[Senate Hearing 118-696]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-696
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
INVESTIGATIONS REPORT
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 6, 2024
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-205 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota TED CRUZ, Texas, Ranking
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts ROGER WICKER, Mississippi
GARY PETERS, Michigan DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin JERRY MORAN, Kansas
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JON TESTER, Montana MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado J. D. VANCE, Ohio
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
PETER WELCH, Vermont Virginia
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming
Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
Jonathan Hale, General Counsel
Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Liam McKenna, General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on March 6, 2024.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 3
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 9
Statement of Senator Blackburn................................... 15
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 16
Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 18
Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 21
Statement of Senator Schmitt..................................... 22
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 24
Statement of Senator Vance....................................... 25
Statement of Senator Baldwin..................................... 28
Statement of Senator Duckworth................................... 30
Statement of Senator Welch....................................... 32
Statement of Senator Warnock..................................... 34
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 35
Statement of Senator Lujan....................................... 37
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 39
Witnesses
Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety
Board.......................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Appendix
Letter dated March 13, 2024 to Hon. Maria Cantwell and Hon. Ted
Cruz from Jennifer Homenty, Chair, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 45
Letter dated March 13, 2024 to Ms. Elizabeth Martin, Vice
President, Enterprise Safety and Mission Assurance, The Boeing
Company from Timothy LeBaron, Director, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 48
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Jennifer Homendy
by:
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 50
Hon. Gary Peters............................................. 51
Hon. Ted Budd................................................ 52
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD INVESTIGATIONS REPORT
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 6, 2024
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Maria
Cantwell, Chair of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cantwell [presiding], Klobuchar, Schatz,
Markey, Peters, Baldwin, Duckworth, Tester, Rosen, Lujan,
Hickenlooper, Warnock, Welch, Cruz, Fischer, Moran, Sullivan,
Blackburn, Young, Schmitt, Vance, and Capito.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
The Chair. Good morning. The U.S. Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation will come to order.
Today, we are having a hearing on the National
Transportation Safety Board investigations and reports. I
welcome the Chair, Safety Board Director, Jennifer Homendy.
Thank you so much for being here.
The NTSB is the Nation's safety watchdog, ensuring that
safety is a top priority for the transportation industry and
the U.S. Department of Transportation. Through its impartial
investigations into transportation accidents, the board makes
recommendations that have transformed transportation safety.
NTSB's recommendations prompted action to require railroads
to use positive train control, passengers to use seatbelts, and
commercial airlines to have well-rested crews. However, the
needs to continue to improve safety are ongoing. For instance,
runaway near misses and close calls in aviation sector are far
too frequent and we simply must do better.
East Palestine derailment and the inspections that have
been less than lacking on the requirements to make sure that we
really are looking out for these longer trains and
improvements, and that is just frustrating given last
Saturday's Norfolk Southern derailment in Pennsylvania where
three trains collided.
And we are seeing a crisis in our Nation's roadways. In
2021, the latest data we have, fatalities are the highest since
2005. In my home state, fatalities have increased 40 percent
since the pandemic and 70 percent in the last decade.
So, while all of that is enough to think about, we are
urgently in need of an NTSB that is operating at full strength
and investigators that will use that expertise to help us plan
for improved safety. That is why this committee has passed out
our aviation bill with the reauthorization of the NTSB.
And I want to thank you for your hard work in eliminating
backlogs that we have seen at the NTSB, but clearly, you need
more investigators on the job to help. The FAA Senate bill
advanced by this committee also requires that the FAA finalize
their 24--sorry, 25 hour cockpit recording rule, also flight
data recorders, and improve with aviation safety inspectors
from the FAA.
I think these are important reforms that will be critical
to the NTSB and that is why we are working hard with our House
colleagues to finalize the House bill and send it to the
President's desk. But obviously the safety concerns of the
flying public is probably the main focus of this morning's
hearing.
Serious questions remain unanswered about the door plug
accident on Alaska Flight 1282, and we need to be satisfied
that manufacturers have strong, strong quality controls and the
FAA oversight is robust.
The FAA and manufacturers, in my opinion, should listen to
machinists and professional engineers who are asking for a
stronger safety culture to improve certification and production
quality, and we need to do everything to make sure they are not
intimidated on the job to just keep the line moving.
Members have been briefed about the accident and this
committee will continue to do its oversight role. On February
6, 2024, you--the NTSB released its preliminary report
regarding flight 1282.
I appreciate its prompt investigation of the accident and
its preliminary findings. The committee continues, though, to
be concerned about the deficiencies in safety culture. I think
probably also articulated or illuminated by the individual
report that was required by our ACSAA bill and was delivered
just a few weeks ago.
The report implies that the Boeing facilities may have
significant--now I am saying your report, to be clear--implies
that Boeing facilities may have significant deficiencies in
record keeping. The investigation continues to determine what
manufactured documentations were used to authorize the opening
and closing of the left mid exit door plug during rework.
In particular, we want to know about the disclosure of
records that may show why or how it was improperly installed
and what caused the accident of 1282, which raises questions
that we will ask in the Q&A period, whether the documents even
exist. These are important issues that we need to get to the
bottom of.
There are lots of people in the Northwest, not just those
who work at Boeing, but those who are involved in an aviation
culture around our state. We want to get this right. So, I look
forward to asking questions about this.
We also, in my opinion, need to continue the final report
on the East Palestine that was helped inform by Senators Brown
and Vance and the Railway Safety Act. We need to include
speeding up the phaseout of legacy tankers and--that carry
flammable liquids, require railroads to provide states with
information about hazardous materials, and we need to pass the
Senate bill that highlights many of these things.
So, I look forward to hearing more about the status of
these investigations and what else we can do to make sure that
the NTSB is fully operational and capable of doing this
investigative job. Thank you, and I will turn to the Ranking
Member.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair. We are here today to
have a comprehensive discussion about the work of the National
Traffic Transportation Safety Board, or the NTSB. I want to
thank Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy for being here today and for
her strong leadership at the NTSB.
I certainly recognize, and I am sure my colleagues here
would agree, the magnitude of the task of investigating complex
and tragic incidents thoroughly and impartially, and NTSB's
arduous task is only made more difficult by the lack of a full
board, a situation that I hope the Senate soon rectifies.
Naturally, we all want answers from an investigation as
soon as possible, but proper analysis takes time. I am grateful
for your work, Madam Chair, and for the work of all the members
and staff at the NTSB. The NTSB serves the important function
of identifying the causes of transportation incidents and
making recommendations to prevent similar future ones.
Both private and public sector transportation operators
learn from NTSB's investigations and recommendations. The NTSB
does not have regulatory authority over transportation safety.
Whether the NTSB's recommendations are considered by Congress,
placed in regulations, or voluntarily adopted by companies
depends on the credibility of the board to conduct thorough
investigations without prejudice to a conclusion.
Maintaining that credibility is essential. I look forward
to hearing from Chairwoman Homendy about the investigations
before the NTSB. Americans are rightly concerned about the de-
pressurization event on Alaska Airlines Flight 1282, concerned
about runway incursions such as the one that occurred in
Austin, Texas, and the derailment in East Palestine, Ohio last
year.
I recognize that the Chairwoman may not and should not
guess what the Board's recommendations will be or discuss
nonpublic information from these investigations. However, I
hope to hear about the status of those investigations and any
preliminary information that is appropriate to share at this
time.
Relatedly, I plan to ask the Chair about a recurring
problem with Congressional oversight of transportation
incidents that are concurrently under investigation at the
NTSB. In some cases, companies that are party to NTSB
investigations have cited NTSB's confidentiality agreement and
regulations as restricting what those companies can provide to
Members of Congress and when.
That is, of course, incorrect. Administrative regulations
and nondisclosure agreements do not trump Congress's
Constitutional power of inquiry and I look forward to hearing
the Chair's opinion on the matter as a former Congressional
staffer herself. This committee also needs to hear about the
NTSB's authorizing statute, as well as the reauthorization
proposal the NTSB submitted to Congress.
Members of this committee must have the opportunity to
comprehensively examine the NTSB as an agency and to
contemplate any changes to the NTSB's authorizing statute. Let
me be clear, the NTSB is a critical agency that does vital
work.
I support that work, and I am happy to engage in a thorough
discussion about its authorities, in addition to the funding it
needs. Without that discussion, I think the Senate would be
failing to meet its responsibilities at a time when the
importance of the NTSB could not be clearer.
Fortunately, today's hearing is an opportunity to begin
such a discussion. Thank you.
The Chair. Thank you, Senator Cruz. And now we will hear
from the Chair. Thank you for being here. We look forward to
your remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JENNIFER HOMENDY, CHAIR,
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Ms. Homendy. Thank you, and good morning. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss the NTSB, our needs, our
challenges, and our critical safety mission. Throughout a
typical year, the NTSB works on about 2,200 domestic and 450
foreign cases, and we expect the number of cases annually to
remain high and continue to increase in complexity.
Some investigations understandably get more public
attention than others, but all our investigations are critical
to improving safety.
I understand that members of the Committee have a
particular interest in our highest profile investigations,
including the in-flight structural failure of a Boeing 737-9
and the Norfolk Southern train derailment in East Palestine.
These investigations are critically important, and I am
happy to answer as many questions as I can. But I do want to
emphasize that these investigations are ongoing. There is still
a lot of work to do to understand what led to these events, so
I want to be careful not to undermine the work of our
meticulous investigators.
Unlike the Alaska 1282 investigation, two dockets are open
to the public on East Palestine. They contain over 6,400 pages
of factual information, which I can discuss at length. With
that said, these are just 2 of 1,200 active open NTSB
investigations in 47 states and Puerto Rico, in addition to the
140 open foreign investigations in over 50 countries.
We owe it to the families of those involved, to the
communities where events occurred, and to the traveling public
to find out what happened in all these tragedies to prevent
them from reoccurring.
That is as true for Alaska 1282 as it is for the recent
natural gas fueled home explosions and fires in Mississippi
that killed a woman in our home, or for the multi-vehicle crash
in Ohio on November 14 of last year, which included a
motorcoach carrying high school band members and killed six
people, or for the hot air balloon accident in Arizona on
January 14 that killed four.
Over the last year, the NTSB has completed many significant
and complex investigations and issued safety recommendations to
prevent these kinds of tragedies. There are currently over a
thousand open safety recommendations that we have made across
every mode of transportation. In 2022 and 2023, we issued 159
new recommendations and closed 261.
Of those closed, 80 percent were closed acceptable, meaning
that the recipient took action to implement the safety
recommendation. This success rate demonstrates the value of our
recommendations, and we appreciate the efforts of recipients to
address them.
The NTSB is also pleased that this committee has included
provisions in FAA reauthorization to address a number of our
recommendations. That work will save lives and we thank you for
it. We also appreciate the Committee's efforts to reauthorize
the NTSB as part of the FAA bill.
Our authorization expired at the end of Fiscal Year 2022,
and we are incredibly grateful for the $140 million that was
just provided to us in the Fiscal Year 2024 appropriations that
is before the House and Senate under consideration.
We are a small agency relative to our Federal partners,
both in terms of the size of our budget and our workforce. But
as the numbers show, our impact is profound and
disproportionate. I like to say we are a small agency with a
big voice, and everyone at the NTSB plays a critical role in
achieving our mission to make transportation safer.
To continue the work as the world's preeminent safety
agency, the gold standard, and develop recommendations that
advance safety change without delay, we need more resources.
Flat funding in the out years, as proposed in the Senate bill,
would frankly devastate our agency, in fact, it is
unprecedented, and reverse the progress made on enhancing and
preparing our workforce for emerging challenges and improving
the timeliness of our investigations.
As you work through conference, I strongly urge your
continued support for the NTSB's ability to carry out our
critical safety mission now and in the future. Before I close,
I mentioned loss earlier. Loss is not new to the NTSB. We know
all too well how fragile and precious life is, but when it hits
home, it hits us hard and reminds us once again what is truly
important, our relationships with each other.
The NTSB is in mourning this week from the sudden death of
our Director of Marine Safety, Captain Morgan Turrell. Morgan
began his career at NTSB in 2003 as a Nautical Operations
Investigator. He left in 2007 to serve as Vice President of
Marine Investigations for Princess Cruises and returned to the
NTSB in 2010.
In 2014, Morgan became Chief of Investigations in our
Office of Marine Safety. Three years later, he was promoted to
Deputy Director and then to Director in 2021. Morgan was a
marine safety expert. He was a proud graduate of the U.S.
Merchant Marine Academy and served as a licensed deck officer,
including master, on a variety of commercial vessels, and he
was an incredible advocate for improving safety on our
waterways.
His last words to me on February 11 were, ``I am surrounded
by my family.'' Morgan was very close to his family, and we are
fortunate to have been part of Morgan's. He was an incredible
person. He was so kind and thoughtful. A mentor, a teacher, and
a friend to so many of us at the NTSB, the Coast Guard, the
Navy, and the Merchant Marine Academy, and he will be missed.
As a mom, I cannot imagine a greater loss than the loss of
your child. I spoke to Morgan's mom yesterday, and she said
that there will be a piece of her missing forever. So, I want
to extend our deepest condolences to Morgan's mom, Katherine,
Morgan's father, Brian, and his older brother, John.
And I also want to extend my deepest condolences to all my
colleagues at the NTSB for such a tragic loss. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Homendy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chair,
National Transportation Safety Board
Good morning, Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and members of
the committee. As chair of the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
provide an update regarding the NTSB's activities.
The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress with
investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and
significant events in the other modes of transportation--railroad,
transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine
the probable causes of the accidents and events we investigate, and
issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In
addition, we conduct transportation safety research studies and offer
information and other assistance to family members and survivors for
each accident or event we investigate. We also serve as the appellate
authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner
certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and
U.S. Coast Guard, and we adjudicate appeals of civil penalty actions
taken by the FAA.
Our current investigative workload includes over 1,200 active
investigations in 47 states and Puerto Rico, in addition to supporting
more than 140 foreign investigations in over 50 countries. Throughout a
typical year, we work on about 2,200 domestic and 450 foreign cases,
and we expect the number of cases annually to remain high and continue
to increase in complexity. The vast majority of these are aviation
accidents being investigated by staff from our four regional offices.
They also include major investigations, such as the in-flight
structural failure of a Boeing 737-9 MAX over Portland, Oregon; the
derailment of a Norfolk Southern train in East Palestine, Ohio; and
multiple runway incursion and other near-miss incidents at airports
across the country.
