    [Senate Hearing 118-676]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 118-676

                               WORLDWIDE THREATS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 4, 2023

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    60-709 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman

    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York		DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut		TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii			MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia			JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine		DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts		KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan		RICK SCOTT, Florida
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois		MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada			TED BUDD, North Carolina
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                  	ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri

    		    Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
      		John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                             C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                  may 4, 2023

                                                                       Page

    Worldwide Threats................................................     1

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     1

    Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker.............................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Haines, The Honorable Avril, Director of National Intelligence...     4

    Berrier, Lieutenant General Scott, Director, Defense Intelligence     9
      Agency.

    Questions for the Record.........................................    49

                                   Appendix A

    Submitted Statement of The Honorable Avril Haines--Annual Threat     56
      Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

                                   Appendix B

    Senator Sullivan and Senator King Letter and CRS Report..........    96

                                     (iii)

                               WORLDWIDE THREATS

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 4, 2023

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
    room G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
    Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
    Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, and Schmitt.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Good morning. Before we begin today, I would
    like to take a moment to acknowledge the passing of General
    Vincent Stewart this past weekend. General Stewart was an
    inspiring, trailblazing marine who served the Nation with honor
    for more than 4 decades, rising from a tank platoon leader all
    the way to director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
        He committed himself entirely to the defense of our Nation,
    and his leadership will continue to be felt throughout the
    Marine Corps and the DIA for years to come. My thoughts are
    with his wife, Phyllis, and his children and family.
        Now turning to today's hearing, the Committee meets this
    morning to receive testimony on the worldwide threats facing
    the United States and our international partners. I would like
    to welcome Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, and
    Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DNI), Lieutenant
    General Scott Berrier.
        Thank you both for joining us, and please convey the
    Committee's gratitude to the men and women of the Intelligence
    Community (IC) for their critical work. As the DNI's annual
    threat assessment makes clear, the United States faces threats
    from a number of State and non-State actors, as well as health
    and environmental security challenges.
        Among these wide-ranging issues, there is a common
    understanding that the future of our national security is tied
    to the success of our strategic competition with China. This
    competition is occurring across every field of national power,
    military, economic, political, technological, and more.
        Of course, every region of the world. For several decades,
    the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has studied the United
    States way of war and focused its efforts on countering our
    advantages. China has invested in offsetting technologies like
    anti-access and area denial systems, artificial intelligence
    (AI), hypersonics and, of course, nuclear weapons.
        Further, the PRC [People's Republic of China] has leveraged
    a combination of military and civil power against its
    neighbors, including statecraft, economic pressure, coercion,
    and deception. Beijing has sought ways to achieve its national
    objectives while avoiding a direct confrontation with the
    United States military.
        As the Defense Department's new joint concept of competing
    puts it, China seeks to win without fighting. The strategy
    warns that if we do not adapt our approach to compete more
    effectively, the United States risks ceding strategic
    influence, advantage, and leverage, while preparing for a war
    that never occurs. Indeed, the document warns that the United
    States could lose without fighting.
        Just as China's leaders have studied our way of war, we
    need to study theirs. With that in mind, I would ask our
    witnesses for their assessments of how China is evolving in
    competitive strategies and objectives.
        I would also appreciate an update on what military and
    nonmilitary factors are most likely to impact Chinese
    decisionmaking with respect to a potential coercive action
    against Taiwan and our other regional partners. Even as we
    compete with China, we must address Russia's violent
    destabilizing activities.
        Ukrainians have fought with incredible courage and skill to
    repel Russia's assault, defending the same values and freedoms
    that we cherish. Ukraine has achieved some very notable
    successes, but there is hard fighting ahead.
        Let there be no doubt the United States will continue to
    help Ukraine succeed on the battlefield. America's assistance
    to Ukraine is also an investment in our own national security.
    I want to commend the leaders of the Intelligence Community for
    their skillful release of intelligence throughout this conflict
    that has routinely exposed Russia's intentions and aided
    Ukraine's warfighters. Intelligence officials are
    understandably cautious about revealing hard won insights on
    adversaries, but this strategy has proven highly effective in
    strengthening the international community's response and
    creating dilemmas for Putin.
        This is a great example of competing effectively in the
    information domain, and I hope we will continue to make use of
    this kind of creative tradecraft. With that in mind, Russia's
    initial strategy in Ukraine was an abject failure, and the
    Kremlin's objective seemed to be changing. Director Haines,
    General Berrier, I would ask for your assessment of the Ukraine
    conflict in the larger context of the evolving international
    order.
        I hope you will also address the extent to which Russia and
    China are aligning under their so-called no limits partnership
    and potential implications for United States national security.
    Finally, nations like Iran and North Korea continue to push the
    boundaries of military brinksmanship and issues like terrorism
    and climate change remain persistent.
        Iran has made concerning advances in its nuclear programs
    and is reportedly seeking Russia's help to make even further
    gains. Its proxies continue to mount drone and rocket attacks
    throughout the Middle East, including against bases in Iraq and
    Syria with a United States Military presence.
        North Korea has conducted nearly two dozen missile tests
    this year, including ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic
    Missiles] and cruise missiles, and has reportedly stopped its
    routine military to military communications with South Korea.
        I understand it is the Intelligence Community's view that
    climate change will continue to exacerbate risks to U.S.
    national security as issues like rising temperatures, poor
    water governance, pollution, changing precipitation patterns,
    and other climate effects are likely to lead to an array of
    human challenges such as food and water insecurity, and threats
    to human health.
        I would appreciate our witnesses' perspectives on each of
    these complex challenges. Thank you again for your
    participation, and I look forward to your testimony. As a
    reminder for my colleague, there will be a closed session
    immediately following this hearing in room. SVC-217. Now let me
    turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker. Senator.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER

        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    congratulate you on your statements concerning the threat we
    see from China and Russia. Also, I want to join you in
    observing and memorializing the life of General Vincent Stewart
    and his untimely death, and I want to thank our witnesses for
    being here today. It comes at a pivotal time.
        The United States is confronted with the most complex and
    dangerous global security environment since the Second World
    War. Our adversaries are growing in their military capabilities
    and engaging in provocative and destabilizing behavior across
    the spectrum of competition and conflict.
        They are actively trying to displace the United States as
    the global leader and weaken longstanding and critical
    alliances and partnerships. We are at an inflection point. The
    decisions we make this year will have far reaching implications
    for the United States military, whether it is properly
    positioned and equipped to deter our adversaries, and if
    necessary, to defeat them in conflict.
        Regrettably, the President's Budget Request lacks the
    urgency this moment requires and fails to make the necessary
    investments in our Nation's defense. For the third year in a
    row, the budget request cuts defense spending. Make no mistake,
    our adversaries are taking notice, and I do believe on a
    bipartisan basis, we will rectify this failure.
        Our foremost adversary, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
    is in the midst of an unprecedented buildup of its
    conventional, strategic, and asymmetric military capabilities,
    under the direction of its most powerful and ruthless leader
    since Chairman Mao. At the same time, Vladimir Putin's brutal
    and unprovoked attack against Ukraine has entered its second
    year and has upended global security, caused untold loss of
    life, and further isolated his autocratic regime.
        Now is not the time to question our commitment to Ukrainian
    partners. To protect United States interests, we need to
    provide Ukraine with the tools it needs to bring this war to a
    successful conclusion. Not to be outdone, North Korea may now
    possess enough missiles to overwhelm our Homeland missile
    defenses, and Iran inches closer to developing a nuclear weapon
    of its own while it continues to sow chaos across the Middle
    East through its terrorist proxy network.
        Additionally, President Biden's disastrous and chaotic
    withdrawal from Afghanistan has emboldened terrorist networks
    around the world. ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and al
    Qaeda affiliates across the Middle East, Africa and South Asia
    are re-constituting their capabilities and remain intent on
    killing Americans.
        I am deeply disturbed by the scope and severity of the
    recent disclosure of classified materials and the impact such
    disclosure has on military operations, intelligence collection,
    and cooperation with key allies.
        Although I understand multiple investigations are ongoing,
    I expect this Committee will be kept fully informed when
    details become available and corrective--as a corrective
    actions are taken. This Committee deserves answers on how such
    a junior servicemember in a support role was able to access,
    print, and post online highly classified documents for over a
    year without detection--for over a year.
        We need to understand whether the Department of Defense's
    (DOD) insider threat and security procedures failed or simply
    were not followed. Again, I thank the witnesses for being here.
    I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and look forward to a very important
    discussion.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Thank you very
    much, and let me now recognize Director Haines.

        STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE AVRIL D. HAINES, DIRECTOR OF
                         NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

        Director Haines. Thank you very much, Chairman Reed,
    Ranking Member----
        Chairman Reed. Could you bring that microphone close as
    possible?
        Director Haines. Is that better?
        Chairman Reed. That is.
        Director Haines. Okay. Good deal. Sorry about that. No, and
    thank you very much for your kind words about General Stewart,
    who really was just an extraordinary leader in the Intelligence
    Community and somebody who has inspired a lot of our folks over
    the years and brings together sort of integrity and skill in a
    way that's quite rare and extraordinary.
        I am thank you for the opportunity to be here today
    alongside my wonderful colleague, General Berrier, and for your
    steadfast support for the men and women of the Intelligence
    Community who serve our country. I am grateful for the
    opportunity to present the annual threat assessment, and we
    just want to acknowledge the many people who have contributed
    to this work, from the collector to the analysts to everyone in
    between.
        This assessment is a product of their effort, and they have
    our gratitude. This year's report notes that during the coming
    year, the United States and its allies will face an
    international security environment dominated by two strategic
    challenges that intersect with each other and existing trends
    to intensify their national security implications.
        First, great powers, rising regional powers, and an
    evolving array of non-State actors are vying for influence and
    impact in the international system, including over the
    standards and rules that will shape the global order for
    decades to come.
        Second, challenges that transcend borders, including
    climate change, transnational criminal activity, health and
    human security, and economic needs made worse by energy and
    food insecurity, as well as Russia's invasion of Ukraine, are
    intensifying as the planet emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic.
        Further, compounding this dynamic is the impact that
    rapidly emerging technologies are having on governance,
    economies, communities around the world. The intersection of
    these challenges underscores the importance of working together
    with partners and allies to address the threats we face, and
    how critical it is to counter efforts to undermine the global
    norms, principles and mechanisms that promote and underpin
    national--transnational cooperation, which is an implicit theme
    in this year's threat assessment.
        The report starts with the People's Republic of China
    (PRC), as it is increasingly challenging the United States
    economically, technologically, politically, militarily, and
    from an intelligence standpoint around the world.
        I will spend most of my time on China and Russia, which are
    among our top priorities, and focus on updating our views with
    the latest rather than repeating what is in the annual threat
    assessment. We assess that the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP,
    under President Xi Jinping, will continue efforts over the next
    year to achieve Xi's vision of making China the preeminent
    power in East Asia and a major power on the world stage.
        What is perhaps most concerning is that the CCP is
    increasingly convinced that it can only fulfill Xi's vision at
    the expense of United States power and influence, and through
    tools of coercion, using demonstrations of strength, as well as
    economic and political coercion, to compel governments to
    acquiesce to the CCP's preferences, including the land, sea,
    and air claims in the region and its assertions of sovereignty
    over Taiwan.
        The relationship between the United States and China has
    consequently become more challenging. Xi's public reference to
    America's suppression of China in March of this year reflects
    his longstanding distrust of United States goals and his belief
    that the United States seeks to contain China.
        Xi's speech was the most public and direct criticism that
    we have seen from him to date, and probably reflects growing
    pessimism in Beijing about China's relationship with the United
    States, as well as his growing worries about the trajectory of
    China's domestic economic development and indigenous technology
    innovation, which he now seeks to blame on the United States.
        Even as the rhetoric has become more heated, we continue to
    assess that Beijing wants to preserve stability and avoid
    triggering additional technology restrictions or sanctions from
    the United States and our partners, as they seek to narrow the
    gap in their economic and technological competition with us.
        Perceiving the United States as a threat, the PRC seeks to
    undercut United States influence, and is looking to portray the
    United States as the root of global problems. China seeks to
    divide us from our allies and partners, frame United States
    actions as provocations that provide a basis for planned PRC
    aggression, which they then claim are simply responses, such as
    China's expansion of its military presence surrounding Taiwan,
    which the PRC asserted was in response to President Tsai's
    recent transit through the United States, as well as her
    meetings with two speakers of the House over the past year.
    China's leaders are focused on spurring domestic economic
    growth this year, but in the long run, spurring indigenous
    technology innovation is paramount.
        President Xi remains confident that Beijing can innovate
    its way to the technological frontier, regardless of United
    States and allied restrictions, and that doing so will give
    China the competitive advantage that is crucial to achieving
    his vision for China as a world power.
        Nonetheless, we are likely to see more dissonant messaging
    and actions coming out of Beijing, such as the recent charm
    offensive by Premier Li Keqiang, welcoming foreign direct
    investment at the China Development Forum juxtaposed against
    Beijing's pressure on foreign firms and executives, including
    investigations of United States firms and a clampdown on
    previous non-sensitive data flows out of China.
        The IC [Intelligence Community] assesses that China's long
    term economic growth will continue to decelerate, because
    China's era of rapid catch-up growth is ending, and structural
    issues such as debt, demographics, inequality, overreliance on
    investment, and inadequate domestic consumption remain.
        Although the CCP may find ways to overcome its structural
    challenges over the long term, in the short term, it continues
    to take an increasingly aggressive approach to external
    affairs, often to bolster its domestic agenda.
        China's leaders are increasing their investment in a world-
    class military. Expanding their country's nuclear arsenal and
    cyber threat capacity, pursuing counterspace weapons capable of
    targeting United States and allied satellites. Forcing foreign
    companies and coercing foreign countries to allow the transfer
    of technology and intellectual property in order to boost
    indigenous capabilities. Continuing to increase global supply
    chain dependencies on China with the possibility of using such
    dependencies to threaten and cutoff foreign countries during a
    crisis.
        The CCP is also seeking to reshape global governance in
    line with Xi's preferences and governance standards that
    support the monopoly of power within China, and expanding
    influence operations, including through the export of digital
    repression technologies.
        Furthermore, we have observed the expanding strategic ties
    between China and Russia. As mentioned by the Chairman, another
    critical priority for the IC, which has been strengthened by
    the conflict in Ukraine.
        We are now over a year into the war, which is reshaping not
    only Russia's global relationships and strategic standing, but
    also our own. Strengthening our alliances and partnerships in
    ways that President Putin almost certainly did not anticipate.
    Often precipitating the very events he hoped to avoid, such as
    Finland's accession to NATO and Sweden's petition to join,
    while also increasing Xi's leverage over Putin.
        On the battlefield, the fighting is principally focused on
    the East around Bakhmut and Avdiikva and remains a brutally
    grinding war of attrition, in which neither military has a
    definitive advantage with day to day fighting over hundreds of
    meters. Russian forces gained less territory in April than
    during any of the three previous months, as they appear to
    transition from offensive to defensive operations along the
    front lines.
        Russian forces are facing significant shortfalls in
    munitions and are under significant personnel constraints but
    continue to lay minefields and prepare new defensive positions
    in occupied Ukrainian territory. Both sides are focusing on
    preparations for a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive this
    spring or summer designed to push Russia out of illegally
    annexed territory.
        The Ukrainian armed forces are still finalizing the
    specific priorities, timing, and scale of the offensive, and
    Western assistance will be crucial in preparing both plans and
    forces. With the support of the Congress, the United States is
    doing a great deal to bolster Ukraine's chances for success.
    But even if Ukraine's counteroffensive is not fully successful,
    the Russians are unlikely to be able to mount a significant
    offensive operation this year.
        In fact, if Russia does not initiate a mandatory
    mobilization and secure substantial third-party ammunition
    supplies beyond existing deliveries from Iran and others, it
    will be increasingly challenging for them to sustain even
    modest offensive operations.
        At the same time, of course, Ukraine remains heavily
    dependent on external military aid and would likely be unable
    to counter Russia's natural relative manpower and resource
    advantages if most Western military aid ceased.
        Furthermore, while we continue to assess that Putin most
    likely calculates the time works in his favor and that
    prolonging the war may be his best remaining pathway to
    eventually securing Russia's strategic interests in Ukraine. We
    assess that Putin probably has scaled back his immediate
    ambitions to consolidate control of the occupied territory in
    Eastern and Southern Ukraine and ensuring that Ukraine will
    never become a NATO ally.
        Putin's willingness to consider a negotiated pause may be
    based on his assessment that a pause would provide a respite
    for Russian forces, as they could try to use that time to
    regain strength before resuming offensive operations at some
    point in the future. While buying time for what he hopes will
    be an erosion of Western support for Ukraine.
        Yet he may be willing to claim at least a temporary victory
    based on roughly the territory he is occupying. The challenge
    is that even as Putin may be scaling back his near-term
    ambitions, the prospect for Russian concessions to advance
    negotiations this year will be low unless domestic political
    vulnerabilities alter his thinking. Of course, as the conflict
    continues, the human toll is only getting worse.
        In addition to the many tens of thousands of casualties
    suffered by Ukrainian and Russian militaries, more than 8
    million people have been forced to flee Ukraine since Russia
    invaded. Moreover, in addition to Moscow's continued assault on
    Ukraine's civilian infrastructure, particularly its energy
    facilities and electrical grid, there is widespread reporting
    of atrocities committed by Russian forces.
        Russia and its proxy groups are using so-called filtration
    operations to detain and forcibly deport tens of thousands of
    Ukrainian civilians to Russia. The IC is engaged with other
    parts of the United States Government to document and hold
    Russia and Russian actors accountable for their actions.
        Moscow has suffered military losses that will require years
    of rebuilding and leave it less capable of posing a
    conventional military threat to Europe and operating
    assertively in Eurasia and on the global stage. But as a
    result, Russia will become even more reliant on asymmetric
    options, such as nuclear, cyber, space capabilities, and in
    China. Our annual assessment also covers Iran, North Korea, the
    many regional challenges we face, including in Africa, where,
    of course, we have seen a recent outbreak of fighting in Sudan,
    which is no stranger to conflict.
        The fighting in Sudan between the Sudanese armed forces and
    the rapid support forces is, we assess, likely to be
    protracted, as both sides believe that they can win militarily
    and have few incentives to come to the negotiating table.
        Both sides are seeking external sources of support, which,
    if successful, is likely to intensify the conflict and create a
    greater potential for spillover challenges in the region. But
    even so, the fighting is exacerbating already dire humanitarian
    conditions in Sudan, forcing relief organizations to curtail
    operations, raising the specter of massive refugee flows and
    aid needs in the region.
        Even before the fighting started, roughly one-third of the
    population, or approximately 15.8 million people, required
    immediate assistance because of disease outbreaks, inflation,
    localized conflicts, internal displacement, and weather-related
    food insecurity.
        Throughout the world, as I noted at the outset, the State
    actors challenges we inventory are undermining our capacity to
    work together with other countries to address what are utterly
    critical transnational threats such as climate change, public
    health challenges, such as the current COVID-19 pandemic, the
    threat from illicit drugs terrorism, irregular migration.
        Before concluding, I just want to raise with you a
    legislative authority of fundamental importance to the
    Intelligence Community and the work we do, which will expire at
    the end of this year if Congress does not act. I am referring
    to section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
    and I can tell you without hesitation that section 702 was
    relied upon in gathering some of the intelligence that form the
    basis of this assessment, as it is hard to overestimate the
    importance of this authority to our work more generally.
        FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] Section 702
    allows the Intelligence Community to collect on the
    communication of specifically targeted foreign persons who are
    located outside the United States. In doing so provides unique
    intelligence on foreign intelligence targets at a speed and
    reliability that we just simply cannot replicate in any other
    authority.
        Section 702 was originally enacted to enable the U.S.
    Government to quickly collect on the communications of
    terrorists located abroad, by allowing the IC to acquire
    foreign intelligence from non-U.S. people located outside of
    the United States who are using U.S. electronic communication
    service providers.
        Section 702 is still vital to our counterterrorism (CT)
    mission. But now it is also principally relied upon for key
    insights across a range of our highest priority threats. In
    fact, 702 acquired information has been used to protect against
    a series of conventional and cyber-attacks posed by China,
    Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
        For example, I can tell you that 702 acquired information
    enabled the United States to gain insights into the PRC's
    efforts to monitor, track, and persecute Chinese nationals
    believed to be dissidents. Section 702 acquired information has
    also been used to identify multiple ransomware attacks against
    U.S. critical infrastructure. Allowing the U.S. Government to
    respond to, mitigate, and in some cases prevent attacks.
        Section 702 acquired information has been used to prevent
    components for weapons of mass destruction from reaching
    foreign actors. Section 702 acquired information has resulted
    in the identification and disruption of hostile foreign actors'
    attempts to recruit spies in or send their operatives to the
    United States.
        I realize that 702 is a powerful authority. It is incumbent
    on all of us in the Intelligence Community to ensure the
    privacy and civil liberties of Americans are built into its
    design and implementation at every level.
        Over the last many years, we have significantly expanded
    oversight and dedicated resources to compliance in order to do
    just that. We welcome the opportunity to help you understand
    better the oversight framework we have built, as we work to
    authorize this critical authority. So, thank you so much for
    your patience and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Director Avril D. Haines
    follows:]

