[Senate Hearing 118-653]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-653
ADDRESSING CLOSE CALLS TO IMPROVE
AVIATION SAFETY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION SAFETY,
OPERATIONS, AND INNOVATION
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 9, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-398 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota TED CRUZ, Texas, Ranking
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts ROGER WICKER, Mississippi
GARY PETERS, Michigan DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin JERRY MORAN, Kansas
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JON TESTER, Montana MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado J. D. VANCE, Ohio
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
PETER WELCH, Vermont Virginia
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming
Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
Jonathan Hale, General Counsel
Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Liam McKenna, General Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION SAFETY, OPERATIONS, AND INNOVATION
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois, Chair JERRY MORAN, Kansas, Ranking
JON TESTER, Montana JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona ROGER WICKER, Mississippi
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado TODD YOUNG, Indiana
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on November 9, 2023................................. 1
Statement of Senator Duckworth................................... 1
Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 4
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 5
Statement of Senator Sinema...................................... 51
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 53
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 57
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 59
Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................ 61
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 63
Witnesses
Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board. 6
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Timothy L. Arel, Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic
Organization, Federal Aviation Administration.................. 14
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Rich Santa, President, National Air Traffic Controllers
Association, AFL-CIO (NATCA)................................... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Captain Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International.................................................. 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
J. Randolph ``Randy'' Babbitt, Babbitt & Associates, LLC......... 42
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Appendix
Ed Bolen, President and CEO, National Business Aviation
Association, prepared statement................................ 69
Response to written questions submitted to Jennifer L. Homendy
by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 73
Hon. Jacky Rosen............................................. 76
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 76
Hon. Ted Budd................................................ 78
Response to written questions submitted to Timothy L. Arel by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 78
Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 80
Hon. Jacky Rosen............................................. 81
Hon. Raphael Warnock......................................... 83
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 85
Hon. Ted Budd................................................ 88
Response to written questions submitted to Rich Santa by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 89
Hon. Jacky Rosen............................................. 90
Hon. Raphael Warnock......................................... 91
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 93
Response to written questions submitted to Jason Ambrosi by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 94
Hon. Jacky Rosen............................................. 95
Hon. Ted Budd................................................ 96
Response to written questions submitted to Randy Babbitt by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 96
Hon. Jacky Rosen............................................. 97
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 97
Hon. Ted Budd................................................ 98
ADDRESSING CLOSE CALLS TO IMPROVE
AVIATION SAFETY
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2023
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation Safety, Operations, and
Innovation,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:58 a.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Tammy
Duckworth, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Duckworth [presiding], Cantwell,
Klobuchar, Markey, Tester, Sinema, Rosen, Hickenlooper, Moran,
Cruz, Thune, Wicker, Sullivan, and Young.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Duckworth. We are a couple of minutes early, but we
will go ahead and get started. The Senate Subcommittee on
Aviation Safety, Operations, and Innovation will come to order.
I want to welcome everyone to our hearing today, addressing
close calls to improve aviation safety. This may be the most
important hearing we have all year, and I want to thank Chair
Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and Ranking Member Moran for
their help in making this hearing happen. The near misses we
have been seeing recently are not normal.
They are a warning that our aviation system is under
stress. And today we will have an opportunity to hear from
several key stakeholders about why we are experiencing so many
near misses and what we need to do to increase our safety
margins.
We will hear from National Transportation Safety Chairwoman
Jennifer Homendy, FAA Air Traffic Organization Chief Operating
Officer Tim Arel, National Air Traffic Controller Association
President Rich Santa, Airline Pilots Association President
Jason--and Captain Jason Ambrosi, and former FAA Administrator
Randy Babbitt.
While disagreements tend to garner more coverage than
compromise, it is worth noting that I remain proud of the
bipartisan FAA Reauthorization Act that we introduced together,
and I remain committed to finding a path forward to passage.
Since in my non-biased, purely objective opinion, the Cantwell,
Cruz, Duckworth, Moran Senate bill is far superior to the House
alternative.
Of course, safety must always come first and that is why I
say this may be the most important aviation hearing we hold
this year. Our nation is experiencing an aviation safety
crisis. Near-misses are happening way too frequently, and I
refuse to be complacent in waiting to act until the next runway
incursion becomes a fatal collision.
A wave of retirements and buyouts drain valuable experience
from the United States aviation system, and coupled with a
surge in demand, created essentially a perfect storm that has
eroded the system safety margins down to dangerously thin
levels.
In far too many near misses, the difference between a close
call and a deadly disaster has depended on a single individual
taking emergency action, along with some good luck. According
to The New York Times, in a recent 12 month period, there were
300 accounts of near collisions involving commercial carriers.
That is almost one near miss per day so far. And I think we
have got some images behind us here. The darker image behind me
is a still picture from a video recorded by an individual
riding in the jump seat of a JetBlue Flight 206 while landing
at Boston Logan Airport.
It shows a Hop-a-Jet charter flight crossing the runway
they are about to land on and reveals how JetBlue 206 came
within 400 feet of the charter flight crossing from left to
right in front of them while taking off from an intersecting
runway, despite that Hop-a-Jet charter flight received explicit
instructions to line up and wait.
Fortunately, Logan Airport had installed a service
detection equipment that notify air traffic control when the
charter flight began its unauthorized takeoff roll, and this
layer of safety was critical in empowering the controller to
provide JetBlue 206 with the go around instructions that
averted disaster.
Unfortunately, that very same month at Austin-Bergstrom
International Airport, we witnessed how the lack of critical
service detection equipment drastically increases the risk of a
catastrophe. In that incident, a controller working on an
overtime shift cleared FedEx 767 to land on a runway that
Southwest--that a Southwest's 737 had been cleared to take off
from.
It was foggy in the early hours and the controller could
neither see the runway with their own eyes nor use ground radar
to track the location of the 737, which was still on the runway
as the large 767 descended through the clouds.
Words failed to adequately describe how close 131 souls
came to dying that day. The following animation demonstrates
what it looks like when a 767 comes within 100 feet of a
landing 737. Here it comes. [video shown]
These two aircraft came within 100 feet of another. And ATC
did not see how close those came and it was the pilot who
called for the go around and--initiated his own go around and
told the other aircraft that he--notified the other aircraft
that he--that they almost came in contact with one another, and
the air traffic controller never saw it.
But the air traffic controller also was on an overtime
shift. Unfortunately, the near misses keep happening. Last
month, an Alaska Airlines flight executive--an Alaska Airlines
flight executing a go round in Portland, Oregon, veered into
the flight path of a SkyWest flight taking off from a parallel
runway.
The FAA, Congress, and the aviation industry must treat
these near misses as a precursor--as precursor events that left
unchecked will eventually result in a deadly catastrophe. We
have many layers of safety in our aviation system. The first
layer is the pilot, controller read-back.
The second layer is all the airport designs and markings.
Next is the runway safety lights that turn red when the runway
is active, alerting a crossing pilot to not cross. In ideal
situations, the fourth layer is a ground radar tool. And of
course, the last line of defense lies with the flight crew,
especially the captain and first officer.
Despite multiple layers of safety, far too many near misses
have come down to the last line of defense. And bottom line, a
system that repeatedly forces pilots into taking emergency
evasive actions to save lives is either a broken system or one
that is overwhelmed by new risks.
Such new risk could be the result of aggregate loss of
experience and has forced the industry to confront a workforce
that overall is less experienced, from pilots, to controllers,
to technicians, and other personnel.
It appears that we have been fortunate to have experienced
pilot--to have experienced pilots in many of these instances
who prevented a close call from becoming a disaster. But
continuing to count on such good fortune is neither sustainable
nor responsible.
I hope we will hear more about this from our witnesses, but
one thing we already know, now is not the time to weaken or
water down the post Colgan era of safety--post Colgan era
safety system. Now is the time to strengthen it.
This includes prioritizing one of the most vital pillars of
our aviation safety system, air traffic control. Look, every
air traffic controller has the privilege and pressure of
working in a road that is inherently stressful, even on a good
day.
But that reality is no excuse for our current status quo,
which forces controllers to regularly work 60 hour weeks
because an estimated 99 percent of airports are understaffed,
in addition to many airports lacking important runway safety
technology. As both a pilot and a passenger, I refuse to accept
a status quo that places the lives of our constituents in the
hands of civil servants who are overworked and utterly
exhausted.
More than a decade ago, the FAA established new pilot rest
and crew rest rules--established a new pilot rest and crew rest
rule. This action aligned with a growing body of knowledge
demonstrating that optimizing human performance requires
optimizing rest and recovery.
And when it comes to optimizing performance, the stakes
could not be higher for ATC. FAA prioritizes the problem of
fatigue controllers, and Congress must invest in these critical
American workers to ensure that ATC staffing levels are
sufficient to end once and for all the era of forcing
controllers to regularly work 60 hours per week and often
without the benefit of vital safety technology and tools.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
how we can work together to enhance safety and get our margins
back to where they need to be. I now recognize Ranking Member
Moran for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Moran. Chair Duckworth, thank you very much. Thank
you for convening this hearing. Thank you for your cooperation
in working with me and others to see that this subcommittee and
this full committee accomplishes its task in regard to
aviation.
The FAA manages one of the world's most complex aviation
systems, in fact the most complex aviation system, and oversees
more than 45,000 flights a day and almost 3 million airline
passengers.
Safety is so important, but it is an evolving process, and
we must continually reevaluate our system to make sure we have
the most safe possible in play. We must determine how to
prevent serious incidents like runway incursions and near
misses, so I am pleased to join you in having this hearing.
We also need to ensure that these incidents are not
indicative of a larger underlying issue. We know that demand
for commercial aviation is expected to grow, and we have new
entrants into our airspace.
FAA is directly involved, impacts a 1.5 million jobs and
$1.5 trillion in GDP in the world's economy. Our job is to
determine the pressure points on our system now so that we can
be ready to meet the demands not only today, but in the future.
Dangerous incidents also further highlight the need for
Congress to pass FAA reauthorization. I was pleased and
certainly agree with you that we have a bill that is worthy of
action by the full committee and consideration by the U.S.
Senate. So, I am anxiously awaiting that to occur and look
forward to working to see that it does.
Earlier, we were successful in confirming a new FAA
Administrator, one--in my view, one of the most important tasks
that we could do, and certainly one of the basic roles of the
U.S. Senate.
And so, I am pleased the Administration nominated and the
U.S. Senate confirmed a new FAA Administrator that we look
forward to working with and have faith that he will perform his
task well.
I do hope that we get out of the series of reauthorizations
that we have had in years past, and I look forward to a long-
term reauthorization of the FAA. The FAA, in my view, is at a
critical juncture.
Perhaps that can be said at many times in our country's
history. But we face many challenges, and the FAA is front and
center. We ought to do everything in our power to ensure the
United States remains a leader in aerospace and innovation, and
everything that we do, we do it safely. Thank you, Chairman.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Senator Moran. I will now
turn it over to main Committee Chairwoman Cantwell for her
opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
The Chair. Thank you, Chair Duckworth, and thank you to
Senator Moran for this important hearing. I can't think of two
people better prepared to lead the safety charge and aviation
charge on our committee than the two of you. So, thank you for
doing this hearing.
And I so agree with both of your comments. I think you
outlined exactly why we are here this morning, that it is a
constant task to be on top of innovation and safety and
competitiveness.
And I want to thank the witnesses for being here, too,
because I think that they are very illuminating of the
challenges we faced in the past, and how we met them, and what
we need to do today. So, I thank all of them for that. The
Aircraft Certification, Safety and Accountability Act outlines
some new ways in which we can improve safety.
One of those was to basically say that we should have a
trend report every year to better listen to some of the safety
trends. This hearing this morning is really a reflection of
that. It is about what trend we are seeing now and why we want
to do more to fix it. So, I want to applaud the NTSB for their
leadership on this particular issue of near misses.
I think that they have sounded the alarm, and I think you
are sounding it again today. And it is one of the reasons why,
as Senator Moran said, we need to get an FAA authorization bill
because it has some tools in that bill that will help us meet
this challenge.
First and foremost, NTSB Director Homendy basically is
saying in her testimony, ``for controllers, we have cited
staffing shortages which lead to scheduling issues, fatigue,
lack of or deficient supervisory oversight, distraction,
ineffective scanning, and the need for value added training.''
That is a--a summation of her--that is right. That is why
we need the additional FAA air traffic controllers that are in
the FAA bill of over 3,000 people to help us meet this balance.
We cannot have people working 6 days a week.
We need people who have the ample amount of rest and
capability to deal with, as my colleague, Senator Duckworth,
said, probably one of the most stressful and challenging jobs
there is.
Second, I think Ms. Homendy also outlines correctly the
important attributes of the air surface detection equipment
program, ASDE-X, which is a ground radar and electronic
technology that allows controllers to track surface movement of
aircraft and vehicles. And in the airports where we have this
technology, guess what?
Things have worked well. The areas where we haven't, this
is why we need this legislation, because we are authorizing
$18.2 billion to make sure that all of our large and midsize
airports have this technology and have this technology
deployed. So, I am sure we are going to hear other comments
this morning and other answers, but two of them lie right in
front of us.
And I am with Senator Moran, we should get this job done
and continue to move forward. I am a believer, as he is, that
aviation is going to continue to grow, and we want it to, and
that the international competition is also going to be there.
So, we have to lead, get it right, and demonstrate that we have
the capacity to grow in the future and to get it to be the
safest system in the world. So, with that, thank you, Madam
Chair, again for this important hearing.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Senator Cruz is not currently
here. He is the Ranking Member of the main committee.
We will reserve time for him to give his opening remarks
when he does attend. In the meantime, we will go ahead with
witness testimonies.
I would like to go ahead and recognize Ms. Jennifer
Homendy, Chairwoman of the National Transportation Safety
Board, for your comments. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF JENNIFER L. HOMENDY, CHAIR, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Ms. Homendy. Thank you--thank you so much, Chair Duckworth.
And thank you, Senator Moran and Senator Cantwell, for leading
on this issue and for having me here today. I want to start by
emphasizing our incredible safety record.
We have the safest airspace in the world, period. The
critical efforts of everyone in this room have contributed to
our reputation as the world's gold standard for aviation
safety. We have a lot to be proud of, but we can make aviation
safer. As you can see from this chart, there were 23 serious
runway incursions in Fiscal Year 2023, up from 16 in Fiscal
Year 2022, and 11 a decade ago.
Runway incursions are also happening at a faster rate over
the last decade. That is all runway incursions and the most
serious. While these events are incredibly rare, our safety
system is showing clear signs of strain that we cannot ignore.
The NTSB has opened investigations into seven runway incursions
this year alone.
In over half, the aircraft got within several hundred feet
of each other. We also opened an investigation into a runway
collision between two business jets that occurred two weeks ago
in Houston. Combined, these events put more than 1,300 lives at
risk. That is on top of three wrong surface landings that we
investigated.
Thankfully, no one was hurt or seriously injured in any of
these incidents, but they could have been. It only takes one.
It only takes one missed warning to become a tragedy. One
incorrect response to destroy public confidence in a system
that has been built over decades.
These incidents must serve as a wakeup call before
something more catastrophic occurs. This isn't the first time
we have seen this. We issued this same warning in 2007 and we
issued the same warning after the 2017 incident at SFO, where
an A320 came close to colliding with an A340 and three other
airliners on a taxiway.
The incident aircraft flew over the A340 at an altitude of
60 feet before it began climbing, which resulted in only 10 to
20 feet of vertical separation. All told, more than 1,000
people on the taxiway that day were at imminent risk of serious
injury or death. I know you are going to want to talk about our
open investigations and get details on those.
The NTSB is incredibly careful to gather all the facts and
evidence around an incident before drawing conclusions or
making safety recommendations. While I cannot discuss the
details of our open investigations, I can share a few things--a
few of what we are seeing.
In the wake of the pandemic, we are experiencing a massive
resurgence of air traffic, but we are also seeing significant
ATC shortages, resulting in mandatory overtime, fatigue,
distraction, and less opportunity for meaningful value added
training.
On the flight deck, fatigue and distraction are leading to
deviations from Federal aviation regulations. Across the entire
industry, we have a newer workforce who need training and
mentorship, and we are seeing people that are struggling with
significant mental health challenges. All of this is compounded
by a lack of technology to ensure redundancy and protect
against human error. Redundancy is the foundation of our
stellar aviation safety record.
It has served as the models for preventing accidents and
crashes in all other modes of transportation. All that is to
say, the current strain on our aviation system and its
workforce cannot be underestimated. Before I close, I want to
thank all of you for being staunch supporters of the NTSB, but
now I need your help.
The NTSB needs the resources to carry out our vital safety
mission. We received a $145 million in the President's Fiscal
Year 2024 budget, which is included in the House mark. The
Senate has at $134.3 million.
We need the Senate to match that number of $145. Our
agency's staffing and funding levels have remained somewhat
stagnant since 1997. The small increases have gotten two well
deserved pay increases for our staff.
But since I have become Chair, we have accomplished a lot.
We have eliminated our backlog entirely. We have boosted
staffing and we have made significant investments in IT. Thank
you for your continued support, and I am happy to answer your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Homendy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair,
National Transportation Safety Board
Good morning, Chair Duckworth, Ranking Member Moran, and members of
the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) to testify before you today regarding the need to
address close calls to improve aviation safety.
As you know, the NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by
Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United
States and significant events in other modes of transportation--
railroad, transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We
determine the probable causes of the accidents and events we
investigate, and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing
future occurrences. In addition, we conduct transportation safety
research studies and offer information and other assistance to family
members and survivors for each accident or event we investigate. We
also serve as the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving
aviation and mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the U.S. Coast Guard, and we adjudicate
appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.
The NTSB does not have authority to promulgate operating standards,
nor do we certificate organizations, individuals, or equipment.
Instead, we advance safety through our investigations and
recommendations, which are issued to any entity that can improve
safety. Our goal is to identify issues and advocate for safety
improvements that, if implemented, would prevent injuries and save
lives.
When it comes to aviation, over the last several decades, the
critical efforts of operators, manufacturers, labor unions, private
aircraft owners and pilots, the FAA, Congress, and the NTSB have led to
significant advances in technology and important legislative and
regulatory changes that have contributed to the current level of
aviation safety. These efforts, many of which have been in response to
the lessons learned from NTSB investigations, should serve as an
example for a collaborative approach to safety in other modes of
transportation.
Let's be clear that aviation is still among the safest modes of
transportation for the travelling public.
Since 2010, the U.S. aviation system has experienced a record level
of safety, as the number of deaths associated with U.S. civil aviation
accidents decreased from 541 in 2009 to, according to our preliminary
numbers, 357 in 2022--a decrease of over one-third (see attachment).
Approximately 95 percent of aviation fatalities in 2022 occurred in
general aviation accidents, with almost all the remainder (19 total) in
Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 commuter and on-demand
operations, which include charters, air taxis, air tours, and air
medical services flights (when a patient or medical personnel are on
board).
However, we cannot become complacent. As recent news on runway
incursions, near misses, and other serious safety incidents have made
increasingly clear, the current moment is both challenging and pivotal
in the realm of aviation safety. The number of runway incursion
incidents classified as the most serious by the FAA varies from year to
year; the trend, however, is not going in the right direction. The
concerning uptick in such incidents is a clear warning sign that the
U.S. aviation system is sharply strained.
In the wake of the pandemic, we're experiencing a massive
resurgence of air traffic. We're also seeing staffing shortages;
fatigue; distraction; deviations from Federal Aviation Regulations; and
a lack of meaningful, value added training as the FAA and industry rely
more and more on computer-based training and the issuance of bulletins
as substitutes for hands-on training. We're also seeing a lack of
redundancy around technology to prevent runway incursions and wrong
surface landings. Redundancy is the foundation of our stellar safety
record, but the aviation workforce is without a technological safety
net.
Meanwhile, our airspace--already the most complex in the world--is
about to become even more congested as drones, advanced air mobility,
and commercial space launches and reentries increase. New fuels are on
the horizon, including zero-emission and hydrogen aircraft, as well,
and more and more lithium-ion batteries are being transported on cargo
planes.
We cannot ignore or avoid the warning signs of strain from all
these recent events. We cannot rest on our laurels and assume our
safety record will maintain itself. We cannot wait until a fatal
accident forces action. We must act before there is a tragedy.
NTSB's Longstanding Concerns with Runway Incursions
Since 1973, the NTSB has issued numerous safety recommendations to
prevent runway incursions and other airport surface incidents.
On May 6, 1986, the Board published a Special Investigation Report,
titled ``Runway Incursions at Controlled Airports in the United
States'' and issued 14 recommendations to the FAA.\1\ We also re-
classified one recommendation as ``Open--Unacceptable Action'' and
reiterated four previous recommendations.
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\1\ SIR8601.pdf (ntsb.gov)
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In 1990, the Board placed airport runway incursions on its first
Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements (MWL); the issue
remained on the MWL year after year, in some form, until as recently as
2013, and continues to be of great concern to NTSB.
In 2000, the Board sent a letter to the FAA with six additional
safety recommendations to prevent runway incursions. One of the six
recommendations urged FAA to require--at all airports with scheduled
passenger service--a ground movement safety system that will prevent
runway incursions; the system should provide a direct warning
capability to flight crews. In addition, we recommended that the FAA
demonstrate through computer simulations or other means that the system
will, in fact, prevent incursions (A-00-66). That recommendation
remains our oldest ``open'' recommendation to FAA related to runway
incursions; meaning, the FAA has not taken acceptable action on it.
In September 2017, nearly three months after Air Canada Flight 759
lined up to land on an active taxiway at San Francisco International
Airport and overflew four airplanes, the Board held a forum on runway
incursion safety issues. And in May 2023, we held a roundtable on
runway incursions and wrong surface landings. As a result of that
roundtable, we plan to hold three additional public meetings focused on
mental health care in aviation, technology, and workforce training and
development.
In my testimony today, I want to detail some of the NTSB's current
investigations into runway incursions, wrong surface landings, and
related incidents, discuss available technologies for reducing and
avoiding these types of incidents, and address further work that needs
to be done to implement even just a few of the NTSB's nearly 300 open
aviation recommendations.\2\ Specifically, I want to highlight the need
for more technology for runway and cockpit alerting. I also want to
revisit ongoing concerns related to the air traffic control (ATC)
workforce and efforts to right-size that workforce, and issues related
to other aviation industry workers.
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\2\ A report of all currently open safety recommendations related
to aviation is available via the CAROL query tool on our website.
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Finally, I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to
address the importance of right-sizing the NTSB itself and ensuring we
can continue to successfully investigate these near-miss aviation
incidents--and many other safety incidents--in our national
transportation system to promote lessons learned and help keep our
skies and the travelling public safe.
NTSB Incident Investigations
The NTSB's Office of Aviation Safety currently has six particularly
relevant investigations open into runway incursion events that occurred
this year.
On January 13, 2023, an American Airlines 777 crossed an
active runway at JFK without clearance, causing a Delta 737 to
abort takeoff. The two aircraft came within 1,400 feet of each
other, putting 308 lives at risk.
On January 23, 2023, a United Airlines flight at Inouye
International Airport in Hawaii crossed the same runway where a
Kamaka Air flight was landing. The aircraft came within 1,173
feet of each other, putting 303 lives at risk.
On February 4, 2023, a Southwest passenger jet and a FedEx
cargo plane were less than 200 feet from colliding at Austin-
Bergstrom International Airport in Texas, putting 131 people in
danger.
On February 16, 2023, in Sarasota, Florida, an Air Canada
Rouge A-321 was cleared for takeoff from the same runway where
an American Airlines B-737 was cleared to land. The two planes
came within 3,168 feet of each other, putting 372 lives at
risk.
On February 22, 2023, in Burbank, California, a Mesa
Airlines jet initiated a go-around while a SkyWest jet was
still departing the runway. The two planes came within 300 feet
of each other, putting 118 lives at risk.
On August 11, 2023, a Cessna business jet and a Southwest
Airlines flight came close to colliding at San Diego
International Airport. The planes were about 100 feet from each
other, putting at least 117 lives at risk.
We are also investigating a recent collision that occurred on
October 24, 2023, in which a Hawker 850XP airplane collided with a
Cessna 510 airplane at William P. Hobby International Airport in
Houston, Texas. Preliminary information indicates that the tower
controller had instructed the crew of the Hawker to line up and wait,
but the Hawker started a takeoff roll and its wing collided with the
tail of the Cessna, which had landed on an intersecting runway.
Luckily, no injuries were reported to any of the four people on the
Cessna or to the three people on the Hawker.
In addition to our open investigations, we recently published final
investigation reports on a close call this year in Boston,\3\ as well
as two wrong-surface landing events last year--one in Tulsa\4\ and one
in Pittsburgh.\5\
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\3\ National Transportation Safety Board. Aviation Investigation
Final Report for DCA23LA192. Washington, DC: NTSB 2023.
\4\ National Transportation Safety Board. Aviation Investigation
Final Report for DCA22LA126. Washington, DC: NTSB 2023.
\5\ National Transportation Safety Board. Aviation Investigation
Final Report for DCA22LA133. Washington, DC: NTSB 2023.
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In Boston, Massachusetts, on February 27, 2023, at Boston Logan
International Airport, a JetBlue flight initiated a go-around after a
Hop-a-Jet flight took off without clearance on an intersecting runway.
The planes came within 400 feet of each other.
In Tulsa, Oklahoma, on June 8, 2022, FedEx flight 1170 landed on
the wrong runway at Tulsa International Airport. The captain and first
officer were not injured, and the aircraft was not damaged. The flight
was cleared for a visual approach and landing on runway 18L; however,
the airplane landed on runway 18R. The airplane was operated as a Part
121 cargo flight from Fort Worth Alliance Airport in Fort Worth, Texas.
In Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on June 21, 2022, United Airlines
flight 2627 was cleared for a visual approach and landing on runway 28C
at the Pittsburgh International Airport, but instead lined up with and
landed on runway 28L. None of the 174 occupants aboard the airplane
were injured and the aircraft was not damaged. The regularly scheduled
passenger flight was operating under the provisions of Part 121 from
the Chicago O'Hare International Airport. The airplane was equipped
with a runway awareness and advisory system, or RAAS, but the operator
did not select the option to provide crews with an aural alert for the
runway that the airplane would be approaching in flight. If the
operator had selected this option, the system would have alerted the
incident flight crew that the airplane was aligned with a runway that
was not consistent with the landing clearance provided by ATC.
Finally, it is also worth recalling one other incident. On July 7,
2017, Air Canada flight 759 was cleared to land on runway 28R at San
Francisco International Airport, but instead lined up on a parallel
taxiway where four air carrier airplanes were awaiting takeoff
clearance.\6\ The flight 759 crew initiated a go-around and reached a
minimum altitude of about 60 feet, overflying the second airplane on
the taxiway before starting to climb.
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\6\ National Transportation Safety Board. Taxiway Overflight Air
Canada Flight 759 Airbus A320-211, C-FKCK. Washington, DC: NTSB.
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Alarming as they are, events like these are incredibly rare. Of the
nearly 55 million airport operations in FY 2023, there have been 23
category A and B runway incursions, which are the most serious, up from
16 category A and B runway incursions in FY 2022. And while the rate of
all incursions (categories A through E) seems to have slightly improved
from 32.98 per million airport operations in FY 2022 to 32.22 in FY
2023, some important nuance is lost by reading too much into this
improvement. In fact, the rate of category A and B runway incursions
has increased from 0.3050 per million airport operations in FY 2022 to
0.4220 per million airport operations in FY 2023.
While aviation is still incredibly safe, and commercial aviation is
the safest mode of transportation by far, it only takes one missed
warning or incorrect response to a warning to become a tragedy and
destroy public confidence in our system.
At the NTSB, we are incredibly careful to gather all the facts and
evidence of a given incident before drawing conclusions or making
safety recommendations. I will not undermine the meticulous work of our
skilled investigators by drawing premature conclusions about ongoing
investigations. Much more will be known when these investigations are
completed.
In the past, for flight crews, we've cited operational errors,
deviations from Federal Aviation Regulations, expectation or
continuation bias, communication problems, such as misunderstanding
clearances or inadvertent entry of a runway because of disorientation
from runway and taxiway markings on airport surfaces, inadequate
infrastructure or signage, and lack of technologies that can provide
redundancy.
For controllers, we've cited staffing shortages which lead to
scheduling issues and fatigue, lack of or deficient supervisory
oversight, distraction, ineffective scanning, lack of meaningful,
value-added training, and lack of technologies that can provide
redundancy. Many runway incursions we've investigated are a combination
of flight crew and controller factors. Again, these encompass many of
the issues we've seen in the past. For now, however, there are a number
of points we can consider.
First, trends around these most serious surface incidents and other
near misses are not moving in the right direction, and we must respond
to these incidents seriously. Any one of these near misses could have
been a devastating tragedy. Any one of them could have meant lives
lost. The current uptick in these events, and the recent incident in
Houston, especially, in which two business jets actually made contact
at non-taxi speeds on intersecting runways, should be an unambiguous
warning to us all. We must not only continue to draw attention to this
issue, but we must make substantive changes at airports across the
country so we can maintain the country's strong aviation safety record.
Second, in connection with the above investigations that have
already been completed and with prior investigations, the NTSB has made
several safety recommendations to the FAA intended to prevent near-miss
events. Some of those recommendations have been outstanding for many
years without action, and include recommendations on ATC technology,
direct flight crew warnings and cockpit alerting, and 25-hour cockpit
voice recorders (CVRs).
Finally, the NTSB has found in our investigations of accidents that
an effective means for managing and mitigating risks in an aviation
operation is the use of a safety management system, or SMS. SMS is a
formal, top-down, business-like approach to managing safety risk.
Air Traffic Control Technology
One set of outstanding NTSB safety recommendations involves airport
surface surveillance technology, which is a powerful tool to boost
situational awareness at airports. The NTSB has recommended increased
installation and use of such technology to strengthen runway safety for
decades, with our oldest open recommendation on the subject issued to
the FAA 23 years ago (Safety Recommendation A-00-66). And yet, today,
airport surface surveillance technology exists at just 43 airports
across the country.
Airport Surface Detection Equipment--Model X, or ASDE-X, uses
ground radar and other electronic technology to allow air traffic
controllers to track surface movement of aircraft and vehicles. It was
developed to help reduce critical runway incursions. ASDE-X alerts air
traffic controllers of potential runway conflicts by providing detailed
coverage of movement on runways and taxiways. According to the FAA, of
the approximately 450 U.S. airports with scheduled passenger service,
ASDE-X is available at only 35 major airports across the country.
Airport Surface Surveillance Capability, or ASSC, is another system
the FAA has developed for runway surface surveillance. It uses
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, or ADS-B, data from
aircraft to help inform ATC towers of aircraft positions; however,
according to the FAA, ASSC is operational at only eight airports across
the country (a ninth will be implemented at Joint Base Andrews over the
next few years).
Of the runway incursions I mentioned earlier, ASDE-X alerted ATC of
an impending collision in three cases: JFK, Boston, and San Diego.
ASDE-X also alerted ATC before the runway collision in Houston. All but
two of the category A and B incursions from FY 2022 happened at
airports that either did not have surface surveillance technology or
where the systems were not operational at the time of the incident.
It's clear that more airports across the country installing more of
this technology, which was specifically designed to help prevent runway
incursions, would dramatically improve safety. Getting lifesaving
technology at more of the Nation's airports is an essential goal, but
it is one that will require significant investment from Congress.
Direct Flight Crew Warnings and Cockpit Alerting
As valuable as they are, ASDE-X and ASSC only warn the ATC tower of
impending risks and do not provide the direct cockpit warning to pilots
that we have long recommended. In 2000, we recommended that the FAA
develop a runway safety system that provides a direct flight crew
warning of runway collision risk, similar to what traffic collision
avoidance systems (which can be integrated directly into the pilot's
navigation display) provide to pilots to avoid a midair collision
(Safety Recommendation A-00-66). The Houston air traffic controller,
for example, tried to get the Hawker pilot to stop on the runway, but
during interviews after the event, the Hawker pilot stated he did not
hear the controller's call. It may be that a direct flight crew warning
would have helped avoid this collision.
The FAA has developed runway status lights (RWSL) to provide a
direct warning capability to flight crews, but for only one type of
runway collision risk. For example, RWSL likely would not warn pilots
of the risk of one airplane landing on a runway while another airplane
was taking off. As a result, the NTSB does not believe that the FAA's
actions to date represent a full response to our 23-year-old
recommendation (mentioned earlier in this testimony).
We continue to urge the FAA to require a system that provides
direct warning capability to flight crews at all airports with
scheduled passenger service, and to collaborate with aircraft and
avionics manufacturers and software developers to create the technology
for a cockpit system that directly alerts pilots when an airplane is
not aligned with the intended runway surface. Such a system would have
prevented the 2017 Air Canada overflight at San Francisco International
Airport.
Twenty-Five Hour CVR Recommendation
In conjunction with our investigations into runway incursions and
many other safety incidents, the NTSB has long been concerned about
current FAA requirements for CVRs. Current FAA regulations require 2-
hour CVR recording capability and provide guidance to the flight crew
on how to safeguard CVR data after an accident or incident. Despite
this, valuable CVR data continues to be overwritten and therefore
unavailable for safety investigations, as happened in the 2017 incident
in San Francisco, the recent runway incursion incident involving two
Part 121 operators at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New
York, and at least 12 other investigations since 2018. Our ongoing
experience with overwritten CVR recordings demonstrates the limitations
of the current 2-hour recording requirement, particularly in cases
where relevant data were overwritten due to the following:
a delay in reporting a safety event that was not immediately
recognized to be of a serious nature until further data review
a failure to immediately deactivate the CVR following
arrival after a safety event
the time remaining in the flight after a safety event, which
exceeded the CVR's 2-hour recording duration
As a result of these concerns, in 2018, we issued recommendations
to the FAA to address the need to install CVRs with a minimum 25-hour
recording capability on all newly manufactured airplanes required to
have a CVR, and to retrofit the CVRs on existing aircraft required to
have flight recorders.\7\ Newly manufactured airliners flying in Europe
are already using 25-hour CVRs, following International Civil Aviation
Organization standards.