Some investigations, understandably, get more public attention than
others, but all of our investigations are critical for improving
transportation safety. We know that we owe it to the families of those
involved, to the communities where events occurred, and to the
traveling public to find out what happened, why it happened, and to
make recommendations to help ensure it never happens again. Some of our
other significant ongoing investigations include the following:
Natural gas-fueled home explosions and fires in Jackson,
Mississippi
A multivehicle crash, including a motorcoach carrying
members of a high school band in Etna, Ohio
A multivehicle crash between a motorcoach and tractor-
trailers parked along a rest area ramp in Highland, Illinois
A student struck by a truck while getting off a stopped
school bus in Excelsior, Wisconsin
A truck colliding with a group of bicyclists in Goodyear,
Arizona
A tanker truck rollover and rupture with anhydrous ammonia
release in Teutopolis, Illinois
An electric bus fire in Indianapolis, Indiana
A Chicago Transit Authority train collision with a snow
removal machine in Chicago, Illinois
Multiple rail employee fatalities in Ohio, Massachusetts,
and North Carolina
A coal train derailment off a bridge over Interstate 25 in
Pueblo West, Colorado
A hot air balloon accident in Eloy, Arizona
A mid-air collision at the Wings Over Dallas airshow in
Dallas, Texas
As I testified before this committee in November of last year, our
Office of Aviation Safety currently has six investigations open into
runway incursion events that occurred in 2023 alone.
On January 13, 2023, an American Airlines 777 crossed an
active runway at JFK without clearance, causing a Delta 737 to
abort takeoff. The two aircraft came within 1,400 feet of each
other, putting 308 lives at risk.
On January 23, 2023, a United Airlines flight at Inouye
International Airport in Hawaii crossed the same runway where a
Kamaka Air flight was landing. The aircraft came within 1,173
feet of each other, putting 303 lives at risk.
On February 4, 2023, a Southwest passenger jet and a FedEx
cargo plane were less than 200 feet from colliding at Austin-
Bergstrom International Airport in Texas, putting 131 people in
danger.
On February 16, 2023, in Sarasota, Florida, an Air Canada
Rouge A-321 was cleared for takeoff from the same runway where
an American Airlines B-737 was cleared to land. The two planes
came within 3,168 feet of each other, putting 372 lives at
risk.
On February 22, 2023, in Burbank, California, a Mesa
Airlines jet initiated a go-around while a SkyWest jet was
still departing the runway. The two planes came within 300 feet
of each other, putting 118 lives at risk.
On August 11, 2023, a Cessna business jet and a Southwest
Airlines flight came close to colliding at San Diego
International Airport. The planes were about 100 feet from each
other, putting at least 117 lives at risk.
We are also investigating a collision that occurred on October 24,
2023, in which a Hawker 850XP airplane collided with a Cessna 510
airplane at William P. Hobby International Airport in Houston, Texas.
In addition, over the last year we have completed many significant
and complex investigations and issued safety recommendations in all
modes to prevent tragedies similar to those I mentioned. These
completed investigations were tragedies that occurred in some of your
states or that involved your constituents, such as the following:
A crash between a pickup truck and a transit van carrying
members of the University of the Southwest's golf team--from
Hobbs, New Mexico--in Andrews, Texas
A pipeline rupture and crude oil release in Edwardsville,
Illinois
A grade-crossing collision between a Metra commuter train
and a box truck in Clarendon Hills, Illinois
Incidents involving fishing vessels in Alaska and Texas
Rail and transit employee fatalities in Texas, Colorado, and
Illinois
A multivehicle crash in North Las Vegas
An airplane crash into Mutiny Bay in Washington
A grade-crossing collision between an Amtrak train
(Southwest Chief) and a dump truck in Mendon, Missouri
An Amtrak train (Empire Builder) derailment in Joplin,
Montana
A Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority accident in
Boston, Massachusetts
A wrong-way driving crash between a service truck and a
motorcoach on Interstate 20 in Big Spring, Texas
A natural gas-fuel explosion and fire in Coolidge, Arizona
A multivehicle collision in Phoenix, Arizona
A train derailment in Raymond, Minnesota
We currently have over a thousand open safety recommendations
across all modes as a result of our investigations. In 2022 and 2023,
we issued 159 new safety recommendations and closed 261. Of those
closed, excluding those that were classified reconsidered, no longer
applicable, and superseded, 192 (80 percent) were closed acceptably,
meaning that the recommendation recipient took action to implement the
safety recommendation. This success rate demonstrates the value of our
recommendations. Our recommendations are meaningful, and we appreciate
the efforts of recipients to address them, even when it literally takes
an act of Congress to make it happen.
For example, we are pleased that, as Congress works to complete FAA
reauthorization, this committee has included provisions to address our
recommendations to require 25-hour cockpit voice recorders on new and
existing aircraft; to improve air tour safety and remove regulatory
loopholes that allow lower standards of safety for some paying
passengers; to ensure that the FAA completes its rulemaking to address
the hazards unmarked towers present to agricultural and other general
aviation aircraft; to reduce turbulence; to improve aviation safety in
Alaska; and to improve runway safety.
We also appreciate the committee's efforts to reauthorize the NTSB
as part of the FAA reauthorization. Unfortunately, we need even more
funding to continue our important and life-saving work. The president's
Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 budget request for the NTSB proposed $145
million, and we anticipate $150 million in the president's budget for
FY 2025, which is still lower than the NTSB's reauthorization proposal,
but higher than the House and Senate reauthorization levels. The
current House FAA reauthorization legislation authorizes $142 million
for FY 2024, and $145 million for FY 2025, with at least $5 million per
year increases in the following years. In contrast, the current Senate
FAA reauthorization, recently passed by this committee, flat funds the
NTSB at $145 million, $5 million less than the president's expected
budget request, beginning in FY 2025. These authorization levels
proposed by the Senate, if appropriated, would require us to reduce
staffing levels and would degrade our mission readiness for critical
safety investigations, such as our East Palestine investigation,
Portland investigation, and the many other investigations I mentioned.
I urge this committee to take advantage of the conference process to
raise authorization levels to meet the needs outlined in the NTSB's
reauthorization proposal.
The NTSB is a small agency relative to our Federal partners, in
terms of the size of our budget and our workforce, but, as our
recommendation implementation success rate shows, our impact is
profound. Everyone at the NTSB plays a role in achieving our mission to
make transportation safer. The reauthorization proposal we sent to
Congress last year represents a modest downpayment on the investments
in the skilled workforce and enhanced authorities our agency needs to
boost transportation safety nationwide and across all transportation
modes. Our dynamic workforce includes the following:
Investigators who go to the scene of an investigation and
those who work in our laboratories
Family assistance specialists who support victims and their
families
Writers who develop our reports and help craft our safety
recommendations
Advocates for our safety recommendations who track those
recommendations' progress in industry, the states, and at
Federal agencies, and who work to ensure implementation
Administrative and human resources officers who support our
ability to recruit, retain, and train our workforce and make
sure we acquire and manage our resources responsibly
Those who keep our technology up-to-date and reliable
Judges and legal counsel who decide pilots' and mariners'
certification appeals
Communications professionals who share the agency's work
with the public and our stakeholders
Their hard work, professionalism, and dedication is the reason that
the NTSB is regarded as the world's preeminent safety agency, and one
of the best places to work in the Federal government.
To continue as the world's preeminent safety agency, completing our
investigations and developing recommendations that advance safety
changes without delays, we must meet the challenges that come with
increasing growth and innovation in transportation. Therefore, it is
critical for the agency to have additional resources to respond to
events without affecting our timeliness, the quality of our work, or
our independence.
We currently have 230 investigators across all modes and would need
to add over 50 more specialists to be fully staffed today. Those
specialists include, at a minimum the following:
16 aviation investigators
10 highway investigators
3 marine investigators
10 pipeline and hazardous materials investigators
5 rail investigators
This does not even begin to address staffing needs in our support
offices.
In the NTSB laboratory, we would need an additional 12 employees to
fill current vacancies. Those vacancies include a medical investigator,
research analysts, materials engineers, and vehicle performance and
recorder specialists. The lab also needs an additional $2.4 million to
replace aging and obsolete equipment, which is critical to conducting
robust and comprehensive investigations. Funding below our requests
would reverse the progress made on enhancing our workforce and
improving the timeliness of our investigations and issuance of safety
recommendations.
These resources will allow us to hire professionals with the
required skills, to purchase the equipment necessary for those skilled
professionals to do their jobs, and to invest in crucial staff training
and development. Our workforce is our greatest asset and is essential
to our mission.
As you consider the NTSB's reauthorization and our appropriations,
I request that Congress support our ability to carry out our critical
safety mission now and in the future; to recruit, retain, and develop a
highly qualified, specialized, diverse, and inclusive workforce; and to
prepare the agency for investigations involving emerging transportation
technologies and systems to improve transportation safety.
The Chair. Thank you, Chair Homendy, and thank you for
remembering him this way at the hearing. I think you represent
an organization that is all about the culture of those
inspectors behind the scenes doing incredibly important work
that we only know the results of. We don't get to see the
faces.
They don't come before us in this way. So, thank you so
much, and we are so sorry for the NTSB's loss and this
individual. I am going to let my colleague, Senator Fischer,
ask the first question, and then I will come back to me in a
minute.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you,
Chair Homendy for being here today. I appreciate it. Last year,
the University of Nebraska, Lincoln campus conducted a first of
its kind crash test of an electric pickup truck to study
whether current highway guardrails adequately protect against
the growing number of those heavier EVs that are on our roads.
At 60 mph, the 7,000 pound electric truck tore through the
barrier without offering any protection to the traveling public
or reduction in speed. I have recently heard from first
responders that are also concerned about responding to electric
vehicle fires.
Forty percent of firefighters have never had EV fire safety
training, and I have heard of instances of more water needed to
extinguish vehicle batteries and the increase in those toxic
gases from the lithium batteries.
What has NTSB found in its investigations on the EV crashes
that are unique compared to the internal combustion engines?
Have you begun to condense that data so it can educate us on
what is happening here?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. Just a few years ago, we issued a report
on the risks of lithium ion battery fires in electric vehicles
to first responders and to second responders, and we defined
second responders in the report as tow truck operators.
We had done a number of investigations where there was
significant risk to the first responders in terms of stranded
energy in the vehicle and in the battery and its components
itself, the amount of work it took to extinguish the fires, and
the potential for shock to emergency responders themselves.
In fact, we did an investigation in Mountain View,
California where the first responders had to reach out to the
auto manufacturer to ask them to come to the scene of the crash
was--they were just--they were lucky they were three miles
away.
But if you think about volunteer firefighters who may be in
a rural area, that is not--that is not something that is
readily at their ability to get people on scene. In this
particular one, we saw re-ignition several times of the
electric vehicle and we have with others not just on the scene,
but also on the tow truck, and up to 5 days later in the tow
yard itself.
So they are a significant risk in terms of battery fire.
They are a significant risk in terms--for emergency responders.
And while we have not done an investigation involving electric
vehicles and the weight, I have raised a red flag numerous
times to say it is an impact on safety.
You mentioned the excellent work that was done by the
University of Nebraska. Their--our guardrails and crash
attenuator, they are rated up to 5,000 pounds. Many of these
vehicles go up to 10,000 pounds.
One vehicle, the lithium ion battery alone weighs the same
weight as a Honda Civic, 3,000 pounds. So, that has an impact
on safety, not just on infrastructure, making sure that people
in the vehicles are safe after there is a crash.
But vehicle to vehicle, vehicle to those outside of the
vehicle, and as I said, vehicle to infrastructure. It is going
to have a significant impact on safety.
Senator Fischer. I wanted to follow up with your comment,
when you just talk, you know, about the weight of these
vehicles. Currently, we have governmental regulations that
stipulate the use of the male crash test dummies in vehicle
testing, and it doesn't mandate any inclusion of female crash
test dummies.
And this is despite the data that is out there revealing a
17 percent higher mortality rate and a 73 percent higher
likelihood of serious injury among women who are in these
vehicle crashes compared to men.
And given the statistics that are out there just on regular
vehicles, not even on EVs with exponential increase in the
weight there, don't you think that we need to look at female
crash test dummies as well so we can start to gather data
there?
And do you have any information on the different sized
vehicles that women may choose to drive compared to men?
Ms. Homendy. Women typically picked--pick larger size
vehicles, sport utility vehicles, minivans, the larger
vehicles. We, you know, whether it is an electric vehicle, or a
gas fueled vehicle, we are seeing increasing sizes and weights
of vehicles across the industry.
Crash test dummies, right now for adults, are based on
really back to the 70s, based on an adult male that is the
height of about 5,9" and weighs 175 pounds. That is not
applicable to most females. I don't know how many of us have
gotten into a vehicle as a female, I am 5,4" and that seatbelt
comes across my neck.
It was until I have my most recent one where I can put up
the seat that it comes down, but that has our stature--or the
stature of different types of people need to be taken into
consideration. I am really thankful for your work in this area,
by the way, and very pleased with the GAOs report that came out
as a result of that work.
I do hope NHTSA takes them up on it, and really takes those
recommendations seriously to really look at the different types
of people who are operating in our vehicles to ensure safety.
And it is not just the safety of the individuals. It is also
making sure that those vehicles are structured so they are
protecting. It is the crashworthiness of the vehicle and
protecting those inside it.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. And I hope when you
gather the statistics on the threats that our first responders
face with these vehicles, you make that available.
Ms. Homendy. Yes. And I--we will make sure that your staff
gets our report, and I am happy to come in at any time and go
through the issues.
Senator Fischer. Thank you so much.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
The Chair. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair. As this committee has
investigated transportation incidents, from the derailment in
East Palestine, Ohio to the depressurization incident on Alaska
Airlines Flight 1282, a common refrain from parties to NTSB
investigations is that they need advanced approval from the
NTSB prior to providing documents and information to Members of
Congress. Madam Chair, is that true?
Ms. Homendy. That is not true.
Senator Cruz. As you know, this committee has significant
oversight authority and responsibility. Does the NTSB's
confidentiality agreement with parties to NTSB investigations
restrict access by Members of Congress to documents and
information in any way?
Ms. Homendy. Absolutely not. And parties should not use the
NTSB as a shield.
Senator Cruz. Thank you for clarifying. I agree, but that
is important to have that on the record, so I appreciate it.
Ms. Homendy. Absolutely. You have a right to that
information and should get that information.
Senator Cruz. Thank you. Turning specifically to Alaska
Airlines Flight 1282. I am deeply concerned about potential
safety issues with the Boeing 737 MAX 9. It is essential that
the NTSB's investigation get to the bottom of this and identify
any safety issues and potential solutions.
To that end, it is equally important that the parties to
the investigation cooperate fully with the NTSB, with Congress,
and others investigating the incident. Madam Chair, how
cooperative have the parties to the investigation been with the
NTSB? And have you gotten timely access to the documents, the
information, and the witnesses you need?
