[Senate Hearing 118-625, Part 1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-625, Pt. 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 2226
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
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PART 1
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. SPACE COMMAND
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET REQUEST
ARMY POSTURE
NAVY POSTURE
U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATIONON
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
AIR FORCE POSTURE
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MARCH 7, 9, 16, 23, 28, 30; APRIL 18, 20, 26, 27; MAY 2, 2023
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-101 WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
MARK KELLY, Arizona ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
march 7, 2023
Page
U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Cyber Command Posture... 1
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 1
Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker............................. 3
Witness Statements
Maier, The Honorable Christopher, Assistant Secretary of Defense 4
for Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflict.
Fenton, General Bryan, United States Special Operations Command.. 6
Nakasone, General Paul, Commander United States Cyber Command/ 19
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security
Service.
Questions for the Record......................................... 62
march 9, 2023
U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command.................... 77
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 77
Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker............................. 79
Witness Statements
Cotton, General Anthony J., USAF Commander, United States 80
Strategic
Command.
Dickinson, General James H., USA Commander, United States Space 91
Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 136
march 16, 2023
U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command..................... 149
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 149
Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker............................. 151
Witness Statements
Kurilla, General Michael E., USA Commander, United States Central 152
Command.
Langley, General Michael E., USMC Commander, United States Africa 163
Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 207
(iii)
march 23, 2023
Page
U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command.................. 243
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 243
Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker............................. 249
Witness Statements
VanHerck, General Glen D., USAF, Commander, United States 250
Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.
Richardson, General Laura J., USA, Commander, United States 260
Southern Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 313
march 28, 2023
The Department of Defense Budget Request......................... 347
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 347
Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker............................. 353
Witness Statements
Austin, The Honorable Lloyd J., III, Secretary of Defense........ 355
Milley, General Mark A., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff... 366
Questions for the Record......................................... 439
march 30, 2023
Army Posture..................................................... 465
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 465
Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker............................. 467
Witness Statements
Wormuth, The Honorable Christine E., Secretary of the Army....... 469
McConville, General James C., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army.... 471
Questions for the Record......................................... 521
(iv)
april 18, 2023
Page
Navy Posture..................................................... 541
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 541
Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker............................. 543
Witness Statements
Del Toro, The Honorable Carlos, Secretary of the Navy............ 545
Gilday, Admiral Michael M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations....... 558
Berger, General David H., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps... 573
Questions for the Record......................................... 645
april 20, 2023
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea.................. 767
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 767
Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker............................. 769
Witness Statements
Aquilino, Admiral John C., USN, Commander, United States Indo- 770
Pacific Command.
LaCamera, General Paul J., USA, Commander, United Nations Command 790
/ Combined Forces Command / United States Forces Korea.
Questions for the Record......................................... 824
april 26, 2023
The Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security 887
Administrationon Atomic Energy Defense Activities.
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 887
Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker............................. 889
Witness Statements
Granholm, The Honorable Jennifer M., Secretary of Energy, 892
Department of Energy.
Hruby, The Honorable Jill M., Administrator, National Nuclear 893
Security Administration.
Questions for the Record......................................... 945
(v)
april 27, 2023
Page
United States European Command and United States Transportation 953
Command.
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 953
Prepared Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker.................... 955
Witness Statements
Cavoli, General Christopher, USA Commander, United States 956
European Command/ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme
Allied Commander Europe.
Van Ovost, General Jacqueline D., USAF Commander, United States 967
Transportation Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 1012
may 2, 2023
Air Force Posture................................................ 1035
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 1035
Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker............................. 1037
Witness Statements
Kendall, The Honorable Frank, III, Secretary of the Air Force.... 1038
Brown, General Charles Q., Jr. USAF Chief of Staff of the Air 1040
Force.
Saltzman, General B. Chance, USSF Chief of Space Operations...... 1041
Questions for the Record......................................... 1104
Appendix
Attachment 1 - General Charles Q. Brown.......................... 1145
(vi)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 2023
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND UNITED STATES CYBER
COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
room G-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, and
Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. I would like to call this hearing to order.
Good morning. The Committee meets today to receive an update on
the readiness and posture of U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM) and U.S. Cyber Command.
Our witnesses are Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC),
Christopher Maier, Commander of U.S. Special Operations
Command, General Bryan Fenton, and Commander of U.S. Cyber
Command and Director of the National Security Agency, General
Paul Nakasone.
On behalf of the Committee, I would ask our witness to
convey our appreciation to the men and women you represent and
their families for their service and professionalism. We live
in a complex and dangerous global security environment. From
Russia's aggression in Europe to China's malign influence in
the Indo-Pacific, to persistent threats from Iran, North Korea,
and violent extremist groups, prevailing in this environment
will require the tailored and often clandestine capabilities
that only our special operations and cyber forces can provide.
The United States has been reducing its footprint in
conflict zones around the world. As such, the special
operations community is at an inflection point, but is no less
relevant to the future challenges we face. As the Defense
Department's recently released Joint Concept for Competing
makes clear, the object of our Nation's adversaries is to win
without fighting.
The Concept warns that if we do not adapt to the realities
of long-term competition, the United States risks ceding
strategic influence, advantage, and leverage, while preparing
for a war that never occurs.
The skills, knowledge, or perhaps most importantly, the
relationships with foreign partners that our special operations
forces have developed over the past 20 years of combat make
them well-positioned to contribute significantly to the
strategic competition. Assistant Secretary Maier and General
Fenton, I look forward to an update regarding your efforts to
focus and prepare our special operations forces (SOF) for the
challenges ahead.
In particular, I would ask that you discuss the
capabilities we need to build an enduring advantage over our
competitors, and what lessons can be drawn from the ongoing
conflict in Ukraine. As part of this, I would like to know how
you are shaping the force of the future through new recruiting
and retention efforts, including building a culture of
accountability.
A number of high-profile misconduct cases have reflected
poorly on the special operations community and additional
efforts to buildupon SOCOM's [Special Operations Command's]
2020 Comprehensive Review of Culture and Ethics, seems
necessary. I also want to hear how you are addressing the
unique challenges faced by special operations family.
The Office of the ASD [Assistant Secretary of Defense] SO/
LIC plays a critical role in the oversight of and advocacy for
our special operations forces, as the service secretary-like
civilian for SOCOM. I believe more must be done to assure ASD
SO/LIC is provided the necessary authority and resources,
including manpower, to fulfill these responsibilities. I look
forward to hearing more about the Department's efforts on this
front.
Turning to Cyber Command, I would like to commend our cyber
forces and the intelligence community for their performance
over the past year in exposing Russia's activities and helping
Ukraine defend itself against both kinetic and cyber-attacks.
Intelligence officials are understandably cautious about
revealing hardware insights on adversaries, but this current
surge has proven highly effective in strengthening the
international community's response and creating dilemmas for
Vladimir Putin.
This is a great example of competing effectively in the
information domain, and I hope we will continue to make this
kind of creative use of intelligence. Some of the tools in our
toolbox, like the section 702 authority from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, are critical to our
ability to counter our adversaries' malign activities.
The Committee would appreciate your views on the importance
of Section 702 of FISA, which sunsets at the end of this year,
and why you believe it is essential that we renew that
authority. We would like also to know what guardrails are in
place to give the public confidence that the authority is being
used judiciously.
General Nakasone, you have been working to mature the cyber
force in advance its capabilities to conduct offensive,
offensive, and supporting intelligence operations. It is widely
recognized that our cyber mission forces are struggling with
shortfalls in personnel numbers. We know that addressing this
issue is your highest priority.
The military services must also ensure their personnel
management provides qualified and trained personnel to your
Command at the beginning of their tours, so both the personnel
and the Command can take full advantage of the time of their
assignment to your force. I would also note that the private
sector has realized the immense value of our cyber operatives
and offering them very high compensation to leave the military.
The services must adjust accordingly by providing a
creative combination of incentives to compete for and retain
these personnel. Finally, over the last decade, a recurring
debate has been waged over whether to sustain the dual hat
arrangement whereby the Commander of Cyber Command also serves
as the Director of the NSA [National Security Administration].
Recently, an independent panel established by the Director
of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense and led
by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joe
Dunford, concluded that the dual hat arrangement should be
sustained. We would welcome your thoughts on this issue.
Thank you again to all witnesses for your service and
appearance before us today. I look forward to your testimony.
Now, let me recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that very fine
and thorough statement. I very much appreciate that, and I want
to thank our witnesses for being with us once again. The United
States faces the most complex and daunting set of security
challenges since the height of the cold war, and our witnesses
today are on the front lines of those challenges.
From the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) unprecedented
military buildup, growing hegemonic ambitions, to Russia's
brazen and unprovoked attack on Ukraine, our adversaries are
testing American resolve. Our foremost adversary and
competitor, the Chinese Communist Party, has stressed both
SOCOM and CYBERCOM in ways we never imagined a decade ago.
Last year, General Nakasone said Chinese advances in cyber
operations are unlike anything he has seen before. He also
noted the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a more difficult
adversary than the Soviet Union because they are much more
tolerant of risk. This presents new challenges to our
deterrence posture.
Although Beijing may be our foremost advisory, others are
not far behind. The cyber capabilities of Russia, Iran, and
North Korea have continued to surprise many. I would appreciate
an update on DOD's work to implement a zero-trust architecture
and provide defensive cyber tools across the Department and the
industrial base.
I also look forward to discussing how collaborative cyber
activities with our allies and partners such as hunt forward
operations have helped to identify vulnerabilities, mitigate
threats, and strengthen our network defenses. Military success
in cyberspace depends on the readiness of our cyber mission
forces. I hope to hear about how we can improve our cyber force
readiness and accelerate development of cyber capabilities,
particularly on the offensive side. General Fenton is no
stranger to the determination of the People's Liberation Army.
Having served as Commander of our Special Operations Forces
in the Pacific, and the Deputy Commander of INDOPACOM [Indo-
Pacific Command], his challenge is twofold, to build a force
capable of enhancing our deterrence and warfighting in the
Western Pacific, even as the threat environment facing our
Nation demands that SOCOM should remain fully engaged in the
fight against violent Islamic terrorist groups across the
world, from Africa to South Asia.
His Command's work is critical to our country's security
and is often the first to respond to our Nation's most
pressing, unforeseen emergencies. In the 2022 National Defense
Strategy. General Fenton's forces have been asked to assume
significant risk.
I think this Committee will want to ensure his Command is
fully resourced to mitigate that risk to the degree possible,
and I would also ask General Fenton and Mr. Maier whether their
authorities and resources in the upcoming year are sufficient
for mission tasks. What is clear to me is that the role and
importance of special operations forces is only increasing as
the nature and complexity of threats facing our Nation
increase.
The resources we provide to Special Operations Command
should reflect that reality. Our first job in this community is
to provide the tools our military needs to deter, and if not
successful there, to defeat these threats. There is no doubt
that continued real growth in the defense budget top line above
inflation remains essential to our national security. This
requires action now, not later.
Our adversaries are not waiting, neither should we. This
Committee led the bipartisan charge to increase the defense
budget in last year's cycle. Mr. Chairman, I frankly have
little confidence that the Administration budget request this
year will be sufficient. If it is not, this Committee will
again need to step up to ensure that our military has the
resources it needs to defend the Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our witnesses. Look
forward to hearing from you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. We will
begin with Secretary Maier, please.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER MAIER,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-
INTENSITY CONFLICT
Mr. Maier. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and
distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you for
providing the opportunity to testify on the global posture of
our Nation's Special Operations Forces, or SOF.
I am honored to appear alongside General Fenton and General
Nakasone. I could not ask for better teammates than General
Fenton and Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter in ensuring
your SOF enterprise is prepared to address the threats facing
the United States today and in meeting the challenges to come.
I start with thanking Congress, and especially this
Committee, for your enduring support of the men and women of
SOF. I am particularly grateful for your assistance in building
the organization I lead, Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict, or SO/LIC, with dedicated and gifted public servants.
Sitting before this Committee last year, I testified we
were at an inflection point in SOF's transformation to focus
more on the pacing challenge of China and the acute threat
posed by Russia, while maintaining enduring capabilities to
counter violent extremist organizations, address Iran's
destabilizing behavior, and conduct no fail crisis response
around the globe.
Today, in updating you on this progress and the work that
remains I will highlight three areas, SOF's ongoing transition
in support of the National Defense Strategy, the development of
SO/LIC, and our continued emphasis on empowering and supporting
our people.
First, we are transforming the SOF enterprise to achieve
the goals of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). While SOF's
role in counterterrorism is widely understood and appreciated,
my team and I work daily to ensure the value proposition of SOF
in integrated deterrence and campaigning against strategic
competitors is accounted for and incorporated into the
Department's processes.
As it has been in every major military challenge this
Nation has confronted since World War II, your SOF will play an
essential role. To start the deep relationship SOF has forged
with allies and partners over the last 2 decades, often through
shared challenges and sacrifice, has produced an international
SOF enterprise that provides us unique, firsthand understanding
of a global operating environment.
It also has enhanced the resilience of our allies and
partners to resist aggression. Second, drawing on the
resilience--second, drawing on those relationships and our
ability to reach some of the most difficult locations on the
globe, your SOF formations provide unique access and placement
that creates options for our Nation's leaders, and SOF as adept
at creating dilemmas for our adversaries.
Here, I would highlight the many years of our investment in
transforming the Ukrainian forces into highly capable force
that is consistently outperforming Russia on the battlefield
today. Representing the value that SOF brings to the Joint
Force is one of my primary responsibilities, and we continue to
make progress institutionalizing SO/LIC's role as Congress has
directed.
Through my role providing civilian leadership for the
organized train and equip of SOF, we have established over the
last year in the Department a series of recurring processes and
delivered key outcomes for the SOF enterprise. For example, the
Special Operations Policy Oversight Council, which I chair,
provides a senior level forum to address SOF unique challenges
across the Department.
We also have made progress on important initiatives to
deter our adversaries and fill warfighting gaps, especially on
irregular warfare and information operations. I am also proud
that SO/LIC played a central role in the Department's landmark
Civilian Harm and Mitigation Response Action Plan.
Finally, I would emphasize the first SOF truth remains
truer today than ever, humans are more important than hardware.
None of our efforts are possible without our most important
resource, our people. With the strong support of Congress, we
continue to evolve the Preservation of the Force and Family, or
POTFF Program, to address SOF unique challenges and to optimize
physical, psychological, social, spiritual, and now cognitive
performance.
We also continue to prioritize a diverse, capable force by
removing barriers to participation and advancement of SOF, an
operational imperative if we are to succeed in an ever more
complex geopolitical environment. Recent publicized challenges
remind us that we must continue to evaluate our approach to
force employment, accountability, and most importantly, present
and engaged leadership.
A healthy SOF culture that reflects our Nation's values is
essential to readiness and core to ensuring we remain the most
lethal SOF enterprise the world has ever known. Investing in
our people is a cornerstone of ensuring your SOF are ready to
take on our Nation's toughest challenges, because it is not a
question of if, but when the call will come.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of this Committee, I
thank you again for your partnership and support, and for this
opportunity to testify today. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. General Fenton,
please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL BRYAN FENTON, UNITED STATES SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND
General Fenton. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and--
--
Chairman Reed. Could you bring that closer, General, the
microphone as close as possible?
General Fenton. Thank you. How is this, Chairman? Chairman
Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished Members of this
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I am honored to testify alongside the honorable Chris
Maier and General Paul Nakasone, and I am equally honored to be
here on behalf of the dedicated men and women of U.S. Special
Operations Command.
Joining me today is Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter,
USSOCOM's Senior Enlisted Leader. Command Sergeant Major
Shorter is representative of the incredible USSOCOM team,
particularly our noncommissioned officer corps.
Our noncommissioned officers are the backbone of our
military and a decisive advantage within your special
operations community, and they make us the envy of every
military around the world. We are thankful for the leadership
and support of this Congress, particularly this Committee, a
committee with the legacies of Senators Nunn and Cohen, who had
the vision and determination to establish USSOCOM almost 36
years ago.
Thank you for your decades of steadfast support ever since.
Your special operations forces remain a national advantage, as
we enter a decisive era, an era where the strategic competitors
such as the People's Republic of China and Russia seek to
reshape the rules based international order, and in response,
your special operations forces strengthen and sustain
deterrence globally as part of the Department of Defense's
approach to integrated deterrence.
With SOF's World War II origins and DNA rooted in decades
of experience in strategic competition, now drawing upon are 20
plus years of hard-won combat credibility and coalition
experience, your SOF provide creative, tailorable, and
asymmetric options for our Nation, while creating dilemmas for
our competitors.
As part of the broader joint force, we campaign every day
to deter and prevent aggression, counter coercion, close
warfighting gaps, and tackle shared challenges alongside allies
and partners, all in support of accelerating the Department of
Defense's strategic momentum toward our NDS objectives.
Yet your SOF also remain vigilant in protecting our
Homeland and United States interests from the persistent
threats posed by global terrorist networks. In doing so, your
SOF work tirelessly alongside a trusted network of allies and
partners, U.S. interagency counterparts, and our Joint Force
teammates to disrupt VEOs wherever they may be.
While we campaign for integrated deterrence and counter
violent extremists, your SOF capability to respond to crisis
represent a critical strategic edge and advantage for our
Nation. Agile, tailored, modernized, and capable, they enable
us to undertake sensitive, high-risk missions, crucial to
safeguarding and rescuing our citizens, and protecting vital
national interests.
Foundational to all these efforts remains our longstanding
collaborative partnership with ASD SO/LIC [Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict's]
Chris Maier and his team. The oversight, policy guidance, and
advocacy within the Department provided by AS SO/LIC are
essential for the modernization, readiness, and well-being of
our SOF units and their families.
Together, we are committed to placing people as our number
one priority, and we are preparing for the future by investing
in them and by leveraging our Nation's diverse talent to solve
diverse challenges. To those listening today who are
considering service to our Nation know the profound sense of
calling and purpose that those of us serving in uniform share.
We know that a deeply rewarding journey lies ahead for
those who choose to join. You will be part of an incredible
team of men and women tackling the toughest challenges for our
Nation. Just yesterday, I had the privilege of hearing from
Colonel retired Parris Davis, our Nation's most recent Medal of
Honor recipient, and a Green Beret.
At yesterday's ceremony to induct him into the Pentagon's
Hall of Heroes, he summed up his military service and time with
a Green Beret in three words, purpose, opportunity, and pride.
As we speak here today, more than 5,000 servicemembers are
USSOCOM are deployed, and they share his sense of purpose and
pride.
They are defending our Nation and standing shoulder to
shoulder with allies and partners in over 80 countries to make
our world a safer place. The courage and commitment of our
special operations community, our military inspires the CSM and
me daily, and we are immensely proud to serve with them. I look
forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of The Honorable Christopher
P. Maier and General Bryan P. Fenton follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Christopher P. Maier and
General Bryan P. Fenton
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished Members of
this Committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the posture
of our Nation's Special Operations Forces (SOF). We are honored to
present an account of the priorities, activities, and investments that
ensure SOF are prepared to meet today's challenges and those to come.
On behalf of the Special Operations community, we thank you for
your leadership and steadfast support. Congress's support ensures our
SOF remain the world's most capable and credible, contributing
integrally to safeguarding and advancing U.S. national interests. Both
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Office of Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) were established through
the foresight and determination of Congress. Your enduring commitment
enables our force to tackle the Nation's most challenging security
problems while building enduring advantages.
SOF remain a national advantage in this decisive decade, as they
have been since their formation. This will be an era marked by dramatic
geopolitical, technological, economic, and environmental changes
globally. SOF combine decades of combat-tested and coalition experience
to advance Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to strengthen and
sustain deterrence with creative, tailorable, and asymmetric options
for our Nation. Together, SO/LIC and USSOCOM directly contribute to DOD
and broader U.S. efforts to deter aggression by our strategic
competitors, counter acute forms of coercion, and tackle shared
challenges alongside our Allies and partners. With our unmatched
capabilities, SOF also remain vigilant and committed to protecting
Americans and America's interests globally with enduring responsibility
for countering violent extremist organizations and responding to
crisis.
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is clear that we will advance
our priorities through integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions
that build enduring advantages. Integrated deterrence requires the
United States to sustain strategic deterrence and its conventional
military advantage, including in space and cyberspace--complemented by
credible irregular warfare capabilities. Competitors continue to seek
advantage through coercive and malign activities in the ``gray zone''
below a threshold they perceive as likely to prompt a U.S. military
response. SOF are uniquely positioned to draw upon our joint, global,
full-spectrum, all-domain capabilities to provide asymmetric options
for our Nation and create dilemmas for competitors, allowing our Joint
Force to gain warfighting advantage and close warfighting
vulnerabilities.
To ensure SOF are well-prepared for current and future challenges,
we are focused on supporting our shared priorities--People, Win, and
Transform--to strengthen our force and families, succeed for the
Nation, and modernize for the future.
Advancing Civilian-Military Partnership
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict's (ASD(SO/LIC)) oversight, policy guidance, and
advocacy within DOD are essential for the modernization, readiness, and
well-being of SOF and their families. As ASD(SO/LIC) reports directly
to the Secretary of Defense in exercising authority, direction, and
control of special operations-peculiar administrative matters, SO/LIC
maintains a seat at the table alongside Secretaries of the Military
Departments in key decision forums, such as the regular Service
Secretary meetings, the Deputy's Management Action Group, and the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council. Participation in these forums empower
ASD(SO/LIC) to provide effective and enduring civilian representation
of SOF equities and competencies to DOD and national leadership--a
voice that is even more important in this period of strategic
transition for the Department and for SOF.
SO/LIC's unique role ensures key SOF-led capabilities are
integrated into strategic concepts and associated investments are made
to critical priorities such as irregular warfare, operations in the
information environment, and undersea capabilities. SO/LIC ensures SOF
concepts and capabilities inform and support DOD's broader planning,
investment, capability development, and experimentation. For example,
the Special Operations Policy Oversight Council (SOPOC) enhances
integration between SOF, the Military Services, and the Combatant
Commands, with the shared goal of ensuring SOF can meet Joint Force
requirements with essential support from the Department. SO/LIC has
instituted regular meetings of the SOPOC to integrate governance of SOF
as well as SOF capabilities and processes across DOD as envisioned
through the enactment of reforms in the Fiscal Year 2017 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and subsequent legislation.
Additionally, senior leaders from SO/LIC, USSOCOM, and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) co-
chair a biannual SOF Acquisition Summit--with participants from each
Military Department and several USD-level organizations--to address
challenges impacting USSOCOM's acquisition, technology, and logistics
efforts in order to enable agile and innovative support to SOF
operations.
The SO/LIC-USSOCOM relationship is defined by multilayered
collaboration, characterized by near-continuous engagement across all
echelons from top leadership to working levels. Over the past year,
this collaborative partnership has continued to deepen as we have been
developing a co-authored future operating concept, detailing our vision
for SOF operating alongside the Joint Force in the future and guiding
near-term force design considerations. At the heart of this operating
concept are our three shared priorities: People, Win, and Transform.
people: strengthen our force & families
Our people are the competitive and comparative advantage of our SOF
formations. The creativity and commitment of these men and women are
essential to adapting tactics, technologies, and organizations for
tomorrow's challenges. We believe unreservedly that the first SOF Truth
endures: ``Humans are more important than hardware.'' Together, we are
committed to investing in our people through tailored education and
training, leveraging our Nation's diverse talent, and enhancing
readiness, resilience, and professionalism.
Investing in Our People
We continue to invest in our men and women by adapting SOF-peculiar
education and training for both today's environment and future
requirements, coupled with tailored talent management for our highly
skilled personnel. In full partnership with the Services, SOF-focused
recruiting, assessing, training, and education yields the most highly
developed workforce within DOD--often with language, regional
expertise, and cultural knowledge proficiency unique to SOF.
SOF's persistent, global campaigning efforts enable tactical units
to cull the latest battlefield lessons learned--notably from Eastern
Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East--while continually
adapting and improving the specialized training pipelines. SOF service
components institutionalize these lessons and pair them with
requirements to prepare the force to integrate new and emerging
technologies.
As one example, USSOCOM's Joint Special Operations University
(JSOU) provides the unique ability to offer SOF-peculiar, joint
education and academic expertise for the force, bridging the gap
between practitioners and academia. JSOU hones its educational
offerings to complement Service-specific professional military
education programs with tailored courses. Publications, such as the
Resistance Operating Concept, ensure both SOF practitioners and Allied
and partner SOF are equipped with academic resources relevant to
current challenges.
As another example, the Army SOF component--via U.S. Army Special
Operations Command's (USASOC) John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School--has adapted its training enterprise for the evolving
strategic environment. The Special Forces pipeline recently modernized
portions of its heavy weapons, anti-armor demolitions, and long-range
communications courses to better operate alongside local partners in
contested environments--drawing upon the operational requirements and
lessons learned in Eastern Europe. The Civil Affairs qualification
course modernized its culmination exercise to focus on pre-conflict
strategic competition and setting conditions for the rapid
reconstitution of governance immediately following a near-peer
conflict. The Psychological Operations culmination exercise now
incorporates synthetic internet and real-time sentiment analysis to
educate students on foreign malign influence techniques and activities
in the information environment. Finally, USASOC recently established a
robotics and unmanned systems integration course that teaches students
how to fabricate, integrate, and employ unmanned systems--while also
training how to counter these same technologies. With support from SO/
LIC, these changes were informed by SOF experimentation in the Indo-
Pacific, lessons learned in the Middle East, and observations from
Russia's ongoing, brutal war in Ukraine.
To steward investments in education and training, SOF talent
management enables USSOCOM to address distinct career needs and best
use the skills of its talented, high-demand, low-density workforce.
Specialized training and operational experience for personnel engaged
in unique, and often sensitive, SOF activities require a more flexible
career management system. A tailored career model optimizes operational
employment potential for individuals with unique skill sets while
providing incentives to attract and retain the most talented
individuals to select SOF career fields. Additionally, the increasing
complexity of the operating environment and the realities of ubiquitous
technical surveillance require a greater emphasis on identity
management and expansion of advanced skill sets across the SOF
enterprise.
Leveraging Diverse Talent
As the NDS highlights, our dynamic, diverse, and innovative society
remains a core strength and source of American advantage. Maintaining
the world's finest SOF in the decades to come requires leveraging all
the dimensions of diversity within the Nation's deep pools of talent.
Building a diverse force is both an operational and strategic
imperative for SOF.
We continue reinforcing efforts to enhance diversity in our
workforce and foster inclusive work environments through USSOCOM's
Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan and the accompanying 2022
Implementation Action Plan--as outlined in the April 2022 presentation
to Congress. The SOF enterprise is committed to welcoming all capable
individuals, ensuring they are part of inclusive teams, and supporting
their equitable career advancement. The SOF Executive Committee on
Diversity and Inclusion--co-chaired by SO/LIC and USSOCOM--continues to
provide senior-leader oversight and fosters accountability for
sustained progress in implementation.
We continue to make essential progress in removing barriers to
women's and minorities' participation and advancement within SOF while
also working with the Services to attract the best talent. Women and
minority servicemembers serve in key leadership roles throughout all
four SOF components and within various SOF headquarters. Women have
also continued to successfully enter SOF-specific career fields within
our most elite units. Throughout SOF, women servicemembers'
representation has increased approximately 40 percent over the past 5
years. While this progress is important and notable, it is not
sufficient. Our sustained commitment to the Diversity, Equity,
Inclusion, and Accessibility strategic goals and implementing
successful best practices from across the enterprise will spur
continued progress.
In 2022, USASOC released its ``Women in Army SOF Study'' to
identify barriers female servicemembers encounter and establish best
practices to recruit, integrate, and retain women in our formation.
Based upon input from over 5,000 participants, the study's findings
generated 42 recommendations related to education and training,
equipment modernization, mentorship and sponsorship, healthcare,
childcare and other matters. Though specific to the Army component,
many of the findings are applicable across the joint SOF enterprise and
will inform future joint implementation efforts.
Additionally, in August 2022, the Navy SOF component--Naval Special
Warfare Command (NSW)--formally established its Assessment Command
(NSWAC) to transform how its units compete for talent by building a
sustainable architecture for diversified outreach, by conducting more
rigorous pre-assessments for character, cognitive, and leadership
attributes, and by strengthening NSW's culture of continuous
assessment. NSWAC is taking a whole-person approach to identify,
prepare, and mentor qualified candidates from diverse backgrounds to
complete training programs and pursue a successful career in NSW. As
this new command was being developed, NSW conducted 60 outreach events
with more than half specifically focused on increasing force diversity
and inclusivity with underrepresented demographics. These efforts will
enhance the way NSW continuously assesses and selects its incoming
officers and enlisted personnel.
The SOF enterprise similarly requires a highly skilled and diverse
civilian workforce. Like our uniformed personnel, USSOCOM's civilian
workforce includes women and minority members serving in key roles
throughout its components and various headquarters, including in senior
executive leadership positions.
At the same time, SO/LIC has continued to make progress in
establishing and filling civilian positions for the Secretariat for
Special Operations to support the ASD(SO/LIC)'s administrative
oversight responsibilities. Over the past several years, these efforts
have resulted in a team of highly skilled and experienced civilian
personnel with expertise in capabilities development, budget,
acquisition, civilian and military personnel, force management,
legislative affairs, and special access programs. Given the relatively
small size of the Secretariat, we continue to focus our hiring efforts
on areas where civilian oversight can have the greatest impact on SOF
readiness, resiliency, and transformation to meet future challenges.
Enhancing Readiness, Resilience & Professionalism
The Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) program--along
with our Warrior Care Program (WCP)--continues to enhance readiness and
resilience for our formation and their families. The POTFF program
delivers a holistic, multifaceted approach to human performance,
resilience, and rehabilitation through a combination of USSOCOM,
Service, and DOD resources. The WCP provides recovery care coordination
for those who have been challenged due to wounds, injuries, or
illnesses. SOF commanders have overwhelmingly embraced both programs as
critical to promoting career longevity, mitigating injury, enhancing
retention, and increasing quality of life. The combination of POTFF and
WCP provides a continuum of support for our personnel through
performance enhancement, injury recovery, and transition assistance.
An increased focus on cognitive performance and brain health is
necessary to prepare SOF to operate in an increasingly complex,
information-rich environment. This focus complements POTFF's broader
holistic approach to human performance across five domains--
psychological, cognitive, physical, spiritual, and social and family.
Cutting-edge work in the cognitive performance arena has also resulted
in demonstrated improvements in self-regulation, cognitive processing
speed, and sustained attention among the majority of those
participating in cognitive training. Additionally, USSOCOM has
partnered with DOD Health Affairs and the DOD Traumatic Brain Injury
(TBI) Center of Excellence on brain health initiatives to include
enhancing TBI prevention efforts, surveillance modalities, treatment
protocols, and research studies. We are grateful for Congress's support
in all these areas, including the fiscal year 2023 appropriation to
continue a pilot study into the long-term effects of repetitive low-
level blast exposure in SOF--another of USSOCOM's ongoing brain-health
initiatives.
We remain determined to prevent suicide and other forms of self-
harm. SOF leaders focus on underlying risk factors through continuous
training and education. We have also engaged the Nation's leading
experts to identify novel ways to address this problem. Through
persistent efforts to destigmatize seeking care, we have witnessed an
increase in servicemembers seeking preventative mental health
resources. Thanks to a combination of POTFF and Defense Health Agency
resources, access to both preventative and emergency mental health care
has improved measurably.
The WCP provides valuable support and advocacy for wounded,
injured, and ill SOF personnel. Over the past year, we have retained
nearly 70 percent of wounded SOF in military service, keeping the
talents and dedication of these highly trained, skilled, and
experienced personnel in our formation. The WCP also remains a trusted
partner and tireless advocate for expanding government and private
capabilities to care for our servicemembers and their families,
including through both increased access to programs at the Department
of Veterans Affairs (VA) polytrauma facilities and novel partnerships
with non-Federal entities. We appreciate Congress' support for Section
522 of the fiscal year 2023 NDAA which included a USSOCOM-initiated
proposal to improve servicemembers' ability to receive charitable
support in order to fill gaps in services that neither DOD nor the VA
can provide.
Supporting families also remains a critical component of enhancing
readiness and resilience within SOF. A range of family focused
initiatives support our force and their families across all Service
components. As one example over the past year, we have acted to expand
childcare access by facilitating Service funding for the Child
Development Center at Camp Bull Simons on Eglin Air Force Base,
Florida. Our men and women of the Army's 7th Special Forces Group, and
other units in the area, stand to benefit from this expanded support
from both the Departments of the Air Force and Army.
Our enduring commitment to professionalism within SOF is critical
to preserving the trust of our Nation and senior leaders that we have
earned over decades. This commitment includes sustaining high
professional standards, emphasizing engaged leadership, and maintaining
accountability. We are nearing full implementation of the
recommendations from the 2019 Comprehensive Review on SOF Culture and
Ethics, on which we routinely report to Congress, including as detailed
in the forthcoming biannual report. The Comprehensive Review
Implementation Team has diligently overseen the continued efforts to
codify institutional adjustments. USSOCOM's components have taken
active roles in refining their processes to select key leaders,
enhancing ethical training throughout the force, and ensuring
accountability for lapses in conduct--all of which will continue.
Behavior that erodes hard-earned trust or threatens cohesiveness--
especially harassment, assault, and extremism in any form--has no place
in SOF formations. Period. We will continue aggressively implementing
our prevention and response programs and vigorously investigating
allegations of misconduct and holding personnel accountable, as
appropriate. We continue to execute all DOD and Service policies,
including the ongoing implementation of the Sexual Assault Independent
Review Commission recommendations to improve reporting processes,
victim advocacy, and prevention of harmful behaviors. We are
fundamentally committed to removing behaviors that promote
discrimination, hate, or harassment and that are inconsistent with the
oaths to defend the Constitution against all enemies foreign and
domestic.
win: succeed for the nation
SOF are strengthening and sustaining deterrence globally as part of
DOD's approach to integrated deterrence. Drawing upon decades of
combat-credibility and coalition experience, SOF provide tailorable,
asymmetric options for our Nation while creating dilemmas for strategic
competitors. With a range of options to deter aggression and counter
coercion, SOF support Joint Force deterrence, including by bolstering
Allies' and partners' resilience and resistance, ensuring precision
access, countering misinformation, and mitigating risk.
Our SOF enterprise supports NDS priority efforts to deter
aggression by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia--
strategic competitors who threaten the rules-based international order.
We continue to focus our campaigning activities to support these joint,
interagency, and multinational efforts while also providing asymmetric
approaches to compete as both the PRC and Russia seek resources and
partnerships globally, including in Africa, the Middle East, and South
America. By persistent campaigning, SOF actively compete for influence
while identifying coercive and malign behavior in the ``gray zone''--
often offering options to judiciously counter such behavior.
SOF leverage unique authorities to collaborate and operate with
Allies and partners--our greatest strategic advantage for tackling
shared challenges and promoting effective integrated deterrence. Since
September 11, 2001, the transnational shared challenge of violent
extremism has necessitated deep integration with capable Allies and
partners, often via their SOF units and their own interagency partners.
Operations over the past 20 years have also necessitated leveraging the
unique capabilities of our U.S. interagency community and integrating
with the Joint Force across domains.
While the threat of violent extremism persists today and will
continue in the years to come, we have honed our approach to conduct
sustainable counter violent extremist organizations (C-VEO) operations
and remain vigilant in protecting Americans and America's interests
globally. The SOF enterprise stands committed to succeed for the Nation
by strengthening our partnerships, campaigning for integrated
deterrence, countering violent extremism, and leading in our DOD-wide
responsibilities.
Strengthening Partnerships
Partnerships are fundamental to SOF and to all our missions and
endeavors. We now benefit from unparalleled integration with our Allies
and partners, the interagency community, and the Joint Force
strengthened over decades and honed particularly over the past 2
decades of global operations. While the shared challenge of countering
violent extremism facilitated unprecedented levels of operational
partnerships, these mutually beneficial relationships have extended to
the full range of SOF operations globally. Ever-expanding partnerships
remain the cornerstone of SOF campaigning.
SOF benefit from our Nation's unmatched network of Allies and
partners. We cannot surge trust in a crisis, so we work every day to
sustain this distinct strategic advantage over our adversaries by
reinforcing America's latticework of Allies and partners. At its
headquarters alone, USSOCOM hosts exchange officers and foreign liaison
officers from 27 Allied and partner nations, offering an unrivaled
ability to provide options to understand and act worldwide.
Through persistent engagement over decades, SOF have fostered
extensive interoperability and generational relationships with Allied
and partner SOF, deepened by operating shoulder-to-shoulder during
combat and other high-risk operations for over 2 decades. Authorities
under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 333 (Building Partner Capacity) and 10 U.S.C.
Sec. 322 (SOF Training)--the latter enabling the Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET) program--are essential to further enhancing
collaboration and promoting interoperability. In 2022, SOF formations
executed 173 JCETs in 77 countries training over 2,000 U.S. SOF
personnel alongside over 7,000 Allied and partner counterparts.
SOF's integration with our U.S. interagency partners is equally
important to leverage our Nation's full capabilities to enhance
awareness and provide expanded options. This set of trusted
relationships facilitates information sharing, enables collaboration,
improves decisionmaking, and enhances synchronization for effective
whole-of-government responses. Routine collaboration with interagency
partners--such as the Department of State, the Department of Justice,
the Department of the Treasury, and the National Counterterrorism
Center, among many others--has enhanced USSOCOM's response to a range
of threats over the past year, including adversary unmanned aerial
systems, violent extremism, adversary misinformation, and near-peer
malign activities.
As one example, Operation Gallant Phoenix (OGP)--a U.S. interagency
and multinational C-VEO initiative launched by USSOCOM in 2014--has
enabled international and interagency partners to share information and
disrupt VEOs. Coupled with Counter Threat Finance authorities and
expertise, information-sharing operations, like OGP, continue to
provide expanded options to disrupt illicit financing and deter malign
activities. Well beyond C-VEO efforts, the OGP model is applicable to
countering coercive activities in the ``gray zone'' and deterring
aggression.
USSOCOM also maintains collaborative, mutually supporting
relationships across the Joint Force. Close coordination with
Geographic Combatant Commands enables SOF to support both regional and
transregional campaigning efforts--particularly important as
competitors, like the PRC and Russia, pursue malign strategic
objectives globally. USSOCOM's Theater Special Operations Commands--
each aligned with a specific Geographic Combatant Command--coordinate
SOF campaigning in their respective theaters, ensuring activities both
support regional strategic objectives and maximize transregional
efforts. Operating transregionally has proven critical for C-VEO
efforts and is necessary to gain advantage over strategic competitors,
particularly in countering coercive ``gray zone'' activities. Strong
collaboration with Functional Combatant Commands also ensures
synchronization across essential warfighting domains.
Special Operations, Cyber, and Space forces are unique in their
global reach, persistence, endurance, and responsiveness. Each brings
complementary capabilities to enable our respective missions. SOF often
require cyberspace and space capabilities to see and sense the
operational environment, or if required, to strike an adversary.
Cyberspace operations may rely on SOF's physical access and placement
to deliver effects. All of these capabilities can be integrated into
campaigns, which enhance the effectiveness of the Joint Force. Our
ongoing efforts to enhance SOF-Cyber-Space capabilities continue to
evolve and now include integration with USSTRATCOM capabilities. This
effort leverages quadrilateral coordination and synergy among USSOCOM,
USCYBERCOM, USSPACECOM, and now USSTRATCOM in addition to other
interagency partners. This partnership generated new options to bolster
deterrence by building warfighting advantage and closing warfighting
gaps across domains and regions--while providing options for escalation
management. In this effort and others, USSOCOM's Space Force Service
Element remains critical to integrating space-based capabilities and
identifying SOF-peculiar space requirements.
Last, our efforts to promote opportunities for experimentation
between SOF components and their respective Services have deepened
ties, resulted in operational breakthroughs, and improved warfighting
effectiveness. In 2022, USSOCOM participated in the Army's Project
Convergence, experimenting with SOF, cyber, and space capabilities to
disrupt near-peer adversaries. Further, SOF supported the USEUCOM-
sponsored ``Atreus'' series of operations, conducting the first-ever
demonstration of the palletized precision munition in Europe. Combining
Air Force innovation efforts with the air-drop expertise of Air Force
SOF and our MC-130 crews enabled the launch of multiple, long-range
offensive weapons from nontraditional strike platforms, like cargo
aircraft. Efforts like these create credible, strategic dilemmas for
our competitors and deepen ties with our Allies and partners.
Campaigning for Integrated Deterrence
SOF campaign globally and across domains to strengthen and sustain
deterrence, supporting DOD's integrated deterrence. SOF operations,
activities, and investments can undermine adversary confidence that
their aggression will succeed, shaping their decision calculus. The
access, placement, and influence generated by SOF's long-term
commitments to building partner capacity and improving interoperability
provide expanded, low-cost options to gain awareness, shape the
operating environment, and present adversaries with multiple dilemmas.
Additionally, SOF remain ideally suited to identify a competitor's
coercive activities in the ``gray zone'' and counter them with
deliberate, credible options while managing escalation.
SOF's placement and access are unique in their breadth. Over 5,000
SOF are currently deployed to over 80 countries executing a range of
activities that enable the Joint Force to campaign for military
advantage. Our active duty force is bolstered by National Guard and
Reserve SOF supporting wide-ranging operations globally in over 30
countries. This multifunctional reserve component also deployed
domestically to 18 states last year, providing essential Defense
Support to Civil Authorities and natural disaster relief.
Our SOF enterprise continues to refine its campaigning activities
to support priority efforts to deter aggression by the PRC and Russia--
with an emphasis on the PRC as our pacing challenge. Efforts to compete
with the PRC are not limited to the Indo-Pacific, and neither are the
efforts to compete with Russia limited to Europe. Though SOF are active
in both regions, these strategic competitors seek resources and
partnerships globally, competing with us and our Allies and partners
for influence in Africa, the Middle East, and South America.
Over the past 4 years, SOF's campaigning activities to counter
coercion and deter aggression by strategic competitors have more than
tripled--comprising nearly 50 percent of the deployed forces in fiscal
year 2023. SOF also provide specialized expertise from our stateside
forces to support Combatant Command priorities globally through U.S.-
based operational support--a disciplined approach to provide tailored,
low-density capabilities to support specific operational needs.
In the Indo-Pacific, SOF continue longstanding efforts to build
partner capacity with Allies and partners, building generational
relationships grounded in trust. We remain focused on honing the core
maritime capabilities of the NSW and Marine Raider formations to
preserve and strengthen U.S. warfighting advantage. Multiple SOF
elements, including Air Force Special Operations units, leverage large-
scale, joint exercises to experiment with emerging technologies and
creative options to extend SOF's operational reach.
In Eastern Europe, SOF continue their decades-long commitment to
enhancing interoperability with Allied SOF throughout Europe.
Additionally, SOF operate alongside critical Allies to support whole-
of-nation resilience efforts and enhance resistance capabilities if
threatened with territorial aggression. SO/LIC and USSOCOM also
actively support United States efforts to bolster Ukraine's defense
following Russia's ongoing brutal and unprovoked invasion--fully
aligning these activities with Security Assistance Group--Ukraine.
Since 2014, following Russia's previous aggression in Crimea and
Eastern Ukraine, SOF supported multinational training efforts with
Ukrainian SOF forces and provided Military Information Support
Operations assistance to illuminate and counter Russian disinformation.
Strategic competitors--specifically Russia--threaten established
international rules in the Arctic and pose increasing challenges to
North American security. SOF play a role in bolstering domain awareness
and integrated deterrence in the Arctic as part of the Joint Force.
Over the past year, SOF strengthened capabilities to operate and
prevail in the austere Arctic environment. Large-scale, joint exercises
and operations, such as Arctic Edge and Polar Dagger, provided venues
for more than 500 U.S. and multinational SOF to experiment and operate
in the North American Arctic region.
A critical way the Department is seeking to gain and maintain
enduring advantage in strategic competition is through SOF-led, but not
SOF-limited, irregular warfare (IW) operations, activities and
investments. IW is a critical tool to campaign across the spectrum of
conflict, enhance interoperability and access, and disrupt competitor
warfighting advantages while reinforcing our own. To further
institutionalize IW across the Joint Force, we are updating policy,
informing doctrine, and modernizing IW education and training. Through
the establishment of the Irregular Warfare Center, we will continue to
strengthen our understanding of IW through research, analysis, and
engagement with Allies and partners.
SOF continue to campaign in the information environment, exposing
and countering adversary propaganda and disinformation to better
compete in the cognitive dimension. The PRC and Russia continue to act
assertively in the information environment to manipulate populations
worldwide. As DOD's Joint Proponent for Military Information Support
Operations (MISO) and the Coordinating Authority for Internet-based
MISO, we are adapting our psychological operations forces for the
evolving information environment. SO/LIC continues to improve guidance
for and oversight of those who organize, train, and equip these
specialized forces and those who conduct operations in the information
environment. As part of the ongoing rebalancing efforts, MISO
activities to counter strategic competitors have more than tripled over
the past 3 years--comprising over 60 percent of the MISO activities
worldwide in fiscal year 2022. The USSOCOM-hosted Joint MISO WebOps
Center (JMWC) continues to coordinate Combatant Commands' MISO
conducted via the internet and actively engage foreign audiences to
illuminate and counter hostile propaganda and disinformation.
SOF's crisis response capabilities remain a critical strategic
hedge and advantage for the Nation. Agile, tailored capabilities enable
SOF to execute no-fail hostage rescue missions and to counter an
adversary's efforts to produce or deploy weapons of mass destruction.
Repeatedly during 2022, SOF provided vital forces and command and
control for crises requiring rapid deployment, complex problem-solving,
and synchronized effects--whether responding to regional crises or
safeguarding Americans globally. USSOCOM continues to optimize its
global posture while sustaining the ability to respond to crises
worldwide.
Last, the critical authorities granted by Congress continue to
allow SOF to campaign effectively against State and non-State actors,
achieving an outsized impact across multiple mission sets. Operations
supported by fiscal year 2018 NDAA Section 1202 (Irregular Warfare)
have proven essential for applying SOF capabilities to expose malign
activity and impose costs on malign actors. Operations supported by 10
U.S.C. Sec. 127e (Counterterrorism) provide flexible options to apply
counterterrorism (CT) pressure in otherwise inaccessible or contested
areas--increasingly important as USSOCOM optimizes its C-VEO
capabilities. Authorities under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 127f (Clandestine
Operational Preparation of the Environment) and Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA
Section 1057 (Intelligence / Counterintelligence) support SOF
activities with greater clarity and transparency, providing options to
campaign for U.S. advantage.
Countering Violent Extremism
We remain vigilant in protecting Americans and America's interests
globally through SOF's enduring C-VEO capabilities. SOF have played a
critical role in degrading VEOs and disrupting innumerable plots to
attack Americans and our interests since September 11, 2001. SOF
formations continue to work tirelessly alongside trusted Allies and
partners, our U.S. interagency counterparts, and Joint Force teammates,
harnessing important capabilities to address the shared challenge of
violent extremism and global terrorist networks that threaten our
Homeland, our citizens, and our interests overseas.
As we focus our campaigning efforts to address the priorities of
integrated deterrence, SOF continue to pursue a sustainable approach to
C-VEO operations by prioritizing threats, working closely with
international and interagency partners, and modernizing approaches to
degrade VEO capabilities. Wherever feasible, SOF embrace a ``partner-
led, U.S.-enabled'' campaign approach to C-VEO, built on a disciplined
prioritization of risks to drive decisionmaking and avoid strategic
distraction. This approach allows partner-led, unified action to pool
resources and share responsibility for our shared security challenges,
reducing our collective security burden. We will leverage and enable
our partners' unique capabilities to provide an expanded array of
options to disrupt VEO threats.
For example, during operations over the past year to counter the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), SOF have worked closely with
international and interagency partners to disrupt illicit financing,
interdict foreign fighters, and illuminate propaganda.
USSOCOM continues leading in its role as the DOD's Coordinating
Authority for C-VEO through our Department-wide campaign planning,
assessments, and recommendations. Its annual VEO threat assessment
highlights its transregional approach involving multiple Combatant
Commands.
Violent extremists will continue to use terrorism as a tactic to
achieve their objectives. Drivers of extremist violence exist in deep,
multigenerational ideological divisions that military force alone
cannot overcome. Ongoing geopolitical, technological, economic, and
environmental change often exacerbate regional instability, threatening
effective governance and fueling radicalization. As a result, violent
extremism and terrorism will persist in the future, representing an
enduring threat to the United States, our Allies, and partners.
After sustained global pressure since 2001, the threat to the
United States Homeland posed by VEOs based in the Middle East and
Africa has diminished, yet persists. Further, the threat to United
States citizens and interests overseas remains. The continued
availability of safe havens and under-governed spaces perpetuate the
risks of VEOs' external attacks. In East Africa, al-Shabaab presents an
ongoing risk to United States interests both in Somalia and throughout
the region. In West and Central Africa, the operations of Russian
private military company Wagner are only exacerbating threats posed by
al-Qaeda's affiliate JNIM and ISIS. In Afghanistan, ISIS-Khorasan is
strengthening its connections to the wider ISIS enterprise and
increasing attacks across the region. In Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula presents a continued threat of conducting or directing
attacks externally. In Iraq and Syria, ISIS senior leaders demonstrate
the intent and capability to target American interests despite the
losses of critical operatives and personnel since 2019. Senior al Qaeda
leaders also remain committed to attacking the United States Homeland
and continue to encourage attacks by their affiliates.
Violent extremists continue to incorporate new technologies and
adapt their tactics, posing an ongoing global threat to our citizens
and a risk to the effectiveness of our CT efforts. Adversary unmanned
aerial systems (UAS) pose a pressing challenge, exhibiting a rapid
evolution in employment and lethality exceeding improvised explosive
devices over the past 2 decades. While the evolving UAS threat from
VEOs is troubling, capable State adversaries and their aligned
paramilitary forces have also successfully employed UAS to target
American, Allied, and partner forces--most notably in Iraq and Syria
over the past year. Given these trends, SOF must continue to modernize
for the evolving CT environment.
Advancing Department-Level Responsibilities
In addition to USSOCOM's designation as DOD's Coordinating
Authority for C-VEO and Internet-based MISO, the command also invests
heavily in its longtime role as the Coordinating Authority for
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (C-WMD) and its recently
established role as Global Coordinator for Counter-Small UAS (C-sUAS)
Prior-to-Launch efforts. USSOCOM continues to provide DOD-wide campaign
planning, assessments, and recommendations in these capacities.
The command's role as DOD's Coordinating Authority for C-WMD draws
upon its international, interagency, and joint relationships to counter
WMD proliferation and deter aggressive actions by State and non-State
actors. Aligned with DOD's strategic priorities, USSOCOM hosted a PRC-
focused C-WMD Senior Leaders Seminar focusing on threats within the
Indo-Pacific. This event bolstered support to DOD-wide strategies,
plans, and policies while improving interoperability with our
international partners. USSOCOM seeks to incorporate select Allies and
interagency partners to an even greater degree in the planning efforts
for the updated DOD Functional Campaign Plan to Counter WMD. The
forthcoming, revised plan will drive deeper interoperability and
strengthen deterrence to defend the Homeland and our Allies' and
partners' interests.
In addition to DOD-wide responsibilities, USSOCOM supports
Geographic Combatant Command planning efforts with critical expertise
in this specialized C-WMD field. USSOCOM forward-positioned C-WMD
subject matter experts to augment and assist USEUCOM contingency
planning efforts prior to the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
This proactive posture ensured critical chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear defense readiness considerations were
included in regional campaign plans.
Similar to its Coordinating Authority role for C-WMD, USSOCOM
continues to expand and refine its efforts as the Global Coordinator
for C-sUAS Prior to Launch efforts, by identifying opportunities to
target and disrupt adversarial sUAS and the networks responsible for
production, proliferation, and use. In this capacity, the command is
actively coordinating with Combatant Commands to synchronize
requirements for intelligence collection, technology development,
operations, and plans--all closely aligned with interagency and
intelligence community partners intended to disrupt sUAS prior to
launch. Further, USSOCOM is working closely with SO/LIC and across the
DOD on C-sUAS-related policy, authorities, and resources to enhance
SOF's capability to lead in this role.
SO/LIC and USSOCOM continue to support DOD's civilian harm
mitigation and response (CHMR) efforts. Both SO/LIC and USSOCOM played
a central role in the development of the Civilian Harm Mitigation and
Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP) and continue to support its ongoing
implementation. SO/LIC leads CHMR policy efforts within DOD and serves
as the executive secretariat for the CHMR Steering Committee, which is
co-chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Comptroller. In
furtherance of that effort, ASD(SO/LIC) co-chairs regular sub-steering
committee meetings with representatives from across the force to
advance CHMR-AP implementation across DOD.
Finally, apart from Coordinating Authority roles, USSOCOM also
serves as the DOD's lead component for synchronizing Counter Threat
Finance activities, including integrating, standardizing, and
advocating for this important capability. The 10 U.S.C. Sec. 284
(Support to Counterdrug Activities and Activities to Counter
Transnational Organized Crime) authorities and the associated Fiscal
Year 2004 NDAA Section 1022 authorities remain valuable assets,
supporting interagency partners to identify and counter competitors'
illicit activities in the ``gray zone.'' These authorities provide
options to illuminate and counter malign activity by global terrorist
networks and PRC-and Russian-affiliated transnational organized
criminal networks, which are often closely tied to illicit networks
associated with drug trafficking organizations.
transform: modernize for the future
We are building enduring advantage by the continued investment in
our people, technologies, and organizations--marked by a commitment to
evolve, modernize, and optimize for the future operating environment.
Our future operating concept will guide this ongoing transformation
through a focused force design effort that examines how we envision SOF
operating as part of the Joint Force in the future.
With the direction and advocacy of SO/LIC, USSOCOM is accelerating
its wide-ranging modernization efforts and leveraging its essential
acquisition authorities that enable it to capitalize on our Nation's
innovation ecosystem--with an emphasis on surface and subsurface
maritime platforms; counter-UAS; next-generation intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); mission command systems; and
collaborative and autonomous unmanned systems. Modernization also
requires strategic discipline and a complementary emphasis on divesting
dated or obsolete platforms that are no longer operationally relevant
or effective in the current and future environments.
We seek to set the gold standard for data-driven decisionmaking for
our Service-like and Combatant Command responsibilities--focusing on
the talent, architecture, and processes needed to capitalize on data
and artificial intelligence (AI)-related technologies. This includes
partnering with industry and academia to modernize our digital
infrastructure, foster a data-literate workforce, and apply data
analytics and AI for decision insight from the headquarters to the
tactical edge.
To set resourcing priorities for future capability development, SO/
LIC and USSOCOM jointly issued Capabilities and Programming Guidance
which formed the basis of SOF's 5-year Program Objective Memorandum and
the President's budget request. Additionally, ASD(SO/LIC) designated
two ``special interest'' acquisition programs--undersea maritime
platforms and Armed Overwatch--allowing us to identify and rapidly
remedy issues for these essential investments. Both actions represent
important steps in enhancing oversight and advocacy for SOF's
transformation.
Building an Enduring SOF Advantage
The SOF enterprise continues to modernize its materiel and systems
and incorporate emerging technologies to build enduring advantage. The
command leverages its acquisition authority to modernize special
operations capabilities in five focus areas: Next-Generation ISR, Next-
Generation Mobility, Data and Networks, Precision Effects, and Hyper-
Enabling the Operator/Biotechnologies.
Supported by SO/LIC, USSOCOM has coordinated closely with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) and the
Services to collaborate on and experiment in each of these focus areas.
USSOCOM's unique attributes of being inherently globally deployed,
partnered, and joint while also possessing acquisition authorities
position it to contribute to the overall modernization of the Joint
Force. Specifically, the command is well-positioned to be the partner
of choice supporting three of USD(R&E)'s technology priorities: within
cyber, focusing on MISO capabilities; within directed energy, focusing
on electronic warfare/electronic attack at the tactical edge; and
biotechnologies.
Next-Generation ISR enables finding and fixing a target in a
contested environment and consists of fusing three data streams from
cyber-based ISR, space-based ISR payloads, and small autonomous and
collaborative unmanned systems. In the cyber domain, we are integrating
tools to provide an open architecture mission command system optimized
for SOF's role in integrated deterrence. We are also leveraging the
full range of open-source data to ensure SOF have access to timely,
geo-rectified, and accurate data to inform their decisions. To better
harness advances in space, USSOCOM has established a collaborative
arrangement with the Space Force and the Space Development Agency to
experiment with payloads that will provide its forces with space-based
capabilities at the tactical edge. Finally, we are aggressively
pursuing collaborative autonomy through our AI for small unit maneuver
efforts across our portfolio of ground, air and maritime unmanned and
unattended sensors.
As part of the Next-Generation Mobility efforts, we continue to
modernize our platforms to prevail in contested environments while
working closely with the Services. We are equipping our existing
aviation platforms with advanced infiltration and penetration
capabilities--such as the Silent Knight terrain-following/terrain-
avoidance radar for our rotary-and fixed-wing fleets and radio-
frequency countermeasures for our MC-130's. USSOCOM has partnered with
both the Air Force and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency for
development of high-speed, vertical take-off and landing platforms and
the Army for its Future Vertical Lift program. Finally, we are
investing in modernized surface and undersea maritime platforms in
close partnership with the Navy--including one of ASD(SO/LIC)'s
``special interest'' acquisition programs. These efforts in developing,
testing, and fielding a range of maritime capabilities will strengthen
deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and across the globe.
The Armed Overwatch program provides SOF with an affordable and
deployable crewed aircraft system capable of conducting close air
support, precision strike, and armed ISR. This program remains central
to SOF's Precision Effects modernization efforts that will provide
critical situational awareness and force protection to SOF ground
forces executing missions in austere and permissive environments.
Precision Effects are not limited to kinetic fires as USSOCOM
modernizes its electromagnetic warfare capabilities--best exemplified
by its C-UAS efforts. While the command hones capabilities to defeat
UAS prior to launch, it is also closely teamed with SO/LIC and the
Army's Joint Counter-UAS Office to detect and defeat UAS that pose a
threat to deployed SOF and our partners. Through a System Integration
Partner contract, USSOCOM has taken a unique software-centric approach
to C-UAS which will enable it to effectively counter the evolving
threat. The command is pursuing a system-of-systems, open architecture
approach to C-UAS that will allow for the rapid integration of both
emerging and proven technologies.
Within the Data and Networks modernization area, USSOCOM is
advancing technologies across three broad capabilities: operations and
intelligence fusion for its tactical commanders, protection of its
operators from ubiquitous technical surveillance, and influence
operations in the cyber domain. The Mission Command System/Common
Operating Picture deployed after only 1 year of development by
embracing agile software development techniques and is USSOCOM's
gateway to DOD's Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). As SOF
operate in increasingly contested environments alongside partners, we
must provide identity management capabilities to protect them, their
partners, and their families. Finally, USSOCOM will continue to
modernize internet-based and other MISO efforts with automation and AI-
enabled capabilities to operate more effectively in the information
environment.
Acknowledging the criticality of its network infrastructure,
USSOCOM continues to implement a zero-trust architecture, providing
greater security across the SOF enterprise. To ensure alignment, we are
working closely with partners across DOD during implementation,
including the National Security Agency and the Defense Information
Systems Agency. USSOCOM has already implemented many of the zero-trust
principles, focusing heavily on the principles of least privilege,
multi-factor authentication, and controlling access to moving forward.
We are also seeking to accelerate the transition to cloud-based
architectures with modern data science environments. These efforts are
integral to advancing JADC2 and ensuring resilient networks now and in
the future.
The final modernization focus area--Hyper-Enabling the Operator/
Biotechnologies--focuses largely on developing emerging technologies,
enabling SOF to rapidly deploy promising capabilities. Hyper-Enabling
the Operator pursues technologies to provide decision advantages by
optimizing information for individuals and teams conducting partnered
operations--with the goal of enhancing effectiveness. Our biotechnology
efforts are closely aligned with the Preservation of the Force and
Family program to address the physical and cognitive well-being of SOF.
Our ongoing brain health efforts remain a critical component of this
effort--combining best-in-market, leading-edge data and AI industry
partners with nutrition and health partnerships while leveraging state-
of-science commercial and academic labs.
Across all areas, USSOCOM continues to steward the acquisition
authority granted by Congress. The command leverages the additional
flexibility provided through tools such as Commercial Solutions
Openings, Other Transaction Agreements, and Middle Tier Acquisition.
This acquisition agility enables USSOCOM to benefit from rapidly
changing technologies--many of which are evolving quickly in the
commercial sector and are often produced by small businesses.
Leveraging Data-Driven Technologies
USSOCOM continues to serve as a pathfinder within DOD for
integrating data-driven technologies, leveraging AI powered by machine
learning (ML), deep understanding, neural networks, and similar
cutting-edge technologies. The command is working with partners across
DOD and in close cooperation with industry and academia to identify and
deploy data and AI capabilities across the SOF enterprise to enhance
decisionmaking from the boardroom to the battlefield.
The SOF enterprise continues to maximize its involvement in DOD-
wide initiatives, led by the DOD Chief Digital and AI Office, to
identify opportunities to implement data-driven technologies. To this
end, USSOCOM was among the first to welcome teams as part of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense's Accelerating Data and AI Initiative in early
fiscal year 2022. Additionally, USSOCOM's efforts to accelerate the
adoption of Advancing Analytics (known as Advana) are enabling the
command to link Service data and SOF data to illuminate the command's
business operations in unprecedented ways. Notably, the command has
linked approximately 300 disparate SOF and Service datasets together to
create a ``single source of truth'' for baseline data and performance-
related insights for its personnel, financial, materiel, and education
activities.
Other recent AI initiatives include capabilities developed for
information operations, medical research, predictive maintenance,
intelligence, and autonomous vehicles. As one example, USSOCOM's
Intelligence Data Science Team is applying AI to intelligence problems
across the SOF enterprise. AI/ML disciplines such as topic modeling,
network analysis, natural language processing, and predictive modeling
are being applied to publicly available information and sensitive
intelligence data to address intelligence requirements. Promising
opportunities exist to further leverage data analytics and AI
technologies in additional areas to include financial planning,
logistics, personnel management, cyber, and a variety of operational
applications.
Across these efforts, we recognize the importance of deploying
ethical and responsible AI capabilities. With partners in industry,
academia, and U.S. Government agencies, we seek to employ explainable
AI capabilities to ensure algorithms and models are aligned with our
moral, ethical, and legal obligations. As the SOF enterprise explores
the potential of emerging algorithmic technologies, to include natural
language processes and large language models, we will remain closely
aligned with DOD-wide initiatives to promote responsible and
explainable AI to mitigate algorithmic risks, ensure traceability, and
guard against unethical, illegal, or immoral outcomes.
conclusion
From SOF's earliest history of strategic competition from World War
II to the cold war through combat operations during the Global War on
Terror, our SOF today stand ready to meet the challenges of this
decisive era. Many decades of problem-solving, courage, and relentless
determination attest to SOF's ability to succeed for the Nation today
and in the future. SOF's unmatched, combat-tested capabilities provide
options to prepare, prevent, and prevail in this era of strategic
competition--whether creating dilemmas for our competitors, countering
coercion, reassuring Allies and partners, disrupting VEOs, or
responding to crises. As creations of Congress, SO/LIC and USSOCOM will
continue to provide the leadership and advocacy necessary to ensure
that SOF remains the world's most capable special operations force.
With your continued support, we will confirm that our Nation's SOF are
unquestionably a national advantage.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Fenton. General
Nakasone, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL NAKASONE, COMMANDER UNITED STATES
CYBER COMMAND/ DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/ CHIEF,
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
General Nakasone. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, I am honored to testify
beside Assistant Secretary Christopher Maier and General Bryan
Fenton.
Joining me today is Command Sergeant Major Sheryl Lyon, the
U.S. Cyber Command and National Security Agency Senior Enlisted
Leader. We are honored to represent the military and civilian
members of U.S. Cyber Command. In the contested cyberspace
domain, U.S. Cyber Command acts against foreign adversaries
that threaten our Nation through malicious cyber activity and
enables action by our Federal, private, and allied partners.
For instance, a combined U.S. Cyber Command NSA [National
Security Agency] Election Security Group countered malicious
cyber actors and oversaw measures to enable the Department of
Homeland Security and the FBI, among other domestic partners,
to defend the recent midterm elections.
The 2022 election cycle proceeded from primaries to
certifications without significant impacts due in part to our
effort. Going forward, success for U.S. Cyber Command will be
measured by how effectively foreign adversarial actors are
prevented from achieving their strategic objectives.
Last year saw significant maturation for U.S. Cyber Command
but our work is not done. In 2023, we must continue to focus on
our people, our partners, and our ability to deliver a decisive
advantage. We must improve readiness, bolster our resilience,
and maintain a culture of continuous improvement.
We will continue to deliver warfighting advantage for the
Joint Force and partners throughout competition, crisis, and
conflict. We are doing so by executing our service like
authorities to build and sustain campaigns in and through
cyberspace and the information environment.
Through these efforts, we seek to counter adversaries in
competition, to deter conflict, and prevail against aggression.
Aligning efforts of both U.S. Cyber Command and NSA is
essential to achieving these goals and is in the best interest
of the Nation and national security. It all starts with people,
the men and women of U.S. Cyber Command working with NSA and
partners here and abroad.
We win with people. The men and women of the United States
Cyber Command are grateful for the support of this Committee
and Congress that has been given to our command. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Paul M. Nakasone
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Paul M. Nakasone
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker and distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for your enduring support and the opportunity
to represent the men and women of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). I am
honored to be here beside Assistant Secretary of Defense Christopher
Maier and General Bryan Fenton. I look forward to describing how
USCYBERCOM continues to deliver return on investment by using the
authorities and resources provided by Congress and highlighting the
work ahead for 2023.
Guided by the National Defense Strategy, USCYBERCOM focuses on
building enduring advantages through campaigning to support Integrated
Deterrence. USCYBERCOM acts against foreign adversaries that threaten
our Nation and expands capability through cooperation with Federal,
private and allied partners. We seek to outmaneuver our adversaries as
they look for opportunities to exploit the United States' dependence on
data and networks in critical infrastructure, the Defense Industrial
Base and private industry.
USCYBERCOM is the Nation's premier military cyber force--one whose
world-class talent and strategic partnerships defend U.S. interests
while delivering warfighting advantage to the Department of Defense
(DOD). It executes its mission along four lines of effort to create and
maintain advantage against our adversaries:
We generate insights and options in defense of the
Nation;
We secure, operate and defend the Department of Defense
Information Network (DODIN), ensuring mission advantage for the
Department of Defense;
We develop options for full-spectrum cyberspace
operations to assist Combatant Commanders and the Joint Force to
achieve their objectives; and
We boost the strength of America's allies and partners in
cyberspace.
USCYBERCOM will buildup its people, partners and decisive
advantage. The Command directs operations through its components. These
include the Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF); Joint Force
Headquarters-DOD Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN), the commander for
which is dual-hatted as the Director of the Defense Information Systems
Agency); Joint Task Force Ares and other Joint Force headquarters
elements. The commanders of Army Cyber Command, Marine Corps Forces
Cyberspace Command, Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet, Air Forces Cyber/
16th Air Force and Coast Guard Cyber Command also lead their Service
cyber components.
Operational success in the cyberspace domain demands speed, agility
and unity of effort. Hence, the roles, missions and responsibilities of
USCYBERCOM and National Security Agency (NSA) must be mutually
supportive in this mission space. A recent report on the dual-hat
leadership structure completed by a Secretary of Defense and Director
of National Intelligence-directed Senior Steering Group (comprising
defense and intelligence leaders) found ``substantial benefits that
present compelling evidence for retaining the existing structure.'' The
successes that USCYBERCOM and NSA have experienced in defending our
elections, in engaging ransomware actors, and in many other missions
with the other Combatant Commands, rest on the alignment of USCYBERCOM
and NSA. The Senior Steering Group highlighted these accomplishments
for the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence,
finding that the dual-hat structure is in the best interests of
USCYBERCOM, NSA and the Nation. Success in protecting the national
security of the United States in cyberspace would be more costly and
less decisive with two separate organizations under two separate
leaders. The enduring relationship is vital for both organizations to
meet the strategic challenges of our adversaries as they mature their
capabilities against the United States.
Present and Future
USCYBERCOM persistently engages adversaries, countering cyber
actors and their affiliates who are seeking to harm the United States,
its interests and its allies. Skilled and dangerous cyber actors exist,
many of them serving foreign military and intelligence organizations.
USCYBERCOM provides options to counter malicious actors who exploit
cyberspace to support their intelligence operations, steal intellectual
property, promote violent extremism, impair democratic processes,
coerce perceived rivals and fund transnational illegal conduct.
The National Defense Strategy named the People's Republic of China
(PRC) as our military's pacing challenge. The PRC combines
authoritarianism with a revisionist foreign policy and stands as the
only competitor with both the intent and power to reshape the global
order to its advantage. Its rapidly modernizing military is building
capabilities far in excess of China's defense needs while supporting
Beijing's coercive diplomacy. Competition with the PRC takes place on a
global scale, and although that contest remains below the threshold of
armed conflict, it is nonetheless strategic in its effects and its
implications. PRC-sponsored cyber actors represent a sophisticated and
growing threat to the United States' and allies' interests.
China is learning from Russian actions in Ukraine and elsewhere.
The National Defense Strategy calls Russia an acute threat to the free
and open global system, noting that Moscow flouts international norms
with its destabilizing actions. Russia's aggression in Ukraine
threatens the peace and stability of Europe. The United States and our
allies are working to ensure the strategic failure of their attempt to
change the status quo by violence.
Russia's military and intelligence cyber forces are skilled and
persistent. Russia has attempted to influence elections, through malign
activities, in the United States and Europe and has enabled
intelligence collection on a global scale. Moscow has a high tolerance
for risk and collateral damage in its cyber operations. This boldness
is evident in Russia's indiscriminate cyberattack on Viasat satellite
communications in Ukraine and across Europe in support of the invasion
of Ukraine last year.
Russia and Ukraine are engaged in a complex struggle in cyberspace
that includes significant support from independent actors. Before the
crisis unfolded, USCYBERCOM partnered with United States European
Command (USEUCOM) and Ukraine by deploying ``hunt forward'' cyber
experts to assist Ukraine's efforts to harden their networks against
Russian aggression. Since the crisis began, USCYBERCOM has focused on
defending secure communications capabilities at USEUCOM and Ukraine--
ensuring the posture of our Nation's nuclear command and control and
strengthening DODIN defense.
The National Defense Strategy emphasizes our enduring commitment to
deterring aggression in the Middle East and promoting stability in East
Asia. Iran remains a destabilizing force in its region, and its cyber
actors are proficient and aggressive. Tehran's paramilitary and
intelligence forces sponsor a variety of malicious cyber activities
against Iran's neighbors and against the United States, as we saw in
last year's midterm election. Pyongyang also maintains cyber forces
supported by North Korean information technology workers dwelling in
other countries. They remain a threat, although much of their recent
activity has been devoted to evading international sanctions by
stealing cryptocurrency for the regime's use.
Non-State actors also remain a threat in cyberspace. International
cybercrime, often organized or executed by actors in Russia, continues
to be a concern. USCYBERCOM and NSA enable efforts by the Department of
Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other partners
to disrupt ransomware, cryptocurrency theft and other criminal
activities. In addition, violent extremist groups are also active in
cyberspace. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, al Qaida and
associated terrorist groups maintain the intent to target Americans,
although their capabilities have been eroded. Our Marine component,
JFHQ-C (marines), works with allies and partners to disrupt violent
extremist group mobilization online and to support diplomatic efforts.
USCYBERCOM is fully engaged in its efforts to defend the DODIN,
disrupt adversary campaigns to harm America and its interests, enhance
our partners' defense, and support Joint Force objectives in
cyberspace. Authoritarian adversaries feel threatened by the freedoms
that democratic states regard as commonplace, and thus they not only
deny such freedoms to their own people, they campaign in cyberspace to
impugn the legitimacy of democratic societies and to intimidate
opposition at home and abroad. As the National Defense Strategy
suggests, it will take a whole-of-government--and indeed, a whole-of-
nation--effort to bend this trajectory back toward international
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
Defense of the Nation
Defending the Nation is paramount among our missions. It means
defending our military systems, networks and the critical
infrastructure that enable national security. Every Combatant Command's
operational plan across the Department assumes that our commanders will
be able to leverage data and communicate orders and data rapidly and
securely across the battlefield. In this regard, USCYBERCOM plays a
crucial role in the defense of military systems, networks and data.
USCYBERCOM and NSA collaborated in defense of the 2022 midterm
election. Foreign attempts to meddle in our electoral process via cyber
means escalated in 2016 and have persisted in every election cycle
since. USCYBERCOM expects them to continue into the future as the
prospect of distracting our leaders, pitting Americans against one
another on divisive issues and undermining public trust in the
democratic process is too tempting for foreign adversaries. USCYBERCOM
seeks to render these campaigns inconsequential, in conjunction with
the FBI and Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (DHS/CISA) partners.
In 2022, USCYBERCOM and NSA teams staffed a combined Election
Security Group (ESG) to coordinate cybersecurity, intelligence and
operations. The efforts of the ESG enabled DHS and the FBI, among other
domestic partners, to defend electoral processes and take action
against foreign actors working to subvert the midterms. The 2022
midterms progressed from primaries to certifications without
significant foreign malign influence or interference.
The Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) played an important role in
the defense of the midterms and is vital to many of our other efforts
as well. CNMF conducts missions to counter malicious cyberspace actors
and covers both the offensive and defensive aspects of our defend-the-
nation mission set. USCYBERCOM established the CNMF as a subordinate
unified command on December 19, 2022 at the direction of the Secretary
of Defense. Elevating the CNMF to the status of a sub-unified command
not only recognized the importance of its enduring mission, it gave the
CNMF greater ability to manage its personnel and readiness and to
request manpower, funding and resources through DOD processes.
Since 2018, the CNMF has deployed hunt forward teams 40 times to 21
countries to work on 59 networks, generating insights and imposing
costs on common adversaries. These partner-enabled operations have
exposed malicious cyber activity by China, Russia, Iran and cyber
criminals; made partner-nation networks more secure; increased our
global cybersecurity partnerships; led to the public release of more
than 90 malware samples for analysis by the cybersecurity community and
ultimately kept us safer here at home. In competition, there is no
substitute for sharing accurate, timely and actionable intelligence to
expose adversarial activity with like-minded domestic and international
partners.
Last year, we created a combined USCYBERCOM-NSA China Outcomes
Group to oversee this shift. The China Outcomes Group aligns components
in USCYBERCOM and NSA, enhances intelligence insights, improves
cybersecurity and delivers operational outcomes for the Nation.
Resources are prioritized and focused on deterring and countering the
PRC's aggressive behavior.
Cyberspace is a global domain. Adversaries often penetrate
privately owned networks and devices, using ever-increasing technical
capabilities to disrupt operations or gain illicit value via activities
such as intellectual property theft, targeting of personal information
and installation of ransomware. USCYBERCOM is working under recently
expanded statutory authorities and aligning efforts with NSA's
Cybersecurity Directorate to bolster companies' ability to defend
themselves against exploitation by cyber actors. This collaboration and
broad sharing of insights with the private sector provides mutual
benefits. An example of this is our UNDERADVISEMENT program, which
links cybersecurity expertise across industry and government, leading
to several operational successes as well as pointing the owners of
victim systems toward threats that they can eradicate. In conjunction,
NSA's Cybersecurity Directorate runs its Cybersecurity Collaboration
Center to share best practices with industry partners and gain
additional insights into the technical challenges they are
encountering.
Strategic Initiatives
The success of our operations to support the National Defense
Strategy depends on training and readiness. We have prioritized
improving the readiness of our cyber forces since USCYBERCOM became a
unified Combatant Command in 2018, and there has been progress in the
last several years. The staffing and training of our teams are
improving. In addition, USCYBERCOM has enhanced its ability to monitor
the status of the Cyber Mission Force (CMF) at the team, mission
element and individual levels. USCYBERCOM is crafting standards for
cybersecurity defenders across the DOD Cyberspace Operations Forces
Service-retained cyber forces. The creation of these standards will
improve the ability to defend networks while enabling our CMF teams to
hunt foreign adversaries where they hide and foster a culture of
innovation, collaboration and compliance that USCYBERCOM seeks to
build.
Strong partnerships are crucial to cyberspace operations. When
working in unison, our diplomatic, military, law enforcement, homeland
security and intelligence capabilities make a powerful combination that
can disrupt the plans of malicious cyber actors. As we saw in our
collective defense of the 2022 midterm election, such effects become
even more decisive when we include our allies and foreign partners.
Their reach often exceeds our own, especially in host-nation systems.
As part of our regional engagement strategy in the Indo-Pacific, we are
working closely with partners such as Australia, Japan and South Korea
to share information that will impose costs on foreign adversaries.
Likewise, we continue to do the same with other partners in Europe and
Asia. We are also working to enhance partnerships with academia and
industry experts who assist us in concept and capability development.
Implementing USCYBERCOM's Service-like authorities will allow it to
deliver priority capabilities with agility and at speed. In fiscal year
2024, USCYBERCOM will assume control of the resources for the Cyber
Mission Force cyberspace operations and capabilities. Enhanced
budgetary control (EBC) gives USCYBERCOM the ability to directly
allocate resources for greater efficiencies during the Department's
programming phase and ensure they remain aligned with priorities
through execution. EBC will lead to better alignment between USCYBERCOM
responsibilities and authorities for cyberspace operations.
Expanding USCYBERCOM's role in acquisition is another important
step in the implementation of Service-like authorities. The Joint Cyber
Warfighting Architecture (JCWA) is USCYBERCOM's premier platform that
enables Cyber Operations Forces to conduct full-spectrum cyberspace
operations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment is granting USCYBERCOM greater technical responsibility and
authority to direct the development, integration and fielding of
critical capabilities and infrastructure in the JCWA. Included in the
Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act is a provision
directing the establishment of a Program Executive Office (PEO) within
USCYBERCOM. This PEO would assume Service-like acquisition decision
authority for JCWA program components by fiscal year 2027.
USCYBERCOM depends on support from the National Guard and Reserve.
Service cyber components employ Reserve Component personnel to support
operations and reinforce relationships with government agencies,
increasing the synergy between USCYBERCOM and these organizations. In
addition, Army Cyber Command benefited from the expertise of civilian
data scientists during their mobilizations to support research and
development projects that would not typically be possible with
traditionally trained active duty forces. National Guard components on
State active duty, and in the State Partnership Program (SPP) work in
various efforts to protect State, industry and foreign-partner systems.
The SPP offers additional capacity to support increased cyberspace
security cooperation activities in support of national defense strategy
objectives. We gain valuable insights from the specialized expertise
that Reserve Component personnel can bring from their civilian jobs in
industry and academia, and such ties have helped us build partnerships
across America.
USCYBERCOM recognizes its challenge to grow and develop its
military and civilian workforces. Cyber Excepted Service (CES) allows
USCYBERCOM to offer cyber professionals opportunities to use their
skills and contribute greatly to the national security of the United
States. Since CES implementation began, USCYBERCOM has seen positive
improvements to the recruiting and hiring timeline.
Enhancing diversity, equality and inclusion is a priority.
USCYBERCOM and NSA cannot afford to overlook or neglect talent wherever
it resides nor can we allow workplace challenges of any sort to
discourage professionalism or inhibit creativity. Our impact for the
Nation depends on fostering a wide range of viewpoints and free-ranging
debate to encourage innovation and problem-solving, and we will not
tolerate harassment in any form or behavior that stifles civil
discourse.
Conclusion
Success for USCYBERCOM will be measured by how effectively foreign
adversarial actors are prevented from achieving their strategic
objectives. USCYBERCOM will counter adversaries in competition to
defuse crises, deter conflict and prevail against aggression. Aligning
efforts of both USCYBERCOM and NSA is essential to achieving these
goals and is in the best interest of the Nation. It all starts with
people--the men and women of USCYBERCOM working with NSA and partners
here and abroad--We win with People.
Last year saw significant maturation for USCYBERCOM, but our work
is not done. In 2023, we must continue to focus on our people, our
partners and our ability to deliver decisive advantage. We must improve
readiness, bolster our resilience and maintain a culture of continuous
improvement. We have and will continue to deliver warfighting advantage
for the Joint Force and partners throughout the full spectrum of
competition, crisis response and conflict. We are doing so by executing
our Service-like authorities to build and sustain campaigns in and
through cyberspace and the information environment.
USCYBERCOM's efforts to defend against and contest adversary
campaigns in and through cyberspace have been enhanced by the support
of this Committee. Designing our campaigns to stay in constant contact
with foreign adversaries (persistent engagement) and synchronizing
Offensive and Defensive Cyberspace Operations with DOD Information
Network Operations are the critical initiatives that allow USCYBERCOM
to maintain its advantage in cyberspace. These concepts will continue
to be key to our effectiveness and are necessary to outmaneuver and
outpace our adversaries wherever they are.
The men and women at U.S. Cyber Command are grateful for the
support this Committee has given to our Command. We can only succeed
with a strong partnership with Congress. Thank you, and I look forward
to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Nakasone.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. As I indicated in my
opening statement, Mr. Secretary, we have made progress in
strengthening the ASD SO/LIC to act as a service Secretary-like
position regarding SOCOM, but there is more to do, particularly
with respect to personnel, facilities, and other aspects of
your office. Could you comment on what more must be done?
Mr. Maier. Thank you, Chairman, and again, I would think
this Committee in particular for the ongoing and very
consistent support for the ASD SO/LIC position, and indeed my
staff.
Mr. Chairman, I give you a quick snapshot to say that I
think we have established a degree of momentum and a bit of
irreversibility, which certainly wasn't the sense of things
when I first took this role, and a lot of that has to do with
the continued support of Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary
Hicks.
I think, as I have testified in this Committee before, the
best snapshot I can give the Committee is when the Secretary of
Defense convenes his service secretaries, it convenes the
Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the
Secretary of the Navy, and me as ASD SO/LIC to ensure that SOF
voice and perspective is in the room.
To your question, Mr. Chairman, on areas of growth, I think
we do need to continue to add staff. We have added about 20 or
25 people over the last 2 years with support from this
Committee, and that is against about 50 people currently.
It is a very small staff compared to the services, even
with our limited authorities relative to them, and then I think
most importantly, leadership billets. We need more ability for
people in a very hierarchical Defense Department to be able to
participate in meetings at the right level of seniority, sir,
so, I would highlight those.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. General
Fenton, what is the value of SOCOM in having properly empowered
service Secretary-like civilian like Secretary Maier?
General Fenton. Senator, thank you very much for that
question, and I would say on a couple of fronts, very, very,
very big value. First and foremost, as the Secretary Major just
mentioned, his ability to be at the service, excuse me, of
Secretary tables with the Secretary of Defense and represent
issues for the SOCOM team along the lines of people, education,
training, and even as he mentioned, where SOF will be and play
a big role in terms of integrated competition. Excuse me, that
is extremely important for the SOCOM enterprise.
I would say, next, his ability to be with the service
secretaries and represent issues from SOCOM back to the
services that we take our folks in from is very important for
us, and we are very grateful for that.
Certainly, his direction, in many ways, throughout the
Department in terms of how SOCOM views not only integrated
deterrence but crisis response in counterterrorism has been a
welcomed guidance for me.
I am very grateful to have a service Secretary, and as I
told you. I think, Chairman, when I was that confirmation, I
looked forward to testifying next to my service Secretary.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General. General
Nakasone, the issue of readiness with cyber mission forces has
been a persistent issue we have discussed at the Committee on
numerous times.
The Cyber Mission Forces play a very key role and they have
very demanding task. They require personnel with special
aptitude, training, and experience. One of the ironies, of
course, is when you develop such a person, he or she becomes
very attractive for outside employers, so you have a retention
problem as well as other problems.
In some cases, in the past, it has been indicated that the
services are not providing you the skilled and trained
individuals you need, which does not provide you with the
maximum possible use.
Could you comment on the present situation with respect to
Cyber Mission Forces, and also any steps that we should be
taking to improve their readiness?
General Nakasone. Chairman, as we take a look at the
readiness of 133 teams, it really comes down to three Rs. It is
the readiness piece of it--I am sorry, it is the recruiting
piece of it. It is the training piece of it.
It is the retention piece of it, and so, when you look at
that, where I see this right now is the fact that the services
have done a good job of recruiting the forces that I need.
Assigning the numbers are one of the things that we are working
with right now to make sure that we have all of the folks that
we need. We have worked very, very hard to get the training to
a very simple and predictable level.
That continues to improve. The other piece that we need to
work hand in hand with the services is the retention piece,
which you highlighted. The challenge of someone that has this
type of training is very, very attractive, to the outside.
But several of the Services, the marines included, have
made tremendous progress in this, in being able to focus their
marines on doing what these marines wanted to do, which is
cyber operations. In being able to stay within our force for
long periods of time, we see a reflective retention rate that
is much higher.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much. Gentlemen, again,
thank you for your testimony. Let me recognize Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. First question to General
Fenton, and this is about the naval small craft instruction and
technical training school, NAVSCIATTS, which provides training
to foreign forces on small boat operations and unmanned aerial
systems. The annual operating cost is $14.8 million, and that
is divided across multiple stakeholders, including the Navy,
SOCOM, and our foreign partners.
General Fenton, let me ask you, do you agree with General
Richardson, the Commander of SOUTHCOM, who said the school
generates outside return on investments? Ukrainian troops were
being trained there last year when President Putin launched his
unprovoked and illegal attacks on their country.
Do you agree, sir, that NAVSCIATTS provides value to our
Combatant Commanders and key foreign military partners?
General Fenton. Senator, thank you for that question. I am
absolutely familiar with these NAVSCIATTS, as you refer to. I
was more familiar with it when I was in INDOPACOM as a Deputy
Commander, and there I saw value in that type of training, and
I will say in many types of training, certain.
We thank this Committee for a number of efforts that SOCOM
has at its disposal in terms of 333, the 1202, and 127-echo
that increase the capability of our forces and create
partnerships in the way that we need those partnerships, and in
SOCOM we call those partnerships pacing----
Senator Wicker. And $14.8 million is a relatively modest
investment, would you agree?
General Fenton. Senator, I am not familiar with the budget.
I am familiar, again, with the type of training that NAVSCIATTS
produces.
Senator Wicker. Okay. We have established that there is
value there, so I appreciate that. Let me turn then to General
Nakasone. Tell us about cyber in support of our Ukrainian
allies and the Russian use of cyber in support of their illegal
and aggressive invasion of Ukraine.
General Nakasone. Senator, the story begins on the 3d of
December 2021, when we deployed a hunt forward team to Kyiv.
That began a 70-day journey for us to ensure that Ukraine was
at a much higher State of cyber readiness.
As you know, we saw early attacks on specific Ukrainian
sites within their government, and we also saw continued
attacks as the invasion approached. What we were able to do
during that time was work with a series of partners to bring
the tools and technology to Ukraine that was able to assist
them as Russia conducted continued attacks.
We continue today with support to a number of different
Combatant Commands, United States European Command, and the
training mission for Ukraine. Also too U.S. Strategic Command,
as we take a look at ensuring that our NC3 network, our nuclear
command and control and communications network, is the top and
most important network and is fully secure.
As we move forward, we continue full spectrum operations
with a series of partners to include Ukraine to provide them
assistance as they battle the Russians.
Senator Wicker. Well, Okay. Do you expect Russia is able to
intensify new capabilities in a spring offensive this year?
General Nakasone. From the cyber perspective, we are
watching this very carefully, Senator. They are a very capable
adversary. We continue to work very tightly with our other
partners within the U.S. Government, CISA [Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency], FBI [Federal Bureau of
Investigation], to ensure that our U.S. critical infrastructure
is protected, and NATO in general to ensure that they are aware
of the tradecraft of the Russians might use.
Senator Wicker. Okay, Secretary Maier, what more do you
need? You were asked and you said you need to add staff, and
then you need more attention to the leadership billets.
Do you have what you need in terms of funding right now to
do this and to deal with your enormous challenges, and if we
give you the same amount you got this fiscal year with an
inflation adjustment, will that be enough?
Mr. Maier. Ranking Member, speaking just to my specific
office, I think we are probably on a good pathway just in terms
of funding. I already highlighted some of the other
requirements.
In terms of the entire special operations enterprise, I
think our priorities are represented, understanding full well
that the challenge with inflation means that if our budget is
flat, that reduces our buying power, so that is something we
will need to keep a close eye on, sir.
Senator Wicker. Yet you need additional staff and you need
increased leadership billets.
Mr. Maier. Yes, sir. I think we are on a good trajectory
with the leadership billets. We are part of that conversation
in the Department. I think especially in outyears years, we are
going to need to add more staff to build that capability to
really help this transition I have described, from
counterterrorism crisis response to also include the peer
competition that we have talked about and I expect we will talk
about more, sir.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here this
morning, for your testimony, and for your service to the
country.
I think I would start this question with you, Secretary
Maier, because SOCOM and CYBERCOM really are at the nexus of
DOD's efforts to address the weaponization of information,
which I think has become as much an issue for us as we are
looking at our ability to be successful around the world as our
military capability.
Can you, Secretary Maier, talk about DOD's role in
addressing that misinformation, and how DOD coordinates with
other agencies and Departments within Government to address
disinformation?
Mr. Maier. Yes, thank you for the question, Senator
Shaheen. I would broadly start with describing DOD information
as rooted in military objectives. As we talk about how this
fits into the interagency, we have a distinct role and a value
to play, but not for broad messaging, not for all the work
that, say, the State Department or some other entities would
do.
I think we have looked at significant components of the
information operations enterprise and really tried to tighten
and target it more so the value proposition and the measures of
effectiveness are there. This is really a journey we are on,
and I think it is one that the leadership of the Department is
very, very focused on.
I would leave you with the idea that this is much more of a
priority in the context of integrated deterrence that the
national defense strategy calls out, because information is so
critical, as you said, to all the aspects of success,
especially as we start to think about adversaries we are trying
to deter, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. As you think about our efforts to
recognizing--you are saying that we are trying to be more
focused and how we address information at DOD. But clearly,
what happens at State and in other Government agencies affects
what DOD does. Are there policy changes? Are there resources?
Is there coordination that should be done that we should be
thinking about? I would ask General Fenton and Nakasone to
respond to that as well.
Mr. Maier. Briefly, ma'am, I think we need to invest more
in the DOD information operations enterprise. It has not been
one that has frequently been a focus, frankly, and I think with
more capability in the Department and all hands, our ability to
coordinate in an interagency standpoint. That is still very
much a work in progress, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. General Fenton.
General Fenton. Senator, I would echo all of Secretary
Maier's comments. Then I would add that the integrated
deterrence approach, I think, does demand a whole-of-government
approach in information operations, and SOCOM is one part of
that in the Department side, but we also coordinate with other
agencies of the Government to ensure that we are integrated and
that folks know that the SOCOM piece is a traditional military
activity.
The information operation space, as I like to say, is a
place we absolutely have to be as part of a military,
traditional military activity, and to get effects for
Commanders either to message an adversary, to see
misinformation and provide that to a host nation.
Senator, I think our key message to the SOCOM enterprise as
we move forward is, we remain aligned with the Department and
certainly as part of the whole Government approach. It is a key
part for us, and our State colleagues and other colleagues in
the U.S. Government are very important as we do that.
Senator Shaheen. General Nakasone.
General Nakasone. Senator, it begins overseas. We are very
familiar in how to do these operations. We have seen it in the
elections. We have seen it with Russia, Ukraine. We have seen
it with Iran.
The same actors that are interfering in our elections are
the same actors that are doing influence operations. We go
after them. This is what persistent engagement is for U.S.
Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. We find them
and we continue to ensure that we understand exactly what they
are doing.
We examine their tradecraft, and then we share it with a
series of different partners. This is only done effectively, as
both the Secretary and General Fenton have indicated, is with
partners. Inside the United States, sharing signatures with the
FBI who share it with social media companies, being able to
work with allied partners who have a broader understanding.
But then I think it is also with, how do you bring the
totality of our Government against them. Whether it is State
Department, Treasury, FBI, being able to go after them.
The one thing we have learned, though, on this is that they
never go away. They are always there, and you always have to be
persistent.
Senator Shaheen. The Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA, trying to
better focus the Department's efforts on information operations
and then establish a principal information operations adviser,
and ask the Secretary of Defense to conduct information
operations and require a strategy and posture review that was
due more than a year ago.
It still hasn't been delivered by the Department. Can you
tell us what the status of that report is, Secretary Maier, and
when we could expect delivery?
Mr. Maier. Senator, yes, we understand both the strategy
and the posture review are overdue. They both are now in senior
level coordination, so above my level. They passed through my
review.
I would expect in a matter of weeks they would come to you.
I would say, in understanding the times out, that these have
helped to animate a lot of the conversations and deep action
within the Department to really focus down it in on posture,
and then the strategy has prompted a relook at how we go about
doing information operations, per your opening question, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, so, I should assume we would
have it by maybe the end of April?
Mr. Maier. That is our intent. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Fischer,
please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Fenton,
in your nomination hearing last year, you agreed with your
predecessor, General Clark, that without sustained
counterterrorism (CT) pressure, we are going to continue to see
terrorist groups that are more able to focus on planning and
preparing for external attacks. Do you still agree with that
statement?
General Fenton. Senator, I absolutely agree with that
statement. There is a direction to the SOCOM team from the
Secretary of Defense to have that as one of our three main
priorities, integrated deterrence, counterterrorism, counter
violent extremist organization (VEO), and crisis response.
Senator Fischer. I remain highly concerned that we aren't
seeing sustained CT pressure that we need in Afghanistan,
especially with respect to ISIS-K [Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria-Khorasan]. It is my understanding that we have only had
one single strike in over a year.
I don't believe that that translates into sustained CT
pressure against ISIS-K. Can you describe the challenges of
conducting the over the horizon CT operations without the
reliable partners on the ground, without basing it in
neighboring countries, and without reliable access to airspace?
General Fenton. Senator, thank you for that opportunity to
comment. On the first portion of that reference to Afghanistan,
I would defer certainly to General Kurilla, his team. They have
a more fulsome insight with a series of partners, than I would
have, and additional challenges.
SOCOM being one part of a whole Government team, I am sure
there are many others that would give you a different insights
and probably some more fulsome data. But what I would tell----
Senator Fischer. Do your insights, sir, differ with some of
theirs that they have made to this Committee?
General Fenton. No, but what I would tell you, Senator, is
that part of addressing ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]
in Afghanistan is addressing it globally. When I look at that
question, I certainly view it through the Secretary's priority,
and for us, defend the Nation, and I think counterterrorism and
VEO, it is a very high priority for SOCOM.
As we think about it, we certainly, first and foremost know
that your Special Operations Command team, in partnership with
COCOM, because ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] is a
global organization, can sense, see, and strike anywhere in the
globe.
In essence, many of our operations are in places where we
are not proximate to the target, and in fact, last year, an
operation that went off in Northwest Syria to remove ISIS,
number one, from the battlefield, we had to fly across Syria to
get there. We are very far from that target.
But our ability to see it, sense it, and then strike it,
unquestionable, and I think we have been able to do that
globally throughout this year in places, Somalia with sustained
pressure on ISIS, against an ops and communications node.
I would add also that that global pressure for SOCOM, in
concert with partnerships, goes on even in the Indo-Pacific.
So, my sense to you, Senator, is that we absolutely have to
keep the pressure on ISIS, on any of those terrorist networks.
If I think about it with a number of the operations that
have occurred, and I would be happy to talk more in a closed
setting, it has been an extremely challenging year for these
extremist operations, with a number of operations we put
together, to include in Syria.
Senator Fischer. Well, SOCOM has been primarily focused on
counterterrorism mission for the last 20 years. The special
operation forces have a lot of capability that they can bring
to the Indo-Pacific. You earlier mentioned your experience
there, and I value your knowledge and experience.
Can you provide an update on how you plan to rebalance your
forces that you have through restructure, training, and
exercises, or to develop any kind of unique capabilities in
order to meet the increased demand signal that we are getting
from INDOPACOM.
General Fenton. Thank you very much for an opportunity to
comment on that. I think as we--Senator, as we look at our
priorities across the when category of integrated deterrence,
crisis response, and counterterrorism, it is an adjustment.
I have heard it referred to in other places as a pivot. I
would tell you it is an adjustment for how we are going to
address strategic competition, integrated deterrence. It is in
our DNA. We have been doing it--we have, as your special
operations forces, were really born to do this. In INDOPACOM, I
think what it means is, through the lens of prevention,
deterrence, and preparation, beginning with partnerships,
partnerships with nations in that region that want the U.S.
there.
They want to see a U.S. capability, and frankly, in many
ways, when that U.S. capability shows up, through the lens of
special operations forces, we are absolutely able to move a
partnership toward the United States and away from the PRC
[People's Republic of China].
I think that same type of partnership helped us in Ukraine
with the training that we were doing there with the Ukrainians,
from 2014 and on, saw the special operations way of warfare and
the way of doing business. All of that is very applicable to
what we are doing in the Indo-Pacific, but I defer certainly to
Admiral Aquilino for a more fulsome of how he sees it, because
I am always in line with his requirements.
We do that through our Theater Special Operations Command,
our TSOC, Special Operations Command Pacific. We take lead from
them at the SOCOM enterprise. But we are invested there,
Senator Fischer, in a way to deter, prepare for, and then if
needed, prevail in conflict.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, and thank all of you,
gentlemen, for your service.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator
Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General
Nakasone, we have been working together on helping to develop a
greater cyber capability amongst new personnel, and we created
this cyber academy for civilian workforce, which should be
accepting its first class in 2024, applications in 2024 for a
class in 2025.
We are using the universities that NSA has already assessed
as having the correct cyber capability and cyber curriculum.
But in light of your testimony, I wanted to ask, would it be
helpful to you to have a dedicated cyber force training just
for permanent Cyber Command personnel for the military side as
well? If you did want that, what would that look like?
General Nakasone. Senator, first of all, thank you for the
work that you have done to build a greater population of cyber
savvy folks. I am not sure that we need an academy yet. What I
am very, very focused on is being able to look at the continued
success we are going to have with the program that you have
worked with in New York.
I am very interested in continuing the successes that we
have had across the National Guard with State partnership
programs. You are very, very familiar with the New York
National Guard's work with Brazil, and other National Guard
forces here.
I am also very, very focused on ensuring that the ROTC
[Reserve Officer Training Corp] and academy programs continue
to have strong growth in terms of the numbers of people that
can be commissioned into our force.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Maier, you
acknowledge in your opening statement that the shift away from
counterterrorism is the primary role of our Nation's special
operations forces.
But far from decreasing the need for those forces, I would
suggest that the current threat environment calls for even more
capability. The need to continue our counterterrorism missions,
support foreign and internal defense activities to bolster
allies, and engage in new types of operations that are going to
counter Chinese and Russian aggression.
In that operating environment, would a decrease in force
size or budget seem like a reasonable step to you?
Mr. Maier. Senator Cotton, thanks for the question. Yes,
this is the crux of the challenge, right. We are being asked to
do more and our forces is probably static. So, I would not
advocate for a reduction in forces, sir.
Senator Cotton. I regret that you are here today, and not
48 hours from now when we are going to get the President's
budget. Because I am troubled that you may, in fact get a
reduction in budget or forces. Have any thoughts on what we are
going to see on Thursday?
Mr. Maier. Senator, as I think you know, I can't talk to
what is likely to be in the budget, but I think as General
Fenton and I both said, the priorities that we have identified
are represented in that budget.
Senator Cotton. That is Okay. Well, if my fears are proven
out, I think you can count on many Members of this Committee,
probably in both parties, to try to make sure that our special
operations forces have the resources they need. General Fenton,
do you agree that SOCOM requirements and your relevance are
growing in this threat environment, not decreasing?
General Fenton. Senator, I would agree with that. I think
that the SOCOM requirements to be in campaigning and
competition are absolutely important and exceedingly asked for
by Combatant Command teams, where I draw my requirements from.
Certainly, in line with our Theater Special Ops Command, the
TSOCs.
But we see it because much of this begins with
partnerships. Partnerships that we forge through the SOCOM team
and enable. The payoff in many ways can be looked at in the
vicinity of Ukraine.
Senator Cotton. So, a decrease in either your budget or
your personnel levels would add risk to your mission and
therefore to our Nation.
General Fenton. Well, Senator, I--no one wants to see a
decrease in the personnel or the budget. I would tell you that
I think it would not reflect the requirements, number one, a
decrease of that, and number two, we would be forced at some
point to make hard choices, because each and every time I think
you will see me give you the best Special Operations Command
for the budget we get.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Mr. Maier, when you talk about your
personnel, I want to return to something else you had in your
opening statement because I want to make sure we are using this
personnel budget the right way. You talked about the need for
more staff. I got to tell you, that gets my hackles up pretty
quickly.
I think we have plenty of staff in the Pentagon, way too
much. Frankly, I think we have too many people dressed like you
and me and not enough people dressed like the men to your right
in your left, performing these jobs. Could you explain a little
bit more about what kind of staff you are talking about and why
you would need more staff?
Mr. Maier. Senator, I was referring specifically to the
special operations low intensity conflict staff that performs
the title 10 responsibility of the organized train, equip for
SOCOM.
Frankly, sir, a lot of what these staff do on a daily basis
is try to articulate the SOF value proposition back into the
Department with the services. Some of my concern is that as we
go from the less intense environment of counterterrorism or go
toward a less intense environment without the intense focus on
counterterrorism, that some of what SOF has traditionally been
afforded will be lost in that.
Sir, sometimes this is just as simple as making sure that
we have the SOF value proposition represented in resourcing,
training, planning. I have been frankly surprised at times of
how that has been forgotten or too narrowly defined as being a
counterterrorism problem.
My 40 some odd staff are very much in that business, and it
is the analytics. It is supporting special programs, other
things like, that that are very, I think, akin to the SOF value
proposition, but don't have representation often within the
broader Department, sir.
Senator Cotton. Okay. General Fenton, one final question.
In your opening statement, you talked about the strategic
transition for the special operation forces. Could you explain
a little more about the role that special--that your force, the
special operations forces, are going to be expected to play in
the future fight? If so, if you can at an unclassified level,
maybe help share that story.
General Fenton. Senator, thank you for that. I will focus
on integrated deterrence, and where the Secretary and the
Department have asked us to be aligned. When I think about
that, I think about a long three, really three lenses, prevent,
prepare, and then prevail.
I think on the prevention side, it is all about being
forward, it is about being deployed, or our skills, cultural
understanding, language, and a familiarity with many of these
environments that come from organizations in our enterprise
that know those places as well, such as our first Special
Forces Group in the Indo-Pacific, for instance, have a very
deep familiarity with all things that go on in many of the
partner nations.
I think it is key to keep that certainly thick and
strengthened. Part of it is being out training, advising,
assisting, building capabilities, and using many of the tools
this Committee gives us in the form of security cooperation,
1202, and counterterrorism tools. That is a very key part.
I think it also allows us an opportunity to help the Joint
Force and enable them as we are out in those environments and
are able to prepare through our understanding of everything
from seabed all the way to the space domain.
Then work in concert with General Nakasone and Jim
Dickinson in a SOF space cyber triad. I think those are all
very important. There is an acceleration toward that. It began
before, certainly under General Richard Clarke, and we are
accelerating that in the special operations team, while we stay
vigilant on the counter-terror mission and certainly our crisis
response duties as directed by the Secretary.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator
Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by
adding an exclamation point to the point that Senator Cotton
just raised about the need for ample resources devoted to our
national defense, most especially the kind of work that you are
doing. I think your testimony today reinforces my hope that we
will have bipartisan support for that kind of sufficient
investment in our national defense.
I have been to Ukraine three times over the roughly last
year, once before the invasion, and had an opportunity to talk
to some of the special forces trainers who were there working
with Ukrainian personnel. General Fenton, I am hoping that
there has been continued training outside of Ukraine. I realize
none of those special operations forces are located physically
there now.
When I was there last, a number of weeks ago, none were
there, at least visibly to us. But I am hoping that that
training mission is continuing outside of Ukraine.
General Fenton. Senator, thank you for that. It absolutely
is continuing outside of Ukraine in a number of locations,
bringing the capability that continues to assist Ukrainians off
as part of the entire Ukrainian military, and that training
goes on, along.
A number of the lines you have seen before, the capability
to defend themselves, the capability to mission plan and
orient, an understanding of the intelligence, and certainly an
understanding of creating dilemmas for the Russian formation.
The Ukrainian SOF is a key part of the Ukrainian military's
approach. We do that, as your special operations team,
certainly under General Cavoli's direction and watching in
concert with his teammates in order that that is integrated
with the entirety of the approach the SecDef directed.
Chairman Reed. What is your assessment as to how well the
Ukrainian special forces have operated?
General Fenton. Senator, I think they have been superb from
the very beginning, and I will start the journey in the 90's
when Special Operations, and Special Forces in particular, or
ten Special Forces Group made contact with Ukrainian forces
after the fall of the Soviet Union.
That generational relationship, something that is very,
very important to your special operations community, in my
sense laid the pathway for in 2014 our ability to really get
after it after the first invasion by the Russians.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
General Fenton. They have done superbly well and they have
been extremely willing to prepare and to fight.
Senator Blumenthal. And to learn.
General Fenton. And to learn, yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, I think a number of
experts have been somewhat surprised that the Russians haven't
been more aggressive in the cyber sphere against Ukraine in
this past year.
What is your assessment as to why they haven't been more
aggressive, why they have been somewhat apparently quiescent,
or maybe the Ukrainians have just resisted and fended them off
without our knowing it?
General Nakasone. Senators, the Russians have been very
active in Ukraine in terms of conducting a number of cyber-
attacks, including destructive and disruptive attacks. I think
there is several pieces of the story here that are important
though.
First of all, when you begin the plan and you think it is
going to be a very easy invasion, perhaps you don't do enough
planning with regards to your enabling activities. Second, give
full credit to the Ukrainians. They did a tremendous job in
terms of building their cybersecurity resilience.
The third piece is, is that this is again for persistent
engagement, my discussion previously, being able to enable and
act with your partners. The Russians have not been as
successful, and there is a number of reasons for that.
I would point also to the fact that we have been able to
bring a series of partners, including the private sector, that
have a tremendous capability and capacity against the Russians.
Senator Blumenthal. I have been impressed when I have
spoken to President Zelenskyy with his focus on cyber. Do you
think that there is a greatly increased danger or risk of
Russian cyber-attack if the counteroffensive anticipated this
spring by Ukraine is successful?
General Nakasone. We are watching this very carefully. This
is the matter of vigilance that I spoke to earlier, because by
no means is this done in terms of the Russia, Ukraine
situation. As Russia looks at armaments coming into the
country, as Russia looks at different support, how do they
react?
One of the things that we are charged with is ensuring the
security of the U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources
with our partners in DHS [Department of Homeland Security] and
FBI. This is something that we are working closely every single
day on, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you very much to you
all and thank you for your service.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, gentlemen,
excuse me, for being here today. Secretary Maier and General
Fenton, I really do commend your submission of the joint
statement to our Committee.
It reflects both alignments and oversight from civilian
policymakers, as well as our uniformed leaders, so thank you
for submitting that.
Secretary Maier and General Fenton, as outlined in your SOF
vision and strategy, how does the SOF balance its various
missions with great power, competition, counterterrorism, and
crisis response, your three main missions? Because right now we
are seeing great power competition increase, ever increasing
with Iran, of course our pacing threat with China, and of
course with the Russian incursion and war in Ukraine.
So, how do you balance those missions, and how should that
great power competition affect your mission?
Mr. Maier. Thank you, Senator. I will take it from a more
strategic level, and then ask General Fenton to speak in more
detail. I would say, first and foremost, it is a risk
assessment and it is weighing against the requirements.
There is always more requirements from the Combatant
Commanders than we can meet as a force and those numbers keep
going up. But I think at the same time, we are very focused on
the idea that while the strategic focus is, of course, on the
pacing challenge of the PRC and the acute threat of Russia, we
can't be surprised by an attack from another adversary.
I think managing that risk is many cases what the SOF
enterprise does very well. We are in essence the hedge against
that risk. It is a constant effort to look for areas where we
can innovate, to be able to do more, do things on a more
sustainable fashion, and in some cases look for where we are
getting what my New England friends would call a twofer, where
we are able to do counterterrorism work and have those
partnerships and access that then helps us also on the National
Defense Strategy (NDS) priorities, ma'am.
Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you. General Fenton.
General Fenton. Senator, thank you for that question. I
think to your point on balance and adjustment, that is an--I am
constantly focused on that in the Command. As you mentioned,
integrated deterrence, crisis response, and counterterrorism
operations, all of those extremely prior--extremely high
priority for the SOCOM team.
I think on the integrated deterrence side, we take our lead
from the Combatant Commands and their requirements for
engagement in their regions, what they need for partnerships,
how they need capabilities build, and Senator, in many ways our
counterterrorism tools and the form factors that we have in
terms of how we present forces.
Those are equally applicable in the integrated deterrence,
the requirements from the COCOMs, for developing a force and
competing with adversaries such as the PRC, as they are for
actual counterterrorism efforts that you know very well. I
think it is a balance. Some of those tools are interchangeable.
We can bring them across a spectrum. Very often it is about
the relationships that then turn into things that we have seen
in Ukraine and we just have mentioned here, SOF investment
early, and we have seen that in many other places as well.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate that, and I know
that my colleague, Senator Cotton, talked about your top line
and strength cuts and how that would impact SOF. I am very,
very concerned about that.
It doesn't matter what Commander it was, whether it was
General Tony Thomas, or Rich Clarke, or now you, General
Fenton, I have always brought this up in discussions and every
SOCOM Commander I have visited with has said, ma'am, we are
going to make do. You know, we will execute the mission
regardless of the budget. I get that.
But I just need to stress to this Committee, how important
it is that we continue to fund you at the appropriate levels.
You give us the greatest bang for the buck with what you do all
around the globe, so we won't question that.
But I do want to dig in a little more. I, General Fenton, I
have supported Section 1202, irregular warfare authorities.
That was done in the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA, and your joint
statement describes this as essential for applying SOF
capabilities against malign actors.
In your personal opinion, would enabling those partner
forces that are responding to hostilities enhance SOF's
irregular warfare contribution to great power competition?
General Fenton. Senator, thank you for that, and I will
thank this Committee for the 1202 authority. That is a very
important tool in the arsenal of the special operations tools
that we use to either develop partnerships, build capability
and capacity of a nation, and certainly, then move forward.
Thank you very much for that. It is key for us to engage in
partnerships at that level that involve irregular warfare, our
ability to operate and buildup a capability of a nation, also
have it able to look at any malign influences that is coming
into it and identify those, and then address them.
Those forces that we work with provide options for their
national command leadership, as well as dilemmas for any
adversary. Senator, I would say of a very small investment in
many ways.
Almost like your special operations team. It is a very
small investment, but for a very high return on the dollar. So,
I thank you very much for that and happy to talk more about it
in closed session.
Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator. Just let me recognize
Senator Hirono and ask Senator King to preside while I attend
the Banking Committee. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
your testimony today, and General Fenton and Secretary Maier,
thank you for meeting with me earlier.
General Nakasone, I have been deeply concerned by the State
of critical infrastructure on and off military installations,
crumbling and out-of-date infrastructure lead to delays and
maintenance schedules, and put communities at risk for
environmental disasters, as we have seen in Hawaii.
But it also leaves infrastructure that is critical to our
national security, but often as an afterthought, like
wastewater treatment plants and pipelines, exposed to cyber-
attacks. That is why I very much appreciate President Biden's
National Cybersecurity Strategy's focus on defending critical
infrastructure, i.e. things like wastewater treatment plants
and pipes.
How would the Department of Defense collaborate with other
Federal agencies to implement the infrastructure goals outlined
in the President's National Cybersecurity Strategy?
General Nakasone. Senator, from a cybersecurity
perspective, we begin, first of all with a focus on DOD
critical infrastructure. Two weeks ago, I was in Hawaii to see
Admiral Aquilino and to work with him in terms of looking at
the DOD critical infrastructure within the islands.
We work with a series of partners when requested to provide
that assistance. That comes as a request for assistance from
other agencies to the Department, of which then we would be
part of that assistance.
Senator Hirono. Don't you think that maintaining our--the
physical aspect of our critical infrastructure is a very
important part of your ability to do your mission?
General Nakasone. Certainly, we need a platform upon which
to operate. I agree with you, Senator. What we are focused on,
though, is obviously the cyber elements of that and then
working again through the Department to assist and answer those
requests.
Senator Hirono. I think it is all we need to look at these
things in a much more total kind of an aspect. That is why it
was really important for Admiral Aquilino to ask for an
assessment of the infrastructure needs across the services in
Hawaii, but I would say across the country.
For, again, you, General Nakasone and General Fenton, the
Administration's NDS identifies China as the pacing challenge
for our military, and to create enduring deterrence, it is
critical that we remain the partner of choice in the Indo-
Pacific area, which is why I have supported additional funding
for exercises in the region and building on long standing
relationships, like the compacts of free association, which we
are concluding our negotiations on.
What opportunities have your respective Commands had for
multilateral training last year, specifically in the Pacific
AOR [area of responsibility], and how will you build from those
going forward? This is for General Nakasone and Fenton.
General Nakasone. Senator, we began with Cyber Flag, which
is our annual keystone exercise. We invited a series of
partners from the Pacific, that includes Korea, that includes
Australia, that includes other nations within the Pacific that
decided to come and exercise with us. That is one piece of it.
The second piece is what I had spoken to previously, which
is a State partnership program, working very, very closely with
Hawaii, the Hawaii Army National Guard, Hawaii Air Force
Reserve and National Guard to be able to assist them as they
take a look at Indonesia and the Philippines, two countries
that are partnered with the State of Hawaii. That is an area
that I think has got tremendous potential in the coming year.
Senator Hirono. General Fenton, I am particularly
interested in really strengthening--I agree with your area of
focus, General Nakasone, but also the Pacific Island nations
such as Palau and Marshall Islands and Micronesia. Can you add
to the response, please?
General Fenton. Senator, I can. I will start with your
special operations team out there through the Theater Special
Operations elements, SOCPAC, Special Ops Command Pacific, is
part of all the INDOPACOM exercise events.
It is very key for us because our ability to build partners
and allies, along with the entire INDOPACOM team for your
special ops, is a pacing item. It is very important and
certainly a high priority for this Nation and the Secretary of
Defense.
Below that we also have our own either bilateral or
multinational special operations training events in the region
or back in places around bases that we have in CONUS. Our
ability to be linked up with the INDOPACOM, desired in states
for partners and allies, and really enable that, plus what we
bring in, it is in our nature, it is in our DNA to be a partner
force of choice, I think is very, very impactful for Admiral
Aquilino and INDOPACOM.
I would say to your, partnering anywhere is important to
us, so to the island nations, whether it be Oceania,
Micronesia, Melanesia, Polynesia, your special ops team has
relationships there already.
Some of that is not in exercise, but certainly in contact
or in deployments as we have had throughout the years, and we
will continue to do that, and strengthen it as the INDOPACOM
team and Commander would want.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. My time is up but I just wanted
to mention, General Fenton, that I did appreciate that in your
prepared remarks, you talk about diversity of thought and
background in our people as a critical enabler of the American
advantage. Thank you very much, and the focus on maintaining
that kind of diversity, I completely agree with you. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Senator King. Thank all of
you for your service. Thanks for being here today. General
Nakasone, I like what you said in your opening, we win with
people. I think that is everything that we do, especially our
country.
In your department, when you are looking to recruit people,
obviously cyber is your purview, what other areas do you look
for in young people? Information technology? I mean, what all
areas do you look for in recruiting somebody for cyber?
General Nakasone. You look for someone that can do critical
thinking, Senator. That begins with--there are more than just
information technology majors out there that are successful in
cyber. There are linguists, there are mathematicians, there are
liberal arts majors. What we are looking for is someone that
has an interest, has a passion to do this type of work. That
doesn't want to leave work until they are able to get the
access that is necessary for us to have an effect.
Senator Tuberville. Is that growing? Is--are we losing more
to the private sector? How is that going?
General Nakasone. First of all, on the recruiting piece,
the services have tremendous success in recruiting cyber
forces. They are not having a problem filling it. I think the
challenge becomes later on is there are a number of choices
that young people have, and so, I think we have to think a bit
differently here.
First of all, maybe we need to lengthen the obligation to
become trained in cyber because it is so attractive. Second, I
do believe that when you come to our forces, that is the only
thing that you should do for your career.
Much in the same way I have watched special operations
forces be successful. When you become a special operations
force operator, that is what you are doing all the time, and
that is what they want to do. Our force is the same way you.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. How is retention in your
Department of young people once they fill their duty? Do we
have pretty good retention to re-up----
General Nakasone. It is a mixed bag service. Senator, I can
certainly come back to it with the numbers. But the challenge,
of course, is that there are a lot of choices, and so that is
what we have to make sure that we are on guard for.
Senator Tuberville. How concerned are you about TikTok and
the influence that they are having on Americans kids?
General Nakasone. So TikTok concerns me for a number of
different reasons. One is the data that they have. Second is
the algorithm and the control, who has the algorithm. Third is
the broad platform.
Influence operations, as we talked about previously, it is
not only the fact that you can influence something, but you can
also turn off the message as well when you have such a large
population of listeners.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, thank you for that. General, you
don't have a recruiting problem, do you?
General Fenton. Senator, I will start that we are recipient
of services and I would want all to know that we are very
integrated with their recruiting efforts, and there are some
challenges out there for the services.
Right now, your special operations team is not having a
recruiting problem. We are aggregated at a very high level of
recruitment. The Department has got a retention number, I
think, that is one of the highest in decades, and we are right
there along with them.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, you require the most rigorous
training standards in military, correct?
General Fenton. Senator, we require very high standards,
and folks who want to come and be part of that journey, who
have determination, grit, initiative, willingness to see
something through, and frankly, what we really look for is
somebody--a quiet professional. Maybe he will do this mission
and succeed, and then get ready to do the next one.
Senator Tuberville. Would you agree that it is also the
most riskiest part in our military?
General Fenton. Senator, there is a lot of our teammates
out there across the services that do some incredible feats of
both their mission and bravery. I would say we are one part of
what our Department has as the most incredible military
formation in the history of mankind.
Senator Tuberville. That is a pretty diplomatic way to put
it, General.
[Laughter.]
General Fenton. They do some really tough mission.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, very tough. You know, I think
there is a lesson here for the rest of our military, and it is
not everybody, but, America's youth want to serve an
organization with purpose and patriotism. I mean, we all saw
that growing up. In light, it seems people rise to standards
that you set for them. I mean, I saw that in my former life of
coaching.
I mean, you set a standard and most of the time, if you
push them hard enough, no matter where they won't or not, they
will reach that standard. I want to thank for what SOCOM does
and everything that you all stand for, because you are on the
front lines every day and you are usually the first one to get
there and the last one to leave. Thanks to your group, and the
people that stand up for this country, and patriotism that they
have for us. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. On behalf of the Chairman, Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the primary
purposes of this hearing is to evaluate your Command's budget
requests. Most Federal agencies have to balance their must
haves against their nice to haves when it comes to requests for
money, and they have to account for long term costs.
For example, the maintenance of fleet vehicles that they
want to buy, but not the Department of Defense. DOD submits its
budget for the things it wants, and then it submits a second
list of things that they want funded and they don't add what
the long-term costs will be. DOD calls this second list
unfunded priorities.
I call it a wish list. Now, last year, some parts of DOD
stuck to their budgets and didn't put anything on a wish list,
but not SOCOM, nope. SOCOM got $13.2 billion in its regular
budget, then turned around and asked for $656 million
additionally.
Now one of the items on SOCOM's wish list last year was
$8.7 million to ensure that a SOCOM armament facility could
meet blast exposure standards that protect servicemembers from
traumatic brain injury.
General Fenton, do you agree that if SOCOM needs funding
for a project that will ensure that it is in compliance with
basic safety standards and help protect workers from brain
damage, that project should be part of the Command's budget?
General Fenton. Senator, I put a high priority on safety.
Senator Warren. Should it be part of your budget then?
General Fenton. Any budget I build will reflect my
priorities, and priority is safety, and certainly align with
the NDS.
Senator Warren. So that means you think that something like
this should be in the base budget?
General Fenton. Senator, I put a high priority on safety
and my budget will----
Senator Warren. But you are telling me your budget reflects
your priorities and somehow this didn't even make it in the
basic budget.
Look, let me ask it this way then. This armament facility
improvements weren't funded last year, so are you going to put
that in your base budget this year or are you going to count on
Congress to add extra money for it? Which it didn't do last
year.
General Fenton. Senator, the first thing I will do is get
intimately familiar with the armament facility you are
discussing right now. I am 6 months of the job. I am still
working my way through a number of certainly locations in the
special ops community.
I will take that for the record and get back to you, but my
budget will be reflective of my priorities that are aligned
with the national defense strategy, and safety of our entire
force is certainly a high priority for me.
Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate that, but I just want to
make another point for the record. I wasn't born yesterday. You
know, I get what is happening here. SOCOM and other commands
are gaming the system.
They take costs that should be part of a base budget
request's essential programs, like funding to come into
compliance with brain injury prevention standards, and then put
them on the wish list, daring Congress not to fund them, and
that way they can boost their overall budget allocation.
In January, I sent a letter to Secretary Austin, along with
Senators Braun, Lee, and King, telling DOD not to send Congress
any wish lists as part of this year's budget. So, General
Fenton, this is your first time submitting a budget as the
Commander of SOCOM.
You will be sending it over to Congress this week, so you
should be right on top of this. Will you pledge not to request
any unfunded priority items on top of your annual budget
request?
General Fenton. Senator, I will submit the budget that
reflects my priorities aligned against the NDS, and I will
submit that, and any UPL [unfunded priority list], required by
law, that reflects facts of life changes, accelerated
capabilities, and any additional NDS initiatives----
Senator Warren. Let me stop you right there. I just want to
be required--you need to submit a list, you are right. That is
required by law. But you don't need to put anything in it or
ask for any funding from it.
The list from European Command and Transportation Command
were blank last year. That is, they lived within their budget.
They did not come back for an additional bite at the apple.
I am just asking if you will agree to do the same thing.
That is what budgets are about. They are about making your
priorities clear, and I want to know if you are willing to live
within the budget you have from the DOD and not come back here
for more.
General Fenton. Senator, I would submit a budget that is
aligned with my priorities and aligned with the NDS.
Senator Warren. Is that a yes or a no?
General Fenton. Senator, as requested by law and by law, I
will submit a UPL. I will take into consideration any facts of
life----
Senator Warren. Okay. That is, frankly, that is not even a
very artful dodge. Look, we don't have any other part of the
Federal Government behave this way and for good reason. The
budget process is about making tough choices and setting clear
priorities.
Anything in the regular budget must include an analysis of
the long-term costs, not things that are on the wish list. I
have a bipartisan bill to eliminate waste like this, but DOD
could shut it down voluntarily right now, and I urge you to do
that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. On behalf of the Chairman, Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, first
of all, thank you for your service to our country. I have to
admit, I like seeing options in the budget. I like seeing
alternatives. It doesn't mean that everything that is on the
budget is necessarily going to be funded by or recommended by
this Committee.
But to see the other options out there, from my
perspective, I appreciate seeing those others that sometimes
may not make it all the way through the budget process. General
Fenton, SOCOM has undoubtedly been reorienting from
counterterrorism to preparation for a high end, near-peer
fight.
Assume a situation in which we had to respond under Article
5 and support our NATO allies in Europe, and China concurrently
took military action to claim Taiwan. What do you assess would
be SOCOM's capability to support a two-theater war concurrently
in Europe and the Pacific?
General Fenton. Senator, what I can tell you now is that
your special operations team is already globally deployed,
5,000 personnel in 80 different countries at Combatant Command
request, and at times a Departmental request.
Our ability to address the integrated deterrence piece,
crisis response, and counterterrorism, we were absolutely able
to do all that. We are able to do the front-end competition,
integrated deterrence with training, building capability
partners and allies, and at the same time, we are also ready to
prepare an environment for the Joint Force and prevailing
conflict.
Senator Rounds. I think what I am really trying to get at
is, is it seems as though our policy here is not necessarily to
win in two theaters. We need everything that we can do to be in
a position to give the young men and women on the front lines
every opportunity. We should be talking about now before it
ever happens.
With regard to a budget which you will prepare, and bring
in, and lay out, would it be fair to say that there are other
items that could be done in the very near future that could
help us do a better job of preparing for a two front defensive
capacity?
General Fenton. Senator, I stay focused daily on readiness
and training, and providing the President and Secretary a range
of options for whatever conditions they may put in front of us.
As you describe, some level of potential two front, or we
stay trained and ready to provide options across a number of
contingencies that the Department has asked us to plan for,
along with the Combatant Commands.
At the same time, also providing dilemmas for the
adversaries, both either in integrated deterrence or in--high
in conflict.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Nakasone, as we all
know, the Cyber Mission Force comprises elements provided by
all of the services. Is there anything we should do to better
execute this construct?
General Nakasone. Senator, I will be coming back to the
Committee under 1502, the NDAA section that came out in the
recent NDAA, to talk about the shortfalls. That comes at the
end of March.
That will be the first indicator that I will have to be
able to communicate with the Committee. I suspect between that
and section 1534, which requires me to come back at the end of
June with the Secretary and the Chairman to talk about
shortfalls in readiness, we will be able to outline exactly
what we think are the areas.
There are some, and there are areas that we can work with
the services to improve.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Also, General, last year we
discussed the benefit of an SPM13 and SPM21, and what they
provided the Command to effectively conduct cyber operations,
recognizing that they are both classified in nature, but
basically, they have streamlined and lay out a collaborative
effort in which to provide accelerated timeframes for cyber
operations.
As you look over the year since, what, if anything, has
changed in your assessment and the impact they have had on
cyber operations?
General Nakasone. Senator, really very little impact. If I
can rewind the clock just a bit, 2018, as you recall, you
assisted with us to make sure that within the NDAA that we saw
cyber as a traditional military activity, that was a huge step
forward for us.
I would also say that the policy memorandums that you
talked about there, they are their foundation for what we do,
any matter that is much more predictable, both for ourselves
and for policymakers. So, we continue to work with it. We are
continuing to move forward.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator. General Nakasone, on a
scale of one to ten, where ten is essential for the national
defense and one is nice to have, where would you rank section
702?
General Nakasone. Ten plus and let me talk a little bit
about 702. Thank you, Senator, for that question. As you know,
FAA 702 allows the U.S. intelligence community to collect the
information and communications of foreign targets of interest
operating outside the United States that use U.S.
infrastructure services.
Outside the United States, the intelligence community can
collect against foreign targets of interest. It is critical for
what we do. What have we seen since FAA 702 was enacted in 2008
and reauthorized two times? It has disrupted terrorist plots.
It has alerted us to cyber-attacks.
Finally, it has uncovered critical infrastructure (CI)
threats. Last year, we are able to utilize this in a series of
ransomware, in a series of being able to uncover what
adversaries were trying to do to us against our critical
infrastructure. Most importantly, as General Fenton can
testify, is what we were able to do against--an essential piece
that we need as a Nation.
Senator King. I think the key word is essential. Thank you,
General. Talk to me about the relationship between electronic
warfare and cyber. Is elect--who is in charge of electronic
warfare. Because in a conflict, electronic warfare and cyber is
going to be where it begins.
General Nakasone. So traditionally the service has had
electronic warfare capabilities that they deploy with their
forces. I think what you speak to is a synchronization of this
battlefield in cyberspace, which we are starting now to work
very, very closely with the Combatant Commands.
Senator King. I am concerned that if electronic warfare is
scattered among the services, it is not going to have the
attention, for example, that cyber has because we have Cyber
Command.
Electronic warfare is definitely going to be part of the
conflict, whether it is jamming or disabling satellite
communications, those kinds of things. There is no central--
what you are telling me is there is no--it is not part of your
Command and there is no Central Command that controls it.
General Nakasone. Is not part of my Command. But again, a
lot of the electronic warfare that is done, is done in support
of service requirements, and so, they have service forces that
do this.
I think what you are speaking to, Senator, is much in the
same way we have tactical forces that assist the services, is
there some type of national capability that we might need? I
think that is something that we have to look very carefully on.
Senator King. I worry about coordination and duplication,
two sides of the same coin. You mentioned briefly in your
opening statement, election interference in 2022. Is election
interference, in terms of cyber, an ongoing problem? It hasn't
gone away.
General Nakasone. It hasn't gone away. This is something we
will deal with for as long as I can look at the future and we
see cyberspace and the ability for adversaries to influence
what goes on.
Senator King. Is it things like hacking and meddling with
the system, or is it more in terms of disinformation?
General Nakasone. What we have seen, Senator, really, when
you talk about infrastructure, that is more of an interference
piece. We see the influence piece much more prevalent these
days and being able to operate outside the United States, go
after trolls and other different actors that are trying to
create influence.
Senator King. These can be Russia, Iran, North Korea,
China. They are actively involved in trying to affect and
interfere in our politics. Is that correct?
General Nakasone. You have hit the top four plus proxies.
Senator King. China cyber capability, is it on the rise?
They have been not as aggressive in terms of elections and
interference as the Russians have been over the last 10 years
or so. Is China starting to become more aggressive or are you
seeing more activity, less worry about reputational risk, and
those kinds of things?
General Nakasone. They have a different playbook, I think,
than the Russians, from what we have seen. The other piece is
that as I mentioned last year, this is a very capable, capable
force. We can cover many of the areas that I can discuss in
closed testimony, but again, a very formidable foe.
Senator King. The new National Cyber Strategy was just
issued last week. Any gaps? I don't expect you to criticize it,
but do you have any suggestions you can share with us?
General Nakasone. I am really pleased with the National
Cyber Strategy. I think that this is something that we have
long wanted in terms of what is the responsibility of both the
Government and the private sector, and being able to meld that
is critically important for us.
I think in the weeks to come, obviously the Department of
Defense's cyber strategy will nest within that, and so I think
for the first time, we will probably have, from the Government
all the way down to our department something that is very
effective.
Senator King. Think of that as a coherent Government wide
strategy.
General Nakasone. Yes, Senator.
Senator King. Thank you, General. Senator Budd.
Senator Budd. Thank you all for being here. General Fenton,
there has been a series of concerning incidents, suicides,
murders, overdoses, drug trafficking arrests surrounding the
special operations community at Fort Bragg.
But I think you and Members here of the Committee, we know
that those reports, they are not indicative of the thousands of
incredible men and women at USASOC. I am hoping that you can
discuss some of the issues that we are actually seeing in
Bragg, including those, and if you can describe what SOCOM is
doing to combat these challenges.
I will just say that our office is here to help, and I am
sure on both sides of the aisle, all of us are here, on your
team in that regard.
General Fenton. Well, Senator, thank you very much for an
ability to comment on that, for an opportunity. That very issue
hits at the heart of our number one priority, our people, who
are competitive in comparative advantage and who we place a lot
of trust and confidence in.
This type of behavior, atypical to the 70,000 plus that are
doing the right thing almost every single day, each and every
day the majority are absolutely doing that, is first and
foremost it disrespects that type of work that our SOCOM
enterprise is known for. Second, it certainly, it is not
behavior that is welcomed.
I want everybody to know that is not the type of behavior
that is welcomed in this formation and is not indicative of an
organization in whom the Nation has placed a lot of trust. We
hold ourselves to a higher standard.
The Command Sergeant Major and I are--first of all, we are
very angry when we get reports like that, and we are
deliberately laser like focused on this. In fact, we talk about
it as a corrosive.
These are corrosive toward the trust and confidence that
this Committee, the Secretary, and certainly the Nation has in
us, and we are we are laser focused on eradicating that from
SOCOM enterprise. One is too many, but we recognize we are not
immune. So, we look at it through a number of lenses.
First, it is a leader issue in preventing this, reinforcing
the standards, the behavior of a drug, some type of other
untoward illegal, not moral and ethical behavior. Not who we
are, not who we want our formation. We asked our whole
formation to be on alert and to help point that out for us and
let us as leaders start to take action.
Second, it is reinforcement policies that tell folks this
in the event they just came into this formation and they didn't
know any better, and they are at risk of doing something like
that that disrespects decades of successful operations of many,
many who came before and those who come after.
Responding. I think a key piece in that one is holding
folks accountable. You will see us do that because that sends a
very big signal back, when appropriate, Senator, back to the
enterprise about this behavior is absolutely not welcomed and
not part of the SOCOM enterprise.
You have my commitment on this, Senator. I have been--in
about 6 months, it has been a top priority because of what it
does, not only to the trust that this Committee and others have
in the SOCOM team, but to our overall readiness. That readiness
is important because it needs to be a very lethal force each
and every time the Secretary puts us on the job.
Senator Budd. Thank you, and you have our commitment as
well. Secretary Maier and also General Fenton, you have talked
a little bit about this today, but can you please expand on
balancing the need for special operations forces to continue
conducting counterterrorism in the Middle East and Africa
versus the important role they play in great power competition?
Do we have the right mix of forces to accomplish both? We will
start with you, Secretary.
Mr. Maier. Senator, thanks for this point. This is maybe
among the most important points that I focus on every day, and
I think the answer is somewhat. I think we have a very lethal,
very capable counterterrorism force.
What we are working to do is make that force more
sustainable over time, because, frankly, many of the threat
actors are still out there and we are still having to do this
mission.
But being able to make it more sustainable so we can draw
on the unique capabilities of the SOF enterprise to bring that
to the fight against a potential PRC or Russia, certainly to
establish that integrated deterrence we seek, sir.
Senator Budd. Thank you.
General Fenton. Senator, I would just add that it is a
balance, as we look at it across the enterprise with the three
missions of the integrated deterrence and counterterrorism
crisis response.
As I mentioned before and will reinforce, the capabilities
we have in the counterterrorism marine arena transfer as well
over into our integrated deterrence approach. But at the same
time, we know that very often they are unilaterally asked for.
In this case in Africa, we work with AFRICOM Commander and
our Special Operations Command Africa, our TSOC, is a way to
address their requirements. Keep the pressure, as I mentioned
earlier.
One of the things at SOCOM we look at is the threat has
been disrupted, but it persists, and our job is to remain
vigilant. When we can set, see, and illuminate, we take action
in concert with the Combatant Commanders and certainly under
SecDef direction.
Senator Budd. Thank you all very much. I have some
questions for the record, General Nakasone, I will submit for
you, but I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
witnesses. Secretary Maier, I want to talk to you about a
previous job you had that I still think you are very involved
in. I understand that you previously led the DOD defeat ISIS
task force. Is that correct?
Mr. Maier. Yes, Senator.
Senator Kaine. And that you continue in your role as
Assistant Secretary of SO/LIC to focus on the anti-terrorism
mission, including the defeat of ISIS, correct?
General Fenton. Correct, Senator.
Senator Kaine. That task force included international
partners. I think there are about 80 international partners,
and it is fair to say that in your work on that task force and
currently it involved a lot of coordination with Iraqi defense
forces, isn't that correct?
Mr. Maier. It did, yes, Senator.
Senator Kaine. I know that my colleagues might have seen
that Secretary Austin has paid an unannounced visit to Iraq.
That news of that broke this morning. I just want to read a
phrase, a quote from him, the United States forces are ready to
remain in Iraq at the invitation of the government of Iraq, he
said this following a meeting with Prime Minister Al Sudani.
Further, ``the United States will continue to strengthen
and broaden our partnership in support of Iraqi security,
stability, and sovereignty.'' Do you think the United States
being in partnership with Iraq for their stability and
sovereignty, for their own sake and for the region, is an
important priority?
Mr. Maier. Senator, yes, I do, and I think it is critically
important to managing a very challenging political situation,
too, with obviously the Iranian and proxy threats there as
well, sir.
Senator Kaine. Just for my colleagues, we have two war
authorizations against the government of Iraq, our strategic
partner who Secretary Austin is visiting today. We have 2,500
American troops in Iraq at the Iraqi Government's request. One
of the war authorizations was passed in 1991. It is 32 years
old.
The other war authorization was passed in the fall of 2002.
The invasion of Iraq began on March 19, 2003, 20 years ago next
week. I have a proposal that is very bipartisan, 12 Democrats
and 12 Republicans have joined together to urge Congress to
repeal the two Iraq war authorizations.
This is going to be marked up in the Foreign Relations
Committee likely in the next few days, and hopefully will be on
the floor for a vote soon, coincident in timing with the 20th
anniversary of the Iraq invasion.
I just wanted to bring it to the attention of my
colleagues. I urge that we repeal the Iraq war authorizations
to recognize reality, an enemy that we were trying to push out
of Kuwait in 1991, an enemy whose government we wanted to
topple in 2002, is no longer an enemy.
They are a security partner of importance right now.
Second, Congress should exercise our Article 1 authority over
war, peace, and diplomacy and not allow it to be on autopilot.
Third, an authorization that is no longer necessary becomes
sort of a zombie authorization that can be grabbed and used for
mischievous purposes if we are not careful.
Fourth, I even think we send a powerful message not just to
allies and strategic partners, we even send a message to
adversaries that you may be our adversary today, Iraq once was,
but the United States specializes over time in turning
adversaries into allies. Look at Japan, look at Germany, look
at other nations.
We hold that hope out to everyone that we will defeat you
should we need to, but we also hold out an olive branch and
look for an opportunity to beat a sword into a plowshare and
turn an adversary into a partner.
The proposal that I have, Mr. Chairman, that I hope will be
voted on in the floor this month has the support of the
Administration, and they have indicated that neither of the two
authorizations are necessary for any current U.S. military
operation, and thus their repeal will not endanger in any way
the security of the United States or Americans anywhere in the
world.
I would just urge my colleagues possibly to take a look at
this once the Foreign Relations Committee acts, because I
believe we will be taking this matter up on the floor very
soon. With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Mullin,
please.
Senator Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Fenton,
can you explain to us, and I know you have been asked this
question before, but I just want it for context again, the
value of the SOF community.
General Fenton. Senator, I think the value of the SOF
community transcends all three mission areas that we have right
now. Our integrated deterrence approach, which the previous was
strategic competition the days before the tragic events of 9/
11, when we were developing partners and allies, competing for
relationships, building partners of force--of choice, and in
many places with our security cooperation approach, actually
strengthening nations across the globe. I think that is called
for even more now.
As we come forward with 20 years of hard-earned combat
credibility, a technology fluence, and an incredible formation.
The SOF formation is a formation that knows the hard skill. It
knows technology.
It deploys around the world on a moment's notice, and in
that case, all that value transitions over to integrated
deterrence. On the counterterrorism side, the center for 20
plus years. In places all over the world, your special
operations command team, along with the rest of our military
interagency partners, I think brought immense value to this
Nation, disrupting degrading terrorist networks globally and
figures, the names that many folks know here are no longer and
have been removed from the battlefield and are no longer a
threat to this Nation.
On crisis response, our ability at SOCOM to, within a very
short notice, deploy forces and arrive in a country and either
safeguard our U.S. diplomats, citizens, or rescue them if that
is indeed the task, and then bring home safely. I think it is
all part of this special Operations command value proposition.
I would add a very small investment on the budget that we
are very grateful for, and I think a very high return on
investment across all those and many more that in the interest
of time, I can followup with you in a classified session.
Senator Mullin. Appreciate it. One last quick question for
you, and then if you could be brief on it, I would like to--you
just kind of explain the partnerships that we have with our
allies in Europe and how that is benefiting us, and I would say
in the with Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine.
General Fenton. Senator, I go back to a very specific part
here of the very high value proposition I think your special
operations teams bring. It started with a relationship, our
ability in small teams to be with Ukrainians in the mid-90's
developed a level of trust. Speed of trust is important in
these, as you know very well.
Then in 2014 began in earnest a level of training that was
about resistance and resilience, and those look like skills of
developing a military--Ukrainian special operations that has an
NCO corps, that knows about mission command, has initiative,
and frankly has been, as I have seen and certainly talk a lot
about, very valuable to the Ukrainian military effort writ
large. I think we have also had the ability to learn from them.
They have got an incredible way that they take equipment
off the battlefield and re-engineer it. That is really great
for us because we learn as much from our partners as I hope
they do from us.
I think in a very small way, that ability for the Ukrainian
SOF and the Ukrainian military to resist, and now absolutely
really fight against this aggression, and has paid dividends.
Started with a high investment with the special operations
team.
Senator Mullin. Thank you so much. Mr. Chairman, I am going
to kind of divvy here a little bit. General Nakasone and I know
each other, and I just want to raise a point here.
The General is over a program that is very forward leaning,
and I would ask that we would--we would ask the Senate Intel
and the House Intel to brief us on a program that General
Nakasone is over. It would reflect, in my opinion, his complete
incompetence in his ability to lead this program.
I think it is important when we are talking about a budget
that he is over, that it is important for us to know that we
have leadership there that we can rely on to make sure the
dollars are protected and the investment has a return. I think
before we can do that, we actually need to know what has
happened.
I was involved in a briefing when I was on the Intel
Committee that turned into a hearing, and I think it is
imperative for us to know the General's risk adverse approach
to a program that needs to be extremely proactive.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Mullin. Your comments are
noted and we will followup.
Senator Mullin. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. At this point, let me recognize Senator
Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
Nakasone, let me just say I am sorry because I have all the
confidence in the world in you and we have been working very
close together, and I am chairman of the Cyber Committee and
also along with Mike, Senator Mike Rounds.
We both appreciate your service, and we are looking forward
to any hearing you want to have. I can tell you, you have the
support of a bipartisan group here, which is very, very deep.
Next of all, General Fenton, I would like to ask you a
question, based on the publishing of the 2019 SecDef, DOD,
CYBERCOM Operations Forces Memo, which directed the
organization of the DOD Cyber Operation Forces, there has been
substantial appropriation development of CYBERCOM organization
and capabilities.
The question is what is the status of the current Special
Operations Forces program developed within SOCOM, and what
effort is needed in--to keep pace with CYBERCOM?
General Fenton. Senator. I will start by, we have got a
very close relationship with General Nakasone and CYBERCOM, and
it has progressed into an area that we now call a capability of
SOF space, cyber triad.
At its heart, it is the ability to converge those
capabilities, the SOF placement access, the cyber work, and
certainly the space work in places for integrated deterrence
effects that we would otherwise not get if we were doing it
individually, and bring certainly a bigger sum back to not only
the mission but to any partner we are working with.
That has been an incredible effort alongside General
Nakasone's team. We are very grateful for that, and also, in
the SPACECOM arena. We are moving that forward with exercises,
experimentation, a number of senior leader huddles, and I think
that you will see that progress, Senator. We would be happy to
talk about the progress.
Senator Manchin. My final question is for all three of you,
and I will start with Secretary Maier, General Nakasone, and
then General Fenton, what can we do to help as Congress? What
would be the greatest help we could be to you, all of us in the
Senate and our Congress--or our cohorts over on the side, the
other side of the House. That would be the greatest--and I
think, if I am asking, the having a budget done on time, what
does that mean for you?
Mr. Maier. Senator, thanks for the question. I think we
will probably all say that having a budget that is consistent,
predictable, and----
Senator Manchin. Does it save you time? Does it save your
money?
Mr. Maier. It saves this time. It saves us money. It adds
predictability. It allows us to put things on contract.
Frankly, for----
Senator Manchin. We are talking September 30th.
Mr. Maier. Yes, sir. I think from the perspective of
enterprise and the special operations enterprise, it is going
through transition. The ability to modernize is hurt by the
fact that the budgets don't come predictably. So that is really
where sometimes it comes home to roost, and it is----
Senator Manchin. So, a budget on time would be a pretty
high priority?
Mr. Maier. Yes, sir.
Senator Manchin. General Nakasone.
General Nakasone. It is the same thing, Senator. It is on
time. It really does----
Senator Manchin. Does it reduce your cost?
General Nakasone. It is predictability. It is being able to
actually spend the money when it is actually due as opposed to
a shortened period of time. We also have new starts that will
not be delayed, would actually be able to get on. So, we would
welcome it.
Senator Manchin. When was the last time that you had a
predictable budget on time?
General Nakasone. Not since I have been the Commander.
Senator Manchin. General Fenton.
General Fenton. Senator, I will start first by, you already
help in many ways with a number of the tools that we use at
SOCOM, 33, 1202, now 127. But to your point on the budget, I
will echo my colleagues here at the table, predictable,
reliable, on time, and then I will just add that continuing
resolutions (CRs) hurt.
In SOCOM, our priority, number three, is transform, and we
think of ourselves as a pathfinder and a trailblazer. We need
new capabilities to not only surpass adversaries, but always to
be dominant.
That is not possible with new capabilities and new
contracts with a CR. It is also we work with a lot of littles,
little companies that want business with Special Ops Command
because they know we are transformative, and that we are a
trailblazer for the Department.
They can't wait forever to get their money, and many of
them aren't there anymore as a result of--my sense is a number
of CRs from----
Senator Manchin. This makes--does this sound reasonable to
you all that I have been told by some retired Admirals and
Generals that if we did our budget on time now, by the 85
budget, the budget law that we had--the President is supposed
to have his budget submitted by the 1st of February, and here
we are.
The House and the Senate are supposed to have theirs by
April the 1st and reconcile by April the 15th, and then we are
supposed to have a budget completed by September 30th. I have
been told if all that happened, that the military could have a
savings anywhere between 5 to 10 percent on today's cost.
You are talking $40 to $80 billion. Does that sound
reasonable? That is, I mean, it is tremendous, and it is that
type of effect--I don't know if you all looked at and evaluated
it for per area of DOD. Secretary, do you have anything on
that, or if you looked at it under those conditions, because
the person never hesitated when they told me this.
Mr. Maier. Senator, I can't account for that exact measure.
I can tell you that it is more costly, and as I think my
colleagues and I have indicated, there is a risk to it as well.
That it is not only financial, it is the ability to execute and
operate with some degree of predictability, which of course,
the Nation looks at us to do.
Senator Manchin. Well, I know that we have many examples
that you can look back on and find out when we did do one on
time and everything, but if you could and give us an accurate
account or close as accurate as you can be, what would be the
savings?
Because we are in a position now, we are having debates and
discussing, we can do things, we can change this year, change
our ways and not commit the sins of the past. I am hoping we
can do that.
It has a tremendous effect on our military, which is what
we are depending. First of all, thank all of you, and all of
you setting there, for your service. I appreciate it more than
you know, and again, I want to thank you all. I yield my time
back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Senator Schmitt,
please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Fenton, I
appreciate the time we had to spend together and talk about
some of the threats around the world, and your role and your
team's role in combating those threats and getting ahead of
those threats. To me, as I mentioned, there is no greater
threat than China on the world stage.
In this great powers era that we have been discussing, the
alliances in the Indo-Pacific, to me, are critical. You have
mentioned it in my meeting with you. We have heard about that
today. General Nakasone had mentioned Indonesia and the
Philippines. We have talked about the Philippines.
What specifically would you like to see this Committee
address as we move forward in this Congress to do everything,
we can put ourselves in the best position to continue to
cultivate and support those alliances?
General Fenton. Senator, first, thanks for the session with
you the other day. I appreciate your time. I know how busy you
are. I would comment on the extreme importance in the power of
the partners and allies.
You and I spoke quite a bit about it, and in the Indo-
Pacific, but certainly globally, as the Secretary has discussed
with the Department and in many ways is doing that with NATO's
alliance, vis-a-vis the Ukraine, and all the work that has gone
into the entire whole-of-government team to make that stronger
than ever, is a signal that aggression by adversaries like
Russia will not be tolerated.
I think it is just important--just as important as we
discussed in the Indo-Pacific. We have got a number of
bilateral treaty allies out there. They are extremely important
partners, as INDOPACOM goes ahead on its daily and certainly
its overall mission.
In particular for the special operations team, we actually
like to think that we are a premier partner force. We have
longstanding ties throughout the region that we look to
continue to strengthen and maintain.
We certainly each and every day don't take them for
granted, and we look to reinforce them. I think that is
important that that continues to grow. I think it is--as you
think about this, Senator, it is about the growth of partners
and allies, and the power in that. Not only for the rules-based
order, but probably for the vision of where we go the next 3 to
5, even 10 years.
I would just recommend that it is a continue to focus on
partners and allies, the power that comes with that, the
partnering, the burden sharing, and certainly the capability
grows--growth that we have all experienced in that. I could
talk certainly more----
Senator Schmitt. Well, and I don't--listen, I don't want
you to--I want to give you the time to be able to get back to
my office with this, because this is something that to me is of
paramount importance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific theater
and will be a long-term commitment on my end.
as you work through--and by the way, you won't be the only
one I am asking this question that comes before the Committee
of what can we do, because I do think that is just critical,
and in doing everything we can to guard against China's global
domination ambition, which has been stated.
I want to work with you on that, and I guess, General
Nakasone, if I could ask you this, and to the extent that you
can share, what you can share with this Committee in the open
setting here, just where we are at with China's capabilities,
whether it is on cyber or artificial intelligence (AI), our
defensive capabilities versus their offensive capabilities.
This will be an ongoing discussion. But in the open setting, I
certainly wanted to ask you about that.
General Nakasone. Senator, they are a near, peer threat.
They are very good. They have been able over the period of 2
decades to develop not only their military but also their
industrial base.
As we look to the future, those capacity and capabilities,
whether or not it is in artificial intelligence, machine
learning. Whether or not it is looking at the capacity to grow
cyber forces, they are very good, but they are not, they are
not, first of all, as good as us and second, they are not ten
feet tall.
We can get in closed session, more in terms of some
thoughts on this, but I did want to make sure I hit that.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I will just close with this. I agree
with the concerns that have been raised by other Committee
Members and you with TikTok. To me, TikTok is a Chinese AI
weapon aimed directly at the United States of America, and we
better take it seriously, so, among other things. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Senator
Duckworth, please.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have to
say, I had a wonderful working relationship with Senator Blunt,
who has recently retired. I would have to say, Senator Schmitt,
I agree with you with your concerns on the Indo-Pacific region.
In fact, my question, gentlemen, is going to followup a little
bit on my colleague's line of questioning.
But I did want to start with saying that Mr. Assistant
Secretary and General Fenton, your written testimony references
the first SOF truth, humans are more important than hardware,
and I couldn't agree with this more.
Two weeks ago, I led a Congressional Delegation (CODEL) to
Japan and Indonesia. My interactions on that trip reinforced
just how important those alliances and partnerships are. We
must not forget that human ties are the United States strategic
advantage in the Indo-Pacific region, and these human
relationships are critical to countering malign Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) activity in that region.
General Fenton, I appreciated our discussion last week. Can
you please elaborate furthermore in that questioning line, and
on an unclassified level, on how the SOF community fosters
close relationships with our allies and partners?
Specifically, how does Special Operations Command's ongoing
work with other nations, from the smallest unit operations all
the way up through your leadership-to-leadership relationships
with military leaders in some of these countries, reinforce our
campaign plans in Southeast Asia?
General Fenton. Senator, thank you. I really appreciated
our discussion as well, and I appreciate your reference in
that. I will start with just emphasizing that partners and
allies are absolutely a key focus for the Department, the
Secretary, and for your Special Operations Command team.
I put that in contrast to what China's focus may be in
terms of clients or customers. We are about partnerships, we
are about friendships, we are about the power of many to make
us all stronger. I think we see that in the way that we
approach, first, your special operations team.
As you mentioned, we start very much from a perspective of,
it is in our training and in our schoolhouses to work through
these because we recognize it is the speed of trust. It is the
speed of a relationships, in many ways with our partners and
teammates around the world. You will see us at a very tactical
level.
I won't mention any countries, and certainly, Senator, I
could talk more in a closed session. You will see us at a
tactical level doing events like training, shooting, jumping,
driving, and building capabilities that use the tools that this
Committee has honored us with.
I think at an organizational level, we will be showing
folks how we have grown ourselves in the 20 plus years of
combat, what it meant to weave in technology, how we understand
our gathering of intelligence, how we understand mission type
orders.
I think at the institutional level, what you will see your
special operations team doing in any of the COCOMs is work with
the COCOMs to ensure that the Nation we have a relationship
with understands the special operations forces and what they
can do, the types of missions, and if I may be the return on
investment and the value that they will bring that nation in a
way that I believe we certainly bring to this Nation.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General. Turning now to
General Nakasone. General, I just want to say I, too, have
complete trust in your ability to do your job.
In fact, your forward leaning posture allowed us to keep
tabs on the well-being of my constituent, who was held in
Haqqani network hands and also in his safe return. So, thank
you very much for the work of you and your subordinates in
that. I want to talk about the cyber domain.
Of course, it has no boundaries. I included legislation in
Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA authorizing DOD to establish a pilot
program to enhance the cybersecurity of our allies, and in
particular the readiness of military forces of Vietnam,
Thailand, and Indonesia. This year I plan to expand that
program to include Malaysia and the Philippines.
Could you elaborate on specifically why the cybersecurity
of our allies and partners is important for U.S. overall, U.S.
national security? If possible, can you comment on the value of
direct engagement with our overseas partners to help build
their cyber skills, and how that is important for our own
national security?
General Nakasone. Certainly, Senator. I think that there is
no better example than Ukraine. We have watched this now for
over a year. We are a very capable partner that was able to
raise their level of cybersecurity, was able to fend off a much
larger foe.
But it is not only that, it is also the ability for us to
share information with that partner. We want to be able to
share our information in the future. Being able to share
information in cyberspace means that you have to have an
assurance that the partner can secure your information.
That is a critical piece, and I know that the work that you
have done to drive that type of cybersecurity, both in the
element of the bar has to go higher for our partners to
operate. Also, we have to have the confidence that we share
information, that our information is between us and that
partner.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I yield back, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Scott, please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. I want to thank each of
you for being here. General Nakasone, first, let's talk about
China. The--is there anything that China sells us? We have
cranes now at the Port Miami that they are worried that there
was the ability for China to surveil what we are doing at our
ports.
You look at what some of my colleagues have talked about,
the risk of TikTok. Is there anything that China sells in this
country that you don't believe creates a potential
cybersecurity risk? What would it be, if they could sell us
anything that wouldn't?
General Nakasone. Senator, certainly you point to the
challenge of cyber, which is a huge attack surface, right.
Whether or not you trade in some type of good or you trade in
some type of commodity, there is always an opportunity.
I think this points to the challenge that we have to be
able to address, which is supply chain. To make sure that the
elements of the supply chain that we operate, particularly
within the Department of Defense, are secure.
Senator Scott. Do you think that Americans should have--do
you think it puts America at risk if Americans have TikTok on
their phone?
General Nakasone. My concern with TikTok, Senator, really
is from two pieces. One is the fact that there is tremendous
amount of data and understanding where your data is, is
critical, I think.
The second piece is the opportunity for influence. This is
a means upon which you receive information or don't receive
information. That is where I always look at that in terms of
being able to measure that risk.
Senator Scott. If you were running a, let's say one of our
electrical grids in the country, if you were responsible,
knowing now what you know in the job that you have now, would
you allow--would you buy anything from China?
Would you allow the employees have TikTok? Would you any
business? Would you buy DJI drones? Would you do anything
knowing what you now know in this job?
General Nakasone. Senator, very difficult in the scenario
that you point to our picture to imagine that you can really do
that. I mean, there is so much of what we do is based upon
international trade, and China has the corner on some things.
I think what I would do is ensure that the areas that are
most sensitive to our operation are well censored, and I have
the confidence that what is being utilized there, I understand
where that information may be going.
Senator Scott. In a world where there was an alternative to
every Chinese product and app and service out there, if there
was an American alternative or American ally alternative to
them, would you, at that point if you running one of these
companies, would you guarantee that your company did no
business with China if there was a good alternative? Would you
think the same thing about our Government, knowing what you
know?
General Nakasone. So again, coming back as a prospective,
perhaps future business owner, I would take a very, very hard
look of anything that was coming from an adversarial nation and
being able to understand that.
Senator Scott. General Fenton, can you talk about what
other things you are doing to prepare your forces to deal with
China, and where are they beating us, and where--and what do we
need to do more and better, knowing that China doesn't like our
way of life and wants to demolish our way of life?
General Fenton. Senator, I think the very first thing we
are doing in Special Operations Command is focus the formation
on the adversaries of China and Russia, but in particular
China's. Reordering the formation in terms of focus.
There are a number of elements in our formation that
understand the PRC and what they have been doing for years
pretty well. But there is work that we have got to do to
certainly bring in additional portions of the formation along.
We do much of that through our education process in our
schoolhouses that--all the components, our Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marine components.
Frankly, at our joint Special Operations university,
understanding of the PRC and the PRC way of warfare. We knew
that very well when we fought the ISIS threat. We understood
how they were going to wage war, and now that is the
understanding of the PRC.
Second, I would say is being present in any region and
trying to understand their malign activities. As I mentioned
before, diplomatic pressure from the Chinese--from the PRC,
economic coercion from the PRC creates clients and customers.
We are out there to build partners and allies.
I think that also allows us to get a sense of what PRC's
malign activities are globally, and then on any given transfer,
Senator, we are providing ranges of options for the Combatant
Commanders and certainly for the Secretary to address either in
deterrence, preparing, and if needed to prevail.
You have got the best special operations team in the world
to do that, and that same time, we are presenting a lot of
dilemmas to the adversary, the PRC.
Senator Scott. Thank each of you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Rosen,
please.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed. I really
appreciate you holding this hearing. I would like to thank each
one of the witnesses for being here and, of course, for
everyone's service to our Nation. General Nakasone, I have
quite a few questions for you on our cyber workforce and Nevada
National Guard.
But I am going to get into cyber workforce first because
the National Cybersecurity Strategy, which was released just
last week, it calls for expanding the national cyber workforce.
I know it is critical we continue to invest in innovative,
nontraditional cyber capabilities and in talent to support the
Department of Defense cyber mission requirements.
In last year's NDAA, as reported out of this Committee, it
included my Civilian Cyber Reserve Act, bipartisan legislation
I introduced with Senator Blackburn to create a civilian cyber
reserve that ensures additional cyber capacity for CYBERCOM in
greatest--times of greatest need.
So, this year, of course, I look forward to working with
the chairman to ensure this critically important legislation
will be included in the final conference. But I was hoping,
General, that you could discuss the value of reserve models,
including the value of a potential civilian cybersecurity
reserve to support your cyberspace operations.
General Nakasone. Senator, first of all, thank you for your
support of U.S. Cyber Command, and in general, the work that we
do in cyberspace. It begins with humans.
This idea of being able to have many more analysts, many
more operators, many more developers is something that is part
and parcel to our success in the future. It is not only with
the civilian workforce that you have championed, but it is also
this idea of how do you bring a larger base to bear?
How do we bring it from K through 12 that makes people very
interested that science, technology, engineering, mathematics
is the way of the future, and girls that code all these things
that will provide a greater base for us to draw from are really
important to us.
Senator Rosen. Well, you are speaking my language. As a
former software developer, now co-founder of the Women in STEM
Caucus, and trying to promote STEM education all the time, this
is music to my ears.
Of course, in fiscal year 2021, the NDAA required the
Department of Defense to submit to Congress an evaluation of
the reserve models to support these cyberspace operations, and
the report was never submitted.
So could you update me on the status of the report and also
the requirement I added in the fiscal year 2023 bill to have
DOD enter into an agreement to assess the benefits of such a
program. I would really like to see us be able to move forward
on this.
General Nakasone. Senator, if I might take that for the
record, just to make sure I can leverage the Department of
Defense for that.
Senator Rosen. That would be perfect. I have some other
questions, too, on auspices--excuse me, specifically for
Nevada's National Guard. But, the National Cybersecurity
Strategy rightly identifies a strengthening our international
partner capacity. It is a pillar of our collective
cybersecurity, our hunt forward operations in Ukraine in
particular.
It really shows us the value of international partnerships.
I have advocated for more funding for hunt forward as we
identify more vulnerabilities, and so, our Nevada National
Guard. We have three partner nations as a National Guard State
Partnership Program, Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa.
How is the program promoting cyber partnerships with our
allies and partners, and what challenges do you see--are you
facing building these and where can we create a better strategy
for this command?
General Nakasone. First of all, I see very, very few--very,
very few limitations on what we need to do in the future. The
countries that you talk about there in the Southwest Pacific,
we have worked very closely with our partners in Australia to
look at how do we kind of incorporate all of them as we
understand their needs, their requirements, their
vulnerabilities, and then be able to assist them. A very, very
small amount of money in a very, very small amount of time
yields tremendous results, in my opinion.
Senator Rosen. Yes, I agree. I want to tell you that I am
also very excited because Department of Homeland Security
recently announced another cyber strategy as it is going to
expand the Abraham Accords collaboration among the United
States, Israel, UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco to include
cybersecurity.
As you work to promote multilateral partnerships between
the Abraham Accords countries, how do you think this is going
to help you with that?
General Nakasone. Well, just think about hunt forward
operations. We began those in 2018. Since 2018, 47 different
missions, 22 countries, 70 different networks.
When we take a look at what has been able to be done--what
we have been able to do is the fact that, one, it builds
tremendous confidence between nations, right. When the United
States deploys a hunt forward team to country x, country x
knows that the United States cares, and it is for us being able
to work with a partner to understand their requirements, and
also build a higher bar of cybersecurity.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you for being there. We have
heard that from our allies and partners. It means a lot when
you are there. You show up and we work in partnership with
others to help potentiate what they are doing to protect
themselves. Thank you again. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. The open portion
of the hearing has concluded. For the benefit of my colleagues
who might be listening, we have two votes. One is already
underway.
We will adjourn here and convene our closed session,
SBC217, immediately following this. I urge my colleagues to
vote and then join us. I would also like to commend the panel
for their excellent testimony--our excellent testimony.
Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
very much. General Fenton and Mr. Maier, I know this has been
touched on, but it is an issue that I think is really
important.
How is the shift going from your rightful and exceptional
focus on CT operations, primarily in the CENTCOM AOR, to the
INDOPACOM region as our pacing threat? What is the kind of
orientation of the strategy in that region? What I mean by that
is, the CT, SOCOM focus post 9/11 was very kinetic, which our
guys did an incredible job at. But the INDOPACOM strategy and
focus is not kinetic, at least not now. We all hope it is never
going to be kinetic.
It is a very different mission set. I don't know if that
impacts morale. It is not as--well, I would like both of you to
talk about that, because I have been concerned that it has been
hard. You have done such a good job in that AOR, and that AOR
is still important.
The issue of making sure that violent extremist
organizations (VEOs) do not threaten our Nation, particularly
with weapons of mass destruction, is still critical. But the
pacing threat is China. Every day we see something.
You saw the foreign minister of China yesterday publicly
saying, hey, we are on a collision course toward war. We don't
want that, but we better well be ready for it. Your operators
are the best in the world.
There are no Chinese forces that can hold a candle to the
United States Special Operations enterprise, not even close.
So, it is a giant strategic advantage we have over them. I want
them to fear the hell out of it. So, what are we doing and how
is that shift going?
Mr. Maier. Senator, thanks for the question. Maybe I will
start and then General Fenton can address some of the issues
that are core to his force here.
I would say that the shift is very much underway, but I
think it is a question of how do we maintain the
counterterrorism capabilities, because if you look at the maps,
sir, of course, many of the areas that were problems continue
to be problems.
We are we are having to manage that risk. At the same time,
we are doing, as you correctly said, sir, a different mission
in the Indo-Pacific. I think the idea that we are not very
kinetic or not kinetic at all in the Indo-Pacific is not
necessarily something that means that the same kind of SOF
skills are not relevant.
As we think of things like placement and access, and really
relying on partners sometimes for that placement and access,
but also the ability to work unilaterally go to places, that
last tactical mile that at times only U.S. Special Operations
can do, that is still relevant in the Indo-Pacific, even if the
finish is not a kinetic or lethal finish.
I think, second Senator, I would highlight the by with and
through approach, really working through partners, that has
really been the hallmark of the counterterrorism efforts,
especially the last decade or so, is very, very relevant again
in the Indo-Pacific because we want our partners to be in the
lead.
But we have demonstrated in places like Ukraine we can do
that from a distance. So, it doesn't have to be the hand on the
shoulder that we are always--we have been familiar with in the
past.
I think these fundamental tools and the approaches we have
used are still very relevant in the Indo-Pacific, sir.
Senator Sullivan. General Fenton, how is the reorientation
of the INDOPACOM theater going?
General Fenton. Senator, I am going to start by agreeing
with you that your special operations formation is the best,
the very best in the history of mankind.
Senator Sullivan. Chinese don't have anything remotely
close to it, and they know that. We know that.
General Fenton. I agree with that, and the same thing with
Russia and any other adversary out there. That's right. The
other part is that we exist and included with the entirety of
the U.S. military, and the CYBERCOM team is exactly the best,
and we have all that. I think, and I would want everybody that
wishes this Nation harm, and if there is an adversary out
there, China----
Senator Sullivan. I just want INDOPACOM theater to know
that we are out there too, right.
General Fenton. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. I sure I want the Chinese to wake up
thinking they got Navy SEALs all over them, every day.
General Fenton. Yes, sir, and your special operations team
is out there and in a very sustainable, durable way, in a
concert with Admiral Aquilino's requirements. I would tell you
that we can handle these challenges.
I will start by saying special operations really never left
strategic competition and great deterrence. You and I talked
about this a Senator, I think last year where I was the special
ops commander responsible in the Pacific for the special
operations forces that both did counterterrorism with one
partner that we can I can talk more in a closed session about
but competed with the PRC all day long by building
partnerships, relationships, and capability.
That continues. At the same time, we will not take our eye
off the persistent threat of global terrorism, and so, we will
still handle the CT mission. There will be a number of forces
that have the CT mission each and everyday hunting anybody that
wishes harm to this Nation but can slide over to present some
level of dilemma to an adversary in an integrated deterrence
arena.
I would just add much of our counterterrorism experience is
desired by these partners and nations as we go forward to train
and becomes a key part of the partnership. So, Senator, I would
just end with, your SOCOM team is absolutely ready to handle
that challenge. I think there is a large portion of our force
that is excited about this. They want to do what the Nation
needs.
Right now, the Nation needs us to get very involved, and we
are, and deter PRC, and certainly to address aggression by the
Russians. They want to be knee deep in it. You know, your
special operations team will, and at the same time handle the
counterterrorism mission and any crisis response mission where
a U.S. citizen or a diplomat needed to be safeguarded or
rescued.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I
just want to say to General Nakasone, no question. I just think
you are--publicly because a lot of what you do is not public. I
think you and your team are doing an exceptional job, General.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. The open
session has concluded again. We have two votes. I would urge my
colleagues to go to the first vote. We will resume immediately
in SVBC17 for the closed session, and to each of you gentlemen,
thank you for your testimony.
General Fenton, Secretary Maier, General Nakasone, let me
tell you, all have been extremely diligent, dedicated and
offered superb service to this Nation over many years, and we
are in your debt. Thank you all very much for that. I will
adjourn the open hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
information operations
1. Senator Shaheen. General Fenton and General Nakasone, Russia
conducts malicious information operations around the world and
particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine. As the Department of
Defense works across the interagency to counter Russian information
operations, how can the United States improve its response time to
malign information operations?
General Fenton. The U.S. requires a unified strategic communication
plan to protect United States, Allies, and Partners, while globally
engaging against Russian malign influence operations. Additionally, the
Department will require investment in artificial intelligence and
machine learning capabilities to detect Russian malign influence
messaging, and conduct rapid counter-messaging. We need to increase our
investments in Information Operations Forces to include Psychological
Operations, Cyber, Space, Electronic Warfare, Civil Affairs, Public
Affairs, and others to provide the Joint Force the right personnel and
capabilities at the right levels to engage against this and other
National Defense Strategy (NDS) challenges.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM, by executing its operational approach
of persistent engagement, aims to anticipate and preclude malign
activity rather than responding after the fact. By actively
campaigning, our cyberspace forces persistently counter malicious
activity to include malign influence operations. Operating continuously
below armed conflict denies initiative to adversaries; generates
insight, opportunities, and options that preclude adversary freedom of
maneuver; and defends DOD information networks, the defense industrial
base and indirectly other elements of U.S. critical infrastructure.
2. Senator Shaheen. General Fenton and General Nakasone, what risks
does a delayed response time to malign information operations pose to
U.S. national security?
General Fenton. As we faced Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)
threats over the past 20 years, the U.S. Government had a unified plan
against VEO malign information operations. The risk of a disjointed,
delayed, or nascent response cedes the information space to our
adversary. A proactive stance under a unified strategic communication
plan which empowers the various departments to take timely action is
required to reduce our adversary's ability to own the narrative. This
is the most effective way to reduce United States risk, while
undercutting Russian malign information and influence operations.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM conducts military cyberspace
operations and presents options to the Secretary of Defense and the
President. The timing of a possible response is a decision for U.S.
policy/decisionmakers.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
future use of unfunded priorities lists (upls)
3. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nakasone, do you agree that
if funding is needed for a project, it should be a part of the command/
service budget?
General Fenton. Yes, I agree, and the Command's most critical
requirements are resourced in the Command's Fiscal Year 2024
President's Budget Request. USSOCOM's fiscal year 2024 budget request
allows Special Operations Forces (SOF) to remain fully capable of
accomplishing USSOCOM's missions, while exceeding the Nation's
expectations. However, sustaining, campaigning, and modernizing SOF
forces must be balanced with an appreciation of both near-and long-term
readiness risk to force and mission. This balancing act means some
requirements cannot be fully resourced within available funding, and
are subsequently deferred to a future year in lieu of near-term higher
priority needs.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM follows congressional and DOD's
budgetary processes.
4. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nakasone, historically, have
previous UPL items been included in the following year's base budget?
Have UPL items from fiscal year 2023 been included in the fiscal year
2024 base budget? If yes, please provide detail including the requested
item, funding amount, and vendor executing the effort. If no, why not?
General Fenton. Yes, if funded by Congress from USSOCOM's fiscal
year 2023 C-UPL and not a one-time requirement. Examples from USSOCOM's
fiscal year 2023 list include:
i. Counter Unmanned Systems Procurement Acceleration, $65.2
million, Anduril Industries
ii. Advana Authoritative Data Management and Analytics, $8.0
million, Booz Allen Hamilton
iii. Enterprise Data Stewardship Program, $18 million, Indefinite
Delivery, Indefinite Quantity Contract (e.g., multiple vendors)
iv. Identity and Signature Management Modernization, $20.9 million,
GDIT/ARMA, CACI/AFC, Thompson-Reuters Special Services, and others
based on mission requirements
v. CV-22 & MC-130J Link-16 TacNet Tactical Receiver, $5.7 million,
Lockheed Martin. Data Link Systems, Sierra Nevada Corporation, and
VIASAT
Some requirements resourced via the UPL are one-time damage
refurbishments or aircraft loss replacements that occurred after the
close of the Program/Budget Review, and were subsequently added to the
UPL. USSOCOM's Combatant Craft Medium Loss Refurbishment for $4.3
million was one such requirement funded in fiscal year 2023.
General Nakasone. The first UPL request for which USCYBERCOM
received funding was in fiscal year 2022. USCYBERCOM was unable to
include the item in its fiscal year 2023 base budget, so another UPL
was requested for fiscal year 2023. All of the USCYBERCOM fiscal year
2023 UPL items which received partial funding in fiscal year 2023 have
been included in USCYBERCOM's Fiscal Year 2024 Presidents Budget (PB)
request as appropriate.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount Requested Congressional Add
Fiscal Year 2023 UPL ITEM ($ millions) ($ millions) Vendor(s)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cyber Mission Force Operational Support.. 167.9 66.0 NSA; FFRDC/UARCs; Booz Allen
Hamilton; Accenture; SANS;
other vendors TBD
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JCWA Integration......................... 56.4 41.4 ManTech; other vendors TBD
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nakasone, do you agree that
Federal agencies should be required to work within the confines of base
budget process?
General Fenton. Yes. The base budget process affords the Command
and the Department the opportunity to ensure the most critical
strategic requirements are resourced within the President's Budget
Request. The C-UPL supplements provide an avenue for Combatant
Commanders and Service Chiefs to communicate emerging requirements
directly to Congress that would have been resourced if the requirement
had been identified before the close of the budget process months
earlier. Also, C-UPLs represent requirements we would have funded
within the base budget if additional funds had been available for
addressing ``fact of life'' changes. fiscal year 2024 examples in the
latter category include acceleration of transformational investments in
modern capabilities such as un-crewed platforms, autonomous
capabilities, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and natural
language processing capabilities.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM follows congressional and DOD's
budgetary processes.
information on upls
6. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, what was the cost
of putting together this UPL list?
General Fenton. UPL compilation is a byproduct of building annual
President's Budget Requests.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
For each item on the unfunded priorities list you submit in
response to 10 U.S.C. 222a, please provide the following information:
7. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, please provide a
detailed description of this UPL?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
8. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, what does the UPL
purchase?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
9. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, please include
detail on all end items with quantities, contractor FTEs, etc.
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
10. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, what specific
capability will the UPL provide?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
11. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, what gap will this
fill that is not in the base budget?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
12. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, how will this
capability support objectives outlined in current National Security,
Military, and Defense Strategy documents?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
13. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, what is the
operational requirement? How does this UPL support current or future
operations?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
14. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, what is the
operational impact if this UPL is not funded in fiscal year 2024?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
15. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, are there plans to
include this item in the fiscal year 2025 base budget?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
16. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, why was this UPL
not included in the fiscal year 2024 President's Budget submission?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
17. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, what is the name
of the vendor(s) executing this effort? Sub-vendor(s)?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
18. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, how often has your
command met with the vendor executing this effort? Please provide a
list of all such meetings, and the agenda for these meetings?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
19. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, what is your
history with this vendor? Please detail when the relationship began,
the number of contracts applied for by this vendor, the number of
contracts awarded to this vendor, and if you have had a personal
relationship with the vendor?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
20. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, has anyone who
formerly worked for your command represented the vendor in meetings?
What is their name, what was their position, and when did you meet with
them?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
21. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, in which city/
State will the UPL be executed?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
22. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, is this
requirement on an existing contract? If so, with who? What is the
history of the contract?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
23. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, what is the
anticipated contract award date if the UPL receives funding?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
24. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, what funding lines
are associated with this UPL?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
25. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, if multiple
appropriations fund this requirement, must all appropriations be funded
simultaneously to source this requirement, or can each appropriation
stand on its own to fund a portion of the requirement?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
26. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, how much was
enacted and obligated (or expended for RDT&E) in fiscal year 2022-23
for this requirement?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
27. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, how much was
requested in fiscal year 2024 for this requirement?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
28. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, is there a tail
associated with this UPL?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
29. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, is any tail funded
in the future years defense plan?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
30. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, please describe
how much the requirement will cost per year for the next 5 years.
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
31. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, please provide in
detail the previous funding requests and enacted for this requirement,
including if it was in the base budget or UPL.
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
32. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, if the requirement
is not included in the future years defense plan, will that be
rectified in the next Program Objective Memorandum or the Program,
Planning, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) cycle?
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
33. Senator Warren. General Fenton and Nasakone, please provide
photos of this requirement for visual aid.
General Fenton. Responses have been retained in Committee files.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM did not submit an Unfunded Priorities
List for fiscal year 2024.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
c-uas
34. Senator Peters. General Fenton, with SOCOM's designation as the
lead for defeating UAS prior to launch, home and abroad. What
recommendations can you offer DOD and the Army's Joint Counter-UAS
office to increase collaboration between DHS and other interagency
partners for illuminating and countering threats to homeland, and where
does the lead coordinating authority fit into the process?
General Fenton. In our role as the DOD's global coordinator to
counter the UAS threat prior to launch, we strive to ensure effective
collaboration occurs within the DOD daily, between the Army's Joint C-
UAS office, DHS, interagency partners and others.
In our coordinating role, we use an approach similar to the one we
use for the Counter-VEO fight in the Combatant Command Areas of
Responsibility (AORs)--protecting the homeland by disrupting the
adversary primarily outside the U.S. (i.e., the Away Game). In order to
execute this role, the Department engages with Law Enforcement and
interagency partners (including but not limited to, Department of
Commerce, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Bureau of
Investigations, DHS, Treasury, and State), as well as coordinating with
USNORTHCOM, the Joint Counter small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS)
Office (JCO), and the National Intelligence Manager for Aviation to
identify threats, priorities, and coordinate opportunities to counter
risks to the Homeland.
To ensure domestic challenges are addressed, we continue to work
by, with, and through USNORTHCOM and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, National Intelligence Manager-Aviation partners,
and we are in close coordination with JCO to ensure no seams exist
between the mutually supportive ``Right of Launch'' and ``Prior to
Launch'' efforts.
internet operations management program
35. Senator Peters. General Nasakone, in your role, you are
responsible for securing the sprawling ``.mil'' digital enterprise that
our warfighters depend upon. Over the last several years, progress has
been made to implement an Internet Operations Management Program that
continuously monitors DOD's cyber infrastructure through the eyes of
the adversary, identifies vulnerabilities, and empowers network
operators to quickly remediate those issues before adversaries like
Russia or China can exploit them. Despite some progress, this critical
capability has yet to be deployed across the entire DOD Information
Network. Over half of the Department's 45 Areas of Operation within the
DODIN have yet to receive this capability. Can we expect full DOD-wide
deployment of the Internet Management Operations Management capability
in fiscal year 2023?
IF NOT, Today's threat environment seems misaligned to picking
winners and losers across the DOD Information Network for proven
capability. What do you need from us to push this critical effort
across the finish line?
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM developed a phased implementation of
the Internet Operations Management (IOM) capability based on
operational focus and intelligence needs. So far in fiscal year 2023,
the Department has expanded this capability to 27 of the 45 DODIN Areas
of Operation (DAOs).
Phase I included 18 DAOs that each completed a 60-day
onboarding, ensuring success through live/recorded training sessions
and concluding with a tabletop exercise to certify DODIN Areas of
Operation initial operating capability meets operational direction.
Phase 2 began on March 30 and will grant access to 9 more
DODIN Areas of Operation who will complete the same 60-day onboarding
cycle.
Full deployment of IOM capability to all 45 DAO's is planned for
fiscal year 2024.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly
armed overwatch
36. Senator Kelly. General Fenton, what is the development status
of the of the AT-802U Sky Warden, to be designated OA-1K?
General Fenton. The Armed Overwatch OA-1K Program is integrating
mature mission system technologies to include weapons, defensive
systems, and secure communications onto the commercial AT-802U
aircraft. This approach leverages proven technologies requiring little
development. Presently, USSOCOM is working with L3Harris and the
Federal Aviation Administration to certify the airworthiness of the AT-
802U modifications that comprise the OA-1K. The first lot of seven
aircraft is now in low-rate initial production with aircraft being
modified at the L3Harris facility in Tulsa, okay.
37. Senator Kelly. General Fenton, when will you take delivery of
the first aircraft?
General Fenton. We are scheduled to take delivery of the first
aircraft by the end of October of this year.
38. Senator Kelly. General Fenton, is SOCOM working to identify
training locations? What are the main considerations?
General Fenton. Yes, the training location is currently being
coordinated by AFSOC through the Secretary of the Air Force's Strategic
Basing Process. There are two main criteria for consideration:
locations with existing similar-sized aircraft training, maintenance,
and support infrastructure and training airspace for Armed Overwatch
mission with air-to-ground range availability and accessibility.
39. Senator Kelly. General Fenton, how will SOCOM select basing
locations for the anticipated 4 squadrons of these aircraft?
General Fenton. The OA-1K will be based with USSOCOM's Air Force
Service Component. AFSOC is leading the effort to qualify candidate OA-
1K bases through the Secretary of the Air Force's Strategic Basing
Process. Once approved, the Secretary of the Air Force will notify
Congress of the decision.
40. Senator Kelly. General Fenton, how can this Committee better
support you in continuing to do the Armed Overwatch mission?
General Fenton. We appreciate the continued support we have
received from the Committee as we maintain an aggressive schedule to
field the Armed Overwatch aircraft. However, there are no additional
steps the Committee can take at this time to accelerate the program.
41. Senator Kelly. General Fenton, are there steps Congress can
take to accelerate progress through program milestones?
General Fenton. We appreciate the continued support we have
received from Congress as we maintain an aggressive schedule to field
the Armed Overwatch aircraft as quickly as possible. However, there are
no additional steps Congress can take at this time to accelerate the
program.
oa-1k operational impact
42. Senator Kelly. General Fenton, armed ISR capabilities have
played a pivotal role in the fight against global extremist threats
worldwide. It's also critical to have a platform capable of doing Close
Air Support missions and supporting our troops on the ground at a
moment's notice. What specific capabilities will the new, dedicated
light attack aircraft to be known as OA-1K provide?
General Fenton. The OA-1K will provide two high-definition,
electro-optical/infrared full motion video (FMV) sensors for overwatch
in support of troops on the ground. The aircraft will have encrypted
line of sight (LOS) voice communications, as well as LOS FMV downlink
to exchange real time voice and video imagery with a supported ground
element. Additionally, the OA-1K will have Link 16 and Beyond Line-of-
Sight full motion video capabilities to exchange battlespace awareness
information with other aircraft and operations centers. For delivering
kinetic effects against a target, the OA-1K will be armed with 2.75''
laser-guided rockets (AGR-20 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System
(APKWS)) and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. The OA-1K will have a 3.5 hour
loiter time plus 30 minutes weapons delivery at a range of 225 nautical
miles. Finally, the OA-1K is equipped with an external, podded modular
multiple-sensor station and open mission system architecture to enable
tailoring of platform capability to support force needs.
43. Senator Kelly. General Fenton, how do you anticipate using the
OA-1K to support SOCOM operations?
General Fenton. Armed Overwatch will provide a cost-effective,
multi-role, rapidly deployable, Irregular Warfare (IW) platform capable
of austere operations in direct support of globally deployed,
geographically isolated SOF units, and remains central to our Precision
Effects modernization efforts, as it will provide responsive and
available situational awareness, protection and fires to our ground
forces executing C-VEO missions in permissive environments.
44. Senator Kelly. General Fenton, how will these aircraft impact
the support SOCOM is able to provide to our Combatant Commanders around
the world?
General Fenton. Combatant Commanders' requirements differ based on
their missions, threats, and national policy in those regions. The OA-
1K will conduct cost-effective IW missions, as well as enable other
USSOCOM assets to pivot toward other priority mission sets. The Armed
Overwatch primary focus is on the C-VEO mission by supporting combined
ground teams for operations that require a low footprint, higher
endurance, and austere capable aircraft.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
dual-hat arrangement
45. Senator Wicker. General Nakasone, could you please comment on
how your dual-hatted role at CYBERCOM and the NSA enhances U.S.
national security and helps both agencies achieve success in their
individual missions? If the dual-hat arrangement were to go away, how
do you think it would impact cyber coordination efforts between
CYBERCOM and the NSA, and the execution of their individual missions?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
cyber workforce readiness
46. Senator Wicker. General Nakasone, does CYBERCOM have the
manpower it needs to fully execute its mission? Would personnel
management tools such as extended tour lengths, geographic assignment
stability, and increased special duty pay help in recruiting and
retaining the cyber workforce the Department needs?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
cyber partnerships
47. Senator Wicker. General Nakasone, please comment on how
CYBERCOM is leveraging partnerships with United States' international
allies to strengthen our defenses against common threats and
adversaries?
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM has increased its focus and engagement
with international partners globally. These partnerships build
resilience in partners' ability to harden their government and military
networks and weapons systems, enhance interoperability in coordinating
and executing cyberspace operations, and enhance partners' posture to
confront cyber threats across the spectrum of competition and conflict.
Further information is in classified responses.
48. Senator Wicker. General Nasakone, the defense industrial base
is often our first line of defense for cyberattacks in the United
States. General Nakasone, how is CYBERCOM collaborating with the
private sector to ensure that the private sector has the information
and tools it needs to detect and respond to cyberattacks?
General Nakasone. Cyberspace is a global domain. Adversaries often
penetrate privately owned networks and devices, using sophisticated
capabilities to disrupt operations or gain advantage via activities
such as intellectual property theft, targeting of personal information
and installation of ransomware. The collaboration and sharing of
insights with the private sector provides mutual benefits. An example
is the UNDERADVISEMENT program, which links cybersecurity expertise
across industry and government, leading to several operational
successes as well as collaborating with system owners in order to
eradicate threats themselves.
artificial intelligence and cybersecurity
49. Senator Wicker. General Nakasone, how is artificial
intelligence (AI) changing warfare in the cyber domain, and what can we
be doing to leverage AI to enhance our offensive and defensive cyber
capabilities?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
cyber capabilities to secure the u.s. southern border
50. Senator Wicker. General Nakasone, I recently traveled to the
U.S. southern border where we have a serious crisis. The border is
clearly controlled by the cartels, which are trafficking humans, fatal
drugs, and weapons. To what extent are the Mexican cartels using cyber
capabilities to control the southern border, and what can you share
about CYBERCOM's efforts to counter the cartels' cyber capabilities?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
joint cyber warfighting architecture
51. Senator Wicker. General Nakasone, please provide a status
update on the migration of Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture
components from the Services to CYBERCOM.
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM is conducting the initial stages of
the migration of the Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture (JCWA)
components from the Services to USCYBERCOM by working to define
Service/USCYBERCOM roles and responsibilities, governance and
authorities.
USCYBERCOM is drafting Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with the
Services outlining relationships and responsibilities. In addition,
USCYBERCOM is working with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)) to define Commander
USCYBERCOM's authorities for Systems Engineering and Integration
(SE&I), enabling cross-JCWA enterprise interoperability functions for
all JCWA program offices. USCYBERCOM expects to use enhanced budget
control (EBC) and SE&I authorities to manage JCWA programs at an
enterprise level in fiscal year 2024.
USCYBERCOM is preparing to establish a Program Executive Office as
directed in the fiscal year 2023 NDAA, Section 1509.
competition
52. Senator Wicker. General Nakasone, does the DOD have a strategy
to ensure that no single vendor has a broad enough enterprise license
agreement that it locks out ``best of breed'' cybersecurity solutions
and thereby increases cyber risk? If so, recognizing that there are
many components to a comprehensive cybersecurity solution, such as
Endpoint Detection and Response, Vulnerability Management, Identity and
Access Management, and Security Information and Event Management, what
is your strategy to ensure that the Department incorporates the best of
each component to reduce cyber risk?
General Nakasone. I defer this question to the Department of
Defense.
53. Senator Wicker. General Nakasone, does the DOD plan to issue a
new department-wide acquisition strategy to meet Zero Trust
requirements that includes a competitive process for multiple
cybersecurity vendors?
General Nakasone. I defer this question to the Department of
Defense.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
irregular warfare
54. Senator Ernst. Secretary Maier and General Fenton, in your
personal opinion, would enabling partner forces that are responding to
hostilities enhance SOF's irregular warfare contribution to great power
competition?
Secretary Maier. Irregular warfare operations and activities
increase pressure on adversaries that seek to compete with the United
States by shaping the environment to prevent or deter hostilities,
enhancing our allies' and partners' ability to respond to hostilities,
and setting favorable conditions for potential future U.S. operations.
Through these operations and activities, the U.S. can positively
influence outcomes for partner defense forces and degrade adversarial
resources and capabilities without overtly/openly escalating
hostilities. This contributes to strategic competition by bolstering
U.S. legitimacy as a dedicated and invested partner while
simultaneously signaling to other adversaries the consequences of
challenging a U.S. partner.
General Fenton. As evidenced by recent and ongoing events around
the globe, competition between world powers spans the operational
continuum, including armed conflict. U.S. SOF must be prepared to
execute IW activities in support of Combatant Command requirements on
both ends of the spectrum equally, especially as it relates to our
interactions with foreign partners. Following through is critical to
the sustainment and implementation of operational capabilities that
were developed prior to hostilities. Perhaps more importantly, the
demonstration of U.S. resolve enhances our credibility, which is
crucial to the sustainment of relationships with current partners and
to fostering future relationships. Our ability to enable like-minded
partners through resourcing, training, and advising across the
operational continuum is the key to achieving strategic effects
designed to prevent--prepare--and ultimately prevail over a mutual
adversary. Conversely, failure to follow through will result in
outsized negative impacts to ongoing and future IW campaigns.
55. Senator Ernst. Secretary Maier and General Fenton, in your
personal opinion, do you agree that extending this authority
indefinitely and increasing its budget authorization would improve
SOF's irregular warfare capability?
Secretary Maier. Yes, codifying section 1202 of the fiscal year
2018 NDAA as a permanent authority and increasing its budget
authorization will enable SOF to fund and plan long-term operations
necessary to build resilient and capable partners and to compete
successfully with adversaries. Section 1202 programs enable SOF to
conduct activities below the threshold of armed conflict that develop
and enable partners to counter our adversaries' malign interests around
the globe. A temporary, or periodically renewed 1202 authority
communicates to our partners and adversaries that U.S. support is bound
by a timeline and that our support has an expiration.
General Fenton. Codifying and expanding the budget authorization
for 1202 broadens the aperture and increases U.S. SOF's value
proposition for Combatant Commanders that are deterred from using 1202
by the current uncertain program lifespan and relatively low budget
cap. Enhanced Combatant Command confidence in the efficacy of the 1202
program would result in increased opportunities and greater flexibility
for U.S. SOF to enable and leverage foreign partners to achieve
specific effects in support of our mutual IW objectives.
56. Senator Ernst. Secretary Maier and General Fenton, in your
personal opinion, are there other modifications to this authority that
could improve SOF ability to compete with great powers?
Secretary Maier. We continuously evaluate existing authorities in
coordination with USSOCOM to ensure SOF has the authorities it needs to
effectively contribute to strategic competition.
General Fenton. We are currently assessing the benefit of combining
the attributes of 127e (support of Special Operations to Combat
Terrorism) and 1202 (support of Special Operations for Irregular
Warfare) into a single fiscal authority that would allow for the
provision of support to foreign partners to achieve effects when and
where counter-VEO operations and integrated deterrence campaigning are
complementary. This is an initiative that--if we determine it has
merit--would be worked through the Department's legislative proposal/
review process.
training
57. Senator Ernst. General Fenton, we need realistic training to
build readiness for GPC. How has SOF adapted its training programs for
GPC?
General Fenton. USSOCOM is executing an aggressive plan of
reorienting SOF to address the global challenges that are impacting new
strategies for campaigning throughout multiple regions and across all
domains. Realistic training is key to building enduring advantage and
critical to enhancing SOF's and our partners' capabilities against near
peer challengers. USSOCOM continues to support and participate in
Service, Joint, and multinational exercises synchronizing these
activities through our Theater Special Operations Commands and the
Combatant Commands to provide deterrent effects to our competitors
whenever possible. USSOCOM continues to explore new training
capabilities, live and virtual, in multiple domains to enhance our
warfighting and crisis response capabilities.
58. Senator Ernst. General Fenton, does SOF have the resource it
needs to adapted its training programs for GPC?
General Fenton. It is important to sustain funding for
experimentation, training, and exercises for the entire Joint Force to
build capabilities, readiness, and deter our competitors. Ensuring SOF
is integrated with our joint and combined partners is accomplished
through maintaining and enhancing our joint and combined exercises
programs, especially with the Interagency, to address current strategic
challenges and anticipate future challenges.
counter narcotics
59. Senator Ernst. Secretary Maier, how is SOF using existing
authorities to conduct its counter-narcotics responsibility?
Secretary Maier. In support of DOD's broader counternarcotics and
counter-transnational organized crime efforts, SOF leverage existing
authorities to conduct exercises and training alongside foreign
partners with responsibilities for disrupting drug trafficking and
associated forms of transnational organized crime.
U.S. law and longstanding policy prohibits direct DOD participation
in law enforcement activities such as searches, seizures, or arrests of
civilians. In peacetime, U.S. law enforcement agencies, often in
collaboration with their foreign counterparts, appropriately lead drug
interdiction efforts, but DOD intelligence, training, and logistical
support are often critical to successful law enforcement actions,
including arrests, seizures, designations, etc. SOF's global presence
and ability to support interagency, non-governmental, and foreign
military partners enhances the development of holistic options to
degrade transnational criminal organization networks. As the designated
global coordinator for the Department's counter threat finance
operations, USSOCOM provides essential support to U.S. Government
efforts to identify and disrupt sources of illicit revenue that
supports terrorist or other transnational criminal organizations.
60. Senator Ernst. Secretary Maier, are the SOF authorities to
conduct its counter-narcotics responsibility sufficient at this time?
Secretary Maier. I appreciate the serious threat that drug
trafficking poses to our society, especially from fentanyl, which
according to DEA kills nearly 200 Americans every day. In addition to
the clear human and economic costs, illicit drugs provide financial
support to violent extremist organizations and other threat networks
that contribute to global instability.
SOF play an important role within DOD's broader counter-narcotics
efforts, which are conducted through a broad range of authorities, both
in support of U.S. and foreign law enforcement operations and by
building the capacity of foreign partners to disrupt drug trafficking
and associated forms of transnational organized crime. While current
authorities have been essential to DOD's efforts in support of our law
enforcement partners, the Department is seeking to amend 10 USC 284 to
authorize planning support for counterdrug operations conducted by U.S.
law enforcement agencies and to increase the cap on small-scale
construction for bases of operations or training facilities in support
of foreign law enforcement agencies. The Department is also seeking to
codify Section 1022 of the Fiscal Year 2004 NDAA, which authorizes the
use of counterdrug funds to enable joint task forces that support law
enforcement agencies conducting counter-drug activities to also provide
support to law enforcement agencies conducting counter-terrorism or
counter-transnational organized crime activities, including the
trafficking of people, weapons, money, and natural resources and
wildlife.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
sof in the arctic
61. Senator Sullivan. General Fenton, Assistant Secretary of
Defense Maier, in your prepared remarks you noted that ``[s]trategic
competitors--specifically Russia--threaten established international
rules in the Arctic and pose increasing challenges to North American
security. SOF play a role in bolstering domain awareness and integrated
deterrence in the Arctic as part of the Joint Force. Over the past
year, SOF strengthened capabilities to operate and prevail in the
austere Arctic environment. Large-scale, joint exercises and
operations, such as Arctic Edge and Polar Dagger, provided venues for
more than 500 U.S. and multinational SOF to experiment and operate in
the North American Arctic region.'' Can you elaborate on how SOCNORTH
is expanding SOCOM's role in the Arctic to deter China and Russia and
defend the Homeland?
General Fenton. USSOCOM supports the Combatant Commands and their
Arctic Strategies. SOCNORTH has expanded and continues to strengthen
USSOCOM's role as part of USNORTHCOM's Campaign to deter and defend
against the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russian malign
influence in the Arctic. The key Operations, Activities, Exercises, and
Investments (OAEIs) SOF brings, combined with our strong relationships
with numerous Allied and Partner nations in the Arctic, strengthens our
capabilities, increases Joint Force domain awareness and enhances
integrated deterrence.
SOCNORTH-led OAEIs across the challenging pan-Arctic environment
and problem-set is increasing in support of integrated deterrence and
Homeland Defense. Specific examples include:
SOCNORTH deployment of a Special Operations Command
Forward (SOCFWD) to both execute and provide Command and Control (C2)
of USSOF military free-fall and combat-dive operations in extreme
Arctic conditions during USNORTHCOM's Exercise VIGILANT SHIELD (April
2021) at Deadhorse, AK.
Operation SPARTAN SENTRY (October 2021), which provided
SOCNORTH an additional opportunity to extend its operational reach to
plan, execute and assess Special Operations on a larger scale at Shemya
Island, AK, as part of USNORTHCOM's Operation NOBLE DEFENDER.
SOCNORTH further advanced SOF campaigning in the Arctic
during Exercise ARCTIC EDGE 22 (February 2022) by establishing a
forward-deployed Joint Force Special Operations Component Command to C2
subordinate Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs) in the execution of
multi-domain Special Operations with more than 500 U.S. and
multinational SOF (the largest ever deployment of SOF to the North
American Arctic).
Operation POLAR DAGGER 1.0 (September 2022) during which
SOCNORTH demonstrated U.S. SOF capability to operate in the Arctic on
St. Lawrence--located 36 nautical miles off Russia's eastern coastline
/ military district. This exercise sent a clear deterrent message
during parallel Russian strategic exercises in the Pacific region.
Follow-on OAEIs (e.g., Exercise ARCTIC EDGE 23, Operation
POLAR DAGGER 2.0, etc.) will provide opportunities for SOCNORTH to
learn, experiment, develop, and evolve USSOF capabilities as part of
the Joint Force, integrate with inter-organizational partners, and
potentially message to adversaries that we can and will ``win'' against
any threat in the Arctic in competition and conflict.
SOCNORTH continues to focus on strengthening key
partnerships with numerous Allied and Partner Nations that share
security interests and equities across the pan-Arctic region. Specific
examples include:
In support of CDRUSNORTHCOM's Globally Integrated Layered
Defense (GILD), and USNORTHCOM's designation in the UCP as the DOD
Arctic Advocate for Arctic Requirements, SOCNORTH is collaborating
directly with SOCPAC and SOCEUR to close operational seams across the
transregional, pan-Arctic problem-set.
SOCNORTH is also partnering with Joint Force Command
Norfolk (JFC-NF) to assist NATO with planning for campaigning and
contingencies in the High North and the trans-Atlantic approaches to
the Homeland.
In October 2022, SOCNORTH hosted the first ``Special
Operations in the Arctic Symposium,'' attended by more than 200
participants from more than 70 joint, interagency, intergovernmental,
and multinational organizations to include the Ted Stevens Center (the
Alaska-based DOD Regional Security Center focused on the Arctic),
helped to build shared understanding, better define pan-Arctic
challenges and share lessons learned across the Enterprise.
SOF is innovating and improving in order to fight and win in this
challenging environment, through the execution of these OAEIs and
building focused relationships.
Secretary Maier. Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH) plays
a key role in the first Pillar of our Arctic Strategy, centered on
security and developing capabilities for expanded Arctic activity. As
an Arctic nation, and as an ally to Arctic nations, we have a
responsibility to operate across our own gaps and seams and to
strengthen partnerships. Special operations forces have always excelled
at both. SOCNORTH works closely with Special Operations Command Europe
(SOCEUR) and Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), finding
opportunities to deepen cooperation with allies and partners to improve
our understanding of the environment, and to ensure each combatant
command is prepared to operate with our allies in the Arctic. One
example is the Senior Leader Dialogue we recently held with leaders
from Norway's defense ministry and special operations command. The
commanders of SOCEUR and SOCNORTH outlined important ways for us to
maximize our unity of effort through our key bilateral relationships,
exercise presence, share awareness, and deepen our interoperability
with allies like Norway. The Arctic is a challenging environment to
operate in, and SOF leads the way, finding opportunities to address
those challenges and further develop our own capabilities.
ocom global force posture
62. Senator Sullivan. General Fenton, Assistant Secretary of
Defense Maier, the 2022 NDS establishes a clear hierarchy of threats,
with the People's Republic of China at the top, followed by Russia. The
focus on Great Power Competition involves a different mission than the
counter-terrorism fight most SOCOM entities have conducted for the past
20 years. It also requires different capabilities. Can you explain,
with examples, how SOCOM's global force posture has changed to reflect
the shift from CT operations to deterring Chinese and Russian
aggression?
General Fenton. USSOCOM has increased deployments of CONUS-based
United States SOF to the Indo-Pacific and Europe to supplement forward-
based forces normally available to United States Indo-Pacific Command
(USINDOPACOM) and United States European Command (USEUCOM). These
forces work with and assure regional allies and partners, set
conditions in theater, and effectively enable U.S. SOF to integrate
with and support the Joint Force during crisis. Even as we re-align SOF
to the USINDOPACOM AOR--our SOF in other AORs such as U.S. Central
Command--executes persistent deployments and engagements to deter,
disrupt, and degrade Russian and Chinese influence and access. In
USEUCOM, U.S. SOF along with Allied SOF, have rekindled traditional
relationships with volunteer and territorial defense forces, which
dramatically increase the resiliency of their nations. In addition, the
Global SOF Posture Plan (GSPP) has been developed with a focus on
supporting the integrated deterrence of Chinese and Russian aggression.
The GSPP shifts posture focus from counter terrorism to integrated
deterrence. An example is the U.S. Air Force Special Operations
Command's development of Theater Air Operations Squadrons and their
Non-Standard Aviation Growth, which were validated by USSOCOM in 2022,
and are currently being staffed for implementation into two key
theaters. These units represent the first developed and validated to
meet the NDS objectives.
Secretary Maier. SOF are present in more than 70 countries at any
one time. We have always deployed to address the needs of the Nation
alongside our Allies and partners. Consistent with the 2022 NDS
direction to address the People's Republic of China as our pacing
threat, and Russia as an acute threat, we are focusing on establishing
the access, placement, and relationships needed to counter these
threats and prepare for conflict if required. A great example of these
efforts is in the Philippines, where Exercise Balikatan 2023 will
include forces from the 27th Special Operations Wing working alongside
our Allies to enhance interoperability and demonstrate resolve in the
critical Indo-Pacific theater. While we have not taken our eye off the
counterterrorism fight, we are purposefully deploying and leveraging
SOF to provide asymmetric advantages for the Joint Force and the
Nation.
63. Senator Sullivan. General Fenton, Assistant Secretary of
Defense Maier, do you think SOCOM is now properly aligned to execute
the 2022 NDS or does more work remain to be done?
General Fenton. Yes. The men and women of USSOCOM stand ready to
execute and support the requirements in our NDS; anytime and anywhere
our Nation requires us. We have always changed shape to meet the
requirements of the Nation and the SOF Enterprise's focus on ``People,
Win, and Transform'' will continue to guide USSOCOM to support the NDS.
SOF is laser-focused on the PRC as the pacing threat, while we continue
C-VEO and ensure the readiness of our no-fail CR mission. We will
continuously evaluate the enterprise moving forward to ensure we
support the joint force through integrated deterrence, and are prepared
to accomplish the most challenging missions at a time of high risk. All
of this requires calibration and nuance to defend the Nation and build
stronger relationships with our allies and partners.
Additionally, USSOCOM is accelerating its wide-ranging
modernization efforts and leveraging its acquisition authorities with
an emphasis on surface and subsurface maritime platforms; C-UAS; next-
generation Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; mission
command systems; and collaborative and autonomous unmanned systems.
USSOCOM continues to build enduring advantages through investments in
our people, technology, and organizations in support of the NDS.
Secretary Maier. The SOF enterprise is aligned with the guidance
set forth by the 2022 National Defense Strategy and continues work to
implement the NDS. We are on the pathway to achieve NDS-defined
strategic objectives through the programming, planning, and allocation
of SOF resources to execute global SOF operations, activities, and
investments. The guidance and direction that CDRUSSOCOM and I have
published in our SOF Vision and Strategy and the fiscal year 2025 SOF
Capabilities and Programming Guidance reflects SOF's alignment with the
2022 NDS. In addition, our co-authored future operating concept we are
developing further aligns how SOF will operate in the future to the
strategic direction outlined in the 2022 NDS. Together, these documents
lay out the plan for aligning SOF with NDS priority initiatives, and we
are providing regular progress updates to the Secretary.
uscybercom support of indopacom objectives
64. Senator Sullivan. General Nakasone, in your prepared remarks
you identified USCYBERCOM's fourth line of effort as ``developing
options for full-spectrum cyberspace operations to assist Combatant
Commanders . . . to achieve their objectives.'' You also noted that
China was ``building capabilities far in excess of its defense needs.''
Deterring, and if necessary defeating, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is
certainly one of INDOPACOM's objectives. A key Chinese capability to
conduct such an invasion is the PLAN (People's Liberation Army Navy).
The Secretary of the Navy has acknowledged we cannot match the output
of Chinese shipyards and the PLAN is already numerically larger than
the United States Navy. The PLAN also uses civilian RO-ROs (Roll on/
Roll Off) ferry vessels to practice the same type of amphibious
operations it needs to conduct to invade Taiwan. What capabilities does
CYBERCOM bring to the fight to help INDOPACOM achieve its objectives,
specifically deterring and defeating a PLA amphibious invasion of
Taiwan?
General Nakasone. Last year, I created a combined USCYBERCOM-NSA
China Outcomes Group to oversee this shift. The China Outcomes Group
aligns components in USCYBERCOM and NSA, enhances intelligence
insights, improves cybersecurity and delivers operational outcomes for
the Nation. Resources are prioritized and focused on deterring and
countering the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) aggressive
behavior.
Further information is in classified responses.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
internet operations management program
65. Senator Budd. General Nakasone, how large is the total attack
surface that CYBERCOM is responsible for defending across the DOD
Information Network?
General Nakasone. The DODIN attack surface being actively tracked
and monitored by Internet Operations Management (IOM) consists of
roughly 300 million Internet Protocol addresses for which USCYBERCOM is
responsible for defending.
66. Senator Budd. General Nakasone, how is CYBERCOM incorporating
industry solutions, including automated monitoring through the eyes of
the adversary, to help better defend that attack surface?
General Nakasone. The Internet Operations Management (IOM)
capability is the industry solution USCYBERCOM has been using since
2019 that performs monitoring through the eyes of the adversary. IOM
has been leveraged to continuously discover, inventory, manage and
monitor all commercial-facing DODIN cyberspace assets, both on-premises
and in the cloud; to aggregate all DODIN commercial-facing asset data
in a centralized location; and to streamline command and control of
DODIN defensive cyberspace operations.
67. Senator Budd. General Nakasone, reportedly over half of the
Department's 45 Areas of Operation within the DODIN have yet to
implement continuous monitoring and vulnerability identification
through the Internet Operations Management Program. Do you expect
Department-wide deployment of that capability this year? If not, when
can we expect it?
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM developed a phased implementation of
the Internet Operations Management (IOM) capability based on
operational focus and intelligence needs. So far in fiscal year 2023,
the Department has expanded this capability to 27 of the 45 DODIN Areas
of Operation (DAOs).
Phase 1 included 18 DAOs that each completed a 60-day
onboarding, ensuring success through live/recorded training sessions
and concluding with a tabletop exercise to certify DODIN Areas of
Operation initial operating capability meets operational direction.
Phase 2 began on March 30 and will grant access to 9 more
DODIN Areas of Operation who will complete the same 60-day onboarding
cycle.
Full deployment of IOM capability to all 45 DAO's is planned for
fiscal year 2024.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 9, 2023
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room G-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, King, Warren, Peters, Rosen,
Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan,
Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. Good
morning. The Committee meets today to receive testimony from
General Anthony Cotton, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, or
STRATCOM, and General James Dickinson, Commander of U.S. Space
Command, or SPACECOM.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service to the Nation, and
please extend my thanks, and thanks of all the Members of the
Committee, to the men and women serving under your command.
General Dickinson, I understand this is likely your last
hearing before the Committee as Commander SPACECOM.
I want to thank you for your extraordinary leadership, and
particularly to the first years of this command as you
establish the norms that are carried forward. Thank you very
much, sir. As in the past, we have asked the Commanders of
STRATCOM and SPACECOM to testify together.
Until 2019, Space Command was a part of Strategic Command.
Now, as SPACECOM stands up as an independent command, it is
important to identify any gaps or seams that have emerged
during the transition.
On the global stage, Russia's illegal war in Ukraine has
introduced risks to the nuclear stability we have maintained
for the better part of a century. Vladimir Putin's behavior has
been dangerously reckless. In February, he suspended Russia's
participation in the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty], the last remaining strategic stability agreement
between our two countries.
General Cotton, it is important to the Committee to
understand how this affects your planning, and I hope to hear
more about it in the classified session. Further, Putin and his
associates have made a series of nuclear saber-rattling
statements to try to make the United States and our allies
reconsider our support for Ukraine.
That strategy has failed. The United States nuclear
deterrent, the bedrock of our national defense, is being relied
upon more than ever, and our extended deterrence for our allies
has proven effective. This has made Russia think twice about
escalating hostilities against NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization]. We must be mindful, however, that as Putin's
conventional arsenal grows weaker, he may rely more on his
nuclear arsenal.
I would welcome our witnesses' thoughts on how we can best
manage this extremely complicated dynamic. Our other near-peer
competitor, China, continues to advance its ballistic missile
capabilities. In addition to expanding its field of hardened
missile silos, the PLA [People's Liberation Army] is building
new air and sea nuclear delivery platforms.
General Cotton, you recently sent a letter to Congress
reporting that while China has fewer warheads than the United
States, it now has more launch platforms than we do. I would
like to know the implications of this assessment.
Beijing's new land-based silos, along with the completion
of its nuclear triad, and nuclear command and control and
communications, or NC3, fundamentally changed the nature of its
nuclear doctrine. This shift may have significant impacts on
stability in the Indo-Pacific region and should inform how we
design our own nuclear strategy to protect the Nation and
maintain our extended deterrence and our commitment to our
allies.
The United States is well under way in its cycle of nuclear
modernization, a once in a generation effort to renew the aging
legs of our nuclear triad. Each leg is a major defense
acquisition program, and I understand that the Air Force and
Navy are encountering workforce and supply chain problems
similar to other Department programs. General Cotton, I would
like to know how these delays could impact your planning
efforts.
Further, I would ask for your views on the efforts of the
National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA, to meet
Defense Department requirements. In prior modernization cycles,
the NNSA could rely on existing infrastructure, particularly
with respect to uranium and plutonium, to meet these
requirements.
That is not the case today, as the NNSA has to recapitalize
the very production facilities needed to provide finished
nuclear parts. It is essential that we understand what impacts
this may have on your operations.
In the space domain, we are quickly gaining a clearer
picture of the threats we face. With respect to Ukraine, we
have learned a number of important lessons. For example, GPS
[Global Positioning System] jamming is now commonplace and
commercial space systems are regarded as enemy combatants by
Russia. There are entire regions of Ukraine that are GPS
denied, and the conflict is creating unexpected consequences
for commercial space operations.
General Dickinson, I hope you will share your perspective
on using commercial space assets in a conflict as our current
policy is ambiguous. Space Command's ability to want Strategic
Command, Northern Command, and U.S. senior leadership of a
missile attack on the Homeland remains critically important.
The Committee would appreciate an update on the progress
SPACECOM has made in assuming control of the missile warning
and NC3 functions it inherited from STRATCOM. Are there gaps in
and how can these gaps be addressed? Finally, SPACECOM is
responsible for integrating both ground and space sensors to
achieve better space situational awareness, essentially
becoming the Defense Department's sensor command.
General Dickinson, I ask that you share your vision for how
to integrate this constellation of sensors which ranges from
ground and sea radars to satellite sensors so that it provides
the best support to the Force.
Thank you again to our witnesses for appearing today. I
look forward to your testimonies. I would note for my
colleagues that there will be a classified hearing immediately
following this session in SVC-217 to continue our discussion.
With that, let me recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Chairman Reed, and thank you to
our witnesses. I can think of no issue that demands the
Committee's attention more than the nuclear threat posed by
China and Russia. Despite its significant setbacks in Ukraine,
Russia remains a major nuclear threat to the United States.
Moscow possesses a larger and more modern nuclear arsenal
than we do. It can also build new and numerous additional
nuclear weapons in short order. Russia has developed new
nuclear weapons unlike anything in the United States inventory,
including nuclear powered transoceanic, autonomous torpedoes
and intercontinental cruise missiles.
These are weapons for which we have no defense. The story
out of China is also very troubling. Beijing is modernizing and
expanding its nuclear force at breakneck speed. It will likely
outpace the United States in the early 2030's. The past 18-
month period has given us a good idea of China's remarkable
growth.
Over that time, China's nuclear arsenal has doubled in
size. The Chinese have blown a missile that can drop nuclear
warheads from orbit anywhere on earth with virtually no notice.
China has become the third country to develop a strategic triad
of nuclear missiles, bombers, and submarines.
General Cotton recently notified Congress that China now
possesses more ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missiles]
launchers than the United States. Just last week, news reports
exposed Beijing's purchase of 28 tons of Russian uranium, which
could be used to further its weapons production. In the space
domain, China and Russia are openly developing and testing
counterspace capabilities.
Each country has dangerously taken out satellite]s in
orbit, creating thousands of pieces of debris and space junk,
endangering hundreds of other satellites, and frankly, those
brazen and irresponsible acts of aggression only scratch the
surface of their real capabilities.
Given these great threat conditions, one would expect a
sense of urgency on the part of our Government, a fundamental
reassessment of our assumptions and realignment of our
resources. Instead, the Departments of Defense and Energy
repeatedly delay programs to modernize our nuclear deterrence
and restore the basic industrial capabilities we use to produce
nuclear weapons.
The Administration downplays the reality that space is a
war fighting domain. Space contains real threats and
adversaries, and it needs military solutions. Refusing to
acknowledge and prepare affects our country's ability to be
ready for a future war that would extend into space.
This Administration needs plans and postures to account for
the worsening security system. If we are to prevail in long
term competition with China and Russia, we need to commit today
to a program of sustained innovation and investment. This
morning, we will begin to receive budget summaries, including
the President's Budget Request.
This request once again is likely not to keep pace with
inflation, and we already know of several significant
shortfalls in naval shipbuilding, munitions, the key
investments in the Western Pacific for example, to name a few.
I would look forward to working with my colleagues here in
Congress on both sides of the aisle to build a bipartisan,
adequate, strategy-based budget for the coming year. About the
sense of urgency, I would like to hear from our witnesses about
how this Committee can help create a sense of urgency to act,
to accelerate the modernization of our strategic arsenal and
adapt our forces. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. General Cotton,
please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL ANTHONY J. COTTON, USAF COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Cotton. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Wicker, and distinguished Members of the Committee.
I appreciate this opportunity to testify next to General
Dickinson, and I thank the Committee and Congress for its
support to national defense. First, I along with my Command
Senior Enlisted Leader, Sergeant Major Howard Kramer, want to
assure you and the American people that the United States
Strategic Command is ready today.
Ready to defend our Nation, defend our allies, and respond
decisively if called upon. The men and women of United States
Strategic Command are the foundation for the capabilities that
underpin our Nation's strategic deterrence. They do this in an
environment that continues to grow complex and challenging.
Russia's invasion of a sovereign Ukraine is an attempt to
undermine the rules based international order by conventional
forces backed with nuclear saber rattling. How this conflict
unfolds and eventually ends will shape the strategic
environment for decades to come.
We see the People's Republic of China (PRC) continuing to
rapidly expand its nuclear capabilities. The PRC's actions are
wholly inconsistent with the long-professed policy of minimal
deterrence. I did report to Congress in January that the number
of land-based intercontinental ballistic missile launchers in
the PRC now exceeds those that we have in the United States.
Along with its significant modernization and expansion of
conventional capabilities, the PRC is also investing heavily in
lower yield precision systems with theater ranges, a new
generation of mobile missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles
with fractional over bombardment systems.
The PRC nuclear modernization, provided with an alarming
number of offensive options that can negatively shape the
environment before and during a crisis or conflict. North Korea
continues to be a rogue actor and poses a threat to the United
States and our allies. North Korea conducted an unprecedented
number of missile launches in 2022, and its new
intercontinental ballistic missile, referred to as the KN-28,
highlight that the security challenge continues to grow.
We are meeting today's challenges with integrated
deterrence. It is the cornerstone of the National Defense
Strategy (NDS). Our unmatched network of allies is a key
component of integrated deterrence, and these relationships are
underpinned by our extended deterrence commitments. These
commitments are enabled by a safe, secure, effective, and
credible nuclear deterrent.
The credibility of our extended deterrent commitments is
not only part of the Nation's iron-clad commitment to our
allies but is also essential in limiting proliferation of
nuclear weapons. The nation's nuclear forces underpin
integrated deterrence and enables the U.S., our allies, and our
partners to confront aggressive and coercive behavior.
To ensure our continue ability to serve as the bedrock of
integrated deterrence, we are recapitalizing every leg of the
nuclear triad and the nuclear command, control, and
communication systems. We are also addressing electromagnetic
spectrum operations holistically and developing concepts to
deploy conventional hypersonic strike capabilities.
We will need to continue partnering with industry to ensure
flexibility, responsiveness, and capacity during
recapitalization and modernization to ensure we can sustain our
current systems while the new ones are being delivered.
Finally, I will end as I started, our people are the
foundation of every capability that enables strategic
deterrence. I am proud to serve alongside the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and guardians, and civilians that
make up U.S. Strategic Command. Thank you again for this honor,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Anthony J. Cotton
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Anthony J. Cotton
introduction
United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is a global
warfighting combatant command (CCMD). Our mission is to deter strategic
attack and employ forces, as directed, to guarantee the security of our
Nation and our Allies. Our people are the greatest enablers of this
security, and it is my privilege to lead the soldiers, sailors,
marines, airmen, guardians, and civilians who dedicate themselves to
this mission 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. I want to thank the
President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for
their confidence in me to lead this command. I also thank Congress for
your continued support to ensure that USSTRATCOM has the resources
necessary to meet our critically important mission. We remain ready to
face the complex deterrence challenges of today's global security
environment while positioning the command for the future.
USSTRATCOM is responsible for strategic deterrence; nuclear
operations; nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)
enterprise operations; joint electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) operations
(JEMSO); global strike; missile defense; analysis and targeting; and
missile threat assessment. These responsibilities will grow in
prominence as we face the challenges identified in the National Defense
Strategy (NDS): strategic competition with the People's Republic of
China (PRC), Russia as an acute threat, threats to the United States
Homeland, and complex escalation dynamics.
To meet these rapidly evolving challenges, the United States must
provide a combat ready force able to deter any adversary, and if
necessary, fight and win. While the command stands ready to execute its
mission today, we need consistent, stable, and on-time congressional
funding to sustain and modernize the nuclear enterprise. This will
ensure our ability to pace current and future threats by providing
capabilities to deter through the spectrum of conflict. Over the past
decade, a cycle of continuing resolutions and late appropriations has
hindered the Department's acquisitions, operations, and maintenance. As
both the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Chief of Naval Operations
testified in 2022, continuing resolutions and late appropriations cost
us time and money, causing potential delays in modernizing the nuclear
enterprise and Joint Force.
The nuclear triad is the foundation of U.S. national security, and
I thank Congress for fully funding our modernization programs: Sentinel
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Columbia-class submarine, D5
submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) second life extension and
modernization (D5 LE2), B-21 Raider bomber, and Long Range Standoff
(LRSO) cruise missile. In addition to these systems, the U.S. must
continue investment in sustainment of current systems and critical
capabilities that support and complement the nuclear triad. These
include nuclear weapons infrastructure overseen by the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA), NC3, nuclear security, and long-range
conventional strike capabilities such as hypersonic weapons (HSWs).
Alongside capability is capacity. We must expand our critical munitions
stockpiles while working with manufacturers to make the defense
industrial base as responsive as possible.
our people
The greatest strength of USSTRATCOM is its people. Like the rest of
the Department, our workforce is aging out and we are in a fierce
competition for talent. My goal is to help personnel currently assigned
to the command maximize their potential while continuing to attract
capable individuals. USSTRATCOM is committed to deliberate development
opportunities and career broadening. These opportunities include
strategic deterrence education programs, and a strategic leader
fellowship program. Additionally, we are committed to maintaining an
inclusive environment where people are valued as well as fostering
quality of life improvements for the military and civilian workforce.
Finally, the need to fully recapitalize our nuclear enterprise has an
important people component--as our systems continue to age, their
increasing maintenance requirements fall squarely on our dedicated team
of servicemembers and civilians.
We have an amazing team serving both in and out of uniform to
protect our country. Investing in people yields dividends for national
security. There are serious challenges with the production capacity of
the defense industrial base, and to help mitigate this I encourage
Congress to look at ways to increase the number of STEM (science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics) and skilled trade workers
throughout the U.S. workforce.
global security environment
For the first time in our country's history, the United States
faces two major nuclear powers, the PRC and the Russian Federation,
which have the capability to employ nuclear coercion as a way to
achieve their national objectives. Russia presents a growing nuclear
deterrence challenge centered on its potential perception that the
threshold for regional nuclear employment is lower with low-yield
systems. The PRC is also developing capabilities that would present a
similar deterrence challenge, and it is unconstrained by any nuclear
arms control treaty limitations. Additionally, the activities of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are regionally
destabilizing and have global implications.
In the longer term, emerging technologies--including HSWs,
fractional orbital bombardment (FOB) capabilities, anti-satellite
capabilities, artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems,
advanced computing, quantum information sciences, biotechnology, and
advanced materials and manufacturing--pose a growing challenge to our
national defense.
Meeting these near-term and longer-term threats requires a globally
focused national strategy and commitment that spans decades.
People's Republic of China
As the NDS states, the PRC is our most consequential strategic
competitor and pacing challenge; its significant nuclear force
expansion reflects an increasing assertiveness and the capability to
employ nuclear coercion. The PRC's rapid qualitative and quantitative
expansion of military capabilities enables a shift in its strategy and
requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to make immediate and
significant alterations to plans and capabilities. The PRC is
aggressively pursuing their global ambitions through a national
strategy of ``Military-Civil Fusion''--a comprehensive focus on
advancing civilian research to develop and then apply new technologies
toward military and defense innovations. For example, the PRC's
development and construction of fast breeder reactors and reprocessing
facilities allows the swift expansion of its warhead manufacturing
capacity. The PRC believes that its robust nuclear weapons program is
essential to counter the U.S. in the near future in order to achieve
what its leaders have deemed ``great power status.''
Correspondingly, the PRC seeks to match, or in some areas surpass,
quantitative and qualitative parity with the United States in terms of
nuclear weapons. The PRC's nuclear capabilities already exceed those
needed for its long-professed policy of ``minimum deterrence,'' but PRC
capabilities continue to grow at an alarming rate. Additionally, the
PRC is making substantial investments to expand its inventory of land-,
sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms and is constructing the
infrastructure necessary to support the significant expansion of its
nuclear forces. Notably, the PRC is developing capabilities
inconsistent with its historical minimum deterrence posture.
Within the past 3 years, the PRC has built hundreds of new ICBM
silos, further indicating a move away from a minimum deterrence
posture. The PRC's three new missile fields collectively provide it
with more than 300 silos. Each of these silos can be equipped with the
CSS-10 Mod 2 ICBM, which is capable of ranging the continental United
States (CONUS) with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
(MIRVs). Additionally, the PRC maintains other ICBMs, some of which are
road-mobile. Unconstrained by arms control treaty limitations, the PRC
is fielding a new generation of mobile missiles, with MIRV and
penetration aid capabilities. The PRC's most modern road-mobile and
MIRV-capable ICBM advanced from concept to deployed system in only a
few years. The PRC is now projected to have over 1,000 warheads by the
end of this decade. In accordance with statutory requirements, I
recently reported to Congress that the number of land-based fixed and
mobile ICBM launchers in the PRC now exceeds the number of ICBM
launchers in the U.S.
Just like the ground leg, the air and sea legs of the PRC's nuclear
triad are now armed with newly developed weapon systems. The air-
refuelable H-6N bomber is armed with new nuclear-capable cruise
missiles and air-launched ballistic missiles that may be nuclear
capable, and the PRC is building a new stealth strategic bomber with
global reach. The PRC's six JIN-class ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) are now being equipped with the new third-generation JL-3 SLBM
capable of ranging CONUS. PRC strategists also highlight their
country's perceived need for lower-yield nuclear weapons.
Significantly, the PRC's investment in lower-yield, precision systems
with theater ranges points to investment in asymmetric capabilities
that could be employed coercively during an escalation crisis, similar
to Russia's irresponsible nuclear saber-rattling during its war against
Ukraine. This presents the United States with a deterrence challenge
that must be addressed with a range of U.S. capabilities, both
conventional and nuclear. The PRC currently has an arsenal of
approximately 1,000 medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles,
many of which are dual capable (i.e., able to be armed by either
conventional or nuclear warheads) and able to inflict significant
damage to United States, Allied, and partner forces in the Indo-
Pacific.
The PRC's 2021 test of a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) with FOB
capability exemplifies its pursuit of weapons systems with implications
for strategic stability. FOB systems use a low earth orbit to deliver a
warhead most of the way to its target destination, deorbiting just
before reaching its target. These systems represent a more challenging
threat because their non-ballistic trajectories complicate missile
detection and tracking, and degrade the target country's ability to
characterize the scale of an attack.
The trajectory of the PRC's nuclear advancements points to a large,
diverse nuclear arsenal with a first-strike offensive capability and a
high degree of survivability, reliability, and effectiveness. When
considered in the context of its heavy investment in NC3, as well as
increased readiness, the PRC's nuclear modernization highlights
emergent capabilities that could provide it with a spectrum of first-
strike offensive options before and during a crisis or conventional
conflict. The PRC may believe that nuclear weapons represent a key
component of its counter-intervention strategy and could use these
weapons coercively against our Nation, Allies, or partners.
Russian Federation
Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine is a violent attempt at
territorial seizure that aims to undermine the rules-based
international order with conventional force backed by nuclear coercion.
Russia's nuclear rhetoric is underpinned by its nuclear arsenal, which
is the largest and most diverse in the world. Russia continues to
flight test its new heavy ICBM, the SS-X-29 Sarmat, with plans to begin
fielding it in 2023 and eventually replace the legacy SS-18 heavy ICBM.
With Sarmat, Russia joins the PRC in developing ICBMs that use at least
partial orbital trajectories. Russia also continues to field new
Dolgorukiy-class SSBNs, armed with the new SS-N-32 Bulava SLBM, and
Severodvinsk-class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines.
Russia's significant investment in launch platforms and systems not
subject to the New START Treaty (NST) provides it with increasingly
diverse and flexible nuclear deterrence options. Russia now fields
nuclear-capable hypersonic systems such as the Avangard HGV, the
Tsirkon land-attack cruise missile, and the Kinzhal air-launched
ballistic missile, the last of which Russia has employed in Ukraine
with conventional warheads. Russia also has a stockpile of
approximately 2,000 theater nuclear weapons that does not fall under
the limits established by the NST.
The continued degradation of Russian conventional capability in
Ukraine will likely increase Russia's reliance on its nuclear arsenal.
This phenomenon, along with the PRC's rapid breakout and development of
capabilities that present a similar deterrence challenge, underscores
the increased perceived utility of nuclear weapons in the contemporary
environment. The United States faces a complex, multipolar nuclear
world that requires concerted U.S. effort to address these deterrence
challenges, strengthen assurance to our allies and partners, and
prevent proliferation.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
The DPRK, an increasing security challenge to the United States and
our allies, is capable of striking regional allies with nuclear weapons
and is an emerging threat to CONUS. The DPRK's advancing missile and
nuclear programs are destabilizing and highlight the critical role of
USSTRATCOM's deterrence and assurance mission.
