    [Senate Hearing 118-682]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                           S. Hrg. 118-682

                         GLOBAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND
                             UNITED STATES STRATEGY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 12, 2024

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http: //www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    60-822 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman

    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York		DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut		TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii			MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia			JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine		DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts		KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan		RICK SCOTT, Florida
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois		MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada			TED BUDD, North Carolina
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                  	ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri

    		    Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
      		John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                 March 12, 2024

                                                                       Page

    Global Security Challenges and United States Strategy............     1

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     1

    Statement of Senator Roger Wicker................................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Scharre, Paul, Ph.D., Executive Vice President and Director of        4
      Studies Center for A New American Security.

    Brands, Hal, Ph.D., Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise         10
      Institute, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global
      Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
      Studies.

    Questions for the Record.........................................    36

                                     (iii)

             GLOBAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND UNITED STATES STRATEGY

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 12, 2024

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Peters, Kelly, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Scott, and Schmitt.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
    discuss a range of global security challenges to the United
    States. As the Biden administration's National Defense Strategy
    (NDS) has made clear, we are in a long-term strategic
    competition with China and Russia. Ultimately, this competition
    is not just a rivalry of military or economic power but also a
    competition of ideas. This requires us to develop an
    understanding of our potential adversaries' strengths,
    weaknesses, philosophies, and objectives. This is where the
    knowledge and insights of the experts before us today are so
    valuable.
        Dr. Paul Scharre is the Executive Vice President and
    Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security.
    He is an expert on the future of technology and warfare,
    particularly with regard to artificial intelligence (AI) and
    autonomous weaponry, and has authored several influential books
    on these issues. Dr. Scharre worked previously as a policy
    expert in the Department of Defense (DOD) and served as an Army
    Ranger with multiple combat tours. Thank you.
        Dr. Hal Brands is a Senior Fellow at the American
    Enterprise Institute and serves as the Henry Kissinger
    Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins
    School of Advanced International Studies. He worked previously
    as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Strategic
    Planning and was a lead writer for the 2018 National Defense
    Strategy Commission. He has authored several books on U.S.
    grand strategy and statecraft.
        Thank you both for joining us today and for your long
    careers of service to the Nation.
        Our objective today is to examine the national security
    issues that this Committee should consider as we prepare the
    Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act. There is a
    common understanding on the Committee that the future of
    America's national security is tied to our competition with
    China. To keep pace and maintain America's edge, the Department
    of Defense must understand China's competitive tactics, develop
    new competitive tools of its own, and integrate with our allies
    and partners.
        For several decades, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has
    studied America's way of war and focused its efforts on
    covering our advantages. China has invested in offsetting
    technologies like anti-access and aerial denial systems,
    artificial intelligence, unmanned vehicles, hypersonics, and
    nuclear weapons. Further, Beijing has leveraged a combination
    of military and civil power against its neighbors, include
    statecraft, economic pressure, coercion, and deception. China
    has sought ways to achieve its national objectives while
    avoiding a direct military confrontation with the United States
    military. As the Defense Department's new Joint Concept for
    Competing states, China seeks to win without fighting. The
    strategy warns that if we do not adapt our approach, compete
    more effectively, the United States risks ceding strategic
    influence, advantage, and leverage while preparing for war that
    never occurs. Indeed, the document warns that the United States
    could lose without fighting.
        Just as Chinese leaders have studied America's way of war,
    we need to study theirs. With that in mind I would ask our
    witnesses for your assessment of how China is evolving its
    competitive strategies and objectives. I would also appreciate
    your views on what military and non-military factors are mostly
    likely to impact Chinese decisionmaking with respect to
    potential action against Taiwan and other regional partners.
        Even as we chart this long-term competition with China, we
    must recognize the current threat Russia poses. Let's be clear.
    Russia's war against Ukraine is an active threat to our
    national security. Vladimir Putin has repeatedly said that if
    he succeeds in Ukraine he intends to reunify former Soviet
    states. This will almost certainly involve direct military
    conflict with a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
    country, requiring the United States to send our own men and
    women into harm's way. We must continue our support for Ukraine
    so we can defeat Putin and cripple his ability to wage war
    elsewhere.
        As we are seeing in Ukraine and the Middle East, the nature
    of conflict and deterrence is evolving quickly. Cyber
    information and space operations can shape the battlefield as
    fundamentally as air, land, and sea power. The interconnected
    nature of these activities must drive the way we develop and
    field new technologies.
        The Defense Department continues to develop the Combined
    Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), concept, which
    would be a force multiplier in this regard. JADC2 will enable
    the Joint Force to detect, analyze, and act on information
    across the battle space quickly using automation, artificial
    intelligence, and predictive analysis.
        If we can field these technologies and mass these
    techniques then we must quickly include our allies and partners
    in the system. Indeed, forging and maintaining strong
    international partnerships is likely to be the decisive factor
    in any future conflict. We have seen this through Ukraine's
    remarkable performance against Russia, and it will hold true in
    the Indo-Pacific.
        I look forward to our witnesses' testimoneys, and I thank
    them again for their participation.
        Let me now recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER

        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our Chairman has
    just delivered a rather sobering opening statement.
        Today's witnesses are here to help this Committee take
    stock of changing threats to American interests. They will help
    us reflect on our progress in mitigating and combating those
    threats over the past year or so.
        The scorecard does not look good.
        The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shows no sign of stopping
    its military modernization project. In fact, China added 30
    ships last year compared to our overall reduction of 2. In
    fact, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) also continues to
    improve its force readiness with complex exercises focused on
    the so-called reunification of China with Taiwan.
        The CCP also continues its regional aggression on other
    countries' sovereign rights. For example, they have repeatedly
    harassed the Philippines' resupply ships in the Second Thomas
    Shoal. Although the San Francisco summit between Presidents
    Biden and Xi produced some feel-good headlines, Xi concluded
    the summit by reminding the United States that he intends to
    control Taiwan, peacefully or not.
        A year ago, we all hoped for significant progress in
    Ukraine's much-awaited offensive. That progress fell short. We
    failed to capitalize on temporary Russian weakness, and now
    face a Vladimir Putin increasingly convinced he can win in
    Ukraine, or at least outlast us and outlast everyone else.
    China, Iran, and North Korea are all contributing to Russia's
    war effort.
        Much has also changed in the past year with Iran. Tehran
    has used the chaos following Hamas' October 7th massacre as an
    opportunity to have its proxies attack United States Forces
    more than 160 times, including with deadly consequences in
    Jordan and in the Red Sea. Iranian-armed Houthis also continue
    to attack critical global maritime commerce in the Red Sea.
        Not to be outdone, North Korea seems to have moved into an
    offensive war preparation mode. This shift from a long-held
    defensive posture is a significant development which further
    complicates the picture in East Asia.
        Worse yet, all four of these adversaries drastically
    deepened their military and economic cooperation over the past
    year, even as we implement a National Defense Strategy that
    largely considers each adversary individually. I struggled to
    use the word ``implement'' because it seems to me that we have
    a strategy that is not being fully attempted.
        I would like to hear from the witnesses how they assess the
    current threats from all of these adversaries.
        The year 2023 was a discouraging year for U.S. national
    security, and 2024 will be worse without substantial investment
    in our military forces. This Committee recently heard about
    challenges across maritime, air, and space domains, as well as
    challenges with insufficient inventories of long-range
    munitions in the Indo-Pacific theater. If we have any hope of
    deterring threats from China, we need to act immediately to
    enhance our capabilities.
        Our needs across the combatant commands and within the
    services are much too long to list here. We need more
    submarines. We need more amphibious ships. We need to give our
    servicemembers more visibility through intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance tools. We need more torpedoes.
    We need more of the SM-6 multi-role missiles, more of the
    Tomahawk strike missiles our ships and submarines carry, and
    more of the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles that allow us to hit
    enemy ships precisely from a safe distance. We need all of
    these things now.
        I welcome our witnesses' suggestions on how to improve the
    Pentagon's ossified planning, contracting, and budgeting
    processes, which continue to prevent us from producing cost-
    effective programs on time and at scale.
        I would also be interested in our witnesses' perspective
    about the sufficiency of the overall topline defense budget.
    The budget proposed yesterday by President Biden requests yet
    another significant cut in defense. He proposed this even as
    the Chinese Communist Party announced a 7.2 percent defense
    budget increase just last week. Is it too much to ask that we
    return to the generous portion of GDP [gross domestic product]
    that gave us more than a decade of peace during the Reagan era?
        We continue to ask our military to do too much with too
    little, and that needs to change. I hope this Committee, Mr.
    Chairman, on a bipartisan basis, is prepared to act this year
    to ensure we address this looming national security crisis.
        Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Dr.
    Scharre, please.

    STATEMENT OF PAUL SCHARRE, Ph.D., EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND
         DIRECTOR OF STUDIES CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

        Dr. Scharre. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
    Wicker, and distinguished Senators. Thank you for having me
    here today.
        We live in a period of tremendous technological change.
    This creates opportunities for the United States but also for
    our adversaries. The U.S. military must adopt technology faster
    than its competitors. The bulk of technological innovation is
    occurring outside DOD, and DOD must prioritize spinning-in
    commercial technologies and harnessing them for military
    advantage. This contest to rapidly adopt commercial
    technologies is an all-too-level playing field with our
    competitors.
        China also has access to world-class technology companies,
    and the PLA is working to ``intelligentize'' its forces. DOD
    needs significant institutional change to keep pace with the
    speed of technological innovation. Without these changes, we
    risk falling behind competitors and the U.S. military being
    unprepared in a future conflict.
        DOD cannot lead in 21st century technologies with a 20th
    century bureaucracy. The tech innovation landscape has changed
    dramatically in the past half century, but DOD institutions
    have not kept up. It is not merely that the technology itself
    has advanced. That alone would be manageable. The problem is
    that the role that DOD plays in tech innovation has changed,
    but DOD has not yet sufficiently adapted to this new reality.
        The Defense Department used to be the main driver of global
    innovation, but not anymore. In 1960, DOD alone controlled 36
    percent of global R&D (research and development) spending. DOD
    could single-handedly drive the shape of technological
    evolution around the world. DOD could make bets that others had
    to respond to.
        Now today this dynamic has reversed. DOD controls only 3
    percent of global R&D. Two trends have caused this shift.
    First, the Federal Government's share of U.S. domestic R&D has
    fallen, with the private sector picking up the slack. Second,
    the U.S. share of global R&D has dropped from nearly 70 percent
    in 1960 to 30 percent today.
        A combination of these trends in the commercialization and
    globalization of research and development has dramatically
    changed the role that DOD plays in technology development.
    Instead of being a trend-setter, DOD is forced to react to
    technology trends exogenous to the defense industry.
        The dominant trend in global technology innovation today is
    the information revolution. Network connectivity and bandwidth,
    big data, AI [artificial intelligence] and machine learning,
    genomics, Internet of Things devices, and computing hardware
    are all advancing at literal exponential rates. To give just
    one example, the amount of computing hardware used to train
    cutting-edge machine learning systems, such as large language
    models like ChatGPT, has grown 10 billionfold since 2010, and
    is doubling every 6 months. This is much faster than the
    historical 24-month doubling in chip performance associated
    with Moore's Law. This has dramatic implications for the
    military. Few other technologies are advancing this quickly.
    Missiles are not 10 billion times faster than they were in
    2010.
        Yet information technologies (IT) are advancing at a
    breathtaking pace, creating new opportunities for military
    applications, and these technologies are so widely available,
    coming out of a highly globalized, commercially driven R&D
    ecosystem, that our competitors have similar opportunities.
        DOD should prioritize investment in digital capabilities
    that are riding these exponential curves--autonomy, robotics,
    sensors, communication networks, data, cloud computing, cyber,
    and electronic warfare, for example.
        We can already see evidence of this dynamic in the war in
    Ukraine, with the proliferation of small, commercially
    available drones and counter-drone electronic warfare and
    jamming systems. Our adversaries will capitalize on these
    technologies. The only question is whether the United States
    also competes or falls behind.
        In recent years, DOD has created a slew of new innovation
    organizations such as DIU [Defense Innovation Unit], AFWERX
    [Air Force Work Project], SOFWERX [Special Operations Forces
    Works], CDAO [Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence
    Office], and others, and many of these have yielded tangible
    successes. Yet DOD has often struggled to innovate quickly at
    scale.
        The Defense Department must move beyond bespoke solutions
    to one-off problems are scale commercial tech adoption across
    the $800 billion enterprise. DOD will need Congress' support to
    move fast, be flexible, experiment with new technologies,
    engage non-traditional companies, and take risks. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Scharre follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Dr. Scharre.
        Dr. Brands, please.