        Director Haines' statement can be found in Appendix A on
    page 56.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Director Haines.
    General Berrier, please.

    STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SCOTT D. BERRIER, USA, DIRECTOR
                     OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

        Lieutenant General Berrier. Chair Reed, Ranking Member
    Wicker, distinguished Committee Members, thank you for the
    opportunity to discuss the DIA's assessment of the global
    security environment.
        Before I begin, I too would like to take a moment to
    recognize and honor Lieutenant General Vince Stewart, DIA's
    20th Director. Vince passed away in his sleep last Friday. We
    lost a giant, an intellectual giant, a trailblazer, and a
    really good friend. Vince was a gifted and talented marine
    intelligence officer who positively touched the lives of many
    in every organization he served in or led. We mourn his loss.
    We grieve with his family, and we honor his memory.
        I am pleased to join Director Haines today to discuss the
    complex threat landscape and our work to provide timely,
    insightful, and rigorous intelligence. DIA and the Defense
    Intelligence Enterprise are transforming our approach to meet
    threats to our Nation posed by strategic competition with
    China, Russia, and other foreign nations.
        With your continued support, DIA and the DIE will continue
    to excel in providing all sorts of analysis, HUMINT [human
    intelligence] and technical collection, open-source collection,
    material exploitation, modeling and simulations, and other
    unique mission sets.
        This will most likely be the last time I testify before
    this Committee as I approach my 39th year of service in our
    Army, and pending retirement. I become somewhat reflective on
    how the threat landscape has changed.
        In 1984, it was a bipolar world. The United States and our
    partners in a cold war with the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist
    Republics]. In my first assignment, I served as an infantry
    battalion intelligence officer or an S2 in Alaska. One of our
    missions was to protect critical oil infrastructure in the high
    North from a Spetsnaz attack.
        My 23-year-old self didn't think much of that mission at
    the time, wasn't very exciting, but in retrospect it was an
    important mission then, and protecting critical infrastructure
    is a really important mission today.
        The difference is the threat landscape is exponentially
    more dangerous today than it was in 1984. We are now in a
    multipolar world with strategic competition at the forefront.
    The events of the past year clearly demonstrate that our
    competitors are emboldened and that they are attempting to
    forcefully recast the rules based international order and
    challenge U.S. interests.
        From Russia's unprovoked and unjustified, full scale
    invasion of Ukraine, to China's military assertiveness in the
    Indo-Pacific region, to an unprecedented number of North Korean
    missile launches, to Iranian directed action against United
    States Forces in the Middle East. The United States now faces a
    multifaceted security environment in which authoritarian
    regimes are testing our resolve through their provocative
    military actions, developing capabilities to hold the Homeland
    at risk, and showing greater risk tolerance for potential
    escalation.
        Like you, I am very concerned about ongoing threats from
    China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist
    organizations, but China is our pacing challenge and DIA's top
    priority. Beijing is expanding its global influence and
    stepping up its multi-domain pressure campaign against Taiwan,
    as observed by sharply increased rhetoric and military activity
    over the last year.
        Xi Jinping's attainment of a third term as a General
    Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party positions Beijing for
    further progress on military modernization and operational
    goals that will challenge the United States during the next
    year and beyond. The war in Ukraine is also a priority for DIA,
    and for the Russian military, 2022 is not a good year.
        The new look army is gone, and in my view, we are at a
    particularly dangerous place with Russia. Putin is not seeking
    an off ramp and Moscow has asserted publicly that it remains
    committed to achieving its objectives in Ukraine through
    military force. China and Russia are seeking to incorporate
    advanced technologies to erode our United States technological
    advantage.
        China is pursuing a whole of nation approach to technology
    development. The PLA believes that integrating future
    technologies, especially AI and quantum, will constitute a
    major revolution in military affairs. As Director, I have
    pressed agency leaders to up our game, relook business
    operations and transform our missions to meet customer needs,
    and to address unprecedented national security challenges.
        Transformation and change are imperatives, and I am pleased
    that DIA is making real more progress on our mission sets. DIA
    has exceptional expertise, responsibilities, and missions that
    you trust us to lead. As such, foundational military
    intelligence, defense, human, and counterintelligence,
    measurement and signature intelligence, or MASINT and JWICS
    [Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System].
        Our strategic, operational, and tactical defense
    intelligence supports warfighters, defense planners,
    policymakers, and the acquisition community. I look forward to
    discussing real world examples of our progress. One final area
    I would like to highlight is the workforce of DIA.
        As you know, our workforce spans the globe with innovative
    and forward leaning officers, and these talented and dedicated
    experts are making strides to defend the United States and our
    allies. From our defense attaches to analysts, to technical
    collectors, to our enabling force. These professionals are
    mission focused and working tirelessly behind the scenes for
    our Nation.
        DIA is investing in the workforce and the infrastructure
    that supports their behind-the-scenes work. Bringing together
    talented officers with varied experiences and giving them the
    tools and authorities to conduct the intelligence that is at
    the core, and investing in our people is a critical step to
    modernizing the next generation of intelligence capabilities.
        I am proud to represent a workforce that provides
    intelligence on foreign actors to prevent and win wars, and to
    illuminate opportunities to enable the United States to outpace
    our strategic competitors. I welcome your questions on the
    global threat environment and thank you for your continued
    support and opportunity to testify today.
        [The prepared statement of General Berrier follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Scott Berrier
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished Committee
    Members thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Defense
    Intelligence Agency's (DIA's) assessment of the global security
    environment.
        Before I begin, I would like to take a moment to recognize and
    honor the 20th DIA Director Lieutenant General Vince Stewart. Vince
    passed away in his sleep last Friday-we lost a friend, an intellectual
    giant, and a trailblazer. Vince was a gifted and talented Marine
    Intelligence Officer who positively touched the lives of many in every
    organization he served or led. We mourn his loss, grieve with his
    family, and honor his memory.
        I am pleased to join DNI Director Haines today to discuss the
    complex threat landscape, and our work to provide timely, insightful,
    and rigorous intelligence. DIA and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise
    (DIE) are transforming our approach to meet threats to our Nation posed
    by strategic competition with China, Russia, and other foreign nations.
    With your continued support, DIA and the DIE will continue to excel in
    providing all-source analysis, HUMINT and technical collection, Open
    Source collection, material exploitation, modeling and simulation, and
    other unique mission sets.
        This will most likely be the last time I testify before this
    Committee as I approach my 39th year of Service in our Army and pending
    retirement. It has been a high honor and privilege, and with my tenure
    at DIA winding down, I have become somewhat reflective on how the
    threat landscape has changed. In 1984, it was a bi-polar world; the
    United States and our partners in a cold war with the USSR. In my first
    assignment, I served as an Infantry Battalion Intelligence Officer--S2-
    in Alaska. Our mission was to protect critical infrastructure in the
    High North-and the Alyeska Pipeline-from a potential Spetznaz attack.
    My 23-year-old-self did not think much of that mission. In retrospect,
    that was an important mission then, and protecting critical
    infrastructure is an important mission today. The difference is the
    threat landscape is exponentially more dangerous today than 1984. We
    are now in a tri-polar world with strategic competition at the
    forefront. The events of the past year clearly demonstrate that our
    competitors are emboldened, and that they are attempting to forcefully
    recast the rules-based international order and challenge U.S.
    interests. From Russia's unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion
    of Ukraine, to China's military assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific
    region, to an unprecedented number of North Korean missile launches, to
    Iranian-directed action against United States Forces in the Middle
    East. The United States now faces a multifaceted security environment
    in which authoritarian regimes are testing our resolve through their
    provocative military actions, developing capabilities to hold the
    Homeland at risk, and showing greater risk tolerance for potential
    escalation.
        Like you, I am very concerned about the ongoing threats from China,
    Russia, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations, but
    China is our pacing challenge and DIA's Top Priority. Beijing is
    expanding its global influence and stepping up its multi-domain
    pressure campaign against Taiwan, as observed by its sharply increased
    rhetoric and military activity over this past year. Xi Jinping' s
    attainment of a third term as General Secretary of the Chinese
    Communist Party positions Beijing for further progress on military
    modernization and operational goals that will challenge the United
    States during the next year and beyond.
        The war in Ukraine is also a priority for DIA; and for the Russian
    military, 2022 was not a good year. The Russian ``New Look Army'' is
    gone, and, in my view, we are at a particularly dangerous place with
    Russia. Putin is not seeking an off-ramp, and Moscow has asserted
    publicly that it remains committed to achieving its objectives in
    Ukraine through military force.
        China and Russia are seeking to incorporate advanced technologies
    to erode United States technological advantage. China is pursuing a
    whole-of-nation approach to technology development, and the PLA
    believes that integrating future technologies-- especially AI and
    quantum-will constitute a major revolution in military affairs.
        As Director, I have pressed Agency leaders to up our game, relook
    business operations, and transform our missions to meet customer needs
    and address the unprecedented national security challenges.
    Transformation and change are imperatives, and I am pleased that DIA is
    making real-world progress on our mission sets. DIA has exceptional
    expertise, responsibilities, and missions that you trust us to lead-
    such as foundational military intelligence, Defense HUMINT and Cover,
    Measurement and Signature Intelligence (or MASINT), and JWICS.
        Our strategic, operational, and tactical defense intelligence
    supports warfighters, defense planners, policymakers, and the
    acquisition community, and I look forward to discussing real-world
    examples of our progress.
        One final area I would like to highlight is the workforce at DIA.
    As you know, our workforce spans the globe with innovative and forward-
    leaning officers, and these talented and dedicated experts are making
    strides to defend the United States and our allies. From our Defense
    Attaches to analysts and technical collectors, these professionals are
    mission-focused and working tirelessly behind-the-scenes for our
    Nation. DIA is investing in the workforce and the infrastructure that
    supports their behind-the-scenes work. Bringing together talented
    officers, with varied experiences, and giving them the tools and
    authorities to conduct intelligence is at DIA's core, and investing in
    our people is a critical step to modernizing the next generation of
    intelligence capabilities.
        I am proud to represent a workforce that provides intelligence on
    foreign actors to prevent and win wars, and to illuminate opportunities
    to enable the United States to outpace our strategic competitors. I
    welcome your questions on the global threat environment, and thank you
    for your continued support and the opportunity to testify today.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General. Thank you both
    for your detailed and thoughtful testimony. Director Haines,
    Secretary Yellen indicated that we will exceed the debt limit
    by June 1st, requiring action before that. Have the
    Intelligence Community assessed the international consequences
    of default on our debt?
        Director Haines. Thank you, Chairman. So, we don't have
    certainty on the outcome of the financial markets nor
    countries' opinions of sort of economic and political
    leadership that might be affected by a default on the debt.
        But I would say that what our assessment is, is that
    regardless of a default's duration, almost certainly it would
    create global uncertainty about the value of the U.S. dollar
    and U.S. institutions and leadership, leading to volatility in
    currency and financial markets and commodity markets that are
    priced in dollars. That is basically as far as our analysts are
    able to provide.
        Chairman Reed. Let me followup--and you might want to take
    this for the closed session also but, our adversaries, I
    presume, would want to exploit any type of difficulty that we
    have. Do we have any indications that China in particular is
    preparing for exploitation of this via through disinformation
    in the United States or through financial or other moves?
        Director Haines. We don't have any information that
    suggests that they are planning for that. But I think our
    analysts would agree with you that it would be almost a
    certainty that they would look to take advantage of the
    opportunity.
        They generally, both Russia and China, would look to
    perceive sort of narrate through information operations, such
    an event as demonstrating the chaos within the United States,
    that we are not capable of functioning as a democracy, and sort
    of the governance issues associated with it. They have done
    that on a range of things.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. General Berrier, we had General
    Cavoli here, who is doing a superb job, and he indicated that
    Russia remains a formidable force despite their significant
    losses in personnel in Ukraine. Because air, maritime, space,
    cyber and strategic forces have not really been committed to
    that effort. What is DIA's assessment of Russia's capacity?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Very similar. Still an
    existential threat with a nuclear arsenal that they have.
    General Cavoli is correct, that their strategic forces have
    largely been untested here and still formidable.
        Chairman Reed. So that the significant--we just--our forces
    out of Europe, which will be a challenge because of their
    existing capacities.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I think from a deterrence
    standpoint, Russia fears strength. So even though their ground
    forces are degraded right now, they will quickly build those
    back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. Director Haines, as I said in my
    statement, the Intelligence Community has done some remarkable
    work with respect to Russia and Ukraine by exposing activities
    that the Russians were contemplating before they could do it.
    Not only embarrassing them, but in many cases frustrating their
    ability to do it.
        Are we ready to use that same approach to other adversaries
    such as China in terms of strategically using intelligence to
    disrupt their operations?
        Director Haines. Thank you, sir. I think we can talk about
    this also in closed session a bit more. But as a general
    matter, we have learned some techniques and mechanisms that
    will not be forgotten coming out of the conflict with Ukraine
    that I think we can deploy in other scenarios which have
    allowed us to do more sharing and downgrading of information.
    Kind of working as a team across the IC to try to preserve
    sources and methods in that process.
        I think we will look to do that. But I think it will be
    more challenging in different areas depending on what those
    sources and methods are, and how we can manage that concern as
    we move forward.
        Chairman Reed. Just quickly, from both of you, we have had
    this incident with the Air National Guardsmen, Teixeira, years
    before that, Snowden. So, this is not really new. We thought
    and we think every time this happens, we put in place things
    like keystroke logging, more restrictive controls, but we are
    still having problems. So just quickly, Director Haines, what
    can we do to make sure we have more appropriate controls?
        Director Haines. Yes. Thank you, sir. It has been
    absolutely extremely frustrating, obviously, and demoralizing
    for folks in the Intelligence Community who work so hard,
    frankly, to put together the kind of intelligence that then
    gets disclosed in leaks. The damage that it does to our
    national security is just unacceptable on every level,
    obviously. I appreciate the support.
        I think what I can tell you at this stage is only an
    interim answer because we are still getting the information
    from the investigation as to what exactly happened. To
    understand that is obviously then, to have greater confidence
    in saying that the things that we are doing are going to make a
    difference to ensure that this doesn't happen again.
        Right now, what we are doing is looking to ensure that we,
    in fact, have the best user activity monitoring, other
    techniques that we use. That we are, again, scrubbing and
    reviewing our processes for ensuring that there is only
    information provided on a need-to-know basis. That when there
    is user privileges, that they are appropriately granted. That
    we have additional controls around these issues, and we can
    obviously talk about this more in closed session.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. Senator Wicker, please.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Haines, I
    don't want to get into a long discussion about the debt limit,
    but it is a fact, is it not, that the House of Representatives
    has passed a bill that would raise the debt limit. If it were
    passed by the Senate and signed into law by the President, a
    default would be avoided. That is correct, is it not?
        Director Haines. Sir, I will confess that I am not tracking
    the puts and takes of this, but I absolutely--I am sure you are
    right.
        Senator Wicker. Well, I just wanted to point that out, that
    the House has done its work and the Senate now needs to pass a
    bill and get it to the President's desk. But let me ask you
    this, Director Haines, the General said since he was a young
    officer, that the threat has changed, the threat has
    exponentially increased. Do you agree that this is the most
    complex and dangerous threat environment since World War II? I
    will ask that to both of you. Director Haines first.
        Director Haines. Sure. Thank you, sir. I feel as if you
    always feel, as if the time that you are in, is the most
    complex and most challenging. I do feel that way, but I am a
    little bit conscious of the sort of cognitive bias that is
    associated with time. But I think it is, as our annual threat
    assessment----
        Senator Wicker. Well, this is a very complex and dangerous
    threat environment, is it not? General, is this the most
    complex and dangerous threat environment since World War II?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I believe it is. When
    you consider the advances in technology, the precision of
    weapons, the globalization information, the rise of China,
    along with what Russia has been up to. Then you consider
    dangerous regional actors like Iran, North Korea, and the
    continued threat of violent extremist organizations, it seems
    like the most complex----
        Senator Wicker. Do you then agree, General, that the
    authorization bill and the appropriation bills that Congress
    passes this year should represent acting accordingly to address
    this greatest threat?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, there is a threat
    there. I support the President's Budget and that is all--I will
    just leave it there.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. I think that answer speaks loudly.
    China gives us a figure, General Berrier, about how much they
    spend. They say $224 billion annually on their military. Do you
    agree that China spends significantly more than they publicly
    admit? What is your best estimate of how much their annual
    defense spending is?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, there are a number of
    factors that go into that estimate. I would be more comfortable
    in a closed session to discuss that.
        Senator Wicker. Director Haines, I guess you don't want to
    discuss that publicly also. Well, let's then let both of you
    discuss what this Ukraine war has done to Russia's military
    capability, not only today, but over the next 10 to 15 years.
    General.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. A number of factors as well.
    Senator, just the combat losses, and I spoke of this in my
    opening statement about the new look army. The reorganization
    that the Russian military took in the early 2000's meant that
    they would be better, faster, smaller, if you will, from what
    they were in the Soviet era.
        That army largely is gone, and they are relying on reserves
    and reserve equipment, older Soviet era kinds of kit. It is
    going to take them a while to build back to more advanced kit.
    The estimates go from 5 to 10 years based on how sanctions
    affect them and their ability to put technology back into their
    force.
        So, I think they have had a setback in the ground forces,
    but still very, very capable in their strategic forces.
        Senator Wicker. Director Haines, the next 10 to 15 years,
    based on what has happened to the Russian conventional military
    capability so far.
        Director Haines. Yes, I mean, I absolutely agree with
    General Berrier. There is no question and I think unanimity in
    the Intelligence Community, it will take years for the Russians
    to build back up their ground forces.
        They have really significantly degraded them, but they
    nevertheless have, as indicated, strategic force, other forces,
    and that doesn't mean that they are not a powerful military
    force.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, then let me just say this with
    regard to my previous question, there is an unclassified
    Department of Defense annual China military power report. That
    is not secret. It doesn't need to be said, done in the schif.
        It states that China's ``actual military related spending
    is likely significantly higher than what it states in its
    official budget.? You don't disagree with that, Director
    Haines, do you?
        Director Haines. No. I think one aspect of it is the civil
    military fusion that we see in China. Where so much of, in
    fact, their civilian industry is actually adapted and used by
    their military. When you consider that, it is a significant----
        Senator Wicker. Thank you. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Reed. Thanks, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen,
    please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for being here and for your
    service to the country. Director Haines, I want to go back to
    your comments about the 702 reauthorization, because I returned
    from, along with a number of my colleagues, including Senator
    Budd, we returned from South America a couple of weeks ago.
    Where we visited four countries, and the 702 really came up, or
    at least the ability of the intel community to use those
    authorizations to address the challenges facing the country.
        I was particularly interested in the counternarcotics
    effort because we continue to have a huge issue in New
    Hampshire with the opioid epidemic. So, I do think it is very
    important for us to continue to have those authorities.
        But there are also some very real concerns about privacy
    that we have heard. So, can you talk to how important it is for
    these authorities to help us continue with counter-narcotics
    efforts and also what we are doing in terms of addressing the
    privacy concerns?
        Director Haines. Yes, absolutely, I think this is one of
    the challenges for us, has been in the Intelligence Community,
    frankly, trying to declassify examples of how it is that we
    have used 702 so that the public has a better understanding of
    the value of this authority and the collection that we have.
        But also, as a general matter, it has been an important
    authority for use for in the context of countering narcotics
    trafficking. In many respects used to help support our foreign
    partners in interdictions as a general matter, and that is
    something that has been critical.
        In terms of the privacy and civil liberties pieces of this,
    what I would say is, we have a number of things that we do in
    order to try to monitor and assess our compliance, and then to
    ultimately design the system in such a way as to incentivize
    and promote compliance. Making it, in other words, technically
    hard to do things that are non-compliant.
        Then ultimately have increased extraordinary investments
    into training of folks who would use the system and then to
    making adjustments as we go through the process where we see
    something goes wrong and then actually addressing it, and also
    holding people accountable in the context of any compliance
    violations.
        Just to give you a couple of things. On an annual basis,
    the entire program is reviewed and recertified by the foreign
    intelligence court (FISC), essentially, as one piece. Also, we
    do semiannual compliance reports to Congress. We have a joint
    60-day review, my office and the Department of Justice, of
    targeting decisions of any U.S. person queries, if they are
    done through the data bases that exist and dissemination.
        We have targeting and minimization procedures for each
    element that are not just reviewed by the Attorney General but
    go to the FISC court. Again, we go through a variety of ways in
    which to try to ensure that we have created, in effect, a
    virtuous cycle where we can ensure that everything that we are
    doing is, in fact, promoting compliance, and then monitoring it
    to see if that is, in fact, what is happening. Then addressing
    challenges as they come and move forward.
        Then we also have been providing reports publicly about
    noncompliance incidents so that we can show the American
    people, we can have all of you and your constituents look at
    what is happening, and see where we make progress, where we
    make mistakes, how we address it. Then, how we move forward on
    it so that we can actually build the trust that is necessary.
    Thank you.
        Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you. You both mentioned cyber
    in your--I think you both mentioned cyber in your remarks, but
    I didn't hear either of you talk about the efforts to address
    disinformation.
        One of the places where our adversaries have certainly been
    very effective. I think more effective than we have been in
    responding in many cases, has been in the disinformation arena.
        Can you speak to what we are doing and how we are
    coordinating with other operations like the Global Engagement
    Center at the State Department?
        Director Haines. Sure. I will start and General Berrier, if
    you want to add to this. But Congress put into law that we
    should establish a foreign malign influence center in the
    Intelligence Community.
        We stood that up and it encompasses our election threat
    executive work, essentially looking at foreign influence and
    interference in elections. But it also deals with
    disinformation more generally.
        What we have been doing is effectively trying to support
    the global engagement center, others throughout the U.S.
    Government, in helping them to understand what are the plans
    and intentions of the key actors in this space. China, Russia,
    Iran, et cetera, and then, give them a sense of what it is that
    we are seeing in terms of the techniques that they use. How
    they go about this, and provide that for policymakers so that
    they are able to take that information and hopefully counter it
    and address it.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I think DIA's perspective on
    this, Senator, is really speed. We want to be able to detect
    that. It is really with our open-source collection capability,
    working with our combatant command partners where this is
    happening all over the world. Then the ability to turn
