruz. On the first, I think the reaction that Reason Foundation
    received from FAA stakeholders on the GAO report, it was not
    really anything new. A lot of these types of complaints we have
    heard for many years. I think they saw the thorough, and I
    think the excellent analysis, in the GAO report as an
    opportunity for Congress, for FAA, for Department of
    Transportation leadership to really take another close look at
    some of these issues that, again, are not new.
        When it comes to the delays that they are specifically
    complaining about, again, those are not new, and as documented
    by GAO quite thoroughly, this is quite common. I think
    especially stakeholders who have contractors who have worked
    abroad with air navigation service providers outside the
    country, and then they come back and work with ATO, can see the
    night-and-day situation when it comes to technology procurement
    and technology development. Some of the larger ANSP's globally
    are able to develop their own technology effectively in-house
    and then market it globally. That is something that the FAA
    used to specialize in developing technology in-house, but
    increasingly it is relying too much on outside contractors
    without adequate internal controls, and that is helping add to
    the delays and cost overruns for a variety of systems.
        Senator Cruz. My understanding is that the FAA has
    concurred with the majority of the GAO's recommendations,
    ranging from better reporting requirements and budget baseline
    practices to more regular reviews from the Joint Resources
    Council. Are those recommendations, in your judgment,
    sufficient, or should Congress consider more creative solutions
    to ensure that the U.S. air traffic control system is the best
    in the world?
        Mr. Scribner. As I said in my opening statement and as I
    detail in my written testimony, I think the problems run much
    deeper. It is structural. It is institutional design that is
    ultimately the root cause here. There is a reason why the vast
    majority of countries, of air navigation service providers
    globally, have moved toward the public utility model, the self-
    supporting public utility model, to avoid some of the political
    problems that the FAA continues to experience. And we have seen
    a lot more success outside the U.S. in modernizing air traffic
    control technologies and practice than we have here. And again,
    I think it is institutional.
        Senator Cruz. And finally, Mr. Iacopelli, in your judgment,
    what is the biggest challenge outside of funding facing the
    FAA's air traffic control system?
        Mr. Iacopelli. Thank you, Senator. I would say, you know,
    we have recently--I will answer it this way--we have recently
    met with the COO of the ATO, and we talked about this
    equipment. Right now the way it is set up is, unfortunately,
    that there is a program office that goes out and looks for and
    acquires new technologies. And they take that equipment idea
    and bring it over to the ATO, and say, hey, we have acquired
    this. How do you want to use it?
        It does not make a whole lot of sense to us. We would
    rather, as the experts in running the air traffic control
    system, and the COO, Tim Arel, has agreed, we should get
    together, talk about what do we need, look at all of the
    systems that are out there, prioritize what we need, prioritize
    what would make it better, go through that, and move forward
    together and saying this is what the ATO needs. This is what
    air traffic control needs to maintain the safety of the NAS and
    improve and increase the efficiency of the NAS.
        Senator Cruz. So what you are saying makes a lot of sense.
    Is there anything that prevents the FAA from doing that now?
        Mr. Iacopelli. There is not, and it is a goal that we are
    going to start doing in the coming weeks and month, certainly
    in 2025, to move--and this is not a NATCA issue. It is an FAA
    issue--moving those pieces around to put the office that goes
    out and acquires technology for air traffic control under the
    ATO so that we are acquiring systems that make sense to air
    traffic control.
        Senator Cruz. Very good. Thank you.
        Senator Duckworth. Chairwoman Cantwell.
        Chair Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair. And following on
    Senator Cruz's line of questioning, because I think the issue
    here is we want to know what modernization takes, and we,
    obviously, have seen a lot of events. So the workforce training
    and hours also matter to us, and the experience of those air
    traffic controllers. If you listen to the Alaska flight audio,
    it was really critical that the communication between the pilot
    and the air traffic control system had the best you could
    possibly have in that situation.
        So Captain Ambrosi, let's just say you are the most active
    user of the air traffic controller system. So you said
    something in your statement, at the very end. I do not see it
    in your written statement. But you were referring to the FAA's
    tendency to do what is required within their budgeting but not
    come to the table with the right amount of technology
    investment. Am I making sense there, when you were talking
    about your resources? I do not know if you have that line and
    you could re-read it again.
        Mr. Ambrosi. If you like.
        Chair Cantwell. Yes, please.
        Mr. Ambrosi. Sure.
        Chair Cantwell. Because I thought it was a very telling
    statement about this dilemma.
        Mr. Ambrosi. Let's see. While Congress has provided the
    funding requested each year by the FAA during the annual
    appropriations process, there remains a significant shortfall
    in the numerous maintenance and modernization efforts.
    Resources have not kept up with inflation and effectively
    require the agency to prioritize sustainment to the detriment
    of modernization and infrastructure needs. The FAA must ask
    Congress for its true needs in order to sustain legacy systems,
    and make greater headway on NextGen and improve the NAS for all
    users.
        Chair Cantwell. Sustainment to the detriment of----
        Mr. Ambrosi. Modernization.
        Chair Cantwell.--modernization. OK. That is what I wanted
    you to focus on.
        So how do we deal with this dilemma? Because sustainment,
    you know, there was much debate between, I think, NATCA and
    others about what they thought the FAA should do. But if the
    FAA is sitting over here looking at sustainment instead of
    modernization, and modernization is absolutely capable, as the
    NTSB Chairwoman has said, on near-miss technology at the
    airports or these systems, how can we be better informed that
    that is no tradeoff when safety is concerned? Trading off
    sustainment for modernization is no tradeoff when safety is
    concerned. How do we better understand this?
        Mr. Ambrosi. Well, I will use this second to do a shout-out
    for Administrator Whitaker and thank him for his leadership. It
    will be sad to see him go. We obviously need an FAA
    Administrator that is going to be a leader, and we need long-
    term, stable leadership at the top of the FAA to tackle this
    exact challenge. It was under his leadership that the FAA did
    request a significant increase in budget last year to address
    the facilities and equipment and improvement. But yes, they
    need to ask for what they need, absolutely.
        Chair Cantwell. OK. I am not sure I quite got the--here is
    how we are dealing with it. We, in the ACSAA, said, we want a
    Top 10 trend list. We want to know what the top safety trend
    concerns are, so that you are elevating that to us. We also,
    obviously, had the Chair testify here, and then Acting
    Administrator heard her, and a few days later ended up finally
    putting out an order on near-miss technology deployment for
    most large airports in the United States.
        But you are asking us to do our oversight role, but it is a
    lot of times way deep down that there is this disagreement. Now
    you have captured it--sustainability versus modernization. But
    what else can we do to crystalize that that modernization
    equals safety, and that Congress needs to understand where
    dollars go when they are prioritizing safety?
        Mr. Ambrosi. All I can answer is by working together and
    highlighting the problems that may be there. I believe that the
    people at the FAA want to modernize. They believe they have a
    path forward. It is just a case of saying, ``All right. We have
    got to really ask for what we need and go out and do it.''
        They have the data. There have been miraculous things over
    the last two decades----
        Chair Cantwell. Not--I have to interrupt--no, no, no, not
    if people are sitting there arguing over formula models for
    staffing. That is what we argued over. I see everybody
    nodding--formula models for staffing. That is what we argued
    over. Nobody argued over you need this technology modernization
    now, so that you can prevent X, Y, and Z from happening, or the
    risk of whatever that risk was, 30 percent change. I don't
    know. Some percent chance of that happening.
        Instead it came down to this is a disagreement over
    staffing models, and I do not really think that is what it was
    about. I think it was about sustainability of an organization
    versus modernization, just as you crystallized it.
        So anyway, I will stop there, Madam Chair. But I do think
    this is--we here are--I am really proud of what our Committee
    has done on oversight, and by that I mean the whole Committee
    has really taken a more aggressive role and position and input
    in really understanding these.
        But you guys all have to help us. You have to help us
    crystallize these opportunities in ways that Congress can fully
    see the tradeoffs without, you know, having to spend hours and
    hours and hours digesting the nuance here of staffing models.
    And I do not know, Mr. Iacopelli, if anybody else has any
    thoughts about that. But the way we have dealt with it so far
    is to use the NTSB, and to say you be the watchdog whistle here
    and tell us, and be louder about it.
        But look, these technology shifts are major in innovation
    and they are also critical to our competitiveness. So we want
    to get it right, and we want to understand it. So I don't know.
    If I could have one more minute, if anybody else has a comment
    on that.
        Mr. Iacopelli. So if I may, thank you, Senator. So it is an
    interesting perspective that the staffing question was
    sustainment versus modernization. On one side was we have a
    model that barely keeps the system alive and runs it as
    inexpensively as we can. On the other side you had the air
    traffic experts who looked at it and said, ``If we are building
    the air traffic control system for the future, and we want it
    to be safe, we need to do these things.''
        And when we talk about sustainment and modernization I
    think Mr. Walsh said it. There is not an easy fix. There is not
    an easy solution. And I would liken it to any--you know, when I
    talked about the buildings, when I talked about anything that
    we are trying to improve, if we are installing high-definition
    TVs in a building that is run on an electric generator, powered
    by gasoline, it is not sustainable.
        So we have to have the equipment that is out there work
    while we modernize, and modernization, in a lot of instances,
    is improving efficiency. And I know your focus, and I think it
    is an excellent question, what are the modernization tools that
    we need that focus on safety. We have to deal with efficiency
    and capacity, but we need to focus first and foremost on
    safety.
        And I think that in our conversations with the FAA, and I
    will also follow up with what Captain Ambrosi said, thank Mike
    Whitaker for his leadership because he has been, much as I
    heard from all of you say, hey, he has been focused on safety.
    It has been an important part of his charge. And we have worked
    together to try to identify those systems we need to make the
    system safe, but we have to figure out a way to do both,
    because we cannot let go of the things we have until we have
    the replacement, and those things take time.
        But the safety issues in the modernization do need to be
    separated out from the capacity and efficiency issues.
        Chair Cantwell. Well, I see many of my colleagues here who
    probably want to jump in on these things. But I would say this
    Committee has the capacity. I think it has demonstrated it has
    the capacity. So I think we just have to get this debate
    elevated. It was not a staffing model discussion. It was about
    what do you need to do. And again, Captain Ambrosi being the
    end user of all of this, you know, I am sure they were the
    loudest in saying this is what we need, because they are the
    ones every day who have to get up there and rely on this.
        Mr. Ambrosi. And with your leadership and the leadership of
    this Committee saying to them, ``Is this really what you need?
    Does this budget have what you need to modernize?'' and put
    them on the spot. So I thank this Committee----
        Chair Cantwell. Well, I think air traffic controllers were
    saying yes, but a larger FAA discussion was saying no, and then
    we are in the middle, trying to digest and help. But anyway, we
    got what we needed, which was important, but more to do. More
    to do because technology and modernization are going to
    continue.
        Again, thank you, Chair Duckworth, for this very important
    hearing, and thank you for your leadership on aviation, in
    general.
        Senator Duckworth. Senator Rosen very patiently joining us
    remotely.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA

        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chair Duckworth. I appreciate you
    and Ranking Member Moran. Today's hearing is critically
    important to all of us, and I appreciate all the witnesses for
    being here and for your work.
        You know, safe and efficient travel, I do not have to tell
    you. I was Chair of the Tourism, Trade, and Export Promotion
    Subcommittee on Commerce, and safe and efficient travel is key
    to Nevada's tourism economy, and it begins with our Nation's
    air traffic controllers. And we do have the safest skies in the
    world.
        And I want to build a little bit on what Senator Cantwell
    is talking about with staffing issues and a lot of these
    systemic issues that we have with modernization, because today
    air traffic controllers are working longer hours, longer than
    ever before, fewer breaks, for more consecutive days. And we do
    agree, every one of us, this is not sustainable, and it must be
    addressed.
        In May, the FAA sent a letter on the controller shortage
    that argued its own staffing targets would produce the same
    hiring levels for the next 3 years, as what the recommended
    targets from the Collaborative Resource Working Group.
        So Mr. Iacopelli, has the FAA sufficiently taken into
    consideration the Collaborative Resource Working Group's
    staffing model, which NAFDA helped inform, when crafting its
    own workforce plan? Because we cannot burn out the workforce we
    have, and we have to grow folks faster than we are doing.
        Mr. Iacopelli. Thank you, Senator. Those are all true and
    very accurate points. The men and women, the professionals that
    we represent, are working longer, and they are working harder,
    and they are handling more aircraft than they have, likely in
    most of their careers because we do have a relative new
    turnover in our workforce.
        As far as the CRWG goes, the Collaborative Resource Work
    Group, the ATO, the Air Traffic Organization, has fully
    embraced it. They were partnered with NATCA in the creation of
    those certified professional staffing targets, because we
    partnered and worked through it collaboratively with the ATO.
        When you get to the FAA--and again, we do thank Mike
    Whitaker for his service and his commitment to safety--but it
    has been a challenge convincing the FAA as a whole that the
    CRWG numbers are the correct number that we need to adequately
    and safely staff the air traffic control facilities in the
    country, that allow them to take sufficient breaks, that allow
    us to participate in the modernization efforts and moving the
    air traffic control system into the future.
        We are expecting that part of the FAA Reauthorization Act
    of 2024--again, thank you all for passing that--requires a
    study of the two different models. In the meantime----
        Senator Rosen. We need more than a study. We need to take
    some action. I think we have studied an awful lot, and
    somebody's safety is on the line.
        I have just a little over a minute. I will take some more
    of your answer off the record because I just want to pair this
    with modernizing our aging technology, as it is going to
    alleviate some of the strain on the air traffic controllers
    because they are working oftentimes with older equipment or
    things that are not as technically good as they could be. And
    it also will help expedite and increase air traffic controller
    graduation rates.
        And one of these pieces of technology that will help us,
    help the air traffic controllers and their workload are the
    Terminal Flight Data Manager and the FAA's Surface Safety
    Portfolio. So I am going to ask you--like I said, I just have
    about a minute left--what impact, Mr. Iacopelli, you think the
    TFDM or Surface Safety Portfolio systems had on airports that
    have installed this equipment, particularly when it comes to
    controllers' morale and retention. You know, workers, we
    partner with technology to be better at our job, so it is
    really important, right, it's a partnership between humans and
    technology that gives us a safe space, a safe airspace in this
    regard.
        Mr. Iacopelli. Well, thank you again, Senator. So we did
    deploy the Surface Awareness Initiative, and I know several
    times Austin was brought up. That was the first location that
    we worked with the FAA, and we collaboratively developed this
    new tool that, again, we call it the Surface Awareness
    Initiative. And we deployed it at Austin first, and we put it
    in seven other locations.
        It is overwhelmingly, positively received. In fact, the
    leadership of the FAA, including Administrator Whitaker, from
    the ATO and NATCA, went to Austin, talked to the folks there,
    and they are very appreciative, and it has made a difference.
    And we are continuing to try--well, not try, we are continuing
    with our deployment schedule to get that out. It is in eight
    facilities now. We are going to another nine facilities in the
    coming months. So it has made a difference.
        And this is an interesting point between those things that
    are modernization that are for safety and those things that are
    modernization for capacity. The TFDM is more a capacity tool.
    All things that we modernize have some effect on safety. But
    the Surface Awareness Initiative is a direct tool that directly
    affects safety.
        Senator Rosen. And if it is a very short answer, how can we
    help you speed up the deployment of some of these tools that we
    know help, because we need to speed up the deployment. It is
    going to really help us all across this Nation. If you want
    just like a 10-second answer, I could take it off the record,
    but what do you need to help speed up your deployment schedule?
        Mr. Iacopelli. What we need to do is be adequately funded
    so that the FAA does not have to choose between deploying this
    and something else and make this a prioritization issue.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you very much, and I yield back, Madam
    Chair.
        Senator Duckworth. Senator Klobuchar.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. Thank you very much, Madam
    Chair. Mr. Walsh, it is critical, as you have talked about in
    this hearing, that our safety and security, for our safety and
    security that we upgrade our aviation system. The NOTAM system
    outage, way back, as you know, caused a delay, major delay, and
    in July the FAA confirmed that there is now a backup system in
    place, but there is still more work to do.
        Could you talk about the challenges that airports and air
    traffic controllers face when trying to transition away from
    their old legacy systems?
        Mr. Walsh. So I think the National Airspace System Safety
    Review Team did a great job in their recent report on the
    topic, and I would highlight some of the things that they said.
    In particular, it is very difficult right now to turn off the
    legacy systems once you have built the new system that is
    intended to replace it. We have a lot of users. In particular,
    if you read between the lines, the military, that does not
    easily transition over to newer technology, and FAA is then
    left holding the bag with two systems rather than one. And then
    they have to sustain both of those systems rather than focusing
    entirely on their new system, which again, takes up an
    increasingly large piece of the not growing pie.
        So I think as our air traffic controllers, our pilots, and
    our technicians work with these older systems it makes their
    life harder, and again, it makes it more upon them to catch
    things when they go wrong or when these systems have outages.
        Senator Klobuchar. OK. Very good. Thank you.
        Mr. Iacopelli, thank you for being here. As you know, we
    have a shortage of air traffic controllers. We have a major hub
    in Minnesota. I know how important the air traffic controllers'
    work is, and we have seen flight disruptions and the like. The
    bill that we passed back in May, with Senator Cantwell's
    leadership, the FAA Air Traffic Controller's Hiring Act,
    focused on boosting FAA training capacity.
        Do you believe that we should focus on training and hiring?
    How is it going? What is the latest?
        Mr. Iacopelli. Well, thank you for the question, Senator,
    and absolutely, yes, we need to continue to focus on hiring. We
    know that the FAA has just met their hiring goal for the Fiscal
    Year, so we are in a new Fiscal Year. And based on the FAA
    Reauthorization Act that they are required to do max hiring.
    And we have partnered with the FAA and our Public Affairs
    Department to go out and promote that.
        If you ever scroll through Facebook you see hundreds of air
    traffic controllers promoting this profession and how great it
    is and how much they want people to get in it, for two reasons.
    One, it is a great profession, and two, we need more air
    traffic controllers.
        We do need to focus on the training. We have recently
    agreed to some new initiatives within the FAA to focus on
    training, increase the success rate, the TSS provision in the
    FAA Reauthorization Act, the training simulator. Again, it is a
    funding issue. It has been authorized. We need the
    appropriations part, and hopefully the FAA is going to ask for
    the right amount of money so, again, we are not choosing
    between which thing is more important. We need all of it.
        Senator Klobuchar. Right. You know, the air traffic control
    tower up in Duluth is 70 years old, in northern Minnesota. The
    weather is rather harsh there. We also have an incredible Guard
    base there, and Cirrus is right near there. So there is a lot
    of it, a great synergy of air travel and air manufacturing. It
    is one of the three oldest towers in the country. It does not
    make the line-of-sight requirements. It is in need of
    significant repairs. It actually gets under water somehow, even
    though it is on a hill, quite a bit. We got some funding for it
    but not enough to get it going.
        So is the biggest obstacle here infrastructure, and just
    talk about the rural communities. And this is not even that
    rural, right. It is quite a big city, Duluth, Minnesota, where
    Bob Dylan came from. The biopic is coming out, so I want to get
    it on everyone's mind.
        Mr. Iacopelli. We have been working, using the Bipartisan
    Infrastructure Law as the base, to go through and look at a lot
    of our facilities. And, I mean, we have our folks sending us
    pictures of flooded basements, mold, decay. When I mentioned
    plumbing, just upgrading the plumbing in the facility, so that
    the restrooms and the water work, so that our folks who are air
    traffic controllers can do that.
        I know up in Alaska they have space heaters. We have gone
    through where the air conditioning this past summer in several
    locations around the country just stopped working. And we have
    had our folks in the elevators stopped and it was 90-plus
    degrees in the tower, and they had to go to remote sites.
        So all of those little things, in those rural communities,
    where you do not hear about it, it does not necessarily make
    the news. We certainly hear about it. I am assuming you hear
    about it from your constituents.
        So it is an enormous task to go out and upgrade the entire
    infrastructure of the national airspace system. And I think Mr.
    Walsh said it--it is not a quick fix. It is not something that
    happened over the past 3 years. It is something that has been
    building for 50 years of, if it's not broke--and I forget how
    you said it--but if it's not broke, we don't need to fix it. If
    it is working, that is good. Let's keep going.
        And I do not want to take up too much time, but we have
    radar sites right now that the FAA is going around trying to
    decommission because they do not have the means by which they
    can maintain it. That is not improving safety. That is simply a
    matter of taking down a radar site so you can use those parts
    someplace else, because they do not have the means by which to
    maintain those radar sites, and that is another big issue we
    are going through.
        Senator Klobuchar. OK. Very good. Anything else, Captain,
    that you would like to add?
        Mr. Ambrosi. I think Dean covered it pretty well there. But
    it is an all-of-the-above strategy. We need to keep it working
    so we can keep moving passengers and cargo. But it is time to
    make that next leap and finally put the people, resources, the
    money in place to move our--it is the safest aviation system in
    the world, but we need to keep it that way and move it forward.
    So I would agree with everything he said.
        Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you. I will send questions in
    writing. There are many things going on today around here, so
    thank you. Thanks.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I hear they are tough in
    Alaska about those space heaters there, Senator Sullivan.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