The DPRK's nuclear-capable ballistic missile research and
development has continued with an unprecedented number of missile
launches in 2022. The DPRK's continued development of ICBMs, SLBMs, and
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles demonstrates its intention to
bolster its nuclear delivery capability. The DPRK is also developing
new capabilities such as HSWs and MIRVs, and its new Hwasong-17 ICBM
has the potential to reach CONUS. The DPRK is also diversifying launch
platforms, and has tested rail, submarine, and ground-mobile missiles.
These advancing nuclear capabilities place pressure on allied faith in
our extended deterrence commitments. The DPRK illustrates that nuclear
and weapons of mass destruction threats to the United States and our
allies are not limited to the PRC and Russia.
integrated deterrence
We are addressing these threats through integrated deterrence. As
the NDS articulates, integrated deterrence spans all domains and
capabilities and is backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent. USSTRATCOM's role, however, is not limited to
nuclear plans and operations. USSTRATCOM's mission, to deter strategic
attack--not just nuclear attack--against our Nation and allies,
includes many components. Correspondingly, our new concepts and plans
must account for nuclear, long-range conventional, space,
electromagnetic spectrum, and cyberspace capabilities. Crucially, DOD's
plans must integrate all capabilities across the spectrum of conflict.
USSTRATCOM also plays a vital role in assuring allies and partners.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) calls the strategic
forces of the Alliance, particularly those provided by the U.S., ``the
supreme guarantee of the Alliance's security.'' In the Indo-Pacific,
our allies similarly acknowledge the importance of our strategic
deterrent. Examples of operations and activities include U.S. bomber
operations with allies, SSBN port visits, and exercises such as
Steadfast Noon, NATO's annual nuclear exercise.
The war in Ukraine, combined with the PRC's rapid nuclear arsenal
expansion and the DPRK's growing nuclear capabilities, will likely make
longstanding United States nonproliferation goals more challenging. For
70 years, U.S. extended deterrence commitments have functioned as one
of the most important factors limiting the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. In the current environment, the credibility of U.S. extended
deterrence commitments is even more vital to nuclear nonproliferation
goals. Critically, there must be no perception of a threshold below
which an adversary may believe it could employ nuclear weapons, such as
non-treaty accountable, lower-yield, theater weapons, to obtain a
benefit.
what usstratcom needs to accomplish its mission
I urge Congress, the Department, and the services to sustain their
decades-long support for critical national security capabilities,
including the infrastructure needed to support these programs. The
recapitalization of our triad is a once in every-other-generation event
that will ensure we have capable forces into the 2080's to defend the
U.S. Homeland and deter strategic attack globally. I am closely
monitoring the transition of our major programs: Ohio to Columbia, D5
LE to D5 LE2, Minuteman III to Sentinel, B-2 to B-21, Air Launched
Cruise Missile (ALCM) to LRSO, and modernization of NC3 capabilities.
It is essential to sustain our current platforms until new systems are
at full operational capability. Correspondingly, we are coordinating
with the services on efforts to mitigate operational impacts should
delays occur in the delivery timeline for new capabilities.
nuclear command, control, and communications (nc3)
The NC3 enterprise is essential to the President's ability to
command and control the Nation's nuclear forces. Acknowledgement of
this vital mission and the unique challenges facing NC3 modernization
were the impetus behind the Secretary of Defense's establishment of my
role as the DOD NC3 Enterprise Lead in 2018. With these
responsibilities and authorities, we are taking a holistic enterprise
approach to develop and deliver the next generation of NC3--a flexible,
resilient, and assured architecture spanning all domains and enhancing
strategic deterrence.
NC3 Next Generation / Modernization
The modernization of the NC3 enterprise underpins the nuclear triad
and sustains assured command and control capabilities in the evolving
threat environment. We are partnering with NC3 stakeholders in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and levying requirements on the
services to modernize all NC3 capability areas, integrating global
nuclear forces with the means to provide strategic deterrence.
In the next 5 years, we will transition from Milstar to the
Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite constellation, gaining
greater capacity, survivable worldwide NC3 reach, and the ability to
provide direction to our forces in degraded environments. Our national
leadership conferencing, currently using a voice-only legacy
technology, will transition to voice and video displays. In our warning
layer, we are moving away from the Defense Support Program and toward
the Space Based Infrared System to maximize warning time. Efforts are
already underway on our submarines, E-6B aircraft, and bombers to
replace previous generation radios with improved systems that are more
resilient to jamming and other electromagnetic effects.
In the next 10 years, the launch and use of Next Generation
Overhead Persistent Infrared geosynchronous and polar satellites will
replace legacy systems with a space-based missile warning constellation
to detect and track threats around the globe. The Space Development
Agency's Proliferated Warfighting Space Architecture is aimed at
building a constellation of satellites in low and medium earth orbit
that can monitor maneuvering hypersonic missiles flying below the range
of today's ballistic missile detection satellites and above the radar
of terminal-phase targeting systems. These satellites will complement
other efforts to detect and track maneuvering hypersonic missiles that
are difficult targets for current missile warning capabilities.
Finally, we will use polar satellite communications capability with the
Enhanced Polar System Recapitalization program to provide message
relay. Our submarines, E-6B aircraft, bombers, and missile fields will
receive communication systems that increase survivability of weapon
systems in a crisis situation. We are focused on achieving our vision--
a modernized NC3 enterprise that remains resilient, reliable, and
available at all times and under the worst conditions.
NC3 Cybersecurity and Technological Improvements
We have confidence in our ability to protect, defend, and execute
the nuclear deterrent mission. The resilience and redundancies of the
systems comprising the Nuclear Command and Control System, combined
with ongoing cybersecurity enhancements, ensure our ability to respond
under adverse cyber conditions.
E-4B Nightwatch
The E-4B Nightwatch aircraft serves as the National Airborne
Operations Center and is a key component of the National Military
Command System for the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The E-4B recapitalization program--the Survivable
Airborne Operations Center--will serve as the next generation airborne
command center platform. In case of national emergency or destruction
of ground command and control centers, the aircraft provides a highly
survivable command, control and communications center to direct U.S.
forces, execute emergency war orders and coordinate actions by civil
authorities. For these reasons, we must continue to develop and deliver
this platform on time to prevent any capability gaps associated with
this important national asset.
E-6B Mercury
The E-6B Mercury accomplishes two missions: Emergency Action
Message (EAM) relay to all legs of the nuclear triad (Take Charge and
Move Out/TACAMO) and an alternate USSTRATCOM command center providing
EAM origination and ICBM secondary launch capability (Looking Glass).
E-XX is the follow-on platform to the E-6B airframe and will execute
the TACAMO mission only. In coordination with the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Joint
Staff, USSTRATCOM and the NC3 Enterprise Center are conducting an
evaluation of alternatives (EOA) to consider all missions and platforms
to deliver the Looking Glass capabilities currently performed by the E-
6B. Recommendations from the EOA should be available by mid-summer. We
must complete recapitalization by the E-6B's projected end of service
life in fiscal year 2038.
land-based triad component]
The ICBM remains our country's most responsive option for strategic
deterrence. The Minuteman III (MMIII) force provides a responsive,
highly reliable deterrent capability, supported by a secure command and
control system. Geographically dispersed ICBMs deny potential
adversaries the possibility of a successful first strike.
MMIII's weapon system replacement, the LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM, will
deliver MMIII's key attributes while enhancing platform security,
streamlining maintenance processes, and delivering greater operational
capability needed for the evolving threat environment. Sentinel's
program scope and scale cannot be overstated--our first fully
integrated ICBM platform includes the flight system, weapon system, C2,
ground launch systems, and facilities. The Sentinel program is pursuing
mature, low-risk technologies, design modularity, and an open system
architecture using state-of-the-art model-based systems engineering.
Sentinel will meet our current needs, while allowing affordable future
technology insertion to address emerging threats. USSTRATCOM is
actively supporting the Sentinel engineering and manufacturing
development process and looks forward to the first Sentinel
developmental flight test. Sentinel will deploy with numerous
advantages over MMIII and will provide a credible deterrent late into
this century. Sentinel fielding is a whole-of-government endeavor. We
appreciate continued congressional support, both for Sentinel and
sustainment of MMIII.
sea-based triad component
The Navy's Ohio-class SSBN fleet, equipped with the Trident II D5
SLBM, patrols the world's oceans undetected, providing an assured
second strike capability in any scenario. Our SSBN fleet continues to
provide a resilient, reliable, and survivable deterrent. However, the
life of the Ohio-class SSBN fleet has been extended from a planned 30
years to an unprecedented 42 years. The average age of the SSBN fleet
is now 32 years. As the hulls continue to age, the Ohio-class will face
sustainment and readiness challenges until it is replaced by the
Columbia-class. Similar to Minuteman III, we must maintain Ohio-class
hulls until the Columbia is available. The Navy has already invested in
the Integrated Enterprise Plan to shorten construction timelines for
Columbia hulls two through 12 to meet USSTRATCOM at-sea requirements.
Continued investment in revitalizing our shipbuilding industry is a
national security imperative.
The first Columbia-class submarine must achieve its initial
strategic deterrent patrol in fiscal year 2031 with an initial loadout
of D5 LE missiles and a steady transition to the D5 LE2. The program of
record delivers at least 12 SSBNs--the absolute minimum required to
meet sustainment requirements. A life-of-hull reactor and shorter
planned major maintenance periods are intended to deliver greater
operational availability. Columbia will deliver improved tactical and
sonar systems, electric propulsion drive, and advanced hull coating to
maintain U.S. undersea dominance.
The Trident II D5 LE2 program will field a modern, reliable,
flexible, and effective missile capable of adapting to emerging threats
and is required to meet Columbia-class SLBM loadout requirements.
Stable funding for D5LE2 is vital to maintaining program benchmarks and
ensuring a viable SSBN deterrent through the 2080's. Columbia's
ultimate success depends on a missile that is both capable and
flexible.
Additionally, shore infrastructure readiness is fundamental to
supporting current Ohio-class SSBN and future Columbia-class SSBN
operations. Provision of military construction and operation &
maintenance funding facilitates the Navy's modernization of shore
infrastructure supporting the nuclear deterrence mission. One immediate
example is the modernization and expansion of the SSBN training and
maintenance facilities in Kings Bay. These facilities are critical for
maximizing the combat readiness of SSBNs and their crews daily,
requiring a commitment to multiple years of funding.
Anti-Submarine Warfare
Anti-submarine warfare threats continue to evolve. The Navy's
Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) provides vital
information concerning adversary submarine and surface ship operations,
enabling U.S. forces to maintain favorable tactical and strategic
positions while supporting deterrent patrol operations. Surveillance
performed by IUSS also provides the theater undersea warfare commander
situational awareness required for maritime defense of the Homeland.
Advances in adversary submarine stealth underscore the importance of
IUSS recapitalization.
Our submarines are formidable weapon systems; however, we must
address potential adversaries' anti-submarine warfare advances to
maintain an effective and viable SSBN fleet well into the future.
Adversary investments in submarine quieting, acoustic arrays, and
processing capabilities may challenge our acoustic superiority in the
future and consequently, SSBN survivability. Development and employment
of advanced sonar sensors, advanced materials science and coatings, and
other efforts within the Navy's Acoustic Superiority Program are vital
to maintain our undersea advantage.
air-based triad component
The bomber fleet is our most flexible and visible leg of the triad.
We are the only country with the capability to provide long-range
bombers in support of our allies and partners, enabling the U.S. to
signal resolve while providing a flexible option to de-escalate a
conflict or crisis. In a force employment model known as the Bomber
Task Force (BTF), USSTRATCOM supports global deterrence and assurance
objectives. BTFs allow dynamic employment of the Joint Force and clear
messaging as potential adversaries watch these missions closely. As
bombers conduct missions throughout the globe, they enhance national
objectives by demonstrating unity with allies and partners, and testing
interoperability. As a complement to the Air Force's Agile Combat
Employment (ACE) concept, we must consider increasing forward-based
maintenance capability to support persistent, episodic global presence
while retaining the ability to increase nuclear readiness posture as
needed. As we sustain legacy systems and field new capabilities, it
will be important to invest in bomber support forces and infrastructure
to adequately sustain flexibility and effective nuclear deterrence
posture.
B-52H Sustainment
The B-52H continues on as the workhorse of our bomber fleet. The B-
52's longevity is a testament to its engineers and maintenance
professionals, but it must be modernized to remain in service into the
2050s. Essential B-52 upgrades include the Commercial Engine
Replacement Program (CERP), Radar Modernization Plan, global
positioning system military code signal integration, and survivable NC3
communications equipment. These improvements will keep the B-52 flying
and able to pace the evolving threat. CERP will replace the B-52's
1960's-era TF-33 engines, which will enable longer unrefueled range,
reduce emissions, and address supply chain issues afflicting the legacy
engines. The B-52's very low frequency and advanced extremely high
frequency modernization programs will provide mission critical, beyond-
line-of-sight connectivity.
B-2 Sustainment
The B-2 fleet remains the world's only low-observable bomber, able
to penetrate denied environments while employing a wide variety of
munitions against high-value strategic targets. The DOD must protect
this unique operational advantage as the Air Force transitions from the
B-2 to the B-21 fleet. Successful transition requires full funding for
B-2 sustainment and modernization programs until the B-21 completes
development and certification for both conventional and nuclear
missions, and is fielded in sufficient numbers to preclude any
capability gap.
B-21
The B-21 Raider will provide both a conventional and nuclear-
capable bomber supporting the triad with strategic and operational
flexibility across a wide range of military objectives. The program is
on track to meet USSTRATCOM operational requirements, and continues to
successfully execute within cost, schedule, and performance goals. The
B-21 will be the backbone of our future bomber force, providing a
penetrating platform with the range, access, and payload to go anywhere
needed in the world. Consistent funding of the Air Force's B-21 program
is required to prevent operational shortfalls in the bomber force and
ensure delivery of this critical combat capability.
Air-Delivered Weapons
The air-delivered weapons portfolio consists of the ALCM, the B83-1
gravity bomb, and the B61 family of weapons, providing a mix of
standoff and direct attack munitions to meet near-term operational
requirements. The ALCM provides current stand-off capability to the
strategic bomber force, but is reaching its end-of-life. LRSO will
replace the ALCM as our country's sole air-delivered standoff nuclear
capability. It will provide the President with flexible and scalable
options, and is capable of penetrating and surviving against advanced
air defenses--a key attribute and important component in USSTRATCOM
operational plans. The LRSO is complementary to the ICBM and SSBN
recapitalization programs and an important contribution to strategic
stability. The B61-12 will soon replace most previous versions of the
B61, providing a modernized weapon with greater accuracy and increased
flexibility. Finally, USSTRATCOM is actively supporting the National
Defense Authorization Act requirement to conduct a study on options to
hold at risk hard and deeply buried targets.
Tanker Support
A robust tanker fleet is essential to sustaining global reach for
all USSTRATCOM missions. The 65 year-old KC-135 is the backbone of the
Air Force's air refueling force but is facing increasing maintenance
and sustainment issues. Limited air-refueling aircraft increases bomber
response timing and constrains bomber deterrence posture agility.
Concurrent mission demands between strategic, theater, and homeland
defense require continued tanker modernization and expansion efforts.
USSTRATCOM fully endorses and supports the Air Force's effort to
modernize and sustain the tanker fleet, including certification of the
KC-46 to support the nuclear mission. A conflict with a peer adversary
would put previously unseen demands on the tanker force.
weapons infrastructure and nuclear security enterprise (nse)
Today's nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure, and
effective. However, our country has not conducted a large-scale weapons
modernization in over 2 decades. Stockpile and infrastructure
modernization must ensure our systems are capable of pacing and
negating adversary threats to our Nation, Allies, and partners. Over
the past 5 years we have made significant investments in the NSE, but
most programs take a decade or longer to field a meaningful capability.
The NNSA, as part of and informed by the Nuclear Weapons Council
(NWC), has developed a comprehensive plan to put these identified
capacities and capabilities in-place. When realized, it will enable our
country to sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile to meet
strategic deterrence needs. In the interim, I look forward to working
with NNSA and other NWC partners to find the best solutions to mitigate
operational risks. I commend Congress for its support of the NNSA's
budget for weapons activities for fiscal year 2023. Stockpile and NSE
programs can take a decade or more to deliver and will require
consistent, uninterrupted funding to provide the needed capacities and
capabilities on time to sustain and modernize the strategic deterrent
force. We must continue to look for ways to accelerate our stockpile
and NSE modernization and recapitalization programs.
As we shift focus beyond life extension to modernizing existing
weapons and fielding new systems, we must overcome challenges that
delay program execution. There are many NSE programs with just-in-time
schedules or that are late-to-need, including pit production, uranium
processing, and radiation case manufacturing. Failure to execute and
deliver timely NSE modernization programs results in accumulation of
operational risk by requiring the retention of aging weapons and
components in the stockpile decades longer than intended. In fiscal
year 2022, the NSE took action on a number of issues impacting the
readiness and modernization of the nuclear deterrent force. Some
areas--for example, the W93, B61-12, and W88 Alt 370--saw progress,
while others such as the W80-4 and W87-1 stockpile modernization
programs are experiencing milestone delays and increased schedule risk.
I look forward to working with NNSA and other NWC partners to improve
our rates of success in these latter areas.
Production of essential components is a critical issue. NNSA has
identified critical capability gaps affecting components essential for
stockpile modernization. It is also vital that the NSE re-establishes a
plutonium pit manufacturing capability of no less than 80 pits per year
as close to 2030 as possible. Weapon production is a multi-decade task
that must address current enterprise limitations as we simultaneously
modernize the stockpile, infrastructure, and platforms while sustaining
the current force until it can be replaced.
For over a decade, our adversaries have dedicated significant
resources to modernizing and expanding their nuclear capabilities. As
our systems continue to age, funding a modern stockpile, supporting
infrastructure, and a robust science, technology, and engineering base
is essential.
nuclear security
Nuclear security continues to be one of my top priorities; we will
commit the resources required to protect our fielded weapons, weapon
platforms, and personnel. Adhering to the Nuclear Weapon Security
Standard ensures denial of unauthorized access to nuclear weapons and
prevents loss of custody. A defense-in-depth strategy starts at every
nuclear weapon and builds outward with a cohesive design to deter,
detect, delay, deny, and defeat security threats.
MH-139A Grey Wolf Replacement Helicopter
The Joint Force achieved a significant ICBM security milestone with
the Air Force's award of a contract to replace the UH-1N helicopter
fleet with the new MH-139A ``Grey Wolf.'' The MH-139A offers enhanced
speed, range, endurance, payload, and survivability versus the UH-1N.
We will continue to work with the Services to deliver this capability.
Countering Small Unmanned Systems
The rapid proliferation and growing technological sophistication of
small unmanned systems is an increasing threat to the nuclear
enterprise. To counter the threat, the Department continues to field
Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS) capabilities and is
refining tactics, techniques, and procedures. Similarly, the
advancement of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles may soon emerge
as a threat to our SSBNs and supporting infrastructure, requiring a
comprehensive force protection system to defend both pier-side and in-
transit SSBNs.
Weapon Generation Facility (WGF)
As we modernize nuclear weapons and platforms, the Air Force will
replace aging weapon storage areas with new WGFs which are vital to
security, sustainment, and fielding of the Sentinel, B-21, and LRSO
triad modernization programs, and their associated weapons. The Air
Force will conduct weapon maintenance, storage operations, and (as
required) weapons generation activities in a single reinforced WGF
facility at each strategic base. This will further increase security,
recapitalize aging infrastructure, and enhance efficiency throughout
the mission. The WGFs are a critical part of the larger nuclear
modernization effort and must be fully funded to deliver on time in
support of each program of record delivery schedule.
joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (jemso)
Per the Unified Command Plan (UCP), CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible
for advocating for JEMSO and electromagnetic warfare capabilities,
providing contingency electronic warfare support to other CCMDs, and
supporting CCMD joint training and planning related to controlling the
EMS. Potential adversaries understand our dependency upon the EMS and
have developed technology to effectively contest our use of it.
Additionally, increased civil and commercial use of spectrum bandwidth
significantly congests the EMS and constrains DOD use. Multiple
USSTRATCOM assessments have identified JEMSO readiness shortfalls,
which are growing. Our adversaries have dramatically increased their
offensive and defensive capabilities in recent years; the DOD must
similarly improve our ability to operate in a degraded electromagnetic
warfare environment.
We must continue to pursue a DOD-wide effort to achieve EMS
superiority and mission success. To support the goals of the DOD EMS
Superiority Strategy, USSTRATCOM is executing 12 assigned tasks,
including establishing an organization, led by a 2-star, called the
Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Center (JEC). The JEC will
lead execution of the 11 other USSTRATCOM assigned DOD EMS Superiority
Strategy tasks. Additionally, USSTRATCOM has led development of JEMSO
cells at other CCMDs to enable these functions. We are also working
with the DOD Chief Information Officer to develop a software system for
use by CCMD JEMSO cells in planning, coordinating, and controlling the
EMS. Following multiple assessments from Northern Edge--USINDOPACOM's
tier 1 exercise--USSTRATCOM is pursuing accreditation authorities for
Joint Force EMSO readiness that will help close capability gaps.
USSTRATCOM is also establishing an EMSO training and education
capability to coordinate DOD EMS joint training, streamline training
processes, and promote standardization.
missile defense
Missile defense capabilities are a key part of integrated
deterrence to deny our potential adversaries coercive abilities or the
benefit of attacks against the Homeland, Allies, and partners. The
proliferation of missile technology and employment techniques designed
to circumvent missile defenses demands a Department-wide missile defeat
approach with continued investment in systems integration and
collaboration with Allies and partners. This comprehensive approach
uses the entire range of available activities to counter the
development, acquisition, proliferation, and use of adversary offensive
missiles of all types, as well as limiting damage from such use. An
important element of this approach is integration of space-and
terrestrial-based sensors for warning, attribution, and tracking of
ballistic, maneuvering, hypersonic, cruise missile, and UAS threats to
optimize the effectiveness of our limited inventory of kinetic
interceptors. A comprehensive sensor architecture that gives commanders
and civilian leaders situational awareness over all threats and
incursions to our air and space domains is imperative.
Cruise missiles continue to offer adversaries ways to generate
strategic effects. USSTRATCOM is working closely with NORAD/USNORTHCOM,
USINDOPACOM, and USSPACECOM to explore capabilities to enhance homeland
defense and deter attack. Additionally, the Missile Defense Agency,
Services, and CCMDs continue to develop and field defenses that protect
the Homeland and deployed forces while reassuring and defending our
Allies and partners. We are committed to improving the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense system and developing the Next-Generation Interceptor
to augment and potentially replace the Ground Based Interceptor.
hypersonic weapons
Long-range conventional hypersonic weapons will provide senior
leadership additional strike options to hold distant and/or defended
high-value, time-sensitive targets at risk without crossing the nuclear
threshold. Conventional HSWs ensure long-range power projection in
contested environments and enables more efficient and effective
application of the nuclear force. While HSWs are not a replacement for
nuclear weapons, these systems show promise as the conventional
complement that the nuclear force needs to expand integrated deterrence
options.
The ability to quickly strike defended targets at long range is an
important capability that the Joint Force and multiple CCMDs require.
Rapid development and fielding of conventional HSWs is a top USSTRATCOM
priority. The goal of fielding the first offensive hypersonic strike
system is on the horizon with the Army scheduled to field a Long-Range
Hypersonic Weapon battery in late 2023, followed by the Navy
Conventional Prompt Strike program beginning in the mid-2020s. The Air
Force has demonstrated successes in the Air-launched Rapid Response
Weapon program and hypersonic cruise missile technology pathfinder
efforts. A robust scientific and industrial base is vital to ensure
that HSWs are fielded in sufficient quantities. Additionally, a program
for continuous technological improvement is important to meet the
evolving security environment over the coming decades.
USSTRATCOM is committed to ensuring HSWs are ready to employ on day
one of fielding as these weapons directly contribute to USSTRATCOM's
UCP-assigned strategic deterrence and global strike responsibilities.
To operationalize these new capabilities in the near term, we are
working across the Department to develop a concept of operation for HSW
support to integrated deterrence. USSTRATCOM is working through policy,
planning, and C2 processes, and--in conjunction with the services and
other CCMDs--is testing HSWs through a rigorous exercise program.
Hypersonic weapons will have an immediate impact to operational plans
by deterring and holding adversaries at risk while providing the Nation
with credible, strategic, non-nuclear response options when faced with
armed conflict. Additionally, HSW-related agreements with allies will
further reinforce collective security, promote interoperability, and
facilitate optimal deployment of these capabilities.
wargames and exercises
Wargames, exercises, and rehearsals of concept continue to refine
how we demonstrate joint capacity, capability, interoperability, and
integrated deterrence across the globe. Last year, USSTRATCOM conducted
over 380 NC3-focused exercises and wargame events focused on
coordination with national-level civilian and military leadership,
other CCMDs, allies, components, and the interagency. These events
integrated advanced weapons, tested new capabilities, and improved
interoperability while providing the opportunity to assess application
of future force concepts.
defense industrial base
Across America, industries--including but not limited to the
defense industry--are grappling with capacity issues stemming from
shortages of skilled labor, global supply chain delays, inflation, and
a shortage of manufacturing facilities. This, combined with a smaller
specialized workforce, transition to offshore supply chains, the need
to produce quickly in volume, and costs associated with modern
technologies, creates additional program vulnerabilities. These program
risks are simple: cost and schedule.
I applaud Congress for its work in attempting to mitigate these
challenges with the defense industrial base, both in the near term and
longer term. Congress, DOD, and industry must find ways to achieve
requirements despite current challenges. As Undersecretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante has said, ``production
is deterrence.'' Congress's efforts to on-shore critical components
with national security implications, its attention to revitalization of
the shipbuilding industry, and investment in infrastructure are all
welcome developments. DOD and industry should deepen an already strong
partnership. For example, the Department, through its Industrial Base
Analysis and Sustainment program, established the National Imperative
for Industrial Skills to invest in industrial workforce development
needs. We should also design contracts, especially with large programs,
to ensure industry accountability for performance, schedule, and cost,
with shared risk for both DOD and industry. The B-21 program is an
example of effective contract structuring which incentivizes industry
to partner with government to identify, incentivize, and mitigate risks
early to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. For items such as
critical munitions, we can speed production by taking advantage of new
authorities such as multiyear procurement contracts. As Dr. LaPlante
has noted, co-production agreements with Allies and partners are part
of integrated deterrence. In the longer term, I encourage further work
with the services to continue to expand industry's capability,
capacity, flexibility, and responsiveness.
conclusion
The cornerstone of our national defense remains deterrence, and we
will continue USSTRATCOM's vital work during turbulent times. The post-
cold war era is over and a competition is underway among major powers
to shape the next chapter. In this environment, USSTRATCOM stands ready
to face complex challenges in today's global strategic environment
while positioning for the future. I am proud to lead an elite team that
stands ready for a new era of strategic competition. Together with our
people, capabilities, allies, and partners, there is nothing that we
cannot accomplish.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General Cotton. General
Dickinson, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES H. DICKINSON, USA COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SPACE COMMAND
General Dickinson. Thank you, Chairman Reed and Ranking
Member Wicker. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen of the
Committee. It remains my distinct honor to represent the 18,000
military servicemen and women, civilians and families of United
States Space Command, who are serving our great Nation around
the world today.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify before this
Committee. I am proud to lead such a talented and patriotic
group of joint space professionals. Their expertise, diversity,
and creativity underpin our strength and effectiveness. Of all
the elements of military space power, our most valued asset is
and always will be our great people.
My provisional headquarters achieved initial operational
capability in just 2 years and we will reach full operational
capability through the disciplined initiative of our great
people. Spacepower enables our way of life and is a critical
component of our national security.
I thank Congress for its support to advance America's
primacy in space. We must maintain our position of advantage in
the space domain and ensure it remains sustainable, safe,
stable, and secure for all.
The Joint Force relies on space-based capabilities to
project and employee power. China and Russia consider this
dependency a soft underbelly and seek to exploit it. They
intend to limit our access to space during crisis and conflict,
and they are fielding capabilities to that effect.
Our strategic competitors' irresponsible actions have
transformed space into a highly contested domain. We must
prevent today's strategic competition from growing into a
conflict in space. We achieve this by deterring aggression,
defending national interests, and if necessary, prevailing in
any domain.
U.S. Space Command contributes to integrated deterrence by
preserving freedom of action in space and by providing critical
support to the rest of the Joint Force. Our mission spans the
spectrum of conflict and in every domain. For example, we are
creating concepts to further integrate space, cyber, and
special operations to generate asymmetrical advantages around
the world.
Additionally, our Protect and Defend Mission involves all
three segments of the space architecture, the ground link and
space vehicle, an approach that requires and demands all domain
solutions. So, my command's planning horizon is near term. We
must be ready to fight today. The threat will not wait.
To this end, we are leveraging the Joint Force, our allies
and partners to integrate and maximize the capabilities that we
have today. At the same time, we look forward to the
capabilities the services are developing for the future fight.
As we observe in Ukraine, commercial space assets are a
significant force multiplier.
For years, our commercial mission partners have augmented
our satellite communications and provide enhancements to our
Space Domain Awareness Sensor Network. Commercial integration
is absolutely critical to our mission success. Today's hearing
will emphasize the United States' resolve to maintain our
leadership and position of advantage in the space domain.
But before I address the Committee's questions, I want to
reiterate and emphasize to the American people my unwavering
pledge that U.S. Space Command will ensure that there is never
a day without space. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General James H. Dickinson
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General James H. Dickinson
introduction
On behalf of the 18,000 men and women of the 11th combatant
command, U.S. Space Command, it is my honor and pleasure to testify
before the Committee. Our team is operating around the world providing
satellite communication, space domain awareness, offensive and
defensive space control effects, and positioning, navigation, and
timing (PNT) services 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days per year.
Space is fundamental to all joint military operations as outlined in
the National Defense Strategy. It is also critical to our way of life
enabling modern banking transactions, navigation, communication and so
many other capabilities vital to our society and economy. Space touches
our lives every day.
As the complexity of this domain grows, we must grow capability to
provide the President and Secretary of Defense with options to deliver
operational and strategic effects to achieve national objectives.
Today, access to space is increasingly contested and congested. U.S.
adversaries are developing, testing, demonstrating, and fielding a wide
range of counterspace capabilities to degrade or deny the ability for
the U.S. military to leverage critical space-based services. As of this
year there are 8,225 satellites in low Earth orbit and nearly 1,000
satellites in geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO).
My Command Strategy focuses on 3 areas to address the contested and
congested environment: Strengthening Relationships and Attracting New
Partners; Integrating Commercial, Interagency, and Academic
Organizations; and, Building and Maintaining Competitive Advantage. The
Command's disciplined focus on these areas has built irreversible
momentum toward full operational capability and will ensure we deliver
on our promise that there will never be a day without space.
challenges in space
Challenges to a safe, secure, stable, and sustainable space domain
are increasing. Both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the
Russian Federation are fielding capabilities that aim to hold United
States, Allied, and partner space assets at risk. North Korea and Iran
are in the early stages of developing their space enterprise.
The PRC conducted the first fractional orbital launch of an ICBM
with a hypersonic glide vehicle in mid-2021. This system could enable
the PRC to rapidly launch weapons that challenge missile warning and
missile defense architectures.
Russia's November 15, 2021 destructive anti-satellite (ASAT)
missile test and its subsequent acts in connection with its further
invasion of Ukraine threaten to foreshadow the future of warfare and
national security. Assured space-based assets, commercial space
capabilities, and space domain awareness are imperative to global
security. Russian interference with space-based capabilities during its
invasion of Ukraine and continued threats to carry out ``retaliation''
against commercial satellite infrastructure demonstrate a willingness
to employ counterspace capabilities to gain military advantage.
Russia's cyber attacks in late February 2022 against commercial
satellite communications networks to disrupt Ukrainian command and
control during the invasion and spillover impacts into other European
countries--highlighted an important nexus between government and
private sector equities in space.
These events exemplify the PRC and Russian commitment to fielding
diverse counterspace capabilities across multiple domains including
cyberspace, electronic warfare, directed energy, anti-satellite
missiles, and potentially even space-to-ground weapons. Current PRC and
Russian counterspace capabilities range from temporarily deceiving,
disrupting, or denying space services, to permanently degrading or
destroying space-based capabilities. All are designed to deter U.S.
response to conflict or crisis and ultimately diminish U.S. influence
and military effectiveness.
The Pacing Challenge--The People's Republic of China
The PRC aims to displace United States alliances and security
partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, surpass U.S. global influence
and power, and revise the international order to advance its
authoritarian interests. Beijing views the United States as
increasingly determined to contain the PRC as it continues to modernize
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into a ``world-class force'' by the
middle of the century. PRC military strategy remains fixed on the
concept of ``active defense'' in all domains, including space.
President Xi views space power as a key to ``great power status''
and a cornerstone of the PRC's economic, political, and military
ambitions. China expects its future wars to be fought mostly outside
its borders and in the maritime domain. PLA strategy emphasizes the
role space-based systems will play in such conflicts. Chinese military
doctrine states that space power is the essential ``glue'' that holds
together air, sea, and land control and that ``the dominance of space
has been inseparable from the outcome of war.''
The PRC continues to strengthen its military space capabilities,
investing in space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR), satellite communication, and navigation. It is also improving
satellite meteorology, human spaceflight, and robotic space
exploration.
The PRC employs a robust space-based ISR capability designed to
enhance its worldwide situational awareness. Its ISR satellites provide
electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar imagery as well as signals
intelligence data. They are used for military and civilian remote
sensing and mapping, terrestrial and maritime surveillance, and
intelligence collection. The PLA owns and operates about half of the
world's space-based ISR systems. These capabilities support the PLA's
ability to monitor, track, and target United States and allied forces
worldwide.
China's BeiDou navigation system, like the United States Global
Positioning System (GPS), is operational and provides persistent, all-
weather, and high-accuracy PNT services to users globally. The PLA uses
BeiDou's PNT to enable force movement and precision-guided munition
employment. This system also includes messaging and user-tracking
capabilities that provide the PLA enhanced command and control (C2).
China's delivery of BeiDou furthered a long-standing goal to reduce
reliance on foreign satellite communications and navigation systems and
to export its domestic alternative globally as part of its Belt and
Road Initiative.
Today, China can hold United States, Allied, and Partner assets at
risk in all orbits. The PLA is specifically pursuing capabilities to
counter United States space assets to achieve space superiority and
enable PLA freedom of maneuver. Chinese military academics advocate for
defeating adversaries' PNT, electronic warfare (EW), and ISR to ``blind
and deafen the enemy.'' The PLA has an operational ground-based ASAT
missile for low Earth orbit satellites, and is pursuing additional
anti-satellite weapons capable of destroying satellites up to GEO. The
PLA has also tested hypersonic glide vehicles aimed at defeating
traditional missile warning systems and ballistic missile defenses.
The PRC developed the Shenlong and Tengyun spaceplanes to explore
reusable technology with enhanced maneuverability. The initial
prototype, launched in 2020, stayed in orbit for 2 days before
returning to Earth. A second Shenlong, launched in August 2022, remains
on orbit today. Payloads on operational versions of these spaceplanes
could provide enhanced space services that the PLA could integrate into
its weapons and C2 systems to erode the information advantage of the
United States and our Allies.
China launched its SJ-21 satellite on 24 October 2021 and reported
in open press that its mission was ``to test and verify space debris
mitigation technologies.'' On 22 January 2022, SJ-21 rendezvoused with
a defunct and fuel-depleted BeiDou satellite. By 26 January, SJ-21 had
captured the defunct satellite and pulled it several hundred miles into
a higher graveyard orbit. The SJ-21 subsequently released the defunct
BeiDou satellite and returned to geosynchronous orbit. While removing a
defunct satellite to graveyard orbit may be innocuous, the SJ-21 could
clearly serve in a counterspace role and hold our geosynchronous
satellites at risk.
Russian Use of Space and Counterspace
Russia's use of space and counterspace capabilities during the
Ukraine conflict validates the Department of Defense's long-held
understanding of Russian doctrine. Russian space capabilities have
supported Russian military ground operations and enabled deep precision
strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure. Media reported on Russian
jamming of radar observationsites and navigation signals (including
GPS) serving the region, as well as cyberattacks on Ukrainian and
European space-enabled communications.
Russia has developed a suite of counterspace capabilities including
EW and directed energy weapons to deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy, and
deceive communications, navigation, and space-based ISR. Its directed
energy weapons include several ground-based, low-power lasers intended
to blind satellites temporarily, and high-power lasers developed to
damage other U.S. satellites permanently.
Russian cyber attacks in late February 2022 disabled very small
aperture terminals in Ukraine and across Europe. This included tens of
thousands of terminals outside of Ukraine that, among other things,
support wind turbines and provide internet services to private
citizens. Today, we continue to see cyber actors focusing their efforts
on our space architecture, that of our Allies, and of our international
and commercial Partners.
Russia conducted a destructive direct-ascent ASAT missile test on
15 November 2021. The resulting explosion generated a debris field that
will threaten satellites and crewed space stations for decades. In
contrast to Russia's deeply irresponsible test, the United States
Government announced in April 2022 that it will commit not to conduct
destructive, direct-ascent ASAT missile testing, and that the United
States seeks to establish this as a new international norm for
responsible behavior in space. In its wake, in December 2022, 155
nations voiced their widespread concern at the United Nations General
Assembly about the impact of destructive testing of direct-ascent ASAT
missiles on the long-term sustainability of the outer space
environment. One hundred and fifty-five countries at the United Nations
joined the United States in calling upon all nations to commit not to
conduct destructive direct-ascent ASAT missile tests.
The Defense Intelligence Agency's 2022 Challenges to Space Report
highlighted that Russia tested a space-based ASAT weapon in 2020.
Russia has continued to research and develop sophisticated orbital
capabilities that could serve dual-use purposes.
PRC-Russia Cooperation
PRC and Russian cooperation on defense matters has increased in
recent years. The PLA participated in Vostok last year--Russia's annual
strategic forces exercise. Beijing has provided Moscow political and
economic support throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine that
began last year. In February 2022, the 2 countries announced 16
agreements including one to increase the interoperability of their
respective nations' global navigation satellite systems. The new accord
will align timing standards of China's BeiDou constellation and the
Russian GLONASS architecture. A fully integrated system will provide
greater precision, resiliency, and allow for more efficient allocation
of service.
Russia possesses deep, decades long, expertise in space operations.
Recently, however, its progress has been hampered by shortfalls in
funding, a lack of qualified personnel, and other resource
inadequacies. Dramatically reduced access to key electronic components
from long standing international sanctions has negatively impacted
Russia's aerospace industry.
Meanwhile, the PRC has committed considerable economic and
technological resources to growing all aspects of its space program. It
is operating a space station and is taking on a greater role in lunar
and deep space exploration. In 2021, Moscow and Beijing agreed to an
International Lunar Research Station and the PRC may attempt to conduct
its first crewed landing on the surface of the Moon before 2030.
North Korean and Iranian developments
North Korea has demonstrated non-kinetic counterspace capabilities
including GPS and satellite communication (SATCOM) jamming. It likely
intends to deny space-based navigation and communications during
conflict. North Korea seeks to develop its space capabilities and has
placed 2 satellites in orbit. North Korea's space program has provided
it with data applicable to its long-range and multi-stage ballistic
missile programs. Additionally, North Korea conducted a record number
of missile launches last year including intercontinental and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles and has continued these activities in 2023.
Iran demonstrated a growing commitment to space with the launch of
the Khayyam sensing satellite. This system, developed cooperatively by
Iran and Russia, was launched by Russia on behalf of the Iranian
government. Similar to North Korea, Iran could apply data from its
space program to further the development of long-range missiles.
strengthen relationships and attract new partners
U.S. Space Command plans and executes space operations in
coordination with other combatant commands, the Services, DOD agencies,
Allies, and a diverse array of international and commercial Partners to
achieve national security objectives. Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
Data Sharing Agreements are one avenue that U.S. Space Command
currently uses to support the safety of the domain. SSA Data Sharing
Agreements provide a mechanism for U.S. Space Command to receive and
share unclassified SSA information with agreement partners to enhance
the materials maintained in the U.S. Government space awareness
catalogue, promote greater transparency in space, and to enhance global
space-flight safety. Agreement partners are able to request support
from U.S. Space Command in 7 advanced areas. The use of these services
demonstrates our partners' desires to promote responsible use of the
space domain and safety of space-flight for all satellite operators in
the U.S. and around the world. Currently the United States Space
Command maintains 169 SSA Data Sharing Agreements with 129 commercial
companies, 7 academic institutions, and 33 governments or international
organizations.
Moving from a focus on promoting safe and responsible space
operations to the imperative of assuring the advantages of space for
national security, U.S. Space Command's rapidly expanding network of
international military-to-military partnerships provides tremendous
strength and resiliency for long-term space security and stability.
Together, we contribute to deterring aggression and supporting the
security and stability of space that generates prosperity for all. Our
Allies and Partners possess complementary capabilities and forces that
both cover current U.S. gaps and free U.S. assets for alternate
priorities. They also contribute unique perspectives, regional
relationships, and information sharing opportunities that improve our
understanding of the environment and expand our security cooperation
options. U.S. Space Command's growing number of foreign liaison
officers and exchange officers--29 in total--are an example of the
Command's priority to maintain connectivity with our foreign
counterpart commands and better understand their perspectives and
priorities.
Interweaving space capabilities into the warfighting functions and
domains of our fellow combatant commands contributes an agile,
credible, and integrated deterrent. In addition to our longstanding
close partnerships with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. European
Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Central Command, U.S. Space
Command, in collaboration with U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern
Command, is developing opportunities to increase space capabilities and
cooperation in Africa and Latin America. U.S. Space Command's Global
Sentinel 2022 exercise included 24 international partner nations in one
location participating in a modeling and simulation event based on
integrated systems. The exercise focused on space domain awareness to
support the protection and defense of shared security interests in
outer space. Global Sentinel 2022 provided a significant strategic
shaping opportunity to strengthen partnerships while amplifying U.S.
Space Command and partner nation deterrence and assurance messaging.
Global Sentinel evolved from its inception in 2014 and is an ongoing
annual effort, comprising 6 to 8 real-world events and a capstone.
Global Sentinel remains the only event of its kind that includes
multinational military partners from all major theaters, furthering
collaboration focused on SSA and space domain awareness.
U.S. Space Command provides space planning and operations
expertise, including integration, coordination, and deconfliction of
capabilities to all combatant commands through our Joint Integrated
Space Teams. These teams, combined with joint planning and targeting,
ensure space capabilities are ready when needed. U.S. Space Command is
fully integrated with United States European Command's response to
Russian aggression in Ukraine. We are tightly aligned and synchronized
with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to deter, and if necessary, defeat our
Nation's pacing threat. U.S. Space Command maintains close coordination
with the Military Services as they develop future capabilities and
competencies that will add to our decisive advantage.
U.S. Space Command is implementing the Mission Partner Environment
(MPE) as our operating framework for communicating with Allies and
Partners. The MPE enables C2 and information sharing across a range of
military operations and enables information exchange between all
participants within a specific partnership or coalition. The MPE
supports execution of critical joint warfighting functions: C2,
intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, information,
and sustainment. Commanders require common services such as chat,
secure voice, and email across the enterprise and expeditionary levels
of operation for human-to-human collaboration. The MPE enables the DOD
to appropriately share information with mission partners at the speed
required for operations.
U.S. Space Command is continually planning to ensure we are
prepared to respond to all contingencies. The command has developed the
capacity to synchronize effects across combatant commands to achieve
integrated operations in campaigning and contingency--a first for the
command and the DOD. These efforts ultimately provide space enabled
effects to enable and assure effective land, air, and sea operations.
integrating commercial, interagency and academia
Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships provide an
asymmetric strategic advantage unmatched by our competition. Our robust
and growing team of Partners includes commercial, interagency, and
academic organizations. Together these Partners develop and deliver
greater military space power that deters aggression and supports space
domain stability. U.S. Space Command has published a Commercial
Integration Strategy to enhance the command's overall military space
power through the collaboration, integration, and partnership with U.S.
commercial industry. The strategy sets priorities and synchronizes
commercial integration efforts so that U.S. Space Command can mitigate
capability gaps, improve space architecture resiliency, and gain and
maintain a technological and operational advantage over adversaries.
Establishment of a New National Space Traffic Management and
Coordination Capability
U.S. Space Command continues to develop partnerships with the U.S.
Space Force and the Department of Commerce. As directed by the
President in Space Policy Directive 3 and the United States Space
Priorities Framework, civil and commercial space data sharing
responsibilities will be led by the Department of Commerce. We also
continue engagements with the broader interagency community and the
civil and private sectors. These partnerships will endure and
strengthen over time.
When the DOD began providing spaceflight safety data to global
satellite operators in 2010, roughly 110 organizations flew a total of
890 satellites amidst a background of 21,000 pieces of trackable
debris. Today, U.S. Space Command supports 680 organizations flying
7,500 satellites in all orbits. Two United States commercial companies
have produced more than half of those 7,500 satellites currently on
orbit. Since U.S. Space Command's inception in 2019, trackable debris
has increased 60 percent from roughly 25,000 pieces to more than 40,600
pieces. The transformation of space architectures and economics, and
the dramatic short-term increase in debris, highlight that space
congestion will be the norm moving forward. Other countries could also
grow their space operations, highlighting that a more comprehensive and
sustainable approach is required for space operations and spaceflight
safety coordination.
Human Space Flight Support Improvements
As the DOD lead for human space flight support, U.S. Space Command
has a close and vibrant relationship with the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA). Our most visible effort is the preparation
for the terrestrial rescue, recovery, and retrieval of astronauts and
spacecraft. U.S. Space Command and NASA also partner on issues such as
space domain awareness, in-space and on-orbit applications and
manufacturing, planetary defense, and hypersonic technology.
U.S. Space Command is fully committed to NASA's human space flight
program. This crucial partnership will deepen as NASA's Artemis
operations expand, the U.S. returns to the moon, and exploration and
development of cislunar space continues.
National Reconnaissance Office and Commercial Integration Strategy
U.S. Space Command continues our exceptional working relationship
with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and other intelligence
community (IC) Partners. This relationship improves our ability to gain
actionable intelligence, establish priorities, and provide global
support to the rest of the Joint Force. We developed a comprehensive
operational deconfliction process with the NRO and IC that enables
seamless integration while delivering combined space effects for
contingency operations.
U.S. Space Command has developed a Commercial Integration Strategy
to advance collaboration, synchronize integration, and expand
partnerships with U.S. commercial industry. The Combined Joint
Commercial Integration Office ties together commercial stakeholders
across the spectrum and drives implementation of this strategy.
The Command leverages commercial space domain awareness data
through our Joint Task Force-Space Defense Commercial Operations cell
(JCO). The JCO provides operationally relevant commercial space domain
awareness to the National Space Defense Center. We are rapidly moving
toward around-the-clock JCO operations to optimize information sharing
between Allies and commercial Mission Partners.
The Command also leverages commercial ISR, space domain awareness,
and SATCOM through the Combined Forces Space Component Command's
Commercial Integration Cell (CIC). The CIC works with industry through
mutually beneficial collaborative partnerships. As the CIC continues to
attract commercial Mission Partners, U.S. Space Command can share SSA
data with these additional commercial providers across multiple
classification domains.
building and maintaining competitive advantage
Our competitors have counterspace capabilities and military
doctrines that extend their concept of warfighting to space.
Consequently, we must develop and field capabilities to contribute to
integrated deterrence in accordance with the National Defense Strategy.
U.S. Space Command identified 5 priority requirements to accomplish the
responsibilities assigned by the Unified Command Plan (UCP). These
include: (1) Integrated Space Fires and Protection, (2) Resilient,
Timely Space C2, (3) Enhanced Battlespace Awareness, (4) Space Systems
Cyber Defense, and (5) Resilient Satellite C2 Architecture.
Additionally, rapid investment in Global Sensor Management, Persistent
and Resilient ISR, Operational Intelligence, Modernized and Agile EW
Architecture, and Electromagnetic Battle Management will underpin long
term success of our protect and defend mission. Relentless pursuit of
these key integrated requirements will ensure we remain the dominant
force in the space domain.
Integrated Space Fires and Protection Capabilities
Every day, civilians and the Joint Force depend on U.S. space
capabilities. To assure the critical services provided by these
capabilities, the DOD must have the infrastructure to deter aggression
and protect these capabilities from attack. Resiliency is fundamental,
but resiliency alone will not deter attacks or provide protection
sufficient to assure our space assets. For U.S. Space Command to
protect and defend U.S. and, as directed, Allied, Partner, and
commercial space assets such as PNT, communications and missile
warning/missile tracking, we require Congress' continued investment in
joint military space capabilities, resilient architectures, and
protection efforts.
Resilient, Timely Space C2
Resilient, timely C2 is key to deterring and defeating hostile
action in space and terrestrially. Rapid and robust communication
between space activities, space assets, and partner combatant commands
enables decisive action. The increasingly dynamic space environment
requires a resilient C2 architecture to synchronize space forces and
effects for both operations in the contested space environment and as a
critical enabler to traditional terrestrial maneuver forces. Congress's
investment in the Combined Space Operations Facility addresses that
need and will remain critical moving forward.
Enhanced Battlespace Awareness
U.S. Space Command relies on a near-real time, comprehensive
understanding of the congested and complex space operational
environment. Space domain awareness data, C2 automation, and machine
learning allow us to better understand the threat in U.S. Space
Command's astrographic area of responsibility (AOR). This critical task
requires more accurate, robust, resilient, and timely space domain
awareness and operational intelligence data from all interoperable
sensors. This will produce highly accurate, rapidly available
detection, tracking, and characterization of space objects, regardless
of their origin. Current space domain awareness systems are stove
piped, disaggregated, and lack the agility necessary for dynamic
tasking. U.S. Space Command, the Missile Defense Agency, and the U.S.
Space Force are partnering to enhance sensor integration into a C2
program. Congress' funding of programs to enhance battlespace awareness
is crucial to ensuring U.S. Space Command can best protect and defend
our vital space assets rapidly and dynamically.
Space Systems Cyber Defense
Digital superiority is key to building and maintaining a
competitive advantage. The PRC, Russia, and other cyber actors are
tirelessly working to infiltrate our cleared defense contractor,
academic, and military networks. These adversaries seek to monitor and
exfiltrate data, and reduce, degrade, and deny our ability to command,
control, and communicate with on-orbit space assets and supporting
ground systems.
Loss or compromise of U.S., Allied, or Partner space systems
degrades the Command's ability to conduct operations in and through
space and support terrestrial operations around the globe. Much of the
digital infrastructure for these space mission systems requires
modernization. As our adversaries' cyber capabilities are evolving, we
need our defensive cyber systems to outpace their growth. We need to be
agile and find ways to become more resilient. We continue to
collaborate with U.S. Cyber Command, Combat Support Agencies, and other
government partners to deploy and integrate defensive cyber systems and
tactics to maintain safe, secure, and reliable network operations.
The Command's Joint Cyber Center continues to partner across the
DOD and with the Department of Homeland Security to prioritize cyber
defense efforts. Increased funding for cybersecurity systems,
persistent defensive cyber capabilities, and cyber experts is critical
to maintaining dominance in the space and cyber domains.
Resilient Satellite C2 Architecture
U.S. Space Command seeks to improve resiliency in our globally
dispersed ground terminal architecture and the Satellite Control
Network (SCN). The current SCN system and follow-on architecture must
be hardened and modernized to be able to fight through a highly
contested environment. Mobile assets fielded with emerging technology
to augment our global ground C2 centers will increase resiliency and
underpin achieving national security objectives. U.S. Space Command has
several requirements for the Joint Space Communication Layer (JSCL),
which is the space transport layer of the DOD Information Network for
SATCOM. For example, it must be scalable to meet the growing military
and commercial SATCOM demand and operationally flexible enough to
respond to adversary threats. Further, the JSCL must be interoperable
with Allied and Partner systems to synchronize communications in a
rapidly changing, multi-domain environment.
Force Development
U.S. Space Command's most important asset is our people. We are
rapidly onboarding and developing a very talented team of space
professionals. Our strategic advantage comes through the diversity of
experience and wisdom of our workforce. U.S. Space Command professional
development programs boost our military promotion rates and our
civilian employees' advancement potential. As our military members
rotate out of the command and return to their parent service units,
they bring invaluable space expertise back to the broader Joint and
Combined Force. We visit colleges and universities to recruit recent
graduates for civilian internships and job opportunities. We continue
to advocate for hiring efficiencies that allow us to rapidly hire and
onboard civilian employees. We recently established a command Academic
Engagement Enterprise to partner with universities across the country
to enhance workforce professionalization and improve U.S. Space
Command's engagement in that critical space. We have full-time civilian
advisors dedicated to building workforce resiliency and preventing
discrimination, sexual assault, and harassment in the workplace to
ensure our workforce remains empowered to reach its full potential.
As of 1 January 2023, we have 62 percent of our authorized military
and government civilian end strength in place. If we include our
contractor workforce, that number rises to 82 percent, a significant
achievement 3 years into the command's 5-year programmed manpower
growth plan.
Resilient Space Architecture and Rapid Reconstitution
Over the last 5 years, the threats to our space enterprise systems
have increased. We must modernize our space enterprise to ensure
resiliency and agility and to preserve freedom of action despite these
advancing threats. The ability to rapidly reconstitute requires us to
prioritize seamless integration between old and new space capabilities
(such as networks, space assets, links, and ground systems). This is
essential to optimizing our data collection, processing, exploitation,
and dissemination. U.S. Space Command is conducting a series of review
efforts to examine the resiliency of the space enterprise. We are
identifying strengths and weaknesses of our current architecture,
challenges to interoperability, and current policy limitations
inhibiting shared space domain awareness. We are examining end-user
interfaces, terrestrial systems, and communications links to orbital
assets. In collaboration with the U.S. Space Force, our Allies, and
Partners, U.S. Space Command is developing the requirements for a
modern, integrated space architecture capable of operating in an
increasingly contested space environment.
Dynamic Space Operations
Over the last 5 years, explicit and implicit threats to our on-
orbit assets have increased. To preserve freedom of action, we must
relentlessly pursue a new concept of employment--Dynamic Space
Operations (DSO). Maneuvers by our current space systems are
constrained by the fixed quantity of consumable resources on-board.
This forces space warfighters to balance use of on-board resources to
mitigate or counter current threats against the risk of insufficient
resources to respond to future challenges.
Dynamic Space Operations includes the ability to restore
consumables of on-orbit platforms or rapidly replace the platforms
themselves. DSO will enable space operators to quickly respond to
adversary operations, support readiness campaigns, and engage in self-
defense, with less concern for future use implications. It will enable
expanded multi-mission operations with less risk of depleting those
limited consumables and mission capabilities. DSO will dramatically
increase our ability to support geographic combatant commanders'
operational requirements across the entire spectrum of competition,
crisis, and conflict. Programs are underway within the DOD, the
national laboratories, and across industry to address the technological
challenges associated with DSO. U.S. Space Command is actively engaged
with developmental efforts and working groups like the In-space
Servicing Assembly and Manufacturing Interagency Working Group. Our
near-term DSO objective is to conduct an on-orbit demonstration to
restore a satellite's maneuver capability by 2026. Our longer-term
objective is to develop the necessary mission requirements and
technical standards to ensure most capabilities delivered beyond 2030
will not be limited by consumables. We ask for Congress' support for
these vital efforts as we develop and secure these crucial
capabilities. Freedom to maneuver in space without concern for limiting
future maneuverability will be an important capability for systems that
are survivable against threats.
Maintenance and Hardening of Critical Infrastructure
U.S. Space Command's assigned AOR begins at an altitude of 100km--
roughly 62 miles--above the surface of the Earth and extends
indefinitely. Our operating domain extends around the globe and
encompasses all 3 segments of our space systems: on-orbit assets,
ground stations, and the cyber links connecting them. Updates to the
ground segment are required to ensure our satellites can provide
mission-critical information to the Joint Force and national
decisionmakers. For example, our missile warning mission relies heavily
on ground-based radar systems that require reliable power and cooling
systems. Many of the facilities and infrastructure supporting U.S.
Space Command exceed 60 years of service. It is increasingly difficult
to maintain the necessary infrastructure for our assets to guarantee
the resiliency, survivability, and endurability required for our
critical space missions. Stop-gap measures are increasingly ineffective
due to the lack of replacement parts and the inordinate time required
to make repairs. We must modernize our aging infrastructure to keep
pace with our competitors. I am grateful for Congress' continued
support to ensure these facilities adequately support U.S. Space
Command's no-fail missions.
Commercial space systems provide essential capabilities to our
national security and civilian life. U.S. Space Command works with
interagency and commercial space system stakeholders through the
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council to improve the
security, resilience, and cybersecurity of commercial space systems.
At our provisional headquarters in Colorado Springs, the DOD has
invested in existing on-installation facilities and off-installation
federally leased buildings to meet U.S. Space Command requirements. Our
provisional facilities on Peterson Space Force Bases are 30 years old.
We accomplished major building system upgrades and repairs to meet
mission requirements (such as power, communication/technology, and
cooling). U.S. Space Command's provisional headquarters in Colorado
Springs supports 1,230 personnel with the required communication,
technology, and capabilities and will support full operational
capability.
Exercises
U.S. Space Command executes the Presidentially assigned UCP
responsibility for Joint Space Operations Training. As such, the
Command is integrating joint and combined space scenarios and training
across the Joint Force. We will conduct 2 mission centric exercises in
fiscal year 2023 as building blocks to a full-scale Tier 1 exercise in
fiscal year 2024 to emphasize the key transitions from competition
through crisis and into conflict. This will highlight both the
supported and supporting relationships between U.S. Space Command and
the other combatant commands that will enable the Joint Force to
overcome anti-access, area denial strategies.
Joint Warfighting Requirements
To maintain momentum, U.S. Space Command is developing joint
warfighting requirements. We will continue to rely on the Services to
contribute solutions that mitigate the capability gaps identified in
these requirements.
Joint Space C2
The Joint Space C2 requirement established a set of threat-based
requirements defining what the Command requires to comprehensively C2
forces across all mission areas. This includes deploying and connecting
worldwide sensors and systems to national decisionmakers and all
combatant commanders in near real time.
Space Effects to the Warfighter
To ensure space and space-enabled capabilities are available during
conflict, U.S. Space Command is defining how to protect and defend
space capabilities to guarantee space effects to the rest of the Joint
Force. The Department will respond to hostile acts in space at the
time, place, and domain of our choosing.
EW/Offensive Cyberspace Operation
U.S. Space Command is defining the required capabilities to
integrate EW and offensive cyberspace operations. Close coordination
with U.S. Cyber Command will enable joint fires to protect the space
and cyberspace scheme of maneuver and provide the warfighting effects
necessary to protect the rest of the Joint Force from adversary hostile
uses of space.
Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR)/PNT
This NAVWAR/PNT requirement establishes the requirements that will
inform future capability development by the services. This requirement
is the initial step to informing the way the Joint Force, Allies, and
Partners will keep pace with an advancing adversary threat. It will
support the modern warfighter with scalable NAVWAR capabilities,
integrate with our partners, and support a redundant and resilient
NAVWAR/PNT architecture.
conclusion
U.S. Space Command is rapidly approaching full operational
capability. I am exceptionally proud of the progress the Command has
made over the last 3-\1/2\ years. There is no combatant command,
warfighting domain, nor element of national power that is not
strengthened by the space capabilities and effects that U.S. Space
Command provides or protects. I am grateful to Congress for your
support that has enabled our success. I ask for your continued support
for the necessary resourcing to ensure we maintain our competitive
advantage in the increasingly contested space domain.
We will continue to grow our critical network of Allies and
Partners to integrate joint military space power into all-domain global
operations to deter aggression, defend national interests, and when
necessary, defeat threats. On behalf of the most critical asset in our
command, the soldiers, marines, sailors, airmen, guardians, civilians,
and families of U.S. Space Command, thank you for your support to our
mission.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Dickinson.
General Cotton, we are facing a first in the history-of-the-
world situation of a trilateral nuclear competition at a
serious level.
As you have indicated, in addition to Russia, which has
since the late 1940's maintained a robust nuclear arsenal,
China is expanding its nuclear capability with additional
missile fields, the new Jin-class submarine, and is upgrading
its H-6 bomber to carry cruise missiles.
How is STRATCOM adapting to this new trilateral nuclear
competition?
General Cotton. Chairman, thank you for the question. It is
fundamentally based around our--what we see is a sound
strategic model; and that is the triad. The ability for the
triad and the systems that we have to be able to cover and
understand how to cover and still offer options, flexible
deterrent options, to the President is key.
One, the triad is fundamental and foundational for that to
happen. Two, I believe that we are going to have to have a
conversation in regards to strategy and force posture. I am
absolutely in a good place today with our systems and where we
stand, and foundational to that is the modernization of our
current system.
But to your point, Chairman, 2010 and the basis of which we
did our modernization efforts was on a 2010 threat. We are
going to have to have that conversation to ensure that the
modernization systems, the proportions of the triad, and other
effects that can bring strategic deterrence to bear is right
moving forward post-2030.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General Cotton. There is another
issue that I would like to touch on with both you and General
Dickinson, is that as the lead combatant command for spectrum
operations, General Cotton, your standing of a Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Center (JEC).
There are several questions here. Given the amount of
electronic attacks we are seeing in Ukraine as well as
operations in the Indo-Pacific, when do you expect the center
to become operational? Also, your comments on the proposed sale
of the S-Band spectrum that is now being discussed.
General Cotton. Sir, thanks for that question, Chairman.
So, as you know, the overall objective of the JEC is to raise
overall readiness of the Joint Forces to prevail in that
mission space.
We are actually doing really good work and we are in the
final steps: working our way through the Deputy Secretary of
Defense for her to sign out the memorandum and actions on the
tasks that we have to move forward. I look forward to seeing
that pretty soon.
In regards to STRATCOM and how do we rely on spectrum, I
will say it to you this way: EMS [electromagnetic spectrum]
superiority for the employment of our forces to maintain
situational awareness, to assure communication through all
domains, and assure PNT, position, navigation, and timing, is
critically important for not only myself as a combatant
command, but for all combatant commanders.
Chairman Reed. General Dickinson, again, your perspective
on the value of the S-band to the military, and also the
knowledge that you and your colleagues in uniform have with
respect to what parts can be shared, or what cannot be shared.
General Dickinson. Thank you, Chairman, for that question.
So, I would have to categorize it as foundational. That
spectrum piece that you are discussing, you mentioned, is
foundational to what U.S. Space Command does, as we have the
responsibility of providing space and able capabilities to the
Joint Force.
What I mean by that, PNT communications, missile warning,
all of those types of capabilities that I am responsible for
providing are dependent upon the use of the spectrum. As I look
at it, I think it is foundational to it and in everything we
do.
Chairman Reed. There would be a certain degree of risk
aversion that you would bring to disposing with that S-band at
this point.
General Dickinson. Yes.
Chairman Reed. That is fair, General?
General Cotton. That is fair, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Wicker, please.
General Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, before I
begin my questions, I want to thank Senators Fischer and King,
and recognize their bipartisan and significant work on the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee. They are going to be very busy
and we are going to look to them in the future, as we already
have, for leadership. General Cotton, we have a nuclear
modernization plan, is that correct?
General Cotton. That is correct, sir.
Senator Wicker. When was it written? When was it developed?
General Cotton. Probably in 2010 timeframe is when the
modernization effort----
Senator Wicker. Okay. Now, when it was developed, this
trilateral threat that the chairman just talked about was not
so significant, was it?
General Cotton. China was seen as a nascent threat.
Senator Wicker. So, things are different now from the time
the plan was developed?
General Cotton. That is correct.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Is it a fact that since 2010, every
Department of Defense and Department of Energy nuclear program
has been delayed or reduced in scope?
General Cotton. I don't know if I can go back to the
timeframe of 2010, sir----
Senator Wicker. But for the most part, that is a correct
statement.
General Cotton. It is----
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, how are we going to meet the
rapidly growing threats from China and Russia with a force that
smaller and delivers later than we planned some 13 years ago?
General Cotton. Senator, I think the way I would couch that
is: the legacy system that we currently have is a credible
system today. The fact that for--since 2016, we have been
modernizing that legacy system and are underway with that
legacy system. I think what I would tell you is I just want to
ensure that the modernization programs that we have today, we
can't--we have lost all margin, and we must ensure that those
programs are fully funded and executed so I can have
replacement and updated systems to the legacy system today. It
is still hard.
Senator Wicker. Has it made sense then that these programs,
for the most part, have all been delayed or reduced in scope?
General Cotton. Sir, that is a policy question from that
position. From my perspective----
Senator Wicker. But we rely on you for expertise and for
advice----
General Cotton. We always forward, Ranking Member, we
always forward our best military advice, as well as our
requirements on what we think and can meet the requirements of
executing the objectives that are laid upon us by the
President.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Your predecessor testified last year
and agreed with nearly every other senior U.S. military officer
that we need to provide Presidents with more nuclear options
than we have today. Do you agree with that sentiment?
General Cotton. I do agree with that.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Let me ask you then about my, the way
I ended my testimony, where I said I would like for you to
share your feeling as to whether we should have a sense of
urgency and whether we should communicate that to the
Commander-in-Chief and also to the American public.
General Cotton. That is a wholehearted ``yes.'' We need to
be able to articulate the sense of urgency to ensure that we
can modernize the systems that we currently have funded and
also look at future posture on what other things throughout the
inventory. I would say for affects conventional and nuclear to
make sure that I can meet the objectives that are given to me
for strategic deterrence to the President.
Senator Wicker. We should make it clear to the taxpayers
and the American citizens that we need to up our game in this
regard?
General Cotton. Continuing beating of the drum so folks
understand that our legacy systems need to be modernized.
Absolutely, sir.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. General Cotton, General
Dickinson, thank you both for being here this morning and for
your service. General Dickinson, I liked your quote, ``never a
day without space''. As you think about the challenges that
Space Command is facing, what is your biggest concern with
respect to readiness?
General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator. Let me just kind of
paint a picture of where the Command is today. Within 2 years,
we achieved initial operational capability--on a very solid
path to achieve full operational capability very soon.
Resources, the Department has done a great job giving me
the resources that I do need. For example, the infrastructure
today, as well as the people, the personnel. The most important
part of the Command is our people.
That is our asymmetric advantage, if you will, in the space
domain as well, all things space. When I look at what we have
done over the last three and a half years in terms of
identifying requirements to the Department, it has gone very
well. We have deliberately and thoughtfully provided
requirements to the Department, and the Department is, in fact,
giving us those resources.
As I said earlier the Department kind of works on 5-year
terms, if you will, with budgets and POMs [Program Objective
Memoranda] and those kinds of things. Combatant Commander, I
look to what is happening today, and I am required to do that
by the Secretary. When I look at that, to answer your question,
I look very hard at space domain awareness. How are we doing
that today?
We are taking steps to make sure that we are leveraging
sensors around the world, that our U.S., and allies, and
partners that traditionally haven't been used for space domain
awareness but do have capabilities. We look at those particular
assets and understand how we can pull them in and integrate
them into a comprehensive architecture.
Then we also look to how do we develop the requirements to
improve upon those in future years. That is one way we were
doing it, trying to solve that situational awareness or improve
the situational awareness issue I have in the space domain.
The second part of that is leveraging commercial companies,
commercial companies that want to participate in that with the
capabilities that they build themselves and provide that data
to us. Through integration of nontraditional sensors, as well
as commercial sensors, we are getting better at space domain
awareness. But as the congestion in space continues to grow, we
will need better capabilities.
Senator Shaheen. Well, you mentioned the expertise of the
personnel who work at Space Force, and I understand that you
have been successful in hiring a number of civilians to address
the milestones that you have set.
That is why I continue to be concerned about the proposed
relocation of Space Force to the Redstone Arsenal. When the
Missile Defense Agency was relocated to Alabama and they lost
80 percent of their workforce who didn't want to leave and make
that move. What would be the impact if you lost a significant
portion of the workforce in a move of Space Force?
General Dickinson. Well, Senator, so today, as I mentioned,
the Command itself right now is about 62 percent, if I count
military, as well as a Department of the Air Force civilians.
I have got a contractor base, too, in addition to that,
that pulls us up a little bit over 80 percent in the total for
the Command. There is really no way to know how many of those
civilians would move to Huntsville, for example, until that
decision is made. Lots of those folks are great civilian
workforce.
They have made life choices and that is why they live, for
example, in Colorado Springs. The military, you know, we are
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and guardians. If told to
move, we'll move. But there is really no way of knowing what
percentage would actually move.
Senator Shaheen. But the report that took a look at the
spacing decisionmakes some assumptions about what would happen
if there were a move and what the impact of that would be. Is
that correct?
General Dickinson. Yes.
Senator Shaheen. Is there a reason why that report is not
available to the public?
General Dickinson. I believe the Department of the Air
Force, the Secretary of the Air Force is doing some additional
analysis before he makes his final decision.
But to your point, ma'am, I would just offer that whether
it is Colorado Springs or Huntsville, I think, you know, both
those locations have the talent pool, if you will, of
professionals, space professionals that could support the
mission of the U.S. Space Command.
So, again, I wouldn't know the percentage, but I do know
that the work base, workforce that is available in Huntsville
is very good as well.
Senator Shaheen. But am I correct that the workforce in
Huntsville has not had the same expertise on operating
satellites that the workforce in Colorado has had?
General Dickinson. Well, so the workforce that I have,
ma'am, in the headquarters itself, the Combatant Command
(COCOM) headquarters, we don't necessarily do that level of
technical flying the satellites, if you will. That is resident
within subordinate units within U.S. Space Command, and those
units are not moving.
Senator Shaheen. So, they will stay in Colorado regardless.
General Dickinson. I am sorry?
Senator Shaheen. They will stay in Colorado regardless of
what happens with everybody else.
General Dickinson. So, the only part of that basing
decision that is under review right now for the decision to
relocate is the headquarters, my headquarters.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Fischer,
please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cotton
and General Dickinson, before I begin my questions, I want to
strongly encourage both of you to make greater use of the
unfunded priorities list.
That process helps you to convey your needs to Congress.
The Department's budget request is the product of a 2-year long
process. Many of the assumptions baked into fiscal year 2024
budget were made in 2021. The geopolitical environment has
significantly changed over the last 2 years.
This Committee views unfunded priority list as a valuable
tool that allows us to make more responsible resourcing
decisions based on the current needs that we have and the
operating environments.
So please use that tool. General Cotton, in your recent
letter to the Committee, you noted that you have a capability
gap that needs to be filled by a low-yield, non-ballistic
capability that can respond without generation. Would a nuclear
sea-launched cruise missile fill that gap?
General Cotton. Thank you for the question, Senator
Fischer. To address the adversaries' perceived advantage on
limited nuclear use, when I was here amongst the Committee and
was tasked with the question and I said I owed you a response
on being able to make that assessment on where we stood. I did
a deep dive as soon as I took command.
During that deep dive and review of our capabilities, I, in
fact, am in agreement that there is a strategic gap or
challenge when it comes to that regime. So, I fully support the
fact that--and the support that we have with this Committee in
pursuing the opportunities to look at low-yield, non-ballistic,
non-generating effects moving forward. Absolutely concur with
that.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General, and thank you for
looking in that and getting back to us. I appreciate that.
Sometimes when you take a new command, I know you have a lot
put on your shoulders in making sure that you have a full
understanding of everything that you are in charge of, and I
appreciate you taking the time to get that to us.
Last year, the Administration sought to retire the B-83
nuclear gravity bomb despite having no replacement program in
place to address hard and deeply buried targets such as
underground facilities in China and North Korea.
What is your best military advice on whether the United
States needs to maintain a capability to hold those hard and
deeply buried targets at risk?
General Cotton. Thanks for the question, Senator. I will
answer that in two parts. Right now, the B-83 is still part of
my arsenal, with the NDAA language that limits the reduction of
that, so I still have that capacity and capability, pending the
results of the hard and deeply buried study that the Department
is currently doing, of which we are a part and are giving our
inputs to that.
That being said, we are going to have to figure out how we
are going to continue to have capability that gets after HDBTs
[hard and deeply burried targets] and what effects can actually
do that. Whether conventional or nuclear, we are going to have
to have a strategy to figure out how to do that. I look forward
to seeing what the study brings us from the Department to make
sure that we can close that.
Senator Fischer. When do you anticipate that study to be
completed?
General Cotton. Ma'am, I was told that we should see that
in the spring.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Could you please keep us
updated on that?
General Cotton. I absolutely will.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. I appreciate the
conversation that we had earlier this week on the importance of
moving forward quickly with NC3 modernization and building out
a road map with clear, achievable, near and long-term goals.
Can you tell this Committee more about NC3, the road map that
STRATCOM is developing?
General Cotton. Senator, I absolutely look forward to
having that conversation, not only in open but in closed
session as well.
The conversation that we had was one of the things that--
that was the second thing that I did upon taking command was
get with the team to understand how we take a conceptual ideas
and what might be seen as concepts with all the dollars and
support that we are getting from the Congress and turn those
into what you had alluded to, a road map that I can, you can,
and my bosses in the Pentagon can actually see in phases of
what we are doing with an NC3 modernization.
So, what we are doing is we are translating what was once
seen as a conceptual piece and talking through the concept. Now
we are having 0 to 5, 5 to 10, 10 to 15 year roadmaps where I
can describe to you within those phases of time what is
actually being done with the taxpayers' money moving forward to
modernize the NC3 modernization program.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. I think it is extremely
important to be able to have roadmaps, checklists to stay on
time so that we can be prepared for the future. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer, and let me also
join Senator--in commending you and Senator King for your
leadership for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. With that,
let me recognize Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for the recognition. General Cotton, just a brief note.
Sentinel, the replacement of the ICBM system essentially
from the--literally from the ground up is one of the most
important and also complicated and major development projects
in the history of this country in terms of budget and schedule
and the necessity of getting this done.
I want you to know that we are watching you because I want
the contractors to know that you are watching them. I hope this
is a high priority in terms of the management and
implementation of that program, which is going to be a massive
undertaking.
General Cotton. Senator, thank you, and you are absolutely
right. I am watching the contractors and I am watching the Air
Force to ensure that we close that gap as well.
Senator King. Thank you. I want to talk about deterrence,
which is really the basis of our entire strategy to defend this
country, and we talked about, you talked with Senator Fischer
about communications, NC3.
It seems to me that NC3--I believe NC3 should be part of
the triad. It should be the quad, because it is really as
important. If our communication system isn't credible then our
deterrent isn't credible, which is what could lead to a
precipitous strike from one of our adversaries.
I hope that you agree with me. I don't want to make you go
through all you went through with Senator Fischer. But NC3
security and absolutely zero-defect reliability is critical to
the deterrent posture of this country.
General Cotton. Sir, it is the foundation of everything we
do when we talk the triad. I often use your slogan of saying
that it is a quad, if you will, NC3. One of the things that we
are also doing is General Nakasone is interwoven in everything
that we are doing in his team in Cyber Command.
I mean he is interwoven in everything we are doing with
current NC3, the legacy systems, as well as when we are
building out the next generation of NC3. So, security is
fundamentally----
Senator King. We put a lot of our time, effort, and focus
on cyber over the last few years. I am a little worried that
electronic warfare is sort of over here and cyber is over here.
Electronic warfare, the ability of our communication systems,
of our satellites to--we will talk about this General, but that
is a part of--maintaining that as part of our deterrence
strategy. It has to be.
General Cotton. It absolutely is, sir. As you know, I am
the lead command in ensuring that we get after the EMS
[electromagnetic spectrum] problem and what we saw as an
atrophy over the past couple of decades--not with the NC3
systems within the Department.
Senator King. No, but the whole system, electronic--if
there is a conflict, electronic warfare is going to be the
first 2 hours or 2 days before anything else happens. Well, let
me move from that to General Dickinson.
Are we developing alternatives to space-based resources?
For example, the simplest one to think of as GPS [global
positioning system]. We have got to be able to have ships and
planes and troops, for that matter, and know where they are
absent GPS, because I believe GPS will be one of the first
targets in a conflict. Yes, I know you are you are not Navy,
but I want ships to be able to do celestial navigation.
General Dickinson. Thanks, Senator. To answer your
question--I do believe we will be degraded at some point in the
GPS world, position, navigation, and timing. With that, I know
there are efforts underway, even in my previous command before
you as Space Command, looking to alternative PNT, alternative
position, navigation, and timing, and how we can develop those
types of capabilities. So that is the kind of the technical
side of it. There are programs that are working on that right
now.
Senator King. That is a high priority. That--you know, we
could have a $100 million aircraft that gets lost because it
can't navigate. We have got to have a high priority on having
alternatives to GPS, it seems to me.
General Dickinson. Yes, I agree, and the Departments are
working on that right now. But what I would also offer to you,
Senator, is efforts within the Department and each of the
services to kind of go back to how we used to do things. When I
was a Second Lieutenant many, many years ago, I had a lensatic
compass and a map in my hand. Many people did in this room, I
am sure.
We can't lose that skill. We have to continue to train that
skill. If you are on a Navy ship, I might get this wrong, you
have a sextant that you can use to utilize stars to do your
navigation. But I think we all have to prepare for that, and I
know, like, for example, in the Army, if you go out to one of
the CTCs [combat training center] or training centers, they are
actually training in that kind of a degraded environment
because we know that we might see that. Of course, we have seen
that in Ukraine as well.
Senator King. Preparing and training are the key words.
Thank you very much, General. Thank you both for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Rounds,
please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, let me
begin by just thanking you and your teams for standing on the
front line, and in some cases having to make some very
difficult decisions. I appreciate the work that both of you do.
As you know, there is an effort and a significant
discussion going on with regard to spectrum and spectrum
sharing. It is important as a country because there are lots of
people that want 5G. It is critical to our country and to
expansion.
But at the same time, 5G means that there are parts of the
electromagnetic spectrum which have to be dedicated toward
that. At the same time, spectrum is limited, and part of what
that limited spectrum is, is being used by the Department of
Defense.
Over the years, there has been more and more of a move by
folks who want to be able to provide more services to the
general public to take parts of the spectrum and that which is
used by the Department of Defense.
I am concerned about this, and as you know, right now,
there is a discussion about that part of the spectrum that is
between 3.1 and 3.45 gigahertz. There is a desire because this
is a very desirable part of the spectrum.
Now, on the political side of things, and we don't expect
you to get into the politics of it, there is a real push to try
to move some of that away from the Department of Defense on a
shared basis. At the same time, there is a reason why the
Department of Defense uses this part of the spectrum in that it
has some very, very special qualities.
I am going to get into the part of this in which we need
your professional military advice. I am making it that way
because there are folks that clearly understand the value of
5G, who would prefer to have this moved in an expeditious
fashion out and away from DOD uses or shared uses, and into the
private sector.
I understand their desire to do so, but I believe that the
national defense of this country is critical and must be
maintained. So, what I am going to ask in terms of your
professional military opinion, is to work our way through this
in a discussion with me about the critical needs of this
country for parts of the spectrum that could be at risk if we
make the wrong political decision.
I am going to begin, General Cotton, within 3.1 to 3.45 and
in very close proximity to that, is it true that we have
significant radars that we have to maintain?
General Cotton. That is a correct statement.
Senator Rounds. Is it true that those radars that we are
dependent on protect our country, Alaska, Hawaii and the
mainland from the possibility of attack by aggressors, with
regard to intercontinental ballistic missiles, short range
missiles, drones, all sorts, or I would say almost the vast
majority of those types of weapons systems, including aircraft,
that may very well be coming at us or directed at our shores.
General Cotton. Senator, that is a true statement.
Senator Rounds. If you were to lose part of this spectrum,
would it be true, or if they were to look at using part of this
spectrum, would it be true that some of those radars that we
rely on could be at risk?
General Cotton. They could be at risk, sir.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Dickinson, space is the
name of the game for you, and you not only have satellites and
so forth, you are responsible also for early warning in some
cases as well. Is that not true?
General Dickinson. That is true. I have UCP responsibility
as the global sensor manager.
Senator Rounds. In those sensors, are there critical
aspects that include very sensitive parts of the spectrum that
are in or near this particular part of the spectrum?
General Dickinson. Yes.
Senator Rounds. What would happen if you were to lose
access to those or to be limited to those, in terms of your
ability to provide adequate warning should an attack occur?
General Dickinson. It would be impacted, possibly degraded.
Senator Rounds. If you were required to move away from the
assets that you currently have in that part of the spectrum,
can you give us any kind of an estimate as to the costs
involved?
General Dickinson. Senator, I can't give you an accurate
cost estimate. I would say it would be very expensive.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Cotton, are you familiar
with the Aegis?
General Cotton. I am, sir.
Senator Rounds. Is it clear that the Aegis system has
significant parts of its radar systems within this very
sensitive part of the spectrum?
General Cotton. It does, sir.
Senator Rounds. Do you have any idea as to what the cost
would be to try to move or to try to allocate spectrum away, or
in areas other than this, if it is even available for the Aegis
system that protects our coasts?
General Cotton. I don't have a cost, but I know it is
extremely expensive.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Do you believe that it is very
important--I am going to ask this of both of you, and then, Mr.
Chairman, my time, I realize, is up, but I would like to have
this question.
Do you believe it is important that uniformed officers of
the Department of Defense have a say or at least have an
opportunity to express to those who make these decisions your
professional military opinion about how serious the loss of
these particular parts of the spectrum could be if the decision
is being made to share or to release that part of the spectrum?
General Cotton. I would at least like to have my best
military advice heard.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Dickinson.
General Dickinson. As a combatant commander, I would ask--I
would say the same thing. I would ask that my best military
advice would be considered.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Cotton, I am just going
to finish with this. Have you been able to offer your best
professional military advice to anyone on the release of the
spectrum to date?
General Cotton. Sir, most of those discussions happened
prior to December, so I don't know what the disposition was
done, but I haven't had that discussion since the command.
Senator Rounds. Thank you very much. Look, I really
appreciate this.
This is a difficult situation because there really is going
to come a point at which your professional military advice has
got to be shared with those individuals that are looking at
making this decision and should not be made.
I am just going to finish with this. I believe that it
should not be made until after the study, which is being
completed by the Department of Defense and the NTIA [National
Telecommunications and Information Administration] is
completed. Would you agree with me that nothing should be done
with this until after that study is completed?
General Cotton. I agree, and we are part of that study.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. General, would you agree with
that?
General Dickinson. I would agree, and we are part of that
study.
Senator Rounds. Do you believe that there should absolutely
be an appeals process that we have currently got in law, should
that be continued on in its current form? General Cotton?
General Cotton. Yes.
Senator Rounds. General Dickinson?
General Dickinson. Yes.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
your patience.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Just to make sure
we are clear, the S-band is the band that Senator Rounds and I
were both talking about. Thank you. Senator Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. General Cotton, the All-domain Anomaly
Resolution Office (AARO) was created to synchronize the
Department of Defense efforts to study and assess unidentified
aerial phenomenon. How is STRATCOM liaising with AARO to help
the office do its job?
General Cotton. So, ma'am, formally UAP [unidentified
anomalous phenomenon], so we are part of that along with other
combatant commands. So, I have a team, as well as myself and in
the senior leadership positions, that liaison with that
organization as well as the other COCOM responsible for that
responsibility.
Senator Gillibrand. Great, and do you foresee that AARO
needs additional resources or additional sensors or additional
detection to be able to do their job more thoroughly?
General Cotton. I would probably have to defer that to my
partner in NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command] to be able
to answer that question. So, I don't--with what I know, I don't
have a good answer for you in that regard, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. I will followup for the record on that.
While Canada has promised to invest $38 billion over the next
20 years in NORAD updates, our radars in the North Warning
System are pretty old and are in known locations. Can you
update us, in this setting on how you are modernizing our
defenses in Alaska and north of our border?
General Cotton. So, if you are talking NORAD [North
American Aerospace Defense Command], NORTHCOM systems, I would
have to defer to NORAD NORTHCOM Commander.
Senator Gillibrand. Then how is STRATCOM adjusting our
missile defense capabilities to respond to the threats you
mentioned in your opening statement of hypersonic glide
vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles, to the extent you can
answer that in this setting?
General Cotton. I would prefer if we could, ma'am, in a
closed setting to be able to address those.
Senator Gillibrand. That is fine. General Dickinson, the
Space Force is working on a commercial augmentation space
reserve, which would give us a civil reserve space fleet if we
needed one during a conflict or crisis. How is SPACECOM
supporting Space Force's efforts to build this reserve?
General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator. So that is a great
initiative. I think it is--we need that, especially as I
described earlier, our leveraging commercial industry to
augment, provide additional capabilities to us.
The way we are working with them is, as the combatant
command warfighter, we are providing our perspective in terms
of requirements for those types of relationships.
In other words, we will have the operational piece in terms
of what those contractors could or could not face in the space
domain. We participate in that way.
Senator Gillibrand. As we plan for peer-on-peer or near-
peer conflicts, we have been able to ensure that our forces
know how to use our Nation's capabilities, and that they have
the opportunity to train with those capabilities.
But most of our space based systems are classified as
special access programs. At current classification levels, are
lower-level commanders able to understand the full scope of
capabilities available to the force and able to conduct
military planning with an understanding of space based
capabilities and limitations?
General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator. Over classification
is a challenge within the Department right now, but one that we
are aggressively working and looking at refining, to make sure
that we can start bringing systems and capabilities to a lower
classification level so that we can optimize their employment
as well as training of the operators and the forces that they
support.
In other words, the classifications, we look across those
and are revisiting those documents, those capabilities to see
whether or not we can pull them down to a lower classification
level. This also allows us to do more integration, better
integration with our allies and partners.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you,
gentlemen, very much for being here today. General Cotton,
thank you for speaking with me last month regarding your
Commander's assessment, including on the SLCM-.
I do appreciate the letter that you responded with to the
Chairman and Ranking Member, affirming that SLCM-N offers
additional options and supports and integrated deterrence
approach. I brought a copy of the letter today. Really
appreciate you responding to my colleagues and I. Mr. Chairman,
I request that the General's letter be entered into the record.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Ernst. The President's budget request should
reflect this assessment. We feel that that is very, very
important, and again, thank you very much for doing your
commander's assessment.
General Cotton, the 2022 China Military Power Report
estimates that China will field 1,500 nuclear weapons by 2035
and that rivals U.S. deployments under New START. I know we
have been hammering down on this.
This is such an important topic for all of us. Do you agree
that we must reassess our strategic deterrence requirements
given China's nuclear breakout?
General Cotton. Senator Ernst, thanks for the question.
Absolutely, I think we need to reassess our strategy or at
least take a look at our strategy, our current strategy, and
have a force posture conversation.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, and after New START, the U.S. and
Russia, and of course China too, might be without strategic
arms constraints. Would you agree that the U.S. should prepare
to upload its non-deployed nuclear weapons to shore up
deterrence?
General Cotton. Senator, I always have flexible deterrence
options.
Senator Ernst. Very good. I hope everybody hears that loud
and clear. How quickly can we upload each leg of the triad?
General Cotton. Ma'am, I rather have that conversation in
the closed setting.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. We look forward to that
classified answer, and General Cotton, and I am just going to
go into generals here, kind of general answers, because you are
Generals. We might need to consider additional measures to
ensure the credibility of our deterrent. So, in general, would
you agree that placing a portion of the bomber force on day-to-
day alert would increase its flexibility?
General Cotton. As a former Joint Forces Air Component
Commander, I would like to have that conversation in closed
session because I can actually do that without putting them on
alert.
Senator Ernst. Okay, and in general, would you agree that
moving some of the ICBM force to mobile platforms would
increase survivability?
General Cotton. In general.
Senator Ernst. In general. In general, would deploying
SLCM-N expand our at sea deterrent?
General Cotton. I think it would address our adversaries'
perceive advantage of limited use.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, and in general, would deploying
ground-based theater-range nuclear forces bolster our
deterrent?
General Cotton. I would like to talk to you about that one
in closed session.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Well, I appreciate that. I think that
it is important that we continue to have those discussions and
understand what our flexibility and options are as we continue
to support our nuclear triad.
Thank you very much for that, and General Dickinson, just
in the time that I have left. In your efforts with the Combined
Space Operations Initiative member nations, I did notice that
you had met recently with space leaders from South Korea and
Japan. How is this space integration improving with these non-
five eyes members?
General Dickinson. Thank you for the question. That is a
great initiative, the Combined Space Operations Initiative
board that we have. We just met in New Zealand a few months
back, and that is the five eyes plus France and Germany.
But outside of those South Korea and Japan in particular,
we are very--working very closely with them. In fact, to the
point where we are doing exercises with them, so we have an
exercise program called Global Sentinel, which is an
unclassified exercise program where we do space domain
awareness training.
They are included in that plus 22 other nations as well,
and that has been very successful. We also have the Space
Force, as well as U.S. Space Command, have personnel serving on
the peninsula--now, not large numbers, but small numbers. But
we are integrating with the forces, the Korean forces on the
ground in Korea as well as in Japan.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I think it is incredibly
important that we continue to work with nations around the
globe. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with the
comments that Mr. Rounds had as well. I think it is very
important that we listen to our military leadership, and based
on your best military advice, to make those decisions that are
best for the defense of our Nation. Thank you, gentlemen.
General Cotton. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Warren,
please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, the Biden
administration is requesting $835 billion in the largest, one
of the largest Pentagon budgets in history. Despite that
gigantic request, I am expecting that we will receive a torrent
of letters from the services and the combatant commands asking
for billions more through the so-called unfunded priorities
list.
That is the Pentagon's term for it, but I just call them
wish lists. The DOD doesn't have to follow the same rules as
every other Federal agency, which is other agencies have to
balance their must-haves against their nice-to-haves and come
up with a budget. Instead, each part of DOD also submits a
second list of things that didn't go through the budget process
that they still want funded.
In January, I sent a letter to Secretary Austin, along with
Senators Braun and Lee and King, telling DOD not to send
Congress any wish lists as part of this year's budget process.
Last year, some parts of DOD did not put anything on their wish
list.
So, my questions today are about whether or not the two of
you will choose that route this year. So, General Dickinson,
you run Space Command. Will you be submitting additional
funding requests on top of the budget that DOD sent to Congress
this morning?
General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator. I will submit a
list, and there is a couple of reasons why I will. So being a
Combatant Command that is only about three and a half years
old, we are continuing to evolve. We are continuing mature. I
described a little bit earlier how we are getting more people,
our infrastructure is growing, and what we have facing us right
now is a very dynamic threat in the space domain, our pacing
challenge being China.
With that, we find ourselves in a situation where we try to
grow a little bit quicker, and sometimes when we do that
because of the threat, it will cost a little more money and
money and money that I haven't forecasted because I wasn't able
to look at that inside of the budget cycle. That is the first
piece of that.
The second piece of it is as I look to round out some of
the capabilities that I need. Specifically space domain
awareness, we are finding in the commercial market that there
are companies that can provide that type of capability to us,
and we are taking that capability in our commercial
integrations strategy and bringing those partners on board.
Sometimes I don't have that, how much that is going to cost
in a contract, inside of a 2-year budget cycle that we are in.
So those are some things that I am doing that would be in my
UPL [unfunded priorities list]. One would be, how do I grow my
command faster to meet the threat? Second, how do I bring on
capabilities that I might not have forecasted, that I have come
to realize--.
Senator Warren. So the budget that has just been submitted
this morning, you are telling me, is already out of date for
your command and that you want to go outside the budget
process. You don't want to have to do the 10-year cost
estimates. You want to go outside that to just plus up your
budget. Is that right?
General Dickinson. It is. The reason I would submit a UPL
is to make sure that I can grow as the threat--.
Senator Warren. Well, but that is the point of the budget
process, is that you go to the Department of Defense, you say,
``here is how I need to grow.'' They give you a number, and
then you make the appropriate choices within that number. You
are just saying they didn't give you a big enough number, so
you want to do an end run in order to plus up your budget? Is
that what you are saying, General?
General Dickinson. I am saying that the space domain, the
characterization of what I see going on in space with the
advancements of the threat from the Chinese in space warrent me
to be able to account for that--.
Senator Warren. Well, but that is the point of going
through the DOD budgeting process. You have been given a number
by DOD and you have just decided to go outside that. I want to
also be sure to get to General Cotton. You run our Nation's
Strategic Command, responsible for our nuclear weapons arsenal.
Now, during your confirmation, you told me, ``as the
Commander, my job is to ensure that I can execute my mission
with the dollars I have been given.'' General Cotton, same
question to you as General Dickinson. Will you be submitting
additional funding requests on top of the budget that DOD sent
to Congress this morning?
General Cotton. Thank you, Senator. I think I had that
caveat there, too, as far as talking about emerging
responsibilities and emerging threats. No different than what
General Dickinson said. The 2-year cycle, things change within
a 2-year cycle.
I have been asked this morning on how am I going to handle
looking at the new emerging threats that we have just seen in
probably the last 60 days of what is going on within the
strategic threat picture.
So right now, we are going to have to look to see if we are
going to submit an UPL to be able to get after some of the
threats that we are seeing today. I am responsible for EMS, the
spectrum management piece.
We are right there on a 2-year cycle where we didn't do
that 2 years ago for the 2024 budget to understand how we are
going to be able to set that up, to be able to get after some
problems. I stand by what I said as a commander, I will always
try to make sure that I get--I can be able to do my job within
my means. But I always, as all commanders, we all have emerging
threats or needs that might change the calculus on what our
previous budget had.
Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate that, and I am out of
time, but I just want to say I think we should be asking DOD to
write budgets that reflect their actual priorities, and that
they should know as much about these emerging threats as the
individual commanders do, and that we should not be doing a
dual estimate here of budgets where you have one number and
then you just come in and ask for a lot of additional money. I
think that is wrong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Cotton. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. Thank you. I sympathize with what Senator
Warren is saying. I mean, it is hard to figure out what the
budget should be, and so there ought to be a way where we
know--we hear everything and then try to make a decision.
Thanks for what you do. Can you just talk about--first off,
you watch all the stuff that China is doing. Clearly the public
should know, the fentanyl coming across the border, the Chinese
spy balloon, the surveillance with DJI drones, they have got
TikTok and all that stuff.
So take--what could we do? What could the public do? What
should we do on things like that? Is there anything that we
could do that would impact and make your jobs and what you are
trying to do as part of our defense easier? Both of you.
Thanks. Whoever wants to go first.
General Cotton. Senator Scott, thank you. I think public
advocation, the advocacy of--for my portfolio, for example, the
advocacy of the modernization of the nuclear triad, the
modernization of the weapons complex, the modernization of
infrastructure. Those are the things that on the surface, I
don't know that the American people will truly understand on
the effects of not having those things are and the effects to
the national security of our Nation for not having those type
of things. So, advocacy in the public light from yourself and
others to be able to articulate the needs that we have I think
makes a big difference for us.
General Dickinson. I think it is advocacy and education and
awareness of how important for my portfolio-space, is to not
only military operations, but just our way of American life and
really the global economy.
As we watched Artemis I launch here not too long ago, and
we see the excitement of going back to the moon and beyond, I
think that really has motivated the American public and the
world, for that matter, that we are going back to the moon and
beyond.
But when you look at that, and you look at what the Chinese
are doing today with their own space station on orbit, their
own ability to go to the moon. Go to the moon and scoop up some
rocks and come back, demonstrating their technology
advancements.
We need to understand that that has a military application
too, and that the same assets or similar assets that we depend
upon in everyday life here in the United States and around the
world is dependent upon space.
Space fuels the economy. Space fuels our lifestyles. I
think just understanding that space is exciting from a civil
commercial piece, we also need to be able to say it could be
held at risk. That risk is what I am doing each and every day,
is to try to mitigate that risk or reduce that risk.
Senator Scott. So how can you or how can we or how can the
Biden administration, any of us, take what we watch what China
is doing every day that we all get to see, right, to do a
better job of explaining what we need to do on nuclear
deterrence and what we need to do on space. How can we put
those together where the public will get it?
Because you are right, it is going to be--we got to
advocate for this stuff. The public doesn't believe in it. It
is going to be hard for us to, to get the money to funded,
right. Because we represent the people in our State. So how
would--what should each of us be doing better?
General Dickinson. I think talking about what they are
doing, in space right now in terms of, you go back to 2007 when
they conducted that direct decent ASAT [anti-satellite] test.
That test, we are still tracking more than 2,000 pieces of
debris from a test that happened in 2007. That type of
messaging and that type of conversation, where appropriate, I
think is very important to do. From my perspective, that is how
you get--a constant conversation about how are they improving
in space.
Senator Scott. Okay.
General Cotton. Senator Scott from my portfolio, I think is
actually educating folks to understand that what does it mean
when the Department of Defense says that China is a pacing
threat? What does that really mean to folks that are in
Melbourne, Florida?
Being able to describe that and understand what does that
mean when we say that there is a nuclear breakout and then the
first time in the history of the United States since the advent
of nuclear weapons, that the United States has two nuclear
peers. That is the education that needs to happen for our
American people.
Senator Scott. Right. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Kelly,
please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Dickinson,
since we left off with Senator Scott's question about your
answer a little bit about commercial space, I want to start
there.
In February, the president of SpaceX revealed that the
company had taken active steps to prevent Ukrainian forces from
using Starlink technology with their drones. SpaceX admitted
they had not foreseen the weaponization, their words, of their
capabilities. I was personally disappointed to see
discontinuation of full services at such a critical time for
Ukraine's self-defense.
General, as SPACECOM moves forward in deepening its
partnership with industry and foreign partners, how are you
approaching the agreements with industry on military use of
commercial capabilities?
General Dickinson. Senator, there is no question that
SpaceX's Starlink system has been used extensively by Ukraine
in its response to the Russian aggression. I think the use of
Starlink has been described in numerous media accounts almost
since the beginning of that conflict. I think this demonstrates
that commercial space capabilities can play a significant role
in our modern high intensity conflicts.
The concerns, I think, SpaceX representatives recently
expressed about Ukraine's use of Starlink highlight the
importance of shared understanding between commercial service
providers and their customers and users. So, these issues, in
my mind, bear on contracts in all operational domains, not just
specific to space.
Senator Kelly. Do you feel there is a connection between
the availability of this capability to our partners, being
Ukraine in this conflict, and relationships we have with
companies like SpaceX?
General Dickinson. Yes.
Senator Kelly. How are we going to ensure that DOD and our
partners will have all the capabilities available throughout
the range of military operations? If you have any specifics
about this going forward, I would love to hear them.
General Dickinson. Yes, there is an initiative that is
working right now within the Department, within the Space
Force, that is actually looking at what you just described
there. How do we make sure during times of conflict that if we
are relying on commercial companies for certain services, that
they will be available to us?
There are models like that right now, for example, the
craft model that we use in the Department right now, the
civilian reserve air fleet. You know, there are--so that may
serve as a model as they go forward in their work, and we
participate, U.S. Space Command, in that process.
Senator Kelly. General, I am going to have my office
followup. If you need assistance there, we are here to help.
General Dickinson. Thank you.
Senator Kelly. General Cotton, In the years since Russia's
unprovoked assault in Ukraine, the United States has been
forced to rethink our nuclear posture and how we think about
deterrence. Just a few weeks ago, Russia announced that it
would suspend its participation in the New START Treaty.
But even prior to that, I mean we all knew that Russia was
refusing inspection of nuclear facilities, which was a key
condition of the agreement. This behavior, along with increased
Chinese aggression and the influence from China, but also North
Korea's regular testing of ballistic missiles, and Iran's, I
would say, undisputed progress to enrich uranium, it
underscores the importance of having a strong deterrence.
The long-range standoff weapon (LRSO), the long range
standoff missile system being developed by Raytheon in Tucson,
Arizona, is going to play a critical role in the deterrence of
our top four adversaries in the future. The ability to forward
deploy this missile on U.S. bombers sends a powerful message to
our adversaries, but also to our allies. So, General, can you
expand on why this is such a critical asset for our Nation?
General Cotton. Senator, thank you for the question. LRSO
is a replacement for the air-launch cruise missile, which is
the air-launch cruise missile nuclear leg of our triad. That
weapon is still a reliable weapon and it is a safe and secure
weapon, but it is well past its life as far as capability
sustained, so we need to replace it with the LRSO.
You are absolutely right. I am quite pleased with what I
have seen with the contractor on the work that they are doing.
It is fundamental because that is fundamental to long range
standoff for the air leg of the nuclear triad.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, and my understanding,
without going into anything, you know, classified, that we will
get more capability out of this weapon than we had with the
prior, I think it was AGM-86, was it?
General Cotton. Yes, and we could talk more about that in
closed, if you would like.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am
going to submit another question for the record on traveling
wave tubes. Specific capability that we don't have a lot of
depth in here, in our industrial base. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Budd,
please.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. General Dickinson,
General Cotton, thank you both for being here today. You know,
last year, President Biden's defense budget was woefully
insufficient to keep pace with China and Russia and also
inflation.
I think many of us are concerned with this upcoming budget,
particularly when it comes to nuclear modernization. So,
General Cotton, other than budgetary constraints, we have
talked a lot about that today, what barriers exist to nuclear
modernization efforts?
General Cotton. Senator, thanks for the question. I think
fundamental to me is ensuring that we don't have any slips in
any of the modernization programs that we have as far as
timelines in terms of being able to get to completion.
The industrial base and supply chain--we hear many people
talk about that. It is a thing, and that is worrisome to me
because that is external to even what folks might think our
technical challenges, but when you throw that on top of what we
are trying to do and what we are seeing, that becomes a
challenge.
Senator Budd. Thank you, and for both of you, to the extent
that you can discuss it in this setting, and maybe we will hear
more later on, how destabilizing is China's development, of
their nuclear capable hypersonic fractional orbital bombardment
capability?
I know that is a concept that has been around for decades,
but we are seeing with new technology their redevelopment of
that. So, are there certain systems? First of all, how
destabilizing is that? Is there something that the U.S. should
field in response?
General Cotton. It is destabilizing. You are right, it is
something that folks have been thinking through for decades,
but because of the destabilization, results of what that weapon
can bring forth, others decided not to go in that direction. I
think for our perspective in Strategic Command, it is about
warning.
As my fellow COCOM Commander in NORTHCOM and NORAD would
tell you that becomes a problem in being able to understand
what your timelines are on when something might be coming into
the Homeland.
General Dickinson. From my perspective as the global sensor
manager, being able to see it is the first thing we have to be
able to do. As I have mentioned earlier in a previous response,
these are emerging type of threats, that we need to be able to
address.
We are looking very closely at it in terms of how do we use
capabilities that we didn't traditionally use for that type of
activity, in this case, the fractional overall bombardment
capability.
Do we have things that we can better leverage today to help
us maintain custody of it, when it is in flight? So, for me, it
is an area that I am aggressively working today with the assets
that I have and we are looking to the future to bring on
increased capability.
Senator Budd. Thanks. We will pick up the discussion of
that in the other setting. General Dickinson, how would you
characterize the current resilience of our military satellite
constellations, and what efforts are being made to improve
resilience in the near and the short term? The concern is that
because these systems are so expensive, we buy less of them,
thus making them more vulnerable. So, if you would comment on
that, please.
General Dickinson. Certainly. So, as I look at the
architecture that we have today and the resiliency of that
architecture, we are looking at ways today that we hadn't
looked at in the past in terms of making them more resilient.
Our ability to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures
for our assets that are on orbit in order to make them more
resilient. Maybe able to move, maybe point in a different
direction, are examples of that, or actually doing--so as I
mentioned in my opening comment, that we look at it from a
link, ground station, and satellite perspective.
Those are the three segments. In order to increase our
resiliency, we look very carefully at how we can harden, not
only the satellite vehicle, but the link to the ground, and
then the ground station through cyber protection back to
wherever the command-and-control facility is.
So, we look at it from that approach. How can we better--
how can we increase the resiliency on orbit, as I mentioned
earlier, and then those two other links.
Senator Budd. Is there a scenario where you would have less
expensive but so many more of them that we would thus reduce
our vulnerability?
General Dickinson. As we go to the future, the department
is looking very closely at doing mega constellation, similar to
what we have seen with some of the commercial companies here in
the United States where we have thousands of satellites on
orbit.
The resiliency there is very good in terms of thousands of
satellites not knowing which satellite does necessarily what
function or the ability of that network to self-heal itself if
you lose two or three or four of them.
This type of resiliency actually causes some of our
adversaries to pause because it is very difficult to defeat
something like that or even degrade it. So that is where we are
going in the future, and that is exactly what we need to be
doing.
Senator Budd. Thank you both. Chair, I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Budd. Senator
Hirono, please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General
Cotton and General Dickinson. Hawaii holds a strategic position
in the Pacific with many integral Department of Defense
equities, which makes the threat of missile attack particularly
acute for the people of Hawaii. I have been asking for many
years now how DOD will ensure Hawaii is defended from a missile
attack.
Recently the cost assessment and program evaluation, CAPE,
conducted a study on how best to meet the current and future
missile defense needs of Hawaii. I have still not received a
brief on the results of that study or the Department's plan for
how it intends to protect Hawaii from all types of missile
threats, from current and future potential adversaries. Is it
fair to say that each of you has roles to play in missile
defense?
Yes? I am not hearing anything. Yes, you do. It is fair to
say. So, can you just briefly describe what these roles are
that you have a missile defense?
General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hirono. General Dickinson.
General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator. So yes, in U.S.
Space Command, I have got a responsibility to provide space
enabling capabilities to the Joint Force, in this case
INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific Command]. Those space
enabling capabilities are missile warning as well as position,
navigation, timing, satellite communications. Those are the
pieces that we provide to the missile defense architecture.
Senator Hirono. General Cotton.
General Cotton. For mine, ma'am--thank you for the
question. For us, above all else, it is about providing warning
and future architectures and protection of the Homeland. So
that is the oversight that we have as far as homeland defense,
providing effective protection of U.S. against rogue nations.
Senator Hirono. So, you both have responsibilities
regarding missile warnings. I do have serious concerns that
there is not one dedicated person in the Department of Defense
with the responsibility to ensure that there is a plan for
missile defense of Hawaii, as there are many roles and
responsibilities doled out across the Department of Defense for
this one issue.
That is why I expressed frustration, because every time I
ask about missile defense or Hawaii, I don't get a response.
So, as we have seen in the continuing challenges regarding the
regional crisis, where there is not one ultimate person
ultimately responsible over the planning and execution of an
issue as it relates to what needs to happen with Red Hill--and
it adds to the lack of trust within the community that the
military will get things right with regard to Red Hill.
So, there is room for mishaps to occur. I await someone to
tell me how Hawaii will be defended from missile attacks.
Moving on, to continue in the line of missile defense, there is
robust conversation occurring in Congress to look for ways to
more effectively use the microwave spectrum to support
developments in wireless telecommunications technologies while
protecting national security.
The development of 5G communications will have a great
impact on the U.S.'s ability to remain a world leader, in both
the commercial and defense spaces. The Department of Defense is
currently conducting a study, in conjunction with NTIA, on how
it can more effectively and efficiently use the spectrum, and
how spectrum sharing would impact current systems.
I believe this analysis will be critical to making an
informed decision about this very important national issue, and
I believe it is critically important Congress extend the FCC
[Federal Communications Commission] spectrum auction authority
until September 2023, while the DOD concludes this important
study.
As I am sure you are aware, the current auction authority
will expire tonight, March 9th, unless Congress agrees to a
short-term extension. With negotiations ongoing, we should
agree to a 60-day extension, at least in my view, and not let
spectrum authority, auction authority lapse.
So, it is critical that DOD and NTIA thoroughly conduct
this study contemplating all options, including vacating and
sharing the spectrum band. It will be imperative that the study
is not only comprehensive but is submitted in a timely matter.
Clearly, I share the concerns expressed by Senator Rounds
on this issue. In the meantime, General Dickinson and General
Cotton, what types of impacts do you anticipate the study will
identify, and do you see opportunities for greater sharing of
the spectrum for civilian usage? My time is up, so perhaps you
can be very brief.
General Dickinson. Yes, Senator. So, we are part of that
ongoing study that the Department of Defense is doing. I
can't--I won't try to guess what the outcomes will be from
that. I know as being part of that study that my concerns and
my voice will be heard in that study in terms of how important
that part of the inspector spectrum is to my mission every day.
My mission every day supports the rest of the Joint Force as
well.
General Cotton. Senator, the same with STRATCOM. We are
part of that team that is part of that study, so I am awaiting
the results of that as well.
Senator Hirono. It is going to be very important that the
study gets done on time because there are other things that are
happening with regard to this issue, as you all know. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Schmitt,
please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had a question
to General Cotton on modernization. Clearly, you know Whiteman
Air Force Base in Missouri, we are very proud of that, which I
know you are very familiar, and part of the nuclear triad and
the B-2 stealth bomber.
I guess you mentioned, one of your focuses is to make sure
that as we approach this modernization, that there aren't any
there aren't any gaps along the way. I guess the focus of my
question would be, what is the level of concern that there
might be, and what can we do to make sure that that doesn't
happen?
So along the way, as we move forward in this, what are some
things to look out for and what can we be doing to help out
with that?
General Cotton. Senator, thank you for the question, and
yes, the incredible men and women of the 509 there are Whiteman
Airforce Base. I think fundamentally, as any--if we start
seeing delays in programs and delays on getting to completion
of a program, because what I don't want and what I have
articulated is I need to make sure, the B-2 is a good example,
that I have sufficient forces in play all the time.
Even during the transition, we must ensure that I have the
legacy systems in place where I can still present options to
the President of the United States. If you start getting slips,
then folks start saying, ``well, okay, so when can I start. Is
there a is there when can I start divesting and do I slow down
divestiture? What do I do about divestiture as a component
commander, I need to make sure that I have those sources
available.''
I am constantly watching to make sure that those future
roadmaps for your area, the bomber force, for example, for
Columbia, for example, ICBMS, every portfolio that I own, is
being modernized right now. So, as we look to those and make
sure that we don't build gaps because of delays in----
Senator Schmitt. Are you confident there aren't those gaps
right now, wherever we are at in that process 0under your
command?
General Cotton. Well, as I said earlier, my bigger concern
is what we are seeing with the industrial base and what we are
seeing with the supply chain.
Senator Budd. Okay. General Dickinson, I guess my question
to you is on the space race. I do feel like whether it was the
Chinese spy balloon, whether it is the fentanyl, that has been
mentioned. TikTok. The public is becoming much more aware,
right now, in real time, the real threat that China poses.
I mean, they are not messing around. They mean business,
and I am a new member here, and the briefings that we have had
in my 2 months here are sobering in many ways. That is, a big
focus of mine and my office: to make sure that we are doing
everything we can to be ready to challenge that threat. I guess
Senator Scott asked the question about what we can do.
I want to drill down on that a little bit more.
Specifically, what are two or three things that you don't think
from a space perspective, you don't think the public might be
aware of as it relates to China in space that are terrifying?
General Dickinson. A couple of things. If you just look at
the sheer number of launches, space launches that they do in a
year--that is a statistic that most people don't know. I will
give you a statistic there. In 2022, last year, there were 186
space launches. Of those, 64 were Chinese, United States was
87, the rest before. Just putting things on orbit, whatever
they may be.
They have rounded out their equivalent of our GPS satellite
network. They call that the BeiDou. They have accurate
position, navigation, and timing capabilities worldwide. If you
look at the just the sheer number of satellites that are in
orbit and what their intended use is everything from ISR
[intelligence, surveillance and reconaissance] satellites to
communications satellites to PNT [positioning, navigation and
timing] satellites.
So, they are moving in a direction where they want to be,
peer to us in terms of capabilities in space. They are still--
we are still the best in space. But what we need to make sure
is that that gap does not close and that we continue to keep
the gap or increase it.
Senator Budd. I guess just a final question. What are a
couple of those capabilities, do you think, outside of the
launches? A couple of those capabilities that, again, most
folks might not be that aware of.
General Dickinson. Well, it would be ISR satellites, so
they can--they have observations in terms of being able to see
around all around the globe in a persistent manner. Then the
other piece is that position, navigation, and timing. That is,
PNT is a critical component of any military operation and quite
frankly, any commercial or civilian operation as well. Having
accurate PNT is very fundamental to that, and they have that.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. Senator
Rosen, please
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed. I really
appreciate you holding this hearing. I would like to thank
General Cotton and General Dickinson for, of course, your great
testimony today and for your service to our country.
Of course, we have the Nevada National Security Site right
here in southern Nevada. I want to speak a little bit about the
upgrades that it needs. So, General Cotton, I want to followup
on a question I asked at your nomination hearing now that you
have taken command. It is an issue I have raced to the
Committee several times.
At the Nevada National Security Site, we oversee the
Stockpile Stewardship Program, principally the U1a facility--
that underground lab where scientists conduct the subcritical
experiments to verify the safety and reliability of our nuclear
stockpile without explosive testing.
U1a is undergoing major construction. It is a project that
will soon house the most capable weapons radiographic system in
the world. However, NNSA [National Nuclear Security
Administration] currently faces significant infrastructure
delays, including at the Nevada National Security Site.
So how will the upgrades to the Stockpile Stewardship
Program, like the U1a, affect STRATCOM certification of the
nuclear stockpile? How do these infrastructure modernization
challenges overall delay your impact to fully fulfill your
responsibilities?
General Cotton. Senator, thank you for the question. As I
had said earlier to the Committee, making sure that we have the
proper funding, the proper insight on the modernization of the
weapons complex writ large, to your point, is absolutely
critical for us in the modernization of our programs, when we
have been talking about the weapons system platforms
themselves. So that is going to be critically important.
When we talk about NNSA and the problems that--or the
challenges that they are facing in regards to infrastructure, I
monitor that daily.
Senator Rosen. So that is how you are addressing these
structural delays, just monitoring? Is there something else
you--.
General Cotton. I continue to push--the requirement, ma'am,
for pit production for me, for example, has not changed.
Senator Rosen. Okay. Thank you. I am going to move on to
you, General Dickinson, for cyber mission and space, because we
know cyber operations, you have been mentioning of course, they
play a critical role, well not just in our space capabilities,
but honestly, I believe in every aspect of our capabilities.
We see our adversaries increasingly developing their
counterspace capabilities that really undermine our interests.
So, China, they have emphasized the offensive cyberspace
capabilities, that they are critical to their cyber warfare
capabilities. Are you concerned about the increasing threat of
cyber-attacks from China and how they could jeopardize the
United States space operations?
You spoke about doing the constellation mode, some of the
other things that you might be doing, you can speak to in an
unclassified setting. So, are these some of the best tools you
can use against--kind of counter the space cyber aggression, if
you will?
General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator. Cybersecurity is a
top priority within the Command because we understand the
challenges and the threats, just as you mentioned there. The
Command is actively working cybersecurity every day.
So as the Command has matured over the last three and a
half years, we have built cyber, cyber protection, in from the
very beginning. An example of that, we have a joint cyber
center that resides within the Command, now that is that
operational capability.
Senator Rosen. I am sorry to interrupt, are you using
machine learning and artificial intelligence to maintain the
digital superiority in the new centers?
We use that type of--those types of capabilities to do as I
described in terms of our JCC, Joint Cyber Center, as well as
the new Space Force Delta 6 that stood up that does cyber
protection for our satellites, satellite communications control
networks, as well as the integration of General Nakasone's
integrated planning element within my command as well.
We participate in the greater cybersecurity and the cyber
deterrence process with USCYBERCOM [United States Cyber
Command] as well, through their cyber priority effects list.
Every day one of my top command priorities is doing--securing
the terrain, doing digital superiority. Part of that is making
sure that we are hard in terms of cyber defense.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I am going to in the really
quickly and I will probably take the answer off the record
because I ask everybody this. STEM [science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics] outreach programs, how are we
going to reach these goals if we don't have the workforce, the
pipeline folks coming in or being trained?
So, I will take it off the record is my time is expiring,
but I want to know about your STEM outreach efforts,
particularly in cyber. How do you plan to grow them? How do you
plan to retain good people because it really is--it is
critical. So, thank you, Mr. Chair. I will take that off the
record. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen. Senator
Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Generals,
thanks for being here, and service for all of you here in this
room today. General Dickinson, I know you talked about Starlink
a little bit in Ukraine. Give your personal assessment really
how that has worked for Ukraine and for all of us in the
future.
General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator. So I think the
lessons that I take from watching that capability, the Starlink
capability, is I think it demonstrates what those large
constellations can provide in terms of thousands of satellites
providing a service or a capability to a certain entity, in
this particular case, Ukraine, I think, shows: one, is the
maturation of our commercial space industry enabled to build
something as technically sophisticated as that on scale, and
put it on orbit, and maintain it. I think that is a big lesson
learned or takeaway for me from the Ukraine-Russia conflict.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General Cotton, a lot of
people talk about tactical nuclear weapons but don't know what
that really means. If Putin were to use a tactical weapon in
Kyiv, what damage would that do and what would be the fallout?
General Cotton. Sir, so when we talk about non-strategic
nuclear weapons, just for a definition, non-strategic nuclear
weapons are any weapons that are currently not under the New
START treaty. So, for Russia, that is approximately 2,000
weapons. For the effects, I would like to hold off and have
that answer to you during a closed session, if we could.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. Thank you very much. General
Dickinson, it probably wouldn't be--it would be unfitting for
me not to ask you about Space Command in your last hearing
here, since the Senator from Colorado, I mean New Hampshire
brought it up a little bit.
We have heard a lot about in the last few years about
basing decision of the command headquarters. I didn't want to
get back into this back and forth, but when my colleagues bring
it up, I want to make sure the facts are correct.
General, in 2019, the Air Force identified six suitable
locations for Space Command, is that correct? In 2020, when the
Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, testified before this
Committee, he instructed the Air Force to allow for communities
to self-nominate. That resulted in the Air Force examining 66
communities across any 26 states, correct?
General Dickinson. As best I can recall.
Senator Tuberville. It was an exhaustive selection process
that weighed 21 different factors and involved site visits,
interviews, input from up and down the chain of command. That
process took 8 months, correct?
General Dickinson. As best I can recall.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Which community ranked
number one in your--in that analysis at the end of the day?
General Dickinson. I don't recall exactly which one.
Senator Tuberville. Well, I will refresh your memory,
Huntsville. Do you recall which base ranked second?
General Dickinson. I don't recall.
Senator Tuberville. Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. You
recall third? You probably don't--which was the Joint Base in
San Antonio. Commander-in-Chief selected the location that the
Air Force ranked number one.
Yet since the President selected Huntsville, the location,
the Air Force study ranked number one in January 2021, we have
had 2 years of delay and the world is on fire right now. We
need to catch up. The Colorado delegation asked for an
investigative report and the GAO [Government Accountability
Office] reported on the process.
Ironic, Colorado wasn't in second or third, but they asked
for a report. So, when the GAO examined this process, they
said, I am going to quote here, ``the Redstone Arsenal ranked
as the highest scoring location in the evaluation phase, the
highest ranked location in the selection phase, and the
location with the most advantages in the decision matrix.
Air Force official stated that the decision to identify
Redstone Arsenal as a preferred location stemmed from Air Force
analysis showing it was the strongest candidate location.'' We
are going back and forth with this, and I know Secretary
Kendall is going back and forth and hopefully we get this done.
Hopefully we get it done before your term is up. I know
that we have got commercial people that are involved in this. I
know commercial people are going to be hugely involved in our--
in Space Command in years and years to come, and we look
forward to all of that coming together in one location in the
very near future, and hopefully that is Huntsville.
So, General, thank you for your service, really. Thank you
for your service. What you have done for Space Command. You
have been the only one there. You brought it from infancy. You
have done a great job. Thank you.
General Dickinson. Thank you.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
Cramer, please.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to both
Generals for your service and for being here. I want to start,
maybe start and end with you, General Cotton. I want to ask
you, your predecessors had some luxuries you don't have.
Of course, they had six B-52 bases in the Northern tier
capable of taking off and landing that great big legacy
machine, six of them between Michigan and Montana. There are
only two that remain that have the cement, and one, of course,
in Minot, which you are more than a little bit familiar with.
The other being Grand Forks. The base in Grand Forks has
narrowed the 300-foot-wide runway to 150 by moving the lights
in but all the concrete remains. As you look forward--and I was
interested in one of your previous answers about LRSO, the
importance of LRSO in the legacy systems, particularly in the
context of a potential gap.
But when it comes to bomber combat employment base that we
have talked about a few times, how useful would more runway
space be for the disbursement of those B-52s and maybe other
large aircraft, especially while we still have some of them
intact that could be prepared quickly.
General Cotton. Senator Cramer, thank you for the question,
and our baby the buff, the B-52, I just recently looked at an
article that was published on the Air and Space Forces Magazine
that showing the testing that is underway for the re-
engineering of the B-52. So I am knocking on wood that
everything is going well in regards of serving the commercial
and your replacement program for that venerable, incredible
machine.
To your point, you are absolutely right. We used to have
numerous airfields throughout the United States of America that
could act as dispersal sites for a lot of our strategic forces
and weapons. Not permanent locations, but the places where you
can disperse.
Over the decades that has eroded. Many communities will
look and see and say, I don't understand why I have an 11,000-
foot runway at my regional airport, and then it is no longer a
11,000 foot runway. So, we are looking into it. I am actually
having the Commander of Air Force Global Strike take a look at
dispersal locations again, because now, once again, as we have
been discussing, we have two near peers.
First time in the history of what STRATCOM has had to deal
with. So we are looking into that right now, sir, so to answer
your question.
Senator Cramer. No, I appreciate that, and as you know, the
folks up in Grand Forks are capable of moving a lot of snow
fast so that 300-foot runways ready to be deployed. With regard
to those two near-peer adversaries or threats.
China's capabilities, of course, are growing at an
unprecedented pace, as you guys have already referenced.
Russia, of course, becomes more unpredictable and dangerous all
of the time. Some of the programs that we are relying to
maintain that deterrence were created with different threats in
mind, obviously, or at least different scales of those threats.
I often joke with Senator King that the reason I accepted
the ranking position on the Seapower Subcommittee was so I
could get my hands on the third leg of the triad. But do you
think, are 12 Columbia-class submarines enough? I guess that is
the bottom line. I know we have a lot of challenges, but given
this threat, particularly from China, are 12 enough?
General Cotton. Senator, thank you for that question. I
think it goes back to the original statement that I made in
regards to I think we have to have a conversation and look at
force posture. Force posture is all three legs of the triad to
ensure that we have what we need moving forward into the
2030's, 2040's, 2050's.
Senator Cramer. Since I have about half a minute left, I do
want to ask both of you a really basic question that I know
requires just a simple answer. It is really in response to
Senator Warren's line of questioning regarding the budget and
unfunded priorities. Do you consider national security as a
like to have or a must have in today's threats? General Cotton
first, and then. General Dickinson.
General Cotton. It is a must have.
Senator Cramer. General Dickinson.
General Dickinson. It is a must have.
Senator Cramer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Senator Sullivan,
please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, good
to see you. General Cotton, thanks again for coming to the
Alaska Day event. Native people in my State were very honored
by your presence, and I think it was a really good event, so
thank you very much on that.
I want to ask you about the recently conducted CSIS [Center
for Strategic and International Studies] Taiwan scenario war
game that I am sure you are familiar with. It recommended that
the B-1s not be retired until the full complement of B-21s and
modernized B-52s are fully on hand. Did you see that, and do
you agree with that assessment?
General Cotton. So I haven't seen the assessment that
articulates B-1 perspective.
Senator Sullivan. What do you think about that general
statement? I am sure it is not the first time you have heard
something along those lines. We need to look at mitigating the
risk of B-21 delivery time going to the right----
General Cotton. Senator, I absolutely agree that--and what
I want to ensure is that we have enough of the bomber force
available that is a legacy until we have a fair amount of B-21
brand new modernized systems. So I don't see a huge dip in my
capability and capacity moving forward.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Let me ask another issue. I had a
very senior U.S. Air Force officer when he was on his way out
retiring and he was talking about force posture for some of the
strategic forces. Mentioned, and I wasn't pushing it, but he
mentioned that with regard to looking at where the B-21 should
be placed, that one place that would certainly get our
adversaries' attention, particularly China and Russia, is
having a certain element of those homeported in Alaska, given
our strategic location.
As you know, Billy Mitchell called Alaska the most
strategic place in the world. With B-21s in our closeness to
Russia, and Japan, and Korea, and the Taiwan Strait, this was a
recommendation that he thought made sense.
A lot of the INDOPACOM theater generals and admirals always
talk about West to the international dateline. I try to
encourage them to not use that. It is kind of a lazy term. A
lot of what is further North is actually closer to key theaters
of engagement, whether or not you are West or East of the
international dateline, it's all about miles.
If you are North, our times are closer. For example, forces
in Alaska are closer, for the most part, the key theater areas
than Darwin, Australia. A lot of people don't know that. A lot
of four star generals and admirals don't know that. So what is
your thought about something like that in terms of force
posture, especially as it relates to near-peer--it is not even
near-peer competition. It is clearly peer competition, in my
view, no?
General Cotton. Senator, thank you for that. We actually
had a discussion about that in my last role as a Commander of
Global Strike Command in regards to, I think from the location
of where the forces are postured, I look to my JFACC, my Joint
Forces Air Component Commander to figure out where they can
best maximize where that would be.
As you know, we would always consider and have considered
and do use the bases in Alaska for dispersal locations for our
bomber forces even today when we are doing our bomber task
forces.
So, that is a conversation that I think should continue,
that we should continue to have. But it would be with the Air
Force in regards to location.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. My final question, I am going
to ask for both of you. I think the Chinese spy balloon has
raised a lot of issues. But one of the issues that I know that
General VanHerck is looking at, and to his credit, he has been
really pressing for a couple of years now, is domain awareness.
Domain awareness, particularly as it relates to
hypersonics, to cruise missiles, and even to slow moving
objects. A lot of our detection devices--in as you know,
Alaska, again, is key here because anything coming into the
lower 48 to strike Chicago or New York City is going to come
through the airspace in Alaska.
But we have traditionally been focused on ballistic
missiles tracking and in bombers. So how do we get on the whole
issue of domain awareness as it relates to hypersonics, cruise
missiles, and then even slow-moving entities like balloons, spy
balloons?
General Dickinson. Senator, in my portfolio in terms of
space domain awareness, that is a critical capability that we
continue to look at, continue to develop requirements, and also
continue to leverage assets that we haven't necessarily used in
the past to do that very function. Of course, Senator, you
know, you have got two great sensors that are in your home
State.
We are looking forward to the LRDR coming on here soon.
That will be obviously a big asset in addition to our
architecture itself. But I think as we look at the evolving
threats that we are seeing now, our approach has to be a
layered approach in terms not only particularly with missile
defense, but also in sensing.
So, one sensor doesn't do it all, so we have got to figure
out and we are figuring out where those gaps are, where those
seams are, and how to get better at understanding the threat.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen. Welcome back. General
Cotton, I can't remember if we have addressed this before at
your confirmation hearing, but I have addressed with a lot of
your predecessor, so I want to raise with you again.
Sometimes we hear criticism about our nuclear forces along
the lines of that we shouldn't spend so much money on weapons
that we never use. I sometimes point out that we don't actually
spend that much money on our nuclear forces in the grand scheme
of our defense budget.
We do happen to be going through a somewhat expensive
modernization right now, but in general it is in the low single
percentiles. I also point out that we actually do use our
nuclear weapons.
We have used them every single day since August 1945 to
deter the kind of war that we had from 1939 to 1945. Would you
agree with that assessment?
General Cotton. I would agree with that, Senator.
Senator Cotton. That every single day our nuclear weapons
deter our adversaries not just from nuclear warfare, but from
the kind of conventional warfare that we saw so often in the
first half, even in some cases, at a lower intensity level, the
second half of the 20th century.
General Cotton. I do agree.
Senator Cotton. So, we have to have a credible nuclear
deterrent to achieve those continued effects. Right now we have
one nuclear arms control treaty, in effect, the New START
treaty. However, Russia has recently suspended its cooperation
with that treaty. Is that right?
General Cotton. They have suspended, yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. What do you think are the prospects for
Russia returning into compliance with that treaty, given their
history of cheating on other treaties like the Intermediate
Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty?
General Cotton. I would hope that they would come back and
try to get in compliance, but hope is not a plan.
Senator Cotton. Right. So over time, there is really no way
to know if they are actually complying with the limits on
warheads or delivery systems under that treaty.
General Cotton. That is correct.
Senator Cotton. I just want to talk a little bit about
Russia's nuclear forces that are sometimes known as tactical
nukes or strategic nukes or low yield nukes, whatever you want
to call it. To put it simply, smaller nuclear warheads, maybe
something akin to what we used to in World War II as opposed to
four megaton city killers. Is that a fair characterization?
General Cotton. That is correct, and to define it, non-
nuclear strategic weapons are defined as any weapon that is not
under the New START treaty. It is about 2,000 weapons.
Senator Cotton. So all these, all these weapons, whatever
their yield, were not covered by the New START Treaty and
therefore not covered by any treaty, correct?
General Cotton. That is correct.
Senator Cotton. Do you want to say how many of those kinds
of weapons we have? If you don't want to in this setting, that
is fine.
General Cotton. We can talk about that in a closed session,
sir.
Senator Cotton. I think we have a little bit fewer than
2,000 is the way I would put it. You might say, well, we have,
you know, four megaton city killers. Why do we need it?
So the logic here is that if all you have are giant city
killers and your adversary has thousands of smaller nuclear
weapons, they might believe that they can detonate one of the
smaller weapons and you won't retaliate because you are not
going to trade a four megaton city killer with a nuclear weapon
that took an artillery battalion off the battlefield, is that
right?
General Cotton. There is a potential for that, exactly.
Senator Cotton. Yes. Totally unconstrained--and Russia is
totally unconstrained in building this and using them if they
choose under arms control treaties. How many arms control
treaties do we have with communist China?
General Cotton. Zero.
Senator Cotton. Zero. So China is not constrained at all in
building every kind of nuclear weapon it wants. In fact, it is
on a crash course, especially in building missile fields in
China. Is that correct?
General Cotton. That is correct.
Senator Cotton. What do you think China's appetite is to
enter some nuclear arms control agreement, say, like the New
START treaty?
General Cotton. I would hope they would want to come to the
table, but my first comment stands.
Senator Cotton. They haven't. Yes, so hope is not a
strategy and they haven't manifested much desire to come to the
table. Even if they did, do you think China would ever accept
an arms control agreement that left them with fewer warheads
and delivery systems than either Russia or the United States
had?
General Cotton. No, that I couldn't answer.
Senator Cotton. I mean, if I were the leader of China, I
don't think I would accept that, and if you did assume that
let's say China accepted some constraint like the New START
treaty, that would mean by definition that China and Russia
together had significant overmatch against the United States in
warheads and delivery systems.
So I just think that the idea that we are restraining
ourself from building the nuclear forces that we need to deter
both Russia and China is the height of folly. I know you are
not responsible for that, but I think your question--your
answers here have illuminated. General Dickinson, I want to
turn to you.
I have a question about the commercial integration cell. I
think as the security environment has grown more complex, it is
necessary for our military to work with partner to share
information--partners in industry to share information and
collaborate on new capabilities.
You have led the way with your commercial integration cell.
Could you just discuss the status of that cell, and the
successes you have had, and the lessons you have learned that
we might buildupon, especially in the other combatant commands.
General Dickinson. Senator, that is a bright spot within
the command. Over the last three and a half years, we have
taken our relationships with commercial industry and have
expanded it.
We have actually had such a bow wave, of commercial
companies wanting to come participate with us and be part of
the team. We actually had to rewrite our strategy so we would
have the appropriate framework in order to onboard commercial
companies that want to be part of the Command. They perform two
primary functions within the Command from a commercial
perspective.
One is satellite communications, and the other one is space
domain awareness. So currently we have got ten partners,
commercial partners out at Vandenberg Space Force Base,
traditional satcom type of capabilities that they provide to
us. In Colorado Springs, we have what we call the Joint Task
Force Space Defense commercial operation cell.
They are a group of contractors that provide space domain
awareness, telescopes, radars that can look deep into space and
report back to us what they see. That has actually been a very
promising enterprise there as we continue to grow that. That is
actually where we have actually had a lot of growth with our
allies and partners.
So, our allies and partners around the world want to
participate in that particular space domain awareness function.
What is good about that particular capability is it is
unclassified. So, our obstacles to classification barriers,
etcetera, we don't see that with that particular cell.
It is growing. We are getting more and more partners, and
allies and partners as well as commercial companies. We
actually exercise that capability during an exercise we call
Global Sentinel, which actually has 24 of our partners and
allies around the world that participate in that.
We go through various scenarios on space debris mitigation,
but it is growing and we have got interest in the allies and
partners to participate and contribute more to it.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you. Gentlemen, thank you both
for your service, and thanks to you and all the troops who
serve in your commands. What you do is deadly serious business.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Cotton. We will
adjourn the open hearing and reconvene in SVC-217, and let's
say in 15 minutes, so give everybody a chance to rest and
recuperate. Also, we have to vote. With that, the open portion
of the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
nuclear modernization
1. Senator Shaheen. General Cotton, a January 2023 GAO report
expressed concerns with the lack of a scheduled risk analysis for the
Navy's Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program. Is it
your understanding that this analysis will be performed and what role
would STRATCOM's equities be represented in addition to the Navy's?
General Cotton. Defer to the Navy for specific Columbia
programmatic schedule risk issues. United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) is following the Columbia's construction status very
closely, and routinely engages the Navy on risk mitigation efforts and
challenges to meeting Columbia's delivery schedule. If Columbia
experiences a delay, there is a moderate risk the Navy will be unable
to meet USSTRATCOM's SSBN at-sea requirements for a period of time
during the Ohio to Columbia transition in the 2030's.
2. Senator Shaheen. General Cotton, can you provide an update on
the expected timeline for the Columbia-class ballistic missile
submarine program?
General Cotton. Defer to the Navy for specific programmatic
timeline issues. As I understand, the Navy is pursuing an accelerated
78-month hull construction schedule. Current construction progress,
while behind this 78-month accelerated schedule, is still ahead of the
84-month threshold schedule. I anticipate the Navy will meet Columbia's
first operational deployment of calendar year 2031.
3. Senator Shaheen. General Cotton, if delays to the program are
anticipated, what do you understand are the causes of the delays and
how is USSTRATCOM prepared to address the delay to maintain a reliable
nuclear deterrent?
General Cotton. Defer to the Navy for specific programmatic issues.
I have established a Nuclear Recapitalization and Transition Cross-
Functional Team to assess and identify options to reduce the risks
associated with the Triad and nuclear command, control, and
communications (NC3) modernization transition. USSTRATCOM will continue
to work with the Services to mitigate operational impacts resulting
from possible timeline delays. Potential mitigation measures include
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles on intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and/or extending select Ohio-class
submarines for an additional 36 months through Pre-Inactivation
Restricted Availabilities (PIRAs). PIRA should be seen as an
opportunity to extend select candidate Ohio-class hulls if there are
delays in Columbia fielding.
usspacecom basing
4. Senator Shaheen. General Dickinson, has USSPACECOM been
successfully achieving hiring milestones for the command's civilian
hiring process?
General Dickinson. U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) headquarters
grew from 137 funded civilian positions in fiscal year 2021 to 681
funded civilian positions in fiscal year 2023. Currently, 417 civilian
positions in the headquarters are filled, or 61 percent. We have 103
hiring actions in work that will be completed in the next 6 weeks,
yielding 520 in place (76 percent) with 4 months left in the current
fiscal year. The lack of a final basing decision has caused some
individuals to turn down job offers, and the command has a 5 percent
civilian attrition rate over the last 12 months due to people leaving
for other positions in the Colorado Springs area.
5. Senator Shaheen. General Dickinson, do you expect a USSPACECOM
Headquarters basing move from Colorado Springs, Colorado to Huntsville,
Alabama to pose a challenge to USSPACECOM's ability to effectively meet
civilian workforce hiring needs?
General Dickinson. Once a final decision is made, I anticipate no
shortage of qualified civilian or contractor employees wherever the
headquarters is based. If the decision is to relocate, then we will be
smart and deliberate about the process to avoid the potential and/or
mitigate the impact of an involuntary separation of civilian personnel.
6. Senator Shaheen. General Dickinson, does the existing workforce
in Huntsville have capabilities needed to support a basing Headquarters
move?
General Dickinson. I believe it does. Given the large science,
technology, engineering, and math (STEM) base in Huntsville, I
anticipate no shortage of qualified civilian or contractor employees in
Huntsville.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth A. Warren
future use of unfunded priorities lists (upls)
7. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, do you agree that
if funding is needed for a project, it should be a part of the command/
service budget?
General Cotton. Yes. USSTRATCOM works with the Department of
Defense (DOD) to identify priorities for inclusion into the annual
budget process.
General Dickinson. The President's Budget represents the highest
Department of Defense (DOD) priorities and includes many of my own
priorities. However, the need to fund critical investments in other
domains meant several space priorities fell below the cutline, and it
is my duty to communicate what space capabilities are delayed or at
risk due to insufficient resourcing. Space currently represents a small
fraction of the defense budget--easily overshadowed by the budgets of
the other services, but all the services, our Allies, partners, and the
civilian sector rely on space. This dependency is irreversible, and our
adversaries are fully aware of this reliance on space. Space is
critical to operations globally, demonstrated by the strong overlap
with ADM Aquilino's U.S. Indo-Pacific Command UPL. These investments in
space will also benefit our partners in Europe, Africa, the Middle
East, and the Americas.
8. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, historically, have
previous UPL items been included in the following year's base budget?
Have UPL items from fiscal year 2023 been included in the fiscal year
2024 base budget? If yes, please provide detail including the requested
item, funding amount, and vendor executing the effort. If no, why not?
General Cotton. USSTRATCOM did not submit a specific UPL item for
fiscal year 2023.
General Dickinson. USSPACECOM's fiscal year 2023 UPL requests were
included in the fiscal year 2024 base budget.
Fiscal year 2023 UPL items included in fiscal year 2024 budget
(executing vendors TBD): National Space Defense Center Service
Responsibilities:
fiscal year 2023 upl items included in fiscal year 2024 budget
(executing vendors tbd):
National Space Defense Center Service Responsibilities:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
APPN ($ K) 2023 UPL 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 FYDP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
O&M $36,900 $14,872 $15,385 $15,897 $16,410 $17,436 $80,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consolidated Space Operation Facility Fit-out:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
APPN ($ K) 2023 UPL 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 FYDP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
O&M $19,200 $12,964 $12,610 $11,761 $11,136 $17,635 $66,106
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proc $9,400 $26,994 $79,529 $28,017 $7,530 $2,547 $144,617
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, do you agree that
Federal agencies have to make tough decisions in regards to their
priorities and budget?
General Cotton. Yes. However, changes in the strategic environment
may drive emerging requirements outside of the normal budget cycle. In
this case, the DOD would need to assess the requirement and determine
if additional funding is required.
General Dickinson. My ability to conduct operations in space are
directly linked to the readiness of forces presented to USSPACECOM by
the Service Chiefs and other agencies. We acknowledge Service and
Agency Chiefs must balance manpower, facilities, and weapon systems
readiness with fiscal responsibility. I commit to being a good steward
of the forces presented to me and will execute my responsibilities in
the space domain.
information on upls
10. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, what was the cost
of putting together this wish list?
General Cotton. The estimated cost of this report for the DOD is
approximately $6,400 in DOD labor. The USSTRATCOM UPL was developed and
submitted in accordance with existing law, and the anticipated workload
is planned as part of our normal business operations and program
prioritization process.
General Dickinson. There were no additional costs to complete the
USSPACECOM UPL beyond the personnel time devoted to this effort.
For each item on the unfunded priorities list you submit in
response to 10 U.S.C. 222a, please provide the following information:
11. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, what is the
description of this UPL?
General Cotton. USSTRATCOM submitted two unfunded priority items
for fiscal year 2024 related to NC3: Enhanced Polar System--
Recapitalization (EPS-R) Strategic Capability and a classified program.
Please see classified response for additional information.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
12. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, what does the UPL
purchase? (Include all end items with quantities, contractor FTEs,
etc.)
General Cotton. [Deleted.]
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
13. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, what specific
capability will the UPL provide?
General Cotton. [Deleted.]
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
14. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, what gap will
this fill that is not in the base budget?
General Cotton. [Deleted.]
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
15. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, how will this
capability support objectives outlined in current National Security,
Military, and Defense Strategy documents?
General Cotton. If funded, both USSTRATCOM UPL items will support
NC3 modernization, which enhances strategic deterrence.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
16. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, what is the
operational requirement? How does this UPL support current or future
operations?
General Cotton. The operational requirement is to provide assured
command, control, and communications to nuclear forces. Both
capabilities expand and modernize our ability to execute, terminate,
and recall nuclear forces.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
17. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, what is the
operational impact if this UPL is not funded in fiscal year 2024?
General Cotton. [Deleted.]
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
18. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, are there plans
to include this item in the fiscal year 2025 base budget?
General Cotton. United States Space Force (USSF) and the United
States Navy (USN) are responsible for funding these programs. Based on
requirements, USSTRATCOM is aggressively advocating for these UPL item
capabilities in their ongoing fiscal year 2025 budget discussions.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
19. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, why was this UPL
not included in the fiscal year 2024 President's Budget submission?
General Cotton. As the Commander of USSTRATCOM, it is my
responsibility to set requirements for the capabilities we need;
however, the Department must balance requirements across the joint
force with finite resources. The final list of what is included in the
fiscal year 2024 budget is ultimately determined by the President and
is then transmitted to the Department via the Office of Management and
Budget.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
20. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, what is the name
of the vendor(s) executing this effort? Sub-vendor(s)?
General Cotton. As the Commander of USSTRATCOM, I have no
acquisition authorities.
Raytheon is the vendor that would support the EPS-R Strategic
Capability. Defer to USSF for specific vendor questions.
The classified UPL item is not yet a program of record and is
currently managed by the USN. Defer to USN for specific vendor
questions.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
21. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, how often has
your command met with the vendor executing this effort?
General Cotton. As the Commander of USSTRATCOM, I have no
acquisition authorities. However, Command subject matter experts may
attend program meetings sponsored by USSF related to the EPS-R
Strategic Capability UPL item, at which vendor representatives may be
present. Defer to USSF for additional information.
General Dickinson. USSPACECOM works with Program Offices for
program information and does not meet directly with vendors to discuss
programmatic details. Information on vendor relationships is provided
from the perspective of the Program Office and is contained in the
classified annex.
22. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, what is your
relationship history with this vendor?
General Cotton. As the Commander of USSTRATCOM, I have no
acquisition authorities. It is my responsibility to set requirements
for the capabilities we need; however, I depend on the Services to
execute acquisition authorities to deliver these capabilities.
Over the course of my career, I have likely interacted with
Raytheon or its subsidiaries on a number of DOD programs as part of my
official duties. As the Commander of USSTRATCOM, I have not had any
relationship with Raytheon regarding EPS-R Strategic Capability.
The classified UPL item is not yet a program of record and is
currently managed by the USN. Defer to USN for specific vendor
questions.
General Dickinson. USSPACECOM works with Program Offices for
program information and does not meet directly with vendors to discuss
programmatic details. Information on vendor relationships is provided
from the perspective of the Program Office and is contained in the
classified annex.
23. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, has anyone who
formerly worked for your command represented the vendor in meetings?
What is their name, what was their position, and when did you meet with
them?
General Cotton. USSTRATCOM does not formally track whether anyone
who
formerly worked for the Command has represented a vendor in meetings
related to EPS-R Strategic Capability conducted by program offices that
are not part of USSTRATCOM. To date, we have not received inquiries
from a contracting officer within the program offices noting concerns
related to the representational activities of former USSTRATCOM
personnel in the context of the EPS-R Strategic Capability. USSTRATCOM
has a robust ethics training program to help current and departing
employees understand post-government employment rules, financial
conflicts of interests, and rules regarding meetings with industry.
USSTRATCOM attorneys routinely provide ethics counsel to current and
former employees about these matters.
The classified UPL item is not yet a program of record and is
currently managed by the USN. Defer to USN for specific vendor
questions.
General Dickinson. USSPACECOM works with Program Offices for
program information and does not meet directly with vendors to discuss
programmatic details. Information on vendor relationships is provided
from the perspective of the Program Office and is contained in the
classified annex.
24. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, in which city/
State will the UPL be executed?
General Cotton. Defer to the USSF and USN.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
25. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, is this
requirement on an existing contract? If so, with who? What is the
history of the contract?
General Cotton. Defer to the USSF and USN.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
26. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, what is the
anticipated contract award date if the UPL receives funding?
General Cotton. Defer to the USSF and USN.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
27. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, what funding
lines are associated with this UPL?
General Cotton. The research, development, testing, and evaluation
(RDT&E) funding line for EPS-R Strategic Capability is 1206432SF.
For the classified UPL item, there are two funding lines: (1) RDT&E
line 0604280N and (2) Other Procurement, Navy funding lines 0742 and
3130.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
28. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, if multiple
appropriations fund this requirement, must all appropriations be funded
simultaneously to source this requirement, or can each appropriation
stand on its own to fund a portion of the requirement?
General Cotton. All appropriations must be funded simultaneously to
complete the capability.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
29. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, how much was
enacted and obligated (or expended for RDT&E) in fiscal year 2022 to
2023 for this requirement?
General Cotton. Defer to the USSF and USN.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
30. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, how much was
requested in fiscal year 2024 for this requirement?
General Cotton. The USSTRATCOM fiscal year 2024 UPL requested $17.9
million for EPS-R Strategic Capability, and $28.3 million for the
classified item.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
31. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, is there a tail
associated with this UPL?
General Cotton. Yes.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
32. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, is any tail
funded in the future years defense plan?
General Cotton. No.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
33. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, please describe
how much the requirement will cost per year for the next 5 years.
General Cotton. Please see table below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Defense Plan
Program Name 2024 ($ 2025 ($ 2026 ($ 2027 ($ 2028 ($ Total ($
millions) millions) millions) millions) millions) millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPS-R Strategic $17.9 $33.3 $21.9 $7.4 $0.0 $80.5
Capability
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Classified Item $28.3 $119.7 $140.1 $146.1 $135.6 $569.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
34. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, please provide in
detail the previous funding requests and enacted for this requirement,
including if it was in the base budget or UPL.
General Cotton. USSTRATCOM has not submitted either item in a
previous UPL request. Defer to the USSF and USN for base budget
details.
EPS-R Strategic Capability UPL item request leverages an existing
program. No previous budget--request exists for this particular UPL
item issue. Please see classified response for additional information.
The fiscal year 2023 budget provided $20.0 million in RDT&E funding
to develop and test the classified UPL item.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
35. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, if the
requirement is not included in the future years defense plan, will that
be rectified in the next Program Objective Memorandum or the Program,
Planning, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) cycle?
General Cotton. This will be determined during future DOD budget
deliberations.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
36. Senator Warren. General Cotton and Dickinson, please provide
photos of this requirement for visual aid.
General Cotton. EPS-R Strategic Capability
No picture available for the classified UPL item.
General Dickinson. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
artificial intelligence
37. Senator Manchin. General Cotton, how are novel technologies
like artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, hypersonic, cyber, and
space-related systems changing the worldwide nuclear risk environment?
How is the growing prevalence of these technologies affect U.S. nuclear
strategy, deterrence, and R&D?
General Cotton. Novel technologies challenge our traditional
warning paradigms, constrain our decision space, and present a risk of
strategic surprise. Our adversaries are making large investments in
these areas because they know that it can create unique challenges for
the United States and its Allies. As the ubiquity of data and speed of
decisionmaking continue to increase, Allies and adversaries alike could
feel pressure to delegate key decisionmaking functions to machines,
which could produce unpredictable results if systems are not
appropriately designed, tested, and used. An adversary who devises an
unanticipated means of threatening our strategic capabilities or our
homeland may lose its incentive for restraint and become emboldened to
act in a future crisis or conflict. While the risk of miscalculation
has been a concern of strategic conflict since the beginning of the
nuclear age, the rapid evolution and application of novel technologies
over the coming decades could increase that risk. DOD has been a leader
in trying to ensure novel technologies do not undermine strategic
stability. For example, in February the United States announced a
Political Declaration on the Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence
in the Military Domain that creates strong norms surrounding the
development and use of AI and autonomy in all military systems. It
reiterates the commitment we publicized in our Nuclear Posture Review
to have a human ``in the loop'' for all actions critical to informing
and executing decisions by the President to initiate and terminate
nuclear weapon employment.
The fundamentals of deterrence have not changed, and our tailored
approach remains sound. We will deter though safe, secure, and
effective nuclear forces enabling country-specific strategies and
plans, extended deterrence commitments, and an integrated deterrence
approach incorporating suitable non-nuclear capabilities tailored to
specific threat scenarios.
As our Allies and adversaries invest in these novel technologies,
so must we. The National Defense Strategy states the Department will
support innovation and fuel R&D for advanced capabilities, such as
directed energy, hypersonics, and cyber, as well as seed opportunities
to include biotechnology, quantum science, and advanced materials. DOD
will follow market forces driving military-relevant capabilities (e.g.,
artificial intelligence, microelectronics, space) and continue to
develop operational models that expand U.S. options and constrain those
of potential adversaries. Furthermore, the Department will explore
employment concepts, integrate new technologies, experiment with
creative applications, and share, as appropriate, asymmetric
capabilities with Allies and partners.
foreign intelligence surveillance act (fisa)
38. Senator Manchin. General Dickinson, I understand that SPACECOM
is developing a series of contingency plans for protecting the U.S. and
allied satellites and tasking the intelligence community for an
increased emphasis on foreign space intentions, especially by Russia
and China. This year, Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) will be up for reauthorization. Title VII
established procedures governing the targeting, for intelligence-
gathering purposes-of non-U.S. persons located abroad. They also
established statutory and procedural protections regarding surveillance
of U.S. persons located outside the United States. What impact would a
failure to reauthorize Title VII have in SPACECOM's collection
requirements for the IC on collection against foreign space intentions?
General Dickinson. Section 702 allows the Intelligence community to
collect the communications of many of our most critical foreign
intelligence targets located outside of the United States who use U.S.
infrastructure and services to communicate. It has helped us to
understand the strategic intentions of the foreign governments we are
most interested in, like the People's Republic of China, Russia, Iran,
and North Korea. This authority is vital to keeping the Nation safe and
I urge Congress to re-authorize Section 702 prior to it lapsing this
coming December.
39. Senator Manchin. General Cotton, it is my understanding that
China's nuclear force, while still smaller in size compared to the
U.S., is modernizing and expanding faster than any other country. Also,
China appears to be pursuing other potentially destabilizing systems,
such as a nuclear-capable hypersonic fractional orbital bombardment
capability. What role does intelligence play in helping us understand
China's capabilities and how does Title VII play a role in enabling us
to closely assess China's nuclear force structure and posture?
General Cotton. [Deleted.]
space domain awareness
40. Senator Manchin. General Dickinson, you mentioned utilizing
civilian assets for space domain awareness. Can you confirm SPACECOM is
utilizing the Green Bank Telescope for this purpose, and if so how has
this asset performed for so far?
General Dickinson. USSPACECOM has used the Green Bank Telescope to
support space tracking efforts. A contract is not currently in place
for further use; however, the Telescope has proven valuable to the
space domain awareness mission. The command is in contact with the
Green Bank Telescope for future space tracking discussions.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky S. Rosen
stem outreach programs
41. Senator Rosen. General Cotton and General Dickinson, what are
STRATCOM and SPACECOM's current STEM outreach efforts, particularly in
cybersecurity, and how do you plan to grow them to keep up with the
defense workforce needs of the future?
General Cotton. STEM talent is in high demand across the country.
My human capital team leads several initiatives to include innovative
hiring practices and a robust intern program to attract talent for our
important mission. USSTRATCOM is considering adopting Cyber Excepted
Service, a personnel framework that allows added flexibility in hiring
and compensation to attract and retain top cyber talent. Similarly, we
have a legislative proposal to obtain Acquisition Demo authority. If
approved, this authority would provide simplified job classification,
streamlined hiring processes, and pay flexibilities. Our Joint Warfare
Analysis Center uses its designation as a ``lab demo'' to compete for
talent in the National Capital Region with pay flexibility, a
laboratory bonus program, and expedited hiring practices that reduce
hiring times by 84 percent.
Not only does USSTRATCOM compete for proven talent, we expanded our
STEM opportunities for college students through multiple internship
programs. Several of our previous internships have led to full-time
positions for young, innovative talent, giving us the opportunity to
grow top talent from the ground up.
From an outreach perspective, my technology leaders have pushed
hard to highlight the important work we're doing and the need for
industry and academia to be a part of our future success. We published
our science and technology top issues to academia, national
laboratories, and industry, leading to a highly productive industry day
with some of the top minds in the business looking for innovative
solutions to our toughest challenges. Through the Services, we pursue
opportunities to advance the use of artificial intelligence and machine
learning to accelerate our ability to analyze the risk of strategic
deterrence failure and more quickly leverage changes in adversary force
posture. We continue to seek methods to improve our decision advantage
through cutting-edge technologies and a talented workforce that can
lead the way.
We have a collaborative relationship with a number of research
entities comprised of universities, federally funded research and
development centers, and national laboratories through the Department
of Energy. As an example, we work with the University of Nebraska to
identify innovative possibilities that can accelerate advancements in
NC3 and cybersecurity. Through my strategic engagement process, I
personally support inspiring the next generation of strategic force
leaders who will need strong STEM skills to oversee modernization of
the Triad, and my staff is active in many off-base organizations that
promote STEM.
General Dickinson. People are the most important part of any
organization, and we are recruiting from the broadest talent pool
available to enable the strategic advantages derived from diversity of
thought and perspective. Our command partnering with National Security
Space Institute, U.S. Space Force's Space Training and Readiness
Command, and other space training stakeholders. These partnerships help
develop a Command Cyber Workforce training pipeline in accordance with
DOD Manual 8140.03 Cyberspace Workforce Qualification and Management
Program guidance. Similarly, my team recently stood up USSPACECOM's
Academic Engagement Enterprise, akin to U.S. Cyber Command's Academic
Engagement Network, this enterprise will enhance workforce
professionalization through participation in space and STEM academic
programs and increase space applied research and innovation through
university partnerships. To date we have 20 member institutions,
including Tier-1 research universities like the University of Arizona,
the University of Colorado-Boulder, Georgia Tech, and Purdue
University.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark E. Kelly
space-qualified traveling wave tubes (twts) and traveling wave tube
amplifiers (twtas)
42. Senator Kelly. General Dickinson, the Administration's ``Space
Priorities Framework'' set a strategic goal of making sure our domestic
space industrial base is secure by strengthening the supply chains it
supports. Over the last few years, the DOD has found that the U.S.
domestic industrial base for a key satellite component is insufficient.
Those components are called space-qualified Traveling Wave Tubes (TWTs)
and Traveling Wave Tube Amplifiers (TWTAs). They are highly engineered
components and are critical to many essential national security,
civilian, and game-changing commercial satellites. While China has
greatly expanded its ability to produce these components, in the West
only two companies produce them. One is a small American company, and
the other is a much larger foreign provider that is heavily subsidized
by its government. This prevents the American company from competing
for opportunities, and impedes the development of a broader United
States domestic industrial base for these components--creating supply
chain risk. Last year, to help establish a globally competitive U.S.
domestic source for next-generation, space-qualified tubes and
amplifiers, I introduced an amendment to the NDAA that would leverage
the National Technology & Industrial Base (NTIB)--a construct that
Congress developed precisely for reasons like this. Despite support
from the Defense Department, process hurdles prevented us from adopting
it. Do you agree that establishing a globally competitive U.S. domestic
source for next-generation, high-powered, space-qualified traveling
wave tubes and amplifiers is necessary for the DOD to obtain these
critical components at high quality, on time, and at a reasonable
price?
General Dickinson. Obtaining high quality critical space components
on time is necessary to maintaining a resilient space architecture.
Whether critical components are sourced domestically or through our
closely aligned Allies and partners, timely and affordable acquisition
is essential to the development and integration of space capabilities.
While domestically sourced components can reduce both timelines and
costs, expanding critical component access by leveraging our
international Allies also adds to our Nation's supply chain resiliency.
43. Senator Kelly. General Dickinson-do you agree Congress can be a
partner in supporting DOD's access to a strong supply chain?
General Dickinson. Supply chain strength and security are critical
pieces of ensuring the resilience of future space architectures. We
support all efforts by Congress and the services in acquiring those
capabilities and working with industry to ensure the security of our
supply chain. The ingenuity of America's space industry is one of our
greatest strengths, and we should take the necessary steps to secure
it.
space force national guard
44. Senator Kelly. General Dickinson, how many Air National Guard
Space Professionals are currently deployed or on a status supporting
Combatant Command Requirements?
General Dickinson. There are 34 Air National Guard members on long-
term Active Duty for Operational Support (ADOS) orders with
Headquarters, USSPACECOM, 16 of whom are Space Professionals.
USSPACECOM currently employs 109 total Guard and Reserve Joint
servicemembers on ADOS orders to effectively meet the command's
requirements. The Air National Guard has 11 organizations with a total
of 729 authorizations performing mission support for USSPACECOM.
Currently, there are 17 Space Professional Guardsmen deployed overseas
in direct support of USSPACECOM missions.
45. Senator Kelly. General Dickinson, what would be the mission
impacts if you did not have Air National Guard Space Professionals
supporting Combatant Command Requirements?
General Dickinson. Active, Guard, and Reserve components bring
important capabilities to bear in defense of the Nation. All USSPACECOM
missions are inherently Federal missions, so forces presented to us
come to us as Title 10 forces. From my perspective as the commander
operationally employing those forces, it is transparent to me whether
any particular servicemember comes to us as an Active Duty member, as a
Title 10 reservist, or as a Guardsman mobilized to Title 10. At
USSPACECOM, they are all Title 10 space professionals. I defer to the
services and the department on how best they organize the components
that present forces to USSPACECOM.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni K. Ernst
deterrence posture
46. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, in a post-New START environment,
should the United States prepare to upload its non-deployed nuclear
weapons to shore up deterrence? Please provide an unclassified answer
to the extent possible; please provide an additional classified answer
if necessary.
General Cotton. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recognizes
that, depending on the security environment, changes in U.S. strategy
and force posture may be required to sustain the ability to achieve
deterrence, assurance, and employment objectives. As the strategic
environment changes, we must continue to reexamine our strategy and
force posture to ensure the Triad and related capabilities are
appropriately configured.
We must sustain and modernize the Triad, NC3, and infrastructure
(to include our forward-deployed stockpile and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization dual-capable aircraft). We must maintain a viable,
flexible, and full-spectrum strategic deterrent that paces the threat
and is able to respond to changes in the security environment.
47. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, how quickly can the United
States upload each leg of the Triad? Please provide an unclassified
answer to the extent possible; please provide an additional classified
answer if necessary.
General Cotton. [Deleted.]
48. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, are there policies or
regulations related to how quickly the United States can upload each
leg of the Triad? Please provide an unclassified answer to the extent
possible; please provide an additional classified answer if necessary.
General Cotton. The 2022 NPR states that while we retain the
capability to upload a portion of the ICBM force, we continue to
configure these missiles with only one warhead day-to-day. The NPR also
affirms that we will field and maintain strategic nuclear delivery
systems and deployed weapons in compliance with New START. Beyond this,
there are no policies or regulations limiting our ability to upload
weapons on any leg of the Triad, as long as the aggregate totals do not
exceed the New START central limits.
49. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, in your personal opinion, in
general, would placing a portion of the bomber force in heightened
alert statuses increase its flexibility? Please provide an unclassified
answer to the extent possible; please provide an additional classified
answer if necessary.
General Cotton. Absent a crisis or conflict, no. The cost of
placing a portion of the bomber force into a heightened alert status
decreases overall readiness with marginal increase in responsiveness/
survivability. Any long-term heightened alert status would drive
significant costs, stretching the maintenance force and air crews to
unsustainable limits. Additionally, based on the current force
structure, ongoing modernization efforts, and the integrated deterrence
strategy of the United States, placing bombers on alert would actually
decrease overall flexibility as it limits my ability to support other
operations across the spectrum of competition. The Department, in
conjunction with the intelligence community, will continue to fully
exploit the indications and warning network to ensure the Nation can
flex and respond to any crisis in a timely and decisively manner.
Please see classified response for additional information.
50. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, in your verbal testimony, you
said you could increase the bomber force's flexibility without
adjusting alert statuses; what other measures would you use to increase
the flexibility of the bomber force? Please provide an unclassified
answer to the extent possible; please provide an additional classified
answer if necessary.
General Cotton. Measures to increase the flexibility of the bomber
force without adjusting alert status include: increasing the number of
B-2 and B-52 crews to increase operational flexibility; increasing the
number of available tankers; and increasing forward-based maintenance
capability to support persistent and episodic global presence while
retaining the ability to increase nuclear readiness.
51. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, in your personal opinion, in
general, would forward stationing dual capable aircraft increase the
flexibility of the nuclear deterrent? Please provide an unclassified
answer to the extent possible; please provide an additional classified
answer if necessary.
General Cotton. These actions could offer an increase in
flexibility. More detailed research across multiple departments is
necessary to weigh the gains in flexibility against impacts to
strategic stability and financial costs to the DOD (in aircraft,
required supporting infrastructure, etc.).
52. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, in your personal opinion, in
general, would moving some of the ICBM force to mobile platforms
increase survivability? Please provide an unclassified answer to the
extent possible; please provide an additional classified answer if
necessary.
General Cotton. This type of analysis was conducted previously and
resulted in a decision to pursue the silo-based Sentinel system.
However, a mobile capability could potentially increase ICBM
survivability. We must take a holistic perspective regarding how the
survivability of the system may evolve over its lifetime and then
balance those findings against the operational concept and associated
costs to make an informed decision.
53. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, in your personal opinion, in
general, would deploying SLCM-N expand our at-sea deterrent? Please
provide an unclassified answer to the extent possible; please provide
an additional classified answer if necessary.
General Cotton. A low-yield, non-ballistic nuclear capability to
deter, assure, and respond without visible generation (similar to the
characteristics of SLCM-N) offers additional options and supports an
integrated deterrence approach. It is one of several possible nuclear
or conventional capabilities the U.S. could develop to enhance
strategic deterrence. I support funding to assess the full range of
possible options to address this challenge in a rapidly changing
security environment with the backdrop of multiple nuclear adversaries.
54. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, in your personal opinion, in
general, would deploying ground-based, theater-range nuclear forces
bolster our deterrent? Please provide an unclassified answer to the
extent possible; please provide an additional classified answer if
necessary.
General Cotton. I am currently satisfied with U.S. strategy and
capabilities with respect to forward-deployed nuclear forces on Allied
territory. As the strategic environment changes, we must continue to
reexamine our strategy and force posture to ensure the Triad and
related capabilities are appropriately configured.
55. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, in your personal opinion, would
you recommend retaining the B83, at least until identifying a
capability that meets requirements for hard and deeply buried targets?
General Cotton. I support retaining the B83-1 as stipulated in the
Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) until a
suitable replacement capability for defeating hard and deeply buried
targets (HDBTs) can be identified. We can maintain the B83-1 for a few
years; however, when the B-2 retires, it will no longer have a delivery
platform. My staff is participating in the Department's response to the
Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA mandated HDBT study, which will examine the full
range of capabilities required to counter HDBTs. We look forward to the
results.
sclm-n
56. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, the 2018 NPR started an Analysis
of Alternatives for the SLCM-N. Could you describe that analysis and
whether any alternatives fit military requirements better than SLMC-N?
Please provide an unclassified answer to the extent possible; please
provide an additional classified answer if necessary.
General Cotton. The Navy completed an Analysis of Alternatives
(AOA) and the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
determined the AOA was sufficient. I support any option that provides a
low-yield, non-ballistic nuclear capability to deter, assure, and
respond without visible generation.
Defer to the Navy for specific outcomes related to the SLCM-N AOA.
space policy
57. Senator Ernst. General Dickinson, what are the current policies
in place to identify what behaviors and actions in space constitute an
act of war? Please provide an unclassified answer to the extent
possible; please provide an additional classified answer if necessary.
General Dickinson. The issue of what constitutes an ``act of war''
in space is governed by international law, just as it is in every
domain. Like cyberspace, space is a newly contested domain with few
historical examples available to make such determinations. Article 2(4)
of the United Nations Charter prohibits the use or threat of force
against territorial integrity and political independence, except under
certain circumstances like self-defense under Article 51 of the
Charter. In the space domain, determinations of what constitutes an
unlawful use of force can be difficult. This is primarily due to the
unique nature of the space domain and associated challenges in
developing situational awareness to identify actions and discern
intent.
USSPACECOM is an active participant in supporting the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy and Department of State in
establishing norms of responsible behaviors in Space. While not legally
binding as rules under international law, the Secretary of Defense's
Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space and the recently released
Tenet-Derived Responsible Behaviors are designed to help mitigate the
risk of miscalculation and improve communication and predictability.
pace-faring nations could help to ensure the safety, security, and
sustainability of the space domain.
58. Senator Ernst. General Dickinson, how can the United States
improve policies to address behaviors and actions in space to determine
acts of war?
General Dickinson. First and foremost, adherence to the rule of law
in outer space is paramount. The existing legal framework, notably, the
Outer Space Treaty and the United Nations Charter, govern space-faring
nations' activities in outer space and prohibit the unlawful use of
force. The recently issued Department of Defense Tenets of Responsible
Behavior for Outer Space and the United States' commitment to not
conduct destructive direct ascent anti-satellite missile tests will
help with determinations of acts of war in space.
USSPACECOM is working closely with the office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy to develop meaningful policy
recommendations that support the establishment of norms and responsible
behaviors, ensure the National Space Policy imperative to preserve
space for peaceful use, and allow for flexible military employment
within the domain, when necessary.
capability revelation
59. Senator Ernst. General Dickinson, what is the framework by
which the Department of Defense evaluates U.S. national security space
capability revelations for deterrence?
General Dickinson. The DOD or Administration determine the policy
for when the United States reveals capabilities, including national
security space capabilities, to deter our competitors.
USSPACECOM implements those policies at the right time and place to
achieve strategic objectives.
60. Senator Ernst. General Dickinson, what is the process by which
USSPACECOM executes declassification of certain U.S.
General Dickinson. When the DOD or Administration make a policy
decision to reveal a national security space capability, USSPACECOM
will work with the original classification authority for the specified
capability to declassify the information necessary to achieve the
strategic objectives.
61. Senator Ernst. General Dickinson, where does the decision
authority rest for declassification or revelation of certain U.S.
national security space capabilities for deterrence?
General Dickinson. The decision to reveal a certain U.S. national
security space capability is a policy question and rests with the DOD
or Administration. The decision to classify or declassify information
related to the capabilities of a national security space asset rests
with the original classification authority.
62. Senator Ernst. General Dickinson, how can the United States
improve the declassification and revelation of certain U.S. national
security space capabilities to deter aggressive adversary behavior?
General Dickinson. As stated previously, the overall decision to
reveal national security space capabilities rests with the DOD or
Administration. The DOD and Administration synchronize these decisions
with other strategic level choices to achieve deterrence and national
goals.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan S. Sullivan
b-52j
63. Senator Sullivan. General Cotton, what new capabilities will
the Commercial Engine Replacement Program bring to the B-521 platform?
General Cotton. The Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP)
engines will provide increased range, more endurance, approximately 30
percent better fuel efficiency, and will require far fewer maintenance
hours. Along with new engines, CERP will replace associated subsystems,
such as engine struts and nacelles, the electrical power generation
system, and cockpit displays.
64. Senator Sullivan. General Cotton, will the B-521 be able to
employ the entire Air Force inventory of anti-ship missiles?
General Cotton. Defer to the Air Force for specifics on ordnance
load-out.
chinese nuclear-capable bombers and submarines
65. Senator Sullivan. General Cotton, how are the PRC's investments
in nuclear capable bombers and ballistic missile submarines impacting
your approach to deterrence?
General Cotton. Per the NPR, our tailored strategy for China is
that the United States will maintain a flexible deterrence strategy and
force posture that continues to clearly convey to the People's Republic
of China (PRC) that the United States will not be deterred from
defending our Allies and partners, or coerced into terminating a
conflict on unacceptable terms. We are addressing this challenge
through integrated deterrence--which spans all domains and capabilities
backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
This approach necessitates the modernization and sustainment of our
nuclear forces, NC3, and weapons infrastructure, and this remains the
Department's highest priority. The programmed modernization efforts are
the minimum necessary to meet the Nation's global security challenges.
Further, without proper sustainment of our legacy systems throughout
the modernization period, our nuclear deterrent will degrade.
b-2 retirement timeline
66. Senator Sullivan. General Cotton, is B-2 retirement tied to the
complete delivery of the B-21 order?
General Cotton. Defer to the Air Force on planning for the B-2
retirement.
67. Senator Sullivan. General Cotton, if B-2 retirement is not tied
to the complete delivery of the B-21 order, how may B-21s will be
operational when the last B-2 is retired?
General Cotton. Defer to the Air Force on planning on B-2 to B-21
transition milestones.
spacecom detection and tracking capabilities
68. Senator Sullivan. General Dickinson, how are SPACECOM's
detection and tracking capabilities changing to keep pace with
adversary threats?
General Dickinson. My number one operational priority is enhancing
existing and advocating for new Space Domain Awareness capabilities
allowing us to assess activities across the space domain. We are
working through the Department's requirements processes to communicate
our unique space domain awareness requirements that will allow us to
monitor potential threats and provide the necessary time to take
actions that protect our critical space assets. A key part of our
strategy is working very closely with industry partners who are
developing space domain awareness capabilities and leveraging their
investments.
69. Senator Sullivan. General Dickinson, how can SPACECOM assets to
identify objects, determine if they are threats like cruise or
hypersonic missiles, and hedge against Chinese attempts to confuse
ground-based missile defense radars?
General Dickinson. Space Domain Awareness is my highest priority,
and we have taken dramatic steps to improve our understanding of the
domain and guard against advanced threats.
USSPACECOM is designated as the Global Sensor Manager for the DOD.
In that role, we synchronize and prioritize sensors like space-based
satellites and ground-based radars assigned to the command. To improve
our coverage of advanced threats like cruise or hypersonic missiles,
USSPACECOM developed a strategy to integrate non-traditional sensors,
such as theater missile defense radars (e.g., AN/TPY-2), sea-based X-
band radars, and Aegis afloat capabilities. Proliferating information
sources and fusing those together cohesively is part of that strategy
to provide timely, accurate, and decision quality information to the
chain of command.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 2023
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AND UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m., in
room G-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shahee,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan,
Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. Good
morning, and the Committee meets today to receive testimony
from General Michael Eric Kurilla, Commander of the United
States Central Command (CENTCOM), and General Michael Langley,
Commander of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).
Thank you both for your service, and I am grateful to the
men and women serving under your command. While CENTCOM has
many responsibilities, the top priority remains deterring the
Iranian regime's destructive and destabilizing activities
without undue provocation. This is a complicated and urgent
mission.
Iran is conducting malign activities across multiple
arenas, including continuing its own nuclear development,
launching drone and missile attacks on neighboring States,
supporting proxy groups, violently repressing its own citizens,
and deepening a military alliance with Russia, and these
threats are likely to increase.
In an unexpected turn, last week, Saudi Arabia and Iran
announced they have restored diplomatic relations in a deal
brokered by China. Press reports indicate the key parts of the
agreement were a commitment by Iran to stop further attacks on
Saudi Arabia and cut back on support for Iranian linked groups
that have targeted the kingdom.
The two nations plan to reopen their embassies and
reimplement a security pact to cooperate on several issues to
benefit their mutual national security. As The New York Times
stated, the deal is, ``a shift that left heads spinning in
capitals around the globe.''
General Kurilla, given the unpredictability of the Iranian
regime, I would like your thoughts on how best to respond to
its malign behavior in the region, taking into account the new
dynamic of their restoration of relations with Saudi Arabia.
What opportunities do we have to collaborate with our allies
and partners to counter drone and missile attacks, and how can
we address Iran's closer alignment with Russia and China?
Turning to Afghanistan, although we have transitioned all
forces out of the country, the Biden administration has
maintained its commitment to ensuring that Afghanistan cannot
be used as a base for ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria],
al Qaeda, or other terrorist groups to conduct attacks against
the United States or its allies.
I would ask for an update on our posture and capabilities,
and whether additional regional agreements have been reached to
ensure we maintain a robust regional counterterrorism
architecture to address the threat from these groups. General
Langley, AFRICOM's area of responsibility (AOR) is becoming
increasingly important in the United States strategic
competition with China and Russia.
Many African countries have longstanding military ties with
Russia and even deeper economic ties with China. As the United
States manages relationships across the continent, we must be
mindful of these preexisting ties and avoid taking a with us or
against us approach, or we will risk alienating the very
nations we seek to engage with.
I would welcome your thoughts on how best to calibrate the
U.S. approach to strategic competition in light of these
factors. The security situation in East Africa remains
dangerously unstable. Since last fall, roughly 500 United
States servicemembers have been redeployed to Somalia to
support the Somali Government's fight against Al-Shabaab, one
of al Qaeda's most powerful global affiliates.
Our renewed presence is an effort to stabilize the Somali
Government and train their forces, after our departure in
December 2020 allowed Al-Shabaab to grow in size and strength.
I hope you will share your views on the status of our
engagement with Somali partners and the whole-of-government
strategy to ensure battlefield successes can be effectively
translated into longer term gains.
Finally, the security situation in West Africa also
continues to decline. Violent extremist operations have
expanded across the Sahel, including pushing down into littoral
states in the Gulf of Guinea. At the same time, Russia and
China are seeking to increase their engagement in this region.
The Wagner Group continues to seek opportunities to exploit
instability in the region, and China has made no secret about
exploring basing operations on the West African coast. Both
countries are also investing in natural resource extraction
across the continent, often at great expense to the long-term
health of African partners' ecosystems and economies.
Given these challenges, General Langley, I would like to
hear how AFRICOM is seeking to engage with partners in Africa
to expose these harmful and manipulative practices. I want to
thank you again and look forward to your testimony.
As a reminder for my colleagues, there will be a closed
session immediately following this hearing and room SVC-217.
Now, let me turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
thank our witnesses for being here. In recent weeks, the
Committee has heard from top military and civilian leaders
about the significant security challenges facing our Nation.
Our top adversaries, including China and Russia, are
testing American resolve, not just in East Asia and Europe, but
also across the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. In the
Middle East, Russia and Iran grow closer. Recently, Iran agreed
to purchase 24 advanced Su-35 fighter jets. Today, Russia is
deploying Iranian drones to kill Ukrainians.
Meanwhile, China works to displace the United States as the
partner of choice for many of our longtime friends in the
region. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) offers more
streamlined arms sales and Huawei 5G networks that would
undermine our operational security in the Middle East. In
Africa, the Russian mercenary group Wagner does--Wagner does
Putin's bidding.
They sow instability across the continent by supporting
coups and spreading lies. They use exploitative practices to
get critical minerals. They pressure African governments to
move away from the West. At the same time, China is using
economic coercion to gain leverage and expand its military
footprint in the basing, something former AFRICOM Commander
General Steven Townsend called his number one global power
competition concern.
We are right to focus on the growing Russia and Chinese
threats, but we cannot take our eyes off the other security
challenges coming from the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.
In Afghanistan, the disastrous withdrawal of United States
troops nearly 2 years ago left a security vacuum the Taliban,
al Qaeda and ISIS have filled.
The Biden administration assured us that the Department of
Defense (DOD) would conduct counterterrorism operations in
Afghanistan even without a limited number of United States
troops on the ground, but the United States has only conducted
one strike in more than a year. The withdrawal from Afghanistan
emboldened ISIS and al Qaeda's affiliates around the world, not
just in Afghanistan.
The terrorist threat is real and growing. As a result of
the Biden Administration's policies, the world's number one
State sponsor of terrorism, Iran, presents an increasing threat
to our personnel and partners in the region.
President Biden should have focused on countering Iran's
missile program and its support for terrorism. Instead, he
focused on returning to the flawed 2015 nuclear agreement. In
the process, this Administration has given them practically
everything and got absolutely nothing.
According to the Department of Defense, Iran could now
produce enough fissile material for a bomb within just 12 days,
and its proxies are on the march nationwide. These facts make
it clear continued significant real growth in the defense
budget top line above inflation remains essential to our
national security.
I will be looking closely to ensure our security assistance
funding remains strong in these theaters and that our
counterterrorism and contingency forces are fully resourced.
This includes additional force protection measures in both
theaters, particularly to protect against more complex Iranian
backed attacks.
I would also note that the budget zeroing out of LPD [low
probability of detection] amphibious ships is the exact wrong
move, when we did not even have the capacity to send one
amphibious ship to Turkey to help with their earthquake.
Finally, I am interested in how the Office of Strategic Capital
might be leveraged to push back against the CCP in these
theaters and elsewhere as they seek to buy ports and raw
materials across the globe.
I thank our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. General
Kurilla, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL E. KURILLA, USA COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
General Kurilla. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker,
ladies and gentlemen of the Committee, I am joined today by
Command Master Chief Derrick Walters, the Command Senior
Enlisted Leader of U.S. Central Command.
On behalf of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast
guardsmen, and guardians who serve this Command, the Central
Region, and this Nation every day, thank you for allowing me to
testify regarding the posture of U.S. Central Command,
alongside my ranger buddy, Mike Langley.
CENTCOM serves as the security integrator for an area of
responsibility that encompasses 21 nations, almost 600 million
people, and serves as the strategic nexus of the world's most
important corridors of trade. I am now 11 months into command.
In that time, I have made 14 trips to the region, and those
visits have allowed me first person insights that have informed
my strategic approach, which is best summarized in three words,
people, partners, and innovation.
People are our greatest asset and our most critical
resource. Our servicemembers and civilians in the United States
and across the region are our Nation's best. I know this body
keeps them top of mind that right now in the CENTCOM region,
thousands of troops are in harm's way.
Our people who are closest to the problem understand the
opportunities available to solve the region's most complex
challenges. That is why we rely so heavily on our partners. Our
partners are the Nations comparative advantage against
competitors like China and Russia.
Across CENTCOM, we cultivate deep abiding partnerships that
can serve as a hedge against the threats in the region, while
deterring Iran from its most destructive behavior. We have the
kind of relationships that elicit candid, sometimes tough,
conversations that result in solutions. These kind of
relationships make us the partner of choice in the region.
A critical component of that partnership is innovation,
innovation of thought, innovation of process, innovation of
concept and technology extends the value of the partnerships.
Innovation allows us to move faster, operate more efficiently,
and increase progress across all operational efforts.
This is more important now than any time in our history.
Forty years ago, the Department of Defense established CENTCOM
to counter the malign influence of a revolutionary regime that
seized power in Tehran and to compete with a great power in the
region, the Soviet Union. The organization's charter, directed
by this body, was to direct and enable military operations and
activities with allies and partners to increase regional
stability in support of enduring U.S. interests.
That mission remains essentially unchanged to this day.
Iran still remains the focus. We now battle violent extremist
groups who threaten the region and beyond. The Soviet Union has
been replaced with China and Russia as strategic competitors.
With these challenges, the CENTCOM region holds the greatest
risk of derailing the National Defense Strategy with a
flashpoint international incident that may demand a response
using unplanned resources and attention.
Today, CENTCOM priorities are to deter Iran, counter
violent extremist organizations, and compete strategically with
China and Russia. Four decades after CENTCOM's formation, Iran
remains the primary destabilizing element in the region. We
have seen rapid advances in Iranian military capability over
time.
The Iran of 2023 is not the Iran of 1983. In fact, today,
Iran is exponentially more capable than they were just 5 years
ago. Today, Iran possesses the largest and most diverse missile
arsenal in the Middle East, thousands of ballistic and cruise
missiles, many capable of striking anywhere in the Middle East.
Iran also maintains the largest and most capable UAV [unmanned
aerial vehicle] force in the region.
The regime continues to enrich and stockpile uranium far
above what is needed for commercial use, and Tehran can enrich
uranium far faster than it could even 2 years ago. An Iran with
a nuclear weapon would change the Middle East overnight and
forever. Iran's vast and deeply resourced proxy forces spread
instability throughout the region and threaten our regional
partners.
As Iran continues to stabilize the region, we continue to
fight against violent extremist organizations. In Syria, we put
pressure on ISIS alongside our Syrian Democratic Forces
partners. In Iraq, we advise, assist, and enable the Iraqi
security forces in their fight against ISIS. While ISIS has
significantly degraded in Iraq and Syria, the group maintains
the capability to conduct operations within the region and has
the desire to strike outside of it.
Our progress in Iraq and Syria contrasts with the security
situation in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the Taliban's hold on
security is maintained through ideology, continued humanitarian
aid, and the persistent abuse of human rights to dissuade
unrest.
Extremist groups see opportunity and ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K)
grows emboldened, seeking to expand its ranks and inspire,
enable, and direct attacks in the region and beyond, with the
ultimate goal to strike on the American Homeland.
Amidst these challenges, strategic competition is deeply
manifest in the region. The People's Republic of China (PRC)
has chosen to compete in the region. The PRC is aggressively
expanding its diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
outreach across the region.
China, dependent upon the region for half of its imported
oil, is also moving beyond energy-based investments to
encompass physical and telecommunication infrastructure that
advances its Belt and Road initiatives.
Over half the oil and more than a third of all the natural
gas imported by China is supplied by CENTCOM countries.
Nineteen of twentyone CENTCOM countries have signed a Belt and
Road initiative with China. We are in a race to integrate with
our partners before China can fully penetrate the region.
Russia looks to expand its influence in Syria, seeking
permanent basing there and undermining our efforts toward
stability and security in the region. The United States Central
Command juts up against Russia with a border six and a half
times longer than the Russian border with NATO [North American
Treaty Organization].
Putin seeks to take advantage of this proximity with a
foothold of influence in the Central Asian States, leveraging
historical relations and a perceived decline in United States
engagement to challenge our influence in that critical part of
the world. With all these challenges and opportunities, the
CENTCOM region looks to the United States for assurances of our
commitment.
For CENTCOM, that commitment is unwavering. In closing, let
me thank you for your support to our servicemembers. I would
also like to thank the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
coast guardsmen, and guardians who serve and sacrifice in
CENTCOM, and all those who have done so for the last 40 years.
It is the greatest honor of my lifetime to be their Commander.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Michael Kurilla
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Michael ``Erik'' Kurilla
i. introduction: a landscape of increasing complexity
In 1983, United States Central Command was formed to serve as a
hedge against the expansionist goals of Iran--then in the nascent days
of its new anti-American regime--and to serve American interests in the
Middle East, Levant, and Central Asia amidst strategic competition with
the Soviet Union. On November 14th 1982, Caspar Weinberger, the 15th
Secretary of Defense, who oversaw the creation of CENTCOM, said: ``the
central region is among the most important regions in the world as far
as we're concerned and as far as the free world is concerned.'' The
Senate Armed Services Committee's January 17, 1982 legislation
authorizing this new command explained that ``U.S. Central Command,
alongside local and regional forces, will be America's security
guarantor in the world's central region.''
Forty years later, while much of geopolitics and policy has
transformed, the security landscape of this part of the world remains
largely unchanged. In many important ways, the region's most vexing
problems have grown more complex.
Now, as then, the world's geographically central region remains
critical to American security interests, global trade, global energy,
and global security. Today, more than a third of global container
traffic transits the Suez Canal and more than a quarter of global oil
transits the Strait of Hormuz. The region is home to almost 50 percent
of the world's known oil reserves and more than 40 percent of the
world's national gas. This part of the world produces 37 percent of the
world's oil, 18 percent of its gas, and houses four of the world's top
five OPEC oil producers: Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates.
The central region remains among the most important regions in the
world. A disruption in the maritime choke points flowing through the
Middle East or the spread of instability throughout the region could
threaten vital national interests and hold the global economy at risk.
Four decades after revolutionary students overran the American
embassy, Iran possesses the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in
the Middle East, with thousands of ballistic and cruise missiles, some
capable of striking the entire Middle East and Levant. The Iranian
regime now holds the largest and most capable Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
force in the region. The advancement of Iranian military capabilities
over the past 40 years is unparalleled in the region; in fact, the
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of today is unrecognizable from just
5 years ago. Even more concerning, Iran has advanced its nuclear
program such that Tehran can now produce sufficient fissile material
for a nuclear weapon in less than 14 days. In addition, the regime
invests heavily in information operations, including broadcasting,
coordinated inauthentic activity, and cyber-attacks.
Alongside the State threat posed by Iran, violent extremist groups
continue to threaten the security and stability of the region. For
example, ISIS, long past its 2014 pinnacle of capability, remains able
to conduct operations within the region with a desire to strike beyond
the Middle East. Though degraded, the group's vile ideology remains
unconstrained.
In Afghanistan, the reduction in collection, analytical resources,
and Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance assets means our
campaign against al Qaeda and ISIS-Khorasan is challenged; while we can
see the broad contours of attack planning, we lack the granularity to
see the complete threat picture. ISIS-Khorasan has increased attacks in
the region and desires to export those attacks beyond Afghanistan to
include the United States Homeland and our interests abroad.
The group also seeks to expand its operational presence and
influence regionally and beyond. We are addressing this through the
development of innovative Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance platforms and increasing additional collection methods
to build out a more fulsome threat picture.
While Afghanistan's security situation deteriorates, the United
States has a moral obligation to safely extract the tens of thousands
of Special Immigrant Visa holders, many of whom aided United States
troops as interpreters, translators, and advisors during our longest
war.
Meanwhile, strategic competition in the central region has grown
more urgent over the past 40 years. Only now, the Soviet Union is
replaced with Russia and the People's Republic of China, both of whom
seek to undermine American interests in the region. Russia looks to
aggressively expand its foothold of influence in the region amidst its
war in Ukraine. Moscow leverages its military presence by propping up
Syria to garner influence in the Middle East. The People's Republic of
China aggressively expands its diplomatic, informational, economic, and
military outreach in this part of the world.
These challenges and complexities, combined with the opportunities
offered by our partnerships in the region, form the basis of CENTCOM's
three strategic priorities.
ii. centcom strategic priorities: deter, counter, compete
Strategic Priority 1: Deter Iran
Deterring Iran is arguably more urgent than at any time in
CENTCOM's history due to Iran's cutting-edge missile and UAV capability
as well as its uranium enrichment program. As it was at the time of
CENTCOM's formation, Iran is the most destabilizing actor in the
region. Today, Iran is undeterred from its malign activities, which
include conventional threats to neighbors, support to violent proxy
groups that spread chaos and instability throughout the region, and
support to Russia's war in Ukraine.
The evolution of the Iranian threat--the primary threat against
which this command was born--is a story that runs the full timeline of
CENTCOM history. Early in the Iran-Iraq war, the regime realized its
armed forces could never fully recover from the crippling losses
suffered during that ruinous conflict. Instead, to develop an
asymmetric advantage against regional militaries, the regime invested
in precision missiles with extended reach. It now commands an imposing
measure of missile capability it uses to coerce, intimidate, and bully
its neighbors.
Tehran has also manufactured increasingly sophisticated Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles. The regime now commands an arsenal of drone systems,
ranging from small, short-range systems to modern intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance systems to long-range One-Way Attack
platforms. They are building larger drones that can fly further with
increasingly deadly payloads. Until the United States helped secure the
Yemen truce, Iran was regularly using Yemen as a testing ground for
these weapons, threatening both United States partners and tens of
thousands of Americans in the Gulf.
Meanwhile, Tehran continues to furnish weapons, support, and
direction to proxies across the region who engage in acts of terror and
undermine local governments, all advancing Iranian interests. The proxy
forces are more emboldened and dangerous through the increased
proliferation of these Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, which allow them to
target U.S. and partner interests with increased speed, range,
accuracy, and explosive capacity.
This story grows more foreboding. Today, Iran continues to enrich
and stockpile uranium far above what is needed for commercial use.
Increasingly more centrifuges are the advanced IRN-6 models, capable of
enriching uranium far faster and more efficiently than Iran's first-
generation centrifuges. The regime is now stockpiling highly enriched
uranium under the guise of commercial use. The International Atomic
Energy Agency report released on February 28th on Iran's enrichment
program reveals that Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60
percent has grown substantially in less than 3 months and that Iran now
has sufficient nuclear material for manufacture of several nuclear
explosive devices. The region is increasingly worried about a nuclear-
armed Iran.
Iran also puts itself increasingly further outside of international
norms; Tehran continues to ignore United Nations Security Council
resolutions, violate sanctions and embargos, proliferate weapons to its
network of proxies and affiliates, and attack shipping vessels in
international waters. The regime continues the brutal beatdown of the
rights of its citizenry, crushing dissent, protest, and human rights.
Iranian-aligned groups routinely strike at American troops and our
partners in Iraq and Syria.
Recently, Iran's advanced weapons are seen on the battlefield of
Ukraine alongside their Russian partners. Iran often aligns information
operations with or in support of Russia. An internationally isolated
Iran has clearly thrown in its lot with an also isolated Russia.
Strategic Priority 2: Counter Violent Extremist Organizations
While Iran poses the most ominous threat to the central region,
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) operating in the Middle East,
Levant, and Central Asian States also represent a danger to security
and stability. The Central Command Area of Responsibility serves as the
epicenter of violent extremism, with 19 of 21 top tier terrorist groups
operating across the region. ISIS and al Qaeda are the principal Sunni
violent extremist organizations in the Middle East and Levant. Both
groups maintain numerous affiliates pursuing local, regional, and
global objectives.
ISIS continues to organize attacks throughout the Middle East and
must not be allowed to operate uncontested. Alongside our Syrian
Democratic Forces partners, we continue to put pressure on ISIS in
Syria. In Iraq, we continue to advise, assist, and enable the
development of the Iraqi security forces in their fight against ISIS.
We see ISIS in Iraq and Syria in three groups:
1. ISIS At Large. This is the current generation of ISIS leaders
and fighters we face in Iraq and Syria today. While we have
significantly degraded this group's capability, it retains the ability
to inspire, direct, organize, and lead attacks in the region and
abroad.
This group offers the most straightforward solution: partner
with Syrian Democratic Forces and advise, enable, and assist Iraqi
Security Forces until ISIS At Large is defeated. The two other groups
represent far more complex problems.
2. ISIS In Detention. These are the roughly 10,000 ISIS fighters
in detention facilities throughout Syria, and approximately 20,000 in
detention facilities in Iraq. We rely on the Syrian Democratic Forces
and our Iraqi partners to secure these sites, keeping this population
off the battlefield. The Government of Iraq has sufficient
infrastructure to keep these fighters in detention. The only long-term
solution in Syria, however, is transfer of these detainees to the
custody of their countries of origin.
Last week, during my sixth visit to Syria since taking command
11 months ago, I again visited the Hasakah detention facility, which
houses more than 5,000 detained ISIS fighters predominately from the
terror group's tactical defeat at the March 2019 battle in Baghuz. I
observed the structural damage incurred during the January 2022 ISIS
attack on the facility in which more than 1,000 ISIS fighters escaped.
The vast majority were later recaptured by SDF forces. During that 10-
day battle involving SDF and United States forces, more than 400 ISIS
fighters and 121 SDF soldiers were killed.
This population of detainees represents a looming threat to
Syria, the region, and beyond. Syrian Democratic Forces leaders
securing the site as well as camp administration officials described
the detainee population as unrepentant and subject to further
radicalization. One Syrian Democratic Forces official referred to the
more than 5,000 detainees as a ``ticking time bomb.''
Unlike the first group, there is no military solution to this
ISIS detainee population. We must support the Syrian Democratic Forces
who continue to secure these sites while working with the countries of
origin of these ISIS detainees to repatriate and rehabilitate or find a
judicial solution.
3. The Potential Next Generation of ISIS. This, the most
concerning group, includes the more than 30,000 children in the al-Hol
camp for internally displaced persons and the more than 1,000 children
in the al Roj camp who are in danger of ISIS indoctrination on a daily
basis.
Last week, while in the al Roj camp, I spoke with dozens of
residents from at least 16 countries, including: Russia, Egypt,
Turkiye, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Morocco, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Lebanon, Yemen, Tunisia, Iraq, Syria, Canada, and the
United States. These residents told me that the vile ISIS ideology
remains a threat throughout the camp. To a person, they all expressed a
desire to return to their country of origin.
During four trips to the al Hol camp in 11 months, I've seen
first-hand that these children are prime targets for ISIS
radicalization. The al-Hol camp is a flashpoint of human suffering,
with more than 51,000 residents, more than 90 percent of them women and
children, living in tents. These children have little meaningful
education, no access to the outside world, limited hot water, and few
constructive outlets to develop their potential. They are at risk of
becoming casualties to an ideological war within the camps: ISIS
leaders want their minds.
As with the second category of ISIS, there is no military
solution for this group. Our long-term goal must be the successful
repatriation, rehabilitation, and reintegration of the camp residents
back into their country of origin.
While progress against ISIS in Iraq and Syria continues apace, the
underlying conditions that led to the group's 2013 and 2014 expansion
remain. The ruinous effects of Assad's rule and civil war in Syria
lingers, employment and educational opportunities remain scarce for
many young men, and millions live in appalling conditions. ISIS' vile
ideology remains uncontained and unconstrained, and a seething hatred
remains open to exploitation.
Our continued, limited presence in Iraq and Syria allows us to
assist the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Iraqi Security Forces in
maintaining pressure on ISIS to prevent the group's resurgence to 2014
levels. The minimal United States troop strength in those countries
allows us the ability to advise, assist, and enable partner forces with
the goal of the enduring defeat of ISIS and the prevention of external
attack plots against the United States and nations throughout the
region. Our support is essential to ensuring regional stability as well
as protecting the Homeland.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban's hold on security is maintained
through ideology, continued humanitarian aid, and persistent abuse of
human rights to dissuade unrest. Extremist groups see opportunity and
ISIS-Khorasan grows emboldened amidst the chaos, seeking to expand its
ranks and inspire, enable, or direct attacks in the region and beyond.
ISIS-Khorasan is building a capability in Afghanistan from which to
strike Western interests worldwide, with the ultimate goal of a strike
on the American Homeland.
Al Qaeda remnants remain in Afghanistan. While the July 2022 death
of Ayman al-Zawahiri set the group back, al Qaeda desires to rebuild.
Though this will take time, al Qaeda remains a long-term threat to
American interests and citizens as well as the Homeland.
Strategic Priority 3: Compete Strategically
In addition to its primary role as a redoubt against the spread of
Iranian-directed instability across the region, this command was
established in 1983 to maintain a military advantage over the Soviet
Union amidst Great Power Competition. This was, after all, in the
moments after the surprising 1979 Christmas Eve Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan--the first major combat operation involving Soviet troops
outside of Warsaw Pact territory since the close of World War II.
Today, CENTCOM's role in Great Power Competition, clearly defined in
the 2022 National Defense Strategy, is more urgent and complex.
Strategic Competition with PRC
China's goal to serve as the world's leading superpower by 2049
puts this region squarely in its crosshairs. The United States Central
Command area of responsibility shares a 2,200-mile border with the
People's Republic of China--larger than the United States border with
Mexico. China looks across that border and sees only opportunity for
advantage in influence. Beijing's willingness to take on higher-risk
projects threatens American preferential ties and unfettered access. On
its current trajectory, the increased technological and military
presence serves as a growing strategic challenge to U.S. partnerships,
access, force presence, and security in the region.
The People's Republic of China aggressively expands its diplomatic
and economic outreach across the region. Last week's PRC-brokered
reestablishment of relations between Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia underscores the emergence of China's diplomatic role in the
region.
China, dependent on the region for half of its crude oil, is also
moving beyond energy-based investments to encompass physical and
telecommunications infrastructure. Beijing also encourages greater
military cooperation in the Middle East and Central Asia, aiming to
challenge our standing in the region. More than half of all the oil and
more than a third of all the natural gas imported by China is supplied
by countries within the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
Expanding regional arms sales by Beijing provides economic
opportunities, expands influence and increases People's Republic of
China interoperability in the region. China seeks to under-mine
American economic, commercial, and security interest in this part of
the world to be-come the region's leading power.
Beijing has reason for optimism here. China is often viewed by
regional partners as more accommodating than the United States,
offering lower costs, favorable financing, faster delivery times and no
end-use monitoring agreements. During my trips to the region and calls
with regional Chiefs of Defense, I routinely hear how much faster and
easier China's foreign military sales program is than ours. While the
American foreign military sales process involves multiple steps going
through multiple layers of government bureaucracy, the PRC can move
much faster, often mak-ing us non-competitive by comparison. Although
this multi-layered process is a reflection of our form of government
and U.S. law, it often has a deleterious effect on our ability to
compete for the sorts of long-term relationships that the sales of
major defense systems create.
The Belt and Road Initiative remains a strategic lever to supplant
U.S. leadership in the region under the guise of benign economic
initiatives and broadening security relationships. Of the 21 countries
comprising the CENTCOM area of responsibility, 19 have Belt and Road
Initiative agreements with China.
Regional powers see the Belt and Road Initiative as an opportunity
to modernize their cities and societies to advance regional economic
and social reform programs including Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030, Oman's
Vision 2040, Qatar's Vision 2030, Kuwait's Vision 2035, and Egypt's
Vision 2030. Three Belt and Road Initiative land corridors and one of
the three maritime corridors transits the CENTCOM area of
responsibility.
As the United States reduced force posture in the region, Chinese
investment and influence grew steadily. Consider the following:
The 8-year period from 2013 to 2021 represented the
largest investment period in the CENTCOM region in PRC history with
$408.7 billion in commercial investments;
From 2015 to 2021, just as it was accelerating commercial
investment, the PRC devoted $2.6 trillion in trade with CENTCOM
countries;
In 2021, in Israel's largest shipping hub, the PRC opened
a new, $1.7 billion modern technological port which is significantly
larger than Israel's three international ports and supports large
shipping vessels capable of carrying more than 18,000 containers;
The PRC is building and operating a container terminal in
Abu Dhabi;
The 10-year, $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor, begun in 2015, is the BRI flagship;
Saudi Arabia is China's largest supplier of crude oil and
with December 2022s comprehensive strategic agreement, PRC reliance on
Saudi crude is set to increase;
Huawei has 5G contracts with 19 of the 21 countries in
the CENTCOM region; and
The PRC targets Iraq for influence and resources--Beijing
invested $10.1 billion in BRI projects in Iraq in 2021 alone.
China's economic interests, transactional approaches and perceived
lack of Chinese bias in in-ternal and regional affairs, will continue
to provide inroads in the region.
Strategic Competition with Russia
Today, 32 years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia's
objectives are to weaken Western security structures in the Middle East
and Central Asia and continue to challenge United States security
interests and critical relationships in the region.
The United States Central Command region holds a 4,750-mile border
with Russia--more than six times the length of NATO's border with
Russia--through the Central Asian States. Since Catherine the Great in
1762, Russia has sought this region as part of its empire. The Kremlin
has viewed the Central Asian States as its territory since the 1922
Treaty on the Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The
emphasis on ownership over Central Asia took on a fever pitch after
World War II, when Stalin used the region for resource extraction and
strategic depth. Putin seeks to take advantage of this proximity and
history by establishing a foothold of influence leveraging long-
established relations and a perceived decline in United States
engagement to challenge our influence in that critical part of the
world. Russia retains extensive interests in Central Asia, spanning
energy, military sales, counterterrorism, counter-drug efforts, and
others.
Today, Putin's interests in the Middle East range from energy
transit to security relationships to military sales. His overall
strategy in the region remains largely unaffected by the war in
Ukraine. Despite the recent damage to its reputation and influence,
Russia continues apace on several fronts to preserve its influence and
access in the Middle East. This includes sustaining military support in
Syria that is indispensable to Assad and influential with Syria's
neighbors.
Russia has more than 2,500 Russian troops in Syria, which Putin
views as a base from which to project power and influence throughout
the region and into Europe and Africa. Russian maritime forces maintain
a permanent presence in Syria's coastal city of Tartus. In 2019, the
two countries signed a 49-year lease for rights to Tartus'
Mediterranean deep-water port. Just as CENTCOM was formed to serve as
the ``security guarantor'' of the world's central region, Russia views
itself as the security guarantor of the Central Asian States. However,
as a result of the invasion of Ukraine, the Central Asian States
increasingly view Russia as a threat to their sovereignty.
iii. centcom's strategic approach: people, partners, innovation
As it enters its fifth decade, CENTCOM requires a new Strategic
Approach to guide all operations, activities, investments, and
initiatives against these complex and confounding challenges. That
Strategic Approach is defined by three words: People, Partners, and
Innovation.
People
Throughout CENTCOM's lifespan, its People have served the region,
our Nation, and this command. Since our 1983 inception, our People have
fought for and provided assistance to the citizens of the world's
central region. Over the course of 4 decades, they have displayed the
grit, discipline, compassion, and empathy that the United States
expects out of its military force.
Today, our People--our servicemembers, civilian workforce,
contractors, and supportive Families--serve as the bedrock of
everything we do and how we succeed. They underpin all aspects of our
strategic approach and drive us along our strategic priorities.
Our People at CENTCOM are our greatest asset and our most critical
resource. We hire, invest in, retain, and care for our People and their
families.
Partners
Partners are our Nation's comparative advantage against competitors
like the People's Republic of China and Russia and serve as a barrier
against the ramifications of Iran's most destructive behavior. No
nation can face the complexity described above alone. We therefore
cultivate deep abiding relations with forces in the region that can
serve as a hedge against threats in the region while deterring Iran
from its worst, most destabilizing activity. We are in a race to
integrate our partners before China and Russia can deeply penetrate the
region.
For China and Russia, partnerships are transactional relationships.
For CENTCOM, our partnerships are based in our values and our
commitment to the region. China views regional countries as possible
customers and clients, while we seek partners and allies. Our values
and our commitment make us the partner of choice in the region. We must
always hold true to our commitments to partner forces and nations as
our actions speak for us to the region.
CENTCOM was formed to serve in support of and alongside Partners--
the ``local and regional forces'' referenced by the legislation
directing the formation of U.S. Central Command. Today that focus is
more urgent than ever in our 40-year history.
For a period of almost 20 years, CENTCOM served as the priority
resourcing requirement for the U.S. Department of Defense. This was an
anomaly in America's national security history: the only period in
which the Nation was committed to two simultaneous wars since World War
II. With the conclusion of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have
significantly reduced our force posture in the Middle East. Without the
large volume of planes, ships, and troops we had in the region just 5
years ago, we must integrate our partners into all security constructs
to foster regional security and stability.
Referring back to the Senate Armed Services Committee legislation
guiding CENTCOM in 1983--this command was established to serve as a
``security guarantor of American interests in the world's central
region.'' Today, we uphold that responsibility by serving as a security
integrator: integrating our Partners into a framework of operations,
activities, investments, and initiatives that will ensure sufficient
regional security to protect our vital national interests.
The kind of deep, abiding partnerships CENTCOM seeks is exemplified
by the Coalition Maritime Forces, a multinational maritime partnership
led by U.S. Naval Forces Central. The Combined Maritime Forces, the
world's largest international maritime partnership, exists to uphold
the rules-based international order. Through this mutually supportive
partnership, the 38 CMF participant countries counter illicit non-State
actors on the high seas and promote security, stability, and prosperity
across international waters.
The realignment of Israel from European Command to Central Command
18 months ago has immediately and profoundly altered the nature and
texture of many of CENTCOM's partnerships for the good. Back in 1983,
the boundaries of the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility excluded Israel;
Secretary Weinberger and National Security Advisor William Clark were
concerned that CENTCOM leaders would be challenged to build enduring,
trust-based relations with Arab military leaders while also partnering
with the Israel Defense Force. While that concern may have been well-
founded then, CENTCOM today readily partners with Arab militaries and
the Israel Defense Force alike. In fact, the inclusion of Israel
presents many collaborative and constructive security opportunities.
Our partners of 4 decades largely see the same threats and have common
cause with Israel Defense Forces and the Arab militaries in defending
against Iran's most destabilizing activities.
Innovation
Through Innovation we multiply the capability of our People and
strengthen our partnerships to deter Iran, counter VEOs, and compete
with China and Russia for influence across the region.
Innovation will strengthen our partnerships, assist our operations,
and allow us to increase progress across all efforts. In so doing, it
will allow us to serve as that security integrator on behalf of
regional security and stability.
Innovation is not just about technology for us; it is innovation of
thought, innovation of concept, innovation of process. We are building
a culture of innovation and our partners are with us on this journey.
For example, across all domains, through employment of systems on hand
and newly acquired systems, we are building an interconnected mesh of
sensors that transmit real-time data. When viewed together through data
integration and Artificial Intelligence platforms, this real-time data
builds a clearer picture of the operating environment. Across CENTCOM,
our formations use unmanned systems paired with Artificial Intelligence
to give us better information faster. This allows us to employ our
manned systems more efficiently and strategically and thereby achieve
decision dominance. We're able to cultivate information and use
Artificial Intelligence to make decisions faster than our adversaries
and use our manned systems more efficiently.
The U.S. Central Command theater holds almost no assigned forces,
and with the declining emphasis on defeating violent extremist
organizations and the National Defense Strategy shift in primary focus
to U.S. strategic competitors, our forces decreased 15 percent over the
course of 2022 alone. CENTCOM force posture saw a reduction of 85
percent from its 2008 peak. With so many looming and existential
threats in the region and such a strong possibility of chaos spreading
and driving the region to again become a strategic distractor, we must
innovate to expand our presence beyond those allocated forces. This is
enabled by the creative application of technology and innovation.
CENTCOM's three innovation task forces--Task Forces 59, 99, and
39--apply these concepts to specific domains. For example, the most
advanced--Task Force 59, our maritime innovation task force--operates a
fleet of unmanned vessels, both on the surface of the water and under
the water. These unmanned vessels carry sensors which are collecting
vast amounts of data. That data, pushed through data integration and
artificial intelligence platforms, helps build a clearer picture of the
operating environment. Through Task Force 59, 99, and 39 CENTCOM is
rapidly improving maritime threat detection and maritime domain
awareness and building an integrated, unmanned, and artificial
intelligence network to achieve safer seas and stronger protection for
global trade.
Just this month, Task Force 59 completed a 3-week International
Maritime Exercise involving 7,000 personnel, 50 partner nations and
organizations, 35 ships, 30 unmanned systems, and more than a dozen AI
tools. The exercise, which took place in the Arabian Gulf, Arabian Sea,
Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and East African coastal regions,
strengthened participants' interoperability and command and control.
More importantly, our international and regional partners are right
there with us. Task Force 59 has established hubs in Bahrain and
Jordan. Four months ago, Bahrain participated in a naval drill in the
Gulf during which seven crewed ships from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United
Kingdom, and the United States teamed with unmanned systems. By the end
of this year, our goal is a Task Force 59 fleet of more than 100
vessels--at least 75 from partner maritime forces--operating together,
communicating together, and providing a common operating picture to all
participating militaries.
In addition to Task Force 59, which operates at sea in the maritime
domain, we have Task Force 99, based in Qatar, operating in the air
domain. Through implementation of Commercial Off-The-Shelf Technology
and collaboration with industry and academia, Task Force 99 creates a
technology transition ecosystem that allows increased awareness and
faster decisionmaking and places cutting-edge tools in the hands of
warfighters and decisionmakers. The task force's three lines of effort
(LOEs) are: increasing awareness of the air domain, accelerating the
speed of the targeting cycle, and imposing dilemmas on adversaries.
Task Force 99 also focuses on aerial drones complete with tailored
payloads and other capabilities operating together to observe, detect,
and gather data that feeds into an operations center. This increases
our air domain awareness and rapidly accelerates the speed of our
decisionmaking. Task Force 99's fleet of unmanned aircraft will impose
dilemmas on our adversaries and detect and defeat threats to our
systems and to our partners.
Finally, we have Task Force 39, our newest innovation task force.
Task Force 39 tests concepts and technology in the land domain with a
heavy focus on testing new technology to defeat adversary drones. In
the coming months, this task force will experiment with robotic
sustainment vehicles.
Through these innovation Task Forces, CENTCOM seeks to serve as the
experimentation center for new drone-defeat systems, ideas, and
technology, to include directed energy. At CENTCOM, we consider
opportunities for innovation as limitless. They are boundless and cross
all realms of possibility.
CENTCOM is also accelerating the employment of Joint All Domain
Command and Control solutions to combat operations to achieve vertical
integration from the Joint Task Force and
Components, all the way to the Joint Staff and National Command
Authority. Every day, we drive Joint All Domain Command and Control
capability forward to allow our People to make faster, more informed
decisions in combat's critical moments.
As a data-centric warfighting headquarters, we've transformed our
targeting process from PowerPoint slides to the employment of live
data. Our goal is a Single Pane of Glass that builds better situational
understanding and allows commanders to achieve decision advantage like
never before.
In late January and early February of this year, our headquarters
led Scarlet Dragon Oasis, our Joint All Domain Command and Control live
fire exercise on the eastern seaboard, the mid-Atlantic Electronic
Warfare range, and across the U.S. Central Command region. The
operation successfully passed digital targeting data and mission
threads between multiple commands across the United States, from Nevada
to Utah to Tampa and our operations centers in South Carolina and
Bahrain. From computer vision, full-motion video, and synthetic
aperture radar algorithms identifying targets, to digital workflow
tools improving speed and precision of targeting teams, to optimizing
machine-to-machine communication flow, the exercise marked a critical
step toward digital warfighting.
Each of these tools, concepts, initiatives, and task forces are
singularly focused on providing our People with the best tools, the
most comprehensive rapid situational awareness, and the fastest and
most accurate decisionmaking capability. This, in turn, serves a great
benefit to our Partners and to the security and stability of the
region. Innovation is about linking our People and our Partners with
ideas and capabilities that enhance all efforts to deter Iran, counter
violent extremist organizations, and compete strategically with Russia
and China.
People, Partners, and Innovation and the National Defense Strategy
The strategic approach outlined above is heavily nested underneath
the 2022 National Defense Strategy. By empowering our People, building
out abiding Partnerships, and embracing Innovation, CENTCOM looks to
allow the National Defense Strategy to manifest across the Joint Force.
A flashpoint with Iran, a crisis in the region, a successful large-
scale attack on a partner country, or an attack on the Homeland by a
VEO all will likely require a response, drawing resources not forecast
away from higher priority theaters to the Central Command region.
Therefore, a modest investment in People, Partners, and Innovation
serves as a hedge against National Defense Strategy derailment.
Furthermore, the Central Command region is literally and
figuratively central to competition with Russia and China--a National
Defense Strategy priority for all of the Joint Force. Our strategic
approach aligns People, Partners, and Innovation against Strategic
Competition with the People's Republic of China and Russia, which the
National Defense Strategy identifies as the priority across all global
regions.
iv. conclusion: a vision and a promise
United States Army General Robert Kingston saw the future.
At the pinnacle of a career leading troops in heavy combat--
Kingston fought in some of the heaviest fighting of both the Korean and
Vietnam wars and was among the most decorated military officers of his
generation--he was selected as the first commander of United States
Central Command. A soft-spoken, battle-hardened warfighter, Kingston
knew the central region from his time leading a contingency force
focused on Iran during the early moments of the hostage crisis. He
understood the unique set of challenges facing the new command and he
knew that the answers to all of them relied on an enduring CENTCOM
commitment to regional forces.
In assuming responsibility for United States Central Command in a
ceremony on MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida on January 3d,
1983, Kingston told the assembled crowd: ``CENTCOM will require
regional military forces to accomplish its mission for the Nation.''
This posture statement is informed by my 14 trips to the region and
the hundreds of calls, video teleconferences, and meetings with
partnered Chiefs of Defense and their military component leaders in my
11 months in command. Those engagements crystallized in my mind that 40
years after Robert Kingston spoke those words, one thing is clear:
CENTCOM requires regional military forces [i.e. Partners] to accomplish
its mission for the Nation. So it will into the future.
The challenges faced by Kingston and his staff and component
leaders have only grown more complex. The threats, more capable. The
competition for influence with external powers, more urgent.
People, Partners, Innovation is our glidepath to deter Iran,
counter VEOs, and compete strategically, allowing us to meet the
challenges posed by these threats, complexities, and adversaries and
ensure regional security and stability.
We employ this strategic approach along a foundation of regional
stability earned by American servicemembers over the course of 4
decades. In peace, in war, in years and years of sustained combat, in
the toughest conditions faced by American servicemembers since the
Vietnam War, these men and women bought time and space for American
leadership and preserved our vital national interests in this critical
region. From the Tanker War to the Gulf War to the Global War on
Terrorism and many contingency and humanitarian assistance operations
in between--CENTCOM troops have fulfilled the original promise of this
command: ``U.S. Central Command, alongside local and regional forces,
will be America's security guarantor in the world's central region.''
Today's CENTCOM servicemembers have transitioned this command to a
security integrator.
Those troops are the forebears of the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, coastguardsmen, and guardians who serve in CENTCOM today--the
greatest men and women in the country, thousands of them in harm's way
as you read this, advancing American policy and representing the
Nation. It is my life's greatest honor to lead them.
Armed with the right strategic approach and the right measure of
resources, I know they will succeed.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General Kurilla. General Langley,
please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL E. LANGLEY, USMC COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES AFRICA COMMAND
General Langley. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker,
distinguished Committee Members, it is an honor to appear
before you today to testify on the State of affairs of the
United States Africa Command.
I am proud to testify, along my good friend, General Eric
Kurilla, the Commander of the United States Central Command.
Now, I assumed command last August, and since then, I embarked
upon a campaign of learning over the last 7 months to inform
our discussion here today.
I undertook this campaign of learning to fulfill my
commitment to this Congress to complete a holistic assessment
upon confirmation. I made that assessment, and I will continue
it throughout my tenure of command.
Upfront, I want to make one thing crystal clear. The team
of servicemembers and civilians at AFRICOM is a talent and
dedicated body. I am honored to serve among them. I am joined
here today by my State Department foreign policy advisor, Mr.
Phil Nelson, who represents the exceptionally skilled
diplomatic team embedded in our headquarters.
Our entire team is laser focused on implementing our whole-
of-government approach, with our partners from the Department
of State, USAID [United States Agency for International
Development], the intelligence community, and other U.S.
Government organizations. We campaign with our allies and
partners to advance mutual interest and to promote stability
and prosperity on the African continent.
You should be proud of their efforts, I certainly am. Now,
Africa is a vast and dynamic continent of sovereign nations.
Collectively and individually, these nations are increasingly
important players on the global stage. As such, AFRICOM's
contribution to American security must be viewed through a
global lens.
Threats once contained on the continent are transforming
into worldwide threats. Terrorism, poverty, food insecurity,
climate change, and mass migration shadow African lives. They
sow the seeds of violent extremists and Russian exploitation.
The Kremlin's invasion of Ukraine has aggravated the food
insecurity crisis in Africa by blocking vital food shipments to
the same nations that feel the deepest impact of climate
change.
Russia's Wagner mercenaries turned chaos into cash. It
destabilizes entire regions across Africa and cuts at American
interests worldwide. The expansion of the Middle East based
violent extremist groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda, including
now the biggest franchise Al-Shabaab, threatens American lives.
Solutions to these colossal problems must be a shared
burden. African nations need to be at the helm of a concerted
international effort to produce sustainable results,
sustainable outcomes.
Assisting African nations to achieving the goals while
advancing American interests can only be accomplished through a
synchronized whole-of-government approach, a whole-of-
government strategy.
We call it a 3-D approach, which is a toolkit of diplomacy,
development, and defense, but one tool does not succeed without
the whole kit. So, I will advocate for my State Department and
USAID partners to receive the resources they need to succeed.
Now, Africa faces many other challenges.
How we are putting African needs at the forefront of our
campaign, reinforced by multilateral and whole Government
engagement, will help AFRICOM and our partners work toward a
sustainable peace, stability, and prosperity.
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished
Members of this Committee, thank you for having me here today.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Michael E. Langley
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Michael E. Langley
african security in a global context
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, distinguished Committee
members, Africa's impact on the world is greater now than at any point
in recent history, so United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) sees our
mission through a global lens. The vast potential of African peoples to
lead the way in worldwide growth is up against a rising tide of
existential challenges. Threats from within the continent are
transforming into threats to America's interests and allies. Terrorism,
poverty, food and water insecurity, protracted conflict, climate
change, and mass human migration disproportionately shatter African
lives. Solutions to these colossal problems must be a shared burden,
with African nations at the helm of concerted international efforts and
a United States whole-of-nation contribution that produces sustainable
outcomes. Since 2008, USAFRICOM has been proud to defend American
interests and lead the United States Department of Defense's inclusive
approach to helping African peoples achieve positive outcomes for all.
Crises in Africa set the stage for violent extremist organizations
(VEOs) to grow, and for America's strategic competitors to bid for
international allies. As the home of some of al-Qaeda's and ISIS's
largest and most active branches, Africa is now the epicenter of
international terrorism. Russia is expanding its African operations,
including via the Kremlin-supported private military company Wagner;
destabilization, democratic backsliding, and human rights abuses follow
in their wake. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine impaired
Africa's food supply, compounding the lingering challenges of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, the People's Republic of China's (PRC's)
economic and military presence poses challenges for both African
nations and American interests. Climate change-related shocks drove a
surge in African natural disasters last year, killing and displacing
millions though protracted droughts, mass flooding, disease outbreaks
and tropical storms. All of these crises combine with protracted
regional conflicts to impede progress toward a stable continent and a
prosperous planet where democracy, human rights, and the rule of law
flourish.
The world needs a stable African continent of sovereign nations
pulling together toward the universal goals of peace and prosperity.
Africa's six maritime chokepoints carry a third of the world's
shipping. Economic growth on the continent has accelerated in recent
decades, and Africa is increasingly an engine of the global economy.
This engine is partly fueled by vast deposits of rare earth minerals--
critical ingredients of the world's transition to clean, sustainable
energy--and by the human capital of a swelling population that will
account for a quarter of humankind by 2050. Sub-Saharan Africa is the
UN's largest regional voting bloc, and three of our African partners
currently sit on the United Nations Security Council: Gabon, Ghana, and
Mozambique. Africa's national voices increasingly harmonize in
organizations like the African Union, regional economic communities,
and multinational security forces that welcome American support. Africa
is a continent of opportunity.
The servicemembers and civilians of USAFRICOM are dedicated to
helping our African counterparts seize that opportunity. USAFRICOM
promotes security and prosperity in collaboration with the U.S.
Departments of State (DOS) and Justice (DOJ), the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), U.S. Coast Guard, Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and others. By
aligning our defense efforts with diplomacy and development, USAFRICOM
teams with African and international partners to campaign across the
spectrum of diplomacy, development, and defense. By convening those
partners in major multilateral exercises like AFRICAN LION, FLINTLOCK,
and the ACCORD and EXPRESS series, USAFRICOM tests and shares
institution-building best practices--including implementing the 2017
Women, Peace, and Security Act and advocating for strict adherence to
the law of armed conflict. By working daily with U.S. embassies and
units throughout the Joint Force, USAFRICOM stands ready to deliver
life-saving rapid response to flashpoints in remote and unpredictable
parts of the world.
America's tools for defense in Africa include military education,
intelligence sharing, maritime and cyber domain awareness, medical
training, DOS's foreign military sales, and--when warranted and
authorized--lethal force to protect American lives and support partner-
led counterterrorism missions. This toolkit of security cooperation and
operational authorities helps African partners to fight 21st century
terrorists and criminals, providing clear alternatives to unfavorable
and opaque deals with Russia or the PRC. Whole of nation investments in
Africa are opportunities for America to demonstrate global leadership
while reinforcing the international rules-based system across all
domains of commerce and defense. USAFRICOM is continually innovating
fresh ideas with our partners and fielding new solutions for a peaceful
and prosperous Africa--an outcome that will underpin America's long-
term security.
Underinvestment in African security raises the risk of an
unexpected crisis that would abruptly strip United States resources
away from our top national security challenge of strategic competition.
It has happened before. In the late 20th century, al Qaeda grew
unchecked in Africa culminating in the 1998 bombings of our embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania. More recently, the Benghazi, Libya attack in
2012, the Tongo Tongo, Niger attack in 2017, and the Manda Bay, Kenya
attack in 2020 claimed American lives. These tragedies drew U.S.
defense capital away from enduring strategic objectives. USAFRICOM's
mission is to mitigate the risk of such tragedies while guarding NATO's
southern flank and protecting the brave Americans who defend our great
Nation.
terrorism in africa
The most immediate threat to both American lives and our partners
in Africa is terrorism. Al Qaeda and ISIS sprouted in the Middle East
but quickly transplanted onto the African continent where they
flourished. Terrorist attacks in the Sahel region accounted for over a
third of the world's terrorism deaths in 2021, up from just 1 percent
in 2007. Today, Africa's VEOs vary in their tactics, resources, and
specific goals, but all aspire to target American interests and African
governments. These VEOs are dynamic networks that hide in vast under-
governed spaces and bustling population centers, creating immense
challenges for surveillance and disruption. Their attacks leave
countless civilians dead, maimed, and destitute while undermining
governance and already struggling economies, which in turn contributes
to mass migration into Europe. As VEOs grow, the risk of terrorist
plots against U.S. citizens, embassies, and ultimately the Homeland are
likely to rise.
USAFRICOM is on the job to counter VEOs in Africa.
Last May, President Biden directed USAFRICOM to move a small force
back into Somalia to help its people fight al-Qaeda's biggest and
richest franchise, al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab dominates swathes of
territory that feed their coffers, replenish their ranks, and provide
springboards to attack neighboring countries. Without relentless
suppression and ultimate pacification, al-Shabaab will seek to attack
United States embassies and eventually the Homeland itself. Somalia's
Government under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is waging a heroic war
against al-Shabaab in collaboration with an array of local and foreign
supporters, including the United Kingdom, TUrkiye, the United Nations,
the European Union, and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
(ATMIS). ATMIS is mandated to gradually draw down until its final exit
at the end of 2024.
USAFRICOM plays a supporting role in the fight against al-Shabaab,
but our contributions are unique and irreplaceable. Last year, we
conducted 15 collective self-defense airstrikes against al-Shabaab,
saving the lives of Somali soldiers engaged in combat with our mutual
enemy. These airstrikes played a critical role in supporting Somali
partners undertaking offensive operations. We also conducted a
precision airstrike that resulted in the death of a high value al-
Shabaab terrorist, demonstrating our commitment to acting decisively to
degrade al-Shabaab's threat to United States persons in the region and
beyond. Alongside our DOS colleagues, we are providing financial,
materiel, training, logistical and medical support to Somalia's
counterterrorism forces. This support includes training and equipping
Somali special operations via the Danab Advanced Infantry Brigade,
which spearheads missions alongside other Somali and ATMIS forces to
clear al-Shabaab strongholds. Enabled by USAFRICOM, a Somali-led
offensive has slowed al-Shabaab's offensive momentum. Al-Shabaab has
responded with a wave of reprisal attacks against Somali combatants and
civilians alike, and Somalia's progress against the group is fragile.
To preserve their battlefield progress and degrade al-Shabaab on an
enduring basis, Somalia needs United States governance and development
support more than ever.
The need for USAFRICOM in West Africa is also acute. Associates of
al-Qaeda's second-largest and fastest-growing branch in Africa--Jama'at
Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)--kidnapped an American citizen in
Burkina Faso last year. Her safe release was thanks to our African
partners and a United States whole-of-government effort, but JNIM
continues to hold another American kidnapped in 2016 and increasingly
threatens Americans in West Africa. They are wreaking havoc with our
regional partners as their reach outgrows rural havens in Mali and
Burkina Faso and now projects into the Gulf of Guinea littoral states.
JNIM has dramatically increased attacks on civilians and security
forces alike and expanded territory under its influence. The outcome
has been thousands of dead and millions of displaced West Africans
along with acute political strain that fostered military takeovers of
democratic governments in Mali and Burkina Faso. Wagner mercenaries
have been quick to turn this turmoil into opportunity. Wagner's
draconian operations with its partner in Mali both add to the human
cost of terrorism and create more openings for terrorist groups.
USAFRICOM is assisting our West African partners to limit JNIM's
activity and prevent JNIM's expansion. We are ever vigilant in
monitoring for plots against Americans or the Homeland. As JNIM grows,
the likelihood of such plots emerging also grows.
ISIS's seven branches on the African Continent also aspire to
attack American interests and partners. From the Mediterranean Sea to
Mozambique Channel, ISIS cells heed the call of Middle East-based
leaders to kill Africans, destroy Africans' infrastructure, and spread
violent jihadist ideology. This ideology feeds off government
instability and human rights violations, but our partnership has
enabled incremental progress against ISIS. Governments in North Africa
and their professional militaries have succeeded in limiting ISIS
expansion and crippling the recruitment and outflow of ISIS foreign
fighters; United States security cooperation has been key to those
efforts, and we must maintain these critical partnerships to prevent
ISIS and other VEOs from reemerging. In east, west, and southern
Africa, a combination of multinational counter-VEO operations and
ISIS's competition with rival VEOs is stymying their growth. At
President Biden's direction, in January USAFRICOM took down global ISIS
finance leader Bilal al-Sudani, which has already yielded new
intelligence insights into ISIS's global operations and its plans and
intentions in Africa. The credit for successes against ISIS goes to the
local peoples, but USAFRICOM has been a crucial partner in this
progress by providing training, funding, and intelligence.
However, ISIS cells throughout Africa are finding ways to adapt and
reconstitute. ISIS continues to kill and displace thousands in West
Africa, Mozambique, and the Great Lakes region. Former ISIS franchise
Boko Haram is wreaking similar damage in Nigeria and the Lake Chad
Basin. In concert with national, multilateral, multiregional, and U.N.
forces, USAFRICOM is America's eyes and ears to provide warning and
options to disrupt ISIS developments before they threaten the Homeland
or United States citizens.
strategic competition in africa: russia
As a producer of food, fossil fuels, and military hardware, Russia
has the opportunity to join with the international community in helping
African nations overcome terrorism and poverty.
Instead, the Kremlin tramples African interests by leveraging
Wagner, a United States-designated transitional criminal organization,
to aggravate weak governance and feed instability. The Kremlin's
motives are power and profit. Recent coups d'etat have triggered U.S.
restrictions that hinder USAFRICOM engagement, forcing those military
regimes to double-down on their dependence on Wagner. Although well
intended, United States coup restrictions can inadvertently incentivize
the most at-risk African countries to dig themselves deeper into the
mire of militancy and corruption.
