[Senate Hearing 118-710]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-710
THE CURRENT READINESS OF THE JOINT FORCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 1, 2024
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http: //www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-559 WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire DEB FISCHER, Nebrask
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York TOM COTTON, Arkansas
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts RICK SCOTT, Florida
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TED BUDD, North Carolina
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
MARK KELLY, Arizona
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John P. Keast, Minority Staff
Director
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii, Chairman DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
MARK KELLY, Arizona
(ii)
Beginning in fiscal year 2023, we added over $100 million
to the Child and Youth Program portfolio to hire more employees at
increased wages to help retain a professional workforce. Our average
CDC employee salary is now higher than those outside the gate at most
installations.
In fiscal year 2023, direct care employees' salaries were
increased beyond the federally mandated $15 per hour. The minimum wage
of an entry-level employee is$18.20 per hour. Childcare employees with
children enrolled in the program now receive a 50 percent reduction in
fees for the first child and a 20 percent reduction for subsequent
children. Currently, 640 CDC employees are benefiting from this
discount.
Our current staffing turnover rate is 20 percent, a
marked improvement over the fiscal year 2021 and fiscal year 2022
turnover rates of 34 percent and 45 percent, respectively. Departing
employees listed ``relocation'' as the primary reason they resigned in
about a third of cases, which is explained by the fact that many
CDCemployees are spouses who move alongside their servicemember.
Military spouses comprise 40 percent of the Marine Corps' Child and
Youth Programs employees. Spouse employment is important for many
Marine Corps families and can be a significant factor in their
financial security, readiness, and retention. The Family Member
Employment Assistance Program is available at each Marine Corps
installation and provides employment related referral services, career
and skill assessments, career coaching, job search guidance, portal
career opportunities, and education centers referrals/guidance. We also
reimburse eligible marine spouses up to $1,000 for State licensure and
certification cost arising from relocation to another State. We
appreciate Congress's recent expansion of this program and continued
support. To address the challenge of PCS cycles, we have implemented a
CDC employee non-competitive transfer program that allows employees to
transfer from their current position more seamlessly to a similar one
at a different installation. This single initiative has enabled us to
retain more than 180 spouse employees, whom we may have otherwise lost.
To mitigate wait lists, we also offer childcare fee
assistance for eligible marines assigned to an installation with a
significant waitlist. Over the last three Fiscal Years, the rate of fee
assistance utilization has increased steadily for both community-based
childcare providers as well as children served. In fiscal year 2023,
over 1,600 children were enrolled in the fee assistance program at over
620 community-based providers at a total cost of $6.1 million. We
recently increased the maximum amount of fee assistance, which will
undoubtedly help our marine families--especially those in high-cost
areas.
We appreciate Congress's support to improve childcare delivery in
all its forms. Access to high quality, affordable and reliable
childcare enables marines to focus on their duties, which directly
impacts our readiness and lethality.
conclusion
The investments we make today to support our marines, sailors, and
their collective warfighting readiness will reverberate through the
rest of this decisive decade. There is only one thing that our Nation
cannot give to our military--more time. We must make critical
resourcing decisions now, so that we have the warfighting readiness
needed for tomorrow. The Corps is perpetually grateful of the support
that this subcommittee has provided for our Force Design initiatives.
Every dollar invested allows us to realize our modernization strategy
and build a more ready force, and importantly, one capable of
satisfying the demands of our Combatant Commanders.
The Marine Corps will be ready to respond to any crisis or
contingency in the future, just as we have in the past. The Marine
Corps will continue to do its part by continuing to maximize every
dollar invested so the American people can be confident that we are
deliberate with the finite resources that are provided to us. We will
also remain the best stewards of the taxpayers' funds via transparency,
accountability, and discipline.
Our Commandant remains committed to ensuring that the Marine Corps
remains our Nation's force-in-readiness. We will continue to rely on
our unique culture as marines to attract the finest young Americans to
join our ranks and drive our personnel readiness. With your help, we
will ensure they are provided world-class training, improved quality of
life, and enabled with the capabilities required to win our Nation's
battles against any adversary. I thank the subcommittee for your
continued advocacy and commitment to our Nation, the Naval Services,
and the Marine Corps. Semper Fidelis.
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much. General Slife. Am I
pronouncing your name correctly?
General Slife. You absolutely are.
Senator Hirono. Okay. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES C. SLIFE, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE AIR FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
General Slife. Thank you, ma'am. Good afternoon, Chair
Hirono, Ranking Member Sullivan, distinguished Members of the
Committee.
The beginning and end of my testimony today is that your
Air Force remains ready. Nevertheless, as Senator Sullivan
pointed out in his opening comments, the strategic landscape is
as complex and dynamic as it has ever been, demanding the Air
Force be ready for a spectrum of threats across differing time
epics. The rapidly evolving capabilities of the People's
Republic of China demand our full attention. Meanwhile, Russia,
North Korea, Iran, violent extremist organizations cannot be
ignored.
At its most basic, the budget being considered by the
Committee today represents our best judgment on how to allocate
risk over time, given the realities of the fiscal constraints
and inflationary pressure inherent in today's environment.
Could we retain greater force structure or additional platforms
intended to be divested? You bet, but it would come at the
expense of today's readiness levels or tomorrow's
modernization, which is a proxy for tomorrow's readiness. Could
we improve upon today's readiness? Absolutely, at the expense
of force structure or modernization, and finally, could we
modernize faster? We could, but it would come at the expense of
either force structure or readiness.
Such is the inescapable logic of allocating risk over time.
While the budget before you may not be ideal in an absolute
sense, we judge it to be ideal given the relative set of
options and the strategic environment in which we exist.
The Air Force's fiscal year 2025 budget request makes
several strategic adjustments that will help us maintain
satisfactory readiness rates while investing in emerging
technologies and modern systems to preserve future capability
and capacity.
Our personnel retention and accession rates are stable.
Updated programs and policies aligned to DOD-wide standards are
already resulting in a steady flow of new airmen. We are
modifying incentive programs and investing in better
infrastructure and support systems to make the decision to
stay, for airmen and families, easier.
We are also updating the way we train. We are rolling out
immersive simulation technology and flight training
improvements, maximizing the effectiveness of our pilots while
airborne and providing realistic training for airmen on the
ground. These new training methods are already increasing pilot
production and helping our airmen prepare for operations in a
contested environment.
Our force presentation around the world is sufficient for
the operational environment which has prevailed since the end
of the cold war, but the agile response needed tomorrow is
going to require a more flexible approach. So our investment in
agile combat employment will help us meet those challenges and
train our airmen to execute hub-and-spoke models that enables
the speed and lethality the future conflict will require.
The Air Force's nuclear enterprise is undergoing much-
needed recapitalization, and we look forward to bringing our
system upgrades and new platforms to the front lines as soon as
possible. Our fiscal year 2025 requests will enhance our
present nuclear capabilities and offer increased flexibility.
The demand for finite resources is fierce, and we strive to
be good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars while delivering on
our highest responsibility--air power in defense of our Nation.
The Air Force's fiscal year 2025 budget request is not without
risk, but it is acceptable risk to ensure our readiness today
and tomorrow.
On behalf of the 677,000 total force airmen and civilians
as well as their families, thank you for your support and
steadfast devotion to ensuring that the Air Force maintains its
place as the preeminent provider of air power, anytime,
anywhere. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Slife follows:]
Prepared Statement by General James C. Slife
introduction
The Air Force, as an indispensable contributor to our Nation's
security, stands ready to defend the Homeland, rapidly deploy and
employ combat power globally, and contribute to the success of our
Joint and Coalition teammates. With Airpower's speed, range, and
flexibility--as well as two-thirds of the Nation's nuclear triad--we
offer powerful options for our Nation's leaders. Our mission--to ``Fly,
Fight, & Win . . . Airpower Anytime, Anywhere''--is underpinned by our
readiness today and in the future.
The President's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request continues the Air
Force's implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and
aligns with the 2023 Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA). The Service's
global commitments have not changed and the urgent need for
modernization has not abated. The costs associated with maintaining our
readiness have increased while the FRA limits on the budget request do
not keep pace with inflation. Our need to provide a safe, strong,
secure, and credible deterrent to opportunistic challengers remains as
vital as ever. These factors place enormous pressure on our budget.
Funding is such that today's readiness is at the highest level of
risk deemed acceptable, balancing today's requirements with the need to
modernize to maintain readiness in the future. The Air Force is being
deliberate and thoughtful in managing short-term risk to readiness to
prepare our forces for both enduring competition as well as acute and
persistent threats.
current readiness
End Strength and Retention
The Air Force's success hinges on our airmen. By balancing
budgetary constraints with the risk inherent in carrying shortages in
some fields, our objective is to sustain a 320,000 person Active Duty
Force as was authorized in the fiscal year 2024 National Defense
Authorization Act. The fiscal year 2025 budget request proposes
reducing the Air Force End Strength (E/S) from the 324,700 requested in
fiscal year 2024 to 320,000 Active Duty members. These reductions
accompany the proposed divestment of legacy platforms in order to fund
necessary operational capabilities required to deter--and fight and win
if necessary--in the strategic environment of today and tomorrow.
Retention rates of both officers and enlisted personnel are
declining to projected stabilization points. For fiscal year 2025, we
project a personnel inventory increase as we apply the full impact of
our recruitment improvements, including Initial Enlisted Bonuses and an
additional 191 Recruiters. Furthermore, we are increasing the number of
enlisted retention programs under our fiscal year 2024 Selective
Retention Bonuses (SRB) program, adding a retention bonus to 19 new
enlisted career fields, for a total of 83 career fields under the
program.
Aircrew Manning
The national pilot shortage continues to challenge our Air Force.
In fiscal year 2024, the Total Force was approximately 1,900 pilots
short of the 19,136 required to meet global requirements. Robust
airline hiring practices continue to draw away experienced pilots at
the Field Grade Officer level, who are critical to training the next
generation. We have prioritized rated manning in operations, test, and
training units by reducing rated staff manning, alleviating risks in
front-line combat capability and pilot production in order to maintain
combat readiness.
To improve retention and production, we continue to invest in
several monetary and non-monetary incentive programs. Monetarily, we
sustain the Aviator Bonus, Aviator Incentive Pay, Special Duty Pay, and
Critical Skills Pay. The Aviator Bonus includes long and short-term
contracts, with some offering more money up front for a longer
commitment (up to $50,000 annually). We have also implemented non-
monetary incentives, such as base of preference in-lieu-of a bonus, for
retention and are pursuing various quality-of-life initiatives,
improving Child Development Centers, and spousal licensure. that
address the needs of our airmen and families.
The Air Force is also continuing pilot production investments. In
fiscal year 2023, the Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) program
produced 1,315 pilots, 39 more than the previous year but 185 short of
the annual pilot production goal of 1,500. Maintenance and supply
challenges for aging training aircraft and low civil service simulator
instructor manning compound to undermine production totals. The Air
Force is addressing the Civilian Simulator Instructor (CSI) manning
issue by pursuing all available authorities, including contract
options, alternate civilian pay scales, and the recently approved up to
50 percent Group Retention waiver. The fiscal year 2024 budget tackled
the sustainment and availability issues for training aircraft and we
are already beginning to see an uptick in throughput based on work
using the ``Theory of Constraints'' methodology. Additionally, we have
implemented several non-traditional means of pilot production,
including integration of immersive technology, to increase
effectiveness during the airborne portion of flight training and better
prepare graduates for 5th-generation aviation.
Flying Hour Program (FHP)
The fiscal year 2025 budget is consistent with fiscal year 2024
flying hour programming, with an increase in 5th-generation flying
hours. Although this programming falls below our desired training
requirement, this budget reflects the hours the Air Force can
reasonably fly due to increasing sustainment requirements of legacy
systems outpacing the Air Force's ability to resource them. We continue
to search for innovative ways, such as virtual reality technology and
synthetic training environments, to ensure quality aircrew training in
the face of shortfalls in our ability to put aircraft in the air.
Weapon System Sustainment (WSS)
The real cost of force sustainment and flying operations is
outpacing inflation planning factors, which challenges our ability to
produce the ready, lethal force required by the National Defense
Strategy. For fiscal year 2025, the Air Force WSS funding request is
$18.8 billion--an increase of $886 million over fiscal year 2024--which
funds of 87 percent of all WSS requirements, keeping pace with rising
depot maintenance costs and inflation. The WSS portfolio continues to
grow due to aircraft sustainment beyond design life, fielding new
weapons systems with increased technical complexity, increasing
requirements for Contract Logistics Support, and inflation above
planned levels in labor and material costs. Competition for finite
resources necessitates prioritizing weapons systems most relevant to
deterring and defeating a peer adversary in a future conflict. The
fiscal year 2025 request continues to ensure near-term capabilities are
sustained at an acceptable level of risk while allowing investment in
future capabilities to mitigate future risk.
enhanced operational readiness and agility
Air Force's Force Generation (AFFORGEN) Model
The operational demands on our force over the past two decades
detrimentally impacted readiness. Thus, AFFORGEN, a model to enable the
Air Force to meet warfighter requirements, is evolving to meet the
challenges of the present and future strategic environments. Through
AFFORGEN, the Air Force can provide a sustainable force offering to
meet rotational requirements, generate readiness to underwrite a
credible deterrence, and establish a predictable deployment flow for
our airmen. We have already received positive feedback from our airmen
regarding their ability to work and train together prior to deploying
under this model.
Air Task Force (ATF)
In concert with AFFORGEN, the Air Force is also evolving our force
presentation model. Over the past 20 years, the Air Force provided
forces by aggregating airmen from many different bases at a deployed
location and forming them into units while deployed. Airmen typically
were unacquainted with each other or did not train together before
arriving at their deployed location. This approach was efficient and
generally acceptable because we fought from large, fixed bases with
relative sanctuary and engaged the adversary at the time and place of
our choosing. Future conflicts will not allow for such luxuries--our
airmen must have the opportunity to train together as a team and be
ready to fight as a cohesive unit on their first day in theater. The
ATF provides that opportunity.
The Air Force's force presentation model is ultimately moving
toward a single complete, cohesive fighting force from a single wing at
a single base. The Expeditionary Air Base (XAB), now being fielded, is
the first step in this process. The XAB sources the command-and-control
team as well as support personnel from one base; the rest are sourced
from up to 50 other locations, a 45 to 50 percent decrease from the 90-
100 locations of the previous model.
The next evolution of our force presentation model, the ATF, is
planned to start in the fall of 2025. ATFs will source personnel from
just three or four bases, allowing teams of 80-160 airmen to train
together in the 12 months preceding deployment. ATFs provide the Joint
Force with a more ready force on day one in theater and allow the Air
Force to better articulate capacity, readiness, and risk.
Agile Combat Employment (ACE)
We currently rely on a limited number of isolated, forward air
bases in the Western Pacific and several fixed bases in Europe and the
Middle East. Advances in potential adversary long-range precision
strike capability increasingly threaten these bases. Competitors will
continue to invest in weapon magazine depth, range, and accuracy,
putting U.S., Allied, and partner locations at risk, as well as
challenging U.S. efforts to gain important regional access, basing, and
overflight permissions.
In response, the Air Force has developed multiple initiatives to
bolster resilient forward basing in a contested environment.
Specifically, the ACE scheme of maneuver increases readiness by
dispersing operations from large bases to networks of smaller,
resilient, adaptive locations. ACE complicates the adversary's wartime
calculus and denies them the lucrative targeting opportunities which
known, fixed, and thinly protected locations provide. Our ACE concepts
continue to be deployed at all echelons of the force, and we are also
updating Air Force Doctrine, testing in ongoing exercises and worldwide
training, and innovating at the unit level.
The fiscal year 2025 ACE investment, $538 million, will continue to
build on previous efforts. These investments include the packaging,
storage, and sustainment of prepositioned essential war reserve
materiel, airfield restoration around the Indo-Pacific, improved agile
expeditionary communications, and ``Mission Ready Airmen'' training.
Our airfield restoration efforts aim to expand the number of bases from
which we can operate and provide a mix of defenses, concealment, and
hardening, as well as the ability to maintain logistics support from
multiple locations.
The ability to defend forward air bases from increasing air and
missile threats in theater remains a critical component of the ACE
concept. Consequently, the Air Force increased its fiscal year 2025
budget request for limited base defense by $10.4 million to $83.6
million, funding cost-effective capabilities to enhance the resilience
and protection of dispersed bases. This investment consists primarily
of passive defense, infrastructure resiliency, operational recovery
measures, and sustainment of fielded Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (C-sUAS) capabilities. It also includes a limited organic Air
Force Air Base Air Defense (ABAD) active defense capability to provide
low-cost expeditionary protection for air bases supporting ACE that
might otherwise be undefended due to Joint air and missile defense
capacity shortfalls. The deployed ABAD system is not by itself intended
or sufficient to provide robust protection against all threats and does
not reduce the need for additional investment in Joint defenses.
strategic readiness investments
Nuclear Modernization
Nuclear deterrence is foundational for our national security. Rapid
Chinese and Russian fielding of modernized nuclear weapons reinforce
the importance of maintaining a strong and modernized strategic
posture. Accordingly, the Air Force remains fully committed to
recapitalizing the nuclear enterprise. As we await the outcome of the
Nunn-McCurdy review of the LGM-35A Sentinel and delivery of the B-21
Raider, our current nuclear force and systems remain ready to respond
to the Nation's needs. The fiscal year 2025 budget request contains
funding for significant B-52 aircraft upgrades, including urgently
needed engine replacement which will allow for longer unrefueled flight
ranges, freeing tanker aircraft for other high-priority operations.
Additionally, several F-35A squadrons are now certified for nuclear
missions. These near-term endeavors provide flexible, credible
deterrence options for our Nation and reassurance to our Allies and
Partners.
Operational Test and Training Infrastructure (OTTI)
The Air Force uses several physical training ranges to sharpen the
combat effectiveness of aircrews. Yet, the current operational training
infrastructure is insufficient for the high-end training capability the
Air Force and the Joint Force need. The fiscal year 2025 budget request
will allow us to continue to modernize select ranges, including the
Nevada Test and Training Range and the Joint Pacific Alaska Range
Complex, to emulate a pacing adversary by fiscal year 2030. In
addition, we plan to improve six primary test ranges with high-fidelity
threat emitters, jammers, and improved targets as part of an integrated
system that allows ranges to function as realistic and reactive
adversaries, greatly enhancing 5th-generation training.
The Air Force's fiscal year 2025 budget request includes $346.2
million for the Joint Simulation Environment (JSE), further enabling
aircrew and other operators to train and maintain readiness against
potential near-peer adversaries. JSE overcomes current live-fly
training limitations, such as range size, which restrict our ability to
replicate threats and allows potential adversaries to observe our
training. Still, some airmanship can only be gained in the air, and we
will continue to strike an appropriate balance between simulated and
aircraft-based training.
conclusion
The Air Force is in a race to maintain its position as the world's
best Air Force. The United States faces a competitor whose national
purchasing power exceeds our own and is actively developing a force to
defeat air power. Conflict is not inevitable--we must seek to prevent
it through readiness. Modernization is also readiness--tomorrow's
readiness. The budget addresses mission requirements while taking care
of our most important asset--our people--and fulfilling the role of the
Service as part of the Joint, Interagency, and Combined team that our
Nation depends on.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. General Guetlein.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL A. GUETLEIN, USSF, VICE CHIEF OF
SPACE OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
General Guetlein. Chair Hirono, Ranking Member Sullivan,
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before this body and the American public
on the military readiness of the United States Space Force and
our continued efforts to sustain such readiness into the
future. On behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, Hon. Frank
Kendall, and the Chief of Space Operations, General Chance
Saltzman, I am honored to share with you our readiness vision
for fiscal year 2025.
Let me begin by saying that the context for any discussion
on the readiness of the Joint Force lies on the Nation's
ability to achieve and maintain freedom of action in space
through space superiority. The repeated actions by both the
Russian Federation and People's Republic of China underscore
the urgency for action. Although we still maintain control of
the space of our adversaries, we are working hard to close the
gap and assert their dominance in space. We cannot afford to
let this happen.
Space is the foundation for the Joint Force, and it is
fundamental to our peaceful way of life. GPS [Global
Positioning System] alone is an essential part of every aspect
of our daily lives, from our cellphones to our banking systems
and even our ability to get the crops out the field and the
groceries on the shelves. We cannot let our near peer
competitors overtake us or we will lose what we hold dear, and
the world will become a far more dangerous place.
The investments provided in the President's Budget maintain
our marginal advantage. However, we must seriously consider
future budgets in order to counter adversary investments and
ensure our Joint Force remains the dominant Joint Force
defending this great Nation.
As we look ahead it is clear that the resources necessary
to maintain the space capabilities the Nation depends on are
significantly outpaced by the demand. Our near peer competitors
have not only made space a contested domain, but their
activities in space reveal that their intentions differ
profoundly from our own. Rather than ensuring peaceful access
to space for all, they strive to seize control of space for
their own aggressive purposes.
The pace of their progress will only continue to accelerate
because they are determined to close the capability gap, and
they are not subject to the same resource constraints we have,
they are not subject to the same processes that we follow, and
they do not share our values of protecting our environment both
on Earth and in space for generations to come.
Our guardians clearly demonstrated the capability, the
resolve, and the experience necessary to face the challenges
posed by our competitors, but there is more to do. As Secretary
Kendall and General Saltzman recently unveiled, the Department
is launching an effort to reoptimize how we organize, train,
and equip our forces in light of great power competition and
the looming threat.
As part of this reoptimization, the Space Force is
implementing a series of key initiatives that will directly
impact readiness. First, we are standardizing the way we
present space capabilities to the combatant commanders, and we
are completing the standup and the resourcing of our service
components at each of the combatant commands. This will ensure
seamless integration of space capabilities into the Joint Force
when called upon by the Nation during times of crisis or
conflict.
Second, we are building joint warfighting leaders and
preparing them for modern warfare. We are redesigning career
paths, changing our readiness standards, and increasing the
scope, temple, and realism of our operational assessments and
exercises in order to build the culture and proficiency
necessary to prevail against the threat. This is the task that
you created the United States Space Force for.
Last, we are establishing a new field command, focused on
preparing the Space Force for future warfare. Space Futures
Command will focus on developing future warfighting concepts
and testing these concepts in modern, live, virtual, and
constructive environments against realistic threats, and
focusing our investments on science and technology to counter
the emerging threats. Space Futures Command will channel these
lessons learned and technologies developed into a robust
objective architecture and force design that will drive future
resourcing decisions and readiness.
I truly appreciate Congress' and this Committee's continued
support for our guardians and the mission. Your steadfast
fiscal provisions have made us the force we are today, and
every guardian appreciates it.
I look forward to working with you as we defeat tomorrow's
challenges together, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Guetlein follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Michael A. Guetlein
introduction
Chair Hirono; Ranking Member Sullivan; distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee; thank you for the opportunity to testify before this
body, and the American public, on the military readiness of the Space
Force and our continued efforts to sustain such readiness into the
future. On behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, Hon. Frank
Kendall, and the Chief of Space Operations (CSO), General B. Chance
Saltzman, I am honored to share the Space Force's readiness vision for
fiscal year 2025.