     STATEMENT OF HAL BRANDS, Ph.D., SENIOR FELLOW AT THE AMERICAN
        ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, HENRY A. KISSINGER DISTINGUISHED
      PROFESSOR OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS AT THE JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF
                     ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

        Dr. Brands. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker,
    distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
    me. Let me just make three brief points at the outset here.
        First, it is a perennial cliche to say that the
    international landscape is more threatening and complex than it
    has been at any time in decades. Today that cliche actually
    happens to be true. All three key regions of Eurasia are
    experiencing severe conflict or the threat of conflict. Today
    we have Russia's war in Ukraine, the war between Israel, Hamas,
    and all of the violent spillover it has produced across much of
    the Middle East, as well as the growing threat of conflict with
    China in the Western Pacific.
        When you add in the other persistent threats the United
    States must contend with from an increasingly belligerent North
    Korea to a nuclearizing Iran to the persistent threat of
    violent extremism, I think it is fair to say that the United
    States faces more and more severe security challenges than at
    any time since the end of the cold war, and perhaps even going
    back farther than that.
        Second, to Senator Wicker's point, the connections between
    the threats the United States faces are growing, as is the
    threat of conflict that spans multiple regions. Ties between
    Russia and China, Russia and Iran, Russia and North Korea, and
    China and Iran are all becoming strongly and more tightly
    interwoven, which means that the conflicts in which these
    various actors are engaged, or could engage in, are becoming
    more tightly interconnected, as well.
        I go into this issue in greater detail in my written
    statement, but let me just say that my gravest concern about
    the international security environment right now is not that
    United States adversaries will mount a comprehensive, highly
    coordinated assault on the international order. It is that the
    regional conflicts in which they are engaged will fuel and feed
    on each other, creating an atmosphere of growing global
    disorder.
        As I mentioned, the United States right now already faces
    hot wars in two of the three key Eurasian theaters. If China
    were to attack Taiwan or otherwise violently upend the status
    quo in the Western Pacific, all three key theaters of Eurasia
    would be engulfed in violent conflicts simultaneously, a
    situation the world really has not seen since the run-up to
    World War II.
        Third, the U.S. is not adequately prepared for the world it
    presently faces. For much of the past decade, the U.S. has been
    transitioning toward a one-war defense strategy in a world
    where it could easily face conflict in two or three theaters
    simultaneously. As we have seen since Russia invaded Ukraine,
    the United States defense industrial base would struggle
    enormously if the United States were engaged in a major
    conflict. U.S. defense spending is about as low, give or take,
    as a percentage of GDP, as it has been at any time since the
    late 1940's.
        In other words, there is a growing gap between the
    challenges the U.S. faces and the resources with which it can
    face them. The longer that gap persists and the larger it
    grows, the greater the likelihood it will be revealed by our
    adversaries, at a time and place of their choosing, and at a
    tremendous cost to global stability and our own security. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Brands follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your
    very insightful testimony.
        Dr. Scharre, with regard to technology, could you briefly
    describe the strategy of today and what you see as its
    strengths and weaknesses.
        Dr. Scharre. Yes, of course, Senator. So I think that when
    you look at the DOD's national defense S&T strategy, I think
    one of the things that they have done very well is list a
    number of different critical technologies. DOD, of course, has
    been doing this for the last several years and then updating
    them. The most recent one has a couple different bins that they
    have put these in, which I think is somewhat helpful to
    organize them.
        I think there might be two things that I would suggest
    would be helpful to the Department to do to add onto this. One
    would be a sense of prioritization among these, that can drive
    actually spending and investments. The problem is 14 things is
    not really a list of priorities. It is a shopping list. It is
    just a lot of things. It is all the things.
        To their credit, past DOD leaders, some of them have made
    very clear priorities. When he was Deputy Secretary of Defense,
    Bob Work said robotics, AI, autonomy, his number one priority.
    When he was Under Secretary, Michael Griffin said hypersonics,
    directed energy, his top priorities.
        The concern that I have in looking at this is, you know,
    both things cannot be the number one thing, right? I think it
    would be helpful for the Department to have a repeatable
    process internally, a rubric, for prioritizing technologies
    that they could come then to excellent audiences, to the Hill,
    to industry, to others to say here is our process. These are
    the questions that we ask, looking at where the technology is
    coming from, its operational effects, its rate of growth. Based
    on those factors we have decided these are the ones that are
    the most important. This is the way it is going to drive our
    decisions. A process that everyone else could look at and
    understand it would be transparent. Instead of just kind of
    individual leaders saying, well, I think this is more
    important.
        I think the other factor that I do not see included too
    often is looking at the rate of growth of these technologies,
    which I think matters quite a bit in sort of what do you think
    is going to be most impactful in maybe the relatively near
    future. You need to look at that differential rate of growth.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Brands, before the 2023 Ukraine counteroffensive you
    were urging more rapid support of the Ukrainian Forces. Now we
    find ourselves in a position where we are deadlocked over this
    supplemental. What is your view on the importance of the
    supplemental and the timing of getting it done?
        Dr. Brands. I think it absolutely crucial in the sense
    that, one way or another, 2024 is going to be a difficult year
    for Ukraine, where they will largely be on the defensive. The
    question is whether 2024 can be a year in which Ukraine can
    resist Russian advances and prepare itself for another
    counteroffensive, perhaps in 2025, and the supplemental is
    absolutely vital on both of those counts. Without additional
    United States aid there just will not be the wherewithal to
    mount another offensive, and as we are seeing right now,
    without United States aid Ukraine will start to run critically
    short of capability that it needs just to hold the line where
    it is.
        The Ukrainian withdrawal from Avdiivka was occasioned
    largely by the fact that Ukrainian Forces simply did not have
    the ammunition to hold very strong defensive positions that
    they held there. When you take into account that most Ukrainian
    defensive lines are not as well developed or strong as the ones
    that they had to leave in Avdiivka, the reality is that if they
    do not get this aid from the United States they are going to
    find it very difficult just to keep the line in place over the
    course of this year, which will further complicate the question
    of how the war ends on terms successful for Ukraine.
        Chairman Reed. Following that up, you have made the point
    that the danger might not be a concerned axis of enemies that
    come after us together but one exploiting the fighting in one
    region, et cetera. This raises the question of China's kind of
    observation of what is going on in Ukraine. So Dr. Brands, your
    views on that.
        Dr. Brands. I think one of the most constructive influences
    on China's calculus relative to Taiwan over the past couple of
    years has been the degree to which Russia has struggled in
    Ukraine and the degree to which a coalition of countries,
    mainly advanced democracies, has rallied to help support
    Ukraine in its fight for survival.
        I think it would be extremely damaging if the United States
    were essentially to throw in the towel in Ukraine and to allow
    Ukraine to be defeated, because the message that would send to
    Xi Jinping and other people who are observing United States
    behavior very closely is that the West may talk tough but
    ultimately you can outlast the United States and get your way
    in the end.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, and I will let the Ranger get the
    last word. Do you concur, Dr. Scharre?
        Dr. Scharre. I do, absolutely, and I do think that, as Dr.
    Brands points out, our threats would worsen in Europe if we
    were to not continue to support Ukraine. In the end we would
    have an emboldened, stronger Russia as a result, which would be
    a much larger burden for us in terms of defending our allies in
    Europe, and the effects would be felt around the world,
    including most acutely with China, and impact their calculus.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Wicker, please.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Brands, let me
    ask you about the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The law
    requires the Secretary of Defense to review the adequacy of the
    strategy and update it if circumstances have changed.
        Now we got the latest strategy in October 2022, 17 months
    ago or so. Do you think events have changed? Do you think this
    situation has changed enough over that time that the Secretary
    needs to review the adequacy of the strategy and make changes?
        Dr. Brands. I think two critical things have changed since
    the strategy was finalized and released in 2022. The first is
    that the assumption that Russia would emerge from the Ukraine
    war significantly weakened and ultimately defeated is no longer
    as tenable as it once was. We are seeing a Russia that is doing
    fairly well on the battlefield right now, and furthermore, is
    aggressively mobilizing economically and militarily in a way
    that will allow it to present a continuing threat to the
    eastern front of NATO for many years to come after this war
    ends.
        The second thing that has changed, obviously, is that the
    Middle East has erupted once again. This was not a calculation
    that was foremost in the crafting of the National Defense
    Strategy. We are seeing increased persistent demands on United
    States military power in the Red Sea, in the Gulf of Aden, in
    Iraq and Syria, and in a variety of other places where the
    United States is trying to push back against Iran and its
    proxies.
        So when you put those two things together I think it
    indicates that we are living in a rather different world than
    was expected when the strategy was released.
        Senator Wicker. Do we ever adequately fund the National
    Defense Strategy?
        Dr. Brands. Well, ``ever'' is a strong statement. I guess I
    would say that the gap between our requirements and our
    resources is bigger at times and smaller at times, and I worry
    that it has gotten bigger in recent years. If you just think
    about defense spending as a percentage of GDP, during the cold
    war the United States spent, on average, about 7.5 percent of
    GDP on defense. During the 1980's, during the period of the
    Reagan buildup, it was about 6 percent, 6.5 percent, on
    average. We are at about half of that today, just north of 3
    percent.
        When you compare that at the threat landscape that the
    United States faces to historical trends of defense spending, I
    think indicates that the gap between resources and commitments
    is getting larger.
        Senator Wicker. Well, sir, in a recent Foreign Affairs
    essay, you mentioned that it is going to be hard to
    dramatically ramp up military spending until it is politically
    expedient, and you mentioned the possibility of Americans being
    convinced only in the case of a jarring geopolitical shock.
        But let me ask you to comment on that. we had a jarring
    political shock in Pearl Harbor, because we were not ready.
    During that time you mentioned that we were spending 6, 7
    percent of GDP the cold war. We never really had a jarring
    shock, did we?
        Dr. Brands. We had shocks that were lesser than Pearl
    Harbor but that did catalyze significant growth in U.S. defense
    spending. So the Korean War, for instance, that led to a
    massive expansion of United States defense spending from I
    believe somewhere in the neighborhood of 3 or 4 percent of GDP
    up to about 14 percent of GDP, at the height of that conflict.
        Senator Wicker. Okay, and let's move ahead to the Carter
    administration, the end of the Carter administration, and then
    the beginning of the buildup in GDP under Reagan. What were
    those numbers?
        Dr. Brands. I believe at its peak under the Reagan
    administration the U.S. was spending north of 6 percent of GDP
    on defense.
        Senator Wicker. We avoided during that time a jarring
    geopolitical shock, did we not?
        Dr. Brands. Yes.
        Senator Wicker. Dr. Scharre, just real quickly, the
    technologies are important. In my opening statement I said we
    need more submarines, we need more amphibs, we need more
    missiles. The fact that we need to gain the lead in DOD in
    technologies does not take away from the fact that we need more
    tools, more ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance], more missiles, more ships. Is that correct?
        Dr. Scharre. Yes, I think that is true. I mean, we
    obviously need physical platforms. We need ships. We need
    submarines. I also think it is true--and I think, actually, the
    Department understands this--that what is on those platforms
    matters more than just the raw numbers. But we do need numbers,
    and that is a major problem right now for the Department.
        Senator Wicker. Lack of numbers is a major problem.
        Dr. Scharre. Absolutely.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Hirono,
    please.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So we already
    spend north of $800 billion for defense. Dr. Brands, you are
    suggesting that we double this to over a trillion. So it is not
    just how much we are spending, it is what we are spending on,
    is it not? So are we spending defense dollars in the kind of
    priorities that you would expect us to be spending this money
    on?
        Dr. Brands. I think there are many constructive initiatives
    underway within the Department to try to prepare the U.S. for
    some of the conflicts that it might face. So I think a lot of
    the operational concepts that are being devised by the services
    that are geared toward conflict in the Western Pacific are
    promising.
        I think, though, that ultimately all of those concepts
    require munitions, they require platforms, they require a
    number of things, where quantity really does matter, and so I
    think that while it is very important that we have the thrust
    of our defense program right. It is very important that we
    resource it adequately, as well.
        Senator Hirono. Well, when you said quantity does matter,
    because at some point the fact that China has so many more
    quantities of planes and ships and everything else. Our
    country, we could meet the challenge of China, for example,
    through innovation. Both of you are now saying that we are
    falling behind in our technological innovation. You say, Dr.
    Brands, that the NDS, which came out sometime in late 2022, is
    already not accurate with regard to Russia's powers and also
    what is happening in the Middle East.
        What do we need to do to make sure that we are actually, we
    have the capacity to assess the needs that we have militarily
    based on what is going on in the world. Not to mention, by the
    way, how important are the alliances that we have at a time
    like this when we are facing the conflicts in the Middle East
    and in Russia and Ukraine? Either one of you.
        Dr. Brands. I can talk about alliances and perhaps the
    assessment issue. We have been fortunate over the past couple
    of years in that we have gotten a real-time education in
    demands that modern war and major war would present for the
    U.S. Defense Department. We have seen in Ukraine the enormous
    quantities of munitions and platforms that would be consumed by
    a war between the United States and Russia, let alone the
    United States and China. So I think we have gotten a greater
    education in sort of the order of magnitude of what a major
    conflict would demand.
        On the question of alliances, just briefly I would say that
    alliances are perhaps our greatest force multiplier in
    international affairs. They give us access and influence in key
    regions. They allow us to advocate the capabilities of other
    countries to our own. They give us the ability to influence the
    calculations of adversaries in an important way. In those and
    other ways, I think they add dramatically to the influence the
    U.S. can observe on the international stage.
        Senator Hirono. I agree with you, and recently we have the
    Quad Alliance, the AUKUS [Australia, United Kingdom, and United
    States] agreements, trilateral relationship with the Republic
    of Korea, Japan, and us, the renegotiation of funding of the
    compact nations. So those are all very critical to our ability
    to be ready in meeting, I think, the demands of the near-peer
    people in China and Russia.
        I am just curious. You both talk about how we are falling
    behind in terms of our technological decisionmaking. We
    recently got the report of the National Defense Industrial
    Strategy. So do we need some kind of a national defense that
    focuses on technological advancement?
        Dr. Scharre. Yes, I think the new strategy and the defense
    industrial base was excellent, and I think actually the big
    challenge there is resourcing it. Because, in particular, the
    Ukraine conflict has highlighted for us these particular
    problems that we have seen in the defense industrial base,
    especially in munitions procurement. It has given us, in many
    ways, a golden opportunity to address those problems now, ahead
    of a potential conflict with China, both to increase munitions
    capacity and then scale production, and then look elsewhere in
    the defense industrial base where we probably have similar
    problems.
        Senator Hirono. Well, but you both highlighted that we are
    falling behind in terms of our technological capabilities. So
    do we need to have a special group, within an entity, or the
    development of a strategy that focuses on DOD capabilities in
    the technology area? Do we need a specific group that is paying
    attention to that need within DOD?
        Dr. Scharre. I think so. I think maybe there are two maybe
    challenges I would see. One would be some improvements to how
    DOD thinks about S&T [science & technology] investments itself
    in terms of the prioritization and the trends. But also at a
    national level we are now competing with China at a national
    level in technology competition, and we do not really have
    anyone at the national level looking at that holistically. We
    have seen not just DOD but Commerce and other elements of
    national power come into form. I think we need to think more
    strategically about how to use those elements of national
    power.
        Senator Hirono. Do you agree, Dr. Brands? I am running out
    of time, but maybe you can respond briefly.
        Dr. Brands. Yes.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Fisher,
    please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Brands, many
    analysts today, they seem to be relatively confident that the
    risk of Chinese aggression is overblown. Do you think that
    confidence is misplaced?
        Dr. Brands. I would not hold a great degree of confidence
    in our ability to predict that China will not use force in the
    Western Pacific over the next several years, in part because
    even if it is not to China's advantage to do so, we have seen
    from the Ukraine war and many other cases in history that the
    leaders often make bad decisions. They often make bad decisions
    when they sit atop authoritarian regimes where information flow
    is very restricted and there is a lot of incentive to tell the
    person at the top what he or she wants to hear.
        I worry also because the reality is that the military
    balance in the Western Pacific is changing dramatically, and it
    is changing in real time. The United States has done a variety
    of important and constructive things over the past several
    years to try to arrest the erosion of deterrence. Everything
    from the coalition-building efforts that have been discussed to
    some of the operational concepts that are being put in place
    today. But the reality is that the scale of the PLA buildup is
    just such that I worry we are losing rather than gaining
    ground.
        The one statistic that always stands out to me is that
    between 2022 and 2023, the PLAAF [People's Liberation Army Air
    Force] added 400 fourth-generation fighters, so basically F-16
    equivalents, to its inventory. When you start getting into
    numbers like that, even a qualitatively superior military,
    which the United States clearly has, may struggle to defend
    Taiwan or otherwise uphold its commitments in the region.
        So as this decade goes on, if the balance continues to
    shift I would become more worried about the PRC's [People's