The Kremlin disregards African interests by withholding fuel and
food to create political leverage, under-delivers on military hardware
and security commitments, and exploits existing friction points to
spread Russia's influence. Wagner exploits political fractures in
Libya, where Russia seeks to threaten NATO's southern flank. Wagner
benefits from Libya's fragmentation, and its interference in parts of
Libya risks hindering efforts to form the unified national government
and security forces that the Libyan people want and deserve. Wagner
lacks accountability to the rule of law and norms of ethics and human
rights, making them a deceptively attractive option for some regimes.
Wagner's short-term promises can be enticing, but the long-term outcome
for African clients are nations mired in corruption and crime that
stunt economic growth. Wagner's financial price tag is exorbitant. The
full Wagner bill is even worse: the failure of government institutions,
the withdrawal of stalwart security allies, the extraction of mineral
wealth, and long-term resource concessions and debt that chips away at
Africans' future.
In addition to Wagner's damage, Russia's February 2022 invasion of
Ukraine sent African food markets into a crisis. Food prices
skyrocketed as grain and fertilizer shipments from Eastern Europe
dropped. Without doubt, Africans are victims of the Kremlin's ongoing
aggression in Ukraine.
strategic competition in africa: prc
In contrast to Russia's overwhelmingly harmful influence in Africa,
the PRC's deep and diverse investment on the continent is a mixed bag.
All sovereign nations are free to evaluate and choose their security
and trade partners, and the PRC sees the same promise in Africa's
future that the whole world recognizes. The PRC has prioritized Africa
for years--and that will not change anytime soon. In January, the PRC's
new Foreign Minister used his first overseas trip to visit several
African countries--just like every PRC Foreign Minister has done
annually for the past 3 decades. Last year, the People's Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN) made its inaugural port call at the PRC's first
overseas base: Doraleh, Djibouti. Also in Djibouti, the PRC is planning
to construct a permanent spaceport. The PRC seeks to establish
additional military and space facilities in multiple African countries,
notably on the West Coast. This could sustain PLAN combatants in the
Atlantic and secure unimpeded circumnavigation of the continent.
USAFRICOM works with United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM)
to discern the long term outcomes of PRC activities in Africa, which
are intensive despite temporary decreases in financial lending and
military engagement due to COVID-19. In itself, Chinese basing in
Djibouti--or any future basing project--poses a marginal threat to
United States interests on the continent. In the event of armed
conflict, however, the PRC may leverage its expanded military footprint
to project power against the United States, our allies, or global
commerce. They already leverage their economic power in Africa to
influence U.N. policy and protect their access to natural resources
like minerals and fisheries. At least a third of the world's ships
engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing--a
problem that disproportionately harms African communities--are Chinese.
Too often, Chinese companies harm African environments and peoples
through irresponsible mining and harvesting operations that ignore
sustainability and shun local stakeholders and job seekers.
USAFRICOM does not offer any nation an ``us-or-them'' ultimatum.
The PRC is on the continent to stay, and they fill a role in Africa's
modernization. USAFRICOM does not seek to block the benefits that the
PRC can bring to the continent's nations. Yet all nations must take a
clear-eyed approach to dealing with the PRC. African nations must be
equipped to enforce laws that protect their fisheries and mineral
resources, ensuring the benefits of these national assets accrue first
and foremost to their own peoples and economies. The long term outcomes
of PRC activity in Africa will be an uneven mix of much-needed
infrastructure, equipment, and trade alongside depleted natural
resources, polluted ecosystems, corruption and deficient military
hardware.
humanitarian and environmental crises in africa
Climate change-related crises and conflicts rank alongside Russia's
war of choice in Ukraine as top catalysts of suffering for millions of
Africans. Africa contributes a small fraction of the total greenhouse
emissions, but changes in global temperature, combined with highly
erratic precipitation, disproportionately hurt the continent. Climatic
changes are accelerating the weather processes that create
environmental disasters in Africa--partly by raising ocean
temperatures. These rising temperatures are pressuring Africa's coastal
fisheries, a crucial food source that is already pressured by
overfishing. Rainfall patterns are also shifting. Last year, East
Africa's current drought--its worst in 40 years--destroyed crops and
livestock, displacing millions. Central and West Africa, by contrast,
suffered deadly flooding that displaced millions more. The Lake Chad
region saw its most intense rainfall in 3 decades. Flooding in southern
Africa was largely due to a series of tropical storms from the Indian
Ocean early last year, and we're seeing that trend continue this year.
Desertification is constraining water and food resources in many parts
of the continent, exacerbating interethnic fighting and interState
friction.
Tragic in their own right, climate-related shocks in Africa also
foster broader population vulnerabilities. The protracted drought in
East Africa exacerbated suffering amid a 2-year civil war in Ethiopia.
Climate-related shocks in places with weak infrastructure lead to
deadly infectious disease outbreaks, like the cholera outbreak Malawi
is currently battling in the aftermath of a devastating cyclone. VEOs
like al-Shabaab and Boko Haram have become adept at exploiting the
consequences of humanitarian crises to recruit new members and degrade
the legitimacy of African governments. The costs of climate change in
Africa are numerous, devastating, and often unpredictable, but one
thing is predictable: the price tag--in both human suffering and in
dollars--will only grow in coming years.
what usafricom needs
The security challenges of Africa are complex and dynamic. Only a
whole-of-government strategy can maximize USAFRICOM's effectiveness and
efficiency in securing American advantage and promoting African
development. Therefore, the requirements of our three whole-of-
government tools--diplomacy, development, and defense--are intertwined
and mutually supporting. One tool cannot succeed without the whole
toolkit.
Diplomacy is the first tool. Fully staffed and resourced diplomatic
missions in Africa would multiply USAFRICOM's opportunities. Therefore,
USAFRICOM appreciates Congress's work to confirm Ambassador nominees
and increased staffing for embassies. This boosts our collective
ability to implement development and counterterrorism programs under
the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability.
Congressional and Cabinet-level delegations to Africa go a long way to
reassuring our partners of American commitment, as did the United
States-Africa Leaders' Summit in December and two Cabinet member visits
in January. USAFRICOM is a key node in protecting United States
facilities in Africa, and out of the State Department's 31 designated
high threat/high risk posts, 16 are under USAFRICOM's purview.
Protecting our diplomatic engagements in conflict areas and preparing
for short-notice military assisted departures of our diplomats is vital
insurance for America's work on the continent. USAFRICOM lowers risk to
American diplomatic missions by maintaining operational readiness to
conduct hostage rescue, personnel recovery, and rapid response to
large-scale emergencies. Yet the DOS-USAFRICOM tie runs far deeper. Our
diplomats, defense attaches, and USAFRICOM military leaders work
together daily to pursue a seamless policy on the continent.
Development is the second tool. Three of the five designated
beneficiaries of the United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and
Promote Stability are in Africa--Libya, Mozambique, and Coastal West
Africa--but all of Africa needs development assistance. In contrast to
Russia and the PRC, nearly 95 percent of America's annual assistance to
Africa is delivered through grants to both government and non-
governmental organizations, not debt. Expanded funding flexibility
would enable USAID to review, reorient, and respond to the ever-
changing constellation of African needs. USAFRICOM appreciates the
support from Congress to USAID through its $11 billion per year purse
focused on Africa. However, this funding is hamstrung by targeted
allocation. In fiscal year 2021, over 95 percent of USAID's non-
humanitarian assistance funding was directed toward a specific
allocation. Years in advance, no one can foresee and allocate funding
for fleeting windows of opportunity to provide aid where Africans are
most in need. USAFRICOM and its partners must be able to act quickly
and decisively in response to rapidly changing security concerns and
constraints; a sluggish response is harmful to both victims and
America's standing as Africa's external partner of choice. Adversaries
like al Qaeda and Wagner are fast and flexible in responding to
opportunities, and USAID must have the agility to optimize its budget
in ways that maximize America's decisive advantage. U.S. investments
focused on stabilization, conflict prevention and peacebuilding,
democracy, governance, economic growth and public health attack the
roots of terrorism and tyranny more than bullets and air strikes ever
will. Working together with DOS and USAID, we ensure America gets the
credit for the United States tax dollars that flow to African needs.
These dollars are a testament to the generosity of the American people
and a critical piece of our informational competition with adversaries.
Defense is the third tool in our whole-of-nation approach. The
first key to defense is security cooperation because this is how we win
against VEOs and strategic competitors alike. USAFRICOM engages in
direct military-to-military engagement and collaborates on U.S. support
to U.N. peacekeeping operations. USAFRICOM drives partner capacity
building via train and equip programs and working closely with the DOS
International Military Education and Training program. USAFRICOM
administers DOS programs like Excess Defense Articles, Foreign Military
Sales, and Foreign Military Financing. USAFRICOM is the face of United
States security cooperation in Africa. If we do not continue to
strengthen our African security cooperation, our partners on the
continent will be more likely to pivot toward Russia and the PRC to
meet their defense needs.
The second key to defense is operational readiness, which USAFRICOM
achieves by providing physical and informational spaces for African,
international, and United States interagency partnerships to grow.
USAFRICOM's headquarters is a hub of interconnectivity linking
representatives from 13 U.S. Government departments and liaison
officers from 18 countries. That number is even larger on the
continent, where USAFRICOM's activities through Joint Task Forces in
Djibouti, Somalia, and Niger bring even more nations together.
Protecting these deployed troops is a sacred duty. To succeed in this
duty, USAFRICOM needs the resources to provide timely rescue response
and defend against the full spectrum of threats, including the alarming
proliferation of weaponized unmanned aircraft systems. Last year, this
Command deployed or put forces on alert over 20 times, and with unrest
on the rise in West Africa, the demand for crisis response will also
trend upwards.
USAFRICOM works in concert with the U.S. State Department to
facilitate direct training through Security Forces Assistance Brigades,
the State Partnership Program (SPP) and health programs. All these
efforts show high return for the investment in Africa and USAFRICOM
stands ready to scale them up. This training works to modernize and
professionalize African security forces that are desperately under-
resourced. All USAFRICOM training for partner forces emphasizes respect
for human rights, law of armed conflict, avoidance of civilian
casualties, and civilian control of the military. Our commitment to
African forces will span decades. The United States National Guard
Bureau's SPP connects Americans and Africans in ways that create long-
term ties of mutual benefit. Africa is fertile ground for SPP growth;
we're seeing strong demand from both African partners and United States
States. Sixteen partner nations currently pair with 14 State National
Guards. Most recently, New Hampshire joined forces with Cabo Verde last
year, and more partnership are in the works. These partnerships in
Africa will yield long-term benefits in advancing our shared security
and prosperity.
Institution-building is central to the USAFRICOM contribution to
our partners' defense. Through various engagement channels we assist
African security forces and defense ministries establish and strengthen
processes for logistics, financial reporting, and communications. Not
only does this capacity building help our partners secure their
borders, coastlines and vulnerable populations, it also enables many to
take on the role of regional security anchors, providing security
assistance to other partners and peacekeeping operations on the
continent. USAFRICOM invests in a growing cadre of states that leverage
United States military training to, in turn, train fellow African
partners, multiplying USAFRICOM's efforts. USAFRICOM is doing this
through multilateral exercises and USAFRICOM's Africa Distribution
Network Forum, which enables the community of African and external
partners to pool airlift logistics capabilities, creating financial
efficiencies in supplying missions across a continent that is over
three times the land mass of the continental United States.
This Command is not alone. Our international partners--including
Brazil, the European Union, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and
the United Nations--bolster African partner forces maritime awareness
and enforcement capabilities. African sea lines of communication are
the highway of world commerce, but illicit income from IUU fishing,
piracy, arms smuggling, wildlife trafficking, and human trafficking
bankroll VEOs and enable narcotics flows through Africa to Europe and
the Americas.
Our partners in the Gulf of Guinea and the Horn of Africa need
robust and interoperable maritime security infrastructure to protect
their borders and marine resources. USAFRICOM engages and trains with
coastal forces by leveraging two naval assets: the USS Hershel
``Woody'' Williams and the USNS Trenton. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
augments these vessels with temporary cutter deployments; the USCG
Cutter Mohawk made numerous port calls and patrols last year, and this
year USCG Cutter Spencer flew Old Glory off Africa's West Coast. Our
naval and coast guard ships in the USAFRICOM AOR reinforce America's
friendship with littoral countries, bolster food security, and deter
crime, including PRC-linked IUU fishing.
USAFRICOM's challenges go beyond the African continent. Our
headquarters staff stretches over two overseas locations: Kelley
Barracks, Germany and RAF Molesworth, United Kingdom. USAFRICOM's
component commands base in multiple European countries and in two
enduring Forward Operating Sites in Africa: Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti,
and Ascension Island. The Command also operates out of 12 other Posture
Locations throughout Africa. These locations have minimal permanent
United States presence, and have low-cost facilities and limited
supplies for these dedicated Americans to perform critical missions and
quickly respond to emergencies. With the exception of Special
Operations Command-Africa, USAFRICOM's components are dual-hatted,
dividing their time and assets between USAFRICOM and United States
European Command (USEUCOM). USEUCOM's role in Ukraine's defense draws
from the same resource pool as USAFRICOM requirements.
To expand reach, USAFRICOM relies on developing deeper
partnerships; National Guard involvement through the SPP; naval assets,
including USCG deployments. Most of all, USAFRICOM needs to maintain
funding and training for African partners that are poised to becoming
regional security drivers in their own right. These partnerships have
track records of producing consistent return on investment for
America's security objectives in Africa.
conclusion: threats and opportunities
USAFRICOM's priority is maximizing America's global advantage. The
dangers in Africa- terrorism, strategic competitors, climate change,
political conflict, and infectious disease--threaten the international
community as much as they threaten our partners on the continent. These
threats merge into a symbiosis that generates outcomes of violence,
resource scarcity, State fragility, and unrealized economic potential.
The only way to counter this toxic alliance is through the
collaboration of a team of partners: sovereign African nations, the
international community, and United States Government institutions.
Africa remains a continent of opportunity. Its nations and peoples want
freedom and democracy and a level economic playing field. These shared
values underpin our ocean-crossing ties.
The ties between Africa and our Nation date back to the Founding
Fathers. After the Revolution, Morocco and Tunisia were among the first
countries to sign treaties of friendship and trade with the United
States, and today they are Major Non-NATO Allies and critical security
partners for AFRICOM. Societies on both sides of the Atlantic continue
to grapple with the painful past of a vast African slave trade.
USAFRICOM seeks to secure a bright future by fostering positive
outcomes for Africans and Americans alike. To keep terrorists out of
the Homeland, we must fight them in Africa. To compete effectively with
strategic adversaries, we must do it in Africa. To protect the flanks
of our neighboring Geographic Combatant Commands, we must do it in
Africa. To energize the world's struggle for human rights, individual
liberty, the rule of law, democratic governance, and free commerce, we
must do it in Africa. In this struggle, USAFRICOM and our partners are
on the job.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Langley.
General Kurilla, you have rightly emphasized the critical
importance of leveraging allies and partners to counter threats
from Iran and Iranian linked groups.
Does our posture change with respect to the new agreement
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and how will it impact our
allies in the region or across the globe?
General Kurilla. Thank you, Chairman. Appreciate that
question. This agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia is the
culmination really of 3 years of discussions that have been
going on, but just recently by China.
I would say an agreement is not implementation. While these
discussions were going on, in the last 90 days, we have
interdicted five major weapons shipments coming from Iran to
Yemen, which those weapons are then used against Saudi Arabia.
One of those shipments included components of navigation
systems for short range ballistic missiles. Again, I think the
implementation is a completely different matter on this.
Chairman Reed. Will China be held accountable by the Saudis
if they cannot limit attacks against the kingdom and weapon
transfers, as you described?
General Kurilla. I think that remains to be seen, Chairman.
What is concerning on this is China's penetration into the
region. In the national instruments of power, they already have
their economic in the region, their information, their military
with the increase in sales of at least 80 percent over the last
10 years in terms of their foreign military sales. Now we are
seeing for the first time really their diplomatic.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. General Langley, you mentioned
the presence of the Wagner group in Africa and their behavior,
which is contrary to any decency at all in the world.
How are we trying, through the information domain, to
expose them and what they are doing, and also obviously expose
the Russian Government that is supporting them and sponsoring
them?
General Langley. Chairman, from the mil-to-mil perspective
in engagement with our partners, we do use information
operations to effect and address the negative sentiment in
their message, that destabilizes in countries in which they
enmeshed themselves in, especially in Mali.
That is very--has been very much present, that they have
this destabilizing activities. It has been--it is reinforced by
the United Nation force there, illuminating and amplifying some
of the atrocities that the Wagner Group is guilty of. So
therein lies the whole-of-government approach.
Since I don't have mil to mil, because of sanctions at this
point, but we still have a whole Government approach that can
take that mantle and still be able to do information
operations.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. General Kurilla, when we spoke
about China, we also speak about Russia.
The aid that Iran is giving to Russia now in the Ukraine
fight and what would presumably be the reciprocation by the
Russians in many different ways is another factor that has
recently emerged.
What is your response to that? What advice can you give to
us, and how can we limit this--the impact of this arrangement?
General Kurilla. Chairman, thank you for the question on
that. It is very concerning any time we see adversaries working
together. We do know that they have shipped hundreds of their
advanced unmanned aerial vehicles to the Ukraine.
These are the same ones that have hit our servicemembers in
both Iraq and in Syria. They are improving upon them based on
what they are learning inside the Ukraine. I am concerned then
with the support that Russia can give back.
As you know, the Iran State media announced the approval
of--don't know the exact number yet what will come out of the
agreement, but the Su-35 is a fourth generation plus fighter,
which has a lot of our partners in the region concerned as
well.
Chairman Reed. What types of steps are you contemplating or
we should be contemplating to try to disrupt or diminish this
threat that is emerging?
General Kurilla. Chairman, I think this will take a whole-
of-government approach to include all of the instruments of
national power on this to be able to prevent that.
Chairman Reed. With respect to the Iranian nuclear program,
they have made significant steps since the termination of the
JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]. Is there any
indication that either Russia or China would encourage them,
sponsor them, or on the other hand, discourage them from moving
further?
General Kurilla. Chairman, I will be able to talk about
that in the classified session immediately following this.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General. Thank you
both. Again, thank the men and women. Glad to see the Master
Chief is here, so you are well supervised, General Kurilla.
Thank you very much. Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let's stay with
Iran, General Kurilla. You can tell us in a non-classified
setting, can't you, whether the threat from Iran has grown
stronger or lesser in the past 2 years.
General Kurilla. Iran's malign behavior has increased in
the last 2 years, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Okay, and what do you need from the
Congress of the United States to meet this threat?
General Kurilla. As we look at the threat mainly that we
face is the ballistic missile and their UAV threat in the
region. One of the ways that we are countering that is through
regional agreements and a regional architecture.
As we go toward an integrated air and missile defense in
the region, we are making progress on that. So, what we need is
the continued resourcing, and I want to make sure that I have a
sufficient and sustainable posture in CENTCOM so that I can
accomplish the missions I have been given to make sure I can
mitigate the risk. If there is one area in the world, I believe
that can derail the National Defense Strategy, it is that
currently the CENTCOM AOR.
Senator Wicker. The resources to help you facilitate these
agreements?
General Kurilla. It is the resources, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Will--help us be specific about that.
Now, after the disastrous Afghan withdrawal, the Departments
assured this Committee that countering terrorist groups would
still be possible over the horizon. We have only done that
once. Is that correct?
General Kurilla. Senator, we--actually all kinetic--all
finishes in the methodology of find, fix, and finish on
counterterrorism targets are not kinetic. There is two that are
non-kinetic that we disrupted and I will talk about that in
setting that involved over five combatant commanders to disrupt
those finishes.
Senator Wicker. Okay, so two non-kinetic and one kinetic.
General Kurilla. Right.
Senator Wicker. Do you think we should be doing more of
those?
General Kurilla. It is difficult right now, as I said in my
confirmation hearing. It is a difficult but not impossible. One
of the things that we are trying to do is increase our
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance over that.
We are putting an investment into long duration, high
altitude, alternative airborne ISR [intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance] that can go up for days and weeks, because
right now I am spending 80 percent of my time transiting to the
region to be able to collect over the top.
Senator Wicker. Okay. General Langley, tell us what China
is doing. How far along are they on their base in Djibouti?
Where do you think they might likely be making their strongest
effort for a military base in West Africa?
General Langley. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
China's aspirations, especially at Doraleh, they are coming
across a thinly veiled front that is all for goodwill. But we
know that they are establishing, especially with the destroyer
that visited Doraleh last March, shows that they have
indications that----
Senator Wicker. Tell us where that is.
General Langley. Duraleh is in Djibouti. I am sorry.
Ranking Member, their aspirations are pretty clear. That is a
strategic line of communication, especially as it embarks upon
the Suez Canal and Bab-el-Mandeb, if they wanted to fully
militarize that. Duraleh is of concern.
They are saying it is all about goodwill, but I think the
other. They do have other aspirations, and in closed session,
Ranking Member, I know that I can be able to lay that out where
in West Africa is their next military base aspiration.
Senator Wicker. Okay, but tell us then if you can, and I
think you can, how that would affect our security as Americans,
and particularly to North America, if the Chinese are able to
establish a base in West Africa.
General Langley. It would put us--it would change the whole
calculus of the geostrategic global campaign plans of
protecting the Homeland. It would shorten--if they build any
capacity on the West Coast, geostrategically it will put them
at an advantage. Right now, we have the decisive advantage.
They cannot--we can't let them have a base on the West Coast
because it would change the dynamics.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Thank you, Senator
Wicker. Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Generals Kurilla, Langley,
thank you both for being here this morning. General Kurilla, I
want to pick up on a conversation that we had when we met a
couple of weeks ago, and I appreciated that opportunity.
One of the things we talked about was the situation in the
ISIS detainee camps in Syria. Can you give us an update on what
the current conditions are and what you are doing in CENTCOM to
help destabilize what is happening there, and what you need
from us in order for us to be more successful there?
General Kurilla. Thanks, Senator. I have been to Syria six
times. I was in Syria last week. As we look at ISIS in Syria,
it has three categories. The first category is ISIS at large.
That is the ones that we are fighting right now with our Syrian
Democratic partners, and I think we have contained ISIS, but
the ideology is uncontained and unconstrained.
The second category is what you may refer to as the ISIS in
detention. I refer to them as an ISIS army in detention. There
are over 10,000 ISIS detainees spread across 26 different
prisons in Northeast Syria. I went inside the Hasaka prison
last Thursday.
That is the same prison that January 2022, last year, there
was 4,400 ISIS detainees in there. They broke out. Over 1,000
made it outside the walls. In a 10-day battle that involved
both our United States forces, air power, and Syrian democratic
forces, over 400 were killed. Some escaped, the exact number
unknown, and then the rest were captured.
But 121 of our SDF [Syria Democratic Forces] partners were
killed in that prison breakout. What we are doing specifically
about the detention facilities is we are trying to consolidate
them now. This body provided funding for us to build another
prison, which we think can consolidate the vast majority of the
rest of the prisoners.
We also train the guards that are on these detention
facilities and the CTF [counter-terrorist financing] funds help
facilitate that. The last category is the potential next
generation of ISIS. I had an opportunity to go into the Al Roj
camp and into Al Hol inside and talk to residents. I talked to
women from 16 different countries last week inside the camp to
include the woman from Alabama.
I also went inside the Al Hol camp and I met three
teenagers who had been there for 6 years, and remember, ISIS
really didn't come to Al Hol until about late 2018. These were
people that went there to escape ISIS and escape the regime.
With the fall of ISIS's territorial caliph in really March
2019, it swelled from about 35,000 to 70,000, and currently
right now there is about 51,000 inside of Al Hol. Over 30,000
of them are children, and they are at risk from radicalization.
About 50 percent of the camp holds or espouses some form of
ideology, according to the camp guards, the camp
administrators, and the residents, and the other half are
trying to escape ISIS.
Really, the only role there is that we can do, is there is
no military solution, is the repatriation, rehabilitation, and
reintegration back into the society.
Senator Shaheen. Are we having any luck getting some of the
countries to repatriate those detainees who came from their
countries?
General Kurilla. Absolutely, ma'am. We have actually had
more success in the first few months of this year than the last
6 months of last year. About half of those IDPs [internally
displaced people] that are in Al Hol are from Iraq.
We work with our Iraqi security partners in the Iraqi
Government to repatriate them. They have done 1,200 in the last
2 months. At that pace, it would be about 4 years to get
everybody back. So, we are working with them on how they can
increase the throughput.
But right now, it is their ability to go through the Jeddah
1 camp, which is South of Mosul, as they bring them back. What
they don't want to do is just move one IDP camp to another, so
they are working through that process.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Well, I hope you will let this
Committee know if there are additional resources or other
supports that you need. General Langley, the map of Africa
shows where the Wagner Group is operating, but it doesn't speak
to the success or not that they are having with recruitment.
Can you speak to that, and maybe Senator Reed asked about
the success that information or disinformation efforts that
they have underway. Can you also talk about what we are doing
to respond to that in a little more detail?
General Langley. Senator, first and foremost, I mean, talk
about Wagners intentions. They are all about power and profit.
If they are going to give a false offering of security, it is
only for the elites in a particular country.
We are seeing that in Mali. Wagner failed in Mozambique.
They tried to entrench upon it, and that government, albeit
developing, did not like that false value proposition. They
have continuing actions in Dakar, a Central African Republic.
In that vein, I think Central African Republic is kind of
getting fed up.
So, there is no recruiting going on. It is all about
profit, making their way to gold mines, diamond mines, or rare
earth mineral mines. That is extension of the Russian
Federation.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I will submit a question for
the record on the disinformation efforts.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Fischer,
please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for being here today and thank you for your service to our
country. General Kurilla, how long would it take ISIS-K to
generate the capability to conduct external operations?
General Kurilla. Specifically, ISIS-Khorasan, Senator? It
is my Commander's estimate that they can do an external
operation against U.S. or Western interests abroad in under 6
months with little to no warning. In the classified session, I
will talk about why I make that assessment. It is much harder
for them to be able to do that against the Homeland.
Senator Fischer. Senator Wicker talked to you quite a bit
about over the horizon and our capabilities that we have there,
or don't have there in Afghanistan. Do you think that you need
any additional resources in our upcoming budget to increase or
improve those capabilities?
General Kurilla. We have been funded, like I said, for some
alternative airborne ISR that will help us get longer duration.
But it is not just about ISR. We are also increasing our other
intelligence efforts to get penetration into the networks that
we want.
A part that goes unseen a lot of times is the analytical
back side. These are the analysts, the linguists, and the
production capability that help us make the decisions. There
has been a significant decrease shifted from the NDS [National
Defense Strategy] to go against higher priority targets, but I
would like to see to make sure that we don't lose so much of
that capability that we cannot see the threat.
Senator Fischer. Because knowing that threat is obviously
very important, as you have stated, for the existence that we
still see in Afghanistan of the terrorist groups that are
there.
General Kurilla. Correct, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Have you requested authority to
conduct any strikes in Afghanistan against the ISIS-K targets
that have been identified?
General Kurilla. In a classified study, ma'am, I can talk
about where we are in terms of the find, fix, and finish on
them.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Do you still have a need for
munitions that can hit hard in deeply buried targets?
General Kurilla. I do, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Do you have specific requests in that
area?
General Kurilla. That was in my unfunded priority list
(UPL) last year.
Senator Fischer. Do you plan to include it this year?
General Kurilla. It depends on the full funding, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Would it be your recommendation and your
best military advice to this Committee that it would be--that
it should be included?
General Kurilla. We did receive funding in my fiscal year
2023 to include the additional procurement of the--its the
Massive Automated Ordinance Penetrator, which goes against
hardened, deeply buried targets.
Senator Fischer. Which are growing in number with our
adversaries. Is that correct?
General Kurilla. That is correct, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. What is your assessment of Iran and Saudi
Arabia reestablishing diplomatic ties? You talked about that a
little bit. But how does that affect our mil-to-mil
relationships that we have with Saudi Arabia?
General Kurilla. We have a very strong mil-to-mil
relationship with Saudi Arabia. I think this agreement is,
again, is the culmination of 3 years of talks between them. The
more concerning part is that China is the one that was
mediating this.
Senator Fischer. As we look at Iran and their proxies
throughout CENTCOM AOR, do they continue to pose a significant
threat to our partners and to our own forces in the region?
What more can be done to deter Iran from those malign
activities?
General Kurilla. We see Iran as the largest malign actor in
the region. Less than 60 hours ago, we had rockets attacked
from Iranian aligned militia group against one of our bases in
Syria.
Senator Fischer. What more can be done to deter them?
General Kurilla. One of the things that we are doing is
increasing our defensive posture in these areas. I want to
thank the services for providing a capability. So particularly
the Army has given us some tremendous capability in terms of
counter-UAS and counter rocket mortar at our bases.
Senator Fischer. With Syria and Iraq, what do you assess to
be the situation in Syria right now? Have you seen any change
in Russia's presence in Syria, or has that remained pretty
steady since the invasion of Ukraine?
General Kurilla. Senator, Syria is very important to
Russia. They have taken very little out of Russia since their
invasion. They have taken a small number of forces, some
munitions, but generally has stayed about the same. What we are
seeing, though, is an increase recently in the unprofessional
and unsafe behavior of the Russian air force in the region.
Senator Fischer. Can you give us an example of that here?
General Kurilla. I can. They fly over our bases with ground
attack aircraft with weapons on them in an attempt to try and
be provocative. But really, it is unsafe, unprofessional, not
what we expect of a professional air force. They want to try
and renegotiate the deconfliction protocols that they violate
every day.
Senator Fischer. This is not new Russian behavior, is it,
sir? Especially with regard to the drone incident that we
recently have seen.
General Kurilla. It is not new, but we have seen a
significant spike since about March 1, in Syria.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
General Kurilla. Thank you, ma'am.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator
Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like
to continue Senator Fisher's line of questions with regard to
Iran. If this was a 3 year of talks, how recent was China
engaged in those talks?
General Kurilla. Ma'am, I understand that it is in the last
several months.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, obviously, that raises serious
concerns, because I just took--I just joined a delegation to
visit the Abraham Accords countries, and the interest of those
countries, UAE [United Arab Emirates], Bahrain, Morocco and
Israel, is to broaden and strengthen the Abraham Accords, and
they were hopeful that they could engage Saudi Arabia in that
context.
This seems to me that that would make that extremely
problematic, because if China is involved, it would be very
difficult to have the kind of technology shared in the Abraham
Accords if they are now in alliance with China.
Second, if they are in an alliance with Iran, the whole
point of the Abraham Accords is to counter Iran's malign
threats. So, does this make the possibility of extending or
expanding the Abraham Accords impossible? What do you recommend
that this Committee do to focus on how we create more regional
alliances?
General Kurilla. Ma'am, I believe this is a--the talks
about opening diplomatic relations so much as this is not an
alliance between Saudi Arabia and Iran. They have had
diplomatic relations in the past while they were still shooting
at each other in the past.
This is really about opening embassies and opening
diplomatic relations when they closed the embassies back in
2016. What this does do, though, is that with China, the most
concerning part about this is that China is the one brokering
this because it shows that they are bringing the diplomatic
aspect of their national instruments of power.
What we see with China on the military side is that they
have a significant increase in bringing their equipment into
the region and their foreign military sales. If there is
Chinese equipment there, we cannot integrate it with United
States equipment.
As we try and build the regional partnerships, and we have
been there for the last 75 years, when we try and build these
regional partnerships. You want to be able to integrate with
your partner. If there is Chinese equipment there, we are not
going to be able to integrate it.
Senator Gillibrand. Understood. Can you, in this setting,
give us more detail on where China has integrated its equipment
in the region?
General Kurilla. China has sold equipment all over the
region inside the Middle East. I can take that for the record
and give you a specific followup for that, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you have a focused plan on what to
do about that?
General Kurilla. One of this is to increase our partnership
with these elements. Again, this is a race to integrate before
China can penetrate.
Senator Gillibrand. Would you recommend expanding and
deepening the Abraham Accords?
General Kurilla. I would, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. With regard to Afghanistan,
I would like an update on what we are doing to get our partners
out and whether those operations are continuing, and what are
the barriers that you are facing currently.
General Kurilla. Ma'am, the getting the partners out
through special immigrant visas. That is a State Department run
program. But from the United States, from the military side, we
are responsible for bringing them into a place called Camp As
Sayliyah in Qatar.
We currently have about 2,600 there right now. We provide
the in processing, the security, and the basic life support.
The State Department runs the actual immigrant visa side. They
are averaging about 60 days there before they are moved on.
In my understanding right now in the pipeline is about
85,000 special immigrant visas, but I would defer to the State
Department on the exact number.
Senator Gillibrand. Again, with regard to Iran, we know
that Russia and Iran have escalated their military cooperation
over the last year. How is CENTCOM coordinating with EUCOM
[European Command] to ensure that our forces are able to
respond to threats that touch both areas of responsibilities?
General Kurilla. I talked to Chris Cavoli often, the EUCOM
Commander in the SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe]. We
have done several operations that I can talk about in a
classified setting to create additional dilemmas for Russia.
Senator Gillibrand. My last question for you, sir, is you
activated the U.S. Space Force Central, which is responsible
for space operations within the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
How are you incorporating the space domain into planning and
training so that your subordinate commanders can effectively
integrate space into their operations?
General Kurilla. We think this is a very big positive of
actually having a component of Space Force. Space has always
played a large role in the CENTCOM AOR, but now I have a
Commander that sits at the table that is able to then integrate
more effectively because he has a seat at the table to be able
to do that.
We actually just finished a large with all the Combatant
Commands in the region to talk about the lessons we have
learned over the last decade of doing space operations in
CENTCOM.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. General Langley, despite the
size and growing importance of the continent, the 21st century
wars in CENTCOM, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the
strategic competition with China have dominated much of our
focus on this Committee. What might we be missing about Africa
that you think this Committee should take note of in the coming
years?
General Langley. Senator, I would say just aspirations of
China. The aspirations of China is threefold, one from a
geopolitical. They are trying to change the international norms
and they are using some of the African countries within the
U.N. construct, whether it be General Assembly or the Security
Council, trying to affect votes to change those international
norms and the international system writ large.
Then there is the geostrategic operation. Their aspiration
for military bases on the continent of Africa. Just talked to
my African partners, they don't want to be militarized in a
strategic sense.
The last piece, Senator, is geoeconomic. Our future economy
is dependent upon a number of rare earth minerals. Some of our
clean energy technologies depend upon the rare earth minerals.
About 30 to 40 percent of those minerals are on the continent
of Africa. That is forward thinking by the PRC.
They are trying to harvest and leverage upon that through
shaky deals, engaging with some of these countries so they can
corner a market, if you will. That is what I am concerned
about, Senator. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. Welcome, gentlemen. General Kurilla, I want
to return to your answer to Senator Fischer about the threat of
terrorist attacks originating from Afghanistan. If I heard you
right, you said you believe that such attacks could occur in a
mere 6 months out of Afghanistan against American citizens or
allies or partners in Eurasia. Is that right?
General Kurilla. Senator, I said abroad, which I would also
include Europe in that.
Senator Cotton. Eurasia. But you said less than--more than
that against the American Homeland.
General Kurilla. It would be harder for them to do that
against the American Homeland.
Senator Cotton. If you assessed 6 months against Europe or
Asia, what would you assess would be the timeline against the
Homeland?
General Kurilla. I think it is hard to put a timeline on
that. But again, I assess that they could in as little as 6
months with little to no warning, and I will talk about that in
the closed session as to why assess that.
Senator Cotton. How likely do you think a terrorist attack
on the United States or one of our allies is originating from
Afghanistan?
General Kurilla. I think it is a higher probability
overseas than it is in the Homeland.
Senator Cotton. When you add up all the troops you have in
your area-of-responsibility and American citizens who are there
for business or tourism or pilgrimages on any given day, what
are we talking about? Probably hundreds of thousands, right?
General Kurilla. At least.
Senator Cotton. Hundreds of thousands within range of a
terrorist attack, in your assessment, in a mere 6 months from
Afghanistan. Okay, I want to turn to Iran.
Senator Wicker. I don't think we heard the answer.
General Kurilla. Yes, I do assess it.
Senator Cotton. I want to turn to Iran. You said in your
written statement they can produce sufficient fissile material
for a nuclear weapon in less than 14 days. You also say that
deterring Iran is arguably more urgent now than any time in
CENTCOM's history due to one, their cutting-edge missile and
UAV capability. Two, their uranium enrichment program. That is
correct?
General Kurilla. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Yet you also say Iran is undeterred from
its malign activities. So that is not good. That it is more
urgent to deter them than in any time in Central Command's
history, but they are undeterred. Why is Iran undeterred right
now?
General Kurilla. Currently, right now we see them, that
their malign activity is increasing. We see them again in the
last 90 days. We have some of the highest numbers of our
advanced conventional weapons and munitions that we have seen
going from Iran to Yemen.
We see their attacks on our United States forces in Iraq
and Syria increasing, and we see the threat streams that I can
talk about in a higher classification.
Senator Cotton. I mean, those are more the results of the
lack of deterrence against Iran. Do they feel undeterred
because they feel safe that neither the United States or our
partners are going to threaten anything they hold dear?
General Kurilla. I can't say the exact reason why they feel
that, but I know right now when I look at them, I believe they
are undeterred.
Senator Cotton. I mean, there is a history--you are right
throughout your statement. There is a history of Iran being
deterred by the credible threat of military force or actual
military force. That is right, isn't it?
General Kurilla. I think that deterrence is always
temporal, so you can deter for a period of time and then it
will wane. I do believe the Suleimani strike was a deterrence.
Senator Cotton. We can go back much further than that. Iran
waged war with Iraq for 8 years and Ronald Reagan sunk half
their navy in the spring of 1988, and surprisingly, that war
ended just a few months later.
Iran also stopped its enrichment program in 2003, after the
United States had invaded and toppled governments on both its
East and its Western border. Then, as you say, they took only
very tentative steps toward higher enrichment in 2019.
After we killed Kassam Soleimani, they did nothing at all
for most of 2020 is that right?
General Kurilla. They--it was a higher level of deterrence
after that.
Senator Cotton. Last week on the Intelligence Committee, we
had our annual worldwide threats briefing and the director of
National Intelligence cited the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh,
a notorious Iranian nuclear scientist, in November 2020, as the
reason Iran accelerated its enrichment program. Do you agree
with that assessment?
General Kurilla. Senator, I think any talk of the Iran
nuclear program would be best in a classified setting.
Senator Cotton. I pointed out there is also something that
happened in November 2020 besides the killing of Mohseh
Fakhrizadeh that might have emboldened Iran, and that was the
election of Joe Biden that gave the Iranians confidence that
they were no longer going to be held militarily at risk.
Speaking of that timeframe, I think it was December 2020,
didn't we face threats to our personnel in Iraq from militias
and the Former President tweeted what he called some friendly
health advice to the Ayatollahs that if a single American was
harmed in Iraq, he would hold them responsible?
General Kurilla. I am not familiar with that specific
tweet.
Senator Cotton. That did happen. It is okay. There are a
lot of them. You don't have to be familiar with every one of
them. But I also don't think those attacks happened. So, I
think what we can learn here whether it's from Kassim Soleimani
or the tanker wars or anything else, that the only thing that
will deter Iran is the credible threat of military force.
One final question, I know you have added Israel to your
AOR, and you right in your statement that you readily partner
today with Arab militaries and the Israel Defense Force alike.
In fact, the inclusion of Israel presents many collaborative
and constructive security opportunities.
One of the opportunities I see is having Israeli Air Force
personnel training alongside American personnel on KC-46
tankers, which we expect to be providing them in the future,
and that is training that we can provide them so they will be
ready to operate those aircraft as soon as they get them.
Do you think that would be what you call a collaborative
and constructive opportunity between the United States and
Israel?
General Kurilla. I think when they get closer to getting
their aircraft, starting to train those pilots so they can
retain that training and go right into the execution of
operating them.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Hirono,
please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
turn to another part of your missions. In both Central Command
and in Africa Command, United States diplomatic efforts are--
diplomatic efforts are at the forefront of your missions. The
military-to-military engagement is one very important aspect of
your responsibilities, but your organizations are just one part
of a whole-of-government approach.
General Langley, I note your team's work in implementing
the 2017 Women Peace and Security Act. Amid the many extremist
threats in both of your areas of operations, it is more
important than ever, as far as I am concerned, to work for
equality for women and girls around the world. Generals, how
are your commands supporting and protecting women and girls in
your AOR?
General Langley. Senator, thanks for that question. As
Women's Peace and Security Act passed in 2017, I have seen from
afar what AFRICOM has started to do. We didn't wait for the
plan or the construct over years.
CENTCOM--excuse me, AFRICOM got after it. I saw this
because I was at CENTCOM and I was at the J5, and we got out
there as well at that time. But how far that CENTCOM and
AFRICOM has gone in the vein of the intent of women's peace and
security--Senator, I would like to just make note, we have it--
we have been to our Africa campaign plan to effect in working
with the Department of Defense to finish out the construct.
But we just didn't--we didn't wait for the word to go. Just
for your information, Senator, across the Horn of Africa, our
JTF [joint task force], we have a Major General Shawley, and
she is affected that in every exercise that we do all the way
down from Djibouti down to Kenya.
Even her, Valerie Jackson, Brigadier General, the United
States + Corps, as they work with other countries, they get it.
President Assad Sheik Mohammed sees a representation of our
talent base in our military and in our U.S. military, that 50
percent of the talent base are women, and they are showing that
it is effective.
It is--and for partners on the African continent, they
realize that. So, it is changing culture.
Senator Hirono. General, I think we have to be very
intentional about the support we provide to women and girls,
because wherever there is instability, and certainly both of
your AORs are characterized by what I would call instability,
women and girls are the ones who bear the brunt of the
challenges. General Langley, would you like to add to what
General Kurilla said? Because you are doing a, I would say, a
pretty good job.
General Kurilla. Ma'am I think----
Senator Hirono. Please.
General Kurilla. Ma'am, I think you are referring to me on
that. So, the--I value the program.
Senator Hirono. I am sorry. Yes, I was referring to you,
General Langley. Go ahead.
General Langley. Yes, Senator. In execution, as we work
with even in the West in our exercises, we ensure that we do
represent and within the spirit and a letter of intent, of the
Act of WPS [women, peace, and security], that we--that our
partners ensure that their culture is changing and women and
girls get meaningful opportunities within the overall
governance and society.
That is why I brought up Major General Shawley as she makes
her travels across. They see that America gets it and they
start to get it as well. It is very compelling, Senator.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. General Langley, further
question for you. You noted in your testimony the climate as a
challenge in Africa. Can you describe the destabilizing impact
of climate change on African nations and what we can do to
counter this impact, or these impacts?
General Langley. Absolutely, Senator. That is a driver of
instability, especially with irregular patterns across the
Sahel. We are seeing that. Across a whole-of-government
approach as I work with USAID, I would say just more
flexibility, trying to predict where the effects are going to
go.
We need to stay ahead of this, and that is why
Administrator power is action for non-humanitarian actions, so
she can move resources, so we can address the effects of
climate change, because it is hard to predict. Even the USAID
being an evidence-based organization can't predict where the
next, 2 years out, where the next atrocity is going to happen
as a result of climate change.
There needs to be flexibility across State Department and
USAID, then backed up by military, by building a capability,
adaptability within our partners and our military so they can
go out and assist the affected people as a result of climate
change.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am particularly
interested in what we are doing to counter climate change
impacts in Africa, because I agree that this is a very
destabilizing situation. So, I will continue to pursue
inquiries along these lines. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Rounds,
please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, first
of all, thank you both for your service to our country and to
your teams as well. A question for both of you.
With regard to our country's refocus with regard to the
threat that we see from both the other major powers in the
world, specifically China, Russia to some degree as well, what
impact has that had in terms of the discussion and the clear
evidence that we have turned from literally more than 20 years
of fighting terrorism to where we are now focusing on this
major power competition.
What is the impact in terms of the countries within your
AORs, and how are they perceiving the United States interest in
your regions of the world? General Kurilla.
General Kurilla. Senator, we are concerned. Again, as I
said, this is about a race between integration with our
partners and Chinese penetration into the region. There has
been a significant increase both in their economic $460 billion
in infrastructure development in the last 5 years, $2.6
trillion in trade.
Really, we see their military capability where they are
trying to sell military equipment and foreign military sales.
In the last 10 years, we have seen a 30 percent decline in the
United States, but an 80 percent increase in Chinese on foreign
military sales. When they buy a Chinese system, we cannot
integrate it into our systems.
Senator Rounds. General Langley.
General Langley. Senator, as Eric just alluded to, we had
the same effects on the continent as well, as far as
investments by--from a military standpoint, both the PRC and
Russia. How we partner--that really segways into the main issue
as far as how slow our 333 program of our arm, train, and equip
our partners. So, they do know that they have choices.
Now, as we saw down in South Africa, they want to show the
world that they have choices and that is why they had Mosi II
exercise. But up in our partners in the Gulf of Guinea region,
they are pressurized by all kinds of--by extremist
organizations threatening their borders.
They come in, they asked, and they said, hey, General
Langley, we don't want your boots on the ground. We want your
equipment. We need help so we can put up a good fight and take
care of these violent extremist organization across all the
affiliates.
But as slow as our processes are, we have 333 and also 332,
our other title 10 authorities is moving to slow, Senator. Just
moving too slow, and they make the wrong decisions.
Senator Rounds. Let's dive into that just a little bit more
for both of you. The foreign military sales, or FMS, is a
critical part of our foreign policy. It requires not just the
availability but also the approval process. Could each of you
share with me your opinion about the approval process and
whether or not there needs to be a more expedited process in
order to allow us to continue with FMS? General Kurilla.
General Kurilla. Senator, they say about 95 percent of all
FMS goes according to plan. Five percent doesn't, 80 percent of
those 5 percent are in the CENTCOM AOR. The challenge we have
is the time it takes to get equipment to our partners.
There is the DOD, Department of State, Congress, and
industry all have a role in that. But what China does is they
come in, they open their entire catalog, they give them express
shipping, they give them no end user agreement, and they give
them financing, which at the end of the day can end up being
some type of predatory financing.
But they are much faster to need, and our security partners
have real security needs and we are losing our ability to
provide our equipment so that it can integrate into the region.
Senator Rounds. They would prefer to have our equipment,
wouldn't they?
General Kurilla. Absolutely. When you buy U.S. equipment,
you buy--you get the quality, you get the training, the
sustainment, the upgrades, but you are also buying into the
bureaucracy, right now.
Senator Rounds. They just can't get it because of our
bureaucratic processes is delaying the delivery of that
product. If it is available, it is still a bureaucratic mess to
get it there.
General Kurilla. There is some that goes very fast and some
that goes very, very slow.
Senator Rounds. General Langley.
General Langley. Absolutely, Senator. We see that just all
along, and I fully concur with Eric about our training and the
capacity is more of a quality. But the sense of urgency,
especially in West Africa, across the Sahel, across Ghana, Cote
d'Ivoire and Benin, and Togo, they need equipment. They need
weapons now.
So even with our significant security cooperation
initiatives, that process is not any faster. It is designed to
be faster, so they make choices, and they make the wrong
choices in siding with--going with either PRC or Russia for
especially lethal aid.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Warren,
please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Biden
administration announced last week that it is requesting $842
billion for the Pentagon budget. It is one of the largest
budget requests ever.
Despite this already massive number, every year DOD pushes
to get even more money by using unfunded priority lists or what
I call wish lists that don't go through the other budgeting
screens. The services and Combatant Commands ask Congress for
billions more in funding for programs from these lists.
Other Federal agencies have to balance their must haves and
their nice to haves, but DOD doesn't. Instead, it games the
system by submitting a second list of items that they want so
that their budget can grow even bigger. I know that there are
colleagues on both sides of the aisle who are concerned about
this and want to see this practice stop.
Last year, both your predecessors at AFRICOM and CENTCOM
submitted these wish lists. So, what I am asking today is about
whether you plan to do the same. General Langley, AFRICOM
requested an additional $353.6 million in unfunded priorities
last year.
In its submission, AFRICOM argued that if some of these
programs weren't funded, it would result in, ``unacceptable
risk.'' So, my question is, this year will AFRICOM be putting
all of its priority projects, if it is that important, if it is
putting us at unacceptable risk, will you put that into your
base budget request?
General Langley. Senator, and just be transparent, I will
be submitting an unfunded priority list and here is why.
Because of the emerging threats. When President Biden directed
us back in last May to return to our persistent presence in
Somalia, and I took command a few months after that.
I asked, being a former programmer, I said, okay, what is
the fully burdened cost? I need to communicate to Congress what
the fully burdened costs. I need to communicate to the
Department first.
I did that. I did that after budget submittal to--from the
services to the Department. So that emerging cost was informed
by the risk that we have----
Senator Warren. So, you are telling me that this request,
the ink is not dry on the budget request from Congress and from
the President, and you are already saying that you know that it
is not enough.
I want to remind you about emerging threats. DOD already
has transfer and reprogramming authorities to deal with
emerging threats. You have the ability to come back to Congress
if you can justify an emerging threat.
We have a panel looking at whether or not there are more
changes that are needed. But these unfunded priority lists are
just another way to game the system. If it is a priority to
cover something like this, then I think you should be covering
it.
Are you telling me that the only things that will be on
your unfunded priority list are things you couldn't have known
about when you submitted your budget?
General Langley. Senator I--even my predecessor also put
the other piece of that cost on there on ISR. We never had
enough.
Senator Warren. I am not hearing a yes or no. Are you
telling me that your unfunded budget priority list will have
nothing on it except things that you could not have known about
when you submitted your budget?
General Langley. There is a persistent threat that we have
to account for. On that, on the list it will include that.
Senator Warren. That is what your budget is for, accounting
for the persistent threat. Let me ask General Kurilla the same.
Last year, CENTCOM submitted a request for $35 million in its
unfunded priority list. Are you planning to submit a wish list
again this year?
General Kurilla. Senator, I am. But on last year's, I am
the one who signed last year. That was for the Massive Ordnance
Penetrator for heavy, deeply buried targets. I do not have
procurement dollars in my baseline budget, that is why I
requested it.
Senator Warren. What you are really telling me is that this
unfunded priority list is just a way to say I need a bigger
base budget.
General Kurilla. I don't have that color of money, Senator,
to ask to request that, but what I what I do as a commander is
I mitigate risk and I go through my priorities and the missions
I have, and then when I have any risk left over, by the law, I
will submit per the UPL.
Senator Warren. You know, look, I appreciate this--you all
know I have raised this issue before. If we are going to have a
budget, we ought to have a budget. There is no reason that DOD
shouldn't be able to work within the budgeting process like
every other part of Government.
I am out of time on this, but I am going to be submitting
more questions for the record, Mr. Chairman, on what these
commands are doing to prevent civilian harm. DOD is on the
right path, but I remain concerned about whether or not we are
getting accurate and honest reporting. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Mullin,
please.
Senator Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
being here. General Kurilla, I just want to personally tell you
how much I appreciate your service.
Upon reading more about you, I was even more impressed. Any
of us that have been in situations like you were in Mosul.
Being able to keep your head in the fight after being shot
three times and still be able to direct fire, I commend you for
that.
That is while it should be common, everyone in front of you
or, and behind you knows that is not always common. So, thank
you for doing that. I want to talk about Afghanistan a little
bit. The American withdrawal from Kabul in 2021, as you know,
was a complete disaster. It brought in systematic failures from
the top down across multiple agencies. But it is not enough to
just say this was a disaster and move on.
Lives were lost and our posture on the world stage has been
forever changed. As you reach 1 year in your current position,
can you explain what you have learned in the aftermath of the
Afghanistan withdrawal and how we can prevent these types of
failures moving forward?
General Kurilla. Senator, just for clarity, specifically
about the withdrawal or overall?
Senator Mullin. The lessons we learned from the withdrawal,
and how we can prevent this from happening again, and how this
has changed your position.
General Kurilla. In terms of the actual withdrawal, one of
the top lessons we learned is the importance of partners'
access, basing, and overflight. We would not have been able to
execute the actual execution of the withdrawal without all of
our partners that we have in the Middle East----
Senator Mullin. I think executing would be a hard word to
say.
General Kurilla. It would not have been possible, at the
scale at which we did it, without our partners who provided the
access, basing, and overflight. I think one of the other big
lessons learned initially, it was just the mission was given to
CENTCOM. It became a five Combatant Command mission, and then
also with our partners, bringing them all into that planning
session.
Senator Mullin. Do you think people should be held
accountable from that withdrawal?
General Kurilla. I think anybody should be held accountable
if there is a failure in something.
Senator Mullin. As you know, there was a tit-for-tat going
on between a couple of people during that whole situation.
Gerald Mackenzie, General Donoghue. I found myself caught in
the middle of that as we were trying to get--out with the team
that I was part of. At the day we did end up getting over 300
Americans out. But it wasn't from the assistance of our
Government.
In fact, I found that it was easier to work for the Taliban
because I knew the price, I was going to have to pay for each
one, than it was to get them out dealing with, unfortunately,
us. In fact, Ambassador Pommersheim that was over Tajikistan
literally told me, Mr. Mullin, I was told not to assist you or
your group in any way. Unfortunately, it cost the life of a 3-
year-old young girl.
At the same time, I see no one, not a single person held
accountable. In fact, General Donahue is now over 18th
Airborne. The irony of that is he is looking over Europe now
and deterrence in Europe. General Mackenzie retired. No one in
the State Department has been held accountable. What does that
say to our partners?
Our partners that lost lives. I was with His Highness in
UAE and he was even upset about it. He said that if America is
willing to walk away from the billions of dollars that they
spent in Afghanistan, what does that say about our region?
He went on to say that I fought, him, his Royal Highness
fought in Afghanistan, his two sons fought in Afghanistan, and
every single soldier that they lost, he visited their house
personally. Yet we pulled out, loss of lives of--that didn't
have to be lost. Not to mention our 13 soldiers, marines. No
one, not a single person, has been held accountable. You think
that is right?
General Kurilla. Well, Senator, if I could. I have great
respect. I have known Frank McKenzie and Chris Donahue----
Senator Mullin. I know you do. I am very familiar with the
relationship. It doesn't make any differences underneath their
command, and no one was held accountable.
In fact, the only person that was chastised about it was
the one Colonel that came out and chastised the withdrawal
mechanism, and how dare him speak out negative about something.
I get it. I get the chain of command.
I remember he broke protocol. Don't you think someone--you
cannot sit here and tell me that that was successful
withdrawal. Don't you think that someone should be held
accountable? It was an absolute disaster.
General Kurilla. Senator, I served 5 years in Afghanistan
every year from 2009 to 2014.
Senator Mullin. I know. I am aware of it.
General Kurilla. I am vested in there.
Senator Mullin. So am I.
General Kurilla. The actual thing. I was not part of the--
--
Senator Mullin. I know.
General Kurilla.--force provider. But I would say that the
execution----
Senator Mullin. You were there before Donahue and you came
back. You know it intimately. I am just asking you, once again,
shouldn't someone be held accountable. If someone is below your
command, and they went through this, and they had an absolute
disaster like this, losing marines. Don't you think someone at
that point would be held accountable?
General Kurilla. I think it is an absolute travesty that we
lost those 13 marines at Abbey Gate----
Senator Mullin. But you don't think anybody should be held
accountable?
General Kurilla. I don't know if accountability has been
assigned to anyone, Senator.
Senator Mullin. Well it hasn't. I mean, I get what you are
saying, but you know there hasn't. At some point, we have got
to--our adversaries and our allies are both taking a look at
this and we look weak.
I know you are dealing with this and we are dealing with
this. It is time for someone to be held accountable. What I am
looking for is your help and your assistance in moving forward.
We got to right this wrong. With that, I yield back. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Mullin. This issue of
accountability is a serious one, but it would take in a 20-year
history of the struggle in Afghanistan. Based on the operation,
NEO [non-combatant evacuation operation] was one of the most
difficult operations, General Kurilla. Evacuating over 120,000
people was something I think was remarkable. Would you concur?
General Kurilla. I absolutely agree. Again, I think the
execution of bringing the people out was done very effectively
in terms of the numbers. We would not have been able to do the
numbers.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Senator Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Langley,
good to see you again. Thank you for being here.
As you know, I recently returned from a bipartisan CODEL
[Congressional Delegation] to Africa, where I had the
opportunity to travel across the continent to Niger, Zambia,
South Africa, Morocco, Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, and had
conversations with a lot of experts, senior leaders on a wide
variety of topics that we care about, including food security,
conservation efforts, critical minerals and defense.
While we, the United States, is doing a lot of great work
across the continent, I worry that it is not well known that we
are providing this. At the same time, it is clear that China
and Russia have a lot of influence in Africa. This concerns me
a lot, and I know it does concern you, too.
I mean, Africa has strategic importance to us for a number
of reasons, including that many critical minerals that our
defense industry requires are mined in Africa. This is
something that China knows and they have begun to exploit.
Last year, Senator Cotton and I introduced the Reshore Act
to reduce our reliance on China for these critical minerals.
But the important work on securing U.S. supply chains need to
continue.
So, General Langley, what are you seeing in Africa with
respect to China's mining activities and their infrastructure
development?
General Langley. First of all, Senator, thanks for that
question. Thank you for going on the CODEL, as I saw in Munich
when you were on your way down there. That that really matters.
That shows--those are assurance actions of our Nation's
leadership going on to the continent, and I thank you for that.
It pressurizes and it makes--causes hesitation in countries
that are thinking about picking the PRC or even Russia as their
partner of choice, because those are assurance actions that
matter and resonate.
Yes, I agree, we are not telling our story well enough.
That is why, when the CODEL came through, right after I took
command on their way to the continent, they asked what was
being done on the continent. Show us--we know what the PRC is
doing, their investments. Show us what we do. That is why I
provided a blue map just to show our investments. So, all that
falls into collectively across our whole-of-government approach
as I engage across the interagency and also State Department,
USAID, how we can be able to coalesce this into actions that
resonate.
Senator Kelly. General, can you talk a little bit about
what China is doing and how it is impacting countries that we
have had relationships with. I don't want to lead you into, but
I am really interested in the negative impact that China's
mining and infrastructure activities have had on the continent.
General Langley. Yes, Senator. So, yes, I also provided to
the foreign actor reliance on the African metal stores, and
that is a very compelling story.
For economic reasons and also how they go about striking
deals with some of the countries on some of our critical assets
for not only for our rare earth minerals that feed into our
clean energy, but also into the military side, as far as our
high technical type of our arsenal and equipment.
China is trying to harvest that. So, it is their engagement
with countries laid out on the slide, the last slide we have,
on the critical reliance on foreign minerals. This is our new
economy. This is going to be a big demand as we start to
modernize our forces and China realizes that.
Those are actions they are trying to take on the
illustrated countries that we have highlighted on here. So,
yes, it is a strategic consequence that we need to be able to
face and in turn to these countries to ensure that they have a
partner of choice.
Senator Kelly. General, how do we do a better job telling
our story? Because you got China in there making bad deals,
building bad infrastructure. This isn't good for the African
nations. You know, at the same time, the Russians have Wagner
in there supporting essentially terrorism. What can we do to
better tell our story on the African continent?
General Langley. Senator, illuminate and amplify. I saw a
good story this morning in the press about the Kenyans have
gone to the street tired of some of the stuff that the PRC is
doing for them, how they are taking advantage of their economy
and taking advantage of their environment.
News stories like that resonate. They change ideas. I
guarantee you the rest--if it happened in Kenya, is happening
all across the continent of Africa, and people read these
stories and it resonates. People are taking action.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, General, and Mr. Chairman, I will
have a couple of questions for the record. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. The--first, I agree
with Senator Mullin that we need to have some way to hold
people accountable for what happened in Afghanistan.
So, I have had a bill that would have a bipartisan
committee that would investigate exactly what happened there. I
want to thank the military for what they did, but the decisions
that were made don't seem to make much sense.
What does the American public not know about China that if
they knew would change--because I assume you spend a lot of
your time thinking about what China is doing all over the
world.
What does the American public need to know about China that
they don't know right now that maybe would impact, would have a
positive impact on impacting their ability to spend the
resources to impact Africa anywhere in the world? For both of
you.
General Kurilla. Senator, so I would go to what one of the
chiefs of defense told me. He says, you have no idea how much
they have closed the gap on you and your technology. This is
someone who is buying Chinese equipment.
I also think that the American public don't have an
understanding of how much they have penetrated into the Middle
East in terms of their diplomatic, informational, military, and
their economic instruments of national power.
Senator Scott. General Langley.
General Langley. Senator, I agree with my good friend Eric
here. China, we have enjoyed for a number of years a decisive
overmatch. But that gap is closing because of China's
advancements or stealing our technology, you name it. How they
are--the procedures they are executing to close that gap.
That is what has me concerned, and even in the economic
realm, as they are trying to harvest a lot of the critical
minerals on the continent of Africa, all that falls into them
being able to, from an economic standpoint, to actually try to
close the gap on that decisive overmatch as well.
Then also changing the international order and
international system as they try to get some of the African
countries to vote or abstain, something that is not along
social norms or the right thing to do in voting, especially
with mining or other things that--or humanity, or human rights,
because they commit some of those atrocities back in China or
some activities they do in Hong Kong.
So just changing the economic system. In those three areas
is where it is most pressing of the list of the activities of
the PRC.
Senator Scott. So, if elected leaders spend more time
explaining exactly what China was doing with the end result
that every American would call out China for their human rights
violations or stop buying their products or not putting their
devices on our phones.
Would that, you think that would impact their ability to do
the bad--you know, to spend their money on the resources to
counteract our military, not be able to go into places around
the world and lend money at unreasonable terms?
General Kurilla. Senator, I think education is very
important that people understand what China is doing.
General Kurilla. Senator, I think it will impose costs on
them as well that they will have to reckon with.
Senator Scott. Yes. General Kurilla, what is the optimal
cooperation you envision among United States, Israel, and the
Arabian, or Abraham Accords members? Is it air defense? What
would you hope out of that?
General Kurilla. I think there are several areas, Senator,
that we can do. The Abraham Accords are also economic, and I
think that is going to--the economic benefit you get in terms
of job creation also is a--reduces instability and some of the
Abraham Accords countries. We do have, we talked about Middle
East air defense. We talked about maritime security and cyber
defense as well.
Senator Scott. General Langley, you talked about what is
happening in Kenya. On top of the public being up in arms about
what is going--what China is doing, are the governments pushing
back at all in Africa?
General Langley. Senator, that is part of the problem,
because what they invest in, and when they strike these deals,
they are striking the deals for mostly autocratic or
authoritarian type of governance. Those of democracies have a
voice because they know that the people are watching. I think
it really matters what particular country that they are
pressurizing.
Senator Scott. General Kurilla, do you have the resources
and personnel that you need to conduct your counterterrorism
mission that is laid out in the National Defense Strategy?
General Langley. Senator, we are currently balancing the
missions that we have with the resources we get, and I am
adjusting risk every day dynamically with the resources that I
have. I am requesting the additional resources I would need to
be able to accomplish all of my tasks.
Senator Scott. Is what you requested is adequate?
General Langley. What I have requested is adequate, and
then it is up to the allocation of those resources in
accordance with the national defense priorities.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Scott. Senate
Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Appreciate it.
Appreciate you holding this hearing. I would really like to
thank Generals Kurilla and Langley for your service and for
being here today. I am just going to kind of get right into it
about Iranian aggression, of course, top of everyone's mind.
General Kurilla, the Pentagon estimates that hundreds of
American troops have been killed by Iranian backed militias in
Iraq and Afghanistan, yet Iran's regime has never been held
accountable for orchestrating attacks against Americans. The
men and women who gave their lives are taken by these State
forces. There are thousands of families there without their
loved ones as a result.
So today, Iranian aligned militias, they are increasingly
targeting United States installations, servicemembers in Iraq
and Syria via rocket and drone attacks. On a regular basis, we
know Iran, the world's leading State sponsor of terrorism, is
threatening the United States and our allied interests in the
Middle East and around the world again via both direct attacks
and also through their support for Hezbollah and the Islamic
Republic's other terrorist proxies.
So, could you discuss in this setting some specific threats
the Iranian aligned militia groups pose to the United States
and our coalition forces? What can we do to proactively not
just defend against them, what can we do to proactively maybe
push them back?
General Kurilla. Thanks, Senator, for the question. So,
again, Iran is the number one malign actor in the Middle East.
The latest attack we just had was less than 60 hours ago on one
of our bases in Syria that we know that was Iranian aligned
militia groups that conducted this attack.
We do see the threat that we face from them are from
rockets, from unmanned systems that are increasingly longer
range and more accurate. Just in January, we had three UAVs
attack our base in on Al-Tanf garrison in Syria.
That was Iranian drones that did that. So, we do see that
across the region, and also against our allies and partners,
whether that was from the Houthis coming out of Yemen against
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, or from Lebanese Hezbollah against
Israel, or from elements coming out of Iraq and Syria against
Iranian aligned militia groups.
What we can do is it is going to take a whole-of-government
approach to be able to go after this problem set. It is not
just a military solution.
Senator Rosen. So, we can work with you on the resources we
need to take care of that. Because I want to get to something
we talked about a little bit earlier, Task Force 59 and some
other interesting things we are doing, but really, Israel's
transfer to CENTCOM. It is now within your area of
responsibility.
It is my sincere hope that this realignment is going to
potentiate even greater military cooperation between the United
States and our shared goals, as well as greater cooperation
between our Arab and Israeli partners, as we see with things
like the Abraham Accords coming forward.
So, I know that I am pleased to see the increasing pace of
joint exercises between the United States, Israel, Arab
partners. Can you tell us a little bit about the progress you
have made in advancing the integration of Israel into your
multilateral maritime partnerships, like the very exciting task
force, the development they are doing. I was able to learn
about them when I recently visited NAVCENT [Navy Forces Central
Command] in Bahrain.
General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator. We think it is going
very well with the integration of Israel into the CENTCOM AOR,
including our exercises and our training as well. We did have a
bilateral exercise called Juniper Oak that we just did in
January, which was the largest exercise with 142 aircraft that
we participated with them in January.
When you talk about Task Force 59, that is our Maritime
Security Innovation Task Force. Is an unmanned and undersea
unmanned vessel task force, where we basically are enhancing
the manned platforms that we have.
One police car--one destroyer in the Red Sea is the
equivalent of one police car patrolling the State of
California. When we take a bunch of unmanned platforms like
sail drones and other unmanned surface vessels and undersea
vessels, they act as a series of indications and warnings with
sensors out there in a mesh network.
They can feed it back into a structured data base that then
we run algorithms against to help us make decisions. Is that
normal behavior, abnormal behavior, to then use our manned
platforms better to be able to get after the problem set.
Senator Rosen. I am going to--hopefully you will come and
show us all a briefing on what you are doing there. It is
pretty exciting. In the few seconds I have left, we are talking
about the region integrated air missile defense, naval maritime
partnerships.
How is CENTCOM reassuring our regional partners that the
United States is really committed to regional stability and
security? When we were there leading the Abraham Accords caucus
delegation when I was there, this was the number one thing
people wanted to know. Are we committed to the region? How are
you showing them that?
General Kurilla. I spend 50 percent of my time in the
region. We have a series of exercises and training events. So
last 41 training and exercises that we do multilateral and
bilateral, and that is the way we are trying to buildup our
partner capacity with them by integrating them into the systems
that we have as well.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I see my time is up, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen. Senator
Budd, please. Oh, excuse me, Senator Tuberville has arrived.
Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Generals,
thanks for being here, and thanks for your service. You have
got your hands full. General Kurilla, in your organization,
Task Force 59, has had some great success building unmanned
systems. I am familiar with one of their platforms, Saildrone.
It seems like these systems have a lot of potential for
both CENTCOM and the Navy, and it is encouraging to see your
command taking advantage of cutting-edge technology commercial
sector. What do you think has contributed to the success of
Task Force 59 work with systems like Saildrone?
General Kurilla. I think what is successful is the people.
It is the people that we hire that are innovative and creative
and critical thinkers. When we push these systems into their
hand, they are using them in ways that we never thought
possible. A lot the systems in the unmanned and the undersea
that we use, they are used for commercial fishing.
When fishermen go out, they are not going out to find fish,
they are going out to catch fish. So, we use a lot of these
systems with their integrated sensors.
I think Saildrone initially was used for maritime
oceanographic capabilities, and we have turned that into
something they can act as indications and warnings with the
sensors that are on it.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, we almost lost a couple a couple
of Saildrones. I think Iran tried to load a couple on one of
their ships. Was that during your----
General Kurilla. It was.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. How did that go out?
General Kurilla. We got him back.
Senator Tuberville. You got them back? Good. Well, that is
good to know. At one time, we had 60 balloons over Kabul,
Afghanistan. Our ISR is very limited. How confident are you in
the intelligence you have to see new threats rising from the
Taliban?
General Kurilla. Currently our intelligence has degraded
since we are no longer in Afghanistan. I believe we can see the
broad contours of an attack. Sometimes we lack the granularity
to see the full picture. We are working to close that gap with
our alternative airborne ISR and some of our other intelligence
that we are working to penetrate into those networks.
Senator Tuberville. It seemed like for some reason this
Administration is going to accept Iran developing a nuclear
weapon. If Iran does develop a nuclear weapon of mass
destruction, which the United States spent trillions trying to
keep out of the hands of dictators in the Middle East, how will
that scramble your AOR?
General Kurilla. It would change it overnight and forever.
Senator Tuberville. General Langley, I am aware of several
vacancies in key diplomatic posts. I was in South Africa
recently. China is there daily, trying to move in. Is that
important to you, the diplomatic post being filled?
General Langley. Senator, absolutely it is. It builds
capacity. As I talk about the 3-D construct, having full-
fledged bolstered capacity at our diplomatic posts is essential
and it makes a difference of us being able to maintain our
partnership and capacity. Moreover, ensuring our strategic
access.
Senator Tuberville. Could you talk a little bit about South
Africa and what you have done since you have been there, your
relationship that you have made and what you see coming from
China, and maybe even Russia?
General Langley. Senator, I haven't been to South Africa
yet. I will be going there in the coming months. But right now,
what I am really concerned about is Mosei II, that exercise,
that naval exercise. That was just a messaging campaign by the
Russian Federation and also by the PRC. So, I have been having
discussions with Ambassador Brigety down there and saying, what
is South Africa's story?
South Africa, they are--they have been a good partner. We
are building that relationship, but they don't want to be
pressurized in who they choose. So, I have to use assurance
actions to compel them that we are the partner of choice.
Senator Tuberville. Don't you think it is vital that we
keep China from overtaking that port there in South Africa?
General Langley. Absolutely, sir, because as we look at the
Cape of Good Hope and look at how much transit that our
commerce goes across, and it can also be a power projection
point as well. So, we can't ill afford, from a geostrategic
opposition, allow either the PRC or even Russia to use that as
a platform.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, I know it is not your purview, but
they are trying to do the same thing in Argentina, you know,
which is the point of South America. We definitely don't need
to lose those two contacts in terms of navigation. Thank you.
Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Kurilla,
welcome. Good to have you here. I, along with my colleagues on
the Committee, have worked to strengthen our partnership with
Israel.
In particular the collaboration and synergies between our
two countries in the innovation space, I believe probably has
never been greater, and it certainly is an area that I believe
the United States must do more to take advantage of our
friendship with like-minded, I guess you could call them techno
democracies that are highly sophisticated in that area.
I was proud to sponsor legislation creating a United
States, Israel Operations Technology Working Group to help
further the DOD efforts in that area. My question for you is,
if you could please speak to the strategic advantage that our
relationship with Israel offers in a global environment where
rapid innovation and the fielding of emerging technologies
rapidly is absolutely key to our national security.
General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator. Israel is one of the
world leaders in technology in terms of the innovation and how
to take that to the areas of national security. I have been
over there several times. I have seen how they are implementing
that. I do find that the relationship that we have with them is
already bearing fruits in terms of that.
I look at that in the counter United States field where I
have been all the way down from Iron Dome, all the way up to
the exoatmospheric Arrow 3. It is the ability to understand
their technology and be able to proliferate that as well.
Senator Peters. Right. General, at the end of this month,
we will mark the 8th year of the war in Yemen. This conflict
has been a humanitarian catastrophe for hundreds of thousands
of deaths, millions displaced, and tens of millions Yemenis
suffering from both famine and disease.
The war has been exacerbated by the role of a proxy
conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran and has been the people
of Yemen who unfortunately have been the victims and have
suffered as a result of this geopolitical strategizing.
Congress has been active in ensuring that United States support
is not the cause for any innocent suffering in Yemen.
A June 2022 GAO [Government Accountability Office] report
regarding civilian impacts of United States military support
for the Saudi coalition provided recommendations to the DOD on
measures to help mitigate civilian harm from our support.
So, my question for you, sir, is has the Department
developed and implemented guidance for reporting any
indications that United States made defense articles were used
in Yemen by Saudi Arabia or the UAE against anything other than
legitimate military targets?
General Kurilla. Senator, I am aware of that GAO report. I
have read it. I have seen it. My understanding right now is the
Department is working through any implementation instructions
from it.
Senator Peters. Very good. General Langley, drug
trafficking and the cartels profiting from that trade are
without question a global threat. AFRICOM is certainly not
immune to these issues with West Africa in particular now
serving as a popular vector for cartels to move products from
Latin America to Europe.
The drug trade destabilizes lawful governments, undermines
public safety, and provides critical funding and resources for
other transnational criminal organizations. So, my question for
you, General, is what efforts is AFRICOM making to strengthen
the ability of local governments to conduct counter-narcotics
operations and to attack this insidious trade?
General Langley. Senator, thanks for asking that question,
because that is of particular concern with our partners. The
Gulf of Guinea is like the wild, wild West of illicit activity,
especially the drug trade.
Two exercises that just happened in the past month.
Obangame Express. Obangame Express is where we--it had a number
of countries that come together to focus on illicit activity
across the Gulf. The drug trade is one of it, smuggling is
another, and transiting citizens as well across that region.
But it is inextricably linked to South America as well. So,
I work with General Richardson on that, and I thank this
Congress for legislation that gave us $200 million to address
this issue. But building partnership and capacity with African
nations, especially in the Gulf of Guinea, addresses that issue
as they build their maritime capacity. But that is also an
opportunity for another ask.
Hershel Woody Williams and even the Coast Guard when they
bring a cutter in, it makes a difference. This is naval
diplomacy at its best. If we can get assignment to another
ship, I wish I had another Hershel Woody Williams to cover the
other side of Africa continent. But just naval activity and
bolstering our partners' ability for their maritime expertise.
To buildupon that building capability is essential going
forward. Thank you.
Senator Peters. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters, and now, Senator
Budd.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. Good morning, gentlemen.
I want to thank you both for your leadership and your service,
particularly your commands of units in North Carolina at Fort
Bragg and Camp Lejeune. So, I recently returned from both of
your overseas areas of responsibility.
A common complaint from our allies and our partners is that
the foreign military sales process is overly complicated and
slow. It is just downright bureaucratic. So, in that vein, I
have a series of questions.
If you would, just if you would give me a simple yes or no
to the answer, and then at the end hopefully we will have a
little more time and I will give you some time to elaborate.
General Kurilla, is the current FMS process fast and flexible
enough to meet our foreign partners' security needs in your
respective AORs?
General Kurilla. In CENTCOM, no.
Senator Budd. General Langley.
General Langley. AFRICOM, no.
Senator Budd. Does the transfer of U.S. defense products
build our partners' capacity to provide for their own defense
and respond to threats? General.
General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
General Langley. Yes, Senator.
Senator Budd. Given the success of Western arms against
Russian equipment in Ukraine, is there an increased interest in
United States defense products in your AOR?
General Kurilla. There is a very strong interest in U.S.
products.
General Langley. Very strong in Africa as well, Senator.
Senator Budd. Thank you. Thank you. Is China increasing
arms exports to any countries in your AOR? General Kurilla.
General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
Senator Budd. General Langley.
General Langley. Senator, it is kind of flatline right now.
Senator Budd. But they have been before.
General Langley. They have been before in the past.
Senator Budd. Thanks. Is the United States still the
security partner of choice in your AORs?
General Kurilla. It is, Senator.
General Langley. Absolutely, Senator. It is in Africa.
Senator Budd. Is the United States at risk of losing that
security partner of choice status to either China or Russia?
General Kurilla. China is making inroads. I do not assess
Russia is.
General Langley. It is a risk, Senator.
Senator Budd. So, if you--elaborate that, if you could each
explain how FMS challenges are impacting strategic competition
with China and Russia in your AORs. If you would elaborate on
that, please.
General Kurilla. Sure, Senator. In the CENTCOM AOR, with
the number of attacks that we see in there, our partners have
real security needs, and so they want to have the equipment
they need fast.
What China is able to do is come in very quickly, open up
their catalog, let them pick from anything in it, very quickly
to deliver it. There is no end user agreement. But what they
don't do is they don't followup with it and they don't have the
training, the expertise, the sustainment, the upgrades.
What we do find with our partners is when they buy Chinese
equipment, a vast majority of it becomes non-mission capable. A
year or so after they have that equipment and we do see a
complaint from that. They want to buy U.S. equipment, but
sometimes it is the timeline to get it that is a hindrance.
Senator Budd. And the process----
General Kurilla. The process is what takes the time to do
it. There are I know that the Department of Defense has a Tiger
team to look specifically at what the Department of Defense can
do to increase it. There is four levers, Department of Defense,
State, Congress, and industry, and I know the Department of
Defense is looking at their lever.
Senator Budd. Thank you. General Langley.
General Langley. Senator, I have characterized in my
assessment since taking command that West Africa is at a
tipping point. What I mean is how these extremist groups,
whether we are talking about ISIS, West Africa, or even JNIM
[Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin] or Boko Haram, they are
all at the door, especially at the Gulf of Guinea states.
As I have done my travels, and I was in Ghana, they said,
we don't want your boots on the ground, but we would like your
equipment. All we need, in Ghana all we need to affect quad
initiative, which is a coalition of willing of states of Togo,
Benin, and Cote d'Ivoire, but they want equipment.
Before they go across the line of departure, they need
equipment. They want U.S. equipment but they know how long it
takes. So, there they are considering because these affiliates
are at their back door, they need something now.
They want to come with us, Senator, but the process is too
slow, and they need to be able to affect a viable offense to
help Cote d'Ivoire--excuse me, to affect Burkina Faso save
their own country.
So, we are showing a good--what we would like to see,
partner led, U.S. enabled, but we need to step up the U.S.
enabled at this point.
Senator Budd. You know, that matches conversations with our
allies recently. Can you please discuss how your requirements
for Special Operations Forces has grown, and what cuts to SOF
in strength would have on your operations?
General Kurilla. Senator, I rely very heavily on our
Special Operations Forces in the CENTCOM AOR. They are doing
tremendous work. Any cuts to in the CENTCOM region would affect
me significantly.
General Langley. It would take the heart out of our
efforts, both in the East and the West with our Special
Operations Forces of AFRICOM.
Senator Budd. Thank you both. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Budd. Senator
King, please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Langley, we
have been having a lot of discussion today about China's
activities in Africa. Is there any buyer's remorse? China has
sort of scaled back on Belt and Road to some extent, and some
of the debt issues are now coming to the fore. Are there
countries in Africa starting to rethink some of those
commitments? Buyer's remorse is probably the best term.
General Langley. Senator, great question, and in I traverse
for that, for any indicators of that, and I low and behold I
saw a story this morning out of Kenya. They have taken to the
streets of how China has been taking advantage of them in the
deals that they strike. Now, there are other indicators across
the continent, other stories of debt trap diplomacy that----
Senator King. They call it debt colonialism.
General Langley. Oh, yes, absolutely, Senator.
Senator King. So, let me followup if that is the case, and
it appears that it is, does this create an opening for us to be
more active in infrastructure projects, support for development
in these countries, that we can come in and show that it can be
done in a much more efficient and skilled way.
General Langley. Absolutely, Senator. That we do have--that
we see that as an opportunity. As we call it, a consolidated
strategic opportunity, and we need to match it up with key
strategic activities.
Whereas we can use a whole-of-government approach, we can
use Prosper Africa, Digital Africa, and get these programs off
the ground and going. I know that I have met with Assistant
Secretary Molly Phee last week and also, I was over at USAID,
and they we have a plan of action collectively, whole-of-
government to be able to put it in motion.
Senator King. You use the term whole-of-government, and I
think the private sector also has to be included in this in
terms of development of resources. You used a phrase earlier
that I noted about the Chinese efforts to monopolize and get a
hold of these rare earths and minerals. Forward thinking by the
PRC.
We haven't been doing that forward thinking. We have
allowed them to take control of, for example, lithium, an
essential element for EV batteries. Eighty-seven percent of the
process to lithium that goes into EV batteries in this country
comes from China. We haven't been doing that forward thinking.
I am suggesting that that is something we should start to
think about and it should be a combination of Government
action, but also the private sector. We don't do everything by
the Government here.
General Langley. Senator, that is correct. We don't tell
the good news story enough, and that is why I provided--well,
this, the blue chart here. But on legislation passed affect us
such as Prosper Africa is also a message to our private
industry to invest in Africa. That is what I talk about when I
talk to the country teams as they are heavily recruiting back
in the United States for investment in the African nations and
states.
Senator King. Thank you. General Kurilla, King Abdullah was
here about a month ago and he said the this was the most
dangerous moment in Israeli-Palestinian relations that he would
seen in decades. Give me your analysis of the status of that.
It seems like it is a very heightened sense of danger in terms
of open conflict.
General Kurilla. Senator, I agree with the statement of
King Abdullah on that, and we watch this very closely. We think
the conditions are there, the tinder and the kindling is there,
and we don't know what it could take for what spark to be able
to start a larger conflict in the West Bank.
Senator King. Let me just ask a sort of parenthetical
question. Often, we get the question about Iran's nuclear
capacity. Do you have a military analysis of what a strike, an
air strike, a significant substantial airstrike on Iran's
nuclear capacity would actually--what would be the impact of
that on their ability to move toward a nuclear weapon?
General Kurilla. I do, Senator, but I best believe that
would be in a classified setting.
Senator King. Okay. Thank you. One other question in your
AOR about stability, and that is Pakistan, a nuclear armed
country. They have had a lot of political issues lately. An
assessment of the stability and long-term prospects for
stability in Pakistan.
General Kurilla. They have an idea of what the military
relationship is there. I have a great relationship with the
Chief of the Army Staff, General Munir. I think the concerns
right now in Pakistan are their budget, their financial
situation, the current political situation, and the
counterterrorism situation as they see the three key Taliban,
Pakistani, the TTP [Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan], the attacks are
significantly increasing with the end of a cease-fire there.
Senator King. Are you confident of their nuclear security
procedures?
General Kurilla. I am confident of their nuclear security
procedures.
Senator King. Thank you. That may be the first good news we
have heard today. Thank you, General. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Reed. I thank you, Senator King. Senator Schmitt,
please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here. Appreciate it. I want to followup a little bit on
the question that Senator Scott asked. I think part of our
challenge right now is, as the newest or one of the newest
members of this Committee, it has become very clear to me that
China is an immediate threat, long term threat, intermediate
threat.
How are you going to characterize it? China should be a
very important focus of ours. So, one of their tools,
obviously, that they deploy around the globe is the debt trap.
I would like for both of you if you could help us communicate
back home to the folks who are wondering what are the most
pressing needs of the country, what is the most concerning
thing from a national security perspective, how that affects
what you guys do, and what are some of the most egregious
examples that you have seen in your roles.
General Kurilla. So, Senator, thank you. What I see again
is the penetration economically where they go in and they
provide infrastructure with the financing that goes with it,
and I can use an example in one country where they went in,
they provided infrastructure, and it was almost like a balloon
mortgage payment.
In the peak of the COVID crisis overseas, at the worst
point of their economy in this one country, they came and they
demanded their payment and it absolutely crushed that country
to do that. It caused them to see the way that China does in
terms of their debt trap.
There are several other examples also in the Central Asian
states as well. It is important to understand, though, what
China is doing. They are doing it for their own benefit, not
for the other's benefits.
General Langley. Senator, the same thing has taken place on
the continent of Africa as well. Whether in the vein of debt
trap diplomacy--here is the difference that makes us a partner
of choice. We go off aid first, financing last.
China does financing first, and that financing puts at a
disadvantage of those that are asking for the funds. Very few
times will they actually do any type of aid. So that is the
assurance action that it causes our partner countries on the
African continent to side with us.
There is a number of initial deals struck in a memorandum
of agreement in the Belt and Road Initiative across 40
countries across the continent of Africa. That is very
compelling. It hasn't matured yet to actually show the negative
effects. But in aggregate, we do communicate cautionary tales
from signing such agreements.
Senator Schmitt. Eighteen months ago, Israel was integrated
into CENTCOM, and I just wanted to find out how that has gone.
What your--is there, you know, fully integrated into that
theater. How you view that?
General Kurilla. It is going exceptionally well and we view
it as a net positive, Senator.
Senator Schmitt. Okay, that is great. I guess finally,
because I have got about a minute and a half here, we talked
about the debt trap, but I think that the building of the
islands in the South China Sea being fully weaponized with the
spy balloon that traversed over Alaska and the Continental
United States, it has certainly raised awareness, I think, at a
point now that we have not seen before.
I think and these are terrible things that have happened.
But I think the American people now recognize the threat that
China poses to the United States, and not just I think,
obviously economically, some of the theft from an intellectual
property perspective has been well documented for a while.
But clearly, as they try to project that strength into the
Indo-Pacific and the South China Sea, and those islands are
fully weaponized. Beyond the debt trap that you, illuminated,
what are a couple of other examples that you see that maybe
most people don't know about, that certainly raises a lot of
concerns and the alarm bells are going off about how serious
China is about global domination.
General Langley. Senator, I will focus just on them trying
to change the international order, trying to change the
international system. That is very compelling, and how they
engage with African nations on the continent, and how they vote
in the U.N. General Assembly. That is an indication that they
cannot gain a strategic advantage unless it is along their
norms, what they consider their norms.
Then the economic piece is very compelling of how they are
trying to corner the market on what we call some of the rare
earth minerals or even resources that are on the continent of
Africa, and how they are trying to strike bad deals with these
countries, extracting these resources without the benefit of
the African nations. That is a cautionary tale that needs to be
told.
General Kurilla. Senator, we see 19 of 21 countries in the
CENTCOM AOR have signed Belt and Road Initiative agreements
with China. That is for China's benefit. We have also seen 20
of 21 countries have Huawei contracts in them. They are
building smart cities and a lot of this is for Chinese
advantage.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Senator
Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for your extraordinary service to our Nation. I want to focus
on the Wagner Group, which I think is kind of the elephant in
both of your rooms, so to speak.
I am a strong supporter of designating the Wagner Group as
a foreign terrorist organization, which will have a
constructive impact. I would think, in both of your commands.
General Langley, if I remember correctly in your testimony, you
talk about the price of the Wagner Group in Africa as being,
``the failure of government institutions, the withdrawal of
stalwart security allies, the extraction of mineral wealth, and
long-term resource concessions and debt that chip away at
Africans' future.''
In Ukraine, as we well know, the Wagner Group poses a very
severe and immediate threat, not only in Bakhmut but throughout
the country. It is probably one of Putin's most effective
fighting forces right now, a mercenary, murderous organization.
The argument that I have heard against it is that
designating Wagner as a foreign terrorist organization
complicates our interests in Africa because governments doing
business with the Wagner Group could suffer sanctions as a
result of that business.
I think that is totally a bogus argument. I see no valid
reason not to designate Wagner as foreign terrorist
organization. Please give me your views. General Langley, and
then General Kurilla.
General Langley. Thank you, Senator, for asking that
question because I do need to message some of the atrocities
going on with the Wagner Group, not only in the Central Africa
Republic, but also in Mali since this past summer. They have
been reported on by the U.N. multinational force there of the
atrocities and egregious actions that are taken on the public.
This is very serious.
The Wagner Group, even though we know that to Yevgeny
Prigozhin, everything is about power and profit, but they are
inextricably linked to the Russian Federation. So, the further
they are on--the more they are on the continent, preying upon
fragile governance will be a problem and destabilizing across
the African continent.
Senator Blumenthal. So, would you feel they should be
designated as a foreign terrorist organization?
General Langley. Well, Senator, I will just--I will say
this, collectively----
Senator Blumenthal. They are foreign terrorist
organization, are they not?
General Langley. Senator, I think that is--if we have a
policy representative, you know, I will stay out of that. I
would like to just focus on what we need as AFRICOM to be able
to do this, and we do it in the information space. But across
all other--the rest of the whole-of-government, we do have
pressurizing things. I can take that into, if you--or let me
bring this up in closed session.
Senator Blumenthal. Of course. Let me ask you both. Maybe I
can ask General Kurilla first. Israel is going through domestic
unrest, protests. I have been visited by a number of members of
the Israeli military on a number of occasions, some personally,
who feel that this unrest is impacting their readiness. Do you
have any views on that topic?
General Kurilla. I talk to the Israeli chief of defense
often, I talked to him yesterday morning. What we talk about is
he is trying to ensure that his military stays out of the
political conversation.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you think that the recent proposals
for changes in their judicial system is in any way undermining
their readiness or preparedness?
General Kurilla. I think as you look at the Israeli system,
they have reserve units and that is where we are seeing some of
this manifest itself. But I do not want to make a statement
really on the judicial system without knowing all the facts of
what they are doing.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask to followup, I think it was
Senator Mullin who was asking you about our Afghan at risk
allies. I have been a leading advocate of the Afghan Adjustment
Act. I have played a part in trying to extract the translators,
guards, security personnel.
My own son served there in the Marine Corps. Actually, was
able to get his translator out of Afghanistan. But there are
thousands still at risk with targets on their backs. Having
served there repeatedly with great distinction, are we doing
enough to get them out?
General Kurilla. I think we have a moral obligation to get
those out. Again, we think the number is, you know, I would
defer to the State Department the exact number. The State
Department works the aspect of getting them out. Once they come
to us in Camp As Sayliyah, we provide the in-processing,
security, and basic life support for them.
Senator Blumenthal. I agree totally. We have that moral
obligation. Veterans groups agree steadfastly and passionately
about it. I am hoping that not only we will pass the Afghan
Adjustment Act, but also take greater measures to enable them
to escape the persecution, torture, and death that many of them
are at risk.
General Kurilla. I do applaud our veterans groups that are
doing--taking that action on as well.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and gentleman, thank
you very much for your service and your leadership. General
Kurilla, just a few quick questions.
Some of this has been covered briefly by a number of other
Senators, but we do have the great powers that are out there
putting a lot of pressure on us in Asia and in Europe. We also
have competing priorities here at home. We have got a financial
crisis. We have got Southern border issues.
Then the very sobering of fiscal outlook right now. We are
entering into an era where being able to support defense with
everything we have got has really slowed down significantly.
The belt is tightening and you have heard concerns today.
I know that the NDS has directed the Department to right
size your forward military presence in your AOR. Of course,
doing that, accepting prudent risk as necessary. So how has
CENTCOM improved the economy of force in your theater?
General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator. CENTCOM is 85 percent
smaller than at the peak in 2008. That was in the midst of two
conflicts. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, even in 2022,
we reduced by 15 percent, post-Afghanistan withdrawal.
What we require in CENTCOM is a sustainable and sufficient
force structure to be able to accomplish the missions we have
been given. Again, I go back to if there is one place that can
derail the NDS, it could come out of CENTCOM with a flash
point.
Senator Ernst. Yes, I absolutely agree with that. I know
the President, during the Afghanistan withdrawal, told us that
if we withdrew from Afghanistan, there would be a windfall of
resources to prioritize China. So, what resources did this
action free up in our budget, and then how did DOD reinvest
those?
General Kurilla. I really, Senator, would defer to OMB
[Office of Management and Budget] and the Department of Defense
on any cost savings. But I believe those resources were then
moved to against the higher priority of INDOPACOM and EUCOM.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you, and I would be willing to
bet there weren't as many cost savings maybe as we would have
thought. Different topic, but you have heard a lot of
discussion about the Abraham Accords today.
I also am a co-chair with Senator Rosen on the Abraham
Accords caucus. I am very proud that our legislation on air and
missile defense cooperation did get passed last year in the
NDAA, and it does help our partners with their security burden.
So, you have talked a little bit about this, but when you
are implementing this or trying to implement this integration
framework, what challenges are you running into now that we
might be able to iron out without legislation, and is there an
area where we might need legislation?
General Kurilla. I can tell you where we are right now. We
are making progress. We are going toward a shared air picture
between a group of countries. The challenge we have, though, is
if there is Chinese equipment that we cannot integrate.
So, whether that is a radar or whether that is an actual
air defense system, we can't let that touch our network based
on the--on what we know about the Chinese equipment. So, it
just is not compatible with it either. So that is the one
challenge that we have to be able to do that.
I am not sure what legislation--the legislation that could
help us potentially is how do we get FMS faster so they don't
have to choose to buy a Chinese system.
Senator Ernst. Excellent, and this has been a discussion as
well about FMS and whether it should be the jurisdiction of
Armed Services or another committee here in the U.S. Senate.
That is something for us to iron out. So, you don't necessarily
need additional authorities for implementation then, that you
are aware of?
General Kurilla. I believe I have all the authority they
need right now, ma'am.
Senator Ernst. Okay. I would just encourage our partners in
that region to buy American. Maybe that is the message that we
need to send.
General Kurilla. I would be happy if they just bought
Western.
Senator Ernst. Western--well, compatible----
General Kurilla. It would be great with all of our systems.
Senator Ernst. No, excellent point. Excellent point,
General. I do want to thank you for your tireless efforts to
build partnerships in the region. I was recently on a CODEL
where we visited Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the
UAE. I heard over and over again your name mentioned
specifically, and we described that or we have described that
in the past as leadership by walking around.
You did State earlier that you spend 50 percent of your
time in the AOR, and I know that that is greatly appreciated by
our partners. So, thank you for doing that. Truly appreciate
your leadership. Presence is power.
General Langley, I know that you are out there and engaged
as well. I do have a question I will submit for the record for
you. It deals with a 127 ECHO program, which I think is
incredibly important in your region to maintaining stability.
Thank you, gentlemen, very much. My time has expired. Thank
you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator. Let me note that the
vote has begun and recognize Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you for your service, testimony today. Very much appreciate it.
Your team members behind you. I know how much they put into
these kind of hearings.
General Langley, I want to begin by also mentioning, we
probably are getting the picture, we had a number of Senate
CODELs to the region recently. I think that is actually
important. I was part of the CODEL with Senator Rosen and seven
U.S. Senators to the Abraham Accords countries.
Started in Morocco. Really impressive ally, one of our
longest standing allies anywhere in the world. I don't know to
what specificity you can provide thoughts, and maybe this is
kind of even against your own interests, but it did occur to me
that I think it is time to have AFRICOM headquarters in Africa,
somewhere. Morocco, I think they would be a great candidate.
What do you think about that?
General Langley. Senator, this has come up numerous times
in the past.
Senator Sullivan. I know, and it has been blocked by some
Members of the Committee, and they are always like, well, we
don't know where to put it, so let's keep it in Germany. That
is not a good answer, right?
Come on, we don't know where to put fricking CENTCOM's
forward headquarters, but we chose Qatar. So, like, real
countries make real tough decisions. What do you think we
should do? I don't think that is a good answer, which is too
tough. Too many good countries, so let's keep it in Germany.
What do you think?
General Langley. Senator, I see the--I see some utility
being on the continent, but at this time, just with our
processes of getting down to visit to numerous countries has
been beneficial. As far as how we are laid out now, I think we
are right sized. Because when we are in Europe, there is other
partners there in proximity that we can plan----
Senator Sullivan. What about like a CENTCOM is
headquartered in Tampa and has a forward headquarters in Qatar.
What about a forward headquarters for AFRICOM somewhere in----
General Langley. Senator, I can talk about that in closed
session because we do have something established----
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Let me, both of you keep talking
and the military loves the phrase, whole-of-government, all
instruments power. We have been talking about critical
minerals, which is really important and a big part of the
discussion.
How much sense does it make for the United States to shut
down our critical mineral production capacity, as a Department
of Interior has done in Alaska, and then you guys come here and
say, boy, oh boy, we sure got to work on critical matters.
Do you think that is smart, like we have--not you guys, but
other agencies literally shutting down--There is something
called the Amber Mining District in Alaska, one of the resource
rich, critical mineral areas of the world. We had an
environmental impact statement Energy Information
Administration (EIA), 7 years, $10 million, ready to go.
Then the Department of Interior came in and reversed that
and said, hey, America, Alaska, start all over. We will keep
getting critical minerals from China. Were you guys informed of
that? Were you informed of that interior making that idiotic
national security decision?
General Langley. No, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think it makes sense for us to
look at areas of critical mineral capacity in America and say,
we are not going to do that because lower 48 environmental
groups don't like it. You would think that makes sense from a
national security perspective to shut down our critical mineral
production when this whole hearing has been about critical
minerals? Does that make sense? General, in your personal
opinion?
General Langley. Senator, I am just here to pass a
cautionary tale about China and their illicit activities on the
continent of trying to corner the critical----
Senator Sullivan. But if we can help uncorner it by
producing our own, doesn't that make sense?
General Langley. Senator, I don't have a position on that.
Senator Sullivan. Come on, General, you do have a position.
You just don't want to say it. What is your personal opinion on
that? Does it make sense to produce more critical minerals in
America if we have them?
General Langley. Senator, we can discuss that in that
closed session about essentials for----
Senator Sullivan. This is the problem, you talk all
instruments of power, whole-of-government, and we don't do it.
Again, that is not you, but it is Biden, it is the
Administration. It is national security suicide, and we do it
every damn day. We have shut down resource development in our
own country. It is idiotic.
That is the right answer, by the way. Real quick, General
Kurilla, you mentioned Iran taking shots at our troops. Are we
retaliating against them? I think one of the lessons we learned
when they were providing very sophisticated IEDs [improvised
explosive device] to kill and wound thousands of Americans in
the 2005, 2006, 2007 timeframe, that that was a bad signal to
let them just kill our people, the best and brightest in
America.
I am sure you lost soldiers to the Quds Force, IEDs, and
until we killed Soleimani, which I think was a really important
message, we weren't retaliating. So, I hope either covertly or
overtly, when these guys are trying to kill Americans, which
they are pretty good at and they do a lot, that we are sending
messages like, all right, you want to try and kill Americans,
game on.
What are we doing to retaliate against these guys?
General Kurilla. Senator, I am prepared to retaliate
overtly, but also not all responses are overt.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. But can you assure this Committee
that we are not just letting them try to attack Americans? You
have already mentioned that they are--without some form of
retaliation.
General Kurilla. Senator, we have all the capability to be
able to retaliate. But not all retaliations are overt.
Senator Sullivan. Good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan, and thank you,
gentlemen, for your testimony. We have a vote on, so I would
encourage all my colleagues to vote, and we will reconvene
within about 15 minutes in SVC-217 for the closed session of
this hearing. I will now adjourn the open session. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
united states africa command
1. Senator Reed. General Langley, the United States provides
limited but growing assistance to fight severe malnutrition including
through the distribution of U.S.-made Ready to Use Therapeutic Food
(RUTF). From your perspective, how important are such efforts to United
States Africa Command (AFRICOM) mission to ``advance U.S. national
interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity''?
General Langley. United States humanitarian and food security
assistance is critical to United States Africa Command's (AFRICOM)
mission to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional
security, stability, and prosperity. Twentyseven of the fiftythree
countries in my Area of Responsibility are enduring complex
humanitarian and food security emergencies due to a myriad of factors.
These countries cannot focus on security, stability, and prosperity
when a significant percentage of their populations are struggling to
meet basic needs. When populations are malnourished and under duress,
this impacts every aspect of their human development and increases
their vulnerability to communicable diseases such as COVID which
impacts global health security. When populations are malnourished and
under duress, AFRICOM cannot achieve our objectives to build partner
capacity and sustain security. In addition, when complex humanitarian
crises persist involving conflict, DOD inherits more issues to address
such as violent extremism and protracted State failure that our
adversaries are taking advantage of like Wagner in Mali, Central
African Republic and other areas. USG efforts, particularly USAID's
efforts in AFRICOM's area of responsibility, to address critical human
development concerns such as malnutrition and food security are vital
to AFRICOM's mission.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
future use of unfunded priorities lists (upls)
2. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley,
historically, have previous Unfunded Priorities Lists items been
included in the following year's base budget?
General Kurilla. Mission-critical items requiring funding outside
the base budget have historically been addressed in subsequent budget
submissions.
General Langley. Yes, although USAFRICOM's objective is to have
requirements captured in the Department's base budget. The Command has
submitted Unfunded Priority List (UPL) items in the past. For example,
in fiscal year 2021 and fiscal year 2023, Congress provided $22 million
for Force Protection and $14.5 million for Force Protection,
respectively. During the annual fiscal year 2024 Program Budget Review
(PBR) cycle, the Department included in the base budget $99.2 million
($269.7 million across the Future Years Defense Program-fiscal years
2024 to 2028) for Force Protection to support physical protection at
several in-theater posture locations.
3. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, have
Unfunded Priorities Lists items from fiscal year 2023 been included in
the fiscal year 2024 base budget? If yes, please provide detail
including the requested item, funding amount, and vendor executing the
effort. If no, why not?
General Kurilla. For the fiscal year 2023 budget, we requested
Congress consider adding $35 million to replace the stockpile of the
GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator. The Massive Ordnance Penetrator
allows us to neutralize or destroy hardened, deeply buried targets.
This stockpile has dipped below validated levels due to necessary live
fire testing performed with the weapon system. The Fiscal Year 2023
Unfunded Priorities List submission simply allows us to replace those
munitions expended in the testing. The U.S. Air Force chose not to add
this to their fiscal year 2024 base budget until they complete a study
on the potential replacement for this munition. The U.S. Air Force did
fund in fiscal year 2023 additional testing on the GBU-57.
General Langley. Yes. The command submitted fiscal year 2023
Unfunded Priority List (UPL) items to Congress for $23.5 million for
Force Protection and for $70.1 million for Counter-Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (C-UAS). The Department, during the annual fiscal year 2024
Program Budget Review (PBR) cycle, included in the base budget $99.2
million ($269.7 million across the Future Years Defense Program--fiscal
years 2024 to 2028) for the Force Protection submission to support
physical protection at several in-theater posture locations and
provided additional funding to the Joint C-UAS Office. USAFRICOM does
not have acquisition authority and can only provide limited information
on vendors. The Force Protection vendor in fiscal year 2024 will come
from the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contracts
and equipment purchases awarded to several vendors over the fiscal
year.
4. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, do you
agree that Federal agencies should be required to work within the
confines of base budget process?
General Kurilla. U.S. Central Command follows the budget process
directed by the Department of Defense and the U.S. Congress. The Fiscal
Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act requires Combatant
Commands to submit an Unfunded Priority List.
As a Combatant Command with few assigned forces and no acquisition
body, CENTCOM relies on the Military Services for most resourcing. The
Unfunded Priorities List allows us to inform the Department of Defense
regarding which of our mission-critical capabilities are not resourced
by the Military Services.
Additionally, the congressionally mandated Unfunded Priority List
program offers an opportunity to resource against changes within the
operational environment since delivery of the base budget. In so doing,
the program allows CENTCOM to buy down risk to force and risk to
mission.
General Langley. I agree that all Federal agencies should be good
stewards of taxpayer dollars and to abide by the law. The Department's
fiscal year 2024 budget request seeks to adequately fund the efforts
necessary to implement the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS).
AFRICOM follows the current statute for submitting an annual Unfunded
Priority List (UPL) as described within the 2017 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 222a and as amended in the Fiscal
Year 2022 NDAA, Section 1051, that ``the commanders of combatant
commands shall submit to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the congressional defense committees
a report on the unfunded priorities of the combatant commands.''
information on unfunded priorities lists
5. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what was
the cost of putting together this Unfunded Priorities List?
General Kurilla. Development of the Unfunded Priority List is part
of our annual research and budget analysis, a core staff function for
U.S. Central Command, and elicits no additional cost.
General Langley. AFRICOM's internal fiscal year 2024 Unfunded
Priority List (UPL) development process did not incur any additional
costs over and above day-to-day costs to the Command. Instead, the
fiscal year 2024 UPL was developed over a 3-month period by one full-
time GS-13 Federal civilian employee and two O-4 military members, at a
reduced quarter-time need, working within the United States Africa
Command's J8 Resources and Assessments Directorate (ACJ8). Three O-5
military member subject matter experts (SME) and three GS-13 civilian
employee SMEs also contributed at a reduced one-tenth need from three
separate Command joint directorates (ACJ2/ACJ4/ACJ6). From these
actualities, a nominal cost can be produced using the following
assumptions: 1) a GS-13 Federal civilian or an O-5 military member
costs approximately $120K annually; 2) one ACJ8 GS-13 working at full-
time; 3) two ACJ8 O-4s working at one-quarter time; and six other
directorate SMEs working at one-tenth time. With these assumptions, the
total cost for the Command to develop the fiscal year 2024 UPL equals
approximately $63,000. This is a low-cost investment for providing risk
mitigation to emerging and/or unfunded Command requirements that were
unable to be fulfilled within the Department's top-line.
For each item on the unfunded priorities list you submit in
response to Title 10 U.S.C. 222a, please provide the following
information:
6. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, please
provide a detailed description of the Unfunded Priorities Lists.
General Kurilla.
Providing for Air Defense
a. Air Vigilance Operations and Sustainment:
Executive Summary: Countering Unmanned Aerial Systems is a top
CENTCOM priority. State and non-State actors continue to mature their
Unmanned Aerial Systems capabilities, tactics, techniques, and
procedures at an alarming rate and present a direct threat to the
United States and its regional partners and allies.
Operational Impact / Risk to NDS: The Air Vigilance system delivers
a ground-based passive signals intelligence sensor employed to detect,
track, identify, geo-locate, and report UAS threat activities. Within
the CENTCOM area of responsibility, 18 Air Vigilance systems in eight
countries provide force protection capability for both forces and
critical infrastructure.
b. Crestone UxS Data base Inventory:
Executive Summary: Crestone is being used operationally throughout
the CENTCOM region to identify and track specific signals of interest.
Funding will be used to hire additional engineers, shorten testing
timelines, and expand the signal of interest library capacity to
enhance defeat options against the UAS threat throughout the CENTCOM
AOR.
Operational Impact / Risk to NDS: Additional investment in Air
Vigilance and CRESTONE systems sustains operational capability to
collect critical intelligence data on emerging aerial threat systems
and provide early warning of operations in restricted air space. The
requested funding supports the required communications transport layer
and the maintenance services for power, heating-ventilation-air
conditioning, and Intrusion Detection Systems. Any loss or degradation
of our ability to collect and report on adversarial attack vectors and
share collected data with other Geographic Combatant Commanders
increases operational risk to United States and Partner Forces.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CENTCOM Fiscal Year
2023 Unfunded Sub- Program Amount ($
Priority Priorities Budget Activity Element in
Line Item Number Group (SAG) (PE) millions)
(LIN) Number
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tactical Electronic 121 0603766A $14.7
1 Surveillance System--
Adv Development / Air
Vigilance Operations
and Sustainment
------------------------------------------------------------
AF TENCAP / CRE012CE 0207247F $15.0
Data base
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Building Joint Force Resiliency / Agile Logistics
a. Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel (PWRM) Stockpile Readiness:
Executive Summary: Sufficient PWRM stocks are a necessity to
compensate for the lack of forces and footprint in theater. Additional
investment will help build a long-term enduring advantage in managing
risk and preparing to respond to small-scale, short-duration crises
without substantially impairing high-end warfighting readiness caused
by the diversion of resources. Contingency preparedness in the form of
PWRM readiness is foundational to deterrence. Mobile prepositioned
stocks are critical to quickly stand up temporary and smaller-scale
logistical support locations near the point of use as conflict unfolds.
Operational Impact / Risk to NDS: Without PWRM levels requested,
CENTCOM is unable to fully meet contingency plan operational base
requirements in the specified time period. Funding is critical to
filling shortages of bed-down and life support systems, fuel support
distribution and storage equipment, and rapid runway repair sets. The
requested $125.1 million will replenish PWRM stockpiles up to the
quantity required to achieve a C-1 readiness rating.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CENTCOM Fiscal Year
2024 Unfunded Sub- Program
Priority Priorities Budget Activity Element Cost ($ in
Line Item Number Group (SAG) (PE) millions)
(LIN) Number
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Expeditionary 021D 0401135F $82.2
Airfield Basing
Assets (BEAR, AGE,
RADR)
------------------------------------------------------------
WRM Equipment / 021D 0208031F $25.6
2 Secondary Items
(Fuels Support Equip)
------------------------------------------------------------
Globally Positioned 041Z 0708550F $16.0
Network CENTCOM (GPN-
CENT)
------------------------------------------------------------
WRM Equipment / 212 0208031A $4.1
Secondary Items (APS-
5)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Innovation
a. Data Analysis and Artificial Intelligence (AI) Initiative
Baseline:
Executive Summary: Additional investment is critical in moving
CENTCOM toward leveraging data as a strategic asset. CENTCOM's military
advantage is increasingly reliant on data-driven technologies and the
integration of diverse data sources, elastic computing to the edge, and
rapid software deployment. Data provides new ways and means to monitor,
respond, and deter aggression at the speed of operations.
Operational Impact / Risk to NDS: CENTCOM requests $8 million to
recruit data scientists and provide hardware and technology capable of
processing large amounts of code, and data libraries.
b. Maven Smart System (MSS) Enterprise Licenses:
Executive Summary: CENTCOM's military advantage is increasingly
reliant on data-driven technologies and the integration of diverse data
sources, elastic computing to the edge, and rapid software deployment.
Information sharing and data analytics are principal mechanisms for
understanding China's encroachment, illuminating Russia's activities,
disrupting Iran's UAS / Advanced Conventional Weapons supply chains,
and spoiling ISIS and AQ external operations. We are currently using
MSS as a component of our Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2)
capability in CENTCOM.
Operational Impact / Risk to NDS: Funding provides CENTCOM with an
enterprise license for users of MSS as a component of our JADC2
capability. MSS allows users to explore and visualize the battlefield
while increasing ability to anticipate, monitor, and respond to
destabilizing activities from strategic competitors. Leveraging MSS as
a strategic asset provides new ways and means to monitor, respond, and
deter aggression at the speed of operations.
c. Cloud Computing Environment / Cloud Transition:
Executive Summary: Cloud Computing Environment is the foundation
upon which CENTCOM builds and tailors effective cyber security,
advanced analytical capabilities, command and control, and future
enabling technologies. CENTCOM cloud strategy focuses on agility,
flexibility, and modernization. Rapid delivery of enterprise resources
and services result in an organization equipped to respond and fight in
the digital age. When mission needs change, a flexible cloud-based IT
enterprise can rapidly scale or reallocate resources or react and
remediate incidents. The desired end State is to establish a multi-
vendor, multi-cloud ecosystem that hosts both on-and off-premise
services across all classification levels.
Operational Impact / Risk to NDS: Funding facilitates CENTCOM's
migration to this new capability and provides resources to leverage
existing systems and develop tools and protocols for secure operations
and applications. Without these funds, CENTCOM falls short of meeting
DOD CIO mandates. CENTCOM and coalition partner operations are put at
risk due to increased network security threats due to the inability to
securely manage and implement critical software / firmware updates on
all networks and systems throughout the Command.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CENTCOM Fiscal Year Program
2024 Unfunded Sub- Element Amount ($
Priority Priorities Line Item Activity (PE) in
Number (LIN) Group (SAG) Number millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CCMD Dir015FMsn 0201138F $8.0
Support / Data
Analysis and AI
Initiative
------------------------------------------------------------
3 CCMD Dir015FMsn 0201138F $34.0
Support / MSS
Licenses
------------------------------------------------------------
CCMD Dir015FMsn 0201122F $30.0
Support / Cloud
Transition /
Computing
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active Campaigning:
Executive Summary: Full Motion Video Extension Unified Relay
(FEURY) serves as a critical enabler of precision strikes, force
protection, and mission command within the Combined Joint Operations
Area (CJOA). Since January 2022, seven Operation Inherit Resolve (OIR)
FEURY sites have enabled 53 airstrikes, linked to 1,779 Rover feeds,
and supported 5,672 total mission hours in the ongoing fight against
Da'esh and Iranian-Aligned Militia Groups (IAMG). The situational
awareness that FEURY provides is vital to the exercise of mission
command, even when not resulting in an airstrike. In January 2022,
FEURY provided decisionmakers and operators real-time, situational
awareness of a prison break in Syria. FEURY was a vital link in
coordinating ground force responses used to contain the situation.
FEURY also gives Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherit Resolve
(CJTF-OIR) the ability to monitor politically sensitive sites and the
Iraqi forces the ability to leverage their airpower in protecting
United States forces in a theater constrained by Force Manning Level
(FML) limits and competing NDS priorities.
Operational Impact / Risk to NDS. Service funding support for seven
FEURY nodes in the CENTCOM area of responsibility ends in November
2023. CJTF-OIR requires support for these seven FEURY nodes for an
additional year to preclude gaps in Full Motion Video (FMV) capability
while alternative means for providing similar capability is pursued.
Complete loss of FEURY FMV would severely degrade CJTF-OIR's ability to
identify and prosecute targets, execute mission command, and place
personnel and CJTF-OIR missions at risk.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CENTCOM Fiscal Year Program
2024 Unfunded Sub- Element Amount ($
Priority Priorities Line Item Activity (PE) in
Number (LIN) Group (SAG) Number millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Agile ISR / Full 011C 0305206F $12.0
Motion Video
Extension Unified
Relay (FEURY)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Digital Modernization
Executive Summary: CENTCOM Digital Modernization is essential to
the Command's ability to maintain information and decision advantage,
preserve C4 systems, and ensure critical kill chains. CENTCOM's Digital
Modernization plan applies the Department of Defense 2019 Digital
Modernization Strategy principles to develop its Future Mission
Environment. The Future Mission Environment is an essential element for
integrating CENTCOM into Joint All Domain Command and Control and the
DOD Mission Partner Environment.
Operational Impact / Risk to NDS: The Future Mission Environment
replaces legacy counter-violent extremist organization-oriented
capabilities developed over the past 3 decades that tether the Command
to fixed information technology hubs that are becoming increasingly
vulnerable to state-based adversaries. Future Mission Environment
implementation requires several Digital Modernization enhancements.
Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) / Internet Protocol v6:
Executive Summary: In existing CENTCOM networks, users and endpoint
devices are automatically trusted within the perimeter and put the
organization at risk from malicious internal actors and those with
assumed legitimate credentials with unauthorized and compromised
accounts-wide access within the network.
Operational Impact / Risk to NDS: With funding for Zero Trust
Architecture, CENTCOM will be able to implement networks that leverage
micro-segmentation, security monitoring and response, and general
protective / preventative controls that improve an organization's cyber
security posture and reduce risk.
Software Defined Networks:
Executive Summary. Software Defined Networks use software-based
controllers or application programming interfaces to communicate with
underlying hardware infrastructure to direct network traffic. Use of
this approach is directed in the DOD Zero Trust Reference Architecture
/ Software Defined Networking, December 2020. SDN benefits include cost
savings realized through reductions in time spent on manual tasks and
improved utilization of existing CENTCOM network resources.
Operational Impact / Risk to NDS. Not resourcing SDN critically
degrades operational availability and uptime / loading of software
upgrades to all CENTCOM networks. SDN speeds system recovery times and
reduces CENTCOM networks failure rates.
Army Intelligence Information Technology (IT) Systems and Networks:
Executive Summary: U.S. Army Central Command's (ARCENT) funding to
support Army Intelligence Information Technology Systems and Networks
has been decremented 100 percent in PB24. United States Army Central
Command requires $5 million for the information security systems
necessary to protect Department of Defense intellectual property and
technical advances.
Operational Impact / Risk to NDS: Without additional funding, the
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System network and system
support would be severely degraded. The number of organic military
personnel with the appropriate Military Occupational Specialty are
insufficient to fill the contract void. The loss of JWICS support to
OIR and Spartan Shield would result in an unacceptable loss of
actionable intelligence to support targeting, force protection,
collection management, and threat monitoring across the AOR.
Army Strategic Network Transport:
Executive Summary: U.S. Army Central Command requires Command,
Control, Communications, Computer, Information Technology (C4IT)
infrastructure in order to direct operations, access information needed
for situational awareness, decisionmaking, and maintain the ability to
exchange information in a contested environment. In this role, USARCENT
provides the C4IT capabilities and infrastructure in the Southwest Asia
(SWA) Theater supporting Operation Spartan Shield (OSS) and CJTF-OIR.
To meet these requirements, USARCENT requires resources for South West
Asia (SWA) network modernization, sustainment, and service support
necessary to meet the Theater's on-going and future operational
requirements. Recent Theater transition, both operational and
budgetary, has led to a gap in required funding in PB24 placing risk on
USARCENT's ability to operate, maintain, modernize, and defend the SWA
network.
USARCENT provides Southwest Asia network support across theater via
Commercial Satellite leases, Terrestrial Fiber leases, Southwest Asia
Theater Signal Service Support, and Field Service Representatives.
These capabilities require sufficient funding to support USARCENT,
Joint, and Coalition operations across Southwest Asia. The decrements
to these requirements present a high risk to the USARCENT's mission to
provide C4IT capabilities in support of on-going operational
requirements. Failure to fund effects the two highest priority
requirements that support strategic communications--commercial
satellite and terrestrial fiber leases.
Operational Impact / Risk to NDS: Without an additional $25.3
million in fiscal year 2024, USARCENT will be unable to lease the
primary and alternate means of transporting data to the Department of
Defense Information Network (DODIN) and source FSRs to maintain the
network. Lack of funding reduces USARCENT's ability to protect and
defend the SWA strategic network against cybersecurity threats on all
voice, video, and data services across the Non-Secure Internet Protocol
Router (NIPR), Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR), and coalition
networks. This translates to degraded command and control and increased
risk to operations in what remains a very kinetic and dynamic theater.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CENTCOM Fiscal Year Program
2024 Unfunded Sub- Element Amount ($
Priority Priorities Line Item Activity (PE) in
Number (LIN) Group (SAG) Number millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CENTCOM 015F 0201122F $5.5
Communications / Zero
Trust Architecture,
IPv6
------------------------------------------------------------
CENTCOM 015F 0201122F $3.4
Communications /
Software Defined
5 Networks
------------------------------------------------------------
Military Intel 411 0305192A $5.0
Program (MIP)
Activities / Army
Intel Info Systems
and Networks
------------------------------------------------------------
Army IT Services Mgt 121 0208550A $2.3
C2 Systems
-------------------------------------
Defense Enterprise 122 0310700A $23.0
Wideband SATCOM /
Army Strategic
Network Transport
------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Langley. The fiscal year 2024 USAFRICOM Unfunded Priority
List (UPL) addresses actions to establish a Somalia persistent presence
to further ensure strategic access, confine Violent Extremist
Organizations (VEOs), secure Sea Lines of Communication and limit
competitor military expansion. More precisely, a lodgment in Somalia
will serve to degrade the growing threat from al-Shabaab, assure
freedom of navigation through the Bab al Mandab sea-lane chokepoint,
and monitor the expanding Chinese presence in Djibouti. In addition,
USAFRICOM requires Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
services and bandwidth increases to meet Departmental High-Risk ISR
requirements for the African theater. Next, USAFRICOM Command and
Control (C2) services and capabilities on the African Continent must be
addressed to ensure USAFRICOM is postured for network resiliency and
survivability in a denied, degraded, intermittent or limited (DDIL)
communications environment. Last, USAFRICOM requires additional
commercial satellite leases to compensate for the shortage of
communication access on the African continent.
7. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what does
the Unfunded Priority List purchase?
General Kurilla. The Unfunded Priority List purchases mission-
critical capabilities not funded within the base budget, thereby buying
down risk to force and risk to mission. As combatant commands do not
procure military capabilities, the Unfunded Priority List is necessary
to mitigate risk.
General Langley. The fiscal year 2024 USAFRICOM Unfunded Priority
List (UPL) request that supports the return to persistent presence in
Somalia addresses estimated one-time costs including: $42.0 million for
airfield improvements, $43.0 million to improve life support areas,
$11.0 million for communications improvements, and $56.0 million for
increases in basic life support/communications costs.. Our High-Risk
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) UPL will purchase
additional contract ISR services, comprised of B-350 and MQ-9 aircraft,
and will provide additional bandwidth and associated processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (PED). Meanwhile our Command and
Control (C2) Resiliency UPL will purchase information technology (IT)
equipment to enable network resiliency and survivability on the African
continent, and the Commercial Satellite Communications (COMSATCOM) UPL
would procure COMSATCOM services to compensate for the shortage of
communication access on the African continent.
8. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, please
include detail on all end items with quantities, contractor full-time
employees (FTE), etc.
General Kurilla. All such details are provided by the Military
Services as they are directed to resource any items on our Unfunded
Priority List.
General Langley. The fiscal year 2024 USAFRICOM Unfunded Priority
List request (UPL) that supports the return to persistent presence in
Somalia addresses required infrastructure and communications
improvements and associated sustainment. The request does not intend to
procure specific end items or hire specific contractor manpower
equivalents. Our High-Risk Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) UPL item will purchase contract ISR services that
will provide three B-350's and two MQ-9 lines (4 aircraft each),
additional data bandwidth, and the associated processing, exploitation,
and dissemination (PED) of data. Our Command and Control (C2)
Resiliency UPL item will purchase network and computer equipment,
digital storage equipment, peripheral keyboard, video, and mice (KVM)
switches, cryptographic material, facility infrastructure upgrades, and
a surge installation labor team. Our Commercial Satellite
Communications (COMSATCOM) UPL item will be for a satellite
communications services contract for satellite communication bandwidth.
The government would not receive end items or labor.
9. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what
specific capability will the Unfunded Priorities List provide?
General Kurilla. Our submitted Unfunded Priority List is intended
to provide a range of mission-critical capabilities not funded within
the base budget, thereby buying down risk to force and risk to mission.
General Langley. The fiscal year 2024 USAFRICOM Unfunded Priority
List (UPL) addresses actions to establish a Somalia persistent presence
to further ensure strategic access, confine Violent Extremist
Organizations (VEOs), secure Sea Lines of Communication, and limit
competitor military expansion. The funding will fully enable U.S.
military capabilities to degrade the ability of VEOs to threaten the
U.S. Homeland, allow ready crisis response, guarantee strategic access
to support U.S. contingency plan execution, isolate and delay strategic
competitor military expansion in the Command's area of responsibility,
and limit spillover impacts on other Combatant Commands/North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). The High-Risk Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) UPL will increase time-on-station for
collection coverage in East, North, and West Africa. For East Africa,
this equates to increased Full Motion Video (FMV) and Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) collection, target development, and force
protection to support United States periodic engagement and partner
nation operations in high-risk areas. For North Africa, this equates to
increased FMV and SIGINT collection against Global Power Competition
(GPC) requirements and supports Key Leader Engagements (KLE). For West
Africa, this equates to increased FMV and SIGINT collection against VEO
operations, target development, and support to Allied partners. The
Command and Control (C2) Resiliency UPL will enable a continent-based
network at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti-Horn of Africa (CLDJ-HOA) to
function independently in a denied, degraded, intermittent, and limited
(DDIL) environment independent from Europe, the location of the greater
USAFRICOM enterprise network. The Commercial Satellite Communications
(COMSATCOM) UPL will compensate for the shortage of communications
access across the African continent.
10. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what gap
will this fill that is not in the base budget?
General Kurilla. All of these gaps are identified in the executive
summary and the operational impact if not funded portion of question #5
that outlines each Unfunded Priority List items and risk associated.
General Langley. The fiscal year 2024 USAFRICOM Unfunded Priority
List (UPL) addresses an emerging requirement with the return to
persistent presence in Somalia that was identified, approved by the
President, and planned out of sequence with the Department's yearly
Program Budget Review (PBR) cycle. It addresses un-programmed costs to
the Services for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
not identified within the Department's recently concluded fiscal years
2024 to 2028 PBR. It addresses un-programmed costs for Command and
Control (C2) Resiliency to address a threat that emerged after
USAFRICOM's Program Objective Memorandum (POM) fiscal years 2024 to
2028 submission to establish a standalone, on-continent network
necessary for a resilient Defense Ecosystem. Finally, the Commercial
Satellite Communications (COMSATCOM) UPL will compensate for the
shortage of communication access across the African continent since
USAFRICOM's POM fiscal years 2024 to 2028 submission.
11. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, how will
this capability support objectives outlined in current National
Security, Military, and Defense Strategy documents?
General Kurilla. The capabilities identified in our Unfunded
Priorities List all serve to enhance CENTCOM's support of the
objectives outlined in the U.S. National Security Strategy, National
Military Strategy, and National Defense Strategy.
The National Military Strategy and National Defense Strategy both
identify the People's Republic of China as the Nation's pacing
challenge and Russia as its acute threat. Meanwhile, the National
Defense Strategy identifies Iran and Violent Extremist Organizations as
persistent threats. All of these threats and challenges are active in
the CENTCOM region. The systems, programs, and capabilities identified
in the CENTCOM Unfunded Priorities List all serve to address them.
The CENTCOM region holds the greatest risk of derailment of the
National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, both of
which correctly prioritize the Indo-Pacific region. A flashpoint with
Iran, a crisis in the world's central region, a successful large-scale
attack on a partner country, or an attack on the Homeland by a Violent
Extremist Organization all will likely require a response, drawing
unplanned resources away from higher priority theaters into the Central
Command region. Therefore, the CENTCOM Unfunded Priorities List can
serve as a hedge against derailment of national strategy.
General Langley. The fiscal year 2024 USAFRICOM Unfunded Priority
List (UPL) addresses capabilities that fully support National Defense
Strategy (NDS) priorities, the National Military Strategy (NMS) in
accordance with the concept of Strategic Discipline, the Department's
NDS-Implementation (NDS-I) Memo, and the USAFRICOM NDS-I Memo. For
example, the 2022 NMS tasks USAFRICOM to reinforce diplomacy and
strengthen relationships with Allies and Partners. Our return to
Somalia and partnership with the administration of Somali President
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, is vital in the fight against Violent Extremist
Organizations (VEOs) in the region. Further, this requirement fully
supports the Department's direction in the recently published fiscal
years 2025 to 2029 Defense Planning Guidance dated 22 February 2023.
The High-Risk Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) UPL
will further the Command's efforts to monitor, react to, and shape the
strategic environment while fully aligning with the NDS's approach to
Africa. Both the Command and Control (C2) Resiliency and Commercial
Satellite Communications (COMSATCOM) UPLs support the NDS, as it calls
on the Joint Force to build a resilient Defense Ecosystem. They are
also fully supported by the NMS in accordance with the concept of
Strategic Discipline, as well as the Department's NDS-I Memorandum.
12. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what is
the operational requirement and how does this Unfunded Priorities List
support current or future operations?
General Kurilla. The response to question 5 offers a detailed
description of the operational requirement for each item on our
Unfunded Priorities List.
General Langley. The fiscal year 2024 USAFRICOM Unfunded Priority
List (UPL) request supports establishing an operational/persistent
presence in Somalia that prioritizes strategic access, confines Violent
Extremist Organizations, and limits competitor military expansion. This
requirement enhances the reliability of existing airfield
infrastructure and life support areas which addresses operational risks
at the USAFRICOM posture locations in support of persistent presence in
Somalia. The High-Risk Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR) UPL will increase services provided by specialized, manned B-350
aircraft and contract MQ-9 aircraft. These platforms provide
intelligence collection operations with sufficient range and
flexibility in deployment locations, and are politically acceptable on
the African continent. The Command and Control (C2) Resiliency UPL
addresses an emerging threat for increased capability and required
resiliency particularly in the area of cyber security needs for the
USAFRICOM C2 enterprise network. The Commercial Satellite
Communications (COMSATCOM) UPL fulfills the need to communicate with
units in austere locations supporting all USAFRICOM assigned missions/
operations on the Africa continent.
13. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what is
the operational impact if this Unfunded Priorities Lists is not funded
in fiscal year 2024?
General Kurilla. The response to question 5 offers a detailed
description of the risk associated with failure to fund each item on
our Unfunded Priorities List.
General Langley. For the return to a persistent presence in
Somalia, if unfunded, there would be a direct and significant increase
in risk to mission and risk to force for United States forces operating
in/near East Africa If the High-Risk Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) UPL is not funded, the threat to U.S. forces
conducting operations in the USAFRICOM area of operations (AOR) will
remain high risk. This is due to the limitations of available airborne
ISR platforms and the need to balance force protection against
operational objectives. In a not-so-distant past, 83 percent of
available ISR assets committed to an AFRICOM operation were re-tasked
to support another Command's operation. For the Command and Control
(C2) Resiliency UPL, lack of funding would add risk to on-continent
USAFRICOM operations and Enterprise Network (AEN) resiliency if the
European based network were to be compromised. By not funding the
Commercial Satellite Communications (COMSATCOM) UPL, force protection/
security personnel, C2 communications, day-to-day troop communications,
base support activities, as well as special operations units working
with local partner forces at continent posture locations would incur
significant risk to force and risk to mission.
14. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, are there
plans to include this item in the fiscal year 2025 base budget?
General Kurilla. As we do every year, we will coordinate with the
Military Services for the fiscal year 2025 base budget requirements.
General Langley. Yes, USAFRICOM will continue to advocate for our
Command's Unfunded Priority List (UPL) items to be included in the DOD
fiscal year 2025 base budget. We do this through our annual Advocacy
Letters provided to the Services and many Agencies, along with the
annual DOD Program Budget Review (PBR) process.
15. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, why was
this Unfunded Priorities List not included in the fiscal year 2024
President Budget (PB) submission?
General Kurilla. These items were submitted to the Military
Services. Based on internal priorities, the Services did not include
these items in their Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget submissions.
General Langley. The fiscal year 2024 USAFRICOM Unfunded Priority
List (UPL) includes the Presidential-ordered return to persistent
presence in Somalia. This is an emerging requirement directed by the
President and out of sequence with the Department's Annual Program
Budget Review (PBR) cycle. Somalia Persistence Presence addresses un-
programmed cost to the Services not identified within the Department's
recently concluded fiscal year 2024 PBR. The High-Risk Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) UPL addresses Joint Staff
validated, but consistently unfulfilled requirements for the USAFRICOM
area of operations. The Command and Control (C2) Resiliency requirement
emerged after USAFRICOM's Program Objective Memorandum (POM) fiscal
years 2024 to 2028 submission. The Commercial Satellite Communications
(COMSATCOM) requirement was included in USAFRICOM's POM fiscal years
2024 to 2028 submission but ultimately not funded by the Army.
16. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what is
the name of the vendor(s) executing this effort? Sub-vendor(s)?
General Kurilla. We rely on the Services and Service Support
Agencies to select the vendors and let the contracts to deliver the
capability we require to meet our National Defense Strategy objectives.
General Langley. USAFRICOM does not have acquisition authority and
can only provide limited information. For the fiscal year 2024
USAFRICOM Unfunded Priority List (UPL) items, the return to persistence
presence in Somalia will be executed via multiple means to include a
combination of troop labor, the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program (LOGCAP) life support task orders (incoming performance
contractor is Fluor), and through competitively awarded supply and
construction contracts by cognizant contracting offices, in accordance
with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and associated
supplements. The High-Risk Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) UPL requirements will be executed through the
current USAFRICOM Reconnaissance Intelligence Exploitation Services
(ARIES) contract. The ARIES contract is administered by the General
Services Administration (GSA) and was awarded to Smartronix, LLC. The
Command and Control (C2) Resiliency UPL requirements will be satisfied
by a variety of information technology (IT) equipment using government
contracts. The Commercial Satellite Communications (COMSATCOM) UPL will
be executed on an existing USAFRICOM COMSATCOM contract with SES S.A.
and Peraton.
17. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, how often
has your command met with the vendor executing this effort? Please
provide a list of all such meetings, and the agenda for these meetings?
General Kurilla. As a Combatant Command, we are reliant on the
Services and Services Support Agencies to meet with vendors.
General Langley. USAFRICOM does not have acquisition authority. In
general, USAFRICOM does not meet with specific vendors, as this is a
function of our lead service components and subordinate contracting
activities. USAFRICOM publishes guidance on engagements with non-
Federal entities in an internal instruction. USAFRICOM J5 Strategy,
Engagement, and Programs Directorate has a non-Federal entity
``gatekeeper'' that coordinates engagements with members of industry.
18. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what is
your history with this vendor? Please detail when the relationship
began, the number of contracts applied for by this vendor, the number
of contracts awarded to this vendor, and if you have had a personal
relationship with the vendor.
General Kurilla. As a Combatant Command, we are reliant on the
Services and Services Support Agencies to meet with vendors.
General Langley. USAFRICOM does not have acquisition authority. In
general, USAFRICOM does not meet with specific vendors, track the
number of contracts bid by a vendor, or track the number of contracts
awarded to a vendor. These are functions performed by our lead service
components and subordinate contracting activities. There are no
personal relationships established.
19. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, has anyone
who formerly worked for your command represented the vendor in
meetings?
General Kurilla. We do not participate in vendor meetings and do
not track vendor representation.
General Langley. USAFRICOM Office of Legal Counsel provides
comprehensive post-employment guidance to outgoing personnel. USAFRICOM
does not prohibit or track employment of former personnel by commercial
entities. However, those prospective employees are subject to post-
service employment rules as stipulated in the Code of Federal Ethics.
20. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what is
their name, what was their position, and when did you meet with them?
General Kurilla. We do not participate in vendor meetings and do
not track vendor representation.
General Langley. USAFRICOM Office of Legal Counsel provides
comprehensive post-employment guidance to outgoing personnel. USAFRICOM
does not prohibit or track employment of former personnel by commercial
entities. However, those prospective employees are subject to post-
service employment rules as stipulated in the Code of Federal Ethics.
21. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, in which
city/State will the Unfunded Priorities Lists be executed?
General Kurilla. We do not participate in vendor meetings and do
not track vendor representation.
General Langley. USAFRICOM does not have acquisition authority and
can only provide limited information. Somalia Persistent Presence,
High-Risk Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and
Command and Control (C2) Resiliency, would be executed Outside
Continental United States (OCONUS). The Commercial Satellite
Communications (COMSATCOM) UPL would be executed in Manassas, VA,
Tampa, FL, and Herndon VA.
22. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, is this
requirement on an existing contract? If so, with who and what is the
history of the contract?
General Kurilla. We rely on the Services and Service Support
Agencies to select the vendors and let the contract to deliver the
capability we require to meet our National Defense Strategy objectives.
General Langley. USAFRICOM does not have acquisition authority and
can only provide limited information. For the fiscal year 2024
USAFRICOM Unfunded Priority List (UPL) items, the return to a
persistent presence in Somalia would be executed via multiple means to
include a combination of troop labor, the Army's Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) life support task orders (incoming
performance contractor is Fluor), and through competitively awarded
supply and construction contracts by cognizant contracting offices, in
accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and associated
supplements. The High-Risk Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) UPL requirements would be executed on an existing
contract with Smartronix, LLC that currently provides contract ISR
services. The current contract was awarded in August 2022 and is a
follow-on to a previous contract. The Command and Control (C2)
Resiliency UPL requirements will be satisfied by a variety of
information technology (IT) equipment using government contracts. The
Commercial Satellite Communications (COMSATCOM) UPL requirements would
be executed via multiple existing contracts with SES S.A. and Peraton.
23. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what is
the anticipated contract award date if the Unfunded Priorities Lists
receives funding?
General Kurilla. We rely on the Services and Service Support
Agencies to select the vendors and let the contract to deliver the
capability we require to meet our National Defense Strategy objectives.
General Langley. USAFRICOM does not have acquisition authority. Due
to the critically of these Unfunded Items, USAFRICOM would seek our
Components to award contracts as soon as funds are made available.
24. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what
funding lines are associated with this Unfunded Priorities Lists?
General Kurilla. Development of the Unfunded Priority List is part
of our annual research and budget analysis, a core staff function for
U.S. Central Command, and elicits no additional cost.
General Langley. The funding lines associated with our Unfunded
Priorities List are identified in the answer to question 5.
Somalia Persistent Presence
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2024
APPN BSO LI BA AG SAG PE Request ($ in
millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OMN 60 1C6C 01 1C 6C 0201109N $88.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OMN 60 1C1C 01 1C 1C 0201109N $26.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPN 60 126 07 02 0201109N $36.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total...... $152
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
High-Risk ISR
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2024
ROC SAG PE Request ($ in
millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8K0 411 0303025A $95.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8K0 411 0303025A $2.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8K0 411 0303025A $121.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8K0 411 0303025A $4.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total..... $223.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enterprise C2 Network Resiliency
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2024
LIN BSA SAG Army PE OSD PE Request ($ in
millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3002BD3000 02 93 BE4162000 0219900A $10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total........ $10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commercial Satellite Communications (COMSATCOM)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2024
LIN SAG Army PE OSD PE Request ($ in
millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
141 141209000 0201109A $12
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total...... $12
------------------------------------------------------------------------
25. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, if
multiple appropriations fund this requirement, must all appropriations
be funded simultaneously to source this requirement, or can each
appropriation stand on its own to fund a portion of the requirement?
General Kurilla. No single Unfunded Priorities List item is split
between multiple appropriations.
General Langley. USAFRICOM requires all appropriations to be funded
simultaneously to synchronize efforts within each individual fiscal
year 2024 USAFRICOM Unfunded Priority List (UPL) item.
26. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, how much
was enacted and obligated (or expended for research, development, test,
and evaluation (RDT&E)) in fiscal years 2022 to 2023 for this
requirement?
General Kurilla. The services have expended funds for similar types
of capabilities, but we cannot identify specific allocations to our
requirements identified in the UPL.
General Langley. No research, development, test, and evaluation
(RDT&E) funding was enacted or obligated for any of our fiscal year
2024 Unfunded Priority List (UPL) items in fiscal years 2022 to 2023.
27. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, how much
was requested in fiscal year 2024 for this requirement?
General Kurilla. The services have expended funds for similar types
of capabilities, but we cannot identify specific allocations to our
requirements identified in the UPL.
General Langley. Given the emergent nature of the Somalia
Persistent Presence requirement, execution represents an un-programmed
cost to the Services and was not identified within the Department's
recently concluded fiscal years 2024 to 2028 Program Budget Review
(PBR). Consequently, this fiscal year 2024 Unfunded Priority List (UPL)
funding request is USAFRICOM's attempt to secure funding. For the High-
Risk Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) UPL item,
USAFRICOM requested $223.8 million in its Program Objective Memorandum
(POM) fiscal years 2024 to 2028 submission through the Army and DOD's
fiscal years 2024 to 2028 Program Budget Review (PBR) processes. The
Command and Control (C2) Resiliency item emerged after the Army's POM
process for fiscal year 2024. The Commercial Satellite Communications
(COMSATCOM) item was included in USAFRICOM's POM fiscal years 2024 to
2028 submission through the Army for $12.0 million.
28. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, is there a
tail associated with this Unfunded Priorities Lists?
General Kurilla. Some of the capabilities will require sustainment
after fielding and integration. Exact costs will be driven by chosen
solutions to meet the requirements, and we will incorporate the costs
in future budget requests.
General Langley. The return to persistent presence in Somalia will
require annual basic life support and communications sustainment. The
High-Risk Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and
Commercial Satellite Communications (COMSATCOM) UPLs will continue to
be a requirement at the increased level, as these services will be
required across the Fiscal Year Defense Plan. The Command and Control
(C2) Resiliency UPL will have an annual sustainment requirement and an
equipment refresh requirement every 3 years.
29. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, is any
tail funded in the future years defense plan?
General Kurilla. Once solutions are identified and resourced, we
will incorporate the associated costs in future planning and
programming.
General Langley. Tails associated with the return to persistent
presence in Somalia have not been funded in the future years defense
plan due to the emerging nature of the requirement. Tails for our other
three Unfunded Priority List (UPL) items, i.e., High-Risk Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Command and Control (C2)
Resiliency, and Commercial Satellite Communications (COMSATCOM)
requirements are included in USAFRICOM's POM fiscal years 2025 to 2029
submission to the Army.
30. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, please
describe how much the requirement will cost per year for the next 5
years.
General Kurilla. The breakdown of associated costs will be driven
by selected solutions to our required capabilities and how the services
integrate those requirements into their budgets.
General Langley. The return to persistent presence requires annual
basic life support and communications sustainment is approximately
$97.0 million per year. The High-Risk Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) cost per year is $224.0 million. The Command and
Control (C2) Resiliency requirement is $600,000 per year with an
equipment refresh cost of approximately $14.0 million in fiscal year
2027. The Commercial Satellite Communications (COMSATCOM) requirement
is $12.0 million per year.
31. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, please
provide in detail the previous funding requests and enacted for this
requirement, including if it was in the base budget or Unfunded
Priorities Lists.
General Kurilla. We have not previously requested funding for the
requirements identified in our UPL. The capabilities identified address
emerging threats and changes in our operational environment.
General Langley. Given the emergent nature of the return to
persistent presence in Somalia, the requirements were not identified
within the Department's recently concluded fiscal years 2024 to 2028
Program Budget Review (PBR). The High-Risk Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) requirement was submitted as an Unfunded
Priority List (UPL) item for fiscal year 2023 (Requested: $219.4
million, Funded: $50 million). In addition, the requirement was
included in USAFRICOM's fiscal years 2024 to 2028 PBR submission and
USAFRICOM's Program Objective Memorandum (POM) fiscal years 2024 to
2028 and fiscal years 2025 to 2029 submissions. The Command and Control
(C2) Resiliency requirement was submitted as an UPL item in fiscal year
2023 (Requested: $10.0 million, Funded: $0.0 million). The requirement
was included in USAFRICOM's POM fiscal years 2025 to 2029 submission to
the Army. The Commercial Satellite Communications (COMSATCOM)
requirement was submitted as an UPL item in fiscal year 2023
(Requested: $17.75 million, Funded: $0.0 million). The requirement was
included in USAFRICOM's POM fiscal years 2025 to 2029 submission to the
Army.
32. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, if the
requirement is not included in the future years defense plan, will that
be rectified in the next Program Objective Memorandum or the Program,
Planning, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) cycle?
General Kurilla. If a decision is made to fund any of the
capabilities in our UPL, we will incorporate the associated costs in
future submissions to the service POMs.
General Langley. USAFRICOM has requested the Services include these
requirements in the next Program Objective Memorandum.
33. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, please
provide photos of this requirement for visual aid.
General Kurilla. We rely on the Services and Service Support
Agencies to select the vendors and let the contract to deliver the
capability we require to meet our National Defense Strategy objectives.
Because the Services will select the vendors, we do not know who they
will select; therefore, do not have pictures.
General Langley.
Somalia Persistent Presence:
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
High-Risk ISR:
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
C2 Resiliency:
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
COMSATCOM:
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
civilian harm mitigation
34. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, how many
subordinate commanders are currently authorized to provide ex gratia
payments under section 1213 within U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and
AFRICOM, respectively?
General Kurilla. I have retained approval authority to provide ex
gratia payments at my level. However, each of my subordinate commanders
at echelon across CENTCOM actively considers ex gratia payment when
reviewing each civilian casualty scenario in theater that meets
statutory requirements.
General Langley. USAFRICOM has not delegated ex gratia payment
authority to any subordinate commanders.
35. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what
training does CENTCOM and AFRICOM, respectively, provide to commanders
on providing ex gratia payments? Please provide details on what this
training consists of, the training length, how often a commander
receives an updated training on this, and when this training was last
updated.
General Kurilla. In concert with my guidance, all my subordinate
commanders receive legal consultation regarding ex gratia payment
statutory authority.
General Langley. AFRICOM does not provide training to subordinate
commands on providing ex gratia payments. The Office of Under Secretary
of Defense Memorandum on Interim Regulations for Condolence or Sympathy
Payments to Friendly Civilians for Injury or Loss That Is Incident to
Military Operations dated 22 June 2022 states that ``The authority to
approve ex gratia payments under section 1213 is delegated to
geographic commanders. Geographic combatant commanders may further
delegate this authority to subordinate commanders''. CDR AFRICOM has
retained this authority for AFRICOM, and therefore does not require a
training program for subordinate commanders.
36. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, for how
many cases did CENTCOM and AFRICOM, respectively, consider providing ex
gratia payments? If it did not ultimately provide an ex gratia payment
after considering it, please detail why this was the case.
General Kurilla. My subordinate commanders consider ex gratia
payments for all incidents of damage, personal injury, or death that
meet the conditions of section 1213 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for 2020. To date, during my time as CENTCOM
commander, we've not had an event that meets these conditions.
General Langley. Since January 1, 2021, USAFRICOM has conducted six
civilian casualty assessments with one being substantiated and five
unsubstantiated. The one substantiated assessment was from a U.S.
airstrike conducted on 1 January 2021 in support of operations.
USAFRICOM works with the Federal Government of Somalia and the United
States Department of State to determine the appropriate measures for
civilian casualty response, including ex gratia.
37. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, the Department of Defense
(DOD) admitted to 12 civilian deaths and 2 civilian injuries resulting
from United States military operations in Afghanistan in 2021 in its
``Annual Report on Civilian Casualties in Connection with United States
Military Operations in 2021''. Yet the Department of Defense only made
one ex gratia payment in 2021 for the death of a civilian in
Afghanistan on January 8, 2021. Why has CENTCOM failed to provide these
payments despite an annual $3 million authorization from Congress to do
so?
General Kurilla. I intend to offer ex gratia payment to the family
from the August 29, 2021 strike in Kabul that tragically killed ten
civilians once the entire family has safely arrived in the United
States.
38. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, how much was the ex gratia
payment that CENTCOM provided for the death of one civilian in
Afghanistan on January 8, 2021?
General Kurilla. An ex gratia payment of $5,000 was delivered
directly to the primary beneficiary of the civilian killed in that
event.
39. Senator Warren. General Langley, the Department of Defense
admitted to 3 civilian injuries resulting from United States military
operations in Somalia in 2021 in its ``Annual Report on Civilian
Casualties in Connection with United States Military Operations in
2021''. Yet the Department of Defense did not make any ex gratia
payments. Why has AFRICOM failed to provide these payments despite an
annual $3 million authorization from Congress to do so?
General Langley. In June 2021, USAFRICOM released its Civilian
Casualty Assessment Quarterly Report; which substantiated three
civilian casualties following a United States airstrike in the vicinity
of Qunyo Barrow, Somalia, on January 1, 2021. After a thorough
assessment of the information and circumstances following the January
1, 2021, airstrike, USAFRICOM assessed that more likely than not, the
airstrike inadvertently injured three (3) civilians. USAFRICOM, working
with the Federal Government of Somalia and the United States Department
of State, determines the applicable actions for civilian casualty
response, including ex gratia. To date, no individuals have been
identified or organizations representing the victims have come forward.
Because al-Shabaab has access to public information about United States
military operations, the embassy or partner may determine it is not
safe for individuals to receive monetary compensation or public
recognition in the media. Al-Shabaab regularly taxes citizens and
punishes them for perceived complicity with its enemies, including the
United States. USAFRICOM's ability to ensure al-Shabaab would not seize
ex gratia payments or punish civilians is limited. The limited number
of United States military personnel in Somalia and the potential
impacts to United States force protection are considered when
identifying the feasibility of a U.S. representative meeting with
prospective ex gratia recipients.
40. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what steps
is CENTCOM and AFRICOM, respectively, taking to use ex gratia payments
more frequently when there are civilian casualties resulting from U.S.
military operations?
General Kurilla. My commanders and I will actively consider ex
gratia payments for each civilian casualty that meets the statutory and
regulatory requirements. When applicable, we also consider beneficiary
requests made under the Foreign Claims Act, as well as all other
authorized measures to provide redress for any civilian casualties.
General Langley. USAFRICOM's approach and response to civilian harm
is based on legal, moral, strategic, operational, and other military
considerations. USAFRICOMs response efforts reflect on U.S. and our
professional military values, including the importance of preserving
human life. Under the law of war, commanders, at all levels, have a
great responsibility to exercise the leadership necessary to reduce the
risk of harm to civilians and civilian objects. USAFRICOM demands that
our leaders demonstrate moral leadership in the conduct of combat
operations, maintain the support of partner s and vulnerable
populations, and avoid unnecessary civilian harm. An ``ex gratia
payment'' may be one of several possible response options that might be
appropriate for DOD to take when U.S. military operations injure or
kill a civilian or damage or destroy civilian property. Other possible
response options could include an acknowledgement of responsibility,
medical care, or other appropriate measures that may be consistent with
mission objectives and applicable law. Such action help express
condolences, sympathy, or goodwill, and are used to support mission
objectives. Such actions are not required by law, does not constitute
an admission of wrongdoing, and is not for the purpose of compensating
the victim or the victim's family for their loss. Any ex gratia will be
in accordance with Section 1213 of Public Law 116-92 and DOD
regulations for implementing the authority in section 1213 to make
payments. USAFRICOM adheres to the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense Memorandum on Interim Regulations for Condolence or Sympathy
Payments to Friendly Civilians for Injury or Loss That Is Incident to
Military Operations dated 22 June 2022. AFRICOM, when allegation is
received, considers all the relevant factors, determines the cause of
the damage, injury, or death, determines whether the prospective
recipient is ``friendly to the U.S.'', obtains legal advice, and then
compiles, maintains, and submits a written record of the decided ex-
gratia action.
41. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, how does
CENTCOM and AFRICOM, respectively, plan to accurately apply the ``more
likely than not'' standard of credibility for reports of civilian
casualties amidst concerns from a RAND Corporation report on ``U.S.
Department of Defense Civilian Casualty Policies and Procedures'' that
DOD applies a standard that is ``higher than advertised'' and ``often
required having positive proof indicating civilian harm in military
information''?
General Kurilla. CENTCOM has fully implemented the August 2022
Department of Defense Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Plan, to
include the standard that civilian casualties were more likely incurred
than not. We will have no problem applying this standard to any kinetic
situation in our theater.
General Langley. USAFRICOM takes stringent measures to prevent
civilian casualties. Protecting civilians remains a vital part of the
command's operations to promote greater security for all Africans.
USAFRICOM, when it identifies or is notified of a civilian casualty
allegation, seeks out and considers all public and classified sources
of available information when deciding if civilian casualties ``more
likely than not'' occurred as the result of an USAFRICOM operation.
USAFRICOM leverages information from Non-Government Organizations,
public and social media venues, and all-sources of intelligence
capabilities available at the time to determine the credibility of the
allegation and to as accurately as feasible determine the ``more likely
than not'' standard of credibility. USAFRICOM continues to be as
transparent as possible by providing a quarterly civilian casualty
report to the public through its public website and provide the public
the ability to report any allegations of civilian casualties in their
native language. USAFRICOM is confident in their processes and
capabilities of their people to mitigate the potential for civilian
casualties, but also recognizes the absolute necessity for continuous
assessments and improvements of those same processes and capabilities.
42. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what steps
is CENTCOM and AFRICOM, respectively, taking to give proper weight to
civilian casualty reporting from outside sources?
General Kurilla. In any report or concern of civilian harm, CENTCOM
incorporates and gives weight to credible information provided by Non-
Governmental Organizations, eyewitnesses, or media outlets.
General Langley. USAFRICOMs policy is to assess all allegations of
civilian casualties regardless of source, especially outside sources.
For example, in 2021 all reports of potential civilian casualties that
USAFRICOM assessed were from public sources such as news media and
social media accounts, with few reports received from NGO's or through
the electronic form on USAFRICOM's website. Additionally, USAFRICOM
reconsiders existing assessments of civilian causality if new relevant
information becomes available through any source to include new
information received from NGO's, media reporting, the USAFRICOM
Civilian Causality Portal, or other outside organizations.
43. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what steps
is CENTCOM and AFRICOM, respectively, taking to proactively seek out
and incorporate information regarding civilian casualties from external
sources, such as non-governmental organizations, in assessing and
investigating reports of civilian casualties resulting from U.S.
military operations?
General Kurilla. Our leadership in Tampa as well as our operational
and component commands across the region have established relationships
with international and regional Non-Governmental Organizations that
report civilian harm. We also routinely coordinate with regional media
outlets on sensitive issues. In the event of a report of civilian
casualties we will not wait for information to come in to us; we will
activate these networks and aggressively seek analysis, eyewitness
reports, and open source information.
General Langley. USAFRICOM investigates allegations of United
States military-caused civilian casualties regardless of source.
USAFRICOM proactively identifies claims of civilian harm from United
States operations by monitoring media websites used in Africa, public
social media, and through USAFRICOM's public website. Maintaining
channels of communication for engagement with civil society
organizations and international organizations, including those that
engage in or support humanitarian activities, assist USAFRICOM's
efforts to ensure that the Command's assessments are accurate.
USAFRICOM encourages these organizations to assist in efforts to reduce
civilian harm. USAFRICOM has had several meetings with non-governmental
organizations (NGO's) to learn their processes and to establish better
lines of communication, which facilitates the discussion of civilian
harm prevention. In July 2022, USAFRICOM hosted a Protection of
Civilians Working Group with an NGO that operates on the African
continent.
44. Senator Warren. General Langley, according to the ``Annual
Report on Civilian Casualties in Connection with United States Military
Operations in 2021'', AFRICOM reopened an assessment regarding reports
that a joint Somali-United States military operation caused civilian
casualties on May 9, 2018. Please provide an explanation for why
AFRICOM maintained its original conclusion that the report was not
credible.
General Langley. USAFRICOM reopened this assessment based on
information received in 2021 through the USAFRICOM on-line reporting
portal. The Command publicly reported the decision to re-open the
assessment to illustrate USAFRICOM's commitment to thoroughness,
accuracy and transparency regarding potential occurrences of civilian
harm. After a review of the information provided, USAFRICOM's
assessment remained unchanged because the further inquiry did not
provide any new details that were not considered in the initial
assessment. The events that generated the civilian casualty allegation
were not a result of USAFRICOM actions.
45. Senator Warren. General Kurilla and General Langley, what does
CENTCOM and AFRICOM, respectively, consider to be ``credible'' reports
of civilian harm resulting from U.S.-origin arms?
General Kurilla. We evaluate each concern of civilian harm with
care and sensitivity to the civilian population. Rather than
unambiguous evidence, which is not always available after a kinetic
strike, we seek the best assessment of the information available in
search of a standard that civilian harm was ``more likely than not.''
We will conduct every such investigation with transparency, and we will
give weight to credible on-the-ground reports.
General Langley. Presidential Executive Order 13732, which provides
the pre-and post-strike measures to address civilian casualty, is only
for U.S. operations involving the use of force and the 2018 NDAA
requires an annual report on civilian casualties in connection with
U.S. military operations. Neither document requires the U.S. military
to conduct, or report on, civilian casualty investigations for non-U.S.
military operations including those that may have involved U.S.-
``origin arms.'' USAFRICOM does not formally investigate civilian
casualty allegations that do not involve U.S. military personnel
conducting operations. For allegations that involve USAFRICOM military
operations, this Command determines ``credibility'' using all
reasonably available information to make a determination that the
potential exists that a civilian casualty could have occurred.
Available information can consist of, but not limited to, video
surveillance from Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
assets, other forms of intelligence collection, munition employment and
function data, and post-strike assessments.
46. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, a January Oxfam report found
that ``that air raids by the Saudi-led coalition, using weapons solely
supplied by the UK and U.S., accounted for a quarter of all attacks''
on civilians from January 2021 through February 2022. These air strikes
resulted in attacks on hospitals, clinics, and ambulances, and forced
people to flee their homes. Has CENTCOM looked into this reporting and
what steps has it taken to evaluate the civilian deaths and injuries
resulting from Saudi-led coalition attacks in Yemen?
General Kurilla. While CENTCOM has no jurisdiction or legal
authorization to conduct a proper investigation into strikes by
sovereign states such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we share our
concern to the Saudis over any report of civilian casualties. CENTCOM
remains engaged with the Saudis on the importance of avoiding civilian
harm and the need to constantly improve methodology and procedures for
doing so. We are working closely with the Saudis to enhance their
civilian harm mitigation and law of armed conflict training. We also
share best practices with the coalition on investigations into
allegations of civilian casualties.
47. Senator Warren. General Kurilla, what steps has CENTCOM taken
to address findings from the June 2022 Government Accountability Office
report on ``Yemen, State, and DOD Need Better Information on Civilian
Impacts of U.S. Military Support to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates'', that it is likely that United States-origin arms were used
by coalition partners to conduct war crimes in Yemen?
General Kurilla. We have reviewed and continue to aggressively
address the findings from this report. We are evaluating mechanisms to
report on civilian harm caused by United States defense articles used
in Yemen by Saudi or UAE forces. We also seek to develop effective
training programs regarding civilian harm mitigation for our Saudi and
UAE partners. We also assess the effectiveness of that training.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
women, peace and security
48. Senator Shaheen. General Kurilla and General Langley, can you
provide an update on how CENTCOM and AFRICOM are implementing the 2017
Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda?
General Kurilla. Our WPS program is among our most successful in
advancing our regional partnerships to reach a sustainable security and
stability. Through the program, we advocate for women's meaningful
participation in their nation's security efforts.
We advise our partners on ensuring women serve as critical actors
in their national security. We seek to model this kind of behavior and
then export it to our partners. Our WPS program managers have
established a baseline assessment for each of our 19 partner countries
which will allow us to evaluate progress in the years to come.
We've incorporated the principles of the WPS program into both our
Theater Strategy and our Campaign Plan. We've highlighted WPS
initiatives within each of our Country Security Cooperation Plans. As
the program evolves, we observe growing interest from partners
throughout the region.
General Langley. At AFRICOM, we are implementing the 2017 WPS
agenda through a 3-Phase approach for the fiscal years 2023 to 2026
timeframe, which we are currently in Phase 2 and portions of Phase 3 of
our process.
Phase 1 (Planning and Informing)--entails training AFRICOM staff to
serve as Gender Focal Points in relevant issue areas, and establishing
and updating WPS doctrine, products, and developing 5-year WPS plans
focused on Angola (but on hold given bandwidth), Botswana, Zambia, and
Niger (but on hold due to coup).
Phase 2 (Implementing and Executing)--entails ongoing training,
integrating WPS equities into AFRICOM Campaign Plan and Order,
establishing online resources for AFRICOM staff, and implementing the
5-year WPS plans.
Phase 3 (Operations, Activities, and Investments Integration)--
entails integrating Command actions across the range of AFRICOM HQ,
Component, and Embassy Offices of Security Cooperation activities. This
phase also includes assessments.
49. Senator Shaheen. General Kurilla and General Langley, what
additional support or resources do you need to better integrate WPS
within your structures but also in your efforts with partner forces?
General Kurilla. Across much of the CENTCOM region, the accepted
male-dominant social construct combined with regional cultural norms
often serve as a challenge to a broader, more rapid WPS application.
This obstacle may be reduced through a whole-of-government approach
across all instruments of American power applying pressure on partner
governments to advance and promote women's security efforts.
We are working additional government funding for our WPS program.
For fiscal years 2022 and 2023, CENTCOM maintained a $307,000 shortfall
against our requested $492,000 for the WPS program.
General Langley. At AFRICOM, a full-time Gender Advisor onsite and
within each of our focus countries is needed to significantly implement
our WPS agenda. This would enable us to better respond to a range of
Partner requirements, including the development of doctrine, inclusion
of gender consideration in DOD security cooperation programs, and
solutions to address barriers to women's participation in security.
50. Senator Shaheen. General Kurilla and General Langley, how are
CENTCOM and AFRICOM looking ahead to ensure the WPS agenda is resilient
and will see long-term success?
General Kurilla. The key to long-term success of the program is
persistent engagement with willing partners. To that end, we've
developed long-duration education and training programs built on the
WPS guidelines.
Success of the program will ultimately rely on small progress
sustained over time. Rather than moving mountains, we're pushing rocks,
with an understanding that small advances will manifest in broader
social change into the future.
General Langley. At AFRICOM, we published a first-of-its-kind
TASKORD at AFRICOM that required every AFRICOM Directorate and
component command to integrate gender considerations into the Command's
Operations, Activities, and Investments. The TASKORD also tasked four
of our components to develop 5-year WPS plans in coordination with
their assigned WPS focus country (i.e. ANGOLA/NAVAF, BOTSWANA/SETAF-AF,
NIGER/AFAF, ZAMBIA/CJTF-HOA). This was to ensure a long-term
relationship was built specific to WPS support and multi-year WPS
programming developed for a designated country.
51. Senator Shaheen. General Kurilla and General Langley, how can
CENTCOM and AFRICOM integrate Women, Peace, and Security into bilateral
and multilateral partnerships in the respective Areas of Operation your
command covers?
General Kurilla. We integrate WPS into bilateral and multilateral
partnerships by modeling the program's principles within our own
forces. We also highlight the strategic value of inclusivity in our own
formations, demonstrating the prominence of American women military
leaders. Further, we plan targeted engagements wherein we encourage
partners to bring women into their planning and command and control
operations. Through anecdotes and engagements, we seek to ensure that
our partners appreciate the role women can play in regional security
and stability.
General Langley. At AFRICOM, in addition to our WPS TASKORD, our
full time Gender Advisor at AFRICOM leads our Gender Network to ensure
integration of WPS across Operations, Activities, and Investments with
our bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Outside of AFRICOM HQ, our
Gender Network includes a full time Gender Advisor at Naval Forces
Africa to cover the maritime domain, a full time Gender Advisor at
Special Operations Command Africa to integrate into special ops
objectives, a full time Gender Advisor at Air Forces Africa to cover
the air domain, and a full time Gender Advisor at our only base in
Africa, Combined Joint Task Force--Horn of Africa (vacant, actively
being advertised), to deploy across the continent and integrate gender
considerations into CJTF-HOA requirements.
information operations
52. Senator Shaheen. General Kurilla and General Langley how are
CENTCOM and AFRICOM addressing the Wagner Group's information
operations and what additional support is required to allow CENTCOM and
AFRICOM to more thoroughly counter Wagner information operations?
General Kurilla. We seek to counter the Wagner Group's information
operations through our Military Information Support Operations program,
which counters the group's messaging and highlights the group's malign
behaviors.
General Langley. At AFRICOM, our WPS programing aims to fully
integrate women as active agents in their respective country's defense
and security spheres. We have assessed that women in our focus
countries have different access and influence roles than men that
positions them as necessary to help counter malign actors that aim to
undermine democracy. AFRICOM recognizes that malign actors integrate
gender considerations to achieve an objective, which is why we see the
recruitment of women by Al-Shabaab. We can counter malign actors by
fully integrating both men and women in defense and security to ensure
the military reflects its population, has stronger security
initiatives, better identifies early warning signals of terrorism and
conflict, and can better counter the negative effects of climate change
that results in instability. Last, we are aiming to replicate past
Military Information Support Operations (MISO) efforts by executing
micro-campaigns with thematic content such as women working to defeat
Al-Shabaab in Somalia.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
armed overwatch
53. Senator Kelly. General Kurilla and General Langley, both of
your theaters have been plagued with conflict from extremists and
terrorist organizations for decades. You both have demonstrated
leadership providing armed ISR missions through use of remotely piloted
aircraft, modified C-12s, multi-role fighters, and any other platform
the DOD has to get the job done. You have collaborated with SOCOM to
provide an outstanding and lethal capability-defending our Homeland
from terrorists and helping reduce the atrocities committed by
extremists worldwide. SOCOM awarded a contract to L3 Harris last year
for the development of a new light attack aircraft to conduct Armed
Overwatch and Close Air Support. Even as we pivot our 4th and 5th
generation aircraft for readiness against peer adversaries, it's
critical we don't lose site of the very real threat we face every
single day from extremists in Africa and the Middle East. Please
describe the importance of Armed Overwatch capabilities in your
theaters.
General Kurilla. CENTCOM leverages Armed Overwatch capabilities for
a range of critical missions. These assets support force protection,
allow battlespace awareness for partner and U.S. forces, and provide
indications and warning against strategic threats.
We also employ Armed Overwatch assets in tracking the movement of
Violent Extremist Organizations. Finally, we employ these assets for
the interdiction of material and financial resources for Iran-backed
groups.
General Langley. Our ability to provide armed overwatch in support
of our personnel and our partners at remote locations in our AOR is
critical. When our teams go beyond the confines of our bases and when
we support our African partners at the forefront in the fight against
violent extremism, we rely on armed overwatch to keep them safe. A mix
of short and long endurance armed aircraft capable of performing ISR,
find/fix/finish, direct action, response, and strike missions is the
optimal solution for the African continent.
54. Senator Kelly. General Kurilla and General Langley, what assets
do you have in theater now that support Armed Overwatch mission
requirements, and is that enough?
General Kurilla. Our rotary and fixed wing, manned and unmanned
Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets
throughout the region are heavily tasked with a range of mission sets,
including Armed Overwatch. While we have sufficient assets in theater
now that support our Armed Overwatch mission requirements, these assets
are stretched thin.
Additional dedicated armed overwatch aircraft would allow us to
focus our MQ-9s on target development, which could increase our ability
to target and defeat ISIS leaders in Iraq and Syria. CENTCOM is
allocated a set number of MQ-9 sorties per day in Iraq and Syria for
fiscal year 2023. These sorties provide armed overwatch for Coalition
and Iraqi forces when conducting counter-ISIS operations. For fiscal
year 2024, CENTCOM will receive a 10 percent reduction in MQ-9 sorties
per day in support of operations in Iraq and Syria.
General Langley. USAFRICOM utilizes both long range-long endurance
and shorter-range armed overwatch platforms. Long flight-times enroute
to our objectives limit our access and loiter times to provide force
protection in most of our locations on the continent. USAFRICOM is not
sourced with enough of these platforms and supplements with contractor
owned, contractor operated MQ-9s and B-350's. This frees up government
owned, government operated platforms, such as the MQ-1 or MQ-9 to
provide armed overwatch for our troops. The current limited resourcing
of armed overwatch capable platforms constrains USAFRICOM's ability to
conduct operations, which includes advise and assist missions with
partner forces in multiple locations simultaneously.
55. Senator Kelly. General Kurilla and General Langley, as we
continue to pivot to the Pacific, do you think you'll have the
resources needed to sustain your Armed Overwatch and ISR requirements
with theater assets?
General Kurilla. We currently have the Armed Overwatch and ISR
requirements to meet our National Defense Strategy objectives in Iraq,
Syria and areas outside of Afghanistan. We are working to increase our
ISR in Afghanistan through the introduction of long duration
alternative airborne ISR. However, any loss of resources to another
theater of operations will introduce strategic risk, risk to force and
risk to mission within the region. Given the presence of the persistent
threats of Iran and Violent Extremist Organizations within our region,
our theater holds the greatest risk of derailment of the National
Defense Strategy. Specifically, a flashpoint incident with Iran or an
attack by Violent Extremist Organizations on American interests in the
West or the Homeland may require unplanned, unscheduled resources from
higher priority theaters outlined in the National Defense Strategy.
General Langley. Currently, I cannot cover all my validated ISR
requirements. Air Force and SOCOM ISR divestments will exacerbate this
issue. Alternative options, such as shorter endurance aircraft such as
those under development by L3 Harris will have limited impact in
Africa, they will be limited to a handful of bases from which they
cannot cover all our teams on the ground, nor will they be able to
provide in extremis support to all our high-risk posts.
56. Senator Kelly. General Kurilla and General Langley, how would a
dedicated SOCOM Armed Overwatch capability impact your theater?
General Kurilla. A dedicated SOCOM Armed Overwatch capability may
benefit the CENTCOM region if it is additive to our requirements vice
used to substitute for current platforms that include manned and
unmanned Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, rotary
and fixed-wing attack aircraft, and gunships.
General Langley. A dedicated armed overwatch platform in a country
such as Somalia would be of benefit, as much of the support would be
reachable from several airfields and forward staging bases. In West
Africa, by contrast, it would require more aircraft at more bases
closer to the areas of violent extremist activity where our forces are
more at risk. This would come at the cost of adding more bases closer
to those areas, such as the Chad-Niger-Nigeria tri-border area and/or
south of current staging locations in the nation(s) of Ghana, Togo, or
Benin, for example.
violent extreme organizations in africa
57. Senator Kelly. General Langley, in addition to my concerns
about the malign influence of China and Russia in Africa, I'm also
concerned about the situation with terrorist groups and violent
extremists across Africa. Last year, your predecessor testified that
``7 of the 10 countries with the largest increase in terrorism were in
Sub Saharan Africa--with Burkina Faso suffering a 590 percent
increase.'' ISIS and al Qaeda-aligned groups remain a potent and
growing threat across much of Africa. In the Sahel region, Jama'at Nasr
al-Islam wal Muslimin is continuing to spread and destabilize the
region. Moreover, al Shabab and the situation in Somalia poses a direct
threat to the Homeland--they have capability, and they have intent.
This is extremely concerning, and I have several questions on how
Congress can best support DOD to reduce threats and stabilize the
region. What ISR capabilities do we have in the region to get after
these challenges, and is it enough?
General Langley. USAFRICOM and its components have a layered mix of
national and tactical ISR capabilities to counter threats and stabilize
the region. They are the full spectrum of intelligence collection to
include: GEOINT, SIGINT, HUMINT and OSINT.
No, USAFRICOM does not have enough ISR capabilities and can only
achieve 826 percent of our requirements using a combination of Global
Force Management (GFM) and contract ISR. This causes the command to
make daily decisions about which operations to support, provide
overwatch for VEOs to target, Russian and Chinese activities to
monitor, and where else we will have to take risk. It also limits our
ability to provide timely indications and warnings support to
diplomatic facilities.
58. Senator Kelly. General Langley, what type of ISR would best
help you capture VEO activity in Africa?
General Langley. USAFRICOM's greatest ISR needs are for additional
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Full Motion Video (FMV) collection.
However, equally important is the need for additional linguists and
analysts to conduct the processing, exploitation, and dissemination
(PED) of material collected.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
naval small craft instruction and technical training school
59. Senator Wicker. General Langley, as you know, the Naval Small
Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS) provides
training to foreign partners on small boat operations and maintenance,
unmanned aerial systems, and other related skills. What is your
assessment of the value that NAVSCIATTS provides to United States
Africa Command in support of its theater security cooperation
requirements and objectives?
General Langley. African partner nations have difficulty
maintaining the readiness of their assets and frequently request
assistance with ship and small boat maintenance. NAVSCIATTS provides
valuable training to our foreign partners in this critical area. In
addition to NAVSCIATTS, the United States Coast Guard Deputy Commandant
for International Affairs, utilizing Mobile Training Teams, hosts
resident and exportable training classes for African Partner Nations.
The wide range of training made available by the USCG Mobile Training
Teams is vital to continued logistical and operational expertise within
our partner nation's maritime forces. The ability to combine maritime
law enforcement training, such as Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported
Fishing, small boat operations, and the International Maritime Officer
Course in support of theater security cooperation ensure those
requirements are met and exceeded. The USCG international training
components are small but mighty in meeting USAFRICOM objectives.
authorizations for the use of military force
60. Senator Wicker. General Kurilla and General Langley, as
Congress examines the future of the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF), it would be useful to understand how
each of your combatant commands have utilized these authorities. Please
provide a list of operations and activities that have been conducted
under each of these AUMFs, respectively, since 2013.
General Kurilla. Since 2013, CENTCOM has relied on the 2001 AUMF as
the domestic legal basis for its operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria
and Yemen, and for other counterterrorism operations conducted
throughout the region. Meanwhile, the 2002 AUMF has been employed only
as an ``additional authority'' for operations in Iraq and Syria in
certain circumstances. For example, the 2002 AUMF was employed in the
targeting of terrorist threats emanating from Iraq.
General Langley.
ODYSSEY RESOLVE
OPERATION EMINENT SHADOW
OPERATION INVERTED LIGHT
OPERATION JUNIPER MICRON
OPERATION JUNIPER SHIELD
OPERATION NEW NORMAL
OPERATION OCTAVE QUARTZ
OPERATION OCTAVE SHIELD
OPERATION RAINMAKER EXORD MOD 1 and MOD 2
USAFRICOM GREY EAGLE EXORD (MOD 1-7)
USAFRICOM JUNCTION SERPENT EXORD
USAFRICOM LOE 1 OCTAVE SHIELD OPORD
USAFRICOM OCTAVE SHIELD EXORD
USAFRICOM OPERATION OCTAVE SHIELD (OOS) ORDER
OPERATION ODYSSEY LIGHTNING
JUPITER GARRET
JUPITER HERRON
JUPITER ARROW
USAFRICOM does not use the 2002 AUMF. Since 2013, USAFRICOM has
conducted counter terrorism operations in Africa under OPERATION
EMINENT SHADOW, OPERATION JUNIPER MICRON, OPERATION JUNIPER SHIELD,
OPERATION OCTAVE QUARTZ, and OPERATION OCTAVE SHIELD. These operations
derive their authority, at least in part, from the 2001 AUMF. The
activities conducted under these operations include the authority to
use force against organizations determined by the President to have
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001 in order to prevent future attacks
against the United States by these organizations. Other activities
under these operations include working by, with, and through partners
and allies and collecting and sharing intelligence with partners and
allies.
61. Senator Wicker. General Kurilla and General Langley, please
provide a list of the current and ongoing operations and activities for
which each of these authorization for the use of military force
(AUMFs), respectively, has been invoked as part of the legal
justification.
General Kurilla. CENTCOM relies on the 2001 AUMF as the domestic
legal basis for its operations in Iraq and Syria, and for other
counterterrorism operations conducted throughout the region. We have no
ongoing military activities that rely solely or primarily on the 2002
AUMF.
General Langley.
OPERATION OCTAVE QUARTZ
OPERATION JUNIPER MICRON
OPERATION JUNIPER SHIELD
OPERATION NEW NORMAL
OPERATION OCTAVE VIPER
USAFRICOM currently conducts counter terrorism operations in Africa
under OPERATION JUNIPER MICRON, OPERATION JUNIPER SHIELD, OPERATION
OCTAVE QUARTZ, and OPERATION OCTAVE SHIELD under the 2001 AUMF. The
activities conducted under these operations include the authority to
use force against organizations determined by the President to have
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on 11 September 2001 in order to prevent future attacks
against the United States by these organizations. Other activities
under these operations include working by, with, and through partners
and allies and collecting and sharing intelligence with partners and
allies.
62. Senator Wicker. General Kurilla and General Langley, if the
2001 authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) were repealed,
what types of current operations or activities would no longer have a
legal basis to continue, and would therefore need to be reevaluated or
stopped?
General Kurilla. The 2001 AUMF remains the cornerstone domestic
legal basis for ongoing CENTCOM operations against Violent Extremist
Organizations such as al Qaeda and ISIS. Repealing it without a
replacement would significantly limit our ability to counter Violent
Extremist Groups operating within our region.
General Langley. If Congress repeals the 2001 AUMF, we would have
to reevaluate or stop the following activities: 1) United States direct
action in support of allies and partners who have come under attack by
al Qaeda, ISIS, or associated forces; 2) United States intelligence-
sharing with allies and partners that may lead to direct action by
allies and partners against al Qaeda, ISIS, or associated forces; and,
3) United States unilateral direct-action operations against al Qaeda,
ISIS, or associated forces, consistent with Presidential policies. All
three types of operations derive their authority from the 2001 AUMF,
which permits the President to use all necessary and appropriate force
against organizations that planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 in order to
prevent future attacks against the United States by organizations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
chinese influence in africom and centcom
63. Senator Cotton. General Kurilla and General Langley, how are
each of your commands working to counter China's influence with our
allies in your respective Area of Responsibilities (AOR)? Please
describe specific programs or actions.
General Kurilla. Strategic competition with China is deeply
manifest in the region. The People's Republic of China aggressively
expands its informational, military, and economic instruments of
national power across the region. With the recent announcement to
normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Beijing is expanding
its diplomatic influence in the region. China, dependent on the region
for more than half of its imported crude oil and more than a third of
all its natural gas, is also moving beyond energy-based investments to
encompass physical and telecommunications infrastructure that advances
its Belt and Road Initiative. 19 of 21 CENTCOM countries have signed a
Belt and Road agreement with China. So, we are in a race to integrate
with our partners before China can penetrate the region.
To compete with China, we invest deeply and aggressively with
partners throughout the region. These abiding partnerships are our
strategic advantage over China in the region. These include developing
Regional constructs that exclude China and promote regional stability.
Additionally, our innovation efforts--including our innovation Task
Forces 39, 59, and 99--are helping to connect our partners to cutting-
edge technologies and new processes to meet the regional threats we
face.
Additionally, as China expands its activities in the region,
CENTCOM illuminates those actions that undermine sovereignty and the
rules-based order. Through our public messaging, we continue to counter
false narratives offered by our competitors.
General Langley. United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) continues
to position the U.S. as a willing and trusted partner, offering
alternatives to PRC cooperation. We are reworking our approach to
security cooperation, countering transnational threats, and cooperation
with the interagency in the context of competition. We offer the most
sought-after security cooperation programs and activities, from
training and education in the U.S. through the International Military
Education and Training Program; complex joint and multilateral
exercises; partner-centric grant assistance; foreign military sales,
and financing for quality military training and equipment with an eye
toward the sustainability of these investments. In fact, the demand for
these programs always outstrips supply. Our efforts are not only
focused on defense, but on development and diplomacy. On the
development front, USAID continues to have a robust presence in Africa.
Their efforts are extensive and long lasting, with a focus on economic
viability integral to promoting prosperity and progress. On the
diplomatic front, we closely coordinate with our Embassy country teams
to ensure advancing of our values and democratic governance. We now
have Security Cooperation Offices in almost all our embassies across
Africa. We welcome and are increasing defense cooperation with our
closest allies and partners in Africa and the Indian Ocean Region. Most
of USAFRICOM's Western and Indo-Pacific allies do not see the PRC
exclusively as a strategic competitor. Most Western allies see China as
an economic competitor, but also a partner at times, and, because the
West has been inconsistent in providing economic alternatives to the
PRC, many of our African partners ask us not to try to force them away
from their Chinese economic projects and agreements. However, our
allies and partners often express consistent concerns regarding Chinese
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, in conjunction with the
detrimental impacts to African food security and stability. We assist
partners in responding to this challenge through initiatives to build
partner capacity in areas such as Maritime Domain Awareness and
Maritime Security. Through these and other efforts, we demonstrate U.S.
commitment through a responsive, requirements-driven approach.
Additionally, the announcement of PRC building a spaceport in Djibouti
may become a concern of allies that have bases there.
u.s. security partnerships in africom and centcom
64. Senator Cotton. General Kurilla and General Langley, please
provide a detailed assessment of how the nations in your AOR view the
United States as a security partner, focusing on the aftermath of the
Chinese brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the
disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. Do the nations in your AOR see
the U.S. as a reliable partner? Why or why not?
General Kurilla. Unlike China, the United States has been in the
region for over 75 years. We have invested in the security and
stability of the region, and developed deep, abiding partnerships. The
United States remains the partner of choice; however, that position is
not guaranteed and it is something we must continue to work on with our
partners. The United States is viewed as a reliable partner but some
regional partners are beginning to hedge with a multi-vector policy
based on their perceived uncertainty of our long-term commitment.
The National Defense Strategy states that China is the pacing
challenge, Russia is the acute threat and Iran and violent extremist
organizations are persistent threats. Some partners view the increase
in posture to counter China and Russia as coming at the expense of the
Middle East and Levant; therefore, they are uncertain as to the future
of the United States long term commitment.
General Langley. The United States remains the security partner of
choice in most of Africa. United States military training, professional
military education, and exercises are still considered the gold
standard. United States equipment, on the other hand, is expensive and
often takes a long time to procure. Because of cost and procurement
delays, some African partners choose to source equipment elsewhere.
Generally, African nations make defense decisions based on
pragmatic assessments of their defense needs, the economic value of a
transaction, and the overall political relationship with a partner.
African nations tend to avoid predicating decisions on the ideology of
a partner or the current status of a partner's global military
operations--they don't want to get caught up in great power
competition. This has been clearly communicated to United States
Defense officials and is demonstrated by African nations' widespread
reluctance to formally criticize the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
USAFRICOM maintains enduring and substantive defense relationships
with many African states, and USAFRICOM always seeks to expand our
engagement on the continent. Defense relationships are only one
component of broader U.S. Government policies. This carries
implications for where and how we engage in Africa. Many countries in
Africa lament the United States' perceived lack of interest in engaging
with them on areas of mutual interest and bristle at how long U.S.
assistance takes to execute and at the restrictions placed on it. In
many countries, the security and economic situation is quickly
deteriorating in a way that makes navigating the lengthy and
bureaucratic nature of U.S. security cooperation untenable, forcing
them to seek assistance from alternative actors like the PRC and Russia
and, more recently, countries like Turkey and Israel.
65. Senator Cotton. General Kurilla and General Langley, how are
your commands working to reassure allies that the United States remains
the preferred partner of choice?
General Kurilla. We reassure our allies through our presence and
engagement, and a vision of increased capabilities based on innovation
and integration. Our basing, extensive training exercises, operations,
and leadership visits all reveal our enduring commitment to the region.
Our Foreign Military Sales, information sharing, and innovation efforts
speak to our deep commitment to the region.
General Langley. We execute Operations, Investments and Activities
to support the AFRICOM campaign plan. We work with our African Partners
on countering mutual threats and malign actors through building partner
capacity with security cooperation. USAFRICOM, through its campaign
plans and component commands, places a premium on engaging with and
providing assistance to our partner nations across the full spectrum of
our capabilities, to remain the partner of choice. Against some threats
like al-Shabaab or ISIS--West Africa our assurance and reassurance may
look more like conventional military operations, while in most of the
rest of continent we work to remain the partner of choice through
security cooperation, engagements, and consistent forward presence.
Great examples of our ability to demonstrate forward presence include
the use of the USS Hershel ``Woody'' Williams and our Security Force
Assistance Brigade mentor teams. Our security cooperation runs the
gamut from large scale multilateral exercises on land such as AFRICAN
LION, or at sea through the EXPRESS exercise series to increase our
partners' capabilities to respond to threats and build
interoperability. USAFRICOM has a robust engagement schedule, including
conferences and key leader engagements, both of which seek to
synchronize activities and foster regional dialog on issues of
importance.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
regional air and missile defense cooperation
66. Senator Ernst. General Kurilla, what is the implementation
status of the air and missile defense architecture for our allies and
partners in the Middle East, as required within 180 days of enactment
of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
year 2023?
General Kurilla. Our allies and partners provide opportunities for
cooperative air and missile defense regionally during both steady State
and crisis situations by leveraging multi-lateral capabilities, the
Regional Security Construct (RSC), and Middle East Air Defense (MEAD)
initiatives. These programs allow us to take advantage of partner
contributions, increase opportunities for international collaboration,
distribute financial burdens, deepen interoperability among systems and
operators, and better defend U.S. deployed forces.
The current priority we are working is a Common Shared Air Picture
that every partner nation can observe. We also work together in sharing
information on missile and Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) threats, both
before and after launch. Pre-launch information sharing is crucial to
understanding adversary missile and UAS capabilities and intentions,
ensuring all partners have the most accurate and up-to-date
information, and developing response plans to potential attack.
67. Senator Ernst. General Kurilla, will the report be delivered on
time? If not, please explain when the report is anticipated to be
delivered and the reason for delay.
General Kurilla. I will defer to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the State Department on the timing of this report.
68. Senator Ernst. General Kurilla, what is the current State of
integrated air and missile defense infrastructure in the region? Please
describe the key barriers to further implementation.
General Kurilla. Integrated air and missile defense serves as a top
functional priority for CENTCOM. Across the region, we've developed a
series of programs and exercises to advance this priority. We are
making the most progress with C-UAS.
Specific to the UAS threat--we have just established Red Sands, an
experimentation center in Saudi Arabia for new tactics, techniques,
procedures, processes, and technology to counter Unmanned Aerial
Systems. Red Sands is our partnership with the Royal Saudi Armed Forces
to test and experiment and ultimately improve tactics, techniques, and
procedures to defeat Unmanned Aerial Systems. Our firm, longstanding
military-to-military relationship with the Royal Saudi Armed Forces
allowed us to quickly develop and implement the program, which serves
as a benefit to both military forces.
We conducted our first Red Sands live fire exercise event in mid-
March in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. During the live fire, we executed
a complex multiple Unmanned Aerial System threat against a layered
defense that included both United States and Saudi systems.
We will evolve the program in the coming months, with additional
capabilities, systems, and technology. During the next iteration of Red
Sands in September, we will defend against more complex drone attacks.
While Red Sands is currently a bilateral event, both CENTCOM and the
Saudis intend to expand the program to other regional partners in the
future.
We have also established Green Sands, a 5-day program to certify
every Base Defense Operations Center entering the CENTCOM region
against complex theater specific threat-based Unmanned Aerial Systems--
prior to deployment into theater. Green Sands will ensure all sections
are more capable of defeating complex, multi-drone attacks using
multiple systems and platforms.
In addition, Task Forces 39 and 99 constantly test and field new
counter-Unmanned Aerial System capabilities, working closely with our
partners to implement best practices. The aim is to develop an
integrated air and missile defense system to defeat adversary drones,
inclusive of electronic warfare, directed energy, traditional systems,
AI-based systems, and increased sensors and data collection. For
CENTCOM, this is about taking ideas, concepts, and systems from
industry, from our partners, in practice in Ukraine, and applying them
to the threat we face in the region. We seek an integrated air and
missile defense architecture that is ubiquitous within the region,
integrated with our partners, and capable of defending our forces and
assets.
Key barriers to implementation to integrated air and missile
defense are each country's reticence to share relevant data with all
regional partners. Almost all are willing to share with the United
States and bilaterally and with many other countries. Many countries
are unwilling to share multilaterally but that is slowly changing.
Another barrier to implementation is Foreign Military Sales (FMS).
If a partner buys Chinese or Russian equipment we will not allow it to
operate on our networks. China and Russia are often viewed by regional
partners as more accommodating than the United States, offering lower
costs, favorable financing, faster delivery times, and no end-use
monitoring agreements. During my trips to the region and calls with
regional Chief of Defense, I routinely hear how much faster and easier
China's foreign military sales program is than ours. While the American
foreign military sales process involves multiple steps going through
multiple layers of government bureaucracy, the People's Republic of
China can move much faster, often making us non-competitive by
comparison.
Our partners have real security needs and they want to invest in
American systems. They know that when they ``buy American,'' they buy
the best equipment, training, sustainment, and upgrades. They also know
that they buy into our bureaucracy.
Streamlining our multi-layered Foreign Military Sales program,
allowing us to move at the speed of relevance, would drive down Russia
and China's opportunities for influence in the region.
69. Senator Ernst. General Kurilla, what is the status and
estimated delivery date of the 10 most important approved Foreign
Military Sales supporting integrated air and missile defense for allies
and partners to the region?
General Kurilla. Our top ten Foreign Military Sales cases relate to
the most significant challenges facing our partners as we reduce our
footprint in the region--Integrated Air and Missile Defense and
Countering Unmanned Aerial Systems. Many of our Middle Eastern Gulf
partners live under constant threat of attack from Iran and its
proxies. It is a positive indicator that our partners are seeking to
counter existential threats with U.S. systems rather than from our
competitors. That said, seven of these ten cases are off track. It is
imperative that we continue to work to improve our FMS process and make
it more responsive. Otherwise, we risk driving our partners to Russia
and China.
Saudi F-15SA
Status: This case is on track. Case is for 84 F-15SA
(Saudi Advanced) aircraft and conversion of 70 F-15Ss to the SA, a
unique, fly by-wire variant of the aircraft. Total case value is
$29.4B.
Estimated Delivery Date: All new production and 20 (of
70) conversion aircraft have been delivered; deliveries of conversion
aircraft continue. Final delivery is expected in October 2027.
Saudi Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).
Status: This case is on track. The case is for seven
THAAD batteries and 360 Interceptor missiles. Total case value is $13.3
billion. While on track, training associated with this case is at risk
due to size of program.
Estimated Delivery Date: For interceptors, delivery is
planned from the second quarter for fiscal year 2024 through fiscal
year 2028. Initial Operating Capability (IOC) is planned over the
period of the second quarter of fiscal year 2025 through fiscal year
2027.
Bahrain Patriots.
Status: This case is not on track due to U.S. Army
prioritization and production rate limitations. U.S. Army fill level
for Patriot Advanced Capability--3 Missile Segment Enhanced missiles
has caused worldwide delivery slippage. Bahrain PAC-3 MSEs delivery
delayed 6-months. This case is for two Patriot Fire Control Units
(FCUs), 60 PATRIOT PAC-3 MSE missiles, 36 Guidance Enhanced Missile--
Tactical (GEM-T) missiles. Total case value is $1.15 billion. Bahrain
is one of three countries experiencing Patriot delays.
Estimated Delivery Date: Estimated deliveries of two FCUs
is on track for July 2023 and November 2023. Delivery for 36 GEM-Ts is
scheduled for 31 May 2023. Delivery of PAC-3 MSEs will begin in the
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2024.
UAE Patriot Interceptors
Status: This case is not on track due to U.S. Army
prioritization and production rate limitations. U.S. Army fill level
for Patriot Advanced Capability--3 Missile Segment Enhanced (PAC-3 MSE)
missiles has caused worldwide delivery slippage. UAE PAC-3 MSEs delayed
2 years from original projection. Case is for 452 PATRIOT PAC-3 MSE
missiles and related support equipment and services. Total case value
is $2.5 billion. UAE is one of three countries that is experiencing
delays to PAC-3 MSE deliveries.
Estimated Delivery Date: Delivery projected over the
period of fourth quarter of fiscal year 2023 through fiscal year 2025.
Qatar Patriot Interceptors
Status: This case is not on track due to U.S. Army
prioritization and production rate limitations. U.S. Army fill level
for Patriot Advanced Capability--3 Missile Segment Enhanced (PAC-3 MSE)
missiles has caused worldwide delivery slippage. Qatar will experience
a two-and-a-half-year delivery delay to remaining PAC-3 MSEs. Case is
for 10 Patriot Fire Control Units (FCUs) and 146 PAC-3 Missile Segment
Enhancement (MSE). Total case value is $7.3 billion. Qatar is one of
three countries experiencing delays to PAC-3 MSE deliveries.
Estimated Delivery Date: To date, the 10 firing units and
114 PAC-3 missiles have been delivered to Qatar. Upcoming deliveries
are expected from the second quarter of fiscal year 2024 through fiscal
year 2026.
Qatar National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMs).
Status: This case is not on track due to an industry
delay. Cases support Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) of 20 NASAMS
including 80 AIM-120C and 100 AIM-120ER Advanced Medium Range Air-to-
Air Missiles (AMRAAM). Total case value is $404 million.
Estimated Delivery Date: To date, 40 of 80 AIM-120Cs have
been delivered. We anticipate delivery of the remaining 40 AIM-120C's
by the second quarter of fiscal year 2024. 50 of 100 AIM-120ERs are
prepared to ship.
Qatar F-15QA
Status: This case is not on track due to multiple radar
development and ferry issues. Two cases are for 48 F-15QAs, associated
equipment, and construction. Total case value is approximately $14
billion. These cases have experienced multiple delays due to radar
development and ferry issues.
Estimated Delivery Date: The next ferry of five aircraft
is expected to arrive in Qatar July 2023; this will bring the total to
33 aircraft in Qatar, 3 aircraft will be delivered in the United States
in Jul 2023 completing delivery of the 36 tranche of aircraft. The next
12 aircraft begin delivery early 2024.
Qatar Fixed Site--Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat
System (FS-LIDS)
Status: This case is on track. The case is for 10 FS-LIDS
with Coyote Block 2 Interceptor missiles. Total case value is $544.3
million. On 24 Mar 2023, the Army offered the case to Qatar.
Estimated Delivery Date: Initial delivery is expected 64-
months after Qatar signs the case.
Bahrain F-16 Block 70
Status: This case is not on track because of multiple
industry delays. The current version of the Airborne Integrated Defense
Electronic Warfare Suite (AIDEWS) is no longer in production, and the
follow-on Advanced-AIDEWS is not available until July 2025. The case is
for 16 F-16V aircraft and associated equipment. Total case value is
$2.05 billion.
Estimated Delivery Date: Bahrain's first F-16 Block 70
rolled out March 2023. We anticipate delivery of all aircraft through
the third quarter of fiscal year 2024 with AAIDEWS available in July
2025.
Jordan F16 C/D Block 70
Status: This case is not on track due to multiple issues.
The case is for 12 F-16s Block 70 aircraft and associated support.
Multiple delays in pricing and availability (P&A) data resulted in a
near doubling of the price. The total case value is $1.97 billion which
will be funded by a combination of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and
Jordanian national funds.
Estimated Delivery Date: We anticipate delivery of the
first aircraft in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2026 with
additional deliveries through fiscal year 2028.
70. Senator Ernst. General Kurilla, what is the risk of Chinese and
Russian arm sales to United States partners to integrated air and
missile defense infrastructure?
General Kurilla. Expanding regional arms sales--particularly in the
area of integrated air and missile defense--provides China
opportunities to expand its influence and interoperability. More
importantly, we cannot integrate Russian or Chinese equipment into our
Regional Air and Missile Defense construct. We will not allow Russian
or Chinese equipment to operate on our networks.
71. Senator Ernst. General Kurilla, what recommendations do you
have for mitigating this risk?
General Kurilla. China is often viewed by regional partners as more
accommodating than the United States, offering lower costs, favorable
financing, faster delivery times, and no end-use monitoring agreements.
During my trips to the region and calls with regional Chiefs of
Defense, I routinely hear how much faster and easier China's foreign
military sales program is than ours. While the American foreign
military sales process involves multiple steps going through multiple
layers of government bureaucracy, the People's Republic of China can
move much faster, often making us non-competitive by comparison.
Our partners have real security needs and they want to invest in
American systems. They know that when they ``buy American,'' they buy
the best equipment, training, sustainment, and upgrades. They also know
that they buy into our bureaucracy.
Streamlining our multi-layered Foreign Military Sales program,
allowing us to move at the speed of relevance, would drive down Russia
and China's opportunities for influence in the region.
maritime domain awareness
72. Senator Ernst. General Kurilla, what are the barriers to
advancing partner-enabled maritime awareness?
General Kurilla. Maritime domain awareness requires the ability to
gather, communicate, and process information to provide a common
operational picture and act on that information. Partner nations have a
variety of sensors including coastal radars and crewed assets which
could be augmented with unmanned technology solutions. We enable the
sharing of information as a go-between among partners, facilitating the
Maritime Threat Network.
There are not many barriers other than cost to advancing partner-
enabled maritime awareness.
saudi arabia and iran diplomatic relations
73. Senator Ernst. General Kurilla, in your personal opinion, what
is the impact to United States security interests from the agreement
negotiated by Iran and Saudi Arabia?
General Kurilla. The impact to U.S. security interests is not yet
fully understood. While a reduction of tensions in the region may yield
positive benefits, an agreement is not implementation. We do not
believe Iran will adhere to the agreement over the long-term. In the 90
days while Iran and Saudi Arabia were negotiating the agreement,
USCENTCOM and partner forces interdicted five major shipments of
Iranian arms headed to Houthi fighters; some of which were advanced
components like inertial navigation systems for short range ballistic
missiles.
We are also concerned about China's role as diplomatic mediator.
China seeks to undermine American influence in the region. In addition
to the economic, informational, and military instruments of power it
has employed in the region, China has now demonstrated its ability to
influence the security environment with the diplomatic instrument of
national power.
74. Senator Ernst. General Kurilla, in your personal opinion, what
do you assess is the impact to our partners from the agreement
negotiated by Iran and Saudi Arabia?
General Kurilla. If the agreement truly lowers tension in the
region it will provide some benefit to our partners in the region;
however, Iranian diplomatic efforts and the actions of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps are historically not aligned. That being
said, it remains to be seen as this is still in development.
There is little trust in the Middle East that Iran will fully honor
agreements, including this one. The agreement may offer us an advantage
by serving as a tool to hold Iran accountable for its malign
activities. Further, the agreement may demonstrate China's inability to
uphold the agreement in that it will not stop Iran's malign behavior.
75. Senator Ernst. General Kurilla, do you assess that Iran has
agreed to cease weapon shipments to the Houthis? Please describe any
rationale and supporting facts for an assessment.
General Kurilla. We do not believe Iran has completely ceased
weapons shipments to the Houthis at this time. This is based on
intelligence, pattern of behavior and partner nation feedback.
76. Senator Ernst. General Kurilla, do you assess that China will
have increased access to Iran or Saudi Arabia as a result of this
agreement? Please describe the level of Chinese penetration in Saudi
Arabia and in Iran.
General Kurilla. Chinese influence and interest in Iran is based on
its energy needs, while Iran needs economic investment from China. This
agreement can assist in securing those needs as it lowers the tension
between Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as stabilizing Chinese energy
purchases from both counties.
China penetration in Saudi Arabia is based on Chinese economic
interest, particularly energy. While Saudi Arabia has purchased some
limited Chinese military equipment--Saudi Arabia continues to purchase
Western and United States military equipment. FMS delays can cause
further facilitate Chinese penetration in Saudi Arabia.
section 702e
77. Senator Ernst. General Langley, could additional resourcing to
the 127 Echo program buy-down risk in AFRICOM?
General Langley. Yes, 127e programs allow U.S. special operations
forces to mitigate the threat of attacks against the U.S. Homeland and
interests abroad by providing a sustainable option to maintain pressure
on violent extremist organizations (VEOs). These programs represent a
relatively low-cost, low-risk, high-payoff opportunity to achieve
counter-VEO objectives while enhancing partnerships, especially when
synchronized with Department of State security assistance and
Department of Defense security cooperation programs. In alignment with
the recently published National Defense Strategy (NDS), 127e programs
facilitate the shift from ``U.S.-led, partner enabled'' to ``partner-
led, U.S. enabled'' counterterrorism operations. Leveraging 127e-
resourced foreign forces in a C-VEO role also enhances USSOCOM's
ability to balance limited assets in consideration of NDS priorities--
gaining efficiencies where C-VEO and Combatant Command Integrated
Deterrence Campaigning are complementary.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
prc reaction to iranian actions in the vicinity of the strait of hormuz
78. Senator Sullivan. General Kurilla, China imports approximately
47 percent of its oil supply from the Middle East. China-bound oil
tankers must pass through the Strait of Hormuz, into the Indian Ocean,
through the Straits of Malacca, and up through the South China Sea to
reach Chinese ports. In 2018, the Iranian Government threatened to
close the Strait of Hormuz in response to United States oil sanctions.
In the 1980's, Iran and Iraq both attacked civilian oil tankers in the
Persian Gulf, which led to the United States reflagging Kuwaiti tankers
as U.S. ships and escorting them with U.S. Navy vessels. China is well
aware both of this history and its reliance on the steady flow of oil
through the Strait of Hormuz and into Chinese ports. Considering
China's economic and military presence in the CENTCOM AOR and the fact
that it now has the world's largest navy, what actions do you think
China would take in your AOR if it thought its oil supply might be
disrupted or cutoff because of a regional conflict?
General Kurilla. China viewed previous Iranian threats to close or
restrict access to the Strait of Hormuz as unacceptably provocative. In
the event of a regional contingency, Beijing would prioritize efforts
to deescalate through diplomacy by asserting itself as an impartial
mediator. Beijing would likely frame the conflict as the consequence of
failed United States regional policies while promoting China's Global
Security Initiative as an alternative basis for stability, dialog, and
dispute resolution.
79. Senator Sullivan. General Kurilla, could such a Chinese
reaction lead to something like the Tanker Wars of the 1980's?
General Kurilla. Given the possible resource cost and associated
risk to its influence, the People's Republic of China is unlikely to
engage in a protracted conflict at sea in the Middle East.
houthis
80. Senator Sullivan. General Kurilla, on January 19, 2021, the
Houthis were designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO),
which the current administration revoked 1 month later. Subsequent
actions by the Houthis have shown the folly of this decision. The
administration has argued the Houthis' FTO designation was revoked to
avoid exacerbating Yemen's humanitarian situation and to create
conditions for peaceful dialog between that group and the Government of
Yemen. Two years later, Yemen's famine persists, the cease-fire agreed
to on April 2, 2022 has collapsed, arms continue to flow from Iran to
the Houthis, some of which have been interdicted by the 5th Fleet and
naval forces from the UK and France, and in February 2022 these
terrorists attacked our base in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Do you
see the Houthis as a terrorist organization with the means and
motivation to attack our servicemembers and allies in the region?
General Kurilla. The Houthis have engaged in terrorist activities
in that past. While the Houthis have the means and capability to
threaten U.S. troops and partner forces, currently, they likely do not
intend to target U.S. troops in the region. They have shown in the past
their capability and will to target partner forces in the region.
chinese illegal unregulated and unreported fishing in the africom aor
81. Senator Sullivan. General Langley, according to your testimony,
at least a third of the world's ships engaged in illegal, unreported,
and unregulated (IUU) fishing are Chinese. The Office of Naval
Intelligence estimates the Chinese illegal fishing fleet is between
12,000 to 17,000 ships. Chinese IUU fishing, occurring throughout your
AOR, is too big of a problem for any one country to monitor on its own.
I recently returned from a Middle East CODEL [congressional delegation]
where I met with the Commander of the 5th Fleet and learned about Task
Force 59, which is employing unmanned surface vessels at scale to
increase U.S. and partner domain awareness in CENTCOM's AOR. Along with
building partner capacity through exercises with the United States Navy
and Coast Guard presence, how might AFRICOM employ something like Task
Force 59 to detect, monitor, and deter Chinese IUU fishing in your AOR?
General Langley. Chinese illegal, underreported, and unregulated
fishing (IUU-F) in my opinion is a significant issue with both the West
and the East and an issue my Command, in particular United States Naval
Forces Africa (NAVAF), is focusing on for capacity-building efforts to
counter IUU-F. IUU-F was prevalent in discussions between United States
and Africa partner maritime leadership at the recent Africa Maritime
Forces Summit. My Navy component, NAVAF, is the lead to garner broad
interagency and international support for a Tri-Service enabled
multinational effort on counter IUU-F.
The first step in countering IUU-F is detecting it. Learning from
Task Force 59, unmanned resources would allow persistent presence, at a
relatively low cost, to defect illicit activity and sharing this
information with local partners, thereby building maritime domain
awareness. Unmanned resources can then be used to monitor illicit
actors once found and allow African partners to take appropriate
action. Finally, these actions by our African patterns can be
communicated in a public manner resulting in a deterrent effect. NAVAF
has several unmanned platforms that can assist our African partners
with maritime surveillance, to include fisheries surveillance. Each
littoral partner in Africa has different capabilities and capacities,
but we realize that unmanned technologies are cost-effective and
represent an opportunity for Maritime Domain Awareness capability for
our African partners.
chinese basing in the africom aor
82. Senator Sullivan. General Langley, as you point out in your
testimony, China seeks to expand its military presence on the African
continent with a new base on Africa's Atlantic coast in Equatorial
Guinea. It already has a military base in Djibouti, which it is
expanding to include a spaceport. Can you describe how more Chinese
naval and airbases in AFRICOM impact the global military competition
between the United States and China? For example, what could China do
with a military base on Africa's Atlantic Coast that it cannot do now?
General Langley. Beijing has pursued additional military bases and
logistics facilities in numerous African countries to support the
People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) ability to project and sustain
military power at greater distances. China's basing outreach in Africa
has focused along the continent's vast coastline. A Chinese military
base on the Atlantic coast of Africa would change the strategic
geography of the AFRICOM area of responsibility and could pose threats
to United States operations. We already have observed a similar pattern
in Djibouti, where the PLA has interfered in United States operations
via suspected lasing events and airspace disputes. Speaking strictly
from a military capabilities perspective, a Chinese naval base on the
Atlantic coast of Africa could enable persistent PLA Navy power
projection in the Atlantic Ocean that spans from the Cape of Good Hope
to the Strait of Gibraltar and westward toward the United States East
Coast--a significant expansion of the PLA Navy's current capabilities.
Equatorial Guinea is a likely location for this goal. During the past
few years, we have seen the Equatoguinean press report that China has
signed a basing agreement in the country. In 2021, we also observed
China and Equatorial Guinea announcing an agreement to adopt joint
strategies to counter piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. These developments
suggest the distinct possibility of a Chinese military presence on the
Atlantic coast of Africa in the coming years.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 23, 2023
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. I would like to call the Committee to order.
As an initial point of business, since a quorum is now present
I ask the Committee to consider 3,059 pending military
nominations. All of these nominations have been before the
Committee the required length of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report----
Senator Wicker. So moved.
Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
Senator Shaheen. Second.
Chairman Reed. All in favor say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
Committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on March 23, 2023.
1. In the Air Force there are 27 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with David J. Berkland) (Reference No.
196)
2. Col. Corey A. Simmons, USAF to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 198)
3. RADM George M. Wikoff, USN to be vice admiral and Commander,
US Naval Forces, Central Command/Commander, FIFTH Fleet and Commander,
Combined Maritime Forces (Reference No. 211)
4. RADM Frederick W. Kacher, USN to be vice admiral and
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet (Reference No. 212)
5. In the Army there are 101 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Tolulope O. Akinsanya) (Reference No. 238)
6. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Jason W. Price) (Reference No. 257)
7. In the Air Force Reserve there are 11 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Sean M. Carpenter)
(Reference No. 290)
8. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Kristin A. Hillery)
(Reference No. 291)
9. In the Air Force Reserve there are 10 appointments to the
grade of major general (list begins with Elizabeth E. Arledge)
(Reference No. 292)
10. Col. Carlos M. Caceres, USAR to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 310)
11. RADM Shoshana S. Chatfield, USN to be vice admiral and US
Military Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Military Committee (Reference No. 311)
12. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Shane K. Doty) (Reference No. 312)
13. In the Air Force Reserve there are 9 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Speight H. Caroon) (Reference No.
313)
14. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Brandi Barnard King) (Reference No. 314)
15. In the Air Force Reserve there are 3 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Daniel S. McPherson) (Reference No.
315)
16. In the Air Force Reserve there are 10 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Matthew J. Andrade) (Reference No.
316)
17. In the Air Force Reserve there are 10 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Adam James Cole) (Reference No. 317)
18. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Eric K. Wilke) (Reference No. 318)
19. In the Air Force Reserve there are 13 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Kelli M. Bermudez) (Reference No.
319)
20. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Lisa Carol Giugliano) (Reference No.
320)
21. In the Air Force Reserve there are 7 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Joseph Catalino, Jr.) (Reference No.
321)
22. In the Air Force Reserve there are 9 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with James M. Bershinsky) (Reference No.
322)
23. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Gary Monroe Boutz, Jr.) (Reference
No. 323)
24. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (John Charles Easley) (Reference No. 324)
25. In the Air Force Reserve there are 37 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Robert M. Acosta) (Reference No.
325)
26. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Nicole Dyan David) (Reference No.
326)
27. In the Air Force Reserve there are 7 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Karrie Megan Bem) (Reference No.
327)
28. In the Air Force Reserve there are 3 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Douglas A. Collins) (Reference No.
328)
29. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Marquis A.T. Smith) (Reference No. 329)
30. In the Air Force Reserve there are 61 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with James S. Akers II) (Reference No.
330)
31. In the Air Force Reserve there are 31 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with David I. Amar) (Reference No. 331)
32. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Sashi A. Zickefoose) (Reference No. 332)
33. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Howard F. Stanley) (Reference No. 333)
34. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Bobby J. Chun) (Reference No. 334)
35. In the Army there are 7 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Joshua G. Glonek) (Reference No. 335)
36. In the Army there are 7 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Alex J. Duffy) (Reference No. 337)
37. In the Army there are 4 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Liza B. Crawford) (Reference No. 338)
38. In the Army Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Jeremy S. Stirm) (Reference No. 339)
39. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Renee R. Kiel) (Reference No. 340)
40. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Melissa B. Riesterhartsell)
(Reference No. 341)
41. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Kimberly A. Dilger) (Reference No. 342)
42. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Abigail R. Osman) (Reference No. 343)
43. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Andrew J. Archuleta) (Reference No. 344)
44. In the Army Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Christopher C. Cross) (Reference No. 345)
45. In the Army there are 37 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Michael J. Baierlein) (Reference No. 346)
46. In the Army there are 575 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Austin P. Abarr) (Reference No. 347)
47. In the Army there are 489 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with James H. Abney) (Reference No. 348)
48. In the Army there are 981 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Mitchell A. Ables) (Reference No. 349)
49. In the Army Reserve there are 9 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Peter B. East) (Reference No. 350)
50. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (list begins with William M. Schweitzer) (Reference No. 351)
51. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(list begins with Louis V. Scott) (Reference No. 353)
52. Col. William F. Wilkerson, USAR to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 359)
53. Col. Evelyn E. Laptook, USAR to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 360)
54. BG Ronald R. Ragin, USA to be major general (Reference No.
361)
55. In the Army there are 37 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with Brandon C. Anderson) (Reference No.
362)
56. In the Marine Corps there are 8 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with David R. Everly) (Reference No.
363)
57. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Walter D. Brafford) (Reference
No. 364)
58. In the Navy there are 16 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Eric J. Anduze) (Reference No.
365)
59. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Brian J. Anderson) (Reference
No. 366)
60. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with Casey J. Moton) (Reference No. 367)
61. RADM(lh) Rick Freedman, USN to be rear admiral (Reference No.
368)
62. RADM(lh) Kenneth W. Epps, USN to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 369) 3
63. In the Navy there are 13 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with Stephen D. Barnett) (Reference No. 370)
64. Capt. Frank G. Schlereth III, USN to be rear admiral (lower
half) (Reference No. 371)
65. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Joshua C. Himes) (Reference No.
372)
66. In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Thomas J. Dickinson) (Reference
No. 373)
67. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major general (list begins with Thomas W. Harrell) (Reference No. 379)
68. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Maximilian S. Lee) (Reference No. 380)
69. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Justin J. Reeb) (Reference No. 381)
70. LTG James W. Bierman, Jr., USMC to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, US
Marine Corps (Reference No. 389)
71. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Matthew J. Clementz) (Reference No. 397)
72. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Samuel T. Kramer) (Reference No. 398)
73. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Carla A. Kiernan) (Reference No. 399)
74. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(John W. Brock II) (Reference No. 400)
75. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(John D. Horton) (Reference No. 404)
76. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Joel N. Buffardi) (Reference No. 405)
77. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Sarah D. Eccleston) (Reference No. 406)
78. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Nicholas P. Fiebke) (Reference No. 407)
79. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Andrew J. Doyle) (Reference No. 408)
80. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(William T. Griggs) (Reference No. 409)
81. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Megan L. Maloy) (Reference No. 410)
82. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Kaitlyn M. Hernandez) (Reference No. 411)
83. In the Army Reserve there are 15 appointment to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Timothy I. Arcelay) (Reference No. 412)
84. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Sara C. Adams) (Reference No. 413)
85. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Christina G. Nalley) (Reference No. 414)
86. In the Army Reserve there are 7 appointments to the grade of
colonel (Andrew Adamczyk) (Reference No. 415)
87. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Ashley S. Lee) (Reference No. 416)
88. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Timothy W. Lindeman) (Reference No. 417)
89. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Ebony Q. Star) (Reference No. 418)
90. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Sarah A. Delarosa) (Reference No. 419)
91. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Mark T. Sopkiw, Jr.) (Reference No. 420)
92. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Justin T. Thomas) (Reference No. 421)
93. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Rei
T. Israel) (Reference No. 422)
94. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Adam L. Fox) (Reference No. 423)
95. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Jason L. Workman) (Reference No. 424)
96. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Stephen J. Cumby) (Reference No. 425)
97. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Stephen M. Anderson) (Reference No. 426)
98. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
captain (Elisabeth Crumpler) (Reference No. 427)
99. In the Navy there are 27 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Kyle A. Aduskevich) (Reference No. 428)
100. In the Navy there are 9 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Bramwell B. Arnold III) (Reference No. 429)
101. In the Navy there are 34 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Jeffrey R. Biermann) (Reference
No. 430)
102. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (James H. Knight) (Reference No. 431)
103. In the Space Force there are 9 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Ross M. Boston) (Reference No. 432)
104. In the Space Force there are 38 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Jason M. Adams) (Reference No. 433)
105. In the Space Force there are 68 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Christopher John Alban) (Reference
No. 434)
106. In the Space Force there are 58 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Bridget L. Ajinga) (Reference No.
435)
107. In the Space Force there are 76 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with John W. Anderson) (Reference No. 436)
108. In the Space Force there are 100 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Christina M. Akers) (Reference No. 437)
109. In the Space Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Cassandra R. Hidalgo) (Reference
No. 438)
110. In the Space Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Edward E. Jones) (Reference No. 439)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 3,059
Chairman Reed. The motion carries. Thank you very much.
Good morning. The Committee meets today to receive
testimony from General Glen VanHerck, Commander of United
States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense
Command, or NORAD, and General Laura Richardson, Commander of
United States Southern Command. I would note that this is
General VanHerck's last appearance before the Committee in his
current role. General, I would like to express my profound
appreciation for your decades of exceptional service to the
Nation and the Air Force, including your outstanding leadership
of our NORTHCOM forces. Thank you, sir, very much.
On behalf of the Committee, I would also thank the women
and men who serve under your respective commands for their
selfless service to the Nation.
The global threats to the United States are edging closer
and closer to home. The 2022 National Defense Strategy
identifies one of the Defense Department's top priorities as
``Defending the Homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain
threat posed by the People's Republic of China.'' General
VanHerck, your command is responsible for this Homeland defense
mission. To be successful, NORTHCOM will need to re-evaluate
its assumptions and plans against the PRC's growing
capabilities to threaten us territorially, as well as in
cyberspace and space. I understand NORTHCOM has been working to
develop a new Homeland Defense Policy Guidance to meet this
challenge, and I would ask for an update on its status and how
it would transform the homeland defense plans of the
Department.
The recent shoot-downs of a Chinese surveillance balloon
and three other unidentified aerial phenomena in our airspace
have raised concerns that we may have an ``awareness gap'' that
needs to be resolved. America's skies and seas must be secure
to protect our citizens, and the Department must pursue
technologies that provide 'forward detection' to buy decision
time for decisionmakers.
Relatedly, Congress is considering auctioning the ``S''
band spectrum, which is the spectrum in which NORTHCOM radars
operate for early warning around the continental United States,
for missile defense on the ground in Alaska, and for maritime
domain awareness with our AEGIS weapons system. General
VanHerck, the Committee would like to know the impact of
curtailing or losing this spectrum with regard to your
operations.
Regionally, NORTHCOM provides support to U.S. law
enforcement to counter cartels engaged in drug smuggling, human
trafficking, and money laundering across the southwest border.
General VanHerck, I am interested to know more about your
efforts to build the capabilities of the security forces in
Mexico and the Bahamas to address these regional threats, and
your recommendations for strengthening those efforts.
Turning to Southern Command, General Richardson, your
command faces growing challenges from China and Russia in Latin
America. The political and economic instability in the region
presents a situation that our adversaries are seeking to
exploit to increase their own influence. China, in particular,
is expanding its presence in the region, primarily through
acquisitions and investments in strategically critical
locations like Panama, and, reflecting the growing influence
Moscow has exerted in the region, most South American countries
have been non-committal on Russia's war in Ukraine.
A critical task for SOUTHCOM is to find ways to counter
China and Russia's malign, hybrid activities. This challenge
includes addressing sources of insecurity among our partners
that our adversaries seek to exploit. It is also important to
strengthen the capabilities of U.S. partners' security forces,
including by building defense institutional capabilities that
adhere to the rule of law and respect human rights.
General Richardson, I am interested in your assessment of
the challenge from near-peer competitors in the SOUTHCOM area,
and how we might work strategically with our partners in the
region to build resilience against these activities.
SOUTHCOM, like NORTHCOM, continues to work closely with the
U.S. Government interagency to support counternarcotic and
counter-transnational criminal organization missions. A
critical component of this effort has been the Joint
Interagency Task Force-South, which provides a model for the
Defense Department to work with civilian agencies and partner
nations to build domain awareness and enhance interdiction
capabilities.
To help compensate for its limited resources, SOUTHCOM has
sought to leverage ``non-traditional'' approaches, such as
artificial intelligence and machine learning, to serve as a
testbed for new tactics and operational concepts. General
Richardson, I would like to know how the Department is taking
advantage of the SOUTHCOM area as a valuable environment for
innovative experimentation.
Thank you, again, to our witnesses. I look forward to your
testimoneys, and as a reminder for my colleagues, there will be
a closed session immediately following this hearing in room
SVC-217.
Let me now turn it over to the Ranking Member, Senator
Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also want to
thank our witnesses for being here and also for their gracious
allocation of time to visit with us before the hearing.
We rightly focus a lot of attention abroad, on Russia's
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the Chinese Communist Party's
constant march to dominance in the Pacific. But the dangers we
face are not limited to areas like Ukraine and the Pacific. We
also face dangers in our own neighborhood.
General VanHerck has been a frequent visitor here recently,
and I appreciate his candid briefings on the Chinese
surveillance balloon that violated our sovereignty earlier this
year.
Unfortunately, Secretary of Defense Austin has declined to
answer the simple questions Senator Rubio and I sent regarding
the Department of Defense's apparently inaction during the
earliest days of the balloon's excursion. In response to the
letter Senator Rubio and I sent with questions, we received a
very dismissive response from Under Secretary Colin Kahl, which
said that all of our questions had already been answered. In
fact, they were not answered and have not been answered by the
Secretary. I expect General VanHerck will get some questions
about that today, and I am grateful for his help in
understanding what went wrong and how we can fix it.
The Chinese surveillance balloon is the most public example
of our Homeland defense gaps, but it is not the only one.
Keeping in mind Putin's threats against our Homeland during the
Ukraine war and China's threats of a military conflict with the
United States over Taiwan, I hope General VanHerck will explain
his requirements for keeping the American people safe.
I am also concerned about the situation on both sides of
our southwest border. President Biden's lax border policies
have created a major opportunity for the Mexican criminal
cartels and an unprecedented humanitarian and security crisis.
In 2022, more than 70,000 Americans died of opioid overdoses,
largely from Mexican-produced fentanyl. Since President Biden
took office, more than 1.2 million illegal migrants have evaded
law enforcement and entered our country. Most recently, the
cartels murdered two American citizens.
This simply cannot continue and does not have to continue.
Given the scale of the current crisis, I hope our witnesses
could comment on ways in which the southwest border support
mission could be made more effective. I would also like to know
whether there is anything Congress can do to work more
effectively with the Mexican Government to counter the cartels.
We also have challenges further south, in Central and South
America. The implications of the growing Chinese threat
continue to concern us. The Chinese Communist Party is
following a well-known playbook on SOUTHCOM. It is aggressively
using predatory economic and diplomatic practices to bully
countries while it sets conditions to buildup the PRC military
presence, gather intelligence, and limit United States access
and influence. As General Richardson has stated before,
proximity matters. We should all be concerned by what China is
doing in the Southern Hemisphere and what it means for the
stability of our partners and our national security.
Despite the significant and growing security threats in
that region, I am troubled to see that SOUTHCOM consistently
faces a mismatch between its requirements and its resources. I
look forward to General Richardson's candid assessment of
SOUTHCOM's most pressing resource and capability shortfalls. I
hope to understand how these shortfalls impact our troops'
ability to accomplish the mission and defend our Nation. I
would also like to hear how the Office of Strategic Capital
might be used to help achieve military objectives at a lower
cost.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back and thank our
witnesses.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much Senator Wicker.
Now let me recognize General VanHerck. Sir?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL GLEN D. VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
COMMAND
General VanHerck. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today and represent the men and women of
the United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace
Defense Command.
Today's strategic environment is the most complicated and
potentially dangerous in my more than 35 years of service.
While the United States military remains the most powerful and
professional force in history, we have to account for the
recent erosion of military advantage and take actions now to
invest in modernization, implement innovative processes,
prioritize our personnel and civilian hiring practices, and
increase agile decisionmaking at all levels.
Our competitors' actions and ambitions are global and all-
domain in nature. It is also clear that they have the
capability and intent to hold our Homeland at risk above and
below the nuclear threshold and in multiple domains to achieve
their strategic objectives. The PRC and Russia have fielded
cruise missiles, delivery platforms, and non-kinetic
capabilities to hold at risk critical infrastructure of
military and civilian in the United States and Canada. Those
capabilities allow them to strike with limited warning and
significant consequences. Limited warning due to a lack of all-
domain awareness inherently limits the decision space and
options available to our national leaders which increases the
risk of miscalculation and escalation.
To address today's strategic environment, for nearly 3
years I have focused on four strategic priorities: domain
awareness, information dominance, decision superiority, and
finally, global integration. Those priorities are critical to
successfully defending the Homeland and to providing our
national leaders with the only thing I can never give them
enough of, and that is time--time to create deterrence options,
and if required, defend and defeat options.
While we have work to do, there has been some notable
progress toward these key priorities. I am grateful to the
Department and Congress for your support of the over-the-
horizon radars that will significantly improve air, maritime,
and space domain awareness and the ability to detect and track
threats well before they reach North America. But we need to go
faster. An acquisition plan based on more than a decade is too
long.
Both the Department of Defense and the Canadian Department
of National Defense have committed to funding over-the-horizon
radar capabilities, and I respectfully urge both governments to
ensure this vital and proven capability is fielded as quickly
as possible. Likewise, Space Force's investment in advanced
space-based warning capabilities and the Navy's commitment to
modernizing the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System are
vital to my homeland defense mission. Yet again, we cannot wait
a decade or longer to field these new capabilities.
Our commands need your continued support to outpace the
rapid gains made by our competitors. Continued progress will
require the Department and Congress to accept some risk by
prioritizing modernization and innovation over maintaining
obsolete platforms, organizations, and infrastructure, and
occasionally accepting failure as part of the process.
The generational challenges ahead of us require the best
minds and expertise we can find, and the Department must also
invest accordingly in civilian and military personnel
recruiting, hiring, and retention. We must continue to build an
enormous advantage that comes through our international
alliances and partnerships.
I believe that the greatest risk for the United States
stems from an inability to change at the pace required by the
strategic environment we are operating in. Homeland defense
must be recognized as essential to contingency plans at home
and for power projection abroad, and it is vital that all
military planning account for that reality. In an era of
incredible innovation and technological achievement,
inflexible, outdated processes are a greater impediment to
success than many of our competitors' advancements.
Finally, I would like to comment on the incursion of the
PRC high-altitude balloon into our airspace. The PRC HAB was
obviously a significant event that shined light on the PRC's
brazen intelligence collection against the United States and
Canada. It was the first time NORTHCOM conducted an engagement
over United States in our history. From this event, I commit to
you that we have already generated critical lessons learned,
and I can guarantee that we are doing whatever is necessary to
keep our country and North America safe.
On behalf of all the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
guardians, and civilians of NORTHCOM and NORAD, I would like to
thank the Committee for your steadfast support, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Glen D. VanHerck
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Glen D. VanHerck
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished Members of
the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to testify, and for the
honor of representing the men and women of U.S. Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). From
the day I assumed Command in August 2020, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have
worked tirelessly to defend the Homeland and North America in an
extraordinarily challenging strategic environment requiring the
commands to adapt new approaches to how we plan, prepare, and operate.
That innovation and evolution is necessary to outpace our competitors
and is a testament to the devotion of our military and civilian
personnel who stand constant watch over the United States and Canada.
The commands have made tremendous progress in a short time, yet
much work remains. While the United States military remains the most
powerful and professional force in history, and our alliances and
partnerships provide a vital strategic advantage over any potential
adversary, it is clear that our competitive advantage is eroding. The
successful defense of North America requires the Department of Defense
to move beyond outdated assumptions and plans that do not fully reflect
competitor capability, capacity, and intent to threaten the Homeland.
Likewise, continued action is required to build enduring advantages and
outpace the gains made by competitors around the globe. This will
require the Department to invest in modernization, implement innovative
processes, prioritize our personnel and improve civilian hiring
practices, and increase agile decisionmaking at all levels.
strategic environment
Today's strategic environment is the most complicated and
potentially dangerous in my 35+ years of service. Our competitors and
potential adversaries, particularly the People's Republic of China
(PRC) and Russia, continue to challenge the rules-based international
order that has provided global stability and prosperity over the last 7
decades. They seek to advance their interests and gain global
advantages through political intimidation, economic coercion, cyber and
information operations, asymmetric attacks on infrastructure, and the
direct threat or actual employment of military force.
The People's Republic of China (PRC)
The PRC remains NORAD and USNORTHCOM's long-term pacing challenge.
Beijing continues ambitious military modernization at an alarming pace.
It would be naive to think their sprint to develop advanced cyber
tools, maritime capabilities, and hypersonic technology has only
regional applications, as the PRC continues to develop advanced long-
range conventional and strategic capabilities and the infrastructure
necessary to project military power at greater distances. Underpinning
this growth is a rapid nuclear expansion that is on pace for the PRC to
expand their nuclear stockpile from what DOD estimates is over 400
today to about 1,500 by 2035. While less observable, the PRC's
aggressive efforts to exploit the information technology sector are
accelerating an increasing threat to North America.
The PRC's aggressive actions in the Pacific in mid-2022 following
congressional visits to Taiwan illustrate how regional events create
geostrategic ripple effects that can quickly reach our shores.
President Xi is likely to use his next term in office to double down on
the PRC's revisionist foreign policy, and is likely to include global
efforts to undermine the United States and bolster partnerships with
United States competitors, including Russia. In February 2022, Xi
signaled his intent to follow this path when he declared the PRC-Russia
friendship would have no limits in a public pronouncement just weeks
before Russia's illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The PRC has almost certainly watched the war to draw lessons that will
inform its next steps toward Taiwan.