    something quickly with them under the right authorities to
    counter that disinformation or misinformation.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you both.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. Senator Fischer, please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    both for being here today. Director Haines, last year you
    testified that, ``China will continue to essentially expand
    their nuclear arsenal and diversification for a period of
    time.? Has that assessment changed or does the Intelligence
    Community still maintain it?
        Director Haines. That assessment has not changed.
        Senator Fischer. In public reports, we have seen that the
    DIA has assessed that China will deploy 1,500 warheads by 2035.
    STRATCOM Commander General Cotton, has also publicly confirmed
    that China has now surpassed the United States in the number of
    fixed and mobile land-based launchers for ICBM. General
    Berrier, do you agree with that assessment still?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I do agree.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Director Haines, does the
    Intelligence Committee assess that China has any interest in
    pursuing arms control agreements that would restrict their
    development of nuclear weapons?
        Director Haines. No. As a general matter, we have not seen
    China express interest in arms control agreements in this area.
        Senator Fischer. General Berrier, we have seen reports that
    Russia is providing China with plutonium for Chinese fast
    breeder reactors. In fact, it was reported by a UK think tank.
    They noted that between September and December 2022, Russia
    provided seven times more highly enriched uranium to China than
    the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency
    have secured over the past 30 years. What are the implications
    of that increased level of cooperation of their nuclear
    programs?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. The layers of cooperation
    between China and Russia go very, very deep. I cannot speak to
    the specifics of the uranium aspect of that. If true, it is an
    acceleration of programs in development and technology
    transfer.
        Senator Fischer. Director Haines, do you have anything to
    add to that?
        Director Haines. No.
        Senator Fischer. Is there any movement within the
    Administration to look at--first of all, to set up agreements
    again with Russia? Is there any, I would say, false hope by
    this Administration to believe that they could pull in Russia,
    let alone trying to pull in China in those talks?
        Director Haines. I couldn't speak to that just because it
    is obviously in the policy community and I am not sure I would
    know, frankly, what it is that they are looking at.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you. Also, Director Haines,
    looking at Afghanistan, do you assess that ISIS-K [Islamic
    State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan] still seeks to conduct
    external operations against the United States, our Forces, and
    our allies and partners?
        Director Haines. Yes.
        Senator Fischer. Do you agree with the assessment that we
    had in March from General Kurilla about how long it would take
    ISIS-K to generate the capability to conduct external
    operations? He told us at that time, that any operation against
    the United States and Western interests abroad could happen
    within 6 months with little or no warning. Would you agree with
    that?
        Director Haines. I would have to take that back, to be
    honest. There has been a number of developments, even since
    General Kurilla apparently testified on this issue, of taking
    out key external ops folks within ISIS-K and I think that might
    affect the timeline. But I would be happy to take that for the
    record.
        Senator Fischer. Do you feel that we have lost information
    gathering capabilities and also CT operations in Afghanistan
    since our withdrawal?
        Director Haines. We certainly, the Intelligence Community
    has been clear about the fact that we are not able to collect
    as much information today as we were, obviously, when the
    troops were in Afghanistan.
        Senator Fischer. How would you, I guess, rate the amount of
    intelligence that we are able to gather in Afghanistan? Because
    it is my understanding our CT operations are basically nil. We
    are looking at hardly anybody on the ground to be able to help.
        So how do you rate what we are able to get when we are
    looking at a threat against not just United States interests
    and persons, but also our Western allies, the growing threats
    that we are facing there?
        Director Haines. To be specific, we would have to do this,
    I think, in closed session. But as a general matter, what we
    have sought to do is to try to--trying to think how to do this
    in an unclassified way but develop enough collection
    opportunities so that we can monitor the threat. It is
    definitely, as you indicated, degraded from what we had
    previously, and we can discuss the details in the closed
    session.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senior Fischer. Senator
    Gillibrand, please.
        Senator Gillibrand. Director Haines, the DOD and the IC are
    engaged in cyber operations against our adversaries every day
    and gain intelligence about how these adversaries operate and
    intend to operate in the cyber domain. However, in the event of
    a large-scale cyber-attack on the Homeland, CISA [Cybersecurity
    and Infrastructure Security Agency] is in the leading role. How
    much of your intelligence on, for example, the PRC cyber
    threat, are you able to share with CISA, and how much must
    remain inside the DOD and the IC?
        Director Haines. We share almost everything with CISA,
    honestly. They get our analysis on these issues. They see the
    raw intelligence. We have overlap in terms of even intelligence
    that we get from commercial threat indexes and so on. So, it is
    quite open sharing in that respect.
        Senator Gillibrand. When we rely on allies across the globe
    for operations and assistance, are we able to leverage our
    efforts with what we do with CISA, with those allies?
        Director Haines. Yes, it is a great question. In fact we
    have talked to allies about, for example, recognizing that so
    much of the critical cyber threat information exists in the
    commercial sector, because we are trying to see how it is that
    adversaries are attacking them.
        We have talked to allies about working together in order to
    obtain and leverage each other's commercial threat information,
    where that is permitted based on the agreements that we have
    with the commercial sector.
        Working with CISA to ensure that they have access to that
    information. That is an example of working with allies and
    partners in a way that can help CISA to better have the
    landscape and the picture that they need for the work that they
    do.
        Senator Gillibrand. In the event of a substantial cyber-
    attack by China on our domestic infrastructure, what would the
    chain of command look like in terms of defense and response?
        Director Haines. I think it would depend on--this probably
    is not the best question for me, but I think it would depend on
    where the response is being conducted and how they are
    approaching it. Obviously, the President is the final authority
    in any event. But how it would work through the system, I
    suspect might have some differences.
        Senator Gillibrand. Lieutenant General Berrier, on the same
    question.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Nothing to add to that, ma'am.
        Senator Gillibrand. Our Government often talks about how
    our allies and partners are our strategic advantage. From the
    perspective of China, Russia, and Iran, who are the allies and
    partners they are most concerned about building closer
    relationships with, and how would building closer relationships
    with those countries impact regional deterrence?
        As context, I recently took a trip to the Middle East to
    study the impact of the Abraham Accords on UAE [United Arab
    Emirates], on Morocco, Bahrain, and Israel. With regard to
    that, obviously there was concern when Saudi Arabia decided to
    engage China in their negotiations with Iran.
        What is the impact of being able to bring Saudi Arabia into
    the Abraham Accords, in the context of the larger question?
        Director Haines. Senator Gillibrand, forgive me. At the
    very--I missed the very first part of your question. Can you
    just repeat the first sentence--?
        Senator Gillibrand. Just that we often talk about how our
    allies and partners are our strategic advantage. So, from the
    perspective of China, Russia, Iran, who are they most concerned
    about?
        Then as an example, the Abraham Accords, I think, is a very
    strategic partnership for us that should be seen as very
    powerful. How did the recent efforts by China to negotiate with
    Saudi Arabia and Iran affect that strategic alliance.
        Whether that was a powerful strategic alliance we should
    have been pushing for?
        Director Haines. Yes. So, I think what our analysts would
    point to as a general matter would be a whole series of key
    countries that are sometimes referred to as hedging states that
    are in the space between, as you indicated, UAE is an example
    of this in a sense.
        There may be others. It is probably easier to talk about
    this in a closed session. But there are a variety of countries
    where, in effect, they are looking at the United States and
    China and Russia on the other side, in effect, and trying to
    diversify their relationship in a way that allows them to
    maximize their interests. While at the same time pursue sort of
    economic and other security strategies in each of these bases.
        I would say with Saudi Arabia in particular, and the
    Abraham Accords more generally, that we do think there has been
    kind of a value of bringing these countries together under
    certain circumstances. In that, that interaction has provided
    some security benefits to the United States and to others.
        But I think each case would have to be looked at on a case-
    by-case basis in order to sort of identify what are some of the
    pros and cons. Not sure that was very helpful. Apologies.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I would say that your
    question is a bullseye on the discussion of strategic
    competition and what strategic competition is. We know that
    China and Russia are seeking partnerships with countries that
    have historically been United States partners.
        This is the nature of the changing landscape and the
    complexity of the environment that I described in my opening
    statement. We have to be there, and we have to be a better a
    better solution, whether that is through intelligence sharing
    or other partnerships.
        I don't think it is a lost cause. I think there is a lot we
    can do, and I think people see the goodness in what the United
    States brings, and we have to go forward with that.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
    Cotton, please.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you both for your appearance. I would
    extend my condolences as well to the family of General Stewart,
    who was a trailblazing marine. I am surprised it has gotten to
    me, the seventh questioner and no one has raised the fact that
    Russia's government has accused Ukraine of trying to
    assassinate President Putin, and saying that the United States
    goaded them into it. Seems like kind of a big deal. Big if
    true, as the kids say today. Dr. Haines, what do you have to
    say about these claims from Russia's government?
        Director Haines. Well, obviously, you have seen the
    Ukrainian Government deny their--you know, having engaged in
    this. At this stage, we don't have information that would allow
    us to provide an independent assessment on this.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. General Berrier.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I think it gets after Senator
    Sheehan's comment about misinformation.
        Senator Cotton. Perhaps some grounds to think that maybe
    these claims are exaggerated. One, do we know that Vladimir
    Putin doesn't spend the night at the Kremlin all that much? Is
    that correct, Director Haines?
        Director Haines. Yes.
        Senator Cotton. The Kremlin is not like the White House, in
    other words. Is not the primary residence of the President of
    Russia. Even if you were there, these drones from the videos I
    have seen, they do not appear to be the kind of the size of
    weapons that could do significant damage to the Kremlin. Is
    that correct?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. That is correct.
        Senator Cotton. They also appear to be the kinds of drones
    that would require relatively close line of sight control,
    which means someone on the ground in Moscow, which is not known
    as an open and friendly city to people who are hostile to the
    Russian Government. Is that correct, General Berrier?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Potentially from the photos
    that I have seen, yes.
        Senator Cotton. In most attacks on Russian soil, Ukraine's
    government has been ambiguous or silent about responsibility
    for the attacks. Yet in this case, they have explicitly
    disclaimed any responsibility. Is that correct, Director
    Haines?
        Director Haines. Yes.
        Senator Cotton. All right. General Berrier, I think you
    might have been on to something when you said that this sounds
    like misinformation. I want to move on to another matter,
    Director Haines, about Mexican drug cartels. They are causing
    now more deaths in America than we lost every year in the
    Vietnam War, or every year in America than the entire Vietnam
    War. In fact, almost twice what we lost in the Vietnam War due
    to fentanyl alone. Has the Intelligence Community produced a
    national intelligence estimate on the threat that the cartels
    pose to America?
        Director Haines. No, we have not, sir.
        Senator Cotton. So, the NIE [National Intelligence
    Estimates] is the most authoritative written judgment on
    national security matters. Is that correct?
        Director Haines. It is authoritative. I suspect it would
    be--yes.
        Senator Cotton. Do you have any plans to produce an NIE on
    the threat that cartels pose to America?
        Director Haines. We do actually have something on our
    calendar that is on transnational criminal organizations,
    including the cartels in this space.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. I think that is warranted, and I
    look forward to seeing it. Director Haines, you mentioned
    earlier that it will take Russia years to rebuild its ground
    forces. I believe you were saying that to express agreement
    with General Berrier. Is that correct?
        General Berrier, you believe it will take years for Russia
    to rebuild its ground forces?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I do.
        Senator Cotton. Most intelligence agencies inaccurately
    judged the early days of the war. They thought that Russia
    would roll into Kyiv very quickly and conquer most, not all, of
    Ukraine. General Berrier, was that a result of our intelligence
    agencies underestimating the Ukrainians or overestimating the
    Russians?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I think it was a
    combination of both.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. When you are making your own
    operational plans, you have to make assessments about the
    adversary, correct?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Correct.
        Senator Cotton. Okay, and that is true where they operating
    at the platoon level or at the national strategic level.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Yes.
        Senator Cotton. So, it is fair to say, based on the fact
    that we now know we overestimated Russia's capabilities as of
    last February, and we have seen their forces degraded to the
    point it will take years to rebuild them, that they are a much
    weaker fighting force than we thought 14 months ago, right?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. That is what we currently
    assess, yes.
        Senator Cotton. Shouldn't our operational plans about a
    potential war with Russia in Europe then be changed to reflect
    that new understanding?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I think in the purview of
    United States European Command and the Department of Defense,
    they are looking at all that, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Yes. They need to urgently because one of
    the reasons we have heard on this Committee about the slow pace
    at which we are delivering certain weapons is that our
    operational plans require it.
        If our operational plan in Europe is based on what we
    thought Russia was capable of 14 months ago versus what they
    are capable now, it badly needs to be revisited. Director
    Haines, one final line of questions about Russia. They have
    gotten a lot more aggressive toward the United States recently.
        We all remember the Black Sea incident in one of their
    aircraft downed, an MQ-9 drone. The head of United States Air
    Force's Central Command recently said that Russia is,
    ``increasingly bellicose toward American aircraft in Syria,''
    suggesting they even are looking for a fight--they are spoiling
    for a dogfight.
        In third, the head of European Command, General Cavoli,
    recently noted that Russian submarines have gotten more active
    in the Atlantic than they have been in years. One, are there
    other instances of growing Russian aggression?
        Two, what is the Intelligence Community's assessment for
    why Russia has grown increasingly aggressive in these ways?
        Director Haines. Can we address this in closed session?
        Senator Cotton. Sure.
        Director Haines. Okay. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kaine,
    please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you to our witnesses. Director Haines,
    in your opening testimony, you said that the Chinese are
    growing more and more pessimistic about the United States-China
    relationship. What is the source of that growing pessimism?
        Director Haines. I would say that there is a number of
    factors that are leaning in that direction in the sense that--
    we can maybe do a little more in closed session to get to what
    the root of this is--but I think they are increasingly
    perceiving the sort of zero sum game that I mentioned
    effectively in the opening testimony. Where in essence we have
    always understood that they perceive themselves, or for the
    last few years now, as being on the rise and they perceive the
    United States as being on the decline. They ultimately are
    concerned about the potential for conflict as we pass each
    other, or sort of the classic frame through which they piece
    this. The----
        Senator Kaine. Is some of the pessimism related to their
    perceptions of statements by American political figures?
        Director Haines. Sure. I mean, but it is all of the larger
    piece, which is to say that I think that they continue to
    perceive that they can't do what they want to do without
    essentially pushing back on the United States and ultimately
    countering us in ways that, you know--and our allies, frankly,
    in a variety of different----
        Senator Kaine. A great President once said, speak softly
    and carry a big stick. I will let my colleagues--we all have
    our own judgment about the size of the stick we are carrying or
    should. I have noticed on the speak softly side of the
    Roosevelt maximum, we have been getting louder and louder with
    respect to China concerns.
        We had the hearing with the INDOPACOM leadership recently,
    and the opening statement is a boilerplate at that hearing. War
    with China is neither inevitable or necessary, but then the
    remaining hours of the hearing was just one statement after the
    next that someone trying to perceive what the intentions were
    here might well lead to the conclusion of, wow, you know, we
    are more pessimistic because of statements that are being made.
        How did, from an intelligence standpoint--I was concerned
    at the news that during the Chinese balloon incident, Secretary
    Austin tried to call his counterpart and the Chinese
    counterpart would not answer the phone. Is that--that was
    publicly reported. Is that accurate?
        Director Haines. I believe it is. I will tell you that as a
    general matter, the Chinese typically clamp down in a crisis
    and they don't engage, and that is a classic paradigm.
        Senator Kaine. That is a little bit different than Russia,
    correct? That even in tough times, at least the lines of
    communication between the military to hopefully de-escalate
    generally remain open with Russia. Isn't that also the case?
        Director Haines. Yes.
        Senator Kaine. We want to try to be very strong to deter
    war. We want to be prepared to win any war we should need to.
    But we would also want to avoid wars based on bad intel. We
    have a recent history of getting into a war against Iraq based
    on bad intel regarding Iraq's non-existent weapons of mass
    destruction program.
        But we would also want to do everything we could to avoid
    wars based on miscommunication, misunderstanding, unnecessary
    escalations. Is that correct?
        Director Haines. Yes.
        Senator Kaine. As the DNI, what is your current level of
    concern about the prospect of getting into unnecessary military
    action based upon a miscommunication or unnecessary escalation?
    Is that a small concern or is that a concern that worries you?
        Director Haines. Absolutely worries me. I mean, I think,
    that is part of the job, right, is that we need to be as
    vigilant as we possibly can in order to be able to help our
    policymakers, our decisionmakers, all of you have a better
    understanding of what is actually happening so that there isn't
    that kind of unintended escalation or miscalculation.
        I think one of the challenges that we all recognize in the
    context of our relationship with China is that because there is
    that kind of clamp down during crises that we were just talking
    about, it puts an extraordinary premium on our capacity to be
    able to provide insight on what is happening in those moments.
        Senator Kaine. I think that is a wise concern to have. Last
    thing I will just say is the unclassified annual threat
    assessment that you shared with the Committee was 40 pages
    long. Two pages were pertaining to the Western Hemisphere.
        I also recently returned from a trip into the Americas, and
    the issues there, whether it is fentanyl, whether it is
    immigration challenges, whether it is political instability.
    But also the fact that our adversaries are investing so heavily
    in the Western Hemisphere suggests to me that we ought to be
    paying more attention.
        Both the SOUTHCOM budget and some other budgetary items
    suggest that we are really under-resourcing the region, and
    that is something that I will try to work with my colleagues
    on. But thanks to the witnesses for your testimony and your
    service.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Rounds,
    please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me begin
    by thanking both of you for your service to our country.
    General Berrier, really appreciate 39 years, and especially to
    your family. This is a lot of deployments, a lot of time away
    from home, and it is truly deployments that are handled not
    just by you but by your family as well, and we thank you for
    that.
        Let me begin with Director Haines. I think Senator Shaheen
    began a series of questions regarding 702 and asking for an
    explanation really about how it works and so forth. I am just
    curious, with regard to our adversaries, do you think that they
    believe that there is an opportunity to manipulate or provide
    misinformation about some of the programs that we have in this
    country?
        Has there been evidence that they have tried to manipulate
    public information or provide misinformation concerning some of
    our more capable programs?
        Director Haines. I am trying to think of a specific
    instance. There is----
        Senator Rounds. I prefer not to use a specific, just not--
    because we are in an unclassified discussion, but just in
    general, do you think that they believe that they can influence
    political decisions here by providing misinformation publicly?
        Director Haines. Yes, absolutely. They have typically
    engaged in such activities in order to try to influence public
    debate on issues that are of importance to them.
        Senator Rounds. Section 702 might be one of those as an
    example.
        Director Haines. Could be. I don't have particular
    information that indicates that that is happening.
        Senator Rounds. But General Berrier, would there be
    assessments made that our adversaries attempt to manipulate or
    to influence political decisions with misinformation or
    propaganda being provided?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I think it is clear that they
    have participated in that activity, and they would take
    advantage of any opportunity that might present itself, yes.
        Senator Rounds. Section 702 might be one of those programs
    that they would provide----
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Potentially, yes.
        Senator Rounds. Potentially. How about with regard to some
    of our military capabilities and some of the challenges that we
    sometimes have? It wouldn't be beneath them to try to
    manipulate decisions on a public level that would influence our
    ability to defend our country, if we had the opportunity. Fair
    enough?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I agree with that.
        Senator Rounds. Lately, I have been really kind of
    following up on the issue of the sharing of spectrum with
    regard to areas, particularly in the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz
    area. This is the S-band, and I am just kind of curious. We
    have a number of different very, very important missions that
    rely on that portion of the S-band. Would that be a fair
    statement, General Berrier?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. It would be, yes.
        Senator Rounds. Are you aware of any of the more capable--
    defensive capabilities that we have that rely specifically on
    radars, communications in that area?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Generally speaking, yes, but I
    am not a technical expert.
        Senator Rounds. Okay. Fair to say that the Aegis destroyer
    systems that we rely on for protecting against air attacks
    along our coastlines utilize--I think publicly we have talked
    about it already, about the fact that our radars are in that
    region.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I think that is fair.
        Senator Rounds. Okay. Not just the East Coast and the West
    coast of the United States, but Alaska and Hawaii as well.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Yes.
        Senator Rounds. But we spent a lot of money specifically in
    that particular area. Our adversaries know that. It is a matter
    of public discussion. Fair enough.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Fair enough.
        Senator Rounds. Right now, there is public discussion about
    sharing a large amount of that area, or a discussion about
    trying to share or take from the Department of Defense portions
    of that spectrum.
        Would that be an item of interest for our adversaries, and
    would there be an advantage to our adversaries if for any
    reason we were to lose that part of the spectrum for defensive
    purposes?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I think that would be an item
    of interest for our adversaries, and I could see them
    potentially trying to take advantage of that discussion.
        Senator Rounds. Director Haines, would you agree with that?
        Director Haines. Yes.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Let me turn one other area,
    Africa. Just really curious. I know that right now China has
    been looking at the possibilities of bases in Africa, along the
    Atlantic coast of Africa.
        What would happen if China were to be able to establish a
    base of operations, or for that matter Russia, along the
    Atlantic coast of Africa? What would that do in terms of
    defending our Homeland?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I think permanent
    bases there would give them more reach and more access. As I
    think about strategic competition, it is one of those things
    that we watch. It is really DIA's job to keep an eye on that
    and alert the department if we see that happening.
        Senator Rounds. Do you see it happening?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. We do see China trying to make
    inroads into Africa for sure. We know that they would like to
    expand their global bases.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator King,
    please.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, Mr. Chairman,
    I would like to ask unanimous consent that a response from the
    Congressional Research Service to a letter that Senator
    Sullivan and I sent to them be included in the record.
        The research service provided an exhaustive report to us in
    response to questions we had on how China invests in national
    security, examining the investments of the PRC that most
    contribute to the country's power and influence.
        I want to thank the CRS team for the work on this. This is
    a very informative report. I hope it can appear in the
    Committee's records.
        Chairman Reed. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [The letter and CRS report can be found in Appendix B on
    page 96.]