    Republic of China] propensity for aggression.
        Senator Fischer. Dr. Brands, the United States has relied
    heavily on sanctions against Russia. When we watch the
    aftermath now of that in Ukraine it has failed to destroy.
    Russia's economy was initially anticipated, you spoke to that
    earlier, that the Russians are moving ahead with that. Do you
    think that China would be more susceptible or less so to those
    sanctions than Russia, and why?
        Dr. Brands. I think it is complicated, Senator. On the one
    hand, China is a harder sanctions target than Russia because
    its economy is bigger, it is more diversified, and I think the
    financial implications of going after the Chinese economy in
    the way that the United States and its allies went after the
    Russian economy would be more globally severe than they have
    been in the Russian case. So for all of those reasons it might
    be more difficult to inflict even the level of pain on China
    that the United States and its allies have done to Russia.
        The flip side of it, however, is that China is also,
    because it is more globally integrated it is more dependent on
    the global economy than Russia is. So the threat of having
    access to Western markets severed would, I think, be more
    impactful for China than it would for Russia, because I do not
    see how China can accomplish its objectives without access to
    the global economy over time.
        Senator Fischer. Dr. Scharre, do you have any comments on
    the sanctions on China, what we would see there?
        Dr. Scharre. Yes, thank you, Senator. Actually, a colleague
    of mine, Emily Kilcrease, at the Center for a New American
    Security, recently released a very detailed analysis of this,
    and I am happy to share it with you all afterwards. Looking at
    different elements of China's economy and their exposure to
    potential sanctions. There are a lot of areas, particularly in
    the defense sector, that are fairly insulated because they are
    not tied into the global economy, but their banking sector, in
    particular, is one that does have some vulnerabilities.
        I think those are places where we want to think
    strategically about how do you leverage that? How do you
    sustain those vulnerabilities, because China is certainly aware
    of them, and they are looking to shore up their defenses and be
    less vulnerable. How do you sustain those? Then in the run-up
    to a potential conflict, how would you think about
    strategically leveraging them, potentially as a means of
    deterrence, which is a new way of thinking about sanctions than
    we have necessarily done in the past, but I think there is a
    lot of value there.
        Senator Fischer. How would you both characterize the
    relationship between Beijing and Tehran?
        Dr. Brands. I think that China has been investing in this
    relationship over the past few years in hopes of strengthening
    its ties to a key player in the region. I think that China,
    however, has to balance its relationship with Iran with its
    efforts to deepen its relationship with Saudi Arabia and other
    key states in the gulf. So there may be a Governor on how far
    the China-Iran relationship can go that is less present in
    other cases where you have autocratic countries coming
    together.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fisher. Senator Kaine,
    please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the
    witnesses.
        Dr. Brands, you talked about China's perception of the slow
    pace of Russia in Ukraine, and that that has affected their
    thinking about their own military ambitions. In particular you
    cited China's observation that when the democracies link arms
    it is pretty formidable. We do not have NATO in the Indo-
    Pacific, but we do have sort of a latticework of alliances--the
    Quad, the improved relationship between Korea and Japan, an
    improving relationship with the Philippines, and AUKUS.
        I would like you to each talk about--this Committee has
    done a lot of work on AUKUS, as has the Foreign Relations
    Committee. There is funding for some parts of AUKUS in the
    supplemental bill pending in the House right now. I would like
    you to talk about how you view the AUKUS framework Pillars 1
    and 2 in terms of our security posture in the Indo-Pacific.
        Dr. Brands. I think it is incredibly important in a handful
    of different respects. In one respect, simply the geography of
    AUKUS is very important because it is proof of concept of how
    the United States can leverage individual alliances in order to
    bring countries together into a larger network of actors that
    are committed to pushing back against Chinese power, even when
    those countries span regional boundaries.
        Obviously, the piece of AUKUS that gets a lot of attention,
    and rightly so, is the submarines piece of it, and that is
    important because undersea warfare is, I think, one of the few
    areas where the United States still enjoys unquestioned
    superiority over China, even at the vast distances of the
    Western Pacific.
        Because it will take some time for the submarine dimension
    of AUKUS to really bear fruit, I think the other pieces of it,
    whether it is the advanced capabilities piece or sort of the
    accompanying piece, which is increased access and presence in
    northern Australia, are particularly important in terms of
    developing the ability to bring power to bear in a conflict in
    the Western Pacific and affecting China's calculations in terms
    of how a conflict would go over the next 5 to 10 years.
        As important as that is in its own right it is also a
    critical bridge to the point where you can start to bring some
    of the undersea capabilities to bear.
        Senator Kaine. Dr. Scharre, other thoughts?
        Dr. Scharre. I think given the timing dimension I might
    prioritize things that involve joint exercises, things that
    demonstrate to China that jointness in our ability to operate
    with our allies in the region, things that involve basing
    posture kind of things. I would, in particular, emphasize
    things that are not physical capabilities but institutional
    elements of collaboration. So things like joint planning
    together, which we already obviously have deep ties with
    Australia and the U.K., but things like bringing them on board
    in terms of planning to actually, in the event of a conflict,
    enable us to be able to fight effectively together.
        Senator Kaine. Australian sailors are already going through
    the training program at the nuclear power school with United
    States Navy and in South Carolina Australian shipbuilders are
    already here training at a manufacturing excellence facility in
    Danville, Virginia. So we are moving out before the sub
    transfers in the 2030's, which I am impressed by.
        Let me conclude with an area where I am not happy with
    alliances and that is the Red Sea. I am worried about the lack
    of a real strategy in the Red Sea with the Houthis trying to
    defend shipping, I think, makes some strategic sense. But
    President Biden and others have acknowledged they do not think
    firing more missiles at the Houthis is going to lead the
    Houthis to fire fewer missiles. In fact, it seems like the pace
    might be escalating.
        In particular I am concerned that the burden of defending
    commercial shipping in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea is
    pretty heavily on the U.S.'s shoulders. I think it is just the
    United States and the U.K. that are engaged in any kinetic
    activity to knock down Houthi drones and missiles. I believe
    the Italian navy might have engaged in one kinetic activity to
    protect an Italian-flagged vessel.
        Why are not more nations engaging in this defense in the
    Red Sea when their probably commerce and trade is more affected
    by the Houthi attacks than is the United States economy?
        Dr. Brands. Senator, I think the basic problem is that many
    of them do not have the capability to do so. Even in cases
    where our allies might be included to help out in providing
    this critical public good they are running short of the
    resources. So Australia had their debate about whether they
    would contribute to Operation Prosperity Guardian and
    ultimately decided they would not, because I believe Australia
    has a total of three ships that could be useful in this sort of
    context, and they have decided that they are needed closer to
    home.
        So the lack of resources relative to challenges
    unfortunately is not a distinctly American problem. It is a
    larger free world problem at this moment.
        Senator Kaine. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine. Senator
    Schmitt, please.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
    for being here. Dr. Brands, in your book I am really interested
    in the Danger Zone book, and how you balance, in trying to
    understand the Chinese perspective, they certainly view
    themselves as a 5,000-year-old civilization, the middle
    kingdom, who, the last 200 years, has been an aberration, a
    humiliation, in their view. They are not going to let that
    happen again, they have a longer view, all those sorts of
    things that are sort of baked into the understanding of their
    mentality and how they are on the march now, in a very real
    way, and probably more than people think. Their shipbuilding
    capacity alone is striking, and I am not sure many people in
    the general public understand that. They have a bigger navy--
    not a better navy, but a bigger navy.
        So that longer view, and you write about the 2020's being
    absolutely critical, which is a very short-term issue in
    setting the stage for this longer, great powers competition.
    You have got the demographic cliff that they are facing. They
    are no longer publishing a lot of economic data. Their youth
    unemployment, which I think drives--GDP is really important to
    us. I think unemployment for the Chinese is most important, for
    a variety of reasons. When you are an authoritarian regime a
    lot of young men not working is a real problem.
        So how do you balance this, in your view of how they view
    where they are at right now--and, of course, you have got this
    big Taiwan question--where they are at right now. Do they view
    that as, in your estimation, as a reason to go quicker, or do
    they fall back to the traditional view of the longer-term
    strategy?
        Dr. Brands. Senator, my view--and this is by no means a
    unanimous view among China watchers, I should add--but my view
    is that China is being motivated by a dangerous mixture of
    weakness, strength, and personalization at this point. The
    weakness comes from the demographic and economic problems that
    you noted, which are already having a pronounced effect on
    Chinese growth, and that effect will only become more
    pronounced over time. At the same time, the military
    modernization program is still going gangbusters, if you look
    at the increases in military spending.
        You have a country whose long-term economic prospects are
    dimming as its near-term military position becomes stronger.
    Historically, that has been a recipe for trouble, because that
    is exactly the sort of combination that tempts countries to use
    force sooner rather than later to lock in advantages while they
    still can. It is reinforced, in this case, because China's
    fortunes have become increasingly entangled with Xi Jinping's
    fortunes, as he personalizes the political system and does away
    with this system of something closer to collective rule that
    China had for a couple of generations after Mao Tse-Tung.
        You sometimes hear Xi Jinping say things like, ``The
    question of Taiwan cannot be passed down from generation to
    generation.'' That is sometimes read as him saying, ``It cannot
    be passed down to the next generation of Chinese leaders.''
        When you put all those things together it makes me worry
    that we may be dealing with a China that is in a bit of a hurry
    by the time we get to the latter part of this decade.
        Senator Schmitt. He is already in an unprecedented third
    term.
        Dr. Brands. With no indication that he is planning on
    stepping down any time soon.
        Senator Schmitt. Correct, and so if you were a betting man,
    if you had to place a wager, red he goes, black he does not go,
    where are you betting?
        Dr. Brands. I think an operation against Taiwan would be
    sufficiently daunting that there are lots of things that the
    United States, Taiwan, and other countries in the region can do
    to drive down the chances of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. But on
    the current trajectory I am very worried about where we will
    end up.
        Senator Schmitt. Then one last question about the CCP and
    China. So there has always been this sort of natural distrust
    between them and Russia, or the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist
    Republics], or the Russian Empire, whatever phase Russia is in.
    How do you view that? Even though they seem to be working more
    collaboratively than they have in recent memory, there is still
    this natural tension. They share a border. How do you gauge the
    reality of that relationship right now?
        Dr. Brands. The historic mistrust is still there. In fact,
    China will occasionally print maps that show it controlling
    parts of Russia, as it is currently constituted. Certainly I
    think the Russians, in particular, know that if China comes
    anywhere close to achieving its ambitions in Eurasia that is
    going to be a very challenging situation for Russia itself.
    Those concerns are rather distant at the moment.
        Ideologically, these are two countries. They are both
    autocratic powers trying to make it in a world dominated by a
    democratic superpower. They both view the United States and its
    allies as their primary enemies, and by all indications, Xi and
    Putin seem to have similar world views and get along fairly
    well.
        So those historic tensions may reassert themselves, but
    perhaps not on a timeline that would help us in this decade or
    a little bit beyond.
        Senator Schmitt. So maybe the United States exploiting some
    of those traditional differences as opposed to driving them
    together probably makes the most sense for us, right?
        Dr. Brands. It could. I will spare you a long excursion
    into history, but if you look back at the prior Sino-Soviet
    relationship, the United States actually pursued a strategy in
    the 1950's of trying to drive them closer together as a way of
    exploiting those frictions within the relationship. I would
    argue that it worked fairly well at the time.
        Senator Schmitt. Okay. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Senator King,
    please.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
    thank both of you for very thoughtful and insightful testimony.
    Talking about some of the issues that we have already touched
    upon, in 1962, as you have testified, our defense was something
    like 8 or 9 percent of GDP. Today it is under 3 percent. The
    projection I just saw was 2.7 for 2024.
        The cornerstone of our national security policy is
    deterrence. I would argue that this dramatic decline, by two-
    thirds, is a chink in the armor of deterrence. Would you
    concur? In other words, the Chinese and the Russians and others
    look at that number as part of measuring how fearful they
    should be of our ability to respond.
        Dr. Brands. I think it is certainly unhelpful, Senator, and
    I think that whether it is the number they look at or the speed
    at which the U.S. would exhaust its munitions inventory in a
    particular conflict, those are precisely the sort of issues
    that would worry me about whether deterrence was eroding.
        Senator King. The second question along those lines is our
    failure to continue to support Ukraine, how would that affect
    Xi's calculus in terms of Taiwan and his analysis of our
    staying power?
        Dr. Brands. I think Xi is predisposed to think that the
    United States and its allies lack the endurance and the stamina
    to hold the line against China and its partners over the long
    term. If the United States were to terminate support for
    Ukraine or would allow Ukraine to be defeated, I think it would
    simply reinforce that perception. Which would be unhelpful, as
    Dr. Scharre had pointed out, not just in Europe but in the Asia
    Pacific as well.
        Senator King. Dr. Scharre, do you agree?
        Dr. Scharre. Absolutely. I mean, Xi already believes that
    America is in decline. That we do not have staying power, and
    it would certainly reinforce that assumption that even in the
    event of a conflict, if the United States were to be directly
    engaged in defending Taiwan, that we simply would not be able
    to go the distance and China could outlast us.
        Senator King. My impression from the initiation of the
    Ukraine war was that Xi was somewhat surprised by the reaction
    of the West, the unification, expansion of NATO, and that
    surprise and concern would be dissipated if we indeed abandoned
    Ukraine.
        Dr. Scharre. Right. Precisely.
        Senator King. I like it when witnesses say precisely in
    answer to a question.
        I want to go back to the very beginning, and also I want to
    associate myself with the questions of Senator Wicker in terms
    of the GDP percentage. The American public does not realize, we
    hear this big number, $800 billion, and at ten times other
    countries, but in terms of the percentage of our economy
    devoted to defense it has fallen by almost two-thirds in the
    last 60 years.
        R&D, real problem. New technologies win wars. Genghis Khan
    conquered the world because of the invention of the metal
    stirrup. The longbow turned the tide. The British had 5,000 at
    the Battle of Agincourt, the French 20,000. The use of the
    longbow was generally considered by historians to be crucial in
    turning that battle, and indeed, the 100 Years War.
        I worry, it is obviously that there are new technologies
    that we have been slow. Directed energy and hypersonics are the
    two that strike me as most obvious. How do we get the Pentagon
    to understand the role of new technology? Dr. Scharre, what is
    your view?
        Dr. Scharre. I think that the Defense Department, basically
    in its DNA, understands the value of technology. I actually
    think what is missing right now is a sense of where the
    priorities ought to lie, because I think the DOD is still stuck
    in a mindset from the 1960's where DOD believes that it has to
    invent all the technologies itself. But there is so much
    technological innovation happening outside the Defense
    Department that I think that is going to matter more.
        I would say that it is true that technology is absolutely
    critical to winning wars, but what matters most is finding the
    best ways of using the technology. That is clear looking at
    history. So having institutional processes that can figure out
    how do we capitalize on this. Because in many ways----
        Senator King. One of the problems--we have had testimony to
    this Committee that smaller companies in Silicon Valley do not
    even bother applying for contracts to the Department of Defense
    because it is so cumbersome, slow, and we are losing access to
    innovation.
        Dr. Scharre. I would actually, so even worse, we are
    building barriers to access, right. Those barriers are self-
    constructed by us, red tape that makes it hard for companies
    that would like to work with DOD to work with us. So we need to
    find ways to tear down those barriers.
        Senator King. In the meantime, we are spending $5 million a
    missile to knock down $200,000 to $300,000 drone out of the
    Houthis, when directed energy could do it for about 50 cents a
    shot. We have just got to break down this barrier, both in
    terms of working with smaller and innovative companies but
    also, as you say, taking advantage of technologies developed in
    the private sector and then transferring them into our arsenal,
    if you will.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Gillibrand,
    please.
        Senator Gillibrand. Hi. Thank you so much for your
    testimony today. I want to ask some larger questions.
        The United States has always had a theory that mutually
    assured destruction and deterrence would restrict an adversary
    from taking the United States on domestically anywhere in our
    country. We have an assumption that we would never have to
    defend a war here in the United States. Well, that assumption
    does not play out when you are looking at the arena of cyber or
    AI or other types of disruption that could be lethal.
        We have seen cyberattacks over the last 5 years in an array
    of places--solar winds, shutting down our supply chain for
    food, affecting oil production and delivery. We have seen
    cyberattacks in every industry, whether it is in health care
    most recently, or in banking, or in any domain within the
    United States.
        Yesterday I sat on the Intel hearing, and asked each of the
    witnesses, from Director Burns to Director Haines and other
    military personnel doing intelligence for DIA and other
    entities. I asked them the question of--I gave one example,
    let's say an adversary decides to use AI and different kinds of
    generated content to spew out false information from an elected
    leader or a candidate to such a degree that it misleads the
    American public in a U.S. election. What are you doing to
    prevent that or to respond to that efficiently, and who here is
    responsible for telling the American people the facts of any
    given incident? None of them had a plan, and none of them took
    responsibility for the protection of the United States.
        I would like to get your assessment of how do we protect
    the United States? Let's just say China, in its effort to
    invade Taiwan, uses the first 2 or 3 months to just do as many