Xi's statement also proved to be more than rhetorical when, in May
2022, the PRC and Russia conducted a combined bomber patrol over the
Sea of Japan coinciding with the Quad Leaders' Summit in Tokyo. The May
2022 bomber patrol was followed by a second bomber patrol in November
2022. The cooperation is not confined to the air domain. PRC and
Russian naval forces conducted a combined patrol in the fall of 2022
that covered 7,000 nautical miles in the Pacific, included a first-ever
combined naval transit of the Aleutian Islands, and came on the heels
of Xi sending scores of troops to Russia to participate in Moscow's
largest annual military exercise. For years, the PRC has relied on
Russian military materiel to build its armed forces, and I am aware of
reports that the PRC has transferred materiel with military
applications to Russia during Russia's war against Ukraine. These
actions are more than symbolic and demonstrate the PRC's growing power
projection capabilities, which will likely encompass the Arctic in the
next decade--a region the PRC is eying with its self-proclaimed status
as a near-Arctic State.
Russia
As USNORTHCOM and NORAD take necessary measures to defend against a
growing PRC threat, the commands continue to defend the United States
and Canada every day against Russian aggression in all domains.
Russia's brazen and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022
proved that Russia has the capability and capacity to inflict
significant damage to infrastructure and other critical targets with
its all-domain long-range strike capabilities. Russia also has a
history of conducting clandestine operations in other nations to
achieve its political objectives. While Russia has overplayed its hand,
suffered significant losses to the heroic Ukrainian defense forces, and
inadvertently helped to unify NATO, it has gained real-world combat
experience as it enters its second year of the full-scale invasion. The
meager performance of Russia's ground forces in Ukraine should not
overshadow other capabilities it has showcased in Ukraine, including
air- and sea-launched cruise missiles capable of striking North
America, cyber activities, and economic coercion. For the first time,
we also saw Russia employ its new KILLJOY air-launched hypersonic
missile in combat.
Concurrent with its war against Ukraine, Russia has also continued
to conduct major military exercises and test developmental capabilities
that will compound the threat to North America once fielded. In April
2022, Russia tested the massive SARMAT ICBM, a highly capable strategic
weapon that helps reinforce the critical importance of a modern and
reliable United States strategic deterrent. Meanwhile, Russia is
testing its special mission Belgorod nuclear submarine, a modern
platform capable of carrying the nuclear-capable Poseidon torpedo,
designed to hold the Homeland at risk by striking coastal targets from
thousands of miles away.
The test of the Belgorod followed Russia's Arctic military exercise
that included live-fire cruise missile launches designed to test
Moscow's readiness for a conflict in the high north. Last fall, Russia
added its first Severodvinsk-class conventional and nuclear capable
cruise missile submarine to the Pacific Fleet, which poses a new
challenge to our defense of the western approaches to North America. In
October 2022, in the midst of elevated international tensions stemming
from Russian threats to escalate its already brutal campaign in
Ukraine, Russia chose to proceed with its annual strategic forces
exercise, including demonstrations of multiple nuclear strike
capabilities. Finally, in January 2023, a Russian Gorshkov-class
frigate transited the western Atlantic while armed with Tsirkon
hypersonic cruise missiles.
I believe it would be shortsighted to view Russia's war against
Ukraine as a limited regional crisis. Russia's actions increase the
very real risk of miscalculation and the conflict's expansion beyond
its current boundaries--scenarios that could rapidly increase the risks
to North America and continental defense. If Russia should seek to
compel allies to reconsider their support for Ukraine through
escalatory actions or follow through with the desperate threats to use
nuclear weapons in Ukraine, the risks to the Homeland would increase.
DPRK and Iran
The Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) tested at least 65
conventional theater and long-range nuclear capabilities over the last
year. That number includes the first tests of a new larger, longer
range, and more capable ICBM, adding another missile that can likely
reach the entire Homeland and one the regime claims is capable of
carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle payload. The DPRK tested more
missiles in 2022 than any time in its history, showing that the regime
will continue to prioritize military capabilities at the expense of
needed food and pandemic relief for its people. Public reports of
renewed nuclear test preparations further highlight the grave danger
this regime poses to regional and global stability. We must remain
ready for multiple contingencies and potential crisis on the Korean
Peninsula.
The DPRK's reckless pursuit of advanced nuclear capabilities and
robust ballistic missile research, development, and testing threatens
regional stability, our allies and partners, and potentially the
Homeland. However, today I remain confident in our current capability
to defend the Homeland against a limited DPRK ballistic missile threat.
Looking forward, I am concerned about future capacity and capability to
respond to advancing DPRK ballistic missile threats, making it crucial
to field the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) as funded in the Fiscal
Year 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328).
Iran has not shied away from pursuing malign global activities,
including in North America; the regime continues to pose a significant
threat to the United States, as well as our partners in the Central
Command region. The August 2022 disclosure of an Iranian plot to
assassinate a former senior United States official on United States
territory illustrated the brazenness of the Iranian Government. The
regime's decision to provide Russia with unmanned loitering munitions
used to attack civilian infrastructure in Ukraine provides further
evidence of Iran's embrace of destabilizing activity. A future decision
by the regime to pursue an ICBM-class missile would add yet another
threat vector capable of striking North America.
Regional Security Threats
I remain concerned about transnational organized crime in Mexico
and the Western Hemisphere and the unrelenting violence it spawns and
insecurity it creates, as cartels vie for control of lucrative illicit
markets. Cartels control fentanyl, cocaine and methamphetamine
trafficking as well as other drugs, and are demonstrating the
capability to use improvised explosives and small-unmanned aerial
systems against Mexican security forces in Mexico, which will likely
embolden the cartels and challenge our partners. As USNORTHCOM supports
our law enforcement and international partners in countering
transnational criminal organizations in our area of operations, I
remain steadfast in my commitment to our military partners in Mexico
and The Bahamas.
I commend Mexico's arrest last summer of the cartel member who
brutally murdered a DEA agent decades earlier, as well as the recent
arrests of Ovidio Guzman Lopez, the son of Sinaloa Cartel leader
Joaquin ``El Chapo'' Guzman, and Jose Rodolfo Villareal-Hernandez, a
Mexican cartel leader known as ``El Gato.'' These arrests are examples
of a shared commitment to justice, buttressed by shared values and our
decades-long partnership, which stands in stark contrast to PRC and
Russian malign and self-serving activities in the Western Hemisphere.
I am committed to deepening the already strong partnership with the
Mexican and Bahamian militaries to advance our mutual goals, from
upholding human rights to ensuring hemispheric defense. I was proud to
host my counterparts from the Mexican Department of National Defense
(SEDENA) and Department of the Navy (SEMAR) in early 2022 and visit The
Bahamas in late 2021, and we will continue to work with Mexico and The
Bahamas to stamp out attempts by the PRC or Russia to divide our
countries and our partnerships.
Transnational challenges
USNORTHCOM's 20th anniversary offered a reminder of the
transnational challenges that have shaped the Command from its
inception. Foremost is the enduring transnational terrorist threat to
North America, led by Sunni extremist groups and their supporters in
North America. The arrest in August 2022 of an ISIS-inspired individual
in New Mexico who had surveilled a United States military base is a
stark reminder that military facilities remain attractive targets to
terrorists. More broadly, the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan
and violent extremist groups' ongoing presence in the region indicate a
renewed threat to the region that we cannot discount. This extremist
threat transcends south Asia and extends to other regions with security
challenges, including the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, where
terrorists continue to operate, train, and plan.
Where We Are Today: 20 Years of USNORTHCOM and 65 Years of NORAD
USNORTHCOM was established on October 1st, 2002, in the immediate
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States,
marking the first time since the colonial era a single commander was
responsible for the defense of the U.S. Homeland. Twenty years later,
the likelihood of a major attack inside the United States by a foreign
violent extremist organization has diminished following a generational,
whole-of-nation effort. However, the primary threat to the Homeland is
now far more significant and consequential. Multiple peer competitors
and rogue states possess the capability and capacity to threaten our
citizens, critical infrastructure, and vital institutions. These
competitors possess, or are developing, the modern capabilities that
limit the time and options available to decisionmakers responsible for
defending our interests. In addition to destructive kinetic and cyber
capabilities, malign actors actively exploit our democratic society by
spreading disinformation that drives wedges between our citizens,
undermines democracy, and weakens our alliances.
In crisis or conflict, potential adversaries will likely seek to
interfere with the Department's ability to project power abroad.
Disruptions of military and civilian transportation infrastructure in
North America could impede the ability of the United States and Canada
to project combat power. Today I assess, as I have for nearly 3 years,
that homeland defense is a potential limiting factor to ensuring rapid
and effective implementation and execution of global contingency plans.
This is due to my lack of domain awareness, limited timely access to
forces that are ready to operate throughout my areas of responsibility,
including the Arctic, and a lack of resilient infrastructure enabling
the Joint Force to fight in and from the Homeland while ensuring
forward power projection.
Defending the Homeland against an ever-growing array of kinetic and
non-kinetic threats will continue to require a collaborative, whole-of-
nation approach to assessing vulnerabilities and developing appropriate
deterrence, denial, and defense strategies. Cyber risks to critical
infrastructure remain a significant concern and a domain awareness gap.
DOD is tasked only with defending defense networks, but military
facilities and missions frequently rely on civilian lifelines such as
energy grids, transportation infrastructure, and other critical
infrastructure. USNORTHCOM, due to law and policy, has limited insight
into potential risks to commercial networks, which could lead to
uncertainty in planning for consequence management. DOD's establishment
of policy regarding the defense of critical infrastructure is a
necessary step forward, and USNORTHCOM will continue to work with the
Department and key mission partners, to include agencies with critical
infrastructure security and cybersecurity responsibilities, to ensure
key defense infrastructure is defended from attacks.
NORAD, the unique United States and Canadian bi-national command,
was established in May 1958 to defend North America from cold war-era
Russian strategic bombers entering United States and Canadian airspace
from the Arctic approaches. Sixty-five years later, Russia has restored
its capability to threaten North America with modernized bombers,
surface ships, and submarines armed with long-range, highly precise
nuclear and conventional cruise missiles. The PRC is making rapid
progress in developing similar capabilities, which will further
complicate NORAD's warning missions and affect national strategic
decisionmaking.
While NORAD's missions to provide aerospace warning, aerospace
control, and maritime warning remain critical to homeland defense,
action and investment are needed to keep pace with competitors that
clearly seek to hold North America at risk above and below the nuclear
threshold. For decades, NORAD has relied heavily on the North Warning
System arrayed along the Arctic coasts of Canada and Alaska to detect
potential airborne threats to North America. It is clear that our
competitors possess long-range strike capabilities that could be used
to attack the United States and Canada from outside the detection range
of legacy sensors.
In order to maintain domain awareness and ensure integrated threat
warning and attack assessment to national leadership, the United States
and Canada must continue to move swiftly to field Over the Horizon
Radar (OTHR), as funded in the Fiscal Year 2023 Consolidated Omnibus
Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328). OTHR is a proven, affordable
technology that will ensure our ability to detect threats from surface
to space in the approaches to North America. I commend both the
Department of Defense and the Canadian Department of National Defence
for their commitment in fiscal year 2023 to investing in OTHR, and I
respectfully urge both Governments to ensure this vital capability is
fielded as quickly as possible.
NORAD's contributions to Homeland and continental defense will
remain vital for many years to come, and will continue to rely on
strong cooperation and shared investment between the United States and
Canada. The United States and Canadian continental defense framework
has an unrivaled legacy of success and serves as an international model
of defense cooperation. I remain encouraged by the bi-national
commitments to modernizing the platforms, sensors, and capabilities
necessary to execute NORAD's missions; this collaborative approach to
deterring and defending against threats to North America is critical.
NORAD must continue to look to the future and take necessary measures
today to counter the threats of tomorrow, and investments by the United
States and Canada must address kinetic and non-kinetic threats to our
nations.
Potential threats to North America routinely transit international
borders and the boundaries between U.S. geographic combatant command
areas of responsibility. NORAD's ability to provide timely aerospace
warning and control and maritime warning will be bolstered by the
United States and Canada's joint commitment to improving global domain
awareness, modernizing command and control systems to provide faster,
better-informed decisionmaking, and continuing collaborative research,
development, and innovation. These efforts will ensure NORAD's ability
to compete with the PRC and Russia for years to come while clearly
signaling a lasting commitment to a robust, modern, and effective
defense of North America.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD Priorities
My priorities for NORAD and USNORTHCOM directly reflect the need to
inform the rapid, agile decisions required of senior leaders in this
dynamic and complex strategic environment. Our competitors continue to
field capabilities specifically intended to strike with limited
warning, which decreases the time and options available to national
leaders in a crisis. Continuing to trust legacy processes and
capabilities increases risk to the Homeland and compounds the risk of
miscalculation and inadvertent escalation. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are
working urgently to increase the domain awareness, information sharing,
and global integration necessary to ensure national leaders have as
much time and as many options as possible.
As competitors and potential adversaries continue to field advanced
all-domain capabilities with the potential to create significant
effects in the Homeland, it is imperative that the United States and
Canada move quickly to improve domain awareness from the seafloor to
space and cyberspace for all approaches to North America. The Over-the-
Horizon Radars (OTHR) funded in the Fiscal Year 2023 President's
Budget, along with the OTHRs announced by the Government of Canada as
part of NORAD modernization, will leverage proven technology and will
significantly improve the ability of USNORTHCOM and NORAD to detect and
track potential threats to North America and the Homeland from the
Earth's surface to space. That capability, in turn, will directly
correlate to more time available to leaders at all levels, enabling the
creation and employment of better deterrence options and if required,
defeat options.
U.S. Space Force investments in advanced space-based missile
warning sensor capabilities show great promise with particular regard
to hypersonic and advanced missile threats. These future systems will
detect, track, and identify threats, including hypersonic threats,
enable better warning and assessment, and develop actionable targeting
solutions, at a much faster pace than we currently experience, while
also delivering an inherent operational resilience. Given our
competitors' advanced maritime domain capabilities, I fully support the
Navy's investment in a modernized Integrated Undersea Surveillance
System. These capabilities, in turn, will directly correlate to more
time and options available to produce a favorable outcome for the
United States and Canada.
Canada's plans to fund a layered surveillance system that will
improve shared domain awareness in the northern air and maritime
approaches to North America will have significant, long-term benefits
for both NORAD and USNORTHCOM's missions. Planned Canadian investment
in Arctic and Polar radars and spaced-based surveillance systems, along
with advanced munitions, communications, and infrastructure clearly
demonstrates shared commitment to NORAD and the combined defense of the
United States and Canada.
In addition to the investment in OTHR, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have
also demonstrated the potential for linking existing platforms and
sharing data with multiple commands, interagency and international
partners. By sharing data previously trapped in bureaucratic and
organizational stovepipes through innovative programs like Pathfinder,
Northstar, and the Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE),
USNORTHCOM and NORAD have proven that it is possible to rapidly improve
domain awareness and streamline global information sharing without the
costs associated with fielding exquisite new capabilities. It is
crucial that the Department of Defense and the Services, as well as the
Canadian Department of National Defence, continue the work to unlock
the remarkable potential of these initiatives.
I am encouraged by the establishment of the Department's Chief
Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO), and I believe that
the CDAO must be empowered to rapidly integrate systems, software and
platforms in order to maintain our competitive advantage across the
Joint Force. Over the past several years, actions by each of our
competitors and potential adversaries have made it clear that regional
actions have global diplomatic, economic, and military ramifications.
It is simply unrealistic to assume that crises will remain confined by
artificial boundaries, and we must adapt plans and perspectives to
account for that global reality.
The feasibility of every other Geographic Combatant Command's plans
will require active campaigning in and from North America, and
successful defense of the Homeland is necessary to deter adversaries
and assure allies and partners. Therefore, I have also directed that
USNORTHCOM and NORAD prioritize homeland defense campaigning to
demonstrate our readiness, capabilities, and resiliency. I am also
operationalizing the commands to accelerate the flow of information
from sensor to decisionmaker. Our competitors and potential adversaries
have shown that they will hold the Homeland at risk in a conflict, and
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are acting today to ensure homeland defense plans
are understood, exercised, and resourced.
While USNORTHCOM and NORAD have made strides in the homeland
defense mission, building a resilient Joint Force is a fundamental
element of all Department planning, exercises, and operations. The
DOD's worldwide missions and responsibilities must evolve from
regionally focused approaches to globally integrated efforts that
account for finite resources and associated risks. At present, I am
concerned for the commands' ability to execute assigned missions--
including contingency and operations plans in support of homeland
defense. I am limited by a lack of timely access to forces that are
organized, trained, and equipped to operate throughout the NORAD area
of operations and the NORTHCOM area of responsibility, as well as by
insufficient supporting infrastructure.
A strong homeland defense is the foundation of our Nation's ability
to project power globally while deterring aggression and achieving our
strategic objectives in competition, crisis, and conflict. As such,
every plan, exercise, and policy decision must consider the necessity
of defending the Homeland when evaluating competing demands for forces
and threats to global campaigning. That, in turn, will require the
Department of Defense and the Canadian Department of National Defence
to place greater focus on developing the depth, flexibility, advanced
technologies, and supporting infrastructure required to respond to
future challenges while addressing growing threats to the Homeland.
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
When directed by the Secretary of Defense, USNORTHCOM provides
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in the Continental United
States, Alaska, and Puerto Rico. In preparing for and responding to
major natural and human-caused disasters, USNORTHCOM serves as the DSCA
synchronizer to support assessment and recovery while simultaneously
acting as the supported combatant command in the command's area of
operations.
USNORTHCOM often supports Federal, State, tribal, territorial, and
local (FSTTL) disaster relief efforts. These collaborative, whole-of-
government efforts demonstrate national resilience that should reassure
the American public, while also making clear to potential aggressors,
that the United States routinely executes interagency domestic relief
operations that allow our Nation to recovery quickly following even
large-scale disasters. It is equally important for our FSTTL partners
to identify and address their capabilities and capacity gaps to fully
perform the roles, missions, and operations under their authorities.
This kind of response, particularly when it is accomplished with little
or no military support, can generate a deterrent effect by casting
doubt in competitors' minds about their ability to produce significant
effects from an attack on the Homeland.
USNORTHCOM is uniquely suited to support our Federal partners in
the aftermath of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
(CBRN) attack. The Department must remain committed to this crucial
mission to ensure these highly trained, specialized elements stand
ready to respond immediately in the event of a weapon of mass
destruction event in the United States.
I continue to stress the importance of USNORTHCOM's defense support
of civil authorities, as rapidly executed, well-planned, multi-agency
responses to wildfires, hurricanes, pandemics, and other significant
disruptions are perhaps the most visible demonstration of the
military's support to the American people. USNORTHCOM works year-round
with our mission partners at every level to strengthen relationships,
improve communications, and incorporate lessons learned from previous
responses in order to deliver rapid and effective support to lead
Federal agencies. Our command takes tremendous pride in supporting our
FSTTL partners, while helping to highlight the resourcefulness and
solidarity of the American people in the face of adversity. It should
be clear to competitors and potential aggressors that the United States
routinely responds to and recovers quickly from large-scale
disruptions--and USNORTHCOM is always ready to support those efforts
with military capabilities as directed by the Secretary.
USNORTHCOM support to civil authorities includes the command's
ongoing support of Federal law enforcement efforts to counter the
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) that have caused so much
harm to our Nation. Illicit drugs trafficked by transnational criminal
enterprises kill more than one hundred thousand U.S. citizens each
year, and the number of fatal overdoses have risen dramatically as
cartels have increased the volume of fentanyl smuggled into the United
States. As directed by the Secretary of Defense and in accordance with
my direct guidance, USNORTHCOM's subordinate command, Joint Task Force
North (JTF-N), provides U.S. Federal law enforcement partners with
intelligence and counter-threat finance analysis and other support as
requested to disrupt the sophisticated financial and physical networks
used to infiltrate illicit goods and exploited human traffic into the
United States. The important work done by USNORTHCOM and JTF-N in
countering transnational criminal organizations and disrupting the flow
of illegal drugs into the United States is a national security
imperative that directly supports homeland defense.
Natural disasters, public health threats, and transnational
irregular migration will likely continue to require DOD support for our
lead Federal partners. Environmental change will also continue to have
a direct impact on military readiness and resources, as was made clear
by the massive destructive power of Hurricane Ian in September 2022 and
by western wildfires that are growing in scale and frequency as fire
seasons now extend throughout most of the year. It is necessary to plan
and account for the growing likelihood of natural disasters that
disrupt military operations and damage critical infrastructure, while
units involved in response operations require time to reset and recover
after completing their missions. The long-term consequences of extreme
weather, rising sea levels, and increased flooding will continue to
affect DOD missions, infrastructure, and personnel, especially those in
the Homeland.
Security Cooperation
In addition to our more visible homeland defense and DSCA
operations, USNORTHCOM continues to reap tremendous benefits from our
military-to-military relationships with our allies and partners in
Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas. Security cooperation with our
neighbors is crucial to regional security, countering the influence of
peer competitors, and addressing shared challenges. Security
cooperation provides a critical and lasting advantage over our more
isolated competitors, and I am grateful to the Department and to this
Committee for your ongoing support of USNORTHCOM's vital work with our
allies and partners. I am proud to work with my military counterparts
in Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas as we support one another's efforts
to defend our nations and stand united against malign actors seeking to
expand influence and presence in the Western Hemisphere.
The military-to-military relationship between the United States and
Canada remains extraordinary and vital. In addition to standing side by
side as partners in NORAD for nearly 65 years, Canada has been a
stalwart ally in continental defense and operations overseas for
decades. The unique trust between our militaries is immediately
apparent within the USNORTHCOM and NORAD headquarters, as United States
and Canadian personnel work side-by-side in pursuit of shared missions
and objectives. The Canadian Armed Forces' shared commitment to
improved domain awareness, information sharing, and modernization of
the capabilities necessary for deterrence and continental defense is
essential to our united efforts to defend North America, and I am
fortunate to serve alongside such steadfast and trusted allies.
The Mexican Department of National Defense (SEDENA) and Department
of the Navy (SEMAR) continue to meet daunting internal and external
security challenges with professionalism and resiliency. Keenly focused
on enhancing regional defense, our Mexican military partners continue
to make major investments in a modern, capable, and reliable force
capable of interoperability with the United States and other partners.
In light of that important effort, USNORTHCOM strongly supports SEDENA
and SEMAR modernization initiatives, including the potential divestment
of their fleet of MI-17 helicopters in favor of Western helicopters.
In April 2022, it was my honor to host the Secretaries of SEDENA
and SEMAR at USNORTHCOM for the Bilateral Military Cooperation
Roundtable (BMCR). During this important annual dialog, USNORTHCOM and
our Mexican military partners conducted a candid and highly productive
assessment of our mutual security challenges, associated requirements,
and shared commitment to addressing threats to our nations. Over the
course of 3 days, Secretary General Sandoval, Secretary Admiral Ojeda,
and I reaffirmed our military-to-military relationship and committed to
a number of concrete steps that will have significant and lasting
positive impacts on regional security.
Our partners in the Royal Bahamian Defence Force (RBDF) continue to
punch above their weight as they continue to provide important
contributions to regional security. USNORTHCOM and the RBDF operate
maritime surveillance systems at Great Inagua and Coral Harbour, and
plans are on track to add a third site in the coming years. That shared
capability has significant benefits for domain awareness in the
southern approaches to North America and demonstrates The Bahamas'
ongoing commitment to security cooperation with USNORTHCOM. Our
collaboration has taken on added importance as the PRC's diplomatic
corps in Nassau continues to produce anti-United States public
statements while highlighting Chinese economic investment and
humanitarian relief efforts in The Bahamas.
USNORTHCOM is strongly committed to a long-term partnership with
the RBDF, and continued whole-of-government engagement and investment
by the United States. As you know, the United States has been without a
confirmed Ambassador to The Bahamas since 2011. No action was taken on
the President's nominee last year, and the nomination was resubmitted
in January 2023. This senior diplomatic position is critical to
demonstrating the importance of the relationship between the United
States and The Bahamas and to mitigating the PRC's efforts to gain a
foothold only 50 miles from the United States east coast.
The Arctic
The ability of the joint force to operate and campaign in the
Arctic remains a pressing concern for USNORTHCOM and NORAD. The PRC and
Russia continue to invest in Arctic capabilities as both seek to
increase presence and influence in the region while shifting the rules-
based international order to their advantage. More than 50 percent of
USNORTHCOM's area of operations is in the Arctic, and USNORTHCOM and
NORAD's priorities in the region continue to focus on increased
presence, campaigning through joint training and exercises, and close
collaboration with allies and partners.
The effects of environmental change in the Arctic will have
significant impacts on accessibility, infrastructure, and competition
for the foreseeable future, and the region remains the most unforgiving
operational environment on earth. As the Department balances the
demands of global mission requirements with difficult budgetary
choices, USNORTHCOM and NORAD require access to trained and ready
forces capable of operating throughout the commands' areas of
responsibility--to include the Arctic. The Joint Force must keep sight
of the fact that special training and purpose-built equipment are
necessary to operate in a region in which extreme climate, distance,
and geography quickly overtake the unprepared.
Over the last year, USNORTHCOM and NORAD collaborated with USEUCOM,
USINDOPACOM, USTRANSCOM, USSOCOM and the military Services while
conducting joint exercises in Alaska, Greenland, and northern Canada.
These demanding events expose Joint Force participants to the demands
of the Arctic operating environment and help to reinforce the necessity
of a force trained and equipped to survive in the extreme cold and
remoteness that defines much of the region. I am encouraged by the
strategic objectives stated in the U.S. National Strategy for the
Arctic that support better understanding of the region, exercising
presence, and capitalizing on the definitive advantage of our
international alliances and partnerships.
While the military Services' respective Arctic strategies
acknowledge the importance of the Arctic and the need to develop the
capabilities needed to operate and compete in the region, direct
investment in Arctic-capable platforms, training, and infrastructure
continues to lag. It is necessary that the Joint Force has the ability
to compete, fight, and win in the Arctic in the coming years, and the
time for the Services to invest in the required equipment,
infrastructure, and training is now. The PRC and Russia have clearly
demonstrated their intent to expand their Arctic presence and
operations, and I urge the Department of Defense, the Services, my
fellow combatant commanders, and the Canadian Department of National
Defence to move faster toward improving our collective ability to
succeed in this strategically vital region.
Conclusion
Homeland defense remains the core mission of both USNORTHCOM and
NORAD. The one constant throughout my time in command has been the
extraordinary pace at which our competitors have advanced their
capabilities to threaten the Homeland. Despite those clear risks, the
processes used by the Department of Defense and the Canadian Department
of National Defence for planning, acquisitions, personnel hiring,
technology development, and other activities necessary to the success
of the defense enterprise remain largely unchanged from when I received
my commission nearly 36 years ago.
As competitors develop greater capability, capacity, and intent to
challenge the United States, Canada, and the rules-based international
order, I believe that the greatest strategic risk for the United States
stems from our own inability to adapt at a pace required by the
changing strategic environment. In an era of incredible innovation and
technological achievement, inflexible, outdated processes are a greater
impediment to success than many of our competitors' capability
advancements. We cannot continue to rely on Industrial Age practices
and legacy platforms to compete in a digital age, and if we fail to
evolve at the pace demanded by the strategic environment, our
competitive advantage will continue to erode.
The Department and Congress must also be more willing to accept the
relatively low risks associated with retiring legacy platforms in order
to ensure our ability to fight and win against advanced and well-
resourced competitors. Over the last decade, the PRC and Russia have
made extraordinary technological advancements while the Department
remains encumbered by obsolete capabilities and associated costs. To
defend the Homeland, USNORTHCOM and NORAD require a modern force with
the capacity and capability to deter and if required defeat advanced
peer competitors. Retiring systems that have exceeded their operational
lifespans--to include fighters and command and control platforms at the
end of their service lives--is necessary to accelerate the arrival of
next generation capabilities.
Along with faster, more flexible development and acquisitions, the
Joint Force requires predictable and timely funding to maintain
readiness and increase capability, capacity, and resilience. The
Continuing Resolutions that have become commonplace over the last
decade have direct and lasting adverse consequences for military
readiness, modernization, and planning. Predictable, on-time annual
budgeting and appropriations, along with streamlined Department
processes and greater tolerance for risk in developing and testing new
capabilities, are essential to maintaining our competitive advantage.
The need to move faster is clear. The PRC and Russia have already
fielded highly advanced hypersonic capabilities, while the United
States' hypersonic program, although accelerating, still languishes
well behind our competitors' efforts. Further, DOD faces operational
challenges with civilian hiring processes for recruiting and hiring the
innovative and experientially diverse workforce needed to drive
innovation and advancement on pace with the civilian tech sector.
Simply put, the Department must continue to strategically tackle hiring
and personnel management improvements to move its workforce goal of
being an employer of choice forward.
Finally, the PRC high altitude balloon (HAB) incursion into our
national airspace was obviously a significant event that shined a light
on the PRC's brazen intelligence collection against the United States
and Canada. It was the first time USNORTHCOM conducted an engagement
over the United States in our history, and it made it clear that our
competitors have the capability and intent to reach the Homeland. The
three Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAPs), also shot down days later
by USNORTHCOM and NORAD, clearly demonstrated the challenges associated
with detecting and identifying unmanned objects in U.S. airspace. As
for NORAD and NORTHCOM, I commit to you that this event has already
generated critical lessons learned for my commands and our mission
partners, and I can guarantee that NORTHCOM and NORAD are going to
continue to learn from it and do whatever is necessary to keep our
country safe.
While we face significant challenges, there should be no doubt we
have the finest military on the planet and that the commands will
defend our nations with tenacity and resolve. In what is likely my
final appearance before this Committee, I remain deeply humbled and
immensely proud to lead the noblest mission of any Combatant Command--
defending the Homeland. I am grateful to the Committee for your
longstanding support of our missions and of the men and women who stand
watch over our Nation every day. I thank you for the honor of
representing our soldiers, sailors, airmen, guardians, marines, and
civilians.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General VanHerck.
General Richardson, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL LAURA J. RICHARDSON, USA, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
General Richardson. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker,
and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you with General VanHerck. I am
honored to represent the men and women of United States
Southern Command to discuss the challenges we share with our
neighbors in Latin America and the Caribbean.
As stated in the National Security Strategy, ``No region
impacts the United States more directly than the Western
Hemisphere.'' Last year I testified before this Committee and
stated, ``This region, our shared neighborhood, is under
assault from a host of cross-cutting, trans-boundary challenges
that directly threaten our Homeland.'' This is still true
today, and is a call to action.
In the last year I have spent time in the region, meeting
with leaders to better understand these challenges and the
threat they pose to our mutual interests. The world is at an
inflection point.
Our partners in the Western Hemisphere, with whom we are
bonded by trade, shared values, democratic traditions, and
family ties, are feeling the impacts of external interference
and coercion. The People's Republic of China, our pacing
challenge, continues to expand its economic, diplomatic,
technological, informational, and military influence in Latin
America and the Caribbean. The PRC has the capability and
intent to eschew international norms, advance the brand of
authoritarianism, and amass power and influence at the expense
of these democracies.
The PRC has expanded its ability to extract resources, and
gets 36 percent of its food imports from the region and 75
percent of its lithium from South America. The PRC also leads
the hemisphere in illegal, unregulated, unreported fishing,
raiding the fish of coastal countries, costing a profit loss of
about $3 billion.
The PRC has also established ports in multiple countries,
manipulated governments through predatory investment practices,
and built potential dual-use space facilities, the most space
facilities in any combatant command region.
Russia, an acute threat, bolsters authoritarian regimes in
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and they continue its extensive
disinformation campaign and has media agreements with 11
countries in the region. There are over 30 million followers of
Russia Today en Espanol and nik Mundo. These activities
undermine democracies and challenge our credibility.
Both China and Russia exploit the presence of transnational
criminal organizations and amplify their destabilizing impacts
on democratic governments. TCOs spread violence and corruption
throughout the region and beyond. Their fentanyl-laced cocaine
contributes to the deaths of Americans in cities and towns
across the country.
The good news is by working with our very willing parts
this leads to the best defense. We must use all available
levers to strengthen our partnerships with the 28 like-minded
democracies in the region who understand the power of working
together to counter these shared threats. Our partners look to
us to lead in the hemisphere. We have an obligation to meet
them where they are and continue to aggressively address our
common security challenges.
We must continue to maximize the effectiveness of important
tools like security cooperation programs to train and equip our
partner militaries and security forces; conduct multilateral
exercises; and build interoperability, and increase the State
Department's international military, education, and training,
foreign military sales programs to educate, train, and build
capacity that our partners put to immediate use to stand
shoulder-to-shoulder with us.
As the National Defense Strategy stages, the United States
derives immense benefits from a stable, peaceful, and
democratic Western Hemisphere that reduces security threats to
the Homeland. USSOUTHCOM is putting integrated deterrence into
action every day, using innovative methods to work seamlessly
across all domains with the other combatant commands, the Joint
Force, allies and partners, Congress, the U.S. interagency,
NGO's, and the private sector to help build a hemisphere that
is free, secure, and prosperous for our generation and
generations to come. I call this Team Democracy, and we need to
field a resourced team.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Laura J. Richardson
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Laura J. Richardson
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished Committee
Members, 2022 marked two important milestones for U.S. Southern Command
(USSOUTHCOM): the 25th anniversary of our move from Panama to Miami in
1997, and the 25th anniversary of our Human Rights Initiative. For a
quarter of a century, the brave women and men of USSOUTHCOM have called
Miami home, while working with allies and partners to improve security,
advance democratic ideals, and promote peace and prosperity throughout
our shared neighborhood.
At the end of the cold war, the United States, its allies, and
partners believed that democracy would displace authoritarianism around
the globe. Twenty-five years later, the strategic environment in Latin
America and the Caribbean (LAC) has changed significantly. The 2022
National Security Strategy (NSS) states, in no uncertain terms, that
``autocrats are working overtime to undermine democracy.'' \1\ We see
this right here in our own hemisphere that external malign actors like
the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are aggressively
exerting influence over our democratic neighbors.
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\1\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-
Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf
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The NSS also states ``no region impacts the United States more
directly than the Western Hemisphere.'' \2\ Presence and proximity
absolutely matter, and a stable and secure Western Hemisphere is
critical to homeland defense. After traveling across LAC and meeting
our partners face to face, I can confirm our security at home is
directly impacted by the challenges facing this strategic region.
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\2\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-
Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf
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Our adversaries use a multidisciplinary and multidomain approach to
counter democracy and SOUTHCOM, our allies, and partners must use the
full weight of integrated deterrence, leveraging the whole-of-
government, industry, private sector, and academia, in order to
effectively respond. With shared purpose and mutual trust, we must
collectively act with a much greater sense of urgency to ensure this
hemisphere remains a stronghold for democracy.
Today, the PRC has both the capability and intent to eschew
international norms, advance its brand of authoritarianism, and amass
power and influence at the expense of the existing and emerging
democracies in our hemisphere. This is a decisive decade and our
actions or inactions regarding the PRC will have ramifications for
decades to come.
While the PRC remains our pacing challenge, other malicious actors
erode regional security. Russia continues its extensive disinformation
campaigns and bolsters authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) spread violence
and corruption throughout the region and beyond. These TCOs traffic
drugs that contribute to the deaths of thousands of Americans in cities
and towns across the country, from Alabama to Washington, from Rhode
Island to Mississippi and everywhere in between. TCOs foment violence
and instability that contribute to irregular migration, forcibly
displacing hundreds of thousands of people who risk their lives to
reach U.S. territory each year. TCO corruption creates insecurity,
deteriorates rule of law, and leaves partner nations susceptible to the
actions of malign State and non-State actors.
We aren't alone in our efforts to create a stable and peaceful
hemisphere. Integrated Deterrence includes campaigning with our
partners and allies as force multipliers for achieving success in this
resource-constrained reality. With our partners and allies from the
United Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Netherlands, we recently
adopted the Framework for Western Hemisphere Collaboration. The
framework commits us to more frequently share information, and work
more closely together on our aligned strategic interests.
Our USSOUTHCOM lines of effort in the face of these challenges are
clear: by strengthening alliances and partnerships, collectively
countering threats, and building our team, we are working to preserve
democracy in our shared neighborhood. While doing so, we are pioneering
ways to outcompete even our most innovative adversaries and address
these transnational challenges.
expanding challenges in the region
Strategic Competition with the People's Republic of China--A Decisive
Decade
When regional leaders and experts discuss the PRC's engagement in
the Western Hemisphere, they focus largely on trade and investment. In
2002, PRC trade with Latin America and the Caribbean was just $18
billion; in 2022 it ballooned to $450 billion. That number is expected
to increase to $700 billion by 2035. Conversely, current United States
trade within the region amounts to $700 billion, which suggests that
the United States' comparative trade advantage is eroding.\3\ \4\
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\3\ https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-
argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri
\4\ https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/
china-lac-trade-four-scenarios-in-2035/
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What concerns me as a Combatant Commander is the myriad of ways in
which the PRC is spreading its malign influence, wielding its economic
might, and conducting gray zone activities to expand its military and
political access and influence in the AOR. The PRC is investing in
critical infrastructure, including deep-water ports, cyber, and space
facilities which can have a potential dual use for malign commercial
and military activities. In any potential global conflict, the PRC
could leverage strategic regional ports to restrict United States naval
and commercial ship access. This is a strategic risk that we can't
accept or ignore. These activities are heavily subsidized through PRC
state-owned enterprises (SOE), allowing them to underbid on
infrastructure projects, quickly displacing local and international
competitors. SOEs are developing deep-water ports in 17 countries,
particularly around strategic maritime chokepoints in this region. In
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, PRC SOEs abused commercial
agreements by conducting military functions at host-country ports.
What's to keep them from doing the same right here in this hemisphere?
In Panama, PRC-sponsored companies are engaged in, or bidding on,
several projects related to the Panama Canal--a global strategic
chokepoint. These projects include port operations on both ends of the
canal, water management, and a logistics park. Meanwhile, in Argentina,
a PRC SOE is attempting to secure the rights to build dual-use maritime
installations near the southern port city of Ushuaia, which would
support sustainment and power-projection while providing proximity to
the Strait of Magellan, Drake Passage, and Antarctica. This would be a
potential game-changer for the PRC, dramatically improving its access
to Antarctica.
The PRC also sees this region as key to expanding its space domain
awareness and improving its military space capabilities. There are at
least 11 PRC-linked space facilities across five countries in this
region, more than any other geographic combatant command's AOR, that
provide Beijing with space tracking and surveillance capabilities. This
includes a joint space-monitoring facility in Chile and a deep space
station in Argentina that is managed by an agency subordinate to the
People's Liberation Army (PLA).\5\
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\5\ https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-
space/
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Our Nation's leaders have expressed concern about the insidious
nature of the PRC-sponsored 5G technology providers for years now. In
our region alone, five countries adopted Huawei's 5G technology, and 24
countries have existing Chinese telecommunication infrastructure (3G/
4G), increasing their potential to transition to Chinese 5G. There are
also 12 countries using PRC-created Safe City programs that provide
persistent surveillance and give PRC SOE technicians access to
government networks. These actions, among others, create a potential
counterintelligence threat to the United States military, our civilian
personnel, and our regional partners. The proliferation of this
technology has also led even more partner nation military personnel to
travel to China to receive training on cybersecurity and military
doctrine.
The PRC relies heavily on resources, including food sources and
minerals from the USSOUTHCOM AOR. This region is one of the richest in
the world in critical rare earth minerals. The PRC's efforts to extract
South America's natural resources to support its own population of 1.9
billion people are conducted at the expense of our partner nations and
their citizens. These actions have the potential to destabilize the
region and erode the fundamental conditions needed for quality private
sector investment.
Environmental crimes such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated
fishing (IUUF), illegal logging, and illegal mining continue to have
devastating impacts on the region and the PRC is the largest
perpetrator of these biodiversity crimes. Every year, there are between
350 and 600 Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-subsidized vessels fishing
off the coast of South America. These vessels severely deplete fish
stocks, disregard environmental safeguards, destabilize the economies
of coastal states, and exacerbate security challenges at a cost of
nearly $3 billion in lost revenue annually.\6\ When I meet with our
partner nations, IUUF, along with transnational criminal networks and
cyber security, is consistently among their top national security
concerns. As a result, their militaries are increasingly being asked to
play a leading role in combating this illegal activity.
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\6\ (U) Online Publication: American University Center for South
America and Latino Studies; 12 July 2022; (U) Latin America-Caribbean:
Illegal Fishing is Environmental Security Challenge; https://
aulablog.net/2022/07/21/latin-america-caribbean-illicit-fishing-is-
environmental-security-challenge/
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Russia as an Acute Threat
The impacts of Vladimir Putin's illegal, unprovoked invasion of
Ukraine reverberated around the world, worsening a global energy and
food crisis. The USSOUTHCOM AOR has not been spared. Families across
the region are struggling to put food on the table and gas in their
cars because of the sharp rise in prices, compounding the negative
impacts in this region from COVID-19.
Through military engagements and gray zone operations, Russia
colludes with authoritarian regimes in the region to undermine United
States influence. In the past year, Russia continued its military
engagements with both Venezuela and Nicaragua. Last year Venezuela
hosted Sniper Frontier 2022, a shooting competition and subcomponent of
Russia's International Army Games. Nicaragua has publicly supported the
Russian invasion of Ukraine, voting--along with only North Korea,
Syria, and Belarus--against a U.N. resolution condemning Russia for its
invasion. These engagements increase Russian influence with nations who
are destabilizing forces in the region.
Russia uses disinformation to further its malign influence, sow
instability and undermine democracy in the region, activities that
promote Russian geopolitical goals and undermine United States national
security interests. For example, Russia spreads false narratives about
its invasion of Ukraine through its Spanish-language media arms, RT en
Espanol, Sputnik Mundo, and its various social media sites. RT en
Espanol's Facebook page has 18 million followers, more than its
English-language site or even CNN's Spanish-language channels.\7\
Despite efforts by Facebook and Twitter to take down accounts spreading
disinformation, Russian operators continue to generate bot accounts to
spread falsehoods quickly. We are in a constant fight to counter and
remove the disinformation spread by fake accounts and correct the
misperceptions this disinformation propagates. It is in our interest to
help develop our partner nations' knowledge and understanding of these
tactics and false information before this malign activity permanently
erodes this hemisphere's confidence in democracy.
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\7\ https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/09/business/russia-propaganda-
spanish-social-media.html
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Transnational Criminal Organizations
Although many partner nation leaders recognize the threats the PRC
and Russia pose to democracy in the region, they see TCOs as their
primary security challenge. The number one cause of death among
citizens ages 15 to 49 years old in Latin America and the Caribbean is
violence and more than 60 percent of the world's most crime-stricken
cities are in this region.\8\
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\8\ https://www.maplecroft.com/insights/analysis/latin-america-
hosts-over-60-of-worlds-most-crime-stricken-cities--global-ranking/
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USSOUTHCOM estimates that there are 200 TCOs and four terrorist
groups operating throughout the region. TCOs such as the Sinaloa Cartel
and Jalisco New Generation Cartel in Mexico are spreading their reach
to the region. The National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia--People's Army (FARC-EP), Segunda Marquetalia, and
Sendero Luminoso continue to operate along primary cocaine trafficking
corridors. First Capital Command (PCC) operates in Brazilian urban
streets, the Amazonian jungle, in neighboring Paraguay, Bolivia, and in
the United States. In Haiti, gangs control roughly 60 percent of the
country, blocking roads for much-needed food and fuel.
TCOs are engaged in a wide variety of illicit activities, including
drug smuggling, arms dealing, illegal logging and mining, human
trafficking, IUUF, and manufacturing counterfeit goods. They are also
invested in numerous legitimate enterprises, including, but not limited
to, commercial banking, manufacturing, agriculture, consumer sales, and
real estate. The diverse activities amount to a war chest of roughly
$310 billion annually, 5 times the combined military budgets of every
nation in Latin America and the Caribbean. TCOs are better funded,
equipped, and manned than the security forces trying to fight them and
increasingly rely on PRC-connected criminal organizations to launder
billions of dollars around the world. \9\
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\9\ https://www.propublica.org/article/china-cartels-xizhi-li-
money-laundering
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Drug trafficking originating from this region contributes to the
deaths of more than 100,000 Americans every year. Interdicting the flow
of drugs directly saves lives by removing product from the pipeline. It
also reduces TCO revenue. The type of contraband or destination is
irrelevant as the money remains in the Western Hemisphere and TCOs use
their illicit funds to exacerbate regional corruption, insecurity, and
instability. This in turn disrupts legitimate economic opportunity,
compromises the rule of law, allows malign State actors the opportunity
to make inroads, and drives irregular migration. TCOs victimize
migrants, by extorting them, forcing them into human trafficking, and
saddling them with debt. The human toll TCOs cause is heartbreaking.
Iran
Iran is focused on rebuilding its economic and diplomatic ties in
the region and pursuing opportunities to circumvent United States
sanctions. Tehran's intelligence and security activities continue to be
a concern and over the past 2 years Iran has increasingly used
Venezuela to assert its presence in the region.
Regional Humanitarian Crises
Fragility. The COVID-19 pandemic severely impacted the economies of
Latin America and the Caribbean, driving 170 million people into
poverty.\10\ Countries in the region suffered disproportionately from
the pandemic. While accounting for only 8 percent of the world's
population, Latin America and the Caribbean suffered nearly 29 percent
of the world's COVID-19 deaths. Fragility and instability drive
irregular migration and create an environment ripe for corruption and
exploitation.
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\10\ https://www.bloomberglinea.com/english/number-of-latin-
americans-living-in-poverty-expected-to-surpass-one-third-of-total/
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Haiti. In recent years, Haiti has suffered an onslaught of setbacks
including corrupt leaders and political assassinations, rampant gang
violence, disease, and devastating natural disasters. Violence in Haiti
is at its worst level in decades, according to the United Nations,
characterized by gender-based violence, homicides, and kidnapping for
ransom. Civil unrest, inter-gang fighting, and road blockages hinder
commerce and humanitarian access. Today, Haitian citizens are
suffering, and its government faces a myriad of challenges to include
insecurity, limited governance capacity, and health concerns. The chaos
caused more than 69,000 Haitians to seek refuge in the United States in
fiscal year 2022. \11\
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\11\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters
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Nicaragua. President Daniel Ortega's regime continues to detain and
prosecute political opponents, even targeting clergy and shutting down
hundreds of civil society organizations and independent media outlets.
Since switching diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to the PRC in
December 2021, Nicaragua has engaged with the PRC in bilateral talks
for a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. In September 2022, PRC
Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Denis
Moncada on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly, highlighting
that the new bilateral relationship has already yielded ``early
harvests.''\12\
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\12\ https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa--eng/topics--665678/kjgzbdfyyq/
202209/t20220921--10769061.html
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Cuba. President Miguel Diaz-Canel's government continues to repress
all Cuban citizens critical of the regime. The government engages in
arbitrary detention, including children, and limits access to
information and freedom of expression, and incarcerates political
dissidents. The Cuban Government's oppressive tactics have forced more
than 230,000 Cubans to seek refuge in the United States in fiscal year
2022.\13\ In September 2022, Hurricane Ian struck Cuba, devastating
homes, causing flooding, and knocking out power to many communities.
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\13\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters
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Venezuela. The humanitarian crisis caused by the Maduro regime in
Venezuela remains one of the most severe in the world. President
Nicolas Maduro's regime and security forces continue to target and deny
access to critical services to any citizen who speaks out against them.
His regime continues to engage in extrajudicial killings, forced
disappearances, torture, and prosecution without due process. The
International Criminal Court is currently investigating possible crimes
against humanity in Venezuela.
The Maduro regime's oppressive tactics and gross economic
mismanagement have caused more than seven million Venezuelans to seek
refuge elsewhere, causing instability and deepening challenges for
those nations that have welcomed them. United States Customs and Border
Protection statistics show that more than 187,000 Venezuelan migrants
were encountered at the United States-Mexico border in fiscal year
2022.\14\
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\14\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters
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Levers: Overcoming Threats and Challenges in the AOR
The pervasive threats and challenges highlighted above pose
significant risks to U.S. and regional security interests. We cannot
accept such risks so close to home and we confront them by
strengthening partnerships, countering threats, and building our team.
Strengthen Partnerships
As the Secretary of Defense said, ``you can't surge trust at the
eleventh hour; trust is something you have to work on every day.'' \15\
We need to continuously engage our partner nations to build and sustain
that trust and be their preferred partner. As we campaign in strategic
competition to enable integrated deterrence and build enduring
advantages, our engagements, presence, and policies must be flexible,
consistent, and responsive to counter malign influence in the region.
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\15\ Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, speech to United States and
NATO troops in Bulgaria, 18 March 2022.
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The best way to outcompete our adversaries is to help partner
democracies deliver for their populations at the speed of relevance. We
achieve this by improving partner nation capability, capacity, and
resilience through security cooperation, exercises, and training
programs while upholding democratic values to ensure malign influence
and autocratic alternatives do not further take root in this region.
The main priority in our USSOUTHCOM Campaign Plan is to expose and
mitigate PRC malign activity. Ultimately, strategic competition with
the PRC is an ideological one between democracy and authoritarianism.
Presently, the majority of nations in the Western Hemisphere are
democracies, and 8 of the 14 nations that still recognize Taiwan are
located in USSOUTHCOM's AOR. Beijing is seeking to reduce that number
and increase influence throughout the region while putting the defense
of the United States Homeland at risk.
Security Cooperation. Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs are
my main lever for engaging partners in this posture-limited theater.
These programs allow us to be on the field and engaged, to strengthen
our partnerships, and develop military capabilities to counter a broad
spectrum of threats and challenges. From high-end technical training
that keeps partner intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
assets in the air, to building institutional capacity that develops
logistics and lifecycle management disciplines, to professional
military education, we are developing trust and interpersonal linkages.
USSOUTHCOM's BPC programs aim to make our partners resilient to the
adversaries operating in this hemisphere.
Our embedded Ministry of Defense Advisors and field service
representatives within partner nation security ministries, such as
those in Colombia, support modernization and innovation efforts in such
areas as personnel, defense intelligence, and doctrine development to
help our partners meet threats to their national security.
The United States Colombia Action Plan enables Colombia to provide
training and readiness directly to several countries, including Panama,
Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and
Paraguay in Spanish, and at a fraction of the cost of United States-
provided training. We really appreciate congressional support of this
program.
These security cooperation programs offer a huge return on
investment as they build trust and enhance capabilities and security
throughout the region--a little goes a long way here.
Department of State Security Assistance. State security assistance
programs increase interoperability with our partners while meeting
their individual security requirements. Foreign Military Sales (FMS),
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
programs produce an exponential return in this AOR. Brazil recently
made an FMS purchase of $15.8 million of 12 Joint Light Tactical
Vehicles as part of the Brazilian Marine Corps modernization plan,
strengthening its ability to counter threats and enhancing
interoperability with United States Forces. The former United States
Coast Guard cutters Albacore, Cochito, and Gannet were delivered to
Uruguay on November 12, 2022. These ships greatly enhance the maritime
security of Uruguay and demonstrate that the United States is the
preferred partner in the region. The Colombian Army received 86 armored
vehicles in 2022 via the EDA program, giving Colombia a more modern
capability to counter threats facing the country.
USSOUTHCOM executes State's International Military Training and
Education (IMET) program that provides professional military education
to personnel from 28 countries in the region. In 2022, USSOUTHCOM
countries were allocated $13.9 million for the IMET program. On
average, this allocation provides professional military education for
approximately 800 international students in United States schools. The
IMET program is one of USSOUTHCOM's strongest levers for countering the
PRC and other malign actors in the region by acquainting international
students with democratic ideals and professional military doctrine.
Partner nation personnel who attend these schools often go on to become
senior military leaders in their countries. The relationships built at
these schools last a lifetime.
Joint Exercise Program. Our Joint Exercise Program continues to
provide an outsized return on investment not only in building
readiness, but also in strengthening partnerships that allow us to
counter malign influence. In 2022 we had over 11,000 participants from
34 nations take part in our exercises, demonstrating once again that
the United States has the convening power to bring nations together.
These complex training events were multi-domain in nature and provided
us year-long engagement opportunities across the AOR, to include
engagements with key leaders.
USSOUTHCOM's exercise program in the counter-TCO realm also brings
together the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives,
the Department of State, and Department of Homeland Security (including
the U.S. Coast Guard), along with partner nation and allied military
forces to enhance readiness, interoperability, and domain awareness,
and to increase intelligence and information sharing.
Additionally, our exercises include training on human rights and on
Women, Peace, and Security, which helps to enhance professionalism and
advance democratic principles.
USNS Comfort. The USNS Comfort hospital ship deployed to five
countries in the region from October to December 2022--Guatemala,
Honduras, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti--taking part in a
humanitarian assistance, readiness building, and goodwill mission. The
USNS Comfort's crew included military and civilian personnel as well as
personnel from non-governmental organizations and partner nation
militaries. Since its inception in 2007, the Continuing Promise mission
has treated more than 580,000 patients overall and conducted over 7,000
surgeries. The USNS Comfort mission to the USSOUTHCOM AOR historically
lasts approximately 159 days, but even during this year's reduced
mission of 52 days, the Comfort managed to treat over 30,000 patients,
conduct 350 surgeries, and positively impact 100,000 people with its
outreach activities. This tremendous soft power asset will have lasting
effects not just on the individuals who were treated, but also on the
entire region.
Operation Health Engagement Assistance Response Team (HEART).
During Operation HEART, a team of 34 medical professionals and 17
support personnel conducted orthopedic, ophthalmology, and dental
surgeries in Guatemala and Honduras. In just 56 days, Operation HEART
treated 993 patients and conducted a knowledge exchange with medical
residents and doctors from Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
and El Salvador.
Key Leader Engagements. Since I last addressed this Committee, I
have visited 13 countries and conducted over 90 key leader engagements
with ministers and chiefs of defense. Increasingly, I have also met
with heads of State and vice presidents as the appetite grows amongst
our partners to engage at senior levels with the United States. To
date, I have engaged eight presidents, three vice presidents, and two
prime ministers, and I have a full calendar of engagements planned
throughout 2023. Establishing and cultivating these relationships is
vital and we must step up our presence in the region to maintain
relevance. Relationships absolutely matter, and our partner democracies
are desperate for assistance from the United States, but if we're not
there in time, they have no choice but to take what's available,
creating opportunities for the PRC to expand its influence. Just like
with the COVID-19 vaccine, they wanted a United States vaccine, but
some partner nations had to take the Chinese Sinopharm or Russian
Sputnik vaccines at 50-60 percent effectiveness because we weren't
there with our Pfizer or Moderna vaccine. \16\ \17\
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\16\ https://apnews.com/article/china-gao-fu-vaccines-offer-low-
protection-coronavirus-675bcb6b5710c7329823148ffbff6ef9
\17\ https://absolutelymaybe.plos.org/2022/04/20/did-we-ever-find-
out-how-effective-sputnik-v-vaccine-actually is/
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U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Infrastructure is one of our
partners' critical needs, and the PRC is leveraging that need to
achieve influence overmatch in the region. We need to step up with much
greater responsiveness in our processes if we want to address our
partner nation requirements and outcompete the PRC in this domain. The
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) works with USSOUTHCOM and partner
nations to advance security, preserve environmental sustainability and
climate resiliency, and protect at-risk indigenous populations. USACE
is providing technical support to the Panama Canal Authority to help
ensure the canal operates successfully for the next 50 years. It also
supports Ecuador to mitigate the negative effects of a substandard PRC
construction project at the Coca Coda Dam. In January 2023, at the
request of the embassy and the government of the Dominican Republic,
USACE assigned a subject-matter expert embedded within the Dominican
Republic's Agency of Mines and Minerals to assist with developing
efforts to preserve rare earth materials.
From a defense and security cooperation perspective, USACE's recent
agreement with the Peruvian Navy to build out Peru's port facilities,
and its continued construction efforts on Tolemaida Air Base in
Colombia, facilitating the development of the largest rotary wing
training and maintenance facilities in the region, will increase our
partners' capacity to counter TCOs in the region.
State Partnership Program. Through the State Partnership Program
(SPP), the National Guard continues to develop relationships with our
partner nations. Eighteen United States states, Puerto Rico and the
District of Columbia have active partnerships with defense and security
forces from 30 nations in the Caribbean, Central America, and South
America. By providing long-term and consistent support and building
trust and teamwork, National Guard servicemembers give us the presence
on the field that is so critical. For example, this year, the South
Dakota National Guard worked with its partner Suriname to renovate a
school for 450 children and provide medical and dental care to three
separate rural and underserved communities, impacting approximately
2,500 civilians. This year, the Regional Security System (RSS),
consisting of seven Eastern Caribbean nations, conducted 25 events
across the RSS and in the continental United States.
SPP's success is enhanced through National Guard participation in
partner nation exercises like those in Brazil and Colombia. The
National Guard also provided medical servicemembers from Puerto Rico,
Louisiana, Arkansas, and South Carolina to our successful Continuing
Promise operations through the USNS Comfort deployment.
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HA/DR). Latin
America and the Caribbean are susceptible to hurricanes, earthquakes,
droughts, and other extreme natural disasters. The United States is
there with assistance before, during, and after disaster strikes.
USSOUTHCOM engages our partner nations regularly, encouraging and
assisting them to take positive steps toward disaster risk reduction,
mitigation, preparedness, and resiliency. Several of our annual
exercises, including TRADEWINDS and CENTAM GUARDIAN, have a HA/DR
component to help build resiliency and readiness related to climate
change and natural disaster response.
A recent example of our support is our response to Haiti's widening
political and humanitarian crises. Supporting a whole-of-government
effort led by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the
State Department, USSOUTHCOM delivered thousands of gallons of much-
needed fuel and 300,000 cholera treatment packets to Haiti. This
operation relieved strain on the local healthcare system and enabled
the U.S. Embassy to remain open to facilitate life-saving assistance.
Humanitarian assistance activities also address basic needs of the
population and build partner capacity to maintain a healthy population.
Activities emphasize public health capacity building, such as improving
medical facilities, disease surveillance systems, and providing basic
medical equipment, education, prevention, and training. Basic
infrastructure activities focus on building partner capacity to provide
essential services, like potable water. Finally, we recently joined
with 12 other countries to identify logistics processes, procedures,
and protocols that are required to improve the military logistics
support to HA/DR activities in the Western Hemisphere.
Confronting Climate Change. This is one of the regions most
impacted by climate change. Hurricanes, rising sea levels, flooding,
and drought are causing grave harm to the region's health, food, water,
energy, and socioeconomic development. Extreme weather events impact
our partners' national security, displacing populations and increasing
irregular migration already accelerated by TCOs and insecurity.
These calamities know no borders. In 2022, Hurricane Fiona slammed
into the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, Hurricane Ian ravaged
western Florida and Cuba, and Hurricane Julia caused landslides and
wiped-out crops in Central America. To help address threats from
climate change and support humanitarian assistance, USSOUTHCOM works to
strengthen our partners nations' ability to address more demanding
disaster response roles, mitigate the effects from climate change,
protect the environment, and enable the transition to clean energy
through subject-matter expert exchanges and by incorporating energy
security scenarios in exercises. Successfully confronting this complex
issue requires a true integrated approach. For example, USSOUTHCOM
partners with the Pacific Disaster Center in Hawaii to facilitate
disaster response training and conduct National Disaster Preparedness
Baseline Assessments with our partner nations. These assessments
promote a multi-agency approach to disaster risk reduction and national
disaster preparedness, in collaboration with partner nations' national
disaster management agencies.
Countering Threats
Countering PRC malign efforts. In alignment with the 2022 National
Defense Strategy's integrated deterrence approach, we strive to use all
levers through campaigning to deny the PRC the perceived benefits of
aggression. USSOUTHCOM leverages the expertise of the Executive branch,
to include the Departments of State and Commerce, to improve partner
nations' knowledge of effective legal frameworks to develop reliable
and secure telecommunication infrastructure and cyber resilience, while
highlighting state-of-the-art substantive alternatives to counter PRC
state-owned enterprise expansion in the region.
By methodically identifying and synchronizing separate initiatives,
from building cyber capability to exposing PRC malign activities, we
can strengthen critical infrastructure to improve our collective
ability to operate in the face of multi-domain threats posed by the
PRC. Information sharing with our partners on the malign activities of
the PRC in other nations and regions that have undercut sovereignty is
critical to ensuring our partners can make informed decisions on their
engagements with the PRC. However, information sharing alone is
insufficient. Collectively, in a whole-of-nation integrated approach,
we must also provide viable alternatives for partnerships and offer
significantly more incentives through campaigning for critical
infrastructure investment and port development in the region.
While the PRC consistently works to expand its network of military
space infrastructure across the AOR, we are focused on strengthening
relationships with our allies and partners through sustained engagement
and investment with what we currently have, including by assisting our
partners to build capability to conduct space operations to meet their
needs. By focusing on strengthening relations, the United States
demonstrates what a true partner looks like, which stands in stark
contrast to the transactional nature of PRC engagements. This strategy,
coupled with continued exposure of the military purpose of the PRC's
scientific or academic space sites in the region, may slow and possibly
reverse the expansion of the PRC's space network in our neighborhood.
Illegal, Unregulated, Unreported Fishing. IUUF is another area
where we must leverage diverse capabilities and authorities. We have
teamed up with the Department of State, partner nation stakeholders,
the private sector, civil society, international organizations, and an
interagency team of U.S. Government experts to confront this issue head
on. The U.S. Coast Guard is conducting various IUUF missions in the
AOR, and USSOUTHCOM has four ongoing IUUF initiatives that are
complementary in nature.
Enhanced Domain Awareness is a secure, unclassified, virtual
environment where USSOUTHCOM, interagency, and foreign partners can
leverage commercially and publicly available information and analytics.
This allows us to collaborate on diverse security challenges including
strategic competition and IUUF as well as issues like migration, human
trafficking, and illegal mining.
USSOUTHCOM has signed a memorandum of understanding with Global
Fishing Watch and has a longstanding relationship with Florida
International University through which we partnered to create the
Security Research Hub--a virtual research community that brings
together the United States, partner nations, academic institutions,
civil society, and the private sector to foster shared understanding of
the most pervasive security issues, to include IUUF.
USSOUTHCOM is also exploring areas of cooperation and opportunities
to provide technical assistance and support to the Eastern Tropical
Pacific Marine Corridor, a voluntary regional cooperation mechanism
created by the coastal states of Ecuador, Costa Rica, Colombia, and
Panama.
Finally, working with 14 partner nations and the National Maritime
Intelligence-Integration Office, U.S. Navy South leads the way for an
intergovernmental approach to information-sharing efforts. When fully
implemented, they will collectively foster timely, actionable
information sharing, multifunctional collaboration, and multinational
trust. This collaboration will illuminate nefarious actors negatively
impacting our partner nations' economies and populations.
Countering Russian malign influence. USSOUTHCOM is postured to
compete with Russia through the coordination and application of
information-related capabilities. While Russia may seem distant, its
presence and influence is felt in our hemisphere, actively undermining
the security and stability of our partner nations. Our multifaceted
approach aims to bolster partner efforts and expose malign activities,
with the goal of blunting Russian exploitation in the information
environment.
Our partners are inclined to support efforts that impose costs on
Russia. Some are willing to exchange their Soviet-era equipment for
NATO-interoperable, United States-made equipment. However, as our
partners agree to support efforts against Russia, the United States
must have responsive mechanisms in place to rapidly provide replacement
assets to maintain partner nation readiness--if not done right, we
could lose this opportunity.
Cyber. Cyber is an all-encompassing domain capable of affecting
every sector of society, not just defense. USSOUTHCOM partners with
other U.S. agencies and organizations such as the Departments of State,
Commerce, Homeland Security, and Justice along with U.S. Cyber Command,
our National Guard SPP teammates, and the U.S. Coast Guard, to deliver
the right support at the right time to assist our partners with their
cyber-related challenges.
Through our cyberspace advise and assist efforts, including
subject-matter expert exchanges and leveraging the expertise of our
Joint Combatant Command Cyber Assistance Teams, we support our
partners' efforts to advance their defensive cyber capabilities and
develop cyber resiliency. These programs are enablers that help our
partners tactically defend against the threats posed by Russia and its
proxies in the cyber domain. However, with the significant increase in
nation-State cyber attacks and hacktivist attacks in the region, our
partner nations are struggling to protect their citizens in the cyber
domain, and we are in a race to help them protect their cyber assets
before they choose competitor solutions. \18\
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\18\ https://www.recordedfuture.com/latin-american-governments-
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Competing in the Information Space. Additionally, our information
operations team shapes pro-U.S., pro-democracy narratives, counters
disinformation by promoting fact-based information, and works
aggressively to reduce U.S. adversary influence in the information
environment. This team highlights democratic ideals such as respecting
human rights and protecting the rule of law. This capability is
postured to provide accurate, timely, and valid information to support
reasonable decisionmaking, resulting in better outcomes and ultimately
decreasing the effectiveness of propaganda.
Agile Processes. To outcompete our adversaries and win through
campaigning, we need to be agile and support our partners at the speed
of relevance. While we are committed to transparent processes, we must
be faster and more innovative to outcompete our adversaries. Right now,
our partner nations are quickly losing confidence in the U.S.'s ability
to deliver capability. At a recent event when I spoke about what I call
``Team Democracy,'' a term I use to describe integrated deterrence and
working together to counter adversary malign activity, a head of state
responded that there aren't very many on ``Team Democracy'' anymore,
citing multiple examples of countries turning away from democracy
because the U.S. overpromises and underdelivers. FMF, FMS, and Security
Cooperation are great levers that can make huge inroads in the AOR when
delivered at the speed of relevance for our partners. However, these
programs are only as good as the processes by which we execute them.
While a little goes a long way in this AOR, we need to do better to
support and react at the speed of need, armed with the capabilities our
partners can implement quickly and sustain for the long term. When we
don't support our partners at the speed of need, our competitors
willingly fill the gap.
To help improve processes, the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy has established two working groups to break down
barriers to our success. The Campaigning in the Western Hemisphere
Group brings together entities within the Department of Defense that
play a role in building partner capacity, and the Defense Opportunities
Group convenes interagency partners that have a stake in a stable and
secure Western Hemisphere. We aspire to quickly gain efficiencies
across the U.S. Government so we may apply all levers of national power
in this vital strategic competition.
Countering TCOs. Our Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S)
conducts the statutorily directed mission to detect and monitor illicit
drugs transiting toward the United States in the maritime and air
domains, delivering a high return on modest investments. In fiscal year
2022, JIATF-South facilitated the disruption of 371 illegal smuggling
events, including a total of almost 300 metric tons of cocaine and over
140,000 pounds of marijuana, with a combined wholesale value of $7.5
billion and saving an estimated 2,976 American lives. In addition to
saving U.S. lives and reducing TCO revenue, JIATF-South-facilitated
drug trafficking disruptions produce evidence in the form of
contraband, detainees, and other information. Our interagency and
international law enforcement partners use this evidence, to help
affect judicial end states that degrade and dismantle TCOs.
I want to highlight our international partners' participation in
these operations, as they are key to overall mission success. Our
international partners participated in 76 percent of the JIATF-South-
facilitated disruptions (up from 62 percent last year) and were
responsible for removing 475,000 kilograms of transit zone cocaine
headed toward the United States. This is a testament to their
commitment to support this regional effort and build their capability
and capacity.
United States-led, multinational counternarcotics operations
ultimately result in our international partners taking the lead on
their own operations, as Colombia does via their Operation Orion.
Colombia executed two iterations of Orion in 2022, leading a coalition
of 41 countries, resulting in the disruption of more than 180,000
kilograms of cocaine and seizing dozens of conveyances. This is an
excellent example of integrated deterrence return on investment--gained
by combining willing and able international partners with a committed
U.S. presence in the Western Hemisphere. Each of these operations was
only successful because of the United States investment to train and
equip our Colombian military and security partners.
Notwithstanding our significant achievements over the decades in
this mission space, there is still more to do. As U.S. resources
against this threat decline, we will continue to innovate--both in
strategy, like re-examining current authorities, and unconventional
resourcing, like contract assets, commercial data, and artificial
intelligence and machine learning.
Combating Money Laundering. Systemic political corruption and lack
of strong anti-money laundering policies make the region a permissive
environment for illicit financial activity. USSOUTHCOM continues to
identify TCO financial support networks, providing direct analytic
support to U.S. Treasury Department and other interagency partners that
facilitate sanctions, arrests, and prosecutions against TCOs. Recently,
USSOUTHCOM supported Treasury's designation of Ecuadorian national
Wilmer Emilio Sanchez Farfan, one of the most significant drug
traffickers in the world and a major cocaine supplier to the Sinaloa
cartel.\19\ While continued disruptions of illicit drug movements
toward the United States remain critical, to truly disrupt these
billion-dollar conglomerates, we must also support interagency efforts
to follow the money.
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\19\ https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0592
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Coast Guard Support. The U.S. Coast Guard is one of USSOUTHCOM's
strongest partners, with its National Security Cutters and Fast
Response Cutters providing the bulk of our counterdrug forces. U.S.
Coast Guard assets enhance operations with unique capabilities and
authorities which, when used in conjunction with the U.S. Navy and
partner nation platforms, maximize the effectiveness of a variety of
missions. The Coast Guard is executing its largest fleet
recapitalization since World War II. These recapitalization efforts
will provide capabilities that support three USSOUTHCOM strategic
initiatives: enhancing Theater Security Cooperation, countering IUUF,
and combating TCOs. Additionally, the Coast Guard provides valuable
humanitarian mission support across the region, saving lives and
delivering much-needed aid when natural disasters suddenly strike the
region.
Building our Team--People First
Housing. Our servicemembers and families are our strength and
foundation. While having our headquarters and two subordinate commands
in South Florida offers a great synergy with our AOR, our team faces
extraordinary pressures with the expensive, competitive, and volatile
housing market. In September 2022, Secretary Austin announced immediate
and long-term actions to help strengthen the economic security and
stability of servicemembers and their families. We benefited with
automatic increases in the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) for the
Miami-Dade and Broward County areas that have carried forward in the
calendar year 2023 BAH rates. We are seeking similar relief for the Key
West area. We are also continuing our work with the Department of the
Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on a housing
solution to address servicemember concerns about cost and availability
of housing in the Miami area.
JIATF-South Resiliency. JIATF-South is currently operating out of
70-year-old facilities that are severely degraded. We received full
fiscal year 2023 planning and design funding to complete the design for
a new command and control facility. We appreciate this continued
support as we look to finalize the design and request the military
construction funding to construct a resilient facility for this
critical mission for the Nation.
Women, Peace and Security (WPS). At USSOUTHCOM, we deliberately
integrate gender perspectives throughout all ranks into our operations,
activities, and investments, exemplifying a truly diverse joint force
and encouraging our partner nations to do the same. Our main objective
is to maximize the talents of the force through recruitment, retention,
training, and advancement. We also highly encourage partner nation
leaders to increase their numbers of women who participate in IMET and
other special programs. We are seeing results. In August 2022, the
Florida National Guard and Guyana's Defense Force hosted the first
Caribbean Regional WPS conference with leadership from 12 partner
nations--including Guyana's First Lady Arya Ali and the AOR's first
female Chief of Defense, Jamaica's Staff Rear Admiral Antonette Wemyss-
Gorman, advocating for gender inclusivity and advancing regional
influence in ways that our adversaries cannot. In September 2022,
Colombia appointed its first female Senior Enlisted Leader of the
Colombian Military Services, Command Sergeant Major Consuelo Diaz
Alvarez, and in October 2022, for the first time in its history, the
Colombian Navy promoted two female Navy Captains, Beatriz Helena Garcia
Restrepo and Carolina Gomez de Castillo, to the rank of Rear Admiral.
Although much work remains, these are just a few of the examples that
demonstrate USSOUTHCOM and its partners' commitment to provide
opportunities for women to become leaders in the defense and security
sectors.
Total Force. The United States military is the most powerful in the
world, and USSOUTHCOM leverages all available personnel, making us
flexible and agile to counter any challenges we may face. Of the
servicemembers at USSOUTHCOM, up to 20 percent at any given time are
Guard or Reserve members conducting operations in more than 20
locations throughout the AOR.
One such total force mission has been ongoing for a decade. Since
2003, Air National Guard Airmen have supported JIATF-South's detection
and monitoring mission through the Host Nation Rider Program. This
program provides technical language support and translation/
interpretation that has been instrumental in achieving successful
detection and monitoring of air operations within the AOR. In fiscal
year 2022, this program was involved in the seizure of over 49,000
kilograms of cocaine, 24,000 pounds of marijuana, and the apprehension
of 154 detainees.
The Reserve component is a force multiplier used in a cyclic manner
to provide predictability, operational capability, and as a strategic
force, providing depth to support a full spectrum of conflicts. Guard
and Reserve support is critical to USSOUTHCOM's mission continuity and
success.
What Resources Does USSOUTHCOM Need?
In this region, a small investment--whether in time, physical
resources, funding, or collaboration--goes a long way. We don't have to
outspend the PRC to outcompete, but we must be present on the field and
deliver at the speed of relevance. This requires having a timely
budget--continuing resolutions are disruptive to United States and
partner nation efforts to defend against threats. If we don't, China
and Russia will fill the void.
Security Cooperation is our main tool for building the capability
of our very willing partners. These partners take our small investments
and immediately employ them against the threats and challenges that
affect our entire hemisphere. Our partner nations are a force
multiplier in a posture-limited theater. The support Congress provided
for the fiscal year 2023 budget toward making our partners more capable
makes us all stronger. We look forward to putting those funds to good
use to support both our fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2024 programs
for security cooperation in our region.
Security Assistance goes hand-in-hand with security cooperation.
The security assistance we provide to countries like Colombia, Ecuador,
and Panama is a game-changer for our partners who are working every day
to counter illicit trafficking, address irregular migration, and secure
our region. However, in contrast, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador
are currently not eligible for FMF. We will work with the Department of
State to consider tailored solutions to advance regional policy goals.
Domain Awareness is key to countering PRC, Russia, and TCO malign
activities that threaten hemispheric security, as well as assisting our
partners during disaster relief. Air, maritime, land, space, and cyber
domain awareness projects in the region fill debilitating coverage gaps
and enable our partners to counter drug smuggling, IUUF, money
laundering, human smuggling, weapons trafficking, and illegal trade in
natural resources. These projects reveal shared problems, illuminate
opportunities, foster enhanced collaboration, and enable us to export
security regionally. The ability to sense, make sense, and share data
with our partners is critical. Maintaining a comprehensive threat
picture with our allies and partners through our Enhanced Domain
Awareness platform enables us to react quickly to threats and to
collaborate in real time as we engage in combined operations and
activities. Critical to building this shared picture is commercial
imagery, open-source intelligence, and off-the-shelf bulk data
analytics that allow us to harness this data in the public and
commercial space to address critical gaps.
Aerial ISR is also paramount to maintaining domain awareness. To
stay ahead of the growing pernicious threats that State and non-State
actors pose, we require long-range, long-dwell, next-generation aerial
ISR, such as solar-powered aircraft with a greater range and time over
target. Aerial ISR aircraft have been critical to our ability to detect
and deliver actionable information to other U.S. agencies and partner
nations that enable their counternarcotics and counter-TCO operations.
In fiscal year 2022, information provided by airborne ISR assets
operating overland accounted for the seizure of 322 metric tons of
cocaine and deprived TCOs of over $9 billion in profits. To further
enhance our ability to enable counternarcotics and counter-TCO
operations, we are pursuing ISR technologies with a greater ability to
detect active drug production laboratories. When deployed, this
capability will allow us to collect over a four times larger area with
twice the sensor resolution of any comparable platform in the U.S.
Government's inventory.
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) also remains a
key intelligence provider in meeting U.S. Southern Command's
priorities. Warning decisionmakers of the breadth and depth of
challenges in the Western Hemisphere requires geospatial analysis at
speed and scale. We appreciate Congress's continued support for NGA's
budget request and for their personnel supporting the Combatant
Commands.and scale. We appreciate Congress's continued support for
NGA's budget request and for their personnel supporting the Combatant
Commands.
Innovation, Science, and Technology. Today we face a more level
playing field in technology, and we need to rapidly adjust how fast we
get technology to the warfighter to maintain dominance and confound the
adversary. The USSOUTHCOM AOR provides a permissive environment that
has a high tolerance for technology experimentation, willing partners,
and diverse climates and geography, all close to the U.S. Homeland.
This affords us great opportunities to conduct innovative activities
with our partners that help gain and maintain a strategic advantage
over the PRC, Russia, and other malign actors.
We take every opportunity to capitalize on these benefits. We are
developing green energy capabilities, working on the first unmanned
persistent solar-powered aircraft with a 300-pound payload, creating
small-scale autonomous low-profile vessels, and developing laser
communications systems with a low probability of detection and faster
speeds than conventional solutions on the market.
A good example of this innovation is our collaboration with the
Office of Naval Research, which has designed an experimentation series
known as SCOUT. SCOUT's inaugural cycle automates antiquated processes
and places capabilities into warfighters' hands faster. The SCOUT team,
comprised of warfighters, engineers, academia, and industry partners,
executes small-scale, discovery-focused events that provide multiple
opportunities to test and measure technologies. This year we will
conduct our first main event in JIATF-South to integrate prototype
solutions focused on enhancing counternarcotics operations.
Information Related Capabilities. To compete in the information
environment, USSOUTHCOM needs an adequate force structure with the
requisite skills to counter the overwhelming threat from malign State
actors in the information domain. Our adversaries are dedicating
significant effort and resources with unrestrictive policies to
undermine democracy in this region. We must do better to keep pace with
them and outcompete them.
NAVSCIATTS. While considering modern warfare, we tend to focus on
five domains: the high seas, inland regions, air, space, and cyber.
However, littorals and rivers are the lifeblood of maritime commerce,
large population centers, and bustling seaports for most of the 31 LAC
countries. Ensuring security in these vital areas is essential to good
governance, economic growth, and long-term prosperity. Malign State and
non-State actors know the significance of littorals and rivers and
routinely use them to transport bulk currency and illegal drugs,
smuggle people and a vast array of illicit commodities, and enable
illegal mining and logging activities that imperil the environment.
We appreciate the support Congress offered last year for the Naval
Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS) in
Stennis, Mississippi. The maritime training and education programs at
NAVSCIATTS generate outsized return on investment, providing invaluable
opportunities to military and law enforcement personnel from the United
States and our allies and partners, most of whom operate smaller craft.
Expertise shared at NAVSCIATTS generates reciprocal trust, shared
knowledge and understanding, collaboration, and multifaceted technical
skills that enable integrated deterrence against the PRC and other
malign actors. They also reduce environmental damage and protect
natural resources.
Ambassadors. We truly appreciate Congress's efforts to confirm
additional Ambassadors in the Western Hemisphere last year. Having a
confirmed Ambassador in country is critical to maintaining strong
relationships and, conversely, not having one in place can have a
detrimental effect and opens the door to our adversaries in the region.
We look forward to Congress's continued support in the effort to
strengthen diplomatic ties in our neighborhood.
Conclusion
The defense of the United States Homeland is directly linked to the
resilience, stability, and security of the Latin America and Caribbean
region. Proximity places us on the frontline of strategic competition,
as we share transboundary challenges and global threats. This requires
the USSOUTHCOM team to be a trusted partner and pursue efforts that
meet our partners where they are, maximizing our efforts where their
priorities align with our own national interests. Meeting these
challenges requires campaigning through an integrated approach to
utilize all available levers across the DOD, U.S. interagency, Allies
and Partner Nations to establish the desired conditions of security,
peace, and prosperity throughout our neighborhood.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Richardson.
General VanHerck, as you know, Congress is considering
disposing of the S-band or auctioning parts of it to the
commercial sector. I want to personally commend Senator Rounds
and Senator King for the very effective work they have done in
making sure the military and the Department of Defense has an
opportunity to look at this.
But this is a spectrum in which your early warning system
is there, your missile defense system, the Aegis system, which
you use for defense. Could you tell the Committee what the
impact of curtailing, selling, or compromising this spectrum
would have on your operations?
General VanHerck. Chairman, absolutely. I am concerned
about the potential national security impacts of auctioning or
selling off that spectrum. It is my assessment there will be
impacts, as you pointed out, to our domain awareness
capabilities. What I think is good is a study that we
understand the national security impacts before we make any
decisions on auctioning or selling off any spectrum.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, sir. I understand there is a
study ongoing with the support of the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of Commerce. Are you participating in that?
General VanHerck. I have not been asked to participate
directly in that. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss
impacts to homeland defense.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, sir.
General Richardson, you have indicated the growing
competition with China and Russia in South America and Central
America. China is using economic leverage at ports and other
infrastructure. They are trying to introduce 5G
telecommunications. They have set up a network of space
tracking stations which are probably doing more than space
tracking. Russia is acting through proxies like Venezuela,
Nicaragua, and Cuba, and as you pointed out and which I think
comes as an interesting surprise to many of us, institutional
investors very active with the media, with Sputnik Mundo and RT
en Espanol.
Do you have the resources to counter these efforts?
General Richardson. Thank you, Senator. I could use
additional resources in order to counter. We can do a lot more
in this region and a little goes a long way with our partners.
This region is fraught with critical infrastructure by the PRC
that has been invested in. As you aid, Senator, the deepwater
ports, space, telecommunications, Safe City/Smart City, which
is really surveillance of the populations, and things like
that.
So with the disinformation, I mean, we play by the rules.
We have rules to follow. We have the rule of law that we follow
in the United States, and our adversaries do not follow any
laws, and they do not play by the rules. So the answer is yes,
Senator.
Chairman Reed. One of the areas that I think you are
probably deficient in is ISR, and that requires additional
equipment and also might be an opportunity to test autonomous
vehicles. Is that something that you are suggesting to the
leadership?
General Richardson. Absolutely. This region and in the
SOUTHCOM AOR, where our adversaries might not be watching so
closely, is to be able to test in a real-world mission the
innovation, the technology, and things like that. We work with
our partners. They are very much involved with wanting to
advance their ability to see and have domain awareness, just
like us at SOUTHCOM.
If we can see more and spot this malign activity, expose
the malign activity, we are able to better counteract the
adversaries and that malign activity in the region.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
General VanHerck, the threats to the Homeland have changed
dramatically and suddenly. The models we used, the systems we
used in the cold war, and in the interim between the cold war
and the present situation, do not seem to be applicable, with
hypersonics, with long-range precision cruise missiles, with a
host of different threats to the United States. You are looking
at sort of the assumptions and the plans that we have had and
tried to reconstruct for this new threat, new world.
How are we doing in terms of getting a new plan in place
and also new weapon systems? You commented that one of our
problems is speed, and that is a function of not only getting
new equipment in place but putting aside legacy equipment. Can
you just comment, General, on those points?
General VanHerck. Chairman, yes. So after 2 years I got
policy on what to defend. I cannot go into that in this forum.
But the task that came back to me was to develop a plan on that
defense-critical infrastructure. It is inside the Department of
Defense critical infrastructure. I have provided that back to
the Department on what I recommend.
Where we are now is further assessment on my
recommendations. I provided a list of options from the status
quo to also including future types of systems. I think the
future of homeland defense is vastly different than what we see
today. It is likely including autonomous platforms, airborne
and maritime platforms, unmanned platforms with domain
awareness sensors, and effectors that are kinetic and non-
kinetic.
We also need to take those over-the-horizon radar
capabilities that I discussed and take that data and
information and fuse it into an integrated picture, a globally
integrated picture that allows us to see, globally, threats
before they become threats here in the Homeland, and tie that
to an integrated air and missile defense system and also into
effectors, which are non-kinetic and also kinetic.
I see the future likely being much less kinetic. There will
be some areas that we should defend kinetically that could
bring us to our knees, but also non-kinetic such as deception,
denial, and the use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Finally, that policy needs to expand beyond defense. Those
discussions are ongoing within the Department and the
interagency and the Security Council, and I look forward to
hearing back on that.
What I would just point out--sorry my time is up--but much
of the critical infrastructure that I defend, and to ensure
that we power project from the Homeland, is not solely held
inside the Department or even Federal entities. It relies on
commercial entities, states, municipalities, and we need to
ensure that is part of the discussion.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, sir.
Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all I have a unanimous consent request. I
mentioned in my opening statement that Senator Rubio and I sent
a letter to the Secretary of Defense and received a very
dismissive, non-answer from Under Secretary Colin Kahl. I would
like to ask unanimous consent to insert those two letters into
the record at this point.
Chairman Reed. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Now General VanHerck, with regard to these letters, I have
received quite a bit of information from talking to you about
this balloon incident, and you mentioned it in your statement,
so let me just go through some quick questions so we can
understand who knew what about the Chinese balloon.
You first learned about this on January 28 of this year. Is
that correct?
General VanHerck. Senator, I learned about it on January
27th. We first detected it by radar, my sensors, on January
28th, in the vicinity of St. Matthew Island, Alaska.
Senator Wicker. Okay, and that is United States territory,
right?
General VanHerck. That is correct, sir.
Senator Wicker. You notified your chain of command on that
day, January 28, right?
General VanHerck. I had a conversation on the evening of
the 27th with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about
my plan to intercept and identify and make an assessment, which
we did on the 28th of January.
Senator Wicker. You sent that notification to Secretary of
Defense Austin, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Milley, via classified email. Correct?
General VanHerck. I sent it to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and to Secretary Austin's military assistant. I
am assuming that the military assistant passed it to the
Secretary.
Senator Wicker. Okay, and you still are not certain at what
point President Biden or Secretary Austin were made aware of
the balloon. Is that right?
General VanHerck. I do not know when the President was made
aware.
Senator Wicker. Fine, and when you confirmed the balloon's
existence on January 28, you tasked NORTHCOM, your command,
with preparing options to counter the balloon. That is correct
also?
General VanHerck. I tasked my NORAD team to develop
options, and Senator, what I would point out is I have options
every single day to defend our Homeland. In this case, the
balloon did not meet the requirement or the authority for me to
engage it because it was not demonstrating hostile intent or
committing a hostile act. Hostile intent would be maneuvering
to an offensive advantage on a platform, an airplane, or
shooting missiles or weapons would be a hostile act.
Senator Wicker. You prepared options, you asked NORAD to
prepare options in that instance?
General VanHerck. I directed my team to be ready with
options, just as we are every day. That is correct.
Senator Wicker. Okay, and had the Secretary of Defense
requested options for shooting down the balloon on January 28,
while the balloon was still over Alaska, you would have been
prepared to provide him those options. Is that correct?
General VanHerck. Senator, I am prepared every single
second of every day to defend our Homeland. That is correct.
Senator Wicker. Ultimately you did not get a chance to
provide those options to the Secretary until February 1st. Is
that correct?
General VanHerck. On February 1st at 0700 I was in DC, and
that was the first time we had a discussion.
Senator Wicker. Okay. So there is January 28, 29, 30, 31,
February 1st. So on the fifth day--it is apparent you took the
right steps, but it is also clear that you received no
direction from the President of the United States or the
Secretary of Defense until the fifth day of this crisis, by
which point the balloon had traversed Alaska and Canada and
then reentered the United States.
So I would publicly call on the Secretary of Defense to
answer the questions which the Vice Chairman of the
Intelligence Committee and I have asked him.
You have already talked about kinetic and non-kinetic
dangers in case we are in a major war in China. Do we have the
capabilities you need to defend our Homeland from a kinetic or
non-kinetic attack by Russia and China?
General VanHerck. Senator, what I would like to do is talk
about that in a closed session in detail. I have concerns, as I
have articulated for 3 years, about my ability to provide
threat warning and attack assessments with the threats to our
Homeland. Why that is crucial is threat warning and attack
assessment are crucial for continuity of government and our
nuclear force posture. That increases the risk of escalation
and strategic deterrence failure. Those are significant
challenges for me.
I also have concerns about the time it would take me to set
the theater in the AOR [area of responsibility] to meet
potential threat timelines from oversea threats.
Senator Wicker. Okay, and quickly--we are being a little
lax on the time today--if the border control agents that we
have now, and ICE personnel, employees of the U.S. Government,
were allowed simply to do their statutory jobs along the Texas-
Mexico border, would we be in a much better situation now, and
are they being restrained from fully enforcing the law as they
have in the past?
General VanHerck. I would have to defer to Customs and
Border Protection and Border Patrol whether they are being
restrained or not. I do think that the best solution here is to
fully resource Homeland Security and their entities to conduct
their law enforcement mission for the laws of our Nation. I do
not see this as an enduring mission, long-term. We are happy to
supported, as directed, to each and every day.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.
Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both, General VanHerck and
General Richardson, for being here this morning and for your
service to the country.
I would like to start with asking both of you about drug
trafficking. General Richardson, I am very concerned, as I know
you are, about drugs flowing into the United States through
Latin America. In 2022, illegal drugs killed over 100,000
Americans, so this is a significant threat to the country, and
fentanyl and the access to fentanyl has made it much worse.
While I recognize that some of those precursor chemicals are
not coming from Latin America, too many of the drugs are.
General VanHerck, I understood that we are also seeing an
increase in drug trafficking coming across the northern border.
Is that something that you have seen?
General VanHerck. Senator, I understand there is a slight
increase, along with migration, coming across the north border
as well, but ultimately I defer to Border Patrol and Customs
and Border Protection.
Senator Shaheen. Well, that is really the question I wanted
to ask both of you is how your commands are coordinating with
other U.S. interagency partners, and have you seen any
particular initiatives that have been effective? General
Richardson, I will start with you.
General Richardson. Well, thank you, Senator, and to
comment on the ability to be able to see and with domain
awareness, as the urgency is at an all-time high and the drug
flow is at an all-time high, my ability to see and my allocated
resources is at an all-time low. The P-8s that I used to have
provided the long dwell, being able to see the capabilities
that I have for vessels, for maritime flow of counternarcotics
mission is also degraded because of the migration and the
assets being needed for that.
But in terms of the capabilities that I have within my own
headquarters and Joint Interagency Task Force South as well, I
have a whole host of interagency and law enforcement. We work
together to provide that synergy and sharing of information, so
it is quick and immediate. Then also our partner nations that
are inside of JIATF South as well, because our partner nations
have been able to participate in 76 percent of the
interdictions and disruptions of the counternarcotics flowing
to the United States.
Senator Shaheen. So if you were going to get all of the
resources that you need, do you have any estimate of what that
would mean, in terms of equipment, assets, dollars?
General Richardson. I would say a little goes a long way,
as I have said before, and the ability to be able to see. I
have about 2 percent of the DOD ISR, which gets after about 17
percent of my requirement. I do not need 100 percent, but I
need a little bit more than the 2 percent, I would say,
Senator.
Senator Shaheen. We had a hearing in the Foreign Relations
Committee yesterday with Secretary Blinken, and one of the
issues that was raised was the potential to designate drug
cartels in Latin America as foreign terrorist organizations
rather than just TCOs. Do you have any view about what that
might enable you to do differently? Would that provide any
other authorities to address drug interdiction?
General Richardson. I think the more that we can do to get
after this problem with the transnational criminal
organizations, the better. I have 42 of the 40 most violent
cities in the world. The TCOs create that instability and that
insecurity within our partner nations, and that is what they
are dealing with every single day. That is at the top of their
lists.
I also am very concerned about the PRC and the long-term
strategic competition that we have with the PRC, but what our
partner nations are facing every single day are the
transnational criminal organizations and how much more powerful
they are getting, the ability to do the money laundering around
the globe, we have really got to get after that.
Senator Shaheen. So I interpret that answer is a yes, it
might be helpful, that designation.
General Richardson. Yes, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. I am going to switch topics because I am
almost out of time. General VanHerck, what do you think is the
most significant threat to our security in the Arctic Region?
General VanHerck. I think the most significant threat is
the growing Russia influence, the illegal influence, and also
the Chinese influence right on the back of that, as we develop
capabilities. I used the analogy last year, you have got to be
on the field to play the game, in a football analogy, and we
are in the locker room, still developing a game plan. We need
to develop additional capabilities.
I am encouraged that the Department and the services have a
strategy. We just have not funded those strategies.
Senator Shaheen. If we entered the Law of the Sea Treaty,
would that give us any additional ability to address the
challenge there?
General VanHerck. I think it gives us more credibility to
sit at the table and have that discussion, and I would
absolutely support that.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
General VanHerck, for your many, many years of service to this
country. It is deeply respected and also appreciated.
On your unfunded priorities list you included several
requests for programs to strengthen domain awareness, allowing
us to better detect and also to track potential threats. Can
you describe in detail some of the capabilities you have
requested and why they are so vital for your needs?
General VanHerck. Thanks, Senator. Absolutely. Over-the-
horizon radar capability acceleration would procure a test
asset--it is $55 million--to go faster to give us the
capability rather than fielding capabilities in 8 to 10 years.
Maybe we could shorten that to 4 to 5 years to enable me to get
after the hypersonics that I described earlier, the cruise
missiles, etc. By the way, I need Canada to do the same thing.
A fielding of a capability in a decade from now is not where we
need to be. So those are some of the dollars there. There is
$55 million.
There is $211 million in the nine long-range mobile radars
that would help me plug the gaps when we have radar failures or
to get after critical defense infrastructure if tasked to do
that. As we move around the country I can move those radars to
give me additional domain awareness.
That is a couple of examples.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you. I know that NORTHCOM is
required to track all kinds of threats to the Homeland, from
the Chinese spy balloons to hypersonics that you mentioned. Do
you have tools you need right now to be able to defend against
them, not just to track them but to defend?
General VanHerck. Yes, so for the high-altitude balloon I
think we are in a good place for that. For hypersonics and
cruise missiles, hypersonics specifically, the U.S. base forces
proliferated low-earth orbit capability in satellite
constellation will get us there, along with the HBTSS, the MDA
is working on. But we cannot wait decades to field these
things. So any way that we can accelerate those capabilities.
Let me give you an example. We are stuck in an industrial
age process for acquiring and we field things in serial
processes. In today's digital and information environment we
can virtually test, we can virtually and do things in parallel.
These are things we should do differently to field capabilities
faster.
I would also ask for your help here in Congress. When we go
faster, we may have some failures. Let us not take a 2-year
investigation of those failures. Let us jump back on the horse
and ride and move forward. We have to be as transparent in the
Department with Congress as possible and make sure that you are
part of the discussion.
Senator Fischer. We always learn from failures too. In
fact, in many cases we learn more.
General Richardson, you made the comment that you have 2
percent of the ISR right now in SOUTHCOM. How does that lack of
ISR limit your options as a commander?
General Richardson. So it does limit. I have got a very
large AOR when you look at Central America, South America, the
Caribbean as well, and all the counternarcotics or the
narcotics flow out of the region and the ability to see malign
activity and be able to expose it. That is really what we need
the ISR and the domain awareness to provide.
Senator Fischer. You do not necessarily need the very high-
tech 5-Gen ISR at this point in time for your AOR, do you?
General Richardson. I need a little bit of that, but some
of the lower capable platforms work very well in this region,
and then the long-dwell duration works well.
Senator Fischer. So you would encourage us to look at
considering keeping those other platforms?
General Richardson. Well, as we talked about, Senator, it
is always trying to turn over and get the next wave of
technology, to be able to have that while keeping some legacy
going. But certainly we have some low-end type things that we
could utilize in the SOUTHCOM AOR.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you. General VanHerck, have
you seen any advances or movements from China or Russia in the
Arctic lately?
General VanHerck. Absolutely, Senator. Russia has
modernized their fleet of icebreakers. They have modernized
their strategic defenses along there, their submarine forces.
China is sailing into the Arctic under the guise of research
vessels, and we know they are doing military options, surveying
the seabed. You have seen that recently as Canada released
their recovery of a Chinese buoy. Those are all things that are
ongoing in the Arctic right now.
Senator Fischer. General Richardson, do you see China
presently working even harder to build access and influence in
Latin America?
General Richardson. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our
witnesses for your service.
General Richardson, I would like to start with you on sort
of this resource shortage issue that you have testified to and
other colleagues have asked you about. One of the bits of
testimony that I recall pretty vividly from last year was when
you were talking about SOUTHCOM's cyber capacity. You have got
partners in the region that have cyber threats just like we do,
and I think you testified that the cyber capacity you have in
SOUTHCOM is just what is provided through your State
partnerships with State Guard units. Is that correct?
General Richardson. Yes. I have a small capability within
my headquarters, but we do rely a lot on the National Guard
State Partnership Program as well and their cyber teams.
Senator Kaine. I think those are really good programs but I
was shocked to hear that you did not have a more robust in-
house capacity in addition to the partnerships with our cyber
teams from the National Guard.
One of the potent things that the United States can do is
joint exercises with other nations' militaries, and this is
something that we do and that China, for example, is not yet
doing in the Americas. Is it my understand that a common
exercise that you have been doing with Southern Cone nations
you are not able to do this year?
General Richardson. Right, and we have that on my unfunded
priority list. We really need to get down to the Southern Cone.
That area, tyranny of distance, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay,
Uruguay, all want to continue to do exercises. So I want to be
able to put that Southern Star Exercise back into play. Our
exercises bring together like over 20 partner nations, and that
is absolutely what the PRC is not able to do is to convene all
these countries to come together and work through exercises.
Senator Kaine. This Southern Star Exercise has been common
in the past but you are not resourced currently to be able to
do that.
General Richardson. Correct, and I have put that forward to
put that exercise back on the plate so we are able to do that.
Senator Kaine. Let me ask you about Colombia. Colombia has
been a very strong military partner of the United States in
recent years. It has been a success story. Colombia
participates in global peacekeeping exercises. I have seen
Colombian troops in the multinational force of observers in the
Sinai, and they do a lot of good work together with the United
States. I think there were some concerns after the Colombian
elections last year about whether that would continue.
Describe for us the mil-to-mil cooperation with Colombia
currently.
General Richardson. Our relationship with Colombia is very,
very strong and continues to be very strong. We have not
canceled anything. All the exercises, all the military-to-
military cooperations is absolutely continuing, and that
relationship could not be any more stronger than it is now.
Senator Kaine. Have you met personally with President Petro
of Colombia?
General Richardson. Yes, Senator. Twice.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
General VanHerck, you had some questions about the Chinese
balloon incident. I want to ask you questions about the
following week, when your mission was involved in taking down
some other unidentified or kind of not completely described
aerial assets. They were generally described as commercial or
benign, but they were in civilian airspace, so they were not
completely, even if they were not hostile, they were not
completely benign if they are in commercial airspace where they
could pose challenges to civil aviation.
So talk a little bit about how things get into commercial
airspace without us being aware of them, and are there rules of
strategies we need to put in place to be more careful about
even benign assets in commercial airspace.
General VanHerck. Yes, ultimately the airspace is the
Federal Aviation Administration. They do have policy and
regulation in place for objects that fly within the airspace
structure. If you are flying objects--and I believe the number
is if it weighs more than four pounds it is required to have an
identification device. In the case of the three unidentified
objects you are talking about, the FAA was not tracking, was
not aware of those objects, and when we assessed them they were
assessed to be of a size and potentially a safety threat to
aviation hazards. So we did not know exactly what they were.
I have talked to the acting FAA administrator about being
more aggressive of messaging the requirements and also putting
out and enforcing those requirements as well. Those are not
mine to do, but I will identify and respond to anything that is
in our airspace the we need to potentially assess as a
potential threat.
Senator Kaine. General VanHerck, you indicated that the FAA
was not tracking them. Did that mean that these devices did not
have the identifier that they are supposed to have if they are
in that band?
General VanHerck. I cannot confirm whether they had it or
not. We did not recover them, due to the locations that they
were. But my assessment would be it was likely they did not
have a device if the FAA was not tracking them.
Senator Kaine. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. Welcome, General VanHerck, General
Richardson. Thank you for coming back and for your service.
General VanHerck, I want to return to the topic of the
Chinese spy balloon. You were discussing it with Senator Wicker
earlier. You had said your radars first picked up the balloon
on Saturday, January 28th. Is that right?
General VanHerck. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Cotton. But you were aware of it on Friday, January
27th.
General VanHerck. The intel community made me aware on the
27th.
Senator Cotton. On Friday, January 27th, you communicated--
is that when you communicated to General Milley, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, and to Secretary Austin's military
assistant?
General VanHerck. I communicated with the Chairman only on
the 27th, and conveyed my plan to intercept, ID, and assess the
balloon when it became a radar capability we could do.
Senator Cotton. When did you communicate with Secretary
Austin's senior military assistant?
General VanHerck. I did that on the 28th.
Senator Cotton. The 28th. Did you ever speak with Secretary
Austin about this balloon?
General VanHerck. I spoke with Secretary Austin on the 1st
of February.
Senator Cotton. Wednesday, the 1st of February.
General VanHerck. To the best of my recollection, that is
the first verbal discussion with the Secretary. There were
emails transmitted back and forth. I set up a battle rhythm,
Senator, and updated the Department every 12 hours beginning on
January 28th, the location, threat, projected flight path, and
intent.
Senator Cotton. Is it your customary practice to speak to
Secretary Austin's military assistant and not Secretary Austin?
General VanHerck. No. Verbally I routine speak with the
Secretary of Defense. Email communication typically goes
through his assistant and provides it back that way.
Senator Cotton. Okay. On what date did you have fighter
aircraft in the air that could have shot down this balloon?
General VanHerck. I had fighter aircraft in the air on the
28th of January. They were armed. I sent two F-35s and two F-
16s.
Senator Cotton. They were armed on the 28th?
General VanHerck. Yes. The F-16s were armed. They flew off
of alert. In Alaska I have aircraft on alert, and they were
armed.
Senator Cotton. So all that was needed on January 28th was
to pull the proverbial trigger.
General VanHerck. So to say pull the proverbial trigger,
yes, had they had hostile intent or hostile act. I had the
authority and I would have made that decision. So you are
exactly correct. After that point it was not my decision to
pull the trigger, as you say.
Senator Cotton. There has been publicly released pictures,
maybe and video, I think one pilot taking a selfie with this
balloon behind him. Were you confident, on January 28th, what
the payload on that balloon was?
General VanHerck. Based on the intel community's assessment
I would say I had 80 percent confidence level we knew exactly
what we were going to see. That was further developed over the
next several days as we were able to collect additional
intelligence before finally downing the balloon off the South
Carolina coast.
Senator Cotton. I am aware of that assessment and I k now
we cannot talk about it here, but I cannot say that I would
have had the same level of confidence that it did not have some
kind of offensive capabilities. Are you aware of at what point
the President was personally aware of this balloon?
General VanHerck. Senator, I am not.
Senator Cotton. Why was it okay to shoot the balloon down
off the coast of South Carolina but not off the coast of
Alaska?
General VanHerck. Well, I think there are many things that
go into that decisionmaking. First is originally we did not
really have a good model for what the payload would look like
when it fell or potentially threatened anybody on the ground.
Now you can look at population density for various places where
the balloon flew over.
Senator Cotton. I am not talking about anyplace over the
continental United States. I do not dispute that. I am talking
about the coast of Alaska versus the coast of South Carolina.
General VanHerck. There is nothing that physically prevents
us from shooting that down on the 28th to the 1st.
Senator Cotton. If the Administration's policymakers
thought they had legal justification to shoot it down off the
coast of South Carolina surely they had legal justification to
shoot it off the coast of Alaska, right?
General VanHerck. Senator, my assessment is the legal basis
would have been the same for either place.
Senator Cotton. That is what I think too.
Well, I am glad that you had fighter aircraft in the skies
that were ready to shoot it down. I think that would have been
the right call. I know it was not your call, that it goes up
higher than you, but I think it was a bad mistake to let a
Chinese spy balloon float all across America and only to leak
it to The New York Times once some rancher or amateur
photographer in Montana spotted it. I suspect if they had not
it would have floated on its merry way all across America and
this would have never become public. I think that is a
dangerous precedent to set, not just with China but with all of
our adversaries. But I am glad you had fighter aircraft from
your command in the sky that were ready to act.
Again, thank you both for your service, and since this is
your last hearing, thank you for many years of service. I know
that you will not regret missing these appearances in the
future, but we have always enjoyed having you here. Thank you,
General. Thank you, General Richardson.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Hirono, please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
much to both of you for your years of service and commitment to
our country.
General VanHerck, you are responsible for homeland defense,
and you noted this morning that you have concerns about attack
assessment and threat warning, and that brings me to concerns I
have about the missile defense of Hawaii, concerns that I have
been expressing for a number of years now. I do remain
concerned that the Department of Defense does not have a plan
to address the current and future missile defense needs of
Hawaii. We did have HDR-H Hawaii that is no longer on the
table, and int appears to me that between NORTHCOM, INDOPACOM,
SPACECOM, STRATCOM, and the Missile Defense Agency there is no
single commander entirely responsible for coordinating the
DOD's defense of Hawaii.
So just as we saw in the crisis at Red Hill, when no single
leader has ultimately responsibility for the coordination and
execution of the mission, there is room for issues to fall
through the cracks, and adding to the concerning lack of trust
that Hawaii's communities have regarding the military.
General VanHerck, do you have the authority to coordinate
across the Department of Defense to ensure there is a plan for
missile defense of Hawaii?
General VanHerck. Senator, I am the authority for ballistic
missile defense such as an ICBM from DPRK, and I am confident
in my ability to defend Hawaii from those ballistic missiles.
Admiral Aquilino is responsible for the defense of Hawaii, and
in the INDOPACOM AOR, and I would say he is the coordinating
authority for that region. But I am the authority for ballistic
missile defense of Hawaii.
Senator Hirono. I think that is the concern that we have,
is ballistic defense, so that would fall to you then. I am
assuming that of course you are going to talk with Admiral
Aquilino.
General VanHerck. Absolutely. We do coordinate, and in many
ways I will coordinate in real time with him for the need to
defend Hawaii from ICBMs potentially from North Korea.
Senator Hirono. And China.
General VanHerck. I am not tasked to defend against China
or Russia for ICBMs. That is the nuclear deterrent, Senator.
Admiral Aquilino has a responsibility in the INDOPACOM AOR for
further defense of Hawaii.
Senator Hirono. You see, this is where I begin to have
concerns, continuing concerns about who exactly is responsible,
who is going to come and tell me that the missile defense of
Hawaii is going to take place, because as I said, for years
HDR-H Hawaii was going to be the way that we were going to
provide missile defense. That is no longer on the table, and to
date I have not gotten any clear information. I am going to get
a briefing on Monday, and General, I do not know if you have
someone who is doing that briefing with me and my staff on
Monday. Are you involved?
General VanHerck. I am not aware of that. But let me just
talk about the Homeland Defense Radar Hawaii. First of all, I
do not need Homeland Defense Radar for Hawaii for the mission I
am tasked to do, for ballistic missiles that emanate from North
Korea. Homeland Defense Radar for Hawaii would be a contributor
to an underlayer, which Admiral Aquilino could certainly use,
which could tether to Aegis-class ships or other ballistic
missile defense capabilities in the region.
Senator Hirono. Well, but then Admiral Aquilino has said
that he too is not looking to HDR-H Hawaii for the missile
defense of Hawaii. General, do you know if there is missile
defense for Hawaii that is going to take care of your area of
responsibility as well as his? Because we are talking about
missile defense against intentions from North Korea as well as
China.
General VanHerck. Senator, I----
Senator Hirono. HDR-H Hawaii was North Korea.
General VanHerck.--I am confident in my ability to defend
Hawaii from ballistic missiles from DPRK. From China, I am not
tasked, and I will defer to Admiral Aquilino. That is his
responsibility.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. I think that provides some level
of better clarification.
General VanHerck. I want to add one thing, Senator. General
Cotton is responsible for the nuclear deterrent, and ballistic
missiles such as nuclear ballistic missiles from China toward
Hawaii, that is the nuclear deterrent that does that.
Conventional, I will defer to Admiral Aquilino.
Senator Hirono. So again, I am talking about nuclear
deterrent, not conventional. Nuclear deterrent. It is the
missiles emanating from China and North Korea that I want
Hawaii to be defended from, and yes, the shooters are not in
Hawaii. We are not talking about putting shooters on Hawaii.
Those are in Alaska and in California.
So again, you know, all my attempts to get clarification as
to who is the one agency, one entity, that is responsible for
missile defense of Hawaii writ large. You know, I am not
talking about any particular, whether it is ICBMs or whether it
is the ballistic missiles. You can sense my frustration, so I
will continue to pursue my line of questioning.
I am sorry. I will add some questions for the record
relating to the impact of climate change on your AORs. Thank
you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to both of you
I want to thank you both for your service to our country and
your teams' as well.
I would like to begin by following up with General VanHerck
with regard to the same line of questioning that the Chairman
began with, with regard to spectrum. I do have real concerns
about the loss of any portion of the spectrum to sales to
commercial operations, and I recognize that, General VanHerck,
your role in defending the Homeland is critical. I just wanted
to clarify or at least better understand part of your response
to the Chairman's question.
There is a study, which is underway, which has been
recognized by both the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary
of Defense, specifically regarding the sensitivity or the need
to maintain, or the impact of the sale of the 3.1 to 3.45 GHz
portion of the spectrum, which currently is under DOD control.
Could you share with us, in this unclassified setting, the
significance of that portion of the spectrum to the defense of
our country at this time? Do we use all of that in the defense
of our country today?
General VanHerck. Senator, absolutely we do. There are
multiple platforms, to include maritime homeland defense
platforms, airborne early warning platforms, ground-based early
warning platforms that enable me to provide threat warning,
attack assessment, defend from potentially airborne assets, et
cetera. So we need to understand the national security impacts
of selling or auctioning, and make a conscious decision before
we do so.
Senator Rounds. I also understand, and what I wanted to
followup with in particular was, it would seem to me that if we
are doing a study, a legitimate study, that there would be some
participation by NORTHCOM since this is part of the spectrum
that they rely on. Confirming you are not aware of being
involved in that particular study at this time?
General VanHerck. Senator, I have not personally been
involved. I will confirm the coordination with my staff, but I
have not personally been involved in that discussion. I would
welcome the opportunity to be personally involved.
Senator Rounds. I would imagine that you probably would,
sir, seeing as how it is a critical part of the defense of our
country. I thank you for, when you have provided this Committee
with your professional military advice it really does ring true
that there is a very serious concern with the loss of any part
of that spectrum. So I appreciate that.
I did want to just followup a little bit as well. Senator
Cotton laid out a very clear line of questioning with regard to
the timing and the decisionmaking process with regard to the
observation balloon from the PRC. If this was a communications-
gathering or an intelligence-gathering unit you did have the
ability and you could see it coming from a long way off,
several days in advance, not just with intelligence recognition
but also with radar catching it.
But during that time period there was a point at which, as
you have indicated, it was not identified as being hostile or
trying to gain an offensive position, therefore, still in
international air, no reason to, or any purpose for taking it
out at that point. That is correct, is it no?
General VanHerck. There is no legal basis in international
airspace to take action. That would actually undermine our
position globally by taking action in international airspace.
I would like to clarify one thing. I did not have the
capability to see that days away. That came through intel
community channels. I could not see it until it got within
radar, and I will talk to you in a classified environment. But
that was not days away. That was the 28th only.
Senator Rounds. On the 28th, though, on the 28th it was
still outside of our legal operating area in terms of
protecting our borders.
General VanHerck. So it passed within sovereign territory
on the 27th, at the end of the Aleutian Island chain, and then
back into international airspace, until the 28th, where it
passed within our sovereign space near Saint Matthew Island,
Alaska, and then transited over Alaska.
Senator Rounds. During that time in which it had passed out
in international waters you were aware of it and knew that it
had the possibility of coming back into our airspace again. But
by then pretty clear on your part that it was not an
offensively armed balloon or object.
General VanHerck. That is correct, Senator. The intel
community assessed that. That was what I verified on the 28th,
when we intercepted and I had fighters get their visual on it
and their targeting pods to be able to make that assessment.
That is not a 100 percent guarantee, but my assessment at that
time, based on all the info, was there was no physical military
threat to the Homeland at that point.
Senator Rounds. The reason why I am bringing this out and
going back through it again with you is, number one, I think
the American people have to understand that if it would have
been viewed as a threat our armed forces would have protected
and we would have taken it out prior to the point of getting in
and damaging any property or individuals within the United
States at that time. But the second piece on this is it became
a decision, not necessarily yours, but somewhere farther up the
chain of command as to not to take it out, even though it was
entering our airspace. It was not your decision because it was
not deemed a threat, or to become an offensive threat at that
time. Fair to say?
General VanHerck. So if it was a threat I am delegated the
authority by the President, through the Secretary, and I would
have taken that out. In this case I did not assess it as a
threat, and therefore I did not have the authority.
Senator Rounds. The authority would have rested with
someone above you in the chain of command.
General VanHerck. Depending on the legal basis for
assessment it would have resided either with the Secretary of
Defense or the President.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator King, please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to ask
both of you about unfunded priorities. General Richardson, we
are under attack--110,000 people died last year of overdoses.
That is 300 a day. Twelve people have died in America since we
have been sitting here in the last hour, and yet your ISR
capability to at least assist in detecting and helping us to
interdict this dread attack is on an unfunded priorities list.
Why is it not in the base budget? This seems to be one of the
most serious and intensely important responsibilities that you
will have in order to help us to deal with this scourge. Why is
it an unfunded priority and not base budget?
General Richardson. Senator, I do not think any commander
will say they have enough ISR, and so certainly as we look
across the----
Senator King. But 2 percent of the ISR that is dealing with
this brutal attack that is killing our citizens just does not
seem to me to pass the straight-face test.
General Richardson. I could do more with a little bit more,
and our partner nations, with the capabilities and building
their maritime domain awareness and being able to share air
tracks and things like that, all of us working together. We
have very willing partners.
I would like to, if I might, Senator, behind me in the
audience we have part of our Inter-American Defense College,
and part of their instruction is to come here and watch us
testify as commanders to our Congress and talk about the
challenges----
Senator King. It is a lesson to them of what to avoid, I
would think.
General Richardson. If they would raise their hands back
there, so you can see all of them.
Senator King. Thank you.
General Richardson. They are in that whole group right
there.
Senator King. Let me followup.
General Richardson. Yes, Senator.
Senator King. We have established that you do not have
enough ISR. The ISR that you have, previous testimony by your
predecessors has been we do not have the resources to interdict
but something like 25 percent of the drug shipments we know
about. Is that still true?
General Richardson. I have the detection and monitoring
mission for the Department of Defense through JIATF South,
Joint Interagency Task Force South, and so----
Senator King. But when you detect and notify----
General Richardson.--we pass that right over to law
enforcement or partner nations to do the interdictions.
Senator King. What percentage is interdicted, as far as you
know?
General Richardson. We believe that we are getting after
about 10 percent of what we know is the known flow of narcotics
flow.
Senator King. We are only getting 10 percent of what we
know.
General Richardson. Correct, Senator.
Senator King. That is appalling, and I realize it is not
your responsibility but it is a collective responsibility that
we are just simply not meeting in this country, to have, number
one, inadequate ISR on this problem, and number two, to not
make effective use of the ISR we do have.
General VanHerck, let me turn to you about unfunded
priorities. One of your major unfunded priorities, again, is
essentially ISR, capability to observe what is going on. We
know the Russians are heavily militarizing their shore of the
Arctic Ocean. Again, my question to you is, it seems to me you
have made a powerful case in your unfunded priority list. Why
is it not in the base budget?
General VanHerck. I will have to defer to the Department in
the present budget why it did not come across, Senator. I am
asking for it. I would also point out I asked for $38 million
for additional support for transnational criminal
organizations, to lead Federal agencies that I am short as
well. There is additional money in my unfunded priority list
for that as well.
Senator King. Well, I am starting to think what we should
do is fund your unfunded priority list instead of the base
budget because you have articulated priorities that are so
important to us.
Talk about--well, perhaps this has to be in a classified
setting, but the lack of visibility, of domain awareness as the
Arctic is fundamentally changing and becoming one of the most
strategic places on Earth.
General VanHerck. Yes, Senator, thank you for the
opportunity to talk about that. The National Defense Strategy
tasked me to monitor and respond in the Arctic.
I am encouraged with the monitor piece. We have got some
over-the-horizon radars. We need to go faster there. Canada is
committed to that. Again, we need to go faster. But under
monitor we need to think about the use of SpaceX and Starlink
capabilities and buying terminals that gives us data and
information sharing. I am encouraged by the Jobs and
Infrastructure Bill. There is $250 million in that to modernize
the Port of Nome. We need to move forward to give us some
capability to be persistent in the Arctic for the monitor piece
as well.
But you need icebreakers as well, so we have got to go
faster there.
Senator King. You have just listed, basically we have an
Arctic gap. Is that correct?
General VanHerck. That is my assessment.
Senator King. Not geographically. I mean, national security
wise.
General VanHerck. That is my assessment. As I mentioned
earlier on the respond side, we are not organized, trained, and
equipped to operate and respond in the Arctic. Infrastructure
is a big concern for me, whether that be runway lengths,
whether that be building, whether that be weapon storage,
whether that be fuel storage. When you only have a few days'
worth of fuel and that fuel is shared with indigenous local
communities, those are challenges that we will face in a
crisis.
My homeland defense design is a layered defense. It starts
forward, and we need the Arctic to do that.
I would point out that Thule Air Base in Greenland is
crucial. There is some money in the budget for Thule, but not
to support my homeland defense design, which I am tasked to do
a layered defense of the Homeland by the Department.
Senator King. Thank you both, and thank you for your candid
testimony today and for your service to the country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Let me also, on behalf of the Committee, recognize the
Inter-American Defense College. Bienvenidos.
Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both
of you for being here and your service.
General VanHerck, just to followup on Senator King's
question how would Maxar and Saildrone help you in the Artic?
Would it be, you know, commercially, and how would that help
you?
General VanHerck. Can you say that again?
Senator Tuberville. Maxar and Saildrone. Would it help you
in the Arctic?
General VanHerck. I am not familiar with specifically. I am
familiar with the OneWeb efforts, Starlink, satellite
communications, anything that gives me additional domain
awareness, data, and information-sharing will absolutely help
in the Arctic. It is very challenging above 65-North to
communicate, to share data, to share information.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, and I do not want to pound
on this balloon nonsense but how would you assess your
relationship with your Canadian counterparts through this
entire scenario?
General VanHerck. I think my relationship with our Canadian
counterparts--by the way, I have a boss in Canada, General
Wayne Eyre, is exceptional.
Senator Tuberville. He runs NORAD, right?
General VanHerck. No. I run NORAD. He is the Chief of the
Defense Staff----
Senator Tuberville. Okay.
General VanHerck.--in Canada. He is the CHOD. He is their
senior military member.
Senator Tuberville. So your relationship was good through
this whole scenario?
General VanHerck. Absolutely. Yes.
Senator Tuberville. If that same balloon took off today,
same path, loaded the same way, now that we know what was on it
and that we brought it down, should or would we shoot it down?
General VanHerck. That is a policy decision. My job is to
maintain options. I did that. I am very comfortable that we had
options from the moment we detected it until the moment we shot
it down. Ultimately ``should'' is a policy decision. That is
not a military decision.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. Thank you.
General Richardson, thanks for being here today and thanks
for the hospitality last week, coming to SOUTHCOM. You have got
a great organization. The people working for you, they are
outstanding. We learned a lot. I would hope that we have more
people come down that way would look at your new program that
you are building, quarters for your personnel, through lend/
lease, which I think we should look at through the Air Force
and through the Navy, because I think we need to privatize more
things on basis to cut back on costs. But I look forward to
seeing how that turns out.
Could you comment on that?
General Richardson. Thank you, Senator. That is for our
family housing for our servicemembers in Miami and certainly a
really tough housing market. This will absolutely get after
being able to counter all of those really high prices in a big
city like Miami. So we are very thankful that we are able to
get that off the ground, and with the support of Congress we
have been able to do that, so thank you very much.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, and we are looking forward to
seeing how that works out. I was very impressed with the
people, after I go to Panama, that were there, actually from my
State of Alabama, Mobile. The Corps of Engineers are down there
working, and we have got a lot of good people.
Just tell us how important, in your eyes, the Panama Canal
is to us here in the United States, in your eyes, since you
have been there.
General Richardson. Well, Senator, more than 70 percent of
our global goods go through the Panama Canal for the United
States. So the importance to the global economy, though, it is
not just about what the United States gets, but that is the
give-back through that canal being open as the exchange of
goods across the world. I talked about trade before, over $740
billion in trade, and so very, very important to the global
economy for the Panama Canal.
Senator Tuberville. On top of that, recently, over the last
few years, China has signed 30 contracts with the Panamanians,
some of it to do with the canal, and the Panamanians are now
trying to get out of some of those contracts because the
Chinese have breached some of those contracts, which we need,
as the United States of America, to protect Panama, because
that is how important it is to all of us. But really good
people down there.
Could you talk a little bit about the two Iranian ships
that are parked outside the Panama Canal and the process that
we need to look at. Do they need to be able to use the Panama
Canal?
General Richardson. So in terms of the Iranian warships
that transited into the SOUTHCOM region and since departed, but
as part of their announcing their global voyage to go around
the globe, and certainly some of the countries that were able
to deny port calls and things like that. But very concerning
because they were just in the region 2 years ago with missiles
and with launchers on those same two ships. So very, very
concerned that they are transiting again. We did not have the
intelligence that they had this cargo on board this time, but
still the fact that they came into the region again, and doing
a global voyage, is concerning.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you for your service.
General VanHerck, thank you very much for what you have done
for our country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
Senator Warren, please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses for your service.
The Pentagon's budget request is $842 billion. This is one
of the largest requests in history, but it is not enough money
for many components of DOD. Each year they push to get even
more money using unfunded priorities lists, or what I call wish
lists.
Now our colleagues on both sides of the aisle are concerned
about this and they want to see this practice stopped. One of
the excuses that I have received, as I have asked about these
lists, is that they reflect emerging threats that cannot be
accommodated in the regular budget process. Now we have
transfer and reprogramming authority to account for exactly
that situation, but even so let us assume that is true. That
means wish lists would only include items that have been
requested before. You could not know about it when you put your
budget together.
General VanHerck, last year your unfunded priority list
contained a request for $50 million for missile defense. Is
that right?
General VanHerck. For this year or last year?
Senator Warren. Last year.
General VanHerck. I would have to go back and review it. I
believe that is correct.
Senator Warren. Well, I will tell you. It is there. I
understand you may not remember all the details, but it is
there. Had you requested funding for that program before?
General VanHerck. Yes. In this year's list as well.
Everything on my unfunded list----
Senator Warren. So let me just be clear here. I am just
trying to track this one argument, and that is, is this some
unexpected expense. You knew about it last year. How do I know
you knew about it last year? Because you had also requested
funding for it from the year before. In other words, this is
not an unexpected requirement for missile defense that you are
trying to get funded through the unfunded priorities list. Is
that right?
General VanHerck. Senator, everything on my unfunded
priority list I POM'ed for, asked for. It was not funded.
Senator Warren. I have no doubt that it was----
General VanHerck. Please allow me to finish.
Senator Warren. I have no doubt that it was not----
General VanHerck. Can I finish answering your question?
Senator Warren. I am the one asking the question here. Was
this on your list before and was it a surprise what you put on
your unfunded priority list?
General VanHerck. There are no surprises on my unfunded
priority list.
Senator Warren. Okay. That is what needed to know.
General VanHerck. All of those were POM'ed for. They are
all missions I am tasked to do, which I am not resourced to do,
and the law directs me to put in an unfunded list within 10
days of the budget, and that is exactly what I did.
Senator Warren. No. Excuse me. The law does not require
that you put in any request. We know last year that two
different divisions actually put in requests of zero. They did
not go to an unfunded priorities list.
Now General Richardson, intelligence surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities have repeatedly appeared on your
wish list as well. As Commander of Southern Command you are on
the front line, confronting transnational criminal
organizations, trafficking drugs in regions there and home, and
I appreciate that work. Last year you asked for an additional
$268 million on your wish list.
Now General Richardson, did DOD approve reprogramming money
for any of the missions under your command this year?
General Richardson. So this year in terms of the funding
that I have received, I have $130 million for security
cooperation for the region. So in terms of the reprogramming, I
am not aware of that.
Senator Warren. Well, according to the Controller's
website, $750 million was reprogrammed to support drug
interdiction. Does that sound about right to you?
General Richardson. I am not tracking the 750, Senator.
Senator Warren. Okay. All right.
But look, here is the point I want to make on this. DOD
already has the tools to reshuffle its resources when needed.
Not only that, they have also done so for a key SOUTHCOM
mission in an amount that was almost three times larger than
your wish list. Both of you have already submitted your lists
for this year. I will be submitting questions for the record to
learn more about why you could not include these in your budget
priorities.
I understand you want more money, but you have to work
within the budget that is given to you. That is what every
other part of the government has to do. I have got a bill with
Senator King, Senator Lee, Senator Braun, that would end the
statutory requirement for these lists. But I want to make
clear--DOD could shut them down on their own right now. We do
not let any other part of government behave like this, and for
good reason.
The budget process is about making tough choices and
setting clear priorities, and refusal to demonstrate leadership
here I think is a real mistake.
General VanHerck. Chairman, I want to correct the record.
Chairman Reed. Senator----
General VanHerck. One hundred percent of my items on my
unfunded priority list were submitted as part of the budget
process.
Chairman Reed. I understand, sir. Any other comments,
General Richardson?
General Richardson. The same here, Senator. Those
requirements that I put forward to the Department as well.
Senator Warren. I do not think I quite understand what our
witnesses are saying here.
Chairman Reed. I think what they wanted was to be able to
fully respond to your questions, Senator, and with that I
would----
Senator Warren. But these are not on their budget now.
Chairman Reed. I think the time has expired. Thank you very
much.
Senator Schmitt, and Senator Rosen will preside as I go to
the Appropriations Committee.
Senator Schmitt, please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank you both for being here. I would note to the Committee
that both of these witnesses have Missouri ties and Missouri
roots.
It is my belief, and I have talked about it a little bit in
this Committee before, that too few people, quite frankly,
understand the urgency, the gravity, and the proximity of the
threat that the PRC, China, poses to the United States of
America. They are rapid development as being a militarized
power now, and projecting that power is very real. It is that
proximity that I want to ask both of you separate questions
about, given your roles.
The Belt and Road Initiative clearly is an initiative to
further their economic, militaristic, and political goals, and
the dual use that they get out of this once they are involved
with these countries is very real.
So General Richardson, I wanted to ask you. It seems me
that China is gaining far too much traction in the Western
Hemisphere, if we sort of look at this under the old Monroe
Doctrine. In the Western Hemisphere they continually abuse, not
just the debt traps that are established but they abuse those
agreements to then later expand militarily.
Could you talk about a couple of those examples that you
see, and Senator Scott, I think, had a great line of
questioning about how we can better explain to our folks back
home the real risks. So from your perspective, a couple of
examples that you would want to highlight that raise real
concerns for you in the Western Hemisphere.
General Richardson. So that Belt and Road Initiative,
Senator, that you talk about, that is really the guise or the
disguise of how I see that the PRC gets their foot in the door,
to expand a lot of these projects into the critical
infrastructure for the partner nations. So when you are talking
deepwater ports in 17 countries, the telecommunications, the
5G, 5G backbone in five of the countries, 24 countries having
the PRC 3G or 4G, and I worry about that, the stealing of
information. There have been numerous cyberattacks of our
partner nations in the region.
You have a communist nation that does not respect the human
rights of their own people, with Huawei and ZTE, and fostering
this out to all of the other partner nations across the globe,
not just in my region. So they do not respect the human rights
of their own people. They are not going to respect the human
rights of every other nation. So that is a huge concern in
terms of telecommunications.
The space, space infrastructure. Eleven space-enabling
infrastructure sites in five countries in the region as well.
So it is very, very concerning, especially with the dual
use that they come in, they are state-owned enterprises from
the PRC, which means that they can be used for military
application at a later date, if needed or wanted.
Senator Schmitt. General VanHerck, we have talked about it
before in classified briefings here and in previous settings
about the Chinese spy balloon, you know, fiasco, and showed how
brazen the Chinese Communist Party is willing to be to gain
intelligence. I think that opened the eyes of a lot of
Americans of, again, just how brazen they were.
But one obvious concern is that they will not just send a
spy balloon. There will be something else, and you have talked
about awareness. What are specifically a couple of things that
this Committee can do to help with that?
General VanHerck. We need to continue to accelerate domain
awareness capabilities. The Department has done a good job with
recognizing my domain awareness capability gaps, which includes
funding over-the-horizon radar. But we need to think
differently about how we field capabilities in a more timely
and rapid manner, using digital technology we have today vice
industrial age processes. You can help with encouraging that
and moving forward with that, and also encouraging testing,
development, and when there are failures, let us not stop
everything. Let us move forward more quickly to field and
rapidly develop capabilities.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rosen. [Presiding.] Senator Peters, you are
recognized.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General VanHerck, I would like to build on the concerns you
mentioned in your earlier testimony regarding cyberattacks here
in the Homeland, and specifically, could you further explain
some of your gaps with authorities, personnel, and instructions
for synchronizing and responding to cyberattacks affecting
local defense communities and how you would coordinate with the
Department of Homeland Security in the event of such an attack.
General VanHerck. Senator, thank you. First, my largest
domain awareness gap, and my biggest concern, is actually cyber
domain awareness. The vast majority of the critical
infrastructure in our Homeland resides outside of DOD, which
General Nakasone is responsible for, and outside other Federal
networks, which Jen Easterly at CISA is responsible for.
My authorities there are limited to have domain awareness.
FISA-702 is crucial to having domain awareness, to giving us
indicators of potential threats in the Homeland, whether they
be violent extremist threats or whether they be peer threats.
So I would encourage that we continue doing that, to give the
National Security Agency and General Nakasone the ability to
help fill those domain awareness gaps.
My responsibility for cyber is I have two cyber protection
teams that defend my critical infrastructure in my
headquarters. More broadly, General Nakasone is responsible for
the DODIN. I am responsible for providing defense support to
civil authorities. So for example, if Jen Easterly at CISA
needs support, and DOD is going to provide Title 10 support,
that support will go through me to provide just like I do for
hurricane or wildfire response.
Senator Peters. Well, I chair Homeland Security Committee
here in the Senate and work on the cyber issues, so I look
forward to working closely with you as to how we coordinate
that, because there is no question that cyber is one of the
most significant threats we face in the Homeland on a daily
basis, and I want to throw out an example of this and get your
response.
Let us take an example in Fayetteville, North Carolina,
home to the Army Special Operations Command and the Immediate
Response Force. If they had suffered a cyberattack to degrade
the mobilization and deployment of the 82d Airborne Division,
in response to some crisis, would your command have the
appropriate authorities and personnel to respond and to
mitigate? Do you have concerns and are those things we should
be looking at pretty seriously?
General VanHerck. We should talk in a classified
environment about potential impacts, but to respond to the
actual cyber incident, that is going to be General Nakasone, or
of it is outside of the DODIN it is going to be Jen Easterly. I
am comfortable that I have everything I need to do to respond
to provide defense support of civil authorities should we be
tasked to do that, to support a lead Federal agency.
Again, it is a concern for me to not have domain awareness
in the cyber domain about potential threats.
Senator Peters. Well, I look forward to discussions in a
secure environment as we further examine that, to make sure
that it is working properly.
The other question I have for you is you discussed the
challenges of ensuring that Joint Force is able to operate in
the Arctic, and you are challenged to respond to potential
threats with forces that are either organic to the National
Guard command structures or assigned to external combatant
commands.
Given the awareness at NORTHCOM of the potential threats in
the Arctic--and I think I am asking this question before
Senator Sullivan can ask you a question related to this, but I
am sure will be coming--given that awareness would you
recommend the services prioritize Arctic training and cold
weather operational readiness for units who may be ultimately
assigned to your command? When I say Arctic training that does
not necessarily mean necessarily in Alaska but also other cold
weather environments like the State of Michigan, with our
training facilities there.
General VanHerck. Senator, absolutely I would. Fifty-2
percent of my AOR is in the Arctic, in the NORTHCOM AOR. As I
said earlier I am tasked to monitor and respond. On the respond
piece it is crucial that we conduct training operations. It is
also crucial for campaigning, to demonstrate we have the
capability, the readiness, the responsiveness, and the
resiliency to operate in the Arctic day-to-day, as part of our
campaigning plan.
It is also crucial that we invest in research and
development to ensure that our platforms are able to sustain
and operate and the human is able to sustain and operate in
this environment. I think we have work still to be done there.
Senator Peters. Thank you, General. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Rosen. Senator Scott, you are recognized.
Senator Scott. Thank you. I thank both of you for what you
do. Thanks for your hard work to try to take care of national
security.
General Richardson, can you talk a little bit about, first,
your ability to sort of watch what is happening in the area
that you are responsible for, and do you have the resources you
need to be able to monitor what is going on, and do you have
good partners with the military in countries outside of our
country?
General Richardson. So we have outstanding partners,
Senator, that want to work with us, and very willing partners,
and to be able to see everything, see the malign activity, be
able to spot it, be able to go after it, you have got to see it
in order to go after it. So the domain awareness, as I have
talked to this Committee before, I get about 2 percent of the
DOD ISR, gets after about 17 percent of my requirement. I would
just say in terms of the urgency right now being at an all-time
high, narcotics flow being at an all-time high, my capability
and capacity to see is at an all-time low for my allocated
resources.
Senator Scott. So what do you need?
General Richardson. So I would need the resourcing in terms
of the platforms. I would say in terms of allocated forces the
ideal platform would be a P-8----
Senator Scott. How many?
General Richardson.--with a long dwell, long operation,
being able to see. I would say anywhere from four to six, which
is what SOUTHCOM had a couple of years ago, and those went away
about a year ago in January.
Also for our partner nations their ability to see as well.
The ground-based radars are very important.
Senator Scott. So Guyana now is a rich country with lots of
oil, and they have got a lot of bad actors around them. From a
national security standpoint for us and also to make sure they
continue their democracy, what support do we need to provide
and what support can you provide?
General Richardson. That is a very willing partner, Guyana,
and the relationship that we have with Guyana, fastest-growing
economy in the world right now because of the light, sweet
crude that was discovered off their shores. But they are very
vulnerable in terms of their capacity and being able to--you
know, our embassy there needs to be a little bit bigger to help
them channel and guide them with all these new additional
resources. My little DOD team needs to be a little bit bigger
as well.
But they can be a stabilizing factor in the region, Guyana,
just by fact of where they are located. They are a neighbor to
Venezuela, also to Brazil and Surinam, but a very willing
partner.
Senator Scott. Thank you. General VanHerck, the southern
border, there has been conversation in DC that the military
could go in and secure the entire southern border, and I know
we have National Guard down there that are helping at the
southern border.
Without taking a policy position on whether we should or
should not do it, is there really the ability, does the
military really have the ability to have much of an influence
on the security of the southern border?
General VanHerck. Senator, within the authorities we have
we cannot do that, but our military, the most professional,
capable on the planet, if tasked to do that, absolutely we
could. That is a policy decision, as you alluded to. We have
incredible capability to do whatever we desire to do, as United
States military.
Senator Scott. So, and I am sorry, you might have answered
this question before I got here. Talk about hypersonics and our
ability to defend ourselves against hypersonics.
General VanHerck. I am not tasked to defend against
hypersonics in the Homeland, with the exception of cruise
missiles. Where I am most concerned is about my ability to
detect and provide threat warning as the NORAD commander and
attack assessment, because of the erosion of strategic
stability that it has for providing continuity of government
and nuclear force posture survival.
We can talk more in a classified session. I will give you
some more details.
Senator Scott. All right. Thank you.
Senator Rosen. Senator Kelly, you are recognized.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General Richardson, I want to followup a little bit on
Senator Scott's question about what you need in SOUTHCOM, and
then the same for NORTHCOM, just recognizing that, you know, my
State, the State of Arizona, has 370 miles of border with
Mexico, and just the amount of transnational criminal
organizations that are operating south of the border and the
fentanyl that is coming from, you know, chemicals that come
from China into Mexico, manufactured there and then come across
our border is killing tens of thousands of Americans every
single year. That is unacceptable.
You talked about needing four to six P-8s. How long ago was
it that you had a single P-8?
General Richardson. A year ago in January the P-8s were
retasked to another area.
Senator Kelly. How many did you have then?
General Richardson. At that time it was two----
Senator Kelly. You had two?
General Richardson.--from a high of six.
Senator Kelly. You feel you need four to six.
General VanHerck, do you have P-8s available?
General VanHerck. I get a little more ISR than General
Richardson does, but my ISR request is pretty much on a not-to-
interfere basis that I get along the southwest border. Now,
Senator, you have to realize that I am limited on collecting
intelligence in the Homeland, by the law, and so therefore you
cannot expect me to be able to do that on this side. We do try
to get additional information on the other side of the border,
as well, on transnational criminal organizations as well as the
National Security Agency helping us.
Senator Kelly. So you cannot fly the airplane south of the
border without permission from Mexico. But can you fly a P-8
along the border and get some valuable information? I mean, is
there something that, some utility?
General VanHerck. So we do fly U-2s and RC-135s, not
necessarily P-8, to gather information about threats to the
Homeland that emanate from all of our borders, not just the
southwest border. My actual allocation of that ISR is very low
compared to, you know, forward geographic combatant commanders.
Senator Kelly. But does NORTHCOM have P-8s available right
now?
General VanHerck. I have P-8s available, one allocated to
me for maritime homeland defense, which would be in support of
submarine activity, not necessarily southwest border activity.
Senator Kelly. Where is that airplane based?
General VanHerck. That airplane is in Whidbey Island,
Washington.
Senator Kelly. I imagine it probably as a significant
OPTEMPO to it right now?
General VanHerck. Well, it is not one airplane. It is an
entire organization wing up there. The one airplane is access
to a single airplane. They are continually doing their mission
training and support. I get access to that one airplane under
the Maritime Homeland Defense EXORD.
Senator Kelly. What do you think we would need to do to
provide like a detachment to SOUTHCOM?
General VanHerck. Is that for me?
Senator Kelly. Either of you.
General Richardson. Senator, if I might be able to talk
about security cooperation in addition to the ISR capability
because our partner nations, that security cooperation is my
main lever in SOUTHCOM, and being able to train and equip our
partners to be able to handle and counter the effects of the
transnational criminal organizations, which are at the top of
their list that they deal with every single day. The TCOs are
way more powerful. They are more sophisticated. They are five
times more than all the defense budgets added together for my
entire region of partner nations, and we have got to really get
after that.
But the foreign military sales, foreign military financing,
excess defense articles, we have got to speed that process up
because every delay in a piece of equipment, a little goes a
long way in this region. I do not need big aircraft carriers.
Our partner nations do not need big brigades of soldiers or
helicopters, but they need five or six helicopters, a maritime
patrol aircraft, the King Air 250. I mean, these go a long way
for them, but every delay in that means our partner is not in
the fight with us, and so we need to make them stronger to
counter the powerful TCOs.
Senator Kelly. General?
General VanHerck. I would just like to followup. We are not
going to interdict our way out of this problem. It is part of
the transnational criminal organization model. What we are
attacking are the symptoms of the problem. That is the human
migration, the counternarcotics trafficking, those kinds of
things. The problem is transnational criminal organizations and
their network.
So I am encouraged. I just sat through the Interdiction
Committee. It is chaired by the Commandant of the Coast Guard
with interagency support, and there is a great strategy out of
the Office of National Drug Control Policy to get after this.
The challenge is operationalizing that strategy across all the
entities of the government who have a hand in this. You cannot
have multiple entities all doing their own thing.
So I do not see this as a DOD lead, but I do think we need
a lead Federal agency empowered to get after the problem that
you are talking about across multiple agencies across our
Nation.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, General VanHerck and General
Richardson, and my office will followup.
Chairman Reed.
[Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Kelly.
Senator Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you
both for your time this morning. This testimony is important to
this Committee because right now our adversaries are probing
our Homeland and really looking for weakness right here in our
hemisphere. Our Homeland is no longer a sanctuary, so thank you
again.
General Richardson, your statement cites at least 11 China-
linked space facilities across 5 different countries in the
region, and this is more than any other area of responsibility
that we see around the globe. So what are the national security
implications of these particular space facilities?
General Richardson. Well just the ability for the Chinese
to be able to track and launch their own satellites, but then
also the ability to surveil not just the United States but our
partner nations' satellites as well across the globe.
Senator Ernst. Right, and what are you doing to mitigate
that surveillance that you spoke of? Are there things that we
can do?
General Richardson. So we are partnering together, of
course, with SPACECOM, with NORTHCOM. We hosted the very first
inaugural Space Conference of the Americas, bringing all of the
space-faring nations together to talk about responsible space
operations. Also the capabilities and being able to get after
the malign activity possibly associated with those. It is
always under supposed research and development and that sort of
thing, and the concern is maybe it is not.
Senator Ernst. Right. That is my concern, and what are we
doing then to prevent more of these space facilities from being
located in your AOR?
General Richardson. So I think just working with the
partner nations, with the governments in terms of the
responsible space operations and things like that, and talking
about and discussing and warning the possibilities associated
with it.
Senator Ernst. Again, relationships matter, so it is very
important in this region specifically.
General Richardson, during your confirmation you committed
to notify Congress if China emplaces long-range missiles in the
area of operations. How do you assess the risk of this in the
midterm?
General Richardson. So I assess all the development and the
Belt and Road Initiative and the critical infrastructure as
just setting the theater, or setting the table, if you want to
put it that way, in terms of possible basing and that sort of
thing in the future. I would say that we are probably about 7
to 10 years behind what has happened in Africa, and with the
state-owned enterprises from the Chinese in the region I worry
about the dual-use capability and used for military
application.
Senator Ernst. Right. I do as well, and what more can we do
for SOUTHCOM to prevent China from continuing to expand in the
region?
General Richardson. Well I would say that Team USA can do a
better job in terms of tooting our own horn about all the
investment from the private sector all the way to what I do in
the military and defense sector. Foreign military sales and
foreign military financing, excess defense articles, training
and equipping is really what we get after. We introduce the
Inter-America Defense College that is behind me here for their
professional development session. You know, our schools are so
important to build trust with our partner nations that we can
communicate, talk in the same language. That is what I really
bring to the table is being able to work with our partner
nations in building that trust, so we can counter the malign
activity together.
Senator Ernst. I think that is so important. Again, those
relationships matter in this area of operations, and you
normally place in front of us what we call a placemat that
shows the region and Russian influence, Chinese influence. I
just want to make sure that it is very clear to everyone that
is watching today, listening to us, that they understand that
while China is our pacing threat and we focus on the INDOPACOM,
we have to recognize that they are in this hemisphere as well.
They are here. They are everywhere around us. They are building
space facilities. They are building other points of operation,
and they are in our backyard.
So while we do focus on the INDOPACOM it is very, very
important. We have got to focus here as well and understand
that they are surrounding us, and we have got to do more about
that.
General VanHerck, just in the remaining few seconds that we
have, what would be the homeland defense implications of
persistent Russia or Chinese cruise missile submarines off of
our coasts? Do you assess this risk is increasing or
decreasing?
General VanHerck. It is absolutely increasing. Within the
last year Russia has also placed their Severodvinsk-class
submarines in the Pacific, so now not only the Atlantic, we
have them in the Pacific. It is just a matter of probably a
year or two before that is a persistent threat, 24 hours a day
potentially. That impact is reduced decision space for a
nation's senior leader in a time of crisis.
Senator Ernst. Absolutely, and again, thank you both so
much for your service and dedication to protecting our
Homeland. I just want to emphasize again how important it is
that we pay attention to Russia and China in this hemisphere as
well. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing, and I want to thank both Generals Richardson
and VanHerck for testifying today, for your service, and
General VanHerck, of course, for your service to our very own
Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. Thank you.
I am going to buildupon what so many others have already
been talking about, our adversaries in our own backyard, China
and Russia, 5G technology, all of that.
General Richardson, you mentioned in your opening statement
24 countries in SOUTHCOM's AOR have existing 3G and 4G Chinese
telecommunication infrastructure. Of course, we have been
talking about the Belt and Road. An additional five countries
have upgraded to Huawei's 5G network, and as has been
discussed, this adoption of all this technology in your AOR, it
is more than concerning. It impacts our national security and
the security of all our regional partners.
So again, I just want to build on what they have been
asking. What role do you, not just in countering the adoption
of the 5G technology in Latin America, do you think there are
ways to leverage public-private partnerships so you do not have
to do everything, and can you speak to this and how you are
doing that please?
General Richardson. Absolutely, Senator, and the fact that
traveling to the region and putting all of these data points
together and hearing from the leaders in the region and then
coming back here to the United States to talk to our private
sector as well, and hear from them, the billions of dollars of
investment. But then when you hear of the big projects and
tenders coming down from our partner nations, and then there
are only six Chinese companies that compete for that project or
the tender, then there is a disconnect there. That is why I
think that we have got to show the investment that our private
sector is doing, which is billions. When I hear from them and
talk to them there is billions of investment into the region,
and we have got to advertise that.
Team USA is there. Our partners want to work with us. They
will turn to us first. But their economies are hurting, and if
we cannot do it fast enough, and our foreign military sales and
our training and equipping sometimes is not as fast. They are
on a political timeline of one term, which is 4 years, and so
they are on a stopwatch to deliver for their people, not a
calendar. So we have got to speed up our processes. Because
they will look to us first, but if we do not have capability to
deliver then they are going to look elsewhere to wherever they
can get it.
Senator Rosen. I think accelerating the process and having
a budget, not a CR, going through, everyone has talked about
that.
General VanHerck, I want to speak with you a little bit
about this because we know Huawei and foreign-owned companies,
they are responsible for our United States miliary
installations and ICBM fields, our training ranges, obviously,
at Nellis. We know that people are building these
telecommunications sites nearby all of these so they can
collect information.
I know we are in an open setting, but can you talk about
the threat this poses, what can we do, public-private
partnership, and your opinion. Can you elaborate a little bit?
General VanHerck. Absolutely. I am very concerned about
Chinese communications infrastructure being built not
necessarily by Chinese but with companies here in the United
States in close proximity to national security locations. We
have to keep an eye on that. That is a threat to our national
security. It is an intelligence collection threat. It may be
even a more broad threat.
I would also point out in my AOR, in the Bahamas, China is
very aggressive. Their Ambassador in the information space,
they have built a new embassy. Economic investment in the
largest resort outside of China is right in the Bahamas, right
off of our coast. It sits right on top of the Navy's AUTEC test
and train ranges, which there is potential collection there.
They are interested in developing smart cities here in the
region. I will not go into detail. I would in a classified
environment. Selling equipment that we, or our partners,
utilize for assessment of goods crossing the border, all those
kinds of things.
I would also point out one of the main lessons from COVID
for me was the supply chain and our supply chain
vulnerabilities, that we have farmed out so much to China. You
know, when you get 80 percent of your pharmaceuticals from
somebody that you may face in a crisis in the future, that is a
national security imperative that we need to go look at.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. We just had a hearing about that
in Homeland Security yesterday, bringing back particularly that
pharmaceutical supply chain, critical medications.
I am going to take my next question off the record, but I
want you to elaborate on cyber domain awareness that you spoke
about. But my time is up so we will just submit that. Thank you
again.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Budd, please.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again, thank you
both for being here. General Richardson, it was great to sit
down with you yesterday and have a helpful conversation.
Following up a little bit on Senator Rosen's questions
about foreign military sales, I have got a couple of yes-or-no
questions about the process, and I have asked similar questions
of other combatant commanders. General Richardson, is the
current FMS process fast and flexible enough to meet our
foreign partners' security needs in your AOR?
General Richardson. No, Senator.
Senator Budd. Does the transfer of U.S. defense articles
build our partners' capacity to provide for their own defense?
General Richardson. Yes, it does, Senator.
Senator Budd. Is China increasing arms exports to any other
countries in your AOR?
General Richardson. Yes, Senator.
Senator Budd. Is the United States still the security
partner of choice in your AOR?
General Richardson. The U.S. is the security partner of
choice, Senator, yes.
Senator Budd. Thank you. Is the United States at risk of
losing that security partner of choice status to China?
General Richardson. Yes, Senator.
Senator Budd. If you would explain a little bit about how
FMS challenges are impacting strategic competition with China
in your AOR.
General Richardson. Yes. So the ability to be able to
deliver quickly. I think that there is also a backlog from
COVID and the impacts that our own private sector and
industries had to take, and being able to not be a year or 2
years behind delivery. Again, we do not need a lot in this
region. A little goes a long way. When we are talking about one
country needing one King Air 250 maritime patrol aircraft or
four coastal patrol vessels or six helos, we are talking about
something that is not that large but that they need to get
after the transnational criminal organizations, the malign
activity that occurs in their countries. Then that impacts,
provides some stability. It curbs irregular migration. It keeps
the flow down if our partner nations can provide that security
and stability for their countries.
Senator Budd. Thank you for that.
General VanHerck, again thank you for being here as well.
The North Carolina National Guard currently has personnel
mobilized to the southern border in support of CBP, Customs and
Border Patrol. We are very proud of them and we want to make
sure our troops have all the resources they need to help secure
the border.
Are there additional resources we could provide that would
make the southwest border deployment more effective?
General VanHerck. Senator, I am comfortable with the
resources I have based on the mission and authorities I have
right now.
Senator Budd. Thank you. So nothing else needed? They have
everything they needed?
General VanHerck. Their commanders have not asked for
anything to me. They are working for me in their Title 10
mobilization capacity and I am not aware of any asks.
Senator Budd. Thank you. and for both of you, we know that
illicit drugs are not the only thing being trafficked through
your AORs and into the United States. Human trafficking is an
all-too-common occurrence, and just this week we learned that
groups of Chinese nationals are paying coyotes a premium to be
smuggled across the southern border.
From your perspectives, what is driving this humanitarian
crisis in your respective AORs, and what resources would be
helpful to enhance your work in countering the human
trafficking side?
General Richardson first.
General Richardson. So I would say the security cooperation
funding is my main lever, Senator, and that really empowers the
partner nation militaries and their security forces to be able
to handle that. That malign activity, as you said, is not just
narcotics. It is human trafficking. It is illegal mining. It is
illegal logging, illegal fishing. It is counterfeit goods. It
is the whole money laundering piece. They are more powerful,
they are more sophisticated, they are corrupt, and they drive
violence and irregular migration, and strengthening our partner
nations to be able to handle that is what makes them stronger
and then generally ends up helping us in the Homeland, where
those malign activities do not end up on our southwest border.
Senator Budd. Thank you. General VanHerck?
General VanHerck. Yes, thank you. So the problems, I call
the symptoms. It is the human trafficking, migration, those
kinds of things, are driven by an instability created by
transnational criminal organizations. If you do not want your
family to live within that environment you are going to try to
get out, and you are willing to pay whatever it is to get out
of there. That is part of their business model.
I would also say natural disasters. They have had several
major hurricanes in Mexico and Central America within the last
few years, and also COVID. That created an environment where
folks who wanton leave, and they want to come to the United
States, and transnational criminal organizations are seizing on
that opportunity as part of their business model.
We will not interdict our way out. This requires a strategy
to go after transnational criminal organizations. We know how
to do this as a nation--cut off the funding, cutoff the
weapons. Seize on those opportunities. Interdiction will not
get us out of this problem.
Senator Budd. Thank you both. My time has expired. Mr.
Chairman, I will be submitting a question for the record.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd.
Senator Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for your service and for being here today.
I want to focus on Russia for the moment, and particular,
General VanHerck, the resources that you have, NORAD and
NORTHCOM, in the Arctic area. Do you think those resources are
sufficient to protect our national security? Should they be
enhanced?
General VanHerck. Senator, no, I do not think I have the
infrastructure, the communications, the ability to respond and
be persistent in the Arctic.
Senator Blumenthal. What kind of additional resources do
you think should be provided?
General VanHerck. Yes, I would point back to the report
that NDAA directed me to do, that I provided to Congress, that
gives a list of the challenges that I face. I need additional
communications capability, data and information sharing, the
ability to be persistent, so fuel north of Dutch Harbor,
Alaska. We need to do more research and development on
capabilities that are going to go into the Arctic platforms to
ensure they operate. When you send platforms into the Arctic
and they are non-functioning, that is a concern for me. I can
talk more in a classified environment.
The infrastructure is the biggest concern. So in a layered
defense concept I need to have forces forward. That would
include at Thule, Greenland, in Canada as well. So NORAD in
Canada has to be part of this discussion as well. We need
persistence. That requires icebreakers. We, as a Nation, are in
a bad shape when it comes to icebreakers, and I fully support
the Coast Guard's plan. We need to go faster.
Senator Blumenthal. The Coast Guard needs more icebreakers
in that area. Do you agree?
General VanHerck. I do agree.
Senator Blumenthal. General, have you seen any effect in
terms of the Russian resources or threat as a result of the
Ukrainian operation?
General VanHerck. So I am not aware of any direct kinetic
threat to the Homeland. We continue to monitor the cyber
domain, and especially through their proxy actors. I can talk
in a classified environment. I am most concerned about that
cyber domain. I would point out that while Russia appears to be
a failure in the land domain in Ukraine they still maintain
significant strategic capabilities to hold our Homeland at
risk, and we have seen them just as active, actually more
active globally, to include in the NORTHCOM AOL, such as
sailing the Gorshkov with hypersonic missiles just a couple of
months ago, through my AOR and into General Richardson's AOR,
and more persistent submarine activities that can hold our
Nation at risk.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you both, maybe beginning
with General Richardson, the Wagner Group has been very active
in Ukraine. It has been very active in Africa. Have you seen
any evidence of its malign activities in your command?
General Richardson. Russian malign activity is alive and
well in SOUTHCOM, and in my statement I talked about the
disinformation campaign. Over 31 million followers now on
Russia Today Espanol and Sputnik Mundo. They do not play by the
rules. They do not have any rules, and they pose journalists to
be legitimate journalists. They are not. Twitter bots are off
the charts, and these especially increase right before
elections in our partner nations. It is very concerning, but it
is very much alive and well with Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela
that Russia continues to keep their alliances with.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you for that. That is very
helpful, and do they operate also through proxies, like the
Wagner Group?
General Richardson. Yes, Senator, they do.
Senator Blumenthal. In your command, General VanHerck, what
have you seen?
General VanHerck. Russia is active. As you know, the
Mexican military utilizes Russian helicopters. I would love to
see those helicopters go. They have asked, through foreign
military sales, for options. We do not move fast enough, the
question we got earlier about foreign military sales, to
deliver capability to basically punt the Russians out of
Mexico.
I would also point out that from a space perspective that
Russia is actively seeking, under academic and research
facilities, access for space monitoring in my AOR as well. I
will just leave it at that. I will talk to you more in a
classified environment about that. But it is alive and well
right here in the NORTHCOM and NORAD AORs.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I agree with you about the
helicopters, by the way. We should be providing American
helicopters, not relying on Russian helicopters.
General VanHerck. Yes. Can I point out one more thing?
Senator Blumenthal. Sure.
General VanHerck. I have been working for more than a year
after I committed to provide radars to the Mexicans for domain
awareness for transnational criminal organization and drug
control. We still have not been able to donate those radars.
The process is too slow.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you both for your
testimony. Very informative and helpful. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Let me note that the vote has started, and recognize
Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank both of the witnesses today for their outstanding service
to our country and excellent testimony. General VanHerck, is
this your last hearing?
General VanHerck. It is my last hearing in front of this
Committee. I am sure there will be others.
Senator Sullivan. So I am sure you are sad about that.
General VanHerck. Senator, I actually enjoy the
opportunity. It is a great chance to tell our story. I have
been telling it for 3 years. Recent events have brought it
further into the light.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I want to compliment you both, but
I want to compliment you in particular on your career in the
military and your outstanding work that you did over the last
several months. It was a busy time for NORTHCOM, and I think
you led the troops of Northern Command exceptionally well, not
just the last couple of months but during your tenure. So thank
you for that.
I do want to reference--can you do a quick shout-out to the
men and women in Alaska, their operations over the last couple
of months and what they were doing on a regular basis, whether
it is Chinese spy balloons or Russian Bear bombers. Just your
thoughts, very quickly, on General Nahom and the team up there,
including the Guard and Reserves.
General VanHerck. Yes. Some exceptional work, not only in
Alaska but across the Department, especially when it comes to
the high-altitude balloon. That was Ph.D.-level employment
tracking. But most importantly the engagement.
That balloon went down, as you know, on the ice shelf off
the coast of northern Alaska with limited infrastructure to
support, and the National Guard stepped up, Tory Saxe and his
team, and General Nahom, to do incredible work, in just
incredibly challenging conditions, and monitoring additional
threats to our Homeland. So I could not be more proud of the
entire team.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you on that, and Mr. Chairman, I
think this hearing has clearly, clearly highlighted the need
for serious FMS reform. Senator Budd and I were in the Middle
East on a codel with Senator Rosen, Senator Kelly, a number of
us, and everywhere we went our allies, our military were like,
``You have got fix FMS. It is killing us.'' So I think that is
something we need to be looking at hard during this NDAA.
General VanHerck, can you briefly touch on the highlighted
challenges of domain awareness? You have been talking about
this for 3 years, but I think the Chinese spy balloon and other
recent activities have really driven home what you have been
talking about, and how we need to do it more rapidly and in a
timely manner.
General VanHerck. Yes. So the bottom line, Senator, is if
you cannot detect something, you cannot defeat it, and you
certainly cannot deter, and so what has happened since Shock
and Awe. Our operations in the Middle East, is Russia and
China, particularly, have developed capabilities to hold our
Homeland at risk, to reduce our decision space, delay and
disrupt our flow. My challenge is to detect those capabilities.
We have assumed, for decades, that the Homeland is a safe
and secure environment, two moats on each side, friendly
nations on each side. That model is gone, and my ability to
detect those threats, whether they be undersea to on orbit and
in cyberspace has not kept pace with the threat. That reduces
decision space for our Nation's senior leader, it erodes
strategic stability, and increases the risk of strategic
deterrence failures.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask you, it is a multi-part
question and I would like you to answer it in the time I have
left. I have appreciated Senators Peters, King, Tuberville,
Blumenthal all raising the issues of the Arctic and your
ability to currently monitor and respond to threats against the
Homeland, specifically in the Arctic.
Now can you also explain why the Arctic, why the Alaska
avenues of approach are so important, not just to Alaska--we
want to protect the great State of Alaska, my state--but we
also recognize, and you recognize, that Alaska often is the
avenue of approach with our adversaries' weapons systems to
attack the Lower 48, if they were going to do that, whether
that is Chicago, Miami, or New York.
So could you explain a little bit on the issue of what you
need more in the Arctic--I appreciate your leadership on this--
and the domain awareness issues that relate to the importance
of those assets in Alaska, not just for Alaska but for the
whole country.
General VanHerck. Yes, Senator. So Alaska may be the most
strategic location on the planet.
Senator Sullivan. I think I have said that a few times
before here, Mr. Chairman. That is Billy Mitchell's famous
quote. Correct?
General VanHerck. It is. So deploying from Alaska, short to
the Indo-Pacific, short to the Yukon AOR, shortest avenue
approach for ballistic missiles from Russia, potentially China
and DPRK to our Homeland.
You know, allowing China and Russia to move forward with
putting ballistic missile submarines, due to the ice now
receding, in close proximity to Alaska and our Homeland,
seriously erodes my ability to provide adequate threat warning,
capabilities, domain awareness. So I hope the Air Force comes
forward with an unfunded request to accelerate the Wedgetail.
The AWACS is worn out. We need a Wedgetail, and we need it much
faster, so I can monitor things in the Arctic as well.
The communication capabilities, I hope that terminals are
funded for SpaceX, Starlink capabilities to give us the domain
awareness, and that we accelerate over-the-horizon radar, and
then more broadly think about globally integrated air and
missile defense, which would include sensors in Alaska,
strategic sensors in Alaska. We need to get long-range,
discriminating radar online sooner and utilize that data better
for deterrence purposes but if required, defeat purposes.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thanks again to both of you, and
again, General, thank you for your outstanding service to our
country for decades. We very much appreciate you here on this
Committee.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
General VanHerck, General Richardson, thank you for your
outstanding testimony today.
We have a vote on so we will vote, but I would announce
that we will reconvene in approximately 15 minutes in SV-217
for the closed session.
With that I will adjourn the open session, and thank you
both.
[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
transnational criminal organizations
1. Senator Shaheen. General VanHerck and General Richardson, would
labeling drug cartels in your respective regions as foreign terrorist
organizations support your operations? Please explain the benefits or
negative consequences of such a designation.
General VanHerck. I assess that designating the drug cartels within
my Area of Responsibility as Foreign Terrorist Organizations would be
of negligible benefit, if any. With specific regard to USNORTHCOM
support to interagency and international partners, I defer to the State
Department for further discussion on FTO designations in accordance
with Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
General Richardson. Labeling drug cartels in the USSOUTHCOM AOR as
foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) would be of small consequence to
operations in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. It would blur the line between
traditional criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations. The drug
cartels are criminal organizations driven by money while terrorists are
driven by ideology. There is also a potential for concerns from
impacted partner nations because the United States would be labeling a
drug cartel as a ``terrorist organization'' which that partner nation
views as an internal criminal enterprise/organization. I defer to the
Department of State, which owns the authority to make this designation,
on how it might impact other United States Government efforts to
counter drug cartels.
security cooperation
2. Senator Shaheen. General VanHerck and General Richardson,
security cooperation with our allies and partners is crucial in the
fight against illicit activities. One proven method to build partner
capacity is through the legal sale of United States made weapons to
vetted foreign militaries and law enforcement, such as the recent sale
of rifles and pistols to the Mexican Navy and Marines. How do you view
the importance of United States material being provided--in terms of
building partner capacity and influence--instead of material sold by
foreign governments that do not share our moral values?
General VanHerck. The timely provision of U.S. material and support
is critically important as we seek to enhance the institutional
capacity of our military partners. This, in turn, serves to limit our
competitors' influence in the region.
General Richardson. Our Foreign Military Sales (FMS) play a
significant role in U.S. Security Cooperation and is a way to achieve
our diplomatic and defense strategic objectives. The strength of our
programs compared with malign global competitors is our enduring
partnership to develop military capabilities and institutions with the
full spectrum of lifecycle management disciplines. This includes
strategy and doctrine, interoperability, personnel and administration,
logistics and infrastructure, and systems and institutions. Our malign
global competitors do not invest in holistic approaches to build
enduring capabilities, rather they exploit investments to advance
malign interests. In contrast, the long-term nature of our FMS sales
helps us maintain strong partnerships with countries to emphasize the
importance of democratic values such as rule of law and respect for
human rights.
3. Senator Shaheen. General Richardson, what can your respective
commands do to ensure these partnership activities are continued?
General VanHerck. Responsiveness to USNORTHCOM's partners'
validated requests is a key element in maintaining the growing
activities with the Mexican military. The current system whereby we
provide support is antiquated and slow. There would be significant
benefit in streamlining the process across the whole-of-government to
move faster and provide more timely support.
General Richardson. The access and presence of our Security
Cooperation Personnel in our embassies throughout the USSOUTHCOM AOR
are the vanguards of these partnerships but we need sufficient
resources to stay engaged. A little goes a long way in this region, and
we must be present via the broad spectrum of Security Cooperation
programs at our required resourcing levels, including:
Train and Equip Programs (Sec. 333, Sec. 8068, Foreign
Military Financing, Global Peace Operations Initiative)
Ministerial Level Advising (Logistics, Cyber, Budgeting,
Human Rights)
Transfers of U.S. Origin Defense Articles and Services
(Near Coastal Patrol Vessels, Jeep J8s, Maritime Patrol Aircrafts) via
the FMS process
Exercises (PANAMAX, RESOLUTE SENTINEL, TRADEWINDS)
4. Senator Shaheen. General VanHerck and General Richardson, when
foreign governments that do not share our moral values provide security
cooperation and material to local governments in your region, how does
that impact stability and influence in those countries?
General VanHerck. Revisionist and revanchist powers seek to gain
footholds throughout the hemisphere. If provided the time and space to
operate, they may be capable of buying some influence and access to the
region. USNORTHCOM's ongoing Security Cooperation engagements are vital
to limiting competitor influence throughout the AOR.
General Richardson. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has
significantly increased its outreach and activities in the Western
Hemisphere, with 21 of 31 nations in the USSOUTHCOM AOR having joined
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The non-transparent nature of PRC
``investment'' in the region leads to debt-traps and corruption that
can break down democratic values in the region. This is true of
security assistance, as well as infrastructure projects by the PRC that
are all aimed at increasing PRC influence close to our Homeland. These
actions have the potential to destabilize the region and erode the
fundamental conditions needed for quality private sector investment.
This in turn disrupts legitimate economic opportunity, compromises the
rule of law, allows malign State actors the opportunity to make inroads
and drives irregular migration. Through military engagements and gray
zone operations, Russia colludes with authoritarian regimes in the
region to undermine United States influence. In the past year, Russia
continued its military engagements with both Venezuela and Nicaragua to
increase influence with these two nations that are destabilizing forces
in the region.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
climate resiliency
5. Senator Hirono. General VanHerk, climate change is affecting the
readiness of our military. Abroad, particularly in South and Central
America, hurricanes, rising sea levels, flooding, and drought damage
the region's health, food, and water supply destabilizing institutions
and making your missions harder. how does climate change's effects on
our critical infrastructure impact your ability to protect the
Homeland?
General VanHerck. The effects of environmental change have direct
impacts on NORAD and USNORTHCOM's missions, planning, and
infrastructure. For example, melting permafrost impacts construction
and infrastructure sustainment at northern bases, while diminishing sea
ice in the Arctic will lead to increased competition and drive
requirements for increased sustainable presence in the region. The
increased duration and intensity of wildfire season in the western
United States and Canada will continue to require USNORTHCOM's support
to civil authorities, while more powerful hurricanes have direct
economic and readiness impacts on installations and personnel along the
Gulf and Atlantic coasts. This reality is factored into NORAD and
USNORTHCOM's planning and will affect the commands' operations for the
foreseeable future.
6. Senator Hirono. General Richardson, I have been focused on
supporting green technologies for our own infrastructure. From your
perspective, what types of technologies help prepare communities for
the effects of climate change?
General Richardson. Within the USSOUTHCOM AOR, our partner nations
face a wide variety of transboundary challenges, to include natural
disasters such as water shortages in Paraguay and Uruguay, flooding in
Ecuador and Honduras, wildfires throughout Chile, the dry corridor that
runs through Central America, and significant risk from sea-level rise.
Below are technologies that could help prepare for and mitigate the
effects of climate change.
Freshwater production and storage capability and drought resistant
crops: With changing climate patterns, emerging areas of increased dry
days resulting in drought conditions will affect reservoir levels and
access to water for drinking and crop production. Island nations may
see an increase in saltwater intrusion into freshwater drinking
supplies due to an increase in demand for freshwater and an increase in
sea-level. The ability to produce or capture freshwater and store it is
essential for agricultural. When used with additional means of
freshwater storage, drought resistant crops may also allow agricultural
areas to remain viable instead of relocating. One area in the
USSOUTHCOM AOR that is experiencing significant drought is the ``dry
region'' that extends through El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua. Over the last 3 decades, drought in this region has resulted
in an approximate loss of $5 billion dollars in the agricultural
sector. This is a major factor that results in food insecurity and
irregular migration.
Early warning systems: The ability to provide advanced warning for
environmental impacts such as severe storms, flash floods, volcanic
eruptions, and tsunamis is critical to protect the population. Some
severe storms such as tropical cyclones allow forecasting days in
advance and allow early warning to populations through media or word of
mouth. Quick onset events that give minute to hour forecast windows
require additional warning systems such as sirens or alarms that don't
require a media source to inform the population.
illegal fishing
7. Senator Hirono. General Richardson, your Command is at the
forefront combating illegal fishing. This maritime crime is depleting
fish stocks worldwide, contributing to food insecurity. In the Pacific
I certainly have heard from our allies and partners, like the Compact
of Freely Associated States, that this is a pressing issue made only
worse by climate change. In your engagements with our partners, what
lessons have you learned from your efforts to combat illegal fishing
that can be applied worldwide?
General Richardson. Engagement and information sharing with Allies
and partners has informed our understanding of the environment and the
threat posed to the region from illegal fishing. The ability to quickly
share unclassified information with partner nations as well as with
interagency and NGO partners has been especially critical to countering
this threat. USSOUTHCOM utilizes our Enhanced Domain Awareness (EDA)
platform to illuminate IUUF activity, trends, and patterns in
USSOUTHCOM's AOR and mitigate these vessels' attempts to evade
detection. Our IUUF dashboard within EDA fuses commercial GEOINT,
academic and NGO data, and publicly available information to provide
allies and partners with near real-time awareness of IUUF, improving
their ability to respond to the growing number of Chinese fishing
vessels conducting these malign activities (over 1,000 as of June
2023).
Beijing subsidizes the Chinese distant water fleet (DWF), which
almost certainly facilitates the DWF's expansion, helps address China's
domestic food needs, and generates revenue for its domestic fishing
industry. These subsidies include oil, preferential loans, and tax
breaks that pay for construction and equipment procurement as well as
covering insurance premiums and vessel decommissioning costs. Beijing
provides the DWF with satellite imagery and research vessels to
facilitate the fleet's efforts to locate fish stocks. China's DWF also
uses government-subsidized supply ships and oilers to sustain itself at
sea for several years without a port call, ensuring a continuous
fishging cycle that facilitates year-round fish transshipment for the
Chinese market. The DWF trawls the edge of the countries' Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZ), operating legally in international waters. The
vessels regularly switch off their automatic identification systems
(AIS), which broadcasts the ship's identity and position, likely to
fish undetected in the EEZ. With the transponder disabled, the fishing
vessels appear to go dark, preventing law enforcement tracking.
humanitarian aid and disaster response
8. Senator Hirono. General Richardson, Latin America and the
Caribbean are particularly vulnerable to extreme natural disasters. An
important pillar of our Nation's response for humanitarian crises is
the Marine Corp embarked on amphibious ships, like the Landing Platform
Dock. What will the impact be in your area of responsibility if the
Marine Corp does not have the ships it needs to deploy in a timely
fashion to give humanitarian aid in the event of a crisis?
General Richardson. In our area of responsibility, the presence of
United States Marines embarked aboard amphibious warfare ships
physically demonstrates America's commitment to our Latin American and
Caribbean partners. 29 of 31 regional countries are connected to the
maritime domain; moreover, a majority of the region's 500 million
inhabitants occupy littorals that surround or partially frame national
borders. U.S. Marines have a long history of operating from the sea and
conducting humanitarian assistance operations in the littorals. Two
recent examples include timely response to Hurricanes Matthew in 2016
aboard the USS Mesa Verde (LPD-19), and Maria in 2017 aboard the USS
Wasp (LHD-1), USS Kearsarge (LHD-3), and USS Oak Hill (LSD-51). Without
these amphibious warfare ships, USSOUTHCOM's response would have been
limited in capacity and capability.
In addition to providing emergency aid for natural disasters and
other crises, the episodic presence of amphibious ships deters Malign
State Actors (MSAs) who are actively establishing footholds in the
Western Hemisphere. Lack of U.S. presence degrades and imperils partner
nation trust--a dangerous circumstance that MSAs can exploit by filling
voids created by inadequate numbers of U.S. amphibious ships.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
future use of unfunded priorities lists (upls)
9. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, do you agree
that if funding is needed for a project, it should be a part of the
command/service budget?
General VanHerck. Yes, NORAD & U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)
follow the budget process directed by the Department of Defense (DOD)
and Congress and identifies priorities for inclusion in the annual
budget process. The Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act
requires Combatant Commands to submit an Unfunded Priority List (10 USC
222a). As a Combatant Command with no assigned forces and no
acquisition authority, NORAD & USNORTHCOM rely on the military Services
for most resourcing. The Unfunded Priority List allows us to inform the
Department of Defense and Congress of our mission-critical capabilities
not resourced by the Services.
General Richardson. Yes, I do agree. The UPL process offers an
opportunity to address emerging priorities that arise after the budget
process closes to meet the evolving dynamic environment in my AOR. As a
combatant commander, I am reliant on the Services and ultimately the
Department of Defense to fund my priorities. In accordance with the law
established in the fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act
(10 USC 222a), I submitted to Congress those mission-critical
priorities that remain unfunded through the regular budget process.
10. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, historically,
have previous Unfunded Priorities Lists items been included in the
following year's base budget? Have Unfunded Priorities Lists items from
fiscal year 2023 been included in the fiscal year 2024 base budget? If
yes, please provide detail including the requested item, funding
amount, and vendor executing the effort. If no, why not?
General VanHerck. In general, requests on prior NORAD and
USNORTHCOM Unfunded Priority Lists (UPL) have not been included in
subsequent year base budgets. Those requests not included in the
subsequent year base budget are generally out-prioritized for
Department resources. However, the USNORTHCOM fiscal year 2023 UPL had
two requests that were not appropriated in fiscal year 2023, but were
included in the Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget Request:
The fiscal year 2023 UPL included a request for $29.8 million
to resource NORAD and USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC)
modernization. The Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget includes
$29.5 million for JOC modernization. The requested funding will
procure and install components to support ingesting,
aggregating, processing, displaying, and disseminating data. If
authorized and appropriated by Congress, NORAD and USNORTHCOM
will utilize the Naval Information Warfare Center for purchase
and installation of required components. Components will be
purchased through Government Services Administration-authorized
vendors that have not yet been identified.
The fiscal year 2023 UPL also included a request for $50.87
million to resource a Cruise Missile Defense of the Homeland
demonstration. The request included sensor procurement, fire-
control integration, testing, and a live-fire demonstration.
The Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget includes $14.5 million
to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Sustainment to begin procuring an elevated sensor; and $5
million to the Department of the Army to begin fire-control
integration. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are not directly involved in
the obligation of this funding; the vendor(s) will be selected
by lead agency.
General Richardson. USSOUTHCOM works with the Army as our Combatant
Command Support Agent (CCSA), the other Services, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Defense Agencies, and the Joint Staff to include
enduring Unfunded Priorities in subsequent year funding. Occasionally,
these priorities are resourced.
information on unfunded priorities lists
11. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, what was the
cost of putting together this wish list?
General VanHerck. Development of the Unfunded Priority List is part
of our annual research and budget analysis activity and has no
additional cost.
General Richardson. USSOUTHCOM did not incur additional expense to
put together the unfunded priorities list since the list is simply a
compilation of the Command's already existing resource requirements
that are compiled as part of a core staff function.
For each item on the unfunded priorities list you submit in
response to 10 U.S.C. 222a, please provide the following information:
12. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, what is the
description of this Unfunded Priorities Lists?
General VanHerck. A description of my unfunded priority list
follows:
(1) Arctic Capable Pre]positioned Shelters ($10 million): Funds
requested will support RDT&E efforts to design expeditionary base camp
systems capable of providing life support, mission command, critical
asset storage and large area maintenance shelter (LAMS) capability in
an Arctic environment at temperatures as low as -65F. Requested funds
will enable continued system modification, augmentation, and testing at
the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) Arctic
Infrastructure Research Center in Fairbanks, Alaska to ensure the
ability to operate in extreme Arctic conditions.
Explanation: Existing expeditionary shelters in Army Prepositioned
Stocks can operate at temperatures as low as -25F. The most recent
research and development efforts have demonstrated Arctic modifications
that increase performance capability to temperatures as low as -40F.
The requested funds ($4.5 million) enable RDT&E in support of base camp
equipment capable of operations at temperatures as low as -65F in
cooperation with the ERDC Arctic Infrastructure Research Center.
Current LAMS capability in prepositioned stocks can operate at
temperatures as low as -20F but require a temperature of +25F to set
up. The requested funds ($5.5 million) enable the Air Force Civil
Engineer Center in cooperation with the ERDC Arctic Infrastructure
Research Center to conduct RDT&E in support of LAMS capable of
operations at temperatures as low as -65F. The National Defense
Strategy (NDS) notes that the United States seeks a secure and stable
Arctic region. Developing equipment that enables campaigning in the
harsh Arctic environment reduces risk in the Department of Defense
(DOD) to generate and deploy forces to the region if needed to support
on-going stability.
(2) Counter Strategic Competitors in the Western Hemisphere ($5.2
million): Requested funds will enable DOD/USNORTHCOM to support
expanded intelligence and aerial & land detection and monitoring
capabilities for United States Federal Law Enforcement Agencies and the
Mexican Military. These capabilities will better position lead
agencies, as part of a whole-of-government approach, to reduce the
threat to the Homeland from transnational criminal organizations and
deter Strategic Competitors in the Western Hemisphere, and particularly
in Mexico.
Explanation: USNORTHCOM's relationships with Allies and partners
support integrated deterrence by using additional tools at the
Department's disposal to deter competitors and potential adversaries
from aggression and undue influence. DOD's alignment of counter
transnational criminal organization policies, investments, and
activities sustain and strengthen deterrence by reinforcing the United
States as the partner of first choice.
Increasing air and land domain awareness in the approaches to the
Homeland directly supports deterrence by denial as noted in the NDS by
maintaining our ability to advance U.S. national interests.
(3) Arctic Campaigning ($7.0 million): Funds requested will support
infrastructure improvement efforts at Pituffik Space Base (Thule,
Greenland). Pituffik SFB is the DOD's northernmost military
installation and the only installation north of the Arctic Circle. The
existing base infrastructure requires significant restoration and
improvements to withstand the harsh environmental conditions of the
region and support campaigning.
Explanation: USNORTHCOM and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) have worked together to define project requirements at Pituffik
SFB to enhance support for Arctic operations. Posturing defensive
forces forward, while actively campaigning, enables improved response
time and longer ``flying time on-station'' to deter competitors and
mitigate threats to the Homeland.
USACE will conduct geotechnical and topographic surveys at Pituffik
SFB to ensure appropriate design for infrastructure restoration/
construction and airfield pavement sites. The presence of permafrost
drives special foundation design to avoid future melting of permafrost
and severe settling of infrastructure floors ($1 million). USACE will
design projects to repair two non-serviceable hangars. One
environmentally controlled hangar will meet requirements to accommodate
Personnel Recovery aircraft and personnel on alert status; and the
other will serve as a facility for large aircraft maintenance and
maintenance administrative spaces ($6.0 million).
(4) Over the Horizon Radar (OTHR) Capability Acceleration ($55
million): The funds requested will procure a testbed and fund RDT&E to
integrate OTHR with space-based sensors.
Explanation: Funding will procure a replacement test asset ($20
million) to conduct wintertime atmospheric study and assess hardening
issues. The collected data will better characterize impacts of Auroral
clutter and identify strategies to mitigate impacts for northern-
looking High Frequency (HF) radars. The existing test set is currently
supporting real world operations and is expected to do so for an
extended time period. RDT&E efforts to integrate OTHR with MDA space
sensors and systems ($35 million) supports improving early warning and
tracking of challenging threats, addressing gaps for both Space and
OTHR systems. Funding would purchase backend servers at 2 sites and the
required software development. Aligned with the NDS, domain awareness
reduces risk and aids in escalation management. Additionally, in the
event of crisis, globally integrated domain awareness capabilities
increase warning and allow for flexible decisionmaking to respond, as
necessary.
(5) Domain Awareness Technology Development ($9.75 million): The
funds requested will provide for a demonstration of Cryogenic
Exploitation of Radio Frequency (CERF) sensor technology in an
operational environment (Alaska).
Explanation: The CERF prototype provides an ultra-wide band passive
sensor that contributes to all domain awareness for USNORTHCOM and
NORAD Homeland Defense missions. The system leverages Intelligence
Community (IC) investments to provide operational indication and
warning of potential threats by means of RF transmissions. Funding
would enable deployment planning, transportation, sensor installation,
communications architecture, and sensor demonstration as well as sensor
employment in an operationally relevant environment (Alaska). The
communications architecture will provide domain awareness data to
existing exploitation systems. The National Security Agency's
Warfighter Integration Program and Tactical Investment Portfolio
program managers in Y1432 will execute funding. Additional details and
applications are available at higher classification levels. Aligned
with the NDS, domain awareness reduces risk and aids in escalation
management. Additionally, in the event of crisis, globally integrated
domain awareness capabilities increase warning and allow for flexible
decisionmaking to respond, as necessary.
(6) ARCHER ($27 million): The funds requested will advance air
domain awareness capabilities by completing the planned ARCHER fielding
in Alaska and provide RDT&E funding required to deploy ARCHER well
north of the Arctic Circle.
Explanation: ARCHER is a passive sensor that contributes to all
domain awareness for USNORTHCOM and NORAD Homeland Defense. The systems
leverage commercial-off-the-shelf technology within an Air Force TENCAP
rapid acquisition effort. There are currently 21 of 35 planned systems
in Alaska. The requested funding would transition ARCHER from the rapid
acquisition process into the long-term sustainment process ($17
million). The funding request also includes RDT&E to develop improved
system shelters ($2.5 million), communications pathways ($2.5 million),
and upgraded geolocation software ($5 million) to enable deployment of
ARCHER systems into remote Arctic locations further north than the
current North Warning System.
Aligned with the NDS, domain awareness reduces risk and aids in
escalation management. Additionally, in the event of crisis, globally
integrated domain awareness capabilities increase warning and allow for
flexible decisionmaking to respond, as necessary.
(7) Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radars (3DELLR)
($211.SM): The funds requested will procure nine (9) 3DELLR's to fill
surveillance gaps caused by existing radar failures.
Explanation: Current long range radars fielded in the 1980's reach
the end of program life in 2025 and will begin to fail at increasing
rates. These radars include 45 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Air Route Surveillance Radars (ARSR-4) ringing CONUS, 14 (FPS-117)
radars at the North Warning System and 15 in the Alaska Radar System.
Procuring 3DELLR systems enable deploying a gap filler capability when
existing radar systems cannot be repaired in a timely manner.
Additionally, 3DELLR can be used to defend critical infrastructure as
required. There is no current Program of Record to replace the existing
radars, making 3DELLR the only option to maintain required domain
awareness for Homeland Defense.
Increasing air domain awareness in the approaches to the Homeland
directly support deterrence by denial as noted in the NDS. Further,
this capability is a risk mitigation in defending the Homeland-the
number one NDS priority.
(8) Modernize Homeland Defense Communications System (HDCS)
Infrastructure ($4.2 million): The funds requested will enable
procurement and sustainment of infrastructure and technology updates
for 61 radio sites; and the Eastern Air Defense Sector and Western Air
Defense Sector that supports access to 386 radars. The investment will
mitigate risk-to-mission from equipment facing accelerated end-of-life
timelines.
Explanation: Hardware and software upgrades at each site are
required for sensor data access and transport, communications
transmission, and information sharing enabling aircraft scramble
capability, cyber security needs, and Domain Awarene]ss for Homeland
Defense, POTUS travel, and National Security Special Events. Air domain
awareness in the interior and approaches to the Homeland directly
support deterrence by denial as noted in the NDS. Further, this
capability is a risk mitigation in defending the Homeland-the number
one NDS priority.
(9) Modernize NCR Domain Awareness [Enhanced Regional Situational
Awareness (ERSA)] ($33.21 million): The funds requested will modernize
the legacy standard definition ERSA camera system in and around the
National Capital Region (NCR) with high-definition systems.
Explanation: The ERSA camera system includes 21 electro optical/
infrared cameras and 8 visual warning systems. The standard-definition
cameras are designed to provide a timely and accurate local air picture
of low altitude, slow-and fast-moving aircraft that pose particular
identification problems within the NCR. Replacing the standard
definition with high-resolution cameras will provide a better visual
identification and characterization solution and be more cost effective
than sustaining the legacy cameras (with limited capabilities) and
scrambling United States Coast Guard helicopters and/or USAF fighters
to investigate and visually identify tracks of interest. Increasing air
domain awareness in the approaches to the Homeland directly support
deterrence by denial as noted in the NDS. Further, this capability is a
risk mitigation in defending the Homeland-the number one NDS priority.
(10) Core Technology Investment ($13.85 million): The requested
funds will enable procurement and installation of hardware and data
transmission technologies that support data sharing and collaboration
to enhance domain awareness and information dominance. Component
modernization will address shortfalls in Unclassified, Secret, and
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) networks.
Explanation: Rapid and agile communications infrastructure increase
the capability to see, understand, and share information that increases
the decision space for senior leaders. Specific investments will
address the NC3 network ($1.1 million); video teleconference
deficiencies ($2.25 million); the transition of the unclassified
telephone system to modem Voice Over Internet Protocol
(VOiP) technologies ($4.6 million); and deficient network servers,
fiber optic systems, and encryption devices ($5.9 million). Improving
domain awareness and information dominance support increased global
integration--the foundational elements to integrated deterrence.
Funding this request will reduce risk in the NOS priority to defend the
Homeland.
General Richardson. The information provided in our UPL submission
to Congress on March 21, 2023, in accordance with 10 USC 222a, provides
a narrative description for each requirement. Please see our UPL for
this information, which is attached as an enclosure for your
convenience. [The attachment has been retained in Committee files.]
13. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, what does the
Unfunded Priorities Lists purchase? (Include all end items with
quantities, contractor Full Time Equivalent, etc.)
General VanHerck. Please see response to question #12.
General Richardson. The information provided in our UPL submission
to Congress on March 21, 2023, in accordance with 10 USC 222a, provides
detailed information for each requirement. Please see our UPL for this
information, which is attached as an enclosure for your convenience. As
a clarifying detail on UPL requirement #3 (Cyber Domain Awareness/
Network Interoperability), the funding requested will provide 30
contractor full time equivalents to run three shifts and maintain a 24/
7/365 network cyber operations support center that is required by
USCYBERCOM EXORD. [The attachment has been retained in Committee
files.]
14. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, what specific
capability will the Unfunded Priorities Lists provide?
General VanHerck. My submitted Unfunded Priority List, in
accordance with 10 USC 222a, is intended to provide a range of mission-
critical capabilities not funded within the military Services base
budget, thereby buying down risk to force and risk to mission.
General Richardson. The information provided in our UPL submission
to Congress on March 21, 2023, in accordance with 10 USC 222a, provides
a description of the capability for each requirement. Please see our
UPL for this information, which is attached as an enclosure for your
convenience. [The attachment has been retained in Committee files.]
15. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, what gap will
this fill that is not in the base budget?
General VanHerck. Please see response to question #12.
General Richardson. The information provided in our UPL submission
to Congress on March 21, 2023, in accordance with 10 USC 222a, provides
information on impact if not funded for each requirement. Please see
our UPL for this information, which is attached as an enclosure for
your convenience. [The attachment has been retained in Committee
files.]
16. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, how will this
capability support objectives outlined in current National Security,
Military, and Defense Strategy documents?
General VanHerck. The Unfunded Priority List serves to enhance
NORAD & United States Northern Command's support of the objectives
outlined in the United States National Security Strategy, National
Military Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Defending the homeland
is the #1 priority of the National Defense Strategy and the National
Military Strategy; the systems, programs and capabilities identified in
the NORAD & USNORTHCOM Unfunded Priorities List all serve to address
this. Furthermore, as the DOD Arctic Capability Advocate, I am
designated to coordinate with other Combatant Commands, the Military
Services and Defense Agencies to ensure that Arctic capability gaps are
identified and prioritized. Arctic related N&NC Unfunded Priority List
items are submitted in accordance with this designation.
General Richardson. The NSS states ``no region impacts the United
States more directly than the Western Hemisphere.'' Presence and
proximity absolutely matter, and a stable and secure Western Hemisphere
is critical to homeland defense. The USSOUTHCOM UPL identifies
requirements in Domain Awareness, Security Cooperation, Cyber Domain
Awareness, Exercises and Partner Nation Training, Crisis Response, and
Countering Disinformation. All items on this list are requirements that
contribute directly to ensuring stability in our hemisphere.
17. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, what is the
operational requirement? How does this Unfunded Priorities Lists
support current or future operations?
General VanHerck. The response to question #12 offers a description
of the operational requirement for each item on the NORAD and
USNORTHCOM unfunded priority list.
General Richardson. The information provided in our UPL submission
to Congress on March 21, 2023, in accordance with 10 USC 222a, includes
descriptions of the operational requirements and impact if not funded
for each requirement. Please see our UPL for this information, which is
attached as an enclosure for your convenience. [The attachment has been
retained in Committee files.]
18. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, what is the
operational impact if this Unfunded Priorities Lists is not funded in
fiscal year 2024?
General VanHerck. The response to question #12 offers a description
of the operational impact resulting from lack of funding for each item
on the NORAD and USNORTHCOM unfunded priority list.
General Richardson. The information provided in our UPL submission
to Congress on March 21, 2023, in accordance with 10 USC 222a, includes
a description of the impact if not funded for each requirement. Please
see our UPL for this information, which is attached as an enclosure for
your convenience. [The attachment has been retained in Committee
files.]
19. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, are there
plans to include this item in the fiscal year 2025 base budget?
General VanHerck. The Military Service Departments are currently
developing their fiscal year 2025 proposals, and the combatant commands
do not participate in those deliberations. NORAD and USNORTHCOM will
not know if any of the requested capabilities are included in the
fiscal year 2025 base budget until the fiscal year 2025 President's
Budget Request is released.
General Richardson. As USSOUTHCOM does every year, we will work
with the Army as our Combatant Command Support Agent (CCSA), the other
Services, OSD, Defense Agencies, and the Joint Staff to include all our
requirements in the fiscal year 2025 budget submission.
20. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, why was this
Unfunded Priorities Lists not included in the Fiscal Year 2024
President's Budget submission?
General VanHerck. These items were submitted to the military
Services in accordance with the Department of Defense's budget process.
Based on internal priorities, the Services and/or the Department did
not include these items in their Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget
submissions.
General Richardson. As the USSOUTHCOM Commander, it is my
responsibility to articulate my requirements and the risk to force and
mission if these requirements are not met. The President's Budget
Request is ultimately determined by the President.
21. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, what is the
name of the vendor(s) executing this effort? Sub-vendor(s)?
General VanHerck. USNORTHCOM and NORAD do not have insight into
potential vendors. Combatant Commands determine requirements but are
reliant on the Services and Service Support Agencies to determine
vendors and execute contracts.
General Richardson. As a Combatant Command, USSOUTHCOM articulates
the capability that is required, with no regard to specific vendors. If
these requirements are funded, we would work with the appropriate
acquisition authority to source the capability. For those items on the
list that are already partially funded or active, vendor information is
provided below:
1b. Airborne Long-Wave Infra-red (LWIR) Hyperspectral
Imagery (HSI) Sensor: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL);
Smartronix Inc. (SMX)--Vendor: MAG Aerospace (MAG)--Sub-Vendor
1c. Center for Southeast Tropical Advance Remote Sensing
(CSTARS): Smartronix Inc. (SMX)--Vendor: University of Miami (UoM)--
Sub-Vendor
1d. Single Aircraft Precision (SAP) High Frequency (HF)
Direction Finding (DF) and Geolocation: Applied Signals Intelligence
(ASI); Smartronix Inc. (SMX)--Vendor: MAG Aerospace (MAG)--Sub-Vendor
3. Cyber Domain Awareness/Network Interoperability:
General Dynamics Information Technology (GDIT)--prime contractor
5. NAVSCIATTS: RMGS, Inc.
6. The Global Prepositioning Network (also referred to as
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)) will not be executed by
traditional vendors. It will be supported by the same enablers that
support the GPN/MPF and will leverage them in a similar fashion but
with alternative funding solutions (UPLs). These enablers include MSC,
Blount Island Command, Naval Beach Group, and the Navy Expeditionary
Logistics Support Group.
7. Countering Disinformation: FWG, Peraton, and Digital
Always-On
22. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, how often has
your command met with the vendor executing this effort?
General VanHerck. Please see the response to question #21.
General Richardson. For those requirements that are already
partially funded or operational, vendor information is provided below:
1b. LWIR-HSI: Over the last 3 years, USSOUTHCOM has
coordinated and collaborated with LLNL regarding the development of
this capability on an as needed basis, but not less than quarterly.
1c. CSTARS: USSOUTHCOM interacts daily with SMX/UofM
regarding this capability because they are executing the mission in the
field today.
1d. SAP-HF-DF: Over the last 5 years, USSOUTHCOM has
coordinated and collaborated with ASI regarding the development of this
capability on an as needed basis, but not less than quarterly.
3. Cyber Domain Awareness/Network Interoperability: GDIT
is the existing IT/Cyber provider for USSOUTHCOM, and as such we
collaborate daily.
5. NAVSCIATTS: USSOUTHCOM does not have a direct
relationship with RMGS, Inc.
6. The Global Prepositioning Network: MARFORSOUTH has met
with the Crisis Response-South (CR-S) enablers (vendors) on average
once per week since December 2022 to include regular attendance at the
Marine Corps' Preposition Force Structure Review to convey Crisis
Response requirements.
7. Countering Disinformation: USSOUTHCOM staff meets with
the vendors on a daily basis.
23. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, what is your
relationship history with this vendor?
General VanHerck. Please see the response to question #21.
General Richardson. I have no relationship history with these
vendors.
24. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, has anyone who
formerly worked for your command represented the vendor in meetings?
What is their name, what was their position, and when did you meet with
them?
General VanHerck. NORAD and USNORTHCOM do not participate in vendor
meetings and do not track vendor representation.
General Richardson. I am not aware of anyone who formerly worked at
USSOUTHCOM representing these vendors in meetings. SOUTHCOM has
processes in place to review vendor visits to ensure that each one is
conducted in accordance with applicable Federal laws and regulations,
whether related to the acquisition process (e.g. Competition in
Contracting Act) or restrictions on individuals based on ethics
restrictions, e.g. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207.
25. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, in which city/
State will the Unfunded Priorities Lists be executed?
General VanHerck. NORAD and USNORTHCOM do not participate in vendor
meetings and do not track vendor representation. I defer to the
appropriate Service or Service Support Agency regarding locations and
vendors.
General Richardson. For those requirements that are already
partially funded or operational, vendor execution information is
provided below:
1b. The completion/procurement of the capability would be
executed through LLNL of Livermore, CA. The installation and
integration onto the airframe would be executed through Smartronix, LLC
of Hollywood, MD, and in conjunction with MAG Aerospace of Fairfax, VA.
1c. This effort is executed through Smartronix, LLC of
Hollywood, MD, and in conjunction with the University of Miami located
in Coral Gables, FL.
1d. The procurement of the capability would be executed
through ASI in Sterling, VA. The installation and integration onto the
airframe would be executed through Smartronix, LLC of Hollywood, MD,
and in conjunction with MAG Aerospace of Fairfax, VA.
3. Coral Gables, FL
5. Stennis Space Center--Hancock County, MS
6. MSC's Reduced Operating Status (ROS) vessel and crew
are based out of Jacksonville, Florida. Marine Corps equipment will be
sourced primarily from Blount Island Command located in Jacksonville,
FL but will be globally sourced from Marine Corps holdings located at
Marine Corps Logistics base in Albany, GA as well as from the Fleet
Marine Forces located at Camp Lejeune in Jacksonville, NC. Navy
enablers will be sourced primarily from Amphibious Base Coronado in San
Diego, CA and from Cheatham Annex located in Williamsburg, VA. Marine
Corps forces will be sourced primarily from Reserve Component units
located across the country. As necessary, Active Component forces will
be sourced primarily from Camp Lejeune located in Jacksonville, NC.
7. Doral, FL
26. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, is this
requirement on an existing contract? If so, with who? What is the
history of the contract?
General VanHerck. NORAD and USNORTHCOM rely on the Services and
Service Support Agencies to select vendors and let the contract to
deliver the required capability to meet National Defense Strategy
objectives.
General Richardson. The requirements that are on existing contracts
are:
1c. The CSTARS requirement is currently in Option Year 1
on a General Services Administration contract. The current Period of
Performance (PoP) runs from 24 August 2022 to 23 August 2023.
2d. Acquisition is through a U.S. Navy Program of
Record--I defer to the Navy.
3. GDIT is the existing IT/Cyber provider for USSOUTHCOM.
5. USSOUTHCOM acquires this training directly from
NAVSCIATTS. NAVSCIATTS uses RMGS, Inc. to augment its faculty.
USSOUTHCOM does not have a history with this contract.
7. FWG and Peraton. Our FWG contracts started in 2019 and
2021, our Peraton started in 2021, and our Digital Always-on contract
is new this year.
27. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, what is the
anticipated contract award date if the Unfunded Priorities Lists
receives funding?
General VanHerck. I defer to the appropriate Service or Service
Support Agency regarding potential contract award dates.
General Richardson. Obligation and expenditure of resources is
highly dependent on when funds become available if Congress ultimately
supports these requirements. My team is ready to execute these
requirements and activities in a timely manner and within the
authorization limits imposed by the type of funding.
28. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, what funding
lines are associated with this Unfunded Priorities Lists?
General VanHerck. General VanHerck Funding lines were submitted
with our Unfunded Priorities List in accordance with 10 USC 222a.
Over the Horizon Radar Capability Acceleration
OPAF P1 line 55 0102417F
RDAF R1 line 158
Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radars (3DELRR)
OPAF P1 line 22 0207455F
ARCHER
OPAF P1 line 55 0102412F
RDAF R1 line 157
Modernize Homeland Defense Communications Systems (HDCS) Infrastructure
OMAF line 10/12A 0102331F
Modernize NCR Domain Awareness ERSA
OPAF P1 line 19 0102326F
Arctic Campaigning
OMAF line 160/15C 0201130F
Arctic Capable Prepositioned Shelters
RDA line 110/84 0604804A
RDAF 0604617F
Countering Strategic Competitors in the Western Hemisphere
OMAF line 440/42G 0201147F
Core Technology Investment
OMAF line 160/15C 0201130F
General Richardson. The funding lines are included in our UPL
submission to Congress on March 21, 2023, in accordance with 10 USC
222a. Please see our UPL for this information, which is attached as an
enclosure for your convenience. [The attachment has been retained in
Committee files.]
29. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, if multiple
appropriations fund this requirement, must all appropriations be funded
simultaneously to source this requirement, or can each appropriation
stand on its own to fund a portion of the requirement?
General VanHerck. NORAD and USNORTHCOM submitted 10 items on the
commands' fiscal year 2024 UPL. Three of the 10 requested capabilities
included multiple appropriations: Over-the-Horizon Radar, ARCHER, and
Arctic-Capable Prepositioned Shelters. Each appropriation funds a
distinct and independent aspect of the requested capability, allowing
each appropriation to stand on its own.
General Richardson. For all but two items in the USSOUTHCOM UPL, a
single appropriation is being requested. My second priority requirement
within ISR (1b) would be funded by two appropriations [Procurement
(PROC) and Operation & Maintenance (O&M)]. Due to the lead time to
complete acquisition of the capability, it would be necessary to
receive the PROC resources prior to the O&M; however, the O&M is
essential to operationalize the capability in theater. Delaying the O&M
delays the critical capabilities the Command requires. USSOUTHCOM
continues to accept risk in this mission. One other ISR requirement
(1d) would be funded by two appropriations [Procurement (PROC) and
Operation & Maintenance (O&M)]. Due to a short lead time to complete
capability and existing aircraft platforms, the funding for both
appropriations would be needed simultaneously.
30. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, how much was
enacted and obligated (or expended for Research, Development, Test, &
Evaluation) in fiscal year 2022-23 for this requirement?
General VanHerck. The following UPL titles and parenthetical
references will be used in questions 30 to 34:
Over the Horizon Radar (OTHR):
Fiscal Year 2022: $66.022 million Fiscal Year 2023: $12.21
million
Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR):
Fiscal Year 2022: $0 Fiscal Year 2023: $14.49 million
ARCHER:
Fiscal Year 2022: $.095 million Fiscal Year 2023: $0
Modernize Homeland Defense Communication System (HDCS)
Infrastructure:
Fiscal Year 2022: $0 Fiscal Year 2023: $0
Modernize National Capital Region Domain Awareness--Enhanced
Regional Situational Awareness (ERSA):
Fiscal Year 2022: $0 Fiscal Year 2023: $0
Arctic Campaigning (Campaigning):
Fiscal Year 2022: $0 Fiscal Year 2023: $0
Arctic Capable Prepositioned Shelters (Shelters):
Fiscal Year 2022: $0 Fiscal Year 2023: $0
Domain Awareness Technology Development--Cryogenic Exploitation of
Radio Frequency (CERF):
Fiscal Year 2022: $0 Fiscal Year 2023: $0
Counter Strategic Competitors in the Western Hemisphere
(Competitors):
Fiscal Year 2022: $0 Fiscal Year 2023: $0
Core Technology Investment (CTI):
Fiscal Year 2022: $0 Fiscal Year 2023: $0
General Richardson. Below is information for those requirements
that were funded in fiscal years 2022 to 2023:
1c. In fiscal year 2022, $10 million in RDT&E was enacted
for this requirement. No RDT&E resources were enacted or obligated for
this requirement in fiscal year 2023.
2c. $16 million will be funded from the enacted fiscal
year 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act Sec. 8068 for Regional
Andean Ridge Environmental Multi Domain Awareness.
2d. Total fiscal year 2023 funding enacted for this
initiative is $21.5. An initial $16.1 million was provided in base
budget. An additional $5.4 million will be funded from the enacted
fiscal year 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act Sec. 8068.
2e. Total fiscal year 2023 funding enacted for this
initiative is $3.7 million.
2f. Total fiscal year 2023 funding for this initiative is
$13.43 million, which will be funded from the enacted fiscal year 2023
Consolidated Appropriations Act Sec. 8068.
4a. $3.5 million will be funded from the enacted fiscal
year 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act Sec. 8068 for Southern Star.
4b. $1.2 million was obligated in fiscal year 2022 to
conduct Keel-Billed Toucan 2022. $1.2 million was obligated in fiscal
year 2023 to conduct Keel-Billed Toucan 2023.
31. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, how much was
requested in fiscal year 2024 for this requirement?
General VanHerck. The Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget includes
resourcing as noted below:
OTHR: The Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget includes $553.1
million for the Air Force OTHR program. This funding supports
development, initial procurement, and planning and design for
future military construction. The UPL request includes funding
for a testbed and RDT&E to integrate OTHR data with space-based
sensors. These two efforts are not included in the Fiscal Year
2024 President's Budget Request.
3DELRR: The Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget includes $103.5
million for the Air Force program to procure three radars. The
NORAD and USNORTHCOM UPL requests funding for an additional
nine radars.
ARCHER: The Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget includes $.577
million to procure one sensor and conduct continuing RDT&E. The
NORAD and USNORTHCOM UPL requests funding to establish long-
term sustainment and RDT&E to improve communication links and
enable deployment in Arctic regions.
HDCS: There is no funding for this specific requirement in the
Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget. Sustainment funding for
the existing system is supported from the Global C3I & Early
Warning Sub-activity Group (SAG 12A)
ERSA: $0
Campaigning: $0
Shelters: $0
CERF: $0
Competitors: $30.4 million is included in the USNORTHCOM
baseline allocation. The UPL includes requests for additive
capability not supported within baseline allocation.
CTI: $2.4 million is included as a line item add to USNORTHCOM
in Air Force Operations and Maintenance Justification Books.
General Richardson. The funding requested for fiscal year 2024 is
included in our fiscal year 2024 UPL submission to Congress on March
21, 2023, in accordance with 10 USC 222a. Please see our UPL for this
information, which is attached as an enclosure for your convenience.
[The attachment has been retained in Committee files.]
32. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, is there a
tail associated with this Unfunded Priorities Lists?
General VanHerck. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM methodology for
developing requests to be included in the UPL specifically seek
capabilities that drive minimal or no follow-on (``tail'') costs.
OTHR: The Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
request does not have follow-on funding requirements. The OTHR
testbed will have some level of follow-on operations and
sustainment (O&S) costs that will be determined by the
Department of the Air Force (DAF). These costs will be funded
through the OTHR program.
3DELRR: The Air Force Program Office estimates O&S costs will
be approximately $15 million per year if all 9 requested
systems are authorized and funded. This O&S cost is not
effective until fiscal year 2026 when the radar systems are
delivered, which provides ample time for NORAD and USNORTHCOM
to work with DAF for resource alignment.
ARCHER: The RDT&E request does not have follow-on funding
requirements. The request includes $17 million specifically
intended to establish long-term sustainment of existing
capability.
HDCS: There are no follow-on costs. The request supports a one-
time software modernization. On-going maintenance of the
existing capability will be funded through the program
baseline.
ERSA: There are no anticipated follow-on costs. The request
supports a one-time camera modernization. On-going maintenance
of the modernized capability will be funded through the
existing program baseline.
Campaigning: There are no follow-on costs. This request
resources one-time facility Planning and Design work.
Shelters: There are no follow-on costs. This request resources
specific RDT&E work only.
CERF: There are no follow-on costs. This request resources
specific RDT&E work only.
Competitors: There are no follow-on costs.
CTI: There are no anticipated follow-on costs. The request
supports a one-time investment in technology component
modernization. On-going maintenance and sustainment of the
modernized capability will be funded through the existing
program baseline.
General Richardson. All items in the UPL have funding requirements
beyond fiscal year 2024, except item 6, the Global Prepositioning
Network, which is a one-time cost in fiscal year 2024 until USMC
decides to sustain this capability. No recurring expenses apply to
USSOUTHCOM as sustainment is within USMC's budget in subsequent years
unless the GPN is activated in response to an emerging in-theater
crisis at which point USSOUTHCOM will use appropriate O&M funding
mechanisms.
33. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, is any tail
funded in the future years defense plan?
General VanHerck. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM methodology for
developing requests to be included in the UPL specifically seek
capabilities that drive minimal or no follow-on (``tail'') costs. As
noted in question 32, the only requests that may drive future-year
funding requirements are the OTHR testbed and 3DELRR. If funding for
this request is authorized and appropriated by Congress, NORAD and
USNORTHCOM will work with Department of the Air Force to develop an
appropriate sustainment plan.
General Richardson. No.
34. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, please
describe how much the requirement will cost per year for the next 5
years.
General VanHerck.
OTHR: The Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
request does not have follow-on funding requirements. The OTHR
testbed will have some level of follow-on operations and
sustainment (O&S) costs that will be determined by the
Department of the Air Force (DAF). These costs will be funded
through the OTHR program.
3DELRR: The Air Force Program Office estimates O&S costs will
be approximately $15 million per year if all 9 requested
systems are authorized and funded. This O&S cost is not
effective until fiscal year 2026 when the radar systems are
delivered, which provides ample time for NORAD and USNORTHCOM
to work with DAF for resource alignment.
ARCHER: There are no additional costs per year. The system is a
passive sensor requiring only periodic maintenance and
sustainment. The request includes $17 million specifically
intended to establish long-term sustainment of existing
capability.
HDCS: There are no follow-on costs. The request supports a one-
time software modernization. On-going maintenance of the
existing capability will be funded through the program
baseline.
ERSA: There are no anticipated follow-on costs. The request
supports a one-time camera modernization. On-going maintenance
of the modernized capability will be funded through the
existing program baseline.
Campaigning: There are no follow-on costs. This request
resources one-time facility Planning and Design work.
Shelters: There are no follow-on costs. This request resources
specific RDT&E work only.
CERF: There are no follow-on costs. This request resources
specific RDT&E work only.
Competitors: There are no follow-on costs.
CTI: There are no anticipated follow-on costs. The request
supports a one-time investment in technology component
modernization. On-going maintenance and sustainment of the
modernized capability will be funded through the existing
program baseline.
General Richardson. Below is the information for the outyear costs
that are known or anticipated at this time:
1a. This requirement will have a future cost; however, at
this time that amount is unknown.
1b. This requirement is anticipated to cost $45.5 million
over the next 5 years.
1c. This requirement is anticipated to cost $35.7 million
over the next 5 years.
1d. This requirement is anticipated to cost $0.9 million
over the next 5 years.
2c. This requirement is anticipated to cost $351.8
million over the next 5 years.
2d. This requirement is anticipated to cost $31.7 million
over the next 5 years.
2e. This requirement is anticipated to cost $48.6 million
over the next 5 years.
2f. This requirement is anticipated to cost $81.4 million
over the next 5 years.
2g. This requirement is anticipated to cost $1.5 million
over the next 5 years.
2h. This requirement will have a future cost; however, at
this time that amount is unknown.
2i. This requirement is anticipated to cost $64.6 million
over the next 5 years.
3. This requirement is anticipated to cost $93.6 million
over the next 5 years.
4a. This requirement is anticipated to cost $15.8 million
over the next 5 years.
4b. This requirement is anticipated to cost $19.5 million
over the next 5 years.
5. This requirement is anticipated to cost $80M over the
next 5 years.
6. This requirement will be funded through operational or
disaster relief funding based on employment of the capability in year
of execution.
7. This requirement is anticipated to cost $17-25 million
over the next 5 years.
35. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, please provide
in detail the previous funding requests and enacted for this
requirement, including if it was in the base budget or Unfunded
Priorities Lists.
General VanHerck. The capabilities included in the NORAD and
USNORTHCOM fiscal year 2024 Unfunded Priority List (UPL) were not
included in prior UPL. The fiscal year 2022 UPL did include a request
for $25.1 million to accelerate Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR)
procurement and fielding. That funding request was enacted and the Air
Force Program Office responsible for OTHR is obligating the funds. The
fiscal year 2024 OTHR related request addresses new and distinct
requirements to increase capability and further accelerate OTHR
fielding.
General Richardson. No resources have been enacted for UPL items
1a, 1b, & 1d. Item 1a was submitted in USSOUTHCOM's fiscal year 2023
UPL at $10.2 million but not funded. 1b was submitted in the fiscal
year 2023 UPL at $9.7 million but not funded. In fiscal year 2021 ($7
million) and fiscal year 2022 ($10 million), the CSTARS requirement was
funded via RDT&E resources that were provided to a national government
agency. The Paraguay Riverine Security Resilience Program (RSRP) and
the Paraguay Special Operations Forces (SOF) requirement were both
funded under the fiscal year 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act Sec.
8068. $27.3 million was funded for Regional Andean Ridge Environmental
Multi Domain Awareness from the enacted fiscal year 2023 Consolidated
Appropriations Act Sec. 8068. For the Regional Caribbean Domain
Awareness requirement, an initial $16.1 million was provided in base
budget and an additional $5.4 million was funded via the fiscal year
2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act Sec. 8068. $3.7 million was
enacted in the fiscal year 2023 base budget for the Jamaica SOF
requirement. The fiscal year 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act Sec.
8068 also is also providing $13.43 million for the Theater Maintenance
Partnership Program. No resources have been enacted for items 2g, 2h,
and 2i. USSOUTHCOM has submitted the Cyber Domain Awareness/Network
Interoperability requirement to the lead service or funding authority
in the fiscal year 2023, 2024, 2025 budget/POM cycles. USSOUTHCOM has
also submitted it to OSD, which directed the U.S. Army to partially
fund it in President's Budget Request 2023 ($8.3 million) and
President's Budget Request 2024 ($8.6 million) respectively. $3.5
million of the funds enacted in the fiscal year 2023 Consolidated
Appropriations Act Sec. 8068 for will fund the Southern Star Exercise.
$1.2 million was obligated in fiscal year 2022 to conduct Keel-Billed
Toucan 2022 (base budget). $1.2 million was obligated in fiscal year
2023 to conduct Keel-Billed Toucan 2023 (base budget). The Countering
Disinformation requirement was funded in fiscal year 2023 at $11
million in the base budget. No resources have been enacted for any
other requirements on the UPL.
36. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, if the
requirement is not included in the future years defense plan, will that
be rectified in the next Program Objective Memorandum or the Program,
Planning, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) cycle?
General VanHerck. The Military Service Departments are currently
developing their fiscal year 2025 proposals and the combatant commands
do not have visibility on those deliberations. NORAD and USNORTHCOM
will not know if any of the requested capabilities are included in the
fiscal year 2025 base budget until the fiscal year 2025 President's
Budget Request is released.
General Richardson. I commit to working with the Army as my
Combatant Command Support Agent (CCSA), the other Services, OSD,
Defense Agencies, and the Joint Staff to include all USSOUTHCOM
requirements in future budget submissions.
37. Senator Warren. General VanHerck and Richardson, please provide
photos of this requirement for visual aid.
General VanHerck. NORAD and USNORTHCOM rely on the Services and
Service Support Agencies to select the vendors and let contracts to
deliver the capability we require to meet National Defense Strategy
objectives. I have no insight into what vendors the Services might
select for any given contract, and therefore I do not have the ability
to provide photos.
General Richardson. As a Combatant Command, USSOUTHCOM outlines the
capability required and an acquisition authority will contract or
purchase a capability to meet that requirement. At this time, the exact
equipment to be purchased for most of our UPL items are unknown. For
those items where specific equipment has already been identified, we
have included photos below:
1c. Center for Southeast Tropical Advance Remote Sensing
2c. Near Coastal Patrol Vessel
2d. Utility Boat (UTB)
2h. C-182 aircraft
2i. TPS-78 Radar
4a. Southern Star Exercise Support--photo from 2022 exercise
4b. Keel-Billed Toucan 24--photo below from 2023 exercise
4c. FIDAE--photo from 2022 trade and air show in Chile
4d. CRUZEX--photo from 2010 exercise
4e. TAPIO-24--photo from 2022
4f. RELAMPAGO-24--photo from 2022
5. NAVSCIATTS
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
transnational organized crimes and fentanyl
38. Senator Manchin. General Richardson, how are you working with
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict, who has led in the Department of Defense for the
counternarcotic mission, to combat this epidemic?
General VanHerck. USNORTHCOM personnel work with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity conflict
through the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counter-narcotics and Stabilization Policy (DASD/CNSP). DASD/CNSP
provides continuous programmatic and policy guidance for the
Department's counterdrug mission to all combatant commands, including
USNORTHCOM, to implement the authorities provided by Congress, which
enables military support to lead Federal agencies and partner nation
law enforcement. DASD/CNSP further provides an annual budget to
USNORTHCOM, coordinated to ensure policy and program goals are met.
General Richardson. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense--
Counter Narcotics/Special Projects (CN/SP), within the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict, is the DOD lead for CN, Counter Drug (CD), and Counter Trans-
Criminal Organizations (C-TCO). We work closely with this office as we
develop the operational requirements to meet our statutorily directed
mission to detect and monitor the trafficking of illegal drugs in the
air and maritime domains throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.
critical infrastructure protection
39. Senator Manchin. General VanHerck and General Richardson, what
additional authorities or resources are you looking for that will allow
you to better perform your duties of security our critical
infrastructure?
General VanHerck. I do not currently require additional authorities
for the defense of critical infrastructure. Regarding resources, domain
awareness is my top priority. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Unfunded
Priority List includes requests for an Over-the-Horizon Radar testbed
to accelerate fielding and for procurement of nine Three-Dimensional
Expeditionary Long Range Radars (3DELRR). The 3DELRR radars could be
used to fill surveillance gaps in support of critical defense
infrastructure if tasked. NORAD and USNORTHCOM have submitted a plan to
the Department of Defense (DOD) identifying a range of options to
defend defense critical infrastructure, and I am awaiting a DOD
assessment of those options. I believe that policy guidance should
expand beyond defense critical infrastructure, and NORAD and USNORTHCOM
are working closely with the Department, the interagency, and the
National Security Council toward that effort.
General Richardson. USSOUTHCOM focuses efforts on exposing,
illuminating, and attributing Malign State Actor (MSA) activity through
information and intelligence sharing with the interagency and partner
nations. For example, we work with the interagency and partner nations
to provide assessments of partner nation infrastructure vulnerabilities
and look for opportunities to assist interagency partners like the
Departments of Treasury and Commerce to provide U.S. assistance to our
partner nations with civil-military activities. These activities are
meant to meet our partners at their need and demonstrate the U.S.
commitment to the region, while outmaneuvering malign actors who might
otherwise step in to capitalize on those vulnerabilities.
It is critical for our interagency partners to be appropriately
resourced and staffed for this mission as much of the influence fight
takes place outside USSOUTHCOM authorities. In those areas that
directly affect our authorities, we need more efficient vetting
processes to be able to reduce the lag time in identifying and getting
partner personnel into training and education programs like the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. We need a
more streamlined foreign military sales pipeline to meet the real-world
challenges that partner nations face. We need the ability to react at
scale to support USG messaging, counter disinformation, amplify key
narratives, and refocus target audiences on topics of national
security. This can only be accomplished through a multi-front campaign
including, removal of disinformation, the timely release of messages
that are amplified at scale, the use of third-party validators that are
able to reinforce that narrative, the ability to offer a private/public
alternative that is viable, and a proactive technologically advanced
protective force that can work on partner nation infrastructure.
chinese activities in the region
40. Senator Manchin. General VanHerck and General Richardson, what
challenges do you foresee in pursuing security cooperation with these
countries?
General VanHerck. A challenge to USNORTHCOM security cooperation
efforts is the mandate under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 312 that restricts how
combatant commanders can expend funds to facilitate partner nation
participation in Traditional Commander's Activities. For example, The
Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) is a willing partner, and the
Bahamian Government has made substantial investments in new ships and
improving their military bases. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 312 requires
``extraordinary circumstances'' for a waiver to pay for RBDF expenses
incident to engagements that strengthen our alliance, even if it is
more cost effective to conduct them in the United States. This
requirement affects my ability to be a consistent and responsive
security cooperation partner to this vital partner, and constitutes my
biggest challenge in countering malign Chinese influence in The
Bahamas.
General Richardson. In this region, a small investment--whether in
time, physical resources, funding, or collaboration--goes a long way.
We don't have to outspend the PRC to outcompete, but we must be present
on the field and deliver at the speed of relevance. The USSOUTHCOM
Security Cooperation program has historically been resourced at
approximately half of our requirement. In the fiscal year 23
Consolidated Appropriations Act (Sec. 8068), Congress supported our
Security Cooperation program, funding some of those requirements that
had not previously been resourced. Further, it is critical to have a
timely and predictable budget--continuing resolutions are disruptive to
U.S. and partner nation efforts to defend against threats. If we don't
have presence in the AOR, the PRC and Russia will fill the void.
41. Senator Manchin. General VanHerck and General Richardson, while
I recognize the challenges associated with detecting and identifying
unmanned objects into our national airspace, could you provide as an
update on USNORTHCOM and NORAD's efforts to identify/deconflict non-
security related activities in our airspace?
General VanHerck. NORAD and USNORTHCOM coordinate directly with the
FAA on a daily basis for both security and non-security activities in
our airspace.
General Richardson. I defer to General VanHerck on USNORTHCOM/
NORAD's efforts to identify/deconflict non-security related activities
in U.S. airspace.
critical minerals in latin america
42. Senator Manchin. General Richardson, do you assess that we are
providing viable alternatives for partnerships with our Latin American
partners, especially as China has taken a hit on the international
stage due to their role in failing to contain the COVID-19 outbreak?
General Richardson. While China did take a hit on the international
stage due to COVID, the PRC was also first on scene within our AOR to
deliver vaccines and support in the wake of COVID. The United States
response was slow in this region, and I believe we have some work to do
make up ground that we lost following the pandemic.
Both the U.S. Government and private industry are working closely
with our partners in the hemisphere to increase security and economic
investment and opportunities, but we must do better. First, we must do
a better job of taking credit for all that Team USA does, from
providing critical life-saving aid to countries following a disaster to
supporting construction of critical infrastructure. United States
Federal agencies and United States-based companies already do so much
to partner with the nations of this hemisphere, but United States
presence and engagement is not always evident to our partners, nor our
adversaries. Second, we must work closely with these nations to learn
about opportunities for partnership and collaboration where our shared
democratic values can thrive, as opposed to allowing malign State
actors to take advantage of the needs of our partners. Specific to DOD,
we must work with our partner nation militaries and security forces to
ensure a secure environment where Western businesses can invest without
concern for the corruption and insecurity brought by TCOs.
fisa reauthorization
43. Senator Manchin. General VanHerck and General Richardson, what
impact would a failure to reauthorize Title Seven have in your ability
to assist our partners and support your efforts to defend our Nation
against malign actors?
General VanHerck. Without FISA Section 702, NORAD and USNORTHCOM's
missions to defend the homeland will be impaired. FISA Section 702 has
helped the commands to understand the strategic intentions of the
foreign governments we are most interested in: the People's Republic of
China (PRC), Russia, Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea. It allows the intelligence community to acquire communications
of specific foreign actors overseas and use those details to identify
and mitigate terrorist plans, cyberattacks, and foreign intelligence
threats. In the last 2 decades, the PRC has evolved as America's
primary geopolitical challenge while Russia continues to pose an acute
and ongoing threat to regional security in Europe. There has also been
a change in conflict. Cyberspace is now a battleground and
cybersecurity has become one of our most pressing national security
concerns. Section 702 is needed to address these evolving challenges
and plays an important role in keeping our Nation secure. In recent
examples, FISA Section 702 assisted in identifying multiple foreign
ransomware attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure and helped
positioned the interagency to respond to and mitigate these events, and
in some instances, prevent significant attacks on U.S. networks. FISA
Section 702-acquired information related to sanctioned foreign
adversaries was used in USG efforts to stop components for weapons of
mass destruction from reaching foreign actors.
General Richardson. Reauthorization of this authority is key to
USSOUTHCOM's intelligence gathering and helps us close our intelligence
gaps. It is the authority that gives us insights into hostile foreign
actors, reporting of cybersecurity threats, counterterrorism threats,
and protecting U.S. allied troops. Without this authority, USSOUTHCOM's
mission to provide indications and warnings, track external State
actors, protect the Homeland, and gain insight into malign State actors
and their activities in the AOR would be severely impaired.
cyber operations
44. Senator Manchin. General VanHerck and General Richardson, based
on the importance of the Cyber domain and its critical integration into
all domains of the Joint Operational environment, is your command
resourced and staffed appropriately to keep pace with the integration
of Cyber capabilities in an operational environment?
General VanHerck. I have significant concerns about emerging cyber
threats to the homeland, however I believe NORAD and USNORTHCOM are
appropriately staffed at this time. In particular, USNORTHCOM has
gained significant capability through the USCYBERCOM Cyberspace
Operations Integrated Planning Element (COIPE) assigned to my
headquarters. The COIPE coordinated defensive and offensive cyber
capabilities within the USNORTHCOM area of operations and is integral
to my ability to compete in the cyber domain. COIPEs are in high demand
in all operational theaters, as they provide crucial expertise, domain
awareness, and capability in the cyber domain.
Regarding resourcing, the USNORTHCOM fiscal year 2024 Unfunded
Priority List included requests for $4.2 million to modernize homeland
defense communications system infrastructure and $13.85 million for
core technology investments. These efforts will improve USNORTHCOM
communications and information security and mitigate risk to mission
from equipment that is nearing the end of its service life. The core
technology investment would enable procurement and installation of
hardware and data transmission technologies to enhance domain awareness
and information sharing while addressing shortfalls in unclassified,
secret, and nuclear command, control, and communications networks.
General Richardson. USSOUTHCOM is accepting risk based on the
resources and staff I currently have to address the growing and
evolving need to integrate cyber capabilities in an operational
environment.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
iran's presence in the western hemisphere
45. Senator Rosen. Latin America is viewed by the Iranian regime as
a key area in which it can expand its influence. By forging
partnerships with leaders in the region, Iran develops new arenas in
which it can conduct illicit activities and circumvent sanctions. This
deepening of ties is perhaps best encapsulated by last year's agreement
between Iran and the Maduro regime in Venezuela. Under this 20-year
agreement, the two countries will cooperate in the areas of oil,
defense, and agriculture. Iran has also deepened its presence in Latin
America through its proxy Hezbollah. Hezbollah is not only a potential
terrorist threat in your Area of Responsibilities, but also an actor
deeply embedded in transnational organized crime networks in the
region, including drug trafficking. That's why last Congress, Senator
Blackburn and I introduced the Hezbollah in Latin America
Accountability Act to hold Iran and Hezbollah accountable for their
activities in the region.
General Richardson, can you update the Committee on Hezbollah's
recent activities in Latin America? In addition, can you explain how
the Iranian regime has expanded its influence in the region and the
steps SOUTHCOM is taking to disrupt and degrade both actors' power
projection capabilities?
General Richardson. Hizballah is active in Latin America,
exploiting the region for fundraising and terrorist operations. The
Lebanese Hizballah Foreign Relations Department is charged with
liaising with diasporas throughout the world. We estimate the Lebanese
diaspora in Latin America sends more than $212 million annually in
remittances, some of which lands in the hands of Hizballah. Support for
Hizballah is most pronounced within the diasporas in Venezuela and the
Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, and we have seen
terrorist-related activity in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and Peru during
the last decade.
Hizballah's Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) is responsible for the
systematic clandestine planning, coordination, and execution of
terrorist activities, such as the development of contingency-based
attack options, outside of the Levant to include in Latin America. In
late 2021 in Colombia, Hizballah was planning to assassinate an Israeli
national in Bogota to avenge the January 2020 killing of Iran's Qods
Force commander Qasem Soleimani as part of a broader operation that
also targeted Americans. In 2017, Bolivian authorities identified a
Hizballah-affiliated warehouse and seized enough explosive precursor
material to produce a two-and-a-half-ton bomb. In 2014, Peruvian police
arrested a Hizballah operative in Lima for planning a terrorist
operation and regional security services disrupted a plot targeting
civilians in Chile.
Iran seeks to improve its standing in the region, while also
portraying the United States as culpable for the region's socioeconomic
and citizen security challenges. To do so, Iran uses its relationship
with Venezuela, the Shia Muslim diaspora, cultural centers throughout
Latin America, Spanish-language media, and military outreach. Venezuela
is Iran's primary ally in the Western Hemisphere. Tehran's relationship
with Caracas has consisted primarily of economic cooperation to assist
each country with circumventing sanctions, arms transfers, and
intellectual and skill exchanges. Iranian leaders will periodically
travel to the region to bolster economic and social ties. In mid-June,
Iranian President Raisi visited Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba to
discuss increased cooperation in the areas of science, biotechnology,
and energy, as well as to expand economic ties and trade. Earlier this
year, Iran's foreign minister or deputy foreign minister have conducted
diplomatic engagements with Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela. Iran uses its cultural centers to gain access to prominent
individuals within the Islamic and indigenous communities throughout
the region. In late 2022, the Iranian ships Makran and Dena (oiler and
frigate respectively) initiated a round-the-world cruise that concluded
in early 2023, with a 1-week stop in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil to ``show
the authority of the dear people of Iran to the whole world,''
according to Iran's Navy Chief. In mid-2021, midway through a trip to
Venezuela to deliver seven small fast-attack boats, Iran diverted two
ships to St. Petersburg, Russia, suggesting Caracas acquiesced to
United States diplomatic concerns.
safeguarding domain awareness
46. Senator Rosen. Our competitors continue to field advanced
capabilities across domains that have the potential to threaten the
Homeland. In light of these threats, NORTHCOM and NORAD must ensure
that the systems providing the Homeland with domain awareness are
survivable, adaptable, and modern. In addition, these systems must be
hardened, as they will be subject to an array of cyberattacks during
any contingency. I am encouraged by NORTHCOM's continued efforts to
modernize legacy detection systems such as the Over the Horizon Radar,
but detection alone is not sufficient. Operators must also have the
ability to effectively communicate the operational picture to other
commands, as well as to our partners and allies, often under highly
compressed timeframes.