        Senator King. Thank you. Director Haines, I want to talk
    about allocation of intelligence resources. Since we have been
    sitting here this morning, about 15 people have died in this
    country from drug overdoses, just in the last hour and a half.
    In about a week and a half, as many as were killed on September
    11th.
        We are under attack and yet we are not really responding.
    We are sort of numb to it, and particularly we had testimony in
    a previous hearing that between one and 2 percent of the ISR
    resources globally under our control are involved in looking at
    the drug importation problem from South of our country.
        I think that is a gross misallocation of resources. If this
    were a terrorist attack killing 110,000 people a year, we would
    be turning this country upside down to counteract it, and to
    not be allocating the most basic, important intelligence
    resources of ISR in this fight, I think is unconscionable.
        I hope that you will go back to the Administration, and
    particularly to the Intelligence Community, and say this is a
    worldwide threat that is the most immediate threat to American
    lives. Can you make that commitment to me?
        Director Haines. Yes, absolutely, Senator. I think you know
    that, and we have indicated this in other testimony, but the
    leaders of the Intelligence Community completely agree with you
    that this is absolutely critical. We are each of us involved in
    a whole series of efforts to try to expand effectively our
    collection and our----
        Senator King. Well, I have been asking these questions for
    years, and everybody agrees, but I keep saying 1 or 2 percent,
    so----
        Director Haines. Insufficient.
        Senator King.--I am looking for action rather than simply
    expressions of concern. General Berrier, do we have any
    information that you can share in open session about Chinese
    provision of munitions to the Russians in the Ukraine war?
    Because in my view, that would change the calculus if suddenly
    Russia had an infusion of ammunition and other munitions in
    order to counteract the actions of the Ukrainians.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, we watch this very,
    very carefully, and publicly, China has said that they would
    remain neutral in this conflict. We continue to watch them, and
    we can discuss it more in the closed session.
        Senator King. Thank you. You mentioned in your testimony,
    and I notice there is a little subtlety where you said this has
    been a bad year for Russia and Ukraine. But then I think in the
    next phrase you said, but Russia is very dangerous. What is the
    analysis of the likelihood of Putin using nuclear weapons? What
    would trigger it and how likely is it?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, there are a number of
    scenarios that we have thought through, and I would be happy to
    discuss those in a closed session.
        Senator King. Well, I think in an open session, though, can
    you tell me that whether you think there is some likelihood or
    possibility of nuclear weapons being used?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I think, you know, in the
    nature of conflict, there is always that possibility. Right
    now, I would say we think it is unlikely.
        Senator King. Unlikely is good. I would rather hear not
    happen, but we can discuss this further in a closed session.
        Director Haines. Can I?
        Senator King. Yes, go ahead, please.
        Director Haines. I think from the IC perspective, it is
    very unlikely is our current assessment.
        Senator King. Thank you. We can discuss that further in a
    closed session. Director Haines, yes or no question, would the
    expiration of section 702 be a major compromise of national
    security?
        Director Haines. Yes.
        Senator King. I think you have testified about how
    important it is, but I don't think it really comes across that
    this is one of the crown jewels of our intelligence capability,
    is it not?
        Director Haines. Yes. As an example of this, 59 percent of
    every PDB, our President's daily brief articles, are sourced to
    702 information. It gives you a sense of just how critical this
    is. It is utterly fundamental. I could not overState, frankly,
    the value of it.
        Senator King. I know you struggled with this in your
    opening statement, but the problem is the importance of it is
    hard to demonstrate to our membership without compromising
    classified material. That is the dilemma. I think we have to
    accept your representation, which I understand you are talking
    for the entire Intelligence Community. This is an essential
    element of our ability to protect this country. Is that true?
        Director Haines. Yes, absolutely.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator. Senator Ernst, please.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I also would like
    to express my condolences to the family and the friends of the
    late General Stewart. So good morning to our witnesses and
    thanks for the testimony today. The greatest military challenge
    that we face is a really a two-front competition, as you have
    laid out so well this morning, between China and Russia.
        So, I do agree with your judgment that China and Russia
    will maintain their strategic ties, which does create great
    potential threats. Let's be clear, we have heard you state over
    and over again, as we have seen China and Russia advancing,
    they are clearly encircling us around the globe. So, China
    proclaimed a no limits partnership on the eve of Russia's
    invasion. Xi just went to Moscow and affirmed that commitment,
    and we watched all of that unfold on our television sets.
    Director Haynes, first to you. How has Beijing's assessment of
    its junior partner in Moscow changed since the invasion?
        Then to you, General Berrier, do the recent joint military
    exercises suggest a deeper or deepening military commitment
    between the two countries?
        Director Haines. Thank you, Senator. So, in terms of how
    the relationship has changed, and in particularly China's
    perception of it since the invasion of Ukraine. I will say that
    even before the invasion of Ukraine, we recognized that China
    and Russia were getting increasingly closer and that we were
    seeing cooperation across all different sectors.
        But to your point, since the invasion, that closeness has
    accelerated to some extent, and in part this is due to the fact
    that Russia is increasingly beholden to and needs China. China
    perceives Russia increasingly as a country that was already in
    the sort of little brother role is often how it is described,
    but nevertheless is now even more beholden and therefore they
    have greater leverage.
        That can sort of manifest itself in the context of various
    aspects of the relationship, such as in the Arctic, where they
    actually have differing interests, where China is not an Arctic
    country but wants to be in effect, and wants to have more power
    and authority in that area.
        Russia recognizes that they are going to need China and
    their investment in order to get to some of the resources that
    they are interested in the Arctic. As a consequence, that China
    sees an opportunity and an increasing one in light of the
    current scenario with Russia.
        So, we see them now at sort of the peak of their economic
    trade, continuing military exercises and other types of
    collaboration and political and technical. It is moving even as
    we continue to assess from an Intelligence Community
    perspective that there are limits ultimately, that they are
    unlikely to get to the point of being like NATO allies, for
    example, as we see them.
        Senator Ernst. Great. Thank you. General Berrier.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I would describe it as
    deepening and it has been gradual, but the complexity, the
    scope, and the tempo of these joint exercises is increasing
    mostly in the air domain, in the naval domain. We don't have a
    lot of insight into more sensitive activities, but I do believe
    that it is deepening and growing.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, and to both of you as well, with
    this partnership and the deepening of their military commitment
    through exercises and so forth, how can we find a wedge and
    really divide the two countries by driving a wedge between
    them? What can we find as a strategy to separate those two
    powers?
        Director Haines. Yes, it is a great question. We have done
    some analysis and we can get you a more thorough explanation
    rather than my quick remarks. But I would say that we do see
    some challenges for them in getting, you know, as they get
    closer and closer.
        Largely, one can recognize that there is a tension where
    there is such an asymmetry in the power of the relationship,
    where you can actually use that to some extent to exploit some
    of the challenges.
        I think that it is unlikely that we will take them really
    off the trajectory of continuing to get closer in the coming
    years.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I believe it is a
    really tough problem and it is a great question. In a closed
    session, there would be some things that we could discuss.
        Senator Ernst. Okay, excellent, and with that, I will yield
    my remaining time. Thank you.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. On behalf of the Chairman, I
    recognize myself for 5 minutes. Dr. Haines, I do recognize the
    importance of the FISA Section 702 authorization. As you noted,
    59 percent or so of the information given to the President
    daily is sourced to 702. However, Americans do have a
    Constitutional right to not be searched without a warrant.
        So, despite the efforts of Congress, there have been
    reported examples of the Intelligence Community using 702 to
    target U.S. citizens. That is not supposed to happen. So, your
    own office's annual transparency report estimates that in 2021,
    the FBI conducted approximately 3.4 million queries of section
    702 acquired data on U.S. citizens.
        Clearly, existing safeguards are not enough. I have a
    series of quick questions I would like to ask for your
    responses. Director, would imposing a warrant requirement
    before the Government searches section 702 acquired data for
    Americans' communications hamper your intelligence gathering
    against malign foreign actors?
        Director Haines. Thank you, Senator. So, a few things. One
    is 702 is an authority that only permits the targeting of
    foreign persons outside of the United States. So just to be
    clear, if a U.S. person were to be targeted under 702, that
    would be unlawful, and that is something that is noncompliant.
        When you talk about the 3.4 million searches that the FBI
    did, that is not where they are targeting U.S. persons. So,
    what is happening there, is there is about--it is a less than 4
    percent of the data that is brought in from FISA that the FBI
    is able to search. When they are doing searches, often what
    they are looking for is connections that allow them to identify
    victims of, for example, cyber-attacks or other things like
    that.
        So, they are searching through an existing data base to see
    if there is a connection that ultimately would allow them to
    make that connection. We can talk about this more in in
    private--in the closed session to give you greater detail. But
    for example, within the 3.4 million, 1.9 million was related to
    a particular cyber-attack. So, it just gives you a sense of the
    difference.
        That is not something that is necessarily--in other words,
    it is not something that is subject to a warrant, nor would it
    be subject to a warrant per se. But as a general matter, if we
    had to seek a warrant for every target of a foreign person
    abroad, there is no question it would have an enormous impact
    on our work and make it much more challenging.
        Senator Hirono. Yes, but with 3.4 million inquiries based
    on data collected through an appropriate 702 inquiry of foreign
    citizens outside of the U.S. I think there is--there are
    concerns.
        So, my next question is, would statutory limits and
    judicial oversight to prevent the collection and the use of
    American's communications and other Fourth Amendment protected
    information, hamper your intelligence gathering efforts against
    malign foreign actors?
        Director Haines. Make sure that I am understanding you
    correctly, if you are asking us what are additional reforms
    that we would be willing to make? We are absolutely open to
    considering reforms. Attorney General and myself wrote a letter
    to Congress letting you know that, that is something we would
    be happy to discuss.
        I mentioned that we have engaged in a number of reforms in
    the last few years to try to promote additional oversight, and
    we would be happy to talk about whether or not those should
    be----
        Senator Hirono. I am running out of time. So, there are
    concerns about limiting the permissible pool of section 702
    targets and also perhaps removing barriers to existing judicial
    review.
        So, yes, I look forward to working with you. You did
    mention in your testimony that you have the foreign malign
    influence center, and you noted that China, Russia, and Iran
    may be doing things that will interfere with our upcoming
    elections.
        Can you just give us like an example of the kinds of tools
    that would use? Then how do you alert our elections officials
    to this kind of interference?
        Director Haines. Yes, absolutely, and we actually we do and
    did relatively recently an Intelligence Community assessment on
    election influence and interference. There is a version of it
    that is unclassified that we can--you know that we have made
    public as well.
        The kinds of things that we look at are, in fact, efforts
    by adversaries, including Russia, obviously engaging in
    information campaigns or in other types of disinformation work
    to try to undermine, for example, candidates or positions or
    things along those lines.
        We absolutely do share that information both with the
    Department of Homeland Security, with FBI, with--and they tend
    to be the ones to make the connection directly to the election
    officials within the United States. There is a fairly robust,
    sort of network that has been developed in order to provide
    this kind of information.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. General, thank you very much for
    your 39 years of service. I did have some questions for you
    that I will submit for the record. I call on Senator Cramer.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Thank you both
    for being here and for your service. I had to step out for a
    while to take a phone call from a reporter in Grand Forks,
    North Dakota.
        The reason for the question was, as you know, the
    Administration yesterday announced an expansion of scrutiny
    over land purchases around military bases. They added, I think,
    eight or nine bases in states like North Dakota, South Dakota,
    Texas, Iowa, to the 100-mile radius as a highly sensitive base.
    In other words, it was given CFIUS [Committee on Foreign
    Investments in the United States] jurisdiction within 100 miles
    of these bases.
        One of them is the Grand Forks Air Force Base, another the
    Minot Air Force base. You may recall there was, we had quite a
    year last year dealing with a Chinese purchase of some land
    near Grand Forks for a wet corn mill facility.
        Anyway, all of that, finally, the Air Force said, bad idea,
    let's not do it. CFIUS didn't have jurisdiction because it was
    only 12 miles from the base. My question isn't to comment
    specifically on Grand Forks and cities, but rather is there an
    increased intelligence involvement or scrutiny of land
    purchases by foreign entities, particularly adversarial foreign
    entities?
        Director Haines. Yes is the simple answer, in the sense
    that over the last many years now, just as a broader context,
    and I suspect you already know this, but basically, as we have
    enacted tools such as CFIUS, for example, using the Chinese as
    an example, they have figured out ways to get around some of
    these issues in order to still try to achieve the results that
    they are looking to achieve.
        We have seen in the mechanisms that on a bipartisan basis,
    Administrations have enacted, I think expanding from the CFIUS
    statute, for example, to an executive order that allows for the
    review of transactions where telecom companies, for example,
    are purchasing land and then selling telecom services to U.S.
    citizens where that information may be then taken and misuse.
        So, there is a variety of examples, I think, of scenarios
    in which that issue at least has come up.
        Senator Cramer. No, well said. I appreciate it. General,
    anything you would want to add to that?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Clearly, a counterintelligence
    threat. Senator, you lay that out, and the purview of the DOJ
    and the FBI here in CONUS. But from a foreign perspective, we
    see this behavior and activity in other countries around the
    world. Clearly a huge counterintelligence threat.
        Senator Cramer. Great. Thank you. With regard--I want to
    comment on Senator King's questions about ISR and the 1 to 2
    percent dedicated to specifically to drug trafficking. Is that
    a priority--simply a prioritization issue, or do we just need
    more capacity to do really good ISR? Because I want to be fair
    that 1 to 2 percent isn't very much but do, we have enough in
    general to cover all of the things that you have to watch.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, every combatant
    commander that speaks before this Committee will say the same
    thing, that they don't have enough ISR. I think it is a
    capacity issue. Certainly, technology can help, advances in
    space, and other sorts of sensing capabilities. But it is a
    really difficult conversation with our SOUTHCOM partners on how
    bad this problem is.
        Senator Cramer. Yes. Great. Thank you. I suspected as much,
    and you are right, it is unanimous among the combatant
    commanders. So, Director Haines, I am going to really shift
    gears here a little bit because we are talking about worldwide
    threats, and it is easy to keep--to talk about the big ones
    that are obvious and always in front of us.
        But there are other smaller skirmishes here and there that
    I think may not be as significant but still significant. I
    would like your take on one in particular, and that is what is
    going on in Haiti.
        I have a number of friends that are involved in charitable
    work. In fact, I am kind of stunned how many friends I have
    involved in charitable work, and they are just distraught about
    what is going on in Haiti.
        Now, Haiti, I don't have to tell you where it is in its
    proximity, and it is--maybe you could just tell me a little bit
    about what you were seeing in Haiti? What--to the degree you
    are able to tell me what you think--what is being done and what
    can be done.
        These are policy questions, I understand that, but I think
    we need to engage a little bit and not just let it fall
    because--for obvious reasons. Maybe just expand to the last 30
    seconds of my time on that.
        Director Haines. Yes. Thank you. I couldn't agree more with
    the fact that this is a really vexing issue and one that should
    be focused on.
        I can tell you that from an Intelligence Community
    perspective, we have been looking to try to find ways to
    support, in effect, what I understand the policy community is
    looking at, which is a multinational force that would try to
    address the situation both from the perspective of training
    police and also to sort of try to manage the violence that has
    erupted and the gang control of territory in this area.
        I will say briefly that, first of all, we have a lot of
    analytic products. I am happy to provide you what I think is
    the best that we have on this. But it is--none of it is
    optimistic, which is to say that this is a really challenging
    situation and it does not look as if it is going to get better
    any time soon.
        Senator Cramer. So, if I might, General, I mean, are there
    security concerns in addition to just the moral and ethical
    concerns?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I think there are security
    concerns, and moral and ethical concerns. When I look at it, it
    is sort of the loss of credibility in the government and
    government's instutions, their ability to provide services, a
    terrible economy, a population at risk.
        Then and at the same time, this rise of these organized
    criminal elements that seem to be taking over and challenging
    the security forces. So really a perfect storm, and I think in
    our hemisphere, we are paying attention to that.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you both.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Senator Warren,
    please.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, cryptocurrency
    is now the method of choice for countries to evade sanctions so
    that they can fund weapons programs, support spying, and
    promote cyber-attacks.
        Crypto crime is hidden, but we know that in 2022 alone,
    there was over $20 billion in illicit transactions. We also
    know that Russia, Iran, and North Korea moved around at least
    $8 billion using crypto.
        So, let's focus for just a minute on North Korea. This one
    country stole a record breaking $1.7 billion. According to the
    U.N. Security Council, North Korea uses its crypto crime to
    fund its nuclear weapons development.
        General Berrier, you lead the Defense Intelligence Agency,
    which collects intel on foreign militaries, including on North
    Korea. When North Korea launders billions of dollars? worth of
    crypto and funnels it into its nuclear program, does that
    threaten our national security?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Certainly, Senator, as North
    Korea steals that money and then tries to turn it into a legal
    tender, which at great cost, as you know. That is helping them
    build their nuclear capacity and that is a threat that we
    recognize.
        Senator Warren. Thank you. So, Director Haines, earlier
    this year, the United States Intelligence Community, which you
    lead, put out its annual threat assessment in which you
    identified North Korean cryptocurrency heists as part of, and I
    am going to quote you here, ``sophisticated and agile
    espionage, cybercrime, and attack threat.'' So, let me ask you,
    does a sophisticated and agile espionage, cybercrime, and
    attack threat undermine our national security?
        Director Haines. Yes, absolutely, and just to pull it
    apart, to say that it is not just--although obviously the
    funding is critical. It is not just the funding of essentially
    nuclear programs that the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of
    Korea] may have involved in, but it is also posing a cyber-
    threat to important networks. That is part of what it is that
    we see as a national security threat.
        Senator Warren. Thank you. So, let's move to another
    example. A 2021 study found that nearly 5 percent of the
    world's Bitcoin mining takes place in Iran. The biggest crypto
    mine in the country is run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
    Corps and is backed by Chinese investment. How much sanctions
    evasion are we talking about here? Well, one crypto exchange
    alone, Binance, has processed $8 billion worth of Iranian
    transactions since 2018. So General Berrier, when the Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard Corps uses crypto mining to replace revenue
    that they lose through sanctions, does that threaten our
    national security?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I think it certainly
    threatens our U.S. Forces in the region. Cryptocurrency,
    Bitcoin is one method of how they finance their operations, so
    I think it is certainly a component of that, yes.
        Senator Warren. Okay. Thank you, and I am going to do one
    more and get one more example in here, and that is Russia,
    because Russia is ransomware central. The most prolific and
    dangerous ransomware gangs are thought to be run by criminals
    in Russia.
        Russia affiliated ransomware gangs have stolen from
    American schools, American hospitals, American power stations,
    and American businesses. Director Haines, do you know what
    portion of ransomware is paid in crypto?
        Director Haines. So, we assess that the vast majority of
    modern ransomware operators demand cryptocurrency, and when