Space superiority is the foundation of the Joint Force, and we
cannot achieve joint success without it. The demand for space forces
outpaces resources by a significant margin. If we want to remain on
top, the Nation must continue to invest in the United States Space
Force and develop the capabilities to deter and if necessary, defeat
aggression in space and around the globe. The Space Force must be
resourced to protect our critical space-based services from adversary
attacks, and to deny an adversary the hostile use of its space
capabilities against our personnel.
Since its creation, the Space Force has pushed the boundaries of
what it means to be a Military Service. Our guardians demonstrate the
unique capability, resolve, and experience necessary to effectively
secure and control the space domain in support of our Nation's defense.
Even so, our competitors continue to mature their counterspace
capabilities, both publicly and covertly, which is why the Space Force
must remain vigilant to retain its readiness and capability advantages.
Recent actions by both the Russian Federation and the People's
Republic of China, including space-related cyber-attacks, direct ascent
anti-satellite demonstrations, and counterspace weapons development,
demonstrate they do not seek peaceful access to space; but rather
intend to conduct aggressive actions that could deny the United States
the free use and benefits of space. Reports concerning specific
counterspace capabilities exhibit the extent these threats pose to our
servicemembers, the American public, and our very way of life. The
United States Space Force will continue to significantly contribute to
our Nation's integrated deterrence and resolve to maintain the most
effective space forces in the world.
As Secretary Kendall and General Saltzman recently unveiled in
February 2024, the Department of the Air Force (DAF) is undergoing a
Department-wide effort to optimize the way both the Air Force and Space
Force organize, train, and equip to meet the PRC pacing challenge. In
the face of rising threats and dangerous shifts in the strategic
environment, the DAF designed this effort to enhance our ability to
effectively deter our competitors, and ultimately, prevail in conflict
should such deterrence fail. We have seen these threats emerge rapidly,
particularly in space as it has transformed from a benign environment
to a contested domain. To address these challenges, the Space Force
will reoptimize its readiness to meet the pacing challenge. At the
direction of Secretary Kendall and General Saltzman, the Space Force
is:
Establishing Space Futures Command as a fourth Field
Command to develop and validate concepts, conduct experimentation and
wargames, and perform mission area design;
Formalizing Space Force Combat Squadrons as our Units of
Action and accelerating implementation of the Space Force Generation
model (SPAFORGEN);
Delivering an Operational Test and Training
Infrastructure (OTTI) to provide our guardians with the most realistic,
dynamic, and effective training solutions available anywhere.
Implementing readiness standards that reflect operations
under contested conditions rather than those of a permissive
environment;
Conducting a series of nested and synchronized exercises
in the Space Force that increase inscope and complexity, fit within a
broader DAF-level framework, and progress through a Service-level,
data-driven process to measure readiness;
Activating service components within Combatant Commands,
providing commanders with space integration and synchronization assets
they need to conduct all domain operations; and
Redesigning career paths to produce guardians that meet
our high-tech operational demands.
Meeting the pacing challenge, while also managing acute and
persistent threats, requires the Space Force to retain both agility and
expertise; one without the other risks unacceptable tradeoffs to our
strategic interests, the safety of our people and assets, and continued
peaceful access to space. Underpinning our success in, from, and to the
space domain is the Space Force's ability to field combat-ready forces
and ensure our guardians have the tools, training, and equipment
required to prevail in a modern, all-domain fight. Continuing to fund
Space Force readiness will remain essential to our Nation's defense now
and in the future. The President's fiscal year 2025 budget request
appropriately balances our readiness requirements to deter aggression
and be prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary.
evolving space force readiness in fiscal year 2025
Future Force Design
Since its inception, the Space Force has taken steps to improve its
force design structure and ``right-size'' its acquisition, talent
management, and organizational strategies to best serve its organize,
train, and equip mission set. Through the Space Warfighting Analysis
Center (SWAC), we initiated a methodical process to produce the most
ideal set of future capabilities required for existing and emerging
operational needs, threats, and costs.
Recognizing the need to effectively implement future force designs,
we are prioritizing efforts to be forward-looking and maintain long-
term readiness advantages in both capability and posture. As such, the
CSO ordered the establishment of a Space Futures Command aimed at
providing better-defined structure, processes, and integration of our
force design efforts. This new Field Command will develop and validate
concepts, conduct experimentation and wargames, and perform mission
area design.
Joint operations require extensive inclusion of space capabilities.
A Space Futures Command will ensure the Space Force force design is
comprehensive with technically sound capabilities, innovative doctrinal
approaches to force employment, force structures organized for
resilience and effectiveness, and training practices designed to retain
competitive advantages in the face of the pacing challenge. We must
have greater awareness of the materiel and assets our force requires,
and the corresponding facilities and personnel needed to accomplish our
missions. We must incorporate more proactive and applicable leadership
and educational opportunities for our servicemembers, and we must
strengthen our people and facilities for the challenges ahead. This is
a Department of Defense (DOD)-wide effort, but as the newest service,
the Space Force has both the most ground to cover and the most agility
to deliver operationally effective warfighting capabilities.
Effective force design analysis and recommendations are essential
to delivering well-equipped, combat ready space forces, and the Space
Force will leverage Space Futures Command to ensure high-fidelity
modeling and analysis that balances fulfilling current operational
requirements while transitioning to the force we need today.
Commercial Space Strategy
The pacing challenge requires that the United States, and the Space
Force in particular, leverage the full breadth and depth of our
commercial sector. The United States retains a significant advantage in
commercial activities, which offer us key opportunities to bolster our
space capabilities and sustain our readiness posture, while
simultaneously stimulating the space economy and enabling competition,
rapid innovation, and cost-effectiveness. Our commercial partners
afford us the ability to exploit what we have, buy what we can, and
build only what we must; particularly as space has become an
increasingly competitive and contested domain.
The commercial sector of the United States space enterprise
provides us with an immense body of knowledge and innovative capability
from which to draw upon. We have the most robust space enterprise in
the world, and the partnerships the Space Force has fostered with
private industry, academia, and allied nations empower us to act faster
and with greater effect than we could alone. This is a critical line of
effort for the Space Force, not only because of our fiscal
responsibility to the American people, but also for the vast knowledge
base we can draw upon to succeed in our mission. Commercial products
that can be utilized to meet military needs will provide for a more
cost-effective and timely acquisition, which supports the DOD and
industry. Further, these partnerships free the DOD to prioritize
dedicated products when capability gaps are identified, saving time,
resources, and testing for those needs that are not commercially
available or are inherently governmental missions.
Consequently, the Space Force developed a Commercial Space Strategy
aligned with a broader DOD Commercial Space Integration Strategy,
intended to further harness our strategic advantages in the United
States commercial sector. This strategy guides our approach in building
out a hybrid architecture designed to enhance resiliency and capacity
in times of need. The Space Force's Commercial Space Strategy informs
methods of integrating critical goods, services, and other activities
already validated and tested by the private sector; improving access to
existing and emerging technologies; and meeting our near-, mid-, and
long-term architecture goals.
The Space Force Commercial Space Strategy is a new way of
approaching industry partnerships, designed to propel our acquisition
and operational practices and thinking into the future. As the
technology available to and from private industry has advanced, the
armed services must adjust our approach. This adjustment must allow the
flexibility to onboard innovative and game-changing technologies; this
is especially true of space systems. Integrating the products and
capabilities found throughout American companies and the research and
development community will streamline space operations, fortify our
hybrid architecture, and ensure we take a proactive posture against
threats.
By utilizing commercial capabilities and systems along with
informed requirements, the Space Force will undoubtably realize an even
greater competitive advantage.
International Partnerships
With the increasing inclusion of allied nations in our space
activities, we develop stronger coalitions, able to conduct coordinated
operations in the space domain. This inclusion will allow us to deliver
more resilient capabilities supporting space operations across the
conflict continuum. We continue to reduce information sharing and
classification barriers with allies to enable combined understanding of
the threats, and the needed capabilities to prevail in a conflict,
should the need arise.
As our service refines mechanisms to share understanding of the
domain, and continues to develop interoperable capabilities through
traditional acquisition, we also look to work with allies and partners
to collectively harness the power of the international commercial space
sector. Our allies have great interest in working with the Space Force
to more effectively utilize commercial innovation and capabilities in a
coordinated manner. They see the same benefit in the commercial space
sector, and we hope to grow opportunities to leverage their innovation
to support combined operations with increasingly diverse nations.
Space Force Generation
As an independent military service, the Space Force maintains its
own readiness standards, reporting, and development through the
SPAFORGEN model. This model affords us the ability to ensure a combat-
ready force for all guardians, whether Employed-in-Place or otherwise.
SPAFORGEN ensures that the Space Force can effectively present combat
ready space forces to Combatant Commanders and provides guardians with
the time and resources necessary to develop and train to remain agile
and effective.
The Space Force measures its readiness based upon the necessary
tools, training, and manpower needed to achieve our strategic and
tactical requirements. Ultimately, the Space Force must ensure that all
our guardians can effectively rise to the challenge through rigorous
development and capability deployment. The Space Force is redefining
our readiness reporting to portray our current posture and the
presentation of space operators to the Joint Force. To that end, in
February 2024, the Space Force transitioned from the Air Force Input
Tool to the new Space Force Input Tool to support our service-specific,
employed-in-place readiness inputs for the Defense Readiness Reporting
System.
In accordance with law, the Space Force presents forces and
capabilities that underpin all instruments of our military power, and
as mandated by Congress, the Space Force is responsible for organizing,
training, and equipping those forces. The Space Force provides ready
and capable operators to commanders worldwide, enabling these
commanders to deter threats and, if necessary, prevail in conflict.
Once presented, our Space Force Combat Squadrons will serve as unique
Units of Action that undertake day-to-day missions for combatant
commanders, while retaining our capacity to prepare and ready for high-
end fights.
SPAFORGEN ensures that forces presented to Combatant Commanders can
execute missions and tasks and are equipped to make appropriate
recommendations on the effective employment, task organization,
operational synchronization, and command relationships of space forces.
Operational Test and Training Infrastructure
OTTI is an overarching concept describing a collection of programs
and capabilities, both live and synthetic, that enable high-end testing
and training of Space Force systems and operators against a thinking
adversary. The Space Force relies on OTTI investments as a critical
component of SPAFORGEN's success, and our overall ability to deliver
combat-ready forces throughout readiness cycles. Generally, Space
Force's ability to effectively develop, test, and train tactics will
create greater and hugely positive impact on operational outcomes. OTTI
provides the means to execute those core activities and is a critical
component to generating Space Force readiness.
More specifically, OTTI provides guardians unique and realistic
training against simulated adversaries, providing dynamic scenario
issues which will prepare guardians for the most diverse and
challenging environments available. Our goal is for guardians to
receive training which prepares them for the threats they may face,
therefore, these scenarios will be challenging and hyper-realistic.
Producing this capability requires that we create an intelligence-
informed accounting of adversary capabilities and invest in high-
fidelity, mission-specific simulators. Such testing and training are
invaluable to our guardians and serves to establish a greater, combat-
ready force posture.
It is imperative that we adequately invest in our test and training
infrastructure so we can better prepare for the ``fight tonight'', and
the President's fiscal year 2025 budget request appropriately
prioritizes Space Force OTTI as a critical function of Space Force
readiness.
Service Component Activation
The mechanism by which the Space Force ensures full integration and
synchronization of space activities throughout the combatant commands
is via Space Force Service Components. The Space Force established its
first three service components in 2022 at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command via
U.S. Space Forces for USINDOPACOM (USSPACEFOR-INDOPAC), U.S. Forces
Korea via USSPACEFOR-KOR as a subordinate unit to USSPACEFOR-INDOPAC,
and U.S. Central Command via USSPACEFOR-CENT.
In 2023, we established USSPACEFOR-SPACE as the Space Force Service
Component to U.S. Space Command and USSPACEFOR-EUCOM/AFRICOM
(USSPACEFOR-EUR/AF) as the component to U.S. European Command / U.S.
Africa Command and will continue standing up component and sub-
component commands as needs may require. The Secretary of the Air Force
directed the activation of the remaining Service Components no later
than 1 October 2025 and we are on track to achieve that goal.
Facilities and Infrastructure
Space Force Facility, Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization
(FSRM) and Military Construction (MILCON) funding enables the Service
to prioritize requirements which reduce risk to mission and the force.
Structural, electrical, and power improvements to operational
facilities reduce risk to mission and enable our joint and coalition
partners in the fight, while quality of life infrastructure and
facility improvements reduce risk to the force by improving resiliency
amongst our guardians and their families.
Facilities and infrastructure are crucial to Space Force missions
which are predominantly employed-in-place from facilities that are
often inseparable from the weapon systems employed. While the Space
Force does partner with the Air Force for significant logistics,
security, medical services, and human resources support, the Space
Force's ability to prioritize its unique FSRM and MILCON at our
specific installations ensures we appropriately optimize our funding
requests and maintain a sufficient, stable, and predictable funding
strategy to execute its assigned missions as an independent service.
Moving forward, the Space Force will continue to prioritize projects
that increase facility and infrastructure resiliency and Service
readiness, while balancing the requirements of the National Defense
Strategy (NDS) and future projects.
Weapon System Sustainment
Space Force Weapon System Sustainment directly supports the Space
Force's ability to sustain the day-to-day readiness of weapon systems
performing space missions, including combat power; missile warning/
missile tracking; positioning; navigation and timing; satellite
communications; space domain awareness; and environment monitoring.
Maintaining operations for these systems is critical to ensure Homeland
and allied defense, and funding for these priorities must be continued
for each to not risk opening capability gaps which will increase our
vulnerability to adversary systems.
From fiscal year 2024 to fiscal year 2025, the President's Budget
Request prioritizes programmatic and operational readiness in support
of the NDS, to include obsolescence mitigation and software maintenance
for Upgraded Early Warning Radar and North American Aerospace Defense
Command Cheyenne Mountain Complex systems. Moving forward, the Space
Force is developing a necessary methodology to identify quantifiable
solutions to balance sustainment support and future readiness needs.
Assured Access to Space
The United States requires the capabilities, infrastructure,
expertise, and tools necessary to access space on-demand throughout our
military, civil, and private enterprises. To support the growing demand
to leverage our launch capabilities, the Space Force established
Assured Access to Space as the largest organization within Space
Systems Command, comprised of Space Launch Delta 45, Space Launch Delta
30, and the Program Executive Office for National Security Space
Launch; Rocket System Launch Program; Launch and Test Range System; and
Servicing, Mobility, and Logistics.
Assured Access to Space is ultimately responsible for procuring
launch services and delivering on-orbit capabilities for the entire
National Security Space enterprise. This critical organization manages
range sustainment programs in support of the DOD and commercial launch
customers and supports three primary objectives: space access; rapid
delivery; and orbital resiliency. Assured Access to Space will also
transform today's launch sites into modern spaceports, with the
capacity and resiliency necessary to ensure our Nation's ability to
deliver capabilities into space when they are needed.
Assured Access to Space is leading the Nation's planning for a new
space mobility mission area to deliver space access, maneuver, and
logistics capabilities needed to tackle growth in commercial satellite
launch cadence and prepare for new operational concepts for mobility in
orbit. It includes investment in on-orbit servicing and maneuver
prototyping with the Air Force Research Laboratory, the Defense
Innovation Unit, and other mission partners.
Spaceport of the Future
For decades, the United States has continuously maintained its
space launch infrastructure to meet limited demand from a small
customer base. However, as demand for national security, civil, and
commercial space capabilities continue to grow, our launch range
infrastructure has not modernized sufficiently to meet the significant
increase in launch demand. Accordingly, the Space Force undertook a
broad effort to analyze our launch infrastructure enterprise and assess
range modernization efforts to maximize our ability to support U.S.
launch requirements.
The Space Force's Spaceport of the Future is taking a comprehensive
approach to look at all factors contributing to range costs and launch
throughput. Launch rates rose approximately 30 percent each of the last
2 years, and we expect rates to continue to rise through the Future
Years Defense Plan. Therefore, the Space Force is prioritizing
enhancements so that we have the infrastructure needed to meet these
launch demands.
To support the demand, the President's fiscal year 2025 budget
request asks Congress to fund our Spaceport of the Future activities to
allow for increased launch throughput, enhanced capability, and assured
access to space capabilities for the warfighter. Without this critical
funding, we will see significant degradation in our infrastructure and
our ability to provide launch services for our national security,
civil, and commercial partners.
We are thankful that Congress is providing the requisite
reimbursement authorities necessary to collect direct and indirect
costs incurred by the Space Force associated with launch activities.
These authorities will facilitate commercial participation and
investment into the United States' launch infrastructure and further
our ability to meet growing range demand.
Agile Talent Management
The Space Force sustains its readiness through its most important
asset: our people. We need to enable our guardians to succeed in an
agile, adaptable manner to field the greatest space Force in the world.
As a result, the Space Force is creating an innovative talent
management system, establishing flexible service options and advanced
training programs to establish opportunities for all guardians,
including specialized credentialing, academics, experiences with
industry partners, and tailored duty experiences to name a few.
The Space Force is also participating in piloting DOD's Defense
Civilian Training Corps program, designed to identify university
talent, provide scholarships for accepted students, and prepare
students for a career in DOD acquisition-related fields. This pilot
program's goal is to create a sustainable pipeline of civilian talent
into the service and motivate university students to serve their
country as civilian members of the DOD. Additionally, Space Force's
existing University Partnership Program further deepens our talent pool
and improves enterprise-wide skill set development. Moreover, the Space
Force is expanding its space-centered curriculum offerings within DAF
educational programs, including Basic Military Training, Non-
Commissioned Officer Academy, United States Air Force Academy, Officer
Training School, and Reserve Officer Training Corps.
Even though we are the smallest military service, the Space Force
places significant emphasis on our recruiting and retention efforts.
Given the Space Force's highly technical mission set, we must remain
diligent in meeting our recruiting goals and maximize guardians'
flexibility to retain the talent we need to maintain our readiness
advantages. While we have not experienced the recruiting challenges
other military services have experienced to date, the Space Force needs
to sustain its efforts, particularly as we expect to grow in Fiscal
Year 2025.
I especially appreciate Congress' support and enactment of the
Space Force Personnel Management Act (SFPMA), which creates significant
flexibility in how we manage our servicemembers to augment their skills
and increase efficiency in workforce management. In accordance with the
SFPMA, the Space Force is quickly moving to integrate its existing
Active component guardians with Reserve Airmen in space-focused career
fields into one service. This critical authorization allows the Space
Force to not only invest in and grow our talent pool, but also to
retain such talent by offering guardians greater flexibility in their
professional experiences.
The Space Force will always look to identify more innovative,
adaptable, and cutting-edge opportunities in talent management to
ensure our guardians are able to rise to the challenge. Moving forward,
the Space Force will refine and expand the ways we provide guardians
with the tools, training, and resources they need to succeed
operationally, professionally, and personally.
the way ahead
The United States has approached our space activities with a desire
to benefit not only Americans, but all people. It remains our goal that
space remains open and accessible to all nations and space faring
actors for peaceful use.
We must continue to ensure this domain is not controlled or
threatened by an adversary who does not seek the peaceful use of space.
The United States is uniquely capable of maintaining an open
environment for all nations in space. Just as we have ensured open
access to maritime trade and sea routes, so too will we in space.
Yet, our near-peer competitors are watching our efforts and
attempting to preempt, deny, circumvent, and counter our space
capabilities. While we are the most recent military service, we are
not--and never have been--a new military service. We are built on
decades of advances and contributions by dedicated servicemembers,
civil servants, and industry partners who devoted themselves to their
country and continue to do so.
These guardians are stationed around the world in our deltas,
combatant commands, and the intelligence community, ready to provide
the combat capabilities we need. Our Units of Action will contribute to
every combat mission the DOD undertakes. The training exercises and
assessments will evolve to simulate warfare of the 21st century. At the
center of it all is our readiness posture and our force-wide endeavor
to provide combat decision makers with the most capable guardians we
can, along with the training and equipment needed to succeed.
Our ability to guarantee access to space is reliant upon our
guardians, our technologies, and our commitment to push ourselves
further, faster, and higher. Readiness does not mean purely standing
alert; it is a mind set and a quality which requires investment in the
mission, in oneself, and in each other. It is ultimately our people who
empower us to do what we do; the technology and the tactics only enable
our greatest assets to accomplish our Nation's needs. The DAF re-
optimization effort is as much an investment in our people as it is a
restructuring of combat capabilities.
There has never been a more important time for the Space Force to
secure our Nation's interests, and we must ensure that we are properly
resourcing the Space Force to guarantee the ability to achieve space
superiority into the future. I truly appreciate this committee's
continued support for our guardians and their mission; and look forward
to working with you.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Ms. Maurer?
STATEMENT OF DIANA C. MAURER, DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Maurer. Good afternoon, Chair Hirono, Ranking Member
Sullivan, other members and staff. I am pleased to be here
today to discuss key findings and recommendations from GAO's
recent work on military readiness, and as you just heard, the
services face difficult decisions about how to address
continuing operational demands while preparing for future
challenges.
Today we see that readiness is increasingly strained.
Across the services we have seen common challenges in three
areas: sustaining weapons systems, generating ready forces, and
balancing mission and resources.
First, all too often the sustainment enterprise is not
delivering mission capability. Less than 40 percent of ships
completed maintenance on time. The F-35 and most aviation
systems failed to meet annual mission-capable or availability
goals, and missile defense sustainment is optimized for
specific systems rather than across the enterprise.
Second, the services have, at times, struggled to align new
equipment, units, and training to generate ready forces. For
example, the Army and Space Force, to their credit, leaned
forward in developing and fielding new technology, but they
sometimes did not ensure units were trained, organized, and
staffed to utilize these new capabilities. The Army and Marine
Corps also face several personnel, sustainment, and
organizational challenges establishing new multidomain units,
and shortfalls in training capability and other challenges
hinder the Space Force's ability to generate space readiness.
Third, we are increasingly concerned about a growing
imbalance between mission and resources. The Navy does not have
enough sailors for the current fleet, much less the fleet of
the future. As we reported earlier this week, the Navy has 16
percent fewer sailors than required in the battle force. The
Space Force is short 2,000 uniformed guardians, plus an
undetermined number of civilians. Aviation and ship sustainment
suffers from the lack of spare parts and shortages of trained
maintenance personnel. The Marine Corps faces a significant gap
between the number and current condition of the amphibious
fleet and near-term operational needs.
To fill gaps like these, services have been doing more with
less. They have prioritized mission and modernization, but to
the detriment of facilities, housing, and barracks.
Servicemembers also face daunting tradeoffs, sacrificing
training, maintenance, and rest to meet operational needs. We
recently reported that most servicemembers consistently sleep 6
hours or less per day, for months at a time, and that level of
sleep deprivation can be like working while intoxicated. This
overtaxing of military personnel creates safety problems,
hinders readiness, and undercuts retention.
The recommendations from our reports can help DOD enhance
readiness. The 30 reports in my statement have 114
recommendations, and nearly all of those are open. Now to be
fair, most of those are directed to OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense], not the services, many are relatively
new, and few involved simple fixes. Prior to today's hearing, I
had the opportunity to meet with everyone on the panel, and I
can tell you they are committed to using the results of GAO's
work to enhance readiness and improve conditions for
servicemembers.
