[Senate Hearing 118-676]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-676
WORLDWIDE THREATS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 4, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-709 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
MARK KELLY, Arizona ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
may 4, 2023
Page
Worldwide Threats................................................ 1
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 1
Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker............................. 3
Witness Statements
Haines, The Honorable Avril, Director of National Intelligence... 4
Berrier, Lieutenant General Scott, Director, Defense Intelligence 9
Agency.
Questions for the Record......................................... 49
Appendix A
Submitted Statement of The Honorable Avril Haines--Annual Threat 56
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
Appendix B
Senator Sullivan and Senator King Letter and CRS Report.......... 96
(iii)
WORLDWIDE THREATS
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 4, 2023
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. Before we begin today, I would
like to take a moment to acknowledge the passing of General
Vincent Stewart this past weekend. General Stewart was an
inspiring, trailblazing marine who served the Nation with honor
for more than 4 decades, rising from a tank platoon leader all
the way to director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
He committed himself entirely to the defense of our Nation,
and his leadership will continue to be felt throughout the
Marine Corps and the DIA for years to come. My thoughts are
with his wife, Phyllis, and his children and family.
Now turning to today's hearing, the Committee meets this
morning to receive testimony on the worldwide threats facing
the United States and our international partners. I would like
to welcome Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, and
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DNI), Lieutenant
General Scott Berrier.
Thank you both for joining us, and please convey the
Committee's gratitude to the men and women of the Intelligence
Community (IC) for their critical work. As the DNI's annual
threat assessment makes clear, the United States faces threats
from a number of State and non-State actors, as well as health
and environmental security challenges.
Among these wide-ranging issues, there is a common
understanding that the future of our national security is tied
to the success of our strategic competition with China. This
competition is occurring across every field of national power,
military, economic, political, technological, and more.
Of course, every region of the world. For several decades,
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has studied the United
States way of war and focused its efforts on countering our
advantages. China has invested in offsetting technologies like
anti-access and area denial systems, artificial intelligence
(AI), hypersonics and, of course, nuclear weapons.
Further, the PRC [People's Republic of China] has leveraged
a combination of military and civil power against its
neighbors, including statecraft, economic pressure, coercion,
and deception. Beijing has sought ways to achieve its national
objectives while avoiding a direct confrontation with the
United States military.
As the Defense Department's new joint concept of competing
puts it, China seeks to win without fighting. The strategy
warns that if we do not adapt our approach to compete more
effectively, the United States risks ceding strategic
influence, advantage, and leverage, while preparing for a war
that never occurs. Indeed, the document warns that the United
States could lose without fighting.
Just as China's leaders have studied our way of war, we
need to study theirs. With that in mind, I would ask our
witnesses for their assessments of how China is evolving in
competitive strategies and objectives.
I would also appreciate an update on what military and
nonmilitary factors are most likely to impact Chinese
decisionmaking with respect to a potential coercive action
against Taiwan and our other regional partners. Even as we
compete with China, we must address Russia's violent
destabilizing activities.
Ukrainians have fought with incredible courage and skill to
repel Russia's assault, defending the same values and freedoms
that we cherish. Ukraine has achieved some very notable
successes, but there is hard fighting ahead.
Let there be no doubt the United States will continue to
help Ukraine succeed on the battlefield. America's assistance
to Ukraine is also an investment in our own national security.
I want to commend the leaders of the Intelligence Community for
their skillful release of intelligence throughout this conflict
that has routinely exposed Russia's intentions and aided
Ukraine's warfighters. Intelligence officials are
understandably cautious about revealing hard won insights on
adversaries, but this strategy has proven highly effective in
strengthening the international community's response and
creating dilemmas for Putin.
This is a great example of competing effectively in the
information domain, and I hope we will continue to make use of
this kind of creative tradecraft. With that in mind, Russia's
initial strategy in Ukraine was an abject failure, and the
Kremlin's objective seemed to be changing. Director Haines,
General Berrier, I would ask for your assessment of the Ukraine
conflict in the larger context of the evolving international
order.
I hope you will also address the extent to which Russia and
China are aligning under their so-called no limits partnership
and potential implications for United States national security.
Finally, nations like Iran and North Korea continue to push the
boundaries of military brinksmanship and issues like terrorism
and climate change remain persistent.
Iran has made concerning advances in its nuclear programs
and is reportedly seeking Russia's help to make even further
gains. Its proxies continue to mount drone and rocket attacks
throughout the Middle East, including against bases in Iraq and
Syria with a United States Military presence.
North Korea has conducted nearly two dozen missile tests
this year, including ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles] and cruise missiles, and has reportedly stopped its
routine military to military communications with South Korea.
I understand it is the Intelligence Community's view that
climate change will continue to exacerbate risks to U.S.
national security as issues like rising temperatures, poor
water governance, pollution, changing precipitation patterns,
and other climate effects are likely to lead to an array of
human challenges such as food and water insecurity, and threats
to human health.
I would appreciate our witnesses' perspectives on each of
these complex challenges. Thank you again for your
participation, and I look forward to your testimony. As a
reminder for my colleague, there will be a closed session
immediately following this hearing in room. SVC-217. Now let me
turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker. Senator.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
congratulate you on your statements concerning the threat we
see from China and Russia. Also, I want to join you in
observing and memorializing the life of General Vincent Stewart
and his untimely death, and I want to thank our witnesses for
being here today. It comes at a pivotal time.
The United States is confronted with the most complex and
dangerous global security environment since the Second World
War. Our adversaries are growing in their military capabilities
and engaging in provocative and destabilizing behavior across
the spectrum of competition and conflict.
They are actively trying to displace the United States as
the global leader and weaken longstanding and critical
alliances and partnerships. We are at an inflection point. The
decisions we make this year will have far reaching implications
for the United States military, whether it is properly
positioned and equipped to deter our adversaries, and if
necessary, to defeat them in conflict.
Regrettably, the President's Budget Request lacks the
urgency this moment requires and fails to make the necessary
investments in our Nation's defense. For the third year in a
row, the budget request cuts defense spending. Make no mistake,
our adversaries are taking notice, and I do believe on a
bipartisan basis, we will rectify this failure.
Our foremost adversary, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
is in the midst of an unprecedented buildup of its
conventional, strategic, and asymmetric military capabilities,
under the direction of its most powerful and ruthless leader
since Chairman Mao. At the same time, Vladimir Putin's brutal
and unprovoked attack against Ukraine has entered its second
year and has upended global security, caused untold loss of
life, and further isolated his autocratic regime.
Now is not the time to question our commitment to Ukrainian
partners. To protect United States interests, we need to
provide Ukraine with the tools it needs to bring this war to a
successful conclusion. Not to be outdone, North Korea may now
possess enough missiles to overwhelm our Homeland missile
defenses, and Iran inches closer to developing a nuclear weapon
of its own while it continues to sow chaos across the Middle
East through its terrorist proxy network.
Additionally, President Biden's disastrous and chaotic
withdrawal from Afghanistan has emboldened terrorist networks
around the world. ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and al
Qaeda affiliates across the Middle East, Africa and South Asia
are re-constituting their capabilities and remain intent on
killing Americans.
I am deeply disturbed by the scope and severity of the
recent disclosure of classified materials and the impact such
disclosure has on military operations, intelligence collection,
and cooperation with key allies.
Although I understand multiple investigations are ongoing,
I expect this Committee will be kept fully informed when
details become available and corrective--as a corrective
actions are taken. This Committee deserves answers on how such
a junior servicemember in a support role was able to access,
print, and post online highly classified documents for over a
year without detection--for over a year.
We need to understand whether the Department of Defense's
(DOD) insider threat and security procedures failed or simply
were not followed. Again, I thank the witnesses for being here.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and look forward to a very important
discussion.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Thank you very
much, and let me now recognize Director Haines.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE AVRIL D. HAINES, DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Director Haines. Thank you very much, Chairman Reed,
Ranking Member----
Chairman Reed. Could you bring that microphone close as
possible?
Director Haines. Is that better?
Chairman Reed. That is.
Director Haines. Okay. Good deal. Sorry about that. No, and
thank you very much for your kind words about General Stewart,
who really was just an extraordinary leader in the Intelligence
Community and somebody who has inspired a lot of our folks over
the years and brings together sort of integrity and skill in a
way that's quite rare and extraordinary.
I am thank you for the opportunity to be here today
alongside my wonderful colleague, General Berrier, and for your
steadfast support for the men and women of the Intelligence
Community who serve our country. I am grateful for the
opportunity to present the annual threat assessment, and we
just want to acknowledge the many people who have contributed
to this work, from the collector to the analysts to everyone in
between.
This assessment is a product of their effort, and they have
our gratitude. This year's report notes that during the coming
year, the United States and its allies will face an
international security environment dominated by two strategic
challenges that intersect with each other and existing trends
to intensify their national security implications.
First, great powers, rising regional powers, and an
evolving array of non-State actors are vying for influence and
impact in the international system, including over the
standards and rules that will shape the global order for
decades to come.
Second, challenges that transcend borders, including
climate change, transnational criminal activity, health and
human security, and economic needs made worse by energy and
food insecurity, as well as Russia's invasion of Ukraine, are
intensifying as the planet emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic.
Further, compounding this dynamic is the impact that
rapidly emerging technologies are having on governance,
economies, communities around the world. The intersection of
these challenges underscores the importance of working together
with partners and allies to address the threats we face, and
how critical it is to counter efforts to undermine the global
norms, principles and mechanisms that promote and underpin
national--transnational cooperation, which is an implicit theme
in this year's threat assessment.
The report starts with the People's Republic of China
(PRC), as it is increasingly challenging the United States
economically, technologically, politically, militarily, and
from an intelligence standpoint around the world.
I will spend most of my time on China and Russia, which are
among our top priorities, and focus on updating our views with
the latest rather than repeating what is in the annual threat
assessment. We assess that the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP,
under President Xi Jinping, will continue efforts over the next
year to achieve Xi's vision of making China the preeminent
power in East Asia and a major power on the world stage.
What is perhaps most concerning is that the CCP is
increasingly convinced that it can only fulfill Xi's vision at
the expense of United States power and influence, and through
tools of coercion, using demonstrations of strength, as well as
economic and political coercion, to compel governments to
acquiesce to the CCP's preferences, including the land, sea,
and air claims in the region and its assertions of sovereignty
over Taiwan.
The relationship between the United States and China has
consequently become more challenging. Xi's public reference to
America's suppression of China in March of this year reflects
his longstanding distrust of United States goals and his belief
that the United States seeks to contain China.
Xi's speech was the most public and direct criticism that
we have seen from him to date, and probably reflects growing
pessimism in Beijing about China's relationship with the United
States, as well as his growing worries about the trajectory of
China's domestic economic development and indigenous technology
innovation, which he now seeks to blame on the United States.
Even as the rhetoric has become more heated, we continue to
assess that Beijing wants to preserve stability and avoid
triggering additional technology restrictions or sanctions from
the United States and our partners, as they seek to narrow the
gap in their economic and technological competition with us.
Perceiving the United States as a threat, the PRC seeks to
undercut United States influence, and is looking to portray the
United States as the root of global problems. China seeks to
divide us from our allies and partners, frame United States
actions as provocations that provide a basis for planned PRC
aggression, which they then claim are simply responses, such as
China's expansion of its military presence surrounding Taiwan,
which the PRC asserted was in response to President Tsai's
recent transit through the United States, as well as her
meetings with two speakers of the House over the past year.
China's leaders are focused on spurring domestic economic
growth this year, but in the long run, spurring indigenous
technology innovation is paramount.
President Xi remains confident that Beijing can innovate
its way to the technological frontier, regardless of United
States and allied restrictions, and that doing so will give
China the competitive advantage that is crucial to achieving
his vision for China as a world power.
Nonetheless, we are likely to see more dissonant messaging
and actions coming out of Beijing, such as the recent charm
offensive by Premier Li Keqiang, welcoming foreign direct
investment at the China Development Forum juxtaposed against
Beijing's pressure on foreign firms and executives, including
investigations of United States firms and a clampdown on
previous non-sensitive data flows out of China.
The IC [Intelligence Community] assesses that China's long
term economic growth will continue to decelerate, because
China's era of rapid catch-up growth is ending, and structural
issues such as debt, demographics, inequality, overreliance on
investment, and inadequate domestic consumption remain.
Although the CCP may find ways to overcome its structural
challenges over the long term, in the short term, it continues
to take an increasingly aggressive approach to external
affairs, often to bolster its domestic agenda.
China's leaders are increasing their investment in a world-
class military. Expanding their country's nuclear arsenal and
cyber threat capacity, pursuing counterspace weapons capable of
targeting United States and allied satellites. Forcing foreign
companies and coercing foreign countries to allow the transfer
of technology and intellectual property in order to boost
indigenous capabilities. Continuing to increase global supply
chain dependencies on China with the possibility of using such
dependencies to threaten and cutoff foreign countries during a
crisis.
The CCP is also seeking to reshape global governance in
line with Xi's preferences and governance standards that
support the monopoly of power within China, and expanding
influence operations, including through the export of digital
repression technologies.
Furthermore, we have observed the expanding strategic ties
between China and Russia. As mentioned by the Chairman, another
critical priority for the IC, which has been strengthened by
the conflict in Ukraine.
We are now over a year into the war, which is reshaping not
only Russia's global relationships and strategic standing, but
also our own. Strengthening our alliances and partnerships in
ways that President Putin almost certainly did not anticipate.
Often precipitating the very events he hoped to avoid, such as
Finland's accession to NATO and Sweden's petition to join,
while also increasing Xi's leverage over Putin.
On the battlefield, the fighting is principally focused on
the East around Bakhmut and Avdiikva and remains a brutally
grinding war of attrition, in which neither military has a
definitive advantage with day to day fighting over hundreds of
meters. Russian forces gained less territory in April than
during any of the three previous months, as they appear to
transition from offensive to defensive operations along the
front lines.
Russian forces are facing significant shortfalls in
munitions and are under significant personnel constraints but
continue to lay minefields and prepare new defensive positions
in occupied Ukrainian territory. Both sides are focusing on
preparations for a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive this
spring or summer designed to push Russia out of illegally
annexed territory.
The Ukrainian armed forces are still finalizing the
specific priorities, timing, and scale of the offensive, and
Western assistance will be crucial in preparing both plans and
forces. With the support of the Congress, the United States is
doing a great deal to bolster Ukraine's chances for success.
But even if Ukraine's counteroffensive is not fully successful,
the Russians are unlikely to be able to mount a significant
offensive operation this year.
In fact, if Russia does not initiate a mandatory
mobilization and secure substantial third-party ammunition
supplies beyond existing deliveries from Iran and others, it
will be increasingly challenging for them to sustain even
modest offensive operations.
At the same time, of course, Ukraine remains heavily
dependent on external military aid and would likely be unable
to counter Russia's natural relative manpower and resource
advantages if most Western military aid ceased.
Furthermore, while we continue to assess that Putin most
likely calculates the time works in his favor and that
prolonging the war may be his best remaining pathway to
eventually securing Russia's strategic interests in Ukraine. We
assess that Putin probably has scaled back his immediate
ambitions to consolidate control of the occupied territory in
Eastern and Southern Ukraine and ensuring that Ukraine will
never become a NATO ally.
Putin's willingness to consider a negotiated pause may be
based on his assessment that a pause would provide a respite
for Russian forces, as they could try to use that time to
regain strength before resuming offensive operations at some
point in the future. While buying time for what he hopes will
be an erosion of Western support for Ukraine.
Yet he may be willing to claim at least a temporary victory
based on roughly the territory he is occupying. The challenge
is that even as Putin may be scaling back his near-term
ambitions, the prospect for Russian concessions to advance
negotiations this year will be low unless domestic political
vulnerabilities alter his thinking. Of course, as the conflict
continues, the human toll is only getting worse.
In addition to the many tens of thousands of casualties
suffered by Ukrainian and Russian militaries, more than 8
million people have been forced to flee Ukraine since Russia
invaded. Moreover, in addition to Moscow's continued assault on
Ukraine's civilian infrastructure, particularly its energy
facilities and electrical grid, there is widespread reporting
of atrocities committed by Russian forces.
Russia and its proxy groups are using so-called filtration
operations to detain and forcibly deport tens of thousands of
Ukrainian civilians to Russia. The IC is engaged with other
parts of the United States Government to document and hold
Russia and Russian actors accountable for their actions.