    cyberattacks as possible in our critical infrastructure, around
    our bases, around our ability to launch from, let's say Guam,
    which they just tested a few months ago. Takes our electric
    grid, takes out our capacity, creates chaos, undermines the
    economy significantly. We have no plan to defend against that.
    I think the response is, well, you have got the FBI [Federal
    Bureau of Investigation], which is a response organization, you
    have got CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
    Agency], which can offer best practices but has no mandate, but
    you have no one who is in charge of protecting anything in
    CONUS [Continental United States].
        I would like you to talk about how should we realign our
    assessment of what the role of the Department of Defense, NSA
    [National Security Agency], CIA [Central Intelligence Agency],
    National Security Operations and Forces, what is the
    responsibility to protect America from an attack from an
    adversary in the United States, whether it is cyber, to create
    chaos and death and destruction, or any other type of attack,
    from, you know, drones attacking our bases, or spy balloons
    hovering over our most secret assets. What should the United
    States be doing?
        Dr. Scharre. Well, thank you, Senator. I would look at both
    of these, the cyber dimension and the disinformation one, as
    warning shots that we are getting now, none of which have been
    critical yet to the U.S. but we have an imperative to respond
    to these, to shore up our defenses.
        I think on the cyber front there is clearly a lot more we
    could do. We continue to have challenges. As you point out,
    just recently in the health care system, and putting the onus
    on industry putting in place government standards for
    cybersecurity across a wide range of sectors that has been
    critical to be shoring up our defenses here.
        On the disinformation, too, there are a wide range of
    things that we could be doing. For example, requiring that AI-
    generated content is watermarked and is labeled appropriately
    when it is online. Something like a bot disclosure law, that if
    someone is using AI--California has this--they have to share
    that it is AI generated, and then cracking down on foreign
    efforts to message, whether using AI or elsewhere, and spread
    disinformation here in the United States, are all things that I
    think we should be doing now.
        Dr. Brands. Senator, I would not add anything substantial.
    I would just say that when the United States war games
    potential Taiwan conflicts or things like that, the Homeland
    dimension is often the piece that gets short shrift, in large
    part because, you know, war-gaming is traditionally a DOD
    competency so it focuses heavily on that aspect of the
    response. But the more that you can get relevant stakeholders
    together to really game through what the domestic disruptions
    would be in this sort of conflict, the more I think you can get
    them talking about the ways in which their responsibilities
    might overlap or where they might need to develop new
    competencies in order to defend the U.S.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your excellent testimony. I have
    one questions which was frequently overlooked today, and that
    is we are emerging into a new world of nuclear competition
    between three powers. Not bipolar competition which shaped the
    whole theory of deterrence, and then, of course, we have the
    other nuclear entities--North Korea, Pakistan, and other
    countries.
        So what is your take on how we should address this nuclear
    issue?
        One other point I would make is it used to be the custom of
    every presidency to seek out at least one agreement with the
    Russians, even if it was a minor one. But we have not had much
    discussion about Russia, and China, I do not think, will talk
    to us until they get up to our level of missiles. But this is
    an issue that is overlooked often, and since I have two
    extremely intelligent gentlemen here, your view. I will start
    with Dr. Scharre, please.
        Dr. Scharre. Thank you, Senator. I would actually argue
    that we have three interlocking problems. There are others that
    complicate what you are describing. There is certainly the fact
    that we are moving into a tripolar nuclear era, with China's
    nuclear buildup. We have emerging technologies that are
    complicating a lot of the strategic dimensions, maybe outside
    of nuclear weapons, but in space and elsewhere, of nuclear
    deterrence. Then also, of course, we have seen with Russia an
    increased salience of nuclear weapons, and a risk that we may
    actually see them used in ways that maybe are heightened from
    what we might have thought a couple of years ago.
        I think it is clear that we need increased investments in
    this space, that if we are going to maintain a deterrent
    against two adversaries simultaneously we are going to need
    more dimensions here. The simultaneity problem is, I would
    argue, most acute in the nuclear dimension because of this
    issue, more so than in the conventional space.
        I think we are also going to need a lot of new thinking.
    The reality is that sort of among the defense intellectuals
    that work on these topics, the sort of nuclear community has,
    over many years, atrophied because nuclear weapons have not
    been as salient until more recently. So I think increased war-
    gaming and studies and investments to buildup that intellectual
    capital and to get senior leaders thinking about these
    challenges. Okay, if an adversary uses a nuclear weapon in a
    conflict to try to maybe terminate on their terms, how do we
    respond accordingly?
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. Dr. Brands, please.
        Dr. Brands. Just three things, very briefly. One, the
    scenarios that we worry about nuclear use now I think are very
    different than they were during the cold war. Now what we worry
    most about is sort of limited nuclear use or coercive use to
    back up limited conventional aggression as opposed to in a
    conflict that would engulf Europe as a whole. Which indicates
    to me that the United States is probably going to need more
    investment in limited nuclear capability of its own to close
    the gap between the conventional arsenal and the strategic
    deterrent.
        The second is that the force sizing issue becomes
    particularly complicated in a tripolar nuclear environment.
    Because having enough to assure a second strike capability
    against one adversary, that may not do you much good if you
    then find yourself in a position of inferiority against
    another. So I am not convinced that we have given that the
    attention that it deserves.
        The third is that, unfortunately, I think bilateral United
    States-Russia arms control is probably dead for the foreseeable
    future. The good news is that that gives us a chance to rethink
    what sort of arms control agreements might be to United States
    advantage in an environment where most of them may need to be
    trilateral rather than bilateral to begin with.
        Chairman Reed. Just a final point before I recognize
    Senator Kelly, it may have been that China, for their own
    benefit, gave us a little help in Ukraine. Because I think they
    were very, very much opposed to Putin's threats to use nuclear
    weapons. Not because of Ukraine but because they do not want to
    see South Korea, Japan, et cetera, become nuclear powers.
        It is a complicated world, and it is a new world for us
    now, and I think we have to approach it that way. But thank
    you.
        Senator Kelly, please.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    both of you for being here today.
        As a Member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I see
    firsthand the importance of intelligence gathering to our
    national security and also to strengthening our international
    partnerships. Building these relationships is vital to advance
    our shared goals and protect the American people.
        As you said recently, Dr. Brands, quote, ``strategy is the
    art of balancing power without subverting democratic purpose,''
    unquote, and there is clearly an art to successful intelligence
    partnerships. Can you speak to how intelligence partnerships
    are vital to the art of national strategy?
        Dr. Brands. Senator, I have looked at this mostly in a
    historical context during the cold war. I guess I would say
    that just as alliances are a force multiplier in general, they
    are certainly a force multiplier when it comes to intelligence.
    One of the things we found historically is that through our
    intelligence liaison programs with allies we may gain access to
    expertise on particular countries or regions that we have not
    invested in heavily ourselves. If we look at the way that
    Australia, for instance, can be helpful in understanding events
    in the South Pacific.
        We may also gain access to particular sources, human
    sources, that the U.S. intelligence system may not have access
    to itself, and so we end up being in a stronger national
    position by dint of the relationships that we have with other
    countries in this realm.
        Senator Kelly. One concern I have had lately is our ability
    to gather intelligence in North Korea. We have got an
    unpredictable actor with an arsenal, and without the
    intelligence flowing in our direction it is just really hard to
    make predictions on what he is going to do.
        A little bit more on Ukraine. Dr. Brands, you have also
    written extensively on our need to provide support to Ukraine.
    I agree that this is one of our top priorities. You know, Putin
    is not going to stop with Ukraine if we do not stop him in
    Ukraine.
        In addition to supporting them militarily, can you give
    your perspective on building an intelligence partnership to
    support Ukraine in its struggle against Russia?
        Dr. Brands. From what I read in the news, United States
    intelligence support to Ukraine has been absolutely vital in
    everything from helping the Ukrainian Government understand the
    nature of the threat that was coming at it in February 2022 and
    after, to providing more actionable insights in the months and
    years that have followed.
        But I would also, Senator, encourage people to think about
    it, the other way around, where the United States will gain
    enormous benefits from an intelligence partnership with
    Ukraine. Because just to put it very bluntly, Ukraine has
    fought Russia and we have not. Ukraine has gained insights into
    the way that modern war works in a high-intensity environment,
    that even the United States military, with all of its
    experience over the last 20-plus years does not have.
        So I would prefer to think of it as a two-way partnership
    in the sense that the U.S. itself will benefit tremendously.
        Senator Kelly. Yes, and not just with intelligence. I have
    made a couple of trips to Ukraine in the last 18 month or so,
    and I made this point with the Ukrainians. At the beginning of
    this conflict. We had much better intel on the Russians and
    experience, combat experience. Fast forward 2 years later, They
    are the ones that have been--they are on the ground here
    fighting every single day and fighting for their lives bravely.
    Now they have that experience, and we have a lot to learn from
    them.
        Dr. Scharre, you have written extensively about the
    importance of AI in military operations. I also noted your
    recent House testimony on the Replicator initiative, which
    intends to field thousands of autonomous systems in about 2
    years. Can Replicators successfully make long-term, fundamental
    changes to the DOD acquisition process?
        Dr. Scharre. I hope so. We will see. I think that DOD set a
    very ambitious goal for itself. I think that is good. They are
    going to need congressional support to make that happen. I
    would like to see them succeed. I think it is too early to
    tell, but hopefully.
        Senator Kelly. In my last minute could you comment a little
    bit about how AI should be integrated into our national
    strategy?
        Dr. Scharre. I guess on a couple of levels. I think
    certainly in the military space we need to be moving forward
    very quickly to bring in AI technology, putting in place the
    infrastructure on data and on computing hardware, cloud
    computing, inside the DOD to make DOD ready for AI, to use it
    effectively. But also nationally we need to protect our
    advantages in AI. The best AI companies in the world are here
    in the United States, and right now the reality is we are
    giving a lot of those advantages for free to China. That a lot
    of the technology proliferates very quickly to China, within 18
    to 24 months. Those best AI models have gone open source, they
    have proliferated to China. I think we also need to look at
    protecting the crown jewels of United States AI advantage.
        Senator Kelly. All right. Well, thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thanks, Senator Kelly. Senator Cotton,
    please.
        Senator Cotton. Gentleman, welcome. Dr. Brands, last
    Thursday night we had the President yelling at us for an hour,
    sounding like it was 1941, with threats to democracy around the
    world. Yesterday we got his budget. He seemed more like Harry
    Truman in the 1940's or Bill Clinton in 1993, drawing down our
    military after the wars. It only had a 1 percent increase in
    defense spending compared to last year's request. Given
    continued high inflation, that amounts to a real cut. China
    recently announced that it was going to increase its defense
    budget by 7.2 percent.
        Do you think the President's Budget Request accurately and
    soundly addresses the severity of the threats that we face
    today?
        Dr. Brands. No. I worry both about the topline, and then
    from what I can tell from a quick skim of the budget
    submission, particularly what it will mean for procurement in
    the coming years, where I think we are looking at an absolute
    cut, which would be, even in relative, inflation-adjusted
    terms, more severe still.
        Senator Cotton. Could you tell us a little bit more about
    the specific concerns you have on procurement, going forward in
    the future?
        Dr. Brands. Well, one of the major challenges we face at
    this point is generating and procuring the number of munitions
    we would need for particular contingencies as well as simply
    some of the platforms that would be used to deliver them. It is
    helpful to have investment in R&D, in modernization and things
    that look forward down the future. But you are not going to be
    able to get there unless you have the money to actually buy
    things once they become available.
        Moreover, procurement spending at this point provides a
    double benefit, because the only way you can really strengthen
    the defense industrial base is by providing guarantees that
    money to buy things will actually be there. If you are looking
    for firms to expand or ramp up new production lines, invest in
    a new workforce. That is the sort of money you need to be
    spending now that would make possible further investments down
    the road.
        Senator Cotton. A kind of multi-year procurement authority,
    that some in Congress have resisted.
        Dr. Brands. Yes, I think that is going to be critical.
        Senator Cotton. Yes. That is because you cannot expect
    those companies, or more to the point, the companies' owners in
    the form of their shareholders, to lay out significant capital
    up front if they do not have confidence of a return down the
    road?
        Dr. Brands. If the business case is there, then they will
    make the investments. But for the business case to be there
    they have to be persuaded that this is not just a 1-year bump
    in, say, procurement of 155 mm artillery ammunition, or
    whatever the capability is. Because otherwise they cannot
    justify all the new investments that will be necessary to get
    to that point.
        Senator Cotton. Dr. Scharre, you are nodding your head. Do
    you have anything to add to that?
        Dr. Scharre. I do, and I guess I would add, Senator, that,
    you know, we have heard from lots of experts in Government,
    outside of Government I have talked to, Dr. Brands, of course,
    has written extensively on this, that we are entering this
    dangerous window at the end of the decade with China.
        It seems to me that if we believed that we would be putting
    our Defense Department, our defense industry on a wartime
    footing. We would be expanding capacity. We would be increasing
    our defense industrial base capacity, building our munitions
    stockpiles, building our ability to surge. We have a few years
    of critical warning now, and we need to seize that opportunity,
    or I think there is a very real risk that we look back on this
    moment and realize that we missed the opportunity to be ready.
        Senator Cotton. Yes. So you make those outlays now, and you
    want to ensure companies will get a reasonable rate of return
    on their investments now. Is there any reason to think the
    world is going to be safer in 3 or 5 or 10 years than it is
    now, and we will not need all that stuff we are investing in?
    Dr. Brands, do you want to take that?
        Dr. Brands. No, there is no reason to believe that. We are
    going to be dealing with a hyper-revisionist and perhaps hyper-
    mobilized Russia for some time to come. We are going to be
    dealing with a China whose military buildup continues at a very
    alarming rate. We are going to be dealing with a North Korea
    whose nuclear arsenal and missile arsenal is going to outpace
    United States missile defenses at some point this decade, as
    well as all the challenges in Iran and from terrorist groups.
    So no, there is no reason to think the threat environment will
    become less severe.
        Senator Cotton. Dr. Scharre?
        Dr. Scharre. I might just add that the best thing that we
    could do to buy down the risk of a conflict with China is to
    make investments now that increase deterrence.
        Senator Cotton. It is always costly, investment of
    resources and national effort, to preserve the peace, but more
    costly, I presume, to win a war when the peace is not
    preserved.
        Thank you, gentleman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Cotton.
    Gentleman, thank you for excellent testimony, and I hope that
    this will not be the last time we have you before the Committee
    and reach out for advice, and I encourage you to feel free,
    please, to let us know what your thoughts are and what we
    should be thinking about.
        We are hopeful that having passed the last batch of
    appropriations bills will get the defense bill done next week,
    but if not then we have problems, immediate problems.
        But again, let me thank you all for excellent testimony and
    for your continued wise insights into the national security of
    the United States.
        With that I will adjourn the hearing.
        [Whereupon, at 10:47 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                     blast overpressure and blast exposure
        1. Senator Warren. Dr. Scharre, you published a Center for New
    American Security report in 2018 on the impact of blast overpressure on
    servicemembers. What steps do you think the Department of Defense (DOD)
    should take now to improve how it is protecting servicemembers from
    blast overpressure and blast exposure?
        Dr. Scharre. DOD has taken some steps to improve its understanding
    of the effects of blast overpressure on the brain but significant work
    remains.\1\ Most notably, DOD has yet to implement a comprehensive
    blast surveillance program that would collect blast exposure data for
    all servicemembers at risk of blast exposure in training and combat.
    The basic technology to collect this data in a quantitative, automated,
    and cost-effective manner has existed since 2011 and have been deployed
    on servicemembers in combat zones. DOD has undertaken a pilot program
    (Blast Overpressure Studies--Pilot) but has not yet implemented a
    comprehensive blast surveillance program that would cover all troops
    who are at risk of blast exposure in training and combat.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ See also Samantha McBirney, ``Repeated Exposure to Low-Level
    Military Occupational Blasts: An Overview of the Research, Critical
    Gaps, and Recommendations,'' Testimony presented before the U.S. Senate
    Armed Services Committee, Military Personnel Subcommittee on February
    28, 2024, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimoneys/
    CTA3200/CTA3250-1/RAND_CTA3250-1.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This failure has significant consequences for troops today and over
    the long term. In the immediate term, U.S. troops are denied the
    opportunity to change their firing tactics based on feedback from blast
    gauges that report their amount of blast exposure. The DOD CONQUER
    program found that that troops were able to reduce blast pressure
    exposure by 30 to 90 percent by modifying firing tactics, but they
    cannot do so without the feedback that blast gauges provide.\2\ In long
    term, without blast exposure data in their service records, troops may
    be denied care for traumatic brain injury by the DOD and VA. Finally, a
    failure to collect comprehensive data on blast exposure makes it more
    difficult for DOD to gain the necessary information to understand the
    relationship between blast exposure and potential brain injury. The
    first step toward better understanding and mitigating potential harm
    from blast exposure is to collect the data.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Suthee Wiri et al., ``Significant Mitigation of Blast
    Overpressure Exposure During Training by Adjustment of Body Position as
    Demonstrated With Field Data,'' Military Medicine, November 7, 2023,
    https://academic.oup.com/milmed/advance-article/doi/10.1093/milmed/
    usad429/7422180.