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\7\ National Transportation Safety Board. Extended Duration Cockpit
Voice Recorders. Rpt. No. ASR-18/04. Washington, DC: NTSB 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are very pleased with the FAA's March announcement that it was
initiating rulemaking to require all newly manufactured airplanes that
must have a CVR be fitted with one with a 25-hour recording capacity.
For existing in-service airliners, the FAA told us it was starting an
Aviation Rulemaking Committee to discuss the NTSB's recommendations. We
are concerned the proposed rulemaking does not address existing
aircraft, and, 8 months after the FAA said it initiated rulemaking, a
notice of proposed rulemaking has not been published.
Air Traffic Controller Workforce and Training
When air traffic controllers signed up to serve on the frontlines
of aviation safety, they knew they were choosing one of the most
safety-critical jobs in transportation. Air traffic controllers are
currently operating at dangerously low staffing levels. They are
working mandatory overtime week after week, year after year, leading to
fatigue and burnout, family stress, and work stress. We are putting the
psychological stress of the entire aviation safety system on the
shoulders of our ATC workforce, and this is unacceptable.
When it comes to recent, high-profile aviation incidents, errors by
ATC, flight crews, or ground personnel are sometimes cited as a
contributing factor, but only 3 of the Nation's 313 air traffic
facilities (4 percent) have enough controllers to meet targets set by
the FAA and the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA).
Both the pandemic and significant retirements have combined to make an
already too-small workforce even smaller and less experienced.
The ATC staffing shortage has had a snowball effect in that we are
seeing scheduling practices that have resulted in more fatigue,
distraction, and lack of or deficient supervisory oversight,
The last time the NTSB issued recommendations on air traffic
controller fatigue was in 2007 (Safety Recommendations A-07-30 and -31
to the FAA, and Safety Recommendation A-07-32 to NATCA), and what we
said then is just as true today: controller fatigue decreases aviation
safety. The more than 170 fatigue-related safety recommendations that
the NTSB has issued as far back as 1989 have addressed topics such as
the adequacy of rest periods, scheduling practices, fatigue awareness
training, and hours-of-service regulations. Even earlier, the NTSB
addressed controller fatigue in a 1981 special investigation report on
the Nation's ATC system. Citing extended work schedules among
controllers in the aftermath of the 1981 strike, the NTSB issued Safety
Recommendation A-81-145, which recommended that the FAA establish and
implement a program to detect the onset of, and to alleviate,
controller fatigue and stress. This recommendation was superseded by
two more specific recommendations from the Board's 1983 follow-up study
of the ATC system. Safety Recommendation A-83-35 urged the FAA to
disseminate guidelines for controller stress and fatigue detection and
management, and Safety Recommendation A-83-36 asked the FAA to expedite
the development and implementation of a controller performance
assessment program that would include attention to stress and fatigue.
In developing fatigue risk management practices for air traffic
controllers in response to our 2007 recommendations, the FAA
encountered problems due to staffing shortages. In some cases, air
traffic managers were unable to keep their facilities staffed during
operating hours because staffing shortages made it difficult or
impossible to assign controllers whose work schedules complied with the
fatigue guidelines. These struggles have continued in the years since
these recommendations, and evidence from our investigations into runway
incursions continues to highlight the impact fatigue can have on
controller performance.
The good news is that we know what we need to do to change this
dangerous status quo. We need adequate staffing, quality training
(including tower simulator training), and significant investments in
more of lifesaving technologies I have already discussed, and the
funding to make all three of those possible. The FAA is making strides
in hiring and training, but the possibility of a government shutdown or
flat funding and sequester threatens to pause or undo significant
progress.
To be clear, these kinds of problems are not just limited to our
ATC workforce. They permeate the entirety of our aviation workforce. At
the NTSB's recent event on runway incursions, workers throughout
aviation--pilots, mechanics, air traffic controllers, ramp agents, and
others--reported dire needs. In fact, pilot fatigue was cited as a
contributing cause of the June 2022 FedEx wrong surface landing at
Tulsa International Airport. It's important to mention that cargo
carriers are currently exempt from Federal regulations governing flight
and duty time (known as the cargo carveout), which the NTSB strongly
opposes. Maintaining the safety of our aviation system means supporting
every corner of the aviation workforce.
Safety Management Systems
SMS is a formal, top-down, business-like approach to managing
safety risk. It gathers data from routine operations that indicate a
risk, but did not result in an accident, injury, or major loss. By
looking at these indicators of a safety risk, and developing
mitigations before an accident happens, and ensuring that the
mitigations have been effective, an SMS is an effective tool to
increase safety. An SMS may have highlighted examples of the
miscommunications that were involved in the many of the runway safety
events we have investigated, or problems with warnings not heard by the
flight crew in the Tulsa event. By looking into these occurrences and
developing mitigations before lives are lost an SMS is an effective
management tool to increase safety.
The NTSB's Role in Maintaining Safety
I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to mention the
needs of the NTSB itself. All the investigations I have discussed
today--all the careful analysis and safety recommendations, and the
material benefits they bring to the flying public--would not be
possible without the NTSB's meticulous and expert investigators.
The purpose of our aviation investigations is to find safety issues
and identify trends that must be addressed to improve aviation safety,
as well as to provide information to the flying community and the
public about lessons learned.
Our current authorization expired at the end of FY 2022, and
earlier this year, we transmitted a reauthorization proposal to
Congress, requesting resources and hiring flexibility to increase the
number of investigators throughout the agency.\8\ I am happy to report
that, over the last 2 years, we have already made great progress toward
our goals to ensure that our employees have the right skill set,
staffing up to our highest level since 2017 to 444 people on November
6, 2023. In FY 2023, we hired 71 people, the highest number in 10
years. Our reauthorization proposal anticipates adding roughly 15 new
employees per year through 2027, in addition to filling the vacancies
that will occur through retirements and separations.
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\8\ National Transportation Safety Board Draft Reauthorization Act
of 2023. Washington, DC: NTSB.
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Since February of 2022, we have significantly reduced the backlog
of investigations open for more than 2 years from 442 to zero as of
September 27, 2023, by filling open investigative and technical review
positions, reassigning investigations that could be expedited, using
reemployed annuitants to broaden the pool of report reviewers in the
short-term, enhancing employee performance standards, and developing
quality metrics and a means to track them for all investigations.
We cannot keep up the momentum and continue to serve as the global
gold standard of aviation investigations without investment. The fact
is, we've had the same level of staffing and nearly the same level of
funding for almost two decades. Yet we have more complex investigations
and government mandates to fulfill. That is why I have advocated
strongly for increased authorization levels and increased
appropriations to NTSB in FY24 and beyond. The President's budget
request seeks $145 million in FY24, and NTSB is grateful that the House
THUD appropriations bill matched that funding level coming out of
committee. I urge the Senate to match that level in its negotiations
with the House chamber.
I also urge this committee to consider NTSB reauthorization as you
move forward expeditiously on your FAA reauthorization legislation. I
look forward to working with you on legislation that will allow us to
hire professionals with the needed skills, purchase the equipment
necessary for those skilled professionals to do their jobs, and invest
in staff training and development. Our workforce is our greatest asset
and is essential to our mission to make transportation safer and to
maintain our status as a leader in safety--both at home and
internationally.
Conclusion
Again, thank you for the opportunity to discuss these critical
aviation safety issues and the NTSB's perspectives and recommendations
with the committee today. We believe strongly that continued vigilance
and investment are needed in our aviation system. We recognize the
progress that has been made; yet there will always be room for
improvement. We stand ready to work with the committee to continue
improving aviation safety, which includes ensuring that the NTSB has
the resources needed to carry out our essential mission.
I am happy to answer your questions.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Chairwoman Homendy. We will
now recognize Mr. Tim Arel, Chief Operating Officer at FAA, Air
Traffic Organization.
STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY L. AREL,
CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Arel. Thank you, Chair Duckworth. Thank you, Chair
Cantwell, and Ranking Member Moran. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify, along with my fellow professionals, on
an issue that has been referred to as close calls and near
misses.
I appreciate you holding this hearing for your continued
oversight, because transparency and a commitment to a
continuous improvement are keys to improving aviation safety.
You are familiar with the statistics. The U.S. aviation system,
as Chair Homendy said, is the safest in the world.
There has not been a fatal crash involving a major U.S.
airline since 2009, but in my 38 years of public service
dedicated to aviation safety, I have come to understand that
safety isn't a number or static place. It is a journey of
continuous improvement, eliminating risk before it becomes a
statistic.
Any significant event, whether isolated or indicative of a
trend, is a concern and one we don't take lightly. One close
call is one too many. Aviation safety is a team sport. Air
traffic controllers, pilots, commercial operators, general
aviation, and airports provide multiple layers of safety to
protect the flying public.
We have intentionally built in redundancies in our
technologies and procedures where with one fails, the other one
kicks in. Let me stress, the level of safety we currently have
is only possible because of transparency and constant
collaboration between the FAA and the users of the national
airspace system.
At the FAA, we are proactive--we are proud of our proactive
safety culture, which means we value and encourage the sharing
of data and safety information amongst the agency, industry,
and labor to reduce risk, to learn from each other, and to
collaboratively develop mitigations.
The bottom line is that sharing and exchanging safety
information makes us safer and stronger. In Fiscal Year 2023,
there were approximately 54.5 million takeoffs and landings in
the U.S., and there were 1,756 total runway incursions.
It is important to note, as the NTSB has highlighted, the
number of most serious runway incursions, those where a
collision was narrowly avoided or there was significant
potential for a collision, what we call categories A's and B's,
was a total of 23. Back to my point about transparency, all
this information is available to the public.
However, even though significant runway incursions were
only 1.3 percent of the total number of operations, any number
is unacceptable. And we are earnestly pursuing the elimination
of all significant safety events in the system. Our goal is
zero significant safety events.
Transparent and collaborative reporting revealed an uptick
in the most significant events early and the FAA immediately
responded through the Administrator's call to action and other
initiatives. A safety summit that was held in March 2023
brought together more than 200 safety leaders from across the
aviation industry, including labor representatives from NATCA,
ALPA, and PASS to discuss ways to enhance flight safety.
NTSB Chair Homendy spoke there as well, and that is where
we committed to a goal of zero significant safety events. This
is the same collaborative approach that was used to virtually
eliminate the risk of fatalities aboard U.S. commercial
airlines. The FAA has held a number of surface safety summits
with individual users of our national airspace system, such as
general aviation, air carriers, business aviation, and airport
operators.
We hear a lot about technology solutions, and those are
certainly key. We are fast tracking technologies to address
specific safety concerns on the airport surface and are
deploying a surface awareness technology at those locations
that currently do not have a surface surveillance system.
The trend overall is going down, but it is not enough. As I
stressed at the beginning of my testimony, while we were proud
of our safety culture and the progress we have made, we do not
have the luxury of complacency. We are optimistic that our
ongoing work in collaboration, with industry and labor, will
continue to lead to greater safety improvements.
The FAA will remain vigilant and continue collaborating
with everyone that utilizes the national airspace system to
enhance safety with a goal of eliminating significant safety
events. Going forward, zero has to be the only acceptable
number.
Thank you again for the chance to speak on this critical
issue, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Arel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Timothy L. Arel, Chief Operating Officer, Air
Traffic Organization, Federal Aviation Administration
Chairs Cantwell and Duckworth, Ranking Members Cruz and Moran, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the chance to be here today
to testify about some of the significant events we have seen in the
National Airspace System (NAS) this year. Before I delve into the
details and the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) actions to
address these events and prevent them in the future, I want to
emphasize the seriousness with which we approach this issue.
Collectively, air traffic controllers, pilots, commercial operators,
general aviation, and airports all play an important role in minimizing
risk within the system. Through years of collaboration with these
stakeholders, the FAA has established multiple layers of safety that
protect the traveling public from the time they board an aircraft to
the time they deplane. These efforts include continued pilot outreach
and training, controller awareness and training, investments in surface
safety and situational awareness technology tools, robust procedures
managed by air traffic controllers, and the application of Safety
Management Systems internally and across part 121 commercial operators
as well as major airport operators.
The level of safety we have would not be possible without
continuous transparent and collaborative communication between the FAA
and industry. At the FAA, we are proud of our proactive safety culture,
which emphasizes the value of nonpunitive sharing of data and safety
information between the agency and industry to reduce risk and maximize
safety. Nevertheless, we view even one runway incursion or other unsafe
operation in the NAS as too many, and the FAA is committed to the
relentless pursuit of continual improvement in everything we do. Any
runway incursions or other event in the NAS, whether isolated or part
of a possible trend, is a concern, and we don't take it lightly. We
appreciate the oversight and attention this subcommittee has focused on
this issue, as increased awareness helps us improve safety.
Runway Incursions
A runway incursion is any occurrence at an airport involving the
incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected
area of a surface designated for the landing and takeoff of aircraft.
Incursions are caused by operational incidents attributed to air
traffic control action or inaction, pilot deviations, or vehicle/
pedestrian deviations.
We measure four categories of runway incursions based on objective,
observable standards:
Category A is a serious incident in which a collision was
narrowly avoided.
Category B is an incident in which separation decreases and
there is a significant potential for collision, which may
result in a time-critical corrective/evasive response to avoid
a collision.
Category C is an incident characterized by ample time and/or
distance to avoid a collision.
Category D is an incident that meets the definition of
runway incursion (e.g., the incorrect presence of a single
vehicle/person/aircraft on the protected area of a surface
designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft) but
results in no immediate safety consequences.
For Fiscal Year 2023, of the approximately 54.4 million takeoffs
and landings in the NAS, there were 1,756 total runway incursions.
Approximately 60 percent of those incursions were attributable to pilot
deviations, approximately 20 percent were caused by air traffic
controller action or inaction, and the remaining approximately 20
percent were caused by vehicle or pedestrian deviations. It's important
to note that the total number of Category A and B runway incursions was
23. Although these statistics suggest that runway incursions account
for approximately 0.003 percent of all NAS operations, and the more
serious incursions in Categories A and B combined account for about
0.00004 percent of all NAS operations, we recognize that any number is
an unacceptable safety risk and we are working hard to drive the number
of such incursions to zero.
Overall, our data, which is regularly shared with Congress and
publicly available, shows a recent downward trend in the rate of runway
incursions. For example, in Fiscal Year 2022, there were approximately
33 incursions per one million takeoffs and landings. In Fiscal Year
2023, there were 32 incursions per one million takeoffs and landings.
Although the change is modest so far, we are optimistic that our recent
and ongoing work and collaboration with industry is bearing fruit and
will lead to continued safety improvements in the NAS.
The FAA takes seriously every safety event in the NAS, whether it
occurs on the surface or in the air. Through the promotion of Voluntary
Safety Reporting Programs and expanded system monitoring through
Aviation Risk Identification and Assessment, we identify and mitigate
events that would have previously been unknown even two years ago. Our
focus is on maintaining our status as the premier air navigation
service provider, keeping aircraft safe, separated, and on time.
Safety Summit and Follow-on Actions
In March of this year, in response to an uptick in the most severe
runway incursions, the FAA took a number of additional actions aimed at
helping to drive down the incidence of all runway incursions. The
Administrator's call to action led to a safety summit that brought more
than 200 safety leaders from across the aviation industry to examine
ways that safety could be enhanced to prevent future occurrences. These
discussions covered commercial and general aviation operations, the air
traffic system, and airport and ground operations. The FAA also held a
series of surface summits separately with stakeholders, including
general aviation, air carriers, business aviation, and airport
operators.
Since the safety summit, the FAA has taken a number of actions to
enhance flight safety and reduce incursions:
March: The FAA issued a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO)
identifying items for safety management focus, including
guidance related to runway safety, and asking all pilots, air
carrier management, and operators to review processes,
procedures, or training to ensure operations are conducted at
the highest level of safety, including adherence to air traffic
control instructions and maintaining a ``sterile cockpit'' to
mitigate risks associated with extraneous communication.
March: The FAA announced additional steps the agency's Air
Traffic Organization (ATO) will take:
Ensure that supervisors devote their full attention to
the operation and airfield during peak traffic periods at
each facility.
Provide more dedicated training for unusual
circumstances.
April: The FAA named an independent safety review team to
further examine ways to enhance safety and reliability in the
Nation's air traffic system. The Safety Review Team began its
work in May and will complete its work this fall and present
concrete recommendations on how the agency can advance air
traffic safety.
June: The FAA launched the ``Stand Up for Safety'' Campaign.
The series will provide monthly, mandatory special emphasis
training for our controller workforce, including operations
supervisors and managers, in collaboration with the National
Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA).
August: The FAA announced it will hold runway safety
meetings at approximately 90 airports between August and the
end of September. The meetings, held annually at each airport
with a control tower, are the primary forum for pinpointing and
addressing airport-specific risk in the surface environment and
are part of the ongoing work of the Runway Safety Action Teams
discussed below.
August: The FAA issued a SAFO with reminders of practices to
prevent injuries while workers are towing aircraft and guiding
them to and from gates. The SAFO reminds aircraft operators
that it is important for personnel to remain clear of operating
engines until they are shut down.
September: The FAA tasked the Investigative Technologies
Aviation Rulemaking Committee to provide recommendations on new
technologies, such as cockpit alerting systems, designed to
reduce runway safety events. When aircraft land on the wrong
surface, it presents risks that can lead to catastrophic events
where the surface could be closed, damaged, or an unsuitable
length for a safe takeoff or landing.
Moreover, over the course of Fiscal Year 2023, the FAA awarded
grants for 55 runway safety projects under the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law and 154 runway safety projects under the Airport
Improvement Program, totaling more than $1.0 billion. These projects
will reconfigure taxiways that may cause confusion, install airfield
lighting, signage or markings, or construct new taxiways to enhance
safety on the airfield.
Longterm Runway Safety Initiatives
The actions since March that are noted above are a small fraction
of the overall sustained effort that the FAA and industry have
undertaken over time to lower runway incursions. Runway safety will
continue to be a high priority for the FAA, and we will continue to
develop and refine initiatives to enhance runway safety. Here are some
of the more significant FAA initiatives that are moving the needle on
safety.
Runway Safety Council. The FAA convened the Runway Safety
Council (RSC) to fundamentally change the existing safety
culture and move toward a systemic proactive management
strategy that involved cooperation throughout the FAA and among
the different segments of the aviation industry. By applying
the formalized and proactive approach of the ATO's Safety
Management System, the RSC is advancing the shift from a
compliance-based safety system to a risk-based, data-driven,
integrated systems solution to runway safety.
Collaboration with the aviation community is a key component of
runway safety. The RSC includes aviation stakeholders from
across FAA Lines of Business, including Airports, Aviation
Safety, and the ATO, as well as FAA employee labor
organizations like Professional Aviation System Specialists and
NATCA, and industry representatives such as aircraft operators,
airline representatives, and flight instructors.
Runway Safety Action Teams. Runway Safety Action Teams
(RSAT) bring local airport stakeholders together at least once
a year at towered airports to identify risks to surface safety
at individual airports and develop plans to mitigate or
eliminate those risks. RSATs provide the foundation of the
Runway Safety Program at individual airports. The RSAT meetings
are the primary forum for pinpointing and addressing airport-
specific risks in the surface environment. The product of a
RSAT meeting is a Runway Safety Action Plan in which the
stakeholders document and agree to pursue specific actions
intended to improve surface safety.
Runway Incursion Mitigation. The Runway Incursion Mitigation
(RIM) program is a national initiative at airports with a
history of runway incursions to identify airport-specific risk
factors that might contribute to a runway incursion. These risk
factors may include unclear taxiway markings, airport signage,
and more complex issues such as the runway or taxiway layout.
The FAA then works with the airport sponsors to develop
strategies to mitigate runway incursions at these locations.
Currently, 131 unmitigated RIM locations have been identified
across 80 airports. To date, the program has mitigated 99
locations. Other solutions like operational modifications or a
hot spot designation (to optimize pilot awareness) are employed
when physical changes are not feasible or best suited. There is
a 78-percent average reduction of runway incursions at
mitigated RIM locations. The RIM program continuously monitors
these locations for reoccurrence and assesses incoming data for
any new RIM location candidates.
Runway Safety Technologies
Investment in technology will continue to be an effective mechanism
to enhance aviation safety and runway safety in particular. We are
committed to the continued development and deployment of safety
technologies in support of aviation safety. Here are some examples of
technologies that are advancing safety.
Technology Sprints. The FAA has announced that we are
pursuing a technology sprint by fast-tracking the deployment of
three initiatives to address specific safety concerns on the
airport surface.
The Surface Awareness Initiative will deploy a
situational awareness display of airport surface traffic to
tower air traffic controllers for airports that do not
currently have a surface surveillance system.
The Approach Runway Verification will add
functionality in the Standard Terminal Automation
Replacement Terminal System (STARS) to provide controllers
with alerts of wrong runway, closed runway, and wrong
airport alignments to prevent wrong surface landings.
The Runway Incursion Device will provide a memory aid
device that generates an audible and visual alert to
controllers to enhance situational awareness of occupied
and closed runways, which we plan to deploy to over 70
towers.
Runway Status Lights. The FAA developed Runway Status Lights
(RWSL) technology to increase situational awareness for flight
crews and airport vehicle drivers and thus serve as an added
layer of safety. A RWSL system derives traffic information from
surface and approach surveillance systems and illuminates red
in-pavement airport lights to signal a potentially unsafe
situation. Runway Entrance Lights are deployed at taxiway/
runway crossings and illuminate if it is unsafe to enter or
cross a runway. Takeoff Hold Lights are deployed by the
departure hold zone and illuminate red when there is an
aircraft in position for departure and the runway is occupied
by another aircraft or vehicle and it is unsafe for takeoff.
RWSL is operational at 20 U.S. airports.
Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X. Airport
Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) integrates data
from a variety of sources, including radars, transponder
multilateration systems, and Automatic Dependent Surveillance--
Broadcast (ADS-B) to provide accurate target position and
identification information and thus give controllers a more
reliable view of airport operations. ASDE-X provides tower
controllers a surface traffic situation display with visual and
audible alerting of traffic conflicts and potential collisions.
ASDE-X is operational at 35 airports in the United States.
Airport Surface Surveillance Capability. Airport Surface
Surveillance Capability (ASSC) is similar to ASDE-X. It
improves surface surveillance and situational awareness in all
kinds of weather. With ASSC, air traffic controllers see
aircraft and ground vehicles on the airport surface and on
approach and departure paths within a few miles of the airport.
Like ASDE-X, ASSC fuses data from multiple sources, including
radars, to provide a highly accurate display for controllers
with the same visual and aural alerting capabilities. ASSC is
operational at nine airports in the United States.
Runway Incursion Warning Systems and Vehicle ADS-B
Transmitters. Runway Incursion Warning Systems (RIWS) and
vehicle ADS-B transmitters are available for installation on
airport and airline-owned vehicles that regularly operate in
the movement area. These technologies enhance situational
awareness for surface operators and Air Traffic Controllers.
FAA has been actively encouraging airports to voluntarily equip
their vehicles. Grants are available for installation of these
systems. As a result, there are now over 2,100 vehicles
equipped with ADS-B transmitters at airports with ASDE-X and
ASSC and over 1,000 vehicles equipped with a RIWS.
From the Flight Deck and the Runway Safety Pilot Simulator.
The FAA has produced 100 site-specific ``From the Flight Deck''
videos to educate and inform pilots and controllers of the
risks associated with operating at specific airports around the
NAS. Other videos cover safety topics, including wrong surface
landings, complex airfield geometry, hold short, wrong
direction intersection takeoffs, and more. Additional airport
videos are forthcoming.
FAA's Runway Safety Pilot Simulator video series is a self-guided
resource to assist flight instructors with teaching student
pilots surface safety best practices before they step foot into
the cockpit. It allows student pilots to navigate on airport
surfaces while communicating with air traffic control and gain
experience following instructions provided by air traffic
control. The scenarios are interactive and allow viewers to
make decisions based on air traffic control instructions.
Pilot Information on Airports Across the NAS. To supplement
From the Flight Deck videos, we began publishing additional
information on faa.gov. This content includes details such as
airport-specific cautions, information local controllers want
pilots to know, airport communications, airspace details, more
general best practices, lost communications tips, and other
preflight planning resources. This supplemental web content is
currently available for 25 airports across the NAS, with more
content in development.
Controller Hiring
Finally, although eliminating runway incursions requires close
coordination and collaboration with industry, we recognize the vital
role we play in working to avoid and eliminate them. Part of that work
is the hiring and training of air traffic controllers. The President's
FY 2024 budget request includes funding for the hiring and training of
1,800 controllers, an increase of 300 above the hiring level for FY
2023. This funding supports the continued training of the 1,500
controllers hired in FY 2023. The FAA Academy's training schedule in
execution for FY 2024 will support the FAA's overall goal to hire 1,800
controllers to include the added training cost for the additional 300
controllers reflected in the FY 2024 budget request. The budget request
will allow the FAA to continue progress toward attaining the necessary
Certified Professional Controller staffing levels to meet current
traffic demands, which have returned to, or in some markets exceeded,
pre-pandemic levels. The 2023 Controller Workforce Plan released in May
includes facility-specific staffing targets. As we continue to work
with our labor partners, we also submitted to Congress the results of
the Collaborative Resource Workgroup and look forward to continued
discussion and progress as we all work toward the shared goal of
staffing targets to meet traffic demands.
Conclusion
I would like to reemphasize the seriousness with which we approach
this issue and assure you that although we are proud of our safety
culture and the work we have done, the FAA will doggedly press for
continued collaboration with industry to further enhance safety
initiatives and technologies to reduce runway incursions with the goal
of eliminating them. Thank you again for the chance to speak about this
critical safety issue.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Arel. And now, I
recognize Mr. Rich Santa, President, National Air Traffic
Controllers Association, for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RICH SANTA, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO (NATCA)
Mr. Santa. Chair Duckworth, Ranking Member Moran, Chair
Cantwell, thank you for this opportunity to testify today.
The most important action Congress can take for the safety
of the national airspace system would be to pass a long term,
comprehensive FAA reauthorization bill before the end of this
year that directs the FAA to adopt a controller staffing target
that has been developed by the Collaborative Resource Work
Group as the basis for the FAA's Controller Workforce Plan, and
to maximize controller hiring for the duration of that bill.
There are over 1,000 fewer controllers today than there
were a decade ago. Continuing to follow the same flawed model
that the FAA utilizes, after more than a decade of missed
hiring goals and missed staffing projections, will continue
this downward trend. A new approach is desperately needed.
The FAA must adopt the updated and more accurate
operational staffing targets that were jointly developed by the
Collaborative Research Work Group. They were developed by a
team comprised of FAA's air traffic organization and NATCA.
And FAA, MITRE Corporation Center for Advanced Aviation
System Development verified and validated that group's work.
The facility staffing targets that the FAA utilizes today in
our facilities were developed almost a decade ago.
It is beyond time to update them. The new CRWG staffing
targets need to be used as the basis for the FAA's annual
control of workforce plan moving forward so that Congress and
aviation industry have a complete, and most importantly,
accurate picture in view of the staffing needs of the NAS.
We appreciate the Commerce Committee's inclusion of the
CRWG staffing targets in its draft reauthorization bill.
Understaffing, the FAA requires mandatory overtime to our
controller workforce, including regular 6 day workweeks and 10
hour days. This leads to fatigue.
Last year, controllers at 40 percent of our facilities
worked 6 day workweeks at least once a month, and several of
our facilities requires 6 day workweeks and 10 hour days every
single week.
Air traffic control is already a highly stressful
profession. Working 200 hours per month layers on significant
fatigue and inserts additional risks into the NAS. In fact, in
June, the DOT Inspector General issued an audit concluding that
while the United States has one of the safest air traffic
systems in the world, the lack of fully certified controllers
poses a potential risk to air traffic operations.
To reach the CRWG's staffing targets, the FAA must hire to
the maximum throughput of the FAA Academy, for more than just
the next 5 years. We are thankful for the bipartisan group of
Senators who have co-sponsored the important Air Traffic
Controller Hiring Act of 2023, which we believe should be
included in the base reauthorization bill.
The FAA also needs to be transparent with its need for
increased funding for its facilities and equipment budget,
which provides resources for physical infrastructure repairs
and sustainment, equipment modernization, and major capital
projects. Congress has always met the agency's stated need, but
the FAA has consistently requested less than it needs. It
hasn't even adjusted for inflation.
This has prevented the agency from meeting its equipment
sustainment replacement and modernization needs, resulting in a
significant backlog. Moving to a fix on failed model has led
the FAA's inability to maintain and replace critical safety
equipment that has exceeded its expected life and introduced
unnecessary risk into the system.
The failure of the U.S. NOTAM system earlier this year
resulting in a shutdown of the airspace was a glaring example
of this risk. Funding limitations have also delayed the FAA
from designing and implementing new technology to improve
safety, such as the airport surface surveillance situational
awareness tools that are so desperately needed to address
runway incursions, a top safety concern.
NATCA is supportive of the Senate's THUD appropriations
bill because along with the funding from the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act, it will meet the FAA's needs this
year. Finally, I want to stress the need to avoid a Government
shutdown.
That would force the FAA to suspend hiring, close its
training academy, delay the pipeline of new controllers, delay
modernization, which would be a catastrophic impact to the
national airspace system. Thank you so much for your time, and
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Santa follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rich Santa, President, National Air Traffic
Controllers Association, AFL-CIO (NATCA)
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the National
Air Traffic Controllers Association, AFL-CIO (NATCA) at today's hearing
titled ``Addressing Close Calls to Improve Aviation Safety.''
NATCA is the exclusive representative for nearly 20,000 employees,
including the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) air traffic
controllers, traffic management coordinators and specialists, flight
service station air traffic controllers, staff support specialists,
engineers and architects, and other aviation safety professionals, as
well as Department of Defense (DOD) and Federal Contract Tower (FCT)
air traffic controllers.
Executive Summary
The National Airspace System (NAS) moves over 45,000 flights and
2.9 million passengers, and more than 59,000 tons of cargo every day
across more than 29 million square miles of airspace. Although it is
the safest, most efficient, and most complex system in the world, we
should always strive to bolster safety, mitigate risk, and improve
efficiency.
The most important action Congress can take for the safety of the
NAS would be to pass a long-term, comprehensive FAA Reauthorization
bill before the end of the year.
For the better part of two decades, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), like much of the Federal government has faced an
unstable, unpredictable funding stream--whether due to the risk of
lapsed appropriations or the risk of lapsed authorization--with
interruptions that have negatively affected all aspects of the Agency,
making it increasingly difficult to maintain the safety and efficiency
of the NAS.
Even when the Agency is not facing the threat of a shutdown,
multiple administrations have submitted insufficient FAA budget
requests to Congress that do not meet the full needs of the NAS.
Historically, Congress provides the Agency with the resources it
requests through both authorization of top-line numbers and the annual
appropriations process, but because FAA requests too little, there are
significant backlogs of NAS system sustainment and ATC facility
sustainment, in addition to mounting delays in the implementation of
NAS modernization and system improvements as well as ATC tower and
radar facility replacement.
Another area where this dynamic occurs is controller staffing.
There are approximately 1,000 fewer Certified Professional Controllers
(CPC) than there were a decade ago. Continuing to follow the flawed
controller staffing model developed annually by FAA's Office of Finance
and Management after more than a decade of missed hiring goals and
staffing projections, followed by reduced expectations the following
year would be deeply problematic. Reducing air traffic capacity due to
understaffing, as FAA did this past summer in the New York airspace,
only serves to undermine the efficiency of the NAS.
FAA must adopt the new, more accurate operational staffing targets
that were developed by the Collaborative Resources Workgroup (CRWG).
These staffing targets should form the basis for FAA's annual
Controller Workforce Plan (CWP) moving forward, so that Congress and
the aviation industry have a complete and accurate view of the staffing
needs of the Agency.
We appreciate the Commerce Committee's inclusion of the CRWG's
staffing targets in its draft FAA reauthorization bill. If FAA uses the
CRWG as the basis for its CWP, Congress will finally get a complete and
accurate picture of the FAA's controller staffing needs. In addition to
limiting NAS capacity, understaffing also requires FAA to assign
mandatory overtime to controllers on a regular basis, which leads to
fatigue. Fatigue introduces unnecessary risk in the NAS. Chronic
fatigue and stress multiply that risk.
FAA also must be transparent with its need for improved funding for
its Facilities and Equipment (F&E) budget, which provides resources for
physical infrastructure repairs and sustainment, equipment
modernization, and major capital projects. NATCA estimates that FAA
requires approximately $4.5 billion for F&E activities in Fiscal Year
(FY) 2024, and this number will approach nearly $6 billion in the near
future. Despite this increasing need, for the past decade, FAA has
consistently requested only approximately $3 billion per year in annual
appropriations.
Congress has always met the Agency's stated need, but that has
prevented FAA from meeting its own equipment sustainment, replacement,
and modernization needs, creating a significant backlog. That backlog
will worsen if FAA continues to submit annual budget requests that do
not reflect its true needs moving forward. Failing to maintain and
replace critical safety equipment that has exceeded its expected life
introduces unnecessary risk into the system. Further, funding
limitations prevent the FAA from designing and implementing new
technologies that will improve safety, such as an airport surface
surveillance situational awareness tool to address wrong surface
landings--a top safety concern.
NATCA's testimony will focus on: (1) the current controller
staffing crisis and training challenges and how they could affect
safety and efficiency; (2) the negative effects of equipment and
infrastructure backlogs and how those affect critical modernization and
infrastructure programs, including significantly delaying the
development and implementation of new safety technology that will
improve surface surveillance at airports and help mitigate the risks of
runway incursions; and (3) the negative effects that a potential
shutdown would have on the NAS, as well as on the nearly 20,000 air
traffic controllers and other aviation safety professionals represented
by NATCA.
I. Controller Staffing and Training Hampered
For years, NATCA has been alerting policymakers that the controller
staffing shortage negatively affects all aspects of the NAS. Despite
meeting its self-imposed air traffic controller hiring goals for much
of the past decade, the FAA has not kept up with attrition.
Consequently, as of the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, there were 1,200
fewer CPCs employed by the FAA than at the end of FY 2012. Currently,
many of FAA's fully certified controllers are working mandatory
overtime hours, frequently 6-day workweeks and 10-hour days, to make up
for the staffing shortage. Some have even been working those schedules
for their entire careers. Over the long-term, this will continue to
introduce unnecessary risk into the system.