    those demands are met, they probably are paid in that form.
        But part of the challenge for us in terms of identifying
    specifically how much is being used--you know, is using
    cryptocurrency, is that we just--all ransomware incidents or
    payments aren't reported or documented----
        Senator Warren. Fair enough, fair enough. But when the
    HSGAC Committee, Homeland Security Committee, put out its
    report, it said basically it is 100 percent. Does that sound
    about right to you? This is a business model built on crypto,
    is it not?
        Director Haines. Yes, I mean--the vast majority, I think
    over 90 percent, is perfectly reasonable.
        Senator Warren. Okay, and then, General Berrier, does the
    fact that ransomware gangs in Russia and around the world are
    using crypto to demand ransoms from American hospitals and
    schools and power stations and businesses, does that threaten
    our national security?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I believe it does, Senator,
    yes.
        Senator Warren. You know, I appreciate this. I appreciate
    your answers. You know, just think about what we are talking
    about here. North Korean nuclear weapons. Iranian sanctions.
    Russian ransomware. Drug trafficking. Human trafficking. Some
    of the major threats to our national security are facilitated
    by crypto.
        That is why Senator Roger Marshall, and I will soon
    reintroduce our bill to crack down on illicit crypto activity.
    Our bill is not about SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission]
    regulation or cracking down on crypto investor scams, although
    I think we need to do that.
        Our bill is about law enforcement and national security and
    keeping our country safe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Scott,
    please.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Thanks, both of you for
    being here. Xi, in the last 12 months, has given a variety of
    speeches that he is preparing the Chinese population for war.
    What should we take from that? How do you each of you assess
    that?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. So, as we listen to Xi Jinping
    and his style of communication, he has been on a long-term
    campaign to oversee China's rise. Now that he is in his third
    term, we see his rhetoric picking up. I believe that there are
    a number of dates out there that mean different things to
    different people. We have talked about 2025, 2027, 2035 and
    2049. I think the bottom line is he has told his military to be
    ready. For what, we are not sure. When, we are not sure. DIA
    watches this very, very closely and we evaluate closely every
    word that he says and where he goes in his speeches.
        Director Haines. Thank you. Just to add, but certainly
    agree with everything that General Berrier said. I think we
    continue to assess that he would prefer to achieve unification
    of Taiwan through peaceful means, but the reality is that he is
    and has directed his military to provide him with the military
    option, essentially, to be able to take it without concern of
    our intervention.
        That is something that will have a meaningful impact on his
    capacity to do so and also his decisionmaking, presumably.
        Senator Scott. Do you assess the position the American
    economy would be in with our dependance on communist China if
    they did decide to invade Taiwan and we decided to come to
    Taiwan's aid? What impact would that have on our economy?
        Director Haines. Yes. So, obviously we can't provide
    precision because the scenario will matter when it happens. All
    of those kinds of things would be critical to actually
    providing an assessment.
        But it is without question, and there have been studies
    done by external think tanks and others on the impact, the
    economic impact that an invasion of Taiwan would have on the
    global financial economy.
        I will say that because TSMC [Taiwan Semiconductor
    Manufacturing Company], the manufacturer of semiconductor chips
    on Taiwan, if that is blocked, it will have an enormous global
    financial impact that I think runs somewhere between $600
    billion to over $1 trillion on an annual basis for the first
    several years on the global financial economy is the general
    estimate.
        Because those chips, those advanced chips are--and over 90
    percent come from Taiwan and they are in almost every category
    of electronic device around the world, and so therefore, until
    we would be able to sort of make up the difference, they would
    have this enormous impact.
        It will also have an impact on our GDP [Gross Domestic
    Product] if there were such an invasion of Taiwan and that was
    blocked. It would also have an impact if they start making
    chips on China's economy, and I think that is another aspect of
    this and in fact a more significant impact on their GDP if they
    were unable to get those.
        Senator Scott. You want to add anything?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Just that I think watching the
    impact that--the economic impact on Russia as they have invaded
    Ukraine with the sanctions. Not an exact an comparison, maybe
    apples and oranges, but I think it gives us an idea of how to
    model this when it happens or if it happens.
        Senator Scott. What is your assessment of risk in Latin
    America? Senator Cramer talked about Haiti, but we know Cuba is
    a State sponsor of terrorism, and they have allowed our
    adversaries to be in Cuba.
        Maduro is doing the exact same thing in Venezuela. So, what
    is your assessment of the risk of bad actors being in Latin
    American? What is the risk that Communist China is going to be
    able to open up military bases in Latin America?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. For the time being, I would say
    the risk is moderate. We do see Chinese and Russian actors in
    Central and South America, something that we watch very, very
    carefully. We have a consistent messaging campaign through our
    defense attache network in Central and South America to talk
    about why this is a bad deal for them. We watch it carefully. I
    don't think they are very, very close to acquiring full up
    operational bases in Central or South America right now.
        Senator Scott. Anything you want to add? All right. What is
    your assessment of the commitment that Germany has to make sure
    that--they will do everything under their power to make sure
    Ukraine succeeds in a war against Russia?
        Director Haines. I think, honestly, that Germany has
    exceeded our analysts' expectations prior to the war, for
    example, in terms of its commitment to providing support to
    Ukraine. We have seen them be actually a stalwart ally on this
    issue, and yes, moving forward.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Nothing that on that.
        Senator Scott. All right. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Peters,
    please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you to both of you for your testimony here today and for
    your service to our country.
        Director Haines, the proliferation of cameras, commercial
    satellite imagery, and social media have helped create an
    environment where open-source intelligence is often one step
    behind, but sometimes a step ahead from traditional
    intelligence gathering efforts.
        The buildup of Russian forces as they prepared to invade
    Ukraine was well documented. With both domestic and foreign
    observers able to confirm troop and vehicle movements, even
    identify entire units who were moving to the front.
        I was also taken by article by the Modern War Institute at
    West Point that talked and some quotes from some intelligence
    operators. They were talking about, of course, the intense need
    for intelligence as this war was progressing, and in this
    saying, ``we were collecting only a fraction of what was
    needed.
        This was not a surprise with the largest war in Europe
    since World War II occurring. Intelligence capabilities were in
    high demand. This did not, however, diminish the frustration of
    walking out of the scif, turning on our phones, and gaining
    access to more and more relevant open-source content than we
    had actually at our workstations.''
        Open-source intelligence has uncovered fields of Chinese
    nuclear silos, new PRC shipyard activity, the buildup of PRC
    troops along the front in India. In short, open-source
    intelligence seems to be democratizing the intelligence field,
    and I want to make sure that we are adequately prepared to
    harness this activity.
        So, my question for you, and General, if you have comments
    on those too, is what changes must the IC community make to
    ensure that the United States is maintaining a strategic
    advantage in espionage and intelligence gathering, particularly
    as these new technologies are coming on board and are
    democratized, and our adversaries and others have access to
    this information as well. How are we thinking this problem set
    through?
        Director Haines. Yes, it is a multi-dimensional issue,
    right? This is something that has been a big focus. I know
    General Berrier will have a lot to say because the Defense
    Intelligence Agency does a lot in the open-source sort of space
    for the Intelligence Community. But first of all, we are in a
    position where really every element has a version of open
    source that they are working on.
        However, we are not in a position where we feel as if the
    entire Intelligence Community is leveraging sort of the best of
    what we can do in this space yet, and that is something that we
    have been focused on.
        We have done a study to look at how we can improve our
    efforts, how we can leverage each other's efforts in this
    space, and you will hear from General Berrier about what DIA
    does. But also, how we can invest in it in a way that supports
    essentially what we collect clandestinely and, you know, allow
    us to bring together the two sources of information so that we
    can provide a complete picture that is more insightful than
    what you might get from open source.
        But at the same time to recognize that there is value in
    actually using open source to help to reveal a picture of what
    is happening in different places and share that with the world.
    At the same time, on the flip side, and just mentioned two
    things that I think are worth noting is that we are very
    conscious of the fact that in this area we have to be extremely
    careful about how we approach privacy and civil liberties
    issues.
        One of the issues that we know has been of concern for many
    Members of Congress is how we deal with, for example,
    commercially available information. That is, for example,
    information that we may purchase as part of our efforts to
    engage in open source, and trying to make sure that we are
    developing sophisticated policies and frameworks to ensure that
    we are handling that information appropriately.
        When we collect it, collecting it appropriately in these
    places. Finally recognizing that spyware and our adversaries'
    access to open-source information also makes them far more
    sophisticated in their capacity to target and to from a
    counterintelligence perspective affect us. That is something we
    are also looking to try to manage and to counter appropriately.
        Senator Peters. Great. Limited time, General, but I want to
    hear your thoughts.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Yes. Just briefly. Senator, I
    think open source is kind of the new frontier for the
    Intelligence Community, but it is also a bit of a wild, wild
    west. So, in my role as the intelligence enterprise manager for
    the Department of Defense on open source, what I have to make
    sure is that the DOD entities that are doing open-source
    collection and analysis are not getting ripped off from the
    data sources and how much they pay.
        That we have the right tools and right training, the right
    tradecraft so that we can go forward to make sure that open
    source and its richness augments everything that we do on the
    sensitive side for a more fulsome picture of what is happening
    out there in the world. I appreciate that question. Thank you.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, General.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator
    Tuberville, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much. Director Haines,
    what is your assessment of Iran's seasoned its second tank, oil
    tanker in a week in international waters?
        Director Haines. Sir, can we take that in closed session? I
    think there is something to be said, but--yes.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much. General Berrier,
    SOUTHCOM Commander has been stating for years that Chinese
    influence in Central and South America is increasing and we are
    at risk of losing our status as a partner of choice for many
    critical allies in the region. I just spent a lot of time down
    in Panama. Do you agree with this assessment? If so, what
    impact would this loss of status have on the safety and defense
    of the Homeland?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I do agree with General
    Richardson, and I believe that we should be doing everything
    that we can to talk to our partners and allies down in Central
    and South America about the value that the United States
    brings.
        Senator Tuberville. Director Haines?
        Director Haines. Completely agree.
        Senator Tuberville. Same thing. Do we see an imminent
    threat in that area?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Not an imminent military
    threat, but I think there is a reputational threat. There is an
    economic threat because they bring their resources quickly. I
    think we have to be insightful in thinking through how we beat
    that.
        Senator Tuberville. All right. Direct Haines, I am
    concerned about--we are all concerned about the rise threat of
    terrorism, especially since the debacle in Afghanistan. In
    March, General Kurilla told this Committee that in his
    estimation, ISIS-K could do an external operation against the
    United States or Western interests abroad in under 6 months
    with little or no warning. Do you agree with this assessment?
        Director Haines. Yes. One of your colleagues raised this
    earlier. I would have to check with our analysts to see if they
    still agree with that. There have been some developments, that
    we can talk about in closed session, since that statement was
    made that I think could affect the timeline. But I agree that
    ISIS-K remains intent on looking to do external attacks.
        Senator Tuberville. General?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, I think our line is
    something like 6 to 12 months. I am not disagreeing with
    General Kurilla's analysis or his team down at CENTCOM.
    Sometimes at different points we might see it slightly
    different, depending on where we are at and what we are looking
    at.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. I yield my time.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
    Rosen, please.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    both for being here today. Good to see you here and the really
    thoughtful answers. I want to build a little bit on what
    Senator Scott was talking about in countering the rising
    Chinese influence. So, Director Haines, of course, we know in
    recent months, China has rapidly increased its engagement
    around the world.
        This includes brokering, actually trying to broker
    troubling agreements between--to reestablish diplomatic ties
    between Iran and Saudi Arabia, offering to broker peace deals
    between Ukraine and the Russian aggressors. So, these
    incidents, they highlight China's persistent presence and
    intention to exert its influence and match the United States as
    a global power.
        So how can the United States address China's increasing
    involvement in global diplomatic matters? Can we expect to see
    more countries try to turn to China as a mediator? What do you
    think the implications of this pivot would mean to us?
        Director Haines. Thank you, Senator. It is very thoughtful
    question. I think, obviously, China's engaging in international
    fora in and of itself is not a challenger problem. It is how
    they engage and the way in which they use that engagement to
    actually undermine, for example, global norms and the
    international order in the way that we have designed it.
        We have spent quite a bit of time in the Intelligence
    Community trying to map out how they are approaching their
    engagement in international fora in order to do just that.
        I would say that this is a place where we have been looking
    at their efforts to essentially sort of garner influence and
    change the direction of international organizations so as to
    support their particular approach to global norms, which is
    more aligned with an authoritarian system.
        You look at organizations such as the ITU or the
    International Telecommunications Union, and other places where
    I think there have been concerns about China's influence and
    efforts in those spaces.
        That is something I know the policy community is focused on
    trying to manage. I think another aspect of it is, as you
    rightly point out, their effort to try to create coalitions. I
    would have to say that in that area we have seen them have
    mixed success.
        You know, there is sort of things like the 17+1 forum and
    other things like that that they have tried to do, where
    because they took quite a bullying approach to trying to get
    other countries to do what they wanted to do, it actually
    backfired to some extent on them, and they weren't able to
    engage in as much influence as we thought. There are yet other
    variations on the theme that I think are important to our work
    moving forward. Maybe General Berrier has more.
        Senator Rosen. Yes.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I believe China is trying to
    enhance its reputation on the global stage. When I look at the
    examples that you gave, we are a key security partner with the
    Kingdom, and we are a key security partner with Ukraine.
        We also have influence, and we are in discussions with
    those partners every single day on really tough issues. I think
    whether those are military diplomats and the defense attache
    service, or the work that our State Department is doing, we
    have got a great message.
        Senator Rosen. Well, I want to build on this because
    China's gaining a hold in the Middle East. They want to gain a
    hold there. Our partners in the region, they want to hedge--
    they may want to hedge what they could perceive as America's
    diminishing global engagement.
        So, building on what you are talking about, how does the
    United States, how do we reassure our allies and partners in
    the Middle East, but more broadly, that we will remain a force
    for stability and security and steadfast with them in the
    region?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Even though our military
    commitments have come down in the central region, U.S. Central
    Command is still very active in this area. We have a forward
    headquarters in Qatar.
        We have deployed forces there still, and it is not a large
    number, but they are they are actively there. We have
    longstanding relationships with these partners, and so, it is
    our ability to continue to communicate with them, to
    demonstrate American resolve in the region, and to bring what
    it is that the U.S. brings.
        Senator Rosen. Director, anything? No. Yes, we had a recent
    trip there, and I think that was the biggest concern from at
    least the Abraham Accord countries that we visited, that we
    would remain steadfast in the region.
        Speaking of the region, I only have 33 seconds left, so I
    will just ask this for the record, but I really want to talk
    about Iran and Russia, their defense cooperation, how concerned
    we are about the sale of Russian aircraft and air defense
    systems to Iran.
        I will take that off the record as I only--unless you can
    answer in about 30 seconds, I will just--we know what Iran is
    seeking from Russia.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Certainly. I think this is a
    relationship of convenience at the moment, and I think the
    Iranians are gaining some benefit for providing munitions, UAVs
    [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles], and such to the Russians. We are
    watching it very, very carefully, and we will see where this
    relationship goes.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Mullin,
    please.
        Senator Mullin. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Director
    Haines and General, for being here. I am going to--I am just
    going to make a quick question about, I believe it is
    pronounced Vagner, but I believe the media pronounces Wagner
    Group all the time. I am going to hold out most of these
    questions for actually the closed session.
        But right now, we see--I mean, in my opinion and I would
    like to get your opinion. In my opinion, Putin is using the
    Wagner group to kind of do his bidding around, literally around
    the world.
        They are--and in my opinion, truly my opinion, they are
    acting more like a terrorist organization than they are a
    malicious group or a contracting group when they are in sowing
    instability, supporting groups, spreading lies, exporting
    critical minerals around the world, pressuring governments to
    distance themselves from us.
        Would you describe their behavior as more acting, more like
    a terrorist group, Director Haines?
        Director Haines. Yes, I would absolutely support the
    perspective that Wagner is actively working in ways that is
    actually driving tourism, particularly in the continent of
    Africa, for example. That is an example of what you are
    describing.
        Senator Mullin. General.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. It is a really interesting
    question. When you look at their business model, how they try
    to build security in nations and conduct paramilitary
    operations and support those nations, there are some atrocities
    that have been reported and committed. I don't know that I
    would go as far as calling them a terrorist organization right
    now. I would have to----
        Senator Mullin. No, I wouldn't--I am not, I am saying
    acting. I was very careful in saying acting. I am not calling
    them a terrorist organization. I am saying acting more like
    that----
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Certainly, you could draw a
    conclusion like that, yes.
        Senator Mullin. So, and we see, their behavior is they
    typically go into these countries that are in disarray and they
    offer to provide security for organizations. Would you agree
    that is kind of how they get their footing in these countries,
    a lot of times?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Certainly, along with business
    opportunities to be developed.
        Senator Mullin. Right. Now, I want to switch my gears real
    quick to China. According to some open sources, China now is
    controlling the inner river that runs through Argentina in
    South America, and is charging tariffs, taxes in the name of
    the PRC for goods being shipped in and out. We also see that
    they have influence basically in all of South America except
    one country. General, you said that we are fighting back with
    information.
        But it seems like those countries are in more need of
    infrastructure in dollars, which is what China is investing.
    Are we winning or losing in South America with information,
    technology, and providing the good deeds that Oklahoma does--
    not Oklahoma, but the United States does?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Well, certainly, I know that we
    are talking to our partners about this issue every day. Whether
    we are winning or losing, hard for me to judge that. I am not
    tracking this river in Argentina where they are collecting
    taxes, but I do know where there is infrastructure, ports,
    airfields that they can buildupon, that they will take
    advantage of that business enterprise.
        Senator Mullin. So, are you familiar with the influence
    that they have, the strong influence that has grown over the
    last 10 years in Central and South America?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Yes, I am.
        Senator Mullin. Are you familiar with the only country that
    they are currently don't have a foothold in South America? I
    find it--and I am not--General, I am not--this isn't an, I got
    you, question because I honestly feel like you and I have been
    developing a friendship over the last couple of years.