In fact, one of the best things about working at GAO is
going to bases and units and talking to people at all levels of
the military. We see servicemembers and civilians consistently
demonstrating professionalism and dedication to the mission.
Your continued oversight, supported by our independent
work, bolstered by DOD's actions to implement our
recommendations, will help those servicemembers address
readiness challenges across the Joint Force.
Madam Chair, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Maurer follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much.
As long as Ms. Maurer pointed out the fact that their
report suggested 114 recommendations and that you had met with
the testifiers today, so I would like to ask all of you,
starting with General Mingus, of the 114 recommendations that
GAO made, which one did you consider the most important to
implement, and did you implement it? We will just go down the
list.
General Mingus. Yes, ma'am. It is hard to prioritize
because they are all important, and we agree with all the
findings and the recommendations. But if I were to pick one it
would probably be our fleet readiness, our weapons readiness is
one of the areas that we acknowledge ourselves and are keenly
focused on reversing that trend.
Senator Hirono. When you talk about fleet readiness, are
you talking about--there are a lot of elements that go into
fleet readiness, such as----
General Mingus. Our Bradleys, our Howitzers. Our fleet
readiness currently is below the standards that we hold for
ourselves, and part of that is a confluence of cascading of
equipment from one unit to other, back to depot. Some of it is
equipment that we have given to Ukraine and the supply parts
that have to go to Ukraine. So it has been a host of things
that have caused this, and our standard for most of our fleet
is about 90 percent operational readiness rates, and if you
aggregate across the fleet it is sitting at about 80 percent.
Senator Hirono. So, General, I would be interested to know
how you are doing with the fleet readiness aspect of the GAO
recommendations, so we will followup with you on how you are
doing with that.
General Mingus. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. Admiral?
Admiral Kilby. Thanks, Chair Hirono. I think I agree with
General Mingus. We do take the GAO reports very seriously, read
them, and try to really understand where we can make progress
in a forward direction.
I would say three reports stand out. One, the latest report
on fatigue, which applies to all the services, but the GAO has
done reports for the Navy fatigue. So that is a serious report
for us, especially given the manning situation that Ms. Maurer
described. That is the second area, and that report was
released on Monday. I have not had a chance to completely
digest the report, but there is much, much of it that we agree
with and concur.
Then finally the readiness report on availability and
modernization and maintenance. Those reports are impactful to
us, and we are taking those very seriously.
Senator Hirono. So as we go down the list, my intention is
that for the recommendations that have been suggested, and as
you point out to this Committee, what you consider to be an
important recommendation that you are going to implement, my
intention is to followup to enable you to make those changes,
as suggested.
So we will continue down the list. General Mahoney?
General Mahoney. Thanks, Senator, and I agree thematically
with my shipmate and my fighting mate over here. The one that
stood out to me, as a leader of marines, was the report on the
condition of the barracks. If we are going to say that the
bedrock of our fighting capability is the individual marine we
have to ensure that there is a safe, sanitary, and secure place
for them to come back after a hard day of training. That is the
one that sticks out to me, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. General Slife?
General Slife. Senator, thanks. So as I look through the
work that GAO has done, the portions that were most compelling
to me was the work that the GAO has done, actually several
reports, on the F-35 specifically. This is, of course, the
backbone of the Air Force's future strike fighter fleet. In
many ways it is a fantastic platform. It is a fantastic
capability we have. But it is extraordinarily complex, and it
is complex in a number of ways. Number one, the structure of
the program office, where we have multiple partners and allies
that are involved in operating the platform, have a voice in
how the platform is developed, clearly the Department of the
Air Force and the Department of the Navy operate the U.S.
fleets, and so there are differences in the way the Navy and
the Marine Corps do supply and the way the Air Force does
supply. So anything that is a shared resource becomes very
difficult for us to manage, just inside the Department of
Defense, much less with our partners and allies.
Then finally, as we have found that we become more and more
interdependent with our partners and allies, the
interoperability at the platform itself, we have to be able to
share data. We have to be able to use common weapons. We have
to service each other's airplanes. There are bureaucratic
impediments in place that we are working hard to knock down,
that will allow us to get the maximum value out of that
platform.
But I would just tell you that the short answer to your
question is that the things that I find most compelling in the
GAO's work is that related to the F-35.
Senator Hirono. Well, good, because we have had issues with
F-35 and its capabilities for what seems like a long time. So I
would be interested to know how you are going to make the kinds
of changes that you just described.
Okay. General Guetlein.
General Guetlein. Thank you, Senator. We have had a pretty
strong partnership with the GAO going forward since we stood up
in 2019. One of the major pivots that we have been doing in the
United States Space Force is pivoting to an employed-in-place
approach to warfighting. Whereas the other services fight
forward, we fight from the Homeland, and facilities that are
heavily driven by software, we have to combine both our men and
women in uniform, our civilians, and our contractor to get
after our mission, and that requires us to change the way we
measure readiness.
For example, we have to measure the power and cooling of
our facilities. We have to balance FSRM resources with weapons
systems sustainment resources. So we needed a completely new
model to measure our readiness so that we could accurately
report to the combatant commanders what they could guarantee to
be provided by United States Space Force during times of crisis
or conflict.
We are in the middle of that pivot. We will finish that
pivot by this fall, and what you have seen in our readiness
numbers, because we are changing the way we do it, is a
significant decline in our readiness reporting. It is not
necessarily because we have changed anything other than the
fact that we are actually looking at what does it take to go to
a fight, which is different than the system that we inherited
from the United States Air Force. Over.
Senator Hirono. I think as the newest entity to be set up,
it remains to be seen how you are going to measure your
attainment of mission.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I want to
begin just because a lot of these hearings are all about
challenges and problems. I want to begin by just complimenting
you, gentlemen, and the forces you lead. I mean, there are a
million reasons to compliment you, but I will just throw out a
couple anecdotal ones.
The Navy, Admiral, with regard to the Eisenhower
deployment, the Carney, I got a report saying it shot down
close to 80 incoming missiles and drones fired by the Houthis.
I know they are heading home right now, but those sailors did
an amazing job.
The Marine Corps, General Mahoney, the full audit, I think
that is actually a really big deal and a great example.
Air Force, General Slife, the work that you did the last
year and a half, General Van Herck called it Super Bowl-level
actions up in Alaska, when we had these spy balloons and the
Russian Bear bombers coming in, and we were shooting down spy
balloons, intercepting them, intercepting Russian Bear bombers,
young, 25-year-old female F-22 pilots doing--I mean, the work
that was going on up there, which you make look so simple, was
remarkable.
General Mingus, I think you are giving pride and hope, just
that 155 millimeter ammo. Look, some of my colleagues here are
saying, ``Hey, our industrial base can't produce like we used
to.'' That is baloney, right. The Army is showing that right
now, the way you are taking that curve on the production of our
ammo is remarkable.
With the Space Force, General Guetlein, some of us were
skeptical, myself included, the way you have stood up. I think
a lot of people have a lot of pride in the Space Force. Your
uniforms are almost as sharp as the Marine Corps', so that is
another thing that I think is quite impressive. It is hard to
do that.
So thank you. There is a lot going on here that is very
important.
But I do want to get some of the challenges. Let me start,
General Mingus, with you and the Army's recruiting goals and
the struggle to meet those. One of the reasons the Army is
shrinking, which it is, is because we cannot get enough
Americans to volunteer. We are working on some of the issues.
Senator Blumenthal and I actually are working on issues of
access. We are probably going to legislate that, high schools
and other places, where we have much better, stronger, open
access for recruiters.
How are you feeling about that, General? What more can we
do? Are we finally kind of hitting the bottom and coming up? I
mean, if we keep missing recruiting goals at the level that
some of the services have been, that is going to be the
ultimate crisis because we cannot man our force.
General Mingus. Thank you, Senator. We acknowledge the last
2 years we missed the mark, and not by a little bit.
Senator Sullivan. Yes. The numbers were huge.
General Mingus. The Secretary and the Chief and the entire
Army have taken this on as a mission that we have to succeed,
for all the reasons you have pointed out. So our benchmarks
this year are 55,000 in the door and another 5,000 in the
delayed entry program for next year, and given the trajectories
we are on right now, we had a very good spring and we are
optimistic that we will meet those goals.
Senator Sullivan. So what did you do different? Like what
happened? What are the corrective measures that you can learn
from, that other services could learn from?
General Mingus. I think many of these lessons are
universal, but where I will start is the restructuring of our
recruiting command. We made it a direct report to the Army. We
are going to up-gun that to a three-star. We are
professionalizing our recruiting force, both on the warrant
officer side and the NCO [non-commissioned officer] side,
increasing the numbers that are actually in the field, looking
at their locations. Expanding the population is probably one of
the biggest things. Instead of focused on juniors and seniors
in high school we are expanding that into college age.
Senator Sullivan. Are you getting access to those
institutions, to your satisfaction, high schools and colleges?
General Mingus. We believe, for the most part, yes, sir.
There are some challenges in certain parts of the country, but
the receptiveness is getting better.
Then the last thing that we have done is what I mentioned
in my remarks, and that is the Future Soldiers Prep Course. We
have brought 18,000 through that program that would have not
otherwise been able to meet the standard. We bring them in, and
whether it is an academic or a cognitive or a physical issue,
and we bring them up to our standard before we let them come
through, and the folks that have gone through that program,
that 18,000, in excess of 90 percent of them have met the
standard on the back end of that.
Senator Sullivan. Good. Great. Well, look, if there is more
that we can do as we are looking to mark up the NDAA, let us
know.
Madam Chair, I have a bunch of other questions, but my time
has expired so I will turn it over to my colleagues.
Senator Hirono. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member
Sullivan. I will followup with you, General Mingus, on the
Future Soldier because I am intrigued with that. You say about
18,000 folks have come through. I spent some time down at Fort
Eustis, talking about this, and I was really impressed, maybe
18 months ago. Ninety percent were able to get to the standard
by the end of that course.
It has not been in place that long, but I hope we are going
to longitudinally follow this group to see what we learn about
retention. Did it not only enable them to meet the standard but
maybe prepare them to, hey, I really want to stick with this.
It is probably a little bit too early to draw conclusions about
that. Am I right about that?
General Mingus. You are, sir, and we are absolutely going
to track everyone, from a longitudinal perspective, just to
make sure we have not created another problem. So far the data
suggests that it is not. First term is on par with other first
termers, and so as a result we are considering the expansion,
instead of just doing it in South Carolina maybe expanding it
to other basic training locations.
Senator Kaine. Well, it will be interesting over time to
compare folks who went through Future Soldier with those who
did not, and see if there is a different kind of stickiness to
their desire to stay. So I will look forward to following that.
I know that many of the other services are watching carefully
what you are doing and maybe others are implementing too. So
thanks for that.
Here is an issue that I have raised with a number of you,
and we have talked in the past. I am really worried about the
inadequacy of the labor supply in our industrial base. You
know, the 45-day shipbuilding analysis that was done, Admiral
Kilby, you and I have talked about this work done by the SECNAV
[Secretary of the Navy] directed to look at why are we so late
on the Columbia, why are we so late on the Ford-class,
Virginia-class. There are a number of reasons, but the
workforce is a key one, and even when it is workforce plus
supply chain, often the challenge on the supply chain is the
workforce. So we see this really spread throughout, and I am
really nervous about it.
Here is what I am finding, though, that troubles me. Every
year, military recruiters turn away thousands of young
Americans who are disqualified from military service for one
reason or another, and I have had interactions with some in the
last 90 days, ``I wanted to serve my country, and I passed
through all the vetting and security check. But I had asthma in
my background,'' or ``I had something else in my background
that meant I was a no-go for entering the service.''
I said, ``Okay, when they tell you no, how did you feel?''
``I was really disappointed.'' ``And then did they say, hey
look, if you want to serve your country you can still serve
your country. Just because you cannot come into the uniformed
service there are DOD civilian positions. There is an
industrial base that are essentially in the foxhole with our
Active service, in terms of the critical nature.''
My interaction with people who have recently been turned
away is, no, they were given nothing other than an, ``I'm
sorry, we can't let you in.'' I would hope that our services
would direct patriotic people who want to serve this Nation,
who for one reason or another may not meet a qualification, I
would hope that they might be directed to other parts of our
defense ecosystem, because we need an awful lot of people. We
need the tens of thousands who exit military service every
year, who are going to go out into the big, wide world and do
anything. There are all kinds of opportunities for them to
continue serving. I think many of them know that, but an awful
lot of people, based on my son's experience when he was a
really green first lieutenant and had his first marine platoon,
and his sergeant came and said, ``I am retiring in 60 days.
What should I do to find a job?''
I mean, there ought to be ways to direct people into
filling up these positions serving our country, in the
industrial base or the DOD civilian side, and I do not know
that we are doing that. I just would encourage you to see if we
might be able to do that better. There is not a question there,
but it is an encouragement.
I do have a question about counter-UAS in my last minute.
We have been having some testimony and some hearings, some
open, some classified, about UAS challenges, and obviously they
are a threat in combat. But increasingly they are also a threat
to our installations, both at home and overseas.
Addressing this threat requires an awful lot of
coordination. If it is at home it is usually between a city or
county and a State and local law enforcement agency, and maybe
the DHS [Department of Homeland Security] or the FBI [Federal
Bureau of Investigation] as well as a base commander and
others. I worry a little bit that we are maybe not really
coordinating as we are thinking about how to deal with the UAS
threat around our own bases, both domestically and those that
are overseas, where you have a foreign government also to deal
with in terms of what you can do.
Are you satisfied with the degree of coordination that we
are seeing in trying to get after and solve this problem? Any
of you.
General Guetlein. Senator, I will answer that in 17
seconds, I can give you about 15 back because the answer is no,
not satisfied. The reason we are not satisfied is because
although the services coordinate effectively together and
leverage each other's capabilities, every single locale is its
own story. So there is no national approach to this counter-
small UAS issue. It is local issue by local issue.
Senator Kaine. I do not want to go over my time, but let me
ask one other question really quick. If there is somebody in
the Pentagon who I could grab by the shoulders and say, ``Hey,
you are responsible for this, the coordination part of it.
Admittedly it is complicated with all the levels, but you are
responsible for this. Tell me what we are doing to really
develop strategies.'' Who would I go to who is that person?
General Mingus. I could be one of them. Dr. Bill LaPlante,
Under Secretary of Defense for A&S, he and I co-chair the
session that kind of leads this on behalf of the Secretary of
Defense.
Senator Kaine. Okay.
General Mingus. He stood up a tiger team, and that tiger
team is still in place, Bill LaPlante and I, and there are a
couple other forums that do this, and all the services are part
of that forum that Bill and I co-chair. But we would love to
come back over and give you a deep dive on that, sir.
Senator Kaine. I would appreciate that. Thank you. Thanks,
Madam Chair.
Senator Hirono. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to
you and the Ranking Member for having this Subcommittee
hearing, and just to pursue the line of questioning that
Senator Sullivan began, I think this recruiting issue will
continue to challenge us, bedevil us, vex us, for years to
come, looking at the long-range trends and the attitudes among
young people. He and I are working to try to make high schools
more accessible to your recruiters, and it is in their
interests, our young people's interests, to know about what
great opportunities there are for careers--not just jobs, but
careers--in the military, and for their parents and their
teachers to understand it, as well. So I think we need to put
together a broader program, as Senator Sullivan and I have
discussed.
Just to ask a question about this, General Mahoney. Is the
Marine Corps still hitting its recruiting targets?
General Mahoney. We made mission last year. We will make
mission this year. The other part of gaining and maintaining a
skilled force is retention, and our retention mission is very,
very strong this year. For career marines we are over 100
percent, at 110 percent, and for first-term enlistments we are
in the mid 1990s. We will make those numbers. Interestingly and
importantly, the numbers that we are keeping have a 95 percent
specialty match against grade. So we are not keeping people
that are not in the specialties that we want, at the grade they
want.
So they are headwinds, and it is hard, and your recruiting
forces out there are working hard every day. But we will make
mission.
Senator Blumenthal. I have 3 minutes left. I have a big
question, which I would appreciate you answering in writing.
What have we learned from Ukraine? If you could give that
answer to me in writing. I would not have time, and I know we
would be putting you on the spot. I would appreciate you
addressing that issue to us in writing.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Mingus. From the conflict in Ukraine, we have
learned how the character of war is evolving due to new and
emerging technologies. Rapid innovation and integration of
emerging technologies provides a decisive advantage. In
Ukraine, the widespread use of unmanned aircraft systems and
electronic warfare challenge traditional concepts of maneuver
and make gaining and maintaining air superiority more
difficult. At the same time, modern technology has not replaced
requirements for signi.cant investments in personnel and
materiel to support successful large-scale combat operations
(LSCO).
We are using these lessons to inform how we modernize our
defense capabilities. Through Continuous Transformation, we are
accelerating change in our formations, equipment, and the way
we fight, while maintaining readiness. We are phasing out
programs and platforms that no longer meet the requirements of
today's combat environment and reinvesting across the Army's
modernization priorities. We are also investing in our
industrial base to meet the demands of LSCO, including
significant investment in our capacity to produce 155 mm
artillery rounds.
Admiral Kilby. In the Ukraine maritime domain, we have
observed that the enduring traditional missions of a maritime
force--sea control, sea denial, and maritime security to secure
the safe movement of one's own maritime trade and deny an
adversary's, persist. The enduring mission of a maritime force
to project power overseas--to provide support to land
operations from the sea persists as well. In sum, the enduring
requirement for a nation's combined arms naval force to
maintain freedom of maneuver in the maritime domain, to
flexibly and promptly project power or execute amphibious
operations against any adversary persist.
In the conduct of these missions--the means by which they
are accomplished however has changed. In this regard we have
observed the following trends:
Advanced Conventional Weapons: We observe and
note increased threats to surface ships from advanced
conventional weapon systems with increased range and accuracy--
this includes air, ground, and submarine launched, cruise and
ballistic missiles, including hypersonic and nuclear capable--
in large numbers. We remain alert to these increasing threats
and continue to improve our collective U.S. joint systems and
innovate to defeat these advanced threat capabilities.
Uncrewed and Semi-Autonomous Weapons: We observe
and note increased threats to surface ships from asymmetric
systems--uncrewed and semi-autonomous surface, subsurface, and
air platforms--in large numbers. To date, Ukrainian combat
systems, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), have
proven capable of defeating this emerging capability--
persistent low signature attack, but frequently at a cost of
limited, high value, munitions. We remain fully alert to this
threat and continue to improve our systems and innovate to
defeat this emerging asymmetric capability.
Moreover, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has
reinforced our view that asymmetric, autonomous capabilities
play an increasing a role modern maritime warfare. In contrast
to highly capable, multi-mission capital ships, with advanced
weapon systems required to project power and exert sea control
across distant maritime areas, Ukraine's successful use of
inexpensive, uncrewed, single use, single mission, systems to
attrite and deny the Russian Federation Navy use of the Black
Sea, has demonstrated that there is a role for asymmetric,
uncrewed, semi-autonomous, systems in certain conflict
contexts.
Persistent Surveillance and Targeting: We observe
and expect increased susceptibility of surface ships and
aircraft to detection, tracking, and targeting from
increasingly automated, numerous, and persistent, Intelligence,
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (ISR-T)
capabilities. It is these supporting--companion capabilities
that enable an adversary's use of advanced conventional weapons
systems, and all types of unmanned and autonomous systems. Our
combat systems, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs),
will have to mitigate this capability or otherwise minimize its
impact.
Electromagnetic Spectrum: We observe and note the
reality on the Ukrainian battlefield that electromagnetic (EM)
interference is pervasive--it is a permanent feature of the
modern battlefield and combat operations. Our combat systems,
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), must mitigate this
capability or otherwise minimize its impact. The understanding
and expertise necessary to use the EM spectrum, and to deny it
to adversaries, needs to reside broadly across the general
force.
Munitions Inventory and Combat Expenditures: The
Navy has supported war efforts in Ukraine and provided
munitions through the use of Presidential Drawdown Authority
(PDA). This has resulted in the transfer of critical munitions
and impacted Navy inventories of key surface-to-air, air-to-
air, and air-to-surface weapons. This effort has highlighted
the limitations of current stockpiles and the defense
industrial base's capacity to replenish them at scale and
speed. To ensure readiness for potential future conflicts, the
Navy and the Nation must continue to invest in expanding the
munitions industrial base.
Early Intel assessments allowed the Navy to be
well ahead of potential request for forces from USEUCOM.
Communication between the service, Joint Staff, and USEUCOM was
extremely efficient to the point the Secretary of Defense
Orders Book (SDOB) was playing catchup. Regarding readiness,
Navy exhausted readiness through unscheduled deployments and
extensions of already deployed force elements. The mission of
``reassuring our partners and allies'' in support of Ukraine
impacted our readiness and force generation for fiscal year
2025 to fiscal year 2027. As we respond to crisis, we need to
ensure we reassess our force allocation decisions, especially
those involving stressed force elements, to determine if
accepting more risk today outweighs the benefits of preserving
readiness of the force for tomorrow.
Vignette: At the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict,
the Ukrainian Navy calculated an aggregate ``general ratio'' of
Ukrainian to Russian maritime force as 1 to 12. (This number is
a rough aggregate representing maritime force that includes
surface ships, coastal missiles, sea-based-missiles, and cruise
missiles.) Despite Russian numerical and technological
superiority, through creative development and employment of
asymmetric systems--unmanned air, surface, and subsurface
platforms, The Ukrainians were able to destroy or damage a
large percentage of the Russian Black Sea Fleet--17 combatants,
including 9 key surface and 1 subsurface combatant, to
effectively deny Russia sea control in the northwest and
western areas of the Black Sea. The Ukrainians have neutralized
the Russian Black Sea Fleet thru applied intelligence,
patience, planning, and asymmetric methods.
General Mahoney. The War in Ukraine validates many of the
foundational assumptions the Marine Corps used in its initial
Force Design (FD) efforts in 2019. We made five broad
assumptions as part of our FD effort. First, we assessed that
the rise of the precision strike regime had arrived. The
proliferation of cheap drones for ISR and missiles to both non-
State actors (Houthis, Hezbollah, HAMAS) and non-peer
adversaries (Iran and DPRK), it would be possible to achieve
greater effects on a modern battlefield at a lower expenditure/
volume of munitions. As consequence, we chose to pursue medium
and long-range precision fires, as well as invest heavily in
our ISR capabilities. Those ISR efforts included providing
small UAS capabilities all the way down to the squad level.
Second, we knew that the proliferation of ISR systems would
make every battlespace more transparent, and that the
reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance fight would become
more important. As marines, we have long asserted that our
purpose is to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy through
fire and maneuver. Due to the proliferation of cheap ISR, we
assumed that the first verb--locate, would take on increasing
importance in any fight. This ability to locate would also
include an ability to prevent the adversary from doing the
same. The War in Ukraine has validated this assumption in
spades, while at the same time surprising us in some ways, to
include the use of commercial space-based systems.
Third, we assumed that a modern battlespace lethality would
be prolific due to the propagation of one-way attack drones and
loitering munitions. Consequently, we prioritized close combat
lethality to include the procurement of loitering munitions
(drones) for our companies, platoons, and even squads in 2020.
Our observations from the War in Ukraine validate this
assumption as well. We are having to change our service level
training to ensure our maneuver units are prepared to operate
under the assumption that we are continuously observable.