When there are too few fully certified professional controllers
(CPCs), positions have to be combined, resulting in divided attention
between different responsibilities. Most commonly, controller staffing
shortages are mitigated through reducing efficiency--meaning flight
delays. Chronically understaffed facilities also introduce unnecessary
safety risks into the system.
Although the FAA has taken steps in the right direction, such as
upwardly adjusting its hiring goals for each of FY 2024-2026 to 1,800
new hires, a government shutdown would cause immediate and irreparable
harm to the FAA's near-term plans to address controller staffing. At
minimum, the FAA's training academy in Oklahoma City discontinues
operations during a shutdown and the students are sent home, while new
classes of controller trainees in the pipeline will have their start-
dates significantly delayed, leading to additional attrition among the
scheduled new hires.
Even before the current funding uncertainty began, according to the
FAA's Controller Workforce Plan, 40 percent of those who were members
of a hiring class between 2014 and 2017 were removed from the FAA,
resigned, or are still in training, meaning FAA can only expect about
60 percent of controller trainees to reach full certification within
five to seven years of their hire. As a result, because it takes
between one and three years for a new FAA Academy graduate to reach
full certification, an increased hiring goal would take several years
to have any positive effect on CPC totals. If the Academy is closed and
hiring stops, the FAA's CPC shortage will become even more pronounced
for the next five to seven years.
A 2023 shutdown certainly would not be the first major disruption
to FAA funding that has harmed controller staffing levels. In 2013,
across-the-board spending cuts as a result of Sequestration forced the
FAA to institute a hiring freeze and shutter the FAA Academy between
March and December of that year. This came at a time in which the FAA
was struggling to replace retiring controllers, and the Agency has
never made up for that sequester-related hiring freeze. In fact, in its
2013-22 Controller Workforce Plan, FAA stated to Congress that it
planned to hire 1,315 controller trainees in 2013 and 1,263 in 2014.
Yet, when it hired only 554 controller trainees in 2013, missing its
target by over 700 because of sequestration, the following year it only
amended its 2014 hiring target to 1,286 adding merely 23 additional new
trainees--a goal it missed by over 170.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
It's also important to note that in 2013, FAA projected essentially
a flat total headcount including CPCs and trainees over the next
decade. Instead, it immediately missed even that modest pace in 2013,
hovered between 700-800 below that goal for much of the decade, and
then once COVID-19 began, fell about 1,400 behind.
But, if you go back further to the 2009 CWP, the same table showed
targets of significantly more hiring and total on-board headcount of
between 15,365 to 15,692 for each year over the next decade.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Sequestration also forced the FAA to issue a ``save money
furlough'' affecting every employee, including air traffic controllers.
During the week of April 21-27, 2013, delays nearly tripled at our
Nation's airports, from 5,103 to 13,694, when compared to the same week
the year before and the year after.
Then, again, in late Sept. 2013, because Congress had not passed
appropriations bills to fund the government for FY 2014, the government
was forced to shut down for 16 days shuttering much of the FAA along
with it, which resulted in furloughs to FAA employees. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) estimates that these furloughs cost the
government a total of $2.5 billion.
In early 2018, Congress and the White House failed--on two separate
occasions--to enact funding legislation and the government was shut
down for three days between Jan. 20-22, and then again on Feb. 9. On
March 23, Congress narrowly avoided its third Federal government
shutdown in a two-month period when it passed an omnibus spending
package that funded the government and also extended FAA authorization
through Sept. 30, 2018. Prior to that, Congress was on its fifth
consecutive CR and fifth consecutive extension to FAA authorization.
From Dec. 2018 through Jan. 2019, the NAS suffered through the
longest government shutdown in U.S. history, exacerbating a controller
staffing crisis that continued to go from bad to worse.
By the 2019-2028 CWP, FAA Finance had long abandoned its goals of
approximately 15,500 total on-board headcount including CPCs and
trainees from a decade earlier and even abandoned the total on-board
headcount including CPCs and trainees from 2013 of approximately
14,800. Without justification or explanation, it had adjusted that
target all the way down to under 14,000. What prompted this reduced
staffing target? Only FAA Finance can answer that question, but you
won't find it in any CWP. Instead, you only will find justification for
a new headcount number each year, because presumably FAA Finance
assumes Congress will not compare past CWPs or notice its consistent
failure to meet its stated hiring targets and goals.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Fourteen months later, the COVID-19 Pandemic forced the FAA to
close its training Academy again and, even after it reopened,
enrollment capacity was reduced by 50 percent to maintain health and
safety protocols.
Although FAA reduced its hiring goals in three different years
(2013, 2019, and 2021) reacting to a major disruption, the Agency
curiously chose not to increase its hiring goals in the following year
even though it has significantly more capacity at the Academy to do so.
See Staffing Fact Sheet (Appendix B).\1\
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\1\ NATCA has not yet received end of Fiscal Year 2023 data from
FAA. Consequently, Appendix B is through the end of Fiscal Year 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A longitudinal review of FAA's CWPs from 2009 through 2021 reveals
that FAA Finance has always projected that FAA only needs approximately
the same number of controllers that it has at that particular moment in
time (Appendix C). As it consistently missed its hiring targets and
otherwise failed to keep up with attrition, the on-board controller
number has decreased throughout that time. FAA Finance consistently
said it only needs the new, lower controller headcount number each year
and looking forward over the next decade. The long-term effect of this
practice has led to the FAA's current state: an untenable one in which
many controllers work mandatory 10-hour days, and six-day workweeks.
Those requirements are based on a system that FAA Finance created of
its own device. And it's one they would have continued but for the
scrutiny of this Subcommittee in recent years.
By 2022, after the staffing attrition due to the pandemic, FAA
Finance finally conceded that it needed more controllers and reset its
long-term target by 2031 back to 14,739, essentially what it said FAA
needed back in 2012. But, having never reached its prior targets and
only driving those numbers down year after year after year, NATCA and
this Subcommittee have no guarantee that FAA will maintain this new
target for the remainder of the next decade, given its consistent
practice to change its plan in each of the previous 15 years.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Moreover, we know from the last shutdown that some of our most
experienced controllers decided to retire, while others tendered their
resignations well-short of their retirement age in order to meet their
financial obligations and provide for their families. Cumulatively,
these delays to controller training, early retirements, and unexpected
attrition wreak havoc on controller staffing throughout the system.
Recognizing that controller staffing is a major problem for the
FAA, in Dec. 2022, then-Acting Administrator Billy Nolen directed the
FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO) to restart the CRWG and partner
with NATCA to collaboratively determine the number of CPCs needed to
meet operational, statutory, and contractual requirements, including
resources to develop, evaluate, and implement processes and initiatives
affecting the NAS. In the weeks that followed, the parties diligently
worked with the MITRE Corporation's Center for Advanced Aviation System
Development to develop CPC operational staffing targets at each of
FAA's 313 air traffic control facilities. The CRWG completed its work
at the end of January and presented its report to the then-Acting
Administrator and NATCA President in mid-February.
Nine months later, the FAA has not yet agreed to adopt the jointly
developed CRWG's CPC targets as the basis for its annual CWP to provide
Congress and the aviation industry with a more complete and transparent
view of FAA's operational workforce needs. We hope that new FAA
Administrator Michael Whitaker will recognize the important
collaborative work done by the FAA and NATCA and adopt the CRWG's
targets, while dispensing with the failed FAA Finance model.
As we highlighted above, the current CWP is flawed because it
relies on a ``finance driven'' staffing model that the FAA uses to
develop facility-by-facility staffing. That model, developed by FAA's
Office of Finance and Management (AFN or FAA Finance) incorrectly
combines CPCs and CPC-ITs (controllers who were fully certified at a
previous facility but are ``in training'' and not yet fully certified
at their new facility). The CWP also ignores existing CPC staffing
targets that were developed nearly ten years ago, which the
reconstituted CRWG report updated based on current needs. Most
importantly, it rejects FAA's own Air Traffic Organization's analysis
that the system is severely understaffed.
The Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General (DOT
OIG) issued a report in June that agreed with the CRWG's analysis. The
DOT OIG's Audit Report AV2023035, titled ``FAA Faces Controller
Staffing Challenges as Air Traffic Operations Return to Pre-Pandemic
Levels at Critical Facilities'' concluded that ``while the United
States has one of the safest air traffic systems in the world, the lack
of fully certified controllers, operational supervisors, and traffic
management coordinators pose a potential risk to air traffic
operations.'' DOT OIG Audit Report at 18.
Regarding controllers, the DOT IG wrote, ``FAA continues to face
staffing challenges and lacks a plan to address them, which in turn
poses a risk to the continuity of air traffic operations.'' DOT OIG
Audit Report at 6 (emphasis added). For example, the DOT IG
``determined that 20 of 26 (77 percent) critical facilities are staffed
below the Agency's 85-percent threshold'' and that ``managers we
interviewed at 16 of the 17 facilities likewise told us their
facilities were not adequately staffed. For example, at several
facilities, controllers were working mandatory overtime and 6-day work
weeks to cover staff shortages.'' DOT OIG Audit Report at 5, 8.
Without rationale, FAA Finance revised its staffing targets upward
after the CRWG issued its report. Not coincidentally, it also was after
the Senate Commerce Committee and the U.S. House of Representatives'
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee both introduced legislative
language to require the FAA to adopt the CRWG targets as the basis for
the CWP. Nevertheless, FAA Finance continued with its intentionally
misleading blending of CPCs and CPC-ITs into one group, despite pending
legislation that requires them to report both groups separately.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
As soon as this Subcommittee turns its attention to other pressing
matters, NATCA is concerned that FAA Finance will begin lowering its
targets again consistent with past practice.
Referencing the above chart, notice that FAA Finance now believes
it needs over 15,400 total headcount (not the 13,800 total headcount it
published that it needed just a few years ago). This higher headcount
is the same total it needed, and had, in 2009, but the Agency won't be
able to achieve those totals for another decade due to the failures of
its finance-driven staffing model over the last decade, which drove the
number down.
This revision by FAA Finance is entirely disingenuous because FAA
has needed that many total controllers the entire time and FAA Finance
intentionally reduced the targets every year until Congress was forced
to intervene in recent years.
Continuing to follow FAA Finance's hiring plan--constructed by a
line of business that has no experience operating or managing the air
traffic system--after more than a decade of missed goals, incorrect
projections, and reduced expectations is a fool's errand.
II. Cascading Delays to Critical Modernization and Infrastructure
Programs Jeopardize Safety of the NAS
Stop-and-go funding negatively affects critical modernization and
infrastructure programs such as delaying development, testing, and
implementation of new technologies, as well as delaying the sustainment
and repair of existing safety-critical equipment. Delays to these types
of programs have real world consequences.
Each year, the NAS experiences hundreds of safety events such as
wrong-surface landings and runway incursions. Particularly critical at
this point in time, a shutdown would significantly delay development,
testing, and implementation of a new surface surveillance situational
awareness tool that will help controllers identify and detect when and
where aircraft and ADS-B equipped vehicles are on airport surfaces.
Although it is still in its infancy of development, this
situational awareness tool would fulfill a similar role as the Airport
Surface Detection System--Model X (ASDE-X) and Airport Surface
Surveillance Capability (ASSC) at airports that do not currently have
any surface surveillance technology. However, unlike ASDE-X and ASSC,
this tool would be limited only to visual indicators and will not
include ``safety logic'' enhancements, which is the predictive software
that alerts controllers and provides an audible alarm as soon as the
safety risk is detected by the program.
To draw a parallel to motor vehicle technology, these tools are
similar to the differences in a car's blind spot warning system. Today,
many cars have some form of blind spot detection system. Some systems
provide a warning light, an audible alarm, and automatic collision
assistance, while other systems simply provide a flashing light on a
side mirror. Both systems help prevent vehicle accidents, and although
one certainly provides more redundancy than the other, both are
significantly safer than what drivers had access to prior to the first
such system in 2001.
As of today, only 44 airports across the NAS have either ASDE-X or
ASSC, and despite being a recent technological upgrade, these programs
are in a sustainment-only posture within the FAA. The FAA does not have
the funding nor contractual capability to expand these programs to new
facilities. As a result, the aviation industry, NATCA, and the FAA
began working on the development and implementation of a situational
awareness tool to help air traffic controllers mitigate these risks.
The successful and timely implementation of this situational
awareness tool likely will hinge on two factors: the availability of
sufficient funding for this program, and an intentional acceleration of
the FAA's acquisitions management process so that this tool can reach
air traffic facilities sooner rather than later. Even if these hurdles
are cleared, the current timeline for first-facility installation is
June 2024, at the earliest. Any future funding disruptions or budgetary
shortfalls, including a flat Facilities and Equipment (F&E) budget due
to a long-term Continuing Resolution, will delay this timeline
significantly.
Moreover, in the event of further funding disruptions, the programs
listed below will experience the following negative effects, just to
name a few:
En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM)--Testing and build
deployment at air traffic facilities must be rescheduled, which
will cause delays.
Standard Terminal Automation Replacement (STARS)--Deployment
of a new wrong surface alerting tool know as Arrival Runway
Verification (ARV) will be delayed.
DataComm--Facility training at Jacksonville Center (ZJX) and
Fort Worth Center (ZFW) would stop and additional classes would
be necessary. Cleveland Center (ZOB) implementation would be
delayed approximately 60 days.
Enterprise Information Display Systems (E-IDS)--Software
testing events must be delayed.
Airspace--New instrument procedure development will be
negatively affected, although the extent of the harm and the
length of the delay will vary depending on each facility's
ability to adjust to a new timeline.
During a shutdown, work on Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs
(VSRPs), which provide for critical communication between air traffic
safety action program review teams and furloughed staff, is deferred,
resulting in the inability to properly identify and mitigate safety and
training deficiencies. The safety reporting program for NATCA
represented engineers and service area support staff also does not
operate; all work on existing reported safety issues and associated
mitigation activities is suspended during a shutdown.
The FAA is behind schedule and continues to suffer through
budgetary shortfalls on many critical modernization and infrastructure
programs. Over the past 14 years, the FAA's F&E budget has not kept
pace with inflation. In FY 2009, the F&E budget was $2.942 billion. It
subsequently was lower than that in each Fiscal Year through 2017,
before it peaked at $3.3 billion in FY 2018. However, since then it has
remained just above or below $3 billion.
Estimating for a modest 2 percent average annual inflation rate
over the last 14 years, the FAA's F&E budget should be over $3.8
billion based on its 2009 budget.
This loss of spending and buying power for modernization and
infrastructure programs forced FAA into a ``fix-on-fail'' model by
requiring it to prioritize mandatory costs such as subscription
services and leases, basic ATC facility sustainment, salaries, travel,
and major support contracts, along with NAS system sustainment. This
prioritization leaves little to no money for important programs such as
ATC facility replacement, the NAS facility sustainment backlog, the NAS
system sustainment backlog, NAS system improvements, radar and
surveillance sustainment and replacement, and Air Route Traffic Control
Center (ARTCC) and Terminal Radar Approach Control facility (TRACON)
consolidation, just to name a few.
NATCA was pleased to see the President's budget request for $3.46
billion for F&E for FY 2024, which in addition to $1 billion from the
Infrastructure and Jobs Act (IIJA) for facilities meets FAA's $4.5
billion need in FY 2024. We support the Senate's Transportation,
Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD)
appropriations bill that would fully meet this need. We are concerned,
however, because NATCA projects FAA's F&E budget need to be between
$5.5 and $6 billion in the near future, and the IIJA funding will
expire at the end of FY 2027.
In the coming years, FAA also will face unprecedented technological
challenges. The continued development and rapid proliferation of
advanced air mobility, drones, and other new entrants could jeopardize
NAS safety and efficiency if not integrated properly. NATCA must be
involved in all discussions surrounding the safe and efficient
integration of these programs.
III. Negative Effects of Government Shutdown on Aviation Safety
We know the kind of irreparable harm that a shutdown would have on
the NAS because we have experienced them numerous times over the past
two decades. In just the past five years, we have experienced three
government shutdowns, while we have experienced 19 additional
threatened lapses in appropriations, four threatened lapses in FAA
authorization, and a narrowly averted debt ceiling crisis just this
past summer. See Appendix A.
For example, the 35-day government shutdown from Dec. 2018 through
Jan. 2019 eroded critical layers necessary to support and maintain the
safety of the NAS. When the longest shutdown in U.S. history finally
ended, the NAS--as well as the frontline FAA workforce represented by
NATCA--was on the verge of unravelling, as many programs that reduce
risk and increase safety completely stopped.
Controllers were distracted because they were thinking about the
shutdown and how they would struggle to pay their mortgages, car
payments, and for food and other household expenses. Federal employees
are paid bi-weekly and by the time the shutdown ended, they had missed
more than two-full pay periods of income. To earn income and take care
of their families, in addition to performing their regular stressful
duties of separating and sequencing traffic, some controllers also were
driving an Uber or Lyft or waiting tables before and after their FAA
shifts.
Air traffic control is a complex, high consequence occupation
requiring multiple layers of safety processes and procedures (i.e.,
safety reporting, quality control, quality assurance, training) to
ensure we deliver the highest level of safety to the flying public.
Many of these supporting functions are suspended during a shutdown
because they do not meet the criteria to continue operating during a
lapse in appropriations. You would never ask a surgeon to perform a
surgery without their surgical team. You also should not ask
controllers to perform their critical safety work without their support
team.
NATCA members work hard to mitigate distractions and reduce fatigue
in our workforce, but shutdowns increase fatigue and create unnecessary
distractions for controllers while they are working airplanes. The
added pressure and stress that a shutdown introduces into the NAS is
intense.
NATCA is extremely concerned about the negative and cumulative
effects that a shutdown would have on the current controller staffing
crisis and training challenges.
Unlike air traffic controllers who continue to work without pay
during a shutdown, NATCA also represents approximately 3,000 additional
aviation safety professionals who would be furloughed, and whose
critical safety work is not performed. For instance, NATCA represents
FAA staff support specialists who work at air traffic control
facilities to provide tactical, strategic, and administrative support
for training; quality assurance/quality control of air traffic control
and traffic management; manage and redesign airspace and air traffic
control procedures; support operational automation, military
operations, and air traffic safety management systems.
NATCA also represents aircraft certification engineers, who assist
in design, production approvals, and airworthiness certification of
aircraft and their components, as well as aerospace engineers who
design and construct critical infrastructure necessary for safe flight
operations including air traffic control towers, radar maintenance and
installation, navigational aids, and communications systems. These FAA
employees are furloughed during a shutdown and are prohibited from
completing their important work.
Moreover, beyond the immediate harms to controller staffing and the
frontline workforce, shutdowns also delay the implementation of
critical modernization technology, as well as the sustainment and
repair of existing safety-critical equipment. For instance, certain
programs will experience significant negative effects as a result of a
shutdown such as En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM), Standard
Terminal Automation Replacement (STARS), DataComm, Enterprise
Information Display Systems (E-IDS), and multiple airspace
modernization efforts at individual facilities across the NAS. A
shutdown also will significantly delay development, testing, and
implementation of a new situational awareness tool that will help
controllers detect and prevent wrong surface landings.
IV. Conclusion
To enhance safety, Congress must continue its efforts to pass a
long-term, comprehensive FAA Reauthorization bill by the end of the
year that provides for maximum hiring of air traffic controller
trainees in order to meet the operational needs of the NAS. It must
also ensure that FAA addresses its backlog of equipment maintenance,
repair, and replacement. Further, it must avoid another harmful
government shutdown and ensure robust FAA funding levels, especially
for the operations and F&E budgets, so that the FAA and NATCA can
continue their critical safety and modernization work.
We thank this Subcommittee for its commitment to transparent
controller staffing through the adoption of the CRWG CPC staffing
targets in the draft FAA reauthorization bill. We hope additional
language to require controller ``max hiring'' as described above will
also be included in the legislation.
NATCA looks forward to working members of this Subcommittee, the
full Commerce Committee, as well as all Members of Congress, aviation
stakeholders, and the FAA to achieve these and many other goals.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
______
APPENDIX A--Historical Shutdown Timeline
2007-2015
Congress temporarily extended FAA authorization 23
times, while the system endured a partial FAA shutdown due
to a lapse in authorization, a government-wide shutdown due
to a lapse in appropriations, sequestration mandated
across-the-board spending cuts, air traffic controller
furloughs that caused crippling flight delays, and a hiring
freeze, as well as numerous threatened shutdowns.
2018
January 20-22: THREE DAY SHUTDOWN.
February 9: SHUTDOWN.
March 23: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
March 31: Threatened lapse in FAA authorization.
October 1: Threatened lapse in FAA authorization.
October 7: Threatened lapse in FAA authorization.
December 7: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
December 22: 35-DAY SHUTDOWN.
2019
February 15: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
October 1: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
November 21: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
December 20: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
2020
October 1: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
December 11: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
December 21: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
December 27: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
2021
September 30: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
December 3: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
2022
February 18: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
March 11: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
September 30: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
December 14: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
December 23: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
December 30: Threatened lapse in appropriations.
2023
June 2023: Debt ceiling crisis narrowly averted.
October 1: Threatened lapse in appropriations & FAA
authorization.
November 17: GOVERNMENT FUNDING EXPIRES.
December 31: FAA AUTHORIZATION EXPIRES.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Duckworth. Five minutes exactly. I am very
impressed.
Mr. Santa. I am air traffic controller----
Senator Duckworth. That is an air traffic controller
speaking right there. He is on the dot. Thank you, Mr. Santa. I
now recognize Captain Ambrosi for his remarks.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JASON AMBROSI, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS
ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Ambrosi. Thank you. I am not sure I will be quite so
accurate as Rich was, but good morning. Thank you, Chair
Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, Chair Duckworth, Ranking Member
Moran, and members of the Committee for holding this hearing.
My name is Jason Ambrosi. I am an international captain on
the Boeing 767 and President of the Airline Pilots Association
International. It is an honor to testify today representing
more than 77,000 airline pilots who fly for 42 airlines in the
United States and Canada.
I would like to begin by thanking this committee and the
entire committee for its commitment to keeping American
aviation system the safest in the world. In the context of this
extraordinary level of aviation safety that Government, labor,
and industry have achieved in the United States, recent near
misses remind us that we can never let our guard down.
From employees to procedures, there is a lot of new in the
post-COVID air transportation system. We must do more, not
less, to safeguard airline passengers, crews, and shippers. The
success that we have achieved in the aviation system didn't
happen by chance. Rather, it stems from decades of industry
wide work and commitment to collaboration, data collection and
analysis, and hazard identification and mitigation.
Our progress has also resulted from critical changes to
regulations governing pilot qualification and training,
fatigue, airline operations and maintenance, and technology.
Airline pilots and other aviation employees are proud to play a
critical role in aviation safety. Through voluntary safety
reporting programs, we are the ones, often the only ones, to
identify safety issues before they develop into accidents.
The presence of two highly trained and well-rested pilots
working on every airliner flight deck is another critical
factor in safety. We saw this during the near-miss incident in
Austin this past February that could have resulted in tragedy
were it not for the actions of the two FedEx pilots working on
board that flight deck together.
Such incidents make it clear that with demand returning
more quickly than some anticipated, this is no time to reduce
safety. Rather, these events compel us to strengthen safety
through data collection efforts such as the Commercial Aviation
Safety Team and technologies like NextGen.
More work can and must be done to prevent near misses and
other incidents. ALPA is calling for expanding the capabilities
at more U.S. airports and areas including flight profile
optimization, STARS remote surveillance displays, ADS-B out
equipage, and NextGen equipage. ALPA strongly supports doing
more to advance NextGen to enhance pilots and air traffic
controllers' ability to pinpoint the position of aircraft while
in flight and on the ground.
Moving NextGen forward will not only help prevent near
misses and enhance safety, but it will also improve traffic
management and aircraft utilization, reduce flight delays, cut
aviation emissions, and contribute to airline profitability.
We commend the U.S. Government for investing $26 million in
new funding to install or replace legacy aviation systems with
new technology to ensure that pilots and controllers benefit
from the state-of-the-art runway, surveillance, and
information. And we support the White House request for
additional funding to extend these safety improvements to more
U.S. airports.
ALPA is committed to ensuring that all U.S. airports
benefit from the same high level of safety, regardless of size
or location. This committee's bipartisan FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2023 included provisions to enhance safety and prevent
near-miss incidents. We thank you for your focus on these
important safety advancements.
Recently, there has understandably been heightened
awareness of aviation workers' mental health. No one is more
committed than ALPA to ensuring that airline pilots are fit for
duty and have the support that they and all of us need when
facing challenges. In 2024, ALPA will mark its 50th year of
developing and implementing programs that support pilot mental
health.
Our work has set the standard for the global airline
industry and is even used by other industries and countries.
However, we as an industry must do more. We applaud this
committee for addressing this issue in your 2023
reauthorization bill. This is a good start, and we stand ready
to work with any stakeholder to make improvements in this
critical area.
Thanks to this committee and its commitment to
collaborating with labor and other aviation stakeholders, U.S.
air travel is extraordinarily safe. ALPA pilots are dedicated
to protecting this Nation's global leadership and moving
forward to advance safety in our skies. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ambrosi follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Jason Ambrosi, President,
Air Line Pilots Association, International
On behalf of the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA),
I want to thank you for inviting me to testify on Addressing Close
Calls to Improve Aviation Safety. My name is Jason Ambrosi, and I am a
current and qualified international captain on the Boeing 767 at Delta
Air Lines and serve as the president of ALPA. ALPA is the largest pilot
union in the world as well as the largest nongovernmental aviation
safety organization, with a history of safety advocacy spanning more
than 90 years.
While the U.S. aviation system remains the safest in the world,
this outcome is not guaranteed. The recent spike in close calls reminds
all of us that safety is a matter of relentless vigilance. To improve
our safety, particularly with regard to close call incidents, it is
imperative that we continue to mitigate risk through data analysis, the
installation of surface safety systems, modernization of the National
Airspace System (NAS), and continued cooperation between industry
stakeholders and regulators.
The Aviation System is Safe but More Work Needs to be Done
Despite an increase in the number of close calls reported earlier
this year, the United States aviation system continues to operate at a
very high level of safety. This success stems from decades of industry-
wide work and commitment to collaboration, data collection and
analysis, hazard identification and mitigation, as well as critical
changes to the regulatory framework governing pilot qualification and
training, fatigue, airline operations and maintenance, and technology.
Professional pilots, flight attendants, air traffic controllers and Air
Traffic Control (ATC) system technicians, among other aviation
employees, play a central role in keeping our skies safe. Two highly
trained and well-rested pilots are an important contributing factor to
system safety. As just one example, in early February, when FedEx 1432
was on approach to land on the same runway that Southwest Airlines
flight 708 was using for takeoff at Austin Bergstrom International
Airport, if not for the actions of the FedEx pilots the incident could
have been an accident.
While it is important to be cognizant of today's high level of
system safety, even one runway incursion is one too many. Thankfully,
we are not discussing accidents, but instead near-miss events in an
environment of more than 52 million takeoffs and landings a year. It is
clear the system is under strain, and we need to aggressively pursue
solutions to stop these events.
The Return to Normal is Not Complete
With demand returning significantly quicker than anticipated, the
post-COVID return to air travel changed the compositional makeup of the
workforce, created a massive training and reallocation of pilot labor,
and created strains on incumbent employees across the system. To ensure
these dynamics do not interfere with system safety, it is important
that a ``back to basics'' philosophy continue to be a core part of
industry culture.
For pilots, the combination of ``early out'' retirement inducement
programs, carrier allocation of pilots during COVID, and record
mainline hiring in 2022 created changes in experience, pilot
availability, and movement between seat and aircraft. While the ``early
out'' retirements have drawn considerable attention, the main effect
was to reduce carrier costs during COVID, accelerate retirements
relative to the baseline for 2021-2023, and enable younger pilots to
remain in the system. With the approximately 3,800 early retirements in
2020 primarily for pilots between the ages of 62 to 65, there was some
ripple effect down the ranks as pilots backfilled those positions,
particularly for long-haul routes. However, most of the early out
pilots would be retired by this point, so the effect is near its end,
as retirements begin to stabilize and return to their pre-pandemic,
forecasted levels.
More significantly, carrier decisions during COVID on pilot
utilization related to aircraft and fleet management created a large
training event across the pilot ecosystem. Given low demand, most
carriers parked planes, bumped pilots off larger aircraft to smaller
aircraft fleets and types, furloughed during the lapse of the first
Payroll Support Program (PSP), and placed pilots on inactive status.
Given pilots are a seniority-structured profession, this resulted in a
massive, across-the-board reallocation of pilots. At the time, such
decisions likely seemed reasonable to carriers as the industry,
manufacturers, and analysts predicted an approximately three-to five-
year recovery lag. However, because demand returned significantly
quicker than predicted, airlines had to reverse these decisions and
effectively retrain nearly every pilot, sometimes back to the equipment
they flew prior to the pandemic, while accommodating new pilot hiring
due to substantial post-COVID growth. By not keeping all of their
pilots up to date on recurrent training requirements and allowing
pilots' currency to lapse due to their inactivity, pressure was put on
other pilots who were working hard to support the needs of the
airlines. The massive retraining episode shuffled pilots between
aircraft fleets and types to accommodate relatively junior pilots
replacing senior positions and incoming pilots to accommodate carrier
growth. This dynamic has played out across the industry, as new hire
ramp workers, flight attendants, controllers, mechanics, and other
safety critical personnel enter the industry.
With all the changes and newly emerging challenges in the post-
COVID operating environment, it is clear that there is a need to re-
focus on key aspects of the operations. Put simply, there is a need to
get back to the basics. Many of the near misses can be avoided when all
parties adhere to the fundamental principles taught in training, such
as focusing on the task at hand, minimizing distractions, and using all
available resources. Given the large number of new hires, in
particular, a ``back to basics'' mentality has emerged as part of the
training and onboarding of many new employees industry wide.
How the Safety System Works
Safety tracking and risk identification and mitigation systems are
at work at the airline, airport and enterprise level. At the airline
level the focus is on safety management systems (SMS). SMS is used to
identify, address, and reduce organizational and systemic risks. The
goal of SMS is to identify active failures and inadequate defenses so
that hazards can be contained while preventative measures can be
reinforced. SMS adds value to an organization's safety structure by
identifying hazards and mitigating risks before they develop into full
accidents. The systems are complex and require assessments of human
factors and their relation to other workplace components. The most
successful SMS incorporates a collaborative effort between the
organization, labor, regulator, manufacturers, and other stakeholders
to build a robust and diverse SMS team.
One of the foundational activities in SMS is the use of voluntary
disclosure programs, where pilots and other front-line workers can
anonymously raise safety concerns through an aviation safety action
program report. Airlines with a healthy and positive safety culture
will receive a significant volume of reports. On a recurring basis the
airline management, pilots, and an FAA representative review all
reports to determine what lessons can be learned and how to address the
safety risk identified. It is this continuous evaluation of new risks
and hazards that is core to safety management systems. Within the
context of the FAA reauthorization, Senator Capito's efforts to expand
protections for deidentified volunteer reports across all voluntarily
submitted flight safety information sent to the FAA would both increase
the volume and depth of data for identification and risk mitigation.
The safety system is at work at the airport level where
collaboration between air traffic controllers, pilots, airport
leadership, the FAA and others takes place regularly. At each airport
with an operating air traffic control tower, Runway Safety Action Teams
(RSAT) review operational issues, concerns and risks. These meetings
are FAA led, and ALPA participates as a partner. Airports with
commercial airline services are just now beginning to implement Safety
Management Systems due to the FAA's Final Rule on Airport Safety
Management Systems promulgated in February of 2023. Requiring certain
airport certificate holders to develop, implement, maintain, and adhere
to an airport SMS we believe will further increase airport safety.
At the national airspace level there are multiple activities
focused on improving system safety, including:
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST). ALPA continues to
collaborate on consensus plans to eliminate safety hazards in
partnership with the FAA and airlines. Collaboration allows for
identifying improvements in training, procedural designs, and
other aspects of an operation.
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS).
This safety group expands upon the commercial aviation focus of
the CAST and includes both airlines and business aviation
representatives. The key attribute of ASIAS is ``big data''
analysis. Using many different data streams, including in-
flight developments, inputs from airlines, manufacturers,
dispatchers, Air Traffic Control, and airports. Information is
compiled and fused together so that data mining and analysis
can be conducted. A critical aspect of this process is that
data is deidentified so that individuals are not singled out.
Instead, the focus is on trends, early warning signs, and being
ready to take immediate action when the data shows that there
is an issue that needs to be addressed. The FAA and industry
evaluate trends monthly and will meet more frequently if
needed. As part of ASIAS, the group will also initiate special
focus projects that look at key recent events across the
airspace system.
Beyond CAST and ASIAS, there are numerous FAA headquarters
and regional safety risk mitigation panels to address specific
operational changes occurring on a daily basis. ALPA pilots
bring real world experience to relay critical information
directly to decision makers to ensure that risks and hazards
are appropriately addressed. For example, this process at the
FAA also includes the needed risk assessments for new entrant
and commercial space operations.
These broad system-level safety activities are foundational to
prevent near misses from becoming accidents. In some cases, these
activities overlap. While that may seem duplicative, overlap is
actually a critical piece of the safety net when the same operational
change is discussed in two or three different forums. The continued
efforts to ensure that safety data is evaluated for new risks and to
ensure that the identified risks are adequately mitigated is very
important.
Action Needed to Eliminate Close Calls at Airports
Many of the recent close call events have been in and around the
airport operating environment and more focus is needed to mitigate such
events moving forward. ALPA is primarily concerned with the close calls
in the movement area of the airport, where FAA air traffic controllers
manage the movement of aircraft and other surface vehicles. The
following steps, at a minimum, must be taken:
Surface safety systems need to be installed at all airports
as soon as possible, regardless of the costs, given the urgency
of the current situation. In the Fall of 2003, the Airport
Surveillance Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) was deemed
suitable for widespread deployment. It is unacceptable that 20
years later a surface surveillance system like ASDE-X is only
installed at 35 airports around the country. That is woefully
inadequate. Our air traffic controller workforce needs these
capabilities at all airports. We rely on their complete
understanding of the operations, and they must have the tools
to fulfill their critical safety role. We strongly urge the
Committee to eliminate whatever barriers the FAA identifies to
rapidly expand surface surveillance to all airports with an air
traffic control tower.