Moscow has suffered military losses that will require years
of rebuilding and leave it less capable of posing a
conventional military threat to Europe and operating
assertively in Eurasia and on the global stage. But as a
result, Russia will become even more reliant on asymmetric
options, such as nuclear, cyber, space capabilities, and in
China. Our annual assessment also covers Iran, North Korea, the
many regional challenges we face, including in Africa, where,
of course, we have seen a recent outbreak of fighting in Sudan,
which is no stranger to conflict.
The fighting in Sudan between the Sudanese armed forces and
the rapid support forces is, we assess, likely to be
protracted, as both sides believe that they can win militarily
and have few incentives to come to the negotiating table.
Both sides are seeking external sources of support, which,
if successful, is likely to intensify the conflict and create a
greater potential for spillover challenges in the region. But
even so, the fighting is exacerbating already dire humanitarian
conditions in Sudan, forcing relief organizations to curtail
operations, raising the specter of massive refugee flows and
aid needs in the region.
Even before the fighting started, roughly one-third of the
population, or approximately 15.8 million people, required
immediate assistance because of disease outbreaks, inflation,
localized conflicts, internal displacement, and weather-related
food insecurity.
Throughout the world, as I noted at the outset, the State
actors challenges we inventory are undermining our capacity to
work together with other countries to address what are utterly
critical transnational threats such as climate change, public
health challenges, such as the current COVID-19 pandemic, the
threat from illicit drugs terrorism, irregular migration.
Before concluding, I just want to raise with you a
legislative authority of fundamental importance to the
Intelligence Community and the work we do, which will expire at
the end of this year if Congress does not act. I am referring
to section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
and I can tell you without hesitation that section 702 was
relied upon in gathering some of the intelligence that form the
basis of this assessment, as it is hard to overestimate the
importance of this authority to our work more generally.
FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] Section 702
allows the Intelligence Community to collect on the
communication of specifically targeted foreign persons who are
located outside the United States. In doing so provides unique
intelligence on foreign intelligence targets at a speed and
reliability that we just simply cannot replicate in any other
authority.
Section 702 was originally enacted to enable the U.S.
Government to quickly collect on the communications of
terrorists located abroad, by allowing the IC to acquire
foreign intelligence from non-U.S. people located outside of
the United States who are using U.S. electronic communication
service providers.
Section 702 is still vital to our counterterrorism (CT)
mission. But now it is also principally relied upon for key
insights across a range of our highest priority threats. In
fact, 702 acquired information has been used to protect against
a series of conventional and cyber-attacks posed by China,
Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
For example, I can tell you that 702 acquired information
enabled the United States to gain insights into the PRC's
efforts to monitor, track, and persecute Chinese nationals
believed to be dissidents. Section 702 acquired information has
also been used to identify multiple ransomware attacks against
U.S. critical infrastructure. Allowing the U.S. Government to
respond to, mitigate, and in some cases prevent attacks.
Section 702 acquired information has been used to prevent
components for weapons of mass destruction from reaching
foreign actors. Section 702 acquired information has resulted
in the identification and disruption of hostile foreign actors'
attempts to recruit spies in or send their operatives to the
United States.
I realize that 702 is a powerful authority. It is incumbent
on all of us in the Intelligence Community to ensure the
privacy and civil liberties of Americans are built into its
design and implementation at every level.
Over the last many years, we have significantly expanded
oversight and dedicated resources to compliance in order to do
just that. We welcome the opportunity to help you understand
better the oversight framework we have built, as we work to
authorize this critical authority. So, thank you so much for
your patience and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Director Avril D. Haines
follows:]
Director Haines' statement can be found in Appendix A on
page 56.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Director Haines.
General Berrier, please.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SCOTT D. BERRIER, USA, DIRECTOR
OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Lieutenant General Berrier. Chair Reed, Ranking Member
Wicker, distinguished Committee Members, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the DIA's assessment of the global
security environment.
Before I begin, I too would like to take a moment to
recognize and honor Lieutenant General Vince Stewart, DIA's
20th Director. Vince passed away in his sleep last Friday. We
lost a giant, an intellectual giant, a trailblazer, and a
really good friend. Vince was a gifted and talented marine
intelligence officer who positively touched the lives of many
in every organization he served in or led. We mourn his loss.
We grieve with his family, and we honor his memory.
I am pleased to join Director Haines today to discuss the
complex threat landscape and our work to provide timely,
insightful, and rigorous intelligence. DIA and the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise are transforming our approach to meet
threats to our Nation posed by strategic competition with
China, Russia, and other foreign nations.
With your continued support, DIA and the DIE will continue
to excel in providing all sorts of analysis, HUMINT [human
intelligence] and technical collection, open-source collection,
material exploitation, modeling and simulations, and other
unique mission sets.
This will most likely be the last time I testify before
this Committee as I approach my 39th year of service in our
Army, and pending retirement. I become somewhat reflective on
how the threat landscape has changed.
In 1984, it was a bipolar world. The United States and our
partners in a cold war with the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics]. In my first assignment, I served as an infantry
battalion intelligence officer or an S2 in Alaska. One of our
missions was to protect critical oil infrastructure in the high
North from a Spetsnaz attack.
My 23-year-old self didn't think much of that mission at
the time, wasn't very exciting, but in retrospect it was an
important mission then, and protecting critical infrastructure
is a really important mission today.
The difference is the threat landscape is exponentially
more dangerous today than it was in 1984. We are now in a
multipolar world with strategic competition at the forefront.
The events of the past year clearly demonstrate that our
competitors are emboldened and that they are attempting to
forcefully recast the rules based international order and
challenge U.S. interests.
From Russia's unprovoked and unjustified, full scale
invasion of Ukraine, to China's military assertiveness in the
Indo-Pacific region, to an unprecedented number of North Korean
missile launches, to Iranian directed action against United
States Forces in the Middle East. The United States now faces a
multifaceted security environment in which authoritarian
regimes are testing our resolve through their provocative
military actions, developing capabilities to hold the Homeland
at risk, and showing greater risk tolerance for potential
escalation.
Like you, I am very concerned about ongoing threats from
China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist
organizations, but China is our pacing challenge and DIA's top
priority. Beijing is expanding its global influence and
stepping up its multi-domain pressure campaign against Taiwan,
as observed by sharply increased rhetoric and military activity
over the last year.
Xi Jinping's attainment of a third term as a General
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party positions Beijing for
further progress on military modernization and operational
goals that will challenge the United States during the next
year and beyond. The war in Ukraine is also a priority for DIA,
and for the Russian military, 2022 is not a good year.
The new look army is gone, and in my view, we are at a
particularly dangerous place with Russia. Putin is not seeking
an off ramp and Moscow has asserted publicly that it remains
committed to achieving its objectives in Ukraine through
military force. China and Russia are seeking to incorporate
advanced technologies to erode our United States technological
advantage.
China is pursuing a whole of nation approach to technology
development. The PLA believes that integrating future
technologies, especially AI and quantum, will constitute a
major revolution in military affairs. As Director, I have
pressed agency leaders to up our game, relook business
operations and transform our missions to meet customer needs,
and to address unprecedented national security challenges.
Transformation and change are imperatives, and I am pleased
that DIA is making real more progress on our mission sets. DIA
has exceptional expertise, responsibilities, and missions that
you trust us to lead. As such, foundational military
intelligence, defense, human, and counterintelligence,
measurement and signature intelligence, or MASINT and JWICS
[Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System].
Our strategic, operational, and tactical defense
intelligence supports warfighters, defense planners,
policymakers, and the acquisition community. I look forward to
discussing real world examples of our progress. One final area
I would like to highlight is the workforce of DIA.
As you know, our workforce spans the globe with innovative
and forward leaning officers, and these talented and dedicated
experts are making strides to defend the United States and our
allies. From our defense attaches to analysts, to technical
collectors, to our enabling force. These professionals are
mission focused and working tirelessly behind the scenes for
our Nation.
DIA is investing in the workforce and the infrastructure
that supports their behind-the-scenes work. Bringing together
talented officers with varied experiences and giving them the
tools and authorities to conduct the intelligence that is at
the core, and investing in our people is a critical step to
modernizing the next generation of intelligence capabilities.
I am proud to represent a workforce that provides
intelligence on foreign actors to prevent and win wars, and to
illuminate opportunities to enable the United States to outpace
our strategic competitors. I welcome your questions on the
global threat environment and thank you for your continued
support and opportunity to testify today.
[The prepared statement of General Berrier follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Scott Berrier
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished Committee
Members thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Defense
Intelligence Agency's (DIA's) assessment of the global security
environment.
Before I begin, I would like to take a moment to recognize and
honor the 20th DIA Director Lieutenant General Vince Stewart. Vince
passed away in his sleep last Friday-we lost a friend, an intellectual
giant, and a trailblazer. Vince was a gifted and talented Marine
Intelligence Officer who positively touched the lives of many in every
organization he served or led. We mourn his loss, grieve with his
family, and honor his memory.
I am pleased to join DNI Director Haines today to discuss the
complex threat landscape, and our work to provide timely, insightful,
and rigorous intelligence. DIA and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise
(DIE) are transforming our approach to meet threats to our Nation posed
by strategic competition with China, Russia, and other foreign nations.
With your continued support, DIA and the DIE will continue to excel in
providing all-source analysis, HUMINT and technical collection, Open
Source collection, material exploitation, modeling and simulation, and
other unique mission sets.
This will most likely be the last time I testify before this
Committee as I approach my 39th year of Service in our Army and pending
retirement. It has been a high honor and privilege, and with my tenure
at DIA winding down, I have become somewhat reflective on how the
threat landscape has changed. In 1984, it was a bi-polar world; the
United States and our partners in a cold war with the USSR. In my first
assignment, I served as an Infantry Battalion Intelligence Officer--S2-
in Alaska. Our mission was to protect critical infrastructure in the
High North-and the Alyeska Pipeline-from a potential Spetznaz attack.
My 23-year-old-self did not think much of that mission. In retrospect,
that was an important mission then, and protecting critical
infrastructure is an important mission today. The difference is the
threat landscape is exponentially more dangerous today than 1984. We
are now in a tri-polar world with strategic competition at the
forefront. The events of the past year clearly demonstrate that our
competitors are emboldened, and that they are attempting to forcefully
recast the rules-based international order and challenge U.S.
interests. From Russia's unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion
of Ukraine, to China's military assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific
region, to an unprecedented number of North Korean missile launches, to
Iranian-directed action against United States Forces in the Middle
East. The United States now faces a multifaceted security environment
in which authoritarian regimes are testing our resolve through their
provocative military actions, developing capabilities to hold the
Homeland at risk, and showing greater risk tolerance for potential
escalation.
Like you, I am very concerned about the ongoing threats from China,
Russia, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations, but
China is our pacing challenge and DIA's Top Priority. Beijing is
expanding its global influence and stepping up its multi-domain
pressure campaign against Taiwan, as observed by its sharply increased
rhetoric and military activity over this past year. Xi Jinping' s
attainment of a third term as General Secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party positions Beijing for further progress on military
modernization and operational goals that will challenge the United
States during the next year and beyond.
The war in Ukraine is also a priority for DIA; and for the Russian
military, 2022 was not a good year. The Russian ``New Look Army'' is
gone, and, in my view, we are at a particularly dangerous place with
Russia. Putin is not seeking an off-ramp, and Moscow has asserted
publicly that it remains committed to achieving its objectives in
Ukraine through military force.
China and Russia are seeking to incorporate advanced technologies
to erode United States technological advantage. China is pursuing a
whole-of-nation approach to technology development, and the PLA
believes that integrating future technologies-- especially AI and
quantum-will constitute a major revolution in military affairs.
As Director, I have pressed Agency leaders to up our game, relook
business operations, and transform our missions to meet customer needs
and address the unprecedented national security challenges.
Transformation and change are imperatives, and I am pleased that DIA is
making real-world progress on our mission sets. DIA has exceptional
expertise, responsibilities, and missions that you trust us to lead-
such as foundational military intelligence, Defense HUMINT and Cover,
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (or MASINT), and JWICS.
Our strategic, operational, and tactical defense intelligence
supports warfighters, defense planners, policymakers, and the
acquisition community, and I look forward to discussing real-world
examples of our progress.
One final area I would like to highlight is the workforce at DIA.
As you know, our workforce spans the globe with innovative and forward-
leaning officers, and these talented and dedicated experts are making
strides to defend the United States and our allies. From our Defense
Attaches to analysts and technical collectors, these professionals are
mission-focused and working tirelessly behind-the-scenes for our
Nation. DIA is investing in the workforce and the infrastructure that
supports their behind-the-scenes work. Bringing together talented
officers, with varied experiences, and giving them the tools and
authorities to conduct intelligence is at DIA's core, and investing in
our people is a critical step to modernizing the next generation of
intelligence capabilities.
I am proud to represent a workforce that provides intelligence on
foreign actors to prevent and win wars, and to illuminate opportunities
to enable the United States to outpace our strategic competitors. I
welcome your questions on the global threat environment, and thank you
for your continued support and the opportunity to testify today.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General. Thank you both
for your detailed and thoughtful testimony. Director Haines,
Secretary Yellen indicated that we will exceed the debt limit
by June 1st, requiring action before that. Have the
Intelligence Community assessed the international consequences
of default on our debt?
Director Haines. Thank you, Chairman. So, we don't have
certainty on the outcome of the financial markets nor
countries' opinions of sort of economic and political
leadership that might be affected by a default on the debt.
But I would say that what our assessment is, is that
regardless of a default's duration, almost certainly it would
create global uncertainty about the value of the U.S. dollar
and U.S. institutions and leadership, leading to volatility in
currency and financial markets and commodity markets that are
priced in dollars. That is basically as far as our analysts are
able to provide.
Chairman Reed. Let me followup--and you might want to take
this for the closed session also but, our adversaries, I
presume, would want to exploit any type of difficulty that we
have. Do we have any indications that China in particular is
preparing for exploitation of this via through disinformation
in the United States or through financial or other moves?
Director Haines. We don't have any information that
suggests that they are planning for that. But I think our
analysts would agree with you that it would be almost a
certainty that they would look to take advantage of the
opportunity.
They generally, both Russia and China, would look to
perceive sort of narrate through information operations, such
an event as demonstrating the chaos within the United States,
that we are not capable of functioning as a democracy, and sort
of the governance issues associated with it. They have done
that on a range of things.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. General Berrier, we had General
Cavoli here, who is doing a superb job, and he indicated that
Russia remains a formidable force despite their significant
losses in personnel in Ukraine. Because air, maritime, space,
cyber and strategic forces have not really been committed to
that effort. What is DIA's assessment of Russia's capacity?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Very similar. Still an
existential threat with a nuclear arsenal that they have.
General Cavoli is correct, that their strategic forces have
largely been untested here and still formidable.
Chairman Reed. So that the significant--we just--our forces
out of Europe, which will be a challenge because of their
existing capacities.
Lieutenant General Berrier. I think from a deterrence
standpoint, Russia fears strength. So even though their ground
forces are degraded right now, they will quickly build those
back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Director Haines, as I said in my
statement, the Intelligence Community has done some remarkable
work with respect to Russia and Ukraine by exposing activities
that the Russians were contemplating before they could do it.
Not only embarrassing them, but in many cases frustrating their
ability to do it.
Are we ready to use that same approach to other adversaries
such as China in terms of strategically using intelligence to
disrupt their operations?
Director Haines. Thank you, sir. I think we can talk about
this also in closed session a bit more. But as a general
matter, we have learned some techniques and mechanisms that
will not be forgotten coming out of the conflict with Ukraine
that I think we can deploy in other scenarios which have
allowed us to do more sharing and downgrading of information.
Kind of working as a team across the IC to try to preserve
sources and methods in that process.
I think we will look to do that. But I think it will be
more challenging in different areas depending on what those
sources and methods are, and how we can manage that concern as
we move forward.
Chairman Reed. Just quickly, from both of you, we have had
this incident with the Air National Guardsmen, Teixeira, years
before that, Snowden. So, this is not really new. We thought
and we think every time this happens, we put in place things
like keystroke logging, more restrictive controls, but we are
still having problems. So just quickly, Director Haines, what
can we do to make sure we have more appropriate controls?
Director Haines. Yes. Thank you, sir. It has been
absolutely extremely frustrating, obviously, and demoralizing
for folks in the Intelligence Community who work so hard,
frankly, to put together the kind of intelligence that then
gets disclosed in leaks. The damage that it does to our
national security is just unacceptable on every level,
obviously. I appreciate the support.