General VanHerck, what steps are you taking to sufficiently harden
our command and control nodes, particularly in the cyber domain, so
that we are able to effectively share the operational picture during a
conflict?
General VanHerck. I have conducted an assessment of requirements
for defending NORAD and USNORTHCOM command and control assets in the
homeland against kinetic and non-kinetic threats. My recommendations
include acquiring automated sensors to detect cyber intrusions,
ensuring first line cyber-defenders are tasked and resourced, and
ensuring adequate defensive Cyber Protection Teams are tasked in the
event of a detected intrusion. I have provided those recommendations to
the Department to inform decisions regarding resourcing, the Services
who own the assets, and USCYBERCOM, which has the technical expertise
to execute the defensive recommendations. Cyber Domain Awareness is a
key part of this initiative, and while I can visualize the cyber assets
controlled by NORAD and USNORTHCOM, my missions rely on many more
critical nodes that are not owned or operated by NORAD or USNORTHCOM.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
chinese surveillance balloon
47. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, prior to the late January/
early February shootdown of the Chinese surveillance balloon, had
NORTHCOM developed options for countering this threat?
General VanHerck. Yes, NORAD and NORTHCOM maintain options daily to
engage potential threats to North America and the United States.
48. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, when were these options
presented to the Secretary of Defense?
General VanHerck. As I testified in open session before the Senate
Armed Services Committee on 23 March 2023, I presented options relating
to the PRC HAB to the Secretary of Defense on 1 February 2023. However,
I'd like to reiterate that I am prepared every single second of every
day to defend our Homeland.
chinese and russian actions in usnorthcom aor
49. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, I have an article from last
year which quotes you as saying that China and Russia are ``very
aggressive and active'' in the whole area of the Northern Command's
area of responsibility, including the Bahamas and Mexico. We've seen
what happened with the Chinese spy balloon. Can you give other examples
of aggressive actions?
General VanHerck. In The Bahamas, the PRC continues its aggressive
economic and political engagement. The PRC Ambassador remains active in
an effort to present the PRC as the alternative to United States
partnership in the region, and has renewed offers to provide economic
assistance, to include renovating the Bahamas' largest stadium. The PRC
also donated medical assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic and relief
supplies such as greenhouses following Hurricane Dorian. Since at least
2013, Chinese entities and intermediaries have supplied Mexican
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) with precursors and
equipment for the production of synthetic opioids and methamphetamine,
and facilitated illicit exports of Mexican iron ore, timber, and other
commodities and raw materials. In addition, Chinese entities have
assisted Mexican TCOs in laundering the revenues and profits generated
from the drug trade and other illicit activities. These activities
ultimately bolster the financial and operational bases of the TCOs,
contributing to the threat they pose to Mexico's internal security as
well as enabling flows of synthetic drugs into the United States.
Although Russia's focus continues to be on its war against Ukraine,
Russian long-range aviation remains capable of executing high-priority
missions and is routinely used to demonstrate Russia's capabilities and
global reach, including through Air Defense Identification Zone
incursions off the Alaskan and Canadian coasts with their heavy
bombers.
50. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, what do we need to do in
order to adequately deter Russia and China in your Area of
Responsibilities?
General VanHerck. In The Bahamas, the PRC continues its aggressive
economic and political engagement. The PRC Ambassador remains active in
an effort to present the PRC as the alternative to United States
partnership in the region, and has renewed offers to provide economic
assistance, to include renovating the Bahamas' largest stadium. The PRC
also donated medical assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic and relief
supplies such as greenhouses following Hurricane Dorian. Since at least
2013, Chinese entities and intermediaries have supplied Mexican
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) with precursors and
equipment for the production of synthetic opioids and methamphetamine,
and facilitated illicit exports of Mexican iron ore, timber, and other
commodities and raw materials. In addition, Chinese entities have
assisted Mexican TCOs in laundering the revenues and profits generated
from the drug trade and other illicit activities. These activities
ultimately bolster the financial and operational bases of the TCOs,
contributing to the threat they pose to Mexico's internal security as
well as enabling flows of synthetic drugs into the United States.
Although Russia's focus continues to be on its war against Ukraine,
Russian long-range aviation remains capable of executing high-priority
missions and is routinely used to demonstrate Russia's capabilities and
global reach, including through Air Defense Identification Zone
incursions off the Alaskan and Canadian coasts with their heavy
bombers.
southern border
51. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, 2 weeks ago, United States
Border Patrol Chief Raul said that we do not have ``operational
control'' of the southern border. Do you agree with that assessment?
General VanHerck. U.S. Northern Command is in a supporting role to
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Southwest Border (SWB)
mission and is neither in a position nor tasked to assess DHS's SWB
operations.
52. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, if you do agree, what actions
need to be taken to regain operational control?
General VanHerck. Please see previous response to question #51.
53. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, what role does Joint Task
Force North play in regaining operational control?
General VanHerck. Joint Task Force North's primary mission is
support to the interagency in the counter TCO and counter narcotic
missions. For the ongoing Southwest Border support to DHS, Joint Task
Force North (JTF-N) commands and controls Department of Defense forces
supporting the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as directed in
the Secretary of Defense's Southwest Border Action Memos. JTF-N is
executing its mission within the authorities of the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff's Defense Support of Civil Authorities Execute Order.
54. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, what do you believe the
proper role of the U.S. military is in securing the border in concert
with Department of Homeland Security?
General VanHerck. I believe that securing the U.S. border and
enforcing immigration laws are inherently law enforcement functions. I
believe it is lawful and appropriate for the Department of Defense to
contribute secondary support to a lead Federal law enforcement agency
at the request of the Department of Homeland Security and as approved
by the Secretary of Defense. As I have previously testified, Department
of Defense support to DHS at the Southwest Border should only occur in
extremis situations and should not be an enduring Department of Defense
mission.
55. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, are there areas of
coordination that need to be improved between the U.S. military and
Department of Homeland Security?
General VanHerck. DOD and DHS have a long-established collaborative
and coordinated working relationship; however, it is important to note
that USNORTHCOM does not directly coordinate with DHS. Instead, OSD
coordinates with DHS, and then, OSD provides guidance to USNORTHCOM
through the Joint Staff. With that, USNORTHCOM will continue to support
direction from military leadership by providing military capabilities
in support of properly vetted DHS Requests for Assistance (RFAs) in
response to natural or manmade disasters and/or countering criminal
organizations. As with most relationships, coordination and
communication can always be improved. Receiving DHS RFAs as early in
the decisionmaking process as possible allows DOD to better respond to
and process those requests. USNORTHCOM is poised to support improved
and streamlined coordination efforts with respect to future DHS RFAs to
assure unit sourcing is identified in a timely manner and the needs of
the Nation are met.
56. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, does the Mexican military
have more combat power than cartels?
General VanHerck. Yes. Mexican military maneuver elements have a
decided advantage over cartels in terms of firepower, tactical
proficiency, organizational cohesion and discipline, leadership,
mobility support, and sustainment. Mexican light attack aircraft can
provide close air support for engaged ground forces, and firefights
between cartel gunmen and military elements typically end with cartels
being the first to disengage and break contact, often after suffering
disproportionate casualties. The Mexican military has openly
acknowledged that it is facing challenges to receiving maintenance on
its Russian-made helicopters due to the war in Ukraine. I believe the
Mexican military would increase its advantage over the cartels if
equipped with reliable helicopters. A more streamlined interagency
process for approving Foreign Military Sales to our partners would also
benefit the Mexican armed forces and help to reinforce the United
States' position as the partner of choice. With that said, I remain
concerned by TCOs' increasing emphasis on fielding military-grade arms
and explosives, and their aggression against Mexican security forces.
threats to the homeland
57. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, General Kurilla said 2 weeks
ago it was his Commander's estimate that ISIS-K could conduct an
external operation against United States or Western interests abroad in
under 6 months, with little to no warning. Do you judge the southern
border to be a possible vector of attack for foreign terrorists?
General VanHerck. Yes, it is certainly possible that the southern
border, and any border for that matter, could be used as an attack
vector. With that said, although it is accurate to judge the southern
border as being potentially vulnerable to foreign terrorists moving
into the United States, USNORTHCOM has no information of plans to do
so. Instead, foreign terrorist groups prefer individuals who have no
known association with a terrorist organization or have no record who
can use safer, cheaper, legal, and more direct methods, such as flying,
to enter the United States.
58. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, does ISIS still assess the
southern border to be an opportunity to smuggle their operatives into
the United States commit terrorist attacks?
General VanHerck. Although it's possible that ISIS, or any entity
that desires to inflict harm to the United States could use any border
to gain access, there is no evidence to suggest ISIS is interested in
or has sent operatives to exploit the United States southern border to
enter the United States to conduct attacks. Even during the group's
high-water mark in 2015, ISIS was unable to conduct a directed attack
in the United States. Instead, ISIS relied on Homegrown Violent
Extremists to conduct attacks on the group's behalf. With substantial
CT setbacks over the last several years, the group likely will continue
to rely on HVEs to target the Homeland.
59. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, do you agree that Iran
remains intent on conducting attacks on the United States Nation's
capital?
General VanHerck. Yes, I agree with that assessment. Iran remains
intent on directing attacks within the United States and is not
limiting its efforts to Washington DC. During the past year, Iran has
targeted Iranian nationals living in the United States that Tehran
views as critical of and a threat to the Iranian regime. Iran has also
stated a clear intent to seek revenge for the death of former Quds
Force Commander, Qasseim Soleimani, and has sanctioned plots against
United States Government officials that Iran views complicit in
Soleimani's death. This includes a failed murder-for-hire plot against
a former U.S. National Security Advisor.
russian intelligence
60. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, last year, you warned the
Armed Services Committee that Russian military intelligence had more
officers deployed to Mexico than any other country in the world. Is
that still your assessment?
General VanHerck. Yes. While I appreciate the Mexican Government's
attention to this matter, I have seen nothing to change my assessment
regarding the concerning number of Russian military intelligence
officers deployed to Mexico.
61. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, what aspects of Russian
activity most concern you?
General VanHerck. I am most concerned by Russia's ability to hold
the homeland at risk with nuclear, conventional, and non-kinetic
weapons. I am also concerned by the potential for a regional crisis,
such as what we are seeing in Ukraine, to escalate into wider conflict
that directly impacts the homeland and/or the territories of our allies
and partners. As we are witnessing in Ukraine, advanced long-range
Russian cruise missiles are highly precise and difficult to detect and
track. They can be fired from long-range bombers, submarines, surface
vessels, or road-mobile launchers and can reach targets in the United
States and Canada from well outside our territory. Some of those
missiles could be used to strike targets in North America with
conventional or nuclear warheads. Limited warning times and uncertainty
about what type of payload a missile is carrying increases the risk of
miscalculation, potentially limiting our options.
62. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, according to Department of
Homeland Security data, Customs and Border Protection encounter more
than 100 Russians attempting to illegally enter the United States every
month near just a single location on the United States-Mexico border.
Do you know how many have had ties to Vladimir Putin's government?
General VanHerck. I'll defer to DHS for the totals, by country, of
foreign nationals entering the United States and if any have ties to
the Russian Government. I am aware of the ongoing efforts by United
States law enforcement agencies to uncover actors with nefarious
intentions at our border crossings, including any Russians.
63. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, how are you working with
Department of Homeland Security to secure this threat?
General VanHerck. DHS and FBI have the primary responsibility to
assess, characterize, and respond to activity by irregular migrants
with possibly malign affiliations or intent. USNORTHCOM coordinates
regularly with the Intelligence Community, FBI, DHS on border security
issues, and I have DHS and FBI representatives permanently assigned to
my headquarters to keep the command apprised of potential threats from
foreign terrorists or foreign intelligence operatives.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Michael Rounds
china's role in drug trafficking on southern border
64. Senator Rounds. General VanHerck, is Joint Taskforce North
(JTF-NORTH) tracking China's involvement with the drug manufacturing
that happens in Mexico, specifically fentanyl?
General VanHerck. Yes, USNORTHCOM and JTF-North are aware that
Chinese expatriates and China-based companies are part of the supply
chain that provides chemicals used to manufacture synthetic drugs,
including fentanyl, in Mexico. Chinese chemical companies are the
primary producers of chemicals used to make illicit fentanyl.
65. Senator Rounds. General VanHerck, if they are, can you explain
to me what the Chinese role in the process is? Are they simply shipping
the component chemicals over from Asia or are they an integral piece in
the development, trafficking and selling of illicit drugs in America?
General VanHerck. Chinese nationals and companies are producers and
brokers of chemicals used in the production of synthetic drugs. Chinese
chemical companies are the primary producers of chemicals used to make
illicit fentanyl and methamphetamine. Aside from a small number of
direct precursor chemicals, the chemicals used to make illicit drugs
tend to be unregulated and uncontrolled by China, so their production
and sale is generally legal in China. Brokers facilitate the sale and
shipment of the chemicals to buyers in Mexico. Some of these
transactions are for illicit purposes from their outset, while others
are for precursor chemicals that do have legitimate, dual-use
applications, but which are subsequently diverted to illicit use.
Accordingly, the role--and complicity--of the Chinese producers and
brokers in the synthetic drug supply chain varies.
transnational criminal organizations
66. Senator Rounds. General VanHerck and General Richardson, do you
believe that having Department of Defense involved in the United
States' approach to countering transnational criminal organizations
results in inter-agency information sharing that would not occur if
Department of Defense was not involved?
General VanHerck. Yes, but only marginally. The Department of
Defense, through USNORTHCOM and Joint Task Force North, does facilitate
information sharing as a by-product of the support we provide to
various U.S. and foreign partners. However, we are limited in what the
Department of Defense can affect, due to the lack of a lead Federal
agency that is empowered to coordinate a whole-of-government strategy
for countering transnational criminal organizations. As I am previously
testified, I do not see the TCO mission and the mission on the
Southwest Border as enduring DOD missions. We need a whole-of-
government strategy with a designated lead Federal agency fully
resourced to execute this mission. DOD resources should only be
utilized in extremis.
General Richardson. Yes. There are currently 18 Interagency
representatives from nine different agencies and departments assigned
full time to USSOUTHCOM Headquarters to enable effective interagency
integration into operations and planning to counter transnational
criminal organizations. USSOUTHCOM has a robust law enforcement
presence and a Law Enforcement Working Group (LEWG) focused primarily
on the counter-TCO mission set. The LEWG brings law enforcement agents
and intelligence officers together with key members of the Staff and
Components to discuss law enforcement issues, align targeting, provide
information sharing, and refine Concepts of Operation.
DOD supports C-TCO interagency efforts through a variety of
technical and procedural means and ways. Interagency partners share
information with DOD to help the Department leverage its resources
under Title 10 to support law enforcement and foreign partners combat
transnational criminal organizations. In the case of Joint Interagency
Task Force-South (JIATF-S), the information shared by the interagency
feeds a ``cycle of success,'' enabling JIATF-S to fuse information and
cue partners to interdict drug trafficking and gather evidence used to
further illuminate and prosecute criminal activity and the criminal
networks behind them. The DOD is uniquely postured to help facilitate
collaboration, integration and synchronization across the USG.
67. Senator Rounds. General VanHerck and General Richardson, is
there any increase in authority that may assist the Department in
furthering the goal of countering Transnational Criminal Organizations?
General VanHerck. No. I have the appropriate authorities to perform
my assigned support missions. Transnational Criminal Organizations are
a global security problem, and the Department of Defense is not the
lead for countering them. I believe designating and empowering a lead
Federal agency to get after this problem would provide greater benefits
than increasing the Department of Defense role.
General Richardson. USSOUTHCOM is currently reviewing our existing
authorities as part of the development of the fiscal year 25
Legislative proposals process. As we look specifically at our ability
to counter TCOs, we will keep the Congress apprised of any additional
authorities we believe would be helpful in this mission.
jtf-north's mission in countering transnational criminal organizations
68. Senator Rounds. General VanHerck, it's my understanding that
JTF-NORTH's ultimate mission is to set up its mission partners to
counter Transnational Criminal Organizations without Department of
Defense support. Do you think this goal is achievable? Or do you expect
Department of Defense to be a necessary component in this task
indefinitely?
General VanHerck. The goal itself is appropriate given Defense
Department priorities and authorities, but I consider it aspirational
in light of how the Federal Government counters TCOs. We simply cannot
interdict our way out of this situation. We need a strategy that goes
after the networks, rather than focusing on specific commodities. With
a designated, resourced, and empowered lead Federal agency, and in a
truly whole-of-government approach, we could begin to see progress.
But, until a lead Federal agency is identified and properly resourced,
I believe we will continue to see only marginal, superficial success.
mexican cartels
69. Senator Rounds. General VanHerck, what happens if the Mexican
cartels are designated as foreign terrorist organizations? How would
that designation affect Department of Defense?
General VanHerck. With specific regard to the U.S. Northern Command
operations, I assess that designating the Mexican drug cartels as
Foreign Terrorist Organizations would be of negligible benefit, if any,
to those activities we conduct in support of our interagency partners.
I defer to the Department of Defense for assessments of Department-wide
effects.
united states-mexico military-to-military relations
70. Senator Rounds. General VanHerck, what does the mil-to-mil
situation look like with our Mexican counterparts?
General VanHerck. The military-to-military relationship between
USNORTHCOM and our Mexican military partners is exceptionally strong
and getting stronger. We have progressed beyond the traditional
transactional relationship into one of a true and resilient
partnership. USNORTHCOM remains attuned to Mexican sensitivities and
understands that we must go at the speed and pace of our partners as
they continue to take on more leadership in the region.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
missile defense
71. Senator Ernst. General VanHerck, what is the risk to homeland
defense of persistent Russian or Chinese cruise missile submarines off
our coasts?
General VanHerck. The risk is decreased decision space for our
Nation's leaders, which erodes strategic stability and increases the
risk of an attack on our homeland and the potential for strategic
deterrence failure. It also potentially limits timely power projection
from the homeland to a forward fight. Russia's strategy, and likely the
PRC's in the future, is to delay and disrupt forces flowing from the
homeland and to destroy the will of the American people in order to
terminate a forward crisis on terms favorable to their goals.
72. Senator Ernst. General VanHerck, are there capability gaps in
current missile defenses against this threat?
General VanHerck. Yes, gaps and limitations in present day
surveillance and response options greatly limit NORAD and USNORTHCOM's
ability to detect, track, ID, and engage cruise missile threats to the
Homelands.
73. Senator Ernst. General VanHerck, what is the risk to homeland
defense from containerized missiles? Please provide an unclassified
answer to the extent possible; please provide an additional classified
answer if necessary.
General VanHerck. Containerized missiles systems can conceal cruise
missiles enroute to a launch location, decrease indications and
warning, and make it difficult to detect and defeat a missile threat.
Russia currently produces the Club-K containerized missile system,
which provides a long-range precision strike capability against land,
sea, and air targets and includes four ground or sea-launched cruise
missiles concealed by a standard 40-foot shipping container. One of the
missiles available for the system is a special anti-ship variant that
accelerates to supersonic speeds of up to Mach 3, generating a
catastrophic kinetic effect on a target vessel.
The PRC is reportedly building a long-range cruise missile that
could be fired from shipping containers. This development likely would
be similar to the Russia Club-K type missile system and disguised as a
commercial shipping container. This new weapon could help the PRC turn
its fleet of freighters into potential warships and commercial ports
into potential missile bases. This development would make
distinguishing civilian maritime traffic from military vessels more
difficult and could limit the ability to warn of an attack against
North America.
74. Senator Ernst. General VanHerck, what is the risk to homeland
defense from cruise missiles generated by platforms other than
submarines? Please provide an unclassified answer to the extent
possible; please provide an additional classified answer if necessary.
General VanHerck. In the maritime domain, Russia's development and
fielding of cruise missile capable surface combatants and deployment
outside of Russian territorial waters will increase the risk to
homeland defense as the Russian naval order of battle expands. Most of
Russia's new surface combatants are capable of carrying the KALIBR
cruise missile, and the Club-K containerized missile system is the
export version of the KALIBR. Russian heavy bombers already have the
capability to launch cruise missiles against targets in North America
without entering NORAD radar coverage. Russia's long-range aviation
command continues modernization efforts intended to improve the
capabilities of its bombers to ensure their continued viability. This
includes upgrades to propulsion, avionics, and weapons, enabling LRA to
strike deeper into North America. LRA's heavy bombers continue to be a
flexible tool for Russia to perform strategic messaging and
conventional precision strikes, as well as providing Moscow with a
nuclear option. Russian heavy bombers frequently conduct Air Defense
Identification Zone incursions off the coasts of Alaska and western
Canada and have the capability to conduct cruise missile strikes
against North America with little to no warning.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has expanded its force of
large surface combatants by building Renhai-class guided missile
cruisers and the Luyang III-class guided missile destroyers. The Renhai
cruiser is equipped with a 112 cell vertical launch system (VLS) and
the LUYANG III has a 64 cell VLS. Once operational, these systems will
be capable of carrying a variety of weapons including anti-ship cruise
missiles, and likely land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) and anti-ship
ballistic missiles. As the PLA Navy continues to transition into a
global multi-mission force, the addition of land attack capabilities to
its modern array of anti-surface and anti-air capabilities is a logical
next step. In the coming years, the PLA Navy will probably field LACMs
on its newer cruisers and destroyers and developmental Shang III-class
SSGNs. The addition of land attack capabilities to the PLA Navy's
surface combatants and submarines would provide the PLA with flexible
long-range strike options and allow the PRC to hold land targets within
North America at risk.
75. Senator Ernst. General VanHerck, what is the risk to homeland
defense from threats posed by long-range bombers like the H-20? Please
provide an unclassified answer to the extent possible; please provide
an additional classified answer if necessary.
General VanHerck. The H-20 will indeed pose an enhanced risk to the
homeland, especially compared to the legacy long-range bombers that the
PRC currently fields. The H-20 is expected to operate at or beyond the
range of the PRC's current bomber fleet. The aircraft's extended range,
combined with long-range weapons will provide a new capability for the
PRC. The low-observable nature of the H-20 will present additional
challenges regarding the ability to detect the aircraft and provide
warning. However, while the H-20 poses an enhanced threat compared to
its predecessors, the PRC's arsenal of currently fielded ICBMs continue
to pose the biggest threat to the Homeland and will remain the largest
portion of its nuclear triad for at least the next decade.
aerial threats
76. Senator Ernst. General VanHerck, what is the risk to homeland
defense from ubiquitous armed balloons?
General VanHerck. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are not aware of an armed
balloon threat to the Homeland.
77. Senator Ernst. General VanHerck, what active and passive
measures can we adopt to reduce vulnerability ubiquitous armed
balloons?
General VanHerck. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are not aware of an armed
balloon threat to the homeland. However, increased domain awareness,
improved information sharing, and global integration between commands
will all reduce vulnerability to potential airborne threats.
78. Senator Ernst. General VanHerck, has NORTHCOM's guidance for
defeating potential aerial threats changed since the four incidents
earlier this year? If so, in what ways? If not, why not?
General VanHerck. No, NORAD guidance for defeating potential aerial
threats has not changed. Our Rules of Engagement have not been modified
for these types of events, and we continue to execute our missions in
accordance with that NORAD ROE.
domain awareness
79. Senator Ernst. General VanHerck, what is the gap in NORTHCOM
capabilities to detect and analyze cruise missile threats? Please
provide an unclassified answer to the extent possible; please provide
an additional classified answer if necessary.
General VanHerck. Although NORAD's current line-of-sight
surveillance architecture is capable of addressing certain legacy
threats, it is inadequate for modern threats to include cruise missiles
and hypersonic weapons. The Department must secure multi-domain,
layered, integrated, passive and active sensor capabilities to enable
timely warning, detection, identification and persistent tracking of
low attitude multi-axis cruise missile attacks.
80. Senator Ernst. General VanHerck, what is the gap in NORTHCOM
capabilities to detect and analyze threats in the cyber domain? Please
provide an unclassified answer to the extent possible; please provide
an additional classified answer if necessary.
General VanHerck. USNORTHCOM requires increased domain awareness in
all domains, to include the cyber domain, to effectively conduct
operations and maintain domain awareness for prioritized defense
critical infrastructure (DCI). The cyber threat remains a significant
concern as competitors continue to expand their capacity to exploit and
exfiltrate data and deny services, and to disrupt critical
infrastructure, commercial services, and military operations.
USNORTHCOM is working with USCYBERCOM, the military Services, and the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to improve domain
awareness and information sharing to better protect DCI in the cyber
domain.
chinese and russian threats
81. Senator Ernst. General Richardson, what are the national
security implications of 11 China-linked space facilities in your Area
of Responsibilities?
General Richardson. The presence of China-linked space facilities
in Latin America and the Caribbean enhances Beijing's ability to track
our space assets as well as their own and to collect on the United
States. The PRC's access to space sites is critical to its efforts to
become a leading space power. Beijing may use these sites to spy on
United States facilities and attempt to intercept communications.
China's ground stations in South America provide coverage of the skies
over the Western Hemisphere and many of the China-linked space
facilities are located along the same longitudinal sector as the United
States Eastern seaboard, Washington, and most of the U.S. military's
telecommunications and reconnaissance satellites that service the area
while in geosynchronous orbit. These facilities make up one segment of
a global network of ground stations that maintain communications with
satellites as they pass over different geographic regions along their
orbit.
82. Senator Ernst. General Richardson, what has SOUTHCOM done to
mitigate surveillance capabilities related to the 11 China-linked space
facilities in your Area of Responsibilities?
General Richardson. USSOUTHCOM is actively engaging with our
partners in the AOR to develop a shared commitment to utilize space in
a manner that is in keeping with the international norms of behavior
for peaceful use in virtually every dimension of our bilateral and
multilateral relationships.? Working with partners across the U.S.
interagency, we continue to engage our foreign partners to help them to
understand the nature of MSA utilization of their space facilities. Few
have a desire for their country to be used as a platform for military
capabilities.
Additionally, USSOUTHCOM, in conjunction with USSPACECOM, has
partnered to establish common objectives to closely monitor and, when
appropriate, address the PRC's space capabilities and influence in the
AOR. This is done through collaborative partner nation engagements to
promote Space Domain Awareness aligned with U.S. interests.
83. Senator Ernst. General Richardson, how is SOUTHCOM preventing
installation of additional People's Republic of China-linked space
facilities?
General Richardson. The PRC consistently works to expand its
network of military space infrastructure across the USSOUTHCOM AOR.
USSOUTHCOM continues to strengthen relationships with our allies and
partners by positioning ourselves as a partner of choice through
subject matter expert exchanges (SMEE) and capability building with
partner nations throughout the AOR. As USSOUTHCOM builds out our common
operation picture while mapping current and potential MSA space
facilities, we provide guidance and requested assistance to partner
nations while illuminating nefarious actions performed by MSAs.
Additionally, we continue to expose predatory and failed MSA influenced
contracts which create unfavorable conditions for partner nations.
In a truly integrated deterrence approach, we coordinate with the
Department of Commerce on critical advocacy cases to deny unchallenged
penetration to the MSA State Owned Enterprises. We also collaborate
with their Commercial Law Development Program, highlighting
opportunities to advise and assist partner nations in developing robust
legal frameworks to secure their critical telecommunication
infrastructure. This effort is coordinated with the Department of State
and is further guided by NSC prioritization to ensure synergy.
84. Senator Ernst. General Richardson, does the United States have
capabilities to hold at risk potential Chinese or Russian military
targets located in your Area of Responsbilities? If so, what
capabilities? If not, what are the capability gaps?
General Richardson. While USSOUTHCOM has no assigned forces and
limited capabilities to hold targets at risk, the United States does
have those capabilities and there are mechanisms in place by which
USSOUTHCOM could request additional capabilities, if required.
85. Senator Ernst. General Richardson, does the United States have
capabilities to hold at risk valued military targets of states in your
Area of Responsibilities that host Chinese or Russian military or dual-
use capabilities? If so, what capabilities? If not, what are the
capability gaps
General Richardson. While USSOUTHCOM has no assigned forces and
limited capabilities to hold at risk valued military targets of states
in this AOR that host Chinese or Russian military or dual-use
capabilities, the United States does have those capabilities. Also,
there are mechanisms in place by which USSOUTHCOM could request
additional capabilities, if required.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
chinese balloon over colombia
86. Senator Sullivan. General Richardson, while many are tracking
the Chinese Spy Balloon incursion over my State in January 2023, most
may have forgotten the Colombian military reportedly sighted a similar
balloon over their country in the same timeframe. United States
military officials have confirmed a Chinese balloon was spotted over
Latin America but have never specified exactly where. The existence of
Chinese balloons in both our NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM AORs are to me a
startling message from China. What have you learned from the Colombians
on the Chinese Balloon that flew over their country?
General Richardson. Colombia was aware the Chinese balloon flew
through its airspace at a high altitude and sent a report through
established channels with information about the balloon. The object was
detected at an altitude of 55,000 feet, moving into the airspace to the
north at an average of 25 knots, or 29 miles per hour. The object was
monitored until it left the airspace. The government did not see the
balloon as a threat to the civilian population and had no additional
information to share about the balloon.
87. Senator Sullivan. Since the previously mentioned incident, what
changes have you made in your tracking capability to monitor future
activity?
General Richardson. This incident demonstrated that we need to be
more aware of this type of surveillance threat within the USSOUTHCOM
AOR. We have learned that we need to be actively monitoring and sharing
potential tracks and threat assessments with NORAD/NORTHCOM, other
COCOMs, and the Joint Staff, as well as our regional partners that may
be in its flight path. In doing so, the USSOUTHCOM Joint Operations
Center (JOC) has increased its coordination and communication with
NORAD/NORTHCOM and the Joint Staff with monitoring and tracking these
occurrences. The JOC has also added these events to its reporting
requirements to the USSOUTHCOM Commander and senior staff to provide
consistent and continuous updates for analysis and decisionmaking.
counterintelligence threats in soutcom
88. Senator Sullivan. General Richardson, can you please speak to
how you mitigate China and Russia from collecting on our Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures during trainings in which our forces train
SOUTCOM-based military's who also receive instruction from China and
Russia?
General Richardson. Training is done at the level of disclosure
permitted by classification guidance. Additionally, the Command
utilizes Foreign Disclosure Officers to review training material prior
to its release to partners. All host nation forces that we partner with
are vetted through the Leahy vetting process. United States forces
receive operational security training prior to entering the theater in
order to protect critical and sensitive information as well as receive
force protection briefs from United States Embassy Regional Security
Officers and Senior Defense Officials once in theater. Sensitive TTPs
are closely safeguarded and those with whom we share those in training
and advisory capacities are closely vetted.
russian presence in the arctic
89. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck can you please speak to how
Russian demands for experienced troops and its primary focus in Ukraine
has impacted their force disposition in the Arctic region?
General VanHerck. Russia has drawn ground forces and equipment from
its Arctic territories to support its conflict with Ukraine. Despite
the requirements of the conflict, Russia continues to develop military
infrastructure in the Arctic, as well as field advanced military
platforms. We judge Moscow will prioritize reconstituting its Arctic
forces following the conclusion of its conflict with Ukraine.
infrastructure improvement in alaska
90. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck what specific infrastructure
improvements in Alaska would most benefit NORTHCOM's mission to monitor
and defend the Homeland?
General VanHerck. Alaska plays a pivotal role in defending the
Homeland as well as providing access to the United States European
Command and United States Indo-Pacific Command AORs in support of
multiple strategic plans. Though all Alaskan infrastructure is key, my
primary concern is the infrastructure that meets these no-fail plans
requirements. To that end, USNORTHCOM has funded a $2 million Area
Development Plan (ADP) through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Alaska
District. This ADP will allow for a holistic analysis of requirements
needed to support OPLANs and CONPLANs in conjunction with those to
support the Indo-Pacific theater. I am awaiting the results of this ADP
to identify any gaps and seams and identify our highest priority
infrastructure. Other improvements that will facilitate Joint Force
support of NORAD and USNORTHCOM mission requirements include alert,
fuels, laboratory, and maintenance facilities at various Alaskan
installations, as well as an operations facility at the Joint Pacific
Alaska Range Complex (JPARC). I am working closely with the Services
and the Department to prioritize investment in these improvements in
the coming years.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 2023
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET REQUEST
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin,
Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. I would like to call a hearing to order, and
since we have a quorum, I would ask the Committee to consider
Tuesday's nominations and a list of 27 pending military
nominations.
First, I ask the Committee to consider the following
civilian nominations. Mr. Ronald Keohane to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and Hon.
Nickolas H. Guertin to be the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Research, Development and Acquisition. Is there a motion to
favorably report these----
Senator Wicker. So, moved.
Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
Voice: Second.
Chairman Reed. in favor, say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
Chairman Reed. Finally, I ask the Committee to consider a
list of 27 pending military nominations. of these nominations
have been before the Committee for the required length of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report this list of 27 pending
military nominations?
Senator Wicker. So, moved.
Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
Voice. Second.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. All in favor, say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
Committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending With the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on March 23, 2023.
1. In the Air Force there are 27 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with David J. Berkland) (Reference No.
196)
2. Col. Corey A. Simmons, USAF to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 198)
3. RADM George M. Wikoff, USN to be vice admiral and Commander,
US Naval Forces, Central Command/Commander, FIFTH Fleet and Commander,
Combined Maritime Forces (Reference No. 211)
4. RADM Frederick W. Kacher, USN to be vice admiral and
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet (Reference No. 212)
5. In the Army there are 101 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Tolulope O. Akinsanya) (Reference No. 238)
6. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Jason W. Price) (Reference No. 257)
7. In the Air Force Reserve there are 11 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Sean M. Carpenter)
(Reference No. 290)
8. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Kristin A. Hillery)
(Reference No. 291)
9. In the Air Force Reserve there are 10 appointments to the
grade of major general (list begins with Elizabeth E. Arledge)
(Reference No. 292)
10. Col. Carlos M. Caceres, USAR to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 310)
11. RADM Shoshana S. Chatfield, USN to be vice admiral and US
Military Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Military Committee (Reference No. 311)
12. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Shane K. Doty) (Reference No. 312)
13. In the Air Force Reserve there are 9 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Speight H. Caroon) (Reference No.
313)
14. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Brandi Barnard King) (Reference No. 314)
15. In the Air Force Reserve there are 3 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Daniel S. McPherson) (Reference No.
315)
16. In the Air Force Reserve there are 10 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Matthew J. Andrade) (Reference No.
316)
17. In the Air Force Reserve there are 10 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Adam James Cole) (Reference No. 317)
18. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Eric K. Wilke) (Reference No. 318)
19. In the Air Force Reserve there are 13 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Kelli M. Bermudez) (Reference No.
319)
20. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Lisa Carol Giugliano) (Reference No.
320)
21. In the Air Force Reserve there are 7 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Joseph Catalino, Jr.) (Reference No.
321)
22. In the Air Force Reserve there are 9 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with James M. Bershinsky) (Reference No.
322)
23. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Gary Monroe Boutz, Jr.) (Reference
No. 323)
24. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (John Charles Easley) (Reference No. 324)
25. In the Air Force Reserve there are 37 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Robert M. Acosta) (Reference No.
325)
26. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Nicole Dyan David) (Reference No.
326)
27. In the Air Force Reserve there are 7 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Karrie Megan Bem) (Reference No.
327)
28. In the Air Force Reserve there are 3 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Douglas A. Collins) (Reference No.
328)
29. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Marquis A.T. Smith) (Reference No. 329)
30. In the Air Force Reserve there are 61 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with James S. Akers II) (Reference No.
330)
31. In the Air Force Reserve there are 31 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with David I. Amar) (Reference No. 331)
32. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Sashi A. Zickefoose) (Reference No. 332)
33. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Howard F. Stanley) (Reference No. 333)
34. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Bobby J. Chun) (Reference No. 334)
35. In the Army there are 7 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Joshua G. Glonek) (Reference No. 335)
36. In the Army there are 7 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Alex J. Duffy) (Reference No. 337)
37. In the Army there are 4 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Liza B. Crawford) (Reference No. 338)
38. In the Army Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Jeremy S. Stirm) (Reference No. 339)
39. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Renee R. Kiel) (Reference No. 340)
40. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Melissa B. Riesterhartsell)
(Reference No. 341)
41. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Kimberly A. Dilger) (Reference No. 342)
42. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Abigail R. Osman) (Reference No. 343)
43. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Andrew J. Archuleta) (Reference No. 344)
44. In the Army Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Christopher C. Cross) (Reference No. 345)
45. In the Army there are 37 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Michael J. Baierlein) (Reference No. 346)
46. In the Army there are 575 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Austin P. Abarr) (Reference No. 347)
47. In the Army there are 489 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with James H. Abney) (Reference No. 348)
48. In the Army there are 981 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Mitchell A. Ables) (Reference No. 349)
49. In the Army Reserve there are 9 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Peter B. East) (Reference No. 350)
50. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (list begins with William M. Schweitzer) (Reference No. 351)
51. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(list begins with Louis V. Scott) (Reference No. 353)
52. Col. William F. Wilkerson, USAR to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 359)
53. Col. Evelyn E. Laptook, USAR to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 360)
54. BG Ronald R. Ragin, USA to be major general (Reference No.
361)
55. In the Army there are 37 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with Brandon C. Anderson) (Reference No.
362)
56. In the Marine Corps there are 8 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with David R. Everly) (Reference No.
363)
57. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Walter D. Brafford) (Reference
No. 364)
58. In the Navy there are 16 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Eric J. Anduze) (Reference No.
365)
59. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Brian J. Anderson) (Reference
No. 366)
60. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with Casey J. Moton) (Reference No. 367)
61. RADM(lh) Rick Freedman, USN to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 368)
62. RADM(lh) Kenneth W. Epps, USN to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 369) 3
63. In the Navy there are 13 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with Stephen D. Barnett) (Reference No. 370)
64. Capt. Frank G. Schlereth III, USN to be rear admiral (lower
half) (Reference No. 371)
65. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Joshua C. Himes) (Reference No.
372)
66. In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Thomas J. Dickinson) (Reference
No. 373)
67. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major general (list begins with Thomas W. Harrell) (Reference No. 379)
68. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Maximilian S. Lee) (Reference No. 380)
69. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Justin J. Reeb) (Reference No. 381)
70. LTG James W. Bierman, Jr., USMC to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, US
Marine Corps (Reference No. 389)
71. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Matthew J. Clementz) (Reference No. 397)
72. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Samuel T. Kramer) (Reference No. 398)
73. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Carla A. Kiernan) (Reference No. 399)
74. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(John W. Brock II) (Reference No. 400)
75. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(John D. Horton) (Reference No. 404)
76. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Joel N. Buffardi) (Reference No. 405)
77. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Sarah D. Eccleston) (Reference No. 406)
78. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Nicholas P. Fiebke) (Reference No. 407)
79. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Andrew J. Doyle) (Reference No. 408)
80. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(William T. Griggs) (Reference No. 409)
81. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Megan L. Maloy) (Reference No. 410)
82. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Kaitlyn M. Hernandez) (Reference No. 411)
83. In the Army Reserve there are 15 appointment to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Timothy I. Arcelay) (Reference No. 412)
84. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Sara C. Adams) (Reference No. 413)
85. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Christina G. Nalley) (Reference No. 414)
86. In the Army Reserve there are 7 appointments to the grade of
colonel (Andrew Adamczyk) (Reference No. 415)
87. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Ashley S. Lee) (Reference No. 416)
88. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Timothy W. Lindeman) (Reference No. 417)
89. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Ebony Q. Star) (Reference No. 418)
90. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Sarah A. Delarosa) (Reference No. 419)
91. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Mark T. Sopkiw, Jr.) (Reference No. 420)
92. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Justin T. Thomas) (Reference No. 421)
93. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Rei
T. Israel) (Reference No. 422)
94. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Adam L. Fox) (Reference No. 423)
95. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Jason L. Workman) (Reference No. 424)
96. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Stephen J. Cumby) (Reference No. 425)
97. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Stephen M. Anderson) (Reference No. 426)
98. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
captain (Elisabeth Crumpler) (Reference No. 427)
99. In the Navy there are 27 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Kyle A. Aduskevich) (Reference No. 428)
100. In the Navy there are 9 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Bramwell B. Arnold III) (Reference No. 429)
101. In the Navy there are 34 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Jeffrey R. Biermann) (Reference
No. 430)
102. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (James H. Knight) (Reference No. 431)
103. In the Space Force there are 9 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Ross M. Boston) (Reference No. 432)
104. In the Space Force there are 38 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Jason M. Adams) (Reference No. 433)
105. In the Space Force there are 68 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Christopher John Alban) (Reference
No. 434)
106. In the Space Force there are 58 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Bridget L. Ajinga) (Reference No.
435)
107. In the Space Force there are 76 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with John W. Anderson) (Reference No. 436)
108. In the Space Force there are 100 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Christina M. Akers) (Reference No. 437)
109. In the Space Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Cassandra R. Hidalgo) (Reference
No. 438)
110. In the Space Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Edward E. Jones) (Reference No. 439)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 3,059
Chairman Reed. The ayes have it. Thank you very much.
Welcome, Secretary Austin, General Milley, and Secretary
McCord. Before I get into my statement, I want to take a moment
to recognize the tragic disasters that struck Mississippi and
Alabama this weekend.
Our hearts are certainly with the people of Mississippi and
Alabama after tornadoes caused terrible loss of life and
intense damage, and I know Senator Wicker, Senator Tuberville
are doing everything they can to help their States, and we are
thinking about the families and loved ones who were suffering.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
receive testimony on the President's Budget Request for the
Department of Defense (DOD) for fiscal year 2024. Witnesses
this morning are Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Under
Secretary of Defense Controller Michael McCord, and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley.
Thank you for appearing before us today and please extend
the Committee's thanks to the servicemembers and Defense
civilians in the Department. I would like to take a moment to
recognize that this will be General Milley's final posture
hearing before his retirement later this year. General, you
have served this Nation for 43 years with honor, skill, and
steadfast leadership, and we are deeply grateful.
We thank your family for their support throughout your
service, and we congratulate you on a very well-deserved
retirement. Thank you, sir. Earlier this month, President Biden
released his fiscal year 2024 budget request for the Department
of Defense with a top line of $842 billion. As the President's
Budget recognizes and as his national defense strategy makes
clear, China is our primary competitor.
The PRC [People's Republic of China] is the only nation
with both the intent and the capability to challenge the
security and economic interests of the United States and our
allies and partners. At the same time, Russia remains a
violent, destabilizing force. Putin's assault on Ukraine is
inflicting horrific suffering on innocent civilians,
threatening European stability, and harming the global economy.
However, if Putin thought his war would drive a wedge
between NATO members and the international community, he was
badly mistaken. The international community has united in a way
not seen in decades, and our potential adversaries around the
world are taking note.
The Biden administration and the witnesses before us today
deserve great credit for leading this effort. In addition to
the threats posed by Russia and China, nations like Iran and
North Korea continue to push the boundaries of military
brinksmanship and issues like terrorism and climate change
remain persistent.
Prevailing in this environment will require thoughtful
strategies and a budget that is structured to meet the
challenges we face. During today's hearing, I would ask our
witnesses to update us on the strategic planning documents
published over the past year, including the National Defense
Strategy, National Military Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review,
and Missile Defense Review, and how the 2024 budget will
execute this strategies.
An essential element for the United States long-term
strategic competition will be our ability to build a joint
capabilities of our Armed Forces across all domains, including
space, cyber, and information operations. As the Defense
Department's recently released Joint Concept for Competing
makes clear, the object of our Nation's adversaries is to win
without a fight.
The concept warns that if we do not adapt to the realities
of long-term competition, ``the United States risks ceding
strategic influence, advantage, and leverage while preparing
for war that never comes.'' I am interested to hear from our
witnesses how this budget supports joint capabilities to ensure
our military remains the world's premier fighting force.
To that end, I am encouraged that the budget includes the
largest ever request for research, development, testing, and
evaluation, a total of $145 billion. The budget would provide
significant funding for modernization areas such as
microelectronics, artificial intelligence (AI), hypersonics,
and 5G, technologies that will be critical for our national
defense.
Our strategy toward China and Russia should not be solely
defined in dollars by how much, but rather where and why we are
investing to achieve the greatest comparative advantage.
Keeping our competition with China front and center, this
budget request includes $9.1 billion for priorities covered by
the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, or PDI.
I am encouraged by the progress we have made through PDI
thus far, and this Committee will continue working to help
improve the design and posture of the Joint Force in the Indo-
Pacific region.
This should include strengthening logistics, modernizing
infrastructure, conducting exercises, and training and building
the capabilities of our allies and partners. Indeed, our
approach to the Indo-Pacific should be informed in part by
lessons drawn from the European Defense and Deterrence
Initiative, or EDI, which has played a decisive role in
strengthening Ukraine for the last 9 years.
The Department's 2024 budget request wisely includes $3.4
billion for EDI related investments and $300 million for the
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. I am also pleased to
see that this budget request prioritizes taking care of our men
and women in uniform and the civilians who serve alongside them
by providing an across the board pay raise of 5.2 percent.
This pay increase sends an important message to the
workforce at a time when recruiting is particularly
challenging. The budget request also includes $16.7 billion for
military construction projects, and I am particularly pleased
to see] increases in barracks sustainment. The improvements to
our facilities' repair and modernization will go a long way
toward the Joint Force's readiness and quality of life for
military personnel.
With regard to our nuclear strategy, I understand that the
budget request supports important steps for the modernization
of our nuclear triad. Given the reckless behavior of Putin over
the past year, our allies and partners depend on our extended
deterrence now more than ever.
We must also be acutely aware of China's rapidly growing
arsenal. Modernization of our strategic forces is needed to
reassure not only our allies but deter any attack on our
Homeland by any of our nuclear armed competitors. Even as we
modernize, we should seek ways to promote strategic stability,
reduce the risk of miscalculation, and, if possible, reduce
nuclear stockpiles when verifiable for all parties.
Given these strategic threats, the proposed investments in
tried-and-true platforms like the Columbia and the Virginia-
class submarines is a prudent decision. Similarly, this budget
supports the further development of long-range stealth bombers,
strengthening the fighter fleet and building up the defense
industrial base, including upgrades to the Navy's public and
private shipyards.
At the same time, taxpayers should not have to pay for
programs and systems that are wasteful or ineffective, and
Congress must not shirk its responsibility to divest outdated
platforms in favor of more effective new technologies. We are
engaged in a struggle between autocracy and democracy, and we
cannot fail in succeeding in that struggle.
Again, I would like to thank the witnesses for their
participation today. I look forward to the testimony and let me
now recognize Ranking Member Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to
thank our distinguished witnesses for being here. For the third
year in a row, President Biden has sent through Congress a
budget request that cuts military spending amid a more
dangerous and complex threat environment.
We are in the most crucial years of our efforts to prevent
aggression by our peer adversary, the Chinese Communist Party.
The cost of failure in this effort would be nearly unthinkable.
Despite international efforts to the contrary, Russia was not
deterred from invading Ukraine, and that invasion has already
cost the global economy well over $1 trillion, in addition to
untold suffering and loss of life.
These costs will continue to mount unless we give the
Ukrainians every single tool they need to win as soon as
possible. Our intelligence community tells us a deterrence
failure over Taiwan would make the economic effect of Ukraine
conflict look vanishingly small. This year's budget is the last
one that funds capabilities that are likely to be fielded
before 2027.
That is the year by which Xi Jinping says he wants the
People's Liberation Army to be ready to take Taiwan. That makes
our work here very urgent. I am heartened to see that the
budget request prioritizes some programs of critical importance
to near-term deterrence and warfighting, including the
Strategic Capabilities Office, DARPA [Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency] led Assault Breaker II, electronic warfare and
cyber programs, and the emerging efforts to deliver real
warfighting capability out of the JAC2 program.
These near-term high return investments are crucial. Even
so, I remain concerned that we are not moving fast enough on
some of these efforts. At the same time, while the National
Defense Strategy emphasizes the importance of our posture in
the Western Pacific, I note this budget actually cuts the level
of spending on key planning and design activities.
This is despite the clear congressional signal sent by
Senators Reed and Inhofe in the statute when they created the
Pacific Deterrence Initiative several years ago. We cannot
successfully deter Xi with a brittle basing and logistics
infrastructure. Further, we must work together to think bigger
and more creatively about the scale of investment and focus
needed to compete with Beijing in the decades to come.
Our current nuclear modernization efforts are moving too
slowly and will produce a force ill-equipped to deter multiple
nuclear armed adversaries. The current approach to rebuilding
our shipbuilding industrial base is also woefully insufficient.
The Department of Defense has failed our shipbuilders by
promising stability and then pulling the rug out from under
them.
This has hit amphibious shipbuilders particularly hard.
This budget also fails by actually shrinking the U.S. Navy this
year and in future years, instead of growing the fleet as is
required by law. Congress again will need to rectify these
failures. Yet even where Congress and the Department of Defense
have agreed on our approach, such as with the submarine
industrial base, progress has been too slow or nonexistent.
We need to make generational investments across our basic
defense infrastructure, including shipyards, munitions, and
ammunition plants, advanced test ranges and even barracks for
our servicemembers. I do appreciate the Chair emphasizing that
in his statement.
Similarly, we cannot effectively compete with and deter our
adversaries with the recruiting deficiencies we have heard
about, for example, at last week's hearing, I hope our
witnesses will address this issue and State whether this budget
contains every single possible investment that could alleviate
the recruiting crisis. Last, I want to discuss the Department's
relationship with Congress.
I think we have some work to do on this front, and let me
mention two instances. First on February 8, I sent the
Secretary of Defense a letter asking some simple questions
about the facts and decisionmaking surrounding the Chinese spy
balloon. This was signed by Senator Rubio, the co-chair of the
Senate Intelligence Committee. Three weeks later, the Deputy
wrote back with a non-answer, which I can only describe as
dismissive. So, I sent another letter reiterating my request.
Yesterday afternoon, the day before this hearing, I finally
received a response to my letter from the Secretary. I have
significant questions about that response, and I will address
that in questions for the record. So, that is one thing. Also,
early last Thursday morning, an Iranian backed attack killed
one American contractor and injured several United States
servicemembers in Syria.
These troops are there to ensure that ISIS [Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria] does not pose a threat to the United States.
That very day, the Senate was considering several significant
votes relating to the use of force against Iran, and yet no
member of the Senate, to my knowledge, was told that day about
an attack by this very adversary while we were voting on issues
involving them.
Given the number of legislative affairs personnel that the
Office of the Secretary has, I find it hard to believe that no
one in the executive branch was tracking the votes on the
Senate floor or thought of the nexus between our decisions and
the very acts that were going on, on the other side of the
globe. It is unacceptable that no one informed the Senate of
this attack in a timely manner.
Mr. Secretary and Mr. Chairman, we are all in this
together. We are all on the same side here. I would strongly
prefer that the Biden administration treat the Congress as a
partner moving forward, and I thank the witnesses for appearing
today.
Again, I thank them for their service and I look forward to
their testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Let me
recognize Secretary Austin. Mr. Secretary, please.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
Secretary Austin. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, at the outset, let me
echo your comments, Chairman, regarding the tragedies that we
have just witnessed in Mississippi and then Alabama, and our
condolences go out to all. I am glad to be here with you today
to testify in support of the President's Budget Request for
fiscal year 2024.
I am joined, as always, by General Milley, and I remain
grateful for his leadership. I am also glad to be joined by the
Department's Comptroller and CFO, Michael McCord. This is a
strategy driven budget and one driven by the seriousness of our
strategic competition with the People's Republic of China. At
$842 billion, it is a 3.2 percent increase over fiscal year
2023 enacted, and it is 13.4 percent higher than fiscal year
2022 enacted.
This budget will help us continue to implement our national
defense strategy and the President's National Security
Strategy. Now I have three key priorities, to defend our
Nation, to take care of our outstanding people, and to succeed
through teamwork. The PRC is our pacing challenge and we are
driving hard to meet it.
Our budget builds on our previous investments to deter
aggression. We are investing in a more resilient force posture
in the Indo-Pacific and increasing the scale and the scope of
our exercises with our partners. This budget includes a 40
percent increase over last year's budget for the Pacific
Deterrence Initiative, and it is an all-time high of $9.1
billion.
That will fund a stronger force posture, better defenses
for Hawaii and Guam, and deeper cooperation with our allies and
partners. This budget also makes the Department's largest ever
investments in both R&D [research and development] and
procurement. We are investing--we are requesting more than $61
billion to sustain air dominance. That includes funding for our
fighters and extraordinary B-21 strategic bomber that I helped
unveil last December.
We are also seeking more than $48 billion for sea power,
including new construction of nine battle force ships. We are
boosting capacity in America's shipyards to build the ships
that our strategy demands. We are investing a total of $1.2
billion in the submarine industrial base, and we are buying two
Virginia-class attack submarines and one Columbia-class missile
submarine.
On land, we are investing in air and missile defense and in
defenses to counter unmanned aerial vehicles. We are also
requesting $11 billion to deliver the right mix of long-range
fires, including major investments in hypersonics. We will also
continue to modernize all three legs of our nuclear triad and
bolster our strategic deterrence. We put forward the largest
budget, largest space budget in Pentagon history.
We have requested $33.3 billion to improve our capabilities
in our resilience in space. Well, let me again thank Congress
for providing the Department with multi-year procurement
authorities and appropriations for critical munitions.
In this budget, we are requesting more multi-year
procurement authorities, and we are asking for more than $30
billion to further invest in the industrial base, and to buy
the maximum number of munitions that American industry can
produce.
This budget also moves us away from aging capabilities that
aren't relevant to future conflicts so we can focus on the
advances that our warfighters will need. Now our national
defense strategy calls out Putin's highly aggressive Russia as
an acute threat. Under President Biden's leadership, the United
States has rallied the world to help Ukraine fight Russia's
indefensible invasion.
We have reinforced NATO's defense and deterrence on its
Eastern flank. Our allies and partners have provided crucial
security assistance coordinated through the Ukraine Defense
Contact Group that I lead. We will support Ukraine's defense
for as long as it takes. Meanwhile, the Department remains
vigilant against other persistent threats, including North
Korea and Iran.
We will take all necessary measures to defend our troops
and our interest overseas, as seen in our recent air strikes
against facilities linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps. We are also investing in over the horizon
counterterrorism capabilities. Mr. Chairman, our Joint Force
stands ready to meet any challenge.
You can see the forces readiness after Russia's unprovoked
invasion of Ukraine, when we swiftly deployed elements of the
3d Infantry Division to Poland to shore up NATO's Eastern
flank. We closely monitor readiness at the unit level and
maintain response forces at our highest State of readiness,
while the rest of the force, by design, is preparing for future
contingencies.
So, this budget will help us maintain our readiness with
$146 billion in funding for operations, training, and
maintenance. This budget also invests in improving our
readiness and resilience in the face of climate change and
other 21st century threats. Mr. Chairman, we are going to
remain the strongest military in the world.
As we mark the 50th anniversary of our All-Volunteer Force,
I am enormously proud of the brave men and women who choose to
wear the cloth of our Nation. We owe it to them and to their
families to take the best possible care of all of our people.
Over the past 2 years, we have made moves easier, we have cut
commissary prices, and we have made childcare more affordable.
This budget funds other key steps to increase the quality
of life of our teammates, including the largest military and
civilian pay raises in decades. Now, we are also pushing hard
to help eliminate suicide in our ranks, including immediate
steps to hire more mental health professionals and improve
access to mental health care. Meanwhile, we are working toward
a military that's free of sexual assault.
We worked with Congress to improve the response of sexual
assault and related crimes under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, and those reforms will be fully implemented by the end
of this year. The Department is also investing in a specialized
workforce to combat sexual assault, harassment, suicide, and
more.
Now, the Department's third priority is succeeding through
teamwork, and our rival network of allies and partners
magnifies our power and expands our security. In recent months,
our friends in the Indo-Pacific have taken major steps forward.
The Philippines has agreed to nearly double the number of sites
where we cooperate together. Japan is committed to double its
defense spending.
Through the historic AUKUS partnership, we will work with
our Australian and British allies to build game changing
defense advantages that will deter aggression and boost our
defense industrial capacity. In sum, Mr. Chairman, this is a
budget that will meet this moment, and I respectfully ask for
your support.
The single most effective way that this Committee can
support the Department and our outstanding troops is with an on
time full year appropriation. So, I look forward to working
with all of you so that we can continue to defend our democracy
and support the forces of freedom in this hour of challenge.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lloyd J. Austin III,
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, distinguished Members of the
Committee: thank you for the opportunity to testify in support of the
President's Budget Request for fiscal year 2024.
On behalf of Deputy Secretary Hicks, the leadership of the
Department of Defense, and our servicemembers, civilian workforce, and
their families, let me also thank you for your continued support and
partnership as we work to defend the United States. I also want to
thank the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley,
and the Department's Comptroller, Mike McCord, who are both testifying
with me and are vital partners in realizing the Department's
priorities.
The President's $842 billion defense budget request for fiscal year
2024 provides us with the capabilities and investments to advance our
three key priorities: defending the Nation, taking care of our people,
and succeeding through teamwork.
This is a strategy-driven budget that provides the resources to
continue to implement our 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the
President's National Security Strategy. This budget will also enable us
to strengthen our deterrent and defensive capabilities across domains,
informed by our 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and our 2022 Missile
Defense Review.
As President Biden has said, we are in a ``decisive decade,'' and
the choices that we make today will set our course for generations to
come--not just for the United States but for the world. So the
Department is rising to meet this moment, seizing on opportunities to
outpace our competitors, strengthen our security, and move our world
toward a more secure future.
As our National Defense Strategy makes clear, the People's Republic
of China (PRC) is the Department's pacing challenge. To meet this
challenge, the Department is honing new operational concepts, deploying
cutting-edge capabilities, and making essential investments for the
long term. This budget request shows it, including requests for the
Department's largest procurement and R&D budgets ever--$170 billion and
$145 billion respectively, and our budget request will also help us
meet the acute threat from Russia, as Russia's unprovoked war of choice
against Ukraine is now in its second year.
To maintain our edge, this budget will invest in vital
technological advancements for the Joint Force, while also reflecting
the need to eliminate capabilities that no longer best serve our
national defense. Such decisions can be difficult, but they will enable
us to invest in the advanced programs that our security demands.
The Department is also intensely focused on taking care of our
people, who remain our greatest asset. This budget invests in
significant quality-of-life improvements, including the largest
military pay raise in 22 years and the largest civilian pay raise in 43
years. We remain focused on continuing to recruit, retain, and develop
the best talent from across the country to serve in both uniformed and
civilian roles.
We owe it to our outstanding servicemembers, civilian employees,
and their families to provide the support that they need to thrive. We
also owe them environments that reward excellence, promote teamwork,
and are free from harassment and abuse. So, we are implementing
military justice reforms, fighting sexual assault, and redoubling our
efforts to end suicide in our ranks. These challenges are personal
priorities for me, and this budget paves the way for even more
progress.
We rely on teamwork within our Department and beyond it--including
with our interagency colleagues, Congress, the defense industrial base,
and our peerless network of Allies and Partners worldwide. That network
is a strategic advantage that no competitor can match. From rallying
the world to support Ukraine's fight for freedom to conducting joint
exercises in the Indo-Pacific with like-minded countries, our Allies
and Partners are a huge force multiplier. They magnify our power,
advance our shared security interests, and help uphold a world that is
free, open, prosperous, and secure, and this budget will support the
security partnerships that make America even stronger.
I have never been more confident in the power of our fighting force
and the talents of our civilian workforce. The fiscal year 2024 budget
request will help ensure that we meet America's national security
challenges and use this decisive decade to defend our democracy and
forge a world of greater security, prosperity, and liberty. I therefore
ask for your support of our budget and our mission as Congress writes
authorizing and appropriations bills in the months ahead.
defending the nation
We are deeply aware of our responsibility to be responsible
stewards of taxpayer dollars. This budget request has been carefully
prepared to provide the resources for the objectives laid out in our
2022 NDS, Nuclear Posture Review, and Missile Defense Review.
The NDS directs the Department to act urgently to sustain and
strengthen U.S. deterrence, with the PRC as our pacing challenge. The
NDS also directs the Department to tackle the acute threat of Russia,
as well as the persistent threats from Iran, the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK), and global terrorist groups.
The NDS clearly articulates our priorities: defend the Homeland
from the growing, multi-domain challenge posed by the PRC; deter
strategic attacks against the United States, our allies, and our
partners; deter aggression, while preparing to prevail in conflict if
necessary, by prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific,
followed by the Russian challenge in Europe; and build a resilient
Joint Force and defense ecosystem.
Within the Department, the NDS is our North Star, and we have
aligned our processes, policies, and plans to implement it. The fiscal
year 2024 budget is the latest concrete manifestation of our strategy--
and its deep recognition that the PRC presents a challenge now and in
the years to come.
prioritizing the prc as our pacing challenge
In recent decades, the PRC has demonstrated both the will and,
increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological
power to reshape its region and the international order to suit its
preferences. The United States will not let that happen. This budget
will enable us to continue executing our strategy and outpacing the
PRC, across all timeframes and domains.
Through the fiscal year 2024 budget, we will strengthen U.S.
deterrence and continue advancing new operational concepts, deploying
cutting-edge capabilities across all domains, and investing in the
innovations that we will need in the future. Through a $9.1 billion
request for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, the largest ever, the
Department is expanding the scope and scale of our activities to
reinforce security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, strengthen
deterrence, and bolster our advantages and those of our allies and
partners.
The Department is also investing in a more resilient posture across
the Indo-Pacific region. For example, in Japan, Australia, Guam, and
the Compact of Free Association States, we are forward-stationing and
deploying more capable forces even as we make major infrastructure
investments in airfields, logistics, domain awareness, and resilience.
In addition, throughout Southeast Asia, we are executing rotational
deployments, logistics cooperation, and targeted security assistance to
strengthen our partnerships, deepen our interoperability, and enhance
our collective readiness. This budget allows us to continue to support
Taiwan's self-defense, consistent with our longstanding commitments
enumerated in the Taiwan Relations Act, the three United States-PRC
Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.
Across the Indo-Pacific region, we have increased the complexity
and scale of our exercises and operations. In addition to building
interoperability with our allies and partners, we are experimenting to
build our warfighting advantages, which will help us further refine our
operating concepts and investments. This budget request will enable us
to continue that crucial work.
meeting the acute threat of russian aggression
Russia's unprovoked further invasion of Ukraine poses a historic
challenge to European and global security. Russia's campaign of
conquest is also an attack on the rules-based international order that
has helped to make the world safer and more secure since its creation
in the aftermath of World War II. If Russia succeeds, it would send a
message to other aggressor nations that they can attack and conquer
their neighbors. With United States leadership, a broad coalition of
allies and partners have rallied to help support Ukraine's defense of
its sovereignty.
Over the past year, the United States has committed more than $32
billion in game-changing security assistance to support Ukraine's fight
against Russian aggression. This has helped meet Ukraine's most urgent
needs--including for air defense, artillery systems, tanks and other
armored vehicles, and other crucial capabilities--and it has translated
to tangible gains on the battlefield. In the year since Russia's unjust
war of aggression began, Ukraine's military forces have won the battles
of Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson--and they have inspired the world with
their courage and resilience.
We will continue to support Ukraine's fight for freedom for as long
as it takes. To keep pace with Ukraine's urgent security needs even as
we maintain our own readiness, we are pushing to expand production from
the defense industrial base. We are focused on increasing the
resiliency of supply chains that are critical for national security. Ee
are focused on accountability of the security assistance that we have
provided.
Our NATO Allies face a historic challenge from Putin's aggressive
Russia, and we are making significant investments in bolstering
European security. Those build on foundational investments in posture
and presence that we have made in Europe since Russia's 2014 invasion
of Ukraine and seizure of the Crimea region. These investments paid
dividends in 2022 when we rapidly surged an additional 20,000 United
States Forces into the European theater to deter Russian aggression and
reassure our NATO allies. With little advance notice, the United States
deployed additional combat power, repositioned United States forces
already in Europe, and integrated deploying forces with prepositioned
stocks of munitions and supplies. Our continued investments in posture
and presence in Europe help deter Russian aggression against NATO--now
and in the future.
tackling advanced and persistent threats
We remain vigilant against the advanced and persistent threats from
the DPRK, Iran, and global terrorist organizations.
We continue to shore up security on the Korean Peninsula despite
the DPRK's provocations, including through bilateral and trilateral
cooperation. We will continue to stand with our allies, the Republic of
Korea (ROK) and Japan. We remain steadfast and ironclad in our extended
deterrence commitments to the ROK and Japan, and we continue to
demonstrate our ability to respond rapidly and firmly to any DPRK
provocation. We are working to strengthen and modernize our alliances
with the ROK and Japan and will continue to ensure that our forces in
and around the Korean Peninsula are ready to ``Fight Tonight'' in the
event of DPRK aggression.
Iran's nuclear program, its dangerous proxies, its support for
terrorism, its cyber threats, and its proliferation of one-way attack
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) all undermine Middle East security and
threaten United States forces and partners. We have acted decisively
when Iran-backed militia groups have attacked United States forces in
Iraq and Syria. As Iran deepens its partnership with Russia, including
Russian military support to Tehran in return for Iranian one-way attack
UAS to deploy in Ukraine, we are developing and fielding effective
approaches to counter the proliferating threats from Iran's UAS. This
budget request seeks to tackle these persistent challenges through
investments in integrated air and missile defense, maritime domain
awareness, and counter-UAS systems. We have repeatedly demonstrated our
ability to deploy combat-credible forces into the region to deter
potential Iranian aggression, and we will continue to take necessary
and proportionate military action to defend United States forces and
facilities from attack, or threat of attack, from Iran or Iran-backed
proxies. The United States will support and strengthen partnerships
with countries that subscribe to the rules-based international order,
and we will make sure those countries can defend themselves against
foreign threats. These actions have the added benefit of demonstrating
our commitment to the region's security that will offset the efforts by
external powers to reshape the region in their interest and to our
detriment.
Meanwhile, ISIS, al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups continue to
threaten the security of the United States, our citizens, and our
Partners in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. We are investing
in a modernized, over-the-horizon counterterrorism architecture to
prevent future attacks on our citizens and the United States Homeland,
and we have proven our continued ability to remove the most threatening
al Qaeda and ISIS operatives from the battlefield.
One legislative authority that is key to our ability to tackle
these advanced and persistent threats--Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act--expires at the end of this year. Section
702 provides essential, irreplaceable insights on the activities of
critical foreign targets. The loss of this authority, or its renewal in
diminished or unusable form, would profoundly damage the Department's
ability to see and mitigate some of the most profound threats against
the United States as well as its allies and partners. Reauthorization
is therefore a matter of utmost priority. Along with our colleagues in
the Intelligence Community and the Department of Justice, we look
forward to working with this Committee and others, in order to secure
section 702s extension.
innovating and modernizing
The fiscal year 2024 budget request will enable the Department to
develop, acquire, and modernize across all domains to address all the
above challenges, especially our competition with the PRC.
To maintain and expand our advantage over the PRC, we need to
modernize not just our weapons systems but also our operational
concepts and the ways that we do business. To operate effectively in a
dynamic security environment, the Department is prioritizing
investments to maintain a ready warfighting capability, build a skilled
defense workforce, and work more effectively with our allies and
partners.
A safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent is the
ultimate backstop to deter strategic attacks on our country and our
allies. The Department is committed to maintaining and modernizing our
nuclear triad, while seeking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in
U.S. national strategy. The fiscal year 2024 budget request, including
an investment of $37.7 billion in fiscal year 2024, fully funds the
nuclear triad and nuclear command, control, and communications,
demonstrating our commitment to maintain reliable and effective legacy
systems while pursuing their timely replacements.
The Department is also accelerating investments in cutting-edge
defense capabilities, such as uncrewed systems that can operate on the
water, underwater, in the air, and on land. Integrating human-machine
teaming, autonomous systems, and resilient networks will make our
operations significantly faster, more lethal, and more survivable.
The fiscal year 2024 budget request includes $30.6 billion
specifically for our munitions enterprise. It invests in modernizing
and growing our munitions industrial base and expanding production
capacity and procurement quantities. The Department is seeking to use
the unprecedented multiyear procurement authorities provided by
Congress to affordably acquire critical munitions, while bolstering our
inventories and providing our industry partners with a more predictable
``demand signal.''
The fiscal year 2024 budget request makes long-term investments of
$33.3 billion in the resilience of our space architecture in the event
of an attack. These investments will further expand and diversify
constellations for space sensing and communications resilience, as well
as augmenting our space warfighting capabilities. These steps will
drive even deeper cooperation with the robust American commercial space
sector.
In the cyberspace domain, this budget request makes targeted
investments to speed the development and management of new cyber tools.
This will help us integrate our sequentially developed Cyber Mission
Force capabilities. It will also aid our transition to, and sustainment
of, advanced cyber capabilities from the Department's Science and
Technology (S&T) activities. These efforts will enhance the
interoperability and effectiveness of our Joint Cyberspace Warfighting
Architecture and maintain an efficient pipeline from America's world-
class cyber-innovation workforce into the Department's cyberspace
operations forces.
The Department is also adapting to America's changing labor market
to ensure that we have the right team to execute the NDS. This budget
funds a new civilian cyber workforce-incentive program to target skill
gaps, and it develops a curriculum of advanced cyber training for our
military. We are also increasing investments in international research
partnerships on critical technologies with our allies and partners.
Our technological superiority is not a given; we have to work for
it every day. That includes rapid prototyping and commercial
integration. So, the Department is investing in tomorrow's technology,
such as responsible cutting-edge artificial intelligence, enhancing our
critical supply chains, and modernizing our testing and training
capabilities.
The Department continues to vigorously develop and test advanced
weapons prototypes. Against the backdrop of our recent successful
flight tests, the fiscal year 2024 budget request expands the
development of several hypersonic weapons programs, as well as
demonstration and testing activities. This budget will also improve our
subsonic cruise missiles to ensure their effectiveness against rapidly
changing threats and targets.
The Department is pursuing a range of initiatives to harden U.S.
basing and ensure that it is resilient against air and missile attacks.
For example, we have made major investments in missile defenses for
Guam and Hawaii, as well as infrastructure improvements across the
entire Indo-Pacific region.
This budget request also funds the advancement of our joint
warfighting concepts and the rapid experimentation and fielding of
emerging capabilities across all domains. Ultimately, these initiatives
will ensure a Joint Force that is increasingly agile, innovative,
interoperable with allies and partners, and resilient.
After decades of combat and coalition experience for our Special
Operations Forces (SOF) in recent conflicts, we are pioneering new SOF
approaches to help meet today's primary challenges. This budget enables
our SOF enterprise to continue to modernize its crisis-response
capabilities, while developing creative, adaptable, and asymmetric
options that ensure our Joint Force will present a range of dilemmas to
our adversaries.
The Department will also expand the Pacific Multi-Domain Training
and Experimentation Capability, which will help our forces train in the
ways and places they may be called upon to fight. These investments
boost our readiness and lay the foundation for advances in sensor-to-
shooter networks that will multiply our forces' lethality. To improve
the speed and global integration of our operational decisionmaking, we
will deliver proven Joint All Domain Command and Control enhancements
to our warfighters by 2027.
The fiscal year 2024 budget is rooted in the recognition that our
competitors and adversaries are not standing still, and we must make
the right investments now to retain our technological advantages in the
decades to come.
The Department will continue to draw on America's longstanding
strategic advantages by investing in critical innovations--such as
quantum computing, advanced materials, renewable energy projects,
integrated networks, and future-generation wireless technology. To
maintain the United States' position as the global leader in research
and development, we are cultivating a strong, adaptive, and highly
skilled workforce of scientists and engineers through programs like the
Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation scholarship-for-
service program.
investing to win across all domains
On land, the fiscal year 2024 budget continues to build a combat-
credible, ready, and lethal Army that can tackle challenges around the
world. Our budget request seeks to strengthen Army capabilities in the
Indo-Pacific region, with significant investments in our air and
missile defenses as well as land-based long-range fires. We are also
revitalizing and strengthening the Army's Organic Industrial Base by
modernizing the Army's arsenals, maintenance depots, and ammunition
facilities.
The fiscal year 2024 budget builds on past investments in the
Marine Corps Force Design 2030 concept, which focused on fielding
capabilities and updating the Corps' force structure in the Indo-
Pacific region. It also makes important new investments in electronic-
warfare capabilities, command and control systems, air and missile
defenses, and ground-force survivability, as well as in training and
exercises.
At sea, this request helps deliver a ready and formidable naval
force focused on deterring potential aggression from the PRC. The
budget request continues the transition of our naval force to
Distributed Maritime Operations, with an increased focus on uncrewed
surface and underwater vehicles. Our request expands investments in
long-range fires, more advanced weapons systems, and next-generation
platforms, including development of the Columbia-class submarine. The
Department also continues its critical investments in the submarine-
construction industrial base; we will begin investing in better
submarine-maintenance capacities, and we will increase our investments
in the optimization of our shipyard infrastructure to make our
industrial base healthier and more capable of meeting future needs. The
budget request continues to move the Navy away from systems that are
ill-suited for operations in highly contested environments.
In the air domain, the fiscal year 2024 budget request makes
significant investments to ensure air dominance in future conflicts.
This includes F-35 and F-22 aircraft modernization, next-generation
fighter development, and autonomous combat collaborative aircraft.
These investments complement global strike capabilities such as the B-
21 family of systems. The budget request invests in the development of
strategic nuclear capabilities, such as Sentinel and the Long-Range
Stand Off weapon. It also prioritizes long-range fires like hypersonic
weapons, as well as a modern air command-and-control framework, rapid
global mobility, and improved electronic warfare capabilities. To fully
realize the tremendous advantages offered by our next-generation
fighter and bomber platforms, we are investing in air-launched weapons
that offer greater range, speed, precision, flexibility, and lethality.
We are also closing shortfalls in supplying critical munitions by
accelerating procurement where feasible, as well as expanding and
procuring additional production capacity for our top-priority air-
launched weapons. Moreover, this budget request continues to
responsibly make the transition away from air-weapons systems that do
not support our strategy, even as we invest in the maintenance and
development of more advanced systems.
In the space domain, we continue to build our advantages over our
competitors by investing in missile warning and tracking, data
transport, communications, and space sensing. This budget request also
funds upgrades to our launch infrastructure to support more government
and commercial launches. Consistent with our recently completed Space
Strategic Review, additional investments will deter hostile uses of
space, and if deterrence fails, ensure that we can prevail in conflict
in this domain, too.
This budget also strengthens our cyberspace operations force, which
persistently engages both State and non-State cyber actors seeking to
harm the United States, its interests, and its Allies. It upgrades our
cyber operations training platform, accelerates the use of cloud-based
capabilities, and invests in rapidly modernizing the software and
hardware needed to further fortify our cyber posture.
Finally, over the past 3 years of the COVID-19 pandemic, we have
seen the massive impact that biological threats can inflict on our
country. Accordingly, the President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget will
enhance our ability to address any future pandemics or other biological
threats.
meeting the climate crisis
As the NDS makes clear, climate change is increasingly shaping the
context in which the Department operates. That places new demands on
the Joint Force, with implications for our readiness. Climate change is
also creating new potential points of friction in places such as the
Arctic, while affecting security relationships with Allies and Partners
around the world. We are determined to ensure that the United States
can meet and deal with these challenges.
This budget therefore invests in enhancing operational capability,
mission resilience, and readiness. This includes programs that mitigate
the risk of energy supply disruptions to critical military facilities--
whether caused by extreme weather, cyber operations, or kinetic attack.
The budget request also includes funding to improve the energy
efficiency of combat operations and platforms while deploying new
technology to improve lethality and mitigate logistics risk in
contested environments. Throughout, our focus is on building our
operational advantages. These are not only essential steps for the
climate of the world that we share, but also strategic moves to defend
our country and strengthen our military.
taking care of our people
The U.S. Military is without a doubt the strongest fighting force
in human history, and we remain determined to keep it that way. The
foundation of that strength is our people. The Department is deeply
committed to taking care of our total workforce by growing our talent,
building resilience and readiness in the force, ensuring accountable
leadership, and tackling even the most difficult workforce challenges.
This budget prioritizes our ongoing actions to take care of our
outstanding servicemembers, and their families, including by increasing
servicemember and civilian employee compensation, raising housing
allowance, and improving military housing. The budget also helps make
quality childcare more accessible and affordable, including through the
launch of universal pre-kindergarten at all Department of Defense
Education Activity schools. We are also making investments to fight a
range of problematic and harmful behaviors. That includes continued
efforts to combat sexual assault and sexual harassment, reform the
military justice system, and prevent suicide in the Force.
growing our talent
To defend our Nation's security, we must tap into the talent that
exists all across our Nation. We must recruit and retain the best of
America, building pathways of opportunity for all qualified patriots
who seek to serve. In this budget, we continue to provide our force
with exceptional opportunities for service and professional
development. This means being the employer of choice for personnel with
technological skills, mastery of foreign languages, and more. We are
also investing in training and education, as well as creating
scholarships for science, technology, engineering, and math. We will
continue to deepen the Department's partnerships with America's best
universities, paving the way for the next generation of leaders. I am
proud that the Department recently established its first university-
affiliated research center at an Historically Black College and
University--just one of the many ways that we are building new ways for
talented Americans to join our team.
building resilience and readiness
Ensuring the safety, health, and well-being of our servicemembers
is a sacred trust--and a matter of readiness. We know that when
economic challenges hit our teammates where they live, it can make it
even harder to serve. However, we also know that when we take care of
our servicemembers and ensure they are well trained and well equipped,
they continue to serve.
So, in addition to robustly funding the factors that immediately
contribute to readiness--training, equipping, and maintaining--we have
made continued investments to support our servicemembers and their
families, launching targeted initiatives to bring down daily costs for
servicemembers. Those efforts have made childcare more accessible and
affordable, lowered prices in the commissary system and made access to
affordable food easier through online ordering, eased moving costs, and
increased opportunities for spousal employment and career mobility
including through the launch of the Military Spouse Career Accelerator
Pilot, a paid fellowship for military spouses that allows employers to
connect with this diverse and talented pool of talent. We have also
raised pay and allowances across the board. The fiscal year 2024 budget
will support a 5.2 percent pay raise for our servicemembers and our
civilian employee workforce--the largest pay raise in decades. The
fiscal year 2024 budget also invests in full day pre-kindergarten at
all Department of Defense Education Activity schools, providing our
military children an essential head start on their education. There is
no greater testament to the resilience and readiness of our force than
the historically high retention rates across the Services.
ensuring accountability
The Department of Defense is committed to the health, safety, and
well-being of our servicemembers and will not tolerate prohibited
harmful behavior. This is a leadership issue, and we will lead. In
February 2021, I ordered the creation of a 90-day independent review
commission (IRC) on sexual assault in the military. The Department,
including the Military Services, are now implementing the IRC
recommendations that I approved.
The Department also worked with the President and Congress to enact
historic legislation improving the response to sexual assault, domestic
violence, and related crimes under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. The Offices of Special Trial Counsel, newly established to
prosecute these crimes with independence and specialized expertise,
will reach full operating capability in December 2023.
We will continue to work relentlessly to end sexual assault and
related crimes, including through investments in a specialized
prevention workforce and through important tools like the On-Site
Installation Evaluations, which help us identify where our efforts are
working and where more support is urgently needed.
The Department remains focused on efforts to eliminate suicide in
the ranks and to respond better when these tragedies occur. This budget
makes a significant investment in suicide prevention, and we are
accelerating efforts to expand and increase access to mental health
care, to including increased hiring and training of mental health
professionals, to ensure that our servicemembers can access the help
they need when they need it.
succeeding through teamwork
Our world is increasingly defined by strategic competition,
profound technological change, and 21st century challenges that pay no
heed to borders. In this changing strategic environment, the United
States is far stronger because of the power of our like-minded allies
and partners, the improvements in industrial exchanges with our
friends, the integration and development of innovation, and the
interoperability of our forces. Our cooperation with allies and
partners is central to co-developing advanced capabilities and rushing
tangible improvements to our warfighters. These are strategic
advantages that no rival can match. The Department is deeply committed
to further strengthening our work with the allies and partners who
magnify our might.
the aukus partnership
The historic AUKUS partnership breaks new ground in working with
two of our closest Allies--Australia and the United Kingdom--to take on
the threats of the 21st century, just as we did together in the 20th
century. As the President outlined in his State of the Union address,
we are building bridges between partners in the Pacific and those in
the Atlantic, and AUKUS is a generational opportunity at the center of
this change. This initiative translates our strategy into action, and
it helps to forge a more advantageous balance of power in the Indo-
Pacific, where the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom are
actively strengthening deterrence across the region. AUKUS will enhance
our collective military capabilities, especially in the advanced
technologies that we believe will be critical for security and
stability in the future.
On March 13, 2023, the President announced our plans for the first
major initiative of AUKUS: providing Australia with a conventionally
armed, nuclear powered submarine capability. This phased approach will
allow us provide this capability on the fastest possible timeline,
while upholding the highest standards for nuclear stewardship and
setting a precedent that strengthens the nonproliferation regime. As
the President made clear, our three nations are making concrete
commitments to each other, and we are backing these commitments up with
significant investments to strengthen the industrial bases of each of
our nations.
allies and partners in the indo-pacific region
In the Indo-Pacific region, we continue to build and strengthen our
peerless network of alliances and partnerships. Recent progress only
underscores the enormous value of our Allies and Partners in the
region.
For example, we are working closely with Japan to expand the roles
and missions of our alliance. We are forward-deploying more versatile,
resilient, and mobile United States capabilities even as we enhance
Japan's capabilities, including in counterstrike, unmanned vehicles,
and counter-hypersonic weapons. We are also increasing our trilateral
cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Australia, further
demonstrating regional commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific
region.
We are working with the ROK to ensure that our combined forces are
able to deter the DPRK and help ensure peace and stability in Northeast
Asia, including by returning our defensive exercises to historical
norms.
In Australia, we have built a deep partnership on technology and
the development of advanced capabilities, including space cooperation
and space domain awareness. We are continuing the rotational presence
of United States capabilities through Australia, across the air, land,
and maritime domains. Working alongside our ally, we are identifying
locations to support enhanced U.S. presence with necessary
infrastructure improvements. In 2022, we also announced that we will
preposition munitions and fuel to support United States capabilities in
Australia.
In the Philippines, we are modernizing the United States-Philippine
Alliance by enhancing maritime cooperation, improving interoperability
and information sharing, and adding four important new locations under
the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. These steps underscore our
unwavering commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty with the
Philippines.
In Thailand, we are continuing to strengthen the long-standing
United States-Thai alliance. Our annual Cobra Gold exercise, for
example, contributes immeasurably to peace, security, and stability in
the Indo-Pacific, while ensuring we are prepared to respond rapidly and
effectively to a humanitarian disaster.
Meanwhile, with India, we are advancing our Major Defense
Partnership and launching a new chapter in United States-India ties.
The Department is bolstering the Indian military's deterrent
capabilities to ensure that India remains the preeminent power in the
Indian Ocean and can help uphold a favorable balance of power across
the wider Indo-Pacific region. We are committed to working closely with
India on technology cooperation; deepening our interoperability across
key defense and security domains, including space and cyberspace; and
ensuring that the United States-India partnership supports the efforts
of our broader network of like-minded Allies and Partners, especially
the Quad.
european security cooperation and support to ukraine
Under President Biden's leadership, the United States has changed
the course of history by surging critical security assistance to
Ukraine over the past year. With the support of Congress, our response
to Russia's full-scale reprehensible assault on its peaceful and
democratic neighbor has provided historic levels of security assistance
to Ukraine through a combination of Presidential Drawdown Authority and
the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. The United States has also
rallied like-minded countries around the world to support Ukraine's
brave defenders. The engine of our efforts is the Ukraine Defense
Contact Group, the coalition of some 50 countries that I convene
regularly to spur and coordinate support to Ukraine. Our Allies and
Partners have collectively committed approximately $20 billion in
security assistance to Ukraine, including hundreds of tanks, thousands
of other armored vehicles, vital air-defense systems, hundreds of
artillery systems, and other crucial capabilities.
In the face of the biggest threat to European security since the
height of the cold war, the NATO Alliance is more united than ever. We
have moved urgently with our Allies to further fortify NATO and bolster
its defenses on its eastern flank. Our commitment to Article Five of
the North Atlantic Treaty remains ironclad. We will not be dragged into
Putin's war of choice, but we will stand with Ukraine as it fights to
defend itself, and we will continue to strengthen NATO's collective
defense and deterrence.
building teamwork at home
Our partners at the Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial
levels provide essential support for our servicemembers and their
families, caregivers, and survivors at military installations and
communities around the country. The Department is committed to working
even more closely with these vital partners. Meanwhile, our
servicemembers continue to proudly support our fellow Americans in
times of crisis, as they have this year during natural disasters and
amidst the lingering COVID-19 pandemic.
At the same time, we are supporting our Federal, State, local,
tribal, and territorial partners' efforts to become more resilient and
less reliant on Department of Defense support. Increased national
resilience will ensure that America stands ready should an adversary
choose to test our will with cyber or kinetic attacks on the U.S.
Homeland.
In addition, our partners in industry remain an engine of
innovation--one that ensures that our warfighters remain ready to
tackle the security challenges of this century. Our budget request will
shore up our defense industrial base, strengthen its ability to produce
the capabilities that we need, and develop critical technologies for
the future.
It is the honor of my lifetime to lead our exceptional and dynamic
team at the Department of Defense. We continue to strengthen our
internal processes to ensure that we make timely decisions based on
rigorous cooperation among civilian and military teams across the
Department and with our interagency partners. We will demonstrate that
spirit of partnership at the highest levels, and we will expect it from
every person in the Department.
conclusion
The way that we respond to today's challenges will help determine
America's course for generations to come. The Department is seizing
this inflection point in history. We will never flinch in the defense
of the democracy that we have vowed to protect, and we will take care
of all of the extraordinary patriots who comprise the world's strongest
fighting force.
The fiscal year 2024 budget enables us to deliver on these
priorities, and we ask for your support as we build the Department of
the future. We remain deeply committed to working with Congress on
oversight and appropriations to ensure that we have the resources that
our Total Force needs and deserves--today, tomorrow, and in the future.
We will be good stewards of those resources, for both warfighters
and taxpayers. Defense reform will ensure that we use taxpayer dollars
efficiently by modernizing our business processes, improving our
financial and contract management, and completing the Department's
audit. Above all, our accountability to both our own forces and the
American public is core to our democracy and sets us apart from our
competitors on the world stage.
Finally, we are grateful for our extraordinary soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, guardians, their families, caregivers, and survivors,
and civilian employees. They are the foundation of America's strength,
and we are honored to serve alongside them. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. General
Milley, do you have a statement?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Milley. I do, Chairman, and Chairman Reed, Ranking
Member Wicker, and distinguished Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I
want to echo the condolences, about the Secretary and the
Chairman, for the great people of Mississippi and Alabama.
Tragic losses.
Our hearts go out to them, and many, many soldiers and
sailors, airmen, marines in uniform come from your two great
states, so our hearts go out to you. I have been privileged to
defend this country for 43 consecutive years in uniform, and as
the Chairman said, this is likely my last set of posture
hearings.
But I do want to thank the Congress for your continued
support to our military, not only on this budget, but for the
last 4 decades. I ask that you support this year's request with
an on-time budget approval. I am honored to represent here
today the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, and
families of the United States Joint Force, along with Secretary
Austin and Mike McCord. I want to publicly thank them both for
their leadership.
Our Joint Force, as the Secretary says, is the most lethal
and capable military in the world because of your support. Our
purpose, the military's purpose, the uniformed military, is
simple. It is to defend the United States, and our task is to
fight and win in all the domains of combat to secure America
and prevent a great power war.
Readiness for us in uniform, and readiness now and
readiness in the future, through modernization, is our number
one priority, and there is no other number one other than the
readiness for combat. The joint boards will accomplish this at
the fiscal year 2024 budget request of $842 billion.
Right now, as pointed out by Senator Wicker, the
international system is under stress. For the first time, the
United States is facing two major nuclear powers whose vital
national security interests are in competition with the United
States. Both the People's Republic of China and Russia have the
means to threaten our interests and our way of life. But war
with either one is neither inevitable nor imminent.
A great power war has not happened in the last 80 years, in
large part because of the rules put in place at the end of
World War II and the capabilities of the United States
military, along with our allies and partners. We must remain
the most powerful Nation and the great power peace then will be
prevailing.
The People's Republic of China remains our number one long-
term geostrategic security challenge. The PRC intends to be the
regional hegemonic Asia within the next 10 years and to exceed
the United States overall military capability by mid-century,
and they have publicly said 2049. The PRC's actions are moving
it down the path toward potential confrontation with its
neighbors and the United States.
But again, war with China is neither inevitable nor
imminent. Additionally, Russia is an acute threat and remains
quite dangerous. Over a year ago, Russia undertook an illegal
and unprovoked war against Ukraine, threatening the peace on
the European continent and global stability.
We are supporting Ukraine to protect its sovereignty and
supporting NATO with the United States force presence in every
single nation on NATO's Eastern flank. This fight is not just
in Ukraine's interest. It is in the United States interest to
protect the system that has prevented a great power war. In
Iran, Iran threatens to push the Middle East into regional
instability by supporting terrorists and proxy forces, as we
recently saw.
Just last week, Iranian aligned groups killed one American
and injured seven in attacks on coalition bases in Syria. We
acted immediately to defend our troops and we will continue to
counter terrorist threats in the region and anywhere else we
find them.
Iran has taken actions also to improve its capabilities to
produce a nuclear weapon. From the time of an Iranian decision,
Iran could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon
in less than 2 weeks and would only take several months
thereafter to produce an actual nuclear weapon.
The United States remains committed as a matter of policy
that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon. The United States
military has developed multiple options for our national
leadership to consider if or when Iran decides to develop a
nuclear weapon.
North Korea's continued ballistic missile testing and
nuclear weapons development pose threats to our Homeland and
our allies and partners, but we stand together, shoulder to
shoulder with the Republic of Korea, to deter North Korean
aggression, as we have for 7 decades.
Terrorists continue to operate around the globe,
threatening fear, destruction, destabilization, and this budget
supports our continued counterterrorism effort. In short, the
United States military stands ready to protect our Nation's
interests and the American people. We are currently standing
watch on freedom's frontier with nearly a quarter of 1.25
million troops in Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and
South America.
The United States never fights alone. The key source of our
strength is our large global network of alliances and
partnerships. Just this month, we conducted 63 operations and
joint combined exercises globally with our allies and partners.
Last, our operational readiness rates are higher now than they
have been in many years.
Currently, 60 percent of our Active force is at the highest
State of readiness and could deploy to combat in less than 30
days, well exceeding our minimum standard of one-third of the
force, Ten percent, in fact, could deploy in less than 96
hours. This military, the United States military is ready.
The Joint Force is at an inflection point, and we must
balance operations, readiness, and modernization. We must not
allow ourselves to create the false trap that we can either
modernize our forces for the future or focus only on today. We
must do both. We must integrate advancing technologies,
including precision long range fires, hypersonic weapons,
quantum computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, and all
domain sensors.
The time is now. We have very little margin to wait, and
the common thread critical to accomplish all of this is our
people. We must continue investing in training, education, and
talent management to be prepared for future operating
environment.
I urge Congress to support this budget's significant pay
raise, health care, housing, and childcare initiatives. This
budget sustains our readiness and adapts the Joint Force to the
future warfighting requirements. There is nothing more
expensive than fighting a war. Preparing for war is very
expensive, but nothing more expensive than fighting it, and
preparing for war will deter a war, and that is our goal.
We must act with clear eyed urgency in order to deter a
great power war. By doing so, no adversary should ever
underestimate the resolve of our Nation and the strength of our
military. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Mark A. Milley follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Mark A. Milley, USA
introduction
After 43 years in uniformed service, 4 years as Chief of Staff of
the Army, and 3.5 years as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this
will be my last set of posture hearings. I want to thank the Congress
up front for your continued support to our military, not only this year
but every year for the last 4 decades. We would not have a military
without the generous support of the American people and their elected
representatives. Thank you for what you have done and, yet again, I ask
that you support this year's request with an on-time budget approval.
I am honored to represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
guardians, and their families of the United States Joint Force. They
are the most lethal and capable military in the world. Our troops are
the best led, best equipped, and best trained force anywhere because of
your support. Side by side with our allies and partners, American
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and guardians are standing watch in
158 countries and conducting operations every day of the year to keep
Americans safe.
The United States military is a key component of our national
power. In concert with our diplomatic corps, economic organizations,
and democratic institutions, we support efforts to sustain a stable and
open international system. This hard and soft power provides a range of
options to this legislative body and the Commander-in-Chief. Our
strength deters adversaries and preserves peace. Although, if
deterrence fails, the United States military is prepared to fight and
win against those who attack the United States or our vital interests.
The Joint Force appreciates the work that our elected
representatives do to ensure that we have the resources needed to
train, equip, and man the force in order to be ready. The increased
level of military funding beyond last fiscal year will ensure we
continue future modernization while simultaneously meeting the national
security readiness requirements of today.
The Joint Force will deliver modernization of our armed forces and
security to the people of the United States at the fiscal year 2024
budget request of $842 billion. The people of the United States,
through this body, have committed significant funding and we will work
diligently to ensure it is spent prudently in the best interest of this
Nation. This budget will enable the investments and transformations
necessary to build the Joint Force of 2030 and beyond.
In alignment with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National
Military Strategy (NMS), this budget delivers a ready, agile, and
capable Joint Force that will defend the Nation, while taking care of
our people, and working with our partners and allies. There are direct
linkages from the NDS and NMS to the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC)
which describes how we will employ and succeed as a Joint Force. The
JWC is threat informed and fully integrated into our resourcing and
requirements processes to build the force required for the future.
Stable, predictable, and timely budgets are critical for this
Nation's defense. The passage of these budgets enables proper planning,
prioritization, and programmatic investments necessary for continued
progress. Continuing resolutions risk future modernization and impair
our ability to meet our missions.
Preventing great power war through readiness and deterrence is very
expensive but not as expensive as fighting a war and the only thing
more expensive than fighting a war is losing a war. This budget is a
significant step in the right direction to ensure that the United
States military maintains the current readiness and develops the future
modernization necessary to deter war and, if deterrence fails, to fight
and win.
strategic environment
The People's Republic of China (PRC): War with the PRC is neither
imminent nor inevitable, however the potential for armed conflict is
growing. The PRC remains our #1 long-term geostrategic security
challenge. Since the reforms of Deng Xiaoping in 1979, the world has
witnessed the greatest geopolitical shift in economic power in over 100
years. In the wake of the PRC's economic growth has come rapidly
increasing PRC military capability. Using economic and military hard
power, the PRC's goal is to revise the global international order by
midcentury, and it intends to be the regional hegemon in Asia within
the next 10 years. Its intention is to exceed the United States'
military capability within the Western Pacific in the next decade and
to exceed the United States' overall military capability by 2049.
The PRC continues to take increasingly aggressive actions to
reshape the Indo-Pacific region and revise the global order. It is
making significant economic investments in its military to improve
technology and modernize its military forces. The PRC continues to
challenge the stability and security in the Pacific as well as across
the globe. Through economic coercion, the PRC is expanding its global
footprint and increasing its ability to project military power at range
and scale. It is aggressively modernizing its military in order to
protect its authoritarian interests and are prepared to use force if
required. The PRC seeks to strengthen its hard power enabling the PRC
to coerce others with militarily might. These PRC actions continue to
move its nation down the path toward confrontation and conflict.
The PRC remains focused on revising the global international order
by midcentury. In short, the PRC continues to develop significant
nuclear, space, cyber, land, sea, and air capabilities. It is working
every day to close the technology gap with the United States and our
allies. We must maintain our military superiority over the PRC in all
the domains of war if we are to preserve the great power peace of the
last 80 years. The PRC represents a real and growing national security
challenge. This is a matter of national urgency.
History is not deterministic and war with the PRC is not
inevitable. While the PRC is clearly an increasingly capable strategic
competitor, it is imperative that we keep our relationship in
competition and not in conflict. By maintaining a strong military with
overmatch against the PRC, we are postured to deter conflict with the
PRC. Through integrated deterrence, we will raise perceived costs to
the PRC and deter aggression. If deterrence fails, then we will end the
conflict on terms favorable to the United States.
Russia: Over 1 year ago, Russia undertook an illegal and unprovoked
war against Ukraine threatening peace and stability on the European
continent--a peace that ensures global stability and an international
order where all nations can prosper. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is in
complete contradiction to the basic rules that underline the United
Nations Charter established at the end of World War II. Russia's war is
a brazen assault against the free people of Ukraine and threatens to
destabilize all of Europe and beyond.
In response to this Russian war of choice, we are supporting
Ukraine as it fights to protect its sovereignty and supporting our NATO
allies with a United States force presence in every single nation on
NATO's eastern flank. Putin's war of choice has caused untold human
suffering and terrorized a free country and its people. Putin attempted
to seize Kyiv, overthrow its government, and fracture the NATO
alliance. NATO remains more unified than ever, and Ukraine remains free
and independent.
The Ukrainian people have demonstrated immense bravery and
resilience and inspired the world. The international community has come
together to ensure that this unambiguous act of aggression by Russia
does not go unanswered. This fight is not just in Ukraine's interests,
it is in the global interest to protect the system and rules that have
prevented great power war since the conclusion of World War II.
With the backing of the U.S. Congress, the United States is
determined to continue to support Ukraine with the means to defend
themselves. The United States has committed to provide Ukraine 160
155mm Howitzers, over 1,000,000 155mm artillery rounds, 38 High
Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), a Patriot air defense
battery, 8 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS),
31 Abrams tanks, and 109 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles.
A broad mix of air defense systems protect the skies over Kyiv and
the cities of Ukraine. Armor systems strengthen Ukrainian front lines
enabling offensive and defense operations. Ukrainians employ long range
fires to challenge Russian command and control and its ability to
sustain Russian aggression. These systems will enable Ukraine to ensure
that Russia does not achieve its strategic objectives. Russia failed in
its initial war aims and continues to revise its strategic goals due to
its sustained operational failures. Russia continues to pay extremely
heavy costs on the battlefield.
Last year, in Poland, we established the first permanent United
States installation on NATO's eastern flank. The United States
maintains significant numbers of combat capable forces in Europe to
deter aggression and to stand shoulder to shoulder with our allies and
partners.
Russia retains a large nuclear capability to threaten the United
States, Europe, and the globe. Vladimir Putin and his regime continue
to use irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and posturing. Russia has
repeatedly demonstrated its capability and will to conduct complex
malicious cyber activities targeting American digital infrastructure,
both military and commercial.
Through private military companies, Russia continues to undermine
other nations' sovereignty and create unstable security situations.
Aside from its brutal war in Ukraine, Moscow's actions in Africa and
the Middle East demonstrate its aggressiveness, resourcefulness, and
opportunism. Russia is an immediate acute and very dangerous challenge
to the United States' national security.
North Korea: Its continued weapons testing and development pose
real threats to our Homeland as well as allies and partners in the
Indo-Pacific. North Korea's rhetoric is becoming increasingly
aggressive as it is growing more confrontational and continues to
enhance its ballistic missile capability and capacity. Pyongyang shows
no signs of relenting in its focus on its Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) program at the expense of its citizens and the peace of the
Korean Peninsula as well as the entire region. Readiness of United
States military forces on the Korean Peninsula and our ability to
rapidly respond to provocation ensure stability and prevent war.
Iran: Iran's support for and involvement in conflicts in the region
and its neighbors threaten to push the Middle East into broader
regional instability and chaos. Through its funding of terrorist
activities and support to partner and proxy forces inside the borders
of its neighbors, along with its ballistic missile programs, Iran seeks
to revise the regional order and balance of power in its favor. Iran's
proliferation of UAVs across the region and into Russia pose critical
security challenges for the United States and our partners. Iran is
taking actions to improve its capabilities to produce a nuclear weapon,
should it make the decision to do so, while continuing to build its
missile forces. From the time of a national decision, Iran could
produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in approximately
10-15 days and it would only take several months to produce an actual
nuclear weapon. The United States remains committed, as a matter of
policy, that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon. The United States
military has developed multiple options for our national leadership to
consider, if or when Iran decides to develop a nuclear weapon.
Violent extremist organizations: Terrorist organizations such as
Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Al-Shabaab, and others continue to export terror,
destruction, and destabilization. Unless the root causes of instability
that give rise to these types of groups are resolved, terrorists will
continue to take root around the globe, threaten others with attacks,
and undermine legitimate governments. The root causes can only be
effectively addressed by including governments of the region and we can
best influence outcomes with diplomatic, economic, information,
stability, and counterterrorism efforts. Through coalition efforts to
train, advise, and assist partners and allies as well as intelligence
sharing, we will continue to ensure that terrorists do not possess the
capacity and capability to exert their will. Our counterterrorism
strategy is to work by, with, and through our regional allies and
partners and to conduct direct action counterterrorism strikes when
necessary to protect the United States or our interests.
Allies and partners: Our alliances and partnerships are key to
maintaining the rules based international order and a stable and open
international system promoting peace and prosperity. This budget allows
us to build our partners' and allies' capabilities, foster
interoperability, and strengthen relationships. Doing so allows us, our
allies, and our partners to counter the coercion of our strategic
competitors, oppose the malign activity of regional threats, and meet
the varied security challenges posed by State and non-State actors. We
are stronger when we operate closely with our allies and partners.
readiness and modernization
Right now, we are experiencing a fundamental change in the
character of war. The character of war--how, where, and with what
weapons and technologies wars are fought--is changing significantly. We
must fully integrate developing technologies including precision long
range fires, hypersonic weapons, quantum computing, artificial
intelligence, robotics, and pervasive all-domain sensors.
The current rapidly changing technology will provide decisive
advantage to the nations that can integrate and fuse the capabilities
into military weaponry, doctrine, training, organization, and
professional development. The future operating environment will be
highly lethal and will be characterized by the ability to see and sense
the environment like never before. The attributes of the future Joint
Force will be characterized by stealth, resilience, speed, distributed,
agile, adaptive, in a constant State of motion, and, most importantly,
highly lethal. Our leaders and forces will operate independently in
degraded communication environments with mission type orders in austere
logistics.
Continued modernization is imperative for the Joint Force. Building
the Joint Force required to implement our National Defense Strategy
requires modernizing our capabilities, design, and employment. We must
not allow ourselves to create the false trap that we can either
modernize or focus only on today. We must do both. The United States
has always had the advantage of time to conduct a long buildup prior to
the beginning of hostilities. Our fortunate geography with oceans on
our east and west borders and friendly neighbors to our north and south
have given us the strategic advantage of buffer zones to threats. With
advances in technology and a growing global interconnectedness, we will
no longer have the luxury of a long protected buildup prior to
conflict. It is imperative that we have a modern advanced force in
sufficient size and readiness to enable sustained deterrence and, if
required, to be able to fight and win. We must make some fundamental
changes to our Joint Force in order to leverage our military overmatch
to deter conflict in a future operating environment.
Our strategic competitors are modernizing their militaries,
weapons, and capability. We must continue to modernize ours; we have no
choice. We must divest legacy systems to enable the modernization of
our forces.
In the fall of 2019, the Secretary of Defense tasked the Joint
Staff to develop the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) to address
strategic conflict. This year, the Joint Staff published the third
iteration of JWC and will integrate the ideas into new joint doctrine.
Today, JWC is the unifying vision to guide future force design, force
development, and force employment to ensure we have the right people,
equipment, training, roles, and doctrine. It will continue to
incorporate evolving threats to help us shape our strategic environment
and future operations. JWC 3.0 contains an updated description of the
overarching military challenges facing the Joint Force, a refined
explanation of the military solution--expanded maneuver--and a detailed
description of how the Joint Force will apply this solution. This
version of the JWC includes greater fidelity on key warfighting
concepts and more precision on the operational approaches that will
enable the Joint Force to gain positions of advantage against peer
adversaries.
Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is a warfighting
capability to sense, make sense, and act at all levels and phases of
war, across all domains, and with partners, to deliver information
advantage at speed to our forces and decisionmakers.
We are revising our leader development Joint Professional Military
Education (JPME) to support the JWC. We are modernizing our JPME
curriculum to develop strategically minded joint warfighters, who think
critically and can creatively apply military power. Our focus remains
on instructing mission command, operational agility, and ethics to
ensure our military leaders can effectively employ forces at all levels
of warfare and respond to a dynamic battlefield. Additionally, we are
increasing the amount of JPME devoted to the study of the changing
character of war and Great Power Competition.
We are focused on building a more lethal Joint Force by ensuring
that we continue to modernize our concepts, doctrine, training, and
military education. We must continue to invest in capabilities that
sustain our military overmatch, while strengthening alliances and
attracting new partners. Investments in this budget ensure the Joint
Force can execute all requirements leveed by our Nation. The
investments made in this budget will ensure that we remain a capable
and ready force while funding our priorities of nuclear modernization,
long range fires, hypersonic technology, artificial intelligence,
robotics, shipbuilding, space, and cyber.
Nuclear modernization: The nuclear triad is the foundation of our
strategic deterrent. Our adversaries are improving their nuclear
posture and potential nuclear threats continue to emerge. It remains
critical that all three legs of the triad--bombers, intercontinental
ballistic missiles, and submarines--remain a viable deterrent and allow
us to hedge against geopolitical, technological, operational, and
programmatic risks. Our legacy systems have been extended well beyond
their original service lives and we must recapitalize our nuclear
enterprise. Modernizing the nuclear triad will cost 3.7 percent of the
Defense budget at its peak not including DOE/NNSA warhead
modernization. Costs will be significant but relatively less burdensome
on the overall Defense budget relative to previous recapitalization
efforts. Modernization of our nuclear forces, weapons complexes, and
requisite nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)
capabilities are a high priority.
Long range fires: The war in Ukraine highlights the strategic and
devastating effect provided by long range fires. The Joint Force must
have a long range strike capability without having to also maintain air
superiority. Long range fires provide significant offensive
capabilities that are both cost-effective and cost-imposing means of
improving deterrence. By enabling power projection from standoff
ranges, the risk to critical United States assets decreases while the
defensive burden imposed upon the enemy increases. These fires
challenge an adversary's logistics, command and control, and basing
forcing them to choose between increased risk or decreased
effectiveness. The PRC has thousands of ground-launched theater-range
missiles in its arsenal that would be difficult for the United States
to counter given its current inventories. Investments in long range and
hypersonic missiles launched from ground, sea, and air platforms are a
cost-effective strategy that improves our ability to compete with the
PRC. Recent budget requests have enhanced the lethality and resilience
of the Joint Force by developing and expanding the long-range fires
portfolio.
Hypersonic technology: Our adversaries are undertaking hypersonic
weapons testing and development from a variety of delivery platforms.
These weapons operate at speeds greater than Mach 5 and are
maneuverable, which make the weapons challenging to detect and defeat.
Weapons operating at these speeds will provide significant offensive
capability that will challenge an opponent's decision timelines. We
must invest in this technology to provide a suite of capabilities that
provide transformational warfighting capability to our Joint Force.
Artificial intelligence and robotics: Decisionmaking in warfare is
fundamental to the outcome. Militaries must be able to collect,
analyze, and assess vast quantities of data in order to make effective
decisions. The military that can iterate through the decisionmaking
framework fastest will have decisive advantage. Artificial intelligence
has the potential to reform military decisionmaking processes at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war to enable rapid
assessments and decisions that outpace human abilities. Additionally,
artificial intelligence combined with new military platforms could
enable the proliferation of robots across the battlefield. Robots in
the land, sea, and air domains could provide significant quantities of
firepower, logistics, and communications capabilities while decreasing
risks to our military forces. Through human-machine teaming, each human
warfighter would have exponentially increased abilities to shoot, move,
and communicate in battle to prevail over the enemy.
Legacy platform divestment: Maintaining and operating weapons that
are not relevant in the future fight and whose capabilities are matched
by superior technology need to be divested. Continuing to purchase and
maintain legacy equipment takes needed Defense dollars away from the
acquisition of higher priority systems necessary for modernization. I
strongly urge Congress to enact legislation that authorizes the
Department to divest select legacy platforms to ensure that every
Defense dollar spent on programs and equipment is relevant for the next
fight. We must not be influenced by a sunk cost bias, and we cannot
continue to mortgage our future by being wedded to technology of the
past.
Shipbuilding: The United States Navy must always be the world's
most powerful naval force in capacity and capability. We must never
accept 2d place in naval power. We are a maritime nation and the vast
majority of international trade moves across the world's oceans. The
United States is committed to a free and open global maritime common.
Manufacturing our warships overseas is a strategic risk and is not in
our national interest. Our shipbuilding and supporting vendor base are
a national security capability that needs support to grow and maintain
a skilled workforce. The fiscal year 2024 President's Budget reflects
the Administration's strong commitment to continued American naval
dominance, including improvements to our industrial base to meet the
demands of our current and future defense needs. This Nation must have
the right ships, with the right crews, and the right capabilities on
the right timelines in the theaters where they matter. This budget
specifically procures warships and submarines with credible combat
power to deter the PRC. We must continue to invest in the industrial
base to support remotely operated ship development, fleet
modernization, on time delivery of the COLUMBIA class submarine, and to
accelerate production and maintenance of VIRGINIA class submarines to
support both the United States and AUKUS needs.
Recapitalization of the sealift fleet is necessary to enable joint
power projection. Sealift ships transport 90 percent of war material
and supplies in support of major combat operations. The DOD sealift
fleet is approaching the end of its useful life with an average age of
48 years. Our overall sealift readiness rate is consistently below our
stated requirements. I urge Congress to remove all limitations on the
Department's ability to procure additional used vessels to replace
these aging ships.
Space: Space is essential to our way of life. Space capabilities
are vital to our economy, quality of life, exploration initiatives, and
national security. Every year we see additional commercial space
launches and increased competition for lower earth orbit.
Our adversaries view space as a warfighting domain and believe that
achieving supremacy in this arena will be a decisive factor in winning
future conflicts. The exosphere is already contested as Russia has
tested both a ground-based anti-satellite missile and an on-orbit anti-
satellite weapon prototype, which threaten our space capabilities. Both
the PRC and Russia view counterspace capabilities as a means to reduce
United States and allied military effectiveness. Additionally, our
adversaries have demonstrated space-jamming capabilities and maintain
independent launch capabilities. Left unsecured, our capabilities in
space will become strategic vulnerabilities. I urge Congress to support
the significant increase in this budget for United States space
capabilities.
Cyber: Adversaries continue to use operations in the cyber domain
to compete with the United States and attempt to gain an information
advantage. Malign cyber actors exploit commercial software
vulnerabilities to gain network access and conduct cyber operations
against United States citizens, organizations, and institutions. The
low-cost barrier to entry and attribution deniability make this a
priority method for adversaries to compete below the level of armed
conflict while minimizing risk of escalation. The PRC, Russia, Iran,
and North Korea use a range of cyber capabilities from information
operations (IO) to cyber-attacks to collect intelligence, position for
future operations, impose costs, and signal to the United States and
adversaries.
Therefore, we must increase our ability to compete and prevail in
cyberspace while ensuring all elements of informational power are
integrated into operations, activities, and efforts to deter our
adversaries and protect the United States Homeland. This requires
investments in technology, building and maturing cyber readiness and
operations, reducing risk to weapon systems and critical
infrastructure, strengthening cybersecurity, and improving network
resiliency.
Advanced Capabilities: The changing character of war necessitates
that we continue to modernize and innovate our technology,
capabilities, and training. Data and communication networks are
fundamental to how the United States trains, plans, and employs force.
We must have rapid and robust linkages from sensors to shooters in a
networked information environment. This will require investments in
microelectronics and quantum computing to ensure we maintain a
technological edge over our adversaries. The current globally
distributed supply chains as well as access to critical materials and
rare earth metals present vulnerabilities to the Joint Force's ability
to acquire necessary parts and technology in the event of crisis. We
must also find ways to deepen collaboration on advanced capabilities
with our closest allies and partners, such as our trilateral
cooperation under AUKUS.
taking care of our people
People are our most important resource in the Joint Force. We must
ensure that we are doing all that we can to take care of and guard our
most critical resource. Taking care of people is a critical readiness
issue and it decisively impacts unit cohesion, recruitment, retention,
and confidence in leadership.
To attract, grow, and retain the best talent in the world, we must
ensure that we are always taking care of our people. I urge Congress to
support this budget's significant pay raise, healthcare, and housing
initiatives. Additionally, this budget strengthens our accountability
and prevention measures for sexual harassment and sexual assault.
Finally, this budget supports improving our mental health and suicide
prevention programs. Each of these initiatives is fundamental to taking
care of our troops and their families.
We are ensuring that the military departments increase their
childcare capacity, and the DOD system remains the gold standard of
childcare. The DOD operates the country's largest employer-sponsored
childcare program, with over 27,000 staff members providing daily care
for more than 160,000 children from infancy up to age 12. This fiscal
year, the DOD is making a significant investment in constructing new
child development centers as well as repairing, renovating, and
maintaining existing child development centers to ensure our children
are in safe and well-maintained facilities. Funding support from
Congress is vital for fully staffed military childcare, and to support
efforts to expand capacity in the community. Childcare is key to
keeping working families working, reducing the high unemployment faced
by military spouses, and ensuring the safety of our military children.
Despite the childcare capacity and quality provided by the DOD there
are still challenges for military families to access that care or
quality care in the community.
This budget equips our servicemembers and families with the tools,
skills, and resources necessary to ensure their health and well-being.
The health and wellness of our force is a readiness, retention, and
recruitment issue.
The Joint Force is committed to growing our talent and ensuring
that all who meet the requirements to serve are able to serve. The
Joint Force competes for the talent of America's youth along with every
other business and organization who seeks our Nation's best and
brightest. The Joint Force's objective is to field the most lethal and
combat effective fighting force in the world. We will continue to
support the accessions of all qualified people to all jobs and
positions within the Joint Force.
conclusion
The United States Joint Force is a flexible and adaptable force
ready to deter, fight, and win our Nation's wars. Significant threats
exist across the globe and the United States is ready to respond to
these challenges. The PRC continues its aggressive attempts to revise
the global order for its own benefits. It is building up its military
might to achieve its goals through the use of force. With its illegal
and unprovoked war in Ukraine, Russia attempted to overturn the rules
based international order and fracture NATO. Russia's war of aggression
and nuclear rhetoric is irresponsible and risks miscalculation and
escalation.
International aggression, where large countries use military force
to attack smaller countries and change recognized borders, cannot be
allowed to stand. The Joint Force will continue to work with the
interagency and in cooperation with our allies and partners to deter
aggression and threats to the free world. America's network of allies
and partners is a strategic source of strength. It is this robust
network, this team of teams, that stands against those autocratic,
revanchist, and revisionist regimes that are uninterested in a
connected and prosperous world.
It is within this framework that it is imperative we modernize our
force, training, and doctrine to remain the most capable and ready
force on the planet. The United States has been challenged before by
many other adversaries. Yet, conflict is not inevitable--our military
might makes war less likely by allowing us to deter across the spectrum
of conflict. Our contract with the American people is that we, the
United States military, will always be ready to protect the
Constitution and the fundamental principles of what it means to be
American. We will always protect and defend this experiment in liberty,
to deter our enemies, and, if deterrence fails, then to fight and win.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Milley.
Secretary McCord, do you have a statement?
Mr. McCord. No, Mr. Chairman, other than to wish your staff
director a speedy recovery.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Secretary Austin and
General Milley, logistics is not the most exciting topic, but
in many cases, it is one of the most crucial topics,
particularly in the Pacific where distances are much an enemy
as our opposing forces.
First, Mr. Secretary and then General Milley, can you
comment upon the investments we are making in modernizing our
logistics, particularly INDOPACOM area, Command and control
activities that would help deliver these resources to our
troops?
Secretary Austin. Thanks, Chairman. As I stated earlier, we
in this budget, we are asking to invest some $9.1 billion in
the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. That will enable us to
strengthen forward infrastructure so we can continue to forward
deploy troops.
That will enable us to deter further forward in theater. In
addition to that, we have pushed a number of our sustainment
elements like fuel further in into the theater, and we continue
to make sure that we have a diverse and agile footprint so that
we can rapidly respond to any challenge.
But I think that we are investing in the right things and
going after the right capabilities to make sure that we can
operate further forward.
Chairman Reed. General Milley, please.
General Miley. Yes, Senator. Thank you. The key here is--
one of the keys here is ammunition. The Secretary has directed
that we analyze all of our ammunition stoppages in light of
what is going on in Ukraine.
Well, that is a key area that we need to increase our
capabilities here in the coming years, is ammunition. The
second piece there is lift. In the area of lift, both sealift
and airlift, there is a lot of investments in this budget and
previous budgets.
That will be an area that requires continued sustained
levels of effort, is in order to move the force, projecting
power is a key attribute of the U.S. Military, and we do that
through sealift and airlift.
That is the second key point, and the last one, I would
say, is the posture. The Secretary has initiated a series with
the INDOPACOM Commander, a series of posture adjustments in the
Pacific, which should better position us for sustainment,
logistical sustainment, if any conflict ever happens.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, we are
in a moment where we are having a challenge getting general
officers off the floor of the Senate and to their assigned
stations after they have been recommended by the Department of
Defense and cleared in terms of their performance and their
capabilities.
Can you tell us what the cumulative effects of this would
be in terms of denying promotions to people who are going to
take key jobs?
Secretary Austin. Thanks, Chairman. The effects are
absolutely critical in terms of the impact on the force. This
is one of the busiest times or one of the most complex times
that we have seen
lately.
We see a war, the largest conflict in Europe since World
War II. We see an aggressive China operating in the Indo-
Pacific. We see Iranian backed elements going after our troops,
and there are a number of things happening globally that
indicate that we could be in a contest on any one given day.
Not approving the recommendation for promotions actually
creates a ripple effect through the force that makes us far
less ready than we need to be. If you look at what we have
coming up, I mean, there are three, I think--well, five, three-
star promotions that are near term, and one of those is a
Commander of our fleet out in the Gulf. That is a critical
position, and then that starts to multiply, 70 more positions,
three-and four-star positions over time.
They include the chiefs of the Army, the Marine Corps, the
Navy, and also the Chairman's replacement at some point in
time, although nobody wants to see that happen. So, the effects
are cumulative and it will affect families, it will affect kids
going to schools because they won't be able to change their
duty station, and so, it is a powerful effect and will impact
on our readiness.
Chairman Reed. As I look forward, I have never in my almost
3 decades here seen so many key military positions coming up
for replacement. We have the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
the Chief of Staff for the Army, the CNO [Chief Naval Officer]
of the Navy, and as you mentioned, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff by law has to leave in September.
If we cannot resolve the situation, we will be, in many
respects, leaderless and at a time of great conflict. So, I
would hope we would expedite and move quickly on this front.
Thank you. With that, let me recognize Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just start
with a couple of short answers--I hope these will be. Secretary
Austin, first, would you agree that this is the most complex
and dangerous threat environment since World War II?
Secretary Austin. Yes, Senator, I would say that is one of
the most complex periods that we have seen.
Senator Wicker. General Milley.
General Miley. Yes, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Over the past 2 years, Congress has added
nearly $30 billion to the President's request in fiscal year
2022 and $45 billion to the President's request in fiscal year
2023--$75 billion added over the request of the President. Have
these additional resources increased our national security and
decreased military risk? Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Austin. They have, Senator. It always helps when
you get additional resources, but if you get additional
resources with additional requirements, it doesn't help as
much.
Also, if we can stop doing some of the things that create a
drag on our force in terms of cau]sing us to spend money on
things that are not relevant in a future fight, that also helps
as well. We appreciate Congress's support in the past for
allowing us to get rid of things that are no longer relevant.
Senator Wicker. You are welcome on that. General Milley,
same question. Has the $75 billion added to our national
defense expenditures--have those funds increased our national
security?
General Miley. Yes, I believe they have.
Senator Wicker. Decreased military risk?
General Miley. Correct.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Thank you very much. Secretary
Austin, the Biden administration has authority to send $1
billion worth of United States weaponry to Taiwan. That is
similar to the policy and the authority we authorized with
regard to Ukraine. Will the Biden administration exercise this
$1 billion and draw down the authority that Congress provided
last year?
Secretary Austin. We will, Senator. My team is working
diligently to make sure that we have the right capabilities in
that particular draw down. Of course, we have the authority. We
will need the appropriations as well.
Senator Wicker. Okay, you will need an appropriation to
replenish that. Is that correct?
Secretary Austin. That is correct, sir.
Senator Wicker. The Administration will be requesting a
replenishment funding for the transferred defense articles. Is
that correct?
Secretary Austin. That is correct.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Let me then talk about your
assessment with regard to Ukraine, I believe you told me,
Secretary Austin, that you believe Ukraine now has the upper
hand in the war against Russia. Is that correct?
Secretary Austin. That is correct. This is a highly
contested fight, Senator, as you know, and we have seen the
tide move back and forth. Most recently we have seen some
pretty significant fighting in the Bakhmut area.
Senator Wicker. Right. But just with regard to your
optimism about Ukraine having the upper hand, that is what you
told me yesterday.
Secretary Austin. It is now--what I was about to say,
Senator, is that the Ukrainians have inflicted significant
casualties on the Russians and they have depleted their
inventory of armored vehicles in a way that no one would have
ever imagined.
Now we see Russia reaching for T-54 and T-55 tanks because
of the level of damage that the Ukrainians have inflicted on
them, and we have in the meantime----
Senator Wicker. But that means reaching for those tanks
demonstrates what to you, sir?
Secretary Austin. It demonstrates that their capability is
waning, and we have continued to witness them being challenged
with artillery munitions and other things, and are reaching out
to Iran, are reaching out to North Korea.
I think, we will see an increase in the fighting in the
spring as conditions for maneuver improve. Based upon the
things that we have done and continue to do, I think Ukraine
will have a real good chance----
Senator Wicker. Do you believe--yes, we are pressed for
time, sir. Do you believe there is a real chance for
significant Ukrainian advancements between now and the
beginning of winter?
Secretary Austin. I believe that there is a chance and we
are doing everything that we can do to ensure that they have
their best opportunity to be successful, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, and if the chair will indulge
me, Mr. Secretary, you have got a pretty big congressional
relations office in your shop, do you not?
Secretary Austin. I do.
Senator Wicker. Do you agree that it should have occurred
to someone in that office to inform Senators who were debating
about Iran last Thursday about what had occurred with regard to
attacks in Syria?
Secretary Austin. Senator, I think you know that we take
the War Powers Act very, very seriously. After every operation,
we are required to debrief Congress and we lean forward and try
to ensure that Congress is briefed before we conduct an
operation.
We also--in this case, we had an attack in--and we launched
an attack on the adversaries in the same time period, same
short period of time. Because of that compressed time, we did
both notifications at the same time. We should have notified
you earlier, and we will endeavor to do so----
Senator Wicker. Well, as a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, if
I might, the attack occurred and counterattack occurred in the
wee hours of the morning, and Members of the Senate were not
notified until very late in the afternoon or early evening.
That is the fact, is it not?
Secretary Austin. No, sir. The attack occurred in the
morning and the counterattack occurred evening, our time,
eastern time.
Senator Wicker. Okay, and so, after the attack occurred, it
did not dawn on anybody in Congressional Affairs to notify
Members who were debating this very issue on the Senate floor.
I think that is correct.
Secretary Austin. Senator, our goal is that is to make sure
that we keep you informed. We will do everything within our
power to make sure that we improve our performance.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Senator
Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Secretary Austin, General
Milley, thank you both for being here this morning and for your
service. General Milley, thank you, especially for all of the
years that you have given to this country and to all of us.
We will miss you, even if you may not miss these posture
hearings. Secretary Austin, I understand that the Department
may be in the final stages of the review of information
operations that was required by the 2020 NDAA.
Can you give us any insights into what that may show and
how important you think information operations are as we look
at the modern defense and whether there is money in the budget
requested to address expanded information operations?
Secretary Austin. Thanks, Senator. I think what we will
find is that that work will show that information operations is
increasingly relevant and increasingly valuable in terms of
enabling our operations, and also understanding and countering
what our adversaries are doing.
So, we will continue to work to refine our policies and
procedures and develop talent in this area as well. But this is
a key area, and we see it every day as we watch the Ukraine,
Russia fight and the relevance of those operations in that
fight.
Senator Shaheen. Well, one of the areas where information
operations have been important is in the Black Sea region, and
certainly, we saw with the downing of the drone just how
important that region is to our national security.
Can you talk about what the most pressing threats are that
Russia poses in the Black Sea and what we are thinking about
going forward as a strategy to respond to that?
Secretary Austin. Well, certainly, Senator, Russia would
aim to completely control the Black Sea and deny our allies and
partners the ability to have continuous access to the sea. You
know, I was in the region before this fight started and had
engaged with our allies and partners and talked to them about
the importance of the access to the Black Sea, encouraged them
to work together, and also wanted to make sure that we were
doing everything within our power to help them strengthen their
capability and strengthen their interoperability. So, this is
critical and this is something that I think we need to continue
to put energy into.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I was in the region in
February, and I can tell you and the countries that I visited,
Georgia, Romania, that there was a great deal of interest in
the fact that we might have a more comprehensive approach to
the region that deals not just with national security, but also
with economic and democratic initiatives there.
Over the past several years alone, Congress has
appropriated over $1 billion in funding for PFAS [Per- and
Polyfluoroalkyl Substances] related activities, testing,
remediation. My--the most recent information I have seen
suggests that there are more than 700 contaminated military
sites across the country, including the former Pease Air Base.
Congress has shown a willingness to accelerate testing and
cleanup by increasing funding, and yet the Department claims
that it is unable to execute those increased funding levels. We
appropriated $517 million or authorized it in fiscal year 2020.
Can you speak to what needs to happen in order for the
Department to make better use of the funds that Congress
appropriated to--appropriates to address PFAS?
Secretary Austin. We will continue to make every effort to
make best use of those funds. I think you see in this budget,
we have asked for another $400 million.
To your point, Senator, if funds are not executed in one
particular year, I think they roll over to the next year. So,
we have the benefit of using the funds that were not completely
executed last year, plus the $400 million we are asking for
this year.
We will make every effort to make sure that we are doing
everything within our--that is possible to utilize the funds,
and where we need more, we will come back and ask you for more.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I appreciate that. I hope
you will also take a look at our willingness to be transparent
with the public where sites have been contaminated because
there is a great deal of distrust, I think, about information
sharing from the Department of Defense, and least we have seen
that in the site in New Hampshire.
I think that undermines our ability to address what needs
to be done in those sites to clean up the contamination and to
encourage the communities to do what they need to do to address
the problem. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shahee. Senator Fischer,
please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For years, we
have underinvested in our munitions production and we are
starting to reverse that trend but more needs to be done to
increase production. Secretary Austin, what is the Department
currently doing to increase munitions production capacity and
what more does it seek to do in fiscal year 2024?
Secretary Austin. Well, thank you, Senator. Let me thank
Congress for what you have done to authorize a multiyear
procurement capability. That sends a strong signal to the
industrial base.
Also, the numbers that you see reflected in our budget
request for procurement sends a strong signal as well. In this
particular budget, we are asking for $30 billion to invest in
munitions and that helps us go after the right kinds of
munitions that we think we need to replenish stocks and to make
sure that we get ahead as well. Also, it allows us to invest a
bit in the industrial base.
Now, we are engaging the, you know, our partners in the
industry and trying to do everything we can to work with them,
to expand their capacity and their capability. But to your
point, there's a lot more work that needs to be done.
Senator Fischer. The Committee has worked to modify or
remove older and unnecessary contracting requirements so we can
get contracting officers to move faster on replacing munitions
in Ukraine. Would it be useful to be able to remove or modify
these unnecessary requirements for weapons related to most,
really our most pressing challenges in the Western Pacific and
in Taiwan as well?
Secretary Austin. Absolutely. Absolutely, it would.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Milley, the current
U.S. nuclear modernization plan was originally designed in 2010
when nuclear threats were much less severe than they are today.
However, since then, every DOD modernization program, along
with every Department of Energy (DOE) infrastructure project
and warhead program, has been delayed or it has been reduced in
its scope.
Can you tell me how we are going to meet the rapidly
growing threats from China and Russia with a force that is
smaller and with a force that delivers later than we planned
for more than a decade ago? Basically, I am asking you, how are
we going to recognize challenges we have today and meet them?
General Miley. Thanks, Senator. As you know, the nuclear
capability of China is growing, and we can cover that in some
detail in a classified session, if you so desire.
The recapitalization of the nuclear triad is the Secretary
and President's number 1 defense priority. That is what has
been one of the most significant contributors to great power
peace in the last eight decades. So, it is imperative for us,
the United States, to recapitalize that entire system with the
silos, the bombers, as well as the subs, but also the NC3
system.
That is really critical, and it does bother me that some of
these programs are behind and they are coming in at over cost,
over budget. But we are going to get there and it will be a
safe, secure, reliable system, guaranteed that, and we will
maintain the strategic deterrence that we have kept for 80
years.
Senator Fischer. Last year, you, along with nearly every
other senior U.S. military officer, testified that we need to
provide Presidents with more nuclear options than we have
today. Do you still agree with that sentiment?
General Miley. I do. I believe that----
Senator Shaheen. Okay, thank you. Yes, is fine.
General Miley. Sure.
Senator Fischer. As a Member of this Committee and also as
a Member of the Senate Commerce Committee, I have worked for
years to promote efficient spectrum management by the Federal
Government without endangering the mission critical operations
of the Department of Defense.
Coordination among the agencies can be difficult, and it
can be slow. Proactive communication among all stakeholders, I
believe, is key for that better coordination. That is why I, as
Ranking Member of the Strategic Force Subcommittee, I send a
letter to the Subcommittee Chairman--with the Subcommittee
Chairman, Angus King, to the Department of Defense last year
that asked for more details about the Department's concerns
with proposed spectrum reallocation in the lower 3G.
DOD's response pointed to the 2020 IDA [Institute for
Defense Analyses] report, but there are still far more details
that we need to learn about what may or may not work for
reallocation in this band. Fortunately, there is an ongoing
study, and I appreciate that, the Path study that should
provide those details.
General Milley, my time is almost up and I expect my friend
from South Dakota will have a conversation with you about this
as well. But for the record, and please answer yes or no, is it
your best military advice that the ongoing Path study as
currently authorized, as currently authorized, should be
completed in order to inform the ongoing spectrum negotiations?
General Miley. Yes.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Before I
recognize Senator Gillibrand, let me just remind all my
colleagues, there will be a classified hearing in the sciff
SCV-217 at the conclusion of this open hearing. Senator
Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McCord, I
was disappointed that for the second year in a row, the All-
Domain Anomaly Resolution Office, or AARO, was not fully funded
in the Department's budget request. Understanding that we
cannot get into specific budget figures in this form, can you
discuss why AARO was not fully funded?
Mr. McCord. Senator, I don't have any information from my
colleague, Under Secretary Moultrie, that he needed additional
funding in this area. It is a relatively new office we are
standing up, so I was under the impression, I am under the
impression that we have adequate funding for the relatively new
State of this. But I will double back with him if there is a
concern.
Senator Gillibrand. I need you to send a letter to this
Committee in writing about why it wasn't fully funded. Several
Senators signed a letter to Secretary Hicks asking that it be
fully funded in this budget and we specified in a classified
annex exactly what funding wasn't being met and its operational
funding, its basic operational funding, so I am highly
concerned about this.
Secretary Austin, the incidents last month involving the
Chinese high-altitude balloon and the three unknown objects
highlighted the need for us to continue to improve our
understanding of UAPs over United States airspace. Do you
intend to ensure AARO receives full funding in the future?
Secretary Austin. I will, Senator, and we--in this budget,
we have asked for $11 million in support of the office, of that
initiative.
Senator Gillibrand. That is not the budget request. Will
you investigate why the budget request isn't being met and be
part of the response----
Secretary Austin. I will. I will.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Secretary Austin, on March
17, Qin Gang, the Chinese Foreign Minister said that the United
States and China are heading toward inevitable ``confrontation
and conflict.''
This comes as the STRATCOM Commander testified that ``the
PRC seeks to match or in some areas surpass quantitative and
qualitative parity with the United States in terms of nuclear
weapons.''
During the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union
developed lines of communication to prevent escalation or
outright hostilities during heightened tensions and developed
norms and mechanisms to avoid miscalculations.
How would you characterize your relationship with your PRC
counterpart, and what steps are you taking to reduce the risk
of miscalculations during a period of heightened competition
between our countries?
Secretary Austin. Well thanks, Senator. I think you have
heard me say two things. The first thing is that Chairman--what
the Chairman said earlier that I don't see conflict as being
imminent or inevitable.
But I do think it is important that leaders and great
powers have the ability to talk to each other, to manage
escalation, to manage crises. You have seen me reach out to my
former counterpart, Minister of Defense Wei, who has now moved
on, and encourage him to keep the lines of communication open.
He has now been replaced by a new minister and I have yet
to have the have the ability to engage him, but I will continue
to make sure that we reach out. I do think that is critical.
Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Austin, we have international
legal structures to address the conduct of our forces in war.
While we have international treaties that govern the use of
space, there is ongoing debate about whether these treaties
would apply during an armed conflict, and what types of
counterspace weapons are permissible.
What steps is the Department taking in coordination with
Department of State to reinforce international norms and
whether we can safely rely on our use of space assets, both
legally and lethally during a conflict?
Secretary Austin. Well, this is an issue that the
interagency of our Administration, we continue to engage on.
Secretary Blinken, as you know, also has engaged our allies and
partners on this issue at the U.N. [United Nations] and in
other fora. We think it is important. The Administration thinks
it is important, and this is something that we will continue to
work on.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate
the policies you issued on March 22d supporting our military
families, and it is critical to their well-being and ability to
retain strong military force. DOD's own surveys show that 24
percent of our servicemembers experience food insecurity.
Last year, I met with military families on Staten Island
who spoke about the challenges they face in basically putting
food on the table to feed their kids. However, very few
servicemembers are considered eligible for basic needs
allowance or the BNA, under existing BNA programs since BAH
[Basic Allowance for Housing] is included in family income
calculations.
Can you tell me how you intend to ensure that food
insecurity in military families have access to the BNA or other
measures?
Secretary Austin. We will have the authority next year to
move to a higher number, a higher percentage, 150 percent will
actually move before we are required to move. We plan to move
in July.
That will allow us to help more families. But you have seen
this with your support, Senator. You have seen us ask for a pay
raise last year, 4.6 percent. You have seen us raise BAH
amounts, and you have seen us work to get childcare costs down.
So, we are trying to increase the resources and reduce the
strain on families and hopefully that total equation will
create benefits for our families and our troops.
Senator Gillibrand. But will you consider removing BAH from
the calculation for BNA?
Secretary Austin. We will do whatever what is ever
feasible, what we are allowed to do by law.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, I want to return to the
issue of the strikes in Syria last week and Senator Wicker's
line of questioning about the timing of notification to
Congress. You said that you ``should have notified Congress
earlier.''
These attacks happened against our troops, killing one
contractor early in the morning eastern time. Do you believe
that you should have notified us that morning while we were
voting on amendments directly related to this kind of attack?
Secretary Austin. Again, there is no connection between
when we notified you, Senator, and your vote. The Chairman and
I were testifying that morning as well, so as soon as we came
out of testimony, we began work on crafting response options.
Senator Cotton. Secretary Austin, I don't believe you. I
believe that your office specifically withheld notification of
this deadly strike against Americans because the Rubio
amendment, on which we voted midday, directly touched on
exactly this scenario, not repealing these use of force
resolutions if the President couldn't certify that Iran was no
longer attacking us in Iran, in Syria.
That is what I believe. Nothing you can say is going to
change my belief about that, and I got to say, I think I speak
for a lot----
Secretary Austin. I just want to say, Senator, that is
absolutely not true.
Senator Cotton. Maybe you didn't personally do it, maybe
you didn't personally do it, but I believe entirely that people
in your office did that. You have a vast legislative operation,
as Senator Wicker pointed out. Do you really expect us to
believe that they didn't know that we were voting on a Rubio
amendment that directly, directly covered exactly this kind of
attack? I don't believe that.
I don't believe it. I believe there was a conscious
decision made not to inform Congress because you fear that it
might lead to the passage of the Rubio amendment, which would
kill the entire bill.
But I want to move on to a more important part, which is
these attacks in the first place. How many attacks has Iran or
its proxies launched against American positions in Iran and
Syria since Joe Biden took office?
Secretary Austin. There has been about 83 attacks, I think,
since--in the last several years.
Senator Cotton. That is a lot of attacks over 2 years. How
many times have we retaliated against Iran or its proxies?
Secretary Austin. We have launched four major strikes,
Senator. But an attack can consist of a number of things. It
can consist of, a rocket that is fired in the direction of one
of our bases but not effective.
Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, I am well aware of what an
attack could entail. So 79 and 4 is Iran's record right now,
and our four attacks have not been against Iran, right, they
have been against Iran's proxies in Iraq or Syria or elsewhere.
Is that correct?
Secretary Austin. That last attack was against IRGC
[Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps], Quds force infrastructure
and----
Senator Cotton. Okay, and after we retaliated, Iran
attacked us again, injuring another American, didn't it?
Secretary Austin. They did.
Senator Cotton. We retaliated for that attack on Friday.
Secretary Austin. We have not yet, Senator.
Senator Cotton. So, what kind of signal do we think this
sends to Iran when they can attack us 83 times since Joe Biden
has become President, we only respond 4.
Maybe it is because they know that until--that we will not
retaliate, until they kill an American, which emboldens them to
keep launching these attacks which kill Americans.
What is our rules of engagement for on the ground
Commanders throughout the region? Are they allowed to engage
immediately if their position has been attacked?
Secretary Austin. They can and they do, and there have been
several instances of that.
Senator Cotton. I have got to say, I have heard from
company and field grade Commanders who have been in the region
very recently, and they say there is a lot of confusion over
that.
Let me move to a related topic, and that is our operations
of unmanned aircraft in the Black Sea. Russia down one of our
Reaper aircraft a couple of weeks ago. Have we flown those
aircrafts into the exact same space since it was downed?
Secretary Austin. We have flown on the paths that we want
to fly in the Black Sea to collect intelligence information.
Senator Cotton. So that is a far--that is far from a yes
answer. I said, have we flown in the same airspace? You have
said we have flown in the path we want to fly to collect
intelligence. So, if we adjusted our flight patterns, have we
moved down of that airspace?
Secretary Austin. We will fly the paths that we feel
necessary to collect intelligence information.
Senator Cotton. So according to an Administration official
from an article in CNN on March 21st, we are not flying in that
airspace ``to avoid being too provocative.'' So, are we
removing our aircraft out of the space from that which that
Reaper flew because we don't want to be too provocative toward
Russia?
Secretary Austin. Senator, you may have heard me say
immediately after this incident to--that I told my counterpart
that we are going to fly the skies, the international skies,
and sail the seas as we wish, and so, we continue to fly in
that airspace.
Senator Cotton. In the exact same airspace where that
Reaper was downed?
Secretary Austin. Again----
Senator Cotton. You haven't pulled back from Crimea or from
the Ukrainian or the Russian coasts?
Secretary Austin. I recommend we take this to a closed
session.
Senator Cotton. We can and I think it answers the question,
though, and it gets to the point I am trying to make here. We
continue to deter ourselves against our adversaries. We let
Iran launch 83 attacks against us and we only respond 4 times.
Russia downs one of our aircraft and we pull back from that
airspace just like we have been delaying ballistic missile
tests over the last 2 year, or over the last year. Just like we
let a Chinese spy balloon float across the country when we
could have done it across the Aleutians.
Now, I don't necessarily think these are Secretary of
Defense calls. I think these are Commander-in-Chief calls. But
we shouldn't be surprised when our adversaries get emboldened
and more aggressive in all these theaters when we continue to
deter ourselves.
Chairman Reed. Have you finished, sir? Thank you, Senator
Cotton. Let me recognize Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here. Thank you for your service, not only over many
decades, but in this role, and particularly at a time when the
threats are as great as any time that most of us can remember.
I have been to Ukraine three times over roughly the last
year visiting Kyiv and President Zelenskyy, and recently
followed you, Mr. Secretary, to visit our base in Bavaria,
where we are training Ukrainian fighters in the use of Bradley
armored vehicles and combined arms.
The bond between our soldiers and their fighters is
extraordinary because of our respect for their will to fight,
and that is what I have seen in the Ukrainian people. They will
fight with pitchforks, if necessary, but they need a lot more.
I want to thank you and the President for committing to do
whatever it takes. I think I am almost quoting exactly. In my
view, whatever it takes includes airplanes, aircraft. Would you
agree that as a strictly military matter, and you know a lot
more about this than most of us at this side of the table, that
that kind of air support from the United States is going to be
necessary, and the sooner, the better?
Secretary Austin. Thanks, Senator. First of all, thanks for
your continued support and for the support of Congress. It is
phenomenal what we have been able to do in what we have helped
Ukraine be, the kinds of effects they have been able to achieve
based upon our support.
As you know, the United States of America leads the way on
that. We talk to our counterparts every week, sometimes
multiple times a week, and I meet with them in person every
month.
What they need right now more than anything else is air
defense, and that is the critical need on the battlefield, and
they also need long range fires in armored capability. We are
providing them a real substantial package of capability in
terms of platforms, but not just that, we are also providing
training and we are providing sustainment.
Sir, you witnessed some of that coming together when you
were in Grafenwohr, and I really appreciate you going out there
and visiting our troops. I think those capabilities will make
the biggest difference in the near term, and they must be
successful going forward.
We know the spring fighting seasons in front of us here and
we want to make sure that they have what they need to be
successful.
Senator Blumenthal. I apologize for interrupting, Mr.
Secretary, but I want to come back to the aircraft, because as
you have identified it very clearly and I agree totally, air
defense is critical.
We have a narrow window of time, and in fact, this spring
will be crucial. Some of our allies are providing planes, but
we have the resources, and only we really have the resources to
provide the aircraft necessary for fully robust air defense.
Secretary Austin. If you are talking to F-16s, whenever you
make that decision, in order to put together what needs to be
put together, to provide that capability, is going to be 18
months or so in the making.
That won't help them in this current fight, and will they
have a capability at some point down the road? We all believe
that they will. What that looks like, it could look like F-16s.
It could look like some other fourth generation aircraft. But
we will continue to work with our allies and partners to make
sure that Ukraine has what it needs.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary,
and again, I want to thank you and the President for your
commitment, which I think is deeply appreciated by the people
of Ukraine as well. I want to focus on a very narrow issue
relating to procurement, which is the helicopter acquisition
and development for the FLRAA contract.
A number of my colleagues and myself had asked the Army for
an explanation for the award of that contract--it is under
challenge right now. Will you commit to provide us with an
adequate explanation? So far, the Army has been totally
unforthcoming.
Secretary Austin. I will commit, Senator, once the protest
is resolved, we will make sure you get a thorough briefing on
this issue.
Senator Blumenthal. Shouldn't we have it now rather than at
some indefinite point in the future?
Secretary Austin. Well, sir, you know that it is
inappropriate to once--while this is under protest, to do that.
I commit to you that as soon as we can, we will provide you
that information.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I want to ask one last
question. Suicide among our servicemembers continues to be a
desperately important problem. I will be meeting later today or
this week with the family of Master of Arms Seaman Recruit
Xavier Mitchell Sandor, who took his own life while he was
stationed on the USS George Washington.
He was among three who committed suicide while that ship
was under maintenance and repair. Similar kinds of suicides
have happened on other ships under similar circumstances. The
report is still outstanding. There have been no completion of
the investigation a year after that event. I know you are very
concerned about the troops.
Nobody cares more than you do about the well-being, and I
include the Chairman in that sentiment. Can you tell us that
additional measures will be taken and that there will be a
report forthcoming about Xavier Sandor?
Secretary Austin. I will. I will make sure that Secretary
Del Toro ensures that this investigation moves on a timely
fashion and in a very thorough fashion.
I would also tell you that I have asked Secretary Del Toro
to make sure that he is personally focused on this issue,
specifically related to ships that are in maintenance and the
berthing associated with those ships.
He has, in this budget, Senator, asked for some $258
billion to address that issue, and I think that is a good
start, but I think we need to continue to make sure our
leadership is doing the right thing, that we have adequate
housing for our young men and women. They are our national
assets. I truly believe that he will remain focused on this,
but I will as well, so.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by
thanking all of you for your service to our country,
recognizing Secretary Austin, not just for your time in
uniform, but your time as Secretary as well. General Milley,
recognizing your time as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, but not
only that, but the amount of time that you and your family have
served our country, we sometimes gloss over that.
I recognize I don't have a lot of time, but I just want to
make this clear, it is not just the time that you spend in the
Pentagon, it is the time that you have spent boots on the
ground.
You have had operational deployments, including the
Multinational Force Observer, Sinai, Egypt, Operation Just
Cause in Panama, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Operation
Joint Endeavor, Bosnia, Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, and
three tours during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
You have also deployed to Somalia and Colombia. We thank
you for your service to our country, sir, and your family as
well, because when you deploy, they are deployed as well. Thank
you.
Gentlemen, both for Secretary Austin and Chairman Milley,
last week you both clarified that you support waiting until the
conclusion of the ongoing study before any decision should be
made on auctioning parts of or any of the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz
spectrum band.
My question is, should an auction occur before the study is
complete? What are the real-world impacts on national security
from a defense and budgetary perspective?
Secretary Austin. It would be devastating, Senator, and it
would take us somewhere north of 20 years to try to recover
from a loss of that spectrum. Parts of that spectrum are vital
to our national defense and the protection of the Homeland.
In order to describe exactly what the specific platforms
are, but we would have to go to a classified section to speak
in detail about this. But I would tell you that this is not
something you can fix overnight once you break it. It will take
20 years plus to recover from that.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, General Milley.
General Miley. Same thing, Senator. I firmly believe that
we should wait till the study is measured twice, that one sort
of thing. But we don't want to vacate because of the severe
national security implications to that.
The sharing is obviously a goal for everybody, but it is
how you share and the technical capability to do that, and that
is what the study should tell us. We want to make a fully
informed decision, and the Secretary and I will be making those
recommendations and writing to the President when the time
comes.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir, once again, for Chairman
Milley, as the principal military adviser to the President,
would you say that it's essential for you to be able to provide
an independent recommendation about spectrum sharing and its
impact on national security to the President?
General Miley. Yes, I do. I would also say, though, that
every recommendation I make to the President is an independent
military best military advice, no matter what the topic. The
Secretary is very good about that, and I will always inform the
Secretary if I disagree with the Secretary ahead of time.
But he and I were always in there together with the
President and I will always make it independent best military
advice recommendation. That is why I signed, when I was
confirmed, that I would do that with the Senate as part of this
Committee, as part of becoming the confirmation process. So, I
will always do that and every Chairman should always do that.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Secretary Austin, INDOPACOM
has listed an unfunded requirement of $147 million for the
development of a missile defense system for Guam.
Can you discuss how that decision by the Department not to
fund this INDOPACOM requirement comports with the Department's
priority to defend Guam?
Secretary Austin. Thanks, Senator. As you know, we have and
we continue to invest heavily in the defense of Guam, and that
work is ongoing. Again, there is always choices that we have to
make in a specific time horizon, and in this case, that is a
capability that I think we can and will consider going forward.
Senator Rounds. I think part of the reason for the question
is because there has been some criticism on the Department
providing a list of unfunded requests. Would you agree that
this one should be very seriously considered by Congress?
Secretary Austin. As you know, Senator, we are required, or
the Service Chiefs and Commanders are required by law to submit
those unfunded requests. I do believe that all of our
Commanders and Chiefs believe that what is on there is
important.
Now, I have asked our Commanders and our Chiefs to make
sure that they build their requirements for readiness and also
combat capability into their base budget. We try to do that at
every turn. But at some point, in time, there are choices that
you have to make.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Hirono,
please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all three
of you for being here today, and especially for General Milley.
Thank you very much for your 43 years of continuous service. I
extend to you my thanks and respect.
For Secretary Austin, investments in the military's
infrastructure are directly correlated to our readiness and
ability to execute deterrence. However, as the people of Hawaii
saw from the disaster at Red Hill, military infrastructure also
impacts our cities and towns. Fuel, chemical, and sewage spills
have lasting impacts on our lands and erode the trust of
servicemembers and their communities.
We must invest in the systems they rely on each day. Basic
things like pipelines, power grids, and barracks. Yet this
year, in Hawaii alone, there is over half a billion in unfunded
infrastructure improvements on the service's unfunded
priorities list.
Secretary Austin, how is the Department ensuring that
infrastructure maintenance and modernization needs are met
before disasters like Red Hill occur? Basically, don't we need
to get more of these projects off unfunded priorities lists?
Secretary Austin. These are, to your point, Senator,
requirements that are critical and they should be met as soon
as possible. In my budget, I have asked for $5.1 billion to
increase operational effectiveness and survivability. Part of
that has to do with the effects that are caused by climate.
But nonetheless, those are facts or real facts, and so, we
will continue to invest in this, but to your point, services
should invest in this to make sure that the infrastructure they
need to support them is, in fact first rate.
Senator Hirono. Secretary Austin, you know that I have been
very much focused on those kinds of infrastructure needs. What
comes out of our pipes, whether electricity stays on--those
continue to capture my attention and be assured that I will
continue to focus on these issues and the needs being met.
Mr. Secretary, in your tenure, you have issued several
policies that increase servicemembers access to childcare,
which you have mentioned, institute parental leave, which is
very popular, and ensure access to reproductive health care for
all women no matter where they are stationed.
These are prudent changes that put our people first, and I
appreciate your leadership on these issues. Senator Austin, how
did you identify these servicemember needs? Once those
requirements were a record, what was the process to implement
updated policies?
Secretary Austin. Well, I talked to our troops. I talked to
the family members. As I go around the country and around the
world, I am very much interested in what their challenges are
and how we can do things to make life better for them. With
your help, we have been able to do some things.
That includes the things that you have mentioned, Senator,
but also the pay raises, the raise in BAH and BAS. We are
asking you for another pay raise this year. Probably the
biggest pay raise for our troops and civilians in decades. But
that is how I get the input by engaging the troops and the
family members.
Senator Hirono. You have been heavily criticized for your
decisions to enable particularly women servicemembers to attain
reproductive health. I, for one, commend you for that.
I want you to stay the course. In the same vein of wanting
to support our servicemembers, I do want to mention that there
is the potential for significant cuts to the cost of living of
Hawaii's servicemembers. I have noted this before, and I think
that these are huge cuts for Hawaii servicemembers are unjust
and unfair, and I hope that there will be a reconsideration of
that decision.
I also want to note, I have been asking about missile
defense of Hawaii for quite some time. I had a productive
meeting yesterday with leaders from your staff about their
roles in and plans for the current and future missile defense
of Hawaii. While there is certainly more work to be done to
establish and execute a long-term plan for the missile defense
of Hawaii, I am encouraged to see the Department treating this
issue with the seriousness it demands. I remain focused on it,
on the issue, as I request updates from your staff.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Ernst,
please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I just want to State
for the record that I am adamantly opposed to the DOD's new
policy on allowing travel expenses for those that are going to
other states to seek abortions.
I think it is incredibly important that we remain adherent
to the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits taxpayer dollars from
going toward abortions. I know this is an extension of travel
services for family members and those servicemembers, but
again, those are taxpayer dollars being spent to fund the
extension of an abortion.
I am adamantly opposed. I know that there are others that
are on this Committee that agree as well. We are not saying
that women can't seek abortions. They can do that, but that is
to be privately funded.
So, thank you both, gentlemen, for being here this morning,
and Secretary, I do worry that there is a mismatch between
strategy and resources at the heart of the President's budget.
The national defense strategy calls this a ``decisive decade''
and commits to act urgently to strengthen deterrence against
the pacing threat of China.
General Milley, would investments in posture presence and
lethal capabilities like long range fires reduce our risk in
the Western Pacific?
General Miley. Absolutely, long range fires would reduce
our risk. Not only the west--anywhere, but for sure yes--That
is correct.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, General Milley. I know that you
addressed this with Senator Rounds, but Secretary Austin, as we
discuss those unfunded requirements, we see that we are three
and a half billion dollars short in the INDOPACOM, which
includes critical strike capabilities and posture enhancements.
So, I do hope that this is something we can work with those
Commanders on those requirements. I think it is incredibly
important and I know my colleague from Alaska may address our
requirements in defending Taiwan, but it is incredibly
important.
If we are saying in the National Defense Strategy that this
is a decisive decade, we need to act accordingly. As Congress,
we must fund accordingly. Chairman Milley, as you know, our
special operations forces are a strategic capability. How can
soft help deter and defeat great power competitors?
General Miley. Well for Special Forces, regardless of
theater, relative to a great power competitor, there is ongoing
intense competition in the so-called gray space. They play a
key role in that area. In addition to that, they can provide
tremendous capability in train, advise, assist in indigenous
partners and allies and region. That's important.
Also, I would argue that irregular warfare is often an
overlooked component. As you start looking at larger
conventional war, irregular warfare plays a very key role in
all forms of war, and that will play a key role in any great
power war as well.
So those are some of the key things, that strategic
reconnaissance, there is development of the battlespace events
force operations, the whole litmus test or a litany of
capabilities that special operations forces bring that have a
direct role prior to the onset of hostilities and can
contribute to the deterrence of war with any great power.
Senator Ernst. Very good, and I appreciate that because you
answered my next question about surrogate forces and partnering
with those forces and indigenous actors, and they do help soft
compete against great powers, so I do appreciate that.
Secretary Austin, will the Department's guidance to the SOF
[Special Operation Forces] enterprise place our great power
competition above counterterrorism and crisis response mission?
Secretary Austin. I am sorry, Senator, I missed the
question----
Senator Ernst. Yes, SOF, as it applies to great power
competition, will you be placing their mission with great power
competition over the other mission of deterring terrorism?
Secretary Austin. We have to strike a balance, and we see
our SOF forces doing that. I know you have talked to our
special operations force Combatant Commander. He is looking at
this in a very methodical way and making sure that he maintains
a balance of capability that can serve both challenges there.
They are doing a great job, and I have seen some of our
Tier 1 forces very rapidly transition and start thinking about
how they are going to be relevant, not just thinking about it,
but developing capability to be relevant in great power
competition. At the same time, keeping a good handle on
transnational terrorist organizations.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate it. I think it is
incredibly important that we continue to fund our SOF as
necessary because they do strike a balance between great power
competition, working in that gray zone, and also deterring
terrorism around the globe.
I would just encourage Members of this Committee to
continue to focus on the strength within our SOF forces.
Chairman Milley, thank you very much for your service to our
great United States Army, as well as the Joint Force.
Also, my best wishes to Hollyanne. We know that behind
every great leader is someone who supports them thoroughly, and
she has been a tremendous force in working with our Gold Star
families, with all of the members of their service and their
families. So, my best wishes to you and your entire family.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the
witnesses. General Milley, I also want to compliment you on
your stellar career, and I also offer the congratulations of
your college classmate, my wife, Anne, who I mentioned I would
see you today, and she wanted me to extend her congratulations
as well.
On the 15th of the month, during our Personnel Subcommittee
hearing, Senator Kelly and I asked Secretary Cisneros and
Martinez Lopez about implementation of the Brandon Act. I
appreciate both of you in your opening statements talked about
the need to get a hold of military suicide issues and resources
that are being devoted to this.
We asked the Secretaries about Brandon Act implementation
and also about a report on Brandon Act implementation that we
were supposed to receive that is overdue. I don't really want
to get into that with you here today, but just to put it on the
radar screen, that during the course of the development of the
NDAA, we really want to get into the implementation of the
Brandon Act that we passed.
Make sure that it's being implemented. Find out if there
are things, we can do to make that implementation easier, and I
really want to work on that between now and the time that we
take up the NDAA in committee. It is possible that we don't
need to do anything more on that space if we are convinced that
implementation is moving out.
If we are not convinced of that, we will need to do more,
and I just wanted to kind of put that on the record to begin.
Secretary, I also want to ask you about your recent trip to
Iraq.
I think it was either 2 or 3 weeks ago that you were there
and reports suggest you had productive meetings, both with
political leadership, Prime Minister Al Sudani, but also with
military leadership. Could you describe that visit for the
Committee?
Secretary Austin. Well, first of all, let me tell you that
our troops are doing well there, and they are enabling and
helping their host, the Iraqi security forces, and they are
very much valued by the Iraqi leadership. The prime minister
was very complimentary of their performance and the value that
they add.
Good meeting with the prime minister and his leadership. I
think, you know, it is not only me, but other leaders in the
region are also saying that the prime minister shows a lot of
promise in terms of a person that is willing to work with
others to move things forward.
Senator Kaine. Describe the current State of the mil-to-mil
relationship. So, talking about the prime minister discussions,
but we have got about 2,500 United States troops in Iraq, as
you point out. We are being hosted. They are there at the
invitation of the Iraqi Government because they value the
United States as a partner. Describe a little bit about the
current mil-to-mil relationship.
Secretary Austin. I think the mil-to-mil relationship,
Senator, is good, really good, and again, I think our partners
understand the value that we add to their overall effort. If
you unplug that, then what happens with their efforts to
maintain pressure on ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]?
What happens with their efforts to continue to develop
their professional force? I think we are very much appreciated.
What I saw was goodness. I think, you know that the Commander
there is doing all the right things and working in conjunction
with the Ambassador to continue to move things forward. So, I
was really encouraged by what I saw.
Senator Kaine. You have had a number of chapters in Iraq,
in 2003, and then in 2010, and then as CENTCOM Commander, and
some of these chapters are with an Iraq that was an adversary
of the United States. How would you characterize this
relationship where they are at their invitation and now, we
seem to be working in partnership to help them advance security
in their country and in the region.
Secretary Austin. It truly is remarkable, and you cheated
me on one of the rotations there. I had three rotations to
Iraq----
Senator Kaine. I left one out.
Secretary Austin. But this is something that has developed
over time and it is developing in a very meaningful way. It
hasn't always been easy. It has been lumpy from time to time.
But I think we are in a pretty good place now, and this is
something that we are going to have to work on each and every
day.
We know, Senator, that not every person in Iraq believes
that Americans ought to be there. But the Government is very
much appreciative of what we bring in and what we are doing to
train and enable their forces. I think we are in a pretty good
place.
Senator Kaine. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. I
think that is important, that one of the capacities the U.S.
has shown throughout our history is the, to use a biblical
phrase, to beat a sword into a plowshare.
To take a nation that was an enemy, and over time, and as
you point out, bumpy, not always smooth, but over time turn the
relationship into one of partnership, not one of being an
adversary.
That is an important aspect of the United States, Iraq
relationship, and it also sends a message to others that that
is something that the United States can do and we can be proud
of. I appreciate your testimony. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine. Senator
Cramer, please.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both,
all three, for your service. A special thank you, General
Milley, for your decades of service. I want to jump down to
talking back about Ukraine a little bit.
There have been a lot of reasons, rationale, excuses,
perhaps for not providing certain advanced weapons systems,
some legitimate I am sure, maybe all of them, I don't know. But
of course, oftentimes that leads to eventually providing them.
But one system we have never offered, and I haven't heard a lot
of talk about are the MQ-9s.
But since we just lost one recently in the Black Sea, where
it is probably more likely to be recovered by Russia than the
United States, and the fact that the Air Force wants to retire
48 older MQ-9s, is there any chance that the United be a
reasonable system to offer Ukraine, either one--or maybe start
with Secretary Austin.
Secretary Austin. Yes. As we look at this, Senator, as you
know, that air domain is a very hostile airspace because of the
capability that the Russians have for air defense. It is not a
survivable platform if they try to use that in that
environment.
Senator Cramer. General Milley.
General Miley. Yes, that is--one, it is not survivable. It
is big and slow. It is going to get nailed by the Russian air
defense systems. In terms of its capabilities, I am not sure
what it will get you beyond the smaller, faster, more nimble
UAV systems that we are providing, as well as some other
countries are providing. So, I think that it is a good system
for certain uses in certain environments, but in the current
situation in Ukraine, it may not be the best system.
Senator Cramer. Thank you. Secretary Austin, I want to now
go to back to China a little bit, and you are probably familiar
with the what I consider the nearly year and a half of torment
that the city of Grand Forks went through while considering an
investment by the Chinese Communist Party investors for Fufeng,
which would have provided a wet corn milling facility 12 miles
from the Grand Forks Air Force Base, 12 miles from the 319th
Reconnaissance Wing, and now an SDA [Space Development Agency]
ground station for low-Earth orbiting satellites.
After sort of cutting a deal and then going to CFIUS
[Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States], where
CFIUS has spent 60 days determining they didn't have
jurisdiction. Finally, after, I don't know, 14 months or so of
all of this, the Air Force finally came out and said it would
present a significant risk.
That, I think, has helped kill the project, although I
understand there is now a 90 day pause. My hope for all of that
is not only that Grand Forks avoided an unfortunate situation,
but that many other communities might have avoid it as well.
Could you talk to us just a little bit about either in the
context of Fufeng and Grand Forks, or the broader context of
are we giving adequate cover and information and coaching
perhaps to other communities around the country? Because it is
my understanding that this is not necessarily a unique
circumstance to Grand Forks.
Secretary Austin. Well, first of all, Senator, let me thank
you for your personal leadership on this issue. To the point
that you are making, this applies to installations all around
the United States of America.
We will continue to emphasize to the Service Chiefs,
Commanders, secretaries, and that we have to be vigilant about
what is going on outside of our fences. We have got to work
with the communities to make sure that we do have some kind of
a situational awareness.
We have to advocate for the protection of our bases and
installations. Again, every one of these cases will be complex,
but there are cases that we must take on. But again, thanks for
your leadership in area.
Senator Cramer. Well, I appreciate you saying it that way,
actually, because I think you are right. I think we need to,
``take them on,'' and rather than sort of punt them to the
CFIUS process or some other political process, particularly
when it comes to the Chinese Communist Party and their
involvement, and their ability--not just ability, but obvious
willingness to do recon in all sorts of matters and ways, and
so I appreciate that.
My hope, like I said, is that the experience that ground
force went through is not just in vain to the rest of the
country, but rather perhaps sheds light on this issue
throughout the country. So, thank you for that.
Again, thank you, General Milley, for your decades of
service, and I yield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Senator Warren,
please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for your service to our Nation. This year's Department of
Defense requests an $842 billion budget, one of the largest
budgets in history.
Now, despite the massive size of this budget request, the
Committee is already receiving letters from various parts of
DOD saying that they need billions of dollars more. DOD calls
these unfunded priority lists, I call them wish lists, and I am
concerned about how they distort our budget process.
So, Secretary Austin, if I could let me ask this directly,
are you comfortable with the figure in the President's proposed
budget that it is sufficient to meet our defense and national
security objectives?
Secretary Austin. I am, Senator. As you know, we made this
budget request based upon our strategy. Our request is directly
linked to the capabilities that we need to execute our
strategy, and we spent a lot of time on that.
I have asked the Commanders and Service Chiefs to make sure
that they go after warfighting capability and readiness in
their base budget, and for the most part we have done that. But
again, we are required by law----
Senator Warren. I understand. So, we are going to go there.
We are going to go there, Mr. Secretary. Now, Secretary Gates
understood that leaders at DOD can always find a gap or a
requirement to justify asking for what he called however many
billions dollars more you want.
He reduced wish list by about 90 percent, and he was able
to do this during the surge in Afghanistan. Secretary Austin,
you have a unique perspective here because before you were
Secretary of Defense, you were the Commander of a major
Combatant Command, a job that is now held by the people who are
asking for unfunded priorities.
When Secretary Gates cut these unfunded lists down, you
were Commanding General of United States Forces in Iraq.
Secretary Austin, did our national security suffer when
Secretary Gates cut down the service wish lists?
Secretary Austin. I can say that while we were in Iraq and
Afghanistan, we based upon the support of Congress, we had what
we needed to be able to prosecute our operations, and so, we
didn't go for--we didn't want for much of anything.
Senator Warren. Okay. So, let's talk then about the budget
process. Each Combatant Commander thinks about how they could
spend more money than you have allocated to them in this
process that you describe.
I assume these Combatant Commanders act in absolute good
faith, but they have a narrow perspective. Secretary Austin, in
putting together the overall budget, you have to weigh our
global national security priorities. Do the Commanders
submitting these wish lists have to do the same?
Secretary Austin. They are primarily focused on their
region and in what they would like to have for their region in
order to be successful. But again----
Senator Warren. I take that as a no. Yes, all right. You
know, as my colleagues on this Committee are well aware, I have
been using these budget posture hearings to ask Combatant
Commanders, folks who occupy the roles like the one you used to
serve, about these lists.
Almost all of them have defended their requests, although
the justifications vary. Three of them said they needed the
items on this list to address unexpected threats that couldn't
be considered in the budget process.
But these same Commanders often repeat the same requests
year after year after year, suggesting that if there were a
real need, they would have worked it into the underlying
budget. Secretary Austin, does DOD have sufficient tools to
address emerging threats without relying on the unfunded
priorities list?
Secretary Austin. We do, and again, we account for that as
we build the budget.
Senator Warren. Okay, and one last question. Do you support
removing the statutory requirement to send Congress these lists
every year? If so, are you confident that we could do so
without jeopardizing national security?
Secretary Austin. I would support that, Senator.
Senator Warren. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I would
also like to submit a letter for the record from Under
Secretary McCord supporting my bill with Senator King, Senator
Lee, and Senator Braun to end the statutory requirement for
these lists. As he notes in the letter these lists are, ``not
an effective way to illuminate our joint priorities.''
We don't let any other part of Federal Government behave
this way, and it is for a good reason. The budget process
requires making tough choices. I appreciate that the Secretary
leads in that, and I would like to submit this for the record,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Warren. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator
Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General
Milley, thanks for being here. Thank you for your service.
Secretary Austin, thank for your service, and your call last
week. Secretary McCord, thanks for being here today. You are
not getting a lot of questions but thank you for being here.
You know, I ran for Senate to serve on this Committee. I
ran because my dad, he was a World War II veteran. He earned
five Bronze Stars and a Purple Heart, and he died on Active
Duty, and I ran to support the warfighter. You know, we owe our
freedom to our troops.
For 50 years, our All-Volunteer Force has answered the
call. I think you would agree to that. Since 1973, we have
asked a lot of our Americans, young volunteers, to fight in
Vietnam, Grenada, Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and
Afghanistan. They have never wavered. In boom times and bust,
young Americans have raised their right hands to defend the
Constitution with their lives, if necessary.
War is hell. You know that better than anybody. Every
recruit should know that. But in the last few years, we have
put them through a different kind of hell. In one of your first
acts, Mr. Secretary, you put our military, every single member,
Active Duty and Reserve, through a mandatory training to root
out extremists.
That sent a message, Mr. Secretary, that our military is
filled with extremists. Our military is one of the most diverse
organizations in the world. It is full of patriots. Eight
months later, we watched the collapse of Afghanistan. It was
the worst defeat of the United States in my lifetime and agony
for most Americans who watched on the 20th anniversary of
September 11th.
That defeat gutted our troops who served there. The
President called it an extraordinary success. That is not what
our veterans of Afghanistan call it. Our withdrawal, a big
letdown to our allies, a military disaster, and national
disgrace. I have talked to leaders all over the world, they
have told me the same thing. Not one general or political
appointee has been held accountable.
Senator Tuberville. Now, I want to give you an example of
accountability. General Milley, May 2021, I sent you a letter
asking for, why did we give up Bagram? Now, you did answer, but
it was a few months later. Now you have 4,500 people, you know,
for the next person in line on the joint staff and a budget of
$250 million. We have got to find ways to get information back
to Congress.
Secretary Austin, I sent you a question on September 2021.
It took almost 4 months. Congress deserves better. America
deserves better. We all deserve better. Now we are on the brink
of a world war with Russia.
China is openly violating our airspace. But it took
Congress to step in and tell our military leaders, you, to stop
throwing our troops out who objected to a vaccine. Most of them
on a religious factor. Given what we put our troops through in
the past 2 years, it is no wonder that the Army missed its goal
of 15,000 soldiers. General, you know, that is an entire
division.
We can't afford that, and it is getting worse. The Navy and
Air Force will probably miss their numbers this year. Yet some
of my colleagues claim that the real crisis is my hold on the
promotion of 158 general flag officers. Mind you, these were
promotions that the majority leader can bring to the floor at
any time.
Those same people claim expanding abortion will make our
military stronger. You know, I want to be clear on this. My
hold has nothing to do with the Supreme Court decision to the
access of abortion. This is about not forcing the taxpayers of
this country to fund abortion. That has been a bipartisan
consensus for more than 40 years.
The military has performed abortions for years. All were
cases of rape, incest, and the harm to the mom. Over the past
40 years, I don't recall one military person ever complaining
that we weren't performing enough abortions.
Nor did the military raise alarm that our service men and
women were being placed in areas that had restrictive policies
on abortion. Poland's restrictive policies. Japan. Djibouti.
All these theaters have abortion policy.
Yet our military changed the policy to do this job in these
different theaters. As of 12 days ago, you all got the American
taxpayer on the hook to pay for travel and time off for
elective abortions, and you did not make this with anybody in
this room or Congress taking a vote. In fact, this contradicts
what Congress has actually voted for. Most of us, some of us in
the room, if not all Senators that have been complaining about
this, have voted for the Hyde Amendment many, many times.
But now, my colleagues on the left, like this abortion
issue is good for a campaign, and that is what this shouldn't
be about. I am not going to let our military be politicized. I
want our military to be the strongest and deadliest it has ever
been. But I also want the Administration to follow the law. As
long as I have a voice in this body, Congress will write the
laws. Not Secretary Defense, not the Joint Chiefs.
General, you said nothing is more expensive than preparing
for war or fighting a war. I truly agree. That is the reason,
if we want something to spend money on, let's pass it and let's
put it in the NDAA.
You know, I represent Alabama, but I also represent
everybody in this country. Everybody, all 320 million. All of
us do. Y'all represent the military. But you also are
responsible and represent every citizen in this country. That
is the reason this country is so strong and we all need to
understand that.
Get on the same page. I am willing to work with you. I am
not here to fight. I am here--we are all on the same team, and
I want to work with you to make this happen. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. I think it is appropriate that the Secretary
and, or the General--need to respond.
Secretary Austin. Well, thank you, sir, and first of all,
let me just say thanks for the support you have given us to
this point. I really implore you to reconsider and allow our
nominations to move forward. It will make a significant
difference for our force. Just to address a couple of things
that you mentioned.
First of all, you said that I had our troops focus on
rooting out extremism and nothing could be further from the
truth. You know, each of our units, troops spent a couple of
hours talking about a number of things.
Now, we have always had regulations against extremist
behavior. You have heard me say that 99.9 percent of our troops
are focused on the right things each and every day. But in this
case, a small set of actions can have outsized impact.
On the vaccine mandate, the vaccine mandate, in my view,
saved lives and it saved a lot of lives. So, you know, I--we
don't see a strong correlation between vaccine mandate and
recruiting. We don't see that because we have done the surveys
that indicate that that is just not true, that there is not a
strong correlation.
Now, on the issue of providing non-covered reproductive
health care for our women, I would just say, Senator, almost
one in five of our troops are women and they don't get a chance
to choose where they are station.
So almost 80,000 of our women are stationed in places
that--where they don't have access to non-covered reproductive
health care, and I heard from our troops, I heard from our
senior leaders, I heard from our Chiefs and also our
Secretaries.
This policy is based on strong legal ground, and it is not
a law, it is a policy, and so, you know, we obviously don't
pass laws in the Department of Defense. But again, I assure you
that we have great respect for this body, Congress, and we will
do everything within our power to make sure that we continue to
work with Congress.
Again, you supported us in a number of ways, Senator. I am
personally grateful for that support, and I know my colleagues
are as well. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Let me recognize Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
all of you for your service and for being here today to
testify. I first want to say to General Milley, I want to take
a moment to thank you for your 43 years of service, the
commitment to our country, and the dedication and sacrifice
your family has made for that with you able to serve. I look
forward to you have an enjoyment retirement and your second
career.
I know whatever it will be, it will be something special,
and we look forward to continuing to work with you. Secretary
Austin, multiple sources, including retired General Officers,
and National Defense Industrial Association, American
Enterprise Institute, and your colleague, Mr. McCord, have all
recognized the damage failing to pass a budget on time has both
in our national security and the taxpayers.
What I am trying to get to, and Mr. McCord, no one knows
better than you how damaging delays and CRs [continuing
resolutions], have they been. Previously, you noted that from
fiscal year 1991 to 2010, the average delay for defense
appropriation was 29 days. That was between 1991 and 2010, and
that has since ballooned out to 118 days.
Also, we are talking about the American Enterprise
Institute. They threw out a rough estimate of $200 million per
day, $200 million per day under the latest continuing
resolution that covered the start of fiscal year 2023. That has
a total of $18 billion.
So, I guess what I am asking is both of yours and Mr.
McCord's commitment to get Congress, all of you, to do
accurate. I mean, I know you come in here and you preach the
high heavens, and we seem to not take it seriously at all.
We are talking real dollars now, real dollars, and they
think that basically the budget keeps ballooning out of sight
and we have no oversight whatsoever. If we as Congress just did
our job on time, we are told that overall, you could save
anywhere between 5 to 10 percent of the request you have. That
is $40 to $80 billion a year. Is that an accurate statement?
Secretary Austin. I think so, and I defer to Secretary
McCord for exact figures----
Senator Manchin. Well, let him respond also.
Secretary Austin. But you are absolutely right, Senator,
and you heard me say in my opening statement that the best way
that Congress can help us in this year going forward is to try
to get an on-time appropriation done. You know, without that,
we can't do new starts. We can't do a number of things, and you
can't get that time back. You know, it is gone, and so that
puts us further behind in terms of our competition with
adversaries like China.
Senator Manchin. Secretary McCord.
Mr. McCord. Yes, I would concur. Your figures are accurate,
Senator. As the Secretary said, we can't buy back time with
money, and that goes on the readiness side if a missed training
rotation due to shortage of funds.
But especially harmful on the contracting side, where we
have got areas like the triad where we are trying to move the
bomber into lower production, that we can't take those next
steps under CRs, as you know, and that is the biggest lost
opportunity when it comes to moving forward. We are very
constrained legally.
Senator Manchin. So basically, we have nonproductive money
that we are appropriating that is used basically to make up for
the inefficiencies of Congress because of our budget process.
Without you having to say anything or confirm that, that is
what I am taking away from this little conversation that we
have had. I am doing everything I can to make sure we do our
job on time. You know, by April 1st, by law, House and Senate
was supposed to have a budget.
By April 15th, by law, we are supposed to have one
reconciled. By September 30th, by law, we are supposed to pass.
That would change the course of what we are doing how we are
spending right now, tremendously, rather than cutting anything,
just being efficient. So, I would hope that we would all take
that seriously.
General Milley, as you know, since the beginning of the
Putin's illegal war in Ukraine, the United States has provided
over $76 billion in justified funding to support Ukraine in
both the military defense of their people in freedom, but also
in humanitarian and infrastructure support.
Can you speak to your confidence in the United States,
NATO, Ukrainian weapons accountability, and possibly elaborate
on the Joint Strategic oversight plan that was announced by
this year by the Inspector Generals of the DOD, State
Department, USAID. You know, they all----
General Milley. As you know, Senator, we do not have any
uniformed troops or civilians, for that matter, accompanying
Ukrainian forces in the front line. We do have folks working
out of the embassy, so they are working at the Ministry of
Defense level, and that is as far as our own hands-on
accountability goes.
We do have some other means through reporting that the
Ukrainians report to us, and I will be happy to talk about that
in a classified session. But the there are some means and
mechanisms of doing some accountability. It is not as rigorous
as you might think. But I think the biggest way to measure the
accountability is effectiveness on the Russian forces.
These are anti-tank munitions, this artillery is having a
devastating effect on the Russians. As you know, publicly, the
Russians have well over 200,000 casualties. Their offensive
aspirations have come essentially to a halt.
Their capabilities have been--their ground forces have been
absolutely impaled on this Ukrainian bayonet, so to speak, and
that is largely due to the resources that the United States and
other countries have provided. Although we don't have by name
DODIC [Department of Defense Identification Code] sort of
accountability, shell number accountability, you can see the
accountability on the battlefield.
Senator Manchin. Yes, my time is running out. I would love
to ask you about the AUMF [Authorization for Use of Military
Force], but I am sure you probably talked about the AUMF before
I got here. But thank you so much. I appreciate it.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Senator Schmitt,
please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Austin,
by the way, for both of you, thank you for your service to the
country. We really do appreciate it. I do. I know I do. The
folks back home do. Secretary Austin, I wanted to ask you a
couple of questions sort of along the lines of what Senator
Tuberville asked.
You mentioned earlier that you didn't want to spend a lot
of time and you thought that there was a drag on our force, and
spending money on things that don't make us a fighting force.
You just mentioned that you don't get the time back.
With the stand down day to address extremism, that cost the
military and taxpayers nearly 5.4 million man hours. As we talk
about recruitment, I think it is completely naive to, when we
talk about the numbers, to separate the challenges that we have
now from the politics, the divisive politics that have been
injected now into the military.
The military stands as this great meritocracy where people
can achieve great things. But by infusing divisive DEI
trainings, by infusing abortion politics, by infusing COVID
vaccine mandates, it has created division in the ranks.
We have heard from those military members, and I sent you a
letter last week, and I want to ask you, we talked about in the
letter, referenced the $86.5 million for dedicated diversity
and inclusion activities. I want to ask you here today, how
many DEI related positions exist in the Department of Defense?
Secretary Austin. I can't speak to that specific number. I
will take that question for the record, with your permission,
Senator.
Senator Schmitt. Sure.
Secretary Austin. In terms of that number, it is a small
percentage of an $842 billion budget. I would just further
point out with respect to DEI, I think, you know, Senator, that
Congress requires that we have a DEI program. In the 2020 NDAA,
it states the Secretary of Defense shall design and implement a
5-year strategic plan for diversity and inclusion in a
Department of Defense.
Senator Schmitt. Yes, I don't--but I don't know what these
activities are, which is the purpose of the letter. I don't
know what materials are being submitted. We looked, so
hopefully the response to the letter will be in fact be
responsive to what actually is being pushed with these so-
called trainings. Then I do want to ask you, so there were
nearly 17,000--well there are over 8,000 military men and women
who lost their jobs because of the COVID vaccine mandate. Is
that correct?
Secretary Austin. That is about right.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. So, when we talk about recruitment
challenges, are you actively going after to try to get those
8,000 people back?
Secretary Austin. They have the ability to----
Senator Schmitt. Well, right. No, I am asking, what are
your efforts?
Secretary Austin. They have the ability to reapply for
readmission----
Senator Schmitt. Are you recruiting these folks?
Secretary Austin. We are not recruiting, but they have the
ability to----
Senator Schmitt.--Sayonara 8,000 well-trained folks.
Secretary Austin. We are recruiting new recruits.
Senator Schmitt. Okay, and so, what happens now to the
remaining several thousand who didn't get the vaccine? Are you
intending to fire them as well? There are several folks that
weren't immediately dismissed who refused the vaccine. They are
still in the military. Are you planning to fire those folks as
well?
Secretary Austin. The vaccine mandate, Senator, has been
rescinded.
Senator Schmitt. So, you don't--now, even though they were
refusing when you did have the policy?
Secretary Austin. That is right.
Senator Schmitt. So, your commitment here today is those
folks are not going to lose their jobs.
Secretary Austin. Not for a vaccine mandate, Senator----
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Well, I would submit that with----
Secretary Austin. If I could, like would like to go back to
the----
Senator Schmitt. Sure.
Secretary Austin.--5 million hours that you mentioned, and
I would like to ask the chairman, who submitted that number,
where that number came from.
Senator Schmitt. We would be happy to back it up. If you
take the stand down day by the number of folks that didn't work
that day, that is where we get the numbers. So, we would be
happy to followup specifically. I do have a question----
Secretary Austin. That is not accurate, Senator.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Well, how--maybe you can answer, how
many man hours were sacrificed that day? You just testified you
can't get those hours back. How many hours were sacrificed on
the stand down day?
Secretary Austin. Let me ask you and tell you where the
numbers came from.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Well, maybe you can get us those
numbers when you respond to the letter also.
Secretary Austin. As simple as this. You know, when asked
to provide that number, his approach was, there are 2.1 million
troops, each one each troop spent 2 hours, and that is where
the number comes.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Well, you can't get the time back,
right. Whatever that number was, you can't get that time back.
General Milley, I do want to ask you a question, because I am
limited on time. I do want to ask you about the Philippines,
which I think you had mentioned in your previous remarks about
that strength, that relationship continues to grow, which I
personally think is critical in the Indo-Pacific.
Can you talk about what some of those efforts, where you
think that is headed? I think as we, you know, obviously the
allies that are talked about the most, Japan, Australia, and
India, but I think the Philippines are critical. Could you talk
about the strategic value of strengthening that relationship?
General Milley. Again, Senator, but just a point of
clarification. It is 2.1 million, 2 hours, in fact, 2 hours per
person. That is with where the 5.4 million. That is out of 2.8
billion man hours available, in fact, on a 10-hour workday, 5
days a week for the U.S. Military.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Well, whether we are talking about
dollars or hours, millions still matter. No, no, I folks, I
represent they a million is a big number.
General Milley. I am just saying where the math came from,
and on the Philippines, but in broad--more broadly than the
Philippines, generally the Western Pacific. It is my view that
China is, you heard it in the opening statement, is trying to
become the regional hegemon within perhaps 10 or 15 years or
so.
Part of that, of course, is putting the Philippines and
other countries in the region at a disadvantage. Those
countries want the United States presence there. They clearly
do. There is a really an underreported arms race going on in
the Western Pacific right now. These countries are arming
themselves up and they very much, with very few exceptions,
want the United States there.
That is why the Secretary traveled to the Philippines. That
is why we are looking at access, basing, and oversight. That is
why we are looking at a repositioning in the Western Pacific.
It is a design there to be forward deployed in order to deter
armed conflict with a great power, great power being China in
this case, and deter Chinese aggression, not only in the
Western Pacific, perhaps elsewhere.
So, these are all linked together, tied together. There are
many other initiatives ongoing by the services and also by
other countries as well. But it is really critical and it is
really critical that we get it done right, and we need to move
out with a sense of urgency because the next 5 years, I think,
are going to be determinative of really what comes in the
future with our relationship with China.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, General.
Chairman Reed. Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the three
of you, thank you for your testimony here today and thank you
for the work you do. I also want to begin by commending the
Department's efforts to invest in and incentivize funding to
build semiconductor manufacturing facilities and advanced
research and development activities at both the national and
the regional levels.
Under Secretary McCord, could you speak to how the fiscal
year 2024 DOD budget request takes advantage of the CHIPS Act
[CHIPS and Science Act of 2022] that Congress passed recently,
that funding, and makes the necessary investments to ensure
that we have both a resilient and a robust domestic
microelectronics manufacturing ecosystem for both state-of-the-
art as well as legacy chips.
Mr. McCord. Thank you, Senator. First, I just want to say
that the Department really appreciates congressional leadership
on the CHIPS Act. It really speaks to the recognition of the
whole-of-government approach needed with China.
CHIPS is separate from our budget in the sense that it is
now a stand-alone authorization. We had prior to that in the
2022 and 2023 budget started a pretty robust microelectronics
effort, Under Secretary Austin, that was really tied to defense
specific capabilities like radiation hardening.
What we are doing with CHIPS on top of that then is really
that broader industrial base, the fabrication, labs to fabs. I
understand that that is now--we are now in our request for
solution source selection for the proposals that went out in
that first year of CHIPS that Congress created last year.
So, we are moving out now with source selection to actually
build out that capability. Then that--again, that sits on top
of the more defense specific microelectronics, which is over $2
billion in our budget.
Senator Peters. Thank you. Secretary Austin, the
development of Taiwan's reserve military capacity is without
question a key component of ensuring that their military is
well prepared to deter, and if needed, to defeat a potential
PRC invasion of the island.
However, I remain concerned that the Department is not
sufficiently addressing the hardships that exist at the
authority and funding level with increased mil-to-mil and civ-
mil interactions between the United States and Taiwan. Current
policy restricts the level of interaction that United States
Forces, particularly the National Guard, have with Taiwan, both
CONUS [Contiguous United States] and OCONUS [Outside the
Contiguous United States].
Additionally, current restrictions do not allow the Guard
to consistently engage with Taiwan under the same authority
that the State partnership program utilizes. Rather, other
authorities must be utilized to justify and to fund National
Guard's involvement in this strategic relationship.
Essentially, what is happening is creating this maze of
funding and authorities that restricts consistent engagement
that is so important. It creates undue processes and procedures
to coordinate and fund cooperation.
So, my question for you, sir, is how is the Department
reassessing the relevant authorities and lines of funding to
help streamline the National Guard's ability to support
security cooperation efforts with Taiwan?
Secretary Austin. We are taking a hard--thanks for Senator.
We are taking a hard look at all the things that we can do to
increase the capability in the reserve forces. You are right,
Senator, this is a--this is critical for them going forward.
Our guard has done amazing work with other countries across
the globe. Most recent example, as you know, is the work that
they did in Ukraine prior to this invasion, and so that kind of
engagement, we think, is critical. So, we are going to continue
to find ways to make sure that we are we are helping as much as
we can in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
We will relook all of our policies and authorities to make
sure that we can streamline this as best possible. In the
meantime, we are going to continue to do what we are doing to
increase our capability.
Senator Peters. Secretary Austin, on Saturday, Russia
accused Azerbaijan of violating the cease-fire, which ended the
2020 war with Armenia. This comes as Azerbaijan has blockaded
the Lachin corridor, and more than 3 months--for more than 3
months, leading to what is a humanitarian crisis in Karabakh.
I recently wrote to you and Secretary Blinken regarding the
use of section 907 waiver authority and the potential effects
of U.S. support in that conflict. My question for you is the
military, is United States military aid supporting the
Azerbaijani military in enabling their aggression against
Armenia?
Secretary Austin. We are clearly not enabling aggression,
Senator. As you know, we have had a relationship with them and
we have provided assistance in some cases, but in all cases, in
use monitoring is really important and we have been focused on
that. So, we have we have taken a responsible approach to this,
and again, we do not support, will not support aggressive
activity.
Senator Peters. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Peters. Senator
Mullin, please.
Senator Mullin. Sorry, my microphone came off there. Thank
you, Chairman, and thank you all for being here. General
Milley, I want to thank you again for the phone call and the
conversation we had yesterday. I greatly appreciate your time
on that. As we stated in that conversation, I wanted to have
something for the record.
Before I begin with the rest of my questions, I would like
to touch base on the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan
with American troops. Will you commit to providing a complete
after-action report on the withdrawal to Congress that provides
accountability and transparency for the American people, for
the closure of lives that were lost and the people left behind?
General Milley. Absolutely, and the Secretary of defense
has directed that we do that, and that is done by the Joint
Staff in CENTCOM as well. But also, the Department of Defense
is doing that, so I absolutely commit to that.
Senator Mullin. Thank you. General, as you know, the
industrial base is going through some changes right now.
Prior to the Russian invasion of the Ukraine sites, or
invasion of Ukraine, sites like McAllister's Army ammunition
plant, we are planning on seeing to see a decrease in
productivity.
Since this invasion, there's obviously been a new emphasis
on where we are moving. Can you speak to what we are seeing
with plans like McAllister and the ammunition depots, what the
plan is and the future looks like for the industrial era?
General Milley. Yes, the--thanks, Senator. The defense
industrial base, as the Secretary said, has had several
different sessions to include the SecDef and others within the
Department to really go over the defense industrial base in
some detail.
One of the big lessons coming out of Ukraine is the
incredible consumption of conventional munitions and the
conduct of what is really a limited regional war. So, a great
power war, if that were to ever happen, God forbid it does, the
consumption rates would be incredible.
The Secretary tasked us to go back and review all of the
various operational plans and the COCOMS to determine if our
estimates are correct, because if those estimates then feed
into these budgets to buy the ammunition, that study is
ongoing.
But we can tell you that, for example, 155 ammunition,
which is in high demand in the Ukraine fight, we report out
daily in a written report to the Secretary of Defense on all
the various ammunition statuses that we have.
I won't go over that in an open session, but in a closed
session, we can do that if you would like. The bottom line is
the defense industrial base is critical to the defense of the
United States, and our ability to produce, manufacture and
produce the logistical capability, especially munitions, is
fundamental.
You mentioned McAllister. I had an opportunity to visit
McAllister. That is an incredible facility with incredibly
skilled workers that are highly motivated and it is really a
one of a type facility. It is an amazing place.
Places like that exist elsewhere in the United States as
well, and we need to pay great attention to that defense
industrial base if we are ever going to successfully compete
and hopefully not actually have a war with the great power.
Senator Mullin. What is interesting is the relationship
between the public and private service there. A lot of our
industrial areas around the country, especially in McAllister,
where we have the public sector working with the private sector
and delivering missions on time.
I think there is a great amount of pride there, that I
think the communities that have the ability and actually the
desire to help are standing ready, and McAllister is no
different.
General Milley. That is great. The workers there are off
the charts incredible. Skilled workers, highly motivated.
Senator Mullin. Focus on Fort Sill just a second. General
Rainey stated recently, the Army Futures Command will be
reviewing their use of cross-functional teams. Fort Sill in
Lawton, Oklahoma is currently home to two cross-functional
teams. As the original architect of this system, while serving
as Army Chief of Staff, can you speak to the usefulness of the
future of these programs, sir?
General Milley. Yes, they the Army Futures Command and the
priorities that the Army laid out for modernization 6, 7 years
ago are still what they are working on. They have had the most
successful modernization programs they have had in decades as a
result of that Futures Command.
Key to that was the cross-functional teams led by General
Officers in each case. Those cross-functional teams were
designed intentionally to be temporary until those programs are
brought online. For example, long range precision fires,
feature vertical lift, the next generation combat vehicle,
those are programs that once they get brought online and
brought into the force, those cross-functional teams will go
away.
But it has been a highly successful and innovative
organizational concept. What General Rainey is talking about
now is the next step, getting it to the next level, because
those programs are well underway. So, he is not talking about
getting rid of those CFTs. He is talking about looking at the
next set of CFTs.
For example, all the main sensing would be one. There is
several of these others that they are looking at, and they have
not made any decisions yet. The Army hasn't. But Secretary of
the Army will make those decision in due time.
But it is an excellent program, it is an excellent Command,
and they are really moving out very, very well in the
modernization of the U.S. Army.
Senator Mullin. Thank you for clarifying that. I yield
back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Mullin. Senator King is
recognized and will take over as I go vote, and the vote is on,
for those who have not yet voted.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Austin, I
just want to clarify a couple of things about vaccines and
vaccine mandates. I am told that a routine mustering into the
service requires something like 13 vaccinations. Is that
accurate?
Secretary Austin. I think it is nine, Senator. Depending on
where you are going. At any one point in time, that number can
increase up to about 13, sir.
Senator King. Depends on the on where the soldier, sailor,
marine, or guardian will be assigned.
General Milley. Right.
Senator King. That is just routine. That is part of the
military for as long as we can remember. Is it true, General,
that--or sorry, Mr. Secretary, that General Washington mandated
vaccination against smallpox in the Continental Army at the
time of the Revolutionary War?
Secretary Austin. That is true.
Senator King. The purpose of this vaccination mandate had
nothing to do with politics. It had to do with saving lives and
maintaining readiness, did it not?
Secretary Austin. That is exactly right.
Senator King. I remember being on a call when we were in
sort of lockdown here with regard to the USS Teddy Roosevelt,
where the--in early March, April, and May 2020, the virus
ripped through the ship.
I think over 1,000 people tested positive because of the
nature of their close military proximity. Doesn't that make
vaccinating against an infectious disease all the more
important in the military?
Secretary Austin. To me and to all of my colleagues, it
absolutely does, Senator. I told chairman a number of times
that in my lifetime, the only thing that I have seen that has
been able to disable a carrier is this vaccine.
Senator King. It is interesting because General Washington
said that, when it alerted John Hancock about the vaccine, he
said, this is the most dangerous thing to our troops, more
dangerous than the sword of the enemy.
Exactly what you just said. General Milley, I want to thank
you for the integrity that you have demonstrated in your
position. I remember, and I am sure you, too, to questioning
you at your confirmation hearing.
My question was, will you tell the truth, will you give
your best military advice, even if it doesn't suit the
leadership that you were working with at the time? You have
done that, and I want to thank you for that and for the
extraordinary service that you have provided to this country
throughout your career, but over the last 4 years.
I appreciate your keeping your word to me and this
Committee from the date of your confirmation. General Austin,
allowing the intelligence about the imminence of the Russian
invasion was, I think, a brilliant move by the Administration
at the beginning.
However, why are we telling everybody in the world what we
are sending and when we are sending it? This morning I learned
on National Public Radio, and I suspect Putin did, although I
don't know if he listens to National Public Radio, how many
tanks have arrived in Ukraine and when they are going to be
deployed. Why do we--why do we broadcast that information?
Secretary Austin. Well, we certainly try not to, Senator.
As you know, as various countries provide contributions, they
are proud of those contributions, and sometimes we find our
colleagues providing a bit too much information. But I----
Senator King. You understand my question?
Secretary Austin. I do. I do. When I meet with our
colleagues here, and I meet with them every month, this is a
point that I will continue to drive home that the Russians are
absolutely focused on where this equipment is and what it is
doing. So, we have got to help ourselves.
Senator King. I fully agree. A couple of questions. I am
going to submit for the record about ISR [Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance] capability, both in NORTHCOM
and SOUTHCOM, which was in their unfunded priority list. But
you can make a strong case that should have been in the base
budget if ISR is so important, particularly in counter-drug,
where people are being killed every day. I think my calculation
is about 20 people have died in this country of overdoses since
this hearing started this morning.
To not have sufficient ISR and resources to interdict what
we can find, I think is a misallocation of resources. I am
going to submit that for the record. Finally, General Milley,
probably the word that has been used the most today is
readiness.
The question I have is, are we preparing for the right war,
in terms of the change nature of war that you have seen over
the course of your career. If a conflict comes, it is going to
start with cyber, electronic, directed energy, space. Are we
adequately taking account of the changing nature of conflict so
that we are not preparing for the last war, but for hopefully
there won't be another one, but if there is another conflict,
that is where our effort should be going?
General Milley. Really briefly, Senator, I think we are in
a pivotal period here, a transition period, where we have a
method of war that is based out of an industrial age sort of
thing, and we are moving to a different operational environment
sometime in the future.
So, think about things like robotics, artificial
intelligence, hypersonics, cyber. There is a wide variety of
technologies that are coming at us very, very quickly. And the
country that maximizes and optimizes those technologies for the
conduct of warfighting is going to have a decisive advantage,
at least at the outset of the next war.
Now, at the same time, you can't throw the baby out with
the bathwater. We are in a transition period, so we are still
going to need ships and planes and tanks, et cetera. But we are
in that transition period, and I think this budget, and the
last one, and future budgets are going to have to move us in
the direction of modernizing the force, transforming this force
into a future operating environment that is probably not very
far away, probably about 10 years or so, and we need to move
all with a sense of urgency.
Senator King. Thank you. I agree, and the R&D [research and
development] emphasis in the last budget, in this budget, I
think is one of the most important policy directions that this
budget represents. On behalf of the Chairman, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank our witnesses, General Milley, in particular, for your
service, and General Austin, as well General--I am sorry, Mr.
Secretary. I appreciate you highlighting the suicide issue in
your opening statement. As you know, that is hitting the forces
in Alaska particularly hard.
Still having a hard time getting our arms around that. It
is still happening, so working together on that one is a high
priority of mine, and I appreciate you putting a lot of
attention to that. I first want to begin by quickly covering an
oversight issue deeply concerning to Members of this Committee,
which was an abuse of the President's Commander-in-Chief
authority when he gave a campaign speech last fall with Active
Duty marines as political props.
This wasn't a speech about Veterans Day or Memorial Day or
speech about the heroic actions of the marines in Iwo Jima or
the chosen reservoir. It was the most partisan political speech
of the President's 2 years in office where he disparaged tens
of millions of Americans that he claimed threaten the Republic,
did not respect the Constitution, on and on and on. Really
harsh partisan campaign speech, and there flanking the
President of the United States were two Active Duty marines.
Shameful, outrageous, infuriating. I have raised this issue
with both of you and other military leaders and how
inappropriate this image was to our republic. General Milley,
you have talked about how the military needs to stay out of
politics. I assume in good faith on both of your parts that you
didn't know this.
But what I want is a commitment from both of you the next
time some White House staffer thinks it is a good idea to
politicize the military with a political speech like this, with
two Active Duty marines or anyone else standing by the
President, that both of you will put your foot down and not
only say no, but say hell no. Can I get your commitment on
doing that to this Committee?
Secretary Austin. Senator, I think you know that I am
opposed to any type of politicization of the military, and I
will not comment on my President's actions.
Senator Sullivan. You think that was appropriate, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary Austin. Again, Senator----
Senator Sullivan. Do you think that was in your personal
opinion, General Milley--you have been speaking about this.
Look, I thought both you were just--you guys are going to go,
no. I have got a bunch more questions. But if we are debating
this, let's have the debate. Do you think that was appropriate,
General Milley?
You have spoken about not politicizing the military. That
is just outrageous, and by the way, Democrats and Republicans
agree with me. So, this isn't even that controversial. The
President made a mistake and politicized--go read the speech.
What do you think, General Milley?
General Milley. I am firmly committed to a nonpartizan,
nonpolitical military.
Senator Sullivan. Okay, so if the White House has an idea
to do something like that again, will both of you commit to
this Committee to tell whoever the staff is, hey, don't do
that. Bad idea. Marines shouldn't be----
General Milley. I will speak for myself. I have been asked
in the past in two different administrations on things just
like that, and I have always said, keep the military out of
politics.
Senator Sullivan. I am surprised we are having a debate on
this. Unfortunately. I am burning a lot of time. It is an
important issue, though. I think we all would agree. I am going
to next turn to Senator Wicker's point on the budget. Budgets
are a reflection of an administration's priorities.
This Administration is now three different times in a row,
submitted inflation adjusted cuts to the Department of Defense,
while many other Federal agencies have gotten double digit
increases. This was the 2022 budget. You see, the DOD was last,
second last with a 3 percent cut. The 2023 budget, same kind of
issue.
We are down there last. That was actually a 4 percent cut.
In this budget, once again, one of the down here with 3 percent
cut, while other agencies, EPA almost 20 percent. Both of you
said this is the most dangerous time since World War II. This
current budget shrinks the Army, shrinks the Navy, shrinks the
Marine Corps.
Doesn't that embolden our allies like Xi Jinping and Putin,
not deter them? General Milley, in your personal opinion, do
you support a budget that actually shrinks three of the four
services, particularly the Navy? The Congress here has been
very clear that we want to grow the Navy. The Chinese are
looking at our Navy naval fleet and we are shrinking it.
That is the budget. The President probably assumes
correctly that this Committee will bump it up significantly.
But do both of you support a budget that shrinks three of the
four services?
What would you say to the issue of emboldening our allies
when they see budgets like this that we 3 years in a row have
to rectify by adding significant funding to them. I will ask
both of you, gentleman.
Secretary Austin. Well, Senator, first of all, let me thank
you for your continued support for DOD. We really appreciate
what you and your colleagues have done over the years. I think
you heard me say earlier that we went through great pains to
link our budget request to our strategy.
We are going after the capabilities that we think we need
to be successful in any endeavor, and so, I am satisfied that
this budget gives us what we need. It is an $842 billion
budget. Again, I think it allows us to go after the right
capabilities.
Senator Sullivan. General.
General Milley. Senator, as I said in my opening statement,
I think the uniformed military can defend this country with an
$842 billion budget. That is a lot of money, and I think if we
put it in the right place against the right priorities, we will
be able to adequately defend this country.
Senator Sullivan. In your personal opinion, do you agree
with shrinking the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps?
General Milley. The size of the forces--I will go one into
one here. When I was Chief of Staff of the Army, I had
advocated for about a 525 to 50 size ground----
Senator Sullivan. This budget takes it to 450.
General Milley. Right, and so, I advocated for that because
my analysis of future combat indicated that. This strategy,
though--this is a strategy informed budget. This strategy and
starting under General Mattis, or Secretary Mattis and now
Secretary Austin, this strategy takes us to an essentially a
one war strategy, a one war strategy with a main effort being
China.
So, the question is, what forces are going to be required
to confront or potentially fight China? I think the Army and
Marines definitely have a role to play, but the weight of the
effort is going to be the Navy and the Air Force--the Navy and
the Air Force. Senator Sullivan: Budget shrinks the Navy.
General Milley. It does buy a couple of ships for a
temporary period of time. I talked to the CNO [Chief Naval
Officer] last night at length about this to make sure that I
was clear on the Navy piece of it. The ships that are being
decommissioned and divested of are having significant
maintenance--in fact that the ships for the amphibs, they have
been in the yard for years. They are costing way more money
just a repair than are worthwhile.
So, they are trying to shift to the next generation of
amphib. You will see the curve, I think, when they submit their
shipbuilding plan, you will see the curve going up in the not-
too-distant future. So, there is a temporary downward spiral of
a couple of ships in the overall shipbuilding program.
But this budget buys nine. If you are down two, the net
effect is you down two ships out of a 296 ship Navy. Then it
goes down to 293, and then it starts coming back up. Now, is
that huge? I think the capability of those ships matters. As we
all know, the capability of our ships are different than the
capability of the Chinese ships.
I know that the Chinese have a lot of ships. However, we
not only have the United States Navy, we have the United States
Navy working with the Japanese Navy, working with the
Australian Navy, working with the British Navy, work with the
French Navy.
If you start adding up these navies, China is not only
outnumbered, but they are outgunned, and in terms of
capabilities, if you look at just what I think is the most
lethal capability in the United States Navy today is the
submarine.
Our subs, the Chinese Navy or the Russian Navy are not even
in the same ballpark as our submarine force. Our submarine
force can bring people to their knees just by themselves. So,
our Navy and this budget--we never have enough things that we
always--we always want something else. But this budget
adequately protects the American people.
I am not going to--I can't compare it against the rest of
the President's priorities. But this $842 billion budget buys a
lot of kit, a lot of training. We are focused on two things,
lethality and readiness, lethality and readiness, that is all
we do every day. 24,000 live fires last year. The 24,000 of
those--you talked about a continuing--I am sorry, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. No, no, I thought it was a good answer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, General, appreciate
your service. Again, thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator
Duckworth, please.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
earlier this month a former soldier was sentenced to 45 years
in prison for attempting to murder U.S. servicemembers, for
attempting to provide material support to terrorists, and
illegally transmitting national defense information.
In fact, Mr. Metzler, the convicted gentleman, provided
sensitive details about his unit, including information about
its location, movement, and security to members of the
extremist organization Order of the 9 Angles, a white
supremacist, neo-Nazi and pro-jihadist group.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the
record a RAND report dated 2021 that is entitled Reducing the
Risk of Extremist Activity in the United States Military.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This report
states, and I will just briefly say this, the vast majority of
military personnel and their families are not extremists, but
even a small number of people engaged in extremist activities
could damage the United States military's reputation, its
force, its members, and the larger community.
Extremist activities can also be harmful to individuals who
are radicalized and their friends and family. That said, as
someone who wore the uniform for 23 years, I mean, I was just a
reservist and a guardsman, did not reach the ranks of the
gentleman here or even some of my colleagues on the other side
of the aisle.
I have to say I am offended at the implication that
conducting extremist training means that our military is filled
with extremists. Just as I personally am appreciative of the
fact that we have sharp training and by conducting sharp
training, we are not saying that every member of the military
is a harasser or a perpetrator of military sexual assault.
Similarly, my entire time since I have left the military
has been spent working on mental health for our troops. By
providing mental health training and resiliency training, we
are not saying that the military is filled with people who are
about to commit suicide.
This is simply part of readiness. So, that said, I am going
to switch. I just want to put this on record because it is very
offensive to me to very politically say that extremism in the
military and training against it is saying that the military is
full of extremists.
The military is full of the bravest, most amazing men and
women who do the best job that they can, and they need to be
equipped to do their jobs. That means that they need to be
equipped with the training to recognize sexual harassment when
it occurs, to recognize extremism when it occurs, to recognize
signs of hidden wounds of war, when it occurs so that we can
keep our units in the highest levels of readiness. Okay, I am
done with that.
Last month, I led a CODEL [Congressional Delegations] to
Japan in Indonesia, and I am planning to going back to the
region twice more in just the next few months, and this, in
June, Senator Sullivan and I will be leading a delegation to
the Shangri-La Dialog.
Mr. Secretary, I believe you are going to be speaking
there, and I look forward to hearing your remarks there. In
August, I am planning to take a bipartisan group of my
colleagues to visit the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand to
spotlight the importance of opportunities that our nations have
to partner together.
Mr. Secretary, in your testimony, you highlighted the DOD's
enhanced maritime security with the Philippines and exercises
with Thailand. In what other ways does the Department's budget
request support our allies and partners in Southeast Asia? And
how are you program to achieve integrated deterrence in this
area of the Indo-Pacific?
Secretary Austin. Well, thanks, Senator, and certainly you
with a PDI, Pacific Deterrence Initiative, we are asking you
for some $9.1 billion to improve infrastructure in the region
so that we can position our troops further forward and we can
be more interoperable. You know, presence matters.
We see a significant investment in the AUKUS agreement,
Australia, and the UK, and the United States are working
together to provide the Australians a conventionally armed
nuclear powered submarine capability. And another pillar of
AUKUS calls for us to work together on key technologies like AI
and hypersonics and long-range fires.
I think that kind of thing, building interoperability is
really, really key. We are doing some of the same things with
the Japanese as we work to become more interoperable with them.
We are helping our partners and allies strengthen their
capabilities in terms of cyber.
I think all of those things will add value. But we are
seeing things in the region now that we weren't seeing 2 years
ago, the Japanese doubling its defense investment more access
to the Philippines.
As you know, 2 years ago, we were about to get kicked out
of the Philippines. But we have moved to strengthen our
relationship, and I just think that is powerful.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I just want to touch on the
cyber piece. In fact, last year, I included--I am sorry, in
2021 NDAA, I included legislation that authorized the
Department of Defense to establish a pilot program to enhance
cybersecurity, the resilience and the readiness of the military
forces of Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia.
General Milley, next month I will introduce legislation to
expand this important program to include Malaysia and the
Philippines. Can you comment on the value of direct engagement
with our overseas partners to help build their cyber skills?
General Milley. I can. Not only cyber skills but any of the
military skills. We have excellent military to military
relations with so many countries. If you look at, for example,
the contact group in Europe that the Secretary has organized,
54 countries show up to support Ukraine and obviously there is
only 30 and NATO's so many countries from around the world in
Asia.
It is particularly important, I think, given the dynamic
nature of the geostrategic environment in Asia. So, the more
countries that we have with us, whether it is cyber or anything
else, is critically important.
In the world of cyber, though, we know that cyber and space
are two domains now of armed conflict, including the
traditional ones of land, sea and air. So, as we modernize the
force and move into cyber space, those two domains are going to
be fundamental to success in any kind of conflict.
Working with our allies and partners in the region and
developing their capabilities along with ours, I think will go
a long way to deterrence. If necessary, if deterrence fails and
it is necessary, then it will go a long way to prevailing in
the armed conflict.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, and thank you for your
remarkable career of service to this Nation and also that of
your wife. She not only directly saved lives herself in a very
hands-on way, quite literally, but also her work on mental
health for our troops is continuing to pay off dividends. Thank
you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth. Senator Budd,
please.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again, thank you
all for being here today and for your time. It has been very
helpful. You know, this week, the Senate will likely vote to
repeal the 1991 and the 2000 to authorizations of use of
military force against Iraq.
Now, one of the amendments considered was whether to
replace the 2000 to AUMF with an authorization for the use of
force against Iranian backed militias in Iraq.
That vote failed but I think there is an important issue
here that needs to be addressed. Now, despite the likely repeal
of the 2002 AUMF, the United States still has forces in Iraq at
the invitation of the Iraqi Government to train, advise, and to
assist Iraqi forces. We also have forces in Syria conducting
operations against ISIS.
Now, given Iran's continuing malign activities in the
region, our forces are at risk of attack from Iranian backed
militias, and in fact have been attacked by those militias more
than 80 times, including just last week, resulting in the death
of a United States contractor and injuries to U.S.
servicemembers.
Secretary Austin and General Milley, a brief yes or no,
please. Do you agree that the President has both the authority
and the responsibility under Article 2 of the Constitution to
protect the United States and our forces from attack and the
threat of imminent attack? Again, yes or no, Secretary Austin
Secretary Austin. I do, Senator.
General Milley. Yes, same----
Senator Budd. Yes. Thank you. But despite the more than 80
attacks by Iranian backed militias, the United States has only
responded with force just a handful of times. In my view, that
is unacceptable. Secretary Austin, earlier you told my
colleague, Senator Cotton, that our last the retaliatory
strikes against IRGC infrastructure, it was against
infrastructure doing.
Now, does that mean a building or a warehouse? The question
behind the question is really why not target the IRGC
leadership or officers directing these attacks?
Secretary Austin. Thank you, Senator. We can be more
specific in closed session, but it included a headquarters
element building and also storage sites where key munitions
were being stored and other capabilities were being developed,
and there were people in those facilities.
Senator Budd. Thank you for that. The point being that we
need to reassert deterrence and our current responses don't
seem to effectively do that. Weakness only breeds more
aggression. Weaknesses are provocative.
If we only respond when they kill an American, they will
continue attacking, hoping to injure as many as possible. There
is no reason why this Administration should not respond more
forcefully should Iranian backed militias threaten United
States Forces in Iraq or in Syria. It is important for the
American people to know that it is not because the
Administration doesn't have the legal authority to do so. This
Administration simply seems to lack the will.
Secretary Austin, another issue that needs to be addressed
is the Department's use of taxpayer dollars to facilitate
abortions. Now, I join my colleagues in publicly denouncing the
policy changes, unfortunately made at your direction, to
authorize unasked, uncharged absences and travel pay for those
seeking abortions.
The military is not a place for social agendas. So, I will
ask you here, will you rescind those abhorrent policies?
Secretary Austin. What I will say, Senator, is, number one,
this policy does not fund abortions, and I want to be clear on
that. This policy provides access to non-covered reproductive
health care. As I said earlier, almost one in five of my
troops, our troops are women.
Senator Budd. Very aware. But I understand that ultimately
it is taxpayer dollars that are for this uncharged absences and
the travel expenses related to that. I understand your point,
but I still think that is not the right answer.
Until these policies are rescinded, I am going to also have
to consider holds against DOD nominees in solidarity with my
colleagues. Mr. Secretary, you can fix this, 158 holds, in
essence, are there. You can fix this in nearly in an instant,
so I would encourage that. Shifting gears, a bit----
Secretary Austin. Sir, I would encourage you to help us
make sure that we have the leadership in place to lead our
magnificent----
Senator Budd. I would agree with you, completely agree with
you, and you can fix that nearly instantaneously with a change
in policy. So, thank you. We understand, Secretary Austin, that
the Committee has heard from most of the Combatant Commanders
so far earlier this year.
I have asked each of them about foreign military sales and
how that's working in their areas of responsibility, and each
have said that the process is not fast or flexible enough to
meet our partners' defense requirements and that we are at risk
of losing our security of partner of choice status to China.
So what efforts are the Department taking internally to
streamline the FMS [Foreign Military Sales] process, and are
there issues that you think need to be addressed by Congress?
Secretary Austin. A year ago, I put together a tiger team
to address this specific issue, and you are right. I mean,
there are a number of our allies and partners who clearly want
to see capability be provided quicker.
I fully understand their concerns. So, we are doing
everything we can to identify logjams and work through those to
speed up things. Industry is coming out of a 2-year trough
there because of COVID, as you know, sir, and, you know, it
will take a little time for our industry to catch up.
But we are going to do everything we can to make sure that
the bureaucracy is not slowing things down. And we will
continue this work. But I don't disagree with you that this is
something that requires consistent focus on, and we are going
to do that.
Senator Budd. Thank you both. I yield.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Austin,
earlier today at this hearing, Senator Ernst asked General
Milley about conflict in the INDOPACOM region, and the
General's response referenced the importance of irregular
warfare. So, Secretary Austin, I have been rather disappointed
with the halting and repetitive process that DOD has exhibited
as it attempts to establish the irregular warfare center.
As you may recall, the IW [Irregular Warfare] Center was
authorized by this Committee back in 2020, and the project was
intended to honor Arizona Senator and former Armed Services
Committee Chairman John McCain's legacy of support for the
concept of a whole society approach to our national security.
He knew that traditional military strength isn't enough in
today's geopolitics and that we also need to succeed in the
irregular and in the competition spaces, not just in conflict.
In recognition of the original intent for this project, this
Committee supported naming the Center for Senator John McCain.
Now, I have also been working closely with this Committee and
the Department to ensure that we leverage expertise and ideas
from universities to help our Nation get after these
significant challenges.
The original authority identified the McCain Institute at
Arizona State University as a site to be reviewed as a location
for the establishment of the center. I appreciate your memo,
Mr. Secretary, from July 2022 affirming your decision to create
the Center for Security Studies in irregular warfare and
directing DOD to act expeditiously, including in determining
allocation.
But now we are nearly 3 years down the road and we have had
numerous duplicative site reviews and we are still waiting for
a final decision, and what I don't think we need is a new
basing process. We need a decision.
It is clear to me that it is time to move forward with
Arizona State University and ensure that the IW Center can
deliver on its promise for DOD and the Nation. So, Mr.
Secretary, can I have your commitment that you will look into
these delays and push the Department to come to a final
decision on this?
Secretary Austin. Certainly, Senator, you have my
commitment that I will look into the delays. You know, what I
have required the team to do is to make sure that we have a
process that is transparent and also that avoids outside
influence and to make sure that we are aboveboard. But I will
certainly look into it and get a brief back to you on specific
delays that we have encountered.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you. Thank you, General, because
3 years is just, it is too long, and this is, as General Milley
pointed out, is just as important if we wind up in a conflict
in the Western Pacific. So, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Milley, last year, Congress authorized multi-year
procurement contracts as a way to boost our Nation's dwindling
supply of munitions and to purchase additional systems in
support of Ukraine, and this has had a meaningful impact on a
lot of Arizona businesses who produce some of these critical
munitions. Multi-Year procurement can save the Government a lot
of money. It can save it a lot of money over the long run and
provide much needed stability for manufacturing business, while
also ensuring that our military and our key partners and allies
have the munitions that they need.
General Milley, can you please, in the time I have
remaining, just talk about the impact that multi-year
procurement has had so far in securing weapons, both for the
United States but also for Ukraine. Has this been beneficial?
And do you think that the munitions that Congress authorized
for multi-year procurement is enough, or should we have more
products being considered for multi-years?
Chairman Reed. You have 19 seconds.
General Milley. So first, multi-year contracts are
essential, and passing a budget on time with no continuing
resolution is essential to ensure we have multi-year contracts.
So, those two things are linked, and I cannot emphasize that
enough. That is important, and it has had a big impact,
positive impact on Ukraine, and it will help to replenish our
stocks as well.
Senator Kelly. Do you think we should expand it to some
other products?
General Milley. I do.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. I would ask, I
have been very tolerant of the time, but I ask people to stay
within 5 minutes. We are running quite late. Senator Scott,
please. Thank you.
Senator Scott. Only for Senator Rosen and me. Only for us
two. Thank you. Thank you for--thank you guys for your service.
Thank you for all the men and women that serve. On the
Personnel Subcommittee for Armed Services, Senator Warren and I
had a presentation on how bad we are doing on recruiting.
Our recruiting numbers are pretty pathetic right now. It
seems like, I remember I joined in 18 and joined the Navy. We
knew who our enemies were, we knew what the military's role was
and I think unfortunate.
A lot of Americans are a little concerned. There is recent
polling data from the Reagan Institute and the National
Independent Panel on Military Service and Readiness, showing us
that many Americans and majority of Active Duty servicemembers
find the military to be politicized and focused on what divides
us instead of what unites us.
If that is true, what can you do and what are you doing to
make sure, because I think Senator Sullivan was bringing up the
fact that we shouldn't have marines in pictures like that and
with speeches.
What are you doing to make sure our military is not
perceived to be a political arm of whoever, whoever the
President is, doesn't matter whether the Republican or
Democrat.
Secretary Austin. Well, first of all, I would just do two
things. First, in terms of the satisfaction of the troops that
are in the ranks and how we view ourselves. Senator, I would
just point to the fact that we have the highest reenlistment
rates probably that we have seen in several decades.
What that means is that people are satisfied with the
opportunities they are provided and with the development that
they are receiving. The second thing is with respect to
recruiting, as you know, there are a number of things that have
combined to create headwinds, and they include the lowest
jobless rate that we have seen in many, many years. Also, 2
years of COVID, and, you know, Senator, without recruiters not
having access to high schools and centers of influence for 2
years will have a profound impact on our ability to recruit.
Our leadership in the services is doing the right thing. I
mean, our Secretaries, our Chiefs are doing the right things.
They are they are investing, beginning to invest the right
moneys in advertising and encouraging their recruiters to be in
the right spaces. They are hiring the right people to be
recruiters, and I used to be a recruiter, so I am not guessing
at what this takes. I know how hard this is and what you need
to do to be successful. They are beginning to do those things
again, and I think we will see this--we will see the trends
move in a different direction.
Senator Scott. So, the next year, we will have good
numbers?
Secretary Austin. Next year, you will have better numbers.
We will be where we want to be probably the year after that. It
took 2 years to get us to where we are because of COVID. It
will take a little bit longer to get to get turned around.
General Milley. Senator, I have had many thanks and
conversation with all the chiefs on this whole topic. Yes, we
have a recruiting challenge, no question about it. I do think
there is a cause-and-effect link to COVID and I am not blaming
that. But we do know that recruiting numbers are directly
linked to contact time.
Because kids have been in high schools and we haven't had
the recruiters in high schools, contact time is very, very low.
So, consequently, you have much lower recruiting numbers as one
key factor. Another key factor is just the familiarity with the
American citizenry, with their military.
Now we are at an all-time high, 50 year high of re-
enlistment, which is incredible, actually. That indicates that
the people in the military are satisfied with what they are
doing every day.
So that is an all-time 50 year high. But 80 percent, 70 to
80 percent in that range, depending on the service, of our
folks in uniform are in uniform who have a family member in
uniform, either a father, mother, brother, sister, aunt, uncle,
grandfather, grandmother, something along those lines.
So, it is familiarity with the military that makes a
difference, I think, in terms of recruiting, and that is what
we got to get out. We have to get out more into the society. We
got to make sure we increase our contact time significantly.
On the politicization piece, look it, I have tried from day
one to make sure that we have an apolitical, nonpartisan U.S.
Military. If we have anything other than that, that is a danger
to the Republic.
We must remain a nonpartisan, apolitical military that is
fundamental to this country and that is what I am committed to.
That is what all the generals are committed to, and that is
what you have right now, and that is what we want to continue
to keep.
Senator Scott. General Milley, I like your answer to
Senator Sullivan on you being able to compete against China. Do
you actually believe that all the countries you named will show
up if China invades Taiwan?
General Milley. I think in different ways, yes. Perhaps not
all with combat forces and that sort of thing. I think allies
operate differently. Every country operates in its own
strategic interest at the moment in time. But I do know that we
have an incredible network of allies and friends around the
world.
In the Pacific, we have a series of bilateral defense
treaties that are ratified by the Senate, and those are
ironclad, you know, with the Republic of Korea, Japan,
Philippines, Thailand, Australia. These are treaties that we
are committed to fight on their behalf sort of thing. So, I
think we have a network of allies and partners that gives us a
strategic advantage over China or Russia, for that matter. If
you look at who China's friends are, it is not very many.
They are operating in a purely transactional way around the
world. They are trying to garner as many natural resources as
they can from around the world. But there is not a lot of
people who are ``friends'' with China.
There are many, many countries that are very tight, very
close with the United States, and that is a great strength of
ours, and I do think they would be there in time of need.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Thank you very
much. Senator Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really
appreciate holding this hearing. I want to thank each of the
witnesses today for testifying for your service to the country.
General Milley, I know this is going to be your last time
before the Committee, and I want to thank you for your decades
of distinguished service leading the brave men and women of our
Armed Forces and really navigating so many challenges
worldwide. We all appreciate your service.
So, we are going to--I am going to talk a little bit about
combating Iranian aggression, because attacks on the United
States installations and servicemembers by Iran's terrorist
proxies are increasing, particularly by rocket and drone
attack.
The Pentagon estimates that hundreds of American troops
have been killed by Iranian backed militias, including, as we
have discussed already today, a deadly attack last week on a
United States base in Syria.
There are families across the country without their loved
ones as a direct result of Iranian aggression. I can't repeat
that enough, a direct result of Iranian aggression. Yet Iran's
regime has never been held accountable for orchestrating
attacks against Americans. So, Secretary Austin, I appreciate
that in this latest instance, last week, the United States
responded with airstrikes against individuals connected with
the IRGC.
But just as you told my colleague, Senator Cotton, Senator
Budd, we know there have been about 83 such attacks by Iranian
proxies on United States forces in Syria in the past 2 years
alone. We have only retaliated four times.
So why has the United States responded so infrequently,
particularly when these militias are most pervasive threat, the
most pervasive threat to U.S. and coalition forces in the
region?
Secretary Austin. Well, first of all, as was stated
earlier, our troops have the ability to certainly protect
themselves, and there have been responses, local responses to
certain types of activity in those--our troops always have the
ability to do that. In terms of major responses, strikes, you
are right, there has only been four of those.
At the three tours I spent in Iraq I can tell you that me
and my troops received a lot of attacks from Iran. But when we
respond, we want to make sure that, Iranian backed militias, we
want to make sure that that we are going after the element that
is responsible for whatever that activity is. So, it takes a
little time to develop attribution.
Then we want to make sure that we are holding the right
element accountable, and we are doing everything that we can to
protect our troops, and so, all of those things go into our
consideration when we plan a response option.
Senator Rosen. Well, I have two questions. One for you,
General Milley, another one for you, Secretary Austin. So, the
first one is for General Milley to followup. What can we do
proactively to counter these militias before they injure and
kill American servicemembers? Then, Secretary Austin, can you
tell us, do our Commanders who I know want to do more, have the
necessary authorities to target Iran's proxies other than the
ability for self-defense? So, General Milley, we will start
with you.
General Milley. In terms of proactive measures, what we are
looking at is force protection in all of the various camps and
outposts in the Central Command area of operations,
specifically in Iraq and Syria, where these attacks occur. They
have, we think, adequate force protection in terms of the kind
of rocket and missile defenses.
They are able to, in fact--forward responses is probably an
understatement because we end up shooting down a lot of these
incoming UAVs, for example. If a rocket or a 107 rocket or
something like that is going to miss the compound by 2 or 3 or
4 or 5 kilometers, that is a significant amount.
Really what we owe you is some better numbers actually on
attacks that I would categorize as actual attacks on the
compound, and missing a compound by 2 or 3 kilometers, that may
or may not--we don't know what that was necessarily. So, we owe
you some better numbers.
But to get to your point about proactively, we have to work
closely with the Iraqi Government for those Shiite militia
groups that are inside Iraq. We have to continue to work with
our partners in the region for the attacks that are occurring
in Syria. So, working with our indigenous allies and partners
is key, and then also putting these groups on notice, the
various Shiite militia groups who know who they are, letting
them know that we will respond affirmatively and forcefully if
they attack our troops.
We have done that. There are some of these groups that are
much more aggressive than others, and we have actually in the
past done some things to those groups that are not necessarily
on the front page of the paper.
There are activities that are occurring that do act as a
proactive measure. The last thing I would say with respect to
Iran. Messaging Iran is critically important. The Iranian
Government is a complex, large organization, and the supreme
leader may or may not be making every single decision.
We do know that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard force and
specifically their Quds force, which is designated a terrorist
organization, that group there is what we need to be targeting
and targeting them very harshly over time, and that is exactly
what we plan on doing.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I know my time is up. But
Secretary Austin, just asked if we have the necessary
authorities, quickly.
Secretary Austin. I think we do, Senator, and this is
something that we need to continue to review as we go forward.
We certainly have the right to self-defense. We have
authorities under the 2001 AUMF, and that enables us to do what
we need to do to in or counter ISIS efforts.
But again, as we go forward, it is always good to look at
the authorities and make sure that we evolve them if that is
required. You have my commitment to work with leadership and
with you to continue to do that.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. The Committee will
stand in recess until 12:55 p.m., and we will reconvene in
closed session in SVC-217. Thank you, gentlemen.
[Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
non-deployability policies
1. Senator Kaine. Secretary Austin, it came to my attention during
visits to the Mid-Atlantic Regional Maintenance Center following the
suicides of four sailors that a contributing factor to the stressors at
the command was a manning policy that allows for a 60 percent increase
in the assignment of personnel (30 percent for limited duty and 30
percent for pregnancy/post-partum) with no additional resources to
support a population that requires extra care and attention. What is
the Department of Defense's (``Department'') position on the assignment
of temporarily non-deployable servicemembers and ensuring that there
are the proper policies and resources in place to support their
rehabilitation and reintegration?
Secretary Austin. One life lost to suicide is too many. That is why
I am committed to addressing mental health issues and suicide in the
Force. In May, I directed the Department to take critical, immediate
actions informed by the work of the Suicide Prevention and Response
Independent Review Committee that I stood up in 2022, to increase
access to behavioral and mental health and servicemember wellness.
Specific to temporarily non-deployable servicemembers, the
Department provides broad latitude to the Secretaries of the Military
Departments to consider all aspects of a member's ability to serve, for
retention and assignment purposes. The Department does not normally
restrict the assignment of servicemembers who are temporarily non-
deployable for a medical condition, except for pregnant servicemembers
beyond 36 weeks of gestation, where there is a medical travel
restriction for servicemembers or the servicemember's spouse. The
Department is committed to, and has a vested interest in, aiding
servicemembers to address and remedy conditions that result in a non-
deployable status, and it is important that servicemembers maintain
continuity of care.
pre-positioned war reserve materiel
2. Senator Kaine. Secretary Austin and General Milley, what is your
assessment of the Department's long-term pre-positioned war reserve
materiel requirements, such as those associated with the National
Defense Sustainment and Logistics Review?