Another legacy system that works extremely well is the
Runway Status Lights (RWSL) system. Runway Status Lights tell
pilots and vehicle operators to stop when runways are not safe.
Embedded in the pavement of runways and taxiways, the lights
automatically turn red when other traffic makes it dangerous to
enter, cross, or begin takeoff. The lights provide direct,
immediate alerts and require no input from controllers. Runway
Status Lights are operational at 20 airports across the U.S.
There is a critical need for expanding Runway Status Lights to
more airports and to more runways. While the cost is high, if
we are going to prevent near misses as well as accidents, the
cost-benefit decision-making process must be reconsidered to
aggressively pursue these safety advancements. For example,
ALPA has identified 15 airports that currently have RWSL but do
not have them installed at key runways and five airports that
would benefit from the installation of an RWSL system.
FAA Call to Action and NTSB Surface Safety Roundtable Offer
Possibilities
ALPA was selected as a co-chair of a new aviation rulemaking
committee that will look at aircraft systems that can be used for
increasing surface safety, wrong-surface landings and other safety
risks that were the focus of the FAA safety summit. For example, flight
deck enhancements are important for flight crews to increase
situational awareness and receive alerts early enough to take action to
avoid a near miss or an accident. The new rulemaking committee is just
getting underway, and recommendations will go to the FAA after further
evaluation and dialogue. The charge for the committee's work is that no
stone should go unturned as we look to advancements in technology to
help address these near miss events.
The NTSB's roundtable this May also represented an important
opportunity to discuss safety with a diverse cross section of the
industry and I thank Chair Homendy for her diligence on this topic. The
NTSB highlighted that surface safety remains one of the longest
outstanding recommendations for the FAA, that ``back to basics'' is a
key piece of its future actions list, and expanding ATC and flight deck
technology must be done without delay.
FAA Reauthorization Provides Opportunities
This Committee's bipartisan Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Reauthorization Act of 2023 includes a number of important provisions
to improve safety and prevent near miss incidents. First and foremost,
the bill not only provides funding and stability for the FAA and FAA
programs, but also for the latest safety technology on runways, for the
hiring of more air traffic controllers, for workforce development, and
a host of technological additives related to this hearing. Notable
provisions of the legislation related to aviation safety,
modernization, and expansion of additional capabilities for more
airports, include:
Flight profile optimization (Sec. 405). By developing
predictable, reliable and repeatable flight profiles that
airline pilots can expect to receive, there are reduced safety
risks because of an absence of the use of unpredictable routes
and unanticipated operational changes.
STARS Remote Surveillance Displays (Sec. 406). By adding a
remote surveillance display as a minimum level of equipment to
all air traffic control towers, including FAA contract towers,
safety will be improved.
ADS-B OUT Equipage Study; Vehicle to Vehicle Link Program
(Sec. 410). By expanding the incentives for all aircraft in the
airspace to equip with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) and to broadcast their position and other
important information, safety will be improved.
NEXTGEN Equipage Plan (412). By identifying the needed
upgrades to aircraft avionics, safety of operations can improve
due to the increased quality of onboard navigation capabilities
that pilots can utilize. Some of the airline aircraft need
upgrades, and this section is key to identify what those
upgrades should be. However, the provision fails to include
pilot representatives as a stakeholder. Since pilots are using
the NextGen equipage, we hope this can be remedied.
PBN Report and Utilization Plan (Sec. 413). Safety improves
if Performance Based Navigation (PBN) can be utilized as the
``baseline'' navigation capability in the airspace. However,
until aircraft equipage including necessary upgrades to certain
aircraft can be accomplished, it will be virtually impossible
to make this transition. Investment in a minimum level of
equipage for the NextGen capabilities is a critical step and
then the safety benefits will follow.
The system safety improvements that have created a much safer
airline industry over the last 10 years did not come about by accident.
They represent a vigilant commitment between government, industry and
labor to identify risk, mitigate it, and ensure the legal and
regulatory framework is based on safety. The proliferation of near miss
incidents requires continued resolve and collaboration based on a back-
to-basics framework for the workforce, the immediate deployment of
necessary runway, surface, and flight deck technologies, and the
greater use of data, data sharing, and industry collaboration for
hazard identification and risk mitigation.
Senator Duckworth. Not bad. Only he had an extra 4 seconds.
I now recognize former FAA Administrator, Randy Babbitt. Thank
you.
STATEMENT OF J. RANDOLPH ``RANDY'' BABBITT,
BABBITT & ASSOCIATES, LLC
Mr. Babbitt. Thank you, Chair Duckworth, and Chair
Cantwell, and Vice Chair Moran. Thank you for having me here
today. I am pleased to be speaking today with you, with folks
from the FAA, the NTSB, and labor in general.
And I was pleased to lead the FAA and ALPA in the past. I
was a commercial airline pilot for a number of years. As ALPA
President, I worked back in the day with Administrator Hinson
to launch the FAA's Aviation Safety Action Program. We also
secured one level of safety, and that is when we moved part 135
operations and their regulations to comply with 121 operations.
We all at that point in time, we also required each of our
ALPA pilot groups to establish and embrace professional
standards. And as President Obama's FAA Administrator, I worked
with the FAA safety professionals, which had been--and we
updated the pilot rest rules, which had been on the NTSB's most
wanted list for about two decades.
So, we got that done. We worked with carriers to implement
the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing System. We
advanced work with the commercial aviation safety team cast,
which reported in 2008 that the risk in fatal commercial
accidents had been reduced by 83 percent.
And all that work was done in conjunction and working
together with all the parties. However, in mid-2009, I
testified before this very committee after a tragic accident,
and knowing we must do more to enhance aviation safety, I
instituted a call to action, urging unions to focus on
professionalism and professional standards committees.
We asked the carriers to adopt voluntary safety and data
sharing programs. Data, when shared and acted upon, without
fear and no retribution, is what makes us safe. And this
remains critical as it is clear that what got us here today is
not a guarantee it will take us into the future.
A lack of accidents today is simply not a good predictor of
future accidents. Our environment is changing, and recent close
calls and incursions are symptoms of strain. And I highly urge
a strong refocus on professionalism, eliminating complacency if
it can, and boosting crew resource management throughout our
operations.
And as our operating environment evolves, the training of
our professionals has to advance with it. Flight simulators can
be used in structured training courses to accurately recreate
the experience of flight operations and a fully immersive
experience, forcing pilots to encounter aircraft malfunctions,
rare events like rapid decompression, emergency descents, high
speed rejected takeoffs, dual engine failures, severe icing
conditions, flight control malfunctions, full stalls, and doing
all of this without placing any lives in danger.
Simulators also present the opportunity to incorporate
actual accident and incident scenarios in training. Pilot
should experience the factors that led to the accident and
learn how to successfully recover so that such accidents never
happen again.
The tools are here. It is backed by substantial data, and
yet there is a hesitation to act. But the focal rule was never
meant to be static. The Safety Act clearly directs that proper,
``supplemental training may be used to offset flight time
requirements when doing so brings us to a higher level of
safety.''
And as knowledge and training techniques progress,
additional training credit should be--and should be well used
to improve, excuse me, both safety and skills. The FAA has
followed up with two aviation rulemaking committees comprised
of experts from across aviation, including ALPA, and the
members of both arcs have unanimously supported supplemental
training and recommended a curriculum to replace simple flight
hours with advanced training and mentoring.
This guidance has not been implemented and in my opinion it
should be. I am not alone in saying this. Our current
Administrator has urged the adoption of modern training
techniques like simulation.
And earlier, I joined with eight former FAA administrators
and two former ALPA presidents, I happened to be in both
buckets, to urge the adoption of tested and trusted new
technologies to strengthen air safety.
We said in that letter, if scenario based simulator
training was a routine part of gaining 1,500 required hours
required for an ATP, we could require updating training and
expose the kind of scenarios that have led to the recent rash
of runway incursions and near misses.
We also said, as pilot training and technology evolves, it
is the responsibility of the FAA and policymakers to evolve
with it. Well, that concludes my message today, and I look
forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Babbitt follows:]
Prepared Statement of J. Randolph ``Randy'' Babbitt,
Babbitt & Associates, LLC
Introduction and Background
Chair Duckworth, Vice Chair Moran, and members of the Commerce
Committee, thank you for inviting me here today to review current
safety issues and the state of aviation safety today.
I am pleased to be here today alongside individuals from the FAA,
NTSB, and representatives from organized labor. I am here today as a
private citizen and safety consultant, and as a frequent user of a
system that has become as safe as it has today thanks to the tireless
work of thousands of professionals from air carriers, labor
representatives and frontline employees, as well as the FAA and the
NTSB, in advancing safety. As I have noted before, history has shown
that we are able to implement safety improvements far more quickly and
effectively when the FAA, industry, and labor work together on agreed
upon solutions.
Throughout my career, including my years as a commercial airline
pilot, I had the pleasure of experiencing this work up close and
personal. For example, when I served as the President of the Air Line
Pilots Association (ALPA) for eight years in the 1990s, I worked with
then FAA Administrator David Henson on what would become known as the
Aviation Safety Action Program (``ASAP''.) Working together, we saw
ASAP developed by the FAA and implemented nationwide. Later in my
tenure at ALPA, I pressed for ``One Level of Safety,'' bringing Part
135 operator standards for commuter carriers up to Part 121 standards.
Achieving this marked a major step forward in aviation safety. During
my time at ALPA, we pressed forward internally and required all ALPA
pilot groups to have Professional Standards Committees. I was also a
member of the FAA's Management Advisory Council (MAC) for a decade,
chairing the MAC for two years. I joined more than a dozen aviation
professionals from public and private sectors on the MAC serving in a
voluntary capacity to help ensure our airspace remains one of the
safest and most efficient in the world.
Later, I was appointed and confirmed as the FAA Administrator, and
I was honored to serve the Agency and the public for 2\1/2\ years.
There I joined a group of dedicated safety professionals who were doing
impressive work. Together, we achieved some very important safety
milestones, including critically needed updates to Flight & Duty time
regulations, something that had been on the NTSB's Most Wanted list for
nearly two decades at that time. Working with our air carriers, we also
refined and implemented the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and
Sharing (``ASIAS'') system.
A Call to Action
In 2009, in my role as FAA Administrator, I came before this
Committee to discuss a ``call to action'' in the face of a crisis
following a tragic accident. We issued a ``call to action'' and brought
in the heads of all the major pilot unions to instill the need for
increasing professionalism. We urged better utilization of each air
carrier's Safety Committee and Professional Standards Committee. The
response was excellent, and carriers responded with helpful feedback
and worked with their committees to support the initiatives. We built
on earlier work of the FAA, labor, and industry including the
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (``CAST''.) Developed in 1997, CAST
created an integrated, data-driven strategy to reduce the commercial
aviation fatality risk in the United States and promote new government
and industry safety initiatives throughout the world. By 2008, CAST was
proud to report the risk in fatal commercial accidents had been reduced
by 83 percent.
I'm proud of the progress we have continued to make in the years
since the 2009 ``call to action.'' I am even more proud of the work my
colleagues at the FAA, and the professionals at every FAA since, have
made on the principals that matter most to aviation safety: the sharing
of information and data without fear; whether that is from front line
employees to management, or management to the FAA or airline to
airline. It is data, when shared and acted upon without fear, that
makes us safer.
This work is critical because it is clear to every aviation safety
professional that what got us to today's unprecedented level of safety
will not get us where we need to go. Today's system is very safe, but
we cannot measure safety by a lack of accidents. The lack of an
accident today is simply not a predictor of a future accident or lack
thereof tomorrow.
Today, the increasing amount of traffic from drones and the
forecast for autonomous operations adds volume and complexity to the
air traffic control system. Rapid changes in our aviation system are
taking place, even as there are signs, in the form of incidents and
incursions, that show the system may be straining under its existing
traffic.
This presents a different kind of crisis and a different ``call to
action'' is needed. While programs like free flight have the potential
to vastly modernize the system and significantly reduce delays and
traffic conflicts, a review of recent incidents and near collisions
puts a bright light on the need for additional focus on
professionalism, eliminating complacency and a renewed focus on Crew
Resource Management (``CRM'') at our carriers.
A current state ``call to action'' would be perfectly in order for
the new FAA Administrator, the Honorable Michael Whitaker. This ``call
to action'' would ideally bring together leadership from our pilot and
controller unions along with safety committees from the various
carriers and the FAA, taking additional input from the NTSB, to review
a range of areas where improvements can be made to aviation safety.
Modern Training for a Modern System
Modernizing the overall aviation operating environment and the
training of its professionals is critical for sustaining and advancing
aviation systems and is a crucial component of this needed ``call to
action.'' Today's sophisticated flight simulators, when used as part of
a structured training program, can play an important role in advancing
safety.
Broadly, the aviation industry is moving to performance-based
training rather than prescriptive training. This reflects that the way
people learn has changed as well as the increasing sophistication of
modern tools and technology. New technology, particularly simulators,
allows high-fidelity training for events that we never could have
trained to in the past using an aircraft, for example, stall recovery.
Flight simulators can be used as part of a structured training course
to accurately recreate the experience of flight operations in a fully
immersive experience, forcing pilots to encounter aircraft
malfunctions, including rare events like rapid decompressions,
emergency descents, high-speed rejected takeoffs, dual engine failures,
severe icing conditions, flight control malfunctions and full stalls,
all without placing any lives in danger. Simulators also present the
opportunity to incorporate actual accident and incident scenarios into
pilot training.
Furthermore, the newest simulators have advanced in quality yet are
much less expensive to purchase and operate. Use of simulators and
structured training could therefore lower barriers to entry into the
profession and open up high quality training to a wider group of
aspiring pilots.
Incorporating this type of realistic training and experience in a
structured and controlled way will add to the existing margin of safety
in commercial operations.
We now have qualitative methods to measure actual transfer of
knowledge. We can determine proficiency based on performance, not just
on the number of hours of training. In 2009, the FAA advanced an ANPRM
aiming to incorporate training best practices and tools so that all
operators could use the upgraded standards.
Simulators also present the opportunity to incorporate actual
accident and incident scenarios into training. Pilots should experience
the factors that led to accidents and successfully recover, so that
such accidents can never happen again. There should be a continuous
feedback loop so that as new errors, whether they be mechanical,
environmental, or pilot-induced, from FAA and NTSB investigations and
recommendations, are rapidly incorporated back into training. As a
current example, we could now require updated training on the kinds of
scenarios that have led to recent runway incursions and close calls.
The tools are here--supported by substantial data. However, there
has been a hesitancy to move, in some cases borne of fear that
advancing pilot training would conflict with the FAA's 2013 First
Officer Qualification rule (FOQ), or the Airline Safety Act of 2010
which mandated the rule. However, direction from and language in the
developed in the Safety Act clearly provides that proper ``Supplemental
Training'' could be used to offset flight time requirements, where that
training offers a higher level of safety than accumulating flight time.
Additionally, that rule was not meant to be static. As knowledge and
training techniques progress, new training providers should be
considered, and additional training credits should be allowed when they
can be demonstrated to improve safety.
The FAA has indeed followed up and chartered two Aviation
Rulemaking Committees (``ARC'') in 2013 & 2021. The ARCs in both cases
were well-staffed and represented with input across the industry,
including the Air Line Pilots Association. The results received
unanimous support from the members of the ARCs of both timeframes and
both acknowledged the value of supplemental training.
Both ARCs laid out a draft curriculum that effectively substitutes
advanced training and mentoring to replace simple, single-engine flight
hours. Notably, the FOQ does not focus on training but simply adds an
arbitrary level of flight hours required to enter Part 121 Operations
as a pilot. Further, neither the FAA nor the NTSB found any value in
the FOQ hour mandates and have so stated.
Aviation has a long history of well qualified people and
organizations seeking changes to improve training and better use of
simulation. I'm pleased to note that one of those well-qualified people
is the Honorable Michael Whitaker, our current FAA Administrator. In
his paper on ``The Evolving Role of Training in Aviation Safety''
written April 21, 2015, he highlights the need to adopt more modern
training techniques and embrace the advantages of modern simulation to
supplement traditional training. I believe that is even more important
and pertinent today.
Military and Global Gold Standards
More than a decade has passed from the date the Safety Act was
passed and far better programs and training equipment are now available
to produce better trained pilots.
Pilot training and simulation technology advances have prompted the
U.S. Air Force to more than triple the amount of simulator training for
its new pilots. Policymakers and the FAA hold military pilot training
and fight experience in such high regard that a pilot leaving the
military for an airline pilot job needs only 750 hours of total
military time instead of the 1,500 hours required for an Air Transport
Pilot certificate. In effect, credit is given for the superior training
provided by the military, which includes significant emphasis on
simulator training.
Looking abroad to the European Union, where air carriers have
excellent safety records and currently operate in and out of dozens of
U.S. airports, I have had recent communications with flight operations
and training people from Lufthansa and have reviewed their Ab Initio
training program. Their current system has fully trained pilots going
on the line with around 400 total flight hours.
Modern instructional methods and equipment being embraced by our
military as well as international air carriers with enviable safety
records, allow them to train pilots in far less time and with lower
carbon footprints through better use of simulation and training
curriculum. The result is better trained pilots. Aviation experts, both
domestic and international, know that little is learned in flying solo
in a single engine light aircraft when compared against a robust
curriculum with a syllabus that includes simulation of emergencies,
weather, and crew resource management in a multicrew environment.
I am not alone in saying this. Earlier this fall, I joined a letter
to this Committee that was authored by a total of eight former FAA
Administrators and two former Presidents of the Air Line Pilots
Association (I count myself twice because I'm in both of those
buckets). We share the view that the adoption of tested and trusted new
technologies will strengthen American airspace safety.
Quoting from that letter\1\, we said ``Simulators also present the
opportunity to incorporate actual accident and incident scenarios into
training . . . There should be a continuous feedback loop so that new
errors, whether they be mechanical, environmental or pilot-induced,
from FAA and NTSB investigations and recommendations, are rapidly
incorporated back into training. For example, if such scenario-based
simulator training was a routine part of gaining the 1,500 hours
required for the ATP, we could now require updated training on the
kinds of scenarios that have led to the recent rash of runway incursion
near-misses.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A copy of the full letter is attached as an addendum to my
testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also emphasized: ``as pilot training technology evolves, it is
the responsibility of the FAA and policy makers to evolve with it.''
Conclusion
Aviation is a business where one mistake is one too many. The
United States continues to enjoy an extremely high level of aviation
safety, and the continuation of that level of safety relies on each of
us setting aside differences and coming together to make changes that
allow us to constantly stay ahead in a changing environment.
Incorporating modern tools, technologies and training, and continuously
advancing each, is an important component of that work.
Chair Duckworth, Vice Chair Moran, Members of the Committee, this
concludes my prepared remarks. Thank you again for inviting me to
discuss the state of aviation safety today, and my views on areas where
we can improve it together. I look forward to discussing and answering
any questions you may have.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Babbitt. I will now
recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions. As you know well,
addressing pilot fatigue was a high priority issue for the FAA
under your leadership.
In December 2009, then FAA Associate Administrator,
Margaret Peggy Gilligan, testified before this very committee
that, and I quote, ``we believe,'' this is quoting her, ``we
believe that it is critical, whenever possible, to incorporate
scientific information on fatigue and human sleep physiology
into regulations on flight crew scheduling. Such scientific
information can help to maintain the safety margin and promote
optimum crew performance and alertness during flight
operations.''
More importantly, FAA acted in late 2011 to publish new
rules on pilot fatigue, which many, including the then Chair of
NTSB believe was a contributing factor to the deadly, tragic,
and preventable Colgan crash that killed 50 people in early
2009. FAA rules were common sense, limit the amount of time
pilots can be on duty and pilots flight time, and implement a
minimum requirement of rest before duty day.
Chair Homendy, you recently stated, and I quote, ``when it
comes to these recent high profile aviation incidents, mistakes
by air traffic control, flight crews, or ground personnel are
sometimes cited as a contributing factor, but is it really
human error when 96 percent of your workplaces are exhausted
and don't have adequate staffing?''
Chair Homendy, is it time for FAA and Congress to reexamine
and update rest rules that are tailored to optimize air traffic
controller performance?
Ms. Homendy. Well, it isn't just the number of hours, it is
the scheduling practices. And then if you are already short
staffed, then you have people who are working mandatory
overtime, 6 days a week, 10 hour days. And then when you look
at the schedule, it is a constantly rotating schedule.
I have one from one event, a scheduled for a week from one
event that we are currently investigating. You have got two
evenings, a morning shift, another evening shift, another
morning shift, a day off, an evening.
All of that can impact your circadian rhythm. So, and then
where you end up with that is distraction, fatigue. You are
missing things. You are forgetting things. That is all an
impact.
Senator Duckworth. I feel like, you know, what was taken as
the minimum amount of rest has now become the standard way that
we schedule folks, and I don't think that that is sustainable.
President Santa, could you share the air traffic controller
workforce perspective on why rest rules are needed to better
protect ATC crews and the flying public?
Mr. Santa. Thank you for the question. It comes down to the
redundancy and the resiliency of our staffing. We are so short
staffed in most or many of our facilities that service air
travel right now, that we don't have the opportunity or the
capacity to have a 5-day workweek with 8 hour days.
The norm, like you said, keeping the system active, keeping
the capacity at the level that it is expected to be requires 6
day workweeks and 10 hour days due to the fact the hiring,
FAA's model hiring and what they produce on the controller
workforce plan has exasperated the situation, resulting in
1,000 fewer controllers and this elevated aviation upturn.
It is unsustainable and needs to be changed through FAA
reauth, because the FAA has been unwilling to collaboratively
involve these new processes.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. If Congress's primary role in
passing the Airline Safety Act of 2010 was to prevent future
Colgan area type disasters, one must recognize that it has been
a success, starting with a 99.8 percent reduction in part 121
fatalities since the enactment--since when the rules went into
effect.
We must never take the post Colgan safety system for
granted, and that is why I strongly oppose tinkering with the
2010 law statutory requirements, including the 1,500 hour rule.
Now, I as a military pilot, I flew simulators, and I agree.
If you have six degrees of motion full immersion simulators,
that is an immense tool and a very useful tool. But I do think
that if we just substitute some of the 1,500 hours and just say
structured simulator time, but don't specifically say what type
of simulator, what kind of training that is going to be--you
can burn holes in the sky in a simulator just as well as you
can burn holes in the sky in a 152.
So, I think we need to be clear when we say let's talk
about simulators, that we are talking about full motion, six
degree, full immersion simulators and not Microsoft Flight
Simulator sitting in a hotel ballroom someplace.
Our safety management system protocols do not appear to be
accounting for new risks in our system, and the aggregate of
these risks are just less experienced workforce and pervasive
air traffic controlling--control shortages.
Mr. Ambrosi, at a time when we have a 737 and a 767 flying
within 100 feet of each other, and every other month seems to
bring new chilling runway incursion or near miss, would you
agree that the most prudent and safest course of action would
be to add additional experience and training requirements
rather than seeking to weaken or water down to 1,500 hour rule?
Mr. Ambrosi. Well, thank you for the question. Absolutely.
It is an all of the above. You need that real world experience,
as well as better training. So, it is an all of the above.
Senator Duckworth. I do think that what we can do is, as
you are trying to get to that 1,500 hour rule, we could break
that down. And so, you actually need a certain number of IMC
hours, you need a certain number of, you know, cross-country
hours and be very specific in that, which is what happens in
the military, which is much more structured than the average
person trying to get to 1,500 hours at the local FBO. I am out
of time--over time. And with that, I will recognize the Ranking
Member Moran for his questions.
Senator Moran. Chairwoman, again, thank you. Mr. Santa,
thank you for highlighting the importance of no shutdown.
It ought to be evident, but you outlined a number of
serious things that can and will happen if we fail to come
together. And again, while we are trying to get ahead of the
problem, this would put us behind the ball one more time.
So, thanks for bringing that to our attention, to my
attention, and we will work to try to avoid any kind of gap in
funding. And Chair Homendy, thank you for reminding me. I am a
new member of the Transportation HUD Appropriations
subcommittee, and I will take your suggestion and your request
at heart.
It is not always that I get asked to follow the House lead,
but I appreciate you bringing that to my attention as well. Mr.
Arel and Mr. Santa, last holiday season, we experienced some
significant operational, really a meltdown, across the U.S.
airspace.
That was exacerbated by NOTAM system outage, which we have
working to solve with legislation as well. It led to thousands
of cancellations. What can I tell my constituents and Americans
about what to expect this holiday season with Thanksgiving
approaching and the winter holidays just around the corner?
Mr. Arel. Thank you, Senator. I can assure you that we have
been working collaboratively with both labor and industry to
address the issues that were highlighted during some of the
more challenging times last holiday season.
Of course, we had a significant weather event that was
unprecedented in some ways with the deep freeze that
immediately followed the snowstorm that had occurred. I just
met recently this week with all of my counterparts across the
airlines. They are in a much better position as far as their
overall staffing, their operational control, and the amount of
coordination they do with the FAA.
Additionally, while we are working to prioritize and train
as many controllers, hire and train and certify as many
controllers as possible--while we have a long way to go, many
of the facilities are much healthier than they were previously.
And then we work collaboratively, to the extent possible,
to have as many people in place to support those peak holiday
periods. Once we were through the Christmas and New Year
holidays last year, the follow on holiday travel periods where
we see that peak in demand, we were much smoother, had much
less interruptions.
We certainly had some challenging weather events that we
don't expect traffic to fly through, but overall, the recovery
from each of those weather events, generally speaking, were 1
day recoveries versus the multi-day type of recovery that you
saw last year. We feel in a much better position than we did
last year, and we are continuing to get better.
Mr. Santa. Thank you for the question. I am going to assume
that the Government doesn't shut down because that changes
everything.
Senator Moran. Ironically, I was sitting here thinking,
that is related to the shutdown. Just thinking that personally.
I may need to be flying because I can't get home before--
because of a shutdown during the holidays. So, this is not a
personal question necessarily, but maybe.
Mr. Santa. So, I am going to take the actual aspects of our
situation and not the changes in weather in this situation,
because we are not healthier than we were last year controller
wise. I think FAA's numbers indicate we have potentially six
more air traffic controllers than we had last year systemwide.
That is not an expansive increase of what we need. We are
at, if I can get the numbers here--our certified air traffic
controller number right now is 10,721. Using their decade old
number, we should be at 13,097, and using the new collaborative
resource work group number, we should be at 14,335. It is an
unhealthy system that needs maximum hiring by the FAA's own
admission for 10 years to get us to the old number.
Ten years of maximum hiring at the current throughput to
get us to a 10 year old number. At that point, it would be a 20
year old staffing number in our facilities.
Senator Moran. What role does that the size of the class
and the capabilities of training and education in Oklahoma City
at the Air Traffic Control Training Center, what role does that
play in the lack of necessary air traffic controllers?
Mr. Santa. I do admit, I think the capacity is right around
1,800, potentially to 2,000. And if they are working to try to
increase that along with us, moving some of the ancillary
things out of Oak City.
But the more throughput we get, the more controllers that
we can hire, the more success we will have sooner. We cannot
unqualify the standards or the professionalism or the
expectation that when you certify in a facility, you are
capable in doing this most challenging profession at the
highest level. So, challenging, but more throughput is needed.
Senator Moran. Without changing the qualifications. There
is nothing wrong. In fact, it is very helpful to increase the
size of the class?
Mr. Santa. Absolutely. If we can increase the throughput
without changing the qualifications, it is much needed.
Senator Moran. Thank you.
Senator Duckworth. Chair Cantwell.
The Chair. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. Captain
Ambrosi, pilots have rest requirements. Why is that?
Mr. Ambrosi. Because we need rest. We absolutely need rest.
And, you know, out of the 2010 bill, there were a lot of
reforms, not just pilot training, but we went to a science-
based fatigue, flight and duty time rest rules about 8 years
ago, and it has been a success because now it is based on
science, not some arbitrary number where it limits our duty day
instead of just flight time.
But, you know, having an adequately rested pilot or
controller or anyone that is a frontline worker is essential.
The Chair. Well, that is where I was going, because to your
side there is the Chair of the NTSB, and she is saying she is
worried about their fatigue level. So, as a captain, you are
worried about the air traffic controller fatigue system?
Mr. Ambrosi. I think Rich is probably better to comment on
how their scheduling goes, because I am not an expert in air
traffic control scheduling. But I can tell you as a pilot, our
rest is essential. So, I would imagine it would be similar for
them.
The Chair. Thank you. So, I wanted to ask about this also--
did you want to make a comment about that, Mr. Santa? OK. The
air surface detection equipment model.
One of the things the technology does do is it helps
illuminate the risks and certainly in a busy environment and
certainly one in which people are paying attention to lots of
different things, the fact that it can be a more illuminating
visual so that it is getting people's attention is also part of
this system.
We have, in the Senate bill, increased the funding $18.2
billion over 5 years, an increase that would put money to, as I
said earlier, upgrade all the large and mid-size airports. I am
assuming all of you support this investment, but if you could
just give me a verbal.
Ms. Homendy. Yes, but we would always also like technology
in the cockpit of an airplane.
The Chair. The same technology you are saying?
Ms. Homendy. There is direct alerting technology to pilots
that can alert them that they are on the wrong runway, that
they are on a taxiway, or that there is something in front of
them.
The Chair. OK. Just down the line of support, do you
support this language that is in the bill?
Mr. Ambrosi. Absolutely.
Mr. Santa. Absolutely, thank you.
Mr. Babbitt. Absolutely.
Mr. Arel. Yes, Senator.
The Chair. OK. So, it takes--my understanding is it takes
almost a year to get all this implemented, even if we got this
bill passed right now. So, I am assuming, Chairwoman Homendy,
that you think this is something we should work with and
dispatch to get this technology deployed as soon as possible?
Ms. Homendy. Absolutely. It has prevented some almost
accidents. And so, we need the technology. Again, we need
technology for air traffic controllers, but we also need
technology in the cockpit of airplanes.
The Chair. But the situational awareness. I think, Mr.
Babbitt, back to the original Next Gen days, the whole concept
about NextGen is to digitize our system off of the radar
system, but the whole aspect of it on the ground that would
also give you situational awareness was one of the things
trumpeted by the bill.
And we can sit here all day and probably think about why we
are in this situation of near misses. I think you described it
accurately. You are coming out of the COVID and re--you know,
ramping up in traffic.
We have situations where we don't have the workforce that
maybe we--would give us the rest time. But we do know that we
have technology solutions, that if we just got them deployed,
this would help.
Ms. Homendy. Well, and usually what I hear when I talk
about technology is, it is too expensive, and we don't have the
resources. We have to give the FAA the resources to invest.
They need those resources. So, we are strongly supportive of
giving them the funding that they need to succeed at their
jobs.
The Chair. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Chairman Cantwell. Next to
speak will be, Senator Sinema, recognized for 5 minutes. She is
via remote.
We can move on to the next Senator who is waiting to speak
and come back to Senator Sinema when she is available. I also
have Senator Thune. Is he available? We are running all over
the Capitol today, all of us in and out, so.
STATEMENT OF HON. KYRSTEN SINEMA,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator Sinema. Madam Chair, can you hear me?
Senator Duckworth. Now I can. Senator Sinema, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
Senator Sinema. Wonderful. Thank you. I apologize for the
technical difficulties. Thank you to each of our witnesses for
joining us today.
Aviation safety is the FAA's mission, and I have long
stated that the United States needs to remain the gold standard
of aviation safety. To continue to set that gold standard, we
need to continue to utilize all the tools available to us and
hold hearings like this one to discuss opportunities to advance
aviation safety.
I appreciate the Committee's emphasis on not simply
maintaining safety, but innovating to improve our national
airspace. The number of near misses makes it clear that now is
the time to act to improve safety. It is unacceptable to wait
for a tragedy that forces into action.
We have heard a lot today about how essential simulator
technology is for training air traffic controllers because it
allows hands on training for emergencies and unforeseen events
without endangering actual aircraft.
In fact, the FAA specifically called for updating simulator
technology for air traffic controllers in response to recent
near misses. We should all have the same desire to use the most
advanced technologies to update our pilot training rules, and
we should make sure that the 1,500 hours of pilot training
provides the best and most practical training available in
order to maximize safety.
Administrator Babbitt, you joined each of our other Senate-
confirmed FAA administrators since 1997 and two former ALPA
presidents in a letter arguing that advanced flight simulator
technology is required to ensure the best training outcomes.
Your testimony today reiterates the need for training to evolve
with technology.
Can you explain why modern advanced flight simulators are
essential to modern pilot training, including the unique
ability to practice avoiding near misses and dealing with other
emergencies?
Mr. Babbitt. Thank you for the question. And yes, I think
it is incredibly important. I think what you have in modern
simulation today is the ability to recreate or repeat events
that have already happened.
You can put people in situations that you would never put
them in, in a real airplane. You would not take an airplane
into heavy icing conditions. You would not do the--but you can
do things you can simulate.
For example, a clearance that clearly was a conflict and
you have to abort. Show the pilot how that happens. What
happened, what went wrong, did anybody learn something from
this? Let's not do it again.
And those are the types of things that immersive simulation
can do. And we have the capacity to actually have controllers
control airplanes on radar scopes and in simulators together so
they can practice these things.
And I think it is a terrific advantage. I think it enhances
safety greatly. If you have already seen a maneuver two or
three times and know which got--you know what got you into it
and how to properly get out of it, I think that is a great
benefit.
Senator Sinema. Well, thank you. Now, Chair Homendy, has
the NTSB ever made a safety recommendation to the FAA based on
a relationship between the exact number of hours spent flying
an aircraft versus using other kinds of structured training
programs?
Ms. Homendy. No, Senator, we have not.
Senator Sinema. Thank you. Now, Chair Homendy, do you agree
with each of the former FAA administrators and Administrator
Whitaker that based on your experience at the NTSB
incorporating the most advanced simulator technology into
structured pilot training programs may play a role in improving
safety outcomes?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, there is a role for technology. What
doesn't exist is the safety data to show how much sim time, and
how much actual flying time is the right amount, so.
Senator Sinema. Thank you. Now, Mr. Santa, as discussed
here today, air traffic control's staffing is an integral
component of our safety in our national airspace.
I understand the FAA has the authority for direct hiring of
individuals into en route and terminal facilities from FAA
certified colleges and academies such as Arizona State and
Embry-Riddle Tech Universities. Now, I could do this by
reviving the Collegiate Training Initiative or CTI Program.