Ms. Homendy. There are a number of parties to the
investigation. Some parties have been very cooperative. For
example, the Federal Aviation Administration.
Boeing has not provided us with the documents and
information that we have requested numerous times over the past
few months, specifically with respect to opening, closing, and
removal of the door and the team that does that work at the
Renton facility.
Senator Cruz. Wow. Are you telling us that that even 2
months later, you still do not know who actually opened the
door plug?
Ms. Homendy. That is correct, Senator. We don't know. And
it is not for lack of trying. It is not unusual that we don't
get information immediately in an investigation. I can point to
numerous investigations where this occurs, and it takes months
and months to get information. But for this one, it is 2 months
later.
We know for a fact that there is a team that deals with the
doors in Renton. There is an entire team of 25 people and a
manager. We--the manager has been out on medical leave. We have
not been able to interview that individual. We have asked for
the names of the other 25 people, have not received the names.
We have asked for the records with respect to what
occurred. We have asked for what shift did it occur on. We
think we know what days the work occurred on, but that is only
because of our investigator's work looking at pictures and e-
mails to try to get to the bottom of that information.
We don't have the records. We don't have the names of the
25 people that is in charge of doing that work in that
facility. It is absurd that 2 months later we don't have that.
Our investigators right now are at the Renton facility, and
they are conducting interviews, from--it started--those started
on Sunday, and they will continue for the rest of the week.
You know, one example, while we were out there, we
investigated both the Spirit Aerospace employees that did the
work on the rivets, while we don't know who does work on the
door plug. For the Spirit Aerospace employees, we were just
informed last week, they are actually not Spirit Aerospace
employees.
They are contractors. They work for three different
contracting firms, Aerotek, Strom Aviation, and Launch. All
three--are in the state of Washington. All three people work
for three different entities for Spirit Aerospace.
Those were not told to us by Spirit Aerospace. That
information was told to us through the individuals who were
being interviewed that contacted us directly. So, I have
engaged--we have engaged our attorney on this matter, just so
you are aware.
Senator Cruz. Well, I will say that is utterly
unacceptable. And the parties who are being investigated by
NTSB need to cooperate fully, and Congress expects them to
cooperate fully because you have an obligation to the American
public to get to the bottom of what happened. Today is March 6.
I am going to ask you to inform this committee in writing,
one week from today, whether or not Boeing has cooperated. And
I expect you to have that list of 25 names.
And so, I am going to ask you a week from today to inform
this committee in writing whether they provided those 25 names
or not, because this investigation needs to get to the bottom
of what occurred and what caused that accident.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you. I will provide that to the
Committee in writing, the 25 names. It is not just the 25
names, we would also like to get, and we have repeatedly
requested from Boeing the documentation that went along with
the work of opening the door plug, closing the door plug, or
any sort of removal, if that exists.
Senator Cruz. So, please include that information as well
when you respond in writing a week from today to let us know
the level of cooperation you are seeing.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair. Thank you. Following on, the expert review panel
found that Boeing employees are still afraid to speak up and
report safety issues. There is a way for employees to speak
directly to the FAA. Is there a way for people to speak
directly to NTSB to aid in this investigation?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. In fact, I received a whistleblower
report myself, anonymously. We received some information that I
made sure our team has. It also went to our team.
So, we do have a couple of ways. The best way is for people
to reach out to us at the website of [email protected], and we
will make sure to follow up on that information.
The Chair. Were you able to get from the company what
specific procedures that they have for identifying, storing,
protecting, retrieving, and retaining quality records? Did
they--were they forthcoming on that?
Ms. Homendy. We have not received that information.
The Chair. Does the fact that Boeing has not produced these
documents, or that NTSB investigators have not been able to
retrieve them, indicate that they do not exist or ever existed?
Ms. Homendy. They may not. There are two options, either
they exist, and we don't have them, or they do not exist. Which
raises two very different question--several different questions
depending on which one is the right answer.
The Chair. Would--if you don't have that documentation,
what does it say about the quality assurance program?
Ms. Homendy. We know they have a--we have been told, let me
back up on that--we have been informed that they have a
procedure to maintain documents on when work is performed and
including when door plugs are opened, closed or removed. We
have not been able to verify that.
And without that information, that raises concerns about
quality assurance, quality management, safety management
systems within Boeing.
The Chair. So that is why I asked that first question about
procedures for identifying, storing, and protecting. Everybody
knows out at Boeing that the workers think that the plane will
fly when the paperwork weighs more than the plane.
That is their way of saying a lot of paperwork exists.
People know that you don't move the line without paperwork. It
is just part of the process. So, the question is, are you
looking at those procedures, and you are saying they are not
forthcoming even on the procedures?
Ms. Homendy. That is correct. But we are looking at those
procedures. We go very in-depth and very broad. We will look at
the procedures, policies.
We will also look at other work that was done around the
same time or within the last several years to see if there are
concerns with other work or records that may be missing.
So, we go in depth, and we are also going in depth on
safety culture, safety promotion, safety management as a whole.
The Chair. OK. And so, do you--and is the FAA and their
aviation safety investigators helpful in this or not helpful?
Ms. Homendy. FAA has been very cooperative and very helpful
to us in the investigation, and we appreciate them. They have
been a partner throughout this from the very beginning.
The Chair. So, I am saying, do any of their aviation
inspectors onsite have data or information about what processes
and procedures may have existed or didn't exist?
Ms. Homendy. That is something that I would like to follow
up with our team and get back to you on.
The Chair. OK. And then, back to this point, every shift is
documented. You know the workers that were involved in this
particular area. You can get their names. You can ask for
interviews with those individuals. And you are saying that that
hasn't happened?
Ms. Homendy. Correct. We have gone through e-mails. We have
gone through texts. We have looked at pictures to begin to get
a picture of the date, in mid-September, or the two dates in
mid-September that we believe the work occurred. We haven't
received that information directly from Boeing.
We also believe we know what shift it occurred on. But we
still--there is one team, one team that deals with the doors of
25 people. Why we don't have those names today, two months
later, is really disappointing.
The Chair. Well, it is beyond disappointing. We have an
entire economy that depends on people getting this right. And I
thought that the CEO said that they would cooperate to the
fullest. So, it seems like this information is now stymieing
your investigation, and it seems that it is knowable and that
you should at least be able to talk to the individuals there.
Do you have any concerns, there was a report about there
could be an additional, because there was a consent decree that
was about to expire, that any kind of other investigation by
Department of Justice would impact your investigation?
Ms. Homendy. I do have concerns. Our attorneys also have
concerns, only from the aspect--we don't want to tell any other
agency what they should or should not do. Where it becomes a
concern for us--we will get the information at some point.
Where it becomes a concern for us is when employees and others
don't feel safe to speak to us. And so, they begin----
The Chair. Well, that is occurring now. And so, what do we
need to do to make sure that people feel safe and secure? That
is part of the expert report, part of why we passed ACSAA to
make sure there was no retaliation.
What else can we do? And we can't have a viewpoint that I
just had to keep the line moving. That is not the viewpoint we
want. We want employees who are saying, I have a concern about
this, to be listened to and to be backed up by those FAA ASIs.
That is what we want.
And so, in this case, we want to understand whether that
kind of retaliation still exists and what we can do to make
sure that these people feel free to speak to you and to others
who are investigating.
Ms. Homendy. I completely agree with that. The aviation
industry is so safe because we do encourage, the industry has
encouraged anonymous reporting, and through anonymous
reporting, addressed risk proactively and encouraged employees
to speak up.
That is how we have addressed safety and gotten to our
excellent gold standard safety record we are in today in the
aviation industry. Without that, there is a significant
concern. I am aware of the concerns with Boeing, which is why
we are delving into safety culture and safety management.
The Chair. And have you discussed this, because I know that
the FAA Administrator just had a 5-hour meeting with them last
week. Was this--do you think this was part of the discussion?
Ms. Homendy. With FAA?
The Chair. Yes.
Ms. Homendy. I imagine so.
The Chair. OK. Senator Moran, and then Senator Rosen--
Senator Blackburn.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I appreciate
that, and I say thank you to my colleague. I want to thank you
for coming to Tennessee recently. I want to thank you for your
hands on approach as you are dealing with these issues of train
crashes.
And I know it has been more hands on than President Biden,
and I appreciate that. Also, I want to say thank you for the
outreach this week, as we had a plane crash in Nashville, and
for your forthcoming information that has helped us with that,
the press conference that you have held. I would like to ask
you if there is any additional information that you can supply
today on that plane crash?
Ms. Homendy. The only additional information is that we
moved the wreckage to a secure location in Tennessee, and we
are beginning to look at the wreckage. Our deepest condolences
to the family, two adults and three children. It was very
tragic.
But as we receive more information, I will make sure that
you continue to remain informed on this.
Senator Blackburn. I appreciate that, and indeed, we do
extend those condolences. And what a tragic situation, but as
we discussed yesterday, gratitude that no lives were lost there
on I-40 when that plane crashed.
I do want to add to the comments of the Ranking Member and
Chair about our concern over lack of cooperation and what we
perceive is lack of cooperation on these investigations.
And I know that is a source of frustration for you and your
team. It is for us, because we hear that some of the
manufacturers are not as cooperative as they should be, the
maintenance organizations are not as cooperative.
And Madam Chair, I would add that it is not only the
planes, it is also trains. It is also other entities that are
involved in the flying public. I do have one other question I
wanted to ask you about. I have advocated for the let
experienced pilots fly.
When we look at the number--what is happening in aviation
and the need to get these planes in the air, on time, on
schedule for the flying public, and I recently offered that as
an amendment. It failed. I know the unions are against this. I
know the union bosses had reached out to the FAA to block this,
raising the pilot age from 65 to 67, and keeping these
experienced pilots flying.
Yesterday, my flight coming in, we had turbulence. I was
glad that there was a guy with experience in the cockpit. And I
would just like to know if the Airline Pilot Association has
reached out to the NTSB to stand against that?
I know you can't take a position on the issue, but I want
to know if the union has reached out to the NTSB requesting a
position?
Ms. Homendy. No, Senator, the union has not reached out to
the NTSB requesting a position. They know that the NTSB bases
its recommendations on the facts around a particular
investigation, and we don't have a recommendation in this
particular area.
Senator Blackburn. OK. And, of course, I think for the
Administration, for the union to reach out to the
Administration and the Administration to have a position like
the FAA had on this is completely inappropriate. Thank you so
much, and I yield back my time. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you, Senator.
The Chair. Senator Klobuchar. I thought Senator Rosen would
be next, but Senator Klobuchar had signed in, so sorry that
she's here, and then we will go back to Senator Moran.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Very good. Thank you. Thank you very
much, Ms. Homendy, and thank you for your work. I wanted to
start out with just railway safety, something you know is big
in every state.
The NTSB determined that the cause of that derailment in
Raymond, Minnesota, appreciate your interest in that, was a
broken rail along a section of a track near the town. Can you
talk about investment in tracks and how important it is, and
the importance of the Railway Safety Act?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, investment in rail and our rail
infrastructure is an investment in safety. So certainly, I
would strongly support investment in rail.
On the Railway Safety Act, we are appreciative to the
Committee for including a number of our current recommendations
on rail, including expanding the definition of high hazard
flammable trains, providing more information to local
communities, to responders, making sure they have the gear and
the training that they need to conduct their important safety
mission, and certainly addressing DOT-111's.
We would ask that DOT-111's, the provision be expanded even
further to eliminate them from all hazmat service. One thing in
particular out of the Raymond, Minnesota investigation, I will
just mention, as we found out from--with the DOT-117 tank cars,
we saw that the gaskets around those particular tank cars,
especially the bottom outlet valve and some others melted.
And so, the lading came out, the material came out. So that
is something we have recommended to be addressed in a couple of
our investigations. Happy to provide more information to you on
that.
Senator Klobuchar. Yes. And as you know, the rail, they
were there on the scene. Immediate clean up. We were fortunate
not to have what happened in Ohio and the town handled it, as
did your agency, well, so.
Ms. Homendy. Yes, they did a great job. BNSF did a great
job on that as well, and it was great working with them. And I
was pleased to be on the scene as well.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you, yes. I remember that. It
was a cold day.
Ms. Homendy. It was cold. Great community though. They all
came together and brought us lots of warmth and cocoa and you
name it.
Senator Klobuchar. Exactly. I think I will ask on the
record the NTSB's open recommendations on rail crossings. Just
that is something also I wanted to mention and move to another
part, air traffic control hiring.
We, I have talked to Ms. Whitaker about this, just we have
a very active airport, a great airport. Voted best in North
America two of the last 3 years. And could you talk about
focusing on training and hiring more controllers?
He told me there is going to be a look at using military
people, hiring them more often, and just important to that for
safety.
Ms. Homendy. Yes. Training--I mean, hiring is key. The FAA
has set goals for hiring. What we are not talking about is the
people who leave every year, which is about half. So, it is a
constant catch up. Investment in the FAA also, besides the
NTSB, robust, sustained investment, long term, is key for FAA
success and for air traffic control and making sure people are
hired and trained.
With respect to training, we have been advocating for
meaningful value added training and training personnel to
proficiency. The one concern I would worry is with respect to
the aviation industry and really across the transportation
industry is we have gone to this death by PowerPoint in
training.
Whether it is iPads or computer based training, there are
great simulators. One I just went to at DCA with respect to air
traffic control, that is a great training tool, hands on for
air traffic controllers, which they deserve.
We have found that this move toward iPad, PowerPoint
training, that employees aren't really digesting that well,
even training a week ago. And so, it is not just providing
meaningful value, added training, but really looking at how
people learn. Not everybody can learn well from an iPad or a
PowerPoint.
So, making sure that they get the training that they need,
that is appropriate for their positions.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Very good. Last, on next generation
9-1-1. I am the Co-Chair of that bipartisan caucus. The NTSB
has issued recommendations related to 9-1-1 systems in several
investigations in recent years. Can you talk about the
importance of improving that 9-1-1 infrastructure?
We all know people aren't just calling in on landlines
anymore. They are calling in on cell phones. They want to send
pictures and there have been some improvements across the
country, but there could be many more.
Ms. Homendy. Yes, I mean, they are the first responders on
the scene, and we are the investigators.
So, making sure that they have robust communication
systems, they have the infrastructure they need, people are
able to get someone on the other line and that 9-1-1 as a
whole, we have a number of recommendations on 9-1-1 operators
and then also local emergency responders on coordination during
an investigation and ensuring there is appropriate
coordination.
Happy to provide more information on all our
recommendations for that.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Very good. And just one last thing
on air traffic control as our Chairwoman has returned, is that
Senator Braun and I have a bill to boost FAA training capacity,
increase the FAA's use of its expedited hiring authority, and I
hope you will look at that.