I think what I can tell you at this stage is only an
interim answer because we are still getting the information
from the investigation as to what exactly happened. To
understand that is obviously then, to have greater confidence
in saying that the things that we are doing are going to make a
difference to ensure that this doesn't happen again.
Right now, what we are doing is looking to ensure that we,
in fact, have the best user activity monitoring, other
techniques that we use. That we are, again, scrubbing and
reviewing our processes for ensuring that there is only
information provided on a need-to-know basis. That when there
is user privileges, that they are appropriately granted. That
we have additional controls around these issues, and we can
obviously talk about this more in closed session.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Haines, I
don't want to get into a long discussion about the debt limit,
but it is a fact, is it not, that the House of Representatives
has passed a bill that would raise the debt limit. If it were
passed by the Senate and signed into law by the President, a
default would be avoided. That is correct, is it not?
Director Haines. Sir, I will confess that I am not tracking
the puts and takes of this, but I absolutely--I am sure you are
right.
Senator Wicker. Well, I just wanted to point that out, that
the House has done its work and the Senate now needs to pass a
bill and get it to the President's desk. But let me ask you
this, Director Haines, the General said since he was a young
officer, that the threat has changed, the threat has
exponentially increased. Do you agree that this is the most
complex and dangerous threat environment since World War II? I
will ask that to both of you. Director Haines first.
Director Haines. Sure. Thank you, sir. I feel as if you
always feel, as if the time that you are in, is the most
complex and most challenging. I do feel that way, but I am a
little bit conscious of the sort of cognitive bias that is
associated with time. But I think it is, as our annual threat
assessment----
Senator Wicker. Well, this is a very complex and dangerous
threat environment, is it not? General, is this the most
complex and dangerous threat environment since World War II?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I believe it is. When
you consider the advances in technology, the precision of
weapons, the globalization information, the rise of China,
along with what Russia has been up to. Then you consider
dangerous regional actors like Iran, North Korea, and the
continued threat of violent extremist organizations, it seems
like the most complex----
Senator Wicker. Do you then agree, General, that the
authorization bill and the appropriation bills that Congress
passes this year should represent acting accordingly to address
this greatest threat?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, there is a threat
there. I support the President's Budget and that is all--I will
just leave it there.
Senator Wicker. Okay. I think that answer speaks loudly.
China gives us a figure, General Berrier, about how much they
spend. They say $224 billion annually on their military. Do you
agree that China spends significantly more than they publicly
admit? What is your best estimate of how much their annual
defense spending is?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, there are a number of
factors that go into that estimate. I would be more comfortable
in a closed session to discuss that.
Senator Wicker. Director Haines, I guess you don't want to
discuss that publicly also. Well, let's then let both of you
discuss what this Ukraine war has done to Russia's military
capability, not only today, but over the next 10 to 15 years.
General.
Lieutenant General Berrier. A number of factors as well.
Senator, just the combat losses, and I spoke of this in my
opening statement about the new look army. The reorganization
that the Russian military took in the early 2000's meant that
they would be better, faster, smaller, if you will, from what
they were in the Soviet era.
That army largely is gone, and they are relying on reserves
and reserve equipment, older Soviet era kinds of kit. It is
going to take them a while to build back to more advanced kit.
The estimates go from 5 to 10 years based on how sanctions
affect them and their ability to put technology back into their
force.
So, I think they have had a setback in the ground forces,
but still very, very capable in their strategic forces.
Senator Wicker. Director Haines, the next 10 to 15 years,
based on what has happened to the Russian conventional military
capability so far.
Director Haines. Yes, I mean, I absolutely agree with
General Berrier. There is no question and I think unanimity in
the Intelligence Community, it will take years for the Russians
to build back up their ground forces.
They have really significantly degraded them, but they
nevertheless have, as indicated, strategic force, other forces,
and that doesn't mean that they are not a powerful military
force.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, then let me just say this with
regard to my previous question, there is an unclassified
Department of Defense annual China military power report. That
is not secret. It doesn't need to be said, done in the schif.
It states that China's ``actual military related spending
is likely significantly higher than what it states in its
official budget.? You don't disagree with that, Director
Haines, do you?
Director Haines. No. I think one aspect of it is the civil
military fusion that we see in China. Where so much of, in
fact, their civilian industry is actually adapted and used by
their military. When you consider that, it is a significant----
Senator Wicker. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thanks, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for being here and for your
service to the country. Director Haines, I want to go back to
your comments about the 702 reauthorization, because I returned
from, along with a number of my colleagues, including Senator
Budd, we returned from South America a couple of weeks ago.
Where we visited four countries, and the 702 really came up, or
at least the ability of the intel community to use those
authorizations to address the challenges facing the country.
I was particularly interested in the counternarcotics
effort because we continue to have a huge issue in New
Hampshire with the opioid epidemic. So, I do think it is very
important for us to continue to have those authorities.
But there are also some very real concerns about privacy
that we have heard. So, can you talk to how important it is for
these authorities to help us continue with counter-narcotics
efforts and also what we are doing in terms of addressing the
privacy concerns?
Director Haines. Yes, absolutely, I think this is one of
the challenges for us, has been in the Intelligence Community,
frankly, trying to declassify examples of how it is that we
have used 702 so that the public has a better understanding of
the value of this authority and the collection that we have.
But also, as a general matter, it has been an important
authority for use for in the context of countering narcotics
trafficking. In many respects used to help support our foreign
partners in interdictions as a general matter, and that is
something that has been critical.
In terms of the privacy and civil liberties pieces of this,
what I would say is, we have a number of things that we do in
order to try to monitor and assess our compliance, and then to
ultimately design the system in such a way as to incentivize
and promote compliance. Making it, in other words, technically
hard to do things that are non-compliant.
Then ultimately have increased extraordinary investments
into training of folks who would use the system and then to
making adjustments as we go through the process where we see
something goes wrong and then actually addressing it, and also
holding people accountable in the context of any compliance
violations.
Just to give you a couple of things. On an annual basis,
the entire program is reviewed and recertified by the foreign
intelligence court (FISC), essentially, as one piece. Also, we
do semiannual compliance reports to Congress. We have a joint
60-day review, my office and the Department of Justice, of
targeting decisions of any U.S. person queries, if they are
done through the data bases that exist and dissemination.
We have targeting and minimization procedures for each
element that are not just reviewed by the Attorney General but
go to the FISC court. Again, we go through a variety of ways in
which to try to ensure that we have created, in effect, a
virtuous cycle where we can ensure that everything that we are
doing is, in fact, promoting compliance, and then monitoring it
to see if that is, in fact, what is happening. Then addressing
challenges as they come and move forward.
Then we also have been providing reports publicly about
noncompliance incidents so that we can show the American
people, we can have all of you and your constituents look at
what is happening, and see where we make progress, where we
make mistakes, how we address it. Then, how we move forward on
it so that we can actually build the trust that is necessary.
Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you. You both mentioned cyber
in your--I think you both mentioned cyber in your remarks, but
I didn't hear either of you talk about the efforts to address
disinformation.
One of the places where our adversaries have certainly been
very effective. I think more effective than we have been in
responding in many cases, has been in the disinformation arena.
Can you speak to what we are doing and how we are
coordinating with other operations like the Global Engagement
Center at the State Department?
Director Haines. Sure. I will start and General Berrier, if
you want to add to this. But Congress put into law that we
should establish a foreign malign influence center in the
Intelligence Community.
We stood that up and it encompasses our election threat
executive work, essentially looking at foreign influence and
interference in elections. But it also deals with
disinformation more generally.
What we have been doing is effectively trying to support
the global engagement center, others throughout the U.S.
Government, in helping them to understand what are the plans
and intentions of the key actors in this space. China, Russia,
Iran, et cetera, and then, give them a sense of what it is that
we are seeing in terms of the techniques that they use. How
they go about this, and provide that for policymakers so that
they are able to take that information and hopefully counter it
and address it.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Berrier. I think DIA's perspective on
this, Senator, is really speed. We want to be able to detect
that. It is really with our open-source collection capability,
working with our combatant command partners where this is
happening all over the world. Then the ability to turn
something quickly with them under the right authorities to
counter that disinformation or misinformation.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for being here today. Director Haines, last year you
testified that, ``China will continue to essentially expand
their nuclear arsenal and diversification for a period of
time.? Has that assessment changed or does the Intelligence
Community still maintain it?
Director Haines. That assessment has not changed.
Senator Fischer. In public reports, we have seen that the
DIA has assessed that China will deploy 1,500 warheads by 2035.
STRATCOM Commander General Cotton, has also publicly confirmed
that China has now surpassed the United States in the number of
fixed and mobile land-based launchers for ICBM. General
Berrier, do you agree with that assessment still?
Lieutenant General Berrier. I do agree.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Director Haines, does the
Intelligence Committee assess that China has any interest in
pursuing arms control agreements that would restrict their
development of nuclear weapons?
Director Haines. No. As a general matter, we have not seen
China express interest in arms control agreements in this area.
Senator Fischer. General Berrier, we have seen reports that
Russia is providing China with plutonium for Chinese fast
breeder reactors. In fact, it was reported by a UK think tank.
They noted that between September and December 2022, Russia
provided seven times more highly enriched uranium to China than
the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency
have secured over the past 30 years. What are the implications
of that increased level of cooperation of their nuclear
programs?
Lieutenant General Berrier. The layers of cooperation
between China and Russia go very, very deep. I cannot speak to
the specifics of the uranium aspect of that. If true, it is an
acceleration of programs in development and technology
transfer.
Senator Fischer. Director Haines, do you have anything to
add to that?
Director Haines. No.
Senator Fischer. Is there any movement within the
Administration to look at--first of all, to set up agreements
again with Russia? Is there any, I would say, false hope by
this Administration to believe that they could pull in Russia,
let alone trying to pull in China in those talks?
Director Haines. I couldn't speak to that just because it
is obviously in the policy community and I am not sure I would
know, frankly, what it is that they are looking at.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you. Also, Director Haines,
looking at Afghanistan, do you assess that ISIS-K [Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan] still seeks to conduct
external operations against the United States, our Forces, and
our allies and partners?
Director Haines. Yes.
Senator Fischer. Do you agree with the assessment that we
had in March from General Kurilla about how long it would take
ISIS-K to generate the capability to conduct external
operations? He told us at that time, that any operation against
the United States and Western interests abroad could happen
within 6 months with little or no warning. Would you agree with
that?
Director Haines. I would have to take that back, to be
honest. There has been a number of developments, even since
General Kurilla apparently testified on this issue, of taking
out key external ops folks within ISIS-K and I think that might
affect the timeline. But I would be happy to take that for the
record.
Senator Fischer. Do you feel that we have lost information
gathering capabilities and also CT operations in Afghanistan
since our withdrawal?
Director Haines. We certainly, the Intelligence Community
has been clear about the fact that we are not able to collect
as much information today as we were, obviously, when the
troops were in Afghanistan.
Senator Fischer. How would you, I guess, rate the amount of
intelligence that we are able to gather in Afghanistan? Because
it is my understanding our CT operations are basically nil. We
are looking at hardly anybody on the ground to be able to help.
So how do you rate what we are able to get when we are
looking at a threat against not just United States interests
and persons, but also our Western allies, the growing threats
that we are facing there?
Director Haines. To be specific, we would have to do this,
I think, in closed session. But as a general matter, what we
have sought to do is to try to--trying to think how to do this
in an unclassified way but develop enough collection
opportunities so that we can monitor the threat. It is
definitely, as you indicated, degraded from what we had
previously, and we can discuss the details in the closed
session.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senior Fischer. Senator
Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Director Haines, the DOD and the IC are
engaged in cyber operations against our adversaries every day
and gain intelligence about how these adversaries operate and
intend to operate in the cyber domain. However, in the event of
a large-scale cyber-attack on the Homeland, CISA [Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency] is in the leading role. How
much of your intelligence on, for example, the PRC cyber
threat, are you able to share with CISA, and how much must
remain inside the DOD and the IC?
Director Haines. We share almost everything with CISA,
honestly. They get our analysis on these issues. They see the
raw intelligence. We have overlap in terms of even intelligence
that we get from commercial threat indexes and so on. So, it is
quite open sharing in that respect.
Senator Gillibrand. When we rely on allies across the globe
for operations and assistance, are we able to leverage our
efforts with what we do with CISA, with those allies?
Director Haines. Yes, it is a great question. In fact we
have talked to allies about, for example, recognizing that so
much of the critical cyber threat information exists in the
commercial sector, because we are trying to see how it is that
adversaries are attacking them.
We have talked to allies about working together in order to
obtain and leverage each other's commercial threat information,
where that is permitted based on the agreements that we have
with the commercial sector.
Working with CISA to ensure that they have access to that
information. That is an example of working with allies and
partners in a way that can help CISA to better have the
landscape and the picture that they need for the work that they
do.
Senator Gillibrand. In the event of a substantial cyber-
attack by China on our domestic infrastructure, what would the
chain of command look like in terms of defense and response?
Director Haines. I think it would depend on--this probably
is not the best question for me, but I think it would depend on
where the response is being conducted and how they are
approaching it. Obviously, the President is the final authority
in any event. But how it would work through the system, I
suspect might have some differences.
Senator Gillibrand. Lieutenant General Berrier, on the same
question.
Lieutenant General Berrier. Nothing to add to that, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. Our Government often talks about how
our allies and partners are our strategic advantage. From the
perspective of China, Russia, and Iran, who are the allies and
partners they are most concerned about building closer
relationships with, and how would building closer relationships
with those countries impact regional deterrence?
As context, I recently took a trip to the Middle East to
study the impact of the Abraham Accords on UAE [United Arab
Emirates], on Morocco, Bahrain, and Israel. With regard to
that, obviously there was concern when Saudi Arabia decided to
engage China in their negotiations with Iran.
What is the impact of being able to bring Saudi Arabia into
the Abraham Accords, in the context of the larger question?
Director Haines. Senator Gillibrand, forgive me. At the
very--I missed the very first part of your question. Can you
just repeat the first sentence--?
Senator Gillibrand. Just that we often talk about how our
allies and partners are our strategic advantage. So, from the
perspective of China, Russia, Iran, who are they most concerned
about?
Then as an example, the Abraham Accords, I think, is a very
strategic partnership for us that should be seen as very
powerful. How did the recent efforts by China to negotiate with
Saudi Arabia and Iran affect that strategic alliance.
Whether that was a powerful strategic alliance we should
have been pushing for?
Director Haines. Yes. So, I think what our analysts would
point to as a general matter would be a whole series of key
countries that are sometimes referred to as hedging states that
are in the space between, as you indicated, UAE is an example
of this in a sense.
There may be others. It is probably easier to talk about
this in a closed session. But there are a variety of countries
where, in effect, they are looking at the United States and
China and Russia on the other side, in effect, and trying to
diversify their relationship in a way that allows them to
maximize their interests. While at the same time pursue sort of
economic and other security strategies in each of these bases.
I would say with Saudi Arabia in particular, and the
Abraham Accords more generally, that we do think there has been
kind of a value of bringing these countries together under
certain circumstances. In that, that interaction has provided
some security benefits to the United States and to others.
But I think each case would have to be looked at on a case-
by-case basis in order to sort of identify what are some of the
pros and cons. Not sure that was very helpful. Apologies.
Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I would say that your
question is a bullseye on the discussion of strategic
competition and what strategic competition is. We know that
China and Russia are seeking partnerships with countries that
have historically been United States partners.
This is the nature of the changing landscape and the
complexity of the environment that I described in my opening
statement. We have to be there, and we have to be a better a
better solution, whether that is through intelligence sharing
or other partnerships.
I don't think it is a lost cause. I think there is a lot we
can do, and I think people see the goodness in what the United
States brings, and we have to go forward with that.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. Thank you both for your appearance. I would
extend my condolences as well to the family of General Stewart,
who was a trailblazing marine. I am surprised it has gotten to
me, the seventh questioner and no one has raised the fact that
Russia's government has accused Ukraine of trying to
assassinate President Putin, and saying that the United States
goaded them into it. Seems like kind of a big deal. Big if
true, as the kids say today. Dr. Haines, what do you have to
say about these claims from Russia's government?
Director Haines. Well, obviously, you have seen the
Ukrainian Government deny their--you know, having engaged in
this. At this stage, we don't have information that would allow
us to provide an independent assessment on this.