        Senator Sullivan. Well, thank you, Madam Chair, and it is
    always good to follow my friend from Minnesota, who has similar
    issues, cold, rural----
        Senator Klobuchar. Space heaters.
        Senator Sullivan.--space heaters needing upgrades. We do
    not have--was it Bob Dylan? We do not have him, but we have a
    lot of other famous people.
        So I want to thank the Chair for holding this really
    important hearing, and Mr. Iacopelli, I want to begin with you,
    first doing a shout-out to all the air traffic controllers
    across the country, in Alaska in particular. These are really
    heroes, in my view. They keep us safe. We have a lot of
    aviation challenges in Alaska. You guys do such a great job. I
    am a giant fan of your workers and members.
        You know, even the whole issue, a lot of Americans do not
    know if you are flying to Asia, you know, even from Chicago or
    somewhere, you come over the Alaska airspace. Our air traffic
    control kind of gets them safely to Tokyo or Seoul. So I really
    just want to do a great shout-out to them.
        And I want talk to you. You know, as we were developing the
    FAA Reauth I supported the Air Traffic Control Hiring Act to
    require the FAA to set a minimum of hiring targets for new air
    traffic controllers. We got a lot of this in the bill, but is
    there more Congress can be doing on this really important
    issue?
        Mr. Iacopelli. Well, thank you, Senator, and I appreciate
    the compliment to our brothers and sisters who work up in
    Alaska.
        You know, the Reauthorization Act and the requirement to
    conduct max hiring, the success of that depends on having it
    sufficiently funded. So we are hopeful that the FAA requests
    the money that they need to continue the hiring. We are working
    with the FAA, and I am sure you are aware, sir, that we have
    expanded the enhanced CTI program, the College Training
    Initiative. So we are working on that.
        We are working on a number of initiatives in-house, if you
    will, to enhance and improve the training, to enhance and
    improve the success rate, most importantly, of that training.
    Because any time we take someone, we know if we hire 2,000
    people, we are not getting 2,000 through our training course
    out in Oklahoma. Then once they hit the field, again, there is
    more attrition.
        But to maintain that focus and not lose sight of the
    importance, and again, we have all Priority 1A things here.
    Everything is a 1, 1, 1 priority. But to continue to focus and
    ensure we have the funding to stay with it. Because it is not a
    one-year task. It is a multiyear, long-term commitment.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, thank you on that, and I again, we
    will continue to stay very focused on this Committee on those
    issues.
        Captain Ambrosi, it is good to see you again, sir, and I
    want to do a shout-out to your members too. They are great
    Americans. A lot of them live in Alaska. We have more pilots
    per capita than any state in the country, as you probably know,
    more veterans per capita too--I know our Chair cares a lot
    about that--per capita.
        But we also have challenges with regard to having enough
    pilots, particularly for regional airlines, because they get
    recruited up to the major airlines so quickly. So one of the
    things that I worked on with you and others, that had
    bipartisan support, and both labor union support and industry
    support, was focusing on education for our pilots. And one
    thing that just kind of--I just do not understand why it still
    exists--that we have this kind of unequal treatment for, loan
    treatment between traditional college students and students
    seeking a professional airline pilot, who shoulder very costly
    loans for training.
        So I am trying to fix that. As you know, we had a bill that
    unfortunately did not make it in the FAA Reauth that I thought
    was kind of a no-brainer to get in there, to help our pilot
    situation. Can you explain the barriers a prospective pilot
    faces for assessing flight education and training and what you
    think Congress should be doing to right-size the existing
    programs?
        And oh, by the way, on Federal loan payback, you know, the
    pilots who go through this kind of training, they get Federal
    loans. They will have a great record of paying back those
    loans, unlike some of the others who do not, because they will
    go get an aviation job or a pilot job, and those are good-
    paying jobs.
        So what more can we do to level that playing field?
        Mr. Ambrosi. Senator, good to see you. Thank you again, as
    you did with the shout-out for our members. They work hard
    every day.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes, we have a lot in Alaska, as you
    know.
        Mr. Ambrosi. Keep our people safe. Thank you for your
    leadership on this issue. As I may have said in former
    testimony that I would not be able to be a pilot today with
    what it costs.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes.
        Mr. Ambrosi. It has gotten out of hand. It is a wonderful
    profession. I am proud to be an airline pilot. And we need to
    do more to open the doors.
        We have a robust pipeline. The schools are full. But there
    are the best and brightest still out there that do not have the
    resources that enable them to do this.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes. Do you think that limits the number
    of pilots in America, just because it is so expensive?
        Mr. Ambrosi. It certainly limits--it takes away the ability
    for a lot of people that would like to get into this
    profession, if they do not have the ability to get the
    resources, the Federal loans, that could help. It does not make
    sense that if you can get those loans for other professions,
    that we cannot do it for ours.
        Senator Sullivan. To get a philosophy degree, you can get a
    Federal loan, but pilot training, you cannot. That seems
    backward.
        Mr. Ambrosi. Yes. Well again, thank you for your leadership
    on it. I believe that opening the doors of opportunity for all
    those that would like to get into this profession, it is an
    important step in the right direction.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. And Madam Chair, I want to work
    with you on that too. I know you care a lot about this issue.
        I see my time has expired, so I will submit additional
    questions for the record. But the one that I am going to
    submit, just to make a very quick comment on, is this idea of
    air traffic control privatization. I know we have differing
    views on the panel, but I am going to submit that.
        I do not support that. I think that the small, rural
    airports, that my state has an enormous number of, they are
    going to kind of lose out on any kind of, you know,
    privatization that would be run by a private entity. I think in
    this case the government is best equipped to make sure smaller
    airports, smaller populations, who need infrastructure, do not
    get missed out. So I will submit that for the record, Madam
    Chair. I appreciate the hearing. Thanks again.
        Senator Duckworth. Without objection. Senator Welch.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. PETER WELCH,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM VERMONT

        Senator Welch. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I
    share the concern about small airports that Senator Sullivan
    just mentioned.
        I want to start by thanking Mr. Whitaker. He had a short
    time but a big impact. And it is extraordinary to hear from
    everyone, from Senator Cruz to folks who are on the panel
    paying tribute to the excellent job he did as the FAA
    Administrator. And I am very sorry to lose him. We are proud of
    him, he is a Vermonter, but primarily because of the
    extraordinary job that he did in creating confidence among all
    of the folks who are keeping our skies safe.
        I have a few questions, Mr. Iacopelli, I want to ask you.
    On these shortages that we are trying to deal with, I know the
    FAA is really hard at work at implementing changes to deal with
    the air traffic controller shortage. And it takes time,
    especially 3,000 ATC staffers overnight cannot be hired.
        But the ongoing shortage is really hurting us in
    Burlington, Vermont, at the Leahy International Airport in
    Burlington, and it has resulted--we understand in the slot
    waivers for the New York area airports, that has been really
    detrimental to us but also to other small airports around the
    country.
        Last year, JetBlue terminated service routes from Leahy
    Burlington International Airport to JFK. That is a real problem
    for us. We had a lot of folks that wanted to come from JFK to
    Burlington and from Burlington to JFK.
        So I want to just ask, what is your confidence about the
    capacity for swift implementation of the ATC workforce
    provisions included in the FAA Reauthorization Act, and will
    the FAA be able to lift the New York City slot waivers by the
    end of the waiver period, which is slated for October 2025?
        Mr. Iacopelli. Thank you, Senator. To start with the slot
    question, we do not know. I do not know that they will be able
    to do that. I do not know if it is based solely on staffing or
    through some commitment with the airlines. NATCA is not
    involved in the----
        Senator Welch. But we are sort of in it now. Do you have
    any assessment of the progress that is being made that gives
    you any capacity to be confident that the target will be met?
        Mr. Iacopelli. So the training and hiring of air traffic
    controllers is an ongoing effort. It is going to take years of
    sustained focus to ensure that we continue to hire. Now, the
    FAA Reauthorization bill requires max hiring for 5 years,
    because that is the length of the bill. And honestly, if it was
    a 10-year bill it would have to be 10 years. Because as we
    hire, and we lose through attrition, as we hire we lose, for
    retirement and those who are unsuccessful.
        But to your question, Senator, we are focused along with
    the ATO and the FAA in ensuring that those who do get hired
    receive the best quality training we can, to ensure the most
    success that we can, to address those issues that you are
    talking about.
        Senator Welch. Well, I will just implore you to stay on it,
    because you were not able, obviously, and I respect that, to
    give us confidence that those slot waivers will be dealt with
    so that we can get service back to New York City. So it is
    really, really important to us in Vermont.
        There is also, you know, with the smaller airports, the
    need for upgrades of equipment and facilities. At our airport
    in Burlington the tower was built in the 1980s, and it is
    considered to be relatively new for a small airport. But we
    have had significant expansions at the airport, and at the
    tower you cannot see the entire airport. We have got $17.8
    billion in the FAA Reauthorization Act to fund the
    modernization of key technologies.
        My question to you is, as we continue to implement the FAA
    Reauthorization Act, how can the FAA better coordinate with
    smaller regional airports to ensure its technology and
    facilities are being consistently maintained and upgraded?
        Mr. Iacopelli. Well, thank you for that, Senator. I think
    the best way for us to do it is continuing to stay involved
    with the FAA and having our experts work with the FAA, whether
    it be in the ATO or any other line of business that oversees
    the deployment of new technologies.
        We do have a good number of professionals out there working
    with the FAA now, and their counterparts who are either in the
    engineering or the other modernization departments. And we do
    make sure we are focused on where does it need to be deployed
    and are we getting it to where it needs to be, as quickly as we
    can. But there are limitations to how much we can get
    accomplished, as was previously discussed.
        Senator Welch. OK. Thank you. I yield back.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you to our witnesses for your
    participation today. They have called a vote so we are going to
    end the hearing.
        The hearing record will remain open until January 13, 2025.
    Any Senators that would like to submit questions for the record
    should do so by December 20, 2024. I again thank the panel for
    being here. I thought this was a very good discussion. We ask
    that responses be returned to the Committee by January 13.
        And that concludes today's hearing. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
                                  Kevin Walsh
    1. FAA Budgetary Processes
        Over the course of the last decade, Congress has consistently
    provided funding in excess of that requested by the FAA to support its
    modernization and sustainment needs, particularly for legacy systems.
    The GAO report implies this level of investment is inadequate to
    support the safety and capacity of the airspace.

       What recommendations do you have that would enable the level
            of investment that is more in line with the needs and short
            comings identified in your report?
        Answer. We previously reported that the amount Congress has
    invested in NextGen generally aligned with the amounts in the
    President's budget request.\1\ For example, as reflected in the Federal
    Aviation Administration's (FAA) congressional budget justifications for
    Fiscal Year 2012 through 2023, FAA's budget requests and actual budget
    for NextGen--including system deployment--remained relatively constant
    at about $1 billion annually. We did not assess FAA's budget requests
    in relation to NextGen priorities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ GAO, Air Traffic Control Modernization: Program Management
    Improvements Could Help FAA Address NextGen Delays and Challenges, GAO-
    24-105254 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2023).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Nonetheless, representatives from an association representing air
    traffic controllers told us that FAA's budget requests for implementing
    NextGen have not kept up with the growing costs of materials and labor
    over time. We also reported that FAA has not updated its full NextGen
    life cycle cost estimate since 2017. Updating this estimate could help
    better inform and justify budget requests. Accordingly, we recommended
    that FAA develop an updated life cycle cost estimate for NextGen,
    measure FAA's performance against it, and create a schedule for
    updating the life cycle cost estimate regularly.
        Finally, we recently initiated a new audit looking at, among other
    things, the reliability of FAA cost and schedule estimation practices
    for air traffic control (ATC) system modernization investments. This
    new audit, coupled with our prior recommendation, may help to improve
    the accuracy, reliability, and justification of the budget requests
    submitted by FAA.