I think it could be helpful. And I see Senator Moran is
here as well, Madam Chair, who is Co-Chair of the tourism
caucus and has done a lot on air. So, thanks.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
The Chair. Senator Moran.
STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Moran. Chairwoman, thank you. Chair Homendy, thank
you for your presence again today. Thank you for your continued
efforts to keep us informed and hopefully helpful in the cause.
NTSB released on February 6 its preliminary findings.
You hosted several of us at NTSB of where we got to see, in
a sense, kind of the hands on circumstances and to hear from
your investigators. So, I think I had a good feel for what I
thought transpired at that point in time, and your testimony
today about lack of cooperation suggest--doesn't suggest, it
tells me that there is more to be known than what that
preliminary--preliminary examination determined.
So, what is it that keeps you from being able to issue your
final report? And maybe you have already said that this
morning, but I want to hear it in a concise, what is missing,
kind of answer.
Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you. So, our preliminary reports
that we issue within 10 days to 4 weeks after an initial event,
provides factual information that we have so far. But it really
is just the beginning of the investigation.
When we conduct investigations such as this, a major, we
certainly focus on timeliness of investigation. But it does
take time because we are looking into different areas. When I
had you all to our lab, and thank you for coming there, I
wanted you to be able to see the door plug in person, to put
eyes on it, rather than looking at a picture or looking at a
diagram.
I think putting eyes on something makes it that much more
real and you can understand what we are looking at. So, I
wanted you to be able to see what we had reported in the
preliminary report with respect to which bolts were missing.
There are a lot of bolts, and there was a lot of
information--that hold components on this door plug and on this
frame, and there are four safety critical retaining bolts. They
are--their sole purpose is retaining this door plug on the
airframe.
And so, what I wanted you to understand is what we saw is
there were no four bolts there. And how we were able to
determine that with our lab equipment and then later confirm it
through some pictures that we received from Boeing.
I also wanted you to be able to see that there were 154
flights in total that had occurred, and so we could see at the
top of that door plug how that door plug was migrating upwards
until it finally came out on the 154th flight. I wanted you to
be able to see that with your eyes.
The--since that time, we have received all the information,
and thank you to the FAA Administrator for this. We asked him
for all the information that they had gathered with respect to
the inspections of the other door plugs that--outside of Alaska
1282. We were able to confirm that we were talking about
different bolts.
Their bolts are the bolts that they were talking about that
were loose were bolts around, again, holding components on the
door plug or on the frame itself, but the four bolts that we
are talking about, with the exception of a few missing cotter
pins that they got, the four bolts we are talking about were
safety critical. Those were not the ones that FAA had
identified in their work.
So now just transitioning to the full investigation, we
have different teams that are digging into different pieces of
this investigation. Our structures team, our operations team,
survival factors team.
Our maintenance records team is what I am updating you on
today, which is in Renton right now interviewing a number of
personnel, Spirit Aerospace contractors, three of them, and
then we have a number of other personnel who work for Boeing,
who were--we understand we are doing work around the area
around the same time.
That work was being done on the rivets and the door plug in
about mid-September to try to identify the list of 25 people
because it is important that we begin to dig into those
procedures, those policies to understand, you know, where we
need to go on this investigation. We have asked repeatedly for
information.
Again, this is not new to this--not something that's just
specific to this investigation. We find this on other
investigations where we repeatedly ask and don't get
information, but we continue to ask.
And so, for this one, there is a lot of information
missing. I do not understand how we could not get the names at
this point 2 months down the road, and it is not for a lack of
trying. Now we are down to interviewing people who were in that
area. We asked for security camera footage.
Renton has security cameras all over the facility. We asked
for security camera footage so we can understand who did the
work. So, it is like----
Senator Moran. What is the explanation of why you haven't
received that information from Boeing or Spirit? I guess it is
Boeing in this case.
Ms. Homendy. We have not gotten a good--we have either not
gotten an answer, or they are saying they are trying to provide
it but can't find it. On the security camera footage, all their
security camera footage is erased within 30 days and
overwritten.
The Chair. Just to be clear, are you referring to the names
of people who were working that shift, or are you talking about
the documents?
Ms. Homendy. The documents, they can't find it. The names,
we haven't been provided.
Senator Moran. Let me ask you about what you said about the
three subcontractors. Those are subcontractors of Spirit
AeroSystems?
Ms. Homendy. That is correct.
Senator Moran. And that was--became known--it was thought
that Spirit AeroSystems actual employees were doing work, which
turns out to be being done by subcontractors of Spirit?
Ms. Homendy. That is correct. That is correct. With three
different entities for the three different people, we had to--
--
Senator Moran. Have you seen information in regard to that
circumstance?
Ms. Homendy. We are not at this time. It was a surprise to
us that we were not told before being contacted by the
individual employees that they were contractors and who they
were contractors for. But we don't have other information that
is missing right now from Spirit Aerospace to my knowledge.
Senator Moran. Two quick questions that I want to ask
before my time expires further. The NTSB--and do you make
interim recommendations as far as safety? So that even though
your final report is not done, are there things that are
occurring at your recommendation that makes flying more safe?
Ms. Homendy. We can issue urgent recommendations, urgent
safety recommendations at any point if we believe they are
warranted. But we have to base those urgent safety
recommendations on factual information. So, when we believe we
need to, we do not hesitate in doing that. We don't wait until
the end.
Senator Moran. Is there any difference of views in NTSB's
findings to date and the FAA findings to date?
Ms. Homendy. No, I have not identified any differences. We
have some differences in work that we have done and differences
in responsibility, but I will say they have been very helpful
throughout the course of our investigation, and we appreciate
that work.
Senator Moran. Chairman, while it is not as much money as
you would have requested, this week we are expected to pass the
appropriation bill that funds NTSB, and it is an 8.2 percent
increase, which is significantly higher than most other
agencies within our capabilities of a budget that is less
spending this year than last.
Ms. Homendy. I strongly want--I want to just say thank you.
It is really appreciated. Many times, at the NTSB, we have to
look at tradeoffs. We have a number of lab equipment that is
ending its useful life.
And oftentimes I am looking at can we train somebody, or
can we replace lab equipment? That is not a tradeoff I like to
make. And so, that investment is a direct investment in safety
with the NTSB, and I just want to thank you so much for
providing that, and also for including our reauthorization bill
in FAA. Thank you so much.
I know I am a strong advocate on our funding, and I
appreciate you hearing the needs of our workforce.
The Chair. Thank you. Senator Rosen.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chair Cantwell, and Chair
Homendy, thank you for your hard work and for your commitment
to safety and to finding out the causes of everything that is
going on. I want to talk a little bit about not necessarily
what happened with this plane, but just our aging
infrastructure overall that impacts aviation safety.
Because aviation professionals are only as effective as the
infrastructure and technology that they rely on. And the
average age of an FAA Air Route Traffic Control Center, the
actual center, is over 60 years old.
These facilities regularly operate with degraded technology
systems, resulting in an inability to access accurate wind
speed. The failure of radio frequencies within congested
airspace is really hurting them sometimes.
And we have malfunctioning runway lights. Many airports
also lack functioning surface surveillance radar systems that
used to track airborne and taxiing planes, as well as airport
ground vehicles, meaning that some controllers have limited
visual awareness of the aircraft that they are directing.
In lieu of a functioning radar system in the air traffic
control facility, many controllers are actually filling the
gaps by resorting to using public flight tracking websites that
aren't approved by the FAA. Perhaps the most alarming are the
reports that the FAA lacks the funding to install runway
warning systems to help prevent these runway collisions. Only a
few dozen of the Nation's commercial airports have surface
surveillance, excuse me, collision warning systems.
So, Chair Homendy, how can we improve existing aviation
technology and infrastructure to reduce this potential risk,
manage this complicated airspace? It is not just the air
traffic controller staffing. We know that is important. But how
does this all fit in, because this is another piece of the
safety that we need to worry about?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, I would just say what I have said
previously in other testimony, which is robust funding for the
FAA. The FAA needs funding for all--whether it is a DOT modal
administration or the NTSB, that investment is an investment in
safety, and they need that support in terms of funding, whether
it is for runway lights or whether it is for technology to
prevent runway incursions.
There is also technology that we have advocated for and
recommended going back 23 years, and asked the FAA to require
airlines to include technology in the cockpit of an airplane to
alert pilots when there is an impending, runway incursion.
That is something that they could act on right now without
having funding. But the other side of that is investment in
technology, in our towers to ensure safety and to supplement
safety for the workforce.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Well, I hope we continue to get
more infrastructure money for our airports because we have a
lot more emerging aviation technology on the forefront. I know
that we have a lot of this going on in Nevada, but it is going
on all across the country. And it is new. It is exciting.
We have air taxis that are delivering a tremendous promise
and drones that are going to do delivery for your packages,
maybe your medications. This can help in urban and rural
settings. We know that is being tested across the country.
But all of these new technologies in airspace really raise
an additional layer of aviation safety concerns as U.S.
airspace becomes much more complex with all these new entrants.
So again, I know we need the investment. Maybe the airlines
need to do some, but we need to do our part.
How should the aviation community, how should we
realistically look at integrating these new technologies like
air taxis, the unmanned air vehicles for drone delivery, into
the aging system, like you said, that is just dealing with so
many near-misses and so many other issues because our
technology is aging? How do we integrate this and move forward?
Ms. Homendy. Well, I can tell you what the--speak to what
the NTSB is doing. On the safety side, we just need to make
sure that innovation isn't number one.
Safety has to lead. Safety always has to be number one.
When it comes to the NTSB's work with emerging technologies,
whether it is AAM, drones, or any other type of technology that
is emerging, we just need to be ready. So, the investment--and
I appreciate Senator Moran and his advocacy, and Senator
Cantwell and others on this committee's advocacy for NTSB
funding for Fiscal Year 2024 and also in the reauthorization
bill, because that will help prepare us for when we are doing
on our investigations for any of that emerging technology.
We have done some recent ones. There are advantage is to
some of those investigations where we have looked at doing
investigations even in testing and development to make sure the
industry understands our investigative process, while also for
us to ensure we are keeping up with the technologies that are
out there.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. In light of what you said,
I hope that the NTSB is not going to retire its most wanted
list of safety priorities, because I think that is really
important for all of us to know as far as what we need to
invest in going forward. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Schmitt.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC SCHMITT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Madam Chair. Good to see you.
Ms. Homendy. Good to see you.
Senator Schmitt. I did have some questions. I know that
Senator Fischer mentioned some of this earlier as relates to
electric vehicles. The weight of some of these vehicles
including--I know you mentioned the battery alone can be the
weight of a Honda Civic or a Toyota Corolla. And so, there are
certainly safety issues there as relates to guardrails and
other vehicles on the road. You would agree with that, right?
Ms. Homendy. Yes.
Senator Schmitt. There are also issues--I want to talk
about our infrastructure too. The weight of these vehicles, the
strain that it can have on parking garages, roads, and bridges.
The amount of money that will be expended to either reinforce
or repair.
Who is looking at this? Because we have a mandate for auto
manufacturers to produce 50 percent of their fleet to be
electric vehicles by 2030. I know there is a new rule in the
works to have that number increased along with 65 percent or 75
percent by 2032. That is being considered.
So, it seems to me we are entering this phase as it relates
these mandates for electric vehicles and all of these
repercussions, all of these ancillary concerns, I don't know
who is addressing it.
So, I am asking you, are you guys looking at this? Who is
looking at this? Because this seems to be a disaster on the
horizon for the American people and our infrastructure, but I
don't hear a lot of talk about it.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you, Senator. I have raised this
consistently over the past year and a half, starting with the
Transportation Research Board, where I raised concerns with
respect to increasing size and weight of all vehicles, but
particularly the weight of electric vehicles.
That we really needed to look at the safety impact, not
just on crashes, but to our infrastructure as well, and
protecting people.
The whole reason why we have a guardrail is to protect
people when there is a crash, yet it wouldn't withstand some of
the crashes with some of these high weights of heavy vehicles,
including heavy electric vehicles, as was demonstrated by the
University of Nebraska.
Somebody needs to take action here. We have repeatedly
flagged it. It is within the Department of Transportation's
purview to do that, and I encourage them strongly to get ahead
of it. We are behind right now.
Senator Schmitt. And I know that as it relates to first
responders who are responding to, you know, crashes or other,
you know, that are involved--that the lithium batteries are
involved with, what is your take on the safety for our first
responders as they are responding to these EV crashes?
Ms. Homendy. It is a significant danger. We issued a report
just a few years ago raising concerns regarding a number of
crashes that we investigated involving electric vehicles and
the risk to emergency responders from stranded energy inside
the battery and components, and the potential--the significant
potential for shock.
We also raised concerns with respect to secondary
responders, which are the tow truck operators, because we saw
many of these vehicles reigniting on the tow truck and up to 5
days later in the tow yard.
Senator Schmitt. So, I guess the last question I have. So,
you have raised these issues, you have flagged the issues that
relates to particularly weights to--of the EVs to the
Department of Transportation. Have you gotten a response? Have
Secretary Buttigieg or anyone responded to that? Is there any
momentum? What do you need from us?
Ms. Homendy. So, we have not issued a specific safety
recommendation, but we have raised it as an emerging trend and
a problem that they need to take seriously. I have not had
further interaction.
Senator Schmitt. OK. We will look forward to working with
you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
The Chair. Thank you. Senator Peters.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair. And Chair Homendy,
thank you so much for being here today, and certainly, I
appreciate your advocacy, as well as your leadership at the
NTSB.
I serve as the Surface Transportation Subcommittee Chair of
this committee, and I certainly strongly support reauthorizing
the board. And as a member of Appropriations Committee as well,
I know how important it is to provide robust funding, as you
have mentioned already, and certainly that has to happen on a
yearly basis, and you have to understand exactly what that
money is or the amount and that it will continue for you to
plan accordingly.
In particular, I note that you have called for increase
year over year funding for your authorization request,
reflecting the need for more resources in the coming years due
to staffing and capacity needs, including relating to changing
realities on the ground in our transportation system.
One thing I am particularly interested in is ensuring that
the NTSB is able to meet the challenges of more connected and
automated transportation system. I believe that connectivity
and autonomous systems have the capability to reap huge rewards
in terms of safety in the years ahead, and we have to do that
obviously with oversight and investigations, but all of that
requires the resources to make that happen.
So, my question for you, ma'am, is can you discuss the
importance of having NTSB reauthorization and robust
appropriations for NTSB specifically, specifically to enable
the board to meet the demands for cutting edge transportation
technology and increased capacity needs related to data
analytics in the coming years?
Ms. Homendy. You know, right now, Senator, we are a small
agency. Before the CR, we had 444 people. When I came in as
Chair, we had 397 and I rapidly filled our vacancies. As a
result of the CR, we have a hiring freeze, and we have gone
down to 429. We cannot bring another person in.