Fourth, at the outset of our FD effort, we made a broad
overarching assumption that our warfighting philosophy of
maneuver warfare remained valid. Once again, the War in Ukraine
has validated this assumption; however, in many ways that we
did not anticipate. As a marine, you understand that there are
two foundational elements to Maneuver Warfare--one grounded in
Liddell Hart (attacking where you're least expected) and the
other in John Boyd (out-pacing the adversary's decisionmaking
cycle). The War in Ukraine has demonstrated beyond any doubt
that Boyd was right, and that advantage can be achieved by
one's ability to make decisions faster than the adversary, and
on a modern battlefield--complete kill chains and kill webs
faster than your adversary.
The one thing that we have learned that we didn't
anticipate is that the speed of adaptation and learning
necessary on a modern battlefield is just as important within
the context of
Boyd's understanding of Maneuver Warfare. As we have
witnessed with the prolific use of Electronic Warfare to
counter drones or mitigate the effects of precision fires,
adaptation at the speed of relevance is essential on a modern
battlefield. This also applies to the successful application of
sea denial using low-profile teams and small, low cost,
attritable capabilities, against large, traditional naval
forces. As has been well-documented, the move-countermove cycle
is now down to weeks in Ukraine. As we think about our own
efforts in recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to
counter-IEDs, that cycle took months, if not years. That is no
longer acceptable. To adapt we are making strides to innovate
and adapt at pace.
The depth of magazine required to support offensive and
defensive operations like those in Ukraine is simply something
beyond the comprehension of most in our joint force. While the
importance of the depth of magazine should not have been a new
observation or new lesson learned, the war in Ukraine has
provided a much-needed reminder.
General Slife. The dominant lesson learned is that air
superiority remains essential to achieving decisive military
advantage in conflict. Both Russia and Ukraine have thus far
failed to achieve air superiority throughout the war, held at
bay by substantial integrated air defense systems and limited
prioritization through ground force-centric military command
structures. Air parity has forced both Russia and Ukraine to
rely on stand-off strikes, which are unable to produce
operational to strategic impacts at scale. Additionally, the
war in Ukraine also demonstrates the need for significant
materiel and capability requirements and reinvigorates the
discussion on appropriate Service resourcing. Winning future
conflicts requires an appropriate mix of exquisite and low-cost
capabilities, resilient air base networks, and sufficient
munition inventory to enable strategic success.
General Guetlein. USSF has learned three primary lessons
since Russia's war in Ukraine. First, we cannot underState the
important role of the commercial space sector, with the
complexities and challenges that go with it, in modern
conflict. For example, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) unmanned
aerial systems have provided both combatants cost-effective,
attritable, asymmetric effects with irreplaceable advantages
for warfighters on the ground.
Second, the prevalence of low-cost, space-based remote
sensing has exposed the changing nature of battlefield
transparency. Space-based remote sensing provides electro-
optical and radar imagery which increases battlefield
transparency for all combatants. Supplementing government owned
and operated remote sensing architectures with commercial
services improves revisit rates and creates more persistent
coverage of every part of the battlefield.
Third, the rapid evolution of electromagnetic and cyber
warfare has significant impact on the modern battlespace.
Potential combatants across the globe have been paying close
attention to the rapid advancements of offensive and defensive
electromagnetic and cyber capabilities, detailing which
electronic attacks have been most effective and against which
systems, and where improvements might be made in potential
future conflicts.
Let me ask you, Admiral Kilby, I am intensely interested in
submarine production. I know Senator Kaine shares that
interest. We have reduced, according to the Navy's proposal,
the number of submarines per year from two to one. I think that
reduction, without any disrespect, is unacceptable. I do not
know whether the Navy went along with it. I understand all the
complexities of internal consideration.
But I know the Secretary of the Navy has focused on
workforce as a major constraint. So I am interested that in
your testimony you do not really address that issue in detail.
There is a sentence or paragraph on page 4 that says, ``To this
end, we are investing in public infrastructure in the
industrial base, aligned with the DOD National Defense
Industrial Strategy. The Navy is in the midst of a generational
change,'' et cetera.
You know, one thing I did on the Armed Services Committee
was to insert an apprenticeship program--this was 5 years ago--
and other kinds of training. My colleagues at the time said to
me, ``This is education. This should be in the Department of
Education.'' I said, ``No. It is a matter of national
security.''
So if that is the constraint on our building two submarines
a year, we need to do something fairly dramatic about it. I
know you are operating within the DOD National Defense
Industrial Strategy, and then the Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Program. But the focus here seems to be mainly on
capital investment, recapitalizing dry docks, et cetera.
I want to see something on training and something major,
something that meets this moment, because whether it is
munitions or artillery or submarines, we have a real challenge
ahead.
Admiral Kilby. Senator, thank you. I agree with you. The
investments in the submarine industrial base are significant.
Thank you for the supplemental. That is $3.4 billion. Our
request that you are reviewing now is $2.3 billion in fiscal
year 2025, and almost $9 billion across the FYDP. That is not
just buying parts and things. It is workforce development. It
is supplier base. It is all the things we think we need to do
to bolster that base to produce those submarines.
Our goal is to produce a Columbia and 2.33 Virginia-class
submarines by 2028. In order to do that we feel we need to make
these investments.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, thank you for your answer. Thank
you for your service. Thank you all for your dedication and
your great work for our country, and I will be following up on
a number of these issues. Thanks so much.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. I am going to call on myself for
a second round of 5-minute questions, and then at that point I
believe votes will be called. Then I will turn the hearing over
to Senator Sullivan, and as long as all of you are here, he can
continue with the questions that he has.
I have mentioned this before to others who have testified
before the full Committee, but Admiral Kilby, I do have
significant concerns about the cost overruns associated with
the replacement of Dry Dock 3 in Hawaii. It is a critically
important project, and no sooner did I speak at one of the
important segments of the construction that I got a cost
increase of almost $900 million, over $400 million of which was
due to poor planning on the Navy's part, meaning that $400
million was due to the need to shorten the amount of time that
it would take for this dry dock to be completed by almost 1
year.
I would say that that is poor planning. So Admiral Kilby,
what assurances can you give me and this Committee that the
Navy has cost overruns under control and that accountability
steps are being taken to address this issue?
Admiral Kilby. Chair Hirono, thanks for that question. I
share your concern. I am part of the SIOP [Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Program] Oversight Committee. We
meet quarterly. To your specific question about Hawaii
supervision we have an officer in charge of construction
activity at Pearl Harbor now in place to watch the QA and
execution of that performance of that work on Dry Dock 5.
I do think it is a big effort, a once-in-a-century effort,
to update these dry docks. They are complex. We are applying
lessons learned. We are bringing industry in earlier to make
sure we understand their voice and that is captured in our
estimates to you. That is from Portsmouth applied to Pearl
Harbor.
So I cannot assure you that it will not happen again. I can
assure you that you have my attention and focus on it to try to
ensure that this program is delivered as we would like it to be
delivered, and at the cost that we predicted it to be delivered
at.
Senator Hirono. I know that a large part of that cost is
attributable to other things such as supply chain issues, et
cetera, but to have almost half of that increase amount
attributable to lack of planning is very, very concerning. So I
am asking for some level of assurance that that will be
attended to.
I am hard pressed to identify a single large project that
the Navy has undertaken that has come in on time and on budget.
If you can identify a project that has met those requirements I
would like to know what they are. But in the meantime, for Ms.
Maurer, do you have anything to add from the GAO perspective,
on what is going on with this massive cost overrun, as far as I
am concerned, on Dry Dock 5 in Hawaii?
Ms. Maurer. Yes, absolutely, Madam Chair. We have some open
recommendations to the Navy that they fully adopt some of the
best practices that GAO has established over many years on cost
estimation and scheduling large projects like the project at
Pearl. Our most recent report on the SIOP effort last year, we
had a couple of new recommendations that I think would be
helpful. One is encouraging the Navy to take a look at design
and risk analysis throughout the lifecycle of large projects
like what is going on at Pearl, as well as to ensure that they
are seeking out the opportunity for independent cost estimates,
as well.
Senator Hirono. Admiral Kilby, are you taking those
considerations to heart?
Admiral Kilby. Yes we are, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. I will certainly followup.
For General Mingus, the Army is negotiating renewals for
several training areas and land leases in Hawaii, very
critical. Pohakuloa comes to mind, and if we do not negotiate
that land lease successfully I think that it would very much
compromise the Army's and the Marines Corps' ability to conduct
these very needed exercises.
But one of the requirements that I put into last year's
NDAA is there should be an official designated responsible for
coordinating the lease negotiations and reaching out to
particularly the Native Hawaiian community. As far as I know,
such a person has not been designated, even if I believe the
time has passed. Can you update me on whether or not a person
has been identified, and if not, when is that going to happen?
General Mingus. Ma'am, the bottom line is I think it is
going to be very soon. The DepSecDef directed the standup of
the cell itself in January. They have not identified a lead,
but I think it is very close.
But we, in the Army, are taking this very seriously. As you
know, General Flynn has been very engaged since the beginning,
held several town halls. We have had the initial environmental
impact studies done. He has got another town hall coming up
this month. We are attuned to the cultural sensitivities of
this particular issue, absolutely, and we also are attuned to
the fact that 2029 seemed a long way away, but it is going to
take us every day between now and then to get us there. We look
forward to working with you on this, and your team, as well.
Senator Hirono. I cannot make it any clearer how important
this aspect of the negotiations is, especially if there are
groups, particularly I would say the Native Hawaiian community,
for whom that mountain, on which Pohakuloa is located, is a
sacred mountain to them. To not take that into consideration is
going to be, in my view, at our risk.
Admiral Kilby, the Navy submitted a legislative proposal to
Congress seeking authority to send up to six U.S-based ships a
year to foreign yards, i.e., in Japan, for repairs, to prepare
for potential contingencies. While I am in favor of keeping the
ships we have in optimal conditions, I think it is shortsighted
to outsource maintenance, especially when the Navy's own
shipyards are in such disrepair, why SIOP is so important.
For example, the surface ship repair piers in Pearl Harbor
are in poor shape, with only 4 of the 13 berths available to
conduct ship maintenance. I would think that we should be
bringing those berths up to par as opposed to sending U.S.-
based ships to other places to be maintained.
Instead of asking for authority to do overseas maintenance
on U.S.-based ships, why isn't the Navy simply sending the
ships already based overseas into these foreign yards for
maintenance and repair? My understanding is there are dozens of
ships already, for example, in Japan, that could be repaired.
Why ask to have ships that are in the U.S. sent off to these
foreign places to be repaired? Can you respond to that, Admiral
Kilby?
Admiral Kilby. Yes, I can, Chair Hirono. Thank you. The
concept behind the legislative proposal is to try to understand
where we have places outside the United States in time of war
that we could rely on for the repair of our ship. The general
concept is short duration availabilities for those ships that
are on deployment from CONUS, not to at all diminish the work
we need to do at our domestic yards and for work packages.
So I do not see any impact. If anything, we can get some
work done and do more work, deeper, when those ships return to
their normal schedules. So there is no desire here to impact
our own industrial base at all and their ability to repair our
ships. We would like to know, though, who our partner nations
and their repair facilities are, who we can trust to send our
ships should we need to do that. So it is meant to just explore
and understand where we have partnerships.
For your specific question about forward-deployed ships,
they deploy on a different cycle. It is called a patrol cycle,
both in Japan and Rota. So they typically go out for 3 months
and come back for 3 months. They have an ecosystem within their
own shipyards, whether they are in Japan or Rota, to take care
of those ships. So we understand how those work right now, from
a forward-deployed naval force perspective.
Senator Hirono. Well, frankly, before I would be convinced
that we should authorize these six ships, so I would definitely
like to engage with you further so that we can be on the same
page. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair. Admiral, I want
to continue following on shipbuilding. You know, the Secretary
of the Navy's statement from April 9th was kind of a shocker.
All four of the major programs, including the first Columbia-
class sub, the new block of Virginia-class subs, the USS
Enterprise carrier class, and the first Constellation-class
frigate are all several years behind in terms of shipbuilding.
That is kind of as bad as it gets, in my view, particularly
when, as I mentioned in my opening statement, the PLA [People's
Liberation Army] is cranking out 10 to 12 high-end ships a
year.
So more specifically, only 66 percent of the attack
submarine fleet in the U.S. Navy is available for operations.
Amphibious ship readiness is at 32 percent, which is stunning.
That impacts your United States Marine Corps. The latest fiasco
with the USS Boxer deployment underscores a huge problem with
amphibs.
So my question, Admiral, and I know you and I have talked
about it, let's assume there are no cost restraints. Let's
assume there is no--I mean, we have workforce issues--budget
limitations. If you had a magic wand, and you are very smart
and have a lot of experience in this world, what would you do
to kind of start to fix this problem?
One of the things I was disappointed in, when the Secretary
puts out this statement, shocking statement to everybody--by
the way, great statement if you are an American adversary, like
holy cow, look at that. These guys can't do anything right. But
there was not a plan to fix it. So if you had a magic wand,
what would you do to fix it?
Here is the reason why I am asking the question. This
Committee, we just had a strategy session this morning, all the
Republican Senators, we are ready to do big stuff--new
shipyards. You know, I happen to think the idea that Senator
Hirono was critical of you on might make sense during wartime.
But what do we need to do? Because we are in kind of
willingness mode. Everybody sees this as a crisis. But we need
leadership from the Navy, and to be honest, I do not think we
have it.
So what would be the top three or four things? Again, no
budget constraints, no nothing. Given your experience, here is
what we should do.
Admiral Kilby. So two different parts to this question or
this answer for you, Senator. Thank you for that. There is a
ship production piece of that----
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
Admiral Kilby.--and there is a ship repair piece to that.
Senator Sullivan. Correct.
Admiral Kilby. So let's start out with the ship production
piece. That is what the submarine industrial base investments
are designed to get after, and they will also affect our repair
business, as well. But specifically, that will address our
nuclear force. Those are what nuclear investments are made to
get after. We also have a surface ship investment, where we
have invested almost $1 billion to try to get suppliers and
vendors to help our conventional surface ship, as well.
You have highlighted the issues, at least at some of the
production yards, our workforce, and I would say experienced
workforce. In some yards we have a very green workforce, so we
have lost years of experience through a number of things and we
have to build that up, which comes from workforce development
and the investments we are trying to make.
So I think there is a piece of that where we just have to
make those investments and let them take, and monitor and watch
it take hold and see if it is trending the way we think it
should trend.
From the repair perspective, we need to get after the
business of how we do shipyard maintenance, both in our private
yards and in our public yards.
Senator Sullivan. Do we need more shipyards, either private
or public shipyards, for the U.S. Navy?
Admiral Kilby. I think it would be helpful to have--this is
an indirect answer--I am not sure if I need more shipyards to
make ships. I need more yards that can outsource work if those
shipyards cannot handle it, and we are doing----
Senator Sullivan. On the maintenance side or on the
production side?
Admiral Kilby. I think both. I think both, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Okay.
Admiral Kilby. I think some of those yards could help our
nuclear community, as well, as long as they are qualified and
pass standards.
Senator Sullivan. How about the disaggregation? I have been
digging into shipbuilding a lot, as much as I can, my team has.
But, I mean, does it make sense to build subs and carriers? I
mean, should our yards be, hey, this is only subs, this is only
carriers, this is only frigates. Can we do that? Is that kind
of specialization helpful in terms of the ability to crank out
ships?
Admiral Kilby. I am not sure. I will have to take that
question and get back to you, Senator. You know, Huntington
Ingalls in Pascagoula does a great job. They have a wonderful
plant, where they are able to produce multiple ships. So it can
be done.
[The information referred to follows:]
Admiral Kilby. The foundation of a healthy shipbuilding
industrial base remains stable, executable acquisition profiles
that promote private sector development and retention of
highly-skilled workforces and investments in world-class
manufacturing and shipbuilding facilities, while allowing the
shipbuilders to maintain a reasonable return on investment. The
current limiting factor in the shipbuilding industrial base and
associated supply chain is the lack of a skilled labor pool to
adequately staff shipyards, original equipment manufacturers,
suppliers, ship designers, and associated supply chains. The
Navy is focused on growing and modernizing the shipbuilding and
repair base as a national security imperative through
thoughtful acquisition strategies, targeted industrial base
investments, increased collaboration with both Government and
industry, and working with our allies and partners to identify
and leverage opportunities to share best practices and promote
foreign investment into our Nation's existing shipbuilding
industry.
I think there is a real estate piece to that, the size of
the yard and their ability to be able to handle multiple lines,
and are they facilitized to use computer-aided design. I think
that is ultimately helpful to them, as well.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Well, I will tell you this,
Admiral. There is a lot of interest in helping the Navy, a lot.
If you guys have big ideas, my own view is this Committee would
embrace them, big ideas. Because we have got to get by this. If
the Chinese keep cranking out 10 to 12 ships a year, and we are
struggling the way the Secretary, in his statement, put it out,
we are going to be in a real big hurt locker, if we are not
already in one.
Let me ask General Mahoney a related question. The ARG/MEU
[Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit] team is one
of the most important elements of American readiness. I
mentioned the amphibious readiness at 32 percent. I mean, holy
cow. No ARG has been ready on time in the past 2 years in the
INDOPACOM theater, our most important theater. Again, that
makes the Chinese happy.
Then, General, the Marine Corps has said, in terms of force
design, the marine littoral regiments need about nine LSMs per
MLR. The Navy, I think, is on budget to produce eight LSMs by
the early 2030s. So that is a giant disconnect with what you
guys say you need in terms of force design and what the Navy is
producing.
Publicly, the Marine Corps has been saying, well, the LSM
procurement plan seems fine, but the LSM procurement plan, from
my math, does not seem to add up at all. If you need nine LSMs
for each marine littoral regiment and there are three marine
littoral regiments, that is 27 LSMs. The Navy right now is
saying you will get 8 by the mid 2030s. So isn't that
undermining the amphibious readiness in terms of the Marine
Corps' new force design, as well, General?
General Mahoney. Senator, thanks. The LSM, as you rightly
noted, is a key enabler for the movement, mobility, and
sustainability of the MLR in the littorals. It is late to need.
The initial procurement year was supposed to be 2022. The way
it is programmed right now is a single ship in 2025, one in
2026, and then two each in 2027, 2028, and 2029, for a total of
eight. You are correct. We will not see critical mass until the
early 1930s in pursuit of our requirement of 35.
Between then and now, what we have done to fill that gap,
vice just stare at it, have invested in leased vessels,
invested in alternate platforms, expeditionary fast transport--
--
Senator Sullivan. But those are clearly suboptimal to the
LSM. Correct?
General Mahoney. They are not ideal, Senator. As a bridging
solution they are not ideal.
Senator Sullivan. I mean, I appreciate the Marine Corps
getting on the issue and having a bridging solution, but, you
know, as I have said in many hearings--and I am going to ask
about force design here in a second--but if the Navy is not
investing in force design, Marine Corps force design will fail.
I think that is just a fact. I just worry that on a basic
concept as important as LSMs, as it relates to marine littoral
regiments, it does not look like the Navy is invested.
General Mahoney. We have the investment in this budget,
sir, but I will say we need to go faster. As you pointed out in
your opening statement, we cannot have our adversaries putting
10, 12 ships in the water, and we are worried about building,
you know, less than that.
Senator Sullivan. So General, let me pivot directly to some
of the Marine Corps force design issues. The Marine Corps
recently decided to reactivate HMLA-269, which was deactivated
in 2022, in accordance with initial force design plans. One of
the major criticisms of force design was General Berger's
``divest now to invest later'' strategy, where there was a very
significant divestment of proven combat power for future
weapons systems to come on board, leaving a gap in combat
capability.
General Smith has said that he would recalibrate force
design to meet emerging threats. Obviously, this HMLA-269
decision is a recalibration, which I think it is good to see
him doing that.
What other examples of recalibration can you provide the
Committee with, with regard to force design, that the Marine
Corps is either undertaking or contemplating, and are you still
focused on three MLRs or is that now going to two?
General Mahoney. Senator, one of the parts of the force
design thesis was to take your assumptions, challenge them,
validate them, wargame them, test them, learn from them, and
refine. In the case of HMLA, which went from seven squadrons,
originally envisioned to five, and then we adjusted in that
calibration of our assumption cut us too thin, back to six,
four on the West Coast and two on the East Coast.
We are looking at the same for a soft support capacity with
our heavy lift, when CH-53K comes aboard.
Senator Sullivan. So that is another force design
recalibration that you are looking to add back, heavy helo lift
capability that was cut as part of force design?
General Mahoney. As part of inventory management, yes,
Senator.
Senator Sullivan. What about your F-35 cuts that were
pretty dramatic?
General Mahoney. Just as a matter of clarity, none of the
programs were cut. We have bought the HMLA program, 369
airplanes, 189 AHs, 160, I think H-1s. We have bought out the
V-22 program, we have bought out KC-130s, and we will buy out
200 CH-53Ks. What we are doing within that buy is managing the
inventory based on global force management, based on mag cap
training, based on individual and organic training, making sure
that we can make that demand and managing the fleet
accordingly. We did not divest any tails, so to speak.
Senator Sullivan. Right, but they were not going out to the
fleet, or some of them were not going out to the fleet.
General Mahoney. That would be correct. The fleet would
drive the demand, and then we would adjust the inventory to
meet that demand. We started flying F-18s, and they were
engineered for 5,000 hours.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask real quick. The Boxer, how
significant is that to West Coast MEU/ARG readiness?
General Mahoney. All the big decks are critical. We are out
of balance right now. The statute calls for 10 and we have 9.
When Bougainville delivers we will have 10.
Senator Sullivan. Okay, and have you been in contact with
your Navy comrades here on this very critical topic, that is
the Navy-Marine Corps team?
General Mahoney. Yes, constant contact, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Let me ask General Mingus. I am
going to get back to you, 11th Airborne Division, as far as I
can tell, and maybe you can provide me an update, morale is
good. We love this unit in Alaska. One of the things, though,
that I have been a little bit concerned about is the MTOW
recognition of the higher costs of operating in the Arctic,
just across the board, the ability to do anything, the ability
to have weapons systems that work in 20 below, the ability to
have the equipment, the gear, snow tires, right. I mean, these
are all big issues, and they cost more.
So you and I have talked about it. I just want to kind of,
in this hearing, get your commitment that as you are looking at
the cost requirements, the MTOW of the 11th Airborne, that it
is going to reflect the additional costs that would be
appropriate for the operations that this unit is doing in
Alaska, and don't just cookie cut, hey, you have got the 11th
Airborne in Alaska, the 82d Airborne on the East Coast, we are
going to make the costs the same. Well, they are not the same.
To have success in Alaska it is probably going to cost more
with that airborne unit. Can you comment on that, General?
General Mingus. Yes, sir. Thank you. Not only do you have
my commitment to you but I also have no choice because the
Chief of Staff of the Army has directed me to fix it, so that
is my goal.
Senator Sullivan. Good.
General Mingus. That is one of the reasons why I personally
went up there, here just a little while ago.
Senator Sullivan. Would you agree with my assessment that
the costs of just operating in that environment is not going to
be what the 82d Airborne deals with?