You, yourself went through the--went from the Community
College of Beaver County through CTI and were directly hired
into a chronically understaffed facility.
Do you think the FAA should establish a program like this
to direct hire into facilities to supplement the staffing of
our facilities across the country?
Mr. Santa. Thank you for the question. It would certainly
be valuable to increase the throughput and subsidize the
academy, but as I said before, the standards can't be lessened
by those schools and the oversight needs to be maintained.
Senator Sinema. Thank you. And my last question. Mr. Santa,
today at most airports, controllers still use paper flight
strips to keep track of flights. I have actually seen it myself
in Arizona. The FAA's Terminal Flight Data Manager Program, or
TD--TFDM is modernizing the system and will increase
controllers situational awareness to allow them to better
handle fluctuations and traffic volume in changing weather.
Unfortunately, due to budget constraints, the FAA recently
reduced the number of airports that received this important
technology from 89 down to 49, including removing four airports
in my home state of Arizona.
Could you talk about how TFDM reduces operational safety
risk by increasing controllers' heads-up time and why
controllers at all these airports will benefit from TFDM?
Mr. Santa. It is not only TFDM, but it is all modernization
installed. And every tool and every implementation of new,
collaboratively determined technology helps our controllers
with separation, surface surveillance, management of traffic
and capacity. And my latest--my most recent data says it is
down from 89 to 32 sites due to lack of funding. So, it
continues to track down due to lack of funding.
Senator Sinema. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Senator. I now recognize
Senator Klobuchar for her 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much. Thank you to all of
you. We have a--I am trying to get the video on here. There we
go. We are in the middle of a big judiciary hearing, so. I
appreciate the ability to ask some questions via video. We have
seen an alarming number of close call incidences on airport
runways throughout the year. And these incidences are
preventable.
We all know that because we go--have gone for years without
incidents like this. The NTSB has called for the expanded use
of airport technologies to mitigate the risk. I have an
amendment to the FAA bill to direct the FAA to issue
recommendations on cockpit alerting technologies that directly
alert crews and pilots of potential incursions to prevent these
near misses.
How can equipping pilots with technology prevent runway
incursions and close calls? And I would ask that of you, Ms.
Homendy.
Ms. Homendy. Yes. Thank you very much. And it is one of our
oldest recommendations going back to 23 years. I mean, the
reason why you have cockpit alerting is if the controller
misses something. And if the controller misses something, then
something can alert the pilots to take action.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you. Mr. Arel, can you discuss
why cockpit alerting systems are important and when we can
expect a requirement from the FAA?
Mr. Arel. Thank you, Senator. As an air traffic controller
and within the air traffic organization, that would be outside
our area of expertise or responsibility. I can--I would defer
to our--my colleagues in aviation safety on the regulatory side
or anyone with the flight tech area of concern.
Ms. Homendy. Senator, may I?
Senator Klobuchar. Yes, you could. And then I have to go in
to vote in this markup right now, and they need me there in
person. So do you want a quick answer and then I will go in
there.
Ms. Homendy. Oh, understood. We--this is the same thing we
saw in 2007. There were a number of runway incursions,
including in O'Hare and then Seattle. And then a terrible
tragedy occurred and 49 out of 50 people on the plane died. At
that point, we issued recommendations for technology. It is
critical to save lives.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Very good. I appreciate that and I
am going to follow up in writing. And thank you, Madam Chair,
for giving me this opportunity. Thank you.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. I do not
have any other Senators in line to ask additional questions at
this time, so we are going to begin a second round of
questions. I want to follow up the simulator discussion.
There are already multiple ways to get to the ATP
requirement under the 1,500 hour rule. If you are a military
pilot, you only need 750 hours because of the very structured
training you get as a military pilot and the use of full motion
simulators.
If you graduate from a 4-year aviation school, many of
which are very good ones in Kansas by the way, for my Ranking
Member, then you only need 1,000 hours because of that good,
structured training and the simulators that are used. If you go
to a two-year program and get an Associate Degree in aviation,
you only need 1,250 hours.
Where we are right now is this discussion on the 1,500 hour
rule is to--is there is a difference in opinion of what exactly
is a simulator. You can't just say structured flight training
in a simulator will qualify you one-for-one, zero sum game.
Every hour you fly on a simulator, you can deduct an hour
away from the 1,500 hour rule, especially if you don't define
what type of simulator. And that is the key thing, because
there is a hesitation to act because we know in industry, or at
least in some carriers, they will fail to use simulator time
effectively.
Look no further than the Colgan incidents where they--they
have simulators, but in the NTSB's accident report from the
Colgan incident, it was found that Colgan Company training did
not have part of their training syllabus for simulator training
at the time of the accident, procedures for how to deal with a
stick pusher system to overcome the icing condition.
And they were never taught that, even though they had
simulators. I think that if we are going to talk about
simulators, then we need to specifically say, full motion, full
immersion, level D flight simulator.
Mr. Ambrosi, rather than pitting simulator training against
real world flight hours, would ALPA support FAA establishing
additional simulator training hours requirements that would
ensure all ATP certificate holders, in addition to earning at
least 1,500 flying in an aircraft, gain a minimum level of
experience training in level D full flight simulators that are
equipped with software capable of accurately recreating flight
conditions for the most daunting and dire emergency situations?
Mr. Ambrosi. The short answer is yes. But if I may,
Congress and through this FAA 2010 bill has created the safest
system out there. We have a 99.8 percent reduction, as you
indicated earlier.
So, also in that bill, Congress had the foresight to say,
if technology comes along, there is a process to look through,
as was testified earlier. So, legislate--there needs to be no
change to the legislation. We are in the right place here. It
is an all of the above. I completely agree with you on the
level of simulation.
Our airline--there are industry today that are already
trying to walk back that level of simulation that you just
discussed by saying maneuvers that were intended to be done in
a full flight, six degree in motion simulator are now being
performed in a level 7 training device.
So, if airlines are already trying to save money by walking
back what is already in that, I agree with your sentiment that
we need to absolutely make sure that any simulator training is
performed in the best simulators.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Mr. Babbitt, you are nodding.
I mean, I will give you a chance to say something about it.
Mr. Babbitt. Well, I agree completely. I think we have the
technology today to do all of the various things you have
discussed. But I also would note for the record that there are
places where different types of simulation become important.
So, for example, the first day that you have gotten out of
ground school, and you are going to go into flight training,
you need to sit in a $17 million simulator to figure out where
the switches are? No, you don't.
You can sit in the stationary device and learn. Does that
count the same? No, it does not. But I would add that it is
helpful. But later simulation, I do think, and the arcs that we
have seen, both of them have curriculums that discuss the
maneuvers and the quality of the simulation, and it is spelled
out. And I agree with Captain Ambrosi that it is right in front
of us. We just need to adopt it.
Senator Duckworth. It is. And the thing with those lower
level flight simulators, they are appropriate for certain types
of training.
When I--after I was wounded and I was working toward
getting my private pilot's license, even though I was a
commercial helicopter pilot, I had to learn to do takeoffs and
landings. I fly with just my one left prosthesis on. I don't
wear a right leg. And I had to learn crosswind landings. And we
did that in a Redbird simulator, right. Various, you know,
lower technology until I got good with it, proficient with it.
But none of that time counted toward the minimum amount of
time that I would need. We don't subtract that time. That is in
addition. That is why I, you know, I proposed to Experienced
Pilots Save Lives Act, and my bill would actually build on
being more clear about what type of training you need before
you become a first officer with an ATP.
So, for example, I think we need 900 hours of cross-country
flight time. 200 hours of that should be--200 hours total
should be night flight time. 375 hours of flight time in the
class of airplane for which you are seeking your rating. 75
hours of instrument flight time in actual IMC. 200 hours of
cross-country flight time in an airplane as a pilot in command
or a second in command, performing the duties of a PIC, while
under the supervision of a PIC. 50 hours of night flight time.
We want pilots to have actual flight time experience that
is relevant. We don't want them in at 152 burning holes in the
sky. But you don't want to do that in a simulator either. And I
think that is part of the discussion we have to have here is,
how do we get to 1,500 hours? How do we get to that first
officer seat in that commercial airliner, whether it is a
regional jet, or a 737, or whatever that is, and we have to do
that in a way that we put forth the best, safest pilots
possible.
And I am concerned that we are doing a one-for-one swap
without clearly stating--one-for-one swap in that 1,500 hours,
without clearly stating exactly what type of simulator is being
used and what type of training is being used.
And, you know, as Captain Ambrosi, Mr. Babbitt, would you
associate yourself with my assessment there, that it is
important to be specific as to what type of simulator and----
Mr. Ambrosi. I can tell you from industry, if you don't, or
if you are not specific, they will go to the minimal.
So, we absolutely need to spell out exactly what needs to
be done, and what level of simulation, and what structure needs
to be to any training that you are referring.
Because if not, if you leave it nebulous and ambivalent, x
credit for who knows what, they will make it a race to the
bottom.
Mr. Babbitt. And I would agree. I think you made--you have
to be crystal clear on--the quality of the simulation gets you
so much. And as I mentioned earlier, the arcs have defined some
of the--but I think one of the things that everybody should
remember with simulation, you are teaching a technique.
Senator Duckworth. Yes.
Mr. Babbitt. This is how you do this. And you can do it
without danger. If you make a mistake, OK, so the simulator
crashes, but nobody gets hurt. But you won't do it again. And
so, it is a technique training, and I think you can't use that
completely to say, well, that is all the flight time I need.
No, that is not accurate either. But it is a great training
tool. It is a great exposure. You have seen these things
before. You have seen it in simulations, so you are prepared
for it when it happens. Early pilot told me a long time ago,
``good pilots never surprise pilots.''
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Babbitt. I am
going to indulge further. I am going to give you extra time,
Mr. Moran. Mr. Santa, I want to get back to this crew rest
idea. We understand and base aircrew rests on scientific
methods, as this Captain Ambrosi has mentioned, and that is
really important.
I remember when I was at Walter Reed, one of my first
surgeries, for which I was conscious, I was going to go into
surgery for, was going to be a 14 hour surgery. And my surgeon
came up to me just as they were putting the anesthetic to be
able to put me under, and said, I have been planning this all
week.
I know exactly what I am going to do. It is going to be 14
to 18 hour surgery. We are going to take care of you. You are
going to be great. I have been up all night thinking about
this. And just as I was about to go to sleep, the last thing I
remember saying to him was like, did you get any sleep, doc?
Because I would feel better knowing that you had gotten
some sleep. And then so, I wanted Mr. Santa to give you time to
talk about this rest issue, because I do believe that we have
gotten to a point with air traffic controllers, because there
is such staffing shortages, because there is such demand that
we are going with the minimum rest required in order to give
someone before they show up for work the next day. And that
minimum should not become the standard.
Mr. Santa. Thank you for the time. I just want to clarify a
few things. Our schedules are in accordance with the orders to
allow enough rest. It is the expansion of 10 day--10 hour days
and 6 day workweeks that really exasperates the fatigue and
introduces potential risks.
With a fully functioning and fully staffed air traffic
control facility, that would be lessened. The FAA's chronic
statement is, we can get more productivity out of our
controllers, and we need to change the schedules of our
controllers.
No, the answer is not continuing to burden us with more
fatigue and continuing to burn us with more effort and work. It
is hiring the right amount of controllers so that our
facilities are not 70 and 60 and 80 percent staffed. It is
untenable and it needs to be corrected through hiring and not
changing the standards.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Senator Cruz is recognized
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair. I would like to start
off with Mr. Arel. For the past decade, the FAA has met or
nearly met its hiring goal for air traffic controllers. This
year, the FAA hired 1,500 future controllers to go through the
ATC academy.
Next year, that number will be 1,800, but 30 percent are
likely to wash out. Add in retirements and other constraints,
and how many controllers will we be at next year?
Mr. Arel. Thank you, Senator. Repeat the question, how many
controllers total we have or hired?
Senator Cruz. How many will we be at next year?
Mr. Arel. As we continue to certify controllers, we expect
to be over 11,000 certified controllers. Making our way up, we
intend to continue to hire at our maximum current rate of 1,800
or slightly better in the near future.
Senator Cruz. So, at this rate, it would take years for the
FAA to hire enough controllers to meet the need, especially
given that it is a multiyear process from initial hiring to
becoming a fully certified controller. Would an additional ATC
controller training facility help boost capacity and improve
retention and performance of the workforce?
Mr. Arel. Senator, one of the challenges that we have, or
the greatest challenge is not the physical space or the amount
of the academy, it is the number of retired controllers, either
military or FAA, that are available to provide instruction and
are willing to locate to where the region where the academy may
be.
Some of the strategies that we are trying to explore is
augmenting the training in our current Oklahoma City Academy
for--to operate our classes out to other Federal facilities and
freeing up those--that finite number of instructors that are
available to provide that instruction to focus on new hires at
the academy.
So, it is a delicate balance of trying to find the right
qualified people to provide that training.
Senator Cruz. Thank you very much. Chair Homendy, thank you
for being here today. And staying on the subject of air traffic
controllers, an OIG report says, 77 percent of critical ATC
facilities are understaffed, with New York Terminal Radar
Approach Control at 54 percent. Given that a majority of the
critical ATC facilities are understaffed, are you concerned
about the impact of that on safety of the airspace?
Ms. Homendy. Absolutely. I am happy to continue.
Senator Cruz. Please.
Ms. Homendy. OK. I just want to be respectful of your time.
Absolutely, I am worried about safety. What is happening from
the staffing shortage is that air traffic controllers are being
required to do mandatory overtime.
And what happens with mandatory overtime? You--it ends up
leading to fatigue and distraction, which is exactly what we
are seeing as part of these incident investigations. And it all
just comes down to the shortage of staffing.
Senator Cruz. You recently said that ``the FAA system for
certifying pilots and mechanics hasn't kept up with the science
around mental health, let alone modern attitudes,'' and called
it an ``open secret that current rules incentivize pilots to
lie about their mental health history or avoid seeking
health.''
Yesterday, I sent you a letter expressing my concern about
this issue and asking what safety changes should be made. Does
the FAA and the NTSB have a full understanding of how pervasive
pilot mental health issues are?
Ms. Homendy. If we just took CDC numbers of one in five
U.S. adults live with a mental health challenge. That is about
58 million Americans.
And then we look at FAA civil airmen statistics which show
that there are about 757,000 pilots, including students,
recreational, sport. Then you are looking at about 114,000 to
151,000 pilots that have mental health challenges. People are
suffering in silence.
Senator Cruz. Captain Ambrosi, it is very concerning that
ALPA, and the FAA refused to comply with the National Academies
study that Congress asked for in the 2018 FAA Reauthorization.
It is Congress's job to provide oversight of Federal
programs, and both the FAA and ALPA deliberately stood in the
way of that by refusing to provide data owned by the Federal
Government needed for the report. And I would urge ALPA to
reconsider your refusal to cooperate.
Turning to a question, in October, an Alaska Airlines pilot
tried to crash an airplane. The pilot has claimed to have been
suffering from mental issues and had taken psychedelic
mushrooms in the days prior to the incident. Do you know when
the Alaska Airlines pilot was last drug tested?
Mr. Ambrosi. I do not.
Senator Cruz. Does ALPA support additional drug testing
requirements for pilots to make sure that they haven't been
abusing substances before they fly?
Mr. Ambrosi. The ongoing drug testing program is reviewed
regularly. I am not an expert on the drug testing program, but
pilots are the highest--one of the highest scrutinized
professions out there.
We go through regular drug testing, regular checks in
training, line checks, line observations, so an extremely rare
incident is this. I share your outrage at this specific
incident, whoever, you know--it calls for a panel to discuss
mental health is what we should do.
Senator Cruz. So why did ALPA refuse to cooperate with the
National Academies study that Congress had mandated?
Mr. Ambrosi. So, I think the HIMS program is being
conflated with pilot mental health. The HIMS program is an
occupational substance abuse and treatment program. And we
actually did cooperate with the Academy.
However, as the study notes, ALPA is not the owner of that
data base. So, I received your letter yesterday. I am happy to
do more research on it and reply with--in writing and meet with
your team to discuss further by the deadline.
Senator Cruz. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Senator Duckworth. Senator Thune.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Madam Chair. Let me just start by
saying that the wider use of new technologies has and will
continue to improve ATC and airport situational awareness. And
I also see technology playing a crucial role in training more
well-rounded and well-prepared airline pilots.
As the number of incidents increases, the last thing this
committee should do is remain complacent, which is why Senator
Sinema and I offered an amendment to the Senate FAA
Reauthorization, codifying the recommendations of the air
carrier training arc to create a 2-month enhanced qualification
program.
This detailed course of instruction paired with advanced
simulator training from seasoned airline pilots would expose
trainees to the cockpits of the jets that they would actually
be flying, and importantly, allow them to experience what it is
like to handle challenging and dangerous situations in those
cockpits.
Mr. Babbitt, your bipartisan letter calling on Congress to
expand the use of simulator training stated that, and I quote,
``requiring the repeated practice of the prevention of and
recovery from myriad real-world accident scenarios in full
motion flight simulators will make better pilots.''
Could you elaborate on why the use of new simulator
technologies is so crucial to training well-rounded pilots?
Mr. Babbitt. Sure. And thank you for the question. I think
the ability we have today with the modern simulation exposes
pilots to situations that they--you simply wouldn't put them
in. We killed a number of pilots in the past, accidents,
practicing engine failures on takeoff in real airplanes. If it
didn't go well, they died.
And we learned from that. And we have now created
scenarios. The other thing I think we get into in the
simulation world is the ability to put people in an
environment. I don't just mean in the airplane. I mean in the
cockpit environment. You have 1,500 hours. Is any of that with
another pilot? Are you always just a pilot in command?
And the answer, you could be. Well, that is not what you
are going to do when you do--have to work as a commercial
airline pilot. You are going to be in a crew situation. You
need to understand crew resource management.
You need to know what happens when the captain is
suggesting something that you don't think is operationally
correct. Have you learned how to deal with that? You do in a
simulator. And so, I think all of these lead us to much better
training. They have been exposed to many things that you simply
won't get exposed to.
Are you going to fly your light airplane into a heavy
thunderstorm and hail? No, you are not. Not twice. So, you
know, these do put us in situations where you can learn from
it. Wow, we will never do that again. I see what happened.
Myself as an example. In 1981, there was a tragic accident,
wind shear in Dallas-Fort Worth. Every airline pilot in this
country had to go get an hour in a simulator because Airbus,
Boeing, and the FAA together changed the technique to recover
from stalls. Every pilot in this country had to go get an hour
in a simulator, and I remember mine.
They said, just shoot the approach and recover just like
you knew how to do. And we did and we crashed. They said, now
we are going to use the new technique. We learned it and it was
great exposure, and we have learned so much.
Wind shear is not the problem that it was back then. So, I
think simulation adds a huge layer of learning and expertise
and coordination to the system and safety.
Senator Thune. Thank you. Ms. Homendy, I fully recognize
the value of cockpit experience, and I see time in real
aircraft is an essential part of training airline pilots, but I
am concerned that the--accumulation, as Mr. Babbitt has noted,
of flight hours, doesn't provide trainees with adequate
exposure to commercial aircraft or prepare them for the
unexpected, potentially dangerous scenarios.
Do you see a role for the enhanced use of new technologies,
including advanced full flight simulators, to improve exposure
of prospective airline pilots to scenarios that they couldn't
otherwise encounter in real aircraft?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, there is always a role for simulators as
part of training, but the most realistic scenario based
training so that pilots become proficient.
Senator Thune. Thank you. Let me just, if I could, Mr.
Arel, during my time as Chairman of this Committee, we
considered and enacted the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, and
included prioritization of NextGen upgrades to bolster the
Nation's air traffic control system.
These upgrades, in addition to employing concepts such as
dynamic airspace management, will allow the United States to
better utilize existing infrastructure, increasing the capacity
and efficiency of the NAS.
Recent ATC issues at airports across the country have
certainly highlighted the need for modernization. From your
perspective, what technology upgrades should be prioritized to
avoid preventable incidents like those we have seen around the
country?
Mr. Arel. Thank you, Senator. Anything that helps to
increase situational awareness for everyone involved is a great
technology improvement.
And the agency is in the process of doing a technology
sprint, launching three areas of technology, one around
approach runway verification, which will be or is available in
all of our approach control automation systems now and can be
programmed locally to detect wrong surface landing.
There is the runway incursion device that will be deployed
in the next year, year and a half, at over 70 towers to provide
an audible and visual alarm to controllers if they were to
clear someone for takeoff or landing on a runway that had been
released for another activity.
And then last, a service awareness initiative that we have
kicked off for rapid acquisition and hope to have in place at
our first facility by June of 2024 for commercially available
services that provide situational awareness, similar to what
any pilot can bring into their aircraft now with an iPad and
they have good situational awareness of aircraft operating
around.
So, anything that increases the sharing and real time
exchange of data between aircraft operators and air traffic
controllers, and provide that common situational awareness, as
well as safety logic, is all helpful.
Senator Thune. Thank you. Madam Chair, my time has expired,
but I have some additional questions I would like to submit for
the record.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Without objection. Senator
Hickenlooper.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Madam Chair. I thank all
of you for being here. This certainly is a timely opportunity
to make sure that we get not just Senators educated, but the
broader population of our country and the world.
Mr. Arel, let me start with you. The cost to build a
traditional air traffic control tower can reach up to $20
million. For airports serving rural communities, this can be a
real impediment. Colorado, we have the Northern Colorado
Regional Airport, which is actually going out and trying to
build their own tower to attract new and reliable air service
from airlines by making sure that they do install a remote
tower project.
So, if approved by the FAA, this will, without question,
grow the local economy. It is important for the FAA safely--it
is important that the FAA safely integrates leading edge
technology into our aviation system.
So, my question is, what is the FAA doing to spur
innovation and safety in these regional airports that really do
play such a big role, such as Northern Colorado airport, in
pursuing remote tower projects?
Mr. Arel. Thank you, Senator. My organization works closely
with our NextGen organization as they explore remote tower
technology. And certainly, there is an opportunity there and
some promise.
The initial technology that has been evaluated to date did
have some shortfalls. I can tell you, as a former controller,
what we want to make sure is that the system works, that it is
reliable, and that it provides that level, that equivalent
level of safety that we see in a staffed tower. There is,
again, some promise.
We are continuing to do that work, NextGen. Our NextGen
office is bringing additional technology into our tech center
in New Jersey, where we are allowing vendors to bring in that
technology, demonstrate it, build that level of trust prior to
us issuing a certification, that it meets that same standard as
our staffed towers.
Senator Hickenlooper. Great. That is--I mean, anything I
say, I have heard this--we have been watching part of this from
the office, that safety first is pretty much the mantra that I
expect and what we have been hearing.
Ms. Homendy, these recent runway near misses, these
incidents of close to catastrophic proportions seem to be
increasing at an alarming rate. In September, DIA, Denver
International Airport, sorry, opened a new taxiway that
hopefully is going to eliminate what they call a hotspot, where
aircraft volume has increased risks of unintended, or not
unintended, but all--air airspace collisions.
The bipartisan infrastructure law continues to make
strategic investments to improve airfield lighting, to
modernize runways, taxi infrastructure, improve safety. Which
effective project designs, which best practices, does the NTSB
recommend that airports should implement following these recent
runway safety meetings that, you know, I assume is happening
nationwide?
Ms. Homendy. We don't have any current recommendations on
that. I think we may have past recommendations that we have
closed, and I am happy to give those to you.
Senator Hickenlooper. Great. But I think it is obviously a
national issue. And I think the more ways we can look at it,
the more successful we will be.
Mr. Ambrosi, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that
there will be a 13 percent increase in the need for pilots by
2030. Some people think that might be conservative. Obviously,
aviation is a key part of our economy. Job growth also affects
a lot of other components and elements of our economy.
Among the many pathways available for an aspiring student
to become a certified pilot, airlines are also establishing
dedicated academies. United Airlines has their Aviate Academy
to further increase the training available to young pilots.
Obviously, I think this increases safety.
In Denver, we have Metropolitan State University, which is
the first university in Colorado to be accredited by the FAA,
to offer a curriculum to aspiring pilots so that they can
achieve a restricted air transport pilot certificate. And MSU
is partnering with a number of affiliate flight schools in the
communities in the greater metropolitan area.
Would you describe the impact, or how would you describe--
or could you describe, I know you can, could you describe the
impact that accredited university programs like MSU's in
Denver, that they have on growing the pipeline of training
pilots?
Mr. Ambrosi. Absolutely. Thank you for the question. As you
know, there is more than one pathway to getting that ATP, and
having an academic program such as that--you know, a two-year
degree gets you a 250 hour reduction.
A four year degree gets you a 500 hour reduction. It gets
you that RATP, as you mentioned. That is because of advanced
academics. So, these pilots are learning more there. They are
getting these advanced academics, which is a credit toward the
program. So, it is a very good pipeline.
The aviation schools such as that are--the pipeline is
full. It is good to be a pilot right now and people are coming
to these schools and in rapid fashion to be part of this
occupation. So, it is an essential part of what we do to get
pilots in the pipeline.
Senator Hickenlooper. Great. I was very impressed. We went
through it and looked at what they were doing, and it was a
great source of optimism. So, anyway, thank you all for all the
work you are doing to keep the skies safe. I yield back to the
Chair.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. The incredibly patient,
Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for
holding this incredibly important hearing. I share my
colleague's serious concerns about the recent series of near-
miss incidents which have impacted my home state of
Massachusetts as well.
In late February, two planes nearly collided at Boston
Logan Airport when one attempted to take off as another one was
landing. And in March, the wings of two United Airlines planes
clipped each other at Logan.
Fortunately, no one was seriously hurt in these incidents,
but passengers and flight crews are understandably worried
about the safety of U.S. air travel. So, Chair Homendy, I
understand that the National Transportation Safety Board
investigated the near-miss at Logan from February.
Can you provide an update on that investigation?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. We issued a final report on that
investigation. And the Hop-a flight pilot heard--thought he
heard that he could go forward. He was told to line up and
wait, but he began his takeoff roll, and said that--reported to
us that he was not feeling well that day and that possibly he
was experiencing some things from the cold weather in Boston.
Senator Markey. And how do you correct that with that
pilot? He misheard an instruction?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. I mean, there has been a lot of fatigue,
distraction. Pilots mishearing instructions in all the
investigations that we are conducting. I mean, the one thing
that is good about your airport is you have SDX. It is not the
same in other airports.
Senator Markey. And what does that mean? What is that--?
Ms. Homendy. So SDX alerts the controllers that there is an
impending collision and can take action to prevent it.
Senator Markey. Should that be mandatory at all airports?
Ms. Homendy. I think it should be mandatory at the most at
least medium or large sized airports. But right now----
Senator Markey. Is that what saved us at Logan?
Ms. Homendy. Yes.
Senator Markey. Yes. So----
Ms. Homendy. That takes resources for the FAA. We need
robust funding for the FAA--sustainable funding.
Senator Markey. But again, like when you are driving a car,
if the driver makes a mistake, the airbag is still there as to
back up, so----
Ms. Homendy. Exactly. It provides the safety net.
Senator Markey. And that is what SDX is.
Ms. Homendy. That is right.
Senator Markey. SDX is the airbag. It is the extra safety
as to whether it has been operator error.
So, I think that is something that we should absolutely be
talking about. And I am glad--again, I am glad that NTSB is
investigating these incidents. Now, I would like to turn to
another threat to aviation safety, climate change. From
increased turbulence in the sky to flooded runways, climate
change is already having serious consequences for our aviation
system.
Coastal airports, like in my home state of Massachusetts,
are especially threatened by ocean level rise. Our airport is
just on landfill in Boston Harbor, which is the second fastest
warming body of water on Earth.
That is how fast it is all warming there. As a Brookings
report declared earlier this year, America's airports aren't
ready for climate change. If we don't invest in climate
resilience at our airports, we are in for a bumpy ride.
To each of our witnesses, starting with Chairman Homendy,
do you agree that climate change is a significant threat to
aviation safety?
Ms. Homendy. I am not a climate change expert, but I agree.
Senator Markey. Captain.
Mr. Ambrosi. Yes. So, I would agree I am not a climate
change expert, but we completely agree and pilots do a lot to
try to minimize carbon emissions, also noise. So, we are an
active participant in reducing greenhouse gases in the aviation
profession.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Mr. Arel. As an air traffic controller, it has really not
impacted us at all. So personally, I believe that climate
change has an impact. But as an air traffic controller, I can
say yes.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Mr. Babbitt. Yes, I think you are seeing more violent
weather, which is not helpful. Also, the slowly rising
temperatures. Aircraft, a lot of people aren't aware of it, but
as the temperature gets higher and higher, the aircraft needs
longer runways. And so, you are pushing the envelope there as
well.
Senator Markey. Thank you. Yes, sir.
Mr. Santa. Thank you, Senator. We certainly have seen a
significant increase in severe weather throughout this last
summer season. And we would--we join in supporting everything
we can do to minimize the impacts of that.
Senator Markey. Thank you. And that is why I filed
legislation with Senator Sullivan, the Airport Infrastructure
Resiliency Act, bipartisan. We can see it is coming.
We need to actually have more protection. And another piece
of legislation, Airline Operational Resiliency Act, with
Senators Fischer and Welsh and Capito aim to improve the
overall resiliency.
And finally, today's hearing would be incomplete if we
didn't discuss the role that airports service workers play in
keeping our airports safe. Baggage handlers, wheelchair
attendants, gate attendants, other workers play an essential
role in our aviation system.
And by providing airport service workers a living wage and
benefits, we ensure that airports have a well-trained and
experienced workforce to identify security incidents and
respond to emergency situations.
When we shortchange airport service workers, we leave our
airports and passengers vulnerable. Earlier this morning, I
rallied with airport service workers, SEIU, and called on
Congress to pass the Good Jobs for Good Airports Act.
And that will ensure that these workers, these hidden
figures at the airport who ensure that the planes can take off
every day and safely, get fair wages, health care benefits,
sick time, which they are not getting right now.
And we have to make sure that all this Federal money that
we send to airports actually gets distributed in a way that is
a lot more fair. And we saw how hard they worked during the
pandemic.
We saw the risks that they took for their health and their
families in order to make the rest of us safe at those
airports, and we just have to rectify that historic imbalance
in terms of how much the airlines are profiting by the billions
and how much these workers are still being left behind without
the benefits they deserve.
So, I just want to raise that once again. And thank you,
Madam Chair, for your great leadership.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Senator Markey. As we have
heard today, there are many things that we can do to improve
the safety of our aviation system in this country, which is the
global leader in safety when it comes to commercial aviation
operations.
Today's hearing demonstrates that we must address the
serious near misses we have seen recently with utmost sense of
urgency and to prevent future incidents. We have dealt with
everything from workforce shortages for air traffic
controllers, to pilots, to maintenance workers, and the pending
FAA reauthorization legislation addresses this.
And in partnership with my ranking member, we have tripled
the funding in this FAA reauthorization bill for pilots, for
maintenance workers, for air traffic controllers, all of those
programs. In the midst of this serious discussion, reducing the
amount of aeronautical experienced pilots is the wrong idea at
the wrong time.
And I just want to reiterate the history of the 1,500 hour
rule. It came about post Colgan crash. And Congress went to the
airlines and said, what is the minimum number of flight hours
that is needed? And it was the airlines who came back and said
1,500 hours.
This number was reached through consultation with the
commercial air carriers who came back and said that is what is
required. And that level has kept us safe, has kept the flying
public safe, in the years since.
There are already multiple ways to become a commercial
airline first officer. There are multiple ways already to get
that ATP. Not every pilot that ends up in a commercial airline
as a first officer has 1,500 hours. You can be an airline--you
can become a military pilot, 750 hours. You can go to a 4-year
aeronautical program with a very structured training program,
very rigorous program. You can do 1,000 hours.
You can attend at any one of our great 2 year programs. We
have many of those in Illinois very proud of them--1,250 hours.
And then for those who don't go through any of those formal
programs, who just go down to the local FBO and start learning
to fly, and that is a very legitimate, valid way to work your
way in, it is 1,500 hours.
Rather than watering down existing safety standards, we
must always be looking to enhance aviation safety. Today we
have discussed the fact that a simulator is not a simulator is
not a simulator. We cannot forget that the United States can
only lead in aviation if it leads to aviation--if it leads in
aviation safety.
And again, if we are going to be talking about simulators,
we need to be clear what type of simulator we are talking
about. Because as Captain Ambrosi says, if you just say
structured training and don't define what that simulator is,
there would be a race to the bottom by the airlines to go with
the lowest level of simulator, the cheapest level of simulator
possible, and that is not going to be beneficial to the flying
public.
With Administrator Whitaker at the helm, and he has strong
tailwinds with almost unanimous 98 to 0 confirmation vote, the
FAA already has a legal authority, the expertise, and the
discretion to issue standards on pilot training and
qualification.
You can already do that. In fact, FAA's Aviation Rulemaking
Committee is already looking at whether it is appropriate to
create yet another pathway to becoming an airline pilot, first
officer with fewer than 1,500 hours.
Again, we have the 4-year program, 1,250--1,000 hours, 2
year program 1,250, military pilots 750, and the FAA is already
looking and already has the authority to create yet another
pathway. We have an Administrator, we have safety experts at
FAA, and a process to study this issue to see if changes are
required.
And if they are, the FAA can certainly act on that. I
believe that we do not need any legislative change that could
lower that safety bar if you are going to use language such as
structured simulator training without defining what that
simulator is. I don't think that preemptively reducing the
1,500 hours that was recommended by the airlines and has
resulted in over 10 years of safe aviation operations is the
way to go.
Now, if you are going to do that, again, then we need to
say, hey, if you are going to get a minimum level experience in
a flight simulator, that needs to be a level D, full flight
simulator, equipped with software capable of accurately
recreating flight conditions for the most daunting and dire
emergency operations.
You know, there are simulators for surgeons as well who can
practice different surgeries without actually having to do it
on the patient first. But I will paraphrase Captain
Sullenberger who said, you know, if we don't--if we have a
doctor shortage and we have a surgeon shortage, the solution
isn't to say, let's make medical school 2 years.