       Are there added revenues, such as the Airport and Airway
            Trust Fund, for Congress to explore for FAA to better leverage
            investment in its infrastructure modernization programs?
        Answer. FAA's funding for these investments generally comes from
    the Facilities and Equipment account. We have not done work on other
    possible revenue sources.
    2. DOD Systems
        The GAO report excluded 43 systems that were classified as the
    responsibility of the Department of Defense or building facilities.

       Can you speak at all to the sustainability of those DOD
            systems? Are there lessons to be learned in how those systems
            are sustained?
        Answer. We have not done work on how the 43 systems and building
    facilities are sustained. Of the 43, 16 were classified as systems
    supporting national defense, and the remaining 27 were classified as
    building facilities. FAA officials rated each of the 16 national
    defense systems by their sustainability and criticality. The table
    below is a summary of the 16 systems based on FAA's 2023 operational
    risk assessment.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ These numbers were derived from the 2023 National Airspace
    System operational risk assessment. FAA intended to perform the
    assessment annually.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Sustainability rating
            Systems by Operational Impact         --------------------------
                                                    Critical   Moderate  Low
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A: Unsustainable due to shortages in spares            0          0    0
     and shortfalls in funding
    B: Unsustainable due to shortfalls in funding          0          0    0
     or capability
    C: Potentially unsustainable due to possible          15          0    1
     shortfalls in funding or capability
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total                                                 15          0    1
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        One of the four critical systems for which FAA does not have an
    associated modernization investment underway is used by the Departments
    of Defense and Homeland Security, as well as FAA.

       How would you suggest these three agencies initiate
            discussions regarding procurement of a replacement system?
        Answer. While we have not done work on how these three agencies
    might initiate discussions for the procurement of a replacement
    system,\3\ we have developed best practices to be used by Federal
    agencies to enhance Federal interagency collaboration.\4\ Specifically,
    in May 2023 we issued a report that highlights eight leading
    collaboration practices, including bridging organizational cultures,
    identifying and sustaining leadership, clarifying roles and
    responsibilities, and developing written guidance and agreements.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ We omitted the official name of the system due to sensitivity
    concerns. We used a generic designation instead.
        \4\ GAO, Government Performance Management: Leading Practices to
    Enhance Interagency Collaboration and Address Crosscutting Challenges,
    GAO-23-105520 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2023).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition, in March 2024 FAA provided us a few additional details
    on the system that is used by FAA and the Departments of Defense and
    Homeland Security. Specifically, FAA officials stated that the three
    agencies intend to modernize the system, but no program is currently
    underway. In March 2024, FAA officials stated that the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense was working on an analysis of alternatives for a
    new replacement investment, and that analysis was nearing completion.
    FAA officials also stated that the National Airspace System (NAS)
    Defense Program plans to begin tri-agency discussions to procure a
    replacement system that meets the modern requirements of all three
    agencies. Lastly, the officials stated that while it is unlikely that
    they will be able to start the program in 2025, once they are able to
    start, it will take at least nine years before the legacy system is
    decommissioned.
        Following the interagency collaboration best practices from our May
    2023 report could be helpful to FAA, and the Departments of Defense and
    Homeland Security in ensuring effective collaboration as they embark on
    their future work.
    3. Limiting Factors
        Pages 37 and 38 of the report call attention to the limitations of
    FAA's acquisition management oversight council, stating ``[it] is not
    ensuring that the investments deliver functionality in manageable
    segments to address the extended periods of time it takes FAA to
    develop and deploy new systems.''

       Has your investigation into these aging systems offered any
            insight into why FAA is less agile in its procurement and
            development of new systems than other Federal agencies--like
            DOD?
        Answer. While we did not perform an in-depth analysis of whether
    FAA is less agile in its procurement and development than other Federal
    agencies, in April 2024, we asked about reasons for FAA's lack of
    agility. FAA officials did not give specific reasons for its lack of
    agility but stated that in some instances it is not appropriate to
    segment a system development effort. Specifically, officials stated
    that when a system is providing functionality that is only useful when
    it is deployed throughout the NAS, it is not appropriate for the system
    to be segmented. The officials highlighted two examples of these types
    of systems: the En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) system and the
    Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS). The officials
    stated that they could not realistically provide only a portion of the
    full functionality to safely separate aircraft in the en route or
    terminal airspace; nor could the FAA provide that functionality to half
    of the country when the systems need to be able to communicate with
    each other.
        In April 2024, FAA officials acknowledged that they should do more
    to identify opportunities to segment investments and deliver
    functionality to users more rapidly across all ATC system modernization
    investments. Specifically, in March 2024 the agency established a
    working group to develop guidance on segmenting investments, where
    feasible. Officials noted that the working group will be addressing the
    types of investments that should apply this strategy. FAA anticipates
    the working group will result in improved guidance and training
    opportunities for segmentation. However, FAA officials did not provide
    specific time frames for developing and implementing this guidance.
    Accordingly, we recommended that FAA establish a time frame for
    developing and implementing guidance that the Joint Resources Council
    ensures that ATC system modernization investments are organized as
    manageable segments.
    4. Modernization Difficulties
        The report shows a clear picture of the pressing needs of
    modernization.

       What are the primary difficulties the FAA has found to
            execute the modernization programs?
        Answer. In our September 2024 report, we identified individual
    reasons why specific investments were delayed, but these reasons varied
    by investment.\5\ In addition, we reported that segmenting large
    complex system development and implementation efforts into smaller and
    more manageable increments has the potential to reduce risk and deliver
    capabilities more quickly. We also highlighted that the Office of
    Management and Budget requires agencies to deliver functionality to
    users at least every 6 months.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA Actions Are Urgently Needed to
    Modernize Aging Systems, GAO-24-107001 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23,
    2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        However, we found that FAA's acquisition oversight body--the Joint
    Resources Council--does not ensure that investments deliver
    functionality in manageable segments. For example, while the Enterprise
    Information Display System (E-IDS) was initiated 8 years ago, it has
    not delivered any functionality to users. Similarly, the NextGen
    Weather Processor (NWP) system was initiated 14 years ago and had yet
    to deliver any functionality to users.
        As a result, we concluded that this lack of segmentation, at least
    partially, contributes to the extended development time frames.
    Accordingly, we recommended that FAA establish a time frame for
    developing and implementing guidance that the Joint Resources Council
    ensures that ATC system modernization investments are organized as
    manageable segments.
        In November 2023 we reported that closer adherence to five program
    management practices could better position the agency's ongoing effort
    to modernize air traffic management.\6\ Collectively, the gaps in
    program management mean FAA has less assurance that it has taken steps
    to avoid major course corrections in the future, contributing to
    continued delays in deployment. We made four recommendations to improve
    FAA program management operations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ GAO-24-105254.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition to these program management challenges, FAA and
    stakeholders cited varying levels of aircraft equipage, the changing
    national airspace, and unanticipated events as challenges to
    implementing its modernization efforts. More specifically, achieving
    the level of equipage on aircraft needed to ensure that operators can
    realize NextGen benefits has continued to be a barrier. While
    foundational systems--such as ERAM and STARS--do not require aircraft
    operators to install avionics, other NextGen systems do, and aircraft
    operators have achieved different levels of aircraft equipage. Also,
    cybersecurity risks posed by a more connected NAS, integration of new
    entrants into the NAS (such as drones and commercial spacecraft), and
    potential spectrum interference were cited as additional challenges.
    Lastly, unanticipated events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have
    affected modernization timelines. Although the COVID-19 public health
    emergency ended in May 2023, FAA was continuing to modify plans and
    schedules resulting from restricted access to facilities, testing
    delays, and difficulties obtaining system components, as of November
    2023.
        Finally, we recently initiated a new audit, which will assess the
    extent to which FAA follows leading practices for planning, selecting,
    managing, and evaluating ATC modernization investments. We will also
    assess the reliability of FAA's cost and schedule estimation practices
    of ATC system modernization investments. This new audit is intended to
    provide additional insights into the execution of FAA's ATC
    modernization investment practices.
    5. Federal Contract Tower Program
        Kansas is home to the Kansas City Air Traffic Control Center and
    eight (8) participants in the FAA's Federal Contract Tower program.

       Can you provide the Subcommittee your perspective of the FAA
            Contract Tower program, which continues to provide critical ATC
            safety benefits to the 264 airports in the program?
        Answer. We have not done work on this topic.
    6. NOTAM Improvement Act
        Following the January 2023 Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) outage, I
    was pleased to introduce with my colleagues, Sens. Klobuchar and
    Capito, a bill to require FAA establish a task force to strengthen the
    resiliency and cybersecurity of the NOTAM system.
        The bill was signed into law in 2023, and the task force's report
    is expected early next year.

       Are there particular themes you expect to find in the
            report?
        Answer. We have not examined the NOTAM outage or the work of the
    taskforce, which would be needed to comment on this topic.
       How do you anticipate the findings and recommendations from
            this report to complement GAO's findings to help bolster safety
            of the NAS ecosystem?
        While we cannot speculate on the taskforce's future report, it will
    be important for FAA to closely review their findings and
    recommendations and work to implement ours and others' recommendations
    aimed at strengthening the safety of the NAS.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to
                                  Kevin Walsh
        With the persistent challenges faced by Congress and the FAA to
    budget for air traffic control modernization, there have periodically
    been suggestions to spin off the air traffic control systems into a
    private or quasi-private entity.
        I have deep reservations about any proposal to transfer the FAA's
    air traffic facilities to a quasi-private corporation and allow it,
    rather than Congress, to make decisions on where funding should be
    spent and how much tax general aviators should pay. This threatens to
    leave rural communities largely ignored.
        The 582 airports out of 600 in Alaska that do not have air traffic
    control would receive little if any funding for upgrades and new
    technology, and it is unclear what would happen to the 400 navigation
    aids that Alaskans depend on. The largest hubs would receive the lion's
    share of the funding leaving states like Alaska with no recourse.

        Question 1. Do you agree that congress is in the best position to
    allocate resources between the few dozen airports serving larger cities
    and the thousands of general aviation airports and facilities serving
    rural America?
        Answer. Congress has the authority to determine how to allocate
    resources or whether to separate ATC operations from FAA. In October
    2016, we identified key transition issues associated with such a
    change, including changes in user fees and their impacts on certain
    users such as general aviation.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ GAO, Air Traffic Control: Experts' and Stakeholders' Views on
    Key Issues to Consider in a Potential Restructuring, GAO-17-131
    (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 13, 2016).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Similarly, I have concerns over a non-public entity making
    decisions regarding the allocation of airspace. In Anchorage for
    example, airspace is shared among Ted Stevens International, Merrill
    Field, one of the largest general aviation airports in the country,
    Lake Hood, the world's largest floatplane airport, and major military
    airfields which conduct air training activities.
        With more licensed pilots per capita than any state in the union we
    have (9,428 active pilots), we have an extremely active General
    Aviation community in Alaska. Allocating air space among these diverse
    users should be determined by a government entity, not a private
    organization.