Where that is a significant issue is our employees, our
investigators, are doing more with less. So, if you just take
our structural engineer, our lead structural engineer on Alaska
1282, he is on duty 50 percent of his year, 50 percent. He has
one trainee right now, but it will take her--she is excellent,
but it will take her one to 3 years of training just to handle
a major on her own.
So, we need the people, not just in order to do the work
and do the work well. We also need the people to make sure that
we have timely investigations, which I think Congress and the
American public deserve. I was able to work with our team to
reduce the backlog that we had of investigations over two
years.
Those were almost 500 over two years when I took over as
Chair. We hit zero on October 1. We are in a CR situation,
having gone down significantly--I think pretty significantly in
our aviation team. We are back up 15 over two years.
This is the direct result. Not to mention the fact that I
am making daily choices with our team on how do we deal with
$14 million of requests internally for needs on training, for
needs on new lab equipment, which is at the end of its useful
life.
Or, you know, do I fund--because before I became Chair, our
entire electrical, AV, and streaming system in our public
boardroom, which provides information to the public when we
hold a public board meeting, how do I get that information out
if that equipment isn't working? I ask--and you know, we have
put out feelers for how much that will cost to replace, and I
get back between $1 million and $2 million, $2.5 million.
Do I invest in that to make sure the public can watch our
board meetings, or do I invest in training that our people
need, or do I invest in our people? These are the tough choices
we have to make every single day. We are looking at these
numbers every single day and very cognizant.
The NTSB are the world standard when it comes to
investigating accidents, crashes, and other events. We need to
remain the gold standard, and the way we do that is through
investment, not starving us. And so, we appreciate your
support. I will tell you, without reauthorization, what happens
is we don't have a number out there.
So, appropriators say, well, you don't have a number, we
will come up with a number. I personally went to OMB, went to
the White House and said, ``I need $145 million, I need $150
million for Fiscal Year 2025.'' I personally did that because
that is what we need to do for the agency. But if we don't have
those numbers and we don't have an authorization, people just
pick what they think is right, but it is not what we need.
With that said, I very much appreciate the $148 million. It
is a significant increase above where we are right now. But in
our--in the authorization bill in the Senate and the Senate
authorization bill for the following 4 years, it leaves it at
$145 million for each year. We need to increase that over time.
The flat funding would hurt us.
Senator Peters. Very good. Thank you. Thank you, Madam
Chair.
The Chair. Senator Vance.
STATEMENT OF HON. J. D. VANCE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator Vance. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thanks, Chair
Homendy for being here and for all your work. I know a lot of
folks have focused on the Alaska Airlines questions. I want to
focus on the train derailment in East Palestine.
And specifically, Madam Chair, I want to focus on this
question of whether the controlled burn was actually necessary
in East Palestine. To sort of recap for folks, the mushroom
cloud, the chemical mushroom cloud that sort of captured
headlines across the country was the result of a controlled
burn.
And what those of us who were sort of focused on this issue
were told is that if you hadn't done the controlled burn, there
would have been an uncontrolled explosion because the situation
on the ground was just incredibly chaotic and dynamic. You had
to do the controlled burn to prevent the uncontrolled
explosion.
And your team has done a very good job. I commend you and
your team on actually looking into whether this was necessary.
And you will forgive me for requesting brief answers to
questions because I have a lot of them, and I just want to walk
through in detail what you folks have found. This is based on
public reporting that me and my team have gone through.
So, February 3, 2023, derailment of the train. Is it true
that Norfolk Southern contractors monitored temperatures on one
of the chemical tank cars from the afternoon of February 5 into
the afternoon of February 6, which is when the controlled burn
happened, and communicated their initial readings to Oxy Vinyl,
the shippers in charge of the vinyl chloride cars?
Ms. Homendy. That is accurate, Senator.
Senator Vance. Is it true that these readings indicated an
initial temperature of 135 +F at 4 p.m. on February 5, which
eventually declined to 126 +F at 9:30 a.m. on February 6, at
which point it stabilized?
Ms. Homendy. That is correct, Senator. It was stabilized
well before the vent and burn, many hours before.
Senator Vance. So declining temperatures, you would think,
and stabilized temperatures are consistent not with something
that needs to be exploded but with something that can be dealt
within a slightly, less catastrophic way.
At least that is my read on it. But is it true that the
chemical shipper, Oxy Vinyl, concluded that the reported and
stabilized tank car temperatures were too low for a runaway
chemical reaction, meaning the sort of thing that would lead to
an uncontrolled explosion?
Ms. Homendy. That is correct. They had testified that
polymerization was not occurring. In order for polymerization
to occur, which was the Norfolk Southern and their contractor's
justification for the vent and burn, you would have to have
rapidly increasing temperatures and some sort of infusion of
oxygen, neither of which occurred.
Senator Vance. Right. And just to be clear, you would need
both of those things. It is not an either, or. You need both of
them to precipitate polymerization, which would lead to an
uncontrolled situation.
Ms. Homendy. Correct.
Senator Vance. So, is it true that Norfolk Southern
contractors testified to the NTSB that they were not certain
that a chemical reaction was occurring in the derailed vinyl
chloride tank car?
Ms. Homendy. They testified to that, yes, sir.
Senator Vance. Is it correct that the chemical shippers
testified that there was no free radical agent or sufficient
heat trajectory to justify Norfolk Southern contractor's
assessment that a chemical reaction was occurring?
Ms. Homendy. That is correct.
Senator Vance. So, from this assessment, is it your
understanding Norfolk Southern contractors lacked scientific
basis to support their conclusion that polymerization was
occurring in the derailed BCM tank cars?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. In fact, they were informed by Oxy Vinyl
of the information that should have been taken by the
contractors in their decisionmaking. But yes, they did not have
that. They lacked the scientific background to address that.
Senator Vance. So let me just go to, sort of, one final
question here. We combine all these facts together.
Your reporting thus far concludes that Norfolk Southern
contractors recommendation to conduct a controlled burn lacks
sufficient scientific basis, disregarded available temperature
data, and contradicted expert feedback from the shipping firm
onsite.
Now, this was all told to the decisionmakers on the ground,
but they had to make a decision in less than 13 minutes to blow
up all five of these toxic chemical cars without any other
voices being included to offer a contrary opinion. Is that
right?
Ms. Homendy. That is correct.
Senator Vance. So, again, I appreciate your work on this,
but just to sort of summarize, this is an extraordinary
finding.
We were told effectively that there were two bad options,
the uncontrolled burn--or excuse me, the controlled burn or the
uncontrolled explosion. And it seems, based on the data that we
have, that there was not a ton of reason to do the uncontrolled
burn.
And that, of course, is what spread the toxic chemicals all
over this community and the surrounding region. It is really an
extraordinary finding. It goes to highlight the importance of
your work.
But I also have to note that residents on the ground talk
about the fact that immediately after the uncontrolled burn,
they moved the tank cars and train traffic was moving through
their town and moving through their community.
I won't ask you to speak to motivations here, but when you
have an unnecessary, uncontrolled burn that poisoned a lot of
people, that then led to rapid transit of train traffic, a lot
of people, including me, are wondering, did they do this not
because it was necessary, but because it allowed them to move
traffic and freight more quickly?
And if so, that is an extraordinary thing that I think
requires a lot of further work from this committee and from
others. But we will stop there because I see my time is up.
Thank you, Chair Homendy.
Ms. Homendy. May I add something to that? Senator, it is
even--you know, I would say the factual information in our
docket shows that Oxy Vinyl was on scene and providing
information to Norfolk Southern and their contractors.
On the 4th, 5th, and 6th, they informed them that
polymerization--they believed polymerization was not occurring
and there was no justification to do a vent and burn.
Rightfully, Norfolk Southern's contractor said, ruled out hot
tapping and trans loading because it would have been a
potential safety issue for their employees.
But there was another option, let it cool down. It was
cooling down. We know for a fact that when that pressure relief
device went off, that it had to have been above 185 degrees.
Later, much later--over the course of 22 hours, that tank car
was cooling. Not to mention the other four tank cars that were
only between 64 and 69 degrees.
So Oxy Vinyl was on scene providing information to Norfolk
Southern's contractor who was in the room when the decision
made--was made and when advice was given to the Governor of
Ohio, to the incident commander, they were not given full
information because no one was told Oxy Vinyl was on scene.
They were left out of the room. The incident commander
didn't even know they existed, neither did the Governor. So,
they were provided incomplete information to make a decision.
The Chair. Yes, go ahead, Senator Vance.
[Technical problems.]
Ms. Homendy. Your mic----
Senator Vance. My line of questioning, I just want to be
clear, is not a criticism of the incident commander or of the
Governor. I think it is a criticism of the people on the ground
who provided inadequate information.
Ms. Homendy. That is right.
Senator Vance. And provided inadequate information, I
think, to the great detriment of the community on the ground.
This extraordinary work by your team, but this is a really,
really troubling set of circumstances.
This town very well may have been poisoned to facilitate
the rapid movement of freight, or at the very least, it was
poisoned for reasons that we can't identify. That should really
concern every single person on this committee.
The Chair. Senator Vance, I can't wait to get your bill on
the Senate floor. And as I said in my opening comments today,
this is so critical because it requires this kind of reporting
so that local communities can plan appropriately. And they
should disclose what they are pushing through a community. So,
I hope that we can get this done.
Ms. Homendy. Yes. And thank you so much.
The Chair. Yes. Senator Baldwin.
STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY BALDWIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Madame Chair. Chair Homendy,
thank you so much for coming before the Committee and for your
tireless dedication to safety across all modes of
transportation.
I would like to discuss for a moment our work to improve
the safety of helicopter tours. In 2019, the crash of an air
tour helicopter in Hawaii killed six passengers and the pilot,
including a mother and a daughter from Madison, Wisconsin.
For that reason, it has become a real priority for me, and
I know it has also been for Senator Schatz. NTSB's finally--
final report on that accident in May 2022 cites several safety
recommendations that are still outstanding by the FAA, and also
issues new recommendations. And I was pleased to see the FAA
propose new safety improvements in August 2023.
And I worked closely with Senator Schatz and Chair Cantwell
to include additional safety improvements in the FAA bill that
passed this committee just a few weeks ago. I am wondering if
you could provide a status update on how you view the current
safety standards for helicopter air tours, and do you believe
that the safety provisions included in the Senate version of
the FAA bill would improve the safety of these tours?
Ms. Homendy. Thank you very much for your work on this
issue and for Senator Schatz's work on this issue. I think it
is critical. The NTSB believes in one level of safety.
As before I became NTSB Chair before I worked on the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, if I showed up
with my family to take an air tour, I would not know to ask,
what are the qualifications of the crew? What are your
operating standards? What are your operating rules?
What are your maintenance procedures? You wouldn't normally
ask those questions. If you are somebody who shows up for a
parachute jump flight, you think my biggest risk is jumping out
of the plane not getting on the plane, which also crashed in
Hawaii.
So, we believe you are a paying passenger, whether you are
on part 121, part 135, part 91, you deserve the same level of
safety. And we have advocated strongly for a set of regulatory
standards that address just that.
We have seen no action on that. This is something I have
been extremely passionate about before--since I have become--
since I came to the board, whether it was FlyNYON in New York,
where we literally listened to some people's last moments that
were strapped into a helicopter on an air tour with a Home
Depot harness that was supposed to hold them in, and they
couldn't unhook it.
They drowned. That is horrific. So still, we don't have the
standards we have recommended. We did an entire report on
ensuring safety in revenue passenger operations under part 91.
We looked at incidents or accidents, terrible tragedies, in
Hawaii, Arizona, I mentioned New York, Connecticut with a B-17
historic adventure flight that crashed, and each time we
continue to say safety needs to improve, and each time we have
been ignored.
People, the public deserves better. FAA should issue
standards to ensure their safety. Thank you for your work.
Senator Baldwin. Thank you. I know several of my colleagues
have already raised the issue of train derailments and rail
safety.
I am very concerned that the derailment rate of the largest
four Class I railroads have increased by 23 percent in the last
decade. While not nearly as devastating as the derailment in
East Palestine that was just being discussed, my home state of
Wisconsin saw a few train derailments over the last year as
well, including one in DeSoto, Wisconsin, that led to some of
the rail cars temporarily ending up in the Mississippi River.
Would you be able to speak to your belief as to why we are
seeing an increase, not a decrease in, derailments in the past
decade and specifically what we need to be doing to confront
that challenge?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. Thank you for the question, Senator. One
thing that is of particular concern--so the derailment rate is
sort of a combined rate for mainline track and for the yards.
We are seeing a significant increase in derailments and
tragedies in the yards. That is where we are very concerned
about employee safety.
We have seen that repeatedly. We have issued a number of
recommendations. We have a lot of open investigations. For
Norfolk Southern alone, we have eight investigations that are
currently open, and we are also doing a safety culture review
separate from East Palestine.
But in particular, we have 190 safety recommendations that
we have issued that are currently open to improve rail safety,
whether it is preventing fatigue or providing for increased
inspection, or new technologies to supplement, not supplant
workers, supplement the work to ensure safety.
Those 190 have not been acted upon. Happy to provide those
for the hearing record, but they can be today, and I hope they
will.
The Chair. Senator--thank you, Senator Baldwin. Senator
Duckworth, thank you so much for your leadership as the rank--
as the Chair of the Subcommittee. We so appreciate your help.
STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Madame Chair, and thank you
for your leadership in getting the FAA reauthorization bill out
of committee in a bipartisan way. I also want to thank Chair
Homendy for being here today and for your work on the MAX 9
investigation.
I have a few things I want to say in a statement before I
ask you some short questions. It is because I am particularly
concerned about NTSB's finding that pilots on flight 1282 were
unaware that the cockpit door was designed to automatically
open during the kind of rapid depressurization event that took
place on that Alaskan Airline flight, when the door plug fell
out.
As a pilot, I cannot convey strongly enough how critical it
is for the flight crew to be fully informed of the features on
the flight deck, and in-flight emergency is not the time for a
flight crew to first learn about something like this.
And then also, as we saw with MCAS, pilots not knowing
about a flight deck feature can be deadly. This is even more
alarming considering that this is the third time, the third
time that Boeing has kept information about MAX flight deck
features from pilots, and the FAA in the past has let Boeing
get away with it the first two times.
This has become a dangerous pattern which FAA absolutely
needs to break. At the start of the MAX program, Boeing removed
MCAS from the flight manual with FAA's blessing. Subsequent
investigations raised questions about how candid Boeing had
been with FAA about the significance of MCAS.