        But I do find it somewhat concerning because that
    information is not hard to find and it is nothing that requires
    being read in on. It is concerning to me when I have such a
    strong influence in Central America, which is growing, but in
    South America, we are losing.
        I would say we are not too far off from losing control of
    the Panama Canal, too. I believe you would probably agree with
    that in some sense. If course doesn't correct pretty quick,
    they are going to control the main shipping lanes through
    there. Would you agree?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I would say that that certainly
    requires U.S. attention for sure, yes.
        Senator Mullin. That would play right into the role of the
    Belt and Road Initiative, to which China is trying to get all
    the world depended on.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Yes.
        Senator Mullin. So, is information enough or should we be
    looking at this in a different strategy to correct course?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Ranging into the policy sector
    there. Certainly, the more that we can bring, the better, for
    sure.
        Senator Mullin. Well, we need that information. I think the
    American people need to know what threat is really knocking on
    our back door and why it is a threat. It is not just rhetoric.
    It is something that--extreme concern. I would say China is
    trying to fulfill what Stalin said, trying to destroy America
    from within, and that slowly, slowly choking us out. With that,
    I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Mullin. Senator
    Budd, please.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. General, Director, thank
    you both for being here and for your service as well. I would
    like to focus on the INDOPACOM AOR [area of responsibility] for
    just a little bit. Director Haines, in this year's annual
    threat assessment, it states expanded military postures by both
    India and China along their disputed border elevates the risk
    of armed confrontation between two nuclear powers. What do you
    assess is the risk of India and China's border dispute erupting
    into a conflict?
        Director Haines. It is not insignificant, and this is on
    the line of actual control between----
        Senator Budd. Correct.
        Director Haines.--Indian and the Chinese border, as you
    indicate. China has been building up its infrastructure along
    the border and continuing to increase their presence. We have
    seen, eruptions at different times, but we have obviously been
    working with India in order to try to ensure that we are
    supporting them and their efforts to manage this.
        Senator Budd. Thank you. General, the buildup that the
    Director just referred to along the line of actual control.
    What assistance, if any, is DIA providing to our Indian
    partners?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. We have, through USINDOPACOM,
    joint intelligence team there, have reached out to our Indian
    partners. We have a relationship with them, and we are
    attempting to support their needs.
        Senator Budd. Thank you. Director, just last week, the
    Chinese accosted a Philippine Coast Guard ship, as many of us
    are aware of. I mean, it appears that these are becoming more
    and more frequent. So, are these negligent or intentional
    encounters? What is the IC's assessment of the purpose of China
    doing this?
        Director Haines. Yes. We actually have some very good
    products on this that if you are interested, we should get to
    you. But this is----
        Senator Budd. If you would, please.
        Director Haines. What we have seen with China is they have
    expanded significantly their coast guard over the last many
    years. They have also begun to use their coast guard in new
    ways. So, in other words, they pass laws that allow them to use
    their coast guard to police, in effect, what they perceive as
    being their rightful waters, and to use even force under
    certain circumstances.
        So, no, I do see this as part of a larger comprehensive
    effort that they have engaged in. There are sort of three
    different pieces to it. There is the ships that they use that
    are part of militia that are not actually part of the coast
    guard or the PLA.
        Then there is the coast guard, and then there is the PLA,
    and the relationship that they have with each of these
    different sort of forces is related and sometimes intersects.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, and a question for both of you, if
    you would. Director, we will start with you. What is your
    assessment of the Chinese military's ability to conduct a
    cross-strait amphibious assault of Taiwan? They have now
    effectively practiced a blockade, but are they ready for a
    major amphibious landing? Director first.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Senator, we can----
        Senator Budd. Director first, and then if you are referring
    us to the closed session--if there is anything you can share in
    this setting, please do.
        Senator Budd. Yes, I would honestly defer to General
    Berrier on their capacity and probably would do it in a close
    session.
        Senator Budd. Understood. Director, any comments on that?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I would just say a very, very
    complicated military operation. We have we have observed
    exercises where they review the points on an operation like
    this, and we can provide more detail in a closed session.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, and one final question for you,
    General. So, DIA's China military power report came out in
    2019, so it is 4 years old now. If a new version was published
    today, what would the top line changes be? How has the military
    balance of power changed in Asia over the last 4 years?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I think we would probably start
    describing the advances that they have made in every domain of
    their military capability in the short 4 years. They have
    really advanced some of those capabilities.
        We talk about space. We talk about their nuclear--expanded
    nuclear capacity, and we would probably also talk about their
    expanded reach throughout the Indo-Pacific and some of those
    things that we were talking about before, like the maritime
    fishing police and the coast guard, and those actions.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, both, again for your time and for
    your service. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd. Senator Schmitt,
    please.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Haines,
    I want to ask you, the CBP has reported that thousands of
    Chinese nationals have come across the Southern border. An
    increase of about 800 percent, I think is the most recent
    estimate. I guess the question for you is, what are some of the
    factors causing this?
        Director Haines. Thank you, Senator. I don't have a full
    answer to that. Why don't I get you that in writing, in
    response?
        Senator Schmitt. Okay. I am not trying to trip you up here,
    my hope would be that the Intelligence Community has some idea
    why we are seeing this increase.
        Director Haines. Yes, we have done some analysis on this. I
    have taken a look at it. They went back to look at more
    questions and I would rather give you a full answer on that.
        Senator Schmitt. Okay. That is fair, and so, I guess I will
    ask you, and if it is the same answer, I understand. But do you
    expect or are you anticipating an increase in the number of
    Chinese nationals seeking to cross the Southern border?
        Director Haines. Yes. I would rather give you the full--
    what I have seen is that it went up in than it seems to have
    gone down a little bit is my recollection, and so unclear what
    the trajectory is, and I think we should give you something----
        Senator Schmitt. Okay. My concern obviously with Title 42
    expiring, has accounted for about 50 percent of all the
    expulsions I think, is very concerning if this is an
    intentional effort by the CCP to send assets across our
    Southern border.
        I think the American people deserve to know what is
    happening and I don't think we do. It is a very concerning
    development, and it is ongoing, and we have seen an increase.
    My concern is again, giving one of the tools that has been
    useful in sending people back is going away and we need to be
    prepared for that.
        I guess switching gears, and this could be for either one
    of you, but I will start with you, Director Haines. During the
    disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, billions of dollars?
    worth of valuable equipment were lost or left behind, I should
    say, in addition, of course, to the brave servicemen who lost
    their lives.
        But just to put that in perspective, there was $48 million
    worth of ammunition, 80 aircraft, 23,000 Humvees, 250,000
    automatic rifles, 95 drones, 42,000 pieces of sensitive
    military equipment, including night vision goggles. How have
    the Taliban utilized this? What do we know? Have they been
    selling this to adversaries? Where is all this equipment and
    how is it being used?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Largely our understanding is
    that the Taliban have organized their security forces, that
    they have fallen in on this equipment. I haven't seen a lot of
    reporting that would indicate that they are selling it. I think
    they are trying to incorporate it into whatever security force
    they develop.
        Senator Schmitt. Do you have anything to add to that,
    Director Haines? Okay. I do want to ask about an after-action
    report on the withdrawal from Afghanistan that obviously was a
    total mess.
        What are your plans to provide an unclassified after-action
    report here? I think there are only some Senators who have been
    able to see it, but I think that given the nature of this--and
    there has been some public reporting that--about what is out
    there, that seems to just sort of blame the previous
    Administration.
        I mean, I think this was one of the more disturbing
    failures in at least modern history. What are your plans to
    have sort of an accounting of this, of what went wrong, and
    make sure this never happens again? Or do you have plans to do
    that?
        Director Haines. Not from the Intelligence Community. We
    don't have any plans to provide an unclassified after-action
    report on Afghanistan. I don't--I can't speak----
        Senator Schmitt. Well, I guess, and I will just close with
    this, and I don't--this is not a partisan statement. I just--
    the idea that what happened in Afghanistan, the fact that the
    American people have not, to this point, gotten an actual
    thorough review of an after-action report of what went wrong
    and how we can make sure this never happens again is deeply
    concerning.
        So, this question isn't just for you. It is being asked of
    other people and we will continue to do that. But I just think
    for the memory of the men and women who were lost, all of the
    equipment that I mentioned, it was just a total debacle and we
    have got to do better, and make sure it never happens again.
        So, I suppose we will be working with you to figure out
    what information you can provide to more fully inform the
    American people. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. I have been informed
    that Senator Sullivan is en route. So, I will take the
    opportunity to further ask a few questions and give him the
    opportunity to get here, but it won't be indefinite.
        One of the issues that we are facing is the, as was
    mentioned before, the proliferation of media, virtual media,
    and now what is approaching is the next great step, AI. Do you
    have any concerns that AI will disrupt our life dramatically,
    and that there are steps that we should start contemplating
    now?
        I know the Administration has announced yesterday that they
    are taking steps to protect AI. In terms of the Intelligence
    Community, how are you doing this, Director Haines?
        Director Haines. Yes, thank you very much, Senator. I do, I
    think you are wise to be focused on this and that it will have
    disruptive impact. We have been writing some analysis to try to
    look at what the potential impact is on society in a variety of
    different realms, and obviously see some impact in intelligence
    activities that we would be happy to talk to you in closed
    session on.
        But what we also recognize is that we do not yet have our
    hands around what the potential is, and what we have been doing
    in the Intelligence Community, there have been many elements
    have themselves put together task forces, experts who are
    looking at these issues, who are trying to understand in
    particular the impact of generative AI, as you have noted it.
        We have been trying to facilitate groups of experts in the
    IC to essentially connect with those in the private sector who
    are on the cutting edge of some of these developments so that
    we can make sure that we understand what they see as potential
    uses and developments in this area as well.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Just a quick question,
    listening to the discussion about the withdrawal of
    Afghanistan. Most of that equipment and supplies were committed
    to the Afghan army, and that was a planned commitment. That was
    not leaving, deliberately leaving equipment behind. That was
    the tactical equipment for the Afghan army, which we all hoped
    would continue to function. Is that correct?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. That was always the plan at
    those Afghan cores that we stood up and trained----
        Chairman Reed. That plan was developed in the Trump
    Administration after the Doha agreement?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. That is correct.
        Chairman Reed. Then also in terms of--I think I agree,
    obviously, that it has to be public, but we should all be aware
    that the Congress and this Committee authorized a commission to
    study the entire situation in Afghanistan over the 20-year
    period.
        That commission is at work today and it will publish the
    results and those results will be available to the public.
    There might be some classified material, but it will be
    available to the public. So, thank you. Senator Sullivan,
    please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    holding this open. Appreciate the witnesses being here. DNI
    Haines, I want to just follow up a little bit first, quickly,
    on the AI piece. Did you happen to read the very long and
    insightful piece by Henry Kissinger and Eric Schmidt, the
    Google founder and senior MIT professor on AI? Did you read
    that?
        Director Haines. I know exactly what you are talking about,
    and it is on my pile, but I have not yet read it, so I
    apologize.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes, I would strongly recommend, take a
    look. I think it is such a big topic. The Economist has a whole
    focus on it today. There is all these great opportunities. You
    know, Henry Kissinger still going at it. I think he turned 100
    or he is turning 100 here very soon. Incredible mind. He brings
    some insights that are very chilling to the uses of AI and what
    it could mean, particularly on the national security front.
        I think it would be good for you guys to do a deep dive on
    this and come back to the Committee. We are all trying to
    figure it out. You have tech companies saying it is the best
    thing since sliced bread. You have other people saying it is
    going to doom the world.
        But I think putting the tech companies fully in charge, I
    don't think it is a good idea either. So, we really need your
    guy's insight, and I think it would be good if you can come
    back to the Committee, either classified or unclassified on
    that topic.
        Take a look at that piece. So, it is really well written
    and pretty scary, to be honest, and these aren't people who are
    prone to be Pollyannish. Let me turn to my----
        Director Haines. I will do that.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Let me turn to my favorite
    topic, energy. I always like to recount this story. It is now
    quite a sad story because some--I am sure you know, Vladimir
    Kara-Murza was in jail for 25 years, unjustly sentenced. I hope
    we can keep beating the drums to tell Putin to let them out.
    All he was doing was speaking the truth about democracy and
    freedom in Russia.
        A very courageous man. I was in a meeting with him a number
    of years ago. Just me, him, and Senator John McCain. I asked
    him what was the most important thing we could do to undermine
    the Putin regime, the kind of mafia grip that he has on his
    society, and the danger he presents to the world. Vladimir
    Kara-Murza looked at me and said, it is easy, Senators, it is
    an easy answer, produce more American energy--produce more
    American energy.
        That is what Russia fears. So, can you talk about two
    things? One, is Russia's attempt to use energy as a weapon--
    they are pretty good at it. Now, we have blunted it to some
    degree, and then two, on the flip side, I read the Intel a lot
    about what the Chinese leadership thinks, what Xi Jinping
    thinks. They are very scared of American energy dominance. Very
    scared. So, can you talk about that as well?
        I know, I think it is some of the products you guys have
    produced, and then maybe I know you don't provide policy, but,
    you know, we do have this kind of element in American society,
    and to be honest, in the Biden administration, and some of my
    colleagues in the Senate who are like, oh my God, we can't
    produce any more oil and gas. That is horrible, climate bomb.
    No offense, it is ridiculous, right.
        We need oil and gas for decades to come. Places like my
    State, Alaska, have the highest standards in the world aren't
    producing it. If we are going to need it, we should produce it,
    not let Russia and Venezuela and hell Saudi Arabia.
        So, any thoughts on that, too? I am talking all energy. I
    love renewables, but we need oil and gas. Now, people close
    their eyes and scream climate bomb, and we can't produce in
    Alaska.
        They have no idea what they are talking about, and you guys
    do. So please enlighten us because, and don't be political
    here. I know the Biden administration--you are an independent
    operator. John Kerry, and everybody, they go around the world,
    oh, my God, quit by an American LNG. These people are idiots,
    and they are undermining our national security.
        The facts are there. China is fearful of American energy
    dominance. Putin wants to use energy as a weapon, and the best
    way to do it as Vladimir Kara-Murza's advice to me and John
    McCain, produce more American energy.
        That is how you undermine Putin and scare the Chinese. What
    are your thoughts on all of those very important topics that
    the media gets wrong, the far left puts its head in the sand
    on? We need factual analysis on this really important topic
    from you.
        Director Haines. Thank you, sir. I know how passionate you
    are on these issues and knowledgeable. So, I won't be
    political, that is for sure. But I also won't touch on policy.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. You don't have to.
        Director Haines. It is not my role.
        Senator Sullivan. That is not your role.
        Director Haines. But I will say, absolutely. The
    Intelligence Community believes that Russia uses energy as a
    weapon. I know that doesn't come as a surprise to you. That is
    something they have continued to try to do during the course of
    the conflict. In fact, you know, is part of their calculation
    for invading Ukraine.
        One of the things that we know that they were focused on
    were the high energy prices for Europe and how that would
    affect essentially, in their view, Europe's calculation on
    sanctions. They turned out to be wrong, which I am quite glad
    about. In any event, that is certainly a part of the picture, I
    think.
        From the Chinese perspective, I would tell you that an area
    that we have spent a lot of focus on is on actually China's
    efforts to try to control global supply chains that relate to
    clean energy production and work. That is a place where we see
    them very consciously looking to try to control the global
    supply chains related to the critical minerals that are
    relevant to clean energy work. We have some really interesting
    analysis on that and happy also to provide that to you, if it
    is useful. Maybe leave it at that, and I don't know----
        Senator Sullivan. Yes, and General, if you don't mind.
    Sorry, Mr. Chairman, just a follow-on question. It is related.
    We did ask in the NDAA last year our military to look at
    options, in the event of a conflict with China to choke off oil
    and gas supplies to them. Our navy could do that, and if you
    have any thoughts on that, or maybe we should talk about it in
    a classified setting.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. I do have thoughts, Senator. To
    start on Russia weaponizing energy, I think they have used it
    as a carrot and stick, right. So, they have really made it
    painful for our European partners early in the war.
        Then they offered it to other partners, nefarious partners,
    for nefarious reasons, to acquire more military hardware. So,
    your comment about weaponization, I think, is really, really
    accurate. I don't disagree with you that China fears us, about
    our potential for energy production increase.
        I think they fear a lot of our economic power all the time.
    To the point in the NDAA, I think those really are in the
    purview of the INDOPACOM team and their planning efforts as
    those proceeds, and then we can talk more in the closed
    session.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Graham.
        Chairman Reed. We have a vote going on, for the benefit of
    my colleagues. I would suggest that we reconvene in SVC-217 at
    12:15 p.m., giving an opportunity to reorganize a bit. I will
    at this point adjourn the open session and we will reconvene at
    12:15 p.m. Thank you very much.
        [Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                  extremism's role in unauthorized disclosures
        1. Senator Hirono. Director Haines and Lieutenant General Berrier,
    Federal investigators found Airman Teixiera, who is accused of posting
    highly classified documents online, has a deeply troubling history of
    racist and violent remarks. Though certainly not the norm, it is an
    example of the devastating consequences unaddressed extremism in the
    military can have on our national security and our global alliances. It
    is clear we must do more to counter the threat of extremism within our
    Armed Forces. What is the threat domestic extremism poses to national
    security?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
    has a foreign intelligence mission and analyzes domestic extremism
    threats in very narrow circumstances where there is a foreign
    connection or the DIA Director--or one of the four Deputy Directors to
    whom the Director has delegated this authority-has determined that
    there is an imminent threat to a person's life or physical safety. Even
    when there is an imminent extremist threat or nexus to DOD inside the
    U.S. homeland, DIA analyzes the threat jointly with the Federal Bureau
    of Investigation (FBI). Given DIA's very limited authorities regarding
    assessing the threat posed by purely domestic extremism, we defer to
    the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security for an assessment as to
    the threat such activity poses to our broader national security.
                                  section 702
        2. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, would imposing a warrant
    requirement before the government searches Section 702-aquired data for
    Americans' communications hamper your intelligence gathering against
    malign, foreign actors?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        3. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, would statutory limits and
    judicial oversight to prevent the collection and use of Americans'
    communications and other Fourth Amendment Protected information, hamper
    your intelligence gathering efforts against malign, foreign actors?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        4. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, would limiting the permissible
    pool of Section 702 targets to those who might reasonably have
    information about foreign threats stop you from your intelligence
    gathering efforts against malign, foreign actors?