        Question 2. Do you agree that airspace should be available to all
    users, including those serving small towns and villages as well as
    individuals as it is currently?
        Answer. FAA regulations currently identify various classes of
    airspace and requirements for those classes, which are, in part, based
    on proximities to airports. While we have not done recent work on how
    separating ATC operations between a government entity and private
    organizations might specifically impact airspace users, as mentioned in
    the prior question, our October 2016 report explores various issues
    that are associated with separating ATC operations from FAA.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ GAO-17-131.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                                  Kevin Walsh
        Planning for Safe Transition Away from Aging Systems: In a 2019
    report, GAO looked at legacy systems across the Federal government,
    identifying the 10 most critical systems in need of replacement. The
    report observed that three agencies, including the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA), had ``no documented plans to modernize'' the
    critical systems identified.
        Five years later, Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) 2024
    report found that FAA still did not have near-term modernization plans
    in place for certain at-risk systems.
        This is exactly why section 622 in the FAA Reauthorization law
    mandates an outside audit of all FAA legacy systems in to determine the
    level of risk and impact associated with operating outdated, unsafe, or
    unstable older systems.
        After the audit is complete, FAA must then implement a plan to
    prioritize the drawdown, replacement, or enhancement of legacy systems
    based on the risks such systems pose to aviation safety.

        Question 1. Having multiple redundancies in systems can help delay
    or even prevent air traffic control (ATC) system failures and
    operational disruptions in the aviation system. To what extent has GAO
    seen the FAA comprehensively incorporate redundancies in legacy ATC
    systems?
        Answer. We have not done in-depth work on this topic. However, when
    we asked FAA about systems that are considered a single point of
    failure or have associated redundancies, FAA stated that depending upon
    the system, if there are not any direct or associated redundancies,
    there are procedural contingencies in place to mitigate operational
    risk. FAA officials explained that if one system goes down, another one
    takes over, or the air traffic controller uses an alternative piece of
    equipment or changes operational procedures to monitor air traffic.

        Question 2. GAO's recent report points out that planning for ATC
    systems should focus not just on upgrading legacy systems and
    installing new technologies, but also on determining which aging
    systems to decommission. In your view, is FAA taking a constructive
    approach to phasing out the systems that have outlasted their useful
    life?
        Answer. The FAA Acquisition Management System includes a
    sustainment phase referred to as In-Service Management, which entails
    revalidating the need to sustain deployed assets or taking other action
    to improve service delivery. During this phase, the service
    organization or program office responsible for sustaining a system is
    expected to periodically revalidate the need to sustain fielded assets
    or recommend other action such as upgrade, replacement, or
    decommissioning and removal.
        The Acquisition Management System also includes a Service Analysis
    phase which is intended to determine what capabilities must be in place
    now and in the future to meet agency goals and the service needs of
    customers. During this phase, the organization is intended to identify
    differences between future service need and current capability. A
    service shortfall is expected to be addressed by a sustainment action
    for existing assets or a new service delivery idea.
        We have not done in-depth work on FAA's decommissioning and
    disposition processes. However, to the extent that FAA can
    expeditiously complete its NextGen modernization efforts, the agency
    will likely be in a better position to decommission aging systems. In
    November 2023, we reported that closer FAA adherence to program
    management practices was needed.\1\ Since that report was issued, the
    FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 requires FAA to operationalize the
    programs under NextGen by the end of 2025 and then sunset its Office of
    NextGen. The act also requires FAA to establish an office within FAA
    responsible for the modernization of NAS, including the development of
    an information-centric NAS, improving the interoperability of NAS
    systems, and developing an integrated plan for the future of NAS. As
    FAA moves in this direction, we believe that full implementation of our
    recommendations, related both to aging systems and NextGen program
    management, will target critical improvements needed for the new office
    to begin meeting the expectations of Congress in this vital area.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ GAO-24-105254.
        \2\ GAO-24-105254 and GAO-24-107001.

        Question 3. I understand that in some cases, FAA will need to
    operate legacy ATC systems until it can safely transition to newer
    technologies. Based on the GAO report, is FAA undergoing effective
    analysis and planning to determine when it is safe to transition away
    from operating older ATC systems?
        Answer. We have not done in-depth work on the decommissioning and
    disposition processes or the transition from one operational asset to
    another. However, FAA completed the 2023 operational risk assessment to
    assist in identifying systems that present a risk to the NAS and may be
    considered for decommissioning as part of the Acquisition Management
    System processes described earlier. Nonetheless, as reflected in our
    September 2024 report, FAA did not prioritize or establish near-term
    plans to modernize unsustainable and critical systems based on its
    operational assessment as originally intended.\3\ Officials stated that
    they plan to use the results of the 2024 operational risk assessment to
    inform future budget decisions and plans for modernization.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ GAO-24-107001.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
                                 Dean Iacopelli
    1. NOTAM Improvement Act
        Following the January 2023 Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) outage, I
    was pleased to introduce with my colleagues, Sens. Klobuchar and
    Capito, a bill to require FAA establish a task force to strengthen the
    resiliency and cybersecurity of the NOTAM system.
        The bill was signed into law in 2023, and the task force's report
    is expected early next year.

       Are there particular themes you expect to find in the
            report?
        Answer. NATCA is a participant in the NOTAM task force. We expect
    themes to include acknowledgement of known vulnerabilities and risks
    associated with the current system, including the need to reduce the
    number of NOTAMs in the system, the need to prioritize the importance
    of NOTAMs in terms of the safety of flight, and the need for more
    stringent requirements for a replacement NOTAM system. Despite these
    themes, the FAA will have a difficult time funding this program without
    increased F&E appropriations. At minimum, the FAA will need $154
    million just to conduct further research on a replacement NOTAM system.
    It will need $354 million to replace the broken NOTAM system.

       How do you anticipate the findings and recommendations from
            this report to complement GAO's findings to help bolster safety
            of the NAS ecosystem?
        Answer. NATCA anticipates both reports will complement each other
    in defining core issues that exist in the NOTAM program and throughout
    the majority of FAA systems and programs.
        Congress has consistently provided the FAA with the resources it
    requests through both authorization of top-line numbers and the annual
    appropriations process. However, because FAA has historically requested
    too little, there are significant backlogs of NAS system sustainment
    and ATC facility sustainment, in addition to mounting delays in the
    implementation of NAS modernization and system improvements as well as
    ATC tower and radar facility replacement.
        The FAA's FY 2025 budget request, for the first time in over a
    decade, acknowledges its true need, although not entirely through its
    F&E request. In addition to the $3.6 billion F&E request, FAA cites the
    $1 billion in funds authorized for 2025 through the Infrastructure
    Investment and Jobs Act as supplementing its facilities and
    infrastructure funding needs. It also proposes a new Facility
    Replacement and Radar Modernization fund that would dedicate $8 billion
    over the next five years--beginning with $1 billion in 2025--to replace
    or modernize aging air traffic control facilities. This includes
    modernizing 377 critical radar systems and more than 20 air traffic
    control facilities. We, along with a wide array of industry
    stakeholders, strongly support this request.
        The FAA must continue to be transparent with its need for increased
    F&E funding so that it can meet its own equipment sustainment,
    replacement, and modernization needs. If not, it will continue to
    exacerbate the FAA's significant sustainment and replacement backlog.
    Failing to maintain and replace critical safety equipment that has
    exceeded its expected life introduces unnecessary risk into the system.
    These funding limitations also have prevented the FAA from designing
    and implementing new technologies that will improve safety.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to
                                 Dean Iacopelli
        With the persistent challenges faced by Congress and the FAA to
    budget for air traffic control modernization, there have periodically
    been suggestions to spin off the air traffic control systems into a
    private or quasi-private entity.
        I have deep reservations about any proposal to transfer the FAA's
    air traffic facilities to a quasi-private corporation and allow it,
    rather than Congress, to make decisions on where funding should be
    spent and how much tax general aviators should pay. This threatens to
    leave rural communities largely ignored.
        The 582 airports out of 600 in Alaska that do not have air traffic
    control would receive little if any funding for upgrades and new
    technology, and it is unclear what would happen to the 400 navigation
    aids that Alaskans depend on. The largest hubs would receive the lion's
    share of the funding leaving states like Alaska with no recourse.

        Question 1. Do you agree that congress is in the best position to
    allocate resources between the few dozen airports serving larger cities
    and the thousands of general aviation airports and facilities serving
    rural America?
        Answer. Congress has consistently provided the FAA with the
    resources it requests through both authorization of top-line numbers
    and the annual appropriations process. However, because FAA has
    consistently requested too little, there are significant backlogs of
    NAS system sustainment and ATC facility sustainment, in addition to
    mounting delays in the implementation of NAS modernization and system
    improvements as well as ATC tower and radar facility replacement.
        The budgetary shortfalls also have not kept up with inflation over
    the past 15 years. For instance, the FAA has consistently requested
    only about $3 billion in annual appropriations for F&E throughout that
    period, even though in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 the Agency's internal
    budgetary estimates showed that it needed at least $4.5 billion, with
    that need quickly approaching $6 billion. This loss of spending and
    buying power for F&E programs forced FAA into a ``fix-on-fail'' model
    by requiring it to prioritize mandatory costs, leaving little to no
    money for modernization and infrastructure programs.
        To sustain many legacy systems, as well as to enhance and grow
    critical safety and modernization programs, the FAA projects that it
    will need $6 billion. At bare minimum, the NATCA projects that the FAA
    will need at least $4 billion to simply sustain these programs and the
    rest of the NAS. Investments that merely cover the costs to sustain
    current equipment will be insufficient to develop and implement new
    technologies and integrate new users into the system.
        The FAA's FY 2025 budget request, for the first time in over a
    decade, acknowledges its true need, although not entirely through its
    F&E request. In addition to the $3.6 billion F&E request, FAA cites the
    $1 billion in funds authorized for 2025 through the Infrastructure
    Investment and Jobs Act as supplementing its facilities and
    infrastructure funding needs. It also proposes a new Facility
    Replacement and Radar Modernization fund that would dedicate $8 billion
    over the next five years--beginning with $1 billion in 2025--to replace
    or modernize aging air traffic control facilities. This includes
    modernizing 377 critical radar systems and more than 20 air traffic
    control facilities. We, along with a wide array of industry
    stakeholders, support this request.
        NATCA is not advocating to reform FAA or the Air Traffic
    Organization's (ATO) structure.
        NATCA will oppose any reform proposal that would transfer
    management or operation of the air traffic control system to a for-
    profit entity or to one that is co-owned, operated, and/or controlled
    by for-profit entities. Moreover, any FAA reform proposal must adhere
    to NATCA's core principles before we would consider endorsing it:

      1.  Ensure the frontline workforce is protected in their employment
            relationship, including their pay, rights, retirement, health
            care and other benefits, negotiated collective bargaining
            agreements, and indemnification for acts within the scope of
            their employment;

      2.  Ensure safety and efficiency remain the top priorities;

      3.  Provide for a stable, predictable funding stream that adequately
            supports air traffic control services, staffing, hiring and
            training, long-term modernization, preventative maintenance,
            and ongoing modernization to infrastructure; and

      4.  Maintain a dynamic aviation system that continues to provide
            services to all users, areas, and segments of the existing
            aviation community as well as integrating new users.