Despite this, when evidence emerged of an internal plan at
Boeing to intentionally downplay the significance of MCAS to a
regular--to regular, the FAA did not investigate. So, they
reduced the significance of MCAS to just a regular concern.
These are internal Boeing--so I have my poster here, which is
the internal e-mail within Boeing itself that says this.
These are internal Boeing meeting minutes showing employees
planning to not use the term MCAS outside of Boeing because,
and I quote, ``if we emphasize MCAS as a new function, there
may be greater certification and training impact.''
They also show a member of Boeing's organizational
designation authority, the ODA, approving this plan. Yet FAA
took no action in response to this evidence. According to the
Department of Transportation Inspector General, FAA did not
even consider finding out who this ODA unit member was to
ensure that he or she was not still authorized to perform
certification work on behalf of the FAA.
Boeing also intentionally hid from pilots the fact that the
AOA disagree alert on nearly 80 percent of Boeing 737 MAX 8
aircraft was not functioning. When Boeing discovered this
defect, it did not report it to FAA or inform airlines or
pilots, opting instead to keep it a secret, keep producing
planes with this same known defect, and wait years to fix it
until a planned software update in the future.
Boeing's plan was disrupted, however, when the first 737
MAX crashed in 2018 and worldwide attention began to focus on
AOA sensors. The company was forced to admit that the AOA
disagree alert was not functioning on most 737 airplanes, and
that they knew about it. Unlike MCAS, this was not a safety
related issue.
However, this was a clear violation of the MAX's approved
flight design. And this is a finding from the U.S. Department
of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General. DOT's
Inspector General recently looked into this and said, and I
quote, ``all features included in the type design are
mandatory, whether or not they are required for safety. Thus,
while the disagree message was not necessary to meet FAA safety
regulations, it was required to be installed and functional as
part of the approved type design.''
Yet, FAA took no action against Boeing for this brazen,
intentional, and repeated disregard of its approved type
design. If FAA is not going to bother to enforce its own
regulations, why would Boeing ever obey them?
So, Chair Homendy, here are my questions. Would you agree
that as a matter of safety, pilots need to know what features
are on the flight deck?
Ms. Homendy. Absolutely. It is a matter of safety. They
need to be fully informed--and fully informed so they know what
to expect.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Would you also agree that it
is dangerous for pilots to first learn about features on the
flight deck during an in-flight emergency?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, and I would extend that to the entire
flight crew, including the cabin crew. One member in this
particular flight was hit by the door as it blew out. There was
a lot going on at the time. It was complete chaos. They need to
know what to expect, and this was a complete surprise.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. You are referring to the
Alaska Airlines incident?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. Alaska 1282.
Senator Duckworth. Yes. Thank you. If FAA does not enforce
its required type design, do you think that it would--that
would make a manufacturer more or less likely to abide by that
type of design?
Ms. Homendy. This is a difficult one for me to answer
because this is not something that we have investigated.
Senator Duckworth. OK. Thank you. And I am over time. Thank
you, Chairwoman.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you so much.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Chair Homendy.
The Chairman. Senator Welch.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER WELCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VERMONT
Senator Welch. Thank you very much. You know, the question
of safety is obviously incredibly important. The question of
cost is also very important. And my understanding is right now,
when you are making assessments of safety, your focus solely is
on the safety and not on cost.
And I know some of my colleagues think that you should be
responsible to make a cost benefit analysis as you are
considering safety factors. I am a skeptic of that. I think
that decision should be made after the recommendation is made.
And I just want you to comment on that because both are
legitimate concerns, but I think all of us here would agree
that safety has to be paramount. So, if there is a proposal
that you would have to do--your agency would have to make a
cost benefit analysis, how would that affect safety?
Ms. Homendy. Significantly. The NTSB is founded on safety.
Our entire mission is safety. We don't consider cost benefit of
any particular recommendation. It is a recommendation, 80
percent of which are adopted acceptably, voluntarily, by the
recipients, which shows a pretty high success rate as it is.
What I will say, when it comes to our recommendations, the
recipients have a choice, you either implement them or you
don't. It is a recommendation. It is not a requirement. We hope
you do, but you--it is certainly a recommendation.
What I will say, the regulator, if they choose to take on
one of our recommendations, and it requires a regulation, they
go through a cost benefit analysis. That is their authority.
Listen, so the NTSB--I have heard this a number of times. The
NTSB's mandate is to save lives.
So, if I am out there, if our investigators and I are out
there at a particular scene of a terrible, terrible tragedy,
can you imagine if we do an entire investigation based on facts
and then have to sit there and determine, oh, what is
economically feasible that would prevent this from happening
again. That is terrible.
What we--what the public deserves, what you deserve is to
know what would prevent it from happening again? What would
prevent that tragedy from reoccurring? Then you can decide. You
can consider that recommendation and determine whether you
should move that forward.
So, the public deserves to know what is right--what is the
right thing to do. Also, I will just mention if we ever had to
do cost benefit analysis, it would take another year to even
issue another report. So, talk about timeliness. That goes
right out the window.
Senator Welch. Well, thank you. I do agree with that. I
also think that where there are cost issues, then you have got
to look to the manufacturer to figure out a better way to do it
and maintain safety.
So, it would be an inappropriate shifting of the burden on
your organization that is committed to safety if we impose that
obligation on you--be real conflict. Another question.
Ms. Homendy. Can I just add, also, why should we evaluate
the safety of what an industry--the economics of--if we issue a
recommendation to an entity that was part of an event, why
should we consider what is feasible or cost effective for them
to implement versus what is right? So, I agree with you,
Senator. Thank you very much for that question.
Senator Welch. Thank you. Just, I know you have been asked
a lot about Boeing, but let me ask you this, how can Congress
support the NTSB efforts to enhance the agency's understanding
of Boeing's quality and safety management system as we consider
NTSB reauthorization?
Ms. Homendy. The NTSB has a lot of authority that we can
use in our investigations. We certainly have subpoena
authority, and we are not afraid to use it, if we need to. We
hope it doesn't come to that.
We hope that we can get cooperative participation, whether
it is our interviews or working with the parties to our
investigation. But it does concern us that we don't have
certain information we should have today.
With that said, we have the ability to get that
information. I will say, one thing about the NTSB and
reauthorization and funding for us is that when a major occurs,
that becomes number one for us. But say our structural engineer
on this one, he handles 15 to 20 cases a year. What happens to
those other 15 to 20 cases?
They get moved aside so we can focus on 1282. People died
in those other 15 to 20 cases. This is why we need personnel.
This is why we need to ensure their training and why we need to
ensure that we are investing in every mode and every office of
the agency, including our critical lab equipment.
Senator Welch. Thank you very much. I yield back, Madam
Chair.
The Chair. I think we need to--I think the prompting of
that question might be the delay in a real SMS system. And I
think some people may in the past have articulated that cost
benefit analysis of that made it, I don't know what the right
word is, but that you could go with a lesser SMS system, a non-
real SMS system.
Ms. Homendy. Oh, no. You have to have a robust safety
management system to ensure safety.
The Chair. So, I think his comments in asking this question
weren't as much directed toward the NTSB doing a safety system
analysis, but this perception that a real SMS never got
implemented because people argued on the cost benefit analysis.
I agree with you, our ACSAA report, legislation we passed,
mandated a real SMS. And so, we are waiting for that to happen,
and we are going to hold the FAA accountable to make sure that
it is implemented.
Ms. Homendy. Understood. Thank you.
The Chair. So, there is no substitution for that. My
colleague from Georgia.
STATEMENT OF HON. RAPHAEL WARNOCK,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Warnock. Thank you so very much, Madam Chair. Chair
Homendy, welcome back. I would like to briefly revisit the
tragic and deadly crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian
Airlines Flight 302. Can you remind me who manufactured these
aircraft?
Ms. Homendy. The manufacturer is Boeing, sir.
Senator Warnock. Thank you. Now let's revisit, the 2023
East Palestine, Ohio train derailment. Can you remind me which
freight rail carrier operated this train?
Ms. Homendy. Norfolk Southern, sir.
Senator Warnock. Thank you. And what about the recent
recall of 2 million vehicles with autopilot technology that is
the subject of a multi-year National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration review. Who manufacturers those vehicles?
Ms. Homendy. Tesla, sir.
Senator Warnock. Thank you. Finally, an incident we have
heard a lot about today, the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 door
plug blowout. Who was in charge of manufacturing that aircraft?
Ms. Homendy. Boeing, sir.
Senator Warnock. So, I see a pattern here. At the heart of
each of these incidents, is a massive corporation, a fortune
500 economic engine for the country that also has a deep
lobbying bench.
And I am concerned at each of these incidents, though
unique in their circumstances, may have been the result of a
focus on production targets and profit margins over safety
related to the question that my colleague Senator Welch asked.
In other words, an insufficient safety culture in our
transportation system and among its suppliers.
And ironically, we have got colleagues of mine who are
asking whether or not we should do the cost benefit analysis as
a part of your analysis of these and sometimes tragic
incidents. Chair Homendy, the NTSB has investigated each of
these incidents and the companies ultimately tasked with
ensuring the safety of their products.
Throughout your investigations, have you seen any evidence
that these companies may be maximizing profits at the expense
of safety?
Ms. Homendy. I don't--we do not have evidence of that
either way.
Senator Warnock. OK. So, what tools does the NTSB have to
investigate and improve the safety culture within these
companies and across the broader transportation system?
Ms. Homendy. With respect to safety culture, we delve in--
on safety culture in many of our investigations.
For Norfolk Southern, we are doing a separate investigation
involving organizational safety culture with respect to Norfolk
Southern because we are currently investigating eight accidents
involving Norfolk Southern that occurred in a relatively short
time period.
So, we are doing that safety culture assessment. And we
have done similar assessments, including for--on Metro North in
the past. We are also digging in on safety culture with respect
to the Alaska 1282.
Senator Warnock. If I can interrupt, what tools do you
have?
Ms. Homendy. We have human performance experts at the NTSB
who delve into safety culture within the agency. So, we have
expert investigators. Certainly, we have subpoena authority if
we can't get records, but we have expert investigators that can
identify deficiencies and recommend action.
Senator Warnock. But you can understand why these incidents
are deeply concerning to us and anybody who is paying
attention. So, let me ask you this, does the NTSB need
additional tools from Congress to improve the safety culture
within these companies?
Ms. Homendy. Our best resources are--resource is our
people. They are top notch, world renowned investigators who
know how to evaluate a safety culture within any entity and
identify deficiencies. We need people and we need training for
those people. And so, that is a direct investment in safety.
Senator Warnock. OK. Thank you very much.
Senator Sullivan. Yes, Madam Chair, I am ready. OK. Well,
thank you, Madam Chair----
The Chair. I mean, we can let Senator Lujan go if you want.
Senator Sullivan. No, it is OK.
The Chair. All right.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. I want to continue on the
Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 questioning. Of course. It is on
everybody's mind across the country. It is really on my
constituents' mind, given how much we fly Alaska Airlines. This
was a very good airline that I fly like almost every weekend.
But let me ask you specifically on that, and then I have a
specific Alaska state safety question. As I think, you know,
the Alaska Airlines was the first airline with the FAA accepted
safety management system. In previous hearings, we discussed
the value of the SMS and the scalability of the SMS for smaller
operators.
Can you talk about the importance of the safety management
system, not just in terms of enhancing safety in the episode
that we are--that you are investigating, but in particular,
what you envision a more mature SMS system being able to be
helpful in terms of safety, big airlines and even smaller
operators?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. There are four pillars for safety
management systems. It is everything from safety policy and
having the safety--comprehensive safety policies in place. Its
safety risk assessment, safety assurance, and safety promotion,
which really gets to safety culture and training of the
workforce.
Having a robust safety management system is key for any
operator. I do agree with your comments on scalability. We do
believe that any operator, whether large or small, can
proactively identify and address those risks, continue to
monitor how they have addressed those risks to ensure that
those--how they address them is effective, and then continue
to--continually reevaluate those risks to ensure safety, while
also promoting safety among their work force, whether it is two
or three people, or it is hundreds of people.
Senator Sullivan. Let me--thank you for that answer. Let me
turn to aviation safety in Alaska. In February 2020, the NTSB
issued a report calling for the FAA and NTSB to take a much
more comprehensive approach to improving aviation safety in my
state.
As you know, whether it is crashes or fatalities, we have
the highest per capita numbers in the country. A lot of reasons
for that, big state, not as much infrastructure as we need,
challenging weather, certainly.
This led to the report, your report, NTSB, so thank you,
led to the launch of a very important program, the FAA Alaska
Aviation Safety Initiative, what we call FAASI in Alaska. And,
again, that is what the FAA and NTSB, and of course our
aviation community in Alaska.
A, I want your commitment to continue to focus on that. It
is a really big deal. A lot of these numbers are from the lack
of infrastructure. My view is we are all Americans, and if it
costs a little bit more for infrastructure in Alaska, then we
deserve it because everybody else in the lower 48 has
significant more infrastructure in terms of aviation than we
do, despite the challenges in Alaska.
I want to thank the Chair. The FAA reauthorization bill
that we just passed here with very strong bipartisan support
worked to address a number of these challenges highlighted in
your February 2020 report and in the broader FAA FAASI
initiative, dealing with upgrading and maintenance of weather
observation systems, increase utilization of IFR routes,
additional ground base ADSB transmitters, a whole host of
things.
But can I get your commitment to continue to work with my
office, the FAA, this committee, to address the issues raised
in your 2020 NTSB report to make Alaska aviation safer? Again,
sometimes we hear, well, geez, you know, it is going to cost
more because we got to put more infrastructure there.
Well, my view is, yes, it is going to cost more. These are
Americans, just like they would be if they were in any other
state in the lower 48. So, can you give me an update from your
perspective on how that is going, FAASI, and then any other
issues we need to be working on?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. First of all, you do have my commitment.
I also would like to say, I have been to our Alaska regional
offices. Our Director of the Office of Aviation Safety, which
is behind me, just came back from our regional office in
Alaska. I do want to thank you for your relationship, your
staff's relationship with our investigators and our lead
investigator there.
Senator Sullivan. We think they are great.
Ms. Homendy. Yes, well, likewise. So, thank you. It is an
incredible relationship. Really appreciate it. I do think you
have unique and great needs, whether it is infrastructure, or
investment in weather technology, or, you know, a host of
safety needs, and you deserve the investment.
We will support that. We will support the work of the FAA
throughout that initiative. It was critical for the NTSB. We
made that recommendation. We believe in it. And you certainly
have my commitment to work on that.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. I appreciate that. And I want
to thank the Chair again on helping us with a lot of the
amendments we had of the FAA bill that directly came from your
2020 report and the FAASI initiative, but we are not done yet.
And so, thank you both.