General Mingus. Yes, sir, and it is going to be more
because they still have to be able to go fight in the jungle
too. So they have to have equipment to go to the Philippines,
or go to Japan, or go to South Korea, but they also have to be
able to operate in Alaska. So they are going to have a very
unique MTOW, and it is not just the equipment. It is the
mechanics and all the other things that go with it to sustain
it, to maintain it, and ensure that it operates in that
environment.
So it is physically in the building with me now. We are
working that. When I was up there I told Brian Eiffler, who had
personally sent it to me. I have got it, because we do not want
this to be a bottom-up. We want it to be a top-down driven
process, and that is what we are doing now, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. How is morale up there, when
you were there with that unit? I think General Eiffler has done
a great job up there, but, you know, we have had this very
high-level rash of suicides, shockingly high, that you never
want to jinx it but it seems to be under control. Do you think
that is because these soldiers have a really good mission,
really good training, you know, a really good unit. The 11th
Airborne is a very storied unit that you guys reactivated,
which I think was great.
What is your sense of the morale there, and do you think we
have--again, you never want to jinx it, but do you think we
have that very troubling issue of high suicides rates more
under control in Alaska?
General Mingus. Sir, the data suggests the trends are all
moving in the right direction, and I do not want to over-
characterize based on a single visit, but my sense, when I was
up there, is that that unit is in very good shape. Probably the
single biggest thing, beyond the leadership, which is the
biggest thing, the leadership up there has really taken ahold
of this and owned it. But just the conversion into a mission
that they can actually accomplish, as they move from a striker
to a light brigade, they have embraced that. The climate and
the culture associated with a light infantry brigade, it really
fits much, much better for them up there.
Senator Sullivan. It is tough training, hard training, and
then that headquarters now is a warfighting headquarters versus
an admin headquarters. Correct?
General Mingus. That is correct, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Thank you very much.
General Slife, I wanted to followup on our conversation
just the other day. I appreciated all the time you gave me 2
days ago in my office. On the 18th Fighter Interceptor
Squadron, I appreciate, again, the pressures that the Air Force
is under. As I mentioned, that is actually a pretty motivated
dual mission, with some great airmen, who are doing great work.
Both as Red Air for the JPARC [Joint Pacific Alaska Range
Complex] RED Flag exercises, and then they are going out and
intercepting Bear bombers, which does not make the news down
here in the Lower 48. But the Russians are doing Bear bomber
runs against Alaska every month now, sometimes with armed
escort fighters, and your young men and women are going out and
intercepting these guys, that unit.
How are we optimizing that, given the cuts that the Air
Force had? I just was chatting with General Nahom this morning.
The plans that seem to make a lot of sense, even though you are
trying to get rid of these F-16s, can we be assured that that
unit will stay there, in that dual-capacity role, and do you
think that is the appropriate dual-capacity role? As you know,
it frees up our fifth-gen fighters to do the high-end fight as
opposed to sitting alert, you know, F-22 sitting alert mission,
getting ready to go intercept Russian Bear bombers in Alaska.
But what is your assessment on that, General?
General Slife. Senator, we think it is a winning idea. We
intend to keep that unit there, and I expect that we will be
able to retain 12 aircraft there. I believe what you and I
talked about was 10, which we judged to be the minimum. But,
you know, budgets are a snapshot in time, and as we have gotten
more experience operating that squadron in the new mission we
believe that we can maintain it at 12 aircraft, and we will
continue to evaluate what the right size of that unit is in
future budget cycles. But yes, we intend to keep it there.
Senator Sullivan. Great. You know, I asked Secretary
Kendall about the KC-135 down at Eielson. You know, I have been
talking about this issue for a long time with the KC-46s. I am
a big fan of Secretary Kendall. Surprisingly, to me, in his
posture hearing he seemed to walk that commitment back a little
bit, which kind of surprised me.
I take very much your good counsel you provided me in our
meeting recently about, hey, this is an all-in and we have got
to make sure we deal with the housing and schools. I get that.
I think it is a really important point that you were raising,
and I have already raised that with some of our leadership back
home in Alaska. But we are going to keep working the housing
issue. That is really important, and we understand that.
Can you reaffirm that commitment on the KC-135? That is an
important issue. It strategically makes complete sense, as you
know, given how strategically positioned Alaska is. Again, I
was a little surprised Secretary Kendall, who had made several
commitments to me on this, seemed to be walking that commitment
back in his posture hearing, which I am concerned about.
General Slife. Yes, sir, I can. I can reaffirm the
commitment. We have already moved one additional KC-135 there,
and as soon as we can work through some of the infrastructure
issues and so forth, as we talked about, remain committed to
putting the other three there, as well, just as soon as we can.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you on that.
General Mahoney, I want to go back to force design. You
know, one element that was moving forward under General Berger,
then it kind of got dropped--I am sorry, under General Neller--
and then it kind of got dropped, was this idea of kind of much
more high-end Marine Corps training in Alaska. I had a good
phone call with General Smith the other day. As you know, he
and I were planning on going up to Alaska to walk the ground.
But in terms of training, which is second to none in my
State, the ability to do littoral regiment training on the
Aleutian Island chain, that is a very real-world mission. You
have got Russian and Chinese joint naval task force coming off
the coast of Alaska the last two summers, big ones, 12-ship
joint naval task force last summer. Putting an MLR on the
Aleutian Islands with capable weapons systems to take out
Chinese and Russian ships would have been nice to have. The
ability to train year-round--at one point General Berger told
me you can only train 6 months out of the year in Alaska. I am
still wondering what 6 months he was talking about. It is the
best training in the world. You have joint forces that would
love to train with you. JPARC is the best air training probably
on Planet Earth that you can do combined and joint operations.
The Marine Corps, in my view, certainly needs to get back
to cold weather training. Of course, we do some in Norway, but
high-end stuff you can do in Alaska, and then you are close,
right, to Japan, to Korea, to Taiwan, if the balloon goes up.
So my discussion with General Smith was really positive on
that.
Can you give me an update, from your perspective, on the
potential of this issue? Like I said, it was something that
seemed to have a lot of momentum under General Neller. It was
not even something I was involved in. It was just what the
Marine Corps was doing. Then it lost momentum under General
Berger. I think it makes sense, strategically, training-wise,
for the Corps to look hard at this.
General Mahoney. Senator, thanks, and I agree with you. As
a fighter pilot who did the old Cope Thunder days of old in
Alaska, then Red Flag, Northern Edge, Arctic Response, that
training range is outstanding.
General Smith has reenergized our ops section, and I think
he is committed to sending our PP&O [Plans, Policies &
Operations], DC Aviation, and importantly, Marine Forces
Reserve, to look at our Reserve component and how they can also
align to exercising in Alaska.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Well, I look forward to working
with you and General Smith and the entire leadership team on
that issue, so thank you on that.
General Guetlein, I wanted to mention, in terms of the
facilities and infrastructure that are crucial to the Space
Force mission, I know that you are in the process of, and I
think you have already handed off the Long Range Discrimination
Radar System at Clear Air Force Base in Alaska, that is now
fully Space Force. What do you need from the Congress, if
anything, on transitioning not just those kinds of facilities,
the ones in Alaska, but also any other place in the U.S. that
relates to infrastructure to the Space Force's needs, that may
have been or might still be Air Force infrastructure, and how
is that going?
General Guetlein. Senator, we have taken responsibility for
all of our FSRM and MILCON globally.
Senator Sullivan. So are you done with that, like that
transition with the Air Force is complete?
General Guetlein. From a funding perspective and the
ownership, yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Including Clear?
General Guetlein. Including Clear. But we still rely on the
Air Force for the non-core space functions. So our CE members
are Air Force members.
Senator Sullivan. Do you plan on changing that, or that is
just going to be a joint kind of capability that you are now
sharing with the Air Force?
General Guetlein. Sir, for the foreseeable future that will
be the arrangement and the relationship that we have with the
United States Air Force. When we stood up the Space Force we
intentionally stood it up to be lean and flat. We only took on
the core space functions of space operations, intelligence,
cyber, and force modernization.
Senator Sullivan. Can I ask, one issue I have raised it
with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and I just want to
put it on your radar. My understanding is that the deployments
still out at Clear are 1 year unaccompanied deployments.
General Guetlein. Correct.
Senator Sullivan. You know, you might have an intrepid
young captain who wants to bring her husband and her three kids
to Alaska for a 2-year deployment, or a 3-year deployment.
There is a wonderful community, Nenana, that is only about 15
miles away, that would love to host Air Force families.
The last time I checked into this, the Air Force, and now I
guess the Space Force, has said that if there is a desire for
not a forced unaccompanied tour but a 2-year tour or 3-year
tour with family that you would consider it on a case-by-case
basis. Am I describing that policy correctly? Or do you know,
or do you want to get back to me on that?
General Guetlein. You are, but I would like to get back to
you with the full details. We have both guardians and airmen at
Clear, and I want to make sure our policies are aligned. But I
do believe that is the way we are approaching it.
Senator Sullivan. So I think it would be best for the
community and the airmen. Look, nobody likes doing 1-year
unaccompanied tours. They are hard on families. If there was a
way that you could start looking at that--again, do not force
it, but if a young captain wants to come up with her husband
and kids, you know, I know certain groups would love that. It
is adventurous, beautiful, and the communities there would love
to embrace them. So it is just a thought that we want to kind
of build on.
General Guetlein. Yes, sir. I appreciate that. It is a
beautiful area.
Senator Sullivan. Yes, and by the way, another great thing
that you guys did, I mean, you tell me. That is the most
sophisticated ground-based radar site on the Planet Earth, and
you guys built that on time, under budget.
General Guetlein. Correct. That was one of my
responsibilities at the Missile Defense Agency was building
that site, and it is an amazing radar, the best on the planet.
Senator Sullivan. It is amazing, so thank you on that.
Then finally, Ms. Maurer, you have got 120 recommendations.
Give me your top three for readiness and lethality and the
ability to beat the Chinese in a war. Your top three.
Ms. Maurer. Sure. I am going to talk in clusters of
recommendations.
Senator Sullivan. You are kind of cheating, but that is
okay.
Ms. Maurer. I know. I know. So I would put F-35 sustainment
in that bucket.
Senator Sullivan. As number one?
Ms. Maurer. As number one, because that is vital not only
to the Air Force but it is a critical part of what the Marine
Corps and Navy want to accomplish and need to accomplish, not
just today but obviously in the future.
The second bucket has to do with fixing Navy ship
sustainment, and more specifically Navy ship maintenance. There
are a lot of different aspects of that. I think that is going
to be a critical thing to keep following on.
Senator Sullivan. Does your report have big think, bold
ideas on that issue?
Ms. Maurer. We think that we have had a whole series of
report, with a number of recommendations, to fix Navy
maintenance, at the depot level, the intermediate level. We
have a draft report we are doing right now on sailor-led
maintenance that has some big, bold recommendations, that will
be coming out later on this year.
Senator Sullivan. Great.
Ms. Maurer. The third cluster is around this issue of force
generation sort of writ large. You know, there is a lot of talk
and a lot of focus on developing and deploying new technology,
and that is tremendous. But the real challenges start once the
new technology is available. So recommendations around making
sure there are sufficient facilities, sufficient training, that
there is a sufficient logistics system and structure put in
place to fully enable the services to take advantage of those
technologies. That theme cuts across a lot of different reports
and recommendations.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Great work.
Well, again I want to thank all the witnesses for your
testimony. I want to thank all the witnesses for your literally
decades of service to our country. We very much appreciate it
for your leadership.
The members of the Committee will have 2 weeks in which to
submit additional questions for the record. We respectfully
request that you get those back to this Committee in short
order. I do not know what the official timeline is but some
quick turnaround. We look forward to working with the
leadership of all the services and GAO on these important
issues. Again thank you, gentlemen and Ms. Maurer, for your
exception service and excellent testimony today.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
ship maintenance issues
1. Senator Hirono. Admiral Kilby, the Navy submitted a legislative
proposal to Congress seeking authority to send up to 6 U.S. based ships
a year to foreign yards in the Indo-Pacific for repairs to prepare for
potential contingencies. While I am certainly in favor of keeping the
ships we have in optimal condition, I think it is short-sighted to
outsource maintenance, especially when the Navy's own shipyards are in
such disrepair. For example, the surface ship repair piers in Pearl
Harbor are in poor shape, with only 4 of the 13 berths available to
conduct ship maintenance. Why isn't the Navy investing in these badly
needed repairs to our shipyards at home instead of outsourcing the
work?
Admiral Kilby. The U.S. Navy proposed amending current restrictions
on ship maintenance to improve the Surface Wartime Repair and
Maintenance (SWaRM) program. This program, crucial for sustaining
operations in contested environments, is constrained by current
regulation limiting scheduled maintenance in foreign ports to ships not
homeported in the U.S. or Guam. Allowing U.S. and Guam-based ships to
participate in SWaRM exercises in foreign ports allows for realistic
wartime repair and maintenance training and enhances collaboration with
international partners. The proposed NDAA language provides assurances
that maintenance executed under this new authority will not have a
significant impact on our stateside industrial capacity. To reiterate,
the proposal is not related to any assessment of stateside capacity or
infrastructure. This proposal aligns with GAO recommendations to
improve battle damage repair capabilities.
With respect to the Navy's shipyard infrastructure and maintenance
capabilities, the Navy is prioritizing infrastructure investments and
industrial plant equipment procurement under the Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP), a comprehensive, long-term
recapitalization of the Navy's four government owned and operated
shipyards, to meet the Navy's nuclear-powered fleet maintenance
requirements.
The Navy is committed to funding SIOP and the program is mature and
well underway. Since 2018, SIOP has completed 40 facilities projects
totaling $1.1 billion, with an additional 51 projects worth $6.3
billion under contract. Projects under construction include Pearl
Harbor Dry Dock 5, Norfolk Dry Dock 8, and Portsmouth Dry Dock 1. SIOP
has delivered 237 new items of industrial plant equipment valued at
$586 million and has 82 items in procurement.
Additionally, the Navy has developed a corrective action at Joint
Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam to improve infrastructure readiness through
military construction and restoration and modernization projects.
2. Senator Hirono. Admiral Kilby, instead of asking for authority
to do overseas maintenance on U.S. based ships, why isn't the Navy
simply sending the ships already based overseas into these foreign
yards for maintenance and repair?
Admiral Kilby. The exclusive use of naval vessels homeported
outside the United States and Guam (also known as forward deployed
naval forces, FDNF) for overseas maintenance and repair in foreign
shipyards would increase the time FDNF sailors are out of homeport
(also known as personnel tempo). Exclusively performing maintenance
activities on these forward deployed ships would negatively impact
high-tempo FDNF operations. It would also fail to realistically
exercise the required capability. The use of non-FDNF naval vessels for
these repair availabilities helps reduce the operational tempo of
already stressed FDNF ships. Furthermore, scheduled maintenance on non-
FDNF ships would have limited impact on personnel tempo because the
maintenance period can be integrated into the ship's overall deployment
schedule.
hickam airfield improvements
3. Senator Hirono. General Slife and Admiral Kilby, I have serious
concerns about the structurally inadequate portions of the runway and
old hangars at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam. The pavement condition
is in the red for far too many locations. This undermines our ability
to provide a forward location to project power outside the second
island chain. To make matters worse, it appears there is no clear
resource advocate for Hickam within Navy Installations Command. Have
the Navy and the Air Force reconciled the dispute about funding repairs
to Hickam Airfield, including adjacent C-17 maintenance hangars? If so,
how was the funding allocated between the two components?
General Slife. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) and Department
of the Navy (DoN) are committed to jointly addressing the Hickam
Airfield requirements for the repair of the C-17 maintenance hangars
and are developing a 1 to N list of requirements to rehabilitate the
airfield at Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam (JBPHH). Part of this effort
includes development of a long-term and living airfield pavement
recapitalization plan while continuing in-house work to execute routine
and emergency work.
Admiral Kilby. Department of the Navy and Department of the Air
Force have coordinated and are working together to support Hickam
Airfield at Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam.
The Navy is tracking the requirements to prepare the JBPHH Airfield
for OPLAN execution and will continue to work together to ensure the
proper prioritization of these projects occur within the
congressionally provided funding levels: Annual FSRM for Airfield
Pavements (Included in each fiscal year), Bldg 1055, Hangar 35 Docks 1
and 2 Restoration, DV Row Full Depth Repair & Concrete Parking,
Generator Project at B1109 (PACAF), Hangar 3 Renovation for PACAF AOC
B2045H (PACAF), Hickam Fitness Center & DFAC Renovation Study, Renovate
Ni-CAD Battery Shop B2131H, Replace HVAC Units at B988, Row 1 Full
Depth Repair & Concrete Parking, Row 2 Full Depth Repair & Concrete
Parking, Row 3 Full Depth Repair & Concrete Parking, Row 4 Full Depth
Repair & Concrete Parking, Rows 5--6 Full Depth Repair & Concrete
Parking, Rows 9--11 Full Depth Repair & Concrete Parking, Rows 12--13
Full Depth Repair & Concrete Parking, Taxilane V & HB/Hangar 19 Towway,
Convert AC to PCC, Wing Joint Mission Planning Center Design, Wing
Joint Mission Planning Center.
4. Senator Hirono. General Slife and Admiral Kilby, when will the
repairs begin, who is performing the repairs, and when will they be
completed?
General Slife. Some of the work is expected to start in fiscal year
2025. I defer to the Navy who, as the Joint Base lead, is responsible
for executing the repairs, on the details of execution of the projects.
Admiral Kilby. The South Ramp, 9-11 Row Mill and Overlay and
Taxiway T/Taxilane HA Convert AC to PCC are scheduled for award by
fiscal year 2025 quarter 4. As the projects are currently in
acquisition, we do not have the name of the contractor performing the
work or the start/finish dates at this time.
5. Senator Hirono. General Slife and Admiral Kilby, did this
process include an agreement on how to monitor airfield conditions for
future sustainment, restoration, and modernization efforts--including
who would fund it?
General Slife. The services have agreed to follow the joint basing
guidelines for facility sustainment to include the Department of the
Navy's (DoN) policies, procedures, and guidance governing facilities
planning, programming, acquisition, sustainment, modernization, new
construction, and disposal at JBPHH. To facilitate this, the 15th Air
Wing and the Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC) are
working together to reprioritize airfield projects based upon the 2022
Pre-Construction Notification report and have updated the Long Range
Repair Plan. Funding will also follow the joint basing guidelines for
sustainment and restoration (DoN will sustain and restore all
facilities at JBPHH) and facility and common infrastructure
modernization where the DoN is responsible. When the modernization
requirement is generated by a new DAF mission or expanded existing
mission requirement, the DAF is responsible for the funding.
Admiral Kilby. Department of the Navy and Department of the Air
Force have coordinated and are working together to support Hickam
Airfield at Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam. The Navy and Air Force plan
to continue inter-service engagement, specifically between 15th
Operational Support Squadron (15 OSS) and Naval Facilities Engineering
Systems Command (NAVFAC), to monitor and prioritize airfield projects.
army infrastructure in the indo-pacific
6. Senator Hirono. General Mingus, I have talked a number of times
about the State of the Army's crumbling infrastructure in the Indo-
Pacific Region. U.S. Army Pacific estimates the total cost to repair
all their facilities is over $8 billion. While I am encouraged to see
the Army's overall budget for military construction has increased by $1
billion this year, there is still a lot of work to do, especially in
the Indo-Pacific. What is the Army's long-term plan to replace or
repair crumbling infrastructure in Hawaii and the Indo-Pacific?
General Mingus. Enabling the Army's mission in the Indo-Pacific
through targeted investment in our critical infrastructure, especially
in Hawaii, is a top priority for the Army. We have requested to invest
$231 million in Active Component construction in fiscal year 2025 to
recapitalize Hawaii infrastructure. Over the next 5 years, the Army is
proposing to invest over $1 billion for infrastructure improvements in
the Indo Pacific Investments vary from the recapitalization of water
supply infrastructure to the construction of a combat aircraft
maintenance facility, as well as live fire range modernization to
sustain training readiness.
The Army has also requested $268 million in facility restoration
and modernization funding for fiscal year 2025 to support the Multi-
Domain Task Force (MDTF), repair critical utilities, and restore
permanent party barracks. Additionally, facility sustainment funding in
Hawaii equals almost $200 million annually to help minimize facility
degradation and address failed building components.
In addition to the Hawaii investments, for fiscal year 2025 the
Army requested over $600 million in facility funding for the rest of
the Indo-Pacific region.
servicemember fatigue
7. Senator Hirono. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Slife, General Guetlein, and Ms. Maurer, earlier this year, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that fatigue and sleep
deprivation among servicemembers continues to be a significant problem,
with roughly two-thirds of servicemembers reporting they sleep 6 hours
or less per night. My concern is that fatigue can lead to accidents,
injuries, death, and significant monetary costs. Will each of you
please summarize what your service is doing to confront this and what
impacts fatigue can have on readiness?
General Mingus. The Army's Holistic Health and Fitness (H2F)
program aims to improve soldiers' overall health, performance, and
personal readiness. The cornerstone of H2F is Field Manual 7-22
(Holistic Health and Fitness) that provides doctrine-based guidance
supported by empirically validated research for promoting holistic
health across five domains. As a soldier optimization program, H2F
specifically focuses on physical readiness, mental readiness,
nutrition, sleep, and spiritual readiness. The sleep domain highlights
the importance of sleep education, sleep duration, sleep timing, sleep
continuity, and physical and psychological effects of sleep deprivation
and fatigue on human performance and functioning. Problems occur when
insufficient sleep degrades the brain's normal functioning and results
in both physical and psychological fatigue. H2F's goal with the sleep
domain is to enhance soldier education and skills on sleep principles,
sleep cycles, understanding of the body and brain's need for sleep, and
to address practical and realistic ways to incorporate healthy sleep
hygiene.
There are several ways that H2F education and training is currently
engaged to maximize sleep readiness and combat fatigue.
H2F encompasses a holistic approach, and all five domains working
together to enhance performance and readiness. This holistic approach
includes:
Education on Sleep Hygiene: Soldiers receive training on
the importance of sleep and how to improve sleep quality. This includes
advice on maintaining a consistent sleep schedule, creating a conducive
sleep environment, and avoiding stimulants before bedtime.
Monitoring and Assessing Sleep: The program includes
tools and resources to monitor sleep patterns. This can help identify
soldiers who are not getting enough rest and allow for interventions to
be made.
Stress Management: H2F provides techniques to manage
stress, which can significantly impact sleep quality. Practices like
mindfulness, relaxation exercises, and mental health support are part
of the program.
Physical Training Adjustments: By tailoring physical
training to individual needs, H2F helps prevent overtraining and
ensures that soldiers are not overly fatigued, which can improve
overall rest and recovery.
Nutrition: Proper nutrition supports better sleep. H2F
offers guidance on dietary choices that can enhance sleep quality and
help manage energy levels throughout the day.
Recovery Protocols: The program includes recovery
strategies that incorporate adequate rest, including naps and sleep
optimization techniques, to reduce fatigue and improve overall
readiness.
These components work together to ensure that soldiers maintain
optimal health and performance, reducing the risk of sleep deprivation
and fatigue-related issues.