Secretary Austin. Maintaining effective prepositioned equipment and
war reserve materiel requirements is critical to our ability to project
power around the world, respond to global contingencies, and execute
war plans. Our reinforcement of NATO's eastern flank following Russia's
February 2022 invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the value of
prepositioned equipment. DOD forces rapidly deployed from the United
States, drew prepositioned armored brigade combat team equipment, and
built battle-ready formations with significant combat power to deter
aggression against NATO. Moving forward, we are pursuing a range of
investments to replenish and improve our prepositioned equipment in
Europe as we also add new prepositioned capabilities--including long-
range fires and logistics--in the Indo-Pacific region. These
investments are key to maintaining our deterrent posture and
warfighting advantages.
General Milley. Prepositioned War Reserve Material (PWRM) is
strategically located to facilitate a timely response in support of
Combatant Commander requirements during the initial phases of an
operation and provide a quick response across a range of military
operations.
The services made instrumental investments and must continue to
grow PWRM capability and capacity. There will likely be some challenges
in sufficient storage space, storage locations, perishable assets
material degradations and an aging fleet of prepositioning ships.
Services will have to continue to prioritize resources and mitigate
some risk derived from insufficient funding through the use of
retrograde equipment, sourcing requirements from other Combatant
Commands, and/or utilizing theater transportation from Active
components.
deployability rates
3. Senator Kaine. General Milley, during your opening statement you
said that operational readiness rates are higher now than they've been
in many years and that currently, 60 percent of the active force could
deploy to combat in less than 30 days and 10 percent could deploy in
less than 96 hours. How are these readiness rates determined and could
you provide additional data, especially related to strategic lift
capabilities, to support these figures?
General Milley. Determining operational readiness rates is governed
by DOD and Joint Staff policies: DODD/DODI 7730-series and CJCSI
3401.02B--Force Readiness Reporting. These documents detail the
requirements for all operational units to periodically report resource
category levels (C-levels), as well as unit capability assessments for
designed and assigned missions as informed by Mission Essential Task
(MET) assessments. The C-levels reflect the status of the unit's
resources (personnel, equipment/supplies, and training) measured
against the resources required to undertake the wartime missions for
which the unit is organized and designed. The operational readiness
rates specifically for the strategic lift capabilities (all components)
are extremely similar to those of the active force. Additional
readiness data is available at the classified level.
hypersonics technology
4. Senator Kaine. Secretary Austin, the Nation's current capability
for developing and testing hypersonic technology is slow and expensive,
resulting in our hypersonic technology maturity being behind the
current, pacing threat. To address this gap, the Multi-Service Advanced
Capability Hypersonics Test Bed (MACH-TB) program was created to
increase the rate and reduce the cost of the Nation's hypersonic test
flights. Last year, a team of several industry partners was named to
leverage commercially available launch vehicles for hypersonic
payloads. This will offer the Department of Defense (DOD) a national
hypersonic testing capability that can be leveraged by a broad range of
U.S. Military hypersonics programs, DOD research programs, industry
partners, and academia stakeholders. Could you please explain the value
of leveraging commercially available launch vehicles for hypersonic
testing?
Secretary Austin. We have made significant progress as a result of
our hypersonic investments over the last 2 years. In the last year
alone, we have performed 12 successful hypersonic flights tests, and we
plan to conduct 20 hypersonic test flights this year. Our fiscal year
2024 budget request also invests $11 billion to deliver a mix of
hypersonic and long-range subsonic missiles.
Use of commercial launch vehicles is one of the primary enablers
for our hypersonic testing. Commercial launch vehicles can provide
proven launch capabilities at reduced cost and complexity when compared
to traditional DOD launch vehicle providers. Commercial launch
providers will deliver turn-key launch services that increase
accessibility and reliability of DOD hypersonic flight tests. Work with
commercial launch vehicles can also help us develop and validate
technologies prior to integrating them into advanced weapon systems. By
using these turn-key solutions to our advantage, the Department can
conduct hypersonic flight testing more frequently and more affordably.
5. Senator Kaine. Secretary Austin, how do programs like MACH-TB
program benefit the DOD and the U.S. national security strategy in the
near term and long term?
Secretary Austin. Our strategy relies on delivering the right mix
of capabilities to support our warfighting concepts, which includes
delivering the right mix of long-range fires, including both hypersonic
and long-range subsonic missiles. In the near-term, MACH-TB enables
rapid risk reduction for hypersonic prototypes, accelerating delivery
of new capabilities to the Warfighter. In the long-term, MACH-TB allows
an affordable and accessible approach to developing new technologies
that will enable next generation hypersonic weapons.
6. Senator Kaine. Secretary Austin, what is the importance and
associated timing of full-scale hypersonics flight tests and the
expansion of critical test infrastructure?
Secretary Austin. We are in a global technology competition that
will shape the future of warfare. This requires the Department to
develop the right defensive and offensive systems to remain ahead of
our adversaries. Deterrence today and tomorrow requires integrating
capabilities into new operational concepts, and hypersonics are a
logical and necessary addition to our mix of capabilities. As a result,
we have made significant progress, performing 12 successful hypersonic
flight tests in the past year. The fiscal year 2024 budget invests $11
billion to deliver a mix of hypersonic and long-range subsonic
missiles, and the Department plans to conduct 20 hypersonic test
flights this year.
Through the fiscal year 2024 budget request for $29.8 billion for
missile defeat and defense, we are also pursuing a layered counter-
hypersonic defense strategy by increasing our investments in
interceptors, and the Department has procured the glide-phase
interceptor for an additional layer of defense. As we continue to
further develop these capabilities, the Department will work closely
with the defense industrial base to ensure that they can produce the
right mix of munitions the joint force needs today and in the future.
7. Senator Kaine. Secretary Austin, how can we ensure that the DOD,
industry partners, and academia stakeholders work together on
requirements definition and program execution of MACH-TB and other
programs to further the Nation's hypersonics capabilities?
Secretary Austin. Our hypersonics test bed, also known by the
acronym MACH-TB, has established a working group composed of
stakeholders from DOD, industry, and academia. This working group meets
quarterly and is structured to identify hypersonic experiment
requirements, allocate experiments to available flight tests, and
develop an execution plan for the flight test campaign.
Bringing together the right stakeholders from the Department,
industry, and academia will help ensure our hypersonic capabilities
continue to advance at the pace and scale necessary to maintain
deterrence and, if necessary, fight to win.
recruiting
8. Senator Kaine. Secretary Austin, how have school restrictions on
the release of Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)
scores (Option 8) affected recruiting in the past 10 years?
Secretary Austin. We are working every day to recruit America's
best talent, and the Department does not have any data to indicate that
school restrictions on the release of test scores have negatively
impacted recruiting in the past 10 years. Rather, we have been facing
multiple years of headwinds. Notably, the pandemic created significant
challenges, keeping recruiters out of schools and communities for more
than 2 years. Also, a historically strong economy and tight job market
are creating fierce competition for talent. We must address these
headwinds and connect with young people, their families, and community
leaders to show the value of public service, and the Military
Departments are working hard to do just that.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
intelligence surveillance, and, reconnaissance (isr) support to
combatant commands
9. Senator King. Secretary Austin, your statement submitted to the
Committee does not address your title 10 obligation to serve as the
single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and
monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the
United States. The Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM) Commanders testified last week that they need more ISR and
domain awareness support and assets, yet these are listed on their
unfunded priorities list--not in their base budget. Why are the `small'
amount of domain awareness and ISR assets--so vital for the Homeland
and today's threat--NOT in your base budget?
Secretary Austin. Our strategy drives our budget, and we are
focused on ensuring the right mix of capabilities to meet its
objectives. The Department is acutely aware of the need to enhance
persistent surveillance of the aerial and maritime approaches to North
America. I have been working closely with Combatant Commanders and the
Military Services to understand and advocate for resources necessary to
protect our Nation against an increasingly wide range of threats.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance remains a priority
for the department, and we will continue to ensure we have significant
ISR capability. However, we also must ensure that we have the
flexibility and agility to outpace our competitors in the future. This
is about having the right mix of capabilities, and it requires getting
the capability to process, exploit, and disseminate the ISR we collect.
Ultimately, our budget is designed to implement the 2022 National
Defense Strategy and we will continue to invest in the right mix of
capabilities today and into the future.
10. Senator King. Secretary Austin, who oversees the counterdrug
and counter-transnational criminal organization mission for the
Department? Does this same person also oversee and provide
recommendations for ISR investments to fulfill your title 10
obligations to help curb the flow of illegal drugs into the Homeland?
Secretary Austin. I oversee policy and operations for all of DOD.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) approves DOD
counterdrug and counter-transnational organized crime strategy, policy,
and plans consistent with national strategies and DOD strategy,
policies, and objectives. Under the authority, direction, and control
of the USD(P), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) oversees and
approves DOD efforts for the detection and monitoring of suspected
illicit drug aerial, maritime, and surface traffic bound for the United
States.
The Combatant Commanders are responsible for counterdrug operations
in their respective areas of responsibility, including requesting
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets using the
Global Force Management process. The USD(P) and ASD SO/LIC participate
in this process and provide recommendations to me on the allocation of
ISR assets globally. When those assets are unavailable due to higher
priority missions, we pursue government-owned/contractor-operated
aircraft, contract aircraft, and periodic deployments of DOD aircraft
as part of a training mission. Using this approach, we have increased
the number of flight hours by more than 2,000 hours since 2018 in
support of the counterdrug mission.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
maintaining our defense technological edge
11. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, global competition for a
skilled workforce, declining investments in research and development
(R&D), the DOD contracting challenges, and the science, technology,
engineering and mathematics (STEM) workforce gap are all impediments
eroding our technological edge with our adversaries. Meanwhile, China
is investing heavily in advanced technologies such as artificial
intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing. That's why I am
working to establish a public-private partnership pilot program to
accelerate the scaling, production, and acquisition of advanced
capabilities for national security by creating incentives for trusted
investment in American small businesses working on innovative defense
technology. How might a public-private partnership that catalyzes
investment in advanced capabilities help maintain our technological
edge, especially with regard to China?
Secretary Austin. It is critical that we draw on all elements of
national power to continue to outpace the PRC, including through
public-private partnerships. The Department is focused on leveraging
America's capacity for innovation to deliver cutting edge capability to
the battlefield as fast as possible. That is why the fiscal year 2024
budget invests $145 billion in RDT&E--the largest ever--and continues
to build bridges with America's dynamic innovation ecosystem. This
includes investments of $1.8 billion for artificial intelligence, $687
million for the rapid defense experimentation reserve, and $115 million
for DOD's new Office of Strategic Capital to drive American investment
in critical technologies. Our capital markets give us an advantage over
adversaries like the PRC, and we need to fully leverage those markets.
The Office of Strategic Capital will allow us to drive private capital
into the critical technologies our warfighters need most.
Additionally, we are actively working to reverse the downward trend
in small business prime contractors. The Department encourages use of
other transaction authorities, which offer flexibility and drives
innovation by inviting non-traditional companies to participate in the
defense industrial base. Cooperation is critical to building the talent
we need and DOD will continue to increase talent exchanges with
industry to cross-train and grow talent in high-end technologies across
the Department.
cyber surge capacity
12. Senator Rosen. General Milley, our Nation faces unprecedented
cyberattacks and a consistent shortage of cyber talent at DOD and other
Federal agencies, which together pose a significant risk to our
national security. To address these challenges, I am working to find
solutions to provide the Department with qualified civilian personnel
to support the Department's cyberspace operations and ensure we have
the talent needed to defeat, deter, and respond to malicious cyber
activity, especially at times of greatest need. How might non-
traditional cyber reserve models be a possible pathway to recruit
personnel who might not otherwise choose to join the active or reserve
components, or who might lack the physical eligibility, but possess
valuable cyber skills?
General Milley. Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. Kathleen Hicks
signed the 2023-2027 DOD Cyber Workforce (CWF) Strategy, which sets the
foundation for how the Department will foster a cyber workforce capable
of executing the Department's complex and varied cyber missions. The
strategy enables the Department to prioritize retaining highly skilled
cyber talent by closing workforce development gaps.
Through the CWF Strategy, the DOD CIO ensures alignment with the
Joint Staff, United States Cyberspace Command, and Services to focus
Department efforts on cyber-related human capital initiatives in
support of the 2022 National Defense Strategy. Additionally, a
forthcoming Cyber Workforce Strategy Implementation Plan provides a
list of initiatives that outline how the Department will pursue a
comprehensive approach to overcome cyber talent shortages.
One of the initiatives is to establish mechanisms for surge
capability for mission needs. The Department of Defense has a well-
established group of Reservists and National Guardsmen that are highly
trained and positioned to fill this gap. Even with these personnel the
Department requires more surge cyber capability and the Department is
exploring expanding the scope beyond traditional service and looking at
all possibilities to fill this need.
One non-traditional pathway for creating more surge capability is a
USCYBERCOM initiative to create a Cyber Alumni Program. Instead of the
traditional Reserve model, it allows the mission owner to maintain a
connection with Service Members and Civilians that have separated from
the Joint Force. Personnel that participate in this program are
eligible to retain their security clearance and gain access to
additional professional development opportunities. This initiative
gives the mission owner access to a searchable Alumni data base of
skilled professionals that may be eligible to surge when the time comes
to respond to an increase in cyber activity.
commuting assistance for servicemembers
13. Senator Rosen. Secretary McCord, airmen stationed at Creech Air
Force Base and servicemembers stationed at many rural or remote
installations have to commute many miles to base from where they live.
Creech has very limited housing nearby, so the vast majority of airmen
live in Las Vegas, which is about 45 miles away. It's an even longer
commute for those who have to drop off their kids at the child
development center or utilize other services at Nellis Air Force Base,
which is on the opposite end of town. Does DOD have the existing
authorities to provide these servicemembers with a gas stipend or
something similar to make their commute less expensive as they deal
with rising costs or is this something the services would need help
from Congress to address?
Secretary McCord. In general, outside of congressionally approved
programs like the Mass Transit Benefit Program [5 U.S.C. Sec. 7905.],
commuting costs are considered a personal expense of the servicemember.
The Department also notes that a gas stipend, as suggested in the
question, would be considered taxable income for members under the
Internal Revenue Code. At this time, the Department has no authority to
provide reimbursement for single-occupant motor vehicles used for daily
commuting from servicemembers' domicile to their assigned duty
stations.
The Department does, however, have a program in place that Services
can use to incentivize hard-to-fill assignments (37 U.S.C. Sec. 352),
and a program to account for the cost of living in high-cost areas (37
U.S.C. Sec. 403b). Currently, Creech Air Force Base does not qualify
for either of these programs.
middle east security cooperation
14. Senator Rosen. General Milley, the Deterring Enemy Forces and
Enabling National Defenses (DEFEND) Act--which Senator Ernst and I
introduced last year and which was included in the Fiscal Year 2023
National Defense Authorization Act (FY23 NDAA)--advances an integrated
air and missile defense architecture between the United States, Israel,
and Arab states to protect against Iranian aggression in the Middle
East. I appreciate the discussions you and I have had about this issue.
Can you provide an update on Central Command's (CENTCOM) efforts to
develop an integrated air and missile defense architecture in the
Middle East, and to promote Israel's integration into regional
partnerships?
General Milley. USCENTCOM is working diligently with allies and
partners across the Middle East to design, plan, and resource an
integrated air and missile defense architecture. Over the past 18
months, USCENTCOM has started multiple efforts with the interagency and
regional partners to forge a multi-lateral construct to counter aerial
threats in the Middle East. These efforts include combined training
exercises, FMS/FMF cases, and liaison officer exchanges, often at the
multilateral level. USCENTCOM supports security-related engagement
between Israel and other nations in the region inherent in the Abraham
Accords and diplomatic initiatives such as the Negev Forum.
USCENTCOM's efforts to develop an overarching security architecture
now includes Israel. USCENTCOM and Israel are planning and conducting
joint training events that significantly increase the interoperability
of United States and Israeli military forces. Notably, in January 2023,
United States and Israeli forces conducted EXERCISE JUNIPER OAK. This
exercise included a large-scale live fire event with over 140 aircraft,
12 naval vessels, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, and Multiple
Launch Rocket Systems.
potential ukrainian counteroffensive
15. Senator Rosen. General Milley, Russia committed significant
manpower and equipment to launch offensives in Ukraine this winter.
Their gains have been limited, and their losses have been significant.
Nonetheless, the defense of these towns has not come without costs to
Ukraine. Are we providing the Ukrainian Armed Forces with the necessary
capabilities and quantities to successfully reclaim territory in a
coming counteroffensive and if not, what is required that they could
immediately employ to reclaim their sovereign territory from Russian
forces?
General Milley. The United States is fully committed to ensuring
Ukraine has the capabilities it needs for a successful
counteroffensive. Along with our allies, we have consulted with
Ukrainian leaders as they have planned their military operations to
resist Russia's illegal full-scale attack on their sovereign territory.
We have trained Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF), focusing on: basic
individual combat tasks, collective combined arms maneuver tasks, and
proficiency on donated weapons systems and equipment.
We are providing Ukraine arms and equipment to support both
upcoming operations to liberate territory from Russian occupation and
to maintain the defense of territory from further Russian advances.
United States and ally assistance has included supply of critical
weapons systems and ammunition: Armored ground vehicles, air defense
weapons; unmanned aerial vehicles; Ammunition for High Mobility
Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS); Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked,
Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; Artillery ammunition, (including precision-
guided rounds); demolition munitions and obstacle clearing equipment;
High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs); other precision aerial
munitions; mortar systems and ammunition; AT-4 anti-armor weapon
systems; anti-tank mines; Claymore anti-personnel munitions; grenade
launchers, small arms and associated ammunition.
16. Senator Rosen. General Milley, what is your assessment of how
short-range drones and one-way attack anti-tank munitions are being
used in this conflict and their effectiveness given the electronic
environment?
General Milley. The utilization of short-range drones follows the
historical airpower progression from primarily intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance purposes to a relatively low-cost
offensive capability. The small drones provide increased ability to
observe and target ground forces, while providing greater stand-off for
Ukrainian forces, while also shortening the targeting process.
Effectiveness depends not just on the uncrewed aerial system (UAS)
itself but also on the operator's proficiency in target recognition and
knowing what munition is most effective against what target. Munition
effectiveness varies on target type (e.g., tank, infantry fighting
vehicle, or troop formation).
One-way attack munitions have shortened the targeting cycle and
enabled the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to attack specific targets
without human input after munition launch. \1\ This application of UAS
technology has the twofold effect of destroying Russian fielded
equipment and forces, and demoralizing Russian troops.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Information provided by Joint Counter UAS Office (JCO)
\2\ ``The Ukraine/Russia Conflic: Monthly Threat Report from March
2023'' National Ground Intelligence Center, 10 April 2023
17. Senator Rosen. General Milley, what lessons have we learned
about these kinds of weapons for our own force and defense industrial
base?
General Milley. We have learned that drones and one-way attack
(OWA) UAS strikes are effective, but not decisive in themselves. We
observed Russia implement defense mechanisms, such as fencing and use
of alternative materials that degraded the effectiveness of UAS
munitions and OWA strikes. UAS support targeting efforts and help to
shape force protection, but they are vulnerable to electronic warfare.
We must enhance resiliency of UAS systems, increase electronic
protection measures to make them more survivable in highly contested
environment, while remaining cognizant of their relatively short
lifespan and high attrition. No single materiel or non-materiel enabler
can tip the scales one way or the other. It is the cumulative effect of
these capabilities, ably employed.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
f-16s to ukraine
18. Senator Kelly. Secretary Austin, I organized a letter to you
with a bi-partisan group of 8 Senate colleagues, requesting that you
take a hard look at what it would take to provide F-16 fighter jets to
Ukraine. I would like to thank you for your prompt response to this
letter and the analysis your team provided. You highlighted that F-16s
are currently Ukraine's seventh priority, and that it would take 12-18
months to train pilots, in addition to a significant length of time to
deliver jets. I understand this, however we cannot be short-sighted
when it comes to Russia. It is imperative that the Russians don't win
this war-or any other war they decide to start. Providing modern
fighters to Ukraine needs to be part of a long-term European deterrence
strategy against Russia. Please explain the long-term strategy
regarding providing military equipment and fighter jets to Ukraine.
Secretary Austin. The United States, in partnership with allies and
partners, is focused on building Ukraine's capabilities to defend its
territory for both the near and long term. We are in constant contact
with Ukraine's military leadership regarding their evolving capability
requirements. Our focus has been ground-based air defense capabilities
to protect Ukraine's people and critical infrastructure, artillery, and
armored vehicles. We are working with allies and partners to lay the
groundwork for Ukraine to be prepared in the months and years ahead to
utilize fourth-generation fighter capability, which we see as an
important element of Ukraine's future force to deter and defeat Russian
aggression in the longer term. This work begins with training, but will
also include maintenance and sustainment planning.
General Milley. Our primary focus remains providing UKR with the
capabilities it needs to defend its territory. No single materiel or
non-materiel enabler can tip the scales one way or the other. It is the
cumulative effect of these contributions, ably employed, that will put
Ukraine in a position of relative advantage.
Currently, air defense is a critical concern for Ukraine and its
people as Russia targets critical national infrastructure. Delivering
effective fires is also a critical concern'to enable the Ukrainian
Armed Forces to conduct combined arms maneuver. As part of a
comprehensive approach, western multi-role fighter aircraft can
contribute to both air defense and delivering fires. We, along with our
allies, are exploring options to ensure the most impactful equipment
and capabilities are making it to Ukraine at the right time.
19. Senator Kelly. Secretary Austin, what did DOD learn from the
assessment of Ukrainian pilots at Morris Air National Guard Base (ANGB)
earlier this month?
Secretary Austin. The Ukrainian military has inspired the world by
fighting bravely and effectively against the further invasion of their
sovereign country by Russia. The two Ukrainian pilots who traveled to
Tucson participated in a pilot familiarization event with the United
States Air Force. The familiarization event was part of our routine
military-to-military dialog designed to build mutual understanding of
how each Air Force operates, not an assessment or a training event. We
continue to support Ukraine through the provision of capability and
weapons and platform training, and in coordination with our allies and
partners.
20. Senator Kelly. Secretary Austin, how did that assessment inform
our analysis on providing aircraft in the short term?
Secretary Austin. The equipment we provide to Ukraine is based on a
collective prioritization, driven by Ukraine's input, of the
capabilities required to be successful on the battlefield, while
balancing United States readiness requirements, training,
sustainability, and other factors. The familiarization event was not an
assessment. Rather, it was part of an existing program to build mutual
understanding of how each Air Force operates.
21. Senator Kelly. Secretary Austin and General Milley, did it
inform other aspects of United States support to Ukraine, e.g. planning
support?
Secretary Austin. As stated, the pilot familiarization event was
part of our routine military-to-military dialog to build mutual
understanding of how each Air Force operates.
General Milley. With an assessment pool of only 2 Ukrainians it's
difficult to generalize the assessment to inform broader planning
support. However, the after-action report identifies that prior to
future highly technical training of this caliber the Ukrainians would
require formal English training.
22. Senator Kelly. Secretary Austin. how does it inform our plans
to potentially support F-16s or other fighter jets in the long-term?
Secretary Austin. For now, we remain focused on providing what is
most effective and what is most urgently needed for the counter-
offensive, and on supporting training the Ukrainian military. Our
priorities are ground-based air defense capabilities to protect
Ukraine's people and critical infrastructure, artillery, and armored
vehicles. We are engaging our allies and partners to lay the groundwork
for Ukraine to be prepared in the months and years ahead to utilize
fourth-generation fighter capability. Fourth-generation aircraft will
be an important element of Ukraine's ability to deter and defeat
Russian aggression in the longer term. Training, sustainment, and
maintenance planning is an important first step.
23. Senator Kelly. Secretary Austin and General Milley, how has the
prolonged conflict in Ukraine changed the calculus with regard to what
military equipment we are willing to provide our partners and allies
over the course of the current conflict (beyond the spring if the
conflict continues)?
Secretary Austin. We have provided more than $32 billion of
security assistance to Ukraine, focusing on the capabilities that are
most urgently needed for success on the battlefield. The Ukrainian
military has used this assistance to inflict tremendous damage on
Putin's forces. Many of the same capabilities that are having the
greatest effect in Ukraine, including air defense systems, portable
anti-tank weapons, and cannon and rocket artillery, are also in high
demand from other allies and partners globally.
We are committed to ensuring that the Department of Defense can
support the defense needs of both the United States and our partners,
and with the support of Congress we have invested nearly $3 billion to
support the expansion of the U.S. industrial base to increase critical
manufacturing capacity for these key systems and weapons.
Decisions to provide specific systems to all partners and allies
are made in a comprehensive and deliberate manner by the Department and
our interagency colleagues, taking into account the need to balance the
operational requirements of our partners with the urgency of
maintaining U.S. readiness and protecting critical U.S. technologies.
These decisionmaking processes consider a wide range of factors,
including our partner's capacity to absorb the system into their
inventory and support it through its lifecycle, the partner's ability
to train on the system to employ it safely and effectively, and the
partner's ability and willingness to maintain accountability and
protection for the system.
General Milley. The conflict in Ukraine has given the United States
Military greater insight into the requirements to conduct large-scale
combat operations. Taking into consideration worldwide inventory, and
the ability of the U.S. and global defense industrial base to produce
and replenish needed capacity, the U.S. must always balance requests
from allies and Partners against meeting our own requirements. There
are certain numbers of munitions and types of systems that we cannot
provide our allies and partners because it creates unacceptable risk to
our ability to defend the Homeland, and meet operational and
contingency requirements elsewhere.
multi-year procurement
24. Senator Kelly. General Milley, you indicated that it would be
prudent to consider expanding this authorization to additional
munitions. Please provide further details about what specific munitions
should be authorized for MYP, and the impact this would have on United
States weapons supply and in support for Ukraine.
General Milley. We thank Congress for the multi-year procurement
and other flexible acquisition authorities granted in recent
legislation. MYP authorities will improve taxpayer buying power,
bolster inventory, and provide a more stable and predictable demand
signal to industry.
The Department is constantly evaluating its munitions inventories
and munitions procurement strategies. Our President's Budget 2024
request includes plans to pursue MYP for five munitions and will
continue to identify additional opportunities to leverage existing MYP
authorities, and recommend additional authorities, where it makes sense
and provides value to the Government.
25. Senator Kelly. General Milley, please explain how MYP affects
the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). How
will this increase our supply of weapons in the AOR, are there any
impacts or concerns regarding weapons storage in the AOR, and what
impact would all of these factors have in a potential China conflict?
General Milley. MYP generates savings through the use of Economic
Order Quantity (EOQ) financing to procure greater quantities of
munitions using a buy-to-budget strategy. The greater quantities of
munitions can be deployed to the INDOPACOM AOR to deter or, if
necessary, defeat China.
INDOPACOM supports MYP to acquire long-lead materials and
components to support the acquisition of critical munitions to enhance
the U.S.' ability to prosecute the National Defense Strategy;
USINDOPACOM is also addressing future in-theater munitions storage
requirements in parallel with targeted MILCON projects, bilateral
agreements, and the dispersal of critical munitions postured across the
theater.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
prc surveillance balloon
26. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, thank you for your response
to the questions that Senator Rubio and I sent on February 8 regarding
the Chinese surveillance balloon. I have additional questions. Please
answer them in an unclassified form, except where a classified response
is necessary, and please submit all unclassified answers in an
unclassified format. Since these questions are for the public record, I
expect that all unclassified answers will not be classified as
controlled unclassified information (CUI), which would limit its
distribution. On February 6, you called me on an unclassified line to
provide an update on the high-altitude balloon (HAB). At the time, you
indicated that you were not personally aware of the HAB on January 29,
while it was still over Alaska, because you were traveling in Asia. You
also couldn't recall when you first learned of the HAB's existence. In
your March 27 response to the letter that Senator Rubio and I sent on
February 8, however, you write that you were first notified of the HAB
on January 27, prior to it entering United States airspace. Can you
please explain the difference between what you told me on February 6--
which was that you had not known for a few days because you were
traveling in Asia--and what you wrote in your letter, which is that you
knew about the HAB and were tracking it all along?
Secretary Austin. I was first notified about the high-altitude
balloon (HAB) by my senior military assistant on the evening of January
27, 2023, prior to it entering U.S. airspace. I received daily updates
from NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and other agencies. The HAB then re-entered
U.S. airspace on January 31, 2023.
27. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, General VanHerck told us last
week that he would have been prepared to present options to shoot down
the HAB while it was over Alaska. Your letter makes it clear that you
never requested options to shoot down the HAB until it traversed Alaska
and Canada, and then reentered the United States. Why?
Secretary Austin. The NORAD/NORTHCOM Commander assessed that the
balloon did not present a kinetic threat to North America. Working with
the Canadian military, NORAD/NORTHCOM began immediately taking action
and developing additional options to better characterize the incursion.
NORAD continued to track the PRC HAB, ensuring the Department could
protect sensitive sites against foreign collection. On January 29,
2023, I departed for travel to the Republic of Korea and the
Philippines. Also on January 29, 2023, the NORAD/NORTHCOM Commander
advised me and Chairman Milley that he was looking at options to engage
the balloon should that be directed. The balloon re-entered U.S.
airspace on January 31. That evening, President Biden, through his
national security Advisor, directed the military to immediately refine
and present options to shoot down the PRC HAB. I, through Chairman
Milley, asked for options to shoot the PRC HAB down. On February 1,
2023, while in the Philippines, I convened a meeting with senior
military officials to review options to take down the PRC HAB safely,
while closely monitoring its path and intelligence-collection threat.
28. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, does Northern Command (NORAD)
currently have the ability to incorporate open source tracking of
private and commercial balloons into the air defense picture?
Secretary Austin. Yes. NORAD and USNORTHCOM also work closely with
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) when unknown, suspect air
tracks appear on radar. Additionally, the FAA has prescribed rules
governing the operation of ``unmanned free balloons'' in the United
States in 14 CFR Part 101.
29. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, following the public
acknowledgment of the HAB, the Department of Defense said that it was
aware of multiple previous Chinese surveillance balloons that had
entered United States sovereign airspace. Who in the Department would
have been responsible for developing options to counter balloons, in
light of the Department's awareness of this threat and did that
official or office develop those options? Why or why not?
Secretary Austin. I cannot speak to how previous Administrations or
previous Secretaries organized the Department's response to any
balloons entering U.S. sovereign airspace. As the PRC HAB incident was
unfolding, I received updates and advice from USNORTHCOM, NORAD, OSD
Policy, and others. On January 29, 2023, the Commander of USNORTHCOM
and NORAD advised me and Chairman Milley that that he was looking at
options to engage the balloon should that be directed. Working with the
Canadian military, NORAD and USNORTHCOM immediately began to develop
options to better characterize the incursion. NORAD continued to track
the PRC HAB, ensuring the Department could protect sensitive sites
against any intelligence collection.
30. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, prior to this case, did NORAD
have courses of action (COAs) for addressing adversary operation of
high-altitude, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft within the 12 nautical
mile (NM) line, or over territory?
Secretary Austin. The primary missions of NORAD include providing
aerospace warning and aerospace control for North America, and NORAD
supports USNORTHCOM in U.S.-only missions, including addressing high-
altitude unmanned aircraft surveillance threats to sensitive sites.
The Department allocates forces in Alaska to support USNORTHCOM and
NORAD responsibilities, and those forces provide aerial defense for
North America. DOD supports homeland defense requirements in Alaska
through coordination between the Air Force, USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and
USINDOPACOM, to include forces permanently stationed in Alaska and a
layered defense network within the Alaska Air Defense Identification
Zone. This approach ensures DOD is able to support homeland defense
requirements, Indo-Pacific campaigning, and warfighting.
31. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, if so, were the HABs
considered in light of the COAs?
Secretary Austin. HABs have been considered in operational
planning/COA development by the Department.
32. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, if not, what is NORAD's
future approach to any form of high-altitude reconnaissance that
violates U.S. airspace?
Secretary Austin. USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM are prepared to
respond to future HABs that violate U.S. airspace.
33. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, was a National Event
Conference (NEC) held at any point for the HAB? Was one held for the
Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) that were engaged by NORTHCOM
aircraft after the Chinese HAB?
Secretary Austin. Upon the PRC HAB reentering U.S. airspace on
January 31, 2023, President Biden, through his national security
Advisor, directed the military to immediately refine and present
options to shoot down the PRC HAB. On February 1, 2023, while in the
Philippines, I convened a meeting with senior military officials to
review options to take down the PRC HAB safely, while closely
monitoring its path and intelligence collection threat. A similar
course of action was taken with the three unidentified aerial objects
that were ultimately shot down.
34. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, some commercial HABs have
altitude capabilities up to 100,000 feet. Can NORAD maintain tracking
of any adversary airframes that might operate at that altitude?
Secretary Austin. In coordination with other Combatant Commands,
the Intelligence Community (IC), and mission partners, NORAD has the
ability to maintain tracking of objects that might operate at 100,000
feet altitude.
35. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, at what point was weather
modeling of the HAB's flight path first incorporated into the planning?
When was a flight path over the contiguous U.S. first assessed?
Secretary Austin. Weather modeling and flight path trajectory were
considered throughout. It was between January 30 and 31 that the flight
path trajectory indicated CONUS overflight.
36. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy Colin Kahl led the Department's public response to the HAB,
providing multiple off-the-record media briefings and briefings to
Congress. What steps, if any, did Under Secretary Kahl take to notify
his superiors and develop response options from January 27 to January
31, while the balloon was in Alaskan and Canadian airspace?
Secretary Austin. Under Secretary Kahl provided me with advice and
counsel, alongside senior military leaders, to ensure that the
Department was in the best position to respond to the PRC HAB in a
responsible and timely manner. Once President Biden gave his
authorization to the Department to take the PRC HAB down, the
Department executed those orders.
37. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, did Secretary Kahl make any
recommendations pertaining to the HAB during that period, or direct his
staff to develop options, and, if so, please explain?
Secretary Austin. Under Secretary Kahl was among the senior DOD
officials that advised me as the PRC HAB incident was unfolding. Thanks
to this deliberate and coordinated approach, we were able to enhance
our understanding of a sensitive PRC surveillance program.
38. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, until Under Secretary Kahl
informed the press that three Chinese surveillance balloons had entered
United States airspace during the previous administration, that
information had been classified. I am concerned that Under Secretary
Kahl leaked this information for partisan ends, because he left out an
important fact, which was that the Trump administration was not aware
of those previous balloons at the time, and therefore had no
opportunity to counter them. You wrote in your March 27 response to the
letter that Senator Rubio and I sent on February 8, ``all information
provided in unclassified settings had been appropriately cleared for
release,'' but you provide no information to support that claim. When,
and through what process, was the information regarding prior Chinese
surveillance balloons cleared for release, and who cleared it for
release? Please provide all documentation to substantiate your
response.
Secretary Austin. As I explained in my prior correspondence, I have
no reason to believe that any member of the Department disclosed
classified information at any point during the unclassified engagements
with Congress or the public. All information provided in unclassified
settings had been appropriately cleared for release. The United States
downgraded and authorized for release a series of talking points in
response to the overflight of the PRC HAB, including talking points
regarding HAB flights over U.S. territory in prior years. The
Department received the cleared points after they were downgraded and
prior to any public statements about this topic. Any suggestions that a
U.S. Government official, including Dr. Kahl, disclosed this
information is inaccurate.
security assistance to ukraine
39. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, in response to Senator
Blumenthal's question concerning critical needs for Ukraine, you said
that ``long-range fires'' are among the critical battlefield needs for
the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). Army Tactical Missile Systems
(ATACMS) are important long-range fire capability, but the Biden
Administration has rejected its transfer to the UAF. Have the
Ukrainians requested ATACMS?
Secretary Austin. The equipment we provide is based on a collective
assessment of the capability Ukraine needs to be successful on the
battlefield, not system requests, while balancing U.S. readiness
requirements, training, sustainability, and several other factors. Our
assistance is also shaped by my frequent conversations with the
Ukrainian defense minister, Chairman Milley's talks with the Ukrainian
Chief of Defense, and by the constant interactions that USEUCOM has
with the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
The Department remains in regular contact with our Ukrainian
partners to assess and support their requirements. We are laser focused
on getting Ukraine the weapons and equipment it needs to be successful
on the battlefield.
It is our assessment that the GMLRS munitions and launcher
capabilities that have been provided to Ukraine can reach the vast
majority of targets in Ukrainian territory. The Department is also in
the process of procuring the Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb for
delivery to Ukraine, which will significantly enhance Ukraine's
precision long-range fires capability.
Based on Ukraine's successes on the battlefield, our near-term and
long-term investments are paying off. We believe that the extraordinary
efforts we are taking, alongside our allies and partners, will continue
to get Ukraine what it needs to be effective.
40. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, if long-range fires are among
UAF's critical needs for battlefield success, then why has the
Administration denied their transfer?
Secretary Austin. We have provided more than $32 billion of
security assistance to Ukraine and are in constant contact with
Ukraine's leadership to understand their requirements. We are focused
on providing what is most effective on the battlefield, and what they
need to be successful, such air defense capabilities to protect the
Ukrainian people and weapons and equipment to retake territory on the
ground. Ukraine has been effective, inflicting tremendous damage on
Putin's forces.
Ultimately, all of our security assistance decisions for Ukraine
are based on a collective prioritization of Ukraine's battlefield
needs, while balancing United States readiness requirements, training,
sustainability, and other factors. Priorities include providing Ukraine
with critical long-range fires capabilities, such as High Mobility
Artillery Rocket Systems and corresponding munitions, which can range
the vast majority of targets in Ukrainian territory. The United States
also committed to provide Ukraine with the Ground Launched Small
Diameter Bomb, which will significantly enhance Ukraine's precision
long-range fires capability.
march delegation to egypt
41. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, during your visit to Egypt on
March 8, 2023, press was prevented from covering your meetings with
senior Egyptian officials. Previous defense secretaries have refused to
proceed with meetings when the press has been prevented from covering
them. Can you please explain what happened, from the Department's
perspective, in terms of press access to your meetings?
Secretary Austin. The Department is committed to freedom of the
press, and we consistently provide the news media with timely and
accurate information. This includes conducting regular press briefings,
responding to public inquiries, and answering press queries. My
invitation and hosting of credentialed, independent media on my trips,
to include my recent visit to the Middle East, is one example.
Prior to travel, my team, alongside a variety of stakeholders such
as the Department of State and host countries, negotiates press access
for planned events. The Department of Defense considers the traveling
press as integral to the success of the U.S. delegation and includes
them in all press events and open engagements.
My team consistently pressed for access by all members of the
accredited press corps traveling with me before, during, and after the
visit to Egypt. After the trip, the Government of Egypt in followup
engagements informed my team that they draw a distinction between
official press affiliated with the United States Government, such as
official photographers and social media experts, and the traveling
press corps. This distinction on their part led to misunderstanding
between our two sides that ultimately impacted travel press access. Our
concerns with this lack of press access were subsequently raised
directly with Egyptian counterparts from DOD and State Department
Policy and Public Affairs offices.
The position of the Department of Defense is and continues to be
that all accredited press traveling with my delegation should have
equal access to my official open and public engagements. We will make
this clear in adva]nce to any host nations--including Egypt--going
forward.
42. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, why did the meeting proceed
despite the press being prevented from covering it, per usual?
Secretary Austin. The United States and Egypt are cooperating
closely to address a range of shared interests, including de-escalating
conflicts, addressing humanitarian crises, supporting a negotiated two-
State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and expanding
regional security integration. My meetings in Egypt were a critical
opportunity to reinforce the Department of Defense's support for
addressing human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as advancing
our work to mitigate civilian harm during Egyptian Armed Forces'
operations. I emphasized a range of United States priorities and
concerns during my meetings with President Sisi and Minister of Defense
Zaki that advanced my Department's focus on implementing the National
Defense Strategy and the United States Government's emphasis on
regional security and stability.
43. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, did you relay anything to the
Egyptian Government about the manner in which the press was treated
during your visit? Please provide any correspondence you had related to
this issue.
Secretary Austin. My team consistently pressed for access for all
members of the press corps traveling with me before, during, and after
my visit to Egypt. Specific challenges related to my March visit to
Egypt were raised directly with Egyptian counterparts.
44. Senator Wicker. Secretary Austin, what measures, if any, does
the Department plan to take to ensure proper press coverage of your
engagements in the future?
Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense will continue to insist
on access to open and public engagements for all members of the
accredited press corps traveling with me.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
chinese spy balloon
45. Senator Cotton. Secretary Austin, when did you first become
aware of the spy balloon? If you submit an answer labeled CUI, please
explain in detail why your answer merits that label, since these
questions are for the record.
Secretary Austin. I was first notified about the high-altitude
balloon (HAB) by my senior military assistant on the evening of January
27, 2023, prior to it entering U.S. airspace. The HAB then re-entered
U.S. airspace on January 31, 2023.
46. Senator Cotton. Secretary Austin, General VanHerck told us last
week that he would have been prepared to present options to shoot the
balloon down on January 28, but you didn't request any until February 1
when the balloon had already finished its journey across Alaska and
Canada, and then reentered the United States. Why didn't you request
options sooner? Why did you leave NORAD airspace unprotected for at
least 5 days?
Secretary Austin. The NORAD/NORTHCOM Commander assessed that the
balloon did not present a kinetic threat to North America. Working with
the Canadian military, NORAD/NORTHCOM began immediately taking action
and developing additional options to better characterize the incursion.
NORAD continued to track the PRC HAB, ensuring the Department could
protect sensitive sites against foreign collection. On January 29,
2023, I departed for travel to the Republic of Korea and the
Philippines. Also on January 29, 2023, the NORAD/NORTHCOM Commander
advised me and Chairman Milley that he was looking at options to engage
the balloon should that be directed. The balloon re-entered U.S.
airspace on January 31. That evening, President Biden, through his
national security Advisor, directed the military to immediately refine
and present options to shoot down the PRC HAB. I, through Chairman
Milley, asked for options to shoot the PRC HAB down. On February 1,
2023, while in the Philippines, I convened a meeting with senior
military officials to review options to take down the PRC HAB safely,
while closely monitoring its path and intelligence collection threat.
47. Senator Cotton. Secretary Austin, when General VanHerck told
you--or perhaps your senior military aide--that he was prepared to
shoot down the balloon in Alaskan airspace on January 28, did you have
the legal authority to order the shoot down?
Secretary Austin. Shooting down the HAB was lawful under domestic
and international law. DOD has express statutory authority to act to
protect against threats to sensitive military installations, including
against surveillance from unmanned aircraft. The action we took
occurred within U.S. territory against an unmanned foreign surveillance
balloon that entered and was operating unlawfully in U.S. airspace.
48. Senator Cotton. Secretary Austin, how could a Chinese balloon
conducting a spy mission not be considered a threat?
Secretary Austin. The NORAD/NORTHCOM Commander assessed that the
balloon did not present a kinetic threat to North America. Working with
the Canadian military, NORAD/NORTHCOM began immediately taking action
and developing additional options to better characterize the incursion.
NORAD continued to track the PRC HAB, ensuring the Department could
protect sensitive sites against foreign collection. On January 29,
2023, I departed for travel to the Republic of Korea and the
Philippines. Also on January 29, 2023, the NORAD/NORTHCOM Commander
advised me and Chairman Milley that he was looking at options to engage
the balloon should that be directed. The balloon re-entered U.S.
airspace on January 31. That evening, President Biden, through his
national security Advisor, directed the military to immediately refine
and present options to shoot down the PRC HAB. I, through Chairman
Milley, asked for options to shoot the PRC HAB down. On February 1,
2023, while in the Philippines, I convened a meeting with senior
military officials to review options to take down the PRC HAB safely,
while closely monitoring its path and intelligence collection threat.
49. Senator Cotton. Secretary Austin, I appreciated General
VanHerck's candor last week. He fulfilled the promise he made when he
was confirmed to give us his honest assessment, even when it's
politically uncomfortable. Will you commit that there will be no
retaliation against General VanHerck for his honest testimony last
week?
Secretary Austin. I am grateful to General VanHerck for his service
to our country. Retaliation is unacceptable and will not be tolerated
in my Department, including for testimony before Congress.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
landmines
50. Senator Rounds. General Milley, you have been outspoken on the
need for landmine alternatives to be available to the Joint Force to
shape engagement areas to kill enemy ground forces and to protect
friendly forces. At Munich you described how the Ukrainians have been
effectively using these capabilities to destroy Russian armor. Can you
describe how the new systems we are developing have self-deactivation /
self-destruct capabilities, so they would not harm civilians after
hostilities cease?1
General Milley. All current U.S. policy-compliant landmine systems
incorporate self-destruct and self-deactivate features that exceed the
requirements of the Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Mines
Protocol II. The Army's legacy compliant systems, the Family of
Scatterable Mines, have demonstrated extremely high self-destruct and
self-deactivate reliability. Throughout lifecycle testing, no armed
mined has failed to self-destruct.
The Army is developing new systems to replace the aging inventory
of legacy Family of Scatterable Mine systems. These new systems are
fully compliant with the U.S. anti-personnel landmine policy and
therefore are not designed or intended to be exploded by the presence,
proximity, or contact of a person nor will they incapacitate, injure,
or kill one or more persons. These systems are also designed to self-
deactivate and leave non-hazardous remnants on the field after either a
pre-set time or when forces on the ground determine that they are no
longer needed.
The requirement for the new systems in development will far exceed
the CCW Amended Mines Protocol II requirement with a minimum self-
destruct reliability of 99 percent. Additionally, the newly developed
mines will have less than 1 in 10,000 probability (e.g. 99.99 percent
reliability) of being hazardous after 120 days.
51. Senator Rounds. General Milley, is it true that the size and
composition of the U.S. Army is based on the assumption that these
capabilities would be available to enable our troops to fight and win a
ground war?
General Milley. Many different variables affect the required size
and composition of the U.S. Army and its ability to meet current and
future challenges. These vary significantly based on the mission, and
various factors of the operational environment, but are not limited to:
training, experience, equipment, sustainability, enemy threat, and
mobility. President's Budget Fiscal Year 2024 requested end-strength
delivers a ready and capable Army able to achieve the Department's
modernization goals.
52. Senator Rounds. General Milley, have the Ukrainians proven that
these are capabilities required to fight and win any future land war?
General Milley. The United States has not actually provided Ukraine
with the new capabilities. It has provided older anti-tank/vehicle
mines that are compliant with U.S. policy.
Landmines have been critical for Ukrainian success against the
Russian ground forces. The Ukrainians employ landmines to canalize
Russian armored forces, putting them into engagement areas and making
them vulnerable to the 60,000 anti-tank weapons systems that we've
provided.
The Ukrainian experience demonstrates how the capabilities of
policy compliant landmines would increase the effectiveness of U.S.
Forces in future conflict by enhancing the effectiveness of friendly
fires, denying adversaries the use of terrain, disrupting enemy
sustainment operations, and inflicting damage to enemy forces. If
developed and used in accordance with international laws, treaties, and
agreements, landmines can remain an effective deterrent and defensive
option.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
special operations forces (sof) in great power competition (gpc)
53. Senator Ernst. General Milley, how can SOF help deter or defeat
great power competitors?
General Milley. Our Special Operations Forces are vital to
achieving the defense priorities outlined in the National Defense
Strategy across the spectrum of conflict. SOF operations and activities
in support of integrated deterrence ensure Joint Force advantage in
great power competition, crisis, and conflict. SOF accomplish this
while maintaining critical crisis response capabilities and continuing
efforts to counter Violent Extremist Organization activities. Our
adversaries increasingly employ irregular, unconventional, asymmetric,
and hybrid / gray-zone activities to challenge the United States and
hold our interests as well as those of our allies and partners at risk.
Authoritarian regimes undertake these malign activities to contest the
rules-based international order and advance their interests.
In response, our SOF are uniquely positioned to provide the means
to deter, detect and illuminate, disrupt, and when required defeat our
adversaries' competitive strategies. In competition, the DOD may not be
in the lead for the USG. Our SOF are well-versed in providing critical
support, information, and intelligence to other Government Departments
and agencies and to those of our allies and partners that they need to
counter our adversaries' malign efforts. SOF strategic competition-
related operations and activities complicate adversary decisionmaking,
reduce their freedom of maneuver, isolate them, and increase the cost
relative to the benefits associated with the continuation of malign
activities. Through building the resilience and capabilities of our
allies and partners across the globe, SOF help to reduce the impact of
adversary malign actions and build awareness, access, and influence,
which limit adversary options and again increase the adversary cost /
risk.
54. Senator Ernst. General Milley, your personal opinion, would
partnering with surrogate forces that are responding to hostilities
help SOF compete against great powers?
General Milley. The National Defense Strategy directs the Joint
Force to impose costs upon our adversaries' malign strategies. The
Joint Force should not rule out / eliminate any viable options,
including the use of partnered or surrogate forces where our interests
align and are mutually beneficial. Our support of surrogate forces must
comply with U.S. Law and DOD policy. Our SOF have a long history of
building and supporting partner forces to defend their nation's
sovereignty and combat internal threats. Their use achieves our
objectives, confounds our adversaries' efforts, preserves U.S.
resources, and reduces the risk to mission and forces, use of surrogate
forces is a legitimate choice and a clear combat multiplier. Failing to
consider the capabilities of surrogate forces surrenders maneuver space
to our adversaries. Employing surrogate forces, particularly when their
activities support a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach,
complicates our adversaries' decisionmaking, increases cost / risk for
our adversaries, and limits their freedom of maneuver.
preventing threats to n]orth atlantic treaty organization (nato)
55. Senator Ernst. General Milley, how extensive are Russian
manpower and equipment losses?
General Milley. Precise casualty information is hard to obtain, but
believe that the number of Russians casualties (including those killed
and wounded) in Ukraine, perhaps 200,000--250,000. Russian forces have
also suffered high losses in their equipment.
56. Senator Ernst. General Milley, by how long has this delayed
Russia's ability to reconstitute a threat to NATO's eastern flank?
General Milley. Russia has already had to mobilize 200-300 thousand
poorly trained reservists in order to sustain their current battle
losses.
The losses have directly impacted their ability to threaten NATO's
eastern flank, and we can provide additional information on our
estimates of Russian combat power at higher levels of classification.
Of note, the United States and NATO have contributed significant
resources to deterring Russia from attacking NATO's eastern flank.
There are now eight NATO Battle Groups in the alliance's frontline
states. There are now more than 100,000 United States Forces in Europe.
Air policing over the Baltic Sea has stepped up, and President Joe
Biden has repeatedly said the United States will defend every inch of
NATO territory.
57. Senator Ernst. General Milley, by your best military advice,
has United States support reduced the risk of deterrence failure in
Europe?
General Milley. Ukraine's military operations, critically enabled
by the United States and our allies, have significantly reduced
Russia's military capabilities in key areas. However, the key factor
that has improved the prospects for deterrence is how this Russian
aggression has galvanized the resolve of NATO nations to collectively
defend our Homelands. It has even resulted in NATO enlargement--Finland
has joined, and Sweden is on a path to join NATO. We are also
demonstrating our enormous capacity to rapidly reinforce NATO's eastern
flank with United States Forces. We will continue to demonstrate this
capacity through regular exercises that showcase United States and
allied agility across the depth and breadth of the Balkans, Baltic, and
Central Europe.
58. Senator Ernst. General Milley, has degradation of Russia's
military likely decreased our operational requirements in Europe?
General Milley. Ukraine's military operations, critically enabled
by the U.S. and our allies, have significantly reduced Russia's
military capabilities in key areas. However, Russia's leaders have
demonstrated a commitment to reckless aggression beyond what anyone had
previously understood. Until that behavior changes, the United States
and our allies must continue to invest in our collective defense,
conventional and strategic, globally and across all military domains.
mismatch between strategy and resources
59. Senator Ernst. Secretary Austin, what hard choices has the
Department made to free-up resources for readiness and modernization?
Secretary Austin. The Department is focused on having the right mix
of capabilities matched to our strategy to deter our adversaries,
remain dominant on the battlefield, and prevail in conflict, if
necessary. As we look to our most significant challenges, we must
divest vulnerable platforms that can no longer be affordably modernized
or maintained to provide credible combat power. Failing to do so will
impact the readiness of the Joint Force and cause a $4 billion drag on
our ability to invest in, and transition to, the capabilities we need
to meet our strategy.
We need help from Congress to ensure that we resource the
capabilities we need to meet our strategy. Two significant examples of
platforms the Department should divest from are the A-10 and some of
the early hulls of the Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship, due to their
single-mission focus or limited relevance for future challenges. These
divestments will help us transition to a more advanced, capable, and
ready force by providing savings that can be utilized to, for example,
correct maintenance backlogs and invest in more survivable, lethal, and
resilient capabilities.
60. Senator Ernst. Secretary Austin, do you commit to provide
documentation of those reinvestments?
Secretary Austin. Yes.
ground-based missile capabilities in western pacific
61. Senator Ernst. General Milley, would fielding ground-launched,
theater-range missile systems in the Indo-Pacific help offset China's
advantage in these capabilities? Please explain.
General Milley. Yes, the ranges associated with such weapons
systems force the adversary to account for threats to assets previously
considered in sanctuary.
The presence of long-range weapons systems inside the theater
complicates the adversary's targeting problem and forces the PRC to
dedicate assets to look for and potentially engage additional targets.
When combined with robust and capable air and maritime forces, these
ground-based systems work to offset Chinese advantages and deliver
competitive United States capabilities within the theater. They provide
the Joint Force with the depth to execute fires from dispersed
locations at different ranges.
62. Senator Ernst. General Milley, would U.S. ground-launched,
theater-range missiles in the Western Pacific help availability of
persistent, prompt, and survivable strike options?
General Milley. Yes, the Department has long advocated for stand-
in, forward deployed forces in the Western Pacific to provide strike
options should hostilities commence. The presence of such capabilities,
especially when combined with other capabilities within the Joint Force
and resilient command and control, will provide increased fires options
to the theater commander.
63. Senator Ernst. General Milley, would U.S. ground-launched,
theater-range missiles in the Western Pacific help deter of enemy
attack or escalation?
General Milley. Yes, the art of deterrence is to convince our
adversaries that the costs we can impose on them are not worth whatever
strategic gain they seek and induce doubt that their objectives can be
accomplished. Ground-launched, theater-range missiles in the Western
Pacific are an important part of combat-credible forces that contribute
to integrated deterrence by altering adversary perceptions of costs,
benefits, and consequences of action.
64. Senator Ernst. General Milley, would U.S. ground-launched,
theater-range missiles in the Western Pacific help impose of
operational costs on enemy forces?
General Milley. Yes, diverse, multi-domain strike options force the
adversary to apply resources toward different locations with a variety
of characteristics. This dilutes the adversary's collection efforts
that could have been focused on specific assets and locations if the
multi-domain options did not exist. Any time we can complicate a
targeting solution it imposes operational costs on our adversaries and
degrades their surveillance-strike capabilities.
65. Senator Ernst. General Milley, would U.S. ground-launched,
theater-range missiles in the Western Pacific help deliver responsive
strikes against time-critical enemy targets?
General Milley. Yes, the characteristics of the ground-launched,
theater-range weapons systems currently in development will help
deliver responsive strikes on time-critical enemy targets with desired
effects. We have campaign-level modeling and simulation analysis
available at higher classification that supports this conclusion.
66. Senator Ernst. General Milley, would U.S. ground-launched,
theater-range missiles in the Western Pacific help destroy high-value
targets to enable other joint forces?
General Milley. Yes, the specifics are available at higher
classification, but our analysis indicates these weapons systems are
lethal, responsive, and enable Joint Force campaign objectives.
67. Senator Ernst. General Milley, would U.S. ground-launched
missiles at various ranges and launch locations in the Western Pacific
create dilemmas for enemy forces?
General Milley. The portfolio of weapons we are developing,
including ground-launched missiles like the Long Range Hypersonic
Weapon, Block V Tomahawk, and Naval Strike Missile, work toward
imposing dilemmas on the adversary. When deployed to distributed
locations and integrated with other Joint and Combined Force efforts
these weapons systems create dilemmas for our adversaries.
nuclear deterrence
68. Senator Ernst. General Milley, given recent nuclear
developments, should Congress receive an independent evaluation of the
strategic nuclear force requirements of deterring Russia and China?
General Milley. I support the congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States.
We are fully committed to field and modernize the nuclear triad,
Dual Capable Aircraft, the nuclear stockpile, and Nuclear Command,
Control, and Communications infrastructure.
In light of increasing nuclear threats from Russia and China, I
support assessing additional low-yield, non-ballistic nuclear
capabilities to better deter, assure, and respond to a potential
regional conflict.
We are also improving our internal processes to ensure we identify
potential requirements early enough for them to have a deterrent effect
against Russia and China.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
china's defense budget
69. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, in your
testimony you stated the PRC remains our number one long term geo-
strategic threat and continues to develop significant nuclear, space,
cyber, land, sea, and air capabilities. While I agree with your
statement, this year's budget is far from sufficient in meeting this
threat. China currently has 340 war ships, while we have 297. In 2028,
China will likely have at least 400 ships and our fleet will shrink to
291. Under this year's budget proposal, our army, the Nation's
preeminent land force will shrink from 485,000 to 452,000 while the
People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) has an end strength of
approximately 975,000. Our Air Force is set to buy the bare minimum of
fighters to keep our capability healthy while every publicly released
war-game has reiterated the absolute importance of our ability to sink
ships for Taiwan to be successful in a cross-strait conflict. Finally,
this year's budget fails to provide the Marine Corps with San Antonio-
class amphibious warships, an absolutely necessary tool to get marines
into the fight. While you're asking to institute an inflation-adjusted
defense cut this year, China seeks to increase its military spending by
over 7 percent. Does the Department understand our budget is not to
counter the China of today, but of tomorrow--a China that continues to
demonstrate a willingness to invest in its military, including in areas
in which they are already ahead?
Secretary Austin. The U.S. military remains the most capable
fighting force in history, and I am confident in the Joint Force's
ability to deter, and if required, defeat PRC aggression. The PRC's
military expansion is why the Department is focused on the PRC as our
pacing challenge and why our fiscal year 2024 budget request includes
$9.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative to maintain
deterrence today, tomorrow, and in the future. This is the largest ever
PDI investment, and a 40 percent increase above last year. We are also
requesting significant resources to maintain dominance in all domains.
Additionally, we're focused on moving and sustaining forces further
forward, west of the International Date Line, and making our force
posture more capable and lethal. Alongside our allies and partners,
we're improving our posture in the Philippines, Australia, and Japan.
We are also focused on funding what is executable to maintain our
strategic advantage, building a distributed and resilience security
architecture in the Indo-Pacific region.
General Milley. The PLA's rapid expansion is one of the reasons the
Department is focused on the PRC as the pacing challenge and why we are
doing more than ever before to deter, defend, and, if necessary, defeat
aggression from the PRC. The National Defense Strategy, with direct
linkages to the threat-informed Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC), is
fully integrated into our resourcing and requirements processes to
build the force required for the future.
Along with the $9.1 billion request for the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative that provides the right mix of capabilities to remain
dominant against the pacing challenge, we are expanding and connecting
our regional allies and partners. Partnerships with countries such as
Australia, the Philippines, Japan, and the Republic of Korea are force
multipliers for a potential conflict with China. President's Budget
Fiscal Year 2024s request, coupled with our unparalleled network of
allies and partners, ensures our continued ability to deter, and if
required, defeat PRC aggression.
taiwan
70. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, I want
to talk to you about Taiwan. I've been giving a series of speeches
around town on the theme of ``Why Taiwan Matters''. I'm doing it
because I fear that the biggest disparity between the United States and
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is around will. I have no doubt that
the CCP has the will to fight over Taiwan if it ever comes to it.
Frankly, I sometimes worry that the United States does not. Not our
servicemembers, of course. I know they will do their duty and do as
commanded, and do it damn well. They are the best fighting force the
world has ever seen. If we go to war with China over Taiwan, it's going
to be a MAJOR war. I'm not sure the American people know why it matters
that we defend Taiwan. So, like I said, I've been giving this series of
speeches trying to build the will. But I'm just one United States
Senator. What are you and the Administration doing to help Americans
understand the importance of Taiwan and the sacrifice that it will take
to defend it?
Secretary Austin. An invasion of Taiwan by the PRC is neither
imminent nor inevitable. The Administration will continue to make clear
that cross-Strait peace and stability remains a fundamental U.S.
national security interest in the Indo-Pacific region. Taiwan's
position within the first island chain is critical to the free flow of
commerce and continued advance of personal freedoms and democratic
ideals throughout the region. This is why this Administration, like
those before it, has affirmed policy commitments enumerated under the
United States ``One-China'' policy, defined by the Taiwan Relations
Act, the three joint communiques, and the six assurances.
Moreover, we affirm these policy commitments not only to the
American people and our Taiwan partners, but with all allies and
partners with shared interests in the Indo-Pacific region. So, the
Department will continue to support a peaceful resolution to cross-
Strait tensions, consistent with the goals and interests of the people
on Taiwan. We will continue to make available to Taiwan defense
articles and services necessary to enable it to maintain its self-
defense consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, and we will also work
with industry to ensure the swift provision of defensive weaponry and
sustainment to Taiwan.
General Milley. Taiwan is an important United States partner in the
INDOPACIFIC region when it comes to economic trade and democratic
values. The Joint Force remains determined to support Taiwan and its
right to defend itself. That involves providing them the right tools
and training they need for defense. Additionally, we remain determined
to modernize our force as the most powerful on Earth to deter
aggressive actions.
This budget is informed by our National Defense Strategy and makes
the necessary investments to ensure we are equipped and ready for any
threat--today and in the future. Every day the Armed Forces
demonstrates to the American people that the U.S. military stands
ready, and with the capability to help defend Taiwan if asked to do so.
I also encourage our elected officials to help carry that message to
the American people that we will not tolerate military action against
Taiwan, and threatens their democratic way of life, and why it's in our
national interest and the global interest to preserve the international
rules-based order.
71. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley,
continuing on the theme of will, how do you access Taiwan's will to
fight?
Secretary Austin. We believe through smart investments and key
reforms, Taiwan can send a clear signal that its society and armed
forces are committed and prepared to defend Taiwan. We therefore
appreciate that President Tsai has prioritized the development and
acquisition of asymmetric capabilities best suited for its defense
against People's Republic of China coercion and aggression. DOD is
taking a proactive approach to supporting these efforts as we continue
upholding our commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act to make
available to Taiwan appropriate defense articles and services.
Taiwan must complement investments in these critical capabilities
with equal focus on enhancing resilience, supporting whole-of-society
defense, and building a strategy that includes defense-in-depth. In
this regard, President Tsai's determination to reform Taiwan's reserve
forces and integrate civilian and military agencies under the All-Out
Defense Mobilization Agency is critical to enhancing Taiwan's overall
preparedness--and in doing so will further strengthen deterrence. DOD
will continue to work with relevant United States Departments and
agencies to support Taiwan's efforts in this regard.
General Milley. In March 2022, over 70 percent of Taiwan's
population stated they would be willing to fight if the PRC invaded
Taiwan.
If the United States did not send troops to support Taiwan during a
PRC invasion, 65 percent of Taiwan's population had confidence in the
Nation's defense.
72. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, will
they respond with the courage and determination of the Ukrainians if
they are attacked?
Secretary Austin. While I would caution against making direct
comparisons between Taiwan and Ukraine, I agree that Ukraine's response
to Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion contains broad lessons for
Taiwan. Taiwan's commitment to defense reforms, whole-of-society
defense and resilience, and increased defense spending are strong
signals that its armed forces and society are committed and prepared to
defend Taiwan.
General Milley. Taiwan is learning lessons from the Russia-Ukraine
conflict and taking measures to increase its resiliency.
In December 2022, President Tsai announced an extension of military
conscription from 4 to 12 months beginning in 2024. The public is
supportive of extending mandatory military service and reserve training
as a result of the invasion of Ukraine. The Taiwanese have a more
favorable view of military service and training.
Public opinion polling indicates over 70 percent of Taiwan's
population would be willing to fight if the PRC invades Taiwan.
Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, some of Taiwan's citizens
are have joined grassroots civil defense organizations.
73. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, Taiwan
spends on its defense, since 2020, (according to the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA)) more than 2 percent of its gross domestic
product (GDP)--something we can't get most of our NATO allies, the
biggest of them, to do. And we're the only ones in the world that
supply them. Yet, they're waiting for $19 billion in deliveries--things
they've already bought. What are you doing to deal with this backlog?
Secretary Austin. We remain focused on identifying the capabilities
Taiwan needs and working to provide them as soon as possible. We are
focused on tackling the issues we control--cutting red tape, decreasing
the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) backlog, and providing innovative
capabilities.
Last summer I tasked the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to
establish an FMS Tiger Team to identify efficiencies, clear systemic
issues, and accelerate the responsiveness of the DOD FMS process to
meet the capability requirements of our allies and partners. We must
provide capabilities to our allies and partners as quickly as possible
in support of their requirements, as well as our own National Defense
Strategy.
Through a review of case studies and past efficiency efforts, as
well as meetings with industry and others, the Tiger Team identified
friction points in the DOD process and developed dozens of
recommendations intended to address the critical and procedural
challenges causing delays. The Tiger Team also identified systemic
changes that seek to improve the overall efficacy and efficiency of the
process, such as accelerating transition to data driven processes to
enable monitoring and transparency and continuous process review to
ensure implementation of the recommendations. To be clear, there is no
one solution. Much like our own challenges, timelines for delivery of
equipment are often dictated by production timelines of industry.
We are committed to working with Congress where appropriate to seek
necessary authorities to reduce the backlog.
General Milley. Since 2000, Congress was notified of over $52
billion in FMS to Taiwan, and the United States delivered over $35
billion worth of defense-related items.
The difference between FMS notification and delivery is mostly the
result of factors outside of DOD control including materiel lead times,
supply chains, and production limitations within the defense industrial
base, and existing laws.
I will support the Secretary's efforts to examine exportability
challenges and identify options to accelerate delivery timelines for
FMS cases whenever possible.
74. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, I want
to talk to you about the so-called ``porcupine strategy'' for Taiwan. I
know the administration subscribes to the necessity of this. I do, too.
Now, to be clear, it doesn't account for all Taiwan needs to defend
itself. They have a range of missions and contingencies to plan for, as
do we. But they do need to focus on the most defensive weapons, things
like harpoons, stingers, and javelins. There was an effort last
Congress to help with that--by providing $10 billion in those sorts of
arms for Taiwan. We passed that in the National Defense Authorization
vAct (NDAA). The problem is the Biden Administration never prioritized
it in its conversations with the appropriators. As a result, it went
unfunded. Instead, we ended up with a small loan program that Taiwan
has been clear it doesn't want and can't use. Will you make it a
priority to get this done this year, either in a supplemental or as
part of the fiscal year 2024 appropriations process?
Secretary Austin. Thank you for providing us authorities under the
Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act. We remain focused on identifying the
capabilities Taiwan needs and working to provide them as soon as
possible. This is a shared challenge, and we will need the
authorization backed by appropriate resources. We stand ready to work
with Congress on this matter.
General Milley. China is the pacing challenge for the United States
military and we support development of Taiwan's asymmetric defense
capabilities against the PRC threat, consistent with the one China
policy. Along with other elements of DOD, the Joint Force is engaged in
efforts to increase Taiwan's capability and capacity to defend itself,
including efforts to identify any further legislative authorities
required and sharpening justification for FMF grants.
75. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, would acquiring $2 billion
dollars in defense capabilities benefit Taiwan's ability to defend
itself?
General Milley. Yes. Our efforts to support Taiwan focus on
deterrence and self-defense, and they remain consistent with our
longstanding policy. Ensuring Taiwan has the means to defend itself
improves deterrence and contributes to peace and stability in the
Strait. Acquiring $2 billion in defense capabilities would certainly
aid our efforts.
authorization for use of military force (aumf)
76. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, in your
testimony you stated we have acted decisively when Iran-backed militia
groups have attacked United States forces in Iraq and Syria. As we all
know, last week Iranian backed terrorists launched rockets and drones
at our troops in Syria, killing a contractor and wounding five other
servicemembers and we did, as you pointed out in your testimony,
respond decisively. One of the key tools we frequently use in these
decisive responses is the 2002 AUMF, which some of my colleagues are
currently trying to repeal. This is the same authority we used to
support taking out Qasem Soleimmani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in 2020,
which set back the terrorist Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds force to
this day. Currently, I have an amendment pending on the floor which
would require the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI) to certify that repealing the 2002 AUMF would not degrade United
States-led deference against Iranian aggression before it is
implemented. In your personal opinions, does repealing the 2002 AUMF
hurt our ability to respond to the aggression of Iranian-backed groups?
Secretary Austin. The President has made clear he will not hesitate
to protect and defend U.S. personnel. There is sufficient domestic
legal authority under the President's Article II authority and the 2001
AUMF to take necessary and proportionate action to protect United
States personnel from threats in Iraq and Syria, including threats from
Iran and Iran-backed groups. The United States does not conduct ongoing
military activities that rely primarily on the 2002 AUMF as a domestic
legal basis. Repeal of the 2002 AUMF would have no impact on current
U.S. military operations and would support this Administration's
commitment to a strong and comprehensive relationship with our Iraqi
partners.
General Milley. No. Repealing the 2002 AUMF would have no
significant impacts or inhibit the United States military's ability to
respond to aggression from Iranian-Aligned Militia Groups, provided the
2001 AUMF remains intact. The 2001 AUMF, along with other authorities,
allow the Joint Force enough flexibility to respond to aggression when
necessary. Any effort to repeal the AUMF should take into account both
current and future threats to our national security threats in the
region and maintain clear authority for appropriate military action.
recruiting in schools
77. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, this
year's budget calls for an additional 12,355 servicemembers. Last week
this Committee had a hearing on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
recruiting challenges, where witnesses testified to a lack of interest
among young people, low test scores, and medical conditions. In your
testimony you stated your desire for DOD to seek partnerships with our
Nation's best universities to find our generation's next leaders. How
detrimental are high schools not allowing recruiters onto their
campuses to both current and future recruiting efforts?
Secretary Austin. The Department is working every day to recruit
and retain America's best talent to leverage the strengths of all our
people. Since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force, military
recruiters have sought broad access to high schools campuses, because
the schools offer one of the best settings for engaging with
prospective recruits. School access allows recruiters to share our
message about the opportunities and benefits available in today's
military. Limited access undoubtedly makes recruiting efforts more
difficult. The Department is working closely with the military services
to develop new and creative ways to engage young Americans across all
corners of the country, including by increasing access to high schools.
General Milley. Federal law (Title 10 (U.S.C., Sec. 503c)
encourages recruiter access to high schools and pertinent student
directory information for the purposes of recruiting. By law, high
schools must provide military recruiters access to high school
students' names, addresses, and telephone listings and the same access
to high school students as is provided to colleges, or to prospective
employers of those students.
The Department is identifying several lines of effort to mitigate
the challenges of the recruiting environment and address barriers to
accessing a broader cross-section of the population. Focusing on our
recruiter's access to high schools is one of these efforts.
The isolation and decreased personal interactions as a result of
the pandemic, negatively impacted and stunted the relationship growth
between our military personnel and communities. The decreased contact
time recruiters had with potential applicants and their influencers in
the community exacerbated the already existing challenges we face with
a youth population that is disconnected and disinterested in service,
declining veteran population and decreased youth interaction with
influences in homes and local communities.
Personal engagement between recruiters, schools and communities is
an important aspect of delivering information, dispelling myths of
military service and communicating the wide range of opportunities
available across the Services and DOD. This is especially key in this
era where youth are presented with a wide range of opportunities and
education benefits in the civilian sector upon graduation.
arctic and alaska strategy
78. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, in your
testimony you stated climate change is creating new potential points
for friction in places such as the Arctic. Last week, during this
Committee's hearing with the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
General VanHerck who, by the way, alongside the servicemembers in my
State, conducted nothing short of varsity level operations against the
Chinese Spy Balloon and several unidentified aerial objects, stated
that ``Alaska might be the most strategic location on the planet.'' He
also testified that DOD currently does not have the infrastructure, the
communications, and the ability to respond and be persistent in the
Arctic and Russia and China have developed capabilities to hold our
Homeland at risk. With Alaska as the gateway for Russian and Chinese
threats to major cities like Chicago, New York, and Miami, why does
NORTHCOM not have assigned forces to do the aerial intercept mission in
Alaska?
Secretary Austin. Forces in Alaska that are assigned to USINDOPACOM
routinely are allocated to support USNORTHCOM and NORAD
responsibilities including to provide aerial defense for North America.
DOD supports homeland defense requirements in Alaska through
coordination between the Air Force, USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and USINDOPACOM,
to include forces permanently stationed in Alaska and a layered defense
network within the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone. This
approach ensures DOD is able to support homeland defense requirements
and Indo-Pacific campaigning and warfighting.
General Milley. Forces are allocated to NORAD and positioned in
Alaska under NORAD command and control to conduct the aerial intercept
missions in accordance with the NORAD contingency plan and a Secretary
of Defense approved execution order.
The United States and Canada are pursuing infrastructure and
communications capability improvements that enhance our homeland
defense from the arctic approaches. Specifically, the Sixth Generation
Over the Horizon Radars, which Congress provided appropriation for,
will increase our ability to execute NORAD's aerospace warning and
control mission.
79. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, who
replaces the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM)-assigned F-22s and F-35s
if those aircraft deploy to combat? Have the replacement units operated
in Alaska year-round?
Secretary Austin. DOD continuously adjusts our global posture based
on operational requirements, risk, readiness and modernization
considerations, and tradeoffs across priorities. DOD deploys fighter
aircraft to support a range of rotational deployments, and if
necessary, combat operations. When executing these deployments, DOD
considers the effect on other missions conducted at the locations that
deploying aircraft depart from.
General Milley. The F-22 and F-35 fighter squadrons based in Alaska
and assigned to United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) deploy
in support of USINDOPACOM, and global requirements. Simultaneously
these squadrons maintain ready aircraft in support of Aerospace Control
Alert Level 1 (ACA 1), which is the steady-State level of readiness,
while also maintaining the capability to increase ready aircraft in
conjunction with increased ACA levels, all in accordance with Operation
NOBLE EAGLE (ONE). By design, when Air Force fighter squadrons deploy,
they only deploy with a portion of their total aircraft. Even in the
event of the deployment of all four Alaska based fighter squadrons,
their remaining aircraft would be capable of maintaining the ONE
mission, and not require a replacement.
Additional backfill of Alaska based fighter aircraft would be
sourced by Continental United States (CONUS) based fighter squadrons
through the identification of pilots that have completed arctic
survival training (through previous assignment to Alaska, or rapid
training) from multiple CONUS alert aircraft locations, and the
augmentation of their air crew flight equipment (survival gear).
80. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, since
2017, the Army has fielded three theater-specific multi-domain task
forces capable of employing long-range precision effects to include
intelligence collection and precision strikes. Currently, two of the
Army's multi-domain task forces are concentrated on the Pacific Command
Area of Responsibility (AOR) and the third is focused on European
Command / Africa Command Currently the Army is looking to field a
fourth and possibly a fifth multi-domain task force. DOD's Arctic
strategy states ``with increasing levels of adversary activities in the
region, it is essential for the U.S. Army to employ a calibrated force
posture with units that are manned, trained, and equipped to maintain a
credible deterrence and the first line of defense of the Homeland.''
The study additionally rightfully points out the Arctic's place as a
center of strategic competition. With the importance of the Arctic as
laid out in the Army's strategy on the region and the branch's interest
in creating two more theater-specific multi-domain task forces, can you
speak to the benefits of having Alaska as the location for the next
multi-domain task force?
Secretary Austin. DOD is using the Army's Multi-Domain Task Forces
(MDTFs) primarily to support priority warfighting objectives. DOD has
activated MDTF headquarters at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, to
support warfighting requirements in the Indo-Pacific region and in
Wiesbaden, Germany, to support warfighting requirements in Europe. DOD
is in the process of activating a third MDTF headquarters in Hawaii
over the course of fiscal year 2023, which will further support DOD's
focus on the PRC as the Department's pacing challenge. DOD assesses
that this laydown of MDTF capabilities is appropriate to support our
requirements. DOD has the ability to deploy elements from the MDTF at
Joint Base Lewis-McChord in the event that any requirements emerge in
Alaska or the Arctic that call for MDTF capabilities.
General Milley. To meet evolving threats, the Army continues to
transform by developing capabilities to remain the dominant land force
in the world. A key effort in this endeavor is the modernization of the
Army's force structure and includes the establishment of Multi-Domain
Task Forces (MDTFs).
The Army's MDTFs are designed to be scalable from operational to
strategic level, which can be tailored to the requirements and the
needs of Joint Force Commanders. The MDTF design will continue to
evolve and change based on feedback from experimentation and required
capabilities for the Army of 2030. During this analysis, the Army
continues to explore options to station the fourth and fifth MDTFs for
activation in fiscal years 2027 and 2028.
The Army and the Joint Force must consider how to mobilize,
project, and sustain combat power to provide Combatant Commanders
(CCDRs) with required forces and equipment. From inception, each MDTF
will be assigned or aligned to a Combatant Command, then built,
trained, and exercised within the context of the Combatant Commander's
requirements.
Alaska is an ideal location for the development of new capabilities
applicable to cold weather environments. The determination for the
basing of the fourth and fifth MDTFs is currently ongoing. However, all
Arctic-capable force structure decisions will be aligned with the
National Strategy for the Arctic Region and other relevant posture
guidance. Thank you for your strong and continued interest in the
modernization and sustainment of our forces.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
support to ukraine
81. Senator Budd. Secretary Austin, as you know, the Ukrainian
Armed Forces have been engaged in significant combat operations against
the Russian Army in and around the cities of Bakhmut and Soledar. Much
of that combat has been urban combat and some of it has been
subterranean combat in the salt mines that are near those cities. The
casualties for both sides have been significant. The Ukrainians have
submitted a Letter of Request to you asking the United States to supply
unmanned ground systems and associated systems. These systems would
allow the Ukrainians to perform a number of dangerous missions remotely
in the contemporary operating environment and thus avoid some of the
casualties that they have been sustaining. The Letter of Request was
from Major General Kyrylo Budanov, No. 222/9A/1220, and was submitted
19 November 2022. What is the status of this request and when can we
expect a decision?
Secretary Austin. The security assistance we provide to Ukraine is
shaped by the Department's frequent interactions with Ukrainian
counterparts in the Ministry of Defense and Ukrainian Armed Forces. The
Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate submitted the Letter of Request
you referenced without formal endorsement from senior officials in the
Ukrainian General Staff or Ministry of Defense who are authorized by
the Government of Ukraine to make formal, prioritized requests.
However, I have asked my staff to followup, as we are continually
looking for new ideas on how best to support Ukraine.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 30, 2023
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
ARMY POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin,
Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order.
Before we start, I would like to acknowledge the UH60
Blackhawk training accident that occurred last night at Fort
Campbell. Our thoughts are with the Army family today and I
know this hits General McConville in a particularly difficult
way as an aviator and as a former commander of the 101st
Airborne Division. You know and you feel it personally.
It also demonstrates the enduring risks our men and women
who volunteer to serve our Nation face every day, not just in
combat zones but in rigorous training. So all of our thoughts
and prayers are with these families and with the Army today.
Thank you.
The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the
President's Budget Request for the Army for fiscal year 2024.
Our witnesses today are Secretary to the Army Christine Wormuth
and Chief of Staff of the Army General James McConville.
Thank you both for your service and please convey this
Committee's appreciation to the men and women serving under
your command.
General McConville, as this will be your last posture
hearing before your retirement, on behalf of the Committee I
would like to offer you our sincere gratitude and
congratulations. The Nation is safer and the United States Army
is on a path of generational transformation because of your
leadership.
We thank you for your many decades of selfless service and
we thank your family for their continued support, and most
particularly for their continued service. I believe that every
one of your sons is in the United States Army and that your
son-in-law is in the United States Army. Am I correct?
General McConville. And my daughter, Senator----
Chairman Reed. I am sorry. You must be Irish. How many
children do you have?
[Laughter.]
Chairman Reed. The Army is faced with historic challenges,
though, and even as the service is undertaking its most
thorough modernization effort in 40 years while in the midst of
the most difficult recruiting environment in half a century,
the Army is being called upon to increase its forward operating
presence.
The Army's strength has always been drawn from its soldiers
and its leaders and its tenacity to get the job done, and that
characteristic grit is certainly needed today.
In its fiscal year 2024 budget the Department of Defense
(DOD) has requested $185 billion to the Army, marking the
fourth straight year of a flat budget for the service. Even as
every other service and element of the Department has benefited
from significant increases, the Army has seen its funding
essentially plateau.
Understandably, the Department is focused on the pacing
threat in the Indo-Pacific where the nature of competition
relies heavily on our Nation's sea and air strength.
However, I am concerned that inadequate investment in the
United States' primary land component may create
vulnerabilities. Combat credible ground forces are fundamental
for deterrence, as we are witnessing every day in Europe.
Furthermore, the Army has a critical role to play in the
Indo-Pacific including providing long-range fires and ground
forces, training and experimentation with our partners and
allies, and enabling logistics and prepositioned stocks.
We risk the Army's combat credibility if we do not provide
it with the resources it needs to continue to field
modernization and to continue to be a force to be reckoned
with.
Even as we focus sea and air resources to the Indo-Pacific,
the Army will be relied upon to maintain a reliable presence
around the world. With that in mind, I am interested in hearing
about the Army's view of its mission globally as well as how
the service is adjusting its operating concepts and force
posture to support the National Defense Strategy (NDS) to
include the Indo-Pacific.
To remain competitive with China and Russia we must
continue to invest in cutting-edge technologies that will
define future battlefields across all domains.
The Army specifically has been pursuing modernization in
key areas like long-range fires, air defense, vertical lift,
and deep sensing, among others. These are ambitious and
farsighted objectives.
I am particularly encouraged by the Army's announcement
yesterday of the creation of a new cross functional team
focused on contested logistics. This team, under the direction
of Army Futures Command, will address the need for more
resilient and agile logistics in dangerous environments like
the Indo-Pacific.
Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, I would ask you
update the Committee on the Army's modernization efforts and
what resources are needed to effectively continue them.
As I mentioned, the Army's most valuable asset has always
been its people. I am pleased to see this budget request placed
as a priority on taking care of our soldiers and Army civilians
by providing an across the board pay raise of 5.2 percent and
investing in barracks improvements.
At the same time, the Army is struggling to recruit new
soldiers. Last year, the service fell far short of its
recruiting goals and the same appears likely this year.
There are a number of factors contributing to this
challenging recruiting environment, including low national
unemployment rates, lingering problems from COVID-19, and
historically low numbers of Americans eligible for or
interested in military service.
I understand the Army is conducting an overhaul of its
recruiting and retention practices including the launch of a
major new marketing campaign and an expansion of the Future
Soldier Preparatory Course.
I would ask for an update on how you plan to recruit a
broader pool of potential recruits and grow back end strength
in the coming years.
Finally, the Army must continue to improve its readiness in
the context of long-term strategic competition. The Army is
focused on large training exercises including Defender Europe
and Pacific Pathways, and its leadership in the Project
Convergence series demonstrate a commitment to regional
preparedness.
These large-scale events not only test system capabilities,
unit skills, and logistics resilience, they also facilitate
experimentation and training with our allies, reflecting how we
would fight in future operations.
We are seeing the importance of efforts like this right now
in Ukraine. I would ask for an update on how the Army is
designing large-scale exercises to support its focus on our
pacing threats, China and Russia.
Again, I thank the witnesses for their participation today.
I look forward to the testimoneys. Now let me recognize the
Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank our witnesses for being here. I also join the Chairman in
offering my condolences to the families of those killed at last
night's training accident Fort Campbell.
On this Committee we take the safety of our servicemembers
seriously and will seek a clearer understanding of exactly what
happened. I will also say that when it comes to the Army, the
distinguished Chairman of this Committee knows whereof he
speaks and I am fortunate to have him as a teammate.
I want to also thank General McConville for his service to
the United States. Since earning his commission from West Point
in 1981 he has faithfully served his country as an Army aviator
and as a general officer.
I also want to recognize General McConville's family, as
the Chairman has done, and I do not know if we have recognized
the favorite family member, which I understand is his
youngest--his grandson, Patton.
No United States soldiers are fighting against Russia in
its brutal invasion of Ukraine. This is Ukraine's fight and it
is fighting well and valiantly. Even though no United States
troops are directly engaged in the fight, the United States
Army is providing critical on-the-ground support for Ukraine.
Thousands of United States soldiers are deployed to provide
logistics to supply Ukraine's military. Thousands more are
training Ukrainian military personnel, and the result is a
significantly degraded Russian military, as Secretary Austin
testified earlier, and that is a positive development.
The lessons of Ukraine should be an example of our efforts
in the Pacific. The Army is and will continue to be on the
leading edge of efforts to rebalance our Western Pacific
forces.
United States Army Pacific, through Pacific Pathways and
other engagements, has established significant relationships
with allies and partners that promise to enable access and
maneuvering capabilities across the theater.
Further, the Army has successfully and rapidly pushed the
envelope to rebuild our arsenal of democracy through
significant capacity expansion, investments, and proposed
multiyear contracts, though more work remains.
The Army also has an important role to play in contested
logistics and in providing more options for sensors and
shooters to the joint force. I am heartened by the speed with
which the Army has sought to reshape itself to provide
deterrent value against the Chinese People's Liberation Army,
but we should still do more to accelerate this effort.
In particular, we should capitalize on the progress made on
the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) and the Mid-Range
Capability (MRC) weapon system. For next-generation combat
vehicles platforms like the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle
(OMFV) and the Armored Multi-purpose Vehicle (AMPV) may soon
replace or reinforce their aging counterparts.
I hope to hear more about these advancements and those in
network, soldier lethality, future vertical lift (FVL), and air
and mission missile defense. None of these achievements or
capabilities would work without the dedicated soldiers of the
United States Army and I join the Chairman in noting that we
are in the front edge of a recruiting crisis.
I would like an update on this year's recruiting goals and
how the Army has changed its strategy to meet its recruitment
and retention objectives.
Along these lines, let me reiterate a position that I have
had for several years now during the markup of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). I am strongly in favor of
expanding the Junior ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corp] and I
do believe this is a valuable program not only for potential
military members but principally for citizenship and public
service in our young people.
Then, sadly, I must mention the Biden administration's
disservice to the Army in the fiscal year 2024 budget
submission. In that regard, I associate myself with the remarks
of the distinguished Chairman of this Committee.
When accounting for inflation, this year's budget is about
a 2 percent cut compared to last year. The impact of that cut
is even more severe at a time when personnel expenses are
rapidly increasing.
Meanwhile, General McConville submitted a list of almost $2
billion worth of unfunded priorities the Army needs, including
support for partnership-building exercises in the Indo-Pacific,
and I do appreciate those submissions because it informs this
Committee.
Further, the budget request fails to use multiyear
procurement authority for critical missiles like Patriot
Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket
System (GMLRS). I am confident my colleagues on a bipartisan
basis, again, will join me to correct this inadequate budget
and ensure the Army has the right resources to confront the
Nation's current and future challenges.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we share very many views
along this and we look forward to hearing the testimony
directly from these distinguished witnesses.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker, very much.
Secretary Wormuth, please?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY
Ms. Wormuth. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker,
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for your
ongoing support as we continue to build the Army of 2030, and
thank you for your comments and thoughts and prayers for the
families of our soldiers who were killed in the crash. Our
hearts go out to them. It is a heavy day for the Army, I would
say, in that regard.
We are pleased to appear before you today. I am, as you
noted, joined by General McConville and want to thank him for
his years of service and leadership of our Army. I am grateful
to work with him every day. We have accomplished a lot this
year but we have a lot of work ahead of us.
We remain focused on our three key priorities--people,
modernization, and readiness. The fiscal year 2024 budget
allows us to support the National Defense Strategy, to provide
ready forces to the combatant commanders, and to take care of
our people.
By investing over $39 billion in procurement and RDT&E
[Research and Development Test and Evaluation], we are
maintaining our momentum on our modernization programs and we
are, largely, on track to bring 24 systems into the hands of
soldiers and across the finish line in fiscal year 2023.
This is a big year for long-range precision fires.
Prototypes of the precision strike missile, the mid-range
capability and the long-range hypersonic weapon will be in the
hands of soldiers this fiscal year.
It is also a big year for next-generation combat vehicles.
Mobile protected firepower is in production and Armoured Multi
Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is also being fielded, and it is a big
year for our integrated air and missile defenses and the future
vertical lift program as well.
As we shift from 2 decades of counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism operations to large-scale combat operations we
are also transforming our force structure. We are going to need
to adapt our force structure to make room for things like the
multi-domain task forces as well as other new units like the
indirect fire protection capability and our M-SHORAD
battalions.
We are a ready Army and we continue to emphasize readiness
in everything we do. We are funding 22 Combat Training Center
rotations this year.
We have a robust exercise program and we are implementing
our new readiness model, which lets us balance modernization,
training, and ongoing missions. We are also investing in Army
prepositioned stocks, which have been key in everything that
has been going on in Europe and will serve us well in other
theaters as well.
To assist Ukraine in fighting Russia the Army has provided
over $20 billion of lethal assistance including a wide range of
munitions, radars, combat vehicles, and other things, and one
of the most important lessons we have learned from Ukraine is
the need for a more robust Defense Industrial Base. In our
budget this year we have $1.5 billion to invest in our
arsenals, ammo plants, and depots.
We are also working very closely with our partners in
industry to increase munitions production so that we can
continue to help the Ukrainians but also, very importantly, to
replenish our own stocks, and even as our soldiers provide
lethal assistance and train Ukrainian soldiers we are not
taking our eye off the pacing challenge of China.
United States Indo Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) may be a
theater named after two oceans but the Army has an important
role to play there. The best way to avoid fighting a war is to
show that you can win any war you might have to fight.
The Army is contributing to strengthening deterrence in
INDOPACOM every day as we campaign in the region through our
exercises and partnerships, and if deterrence fails the Army
will be a key player on the joint force team in the event of a
conflict.
As important as it is to build new weapon systems and
maintain our readiness, people are the strength of our Army.
This budget increases soldier and Department of Army civilian
pay by 5.2 percent and funds important quality of life
improvements like family housing, barracks, childcare
initiatives, and other important programs.
We also, of course, want to build cohesive teams of
soldiers that are trained, disciplined, and fit. So the Army is
committed to building positive command climates across the
force so our soldiers can be everything they can be.
Since appearing before you last year, we have taken steps
to build out a prevention workforce that will help us in our
efforts to reduce harmful behaviors across the Army, which in
turn will help us with recruiting and retention.
We are also continuing to strive to prevent suicide in our
ranks. Suicide is a national challenge, but we have to do
everything we can to reduce suicide in the Army. So we are
pursuing a range of initiatives to help our soldiers be more
resilient.
One of the most important things we can do is to make sure
that we have engaged leaders at every level who know their
soldiers and make sure that their soldiers know their leaders
and are connected to their buddies and families.
Our Army is the greatest army in the world, but if we are
going to keep it that way we must solve our recruiting
challenge. The difficult recruiting landscape we face did not
appear in 1 year and it is going to take us more than a year to
solve it.
But we are laser focused on this challenge and we are not
going to lower our standards to solve the problem. The whole
Army leadership is adapting and changing how we are recruiting.
We are generating positive momentum from initiatives like
our Future Soldier Prepatory Course, our Soldier Referral
Program, and our new advertising campaign ``Be all you can
be.''
Our efforts are geared toward doing one thing,
reintroducing the Army to the American public and inspiring a
renewed call to service. We very much need your help to be
successful in this effort.
I am proud of all that our soldiers do to protect our
country every day, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
General McConville, please?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES C. McCONVILLE, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMY
General McConville. Thank you, Secretary, for your
leadership.
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here
today.
Before I start, I would like to express my sincere
condolences to the families of the crews, the MEDEVAC
helicopters from 101st, who are being informed today of their
loss. They served our country proudly and I'm very, very proud
to serve with them, and they remain in our thoughts and prayers
as we go out throughout the day.
The United States exists for one purpose and that is to
protect the Nation by being ready to fight and win our Nation's
wars as a member of the joint force, and we have hundreds of
thousands of soldiers training every single day around the
world to make that happen, just like those MEDEVAC pilots.
To do this, the Army has three clear priorities--people,
readiness, and modernization, or, in other words, future
readiness. We have remained aggressively committed to these
priorities while answering the Nation's call during every
crisis and every challenge.
This year, the Army continues to undergo its greatest
transformation in almost 50 years and we are delivering on
modernization because we have been consistent and we have been
persistent on our modernization priorities.
Last year, we officially updated our capstone warfighting
doctrine to Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), which incorporates
emerging lessons from Ukraine. We continue to stand up new
organizations to support our new doctrine. Last June we
reactivated the historic 11th Airborne Division in Alaska.
In September, we stood up the third of the five Multi-
Domain Task Forces (MDTFs). As the Secretary noted, we are on
track for 24 signature weapon systems in 2023.
But at the end of the day, we must get the right people in
the right place in order for any of these initiatives to be
successful. That is why people remain the Army's number-one
priority.
We want every young person, every parent, to know that
service in the Army is a pathway to success both in and out of
uniform. Whether you serve for 4 years or 40 years, the Army
offers endless possibilities.
We are not a profession of arms but a profession of
professions. You can be whatever you want to be in United
States Army. In fact, you can be all you can be.
I am often asked how people can help us and my answer is
inspire young men and women to serve, because when we get the
call we go with the Army we have. The Army we have is the
world's greatest fighting force because we serve with the
world's greatest soldiers.
With your continued support we are going to keep it that
way. I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of The Honorable Christine E.
Wormuth and General James C. McConville follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Christine E. Wormuth and
General James C. McConville
enduring army priorities
For nearly 248 years, the United States Army has dedicated itself
to fighting and winning the Nation's wars. As old threats evolve and
new ones emerge, the Army is making decisions and prioritizing
investments that not only contribute to current readiness but will also
pay dividends on the battlefields of 2030 and beyond. That is why we
are especially grateful to Congress for providing the funding necessary
to produce highly trained and lethal forces ready to meet an array of
challenges at home and abroad. Our ability to maintain continuity
through crisis is a testament to our solemn commitment to the Army's
three enduring priorities: people, readiness, and modernization. The
Army's Budget Request for fiscal year 2024 of $185.5 billion supports
these priorities and will enable us to deliver the Army of 2030 in
support of the National Defense Strategy.
ready to fight and win
America's Army exists to protect the Nation by fighting and winning
our wars as a member of the Joint Force. There is nothing more
reassuring, and no greater deterrent, than American soldiers on the
ground, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with our Allies and partners.
Linchpin of the Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific. From Washington
and Alaska, to Hawai.i and Guam, to Japan and South Korea, there are
currently 71,000 soldiers serving in the Indo-Pacific theater. The
Indo-Pacific is not just an air and maritime theater, but a joint
theater with joint problems that require joint solutions. The Army is
the linchpin Service, enabling and sustaining our joint and Allied
partners. Our fundamental goal is to deter conflict in the region.
Thus, the best way to avoid fighting a war is to make it very clear
that the Joint Force, in concert with our Allies and partners, can and
will win such a war. To that strategic end, the Army contributes to
deterrence by campaigning, which plays three important functions in the
Indo-Pacific: complicating Chinese decisionmaking; enhancing U.S.
access to the region; and placing combat-credible and interoperable
land forces forward to create interior lines for the Joint Force.
This year is going to be one of historic modernization for our
force posture in the Indo-Pacific. We are working closely with our
regional Allies and partners to secure greater operational access and
basing arrangements in strategic locations to enable adversary-focused
training and exercises. In terms of logistics, the 8th Theater
Sustainment Command in Hawai.i will oversee the delivery of supplies,
fuel, munitions, and activity sets for U.S. Army Pacific's (USARPAC)
joint and multinational training and exercises. Strengthening our
ability to operate across the theater requires not only logistics at
scale, but also the resiliency to operate in contested environments.
It has been a consequential year for the Army in the Indo-Pacific.
USARPAC completed its inaugural iteration of Operation Pathways,
representing the Theater Army's new posture paradigm to build and
thicken Joint Force interior lines. This gives USARPAC the operational
endurance to see, sense, and understand regional threats; sustain,
protect, and command and control (C2) large-scale operations; and
conduct maneuver and fires. USARPAC demonstrated those capabilities by
offloading APS afloat in support of exercise Salaknib in the
Philippines. USARPAC, alongside our Indonesian partners, expanded
exercise Super Garuda Shield from a modest bilateral venture to a major
regional undertaking with 14 partner nations and 4,000 combined forces.
Next, we established the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center,
bringing the first combat training center to the Indo-Pacific with
inaugural rotations at our Hawai.i and Alaska campuses, along with an
exportable capability we employed in Indonesia.
Capitalizing on that momentum, the 5th Security Forces Assistance
Brigade (SFAB) persistently trained and advised 12 of our Allies and
partners across the region. The Army also activated the 11th Airborne
Division in Alaska--a unit with an historic Indo-Pacific lineage that
provides our soldiers with a clear purpose, identity, and mission. As
part of our Arctic Strategy, the 11th Airborne Division is being
tailored as a rapidly deployable operational command headquarters.
Finally, USARPAC initiated the Unified Pacific Wargame Series, offering
key insights on Army capabilities, posture, and contested logistics for
a protracted conflict in the Indo-Pacific. In October 2022, America's
First Corps certified as a Joint Task Force as part of the Mission
Command Training Program Warfighter Series, with participants from
Washington, Hawai.i, Colorado, and Kansas. I Corps' experimentation
with distributed C2 will enable commanders to present multiple dilemmas
to a potential adversary. We also activated the third of five planned
Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF), task-organized to provide anti-access,
area-denial capabilities through long-range precision fires and
effects. The 3d MDTF at Fort Shafter, Hawai.i joins the 1st MDTF at
Joint Base Lewis McChord, Washington as the second MDTF supporting U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command.
Tip of the Joint Spear in Europe. Since Russia's unjust and
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. Army's
tactical readiness and strategic readiness have been on full display
across continental Europe. The 43,000 American soldiers in Europe
underscore our ongoing commitment to the region, further bolstered by
President Biden's force posture announcement at the NATO Summit last
June. In Germany, we are forward stationing an air defense artillery
brigade headquarters, a short-range air defense battalion, a combat
sustainment support battalion headquarters, and an engineer brigade
headquarters. In Italy, we are forward stationing a short-range air
defense battery. In Poland, the Army has forward-stationed the V Corps
Headquarters Forward Command Post--the first permanent U.S. forces on
NATO's eastern flank. We are maintaining a substantial rotational force
in Poland, including an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), combat
aviation brigade, and a division headquarters. In Romania, we have
headquartered a rotational brigade combat team, supporting an
additional maneuver force on the eastern flank. In the Baltics, we have
enhanced our rotational deployments--which include armored, aviation,
air defense, and special operations forces--to reinforce Baltic
security, enhance interoperability, and demonstrate the flexibility and
combat readiness of U.S. forces.
We have been able to demonstrate our steadfast support to NATO
thanks to years of investments in setting the European theater, where
we continue to invest in and modernize a robust set of Army
Prepositioned Stocks (APS). Importantly, we are moving some of our APS
into Poland this year to reinforce NATO's eastern flank. We are also
leveraging NATO Common Funding to build a new equipment complex in
Poland to house, maintain, and issue an ABCT equipment set. The XVIII
Airborne Corps--America's Strategic Response Force--similarly
highlighted the Army's investments in rapid power-projection
capabilities. The XVIII Airborne Corps' 9-month deployment to
Wiesbaden, Germany built upon years of cooperation with the Ukrainian
military, providing the training and support required to aid the heroic
defense of their homeland. These investments in strategic readiness
would not have been possible without congressional foresight and
support. This is especially true for the European Deterrence Initiative
(EDI). Total EDI funding for the Army in fiscal year 2023 is $2.8
billion to support 9,800 rotational Army forces in Europe, and enhance
our forward posture, training, and interoperability.
The United States remains committed to supporting Ukraine's near-
term combat needs and its long-term defense requirements against future
Russian aggression. The Department of Defense (DOD) has established
Security Assistance Group--Ukraine (SAG-U), commanded by an Army three-
star general under U.S. European Command, in Wiesbaden, Germany. SAG-U
is purpose-built to execute the full range of our security assistance
activities in a more efficient and sustainable manner. SAG-U will reach
full operational capability in Q3 fiscal year 2023. The lessons we
observe in Ukraine underscore our Army's greatest strengths: combined
arms maneuver at scale; the importance of empowered leadership through
mission command; and the immeasurable value of a professionalized Non-
Commissioned Officer Corps.
The Army continues to supply critical weapon systems, equipment,
and munitions to Ukraine, including Stinger anti-aircraft systems,
Javelin anti-armor systems, 155mm artillery rounds, and other items. We
have provided billions of dollars of Army materiel to Ukraine through
the Presidential Drawdown Authority. We are also working to execute
billions in procurements for Ukraine through the Ukraine Security
Assistance Initiative.
The Army will initiate multi-year procurement contracts for
artillery rounds and artillery charges in fiscal year 2023. For fiscal
year 2024, the Army will work with Congress to explore additional
multi-year procurement contract opportunities for critical munitions.
In addition to these potential multi-year contract efforts, the request
includes additional funding for a range of munitions, including Javelin
and Stinger missiles, and artillery, combat-vehicle, and small-arms
ammunition.
We were able to fill critical gaps in Ukraine's defense thanks to
our comprehensive modernization initiatives, but we must be able to
replenish these stocks. Russia's war in Ukraine is further highlighting
lessons from the pandemic that military readiness depends upon a robust
and modern Organic and Defense Industrial Base. The Army is working
closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and our
industry partners to rapidly increase production capacity and transform
our processes from vulnerable supply chains to a more resilient supply
fabric.
Readiness is our most effective form of deterrence. The best way to
win without fighting is by demonstrating our ability to win decisively
by fighting. Forward deployed combat capability, prepositioned stocks,
and a resilient sustainment infrastructure will be key to future
deterrence. One of the many ways we showcase our combat-credible forces
in Europe is through DEFENDER-Europe, the Army's annual joint and
multinational exercise series. Last year, concurrent with our support
to Ukraine, and alongside our NATO Allies, DEFENDER-Europe 22 stretched
across nine European countries, featuring 3,450 American troops and
5,200 multinational servicemembers from 11 Allied nations. DEFENDER-
Europe 23 will include over 7,800 U.S. troops, training alongside
15,000 multinational forces from 26 Allied and partner nations.
National Guard units from 10 U.S. states will also participate, marking
the 30th anniversary of the National Guard State Partnership Program.
delivering the army of 2030
The Army continues to progress through our greatest transformation
in almost half a century. Fifty years ago, Army senior leaders closely
observed the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and incorporated its lessons into
the emerging AirLand Battle doctrine, the creation of new Army
organizations, and the development of the ``Big 5'' weapons systems.
Today, we are not only supporting Ukraine but paying close attention to
the characteristics of modern warfare as they unfold, and incorporating
those lessons into new doctrine, organizations, training, and materiel.
Last October, the Army officially adopted Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)
as our official capstone doctrine, the most significant shift in
warfighting doctrine since AirLand Battle. MDO acknowledges that the
Army of 2030 will be contested in every domain--air, land, sea, space,
and cyberspace. Our soldiers must be ready to fight and win in multiple
domains simultaneously to get from fort to foxhole in a contested
environment.
The Army has been consistent and persistent in pursuing our
modernization initiatives as we work to deliver the Army of 2030 and
design the Army of 2040. We remain aggressively committed to our six
modernization portfolios--long-range precision fires, next generation
combat vehicle, future vertical lift, the network, air and missile
defense, and solider lethality--and are on track to deliver 24 new
systems into the hands of soldiers by the end of fiscal year 2023. That
includes eight fielded systems, six systems issued for testing, and ten
systems undergoing soldier touchpoints. Our annual Army Futures
Command-hosted experiment, Project Convergence, continues to evolve and
expand from the Army-centric inaugural event in 2020 to last fall's
combined, joint series of experiments with the entire Joint Force, the
United Kingdom, and Australia.
To succeed on the future battlefield and continue to dominate the
land domain, there are six operational imperatives the Army of 2030
must do. First, we need to see and sense more, farther, and more
persistently at every echelon than our enemies. That is why we are
modernizing our aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities, to include the Multi-Domain Sensing System, Terrestrial
Layer System, and the Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node, or
TITAN.
Second, we have to concentrate highly lethal, low signature combat
forces rapidly from dispersed locations to overwhelm adversaries at a
time and place of our choosing. To do this, we are investing in a
faster, more survivable armored fist. Upgraded tanks and Bradleys will
be joined by Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicles, or AMPVs, which are
already in production. The Mobile Protective Firepower System, which
was just awarded for production, will provide greater protection to
infantry forces without sacrificing speed or mobility.
Third, we must win the fires fight by delivering precise, longer-
range fires as part of the Joint Force to strike deep targets and
massing enemy forces. Since 2016, the Army has invested significantly
in fire support systems, and we have made long-range precision fires a
top modernization priority. We are working tirelessly to ensure that we
have multiple options to service targets at ranges from 40 miles
(Extended Range Cannon Artillery) to over 1,700 miles (Long-Range
Hypersonic Weapon).
Fourth, we need to protect our forces from air, missile, and drone
attacks. We are continuing to field Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense,
or M-SHORAD, to protect our maneuver forces against a wide range of air
threats. The Army is also developing an enduring Indirect Fire
Protection Capability, or IFPC, that will work together with the Army's
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System to provide an
unparalleled ability to identify, track, and defeat aerial threats.
Current events also highlight the proliferation and significance of
enemy Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). To address this threat, we are
investing in counter-UAS division sets that place fixed, semi-fixed,
mobile, and portable counter-UAS capabilities in the hands of our
maneuver forces.
Fifth, we must rapidly and reliably communicate and share data not
just with ourselves, but with our Sister Services, and Allies and
partners. The Army has demonstrated how to rapidly combine targeting
data from our joint teammates and pass that information to the correct
Army fires element--reducing the targeting cycle to mere minutes. The
Integrated Tactical Network architecture, in fielding now, enhances
classified data transfer with both better network bandwidth efficiency
and resilient relay links to ensure persistent connectivity for our
warfighters.
Finally, we must sustain the fight across contested terrain for
both short, sharp operations as well as for protracted conflict. This
will require not only standard equipment, like field kitchens, fuelers,
and trucks, but also the niche, often overlooked capabilities like Army
watercraft and Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, or JLOTS. Sustainment
must be at the forefront of our planning, preparation, and training--
not something that we can assume will always be readily available. Army
logisticians are the best in the world, and they are up to the task.
people are our greatest strength and first priority
Recruiting Initiatives. We are experiencing the most challenging
recruiting landscape in a generation. There is no one-size-fits-all
solution. Nevertheless, we are committed to tackling these problems
head on by recruiting a force that looks like the Nation it serves. All
our recruiting initiatives will be informed by first principles: 1) we
will not sacrifice quality for quantity; 2) we will not lower our
standards; and 3) we will invest in America's young people so they can
meet our standards. The Regular Army Accessions Mission for fiscal year
2023 is 65,500. While we are singularly focused on meeting this
mission, we need help from community leaders, parents, educators,
coaches, and influencers to inspire young people to serve.
The Army is implementing several important changes to improve
organizational understanding, recruiter management, regional awareness,
marketing, and applicant eligibility. First, we established the Army
Recruiting Task Force, under the direction of a two-star general, to
examine the current State of the Army's recruiting enterprise and to
make recommendations to Army senior leaders for action. Second, we are
overhauling how the Army recruits by selecting recruiters differently,
improving recruiter training, increasing recruiter resources, and
creating new incentives for high-performing recruiters. For instance,
the Army recently launched a ``Recruiting Scholars'' program to
identify, incentivize, and send top-notch captains to graduate school
after completing a recruiting-company command. There are 21 talented
captains in the first cohort.
Next, the Army designated 15 major cities as priority markets for
fiscal year 2023. With help from community partners, including Veterans
Service Organizations, Military Support Organizations, and our Soldiers
for Life, we are saturating these markets with activities and
initiatives to maximize awareness regarding the benefits of Army
service. Fourth, we established the Future Soldier Preparatory Course
(FSPC) pilot program in July 2022 at Fort Jackson, South Carolina to
support the accession of recruits who are inclined to serve but might
need help improving their test scores or physical fitness. As of March
22, 2023, 4,219 FSPC recruits have graduated and moved on to Basic
Combat Training (BCT). This represents a 98 percent success rate. FSPC
recruits improved their Armed Forces Qualification Test score by an
average of 18.5 points. Similarly, 97.6 percent of FSPC recruits
achieved the Army's accessions body composition standards. Most
importantly, FSPC graduates are performing very well in BCT with just a
4.8 percent attrition rate, as compared to the average BCT attrition
rate of 6.1 percent in 2022.
Be All You Can Be. On March 8, 2023, the Army officially
reintroduced ``Be All You Can Be'' as our marketing slogan. ``Be All
You Can Be'' featured prominently in Army advertisements and marketing
materials from 1981 to 2001. After a two-decade hiatus, we are excited
to introduce ``Be All You Can Be'' to a new generation of young people.
The Army Enterprise Marketing Office hosted numerous in-person focus
groups and tested ``Be All You Can Be'' against 18 other taglines,
eventually surveying 20,000 people across five target audiences:
prospects, soldiers, veterans, influencers, and engaged citizens. Our
extensive market research revealed that the ``Be All You Can Be''
slogan, once popular with Generation X, resonates with Generation Z by
signaling a sense of purpose, passion, possibility, community, and
connection unique to the Army. With support from Congress, the Army
will spend $116.7 million in fiscal year 2023 to launch this rebranding
campaign across multiple media platforms. Additionally, we believe that
the ``Be All You Can Be'' narrative will help veterans and retirees
tell their Army stories and inspire a new generation of young people
toward military service.
Quality of Life. Recruiting and retaining the next generation of
the All-Volunteer Force requires sustained investment and quality-of-
life improvements in Army housing, barracks, child care, spouse
employment, health care, and the exceptional family member program.
High-quality housing and barracks are key to ensuring overall
health and wellness, thereby contributing to readiness and critical for
retaining Army soldiers and their families. First, the Army supports
DOD's continuous assessment of Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) rates,
ensuring military paychecks keep pace with market conditions across the
country. Average BAH rates have increased 12.1 percent since 2022.
Personnel in 291 of 300 military housing areas received a BAH rate
increase. Second, privatized housing companies began a 6-year, $3-
billion investment plan in 2020 to improve the Army's housing
inventory, to include new builds and major or medium renovations
through 2026. The Army has programmed $1.6 billion for fiscal years
2024 to 2028 to improve the government-owned Army Family Housing
inventory. Third, the Army historically invests an average of $1
billion per year in barracks for construction, restoration, and
modernization across all three Army components. In fiscal year 2024,
the Army is requesting support for permanent-party barracks in Fort
Wainwright, Alaska; Joint Base Lewis McChord, Washington; Fort Bragg,
North Carolina; and Natick Soldier Systems Center, Massachusetts.
Importantly, Army senior leaders remain vigilant in their housing and
barracks oversight responsibilities.
With congressional support, the Army has expanded on-and off-post
child-care options by increasing staff compensation and benefits,
investing in facilities, growing family child care, and extending care
hours. Entry level salaries are now $17.39 per hour. We are offering
recruiting and retention bonuses for child-care staff and providing
them with a 50 percent child-care discount for the first child and a 15
percent multiple-child discount for additional children. In terms of
off-post care options, we continue to provide Army Fee Assistance to
approximately 10,000 children of the Active and Reserve component per
month, all while exploring new initiatives and partnerships. We also
increased the provider rate cap to $1,700 per month, thereby reducing
out-of-pocket expenses for hard-working Army families. Since fiscal
year 2021, Congress has funded seven new Child Development Centers
(CDCs) in Alaska, Hawai.i (2), Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, and
Louisiana. The Army is planning to fund more CDCs in the out years.
Army spouses--over 431,000 across all three components--play an
important role in soldier and family readiness and soldier retention.
Leveraging both Army and DOD programs, and partnerships with other
Federal and non-governmental organizations, we remain committed to
improving spouse employment and career opportunities. When spouses are
satisfied with their careers, employment options, access to services,
and overall quality-of-life, they are far more likely to support their
soldier's continued service.
There are 46,000 Active component soldiers--9 percent of the
force--with family members enrolled in the Exceptional Family Member
Program (EFMP), totaling 55,000 family members. We are committed to
reforming the EFMP and to providing comprehensive and all-inclusive
support to Army families with a family member with a qualifying
condition. In August 2022, we launched the Enterprise EFMP system to
improve enrollment, transparency, assignment coordination, and access
to support. We have also created a centralized EFMP office within the
Headquarters, Department of the Army to coordinate healthcare services,
reassignment processes, and education support services. Taken together,
these initiatives will help reduce the bureaucratic burden on Army
families. Moreover, the Army continues its close partnership with the
Defense Health Agency to ensure access to high-quality healthcare for
our soldiers and their families.
Reducing Harmful Behaviors. People are the Army's number one
priority. We take care of our people by building cohesive teams that
are highly trained, disciplined, and fit, that are ready to fight and
win, and where each person is treated with dignity and respect. Leaders
across the Total Army are steadfastly committed to reducing the harmful
behaviors that break trust with our soldiers and the American people--
including sexual assault and harassment, acts of extremism, and racism,
among others. To reduce harmful behaviors, we are shifting the paradigm
from focusing on intervention and response to prioritizing integrated
prevention activities. Integrated prevention activities address the
conditions that lead to harm by reducing risk factors and increasing
protective measures to preclude harmful behaviors. To that end, we are
aggressively implementing the fiscal year 2022 Independent Review
Commission's recommendations to counter sexual assault and sexual
harassment within our formations, to include realigning Sexual Assault
Response Coordinators (SARCs) and Victim Advocates from the operational
chain of command to the Lead SARC at each installation. This
independent reporting structure will enable Sexual Harassment/Assault
Response and Prevention, or SHARP, professionals to advocate for
victims more effectively.
The Army is committed to working with Congress and the OSD to
effectively implement the military justice reforms directed by the
fiscal year 2022 and fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorization
Acts. In July 2022, the Army issued a General Order establishing the
Office of the Special Trial Counsel (OSTC) as a field operating agency.
The Senate confirmed our nominee for Lead Special Trial Counsel in
November 2022 and set his subsequent promotion to brigadier general in
January 2023. The Army expects the OSTC to reach full operational
capability by December 27, 2023, as required by law.
Every single suicide is one tragedy too many. Exposure to harmful
behaviors, such as sexual assault, harassment, or other acts of
violence, may increase the risk of suicide. The Army is committed to
supporting those exposed to harmful behaviors and doing everything we
can to address this critical issue. Fortunately, we saw significant
decreases in suicide across all Army components in 2022. The Army is
leveraging a new public health approach to prevent and respond to
suicide at the individual and community levels. We will publish a
comprehensive suicide prevention regulation to define this new approach
for the force by the end of Q3 fiscal year 2023. Army leaders continue
to employ the Health Readiness and Suicide Risk Reduction Tool across
our formations. Last year, we introduced the ``Stories of Hope''
podcast to raise awareness, reduce stigmas, and increase help-seeking
behaviors.
50 years of the all-volunteer force
As we commemorate 50 years of the All-Volunteer Force, it has never
been more important to recruit and retain the talented individuals who
make our Army the world's greatest fighting force. We win through our
people--our Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve soldiers; our families;
Army civilians; and our veterans and retired Soldiers for Life. We need
every American to know that the U.S. Army is an organization of endless
possibilities that provides a pathway to success both in and out of
uniform. Our message is clear: if you want to serve something greater
than yourself, if you want to belong to the world's greatest team, if
you want to BE ALL YOU CAN BE, then join us. With the limitless talent
our Nation has to offer and continued support from Congress, we will
remain ready to fight and win, against any adversary, anywhere in the
world.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General McConville.
Secretary Wormuth, our munitions situation has come into
very, very sort of focused and graphic dimensions with the
Ukrainian fight. Not only do we have to continue to supply the
Ukrainians, we also have to replenish our supplies.
So what obstacles are in your way to do that and what
should we do as a Congress to assist you?
Ms. Wormuth. I think, Senator, the biggest obstacle--there
are perhaps two obstacles but let me first say I think we are
buying at the absolute edge of defense industrial capacity
right now and we are really working to expand that capacity in
real time, and that is why you see us investing $1.5 billion in
our own organic industrial base so the ammo plants, for
example, at Scranton that build 155mm shell casings we are
investing in that plant to increase its production capacity,
and we have done a lot with industry, as I said.
The multi-year procurement authorities that we have been
given are very, very helpful and that is one thing that I think
is helping us quite a bit.
The biggest obstacles, really, are twofold, I would say.
One, some of the machining tools that are needed to open up new
production lines are just very large, complex machines
themselves and take time to fabricate and time to install, and
there is just a limit to what we can do to compress that
timeframe.
Then the other issue is, of course, some of the fragility
in the supply chain that we have seen throughout the pandemic
and we are, again, working very closely with our defense
industry partners to try to help them strengthen those supply
chains wherever we can.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
General McConville, we are at an unfortunate impasse in
efficiently nominating and confirming general officers and flag
officers. Can you tell us what the real-world effect of this
is, unit readiness but also, I think, morale and the personal
decisions of families about whether they are going to stay in
the service or depart?
General McConville. Senator, right now at the Senate we
have three three-star generals. One is the space missile
commander and the G-4 and also our Assistant Secretary of the
Army Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASALT) and there is
also 37 other one-star generals.
The impact is probably most felt in some ways on the
families and the kids. Even though it looks like it is only 40
generals, there are probably four or five other transitions
that have to happen so as someone moves up, someone moves, and
works their way through.
So what it really does it affects the families and some of
the kids. They are trying to figure out where they are going to
go to school, when they are going to move, and all those things
kind of come in to the readiness of the force.
As you know, we have some major transitions coming up this
summer, and we talked about--I am going to retire by law and
that is going to be in August and so there will be a
replacement that will go through the process.
But with every--at this level there are probably eight
moves we made. There will be a promotion to the chief, whoever
that person becomes. All those jobs are going to have to
change.
All those officers have families and kids that are going to
be affected, and anything we can do to help smooth those
transitions will put us in a much better position for
readiness.
Chairman Reed. I think there is another aspect here, too,
is that we have some extraordinary talented--in fact, I would
say they are all extraordinarily talented--the senior officers
and even captains and majors who could walk out the door
tomorrow and command million-dollar salaries as crypto
specialists, et cetera.
Is that a dynamic, too, that is being affected?
General McConville. Well, I hope not. Most officers do not
do it for the pay. If you take a look at the one-star pay, it
is $180,000. People go, that is a lot of money. But most of
these folks are sitting with 30 years in so actually it is a
net of about 45. They make--they do these jobs for $45,000 a
year and generals do it for nothing because we are at 40
percent in those type things.
But people do not do it for the money. I think they do it
for the respect, and so I think that is very, very important
that we actually take a look at what they do. These general
officers and these leaders that are coming up in the Army are
the best I have ever seen.
I have been doing this for a long time. I have seen a lot
of generals. They are all combat proven. Their families have
been through 20 years of continuous combat. They are the best I
have ever seen and I would ask that we do all we can to get
them confirmed.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much. My time is
rapidly diminishing and just let me commend Madam Secretary,
you and General McConville for, again, looking at this
contested logistics cross-functional team.
Napoleon, I think, said an army moves on its stomach, and
in the Pacific, particularly, we might be able to produce the
ammunition, but if we cannot get it to the front lines, we will
not prevail.
With that, and I will try to be--I will stop now and,
again, thank you.
Senator Wicker, please?
Senator Wicker. It is hard to stop, is it not, Mr.
Chairman?
Let us talk about unfunded priorities, General McConville
and Madam Secretary.
The Army budget request includes investments to support
prototyping for the long-range hypersonic missile flight test,
the mid-range capability missile, initial fielding of the
precision strike missile, both the mid-range capability (MRC)
and PrSM, our own INDOPACOM commanders' unfunded priorities
list.
So I want to ask you to talk about that. And also the
commander's unfunded priorities list includes $377 million for
Army campaigning. Tell us, and we will, first, General
McConville, do you agree that expanding the Pacific Pathways
program gives us more deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and would
you discuss, please, specifically those unfunded priorities?
General McConville. Yes. I think it is very important that
we continue campaigning in the Indo-Pacific. That is how we
build strong allies and partners and relationships, and those
are very important in any future conflict.
Senator Wicker. Okay, do you have any idea why they were
not funded? Did this come down from Office of Management and
Budget (OMB)?
Secretary Wormuth, would you comment on that?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator Wicker, we have funding in our base
budget for Operation Pacific Pathways. I do not have the number
off the top of my head but it is, I think, over $100 million
for Pacific Pathways.
I think the unfunded list that you are referring to is the
INDOPACOM commanders' unfunded priority list.
Senator Wicker. Indeed, yes, that is my question.
Ms. Wormuth. I have no doubt that Admiral Aquilino would
like to see more invested in both exercises and weapon systems.
He is very focused on his theater.
We in the Army have to balance across all of our
requirements across the European theater or across the
INDOPACOM theater. We have got to be able to invest
sufficiently in our modernization systems and take care of our
people.
We have invested in Pacific Pathways. We are investing in
modernization of the precision strike missile, the mid-range
capability.
I just suspect that Admiral Aquilino would like to see us
do more but again----
Senator Wicker. Well, would you like to see us do more? If
we found the extra money that would be advantageous for
national security in the Indo-Pacific, would it not?
Ms. Wormuth. Certainly, if Congress were to give the Army
more money I think we would look at investments in the
INDOPACOM region, yes.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Now, let us talk about recruiting,
and I think, General McConville, you mentioned inspiring young
people and, of course, you have inspired the next generation of
McConvilles to do this.
Secretary Wormuth, you are married, I believe, to a retired
naval officer.
It occurs to me that with base closures and the shrinking
military presence around the country that there are fewer and
fewer young Americans who actually grow up knowing members of
the military and seeing them go off to work and having them as
members of their families.
Yes or no, General McConville, this is part of the problem,
is it not?
General McConville. I believe so. Eighty-three percent of
the young men and women that come into the military come from a
military family and that population with 1 percent serving is
getting much smaller.
Senator Wicker. Right. I have been a strong advocate for
expanding high school JROTC since I became aware of a RAND
Corporation study which basically sang the praises of JROTC as
a subset of high achievers within a school.
You could even have a poorly performing school but the
subset of students there who are participating in JROTC stay in
school longer, they graduate with higher grades, and they
achieve better in life.
I have never found a superintendent or principal who, when
asked about JROTC, did not say they would like to have JROTC in
their school or they are delighted that they have them.
General McConville, if we went beyond what the DOD is
asking in expanded JROTC in the high schools how helpful would
that be?
General McConville. What I know, Senator, is that 44
percent of the young men and women that come into the military
come from a high school that has JROTC and 10 percent of the
high schools have JROTC, not necessarily in that, and I think
what is really important is the structure and the exposure that
they get.
But more importantly is the instructors. We have got to
make sure whoever the instructors are are of the quality they
are going to help inspire young men and women to serve.
Senator Wicker. Indeed, these are probably retired senior
officers or retired senior enlisted persons who are very
inspiring.
General McConville. Many are, but it only takes one to not
live up to that standard that can hurt the program. So I think
it is extremely important we have strong vetting in place and
make sure we have the right people leading these programs.
Senator Wicker. And I agree with you there. Thank you very
much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.
Senator Gillibrand, please?
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wormuth, in October you ordered inspections into
toxic mold on military installations and found that over 2,000
Army facilities have mold problems.
I understand that the proposed budget for new barrack
buildings would only pay for five new barracks buildings. How
much does the Army need to remediate these mold issues or
rebuild impacted facilities?
Ms. Wormuth. Thank you, Senator.
Yes, we found mold. We inspected 68,000 buildings and found
mold in about 2,100, and we are investing $3.5 million to
remediate the mold in those 2,100 building and we are going to
continue to keep a very close eye on mold in the barracks.
We are spending about a billion dollars a year across all
three components--Active, Guard and Reserve--on barracks, both
renovations and building new barracks, and we are going to
continue to do that through 2030.
The challenge we have, Senator, is just we have such an
enormous inventory of barracks that we are not able to rebuild
all of them in 1 to 2 years as we might like and still be able
to, again, invest in new weapon systems and invest in other
initiatives that we need to do. So we are trying to strike a
balance.
Senator Gillibrand. Are you doing any medical monitoring of
the servicemembers who have been exposed to toxic mold?
Ms. Wormuth. I think we probably need to do more there to
make sure that we are tracking that. I know that there has been
a DOD IG [Inspector General] report recently that touches on
that.
Senator Gillibrand. I would like you to submit an analysis
about what you intend to do to make sure the servicemembers who
have been exposed are healthy.
Ms. Wormuth. Okay. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Ms. Wormuth. Mold in housing, barracks, and other Army
facilities can adversely affect the morale and health of
soldiers and families, resulting in reduced readiness. To
prevent this, U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM)
is ensuring all mold-related work orders in Army facilities are
addressed by a certified inspector within 24 hours. IMCOM also
ensuring privatized housing companies similarly respond to work
orders pertaining to mold.
The Army developed recommendations for remediating indoor
mold based on the industry standard for mold remediation.
Trained IMCOM housing inspectors evaluate housing and
barracks for health risks. These inspectors focus on areas
where mold is suspected or indicated. All relevant data is
documented in the DOD enterprise Military Housing (eMH) data
base, including inspections and environmental health
assessment, data and recommendations; maintenance and repair
actions; tenant concerns; work order status; and information
regarding potential environmental health exposures, the tenant
potentially affected, and the status of the identified risk.
Soldiers and family members are advised to consult their
health care provider if they have health concerns about mold.
Healthcare providers are prepared to fully evaluate patients
presenting with symptoms of asthma, hypersensitivity
pneumonitis, rhinitis, or rhinosinusitis, to include ordering
any appropriate diagnostic tests. If an evaluation reveals that
patient symptoms could be associated with damp housing
conditions, healthcare providers will conduct a two-part
interview to assist in determining whether a building
assessment is justified (e.g., focus on moisture or fungal
growth issues.)
This integrated clinical and environmental approach helps
determine if patient symptoms could be associated with damp
housing conditions. Such a determination can trigger a home
assessment and potential International Classification of
Diseases (ICD-10) coding in the patient's electronic health
record as contact and/or suspected exposure to mold.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
General McConville, I was deeply concerned to hear of
Private Ana Basaldua Ruiz's death on Fort Hood earlier this
month. Yet another young woman who was allegedly sexually
harassed is now deceased.
Can you discuss how the Army is progressing in building a
prevention workforce and implementing the Independent Review
Commission's recommendations to decrease the incidence of
sexual harassment and how are you protecting your young
servicemembers from these crimes?
General McConville. Yes, Senator. Just like I said, parents
send their sons and daughters to us. I have sent our sons and
daughters to the Army and we have a sacred obligation to take
care of them. Commanders will be held responsible.
But it really comes down to from the bottom up, building
cohesive teams where everyone takes care of each other,
everyone treats everyone with dignity and respect. When that
does not happen, we are going to investigate. We are going to
hold those accountable that did it.
But the Army's trying to really get after that. There is a
lot of prevention for us getting--how do you get ahead of these
type things, how do you make sure it comes back to readiness.
Everyone has to be a valued member of the team. Everyone has to
be treated with dignity and respect, and that is what our
commanders are doing.
Senator Gillibrand. So with regard to Fort Hood, the
previous report said that the climate was so toxic that it was
permissive for sexual assault and sexual harassment. What are
you doing to address the climate at Fort Hood?
General McConville. Well, we have. We changed out--from
that report we actually took out 14 leaders, which has never
been done in, really--at least I know in the history of the
Army.
But the leadership that is in place at Fort Hood I have
tremendous confidence in. They are after this. They are on top
of it. They are doing everything they can to get the
investigation and get the information and they are working very
closely with the family.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Secretary Wormuth, will you talk about the development of
Multi-Domain Operations and how you have shifted personnel to
ensure that Multi-Domain Task Forces are fully resourced? How
has staffing for these roles been impacted by the Army failing
to hit its recruitment goals by thousands of soldiers?
Ms. Wormuth. Thank you, Senator.
As you know, we now have three Multi-Domain Task Forces and
we will eventually build a fourth and fifth Multi-Domain Task
Force. They vary a little bit in size. They are tailor made to
the theaters that they support and work in, and right now they
are fully manned.
I would expect that we will continue to make sure that they
are fully manned even as we work through how we are going to
deal with the Army getting slightly smaller and dealing with
recruiting challenges.
But they are very, very important because they bring
capabilities that are kinetic through the long-range fires
battalions but also very important nonkinetic work. They work
on intelligence and developing targeting. They have cyber
capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, and they are
going to be very, very important in both Europe and Indo-
Pacific.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Can you discuss in this
setting how Project Linchpin is integrating artificial
intelligence (AI) into Army systems? I understand that the
project aims to improve navigation systems, anticipate
maintenance needs, help with targeting, and aid intelligence
analysis.
Will you address how this project will or will not keep a
human in the loop on intelligence and targeting analyses?
Ms. Wormuth. That is an important project and we are very
much trying to integrate and bring more artificial intelligence
capabilities into our Army in various ways. That is very much
going to be a wave of the future, I think, clearly.
Army Futures Command is going to be looking as we think--
start thinking about the Army of 2040 how can we bring even
more AI capabilities.
So we are using AI right now with some of the work that we
are doing with the experimentation we are doing with the 18th
Airborne Corps. We also have an AI Integration Center at
Carnegie Mellon University that we are working with very
closely and many of the fellows coming out of that program are
going into different parts of the Army to help us do more with
AI capabilities.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Fischer, please?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Wicker briefly touched on the--really, the need and
the value that we receive as Members of Congress from the
unfunded priority list that you provide and I would say that
the majority Members of Congress view that as a useful tool so
that the Committee can use that and you can convey what is
needed to meet the challenges that you face.
So I do thank you, General, for the visibility that you
have provided on the importance of your needs so that it will
allow us to make more responsible, I think, resourcing
decisions on those needs.
If I could, I would like to ask both of you--the Army has
spent the last 20 years primarily conducting counterterrorism
and counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East. Can you
provide an update on how you plan to rebalance your forces,
restructure training and exercises, or develop unique
capabilities in order to meet the increased demand that we are
going to see in the INDOPACOM area? I would especially like to
know what you learned from the Project Convergence exercises.
Ms. Wormuth. Certainly, Senator Fischer.
We are doing a lot to shift from counter-insurgency (COIN)
and counter terrorism (CT) to large-scale combat operations
through exercises like Defender Europe and Pacific Pathways in
the Pacific.
We have come out with a new field manual, 3-O, which is our
vision and doctrine for multi-domain operations, and I would
say when we look at the Indo-Pacific we are really going to be
focused on establishing and setting up and securing staging
bases for air and maritime forces, contested logistics.
The Army will play a huge role in terms of making sure that
the joint force has the supplies that it needs, and many of the
new air and missile defense systems that we are developing are
directly designed to deal with the anti-access area denial
threats that China poses, for example.
So our entire modernization program is focused on
developing the kinds of capabilities that we need for large-
scale combat.
Senator Fischer. General, with Project Convergence what did
you learn?
General McConville. Yes, I think Project Convergence is
really the future. It is the ability to take deep sensing,
different types of sensors, and quickly move information to an
integrated battle command system, take advantage of artificial
intelligence, and then move that data to an effective lethal
means.
A good example of that is countering unmanned aerial
systems (UAS). So we are going to have a whole bunch coming at
us and you do not necessarily want to be shooting Patriot
missiles at $100,000 UASs and so if you think about the future
battlefield there will be multiple threats.
We will have multiple sensors to pick up those threats. We
will bring them quickly into an integrated battle command
system, take advantage of the technology, and then get them to
the right weapon systems that can deal with that problem.
We are seeing this nascent right now in Ukraine. They are
doing a very good job taking advantage of the sensor they have
with the fires they have and that is a lot to do with how
effective they have been.
Senator Fischer. When you look at the change in the
battlefield, and we talked about this a little bit earlier this
week, can you provide the Committee an update on the
development of the Army's long-range hypersonic weapon?
General McConville. Yes. Right now we have a battery that
is already fielded. The systems are ready to go. We are doing
testing. We have a couple more tests to do on the weapon
systems and we had to test that we are working through like
every test to get it to the final configuration.
But at least the schedule we have right now we anticipate
having a hypersonics capability by the end of this year, which
has been pretty remarkable.
Senator Fischer. Yes. Thank you.
Madam Secretary, we spoke earlier this week about the
Future Soldier prep course. Can you highlight to the Committee
some of the successes of the program?
Ms. Wormuth. Certainly. This program has been very
successful. We have it at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and
also Fort Benning, Georgia. We have had about 8,000 young
Americans go through the program. There is two components. It
is sort of like a mini boot camp.
There is an academic component, which is designed at
helping young people who have not quite scored high enough on
the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) raise
their scores, and then we have a physical fitness component
because in some cases we have got young kids who want to serve
but they are not quite within our body fat composition
requirements.
It has been very successful, both pathways, if you will.
About 97 percent of the folks who go into it have graduated and
have gone on to basic training, and many of them are performing
very well at basic training as well.
Senator Fischer. So that is a way to get closer to the
goals that you have for the recruitment----
Ms. Wormuth. Yes, absolutely, and to do so in a way that
does not lower our standards, which both the chief and I feel
is very important.
Senator Fischer. Exactly. Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Let me remind my colleagues that when we conclude this open
session we will recess and start a closed session in SVC-217.
Senator Hirono, please?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here and, General McConville,
thank you very much for your service and best wishes on your
retirement.
Secretary Wormuth, we have talked a number of times about
the State of the military's infrastructure in Hawaii, and I
know you have visited Hawaii several times to see the failures
for yourself.
I appreciate your attention in this area but as you know
there are still rolling blackouts at Schofield Barracks, issues
with the water systems at Tripler, and UXO removal concerns on
the Big Island.
A majority of the Army's facilities in Hawaii are failed or
failing with an estimated cost of repair of almost $5 billion.
Fixing this will not happen in 1 year but we must start taking
these projects off the unfunded lists and make real progress.
Madam Secretary, how are we going to chip away to the $5
billion in fixing that we have to do? Do we not need to get
more of these projects off the unfunded list?
Ms. Wormuth. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
We do have considerable infrastructure challenges in
Hawaii, as you note, and I would say both above ground in terms
of buildings and barracks--I saw some barracks that were not in
good shape at Schofield Barracks--as well as our underground
infrastructure in Hawaii.
The chief and I right now as we look to the next budget--we
are building the next 5-year budget--are looking at how we can
invest more in infrastructure. We actually sent out a team from
Army Materiel Command and from our installations' energy and
environment team to assess the infrastructure.
They came back with, frankly, a multibillion-dollar bill
and so what we are trying to do is look at how we can find more
resources to put toward that problem and we also want to do it
in a way, frankly, that is mindful of the limited construction
capacity that is on Hawaii.
It is going to be complex to sort of figure out how many
projects we can do a year and how do we phase that in in such a
way that we do not overtax the capacity on islands.
Senator Hirono. It makes a huge difference to the community
when the military writ large--because the community is not
necessarily making distinctions that Red Hill, oh, that is a
Navy issue and Pohakuloa is an Army issue. It is all combined,
and every time we can make real progress in dealing with the
infrastructure needs I think it would be--it really helps the
community to understand that the military is there as part of
our community and they are making progress or they are doing
good things. We need to think of it in that way and I know you
recognize that.
Senator Wicker has asked these questions, General
McConville. The National Defense Strategy makes clear that the
priority theater is the Indo-Pacific. So efforts like the
Army's Operation Pathways, the newly constituted multi-domain
task force in Hawaii, and the INDOPACOM aligned fifth security
force assistant brigade are crucial to the Army's success in
this area.
Yet, despite Admiral Aquilino identifying the need for our
$473 million investment in Pacific Pathways what is being
requested is only $123 million and--because Pacific Pathways,
though, that mainly pays for exercises with allies. Is that not
right, General?
General McConville. That is correct.
Senator Hirono. So I assume that when there is such a big
gap between what Admiral Aquilino wants and what he is getting
that it just means that we are doing far fewer exercises in the
Indo-Pacific AOR [area of responsibilities], and I do not know
what the numbers are. But at some--is that a good way to think
about it, that we are funding far fewer exercises than what
Admiral Aquilino thinks is necessary?
General McConville. Well, as the Secretary said, we are
trying to balance the exercises with the barracks with the
training and in the modernization, and we have requested
additional funding if it is available to support that
campaigning and I stand by the notion the more campaigning, the
more resources we have, I think the stronger our allies and
partners will be and the stronger our presence will be.
Senator Hirono. I tend to agree with that and, yet, the
military has over an $800 billion budget and one would think
that some of these priorities can be better met.
You were asked about the sexual harassment of--both of
you--and it continues to be a scourge in spite of the efforts
of this Committee, particularly with Senator Gillibrand's
leadership.
So, General McConville, you noted that it starts at the top
and it goes all the way down. I think both of you agree. I am
glad that you took swift action with regard to the culture at
Fort Hood.
But with the most recent tragic suicide, I realize the
investigation is still going on but I think that how we deal
with sexual assault and harassment really impacts our ability
to recruit women to the military. Would you agree with that,
Madam Secretary and General?
General McConville. I think it affects readiness. I think--
--
Senator Hirono. Yes.
General McConville.--one of the secret sauces of good units
is cohesive teams and if you have sexual harassment, you have
sexual assault, you have any type of racism, any of those type
things hurt the cohesion of a unit and we do not want that in
our Army.
Senator Hirono. We can do a lot more, I know that. So thank
you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Cotton, please?
Senator Cotton. On behalf of all our Arkansans I also want
to express my condolences for the soldiers whose lives were
lost in the crash of two Blackhawk helicopters near Fort
Campbell overnight.
It is terrible tragedy for all their families and the 101st
community, and if you have served time there as I know General
McConville has served more than a day or two at Fort Campbell,
it is especially hard hitting.
General McConville, I want to add my thanks and
congratulations to you for a highly distinguished and decorated
career of service to the Army. I know you are not retiring yet
and you will run through the tape later this year.
But we are very grateful for what you have done for our
country and we are glad that in the middle of a recruiting
crisis we are getting a four for one McConville trade. We may
be losing you but we have got three children and one in-law. So
thank you and your family for your service.
Secretary Wormuth, I want to talk about the Army Combat
Fitness Test and this ongoing years-long saga of that. Last
year the Army unveiled gender-based standards after many years
of promising gender-neutral standards.
As a result, this Committee directed the Army within 180
days of the enactment of last year's NDAA to promulgate new
gender-neutral standards for combat arms, Military Occupation
Specialties (MOSs). What is the status of those new standards?
Ms. Wormuth. Thank you, Senator. We are looking forward to
coming to brief you in June about where we are on that NDAA
requirement, and I know you and the chief had a discussion
about this.
The language in the bill, as you know, talks about gender-
neutral standards for combat, military occupational
specialties, and we will be able to lay out for you how we have
approached that to date.
We also, as you know, are coming up on the deadline for the
Active Duty component to finish taking the test for record, the
Army Combat Fitness Test. The Guard and Reserve folks have
until October to take that test for record.
But we can also give you an update on the data that we are
seeing from that and what we can take away from that and what
we can learn in terms of how we might adapt the ACFT, going
forward.
Senator Cotton. So the law calling the Army to establish
the standards by June, not to brief Congress by June, are you
going to--are you prepared to meet that requirement to
establish the standards?
Ms. Wormuth. We actually have standards in a Department of
the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) that lay out requirements for all of
the combat MOSs that are gender neutral and we can brief you on
those.
Senator Cotton. Can you tell us what those combat MOSs are
today or what branches, at least?
Ms. Wormuth. I believe that we have them for all of the
MOSs, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Okay. But it is your understanding--the
expectation of this Committee is that we have a single standard
for the combat arms branches and then for all the other
noncombat arms branches there will be a male and a female
standard?
Ms. Wormuth. As I have read the law that you all put in
last year, these are standards. They are physical gender-
neutral standards for combat, military occupational
specialties, yes.
Senator Cotton. Yes, because I mean--and I was not the only
one. Senators Ernst, Gillibrand, and Duckworth expressed
concerns about this as well as did most of the Committee.
I mean, when you are talking about things like the infantry
there is irreducible physical demands. You have to be able to
carry a 75- or 100-pound pack or carry a 250-pound wounded
comrade, whether you are a man or a woman. Or if you are an
artillery or armor you have to be able to handle shells that
can weigh up to a hundred pounds.
The standard, we all think, should be somewhat different if
you are, say, working on a computer. That work is very vital
but it is not the same kind of physical demands that the combat
arms are, and in the middle of a recruiting crisis I do not
think we should be taking steps to dissuade anyone, young men
or young women, who may not be up to the physical rigors of
armor and artillery but are able to perform all those other
roles. That is your understanding of what this Congress
intended, right?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, the DA PAM spells out exactly those
kinds of things. I think the issue has been is--there is our
combat. There is the fitness test and then there are the
standards for the MOSs and there is a distinction there.
Senator Cotton. Correct. I mean, this has been a long saga,
as I said, and in retrospect, I mean, we had an Army that, let
us see, toppled a Marxist government in Grenada, toppled a
narco government in Panama, kicked Saddam Hussein out of
Kuwait, toppled the Taliban, toppled Saddam Hussein, doing
pushups, sit-ups, and a 2-mile run.
So I think those guys were pretty physically fit that did
all those things. But we are where we are. We have moved to the
combat fitness test. I do not think the issue are the events on
it.
The issue is making sure that we have high standards that
are suited for the demands of the battlefield and we just want
to make sure that that is what we are going to get from the
Army by the 180-day deadline.
Ms. Wormuth. Yes.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Kaine, please?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to our
witnesses, thank you for your service to the country. I add my
sentiment to those who have expressed just sorrow over the
incident with the servicemen and women at Fort Campbell. I know
that it is tough for the whole Army family and the Committee
shares in that.
I just want to share with my Committee colleagues, I had
the opportunity to do something 6 days ago. I was at the first
of the nine base renamings. Two years ago in the NDAA this
Committee in a bipartisan way decided that bases that had been
named for Confederates should be renamed for American heroes
who whom all could admire, and it was a--it is a pretty tough
task.
The naming commission considered about 7,000 or 8,000 names
and then reduced that to 2,000 and then to about 500, and
eventually reduced it down to 87 names and from those names had
to find nine. Talk about a commission I am glad I was not on.
But the first renaming was Fort Pickett, which had been
built right before World War I and named in honor of General
Pickett, the Confederate general. It was renamed Fort Barfoot.
Van Barfoot was a Choctaw from Mississippi who enlisted,
came to train at Fort Pickett, and then was deployed overseas
in World War II and fought courageously in Italy and won a
medal of honor under the most unusual circumstances,
demonstrated great heroism in killing a lot of Germans and
capturing scores of Germans and then saving the lives of many
Americans.
He then came back and continued to serve in the Army in
Korea, served in the Army in Vietnam. When he retired from
Active Duty he was connected deeply to the Virginia National
Guard, which is headquartered now at Fort Barfoot. Was very
involved in the Virginia War Memorial in Richmond that honors
those who lost their lives in recent wars.
He last made news when he was about 90 years old because he
hung an American flag that was too big, according to his
homeowners association, and they had the foolishness to try to
test a congressional Medal of Honor winner.
The ceremony was just amazing. It was led by tribal
representatives from Virginia, Virginia's recently recognized
tribes, and everyone in this community--Dinwiddie and
Blackstone and Crewe and Lunenburg, Brunswick Counties--was so
proud to be there and the naming commission did a remarkable
job.
Just to see the family--Colonel Barfoot's daughter spoke,
other family members were there, and to talk to the naming
commission about the care that they used in approaching this
and knowing something about the other names that are
forthcoming--the other base names--will be done in the months
to come.
I just wanted to say job well done to the Army and to the
naming commission and doing it and just to report back to my
colleagues.
Everyone here around this dais supported that at the time
in Committee, and I think if you go to one of these you will be
really proud, as I was, to have played a little part in it and
appreciate the Army approaching it the right way.
General McConville, I have a couple of questions for you.
In watching the Russian invasion of Ukraine we realize how
different a conflict is where you have contested logistics and
contested airspace versus the war on terrorism where we often
had dominance in airspace and there was not such a contest.
Can you share your thoughts--you have talked a little bit
about this already this morning--on the contested logistics and
how the Army will conduct logistics operations in contested
environments and the plans that you are putting in place to do
that?
General McConville. Yes, Senator. I think, again, one of
our biggest changes in our training and how we operate is we
are able to operate fairly without any type of enemy contact
from here all the way to Iraq, Afghanistan, and we know that is
not going to be the case. It is not going to be the case in the
Pacific if we have to fight in the Pacific. It is not going to
be the case here.
So what we are doing is building those capabilities and
some of it is just by prepositioned stocks. We cannot assume we
are going to be able to just sail across the seas safely. So we
want to position equipment and ammunition in the theater. We
need to disperse it. We need to protect it.
There is that old saying about amateurs study tactics and
professionals study logistics and what we see is those tanks
and artillery pieces and aircraft become expensive paperweights
if they do not have fuel, if they do not have parts, and they
do not have ammunition.
All that is part of what this contested logistics is about,
and you can think about here, I mean, with cyber capability
right now. So we are going to be attacked by cyber. We are
going to--they are going to use space.
We use space a whole bunch right now to move things, and
even how we move by air or sea we are going to have to protect
our systems and we are going to have to be aware of that and we
are going to have to basically fight our way across.
That is where our allies and partners become so important,
the fact we have developed these relations, we have access and
presence, we can quickly move into the--whether it is ports or
airfields, and then we have the equipment and we have forces in
the right place that can facilitate all of this.
Senator Kaine. Just one fact for my colleagues as I
conclude, and it will inspire a question for the record.
In World War II we used 1.67 gallons of fuel per soldier.
In Iraq and Afghanistan that had gone up to 27.3 gallons of
fuel per each member of our troops. The contested logistics
with respect to deployment of fuel that we will need will be a
real challenge and I will ask a question about that for the
record.
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.
Senator Rounds, please?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
both of you for coming before our Committee today.
General McConville, thank you for your service and thank
you to your family for their service to our country as well.
You make a very good point when we talk about the number of
places that you have been but also the fact that we lost young
soldiers who were training and that it is not just those that
are facing an adversary but those that are training throughout
the year throughout our country that also take risk on a daily
basis, and our thoughts and prayers are with you, the entire
team, and the family of these soldiers.
General McConville, as you know, there is an effort by some
in Congress to require sharing of all or some of the 3.1 to 3.4
or .5 band of the electromagnetic spectrum, also known as the
S-Band. Right now it is held by DOD and some of the private
sector needs it for 5G development, which is also important.
But can you confirm that the Army has systems critical to
our national security that reside on this portion of the
spectrum?
General McConville. Yes, I can, Senator, and from where I
sit it is--I know there is a study that is being done. I think
it is really important we do our independent study, take a look
at what that means, and it happens to some of our bases with
encroachment when people want to move close and we understand
that that can happen.
But if we cannot do the training we need to do, same thing
with these systems. I understand perspectives where you want to
develop the communications capability.
But the only thing I would advise if asked is just take a
hard look at--independent people looking at that and we know
the risks to national security when we make that decision.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. I think part of the point that
we try to make is is we are practicing at multiple bases across
the entire United States. So we have that risk at multiple
locations across the entire United States during our training
sessions.
Let me just take a step forward here, Secretary Wormuth.
Thank you for what you do and your looking ahead in terms of
what the Army will be facing.
Part of what it is, and it was just mentioned a minute ago,
and that is the--within the cyber domain and the challenge that
we literally will not go to war without having a cyber
presence.
How well do you believe that the fiscal year 2024 budget
supports the growing cyber threat, and where is the Army taking
risk in the cyber domain and where would additional funding be
most helpful in buying down that cyber risk?
Ms. Wormuth. Thank you, Senator. We are making a lot of
investments related to cyber in this budget because it is such
an important area, and ensuring that we have good cybersecurity
is really critical, particularly for our modernization
programs.
We have got to make sure that they are secure and not able
to be stolen by our adversaries. We have over $400 million in
this budget for implementation of our zero threat approach to
cybersecurity. We are spending about a half billion dollars to
continue moving to the cloud.
One of my objectives is for us to become a more data-
centric Army and, certainly, having our data in the cloud is
critical. We have got about $600 million in the budget for
modernizing our cryptography and retiring some of our technical
debt with our tactical radios.
So I do not think that we are taking a lot of risk in this
budget in the cyber area because it is so important. My own
view is if there is a place where we are taking risk, and I
think this is a place where as an entire joint force we may be
taking risk, it is in--I worry a lot about threats to the
Homeland, particularly through the cyber domain and so much of
the critical infrastructure in our country is outside in the
private sector, that figuring out how we work more closely with
State and local governments, with private companies, to make
sure that we are secured outside the fence line that is where I
think we have risk and that is, in my view, more about how do
we work together better organizationally necessarily than about
the amount of money you spend.
Senator Rounds. I agree with you. I also think that you
have taken a major step forward, once again, in terms of
coordinating with other sectors.
I know that you have entered in or are entering into an
agreement with Dakota State University in South Dakota on some
advanced cyber activity as well and we appreciate the
opportunity to be a part of the solution.
General McConville, I have two thoughts. First of all, I am
just going to ask this rather quickly. I understand that the
Army is the executive agent for the theater, integrated air and
missile defense, including the protection of fixed sites like
airfields and supply depots.
The missile threat to fixed and semi-fixed sites seems one
of the most challenging threats to the joint forces. What
additional investments, if any, does the Army need to make in
air and missile defenses?
General McConville. Senator, I agree with you. It is a
significant threat and we are making significant investments.
We are going to build more Patriots. We are building indirect
fire protection capability, nine of those units. We are
building counter UAS batteries.
I think on the future battlefield we are going to protect
it. But what we are also doing is taking advantage of an
integrated battle command system and, again, this sensor, this
convergence of having multiple--getting away from having one
radar for one air defense system.
So you take advantage of all the sensors that are out there
and you use an integrated battle command system and you get
better sensors so we can see things coming in. Taking advantage
of the technology when it comes to artificial intelligence and
so we can deal with those systems early on.
But I think when the Secretary and I talk about it that is
why air and missile defense is so important, especially in the
Pacific, and we want to be able to do that.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds.
Senator Peters, please?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Madam Secretary and General McConville, I want to
add my condolences to my colleagues' here for the horrible
accident in Kentucky. I know that my heart goes out to their
family, friends, and the entire Army community right now, who I
know is all grieving.
Secretary Wormuth, in 2018, the Army requirements oversight
councils were held for both the Abrams and the Stryker
programs.
A modernization goal was set for the Abrams program at a
rate of one full brigade per annum funding cycle, and similarly
for the Stryker a modernization goal was set to upgrade one
half a brigade each year.
Congress has continually and consistently supported these
programs and maintained these desired modernization rates with
significant congressional adds along the way to support what
Army leadership describes as, quote, ``enduring programs that
the Army will depend on for decades.''
So my question for you, ma'am, does the Army continue to
support the Abrams and Stryker programs and at a modernization
rate that is workable to support the industrial base that makes
this equipment?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, we do very much support the Abrams
and Stryker programs. Those vehicles--I think we have the best
tanks in the world. I think if you asked the Poles and the
Australians they would say the same, the Ukrainians as well.
The challenge that we have is that we are trying to both
continue buying important enduring platforms like Abrams, like
Stryker, while at the same time investing in developing new
next-generation combat vehicles like Armored Multi-Purpose
Vehicle (AMPV), like the optionally manned fighting vehicle,
and with the budget that we have we are only able to buy the
volumes that you see in the budget that we have presented.
I do think in terms of Abrams, for example, as I said,
there are significant foreign military sales that have been
made and I think that will be very helpful with sustaining the
industrial base for those programs.
Senator Peters. Very good.
General McConville, for decades the Latvian--we have had
Latvian troops training with the Michigan National Guard up at
Camp Grayling to learn skills necessary to counter potential
Russian invasion in Latvia and, certainly, never has this
training been more relevant than it is right now.
But in addition to Latvians, we routinely have other
European allies as well as INDOPACOM partners trained at Camp
Grayling to take advantage of the size and the capabilities
that that installation offers.
Our National Guard installations, and I hope you agree, are
a hidden gem. They offer capacity and unique training
environments for not only U.S. forces but also our allies as
well.
So my question for you, General, is how does the Army
budget invest in the National Guard and in particular into its
military installations, its ranges, its training areas, to help
enable the Guard to conduct the multi-domain operations
training that is so essential today?
General McConville. Senator, first of all, let me highlight
what a great job the National Guard is doing with Michigan and
these partners, and if you take a look at Ukraine, you take a
look at Latvia, these State partnerships have been going on for
quite a while and, quite frankly, why these armies have the
capabilities, that they have the capacity and the competence.
What we do in the National Guard is we talk to them very
closely. We want to resource them within our means we can and
we come to their priorities and we lay them out and you will
see some of those even on our unfunded priority list that did
not quite make it in the budget.
Really, like the Secretary said, to us it is all about
balance. We have a fixed budget, as both sides have said. Some
would argue that you cannot transform an Army without having 3
to 5 percent real growth.
We are trying to do that and we are trying to do the best
we can with what we have and deliver the best Army we can do
with the resources we get.
Senator Peters. Thanks.
General, the National Defense Strategy places great
emphasis on the ability of our forces to operate in contested
environments and the need to overcome enemy disruption, and my
question for you is how is the Army empowering commanders and
local installations to replicate live electromagnetic effects
during home station training scenarios focused on operating in
these domains?
General McConville. Yes, that is something we are trying to
get to. I would say we are doing a better job at our National
Training Centers as such because that is expensive and also the
places you can actually do that we have to work our way through
it when you start using those type systems.
But as you say, Senator, that is something that is really
the big shift that we are seeing. We are going to be jammed in
the battlefield. They know how important data is for us.
If you go to the National Training Center right now you
have a very different experience than you did a couple years
ago. You cannot expect to have--if you are emitting as a
command post or you are trying to do things we are going to
take all those things that you depend on away from you so when
you are in actual combat it should be a lot easier.
Senator Peters. Right. Right. Thank you, General.
General McConville. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Ernst, please?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and my condolences as
well to the families and the fellow soldiers all within the
101st Screaming Eagles family. We are sincerely, sincerely
upset about the loss of those soldiers and it hits home for so
many of us.
But thank you for being here today, Secretary Wormuth and
General McConville.
On Saturday I will have the great opportunity to attend a
retirement of a dear friend of mine from the Iowa Army National
Guard, and it seems that many of us that have gray hair are
seeing many of our friends and family members retire through
the years and, General McConville, I wish the best to you and
to your family as well.
We know as we are stepping out of the uniform and out of
the boots and leaving the ranks behind that we need young
soldiers to step up into those ranks and so I do want to
address some of the recruiting challenges that we are seeing
today.
On Tuesday, Chairman Milley had told us that the threats of
America are at its highest since World War II and our Army is
smaller now than it is required to be. By September Army end
strength could fall to 445,000 soldiers and that is a 7 percent
decline just over the past 2 years.
So today I want to focus on our high schools and how some
of those high schools are truly failing our military and their
students.
The law requires high schools that receive Federal funding
allow access to our recruiters and as the Department of
Education admits on its very own website only about 95 percent
of the schools actually follow the law by allowing military
recruiters access to their students.
Mr. Chair, if I could enter into the record--this is from
the Department of Education's website.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
It does raise a question. So 95 percent do allow some level
of access. So what about the 5 percent of schools that deny
access to military recruiters? It really is about following the
law of the United States.
But it is not just about the law. It is about the
opportunity that is extended to those students and it is about
patriotism.
So, General McConville, I am going to ask you to put on a
recruiter's badge for a moment--through your years of
experience you know this very well--but how would you explain
the benefits of service to the many students in the 1,100
schools who deny access? Who have not been able to meet a
recruiter?
General McConville. Yes. What I would say to those
superintendents or those teachers or those counselors that do
not want military recruiters you may be depriving your students
of doing maybe the most important thing in their life and
having an impact.
We use the--kind of the slogan or the motto of ``be all you
can be'' but there are just so many stories of people that have
rose to the highest levels, have gotten an education, whether
they did it in the military or gone further.
But I just think that everyone should have an opportunity
to serve, not necessarily in the Army or the military but just
in general. They will be much better citizens, they will do a
much better job, they will get training, they will get
education, they will get leadership and they will just be--and
when they are older and gray like some of us and they look back
on their lives they will say, ``I served in the 101st Airborne
Division.''
Senator Ernst. Yes.
General McConville. I was part of the Band of Brothers.
There was a young woman from the 82d. We asked her why she
joined the military, and she was at Kabul and did some
incredible things and what she said to us--she goes, ``I did
not want to go through life without having an impact.''
We just had another--an officer. He was an All-American at
Duke, played basketball there. He went to--play professional
basketball and he was talking at an event for us, and he served
with the Rangers. He came back. He goes, ``I worked on a Coach
K. It was great team. I worked--played for two professional
basketball teams. But the best team I ever was on was the Army.
Senator Ernst. Outstanding, and I know one of my staff
members this morning mentioned this is how he came to serve was
he met a recruiter at his school.
I think it is really important that we allow that access
because, as you said, so many people that join they join
because they have a family member. But there is a whole swath
of young men and women that are incredible and really deserve
the opportunity to serve.
They just have to be exposed. They only know what they
know, and those recruiters can really take in discussions about
benefits and patriotism and so we think that that is really,
really important.
I do have some questions that I will submit for the record,
Secretary Wormuth, for you as well in regards to recruiting.
But we, certainly, want to make sure that we are correcting
this by the high schools and I have legislation I am working on
to do that.
But I thank you both very much. General McConville, thank
you for your service.
Thank you, Secretary.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Kelly, please?
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I could not
agree more with the senator from Iowa on this, the opportunity
to serve, and as you mentioned, General, some of it--just
somebody talking about it later, my dad served in the 82d
Airborne, and I would hear it from him all the time and one of
the reasons I took my path not in the Army but in the Navy.
Also, I want to share my condolences on yours and, Madam
Secretary, for you, too, and the Army's loss. We often expect
losses in combat. Training accidents are--especially mid-airs
are just horrific, and so we are with you in sharing the grief
over this.
General, you talked a little bit about training
opportunities. I want to talk about a place specific to Arizona
because for the last several years we have been hearing from
witnesses as we prepare for this pacing threat of China that we
need to be doing everything we can to prepare for this fight
that we, obviously, do not want to get in and the best way we
can--in my opinion, that we can avoid staying out of a fight is
to make sure that our adversaries understand that they are not
going to win and that means being as prepared as possible.
Electronic warfare is something we have talked about a lot
lately. It is a critical mission. I am really pleased to see
that DOD has taken a fresh look at our capability here because
it is going to be part and a big part of a potential future
fight, especially if it is in the Western Pacific.
I have been looking at this issue closely and I know some
of my colleagues on the Committee have as well. But we need
expanded airspace. The stick is longer than it used to be. We
need more space. The threat is more significant, and we need to
be able to replicate the high-end threat and have areas where
we can put emitters and have the dynamic opportunities to best
equip their forces and train them.
DOD has had officials out to see the electronic proving
ground at Fort Huachuca in Arizona and folks agree that this
place has the capacity and it also has the expertise and they
are willing to do more.
General, can you please talk to the Army's vision and
strategy for ensuring that our military is prepared for the
advanced electronic warfare threats that we will face in the
future?
General McConville. Yes, Senator, you make a great point
about Fort Huachuca. There is a reason why we have the unmanned
aerial system training out there.
There is a reason why we have electronic warfare capability
at areas like that. It takes special places. Certainly, got to
have the size. But it is also where you can do it. There is--I
mean, we do a lot of stuff at the National Training Center. We
do it out at Fort Huachuca.
But it is something that is going to be more important in
the future. We got to train the way we are going to fight. We
got to expose our commanders to that environment, and our
intent is that our training centers are so rigorous that when
they actually go into combat it is an easier day.
Senator Kelly. Yes. That is what you want, right. You want
the training to be the most challenging thing.
General McConville. That is right.
Senator Kelly. Not often the case. You know, Fort Huachuca
also offers geography and a landscape that really does not
exist anywhere else, this natural bowl where you can transmit
on a lot of different frequencies at very high energy.
This is a real opportunity, too, and it has got a lot of
potential to help the Air Force with their F-35s that every--
not every but a lot of their training missions they need to be
considering the high-end threats.
We can put emitters at Fort Huachuca. We also have
opportunities to extend the size of the Barry Goldwater Range
and may be connected to a Military Operations Area (MOA). The
Jackal MOA, I think, that is north of Fort Huachuca.
In my remaining time I am going to have another question
for the record on the Fort Huachuca range. But I have got about
30 seconds and I really do not want to go over.
Madam Secretary, I am going to submit another question for
the record about your vision for human machine teaming and
working together. That offers a lot of opportunities for us in
future conflicts.
Thank you, and I will yield back my 8 seconds.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. I appreciate that
very much.
Senator Scott, please?
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Thank each of you for
being here. Thank you for what you do.
General, can you talk about why should communist China or
why should Russia, any of our enemies--why should they be
concerned about the capacity that our Army and our military has
and why should they--when they look at our recruiting we are
not hitting our recruiting numbers.
Support of the military is not what it used to be. Should
they be concerned? Should they be concerned whether if they
want to invade Ukraine or China wants to go in Taiwan or North
Korea wants to do something in South Korea? Should they be
concerned or not?
General McConville. I think when I look at our adversaries,
should they be concerned about the United States Army,
absolutely, yes, they should be. It is the most lethal and
ready army in the world and I think when we--I have spent a lot
of time traveling around the world so when I go to Latvia,
Estonia, Poland, Romania, you name it, that is the respect that
our soldiers have.
Every one of those countries wants us to be a partner with
them and I think it is the same thing in the Pacific. I think
it is only going to get better with resources as we transform
the Army to make sure that we have the capabilities as part of
the joint force that are going to make maybe an amphibious type
of assault or an airborne assault or an air assault very
difficult to do.
As far as for people side of the house do we have some
challenges? Absolutely. But we are looking for everyone's help
to work our way through these problems, to inspire young men
and women to serve.
Senator Scott. What do you think about Taiwan's effort to
put themselves in a position that communist China will not want
to invade? Do you think they are doing all the right things?
Do you think they are--they have a big enough military and
do you think they have made--are going to make it difficult for
them?
General McConville. What I would like to do, Senator, is
take that to the--if we can take it to the next session.
But here is what I would say, generally. I think there are
some good lessons learned when we deal with allies and partners
from Ukraine, and what I would say is take a look at what are
their capabilities, what are their capacity, what is their
competence, and by capabilities what type of weapon system they
have.
Do they have the right weapon systems to defend themselves?
Do they have enough of those weapon systems? Are they competent
in those weapon systems?
But, to me, the most important thing is do they have the
will to fight, and if they do not have the will to fight to
defend their country like the Ukrainians did we need to take a
hard look at that.
Senator Scott. What do you think about--what do you think
about the capacity of the military in South Korea and the
willingness of the people to defend their freedoms?
General McConville. I think the South Koreans have very
good capacity and I think they are very committed to defending
their freedom.
Senator Scott. So you think that North Korea should be
concerned if they wanted to invade?
General McConville. I think North Korea should be
concerned.
Senator Scott. Okay. What about our North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies? Do you think they are building the
capacity they need and they have the willingness?
I mean, if you look at Germany as an example and you look
at their pathetic response to the invasion of Ukraine where
they have not put up the resources they should, they have not
built the military they should--I mean, what do you think about
what NATO allies are doing?
General McConville. I think NATO allies respond to their
interests. There are a lot of things that go on in each
country. I look back to General Marshall when he had my job. He
said, you know, when I had the time I did not have the money.
Then when I got the money I did not have the time.
We are seeing that kind of play out right now and that is
why it is very important that we invest in our militaries
during a time we are not in a major conflict and that is why we
want to develop these future systems right now while we have
the time and we have some money before it is too late.
Senator Scott. Do you think that our NATO allies are doing
their part?
General McConville. I think the NATO allies I have seen--
again, the ones that are most in, I would say, harm's way,
absolutely. If you look at what the Poles are doing, you look
at what the Romanians are doing, you look at what the
Lithuanians are doing, Estonia, things have changed.
I have seen a fairly significant change in how NATO has
come together because they see a real threat.
Senator Scott. Do you think the American public understands
enough about the threat of communist China?
General McConville. I think Americans may or may not. I
would not speak for the Americans. But I think in a lot of ways
people are focused on what is happening in this country and
when you start to talk about what is happening in Ukraine or
what happens in Taiwan it gets to this world order bit, and for
a lot of people they are not quite sure how that plays into
their lives.
But we can show that regional conflicts have global
implications and we want to avoid regional conflicts. It is no
one's interest to have a Ukraine or have a Taiwan.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Scott.
Senator King, please?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Secretary Wormuth, I want to compliment you on
something in the budget. In these hearings you rarely have that
happen. The fact that you have a significant increase in R&D
[research and development] I think that is very important
because my next question is going to be to General McConville,
which is about the changed nature of warfare.
We have seen enormous changes--cyber directed energy, all
of space, all of those things that have become so much part of
conflict that in the first day, I guess, the question is are
your Army units going to be able to maneuver if they cannot
communicate and if GPS [Global Positioning System] is gone?
That is the kind of environment that we are facing.
General McConville. I think what we are doing is we are
prepared for that environment. So, in fact, one of our cross
functional teams is we call it alternate precision navigation
timing. Basically, it is how do we figure out what happens when
they jam a GPS.
I come from the philosophy you never want to be a one
option commander. You never want to be dependent on one option.
You never want to be dependent on the weakest link of a supply
chain.
As you mentioned so eloquently, Senator, we are moving from
air-land battle--if you think about it that is two domains we
are kind of focused on fighting, that has been the doctrine
used for last 40 years--to multi-domain operations.
So we are going to be contested in space because the Army
uses space a lot. Certainly going to be contested in cyber all
the way to the Homeland because we are going to have to
basically fight from port to--from fort to foxhole.
We are, certainly, going to be contested in the air. You
can see how right now even Ukraine we have been contesting the
sea. Ships are getting sunk and that matters, and then
definitely on the ground.
So it is going to be a very complex battlefield. We have to
teach our soldiers. Many of you have visited our soldiers in
the field and our operation centers. They were huge operation
centers. They had stadium seats. They had big screens on them.
That is not the future. They are going to have to learn to
move, and how they emit and how they communicate is going to
become extremely important.
Senator King. Are you satisfied that we are taking adequate
in terms of both training, expenditure, and culture, if you
will, to be thinking in new and different ways in order to deal
with this entirely new threat environment?
General McConville. I think we are, Senator, but I think we
can always do more. But if you go out to our National Training
Center and our Joint Readiness Training Center and other
training centers, that is what we are making them do.
So they cannot set up the big operation centers. We make
them move every couple hours, and they are seeing swarms of
unmanned aerial systems and so they are getting their radios
jammed. They are getting their GPS jammed, and so what we have
to do to our soldiers, who a lot of them have spent the last 20
years doing counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, this is the
new fight and we built new doctrine.
We are building new organizations to get after that. We are
doing talent management differently now. We are going to be
coding on the battlefield. We are going to have to have people
that can actually code on the battlefield because then they are
going to be trying to defeat algorithms and we have to be able
to do that.
Senator King. Well, I appreciate that, and I have been
asking the same kind of questions of the Navy. In fact, the
Secretary of the Navy showed up at my office last week with a
sextant just to prove that GPS was not the be all and end all.
A question relating to my service on the Veterans Affairs
Committee. One of the issues that we have identified with our
veterans is the transition between Active Duty and veteran
status and how we can facilitate that in a more active way.
Suicide--the disproportionate number of suicides occur
within 2 or 3 years of separation from Active Duty.
General, I hope this is something that you are focused upon
because it is critical to make sure that that transition
happens smoothly and that the new veteran knows that there is
available services and that there is somebody that cares about
them when they leave the service.
General McConville. Senator, as you and I talked about, I
am absolutely committed to that. I want to make that work.
Transitions are the most dangerous time. I am a student of
suicides. They break my heart every time we lose a soldier and
they happen during transitions, whether it is a transition in
their relationship, transition in their job, transition in
their financial status, or even transition out of the military.
When they leave that warm web of friends, and we have to do
a better job of--we do not want them to have a smooth landing.
We want them to have a smooth takeoff. How do they leave the
Army or the military as a whole and get into that welcome that
we talked about and we have to manage that transition for them.
Senator King. I appreciate that and I also--I want to end
with a compliment to you not only for your many years of
incredibly distinguished service but when you were talking
about Taiwan you listed capability and capacity and I was madly
writing notes, and you anticipated because you came down to the
conclusion of the most important factor is will to fight--will
to fight--and that is the one thing that we have learned from
Ukraine was so critical. So thank you for your service and
thank you for your important testimony here today.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Budd, please?
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. Again, thank you both
for being here. I just want to extend my condolences to the
family of those killed at Fort Campbell last night. I come from
a family of aviators including a Blackhawk pilot, so we are
certainly keeping them in our prayers.
Secretary Wormuth, quality of life is a major factor in
retaining soldiers and their families, as you know. The Army is
investing to replace barracks and built a new child development
center at Fort Bragg in my home State in North Carolina. These
are going to go a long way but there is much more to be done.
Can you please discuss how the Army is investing in quality
of life initiatives this year?
Ms. Wormuth. Certainly, Senator.
One important quality of life investment we are doing is
barracks, both building new ones, as you said, and renovating
ones that we have.
We have got about a billion dollars in this year's budget
for barracks across Active, Guard, and Reserve and we are going
to keep that kind of investment until 2030 to really try to get
after our entire inventory. In fact, General McConville and I
are looking at can we find a way to invest even more in
barracks.
We are also investing quite a bit in family housing and we
work very, very closely with our five privatized housing
partners to try to make sure that they are building new
inventory and maintaining the inventory that we have.
We have had some challenges with those companies a few
years ago but I think we are in a better place with them now,
although there is always work to do.
Another big set of quality of life investments we are
making are in--related to child care. In the last couple of
years we have built a number of new Child Development Centers
(CDCs). What we are really focusing on this year is trying to
make sure that we are staffing our CDCs at the highest level
possible so we can operate at maximum capacity.
We have raised the minimum wage for our daycare workers. We
have raised the fee assistance for our soldiers from $1,500 a
month to $1,700 a month. We are giving recruiting bonuses
basically for CDC workers.
We are giving bonuses for our in-home child providers--
spouses, in many cases, who open up their own homes. If they
move from one duty station to another and stay with the program
there is a bonus for that as well. So we are really trying to
focus on child care.
Senator Budd. Very good. Do not let up, particularly in
North Carolina. If you would keep your eye on that, appreciate
it.
General McConville, are the Army and the Marine Corps
interoperable in the INDOPACOM theater?
General McConville. I believe so. I think we work very
closely together. We have done what we call Project Convergence
where we are bringing together the forces. We are all trying to
get to the point where we have a combined joint all-domain
command and control capability and I know that the commandant
and the chief level we work very closely. They are training
together out there. We are sharing capabilities and, quite
frankly, there is plenty of work for everybody out there.
Senator Budd. So you mentioned their capabilities but how
do their missions and their capabilities differ and how are
they mutually supportive?
General McConville. I think when we take a look at the--
when I take a look at the Marine Corps, if you are going to do
it. When you think about forced entries, okay, I have looked at
the Marine Corps as the experts on amphibious operations.
I look at the Army as the experts on airborne operations
from 82d Airborne Division, 18th Airborne Corps, 101st, the
expert on air assault operations.
When you take a look at those type of operations that is
where it plays out. But the Marine Corps has, certainly--from
the maritime environment can do great things. But at the end of
the day, where the where the Army comes in is, quite frankly,
the capacity and the scale.
You are going to do large-scale combat operations on land.
You can do them in the United States Army in conjunction with
the Marine Corps.
Senator Budd. Thank you.
So how is the Army incorporating multi-domain task forces
into theater operational plans and theater formations to
operate in a denied or degraded environment?
General McConville. Yes. I think we are going to see the
multi-domain task force being in tremendous demand by all
combatant commanders. Quite frankly, it already is. We are
seeing some of the value, and I can talk a little more about
that in a classified session of what they are doing.
But when you think about what they exist to do is they
provide long-range precision fires. So you are going to see
hypersonics. You are going to see mid-range capability to sink
ships. Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) can do that.
But they also provide long-range precision effects. So they
are in intelligence. They are in IO--information operations.
They do cyber. They do electronic warfare in space, and you can
also bolt in air and missile defense.
So when you start thinking about the ability to assist in
maybe a no-fly zone with--from the ground we can assist in that
because we will have integrated air and missile defense.
If you think about maybe you want to have a no-sail zone or
assist in that because we are going to have anti-ship
capability, anti-axis capability, that organization will play
very well into that.
Senator Budd. Thank you very much. I have another question
but I will submit it for the record. Thank you both.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd.
Senator Blumenthal, please?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for your very articulate and informed testimony today, and I
join in condolences to the family--the larger family--Army
family of the nine soldiers who died at Fort Campbell.
Secretary Wormuth, I want to focus for the moment on
helicopters, the Sikorsky and Bell competition for the next
long-range assault aircraft contract.
That contract was awarded to Bell. I am sure you are
familiar with efforts on my part and our delegation's part to
get some of the basic facts, which we are entitled to receive
as a matter of oversight.
I am deeply disappointed that we have received none of the
essential facts that underlie the Army's decision to go with
Bell rather than Sikorsky when, in fact, Sikorsky may have a
less expensive, more maneuverable longer-range helicopter under
FLRAA.
But as disappointed as I am with the decision I am more
disappointed with the lack of an explanation and, in fact, the
reliance, apparently, on a regulation, which Deputy Secretary
Hicks acknowledged does not bind. The Army has not bound it in
the past, does not bind it now from providing this information
to us.
I am not going to get into a debate on the legalities here.
What I am interested in knowing is your commitment to give us
that explanation when the source selection process has
concluded, which will be next week when the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) issues its opinion.
Will you commit to give us a briefing and an explanation
next week when the GAO finishes it?
Ms. Wormuth. Absolutely, Senator. I have already asked Doug
Bush, our Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, to be prepared
to give you that briefing the minute the GAO completes its
review.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
General McConville, I am struck by your quotation--I do not
remember who it is attributed to--General Marshall, that when I
had the time I did not have the money; when I had the money I
did not have the time.
I am afraid that aptly describes our situation in Ukraine,
or more specifically, the Ukrainians' position vis-a-vis are
providing the money, the arms, the weapons that are needed
because I too had been impressed with the will of Ukrainians.
When I visited three times over the last, roughly, year,
speaking not only with President Zelensky but with his top
military leadership, with everyday Ukrainians, they will fight
to the last person. They will fight with pitchforks, if
necessary. They do not want our troops on the ground. They want
what we would give our troops if they were on the ground.
I have also been impressed, and I hope you will take this
message back to the men and women under your command, with the
training that we provide. I visited Grafenwohr in Germany and
watched the training that our soldiers are providing to those
Ukrainian freedom fighters, men and women who 6, 8, 10 weeks
ago were bakers, computer programmers.
Now they are about to go to the trenches in Ukraine, and
the bond between them and our soldiers is really inspiring and
the kinds of skills that our soldiers are imparting to them
really inspiring.
I hope we can give to them the arms that they need and you,
as a professional--and I underscore the word professional--not
only distinguished but a man who knows how wars are won will
also support the kinds of increased arms that are needed now
because time is not on our side. The spring is an essential
time to provide that aid.
So I want to ask you whether you think Ukrainians are
getting enough now to win because if they do get enough they
will win, and in your professional judgment whether we should
be doing more.
General McConville. Some of that question I could talk in a
classified session about. But I agree with you as far as on the
Ukrainians.
I mean, they learned to operate our Patriots in weeks,
which is really pretty incredible, and same thing over in
Grafenwohr where they come in, they are really serious about
the training, they are very, very professional, and they want
to do it.
They are taking our things that people thought were not
possible, some of our very sophisticated systems, which
historically you could never give to another military because
they could not maintain.
It is nice to have the gear but you have to maintain it,
you have to sustain it, and so far, I think, they are doing a
magnificent job of working that, and we are learning a lot from
tele-maintenance to tele-training and when they are down range
and they are very innovative on taking our systems and doing
that extremely well.
From our standpoint we are giving them the weapon systems
that are requested from us at the same time the Secretary and I
are trying to make sure that we have what we need to go and do
the job, and we appreciate your support in replenishing not
only the ammunition but also allowing us to modernize the Army
while we go ahead and provide them with the systems they need.
Senator Blumenthal. My time is expired, but thank you both.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Sullivan, please?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General.
Madam Secretary, welcome. Thanks for your great service.
Appreciated the call yesterday.
My condolences as well to the Army family members in this
recent crash. It reminds us that it is a risky profession 24/7.
I wanted to ask you--first, compliment both of you and then
ask kind of a two-part question. How is the 11th Airborne
Division doing? We love them in Alaska. Very proud of them in
Alaska.
General, it was great being with you for the patching
ceremony in Fairbanks and Anchorage last year, I know that the
Army is looking at standing up two or three--two more multi-
domain task forces, and I am not trying to be greedy here but I
just happen to live in the State that Billy Mitchell called the
most strategic place in the world and, by the way, so did the
NORTHCOM commander last week in a hearing. Best training in the
world by far, and a gateway to the Arctic, gateway to the
Pacific, a couple of miles away from Russia and the Taiwan
Strait and--I am talking about Alaska.
We would love to have a multi-domain task force base in our
great State. But maybe if you can talk about both 11th Airborne
and where you are looking for the next multi-domain task force
that would be great. Both of you.
Ms. Wormuth. Thanks, Senator Sullivan.
We are very pleased with the 11th Airborne Division. I
think the reestablishment of that division has really
reinstilled our soldiers in Alaska with a sense of purpose. I
think morale is quite high as we----
Senator Sullivan. Is it not the most--the highest?
Ms. Wormuth. I was just about to say that. Yes.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Sorry. Did not want to steal your
thunder.
Ms. Wormuth. It is the most popular--most popular duty
station right now. One of the----
Senator Sullivan. In the U.S. Army. So everybody is
requesting it more than--that is so great.
Ms. Wormuth. Yes. Exactly. They just completed a major
training exercise, which went very, very well. I think we set a
goal in our Arctic strategy a few years ago to really bring
back our cold weather expertise and we are really starting to
do that in a way that I think is going very, very well.
As you know, General Eifler and Command Sergeant Major
Daley are--and all of the leaders below them are very engaged
and I think the division is doing great things.
Senator Sullivan. Good. General? Then maybe you can talk
multi-domain task force as well.
General McConville. Yes, Senator. It is really interesting
when you take a look at a unit that gets purpose.
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
General McConville. In the Army those who have served,
like, little tabs, little patches----
Senator Sullivan. Mean a lot.
General McConville.----mean a lot.
Senator Sullivan. Oh, yes.
General McConville. What I see is there has been a huge
change in Alaska because of the focus and now they--it used to
be people were trying to survive up in the Arctic. Now they are
thriving----
Senator Sullivan. Good.
General McConville.----and they are becoming the best in
the world and becoming masters of their craft, and now they are
working with--around the world in other places, too, where we
understand the importance of the Arctic as a strategic
environment that we are going to have to deal with and a lot of
people look in the Arctic and now we have a force that is fully
capable of doing that.
They have taken that mission on from an airborne and air
assault. Again, those type tabs mean a lot to our soldiers and
I think they are making a huge difference.
On the multi-domain task force right now we are kind of
taking a look. I think we are not going to--certainly, not
commit here where we are starting to look, but in the Pacific
when you start thinking about why you would want that
capability is the anti-access capability.
You want the capability to provide maybe a no-sail zone,
maybe a no-fly zone capability in conjunction with the joint
partners, and then it is just a matter of the type of
capabilities.
We are going to have long-range precision fires. Where is--
and they do not necessarily have to be all together but you
start to kind of lay that down how do you want to do that and
then how do you want to position forces or rotate forces
forward so they are also operating in the theater, and all
those have to come together?
Senator Sullivan. Okay. If you can keep me and this
Committee informed on what you are looking at for the next
deployment and stationing of those that would be great.
My next question is on the budget, and I kind of took
Secretary Austin and General Milley to task here. The Biden
administration keeps putting forward defense budget cuts, three
in a row. We bolster it up in a bipartisan way. I think that is
leading from behind. They know we are going to do that so they
put forward significant cuts, and I pressed General Milley and
Secretary Austin.
The current budget right now shrinks the Navy, shrinks the
Marine Corps, and shrinks the Army to 450. It is a pretty low
number for the U.S. Army, and I think this--but they also say
it is the most dangerous time since World War II. It is kind of
a disconnect there in terms of the signal we are sending,
emboldening people like Putin and Xi Jinping.
Can you comment, Madam Secretary or General, on the--going
from 485 to 450 and how does that enhance America's national
security in terms of end strength for the U.S. Army?
Ms. Wormuth. Thanks, Senator. I really appreciate the
question because I want to make clear that the fact that Army's
end strength is decreasing is not due to the budget. It is not
because we have been told cut the Army or there is not enough
money to invest in a larger army.
The issue, frankly, is really our recruiting challenge and
we have talked a little bit about that with you. We have got to
solve our recruiting challenge and what you can see in the 5-
year budget that we submitted is our intent to build back our
end strength.
So over the next 5 years we hope to start increasing our
end strength by about 4,000 a year. But we are going to have to
work really hard on recruiting to do that.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Warren, please?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would also
like to express my condolences to the family and the friends of
the nine soldiers who were killed in the Army helicopter crash
at Fort Campbell. It is a reminder of how much we owe to every
one of our servicemembers who put themselves in harm's way on
our behalf. So it is a very sad day.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. What I
want to talk about today is behavioral health. Improving
behavioral health resources and access for our servicemembers
is critical to supporting those who are already sacrificing so
much to serve our country, and I am deeply concerned that we
are not doing enough to address the crisis of substance use
disorder for our servicemembers.
Last fall I sent a letter to the Defense Department along
with my colleagues Senator Markey, Senator Cornyn, Senator
Murkowski, and Senator Heinrich on reports of high levels of
fatal drug overdoses involving opioids and fentanyl at Fort
Bragg, Fort Bliss, and West Point.
In DOD's response we discovered a total of 15,293 Active
Duty servicemember overdoses from 2017 to February 2023. There
were 332 fatal overdoses.
Now, this is a problem for all of the services but the Army
had the highest rate of overdose death.
Secretary Wormuth, one of the ways for us to be able to
address this issue is to understand the extent of the problem.
Is there any kind of annual public reporting on servicemember
overdoses?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, I am sure that we track that data. I
am actually----
Senator Warren. I did not ask if you track the data. I
asked if you had a regular reporting of the data because I
could not find one.
Ms. Wormuth. We may not and we probably should have one.
Senator Warren. Okay. There is no annual reporting, and I
just want to make clear the only reason we know the numbers
that I just cited is because DOD provided it as an answer to
our letter.
Public data that are updated on an ongoing basis would help
us better understand and track this problem and whether any new
policies that DOD implements are effective. We got to collect
the numbers to know what is happening here.
Now, one other aspect of this DOD's data showed that more
than 80 percent of fatal overdoses by servicemembers were
accidental. One thing that could help us prevent accidental
overdoses from becoming fatal overdoses is easy accessibility
of the overdose reversal drug Naloxone.
Secretary Wormuth, DOD says that it provides Naloxone in
high-risk cases, which is a good best practice. How often has
the Army provided Naloxone to servicemembers and their
families?
Ms. Wormuth. I do not have that information, Senator
Warren, off the top of my head. I do know that we have
established a public awareness campaign for our soldiers called
``One Pill Can Kill'' and, for example, at Fort Bragg every
single newly arriving soldier gets that prevention training
because we are deeply concerned, particularly with fentanyl
being as prevalent as it is--we are deeply concerned about
making sure our soldiers know the dangers there.
Senator Warren. I want you to know I very much appreciate
that you are trying to engage in other harm reduction
techniques here. I am in favor of that.
But I want to make the pitch that it needs to be more
coordinated and that we need better accountability. You got to
have the numbers--what programs are you trying and what effect
is it having on outcomes.
We know across this country now that harm reduction
services save lives. We need to be doing everything that we can
to mitigate overdoses among our servicemembers including using
harm reduction services that are available and then tracking
whether or not they are having the outcomes that we hope for.
So I would like to be able to work with you more on this
and see if we can get a stronger program in place.
Ms. Wormuth. We would welcome that.
Senator Warren. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Warren.
Senator Shaheen, please?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, for being here this
morning.
I would also like to offer my condolences. I was in Romania
at the end of February and had a chance to meet personally with
a number of members of the 101st Airborne who were there from
Kentucky. So I can only imagine how devastating it is for the
people, for everybody in the 101st but especially for the
families.
I would like to begin, Secretary Wormuth, with asking you
about the enhanced night vision goggle binoculars, or ENVGBs,
because Congress stepped in to restore the full $300 million in
funding for 2023 after the Army budget request did not include
any funding for the ENVGBs, and as I have heard from a number
of companies and soldiers it is very important to this critical
program to maintain the industrial base for it.
That is why I was very concerned and did not really
understand why again this year the Army has requested only $30
million for fiscal year 2024 for the ENVGB program and that is
especially after, in the words of the Army's unfunded priority
list last year, failure to fund the ENVGB program, and I quote,
``decreases soldier survivability.''
So how does the Army justify this decision?
Ms. Wormuth. Thank you, Senator. The enhanced night vision
goggle binoculars are a great product, great system. Our
soldiers--they are very, very popular. They have got a lot of
great capabilities.
I would say our approach to funding the ENVGBs is similar,
in some cases, to other important systems like Abrams and
Stryker. We are trying to strike a balance between investing in
enduring programs or well tested systems like the enhanced
night vision binoculars while also making sure that we have
sufficient resources to invest in some of the new systems that
we are developing.
So our judgment was that that funding level was sufficient
and allowed us to be able to strike a balance across our
program.
Senator Shaheen. Well, again, I understand and we have had
these conversations before about the Integrated Visual
Augmented System (IVAS) program and I know the Army has now
ordered an IVAS 1.2 variant.
But I think it is not at all clear and, in fact, I would
like, Mr. Chairman, to submit for the record the Integrated
Visual Augmentation System report here that was done by the
Inspector General--well, it was done by fiscal year 2022
directors of Operational Test and Evaluation. It is their
report.
But it confirms, I think, what the Inspector General found
when he said the Army is at risk of wasting, and I quote,
``wasting up to $21.88 billion in taxpayer funds to field a
system that soldiers may not want to use or use as intended and
the fact is this report found that IVAS did not demonstrate
improvements to deficiencies and that soldiers were, in fact,
performing worse than they had without the system.
So, again, I understand the balance that you are trying to
strike but it is hard for me to understand how much longer we
are going to spend money on a program that does not seem to be
accomplishing what you say is the intent.
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, what I would say there is we have had
some challenges with the IVAS program, that is for sure, and
the $22 billion figure that is cited in that report assumes
that we buy it for the entire Army, which is not our current
plan.
With the 1.2 variant if Congress funds that what we are
going to try to do is see if it can be successful. We are
working very, very hard with Microsoft. But it is a new system
that will allow us to train, to rehearse, and to fight and it
gives some additional capabilities beyond the night vision
goggles, which, again, are superlative.
So if we think it can work then we will invest in it. If it
does not prove out this time then we will move on. But I think
we believe that we should give it a chance. It is a very
important step forward in terms of wearable technology for our
soldiers.
Senator Shaheen. Again, I understand the intent and why on
paper it looks like a technology that would be worth investing
in. But the fact is to date it has not proven to be a
technology that soldiers can use and improve their ability to
operate.
So I would again urge you to take a look at that program
and to really question how far down the road we want to go
investing in something that is not working.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. All right, and without objection the report
will be submitted for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Reed. Senator Rosen, please?
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed. I appreciate
you holding this hearing. I would like to thank the witnesses
for being here to testify today and, of course, for your
service to this Nation.
General McConville, as this will be your last time before
the Committee, thank you for your decades of distinguished
service leading the brave men and women of the United States
Army.
We appreciate you, and I also, too, like all of my
colleagues want to express my deepest condolences for the
families, the fellow soldiers, of those that were lost in last
night's tragedy at Fort Campbell, and just to express my
heartfelt sympathies.
So I am going to talk a little bit about Nevada and,
General McConville, I want to revisit an issue that I raised
with you last year. Thank you for your commitment to ensure
that Nevada will finally have its first small arms
qualification range, and as we discussed, Nevada's Guard and
Reserve soldiers are traveling to surrounding states in order
to satisfy their annual weapons qualification, and it is about
an average cost of around $500,000 a year per unit.
I appreciate your commitment to look into this, which
spurred the effort underway to build a permanent range in
Hawthorne Army Depot by fiscal year 2025. I understand that the
Nevada Army National Guard is on track to complete their
planning and design to meet that timeline and so, General
McConville, can I again have your commitment that the Army will
see this project through in fiscal year 2025 so that soldiers
can meet their annual requirements at greater convenience and
lower tax cost to the taxpayer?
General McConville. You have mine but I just want to check
with the Secretary because she is going to be here. You have my
commitment.
Ms. Wormuth. We will follow through on it, Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. I have been to where they proposed it, at
Hawthorne Army Depot. Everyone is so excited. The plans are
really great and everyone is looking forward to having that in
Nevada and with all the rest of our military there and Reserves
there how it can be used for everyone in our State. So thank
you for that. Really appreciate it.
Again, I am going to move on to you then Secretary, about
Hawthorne Army Depot. It is the world's largest ammunition
depot and demilitarization facility, and the depot stores
demilitarizes munitions and ensures munitions readiness for the
DOD.
Despite its size and crucial role that Hawthorne plays it
is in desperate, desperate need of significant infrastructure
upgrades. As an example, I heard from folks in Hawthorne
earlier this month that the boilers, which were installed in
1974, were inoperable and the facilities were without heat.
The need to invest in our munitions depots has only become
more acute in light of our need to ramp up munitions production
not to only arm Ukraine but to, of course, backfill our own
stockpiles.
So given this, does the Army have plans to invest in
repairs or upgrades to the munitions depot, and if it does not
can I have your commitment that we can include Hawthorne in
Army's--in the Army's next future years defense planning
unfunded priority list so that we can--we really need to care
about our munitions readiness.
Ms. Wormuth. Yes, Senator Rosen.
First of all, I would say on life, health, and safety
issues we always want to take care of those. So I will make
sure that we go out and look at the--at Hawthorne and assess
whether there is a life, health, and safety issue with the
boiler because if there is we will want to take care of that
right away.
We have a 15-year $18 billion organic industrial base
strategy and plan to try to address modernizing all of these
facilities and many of them are quite old, as you know. They
are sort of vintage World War II.
Again, we cannot do all of the modernization in 1 year so
we try to phase that over time and, certainly, I believe that
there are investments planned for Hawthorne depot a couple of
years from now.
We constantly assess that plan every year and will talk to
General Hamilton, the new head of Army Materiel Command, to
make sure that we have got investments in Hawthorne in the
right prioritization.
Senator Rosen. Yes. I think that--well, first of all, about
the boilers not all of Nevada is a desert so it does get cold
there and, really, our munitions readiness, building up our
stockpile, they have been--they are always so busy but it has
really played an even more integral role since we have been in
Ukraine.
I guess I will go on to this. Ukraine keeps receiving more
advanced equipment--the Abrams tanks, the Patriot missile
defense system--and those demands for those teams and
capabilities continue to grow.
So what are you doing to expand the current programs and
ensure that we are equipped efficiently and accurately to
respond to requests from the battlefield, especially as it
relates to Ukraine?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, we are investing $1.5 billion in the
organic industrial base this year to try to expand production
for munitions precisely so that we can continue to supply
Ukraine what they need but also to replenish our own stocks,
and we are using some of the supplemental money that Congress
has given us to replenish our stocks and not just buy new old
stuff but we are buying new new stuff. So we are replacing M-
113 vehicles with the new AMPVs, for example.
We are also working really closely with industry to try to
see how they can increase the scope and scale of their
munitions production to, again, try to make sure we can keep
supplying the Ukrainians.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Duckworth, please?
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do want to express my condolences.
General McConville, you and I know inherently how dangerous
the job is, especially that of our helicopter crews, and I
personally gave you some heavy, heavy nights in Iraq a lifetime
ago when my own aircraft went down while you were in--where we
were supporting your unit, the first Calvary Division (CAV)
there. So know that I have been thinking about those crews and
their families.
Good morning to both of our witnesses. I appreciate our
candid conversation earlier this week. In your written
testimony you highlighted the critical importance of contested
logistics in both short sharp operations as well as for
protected conflict.
My colleagues have heard me talk about these difficulties
in this Committee for some time now, especially as we look into
the Indo-Pacific region.
General McConville, in what ways does this year's Army
budget request support contested logistics for the joint force
and what efforts are you making to bolster sustainment
capabilities and capacity, especially in Southeast Asia?
General McConville. Thank you, Senator. As we take a look,
one of the big things we have done right off the bat is stand
up a cross functional team for contested logistics.
As you know very well, I mean, we cannot do what we do
without logistics. We are seeing it playing out in Ukraine, and
Ukraine is such a great lesson for us all because we are seeing
it play out.
But it is on land and we have very robust capability to
support logistics in Europe. We need to do the same thing in
the Pacific and that is working with allies and partners. In
the budget there is funding for watercraft.
There is funding for prepositioned stocks, which is really
important moving them forward, fuel distribution, all these
type things that we are going to need to operate these weapon
systems.
These weapon systems without fuel, without parts, without
bullets do not perform their duty. So we are working that very
hard and we think it is very important.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
A critical vulnerability for any military, as we said, is
the logistical tail associated with delivering operational
energy to its fielded forces. Both our readiness and our
allies' and partners' readiness will be bolstered by, one,
reducing reliance on fossil fuels and employing more diverse
and renewable operational energy sources; developing innovative
delivery systems; distributed storage, as you said pre-po;
sources flexible contracting and improved automation; and, of
course, ensuring supply lines are resilient in the face of
climate change, disruption through energy supplies and also
cyber attacks.
Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, how important is
logistics cooperation in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and what
efforts in your budget request work toward operational energy
security and resilience?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, as General McConville said, logistics
are going to be critical. It is that old saying of amateurs do
strategy and professionals do logistics, and we have made
substantial investments in that area in this budget.
Specifically on operational energy, I would say we have got
over $1.3 billion in our budget this year for two big areas--
about a billion dollars in installations resilience, really
making sure that our installations are adapting to extreme
weather.
But the other $300 million is investing more in operational
energy and looking at electrification of our vehicles, looking
at investing in developing hybrid vehicles.
So, for example, we have a hybrid Bradley that I was able
to see, as well as hybrid JLTVs, for example, and those are
really important because they are going to be much more fuel
efficient, which means that we will not have to have the kinds
of fuel convoys that we saw in Iraq, for example, which means
we are going to put fewer soldiers at risk.
But those hybrid vehicles are also lower signature, which
is really important when you are looking at the kind of
contested environment, and they are very, very quiet, which is
going to increase their survivability and, ultimately, our
lethality.
So those operational energy investments are really
important.
Senator Duckworth. DOD put out a statistic a while ago
about Iraq that said that 80 percent of our casualties in Iraq
came from convoy operations and over 50 percent of those
convoys were for logistics and fuel--movement of fuel. I think
it is highly important.
But when you look to the Indo-Pacific region we are going
to have to be able to partner with so many folks both in terms
of partner military and allies and friends but also commercial
resources as well, and I think it is important to make sure
that we plus up our cyber capabilities and that of our allies
also.
I know that the Army Futures Command in particular is
leading efforts when it comes to developing members across the
total force with skill sets in advanced technology areas such
as computer programming, coding, AI, ML [machine learning].
I would like to hear from each of you about the benefits to
the Department that comes from leveraging the digital skills of
its total force servicemembers, particularly those in the
Reserve component who have tech skills from their civilian
careers.
Ms. Wormuth. Sure, Senator.
Just briefly, I would say we desperately need to build out
our tech skills, our cyber capabilities. They are going to be
incredibly important--our AI capabilities--and we need to be
able to leverage them not just in the Active component but in
the Guard and Reserves.
In many cases where we cannot compete, frankly, financially
with the salaries that people can get in the commercial sector,
being able to draw on cyber capabilities from people in the
Guard and soldiers in the Reserves is a great way to sort of
thread that needle.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Duckworth.
Thank you, Secretary Wormuth, General McConville. We will
recess the open hearing and reconvene at 1200 hours in SVC-217,
and I have been informed there is a vote that will commence at
11:45.
Thank you very much and we will see you shortly, and thank
you, and we recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
future use of unfunded priorities lists (upls)
1. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, do you
agree that if funding is needed for a project, it should be a part of
the command/service budget?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. In accordance with 10
U.S.C. 222a, the Chief of Staff of the Army is required to submit an
unfunded priorities list (UPL) to congressional defense committees. The
Army's fiscal year 2024 UPL totals $1.93 billion and reflects rapidly
evolving requirements and opportunities in the strategic and
operational environment since developing the fiscal year 2024 budget
request. The UPL identifies priority items in the event Congress
decides to allocate resources above the resources requested in the
annual President Budget Request (PBR).
Given the detailed level of specificity of questions regarding the
28 UPL items, coupled with the degree of sensitivity of some of the
answers that address capability gaps with strategic competitors, we
respectfully recommend an in-person briefing and discussion with
appropriate staff to more fully address these questions, provide
broader context, and highlight how each UPL item, in addition to fully
funding the PBR, supports the Army's continued priorities of People,
Readiness and Modernization and maintains alignment with the National
Defense Strategy.
The Army carefully considers all projects and programs through a
rigorous review and prioritization process to build each year's budget
request. This process is lengthy and takes place several months in
advance of execution. As is the case for the Army's fiscal year 2024
UPL, the UPL items reflect rapidly evolving requirements and
opportunities and are intended to supplement the annual PBR and are not
intended to substitute or displace the fiscal year 2024 PBR.
2. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
historically, have previous UPL items been included in the following
year's base budget? Have UPL items from fiscal year 2023 been included
in the fiscal year 2024 base budget? If yes, please provide detail
including the requested item, funding amount, and vendor executing the
effort. If no, why not?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The annual Unfunded
Priorities List (UPL) as an opportunity to enhance the Army's enduring
priorities of People, Readiness, and Modernization. Some items were
included to accelerate readiness such as the HMMWV ABS (OPA) and M-
SHORAD (MSLS) lines whereas other items were included to address
emergent priorities that presented after the annual PBR was locked.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
President's Fiscal Fiscal President's Fiscal
PE / LN Budget 2023 Year 2023 Year 2023 Budget 2024 Year 2024
LI# Item APPN TITLE ($ in UPL UPL (Cong. ($ in UPL
millions) (RQST) Add) millions) (RQST)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
81 0604121A RDTEA Synthetic Training 166.452 13.500 40.000 109.714 0.000
EnvironmentPRefineme
nt & Prototyping
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 8082C14300 MSLS M-SHORAD-- 135.747 275.062 0.000 400.697 22.700
Procurement
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15 8992DA0924 OPA HMMWVAnti-lock 10.665 50.458 109.050 45.554 47.473
Braking &PElectronic
Stability Control
(ABS/ESC)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, do you
agree that Federal agencies have to make tough decisions in regards to
their priorities and budget?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Agencies and
organizations make tough decisions inherent to balancing resources
against priorities. We are committed to providing the best Army we can
with the resources available.
information on upls
4. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, what
was the cost of putting together your unfunded priorities list?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. In accordance with 10
U.S.C. 222a, the Chief of Staff of the Army is required to submit an
UPL to congressional defense committees. The Army developed the fiscal
year 2024 UPL as part of the FY24 budget development process, so there
was minimal additional cost.
5. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
Army requested the following 28 items for 1.9 billion dollars in fiscal
year 2024: Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System
(IBCS), Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) Increment 1, Trojan
Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT), Air
Launched Effects (ALE) Acceleration, Organic Industrial Base
Modernization Planning & Design, Expanding INDOPACOM Campaigning
Activities, Abrams SEPv3 Procurement, AH-64E Apache New Generator,
Water System Upgrade Projects in Hawaii, Water Intake Pump Upgrades,
Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA, Maneuver Support Vessel, Heavy; Army
Watercraft, ARNG Vehicle Maintenance Shop, Network Enterprise Center,
Fort Hunter Ligget (FHL), CA, Cost to Complete (CTC) Active Army, Cost
to Complete (CTC) Army National Guard, Cost to Complete (CTC) Army
Reserve, Army Reserve Center (ARC) located on USMC Logistics Base
Albany, GA, Planning and Design MILCON Projects Active Army, Planning
and Design MILCON Projects Army National Guard, Automated Multipurpose
Machine Gun Range, Camp Blanding, FL, National Guard Readiness Center,
New York, NY, Multi-Purpose Athletic Field, Fort Polk, LA, Integrated
Visual Augmentation System (IVAS) Development, Integrated Visual
Augmentation System (IVAS) Procurement, Black Hawk (HH-60M)
Replacement, Apache (AH-64E) Replacement, HMMWV Anti-lock Braking &
Electronic Stability Control (ABS/ESC), Demilitarization Preparation
for Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) For each item on the unfunded
priorities list you submit in response to 10 U.S.C. 222a, please
provide the following information:
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
6. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, what
is the description of this UPL?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
7. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, what
does the UPL purchase? (Include all end items with quantities,
contractor FTEs, etc.)
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
8. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, what
specific capability will the UPL provide?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
9. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, what
gap will this fill that is not in the base budget?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
10. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, how
will this capability support objectives outlined in current National
Security, Military, and Defense Strategy documents?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
11. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, what
is the operational requirement? How does this UPL support current or
future operations?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
12. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, what
is the operational impact if this UPL is not funded in fiscal year
2024?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
13. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, are
there plans to include this item in the fiscal year 2025 base budget?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
14. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, why
was this UPL not included in the fiscal year 2024 President's Budget
submission?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
15. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, what
is the name of the vendor(s) executing this effort? Sub-vendor(s)?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
16. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, how
often has your command met with the vendor executing this effort?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Specific to UPL item
numbers 1, 2, 7, 23-27, the Department has existing programs and/or
contracts and, therefore, has statutory and regulatory responsibilities
required for their management. The Department, at every level--from
contracting officer, to Program Manager, to Army Senior Leadership, to
numerous personnel in-between--regularly meets with the vendors to
ensure compliance with contracts and provides appropriate programmatic
oversight. Our engagements with vendors are considered a regular and
necessary tool in the prudent oversight and supervision of programs and
the expenditure of taxpayer dollars.
In addition, the Department regularly meets with all sectors of
business so that industry has the opportunity to discuss with the
Government possible materiel solutions or technologies with potential
utility to fulfill Army requirements. Again, this is a part of the
normal course of doing business within the Acquisition arena.
17. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, what
is your relationship history with this vendor?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Specific to UPL item
numbers 1, 2, 7, 23-27, the Department has existing programs and/or
contracts and, therefore, has statutory and regulatory responsibilities
required for their management. The Department, at every level--from
contracting officer, to Program Manager, to Army Senior Leadership, to
numerous personnel in-between--regularly meets with the vendors to
ensure compliance with contracts and provides appropriate programmatic
oversight. Our engagements with vendors are considered a regular and
necessary tool in the prudent oversight and supervision of programs and
the expenditure of taxpayer dollars. In addition, the Department
regularly meets with all sectors of business so that industry has the
opportunity to discuss with the Government possible materiel solutions
or technologies with potential utility to fulfill Army requirements.
Again, this is a part of the normal course of doing business within the
Acquisition arena.
18. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, has
anyone who formerly worked for your command represented the vendor in
meetings? What is their name, what was their position, and when did you
meet with them?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Specific to UPL item
numbers 1, 2, 7, 23-27, the Department has existing programs and/or
contracts and, therefore, has statutory and regulatory responsibilities
required for their management. The Department, at every level--from
contracting officer, to Program Manager, to Army Senior Leadership, to
numerous personnel in-between--regularly meets with the vendors to
ensure compliance with contracts and provides appropriate programmatic
oversight. Our engagements with vendors are considered a regular and
necessary tool in the prudent oversight and supervision of programs and
the expenditure of taxpayer dollars.
In addition, the Department regularly meets with all sectors of
business so that industry has the opportunity to discuss with the
Government possible materiel solutions or technologies with potential
utility to fulfill Army requirements. Again, this is a part of the
normal course of doing business within the Acquisition arena.
19. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, in
which city/State will the UPL be executed?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
20. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, is
this requirement on an existing contract? If so, with who? What is the
history of the contract?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
21. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, what
is the anticipated contract award date if the UPL receives funding?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
22. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, what
funding lines are associated with this UPL?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
23. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, if
multiple appropriations fund this requirement, must all appropriations
be funded simultaneously to source this requirement, or can each
appropriation stand on its own to fund a portion of the requirement?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
24. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, how
much was enacted and obligated (or expended for RDT&E) in fiscal year
2022 2023 for this requirement?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
25. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, how
much was requested in fiscal year 2024 for this requirement?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
26. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, is
there a tail associated with this UPL?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
27. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, is
any tail funded in the future years defense plan?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
28. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
please describe how much the requirement will cost per year for the
next 5 years.
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29. [The spreadsheet has been
retained in Committee files.]
29. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
please provide in detail the previous funding requests and enacted for
this requirement, including if it was in the base budget or UPL.
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Please see the enclosed
spreadsheet to address questions 5-29.
30. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, if
the requirement is not included in the future years defense plan, will
that be rectified in the next Program Objective Memorandum or the
Program, Planning, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) cycle?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army carefully
considers all projects and programs through a rigorous review and
prioritization process to build each year's budget request.
31. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
please provide photos of this requirement for visual aid.
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. We are unable to provide
photographs of each UPL item at this time.
lower tier air and missile defense sensor (ltamds)
32. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, how
does the Army feel about the first two allotments produced of the
LTAMDS?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Lower Tier Air and
Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) is the Army's modernization effort to
develop the next generation, 360-degree sensor, intended to replace the
aging PATRIOT radar. The LTAMDS systems on hand are currently
undergoing testing and the Army is encouraged by the emerging results.
LTAMDS will mitigate critical capability gaps in defending forces
against rotary, fixed-wing, tactical ballistic missiles, and next-
generation threats including hypersonic weapons. The Army anticipates
providing LTAMDS primary sector capability by December 2023.
33. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, when
do you expect the Army to request Lot 3 of the LTAMDS and when does the
Army want Lot 3 completed?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The President's Fiscal
Year 2024 Budget Request includes funds to award a contract for
production of the five sensors in 2d quarter fiscal year 2024 with
anticipated delivery beginning in 3d quarter fiscal year 2026.
34. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, how
many units for Lot 3 will you request?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The President's Fiscal
Year 2024 Budget Request includes funds for three sensors to support
the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), which will provide an Early
Operational Capability for the Defense of Guam, and an additional two
sensors to support the LTAMDS program's Initial Operational Test and
Evaluation activates beginning in fiscal year 2026.
35. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, are
there any outstanding issues for the workers regarding the LTAMDS?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Based on the current
schedule for production and deliveries, the Army does not anticipate
any issues for the workers regarding the LTAMDS program.
military housing
36. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, a
survey from the Military Family Advisory Network found that in 2021
found 40 percent of respondents were unaware of the Tenant Bill of
Rights. What is the Army specifically doing to ensure servicemembers
and their families are aware about the Tenant Bill of Rights?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. All military lessees
receive the Plain Language Brief prior to their lease signing and again
30 days after they move in. This Army brief covers the Tenant Bill of
Rights and explains tenant responsibilities, informal and formal
dispute resolution processes, and off post housing services. Military
family members are invited to the Plain Language Brief but are not
required to attend.
37. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, does the Army have
any survey data estimating the percentage of members and their families
who are aware of the Tenant Bill of Rights? What does that survey data
show?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army does not conduct
such a survey, but will encourage the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) to add it to the annual tenant satisfaction survey in the
future. The Army uses the housing office record of delivery of the
Plain Language Brief as a proxy for receipt of the Tenant Bill of
Rights. Every military lessee receives the mandatory Plain Language
Brief prior to signing the lease, and again 30 days after moving in.
Military family members are invited to the Plain Language Brief, but
are not required to attend.
38. Senator Warren. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, if
the Army isn't tracking this information, is this something the Army
would track in the future?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army will request
that OSD revamp its annual Tenant Satisfaction Survey to include survey
questions regarding the Tenant Bill of Rights. In addition, the Army
already has sound processes and policies in place to inform residents
of the Tenant Bill of Rights, and will further refine these processes
to ensure residents understand their rights.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Gary C. Peters
contested training
39. Senator Peters. General McConville, the National Defense
Strategy places great emphasis on the ability of our forces to operate
in contested environments and the need to overcome enemy disruption.
Outside of J-R-T-C and N-T-C, would the Army benefit from having
training locations with standing approvals to employ Cyber, Electronic
Warfare, Space, and Influence Operations into Large Scale Combat
Operation training exercises?
General McConville. The Army has not identified a requirement for
additional training locations. The Army is presently evaluating the
optimization of existing training locations and training products for
the Combat Training Centers (CTC) including the Joint Readiness
Training Center and the National Training Center as well as home
station training (HST). Optimization of CTC and HST products to create
a contested, congested, and complicated electromatic spectrum
environment will include the employment of cyberspace, electronic, and
space warfare products and will influence both opposing and friendly
forces during training for Large Scale Combat Operations.
The Army has several other initiatives ongoing with regards to
operating in a contested, congested, and complicated environment. In
fiscal year 2028, the Army is programming an electromagnetic warfare
training range at Fort Huachuca, AZ that will provide a realistic
representation of adversary capabilities across the electromagnetic
spectrum and multiple domains. The Army is also planning a cyberspace
and electromagnetic warfare (EW) multipurpose training range at Fort
Gordon, GA in fiscal year 2029 that will provide a sophisticated
institutional EW training capability for initial entry training for the
Army's EW Soldiers. The Army is developing ranges capable of providing
a cyber training environment within existing footprints, as well as
multi-component training options. The Army is exploring the development
of live, virtual, and constructive training capabilities to provide for
a more realistic and robust training environment for multidomain
operations and opportunities for training integrated with testing and
experimentation.
electronic warfare--multi-domain operations
40. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth, on several occasions, the
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) has expressed concerns about how
the Department of Defense is tasked and organized to support Electronic
Warfare operations in support of the Joint Force or newly established
Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF). Although both Cyber and Electronic
Warfare personnel are attached to the Army Cyber Branch, EW lacks a 3-
star proponent in the Department, and EW capabilities are funded
through the Force Development Intelligence (FDI) portfolio--meaning EW
funding competes with the intelligence portfolio and priorities. Can
you outline what entity owns or will own the manning, training,
equipping, budgeting, and capability development for Electronic Warfare
operations in the Army?
Secretary Wormuth. Electromagnetic Warfare (EW) is a warfighting
capability which the Army enterprise provides through manning,
training, equipping, budgeting, and capability development. The Army
Cyber Command (ARCYBER) is the Army's primary Army Service Component
Command (ASCC) responsible for directing, and conducting integrated
Cyberspace Operations (CO), EW, and Information Operations (IO).
ARCYBER is the 3-star ASCC designated to serve as the focal point for
identifying, receiving, integrating, synchronizing, and advocating for
operational capability requirements through Service, Joint, and DOD-
level processes in support of Joint and Service Cyberspace Operations,
Information Operations, and Electromagnetic Warfare.
Personnel proponency for EW belongs to the Cyber Center of
Excellence aligned under the Combined Arms Center and U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Modernization proponency of EW
belongs to Army Futures Command (AFC) for force design and force
development and is the capabilities developer and operational architect
for the future Army. In addition, the Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)) and U.S. Army
Materiel Command (AMC) is responsible sustainment and logistics of EW
materiel. The Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G-3/5/7 is the Army's lead
integrator and synchronizer across force modernization time horizons.
The G-3/5/7 performs force modernization activities and uses the Army
Campaign Plan to execute these activities and reach decisions through
the Army Synchronization Meeting. Coordinated and synchronized, ARCYBER
will manage EW requirements as the Army Command focused on integrated
cyberspace operations and EW capabilities. Last, Forces Command
(FORSCOM) along with Human Resources Command (HRC) are responsible for
providing, assigning and stationing of EW Soldiers to ASCCs, Army
Commands, Field Operating Agencies and Direct Reporting Units.
41. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth, IF NOT, today's threat
environment seems misaligned to picking winners and losers for
employing capabilities designed to enhance survivability and lethality
during Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) or below the threshold of
armed conflict. What do you need from us to push this critical effort
across the finish line?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army is investing in three major EW
programs. First is the Terrestrial Layered System (TLS) which provides
commanders an integrated SIGINT/EW/Cyber capability at all echelons.
Each echelon is tailored for their specific operations and likely
adversary signals of interest. Second, is the Multi-Function Electronic
Warfare--Air Large (MFEW-AL). This system is an EW pod that supports
Divisions and BCTs with all facets of EW. It is currently configured to
mount to the Gray Eagle, however, it is platform agnostic. Third, is
the Electronic Warfare Planning & Management Tool (EWPMT). EWPMT is the
cornerstone for EW capabilities and provides command and control for EW
and spectrum management.
TLS is an integrated Ground Tactical SIGINT/EW/ and RF-Enabled
Cyber capability. It will be developed in two (2) variants--Brigade
Combat Team (BCT) and Echelon Above Brigade (EAB). TLS-Brigade Combat
Team (BCT) will be fielded on a platform based on the type of formation
(e.g. Stryker for Stryker BCT, Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) for
Armored BCT, and a dismounted manpack for Infantry BCT). The First Unit
Issue for Stryker is fiscal year 2024 and fiscal year 2025 for AMPV.
TLS-EAB will be fielded on a Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV)
to MDTFs, Corps, and Divisions with First Unit Issue in fiscal year
2026.
MFEW-Air Large is in the testing phase and will be fielded to
Division Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs). First Unit Issue is fiscal
year 2025.
EWPMT is a software-based program that provides the Common
Operating Picture, situational awareness, and planning capabilities
within the Electromagnetic Spectrum. It will synchronize all Army EW
efforts and is being fielded in fiscal year 2024.
To push the critical effort of employing EW capabilities with
today's threat environment, the Army will work with DOD to ensure
enabling policies directives are developed to allow for actions in the
electromagnetic spectrum that provide Commander's options to support
campaigning and integrated deterrence in support of national defense
priorities.
m-shorad
42. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth, what is the plan to move
beyond the initial four battalion goal for MSHORAD and resource the
Army's stated need of up to nine battalions of this critical air
defense capability? How can Congress help you achieve your goal of nine
battalions?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army uses all components to resource
required capabilities and will welcome any assistance with
modernization. Fielding additional Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (M-
SHORAD) battalions (BNs) will help tactical formations defeat aerial
threats that could limit the Army's ability to conduct multi-domain
operations. We have three Active Component M-SHORAD BNs with a fourth
activating in fiscal year 2025. The National Guard will convert four
Avenger Battalions to M-SHORAD BNs starting in fiscal year 2027 upon
materiel procurement. The Army will use future Total Army Analyses to
determine how to create additional M-SHORAD BNs in our force structure.
c-uas
43. Senator Peters. General McConville, when does the Army intend
to resource a counter small, unmanned aircraft system (C-sUAS) single
vehicle solution?
General McConville. The Army has programmed funding for nine
Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft System (C-sUAS) Division Sets to
protect critical assets and maneuver formations from the sUAS threat.
The current composition of those Division Sets includes the two-vehicle
configuration of the Mobile, Low, Slow, Unmanned Aircraft Integrated
Defeat System (M-LIDS). The Air and Missile Defense Cross Functional
Team (AMD CFT), as the Army's C-sUAS lead for operational requirements
and capability development, continues to evaluate new capabilities and
emerging technologies to keep pace with the evolving sUAS threat. The
Army is assessing opportunities to move toward a single-vehicle
configuration at the earliest opportunity and will request resourcing
in the appropriate year. The Army appreciates Congress's continued
support as the Army continues to develop C-sUAS capabilities to address
the evolving threat.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
remote maintenance support to ukraine
44. Senator Rosen. Secretary Wormuth, as you saw during your visit
to Poland last year, the Army is providing remote maintenance teams to
allow Ukrainians on the frontlines to receive immediate advice from
U.S. Soldiers on weapons and equipment maintenance. As Ukraine receives
more advanced equipment, such as Abrams tanks and the Patriot missile
defense system, the demand for these teams and capabilities will grow.
What is the Army doing to expand this program and ensure it is equipped
to efficiently and accurately respond to requests from the battlefield,
particularly as we expect Ukraine to soon mount a counteroffensive?
Secretary Wormuth. Remote Maintenance Operations (RMO) are
conducted at the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center-Ukraine
(RDC-U) in Jasionka/Rzeszow, Poland. While uniformed servicemembers are
present to administer the RMO program, remote maintenance is currently
being conducted by contracted Field Service Representatives (FSRs) from
OEMs and defense industry partners. FSRs directly engage with Ukrainian
Armed Forces (UAF) users and depots to identify faults, troubleshoot,
and determine repair part requirements via group chats.
There are currently 29 U.S. platforms and 33 International
platforms supported by the Remote Maintenance Cell at RDC-U, to include
Patriot. FSRs for M1 Abrams are expected to establish presence at RDC-U
following the completion of initial training and transfer of Abrams to
the UAF.
While the remote maintenance operation concept has been proven to
be an essential enabler of UAF combat readiness, office space for FSRs
at the RDC-U is quickly becoming limited. The RDC-U command team has
requested Special Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U)/J4 to establish a
process to validate FSR requirements. Based on the complexity and
number of components in a platform or weapon system, the number of FSRs
required can vary greatly. For example, there are 45 FSRs at the RDC-U
to support the Patriot while there is 1 FSR each for M777 and Bradley
Fighting Vehicles.
As an alternative method, several coalition partners support
internationally donated platforms by conducting remote maintenance from
the host country. This and other alternatives will be a consideration
for SAG-U's validation process of FSR requirements. Additionally, all
chat rooms are being supported by a pool of contracted interpreters
which will be considered as the increased number of FSRs and platforms
will require increased interpreter support.
army's implementation of zero trust
45. Senator Rosen. General McConville, in November, the Department
of Defense released its Zero Trust Strategy and Roadmap, which lists as
a key goal technological acceleration at a pace that equals or exceeds
industry advancements. I am encouraged by the Army's efforts to
accelerate its digital transformation by requesting $439 million for
Zero Trust Implementation and $95 million for defensive cyber tools. In
addition to funding critical digital infrastructure necessary for Zero
Trust implementation, what is the Army's strategy to accelerate its
technological advancements?
General McConville. The Army completed a comprehensive Network
Capability Portfolio Review (N-CPR) of Army network requirements from
enterprise to tactical levels to ensure the Army has a complete set of
stable requirements for advancing the Unified Network, underpinned by
Zero Trust (ZT) principles. The CPR examined network operations, cloud
and data center infrastructure, transport, software, services and ZT
implementation.
Informed by the N-CPR, the Army Unified Network Plan and
Implementation Plan established the strategic direction and specific
activities required for the Army to modernize its networks and
accelerate initial ZT capabilities during fiscal year 2023-2024.
The Army established the Army Functional Management Office--Zero
Trust to synchronize, implement, and execute Army ZT efforts across the
enterprise to ensure prioritization, resourcing, and alignment with DOD
and Service ZT directives, goals, and objectives.
As part of the strategy, the Army accelerated Identity, Credential,
and Access Management, a foundational capability to zero trust, that
provides endpoint security and compliance. Additionally, the Army is
collapsing several stovepipe networks under Army Cyber Command to
ensure a common security approach across the Army. These accelerated
activities underpin enhanced ZT capabilities in fiscal year 2025-2026
to include Software Defined Networking, Data Tagging, and Automated
Incident Response. The Army's goal is to reach a complete ZT
architecture by fiscal year 2027.
This effort will culminate in a Unified Network based on ZT
principles, aligned to the DOD Strategy, and will deliver a survivable,
secure, end-to-end capability that enables the Army to operate as part
of the Joint Force across the competition continuum in all operational
domains.
46. Senator Rosen. General McConville, how do you plan to allocate
resources to attract a sufficiently skilled workforce in this domain?
General McConville. The Network Capability Portfolio Review (N-CPR)
also addressed the required workforce necessary to develop and maintain
a unified network aligned with Zero Trust (ZT) principles. The Army
continues to use all authorities by Congress to attract the most
skilled workforce in this domain. Specifically, the Army is currently
expanding the Cyber Excepted Service alternate personnel system, which
provides enhanced flexibilities to recruit, compensate, and retain
civilian talent for cyber workforce positions.
Additionally, the Army is capitalizing on workforce flexibilities
as a key component in identifying, attracting, and maintaining talent.
A current example is the Targeted Local Market Supplement (TLMS), which
provides additional compensation incentives for critical cyber work
roles. Simultaneously, the Army is developing and employing key
execution enablers such as ZT Curriculum for the workforce and Army
Regulations that incorporate ZT principles. These efforts will enable
us to both attract and maintain a sufficiently skilled workforce.
army's multi-domain task forces (mdtfs)
47. Senator Rosen. General McConville, the Army describes the
Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) as theater-level maneuver elements
that are designed to employ long-range precision effects to combat our
adversaries' ``anti-access/area denial'' networks in all domains. The
Army has further described the MDTF as the ``centerpiece'' of its
ability to operate in a highly contested multi-domain environment.
Should future military engagement in the Taiwan Strait involve our
allies and partners, what steps is the Army taking to ensure that the
MDTFs can generate multinational interoperability?
General McConville. The development of the Multi-Domain Task Forces
has always been intended to provide the range, speed, and convergence
of cutting-edge technologies that gives the Joint Force Commander the
decision dominance and overmatch required to fight and win.
The Army has collaborated with key Allies in the development of
some of the technologies that are organic to the MDTF as well as
collaboration in exercises with those Allies related to the employment
of this new formation. During Project Convergence 2022, the Army
prioritized assessing the all-service ability to connect and
collaborate with allied nations.
The Army will be able to integrate with Allies or partners in the
employment of certain capabilities of the MDTF while ultimately
providing the Joint Force with the overmatch necessary to fulfill the
Combatant Commander's requirements. Examples of this integration is IAW
the Australia, United Kingdom, United States (AUKUS) tri-signed
Statement of Intent to develop and provide joint advanced military
capabilities to promote security and stability in the Indo-Pacific
region.
48. Senator Rosen. General McConville, is there a plan to station
future MDTFs in, or closer to, theater in an effort to better integrate
our multinational partners?
General McConville. Ultimately, the decision to station forces
overseas is reserved for the Secretary of Defense and the National
Security Council. Based on the priorities established in the National
Defense Strategy, the Army will determine the appropriate support to
the Pacific, Europe, and integrated deterrence.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
human machine teaming
49. Senator Kelly. Secretary Wormuth, as Chair of the Airland
Subcommittee, I met with General Rainey, the commander of Army Futures
Command, a few weeks ago. We had a great conversation about the success
of the last Project Convergence exercise at Yuma Proving Ground in
Arizona, as well as some of his priorities. We talked about development
of uncrewed vehicles and the ability to offload menial tasks,
logistics, re-supply capabilities on machines. I see a lot of potential
with human-machine teaming. We've seen the success in the air with
remotely piloted aircraft, and I want to see success on the ground.
What is your vision for how you see human-machine teaming working in
the future for the Army?
Secretary Wormuth. Human machine teaming is a complicated
initiative with exciting possibilities for the reduction in cognitive
load for soldiers, increased operational capabilities at every level
from the squad up, and enhanced logistics to remove soldiers from
harm's way by reducing the need for human operators in certain
circumstances. The Army is investing $74.3 million (Science and
Technology (S&T)) in fiscal year 2024 to address the questions of how
to integrate human-machine teams, and how to best leverage the unique
strengths of human-machine teams. Key research areas for human-machine
teaming for autonomy include the allocation and switching of
operational tasks to both human and machine team members; enabling
soldiers to rapidly train and adapt machines in the field; a means to
assess human-machine teams; and tools to enable mission planning and
after mission assessment. S&T initiatives are demonstrating flexible,
adaptive interactions between soldiers and unmanned assets including in
the areas of autonomous mobility technologies and weapon engagement
systems to enable robust manned-unmanned team dynamic environments. The
Army's goals are to demonstrate data-driven task handoff in 2024,
dynamic-retasking and custom situational awareness by role in 2026,
with more natural interactions being demonstrated in 2028.
50. Senator Kelly. Secretary Wormuth, this is something I hear
about from innovators in Arizona. How are you thinking about onboarding
these capabilities?
Secretary Wormuth. Onboarding and leveraging the full potential of
Robotic Enabled Maneuver requires an integrated and phased approach.
Interdependent and mutually supporting themes of soldiers, data, and
technology will adapt and undergo a cultural change to deliver a modern
capability that can be constantly adapted in response to both threats
and tech maturity. Key to aligning and delivering Robotic Autonomous
System capabilities is the development of suitable processes and trust,
all of which underpin the effective employment of Robotic Enabled
Maneuver.
51. Senator Kelly. Secretary Wormuth, how will these efforts
support us in future conflicts?
Secretary Wormuth. Robotic and autonomous systems will exist in
future conflicts operating both with and against U.S. forces. The
challenge is to learn how to best use robotic and autonomous systems to
gain and maintain the advantage on the battlefield. AFC's campaign of
persistent experimentation is designed to drive the learning that gives
us that advantage.
52. Senator Kelly. Secretary Wormuth, what is the roadmap for
development, and how does the Army's budget request support these
efforts?