Senator Cotton. Okay. General Berrier.
Lieutenant General Berrier. I think it gets after Senator
Sheehan's comment about misinformation.
Senator Cotton. Perhaps some grounds to think that maybe
these claims are exaggerated. One, do we know that Vladimir
Putin doesn't spend the night at the Kremlin all that much? Is
that correct, Director Haines?
Director Haines. Yes.
Senator Cotton. The Kremlin is not like the White House, in
other words. Is not the primary residence of the President of
Russia. Even if you were there, these drones from the videos I
have seen, they do not appear to be the kind of the size of
weapons that could do significant damage to the Kremlin. Is
that correct?
Lieutenant General Berrier. That is correct.
Senator Cotton. They also appear to be the kinds of drones
that would require relatively close line of sight control,
which means someone on the ground in Moscow, which is not known
as an open and friendly city to people who are hostile to the
Russian Government. Is that correct, General Berrier?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Potentially from the photos
that I have seen, yes.
Senator Cotton. In most attacks on Russian soil, Ukraine's
government has been ambiguous or silent about responsibility
for the attacks. Yet in this case, they have explicitly
disclaimed any responsibility. Is that correct, Director
Haines?
Director Haines. Yes.
Senator Cotton. All right. General Berrier, I think you
might have been on to something when you said that this sounds
like misinformation. I want to move on to another matter,
Director Haines, about Mexican drug cartels. They are causing
now more deaths in America than we lost every year in the
Vietnam War, or every year in America than the entire Vietnam
War. In fact, almost twice what we lost in the Vietnam War due
to fentanyl alone. Has the Intelligence Community produced a
national intelligence estimate on the threat that the cartels
pose to America?
Director Haines. No, we have not, sir.
Senator Cotton. So, the NIE [National Intelligence
Estimates] is the most authoritative written judgment on
national security matters. Is that correct?
Director Haines. It is authoritative. I suspect it would
be--yes.
Senator Cotton. Do you have any plans to produce an NIE on
the threat that cartels pose to America?
Director Haines. We do actually have something on our
calendar that is on transnational criminal organizations,
including the cartels in this space.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I think that is warranted, and I
look forward to seeing it. Director Haines, you mentioned
earlier that it will take Russia years to rebuild its ground
forces. I believe you were saying that to express agreement
with General Berrier. Is that correct?
General Berrier, you believe it will take years for Russia
to rebuild its ground forces?
Lieutenant General Berrier. I do.
Senator Cotton. Most intelligence agencies inaccurately
judged the early days of the war. They thought that Russia
would roll into Kyiv very quickly and conquer most, not all, of
Ukraine. General Berrier, was that a result of our intelligence
agencies underestimating the Ukrainians or overestimating the
Russians?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I think it was a
combination of both.
Senator Cotton. Okay. When you are making your own
operational plans, you have to make assessments about the
adversary, correct?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Correct.
Senator Cotton. Okay, and that is true where they operating
at the platoon level or at the national strategic level.
Lieutenant General Berrier. Yes.
Senator Cotton. So, it is fair to say, based on the fact
that we now know we overestimated Russia's capabilities as of
last February, and we have seen their forces degraded to the
point it will take years to rebuild them, that they are a much
weaker fighting force than we thought 14 months ago, right?
Lieutenant General Berrier. That is what we currently
assess, yes.
Senator Cotton. Shouldn't our operational plans about a
potential war with Russia in Europe then be changed to reflect
that new understanding?
Lieutenant General Berrier. I think in the purview of
United States European Command and the Department of Defense,
they are looking at all that, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Yes. They need to urgently because one of
the reasons we have heard on this Committee about the slow pace
at which we are delivering certain weapons is that our
operational plans require it.
If our operational plan in Europe is based on what we
thought Russia was capable of 14 months ago versus what they
are capable now, it badly needs to be revisited. Director
Haines, one final line of questions about Russia. They have
gotten a lot more aggressive toward the United States recently.
We all remember the Black Sea incident in one of their
aircraft downed, an MQ-9 drone. The head of United States Air
Force's Central Command recently said that Russia is,
``increasingly bellicose toward American aircraft in Syria,''
suggesting they even are looking for a fight--they are spoiling
for a dogfight.
In third, the head of European Command, General Cavoli,
recently noted that Russian submarines have gotten more active
in the Atlantic than they have been in years. One, are there
other instances of growing Russian aggression?
Two, what is the Intelligence Community's assessment for
why Russia has grown increasingly aggressive in these ways?
Director Haines. Can we address this in closed session?
Senator Cotton. Sure.
Director Haines. Okay. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you to our witnesses. Director Haines,
in your opening testimony, you said that the Chinese are
growing more and more pessimistic about the United States-China
relationship. What is the source of that growing pessimism?
Director Haines. I would say that there is a number of
factors that are leaning in that direction in the sense that--
we can maybe do a little more in closed session to get to what
the root of this is--but I think they are increasingly
perceiving the sort of zero sum game that I mentioned
effectively in the opening testimony. Where in essence we have
always understood that they perceive themselves, or for the
last few years now, as being on the rise and they perceive the
United States as being on the decline. They ultimately are
concerned about the potential for conflict as we pass each
other, or sort of the classic frame through which they piece
this. The----
Senator Kaine. Is some of the pessimism related to their
perceptions of statements by American political figures?
Director Haines. Sure. I mean, but it is all of the larger
piece, which is to say that I think that they continue to
perceive that they can't do what they want to do without
essentially pushing back on the United States and ultimately
countering us in ways that, you know--and our allies, frankly,
in a variety of different----
Senator Kaine. A great President once said, speak softly
and carry a big stick. I will let my colleagues--we all have
our own judgment about the size of the stick we are carrying or
should. I have noticed on the speak softly side of the
Roosevelt maximum, we have been getting louder and louder with
respect to China concerns.
We had the hearing with the INDOPACOM leadership recently,
and the opening statement is a boilerplate at that hearing. War
with China is neither inevitable or necessary, but then the
remaining hours of the hearing was just one statement after the
next that someone trying to perceive what the intentions were
here might well lead to the conclusion of, wow, you know, we
are more pessimistic because of statements that are being made.
How did, from an intelligence standpoint--I was concerned
at the news that during the Chinese balloon incident, Secretary
Austin tried to call his counterpart and the Chinese
counterpart would not answer the phone. Is that--that was
publicly reported. Is that accurate?
Director Haines. I believe it is. I will tell you that as a
general matter, the Chinese typically clamp down in a crisis
and they don't engage, and that is a classic paradigm.
Senator Kaine. That is a little bit different than Russia,
correct? That even in tough times, at least the lines of
communication between the military to hopefully de-escalate
generally remain open with Russia. Isn't that also the case?
Director Haines. Yes.
Senator Kaine. We want to try to be very strong to deter
war. We want to be prepared to win any war we should need to.
But we would also want to avoid wars based on bad intel. We
have a recent history of getting into a war against Iraq based
on bad intel regarding Iraq's non-existent weapons of mass
destruction program.
But we would also want to do everything we could to avoid
wars based on miscommunication, misunderstanding, unnecessary
escalations. Is that correct?
Director Haines. Yes.
Senator Kaine. As the DNI, what is your current level of
concern about the prospect of getting into unnecessary military
action based upon a miscommunication or unnecessary escalation?
Is that a small concern or is that a concern that worries you?
Director Haines. Absolutely worries me. I mean, I think,
that is part of the job, right, is that we need to be as
vigilant as we possibly can in order to be able to help our
policymakers, our decisionmakers, all of you have a better
understanding of what is actually happening so that there isn't
that kind of unintended escalation or miscalculation.
I think one of the challenges that we all recognize in the
context of our relationship with China is that because there is
that kind of clamp down during crises that we were just talking
about, it puts an extraordinary premium on our capacity to be
able to provide insight on what is happening in those moments.
Senator Kaine. I think that is a wise concern to have. Last
thing I will just say is the unclassified annual threat
assessment that you shared with the Committee was 40 pages
long. Two pages were pertaining to the Western Hemisphere.
I also recently returned from a trip into the Americas, and
the issues there, whether it is fentanyl, whether it is
immigration challenges, whether it is political instability.
But also the fact that our adversaries are investing so heavily
in the Western Hemisphere suggests to me that we ought to be
paying more attention.
Both the SOUTHCOM budget and some other budgetary items
suggest that we are really under-resourcing the region, and
that is something that I will try to work with my colleagues
on. But thanks to the witnesses for your testimony and your
service.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Rounds,
please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me begin
by thanking both of you for your service to our country.
General Berrier, really appreciate 39 years, and especially to
your family. This is a lot of deployments, a lot of time away
from home, and it is truly deployments that are handled not
just by you but by your family as well, and we thank you for
that.
Let me begin with Director Haines. I think Senator Shaheen
began a series of questions regarding 702 and asking for an
explanation really about how it works and so forth. I am just
curious, with regard to our adversaries, do you think that they
believe that there is an opportunity to manipulate or provide
misinformation about some of the programs that we have in this
country?
Has there been evidence that they have tried to manipulate
public information or provide misinformation concerning some of
our more capable programs?
Director Haines. I am trying to think of a specific
instance. There is----
Senator Rounds. I prefer not to use a specific, just not--
because we are in an unclassified discussion, but just in
general, do you think that they believe that they can influence
political decisions here by providing misinformation publicly?
Director Haines. Yes, absolutely. They have typically
engaged in such activities in order to try to influence public
debate on issues that are of importance to them.
Senator Rounds. Section 702 might be one of those as an
example.
Director Haines. Could be. I don't have particular
information that indicates that that is happening.
Senator Rounds. But General Berrier, would there be
assessments made that our adversaries attempt to manipulate or
to influence political decisions with misinformation or
propaganda being provided?
Lieutenant General Berrier. I think it is clear that they
have participated in that activity, and they would take
advantage of any opportunity that might present itself, yes.
Senator Rounds. Section 702 might be one of those programs
that they would provide----
Lieutenant General Berrier. Potentially, yes.
Senator Rounds. Potentially. How about with regard to some
of our military capabilities and some of the challenges that we
sometimes have? It wouldn't be beneath them to try to
manipulate decisions on a public level that would influence our
ability to defend our country, if we had the opportunity. Fair
enough?
Lieutenant General Berrier. I agree with that.
Senator Rounds. Lately, I have been really kind of
following up on the issue of the sharing of spectrum with
regard to areas, particularly in the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz
area. This is the S-band, and I am just kind of curious. We
have a number of different very, very important missions that
rely on that portion of the S-band. Would that be a fair
statement, General Berrier?
Lieutenant General Berrier. It would be, yes.
Senator Rounds. Are you aware of any of the more capable--
defensive capabilities that we have that rely specifically on
radars, communications in that area?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Generally speaking, yes, but I
am not a technical expert.
Senator Rounds. Okay. Fair to say that the Aegis destroyer
systems that we rely on for protecting against air attacks
along our coastlines utilize--I think publicly we have talked
about it already, about the fact that our radars are in that
region.
Lieutenant General Berrier. I think that is fair.
Senator Rounds. Okay. Not just the East Coast and the West
coast of the United States, but Alaska and Hawaii as well.
Lieutenant General Berrier. Yes.
Senator Rounds. But we spent a lot of money specifically in
that particular area. Our adversaries know that. It is a matter
of public discussion. Fair enough.
Lieutenant General Berrier. Fair enough.
Senator Rounds. Right now, there is public discussion about
sharing a large amount of that area, or a discussion about
trying to share or take from the Department of Defense portions
of that spectrum.
Would that be an item of interest for our adversaries, and
would there be an advantage to our adversaries if for any
reason we were to lose that part of the spectrum for defensive
purposes?
Lieutenant General Berrier. I think that would be an item
of interest for our adversaries, and I could see them
potentially trying to take advantage of that discussion.
Senator Rounds. Director Haines, would you agree with that?
Director Haines. Yes.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Let me turn one other area,
Africa. Just really curious. I know that right now China has
been looking at the possibilities of bases in Africa, along the
Atlantic coast of Africa.
What would happen if China were to be able to establish a
base of operations, or for that matter Russia, along the
Atlantic coast of Africa? What would that do in terms of
defending our Homeland?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I think permanent
bases there would give them more reach and more access. As I
think about strategic competition, it is one of those things
that we watch. It is really DIA's job to keep an eye on that
and alert the department if we see that happening.
Senator Rounds. Do you see it happening?
Lieutenant General Berrier. We do see China trying to make
inroads into Africa for sure. We know that they would like to
expand their global bases.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator King,
please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, Mr. Chairman,
I would like to ask unanimous consent that a response from the
Congressional Research Service to a letter that Senator
Sullivan and I sent to them be included in the record.
The research service provided an exhaustive report to us in
response to questions we had on how China invests in national
security, examining the investments of the PRC that most
contribute to the country's power and influence.
I want to thank the CRS team for the work on this. This is
a very informative report. I hope it can appear in the
Committee's records.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[The letter and CRS report can be found in Appendix B on
page 96.]
Senator King. Thank you. Director Haines, I want to talk
about allocation of intelligence resources. Since we have been
sitting here this morning, about 15 people have died in this
country from drug overdoses, just in the last hour and a half.
In about a week and a half, as many as were killed on September
11th.
We are under attack and yet we are not really responding.
We are sort of numb to it, and particularly we had testimony in
a previous hearing that between one and 2 percent of the ISR
resources globally under our control are involved in looking at
the drug importation problem from South of our country.
I think that is a gross misallocation of resources. If this
were a terrorist attack killing 110,000 people a year, we would
be turning this country upside down to counteract it, and to
not be allocating the most basic, important intelligence
resources of ISR in this fight, I think is unconscionable.
I hope that you will go back to the Administration, and
particularly to the Intelligence Community, and say this is a
worldwide threat that is the most immediate threat to American
lives. Can you make that commitment to me?
Director Haines. Yes, absolutely, Senator. I think you know
that, and we have indicated this in other testimony, but the
leaders of the Intelligence Community completely agree with you
that this is absolutely critical. We are each of us involved in
a whole series of efforts to try to expand effectively our
collection and our----
Senator King. Well, I have been asking these questions for
years, and everybody agrees, but I keep saying 1 or 2 percent,
so----
Director Haines. Insufficient.
Senator King.--I am looking for action rather than simply
expressions of concern. General Berrier, do we have any
information that you can share in open session about Chinese
provision of munitions to the Russians in the Ukraine war?
Because in my view, that would change the calculus if suddenly
Russia had an infusion of ammunition and other munitions in
order to counteract the actions of the Ukrainians.
Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, we watch this very,
very carefully, and publicly, China has said that they would
remain neutral in this conflict. We continue to watch them, and
we can discuss it more in the closed session.
Senator King. Thank you. You mentioned in your testimony,
and I notice there is a little subtlety where you said this has
been a bad year for Russia and Ukraine. But then I think in the
next phrase you said, but Russia is very dangerous. What is the
analysis of the likelihood of Putin using nuclear weapons? What
would trigger it and how likely is it?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, there are a number of
scenarios that we have thought through, and I would be happy to
discuss those in a closed session.
Senator King. Well, I think in an open session, though, can
you tell me that whether you think there is some likelihood or
possibility of nuclear weapons being used?
Lieutenant General Berrier. I think, you know, in the
nature of conflict, there is always that possibility. Right
now, I would say we think it is unlikely.
Senator King. Unlikely is good. I would rather hear not
happen, but we can discuss this further in a closed session.
Director Haines. Can I?
Senator King. Yes, go ahead, please.
Director Haines. I think from the IC perspective, it is
very unlikely is our current assessment.
Senator King. Thank you. We can discuss that further in a
closed session. Director Haines, yes or no question, would the
expiration of section 702 be a major compromise of national
security?
Director Haines. Yes.
Senator King. I think you have testified about how
important it is, but I don't think it really comes across that
this is one of the crown jewels of our intelligence capability,
is it not?
Director Haines. Yes. As an example of this, 59 percent of
every PDB, our President's daily brief articles, are sourced to
702 information. It gives you a sense of just how critical this
is. It is utterly fundamental. I could not overState, frankly,
the value of it.
Senator King. I know you struggled with this in your
opening statement, but the problem is the importance of it is
hard to demonstrate to our membership without compromising
classified material. That is the dilemma. I think we have to
accept your representation, which I understand you are talking
for the entire Intelligence Community. This is an essential
element of our ability to protect this country. Is that true?