        2. Senator Warren. Dr. Scharre, which military occupational
    specialties are at highest risk for blast overpressure and blast
    exposure?
        Dr. Scharre. The unfortunate reality is that we do not have good,
    quantitative data to assess which military occupational specialties are
    most at risk from blast exposure because DOD has not collected this
    data. The 4 November 2022 memo from Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Readiness Shawn G. Skelly, ``Interim Guidance for Managing Brain Health
    Risk from Blast Overpressure,'' identified several weapon systems whose
    blast overpressure exceeds 4 pounds per square inch (psi). Troops
    exposed to blast overpressure in excess of 4 psi have demonstrated
    degradation in neurocognitive performance. Weapon systems identified in
    the memorandum include breaching explosives, shoulder-fired anti-tank
    weapons, 0.50 caliber sniper rifles and machine guns, howitzers, and
    mortars. Troops who regularly use these weapon systems, such as those
    in breaching, artillery, mortars, anti-tank, or sniper duty positions,
    may be at heightened risk. However, to more fully understand the risk
    profile of troops in various roles, DOD must take several additional
    steps:
          Undertake additional weapons testing using blast pressure
    monitoring devices (blast gauges) to better characterize the blast
    effects of these weapons.
          Conduct computer simulations of how the blast waves
    travel to estimate the actual amount of blast overpressure exposure to
    the brain.
          Conduct neurocognitive testing of troops before and after
    firing to understand the immediate neurocognitive effects from blast
    exposure when firing weapons.
          Conduct a longitudinal medical study of troops in high-
    risk occupations or duty positions to better understand the cumulative
    effects of repeated exposures over the course of a servicemember's
    career.
          Institute a blast surveillance program to comprehensively
    monitor and record blast exposures across the force to better
    understand how many exposures, of what intensity and over what
    duration, troops are experiencing in training and combat.
        DOD has taken some of these actions but has not pursued all of them
    comprehensively. For example, the DOD CONQUER program was a pilot blast
    monitoring program to better characterize training-related blast
    exposure for servicemembers using breaching explosives, shoulder-fired
    anti-tank weapons, artillery, mortars, and .50 caliber machine guns and
    sniper rifles. This data has helped improve understanding of the type
    of blast exposure caused by firing various weapon systems. Similarly,
    DOD has conducted a pilot blast surveillance program (Blast
    Overpressure Studies--Pilot). However, there is much more that needs to
    be learned about the effects of repetitive blast exposure on the brain.
    Gaining this information will help DOD better understand which duty
    positions are most at risk and ultimately establish training safety
    standards that will reduce risk to servicemembers while preserving
    readiness.