Secretary Wormuth. Human machine teaming is a complicated problem
with exciting possibilities for the reduction in cognitive load for
soldiers, increased operational capabilities at every level from the
squad up, and enhanced logistics to remove soldiers from harm's way by
reducing the need for human operators in certain circumstances. Science
and Technology (S&T) is investing $74.3 million in fiscal year 2024 to
answer the questions of how to integrate human-machine teams, and how
to best leverage the unique strengths of human-machine teams. Key
research areas for human-machine teaming for autonomy include the
allocation and switching of operational tasks to both human and machine
team members; enabling soldiers to rapidly train and adapt machines in
the field; a means to assess human-machine teams; and tools to enable
mission planning and after mission assessment. S&T is demonstrating
flexible, adaptive interactions between soldiers and unmanned assets
including autonomous mobility technologies and weapon engagement
systems to enable robust manned-unmanned team dynamic environments. The
Army's goals are to demonstrate data-driven task handoff in 2024,
dynamic-retasking and custom situational awareness by role in 2026,
with more natural interactions being demonstrated in 2028.
53. Senator Kelly. Secretary Wormuth, what obstacles do you see in
the future with these efforts, and is there anything Congress can do to
help?
Secretary Wormuth. The biggest obstacles to the Army's development
and fielding of ground maneuver robotics systems include the
development of technologies and software for autonomous cross-country
maneuver and human-machine integrated command and control. Rapid
technological advances in these areas are primarily driven by Army
investments since commercial industry focuses on on-road autonomous
technologies. Additional Army funding would increase the speed of
innovation and support the accelerated development of the Army's
marquee ground robotics effort--the Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV).
Additional funding for the RCV program will enable the Army to
accelerate development of human-machine teams capable of fighting as a
robotic enabled maneuver element, which combines crewed combat and
control vehicles with robotic combat vehicles capable of performing in
operationally relevant off-road, all-weather, and limited visibility
combat conditions. Further, the Army would be able to accelerate the
development of a robust and resilient network and modular payload
integration on the RCVs. These payloads enable Army formations to
counter the increased threat of enemy unmanned aerial systems, employ
electronic warfare capabilities, and launch loitering munitions.
Increased funding for software development would improve the RCV's
cross-country mobility and enable the transfer of more tasks from
remote operation to autonomous operation, which would reduce soldiers'
cognitive loads and accelerate the decisionmaking process.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
medevac operations
54. Senator Wicker. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, as we
look to improve the readiness of the Army in a Great Power competition,
the speed and consistency of things like MEDEVAC operations take on a
new level of urgency. The longer a helicopter is in a hovering position
to extract a wounded soldier, the more our soldiers and aircraft are at
risk to incoming enemy fire and engine failure related incidents. Any
accelerating capability would also have a dual use during peacetime, as
MEDEVAC-like operations are routinely conducted by the National Guard
in search and rescue missions following natural disasters. What dual
use capabilities are currently being evaluated by the Army that would
accelerate and improve the confidence of these extractions in the
field, and is there anything we can do to accelerate the adoption of
these capabilities into the Army and National Guard?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Currently, the Army has
three operational techniques for Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) missions,
with a fourth one under user testing. These techniques can be used in
both combat and homeland support scenarios. At present, there are no
suggestions to speed up the adoption of these strategies since they are
in the developmental testing phase or currently being used. Three
systems (dynamic hoist, tag line, and Vita Rescue System-Litter
Attachment (VRS-LA)) are currently in development. One technology, the
Cascade Rescue Stable Flight Heli-Bag, was recently approved for use on
Army Aircraft, the Heli-Bag uses an aerodynamic brake (rudder) to
mitigate the spin and oscillation caused by rotor downwash. It provides
patient immobilization and containment. This system can be combined
with the dynamic hoist technique or used during stationary hovering.
It's presently being utilized by certain Army National Guard and
Special Operations Units.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
munitions production
55. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, the Russian invasion of
Ukraine highlighted a longstanding problem in our defense industrial
base. Our nation simply does not produce munitions fast enough. This is
not about Ukraine depleting our war stocks--most of the munitions used
in Taiwan would be fundamentally different than the ones used in
Ukraine. This is about the fact that Ukraine has exposed some cracks in
our defense industrial base that we need to shore up to ensure our
national security. Here's some sobering facts: In 1945, the U.S.
operated 86 ammunition plants. Today, we operate five. In 1 week, the
Ukrainian military fires more 155mm artillery shells than the U.S.
produces in a month. In the first 8 months of the war, the Ukrainians
launched more Javelin antitank missiles than the U.S. produces in 5
years, and fired more Stinger anti-aircraft missiles than we
manufacture in 13 years. Beyond Ukraine, war games have shown that the
U.S. would run out of some munitions in less than 1 week in a Taiwan
conflict. While DOD has made significant strides in beginning to
increase our munitions stockpile, I remain concerned about the scale
and efficiency of its munitions production. We must act with the
urgency this situation requires. What concrete steps are you taking to
decrease delivery times?
Secretary Wormuth. In order to accelerate deliveries, the Army is
reducing acquisition and contracting lead times by taking advantage of
the new authorities granted by Section 1244 of the fiscal year 2023
National Defense Authorization Act that allow for streamlined staffing
of Justification and Approval documents and increased flexibilities for
Undefinitized Contract Actions. The Army is also working to reduce
production lead times by ramping up capacity where the Army can and
employing second and third-shifts on certain production lines.
Additionally, the Army is working in close coordination with
industry partners on three lines of effort to accelerate and increase
deliveries: 1) the expansion and modernization of government-owned,
contractor operated facilities; 2) the establishment of contractor
owned, contractor operated second sources; and, 3) leveraging
international partnerships for end items and component production.
Last, the Army is using supplemental funds provided by Congress to
shore up current production lines and add additional production lines
to expedite the replenishment of U.S. stockpiles.
56. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, what are your main
challenges?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army's main challenges are speeding up
facility modernization, increasing production capacity in a timely
fashion to support present requirements, and forecasting future
requirements from allies. In addition, the Army has identified certain
munitions components and precursor materials--such as propellants and
explosives, and nitrocellulose--that are experiencing supply challenges
due to a spike in global demand. The Army is currently exploring means
to secure those sources of supply, including options to onshore many of
them.
57. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, what can Congress do to
break down barriers for you?
Secretary Wormuth. Congress is providing key support to enable the
Army to rapidly respond to Russia's war against Ukraine and to expand
production capacity within the munitions industrial base. In
particular, the Army is greatly benefited from the temporary
contracting and acquisition authorities provided under Section 1244 of
the fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act that have
allowed the Army to more rapidly award contracts to provide
capabilities to Ukraine, to allies and partners who are assisting
Ukraine, and to replenish domestic stocks. Importantly, Section 1244
also provides the authority to enter into multiyear contracts for a
select set of munitions. The Army plans to use this authority for
munitions in fiscal year 2023 and have requested congressional approval
to enter into multiyear procurements (MYP) in fiscal year 2024. These
MYPs provide production stability and predictability to industry
partners, allowing us to build and sustain capacity within the defense
industrial base, while achieving cost savings for the government.
Additionally, congressional support of the Army's fiscal year 2024
budget request will be valuable as the request includes significant
funding for a range of munitions, including precisions munitions and
artillery ammunition, as well as investments in the munitions
industrial base.
58. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, bolstering our defense
industrial base it critical. Multi-Year procurement authorities are one
of the ways we can help provide a steady demand signal to defense
companies. Per your budget request, the Army still has yet to leverage
Multi-Year procurement authorities but have stated you are looking at
it for the PAC-3 (patriot anti-aircraft system missile) and the GMLRS
(artillery round). When should we expect to see that?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army has submitted MYP requests to Congress
for PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement
(MSE) and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS).
The Army also submitted fiscal year 2023 MYP requests for the 155mm
M1128 projectile program and the Modular Artillery Charge System
program. Initial contract awards for these programs are expected in
fiscal 2023.
59. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, why are you only using these
authorities for two systems?
Secretary Wormuth. In addition to the four planned MYP
opportunities already identified, the Army continues to explore
additional systems where use of MYP authority may make sense. The four
planned MYP contracts were identified due to the priority of the
requirement and, moving forward, we will take a managed risk approach
prior to applying the authority to more programs. One of the key
challenges in implementing MYP contracts is having a stable funding
profile over time. Historically, the ammunition portfolio has not had
stable funding profiles, and thus has not met the criteria for MYP
implementation.
60. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, PrSM is one of your key long
range fires capabilities. Have you considered multi-year procurement
for PrSM?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army is not considering utilizing MYP
authority for the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) program at this time.
PrSM, Increment 1, continues to execute the engineering and
manufacturing development (EMD) phase of the program through fiscal
year 2025. Key activities include Production Qualification flight
Testing and validating the missile design meets Key Performance
Parameters requirements. Once completed, the program will conduct a
Production Readiness Review and request Milestone C approval for Full
Rate Production (FRP). Based on the current program plan, MYP would be
considered beginning in fiscal year 2026 at the earliest. In the
interim, PrSM will begin delivering limited quantities of Early
Operational Capability missiles in 4th quarter fiscal year 2023 and
continue until FRP occurs.
61. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, are there steps you can take
to accelerate its delivery?
Secretary Wormuth. The program could conduct analysis with the
prime contractor and key missile component suppliers to add shift work,
additional overtime, examine supply chain bottlenecks, and other
factors, to accelerate PrSM production. Currently, the program is
executing two more years of technical integration, test, and
manufacturing development to mature and document the design and
associated technical data, therefore an acceleration of deliveries is
not advisable until the program achieves Full Rate Production in fiscal
year 2025.
62. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, will you still be able to
effectively execute multi-year procurement authorities under a
continuing resolution?
Secretary Wormuth. Yes, the Army will be able to effectively
execute MYP under a continuing resolution. The programs that the Army
has identified for MYP contracts are not new starts. Therefore, each
system can be funded up to the level of what was appropriated in fiscal
year 2023.
63. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, another key vulnerability of
our munitions base is our reliance on foreign nations--at times sworn
enemies--for essential materials. DOD does not purchase any munitions
fully sourced in the U.S.--not a single bullet, bomb, or missile.
Secretary Wormuth, can you tell me what percentage of the Army
munitions supply chain relies on China?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army is currently executing a Munitions
Assurance program with the goal of identifying and mitigating those
components or precursor materials that come from foreign sources.
Mitigation plans include, but are not limited to, onshoring the
components and materials in question, and developing new products that
``design out'' the material or component. The Army can provide
additional detail in a classified setting.
64. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, do you believe any
dependence is acceptable?
Secretary Wormuth. I believe that dependence on critical materials
from potentially adversarial nations is not within our national
interest, and that is why sourcing mitigating dependence of foreign
sources is a top priority for management of the industrial base.
65. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, are you worried that China
would attempt to cutoff our access to rare earth material critical to
our munitions development the way they did with Japan in 2010?
Secretary Wormuth. I would expect any potential adversary to
utilize all their levers of power if deemed advantageous to their aims.
66. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, what steps are you taking to
end this dependence?
Secretary Wormuth. The tools available to the Army for mitigation
include: 1) The ability to establish safety stocks or stockpiles of
materials where that is feasible and warranted, 2) The establishment of
domestic, National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB), or at least
friendly nation sources of supply, and 3) Designing problematic
materials out of the supply chain to eliminate the risk posed by them.
Authorities granted to expand the National Stockpile have enabled
the addition or expansion of several materials important to munitions
production. The Army has and will continue to leverage the authorities
provided under Defense Production Act Title III to establish domestic
or NTIB sources of supply for materials sourced from potentially
adversarial nations. In addition, Defense Logistics Agency sponsored
Small Business Innovative Research efforts are being leveraged to
establish more favorable sources of supply for materials. Science and
Technology efforts are underway to design alternate paths to achieve
munitions solutions that do not require materials sourced from
potentially adversarial nations. Once mature, these solutions would be
transitioned into munitions programs.
67. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, Army stated that much of
your munitions' requirements have been met by Ukraine supplemental
funds, which are not reflected in this budget. What is your estimate of
how much funding you have or will received from the appropriated
supplemental funds?
Secretary Wormuth. To date, the Army has received $2.1 billion in
Ukraine supplemental funding for munitions.
68. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, are you confident that this
request, in addition to Ukraine supplemental funding already provided,
will allow you to replenish your stocks to maintain U.S. readiness?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army is confident that the supplemental
funding requested will be approved for distribution to the Army for
replenishment.
69. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, as the war in Ukraine has
shown, our allies' munitions stockpiles will be crucial to any future
conflict. What steps are is the Army taking to ensure our allies have
the munitions they need in case of conflict?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army is working with allies to replenish
munitions stockpiles by supplementing current production lines with
U.S. munitions. This is based on ally stock requirements and current
production efforts to support replenishment efforts within ally
industrial bases. The Army is also working closely with allies to make
munitions fully interoperable with their weapons and fire control
systems.
70. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, are there any additional
authorities or resources you need?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army has received considerable support from
Congress to enhance munitions production. Specifically, the temporary
authorities provided under Section 1244 of the fiscal year 2023
National Defense Authorization Act enable the Army to accelerate
munitions production through contracting flexibilities and the
authority to commit to multiyear procurement contracts for select
munitions beginning in fiscal year 2023. The Army will work with
Congress to assess the need for extending or modifying these
authorities, as appropriate, given the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
Additionally, the supplemental funding provided by Congress has allowed
the Army to meet many of its munitions-related requirements. The Army's
fiscal year 2024 budget request includes significant additional funding
for a range of munitions and investments in the munitions industrial
base. Congressional support for this request will enable the Army to
continue meeting those requirements.
71. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, the Army budget invests in
the defense industrial base, with $726 million slated for ammunition
facilities and another $115 million for modernization and upgrades for
depots that work on weapons and tracked combat vehicles. Will this
funding provide you with adequate capacity to meet all of your munition
production goals?
Secretary Wormuth. At this time, yes. However, efforts to further
accelerate artillery production are being developed and if approved by
OSD will be provided to Congress in the near future. In addition, the
replenishment funding provided to the Army to date is adequate for
replenishing stockpiles and supporting Ukraine efforts for present and
forecasted worldwide munitions requirements.
72. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, if not, where do you need
additional investment to expand capacity?
Secretary Wormuth. Likely, the Army will need additional investment
to expand capacity. The Army is working on needed investments in
artillery shell and propellant charge production to further accelerate
and sustain the planned ramp up in production. The Army is working to
get that to Congress for consideration in a Ukraine Replenishment
Tranche request very soon. In addition, there are enduring requirements
outlined in the Army Ammunition Modernization Plan that will help
sustain the needed capacity. The report is provided to Congress on a
yearly basis, with the latest delivered in March 2023.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
department of education noncompliance
73. Senator Ernst. Secretary Wormuth, would you agree that those
administrators of schools that deny access to recruiters are harming
your recruitment effort?
Secretary Wormuth. Administrators who deny or limit the access of
Recruiting noncommissioned officers (NCO) into schools impede the
Army's recruiting ability. Meaningful, face-to-face interactions
between our Recruiting NCOs and potential applicants is the best way
for students to learn about the opportunities and benefits the military
offers and what military service is really like. In schools where
Recruiting NCOs are unable to speak with students, or are not supported
by administrators and teachers, it is difficult to ensure those youth
are aware of the opportunities and benefits available to them through
military service. Recruiting NCOs are not seeking access to convince
every student to join, but instead to have the opportunity to educate
today's youth about opportunities, benefits, and the role the Army
plays in supporting and defending the Constitution; in the end allowing
students to make informed decisions about their future.
74. Senator Ernst. Secretary Wormuth, would you further agree that
the Federal Government must enforce the law--including by withholding
funds?
Secretary Wormuth. Withholding Federal funding is an available
tool. However, in most cases, access issues can be resolved through
leader engagement. Professional relationships between Army Recruiters
and the school administration are crucial and when local, State, and
Federal leadership also support those relationships, it is truly
invaluable. The Army fully recognizes that school districts have State
and local education requirements that must be met during the calendar
year and the Army's Recruiting NCOs do their best to work with schools
to achieve the best balance to achieve mutual success. The Army
continues to work with local education officials to improve access and
in most cases, issues of denying access can be resolved through
proactive leader engagement at all levels. This approach opens doors
for Recruiting NCOs to develop rapport with school administrators,
teachers, and student bodies. It takes time, but quality, meaningful
access is almost always achieved as relationships and trust develop.
The Army also supports a whole-of-government approach to ensure
relationships are built, sustained, and where needed, created if they
are not present. Local, State and Federal leadership and agencies play
a crucial role in developing trust and sustaining meaningful
relationships.
75. Senator Ernst. Secretary Wormuth, what are you going to do to
ensure recruiter access?
Secretary Wormuth. Army leaders continue to work with our local
recruiting partners (Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army
(CASAs), influencers, community partners, Superintendents etc.) to
increase meaningful access to schools. For example, in January 2023,
U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) reported approximately 400 of
17,000 high schools denied access to Recruiters. However, USAREC made
significant progress by leveraging CASAs, Army Reserve Ambassadors, and
local leaders and regained access to all but one high school between
January and March 2023. The Army continues to experience success
accessing student populations across the country. One example is
through USAREC's ``High School Blitz'' in which they conduct hundreds
of high school engagements on a weekly basis. A few challenges that
recruiters have faced include the belief that college remains the only
viable option for post-high school education, which further creates a
disconnect between communities and the military. Recruiters are
overcoming this challenge as they continue to develop a positive
rapport with school administrators, teachers, and student bodies. These
relationships take time but significant progress is being made in
building relationship that led to open lines of communication and fact
sharing.
76. Senator Ernst. Secretary Wormuth, will you commit to report
back on your progress in 60 days?
Secretary Wormuth. Yes--the Army can provide an update for full
transparency in efforts to improve meaningful access to high schools
across the country.
preventing threats to nato
77. Senator Ernst. General McConville, has degradation of Russia's
military likely decreased our operational requirements in Europe?
General McConville. DOD continues to assess the operational
requirements in Europe following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The Army
contributes to the ongoing evaluation of requirements in Europe to
ensure the right capabilities fulfill requirements while preserving the
readiness of forces. The Army continues to provide trained and ready
forces to Europe to support operational requirements determined by the
Commander, U.S. European Command and approved by the Secretary of
Defense. Rotational and forward-stationed Army forces in Europe are
actively contributing to deterrence by integrating with Allies and
partners and participating in training exercises. It is important to
note that only Russia's conventional ground forces have been degraded
and they still remain a significant threat. Also, Russia still remains
lethal air, naval, hybrid, and strategic/non-strategic nuclear
capabilities. For this reason, deterrence and defense of Europe through
NATO will remain a priority.
ground-based missile capabilities in western pacific
78. Senator Ernst. General McConville, would U.S. ground-launched,
theater-range missiles in the Western Pacific help availability of
persistent, prompt, and survivable strike options?
General McConville. Yes, the synergy and the varied capabilities of
the services long range fire capabilities work in concert to provide
complex dilemmas for an adversary allowing the DOD to synchronize
efforts against singular or numerous targets simultaneously. Missile
platforms are rapidly transported via air or sea to engage enemy forces
throughout the Western Pacific which avoids lingering to become targets
for enemy counter fire.
79. Senator Ernst. General McConville, would U.S. ground-launched,
theater-range missiles in the Western Pacific help deter of enemy
attack or escalation?
General McConville. Yes, U.S. ground-launched, theater-range
missiles in the Western Pacific in mutually supporting relationships
with their air and maritime launched counterparts provide a combined
arms threat to enemy forces. This increased lethality affects enemy
decision calculus and contributes to deterring attack or escalation by
greatly increasing the joint force's capability to impose operational
costs on enemy forces. In addition, the inclusion of ground-launched
theater-range missile capability requires the enemy to allocate kinetic
and non-kinetic resources to seek and destroy these assets diminishing
enemy capacity to concentrate efforts on a singular DOD service.
80. Senator Ernst. General McConville, would U.S. ground-launched,
theater-range missiles in the Western Pacific help impose of
operational costs on enemy forces?
General McConville. Yes, U.S. ground-launched, theater-range
missiles in the Western Pacific in mutually supporting relationships
with their air and maritime launched counterparts provide a combined
arms threat to enemy forces far beyond the threat that each individual
platform would pose individually. This increased lethality greatly
increases the joint force's capability to impose operational costs on
enemy forces and contributes to deterring attack or escalation by
affecting enemy decision calculus.
81. Senator Ernst. General McConville, would U.S. ground-launched,
theater-range missiles in the Western Pacific help deliver responsive
strikes against time-critical enemy targets?
General McConville. Yes, the persistent presence of U.S. ground-
launched, theater-range missiles in the first and second island chains
provides a proximity and high reload speed that helps deliver
responsive strikes against time-critical targets. In mutually
supporting relationships with their air and maritime launched
counterparts, ground launched capabilities provide a combined arms
threat to enemy forces far beyond the threat that each individual
platform would pose individually.
82. Senator Ernst. General McConville, would U.S. ground-launched,
theater-range missiles in the Western Pacific help destroy high-value
targets to enable other joint forces?
General McConville. Yes, U.S. ground-launched, theater-range
missiles in the Western Pacific with their persistent presence, high
reload speeds, and proximity to enemy targets form a mutually
supporting relationships with their air and maritime launched
counterparts and provide a combined arms threat to enemy forces far
beyond the threat that each individual platform would pose
individually.
83. Senator Ernst. General McConville, would U.S. ground-launched
missiles at various ranges and launch locations in the Western Pacific
create dilemmas for enemy forces?
General McConville. Yes, U.S. ground-launched, theater-range
missiles in the Western Pacific with various capabilities complicate
enemy decision calculus to include ranges and launch locations creating
dilemmas for an adversary through supporting relationships from
multiple domains providing long range fires from air, ground, and
maritime launched (both from the surface and sub-surface fleet)
creating a joint combined arms threat to enemy forces far beyond the
threat that each individual platform would pose individually.
short range air defense systems
84. Senator Ernst. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, what
is the plan to move beyond the initial 4 battalion goal for MSHORAD and
resource the Army's stated need of up to 9 battalions of this critical
air defense capability?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army utilizes all
components to resource required capabilities and will welcome any
assistance with modernization. Fielding additional M-SHORAD Battalions
will help the Army's tactical formations defeat aerial threats that
could limit ability to conduct multi-domain operations. The Army will
have to balance increased force structure to modernize the Army of
2030. Guided by the National Defense Strategy, the Army is in the
process of determining how and where to make these changes. Once
analysis is complete and documented in structure, the Army will assess
impacts to modernization priorities and Army procurement.
85. Senator Ernst. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, what
is the Army's current timeline to resource a counter small, unmanned
aircraft system (C-sUAS) single vehicle solution?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army has programmed
funding for nine C-sUAS Division Sets to protect critical assets and
maneuver formations from the sUAS threat. The current composition of
those Division Sets includes the two-vehicle configuration of the
Mobile, Low, Slow, Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System (M-LIDS).
The Air and Missile Defense Cross Functional Team (AMD CFT), as the
Army's C-sUAS lead for operational requirements and capability
development, continues to evaluate new capabilities and emerging
technologies to keep pace with the evolving sUAS threat. The Army is
assessing opportunities to move toward a single-vehicle configuration
at the earliest opportunity and will request resourcing in the
appropriate year. The Army appreciates the continued support from
Congress as the Army continues to develop C-sUAS capabilities to
address the evolving threat.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
multi-domain task forces in alaska
86. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
since 2017, the Army has fielded three theater-specific multi-domain
task forces capable of employing long-range precision effects to
include intelligence collection and precision strikes. Currently, two
of the Army's multi-domain task forces are concentrated on the PACOM
AOR and the third is focused on EUCOM/ AFRICOM. Currently, the Army is
looking to field a fourth and possibly a fifth multi-domain task force.
Your department's Arctic strategy states ``with increasing levels of
adversary activities in the region, it is essential for the U.S. Army
to employ a calibrated force posture with units that are manned,
trained, and equipped to maintain a credible deterrence and the first
line of defense of the homeland.'' The study additionally rightfully
points out the Arctic's place as a center of Strategic Competition.
With the importance of the Arctic as laid out in your strategy on the
region and the Army's interest in creating two more theater-specific
multi-domain task forces, can you please speak to the benefits of
having the next multi-domain task force in Alaska?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. MDTF stationing is a
decision reserved for the Secretary of the Army. The Headquarters,
Department of the Army develops options to station our limited
resources based on operational requirements found in the National
Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The
Army Staff is still currently assessing those requirements in our
annual Total Army Analysis (TAA) that will be approved by the Secretary
of the Army. Specific for the Arctic, all Arctic-capable force
structure decisions will be aligned with the National Strategy for the
Arctic Region and other relevant posture guidance. The Army fully
realizes and values that Alaska is an ideal location for the
development of new capabilities applicable to cold weather environments
and for the threats unique to the region.
11th airborne division
87. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, as
you know, last June, on the anniversary of D-Day to be exact, the 11th
Airborne Division or ``Arctic Angels'' was stood up at Joint-Base
Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage. Prior to the stand up, the U.S.
Army's Alaska Headquarters was suffering from an identity crisis which
unfortunately was contributing to a mental health crisis among the
soldiers in my State. Since its stand up, the 11th Airborne Division
under General Eifler and Sergeant Major Daly has been nothing but
remarkable for the morale of soldiers stationed in Alaska. In fact, as
you both know, Alaska is now the top requested duty station in the
country. Over the last few months, the 11th Airborne Division completed
a forced entry airfield seizure in Scandinavia and next week will
conduct an exercise called the ``Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness
Center-Alaska Exercise.'' What lessons has the army learned on the 11th
Airborne's successes that can be applied to other service's other
divisions?''
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army is very proud of
everything that the 11th Airborne Division has accomplished since
standing up last summer, as the cutting edge of the Army's Arctic
capability. In addition to what the Army is learning on the ground in
Alaska about Arctic operations, there are two broader lessons that
could be applied across the force.
The first is a strong reminder that America's soldiers are always
ready to face a challenge, no matter how great, as long as the Army
ensures a clear sense of purpose. In the case of the 11th Airborne
Division, this meant orienting on the developing strategic importance
of the Arctic, but every formation has a distinct purpose that should
animate everything from its training to a sense of esprit de corps.
The second lesson is on the importance of symbols like the maroon
beret of the paratrooper or the storied patch of the 11th Airborne
Division under which the Army pulled Alaska-based forces together.
Symbols have an important role in building collective identity and
pride. Soldiers are motivated by those distinctive elements that mark
them as experts or identify challenges they have overcome. The Army
continues to harness the potential of distinctive symbols that create a
sense of purpose and belonging attractive to recruits, for diverse
units across the Army.
suicide prevention in alaska
88. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, as
you know, unfortunately on Monday a soldier in Alaska died by suicide.
While the suicide rate among soldiers assigned to Alaska has dropped,
from 17 in 2021 to 6 in 2022, we can all agree that one is too many. I
do want to commend both your and the rest of the Army's response on
this difficult, difficult issue. Part of your response so far has
included sending 40 mental health counselors to Alaska. However, I
think we can all agree there is more to be done. I have tried to work
alongside you to also prevent suicide including my introduction of the
Don Young Arctic Warrior Act in last year's NDAA which sought to
provide additional services including a home leave demonstration
program and special pay for cold weather operations. Again I want to
highlight what you both have done so far but can you please tell us
what other important steps the Army is taking this year to prevent
suicide?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. To get at the root cause
of suicide and other harmful behaviors, the Army is shifting from
responding to events to an integrated primary prevention model as the
Army continues efforts to enhance leader engagement; strengthen
individual, unit, and community resilience and connectedness; and
mitigate stressors that may lead someone to suicide. This comprehensive
approach focuses on the integration of a variety of primary prevention
and intervention strategies and activities.
In addition, the Army continues to invest in upstream prevention
efforts like quality-of-life improvements, sponsorship for new soldiers
and families coming into a new unit, and financial literacy to help
soldiers and families thrive and navigate the challenges they might
face in Army life. The Army will soon publish a standalone suicide
prevention regulation and Lethal Means Safety Toolkit.
The Army is actively participating in the DOD working group that is
developing the roadmap for implementation of the Suicide Prevention and
Response Independent Review Committee's (SPRIRC) recommendations. In
addition, the Army is proactively addressing the Secretary of Defense's
immediate actions directed following the release of the SPRIRC report.
Specifically, the directive that Commanders at all levels promote
mission readiness through healthy sleep throughout the force.
Again, the Army appreciates Senator Sullivan's support of Army
Suicide Prevention efforts. The Army is dedicated to eliminating these
tragedies and will not stop until this critical task is accomplished.
wokeism in the military
89. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, I
want to point out some of the excellent messaging you have created in
your recent advertisements which really get at the ``Be All You Can
Be'' spirit of the Army and drive home what our military should be
doing, which is increasing lethality and readiness. As you both know, I
was confused like many others on the target audience of the ``Calling''
series last year which featured one segment in particular called
``Emma.'' Additionally, I want to point out as I did in our hearing on
recruitment that continued messaging on fake extremism in the military
by left-leaning publications is damaging to our Army's recruitment
efforts. What is the Army's strategy to ensure wokeism and false
allegations of extremism in the military are countered so that we are
not pushing away potential recruits from serving their country?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. In the current
competitive labor market, there are multiple options for young
Americans. To compete in this market, the Army continues to tell its
story in new ways to ensure the Army remains a top choice for those
Americans who want to serve their country. Through the re-introduction
of the ``Be All You Can Be'' campaign, the Army is reaching out to
Americans from all backgrounds, talents, and regions and give them
multiple reasons to come in and stay in the Army. The U.S. Army is
committed to providing opportunities for every American who wishes to
serve their country. With that, the Army continues to invest in our
country's youth through programs focused on improving test taking
skills, advanced degree programs, and safe and effective weight loss
training.
the army's arctic strategy
90. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, in
August 2022, the U.S. Army announced the first BAE-produced BvS 10
``Beowulf'' Cold Weather All-Terrain Vehicle (CATV) would be delivered
to the U.S. Army Northern Warfare Training Center in Fort Wainwright,
Alaska in 2023. In what month do you expect the first CATVs to be
delivered to Alaska?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The first Cold Weather
All-Terrain Vehicles is anticipated to be delivered to Alaska by
September 2023.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Eric Schmitt
future soldier preparatory course (fspc)
91. Senator Schmitt. Secretary Wormuth, I was encouraged and
interested to learn from your testimony about the early success of the
Future Soldier Preparatory Course (FSPC) pilot program. Have the
candidates who successfully completed the FSPC continued to basic
training only at Fort Jackson, or were some also transferred to other
basic or One Station Unit Training sites as well?
Secretary Wormuth. Future Soldier Preparatory Course pilot program
graduates primarily attend either Basic Combat Training (BCT) at Fort
Jackson or One Station Unit training either Fort Moore or Fort Leonard
Wood based on their contracted Military Occupational Specialty. In rare
cases, some may attend training at another BCT location.
92. Senator Schmitt. Secretary Wormuth, last week, Under Secretary
Camarillo testified that the Army will grow the FSPC with ``two
additional companies at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and two companies
at Fort Benning, Georgia.'' I think it is great that the Army is
expanding the program. Are there currently plans to expand FSPC into
other basic training sites like Fort Leonard Wood?
Secretary Wormuth. At this time, further expansion is not required
based on capacity at Fort Jackson and Fort Moore. However, the Army
does have conditions-based decisions to expand to other training
locations if necessary.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2023
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NAVY POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth,
Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan,
Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
receive testimony on the President's Budget Request for the
Department of the Navy (DON) for fiscal year 2024.
I would like to welcome the Secretary of the Navy Carlos
Del Toro, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday, and
Commandant of the Marine Corps General David Berger.
We are grateful for your service, for the service of the
men and women under your command, and for the support of all
Navy and Marine Corps families. Thank you.
Admiral Gilday, General Berger, this will be your last
posture hearing before the Committee in your current role. I
would like to thank you for your remarkable leadership of the
Navy and the Marine Corps as well as your many decades of
service to the Nation.
You have guided your services through significant
challenges with resolve and vision and we are deeply grateful.
The Navy and Marines are faced with a dangerous and
evolving global security environment. Certainly, threats from
Russia, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist groups remain
persistent and the Navy has an important role to play in
addressing them.
But the clear pacing challenge for our naval forces is
China. In the Indo-Pacific and in seas and ports around the
world the United States Navy and the Marine Corps will continue
to be the first line of deterrence and defense against the
PRC's [People's Republic of China] expanding global ambitions.
Recognizing this challenge, the Biden administration has
requested approximately $256 billion in funding for the
Department of the Navy for fiscal year 2024. This represents an
increase of $12.8 billion more than the 2023 enacted budget,
the largest increase among the services.
Within this budget the Navy has requested nine new ships.
The procurement of several new submarines, destroyers,
frigates, and logistics vessels is well reasoned. At the same
time, the Navy is proposing to retire a number of ships before
the end of their service lives including several Littoral
Combat Ships and dock landing ships.
I understand the Navy made the difficult choice to retire
some of these ships now, to free up more resources in the
future. But it seems that this plan would take us in the
opposite direction of the Navy's goal for a 355-ship fleet,
particularly regarding the amphibious force structure.
The Committee will want an update on these issues as well
as the Navy's forthcoming 30-year shipbuilding plan. Even as
the Navy requests newer, more advanced ships I am concerned by
the continuing struggles to maintain our current fleet.
Deferred ship maintenance, reduced steaming and flying hours,
and canceled training and deployments have created serious
readiness problems within the Navy.
These problems are also being experienced by private
shipyards and Navy shipyards. The 2022 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) directed the Navy to study how to
improve the capacity in our shipyard industrial base and the
Department has since begun the Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Program, or SIOP.
This program represents more than $25 billion in planned
investments over the next 25 years to modernize and improve our
shipyards.
Admiral Gilday, I would ask for an update on SIOP and the
outlook for Navy maintenance efforts.
The Marine Corps, while maintaining its ability to operate
worldwide, is continuing to restructure around two concepts,
Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment and
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations.
The key elements of these concepts is a more flexible
amphibious force that can support a broader naval fight once
ashore. Rather than simply acting as a landing force the Marine
Corps intends to help control the sea and air in support of the
Navy and as part of the joint force.
To achieve this the Marine Corps is prioritizing a number
of modernization efforts including deep sensing, long-range
fires to include anti-surface capabilities, enhanced air and
missile defense, and improved ground and amphibious combat
vehicles.
These platforms will equip the marines with improved force
protection and enhanced lethality with a particular emphasis on
providing highly mobile capabilities and addressing contested
logistics.
General Berger, I appreciated your thoughtful approach
throughout this restructuring. Your posture toward adjusting
Marine Corps requirements based on the results of
experimentation and wargaming has yielded valuable outcomes
such as updating the number of cannon batteries and the size of
fighter attack squadrons.
The Committee looks forward to continued engagement on
these modernization efforts as they proceed.
Finally, I would note that the United States' greatest
competitive advantage over China is our global network of
allies and partners.
The recent agreement between the United States, Australia,
and the United Kingdom to collaborate on nuclear submarine
production through the AUKUS [Australia, United Kingdom and the
United States] partnership is a meaningful step forward in
ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Successful implementation of this plan will require
responsible oversight and a stable industrial base. I would ask
our witnesses for their views on what we have the capacity to
produce now and in the future and how we can provide the budget
and resources to match.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today. I
look forward to your testimonies, and now let me recognize the
Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome our witnesses and thank them for their years of
distinguished service. I want to associate myself with the
generous words of appreciation that the distinguished Chairman
has made with regard to Admiral Gilday and General Berger.
I would add to that my appreciation for the talented team
of marines and sailors who are seated behind you and have been
such a great help to all of us in our efforts to get this
right.
I also want to share and associate myself with the remarks
made by the distinguished Chairman and his concern that the
budget proposal would take us in the wrong direction and I
think on a bipartisan basis we will be able to rectify that.
Members of this Committee know all too well that the
Chinese Communist Party represents a major threat to the
Nation. Today, we are in a more complex and sobering threat
environment than we have been in since World War II.
In that war our economy was larger than all of our
adversaries combined with an unmatched industrial base. We no
longer enjoy that advantage, not by a long shot. The evidence
is clear China has launched 75 new warships since 2018 compared
to our 35, 75 to our 35.
China has over 200 hardened aircraft shelters, more than
eight times what we have available in the Western Pacific, and
there are other examples of this imbalance.
I am troubled by China's recent creation of defense
mobilization offices, air raid shelters, and wartime emergency
hospitals. China is rapidly expanding its military forces and
preparedness. We cannot be complacent in our response.
Yet, late yesterday the Navy submitted its statutorily
required 30-year shipbuilding plan, which seems to embrace
complacency. Even in the most aggressive alternative plan the
Navy would not reach the statutory 355-ship requirement until
fiscal year 2042.
Compared to last year's plan, it trades 35 amphibious
warfare ships for support vessels, harming the ability of our
marines to project force. The Navy's fiscal year 2024 budget
request is anemic. Under the President's proposal the size of
the fleet would shrink further.
Let me be clear. This budget request has failed yet again
to build a U.S. Navy fleet that is capable of meeting even
basic tasks to say nothing of growing strong enough to deter
near-term threats.
Thankfully, there is bipartisan agreement that we must
substantially increase the shipbuilding budget. I am concerned
with production constraints at our shipyards. Despite
congressional support the Navy has proved unable to achieve
delivery of two attack subs per year, three destroyers per
year, and two frigates per year.
This trend puts us further and further behind the goal to
build the Navy we need. Expanding our shipbuilding capacity
will require generational investments combined with new
approaches to growing the workforce.
Growing our shipbuilding capacity will also require stable
demand signals to industry. The Navy introduced uncertainty in
the shipbuilding industry by excluding the LPD amphibious ship
from the fiscal year 2024 budget. Congress has reversed
decisions like this in the past and I certainly hope and I
actually am confident that we will do so again this year for
LPD 33.
I am also concerned about ship maintenance, which is
essential to avoiding a smaller fleet available in the near
term. Lack of investment and maintenance together with rising
requirements has left the fleet in brittle condition. As a
result of decades of deferred maintenance. The Navy wants to
decommission 11 ships including 8 before the end of their
expected service life.
This strategy of divest to invest does not work. In fact,
that failed doctrine is a contributing reason we are in this
predicament.
The assumptions included in this budget have the size of
the fleet shrinking even more in the next 5 years. I see a
whole lot of divest and very little invest in this budget.
I fully expect that Congress will work together in a
bipartisan and patriotic way to put a stop to this disgraceful
lack of commitment to our naval forces.
Finally, I am concerned that the Navy is not sufficiently
leveraging promising new technologies. This is in contrast to
the Marine Corps, which has embraced innovative concepts and
equipment relevant to the high-end fight.
The Navy should adopt resilient communication advances,
invest in autonomous technology, make use of additive
manufacturing such as 3D printing, and move to alternative
materials such as composites.
Navy acquisition must do a better job of moving cutting-
edge programs into production and do so urgently. A Western
Pacific conflict would lean heavily on our naval and air
forces.
Congress needs to exercise its constitutional obligation to
provide these resources, the equipment, and ships necessary to
provide for the common defense and I am certain we will.
Thank you all for your service and thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Mr. Secretary, please?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CARLOS DEL TORO, SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY
Mr. Del Toro. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Wicker, distinguished Members of the Committee. It is an honor
to appear before you today alongside General Berger and Admiral
Gilday to discuss the posture of our Department of the Navy.
Today, our Nation, as you both have highlighted, does face
challenges in every region and domain that we operate in. From
the seabed to the stars, we recognize principally the People's
Republic of China is our pacing threat, executing a strategy
aimed at upending international order.
To preserve our way of life, the National Defense Strategy
calls upon the joint force to deter aggression while being
prepared to prevail in conflict. A strong Navy and Marine Corps
are the foundation upon which the successes of the joint force
exists.
The President's 2024 Budget does send a strong signal to
the American people of the value that President Biden and
Secretary Austin place in maintaining a robust Navy and Marine
Corps to confront the threats that we face to the tune of an
increase of $11 billion.
This year's budget request supports our three enduring
priorities: to strengthen our maritime dominance, to build a
culture of warfighting excellence, and enhancing our strategic
partnerships around the globe.
With your support over the past year we have made major
strides to modernize our fleet and our force. The year 2022 saw
the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford,
providing the Navy with lessons learned that will benefit
future Ford-class carriers.
Construction of high-end surface combatants continue,
including the first Constellation-class frigate, USS
Constellation, and the first of our Arleigh Burke Flight III
destroyers, the USS Jack Lucas.
We continue progress on our first Columbia-class ballistic
missile submarine, the USS District of Columbia, while
preconstruction activities on the second Columbia SSBN, USS
Wisconsin, have also begun.
On the innovation front, Task Force 59, just as one
example, in Bahrain, continues to test a wide range of unmanned
surface vessels and we are looking forward to expanding this
effort to Fourth Fleet this coming year.
When we consider the composition of our fleet we seek to
strike a balance between readiness, modernization, and capacity
with an immediate emphasis on readiness. This year our
divestment request includes three amphibious ships and at least
two cruisers in poor material condition that offer very limited
warfighting capability.
Further investment in these platforms just simply does not
make sense. It is a waste of the taxpayers' money. Our
decisions to divest or extend a ship life are based on a hull
by hull evaluation.
For example, we recently announced the modernization of the
destroyer USS Arleigh Burke DDG-51 to keep it sailing through
2031, 5 years beyond its estimated service life. We hope to be
able to continue that trend with other ships when possible in
the Arleigh Burke-class and even with our cruisers, the
Ticonderoga-class cruisers.
We owe it to the American people to be responsible stewards
of taxpayer dollars. Investing in platforms with limited
capability conflicts with that responsibility.
Our naval forces are more than just platforms and systems,
however. It is our sailors, our marines, that are truly our
greatest strength. This year's budget request contains multiple
investments to support them and their families with services,
benefits, housing, and education that they deserve.
In addition to our commitments to our people we are
reinforcing our international relationships including those
with our Ukrainian partners as they defend their sovereignty in
response to Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion.
In the Indo-Pacific we continue to play a leading role in
the AUKUS security partnership. Our Navy will be critical to
this initiative's success as we support Australia's acquisition
of conventionally armed nuclear-powered fast attack submarines.
We continue to hone our skills with allies and partners in
the Arctic, ensuring we are prepared to operate in this
challenging and unforgiving environment. Along with our
partnerships abroad we are committed to also strengthening our
relationships here at home. We value your support and we
recommit our leadership toward defueling and remediating the
Red Hill bulk fuel storage facility spills.
We are committed to doing what it takes to address the
concerns of servicemembers, their families, the people of
Hawaii, and all other communities throughout the United States.
As I have said before, we build trust 1 day at a time, one
action at a time.
As I close, I would like to emphasize that to meet these
commitments and obligations the Department of the Navy does
require a strong cadre of senior leaders. Delaying the approval
of our flag and general officer nominations before the Senate
is especially harmful to our readiness. I urge all of you to
reconsider this situation and allow our nominations to please
move forward.
Finally, I am grateful for the trust that you have placed
in me to lead this department. I look forward to discussing how
best to support our sailors, marines, and their families and
defense of our Nation working very collaboratively with each
and every one of you.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of The Honorable Carlos Del Toro
follows:]
Prepared Statement by The Honorable Carlos Del Toro
Introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, distinguished Members of the
Committee, it is an honor to appear before you alongside General Berger
and Admiral Gilday to discuss the posture of the Department of the Navy
(DON). We appreciate your trust and confidence in us to lead the DON,
and appreciate opportunities like this to come together with you and
address how to best to recruit, train, equip, and prepare our sailors
and marines so they can fulfill their vital role in support of the
Joint Force, protecting our national security interests.
The United States requires a strong Navy and Marine Corps. The
national and economic security of our Nation depends on free and open
access to the sea. Ninety percent of international trade travels over
the seas and one third of that transits the South China Sea. Over 400
undersea fiber-optic cables carry more than a trillion dollars in
transactions every day. And the rules-based international order that
benefits us all requires a strong maritime force, campaigning forward
alongside allies and partners to provide the sea control and integrated
deterrence we need to counter strategic competitors today and into the
future.
We find ourselves at an inflection point, one that demands we renew
our commitment to naval primacy as we chart a course through this
century of intense maritime competition. Over the past two decades, the
People's Republic of China (PRC) has more than quadrupled its export
trade and used its growing wealth and economic power to rapidly expand
and modernize its military and its navy. The People's Liberation Army
Navy has added over one hundred combatants to its fleet in that time--a
naval buildup that is a key component of its increasingly aggressive
military posture. Today it has approximately 340 ships, and is moving
toward a fleet of 440 ships by 2030. The PRC is conducting active,
aggressive maritime activities in the South China Sea and beyond that
have the potential to undermine our system of international law,
including the freedom of the seas, a foundational United States
interest.
Our maritime challenges are not confined to the Indo-Pacific.
Moscow has not abated in its efforts to control large swaths of the
Black, Baltic, and Arctic Seas, trying to intimidate and deny other
countries the opportunity to exercise their rights to free passage.
That is why six of seven of NATO's priority operating regions are
maritime-focused, and NATO is moving to adopt its first maritime
strategy.
Our Navy and Marine Corps team are meeting these threats on the
sea, under the sea, in the air, and in cyberspace every single day. To
defend freedom of the sea, we must ensure our sailors and marines have
the capability and forward presence to stand by our allies and our
partners. That is why I have directed our Navy and Marine Corps team to
prioritize our investment in readiness, to make sure our ships and
aircraft are always prepared to deploy. This approach will deliver the
integrated deterrence at sea required by our National Defense Strategy.
Three Enduring Priorities Guiding the Department of the Navy
Last year I had the privilege of introducing my strategic vision
for the Department of the Navy to this Committee, centered on our
Department's three enduring priorities, which are complementary to and
supportive of both the CNO's Navigation Plan 2022 and the Commandant's
Force Design 2030.
First, we are strengthening our maritime dominance so that we can
deter potential adversaries, and if called upon, fight and win our
Nation's wars. Second, we are building a culture of warfighting
excellence, founded on strong leadership, and rooted in treating each
other with dignity and respect. And third, we are enhancing our
strategic partnerships, across the Joint Force, with industry, with
academia, and with our allies and partners around the globe. Over the
past year and a half, our DON team has made irreversible progress
across our three enduring priorities, supporting positive growth and
modernization in our naval force. I highlight the progress we've made
and successes we've enjoyed over the past year through the support of
the Committee and your other colleagues throughout Congress.
Strengthening maritime dominance requires us to rapidly field the
concepts and capabilities that create advantage relative to our pacing
threat, with the sustainment necessary to generate integrated, all-
domain naval power. That is why we are making the investments now,
guided by the CNO's Navigation Plan and Marine Corps Force Design 2030,
to ensure we remain the most lethal, capable, and globally postured
force on this planet for decades to come.
Last June, our shipbuilders laid the keel for USS District of
Columbia, the first of a new class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines that will underwrite the Nation's nuclear deterrent out to
the year 2080. The second Columbia-class hull, USS Wisconsin, has begun
pre-construction activities.
In July, we commissioned USS Fort Lauderdale, an amphibious warship
that will help modernize our amphibious fleet and extend the reach of
our marines to fight from the sea wherever there is a need.
What's more, USS Tripoli, the second of our America-class
amphibious assault ships, completed its maiden deployment in 2022,
operating throughout the Indo-Pacific with our larger, traditional
aircraft carriers as a test of our F-35B ``Lightning Carrier / Assault
Carrier'' concept. Deployments like this one highlight the Navy and
Marine Corps' interoperability as well as the strategic and operational
advantages that amphibious ships continue to provide to the Joint
Force.
With regard to aircraft carriers, we've made significant progress
on USS Gerald R. Ford, the first new carrier to be deployed in almost
50 years. We are taking the lessons learned from the Ford as we build
the future USS John F. Kennedy, USS Enterprise, and USS Doris Miller.
Our carriers are not only vital to deterrence, they are also the
cornerstone of our interoperability with our allies.
Our most advanced fighter aircraft, the F-35 Lightning II, now
brings fifth-generation stealth and multi-role, multi-mission reach and
power wherever we need to fight. Meanwhile, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
will be the numerically predominant aircraft in the carrier air wing
well into the 2030's. Service-life modification initiatives and
capability upgrades enhance our inventory by advancing the tactical
relevance of the F/A-18 E/F and closing the Navy's strike-fighter gap.
We are working with industry to ensure trained mechanics are prepared
to support induction schedules, and that they are bringing electrical
and avionics experts onboard to support Block III transition efforts.
Marine aviation continues to build capability and capacity in the
image of the future force. Recently, we stood up Marine Aerial Refueler
Transport Squadron 153 in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, significantly increasing
the reach and sustainment capabilities of marines in the Pacific
theater.
The 15 KC-130J tanker aircraft that VMGR-153 will have by 2026 will
enhance the organic mobility available to marines during training, in
response to crisis, or in conflict. We are approaching 1 year since the
CH-53K Sea Stallion program became operational, and we are well
underway transitioning Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 into our
first fully operational Sea Stallion squadron. While it is still in
transition, HMH-461 is already conducting heavy-lift assault support
missions previously impossible with legacy aircraft.
Over the past year, DON personnel have also demonstrated the
immense potential of unmanned and autonomous vehicles. The Overlord
Surface Vessel Ranger successfully transited from the Gulf Coast to the
West Coast without an embarked crew. These unmanned surface vehicles
will reduce the risk to our personnel, lower operating costs, and
protect access to areas like the South China Sea. In addition, United
States Naval Forces Central Command's Task Force 59, a new, first-of-
its-kind task force, is rapidly integrating unmanned systems and
artificial intelligence into maritime domain awareness in the Fifth
Fleet area of operations, and we will soon expand that capability to
other regions of the world.
In addition to procuring the modern platforms, we are also
expanding the areas available for our personnel to train. With our
partners in Congress, through the National Defense Authorization Act of
2023, we are expanding and modernizing our training ranges at Naval Air
Station Fallon. This initiative will provide our pilots with the
airspace and ground necessary to hone their skills in the advanced
aircraft we field.
Another area of improvement is shipyard performance: our
significant investment in the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization
Program, known as SIOP, is modernizing our four aging public shipyards
by optimizing facilities and infrastructure as well as increasing dry-
dock capacity and capability. We are also looking at establishing a
parallel high-end technical track in nuclear welding, robotics, hull
technology, software and electronics integration, as well as additive
manufacturing for high-paying blue collar career.
We have made significant improvements to surface ship readiness.
Working with industry partners, we have reduced maintenance delays on
major maintenance periods in private shipyards by 39 percent since
2019. On-time completion of availabilities has also steadily increased
from 34 percent in fiscal year 2019 to 41 percent for all maintenance
periods completed in fiscal year 2022. We have brought data and
advanced analytics to inform the plan for each maintenance and repair
availability period, and improved our processes to better scope work
and structure each availability well before ship arrival dates.
Public shipyards are also improving from fiscal year 2019 in both
fewer days of maintenance delay and increases to on-time completion
percentages. In fiscal year 2022, despite lingering COVID challenges to
production, the public shipyards reduced number of days of maintenance
delay by 29 percent from 2019 with on-time completions now at 33
percent.
Our second enduring priority, building a culture of warfighting
excellence, demands more aggressive recruiting, more ``training like we
fight,'' and a stronger commitment to retaining a strong, diverse, and
healthy force--a force that is ready at all times and focused on
warfighting and strong, positive leadership at every level. That's why
we have expanded community-and school-based outreach while
simultaneously increasing media campaigns in underserved and minority
markets. We must attract the broadest possible talent pool from
throughout our all Nation, including more women.
Recognizing that quality of life for our servicemembers and
families is inseparable from warfighting excellence, we have directed
substantial investments in quality-of-life initiatives, infrastructure
improvement, and the largest military pay raise in over 20 years. All
of these efforts are centered on one goal: combat readiness. Our
sailors and marines are better prepared and more focused when they know
their families are being cared for and doing well.
Our third strategic priority, enhancing our strategic partnerships,
sustains and expands our advantage by seeking to achieve seamless
integration, communication, and collaboration with each of our
partners. With our Government partners, we have strived toward greater
agility, adaptability, trust, and transparency in support of our
warfighters. Globally, we have strengthened our relationships with
like-minded maritime nations, deepening interoperability and
interchangeability in order to enable mutual action to address shared
challenges.
Our actions in the face of adversity will long be remembered by our
allies and partners. Since the start of the conflict in Ukraine, the
Navy and Marine Corps have supported our Ukrainian partners as they
continue to defend their sovereign territory in the face of unprovoked
Russian aggression. Together, we have risen to the occasion, supplying
an unprecedented volume of capabilities to assist in their time of
need. In 2022 alone, the Department of the Navy coordinated the
identification, adjudication, and delivery of over $1.3 billion in
critical systems, weapons platforms, munitions, and support equipment
to address critical Ukrainian needs.
Beyond tending to our international partnerships, we are working to
expand on relationships here at home. We have made a concerted effort
to support our defense industrial base, with special attention paid to
supporting entrepreneurs leading small and medium-sized businesses. As
a direct result of the President of the United States' Executive Order
13985, ``Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved
Communities Through the Federal Government,'' the DON took action to
further develop and refine our strategic and tactical approaches to
maximize small-business utilization across a diverse industrial base.
These deliberate actions have increased our outreach to small
businesses, improved subcontracting compliance and oversight, fostered
more opportunities to fully utilize the Department of Defense (DOD)
Mentor-Protege Program, and increased Phase III Small Business
Innovation Research program funding by 16 percent over the previous
year.
All of these endeavors contribute to our desired expansion of the
DOD's supply chain marketplace.
the fiscal year 2024 president's budget
Despite the successes and progress highlighted above, there is
still work to be done on all fronts. The President's Budget for fiscal
year 2024 Request to Congress is a clear signal of President Biden's
support for our Navy and Marine Corps team and of the recognition of
our critical role in the Joint Force especially in light of the complex
strategic environment. Our request this year totals $255.8 billion, a
4.5 percent increase over last year. Every dollar of this request will
contribute to the warfighting strength of our Navy and Marine Corps,
from research and development of next-generation technologies and
systems to procurement of high-end platforms critical to defending our
Nation, infrastructure improvements, and most importantly, taking care
of our sailors, marines, and their families who sacrifice so much.
Strengthening Maritime Dominance
Fleet Investments
A modern, capable, and lethal Navy requires sustained investment
across a variety of platforms to complete missions in all environments.
President's Budget 2024 prioritizes the development, procurement, and
sustainment of our Navy's ships to provide our Nation with the most
capable platforms. The request includes the full funding for two
destroyers, two nuclear-powered attack submarines, two frigates, one T-
AO fleet replenishment oiler, and one AS(X) submarine tender, while
providing the next increment of funding for construction of CVN 80, CVN
81, and LHA 9, as well as the first year of incremental funding for the
second Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine.
The budget request also includes a significant investment in
submarine maintenance with the goal of reducing maintenance periods and
improving the operational availability of these critical assets. These
funds are aimed at improving material availability and strengthening
the private and public industrial bases.
President's Budget 2024 prioritizes modernization of the Zumwalt-
class (DDG-1000) guided-missile destroyer to enable the Navy's first
fielding of the conventional prompt strike sea-based hypersonic weapon
system. It also includes key enablers for the Integrated Combat System
such as Infrastructure-as-Service. The Integrated Combat System will
allow the Navy to deliver future capabilities through software uploads
instead of hardware installations.
Fleet Divestments
Within President's Budget 2024 is the request for the divestment of
eight surface combatants: three cruisers (CG); three Landing Ships,
Dock (LSD); and two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). The three CGs--USS
Cowpens (CG-63), USS Shiloh (CG-67), and USS Vicksburg (CG-69) are all
within 3 years of their end-of-service-life dates. While these cruisers
have a large vertical-launch capacity for a variety of weapons, the
cost associated with repairing, modernizing, and sustaining the hulls
requested significantly outweigh any warfighting contribution they
provide to the fleet, and occupy limited, valuable private shipyard
space that could be better used for maintaining more-lethal ships.
In addition to the three cruisers, we are requesting divestment of
USS Jackson (LCS-06) and USS Montgomery (LCS-08), both Independence-
class LCS variants. We acknowledge that both hulls are a third of the
way through their projected service life of 25 years. However, these
platforms are less lethal, less capable, and far more expensive to
sustain than what is needed for the contested seas our Navy now finds
itself operating in.
Finally, we are requesting the divestment of USS Germantown (LSD-
42), USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44), and USS Tortuga (LSD-46), three
amphibious ships that are all at or over 34 years of service and in
unsatisfactory material condition. The planning and repair periods
required for these ships to reach a deployable status would put all
three at or near their 40-year end-of-service-life mark. Undertaking
the repair of these ships, with potential cost growth, would tie up
funding, shipyard capacity, and take an enormous personal toll on our
sailors assigned to the projects. However, we recognize this request
brings us below the 31 amphibious ships we are required to maintain per
the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2023. The CNO,
Commandant, and I are committed to ensuring we meet this requirement
and doing so in a timely manner, but with a capable, sustainable mix of
ship classes that will support our marines and sailors for decades to
come.
In President's Budget 2023, the DON proposed 16 ship divestments,
but was only allowed to divest four. Ultimately, it is our sailors and
marines who pay the price when we are restricted from retiring legacy
platforms and investing in the capabilities needed for the future.
Research and Development (R&D) of Enhanced Capabilities
President's Budget 2024 requests a total of $26.9 billion to
increase innovation and modernization efforts in R&D. The budget
request commits $718 million of R&D funding to the recapitalization of
all portions of the undersea leg of the triad including Columbia-class
submarines, Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) capability, and the
Trident D5 life extension 2. The next-generation air defense family of
systems includes the F/A-XX, the ``Quarterback'' of the manned/unmanned
team concept, directing multiple tactical platforms at the leading edge
of the battlespace. President's Budget 2024 also funds $861 million in
R&D for unmanned platforms, including the MQ-4 Triton, the MQ-25
Stingray, the Large Unmanned Surface Vessel, the Extra Large Unmanned
Undersea Vehicle, and the MQ-9A Reaper.
Sustaining Maritime Information Superiority
Information is combat power, and we will continue modernizing our
information technology infrastructure, ashore and afloat to ensure this
essential backbone of our maritime power remains secure and survivable
and continues to deliver information everywhere to maintain decision
advantage over our adversaries. President's Budget 2024 budgets
approximately $13 billion for Enterprise IT, cyber activities, business
systems, and other communications across the DON.
These investments are a critical warfighting priority for the
Department. The DON is building information superiority to win the
naval fight by modernizing its infrastructure, innovating and deploying
new capabilities, and defending its information. These initiatives are
enabled by data that is managed as a strategic asset.
Bringing the DON's enterprise infrastructure to parity with
Industry is essential for us to maintain our advantage in competition,
crisis and conflict. We have charted a path to a digital work
environment where users can securely access their data anywhere on any
device with performance that rivals best-in-class experiences in
Industry.
The DON is accelerating the modernization and transformation of our
IT capabilities by ensuring that decisions made to sunset or
rationalize unneeded, obsolete, unproductive, insecure, and un-
auditable IT applications are realized. This effort, coined Cattle
Drive, will accelerate modernization within multiple business and core
IT portfolios and self-identify funds for potential re-alignment to
transformational investments
The DON is accelerating adoption of game-changing low-earth orbit
commercial satellite technology to provide resilient, low-latency,
high-speed communications for warfighting, support, and quality-of-
life-and-work solutions. We are adopting a new approach to
cybersecurity that will move the DON from its current ineffective
compliance-based cybersecurity approach to one based on readiness where
the right to operate is earned and managed every day.
The DON is a leader within the DOD on the initiative to implement a
more effective cybersecurity model called zero trust that is better
adapted to today's threat and computing environments. Finally, data
management and analytics progress the DON is making on multiple fronts
is enabling us to improve decisionmaking, sustain information
superiority and meet the goals of the DOD data strategy by ensuring
quality data are accessible, understood, and shared to the point of
need.
Enabling Cyberspace Superiority
In addition to building information superiority, the Department
will ensure our networks and systems are secure, our critical
infrastructure and weapon systems are survivable, and our cyber forces
can impose costs on adversaries in and through cyberspace when
required.
Adversaries and competitors worldwide leverage cyber
vulnerabilities to hold our capacity and capabilities at risk. This
malign behavior requires a robust response, and we will prioritize
building cyber resilience and strengthening our capacity to withstand,
fight through, and recover quickly from disruption. To do this, the
Department must ``bake in'' cybersecurity to new capabilities and
platforms we procure while ``bolting on'' cybersecurity capabilities to
legacy platforms. This strategy also requires training our sailors and
marines to operate in cyber contested environments.
In addition to building cyber resilience, the Department is
advancing the technology, tactics, and readiness of our military
cyberspace operations forces. One example of this force development is
the Navy's forthcoming establishment of a specific cyber warfare
officer designator and enlisted rating. The Department is similarly
committed to improving the readiness of the cyber forces we present to
U.S. Cyber Command, and we will expand the integration of non-kinetic
effects afloat.
Marine Corps Information Command, which operates under the Marine
Forces Command, achieved initial operational capacity in January 2023.
Marine Corps Information Command provides critical linkages at the
operational level as well as task-organized elements to support
campaign objectives by providing decisionmakers the ability to leverage
authorities and approvals across the cyber, space, influence, and
intelligence functions, generating multi-domain advantages.
Our information space requires new approaches to training, such as
the Persistent Cyber Training Environment, which integrates
capabilities to continuously evolve cyber training and exercises. This
joint capability has expanded access over the last year, enabling force
readiness and driving decisions on the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels.
Munitions Procurement
President's Budget 2024 takes full advantage of new authorities
granted by Congress in the fiscal year 2023 National Defense
Authorization Act that provided a streamlined multiyear procurement
process for critical munitions. Not only will this authority allow the
Department to replenish munitions stockpiles which are reduced in
support of the war in Ukraine, it will also support efforts to
strengthen the industrial base capacity to develop, produce, and field
munitions. We are requesting funding for the procurement of 34 Block V
Tactical Tomahawk missiles for the Marine Corps, as well as several
hundred Tactical Tomahawk recertification kits, navigation and
communications kits, and Maritime Strike Tomahawk kits for the Navy.
Additionally, President's Budget 2024 supports the awarding of multi-
year procurement contracts for critical munitions, including Standard
Missile (SM-6), the Naval Strike Missile, and Long Range Anti-Ship
Missile (LRASM). Overall, funding for these and other weapons increased
by $2 billion in this budget--a growth of nearly 50 percent compared to
last year.
Organic Industrial Base
The DON's organic industrial base is vital to our national
security, and the DON is committed to ongoing depot modernization and
optimization efforts. A modernized and ready organic industrial base
generates Fleet readiness and strengthens our Nation's security.
President's Budget 2024 continues the investment in our industrial
base to further efforts to train, recruit, and retain the workforce,
expand capacity and enable the development and integration of new
technologies. Deliberate investments in the planning and design of
facilities and optimization within the depots, as well as contract
execution in dry-dock repair and refurbishment are focus areas of the
budget cycle.
President's Budget 2024 reflects the three named efforts within the
Organic
Industrial Base where these investments highlight the commitment to the
Nation's security with regard to maintaining our wartime assets. First,
the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program consists of four
public shipyards located in Portsmouth, VA; Kittery, ME; Bremerton, WA;
and Pearl Harbor, HI. President's Budget 2024 funding totals $2.7
billion across multiple accounts. Replacing Dry Dock 3 at Pearl Harbor
Naval Shipyard is a critical enabler of increased naval capability.
This project will construct a graving dock in order to support Pearl
Harbor Naval Shipyard's ability to continue serving the Navy decades
into the future by maintaining and modernizing the Pacific Fleet's
nuclear-powered submarines. Second, the Fleet Readiness Center
Infrastructure Optimization Program consists of three Fleet Readiness
Centers located in NAS North Island San Diego, CA; NAS Jacksonville,
FL; MCAS Cherry Point, NC. And finally, the Marine Corps Organic
Industrial Base consists of two Marine Corps production plants located
in Albany, GA and Barstow, CA.
The Presidential Budget Request funds public shipyard depot
maintenance to 100 percent, and increases the overall workforce from
37,089 to 37,234 full-time employees, adding an additional 145 full-
time employees for the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate
Maintenance Facility Guam Detachment. President's Budget 2024 also
aligns funding to improve supply chain capability and materiel
availability in order to make proper budget and schedule decisions for
items such as long-lead-time materiel.
Aviation Investments
The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet will be the numerically predominant
aircraft in the carrier air wing into the 2030's. President's Budget
2024 funds service-life modification initiatives and capability
upgrades that enhance our strike-fighter inventory by maintaining the
tactical relevance of the F/A-18 E/F and minimizing the Navy's strike-
fighter shortfall. The Presidential budget request also funds delivery
and support of survivable, reliable, and resilient airborne command,
control, and communications through the installation of critical
modifications to the existing E-6B fleet, along with platform
recapitalization to procure a follow-on TACAMO capability.
We will prioritize the continued development and production of
unmanned aircraft systems to support current Fleet intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements and to support future
unmanned aircraft system integration into the carrier air wing. The
budget funds two MQ-4 Tritons, three MQ-25 Stingrays, and five MQ-9A
Reapers for the Marine Corps. President's Budget 2024 requests funding
for 35 F-35s: 19 F-35C variants for the Navy and Marine Corps and 16 F-
35B variants for the Marine Corps. These aircraft will be the backbone
of DON air combat superiority for decades to come, complementing the
carrier strike group with a dominant, multirole, fifth-generation
aircraft capable of projecting U.S. power and deterring potential
adversaries.
President's Budget 2024 also requests funding for the procurement
of 15 CH-53K King Stallions. These production assets will be part of a
2-year block buy contract authorized by Congress in the Fiscal Year
2023 NDAA. The program recently achieved a Full Rate Production
decision.
Climate Readiness
For the Navy and Marine Corps, a changing climate means a contested
operational environment. Climate change brings extreme weather events,
more humanitarian crises, and heightened friction around essential
natural resources. A more volatile world increases demands on our Navy
and Marine Corps forces while simultaneously impacting the capacity to
respond to those demands. Improving the energy performance of our
platforms and weapons systems is essential to providing a combat-
effective force in contested operating environments. To do this, the
Department is working to establish rigorous, energy-informed
requirements for new capabilities that are then sustained throughout
our acquisition decisionmaking.
Last year, the DON published Climate Action 2030 to maintain the
superiority of our naval forces through resilience and reducing the
national security threat of climate change. In support of this
initiative, last December, the Naval Postgraduate School signed an
education partnership agreement with Stanford University's Doerr School
of Sustainability. In bringing together these two globally recognized
institutions, it is our hope to realize solutions our Navy and our
Nation can employ to mitigate and reduce effects of a changing climate.
Jointly with our partners in Congress, we are constantly seeking
innovative solutions, leveraging science, partnering with industry and
other government entities, and investing responsibly to ensure mission
readiness. Climate readiness is a tactical, operational, and strategic
enabler, and we must ensure our naval forces can operate and succeed in
any environment.
Building a Culture of Warfighting Excellence
Building the Future Force
The civilian workforce is comprised of talented individuals from
all walks of life whose experiences and skillsets are critical not just
to our economic success, but to the overall security of our Nation.
Today's Navy and Marine Corps team is a forward-deployed highly
sophisticated network that is one of the most technologically advanced
networks ever conceived and which operates either in concert with other
combat units or fully self-sustained, and able to dominate in the air,
sea and undersea.
As we become a more technologically advanced force, top civilian
talent is increasingly critical to maintaining America's might upon the
sea. Technical talent is needed for the wide array of challenges the
DON faces. More than half of the civilian workforce are top-tier
scientists, logisticians, engineers, mathematicians, technology
specialists, or cyber experts; almost a quarter of the workforce are
artisans performing critical work at the shipyards, depots, civilian
mariners, or safeguarding our facilities and activities. As one
indication of the quality and expertise of our workforce, the DON was
issued 225 patents (more than the Air Force and Army combined) in
fiscal year 2022 and holds more than 58 percent of all active DOD
patents (4,129).
Our civilian workforce ensures a 24/7 rapid response to warfighter
requirements, develops and manufactures critical systems, repairs and
maintains our ships and aircraft and develops game-changing technology
and equipment. The civilian workforce is present in 55 countries,
supporting sailors and marines around the world.
We are in a competition for talent with many other employment
sectors, which is driving us to re-evaluate how we manage the careers
of our sailors, marines, and civilians, from initial recruitment to
retirement. To maintain a Fleet that is prepared to defend our Nation
from all potential adversaries, we must continue to enhance our ability
to attract, develop, and retain a workforce equally as talented and
diverse as the American people they serve. This includes maintaining an
appropriate number of senior executive leadership (general officer,
flag officer, and SES) billets to ensure optimal operational readiness.
The Marine Corps continues to make great strides toward retaining
more experienced marines under the Service's Talent Management program.
Leveraging authorities previously enabled by Congress, the Service
enacted nine initiatives in 2022, from which they will expand and
accelerate in 2023 including Early Reenlistment Authority, SNCO
Promotion Board Realignment, Recruiting Station Commanding Officer
Selection Boards, the Special Duty Assignment volunteer program,
MarineView 360-degree leadership reviews, officer promotion opt-outs,
Digital Boardroom 2.0, Separate Competitive Promotion Categories, and
the Career Intermission Program.
As a result of many of these programs, the Marine Corps met or
exceeded its first and subsequent term alignment program goals for the
first time in 13 years and retained a statistically higher-quality
group of marines. The Service is examining numerous other evolutionary
initiatives and remains committed to evolving the talent management
system with the primary goal of improving warfighting readiness in an
increasingly complex world.
As another example of a positive development in force development,
in August 2022, Naval Special Warfare Command (NSW) formally
established its Assessment Command (NSWAC) to transform how its units
compete for talent by building a sustainable architecture for
diversified outreach. It conducted more rigorous pre-assessments for
character, cognitive, and leadership attributes, and strengthened NSW's
culture of continuous assessment. NSWAC is taking a whole-person
approach to identify, prepare, and mentor qualified candidates from
diverse backgrounds to complete training programs and pursue a
successful career in NSW. As this new command was being developed, NSW
conducted 60 outreach events with more than half specifically focused
on increasing force diversity and inclusivity with underrepresented
demographics. These efforts will enhance the way NSW continuously
assesses and selects its incoming officers and enlisted personnel.
Educational Initiatives
Last year I talked about the Targeted Re-entry Program, which
empowers commanding officers to identify and nominate their sailors for
an accelerated return to Active Duty. This year we want to highlight
our increased partnership with the Department of Education, trade
schools, and colleges and universities to develop and recruit the
military and civilian workforce we need.
As we become a more technologically advanced force, education will
be a crucial warfighting enabler to maintaining America's might upon
the sea. Our naval education enterprise is working to develop leaders
with warfighting knowledge, intellectual dynamism, and creativity to
maintain a strategic advantage against competitors and global
adversaries. Through our naval university system, we are creating a
continuum of learning that develops such leaders to serve at every
level and equips them with skills to maintain and operate increasingly
complex systems in an ever-changing warfighting environment.
President's Budget 2024 requests a $480.2 million investment to
continue supporting and growing our naval education institutions. We
maintain several world-class institutions, including the United States
Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, Naval War College, and Marine
Corps University. This requested funding will also sustain our efforts
to expand our enlisted personnel's access to the Naval Community
College to support their education goals. We are deeply committed to
formalizing a culture of lifelong learning for both our enlisted and
officer communities.
Resiliency & Readiness
Mental health concerns and rising suicide rates are national-level
issues to which the Services have not been immune. We are well aware of
the inextricable link between mental health, resiliency, and the
readiness of our force. To that end, Admiral Gilday, General Berger,
and I are committed to supporting and ensuring the mental health,
safety, and well-being of all sailors, marines, and their families, and
the Department's civilian workforce.
We must do everything we can to foster the well-being of our people
and prevent suicide. No one solution applies to every sailor, marine,
family member, or civilian. We are constantly evaluating how we do
business when it comes to providing services and resources to ensure
they are meeting needs. Military service entails sacrifice not just for
the servicemembers, but for their families as well, and we want to make
sure family members feel seen, heard, and taken care of regardless of
whether their sailor or marine is home, stationed overseas, or
deployed. The DON offers multiple mental-health and counseling
resources to all servicemembers at all levels. As we continue to
encourage positive help-seeking behaviors and combat the stigma around
mental healthcare among our marines and sailors, President's Budget
2024 requests $87 million for mental health support, an increase of
$13.1 million from last year. This additional funding will provide for
increases to our Sailor Assistance and Intercept for Life (SAIL)
program, which provides rapid assistance to those in crisis, as well as
the addition of two Warrior Toughness Teams for each coast.
Given the complexity of this challenge, our Office of Force
Resiliency has taken an integrated approach to enhance holistic, data-
driven suicide-prevention strategies which recognize the benefits of
addressing common risk and protective factors to promote healthy
cultures and climates. As such, our suicide prevention efforts draw
from and harmonize with the Defense Strategy for Suicide Prevention and
the White House Strategy to Reduce Military and Veteran Suicide. We are
taking action on the recently released report from the Suicide
Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee, and will work
within DOD's coordination framework to implement key recommendations
that will strengthen our prevention effort.
The Department of the Navy is laser-focused on countering sexual
assault and sexual harassment at every level. In addition to the toll
on victims, sexual assault and sexual harassment directly impact unit
cohesion and ultimately undercuts our readiness. We must create
environments that foster respect, maintain the dignity of military
service, and increase our warfighting readiness. Sexual assault and
sexual harassment are a persistent challenge requiring a multi-pronged
approach that leverages a wide range of initiatives, not only to
address these issues, but also to prevent them before they occur.
I directed the establishment of an Implementation Advisory Panel
for the Department of the Navy last spring, bringing leaders to the
table to pinpoint strategies for the Navy and Marine Corps to implement
the recommendations of the Independent Review Commission on Sexual
Assault in the Military, as approved by the Secretary of Defense.
Through the Implementation Advisory Panel, the DON has already made
significant strides to implement the Independent Review Commission's
recommendations, focusing on the Committee's highest-priority efforts
first. We fully recognize that we need to continue to confront and
prevent these destructive behaviors. We are investing significant
resources to fuel the needed changes and we have made substantial
progress in standing up a dedicated prevention workforce to prevent
harmful behaviors, professionalizing the sexual assault response
workforce to better provide victim care and support, and establishing
Offices of Special Trial Counsel.
Additionally, our Office of Force Resiliency actively synchronizes
the DON's sexual assault awareness and training, prevention, victim
response, and accountability initiatives with the DOD Office of Force
Resiliency. Sexual assault and harassment are more than just criminal
matters. They undermine the trust and commitment that are foundational
to our forces and they erode faith in our leaders, institutions,
shipmates, and marines. This is a leadership issue, and you have my
commitment to clearly and actively support these efforts and to
demonstrate that sexual assault and sexual harassment will not be
tolerated in any way, shape, or form.
Taking Care of Our People
We continue to make great strides in providing quality-of-life
services and improving housing options available to our sailors,
marines, and their families. In President's Budget 2024, we are asking
you to support our DON families with $622 million aimed at sustaining
our child and youth services. Additionally, we continue our investments
in housing for both accompanied and unaccompanied personnel. Notably,
our request includes $131.8 million for the construction of a
Bachelor's Enlisted Quarters and Support Facility at Marine Corps
Barracks, here in Washington, DC. We are also requesting funding to
support housing renovations at multiple bases, to include Naval Base
San Diego, Naval Air Station Lemoore, Naval Air Station Oceana, and
Naval Base Ventura County. These investments will yield dividends for
years to come as we continue to offer safe, affordable, and convenient
housing to those who defend our Nation.
Strengthening Strategic Partnerships
Community Partnerships
The DON is leveraging the Department of Defense Readiness and
Environmental Protection Integration Program (REPI) to partner with
local governments and non-governmental organizations to advance mission
readiness through mutually beneficial, sustainable communities near our
installations and ranges. The recently announced 2023 REPI Challenge
includes several projects that support DON installations, to include:
invasive species management and reef preservation near Pacific Missile
Range Facility Barking Sands and Marine Corps Base Hawaii; habitat
improvement and species management at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton,
Naval Base Coronado, Naval Base Ventura County Point Mugu, and Naval
Weapons Station Seal Beach in California; and shoreline stabilization
near Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia.
Outside our fence lines, the communities that host our Navy and
Marine Corps installations continue to utilize the Defense Community
Infrastructure Pilot (DCIP) program to fund community infrastructure
projects that benefit local installations, enable the DON's warfighting
mission, and provide support to our servicemembers and their families.
Using 2022 DCIP grant funds, Onslow County in North Carolina will
upgrade a runway at a local airport to benefit travel in southeastern
North Carolina, including Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, Marine Corps
Air Station New River, and Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point. In
Florida, a new water main will improve capacity and pressure for not
only for Naval Station Mayport, but also the surrounding community
where many of our sailors, marines, civilians and their families live.
Finally, the city of Newport News in Virginia will undertake a $15
million project at the Harwood's Mill Reservoir Dam to increase flood
protection for the entire community and ensure a reliable water supply
to Naval Weapons Station Yorktown.
We continue to work with our partners across the Federal
Government, the State of Hawaii, and Congress to close the Red Hill
Bulk Fuel Storage Facility and remediate the effects of the 2021 spill.
We are committed to doing what it takes to address the concerns of
servicemembers, their families, and the people of Hawaii. As I've said
before, we rebuild trust 1 day at a time, one action at a time. Aging
infrastructure such as that at Red Hill is a challenge we face at the
national level, and we appreciate Congress's support and partnership as
we increase our focus on revitalizing the shore infrastructure our Navy
and Marines Corps rely upon.
Joint Force and Government
The Department of the Navy is committed to providing the right mix
of capabilities and remaining dominant against threats defined in the
National Defense Strategy. Across both Services and throughout the DON,
President's Budget 2024 will invest in capabilities for maritime
dominance.
Successful implementation of the concepts within the Navigation
Plan and Force Design 2030 will be pursued through a unified,
integrated effort at every echelon. But our fully integrated naval
force is only part of the formidable Joint Force team that stands
united in the protection of the American people. Collaboration between
military departments and with the interagency is critical to the
defense of the United States.
We are constantly seeking opportunities to maximize the combined
efficiency and effectiveness of our Navy and Marine Corps in
cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Space Force. For example, we
continue to work with our fellow Services on critical advanced research
programs including hypersonic weapons. And worldwide, the Joint Strike
Fighter program is yielding unprecedented reach and agility for the
entire Joint Force.
The Department of the Navy, as a forward-deployed force, is a key
contributor to Integrated Deterrence as our daily interactions with
allies, partners, and potential adversaries impact diplomatic,
economic, and intelligence equities in addition to the obvious military
impacts.
Our most significant contribution as a military department is
America's naval forces. The combat-credible forces of the Marine Corps
and the Navy are unique as America's most timely, flexible, and
forward-deployed force across the full spectrum of challenges--from
naval diplomacy to strategic deterrence, resource competition, crisis,
and conflict. Our allies and partners as well as our potential
adversaries see these forces conducting forward operations and
training, alongside partner nations. This constant forward presence
engenders trust through episodic engagements as well as urgent response
in the event of a national emergency.
The iconic presence of marines in our embassies is just one highly
visible way the Department of the Navy supports the State Department
and whole-of-government activities. Behind the scenes, military
attaches strengthen our bonds with international partners as they
facilitate and coordinate activities, from small-scale personnel
exchanges to large-scale multi-lateral military exercises.
Allies and Partners
Over the past 18 months, the Department of the Navy has been fully
committed to the multi-phased, commitments-based process, known as the
Australia--United Kingdom--United States Partnership (AUKUS) to
facilitate the development of the optimal pathway for Australia's
acquisition of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines, which
will contribute to maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific
region by enhancing deterrence. As part of this initiative, Australian
sailors will embed on United States SSNs and the United States Navy
will increase SSN port visits to Australia beginning this year.
Additionally, as early as 2027, the Navy plans to rotate up to four
U.S. Virginia-class submarines to HMAS Stirling near Perth, an
initiative we are calling ``Submarine Rotational Force--West (SRF-W;
``Surf West''). Beginning in the early 2030's, pending statutory
authority, we intend to sell Australia at least three Virginia-class
SSNs, and potentially an additional two more if needed. The AUKUS
partners will begin delivering the trilaterally developed SSN-AUKUS in
the late 2030's. The cost sharing through the different phases of AUKUS
will be fair, transparent, and proportional--with the United States and
Australia making investments to upgrade the United States submarine
industrial base. We will continue to lead and advance this effort as
directed by the President and Secretary of Defense.
As the world has seen over the last year with Russia's unprovoked
and indefensible invasion of Ukraine, and the strengthened resolve and
solidarity of NATO and like-minded nations around the world, the value
of allies and partners cannot be overstated; the global landscape
offers a stark contrast between those countries with strong
international partnerships and those who are isolated due to their
antithetical stance vis-a-vis the rules-based international order.
Globally, we have strengthened our relationships with like-minded
maritime nations, deepening interoperability in order to enable mutual
action to address shared challenges.
As we emerged from the COVID pandemic and returned to our historic
operating pace, we have looked for ways to expand cooperative
deployments and operations around the world. Our recent growth in
cooperative efforts with our partners has been focused on increasing
interoperability and moving toward interchangeability with allied and
partner maritime forces. In every international engagement, I have
consistently heard the same message from our allies and partners: ``We
want to do more with the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps''--a signal that we
are the partner of choice across the globe.
In January 2023, the United States and Japan reaffirmed the
necessity to optimize our force posture and enhance response capability
through a readjustment in the laydown of United States Forces in Japan.
This will provide for stationing of the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment
in Japan by 2025, and with it, advanced intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities as well as anti-ship and transportation
capabilities.
In a demonstration of the capabilities and resolve of NATO, the USS
George H.W. Bush Carrier Strike Group recently completed Exercise
Neptune Strike 22.2., operating under the command of Striking Forces
NATO (STRIKFORNATO), and flexing the capabilities of all-domain warfare
at a critical time.
During the same period, we employed the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier
Strike Group for the first time with our NATO allies during Exercise
Silent Wolverine. The exercise was designed to test the carrier's
capabilities through integrated high-end naval warfare scenarios,
leading to its inaugural deployment this year. The USS Kearsarge
Amphibious Ready Group and 22 Marine Expeditionary Unit provided
persistent presence in the Baltic Sea. This demonstration of capability
exemplifies the unparalleled power of alliance and partnerships.
Last year, I personally witnessed the power of partnership during
RIMPAC 2022, when forces from 26 nations from nearly every continent
converged at Pearl Harbor. We came together as capable, adaptive
partners, and declared our commitment to work together, to grow our
collective capability, and to nurture and enhance relationships that
are critical to ensuring the safety of the sea lanes and the security
of the world's interconnected oceans.
Strengthening maritime dominance requires us to rapidly field the
concepts and capabilities that create advantage relative to our pacing
threat with the sustainment necessary to generate integrated, all-
domain naval power.
Alongside our Filipino allies, marines from 3d Marine Littoral
Regiment completed the largest iteration of Exercise Balikatan last
April. This was the initial operational employment of 3d Marine
Littoral Regiment, and they used it to flex their capability to deploy
from Hawaii and carry out amphibious landings in northern Luzon,
ultimately enabling combined coastal defense training. This exercise
not only strengthened the bond with our Filipino partners but tested
small, distributed, and austere encampments, resulting in refinements
of the concepts integral to the Marine Littoral Regiment.
This month, marines and sailors with the 31st Marine Expeditionary
Unit completed the first Japan-based Iron Fist exercise, which
increased interoperability and strengthened relationships between the
DON and the Japan Self-Defense Forces, and demonstrated the commitment
of United States and Japan forces to maintain a free and open Indo-
Pacific.
Last November I had the chance to visit my Indian counterparts in
an effort to drive forward high-end navy-to-navy cooperation to address
challenges in the undersea warfare domain. While we continue to advance
thinking on concepts and technology, we are furthering our defense
information sharing and exercising in ways that are relevant to our
shared goals, as exemplified by the USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike
Group's participation in Exercise Malabar with India, Australia, and
Japan, and which included high-end tactical anti-submarine warfare.
While in Brazil, I had the privilege of presiding over the opening
ceremony of the longest-running maritime exercise, UNITAS, and took the
opportunity to spotlight the importance of partnerships in our own
hemisphere and the Atlantic basin. It was a particular honor to meet
with the Cameroonian Head of Navy and visit his two ships, which had
conducted their first-ever trans-Atlantic voyage in order to
participate in the exercise. Their pride, determination, and dedication
to being a part of this U.S.-led multinational exercise were evident as
they celebrated this exceptional achievement. Strengthening our
relationships across Africa and the Western Hemisphere is an important
aspect of furthering the National Defense Strategy as the PRC endeavors
to extend its influence over our neighbors and African partners.
One of the most significant detriments to local economies is
illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. I have been keenly
interested in this complex challenge, and we are working with our
partners across the globe to increase maritime domain awareness,
information sharing, and information operations to counter this
scourge. Massive fishing fleets from countries such as the PRC prey on
countries with weak capabilities to protect their exclusive economic
zones. Closely linked to the IUU fishing problem is a country's ability
to effectively conduct maritime domain awareness.
As the Navy and Marine Corps team works tirelessly to ensure our
forward presence, we are in an intense global competition with the PRC
for strategic access and influence. That competition is particularly
concentrated in the Indo-Pacific. To prevail, we will continue to
innovate, leveraging our naval diplomacy to maximum advantage.
Improving ports and enabling enhanced maritime patrolling capacity from
modern airfields serves U.S. security interests as well as island
nations' interests.
Combined, these critical enablers of U.S. influence, posture, and
readiness in the Indo-Pacific are also the core components of the DOD's
ability to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the
region as the catastrophic consequences of climate change accelerate. A
resilient, distributed posture to meet our operational needs and
outcompeting the PRC for strategic access and influence in the Indo-
Pacific go hand in hand.
President's Budget 2024 will strengthen global alliances and
partnerships with funding for joint operations and exercises around the
world, including CARAT, Malabar, and Balikatan in the Indo-Pacific;
NATO operations in the Mediterranean; and exercises like UNITAS in our
own hemisphere.
We will continue to foster opportunities for sailors, marines, and
DON civilians to train, learn, and operate side-by side with their
counterparts in partner and allied forces. We will work on
operationally integrating with our allies and partners through shared
warfighting concepts, continually campaigning forward to deter
adversaries and protect the rules-based international order.
Our sailors, marines and civilians are warrior-diplomats for our
Nation. Their professionalism and dedication promote the connections
that strengthen our collective security and cultivate shared ideals
that send the message that the United States is a friend worth having.
closing
The United States Navy and Marine Corps Team is on the front lines
of defending the free and open rules-based international order against
those who would cast us into a new dark age defined by the principle of
``might makes right.''
I have a sacred obligation to Congress and to the American people
to ensure that our Navy and Marine Corps are always prepared to defend
those liberties, those non-negotiable American values wherever the
Nation's interests may be threatened. The Navy and Marine Corps remain,
after all, this Nation's single most versatile instrument of national
power.
For this, I am grateful for your sustained, bipartisan support of a
strong Navy and Marine Corps.
I look forward to working with old friends and new partners in
Congress to advance the Nation's security with a Navy and Marine Corps
supremely able, first and foremost, to deter all potential adversaries,
and if called upon to fight and win our Nation's wars.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Gilday, please?
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL M. GILDAY, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Gilday. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker,
distinguished Members of the Committee----
Chairman Reed. Could you bring that closer to you please,
sir?
Admiral Gilday. For the Chairman and Ranking Member, I
appreciate your thanks for our service this morning, and my
wife has joined me this morning. I would like to thank her as
well for her support. I appreciate the opportunity to appear
with both the Secretary of the Navy Del Toro and General Berger
this morning.
For more than three quarters of a century the United States
Navy has been an anchor of world stability, deterring war,
upholding international law, and ensuring access to the seas.
Today, our Navy's role has never been more expansive or more
consequential.
This past year the Navy and Marine Corps team executed more
than 22,000 steaming miles and nearly 1 million flying hours.
We participated in, roughly, 100 exercises with allies and
partners around the globe including the Arctic.
At this moment we have about a hundred ships at sea, a
third of the force, reassuring America's allies and partners
that we stand the watch alongside them and remind the world
that we seek to preserve peace but we are prepared for any
fight.
We are America's away team, constantly present, in contact
with allies, partners, and potential adversaries every single
day. Operating forward, your naval forces defend the rules-
based international order. Our Navy flies, it operates, and it
steams wherever international law allows so that others can,
too.
The United States has always been a maritime nation. To
preserve our security and our prosperity America needs a combat
credible naval force to protect our interests in peace and to
prevail in war, not just today but for the long run.
Our fiscal year 2024 budget request remains consistent with
the Navy's enduring priorities. As the Secretary stated, we are
prioritizing readiness first with an emphasis on the sailors
who empower everything that we do, ensuring that we are always
combat ready.
Next, we are modernizing our current fleet, 70 percent of
which we will have in the water a decade from now, and third,
we are continuing to build our capacity, ensuring we have
relevant, lethal platforms to achieve warfighting advantage
with a hybrid fleet of manned and unmanned platforms on, above,
and below the seas.
Our budget request reflects the Navy's commitment to
deliver, to deploy, and to maintain that fleet. It fully funds
the Columbia-class submarine, ensuring the on time delivery of
the most survivable leg of the Nation's strategic deterrent
triad.
It keeps our fleet ready to fight tonight. Dedicating the
resources necessary to train and educate resilient sailors that
can out think, that can out decide, and that can outfight any
potential adversary.
It funds private and public sector ship maintenance to 100
percent. Increasing the capacity and retaining highly skilled
labor to get our ships back to sea faster with full magazines
and spare parts in our storeroom to be prepared for any
contingency.
It invests in modernizing our fleet. Procuring weapons with
range and speed along with integrated systems to improve fleet
survivability, and a resilient cyber secure network
infrastructure. It invests in capable capacity, building toward
a larger distributed hybrid fleet. Fielding a ready fleet today
while modernizing for the future.
Our competitors are investing heavily in warfighting
capabilities of their own and the oceans we are operating in
are growing more lethal and more contested every single day.
Failing to modernize and meet those threats would erode
America's maritime superiority at a time when command of the
seas will determine the balance of power for the rest of this
century.
This means we can no longer afford to maintain ships
designed for a bygone era, especially at the expense of
readiness and modernization or at the expense of buying new
ships most relevant to today's fight.
America cannot afford to field a hollow force. We have been
there before and we have seen the tragic results. It is a
mistake that we must never repeat. Ships, submarines, and
aircraft are no doubt expensive instruments of national power
as are the costs of maintaining them. But history shows that
without a powerful navy the price tag could be much higher.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify today. I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Gilday follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral Michael M. Gilday
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the posture
of the United States Navy. On behalf of every American sailor, Navy
civilian, and their families, thank you for your continued leadership
and support.
With increased funding in the 2023 Defense Appropriations Act,
Congress has provided the means for the U.S. Navy to deliver the fleet
our Nation needs in support of the 2022 National Defense Strategy. This
investment will help us turn the corner on readiness to meet strategic
competitors in peace and war, ensuring our ability to maintain free and
open oceans and the international rules-based order. Moreover,
consistent, steady funding is necessary to provide a clear signal to
our industry partners, especially our shipbuilders, on the way ahead.
This statement will detail where we are--and what we must do--to ensure
our maritime dominance deep into this century.
Flanked by two oceans, the United States has always been a maritime
nation. The seas remain the lifeblood of our economy, our national
security, and, consequentially, our way of life. Our livelihood depends
upon free, open, and secure maritime trade. A strong naval force is
essential to U.S. national security and long-term economic health. The
United States Navy has and will continue to serve as our Nation's
primary instrument of sea control and power projection, ensuring our
global maritime access during times of peace and war.
From our humble beginnings with six wooden frigates, the
composition of the U.S. Navy has steadily evolved to defend U.S.
interests around the world and ensure American security. For the past
247 years, the U.S. Navy has played a critical part in defending and
advancing national policy. For the past 77 years, we have been an
anchor of world stability by deterring war, upholding international
law, and assuring access to the global maritime domain for our Nation,
our Allies, and our partners.
Today, our Navy's role has never been more expansive or
consequential. We now face challengers who are attempting to rewrite
the rules-based international order and reshape the world to meet their
autocratic desires. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has
aggressively modernized its militaries and fielded offensive
warfighting capabilities at unprecedented speed and scale across all
domains. These developments are not solely to support regional designs.
They are for global ambitions. At the same time, Russia's unprovoked,
full-scale invasion of Ukraine has triggered the largest conflict in
Europe since the Second World War--with combat occurring on land, sea,
and air. The future of the global order depends on the actions we take
in this moment.
Our fiscal year 2024 budget request remains consistent with the
Navy's priorities. To meet the challenges of today while building the
fleet of tomorrow, our Navy continues to prioritize readiness first--
with a special emphasis on the sailors who empower everything we do.
Next, we are focused on modernizing our capabilities. Then, we will
continue to build the capacity of the fleet. Prioritized investments in
people, technologies, critical infrastructure, and platforms ensure
that we are ready to fight tonight, while making progress on the
capabilities we need to maintain our combat credibility far into the
future. To enable Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), we must
generate cost-effective capacity to achieve warfighting advantage with
acceptable risk. We have already begun building the future fleet--a
hybrid force enhanced by unmanned platforms operating on, above, and
below the waterline.
navy's unique peacetime mission
With the passage of the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense
Authorization Act, the United States Navy has a new mission statement.
The old mission statement, articulated in Title 10 of U.S. Code, called
for the Navy to be ``organized, trained and equipped primarily for
prompt and sustained combat.'' Now, Congress has additionally charged
the Navy with supporting ``the peacetime promotion of the national
security interests and prosperity of the United States.''
Though the mission statement is new, the mission is not. U.S. naval
power has always played a unique and vital role in promoting our
Nation's security and prosperity during peacetime. The law now
accurately reflects our Navy's contributions throughout the history of
our Republic.
Whether providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,
countering sea-based illicit activity, safeguarding global shipping
lanes, saving lives, or deterring conflict, sailors advance U.S.
interests every day. Constantly on call, our sailors are forward
deployed in submarines, ships, and aircraft, standing guard with our
allies and partners around the world. In part, the change to title 10
acknowledges our historic mission and recognizes that peacetime
activities can produce strategic results. However, the change does more
than describe what the Navy has always done. It also highlights the
need to build a healthy, ready naval force that will safeguard our
Nation--one that is properly sized, equipped, and trained for the vast
array of operations needed to preserve peace and prevail in
competition, crisis, and conflict.
Of all the peacetime missions that promote security and prosperity,
deterring conflict is foremost. Our sailors are constantly present,
operating, and training, often in parts of the world that may become
hotspots. We are America's away team, deployed in peace and ready to
answer the call if we are needed in war.
During peacetime, the U.S. Navy must continue strengthening and
expanding our network of Allies and partners. Whether in day-to-day
competition, crisis, or conflict, Allies and partners add significant
defense capabilities and resources. They provide integrated deterrence
against adversaries by expanding access to maritime infrastructure
through cost-effective, secure, reliable, and geographically
distributed bases, and provide information in support of distributed
operations.
Thanks to support from Congress, we are starting to rebuild our
fleet following two decades of ground wars. Still, rebuilding will not
happen overnight. It will require years of stable and predictable
funding and a long-range plan that incentivizes our industry partners
to invest in the infrastructure and capacity needed to support our
growing fleet.
While most combat forces generally only meet in times of war,
navies are in contact with potential adversaries every single day. We
are forward deployed around the globe, sailing waters in close
proximity to other navies, coast guards, and maritime militias,
contesting threats to the rules-based international order and ensuring
the world's waterways are free and open for all. In this critical
decade, the challenges we face are mounting.
the maritime challenges to u.s. national security
The United States continues to face pacing, acute, and persistent
challenges to our national security. Above all, our pacing challenge is
the PRC. As we have witnessed over the past several decades, the PRC
seeks to undermine U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the
Indo-Pacific region, and leverage its growing capabilities, including
its economic influence and the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) growing
strength and military footprint, to coerce its neighbors and threaten
their interests. In only two decades, the PRC has tripled the size of
its Navy--and is on pace to quadruple to over 400 ships by 2030.
Additionally, it has expanded its strategic nuclear capacity and
capability, advanced its cyber, irregular warfare, and space
capabilities, and constructed a system of sophisticated sensors and
long-range precision weapons to intimidate neighbors, challenge free
and open access to the seas, and hold U.S. forces and the Homeland at
risk.
The PRC seeks to deny United States and allied forces access within
the First Island Chain and beyond. Advances in missile technology by
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force have provided the PRC
with the offensive means of striking U.S. and Allied forces. As the PRC
has attempted to displace the U.S. Navy from the waters in the Western
Pacific, the PLA Navy, alongside the People's Armed Forces Maritime
Militia (PAFMM) and China Coast Guard (CCG), has increasingly conducted
aggressive operations--actions just short of war--to intimidate
neighbors and force nations to submit to Chinese territorial claims.
Through these ``gray zone'' operations, the PRC has staked illegal
maritime claims to offshore resources that threaten the peace,
prosperity, and ecological stability of the world's oceans. Without
question, the PRC's investments in offensive warfighting systems--
across all domains--are aimed at the heart of America's maritime power.
Russia remains an acute threat as its unprovoked war of aggression
against Ukraine continues. Although the Kremlin predicted Ukraine would
fall within days and NATO would fracture, the citizens of Ukraine have
successfully contested Russian forces on land, sea, and air, bolstered
by the support of the United States and other like-minded nations. This
war has reminded Russia, and would-be aggressors everywhere, of the
power and importance of Allies and partners. Along with our Allies, we
draw inspiration and strength from the tenacity and courage of the
Ukrainian people, and we remain resolute in our responsibility to
uphold the rules-based international order, and every nation's inherent
right to freedom and self-determination.
In its most provocative year of missile launches ever, North Korea
has been a persistent threat on the Korean Peninsula as it continues to
expand its nuclear and missile capability to threaten the United States
Homeland, deployed United States forces, and the Republic of Korea
(ROK) and Japan. With forces on the peninsula and vessels in the
surrounding seas, the United States Navy and the Joint Force stand with
our ROK Allies. During my visit to the ROK this past November, I
confirmed that our alliance and friendship remain strong. We left no
doubt that our commitment to extended deterrence for the Korean
Peninsula is ironclad.
Iran, beyond its nuclear advancements and development of missile
systems, has been building and exporting unmanned aircraft, most
notably to support Russia's brutal campaign in Ukraine. All the while,
Iran is advancing maritime capabilities that threaten maritime
chokepoints, putting at risk the free flow of energy resources and
international commerce. Further, Iran is undermining regional stability
supporting terrorist groups and military proxies, employing its own
paramilitary forces, engaging in military provocations, and conducting
malicious cyber and information operations. Global terrorist groups
have had their capabilities degraded, but some may be able to
reconstitute them in short order, which will require monitoring
indications and warning against this threat.
Whether they are pacing, acute, or persistent challengers, our
adversaries are focused on acquiring sophisticated technologies that
are changing the battlespace. From drone technologies to robust
networks of sensors, our adversaries--both state-and non-state-
sponsored--have the ability to harm our national interests in myriad
ways. In the coming years, developments in new technologies such as
artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and additive
manufacturing will continue to disrupt the way war is conducted.
contributions to the joint force, nested in the national defense
strategy
A combat-credible U.S. Navy--forward-deployed and integrated with
all elements of national power--remains our Nation's most potent,
flexible, and versatile instrument of military influence. Together with
the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard, our Navy must deploy
forward and campaign with a ready, capable, combat-credible fleet.
Decisive naval power is a critical component of the Joint Force.
This past July, I released an updated Navigation Plan, aligning our
priorities of Readiness, Capabilities, and Capacity to the 2022
National Defense Strategy (NDS). The U.S. Navy remains committed to (1)
strengthening our Nation's deterrence, (2) campaigning through forward
presence, and (3) building enduring warfighting advantages. In this
rapidly changing world, a formidable naval force is crucial in
effectively implementing the NDS and the 2022 National Security
Strategy (NSS). The Navy's fiscal year 2024 budget request will deliver
on our commitments to the Joint Force by aligning our planning,
resources, and investments with national policy objectives:
Strengthening Deterrence. Integrated deterrence--the cornerstone of
the 2022 NDS and a strategic focus of the 2022 NSS--is how the
Department of Defense (DOD) aligns DOD's policies, investments, and
activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence. It is tailored to
specific competitors and coordinated to maximum effect inside and
outside of the DOD. Integrated deterrence leverages the Joint Force's
combined capabilities in all domains. It emphasizes a unity of effort
throughout the U.S. Government as the Department of Defense (DOD)
coordinates with and supports the State Department, Intelligence
Community, and other government agencies. Additionally, integrated
deterrence promotes the importance of working with our Allies and
partners to uphold the international rules-based order throughout the
globe. Neither the DOD nor the public sector holds a monopoly on
delivering deterrent effects--thus, we must work with America's vast
and innovative private sector to ensure peace.
A secure and reliable strategic nuclear deterrent backstops
integrated deterrence. Our Navy operates and maintains the most
survivable leg of the Nation's nuclear triad, representing
approximately 70 percent of America's treaty-accountable, nuclear
arsenal. Navy's fiscal year 2024 budget requests the resources to
replace the 14 Ohio-class submarines with the more capable Columbia-
class and continue development of the second life extension of the
TRIDENT II D5 missile, as well as refresh supporting infrastructure and
modernize our nuclear command, control, and communications systems. Our
Ohio-class submarines have been patrolling the oceans on deterrent
missions for 42 years. This once-in-a-generation overhaul of our
ballistic missile submarine force comes with a massive price tag, but
it is a must-pay bill for the Nation so that we maintain America's
assured second-strike capability.
In addition to our nuclear forces, our combat-credible conventional
naval forces reinforce deterrence. These forces deploy globally to
protect American interests across the spectrum of conflict. Operating
far from U.S. shores, naval forces provide the first physical line of
U.S. Homeland Defense, preventing potential adversaries from using the
seas to threaten the American Homeland. Naval Forces are the only
element of national power that can fulfill this role.
To deter war, we must continue to work more seamlessly with our
Allies and partners across all domains and by integrating key
technologies and other instruments of national power. Among other
initiatives, we have been working hard to bolster the trilateral
security partnership of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, known as AUKUS. AUKUS is a generational opportunity to
reinforce the collective defense and prosperity of the United States
and two vital Allies who always stand beside us. With the overarching
objective of promoting peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, through
our efforts to enable Australia to acquire a conventionally armed,
nuclear-powered submarine capability, AUKUS provides a unique
opportunity to strengthen the U.S. Submarine Industrial Base while
enhancing two of our Allies' military capabilities. This trilateral
security partnership also provides an opportunity to set the highest
standards of nuclear nonproliferation for this critical endeavor. To
successfully compete with the PRC and ensure a free and open Indo-
Pacific region, we will continue to find ways to integrate our efforts
with our robust network of Allies and partners.
The naval service's ability to control the seas and project power
has underpinned America's national defense and economic vitality for
generations. Sea control provides freedom of maneuver to the Joint
Force and our Allies while denying it to our adversaries in conflict.
Our ability to project power deters aggression by convincing rivals
they have no viable means of achieving their objectives through force.
Should conflict arise, forward deployed sailors and marines stand ready
to fight alongside the rest of the Joint Force, our Allies, and our
partners to deny enemy objectives, destroy enemy forces, and compel war
termination.
Forward Presence and Campaigning. Naval forces provide the United
States strategic advantages in position, influence, and flexibility,
independent of access to overseas land bases. Our forward posture
guarantees our Nation the ability to respond to crisis, blunt gray-zone
activities, and preserve a stable and secure global maritime order. The
Navy's global maneuverability supports diplomacy, reassures our Allies,
and generates favorable influence and access in critical regions.
Alliances and partnerships remain the United States' greatest
strategic advantage. Our Allies and partners recognize U.S. naval
forces as their on-scene partner of choice for building combined
maritime strength. In turn, the U.S. Navy recognizes the value of
America's unmatched network. Having met with over 40 heads of navies
around the world over the past year, I have witnessed the power of
personal connections to bolster our collective strength. Relationships
forged on the seas for over seven decades have been the bedrock of the
free and open, international, rules-based order. And they will continue
to be so.
Our adversaries do not have the same reinforcing strength and
global backing that America shares with like-minded nations. In turn,
the United States provides maritime power that no other country can.
The U.S. Navy also brings to NATO an ability to further the
interoperable naval combat power of Allies and partners and enable
continued deterrence in response to Russia's war on Ukraine. We also
leverage the strength of our allies and partners as part of our
integrated deterrence of the PRC as well. We are constantly
strengthening interoperability, sharing maritime domain awareness, and
helping to build capacity for resilient, integrated logistics for our
allies and partners.
Across the spectrum of conflict, the U.S. Navy operates forward,
exposing and contesting malign activities of our adversaries. The U.S.
Navy remains the partner of choice not just because of our strength,
but also because of our respect for the rule of law.
Building enduring warfighting advantages. To maintain our
warfighting advantage at sea, America needs a larger and more capable
Navy. Faced with competitors and emerging disruptive technologies, we
must become more agile in developing and delivering our future force.
Above all, our naval forces must be combat credible--measured by our
ability to deliver lethal effects in contested and persistently
surveilled battlespaces.
In collaboration with the other U.S. Armed Services, we have
prioritized the future capabilities we need to employ our warfighting
concepts and maintain credible deterrence. As we build the future
fleet, we group these critical capabilities into six overarching Force
Design Imperatives, as I described in Navigation Plan 2022.
Expand Distance. Long-range precision fires across all domains and
platforms with greater reach enable naval forces to strike hostile
targets while increasing our own survivability.
Leverage Deception. Deceptive measures--including stealth,
concealment and maneuver, emissions control, and electronic warfare--
degrade enemy surveillance and increase adversary uncertainty, enabling
naval forces to operate effectively in contested battlespaces.
Harden Defense. Integrating directed energy with hard-kill and
soft-kill defensive systems disrupts attacks and keeps naval forces
survivable when targeted by adversaries.
Increase Distribution. Distributing forces geographically and in
all domains enables them to threaten an adversary from multiple attack
axes. Smaller, lethal, and less costly platforms--including those
manned, unmanned, and optionally manned--further complicate threat
targeting, generate confusion, and impose dilemmas for our adversaries.
Ensure Delivery. Resilient logistics connecting the foundry to the
fleet--enabled by secure communications and information technology--
refuel, rearm, resupply, repair, and revive distributed naval forces
down to the last tactical mile.
Generate Decision Advantage. Naval forces will out-sense, out-
decide, and out-fight any adversary by accelerating our decision cycles
with secure, survivable, and resilient networks, accurate data, and the
assistance of AI-enabled decision aids. Connecting sensors, weapons,
and decisionmakers across all domains enables naval forces to mass
firepower and influence without massing forces.
Together, these six Force Design Imperatives enable DMO and other
Joint warfighting concepts. These imperatives also define the
requirements for the surface, subsurface, aviation, and information
platforms that our fleet needs and will guide our priority investments
going forward.
u.s. navy priorities
Navy's fiscal year 2024 budget request delivers a combat-credible
Navy designed to deter and, if necessary, prevail in conflict. To
deliver that fleet today, tomorrow, and in the future, we will continue
to focus on three priorities: Readiness, Capabilities, and Capacity.
Our central challenge is balancing our investments in the future
fleet while sustaining a forward posture that keeps America safe and
prosperous. It is increasingly costly to operate and maintain our
ships. We appreciate Congress' support with additional funding in
fiscal year 2023 to mitigate the effects of inflation. We will continue
to need congressional support of the robust budget in fiscal year 2024.
In today's fiscal environment, we face the enormous challenge of
simultaneously recapitalizing our strategic nuclear deterrent, century-
old dry dock facilities, and strategic sealift capacity, while
investing in weapons and platforms we will need in a future fight. Our
focus on Readiness, modernizing Capabilities, and building Capacity is
a result of the threats facing our Nation today and the challenges we
face in the decades to come. To defend our Homeland and protect our
national interests, we cannot field a fleet larger than we can sustain.
Hollow fleets cannot fight tonight, and sacrificing current readiness
for future capabilities or increased ship counts would severely
constrain our Navy's ability to respond in crisis or conflict. Our
Nation needs a larger, more capable, more lethal fleet--but we must
build the future fleet at a sustainable rate; not at the expense of
warfighters that must be ready to stand the watch tonight.
readiness
Readiness remains our top priority. Forward-deployed, combat-
credible forces deter conflict and protect the free and open system
underpinning American security and prosperity.
Across the Navy, from our shipyards and aviation depots, to our
global network of bases and stations, to the steaming and flying hours
our sailors need to hone their skills, we are focused on readiness. Our
fiscal year 2024 budget request dedicates the resources necessary to
train and educate resilient sailors that can out-think, out-decide, and
out-fight any potential adversary. Today's security environment demands
ships, aircraft, and submarines, as well as expeditionary, information,
and special warfare forces that are ready to fight and win.
The Navy is committed to accelerating our warfighting advantage by
unleashing our people, and our ``Get Real, Get Better'' call to action
empowers our warfighters to find and fix problems, and to innovate at
every level, from the deckplates to our senior leaders. While our Navy
team remains the most capable maritime force in the world, we have
identified unacceptable variability in our performance. To address
this, we must standardize and incentivize best practices, leadership
behaviors, and problem-solving techniques throughout the force to
reduce this variability and unleash our full potential. The essential
element is fostering a healthy ecosystem--a culture--that assesses,
corrects, and innovates better than the opposition, accelerating our
warfighting advantage in this critical decade.
This past year, the Navy-Marine Corps team executed more than
22,000 steaming days and nearly one million flying hours. Additionally,
the Navy participated in roughly 100 exercises with Allies and partners
across the globe, strengthening America's integrated deterrence. We are
planning for similarly robust level of exercises and engagement efforts
over the next year and in years ahead. As our naval forces remain in
high demand, our budget request emphasizes critical aspects of our
readiness. Our sailors stand ready all over the world, from Sasebo to
San Diego and from Norfolk to Naples, as our Navy keeps the oceans open
and free.
Since the invasion of Ukraine, the Navy has had a continuous
Carrier Strike Group presence in the Mediterranean, from the extended
deployment of the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), to the current
deployment of the USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) Carrier Strike Group.
Furthermore, the Navy provided early support to European Command
operations with surge deployments of additional forces, to include six
destroyers, two P-8 aircraft, two submarines, and a destroyer squadron
staff. Our sailors have been present where it matters, when it matters.
Additionally, America's first-in-class aircraft carrier USS Gerald R.
Ford (CVN 78) returned to Naval Station Norfolk in November after
successfully completing its inaugural deployment in the Atlantic,
conducting exercises, strategic engagements, and port visits with
Allies and partners.
We have deepened our integration with the U.S. Marine Corps with
the establishment of Task Force 61/2 under Naval Forces Europe. This
effort streamlined command and control of Navy and Marine Corps forces
deployed to act as a deterrent and reinforce Alliance cohesion in the
wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. We operationalized this cohesion
with the deployment of the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) Amphibious Readiness
Group (ARG) with the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) embarked.
After the USS Kearsarge ARG-MEU deployment, the same team provided the
core U.S. military command element that quickly established
humanitarian support for Turkiye after the recent earthquake, utilizing
the USS Hershel ``Woody'' Williams (ESB 4) to deliver disaster relief
supplies for those affected by the earthquakes.
Our Navy defends the Homeland and ensures maritime routes remain
free and open, fostering compliance with existing rules to assure
global peace and prosperity, including in the Arctic Region. Increased
competition in the area by both Arctic and non-Arctic nations, as a
result of increasingly navigable waters, demands additional attention
from America's tri-service maritime forces. With the Marine Corps and
the Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy jointly trains for operations in Arctic
conditions and, since 1958, our submarines continue to conduct routine
operations in the Arctic region. We participated in numerous exercises
in 2022--NORTHERN VIKING, COLD RESPONSE 2022, DYNAMIC MONGOOSE, ARCTIC
EDGE, and ICEX--with several more planned for 2023 in the high north to
ensure we are ready to respond in that region in times of crisis and
conflict. As we did this past year, we will continue to work closely
with our strong network of Allies & partners from Canada, Iceland,
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, and United Kingdom among many other
nations that share a vision of a free, open and stable Arctic. Beyond
training and operations, our Navy continues important communications,
surveillance, navigation, marine meteorology, and physical oceanography
research activities to improve situational awareness in support of
future cold weather high-latitude operations, including the Arctic
Submarine Lab and Polar Over the Horizon Radar. For example, prototype
components of the Arctic Mobile Observing System will be deployed in
October 2023 using a variety of autonomous platforms over a year-long
deployment to demonstrate under-ice navigation, communication, and
environmental sensing. Overall, this budget includes $39 million in
fiscal year 2024 and $236 million across the FYDP for Arctic research
and operations. Now and in the future, the U.S. Navy stands ready to
respond to changing geopolitical and climate conditions in the Arctic.
To deliver forward presence and capability, our Navy continues to
make progress improvements. For example, our aircraft depots are
reducing the time it takes to conduct maintenance and return aircraft
and engines back to the Fleet. Our President' Budget 2024 request
improves funding over fiscal year 2023 enactment to sustain gains in
our aircraft mission capable rates. Of note, in our aviation depot
maintenance account, we increase funding for engines by $25 million, $9
million for components, and $1 million for our Depot Readiness
Initiative. The President' Budget 2024 request provides for the
operation, maintenance and training of nine Active Navy Carrier Air
Wings, with the necessary flight hours and maintenance efforts to
ensure their carrier and expeditionary strike groups are combat ready.
The budget request aligns with our broader focus across Naval Aviation
to increase lethality and readiness through process improvement and
finding efficiencies at all organizational levels. As aviation costs--
across both the private and public sectors--continue to increase, the
Navy recognizes the need to maintain a relentless drive to reap the
full benefit of every investment dollar.
Better maintenance performance has been a point of emphasis across
the Navy. Repeatedly deploying combat-credible forces starts with
performing high-quality maintenance on time and in full. Data-driven
reforms such as Performance-to-Plan (P2P), the Naval Sustainment System
(NSS), and other initiatives continue to improve maintenance processes
and increase operational availability. Over the last several years, the
aviation community has enhanced readiness as we maintained over the
threshold Mission Capable Rate for most Type-Model-Series Aircraft,
including the F/A-18E/F, E/A-18G, E-2D, P-8A, MH-60R, and MH-60S. This
represents a significant improvement in Navy aircraft readiness, but we
are not yet satisfied. We are getting real and getting better at
applying what we have learned in aviation to our maintenance processes
across the fleet.
We continue to take a data-driven approach to improve surface ship
and submarine maintenance, and we have seen positive results. However,
unprecedented hiring challenges in a competitive job market, along with
sustained, pandemic-induced delays and supply chain issues, have
hampered progress for our public and private shipyards. Our budget
request funds both private and public sector ship maintenance to 100
percent, with a focus on increasing capacity and retaining highly
skilled labor at the public shipyards. On top of those resources, we
have invested considerably in other requirements essential to the
material condition of our Fleet. Completing maintenance for our
Virginia-class submarines and returning them to the Fleet on time is a
critical warfighting priority. To that end, we added $541 million for
Virginia-class materiel and spares to build depth and breadth in on-
hand inventory to help ensure that the necessary parts are available
when required during maintenance availabilities.
We remain committed to driving down costs wherever and whenever
possible. In particular, P2P-driven improvements--such as the goal of
awarding contracts 120 days before the start of a maintenance
availability, level loading ports through better prediction of
workload, better availability planning, and improved long-lead-time
material acquisition--have provided effective solutions for readiness.
Still, just like our industrial partners, our public shipyards face
headwinds from workforce constraints, supply chain logjams, and
increased costs due to inflation. We recognize the challenges, are not
satisfied with current conditions, and will continue to invest in
people, processes, and infrastructure to drive maintenance delays down
to the only acceptable number--zero.
Today, the average age of U.S. naval shipyard facilities and
related infrastructure is 62 years, while the average dry dock age is
approaching 100 years. The Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program
(SIOP) provides a strategic roadmap for necessary investments in our
public shipyard dry docks, capital equipment, and facilities. We are
committed to taking a holistic, analytic approach to our critical shore
infrastructure, making necessary investments to overhaul and optimize
our Nation's shipyards through SIOP, and ensuring our shore
establishment can support fleet operations. With $2.7 billion requested
for SIOP in our budget request, the Navy can continue to upgrade and
reconfigure our four public shipyards. This robust investment in the
infrastructure and facilities of our four public shipyards is a vital
effort to maintain and support upgrades of current and future
submarines, aircraft carriers, and surface combatants.
When fully executed, SIOP will deliver required dry dock repairs
and system upgrades that will optimize workflow within the shipyards
through significant changes to their physical layout. Moreover, the
SIOP investments allow the public shipyards to recapitalize industrial
plant equipment with modern technology that will substantially increase
productivity and worker safety. As a result of previous SIOP
investments, we have already completed construction of the Super Flood
Basin at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, construction of the Norfolk Naval
Shipyard Production Training Facility, and design of Pearl Harbor Naval
Shipyard Dry Dock 3 Replacement. We remain committed to working with
Congress, DOD leadership, the shipyard workforce, impacted communities,
regulators, and industry leaders as we continue to drive down
maintenance delays. We acknowledge that submarines are still
experiencing an unacceptable amount of delay days. Still, these
investments in our four public shipyards are rebuilding the industrial
base we need to maintain, upgrade, and return our ships, submarines and
aircraft carriers back where they belong--deployed at sea.
Maintenance delays and other readiness issues are not solely
shipyard problems. To ensure fleet readiness, we must also reinforce
and build resiliency into our supply chain, and prevent undue influence
by strategic competitors. The Naval Sustainment System-Supply is
driving end-to-end naval supply chain integration and reform as it
streamlines the Navy's supply chains to increase readiness, decrease
turn-around times, increase availability of spares, and reduce costs.
The key to sustained success will come from the better use of data as
we improve the resilience and responsiveness of the Naval Supply
System.
Our sailors--and the civilian workforce that supports the fleet--
remain our most important weapon system. We must continue to evaluate
and improve our capabilities to achieve our mission of attracting,
developing, and managing talent to ensure our advantage at sea while
providing exceptional service to our sailors and their families.
Notably, our budget request contains a substantial 5.2 percent pay
raise for our military and civilians. From education and training to
overall health and wellness, our budget invests in our Navy's most
important asset--our people.
To ensure the readiness of every operational unit, we are working
hard to resolve the manpower problems that exist in the fleet. The
solution begins with more robust recruiting and retention efforts. We
also need to keep honing and optimizing personnel readiness metrics to
include the experience and proficiency of sailors to determine whether
operational units are getting personnel with the right skills. The
solution demands the continuous effort of leadership as we must
continue to prioritize and care for our sailors and civilians.
The Navy continues the Fleet Training Wholeness initiative to
integrate live platforms and simulators across our strike groups. This
initiative funds Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training at the
unit and strike group levels. In the fleet, LVC continues to be a game-
changer in training our combat leaders. To date, fleet exercises like
Large Scale Exercise-21 have connected eight Maritime Operations
Centers, three Marine Force Operations Centers, eight Carrier and
Expeditionary Strike Groups, and 30 ships into a single LVC training
environment. As we look ahead to Large Scale Exercise-23, planned for
August of this year, our expanding LVC capabilities will only increase
the numbers of total participants--training both at-sea and pierside--
in an advanced, global scenario. From the pilot in the cockpit to the
technician on the radar scope, LVC initiatives allow warfighters in all
domains to train together at unprecedented levels of integration and
complexity.
Investments in training like the Ready Relevant Learning (RRL)
initiative allow the Navy to continue to modernize Navy training and
accelerate new delivery methods, supplementing our traditional brick-
and-mortar schoolhouses with modern, multi-media, multi-platform
solutions. In addition, RRL will develop Career-Long Learning
Continuums for Navy ratings to map out technical, professional, and
leadership training requirements for apprentice, journeyman, and master
level milestones in a sailor's career. Career-Long Learning Continuum
efforts will change the paradigms of Navy training by delivering Navy
Enlisted Classification refresher training, performance support at the
point of need coupled with journeyman and master core training to close
not only existing capability gaps, but also enhance fleet readiness.
To maintain a Fleet prepared to fight and win in long-term
strategic competition, we continue to evaluate and improve our
capability to attract, develop, and manage a talented and diverse
workforce. Furthermore, at a time of intense talent competition and a
rapidly evolving tactical and technical landscape, we are committed to
modernizing and enhancing our entire talent management approach to
recruit and retain the best and brightest. We are also reengineering
advancement and assignment policies and practices to deliver a positive
sailor experience in terms of transparency, flexibility, and career-
driven choice, while attempting to balance sailor personal and
professional desires with Navy priorities.
As part of this initiative, we released MyNavy Assignment (MNA)--an
upgrade to our detailing platform providing visibility of all available
billets as part of the Detailing Marketplace Assignment Policy (DMAP).
MNA is a modern user interface providing sailors the ability to
bookmark billets of interest and provide amplifying information. DMAP
continues to expand sailors' options beyond the traditional enlisted
career paths. It also rewards sailors in sea-intensive ratings who stay
on sea duty by offering assignment-based monetary incentives and early
advancement opportunities for many sailors who possess the requisite
proficiency and experience. We expanded this practice and policy to
supervisor positions through the Senior Enlisted Marketplace (SEM),
beginning with Master Chief billets during fiscal year 2024 advancement
selection boards. We plan to expand to Senior Chief and Chief Petty
Officer billets in the following 2 years to expand SEM to become the
primary means of advancement.
To accelerate those sailors with the highest competence and
strongest record, we expanded the Advancement-to-Position (A2P) program
to fill priority supervisor and journeyman-level billets in eight
additional ratings. A2P assists in filling critical gaps and rewards
proven performers willing to take a difficult assignment with a spot
promotion. We have also empowered commanding officers and officers-in-
charge to reward top performers with both an advancement and geographic
stability allowed by a guaranteed follow-on 3-year assignment at the
same unit through the Command Advancement-to-Position program. These
talent management initiatives support sailor development, increase
transparency, and generate Fleet-wide, warfighting readiness.
With great sadness, we recognize that suicide rates increased in
2022. Navy leaders and I have been traveling to ships, squadrons, and
bases to listen, learn, and help. Every loss of life is a tragedy. As
we continue to destigmatize mental health treatment, we are working to
ensure every Member has access to the full continuum of mental health
support. Our budget request expands mental health programs like sailor
Assistance and Intercept for Life, adds support for the 21st Century
Sailor Office, and increases our Warrior Toughness Teams to help foster
the mental, physical, and spiritual resilience of our forces. Along
with these programs, we are working to ensure the availability of
mental health and wellness support worldwide, including at specialty
and primary care clinics, Navy installation counseling centers, on the
waterfront, embedded within the fleet, and via virtual health
platforms. Navy Chaplains and deployed resiliency counselors provide
confidential counseling and are essential in ensuring the spiritual
readiness and resiliency of the Naval Force. The Navy's budget request
continues to resource quality care for our sailors and support services
for them and their families.
Though we work in the profession of arms and accept the hazards
that come with defending our country, all sailors deserve to be treated
with respect and dignity and should feel safe among their fellow
shipmates. We are focused on creating a culture intolerant of sexual
assault and are actively executing and evaluating the DOD Prevention
Plan of Action. This is a comprehensive approach to promote prevention
and reduce destructive personnel behaviors that lead to incidents. In
addition, we are implementing the 82 Independent Review Commission
(IRC) recommendations on accountability, prevention, climate, culture,
and victim care. Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)
personnel remain fully available to sailors worldwide to address
victims' physical, mental, and emotional well-being, strengthen
resilience, encourage reporting, and support victim recovery.
Moreover, we do not accept any form of sexual harassment in our
Navy. To ensure sailors are heard, and to remove actual or perceived
bias from the process, Navy Sexual Harassment investigations are now
conducted by an independent third party assigned from outside the
command. Likewise, the establishment of the Navy's Office of Special
Trial Counsel ensures that accountability for sexual assault and sexual
harassment, among other serious offenses, will be handled by an
independent, specialized, and expert cadre of professionals. We listen,
and we continue to learn. Our work to eliminate sexual assaults and
remove sexual harassment from our fleet is not done.
When sailors are valued for their diverse talents and are treated
with respect and dignity, they feel a sense of belonging to their teams
and deliver a higher level of performance. With nearly 50 percent of
recruitable talent coming from diverse populations, the Navy must be
deliberate in advancing a culture where every person, regardless of
their background, has the opportunity to succeed as a sailor and where
our Navy, in turn, benefits from our sailors' talents, experiences, and
insights. We have built on lessons learned from our findings in Task
Force One Navy and have launched 53 Task Force One Navy initiatives,
which remain on track for full implementation.
All of our most pressing challenges require strong leadership.
However, in the past year, as required to support the Space Force and
by the fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, the Navy
reduced more than 8 percent of its Flag Officer billets. These
leadership reductions come at a high cost to maintaining operational
readiness, impeding the Navy's efforts in an already challenging
operational environment. At present, nearly one-third of the Navy's
remaining 149 Flag Officer billets are double-or triple-hatted. These
significant additional demands on leadership have ripple effects on
readiness that negatively permeate across the fleet. To ensure our Navy
can respond in crisis and win in conflict, we need Flag Officers with
the focus and bandwidth to respond thoughtfully to the many challenges
the Navy must navigate.
In the Navy, we serve as families. To improve the lives of our
sailors and their families, we continue to focus on improving the
consistency of sailor pay, quality of unaccompanied housing, and other
quality of life services. This includes installing broadband internet
services and wireless connectivity, improving berthing barge living
conditions, improving crew parking and transportation, and ensuring an
overall better experience for sailors on the waterfront. Access to
high-quality childcare is critical to supporting our warfighters. Our
budget request supports increased staff salaries and adds two new Child
Development Centers. Funding will also support adding full-day pre-
Kindergarten opportunities at overseas locations.
We know that to retain our Force of talented and trained sailors we
must continue to invest in ways that benefit them and their families,
while providing environments that make them feel valued and enable them
to serve honorably. Continued funding to improve the lives of sailors
will be our greatest return on investment. Our people form the keel of
our fleet's readiness and they will inspire the next generation to
answer our Nation's call to serve.
capabilities
The Navy's budget request makes substantial investments that will
modernize our capabilities. The Navy prioritizes delivering
capabilities that can achieve lethal and persistent effects inside
adversary weapon engagement zones, generate advantages to create off-
ramps in crisis, and decisively win should crisis escalate into
conflict. As the challenges in this era require the support and unified
effort of Allies and partners, it is fundamental to our success that we
develop compatible and complementary capabilities. To win now and in
the future, we strive not only for interoperability with Allies and
partners, but also for interchangeability across the combined force.
As we build and deploy a Navy capable of deterring and, if
necessary, defeating a strategic competitor, we must prioritize
capabilities for DMO--our Navy's foundational operating concept for
maintaining warfighting advantage in contested seas. The Navy's budget
request focuses on delivering these critical capabilities. To expand
our reach, we are investing in hypersonic weapons, space-based
capabilities, unmanned tanking, and long-range precision fires. For
increased deception and defense, we are investing in undersea
platforms, weapons, and systems, next-generation aircraft and surface
platforms, cyber capabilities, counter-surveillance, and integrated
weapons systems. Finally, we are investing in smaller, lethal
platforms, autonomous systems in all domains, AI, resilient logistics,
and integrated combat systems and networks, all of which enable a more
distributed fleet, the delivery to sustain it, and expand our decision
advantage.
Our adversaries are also heavily investing in emerging
technologies. In response, the Navy will adopt a more agile approach to
experimentation and force modernization, leveraging partnerships with
industry and academia. Working closely with Allies and partners, we
will expand our partnerships across the entire technology ecosystem.
Maritime dominance has always depended upon the employment of game-
changing capabilities in combat.
Rising to meet today's challenges with unmatched capabilities, the
Navy-Marine Corps combat team completed its first deployment of F-35C
and CMV-22B this past year. The warfighting advantages these platforms
bring to the battlespace provide the Joint Force with an undeniable,
lethal edge over our adversaries. Both aircraft, though different
mission sets, allow our forces to project power deep behind enemy
lines. In addition, the USS Gerald R. Ford completed its first
deployment. This aircraft carrier not only signals the next generation
of our fleets' principal weapon of power projection has arrived, but
also that our Nation remains poised and committed to maintaining our
warfighting advantage for decades to come. Deploying such capabilities
and platforms marks the culmination of many years and many people's
hard work, showing the capabilities that our Nation can bring to bear.
One of the key areas that is shaping and will continue to shape
future warfare is the incorporation of cyber-warfare tools to detect
and defeat adversary attempts to infiltrate and disrupt our warfighting
systems. The Navy continues to make this a priority focus area to
ensure our forces are ready to respond to adversary cyber-attacks. In
addition, the Navy is working closely with the Joint Force to develop
cyber capabilities that can be used across the entire spectrum of
conflict. As such, the Navy will continue moving from its current
compliance-based cybersecurity approach to one where the right to
operate is earned and managed every day. Teams organized around the
Department's recently announced Cyber Ready effort will develop
solutions, select tools, and produce methods, policies, guidance, and
concepts of operation for instituting this new approach. A critical
element to implementing this approach is the need to ensure the Navy
has a skilled cyber-workforce comprised of both military and civilian
cyber experts. To ensure the Navy has the cyber workforce the Nation
needs, and in alignment with congressional intent, we are implementing
a dedicated cyber designator. We remain committed to growing this
capability alongside the Joint Force, as well as with our Allies and
partners, collectively building a more robust security outlook.
In response to potential adversaries developing and fielding
hypersonic missile systems, the Navy collaborated with the rest of the
defense enterprise to make hypersonics one of our highest priority
modernization efforts. This past year has been marked with certified
successes for our Conventional Prompt Strike capability. In 2022, we
conducted one First Stage and one Second Stage Solid Rocket Motor
static fires, marking five successful static fire tests of the newly
developed missile. In another joint effort, the Navy Strategic Systems
Programs and the Army Hypersonic Project Office successfully conducted
the second High Operational Tempo for Hypersonics flight campaign in
October, 2022. These developments represent significant progress in our
hypersonic capabilities, and both programs are on track to support the
first fielding of a hypersonic capability to the Army later this year.
Both the Army and the Navy programs are on track to support the first
fielding of a hypersonic capability to the Army later this year. Stable
funding at the requested level will keep this critical capability on
track to field on Zumwalt-class DDGs, followed by Virginia-class SSNs
equipped with the Virginia Payload Module. The rapid development and
demonstration of conventional land and sea-based hypersonic strike
weapon systems support our Nation's ability to deter and, if necessary,
defeat potential strategic competitors. Modernizing capabilities will
remain a priority to ensure our Navy maintains warfighting advantage.
Weapons with range and speed are critical capabilities. Our budget
request pursues four multi-year procurement contracts for Advanced
Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6). In
addition, our request allows us to continue to work jointly with the
Air Force in the procurement and production of Joint Air-to-Surface
Standoff Missiles and Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles. We are also
increasing our investments in Maritime Strike Tomahawks, as well as
refreshing and recertifying existing Tomahawks and MK-48 Heavyweight
Torpedoes.
Above the sea, we remain resolute in our commitment to the Joint
Force in establishing air superiority in the maritime domain, and
sustaining our unique ability to project power from the flight decks of
our aircraft carriers. The Navy's President' Budget 2024 request
supports procurement of thirty-four aircraft, modification, spares and
support equipment. In this budget, our significant aviation investments
include 15 F-35C Lightning II's, 14 Multi-Engine Training Systems, 2
MQ-4 Tritons, and 3 MQ-25 Stingray II's. These advanced platforms are
helping us drive down risk in our future carrier airwings, which will
fully integrate unmanned carrier aviation. This past year, we completed
MQ-25A aircraft in-flight refueling of Navy carrier-based aircraft and
its first carrier demonstration. This unmanned aerial platform will
complement the capability of our combat strike fighters and extend the
range of our aircraft carriers.
We continue to make progress on the future technologies we need.
This past year, we completed over 4000 hours and 46,000 nautical miles
of unmanned surface vehicle operations. These unmanned systems, and
others like them, will play a key role in building our capability to
conduct DMO. To operationalize the Department's Unmanned Campaign Plan,
we established Task Force 59, which has been a game-changer for the
fleet. As we prioritize the Indo-Pacific and push warships to patrol
those waters, we have leveraged unmanned surface vessels and achieved
outstanding maritime domain awareness in a critical region with three
major chokepoints--the Suez Canal, the Bab Al-Mandab, and the Strait of
Hormuz--spanning a maritime area the size of California. This
achievement provides the Navy with scalable solutions to monitor the
world's waterways and keep the oceans open and free.
As AI and other disruptive technologies rapidly proliferate, we
must proactively work to gain every advantage. Many of these rising
technological developments play to our strengths as a Nation. More
sensors, providing more information, create more battlespace
transparency. Our application of AI solutions will provide our forces
with decision superiority as we map, measure, manage, and govern the
battle space. We will continuously leverage such technological
developments to better the fleet and our sailors. While strengthening
our Force, we must remain aware that no nation has a monopoly on
innovation--and history has shown us the navy that continues to adapt,
learn, and improve the fastest gains a strategic warfighting advantage.
To enhance our current and future hybrid fleet, we are maturing AI-
enabled warfighting capabilities and developing an AI-ready workforce.
This past year, Task Force 59 led and participated in International
Maritime Exercise (IMX) 2022, the largest maritime AI and autonomous
system exercise ever held. Along with this IMX, we executed Digital
Horizon, an event exercising 15 advanced unmanned systems, 10 of which
operated in the Middle East for the first time. Task Force 59 led
industry partners during phased evolutions, both ashore and at sea, to
advance fleet efforts to enhance regional maritime awareness with
greater effectiveness and reduced cost.
Along with building testing platforms and driving operational
concepts for the future fleet, Task Force 59 advances our understanding
of commercial technology that has the potential to complement other
government-sponsored AI procurement and operations. In support of these
efforts, the Unmanned Task Force continues to focus on rapid
experimentation and solving operational problems to quickly inform
acquisition strategies. We also continued work with partners and Allies
in events such as NATO Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative Exercises.
Strategic sealift investments are returning improved capability for
the fleet and Joint Force. Our Navy's commitment to surge sealift
requirements continues through procurement and refurbishment of used
commercial Roll-On Roll-Off ships to replace aging Ready Reserve Force
capacity. In 2022, the U.S. Navy purchased five used sealift vessels
and received authorization to buy another two in 2023. President'
Budget 2024 requests funds for the purchase of up to two more used
vessels in fiscal year 2024 and fiscal year 2025. We will need
congressional support to fully execute this cost-effective strategy.
The buy-used recapitalization program provides a stable acquisition
profile with forecasted maintenance and repair costs to meet strategic
mobility requirements at a moderate level of risk. In parallel with
recapitalizing strategic sealift, the Navy is researching and
developing future joint distribution capabilities and making
significant investments to meet fleet and joint refueling requirements.
capacity
Congress's support of the Navy's shipbuilding budget this past year
helped us signal our partners in industry--as well as our challengers
around the world--that we will remain the world's strongest maritime
power. Authorizing and appropriating the procurement of 12 battle force
ships displays Congress' continued commitment to the Navy's
shipbuilding programs. We appreciate the strong support by Congress for
naval shipbuilding during fiscal year 2023 enactment. This year, our
budget requests funding for procurement of an additional nine battle
force ships.
With sustained funding, the Navy can turn the corner on beginning
to build the fleet this Nation needs: a combat-credible, hybrid fleet
capable of succeeding across the continuum of day-to-day competition,
crisis, and conflict. We also need a fleet with the capacity to
distribute assets and deliver larger volumes of kinetic and non-kinetic
effects across all domains to meet the strategic and operational
demands of the Joint Force.
The Navy's most critical role in support of our national defense
and robust nuclear posture continues to be maintaining the most lethal
ballistic missile submarines in the world. Thus, our number one
acquisition priority remains the on-time delivery of the Columbia-class
ballistic missile submarine. Originally designed for a 30-year service
life, the first of the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines will be
retired in 2027 after 42 years of highly effective deterrent patrols.
The Columbia-class will replace it as the Navy's contribution to the
nuclear triad--which remains the most survivable leg of the U.S.
strategic nuclear deterrent force. This is a once-in-a-generation
investment, and sustaining our Nation's most secure and reliable
strategic nuclear deterrent will require considerable resources. When
the Columbia-class enters full-rate production in fiscal year 2026,
delivering the Nation's sea-based nuclear deterrent will consume nearly
a quarter of the Navy's entire shipbuilding budget. The Navy's request
funds the second Columbia-class submarine and delivery of the first
vessel in fiscal year 2028. Specifically, the Columbia-class program
request of $5.8 billion, includes the first of 2 years of incremental
full funding for the second submarine, to be awarded in fiscal year
2024. The budget request also includes continuing Integrated Enterprise
Plan funding initiatives, material procurement for future boats, and
continued funding for Submarine Industrial Base investments. The
strategic significance of this platform requires the Navy and the
Nation to dedicate the necessary resources to ensure its on-time
delivery.
Shipbuilding remains critical to increasing our fleet's capacity,
and requires significant investments from both the Government, as
included in the fiscal year 2024 request, and the private sector. A
combined commitment ensures healthy competition in the shipbuilding
industrial base, which is vital to meeting Navy requirements in support
of our national interests and defense of the Homeland. With the help of
Congress, the Navy and private shipbuilders are identifying
opportunities to generate resiliency and productivity in the
shipbuilding workforce. Part of the challenge of growing the fleet is
having enough shipyards with the capacity and workforce to build the
ships that we are budgeted.
The shipbuilding industrial base faces an increase in demand across
the enterprise, particularly in nuclear ship construction. As the Navy
ramps up production of the Columbia-class, we continue to procure two
Virginia-class submarines per year. The Virginia-class submarine budget
requests $10.3 billion, or 32 percent of this appropriation, funding
two Block V submarines and Advance Procurement for two fiscal year 2025
and two fiscal year 2026 submarines. These investments are important to
meet U.S. requirements, and are critical as we accelerate work to
deliver on our commitments under AUKUS. The Navy is working with the
Department of Defense, Congress, and industry as analysis of the
optimal pathway refines future SSN workload.
Additionally, we continue production of the world's most capable,
most lethal surface vessels. The Ford-class carrier program requests
$1.9 billion, and funds the seventh increment of funding for CVN 80,
and the sixth increment of funding for CVN 81. As part of the surface
combatant portfolio, our budget requests $4.5 billion for two Arleigh
Burke-class Destroyers as part of the fiscal year 2023 to fiscal year
2027 multi-year procurement of modern Flight III Destroyers. We plan to
award these destroyers this fiscal year. To support the building of our
Constellation-class Frigates, our request includes $2.2 billion for the
fifth and sixth ships of this class. These investments ensure that we
field a fleet that sails forward, keeps the oceans open, and ensures
our maritime advantage on and below the seas.
To ensure that we can build the future submarines and aircraft
carriers, we are taking steps to expand and strengthen the nuclear
industrial base by investing in six key areas: shipbuilder
infrastructure, supply chain capability/capacity, scaling new
technologies, addressing workforce trade skill gaps and constraints,
expanding productive capacity via strategic outsourcing of large scale
fabrication, and government oversight of expanded industrial base
efforts. In the Navy, any time we are splitting atoms, we know the work
will be demanding, but these nuclear-powered platforms require our
sustained commitment and continued support of the shipbuilders
delivering these critical assets to the fleet.
Beyond these nuclear shipbuilding projects, we are working closely
with private shipyards to strengthen the Surface Combatant Industrial
Base and Frigate Industrial Base. A key focus has been on the Workforce
Development investments that address risk in schedules, increase
capability to meet future force structure, promote job creation and
economic security, and address risk in single or fragile supply chains.
Expanding the capabilities of suppliers and shipyard infrastructure in
the surface ship industrial base results in greater industrial base
stability, cost savings, and improved efficiency as production
increases to build greater quantities of surface combatants. These
initiatives are paralleled by ongoing private sector investments to
expand the Nation's shipbuilding industrial base. We support any
efforts to grow our capacity to build more ships annually. This is all
part of a long-term commitment and clear signal to industry that the
unique work done in our private shipyards is essential to the Nation,
and the workforce they provide will be gainfully employed for years to
come. The Nation's shipbuilding industrial base remains a strategic
asset. It requires continued support to expand its capacity, and to
recruit and retain the workforce the Nation needs to deliver the fleet
of tomorrow.
A robust munitions industrial base, capable of delivering critical
munitions in large quantities and in strategically relevant timeframes,
is also an essential component of our Nation's warfighting capacity.
The rapid expenditure of munitions in Ukraine has demonstrated the
timeless truth that industrial capacity is a key enabler of victory.
Our budget request adds over $2 billion in critical munitions
investments, including supporting multi-year procurement contracts. We
are working closely with our defense partners to make the necessary
investments to allow us to rapidly ramp up production of critical
munitions right now. We are taking a multi-pronged approach to
introduce both stability and competition into the weapons acquisition
process in order to accelerate delivery times, increase inventories,
and lower costs. This includes use of multi-year contracts and large
lot procurements, recertification of existing munitions, new
production, and exploration of alternative systems designed to
circumvent our adversaries' advantages and play to our strengths. We
are also working with our partners and Allies to ensure their
requirements are met, as well. Today's weapons are intricate,
specialized, and depend on complex supply chains, which challenges our
ability to quickly ramp up production. We cannot afford to wait until
conflict begins to make these critical munitions capacity investments.
Unmanned systems will play an ever-increasing role in expanding the
capacity and distribution of our fleet. We will explore opportunities
to scale proven capabilities of unmanned Maritime Domain Awareness
systems, such as those demonstrated by Task Force 59. In addition, the
AI-enabled software that meshes our network of systems and platforms
will provide an array of decision advantage solutions as we track
forces, manage the battlespace, and maintain our dominance at sea.
Finally, we must focus on accelerating the adoption of technologies and
scalable platforms that provide increased capability and capacity,
while laying the foundation for our future hybrid fleet.
conclusion
The U.S. Navy's mission has never been more essential for the
preservation of American security and prosperity. Facing increasingly
aggressive challengers, the Navy's priorities--Readiness, Capabilities,
Capacity--will help us maintain our combat credibility in contested
seas.
In line with the NDS, the Navy's fiscal year 2024 budget request
keeps us on a steady path to modernize U.S. naval power, while
maintaining readiness and sustaining a forward posture that keeps
America and our Allies safe and prosperous.
Capable ships, submarines, and aircraft are expensive instruments
of national power, as are the costs of maintaining and sustaining them.
However, without a ready, powerful Navy, the costs we incur in
potential conflict could be much higher. The investments we make now
will shape the global maritime balance of power for the rest of this
century.
This is my final testimony before this Committee. It has been the
honor of a lifetime serving as the Chief of Naval Operations these past
three-plus years.
On behalf of more than 600,000 Active and Reserve sailors and Navy
civilians, thank you for allowing me to testify today. I am grateful to
this Committee and to your colleagues in Congress for your steadfast
commitment to the Navy. Let us continue our work to deliver the Navy
that this Nation deserves--a Navy that will preserve peace, strengthen
prosperity, and defend America for many decades to come.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral Gilday.
General Berger, please?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID H. BERGER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS
General Berger. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, I also thank you for
your comments, and my wife, Donna, is here also as is the
sergeant major of the Marine Corps and his wife, and it has
been the privilege of a lifetime and this is the best team you
could ever hope to match up with.
Three years ago I appeared before you and described how
change, in my opinion--rapid change--was required to meet our
statutory requirements and the mandates of the National Defense
Strategy for the future, and with the bipartisan help of this
Committee and the civilian leadership in the Pentagon I am here
to tell you that Force Design for the Marine Corps is not a
future aim point. It is a reality and it is here today.
A couple of examples. In the Pacific, in U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command (INDOPACOM) Task Force 76.3, they were built to create
advanced information sensing maritime awareness for Admiral
Aquilino, which he desperately needs in the Pacific.
They took what they learned during experimentation and they
applied it in exercises. They turned kill webs--what they call
kill webs into reality and they did it in the Philippines and
they did it in Japan, right in China's backyard.
In U.S. European Command (EUCOM) last fall Task Force 61.2,
using some new technology and a different way of organizing,
created both air and maritime domain awareness for the European
commander and Sixth Fleet and they focus their efforts on the
Russian air and naval activities, and marines, in fact, are in
Estonia right now doing the same and they will be there for the
next 4 months.
In U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) General Kurilla has our
Marine Corps MQ-9s. He needs ISR [intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance]. He needs persistent ISR and that is what
we are giving him in the key maritime terrain, and this month.
In fact, while we are sitting here, the new Marine Littoral
Regiment (MLR) out of Hawaii is in the Philippines, Third MLR.
They are using new sensing capabilities and lethal capabilities
in the Philippines and they are demonstrating that right
alongside of our Philippine counterparts and other allies and
partners in exercise Balikatan, and that is how it should be.
A couple of months ago Japan announced that they would host
the second--the next Marine Littoral Regiment forward. It would
stay in Japan in the First Island chain, and that is exactly
where I think you want Marine Corps presence.
In short, your marines are forward. I think they are where
it matters most and that is exactly how it has always been.
Three years ago I described how the Marine Corps would not just
modernize quickly but we would self-fund that effort. We would
get leaner, lighter, more naval, and 3 years later your Marine
Corps--your marines--have done just that and the results are in
the field now.
We are not waiting for 2027 or 2025. We are not waiting for
2030. Your marines are ready to handle any crisis anywhere on
the globe now, today.
Our major divestments, which we had to do, they are done.
We are at our fighting weight. Now we have to sustain our
modernization efforts while we focus on the quality of life
issues most important to marines and sailors and their
families.
People--as both the Secretary and the CNO [Chief of Naval
Operations] have mentioned, people are the real source of our
competitive advantage as a Nation, as the Marine Corps, and I
ask for your help now to invest in their quality of life.
We have to focus on where marines live, where they work,
where they eat. marines and their families expect that from us.
They have earned it and they deserve it and now we have to
deliver.
I think restoring, modernizing our infrastructure, which
many of you all have spoken about, is directly tied to
recruiting, directly tied to retention. That is how we support
families. That is how we generate readiness.
So on behalf of all marines, I ask for your support now as
we bring our infrastructure up to par with the quality of
marines and sailors who operate from those warfighting
platforms.
I also ask for your help, your support for the amphibious
fleet. That is how we project power. The CNO and I agree on
three key principles when it comes to the amphibious fleet.
First, the absolute minimum number of amphibious warships
the Nation needs is 31. That is the operational requirement
minimum.
Second, both of us agree block buys do two things. They
save the taxpayer money and they give the industry what the CNO
calls headlights, which they need.
Third, divesting without replacing, I think, is a dangerous
approach. That creates unacceptable risk. Amphibious ships are
critical to crisis response. They are critical to deterrence.
That is how we evacuated citizens out of Lebanon. That is how
the United States made our initial entry into Afghanistan in
2001. All from the sea.
Today, we are asking them to do all that plus deterrence,
plus integrated deterrence and campaigning, and my concern here
is the first time this Nation cannot respond to a crisis and
someone else does is the last time they trust us.
So in my final year of Commandant I will just finish up by
saying thank you. Thank you to the individual Members of this
Committee. Thank you for your coaching and your mentoring and
your guidance.
With that, I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Berger follows:]
Prepared Statement by General David H. Berger
introduction
Chair, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the Committee,
I am thankful for the opportunity to report the progress of your Marine
Corps over the last year and seek your support in continuing to prepare
the Service to face an increasingly uncertain and challenging future. I
would be remiss, in my final year as Commandant, if I did not first
acknowledge the unwavering support of this Committee over the last 3
years. Simply put, the Marine Corps of today is a better fighting force
because of your guidance, commitment, and resourcing decisions. But
there is still much work to be done. A brief review of world events
over the past few years tells us we are moving in the right direction,
but we cannot slow down. In fact, we need to accelerate our efforts so
your Marine Corps can effectively deter while remaining ready to
immediately respond to any crisis, anywhere on the globe, at any time.
The work of this Committee is crucial to the modernization of the
Marine Corps into a force that will continue to do just that.
posture
Today, more than 32,000 marines are forward-deployed or stationed
across 50 countries. There are also, on average, 102 Marine Corps
fixed-wing aircraft (F-35, F/A-18, and KC-130J) forward-deployed or
stationed overseas, a 22 percent increase since 2018. This forward
posture is a critical requirement for integrated deterrence and
reinforces a national source of strategic advantage--our global network
of allies and partners.
Most Marine Forces west of the International Date Line are based in
Japan. In January, the Government of Japan announced its intention to
host the future 12th Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR). This unit will
possess advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities as well as long range precision fires capabilities,
improving both maritime domain awareness and our ability to deter
potential adversaries. When combined with the other stand-in force
capabilities of III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), 12th MLR will
provide a major lethality upgrade for the fleet and joint force in the
Indo-Pacific.
While our posture has become more robust in the Indo-Pacific, fewer
of our forward-deployed marines are serving afloat with the fleet. In
2018, 16,000 marines served aboard ships, but in 2022, just 12,660 did
so--a 20 percent decrease. The principal reason for this decline was
the lack of amphibious warfare ship availability. As directed by the
Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 10 LHA/LHD
and 21 LPDs are the bare minimum necessary for our amphibious fleet.
Additionally, in my best military judgment, the Marine Corps needs a
minimum of seven Amphibious Ready Group / Marine Expeditionary Units
(ARG/MEU), three MLRs, and 35 Medium Landing Ships (LSM) to provide a
strong forward posture for building partnerships in the littorals and
to contribute to integrated deterrence.
resources
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for the Marine Corps is $53.2
billion (B). To date, the Marine Corps has taken every possible
opportunity to self-fund our modernization. This required hard choices
and difficult, unpopular decisions. With the support of our civilian
leadership in the Department of the Navy (DON), Department of Defense
(DOD), and Congress, from Presidential Budget 2020 to Presidential
Budget 2023 this approach succeeded. Over the last five program
objective memorandum (POM) cycles, the Marine Corps divested $18.2
billion across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) in structure and
legacy platforms and systems and has reinvested $15.8 billion directly
into modernization. The success of these divest-to-invest actions would
not have been possible without the support of our civilian and
congressional leadership.
To be clear, the Marine Corps is now complete with our major
divestments. Reducing the approved acquisition objectives (AAO) of
major programs like the CH-53K or F-35 at this point would not produce
resources for investment elsewhere and would be premature decisions. We
approached fiscal year 2024 as a program review year. Limiting the
introduction of new programs in fiscal year 2024 allows the Marine
Corps to maintain or even accelerate progress on investments from
preceding budget cycles that are directly tied to our pacing threat.
The suggestion that we may have to choose between preparing to
fight tonight--which your marines are fully prepared to do--and
preparing for some distant point in the future presents a false
dichotomy. Readiness, lethality, and modernization to meet future
challenges are all required today. Our collective challenge is to
balance the resource tension between the force we employ today and the
development of the force to compete and win in the years to come.
warfighting readiness
In many ways, Marine Corps readiness has improved since 2018. Our
units have higher levels of persistent manning / staffing, more
equipment and supplies, enhanced individualized training, and more
collective training--much of it force-on-force. Our combat arms units
are equipped with modern capabilities far superior to those of past
formations. Yet, while many things have changed, the foundational
elements have not. We remain the most elite infantry in the world, with
the most proficient combined arms teams on the globe.
While there have been substantive readiness improvements across the
force, nowhere have these improvements been more visible than in Marine
aviation. Across all type / model / series of aircraft, our mission
capable rate has increased from 57 percent in 2018 to 66 percent in
2023--an achievement that would not have been possible without
congressional support and the herculean efforts of Marine aviation
mechanics and maintenance crews. We anticipate further improvements to
aviation readiness as we retire older airframes (e.g., F/A-18 and CH-
53E) and accelerate acquisition of newer platforms like the F-35B/C and
CH-53K.
In 2018, we employed a lethal, though primarily fourth generation,
tactical air (TACAIR) force of 173 F/A-18C/D and 126 AV-8B, with 72
fifth generation F-35B/Cs. Today, our TACAIR force is comprised of 174
F-35B/C and 178 fourth generation aircraft--a major step forward.
Despite the challenges associated with transitioning the force from
fourth to fifth generation aircraft, the overall readiness of our
TACAIR fleet increased from 56 percent in 2018 to 68 percent in 2023.
We have also achieved significant gains in the readiness of our MV-
22 fleet, rising from 52 percent in 2018 to 64 percent in 2023. The
current challenges surrounding a series of hard clutch engagements
caused each of the Services to take immediate action to replace certain
transmission components in our V-22 fleets. That action is ongoing, and
we expect to see a rebound in readiness this spring and summer.
Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV): The introduction of the ACV has
the potential to greatly enhance our littoral mobility and
expeditionary reach. However, as with all new systems and technologies,
there have been a few notable challenges. At present, we are working
with BAE Systems to address two major component issues--one with the
struts / shock absorbers, and the other with the central tire inflation
system. Both issues have caused part failures, resulting in a decrease
in reliability and a corresponding decrease in readiness. We have also
identified issues related to possible water incursion into the power
train and are working with our industry partner to resolve those as
well. In addition to these mechanical issues, we have experienced three
incidents in the surf zone that resulted in vehicles rolling over.
According to BAE Systems and confirmed by our safety investigations,
these rollovers were caused by a lever effect generated when the
vehicle becomes parallel to the surf-line and is struck by a large
wave. These events were, in large part, the product of training
shortfalls. We are actively working with BAE Systems to rectify all
mechanical concerns and are enhancing the training regimen for our
vehicle operators on this new and more sophisticated amphibious
vehicle.
F135 Engine: In both President's Budget 2022 and President's Budget
2023, Congress enacted funding to support F135 engine modernization. In
addition to this funding, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
added significant resources for an engine core upgrade and for power
and thermal management system (PTMS) modernization. We will continue to
monitor the current F135 engine and F-35 PTMS's ability to support
Block IV mission systems and will work with the Joint Program Office to
ensure our requirements are being met.
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Pilot Training: As an integral part
of Force Design, we embarked along a path in late 2019 to double our
uncrewed aircraft capacity across the force from three unmanned aerial
vehicle squadrons (VMU) to six squadrons, while transitioning from the
RQ-21 to the much more capable MQ-9. While our commitment to uncrewed
systems is unshakeable, we have concluded the Air Force's capacity to
generate trained MQ-9 UAS officers is insufficient to satisfy Marine
Corps requirements. At present, half of our total inventory of UAS
officers (72 of 148) are not yet trained and qualified to operate the
MQ-9. We are working with the Air Force to remedy this throughput
issue. However, there is a need to direct the necessary resources in
future budgets to establish a Naval UAS School to resolve this larger
joint force issue.
Pilot Readiness Concerns: Service Chiefs are routinely asked about
how the joint force can effectively compete against the Department's
pacing challenge--the People's Republic of China (PRC)--or our acute
threat--Russia. But there is a different competition that is more
directly and more adversely impacting the joint force than that
emanating from either Russia or China, and that is the unhealthy
competition between the Services and the airline industry. As the head
of personnel for the Air Force stated during testimony in 2017, we
cannot compete with the airlines. We could not then and we cannot now.
This is an issue that requires your oversight. We are at a competitive
disadvantage and risk our reservoir of pilots drying up. As an example,
in 2018, the Marine Corps had 88 of the 203 required F-35 pilots (43
percent of the requirement). At the end of 2022, we had 218 of 498 F-35
pilots (44 percent of the requirement). At the end of 2022, we had 200
F-35 pilots in flight school and another 62 at our fleet replacement
squadrons with fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2024 completion dates.
We are making some progress, but not enough--and certainly not quickly
enough. We are exploring various options for structuring aviation
bonuses and aviation incentive pay under the new authorities granted in
the fiscal year 2023 NDAA. But ever-larger monetary incentives are
neither sustainable nor the appropriate remedy. This is not just a
Marine Corps problem. It is a joint force problem, and we will continue
to work with the other services and Congress as our understanding of
this issue develops.
force design and current operations
There is a misperception by some that Force Design might create a
gap in Marine Corps capabilities between divestment and fielding new
capabilities. The reality is that fielding new capabilities associated
with Force Design is already well underway. Many of these ``future''
capabilities tied to Force Design 2030 are already being employed by
Marine forces today. Six examples from 2022 are illustrative:
TF 61.2 and Reconnaissance and Counter-reconnaissance: In March
2022, U.S. Sixth Fleet partnered with II MEF to create Task Force (TF)
61.2. TF 61.2 was designed as a joint task force crisis response
capability to command and control naval forces supporting contingencies
in Europe and Africa. This force was delegated tactical control of
amphibious forces (ARG/MEU) in theater, allocated Marine forces (Marine
Rotational Force--Europe), and a task organized reconnaissance/counter-
reconnaissance force. Near simultaneously, II MEF and 2d Marine
Division were tasked with ``accelerating experimentation with maritime,
multi-domain reconnaissance constructs and activities to enhance the
ability of the stand-in force to dominate the information environment,
sense and make sense of the situation, and win the reconnaissance vs.
counter-reconnaissance competition.'' Commander, Sixth Fleet,
immediately volunteered TF 61.2 to support these broader Service
experimentation efforts. During the next several weeks, TF 61.2
conducted training aboard both the USS Woody Williams (ESB-4) and USS
Georgia (SSGN-729) and engaged in combined-arms training in both Greece
and Turkey. Those initial exercises demonstrated that maritime
expeditionary forces could increase surface, subsurface, and aerial
domain awareness for the fleet commander--regardless of theater--and
allowed us to focus on the information web required to create domain
awareness in a contested space. TF 61.2 then transitioned these
experimental capabilities to the Baltics, where it participated in
bilateral training on maritime domain awareness with the Estonian Navy
in the Gulf of Finland. During this period, TF 61.2 participated in an
amphibious landing in Estonia and Exercise BALTOPS with 16 North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations, utilizing 47 ships and
7,000 personnel. This new organization has been so successful the
previous Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) chose to highlight
the value of the task force during his spring 2022 annual testimony.
The bottom line is that your marines' ability to conduct reconnaissance
and counter-reconnaissance is a current force capability that directly
contributes to competition and deterrence today.
TF 76.3: Building upon the success of TF 61.2, in October 2022, the
3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Naval Task Force 76 staffs merged
into a completely integrated naval task force in the Indo-Pacific. Over
the next several months, TF 76.3 experimented with naval concepts at
sea and ashore via a broad campaign of learning labeled Noble Fusion
22.2. TF 76.3 also participated in exercises Kamandang in the
Philippines and Resolute Dragon in Japan. Once again, marines and
sailors demonstrated the ability to create advanced information webs to
support maritime domain awareness across the theater. Just as
importantly, they demonstrated this capability to potential
adversaries.
USS Tripoli: The most recent deployment of the USS Tripoli (LHA-7)
demonstrated the strategic and operational advantage that amphibious
warfare ships create today. In early 2022, Tripoli set sail as an
independent deployment, in part to test our F-35B ``Lightning Carrier /
Assault Carrier'' concept by which 16-24 F-35Bs were embarked and
operated in concert with a traditional carrier strike group. During
Tripoli's time in the Indo-Pacific, embarked marines and sailors
trained with and supported the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and USS
Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), among other traditional surface combatants. Not
only did the deployment illustrate the potency of the Lightning Carrier
concept in support of carrier strike group operations, it also
demonstrated the versatility and value of the platform for the
integrated Navy-Marine Corps team. During Exercise Valiant Shield 2022,
the Commander of U.S. Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral (VADM) Karl Thomas,
embarked his staff aboard the Tripoli and used it as his command
platform for 15 days--a strong endorsement of the platform's importance
within the larger fleet. VADM Thomas noted, ``One day you can have F-
35Bs on the flight deck, the next day you could have MV-22s and you can
be putting marines ashore . . . it just is a very versatile instrument
. . . [with] 14 5th-gen fighters on board--it's an incredibly capable
sensor.''
The LHA's size, which closely mirrors the amphibious warfare ships
of our allies, makes it an attractive partnership and learning
platform. During their deployment, marines and sailors from Tripoli and
the 31st MEU trained with forces from Japan, Australia, the
Philippines, and Singapore.
Multifunction Air Operations Center (MAOC): In March 2022, 2d
Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) conducted the Service's first operational
deployment of a multi-function air operations center (MAOC). In
Lithuania, under the command of U.S. Air Forces Europe, the MAOC
conducted air surveillance and multi-domain awareness in support of
NATO operations. This is not simply an evolutionary step in fixed
aviation command and control (C2) nodes, but rather, a
transformational, expeditionary capability that can serve as a hub for
Marine Corps, naval, and joint kill chains and webs. The MAOC provides
the Marine Corps with the capability to control aircraft and missiles
and enables decision superiority. It also offers the ability to gain
and maintain custody of adversary targets and hold those targets at
risk via fires with its organic TPS-80 Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar
(G/ATOR), Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S), and
highly proficient aviation C2 marines. The MAOC is scalable by task-
organized units, small enough to support distributed teams or large
enough to support a multi-MEF or Corps-level fight. This agency
construct is also the model we are using for the development of all-
domain C2. 3d MAW is now leading the Service's MAOC experimentation
efforts and employed this capability as part of Marine Rotational
Force--Darwin (MRF-D), integrating C2 and sensor services for 16 allied
and partner nations during Exercise PITCH BLACK. From these initial
efforts, 3d MAW has matured the MAOC, creating a persistent hub to
enhance the common tactical picture for I and III MEF. Recent
experiments in February 2023, which included U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
(USINDOPACOM), have further demonstrated the MAOC's ability to
integrate additional capabilities from the MEF Information Group and
improve the common tactical picture for a carrier strike group, and is
visible evidence of Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) in
practice.
Marine Corps Information Command (MCIC): In October 2022, we
streamlined and simplified much of the coordination required for space
and cyberspace operations at the headquarters level, by realigning
current relationships and structure at Headquarters, Marine Corps
(HQMC) from a staff officer to an operational commander, to create the
MCIC. The MCIC is a service-retained command designed to integrate
global Marine Corps capabilities in information, intelligence,
cyberspace, and space to support Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) resulting in
decision advantage. This two-star command operates under Marine Forces
Command (MARFORCOM) and provides critical linkages across operational
level planning. It also provides task organized detachments to support
the FMF commander's campaigning objectives. This allows the commander
to leverage the authorities needed to synchronize global cyber, space,
influence, and intelligence effects and generate multi-domain
advantages in support of the commander's objectives. The MCIC achieved
initial operational capability (IOC) in January 2023.
VMGR-153 and HMH-461: In January 2023, we activated Marine Aerial
Refueler Transport Squadron 153 (VMGR-153) in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. By
2026, VMGR-153 will bring 15 KC-130J aircraft to the region, building
on the organic mobility available to marines responding to crisis or
conflict in the region. We are also approaching 1 year since the CH-53K
program achieved IOC and are well underway transitioning Marine Heavy
Helicopter Squadron 461 (HMH-461) into our first fully operational CH-
53K squadron. Despite their ongoing transition, HMH-461 is already
demonstrating the significant impact of this new capability, conducting
heavy lift assault support missions previously impossible with legacy
aircraft. In parallel, the operational test and evaluation squadron
(VMX-1) continues to push the boundaries of heavy lift operations. Last
December, they successfully lifted an F-35C, demonstrating the
platform's utility in conducting next generation tactical recovery
missions.
force design and the ground combat element (gce)
Infantry Battalion Experiment (IBX): IBX is an ongoing Service-
level initiative designed to evaluate the future infantry battalion's
ability to conduct expeditionary, offensive, and defensive operations
as an element of a MEU, MLR, or infantry regiment in support of fleet
and joint operations. The results of IBX live-force experimentation
represent a critical component of our campaign of learning and are one
of several inputs informing our ongoing assessment of the future
infantry battalion.
After 24 months of experimentations and force-on-force exercises
with three infantry battalions, our combat developers, division
commanders, and MEF commanders recommended an 811-person infantry
battalion. This new battalion demonstrated improved C2, sensing, and
lethality. Importantly, this recommendation reflects the value of our
campaign of learning. In 2019, we experimented with a 735-person
battalion. But force-on-force experimentation made clear our initial
assumptions were off. It also demonstrated a need for additional ground
ISR and indirect fires capacity. In line with these findings, we right-
sized personnel, added back indirect fires capacity, and added organic
UAS platforms and personnel to improve surveillance and target
acquisition. Future infantry battalions will possess Block IV Javelins
at the company-level to increase anti-armor capability and will have
loitering munitions (organic precision fires (OPF)) at the squad and
platoon levels to increase lethality, enhance maneuver, and facilitate
distributed operations. They will have additional communications,
logistics, and intelligence capabilities at the company-level, and new
signals intelligence and electromagnetic warfare capabilities at both
the battalion and company levels. They will possess vehicle-mounted and
canister-launched OPF at the company and battalion level to enhance the
lethality, multi-domain awareness, and reach of those units, and will
have improved C2 systems at the company-level. But our learning never
stops. We will build from past efforts and conduct another round of
experiments with two additional battalions this year. These experiments
will evaluate the new infantry battalion design against a peer
adversary, with the aim of further refining its structure and
capabilities to the demands of the modern battlefield. We will also
begin incorporating our lessons learned into FMF battalions not
directly involved in IBX later this year.
Close Combat Lethality: In 2018, former Secretary of Defense James
Mattis convened the Close Combat Lethality Task Force (CCLTF). As we
approach 5 years since that effort was launched, we should take stock
of its significant impact. The CCLTF's insights have been instrumental
in informing the ongoing transformation within our infantry formations,
the most visible of which being the success of the Multi-purpose Anti-
armor Anti-personnel Weapon System (MAAWS). It provides a multiple-
effects rocket system to infantry and combat engineer squads to
increase firepower and enhance their ability to close with and destroy
the enemy. The MAAWS is a medium-range, multi-purpose, man-portable,
line-of-sight, reloadable, recoilless, day/night, anti-armor, and anti-
personnel weapon system with an available suite of 84mm rockets. MAAWS
munitions will be capable of obscuration, illumination, personnel
denial, armored vehicle denial and penetration, bunker and hardened
facility penetration, and soft target destruction capabilities. Every
rifle squad, combat engineer squad, and Marine Special Operations
Command (MARSOC) team will be equipped with one MAAWS. Fielding began
in the 3d quarter (3Q) of fiscal year 2021 and will be complete in 3d
quarter of fiscal year 2025.
The Marine Corps has also fielded lightweight body armor including
a new plate carrier (PC Gen 3), and an enhanced combat helmet--all of
which address the significant weight of the individual marine's combat
load so well documented from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
addition, new night vision devices (AN/PVS-31A) have enhanced night
movement and weapons lethality for our infantry, improving their
situational awareness and ability to acquire targets. The MAAWS, Squad
Common Optic, M27 squad automatic rifle, M17 pistol, and Mk13 and Mk22
precision rifles have all increased organic lethality within our small
units. Multi-domain sensing and targeting is being addressed with a new
signals intelligence / electromagnetic warfare (SI/EW) program called
Marine Electromagnetic Ground Family of Systems (MEGFoS). This SI/EW
suite of equipment, crewed by dedicated SI/EW and cyberspace personnel,
will be employed in the future infantry battalion, greatly enhancing
tactical level target identification and engagement. All these
capability enhancements make our squads and platoons more lethal.
3d MLR and 12th MLR: On 3 March 2022, we activated 3d MLR and it is
on track to achieve IOC this year. 3d MLR has an established littoral
combat team (LCT), combat logistics battalion (CLB), and littoral anti-
air battalion (LAAB), all of which have been exercising in operations,
activities, and investment events in the Indo-Pacific region. 3d MLR
continues to operate in coordination with the Naval Surface Group
Middle Pacific (NAVSURFGRU MIDPAC) to further develop its maritime
fires capabilities, and most recently, deployed to Marine Air-Ground
Task Force--Training Command (MAGTF-TC) to execute the first Service-
level MLR training exercise. This exercise focused on the MLR's ability
to sense and make sense of the operating environment and rapidly close
kill chains. 3d MLR is designed to be a stand-in force, but it is not
the Service's sole stand-in force. Rather, it is one part of the larger
III MEF system of stand-in forces that includes our forward deployed
naval force, as well as other expeditionary capabilities including the
F-35B/C.
We are on track to activate 12th MLR by 2025. The Government of
Japan and Secretary Austin recently announced that 12th MLR will be
forward stationed on Okinawa to create greater maritime domain
awareness and enhance our collective ability to deter in the region. As
Secretary Austin stated during the announcement, ``We will equip this
new formation with advanced intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, as well as anti-ship and transportation capabilities
that are relevant to the current and future threat environments.'' 12th
MLR's presence and capability suite will augment our existing stand-in
force capacity in the first island chain.
These littoral regiments provide the joint force two essential
capabilities. First, they serve as eyes and ears of the joint force--
meaning their persistent, forward, and distributed posture enables the
joint force to reach well inside of weapons engagement zones. Second,
they provide decision space and time for the other joint forces to
deploy, while maintaining continuous maritime domain awareness.
force design emerging capabilities
In addition to current operations that demonstrate Force Design in
action today, a number of emerging capabilities on the horizon will
increase the Marine Corps' ability to enable full-spectrum operations
for the Joint Force in contested environments.
Unmanned Logistics System-Aerial (ULS-A): As the ongoing conflict
in Ukraine has illustrated, even traditional ground resupply, executed
over interior lines and relatively short distances, can be disrupted
with operational level effects. Consistent with these lessons, the
Marine Corps is developing the ULS-A Small or Tactical Resupply
Unmanned Aircraft System (TRUAS). The TRUAS has a 9-mile range and
maximum payload of 150 pounds, which is sufficient to fly in
ammunition, food, medical supplies, and batteries, among other
supplies. This small system only requires two marines to operate and
will be a game-changing capability for our distributed forces. The
TRUAS is anticipated to achieve IOC in 2023 with fielding completed in
2027. Fielding this capability is critical toward setting conditions
for the development of the ULS-A Medium system, which is the required
capability for large-scale tactical distribution in a contested space.
The emerging ULS-A Medium will be fielded in 2025 and will provide
payloads between 300 and 600 pounds with a range of up to 100 miles.
Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS): MADIS is an
expeditionary, upgradable, and state-of-the-art capability to protect
maneuver forces, installations, and other designated critical assets
from fixed / rotary wing (FW/RW) aircraft and Group 1-3 UAS. It uses
sensor-integrated C2 to provide beyond line-of-sight cueing, targeting,
and engagement. Current air defense capabilities only defend against
FW/RW targets and Group 3 UAS within line of sight. The MADIS is
composed of a complementary pair of Joint Light Tactical Vehicles
(JLTV). The Mk1 JLTV is designed to kill FW/RW variants with a turret-
mounted 30mm cannon, Stinger missiles, and an electromagnetic warfare
(EW) jammer. The Mk 2 JLTV provides redundant, non-kinetic and kinetic
fires while primarily employing C2 software and sensors to collect,
interpret, and pass radar tracks to the Mk 1 via a wireless local
network for target engagements. The AAO is 131 systems comprised of 262
vehicles; the fiscal year 2024 budget request provides for 13 MADIS (26
vehicles). We will achieve IOC in 4th quarter fiscal year 2024 with the
delivery of 17 systems, and we anticipate reaching full operational
capability (FOC) in fiscal year 2031. The fiscal year 2024 budget
request for the MADIS family of systems is $265 million (M).
Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC): The MRIC defends forward-
deployed forces against the threat of cruise missiles and other aerial
threats with similar flight profiles. This is accomplished through the
integration of already-fielded Marine Corps and Israeli systems that
include CAC2S, the TPS-80 G/ATOR, the Iron Dome Battle Management
Controller, and the Tamir missile and guidance uplink. Each MEF will be
fielded with one MRIC battery. A battery is comprised of a headquarters
element and four independently deployable firing platoons. To date,
there have been four successful live fire events: August 2019, November
to December 2021, April to June 2022, and September 2022. Each live
fire successfully demonstrated the destruction of multiple
operationally challenging missile threats. The Service's fiscal year
2024 budget request is for $44 million.
Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS): The
Marine Corps is transitioning the majority of its existing lightweight
155mm towed artillery batteries into medium-range missile (MMSL)
batteries equipped with NMESIS to conduct anti-surface warfare
operations as a component of an integrated naval force. By 2030, the
Marine Corps will have 14 MMSL batteries: three batteries forward
deployed in support of MLRs and 11 continental U.S. (CONUS)-based
batteries supporting the rotational and MEU deployments. The program
will enter low-rate initial production (LRIP) in 3d quarter fiscal year
2023. The first six operational launchers will be fielded to MMSL
Battery, 3d MLR in 4th quarter fiscal year 2023 to give the Service its
first capability to contribute to sea denial and sea control operations
with ground based anti-ship missile (GBASM) fires. We anticipate
reaching IOC in fiscal year 2025 after fielding five MMSL batteries and
a MMSL battalion headquarters. We anticipate reaching FOC in fiscal
year 2030 when all 14 MMSL batteries have been fielded. The Service's
fiscal year 2024 budget request for $402 million supports procurement
of 24 NMESIS launchers and associated equipment, and 90 Naval Strike
Missiles (NSM) keeping the program on track to reach 774 NSM. The 774
NSMs provide one combat load plus one combat load resupply per deployed
MMSL unit.
Long-Range Fires (LRF): OSD directed the Marine Corps to develop
and field a ground-launched Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM)
capability to support joint force long range, precision fires
requirements. The LRF weapons system is composed of a Remotely Operated
Ground Unit for Expeditionary (ROGUE) Fires leader kit, LRF launcher,
LRF C2 System (LC2S), and LRF Reload and Resupply System (LRRS). All
four components are required to complete a full mission of loading,
transporting, and firing a Tomahawk missile. This capability leverages
existing Navy and Marine Corps hardware and software such as the Mk41
Vertical Launch System, Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System,
Tomahawk cruise missile, and JLTV to reduce risk by accelerating
capability delivery to the FMF and combatant commanders. The current
plan is to establish three 16-launcher, long range missile (LMSL)
batteries to form one LMSL battalion capable of deploying one battery
at a time by 2030. The first four operational launchers are scheduled
to be fielded during 4th quarter fiscal year 2024. Remaining batteries
are planned for activation between fiscal year 2026 and fiscal year
2028. OSD provided $1.2 billion in research, development, testing, and
evaluation (RDT&E) and Procurement Marine Corps (PMC) funding through
fiscal year 2026 to support the development and procurement of 56 LRF
launchers, C2 and support equipment, and 152 Tomahawk (TLAM and MST)
missiles. The fiscal year 2024 budget request for LRF is $142 million.
research, development, test & evaluation (rdt&e)
This year, we will invest heavily in the next generation of RDT&E
efforts. We are placing an emphasis on the future of marine aviation,
JADC2, persistent sensing, and contested logistics, while expanding our
experimentation efforts. With the support of the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering's Joint Capability
Technology Demonstration office, we will begin the Long-Range Attack
Munition (LRAM) project, to rapidly develop and field a low-cost, air
launched, family of loitering and swarming munitions. The LRAM can be
employed by not just H-1s and F-35s, but also palletized and employed
from MV-22s, CH-53Ks, and C-130's, thereby significantly expanding our
magazine depth. Likewise, we have moved out in earnest on
experimentation with our capstone research and development effort, the
family of integrated targeting cells (FITC). FITC accelerates the
evolution of combined arms to a new level. It fuses operations,
intelligence, and fires functions together in one center and creates
the means by which the Marine Corps will be able to participate in and
control joint fires, while also gaining and maintaining persistent
custody of adversary targets. We will also expand our ground launched
loitering munitions capabilities by demonstrating a common launcher for
the family of munitions, and we continue testing a low-cost, hypersonic
booster that will be in a form factor the Marine Corps can logistically
support in a contested environment. For maritime mobility, we are also
investing in our first Stern Landing Vessel (SLV) prototypes, which are
helping buy down risk and advance the Medium Landing Ship (LSM)
program. We will continue efforts to develop a medium-sized, uncrewed
logistics aircraft and will begin small boat experimentation to
determine the future of our surface reconnaissance capabilities.
force design experimentation in support of contested logistics
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, in close collaboration
with both the Navy and III MEF, is currently experimenting with more
than a dozen new technologies and potential future capabilities focused
on enabling logistics in a contested environment. These operational
experiments include well-known capabilities such as the SLV and wing-
in-ground-effect (WIG) craft, as well as lesser-known, emerging
capabilities such as the autonomous low-profile vessel (ALPV). Based on
our existing experimentation plans, operational experimentation with
these and other capabilities will continue over the next 3 years and
inform future capability investment decisions.
force design experimentation with littoral mobility
Mobility is a key characteristic to the dispersion and persistence
of stand-in forces. In the case of the Indo-Pacific, littoral mobility
will be essential to our ability to maneuver through the complex
geography of the region. We recognized this capability gap early in the
design process and identified the LSM as a mechanism to transport
marines in this unique maritime environment.
Medium Landing Ship (LSM): Distinct, yet complementary to
traditional L-Class amphibious warfare ships, the LSM is purpose-built
to provide tactical maneuver for regimental sized units, forward-
deployed naval forces, and other expeditionary advanced base-enabling
forces operating within contested environments. The LSM is a maneuver
asset, and as a shore-to-shore connector, is unique and critical to
expeditionary littoral mobility. It will facilitate campaigning and
support diverse missions such as security cooperation, humanitarian
assistance / disaster relief (HA/DR), and logistics support. While not
optimized for any one threat or region, we envision the LSM being of
particular utility in the maritime gray zone contests omnipresent in
the Indo-Pacific. Given its size and characteristics, this vessel could
be employed with a lower risk of escalation than larger platforms.
After extensive research and wargaming, we calculated a need for
nine LSMs to support a single regimental sized unit. The DON's
Amphibious Force Requirements Study over the last 2 years validated
this number, articulating a requirement of no fewer than 18 LSMs to
support littoral maneuver. Given that current force structure plans
call for three MLRs, we require 35 LSMs to account for operational
availability and mobility for those units. We anticipate an initial
request for 18 of the 35 LSMs we seek will be a step toward enabling us
to more effectively counter adversaries' strategies, support and
reinforce alliances and partnerships, and do so at a relatively low
cost.
Despite focusing our efforts over the past 3 years on deterring,
competing, and if necessary, contesting the pacing challenge, the
Marine Corps will not fully realize the capabilities of the MLR until
we have the littoral mobility assets that enable these forces. The
decision to delay LSM procurement from fiscal year 2022 to fiscal year
2025 was a setback in our ability to bring this capability online
within an operationally relevant timeframe. As marines do best, we have
adapted to this challenge and are developing bridging solutions to
experiment with LCU-1700's and leased Expeditionary Fast Transports (T-
EPF) and SLVs. While these platforms will inform the eventual
employment of the LSM, they will fall short of desired capabilities if
called upon in an operational setting. Our modernized expeditionary
forces need a comparably modern mobility platform to bring the full
weight of their capability to bear on competitors or adversaries,
particularly in littoral regions.
force design campaign of learning
Marine Corps Wargaming and Analysis Center (MCWAC): Wargames play
an essential role in concept development and operational planning and
provide the basis for informed decisionmaking. The Marine Corps is
undergoing a shift from human-driven to technology-enabled processes
that will provide disproportionate benefits--not only to the Service,
but the joint force writ large.
Upon completion in 2024, the MCWAC in Quantico will provide a
state-of-the-art facility designed to help decisionmakers better
visualize the threat environment, gain competitive advantages over
adversaries, and simulate future operating environments. It will also
provide data that informs force development, force management, and
system functionality. Simulations will support existing and developing
weapons platforms and capabilities in all regions of the globe.
MCWAC will incorporate elements of artificial intelligence and
machine learning to amplify decision accuracy on issues that determine
the way we organize, train, and equip for the future fight. This
facility will also provide a critical asset to the joint force and
senior leadership currently unavailable in the National Capital Region.
Its location facilitates participation by joint, interagency, and
multinational organizations, in addition to Service-specific analysis.
Lessons Learned: Between July 2019 and December 2022, we executed
25 wargames. This calendar year, we will conduct another 9 wargames and
welcome the participation of any Member, or their staff, interested in
observing. These wargames will primarily focus on two subjects: (1)
reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, and (2) III MEF deployment
and sustainment during major combat operations.
One of the persistent lessons from our wargames is that our current
logistics concepts and capabilities are not optimized for maritime
campaigns in a contested environment. Improving joint and combined
logistics integration, and streamlining logistics C2, are critical
areas for further planning and development. The number and capabilities
of current logistics distribution platforms are insufficient to
adequately deploy, maneuver, and sustain stand-in forces. Due to
geographical distribution of forces, all Services will be challenged to
meet their sustainment requirements. This suggests the Marine Corps
will have reduced access to connecters under the operational control of
the other Services.
Our learning is continuous, and we have already refined some of our
initial Force Design decisions based on that learning. For example,
when we initially reduced the number of cannon batteries, we assumed
that the existing 6-gun per battery model would be sufficient to meet
requirements. After additional study, we decided to expand those
batteries back to their original, pre-2015, 8-gun structure and added
back two batteries. Next, we initially assessed 10-plane fighter-attack
squadrons (VMFA) as the operationally suitable and sustainable approach
for the future force. After multiple studies, a series of experiments
and wargames, and emergent capabilities development, we know the 10-
plane model requires redress and are undertaking that effort now.
Likewise, initial assessments of our heavy-lift helicopter capacity
demonstrated we could cut several squadrons; yet real-world
considerations have resulted in a modification to our original plans
and restoration of some of that structure and capacity.
amphibious warfare ships
Achieving the priorities of the National Defense Strategy requires
a Navy that creates advantage for the joint force across the
competition continuum. Sustaining and recapitalizing our nuclear
deterrent and nuclear command, control, and communications systems;
enhancing and expanding our undersea advantage; and creating advanced
naval expeditionary forces that consist of all classes of ships and are
capable of persisting and prevailing against any threat, are all things
we must do now. We cannot create and sustain this force on the time
horizons necessary to achieve competition and deterrence objectives
without a significant expansion of our defense industrial base, which
is currently organized for peacetime efficiency. We are a maritime
nation that requires naval forces capable of answering the Nation's
call, whenever or wherever that might be. Amphibious warfare ships are,
and will continue to be, a critical component of the Nation's fleet.
They provide an essential capability to the joint force that cannot be
overstated. As the amphibious fleet requirement authority, as
designated in the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA, it is my obligation to ensure
this Committee is aware of the current status of your amphibious fleet.
Secretary of the Navy Amphibious Ship Studies: Since 2019, three
DON studies have examined amphibious warfare ship force structure
requirements. Combining the findings of those studies with amphibious
warfare ship readiness trends over the past 10 years and projected ship
availability rates, I conclude that the Nation requires no fewer than
31 traditional amphibious warfare ships (10 LHA/LHD and 21 LPDs/LSDs)
to ensure the warfighting readiness and responsiveness of amphibious
naval forces.
The Importance of Amphibious Warfare Ships and the ARG/MEU: Our
Nation's amphibious warfare ships enable marines to execute three
essential missions in support of the National Defense Strategy. First,
unlike traditional surface combatants whose role is to sink enemy
surface combatants and submarines or destroy enemy aircraft and
missiles, amphibious warfare ships are meant to project the national
power of the United States globally as both a warning to our
adversaries and as a visible sign of our commitment to allies and
partners. Our defense strategy clearly identifies those allies and
partners as a source of our strategic advantage. As Secretary Austin
has previously stated, we ``need resources matched to strategy,
strategy matched to policy, and policy matched to the will of the
American people.'' Our strategic aims are clear: we must deter any act
or activity intended to disrupt the rules-based international order.
Our strategy is to not fight unless necessary; we seek only to deter
conflict. Effective integrated deterrence requires amphibious warfare
ships. More so than any other Marine Corps operation, activity, or
investment, amphibious warfare ships with embarked marines provide a
flexible, scalable, and visible capability for our combatant commanders
to employ at the time and place of their choosing in support of
integrated deterrence campaigning.
Second, amphibious warfare ships enable marines to immediately
respond to crisis or contingency. When the Japanese nuclear reactor in
Fukushima was damaged by an earthquake in 2011, an amphibious Task
Force responded immediately. Non-combatant evacuations in Lebanon, the
response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, the rescue of downed U.S.
aircrew in contested areas, and numerous other situations around the
world have all required an amphibious response, either due to lack of
inland access or a determination that a large U.S. military footprint
ashore would exacerbate an already dire situation.
Third, amphibious warfare ships and their embarked marines ensure
the President and his Ambassadors, as well as all U.S. citizens living
outside the United States, have the on-call crisis response protection
required to ensure their safety. Whether in Haiti, Venezuela, South
Sudan, Yemen, Eswatini, or anywhere else on the globe, MEUs are ready
to respond and protect. We must maintain forward-deployed ARG/MEUs with
the operational reach to rapidly respond to our highest threat
consulates and embassies globally. Marines forward-deployed aboard
ships are the operationally desirable solution.
Lastly, the 31 combined amphibious warfare ships are vital
components of our Nation's seven ARG/MEUs. This number of ships allows
the Nation to maintain at least two ARG/MEUs at sea, with the option to
surge to five. Assuming our present trajectory, we will fall below the
congressionally mandated floor of 31 amphibious warfare ships. From my
perspective, this is a result of divesting these platforms faster than
we are procuring their replacements. The result of not meeting this
requirement became most acutely visible when we were unable to provide
traditional disaster-relief response following the earthquake in Turkey
earlier this year. Our ARG/MEU deployments are a visible sign of
commitment to our allies and partners and provide evidence to the PRC
of our readiness to contest any malign activities. They also provide a
visible sign to Russia about our commitment to NATO. In fact, when the
Prime Minister and Minister of Defense for Sweden wanted to send a
clear signal to Russia regarding Sweden's intention to join NATO, they
did so by making a statement on the flight deck of the USS Kearsarge--a
Wasp-class amphibious assault ship.
LPD Flight II Program: The PRC is accelerating their production of
amphibious warfare ships. We cannot overlook the fact that since 2019,
the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has launched three Type 075
``LHA-like'' and three Type 071 ``LPD-like'' amphibious warfare ships.
The PLAN intends to launch an additional five Type 075 ''LHA-like''
amphibious warfare ships in the next 5 years. It appears that the PLAN
sees amphibious warfare ships as highly relevant and a critical
instrument in power projection as evidenced by their recent deployments
extending beyond the South China Sea. In my opinion, there is also a
soft power component to our amphibious warfare ships that cannot be
replaced by other platforms. It is obvious the PRC is learning this
lesson and is pursuing their own amphibious warfare ship program as a
competitive act.
Next, an LPD's or any other amphibious warfare ship's vulnerability
to an anti-ship missile is no more relevant to its value than an
aircraft's vulnerability to being shot down is relevant to its value.
Over 5,000 helicopters were destroyed during the Vietnam War, yet we do
not hear persistent arguments related to their survivability. In a
recent series of wargames held by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2 carriers and 10--20 destroyers and cruisers
were sunk in the Pacific during each of the 24 iterations. Just as
these wargames do not signal the irrelevance of these surface warships,
conjecture about the survivability of amphibious warfare ships does not
either. Instead of focusing exclusively on the survivability of
platforms in a high-end fight, we should instead seek an appropriate
balance of capabilities needed to effectively campaign and maintain
deterrence with those capabilities optimized for major war. As
evidenced by constant year cost, the LPD Flight II is the most
effective and affordable answer until a follow-on amphibious warfare
ship is developed.
force design and marine forces reserve
The Marine Innovation Unit (MIU), manned by Marine Reservists, was
recently established aboard Stewart Air National Guard Base in New
York. This cutting-edge unit will make considerable contributions by
focusing marine talent toward accelerated identification and adoption
of advanced capabilities, transforming naval service capacity for
technology employment, and retaining and investing in human capital.
MIU is expanding Marine Corps reach into the wider innovation ecosystem
and developing key partnerships with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU),
NavalX, Army Futures Command, and others to increase tempo and progress
toward Force Design objectives.
The MIU is just the beginning. We continue to explore the efficacy
of establishing a maritime reconnaissance capability within our Reserve
component (RC) as part of our larger multi-domain reconnaissance
initiatives across the force. We are currently evaluating the potential
to establish a reserve MQ-9 squadron, as well as Reserve augmentation
detachments with Active Duty squadrons.
In addition to its role supporting Force Design, Marine Forces
Reserve (MARFORRES) continues to function as both an operational and
strategic Reserve to augment and reinforce the Active component (AC).
In 2022, more than 1,100 marines and sailors activated to support
Operation ALLIES WELCOME (OAW), honing their security and humanitarian
relief skills. From that activation, 103 marines volunteered to deploy
to OAW-Kosovo aboard Camp Bondsteel. Finally, as the Service brought
new capabilities online during fiscal year 2022, MARFORRES provided
High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Amphibious Assault
Vehicle (AAV) rotations in support of USINDOPACOM requirements. This
augmentation enabled the AC to execute Force Design experimentation and
unit transitions without an impact on combatant commands. The Marine
Corps' continued employment of the RC demonstrates our total force
approach and has proven to be a critical component of force
modernization efforts.
force design and marine special operations forces
As part of the larger Force Design effort, our marine special
operations forces are modernizing through their Next Generation Raider
Force (NGRF) initiative. The NGRF is intended to implement the
strategic shaping and reconnaissance (SSR) operating concept, and its
two major sub-components--irregular warfare and special reconnaissance,
both focused in the littoral regions of the globe. In a manner
consistent with other marine forces, MARSOC seeks to provide the joint
force with the capability to shape the operating environment;
illuminate adversary actions, activities, and intentions; and provide
options to impose cost, both kinetically and non-kinetically, from
competition to conflict.
talent management
Talent Management 2030 (TM2030) directed accelerated personnel
reforms and oriented the Service toward retaining more experienced
marines. In February 2022, I directed the Assistant Commandant of the
Marine Corps to form a Talent Management Strategy Group to align and
harmonize Service-wide talent management efforts. This group focuses on
future demographics, economic, and human capital trends, while working
with academia, research organizations, pertinent departments in HQMC,
and commanders in the FMF to identify initiatives that will better
align individual abilities, skills, and desires with the warfighting
needs of the Service. Since the release of TM2030, we have better
aligned departments and organizations involved in talent management,
assessed, and mapped out interdependencies of total force personnel
policies, and begun to generate momentum with a sense of urgency.
Leveraging authorities previously enabled by Congress, we enacted nine
initiatives in 2022, which we will expand and accelerate in 2023:
Commandant's Retention Program (CRP): During fiscal year 2023, the
CRP offered pre-approved reenlistments to top-performing marines by
streamlining the process and giving priority access to primary military
occupational specialty (MOS) monitors for duty station and assignment
options. The CRP resulted in a 72 percent increase of first-term
reenlistment submissions by top-performing marines with the average
reenlistment approval accomplished in 24 to 48 hours, much quicker than
the previous norm. Going forward we will expand the program to more
first-term marines as well as our career force.
Staff Non-Commissioned Officer (SNCO) Promotion Board Realignment:
Beginning in fiscal year 2024, we are realigning SNCO promotion boards
to sequence more effectively with the assignments and reenlistment
processes. This initiative will reduce SNCO billet gaps in the FMF and
decrease the processing time of reenlistment packages. The realignment
will provide greater predictability for SNCOs and their families while
dramatically reducing the number of permanent change of station (PCS)
moves across the force.
Recruiting Station Commanding Officer Selection Board: We
implemented two initiatives for the fiscal year 2023 Recruiting Station
Commanding Officer (RSCO) selection board. First, officers now have the
opportunity to volunteer for command, including officers otherwise not
scheduled for consideration. Second, officers may also request removal
from RSCO consideration for 1 year, without penalty, should they prefer
to complete a deployment or other professional obligation, or due to a
personal life circumstance.
Special Duty Assignment (SDA) Volunteer Program: Prior to 2022, we
screened and selected marines for Special Duty Assignments en masse.
But last year, we launched a pilot SDA volunteer program, expanding
incentives to provide duty station preference for volunteer recruiters,
drill instructors, and combat instructors. As a result, volunteers
increased by 62 percent, reducing the number of involuntarily screened
marines by 38 percent. This minimized disruption to our marines, their
families, and FMF units while also reducing SDA school attrition. We
will improve and expand this program in 2023.
MarineView 360-Degree Leadership Review: MarineView360 is a
development tool for leaders that helps marines identify their
strengths, personal blind spots, and areas for focused improvement
through the polling of their supervisors, peers, and subordinates.
Leaders receive feedback and advice through a dedicated mentor and
coach. The MarineView360 pilot began with a group of 150 sitting
commanders and is now leveraging the experience of 200 additional
selected commanders and senior enlisted advisors. The final phase of
the pilot will expand to 1,000 marines of varying rank from gunnery
sergeant to colonel.
Officer Promotion Opt-Out: Starting in 2022, both the AC and RC
offered certain officer populations the ability to opt-out of
consideration for promotion once without penalty. This allowed officers
increased flexibility in their career paths to pursue unconventional
career experiences or formal education that would otherwise take them
off track for key developmental assignments. We are currently exploring
the expansion of this initiative to enlisted marines to afford them the
same flexibility in their careers.
Digital Boardroom 2.0 (DBR 2.0): DBR 2.0 increases the
functionality and accuracy of information presented to board members,
enhances the conduct of virtual boards, safeguards data, and improves
this critical talent management process. The Enlisted Career Retention
and Reserve Aviation boards successfully used DBR 2.0 in 2022. With the
availability of cloud-based data, we will expand use of DBR 2.0 while
simultaneously assessing the outcomes, cost and time savings, and
professional depth and breadth of board members to benchmark with our
legacy process.
Separate Competitive Promotion Categories: To meet the demands of
the future, the Marine Corps must retain the highest quality officers
with the necessary skill sets at all ranks. To that end, we are
exploring options to reorganize the unrestricted officer population
into separate competitive categories to better meet the Marine Corps'
needs for diverse expertise and experience at all ranks by competing
for promotion with peers having similar skill sets, training, and
education. We will conduct a pilot program to evaluate the merits of
this reorganization during the 2025 field grade officer promotion
boards.
Career Intermission Program (CIP): Many marines desire to pursue
specialized education, or to focus on family for a significant life
event. The CIP is an initial step toward allowing marines an option to
temporarily pause their Active Duty service and later resume their
careers without penalty. This program enables career flexibility, and
in doing so, also encourages retention of experienced, talented
marines.
talent management way-ahead
Manpower Information Technology System Modernization (MITSM): In
February 2022, Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC,
M&RA), created a business capability requirements document that
outlines the capabilities required to begin the MITSM acquisition
process. MITSM will aggregate legacy systems and capabilities into a
device-agnostic, data-driven, and dynamic human resources information
technology solution that meets the evolving needs of the Marine Corps'
talent-based workforce. One aspect of the MITSM will be a web-based
``talent marketplace,'' which will enable a collaborative and
transparent assignment process and increase the role of both commanders
and individual marines. This capability will help us better align the
talent of individuals with the needs of the Service to maximize the
performance of both. Despite its criticality to modernizing our talent
management systems and processes, MITSM is currently challenged by the
acquisition process.
Potential Implementation of ``Indefinite End of Active Service''
Policy for Enlisted Personnel: As we seek to mature the force, we also
seek to eliminate antiquated processes and policies that induce both
friction within the personnel system as well as personal and familial
stress. There is little reason why those who have served honorably for
16+ years need to worry about re-enlistment before completing 20-years
of service. This year, we will explore the feasibility of senior SNCO
career designation to establish an indefinite expiration of Active
service. This shift will align senior SNCO retention practices with
those of officers, increase flexibility in assignments, reduce
administrative burden and needless paperwork, and minimize uncertainty
for SNCOs and their families.
Small Unit Leader Initiative: Under the current policy, first-term
marines are ineligible for promotion to sergeant. While the spirit of
that policy is reasonable, it creates a disincentive to the highest
performing marines across the force by establishing an administrative
obstacle they cannot overcome regardless of individual talent. Going
forward, if one of our talented marines with at least 36-months of
service wishes to re-enlist, then that marine will become eligible for
promotion to sergeant upon their re-enlistment. This program will
incentivize the most talented who desire to stay for another enlistment
and should help mitigate the persistent need for sergeants across the
FMF.
Active and Reserve Permeability: During the next year, we will
explore options to increase the permeability between the AC and RC. The
aim is to better match the diverse--and often immediate--operational
needs of AC commanders with the specialized skills of individual
marines in the RC. Due to statutory limitations on reserve employment,
we will work with the administration to identify potential
opportunities for improvement to AC-RCg permeability.
Orders Issuance: In an attempt to give individuals and their
families as much time as possible when executing a PCS move, we will
increasingly attempt to issue orders up to 12 months before the
execution date. We will also assess the feasibility of issuing follow-
on assignment orders to those individuals selected for resident
professional military education. This should do two things. First, it
should provide greater clarity to servicemembers and their families to
facilitate proper planning for any school transitions, childcare needs,
and special healthcare needs, and will provide spouses more time to
secure desirable employment. Second, earlier issuance of orders would
allow the Service to clarify a unit's incoming personnel picture to
increase long-term planning, effectiveness, and risk management.
Five-Year Orders: The importance of unit cohesion cannot be
overstated. To achieve that cohesion, we need to shift from a 3-year
tour model toward a 5-year tour model--with notable exceptions for some
of locations such as Okinawa, Japan and Twentynine Palms, California.
In addition to creating greater unit cohesion and, as a result, greater
readiness, a 5-year model would facilitate improvements to family
stability and family readiness. Using the standard twenty-year career
timeline, the new assignment length would only require a family to
relocate three times after the initial assignment. This suggested tour
length should enable children to finish elementary or secondary school
in one location, and would enable extended periods of spouse
employment--minimizing the impacts on dual-income households.
Assignment Incentive Pay / Hardship Duty Pay: Congress and the
Department have provided us with the authorities necessary to
incentivize service at some of the more challenging duty stations and
we have a plan to use them. We will increasingly utilize Assignment
Incentive Pay (AIP)--consistent with the other services--to increase
the attractiveness of hard-to-fill duty stations. Notably, Army
soldiers stationed at Fort Irwin, California or in Korea, have many of
the same concerns as our marines at Twentynine Palms and Okinawa. In
addition to AIP, we are exploring other authorities provided by
Congress, to incentivize duty by our most talented marines in our
hardest-to-place locations.
Weapons Systems Officers (WSO) & Electronic Countermeasures
Officers (ECMO): As we transition from the F/A-18D and EA-6B to the F-
35, we will have the opportunity to transition some of our most
talented Naval Flight Officers (NFOs) currently serving as WSOs and
ECMOs into our expanded uncrewed aircraft squadrons (VMUs). At present,
we have 95 WSOs and 32 ECMOs. While the legacy aircraft these officers
were previously associated with are being retired, their individual
skills remain critical to the future force.
Attracting, developing, incentivizing, and retaining dedicated
professionals that increase our readiness and lethality is a priority
and necessary to improve our efficacy as a force. The initiatives
undertaken since the publication of TM2030 demonstrate our commitment
to our expeditionary warfighting legacy and our drive to fight and win
in 2030 and beyond. Our performance in future battles will be defined
by the investments we make in our Marine Corps today. All actions to
evolve our talent management system are aimed squarely at supporting
our warfighting requirements. They will incentivize and optimize our
talent and sustain our ability to serve as the Nation's premier
expeditionary force in readiness within the rapidly evolving world we
face.
recruiting and retention
The Marine Corps is not insulated from the challenging recruiting
and retention environment impacting the entire DOD. The fiscal year
2024 budget supports an Active Duty end strength of 172,300 marines, an
achievable target. The Marine Corps will monitor and reevaluate end
strength, even as we continue to increase retention as part of our
Talent Management strategy. We appreciate the support and flexibility
that Congress provides us on retirement, retention, and end strength.
In 2022, we achieved our annual recruiting mission and exceeded
both our first-term re-enlistment goal (101 percent) and our
subsequent-term re-enlistment goal (107 percent). To put this in
perspective, 5,063 first-term marines re-enlisted in 2018, while 5,820
re-enlisted in 2022. Further, we are re-enlisting those marines
earlier. In fiscal year 2022, the Service met its First Term Alignment
Program (FTAP) mission on 8 July 2022, which at the time was considered
a major accomplishment. In fiscal year 2023, we met our FTAP mission of
6,225 marines on 6 February 2023--a full 6 months earlier--and retained
higher quality marines than we have in the last few years.
The Marine Corps met or exceeded both our FTAP and Subsequent Term
Alignment Program (STAP) goals across the force for the first time in
13 years. In fiscal year 2023, we expanded early re-enlistment
authorizations for marines with at least 24 months' time in service
from 200 to 600. We reached 150 in the first weekend, and then reached
200 (last year's total) within 3 weeks. We then expanded this program
to accommodate the 700+ submissions we had received by 1 February this
year. Completing these early re-enlistments will help mitigate any
recruiting challenges across a 2-year period (fiscal years 2025 to
2027). In fiscal year 2023, we satisfied our retention goal of infantry
marines before December for the first time in over a decade. As a
result of these retention efforts, we are gradually maturing the force.
This will result in more mature non-commissioned officers leading our
youngest marines and will generate better operational outcomes on the
modern battlefield.
As noted by RAND economist Dr. Beth Asch, we should never forget
that we do not have an All-Volunteer Force; but rather, a predominantly
all-recruited force. To overcome current challenges in recruiting, we
have challenged all assumptions. We have also resurrected and reviewed
ideas and options previously generated over the years, but never
actioned or implemented. The results have been very promising.
While some assumed 5 year ``infantry-only'' contracts would not be
well received, that assumption has been invalidated. During the past
year, we conducted a limited experiment in which we offered recruits a
60-month infantry-only contract. This 400-spot program ``sold out''
immediately and was subsequently expanded to accommodate the demand.
Infantry-only contracts ensure unit cohesion and almost guarantee
marines two deployments in a single contract, mitigating unit turnover
between deployments. Since the completion of that pilot program, we
continue to find that our young marines prefer the stability afforded
by these 60-month contracts and are choosing this option over 48-month
contract options.
Some assumptions related to the utility of monetary incentives have
also been invalidated. Big sums of money are not required to
incentivize potential marine recruits. This past year, we implemented a
$5,000 shipping bonus program for new enlistees with great success. In
exchange for this one-time payment, we direct shipping at a date of our
choosing, which gives us greater predictability and flexibility. This
experiment was very successful. We also ]implemented a $9,000 shipping
bonus program with similar success. In exchange for this one-time
payment, the individual's contract time does not officially begin until
they arrive at their first unit. As a result, those in this program
that become infantry marines will average 2 deployments during their
first contract, because their initial 7 months of entry-level training
will not count toward their obligated service.
Finally, we want to make the statement, ``there is always boat-
space for talent,'' a truism across the Marine Corps. In the past,
talented individuals were denied re-enlistment due to ``closed'' MOSs
or other administrative obstacles beyond their control, such as an
inability to transition from an MOS they didn't choose or perhaps never
wanted. These talented marines want to re-enlist, but they also want a
new (primary MOS) PMOS. The ability to ``laterally move'' talent into a
new PMOS is an obstacle at present, but we are working on this issue.
This is a training issue, not a personnel issue. Regardless, we are not
going to let 8 to 12 weeks of retraining costs prevent us from
benefiting from the talents and leadership of these proven marines for
another 4 years or more of service. If we must choose between proven
leadership and MOS credibility, we will prioritize proven leadership
for a greater return-on-investment. Retraining costs less than the
$42,000 cost to recruit a marine. While recruiting will remain
challenging for the foreseeable future, the Marine Corps is up to the
challenge. But there is one option that we will not exercise: we will
not lower our standards. This is non-negotiable. Despite the well-known
recruiting challenges in recent years, from 2018 and 2022, the average
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) and average General Technical
(GT) scores of our infantry marines (0311s) have actually increased
across the force.
childcare
Addressing the availability of childcare remains a top priority for
the Service. Unfortunately, persistent supply and demand imbalances
have resulted in unacceptable wait times for our marine families. At
present, there are notable waitlists for full-time childcare at Marine
Corps Base (MCB) Quantico, MCB Camp Lejeune, MCB Camp Pendleton, and
MCB Hawaii. These locations still maintain approximately 77 percent of
the Service's unmet waitlist for ages 6 weeks to 5 years. This is
primarily due to a shortage of qualified workers, high turnover due to
less competitive pay, lengthy hiring and background check processes,
seasonal PCS fluctuations, and facility renovations. While we have
capacity to serve 6,523 children at present, we only have sufficient
staff to serve 5,880 children. To provide a variety of options that fit
families' needs and to mitigate lengthy Child Development Center (CDC)
waitlists, we also offer fee assistance for eligible marines who are
geographically remote, reside more than 15 miles from an installation,
or are assigned to an installation with a lengthy CDC waitlist.
In 2022, with the support of OSD Office of Military Family
Readiness Policy, we established the Child Care in Your Home (CCYH)
Pilot Program. CCYH is a DOD fee assistance pilot program that helps
military families cover the cost of full-time childcare (30-60 hours
per week) provided in their homes. Designed to support families with
non-traditional work schedules, care can be provided every day of the
week and during non-traditional hours, such as evenings and weekends,
or on rotating schedules.
At present, we maintain 58 childcare facilities (32 CDCs and 26
school-aged care facilities). Renovations are currently in-progress
aboard MCB Quantico and Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Beaufort. We
recently completed a $37.7 million construction project aboard MCAS
Miramar, which will provide 412 new childcare spaces to our families.
In addition, we have construction planned aboard MCB Butler in Okinawa
for a new school-aged care facility, aboard Camp Pendleton for a new
CDC that will add 250 additional spaces, and aboard MCB Camp Blaz in
Guam to satisfy the needs of 276 children in the future.
substance abuse prevention
The Marine Corps' Substance Abuse Program focuses on three distinct
areas: drug demand reduction, alcohol misuse prevention, and substance
misuse non-medical counseling services. As part of our continued
vigilance, we have expanded our urinalysis testing to include both
illicit and prescription drugs, including the most misused and abused
opiates. One hundred percent of urine samples are now tested for
fentanyl. Additionally, due to a regrettable resurgence in lysergic
acid diethylamide (LSD) in some of the communities surrounding our
major bases and stations, we added LSD testing back to the standard
drug testing panel. Delta-8 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) was also added
to the standard drug testing panel in July 2021, expanding testing for
THC products. THC remains the most prevalent drug detected during our
testing. While expansion in testing did result in an increase in
positive test results, the Marine Corps remains below the DOD benchmark
for positive test results and current data indicates that prescription
drug misuse is low.
sexual assault prevention and response
As a Service, we have focused on countering sexual assault within
our ranks by professionalizing the prevention workforce, improving
training for marines at all levels, professionalizing the sexual
assault response workforce, and strengthening an environment of
accountability by establishing an Office Special Trial Counsel. As of
January, our newly established Office of Special Trial Counsel reached
IOC and is on track to reach FOC by December 2023, putting
prosecutorial discretion for these offenses in the hands of trained
attorneys. In addition to these efforts, the Marine Corps continues to
implement the recommendations of the Independent Review Commission on
Sexual Assault in the Military, as approved by the Secretary of
Defense. These efforts include developing organizational structure,
hiring qualified professionals, and ensuring our prevention workforce
is trained and postured to provide this crucial support to commanders.
We are also investing in education to enable prevention, focusing on
leadership responsibilities to both prevent and respond to sexual
assault and sexual harassment, and providing training for trauma-
informed leadership. While this larger societal problem persists, we
are actively pursuing solutions to improve prevention and ensure
offender accountability when prevention efforts fail.
suicide prevention
As part of our larger human performance management efforts, we
continue to examine our mental health programs and suicide prevention
efforts. Every life lost to suicide is one too many. As an organization
known for our camaraderie, we take every loss of life seriously and
continue to pursue all opportunities to reduce the incidence of suicide
amongst our marines, sailors, and their family members.
The Secretary of Defense recently released a report from the
Suicide Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee. The
Committee concluded that the most important preventative measure is
engaged quality leadership, and we agree. This has long been a focus of
ours, as have many of the recommended personnel reforms, which mirror
our on-going talent management initiatives. We also embrace the
Committee's conclusions about the criticality of access to mental
healthcare professionals and services, and their recommendations
related to TRICARE reform to enable such access.
healthcare
Developmental Pediatricians: Generating ready forces requires
building and sustaining readiness at-home among our military families.
Military service is demanding. Extended training, frequent military
moves, and routine deployments--scheduled and unscheduled--strain
marriages and stress families, regardless of a marine's rank or time-
in-service. That stress is magnified in cases where children have
special medical needs, such as Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD).
Regrettably, we are currently unable to provide sufficient
developmental pediatric care across the force, even in areas where we
enjoy highly developed military healthcare infrastructure, such as San
Diego or the National Capital Region. Parents are often forced to wait
6 months or longer for an appointment. This is not acceptable. The
scholarship is clear and undisputed: early intervention is the key to
better outcomes for children with ASD. Today, we have four Active Duty
and three civilian developmental-behavioral pediatricians to support
the force, which is insufficient to meet the needs of our families. The
force requires at least two developmental-behavioral pediatricians per
medical treatment facility to meet the needs of our families. If
providing these additional developmental pediatricians is considered
unsupportable, then we would ask for Congress' support in creating
legislation to make it easier for families requiring this care to
obtain it from the civilian market. Parents should not be forced to
choose between their profession and calling to serve, and their need to
provide for their families.
Defense Health Agency (DHA): The DHA has undertaken the largest
transformation in the history of the military health system. From the
lens of providing support to servicemembers and families, this
undertaking has failed to satisfy expectations, and has resulted in
both unsustainable costs and degraded services. While the DHA is
maturing in its role as a combat support agency (CSA), the lack of
agreement between the DHA and military departments regarding DHA's
roles and responsibilities as a CSA, as well as business rules
governing employment of uniformed personnel inside the medical
treatment facilities (MTFs), has created significant challenges. This
problem is compounded by a recent exodus of military and civilian
healthcare professionals due to ``burn out'' from the COVID-19 pandemic
and operational tempo, the ability to double or even triple salaries in
the civilian sector, and uncertainty and frustration over the DHA
transition. Due to the nation-wide shortage, the DOD is competing for
the same finite resources when attempting to hire contract healthcare
professionals. Unfortunately, the DOD contract pay rate is near the
lowest, if not the lowest, in the industry, making recruitment
particularly challenging.
In terms of improving the affordability of healthcare as promised,
these cost savings have not been realized. In fact, the transition has
come with higher costs. An additional undesired outcome of the movement
away from Service authority, direction, and control of healthcare
delivery is the lack of consideration for Service-specific requirements
and the impact to healthcare operations. Specifically, in remote
locations such as Okinawa and Iwakuni, decisions to reduce access to
care inside MTFs has negatively impacted dependents and civilian
personnel, which impacts operational readiness.
I ask for your continued oversight of the DHA and help in
addressing the overwhelming gap between DOD contract healthcare labor
rates and the civilian market. The success of the military health
system (MHS) requires the ability to hire qualified, civilian
healthcare labor. The MHS must have contract rates that can compete in
a highly competitive market for a finite and highly valuable resource.
Failure to remedy this issue will have catastrophic consequences on the
readiness of the force.
training and education
The Marine Corps enjoys a hard-earned reputation as a learning
organization. The previous 3 years of Service-level training exercises,
along with other large and small exercises, wargames, and live force
experiments, established a sound foundation for organizational
learning. Collectively, they provided clear evidence that change is
required. We have learned that today's training and education system
must rapidly evolve to prepare individual marines and units to succeed
on an all-domain battlefield. Those changes are articulated in the
recently published Training and Education 2030 report.
Training and Education and the Russo-Ukraine Conflict: While the
future remains uncertain, clear trends are emerging from the conflict
in Ukraine that are consistent with much of what we have seen in other
recent conflicts, evidencing the need for accelerated modernization
across the joint force. However, we should not lose sight of the fact
that the Ukrainians succeeded in the early phases of the conflict not
because of superior equipment, but because they were adaptable--
especially at the tactical level--and rapidly innovated new concepts of
employment to address specific areas where the Russians had achieved
advantage. In fact, their bias for action, unit cohesion, and emphasis
on decentralized C2 had a significant impact on the readiness of
Ukraine's infantry and maneuver forces. These factors allowed Ukrainian
battalions to effectively operate in and control battlespace we would
normally associate with an Army Brigade or Marine Regimental Combat
Team--units 3 or more times larger than a traditional battalion. The
operational requirements associated with these expanded areas of
responsibility are placing more and more demands upon junior leaders
that can only be addressed through greater investment in the training
and education of our marines. The conflict is demonstrating that
advanced capabilities will be available and employed at much lower
tactical levels than we have witnessed in our own recent past. In
future conflicts, we are going to ask junior leaders at the company
level and below to do things battalion commanders may not have had the
authority to do in recent years. It is clear this will require an
increasing investment in the training and education of our leaders at
all levels and across the entire joint force.
doctrine
Doctrine establishes the basis for developing operational concepts
and requirements. It also describes our understanding of how those
capabilities are to be employed and ultimately, details training and
associated resource requirements. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication
(MCDP) 1, Warfighting, tells us that doctrine
``establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of
fighting. It also provides . . . a mandate for professionalism, and a
common language.'' Our doctrine, including its bedrock in Warfighting,
has given us a solid grounding in the essential elements of maneuver
warfare, upon which we expect our philosophy of warfare to remain
anchored for the foreseeable future. This is not enough. The character
of warfare has always been subject to the constant and uneven pressures
of technological advance and social and geopolitical change. Warfare's
changing character means we must constantly review and revise our
assumptions; they will change, and we must change with them. Doctrine,
in turn, must evolve, adapt, and keep pace. For example, in June 2022
we published MCDP 8, Information, describing how the Marine Corps gains
and exploits information advantages in all warfighting domains across
the competition continuum. We also recently revised MCDP 4, Logistics,
updating our doctrinal foundation of this critical warfighting function
to meet the challenges of the future.
Changes to our warfighting ideas, theories, and concepts must be
expressed clearly and quickly. This leads to greater emphasis on the
rapid creation and dissemination of doctrine at a level of specificity
below that of our capstone publications and tied tightly to our
campaign of learning, including feedback from the FMF. Most
importantly, we must hold ourselves accountable for training and
operating in accordance with our refined doctrine.
enhanced infantry and leader training
Fourteen-week Infantry Marine Course (IMC): Before our IMC pilot
effort began, the Marine Corps underwent a deliberate process to
identify the infantry skills necessary to win in a fight against a peer
adversary. During this process, Training and Education Command
developed 39 behaviors required for all infantry marines. These
required behaviors range from traditional skills like employing the
service rifle, patrolling, and land navigation to skills such as
``embodying the Marine Corps' warfighting philosophy'' or ``manag[ing]
signature.'' Based on feedback from our division commanders, a subset
of 20 of the original 39 infantry behaviors were prioritized as a
requirement for entry-level training. Those 20 infantry behaviors
became the foundation for a new program of instruction (POI) and the
first pilot of the 14-week IMC.
IMC marines are held to a much higher physical standard to both
enter training and to graduate than previously required. Marines
earning the infantry MOS are now challenged to achieve first class
scores on the Physical Fitness Test (PFT) and Combat Fitness Test
(CFT), achieve a minimum swim qualification of Water Survival
Intermediate (WSI), and pass an evaluation on the Shallow Water Egress
Trainer (SWET), which simulates procedures for evacuating a sinking
aircraft. Student physical graduation requirements also include a 10-
kilometer (km) Combat Endurance Assessment (CEA) and completion of a
20km hike with a 75-pound fighting load.
In addition to better physical fitness, IMC marines develop better
decisionmaking skills. By the end of the course, students make
thousands of decisions, receiving constant feedback from both combat
instructors and peers, significantly increasing the experiential
foundation for sound decisionmaking. As IMC builds a better
decisionmaker, it also produces a significantly more lethal marine. IMC
graduates are trained to a markedly higher standard in rifle
marksmanship and are combat capable in all environments with the M27
Infantry Automatic Rifle (IAR). They are further trained in the
employment of medium machine guns, grenade launchers, anti-armor
systems, and light mortars--all of which are new weapons skills for
basic riflemen.
Better-trained marines generate operational tempo--a key to success
in maneuver warfare. The outcomes thus far are remarkable. IMC
graduates are trained to be quicker-thinking and better decisionmakers,
more physically fit, and much more lethal at earlier points in their
careers than their predecessors. All these things should increase the
readiness of their units and the overall force. To date, 3,524 marines
have graduated from this program. While it is too early to make any
definitive conclusions, initial findings suggest IMC graduates may have
lower non-EAS attrition rates.
the modernized marine corps training environment (project tripoli)
We train how we fight. But we are limited by the number of ranges
and training areas available, environmental limitations, airspace
restrictions, and several other factors that ensure marines can employ
the full range of capabilities they will have at their disposal. One
solution to this challenge is to expand and modernize the Marine Corps
training environment (MCTE) through an effort called Project Tripoli,
which seeks the integration of the live, virtual, and constructive
training domains. The MCTE is our combined arms training concept for
the future that will enable us to realistically train and exercise with
our advanced capabilities both internally and as part of the joint
force. Importantly, it permits training with capabilities in a manner
concealed from our adversaries and in ways that would otherwise be
resource prohibitive in terms of materiel, ordnance expenditure, and
personnel. The MCTE will enable combined arms training in the broadest
sense and will allow new and expanded dimensions in force-on-force
(FoF) exercise capabilities. Conceptually, a modernized MCTE integrates
all training enablers--from high-fidelity flight simulators, to ranges
and training areas, to FoF training systems--into C2 architectures and
networks supporting training events. MCTE is not a single acquisition
program, but a system comprised of multiple training programs. To
further improve the MCTE network, we will continue to build
interoperability among existing training systems as we bring new
systems online, pre-designed with enabling technologies to support
increasingly dynamic training environments.
Our next big step will be to field our Force-on-Force Training
System (FoF-TS) Next Program across the force to equip units with the
training tools necessary to conduct realistic and challenging FoF
training. This system is designed specifically to accommodate rapid
changes and refinements in the training continuum. Additionally, it
will process the tremendous amounts of sensor data needed for our FoF-
TS, UAS, cyber, electronic warfare, and loitering munition capabilities
to facilitate readiness. The fiscal year 2024 budget request for
training and education modernization is $581 million.
training areas and ranges
At present, ensuring sufficient range access and training in the
Western Pacific region is challenged a by a lengthy supply chain,
environmental constraints, infrastructure challenges, and access
restraints. To ensure the persistent readiness of marines in the
region, the Marine Corps has a number of planned investments across the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Investments planned for
Guam include: a live-fire training range complex, a multi-purpose
machine gun range, and urban combat training facility, and a training
support center. On Tinian, the Marine Corps is pursuing a platoon level
live-fire and maneuver range and an explosive ordnance disposal range.
These efforts are pending a positive determination of ongoing
environmental impact studies. The Marine Corps is also involved in the
Pacific Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC)
initiative. PMTEC will better integrate existing capabilities and
expand the ranges and training areas available to marines, to include
the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex and the Pacific Missile Range
Facility.
Training areas and ranges in Alaska continue to grow in importance
to overall Marine Corps readiness. The sophistication, instrumentation,
infrastructure support, and sheer size of Alaska ranges make them
indispensable for the development of 5th generation fighter aircraft
tactics. During 2022, marines participated in four joint exercises in
Alaska, to include the high-end rehearsal exercise RED FLAG. The Marine
Corps provided 38 F-35Bs across different phases of the exercise as
well as leading edge air C2 capabilities. In 2023, we will expand our
participation in exercises in Alaska to include Exercises NORTHERN EDGE
and ARCTIC EDGE.
While our efforts to prevent encroachment have focused on
protecting the ranges and training areas we have, modernized training
requirements are going to push us to expand training areas in multiple
domains to ensure we have trained and ready forces to meet our Nation's
needs into the future. MCAS Yuma makes an outsized contribution to the
training readiness of marine aviation due, in part, to the presence of
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) and the
conduct of the biannual Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) courses.
In addition to the decades long challenges associated with the location
of the Yuma Fairgrounds, the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station
(MCAS) Yuma's Barry M. Goldwater Range (BMGR) in support of modernized
aviation training is at risk due to the loss of Flat Tailed Horned
Lizard (FTHL) habitat associated with border wall construction. By risk
we mean, the loss of habitat increases the likelihood that the FTHL
would be listed under the Endangered Species Act. Listing the FTHL
could result significant restrictions to our ability to train and
experiment to meet force design objectives. To prevent this from
occurring, we need to act now to secure necessary FTHL habitat and are
leveraging the Readiness and Environmental Protection Integration
Program as one tool to support habitat protection efforts.
In addition to physical ranges, we will also leverage a variety of
virtual ranges like the Persistent Cyber Training Environment (PCTE)
for joint qualification requirements and rehearsals. The PCTE
integrates capabilities that support continuous evolution of cyber
training and exercises, enabling force readiness and driving decisions
on tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Over the past year, the
PCTE has expanded access to cyber operating forces in the FMF. We are
confident that access to these modern training environments will
significantly enable the all-domain nature of our marine forces.
installations and logistics
In recent years, we have identified logistics as the ``pacing
function'' for warfighting. Among the seven warfighting functions,
logistics most dictates the tempo of operations and the operational
reach of a unit. No other warfighting function more profoundly affects
our ability to persist in contested spaces. Moreover, logistics and
sustainment capability and capacity have a deterrent effect. Persuading
an adversary that a quick win is not possible by demonstrating an
ability to generate, re-generate, and sustain combat power is, in
itself, a deterrent.
An uncertain future, the threat of peer and near-peer competitors,
and developing challenges in all warfighting domains create wide-
ranging implications for sustaining the current and future force. To
support emerging and future operational requirements against peer and
near-peer adversaries, we will have to transform our approach to
logistics. Simply put, we must transition from a force optimized for
supporting sustained operations ashore to a maritime force capable of
supporting operations in austere, expeditionary, and littoral
environments that are contested across all domains. This process of
change and adaption began with the release of our Installations and
Logistics 2030 report and our revised foundational doctrinal
publication on logistics, MCDP 4.
While our current approach worked well in the past, it is
insufficient to meet the demands of the future operating environment,
particularly when contested across all domains. The magnitude of change
required to prepare the Marine Corps installations and logistics
enterprise to support the future force mandates a fundamental
reevaluation of our approach to logistics.
installations assessment and resources
Ready and resilient bases and stations are a critical requirement
today and into the future. Years of under-funding the installations
portfolio has resulted in a funding shortfall across the FYDP in the
tens of billions of dollars. Earlier decisions to take near-term risk
in these accounts and shift resources to support readiness-related
accounts resulted in longer-term systemic risks to the Service that we
must address.
Beginning in 2023, we will engage in a comprehensive and informed
infrastructure recapitalization that directly contributes to the
requirements of the future force. This will require additional funding,
and while it will take more than one FYDP to accomplish, the foundation
must be laid today.
facilities sustainment, restoration and modernization (fsrm)
Fiscal year 2024 will be the second year using our pilot Readiness
Maximization Tool. This pilot program prioritizes restoration,
modernization, and demolition in order to achieve a better facility
readiness outcome as opposed to the traditional emphasis of focusing on
sustainment metrics. The Marine Corps' fiscal year 2024 FSRM budget
request for the Active and Reserve forces totals $1.3 billion.
installations plan 2023 (iplan)
In the near future, we will publish our first ever Installations
Plan (IPLAN), modeled after the Aviation Plan (AVPLAN), to create a
shared understanding of the Marine Corps Installations Command (MCICOM)
enterprise. We intend to produce this reference document annually to
show military construction (MILCON) and FSRM funding framed across time
by region, base, and station. The report will further identify the five
priority MILCON projects (funded or unfunded) by base and station for
the next 1 to 10 years. Finally, future versions of the IPLAN will
include a threat-based resiliency assessment by base and station
regarding resiliency of force protection; airfield operations; range
support; and command, control, and communications. It will also
describe the scope, cost, and schedule to achieve resilience.
milcon priorities in support of force design
The fiscal year 2024 budget includes $1.3 billion to support a
total of 16 projects, which includes both planning and design. This
funding includes seven projects totaling $457 million to continue our
efforts to relocate marines from Japan to Guam.
infrastructure
Water Infrastructure: Aging drinking water and wastewater systems
were not designed to meet increasingly stringent environmental
requirements. These old systems also require significant maintenance to
continue operation. Since fiscal year 2016, the Marine Corps has
invested approximately $400 million to upgrade or replace drinking
water and wastewater infrastructure, improving environmental compliance
and reducing risk to personnel and the environment. We are currently
evaluating the need for future support.
Energy Infrastructure: The vast majority of our installations are
dependent on a commercial electrical grid vulnerable to disruption due
to a variety of threats such as aging infrastructure, severe weather,
and both physical and cyber-attacks. While procedures and
infrastructure are in place to respond to short-term power outages,
there is a growing need to ensure we can maintain essential functions
and critical services during a prolonged outage. As part of our renewed
focus on installations, we will produce energy resilience plans by base
and station in 2023.
Fuel Storage Tanks: In April 2022, in response to an inquiry by the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and
Environment, MCICOM conducted a risk assessment of significant (>10,000
gallon) fuel storage tanks located on Marine Corps installations, and
the risk to drinking water sources and systems. This assessment
included tank condition, tank location relative to systems and sources,
and condition and adequacy of containment systems. The assessment
concluded no immediate threat for this population of storage tanks.
However, the assessment did identify two >10,000-gallon tanks with a
high-risk for release due to condition, but due to their locations,
concluded any release from either tank would not impact water sources
or systems. Since the completion of this assessment, the high-risk tank
located aboard Camp Fuji has been replaced, and the other tank, located
aboard MCB Quantico, is scheduled to be replaced this fiscal year. As
an additional risk mitigation, the tank aboard MCB Quantico has been
drained pending replacement.