Director Haines. Yes, absolutely.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator. Senator Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I also would like
to express my condolences to the family and the friends of the
late General Stewart. So good morning to our witnesses and
thanks for the testimony today. The greatest military challenge
that we face is a really a two-front competition, as you have
laid out so well this morning, between China and Russia.
So, I do agree with your judgment that China and Russia
will maintain their strategic ties, which does create great
potential threats. Let's be clear, we have heard you state over
and over again, as we have seen China and Russia advancing,
they are clearly encircling us around the globe. So, China
proclaimed a no limits partnership on the eve of Russia's
invasion. Xi just went to Moscow and affirmed that commitment,
and we watched all of that unfold on our television sets.
Director Haynes, first to you. How has Beijing's assessment of
its junior partner in Moscow changed since the invasion?
Then to you, General Berrier, do the recent joint military
exercises suggest a deeper or deepening military commitment
between the two countries?
Director Haines. Thank you, Senator. So, in terms of how
the relationship has changed, and in particularly China's
perception of it since the invasion of Ukraine. I will say that
even before the invasion of Ukraine, we recognized that China
and Russia were getting increasingly closer and that we were
seeing cooperation across all different sectors.
But to your point, since the invasion, that closeness has
accelerated to some extent, and in part this is due to the fact
that Russia is increasingly beholden to and needs China. China
perceives Russia increasingly as a country that was already in
the sort of little brother role is often how it is described,
but nevertheless is now even more beholden and therefore they
have greater leverage.
That can sort of manifest itself in the context of various
aspects of the relationship, such as in the Arctic, where they
actually have differing interests, where China is not an Arctic
country but wants to be in effect, and wants to have more power
and authority in that area.
Russia recognizes that they are going to need China and
their investment in order to get to some of the resources that
they are interested in the Arctic. As a consequence, that China
sees an opportunity and an increasing one in light of the
current scenario with Russia.
So, we see them now at sort of the peak of their economic
trade, continuing military exercises and other types of
collaboration and political and technical. It is moving even as
we continue to assess from an Intelligence Community
perspective that there are limits ultimately, that they are
unlikely to get to the point of being like NATO allies, for
example, as we see them.
Senator Ernst. Great. Thank you. General Berrier.
Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I would describe it as
deepening and it has been gradual, but the complexity, the
scope, and the tempo of these joint exercises is increasing
mostly in the air domain, in the naval domain. We don't have a
lot of insight into more sensitive activities, but I do believe
that it is deepening and growing.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, and to both of you as well, with
this partnership and the deepening of their military commitment
through exercises and so forth, how can we find a wedge and
really divide the two countries by driving a wedge between
them? What can we find as a strategy to separate those two
powers?
Director Haines. Yes, it is a great question. We have done
some analysis and we can get you a more thorough explanation
rather than my quick remarks. But I would say that we do see
some challenges for them in getting, you know, as they get
closer and closer.
Largely, one can recognize that there is a tension where
there is such an asymmetry in the power of the relationship,
where you can actually use that to some extent to exploit some
of the challenges.
I think that it is unlikely that we will take them really
off the trajectory of continuing to get closer in the coming
years.
Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I believe it is a
really tough problem and it is a great question. In a closed
session, there would be some things that we could discuss.
Senator Ernst. Okay, excellent, and with that, I will yield
my remaining time. Thank you.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. On behalf of the Chairman, I
recognize myself for 5 minutes. Dr. Haines, I do recognize the
importance of the FISA Section 702 authorization. As you noted,
59 percent or so of the information given to the President
daily is sourced to 702. However, Americans do have a
Constitutional right to not be searched without a warrant.
So, despite the efforts of Congress, there have been
reported examples of the Intelligence Community using 702 to
target U.S. citizens. That is not supposed to happen. So, your
own office's annual transparency report estimates that in 2021,
the FBI conducted approximately 3.4 million queries of section
702 acquired data on U.S. citizens.
Clearly, existing safeguards are not enough. I have a
series of quick questions I would like to ask for your
responses. Director, would imposing a warrant requirement
before the Government searches section 702 acquired data for
Americans' communications hamper your intelligence gathering
against malign foreign actors?
Director Haines. Thank you, Senator. So, a few things. One
is 702 is an authority that only permits the targeting of
foreign persons outside of the United States. So just to be
clear, if a U.S. person were to be targeted under 702, that
would be unlawful, and that is something that is noncompliant.
When you talk about the 3.4 million searches that the FBI
did, that is not where they are targeting U.S. persons. So,
what is happening there, is there is about--it is a less than 4
percent of the data that is brought in from FISA that the FBI
is able to search. When they are doing searches, often what
they are looking for is connections that allow them to identify
victims of, for example, cyber-attacks or other things like
that.
So, they are searching through an existing data base to see
if there is a connection that ultimately would allow them to
make that connection. We can talk about this more in in
private--in the closed session to give you greater detail. But
for example, within the 3.4 million, 1.9 million was related to
a particular cyber-attack. So, it just gives you a sense of the
difference.
That is not something that is necessarily--in other words,
it is not something that is subject to a warrant, nor would it
be subject to a warrant per se. But as a general matter, if we
had to seek a warrant for every target of a foreign person
abroad, there is no question it would have an enormous impact
on our work and make it much more challenging.
Senator Hirono. Yes, but with 3.4 million inquiries based
on data collected through an appropriate 702 inquiry of foreign
citizens outside of the U.S. I think there is--there are
concerns.
So, my next question is, would statutory limits and
judicial oversight to prevent the collection and the use of
American's communications and other Fourth Amendment protected
information, hamper your intelligence gathering efforts against
malign foreign actors?
Director Haines. Make sure that I am understanding you
correctly, if you are asking us what are additional reforms
that we would be willing to make? We are absolutely open to
considering reforms. Attorney General and myself wrote a letter
to Congress letting you know that, that is something we would
be happy to discuss.
I mentioned that we have engaged in a number of reforms in
the last few years to try to promote additional oversight, and
we would be happy to talk about whether or not those should
be----
Senator Hirono. I am running out of time. So, there are
concerns about limiting the permissible pool of section 702
targets and also perhaps removing barriers to existing judicial
review.
So, yes, I look forward to working with you. You did
mention in your testimony that you have the foreign malign
influence center, and you noted that China, Russia, and Iran
may be doing things that will interfere with our upcoming
elections.
Can you just give us like an example of the kinds of tools
that would use? Then how do you alert our elections officials
to this kind of interference?
Director Haines. Yes, absolutely, and we actually we do and
did relatively recently an Intelligence Community assessment on
election influence and interference. There is a version of it
that is unclassified that we can--you know that we have made
public as well.
The kinds of things that we look at are, in fact, efforts
by adversaries, including Russia, obviously engaging in
information campaigns or in other types of disinformation work
to try to undermine, for example, candidates or positions or
things along those lines.
We absolutely do share that information both with the
Department of Homeland Security, with FBI, with--and they tend
to be the ones to make the connection directly to the election
officials within the United States. There is a fairly robust,
sort of network that has been developed in order to provide
this kind of information.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. General, thank you very much for
your 39 years of service. I did have some questions for you
that I will submit for the record. I call on Senator Cramer.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Thank you both
for being here and for your service. I had to step out for a
while to take a phone call from a reporter in Grand Forks,
North Dakota.
The reason for the question was, as you know, the
Administration yesterday announced an expansion of scrutiny
over land purchases around military bases. They added, I think,
eight or nine bases in states like North Dakota, South Dakota,
Texas, Iowa, to the 100-mile radius as a highly sensitive base.
In other words, it was given CFIUS [Committee on Foreign
Investments in the United States] jurisdiction within 100 miles
of these bases.
One of them is the Grand Forks Air Force Base, another the
Minot Air Force base. You may recall there was, we had quite a
year last year dealing with a Chinese purchase of some land
near Grand Forks for a wet corn mill facility.
Anyway, all of that, finally, the Air Force said, bad idea,
let's not do it. CFIUS didn't have jurisdiction because it was
only 12 miles from the base. My question isn't to comment
specifically on Grand Forks and cities, but rather is there an
increased intelligence involvement or scrutiny of land
purchases by foreign entities, particularly adversarial foreign
entities?
Director Haines. Yes is the simple answer, in the sense
that over the last many years now, just as a broader context,
and I suspect you already know this, but basically, as we have
enacted tools such as CFIUS, for example, using the Chinese as
an example, they have figured out ways to get around some of
these issues in order to still try to achieve the results that
they are looking to achieve.
We have seen in the mechanisms that on a bipartisan basis,
Administrations have enacted, I think expanding from the CFIUS
statute, for example, to an executive order that allows for the
review of transactions where telecom companies, for example,
are purchasing land and then selling telecom services to U.S.
citizens where that information may be then taken and misuse.
So, there is a variety of examples, I think, of scenarios
in which that issue at least has come up.
Senator Cramer. No, well said. I appreciate it. General,
anything you would want to add to that?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Clearly, a counterintelligence
threat. Senator, you lay that out, and the purview of the DOJ
and the FBI here in CONUS. But from a foreign perspective, we
see this behavior and activity in other countries around the
world. Clearly a huge counterintelligence threat.
Senator Cramer. Great. Thank you. With regard--I want to
comment on Senator King's questions about ISR and the 1 to 2
percent dedicated to specifically to drug trafficking. Is that
a priority--simply a prioritization issue, or do we just need
more capacity to do really good ISR? Because I want to be fair
that 1 to 2 percent isn't very much but do, we have enough in
general to cover all of the things that you have to watch.
Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, every combatant
commander that speaks before this Committee will say the same
thing, that they don't have enough ISR. I think it is a
capacity issue. Certainly, technology can help, advances in
space, and other sorts of sensing capabilities. But it is a
really difficult conversation with our SOUTHCOM partners on how
bad this problem is.
Senator Cramer. Yes. Great. Thank you. I suspected as much,
and you are right, it is unanimous among the combatant
commanders. So, Director Haines, I am going to really shift
gears here a little bit because we are talking about worldwide
threats, and it is easy to keep--to talk about the big ones
that are obvious and always in front of us.
But there are other smaller skirmishes here and there that
I think may not be as significant but still significant. I
would like your take on one in particular, and that is what is
going on in Haiti.
I have a number of friends that are involved in charitable
work. In fact, I am kind of stunned how many friends I have
involved in charitable work, and they are just distraught about
what is going on in Haiti.
Now, Haiti, I don't have to tell you where it is in its
proximity, and it is--maybe you could just tell me a little bit
about what you were seeing in Haiti? What--to the degree you
are able to tell me what you think--what is being done and what
can be done.
These are policy questions, I understand that, but I think
we need to engage a little bit and not just let it fall
because--for obvious reasons. Maybe just expand to the last 30
seconds of my time on that.
Director Haines. Yes. Thank you. I couldn't agree more with
the fact that this is a really vexing issue and one that should
be focused on.
I can tell you that from an Intelligence Community
perspective, we have been looking to try to find ways to
support, in effect, what I understand the policy community is
looking at, which is a multinational force that would try to
address the situation both from the perspective of training
police and also to sort of try to manage the violence that has
erupted and the gang control of territory in this area.
I will say briefly that, first of all, we have a lot of
analytic products. I am happy to provide you what I think is
the best that we have on this. But it is--none of it is
optimistic, which is to say that this is a really challenging
situation and it does not look as if it is going to get better
any time soon.
Senator Cramer. So, if I might, General, I mean, are there
security concerns in addition to just the moral and ethical
concerns?
Lieutenant General Berrier. I think there are security
concerns, and moral and ethical concerns. When I look at it, it
is sort of the loss of credibility in the government and
government's instutions, their ability to provide services, a
terrible economy, a population at risk.
Then and at the same time, this rise of these organized
criminal elements that seem to be taking over and challenging
the security forces. So really a perfect storm, and I think in
our hemisphere, we are paying attention to that.
Senator Cramer. Thank you both.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Senator Warren,
please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, cryptocurrency
is now the method of choice for countries to evade sanctions so
that they can fund weapons programs, support spying, and
promote cyber-attacks.
Crypto crime is hidden, but we know that in 2022 alone,
there was over $20 billion in illicit transactions. We also
know that Russia, Iran, and North Korea moved around at least
$8 billion using crypto.
So, let's focus for just a minute on North Korea. This one
country stole a record breaking $1.7 billion. According to the
U.N. Security Council, North Korea uses its crypto crime to
fund its nuclear weapons development.
General Berrier, you lead the Defense Intelligence Agency,
which collects intel on foreign militaries, including on North
Korea. When North Korea launders billions of dollars? worth of
crypto and funnels it into its nuclear program, does that
threaten our national security?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Certainly, Senator, as North
Korea steals that money and then tries to turn it into a legal
tender, which at great cost, as you know. That is helping them
build their nuclear capacity and that is a threat that we
recognize.
Senator Warren. Thank you. So, Director Haines, earlier
this year, the United States Intelligence Community, which you
lead, put out its annual threat assessment in which you
identified North Korean cryptocurrency heists as part of, and I
am going to quote you here, ``sophisticated and agile
espionage, cybercrime, and attack threat.'' So, let me ask you,
does a sophisticated and agile espionage, cybercrime, and
attack threat undermine our national security?
Director Haines. Yes, absolutely, and just to pull it
apart, to say that it is not just--although obviously the
funding is critical. It is not just the funding of essentially
nuclear programs that the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of
Korea] may have involved in, but it is also posing a cyber-
threat to important networks. That is part of what it is that
we see as a national security threat.
Senator Warren. Thank you. So, let's move to another
example. A 2021 study found that nearly 5 percent of the
world's Bitcoin mining takes place in Iran. The biggest crypto
mine in the country is run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps and is backed by Chinese investment. How much sanctions
evasion are we talking about here? Well, one crypto exchange
alone, Binance, has processed $8 billion worth of Iranian
transactions since 2018. So General Berrier, when the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps uses crypto mining to replace revenue
that they lose through sanctions, does that threaten our
national security?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I think it certainly
threatens our U.S. Forces in the region. Cryptocurrency,
Bitcoin is one method of how they finance their operations, so
I think it is certainly a component of that, yes.
Senator Warren. Okay. Thank you, and I am going to do one
more and get one more example in here, and that is Russia,
because Russia is ransomware central. The most prolific and
dangerous ransomware gangs are thought to be run by criminals
in Russia.
Russia affiliated ransomware gangs have stolen from
American schools, American hospitals, American power stations,
and American businesses. Director Haines, do you know what
portion of ransomware is paid in crypto?
Director Haines. So, we assess that the vast majority of
modern ransomware operators demand cryptocurrency, and when
those demands are met, they probably are paid in that form.
But part of the challenge for us in terms of identifying
specifically how much is being used--you know, is using
cryptocurrency, is that we just--all ransomware incidents or
payments aren't reported or documented----
Senator Warren. Fair enough, fair enough. But when the
HSGAC Committee, Homeland Security Committee, put out its
report, it said basically it is 100 percent. Does that sound
about right to you? This is a business model built on crypto,
is it not?
Director Haines. Yes, I mean--the vast majority, I think
over 90 percent, is perfectly reasonable.
Senator Warren. Okay, and then, General Berrier, does the
fact that ransomware gangs in Russia and around the world are
using crypto to demand ransoms from American hospitals and
schools and power stations and businesses, does that threaten
our national security?
Lieutenant General Berrier. I believe it does, Senator,
yes.
Senator Warren. You know, I appreciate this. I appreciate
your answers. You know, just think about what we are talking
about here. North Korean nuclear weapons. Iranian sanctions.
Russian ransomware. Drug trafficking. Human trafficking. Some
of the major threats to our national security are facilitated
by crypto.
That is why Senator Roger Marshall, and I will soon
reintroduce our bill to crack down on illicit crypto activity.
Our bill is not about SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission]
regulation or cracking down on crypto investor scams, although
I think we need to do that.
Our bill is about law enforcement and national security and
keeping our country safe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Thanks, both of you for
being here. Xi, in the last 12 months, has given a variety of
speeches that he is preparing the Chinese population for war.
What should we take from that? How do you each of you assess
that?
Lieutenant General Berrier. So, as we listen to Xi Jinping
and his style of communication, he has been on a long-term
campaign to oversee China's rise. Now that he is in his third
term, we see his rhetoric picking up. I believe that there are
a number of dates out there that mean different things to
different people. We have talked about 2025, 2027, 2035 and
2049. I think the bottom line is he has told his military to be
ready. For what, we are not sure. When, we are not sure. DIA
watches this very, very closely and we evaluate closely every
word that he says and where he goes in his speeches.