The solution isn't to say, let's just have surgeons only do
training on a surgery simulator and they don't actually have to
operate on patients. That is not the solution. I don't think
this is the either extreme end.
I am just saying that if we are going to put in simulators
and we are going to reduce the flying hour requirements for
that first officer, then let's be clear about what we are
substituting it with and let's be precise about what we are
substituting it with. Let's have a curriculum for what that is
going to be.
Again, you can fly holes in the sky in a simulator just as
well as you can fly holes in the sky in a 152. I want to thank
our witnesses for your participation today. The hearing record
will remain open for 4 weeks until December 7, 2023.
Any Senator that would like to submit questions for the
record should do so two weeks from now by November 23. We ask
that responses be returned to the Committee by December 7,
2023.
And that concludes today's hearing. Thank you, everyone.
[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Ed Bolen, President and CEO,
National Business Aviation Association
Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, Subcommittee Chair Duckworth,
Subcommittee Ranking Member Moran and Members of the Subcommittee on
Aviation Safety, Operations, and Innovation, thank you for holding this
hearing to examine and address close calls in the National Airspace
System and improve aviation safety. On behalf of the National Business
Aviation Association's (NBAA's) 11,000-member companies, I am honored
to submit testimony for this hearing.
NBAA's members, many of which are small businesses, rely on general
aviation aircraft to meet some portion of their transportation needs.
These aircraft provide connectivity to communities in every state,
which is especially critical to communities with little or no airline
service. Business aviation is keeping small businesses globally
competitive and bolstering our national economy with 1.2 million
American jobs and $247 billion in economic output.
The aviation industry overall--from commercial aviation, to general
aviation, manufacturing, Advanced Air Mobility and other emerging
technologies and associated businesses--accounts for more than 5
percent of the United States gross domestic product.
We applaud Chair Cantwell and Ranking Member Cruz for holding this
hearing focused on safety-a core value for our industry. Since the dawn
of flight, safety has been integral to everything we do, on the ground
and in the air. Since NBAA was founded in 1947, we have been
intentional in developing partnerships with government leaders and
other stakeholders to deliver the products, procedures and policies
that continually increase the safety of flight. Because of this
continued, comprehensive focus on innovative approaches to safety,
aviation is the safest mode of transportation, and the U.S. stands as
the global leader in aviation safety.
Safety is not a destination--it is a journey and a practice that
requires vigilance and a supportive culture to thrive. Although the
business aviation community has built an impressive safety record,
there have been some recent incidents that require thorough review and
response.
General aviation (GA) has a strong role to play in shaping the
future of aviation safety, in part because it is the proving ground for
the industry. GA is where aviation was born, and it's the point of
entry for many in the community, from the pilot's first hours of flight
to the mechanic's first oil change.
We take this responsibility seriously. Just this week, nearly 500
business aviation professionals are gathering in Wichita, KS for the
Bombardier Safety Standdown presented in close partnership with NBAA.
This annual event, which began in 1996, is a premier forum to bring our
community together and work on solutions to improve aviation safety
standards and sustain positive changes within the industry. The
aviation safety program is free of charge and the information is
catered towards pilots, crewmembers, maintenance technicians and
managers, no matter what aircraft they operate. In addition to the
event, the Safety Standdown website provides access to live seminar
webcasts, as well as a variety of safety-related articles written by
experts in the industry.
Recognizing the increase in serious numbers of incursions and the
recent near misses and close calls involving business aviation
aircraft, NBAA continues its efforts and collaboration with the FAA,
NTSB, NATCA and other organizations to raise awareness and to develop
and promote educational resources on the subject.
NBAA members have organized a number of committees to engage in
improving safety across the industry. Foremost, our Safety Committee,
one of our oldest committees, biennially studies and identifies Top
Safety Focus Areas, to help promote safety-enhancing discussions and
initiatives within flight departments and among owner-flown operations.
We are proud to announce that NBAA is standing up a Runway and
Surface Safety Working Group that brings experts together across NBAA
committees and across the industry to address the recent runway
incidents and incursions.
NBAA has played a leadership role in a number of stakeholder
meetings over the course of the last year to discuss close-call events.
I participated in the FAA Safety Summit, held this spring emphasizing
those efforts. NBAA's Director of Airports has been serving as the
Industry Co-Chair of the Surface Safety Group and representing the
industry on the Runway Safety Council. NBAA participated in the NTSB
Runway Incursion Roundtable this spring. We have written a number of
web stories and have held a number of podcasts on the subject, most
recently one with the Chair of NTSB and the FAA Manager of Runway
Safety. We are planning for a second portion of that in partnership
with NATCA, to focus on pilot-controller interactions related to runway
safety and wrong-surface operations, as well as a live webinar. NBAA
members and staff participate in the local Runway Safety Action Team
(RSAT) and Special Focus RSAT meetings and other runway safety
initiatives across the country and those presented virtually.
Building a Culture of Safety
In addition to responding to specific events in the national
airspace system, a key strategy for continually enhancing business
aviation's safety posture is to cultivate a culture of safety, from
training and education to studying and mitigating human factors, to
acknowledging excellence in safety leadership within the industry.
Everyone--from the pilot, to the cabin crew, to the dispatcher, to the
maintenance technician and beyond--has an important role in the safety
of flight.
Technologies, and their implications for aviation, are a key
element in the safety formula, but technology cannot replace the human
element in the equation. That's why the business aviation community
places a sharp strategic focus on human factors--how fatigue, stress,
confusion and other influences can impact decision-making--in thinking
about safety.
There are a number of misperceptions that can lead a pilot to take
off or land from a wrong taxiway, runway, or even a wrong airport.
These incidents are known as wrong-surface events. They often involve
human factors, and reducing them is a top priority for FAA, NBAA and
the industry. We are actively working with the FAA and other
stakeholders in the Surface Safety Group focused on developing tools to
increase situational awareness for pilots at airports with a high
number of wrong-surface incidents.
The association participated in the FAA's Surface Safety Symposium,
which brought together commercial airlines, ground vehicle drivers and
general aviation pilots and operators to discuss and develop solutions
to runway and surface safety challenges. NBAA also provided a platform
to the FAA Runway Safety organization at its October 2023 NBAA-BACE,
which included 20,000 attendees from across the industry, to engage
with attendees during the convention's Meet the Regulators session.
NBAA is also working to reduce runway excursions, another event
often driven by human factors, in which an airplane inappropriately
exits a runway. Like incursions, these events require strategically
driven mitigation planning, along with tools developed by experts for
industry. To that end, the association has gathered some of the best
expertise on excursions at events, including our National Safety Forum
in 2022, and continues to develop resources, including our Guide for
Reducing Business Aviation Runway Excursions, which has been updated by
the Safety Committee in collaboration with the Domestic Operations
Committee and is in the process of being published.
In 2022, NBAA launched its Business Aviation Safety Manager
Certificate Program. This online accreditation was designed to educate
individuals to effectively manage a business aviation organization's
proactive safety efforts. It includes an in-depth look at the four
elements of a Safety Management System (SMS), including Safety Policy,
Risk Management, Safety Assurance and Safety Promotion, as well as
modules on Safety Leadership and Emergency Response. The effort goes
beyond initial education, by connecting certificate applicants to each
other, in a community of engagement through peer-to-peer learning that
fosters continuous safety improvement across the board, while also
meeting the specific operational needs of any given aviation operation.
In just a single year since this program's launch, more than 300 people
have completed the course, obtaining recognition for safety leadership,
while building an enduring peer community of safety advocates in
business aviation.
NBAA honors safety leadership in other important ways. For several
decades the association has annually issued its Flying Safety Awards, a
standards-based honor that recognizes exceptional achievement in safe
flying operations, and pays tribute to the skill of a company's
management, maintenance, pilot, scheduler/dispatcher and support-
personnel teams.
NBAA's Safety Committee administers the annually issued Dr. Tony
Kern Professionalism in Aviation Awards, which specifically honor
individuals for outstanding professionalism and leadership in support
of aviation safety. The committee's newest honor, the Above and Beyond
Award, is given to individuals whose application of safety best
practices played a key role in avoiding injury, loss of life, or
catastrophic aircraft damage in hazardous flying circumstances.
Addressing Human Factors to Strengthen Safety
Safety in aviation goes beyond the flight deck to all aspects of
the industry. Recognizing this, the NBAA maintenance committee has
taken a proactive approach by developing educational initiatives at its
annual Maintenance Conference to emphasize the crucial role of the
human factor in ensuring safety. This initiative underscores the fact
that, despite the advancements in technology and the stringent
protocols in place, we must remember that aviation professionals are
only human. By addressing human factors in maintenance practices and
procedures, the committee seeks to foster a culture of vigilance,
continuous learning, and open communication to mitigate risks and
enhance safety across the aviation industry. These efforts are critical
to addressing safety issues before they ever reach the flight deck.
Another important part of the work to address the impact of human
factors on aviation safety lies in our sector's focus on mental health
and fitness for duty. More than a small-bore approach to myriad, stand-
alone psychological and physical symptoms, the work in this area looks
at the whole person, recognizing that aviation is a physically and
mentally demanding environment in which a clear mind and well-rested,
healthy body is essential to safe business aircraft operations,
maintenance and management.
Studies confirm the prevalence of this concern, as well as the need
for both action and compassion on the matter: one recent report\1\
concluded that nearly 60 percent of pilots avoid seeking health care
due to the fear of losing their aviation medical certificate. NBAA is
concerned that some aeromedical certification requirements may
needlessly impede eligibility for pilot certification, severely
dissuading pilots from seeking treatment for a troubling condition.
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\1\ Hoffman et al., 2022. Healthcare Avoidance in Aircraft Pilots
Due to Concern for Aeromedical Certificate Loss. J Occup Environ Med.
64(4):e245-e248. 11
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As with so many other aspects of aviation safety, partnerships
between industry and government can produce solutions to the problem
without compromising safety, and we have proven successes with such an
approach. For example, we have worked with the FAA to develop multiple
pathways for Aviation Medical Examiners (AMEs) to issue airmen medical
certificates at the conclusion of an exam, thereby minimizing wait
times for FAA reviews. We have also emphasized the need for AMEs to
research and identify for aviators the full menu of pharmacological
treatment options that can safely be used in the aviation environment
to address a given condition, and to better define the criteria for
requiring or deferring neurocognitive testing.
We continue to be an active partner in educating the business
aviation community on these policies; in the past year alone, NBAA
hosted an interactive News Hour webinar and a National Safety Forum
discussion with aviation mental health experts and the FAA Federal Air
Surgeon. We have engaged with the aviation community on these policies
at events such as the Experimental Aviation Association's annual
AirVenture Oshkosh show, the University of North Dakota's yearly
Aviation Mental Health Symposium, as well as regularly held FAA Human
Intervention Motivational Study and InfoShare Conferences and FAA
General Aviation Joint Safety Committee (GAJSC) meetings, among others.
Collectively, these efforts will help address misperceptions about
mental wellness and fitness for duty, while reducing barriers that
interfere with obtaining treatment and healthcare, getting pilots the
help they need, maintaining pilots' livelihoods, aiding employers in
understanding the readiness of their workforce--and, most importantly,
enhancing safety.
Safety Leadership Through Pioneering Technologies
As this committee knows, many of the technologies and solutions
that have revolutionized aviation safety were born in the business
aviation community. We led the way with GPS, a transformative
navigation and safety technology. We led the way in development of
airborne collision-avoidance systems that ensure situational awareness
at all altitudes. We led the way in developing enhanced vision systems
that can identify unanticipated ground obstructions in thick fog, and
see through clouds to locate terrain while in flight. We partnered with
the FAA in integrating the Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM)
technology that has vastly increased the efficiency and safety of
aviation system management. Similarly, we were the early adopters of
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B), a cornerstone
technology for ushering in the next generation aviation system's
enhancements to safety, as well as efficiency and sustainability.
Safety Leadership Through Data-Based Programs
Of course, the deployment of world-leading technologies has been
only one piece of the safety equation for aviation. The development and
implementation of innovative programs that identify the root causes of
safety threats, and offer proven ways to eliminate them, is also a key
building block for a solid safety foundation.
For example, 20 years ago, NBAA and its members joined with the
International Business Aviation Council in developing the safety
focused International Standard for Business Aircraft Operations (IS-
BAO), a set of best practices focused on safety management as a data-
driven team effort, including pilots and cabin crew, schedulers,
dispatchers, maintenance technicians and others.
Since the program's founding, more than 700 business aviation
operators in 35 countries have become IS-BAO registered, improving
their safety risk profile. Today, the business aviation community is an
active participant in a variety of government-industry programs that
aggregate operational data to identify risks, capture behaviors that
contribute to accidents, and pinpoint ways to mitigate those events.
As just one example, we can point to the FAA's Aviation Safety
Information Analysis and Sharing program, also known as ``ASIAS,'' in
which more than 150 organizations capture and coordinate data and other
information critical to avoiding a variety of unusual events, including
bird strikes, mid-air collisions, course deviations and other aviation
safety hazards.
NBAA has promoted ASIAS through discussions at our National Safety
Forum on specific aviation hazards, during the NTSB Roundtable
discussion at NBAA Business Aviation Convention and Exhibition (NBAA-
BACE), in articles published in NBAA's safety-focused Business Aviation
Insider magazine, and through our ongoing engagement at the ASIAS
Executive Board and GA Issues Analysis Team governance levels within
the program. As part of Safer Skies, launched in 1998, the FAA and the
general aviation community jointly pursue a goal of reducing GA fatal
accidents.
The GAJSC uses a data-driven, consensus-based approach to analyze
safety data to develop specific interventions that will mitigate the
root causes of accidents. The GAJSC focuses on proactively assessing
data to identify new emerging issues and threats to general aviation
safety, analyze them, and develop mitigation strategies to address and
prioritize safety issues to prevent accidents.
NBAA, a founding member of the GAJSC, has supported the valuable
safety studies and analyses conducted by this group, and worked to
educate our members on the tools created to address specific safety
risks. The current goal is a safety improvement over the FY18 target of
1.00 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours to a FY28 target of 0.89
fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours.
Leadership in Safety Policy Development
A comprehensive approach to safety involves not just an investment
in new technologies, or simply the development of risk-mitigation
programs, but also a continuing commitment to an effective and tailored
policy framework that matches the size and operational realities of
business aviation. For a safety mandate to realize the benefits it
seeks, it must have flexibility to scale, to fit the largest commercial
operation, or the smallest charter business. NBAA and its members have
led the way in this area. For example, the business aviation community
has most recently been focused on a policy proposal put forward by the
FAA in January, which would extend the requirement for implementation
of SMS programs beyond those for the airlines to many business aircraft
operations.
While NBAA and its members have always supported rigor in ensuring
everyone involved in a flight maintains a premium on safety, we know
that an SMS suited for the largest airline will not likely be
transferable to a small operation with a single airplane. We can look
outside of the United States to learn lessons as we review the FAA's
new proposal. Our focus will be on ensuring that any resulting program
is not only flexible, but also meaningful in driving safety, rather
than confusion due to compliance burdens and other missteps that have
been characteristic of the introduction of SMS for business aviation in
Canada and elsewhere.
For example, Canada's SMS implementation in the mid-2000s created
significant industry concerns due to lack of scalability and the
government's poor transition from an historic view of prescriptive
oversight to one in which risk is defined by the operator. As a result,
it has taken nearly two decades to modernize those initial regulations
so that they reflect the vast diversity of operations subject to the
mandates involved.
A similar operator experience with an SMS rollout in New Zealand
was shared in AvWeb:
``We've gone through SMS in New Zealand . . . We were promised
from the start that it would be scaled to the size of our
operations, but in the end we had to do all the requirements,
even if the CAA [Civilian Aviation Authority] guys acknowledged
it made little sense for us . . . The hardest part of
implementation was a lack of understanding from CAA about SMS,
since they were quite new to it as well, so we had little
effective guidance (despite a lot of effort on their part) and
a lot of inconsistent directives.''
The U.S. aviation industry cannot afford to repeat the poorly
developed SMS deployment we have seen elsewhere. We must get this right
from the start in order to leverage the safety benefits that we know
SMS can deliver. The business aviation community has experience
partnering with the government in the development of effective,
customized policies, and we enthusiastically welcome the same approach
to the consideration of SMS requirements for our sector.
Continually Improving Safety
The general aviation community appreciates the leadership and work
of this Committee on the policy solutions that strengthen our unrivaled
national airspace system, sustain vigilance across the industry on
safety and maintain the role of the United States as the world leader
in aerospace. NBAA appreciates the opportunity to contribute to the
record on this important issue and will continue to engage with our
members and other stakeholders to continually improve aviation safety.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Jennifer L. Homendy
Efforts to Address Near-Misses
Chair Homendy, you participated in FAA's Safety Summit back in
March. You said then that ``the absence of a fatality or an accident
doesn't mean the presence of safety.'' I couldn't agree more, and that
is why we must take each one of these close calls so seriously and it
is also why we need a FAA Reauthorization bill to strengthen aviation
safety.
You have been vocal about the effectiveness of surface situational
awareness technologies, such as Airport Surface Detection Systems
(ASDE-X) and Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC), crediting
them with helping avoid potential accidents at Boston Logan in February
and at JFK in January. You have also said that February's near-miss in
Austin would never have gotten that far if the airport been equipped
with these technologies.
Question 1. Section 404 of the Senate FAA bill directs FAA to
submit an action plan for upgrading existing and implementing surface
situational awareness technologies at more airports. Do you agree that
expanded deployment of these technologies at more commercial airports
would help reduce the number of near-misses?
Answer. I strongly agree. There are approximately 450 commercial
service airports within the United States. Of these, only 43 (or less
than 10 percent) have ASDE-X or ASSC technologies installed and
operational. More airports across the country installing more of this
technology would dramatically improve safety. I do want to clarify that
the JetBlue crew in the incident in Boston initiated the go around
prior to the ASDE-X alerting. In addition, as I testified, though
extremely valuable for safety ASDE-X and ASSC only warn the air traffic
control tower of impending risks and do not provide the direct cockpit
warning to pilots that we have long recommended. Especially considering
current funding constraints that may limit the ability to upgrade
existing and implementing new surface surveillance technology, the NTSB
strongly urges that technologies be developed and implemented to
directly alert pilots in the cockpit of impending runway incursions
without relying on a runway surveillance safety system at the airport.
A system to provide direct alerts to flight crews has been a key
element of an NTSB safety recommendation now open for over 23 years.
Question 2. In your testimony, you stress that Safety Management
Systems (SMS) provide operators with standardized risk-management
procedures and processes to increase aviation safety. SMS is based on
sharing data to identify and address safety patterns. How can Safety
Management Systems help prevent near-misses and close-calls from
happening in the first place?
Answer. SMS is a formal, top-down, business-like approach to
managing safety. It gathers data from routine operations to identify
indicators of specific safety-related risks. By looking at these
indicators and developing mitigations before an accident happens, and
ensuring that the mitigations are effective, an SMS can be an effective
tool to increase safety.
In the area of runway safety, an operator can use SMS to identify
problems with radio communications, warnings not perceived by flight
crew, or flight crews' elevated workload and distraction, all of which
have been identified in runway safety-related events. Identifying
specific risks in these areas can allow an operator to develop and
implement tailored safeguards before lives are lost. In this way, SMS
can be an effective management tool for an operator to increase flight
operation safety. The same approach can be used by the FAA to manage
safety-related risks in the air traffic control (ATC) system.
Currently only Part 121 air carriers (generally larger airlines and
regional carriers, as well as cargo carriers) are required to
incorporate an SMS into their operations; the FAA has only encouraged
all other operators to voluntarily implement an SMS. The NTSB believes
that Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying and Part 135 operators would
benefit from an SMS to ensure that operational risks are sufficiently
mitigated. In addition, it is critical that the FAA oversee these
operators' SMSs to ensure that mitigations are in place to address
potential safety hazards.
We welcome the FAA's action on this issue through their January 10,
2023, notice of proposed rulemaking to update and expand the
requirements for SMSs. This includes a requirement that manufacturers
have in place an appropriate SMS as we have previously recommended and
which Congress required in 2020. We have called on the FAA to expedite
progress on adopting a final rule that requires Part 135 operators, all
Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operators, and manufacturers to
develop and implement an SMS.
Question 3. In the Aircraft Certification, Safety and
Accountability Act (ACSAA), I pushed for a report to FAA and Congress
so we can stay ahead of emerging trends impacting safety. Data is
critical in an information age. So how can NTSB, FAA and stakeholders
work more closely together to identify and address safety trends like
near misses?
Answer. The collaboration among operators, manufacturers, labor
unions, private aircraft owners and pilots, the FAA, Congress, and the
NTSB over the last several decades has been critical to the current
level of aviation safety; yet we cannot be complacent. We must continue
to work together to identify emerging safety concerns and gather data
regarding incidents that may be warnings about broader gaps in safety.
One example of how NTSB has worked to stay ahead of emerging trends
is our 2021 safety research report which examined the prevalence and
risk factors of turbulence-related accidents in Part 121 air carrier
operations. A review of our accident data indicated that turbulence-
related accidents are the most common type of accident involving air
carriers operating under Part 121, accounting for more than a third of
all such accidents from 2009 to 2018. Most of these accidents resulted
in one or more serious injuries but no aircraft damage. Our report
assessed the effectiveness of policies, programs, technologies, and
other applicable safety countermeasures; and made recommendations for
improving turbulence avoidance and injury mitigation. Since that
report, we continue to see and investigate turbulence-related events.
When we make recommendations to improve safety, it is imperative that
the recommendation recipients consider and take action to improve
safety.
Over the last couple of years we have worked to meet the challenges
that come with the increasing growth and innovation in transportation
by becoming a more data-driven agency to improve safety. We established
a dedicated executive position to lead a future Office of the Chief
Data Officer to grow the agency's data, strategic planning, and
enterprise risk management programs. A full-time chief data officer is
being recruited to lead this office. Our reauthorization and
appropriations requests are critical to this effort to allow us to hire
professionals with the required skills, to purchase the equipment and
systems necessary for those skilled professionals to do their jobs, and
to invest in crucial staff training and development.
Pilot Mental Health
In early November you announced that the NTSB would spearhead a
series of roundtable discussions pertaining to aviation safety, with
the first roundtable on December 6 focused on mental health. I'm
pleased to see NTSB taking a leadership role here, particularly after
two recent incidents that raise questions about whether we are doing
enough to support pilot mental health.
In the Senate FAA bill, we included Section 509 to establish an
aviation medical modernization working group that would issue
recommendations relating to FAA's special medical issuance backlog,
updates to FAA's testing rules for mental health conditions, and the
modernization of FAA's approach to approving medications to treat
conditions such as depression and anxiety.
Question 1. Do you believe FAA is committing adequate resources to
evaluate and modernize its response to pilot mental health conditions?
Do you believe bringing together medical professionals via the aviation
medical modernization working group established in section 509 of our
bill is a step in the right direction?
Answer. The FAA, like all agencies, is working with a constrained
budget. I testified before the committee that the FAA needs more
resources so it can dedicate appropriate resources to safety
priorities. The Office of Aerospace Medicine is no different. Until
2019, the FAA had just one chief psychiatrist performing specialty
review; as of 2023 a fourth staff psychiatrist has been added, along
with one staff neuropsychologist. The need for the FAA's 2023 actions
was reinforced by panelists participating in our recent December 6th
roundtable as was the need for the FAA to more effectively and
efficiently review deferrals. As noted by the May 2023 DOT OIG report,
structural problems, the cultural stigma, or the fear of being grounded
cause pilots to underreport their mental health care or to avoid
seeking care in the first place, which is a transportation safety
risk.\1\
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\1\ Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General
Report (AV2023038), ``FAA Conducts Comprehensive Evaluations of Pilots
With Mental Health Challenges, but Opportunities Exist to Further
Mitigate Safety Risks.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, in my opinion, some necessary changes to the FAA's mental
health approach should require little study and should be implemented
without delay. Consistent with the DOT IG's findings, the longer-term
questions about mental health in the aviation industry could certainly
benefit from a working group. Participants in our roundtable indicated
that they have been subject to disincentives for reporting or seeking
care for treatable mental health conditions. I believe the FAA can and
should adapt and clarify its processes to empower pilots and air
traffic controllers to confidently seek mental health care that will
improve their personal wellbeing and enhance public safety.
Question 2. Should we be concerned that, as some have alleged, the
current special medical issuance backlog and time it takes for FAA to
evaluate and issue decisions relating to pilot medical conditions
dissuades pilots from being forthcoming about their medical history and
mental health? What more could FAA be doing to address this issue?
Answer. Consistent with the OIG report, I believe that pilots are
dissuaded from being forthcoming about their mental health history and
struggles. Pilots and members of our ATC workforce, too, are suffering
in silence. The FAA could benefit from increased resources to work
through its backlog and to build out an infrastructure that can
effectively handle increased reporting while keeping deferred
applicants informed. Continued FAA review of its mental health special
issuance standards (including list of approved antidepressants) will
also be important.
At our December 6 mental health summit, we heard from aviation
professionals frustrated not only by the system's slow pace, but also
by its limited transparency. A professional awaiting FAA review of a
deferred medical application is facing uncertainty about career,
livelihood, security, and identity. People in this position want to
know where in the process they stand, why, and about how long they
should expect to wait. Approaches should be considered, too, that
categorically remove certain cases from the deferral backlog and allow
the FAA to focus resources on serious mental health concerns rather
than requiring professionals with mild symptoms to undergo
disproportionately burdensome review processes. At the same time, an
appropriate level of oversight is necessary to identify and mitigate
risk, and to promote the safety and well-being of aviation
professionals and the flying public. Achieving this balance will
require resources.
At our mental health summit, we heard from experts and aviation
professionals that structured peer support programs have the potential
to serve as a foundational mental health resource in aviation. Airline
pilot peer support programs have found that the great majority of
initial contacts in such programs are resolved without escalation.
However, the vast majority of pilots in the U.S. do not have access to
peer support programs. These include general aviation pilots, pilots
for revenue-generating operations under parts 91 and 135, and many
major commercial airline pilots. This is an equity issue that must be
addressed.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to
Jennifer L. Homendy
Aging Infrastructure Impacting Aviation System
Aviation professionals are only as effective as the infrastructure
and technology they rely on. According to the President's most recent
budget request, the average age of an FAA Air Traffic Control facility
is over 60 years old, and more than half of terminal facilities are
more than 40 years old. These facilities regularly operate with
degraded technology systems, resulting in a lack of accurate wind speed
and direction calculations, the failure of radio frequencies within
congested airspace, and the malfunctioning of runway lights. Many
airports also lack functioning radar systems used to track airborne and
taxiing planes, meaning that some controllers have no visual awareness
of the aircraft they are directing, especially in poor weather
conditions.
In lieu of functioning radar systems in Air Traffic Control
facilities, many controllers are filling the gaps by resorting to using
public flight-tracking websites that aren't approved by the FAA.
Perhaps most alarming are the reports that the FAA lacks the
funding to install runway warning systems to help prevent runway
collisions. Only forty three of the Nation's more than five hundred
airports serving commercial flights have runway collision-avoidance
systems. This is simply not good enough.
Question 1. How can we improve the existing technology and
infrastructure utilized by air traffic controllers and aviation
professionals to reduce potential risk and manage congested airports
and complicated airspace at our Nation's airports?
Answer. Technology and infrastructure improvement begins with
investment. If we want to maintain the international gold standard in
aviation safety, preserve public trust, and continue to support the
growth of the aviation industry, we must invest the resources necessary
to ensure our ATC workforce is fully supported and the technologies our
workforce utilizes are not relics of the past century. Ensuring more
airports have access to life-saving technology is a much-needed step in
this direction.
Safety for Passengers
Investments in technology are necessary to help keep the flying
public safe from preventable accidents. While there hasn't been a fatal
crash involving a major U.S. airline in over a decade, many passengers
are wary of flying amid recent highly-publicized safety incidents.
Question 1. The 2022 holiday travel season was one of the busiest
to date, marked with a slew of flight delays and cancellations amid
pilot and controller workforce shortages--all of which we hope to avoid
this year. Can you discuss why passengers planning to travel this
holiday season should feel safe and confident about their travel plans?
Answer. As I've stated many times, the U.S. aviation system
oversees the safest airspace in the world. Since 2010, our system has
experienced a record level of safety, as the number of deaths
associated with U.S. civil aviation accidents decreased from 541 in
2009 to, according to our preliminary numbers, 357 in 2022--a decrease
of over one-third. Approximately 95 percent of aviation fatalities in
2022 occurred in general aviation accidents, with almost all the
remainder (19 total) in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135
commuter and on-demand operations, which include charters, air taxis,
air tours, and air medical services flights (when a patient or medical
personnel are on board). The runway incursions discussed in my
testimony are serious incidents requiring a serious response from
policymakers and operators within the U.S. aviation system, but we must
be clear that we are talking about an extremely small percentage of
overall airport operations across the country. Flying remains one of
the safest possible forms of transportation for the travelling public,
who are far more likely to be involved in a crash on our roads on the
way to the airport than to be involved in any crash at the airport.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Jennifer L. Homendy
Pilot Mental Health
Question 1. From an overarching perspective, does the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and NTSB have a clear and full
understanding of how deep and pervasive the issues of pilot mental
health and stability are across the aviation industry?
Answer. No. The FAA has information on the number of special
issuances for mental health issues that are processed, but this number
does not include cases where the pilot or controller does not disclose
these problems. Research suggests that there is significant
underreporting of mental health issues by pilots. For example, a 2006
study of toxicological test results among fatally injured pilots found
that only 6 percent had reported their use of detected psychiatric
medications to the FAA (Canfield, et al., 2006).
According to the CDC, about 20 percent of the U.S. population lives
with a mental illness, and about 4 percent have a serious mental
illness. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there were about
91,700 airline pilots, copilots, and flight engineers working in 2022.
If airline pilots were representative of the general population, this
would suggest that about 18,000 are experiencing a mental health
problem, with about 3,700 experiencing a serious one.
Studies of pilots that involve reviews of government databases
suggest pilots experience fewer issues than the general population,
whereas studies involving confidential surveys suggest they may have a
higher prevalence of mental health issues (Ackland, et al., 2022). The
true incidence is unknown. In our December 6, 2023, summit, we heard
from person after person, however, that pilots, student pilots, and
other aviation workers face significant barriers to accessing mental
health care, care that others in high-stress work environments have
access to and care that all people may find useful over their lifetimes
due to any number of normal life circumstances, such as the death of a
loved one or a divorce.
Question 2. Does NTSB believe there are alternative solutions
Congress should consider in addressing and monitoring pilot mental
health?
Answer. The NTSB has not issued recommendations on this topic.
However, there are clearly many informed perspectives from which to
approach this issue. We learned from some of these perspectives during
our December 6, 2023, summit, at which aviation industry professionals,
academics, and other experts shared diverse suggestions in an open
forum. Additionally, we note that consensus recommendations have been
offered by other entities; however, the FAA has failed to implement
many of them and more action is needed. For example, the FAA's Pilot
Fitness Aviation Rulemaking Committee issued several recommendations in
2015, including the following:
The FAA should ensure all Aviation Medical Examiners (AME)
demonstrate knowledge in assessing basic mental health
concerns, and enhance AME training on this topic.
Air carriers should develop effective pilot assistance
programs.
The FAA should encourage air carrier operators to implement
mental health education programs for pilots and supervisors
that improve awareness and recognition of mental health issues,
reduce stigmas, and promote available resources to assist with
resolving mental health problems.
The FAA should assemble and disseminate information on
benchmark pilot support programs, which includes pilot
assistance programs, to serve as a resource for air carriers to
develop new or improve existing programs.
Encourage advocacy for a uniform national policy on
mandatory reporting of medical issues that affect public
safety.
The Aerospace Medical Association's Mental Health Working Group
issued a number of recommendations in 2021, urging the FAA to promote a
culture of reporting while striving to maintain safeguards for
individual privacy. The group also offered the following additional,
specific recommendations:
A regulatory framework that incorporates health promotion
(wellbeing) and pathways to recovery.
Regulators should facilitate the development of a ``safe
harbor'' for disclosing mental problems and receiving
treatment.
Blanket mandatory reporting of all pilots with mental health
problems to the aeromedical authorities should not be
encouraged, as it will likely deter people from seeking help.
(7-17)
Regulators, operators, and industrial groups should explore
ways of minimizing the risk of income loss due to mental
illness. Suitable insurance should be mandated.
Question 3. Does FAA's existing pilot medical programs help
encourage or discourage pilots from speaking out on their mental well-
being?
Answer. There is a high rate of nondisclosure of mental health
issues among participants in the FAA's existing pilot medical programs.
The reasons for this include social stigma and concerns about removal
from flying status, loss of income, and loss of livelihood. Any effort
to improve the rate of self-disclosure would need to address these
inhibiting factors while also ensuring safety.
Drug Testing
Question 4. Current FAA regulations require airlines to randomly
drug test between 20 and 25 percent of their pilot workforce each year.
In your view, what changes to current drug testing requirements are
needed?
Answer. Our investigations to date have not yet identified
necessary revisions to airline pilot drug-testing requirements.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Ted Budd to
Jennifer L. Homendy
Question. In addition to investigating aviation accidents, the NTSB
also plays an important role in adjudicating enforcement actions that
the FAA brings. Chair Homendy, do you believe it is important for NTSB
to be a neutral and impartial decisionmaker in these proceedings?
Answer. The NTSB and our Office of Administrative Law Judges are
critical parts of the airmen appeals process to ensure that the FAA's
aviation enforcement actions are lawful and factually justified. The
overall fairness of those proceedings hinges on our objectivity, which
is an adjudicative cornerstone we hold in the highest regard. Supreme
Court precedent provides for appropriate deference to rulemaking
agencies for determining sanctions, and we do believe it is important
for the NTSB to have the ability to consider the reasonableness of such
actions, as justice demands, relative to the particular facts and
circumstances presented by each case.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Timothy L. Arel
Improve Controller Training
According to a June 2023 DOT OIG report, the average time to train
fully certified controllers has increased since the halt in controller
training caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The same report verified that
today, it can take more than three years to train a controller. FAA
must invest more in making advanced technologies available to help
address the controller training backlog. For example, Tower Simulation
Systems (TSS) are identical computerized simulations of tower
environments that enable controllers to train on air traffic skills
such as enforcing safe runway occupancy, spacing, and sequencing
requirements for aircraft. According to the FAA, controllers at FAA's
operational facilities only have access to 57 ``fixed'' TSS at major
airports and 50 ``mobile'' units in comparison to the 185 total FAA-
operated towers across the system. The Senate FAA bill (Section 530)
would increase access to Tower Simulation Systems nationwide to
facilitate quality on-the-job training and help accelerate the time it
takes for controllers to become fully certified.