        NATCA will meticulously review the details of any reform proposal
    before taking a position.
        Similarly, I have concerns over a non-public entity making
    decisions regarding the allocation of airspace. In Anchorage for
    example, airspace is shared among Ted Stevens International, Merrill
    Field, one of the largest general aviation airports in the country,
    Lake Hood, the world's largest floatplane airport, and major military
    airfields which conduct air training activities.
        With more licensed pilots per capita than any state in the union we
    have (9,428 active pilots), we have an extremely active General
    Aviation community in Alaska. Allocating air space among these diverse
    users should be determined by a government entity, not a private
    organization.

        Question 2. Do you agree that airspace should be available to all
    users, including those serving small towns and villages as well as
    individuals as it is currently?
        Answer. NATCA is focused on the safety and efficiency of the system
    for all users. NATCA takes pride in its role as an aviation safety
    organization that stands shoulder-to-shoulder with government and
    industry stakeholders to ensure that the NAS remains the safest and
    most efficient in the world. The air traffic controllers, including in
    Alaska Flight Service Stations, and other aviation safety professionals
    that NATCA represents throughout the Federal Aviation Administration
    (FAA), Department of Defense (DOD), and the FAA's Federal Contract
    Tower (FCT) program ensure the safe and efficient movement of GA
    aircraft and millions of tons of cargo annually, while simultaneously
    ensuring that more than one billion commercial passengers annually
    arrive at their destinations safely. In its role as a safety
    organization, NATCA does not take a position on how access to airspace
    is allocated or prioritized among existing users.
        NATCA believes the National Airspace System must continue to be a
    dynamic aviation system that continues to provide services to all
    users, areas, and segments of the existing aviation community as well
    as integrating new users.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                                 Dean Iacopelli
    FAA Facilities and Equipment Funding
        The President's FY 2025 Budget included the establishment of a $8
    billion Facility Replacement and Radar Modernization program to make
    further investments in addressing FAA's aging infrastructure through FY
    2029. Building upon the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law $5 billion
    investment in air traffic facilities, the Administration proposal would
    provide dedicated supplemental appropriations to modernize 377 radar
    systems and more than 20 aging air traffic facilities nationwide.
        In July 2024, NATCA joined a coalition of aviation industry leaders
    advocating for the establishment of a separate annual funding stream
    from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF), dedicated solely for
    upgrading and replacing FAA air traffic facilities, systems, and
    equipment.
        While the Administration and industry coalition proposals are
    different, both emphasize using additional AATF funding to upgrade air
    traffic control system infrastructure in light of growing air travel
    demand.

        Question 1. How would air traffic controllers, air traffic support
    specialists, and other ATC professionals represented by NATCA benefit
    from additional funding to upgrade FAA systems, facilities, and
    equipment in performing their job duties?
        Answer. The FAA's FY 2025 budget request, for the first time in
    over a decade, acknowledges its true need, although not entirely
    through its F&E request. In addition to the $3.6 billion F&E request,
    FAA cites the $1 billion in funds authorized for 2025 through the
    Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act as supplementing its facilities
    and infrastructure funding needs. It also proposes a new Facility
    Replacement and Radar Modernization fund that would dedicate $8 billion
    over the next five years--beginning with $1 billion in 2025--to replace
    or modernize aging air traffic control facilities. This includes
    modernizing 377 critical radar systems and more than 20 air traffic
    control facilities. We, along with a wide array of industry
    stakeholders, strongly support this request.
        Disruptions to FAA funding and significant budgetary shortfalls
    create a more stressful, less productive work environment for all
    aviation safety professionals. Many controllers and other aviation
    safety professionals go to work every day in facilities that are
    plagued by leaking roofs, flooding basements that contain electronic
    systems, broken-down elevators and HVAC systems, and chronically
    backed-up bathroom toilets. Without sufficient funding the FAA will
    continue to experience delays implementing vital modernization
    technology, sustaining and repairing of existing safety-critical
    equipment, and the hiring and training of new controllers and other
    aviation safety professionals.
        Additional funding, such as the Facility Replacement and Radar
    Modernization proposed in the President's FY 2025 Budget, would not
    only allow for an improvement in physical infrastructure and working
    conditions, but it would also provide for desperately needed
    modernization and technology updates to aviation systems and air
    traffic control automation platforms that are used by controllers 24
    hours a day, 7 days a week.
        The FAA must continue to be transparent with its need for increased
    F&E funding so that it can meet its own equipment sustainment,
    replacement, and modernization needs. Failing to maintain and replace
    critical safety equipment that has exceeded its expected life
    introduces unnecessary risk into the system, such as the complete
    failure of the NOTAM system in 2023 and the current unexpected outages
    of the FAA's Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) program that are
    plaguing air traffic facilities across the country.

        Question 2. Given NATCA's support for the industry proposal, and if
    more AATF funds are made available annually, what system upgrades would
    you like to see FAA prioritize first in its modernization of air
    traffic control systems?
        Answer. NATCA has identified several automation platforms and
    modernization programs that are the most critical to maintaining and
    upgrading the National Airspace System (NAS) based on their
    relationship and necessity to the continued safe and efficient
    operation of the NAS. At the top of that list is maintaining,
    repairing, and replacing RADAR systems, some of which date back to
    1964. NATCA anticipates that RADAR failures are likely to occur in
    2025, which could cause gaps in surveillance coverage throughout the
    country. NATCA also believes that additional funding is needed for air
    traffic automation platforms such as ERAM, STARS, and ATOP enhancements
    to support new entrants, such as space launches and UAS/UAM/UTM
    operations. The Agency and NATCA have been able to fast-track a surface
    surveillance situational awareness tool that will help controllers
    mitigate the risks associated with wrong-surface landings and runway
    incursions. It needs to be deployed across all airports that do not
    currently have an existing surface tool.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to
                                 Dean Iacopelli
        Question 1. Safety is the most important concern, but equipment
    failures can also cause flight delays and disruptions. In June, a feed
    from a long-range radar to the Chicago TRACON malfunctioned. Air
    traffic controllers reported seeing multiple targets on their displays.
    They saw two aircraft representing just one aircraft on their screen.
    Worse, this was at a time when there was no qualified technician on
    duty to fix the equipment. This resulted in a ground stop at O'Hare,
    while they called in an off-duty technician. In August, air traffic was
    halted in Newark due to a technology outage in Philadelphia. Ground
    stops can have ripple effects.

        When equipment failures result in ground stops--what does that mean
    for air traffic controllers and what is the impact on air traffic
    across the country?
        Answer. As you rightfully noted, equipment failures that cause
    ground stops are a tremendous burden and cause unnecessary stress for
    air traffic controllers. For controllers and other aviation safety
    professionals, an equipment failure is often treated as an emergency
    and swift action is needed to ensure safety for all aircraft and the
    flying public.
        In recent years, these unexpected outages have occurred far more
    frequently, placing an even higher workload and stress level on the air
    traffic workforce. Depending on the outage, the effects are often felt
    throughout the National Airspace System. In addition to the examples at
    the Chicago TRACON and in Philadelphia, the complete failure of the
    NOTAM system in 2023 and the anticipated outages of the FAA's
    Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) program going forward are
    recent examples of a long-standing problem.
    Topic: Air Traffic Control Infrastructure
        Question 2. While recently describing the need for FAA to upgrade
    its facilities to keep up with technology, FAA Administrator Michael
    Whitaker called some of the current efforts ``band-aid'' solutions with
    ``a lot of duct tape''.

        Do you agree with Administrator Whitaker's characterization, and if
    so, can you describe how this ``band-aid'' approach is impacting air
    traffic controllers?
        Answer. NATCA concurs with the statement from Administrator
    Whitaker. Controllers are working in rapidly-aging facilities, using
    outdated and unstable technology that lacks modern automation. These
    issues can lead to significant delays and a tremendous increase in
    workload.
        Although the FAA has begun the process of upgrading its rapidly
    aging infrastructure to improve technology, that process has been slow
    and hampered by the Agency not requesting its full need for F&E funding
    throughout the last 15 years. This loss of spending and buying power
    forced FAA into a ``fix-on-fail'' model by requiring it to prioritize
    mandatory costs, leaving little to no money for modernization and
    infrastructure programs. The FAA's ``fix-on-fail'' philosophy has also
    been applied to maintenance and repair projects, as the Agency stopped
    stockpiling critical parts for essential operational equipment
    resulting in a backlog of maintenance projects at facilities around the
    country.
        Congress has consistently provided the FAA with the resources it
    requests through both authorization of top-line numbers and the annual
    appropriations process. However, because FAA has consistently requested
    inadequate resources, there are significant backlogs of NAS system
    sustainment and ATC facility sustainment, in addition to mounting
    delays in the implementation of NAS modernization and system
    improvements as well as ATC tower and radar facility replacement.
        Furthermore, the F&E budget has not kept up with inflation over the
    past 15 years. For instance, the FAA has consistently requested only
    about $3 billion in annual appropriations for F&E throughout that
    period, even though in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 the Agency's internal
    budgetary estimates showed that it needed at least $4.5 billion, with
    that need quickly approaching $6 billion. This loss of spending and
    buying power for F&E programs forced FAA into a ``fix-on-fail'' model
    by requiring it to prioritize mandatory costs, leaving little to no
    money for modernization and infrastructure programs.
        The FAA's FY 2025 budget request, for the first time in over a
    decade, acknowledges its true need, although not entirely through its
    F&E request. In addition to the $3.6 billion F&E request, FAA cites the
    $1 billion in funds authorized for 2025 through the Infrastructure
    Investment and Jobs Act as supplementing its facilities and
    infrastructure funding needs. It also proposes a new Facility
    Replacement and Radar Modernization fund that would dedicate $8 billion
    over the next five years--beginning with $1 billion in 2025--to replace
    or modernize aging air traffic control facilities. This includes
    modernizing 377 critical radar systems and more than 20 air traffic
    control facilities. We, along with a wide array of industry
    stakeholders, strongly support this request.
    Topic: Close Calls and Near Misses
        Question 3. Coming out of the pandemic, we saw an alarming rise in
    close calls in commercial aviation. Last year, FAA convened a safety
    summit to bring stakeholders together to address it. We've done a lot
    of work since then to help restore our margins of safety--including
    passing an FAA reauthorization law with many safety enhancements. But
    the new law is just starting to be implemented, and in the meantime,
    our aviation system remains stressed.

        Do you think modernizing our aging air traffic control systems
    would improve our safety margins and if so, how?
        Answer. Although it is the safest, most efficient, and most complex
    airspace system in the world, we should always strive to bolster
    safety, mitigate risk, and improve efficiency. NATCA believes that
    investing in modernization and technology programs will improve the
    margins of safety in addition to enhancing system efficiencies.
        The FAA's aging radar surveillance infrastructure is in dire need
    of modernization. NATCA anticipates in the near future, RADARs
    throughout the U.S. will start to fail causing gaps in surveillance
    coverage. Likewise, new RADAR technology could also allow for
    surveillance coverage in areas where coverage does not currently exist.
    In addition, emerging technologies and new entrant activity such as
    UAS, UAM, and increased space launches will require updated automation
    technology so controllers can continue to ensure as the system improves
    safety margins rather than degrade.
        The Agency and NATCA have been able to fast-track a surface
    surveillance situational awareness tool that will help controllers
    mitigate the risks associated with wrong-surface landings and runway
    incursions. It needs to be deployed at facilities that do not have an
    existing surface surveillance tool.
    Topic: Fiber Optic Cables
        Question 4. You noted in your testimony that FAA needs to upgrade
    its telecommunications from copper wire to fiber optic cable but since
    FAA only has enough funding to proceed on a case-by-case basis, FAA is
    stuck spending $7 million per month just to maintain the old copper
    wire that ultimately needs to be replaced. That's $85 million a year.