        5. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, would removing barriers to
    existing judicial review mechanisms, already established by Congress,
    prevent you from conducting your intelligence gather against malign,
    foreign actors?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
                           pacific intelligence needs
        6. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, there are enormous Intelligence
    Community workforce needs in Hawaii. For one example, the Army has a
    PED Center on Oahu that needs to hire approximately 700 professionals.
    This is why Private Public Partnership Programs to develop on island
    cyber and intelligence talent is so important. How is the Intelligence
    community working with INDOPACOM to meet the intelligence needs of the
    priority theatre?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        7. Senator Hirono. General Berrier, how is the Defense Intelligence
    Agency using artificial intelligence and machine learning to make this
    intelligence collection and analysis more efficient?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
              unidentified anomalous phenomena (uaps) over hawaii
        8. Senator Hirono. General Berrier, Hawaii is physically closer to
    many of our adversaries than the continental United States is, and in a
    small geographic area, houses some of the Nation's most critical
    military infrastructure. This makes Hawaii a unique target for foreign
    surveillance--from satellites, surveillance balloons, and so called
    unmanned anomalous phenomena, or UAPs. Are these UAPs a fairly common
    occurrence, and do they pose a surveillance threat?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. There is no question Hawaii-and the
    state's national security and military infrastructure--is a priority
    for foreign intelligence and surveillance activity. However, Hawaii
    currently has less UAP activity compared to other locations in the
    United States because of Hawaii's relative geographic isolation. The
    airspace over Hawaii is ``less-cluttered.'' In Hawaii, military,
    Federal, and State agencies partner to monitor all aerial and space-
    based activity including UAPs near the State and traversing U.S.
    territories.
                     damage of aggressive rhetoric on china
        9. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, Chairman Milley, in his
    testimony expressed his concerns about ``overheated'' rhetoric with
    respect to China and the potential for war over Taiwan. I share the
    Chairman's concerns. War is not inevitable. Do you agree with General
    Milley that we need to be disciplined in our messaging with respect to
    China and, especially, Taiwan?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        10. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, how does China react to such
    rhetoric?
        Director Haines.
                  climate change and environmental degradation
        11. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, it is clear climate change
    contributes to global instability. Environmental disasters can weaken
    government institutions, cause migration, and force communities to turn
    to illegal activities to survive. As climate change intensifies, what
    additional national security challenges do you see it causing for the
    U.S.?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
                  china's attempts at influence in the pacific
        12. Senator Hirono. Director Haines, your annual threat assessment
    states ``China faces a myriad--and in some cases growing--domestic and
    international challenges that probably will hinder CCP leaders'
    ambitions. These include an aging population, high levels of corporate
    debt, economic inequality, and growing resistance to ``heavy handed
    tactics in Taiwan and other countries.'' How do you believe these
    challenges will affect China's military buildup in the coming years?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        13. Senator Hirono. Our network of allies and partners is the
    greatest asymmetric advantage we have in the long-term strategic
    competition with China. This network is sustained by mutually
    beneficial cooperation on issues not merely pigeonholed to defense. How
    have the Chinese reacted to these initiatives?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
                              aba-compliant scifs
        14. Senator Duckworth. One challenge Americans may face when
    working in the Intelligence Community is the inaccessibility of
    sensitive compartmented information facilities or SCIFs. In last year's
    NDAA, I secured report language that asked the Department of Defense to
    report on the remediation of those SCIFs to achieve compliance with the
    Architectural Barriers Act (ABA), improve worker safety, and fully
    capitalize on the talent and crucial warfighting skills resident across
    the full spectrum of American society. Can you comment on how important
    it is to design and build SCIFs that are ABA compliant and why is it
    important for the Intelligence Community to include Americans of all
    abilities?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. DIA is committed to accessibility and
    safety for all, and DIA always strives for excellence in SCIF design,
    development, and construction for our global and diverse workforce. DIA
    actively seeks to create and advance a safe, compliant, inclusive and
    accessible work environment, and improve DIA SCIFs across the globe.
    DIA's Inclusive, Diversity, Equity, and Accessibility strategic plan
    specifically addresses the requirement to have an accessible,
    physically, and psychologically safe workplace for officers with
    disabilities. Designing and building accessible SCIFs ensures that DIA
    can attract, recruit, accommodate, and retain employees with critical
    skills-vital to DIA's mission success. DIA also seeks to attract
    individuals with disabilities to join the agency, and SCIF and
    technology improvements are essential to accommodate talent resident
    across the full spectrum of American society.