Question 1. Would you agree that Tower Simulation Systems improve
controller training? How are they used to help controllers understand
and mitigate operational risks?
Answer. The Tower Simulation System (TSS) enhances controller
training. The TSS is a full-scale tower simulator that provides an
interactive, highly realistic environment for controllers to learn,
practice, and perfect skills. The voice recognition feature allows
trainees to practice air traffic procedures as if they were speaking
directly to aircrew. The recorded playback feature allows instructors
to review and evaluate performance in the moment, providing trainees
with immediate feedback. High fidelity training scenarios allow
trainees to practice and perfect numerous air traffic procedures in a
safe environment before the trainee is certified and transitions to the
air traffic control tower. Additionally, the TSS offers refresher
training which allows certified controllers to increase proficiency and
promote behaviors essential for the identification, mitigation and/or
management of safety-of-flight risks.
Question 2. Do you believe increasing investments in making Tower
Simulation Systems available will increase safety in the National
Airspace System?
Answer. Yes. According to a 2021 study by Ernst and Young, the TSS
reduces time to certification by 27 percent, which contributes to an
increased throughput of new hire controllers and addresses staffing
shortages that potentially introduce risk to the NAS. It also enables
certified air traffic controllers the opportunity to practice safety
procedures in a simulator.
Question 3. Moving forward, what is FAA's plan to increase
installations of and controller access to this technology?
Answer. The FAA is committed to achieving its air traffic
controller hiring goals, and continued investment in the TSS plays a
key role. Over the next five years, the FAA will plan and execute an
increase to the footprint of the TSS program with the procurement of
additional systems to ensure each air traffic control facility is
equipped with a training simulation system.
Airport Surface Surveillance Technology
In response to the near-misses we have witnessed recently, NTSB has
called for expanding the use of surface situational awareness
technologies--such as Airport Surface Detection Systems (ASDE-X) and
Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC). These technologies help
air traffic controllers track the movement of aircraft and vehicles on
the runway to avoid potential conflicts, and also alert controllers
when a plane is lining up on the wrong runway or taxiway. This
technology has been successfully deployed at Sea-Tac Airport in
Washington state. Since it was implemented there in 2018, on at least
fifty (50) occasions it has prevented pilots from mistakenly landing in
the wrong place. We need this technology at more airports.
FAA Clarification: ASDE Taxiway Arrival Prediction (ATAP) is a
capability that has been deployed in all 44 ASDE-X and ASSC systems. It
alerts an aircraft lining up on a closed runway or taxiway. It does not
alert for an aircraft lining up on the wrong runway. ATAP is credited
with one save at Seattle, and at least 75 saves across all 44 airports
with ASSC or ASDE-X.
Question 1. The Senate FAA bill would increase funding to $18.2
billion over five years for FAA's Facilities & Equipment (``F & E'')
account--a $600 million increase over authorized funding levels in the
2018 bill--that funds capital investments related to airport safety
infrastructure. Do you believe increased funding for the F & E account
can be helpful in upgrading and replacing aging surface situational
awareness technologies? If so, why?
Answer. Long-term, stable, and sufficient funding for the agency's
capital needs will allow the agency to modernize the most complex
airspace in the world. Additional funding for the F&E account would be
critical in upgrading multiple technologies, including upgrading, and
replacing aging surface situational awareness technologies.
Question 2. The FAA has only deployed existing surface situational
awareness technologies at 44 airports. What is FAA doing to improve
runway safety at airports without surface surveillance capabilities? Do
you agree that legislation pushing for increase safety technology and
resources, like found in the Senate FAA bill, will help?
Answer. The FAA is focusing on deploying technologies that are
agile, efficient, and cost-effective in providing surface situational
awareness solutions across our airspace. The three technologies that
make up the Surface Safety Portfolio will enhance surface situational
awareness for controllers. These technologies are the Approach Runway
Verification (ARV), Runway Incursion Device (RID), and the Surface
Awareness Initiative (SAI). All of these technologies are planned for
deployment and installation at airports in 2024.
ARV alerts air traffic when an approaching aircraft is lined
up with the wrong airport surface. ARV completed key site
verification in September 2023.
RID is a memory aid for controllers to provide additional
situational awareness of occupied or closed runways. RID
provides an audible and visual alert to controllers when a
runway is not available for departing or landing aircraft.
SAI uses commercially available technologies that display
airport surface traffic to controllers in towers for airports
that do not currently have a surface surveillance.
Additionally, the FAA works collaboratively across the agency and
with industry to identify and address the root causes of identified
surface safety issues and mitigate associated safety risk at specific
facilities. The data may lead to the identification of a surface safety
``Hot Spot'' or recurring issue. Hot Spots are quickly mitigated by
developing and disseminating communications to stakeholders,
development of From the Flight Deck videos, Pilot Handbooks, and
Arrival Alert Notices. These communications support awareness of the
root causes of surface incidents at airports by all parties, and
thereby improve surface safety. Other mitigations could include
improved airport signage and markings, plans for runway and taxiway re-
design, changes to procedures and phraseology, as well as pilot and
controller forums and outreach.
Runway Safety Action Team (RSAT) meetings are required at each
facility at a minimum of once per year. These meetings are designed to
bring local stakeholders together to discuss current surface safety
issues at the airport and to identify action items for future
mitigations. RSAT meetings focus on surface Hot Spots, active and
upcoming construction projects, possible wrong surface risk, and
discussion on recent events that have occurred on the airport. These
discussions provide an opportunity for all parties to learn from the
event to prevent future occurrences. In FY2023, all 267 FAA and all 253
FAA Contract Tower facilities completed their required annual RSAT
meetings.
In addition, Surface Safety outreach programs include monthly
meetings with controllers, pilot groups and airport operators, pilot
controller forums, and monthly e-mail outreach on upcoming projects and
hot topics. These programs have contributed to surface event reductions
and runway safety improvements through heightened awareness. Facilities
with active outreach activities have shown marked reductions in runway
incursions.
The FAA established the Runway Incursion Mitigation (RIM) program
in 2015. This program identifies airport locations with a history of
runway incursions. These locations then become a priority for the FAA
and industry to implement mitigations. Since 2015, 75 of these
locations at airports with no ground surveillance have implemented
mitigations, with an average runway incursion reduction of
approximately 75 percent.
Question 3. The FAA is partnering with the private industry in
developing low-cost alternatives to ASDE-X and ASSC that can be viable
options for airports without existing surface surveillance
capabilities. What is the status of these newer, successor technologies
and when should we expect widespread distribution of surface
situational awareness technologies across the NAS?
Answer. As stated above, the FAA is focusing on deploying
technologies that are agile, efficient, and cost-effective in providing
surface situational awareness solutions across our airspace to provide
widespread distribution. The three technologies that make up the
Surface Safety Portfolio will enhance surface situational awareness for
controllers. These technologies are the Approach Runway Verification
(ARV), Runway Incursion Device (RID), and the Surface Awareness
Initiative (SAI). All of these technologies are planned for deployment
and installation at airports in 2024.
ARV alerts air traffic when an approaching aircraft is lined
up with the wrong airport surface. ARV completed key site
verification in September 2023.
RID is a memory aid for controllers to provide additional
situational awareness of occupied or closed runways. RID
provides an audible and visual alert to controllers when a
runway is not available for departing or landing aircraft. SAI
uses commercially available technologies that display airport
surface traffic to controllers in towers for airports that do
not currently have a surface surveillance.
For SAI, the FAA throughout 2023 has had multiple
engagements with industry to conduct market research on
available technologies that can address the need to proliferate
surface awareness technologies throughout the NAS.
Many of these technologies are used today by airlines and airport
operators providing airport ramp surveillance information. The FAA
intends to initially deploy these solutions in June 2024 with a more
widespread rollout to follow.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to
Timothy L. Arel
Airport Surface Detection System
The Airport Surface Detection System, which dates to the 1990s, has
become a critical surface situational awareness tool for ATC, and we
have a 23-year old NTSB recommendation describing why the technology
should be installed airports across the country.
Unfortunately, both Congress and the aviation industry have fallen
short over many decades in providing the level of investment that would
enable FAA to ensure its controllers working at airports, such as
Austin-Bergstrom, have the benefit of this additional layer of defense.
Question 1. Given the current budget environment and lack of
funding for this critical technology, what can we do over the next year
to improve safety and deploy critical aviation technologies in a manner
that prioritizes the most high-risk locations for initial installation?
Answer. The FAA is focusing on deploying technologies that are
agile, efficient, and cost-effective in providing surface situational
awareness solutions across our airspace. The three technologies that
make up the Surface Safety Portfolio will enhance surface situational
awareness for controllers. These technologies are the Approach Runway
Verification (ARV), Runway Incursion Device (RID), and the Surface
Awareness Initiative (SAI). All of these technologies are planned for
deployment and installation at airports in 2024.
ARV alerts air traffic when an approaching aircraft is lined
up with the wrong airport surface. ARV completed key site
verification in September.
RID is a memory aid for controllers to provide additional
situational awareness of occupied or closed runways. RID
provides an audible and visual alert to controllers when a
runway is not available for departing or landing aircraft.
SAI uses commercially available technologies that display
airport surface traffic to controllers in towers for airports
that do not currently have a surface surveillance.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to
Timothy L. Arel
Aging Infrastructure Impacting Aviation System
Aviation professionals are only as effective as the infrastructure
and technology they rely on. According to the President's most recent
budget request, the average age of an FAA Air Traffic Control facility
is over 60 years old, and more than half of terminal facilities are
more than 40 years old. These facilities regularly operate with
degraded technology systems, resulting in a lack of accurate wind speed
and direction calculations, the failure of radio frequencies within
congested airspace, and the malfunctioning of runway lights. Many
airports also lack functioning radar systems used to track airborne and
taxiing planes, meaning that some controllers have no visual awareness
of the aircraft they are directing, especially in poor weather
conditions.
In lieu of functioning radar systems in Air Traffic Control
facilities, many controllers are filling the gaps by resorting to using
public flight-tracking websites that aren't approved by the FAA.
Perhaps most alarming are the reports that the FAA lacks the
funding to install runway warning systems to help prevent runway
collisions. Only forty-three of the Nation's more than five hundred
airports serving commercial flights have runway collision-avoidance
systems. This is simply not good enough.
Question 1. How can we improve the existing technology and
infrastructure utilized by air traffic controllers and aviation
professionals to reduce potential risk and manage congested airports
and complicated airspace at our Nation's airports?
Answer. With respect to deployment of additional tools and
technology to improve surface surveillance at additional airports
across the National Airspace System, the FAA is focusing on deploying
technologies that are agile, efficient, and cost-effective in providing
surface situational awareness solutions across our airspace. The three
technologies that make up the Surface Safety Portfolio will enhance
surface situational awareness for controllers. These technologies are
the Approach Runway Verification (ARV), Runway Incursion Device (RID),
and the Surface Awareness Initiative (SAI). All of these technologies
are planned for deployment and installation at airports in 2024.
ARV alerts air traffic when an approaching aircraft is lined
up with the wrong airport surface. ARV completed key site
verification in September.
RID is a memory aid for controllers to provide additional
situational awareness of occupied or closed runways. RID
provides an audible and visual alert to controllers when a
runway is not available for departing or landing aircraft.
SAI uses commercially available technologies that display
airport surface traffic to controllers in towers for airports
that do not currently have a surface surveillance.
Long-term, stable, and sufficient funding for the agency's capital
needs will allow the agency to modernize the most complex airspace in
the world.
Safety for Passengers
Investments in technology are necessary to help keep the flying
public safe from preventable accidents. While there hasn't been a fatal
crash involving a major U.S. airline in over a decade, many passengers
are wary of flying amid recent highly publicized safety incidents.
Question 1. The 2022 holiday travel season was one of the busiest
to date, marked with a slew of flight delays and cancellations amid
pilot and controller workforce shortages--all of which we hope to avoid
this year. Can you discuss why passengers planning to travel this
holiday season should feel safe and confident about their travel plans?
Answer. The U.S. aviation system is the safest in the world. There
has not been a fatal crash involving a major U.S. airline since 2009.
The FAA has multiple layers of safety that protect the traveling public
from the time they board an aircraft to the time they deplane.
During the 2023 Thanksgiving holiday travel season traffic was up
more than 4 percent over 2022 and delays were down 12 percent. Only 1.5
percent of the 350,000 flights were canceled. The FAA implemented a
Holiday Airspace Release Program (HARP), route structure and traffic
management initiatives to manage the increased volume and complexity.
Question 2. In addition to ensuring the safety of passengers, what
changes if any has the FAA implemented to ensure the reliability of
flight schedules during this upcoming holiday season?
Answer. The FAA and the Department of Defense (DOD) expanded the
airspace included in the Holiday Airspace Release Program (HARP). HARP
allows civil flights to access airspace typically reserved for military
use. This year's route expansion allows for the release of an
additional 22 pieces of airspace on the Eastern Seaboard on
Thanksgiving, Christmas, MLK and President's Day holidays as well as
the preceding weekends. DOD and FAA are in discussions to streamline
coordination timeframes for HARP for more dynamic scheduling of
airspace (altitudes and timing of use) and to allow for more
flexibility for civil and DOD scheduling needs.
The Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC) has added
regional planning discussions to its daily planning cadence. The ATCSCC
runs telcons with air traffic control facilities, airlines, and other
flight operators every two hours to coordinate management of the
National Airspace System (NAS). The regional planning discussions have
improved the situational awareness for areas that may see more
impactful constraints such as weather and volume, provided industry
with early notice about potential delays and traffic management
initiatives, and allowed airlines to make informed decisions about
their operations to adjust timing or routing of flights as needed.
Collaboration between National Weather Service (NWS), Center
Weather Service Units (CWSU) and airline meteorological services has
improved with the implementation of the new NWS weather group chat 2.0
feature. The chat feature provides the teams with the ability to
discuss potential differences in weather forecasting to make FAA and
industry planning processes more predictable, and therefore improve
operational outcomes. It assists with strategizing and implementing
appropriate mitigations to weather constraints.
The addition of newly FAA-created ``escape routes'' for Central
Florida has improved flexibility for airlines to fly lower altitude
routes to mitigate lengthy departure delays that often happen during
Florida's thunderstorm season. Jacksonville Center (ZJX) has developed
a capping and tunneling strategy that has shown improved capabilities
during high volume events that allow for flights to transition ZJX at
mid-level altitudes and climb to higher altitudes once beyond impacted
airspace. These routes, as well as improvements and modification to
existing Northeast corridor escape routes, continue to provide added
options to industry and facilities to alleviate potential airport
surface congestion during severe weather and high-volume events.
The ATCSCC continues to work with facilities and airline partners
to adjust Ground Delay Program (GDP) and Airspace Flow Program (AFP)
parameters to utilize shorter duration and focus on timely exit
strategies. This allows for fewer delays and less canceled flights for
industry. This in conjunction with development and utilization of
Integrated Departure Arrival Capability (IDAC) has improved flow
concerns out of south Florida onto the Atlantic Routes (ARs) northbound
and across the Gulf westbound.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to
Timothy L. Arel
Terminal Flight Data Manager
At many airports across the country, air traffic controllers still
rely on paper flight strips to keep track of flights.\1\ The Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) Terminal Flight Data Manager (TFDM) is
a NextGen system designed to improve the management of airport surface
traffic, including aircraft departures, by replacing paper flight
strips with an automated electronic system.\2\ In 2018, the FAA
anticipated that implementation of TFDM would be complete at 89
airports by 2028.\3\ According to a 2023 Government Accountability
Office report, the FAA has fallen short of its TFDM implementation
goals and has responded by revising its projected completion date to
2030 and decreasing the number of airports designated to receive this
technology from 89 to 49.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/technology/tfdm/efs
\2\ https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105254 at 12.
\3\ https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105254 at 12.
\4\ https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105254 at 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport in Savannah,
Georgia, is one of the 40 airports that were removed from the FAA's
TFDM implementation list.\5\ On November 1, 2023, the Department of
Transportation (DOT) Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported that
delays in the deployment of TFDM and the NextGen Air Transportation
System are some of the Department's top management challenges for
Fiscal Year 2024.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ https://tfmlearning.faa.gov/assets/media/CDM/CDM_2022/
TFDM_CDM_General_Session
.pdf.
\6\ https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/39685 at 10.
Question 1. Does TFDM reduce operational safety risk at airports?
Answer. TFDM provides capabilities that will reduce operational
safety risk compared to the paper flight strip environment today:
Ability to electronically toggle a runway as open/closed,
automatic notification to controllers of closed runways, and
marking of all affected electronic flight strips.
Safety logic to prevent the progression of an electronic
flight strip into the next logical action if that action places
the flight on a closed runway.
Automatic marking of electronic flight strips when data
changes, and inclusion of additional data elements not
available with paper flight strips.
Automatic generation and display of runway placards that
indicate closed runways and other memory joggers.
These enhancements improve controller situational awareness and
help identify potentially hazardous situations on the surface.
Question 2. What must the FAA do to address the issues raised in
the DOT Inspector General report?
Answer. The DOT OIG report focused on challenges related to
pandemic impacts on the program. TFDM's primary issue was the inability
for the team to travel and access the air traffic facilities to
implement TFDM systems into the field. These restrictions drove a
significant delay in the TFDM deployment schedule, resulting in cost
growth. Facility access and travel are no longer a challenge for the
program. The FAA addressed the cost growth due to these delays by
reducing the waterfall from 89 sites to 49 sites.
Question 3. Why was Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport
removed from the FAA's list of airports scheduled to receive TFDM
technology?
Answer. In reducing the 40 sites from the TFDM strategic plan due
to COVID pandemic cost impacts, the FAA considered the current
implementation status (sites currently being deployed), the expected
benefits of TFDM deployment at each site, and the number of operations
at the facility to determine the sites that would remain on the TFDM
deployment waterfall. Based on this criteria, Savannah/Hilton Head
International Airport was removed from the TFDM waterfall.
Facility Staffing Timeline
On November 1, 2023, DOT OIG released its audit of DOT's top
management challenges for Fiscal Year 2024.\7\ The report identified
inadequate air traffic controller staffing at critical facilities as
one of the main potential causes of flight delays and cancellations.\8\
According to the report, 20 of the FAA's 26 most critical facilities
were staffed below the agency's 85 percent threshold as of March
2022.\9\ Moreover, staffing challenges and pauses in air traffic
controller training during the pandemic have resulted in increased
certification timelines for controllers.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Id.
\8\ Id. at 9.
\9\ Id. at 9.
\10\ Id. at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 1. What is the FAA doing to address this challenge?
Answer. We are getting healthier every year and making steady
progress back to where we were before COVID. This is a process that
takes time to ensure appropriate levels of training and we are
committed to it.
In 2022, the FAA established the Air Traffic Controller (ATC)
Certification Training Process Initiative to address overall attrition.
This initiative focuses on increasing the ATC hiring pipeline,
improving Academy execution, and increasing the number of certified
professional controllers. With a focus on these three areas, the FAA
intends to streamline the path to certification and outpace attrition.
The Initiative played a key role in FAA exceeding its aggressive FY2023
hiring goal of 1,500.
In addition to the fully certified controllers in our workforce,
there are currently more than 2,700 trainees seeking full certification
at 313 air traffic control facilities. Out of the 2,700 trainees, 1,500
plus are certified on one or more position within their respective
facility and required to maintain currency on those positions.
Because these trainees can staff positions they are certified on,
some facilities experience less significant staffing shortages. The
presence of previously certified controllers, particularly CPC-ITs,
helps alleviate staffing shortages at some facilities as they progress
toward full certification.
The FAA is also investing in the modernization of the Tower
Simulation System (TSS), which is proven to reduce time to
certification by 27 percent for new hires and 21 percent for Certified
Professional Controllers in Training (CPC-ITs). The upgrade of the TSSs
will contribute immensely to the ongoing effort to address staffing
shortages.
Question 2. Under current FAA hiring practices, how long will it
take the FAA to fully staff all air traffic facilities with the needed
number of fully certified controllers?
Answer. Based on hiring plans put forth in the 2023 Controller
Workforce Plan, the FAA will have the number of fully certified
controllers required to fully staff all air traffic control facilities
between 2027-2032. Through increased hiring and training, FAA is
looking for opportunities to increase the number of certified
controllers beyond current projections over the next five years.
Question 3. Under current hiring practices, how long will it take
to lift the capacity restrictions caused by controller staffing
shortages?
Answer. The FAA has an aggressive hiring plan in place. In unusual
cases where staffing has not been able to outpace attrition and
impacted throughput, we have found it necessary to consider other means
to address staffing issues, such as slot waivers at New York TRACON, or
transferring responsibility for a number of airspace sectors to another
adjacent facility.
Data Communications
In the 2018-2019 NextGen Implementation Plan, the FAA outlined a
plan to implement the Data Communications system, which would enable
air traffic controllers to send more reliable, pre-scripted text-based
messages with departure clearance instructions and reroutes directly to
pilots, reducing the potential for miscommunications.\11\ The FAA
reached its implementation milestone for deploying the system at
airport towers, reaching 65 airport towers by July 2022. However, the
FAA missed its target for implementation at en route centers, reaching
only 12 of 20 centers by September 2023. More airports have requested
Data Communications capabilities for their towers, but the FAA has
stated that it does not plan to expand capabilities to smaller
airports.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-06/
NextGen_Implementation_Plan_2018-19%
20%281%29.pdf at 12-16.
\12\ https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105254 at 16.
Question 1. Does the FAA have plans to bring Data Communications
capabilities to smaller, regional airports? If not, why?
Answer. Bringing Data Comm capabilities to smaller regional
airports is not currently planned. There is no business case nor the
infrastructure to support the capability at smaller airports and many
of the aircraft that use these small airports are not equipped with
Data Comm capabilities.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Timothy L. Arel
ATC Delays
According to Airlines for America,\1\ the overall direct/indirect
cost of flight delays and cancellations in the National Airspace System
(NAS) was $28 billion in 2018. Those costs have increased significantly
since then. In New York, air traffic control (ATC) staff shortages have
resulted in tens of thousands of delays and cancellations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``U.S. Passenger Carrier Delay Costs.'' Airlines for America.
May 24, 2023. Available at https://www.airlines.org/dataset/u-s-
passenger-carrier-delay-costs/#: :text=In%202022%2C%
20the%20average%20cost,%percent20to%20%2442.15%20per%20minute.
Question 1. From 2018--present, how many passenger delay minutes
have been caused by short-staffing at N90? Please break down by
calendar year.
Answer. The table below contains the delay minutes attributed to
N90 staffing over the past six calendar years. The figures for 2023 are
through Nov. 28. These delay minutes are from OPSNET, a system that
captures reportable delay for the FAA. OPSNET reflects aircraft delays
when under FAA control. It should be noted that OPSNET does not permit
a facility to record secondary causes even though there are often
multiple causal factors. Note that in 2022, as flights in the NY area
began to approach pre-COVID levels, traffic management initiatives were
needed to allow the available controllers to safely manage the traffic,
resulting in delays even on days when weather was not a significant
factor.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Delay Minutes Caused by N90
Year Short Staffing
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2018 -
2019 948
2020 -
2021 437
2022 19,998
2023 178
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2. When tens of thousands of consumers are either
inconvenienced or stranded because of a government failure, who bears
the cost?
Answer. The FAA's mission is to provide the safest and most
efficient aerospace system in the world. When circumstances require it,
the FAA does place a higher priority on the safety of the traveling
public than the capacity at a particular airport or region.
Nevertheless, we continue to seek improvement in our performance, and
we look forward to working with Congress to address the causes of
flight delays.
Question 3. Does the government write each disrupted passenger a
check or are airlines ultimately held liable for the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) failure to staff and operate the NAS?
Answer. Airlines are not held responsible for compensating
passengers or providing services such as meals or hotels for
cancellations or delays caused by weather or management of the national
airspace system.
Question 4. What percentage of delays across the NAS originate in
the New York area?
Answer. A 2012 study by MITRE found that one third of U.S. flights
are directly impacted by delays in New York and Philadelphia. An update
to the study would be needed to narrow this finding down to New York
only.
Question 5. When delays are due to government shortcomings, are
these statistics made public in a transparent way?
Answer. The FAA and the Air Traffic Organization strive to be
transparent in how we carry out our mission. In support of that
transparency, we maintain a public facing website that provides
continuous real time flight delay information at: https://
www.fly.faa.gov/flyfaa/usmap.jsp?legacy=true.
The Department of Transportation issues a monthly consumer report
that details various causes of flight delays. The report can be found
here: https://www.trans
portation.gov/individuals/aviation-consumer-protection/air-travel-
consumer-reports.
N90
The New York Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility (N90 TRACON)
has been chronically understaffed for decades. Congress has on multiple
occasions directed the FAA to reexamine or reorganize the airspace
managed by N90. The FAA, to its credit, has attempted to execute
reorganization plans only to be stymied by political pressure. Earlier
this year, the FAA reduced the volume of flights into and out of the
New York area and cited staffing at N90 as a reason. Shortly after
announcing the volume reduction, the FAA put the planned transfer of
New Jersey airspace to the Philadelphia TRACON on ``pause'' until the
end of the year.
Question 1. How many Certified Professional Controller (CPC) and
Certified Professional Controllers-In Training (CPC-IT) were assigned
to N90 at the following periods of this year (please quantify by CPC
and CPC-IT separately):
a. January 1, 2023
Answer. CPC 123, Trainees 54
b. March 22, 2023
Answer. CPC 129, Trainees 67
c. May 15, 2023
Answer. CPC 127, Trainees 70
d. August 8, 2023
Answer. CPC 129, Trainees 69
e. September 15, 2023
Answer. CPC 130, Trainees 66
f. November 5, 2023
Answer. CPC 132, Trainees 72
Question 2. In the March notice announcing the waivers, the FAA
stated, ``Dedicated training initiatives have been successful in
reducing most of the training backlog with the exception of N90.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Federal Register Notice of Limited Waiver of Slot Usage
Requirement for Summer 2023.'' Federal Aviation Administration. March
22, 2023. Available at https://www.faa.gov/general/federal-register-
notice-limited-waiver-slot-usage-requirement-summer-2023.
a. What training initiatives were successful at locations other
than N90?
Answer. FAA's Technical Training Organization (AJI) uses standard
and innovative processes to meet the evolving training needs of the Air
Traffic Organization. For example, AJI established a Regional Graduate
Training initiative to address a training backlog at the FAA Academy
and select field facilities due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Under this
initiative, AJI initially established three satellite training
locations in the NAS: Phoenix, San Diego, and Chicago, to resume
Terminal RADAR (RTF) and TRACON Skill Enhancement Workshops (TSEW)
training. This initiative has been a success and has demonstrated the
possibility of alleviating training throughput pressure not only at the
Academy in Oklahoma City, but at other field facilities as well.
b. What training initiatives were not successful in training more
controllers or improving retention at N90?
Answer. The FAA has employed a number of initiatives over the last
several years to attract and retain controllers at N90. This includes
controller incentive pay (CIP), targeted hiring from the local area,
and priority placement for controllers not currently at N90 who ask to
be transferred there. The list below highlights some of the key
incentives the FAA has offered.
FEB 2014, Return Rights and Priority Release--148 CPC and 31
Trainees
MAR 2016, Return Rights and Priority Release--140 CPC and 40
Trainees
JUL 2016, Training Incentive (additional 15 percent for On-
the-Job Training and $3,000 lump sum to all CPC in area when
trainee achieves CPC level 3 certification)--132 CPC and 37
Trainees
JUL 2017, Training Incentive (extended from 2016) and Annual
Leave Buy Back--132 CPC and 21 Trainees
AUG 2017, Enhanced CIP and Return Rights--133 CPC and 16
Trainees
MAR 2018, New York Local Hiring Law--131 CPC and 23 Trainees
APR 2018, No-experience Direct Hire Initial Screen--131 CPC
and 26 Trainees
MAY 2018, Ten Eleven Twelve Radar Assessment (TETRA)--130
CPC and 30 Trainees
JUN 2018, Annual Leave Buy Back--128 CPC and 30 Trainees
Question 3. In postponing the planned transfer of airspace to
Philadelphia, the FAA and the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association have claimed the performance of N90 has improved. What
metrics did the FAA set for performance that N90 has met?
Answer. FAA and NATCA agreed earlier this spring to monitor the
performance of the facility over several months and then manage the
airspace appropriately. The agency appreciates the benefit of that
additional time and data and is now collaborating with NATCA on next
steps and will keep the Committee up to date in the coming weeks.
Question 4. How many times did the FAA order volume reductions at
John F. Kennedy International Airport, LaGuardia International Airport,
or Newark International Airport because of controller staffing issues?
Please provide the number of volume reductions for each airport for
calendar year 2023.
Answer. The FAA acted preemptively to reduce volume in the New York
airspace by offering slot usage relief at the New York airports and
encouraging voluntary participation by the airlines. The result was a
hand-back of approximately 6 percent of the New York airport slots by
the airlines for the summer 2023 scheduling season which significantly
contributed to a reduction in delays in the area. Modeling shows that
had these reductions not taken place, delays would have been 31 percent
higher in the NY area.
The FAA has also offered a 10 percent slot usage waiver for the NY
airports during the winter 2023/2024 and summer 2024 scheduling
seasons.
The FAA's primary way to reduce volume at an airport is through
traffic management initiatives such as a ground stop (GS) or ground
delay program (GDP). While the FAA utilized these initiatives many
times over the course of the year at the New York area airports, no GS/
GDPs were attributed to staffing. Notwithstanding the lack of evident
data, staffing shortages do cause a reduction in capacity and if they
occur at the same time as a weather-or volume-related program, they
will be a significant contributory factor for delays in the New York
market.
The Traffic Flow Management System (TFMS) which implements these
programs, does not permit a facility to record secondary causes. In the
event that there is heavy weather, high volume and a staffing shortage,
weather is usually chosen as the prevailing condition.
Question 5. How much longer have weather-related ground-stops
lasted at New York area airports because of ATC staffing?
Answer. If there were staffing shortages causing reduced capacity
at the time of weather-related traffic management initiatives, the
duration of those initiatives would have been extended. However, the
FAA is unable to determine how much additional time weather-related
GDPs and GSs have run as a result of short staffing.
Question 6. What long-term solutions are under consideration for
N90?
Answer. The FAA is considering transferring the N90s Newark (EWR)
air space management to Philadelphia Tower/TRACON (PHL).
Question 7. How much money was spent to renovate the Philadelphia
TRACON in anticipation of it receiving responsibility for New Jersey
airspace?
Answer. The FAA spent $15 million on renovating the PHL TRACON to
accommodate a possible move of EWR air space.
Deploying Runway Technologies
Question 1. Can you clarify the distinction and capabilities
between ASDE-X runway lighting technology, and ADS-B mandated equipage
for aircraft flying in and out of airports?
Answer. Airport Surface Detection Equipment--model X (ASDE-X) and
Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) provide airport surface
event information to air traffic controllers to enhance their
situational awareness. This includes a display of aircraft on the
airport surface and alerting if a conflict is projected to occur.
Runway Status Lights (RWSL) are embedded in the pavement and inform
pilots when it is unsafe to enter, cross, or depart from a runway. RWSL
uses the position information of aircraft and vehicles obtained from
the ASDE-X and ASSC systems to automatically illuminate and extinguish
lights.
All ASDE-X and ASSC airports are within Class B and Class C
airspace, which require ADS-B equipage per FAR 91.225. ADS-B is one of
several surveillance sources that are provided to the ASDE-X and ASSC
systems. ADS-B uses satellite position services to track aircraft and
vehicles more accurately. The increased accuracy of ADS-B surveillance
provides measurable benefits to operators, air traffic controllers, and
the flying public by enhancing the situational awareness, safety, and
efficiency at these facilities.
Question 2. Which surface surveillance technology is proven to be
most beneficial to preventing aviation near miss incursions, accidents,
and incidents?
Answer. The FAA currently has surface surveillance at 44 airports
which include Airport Surface Detection Equipment--model X (ASDE-X) and
Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC). These two systems have
been instrumental in reducing risk on the surface by alerting
controllers to potential collisions.
All surface surveillance technologies contribute to provide safety
improvement benefit both in the airport traffic control tower and in
the cockpit. The FAA is exploring technologies that can be deployed
quickly, like Surface Awareness Initiative (SAI), to enhance
controllers' situational awareness where that capability does not
currently exist. The FAA is also researching Runway Incursion
Prevention through Situational Awareness (RIPSA), to enhance pilot
situational awareness at airport surface areas most prone to incidents.
The prototype RIPSA system will be installed and evaluated at San
Antonio International Airport in 2024. RIPSA will employ the same in-
pavement lights that are deployed at Runway Status Lights sites to
protect runway/taxiway entrances.
The lights will be driven by surveillance inputs including a new
lower cost surface movement radar, ADS-B, and a feed from the airport
surveillance automation system. RIPSA Runway Entrance Lights (RELs)
provide a direct visual warning to pilots and vehicle operators that it
is unsafe to enter or cross a runway.
Question 3. Will the Austin-Bergstrom (AUS) airport be receiving
new surface surveillance technology in 2024? How will this technology
improve runway safety across the airport?
Answer. Yes, AUS will receive a solution to be acquired under the
Surface Awareness Initiative (SAI) program and is scheduled for 2024.
SAI solutions must display all ADS-B aircraft (a mandate for AUS
airspace) on the surface movement area including runways, taxiways,
intersections, and if desired by ATC, terminal ramps. Currently AUS has
no enhanced surface situational awareness capabilities. In addition, a
new function within the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System
(STARS), tower and terminal radar approach controllers primary display,
called Approach Runway Verification (ARV) that provides wrong surface
landing alerts will be adapted and installed for Austin-Bergstrom in
early 2024.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Budd to
Timothy L. Arel
Question 1. Near misses at Boston Airport in February, Indianapolis
Airport and San Diego Airport in August, and an actual collision at
Houston Hobby Airport last month all involved aircraft given a line up
and wait clearance. While a line up and wait clearance can be helpful
in increasing the runway throughput and reducing pre-takeoff delays, it
does present risks in busy runway environments. What limitations does
FAA place on issuing line up and wait clearances?