Last, H2F will be integrated within all levels of Professional
Military Education from Private to General by fiscal year 2025. This
education includes training from the five H2F domains identified in FM
7-22 and the importance of healthy sleep. Most recently, an entire day
of H2F curriculum is now included into the Pre-Command Course. This
curriculum educates every incoming Brigade and Battalion Command team
about the importance of the five domains to ensure commands understand
and prioritize holistic health and fitness at their units.
Admiral Kilby. Restful sleep for sailors is a significant component
of the Navy's consistent pursuit of safe operations, both ashore and
afloat. Safe operations manifest in operational excellence. Sailor
fatigue and sleep deprivation risk negatively impacting operational
excellence as they may be a contributing factor in near misses and
accidents potentially resulting in damage and loss to equipment,
injury, or death. The Navy has dedicated various lines of effort to
research fatigue and its effect on performance, the results of which
are then applied to positively affect manning, readiness and
operational considerations.
The Navy has established crew endurance and fatigue management
policy for each warfare community. This policy has resulted in
procedures meant to ensure that sailors have adequate rest periods
prior to mission evolutions while also setting mission endurance
limits. Additionally, the importance of the body's circadian rhythm
drives the method in which sailors are assigned watchbill duties.
Sailors are afforded a more consistent sleep and wake schedule based on
the body's natural biological processes.
Navy is testing wearable fatigue monitoring systems for their
potential to give sailors and their chains-of-command near real-time
updates on the State of fatigue. This provides the individual sailor
and his/her leadership the opportunity to make safe, risk-mitigating
decisions based on quantifiable data. Research funding is also being
allocated to test the suitability of mattresses onboard ships and
submarines to provide quality sleep when compared to alternatives.
General Mahoney. The Marine Corps addresses fatigue across the
force through both our Marine Corps Total Fitness (MCTF) program and a
system of programs and the Marine Corps Safety Management System
(MCSMS).
MCTF is an evidence-based framework that integrates multiple
capabilities and leverages existing resources to enhance prevention
efforts and support the four domains of fitness: social, spiritual,
mental, and physical. This holistic approach to health and wellness
helps strengthen both marines and their family. MCTFs interconnected
domains equip Commanders with a seamless system to boost readiness and
enhance the wellness of their marines. One such example is the Warrior
Athlete Readiness and Resilience (WARR) program. WARR includes a focus
on developing healthy sleep habits. The second annual WARR Sleep
Challenge is being held on Marine Corps installations 3-14 March 2025.
The intent of this challenge is to drive awareness of the importance of
sleep and how lifestyle factors can have an immediate impact on the
quality and quantity of sleep. Participants track their sleep habits
and energy levels during the challenge. In addition, more than 80
Semper Fit/WARR program staff have been certified as sleep coaches and
provide sleep education.
In addition to MCTFS, the MCSMS includes detailed program that
clearly outlines requirements and training for the management of risk
both on and off-duty--to include fatigue.
The Marine Corps Risk Management Process directs Commanders to
observe off-duty rest periods that are free of work-related
requirements to allow for rest or sleep. It also prohibits vehicle
operators from driving more than 10 consecutive hours in a 24-hour duty
period, and to follow commanders established rest-recovery guidance.
For duty related driving tasks, commanders must, at a minimum, conduct
a deliberate risk assessment when operations require performing the
maximum allowed 10 hours of driving. Such an assessment considers time
on duty, the individual's physical condition, driving conditions, and
length of travel. Commanders must also incorporate fatigue control
measures such as alternate means of transportation or designating rest
stops to ensure personnel are sufficiently rested. Travel by personally
owned or government owned vehicles is limited to 400 miles per day,
with a 15-minute rest break for every 2 hours of driving and a 30-
minute meal break for every 10-hour driving period.
In addition to MCSMS, the Marine Corps aviation community also
follows the Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF) Naval Air Training and
Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) General Flight and
Operating Instructions Manual (CNAF M-3710.7). CNAF M-3710.7 issues
policies and procedural guidance applicable to a broad spectrum of
users and complements individual type/model/series aircraft NATOPS
manuals. These manual addresses sleep, circadian rhythm, limitations on
flight time, operational tempo, crew day, and crew rest for flight crew
and flight support personnel. In addition to CNAF M-3710.7, Standard
Operating Procedures are directed at each squadron, Marine Aircraft
Group, and Wing to can provide further limitations based on op tempo
and operating environment to mitigate various types of fatigue.
General Slife and General Guetlein. The Department of the Air Force
(DAF) is committed to ensuring our military is the most ready and
operationally lethal military in the world.
The DAF has long understood that adequate sleep is a foundation of
good health and critical to military performance and readiness, and has
published fatigue management guidelines in DAF instructions and
manuals.
The United States Space Force (USSF) established Guardian
Resilience Teams (GRT) through a partnership with the American College
of Lifestyle Medicine (ACLM). The USSF also developed a GRT Sleep Guide
(Dec 2023) to promote sleep hygiene and mitigate the effects of the
shift work. In addition, the DAF is actively engaged in multiple
research projects looking at fatigue management, to include
neurotechnology to mitigate fatigue, identifying circadian rhythm
biomarkers, impact of pharmacological intervention, and wearable
technologies to increase fatigue awareness, to name a few.
Ms. Maurer. Fatigue caused by inadequate sleep can negatively
affect a servicemember's military performance and has contributed to
accidents resulting in servicemember deaths and hundreds of millions of
dollars in damage to Department of Defense (DOD) ships, vehicles, and
aircraft, according to our prior work and the National Commission on
Aviation Safety. \3\ Fatigue can cause a reduced ability to execute
complex cognitive tasks, communicate effectively, quickly make
appropriate decisions, and sustain a level of alertness required to
carry out assigned duties, according to a 2021 DOD study on sleep
deprivation and readiness. \4\ In the study, DOD stated sleeping less
than 7 hours per night can have significant effects on cognitive,
emotional, and physical capabilities that directly affect military
performance. These effects include deficits in marksmanship, physical
training, decisionmaking, and risk-taking behavior.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See, for example, GAO, Military Vehicles: Army and Marine Corps
Should Take Additional Actions to Mitigate and Prevent Training
Accidents, GAO-21-361 (Washington, DC: July 7, 2021) and Navy
Readiness: Additional Efforts Are Needed to Manage Fatigue, Reduce
Crewing Shortfalls, and Implement Training, GAO-21-366 (Washington, DC:
May 27, 2021). Also, see National Commission on Military Aviation
Safety, Report to the President and Congress of the United States
(December 1, 2020).
\4\ Department of Defense, Report to congressional Armed Services
Committees, Study on Effects of Sleep Deprivation on Readiness of
Members of the Armed Forces, (Washington, DC.: March 2021). DOD
conducted this study in response to section 749 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. Pub. L. No. 116-92, Sec. 749
(2019).
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DOD and the services recognize that impairment from sleep
deprivation can be equivalent to the effects of alcohol intoxication
and significantly increases the risk of physical injury. For example,
Navy guidance cautions that getting less daily sleep than the minimum
requirement can rapidly and significantly degrade alertness and
performance, which can lead to mishaps and numerous negative health
outcomes. \5\ Navy data show that sailor effectiveness declines after
prolonged periods without sleep, equating to impairment levels
comparable to intoxication.
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\5\ Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet and
Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic Instruction 3120.2A,
Comprehensive Crew Endurance Management Policy (Dec. 11, 2020).
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The services also recognize that sleep deprivation affects medical
and force readiness and has financial implications. For example, Navy
guidance states that less than 6 hours of sleep per night can lead to
servicemembers being more prone to systemic heat injuries. \6\ Army
Holistic Health and Fitness system documentation outlines that chronic
sleep deprivation contributes to medically nondeployable status of
servicemembers. \7\
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\6\ Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 5100.19F,
Navy Safety and Occupational Health Program Manual for Forces Afloat
(May 9, 2019).
\7\ The U.S. Army Holistic Health and Fitness Operating Concept,
The U.S. Army's System for Enhancing Soldier Readiness and Lethality in
the 21st Century (October 1, 2020).
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The services have also reported that lack of sleep can lead to
mishaps--incidents that result in death, injury, illness or property
damage. Mishaps can range from an aircraft crash to an ankle sprain at
work.
The Army has found that fatigue, lack of rest, or lack of
sleep was a cause in 8 percent of tactical vehicle accidents between
fiscal years 2010 to 2019. \8\
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\8\ In 2021, we found that the Army and Marine Corps reported 3,753
tactical vehicle accidents (e.g., tanks, trucks) from noncombat
scenarios resulting in 123 servicemember deaths from fiscal years 2010
to 2019. GAO, Military Vehicles: Army and Marine Corps Should Take
Additional Actions to Mitigate and Prevent Training Accidents, GAO-21-
361 (Washington, DC.: July 7, 2021).
The Naval Safety Center found that between 2015 and 2019
there were 489 reported instances of fatigued-driving related
fatalities, serious injuries, and property damage involving marines and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
sailors.
In 2017, the Navy had four significant mishaps at sea,
including two collisions that resulted in the loss of 17 sailors' lives
and hundreds of millions of dollars in damage to Navy ships, which the
Navy attributed partly to sailor overwork and fatigue. \9\ According to
Navy guidance, after sailors have been awake for 18 hours, their
performance, efficiency, and decisionmaking ability rapidly decline to
75 percent of baseline effectiveness or less, and accident rates
increase for almost every activity. \10\
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\9\ We have reported that the Navy has since acted to address
sailor fatigue, resize surface ship crews to handle workload, and
improve training in the surface fleet. See GAO, Navy Readiness:
Additional Efforts Are Needed to Manage Fatigue, Reduce Crewing
Shortfalls, and Implement Training, GAO-21-366 (Washington, DC.: May
27, 2021) and GAO, Navy Readiness: Challenges to Addressing Sailor
Fatigue in the Surface Fleet Continue, GAO-24-106819 (Washington, DC.:
October 11, 2023).
\10\ Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet and
Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic Instruction 3120.2A,
Comprehensive Crew Endurance Management Policy (Dec. 11, 2020).
More recently, as required by the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2022, DOD established the Suicide Prevention and
Response Independent Review Committee to conduct a comprehensive review
of suicide prevention and response programs and found that sleep
disruption was a risk factor for suicide. The committee issued a
report, and among its 127 recommendations, seven are related to sleep,
including providing education on healthy sleep habits during military
training and regularly scheduled unit formations. The report also had a
high-priority recommendation that duty schedules allow for 8 hours of
sleep and minimize the frequency of shift changes. \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ A Secretary of Defense memorandum related to the report's
recommendations directed commanders at all levels to promote mission
readiness through healthy sleep throughout the department, in
accordance with DOD Instruction 1010.10, among other things. Secretary
of Defense Memorandum, Next Steps on Suicide Prevention in the Military
(March 16, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In March 2024, GAO made nine recommendations to help the department
better manage servicemember fatigue, including that DOD conduct an
assessment of its fatigue-related oversight structure, assign DOD
leadership, and create and maintain a list of all fatigue-related
research projects, and that the military services assign fatigue-
related leadership. \12\ DOD generally concurred with the
recommendations and has begun taking steps to address them. For
example, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness reported that it would create and publish a comprehensive
list of all fatigue-related research projects by May 2026.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ GAO, Military Readiness: Comprehensive Approach Needed to
Address Service Member Fatigue and Manage Related Efforts, GAO-24-
105917 (Washington, DC.: Mar. 26, 2024).
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space readiness
8. Senator Hirono. General Guetlein, the Secretary of the Air Force
recently tasked the Space Force to conduct more complex training
exercises as part of his plan for ``Great Power Competition.'' General
Guetlein, can you please talk about what kind of training shortfalls
exist today for the Space Force?
General Guetlein. The Space Force was lacking in large scale
exercise and mission focused training that encompassed multiple
operational plans and a complex, large-scale military, operating to
fight against a high-end adversary. The USSF's Operational Exercise,
called Resolute Space 25, is a series of nested exercises that increase
in scope and complexity, and is focused on addressing the threats posed
by near-peer competitors by operating as a critical component of the
Joint Force.
The Space Force also lacks an operationally relevant and realistic
test and training capability that provides environment for secure,
relevant, and effective High-End Advanced Training, Tactics and Testing
(HEAT3) and experimentation for a high-end fight against current and
emerging threats. Current training infrastructure was designed and
built for system proficiency and procedural currency in a benign
environment. To address these shortfalls, we are building an
Operational Test and Training Infrastructure (OTTI), with $438 million
requested in fiscal year 2025.
9. Senator Hirono. General Guetlein, given that Space Force
guardians who are assigned to Hawaii experience a very high cost of
living, do you think a review of alternative housing options would be
helpful?
General Guetlein. The Space Force acknowledges the unique
challenges faced by guardians stationed in high-cost areas, including
Hawaii, and is always open to exploring alternative housing options. To
support our guardians in Hawaii, the DOD offers two key programs: 1)
the Overseas Cost of Living Allowance (OCOLA), which adjusts based on
local costs of goods and services, and 2) the Basic Allowance for
Housing (BAH). The 2025 BAH rates for Hawaii increased by 10 percent on
average, exceeding the national average of 5.4 percent. The DOD also
implemented temporary 2024 BAH increases to mitigate the impact of
rising rental costs following the Maui fires.
operational energy demand reduction in the indo-pacific
10. Senator Hirono. General Slife, the potential for a next
generation tanker in form of a blended wing body (BWB) aircraft would
save between 30-50 percent fuel, which would be invaluable to
operations in the Indo-Pacific in terms of extended range, sortie
generation, and reducing contested logistics vulnerabilities. How
significant would a platform like BWB be for the Air Force and what the
next steps for this program?
General Slife. A blended wing body (BWB) streamlined design is more
fuel efficient than the tube and wing design aircraft we operate today,
potentially offering more range, refueling capability, and cargo
capacity. The Air Force is partnered with JetZero to build and fly a
full-scale BWB demonstrator aircraft in 2027. Flight test data and
lessons learned during the design, fabrication and assembly will inform
future decisions regarding the possible integration of this type of
aircraft into the Air Force's force design. BWB designs are being
holistically evaluated in collaboration with Air Mobility Command to
assess operational impacts in the Indo-Pacific and other Combatant
command areas of responsibility.
privatized housing and enlisted barracks
11. Senator Hirono. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Slife, General Guetlein, and Ms. Maurer, in the Fiscal Year
2024 National Defense Authorization Act, we included a number of
oversight and management reforms related to unaccompanied housing. For
each Service, and Diana as well, how have you all addressed the
condition of barracks and housing over the last year and where do you
think there are still areas for improvement?
General Mingus. The Army is dedicated to providing safe, high-
quality housing and barracks for its soldiers and families while
continuing to balance modernization, readiness, recruiting, and other
quality of life initiatives.
Barracks: The Army plans to invest an average of $2.1
billion annually in the construction, sustainment, restoration, and
modernization of barracks for unaccompanied soldiers over the next five
years. For fiscal year 2025, the Army is requesting $2.5 billion in
barracks funding. As part of this historic investment, the Army is
requesting 100 percent of the requirement to sustain barracks, an
investment of $680 million in fiscal year 2025. Second, we are working
closely with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to stabilize project cost
growth through early involvement in the planning and design processes.
Third, as part of these efforts, the Army has stood up a barracks
working group which held a summit in December 2023 to discuss barracks
management and design. In fiscal year 2025, the Army is requesting $35
million to hire civilian barracks managers at multiple installations,
which will eliminate the burden placed on soldiers to perform barracks
maintenance as collateral duties.
Privatized Housing: Starting in fiscal year 2025,
privatized housing providers are investing up to $2.5 billion over the
next 3 years on new construction, renovations, and other improvements.
The Army, working with the providers, is exploring every option to
inject capital into the privatized portfolio, including raising
additional debt, sales of excess real property, and additional
government equity contributions. The new ground lease amendment
language reinforces provider requirements to properly maintain homes
and clarifies consequences for non-compliance.
Government Owned Housing: The Army is investing $403.7
million in fiscal year 2025 on government owned housing facilities.
These investments include funding for sustainment, construction of 138
new homes, and renovation of 252 homes. Due to these investments, the
Army expects 90 percent of its Army Family Housing will be in good or
adequate condition by the end of 2025.
Both Privatized and Government Owned Housing:
Installation housing office personnel conduct 100 percent Quality
Assurance inspections on change of occupancy maintenance and emergency/
Life Health Safety work orders. The Army continues the fiscal year 2020
and fiscal year 2021 NDAA-mandated third-party inspections for all
family housing (privatized and government owned/controlled) with
estimated completion by end of 2026. In addition, the Army remains
committed to combating all environmental hazards within housing and our
recently updated policy (February 2024), improved training
opportunities provided by the Installation Management Command and
oversight focus on mold, lead-based paint, and asbestos-containing
material mitigation.
Admiral Kilby. In the past year, Navy has focused on improving the
condition of our barracks and our sailors' quality of life. Navy
continues to be engaged with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
the other services in developing new standards and share best practices
aimed at improving conditions in unaccompanied housing (UH). We
developed and initiated ``Forging Communities of Excellence,'' an
initiative focused on improvement efforts along three distinct lines of
effort (LOE): Facilities Improvement, Management, and Quality of Life.
Facilities Improvement:
Under our Facilities Improvement LOE, there were six Navy
installations with restoration and modernization (RM) projects awarded
to address POOR and FAILING condition barracks, which will result in
the improvement of 1,244 bedrooms for our sailors. Our efforts continue
in fiscal year 2025 at three Navy installations with RM projects
improving 613 bedrooms at those locations.
We met the mandate to fund and execute 100 percent
sustainment funding for barracks, spending $232 million in fiscal year
2024. fiscal year 2025 is funded at $235.1 million.
Standardization of response to service calls has been
implemented per Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) NOTICE
11100 (22 Aug 2024). Standardizing maintenance response to emergency,
urgent, and routine service calls across all installations ensures
alignment with CNIC maintenance standards, priorities, and reporting.
In accordance with the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA, the Navy
has contracted an independent third-party inspector to evaluate all
public private ventures at Naval Base San Diego and Naval Station
Norfolk. Inspections began in September 2024 and will conclude in March
2025. Once complete, reports will be prepared to give the DON a better
understanding of the overall condition of the units and provide
information on potential improvements that will directly benefit
current and future residents.
Management:
A new UH maintenance policy guided the establishment and
operation of a maintenance team within UH to reduce maintenance request
response time. Having timely resolution to maintenance issues
demonstrates our commitment to not only ensure a safe and habitable
living space but also to sustain our buildings and mitigate further
damage. Additionally, this policy note provides clarification regarding
work performed in and by UH staff, enterprise military housing
maintenance reporting requirements, public works referral, and
tracking.
Quality of Life:
We expanded upon the QR code program first introduced in
2022 that allows UH residents to report issues with their residence
using a mobile device. The Housing Maintenance Request Service was
deployed to four installations--NAS Lemoore, NAVBASE San Diego, NAS
Jacksonville and NSA Bethesda as a pilot. A new QR code initiative
expands the existing capability by eliminating the manual entry
requirement of the Housing Office. The limited release at the pilot
locations provides valuable feedback and allows us to address issues
prior to deployment enterprise wide.
CNIC NOTICE 11103 (December 28, 2023) authorizes sailors
to use personally owned small cooking appliances in all UH rooms on
Navy installations as long as each device has an automatic shutoff
feature and does not present a fire hazard. As of July 1, 2024, 58
percent of eligible rooms across the Navy have successfully expanded
cooking capabilities for their residents and 28 percent are pending
NAVFAC assessment. Fourteen percent are unable to offer the expanded
cooking capability due to fire and/or electrical safety issues.
The Navy introduced a free, high-speed Wi-Fi pilot
program on February 1, 2024 at 12 permanent party Navy UH buildings in
the Hampton Roads, Virginia area. The feedback and performance metrics
from the pilot program were used to inform future expansion
implementation requirements.
A new temperature requirements policy provides
temperature standards and guidance to address heating, ventilation, and
air conditioning (HVAC) failures/lack of HVAC, and to ensure safe water
temperature for the health, comfort and safety of residents in
government owned and leased UH. These HVAC standards will aid in
prevention and mitigation of heat and cold stress injuries and mold or
mildew development. Water temperature standards will aid in prevention
of burns, scalding, or bacterial growth. The establishment of a
temperature standard creates a benchmark for expectations of each
installation to execute.
General Mahoney. The Marine Corps developed its Barracks 2030
initiative to improve Marine Corps unaccompanied housing. This
initiative represents the Marine Corps' most consequential facilities
investment to date, focusing on three primary lines of effort:
Management, Modernization, and Material.
Management: The Marine Corps is professionalizing and streamlining
barracks management by transitioning 532 uniformed, collateral-duty
barracks managers to 347 professional civilian managers. In fiscal year
2024, 160 contract civilian barracks managers were hired, bringing the
total to 200 (contractor supported) building managers, at a cost of $25
million. In fiscal year 2025, an additional 32 contract civilian
barracks managers will be hired, increasing the total of contracted
civilian barracks managers to 232. Additionally, a Table of
Organization and Equipment Change Request (TOECR) has been developed,
submitted, and approved to increase the structure of Marine Corps
civilian barracks managers to 115. Hiring actions for Marine Corps
civilian barracks managers are scheduled to commence at the end of
quarter 2, fiscal year 2025, and conclude in fiscal year 2026.
To complement these management reforms, the Marine Corps has also
fully implemented QSRMax, a QR code enabled, digital maintenance
request system that allows marines to submit maintenance requests
online using their preferred device and track the status of their
requests in real-time. This system enhances communication between
marines and maintenance personnel, increasing transparency and
accountability. Of note, since the implementation of QSRMax over 10,000
requests have been processed.
With the hiring of contract and Marine Corps civilian barracks
managers and the implementation of QSRMax, we envision not only
improving upon corrective maintenance but also improving our ability to
anticipate and proactively address issues that arise in the barracks.
Modernization: The Marine Corps is right sizing, reconfiguring, and
recapitalizing the barracks portfolio. As of September 30, 2024, $148.2
million has been executed for restoration and modernization projects on
11 barracks, positively impacting 4,200 marines. In fiscal year 2025,
the Marine Corps issued Authority to Advertise for restoration and
modernization projects valued at $408 million and for design of future
projects, affecting 12 barracks and 3,930 marines. Additionally, the
Marine Corps commenced its Barracks Utilization Study, aimed at
reviewing every single barracks across the enterprise, assessing
internal layouts and utilization, with the goal of rightsizing our
barracks inventory. To date, 6 installations have undergone the study,
with the remaining 15 to be completed by quarter 1, fiscal year 2026.
Material: The Marine Corps is implementing standard door security
lock systems and standardizing and reducing the furnishings refresh
cycle. The Marine Corps is conducting a barracks access control pilot
program to test the door security lock systems, with the intent to
implement the systems enterprise-wide in fiscal year 2026. In fiscal
year 2024, the Marine Corps executed funding of $20.6 million for
modern furnishings in 109 barracks, with deliveries occurring from
January to October 2025. To date in fiscal year 2025, the Marine Corps
has internally funded and obligated another $10 million for modern
furnishings, impacting 22 barracks. The Marine Corps also expects to
obligate an additional $5.7 million across the remainder of fiscal year
2025, estimated to impact 15 barracks.
In conclusion, the actions we have taken so far are just the
beginning. Improvements to barracks are one of the most visible
demonstrations of a leader's commitment to their marines. Each year, we
make incremental, yet tangible improvements to our barracks, and we
will see this through.