        How important is this transition from copper to fiber optic cable
    and is this something we should be accomplishing more swiftly?
        Answer. FAA telecommunications are the backbone of the air traffic
    control system, which makes the transition from copper wire to fiber
    optic cable absolutely critical to the operation of the National
    Airspace System (NAS). This network provides data to air traffic
    control information and automation platforms in addition to air-to-
    ground communications and facility-to-facility communications.
        Presently, there are over 30,000 services at over 4,600 FAA sites
    that must transition away from copper wire and onto a fiber optic cable
    network in order to avoid severe service disruptions and extensive
    flight delays. NATCA believes the current timeline to complete the
    transition is insufficient when compared to the rate of copper wire
    discontinuances.
        One of FAA's three main service providers has advised the Agency
    that it will be discontinuing copper wire services two years earlier
    than originally planned. This requires the FAA to reallocate resources
    to ensure that none of the affected facilities lose services during
    2025 before the discontinuance occurs.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
                                 Dean Iacopelli
    Air Traffic Controllers Hiring
        Question 1. Our nation is facing a shortage of air traffic
    controllers, causing flight disruptions and safety risks across the
    country and seriously straining our air traffic controller workforce,
    and putting travelers at risk. The Federal Aviation Administration
    Reauthorization passed in May included my bill with Senator Braun, the
    Air Traffic Controllers Hiring Act, to boost Federal Aviation
    Administration training capacity and increase the Federal Aviation
    Administration's use of its expedited hiring authority.

        In your view, how should the Federal Aviation Administration focus
    on training and hiring more controllers?
        Answer. NATCA thanks Sen. Klobuchar and Sen. Braun for their
    leadership in passing the Air Traffic Controllers Hiring Act as part of
    the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. The FAA must take a holistic,
    collaborative approach to resolving its staffing and training
    challenges. The first step is implementing the Collaborative Resource
    Workgroup's (CRWG) jointly-developed operational CPC staffing targets
    for each facility as the basis for its annual Controller Workforce Plan
    (CWP) as required by the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, while
    continuing maximum controller hiring for at least the duration of the
    Act.
        The FAA also must continue to submit annual budget requests for its
    Operations account that account for the increased cost to hire and
    train at least 2,000 new air traffic controllers annually, in order to
    rebuild controller staffing levels and meet current and projected
    traffic demands.
        NATCA supports the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Fiscal Year
    (FY) 2025 Operations budget request, which included an increase to
    $13.6 billion from the 2024 Continuing Resolution level of $12.72
    billion, in recognition that the FAA will experience several
    uncontrollable cost increases in addition to maximum controller hiring.
    In July 2024, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved this budget
    request in its FY 2025 THUD appropriations bill.
        We were pleased the negotiators from the House and Senate agreed to
    an anomaly in the December-passed Continuing Resolution to ensure the
    FAA can maintain its hiring, training, and staffing plans until a full-
    year appropriations bill can be passed.
    Air Traffic Control Infrastructure
        Question 2. Smaller regional airports provide a vital link to the
    rest of the world for many rural communities, particularly for both
    residents and businesses in my state that rely on them to connect to
    the Twin Cities and beyond. At the Duluth International Airport, the
    current air traffic tower is 70 years old, making it one of the oldest
    towers in the country. It does not meet current Federal Aviation
    Administration line-of-sight requirements, and it needs significant
    repairs. I've been fighting to get them the funding to build a new one.

        What do you see as the biggest obstacles for building out
    infrastructure to support air traffic controllers?
        Answer. The FAA operates more than 300 ATC facilities of varying
    ages and conditions. NATCA has been and continues to advocate for
    additional funding to repair and replace the FAA's physical
    infrastructure. Although the FAA has begun the process of addressing
    its rapidly aging infrastructure through a combination of realignments,
    sustaining and maintaining some facilities, and replacing a handful of
    others, that process has been slow and hampered by funding disruptions
    and limitations. The landmark, bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and
    Jobs Act (IIJA) was a huge step in the right direction in addressing
    these issues, but it will not be enough on its own.
        Some of the biggest hurdles, beyond funding limitations, include
    significantly-high vendor costs, flawed FAA/vendor contracts, and
    vendor inability to provide product that meets FAA's needs and
    standards.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to
                                   Dave Spero
    1. Pace of Modernization
        The GAO report has highlighted that many of the safety critical
    systems currently operating are well past their planned service life.
    It is, though, clear to me the endurance of these systems is a
    testament to the quality of the Kansas workforce that has been
    manufacturing these systems for decades.
        Congress has allocated $5 billion over 5 years for airspace system
    infrastructure modernization, though the pace of deploying new
    technologies, also produced in Kansas, could take years.

       As an expert in the operations and maintenance of these
            systems, is this a sustainable path forward?
        Answer. The largest PASS bargaining unit at the FAA is the Air
    Traffic Organization (ATO) Technical Operations unit, consisting of
    technical employees who install, maintain, repair and certify the
    radar, navigation, communication and power equipment that comprises the
    U.S. National Airspace System (NAS).
        Within Technical Operations, PASS represents FAA airway
    transportation systems specialists, more commonly referred to as
    technicians. Technicians ensure the functionality of communications,
    computers, navigational aids and power systems vital to safe air travel
    and the mission of pilots and air traffic controllers. Technicians
    maintain aging systems while simultaneously interfacing with highly
    technical, state of the art cloud-based solutions, and this is often
    overlooked.
        As emphasized in PASS's testimony, PASS-represented technicians in
    the field have many concerns regarding issues with aging equipment and
    the pace at which the equipment is being upgraded. Of utmost
    importance, the correct number of technicians must be in place to
    maintain the current equipment and assist in the implementation of new
    equipment and technology. The amount of time it takes to upgrade one
    system at hundreds of locations across the country can be considerable.
    Without the right number of technicians in place to install the new
    systems and equipment while also maintaining operations around the
    country, the time to upgrade the system can take even longer.
        While PASS appreciates the funding allocated by Congress for
    airspace system infrastructure modernization, it is also essential to
    recruit and retain the right number of employees to ensure a successful
    modernization. For the FAA to do that, it needs to develop, in
    collaboration with PASS, a workforce staffing model and implement it as
    soon as possible. Once the staffing is appropriate a paradigm shift to
    have our workforce install equipment across the NAS quicker and more
    efficiently so it is not obsolete before it is completely installed
    would accelerate aviation modernization.
    2. NOTAM Improvement Act
        Following the January 2023 Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) outage, I
    was pleased to introduce with my colleagues, Sens. Klobuchar and
    Capito, a bill to require FAA establish a task force to strengthen the
    resiliency and cybersecurity of the NOTAM system. The bill was signed
    into law in 2023, and the task force's report is expected early next
    year.

       Are there particular themes you expect to find in the
            report?

       How do you anticipate the findings and recommendations from
            this report to complement GAO's findings to help bolster the
            safety of the NAS ecosystem?
        Answer. PASS expects the report to include themes that address but
    are not limited to the following issues: ensuring NOTAMs are accurate,
    timely, relevant, and contain pertinent information; best practices to
    improve the accuracy and understandability of NOTAMs; how to educate
    and work with air carriers, other airspace users and aviation service
    providers; NOTAM cybersecurity, stability, and resiliency; and
    training.
        It is also likely that the report will determine if its
    recommendations satisfy the National Transportation Safety Board's
    safety recommendation A-18-024, which asks the FAA to ``establish a
    group of human factors experts to review existing methods for
    presenting flight operations information to pilots . . . to optimize
    pilot review.'' \1\ By emphasizing human factors design, information
    prioritization, stakeholder collaboration, and modernization of the
    NOTAM system, these actions align with the NTSB's goal to enhance how
    pilots receive and retain flight operations information, particularly
    in critical situations such as what happened in the Air Canada 759
    incident it references in the recommendation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Taxiway Overflight Air
    Canada Flight 759 Airbus A20-211, C-FKCK, San Francisco, California,
    July 7, 2017.'' Report Number AIR-18-01. Adopted on September 25, 2018.
    Published on October 11, 2018. https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/
    recletters/A-18-023-029.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    3. Limiting Factors
        Page 7 of the GAO report highlights that a lack of spare parts for
    certain systems is point of concern to maintaining these systems.

       What are some of the limiting factors for part production?
        Answer. In February, PASS was granted the opportunity to provide
    the Government Accountability Office (GAO) with information regarding
    135 FAA programs and services. In order to provide the GAO with the
    most accurate and current information, PASS shared the list of programs
    and services with Technical Operations employees throughout the country
    and asked them to complete a survey. In addition to providing
    information on systems not on the GAO's list, the results of the survey
    indicate top concerns are related to aging equipment, cumbersome
    procedures, parts that are unreliable or unavailable, system
    complexity, and staffing and training of the workforce. At the rapid
    pace with which technology changes, the FAA is getting further behind
    in replacing aging systems.
        For instance, a PASS member who was surveyed cited key concerns
    with the High Intensity Approach Lighting System with Sequenced
    Flashing Lights (ALSF-2). The ALSF-2 is an approach lighting system
    (ALS), which provides the basic means to transition from instrument
    flight to visual flight for landing. This provides visual information
    on runway alignment, height perception, roll guidance and horizontal
    references for Category II/III instrument approaches.
        ALSF is critical for an airport in low visibility weather
    situations. If it is not working, the airport is downgraded, which
    means some aircraft cannot land. An ALSF system failure would
    constitute significant delays to an airport and the NAS overall in
    instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions. However, due to the age of
    this system, light rebuild kits for ALSF are not reliable. Lighted
    navigational aids require regular parts replacement and fail often. If
    an outdated replacement part is either unreliable or unavailable, the
    impact on the system could be far-reaching.
        While PASS is not involved with the production of parts, the union
    concurs that the lack of spare parts is concerning. PASS stands ready
    to assist with a further review of issues related to the availability
    of parts.
    4. Workforce
        The GAO report highlighted challenges not new to the FAA:
    workforce--and difficulties recruiting technicians with the skills
    required to maintain some of these older systems.
        In your testimony, you indicated it can take up to three years to
    fully train a technician to perform necessary duties related to a
    position. As noted in the report, the systems your workforce is
    responsible for maintaining are outdated and technologies no longer
    commonly taught at technical schools.

       To what degree does this situation exacerbate the training
            challenge?
        As indicated in PASS's testimony, hiring and training new
    technicians is not a quick or easy process. FAA technicians must be
    skilled and proficient on multiple systems. It can take up to three
    years to fully train an FAA technician to perform all necessary duties
    related to the position. Furthermore, the FAA is still playing catch up
    after its training academy in Oklahoma City was shuttered during the
    COVID-19 pandemic.
        Exacerbating the issue is the fact that the FAA training for many
    aging systems and equipment is not offered very often. This is another
    reason the current workforce is essential. The knowledge and skills
    these employees have are vital to the continued operation of the
    system. We must utilize the technicians' knowledge working these
    programs to provide on the job training to a new generation of
    technicians before they retire. We cannot let this knowledge walk out
    the door when they retire. FAA employees must be trained to maintain
    and certify all systems and equipment in the aviation system--both
    current and those newly introduced.