Answer. Limitations/Procedural requirements in FAA Order JO 7110.65
are as follows:
1. When issuing the instruction to line up and wait (LUAW), the
controller must preface the instruction with the runway to be
used and receive correct readback.
2. An aircraft issued instructions to LUAW must not remain on the
runway in position for more than 90 seconds without the
controller providing additional instructions.
3. If an airport has an Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE)
system operating with a fully operational Safety Logic System,
the controller may take certain actions that otherwise would be
prohibited at airports without this technology. For example, at
a facility with a fully operational Safety Logic System, the
controller may have an aircraft on the runway in LUAW position
and still clear an arrival to land on the same runway. If the
Safety Logic System was inoperative, in limited mode, or not
installed, the controller would be prohibited from issuing the
landing clearance while an aircraft was occupying the same
runway with a LUAW clearance.
4. When an aircraft is authorized to LUAW, the controller must
inform the pilot of the closest traffic within 6 flying miles
requesting a full-stop, touch-and-go, stop-and-go, option, or
unrestricted low approach to the same runway.
5. The controller may not authorize an aircraft to LUAW at any time
when the runway intersection to be used is not visible from the
tower.
6. The controller may not authorize an aircraft to LUAW when the
departure point (runway full length or intersection) is not
visible from the tower, unless the aircraft's position can be
verified by the ASDE, or the runway is used for departures
only.
7. The controller may not authorize aircraft to simultaneously line
up and wait on the same runway, between sunrise and sunset,
unless the local assist/local monitor position is staffed.
8. When aircraft are authorized to LUAW on runways that intersect,
the controller must exchange traffic information between that
aircraft and the aircraft that is authorized to line up and
wait, depart, or arrive to the intersecting runway(s).
9. When a controller delivers or amends an ATC clearance to an
aircraft holding in LUAW position, an additional clearance must
be issued to prevent the possibility of the aircraft beginning
takeoff roll, such as ``hold in position'' to ensure the pilot
understands the transmission is for purposes other than issuing
a departure clearance.
10. When authorizing an aircraft to LUAW at an intersection, the
controller must state the runway intersection.
Additionally, facility air traffic managers must comply with the
following LUAW provisions of FAA Order JO 7210.3 in developing local
LUAW procedures:
1. Air traffic managers must determine an operational need exists
prior to authorizing LUAW operations.
2. Air traffic managers must issue a facility directive containing
procedures to ensure the efficient use of runways, positive
control, and coordination of aircraft/vehicles on or near
active runways.
3. Air traffic managers must develop procedures to be included in a
facility directive for the mandatory use of an approved memory
aid at the appropriate operational position(s) when a LUAW
clearance has been issued.
4. Air traffic managers must ensure that when LUAW is used in the
operation, the local control position is not combined with any
other non-local control position. This reduces controller
workload and ensures maximum effort can be concentrated on
scanning runways and associated traffic.
5. Air traffic managers must conduct an annual review of LUAW
operations, and forward findings to their Service Area Director
of Air Traffic Operations.
Question 2. Is FAA reviewing those limitations in light of recent
incidents?
Answer. In an ongoing effort to reduce safety risks associated with
Line Up and Wait (LUAW) operations, FAA facilities using these
procedures were required to conduct a joint review of their local
procedures beginning on August 15, 2023, through August 29, 2023. If
the review was not completed by August 29, 2023, then the facility was
required to suspend LUAW operations. Utilizing the Local Safety
Council, facilities verified that facility LUAW procedures complied
with current FAA policies and, if applicable, identified and submitted
best practices or local procedures that contribute to the successful
implementation of LUAW operations.
If it was determined that the facility's LUAW procedures or
application were not compliant with FAA policies, the facility was
required to suspend LUAW operations and work collaboratively to correct
the deficiencies. All local facility changes to LUAW procedures require
coordination per FAA Order JO 7210.3 paragraph 10-3-8 LINE UP AND WAIT
(LUAW) OPERATIONS.
This review provided FAA air traffic facilities with an opportunity
to work together and collaboratively to identify and reduce risks
associated with LUAW operations.
In addition, the ATO monitors and analyzes events associated with
LUAW operations that result in unintended outcomes. This analysis is
performed monthly by subject matter experts. The ongoing effort
provides leadership with quantitative data as it relates to the
effectiveness and proper use of LUAW processes and procedures.
A more detailed and targeted assessment of LUAW procedures was
conducted by ATO Safety in August 2023. The assessment identified six
observations and made nine recommendations for best practices to
facilities that use the procedure.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Rich Santa
Controller Staffing
As of August 2023, FAA reported having 13,300 total controllers--
about 10,700 certified professional controllers in the system plus
about 2,600 controllers in various stages of training. We know the FAA
is experiencing a shortage of about 3,000 controllers despite already
reaching its hiring target of 1,500 controllers for Fiscal Year 2023.
That is why we include a requirement in the Senate FAA bill for the
agency to update its controller staffing models to get an accurate
count of controllers needed per facility and close this staffing gap as
soon as possible.
We know that interest in becoming a controller is not the issue.
Last year, FAA received about 58,000 applications for 1,500 open
positions. While candidates must achieve high scores on the Air Traffic
Skills Assessment exam to attend the FAA Academy, the Academy's
capacity to educate controllers is capped at about 1,800 trainees. To
enable more controllers to be hired, the Senate FAA bill (Section 533)
requires FAA to develop a plan to double its capacity and facilities to
educate and train more controllers each year.
Question 1. Given current capacity constraints, how important is it
that the FAA hires and educate the highest number of controllers
possible per Fiscal Year?
Answer. As I outlined in my written testimony, it is absolutely
critical that the FAA engage in max hiring of air traffic controllers
for the duration of the next FAA reauthorization bill. Recently, the
FAA has taken steps in the right direction, such as upwardly adjusting
its hiring goals for each of FY 2024-2026 to 1,800 new hires, which is
roughly the capacity of the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City.
However, according to the FAA's Controller Workforce Plan, 40
percent of controllers who were members of a hiring class between 2014
and 2017 were removed from the FAA, resigned, or are still in training,
meaning FAA can only expect about 60 percent of controller trainees to
reach full certification within five to seven years of their hire. As a
result, because it takes between one and three years for a new FAA
Academy graduate to reach full certification, even an increased hiring
goal above and beyond the current capacity of the Academy would still
take several years to have any positive effect on CPC totals.
In contrast, the FAA's finance-based controller hiring plan has
been and will continue to be ineffective. The FAA's National Airspace
System Safety Review Team (SRT) report issued earlier this month
reinforces what NATCA has been saying about controller staffing for a
decade when it concluded that ``when retirements and other attrition is
accounted for, the [FAA's] hiring plan produces a negligible
improvement over today's understaffed levels, resulting in a net
increase of fewer than 200 air traffic controllers by 2032. The [Air
Traffic Organization] must determine staffing needs based on actual
system needs rather than on Academy throughput and budgetary
constraints.''
Question 2. Do you agree that current capacity at the FAA Academy
is not adequate to educate enough controllers to help meet projected
workforce needs over the next 10 years?
Answer. In all likelihood, yes. If the FAA had taken a holistic,
consistent, and sustained approach to hiring and training air traffic
controllers over the previous two decades, we would not be in the
position we are today, and the current capacity may have been
sufficient. However, at this point, the current capacity is likely
insufficient given the status quo.
Question 3. If not, should FAA look at increasing both brick-and-
mortar and technological capacity to improve the agency's ability to
educate and train more controllers? How could this increase FAA's
ability to educate more developmental controllers?
Answer. Yes and NATCA stands ready to consider practical options
and collaborate on viable solutions. NATCA supports the Senate's draft
FAA Reauthorization bill that includes both expansion of the FAA's
training capacity through its Academy and the implementation of Tower
Simulator Systems in every tower that does not already have one. This
will improve training times once trainees graduate from the Academy and
enhance recurrent training for Certified Professional Controllers by
allowing them to practice situations that are not regularly occurring
including different types of emergencies.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to
Rich Santa
Aging Infrastructure Impacting Aviation System
Aviation professionals are only as effective as the infrastructure
and technology they rely on. According to the President's most recent
budget request, the average age of an FAA Air Traffic Control facility
is over 60 years old, and more than half of terminal facilities are
more than 40 years old. These facilities regularly operate with
degraded technology systems, resulting in a lack of accurate wind speed
and direction calculations, the failure of radio frequencies within
congested airspace, and the malfunctioning of runway lights. Many
airports also lack functioning radar systems used to track airborne and
taxiing planes, meaning that some controllers have no visual awareness
of the aircraft they are directing, especially in poor weather
conditions.
In lieu of functioning radar systems in Air Traffic Control
facilities, many controllers are filling the gaps by resorting to using
public flight-tracking websites that aren't approved by the FAA.
Perhaps most alarming are the reports that the FAA lacks the
funding to install runway warning systems to help prevent runway
collisions. Only forty three of the Nation's more than five hundred
airports serving commercial flights have runway collision-avoidance
systems. This is simply not good enough.
Question 1. How can we improve the existing technology and
infrastructure utilized by air traffic controllers and aviation
professionals to reduce potential risk and manage congested airports
and complicated airspace at our Nation's airports?
Answer. As I outlined in detail in my written testimony, the FAA
desperately needs to continue modernizing technology and improving,
repairing its infrastructure throughout the National Airspace System.
The most important component of improving this is stable, sufficient
funding levels. Without that, critical modernization and infrastructure
programs experience delays in development, testing, and implementation,
as well as delays to the sustainment and repair of existing safety-
critical equipment.
The biggest hurdle to achieving stable, sufficient funding is the
FAA's willingness to be transparent with its need for improved funding
for its Facilities and Equipment (F&E) budget. NATCA estimates that FAA
requires approximately $4.5 billion for F&E activities in Fiscal Year
(FY) 2024, and this number will approach nearly $6 billion in the near
future. Despite this increasing need, for the past decade, FAA has
consistently requested only approximately $3 billion per year in annual
appropriations.
Congress has always met the Agency's stated budgetary needs, but
that has prevented FAA from meeting its own equipment sustainment,
replacement, and modernization needs, creating a significant backlog.
The FAA's self-inflicted budgetary shortfalls have not even kept up
with inflation over the past 14 years. This loss of spending and buying
power for modernization and infrastructure programs forced FAA into a
``fix-on-fail'' model by requiring it to prioritize mandatory costs and
leaves little to no money for other important modernization and
infrastructure programs.
NATCA was pleased to see the President's budget request for $3.46
billion for F&E for FY 2024, which in addition to $1 billion from the
Infrastructure and Jobs Act (IIJA) for facilities meets FAA's $4.5
billion need in FY 2024. We support the Senate's Transportation,
Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD)
appropriations bill that would fully meet this need. We are concerned,
however, because NATCA projects FAA's F&E budget need to be between
$5.5 and $6 billion in the near future, and the IIJA funding will
expire at the end of FY 2027.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to
Rich Santa
Terminal Flight Data Manager
At many airports across the country, air traffic controllers still
rely on paper flight strips to keep track of flights.\1\ The Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) Terminal Flight Data Manager (TFDM) is
a NextGen system designed to improve the management of airport surface
traffic, including aircraft departures, by replacing paper flight
strips with an automated electronic system.\2\ In 2018, the FAA
anticipated that implementation of TFDM would be complete at 89
airports by 2028.\3\ According to a 2023 Government Accountability
Office report, the FAA has fallen short of its TFDM implementation
goals and has responded by revising its projected completion date to
2030 and decreasing the number of airports designated to receive this
technology from 89 to 49.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/technology/tfdm/efs
\2\ https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105254 at 12.
\3\ https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105254 at 12.
\4\ https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105254 at 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport in Savannah,
Georgia, is one of the 40 airports that were removed from the FAA's
TFDM implementation list.\5\ On November 1, 2023, the Department of
Transportation (DOT) Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported that
delays in the deployment of TFDM and the NextGen Air Transportation
System are some of the Department's top management challenges for
Fiscal Year 2024.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ https://tfmlearning.faa.gov/assets/media/CDM/CDM_2022/
TFDM_CDM_General_Session.
pdf.
\6\ https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/39685 at 10.
Question 1. Does TFDM reduce operational safety risk at airports?
Answer. Yes, TFDM has the capability of automating the majority of
flight strip modification and coordination that currently is manually
performed by controllers. By automating these processes, it can reduce
controller workload in this area and allow them to focus more attention
on safety issues.
Question 2. Will Air Traffic Controllers benefit from the
implementation of TFDM at airports across the country?
Answer. Yes, TFDM not only automates many coordination and
scheduling functions that reduce controller workload, but it also
creates, updates, and displays electronic flight strips that assist in
mitigating legibility issues for controllers.
Question 3. What must the FAA do to address the issues raised in
the DOT Inspector General report?
Answer. Unfortunately, in regard to TFDM, without stable,
sufficient funding levels, there is little the FAA can do to achieve
its goals and address the issues raised in the OIG report.
As I outlined in detail in my written testimony, the biggest hurdle
to achieving stable, sufficient funding is the FAA's willingness to be
transparent with its need for improved funding for its Facilities and
Equipment (F&E) budget. NATCA estimates that FAA requires approximately
$4.5 billion for F&E activities in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, and this
number will approach nearly $6 billion in the near future. Despite this
increasing need, for the past decade, FAA has consistently requested
only approximately $3 billion per year in annual appropriations.
Congress has always met the Agency's stated budgetary needs, but
that has prevented FAA from meeting its own equipment sustainment,
replacement, and modernization needs, creating a significant backlog.
The FAA's self-inflicted budgetary shortfalls have not even kept up
with inflation over the past 14 years. This loss of spending and buying
power for modernization and infrastructure programs forced FAA into a
``fix-on-fail'' model by requiring it to prioritize mandatory costs and
leaves little to no money for other important modernization and
infrastructure programs.
NATCA was pleased to see the President's budget request for $3.46
billion for F&E for FY 2024, which in addition to $1 billion from the
Infrastructure and Jobs Act (IIJA) for facilities meets FAA's $4.5
billion need in FY 2024. We support the Senate's Transportation,
Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD)
appropriations bill that would fully meet this need. We are concerned,
however, because NATCA projects FAA's F&E budget need to be between
$5.5 and $6 billion in the near future, and the IIJA funding will
expire at the end of FY 2027.
Question 4. Why was Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport
removed from the FAA's list of airports scheduled to receive TFDM
technology?
Answer. Although NATCA continues to advocate for the FAA to
complete its full 89-site waterfall, the FAA unilaterally chose to
reduce programmatic funding and limit deployment at larger airports
that would assist in justifying the TFDM ``business case.''
Facility Staffing Timeline
On November 1, 2023, DOT OIG released its audit of DOT's top
management challenges for Fiscal Year 2024.\7\ The report identified
inadequate air traffic controller staffing at critical facilities as
one of the main potential causes of flight delays and cancellations.\8\
According to the report, 20 of the FAA's 26 most critical facilities
were staffed below the agency's 85 percent threshold as of March
2022.\9\ Moreover, staffing challenges and pauses in air traffic
controller training during the pandemic have resulted in increased
certification timelines for controllers.\10\ In your testimony, you
noted that delays to controller training, early retirement, and
unexpected attrition have negatively affected certified controller
staffing and have forced many fully certified air traffic controllers
to work mandatory overtime hours to make up for staffing shortages.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Id.
\8\ Id. at 9.
\9\ Id. at 9.
\10\ Id. at 10.
\11\ https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/5FC4E704-5AEF-
4FDE-A88A-CC6CD882
3B65%20Rich%20Santa%20November%209,%202023%20Committee%20Testimony
Question 1. Under current FAA hiring practices, how long will it
take the FAA to fully staff all air traffic facilities with the
necessary number of fully certified controllers?
Answer. As I outlined in my written testimony, the FAA's National
Airspace System Safety Review Team (SRT) report issued earlier this
month reinforces what NATCA has been saying about controller staffing
for a decade when it concluded that ``when retirements and other
attrition is accounted for, the [FAA's] hiring plan produces a
negligible improvement over today's understaffed levels, resulting in a
net increase of fewer than 200 air traffic controllers by 2032. The
[Air Traffic Organization] must determine staffing needs based on
actual system needs rather than on Academy throughput and budgetary
constraints.''
At that pace, given the FAA's current hiring practices, the length
of time that it would take FAA to fully staff all air traffic
facilities would be measured in decades rather than years.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Rich Santa
N90
The New York Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility (N90 TRACON)
has been chronically understaffed for decades. Congress has on multiple
occasions directed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to
reexamine or reorganize the airspace managed by N90. The FAA, to its
credit, has attempted to execute reorganization plans only to be
stymied by political pressure.
Earlier this year, the FAA reduced the volume of flights into and
out of the New York area and cited staffing at N90 as a reason. Shortly
after announcing the volume reduction, the FAA put the planned transfer
of New Jersey airspace to the Philadelphia TRACON on ``pause'' until
the end of the year.
Question 1. What metrics did the FAA set for performance that N90
has met?
Answer. NATCA is not aware of any specific metrics FAA has set for
N90 performance.
Question 2. If the FAA determined transferring responsibility for
New Jersey airspace to Philadelphia TRACON was the best decision for
the National Airspace System (NAS) safety and efficiency, does NATCA
commit to supporting the FAA and helping to facilitate the change?
Answer. NATCA does not make decisions to transfer airspace. It
negotiates the procedures and appropriate arrangements regarding the
effects on bargaining unit employees of the FAA's decision to transfer
airspace. If the FAA decides to transfer any airspace throughout the
NAS, NATCA will negotiate in good faith regarding the working
conditions of all NATCA represented affected employees. NATCA will
stand behind its negotiated agreement with the FAA.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Ted Budd to
Rich Santa
Question. In cases not involving a line up and wait clearance,
runway incursions can occur when an airplane enters a runway without a
clearance, or a clearance is erroneously issued. In other words, runway
incursions can often involve pilot or controller error. Mr. Ambrosi,
Mr. Santa, are your organizations sponsoring any programs to promote
runway safety awareness among your members?
Answer. NATCA and the FAA jointly sponsor several such programs.
For example, we collaboratively developed the ``Stand Up for Safety''
campaign which reinforces our continued commitment to maintaining and
promoting a robust and healthy safety culture. The campaign focuses on
topics like Line Up and Wait, highlighting our commitment to safety and
a ``just safety culture.''
NATCA and the FAA also jointly sponsor the ``Partnership for
Safety'' program for which our mission is to facilitate the
identification and mitigation of hazards at the local facility level
through ``Local Safety Councils'' made up of NATCA and agency
representatives. Each month the Partnership for Safety program delivers
briefings on safety topics that are developed from topics trending in
the Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs and information received from
the Confidential Information Share Program.
Semiannually, all operational personnel, including Air Traffic
Controllers, also receive training on topics collaboratively identified
for National Recurrent Training. Currently, NATCA and the FAA are
developing a recurrent training module on runway incursions.
Controllers at every towered airport will receive this training,
consisting of runway incursion data and trending information, along
with causal and contributing factors for runway incursions.
In addition, NATCA and the FAA collaboratively developed ``From the
Flight Deck'' videos and Pilot Handbooks to help mitigate surface
safety risks. These videos and handbooks address numerous aspects of
runway safety. The Pilot Handbooks capture air traffic controller
insight and recommendations, providing clarity and familiarity to
pilots operating at a specific airport.
Air traffic controllers and pilots are valuable resources for each
to learn from the other. This starts with Flight Deck Training for
controllers and facility tours for pilots. NATCA also promotes pilot-
controller forums that provide pilots with direct access and engagement
with air traffic controllers to help mitigate surface safety risks and
create viable solutions.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Jason Ambrosi
Flight Deck Collision Avoidance Systems
Following the incidents from this past year, the FAA has tasked the
Investigative Technologies Aviation Rulemaking Committee to examine
aircraft alerting systems that are designed to improve situational
awareness for pilots and increase surface safety. ALPA was selected to
co-chair this committee and will lead the effort to recommend
enhancements to flight deck technologies to the FAA.
Question 1. Our FAA bill recognizes the importance of aircraft
being equipped with runway traffic alerting systems, and I'm grateful
for the leadership of my colleague, Senator Klobuchar, on this issue.
Do you think the FAA should be taking a close look at ensuring aircraft
are equipped with the latest traffic alerting technologies, such as
Automatic Dependent Broadcast--Surveillance (ADS-B) In, as the
Klobuchar amendment to the FAA bill would require?
Answer. ALPA is supportive of broader equipage and use of ADS-B In
for real time alerting and improved situational awareness on the flight
deck of air carrier aircraft when operating on the surface of an
airport, and in all other phases of flight. As I indicated in my
testimony, we should leverage appropriate, system-wide technologies and
capabilities to add more layers of safety protection and ensure a
continued record of no major fatal hull-loss accidents in passenger
airline operations.
Question 2. Since 2020, aircraft operating in most controlled
airspace have been required to use ADS-B Out to broadcast relevant
information about their location, ground speed, and altitude to air
traffic control. ADS-B In, which is a voluntary technology for
operators, allows pilots to have that same information about nearby air
traffic. Do you believe that ADS-B In can improve the situational
awareness of pilots?
Answer. ALPA believes that ADS-B In capabilities can be used to
improve situational awareness for pilots in a variety of scenarios. In
2012 as part of the FAA's ADS-B In Aviation Rulemaking Committee final
report, ALPA supported the development of surface based ADS-B In
applications, particularly the ``SURF Indications and Alerts (SURF
IA)'' capability as initially defined in RTCA. This capability can
provide flight deck alerting of imminent runway incursion situations.
However, this capability is not yet mature or available for purchase.
When thoughtfully integrated into the pilot workload demands,
information and alerting systems can greatly enhance the pilot's
situational awareness and ability to take corrective or preventive
actions to safety events.
However, it should be noted that when considering safety mitigation
strategies and capabilities, ALPA is a strong proponent of conducting a
thorough safety risk management assessment to ensure the addition of
new or enhanced capabilities does not introduce other unforeseen
hazards to airline operations.
Question 3. Do you believe that all commercial and regional
aircraft should be equipped with ADS-B In technology or other similar
traffic alerting systems?
Answer. ALPA is supportive of the development of a comprehensive
strategy that results in advancements in the safety of airline
operations on the airport surface. There are multiple technologies
including ADS-B in, that could and should be used to achieve increased
levels of safety. Systems that pilots have at their disposal in the
flight deck should be designed to provide time critical information to
pilots, without reliance on air traffic control or other ground-based
infrastructure. If installed, these systems would also be usable at
airports that do not have surface safety infrastructure, and as such
could be usable at every airport. Flight deck based surface safety and
alerting systems should be strongly considered in order to reduce the
risk of accidents.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to
Jason Ambrosi
Aging Infrastructure Impacting Aviation System
Aviation professionals are only as effective as the infrastructure
and technology they rely on. According to the President's most recent
budget request, the average age of an FAA Air Traffic Control facility
is over 60 years old, and more than half of terminal facilities are
more than 40 years old. These facilities regularly operate with
degraded technology systems, resulting in a lack of accurate wind speed
and direction calculations, the failure of radio frequencies within
congested airspace, and the malfunctioning of runway lights. Many
airports also lack functioning radar systems used to track airborne and
taxiing planes, meaning that some controllers have no visual awareness
of the aircraft they are directing, especially in poor weather
conditions.
In lieu of functioning radar systems in Air Traffic Control
facilities, many controllers are filling the gaps by resorting to using
public flight-tracking websites that aren't approved by the FAA.
Perhaps most alarming are the reports that the FAA lacks the
funding to install runway warning systems to help prevent runway
collisions. Only forty three of the Nation's more than five hundred
airports serving commercial flights have runway collision-avoidance
systems. This is simply not good enough.
Question 1. How can we improve the existing technology and
infrastructure utilized by air traffic controllers and aviation
professionals to reduce potential risk and manage congested airports
and complicated airspace at our Nation's airports?
Answer. In my testimony I discussed the important need for the FAA
to have stable and reliable funding. ALPA firmly believes this is a
foundational element that can be improved upon to reduce potential risk
and manage congested airports and complicated airspace at our Nation's
airports.
The stable, consistent, and adequate funding of air traffic control
ensures that our Nation's air traffic controllers are provided with
critical safety enhancing technologies, systems, and training. Just as
importantly, a stable and reliable funding mechanism also ensures that
there is adequate staffing levels in all of the air traffic control
facilities. Without a full cadre of air traffic controllers, the air
traffic control system cannot perform as intended. Congress has all the
necessary tools and authority to address this important aspect of the
future of the air traffic control system.
On February 14, 2023, I sent a letter to this Committee's
leadership to submit into the record for the February 15, 2023 hearing
titled, ``The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) NOTAM System
Failure and its Impacts on a Resilient National Airspace.'' In that
letter ALPA discussed this topic in greater detail pointing out that in
the past, Congress has provided the FAA with a single year's worth of
funding for multiyear modernization projects, such as NOTAM system
upgrades. This ``band aid'' approach creates enormous challenges for
the FAA to keep massively complicated projects on course and bring them
to completion. Continuing resolutions, government shutdowns,
authorization extensions, and other disruptions also hinder the
infrastructure modernization process. With all of these issues at play,
modernization of a critical system becomes a series of stop, replan,
and restart.
This is not a reliable or efficient approach to effectively plan
and execute the modernization plan for our Nation's air traffic control
infrastructure. Giving the FAA the resources it needs to complete the
mission, across multiple appropriation cycles, is a key area where
Congress can assist in ensuring that our Nation's air traffic control
system will meet the needs of the Americans who depend on safe and
reliable air transportation.
Nearly a year later, ALPA holds fast to these statements. We
continue to believe that the stable, reliable and continuous funding of
the FAA is foundational to proactively ensuring that continued
improvements in safety performance are achievable and sustainable
across the National Airspace System.
Enhancing Safety Through Emerging Technology
The advent of new and exciting technologies like air taxis deliver
tremendous promise, but also raise an additional layer of aviation
safety concerns. A NASA project recently completed its first step
towards achieving an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System, which
would address potential hazards expected with new modes of flights
entering U.S. airspace. Still, operating within U.S. airspace is only
getting more complex, especially with new entrants into our airspace.
Question 1. How should the aviation community realistically
integrate new technologies, like air taxis and unmanned air vehicles,
into an aging system that appears to be struggling to undergo basic
safety improvements for manned, commercial flights?
Answer. ALPA continues to participate in many activities that are
focused on the safe integration of new types of operations into the
national airspace system. These activities include consensus standards
development, participation on FAA established Aviation Rulemaking
Committees (ARC's), review and comment on the many numerous requests by
new-entrant operators for regulatory waivers and exemptions,
participation in FAA Safety Risk Management Review panels, and more.
ALPA also continues to promote a data-driven, predictive safety
risk management approach to the integration of new entrants. A data-
driven approach can be successful when combined with a solid foundation
of Federal Aviation Regulations that establish rules for aircraft
certification, certificated operations, pilot training, maintenance,
and other key operational parameters. These two aspects--data
collection analysis and proactive safety mitigation, and a solid
regulatory framework for operators--are key to the safe introduction of
new entrants into the airspace system.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Ted Budd to
Jason Ambrosi
Question. In cases not involving a line up and wait clearance,
runway incursions can occur when an airplane enters a runway without a
clearance, or a clearance is erroneously issued. In other words, runway
incursions can often involve pilot or controller error. Mr. Ambrosi,
Mr. Santa, are your organizations sponsoring any programs to promote
runway safety awareness among your members?
Answer. The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) has
had continuous collaboration with the FAA and the National Air Traffic
Controllers Association (NATCA) on promoting runway safety awareness
among the ALPA membership. We jointly evaluate surface safety incidents
as part of the ongoing safety data and analysis activities in the
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) program. In
addition to this, we continue to partner on numerous events and
awareness enhancing activities. For example, last September at the ALPA
Air Safety Forum ALPA led a panel discussion on the important topic of
surface safety. There were representatives from the FAA and NATCA on
the panel. As I mentioned in my written submission, ALPA is also
jointly participating with the FAA and NATCA at Runway Safety Action
Team (RSAT) meetings at every airport that has an air traffic control
tower. ALPA and NATCA have a long history of partnering on promoting
surface safety. For example, our organizations have partnered on
training materials that discuss the importance of surface safety and
how to mitigate undesired outcomes. ALPA has also promoted runway
safety awareness through multiple, direct communications to its more
than 77,000 members to remain vigilant and to stay focused on the
important task of safely operating on the surface of the airport.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Randy Babbitt
Short-term Extensions and Shutdown
As you know Mr. Babbitt, the short-term extension of the 2018 FAA
reauthorization bill expires at the end of the year. During your 2-year
tenure leading the FAA, you went through nine (9) extensions in just
those two years. And in fact, after the 2003 FAA Reauthorization law
expired in 2007, the FAA and industry had to endure 23 short-term
extensions before a proper, long-term reauthorization was finally
passed in 2012. This is no way to govern, and it is not something I
want to see happen again.
Question 1. Which is better for the FAA and industry: (i) the
stability of a long-term reauthorization bill that advances aviation
forward, or (ii) an endless string of short-term extensions that do
nothing to address the near-misses and close-calls we have discussed
today?
Answer. The FAA is a large organization and having a clear view of
forecast budgets allows financial stability for planning, funding, and
advancing the interests of safety. And operational integrity is
dependent on financial stability and is of the utmost importance and
value to any company or large organization. The FAA it is no exception
and having a confirmed budget allows continuous improvements and
organizational stability.
Question 2. A government shutdown is potentially 2 months away.
Would a government shutdown make aviation less safe?
Answer. The professionals at the FAA have historically kept the
system running and safe during past shutdowns. And while ``back pay''
is often provided, the financial difficulties imposed on loyal
employees being asked to work without pay is simply unnecessary and
unfair. And being candid, while the system will maintain a high level
of safety, it clearly would be far better and safer to have a stable
ongoing funded budget on which to depend. Employees, many operating in
highly stressful environments, on which our air transport systems
depend, do not need the additional stress of working and not knowing
when they might next be paid.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to
Randy Babbitt
Aging Infrastructure Impacting Aviation System
Aviation professionals are only as effective as the infrastructure
and technology they rely on. According to the President's most recent
budget request, the average age of an FAA Air Traffic Control facility
is over 60 years old, and more than half of terminal facilities are
more than 40 years old. These facilities regularly operate with
degraded technology systems, resulting in a lack of accurate wind speed
and direction calculations, the failure of radio frequencies within
congested airspace, and the malfunctioning of runway lights. Many
airports also lack functioning radar systems used to track airborne and
taxiing planes, meaning that some controllers have no visual awareness
of the aircraft they are directing, especially in poor weather
conditions.
In lieu of functioning radar systems in Air Traffic Control
facilities, many controllers are filling the gaps by resorting to using
public flight-tracking websites that aren't approved by the FAA.
Perhaps most alarming are the reports that the FAA lacks the
funding to install runway warning systems to help prevent runway
collisions. Only forty three of the Nation's more than five hundred
airports serving commercial flights have runway collision-avoidance
systems. This is simply not good enough.
Question 1. How can we improve the existing technology and
infrastructure utilized by air traffic controllers and aviation
professionals to reduce potential risk and manage congested airports
and complicated airspace at our Nation's airports?
Answer. In today's world, technology advances at a blistering pace.
There are significant technological changes and improvements available
to provide increased safety margins and smoother operations, both with
enormous economic advantages to both airlines and travelers by adopting
such new technology. Additionally, equipment exists today to safely
warn and protect against runway incursions and near collisions.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Randy Babbitt
Question 1. Is the 1,500-hour rule an effective measure for
ensuring a pilot's skills, experience, and qualifications meet the high
standards we expect of airline pilots?
Answer. No, the 1500 hours was an arbitrary number as a base
placeholder in the original legislation. The legislation then went on
to provide that offsets should be provided where a curriculum,
mentoring, and advanced skills training are incorporated into pilot
training.
Examples currently recognized would be graduates from colleges and
universities that are FAA approved may reduce the 1500 hours to 1000
hours upon graduation of the approved curriculum. Graduates with
associate degrees may reduce the 1500 hours to 1250 hours. And pilots
having trained to fly in the United States military can reduce the time
required to 750 hours.
Notably the FAA has held two aviation rulemaking committees
(``ARCs'') and both have made clear recommendations of curriculums to
be followed to allow for further reductions from the 1500 hour rule.
The shortcoming of the current 1500-hour rule is that it simply added
1250 hours on top of the Commercial rating requirements to be eligible
for a restricted ATP and thus meeting the requirements to operate as a
crew member for a Part 121 carrier. The legislation was silent on the
1250 additional hours, with no requirements for monitoring, a
curriculum, or any performance testing, just acquire 1250 more simple
flight hours. By not adopting available new technology in flight
training, aircraft simulation and curriculums of today for today's
environment is leaving safety opportunities on the cutting room floor.
Today's simulator capabilities are in full use in all branches of our
military and that every major airline and provides exposure to and
training for procedures and maneuvers likely to be encountered in
airline operations, including maneuvers too risky to demonstrate in
real aircraft.
We can train pilots better, make them safer and have them trained
to be professional pilots by following the advice of both recent ARCs
as well as the guidance set forth in the legislation itself from 2010.
Question 2. When Congress was drafting the Airline Safety and
Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, did the FAA and
Congress discuss how the law could be updated in the future to account
for safety advancements?
Answer. Yes, having testified in several of the hearings that led
up to the legislation, the language that was developed allowed for and
anticipated modifications as technology improved and knowledge gained
for training pilots in today's advanced aircraft and operations in a
highly sophisticated Air Traffic Control (``ATC'') environment.
Following the passage of the legislation, the FAA appropriately
convened Aviation Rulemaking Committees (``ARCs'') to review and
suggest changes to be implemented following the guidelines laid out in
the legislation.
Unfortunately, none of the changes proposed have been implemented
following either the 2013 ARC or the 2021 ARC, despite being drafted
and unanimously supported with full industry input.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Ted Budd to
Randy Babbitt
Question. The FAA has increasingly been adopting performance-based
standards for aircraft certification. But it has not done the same for
airmen certification. Can you explain some of the benefits of
performance-based standards in airmen certification?
Answer. No response from witness.
[all]