Director Haines. Thank you. Just to add, but certainly
agree with everything that General Berrier said. I think we
continue to assess that he would prefer to achieve unification
of Taiwan through peaceful means, but the reality is that he is
and has directed his military to provide him with the military
option, essentially, to be able to take it without concern of
our intervention.
That is something that will have a meaningful impact on his
capacity to do so and also his decisionmaking, presumably.
Senator Scott. Do you assess the position the American
economy would be in with our dependance on communist China if
they did decide to invade Taiwan and we decided to come to
Taiwan's aid? What impact would that have on our economy?
Director Haines. Yes. So, obviously we can't provide
precision because the scenario will matter when it happens. All
of those kinds of things would be critical to actually
providing an assessment.
But it is without question, and there have been studies
done by external think tanks and others on the impact, the
economic impact that an invasion of Taiwan would have on the
global financial economy.
I will say that because TSMC [Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Company], the manufacturer of semiconductor chips
on Taiwan, if that is blocked, it will have an enormous global
financial impact that I think runs somewhere between $600
billion to over $1 trillion on an annual basis for the first
several years on the global financial economy is the general
estimate.
Because those chips, those advanced chips are--and over 90
percent come from Taiwan and they are in almost every category
of electronic device around the world, and so therefore, until
we would be able to sort of make up the difference, they would
have this enormous impact.
It will also have an impact on our GDP [Gross Domestic
Product] if there were such an invasion of Taiwan and that was
blocked. It would also have an impact if they start making
chips on China's economy, and I think that is another aspect of
this and in fact a more significant impact on their GDP if they
were unable to get those.
Senator Scott. You want to add anything?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Just that I think watching the
impact that--the economic impact on Russia as they have invaded
Ukraine with the sanctions. Not an exact an comparison, maybe
apples and oranges, but I think it gives us an idea of how to
model this when it happens or if it happens.
Senator Scott. What is your assessment of risk in Latin
America? Senator Cramer talked about Haiti, but we know Cuba is
a State sponsor of terrorism, and they have allowed our
adversaries to be in Cuba.
Maduro is doing the exact same thing in Venezuela. So, what
is your assessment of the risk of bad actors being in Latin
American? What is the risk that Communist China is going to be
able to open up military bases in Latin America?
Lieutenant General Berrier. For the time being, I would say
the risk is moderate. We do see Chinese and Russian actors in
Central and South America, something that we watch very, very
carefully. We have a consistent messaging campaign through our
defense attache network in Central and South America to talk
about why this is a bad deal for them. We watch it carefully. I
don't think they are very, very close to acquiring full up
operational bases in Central or South America right now.
Senator Scott. Anything you want to add? All right. What is
your assessment of the commitment that Germany has to make sure
that--they will do everything under their power to make sure
Ukraine succeeds in a war against Russia?
Director Haines. I think, honestly, that Germany has
exceeded our analysts' expectations prior to the war, for
example, in terms of its commitment to providing support to
Ukraine. We have seen them be actually a stalwart ally on this
issue, and yes, moving forward.
Lieutenant General Berrier. Nothing that on that.
Senator Scott. All right. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Peters,
please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to both of you for your testimony here today and for
your service to our country.
Director Haines, the proliferation of cameras, commercial
satellite imagery, and social media have helped create an
environment where open-source intelligence is often one step
behind, but sometimes a step ahead from traditional
intelligence gathering efforts.
The buildup of Russian forces as they prepared to invade
Ukraine was well documented. With both domestic and foreign
observers able to confirm troop and vehicle movements, even
identify entire units who were moving to the front.
I was also taken by article by the Modern War Institute at
West Point that talked and some quotes from some intelligence
operators. They were talking about, of course, the intense need
for intelligence as this war was progressing, and in this
saying, ``we were collecting only a fraction of what was
needed.
This was not a surprise with the largest war in Europe
since World War II occurring. Intelligence capabilities were in
high demand. This did not, however, diminish the frustration of
walking out of the scif, turning on our phones, and gaining
access to more and more relevant open-source content than we
had actually at our workstations.''
Open-source intelligence has uncovered fields of Chinese
nuclear silos, new PRC shipyard activity, the buildup of PRC
troops along the front in India. In short, open-source
intelligence seems to be democratizing the intelligence field,
and I want to make sure that we are adequately prepared to
harness this activity.
So, my question for you, and General, if you have comments
on those too, is what changes must the IC community make to
ensure that the United States is maintaining a strategic
advantage in espionage and intelligence gathering, particularly
as these new technologies are coming on board and are
democratized, and our adversaries and others have access to
this information as well. How are we thinking this problem set
through?
Director Haines. Yes, it is a multi-dimensional issue,
right? This is something that has been a big focus. I know
General Berrier will have a lot to say because the Defense
Intelligence Agency does a lot in the open-source sort of space
for the Intelligence Community. But first of all, we are in a
position where really every element has a version of open
source that they are working on.
However, we are not in a position where we feel as if the
entire Intelligence Community is leveraging sort of the best of
what we can do in this space yet, and that is something that we
have been focused on.
We have done a study to look at how we can improve our
efforts, how we can leverage each other's efforts in this
space, and you will hear from General Berrier about what DIA
does. But also, how we can invest in it in a way that supports
essentially what we collect clandestinely and, you know, allow
us to bring together the two sources of information so that we
can provide a complete picture that is more insightful than
what you might get from open source.
But at the same time to recognize that there is value in
actually using open source to help to reveal a picture of what
is happening in different places and share that with the world.
At the same time, on the flip side, and just mentioned two
things that I think are worth noting is that we are very
conscious of the fact that in this area we have to be extremely
careful about how we approach privacy and civil liberties
issues.
One of the issues that we know has been of concern for many
Members of Congress is how we deal with, for example,
commercially available information. That is, for example,
information that we may purchase as part of our efforts to
engage in open source, and trying to make sure that we are
developing sophisticated policies and frameworks to ensure that
we are handling that information appropriately.
When we collect it, collecting it appropriately in these
places. Finally recognizing that spyware and our adversaries'
access to open-source information also makes them far more
sophisticated in their capacity to target and to from a
counterintelligence perspective affect us. That is something we
are also looking to try to manage and to counter appropriately.
Senator Peters. Great. Limited time, General, but I want to
hear your thoughts.
Lieutenant General Berrier. Yes. Just briefly. Senator, I
think open source is kind of the new frontier for the
Intelligence Community, but it is also a bit of a wild, wild
west. So, in my role as the intelligence enterprise manager for
the Department of Defense on open source, what I have to make
sure is that the DOD entities that are doing open-source
collection and analysis are not getting ripped off from the
data sources and how much they pay.
That we have the right tools and right training, the right
tradecraft so that we can go forward to make sure that open
source and its richness augments everything that we do on the
sensitive side for a more fulsome picture of what is happening
out there in the world. I appreciate that question. Thank you.
Senator Peters. Thank you, General.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator
Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much. Director Haines,
what is your assessment of Iran's seasoned its second tank, oil
tanker in a week in international waters?
Director Haines. Sir, can we take that in closed session? I
think there is something to be said, but--yes.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much. General Berrier,
SOUTHCOM Commander has been stating for years that Chinese
influence in Central and South America is increasing and we are
at risk of losing our status as a partner of choice for many
critical allies in the region. I just spent a lot of time down
in Panama. Do you agree with this assessment? If so, what
impact would this loss of status have on the safety and defense
of the Homeland?
Lieutenant General Berrier. I do agree with General
Richardson, and I believe that we should be doing everything
that we can to talk to our partners and allies down in Central
and South America about the value that the United States
brings.
Senator Tuberville. Director Haines?
Director Haines. Completely agree.
Senator Tuberville. Same thing. Do we see an imminent
threat in that area?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Not an imminent military
threat, but I think there is a reputational threat. There is an
economic threat because they bring their resources quickly. I
think we have to be insightful in thinking through how we beat
that.
Senator Tuberville. All right. Direct Haines, I am
concerned about--we are all concerned about the rise threat of
terrorism, especially since the debacle in Afghanistan. In
March, General Kurilla told this Committee that in his
estimation, ISIS-K could do an external operation against the
United States or Western interests abroad in under 6 months
with little or no warning. Do you agree with this assessment?
Director Haines. Yes. One of your colleagues raised this
earlier. I would have to check with our analysts to see if they
still agree with that. There have been some developments, that
we can talk about in closed session, since that statement was
made that I think could affect the timeline. But I agree that
ISIS-K remains intent on looking to do external attacks.
Senator Tuberville. General?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I think our line is
something like 6 to 12 months. I am not disagreeing with
General Kurilla's analysis or his team down at CENTCOM.
Sometimes at different points we might see it slightly
different, depending on where we are at and what we are looking
at.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. I yield my time.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for being here today. Good to see you here and the really
thoughtful answers. I want to build a little bit on what
Senator Scott was talking about in countering the rising
Chinese influence. So, Director Haines, of course, we know in
recent months, China has rapidly increased its engagement
around the world.
This includes brokering, actually trying to broker
troubling agreements between--to reestablish diplomatic ties
between Iran and Saudi Arabia, offering to broker peace deals
between Ukraine and the Russian aggressors. So, these
incidents, they highlight China's persistent presence and
intention to exert its influence and match the United States as
a global power.
So how can the United States address China's increasing
involvement in global diplomatic matters? Can we expect to see
more countries try to turn to China as a mediator? What do you
think the implications of this pivot would mean to us?
Director Haines. Thank you, Senator. It is very thoughtful
question. I think, obviously, China's engaging in international
fora in and of itself is not a challenger problem. It is how
they engage and the way in which they use that engagement to
actually undermine, for example, global norms and the
international order in the way that we have designed it.
We have spent quite a bit of time in the Intelligence
Community trying to map out how they are approaching their
engagement in international fora in order to do just that.
I would say that this is a place where we have been looking
at their efforts to essentially sort of garner influence and
change the direction of international organizations so as to
support their particular approach to global norms, which is
more aligned with an authoritarian system.
You look at organizations such as the ITU or the
International Telecommunications Union, and other places where
I think there have been concerns about China's influence and
efforts in those spaces.
That is something I know the policy community is focused on
trying to manage. I think another aspect of it is, as you
rightly point out, their effort to try to create coalitions. I
would have to say that in that area we have seen them have
mixed success.
You know, there is sort of things like the 17+1 forum and
other things like that that they have tried to do, where
because they took quite a bullying approach to trying to get
other countries to do what they wanted to do, it actually
backfired to some extent on them, and they weren't able to
engage in as much influence as we thought. There are yet other
variations on the theme that I think are important to our work
moving forward. Maybe General Berrier has more.
Senator Rosen. Yes.
Lieutenant General Berrier. I believe China is trying to
enhance its reputation on the global stage. When I look at the
examples that you gave, we are a key security partner with the
Kingdom, and we are a key security partner with Ukraine.
We also have influence, and we are in discussions with
those partners every single day on really tough issues. I think
whether those are military diplomats and the defense attache
service, or the work that our State Department is doing, we
have got a great message.
Senator Rosen. Well, I want to build on this because
China's gaining a hold in the Middle East. They want to gain a
hold there. Our partners in the region, they want to hedge--
they may want to hedge what they could perceive as America's
diminishing global engagement.
So, building on what you are talking about, how does the
United States, how do we reassure our allies and partners in
the Middle East, but more broadly, that we will remain a force
for stability and security and steadfast with them in the
region?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Even though our military
commitments have come down in the central region, U.S. Central
Command is still very active in this area. We have a forward
headquarters in Qatar.
We have deployed forces there still, and it is not a large
number, but they are they are actively there. We have
longstanding relationships with these partners, and so, it is
our ability to continue to communicate with them, to
demonstrate American resolve in the region, and to bring what
it is that the U.S. brings.
Senator Rosen. Director, anything? No. Yes, we had a recent
trip there, and I think that was the biggest concern from at
least the Abraham Accord countries that we visited, that we
would remain steadfast in the region.
Speaking of the region, I only have 33 seconds left, so I
will just ask this for the record, but I really want to talk
about Iran and Russia, their defense cooperation, how concerned
we are about the sale of Russian aircraft and air defense
systems to Iran.
I will take that off the record as I only--unless you can
answer in about 30 seconds, I will just--we know what Iran is
seeking from Russia.
Lieutenant General Berrier. Certainly. I think this is a
relationship of convenience at the moment, and I think the
Iranians are gaining some benefit for providing munitions, UAVs
[Unmanned Aerial Vehicles], and such to the Russians. We are
watching it very, very carefully, and we will see where this
relationship goes.
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Mullin,
please.
Senator Mullin. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Director
Haines and General, for being here. I am going to--I am just
going to make a quick question about, I believe it is
pronounced Vagner, but I believe the media pronounces Wagner
Group all the time. I am going to hold out most of these
questions for actually the closed session.
But right now, we see--I mean, in my opinion and I would
like to get your opinion. In my opinion, Putin is using the
Wagner group to kind of do his bidding around, literally around
the world.
They are--and in my opinion, truly my opinion, they are
acting more like a terrorist organization than they are a
malicious group or a contracting group when they are in sowing
instability, supporting groups, spreading lies, exporting
critical minerals around the world, pressuring governments to
distance themselves from us.
Would you describe their behavior as more acting, more like
a terrorist group, Director Haines?
Director Haines. Yes, I would absolutely support the
perspective that Wagner is actively working in ways that is
actually driving tourism, particularly in the continent of
Africa, for example. That is an example of what you are
describing.
Senator Mullin. General.
Lieutenant General Berrier. It is a really interesting
question. When you look at their business model, how they try
to build security in nations and conduct paramilitary
operations and support those nations, there are some atrocities
that have been reported and committed. I don't know that I
would go as far as calling them a terrorist organization right
now. I would have to----
Senator Mullin. No, I wouldn't--I am not, I am saying
acting. I was very careful in saying acting. I am not calling
them a terrorist organization. I am saying acting more like
that----
Lieutenant General Berrier. Certainly, you could draw a
conclusion like that, yes.
Senator Mullin. So, and we see, their behavior is they
typically go into these countries that are in disarray and they
offer to provide security for organizations. Would you agree
that is kind of how they get their footing in these countries,
a lot of times?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Certainly, along with business
opportunities to be developed.
Senator Mullin. Right. Now, I want to switch my gears real
quick to China. According to some open sources, China now is
controlling the inner river that runs through Argentina in
South America, and is charging tariffs, taxes in the name of
the PRC for goods being shipped in and out. We also see that
they have influence basically in all of South America except
one country. General, you said that we are fighting back with
information.
But it seems like those countries are in more need of
infrastructure in dollars, which is what China is investing.
Are we winning or losing in South America with information,
technology, and providing the good deeds that Oklahoma does--
not Oklahoma, but the United States does?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Well, certainly, I know that we
are talking to our partners about this issue every day. Whether
we are winning or losing, hard for me to judge that. I am not
tracking this river in Argentina where they are collecting
taxes, but I do know where there is infrastructure, ports,
airfields that they can buildupon, that they will take
advantage of that business enterprise.
Senator Mullin. So, are you familiar with the influence
that they have, the strong influence that has grown over the
last 10 years in Central and South America?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Yes, I am.
Senator Mullin. Are you familiar with the only country that
they are currently don't have a foothold in South America? I
find it--and I am not--General, I am not--this isn't an, I got
you, question because I honestly feel like you and I have been
developing a friendship over the last couple of years.
But I do find it somewhat concerning because that
information is not hard to find and it is nothing that requires
being read in on. It is concerning to me when I have such a
strong influence in Central America, which is growing, but in
South America, we are losing.
I would say we are not too far off from losing control of
the Panama Canal, too. I believe you would probably agree with
that in some sense. If course doesn't correct pretty quick,
they are going to control the main shipping lanes through
there. Would you agree?
Lieutenant General Berrier. I would say that that certainly
requires U.S. attention for sure, yes.
Senator Mullin. That would play right into the role of the
Belt and Road Initiative, to which China is trying to get all
the world depended on.
Lieutenant General Berrier. Yes.
Senator Mullin. So, is information enough or should we be
looking at this in a different strategy to correct course?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Ranging into the policy sector
there. Certainly, the more that we can bring, the better, for
sure.