General Slife. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) is committed
to taking care of Airmen and to investing $1.1 billion in Facility
Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM) fiscal year 2022 to
2026, more than double the investment over the previous 5 years of
fiscal year 2017 to 2021. DAF prioritizes dorm requirements above other
needs with dedicated FSRM) funds using the DAF Dormitory Master Plan to
inform strategic investments to keep good dorms good while addressing
systems and components that degrade over time. Further, the DAF fully
supports full-time barracks managers and already has a cadre of Airmen
Dorm Leaders and Dormitory Superintendents whose primary job is to
ensure dorms are safe and that Airmen's issues are addressed.
General Guetlein. The Department of the Air Force is committed to
taking care of guardians and is making a much needed investment of $1.1
billion in Facility Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM)
fiscal year 2022 to fiscal year 2026, more than double the investment
over the previous 5 years of fiscal year 2017 to fiscal year 2021. The
DAF uses the DAF Dormitory Master Plan to inform strategic investments
in dorms while addressing systems and components that degrade over
time. Further, the DAF fully supports full-time barracks managers and
already has a cadre of Guardian Dorm Leaders and Dormitory
Superintendents whose primary job is to ensure dorms are safe and that
guardians' issues are addressed.
Ms. Maurer. In our September 2023 report, we found that poor living
conditions in military barracks undermine quality of life and
readiness, and we made 31 recommendations for DOD to improve its
oversight and management of barracks housing. \1\ For example, we
reported that DOD did not reliably assess conditions. We also found
that potentially thousands of servicemembers lived in substandard
barracks because DOD allowed the services to waive minimum standards.
In addition, barracks managers assigned to oversee day-to day
management of facilities were in many cases not positioned to perform
their duties effectively. We also found that service policies on
exceptions to requirements for living in barracks varied by military
service and installation Further, we found that DOD did not
sufficiently assess the effects of barracks conditions on
servicemembers, such as through surveys, and that DOD had not
established a joint strategy for the services to coordinate and
collaborate on improving barracks conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Military Barracks: Poor Living Conditions Undermine
Quality of Life and Readiness, GAO-23-105797 (Washington DC, September
19, 2023).
Since we issued that report, DOD has implemented eight
recommendations, including clarifying guidance on condition
assessments, setting requirements related to waiving minimum standards,
revaluating policies related to barracks managers, adjusting guidance
on eligibility for housing allowances, improving resident surveys, and
developing a joint strategy to improve barracks conditions across
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
military services. Specifically:
In July 2024, DOD issued guidance requiring the military
departments to conduct complete condition assessments of all permanent
barracks every 2 years, and that qualified, trained personnel conduct
these assessments.
In July 2024, DOD issued guidance to the military
departments setting requirements for waiving minimum standards on
privacy and configuration of barracks, including requiring annual
reporting to the DOD Chief Housing Officer on all issued waivers
starting in January 2025. Guidance also requires military department
secretaries to terminate waivers after 9 months without renewal.
In January 2025, DOD also clarified guidance to identify
appropriate reasons for providing housing allowances to those who would
otherwise live in barracks, such as experiences of assault or
harassment in barracks.
In February 2025, the Navy provided documentation that it
had reevaluated existing policies regarding barracks manager positions.
As a result of the evaluation, the Navy reported replacing military
billets with civilian personnel where necessary, and establishing a
training curriculum for the position.
In September 2024, DOD revised questions on its annual
Status of Forces survey to include questions on both servicemember
satisfaction with barracks housing, and effects on reenlistment
decisions. Further, in February 2025, DOD directed the military
services to survey all barracks residents through the annual Tenant
Satisfaction Survey.
In February 2024, DOD issued a Resilient and Healthy
Defense Communities strategy, followed by an implementation plan in
October 2024. Both the strategy and implementation plan identified
specific actions required by various entities across DOD to improve
barracks conditions.
DOD officials have told us they are taking steps to implement the
remaining 23 recommendations, but these actions are still in progress.
According to officials, DOD is working to address health and safety
issues, incomplete funding information, insufficient oversight, and the
feasibility of privatized barracks, among others.
While the department has taken important steps forward in improving
barracks conditions, more work remains to ensure servicemembers and
their families have access to quality housing, whether they live in
barracks, privatized family housing, or in private sector housing in
communities surrounding military installations. In addition to
implementing remaining open recommendations related to barracks,
implementing our outstanding recommendations related to strengthening
oversight of privatized family housing, and collecting better
information about areas with critical housing shortages, will help DOD
address housing challenges affecting servicemembers and their families.
\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, Military Housing: DOD Should Address Critical Supply and
Affordability Challenges for Service Members, GAO-25-106208
(Washington, D.C., Oct. 30, 2024). Military Housing: DOD Can Further
Strengthen Oversight of its Privatized Housing Program, GAO-23-105377
(Washington, D.C., April 6, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
navy fleet maintenance
12. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, the Navy's fleet readiness for
ships and submarines is well-below the Navy's own stated requirements.
The maintenance delays and readiness issue is further exacerbated and
inextricably linked to the 1 to 3 year delays across most of the major
shipbuilding programs. Fewer ships being produced on time means fewer
ships in the water to execute their mission, which increases demand on
fewer number of hulls, decreasing the opportunity for those ships to
have needed maintenance done. Once more ships are produced there will
be a larger demand for maintenance facilities to keep these ships
operational. Better maintenance planning for the surface fleet is
improving the sequencing of ship availabilities, but the fleet's
readiness is still not where it needs to be to meet combatant commander
requests for forces. Do you agree that shipbuilding delays are
impacting fleet readiness?
Admiral Kilby. Yes, delays in shipbuilding have a cascading effect
on fleet readiness by forcing in-service ships to cover the missions
for the ships delayed in delivery, making the readiness of the Active
fleet more important. The Navy prioritizes our people and readiness to
deploy and fight today, while investing in the industrial base to build
and maintain our fleet for tomorrow. We must get our ships, submarines,
and aircraft in and out of their maintenance periods on time and on
cost.
The Navy will continue to invest in the Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Program (SIOP) and submarine industrial base (SIB) to
support submarine maintenance, increase the health of industry, build
supply chain resiliency, and improve our long-term capacity. Navy is
working with private industry partners to enhance cost-effectiveness
and schedule adherence in submarine maintenance, and this collaborative
effort aims to deliver valuable surge capacity for submarine
maintenance operations. Navy is continuing its efforts to drive out
delays in finishing maintenance availabilities, enabling more players
on the field through collaborative efforts with industry.
13. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, what is the Navy doing to
ensure it will have adequate maintenance facilities available to
service the new ships it plans to acquire?
Admiral Kilby. The Navy prioritizes our people and readiness to
deploy and fight today, while investing in our industrial base to build
and maintain our fleet to be strategically ready for tomorrow. The Navy
continues to significantly invest in the SIOP and SIB to support
submarine maintenance, increase the health of industry, build supply
chain resiliency, and improve our long-term capacity. Navy is working
with private industry partners to enhance cost-effectiveness and
schedule adherence in submarine maintenance, and this collaborative
effort aims to deliver valuable surge capacity for submarine
maintenance operations. Navy is continuing its efforts to invest in the
maritime industrial base (MIB), drive out delays in finishing
maintenance availabilities and enable more players on the field through
its collaborative efforts with industry. The Navy continues to balance
loading across maintenance facilities and is continually reviewing and
forecasting workload to ensure adequate future capacity.
14. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, crewing shortfalls across the
surface fleet have necessitated pulling sailors from ships in
maintenance availability periods to fills gaps at-sea meaning ships
undergoing maintenance have fewer sailors onboard to assist with
maintenance or quality assurance. How is this practice affecting
timeliness of completing maintenance availabilities?
Admiral Kilby. There is no data that supports a correlation between
lower manning levels during maintenance availabilities and the
timeliness of completing maintenance availabilities. The primary reason
for maintenance availabilities not completing on time is growth work,
or new work that arises during the maintenance availability. This is
depot level work accomplished by the shipyard and not by the ship's
crew. Sailors play a significant role during maintenance
availabilities, including vital work control and quality assurance
functions, but the targeted manning actions conducted by the Type
Commander are not a significant factor driving maintenance delays.
Manning gaps at sea continue to create challenges across the
Surface Force. Deployed ships will continue to be the priority with
some level of manning risk being taken by ships in maintenance
availabilities. This personnel risk is managed closely by the Type
Commander to ensure no ship drops below a level that prevents mission
accomplishment.
15. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, what is the Navy doing to
reduce maintenance delays and backlogs to meet desired Optimized Fleet
Response Plan (OFRP) timelines?
Admiral Kilby. The Navy employs a tiered readiness model that
varies unit readiness levels as they cycle through the OFRP, which is
designed to ensure sufficient time is dedicated for regular training
and maintenance prior to deployment in order to generate long-term
sustainable operational availability. On average, at any point in time,
about one-third of our ships are deployed around the globe or in post-
deployment sustainment; about one-third are completing training and
certifications to be the next-to-deploy forces; and about one-third are
undergoing critical maintenance and modernization necessary to be ready
to deploy again in the future. Typically, the sustainment phase, which
includes deployment and post-deployment, is the longest period of time
in the OFRP cycle. Ships in post-deployment sustainment maintain
readiness levels to surge for a fight, if called upon, for most of the
sustainment phase. Likewise, the next-to-deploy forces finishing their
final training and certification phases can also be surged for a fight
to respond to crisis.
The current readiness ratings, including current category (C)-
ratings, are classified data that is regularly reported to Congress in
the ``Department of Defense Semi-annual Readiness Report to the
Congress.'' Navy is currently meeting operational requirements and is
seeing improvements in readiness levels but acknowledges key challenges
to readiness, particularly with recruiting/personnel and delays with
ship maintenance. Navy is also driving cultural change and process
improvement measures through efforts such as Perform to Plan, investing
in contingent material for depot availabilities, investing in
additional spare parts, planning and locking work for availabilities at
least 4 months in advance of start, and using multi-year procurement
funding for maintenance availabilities. More details can be provided at
a classified level if desired.
16. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby what is the size of the Navy's
depot-level maintenance backlog on the surface fleet, in dollars?
Admiral Kilby. At the end of fiscal year 2024, surface ships
carried a $1.87 billion depot-level maintenance backlog. This is about
$130 million lower than the end of fiscal year 2023.
17. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby for ships you are proposing to
decommission early, how much does their maintenance backlog contribute
to the decommissioning decision?
Admiral Kilby. Multiple financial and operational factors go into
determining if a hull should be selected for early decommissioning.
Among them are overall material condition, total ownership costs,
backlogged maintenance, and the warfighting relevance of each platform.
Legacy platforms that are extremely expensive to repair and maintain
and cannot stay relevant in contested environments must be retired in
order to invest in the maintenance of other platforms and in essential
capabilities the Navy needs. For Dock Landing Ships (LSDs), the rising
costs of maintaining the material readiness makes the total operating
cost of this ship a less efficient use of resources than investing in
the rest of the amphibious fleet. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class
is not designed to operate effectively in a Great Power Competition
environment and investment in retaining more LCS than necessary would
prevent investment in higher priority programs that are better aligned
with the National Defense Strategy. Divestment of Expeditionary Fast
Transport (T-EPF) class ships enables significant cost avoidance for
Navy in support of higher priority programs and aligns the T-EPF
inventory to the requirement. The Department of the Navy requirement
for T-EPFs is 12 (8 for Navy, 4 for USMC). Following divestment of T-
EPFs 1-4, the Department of the Navy will have a total of 12 T-EPS.
Operational limitations of the Expeditionary Transfer Dock limit the
usefulness of this platform and the cost to maintain them exceeds the
relative value.
18. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, if you had a magic wand, how
would you increase U.S. ship maintenance capacity?
Admiral Kilby. The Navy's maintenance operations for non-nuclear
surface ships, submarines, aircraft carriers, and aircraft have
achieved substantial efficiency gains that have allowed the Navy to
leverage existing capacity and enhance operational readiness.
Improving maintenance throughput for non-nuclear surface ships,
submarines, aircraft carriers, and aircraft hinges on several key
levers. Enhancing workforce capabilities through targeted training and
retention strategies is critical to being able to increase maintenance
capacity across the Navy. These include optimizing the use of public
and private maintenance yards, accelerating SIOP projects, integrating
advanced technology such as 3D printing, investing in the MIB supply
chain, and implementing streamlined processes.
navy shipbuilding delays
19. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, imagine you weren't in a
resource-constrained environment or operating under Fiscal
Responsibility Act caps, what are the top five changes that the Navy
needs to build the fleet needed to effectively meet our worldwide
commitments?
Admiral Kilby. In a resource unconstrained environment with the
objective of supporting the overall Navy priorities, I would request
the following:
Shore Infrastructure: An overhaul of our current facilities, at
home and abroad, to support warfighting, force generation and, quality
of service improvements that support our warfighters and their families
in a competitive maritime great power conflict era.
Strategic Priorities: The Chief of Naval Operations'
recommendations for key investments to reduce risk in executing the
Interim Defense Strategic Guidance include Military Construction and
acceleration and expansion of Surface Warfare Priority Systems and
Aviation Critical Planeside systems to support increased operational
demand.
Support Forces: Increase operational support capacity by expanding
Military Sealift Command's (MSC) auxiliary fleet with Buy-Used
authorities and New Construction funding. This allows us to repair,
replenish, and rearm air, sea, and undersea resources, prolonging
battle survivability and sustainability of systems deployed overseas.
Additional support for civilian mariners is key to realizing and
utilizing a re-invigorated MSC.
Manning and Training: Authority and funding to man an expanding
Navy and execute missions across the globe. Those forces will require
additional world-class training and facilities.
The objective is to maintain the U.S. Navy into the future as the
world's most powerful Navy to preserve the peace, respond in crisis,
and win decisively in war.
20. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, if you had a magic wand, how
would you increase U.S. shipbuilding capacity?
Admiral Kilby. Health and competition in the shipbuilding
industrial base and supply chain are vital to strengthening the
shipbuilding and repair industrial base. This effort requires a whole
of government approach to rebuild the maritime power of the Nation.
Rebuilding the MIB should focus on workforce training and development,
incentivizing private sector investment in infrastructure, integrating
advanced technology, improving the supply chain, and encouraging
international shipbuilding collaboration.
With the help of Congress especially with investments in the
submarine and surface ship industrial base to date, and in coordination
with local and State governments as well as national organizations, the
Navy and its shipbuilders will continue identifying opportunities to
generate resiliency and productivity in the shipbuilding industrial
base, workforce and associated supply chain.
navy manning
21. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, if the Navy were to resolve
the shipbuilding problem, there is still the challenge of adequately
crewing more ships? Does the Navy maintain a robust recruiting plan
aimed at crewing an influx of new ships?
Admiral Kilby. Yes, the Navy maintains a robust recruiting plan to
support the Navy Recruiting New Accessions Mission. Fleet demands,
operational requirements, training capacity, separations, retirements,
attrition, funding, and future personnel needs are some of the many
variables included in the modeling processes used to determine Navy's
required recruiting mission. Additionally, although Navy currently has
more than 20,000 gaps at sea, given our improvements in recruiting over
the past year, Navy has an achievable target of 100 percent inventory
manning by 2027. To support this goal, Navy leadership employs a
driver-based performance improvement approach to identify and address
gaps, track high-impact actions, eliminate execution barriers, and
implement solutions that drive measurable improvements toward the goal.
22. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, in the 1980s and early 1990s,
several Oliver Hazard Perry Frigates were manned with Active Duty and
Reservists to achieve a full crew complement. Has the Navy considered
adding reserve billets to ships to assist with the manning gaps at-sea?
Admiral Kilby. The Surface Force faces the challenge of meeting the
necessary manning scale to effectively deploy mission capable ships
while balancing risk with future force generation requirements and
shore support capabilities. The shortage of a ready pool of sailors
presents a significant obstacle to achieving optimal readiness levels
across the Fleet. Addressing this issue necessitates a total force
manpower approach to enhance the recruitment, continued training, and
retention of qualified sailors, forging a resilient and sustainable
manning structure capable of effectively supporting the operational
demands for the Surface Force in peacetime and in conflict.
Over time, the number of reservists assigned to ships has decreased
but reserve personnel still do fill at-sea billets today. Full-time,
training and administration of the Reserve sailors on a permanent,
rotational basis have dedicated at-sea billets. Part-time, Selected
Reserve sailors, leveraged through both voluntary and involuntary
mobilization authorities, fill a limited number of vacant billets. The
Navy will look for continued opportunities to make Reserve manpower
investments toward building additional strategic depth of Reserve
personnel with required Navy enlisted and officer classifications
needed at sea.
amphibious warship readiness
23. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, it is now clear that the
Navy's decision to not address the rudder issue on the USS Boxer when
it was discovered during a maintenance period and instead granting a
waiver to depart from its design specifications was a mistake that has
led to the lead ship in an Amphibious Ready Group to not deploy with
the other two ships in its group. What is being done to address how
that risk decision was made so it can be prevented in the future?
Admiral Kilby. Navy uses a process that takes technical,
programmatic and operational readiness priorities into consideration to
develop a plan to operate a ship's system with material non-
conformance. The Departure from Specification (DFS) process outlined in
the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual is focused on ensuring ships are
ready for tasking. In the case of USS Boxer, none of the adjudicated
DFSs on the rudder system during her last CNO maintenance availability
contributed to the failure of the starboard rudder's upper bearing. The
upper bearing, intended to be a life of ship component, materially
failed in the ship's 29th year of service. The Wasp-class was
originally designed with an intended 40 years of service life.
24. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, the recent fiasco with the USS
BOXER is a perfect example of amphibious readiness issues. The ship
wasn't ready to go for its October deployment date. It went out in
April and was back in San Diego days later, with all the embarked
marines and their equipment offloaded at the pier. The lead ship in the
Amphibious Ready Group is pierside because the Navy couldn't maintain
it. There is a provision in the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense
Authorization Act that requires the Navy to regularly brief this
committee on Amphibious Warship Readiness. So, what is the Navy doing
to improve amphibious ship readiness?
Admiral Kilby. Conducting maintenance availabilities on-time
remains a top Navy focus. We are ensuring ships are combat-ready for
operational demands. Commander, Naval Surface Forces and Commander,
Naval Sea Systems Command conducted an Amphibious Ship Maintenance
Study of amphibious ship maintenance performance to identify areas
where the force can improve. The study covered broad aspects of
amphibious maintenance to include availability planning, execution,
modernization, government oversight, and quality control. Navy is
making changes in processes to drive delays down, improve maintenance
planning, and address poor material conditions. Navy will focus on
advanced planning for ship availabilities to ensure they start on time,
allow shipyards to order long lead material earlier, and better manage
their workforce. Upcoming budget submissions will reflect
implementation of these recommendations.
25. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, are there challenges unique to
amphibious ship readiness that are different than other classes of
ships that explain why amphibious ships have such lower readiness
numbers than cruisers and destroyers?
Admiral Kilby. The primary reason for amphibious ship deployment
delays has been emergent maintenance. These issues have occurred
outside of normal maintenance periods and are exacerbated by the ships'
age and previous deployment extensions. In addition, amphibious ships
have older engineering plants and the older large deck ships have older
steam propulsion systems with limited parts and technicians. They have
negatively impacted the Navy's force generation capability, reduced
maritime global operational presence, and increased both operational
and maintenance costs.
The majority of amphibious ship deferred maintenance is being
addressed in availabilities that commenced in fiscal year 2024 or are
programmed to start in fiscal year 2025. Age (30+ year old ships), high
operational tempo, and obsolescence of parts, systems, and specialized
labor are contributing factors to the higher deferred maintenance costs
for amphibious ships. Over $100 million of the $352 million is specific
to two LHDs whose ballast tank maintenance was previously deferred, but
this work will be done in their upcoming availabilities that begin in
fiscal year 2025. In compliance with the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA, the
Navy subsequently revised our amphibious ship force structure plan to
sustain 31 amphibious ships, and program for this deferred maintenance
in their fiscal year 2024 and fiscal year 2025 availabilities.
On June 12, 2024, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and
Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on Amphibious Warfare Ship Terms of Reference,
demonstrating Navy and Marine Corps full alignment and commitment to
amphibious ship readiness. The new terms of reference serve as
supplemental guidance to existing readiness reporting criteria and will
ensure consistency and uniformity in Navy and Marine Corps amphibious
force planning, assessment, and operational mission execution.
26. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby and General Mahoney, what
progress has the Navy made in coordinating with the Marine Corps to
identify the required number of operationally available amphibious
ships to meet Combatant Commander demand in the Indo-Pacific theater?
Admiral Kilby. Navy and Marine Corps work together, through the
global force management allocation process, to set the number of
operationally available amphibious warships, coupled with Marine
Expeditionary Units, each year to inform the global allocation of these
forces through the Global Force Management Allocation Plan and to meet
directed readiness table requirements.
Amphibious ships in the Indo-Pacific theater are permanently
assigned to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). USINDOPACOM
conducts nearly all of its maritime operations with its assigned forces
and does not usually rely on additional allocation of service retained
forces. Other Combatant Commands (CCMDs), such as U.S. Central Command
and U.S. European Command, rely on the allocation of service retained
and USINDOPACOM forces to conduct their maritime operations.
USINDOPACOM, in coordination with its maritime component U.S. Pacific
Fleet (PACFLT), sources its demand of amphibious ships by optimizing
their assigned operationally available ships. Last, in the event of a
crisis in USINDOPACOM, forces could be supplemented by amphibious ships
designated as the Immediate Response Force which may be reallocated
from other CCMDs.
The February 2024 joint Naval Board between the CNO and the CMC set
key priorities for improving and optimizing Navy and Marine Corps
amphibious operations. Since the Naval Board, a joint Navy-Marine Corps
Integrated Planning Team has met each week, coordinating efforts across
all echelons of command within each Service, to meet each of the four
priorities established by the Service Chiefs. In June 2024, common
amphibious operations terminology between the Navy and Marine Corps was
approved by a joint CNO-CMC MOU. Navy uses the language established in
this common lexicon to define ships as operationally available. PACFLT
and Marine Forces Pacific, in compliance with the common terminology,
continue to identify opportunities to support planned campaigning.
Additionally, the CNO and CMC endorsed a common amphibious warship
readiness reporting mechanism to ensure both services have a shared
perspective of the amphibious ship readiness at all times.
General Mahoney. In 2024, the Commandant and Chief of Naval
Operations directed respective staffs to work closely together to
refine supporting and supported Commander requirements to ensure
readiness of the Navy/Marine Corps team in support of Combatant
Commanders' demands. The Marine Corps is working diligently with the
Navy for creative solutions to maximize forward presence while the Navy
implements new controls in an effort to increase ship availability.
To enhance communication, the Navy and Marine Corps have signed a
Joint Memorandum of Understanding aimed at establishing a standardized
lexicon for amphibious warship readiness levels (as discussed in
question 29).
27. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, what is the current State of
readiness for Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) vessels?
Admiral Kilby. Twelve of the fourteen existing EPF vessels are at,
or scheduled to move to, long-term layberth locations for extended
maintenance periods, with most of the previously assigned crew members
reassigned to fully operational vessels. These vessels are in lay up
because of the need for extended maintenance, and to reassign the
Military Sealift crews to higher priority oiler and supply ships.