The Chair. Thank you.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
The Chair. The main transportation system in Alaska is by
air, and we want to get this right. And we want to help them in
whatever ways we can. We have a vote underway, and we have a
second one following it, so we are going to wrap up here soon.
Senator Lujan.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEN RAY LUJAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Chair Cantwell. And Chair
Homendy, thank you so much for being here today. Yesterday, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration closed their
comment period on their Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
on impaired driving technology.
And I was heartened to see over 17,000 comments submitted,
many from victims sharing their own stories on why this
technology is so important. In 2021, I was proud to pass this
legislation, the Halt and Ride Act, with colleagues Senator
Peters, Capito, and Rick Scott as part of the bipartisan
infrastructure law, and this provision required that impaired
driving prevention technology be in all new cars after 2026.
Chair Homendy, yes or no, does the impaired driving
provision of the bipartisan infrastructure law align with
NTSB's prior recommendations on the most important tools we can
use to address impaired driving?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, Senator.
Senator Lujan. Well, I appreciate that, and I look forward
to reading through all of the comments from the automotive
suppliers and manufacturers who want to be part of finding a
solution.
As I saw at the recent auto show here in Washington, D.C.
and in others across the country, there is technology out there
that is already doing a lot of this work, and I was really
encouraged to see major automotive manufacturers behind much of
this technology as well. That was one of the goals here was to
also create a market so that innovation would be unleashed, and
I am seeing it happen.
Now, Chair Homendy, yes or no, will requiring impaired
driving prevention technology in vehicles reduce the number of
traffic fatalities on our roadways and save thousands of lives
each year?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, and that is backed by research.
Senator Lujan. I appreciate that. I was proud to also lead
on an amendment to reauthorize the NTSB as part of the FAA
reauthorization, working closely with the Chair of this
Committee, Maria Cantwell, where we were able to earn support
through the Chair's leadership to be able to get this done.
Now, Chair Homendy, I know that during your tenure as
Chair, the NTSB has eliminated the pre-existing backlog of
investigations, and I want to commend you for that, some of
which had previously gone incomplete for years.
Now, Chair Homendy, yes or no, did the increase in staffing
levels over the past three years enable the NTSB to eliminate
this backlog of investigations?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. It was a combination of increase in
staffing levels and improvement--improvements to our process,
which I have to say--I set the vision. It was the team who did
the work, and I am really proud of them.
Senator Lujan. Chair Homendy, yes or no, if Congress fails
to provide the NSTB with sufficient resources--I got the
acronym wrong--the NTSB with sufficient resources, will it
impact the agency's ability to close the investigations in a
timely manner? Will that negatively impact the ability to get
that done?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. And I can just show you right now. The
nearly 500 investigations that were well over two years, some
three and four years when I became Chair, went down to zero on
October 1.
We had 400--we went up from 397 employees to 444 employees.
Beginning on October 1, we hit a CR. And what happened? We went
down to 4--today we are at 429 employees, and now we are 15
investigations right over the two-year mark.
It is a direct impact. We are--if we have less employees,
our employees are forced to do more with less. Our employees
are our greatest resources, and they are key to improving
safety.
Senator Lujan. Now, similar to the previous questions,
Chair Homendy, in recent years we have seen historic levels of
traffic fatalities on our roadways. My question is, yes or no,
would an increased authorization enable the NTSB to do even
more to reduce the number of deaths each year on our roadways?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, certainly. We have millions of crashes
that occur on our roads, and we have less than--around 30
people in our highway safety office. They need more people.
Senator Lujan. And Chair Cantwell, I do have a few other
questions pertaining to the investigation that I want to
commend NTSB in conducting. I will submit those into the
record. Very much appreciate your time today, and I yield back.
The Chair. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Lujan. As I
mentioned, we are running out of time just because we have two
votes back to back, but I did want to submit some questions too
for the record.
I am going to submit some things on East Palestine that I
would like answered. I also want to note that it is the 25th
anniversary of the Olympic pipeline explosion in Bellingham,
Washington, which killed three children under the age of 19.
The company's negligence was so severe that multiple
company executives were sent to jail, and the judge in the case
decried the lack of effective Federal oversight. So, I am going
to submit questions about the lack of investigation on the
Keystone pipeline, but what resources would help the board be
more effective in being a pipeline safety watchdog, when do you
deploy for pipeline incidents, and what pipeline safety would
you recommend to Congress that we also do to enhance.
So just for the record, that we have that. I want to say
that I also am going to send a letter to Boeing and the various
manufacturers saying we need this information immediately as it
relates to this investigation.
Also to send that to the FAA. I am not sure why that hasn't
happened, but one of the reasons we wanted to have you here
today is that people need to listen to the NTSB. So often, you
have done the painstaking work to actually get the data and
information, and then the consequences, people don't listen to
it.
And so, we are trying to do everything we can, as we did in
ACSAA, to ask for a trend report. Part of the trend report was
to bolster the NTSB's recommendations, and to say, listen to
them and monitor the trends.
Your appearance here before the Committee led to a
conference the FAA was holding, where you had already said that
we needed to do something about near-miss technology at
airports, and yet it wasn't being listened to.
And the fact that we had you here that day, again, making
people listen to that voice and resulted in the FAA and then
the Acting Administrator at that point in time putting out a
directive. So, we are doing everything we can.
We need to get this right. I think showing their support
for your investigation could be so helpful. People shouldn't
forget they are also the largest exporter of our country,
aviation, and so we want to get this right. They are also a big
key component of our DOD system. We need to get this right.
So, we need to help with the investigation so we can find
out what in our system needs to be improved. I don't think it
will be a surprise to say that a true safety management system
needs to be implemented.
So, with that, I see my colleague here. I am going to ask
that the hearing records remain open for two weeks and any
Senators submit questions for the record. And then at the
conclusion of Senator Markey's questioning, that we be
adjourned, and he can gavel us out. Thank you so much.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you. Since the door plug blew off the
Boeing 737 MAX 9 in January, the National Transportation Safety
Board has done excellent work to help identify the cause of
this incident.
But many experts believe that the answer goes back much
further to Boeing's 1997 merger with the aerospace manufacturer
McDonnell Douglas. It is well documented, after this merger,
Boeing's culture shifted from prioritizing engineering
excellence to prioritizing the bottom line.
This cultural shift is the systemic rust that allowed the
door plug to break loose. In fact, the very subcontractor that
was involved in the door plug blowout, Spirit AeroSystems, used
to be a part of Boeing itself. Boeing sold off Spirit after the
1997 merger with McDonnell Douglas in an effort to outsource
work and shed manufacturing costs.
Even then, Boeing engineers warned that this profit
motivated strategy put the entire manufacturing process at
risk. Fast forward to today. Those engineers have been proven
correct. Boeing's weak oversight and failure to prioritize
safety endangered the lives of the 180 passengers and crew
aboard the Alaska Airlines flight.
Chair Homendy, from your current and previous
investigations, do you agree that Boeing's safety concerns stem
from a culture that fails to prioritize safety?
Ms. Homendy. I would say with respect to safety culture,
that safety culture has to be a priority whether it is for
Boeing or for any other organization. For this, particular
accident or event, we are digging in on Boeing's safety
culture.
It is absolutely critical because the aviation industry's
success has really been a result of having a good safety
culture, where you have people who can freely report and stop
work if they feel there is a safety issue, where they know that
an entity takes their reporting seriously, follows up, and
promotes safety.
We need that at Boeing and any other entity where we
conduct an investigation.
Senator Markey. But you do have concerns about the overall
safety culture of Boeing?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, we do. Which is part of why we are in--
that will be part of our investigation of the Alaska 1282 door
plug blowout.
Senator Markey. And you are going to look at the safety
culture of Boeing beyond this incident, across the entire
company?
Ms. Homendy. We are going to look--yes, we are going to
look at safety culture within Boeing.
Senator Markey. You are going to look at the cultural
concerns broadly?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, yes.
Senator Markey. I think that is absolutely critical. Now, I
would like to turn to the significant risk posed by autonomous
vehicles.
In the past 8 years, the NTSB has investigated multiple
incidents involving autonomous driving technologies, like
Tesla's Autopilot System, that are designed to operate in
specific road conditions, particularly on highways. In fact, in
2016, NTSB recommended that the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration and auto manufacturers restrict drivers from
activating these systems outside those road conditions.
It is long past time that we take firm control of the wheel
and steer toward safety and implement this recommendation. So,
Madam Chair, can you briefly explain the reasoning for this
recommendation?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. And in fact, I thought this may came up--
come up because this is--you are a champion on this issue. And
I just pulled Tesla's statement on--which is really their
limitations on operational design domain.
They warn on their website for those who have vehicles that
some of their automation will not work in some areas, including
areas of poor visibility, heavy rain, snow, fog, bright light,
oncoming headlights, direct sunlight, mud, ice, snow,
interference or obstruction by some objects mounted on to the
vehicle, narrow, high curvature, or winding roads, and damaged
or misaligned bumper, and extremely hot or cold temperature, an
area where the vehicle is not designed to operate using that
technology. Who reads that? We have to make----
Senator Markey. That just leaves--you are backing out of
the driveway and then going back into your car again, because
other than that, you are back--you are out on the road. This
isn't like the Postal Service who rain, sleet, snow all night.
They are saying, well, the sunlight might affect it, or the
snow might affect it, or rainy conditions might affect it, or
winding roads might affect it. So, as I am listening to that
description, it sounds like to me it is not ready for prime
time. It is not ready to be handed over to people who have
grown up with a car that they drive where they expect the
brakes or the steering wheels all work, no matter where they
are going.
And not, oh by the way, this thing that you just turned on
could be extremely dangerous for your two kids in the back
seat.
Ms. Homendy. Well, and if it is only designed to be
operated in a certain type of environment, it should be limited
to those environments. We issued that recommendation to Tesla
following the 2016 tragedy in Williston, Florida. We issued the
same recommendation to NHTSA. We issued it again. Both have
failed to act on those recommendations.
Senator Markey. Yes. In 1999, I was successful--we had to
pass a safety bill after that Ford Explorer, you know, mess.
So, one of the amendments I got was on your dashboard there is
now a little light that goes on if your tires are
underinflated.
It was like, oh, my god, like asking the industry to go to
the moon or something to just have that. But how many people
now look at that light and they say, oh my goodness, you know,
maybe I should go in and inflate a little bit more, right.
But it is a warning, and it is saying, you know, this could
be dangerous for you. And as I am just listening to what you
are saying, it is almost like this should be a little car right
there, right above the little light, just saying, well, here is
all the ways in which this technology does not, in fact,
operate safely on the road, just so people can be seeing it on
an ongoing basis. In other words, saying, well, yes, you should
know to inflate your tires.
But we got the light there just to give people a little
extra, you know, warning. And I think that that list that you
just read is just something that can't be buried in the fine
print. You can't be assuming that people know that it is
dangerous for all those conditions.
And so, from my perspective, I just think that we have
reached a point where we have to have higher standards for
Tesla. We have to have higher standards for any company that is
going to be moving toward autopilot because there are certain
set of assumptions that we make about safety that don't
necessarily transfer over.
So, I really do look forward to working with you, Madam
Chair, on this and with all of my colleagues. And just one
final question, if I could. I would like to discuss the
importance of ensuring that freight trains have two person
crews. Over and over, we have seen the safety benefits of
multi-person crews.
In fact, after the East Palestine derailment last year,
this committee heard loud and clear that having multiple crew
members on the train streamlined emergency response and
increased crew and community safety.
So, Madam Chair, do you agree that the inclusion of several
crew members on the train that derailed in East Palestine
enhanced safety?
Ms. Homendy. Oh, in East Palestine, I have reviewed the
transcript from the inward facing camera, and it was clear they
did a phenomenal job. There were three people in that
locomotive.
One was the locomotive engineer was focused on operating
the train. The conductor at one point got out after it derailed
to say, hey, what is going on here? Is something on fire? There
was uncoupling of the locomotive so they can move forward and
be safe, as they do in standard practice.
And then, another was talking with dispatch. So, there was
incredible crew resource management there.
Senator Markey. Yes. And has the NTSB investigated other
rail accidents in which having multiple crew members on board
was beneficial to the incident response?
Ms. Homendy. There was one in Graettinger, Iowa. It was a
Union Pacific derailment involving ethanol. It was a
significant derailment and fire. And one crew member had
uncoupled some of the cars right before the derailment and then
pulled those cars away from the fire to ensure they were
mitigating any damage and ensuring safety.
The other crew member went to--went around and pulled the
other cars behind the derailment, away from the other end. So,
they isolated just the cars that had derailed in the fire. So,
that took two crew members to do that.
Senator Markey. Excellent. So, I think it is very clear
that a two person crew is a matter of safety. Having that extra
set of eyes, that extra set of hands able to deal with
dangerous situations when they occur is absolutely essential.
And that is why I am so glad that the effort that Senator
Vance and I have made to include that language in the Railway
Safety Act, which the Committee passed last year with the
leadership of Chair Cantwell and Ranking Member Cruz is so
important because it mandates the two person crew.
And I just think that is the common sense response to the
obvious safety benefits that your agency has identified in
having those people on board. So, I just think we have to pass
that legislation. It is very important.
The two person crew provision is essential, and we are
going to continue to try to work as hard as we can to enhance
safety by keeping that provision and all the way to the
President's desk. So, we thank you so much for all of your
work, and I feel like I am all alone here and just go on
indefinitely.
Ms. Homendy. I am happy to talk about safety----
Senator Markey. I know you are. It is great just to have
somebody who is such an expert on all these issues, but I thank
you for your great work and----
Ms. Homendy. Well and thank you for your work on safety.
And on behalf of the NTSB, you have been a real champion.
Really, everyone has on this committee, and we really
appreciate your support.
Senator Markey. No, thank you so much. And with that, I
would say--I haven't done this in a long time. This hearing is
adjourned.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Hon. Jennifer Homendy
As you know, at-grade crossings are among the deadliest points on
our railroads. In the last five years, 532 people were killed in
collisions at rail crossings across the country, including seven in
Minnesota. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law has provided funding for
projects in Minnesota that reduce or eliminate the risk of accidents
between pedestrians, vehicles and trains and make sure first responders
are not blocked by trains during emergencies.
Question 1. What open recommendations does NTSB have to improve
safety at highway-railroad grade crossings?
Answer. The NTSB has a long history of investigating preventable
collisions at grade crossings. Over the years, our agency has issued
many recommendations aimed at improving grade-crossing safety for
motorists and train occupants. Some of our key outstanding
recommendations and recent investigations related to grade-crossing
safety can be divided into four categories: rail worker safety, grade-
crossing design, technology improvement, and public versus private
grade-crossing safety and hazardous materials (hazmat) concerns.