       Are there ways industry and Congress can work together to
            provide technical programs to better equip current and future
            technicians for their jobs, with the systems-wide modernization
            and replacement in mind?
        Answer. The FAA must address aging systems and equipment throughout
    the National Airspace System (NAS) based on careful analysis combined
    with efficient and effective action. Given the pace of technology, many
    systems and equipment are on the path to becoming outdated every day.
    The technician workforce can be instrumental in assisting the agency in
    ensuring successful implementation and updates throughout the NAS.
        PASS believes there are many ways industry and Congress can
    collaborate to better equip current and future technicians.
    Congressional inquiry and legislation is essential to securing both
    attention and funding for many aspects of the aviation system. But
    without the FAA's commitment to action, little can be accomplished.
        For example, PASS thanks lawmakers for including language in the
    2024 FAA reauthorization bill directing the agency to install 15
    taxpayer-purchased instrument landing systems (ILS) that are in storage
    in Independence, Missouri. The technicians PASS represents are ready
    and capable of completing this task when fully staffed. This pilot
    program can be an example of how we can save time and taxpayer dollars
    by utilizing the Federal workforce. This is a prime example of the FAA
    taking steps toward identifying a solution but then failing to complete
    the work to implement it. While the language in the reauthorization law
    directs the FAA to install the ILS within 18 months of the law's
    passage (May 2024), PASS's attempts to coordinate with the agency to
    begin the project have gone unreturned. As far as PASS knows, the
    equipment--paid for by the taxpayer--is still not in service.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to
                                   Dave Spero
        With the persistent challenges faced by Congress and the FAA to
    budget for air traffic control modernization, there have periodically
    been suggestions to spin off the air traffic control systems into a
    private or quasi-private entity.
        I have deep reservations about any proposal to transfer the FAA's
    air traffic facilities to a quasi-private corporation and allow it,
    rather than Congress, to make decisions on where funding should be
    spent and how much tax general aviators should pay. This threatens to
    leave rural communities largely ignored.
        The 582 airports out of 600 in Alaska that do not have air traffic
    control would receive little if any funding for upgrades and new
    technology, and it is unclear what would happen to the 400 navigation
    aids that Alaskans depend on. The largest hubs would receive the lion's
    share of the funding leaving states like Alaska with no recourse.

        Question 1. Do you agree that Congress is in the best position to
    allocate resources between the few dozen airports serving larger cities
    and the thousands of general aviation airports and facilities serving
    rural America?
        Answer. PASS has been opposed to any attempt to privatize the
    aviation system. We have consistently maintained that the U.S.
    government is the only entity that should be responsible for the safe
    and efficient operation of this country's aviation system. This
    country's aviation system is clearly valuable both in terms of economic
    impact and services provided. It is obvious that such an asset should
    be properly funded and overseen. Privatizing the air traffic control
    system would do neither.
        In fact, congressional oversight would be severely curtailed and
    that congressional oversight ensures that the flying public has a voice
    when it comes to aviation-related issues. This is even more essential
    in Alaska and other rural or smaller environments. Many smaller
    airports across the country are dependent on congressional involvement
    and support in order to continue to operate. Under a private model,
    local cities and towns could be increasingly saddled with the costs of
    keeping their airports open and maintained properly.
        PASS agrees that Congress should continue to allocate aviation
    resources throughout the country.

        Similarly, I have concerns over a non-public entity making
    decisions regarding the allocation of airspace. In Anchorage for
    example, airspace is shared among Ted Stevens International, Merrill
    Field, one of the largest general aviation airports in the country,
    Lake Hood, the world's largest floatplane airport, and major military
    airfields which conduct air training activities.
        With more licensed pilots per capita than any state in the union we
    have (9,428 active pilots), we have an extremely active General
    Aviation community in Alaska. Allocating air space among these diverse
    users should be determined by a government entity, not a private
    organization.

        Question 2. Do you agree that airspace should be available to all
    users, including those serving small towns and villages as well as
    individuals as it is currently?
        Answer. PASS firmly believes that airspace should be available to
    all licensed and certified users throughout the system. Our air traffic
    control system is a national public asset and PASS strongly believes it
    should remain in the public trust.
        Allowing any entity other than the U.S. government to allocate
    airspace would place such decisions in the hands of a private entity
    not focused on what is best for the country overall. Furthermore,
    Americans in rural areas rely on their local, smaller airports for
    employment, commerce and transportation. Many of these smaller airports
    will not have a congressional advocate under a private model and it is
    possible that a nongovernmental entity would do away with Essential Air
    Service program. It is feasible that a corporation would not focus on
    maintaining these facilities if they are not profitable, essentially
    shrinking this country's airspace.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                                   Dave Spero
        Safety Risk Analysis of FAA's Technician Workforce: In addition to
    aviation safety inspectors, Professional Aviation Safety Specialists
    (PASS) represents FAA employees who play an integral role in operating,
    maintaining, and certifying air traffic control systems. This includes
    FAA's technical operations workforce made up of airway transportation
    systems specialists, commonly referred to as technicians. However, as
    air traffic systems age, so does the workforce that has the knowledge
    and expertise to operate and maintain these systems.

        Question 1. Has FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO) conducted a
    safety risk management (SRM) analysis with respect to the technician
    workforce to evaluate staffing challenges associated with operating
    aging systems?
        Answer. The Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO
    (PASS) appreciates the opportunity to address these questions and
    concerns. As indicated in the question submitted by Hon. Maria
    Cantwell, the FAA's Technical Operations workforce is responsible for
    maintaining and certifying this country's aviation system and, as the
    system ages, so too does the workforce.
        While the FAA has a process in place for conducting safety risk
    management (SRM) analyses, the primary objective of SRM is to provide
    information regarding hazards, safety risk and safety risk mitigations
    to agency decision-makers. The target of such analyses is usually
    safety risks outside of the makeup of the workforce. This means that
    while the SRM is able to identify certain risks and hazards, PASS is
    not aware of the agency using this method to examine its staffing
    challenges. The FAA should apply SRM to workforce and staffing issues.

        Question 2. Has ATO done such an analysis to determine the number
    of technicians it needs per FAA facility to ensure the safe and
    reliable operation of ATC systems in the National Airspace System? If
    so, what has been the level of coordination between ATO and PASS in
    assessing and developing solutions to this staffing issue?
        Answer. PASS has long called attention to not only the need for
    sufficient technical staffing but also the lack of a reliable staffing
    model on which to base staffing decisions and placement. As stated in
    PASS's written testimony, the FAA has been developing the Technical
    Operations staffing model (TSM) for over a decade and the agency is
    aware that the workforce is short at least 800 technicians.
        PASS has concerns that the FAA's current strategy is not taking
    into consideration all the necessary data to determine the optimum
    number of technicians. PASS has provided input and assisted the FAA on
    attempts to establish an adequate workforce plan, but the union feels
    as if the agency is not fully cooperating with PASS to develop such a
    plan. As always, the union stands ready to assist the FAA with a
    staffing plan that will take into consideration all the elements of the
    position, including the responsibility of ensuring the safe and
    efficient operation of aging and new systems and equipment.
        Air Traffic Specialist and Technician Workforce Shortages: Due to
    severe FAA technician staffing shortages in some areas of the air
    traffic control system, the responsibility of keeping some systems
    running falls on one FAA employee. At the San Antonio System Support
    Center,
        for instance, at the hearing date there was just one full-time
    certified technician responsible for servicing three long-range radar
    sites within hundreds of miles from San Antonio. He has since been
    promoted and there is not a certified technician in this area to
    maintain the three long-range radars. And overall, the FAA is short at
    least 800 technicians throughout the National Airspace System.

        Question 3. While we are grateful to dedicated FAA employees who
    make it possible to maintain aging systems that still perform key
    safety functions, do you believe these technician workforce shortages
    insert operational safety risks into the National Airspace System?
    Would you agree short-staffed FAA facilities expose single points of
    failure in how FAA operates air traffic systems?
        Answer. PASS is extremely concerned that the technician staffing
    shortages introduce additional risk into the National Airspace System
    (NAS). Insufficient technician staffing can result in increased
    restoration times and more air traffic delays during an outage. It can
    also make it difficult to ensure adequate shift coverage by
    technicians, another scenario that increases the risk of major air
    traffic issues.
        For example, as PASS discussed in testimony presented in July to
    the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Aviation
    Subcommittee, an incident over the summer with a radar system caused a
    ground stop when no technician was on site with the requisite skills to
    fix the issue. Just a few weeks later at the same airport, a power
    supply failure led to another ground stop. The failure was resolved
    quickly yet required an off-duty technician to intervene to restore it
    to service. Again, there was no technician with that skillset on duty.
    Even brief ground stops have a ripple effect across the NAS. These two
    problems would have been resolved immediately if the agency had the
    right number of people with the right training in place.
        While the FAA acknowledges that it is short at least 800
    technicians, PASS and the employees we represent have serious concerns
    that this number is far higher. The FAA is not taking into
    consideration many factors that go into a fully trained and capable
    technician who is able to perform all duties required of the position.
    PASS again emphasizes that we are prepared to assist the agency in
    determining the right path forward to ensure adequate staffing at
    facilities throughout the country.

        Question 4. What is PASS doing in its own capacity to recruit more
    FAA technicians, share knowledge about aging systems, and ensure they
    receive proper training to enable them to respond in the event of a
    system issue or outage?
        Answer. FAA technicians must be skilled and proficient on multiple
    systems. It can take up to three years to fully train an FAA technician
    to perform all necessary duties related to the position. Unfortunately,
    the FAA is still playing catch up after its training academy in
    Oklahoma City was shuttered during the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition,
    the FAA does not hire new technicians before experienced technicians
    retire. That training and expertise walks out the door without
    mentoring the next generation of employees. We encourage proactive
    staffing so this expertise is taught to the next generation of
    technicians.
        PASS consistently expresses concern with the training of the
    technician workforce and the ability of the FAA to keep current with
    hiring and training new technicians. It is a long process because these
    employees are tasked with such an important responsibility. However, in
    order for the agency to function safely and efficiently, it is a
    process that must be made a priority.
        Furthermore, the membership of PASS is a diverse group of men and
    women from across the country. PASS is focused on increasing efforts to
    recruit new employees and retain the current workforce. Our members
    serve on committees, organizations and boards tasked with building
    interest and involvement in aviation. PASS members also participate in
    tradeshows and events at schools specifically aimed at attracting youth
    to a career in aviation. In addition, PASS worked closely with the FAA
    to develop the Gateways Internship\1\ program to hire college and even
    high school students as trainee technicians to receive practical, on-
    the-job experience while still in school. But comprehensive training
    for all technicians must remain paramount.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Federal Aviation Administration, Gateways Program, https://
    www.faa.gov/jobs/students/gateways, (accessed January 17, 2025).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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