Senator Mullin. Well, we need that information. I think the
American people need to know what threat is really knocking on
our back door and why it is a threat. It is not just rhetoric.
It is something that--extreme concern. I would say China is
trying to fulfill what Stalin said, trying to destroy America
from within, and that slowly, slowly choking us out. With that,
I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Mullin. Senator
Budd, please.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. General, Director, thank
you both for being here and for your service as well. I would
like to focus on the INDOPACOM AOR [area of responsibility] for
just a little bit. Director Haines, in this year's annual
threat assessment, it states expanded military postures by both
India and China along their disputed border elevates the risk
of armed confrontation between two nuclear powers. What do you
assess is the risk of India and China's border dispute erupting
into a conflict?
Director Haines. It is not insignificant, and this is on
the line of actual control between----
Senator Budd. Correct.
Director Haines.--Indian and the Chinese border, as you
indicate. China has been building up its infrastructure along
the border and continuing to increase their presence. We have
seen, eruptions at different times, but we have obviously been
working with India in order to try to ensure that we are
supporting them and their efforts to manage this.
Senator Budd. Thank you. General, the buildup that the
Director just referred to along the line of actual control.
What assistance, if any, is DIA providing to our Indian
partners?
Lieutenant General Berrier. We have, through USINDOPACOM,
joint intelligence team there, have reached out to our Indian
partners. We have a relationship with them, and we are
attempting to support their needs.
Senator Budd. Thank you. Director, just last week, the
Chinese accosted a Philippine Coast Guard ship, as many of us
are aware of. I mean, it appears that these are becoming more
and more frequent. So, are these negligent or intentional
encounters? What is the IC's assessment of the purpose of China
doing this?
Director Haines. Yes. We actually have some very good
products on this that if you are interested, we should get to
you. But this is----
Senator Budd. If you would, please.
Director Haines. What we have seen with China is they have
expanded significantly their coast guard over the last many
years. They have also begun to use their coast guard in new
ways. So, in other words, they pass laws that allow them to use
their coast guard to police, in effect, what they perceive as
being their rightful waters, and to use even force under
certain circumstances.
So, no, I do see this as part of a larger comprehensive
effort that they have engaged in. There are sort of three
different pieces to it. There is the ships that they use that
are part of militia that are not actually part of the coast
guard or the PLA.
Then there is the coast guard, and then there is the PLA,
and the relationship that they have with each of these
different sort of forces is related and sometimes intersects.
Senator Budd. Thank you, and a question for both of you, if
you would. Director, we will start with you. What is your
assessment of the Chinese military's ability to conduct a
cross-strait amphibious assault of Taiwan? They have now
effectively practiced a blockade, but are they ready for a
major amphibious landing? Director first.
Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, we can----
Senator Budd. Director first, and then if you are referring
us to the closed session--if there is anything you can share in
this setting, please do.
Senator Budd. Yes, I would honestly defer to General
Berrier on their capacity and probably would do it in a close
session.
Senator Budd. Understood. Director, any comments on that?
Lieutenant General Berrier. I would just say a very, very
complicated military operation. We have we have observed
exercises where they review the points on an operation like
this, and we can provide more detail in a closed session.
Senator Budd. Thank you, and one final question for you,
General. So, DIA's China military power report came out in
2019, so it is 4 years old now. If a new version was published
today, what would the top line changes be? How has the military
balance of power changed in Asia over the last 4 years?
Lieutenant General Berrier. I think we would probably start
describing the advances that they have made in every domain of
their military capability in the short 4 years. They have
really advanced some of those capabilities.
We talk about space. We talk about their nuclear--expanded
nuclear capacity, and we would probably also talk about their
expanded reach throughout the Indo-Pacific and some of those
things that we were talking about before, like the maritime
fishing police and the coast guard, and those actions.
Senator Budd. Thank you, both, again for your time and for
your service. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd. Senator Schmitt,
please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Haines,
I want to ask you, the CBP has reported that thousands of
Chinese nationals have come across the Southern border. An
increase of about 800 percent, I think is the most recent
estimate. I guess the question for you is, what are some of the
factors causing this?
Director Haines. Thank you, Senator. I don't have a full
answer to that. Why don't I get you that in writing, in
response?
Senator Schmitt. Okay. I am not trying to trip you up here,
my hope would be that the Intelligence Community has some idea
why we are seeing this increase.
Director Haines. Yes, we have done some analysis on this. I
have taken a look at it. They went back to look at more
questions and I would rather give you a full answer on that.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. That is fair, and so, I guess I will
ask you, and if it is the same answer, I understand. But do you
expect or are you anticipating an increase in the number of
Chinese nationals seeking to cross the Southern border?
Director Haines. Yes. I would rather give you the full--
what I have seen is that it went up in than it seems to have
gone down a little bit is my recollection, and so unclear what
the trajectory is, and I think we should give you something----
Senator Schmitt. Okay. My concern obviously with Title 42
expiring, has accounted for about 50 percent of all the
expulsions I think, is very concerning if this is an
intentional effort by the CCP to send assets across our
Southern border.
I think the American people deserve to know what is
happening and I don't think we do. It is a very concerning
development, and it is ongoing, and we have seen an increase.
My concern is again, giving one of the tools that has been
useful in sending people back is going away and we need to be
prepared for that.
I guess switching gears, and this could be for either one
of you, but I will start with you, Director Haines. During the
disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, billions of dollars?
worth of valuable equipment were lost or left behind, I should
say, in addition, of course, to the brave servicemen who lost
their lives.
But just to put that in perspective, there was $48 million
worth of ammunition, 80 aircraft, 23,000 Humvees, 250,000
automatic rifles, 95 drones, 42,000 pieces of sensitive
military equipment, including night vision goggles. How have
the Taliban utilized this? What do we know? Have they been
selling this to adversaries? Where is all this equipment and
how is it being used?
Lieutenant General Berrier. Largely our understanding is
that the Taliban have organized their security forces, that
they have fallen in on this equipment. I haven't seen a lot of
reporting that would indicate that they are selling it. I think
they are trying to incorporate it into whatever security force
they develop.
Senator Schmitt. Do you have anything to add to that,
Director Haines? Okay. I do want to ask about an after-action
report on the withdrawal from Afghanistan that obviously was a
total mess.
What are your plans to provide an unclassified after-action
report here? I think there are only some Senators who have been
able to see it, but I think that given the nature of this--and
there has been some public reporting that--about what is out
there, that seems to just sort of blame the previous
Administration.
I mean, I think this was one of the more disturbing
failures in at least modern history. What are your plans to
have sort of an accounting of this, of what went wrong, and
make sure this never happens again? Or do you have plans to do
that?
Director Haines. Not from the Intelligence Community. We
don't have any plans to provide an unclassified after-action
report on Afghanistan. I don't--I can't speak----
Senator Schmitt. Well, I guess, and I will just close with
this, and I don't--this is not a partisan statement. I just--
the idea that what happened in Afghanistan, the fact that the
American people have not, to this point, gotten an actual
thorough review of an after-action report of what went wrong
and how we can make sure this never happens again is deeply
concerning.
So, this question isn't just for you. It is being asked of
other people and we will continue to do that. But I just think
for the memory of the men and women who were lost, all of the
equipment that I mentioned, it was just a total debacle and we
have got to do better, and make sure it never happens again.
So, I suppose we will be working with you to figure out
what information you can provide to more fully inform the
American people. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. I have been informed
that Senator Sullivan is en route. So, I will take the
opportunity to further ask a few questions and give him the
opportunity to get here, but it won't be indefinite.
One of the issues that we are facing is the, as was
mentioned before, the proliferation of media, virtual media,
and now what is approaching is the next great step, AI. Do you
have any concerns that AI will disrupt our life dramatically,
and that there are steps that we should start contemplating
now?
I know the Administration has announced yesterday that they
are taking steps to protect AI. In terms of the Intelligence
Community, how are you doing this, Director Haines?
Director Haines. Yes, thank you very much, Senator. I do, I
think you are wise to be focused on this and that it will have
disruptive impact. We have been writing some analysis to try to
look at what the potential impact is on society in a variety of
different realms, and obviously see some impact in intelligence
activities that we would be happy to talk to you in closed
session on.
But what we also recognize is that we do not yet have our
hands around what the potential is, and what we have been doing
in the Intelligence Community, there have been many elements
have themselves put together task forces, experts who are
looking at these issues, who are trying to understand in
particular the impact of generative AI, as you have noted it.
We have been trying to facilitate groups of experts in the
IC to essentially connect with those in the private sector who
are on the cutting edge of some of these developments so that
we can make sure that we understand what they see as potential
uses and developments in this area as well.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Just a quick question,
listening to the discussion about the withdrawal of
Afghanistan. Most of that equipment and supplies were committed
to the Afghan army, and that was a planned commitment. That was
not leaving, deliberately leaving equipment behind. That was
the tactical equipment for the Afghan army, which we all hoped
would continue to function. Is that correct?
Lieutenant General Berrier. That was always the plan at
those Afghan cores that we stood up and trained----
Chairman Reed. That plan was developed in the Trump
Administration after the Doha agreement?
Lieutenant General Berrier. That is correct.
Chairman Reed. Then also in terms of--I think I agree,
obviously, that it has to be public, but we should all be aware
that the Congress and this Committee authorized a commission to
study the entire situation in Afghanistan over the 20-year
period.
That commission is at work today and it will publish the
results and those results will be available to the public.
There might be some classified material, but it will be
available to the public. So, thank you. Senator Sullivan,
please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this open. Appreciate the witnesses being here. DNI
Haines, I want to just follow up a little bit first, quickly,
on the AI piece. Did you happen to read the very long and
insightful piece by Henry Kissinger and Eric Schmidt, the
Google founder and senior MIT professor on AI? Did you read
that?
Director Haines. I know exactly what you are talking about,
and it is on my pile, but I have not yet read it, so I
apologize.
Senator Sullivan. Yes, I would strongly recommend, take a
look. I think it is such a big topic. The Economist has a whole
focus on it today. There is all these great opportunities. You
know, Henry Kissinger still going at it. I think he turned 100
or he is turning 100 here very soon. Incredible mind. He brings
some insights that are very chilling to the uses of AI and what
it could mean, particularly on the national security front.
I think it would be good for you guys to do a deep dive on
this and come back to the Committee. We are all trying to
figure it out. You have tech companies saying it is the best
thing since sliced bread. You have other people saying it is
going to doom the world.
But I think putting the tech companies fully in charge, I
don't think it is a good idea either. So, we really need your
guy's insight, and I think it would be good if you can come
back to the Committee, either classified or unclassified on
that topic.
Take a look at that piece. So, it is really well written
and pretty scary, to be honest, and these aren't people who are
prone to be Pollyannish. Let me turn to my----
Director Haines. I will do that.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Let me turn to my favorite
topic, energy. I always like to recount this story. It is now
quite a sad story because some--I am sure you know, Vladimir
Kara-Murza was in jail for 25 years, unjustly sentenced. I hope
we can keep beating the drums to tell Putin to let them out.
All he was doing was speaking the truth about democracy and
freedom in Russia.
A very courageous man. I was in a meeting with him a number
of years ago. Just me, him, and Senator John McCain. I asked
him what was the most important thing we could do to undermine
the Putin regime, the kind of mafia grip that he has on his
society, and the danger he presents to the world. Vladimir
Kara-Murza looked at me and said, it is easy, Senators, it is
an easy answer, produce more American energy--produce more
American energy.
That is what Russia fears. So, can you talk about two
things? One, is Russia's attempt to use energy as a weapon--
they are pretty good at it. Now, we have blunted it to some
degree, and then two, on the flip side, I read the Intel a lot
about what the Chinese leadership thinks, what Xi Jinping
thinks. They are very scared of American energy dominance. Very
scared. So, can you talk about that as well?
I know, I think it is some of the products you guys have
produced, and then maybe I know you don't provide policy, but,
you know, we do have this kind of element in American society,
and to be honest, in the Biden administration, and some of my
colleagues in the Senate who are like, oh my God, we can't
produce any more oil and gas. That is horrible, climate bomb.
No offense, it is ridiculous, right.
We need oil and gas for decades to come. Places like my
State, Alaska, have the highest standards in the world aren't
producing it. If we are going to need it, we should produce it,
not let Russia and Venezuela and hell Saudi Arabia.
So, any thoughts on that, too? I am talking all energy. I
love renewables, but we need oil and gas. Now, people close
their eyes and scream climate bomb, and we can't produce in
Alaska.
They have no idea what they are talking about, and you guys
do. So please enlighten us because, and don't be political
here. I know the Biden administration--you are an independent
operator. John Kerry, and everybody, they go around the world,
oh, my God, quit by an American LNG. These people are idiots,
and they are undermining our national security.
The facts are there. China is fearful of American energy
dominance. Putin wants to use energy as a weapon, and the best
way to do it as Vladimir Kara-Murza's advice to me and John
McCain, produce more American energy.
That is how you undermine Putin and scare the Chinese. What
are your thoughts on all of those very important topics that
the media gets wrong, the far left puts its head in the sand
on? We need factual analysis on this really important topic
from you.
Director Haines. Thank you, sir. I know how passionate you
are on these issues and knowledgeable. So, I won't be
political, that is for sure. But I also won't touch on policy.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. You don't have to.
Director Haines. It is not my role.
Senator Sullivan. That is not your role.
Director Haines. But I will say, absolutely. The
Intelligence Community believes that Russia uses energy as a
weapon. I know that doesn't come as a surprise to you. That is
something they have continued to try to do during the course of
the conflict. In fact, you know, is part of their calculation
for invading Ukraine.
One of the things that we know that they were focused on
were the high energy prices for Europe and how that would
affect essentially, in their view, Europe's calculation on
sanctions. They turned out to be wrong, which I am quite glad
about. In any event, that is certainly a part of the picture, I
think.
From the Chinese perspective, I would tell you that an area
that we have spent a lot of focus on is on actually China's
efforts to try to control global supply chains that relate to
clean energy production and work. That is a place where we see
them very consciously looking to try to control the global
supply chains related to the critical minerals that are
relevant to clean energy work. We have some really interesting
analysis on that and happy also to provide that to you, if it
is useful. Maybe leave it at that, and I don't know----
Senator Sullivan. Yes, and General, if you don't mind.
Sorry, Mr. Chairman, just a follow-on question. It is related.
We did ask in the NDAA last year our military to look at
options, in the event of a conflict with China to choke off oil
and gas supplies to them. Our navy could do that, and if you
have any thoughts on that, or maybe we should talk about it in
a classified setting.
Lieutenant General Berrier. I do have thoughts, Senator. To
start on Russia weaponizing energy, I think they have used it
as a carrot and stick, right. So, they have really made it
painful for our European partners early in the war.
Then they offered it to other partners, nefarious partners,
for nefarious reasons, to acquire more military hardware. So,
your comment about weaponization, I think, is really, really
accurate. I don't disagree with you that China fears us, about
our potential for energy production increase.
I think they fear a lot of our economic power all the time.
To the point in the NDAA, I think those really are in the
purview of the INDOPACOM team and their planning efforts as
those proceeds, and then we can talk more in the closed
session.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Graham.
Chairman Reed. We have a vote going on, for the benefit of
my colleagues. I would suggest that we reconvene in SVC-217 at
12:15 p.m., giving an opportunity to reorganize a bit. I will
at this point adjourn the open session and we will reconvene at
12:15 p.m. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
extremism's role in unauthorized disclosures
1. Senator Hirono. Director Haines and Lieutenant General Berrier,
Federal investigators found Airman Teixiera, who is accused of posting
highly classified documents online, has a deeply troubling history of
racist and violent remarks. Though certainly not the norm, it is an
example of the devastating consequences unaddressed extremism in the
military can have on our national security and our global alliances. It
is clear we must do more to counter the threat of extremism within our
Armed Forces. What is the threat domestic extremism poses to national
security?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
has a foreign intelligence mission and analyzes domestic extremism
threats in very narrow circumstances where there is a foreign
connection or the DIA Director--or one of the four Deputy Directors to
whom the Director has delegated this authority-has determined that
there is an imminent threat to a person's life or physical safety. Even
when there is an imminent extremist threat or nexus to DOD inside the
U.S. homeland, DIA analyzes the threat jointly with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI). Given DIA's very limited authorities regarding
assessing the threat posed by purely domestic extremism, we defer to
the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security for an assessment as to
the threat such activity poses to our broader national security.
section 702
2. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, would imposing a warrant
requirement before the government searches Section 702-aquired data for
Americans' communications hamper your intelligence gathering against
malign, foreign actors?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
3. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, would statutory limits and
judicial oversight to prevent the collection and use of Americans'
communications and other Fourth Amendment Protected information, hamper
your intelligence gathering efforts against malign, foreign actors?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
4. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, would limiting the permissible
pool of Section 702 targets to those who might reasonably have
information about foreign threats stop you from your intelligence
gathering efforts against malign, foreign actors?
5. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, would removing barriers to
existing judicial review mechanisms, already established by Congress,
prevent you from conducting your intelligence gather against malign,
foreign actors?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
pacific intelligence needs
6. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, there are enormous Intelligence
Community workforce needs in Hawaii. For one example, the Army has a
PED Center on Oahu that needs to hire approximately 700 professionals.
This is why Private Public Partnership Programs to develop on island
cyber and intelligence talent is so important. How is the Intelligence
community working with INDOPACOM to meet the intelligence needs of the
priority theatre?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
7. Senator Hirono. General Berrier, how is the Defense Intelligence
Agency using artificial intelligence and machine learning to make this
intelligence collection and analysis more efficient?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
unidentified anomalous phenomena (uaps) over hawaii
8. Senator Hirono. General Berrier, Hawaii is physically closer to
many of our adversaries than the continental United States is, and in a
small geographic area, houses some of the Nation's most critical
military infrastructure. This makes Hawaii a unique target for foreign
surveillance--from satellites, surveillance balloons, and so called
unmanned anomalous phenomena, or UAPs. Are these UAPs a fairly common
occurrence, and do they pose a surveillance threat?
Lieutenant General Berrier. There is no question Hawaii-and the
state's national security and military infrastructure--is a priority
for foreign intelligence and surveillance activity. However, Hawaii
currently has less UAP activity compared to other locations in the
United States because of Hawaii's relative geographic isolation. The
airspace over Hawaii is ``less-cluttered.'' In Hawaii, military,
Federal, and State agencies partner to monitor all aerial and space-
based activity including UAPs near the State and traversing U.S.
territories.
damage of aggressive rhetoric on china
9. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, Chairman Milley, in his
testimony expressed his concerns about ``overheated'' rhetoric with
respect to China and the potential for war over Taiwan. I share the
Chairman's concerns. War is not inevitable. Do you agree with General
Milley that we need to be disciplined in our messaging with respect to
China and, especially, Taiwan?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, how does China react to such
rhetoric?
Director Haines.
climate change and environmental degradation
11. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, it is clear climate change
contributes to global instability. Environmental disasters can weaken
government institutions, cause migration, and force communities to turn
to illegal activities to survive. As climate change intensifies, what
additional national security challenges do you see it causing for the
U.S.?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
china's attempts at influence in the pacific
12. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, your annual threat assessment
states ``China faces a myriad--and in some cases growing--domestic and
international challenges that probably will hinder CCP leaders'
ambitions. These include an aging population, high levels of corporate
debt, economic inequality, and growing resistance to ``heavy handed
tactics in Taiwan and other countries.'' How do you believe these
challenges will affect China's military buildup in the coming years?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
13. Senator Hirono. Our network of allies and partners is the
greatest asymmetric advantage we have in the long-term strategic
competition with China. This network is sustained by mutually
beneficial cooperation on issues not merely pigeonholed to defense. How
have the Chinese reacted to these initiatives?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
aba-compliant scifs
14. Senator Duckworth. One challenge Americans may face when
working in the Intelligence Community is the inaccessibility of
sensitive compartmented information facilities or SCIFs. In last year's
NDAA, I secured report language that asked the Department of Defense to
report on the remediation of those SCIFs to achieve compliance with the
Architectural Barriers Act (ABA), improve worker safety, and fully
capitalize on the talent and crucial warfighting skills resident across
the full spectrum of American society. Can you comment on how important
it is to design and build SCIFs that are ABA compliant and why is it
important for the Intelligence Community to include Americans of all
abilities?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. DIA is committed to accessibility and
safety for all, and DIA always strives for excellence in SCIF design,
development, and construction for our global and diverse workforce. DIA
actively seeks to create and advance a safe, compliant, inclusive and
accessible work environment, and improve DIA SCIFs across the globe.
DIA's Inclusive, Diversity, Equity, and Accessibility strategic plan
specifically addresses the requirement to have an accessible,
physically, and psychologically safe workplace for officers with
disabilities. Designing and building accessible SCIFs ensures that DIA
can attract, recruit, accommodate, and retain employees with critical
skills-vital to DIA's mission success. DIA also seeks to attract
individuals with disabilities to join the agency, and SCIF and
technology improvements are essential to accommodate talent resident
across the full spectrum of American society.
DIA continues to expand physical and information
technology accessibility to address the expected 2-4 percent annual
increase of persons with disabilities and/or persons with targeted
disabilities. Buildings that are accessible allow for more equal, and
hopefully equitable, access for officers with various abilities.
DIA strives for facilities that are flexible and
adaptable, providing employees and visitors with disabilities equal
opportunities. Inaccessible facilities can profoundly impact
individuals with disabilities; limiting their ability to access
information, engage on various platforms, and participate fully in the
work environment.
DIA also is increasing efforts to attract neuro-diverse officers
which may require facility and workspace adjustments. DIA is adopting
industry lessons learned to improve the employee experience of recently
onboarded neuro-diverse officers. Our facilities, engineering, IT, and
human resource experts also are working with other IC partners to
develop an optimal employee experience and to promote retention of
officers with disabilities. So far, our experience demonstrates that
some neuro-diverse officers need such things as isolated workspaces and
adjusted lighting for optimal performance.
15. Senator Duckworth. Please describe any efforts currently
underway to ensure current SCIFs are ABA compliant and future SCIFs are
designed with ABA-compliant features.
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. DIA's Office of Facilities and Services
oversees all new construction and renovated spaces and guarantees that
the DIA workspace meets the proper specifications and equipment (such
as, clearances, turn radius, hallways widths, furniture sizes,
lighting, etc.) required for personnel with and without disabilities.
DIA is committed to Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and ABA compliance as
fundamental to workforce needs and safety. Each year, DIA's
congressionally funded resources for facilities and logistics is
required to maintain, update, and replacing aging facilities, ensure
Federal compliance, and renovate workspaces for safety and
accessibility. Our commitment to excellence also requires facility,
engineering, IT, security and human resources experts to collaborate on
new construction as well as refurbish exiting workspaces to meet
employee and mission needs.
New facilities projects and construction I All DIA new
facility projects-including furniture reconfiguration and major or
minor construction-are designed to meet ADA and ABA requirements.
DIA architects, engineers, and facilities experts also
review, consider, and include workforce accommodation requirements
during both the design and construction phases.
DIA's Fiscal Year 2024 Military Construction Project
(MILCON) request for DIA Headquarters Annex at Fort Belvoir recently
incorporated accessible phone booths for officers with disabilities.
DIA's Ombuds Office--in partnership with human resources and diversity
and inclusion experts-are working with the DIA MILCON leads to consider
other workspace and accessibility needs at the future DIA facility.
DIA is attuned to current and future workforce needs, and
we expect modifications to aging and existing facilities to increase.
Employees also can request additional workspace requirements-beyond
standard ADA and ABA code. DIA is responsive to these additional
requests identified by our DIA Equal Opportunity and Diversity experts.
In these cases, the modifications-including construction and equipment-
are eligible for special funding and independent, ad hoc renovation.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
huawei
16. Senator Rosen. There have been news reports in the past year
highlighting efforts by Huawei and foreign government-owned companies
to build telecommunications infrastructure near ICBM fields and United
States military installations and training ranges, for collection
purposes, which may possibly pose a threat to U.S. Forces, tactics, and
systems.
Director Haines, can you discuss the threat this infrastructure
poses and how you are mitigating these threats?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
china-russian relationship surfaces and gaps
17. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, what are the friction points
between China and Russia? Please provide an unclassified answer to the
extent possible; please provide an additional classified answer if
necessary.
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
18. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, how can the United States
exploit these friction points? Please provide an unclassified answer to
the extent possible; please provide an additional classified answer if
necessary.
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
russian forces in the east
19. Senator Ernst. General Berrier, has the war in Ukraine weakened
Russia's ability to defend its borders? Please provide an unclassified
answer to the extent possible; please provide an additional classified
answer if necessary.
Lieutenant General Berrier. The Russian military's ability to
rapidly respond to multiple simultaneous threats on its borders
probably has degraded because of personnel and equipment losses in
Ukraine. Moscow is likely to need to reconstitute its ground forces.
During the Ukraine conflict, Russian ground forces have suffered a
significant number of casualties, with at least 50,000 killed and
180,000 wounded. These figures include airborne troops' attrition-a key
force for quick reaction operations to suppress border instability.
Additionally, Russia has suffered over 10,000 vehicle losses, forcing
Moscow to use older and less modem variants.
Conventional Weapons. Russia maintains conventional air-,
sea-, and ground--launched cruise missiles as part of its escalation
management strategy to defend its borders, along with its capable
integrated air defense system. However, Russia has likely employed much
of its pre-war inventory of cruise missiles over the course of the war
in Ukraine.
Vagner Insurrection. On June 23 and 24, several thousand
Vagner private military company (PMC) armed convoys and personnel
crossed from bases in Ukraine into Russia, meeting minimal resistance
from Russian border guards-demonstrating vulnerabilities in Russia's
border security. The Vagner forces subsequently took control of the
Southern Military District headquarters in Rostov-on-Don and advanced
within 200km of Moscow before Vagner owner Yevgeniy Prigozhin ordered
his forces to halt.
Internal Security Forces and Border Security. Russia
retains its internal security forces and their capabilities-such as the
Border Service and the National Guard-to maintain Russian borders.
These forces are responsible for and capable of responding to most
traditional cross-border threats. However, Russia's security forces
alone probably are unable to repel a heavily armed conventional force,
based on the recent successful Ukrainian cross-border operations into
Russia.
Nuclear Capabilities. Russian nuclear doctrine allows for
Moscow to use nuclear weapons if the regime faces an existential
threat--e.g. jeopardizing the Russian state's existence and threatening
the regime's survival. This situation could arise if a conflict
escalated and Moscow perceived its adversaries seek to inflict
unacceptable damage on Russia.
20. Senator Ernst. General Berrier, does Russia's ability to defend
its borders make them insecure about Chinese border aggression? Please
provide an unclassified answer to the extent possible; please provide
an additional classified answer if necessary.
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
military lessons learned
21. Senator Ernst. General Berrier, what are the most important
military lessons China has learned through observations of modern war
tactics employed in Ukraine? Please provide an unclassified answer to
the extent possible; please provide an additional classified answer if
necessary.
Lieutenant General Berrier. Beijing almost certainly has strategic,
operational, and tactical lessons from its observations of Russia's war
in Ukraine, which Chinese government and military commentators have
discussed publicly. For example, in May, Peoples' Liberation Army's
(PLA) Western Theater Commander General Wang Haijiang, told a PLA
newspaper that the Ukraine war showcases that modem warfare is a
contest of overall national strength. General Wang Haijiang further
explained the view that the military domain is intertwined with
``battles in political, financial, technological, cyberspace, and
cognitive areas.'' PLA observations of Russian failures in Ukraine
probably have reinforced China's existing tactical and operational
concerns about the PLA's capabilities.
Beijing's military campaign planning-including a Taiwan scenario--
probably has assisted leaders in seeing the critical need to enhance
secure communications and increase stockpiles of precision--guided
missiles and drones.
22. Senator Ernst. General Berrier, have any of these lessons
learned affected China's planning for an invasion of Taiwan? Please
provide an unclassified answer to the extent possible; please provide
an additional classified answer if necessary.
Lieutenant General Berrier. The PLA almost certainly is seeking to
apply lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine conflict to a potential
Taiwan campaign. PLA texts have acknowledged publicly that a Taiwan
invasion could become a protracted conflict, a concern which Russia's
Ukraine invasion could exacerbate. The protracted Ukraine conflict
almost certainly conflicts with Beijing's desire to force quickly
Taiwan's capitulation and minimize the invasion's cost. Beijing also is
concerned that military opposition as well as economic and diplomatic
repercussions, could jeopardize unification or China's regime
stability.
23. Senator Ernst. Director Haines and General Berrier, has China's
replication of Russian influence operations, especially in their use of
online personas, been assessed to be a purposeful assumption of their
tactics, techniques, and procedures?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
deterring china
24. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, has the West's response to the
War in Ukraine given China pause about invading Taiwan?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
25. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, how does Ukraine's fate affect
China's political calculations to invade?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
chinese map updates
26. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, the Economist recently reported
that the Chinese Ministry of National Resources has re-issued an order
to add the Chinese-names to eight Russian locations on Chinese maps,
including the city of Vladivostok. Do you believe that the re-issuing
of this order is intended to signal Chinese re-interest in this lost
territory?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
27. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, do you believe that the timing
of this re-issued order is significant?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
people's liberation army's lack of joint experience
28. Senator Sullivan. General Berrier, late last year the National
Defense University published a study that examined the backgrounds of
more than 300 senior People's Liberation Army officers. It identified a
complete lack of joint military experience amongst those officers. The
study suggested that the lack of perspective beyond that of their own
service could make these officers less effective when conducting joint
operations. Chinese military modernization includes a focus on
conducting joint operations but it seems their senior military
leadership does not have Joint experience as we would define it. What
are your thoughts on how a lack of joint experience amongst the PLA's
senior leaders might impact its ability to conduct joint operations in
a conflict?
Lieutenant General Berrier. As of summer 2023, the PLA conducting
joint military operations in a real-world conflict has not been
observed. China's top military command is composed of current or former
army officers, and only a third of these individuals have prior joint
command experience. The PLA is developing joint command capabilities,
with a focus on military modernization and refining command and control
systems. Since 1999, Beijing has prioritized PLAjoint capabilities
through large-scale force structure reforms-including the Joint
Operations Command Centers establishment-and professional military
education enhancements. The PLA also has implemented cross-theater
training initiatives and exercises with foreign partners. The PLA also
is expanding joint duty rotations for its officers, even though most of
these opportunities occur relatively late in their careers. PLA
officers, without sufficient joint experience, are likely to be less
adept at planning and executing service-level maneuvers and joint
operations to achieve integrated operations and objectives. We expect
the PLA's joint experience to advance as bureaucratic acceptance
increases, with personnel transitions, and as joint doctrine is
refined.
russia and china's weaponization of energy
29. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines, Russia's failed attempt to
weaponize Europe's reliance on Russian energy exports to coerce our
partners into loosening its support for Ukraine has pushed it closer to
its ``no limits'' partner, the PRC. Before the war, Russia monitored
PRC investments in its country out of fear its participation in the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) would supplant its own led ``Eurasian
Economic Union.'' Now, Russia is welcoming Chinese investment in ports
and energy projects along the Northern Sea Route. Chinese financers
provided up to 60 percent of the capital for Russia's Yamal liquefied
natural gas project terminating in the port city of Sabetta on Russia's
northern coast. The project is considered the ``crown jewel'' of
Russia's investments in the Northern Sea Route and could produce up to
926 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas from the South Tambey
field. In the last year, the PRC has become the largest importer of
Russia oil. Last month, the PRC imported a record high quantity of oil
from Russia's Arctic. Do you see Russia and China continuing to deepen
ties on Russian energy exports to China?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
30. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines, do you see Russia and China
deepening ties on Chinese investment in port and energy infrastructure
projects along the Northern Sea Route?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
31. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines, how might Russia and China's
deepening economic ties impact our security interests in Europe and the
Indo-Pacific?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
32. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines, Russia relies heavily on
revenues from oil and natural gas, which in 2021 made up 45-percent of
the country's national budget. Since February 2022, Russia has
unsuccessfully sought to weaponize its energy industry to erode our
European partners' support for Ukraine. This failure is in a large part
due to United States companies boosting shipments to Europe by 137
percent in 2022 and providing 50-percent of Europe's liquefied natural
gas supplies along with 12-percent of its oil. Can you describe the
national security implications had the United States been unable to
help offset European energy needs formerly supplied by Russia?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
33. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines, would Russia have had
significant leverage over Europe and forced our NATO allies to make
some hard choices for their citizens if the United States was unable to
increase energy exports to Europe after February 2022?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
APPENDIX A
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APPENDIX B
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