Reassignment of personnel from these vessels is one element of MSC's
Workforce Initiative, a comprehensive plan to address civilian mariner
retention and recruitment shortfalls, and the resulting crewing
shortfalls that are adversely affecting all 61 Government Owned/
Government Operated vessels. Two of the twelve EPFs will remain at
layberths in the Seventh Fleet area of responsibility while the other
ten are in CONUS at locations on the East, Gulf and West Coast. The
newest two EPFs, USNS Apalachicola and USNS Cody, are conducting
required post-delivery testing on the East Coast and will proceed to
their Post-Shakedown Availabilities this summer.
28. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, what is the current State of
readiness for the Landing Craft Utility (LCU) vessels?
Admiral Kilby. The current LCU 1610 class is an aging landing craft
that first entered service in the 1960s. Despite the age of this class,
the Navy was able to meet all LCU deployment requirements in fiscal
year 2024 and is projected to do so again in fiscal year 2025. The
long-term plan for this class is to replace them with the new 1710
class LCU starting in quarter 4, fiscal year 2025. Pacific units are
scheduled to receive their landing craft first, followed by Atlantic
units. fiscal year 2024 funding was allocated for depot level
maintenance on the 1610 class to ensure they remain operational until
they are eventually replaced by the 1710 class.
29. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby and General Mahoney, I
understand the Navy and Marine Corps will sign a document that
clarifies the common terminology applicable to amphibious warship
readiness. Will that document also apply to Expeditionary Fast
Transports, Landing Craft Utilities, and the leased commercial vessels
the Marine Corps is using as a mobility bridging solution?
Admiral Kilby. The Amphibious Warship Terms of Reference only
applies to Amphibious Warfare ships, which directly support Marine
Expeditionary Unit deployments onboard Amphibious Ready Groups, not to
Expeditionary Fast Transports, Landing Craft Utilities, or leased
commercial vessels.
General Mahoney. No. The Joint Memorandum of Understanding signed
by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps
on June 12, 2024, specifically targets the standardization of readiness
terminology for the Navy's amphibious warfare ships. This scope does
not extend to other vessel types, including Expeditionary Fast
Transports, Landing Craft Utilities, or leased commercial vessels that
the Marine Corps may use as part of its mobility bridging solution.
landing ship medium
30. Senator Sullivan. General Mahoney, the Marine Corps' public
position is that it agrees with the Future Years Defense Program
procurement profile of 1, 1, 2, 2, 2 for the Landing Ship Medium (LSM).
The problem is that each Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) requires nine
LSMs and this would only get eight by the early 2030s. In your opinion,
is a procurement profile that does not provide the minimum number of
LSMs to move one MLR (assuming 100 percent readiness) adequate given
the threat in INDOPACOM?
General Mahoney. The LSM program is late to need. The top priority
is to begin procuring a capability starting this fiscal year.
The initial Navy acquisition strategy was to procure 18, while
assessing the USMC requirement of 35, as LSM were delivered and
evaluated through employment.
Changes to LSM program since fiscal year 2024: Responses to the
Request for Proposal (RFP) received in fiscal year 2024 were deemed
unaffordable, as they were well over the $268 million estimated and
budgeted for the fiscal year 2025 procurement of the first vessel.
Therefore, the fiscal year 2025 NDAA was modified (section 128) to
disallow procurement of LSM solicited in the RFP, as defined by the
approved Capability Development Document requirements. NDAA offered an
``Exemption'' to utilize fiscal year 2025 funding to procure a
``commercial or non-developmental item.''
As a result, the Marine Corps, in coordination with the Navy,
revised a list of Top-Level Requirements for modified select threshold
values to acceptable levels achievable with currently available non-
developmental vessel (NDV) designs.
A Resources and Requirements Review Board (R3B) approved these
revised requirements on January 24, 2025, with the intent to procure
the first NDV as LSM Block 1 in fiscal year 2025, with incremental
procurements to match the initial President's Budget 2025 Plan for
eight in the FYDP.
Littoral Maneuver Bridging Solution (LMBS) to provide mobility,
maneuver, and sustainment to The Stand-in Forces (inclusive of the
MLRs) until LSM Block 1 are available in appreciable numbers.
As stated in the question, with original procurement profile of LSM
already ``late to need,'' the LMBS was developed, and approved by an
R3B in October 2023 to provide near-to mid-term operational mobility
and tactical maneuver until LSM reaches initial operational capability.
LMBS was originally intended to be a combination of vessels, to include
T-EPF, LCU, and chartered vessels, phased into service in theater
fiscal year 2024 to fiscal year 2029.
Uniformed sailor and MSC manning shortfalls have delayed
deployments of T-EPFs for LMBS, but other opportunities, such as
acquisition of LCU 2000 craft, spot charter of RO/RO vessels, and
extension of Stern Landing Vessel charters are intended to provide
capability to MLRs in the near term.
None of the LMBS vessels meet the full capability intended with the
LSM, but employed in the aggregate, these vessels will provide initial
mobility and maneuver capability to stand-in forces for the near-term.
31. Senator Sullivan. General Mahoney, what are the readiness
implications of standing up the first Marine Littoral Regiment prior to
having the Landing Ship Mediums ready to support it?
General Mahoney. Without the Littoral Mobility Bridging Solution
(LMBS)* and subsequent fielding of the Landing Ship Medium (LSM),
Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR) will be significantly hindered in
executing force closure from home station to their deployed area of
operations and tactical maneuver and sustainment while deployed in a
littoral operating environment.
However, delays in LSM development and challenges in implementing a
bridging solution have forced the 3rd MLR to rely on USTRANSCOM
support, limited to force-closure in their deployed area of operations
in the Philippines. This support does not enable tactical maritime
maneuver or sustainment within their operating area.
By fiscal year 2026, the 3d MLR will be capable of executing its
full mission-essential tasks during deployments, assuming adequate
naval support within a permissive operating environment and no shift to
crisis or conflict. If such a shift occurs, the MLR would lack the
ability to close the force from home station, reposition the force once
forward, and sustain the force during combat operations. In that case,
elements of the MLR already forward located across an island
archipelago, would be confined to movement via land, not able to
maneuver to critical choke points, not able to reposition to complicate
enemy targeting, and either quickly run out of critical supplies such
as munitions and unmanned systems, or be forced to receive resupply
from less risk-worthy (compared to LSM) strategic air and maritime
platforms.
* LMBS will be a combination of surface naval platforms
operationally available in the near term to provide an intermediate
capability to the MLR for a period of approximately 10 years, until LSM
squadrons are able to meet the operational demand. The target total
lift capacity for the LMBS is 116,100 sq ft of cargo and 1,200
personnel, validated in the October 2023 Navy Resource Requirements
Review Board process.
32. Senator Sullivan. General Mahoney, if the version of the
Landing Ship Medium procured in the Future Years Defense Program closer
to what the Marine Corps originally envisioned or what the Navy
originally envisioned?
General Mahoney. The Navy and the Marine Corps jointly concurred on
the LSM requirements during the requirements process. These
requirements supported the maneuver, mobility, and sustainment of
Stand-in Forces (inclusive of the MLRs) and were suitable for
operational employment and access (shallow draft and beach-ability)
within the intended operating environment. Based on the results of the
Request for Proposal, we made adjustments that are reflected in the
updated Top-Level Requirements. Tradeoffs for functionality, MILSPEC
components, and affordability resulted in the current approved
requirements.
The newly revised LSM Block 1 requirements for incremental
procurement of non-developmental vessels are sufficient to meet the
intended Marine Corps scheme of maneuver supporting distributed
operations. LSM Block 1 will provide marked improvement over the near-
term LMBS solutions and will allow an expanded phasing of capabilities
into theater.
33. Senator Sullivan. General Mahoney, what attributes in the
Landing Ship Mediums procured under the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP) would you eliminate in order to get a larger number of them
operationally available before the end of the FYDP?
General Mahoney. The new LSM block approved does just that--it
modifies the original requirements to deliver a more affordable vessel
in a timelier manner. The Top-Level Requirements for LSM Block 1 offer
sufficient attributes to support the marine scheme of maneuver and
distributed operations.
Beyond the ship's attributes, there is a great opportunity to build
LSMs by contracting with more than one vendor at more than one yard.
The implications for the ship building industrial base are apparent.
army 11th airborne resourcing & readiness
34. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, it is critical that the
Modified Tables of Equipment recognize the higher cost of operating in
the Arctic. That includes Cold Weather All-Terrain Vehicles (CAT-V),
snow machines, snow tires for tactical vehicles, and two sets of
extreme cold weather clothing. The snow tires are a serious issue.
Right now, all the division's tactical vehicles--Humvees, Joint Light
Tactical Vehicles, trucks--all use the same tires they would at the
National Training Center in the desert at Fort Irwin, California. These
do not provide adequate grip in the snow and ice the soldiers operate
in half the year. They use tire chains in training areas but can't use
them on the public highways they use to access the training ranges.
They deserve a better, safer solution that enhances tactical vehicle
mobility. Can you assure me that the 11th Airborne's modified tables of
organization and equipment will provide for appropriate equipment and
gear that reflects the division's unique mission?
General Mingus. Alaska is essential to the Army's ability to
maintain Arctic capabilities. In line with the 2024 DOD Arctic
Strategy, the Army will develop doctrine, training, and equipment to
meet the unique requirements of cold weather, mountainous, and high-
altitude environments. As we develop capabilities for Army 2030 and
beyond, this key terrain also remains an important part of our focus on
the Pacific theater. Therefore, the Army will ensure that 11th Airborne
Division is appropriately resourced with the soldiers, equipment, and
training needed to execute its missions.
The Army recognizes the unique equipment demand associated with
serving and operating across the Arctic. I am leading an Army
Requirement Oversight Council (AROC) to validate the personal equipment
(uniforms, skis, snowshoes) and organizational equipment (CATVs, snow
machines, tents, heaters) required to ensure our soldiers have what
they need to accomplish the mission in an Arctic environment. Upon
completion of the Army Requirements Oversight Council process, the Army
will develop and produce MTOEs and field new equipment as resources
allow.
35. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, the Stryker brigade combat
team (BCT) at Ft. Wainwright has transitioned into an infantry brigade
combat team (IBCT). The manning levels for these two BCTs are
different, with the Stryker Brigade Combat Team having around 5,000
personnel and the IBCT having around 4,000 personnel. It is my
understanding that 350 soldiers were assigned to 11th Airborne
Headquarters, leaving roughly 650 soldiers beyond what the IBCT calls
for. Knowing that 11th Airborne lacks a division artillery
headquarters, sustainment brigade headquarters, and aviation brigade
headquarters, will these formations be filled with the 650 soldiers who
are in excess of the IBCT's manning requirement?
General Mingus. The Army recognizes the strategic importance and
unique environmental challenges of Alaska and global arctic
environments. The conversion of the Stryker BCT to an Infantry BCT, a
formation that is (a) better suited for arctic conditions and missions,
and (b) more rapidly deployable to respond to missions in the Indo
Pacific region and around the globe, allowed the Army to create the
11th Airborne Division headquarters and invest in other critical Army
structure priorities. The 11th Airborne Division provides the Army with
a functional warfighting headquarters that can operate in Alaska and
that is capable of global deployment. The Army is committed to
investing resources to improve its capabilities to fight in the Arctic,
balanced with other regional and global requirements. As an example,
the Army activated the Arctic Aviation Command, an aviation
headquarters assigned to the 11th Airborne Division, designed to
provide oversight and command and control of all Alaska-assigned
Aviation units. Additional Alaska-based requirements will be considered
in the future during our Total Army Analysis process.
air force aircraft in alaska
36. Senator Sullivan. General Slife, the Air Force redesignated the
18th Aggressor Squadron at Eielson as the 18th Fighter Interceptor
Squadron (FIS), the only one in the Air Force. Lt. Gen. Nahom, the
Alaskan Command commander, said this decision was based on readiness
concerns for the 5th generation fleet in Alaska, which was previously
flying the Homeland defense alert mission. The 18th FIS has been
conducting real world intercepts for months, allowing F-22s and F-35s
to train and deploy more into INDOPACOM. In this process, the Air Force
overlooked the fact that its fiscal year 2025 budget called for the
divestment of 11 of the F-16s in the squadron. This would clearly not
leave enough F-16s to conduct the Homeland defense mission, which means
the F-35s and F-22s have to help out, negatively impacting their
readiness. What is the Air Force doing to ensure that the 18th FIS can
conduct the alert mission without requiring 5th generation fighter
augments?
General Slife. The Fiscal Year 2025 President's Budget (PB)
proposes reducing the 18 FIS Total Aircraft Inventory to 10 aircraft,
providing sufficient augmentation for F-22 and F-35 aircraft to execute
the Homeland Defense Mission in Alaska. The Fiscal Year 2025
President's Budget is only a snapshot in time, and with more experience
operating the new mission, the Department of the Air Force (DAF) will
continue to evaluate the appropriate aircraft inventory for the 18 FIS.
The DAF will closely monitor the Homeland Defense Mission in Alaska to
ensure robust and resilient Homeland Defense capabilities are postured
against threats. Simultaneously, we must reduce legacy aircraft and
transition limited resources to newer platforms than can deter and
defeat future threats.
37. Senator Sullivan. General Slife, what is the long-term plan to
replace the pre-block F-16s with a suitable replacement aircraft?
General Slife. A portion of the pre-block F-16 Fleet (Block 15/25/
30) will be recapitalized with F-15EX or F-35 Aircraft. This plan
allows the Department of the Air Force to focus modernization efforts
on the most advanced-post-block aircraft and divest the least capable
aircraft. F-16 post-block fleet will receive advanced capabilities to
improve survivability and increase offensive viability in evolving
threat environments into the 2040s. The Air Force intends to right-size
current aircraft inventories to expedite the transition away from less
capable aircraft and prioritize investment in cutting-edge
capabilities.
38. Senator Sullivan. General Slife, can you re-affirm the Air
Force's commitment to deliver four KC-135s to Eielson?
General Slife. Yes, the Department of the Air Force is committed to
delivering four (4) KC-135s to Eielson.
space force fighting from garrison
39. Senator Sullivan. General Guetlein, at a time when all the
other services are shifting their concept of fighting to be
distributed, expeditionary, and agile, the Space Force is unique in
that it will have to remain a garrison force to conduct sustained,
reliable operations in the space domain. Can you explain how redundant
and reliable sources of energy and water are needed at Space Force
Stations in a way that is different from the other services?
General Guetlein. The Space Force's ability to conduct critical 24/
7 operations from our home stations is reliant on resilient
installation systems and infrastructure. We have identified the key
systems and infrastructure that are essential to mission success. We
maintain resilient energy and water through a comprehensive approach to
security, multi-source system redundancy, and risk management to ensure
our systems remain operationally capable across the entire spectrum of
conflict.
40. Senator Sullivan. General Guetlein, do your units at Space
Force Stations train to ensure mission continuity in the event of
utility disruption?
General Guetlein. Yes, many of our units operate critical 24/7
mission systems and train to ensure mission continuity in the event of
utility disruption. Guardians train and participate in continuity
exercises to ensure mission continuity by identifying utility
disruptions, ensuring their systems seamlessly transfer to back-up
power, and by implementing procedures to return to main power as
appropriate.
missile defense
41. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, General Mingus, General Slife,
and General Guetlein, the Department of Defense has funded efforts to
defend the United States from ballistic missile attacks for over half a
century through a Missile Defense System (MDS). The MDS consists of
diverse land-, sea-, and space-based systems and assets located across
the globe. Among more recent plans, the Department of Defense is
developing an integrated missile defense system for Guam, which is
planned for operations in 2027. How is the Department of Defense
ensuring that combatant commands' readiness requirements for the
Missile Defense System (MDS) are pacing evolving missile threats?
Admiral Kilby. The Joint Staff leads the Integrated Air and Missile
Defense (IAMD) Capability Portfolio Management Review (CPMR) which is a
top down, concept driven, threat-informed capability development
process that informs DOD decisionmaking. The CCMDs, Services, and the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) participate in this process. The CPMR
process conducts continuous and comprehensive portfolio reviews. An
important input to this process is the Combatant Commands' Integrated
Priority List (IPL), which prioritizes issues that limit the CCMD's
ability to successfully achieve assigned roles, functions, and
missions. An output of the IAMD CPMR is the Joint IAMD Portfolio
Priority List (JIPPL), which is a prioritized list of capabilities
required to enable CCMD and joint force objectives. Both the IPL and
the JIPPL are used in developing service budget proposals.
General Mingus. As a member of the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council, I review the annual Capability Gap Assessment for Integrated
Air and Missile Defense to ensure that Army and Joint capabilities are
meeting combatant command requirements and evolving threats. In this
role I also review periodic Capability Portfolio Management Reviews for
Integrated Air and Missile Defense to assess evolving threats relative
to the Joint Warfighting Concept. These two Joint processes ensure
appropriate balance within the Integrated Air and Missile Defense
portfolio and inform the Missile Defense Agency for their budget
development process. In addition, I serve with the Army Acquisition
Executive as a member of the Missile Defense Executive Board in its
mission to provide oversight of the activities of the Missile Defense
Agency.
General Slife. The current priority across the entire Department of
Defense is to deliver on the President's Executive Order issued on
January 27 calling for the development and fielding of a next
generation missile defense shield for America. This DOD-wide effort
will place the burden of escalation upon the adversary, thereby
strengthening deterrence and providing greater security for the
American people.
General Guetlein. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviews
the annual Capability Gap Assessment for Integrated Air and Missile
Defense to ensure that joint capabilities are meeting combatant command
requirements. Periodic Capability Portfolio Management Reviews for
Integrated Air and Missile Defense assess evolving threats relative to
the Joint Warfighting Concept. These two Joint processes ensure
appropriate balance within the Integrated Air and Missile Defense
portfolio and inform the Missile Defense Agency for their budget
development process. The USSF provides Integrated Tactical Warning and
Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) capabilities for the INDOPACOM area of
responsibility. The ITW/AA requirements, operational status, and
capabilities are managed through a USSPACECOM/NORAD Operations Approval
Board and Mission Overview Board to ensure ITW/AA capabilities are
meeting combatant command requirements.
42. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby and General Mingus, given the
substantial investment for missile defense in Guam, what are you doing
to ensure there are sufficient munitions/interceptors to meet mission
requirements?
Admiral Kilby. IAMD is a whole of DOD effort. The Department is
investing in uplifting the munitions industrial base's capabilities and
capacities across prime manufacturers, sub-vendors, as well as organic
DOD arsenals. We are also seeking to procure to maximum executable
production rates for critical munitions. For instance, the Navy is
procuring new SM-6 missiles at maximum production capacity, while also
using supplemental funding to perform recertifications on the existing
SM-6 inventory. The Navy will work closely with the MDA to ensure the
Aegis Guam System munition requirements are accounted for and
prioritized appropriately in DOD planning and procurement profiles.
General Mingus. The Fiscal Year 2025 President's Budget Request
includes $303 million for the Army to support missile defense in Guam.
The Army will position sufficient interceptors on Guam to meet the
initial unit requirements with additional inventory shipped to meet the
anticipated demand signal as required.
43. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby and General Mingus, what are
the expectations of maintenance and downtime for the various systems
deployed to Guam?
Admiral Kilby. The various systems deployed to Guam create a
layered defense that minimizes overall maintenance and downtime. The
decision to bring any element down for maintenance is informed by
USINDOPACOM decisions, the Concept of Employment, and readiness posture
levels.
General Mingus. The individual capabilities under development that
make up the Army's Guam Defense System (GDS) are designed to minimize
downtime and meet the Operational Readiness (OR) goal of 90 percent.
Each individual system's sustainment plan and associated Technical
Manuals ensure scheduled and unscheduled maintenance is performed as
instructed. In most cases, initial system maintenance will be provided
via Contractor Logistics Support and each Army system will have
appropriate maintainers assigned, along with required repair parts to
meet anticipated demands. Additional maintenance data will be gathered
as Army GDS systems progress through planned developmental and
operational testing, along with soldier logistics demonstrations.
44. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby and General Mingus, how does
the Department of Defense plan to maintain 360-degree missile defense
capability of the new, integrated system in Guam when deployed systems
have periods of planned and unplanned downtime?
Admiral Kilby. In order to minimize the effects of planned and
unplanned downtime, the missile defense capability being developed for
Guam takes a system-of-systems approach with a variety of layered
sensors and effectors plus integration of multiple command and control
and fire control systems.
General Mingus. Like all air and missile defense systems, the Guam
Defense System (GDS) must provide a sustainable and operational
capability that minimizes the adverse impacts of air and missile
attack, even during periods of planned or unplanned downtime. This
starts with a deliberate threat analysis and defense design based on
the operational environment. Planned downtime is maximized during
periods of lowest assessed risk to mitigate the potential threats,
commensurate with mission requirements and available resources.
Enhancing the overall effectiveness of the defensive capability during
downtime requires a layered system-of-systems approach that can be
sustained over time and integrated into a common command and control
system with sufficient capacity to address the volume of any potential
threat.
marine corps aircraft squadrons
45. Senator Sullivan. General Mahoney, what analysis informed the
decision to move back to 12 aircraft squadrons?
General Mahoney. Two primary inputs informed the decision to
increase the number of F-35 aircraft per squadron from 10 to 12 across
18 Active component squadrons and 2 Reserve component squadrons. First,
extensive exercising revealed that the ten aircraft per squadron
construct yielded a sub-optimal sortie generation rate. Twelve aircraft
squadrons, on the other hand, enable the Fleet Marine Force to achieve
higher sortie generation rates that better satisfy the demands of the
service and wider joint force.
Second, Johns Hopkins University conducted a third-party assessment
that validated these findings. Their independent study supported the
service's conclusion that 12 aircraft per squadron is the appropriate
construct to ensure mission success and operational efficiency.
46. Senator Sullivan. General Mahoney, what are the benefits to 12
aircraft squadrons versus 10 aircraft squadrons?
General Mahoney. The 12 aircraft squadron construct provides two
primary benefits. First, anticipated threats in the current operational
environment necessitate aircraft inventories that maximize sortie
generation rates and unit mobility. Detailed analysis revealed that a
12 aircraft construct enables the Marine Corps to achieve greater
sortie generation rates than the 10 aircraft construct, while still
allowing squadrons to deploy in support of Marine Expeditionary Units
and other vital GFM commitments.
Second, the 12 aircraft construct provides the Marine Corps with
greater sustainment capabilities and readiness profiles for its F-35
fleet, due to the flexibility inherent in this increase.
47. Senator Sullivan. General Mahoney, what changes is the Marine
Corps making to CH-53K squadrons?
General Mahoney. The Marine Corps is in the process of replacing
its legacy heavy lift helicopter, the CH-53E Super Stallion, with the
new and improved CH-53K King Stallion. The CH-53K is the only viable
replacement for the aging and inventory-limited CH-53E, due to its
ability to support the Marine Corps' critical Heavy Lift Mission. It is
a vital component of the mobility and logistical support required for
distributed operations in a contested environment. Upon the completion
of this transition, the Marine Corps will still maintain six
operational squadrons and one Fleet Replacement Squadron. Although the
transition may provide insights into personnel organization, there are
currently no planned or anticipated changes to the CH-53K squadron
construct.