        3. Senator Warren. Dr. Scharre, what would be the benefits of the
    Department of Defense updating and disseminating thresholds for blast
    exposure safety, including on the basis of brain injury risk and over
    longer periods of time such as 72 to 96 hours, yearly, and annual
    limits?
        Dr. Scharre. The benefit would be to improve safety standards,
    adjust training practices, and ultimately reduce the amount of
    potentially harmful exposure that U.S. troops have to blasts, including
    from firing their own weapons. The long-term effect of reducing blast
    exposure to safer levels would be reduced incidents and severity of
    traumatic brain injury among the force, increasing long-term health,
    reducing cognitive impairments, and improving readiness.

        4. Senator Warren. Dr. Scharre, what would be the benefits of the
    Department of Defense developing strategies to mitigate blast exposure
    and blast overpressure to the military occupational specialties most at
    risk?
        Dr. Scharre. There are several potential strategies that DOD could
    employ to reduce potentially harmful blast exposure to safer limits.
    One of the easiest ways to do so is to provide blast gauges to troops
    when firing heavy weapons or conducting breaching, which provides
    immediate feedback on blast overpressure exposure. In prior tests using
    blast gauges during training, the feedback from blast gauges allowed
    units to identify flaws in firing positions that cause individuals to
    receive excessive amounts of exposure, such as standing in the wrong
    location or having the wrong body position when firing the weapon.
    Feedback from blast gauges allows troops to immediately modify their
    firing techniques to reduce exposure. The DOD CONQUER program found
    that that troops were able to reduce blast pressure exposure by 30 to
    90 percent by modifying firing tactics.\3\ Other strategies to reduce
    blast exposure could include reducing the number of rounds that
    servicemembers are exposed to during training, requiring mandatory rest
    periods after exposures to allow the brain to heal, mandating greater
    standoff for non-firing troops on firing ranges, increasing protection
    such as through improved helmet designs that could reduce blast
    exposure, limiting the total amount of time in their career that
    servicemembers can spend in high-risk duty positions, such as anti-tank
    roles that involve firing shoulder-fired heavy weapons, and potentially
    modifying certain weapons to reduce the amount of blast overpressure
    exposure when firing. The benefit of these and potentially other
    strategies would be to reduce potentially harmful blast exposure and,
    as a result, reduce incidents of brain injury while minimizing the
    impact to training and operational effectiveness.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Wiri et al., ``Significant Mitigation of Blast Overpressure
    Exposure During Training by Adjustment of Body Position as Demonstrated
    With Field Data.''

        5. Senator Warren. Dr. Scharre, how would servicemembers benefit if
    the Department of Defense establishes blast exposure and traumatic
    brain injury logs to track their exposure over their career?
        Dr. Scharre. I have personally spoken with multiple servicemembers
    who were exposed to excessive amounts of blasts from firing their own
    weapons during training well beyond approved limits, particularly the
    Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle, and now suffer traumatic brain injury as
    a result. However, since this exposure is not documented in their
    service records and the VA and DOD have been slow to acknowledge the
    link between blast exposure and brain injury, these servicemembers have
    struggled to receive care through the VA for their injuries.

        6. Senator Warren. Dr. Scharre, what would be the benefits of
    requiring DOD to consider blast exposure in the weapons acquisition
    process and for companies to provide blast overpressure and blast
    exposure safety data under their contract requirements?
        Dr. Scharre. DOD currently lacks good data on the amount of blast
    overpressure that certain weapons may expose troops to when firing.
    Collecting this data is essential to understanding the relationship
    between blast exposure and brain injury and establishing safe limits
    and blast exposure reduction strategies. DOD will not be able to fully
    understand and mitigate potentially harmful blast exposure--or even
    understand what levels and types of blast exposure are potentially
    harmful--without first collecting the data.

        7. Senator Warren. Dr. Scharre, what steps should the Department
    take to mitigate the higher risk levels to blast exposure and blast
    overpressure that training instructors face?
        Dr. Scharre. DOD should take several steps to mitigate blast
    exposure for training instructors:
          Issue blast gauges to instructors so that they can modify
    their positions on the range to minimize their blast exposure based on
    immediate, quantitative feedback on blast exposure.
          Enroll instructors in a blast surveillance program to
    record their cumulative blast exposures over time.
          Conduct regular neurocognitive assessments of training
    instructors, including pre-and post-training events, to identify and
    document any changes in performance.
          Continue to update range safety standards based on the
    best available data from ongoing DOD studies on blast exposure.

        8. Senator Warren. Dr. Scharre, New York Times reporting from
    November 2023 revealed that despite DOD taking some steps to improve
    safety for blast overpressure, ``things have hardly changed on the
    ground.'' Instead, ``[t]raining continues largely as it did before''
    and ``[t]roops say they see little being done to limit or track blast
    exposure.'' What are the biggest challenges to implementing safety
    measures for mitigating exposure on the ground?
        Dr. Scharre. The biggest obstacle to improving safety measures for
    mitigating blast exposure is the failure of DOD leaders to prioritize
    understanding and mitigating harm from blast exposure. DOD has
    generated presentations, briefings, documents, and some modest pilot
    programs but taken few meaningful steps since our CNAS report was
    published in 2018. DOD has not implemented a comprehensive blast
    surveillance program that would track and monitor blast exposure among
    servicemembers in training and combat. DOD has not actually implemented
    a longitudinal medical study that would collect data on blast
    exposures, neurocognitive performance, and potential biomarkers on
    high-risk servicemembers who are exposed to blasts over the course of
    their career so that DOD can better understand the effects of
    cumulative blast exposures over time.
        These failures cannot be chalked up to merely a slow-moving
    bureaucracy. They represent a failure of DOD leaders to prioritize this
    issue and take meaningful and urgent action to mitigate the potential
    harm to servicemembers from blast exposure.