Rail Worker Safety
In response to multiple incidents involving rail worker fatalities,
the NTSB issued recommendations to the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) and to the General Code of Operating Rules Committee, the
Northeast Operating Rules Advisory Committee, Canadian National
Railway, and the Norfolk Southern Corporation.\1\ We recommended that,
when approaching crossings not equipped with gates that are in the
fully lowered position or where someone is already positioned at the
crossing, rail workers stop the equipment, dismount, protect the
crossing from the ground, and get back on the equipment after the
equipment is through the crossing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Safety Recommendations R-23-19 and -20.
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Grade-Crossing Design
In response to an incident involving a motorcoach stuck on the
track at a grade crossing, the NTSB successfully urged the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA), with assistance from the FRA, American
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, and American
Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association, to develop
specific criteria for when an existing grade crossing should be
reconstructed or closed, or otherwise mitigate the risk posed by an
unsafe vertical profile.\2\
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\2\ Safety Recommendation H-18-25.
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We also issued further recommendations to the FHWA, which remain
open, urging an update to FHWA grade-crossing signage guidance to
federal, state, and local agencies.\3\ We continue to work with the
FHWA to ensure follow-through on this recommendation, especially in
light of the revised Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for
Streets and Highways, published December 2023 and effective January 18,
2024.\4\
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\3\ Safety Recommendations H-18-23 and H-18-24.
\4\ U.S. DOT, Federal Highway Administration. Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways. Washington, DC: FHWA.
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The NTSB issued several other recommendations in response to this
investigation aimed at ensuring better coordination between all
relevant stakeholders when it comes to addressing grade-crossing design
and maintenance.\5\
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\5\ Safety Recommendations H-18-28; R-18-12, -13, -14 and -15; R-
18-12, -13, -14, and -15.
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Technology Improvement
In response to an incident involving a truck driver mistakenly
turning onto the railroad right-of-way, the NTSB issued a
multirecipient recommendation urging leading technology companies to
incorporate grade crossing-related geographic data, such as those
currently being prepared by the FRA, into their navigation
applications; these companies are: Google, Apple, Garmin Ltd., HERE,
TomTom NV, INRIX, MapQuest, Microsoft Corporation, Omnitracs LLC,
OpenStreetMap US, Sensys Networks, StreetLight Data, Inc., Teletrac,
Inc., and United Parcel Service of America, Inc., The intent of this
recommendation is to reduce the likelihood of collisions at or near
public or private grade crossings by providing road users with
additional safety cues.\6\ Our advocacy is ongoing, as 10 of the 14
recommendation recipients have yet to act on this important safety
countermeasure.
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\6\ Safety Recommendation H-16-15.
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In 1998, we conducted a safety study into the safety of passive
crossings (that is, crossings that do not have train-activated devices
such as lights or gates to warn drivers of an approaching train) and
found that in-vehicle safety and advisory warning systems and other
applications of intelligent transportation systems have the potential
to reduce accidents and injuries at crossings.\7\ We recommended that
the Department of Transportation (DOT) develop and implement a field
test program for in-vehicle safety and advisory warning systems,
variable message signs, and other active devices; then ensure that the
private entities who are developing advance technology applications
modify those applications as appropriate for use at passive grade
crossings. Further, following the modifications, the recommendation
called on DOT to take action to implement use of the advanced
technology applications.\8\ The FRA has responded on behalf of DOT that
it believes the recommendation is not feasible, and it is currently
classified as ``Open--Unacceptable Response.''
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\7\ NTSB. Safety at Passive Grade Crossings Volume 1: Analysis,
July 21, 1998. Rpt. No. SS-98/02. Washington, DC: NTSB, 1998.
\8\ Safety Recommendation I-98-1.
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Public Versus Private Grade-Crossing Concerns
In response to a 2013 collision and hazmat incident on a private
road at a private grade crossing in Rosedale, Maryland,\9\ the NTSB
issued several recommendations to the FRA, the 50 states, the
Association of American Railroads, and the American Short Line and
Regional Railroad Association aimed at ensuring safety equivalence
between public and private grade crossings.\10\
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\9\ NTSB. Highway-Railroad Grade Crossing Collision, Rosedale,
Maryland, May 28, 2013. Rpt. No. HAR-14/02. Washington, DC: NTSB, 2014.
\10\ Safety Recommendations R-14-48, -49, -50, -52.
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______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gary Peters to
Hon. Jennifer Homendy
Question 1. As Chairman of the Congressional Boating Caucus, it's
my understanding that following the investigation of the 2019
Conception boat fire, the National Transportation Safety Board
recommended that the Coast Guard require boat owners to install more
comprehensive smoke detector systems, upgrade emergency exits and make
mandatory inspection checks on roving watches. Have these safety rules
been implemented? In what manner are they communicated to vessel
owners?
Answer. All new NTSB recommendations issued to the USCG in relation
to the Conception tragedy are classified Open--Acceptable Action,
meaning they have not yet been fully implemented.\11\ We are grateful
to Congress for its work on the Elijah E. Cummings Coast Guard
Authorization Act of 2020, which mandated the Coast Guard
implementation of a number of our Conception recommendations. We
continue to engage with the Coast Guard as it completes the required
work on these recommendations and look forward to its final
rulemakings.
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\11\ Safety Recommendations M-20-14 through -20.
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I want to mention that as a result of our Conception investigation,
we also reiterated a 2012 recommendation we made to the Coast Guard to
require all operators of US-flagged passenger vessels to implement
safety management systems (SMSs), taking into account these vessels'
characteristics, methods of operation, and nature of service, and, with
respect to ferries, the sizes of the ferry systems within which the
vessels operate. In 2010, Congress mandated that the USCG develop
appropriate SMS regulations for all US-flagged passenger vessels.
However, the Coast Guard has not taken the necessary action to
implement this recommendation.
The Coast Guard issued an advanced notice of public rulemaking
(ANPRM) addressing this recommendation in January 2021. In November
2022, the USCG said it anticipated publishing a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) in March 2023; however, it has yet to be published.
This recommendation is now 12 years old. It has been more than 3 years
since the ANPRM, and more than a year since the USCG's initial target
date for issuing an NPRM. As a result, the Board recently classified
this recommendation Open--Unacceptable Response. In August 2023, I
wrote a letter to the Commandant strongly encouraging her to issue the
SMS regulation within 30 days.\12\ The regulation has still not been
issued.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ NTSB Chair Homendy Letter to USCG Admiral Fagan, August 31,
2023.
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Also in response to the Conception tragedy, we recommended that the
Passenger Vessel Association (PVA), Sportfishing Association of
California (SAC), and the National Association of Charterboat Operators
(NACO) advise their members of the accident and encourage members to
voluntarily take safety measures prior to the Coast Guard's
rulemaking.\13\ The recommendations to the PVA and SAC have been
classified Closed--Acceptable Action, but we have not heard back from
the NACO regarding our recommendation.
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\13\ Safety Recommendations M-20-21 and -22.
Question 2. I am a proud motorcycle rider and co-Chair of the
Senate Motorcycle Caucus. The safety of motorcyclists on our roads is a
huge priority of mine--one that I know is shared by the NTSB. I also
strongly believe that the responsible deployment of connected vehicle
technology has the power to save thousands of lives per year and help
address the historic number of fatalities on our roads. I am also proud
to say that Michigan leads the way on this innovative safety
technology. One of the Board's open recommendations has to do with the
incorporation of motorcycles into connected vehicle-to-vehicle systems
and vehicle-to-infrastructure systems. Can you expand on NTSB's
recommendations related to incorporating motorcyclists into connected
vehicle systems? What progress has been made on these recommendations?
Answer. The NTSB has long believed in the promise of connected
vehicle technology, or V2X, to save lives for all road users, including
motorcyclists and other vulnerable road users. In the NTSB's 2018
safety study examining the Select Risk Factors Associated with Causes
of Motorcycle Safety, the NTSB found that about one-third of the crash-
involved motorcycle riders, regardless of training or experience, never
attempted to perform collision avoidance, suggesting that they may have
needed more time to respond to emerging crash risks. Although many of
them perceived that a hazard existed, they continued to travel
straight, at a constant speed, and never attempted to brake or swerve.
V2X technologies allow vehicles to communicate with one another or
with road infrastructure to help warn drivers of risks and avoid
crashes. V2X technologies are designed to overcome the line-of-sight
limitations of sensors, cameras, lasers, and radar used in vehicle-
based technologies, thus providing vehicle drivers with more time to
detect and react to potential crash risks. Moreover, this increased
functionality can work together with current onboard crash warning and
prevention systems to optimize warnings and interventions. As a result
of the 2018 safety study, the NTSB issued four recommendations related
to motorcycles and V2X (H-18-29, -30, -31, and -37).
While each of the four recommendations are currently classified
Open-Acceptable Response, challenges remain to achieve the promised V2X
safety benefit for all road users including motorcyclists. In October
2023, the Department of Transportation (USDOT) released its draft V2X
deployment plan--Saving Lives with Connectivity: A Plan to Accelerate
V2X Deployment outlining the agency's plan to overcome outstanding
challenges and chart a path toward widespread V2X deployment. In
response to a request for feedback, the NTSB submitted comments to the
USDOT's draft deployment plan in February 2024 largely supporting the
draft plan but making clear that with more than 40,000 deaths annually
on our roadways and millions more injured, the USDOT's commitment to
V2X deployment must translate to rapid action.\14\ We encourage the
expeditious release of the USDOT's finalized V2X deployment plan.
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\14\ NTSB comments on USDOT draft document ``Saving Lives with
Connectivity--A Plan to Accelerate V2X Deployment.'' February 2, 2024.
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______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Budd to
Hon. Jennifer Homendy
I am very concerned about the rising number of runway incursions
and close calls. These near-misses and others like them usually involve
pilot or controller error. The lack of qualified controllers is placing
a strain on aviation safety. Thankfully, the FAA bill this committee
reported out takes step to address that controller shortage, but hiring
and training will take time.
Question 1. Do you have any recommendations on dealing with the
current shortage of qualified air traffic controllers?
Answer. The last time the NTSB issued recommendations on air
traffic controller fatigue was in 2007 (A-07-30 and -31 to the FAA, and
A-07-32 to the National Air Traffic Controllers Association), and what
we said then is just as true today: controller fatigue decreases
aviation safety. The more than 170 fatigue-related safety
recommendations that the NTSB has issued as far back as 1989 have
addressed topics such as the adequacy of rest periods, scheduling
practices, fatigue awareness training, and hours-of-service
regulations. Even earlier, the NTSB addressed controller fatigue in a
1981 special investigation report on the Nation's air traffic control
(ATC) system. Citing extended work schedules among controllers in the
aftermath of the 1981 strike, the NTSB issued A-81-145, which
recommended that the FAA establish and implement a program to detect
the onset of, and to alleviate, controller fatigue and stress.
This recommendation was superseded by two more specific
recommendations from the Board's 1983 follow-up study of the ATC
system. A-83-35 urged the FAA to disseminate guidelines for detecting
and managing controller stress and fatigue, and A-83-36 asked the FAA
to expedite the development and implementation of a controller
performance assessment program that would include attention to stress
and fatigue.
When developing fatigue risk management practices for air traffic
controllers in response to our 2007 recommendations, the FAA
encountered problems due to staffing shortages. In some cases, air
traffic managers were unable to keep their facilities staffed during
operating hours because staffing shortages made it difficult or
impossible to assign controllers whose work schedules complied with the
fatigue guidelines. These struggles have continued in the years since
these recommendations were issued. To that end, we welcome the FAA's
recent action to require air traffic controllers to receive at least 10
hours off between shifts and 12 hours off before a midnight shift.
The good news is that we know what we need to do to change this
dangerous status quo. We need adequate staffing, quality training
(including high-fidelity tower simulator training), and significant
investments in more lifesaving technologies like ASDE-X, ASSC, and
runway status lights (RWSLs), and the funding to make all of those
possible.
Question 2. Are there ways airlines and manufacturers could look at
integrating new or existing flight deck technologies to help pilots
avoid these close calls?
Answer. As valuable as they are, ASDE-X and ASSC only warn the ATC
tower of impending risks and do not provide the direct cockpit warning
to pilots that the NTSB has long recommended. In 2000, we recommended
that the FAA develop a runway safety system that provides a direct
flight crew warning of runway collision risk, similar to what traffic
collision avoidance systems (which can be integrated directly into the
pilot's navigation display) provide to pilots to avoid a midair
collision (A-00-66).
The FAA has developed RWSLs to provide a direct warning capability
to flight crews, but this technology is not installed at all airports
with scheduled passenger service and does not warn pilots of all types
of runway collision risk. For example, RWSLs likely would not warn
pilots of the risk of one airplane landing on a runway while another
airplane was taking off. As a result, the NTSB does not believe that
the FAA's actions to date represent a full response to our 23-year-old
recommendation. We continue to urge the FAA to require a system that
provides direct warning capability to flight crews at all airports with
scheduled passenger service.
We have also recommended that the FAA collaborate with aircraft and
avionics manufacturers and software developers to create the technology
for a cockpit system that directly alerts pilots when an airplane is
not aligned with the intended runway surface. Such a system would have
prevented the 2017 Air Canada overflight at San Francisco International
Airport. The NTSB currently has open recommendations (A-18-25 and -26)
that resulted from that investigation and that deal with direct cockpit
alerting.
The NTSB's preliminary report on Alaska Airlines Flight 1282
includes a number of very concerning details. In addition to the
failure of the mid-exit door plug and rapid decompression, the pilots
reported hearing a loud bang after which the cockpit door flew open,
their headsets were dislodged, and the Quick Reference Checklist was
blown out into the cabin. Reports on the incident have stated that the
cockpit door was actually designed to open in the case of a rapid
decompression, and that pilots and even industry experts were not aware
of this design feature.
Question 3. Has your investigation determined that this was in fact
a feature rather than a failure?
Answer. Our investigators continue to examine this question as part
of our ongoing investigation. I remain deeply concerned that, if this
design feature functioned as it was intended, the flight crew was not
aware of that feature and its consequences. We intend to address this
question in our final report on the accident.
Question 4. Has the NTSB ever made recommendations on ways to
ensure that aircraft manufactures fully communicate critical design
features to customer airlines and their pilots?
Answer. For decades, the NTSB has made numerous recommendations to
the FAA urging it to require aircraft manufacturers to make various
specific changes to flight manuals, maintenance manuals, pilot
operating handbooks, and other critical documents to ensure broad
awareness of potential safety issues uncovered in our investigations.
Our investigation into the Alaska flight 1282 incident will look
carefully at the need for any changes to aircraft manufacturer
communications to pilots, flight crew, and other stakeholders, and we
will not hesitate to issue recommendations for needed changes.
[all]