          DIA continues to expand physical and information
    technology accessibility to address the expected 2-4 percent annual
    increase of persons with disabilities and/or persons with targeted
    disabilities. Buildings that are accessible allow for more equal, and
    hopefully equitable, access for officers with various abilities.

          DIA strives for facilities that are flexible and
    adaptable, providing employees and visitors with disabilities equal
    opportunities. Inaccessible facilities can profoundly impact
    individuals with disabilities; limiting their ability to access
    information, engage on various platforms, and participate fully in the
    work environment.

        DIA also is increasing efforts to attract neuro-diverse officers
    which may require facility and workspace adjustments. DIA is adopting
    industry lessons learned to improve the employee experience of recently
    onboarded neuro-diverse officers. Our facilities, engineering, IT, and
    human resource experts also are working with other IC partners to
    develop an optimal employee experience and to promote retention of
    officers with disabilities. So far, our experience demonstrates that
    some neuro-diverse officers need such things as isolated workspaces and
    adjusted lighting for optimal performance.

        15. Senator Duckworth. Please describe any efforts currently
    underway to ensure current SCIFs are ABA compliant and future SCIFs are
    designed with ABA-compliant features.
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. DIA's Office of Facilities and Services
    oversees all new construction and renovated spaces and guarantees that
    the DIA workspace meets the proper specifications and equipment (such
    as, clearances, turn radius, hallways widths, furniture sizes,
    lighting, etc.) required for personnel with and without disabilities.
    DIA is committed to Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),
    Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and ABA compliance as
    fundamental to workforce needs and safety. Each year, DIA's
    congressionally funded resources for facilities and logistics is
    required to maintain, update, and replacing aging facilities, ensure
    Federal compliance, and renovate workspaces for safety and
    accessibility. Our commitment to excellence also requires facility,
    engineering, IT, security and human resources experts to collaborate on
    new construction as well as refurbish exiting workspaces to meet
    employee and mission needs.

          New facilities projects and construction I All DIA new
    facility projects-including furniture reconfiguration and major or
    minor construction-are designed to meet ADA and ABA requirements.

          DIA architects, engineers, and facilities experts also
    review, consider, and include workforce accommodation requirements
    during both the design and construction phases.

          DIA's Fiscal Year 2024 Military Construction Project
    (MILCON) request for DIA Headquarters Annex at Fort Belvoir recently
    incorporated accessible phone booths for officers with disabilities.
    DIA's Ombuds Office--in partnership with human resources and diversity
    and inclusion experts-are working with the DIA MILCON leads to consider
    other workspace and accessibility needs at the future DIA facility.

          DIA is attuned to current and future workforce needs, and
    we expect modifications to aging and existing facilities to increase.
    Employees also can request additional workspace requirements-beyond
    standard ADA and ABA code. DIA is responsive to these additional
    requests identified by our DIA Equal Opportunity and Diversity experts.
    In these cases, the modifications-including construction and equipment-
    are eligible for special funding and independent, ad hoc renovation.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
                                     huawei
        16. Senator Rosen. There have been news reports in the past year
    highlighting efforts by Huawei and foreign government-owned companies
    to build telecommunications infrastructure near ICBM fields and United
    States military installations and training ranges, for collection
    purposes, which may possibly pose a threat to U.S. Forces, tactics, and
    systems.
        Director Haines, can you discuss the threat this infrastructure
    poses and how you are mitigating these threats?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
                  china-russian relationship surfaces and gaps
        17. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, what are the friction points
    between China and Russia? Please provide an unclassified answer to the
    extent possible; please provide an additional classified answer if
    necessary.
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        18. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, how can the United States
    exploit these friction points? Please provide an unclassified answer to
    the extent possible; please provide an additional classified answer if
    necessary.
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
                           russian forces in the east
        19. Senator Ernst. General Berrier, has the war in Ukraine weakened
    Russia's ability to defend its borders? Please provide an unclassified
    answer to the extent possible; please provide an additional classified
    answer if necessary.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. The Russian military's ability to
    rapidly respond to multiple simultaneous threats on its borders
    probably has degraded because of personnel and equipment losses in
    Ukraine. Moscow is likely to need to reconstitute its ground forces.
    During the Ukraine conflict, Russian ground forces have suffered a
    significant number of casualties, with at least 50,000 killed and
    180,000 wounded. These figures include airborne troops' attrition-a key
    force for quick reaction operations to suppress border instability.
    Additionally, Russia has suffered over 10,000 vehicle losses, forcing
    Moscow to use older and less modem variants.

          Conventional Weapons. Russia maintains conventional air-,
    sea-, and ground--launched cruise missiles as part of its escalation
    management strategy to defend its borders, along with its capable
    integrated air defense system. However, Russia has likely employed much
    of its pre-war inventory of cruise missiles over the course of the war
    in Ukraine.

          Vagner Insurrection. On June 23 and 24, several thousand
    Vagner private military company (PMC) armed convoys and personnel
    crossed from bases in Ukraine into Russia, meeting minimal resistance
    from Russian border guards-demonstrating vulnerabilities in Russia's
    border security. The Vagner forces subsequently took control of the
    Southern Military District headquarters in Rostov-on-Don and advanced
    within 200km of Moscow before Vagner owner Yevgeniy Prigozhin ordered
    his forces to halt.

          Internal Security Forces and Border Security. Russia
    retains its internal security forces and their capabilities-such as the
    Border Service and the National Guard-to maintain Russian borders.
    These forces are responsible for and capable of responding to most
    traditional cross-border threats. However, Russia's security forces
    alone probably are unable to repel a heavily armed conventional force,
    based on the recent successful Ukrainian cross-border operations into
    Russia.

          Nuclear Capabilities. Russian nuclear doctrine allows for
    Moscow to use nuclear weapons if the regime faces an existential
    threat--e.g. jeopardizing the Russian state's existence and threatening
    the regime's survival. This situation could arise if a conflict
    escalated and Moscow perceived its adversaries seek to inflict
    unacceptable damage on Russia.

        20. Senator Ernst. General Berrier, does Russia's ability to defend
    its borders make them insecure about Chinese border aggression? Please
    provide an unclassified answer to the extent possible; please provide
    an additional classified answer if necessary.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                            military lessons learned
        21. Senator Ernst. General Berrier, what are the most important
    military lessons China has learned through observations of modern war
    tactics employed in Ukraine? Please provide an unclassified answer to
    the extent possible; please provide an additional classified answer if
    necessary.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. Beijing almost certainly has strategic,
    operational, and tactical lessons from its observations of Russia's war
    in Ukraine, which Chinese government and military commentators have
    discussed publicly. For example, in May, Peoples' Liberation Army's
    (PLA) Western Theater Commander General Wang Haijiang, told a PLA
    newspaper that the Ukraine war showcases that modem warfare is a
    contest of overall national strength. General Wang Haijiang further
    explained the view that the military domain is intertwined with
    ``battles in political, financial, technological, cyberspace, and
    cognitive areas.'' PLA observations of Russian failures in Ukraine
    probably have reinforced China's existing tactical and operational
    concerns about the PLA's capabilities.
        Beijing's military campaign planning-including a Taiwan scenario--
    probably has assisted leaders in seeing the critical need to enhance
    secure communications and increase stockpiles of precision--guided
    missiles and drones.

        22. Senator Ernst. General Berrier, have any of these lessons
    learned affected China's planning for an invasion of Taiwan? Please
    provide an unclassified answer to the extent possible; please provide
    an additional classified answer if necessary.
        Lieutenant General Berrier. The PLA almost certainly is seeking to
    apply lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine conflict to a potential
    Taiwan campaign. PLA texts have acknowledged publicly that a Taiwan
    invasion could become a protracted conflict, a concern which Russia's
    Ukraine invasion could exacerbate. The protracted Ukraine conflict
    almost certainly conflicts with Beijing's desire to force quickly
    Taiwan's capitulation and minimize the invasion's cost. Beijing also is
    concerned that military opposition as well as economic and diplomatic
    repercussions, could jeopardize unification or China's regime
    stability.

        23. Senator Ernst. Director Haines and General Berrier, has China's
    replication of Russian influence operations, especially in their use of
    online personas, been assessed to be a purposeful assumption of their
    tactics, techniques, and procedures?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                deterring china
        24. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, has the West's response to the
    War in Ukraine given China pause about invading Taiwan?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        25. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, how does Ukraine's fate affect
    China's political calculations to invade?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
                              chinese map updates
        26. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, the Economist recently reported
    that the Chinese Ministry of National Resources has re-issued an order
    to add the Chinese-names to eight Russian locations on Chinese maps,
    including the city of Vladivostok. Do you believe that the re-issuing
    of this order is intended to signal Chinese re-interest in this lost
    territory?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        27. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, do you believe that the timing
    of this re-issued order is significant?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
              people's liberation army's lack of joint experience
        28. Senator Sullivan. General Berrier, late last year the National
    Defense University published a study that examined the backgrounds of
    more than 300 senior People's Liberation Army officers. It identified a
    complete lack of joint military experience amongst those officers. The
    study suggested that the lack of perspective beyond that of their own
    service could make these officers less effective when conducting joint
    operations. Chinese military modernization includes a focus on
    conducting joint operations but it seems their senior military
    leadership does not have Joint experience as we would define it. What
    are your thoughts on how a lack of joint experience amongst the PLA's
    senior leaders might impact its ability to conduct joint operations in
    a conflict?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. As of summer 2023, the PLA conducting
    joint military operations in a real-world conflict has not been
    observed. China's top military command is composed of current or former
    army officers, and only a third of these individuals have prior joint
    command experience. The PLA is developing joint command capabilities,
    with a focus on military modernization and refining command and control
    systems. Since 1999, Beijing has prioritized PLAjoint capabilities
    through large-scale force structure reforms-including the Joint
    Operations Command Centers establishment-and professional military
    education enhancements. The PLA also has implemented cross-theater
    training initiatives and exercises with foreign partners. The PLA also
    is expanding joint duty rotations for its officers, even though most of
    these opportunities occur relatively late in their careers. PLA
    officers, without sufficient joint experience, are likely to be less
    adept at planning and executing service-level maneuvers and joint
    operations to achieve integrated operations and objectives. We expect
    the PLA's joint experience to advance as bureaucratic acceptance
    increases, with personnel transitions, and as joint doctrine is
    refined.
                   russia and china's weaponization of energy
        29. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines, Russia's failed attempt to
    weaponize Europe's reliance on Russian energy exports to coerce our
    partners into loosening its support for Ukraine has pushed it closer to
    its ``no limits'' partner, the PRC. Before the war, Russia monitored
    PRC investments in its country out of fear its participation in the
    Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) would supplant its own led ``Eurasian
    Economic Union.'' Now, Russia is welcoming Chinese investment in ports
    and energy projects along the Northern Sea Route. Chinese financers
    provided up to 60 percent of the capital for Russia's Yamal liquefied
    natural gas project terminating in the port city of Sabetta on Russia's
    northern coast. The project is considered the ``crown jewel'' of
    Russia's investments in the Northern Sea Route and could produce up to
    926 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas from the South Tambey
    field. In the last year, the PRC has become the largest importer of
    Russia oil. Last month, the PRC imported a record high quantity of oil
    from Russia's Arctic. Do you see Russia and China continuing to deepen
    ties on Russian energy exports to China?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        30. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines, do you see Russia and China
    deepening ties on Chinese investment in port and energy infrastructure
    projects along the Northern Sea Route?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        31. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines, how might Russia and China's
    deepening economic ties impact our security interests in Europe and the
    Indo-Pacific?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        32. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines, Russia relies heavily on
    revenues from oil and natural gas, which in 2021 made up 45-percent of
    the country's national budget. Since February 2022, Russia has
    unsuccessfully sought to weaponize its energy industry to erode our
    European partners' support for Ukraine. This failure is in a large part
    due to United States companies boosting shipments to Europe by 137
    percent in 2022 and providing 50-percent of Europe's liquefied natural
    gas supplies along with 12-percent of its oil. Can you describe the
    national security implications had the United States been unable to
    help offset European energy needs formerly supplied by Russia?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        33. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines, would Russia have had
    significant leverage over Europe and forced our NATO allies to make
    some hard choices for their citizens if the United States was unable to
    increase energy exports to Europe after February 2022?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

                               APPENDIX A

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                               APPENDIX B

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