        9. Senator Warren. Dr. Scharre, what steps should the Department
    take to improve training and education for servicemembers on the
    dangers of this exposure and safety measure to address these concerns,
    and ensure that servicemembers are following through on implementation
    of these safety measures?
        Dr. Scharre. DOD has ample mechanisms to ensure that troops comply
    with safety standards and conduct hazardous training in a safe manner.
    For example, DOD regularly conducts training on airborne operations and
    has extensive procedures in place to ensure that troops successfully
    train on high-risk activities in a safe manner. DOD is more than
    capable of enforcing training safety standards for firing heavy
    weapons, such as firing limits, if it prioritizes doing so.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
                               technological edge
        10. Senator Rosen. Dr. Scharre, history shows us that harnessing
    new technologies creates a significant advantage on the battlefield.
    The country that manages to use these technologies effectively and
    efficiently will have the upper hand in any future wars. What do you
    predict will be the defining weapons of the next war and how can the
    United States ensure it uses these weapons effectively and responsibly?
        Dr. Scharre. Technology is critical to modern warfighting, and
    disruptive technologies have often led to profound changes in the
    character of warfare, necessitating changes in tactics, doctrine, and
    military organization. In recent years, the Defense Department has
    identified priority technology areas for investment that may have a
    significant effect on U.S. and adversary warfighting capabilities. What
    is often missing from DOD lists of technology areas is prioritization
    among these technologies and a sense of the relative speed at which
    these technologies are advancing. Technologies are advancing at
    dramatically different rates of progress. In particular, information
    technologies are currently growing at literal exponential rates. This
    creates opportunities for significant disruptions in warfare from
    military capabilities that leverage information technologies.
        A few examples of the current exponential growth trends in
    information technology:
        Global communications networks are growing exponentially in speed
    and size. From 2018 to 2023, broadband speeds grew 20 percent annually
    and wireless network speeds 27 percent annually. During that same time,
    the number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices grew 20 percent per year
    and the number of global public Wi-Fi hotspots 30 percent annually. As
    of 2023, two-thirds of the world's population was online and there were
    nearly 30 billion connected devices.\4\ While militaries will operate
    military-specific networks on the battlefield, the same underlying
    technological advancements that enable exponential growth in civilian
    network bandwidth and connectivity also enable military networks.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Cisco, Cisco Annual Internet Report, 2020, https://
    www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/executive-perspectives/
    annual-internet-report/white-paper-c11-741490.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Artificial intelligence capabilities are similarly growing
    exponentially. The amount of data and computational power applied to
    cutting-edge machine learning systems is growing at a breathtaking
    pace. Between 2010 and 2022, the amount of computational power used to
    train cutting-edge machine learning models increased ten
    billionfold.\5\ The amount of computing power used to train the largest
    and most capable AI models is currently doubling every 7 months.\6\
    Chip performance is doubling approximately every 2 years.\7\ And
    algorithms are also improving, doubling in performance approximately
    every 9 months.\8\ The combined effect of these exponential growth
    trends is such that by 2030, the most capable AI models could be
    trained on one million times more effective computing power than
    today.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ Jaime Sevilla et al., Compute Trends Across Three Eras of
    Machine Learning, arXiv.org, March 9, 2022, https://arxiv.org/abs/
    2202.05924.
        \6\ Epoch, ML Inputs Visualization, https://epochai.org/mlinputs/
    visualization'startDate=2015-9-1&startLargeScaleEra=2015-9-
    1&largeScaleAction=isolate&preset=Large percent20'scale
    percent20modelspercent20-
    percent20compute&labelEras=false&labelPoints=true, accessed on 11/11/
    23.
        \7\ Marius Hobbhahn et al., ``Trends in Machine Learning
    Hardware,'' (Epoch, November 9, 2023), https://epochai.org/blog/trends-
    in-machine-learning-hardware.
        \8\ Danny Hernandez and Tom B. Brown, Measuring the Algorithmic
    Efficiency of Neural Networks, arXiv.org, May 8, 2020, https://
    arxiv.org/abs/2005.04305; Florian E. Dorner, Measuring Progress in Deep
    Reinforcement Learning Sample Efficiency, arXiv.org, February 9, 2021,
    https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.04881; Ege Erdil and Tamay Besiroglu,
    Algorithmic progress in computer vision, arXiv.org, December 16, 2022,
    https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.05153; and Anson Ho et al., Algorithmic
    Progress in Language Modeling, forthcoming.
        \9\ Paul Scharre, ``Future-Proofing Frontier AI Regulation:
    Projecting Future Compute for Frontier AI Models,'' (Center for a New
    American Security, March, 2024), https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/
    files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Report_AI-Trends_FinalC.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        With the digitization of biology, genomics is also benefiting from
    exponential growth in information technology. It cost $300 million to
    sequence the first human genome, which was completed in 2000.\10\ By
    2023, the cost to sequence a human genome had dropped to $200, over a
    million times cheaper,\11\ allowing scientists to build massive genomic
    data bases.\12\ AI models can predict biochemical interactions, such as
    how proteins fold,\13\ enabling scientists to computationally explore
    hundreds of millions of possibilities, including those not found in
    nature.\14\ The price of DNA synthesis machines, which allow scientists
    to manufacture artificial proteins, is dramatically dropping.\15\ And
    automated labs use information technology to accelerate the speed and
    scale of physical experimentation in biology.\16\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ National Human Genome Research Institute, ``The Cost of
    Sequencing a Human Genome,'' November 1, 2021, https://www.genome.gov/
    about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost.
        \11\ Illumina, ``Illumina's revolutionary NovaSeq X exceeds 200th
    order milestone in first quarter 2023,'' press release, April 4, 2023,
    https://www.illumina.com/company/news-center/press-releases/2023/
    4b48580b-42d4-419b-8512-5adcbb069836.html.
        \12\ Broad Institute, ``Human Genome Sequencing Dashboard,'' n.d.,
    https://broad institute.github.io/gp-dashboard/
        \13\ AlphaFold Protein Structure Data base, https://
    alphafold.ebi.ac.uk/.
        \14\ B.I.M Wicky et. al, ``Hallucinating symmetric protein
    assemblies,'' Science, September 15, 2022, https://www.science.org/doi/
    10.1126/science.add1964.
        \15\ David Baker and George Church, ``Protein design meets
    biosecurity,'' Science, January 25, 2024, https://www.science.org/doi/
    10.1126/science.ado1671.
        \16\ Strateos, ``Cloud Lab Automation-as-a-Service,'' n.d., https:/
    /strateos.com/; Emerald Cloud Lab, ``Transcend the Lab,'' n.d., https:/
    /www.emeraldcloudlab.com/; Carnegie Mellon University Cloud Lab, ``The
    Future of Automated Science is at CMU,'' n.d., https://
    cloudlab.cmu.edu/; Chase Armer, Florent Letronne, and Erika
    DeBenedictis, ``Support academic access to automated cloud labs to
    improve reproducibility,'' PLOS Biology, January 3, 2023, https://
    journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article'id=10.1371/journal.pbio.3001919.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Military capabilities enabled by information technology riding
    these exponential curves are the most likely to see dramatic changes in
    the coming decades. These include capabilities relying on autonomy,
    robotics, advanced sensors, communications networks, data processing,
    automated decision aids, AI and machine learning, computing hardware,
    cloud computing, electronic warfare, cyber operations, synthetic
    biology, and genomics. While other non-digital military capabilities
    will continue to be valuable, they are often not growing at the same
    pace, and are therefore unlikely to see the same degree of change.
    Missiles are not ten billion times faster than they were in 2010.
    Stealth aircraft are not ten billion times stealthier. Yet information
    technologies are advancing at a breathtaking pace, creating new
    opportunities for military applications.
        The war in Ukraine provides an example of this dynamic. The
    conflict is a blend of War War I style trench and artillery warfare,
    combined with 21st century drones and social media. Yet the most
    dramatic changes are happening in the evolution of drone technology and
    tactics. Drones are increasingly adopting AI tools to identify targets
    and autonomous capabilities to carry out attacks in the face of
    electronic warfare countermeasures and jamming. Counter-drone systems
    have led to a rapid cycle of innovation in drones and countermeasures.
    This pace of adaptation is not matched, for example, in trench
    construction.
        If the United States is to be prepared for future conflicts, it
    must remain at the forefront of rapidly evolving digital technologies
    or risk falling behind competitors. In addition to their rapid growth,
    many information technologies come from the commercial sector and are
    highly globalized, making them widely available, including to State and
    non-State competitors.

        11. Senator Rosen. Dr. Scharre, new technologies depend on a
    fragile and global supply chain--from critical minerals to
    semiconductors. Access to raw and refined critical minerals will have a
    role to play in these technologies, but only if we make a concerted
    effort to strategically leverage our resource advantages to overcome
    global supply chain challenges. What specific strategies can the United
    States employ to mitigate such vulnerabilities, invest in domestic
    industry, and help strengthen our supply chain resilience?
        Dr. Scharre. For many years, China has held an advantage in both
    the mining of rare earth minerals and their processing. Thanks to
    discoveries of large deposits off the coast of Japan,\17\ in
    Sweden,\18\ and in Wyoming, \19\ the United States and its allies have
    an opportunity loosen China's stranglehold on mining. The United States
    and its allies should also work to reduce their reliance on China for
    rare earth mineral processing. The United States should invest in
    storage capacity for processed versions of these minerals and maintain
    a strategic reserve to reduce the ability for China to use rare earth
    minerals as leverage as it did to Japan in 2010.\20\ The United States
    should work with its allies to develop the deposits that have been
    discovered in the United States and partner nations to reduce reliance
    on Chinese mining. Reducing China's advantage in processing will be
    more difficult due to both their edge in the technology \21\ and their
    lax environmental standards.\22\ The United States needs to build on
    its funding of new processing plants through the Defense Production Act
    \23\ and create additional incentives for companies to invest in and
    open processing facilities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ Yen Nee Lee, ``A massive, `semi-infinite' trove of rare-earth
    metals has been found in Japan,'' CNBC, April 12, 2018, https://
    www.cnbc.com/2018/04/12/japan-rare-earths-huge-deposit-of-metals-found-
    in-pacific.html.
        \18\ Jackie Northam, ``It's a journey to the center of the rare
    earths discovered in Sweden,'' National Public Radio, July 18, 2023,
    https://www.npr.org/2023/07/18/1187075988/europe-rare-earth-sweden.
        \19\ Michael Auslin, ``Wyoming Hits the Rare-Earth Mother Lode,''
    Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
    wyoming-hits-the-rare-earth-mother-lode-natural-resources-policy-china-
    mining-8e559cec.
        \20\ Simon Evenett and Johannes Fritz, ``Revisiting the China-Japan
    Rare Earths dispute of 2010,'' (Centre for Economic Policy Research,
    July 19, 2023), https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/revisiting-china-japan-
    rare-earths-dispute-2010.
        \21\ Siyi Liu and Dominique Patton, ``China bans export of rare
    earths processing tech over national security,'' Reuters, December 22,
    2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/china-bans-export-
    rare-earths-processing-technologies-2023-12-21/.
        \22\ Jaya Nayar, ``Not So ``Green'' Technology: The Complicated
    Legacy of Rare Earth Mining,'' Harvard International Review, August 12,
    2021, https://hir.harvard.edu/not-so-green-technology-the-complicated-
    legacy-of-rare-earth-mining/.
        \23\ Gracelin Baskaran, ``What China's Ban on Rare Earths
    Processing Technology Exports Means,'' (Center for Strategic and
    International Studies, January 8, 2024), https://www.csis.org/analysis/
    what-chinas-ban-rare-earths-processing-technology-exports-means.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 staying ahead
        12. Senator Rosen. Dr. Scharre, what are the competitive advantages
    of the United States in comparison to China when it comes to artificial
    intelligence (AI)? How can the United States ensure that our public and
    private institutions stay ahead of the curve in this critically
    important field?
        Dr. Scharre. The United States has two asymmetric advantages over
    China in AI: chips and human talent.
        U.S. companies occupy critical chokepoints in the supply chain for
    manufacturing high-end chips, especially in the electronic design
    automation software used to manufacture advanced chips. Collectively,
    the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands control 90 percent of the
    global market for semiconductor manufacturing equipment. The United
    States has used this leverage, in concert with Japan and the
    Netherlands, to deny China access to leading-edge AI chips by
    prohibiting the export to China of any advanced chips made using United
    States technology. Given the dominance of U.S. companies in
    semiconductor manufacturing equipment chokepoints, United States export
    controls have, in the near term, successfully denied China access to
    the cutting-edge AI chips used to train the largest and most capable AI
    models. To fully capitalize on this advantage, however, the United
    States must take several additional steps.
        First, in the near term, the United States must extend protections
    on high-end chips to include other aspects of the supply chain for the
    computation used to train cutting-edge AI models. This includes
    regulations on cloud providers and trained AI models with certain dual-
    use capabilities, such as the ability to aid in cyber, chemical, or
    biological attacks. Restrictions on cloud computing infrastructure and
    trained AI models need not be as broad as the current chip export
    controls. Cloud computing infrastructure, for example, provides the
    opportunity for more tailored and fine-grained restrictions, since the
    chips themselves remain in the United States.\24\ Similarly, the
    overwhelming majority of AI models are safe to release open source.
    However, a small set of the most computationally intensive AI models,
    which can only be trained using the most advanced, export-controlled AI
    chips, may need to be export controlled.\25\ Without additional
    controls on cloud computing infrastructure and trained AI models, U.S.
    chip export controls will not be effective. China can simply access
    chips through the cloud. Or Chinese AI labs can download trained United
    States AI models for free, such as Meta's Llama 2 model, negating the
    need to train their own large models from scratch, effectively
    circumventing United States export controls.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ Tim Fist and Paul Scharre, ``The Could Can Solve America's AI
    Problems,'' Foreign Policy, October 7, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/
    2023/10/07/cloud-computing-artificial-intelligence-chips-sanctions-us-
    china/.
        \25\ Caleb Withers, ``Response to NTIA Request for Comment: ``Dual
    Use Foundation Artificial Intelligence Models with Widely Available
    Model Weights,'' (Center for a New American Security, April 4, 2024),
    https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/response-to-ntia-request-
    for-comment-dual-use-foundation-artificial-intelligence-models-with-
    widely available-model-weights.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Second, the United States must take steps now to preserve its
    control over key chokepoints in semiconductor manufacturing equipment,
    so that the United States retains the ability to deny China access to
    advanced chips in the future. United States leverage over China's
    access to advanced AI chips stems from the dominant role that United
    States companies play in semiconductor manufacturing equipment,
    especially in the electronic design automation software used to design
    the most advanced chips. A major focus for the CHIPS Act should be
    ensuring that U.S. companies remain in a dominant position in these key
    chokepoints for the next generation of chip manufacturing technology.
    The United States can help achieve this by supporting research and
    development in next-generation semiconductor manufacturing technology.
    Additionally, building leading-edge fabs in the United States can help
    create a vibrant ecosystem of chip manufacturers, designers, and
    equipment suppliers--and the human talent that supports those
    innovations--in the United States.
        The United States also has significant advantages over China in
    human talent. China produces more of the world's top AI scientists than
    any other country, but they don't stay in China--they come to the
    United States.\26\ Over half of China's top undergraduates studying AI
    come to the United States for their graduate studies.\27\ And 90
    percent of Chinese undergraduates who gain a PhD in AI in the United
    States stay in the United States after graduation.\28\ China's brain
    drain is a brain gain for the United States. China has engaged in a
    massive campaign of intellectual property theft and academic espionage,
    including by tapping into the global diaspora of Chinese scientists and
    engineers. The United States must improve research security, visa
    screening, and investigations to crack down on academic espionage. But
    the United States Government should not cutoff the flow of Chinese
    talent to the United States, which overwhelmingly benefits the United
    States over China.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ MacroPolo, ``The Global AI Talent Tracker 2.0,'' n.d., https:/
    /macropolo.org/digital-projects/the-global-ai-talent-tracker/.
        \27\ Paul Mozur and Cade Metz, ``A U.S. Secret Weapon in A.I.:
    Chinese Talent,'' New York Times, June 9, 2020, updated April 13, 2021,
    https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/technology/china-ai-research-
    education.html.
        \28\ Remco Zwetsloot, Keeping Top AI Talent in the United States
    (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, December 2019), 22,
    https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Keeping-Top-AI-Talent-
    in-the-United-States.pdf.

        13. Senator Rosen. Dr. Scharre, over 66 years ago, in response to
    the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik, Congress passed the
    National Defense Education Act, which became a successful legislative
    investment in higher education. You have argued that ``talent'' is
    going to be one of the important cornerstones to dominate the future,
    but it seems like it may take a Sputnik-like moment to motivate us to
    make such large changes. With the speed at which technology evolves,
    will we be too late when that moment comes, and how do we attract the
    right people today to prepare for tomorrow?
        Dr. Scharre. Our Sputnik moment for AI is here. ChatGPT and
    subsequent breakthroughs set off a wave of excitement, investment, and
    government attention on AI in the United States, China, and around the
    world. The question is whether we choose to rise to this moment.
        The United States has many advantages in the competition for
    talent. Seven of the top ten institutions publishing deep learning
    research are American universities or corporate research labs. Only two
    are Chinese.\29\ Yet these advantages will not be enough to secure
    continued American leadership in AI. The United States must reinvest in
    human talent through improved STEM education and high-skilled
    immigration if it is to remain a global technology leader. \30\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ ``The Global AI Talent Tracker 2.0,'' Macro Polo, n.d.,
    https://macropolo.org/digital-projects/the-global-ai-talent-tracker/.
        \30\ Portions of this answer are adapted from Paul Scharre,
    ``America Can Win the AI Race,'' Foreign Affairs, April 4, 2023,
    https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/ai-america-can-win-race,
    and Paul Scharre, Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of Artificial
    Intelligence (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2023), pp. 30-34.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The congressionally mandated National Security Commission on AI
    (NSCAI) recommended in 2021 that Congress pass a ``National Defense
    Education Act II'' to strengthen ``digital skills, like mathematics,
    computer science, information science, data science, and statistics.''
    The NSCAI recommended that the new National Defense Education Act cover
    talent development across the spectrum of educational programs,
    including K-12, community college, university, graduate, PhD, and
    reskilling programs. \31\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \31\ National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, Final
    Report, 2021, https://reports.nscai.gov/final-report/, 175.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Educators and students also need the resources to leverage AI tools
    effectively. The National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource
    (NAIRR), if fully funded by Congress, will be able to provide much-
    needed data and computing resources for under-resourced STEM
    departments. \32\ Additionally, recent changes to STEM education should
    be expanded to improve STEM teacher fluency, increase programs for
    underserved communities, and increase science-themed organizations for
    children. \33\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \32\ U.S. National Science Foundation, ``National Artificial
    Intelligence Research Resource Pilot,'' n.d., https://new.nsf.gov/
    focus-areas/artificial-intelligence/nairr.
        \33\ U.S. Department of Education, ``U.S. Department of Education
    Launches New Initiative to Enhance STEM Education for All Students,''
    December 7, 2022, https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-
    education-launches-new-initiative-enhance-stem-education-all-students.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Improvements in domestic STEM education, while necessary to sustain
    America's long-term competitive edge in science and technology, will
    also take time to fully come to fruition. The foundations for science
    and technology education begin early, and it will take a generation to
    fully reap the benefits of reformed STEM education. This places a
    premium on improving STEM education now. But these steps will also not
    be enough.
        High-skilled immigration, by contrast, can bring skilled scientists
    and engineers immediately into the United States, injecting much-needed
    talent into America's workforce. More fundamentally, as a nation of 330
    million people, the United States will always be at a disadvantage
    competing against China's 1.4 billion if the United States restricts
    itself to home-grown talent.\34\ Yet America has an asymmetric
    advantage over China in the talent competition: American universities
    and companies are a major draw for AI researchers from around the
    world. Indeed, American leadership in AI is already heavily powered by
    foreign talent. Two-thirds of the top AI researchers in the United
    States did their undergraduate studies overseas, with the top sending
    regions China, India, and Europe.\35\ If the United States draws on the
    best and brightest of the world's 8 billion people, the United States
    will be able to maintain a leadership position over China in AI talent.
    Yet America's biggest barrier to AI talent is its own immigration
    policies.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \34\ Remco Zwetsloot, ``China's Approach to Tech Talent
    Competition: Policies, Results, and the Developing Global Response,''
    (Brookings Institution, April 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
    content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200427_china_talent_policy_zwetsloot.pdf;
    Remco Zwetsloot, ``Strengthening the U.S. AI Workforce,'' (Brookings,
    September 2019), https://cset. georgetown.edu/publication/
    strengthening-the-u-s-ai-workforce/.
        \35\ ``The Global AI Talent Tracker 2.0;'' and Remco Zwetsloot et
    al., Skilled and Mobile: Survey Evidence of AI Researchers' Immigration
    Preferences (arXiv.org, May 5, 2021), https://arxiv.org/pdf/
    2104.07237.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Numerical caps on visas and green cards, long wait times, and
    limitations on visa sponsorship all create obstacles for foreign
    scientists who want to work in the United States. \36\ A numerical cap
    on H-1B work visas arbitrarily constrains U.S. companies from hiring
    foreign talent. Per-country caps on green cards create especially long
    wait times for Indian scientists, who make up a quarter of Silicon
    Valley's workforce. \37\ One study estimated an 89 year wait time for
    Indian nationals applying for an employment-based green card. \38\ It
    is not surprising, then, that nearly 70 percent of top machine learning
    researchers residing in the United States said visa and other
    immigration problems were an obstacle to recruiting foreign scientists.
    \39\ Immigration policy is the single biggest area where government
    regulation is harming American competitiveness.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \36\ Tina Huang and Zachary Arnold, ``Immigration Policy and the
    Global Competition for AI Talent,'' (Center for Security and Emerging
    Technology, June 2020), https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/
    immigration-policy-and-the-global-competition-for-ai-talent/
        \37\ Silicon Valley Institute for Regional Studies, ``Share of
    Residents in Technical Occupations with a Bachelor's Degree or Higher,
    by Place of Origin,'' 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20230121023908/
    https://siliconvalleyindicators.org/data/people/talent-flows-diversity/
    tech-talent/share-of-residents-in-technical-occupations-with-a-
    bachelors-degree-or-higher-by-place-of-origin/.
        \38\ David Bier, ``Backlog for Skilled Immigrants Tops 1 Million:
    Over 200,000 Indians Could Die of Old Age While Awaiting Green Cards,''
    (CATO Institute, March 30, 2020), https://www.cato.org/publications/
    immigration-research-policy-brief/backlog-skilled-immigrants-tops-1-
    million-over#.
        \39\ Zwetsloot et al., Skilled and Mobile.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Biden administration has taken some steps to make it easier for
    international STEM students to come to the United States. \40\ The
    White House has, for example, increased the number of foreign exchange
    programs, expanded the number of fields qualifying for the STEM
    Optional Practical Training (OPT) visa for recent college graduates,
    and updated policies on the evidence STEM PhDs can present when
    applying for the O-1A ``extraordinary ability'' visa. These are
    valuable steps but have a minor impact relative to the scale of self-
    imposed barriers to talent. The United States needs comprehensive
    reform of high-skilled immigration policy to make it easier for U.S.
    universities and companies to recruit international scientists and
    engineers. This should include reducing barriers for STEM PhD graduates
    to stay in the United States by exempting them from the H-1B cap and
    easing the path to permanent residency. \41\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \40\ The White House, ``Biden-'Harris Administration Actions to
    Attract STEM Talent and Strengthen our Economy and Competitiveness,''
    fact sheet, January 21, 2022, https://www. whitehouse.gov/briefing-
    room/statements-releases/2022/01/21/fact-sheet-biden-harris-
    administration-actions-to-attract-stem-talent-and-strengthen-our-
    economy-and-competitiveness/.
        \41\ For recommendations on additional steps to increase high-
    skilled immigration, see National Security Commission on Artificial
    Intelligence, Final Report, 175-179.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      iran
        14. Senator Rosen. Dr. Brands, you have argued for the enduring
    importance of the Middle East to United States foreign policy and the
    challenges posed by Iran. What key elements should be included in a
    reassessment of United States strategy toward Iran to address its
    nuclear ambitions, regional aspirations, and warfare via terrorist
    proxies?
        Dr. Brands. Regardless of what happens in the current Middle East
    crisis, the United States will face an expanded challenge from an Iran
    whose nuclear program continues to advance and whose foreign legion of
    proxies has become far more potent than many American observers had
    expected. In any reassessment of United States strategy in the region,
    the United States will need to reestablish redlines beyond which
    further progress toward a nuclear capability would bring a swift and
    dramatic response, which will, in turn, require establishing more
    credible threats to use force against Iran's nuclear program and its
    accompanying military capabiliies. It will also need to develop a
    strategy that inflicts higher costs on Iran for the actions of the
    proxies it has empowered. It is not sustainable, for instance, for the
    US to be playing defense in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden against Huthi
    attacks, while taking no action against the Iranian naval assets that
    are assisting those attacks with intelligence and other support. Only
    when Tehran becomes convinced that it will pay a major price for
    actions of its proxies will it move to distance itself from them or
    restrain them. Finally, any strategy in the region must be accompanied
    by a strengthening of United States ties with key regional players, in
    the Gulf and beyond, that are most likely to join Washington in pushing
    back against Iranian influence.

                                     [all]