Barracks: The Marine Corps possesses 672 barracks with 155,329 bed
spaces. On average, those barracks are 32 years old and in need of
renovation. In fiscal year 2022, we renovated 14 barracks for a total
cost of $118 million, and in fiscal year 2023, we plan to renovate
another 16 at a cost of $262 million. The barracks renovations
completed in fiscal year 2022 to fiscal year 2023 will positively
impact 8,116 marines living in them. The per barracks renovation costs
over the past 2 years have risen from $8.4 million to $16.4 million. At
present, 16 percent or 108 Marine Corps barracks are in poor (Q3 on the
facilities conditions index ratings) or failing (Q4) condition. Current
estimates to recapitalize, sustain, or demolish require an additional
$3 billion to return all assets to Q2 (>80 facility condition index) by
2031. Clearly Q2 is not our goal; Q1 is and will be. In fiscal year
2024, we plan to use approximately $270 million to renovate 25 barracks
including some renovations previously deferred.
guam and h2b visas
Earlier this year the Marine Corps reactivated Camp Blaz--a
facility that secures a geographically distributed and operationally
resilient posture for the Marine Corps in the Indo-Pacific. It also
strengthens DOD's ability to deter, defend, and support allies and
partners in the region. The continued build-out of Guam projects will
require a reassessment of the H-2B visa issue, based on available
qualified workforce.
climate change resilience
Currently, the Marine Corps is undergoing a review of installation
master plans to build resilience against all hazards such as wildfires,
water scarcity, rising sea levels, and hurricanes. Marine Corps Recruit
Depot (MCRD) Parris Island (PI) has already completed a master plan
(2021) and a Climate Change Resiliency and Adaptation Plan (2020),
which are being used to develop MILCON and FSRM investment projects to
reduce existing and projected localized flooding. The Military
Installation Resilience Review of the low country community surrounding
MCAS Beaufort and MCRD PI developed a toolkit for structural
interventions and nonstructural planning approaches to enable the low
country communities to adapt to climate change. The toolkit has been
applied to three pilot projects: St. Helena Island wastewater treatment
plant, Lady's Island neighborhood, and the Shell Point Interchange.
MCRD PI's efforts to address sea-level rise and climate change with
regional conservation groups and the local community is growing
stronger. MCRD PI currently has five initiatives in process with our
regional partners: Lowcountry Sentinel Landscape Application, National
Fish and Wildlife National Coastal Resiliency Fund (carbon
sequestration $550,000), South Carolina Department of Natural
Resources, Readiness and Environmental Protection Integration Program,
and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
conclusion
On-going conflicts across the continent in Africa, along the line-
of-actual-control between India and China, along the Turkish-Syrian
border, and in Ukraine remind us that despite our best efforts, we can
never know with certainty when, where, or how an adversary might
precipitate conflict--especially against an ally or partner. We must be
ready--not simply available--to respond tonight, tomorrow, and every
night into the future. We are. As a Service, we must ensure that your
crisis response force is globally deployable. We are. But we don't have
the luxury of building a force for only one threat, one region, or one
form of warfare. The Marine Corps must be organized, trained, equipped,
and postured for the full range of operations in places we might not
expect, and on timelines we did not anticipate. We are. In these times
of increasing complexity and uncertainty, the Nation needs one force,
maintained at the highest levels of readiness, that can respond to the
crises that few saw coming. We are that force.
This Committee's support to our modernization efforts--anchored on
Force Design 2030, Talent Management 2030, Training & Education 2030,
and Installations and Logistics 2030--has been crucial to our success
thus far. Today is an opportunity to re-recommit to our modernization
program and help facilitate its acceleration, while at the same time
addressing issues often mistakenly deemed secondary to readiness such
as barracks, housing, childcare, and healthcare. Which are equally
essential to the readiness of the force.
Based on your continued support, 2022 and 2023 will be known as the
years Force Design transitioned from ideas to operational capabilities.
Force Design is now; it is here today. But with updates to organization
and equipment well underway, we must turn both our attention and our
resources to manning, training, and retaining. We must never lose sight
that our most critical warfighting advantage is our people, and that
they deserve the best quality-of-life that we can provide them given
the anticipated stress associated with military service. I look forward
to working with the Committee Members and staff over my final months as
Commandant, and thank each of you and your staff for the tireless
efforts in support of the Marine Corps.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Berger.
Mr. Secretary, submarines are critical, in fact, I would
argue the most critical aspect of our Navy, and looking at the
contract right now they are beginning to work on Block V.
But going back to Block IV we are seeing already delays,
which will translate into the next block--the multiyear
acquisition of these submarines. Block IV has been running
about 12 to 18 months behind, costs have been increasing, and
we are trying to bring the Columbia in on course and on
schedule. But when you see these reverberating cascading
effects you wonder if that is possible, too.
What are you doing and what is the Navy doing to get these
course and schedule issues on track?
Mr. Del Toro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There is numerous
steps that we are taking, first and foremost, obviously,
providing proper oversight over the construction contracts
themselves.
We believe by several estimates that they are at about 1.2
to 1.4 submarines a year when they need to be at 2.0 submarines
a year. No one ignores the fact that we have been living in
COVID and COVID has actually had a significant impact on our
supply chains and our providers and so this takes all hands on
deck basically to get to a better place and I hope, and I am
actually optimistic that we can get to a better place in the
next 5 years.
But it is going to demand a lot of incremental progress and
a lot of continued investment in the submarine industrial base.
So last year, for example, there was approximately $700 million
that was invested alone in projects like the regional training
centers or systems that are so critical to getting to a better
place.
Those regional training systems have been implemented in
the Northeast. They have also been implemented in Virginia as
well, and out in San Diego working with the community colleges.
Working with numerous suppliers and vendors throughout the area
so that then we can make the CAPEX [Capital Expenditure]-like
investments in those companies to help them get to a better
place with their own capital investments as well.
Fundamentally, we also have a challenge, obviously, with
regards to workforce training and recruitment, and so I
believe, as I have visited all the shipyards and met with all
the senior leaders of the shipyards, that they are committed
now to actually increasing benefits at the shipyards
themselves. Making the shipyards more amenable to workers
coming and working there. Looking for housing solutions in the
local communities as well in places where housing is a real
problem.
I am hopeful that over the course of the next few years we
are actually going to see some significant increased
improvements and getting us to the right place closer to two
boats per year on the Virginia-class.
Chairman Reed. I hope we can because it is essential to the
Navy. It is one of our greatest assets, particularly in the
Pacific if there is any conflict there.
Admiral Gilday, I recently received a briefing from
Secretary Raven about the suicides on the George Washington.
The first phase was focused on the individual sailors who were
involved.
This new phase is more about collective causal conditions,
environmental conditions. But with respect to the first phase,
I think not only myself but some of my colleagues were
interested about accountability for commanders.
Was there a thorough investigation of commanders'
responsibilities and was it formally concluded that there was
no command or leadership gaps or, in fact, is that still
pending?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, in the first investigation we did not
take action against the commander of the George Washington. The
Secretary and I have both been to that ship. We have walked
those deck plates. We have met with those sailors before and
after that investigation was completed.
The investigation found that those suicides, tragic as they
are, were independent and there were no common causal factors
across those three.
With respect to improvements, although the second
investigation has not yet been signed out, there are many
improvements that we have made across the force. They include
investments in things that we learned from the George
Washington.
As an example, parking was a problem at the shipyard so we
are investing in two parking lots, two multipurpose fitness
facilities. We brought minimarts, if you will, closer to the
ships. We improved WiFi. We moved sailors off the ship. We
invested in new berthing barges. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. I appreciate that. But, very succinctly, was
there an investigation of the chain of command? Was it
completed with a conclusion by the Secretary that there was no
leadership failings?
Admiral Gilday. Yes. That was a rigorous investigation,
sir. There were things that went wrong. But tying those
specific failures to the specific death by suicide were not
clear.
Chairman Reed. Let me make one other comment, no questions.
But as we went through the reports on the George Washington we
noticed that one factor was sleep deprivation. That was also a
factor in the investigation regarding the McCain and Fitzgerald
collisions.
I would presume that you are now relooking at policies and
procedures so that that is not a factor and I will----
Admiral Gilday. Sir, for ships that are underway we
absolutely have and we have sleeping policies in effect now
based on what we learned from the collisions in 2017.
The particular issue that you spoke to with respect to the
George Washington is the fact that one sailor in particular was
having trouble sleeping on the ship. As I mentioned a moment
ago, we have tried to move everybody but the duty sections off
the ship into new berthing barges and other facilities to get
after that problem.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Wicker, please?
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Berger, let us talk about LPDs. I think you said
that there is a minimum--absolute minimum requirement of 31
amphibs. Also, you have asked for $1.7 billion as your number-
one unfunded requirement to fully fund the LPD 33. Why have you
done that and why is this so important? What if we do not do
it?
General Berger. Sir, the study that the Secretary of the
Navy directed us to do last year determined the operational
requirement. Pretty rigorous study. Thirty-one is the minimum
and that made some assumptions on readiness but 31 is the
minimum of 10 big decks and 21 medium and smalls.
So 31 is both the operational requirement and now the
statutory law minimum. That is where the minimum came from. In
the shipbuilding plan and the budget submitted there is no plan
to get to that number and that is why I put it as the top of
the unfunded list. I understand it--I know it to be the
operational requirement and the law and I saw no plan to get
there.
Senator Wicker. Where will that disadvantage us the most if
we do not do that?
General Berger. It may be a paraphrase, but in the
Chairman's opening statement he said that the Navy and the
Marine Corps are the Nation's first line of deterrence, first
line of defense. I agree with that.
If we do not have enough amphibious ships or other naval
vessels, then you put at risk both deterrence and defense and
the ability to respond to a crisis. So the short answer is my
concern is if something happens around the world we will not
have the right capability nearby where the combatant commander
needs it.
Senator Wicker. In particular, how would that help us in
the Pacific?
General Berger. If something happened in Taiwan or any of
the regions of the Pacific where there was an aggressive action
and we did not have a naval expeditionary force nearby, then
time--if you are a combatant commander, if you are an
operational commander, as you know, sir, time matters.
I think the same you could say in Central Command, same in
European Command. There are times when you can fly in and land
a force, but not always. In fact, most of the cases you need a
seaborne force, and you need marines that can project power
ashore when you need to.
Senator Wicker. Let us also talk about production line.
Now, we are building LPDs now but if this current budget is not
changed what will happen to that production line? What will be
the consequences of it?
General Berger. That line would stop, sir.
Senator Wicker. In the future when we decide we finally
want another amphib, how will that disadvantage us? You got to
go find the workers again, do you not?
General Berger. That is correct.
Senator Wicker. Okay.
General Berger. You got to retrain them, hire them. You got
to start from scratch.
Senator Wicker. Also, with regard to cost savings I
understand the LPD has already gone through cost saving
programs and someone has suggested a dramatic reduction in
flight decks and you view that as unacceptable. Would you
explain that to us?
General Berger. In 2014 the Navy and the Marine Corps,
directed by the Secretary of the Navy, undertook a study for
about 18 months looking at the LPD-17 and what could be an
affordable but capable replacement for the LSD and that became
the LPD Flight II.
Reduction of what was an LPD-17 version into a Flight II
status, every bit of efficiency squeezed out of that. I think
the input from Huntington Ingalls was really important. So now
if there is another effort to reduce that further I know that
we went to the minimums in 2014. Nothing less will do.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Good. Let us leave it there and,
Secretary Del Toro, let us talk briefly about frigates. Now, we
are building those in Wisconsin now?
Mr. Del Toro. That is correct, sir.
Senator Wicker. The decision has been made to build the
frigates there and at another shipyard. Is that correct?
Mr. Del Toro. No, sir, not as of right now. The decision--
--
Senator Wicker. That has not been made?
Mr. Del Toro. No, sir. That decision has not been made.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, where are we on that?
Mr. Del Toro. We are actually waiting for the completion of
the technical design package, which is expected by the end of
this year.
Once that technical design package is fully mature and
submitted for review, we will review it and at that point we
will make a decision on whether we have the ability to actually
take that technical data package, and make sure that it is
mature enough to actually compete--perhaps, compete with
another shipyard so that we could have two shipyards building
the Constellation-class frigate.
Senator Wicker. Well, we are going to need four a year. Is
that right?
Mr. Del Toro. I am sorry, sir?
Senator Wicker. We are going to need four frigates a year
and that that concept is a way to get that. Is that correct?
Mr. Del Toro. No, sir. Right now the President's Budget
recommends a saw tooth pattern of two one two one, moving
forward. So it is two frigates a year that we will initially
need.
Senator Wicker. Admiral Gilday, how important would it be
to move to four?
Admiral Gilday. I think very important, based on the
comments of both you and the Chairman at the opening of the
Committee. If we could get a second shipyard and two a year
from each shipyard--two destroyers, two to three destroyers a
year, we would be in a much better place. We are catching up
and you cannot buy back time, sir, with the seven shipyards
that we have, relative to the 30 that we had years ago.
Senator Wicker. It is going to be hard to get to four a
year without designating two shipyards. Do you agree?
Admiral Gilday. I agree. I also agree with the Secretary's
comments. I think two shipyards is in the plan. We want to make
sure that we are measuring twice and cutting once before that
decision is made.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, gentlemen.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Hirono, please?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
much for your service and especially for Mr. Secretary and
General Berger. This will be your last, I guess, year of
service, so I thank you.
I note, Mr. Secretary, that recently the DOD [Department of
Defense] opened up its Red Hill Clinic to people who were not
in the service and that is very much appreciated by a community
that has been rocked by the disaster at Red Hill and continue
to raise many questions about what the military is doing and
how they are doing it.
There were a number of recommended changes to the--based on
what happened at Red Hill and characterizing what happened at
Red Hill as having had a culture of procedural noncompliance, a
lack of ownership, and poor training.
These were among the descriptions of what led to the
disaster at Red Hill, and there were a number of
recommendations made, Mr. Secretary. Among the changes that
were recommended can you describe a specific major change that
you have implemented or that is being implemented?
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, ma'am, and currently out of the 253
repairs that were identified in order to defuel Red Hill
approximately just over half have now been completed.
But the one major change that I would say that I have
personally implemented is to ensure that anyone who actually
enters Red Hill is actually being supervised properly. So out
of the many subcontractors that do work at Red Hill at any
given day they have Government oversight.
There is a plan in place that they have to demonstrate for
exactly what they are going to do, how it was verified, and
oversight over the individual actions that they are going to
take with regards to any maintenance that actually gets
conducted in Red Hill.
Senator Hirono. So it is not just at Red Hill. There are
other installations where this kind of review needs to take
place. It is stunning to note that the lack of ownership, poor
training, lack of oversight that characterize what happened at
Red Hill may be going on in other facilities and that needs to
be changed. That kind of culture of lack of oversight is really
very stunning and totally unacceptable.
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, if I can just add that that degree
of oversight actually has been enforced now at all other fuel
facilities as well, too.
Immediately after the incident at Red Hill we made sure
that we looked at every other fuel farm that we own and operate
to try to ensure that we up the standards of how those fuel
farms are actually operated.
Senator Hirono. That is reassuring.
Mr. Del Toro. So those measures are in place.
Senator Hirono. That is reassuring, Mr. Secretary, because
as you know the community is still very much questioning the--
basically the military's capacity to do the right thing and
complete the work that needs to be done at Red Hill.
General Berger, many field grade officers who are actually
on the ground and closest to the problem have come on and
publicly said the changes made by Force Design 2030 have made
their units more capable, and you mentioned the Hawaii-based
Third Marine Littoral Regiment's successes against a more
standard Air-Ground Task Force in recent exercises.
These young men are the future leaders of the Marine Corps
and are currently tasked with ensuring the marines are
prepared. So their support for the changes made by Force Design
2030 is instructive. I just wanted to make that statement,
General, because I do support the changes that you have made.
One thing that does concern me, General Berger, is you
noted that infrastructure is very important. The modernization
and maintenance of infrastructure that has to do with the
quality of life of our people, and, yet, the Marine Corps only
funded 54 percent of the facilities' sustainment and
restoration funds that it needs.
So why is this, General? Because for other funding needs it
is a much higher percentage of the items that are being funded
and yet for the Marine Corps it is only 54 percent. Why is
that?
General Berger. The approach of 80 percent funding for FSRM
[Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization], which
has been the model that we have used for as long as I have been
a marine, has not always allowed us the flexibility to put
money where we should have put it because we are tied to a
fixed percentage across FSRM. The model that we are using now
supported by OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] allows us
the flexibility to move money within, to not waste money where
it is not going to do any good.
Senator Hirono. There is a question as to what you consider
will not do any good because there are a lot of infrastructure
needs. I think, throughout the DOD and, as you know, to me, Red
Hill and some of the other events that have occurred with
regard to the Army and the other services says to me that we
need to pay a lot more attention to our infrastructure needs.
The kind of deferred maintenance that is exemplified, I
would say, throughout DOD is an area that I personally--well, I
will be focused on as Chair of the Readiness Subcommittee.
I just want to note that to you that I will be paying
attention to the needs of all of our services with regard to
repair and maintenance of infrastructure. I want to know that
what is going through our lines, our pipes, our electrical
lines are--that those infrastructure needs are being met.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Fischer, please?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.
Mr. Secretary, earlier this morning I attended a classified
briefing on the modernization of our triad platforms, and I
would say since the Columbia program is on a tight timeline to
deliver the first submarine to the Navy in 2027, can you
provide us an update in this public setting on whether the Navy
will be able to meet this timeline given workforce and supply
chain challenges?
Mr. Del Toro. Thank you, Senator. Thank you for that
question and for your commitment to the nuclear triad as well.
As you know, currently approximately 50 percent of our ship
construction funds are devoted to submarines of which Columbia
is the highest acquisition priority. When I came in as
Secretary approximately 19 months ago or so. I also foresaw
that there always could exist, perhaps, a gap between the
decommissioning of the Ohio-class and the oncoming of the
Columbia-class.
One of the measures that I did take last year was to start
analysis associated with how long it would take, and how much
resources would be needed to actually look at each one of our
Ohio sub hulls and see if we could extend some of those hulls
to close the potential gap between Columbia and Ohio. That
process is now underway and we should have better estimates,
hopefully, by the end of this year that we can invest in the
President's 2025 Budget.
In addition to that, all the oversight functions that I
mentioned earlier to the Chairman with regards to keeping
Columbia on track and, again, I thank the Congress for their
investments in the industrial base.
Senator Fischer. Can you give us a timeframe that we are
currently seeing for the Columbia? Is it on track? Is it
maintaining?
Mr. Del Toro. Yes.
Senator Fischer. Is it dropping back?
Mr. Del Toro. So Columbia is on track in accordance with
her contract requirements. There was an expedited schedule that
was created by Electric Boat, approximately 6 months advanced.
It is about approximately 10 percent behind the 6 month advance
schedule that we would like to adhere to as well, too.
But rest assured that we are working very closely with the
industrial base to keep it on its contract schedule.
Senator Fischer. Admiral, do you have anything to add to
that?
Admiral Gilday. I was just up in Connecticut last week at
the shipyard. The Secretary is absolutely right. We are about
10 percent behind in the advanced schedule. We are watching
that very closely.
So that advanced schedule, 78 months versus the 84 months
contracted, is intended to give us margin for first-of-a-class
ship. We are going to have to do weapon systems testing and we
are going to have to do testing of a first-of-a-kind integrated
propulsion system, and so we are trying to factor that in,
watching it very closely.
I would say that the shipbuilders are making really great
strides--in terms of hiring 4,000 additional workers last year,
another 6,000 planned for this year.
So we remain confident and keep a close eye on it, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. In working with the industry on this, can
you give us some specifics that you are looking at to help them
continue on that expedited schedule?
Admiral Gilday. So, as you know, the Congress has been very
generous in terms of infrastructure investments that we have
made in those two shipyards down in Newport News and also up at
Electric Boat to the tune of billions over the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP).
Separately, I think that the money that we are applying for
advanced procurement materiel, particularly given the supply
chain challenges we have seen post COVID, are also going a long
way to get that materiel well in advance so that we have no
work stoppages.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
What do you assess the role of the unmanned platforms? What
are they going to play in future Navy operations? You mentioned
those in your opening statement. How do you think the
architecture of the fleet should be structured so that you can
achieve that balance between manned and unmanned?
Admiral Gilday. So whether it is under, on, or above the
sea we are looking at manned/unmanned teaming. So this will be
a phased approach. Initially, you would have unmanned teamed
with manned aircraft, as an example, where the manned aircraft
would be the quarterback and the unmanned would be the wingman.
We are doing the same thing under the sea. We are doing the
same thing on the sea. Under the sea, we have our first extra
large UUV [Unmanned Undersea Vehicle] prototype in the water
now for testing off the coast of California, with more to
follow. This brings a clandestine mine-laying capability to the
combatant commanders.
On the surface we have been doing a lot of work with drones
in the Middle East. We will have a hundred this year operating
along with six other countries. We are only paying 20 percent
of that bill. The other countries are chipping in and paying
most of it.
That allows us to have more persistent coverage in an area
where--in the Middle East that is still a maritime domain. But
we do not have the numbers of ships that we have had in the
past.
In the air we have our drone and MQ-25 that is operating
off our carriers now and testing. We will go IOC [Initial
Operational Capability] in a couple of years and so that frees
up--that is our first instantiation of an airborne UAV
[Unmanned Aerial Vehicle] that allows us to refuel aircraft in
the air, give them another 500 miles of range.
So we are making all of these progressive advancements and
trying to do it very deliberately but at speed.
Senator Fischer. The lessons you are learning in the Middle
East are those transferable to the Pacific?
Admiral Gilday. Absolutely. The Secretary just announced
that we are going to scale our unmanned operations from the
Middle East to Southern Command. So it is taking a closer look
at illicit drugs and illicit persons that are coming up the
northern approaches by the maritime. Also, our intent is to put
an unblinking eye on illicit Chinese fishing on both coasts of
South America.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Kaine, please?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to Admiral Gilday
and General Berger, my congratulations and gratitude to both of
you for wonderful service.
General Berger, I just want to pick up one point and make
sure I get the punch line version of one aspect of your
testimony. The Nation needs 31 amphibs. The statutory
requirement is 31 amphibs. The budget we have before us has no
path to get to 31 amphibs. Am I reading you right?
General Berger. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. All right. Thank you.
Secretary Del Toro, I want to thank you for your attention
to an issue that has been very challenging for us in Virginia
and that is military suicides, particularly connected with the
George Washington and also the Mid-Atlantic Regional
Maintenance Center (MARMC).
You and I went together down to MARMC and I could tell in
your interaction with the command and with the rank and file,
both the sailors and the civilians in that unit of 2,500
people, that this is something you take very, very seriously
and you are focused on trying to figure out a way to improve
this set of tragedies.
If I could ask you a set of questions about that. Could you
first tell me what is the status of Brandon Act implementation?
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir. The fine details of how best to
implement the Brandon Act are being reviewed by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. I hope that
over the course of the next several months we will actually
have a path forward on how best to execute it.
It is extremely important to bring every tool in the
toolkit in order to solve this or try to help solve this very,
very tragic situation with regard to not just suicides in the
Navy, but suicides in the Nation, and there is no greater
responsibility the Secretary has than the safety of their
personnel both in the Navy and Marine Corps and the civilian
personnel. As you suggested, we take this responsibility very
seriously.
Senator Kaine. I would love to stay in touch with you about
this because what I would not like to happen would be for there
to be a report about implementation after the NDAA is done that
we do not find satisfactory.
I would like to stay in dialog with you about the
implementation, so that if we feel like we want to offer some
additional muscle to implementation we have a chance to do that
before the Committee finishes its work on this. So I will
continue with you on that.
I also had the chance to talk to Admiral Franchetti and
Secretary Raven about the phase two analysis of the George
Washington suicides, and I know that it is not yet done.
I was heartened by some of the initial discussion about the
depth of recommendations that are going to be made. But I am
interested in one particular issue and I am not sure that it is
covered in the phase two, based upon my questions.
Last year's House Report to the NDAA directed a briefing on
personnel assignments to carriers undergoing refueling. Do we
need to maintain the entire ship's fleet with a ship during an
extended refueling? In the George Washington case it is 6
years. Senator Scott has raised some similar questions in
hearings before.
As I asked Secretary Raven and Admiral Franchetti about,
does phase two get into challenging assumptions about whether
we have to keep the entire ship personnel component intact
during the entire refuel, which can be a very extended one as
the George Washington, I got an answer that made me think that
was not part of the analysis. So and yet that was a suggestion
in the NDAA language from the House side last year that we
analyze ship personnel assignments during extended refuels.
Tell me if you are doing anything to sort of challenge your
own assumptions about what personnel component is needed during
a refuel, or particularly for first tour sailors, are there
other assignments that they could take on that would more
closely match the MOSes [Military Occupational Specialties]
they have trained for.
Mr. Del Toro. Absolutely so, Senator, and in fact, the
summary report may not have highlighted that as a fact. But we
are taking a close look at this because it is extremely
important, and while the entire crew may not be needed
throughout the course of the entire RCOH [Refueling and Complex
Overhaul], especially when the ship first comes into port and
to its following stages, toward the end of the RCOH you do have
to build that crew back up.
In fact, one of the things that we discovered on the George
Washington, for example, is that there was a lack of mid level
leadership in the chief petty officer corps. They were not
providing the necessary oversight for junior personnel, for
example.
So although it is complicated, I do not think the entire
crew is needed throughout the entire period. But there are
stages where we actually need that mid level management
overseeing our most junior sailors who could be challenged with
living in a shipyard environment.
Senator Kaine. Just one final thing as I conclude. When we
visited the Mid Atlantic Regional Maintenance Center following
the suicide of four sailors there within 2 months it was, I
think, fairly clear that a contributing factor was a manning
policy that allowed for a 60 percent increase in the assignment
of personnel who were either on limited duty or pregnancy
postpartum, with no additional assignment of medical resources
to help them deal with, for example, a med board process or
other needs they might have.
What are you doing to try to deal with that issue to
provide more in-unit resources in billets like this where there
is a high percentage of people who are assigned on either a
limited duty or a pregnancy postpartum status?
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir. I will let the CNO address the
specific actions that are being taken, but we actually have
channeled back on that policy. We have way too many LIMDUs
[Limited Duty Personnel] going to other places where they
cannot be cared for in the manner that they deserve to be cared
for.
So we are actually looking at withholding the ones that we
can back on ship where they have better care and more resources
available to them. But, perhaps, the CNO can go into a little
bit more detail on the specific action.
Senator Kaine. I am over time. But if you could do it
briefly.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I will make three quick points.
The first thing that we are doing is making a faster
determination of what path they ought to be on. Are they just
on light duty for a period of 2 weeks because they have a
sprained ankle or do we need to move them off the ship on a
more permanent basis. Getting them the help that they need at
an accelerated rate so that we prevent them from going into a
limited duty status. The point is to keep sailors at work.
The third, for those on limited duty to get them those
medical evaluations at a much faster pace. We are also reducing
the ratio of those in limited duty at commands so that we do
not have another MARMC, so that people are properly supervised,
sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Cotton, please?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Gilday and General Berger, thank you for your
latest and presumptively your last appearance at the Committee
as Chief and Commandant. We congratulate you for a lifetime of
service and appreciate everything you have done for this
country.
Mr. Secretary, I want to be the latest Senator to ask about
this issue of the 31 amphibs. The budget this year does not
include any fiscal year 2024 money for the seventeenth San
Antonio-class ship.
That sets you on a path to fall below the legislatively
mandated 31-ship amphib floor, as Senator Kaine pointed out,
and, General Berger, you testified that you think that is in
the needs of the Marine Corps.
I just want to ask what is up with this discrepancy between
that legislative mandate and General Berger's stated needs for
the Marine Corps, and the budget request? Can you explain it to
us?
Mr. Del Toro. Thank you, Senator. First, let me
unequivocally State that I do not dismiss anything that the
Commandant of the Marine Corps said with the need for our
Nation to have the heavy lift that is necessary to provide our
expeditionary forces in the Pacific. In particular, the ships
that they need to be able to carry equipment and personnel
around the Pacific.
The concern that developed over the course of the last year
or so has been the increasing costs of the platforms
themselves. There were two studies that were done to address
this issue.
One is a cost study that was initiated by the Office of
Security Defense to look at the--and compare the costs,
essentially, between the different designs of the LPD and see
if we could actually bring down those costs. The second is the
BFSAR [Battle Force Slip Assessment and Requirement] which is
mandated by the 2023 NDAA as well, and to take a look at the
overall requirements for the amphibious ships, both large and
medium, in order to make the right decisions necessary in the
2025 budget to invest in the required platforms.
I think that there is also general recognition that moving
toward a multi-ship multiyear procurement is an effective way
to bring the cost of those ships down in the future.
Senator Cotton. So at bottom it is a cost issue?
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir. The cost per ship issue.
Senator Cotton. Yes.
General Berger, any further thoughts on this matter?
General Berger. You, the Senate--the Congress gave the
service chiefs the authority, the responsibility to determine
the operational requirement. Which I did, which is 31.
But the Secretary, obviously, has a lot of things he has to
fund as does the Secretary of Defense. I am not in their
position to weigh it against all the other things that they
must fund. I can just tell you that the operational
requirement, the minimum, is 31 and that assumes a level of
maintenance that provides the availability to the combatant
commanders.
Senator Cotton. Okay, Thank you both. Obviously, this
matter has a high degree of interest on the Committee and I
suspect we will be addressing it in the months ahead.
Mr. Secretary, I also want to speak about the State of our
industrial base, especially what it means for submarines, the
Navy's inability to build ships and the fleet on time and on
budget for many years. Well before you came along, to be fair--
--
Mr. Del Toro. Trying to make it better, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Yes.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cotton. We all are, but it has been a source of
growing concern. There are press reports that it is now going
to take 5 years for the Virginia-class submarine production to
reach its target of two boats per year.
Admiral Gilday earlier this year spoke to industry and he
told them that they needed to prove it. That is a direct quote.
I think that is an apt quote to industry regarding the ability
to ramp up production. Our submarines, obviously, provide us an
unmatched strategic advantage, especially in the Western
Pacific against Communist China.
So could you give us some thoughts about what we can do in
this Committee and in Congress to help assist with the ramp up
of the industrial base especially as it relates to submarines?
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir. Again, it is an all hands on deck
approach. Everything from trying to improve the manpower issue
and trying to get the shipyards to be able to recruit more
effectively.
I mean, we face across the entire country, a national
shortage when it comes to blue collar workers. I think
increasing legal immigration to this country and work visa
programs actually may very well help to better and support that
blue collar workforce that is needed in places like the
shipyards, for example.
But, again, the investments that you have made in 2023 and
2024 are in the right direction in terms of the investments in
the industrial base itself.
One thing that I have been trying to do, Senator, is trying
to expand the marketplace with regards to smaller shipyards.
Getting them involved in Department of Defense construction and
having them actually support the big primes.
I have been having conversation with the primes, for
example, to try to include more smaller shipyards to feed the
primes, and a perfect example of that actually is being
executed now at Austal, where even before I got here the CNO
encouraged the development of steel hulls at Austal.
They are now building steel hulls and they are actually
contributing to Electric Boat up in Connecticut and providing
the necessary modules necessary. I think HII [Huntington
Ingalls Industries] is doing the same thing as is Ingalls down
in Pensacola as well, too.
I think continued investment in CAPEX makes a lot of sense
where the Government invests in these capital improvement
programs at the shipyards so that the shipyards can also make
an equal investment and help get us to the right place.
It is all hands on deck across the entire spectrum of
improvements that have to be made.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Rosen, please?
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Wicker, for holding this very important hearing and I want to
thank all of you for being here today and thank you for your
service and for your support for things in Nevada, of course,
across the country as well.
I want to talk a little bit about Nevada and the Fallon
Range Training Complex modernization. Secretary Del Toro, as
you know, we are so proud in Nevada to host Naval Air Station
Fallon, home to ``Top Gun'' and the Nation's premier carrier
air wing and the SEAL training centers. I want to offer you and
your staff again my personal gratitude for working with me and
the Nevada delegation on a consensus proposal to modernize the
Fallon Range Training Complex, which was included in the Fiscal
Year 2023 NDAA.
I appreciate that Under Secretary Raven and other senior
leaders will be traveling to Fallon just later this week to
meet with the Tribal Nations because this agreement included
key mitigations for local and tribal governments that require
future appropriations.
Specifically, the Navy is responsible for compensating for
the timely reconstruction and, of course, relocation of
impacted roads and infrastructure, the displaced grazing
permittees, our cultural resource surveys and environmental
assessments. Funding and completion of these requirements is
not just important for my constituents, it is also necessary to
ensure that expanding the training complex can become
operational for the future of the Navy.
Given that Fallon modernization was the top Navy's
legislative priority the Nevada delegation was expecting that
in the fiscal year 2024 budget the request would include
funding for those various commitments. However, fiscal year
2024 budget was silent, silent on Fallon modernization.
Secretary Del Toro, can you speak to the Navy's
implementation plan for modernization of the Fallon Range
Training Complex, given the urgency to modernize? I am curious
why this implementation is not included in the Navy's fiscal
year 2024 budget request.
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, let me first, again, thank you for
your leadership on this issue. I was so proud to have been--
played a small role by your side, basically, to bring this
across the finish line. But it is about execution now.
I am unaware that we actually do not have the necessary
funds to execute on the plans that were already baked into the
agreement in fiscal year 2024. As far as I know, and I have
reviewed the actual next steps that are required to execute the
plan, I know that there is going to be moneys that get put into
the President's Budget 2025 to continue those efforts.
But as far as I am aware there are no delays in actually us
being able to meet the requirements necessary that were laid
out in that plan, in accordance with agreements that were made
between the tribes and us and the community and us as well,
too.
It is my understanding that all the funds that we currently
have are enough to fulfill the existing requirements that we
currently have. More will come, obviously. But let me get back
to you with more specifics because I do not want to misspeak on
that.
Senator Rosen. Perfect. I will have my team circle back and
we can find out about that.
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, ma'am.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Del Toro. Thanks to strong support from Congress, the
Department of Interior, Tribal, and State and local
stakeholders, the Navy continues to make significant progress
on Fallon Modernization, and our fiscal year 2024 budget
request aligns with our overall schedule. While our current
efforts are not listed as distinct budget line items, the
Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2024 budget request
includes several key actions within our Operations and
Maintenance funding. In fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2024,
the Navy will execute numerous planning studies and surveys
that are needed to support our military construction projects.
We are conducting the environmental planning needed for the
relocation of Sand Canyon/Red Mountain Road and the relocation
of the gas pipeline at B-17 and State Route 361. We have also
initiated the process to update the Integrated Natural Resource
Management Plan and Wildland Fire Management Plan at Fallon.
The first of five military construction projects needed to
support modernization, P442 Range Training Complex Land
Acquisition, was authorized and appropriated in fiscal year
2021, and with the passage of the fiscal year 2023 National
Defense Authorization Act can now move forward on that project.
The remaining four military construction projects will be
included in future budget requests aligned with execution
timelines and mission-need dates.
Senator Rosen. I also want to ask you this, that I
understand the Navy has yet to finalize an agreement with the
local tribes regarding access to important sites. So can you
give me an update on the Navy's engagement with the tribes and
the timeline for finalizing access?
Mr. Del Toro. Ma'am, allow me to get back to you with
specifics because I do not want to misspeak in any way. My
understanding was that everything is on track and actually
Secretary Berger and Secretary Raven are traveling out there to
actually celebrate, in many ways, the progress that we have
made in the path forward and review what lays ahead, basically,
on the POA&M [Plan of Action and Milestones].
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Del Toro. The Department of the Navy deeply values our
relationships with the Tribes, and Naval Air Station Fallon has
existing procedures established to support public access,
including Tribal access requests.
In fiscal year 2022, the Navy and the Northern Nevada
Tribes collaborated to produce a draft Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) to streamline Tribal access requests. Based on new
requirements included as part of the Fallon Range Training
Complex modernization in the fiscal year 2023 NDAA, the Navy
updated the draft Tribal Access MOA, and shared it with the
Tribes on February 27, 2023. The Fallon Paiute Shoshone Tribe
(FPST) has been convening the Northern Nevada Tribes for
discussions and to collect feedback on the updated draft Tribal
Access MOA, and has offered to consolidate any additional
Tribal comments and return them to the Navy. The Navy is in
regular communication with our Tribal leaders at the local and
Secretariat level, and we understand that their process should
finish soon. Once we receive the consolidated comments from the
Tribes, we will finalize the agreement.
Senator Rosen. I am going to stay a little bit on Naval Air
Station Fallon because the personnel stationed there they do
conduct critical training missions. The fleet is deployable and
operationally ready every day.
These operations [are] incredibly demanding and so reducing
external stressors is important not only to the sailors but
also to the mission. I know 172 new housing units are on track
to be built at Naval Air Station Fallon. It is going to help
ease a little bit of that housing strain.
But more needs to be done, and Fallon is still considered a
remote duty installation and I want to ensure that other things
for quality of life are also addressed. I can take this off the
record if you would be brief--can you speak to the quality of
life at Fallon, mental health resources that might be available
for our sailors and folks that train there and work there. What
are you doing to support those on remote duty in the NDAA?
Mr. Del Toro. We recognize that Fallon is a remote site and
we recognize the challenges that go along with that, in
general.
The CNO, the Commandant, and I are hyper focused on
actually the remote sites across the entire country more so
than the major concentration areas as well, too, because they
undergo a lot more stressors than other locations.
I have actually specifically spoken to the Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on the hospital issues
associated with Fallon, Nevada, for example. Because it is so
important to get the right mental health providers necessary to
fill those billets in Nevada and we are struggling to fill
those billets in Nevada, obviously, as well as in Yokosuka,
Japan and Rota, Spain as well, too.
But allow me to get back with a long list of actions that
we are specifically taking with regards to Nevada on the
quality of life issues on the bases.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Del Toro. Taking care of sailors and their families
remains one of my top concerns, and this is especially
important in more remote areas where certain services may not
be as readily available. To your point, we need these
outstanding sailors to be able to focus on their mission, so
ensuring that they and their families have the resources they
need is extremely important. To that end, the Navy provides
mental health resources, child and youth programs, and an array
of morale, welfare and recreation programs for those assigned
to NAS Fallon.
Mental Health Resources:
The Fleet and Family Support Center at NAS Fallon is
staffed with independently licensed mental health professionals
to provide in-person, short-term, non-medical clinical
counseling for commonly occurring life situations and
adjustment issues, thereby intervening prior to the development
of more serious problems or diagnosable mental disorders.
Additionally, Sailor Assistance and Intercept for Life
(SAIL) is a voluntary program that quickly provides rapid
assistance, ongoing clinical case management, care
coordination, and reintegration assistance during the stressful
period following suicide-related behavior by a sailor. SAIL is
delivered virtually and to increase access to services in
remote duty locations like NAS Fallon, Navy recently expanded
virtual access to both SAIL and non-medical, clinical
counseling services.
The Navy's Integrated Primary Prevention Program is
dedicated to the prevention of interpersonal violence and self-
harm. The Navy Integrated Primary Prevention Workforce will
total more than 300 personnel over the next 5 years. NAS Fallon
will be assigned three Integrated Primary Prevention billets,
and Navy Region Southwest assigned another 50 billets.
Child and Youth Programs (CYP):
NAS Fallon Child Development Center is the only accredited
childcare provider in Churchill County and supports children
ages 6 weeks to 5 years. CYP also provides a School-Age Care
(SAC) Program for elementary school-aged children (before/after
school and summer programs/camps) and a Youth/Teen Program.
Finally, a School Liaison Officer is assigned to NAS Fallon to
connect military families with area schools and to support
schools in responding to military and family needs.
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR):
NAS Fallon MWR offers an array of quality of life services,
activities and events, and delivers high-quality, innovative,
recreation programs. Navy MWR provides a variety of free and
low/competitively priced options for sailors and their
families, including dining, fitness, recreation, gear rental,
an RV park, and a variety of other amenities on the
installation. The revenue generated from these programs is
reinvested in sailor and family programs. NAS Fallon actively
engages with sailors and families, both those permanently
assigned and those visiting for temporary additional duty,
training, or other mission reasons to ensure quality of life
programs are relevant, accessible, convenient, and well-
marketed.
The Navy supplies similar quality of life resources at
other remote locations. These services are critical as they
directly benefit the well-being of sailors and families. The
Navy is also engaged with the Suicide Prevention and Response
Independent Review Committee Implementation Working Group to
target QOL support to Remote and Isolated locations.
Senator Rosen. Perfect. Thank you very much. I will be
submitting some more questions for the record. Thank you.
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Rounds, please?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, to
all three of you thank you very much for your service to our
country.
Admiral Gilday, 38 years is a long time. Cannot do it
without family. I appreciate you and your family. Very, very
special.
General Berger, thank you very much for your 42 years of
service and, once again, without what you do, the Services here
in the United States simply are not what they are today. So
thank you to both of you.
Admiral Gilday and General Berger, there have been efforts
to share or take parts of the spectrum away from DOD activities
and to use them for 5G, recognizing that 5G is an important
aspect in this country and it is something that we need to be
able to utilize.
But in doing so there is a particular part of the spectrum
which is, I believe, very critical to a number of our defensive
systems. Specifically, the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz band, or the S
band, of the electromagnetic spectrum is used specifically by a
number of your platforms.
Admiral Gilday, General Berger, could you share with us in
this unclassified meeting the types of systems that would be
impacted if this transfer of spectrum capability or limitation
of spectrum capability were actually enacted before this
September study is completed? Can you share with us how serious
this could be to your ability to do your mission?
Admiral Gilday. Senator, I would like to talk about three
specific threat areas that I think come to mind when it comes
to the very powerful capabilities that we have in that part of
the spectrum.
The first is air defense. We just saw what happened when a
balloon flew over the United States. We cannot have that happen
with a more serious threat, and so that band affects the ship-
borne radars that specifically would provide that type of early
warning.
The second point I would make is about countering unmanned
and so these are drones that are increasing in capability and
size and lethality. I do not mean to be dramatic but we have to
look around the bend to the future, the possibility of having
to defend ourselves against threats like that and we cannot be
blind to them. Taking away the capability in that band would do
so.
The last area that I would speak to is missile defense and
so we need warning there as well. These radars in that band
bring that to bear. We know that we are in the age of
hypersonics. It is not a place where we think that we want to
accept risk.
If we do lose access to that band, if it is either vacated
or shared and we cannot do that job on a continual basis, then
I think we have to look at what modifications that we would
need to make to probably 188 ships in terms of their systems to
provide the American people with a degree of confidence that
those three areas that I mentioned are properly defended.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
General Berger?
General Berger. I think what seems lost in that
conversation, Senator, is those systems, those radar,
electronic warfare systems were designed to optimize that
spectrum for a weapon system.
We had access to that when the requirements were developed.
That is why we went with that weapon system. So if that access
is lost then the very reason you pick that part of the band of
the spectrum for a radar, for electronic warfare, for a
training system, all that is lost to us.
We have to be able to train realistically. So, for us, I
think the same as CNO, the radar systems primarily but also
other sensing systems and electronic warfare. That is why we
chose that portion of the band.
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, if I can just add, the cost of
actually relocating these systems would be enormous, I mean,
upwards of $250 billion, probably. So I am really fearful of
the secondary consequences that some of these decisions could
actually lead us to.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Would it be fair to say
that the State of Hawaii is protected by those systems today,
Admiral Gilday?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, to some degree.
Senator Rounds. How about the capital of our country,
Washington, DC?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
Senator Rounds. How about the West Coast of the United
States today?
Admiral Gilday. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
Senator Rounds. All of those are utilizing weapon systems
or radars that are specific to this particular part of the
spectrum that they are talking about trying to either share or
sell, correct?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, and importantly also it would
affect our ability to train to a high degree of proficiency to
use those weapon systems.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. My time is expiring. I would not
want to disappoint the Committee. I will ask a question for the
record with regard to the USS Boise and your plans for not only
the USS Boise to actually get it through dry dock, but those
other Los Angeles-class attack subs that are behind it in line.
Right now we do not have the shipbuilding capacity to be able
to get those back in operation in less time than what it took
to build them in the first place.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator King, please?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to associate myself with Senator
Rounds' questions on spectrum and the answers that you have
provided. This is a critical issue. There is no reason to move
forward with a spectrum auction before this study is completed.
I think there is a significant national security risk.
Second, before beginning my questions I want to compliment
General Berger. A friend of mine once said everybody is for
progress, nobody is for change. You have managed both progress
and change in a remarkable way, I think, during your 3 years as
Commandant and I want to compliment you on that because it is
not easy to move a large institution. You have done it with a
very forward thinking way of looking at the future demands on
the Marine Corps and you have done that very effectively.
Mr. Secretary, we have talked about this before. I am
concerned about the transition from the DDG Flight III to the
DDG(x), which is currently in design. Number one, are you
supportive of the joint work that is being done by Bath Iron
Works and Huntington Ingalls to be sure that the design is
buildable and will be most effective for the Navy and for the
taxpayers?
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, Senator. Not only am I supportive but it
is actually critical to success for the DDG(X) and it is part
of the reason why we actually have moved the schedule 2 years
to allow for a far more mature design and allow the shipyards
to actually work closely with us to determine exactly not just
the propulsion plant and what it should look like but to
actually build out a land-based engineering site that we could
actually test the propulsion plant at. As well as the many
other technologies--advanced technologies--like Helios and
others that it will actually provide in the future.
Senator King. You used the right word, maturity of design,
because as I have sat through 10 years of hearings on weapon
systems, maturity of design is one of the key factors to
prevent a debacle in terms of acquisition, both in terms of
time and cost.
Also we need to be thinking now about the transition from
the Flight IIIs to the new ship, that there not be a lag. You
have seen me draw the graph of the trough in employment if we
do not have a smooth transition. I hope that is in your plan.
Mr. Del Toro. I could not agree with you more, Senator. I
think continuing to build DDG-51 Flight IIIs is critical to
ensuring that we do not have a gap like we are trying to
prevent between the Ohio and the Columbia-class.
Senator King. The issue of suicide has come up several
times. There is an aspect of it that has not been discussed
today. That is the relationship between the transition from
Active Duty to veteran status and suicide.
Unfortunately, there is a correlation. Many suicides of
veterans take place in the first 1 or 2 or 3 years after the
transition.
I hope that we can work together and perhaps discuss
offline how we can improve that transition--the handoff, if you
will--so that a sailor does not walk out the door 1 day in the
warm embrace of the Navy, and then suddenly into the cold world
without the handoff to the veteran status. So will you commit
to working with me on that?
Mr. Del Toro. Absolutely, Senator, and continuity of care
is essential to that transition.
Senator King. Admiral Gilday, I think I asked you a similar
question when you were first up for confirmation about
hypersonics and we will take this in a classified setting.
But a general question is are you satisfied with where we
area in terms of naval defense to a hypersonic attack? It seems
to me that is one of the most serious strategic challenges that
we face today, particularly in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, no, I am not. We are working to close
some known gaps that we have with respect to layered defense.
Some of the biggest obstacles are technology, including mature
technology, that would be--that we would be able to apply to
the--to that problem set.
I think another aspect of it is being able to confuse and
disrupt the adversary's ability to accurately target and use
those weapons effectively. In a classified setting, sir, I
think we can talk about that in a little bit more detail.
Senator King. Well, I am glad you started with the
question--the answer was no because that implies we have work
to do.
Admiral Gilday. We do.
Senator King. I will look forward to working with you and
your successor. I hope you will pass that sense of urgency on
to your successor.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I shall.
Senator King. I will have another couple of questions for
the record on some manpower issues.
Mr. Secretary, I commend you for the work you have done in
terms of helping our shipyards with their workforce challenges.
It sounds mundane but things like parking and childcare
availability is important to having the workers that we need to
build the next generation of ships, whether they be submarines
or destroyers or frigates or amphibs.
Please keep that work in mind. Workforce, in my view, is
maybe one of the most significant challenges that we have
today.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Ernst, please?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you,
gentlemen, very much for being here today. Admiral and General,
thank you so much for your service and dedication to our great
United States of America and to your families and your
teammates as well. Truly appreciate them for their support.
China's military has raised the risk of great power war and
our combat credibility, especially as we look at the Indo-
Pacific, is increasingly in question and that is why Congress
has really called on the Department to build our lethal
capabilities to deter China.
General Berger, I would like to start with you. The late
Chairman, John McCain, had declared that, quote, ``The Marine
Corps must modernize itself for the deterrence of great power
competitors,'' end quote. We all know there has been a lot of
debate surrounding modernization efforts within the Marine
Corps. How did this Committee's intent inform your vision for
the future force?
General Berger. Probably, first, I would start with when
Senator McCain said that and 4 years ago the Marine Corps very
ready to handle the problem sets of today, right now.
In fact, if we had the capacity we would have a Marine
Expeditionary Unit--an Amphibious Ready Group off the coast of
Africa right now so that if Sudan got worse that General
Langley would have a number of options.
I think readiness in terms of handling the problem sets of
today was not the issue. But the National Defense Strategy, the
indicators in the intelligence community, the developments in
technology were a clear indicator to General Neller before me
that we had to change. Holding on to what we had that was
successful in the past was not going to help us in the future.
To your point, I think the indicators from this Committee,
the support from individual Members and collectively, that has
allowed us in 3\1/2\-years to get to where we are. We are very
ready today but we cannot slow down.
We have to move quickly to stay in front. We have a pacing
threat. We have a pacing challenge.
Senator Ernst. Yes, we do, and, General, you shared your
predecessor's assessment that the marines were not organized,
trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the
rapidly evolving future operating environment and you just
referenced that.
How do your investments meet operating requirements in the
Indo-Pacific specifically?
General Berger. Some of it is the weapon systems
themselves, the capabilities. Everything from the MV-22, which
this Committee and others saved from death 25 years ago and
thank God we have it right now. The 53K [CH-53K], the anti-ship
missile capability that we're developing and all this were
years in the making.
I think in the Pacific the challenges that Admiral Aquilino
and his commanders face are range and it is a home game for the
PLAN [People's Liberation Army-Navy]. So we have a couple of
challenges out there.
We have to be present. We have to be the stand-in force
there from the beginning, because fighting your way in from the
outside not a good plan. We have to work on the logistics so
that that forward stand-in force is sustainable, is ready. You
have to be there with allies and partners because they have to
believe that the United States is not running away from them,
is going to be there even when things get tough, and that is
where the Marine Corps-Navy [team]--I mean, this is where we
make our money. Right alongside the allies and partners forward
where it matters. If we back off, if we pull out of there, we
are sending a message strategically, which is not the message
we are going to send.
Senator Ernst. You have outlined a number of gaps that
exist logistically, support and working with other nations. Are
there other gaps that you can address specifically within the
Marine Corps?
General Berger. The biggest one is what most of the Members
brought up, which is the capacity to get us there, to have that
presence forward all the time.
If we do not have the vessels, if we are not forward and we
are in the United States and we are fighting our way to get in,
bad place to be. I think if you still believe, in other words,
that 3 ships--amphibious ships loaded up with 2,300 marines. If
they have a deterrent value, and I think they do, then you want
them right in the adversary's grill, right in their face where
they can see them all the time.
Senator Cotton asked basically can we afford conventional
deterrence. Absolutely, yes, because the alternative is a lot
worse.
Senator Ernst. Are you managing that near-term risk as you
divest from some of the legacy programs that you have?
General Berger. Absolutely, yes. Absolutely, yes, ma'am.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank
you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Kelly, please?
Senator Kelly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for being here.
My first question is to General Berger. First of all, thank
you for all the incredible work that is happening in southern
Arizona at the Marine Corps Air Station in Yuma. It is home to
the, as you know, the largest F-35 command in the Marine Corps.
It is also the home of the weapons and tactics instructor
corps so it is helping train F-35 pilots in the Marine Corps
across the country, essentially.
But also across our entire State we have got other flying
missions. We have got Luke Air Force Base, Davis-Monthan. We
are training F-16 pilots and operational squadrons and A-10's,
Air Force F-35s. We have got the Compass Call mission at Davis-
Monthan with C-130's, soon to be getting a new airframe.
Helicopters, UAVs, we got all this--a lot of stuff and it
is the greatest place in the country to train. I am not being
parochial here on it being Arizona. I mean, it really has good
weather to train these missions.
What we are struggling with right now a little bit is
airspace. We have got a lot of airspace. We got the Barry
Goldwater Range. We have got Military Operations Areas (MOAs),
Outlaw, Jackal, other MOAs. We have got a restricted area over
Fort Huachuca.
General, I am interested from your perspective, the
perspective of the Marine Corps, how would expanded airspace in
the Southwest improve DOD's ability to support fifth-generation
fighter aircraft training?
General Berger. Senator, sitting behind me is my wife and
she is probably smiling because we took our family to Yuma,
Arizona. We lived there for 3 years, raised our kids there. So
everything that you describe we lived when we had kids that
were younger. It was a great place to raise a family.
It is also a fantastic place to train. You mentioned the
weapons and tactics instructor course. That is what my
assignment was. I am an infantry guy so, first of all, getting
invited to teach at an aviation school I thought they had made
a mistake.
But off I went to Yuma and learned more about combined
arms, Marine Air-Ground Task Force, how we fight, than any
other assignment I have ever been in. Airspace is critical.
Without that you cannot put all the pieces together, and it was
a box that we operated in in the 1990's when I was an
instructor there but we did not have the range of the weapon
systems we have now.
We did not have the speed and range of the aircraft we have
now. If we cannot stretch the legs of the F-35, of the Multiple
Launch Rocket System (MLRS), if we cannot use the airspace to
the maximum degree of the weapon system, then the first time
the marines are going to employ it is in combat and that is not
what we want.
So absolutely critical, both altitude and depth of the
Barry Goldwater ranges and the rest, as you mentioned. If we do
not have that then we are putting our air crews, our ground
marines, in a risk because the first time they are going to
really put all the pieces together is when the fighting starts.
Senator Kelly. Yes. As you mentioned, as the stick gets
bigger the airplane is going faster, the Advanced Medium Range
Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM) is going further. We need more
space. We can stitch together some of this space, by the way.
That is something we have talked about in Arizona is we have an
opportunity here with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
reauthorization bill. Talk to the FAA, come up with a plan that
works for commercial aviation, works for the airline industry,
but also helps us train better.
Now, I think Senator Sullivan, if he goes next, he is
probably going to jump in here and talk about the airspace in
Alaska. But this is really important and the weather is ideal
for this training.
General Berger. Just one quick plug for the FAA. They have
been fantastic partners for 35 years, handing off airspace
between LAX [Los Angeles International Airport] and Twentynine
Palms and Yuma. Great partners.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. Thank you, General.
Secretary Del Toro, just real quick. I know Senator Kaine
talked about the Brandon Act. I really appreciate all the hard
work you have done on this.
We need to get it implemented. We discussed a little bit
about this from a more personal side this morning. Can you just
give me a really quick--and I do not have a lot of time--but a
status update. How is the Navy working with DOD to make this a
reality and what specific actions have you taken to support
implementation?
Mr. Del Toro. Thank you, Senator.
Well, for starters, I have personally met with the Caserta
family to understand the challenges that they have undergone,
and what they would like to see moving forward in terms of the
Department of Navy and the Department of Defense being able to
work with families like the Caserta family as they struggle
with this tragic incident.
I believe it has to be with--we have to get to a better
place with regards to executing the right of individuals to be
able to seek out help from the private sector privately but at
the same time with the checks and balances necessary so that
the military also understands the struggles that this
individual may be facing because if we do not understand the
struggles that they are facing then that presents even greater
threats as well, too, to operations and also to the individuals
themselves.
We have to find that right balance between those two needs
in order to get to a better place and those are the discussions
that I have had with the Department of Defense.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I know we are over. Can I make just
one quick comment?
Senator Kelly. Yes. Yes.
Admiral Gilday. The Department issued a mental health
playbook and so for sailors and marines one of the things it
does is it helps them. It raises their awareness of what
options are available and there are already self-referral and
confidential options that are available.
We still have work to do as the Secretary is working on to
make this more holistic across the Force. But we have made
investments and we are trying to head in the right direction in
order to make that available.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary, and thank you, General.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
Senator Sullivan, please?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank the witnesses, in particular Admiral
Gilday, General Berger. Thank you for your incredible service
and to your families over decades. It is very appreciated. I
have enjoyed working with both of you.
I am going to dig into this 31 amphib ship issue a lot more
harshly because I just do not think what is happening right now
is remotely appropriate.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record a
Defense One news article ``Navy on the path to violate 31
amphib ship requirement in 2024'' for the record.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Defense One
March 13, 2023
Navy On Path To Violate 31-Amphibious-Ship Requirement in 2024
By Caitlin Kenney
The Navy is proposing to drop its amphibious fleet below 31
ships, despite an agreement with the Marine Corps and a
potential violation of last year's defense policy law.
Sent to Congress on Monday, the Navy's proposed $255.8
billion 2024 budget aims to retire eight warships before the
end of their intended service life, including three Whidbey
Island-class dock landing ships, or LSDs, that it proposed to
scrap last year but which were saved by the 2023 National
Defense Authorization Act.
The Navy's $32.8 billion shipbuilding request buys nine
battle force ships but no amphibs, including the San Antonio-
class amphibious transport dock ships, or LPDs, that are meant
to replace the LSDs.
The LSDs chosen for early retirement were found to be in
``poor material condition,'' according to Defense Department
budget slides.
``We've gone through, not only on LSDs but the other
divestments proposed in this budget, did a ship-by-ship review,
to understand the material State of each of the ships. What we
found on the LSDs is that they are challenged in terms of
readiness. We want to make sure that the capabilities that we
field are the right capabilities, and are able to perform the
mission to the standards that we expect,'' Navy Undersecretary
Erik Raven told reporters ahead of the proposed budget's
release.
``And so we're proposing those divestments because we think
the return on investment, on further investments on those
particular ships, as judged hull by hull, that return on
investment is not there,'' Raven said. ``Additionally, say that
we have sailors and marines who are serving on these ships, we
think that getting them matched up to the right platforms is
the way to go.''
Marine Corps Commandant General David Berger last week
rejected any plans that would cut these aging LSDs before their
replacements were delivered.
Despite the delivery of one LPD in 2024, the early
retirement of the three LSDs would mean the total number of
amphibs that year would drop below the legally required 31
ships minimum laid out in the 2023 NDAA, according to the
budget documents. Raven told reporters that the Navy is not
seeking a waiver at this time.
It was a surprise that the Navy ``has thumbed its nose that
defiantly to the Congress'' after lawmakers supported the ship
minimum last year, said a congressional staffer who spoke to
Defense One on condition of anonymity. ``So what the Navy has
done with this budget is they took all of those signals and all
those indications and warnings, if you will, from the Congress
and--said you know, `Thanks, but no thanks, we're going to do
what we think what we ought to be doing, and we don't really
care what the Congress has to say on this subject.' ''
Berger on Monday reiterated the reasoning behind the 31-
ship requirement for amphibs.
``Anything less incurs risk to national defense by limiting
the options for our combatant commanders,'' he said in a
statement to Defense One. ``Per strategic guidance, the Marine
Corps must be able to provide the Nation with crisis response
capabilities and build partnerships with allies and partners in
support of integrated deterrence--difficult to achieve without
the requisite number of amphibious warships.''
The requirement is linked to the Nation's defense, said
Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., and ranking member of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, at the March 9 Amphibious Warship
Industrial Base Coalition event on Capitol Hill.
``We cannot defend this Nation, we cannot do what we need
to do to prevent war, to prevent war, without the 31 ships,''
Wicker said. ``And so the National Defense Authorization Act--
makes it clear that the Commandant of the Marine Corps is the
one we're finally going to listen to in terms of our ship
requirement.''
This year's 30-year shipbuilding plan, and what it may say
about the long-term future of these ships, will be released
``very soon,'' Raven told reporters ahead of the budget roll
out.
Procurement
The Navy budget documents also chart out the ship
procurements from 2024 to 2028, and there are a lot of zeros in
the amphibious fleet's future. The Navy plans to buy its next
America-class amphibious assault ship or LHA in 2027 and does
not plan to buy any San Antonio-class LPD 17 Flight IIs in any
of the years listed.
The shipbuilding topline includes new ship construction as
well as funds for other vessels like the Landing Craft, Air
Cushion (LCAC) Service Life Extension Program and the Landing
Craft Utility LCU 1700 class.
The future Landing Ship Medium or LSM, is still planned for
2025. However, that is already 2 years past the original plan
to buy the first ship in 2023. The Marine Corps just started to
experiment with a commercially leased ship to inform the LSM's
future capabilities.
Last month, Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro said the service
is taking a ``strategic pause'' on buying more LPDs until
additional studies are completed, Defense News reported.
Afterward, the Navy would ``probably'' start buying them again,
according to the report.
On Monday, Raven told reporters at the Pentagon that the
office of the Secretary of Defense had directed the pause and a
capabilities-based assessment, and that there is an
``integrated team'' to assess the ships.
``What we are making sure that we are doing as we move
forward with our budget plans, is making sure that we have the
right capabilities at the right price aligned to not only
meeting military requirements, but working with industry,''
Raven said. ``And for LPD, we're taking a look at the
acquisition strategy moving forward, again, to make sure that
we would have the right capabilities at the right price and
working with industry partners to put together that plan moving
forward.''
The Navy has ``time to get this right'' with the LPD, and
that the Navy and Marine Corps are ``fundamentally aligned'' on
the 31-ship requirement, Rear Adm. John Gumbleton, the deputy
assistant secretary of the Navy for budget, said Monday.
``Both service chiefs like 31 [ships] as a requirement.
Both service chiefs like multiyear procurements. Both service
chiefs want to buy in a predictable future. And so if we can do
a study and actually lower the costs of this, that's all to the
good of the Department of the Navy and Marine Corps,''
Gumbleton said.
Buying amphibious ships tends to be the last priority for
the Navy after spending shipbuilding funds on aircraft
carriers, submarines, and destroyers, Hudson Institute Senior
Fellow Bryan Clark said March 9 during Defense One's State of
the Navy event.
``Whatever gets left over is what can go toward the
amphibious ships and the support ships. And when you do all the
numbers for that, you always end up with you know maybe not
quite enough for the amphibious ships, because if you're
building one LHA every four or 5 years that you can
incrementally fund, that's a chunk of money that's on the scale
of you know, $500 million a year. And then you've got maybe
$500 million or a billion dollars leftover for one more
amphibious ship, which isn't quite an LPD,'' Clark said.
Senator Sullivan. The 30-year plan makes it clear that the
Navy has no intention of meeting this statutory requirement.
Last year the Congress of the United States, there was an
amendment that I worked on personally with the Commandant. Got
this in the law. It is the law. Let me read the law.
``The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not
less than 11 operational aircraft carriers and not less than 31
operational amphibious warfare ships of which not less than 10
shall be amphibious assault ships.''
That is the law. We passed that. I want to compliment the
Commandant. It is not easy to be sitting next to your boss
saying we need this, we need this, we need this. Your boss,
obviously, does not agree, General.
But here is the thing. There has been these discussions of
balancing costs, another CAPE [Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation] study that is going to come out in June 2023 for
the fiscal year 2025 budget on amphib requirements. That is
irrelevant.
The Congress of the United States did the balancing, Mr.
Secretary, working with the Marine Corps. It was unanimous, by
the way, in this Committee. You are violating the law.
Would you come before this Committee and say, sorry, we are
not going to do 11 carriers? No way. You would get your you
know what handed to you. You cannot do it, sir. I find it
simply unacceptable that we are all just letting you say maybe
that was a suggestion by the Congress. It was not a suggestion.
It was a mandate.
Mr. Secretary, I would like to just ask you right off the
bat. Why are you violating the law? Why does your shipbuilding
plan have no remote interest, for the next 30 years, as far as
I can tell, of hitting the statutory mandate that we told you
to hit? I have no idea what your answer is going to be. But you
need to follow the law, sir. What is the answer?
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, as a member of the executive, it is
my responsibility to follow the law.
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
Mr. Del Toro. It is also my responsibility to ensure that
we just do not waste taxpayer money on vessels, for example,
that will never see the light of day----
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Let me ask you on that one. This
Congress has given you multi-ship procurement authorities, past
three NDAAs. This is the third year in a row that amphibs are
not being procured with this cost-saving authority.
So it is a little rich when you tell me about taxpayer
savings when you are not using the ability to save money that
we gave you on amphibs. You use it for every other ship but not
amphibs.
So I am not really buying the taxpayer argument because you
are not using that authority. What is your answer to the issue
that you are not following the law? What I am going to ask for
a request on, because I am running out of time. I am requesting
you come back to this Committee soon and tell us how you are
going to follow the law.
That is your only option, Mr. Secretary. Another CAPE
study? We did the study. We told you what to do and you need to
do it. The Commandant agrees with us. This Committee agrees
with us.
So what is your answer to this question? You are violating
the law right now, and your shipbuilding plan looks to say,
hey, we are going to violate the law for the next 30 years.
That is totally unacceptable.
In my view, you have not been hit hard enough by Members of
this Committee. You are ignoring us. Worse, you are ignoring
the law. What is your answer to that? I do want your commitment
to come back here with a statement on how you are going to fix
this.
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, you have my commitment that I will
come back to you with a statement on how we can fix this. I
think----
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Del Toro. Admiral Gilday, General Berger and I agree on
the requirement for 31 amphibious ships, and we are committed
to ensuring we meet this requirement and doing so in a timely
manner, but with a capable, sustainable mix of ship classes
that will support our marines and sailors for decades to come.
On June 19, 2023, I committed to implementing the law requiring
31 amphibious ships, and I commit to providing an updated
shipbuilding plan in support of the President's Fiscal Year
2025 Budget, which explains this strategy.
Senator Sullivan. And follow the law.
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir. It is my intent to follow the law
and I hope that, hopefully, by the President's Budget 2025
submission we will be able to be back in place with a multiyear
procurement that actually looks at----
Senator Sullivan. Not looks at. That is not your option. We
looked at it.
Mr. Del Toro. Like I said, sir, as we develop the
President's Budget 2025 I will look at that as an option that
we can pursue to get us back on track with multi-ship
procurements for LPDs.
Senator Sullivan. It is not an option for you, Mr.
Secretary. The Committee, the Congress, the President have
spoken.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a big issue and right now
with the Secretary of the Navy ignoring the Congress of the
United States is unacceptable.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Shaheen, please?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for being here this morning. I am sorry I missed much of the
questioning. We have multiple hearings at the same time.
I would like to also echo the Chairman and Ranking Member's
comments about you, Admiral Gilday and General Berger, and the
service that we all very much appreciate.
Secretary Del Toro, I was really pleased to see that the
Navy included several new funding options for childcare
centers. I think each one of you talked about the quality of
life and the importance of ensuring that we can maintain those
people who join our military and childcare is one of those
areas where it is absolutely critical.
In New Hampshire we were able to have a joint effort
between the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the New Hampshire
National Guard to put a joint childcare center on, but one of
the big challenge just has been recruiting teachers.
Can you speak, Secretary Del Toro, to what more the Navy is
looking at in terms of recruitment for teachers within our
childcare facilities? Or Admiral Gilday, either one.
Mr. Del Toro. Yes, ma'am. I will just be brief and then
pass it to the admiral.
One of the initiatives that we are looking actually is to
be able to provide those childcare providers the ability to
save costs on the children if they have children themselves.
We allow up to 50 percent reduction, for example, in
childcare costs so that they can actually have their own
children at the childcare center as well, too, in addition to
trying to increase the pay for those childcare providers as
well.
Admiral Gilday. Exactly. On the pay piece we are paying
above minimum--above the--I am sorry, above the average
national wage for childcare center workers, about $5 above the
median.
Second, we have reached out to a couple of schools in Texas
and Utah, particularly during peak months where they are having
students come in and help us in those childcare centers as
well, and they are being adequately compensated for that help.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I applaud any efforts that you can
undertake that will improve our ability to provide childcare
for the men and women in the military.
One of the things I learned as Governor when we were trying
to address childcare in New Hampshire was that the military was
the role model for the private sector on this issue and we need
to see that continue.
Secretary Del Toro, I think you mentioned AUKUS in your
opening comments and I wonder if--it is my understanding one of
the challenges that we have had is the challenging framework
that exists for sharing information and technology about our
capabilities.
Can you speak to whether we are able to do that through
AUKUS right now. What changes do we need to make in order to
provide that sharing that is really going to make that compact
work as it should?
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, when it actually comes to sharing of
the nuclear-powered technology for the submarine itself there
have--it has not been a challenge necessarily. It is actually
in the other areas in terms of AI [artificial intelligence] and
machine learning and other technologies where we actually have
to get to a better place with regards to being able to share
that technology with our international partners.
CNO, would you comment a little bit more on that, too?
Admiral Gilday. On the second pillar?
Mr. Del Toro. Yes.
Admiral Gilday. One of the things that AUKUS has done is it
has really opened up the blinders in terms of our collaboration
with both the U.K. and Australia and their industry in areas
like quantum computing, AI capabilities.
We are already doing a lot of that with both of those
countries in the submarine force but this will accelerate it in
terms of investment by private individuals as well, by equity
firms that are seeing the progress that we are making in those
specific areas.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I would encourage us to continue
that. Obviously, if we cannot make something like AUKUS work
with our closest partners we are going to have challenges
across the board.
General Berger, I think several times when you have been
before this Committee I have asked you about the ability of the
Marine Corps to recruit women--recruit and retain women, and I
understand that in fiscal year 2022 the Marine Corps was able
to recruit a slightly higher percentage of women than in the
past.
But can you talk about what the biggest obstacles are to
that recruitment and also to retention of women once they get
into the Marine Corps?
General Berger. The first obstacle, I think, was not having
any role models in most of the fields in the Marine Corps where
they got promoted to colonel and general. In other words, they
could not go into combat arms until 2015, so they did not see
anybody at the top that was representing them except in
administrative sort of staff fields.
But the Marine Corps is a warfighting organization. I think
now they are seeing role models in aviation and infantry that
were not there 6, 7 years ago.
That is a huge plus. Right now we have an infantry officer
school just like the Army does. We have three female
lieutenants in the course right now. Five years ago there were
none.
We have female enlisted marines that are in the infantry
course in both coasts--in the East Coast and West Coast. We
have them in infantry battalions now that are mortarmen. These
were not even thinkable things 5, 6, 7 years ago.
So, first of all, I think it has produced--make sure that
we advance the ones who can serve as role models. I think the
initiatives that Congress has given us in the last few years
have helped a lot, being able to opt out of promotion.
If it is not the right time in my family career can I just
step out of promotion and then come back in without a penalty?
Yes, you can. Can I ask to step out of command, not be
considered for command? Sure. Can I take an intermission from
my career? I want to do something for a couple of years and
come back in without any penalties.
All these are provisions that Congress has given us, which
are now, I think, becoming more and more useful. We changed a
policy last year, where dual military people--which are more
prevalent now, I think, than they were a decade ago--for us to
assign them to different duty stations, it takes a general
officer to approve that now. So we are making it better for
females to stay, and raise a family, and have it all instead of
making a choice, and I think over the next 10 or 15 years if
recruiting continues like it is right now. I mean, in a decade
we have 85 percent more female aviators now than we did 10
years ago--85 percent.
Last month, Colonel Nicole Mann, she came back from the
International Space Station. She is a jet pilot, test pilot,
astronaut, mission commander. These are the kind of role models
that we need.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Tuberville, please?
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen,
thanks for being here today and your sacrifice and your
families' sacrifice. We know how tough that is.
You know, guys, I am proud of our Navy and I want to talk a
little bit about team building and recruiting. Americans are
proud of their Navy. Outside of ports like Norfolk and San
Diego many Americans do not see the work that your sailors do.
They do not see it.
The Navy's work is often unseen, it is far from our shores.
Even the Navy's history like the Midway and Manila Bay it is
hard to see. So to recruit new sailors you must tell the Navy's
story to both internal and external audiences. It has got to be
told.
Today we have more ships named for politicians and
activists than we do for great Navy battles and heroes of our
past. We have a USS Carl Vinson but no USS Enterprise.
We have the USS John P. Murtha but where is the Yorktown?
New sailors should be on USS ships like the Wasp, the Midway,
the Vengeance, or the Intrepid.
Mr. Secretary, you were the commander of the DDG-84 who was
named after who, sir?
Mr. Del Toro. John Duncan Bulkeley, Senator.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, sir, and he was a Medal of Honor
winner, and I know you were proud to serve on that ship. When
he was asked about charging two German ships when he had only
one working gun, Admiral Bulkeley said, quote, ``What else
could I do? You engage, you fight, you win. That is the
reputation of our great Navy.''
Mr. Secretary, in your capacity to name ships I hope in the
future that we get back to naming ships after heroes, people
that has actually done something. Now, we have had politicians
that has been in the military before and I understand that. But
our history is told through our battleships and the things that
we put names on.
Our sailors need to hear and see all these stories instead
of divide us. Sometimes they do divide us. This week many of us
watched the video that has gone viral online of a young Navy
lieutenant JG. I have a lot of problems with this video. This
nonbinary officer said the highlight of her deployment on the
USS Gerald Ford was reading a poem to the entire ship.
Admiral Gilday, have you seen this video?
Admiral Gilday. I have.
Senator Tuberville. I hope we train our officers to
prioritize their sailors, not themselves. Did it surprise you
that a junior officer says the highlight of her deployment, her
first and the ship's first, was about herself and her own
achievement?
Admiral Gilday. I will tell you why I am particularly proud
of this sailor. Her grandfather served during World War II and
he was gay and he was ostracized in the very institution that
she not only joined and is proud to be a part of, but she
volunteered to deploy on Ford and she will likely deploy again
next month when Ford goes back to sea.
Sir, we ask people from all over the country, from all
walks of life, from all different backgrounds to join us and
then it is the job of a commanding officer to build a cohesive
warfighting team that is going to follow the law and the law
requires that we be able to conduct prompt sustained operations
at sea.
That level of trust that a commanding officer develops
across that unit has to be grounded on dignity and respect, and
so if that officer can lawfully join the United States Navy, is
willing to serve and willing to take the same oath that you and
I took to put their life on the line, then I am proud to serve
aside them.
Senator Tuberville. Admiral, I agree with that. I do not
care who you are as long as you join our military to fight for
the freedom of our country and protect our country.
The problem that I am having is the obsession with race,
gender, sex. It is focused on self. It is not focused on team,
and if we do not start building a team, we have no chance to
win individually in this country. We have no chance.
Everybody else is building, and to do a poem with all the
8,000 other people on this ship and to focus on herself--and do
not get me wrong. Her uncle or whoever that fought--hey, my dad
died in the military. Okay. I am all for that.
But I am all for building a machine. We do not--our
recruiting is suffering. We do not need to have another Bud
Lite moment. I mean, we do not need to have a Bud Lite moment
in the Navy.
I mean, we have to build a killing and fighting machine,
and it just concerns me that we do all these things and we
focus on one thing, one person. We are all Americans. That is
what we are and I hope as admirals and generals and people,
secretaries, that we start pushing Americans first. Not a
gender, not a race, not nationality.
We all got to come together. If we do not we have zero
chance, because this is not the country we used to have. This
is not the military we used to have and we have got to get out
of that rut of saying we are individuals.
We are not individuals. We are the best country on the face
of the earth and the best military, the United States of
America.
Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
Senator Blumenthal, please?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here and for your service to our Nation.
Admiral Gilday and Commandant Berger, thank you
particularly and your families for your extraordinary service
over many years.
I want to just take a moment to tell my colleagues about a
bill that I introduced along with Senator Sullivan to
commemorate the United States Marine Corps' 250 years in a
commemorative coin to mark this important milestone.
I am really grateful to my colleague, Senator Sullivan, to
join with me in this tangible reminder of the Marine Corps'
contributions to our Nation and I hope all my colleagues on the
Committee will join us in this legislation.
It may seem symbolic but symbols often tell an important
story, particularly, Commandant, in a time when the Force
Design 2030 has created issues within the Corps. This kind of
point of solidarity, I think, can be important.
Admiral Gilday, I want to come back to the questions raised
by the Chairman about accountability on the USS George
Washington. I was in the briefing that we received and I have
no question that you and the briefers and our top command in
the Navy are deeply concerned about those three suicides.
But what I heard in that briefing was that phase one did
not address accountability. Phase two did not have it as a
specific topic, but that accountability might emerge somehow
from phase two.
I would like your assurance that accountability, that is,
holding responsible anyone in command who knew or should have
known about the desperate straits of those three sailors will
be at least named and held accountable in some way.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I know that you understand--
everybody does--how complicated death by suicide can be and the
number of factors that can be involved, and I am in no way
trying to be evasive on this issue. I take personal ownership
for some of the failures that we saw in Norfolk and other
places that we are currently correcting.
That said, in any specific investigation and the Navy has
relieved 15 commanding officers over the past 12 months for
various reasons. We have to connect those actions directly to
the findings, to the facts, of those investigations.
I commit to you, sir, that we will look very closely to
that and come back to you.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. We are at the 1-year anniversary of the
death of one of those sailors. Master of Arms Seaman recruit
Xavier Mitchell-Sandor, and I want to suggest that one way to
alleviate--and I know you are taking steps on the USS Stennis
to alleviate some of those issues that were involved in those
suicides, maybe to procure housing on the open market when
ships are in maintenance for many years using the BAH [Base
Allowance for Housing], a bigger topic for further
consideration.
Secretary Del Toro, we all have seen the recent leaks of
classified documents that are so deeply alarming, appalling,
and that show Americans how many members of our military have
such wide access to top secret documents.
I wonder if you are considering measures that might
restrict access, particularly on the part of junior members of
the military in the Navy, for example, to classified documents.
I have been a longtime advocate of declassifying documents
that do not need to be kept secret. But at the same time maybe
we ought to be looking at who has access to those documents
that truly have to be kept secret to protect vital information
and sources and methods.
Mr. Del Toro. Well, thank you, Senator. We very much are
and the Department of the Navy and throughout the Department of
Defense. The Secretary of Defense just this morning actually
has requested a 45-day review of security clearances and
accesses across the Department and so we will be looking at
this issue very, very carefully.
As you know, on the one hand you have the desire to be able
to share more intelligence information with our allies and
partners and that presents risks, obviously. On the other hand
there is a need to actually protect the secrets that we do have
and so it is a bit of a dual-edged sword.
But we have to do better across the Department to ensure
that we keep it to only those that really need the intelligence
in order to be able to fulfill their responsibilities and their
duties, both substantively and administratively as well.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you all. Thanks, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Budd, please?
Senator Budd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again, thank you
all for being here. Thank you, each of you, for your service.
General Berger, a common criticism of Force Design 2030 is
that the Marine Corps has depleted its combat power, for
example, by divesting of its main battle tanks and a
significant portion of its aviation assets.
To the extent that you can talk about it in this setting,
can you talk about the underlying analysis and your logic to
these divestment decisions?
General Berger. Yes, Senator. First, the underlying
analysis was derived from a series of wargames 5, 6 years ago,
7 years ago, where each individual wargame was testing the
force against the pacing challenge--pacing threat.
In every case it was not a good outcome. So the conclusion
there was if you do not change, the outcome is not going to
change. That drove us toward devising, first of all, if that is
the case, keeping our original equipment and our formations,
everything, the same, is not going to keep up with the pacing
challenge then what do we need to do differently and we started
with how we are going to operate. Not equipment, but how we are
going to fight.
So the first step was, as the Chairman said, a more
distributed way of operating in an expeditionary naval manner
that fits right into the joint concept for the future concepts
drive everything in the Marine Corps. So, first, get the
concept right.
Second, if that is an underlying concept that the Navy and
Marine Corps joint force is going to operate upon, then test it
in a series of wargames and then go out into the field and
experiment with it, and that is exactly what has happened for
the past 4 years.
Senator Budd. Thank you for that. So those that are
criticizing Force Design 2030 the simple answer, and I will let
you fill in the blank for that, is it divestment? Is it a
change? How would you approach the critics of Force Design
2030?
General Berger. This July--this summer when the president
sends me home, that will be the last day that I get a morning
intel report. It will be the last access I have to every bit of
technological development that the CNO and I and the other
services chiefs have.
We will not have access to all of the information we need
to develop the force anymore. My answer to the critics is
beginning on the next day I will be the biggest supporter of
whoever the next Commandant is because I will know he has
information I do not and I will trust that the marines who are
doing the experimentation out in the fleet, as long as we have
a mechanism for feeding that back in to the headquarters of the
Marine Corps and we make the changes, we will be fine.
I trust that this current Commandant, past ones, future
ones, have access to the best information available. We have
the best process for developing the Marine Corps that fits into
a naval construct, complements the joint force. All that I am
very confident in.
Senator Budd. Thank you, General.
Admiral Gilday, much has been made about the growth of the
Chinese navy and the need to grow the number of the United
States ships in the fleet to meet that growing threat. I would
like to hear from you not about the quantity of ships in their
fleet or in our fleet but about the relative qualitative
advantage of Navy power.
What kind of technological advancements are we seeing from
the Chinese and how should we be viewing this issue?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, we are watching the Chinese very
closely, and to the Commandant's point, what we are going to
fight with is being informed by how we are going to fight and
that is what we are out there doing with our strike groups,
with our amphibious ready groups, in our fleet exercises, in
our war games, to try and refine that based on how we are
watching China.
There is no question our biggest asymmetric advantage is
people. The investments we are making in live, virtual,
constructive training, as an example, allow us to train as a
Fleet Marine Force and as a Navy at a scope and scale that we
could never do by getting individual ships underway, first.
Second is we are completely revolutionizing the way we are
training individual sailors through a framework called ready
relevant learning where it is beyond brick and mortar
classrooms or school houses. We are getting information to
young sailors at the right time and the right quantity.
With respect to--you mentioned capacity, and if I could for
a second, sir, for the last 2 decades the Nation has been
focused on ground wars. That has been the priority and
understandably so.
The investments that we are making now and, largely, due to
the support of this Committee, we have 56 ships in construction
across 7 shipyards with another 77 on contract. That rudder
turns the ship of the United States Navy very slowly but we are
really trying to get after that capacity issue as well.
In the modernization investments that we are making we have
increased--if you take a look at our operations and
modernization accounts we are up 5 percent from where we were
last year, a total of $11 billion, and much of that is going
into readiness.
I mentioned in my opening statement we are funding
maintenance at 100 percent. We are investing in new submarines,
expanding the amount of missile tubes. We are improving
torpedoes that they fire. With surface ships we are giving them
longer range weapons, both Tomahawks and defensive weapons.
We are investing in the electronic warfare capabilities. We
are investing in the weapons, doing multiyear buys of weapons,
that our aviators fire from their F-35s and their Super
Hornets. We are trying to wherever we can buy down risk and
close on vulnerabilities so that we can pace China instead of
trying to follow them.
Senator Budd. Very good. Thank you all.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd.
For the information of my colleagues, the vote has started
and, of course, at the conclusion of this open hearing we will
go into a closed hearing in SVC 217.
With that, Senator Duckworth, you are recognized.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
say thank you--a deep and profound thank you to both Admiral
Gilday and General Berger, to you and your families for your
extraordinary lifetime of service to our country.
I do want to associate myself with Senator Sullivan's
concerns that the current Navy budget proposal significantly
undercuts Marine Corps amphibious capabilities. In fact, I
think it undermines Marine Corps doctrine.
At a time when we need to be looking at the Indo-Pacific
region and a shift toward a forward deployed island-based
force, to cut back on LPDs in particular, I think, is a
misjudgment. That said, I do want to talk about logistics in
the Indo-Pacific.
General Berger, I have appreciated your leadership among
the Service Chiefs and recognizing the challenges posed by
sustaining forward deployed troops in a contested logistics
environment, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, which is
characterized by island formations and huge swaths of open sea.
I have been ringing alarm bells about this problem, especially
in a contested logistic environment, for years, not just
because of my own experiences or because U.S. Transportation
Command is in Illinois, but also because I truly believe that
for the sake of our servicemembers and for the credibility of
our deterrent we have to get this right.
General Berger, in what ways does this year's Marine Corps
budget request support contested logistics and how does this
benefit the Marine Corps and how does it benefit the joint
force?
General Berger. We have had some long discussions on
contested logistics. I am going to miss them.
First of all, the structure--the laydown of where we have
prepositioned supplies and parts and munitions and equipment
across the Pacific, across the world, we have to relook now,
quickly.
It was built for a different timeframe, under a different
set of circumstances. So where we have afloat and ashore
prepositioning has to be revisited, has to be changed, and
there is funding to do that. But that is going to take a
fundamental--it is going to take a different look and some
tough decisions in the next few years.
A second is, I think, the platforms that we use to move
that equipment, those supplies around. Here, the good news is
everything from the 53K [CH-53K] to the medium landing ship to
every other conveyance that is unmanned that the CNO is working
on and we are working on that is going to move that around, we
are going to need it all. It is going to be planes, trains, and
automobiles.
We also have to educate, train our logisticians in a
different way, which you have talked to me about before. It is
not business as usual for them, because it is not an
administrative move of materials. Even the way that we contract
has to change, because this peacetime exercise approach is not
going to work in a conflict in a contested environment.
Last, I would say the resilience part. If it comes to a
conflict we are both going to--there is going to be some
degradation across the board. How fast can we come back? That
gets into applying the same methodology for kill webs into, as
you pointed out before to me, logistics webs. How do we create
logistics webs that look like kill webs?
Senator Duckworth. I think LPDs are going to be an
important part of that and this budget does not support the
number of LPDs that I think that we need.
A critical vulnerability for any military is the logistics
tail associated with delivering operational energy to its
fielded forces. Both our readiness and our allies' and
partners' readiness will be bolstered by reducing our reliance
on fossil fuels and employing more diverse and renewable
operational energy sources, as well as seeking more creative
and cooperative ways of supplying operational energy to U.S.
troops and to our overseas partners.
Secretary Del Toro, General Berger, how much could we gain
from cooperating with our allies and partners in Europe and in
the Indo-Pacific to improve our logistics availability and
distribution? What efforts in your budget request work toward
operational energy security and resilience?
Mr. Del Toro. Thank you, Senator. It is an incredibly
important topic.
We have significantly improved, I would say, our alliances
across the Indo-Pacific for this very nature. We are kicking
off with Balikatan, for example, 2023 with 17,500 marines right
now working side by side with our allies and partners.
The ability to actually move our forces forward and provide
the logistical bases that they need. As you know, the Secretary
of Defense just came from the Philippines and negotiated four
additional bases as logistics bases in the Philippines, as well
in the north as close to Taiwan as one can possibly get.
Providing operational energy investments to those bases is
always critical. We have--and the Marine Corps is another
example in Albany, Georgia, for example, where we have become
zero dependent on outside sources for energy, for example. The
same thing applies to Miramar in California, for example, where
we actually have provided energy out to the local communities.
These are all investments that are necessary. They are also
necessary at sea as well, too. For many years biofuels have
been very, very expensive, and it has been hard to get the
price point of biofuels down to the point where it actually
makes sense to be able to invest in that.
So we have in the President's Budget commitment to continue
in the R&D [research and development] effort that is necessary
to try to discover that biofuel that will provide the biggest
return on investment to our forces.
Senator Duckworth. General Berger?
General Berger. For us it is not as much of a money issue
as it is an operational-tactical imperative. We cannot fly in
batteries, fuel the way we used to. It is not going to be
possible. It is not going to be practical.
We have got to find other ways to power our equipment,
vehicles, everything. There is money in the budget to do that
but it is going to take time and your support.
Senator Duckworth. According to DOD's own reports 50
percent of all casualties during the war in Iraq occurred
during convoy operations and 80 percent of all convoys were
conducted to move fuel. We need to do better.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
Let me recognize Senator Cramer and also give the gavel to
Senator Warren while I go vote and return quickly.
Senator Cramer, please?
Senator Cramer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, General and Admiral, for your decades of service and
congratulations on another good solid year ahead.
Mr. Secretary, I am going to get right to the point with
you. I worked with the Navy for a little better than a year and
a half to this point, on behalf of a Navy SEAL and an officer
who wanted to get out of his service a few months early so that
he could pursue his next level of service--his next area of
service in political office.
It is pretty much over--the case--but I wanted to highlight
it in this forum because it is really a horrible vignette of
how the Navy, I think, far too often treats its people. I
brought it up with you once quite a while back, with Admiral
Gilday as well, and I will make it as brief as I can.
Lieutenant Adam Schwarze asked in July 2021 for permission
to run for office while serving his final few months in the
Navy. The paperwork got lost and it took me getting involved
for the paperwork to find its way back into the process. Then
the CNO endorsed his request and then it was denied by you.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Schwarze also tried to get out using
an old but still authorized early retirement authority. Again,
process stopped unexplainably. But I weighed in and the process
then continued with the commander of naval personnel endorsing
the package, only again to be denied at your level.
Then, from my vantage point, Mr. Secretary, began what I
think was a witch hunt. He was called back from his SkillBridge
assignment in Minnesota to his last assignment in Hawaii where
he could then be punished.
The Naval Special Warfare Group lawyers proceeded to rip
apart his history, his dedication, and question his integrity
with statements that literally, quote, ``call into question his
sincerity and trustworthiness.'' I am happy to provide all of
this for you in case your team has lost it.
In fact, you went after this decorated hero with a veracity
that made my staff, including a commander in the military,
reach out to him to check his well being and reached out to the
Navy to make sure that they were looking out for his well
being.
You pulled his trident and then prevented him from retiring
on time. You did an investigation that included false
statements about me and my connection with Lieutenant Schwarze,
statements that seemed quite political for what is supposed to
be an apolitical organization.
The whole time that my office was trying to get information
from the Navy it faced roadblocks, barriers. It was like
pulling teeth. Then after all of that, a board of inquiry was
held and on all counts the board voted three to zero that the
preponderance of the evidence did not support any basis of
misconduct. Three-zero, seven times.
In summary, you screwed the sailor's paperwork up
constantly, repeatedly. You made a political decision on his
future. You tarred and feathered him out of revenge.
A board of inquiry unanimously absolved him of all charges.
You held him past his retirement date until the law actually
required you to let him out, and you left a patriot feeling
like the Navy does not care about him or worse at the end of
his service, and you kept his trident.
I just--after hearing all this stuff about how important
the people are, Mr. Secretary, I am perplexed and I hope it is
not too late for some corrective measure to replace this
person's integrity and dignity.
With that, I will just let you respond.
Mr. Del Toro. Thank you, Senator. I would be happy to
continue to work with you on this situation.
However, first, I would like to make a statement that I
personally did not make any statements against you or
Lieutenant Adam Schwarze myself. But I will add that we have a
responsibility in the Department of Defense that all
servicemembers actually act in accordance with the Hatch Act,
and Lieutenant Adam Schwarze knew exactly what the rules and
requirements of the Hatch Act were.
We cannot allow uniformed service personnel, even if they
are 1 day from retirement, to participate in political
activities, especially election-related activities.
That is a standard that must be met. It has been adhered to
since the beginning of the founding of our Nation and we have
to actually meet that standard.
Senator Cramer. So is there a standard where Navy lawyers
are allowed to just absolutely trash a guy's reputation, create
misstatements--factually untrue statements about his career and
his claims so that they can somehow prove their point? Is that
a standard?
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, I would be happy to look into the
case further to see if those statements are accurate. I do not
know the details of the----
Senator Cramer. I do. I do. I know them.
Mr. Del Toro.--statements that were made by lawyers and I
would be happy to work with you on that.
Senator Cramer. I know them including the statements about
me that are in your lawyer's records. So----
Mr. Del Toro. I would be happy to collaborate with you and
your office, Senator.
Senator Cramer. I look forward to that. I would rather not
have to do it so publicly but after a year and a half of being
stonewalled I am glad you are here today. Thank you.
Senator Warren. [Presiding.] Thank you. So I recognize
myself now.
Last year the White House released a report telling
agencies to prioritize union shops with pro-worker employers
when awarding government contracts. This includes the
Department of Defense. Workers are central to the United
States' national security and the strength of our Defense
Industrial Base.
I am concerned that the Navy is not following through on
the President's commitment to unions and workers. For example,
I have heard reports that the Navy is consistently passing over
union shipyards for contracts and giving them to nonunion
shipyards instead. Some of these nonunion shipyards are already
at capacity, working on multiple contracts at the same time,
while the docks at the union shipyards are sitting empty.
It sounds like even though there is plenty of work to go
around, the Navy is actively choosing to ignore union shipyards
where workers generally have better wages and better
protections in favor of nonunion ship yards that are already
overburdened with contracts.
Secretary Del Toro, do you agree that the Navy contract
should prioritize union workers when their shipyard is ready
and able to do the job?
Mr. Del Toro. I do, Senator, in accordance with all the
other regulations that drive the issuance of contracts under
the FAR [Federal Acquisition Regulations].
Senator Warren. Good. Thank you. I agree with you on this.
This has serious consequences. Missing out on contracts can
mean closing the doors for these shipyards and laying off
hundreds of workers, especially for smaller shipyards, and it
means the next time that the Navy needs a ship repaired it will
have to go to a nonunion shipyard that is likely already over
extended, resulting in delays and threatening our ability to
protect our coastline and to support our allies.
The implications of this are huge as ongoing conflicts like
the war in Ukraine and the threat of future conflicts fuel
demand for weapons and other equipment. Delays in completing
crucial projects could leave us vulnerable when we most need
security.
Secretary Del Toro, do you agree that the closure of union
shipyards is a threat to the Defense Industrial Base?
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, the closure of any shipyard in the
United States can present a threat to the United States in
terms of our ability to build our ships and maintain our
national security. I would be most interested in actually
getting the details of those reports that you mentioned so I
could validate whether they are true or there is other issues
at play that I am just not familiar with.
Senator Warren. That is good but we also--the good news is
that the Navy still has time to change this approach. You said
earlier this year that now is the time to invest in the defense
workforce and I could not agree more with you on that.
Part of the solution should be to take advantage of the
resources that we already have but we are not using or not
using enough like union shipyards. More broadly, there is a lot
that the Department can do, for example, making sure that
contractors are properly notifying employees of their right to
organize, improving contractors' compliance with anti-union
consultant disclosure forms, and ensuring that Federal funds
are not spent by contractors on union busting.
Secretary Del Toro, can you tell me what steps you plan to
take to ensure that the Navy is reinforcing the Defense
Industrial Base while preserving union jobs?
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, I am committed to preserving union
jobs, as I said earlier, and we actually have several shipyards
that are already under union labor agreements as well, too. My
commitment to you is that I will work with my acting Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition (RD&A), that I hope we will actually have a
permanent Assistant Secretary RD&A [for] Research, Development,
and Acquisition, so I can actually invest more time in looking
into these issues and many other issues as well.
Senator Warren. I appreciate it and I look forward to
working with you on this. President Biden has made an historic
commitment to empower workers by prioritizing union labor in
Federal contracting and, as you know, DOD is not exempt from
that pledge and should not want to be exempt from that pledge.
Protecting union jobs in the defense sector is a question
of national security and I look forward to working with you to
make sure that the Navy can fulfill its duty to the American
people. Thank you.
Mr. Del Toro. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Warren. Thank you, and I now recognize Senator
Scott.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairwoman Warren.
[Off mic.]
If we could talk about Taiwan a little bit. It sure appears
that China is building a military to somehow intimidate or
defeat Taiwan. If that happens the United States Navy and most
likely the marines are going to be front and center in doing
whatever we can to support Taiwan.
In the meantime, the most important thing we could do is
make sure does not happen. So can each of you talk about what
you are doing to get Taiwan prepared to make sure this does not
happen?
One thing you keep hearing up here is the fact that I think
it is something like $19 billion worth of United States
military equipment has been ordered and not been delivered and
so what are we doing to make sure Taiwan is doing their part?
What are we doing to make sure our military industrial base
provides the resources and what can you do to make sure that
happens? Because it does not make any sense to me that the
equipment is not there and Taiwan is not actually doing more
than what they are doing right now. So if each of you could
answer that.
Mr. Del Toro. Senator, if I could start.
Our National Defense Strategy is hyper focused on China as
the pacing threat, obviously, with regards to their interest in
potentially using military force against Taiwan, which we have
to avoid at every possible moment.
Part of the challenge that we face in providing the
equipment, obviously, is the challenges that we have had in the
supply chain over the last 3 or 4 years. So that is an issue
that the Office of the Secretary of Defense is trying to
address with special authorities.
Senator Scott. Can I just stop you right there? Can I just
stop you right there for a second?
Mr. Del Toro. I am sorry?
Senator Scott. That sounds really good. I have not heard
one thing that is going to accelerate the $19 billion or
whatever the number is. We have had these hearings and it keeps
coming up. I have not heard one thing that actually has been
done to accelerate it.
Mr. Del Toro. I will--happy to provide you a list of things
that have been done in the industrial base to actually
accelerate the deliveries of those equipments and authorities.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Del Toro. While the Department of State has legal
responsibility for the FMS process, accelerating delivery of
these capabilities to Taiwan is a focus at the highest levels
of the Department of the Navy. From the Secretary on down, we
are working with senior Department of Defense leadership and
our industrial partners to see how fast they can accelerate
their production lines. We are working to identify and provide
investment opportunities to streamline testing and
recertification to alleviate some of the existing barriers to
increased production throughput. In particular, we are making
targeted investments in those critical munitions necessary in a
high-end, sustained war fight. But it's going to take some time
to do so, because capital investments need to be made, both
materially and also in the workforce, in order to increase the
production rates that are necessary to get new capabilities to
Taiwan, in addition to our other international allies and
partners, who have been asking for additional munitions, as
well, too.
So industry has to do its part to fulfill its contracted
obligations for timely delivery of systems to our international
partners. I think that they see the commitment that the
President and the Secretary of Defense are making in terms of
ensuring a reliable, solid pipeline in the future and now is
the time for industry to make those capital investments.
In the meantime, we are not standing still. We are working
to ensure Taiwan is ready and able to use this equipment to
full effect upon delivery, increasing their overall training
and readiness postures.
Senator Scott. So is it happening? Is there anything that
is happening?
Mr. Del Toro. There is discussions at the OSD [Office of
the Secretary of Defense] level, both at the DSD [Deputy
Secretary of Defense] level and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Sustainment across the entire Department,
working with suppliers of munitions providers and other
equipment across the board to see how fast they could
accelerate their production lines.
But it is going to take some time to do so because capital
investments need to be made, both materially and also in the
workforce in order to increase the production rates that are
necessary to get them to Taiwan in addition to our other
international allies and partners as well, too, who have been
asking for additional munitions as well, too.
So industry has to do its part. I think that they see the
commitment that the President and the Secretary of Defense is
making in terms of ensuring a reliable solid pipeline in the
future. Now is the time for industry to make those capital
investments.
Senator Scott. I would love to see concrete actions that
are actually going to change the timeline because I was just in
Cyprus the week before last. They got the same issue. They are
not getting all--everything they want. They do not have any
expectation of the dollar numbers but even a country like that
cannot get what they want.
So what is the Navy doing, what are the marines doing
actually to get Taiwan in position on top of the equipment and
ready to make--hopefully, deter China from doing something?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I think it is best if we talk about
that in a classified session in terms of the things that we are
looking at in terms of our responsibility to field a ready
force every single day.
So our priorities have been readiness of the current force,
modernization of the force, 70 percent of which we are going to
have 10 years from now, and that is important from two aspects.
One is you got to be ready to fight tonight to put doubt in
Xi's mind that today is not the day.
In a series of speeches last month in one of them he
challenged his generals to be ready for war now, and so we take
those kinds of assertions very seriously. Readiness has to be
our top priority. Getting ships out of maintenance on time,
which we are improving at but not yet satisfied with, has to
improve.
As the Commandant said earlier in this hearing, pushing
everything we can forward: that is where we need to be. The
Navy and the Marine Corps needs to be forward, and it is not
just likely that it will be the Navy and Marine Corps. It is
definitely that it will be the Navy and the Marine Corps as the
away team and the first on the scene.
Again, we are making balanced investments in the force that
we have today, the best we can put in the field in terms of
weapons.
We have just done in this budget proposal four big
multiyear procurements based on the authorities that the
Congress has provided us for weapons with range and speed. Two
of those are between the Navy and the Marine Corps. The other
two are with the United States Air Force.
So, sir, already approaching your limit. But Commandant----
Senator Scott. Do you want to add anything?
General Berger. We have been training with the Taiwanese
marines for more than a decade. I think lately, the last 2
years, I would say, focus on command and control, air defense,
defense from the beach, and mining and building out their
national guard and reserve--in other words, making it a whole
total force, which is what they are going to need.
Senator Scott. [Presiding.] Thank you.
Let me recognize Senator Schmitt.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Senator Scott, and unlike
Senator Scott's home State of Florida, Missouri is landlocked--
my home State. But when I started on this Committee I wanted to
be on the Seapower Subcommittee.
So we have an Army base. We have an Air Force base.
Missouri, obviously, does not have a naval base. Mississippi is
not deep enough.
The reason for that is because I think that our biggest
challenge from a national security perspective that we are
facing--Missourians, Americans--is China. That is a focus of
mine and I know that it is a focus of yours with the Navy and
the Marines and to that end there are several very concerning
trends that I want to discuss.
The first is the fact that China's naval fleet is rapidly
outpacing our own and that gap is only widening. The Pentagon
reports suggest China may have 420 ships by 2025 and 460 ships
by 2030. What is worse, Beijing is devoting significant amounts
of its maritime training on island capture scenarios.
In 2021, the People's Liberation Army, quote, ``conducted
more than 20 naval exercises with an island capture element,
greatly exceeding the 13 observed in 2020,'' according to a
Pentagon 2022 report on Chinese military developments.
This is another indicator, I think, of China's ambitions
and Taiwan is in the crosshairs. There is no doubt about it.
So to sort of followup on Senator Scott's questions, to me
the best way to support Taiwan's ability to defend itself from
Chinese aggression is to bolster their defensive capabilities
today.
Harpoon anti-ship missiles, which the U.S. Government is
already committed to providing, is critical, providing a
hundred new delivery systems, which I think has already been
committed, as well as 400 Harpoon Block II surface-launched
missiles.
But the fact is that these are not going to be fully
fielded until 2027. To expedite this critical capability as a
stopgap until the new systems can be fielded, the U.S. should
transfer from several hundred older missiles in the military's
inventory that are under consideration for deep militarization
or destruction.
Secretary Del Toro, will you commit to working
collaboratively and creatively with the Taiwanese and the
Administration to leverage existing munitions and support
equipment to expedite defense aid to Taiwan?
Mr. Del Toro. Absolutely, I will. We have been actually
collaborating within the letter of the law and the authorities
that are allowed by law for us to collaborate with the
Taiwanese, provide them the munitions that are necessary, the
equipment that is necessary for them to be able to defend
themselves.
Senator Schmitt. Well, I think--that is good to hear. I
think we have heard a lot about the supply chain issues. But
Taiwan--the shot clock has probably started. It is between now
and 4 years.
I mean, this is coming and I just do not know how much time
they really have to have the support that they need to deter a
Chinese offensive. Which they seem to be dead set at.
In that vein and also in this broader sort of industrial
base, you mentioned the discussions that have been had. Let us
say we were at war today. Let us say today the United States is
at war with some power--China, whoever. What would we do
differently than we do right now to ramp up that industrial
base? What is holding us back?
There is a demand signal, which I think is being sent.
There is a demand--what else would we do? I mean, three or four
things that we would do differently than we are doing right now
to be prepared, and also this also relates to Taiwan.
Mr. Del Toro. There are war authorities that would be
exercised that are not currently exercised. But let us--the
goal here is to prevent war with China----
Senator Schmitt. Correct.
Mr. Del Toro.--to deter China from going to war and I think
the power of our coalitions with our allies and partners
internationally has much to do with that fact.
Senator Schmitt. I agree, and I have limited time. I think
the Philippines see what is happening. I think this is----
Mr. Del Toro. In South Korea and many other----
Senator Schmitt. Yes.
Mr. Del Toro.--countries in the Indo-Pacific that we rely
on as partners actually.
Senator Schmitt. But as it relates specifically to the
industrial base other than the war powers what is it that we
can do differently? Are there State barriers in the states
where we have naval shipyards? What is it----
Mr. Del Toro. So this President's Budget actually has
increased the amount of funding for increased munitions by 50
percent, for example. That is the most significant increase
that we have had in the several past years and its investments
in SM-6, LRASM [Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile], and numerous
other missions as well, too.
We are also investing in CPS [Conventional Prompt Strike],
for example, to try to get deployable on the Zumwalt-class
destroyer by 2025 and on the Virginia-class submarine by 2030.
Those--we are pushing on all fronts, on all cylinders, to
actually try to move as fast as we can.
But just like in the shipbuilding industry with regards to
the shipbuilding plan as well, too, we can only move as fast as
industry can actually produce as well, too. Because the
opportunity costs associated with making major multibillion
dollar investments when industry cannot keep up with those
productions means that we cannot spend money in other places as
well too where it is badly needed as well.
So it is all about finding the right balance and the right
compromise to move forward . . .
Senator Schmitt. Right, which is why I am sort of
highlighting Taiwan. Because I think they have been on the
backburner and I do not think they can be anymore.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, can I make one----
Senator Schmitt. Yes.
Admiral Gilday. So if I would use Austal Shipbuilding in
Alabama as an example. That company shifted from completely
working with aluminum to working with steel.
The reason they could do that--the sole reason they could
do that--is because of the Defense Production Act. So to answer
your question, there needs to be substantial investment by the
U.S. Government in those industries in order for them to surge.
We stopped doing that in shipbuilding in the Reagan
administration. You saw 30 shipyards go down to 7. We saw that
in the 1990's during the Clinton administration with the
aircraft industry and how it supports the military. That is the
first thing.
The second thing is you need a bigger Navy and Marine Corps
to protect those approaches from the sea to keep the United
States economy humming and to deny that to any adversary. Those
are the two things.
Senator Schmitt. I am going to ask my hypersonic question
in closed session. So thank you.
Senator Sullivan. [Presiding.] I am taking over as the
Chairman until the Chairman gets back so I will call on myself.
General Berger, you have gotten a lot of compliments on
Force Design. I have complimented you on it previously. But it
is not without risks--significant risks. You acknowledged this
in your testimony last year.
Like the Navy, the Marine Corps has minimum force levels
that are required by Congress. I have been reading a lot about
the history of the 82d Congress. The Marine Corps loves to cite
the 82d Congress in the aftermath of the Korean War.
You know this, General. The only reason the Marine Corps
exists--the only reason the Commandant of the Marine Corps is a
co-equal to the CNO in a hearing like this is because of
Congress.
Very importantly, the 1952 law that the Secretary of
Defense, Secretary of Navy, the President of the United States
all opposed, mandated that the Marine Corps has three full
combat infantry divisions, three full air wings, and task-
organized for combined arms operations.
I am going to talk about some of the Force Design
divestments. They have been dramatic. But I have concerns they
have been so dramatic that the current U.S. Marine Corps does
not meet the congressionally required minimums. Again, that is
not your choice. We gave that to you. So I do not want to
debate that right now.
What I would like for the record to this Committee I would
like you to provide a detailed T&O [Table of Organization] of
the Marine Corps as it currently stands. You can use MCRP 1-10
[Marine Corps Reference Publication], three regiments,
everything in here, that the Marine Corps has kept these
minimums that are required by the Congress. [The MCRP 1-10 has
been retained in Committee files.]
Can I get a detailed detail of the current T&O of the
Marine Corps Today to make sure Force Design is not taking us
under the statutory requirements of the 1952 law?
General Berger. We can provide you--absolutely, it is
unclassified--a task organization of the Marine Corps today.
The law--the statute, as you accurately depicted, three
divisions, three wings.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Berger.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Publication of MCRP 1-10.1, Organization of the United
States Marine Corps (Limited Dissemination Control: None) and
the Publication of MCRP 1-10.1 Organization of the United
States Marine Corps (Distribution Statement A: Approved for
public release, distribution is unlimited). [The MCRP 1-10 has
been retained in Committee files.]
Senator Sullivan. Correct.
General Berger. There was nothing more specific in that and
we have changed it significantly over 70 years.
Senator Sullivan. I just want--just look at the T&O. I have
been looking at this. Look at the same one for the air wing and
just say that you are meeting it. Again, that is not your call.
That is our call and you need to meet that, and I would like to
see details on that.
I have been focused on Force Design more than any other
U.S. senator. Again, I have been very complimentary of your
bold approach. It takes a lot of guts, as Senator King said.
I have been, as you know, General, frustrated by some of
the answers that the Committee has been provided with. I think
this idea that everything has to be classified--I think even
your comment to Senator Budd that, well, you get classified
stuff and the other generals do not. I get classified stuff.
So I think it is really in the Marine Corps' interests to
be able to explain this. There is a lot of criticism of it. One
of the criticisms is that the Marine Corps is creating more of
a niche force focused on one combatant command with one
littoral mission, and putting at risk the critical statutorily-
mandated global crisis combat capability, kick in the door
capability of the Marine Corps anywhere in the world for any
contingency, not just littoral contingencies, and without 31
amphibs I believe this is a real concern.
Lieutenant General Heckl, recently at the Seapower
Subcommittee when I was asking him, said having a hearing on
this--I have talked to the Chairman and others--just getting it
out there. Marine Corps defend this, critics come and--I think
it is good for the Marine Corps. Would you be supportive of
that, General?
General Berger. Senator, earlier this week we finished
another briefing, as you all have requested. That was, by our
count, 429 briefings----
Senator Sullivan. Those are classified--those are
classified briefings, General. You need a hearing on this. The
Congress of the United States--the biggest undertaking of
reorganization of the Marine Corps in decades, merits a
hearing. I do not know why you would resist that and I do not
know why we keep getting----
General Berger. I have never said no to a hearing from any
Committee in 4 years.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. So would you be up for a hearing?
General Berger. Any hearing that is requested by a
Committee with jurisdiction over the military absolutely I
would say yes to.
Senator Sullivan. Okay.
General Berger. I have not said no yet.
Senator Sullivan. I have run out--I am running out of time
here and I have committed to the Chairman.
Let me just ask one--one of the things that I put in the
section 1023 of last year's NDAA--and, again, I do not think we
have gotten it in the way in which I was expecting it and it
has been classified, which does not help--is the extent to
which the Marine Corps has divested so much capability and I
have the long list here and it is very long--and the aviation
side is enormously shocking to me--that the Marine Corps would
have to rely on the Army to provide such capabilities.
I do not think anyone has, at least as far as I can tell,
given this Committee that information we requested--bridging,
armor, assault breaching, route clearing, MPs [Military
Police]. There is a lot that we do not have anymore, that if we
go to war tomorrow and there is a river the marines have to
cross, they cannot cross the river.
So can you commit to this Committee again to take a look at
section 1023 and the letter I sent you on April 5th to answer
those questions? You have answered. Maybe I will just ask
around.
Do you have answers to that question on what capability
have the Marine Corps given up that the Army now has to take?
Then that is my final question.
General Berger. The Act required us--asked us to give
briefings, which we provided this month in accordance with the
statute.
Senator Sullivan. Classified.
General Berger. We checked with the Committee to make sure
that it answered----
Senator Sullivan. I do not think classified briefings do
that justice, but go on.
General Berger. That was what was required in the NDAA----
Senator Sullivan. It was not classified. I wrote it. I know
what I am talking about.
General Berger. It did not specify classified or
unclassified. I think across the joint force to get the whole
picture of what the capability of any element of the joint
force is, you need to have unclassified and classified put
together so you get a better picture of both capability and
capacity.
Senator Sullivan. The Army question?
General Berger. Pardon me?
Senator Sullivan. The Army question?
General Berger. What is the question again, Senator?
Senator Sullivan. This is in the law--the extent to which
the Marine Corps is relying on the Army to provide capabilities
it has divested.
General Berger. What requires the combatant commander to
make decisions on how to employ the force that is the combatant
commander's decision, not mine? We provide, man, train, and
equip forces as does the other services. How they are employed
that is up to combatant commanders.
Chairman Reed. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Sullivan. I
have two additional questions, gentlemen, before we break.
First, unfortunately, there has been an impasse in
confirming general offices at a regular schedule. We previously
used unanimous consent for all general officers except those
with key positions requiring hearings.
Are you seeing an impact, Admiral Gilday, in the service
not only in terms of readiness but also in terms of quality of
life of families, planning for families, planning for
schooling, and also decisions at that level about whether they
retain themselves in the service or depart?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, we are not at that point yet. We are
not at that point yet but we will be soon, and so to give you
just a few examples, the director of Naval Reactors,
responsible for more than 60 reactors and in the middle of
AUKUS, is a concern. Four fleet commanders, including the fleet
commander forward in the Western Pacific and the fleet
commander in the Middle East, is a concern.
Three force commanders--surface, air, and subsurface--
three-star officers, the head of Naval Installations Command,
the superintendent of the naval academy as we are beginning
to--as we are on the verge here of bringing another class and
to keep that production line moving uninhibited is another
example.
We have five promotion lists with over 50 people and so it
is close to 80 right now and growing, sir, but I would double
it in terms of the amount of families that are affected this
summer.
Chairman Reed. General Berger, do you have comments?
General Berger. I think my review is exactly the same.
Within 90 days they are going to have significant impacts. At
the one-and two-star general list we can move those. At the
three-and four-star level they are one by one assignments.
As you point out, without confirmation there is no moves.
There are vacancies or delayed retirements or family plans that
they do not know when that will happen. It is--I think by the
late summer, early fall, you will have fairly--you will have
significant impacts to both readiness and quality of life both.
Chairman Reed. Let me followup one question. This force
structure is interesting and should be pursued but you train
regularly, I presume, the Marine Corps with Army armored units
and the Army has far more tanks and mechanized vehicles than
Marine Corps could ever want, not only need. The whole thrust,
I think, of our strategy over the last several decades has been
joint fighting, not individual services with their expertise.
So you have available armored vehicles if the combat
commander believes that is for the mission. Is that correct?
General Berger. Absolutely do. Everything that we do is as
a joint force. The Navy, the Marine Corps will not do anything
on a large scale by itself. It is entirely as a joint force.
There is some duplication, as you know, Senator, but mostly
we want complementary capabilities. We have capabilities the
Army does not. They have capabilities we do not. I think that
is what you want.
Chairman Reed. Yes, I tend to agree and you could want
everything in the world like your own fleet of C-141s so you
could be flown everywhere with marine pilots. But that would
not make a lot of sense, would it?
I think, again, we have to look carefully at this because
we do have a responsibility to view the force structure changes
and make sure they are correct. But I think so far what we have
done is try to incorporate the threat that is emerging, not
fight the last war.
Mr. Del Toro. Mr. Chairman, you could not have said it
better. I am sorry to interrupt. It is about today's threat and
I fear that some of the critics of both, perhaps, Force Design
or our Navy operations fail to understand that the threat very
much has changed in the Indo-Pacific. When you take into
account satellites and cyber security and everything else--
cyber warfare that is at play here, they fail to understand
that we have to evolve and we have to be able to innovate in
order to be able to effectively fight not yesterday's war in
1953 or 1952 but tomorrow's war.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you all very much. We are going
to recess until 1230 hours to go into the closed session and in
the meantime I hope the second vote is called.
So we will reassemble in the SVC-217 at 12:30. Thank you
very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
port security barriers
1. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Gilday, I continue to be concerned
about the State of the Navy's port security barriers. We do everything
we can to ensure our ships are capable and protected at sea, so we
should commit a similar level of effort to make sure they are protected
from terrorist and other threats when they are in port. How important
is it that we are investing in modern, capable port security barriers
that can defeat the threats we face today?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy is committed to ensuring the security of
our ships, while in port and at sea. The Navy utilizes Port Security
Barriers, also called Waterborne Security Barriers (WSB), which are
systems designed and used to protect U.S. military assets. WSBs are
able to thwart attacks by terrorists that use small vessels laden with
explosives as mobile weapons targeting military ships and waterside
installations. In order to defeat the threats we face today, the Navy
has developed WSB technical requirements to support the acquisition of
the next generation of WSBs (WSB 2.0), which will include enhanced
attack survivability and maintainability over existing Port Security
Barriers. Barriers are sustained and placed on a phased replacement
plan to ensure continued operation and protection of our ships.
2. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Del Toro, will you commit to ensuring
that any efforts to procure port security barriers will involve a fair
and open competition?
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy complies with all statutory and
regulatory requirements, including Part 6 Competition Requirements of
the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), to acquire quality supplies
and services that satisfy the Navy's needs for measurable improvements
to mission capability and operational support at a fair and reasonable
price. If an other than full and open competition strategy is used, it
is performed in accordance with FAR 6.302 and in compliance with Title
41 United States Code (U.S.C.) 3304 and Title 10 U.S.C. 3204.
An Acquisition Strategy Framework was developed in March to support
competitive procurement of new Waterborne Security Barriers 2.0 (WSB
2.0). The Navy intends to engage industry using Industry Days and
Requests for Information, to include review of a draft Request for
Proposal (RFP), before releasing the final RFP. WSB 2.0 will provide
for enhanced attack survivability and maintainability over legacy
variants.
intellectual property
3. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Del Toro, I am concerned with China's
ongoing theft of American intellectual property and the impact that has
on small businesses, including a constituent company of mine that
provides an important technology to your Department. What is your view
of China's ongoing theft of United States private sector intellectual
property and the impact that has on our defense industrial base?
Secretary Del Toro. Chinese cyber intrusions are the most prolific
in the world. China uses cyberspace to conduct operations against the
Department of Defense Information Network and the United States
Homeland. They do this to weaken our allies and partners and to
undermine United States interests. We need to do better at protecting
our intellectual property.
4. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Del Toro, do you see this an issue
that the Department of the Navy, and the Department of Defense as a
whole, can do a better job of working to address?
Secretary Del Toro. The Department of the Navy continues to focus
on cyberspace activities by prioritizing investments in cyberspace
workforce, operations, research and capabilities.
shortfalls in civilian police force staffing
5. Senator Shaheen. There is a Department of Defense (DOD) civilian
police force shortage across the Department that has developed into a
severe national security concern. In the State of Maine, this directly
affects Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) and Naval Computer and
Telecommunications Area Master Station Atlantic Detachment Cutler
(Naval Support Area Cutler), with PNSY falling below 50 percent of
their authorized force and 37 percent of their required, and Naval
Support Area Cutler falling 32 percent below their authorized force and
25 percent of their required.
Admiral Gilday, how aware is the Navy of this issue, how long has
this been occurring, and how is the Navy addressing these shortfalls?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy is keenly aware of the challenges we
continue to face attracting, hiring, and retaining security force
personnel at PNSY and NSA Cutler. We have focused on recruiting and
retaining talent for several years. We have employed a number of
strategies to address the manning shortfalls; including expanded
authorization and use of direct hiring capabilities for Police and
Security positions, authorizing targeted recruitment, relocation and
retention incentives, and raising the full performance level of Police
Officer positions to the GS-7 level. Several CNIC Regions expanded
outreach through Navy and State sponsored marketing, and hiring events
targeted toward Police Officers have been carried out over the years to
recruit local talent to expedite the hiring process. Further, CNIC has
a focused Performance to Plan (P2P) working group that is assessing
recruiting and retention challenges and proposing mitigations to reduce
fill time and enable management's ability to respond to turnover.
6. Senator Shaheen. As it stands, multiple barriers contribute to
the workforce shortage. Some include pay parity with civilian
counterparts, the Commander, Navy Installations Command requirement to
have a bachelor's degree (which is not required by police departments
in the local area), and a lack of transferability of credentials/
qualifications. For example, a Navy Master at Arms on the PNSY police
force might not meet the hiring criteria to be a General Schedule (GS)
police officer, given that the prerequisite for a new applicant is that
they must have a bachelor's degree or like experience. Or, a 10-year
veteran of the Maine State police would have to go to the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center or police academy since the mid-Atlantic
region will not honor a waiver for a 20-year retired officer or anyone
with a prior police academy with a law enforcement background.
Secretary Del Toro, of these barriers, which can the Navy remove,
which require the DOD to remove, and which require changing by Office
of Personnel Management? In addition, will pay levels need to be
considered?
Secretary Del Toro. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is the
authority that establishes formal qualification requirements for jobs
within the General Schedule employment system. The Department of Navy
(DON) applies the OPM regulations when evaluating candidates for jobs
in the Police Series (0083) and does not supplement these requirements
with other qualification factors.
A candidate for employment as a Police Officer may qualify for the
position based on three criteria: 1) education; 2) experience; or 3) a
combination of the two. New entrants to the 0083 series may qualify at
grades GS-02 through GS-06. Qualification at a specific level is
dependent upon the candidate's experience and/or education. Personnel
with prior Law Enforcement (LE) experience may submit a waiver for LE
training and police academy requirements. The waiver must be reviewed
by the DOD Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Commission and
approved by the Under Secretary of Intelligence & Security per
Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 5525.15, ``Law Enforcement
Standards and Training.''
7. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Gilday, would it be helpful to change
policy and consider classifying base police as law enforcement
officers?
Admiral Gilday. Candidates who lack qualifying work experience
related to the position may also seek qualification consideration by a
substitution of education for experience. All Executive Agencies use
the OPM established minimum qualification requirements, along with
agency-prescribed specialized requirements to qualify candidates for
Federal positions. Establishment of a Law Enforcement Officer (LEO)
designation would create significant labor implications to include age
requirements and benefit contributions.
8. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, has DOD
or the Navy applied for direct-hire authority to address the issues
identified at the named facilities?
Secretary Del Toro. The Department of Defense currently has Direct
Hire Authority (DHA) for Police Officer positions The Department of the
Navy is taking advantage of the DHA to address the identified issues at
the named facilities.
Senator Shaheen. In talks with constituents of Maine impacted by
this, a suggestion I received was to amend the recruitment process by
hiring recruits as GS-5, processing them through their required
training in the time that takes, and joining the field as GS-7,
skipping GS-6.
9. Secretary Del Toro, how feasible would change be, and what
effects would it have across the organization?
Secretary Del Toro. The experience and training completed at each
GS level provide our civilian Police Officers with the necessary
qualifications for career advancement. Adjusting the career development
to allow for a two-grade interval pattern would not be consistent with
current training requirements.
Police Officer hires have a rigorous training and development plan
that includes specific work and exposures at each grade level.
Adjusting the development plan to increase compensation without
alignment to their skill would not result in improved quality of the
work performed at the higher level without the on-the-job experience at
the intervening level.
It should be noted that increasing the grade level is not the only
way to increase pay for General Schedule (GS) employees. The Navy,
similar to other civilian employing components and agencies, has the
option to seek OPM approval of higher special rates of pay for a
category of GS employees if a determination is made that pay increases
are needed to address significant recruitment and/or retention
difficulties. (See 5 U.S.C. 5305 and 5 CFR part 530, subpart C.)
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
amphibious transport docks (lpds)
10. Senator Hirono. General Berger, a key part of Force Design 2030
is the ability to get marines and supplies to austere locations, which
requires a robust amphibious fleet. Yet, I understand the Office of the
Secretary of Defense has delayed the purchase of a required LPD for a
12th study. How would not resourcing the LPD line impact the Marine
Corps vision for Force Design 2030?
General Berger. The LPD is an essential component to reaching the
operational and statutory requirement of 31 amphibious warfare ships.
As ships are being decommissioned faster than they are procured,
delivered, and eventually employable, this inventory under President's
Budget 2024 will decrease to 27 ships over the next 5 years. While we
will likely still be able to support the Indo-Pacific Theater, we will
accept risk elsewhere in the world. The decrease in the overall
Amphibious Warfare Ship (AWS) inventory, combined with consistent/
constant Global Force Management (GFM) demand and longer than planned
maintenance availabilities results in an overworked AWS fleet with no
``ready bench'' lacking ships to fulfill SECDEF directed GFM
requirements, delayed deployments and reductions in training and
certification periods. Meanwhile, the LPD Flt II continues to be
affordably constructed with capabilities critical to providing
strategic mobility, force projection, and the ability to campaign
across the globe. It provides the ability to operate offensively in a
medium-density, multi-threat, anti-access littoral environment by being
a seabase from which the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) operates
helicopters, tiltrotor aircraft, landing craft, and amphibious
vehicles.
Effective integrated deterrence requires amphibious warfare ships.
LPDs with embarked marines provide a Distributed Maritime Operations
capability that is a flexible, scalable, and visible capability for our
combatant commanders to employ at the time and place of their choosing
in support of integrated deterrence campaigning. This flexibility is
further enhanced by the LPD Flt II capability to embark rotary-wing and
tilt-rotor aircraft and operate independently, unlike its predecessor
LSDs, which expands the options provided to the combatant commanders.
The Marine Corps has a requirement for no less than 31 amphibious
warfare ships: 10 LHA/LHD and 21 LPDs. Since 2019, three DON studies
have examined amphibious warfare ship force structure requirements. The
requirement was informed by combining the findings of those studies,
the most recent being the SecNav directed Amphibious Fleet Requirement
Study (AFRS) in 2022, with amphibious warfare ship readiness trends
over the past 10 years. AFRS was a threat informed, scenario directed,
model driven, multiple phase event executed by the analytic arms of the
Navy and the Marine Corps. The findings of AFRS were briefed to the
service chiefs and SecNav, 31 amphibious warfare ships were reported as
the minimum required. This finding is consistent with 11 amphibious
warfare ship inventory studies completed over the last 14 years.
The last Congress recognized this requirement in the James M.
Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 117-263 (2023).
Section 1023 requires the Navy maintain ``not less than 31 operational
amphibious warfare ships, of which not less than 10 shall be amphibious
assault ships.'' This law mirrors the need of the National Security
Strategy, but it is important to note, this is a floor not a ceiling.
sea lift capacity
11. Senator Hirono. Secretary Del Toro, it is widely known lift
will be crucial for any contingency in the Pacific. There are many
ongoing Navy programs aimed at this problem: the future Landing Ship
Medium and the re-capitalization of the Ready Reserve Fleet to name a
few. What does the Navy need to make sure we have the lift capabilities
the force needs in this decade?
Secretary Del Toro.
To address inter-theater lift requirements, Department of
Navy (DON) has made it a priority in their fiscal year 2024 budget
submission to recapitalize the sealift forces. This plan is an
integrated three-phase approach that 1) modernizes most viable existing
ships through a Service Life Extension program, 2) procures militarily
useful used sealift vessels to address near term capacity gaps, and 3)
develops requirements for new construction ships to recapitalize
Maritime Prepositioning Force. This work is being accomplished in order
to meet Combatant Commands delivery requirements.
Navy's commitment to meeting near-term surge sealift
requirements continues through procurement and refurbishment of used
commercial Roll-On Roll-Off ships for replacement of aging Ready
Reserve Force capacity. The Navy requires continued support for the
BuyUsed recapitalization program in order to provide a stable
acquisition profile with forecasted maintenance and repair costs to
meet strategic mobility requirements at a moderate level of risk.
Navy continues to act on congressional authorities to
address strategic sealift readiness and recapitalization by purchasing
two used vessels that participated in the Maritime Security Program.
The CAPE ARUNDEL and CORTES will complete re-classification, baseline
readiness and modification and be ready for tasking Q3 FY23. Also,
Maritime Administration (MARAD)'s Vessel Acquisition Manager awarded a
contract for three sister ships and is performing a market analysis for
additional ships. Ships will complete re-flag, reclassification and
modification and be ready for tasking approximately 8 months after
transfer of ship from seller.
The Sealift Buy-Used program will execute to authorized
limitations with the purchase of nine used vessels by fiscal year 2024.
The Navy requires support for the fiscal year 2024 Sealift Legislative
Proposal requesting removal of the overall limitation of the purchase
of foreign-built used vessels, necessary to expediently and cost
effectively be prepared to deliver this required capability in wartime.
As part of the intra-theater lift requirement the Navy is
investing in requirements development of the newest class of at-sea
resupply ships, the Next-Generation Logistics Ships (NGLS). NGLS will
augment existing Combat Logistics Force ships, adding more capacity in
theater for the distribution of logistics commodities. The Navy's
fiscal year 2024 budget request includes research and development
funding for the NGLS program to support procurement of the first ships
in fiscal year 2026.
As part of the integrated solution to address tactical
lift, Navy is investing in Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) service
life extension and the procurement of the LCAC's replacement, the Ship
to Shore Connector (SSC). The SSC provides a robust, modern operational
capability to land credible combat power from amphibious ships across
beaches not accessible by conventional landing craft, thus enabling the
Marine Corps and Navy to project combat power ashore from the sea. The
SSC provides a one-for-one enhanced replacement platform for legacy
LCAC, which are reaching an average 30 years of age. The Navy is
continuing to support production progress in serial SSC deliveries.
The Navy is also replacing its aging Landing Craft
Utility (LCU) fleet with the LCU 1700 program which recapitalizes the
capabilities and flexibility currently provided by the LCU 1610 Class
in a more fuel efficient, cost effective, and updated design. Navy
requires support of the fiscal year 2024 budget request to continue to
modernize the aging LCU 1610 fleet, which is currently approaching an
average age of 50 years, with a request for two additional LCU 1700.
The Navy is investing in a Medium Landing Ship to provide
distributed maneuver and mobility support for littoral expeditionary
forces such as Marine Littoral Regiments in contested littoral
environments. The fiscal year 2024 funding request continues the
development of the equipment baseline and efforts to support a lead
hull contract award in fiscal year 2025.
Navy's integrated strategy addresses near-term lift needs
while establishing strategically placed long-term lift solutions to
support employment across the competition continuum.
shipyard modernization
12. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, I was glad to see the Dry Dock
3 replacement at Pearl Harbor was fully funded in this year's budget
request. As you know, this is a complex project that the Navy must get
right. I also remain focused on resourcing the Waterfront Production
Facility to ensure our shipyard workers have the required tools and a
logical shop layout. While I understand there may be engineering
constraints to completing the dry dock at the same time as the
production facility, this is a critical part of the Shipyard
Infrastructure Modernization Plan and should be prioritized as such.
Admiral Gilday, the planned mission need date for the waterfront
production facility is fiscal year 2028. Is the facility on track to be
completed by then?
Admiral Gilday. The Waterfront Production Facility (WPF) at Pearl
Harbor Naval Shipyard (PHNS) is not on track to meet the mission need
date of fiscal year 2028 reflected in the most recent Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Program 5-Year Plan Report to Congress. The
Navy has prioritized completion of the PHNS Dry Dock 3 replacement
project, but as mentioned in the same report, needs additional funding
for WPF planning and design efforts. The $20 million provided for WPF
design funding in the fiscal year 2023 Omnibus spending bill allowed
for the initiation of facility design efforts.
13. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, how are is the Navy ensuring
that the Dry Dock 3 replacement project stays on time and on budget?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy is employing a coordinated management
strategy across contracting, organizational, and scope domains to
control cost and schedule for the Dry Dock 3 replacement project at
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (PHNS). That work is synchronized with
fleet and maintenance schedules to ensure alignment with operational
demands.
During project design, the acquisition strategy used early
contractor involvement to obtain feedback from all five potential
bidders on constructability of the project and the contract documents.
Their feedback ensured the design was buildable, led to improvements in
the design, and corrected items that would have otherwise been found
during construction, potentially creating cost and schedule changes.
The contract allowed for alternative technical approaches, changes to
the design that the government accepted as part of the award which will
mitigate cost and schedule risk.
Additionally, the Navy awarded separate contracts ahead of the main
construction contract, to accomplish environmental dredging and remove
unexploded ordnance, averting a significant risk of delay at the
beginning of work. A separate contract was completed to relocate the
perimeter fence around the Controlled Industrial Area, allowing
unimpeded access for the construction contractor at the start of work.
The construction contract includes an economic price adjustment clause
that places risk for the escalation of many materials on the
government, lowering the award cost. The contract offers significant
award fees for completing specific milestones (including ultimate
completion) by specific dates, providing meaningful incentives to meet
performance standards.
Lastly, the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program's Program
Management Office retains visibility and accountability for schedule,
cost, and performance at every level, with well-defined thresholds to
preserve flag officer-level decision space. The Navy has established
formal project governance, learning from other mega-projects, setting
expectations for issue resolution. The Naval Facilities Engineering
Systems Command commissioned a dedicated Officer in Charge of
Construction to provide a level of oversight far beyond the typical
construction effort, patterned off recent success at other naval
depots. The project execution team continuously identifies and monitors
risk and uses both qualitative and quantitative analysis to report on
and manage risks until they are retired.
work force development; immigration reform
14. Senator Hirono. Secretary Del Toro, I am concerned by the slow
pace of ship and submarine construction and maintenance. For example,
the Navy is buying 2 Virginia submarines a year, but only receiving
about 1.2 a year, which I know you both find unacceptable. The DOD is
spending a fortune to fix this, in part through workforce development--
but I am not sure that we have yet to find the right answer to this
complex problem. Developing a workforce is a worthy endeavor, but if
there are simply not enough workers, money alone will not solve the
problem. Secretary Del Toro, I was pleased to hear you speak on the
need for immigration reform earlier this year. Could you expand further
on the importance of our immigrant workforce to military readiness?
Secretary Del Toro. We are facing a national shortage of blue
collar workers and with historically low unemployment rates, recruiting
skilled laborers is even more challenging. We need to take a holistic
approach to maintaining a shipyard workforce that is capable of
executing the Department of the Navy's (DON) shipbuilding plans. This
all-hands-on-deck approach involves multiple engagement strategies to
include retention and recruitment efforts as well as potentially
increasing the number of candidates by leveraging applicable visa work
programs.
With retention efforts focused on monetary incentives for current
employees, the DON is expanding its outreach program with hiring events
at colleges, vocational centers, and conference centers. In addition to
these employment focused events, the DON is developing an engagement
strategy to advertise and recruit skilled laborers at various public
venues to include sporting events and Fleet Week festivities.
The abovementioned efforts may not be enough and we will need to do
more to attract the skilled labor force our shipyards require. This
includes a potentially greater focus on programs that provide foreign
nationals an opportunity to lawfully employ their skills in a trade
that advances our military readiness.
climate resiliency
15. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, your
services own many of the bases most vulnerable to climate change in the
country. This year's budget request includes $3.7 billion for
installation resiliency measures, which is about equal to the cost of
repairs to Camp Lejeune after Hurricane Florence. Rising sea levels and
more extreme weather events will make these types of repairs costlier
and more frequent unless we make investments now. Following the
Department of Defense's Climate Adaption Plan, the Department of the
Navy released Climate Action 2030. Admiral Gilday and General Berger,
how is implementation of both these plans going, and what is the
importance of fully funding these measures?
Admiral Gilday. The Department of the Navy's Climate Action 2030
acknowledges that climate resilience is an important component of
mission readiness and works to ensure our installations and
infrastructure are resilient to a wide range of near-term and long-
range challenges. These challenges include extreme weather events,
water scarcity, sea level rise, flooding, wildfires, and other
environmental considerations and threats that can affect operations and
present significant risks to mission. We see climate affecting the Navy
in significant ways and expect this impact to intensify in the coming
years. By incorporating climate change considerations into the
decisionmaking process for shore investments, the Navy gains
operational and tactical advantages, remains agile, preserves decision
space, and reduces climate hazard risks to mission and operations.
To further support the Administration's priorities, the Navy
integrated the goals of Climate Action 2030 into current mission
requirements and installation investments, for example:
Incorporating installation climate resilience plan (ICRP)
components in our Master Planning process and plans. The Navy completed
an ICRP at Naval Base San Diego and prioritized and resourced ICRPs at
Naval Base Guam, Naval Base Coronado, and Naval Support Activity
Hampton Roads.
Increasing implementation of water and energy
conservation measures in buildings and piloting use of low-carbon
building materials.
Incorporating water resilience analysis and mitigation
recommendations into annual Installation Energy Program Summaries.
Conserving water to the maximum extent practicable
through activities that positively impact groundwater recharge,
stormwater retention, and sustainable land management on Navy
installations and ranges.
Planning installation micro-grids and long duration
battery storage to ensure continuity of critical missions.
Proactively leveraging public and private ventures and
third-party financing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions of non-
tactical vehicle fleets and the emissions and traffic impacts of the
commuting military, civilian, and contractor workforce.
Constructing living shorelines and breakwater projects to
reduce shoreline erosion and protect Navy missions from sea level rise
and storm surge.
Investing in resilience projects at the U.S. Naval
Academy (USNA) to improve installation resilience.
Investments in the President's Budget 2024 focus on building
installations resilience and include investments to improve the Navy's
aging utility systems, USNA resilience investments, planning and design
of two Net Zero building retrofits, upgrading building control systems
for improved cybersecurity and energy savings, initiating carbon
footprint assessments to identify energy savings opportunities at Navy
installations, planning and installation of electric vehicle support
equipment (EVSE) and leasing of non-tactical zero emission vehicles,
greening bases initiative, xeriscaping projects, and greenhouse gas
emissions tracking and reduction.
General Berger. These initiatives are important to ensuring the
ability of our installations to to withstand natural hazards and
extreme weather events (e.g., coastal storms, floods, desertification,
drought, wildfire, etc.).
The Department of Defense's Climate Adaptation Plan, Department of
the Navy's Climate Action 2030, and congressional statutes improve
resiliency and sustainability of installations through master planning;
improve energy security posture through third party financing and
accelerating advanced micro-grid deployment; and implement nature-based
solution projects to address climate impacts, sequester carbon, and
enhance ecosystems. We are pursuing climate resiliency initiatives
aligned with our missions.
Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) Parris Island (PI) completed a
Climate Change Resiliency and Adaptation Plan (2020) and a Master Plan
(2021). These documents are being used to develop military construction
and facilities, sustainment, restoration, and modernization investment
projects to reduce existing and projected localized flooding. The
Military Installation Resilience Review of Marine Corps Air Station
(MCAS) Beaufort and MCRD PI has developed a toolkit for structural
infrastructure interventions and nonstructural planning approaches to
adapt to climate change and optimize resilience for shared community
assets and infrastructure.
Fiscal year 2023 funding and the Fiscal Year 2024 President's
Budget Request address erosion and flooding issues affecting training
areas and ranges at Marine Corps Base (MCB) Hawaii, MCAS Cherry Point,
MCAS Beaufort, and MCAS Yuma. Installation Master Plan updates will be
complete in fiscal year 2025 for MCB Camp Lejeune and in fiscal year
2026 for MCB Camp Pendleton.
These resources ensure the Marine Corps is postured to meet the
Department's stated performance goals: 1) build climate resilience, and
2) reduce climate threat through prioritizing Science & Technology
research of Operational Energy advancements and fossil fuel demand
reduction initiatives such as anti-idle applications, hydrogen power
research and continued research into tactical vehicle hybrid/electric
components.
pier side maintenance
16. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, as more ships and submarines
are based forward the need for pier side maintenance capacity is
outpacing shipyard growth. What is the importance of replacement
submarine tenders in Guam?
Admiral Gilday. Forward-based replacement submarine tenders are
required to support SSNs, SSBNs, SSGNs, UUVs, and submarine emergency
response requirements for homeported, transient, and visiting
submarines and UUVs in Guam. Submarine tenders directly contribute to
submarine force readiness by enhancing submarine material readiness
through intermediate-level maintenance support, loading, unloading, and
storing submarine weapons and unmanned vehicles, and resupplying
submarines with a range of materials. The tenders also support emergent
nuclear and non-nuclear repairs for submarines across the theater. The
replacement submarine tenders will be more capable of providing
submarine and UUV support than current tenders and will be specifically
designed to support deployed Virginia-class and Columbia-class
submarines. The nearest Intermediate Maintenance Facility (IMF) is in
Pearl Harbor, HI for Guam homeported boats. Replacement tenders in Guam
also add significant time in operational availability back to Guam-
homeported and visiting platforms since they are not forced to transit
to Pearl Harbor for tending, resupply or intermediate-level
maintenance. In addition, future tenders in Guam will be required to
support submarines during peacetime and wartime. The proximity of Guam
replacement tenders will allow the submarine force to maintain presence
and project power in the INDOPACOM theater.
USS Frank Cable and USS Emory S. Land submarine tenders will exceed
their service lives by 13+ years before the first AS(X) reaches initial
operational capability in fiscal year 2031. These tenders were designed
and fitted to accommodate attack submarines in a peacetime environment
at Guam and provide pier-side moored repair and services to submarines.
The current tenders lack the capacity to support modern weapons systems
handling and storage, C5I communications, water processing, rapid
mooring counter weights, and fender storage/deployment. The current
tenders also lack dedicated airlift capability.
The AS(X) platform, as an expeditionary tender, will have peacetime
and wartime missions. In peacetime, the AS(X) provides pier side
support in a forward deployed submarine homeport, providing sustained
repair, supply, weapons handling, and tending operations for home
ported or visiting submarines and ships, and fly away emergent voyage
repair services for other deployed submarines and ships. AS(X) also
provides rapid emergency response to crew rescue operations, nuclear/
radiological emergencies, and natural disasters. AS(X) will
periodically provide tended submarines off ship support, including
messing and berthing facilities, when they become uninhabitable due to
repair and overhaul work.
In wartime, AS(X) may be tasked to transit in an open-ocean,
hostile environment, unescorted to or from a port where operations are
occurring. During the transit, the AS(X) can conduct independent anti-
surface self-defense operations against non-warship surface craft and
limited anti-air self-defense employing small caliber crew-served
weapons fire. Once AS(X) has arrived at a Joint or Allied force forward
staging port or at anchor, it will continue self-defense and force
protection and require minimal port security. From the forward
location, AS(X) will be capable of providing repair, resupply, weapons
replenishment, and tending operations to multiple submarines providing
rapid repair and replenishment of deployed submarines, allowing them to
get back to the fight faster.
17. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, Hawaii is scheduled to get a
floating dry dock in 2032. Will that be late to need?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy plans to initiate construction of a
floating dry dock for Hawaii in 2032 for delivery to meet the mission
need date in 2036. The Navy awarded a site selection study in late 2022
to evaluate potential operating sites within Joint Base Pearl Harbor-
Hickam. The results of this study are due this summer and will inform
the Navy's way ahead on pier infrastructure requirements and Military
Construction / Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization project
funding needed to support the floating dry dock.
18. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, what can be done to make pier-
side maintenance more efficient?
Admiral Gilday. Analysis by the Center for Naval Analysis shows
Days of Maintenance Delay are attributed to four main efforts:
Modernization, Throughput, Unplanned Work, and Material Availability.
Improvements in each of these efforts will make pier-side maintenance
more efficient.
To address the challenges of completing availabilities on time from
CNO Availabilities and Intermediate Availabilities, the Navy continues
to develop and institute Naval Sustainment System--Shipyard (NSS-SY)
and Supply initiatives, leverage Performance to Plan (P2P) and Get
Real, Get Better behavior and improvements. These initiatives are not
constrained to availabilities in dry docks, rather they permeate
throughout each of the public shipyards, and include pier side
maintenance.
In support of all maintenance availabilities, the Navy has
developed the 15-Year Maintenance Strategy while NSS-SY identifies and
executes initiatives that reduce nuclear ship and submarine maintenance
availability durations at public shipyards.
Additional initiatives underway to improve shipyard performance,
throughput and material readiness, and reduce unplanned work include:
Waterfront improvement initiatives which span three focus
areas:
1. Project Management Fundamental adherence including
transparency, accountability and training needed at all levels.
2. Improved metrics fidelity to drive better understanding of
performance versus targets and why goals are missed.
3. Implementing a culture of fix or elevate at shipyards.
Leadership is spending more time on the deck plates and improving
process review to better support inputs from mechanics.
Inside the shops, there is focus on lean transformation
resulting in leaning out ship areas to drive safe, quality flow of
material. The shops are also working on schedule integration to improve
connectivity to project schedules and implement ``drop-in'' governance.
Finally, shops are using lean skillsets to unlock shop leads and Gemba
through lean coaching and training. Gemba is the observation of work in
action, often to provide senior leaders a better understanding of how
things get accomplished and provide any help that may be needed.
NAVSEA is leveraging a three-pronged approach to address
hiring challenges and improve retention.
Special Pay Rates: One of the leading indicators
related to under performance of hiring plans is the disparity of pay in
comparison to private industry. Each shipyard developed data-driven
positions to be considered for Special Pay Rates.
Through the NSS-SY People Pillar the Expert
Tradesperson initiative creates a career path that incentivizes our
best and brightest mechanics to stay in the wage grade field. The
Expert Tradesperson position was established with a clear vision and
intent to enhance a career in trades and increase responsibilities and
authorities within the production department, thereby dramatically
improving throughput and productive capacity.
Exceptions to Pay Increase Limitations: Annual
appropriations law found in the Financial Services and General
Government Appropriations Act places limits on wage schedule increases
for Federal Wage System positions. This limitation does not provide
parity with private industry and places undue burden on the naval
shipyards to recruit or retain qualified employees.
Development of a comprehensive plan to purchase CNO
availability material with sufficient lead time to ensure it is
received by the start of availability.
Development of the Planning Improvement Control Board
process which helps alter or remove outdated requirements, or
anticipate more efficiently addressing planning or inspection
requirements.
Development of the Engineering Intervention Board (EIB)
which was established in fiscal year 2021 to revise or remove
maintenance requirements and improve maintenance effectiveness by
leveraging SEA 05 expertise and technical authority. The goal of this
effort is to reduce work package sizes by challenging cumbersome
technical requirements and supporting ideation of priority improvement
items, in partnership with field activity stakeholders. This effort by
the EIB supports the NAVSEA Commander's intent to implement a full
system transformation to deliver nuclear ships from maintenance
availabilities to the Fleet on time.
The aforementioned initiatives will improve Modernization,
Throughput, Unplanned Work, and Material Availability and thus increase
the overall efficiency of ship maintenance including pier side
maintenance availabilities within the public shipyards.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
non-deployable assignment & care
19. Senator Kaine. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, as
discussed during the hearing, it came to my attention during visits to
the Mid-Atlantic Regional Maintenance Center following the suicides of
4 sailors that Navy manning policy allows for a 60 percent increase in
the assignment of personnel (30 percent for limited duty and 30 percent
for pregnancy/post-partum) but does not address the additional
resources needed to support a population that requires specialized time
and attention. During the hearing Secretary Del Toro mentioned that
Navy is ``channeling back'' on that policy. Where are these changes
codified and how are you ensuring their implementation?
Secretary Del Toro. and Admiral Gilday. Navy is currently
conducting a holistic review of assignment policies for both Limited
Duty (LIMDU) and pregnant/post-partum sailors to ensure their
assignment offers sufficient support and meaningful duties with
accommodation for their medical/work limitations. As an immediate and
interim action while this review is ongoing, distribution of LIMDU
sailors was shifted from previous distribution models to an even
percentage across appropriate shore commands within a geographic
region, providing a reduction in LIMDU populations at our largest shore
commands.
rcoh assignment policies
20. Senator Kaine. Secretary Del Toro, last year's House report to
the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2023 directed a
report to the Committees of the Armed Services of the Senate and House
to address alternative approaches to manning ships undergoing refueling
and complex overhaul (RCOH). What is the status of the report?
Secretary Del Toro. The report has been drafted and is under review
within the Department of the Navy. It will be provided to you and the
Committee in the near future.
21. Senator Kaine. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, is the
Navy considering the implementation of alternative policies for first-
term sailors assigned to ships undergoing RCOH as a result of the House
report requirement?
Secretary Del Toro. and Admiral Gilday. The Navy is considering
options for assignments policies for first-term sailors assigned to
ships undergoing RCOH with anticipated costs and benefits. Options
currently being reviewed by Navy leadership include:
1) Expanding cross-deck opportunities for first-term sailors to
serve aboard operational units.
Developing a split-tour program that ensures first-term sailors are
not assigned to carriers in RCOH for longer than 2 years.
22. Senator Kaine. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, in
addition to considering changes to policy regarding first-term sailor
assignment to ships undergoing significant maintenance, what are other
ways (if any) that the Navy is challenging assumptions about crew
assignments during RCOH?
Secretary Del Toro. and Admiral Gilday. The Navy is challenging
assumptions about crew assignments during RCOH in the following areas:
1) Navy Manpower Analysis Center will conduct a study to identify
RCOH ``essential'' manning. The study will establish minimum acceptable
RCOH crew size by rating, for each of the different phases of the RCOH.
2) Evaluating Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) policy and
the provision of crew meals when shipboard food services are not
available or are limited during RCOH.
components of mental health
23. Senator Kaine. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, we
understand that Navy has recently made adjustments to its physical
readiness program in an effort to boost recruitment and retention.
Although the program can be an effective force-shaping tool when used
in this manner, it does not appear to incentivize the individual
physical readiness of the average sailor but rather, encourages meeting
the minimum standard by employing negative reinforcement in terms of
career consequences. This type of policy does not seem to align with
the Navy's Get Real, Get Better or Culture of Excellence campaigns.
Furthermore, physical health is an essential component of mental health
so it stands to reason that positive reinforcement of and a commitment
to physical fitness requirements could have a positive effect on the
overall mental health of the force. What is the feasibility of
providing sailors with career incentives for individual physical
readiness achievements and are there plans to incorporate this into
future talent management initiatives?
Secretary Del Toro. and Admiral Gilday. Navy supports a holistic
approach to overall wellness, recognizing that a tough and resilient
mind, body, and spirit is essential to preparing one's self for the
rigors of deployments and combat.
Sailors are incentivized for their physical fitness in their
periodic performance evaluations. The military bearing section
considers a sailor's performance in physical readiness. These
performance evaluations are considered when sailors compete for
advancement.
Commanding Officers and Officers in Charge are highly encouraged to
further develop awards or incentive programs that encourage sailors to
live healthier lifestyles. Examples include special liberty for
excellence, award certificates for excellence and improvement, and
sailors who score outstanding being exempt from command physical
training for a period of time.
24. Senator Kaine. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, during
the hearing Senator Reed asked about sleep deprivation as a
contributing factor to sailor mental health and suicide. You responded
by saying that the suicide of the sailor he was referring to was partly
due to their inability to sleep aboard the USS George Washington,
undergoing RCOH. However, a Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report in 2021 found that only 14 percent of deployed Surface Warfare
Officers were receiving the recommended 7 or more hours of sleep needed
for optimal performance and that the Navy was inconsistent in its
efforts to ensure the mandatory amount of rest per 24-hour period. A
survey of surface fleet officers and enlisted personnel drew similar
conclusions. Fatigue management has not only been a causal factor in
the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain collisions but it is shown to
contribute to mental health issues. The Navy's own Mental Health
Playbook issued in February states, ``Consistently, the data and the
science show that if our people are not sleeping, eating, or
exercising--they are at higher risk for mental health issues.'' How is
the Navy implementing and enforcing Commander Naval Surface Forces
Pacific Instruction/Commander Naval Surface Forces Atlantic Instruction
3120.2A?
Secretary Del Toro. and Admiral Gilday. The Navy is implementing
the measures below to mitigate the effects of fatigue and improve the
sleep obtained by Navy Surface forces.
A 24-hour work and sleep cycle for all hands, every day.
Target of 7.5 hours of sleep opportunity for all hands
each 24-hour period, subject to operational tasking and manning. If not
achievable in a single block, planned naps.
Limits to the length of the work-day (12 hours planned,
maximum of 14 hours)
A shipboard routine that supports both rest and work
(scheduled watch, meals, announcements, training, meetings).
Specific, formal consideration of the risk of fatigue in
planned and unplanned work and watch evolutions.
Leveraging bio-monitoring, analytics, data-driven manning
experiments, and additional research to further improve, supervised by
our Human Factors Engineer, including our Human Systems Integration
experts, and share best practices with other type commanders via the
U.S. Fleet Forces Command & Commander, Pacific Fleet Fleet Operational
Safety Council.
Addressing physical barriers to quality sleep/sleep
obtained and better watch environment including:
Improved lighting for berthing and workspaces,
mattresses, blankets, rack design, berthing noise, and berthing
temperatures.
Bridge lighting and equipment lighting/positioning
improvements for day and night, bridge and combat information center
paint schemes
Partnership with Naval Sea Systems Command Human
Systems Integrations and technical warrant holders.
Training in these policies is provided at each milestone
including the Basic Division Officer Indoctrination Course, Department
Head School, and the Surface Command Course. Similar training is
provided to each ship as part of the shipboard Basic Phase.
Since 2022, to promote enforcement, the Navy has introduced two
tools that provide near real-time data on sleep and fatigue at multiple
echelons. Command Readiness, Endurance and Watchstanding (CREW)
collects biometric sleep, activity and health data to provide near
real-time information to the sailor, medical, and leaders. This
overcomes the inaccuracy inherent in individuals' attempts to gauge the
effects of fatigue on performance, and allows for timely, effective
individual, team, unit-level and Force interventions and risk
management. This effort is largely funded by the Military Operational
Medicine Research Program (MOMRP) and builds on previous work to
monitor COVID and a partnership with the Naval Health Research Center
and Office of Naval Research, in addition to previous work with NASA
and the trucking industry. Initial operational capability is pending
additional funding.
Additionally, Optimized Watch bill Logistics (OWL) uses data and
individual qualifications in a sophisticated model for watch bill and
work planning and management. Initial operating capacity is 2023 with
several ships already enrolled. Like CREW, OWL is largely MOMRP funded.
Modeling and decision tools are also embedded within the Surface
Training and Readiness Management System (replacing the Relational
Administrative Data Management system), which is in testing at sea for
integration with the Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise
Service. OWL has a fatigue module that is based on schedules; once CREW
is fully funded, it will provide actual fatigue data to OWL to aid
decision makers.
25. Secretary Senator Kaine. Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, how is
the Navy implementing and enforcing the fatigue management
recommendations made in the GAO-21-366, Navy Readiness report,
particularly recommendations 1-4 related to collecting data, addressing
causal factors, and identifying and assisting units that are not in
compliance?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Afloat Safety Climate
Assessment Survey is administered twice per Optimized Fleet Response
Plan (OFRP) to each ship. This focused, peer-reviewed set of questions
focuses on safety and sleep and provides detailed information on the
amount of sleep achieved by each individual, with the data sorted by
ship class and Department. To assist individual ships with compliance,
the results are reviewed by the cognizant Type Commander and debriefed
in-person to the Triad (CO/XO/CMC) with specific recommendations for
improved sleep. To date, the average sleep has increased from 5.1 to
5.25 hours since the surveys started in 2021, but further improvements
will be contingent upon improved manning onboard ships. In addition to
the length of sleep, the transition to circadian watches has been shown
to reduce overall fatigue across the force. The surveys also show the
main factors that impact the quality of sleep: the most frequently
cited issues are work stress, mattresses, interference from other crew
members, and rack curtains. Initiatives are underway with the NAVSEA
Habitability Technical Warrant Holder to address the challenges
associated with the berthing environment.
Starting in 2023, each ship must conduct a quarterly self-
assessment in the Training and Operational Readiness Information
Services program, to address adherence to the Crew Endurance Policy.
Additionally, each ship must sign out a Commanding Officer's Standing
Order that articulates a tailored policy to meet the requirements of
the SURFOR instruction. This approach is designed to ensure a
consistent deck-plate application of the instruction and a culture of
self-assessment. External assessments are conducted once per OFRP
during Mariner Skills Week as part of the Basic Phase.
The Command Readiness, Endurance and Watchstanding (CREW)
represents the primary effort by the Navy Surface Force to collect data
on sailor fatigue, identify causal factors for sailor fatigue, and
identify units not in compliance with Commander Naval Surface Forces
Pacific Instruction/Commander Naval Surface Forces Atlantic Instruction
3120.2A. CREW collects biometric sleep, activity and health data to
provide near real-time information to the sailor, medical, and leaders,
providing for systematic collection of quality and timely fatigue data
from sailors that are accessible to operational commanders to support
underway decisionmaking.
Once fully implemented, CREW data on sailor fatigue will be
utilized to identify, monitor, and evaluate factors that contribute to
fatigue and inadequate sleep such as the effects of crew shortfalls,
work requirements, administrative requirements, and collateral duties.
Additionally, the data provided to operational and administrative
leadership by CREW will allow for identification of those units that
need greater assistance and attention in implementing the Navy's
policies on fatigue.
hr transformation
26. Senator Kaine. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, our
office has received over 18,000 pieces of correspondence from
constituents concerning Navy pay and personnel issues, ranging from
inaccurate affiliation dates resulting in a break in service and loss
of Transitional Assistance Management Program benefits, to DD-214
errors and untimeliness that cause significant issues for
servicemembers attempting to transition from the service. What is the
status of your Human Resources modernization efforts and how do you
plan to offer increased transparency and responsiveness (in addition to
speed, accuracy and quality) to your processes?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The MyNavy H.R. system
digital transformation is designed to improve services to all Active
component and Reserve sailors and future recruits through a modernized
MyNavy H.R. information technology (IT) system of systems. We are
engaging in a number of lines of effort within transformation:
1. Enterprise Customer Relationship Management (eCRM)--focused
on enhanced recruiting and maintaining customer relationships to
provide transactional handoffs through a tiered service helpdesk model.
2. MyNavy All Access (MNAA)--dedicated to developing a single
point of entry for the sailor to interact with and view data in the
MyNavy H.R. environment via web and mobile applications.
3. Authoritative Data Environment (ADE)--the data service for
MyNavy HR, providing a single, integrated, and authoritative source of
data to enable workforce decisionmaking to improve sailor and fleet
readiness.
4. Navy Personnel and Pay (NP2)--the integrated personnel and
pay system that enhances how sailors receive pay support. NP2 leverages
an audible, cloud-hosted software solution to enable Treasury-Direct
disbursement and a single pay source.
5. Learning Stack (LS)--provides modernized content delivery and
curriculum development to support on-demand training at the point of
need.
This IT modernization will enable improved operations in
recruiting, personnel and pay support, assignment and distribution,
training, and in other mission areas within the Personnel, Manpower and
Training space. With regards to personnel and pay issues, MyNavy Career
Center (MNCC) recently transformed the legacy, decentralized Personnel
Support Detachment (PSD) model of 27 locations to align around the work
and eliminate variability. It now consists of a Human Resources Service
Center (HRSC) with call center locations in Millington, TN and Little
Creek, VA; six Transaction Service Centers (TSC); a Travel Processing
Center (TPC) in Millington; and 13 Regional Support Centers (RSC) to
improve efficiency, accuracy, and training.
Each TSC functions as a Center of Excellence (COE) for a specific
major transaction type and is led by an O-5 or above commanding officer
for accountability, transparency, responsiveness and to uphold a higher
standard for Sailor Pay. RSCs are designed as the principal point of
contact for leadership teams who are working through personnel and pay
issues and to train Command Pay and Personnel Administrators (CPPAs).
HRSC operates 24/7/365 and provides a wide range of assistance to
sailors and their families. HRSC provides up-to-date information and
resolves issues at the Tier 1 level. HRSC conducts ``warm handoffs'' to
subject matter experts in our TSCs and one TPC if the situation
requires action beyond the authority of HRSC agents.
In order to deliver a simple IT solution to Personnel/Pay and
increase the visibility, transparency, and responsiveness of the
personnel and pay enterprise, the following items have recently been
implemented for use by MNCC, command triads, and CPPAs:
Enterprise Customer Relationship Management (eCRM).
Allows MNCC to globally track, process, and manage most Personnel/Pay
transactions. eCRM allows MNCC to track a transaction from the time it
is submitted through completion, with full visibility of all actions
taken.
CPPA Dashboard. Increases transparency of transactions
and allows command leaders to view individual CPPA performance metrics
at the unit level.
Enhanced Unit Commanders Financial Report (eUCFR). MNCC
coordinated with the Defense Finance Accounting Service to develop the
eUCFR, providing commands with a monthly snapshot of each sailors
monthly pay and entitlements.
MNCC continues to review and improve business processes for all
types of personnel and pay transactions. As these processes improve
MNCC has also been dedicated to increase Personnel/Pay knowledge and
experience in our TSCs, RSCs, and CPPAs to further improve transaction
responsiveness and accuracy.
submarine industrial base
27. Senator Kaine. Secretary Del Toro, Congress has provided
significant funding for investment in the submarine industrial base.
How is the Navy deciding where that funding should go? Can you provide
a summary of where these investments are being made?
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy's ability to reach and sustain the
required submarine production cadence of one Columbia-class submarine
and two Virginia-class submarines per year is gated by addressing
challenges to Submarine Industrial Base (SIB) capability, capacity, and
workforce. SIB funding is addressing these challenges by investing in
critical areas to include modernizing shipbuilder infrastructure,
strengthening supply chain capability/capacity, scaling new
technologies, addressing workforce trade skill gaps and constraints,
expanding productive capacity via strategic outsourcing, and scaling
government oversight of expanded industrial base efforts.
Through significant analysis, the Navy has identified the most
pressing needs within each of these areas and is providing resources to
address.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
shortfalls in civilian police force staffing
28. Senator King. There is a DOD civilian police force shortage
across the Department that has developed into a severe national
security concern. In the State of Maine, this directly affects
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) and Naval Computer and
Telecommunications Area Master Station Atlantic Detachment Cutler
(Naval Support Area Cutler), with PNSY falling below 50 percent of
their authorized force and 37 percent of their required, and Naval
Support Area Cutler falling 32 percent below their authorized force and
25 percent of their required.
Admiral Gilday, how aware is the Navy of this issue, how long has
this been occurring, and how is the Navy addressing these shortfalls?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy is keenly aware of the challenges we
continue to face attracting, hiring, and retaining security force
personnel at PNSY and NSA Cutler. We have focused on recruiting and
retaining talent for several years. We have employed a number of
strategies to address the manning shortfalls; including expanded
authorization and use of direct hiring capabilities for Police and
Security positions, authorizing targeted recruitment, relocation and
retention incentives, and raising the full performance level of Police
Officer positions to the GS-7 level. Several CNIC Regions expanded
outreach through Navy and State sponsored marketing, and hiring events
targeted toward Police Officers have been carried out over the years to
recruit local talent to expedite the hiring process. Further, CNIC has
a focused Performance to Plan (P2P) working group that is assessing
recruiting and retention challenges and proposing mitigations to reduce
fill time and enable management's ability to respond to turnover.
As it stands, multiple barriers contribute to the workforce
shortage. Some include pay parity with civilian counterparts, the
Commander, Navy Installations Command requirement to have a bachelor's
degree (which is not required by police departments in the local area),
and a lack of transferability of credentials/qualifications. For
example, a Navy Master at Arms on the PNSY police force might not meet
the hiring criteria to be a General Schedule (GS) police officer, given
that the prerequisite for a new applicant is that they must have a
bachelor's degree or like experience. Or, a 10-year veteran of the
Maine State police would have to go to the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center or police academy since the mid-Atlantic region will
not honor a waiver for a 20-year retired officer or anyone with a prior
police academy with a law enforcement background.
29. Senator King. Secretary Del Toro, of these barriers, which can
the Navy remove, which require the DOD to remove, and which require
changing by OPM? In addition, will pay levels need to be considered?
Secretary Del Toro. OPM is the authority that establishes formal
qualification requirements for jobs within the General Schedule
employment system. The DON applies the OPM regulations when evaluating
candidates for jobs in the Police Series (0083) and does not supplement
these requirements with other qualification factors.
A candidate for employment as a Police Officer may qualify for the
position based on any of three criteria: 1) education, 2) experience,
or 3) a combination of the two. New entrants to the 0083 series may
qualify at grades GS-02 through GS-06. Qualification at a specific
level is dependent upon the candidate's experience and/or education.
Attainment of a bachelor's degree is not required under OPM
qualifications in order to qualify at any grade level in the 0083
series. Personnel with prior law enforcement (LE) experience may submit
a waiver for LE training and police academy requirements. The waiver
must be approved by the DOD Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST)
Commission.
30. Senator King. Admiral Gilday, would it be helpful to change
policy and consider classifying base police as law enforcement
officers?
Admiral Gilday. Candidates who lack qualifying work experience
related to the position may also seek qualification consideration by a
substitution of education for experience. All Executive Agencies use
the OPM established minimum qualification requirements, along with
agency-prescribed specialized requirements to qualify candidates for
Federal positions. Establishment of a Law Enforcement Officer (LEO)
designation would create significant labor implications to include age
requirements and benefit contributions.
31. Senator King. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, has DOD or
the Navy applied for direct-hire authority to address the issues
identified at the named facilities?
Secretary Del Toro. The DOD has Direct Hire Authority for Police
Officer positions. The DON is taking advantage of the DHA to address
the identified issues at the named facilities.
32. Senator King. In talks with constituents of Maine impacted by
this, a suggestion I received was to amend the recruitment process by
hiring recruits as GS-5, processing them through their required
training in the time that takes, and joining the field as GS-7,
skipping GS-6.
Secretary Del Toro, how feasible would change be, and what effects
would it have across the organization?
Secretary Del Toro. The experience and training completed at each
GS level provide our civilian Police Officers with the necessary
qualifications for career advancement. Adjusting the career development
to allow for a two-grade interval pattern would not be consistent with
current training requirements.
Police Officer new hires have a rigorous training and development
plan that includes specific work and exposures at each grade level.
Adjusting the development plan to increase compensation without
alignment to their skill would not result in improved quality of the
work performed at the higher level without the on the job experience at
the intervening level.
It should be note that increasing the grade level is not the only
way to increase pay for General Schedule (GS) employees. The Navy,
similar to other civilian employing components and agencies, has the
option to seek OPM approval of higher special rates of pay for a
category of GS employees if a determination is made that pay increases
are needed to address significant recruitment and/or retention
difficulties. (See 5 U.S.C. 5305 and 5 CFR part 530, subpart C.)
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
future use of unfunded priorities lists (upls)
33. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Gilday, and General
Berger, do you agree that if funding is needed for a project, it should
be a part of the command/service budget?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The President's Budget
represents the best balance and prioritization of resources to execute
the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy. However,
opportunities always exist to enhance the President's Budget,
accelerate capabilities, and reduce warfighting risk should additional
resources become available. In addition, as we operate over time, there
can be emergent warfighting needs that are identified too late to be
included in the annual President's Budget.
General Berger. Yes.
34. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger,
historically, have previous UPL items been included in the following
year's base budget? Have UPL items from fiscal year 2023 been included
in the fiscal year 2024 base budget? If yes, please provide detail
including the requested item, funding amount, and vendor executing the
effort. If no, why not?
Admiral Gilday. My understanding of the purpose of 10 U.S.C. 222
directing the Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) is to identify items that
are executable in the budget year in order to provide Congress with
options to enhance or accelerate capabilities and reduce warfighting
risk, should additional resources become available as Congress marks up
the defense bills that year. While some UPL items may be included in
the following year's budget, they are not necessarily correlated to the
UPL. For example, maritime and aviation spares were identified on the
fiscal year 2023 UPL as an executable way that Congress could enhance
readiness in fiscal year 2023 if funding above the President's Budget
Request was available. The fiscal year 2024 President's Budget includes
funding for maritime and aviation spares to fund fiscal year 2024
requirements--not because they were included on the fiscal year 2023
UPL. The funding is related, but cannot be directly correlated. The
Navy's Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process assesses each year's
requirements to inform the President's Budget Request.
General Berger. Yes, previous unfunded UPL items have historically
been included in the following year's budget. Yes, unfunded fiscal year
2023 UPL items have been included in the fiscal year 2024 budget. The
information for those items is articulated in the fiscal year 2024
budget justification material.
35. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, do you agree
that Federal agencies should be required to work within the confines of
base budget process?
Admiral Gilday. The base budget process includes the submission of
the President's Budget Request, working with and supporting Congress in
their review and oversight of the budget, and Congress' enactment of
the final defense bills each year. This process is typically sufficient
for the Navy to operate. However, there are circumstances where
supplemental funding may be necessary. For example, in fiscal year
2022-2023, the Department of Defense was challenged with resourcing
support for Ukraine beyond our base budget, and fact-of-life increases
needed in our base budget for higher than expected inflation. We are
grateful to the Congress for supporting these emergent needs.
General Berger. Yes.
36. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, Secretary of
Defense Austin supports legislation that would repeal the requirement
for individual leaders to submit unfunded priority lists under 10
U.S.C. 222a. He stated this publicly in a Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing on March 28, 2023 and in a letter that Under
Secretary Michael J. McCord sent on behalf on Secretary Austin to me on
March 20, 2023. Do you plan to continue to submit unfunded priority
lists?
Admiral Gilday. As a Service Chief, I plan to meet the reporting
requirements directed to me by Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Should
Congress repeal 10 U.S.C. 222a, then I would no longer be required to
submit my unfunded priorities list each year.
General Berger. Yes.
37. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, if you plan
to submit unfunded priority lists in the future, why are you doing so
despite Secretary of Defense Austin's support for the repeal of these
required lists?
Admiral Gilday. As a Service Chief, I plan to meet the reporting
requirements directed to me by Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Should
Congress repeal 10 U.S.C. 222a, then I would no longer be required to
submit my unfunded priorities list each year.
General Berger. While my term as the Commandant will end on 10 July
2023, in order to be in compliance with 10 U.S.C. 222a, which requires
Service Chiefs to submit a unfunded priority list, it is likely that
future Commandants will submit a list.
information on upls
38. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, what was the
cost of putting together this UPL list?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy developed the fiscal year 2024 Unfunded
Priorities List (UPL) as part of the POM-24 budget development process,
so there was minimal additional cost. Emergent needs were added to the
UPL as identified through normal execution processes, e.g. dry dock
repairs needed at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Trident Refit Facility
Bangor.
General Berger. There is no additional cost for putting together
the UPL as it is part of our Planning, Programming, Budgeting and
Execution process.
39. Senator Warren. For each item on the unfunded priorities list
you submit in response to 10 U.S.C. 222a, please provide the following
information:
Admiral Gilday and General Berger, please provide a detailed
description of the UPL.
Admiral Gilday. Attached is the Navy fiscal year 2024 Unfunded
Priorities List (UPL) package provided to Congress, which includes a
detailed description of each UPL item [Appendix].
General Berger. In support of 10 U.S. Code Sec. 222a, I submitted
a prioritized list of the Marine Corps' unfunded priorities for fiscal
year 2024, which I respectfully asked the Senate Armed Services
Committee to consider should additional funds above those requested in
the Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget be made available. I have made
extensive efforts in the fiscal year 2024 budget submission to assess,
prioritize, and balance force capability, capacity, and readiness to
most rapidly achieve Force Design objectives and build the Joint
Force's Stand-in Force while maintaining the Nation's crisis response
capabilities. The UPL submission reduces risk in executing the National
Defense Strategy by prioritizing investment in the next LPD-17 Flight
II San Antonio-class Warship (LPD-33), continuing a vital component in
amphibious warfare ship formations to meet the demands of Distributed
Maritime Operations and crisis response. It accelerates key Force
Design warfighting investments and supporting modernization initiatives
that advance the kill chain and increase our ability to credibly deter
adversaries. Finally, military construction projects are listed that
accelerate development of facilities supporting our future force.
Please see the enclosure which I included with my letter to the
Committee that provides detailed supporting material on each of the 32
items requested in the Marine Corps Unfunded Priority List. [Enclosure
1 has been retained in Committee files.]
40. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, what does
the UPL purchase?
Admiral Gilday. Attached is the Navy Fiscal Year 2024 Unfunded
Priorities List (UPL) package provided to Congress, which includes a
list of each UPL item that Congress could procure if additional funding
becomes available. [The Navy Fiscal Year 2024 Unfunded Priorities List
has been retained in Committee files.]
General Berger. Please see ``Item'' in Section I of the enclosure.
[Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee files.]
41. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, please
include detail on all end items with quantities, contractor full-time
equivalents, etc.
Admiral Gilday. Attached is the Navy Fiscal Year 2024 Unfunded
Priorities List (UPL) package provided to Congress, which includes a
detailed description of each UPL item and the quantity where
applicable. Some UPL items (e.g. maritime and aviation spare and repair
parts) cannot be quantified at this time. Contractor full-time
equivalents will be determined during contract negotiations should
Congress enact appropriations for the UPL item. [The Navy Fiscal Year
2024 Unfunded Priorities List has been retained in Committee files.]
General Berger. Please see the table at the top of Section I of the
enclosure. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee files.]
42. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, what
specific capability will the UPL provide?
Admiral Gilday. Attached is the Navy fiscal year 2024 Unfunded
Priorities List (UPL) package provided to Congress, which includes a
detailed description of each UPL item and the capability each item will
support.
General Berger. Please see Operational Impact in Section I of the
enclosure and 11 in Section III. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in
Committee files.]
43. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, what gap
will this fill that is not in the base budget?
Admiral Gilday. [Deleted.]
General Berger. Please see 11 in Section III of the enclosure.
[Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee files.]
44. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, how will
this capability support objectives outlined in current National
Security, Military, and Defense Strategy documents?
Admiral Gilday. [Deleted.]
General Berger. Please see 11 in Section III of the enclosure.
[Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee files.]
45. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, what is the
operational requirement? How does this UPL support current or future
operations?
Admiral Gilday. Attached is the Navy fiscal year 2024 Unfunded
Priorities List (UPL) package provided to Congress, which includes a
detailed description of each UPL item and how each item will support
current or future operations and requirements. [The Navy Fiscal Year
2024 Unfunded Priorities List has been retained in Committee files.]
General Berger. Please see ``OPERATIONAL IMPACT'' in Section I of
the enclosure. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee files.]
46. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, what is the
operational impact if this UPL is not funded in fiscal year 2024?
Admiral Gilday. The President's Budget provides the best balance of
investments to meet operational requirements within the directed fiscal
topline. My understanding of the purpose of 10 U.S.C. 222 directing the
Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) is to identify items that are executable
in the budget year in order to provide Congress with options to enhance
or accelerate capabilities and reduce warfighting risk, should
additional resources become available as Congress marks up the defense
bills that year. Thus, the operational impact of not funding the UPL is
the missed opportunity to enhance or accelerate capabilities and reduce
warfighting risk.
General Berger. Please see ``OPERATIONAL IMPACT'' in Section I of
the enclosure. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee files.]
47. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, are there
plans to include this item in the fiscal year 2025 base budget?
Admiral Gilday. All fiscal year 2024 UPL items will be considered
as we develop the fiscal year 2025 budget. Some UPL items are regularly
included in our budget whether included on the UPL or not, e.g.
maritime and aviation spares; and facilities sustainment, restoration,
and modernization funding. The Navy's Program Objective Memorandum
(POM) process assesses each year's requirements to inform the
President's Budget Request. The POM-25 process is currently ongoing and
the final fiscal year 2025 President's Budget is pre-decisional.
General Berger. The fiscal year 2025 budget process is ongoing and
this information cannot be shared at this time.
48. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, why was this
UPL not included in the fiscal year 2024 President's Budget submission?
Admiral Gilday. The President's Budget provides the best balance of
investments to meet operational requirements within the directed fiscal
topline. My understanding of the purpose of 10 U.S.C. 222 directing the
Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) is to identify items that are executable
in the budget year in order to provide Congress with options to enhance
or accelerate capabilities and reduce warfighting risk, should
additional resources become available as Congress marks up the defense
bills that year. The UPL also includes emergent warfighting needs that
are identified too late to be included in the annual President's
Budget, e.g. dry dock repairs needed at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and
Trident Refit Facility Bangor.
General Berger. The Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget submission
reflects our extensive efforts to assess, prioritize and balance force
capability, capacity, and readiness within a constrained topline.
49. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, what is the
name of the vendor(s) executing this effort? Sub-vendor(s)?
Admiral Gilday.
1. Maritime Targeting Cell Afloat (MTC-A) Development--Northrop
Grumman
2. Fund ZEUS for DDG-1000 Class--Raytheon
3. Dry Dock Repairs for PSNS Investment Restoration and
Modernization (RM)--Kiewit-Alberici
4. DDG-51 SEWIP Blk III (DDG 136-137)--Northrop Grumman, GD-BIW,
HII
5. CVN 75 and CVN 80 SEWIP Blk III--Northrop Grumman, HII
6. E-2D Theater Combat Id and HECTR--Northrop Grumman
7. Navy Unique Fleet Essential Airlift Logistics KC-130J (+1 A/C
Reserves)--Lockheed Martin
8. Targeted Facilities Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization
(FSRM) Investment--Various Vendors competing
9. APN-6 Spares--Various vendors and depends on Program (air
vehicle)
10. OPN-8 Maritime Spares--Various vendors and depends on program
(ship type)
11. VIOLET--classified, will provide information through
appropriate channels if requested.
General Berger. Please see Section II of the enclosure. [Enclosure
1 has been retained in Committee files.]
50. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, how often
has your command met with the vendor executing this effort? Please
provide a list of all such meetings, and the agenda for these meetings?
Admiral Gilday. Vendors are selected through a competitive process
in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations. For those items
where contracts with vendors are already established, the Navy has
frequent, ongoing contact as a normal course of program management. The
focus of such contact ensures proper administration of contract
requirements and oversight of contractor performance to confirm the
effective delivery of goods and services to the Government.
General Berger. Please see Section II of the enclosure. Vendors are
selected through a competitive process in accordance with Federal
Acquisition Regulations. For those items where contracts with vendors
are already established, the Marine Corps has frequent, ongoing contact
as a normal course of program management. The focus of such contact
ensures proper administration of contract requirements and oversight of
contractor performance to confirm the effective delivery of goods and
services to the Government. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee
files.]
51. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, what is your
history with this vendor? Please detail when the relationship began,
the number of contracts applied for by this vendor, the number of
contracts awarded to this vendor, and if you have had a personal
relationship with the vendor.
Admiral Gilday. Vendors are selected through a competitive process
in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations. In the conduct of
my duties as Chief of Naval Operations, any relationship with vendors
providing goods or services to the Navy is on a professional basis and
in accordance with Government ethics rules.
General Berger. Please see Section III of the enclosure. Vendors
are selected through a competitive process in accordance with Federal
Acquisition Regulations. In the conduct of my duties as Commandant, any
relationship with vendors providing goods or services to the Marine
Corps is on a professional basis and in accordance with Government
ethics rules. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee files.]
52. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, has anyone
who formerly worked for your command represented the vendor in
meetings? What is their name, what was their position, and when did you
meet with them?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy does not track this level of information.
However, Government ethics rules impose employment restrictions on
personnel after leaving the Department of Defense. This includes
representational bans that prevent individuals from representing a
vendor before the Government regarding any official action for a
certain period of time.
General Berger. The Marine Corps does not track this level of
information. However, Government ethics rules impose employment
restrictions on personnel after leaving the Department of Defense. This
includes representational bans that prevent individuals from
representing a vendor before the Government regarding any official
action for a certain period of time.
53. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, in which
city/State will the UPL be executed?
Admiral Gilday. The locations would vary with each UPL.
1. Maritime Targeting Cell Afloat (MTC-A) Development--Northrop
Grumman (Aurora, CO)
2. Fund ZEUS for DDG-1000 Class
Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE): Raytheon
(Tewksbury, MA & Portsmouth, RI)
Integrated Combat System (ICS): Lockheed Martin
(Moorestown, NJ)
AN/SPY-6 radar: Raytheon (Andover, MA)
Installed on DDG 1000 Class in San Diego, CA during a
maintenance avail
3. Dry Dock Repairs for PSNS Investment Restoration and
Modernization (RM)--Kiewit-Alberici (Bremerton, WA)
4. DDG-51 SEWIP Blk III (DDG 136-137)--Northrop Grumman
(Baltimore, MD);
Installed on DDG 136 BIW (Bath, ME)
Installed on DDG 137 at HII (Pascagoula, MS)
5. CVN 75 and CVN 80 SEWIP Blk III--Northrop Grumman (Baltimore,
MD)
6. E-2D Theater Combat Id and HECTR--Northrop Grumman (Melbourne,
FL)
7. Navy Unique Fleet Essential Airlift Logistics KC-130J (+1 A/C
Reserves)--Lockheed Martin (Marietta, GA)
8. Targeted Facilities Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization
(FSRM) Investment --Various vendors competing
9. APN-6 Spares--Various vendors and depends on Program (air
vehicle)
10. OPN-8 Maritime Spares--Various vendors and depends on program
(ship type)
11. VIOLET--classified, will provide information through
appropriate channels if requested.
General Berger. Please see II.3. and II.4 Section II of the
enclosure. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee files.]
54. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, is this
requirement on an existing contract? If so, with who? What is the
history of the contract?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, the UPL identifies items that are executable
in the budget year in order to provide Congress with options to enhance
or accelerate capabilities and reduce warfighting risk.
General Berger. Please see III.3 and III.4 in Section III of the
enclosure. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee files.]
55. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, what is the
anticipated contract award date if the UPL receives funding?
Admiral Gilday. Funding vehicles are in place for every UPL. The
obligation and execution of funds would vary depending on if Congress
funded a UPL and the project funded.
General Berger. Please see 8b of Section III of the enclosure.
[Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee files.]
56. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, what funding
lines are associated with this UPL?
Admiral Gilday. Below is the Navy fiscal year 2024 Unfunded
Priorities List (UPL) with appropriation, line title, and line item
numbers identified for each UPL item.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
General Berger. Please see the table at the top of Section I of the
enclosure. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee files.]
57. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, if multiple
appropriations fund this requirement, must all appropriations be funded
simultaneously to source this requirement, or can each appropriation
stand on its own to fund a portion of the requirement?
Admiral Gilday. Any funding enacted for the Navy fiscal year 2024
Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) will be used to enhance or accelerate
capabilities and reduce warfighting risk as identified. However,
funding the identified multiple appropriations together enables better
integration of effort and reduces delays. The unfunded portions may be
requested in future budget requests to complete the identified UPL
item/effort and deliver the subsequent benefit.
General Berger. Please see table at the top of Section I of the
enclosure. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee files.]
58. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, how much was
enacted and obligated (or expended for Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation) in fiscal years 2022-2023 for this requirement?
Admiral Gilday. The table below shows the enacted and obligated
(and expended for RDT&E) amounts for fiscal year 2022 and fiscal year
2023 for each Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) item based on the line
item, program element, and/or ship hull. The UPL informs Congress of
ways they can enhance, accelerate, or reduce risk for existing line
items/program elements should additional resources become available.
Fiscal year 2023 obligation/expenditure data is as of 18
May 2023.
For UPL priority #7, the SCN funding data shows DDG 136
and DDG 137 (fiscal year 2021 ships) cost to complete.
For UPL priority #8, the SCN funding for ``Carrier
Replacement Program'' shows CVN 80 funding.
For UPL priority #8, the SCN funding for ``CVN Refueling
Overhauls'' shows CVN 75 refueling overhaul funding.
General Berger. Please see the ``Current Funding Profile'' table in
Section I of the enclosure. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee
files.]
59. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, how much was
requested in fiscal year 2024 for this requirement?
Admiral Gilday. The table below shows the amount requested in the
fiscal year 2024 President's Budget for each Unfunded Priorities List
(UPL) item based on the line item, program element, and/or ship hull.
The table shows both the fiscal year 2024 and Future Years Defense
Program requests. The UPL informs Congress of ways they can enhance,
accelerate, or reduce risk for existing line items/program elements
should additional resources become available.
For UPL priority #7, the SCN funding data shows DDG 136
and DDG 137 (fiscal year 2021 ships) cost to complete.
For UPL priority #8, the SCN funding for ``Carrier
Replacement Program'' shows CVN 80 funding.
For UPL priority #8, the SCN funding for ``CVN Refueling
Overhauls'' shows CVN 75 refueling overhaul funding.
General Berger. Please see the ``Current Funding Profile'' table in
Section I of the enclosure. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee
files.]
60. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, is there a
tail associated with this UPL?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, most items in the President's Budget and on
the Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) have associated tail costs. For
example, the procurement of a KC-130J aircraft will require additional
manpower, training, operations, spares and repair parts, and
maintenance costs when it delivers to the fleet. Some items, such as
aviation and maritime spares, are continuous investments needed each
year to sustain the overall Navy fleet.
General Berger. Please see ``Current Funding Profile'' table in
Section I of the enclosure. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee
files.]
61. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, is any tail
funded in the future years defense plan?
Admiral Gilday. The table below shows the amount requested in the
fiscal year 2024 President's Budget for each Unfunded Priorities List
(UPL) item based on the line item, program element, and/or ship hull.
The table shows both the fiscal year 2024 and Future Years Defense
Program requests. The UPL informs Congress of ways they can enhance,
accelerate, or reduce risk for existing line items/program elements
should additional resources become available.
For all UPL items except for the KC-130J, some funding is
programmed over the FYDP of the fiscal year 2024 President's Budget. If
Congress enacts appropriations to procure the KC-130J in fiscal year
2024, then Navy will include ``tail funding'' for the aircraft in the
fiscal year 2025 President's Budget FYDP based on when it delivers to
the fleet.
For UPL priority #7, the SCN funding data shows DDG 136
and DDG 137 (fiscal year 2021 ships) cost to complete.
For UPL priority #8, the SCN funding for ``Carrier
Replacement Program'' shows CVN 80 funding.
For UPL priority #8, the SCN funding for ``CVN Refueling
Overhauls'' shows CVN 75 refueling overhaul funding.
General Berger. Please see ``Current Funding Profile'' table in
Section I of the enclosure. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee
files.]
62. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, please
describe how much the requirement will cost per year for the next 5
years.
Admiral Gilday. The table below shows the amount requested in the
fiscal year 2024 President's Budget for each Unfunded Priorities List
(UPL) item based on the line item, program element, and/or ship hull.
The table shows both the fiscal year 2024 and Future Years Defense
Program requests. The UPL informs Congress of ways they can enhance,
accelerate, or reduce risk for existing line items/program elements
should additional resources become available. The cost per year may
change if Congress enacts funding for the UPL items in fiscal year
2024. In some cases, accelerating funding may result in reduced costs
per year over the next 5 years, pending contract negotiations and
revisions to the program schedules.
For UPL priority #7, the SCN funding data shows DDG 136
and DDG 137 (fiscal year 2021 ships) cost to complete.
For UPL priority #8, the SCN funding for ``Carrier
Replacement Program'' shows CVN 80 funding.
For UPL priority #8, the SCN funding for ``CVN Refueling
Overhauls'' shows CVN 75 refueling overhaul funding.
General Berger. Please see the ``Current Funding Profile'' table in
Section I of the enclosure. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee
files.]
63. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, please
provide in detail the previous funding requests and enacted for this
requirement, including if it was in the base budget or UPL.
Admiral Gilday. The table below shows the fiscal year 2022 and
fiscal year 2023 amounts requested in the President's Budgets, included
on the Navy's UPLs, and enacted by Congress for each UPL item based on
the line item, program element, and/or ship hull. The UPL informs
Congress of ways they can enhance, accelerate, or reduce risk for
existing line items/program elements should additional resources become
available.
For UPL priority #7, the SCN funding data shows DDG 136
and DDG 137 (fiscal year 2021 ships) cost to complete.
For UPL priority #8, the SCN funding for ``Carrier
Replacement Program'' shows CVN 80 funding.
For UPL priority #8, the SCN funding for ``CVN Refueling
Overhauls'' shows CVN 75 refueling overhaul funding.
General Berger. Please see ``Current Funding Profile'' table in
Section I of the enclosure. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee
files.]
64. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, if the
requirement is not included in the future years defense plan, will that
be rectified in the next Program Objective Memorandum or the Program,
Planning, Budget, and Execution cycle?
Admiral Gilday. My understanding of the purpose of 10 U.S.C. 222
directing the Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) is to identify items that
are executable in the budget year in order to provide Congress with
options to enhance or accelerate capabilities and reduce warfighting
risk, should additional resources become available as Congress marks up
the defense bills that year. While some UPL items may be included in
the following year's budget, they are not necessarily correlated to the
UPL. For example, maritime and aviation spares were identified on the
fiscal year 2023 UPL as an executable way that Congress could enhance
readiness in fiscal year 2023 if funding above the President's Budget
Request was available. The Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget includes
funding for maritime and aviation spares to fund fiscal year 2024
requirements--not because they were included on the fiscal year 2023
UPL. The funding is related, but cannot be directly correlated. The
Navy's Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process assesses each year's
requirements to inform the President's Budget Request.
General Berger. Please see ``Current Funding Profile'' table in
Section I of the enclosure. [Enclosure 1 has been retained in Committee
files.]
65. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, please
provide photos of this requirement for visual aid.
Admiral Gilday. Below are photos of the items on the Navy fiscal
year 2024 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL). Some UPL items are technology
development, so a photo of the platform on which the technology will be
used is provided. Some UPL items include a variety of efforts or parts,
so a representative photo of the UPL item is provided as an example.
#4. VIOLET is classified--details available at a higher
classification.
General Berger. Please see the photos of each of the 32 items
requested.
1 (+1) LPD-17 Flight II (LPD-33)
2 CH-53K Initial and Outfitting Spares
3 Project 7/11--Modular Operations Cells
4 (+2) KC-130J Aircraft and Initial Spares
5 Distributed Common Ground/Surface System-Marine Corps (DCGS-MC)
All-Source SCI Workstations
6 Family of Field Medical Equipment (FFME) Damage Control
Resuscitation (DCR) and Damage Control Surgery (DCS) Equipment Sets
7 (+4) AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR Radar
8 Satellite Communications Terminal, Network-on-the-Move (NOTM)
9 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles and Trailers
10 Ultra-Light Tactical Vehicle--High Power (ULTV-HP) Purchase
11 Digital Interoperability (DI)--Marine Agile Network Gateway Link
(MANGL) Roll-Up
12 Ultra-Light-Weight Camouflage Netting System (ULCANS)
13 Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) / Testing,
Evaluation and Engineering Environment
14 (+4) F-35B Engine/Lift System USMC Spares
15 USMC MAGTF Defensive Cyberspace Operation-Internal Defensive
Measures (DCO-IDM) Suites (MDS)
16 Marine Corps Cyberspace Environment (MCCE)--Archimedes Program
17 Joint Marine Innovation Unit (MIU) Fusion and MARFORCYBER
Continuity of Operations Site
18 (+1) KC-130J Weapons System Trainer and Initial Spares
19 Demolition Equipment Set, Squad Engineer/Explosive Hazard Defeat
Systems
20 (+3) UC-12W(ER) Beechcraft King Air 350ER with Cargo Door and
Initial Spares
21 Multi-Terrain Loader--Replacement
22 H-1 Digital Interoperability (DI) Link-16
23 H-1 Digital Interoperability (DI) Mobile User Objective System
(MUOS)
24 P875 Water Reclamation Facility Compliance Upgrade, MCB Kaneohe
Bay, HI
25 P1556 10th Marines Maintenance & Operations Complex, MCB Camp
Lejeune, NC
26 P258 2D LAAD Maintenance and Operations Facilities, MCAS Cherry
Point, NC
27 P982 Consolidated Communication Facility, MCLB Albany, GA
28 P1499 Corrosion Repair Facility Replacement, MCB Camp Lejeune,
NC
29 P1546 Amphibious Combat Vehicle Shelters, MCB Camp Lejeune, NC
30 P521 Fire/Emergency Response Station (53 Area) Replacement, MCB
Camp Pendleton, CA
31 P100 Unspecified Minor Construction
32 P101 USMC Military Construction Planning & Design
This information is provided in the supporting material
accompanying the Marine Corps fiscal year 2024 Unfunded Priority List.
mental health and suicide prevention
66. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, what steps
are the Navy and Marine Corps taking to integrate the recommendations
of the Suicide Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee
(SPRIRC) and when does it expect these recommendations to be
implemented?
Admiral Gilday. Upon receipt of the Suicide Prevention and Response
Independent Review Committee report, the Secretary of Defense directed
the immediate implementation of several recommendations. These
addressed servicemember well-being and access to behavioral and mental
health care along with establishing a Suicide Prevention Implementation
Working Group as the primary body to assess the advisability and
feasibility of implementing each of the remaining recommendations.
General Berger. On March 22, 2022, the Secretary of Defense
established the Suicide Prevention and Response Independent Review
Committee (SPRIRC) to conduct a comprehensive review of the
Department's efforts to address and prevent suicide. The Committee
provided a range of recommendations to eliminate suicide in the
military. The SECDEF's SPRIRC issued its final report on February 24,
2023, and made 127 recommendations. The Marine Corps fully supports
efforts to reduce suicide. Marine Corps representatives are serving on
most of the 20 sub-working groups and have begun developing
implementation plans for the IRC recommendations. The Marine Corps
continues efforts to reduce suicides by focusing on integrated and
comprehensive efforts. We will continue to invest at every level of our
Corps to ensure marines know how to recognize signs of a teammate who
is struggling, and where to go for resources.
67. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, the SPRIRC
report emphasizes the critical need to limit or reduce access to highly
lethal methods for suicide. What steps are you taking to reduce access
to these methods, particularly firearms, and which of the SPRIRC
recommendations regarding lethal means reduction do you plan to
implement?
Admiral Gilday. Lethal means safety is a critical component of
Navy's suicide prevention program. The Navy has continued its
partnership with the Defense Suicide Prevention Office and Department
of Veterans Affairs to provide sailors with over 413,400 gunlocks.
Navy promotes the voluntary use of gunlocks and other safe storage
methods for privately owned firearms. If a sailor demonstrates suicidal
ideations or presents themselves at risk for causing harm to others, it
is a requirement for the health professional and/or commander who
witnesses these action to ask the member to store their privately owned
firearms and ammunition for temporary safekeeping. This step must be
entirely voluntary for the sailor and for a duration determined solely
by the owner of the firearm. The Navy also continues to work with the
Defense Suicide Prevention and the other Services on how best to
highlight the importance of safe firearm storage practices.
General Berger. The SECDEF's SPRIRC issued its final report on
February 24, 2023, and made 127 recommendations. The Marine Corps fully
supports efforts to reduce suicide. We are working with the Office of
the Secretary of Defense to review the recommendations and develop
implementation plans. Reducing access to lethal means is an important
aim and part of the SPRIRC's recommendations. Gun locks are provided
with every purchase of a firearm at Marine Corps Exchanges, and safes
and other locking devices are available for sale. The Marine Corps also
has been working with the Department of Veterans Affairs to distribute
gun locks throughout the Marine Corps. Additionally, lethal means and
firearm safety messaging are being disseminated to marines and families
to increase suicide prevention and lethal means safety awareness. Other
strategies include our Suicide Prevention Podcast Series, Welcome
Aboard Briefs, and Suicide Prevention and Lethal Means Safety Toolkit,
all of which provide suicide prevention and lethal means safety
education and resources.
68. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, what mental
health services do you provide to Navy and Marine Corps-affiliated
civilians and contractors and what steps do you plan to take to support
those communities in suicide prevention?
Admiral Gilday. The Department of the Navy (DON) Civilian Employee
Assistance Program (CEAP) provides services to civilian employees and
their families. The DON regularly reminds employees about DONCEAP
services and encourages them to seek assistance. DONCEAP services
include mental health counseling, suicide prevention, educational
materials, and webinars. Employees have continuous access to many of
these services, twenty-four hours a day, 7 days a week. DON civilian
employees have increased their use of DONCEAP services over the course
of the last 3 years.
Navy and Marine Corps leadership will continue to encourage
employees about DONCEAP services as well as the importance of
cultivating healthy wellness habits, including mental health.
Supervisors are reminded to include the availability of DONCEAP
services when counseling employees on leave and workplace flexibility
options. These flexibilities include self-help and caring for eligible
family members. DON leadership believes that initiating regular
conversations surrounding mental and emotional well-being is
instrumental in normalizing and destigmatizing receiving mental health
treatment and fostering a healthier workforce.
The DON is committed to supporting civilian employee well-being and
ensuring that employees are aware of available mental health and
suicide prevention services.
General Berger. Each Federal executive branch agency has an
Employee Assistance Program (EAP). An EAP is a voluntary, confidential
program that helps employees work through various life challenges that
may adversely affect job performance, health, and personal well-being
to optimize an organization's success. EAP services include
assessments, counseling, and referrals for additional services to
employees with personal and/or work-related concerns, such as stress,
financial issues, legal issues, family problems, office conflicts, and
alcohol and substance use disorders. EAPs also often work with
management and supervisors providing advanced planning for situations,
such as organizational changes, legal considerations, emergency
planning, and response to unique traumatic events. An essential role of
Federal Work-Life and EAP Coordinators involves reducing the stigma
associated with seeking support around mental wellness.
69. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, what steps
are the Navy and Marine Corps taking to address concerns about drug
overdoses among its Active Duty servicemembers?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy takes drug misuse seriously and recognizes
that even one overdose is one too many and has enacted the following
actions to prevent drug overdoses:
Educate leaders on the dangers of misusing prescription
drugs to ensure early warning signs of misuse are identified.
Educate sailors and their family members on properly
disposing of unused and outdated medications and encourage them to
dispose of medications following proper disposal procedures. The Navy
supports the Drug Enforcement Administration's ``Prescription Drug Take
Back'' initiative to turn in unused and outdated prescriptions.
Increased urinalysis testing for the most commonly
misused prescription drugs. The Navy monitors the prescription drug
positives to identify specific drug and demographic trends.
Promote information sharing across the medical continuum
of care to deter Navy personnel from inappropriately gaining access to
and using prescription drugs in a manner other than it was prescribed.
To further prevent drug overdoses, specifically opioids, the Navy
also follows Department of Defense (DOD) policy that promotes the use
of evidence-based pain management guided by clinical practice
guidelines to effectively prevent acute pain, treat acute and chronic
pain, promote non-pharmacologic treatment, and minimize the use of
opioids with appropriate prescribing only when indicated. The DOD also
makes opioid antagonist reversal medications (i.e., naloxone) available
and promotes their use by military medical treatment facility providers
and pharmacies in conjunction with patient education and training.
Substance use identification, education, and awareness activities are a
key component to the DOD and Navy's efforts at preventing or reducing
drug misuse and overdose.
General Berger. Urinalysis testing includes illicit and
prescription drugs, including marijuana and opiates. One hundred
percent of urine samples are now tested for fentanyl, which will assist
in efforts to assess fentanyl misuse in the Marine Corps. While the
percent of marines testing positive for fentanyl remains very low, the
Marine Corps did see an increase in fentanyl positives in fiscal year
2022 compared to previous years (.01 percent of all marines tested
compared to .007 percent in fiscal year 2021 and .008 percent in fiscal
year 2020).
70. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday, what steps is the Navy taking
to better understand the needs of servicemembers living aboard aircraft
carriers to prevent further suicides, as occurred on the USS George
Washington, and those at maintenance centers such as those at the Mid-
Atlantic Regional Maintenance Center?
Admiral Gilday. Navy reinforces the importance of access to the
full continuum of mental health (MH) resources for our sailors, while
aiming to utilize the right care, at the right level, at the right
time. There is ``no wrong door'' for our sailors and marines to get
help through MH services in primary care and specialty clinics,
embedded within the Fleet, and via virtual health (VH) platforms. Non-
medical MH services are available for sailors and their family members
through Fleet and Family Support Centers, Military and Family Life
Counseling, and Military OneSource. Navy Chaplains provide confidential
counseling and are important in ensuring spiritual readiness and
resiliency of the Naval Force.
Embedded Mental Health (EMH) remains vital for Fleet and Fleet
Marine Force, with just over 36 percent of Active Duty mental health
providers and 31 percent of behavioral health technicians assigned to
EMH billets. The Navy also recently assigned Chaplains to guided
missile destroyers to provide confidential counseling while ensuring
spiritual readiness and resiliency of the Naval Force.
71. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday, what steps is the Navy taking
to respond to those identified needs of those servicemembers and reduce
the risk of suicide of those who are stationed on aircraft carriers and
at maintenance centers?
Admiral Gilday. One of the Navy's key initiatives in addressing
mental health needs is a recently developed ``Mental Health Playbook''
released in February 2023. The Playbook is designed to support command
leaders in preventing mental health issues from occurring and, when
they do, to connect sailors with the proper mental health care, at the
right level, at the right time.
The Playbook enables all sailors to share an understanding of how
to conduct mental health preventive maintenance and where to go for
additional resources. The Navy must continue to prioritize access to
the full continuum of mental health and wellness support resources for
our sailors available ashore, within the Fleet, and via virtual health
platforms.
72. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday, what steps is the Navy taking
to provide more mental health resources to the needs of those
servicemembers who are stationed on aircraft carriers and at
maintenance centers?
Admiral Gilday. Navy Medicine is committed to a comprehensive
approach to support Fleet readiness through collaboration with
stakeholders to address access to mental health resources. In effort to
provide greater resources, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
opened a new Embedded Mental Health facility in October 2022 to ensure
fast and quality access to mental health care for their operational
sailors. The facility also provides consultation to leadership triads
(Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Senior Enlisted Leader) and
training for medical personnel and crews.
As further mental health support, chaplains were recently added on
guided missile destroyers. President's Budget 2024 includes a request
for additional end strength for Operational Forces Embedded Mental
Health Programs to improve access to care for marines and sailors in
the Operational Forces by reducing the time for evaluation and
treatment. This increase includes 25 Psychiatrists, 18 Clinical
Psychologists, 11 Licensed Clinical Social Workers, and 47 Behavioral
Health Technicians (54 officer and 47 enlisted).
President's Budget 2024 also includes a request for additional end
strength for USMC Medical Battalions to provide health service support
to the Marine Expeditionary Force through forward resuscitative health
care capabilities. The personnel addition includes eight officers (3
Medical Corps, 4 Medical Service Corps, and 1 Nurse Corps).
Further, the Navy is working with the Defense Health Agency and
entering into agreements for additional clinical support from the
staffs at military medical treatment facilities to provide assistance
on ships or on installations.
73. Senator Warren. Ongoing Naval Criminal Investigative Service
(NCIS) Investigation into the Death of Lance Corporal Ronald Valentin
Secretary Del Toro, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service is
continuing to investigate the death of Lance Corporal Ronald Valentin,
USMC, who died in 2018. Five years later, this investigation continues
to be ongoing with little answers for his family and they remain
concerned about the lack of regular updates and information that they
have been given by NCIS. Secretary Del Toro, will you commit to NCIS
providing the family of Lance Corporal Valentin a monthly call to
update them on the latest status of their son's investigation?
Secretary Del Toro. NCIS has provided regular updates to the family
of LCpl Valentin throughout the investigation and has noted recent
contact and lengthy conversations with Ms. Ortiz (LCpl Valentin's
mother) on the following dates: October 11, 2022; October 27, 2022;
December 14, 2022; January 30, 2023; March 23, 2023; and May 3, 2023.
The investigation has remained active since 2018 and NCIS is committed
to completing this investigation in the most expedient manner possible,
while ensuring all possible investigative leads are pursued. Because
this remains an active criminal investigation, NCIS must limit the
information being released in order to preserve the integrity of the
investigation. Though NCIS seeks to be transparent and provide as much
information as possible to the family, in some instances, no new
information has been available to share.
74. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, when do you anticipate the
investigation into the death of Lance Corporal Valentin will be
completed?
Secretary Del Toro. NCIS is working diligently to explore all
logical leads in the investigation as quickly as possible while
ensuring those steps are accomplished in the most effective manner
possible. Determining an estimated date of completion of the active
investigation is difficult given the complexity of the investigation
and the possibility that additional investigative tasks may be
identified from results of the remaining identified tasks. NCIS has
completed hundreds of individual actions during this investigation and
is currently pursuing the re-interview of several witnesses in an
effort to identify additional information to explain the circumstances
of Lance Corporal Valentin's death. Additional laboratory analyses have
also recently been requested and are currently ongoing.
75. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, what has contributed to the
delays of this investigation as it continues into its fifth year
without a conclusion?
Secretary Del Toro. This investigation has remained active since
2018 and NCIS continues to pursue all potential leads that might
provide relevant information to explain the details of how Lance
Corporal Valentin died, if criminal activity was involved, and if so,
who was responsible. NCIS continues to support this investigation with
multiple NCIS personnel around the globe.
76. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, during this investigation,
the family of Lance Corporal Valentin has faced several changes in the
case agents they are working with. How often do case agents turn over
and what is the process for notifying the family in advance when the
case agent will change?
Secretary Del Toro. NCIS strives to limit the number of case agents
in all cases and especially in complex investigations such as this one.
As the incident occurred in an overseas location, there are regular
cycles where NCIS Special Agents move, or complete a Permanent Change
of Station (PCS), from Okinawa to other offices throughout the world.
Per DOD PCS regulations, Okinawa, Japan, is designated as a 2-year
tour, wigth option to request and extension. Three case agents have
been assigned to this investigation since it was initiated in 2018 and
each change was made as a result of the PCS of the assigned case agent.
When the assigned case agent changes, the family would be notified
prior to that occurring during a regular update.
77. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, the family of Lance
Corporal Valentin has disclosed that they initially received the body
of a different individual instead when Lance Corporal Valentin was
being returned to his family. Please explain why this incident
occurred, if there are any other cases when NCIS has provided the
incorrect body to other families, and what steps NCIS is taking to
ensure this does not happen to another family.
Secretary Del Toro. The Port Authority at John F. Kennedy Airport
(JFK) and the commercial airline responsible for the transportation of
Lance Corporal Ronald Valentin's remains misidentified the aircraft
carrying his casketed remains resulting in this unfortunate mishap.
This misidentification was communicated to family members and their
Marine Casualty Assistance Calls Officer awaiting his arrival at JFK,
to the family's funeral director who was present to receive custody of
his remains from the commercial airline, and to the Marine Honor Guard
who was onsite to conduct planeside honors. This resulted in the
conduct of planeside honors of the incorrect casketed remains by the
marines and transfer of custody from the commercial airline to the
family's funeral home. Upon discovery of this mishap, the incorrect
remains were returned to the custody of the commercial airline. Lance
Corporal Valentin's casketed remains, accompanied by his commanding
officer and escorted by a uniformed marine, were transferred via
planeside honors conducted by the Marine Honor Guard to the family's
funeral home. Lance Corporal Valentin's remains were escorted at all
times throughout the process and treated with the utmost dignity and
honor.
78. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, the family of Lance
Corporal Valentin has expressed concerns that the cameras at Camp
Hansen had stopped working in July 2018 and were still not working at
the time of Valentin's death at the end of August. Why had these
cameras not been fixed yet at the time of Valentin's death, how many of
these cameras were not working, and how long were they inoperable
before and after his death?
Secretary Del Toro. These cameras were maintained by a DLA
contract. The Marine Corps has no record of operational status or
maintenance on these cameras.
79. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, the family of Lance
Corporal Valentin has expressed concern regarding whether the
investigators were able to access the information in Valentin's phone.
Has NCIS been able to open and access the information in Valentin's
phone?
Secretary Del Toro. Because this remains an active criminal
investigation, this information is not releasable in a public forum.
The family has been provided updates regarding the phone's status.
naval criminal investigative service
80. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, in September 2022, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on
``Servicemember Absences: DOD Actions Needed to Enhance Related Data,
Procedures, and Staffing.'' This report found that NCIS was not
properly identifying the number of special agents it needed to conduct
criminal investigations. The Department of Defense stated in February
2023 that it has begun to keep a record of the number of special agents
it needs. What steps is NCIS taking specifically to fulfill this
recommendation?
Secretary Del Toro. NCIS disagreed with the GAO finding that NCIS
does not have a process to determine staffing requirements to conduct
criminal investigations. NCIS has an overall End Strength that is
composed of special agent and non-special agent positions. From there,
NCIS Director has discretion to properly allocate the resources
authorized to meet strategic mission objectives.
NCIS maintains a dynamic approach to staffing occupational series
in order to maximize recruiting efforts and maintain End Strength fill
rates within authorized budgetary targets. Creating a process that
forces rigidity on 1811 staffing levels, as a measure of mission
success, fails to account for the diverse occupational series that
contribute to the criminal mission and limits the ability to surge to
emergent mission need.
Since April 2022, NCIS keeps a record of the number of special
agents needed to support NCIS' mission. At the beginning of each fiscal
year, NCIS will update that number and keep previous years' numbers for
historical trending. Specifically, NCIS is taking the following steps:
1. NCIS maintains data of numbers of special agents each fiscal
year.
2. This dashboard will include data from past and future fiscal
years for comparison.
3. NCIS' process is to record the necessary number of special
agents at the start of each fiscal year.
4. NCIS will keep a similar record for future fiscal years.
81. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro and General Berger, in the
same GAOreport, GAO found that the Marine Corps lacks procedures to
determine whether the absence of a servicemember is involuntary or
voluntary, which is important in helping to ``ensure that the absence
is reported to the appropriate military organization for further
action, to include notifying and assisting the servicemember's family
and investigating any criminal activity associated with the absence.''
In February 2023, DOD stated there were Marine Corps working groups
being held to establish procedures addressing this recommendation and
that these procedures would be issued by March 2023. What is the status
of these working groups and have these procedures been completed? If
so, please provide a copy of them.
Secretary Del Toro. Staff from Marine Corps Installations and
Logistics and Manpower and Reserve Affairs held working group meetings
in late 2022 and early 2023 to establish procedures for commanders to
use to determine whether a marine's absence is voluntary or not. The
working group is recommending updates to policies on the absentee and
deserter collection program in the Marine Corps Corrections Manual,
which are in final coordination. We expect a final decision in summer
2023.
Currently, personnel accountability is taken the morning of every
workday and status reported to local headquarters through an electronic
Unit Manning Status Report. If a marine is not present or accounted for
as expected, a command will attempt to locate them via telephone, by
visiting their dwelling, speaking to coworkers and friends, contacting
family members listed as emergency contacts in their Record of
Emergency Data, and potentially notifying law enforcement. If a
commander believes the marine is `duty status unknown' as opposed to in
an `unauthorized absence' (UA) status, they follow policy outlined in
the Casualty Procedures Manual. If they believe a marine is UA, they
follow procedures outlined in the User Manual for Unit Diary Reporting.
General Berger. Staff from Marine Corps Installations and Logistics
and Manpower and Reserve Affairs held working group meetings in late
2022 and early 2023 to establish procedures for commanders to use to
determine whether a marine's absence is voluntary or not. The working
group is recommending updates to policies on the absentee and deserter
collection program in the Marine Corps Corrections Manual, which are in
final coordination. We expect a final decision in Summer 2023.
Currently, personnel accountability is taken the morning of every
workday and status reported to local headquarters through an electronic
Unit Manning Status Report. If a marine is not present or accounted for
as expected, a command will attempt to locate them via telephone, by
visiting their dwelling, speaking to coworkers and friends, contacting
family members listed as emergency contacts in their Record of
Emergency Data, and potentially notifying law enforcement. If a
commander believes the marine is `duty status unknown' as opposed to in
an `unauthorized absence' (UA) status, they follow policy outlined in
the Casualty Procedures Manual. If they believe a marine is UA, they
follow procedures outlined in the User Manual for Unit Diary Reporting.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
ffg industrial base
82. Senator Peters. In recent years, this Committee has advocated
for investments in Navy shipbuilding to ensure timely acquisition and
reduce program risk. We've seen the benefits of these investments in
programs like Columbia and DDG-51, to name two. I'm pleased that
Congress provided $50 million last year for the Frigate industrial base
and workforce development and look forward to seeing the positive
impact on the workers and manufacturers in Michigan's Upper Peninsula.
I understand that this funding has already been allocated and needs
remain. That's why I'm advocating for another round of additional
funding in fiscal year 2024 to continue to address challenges typical
of new ship classes as they ramp up production--like recruiting,
retaining and training skilled workers, developing critical suppliers,
and supporting needed shipyard infrastructure improvements.
Secretary Del Toro, can you share your thoughts on how these
investments are critical to ensuring the success of the Frigate
program?
Secretary Del Toro. Sustained Industrial Base investment is a
critical enabler to ensuring the success of the Frigate program.
Recruiting, retaining, and training skilled workers to build Frigates
is the primary long-term challenge to the program's ability to meet the
Navy's small surface combatant requirements. Fincantieri must execute
an aggressive talent acquisition strategy and compete with other non-
defense industrial activities in Wisconsin and Michigan to grow and
maintain a skilled workforce. Continued investments in workforce
activities must include outreach to local school systems to increase
interest in skilled trade jobs, coordination with universities and
technical colleges to develop and bolster training pipelines and
apprenticeship opportunities, and direct recruitment and retention
incentives such as bonus programs and other tangible benefits.
Workforce development efforts are also constrained by a lack of
available housing in Marinette, Menominee, and the surrounding areas.
Continued investment will allow the Frigate program to support regional
investments in the communities where defense workers reside, increasing
their attractiveness and accessibility to sustain and grow the
workforce.
The Frigate Industrial Base includes regional suppliers facing
similar challenges. Beyond the benefits of supporting the workforce at
the shipyards and their suppliers, investments in supply chain risk
reduction, efficiency improvements, and capacity expansion are
warranted. Fincantieri has invested substantially in shipyard
infrastructure, and commensurate investment in the supply chain that
provides equipment, materials, and subcontracted services will allow
the program to realize the full potential of those investments.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
force design 2030
83. Senator Manchin. Secretary Del Toro, your testimony highlighted
the importance of Force Design 2030. Can you detail to the Committee,
how you as Service Secretary responsible for the Marine Corps and Navy
are supporting Force Design 2030 and the improved integration of the
Navy and Marine Corps? General Berger, as I said we're proud to see the
Marine Corps making tough decisions as it relates to funding to get
after the China problem, but what is your estimate for future funding
increases needed to support Force Design and what are your top three
priorities?
Secretary Del Toro. Supporting and accelerating Force Design 2030
is a top priority for Department of the Navy budget requests. I am
closely working with both the Marine Corps and Navy to ensure that this
and future budget requests support both Force Design 2030 and drive
increased integration of naval capabilities. These efforts are central
to my enduring priority of strengthening maritime dominance.
General Berger. My estimate for future funding requirements needed
to support Force Design 2030 will be provided in the fiscal year 2025
budget and in each subsequent budget cycle as we take stock of the
impacts of inflation and prioritize our modernization efforts across
the Department.
It is critical to maintain the funding levels we have been
provided, adjusted for inflation in the future, to ensure we have
sufficient buying power to continue to accelerate the Force Design 2030
capabilities needed to stay ahead of the pacing threat. Over the course
of the last several budget cycles, the Marine Corps has taken every
possible opportunity to self-fund our modernization, reallocating $15.8
billion in structure and legacy platforms and systems for our
transformation efforts. However, any reduction in topline will
challenge our ability to modernize commensurate with the pacing threat,
while simultaneously maintaining current levels of combat ready forces.
The resulting lost buying power will force hard choices between Global
Force Management commitments, current readiness, and the velocity of
our modernization efforts, the speed which has been set by our
adversaries.
As I've testified in the past, my main effort as Commandant is to
build the Marine Corps that will define integrated American naval power
in 2030, even as it must remain ready to confront the challenges of
today. I remain fully committed to this goal. My three top priorities
continue to focus on the three pillars of Force Design 2030--equipment
modernization, talent management reform, and training and education
modernization--that will enable the Marine Corps to meet global threats
and remain the Nation's premier crisis response force. The Marine Corps
will also prioritize Quality of Life and critical infrastructure
investments going forward, areas where we have accepted risk in the
past. To achieve this, sustained, adequate, predictable funding is the
single most effective way to maintain critical strategic momentum in
our ability to continue our Force Design 2030 transformation efforts,
while ensuring that marine forces operating forward provide the
foundational integrated deterrence and day-to-day campaigning necessary
to build advantage with our allies and partners.
amphibious ship fleet
84. Senator Manchin. Secretary Del Toro and General Berger, why was
there no funding included in the Navy's budget request for amphibious
shipbuilding? Taking the politics out and considering the future threat
as well as unforeseen maintenance and accidents, what minimum number of
amphibious ships do you believe we need? Same question for the
Commandant.
Secretary Del Toro. Admiral Gilday, General Berger, and I all agree
on the requirement for 31 amphibious ships, and we are committed to
ensuring we meet this requirement and doing so in a timely manner, but
with a capable, sustainable mix of ship classes to ensure we meet the
Nation's need for ARG/MEUs for decades to come. The current analytical
work is assessing the recently approved Department of Defense Planning
Scenario for the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and studying the
cost/capability of LPD 17 Flt II amphibious ships. The analytic results
of both will be reflected in the fiscal year 2025 30-Year Shipbuilding
Plan.
General Berger. The Marine Corps has a requirement for no less than
31 amphibious warfare ships 10 LHA/LHD and 21 LPDs. Since 2019, three
DON studies have examined amphibious warfare ship force structure
requirements. The requirement was informed by combining the findings of
those studies, the most recent being the SecNav directed Amphibious
Fleet Requirement Study (AFRS) in 2022, with amphibious warfare ship
readiness trends over the past 10 years. AFRS was a threat informed,
scenario directed, model driven, multiple phase event executed by the
analytic arms of the Navy and the Marine Corps. The findings of AFRS
were briefed to the service chiefs and SecNav, 31 amphibious warfare
ships were reported as the minimum required. This finding is consistent
with 11 amphibious warfare ship inventory studies completed over the
last 14 years.
The last Congress recognized this requirement in the James M.
Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 117-263 (2023).
Section 1023 requires the Navy maintain ``not less than 31 operational
amphibious warfare ships, of which not less than 10 shall be amphibious
assault ships.'' This law mirrors the need of the National Security
Strategy, but it is important to note, this is a floor not a ceiling.
talent management 2030--invest and retain enlisted marines
85. Senator Manchin. Can you comment on the potential benefits of a
retain and invest model? What are the biggest challenges you are facing
toward affecting this reform?
General Berger. Force Design 2030 envisions a ``Stand-in Force,''
of relatively small, highly mobile, distributed, and lethal units. To
succeed, such units must possess both the maturity to decide and act
during increasingly complex conflicts and a greater technical expertise
demanded by high technology, multi-domain battlefields. As such, Talent
Management 2030 has directed a paradigm shift from the Marine Corps'
legacy, high turnover ``recruit and replace'' personnel model toward
one that places greater emphasis on retention of the most capable
marines. Some of these efforts are already well underway. This
deliberate maturation of the force will develop the necessary structure
to fight and win on tomorrow's battlefield. By doing so, the marine
Corps can achieve cost savings to entry-level training, reduce the
accession requirement in today's challenging recruiting environment,
increase unit continuity, and benefit from more mature marines.
As the Marine Corps strives to increase its return on investment,
we will ensure that its warfighting capability is enhanced through
training and education within its formations. This will create a more
stable team to support the collective national defense. Lateral entry
opportunities enable the service and marines to match duty to an
individual's performance and desire to serve.
Potential challenges include the ability to retain enough marines
to pivot to the new paradigm, which can be addressed by implementing
tailored incentives. Additionally, the Marine Corps must recruit
marines who are compatible with longer duration service, which can
potentially be achieved through implementing new applicant screening
tools and initiatives.
As the Marine Corps works to invest in and retain its best talent,
it must also prioritize the quality of leadership, life, and support
for marine families; these factors fuel the retention of talent.
landing ship medium
86. Senator Manchin. At a time of increasing tensions in the world,
especially the Pacific, how will this delay in acquiring the Landing
Ship Medium (LSM) hinder the Marine Corps' ability to operate in costal
environments? Will you explain the difference in Marine Corps
capability against our pacing threat when comparing 18 LSMs that the
Amphibious Force Requirement Study identifies as a minimum capability
and 36 LSM's, which the Marine Corps considers their requirement?
General Berger. Operational intra-theater surface maneuver,
tactical mobility and sustainment is critical today in the Indo-Pacific
to assure campaigning activities are achieved for integrated deterrence
of malign activities. Until the Medium Landing Ship (LSM) is available
in appreciable numbers (IOC 8FY34), the Navy and Marine Corps have
developed a strategy known as the Littoral Maneuver Bridging Solution
(LMBS). The LMBS utilizes a mixture of available ships and landing
craft, as well as chartered platforms with an operational focus for use
in Indo-Pacific region. The LMBS provides flexible options and informs
future naval resourcing decisions to ensure the Marine Corps can
operate throughout the littorals as required until the LSM is delivered
to the fleet.
The purpose built, beachable, shore-to-shore LSM requirements is
derived from multiple studies and wargames that highlight a critical
gap in capability and capacity between amphibious warfare ships and
their complementary landing craft. The LSM allows shore-to-shore
maneuver, mobility and sustainment of task organized units of action of
stand-in forces (SIF) and enables sustained logistics forward in
contested environments. The delay in this capability hinders our
ability to establish key terrain and develop relationships required.
The LSM inventory objective is 35 ships based on the concept of
operations (CONOPS) to provide littoral maneuver for three Marine
Littoral Regiments (MLR) as the foundational formation of the SIF. The
near-term inventory requirement is 18 LSM to initiate the program.
Maturation of the CONOPS and experimentation will inform the long-term
inventory objective.
delayed budget and continuing resolutions
87. Senator Manchin. Secretary Del Toro, General Berger and Admiral
Michael M. Gilday, can I have each of your commitments to get Congress
as accurate an estimate as possible on the financial impact previous
continuing resolutions have had on the Department of Defense?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. Continuing Resolutions (CRs)
of any duration create inefficiency in government operations. The
execution of this year's requirements based on small incremented
periods of availability substantiated by last year's appropriations
means every transaction is executed in increments of the number of CRs,
rather than deliberate transactions for the entire quarter or fiscal
year. The administrative cost of the inefficiency is impossible to
quantify but it spans across the Department wherever funds are
executed, and increases with the number of CRs.
The Department cannot execute our strategic priorities,
such as investing in cutting-edge technologies and capabilities, with
last year's budget.
A full-year CR erodes the United States military
advantage relative to China, impedes our ability to innovate and
modernize, degrades readiness, and severely limits our ability to take
action against energy challenges (e.g., fuel and utilities). It signals
to our adversaries that the U.S. is not committed to its stated
priorities.
CRs create uncertainty, particularly in an era of
increasing and evolving requirements to meet the demands of the DON as
we face competitors who are not hamstrung by inefficiencies in funding
requirements.
The Department is challenged to execute national defense
strategies required today when funding is limited to a prior year
level, and more important, while there are restrictions to move ahead
with the investments in new programs and technologies that are required
today. The longer a CR lasts, the greater uncertainty, and decision
time that is lost; longer CRs require the Department to respond to and
execute the congressional decisions made on the President's Budget
Request in an appropriations act in a truncated period of time. This is
particularly challenging for military personnel and readiness accounts
that are in 1 year appropriations.
Given the commonplace nature of CRs today (in 13 of the
last 14 years), the DON has worked around the inefficiencies as much as
possible. However, delays in initiating new starts in procurement and
research and development, and increased production rates place our Navy
and Marine Corps at a strategic disadvantage with our competitors. In
the last 3 years, each year there are have been over 60 programs that
are precluded from execution during a CR because of restrictions on new
starts and production rate increases. The DON appreciates the anomalies
Congress has provided in the past for the Columbia program, but there
are other programs that stall pending appropriations acts.
While CRs are inefficient and delay getting on with
today's business, receiving an appropriation act at some point is
essential. A yearlong CR would have devastating consequences not only
for funding levels, but the misalignment of priorities and budget
requests in the current year compared to last year. . Further, the
comparison of fiscal year 2024 program requirements compared with
fiscal year 2023, without the ability to realign funding, would create
a $26.1B misalignment of funds. We cannot afford this type of
perturbation in funding the investments we need today and for the
future.
Increased inflation experienced during fiscal year 2023
and projected for fiscal year 2024 will reduce the Department's buying
power, further stressing the Department's topline.
This year we have identified 49 new starts slated for
fiscal year 2024. When looking at the last 4 years (fiscal year 2020 to
fiscal year 2023), all which have started under CRs of 80 days or more,
the sum of delayed programs for the Department of the Navy alone is 81.
This sets programs off poorly, creates doubt with committee staff,
erodes trust in our industrial base, and cedes ground to our adversary.
General Berger. Over the past several years that I have been
Commandant, every fiscal year has begun with a continuing resolution or
CR, due to the absence of enacted appropriations. Given that Congress
has eventually passed the appropriations acts, the strictly financial
impact is neutral. However, I'd offer three ways that these continuing
resolutions, particularly a yearlong CR, adversely impact your Marine
Corps.
First is people. In an all-volunteer force, an extended CR has the
potential to eat away at the trust that marines and their families have
in their government. Without enacted appropriations, I may have to
delay or cancel transfer orders; reduce incentive pays and bonuses;
families won't know whether to renew their housing leases; and spouses
won't know whether to accept the job offer they got last week all due
to uncertainty. The impacts on recruiting and retention may very well
be lasting at the time we are facing the most challenging recruiting
environment since the advent of the all-volunteer force.
Second is our ongoing transformation efforts. CRs look in one
direction--backward--forcing us to execute last year's budget against
this year's priorities. At a time when we are working to accelerate
transformation efforts, CRs slow us down. They artificially slow
acquisition programs delaying the start of new contracts. They
effectively prevent modernization at speed, ceding the initiative to
our adversaries. This includes slowing R&D and procurement of critical
Force Design 2030 programs, affecting workers across the country, as
well as preventing facilities supporting new platform investment,
training, and quality of life initiatives. Service chiefs need
sufficient, stable, predictable funding to stay in front of our pacing
threat. CRs often require services to temporarily reprioritize their
requirements to ensure sufficient resources remain available for must
pay obligations.
Third is our strategic partners. Under every CR, we face the
prospect of losing the trust and confidence of our allies and partners
because commanders may have to scale back or cancel scheduled
exercises. For a National Security Strategy that depends on allies and
partners, trust is a big part of what keeps the door open. Once that
door closes, it's hard to recover from the damage done to the military
relationships.
The concern with budgetary stagnation is compounded by the fact
that our strategic competitor, China, is accelerating. The three
impacts illustrated above translate to an increased risk to our ability
to deter and compete with China, particularly in the Pacific. Our
people, our transformation efforts, and our relationship with our
strategic partners are key to staying ahead of the pacing threat.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
resilience of sailors and marines
88. Senator Rosen. Secretary Del Toro and General Berger, sailors
and marines have been subjected to extended deployments and heightened
operational tempos over the last few years, which has impacted our
people as well as the ships, aircraft, and equipment that they operate
and maintain. Taking care of our servicemembers must also be a top
priority, especially considering the particularly arduous pandemic-era
operations coupled with ongoing supply chain issues and a downturn in
recruitment.
How are the Navy and the Marine Corps focusing on the well-being of
sailors and marines throughout the deployment cycle, in addition to
maintaining their operational readiness and ability to deploy?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy is overhauling the totality of its
prevention programs through its Advance Navy Culture initiative. This
places a focus on the outcomes of the Navy programs which are currently
in place that aim to build teams with high connectedness, cohesion and
inclusion to better monitor the well-being of our sailors throughout
the deployment cycle. In addition, Navy is overhauling its internally
developed Warrior Toughness and congressionally mandated Expanded
Operational Stress Control program into one continuum focusing on
building sailor minds, bodies, and spirits. The Navy is also increasing
the number of mental health providers and chaplains on the waterfront.
In March, the Navy published its Mental Health Playbook which helps
to normalize the conversations about mental health and provides a
roadmap to navigate care options for sailors.
For Newport News Shipyard in particular, we have increased the
mental health professionals assigned to Refueling and Complex Overhaul
(RCOH) aircraft carriers and leased office space to put the crew's
medical department in closer proximity to the ship. This increases
accessibility and reduces commute times. Additionally, we have taken
numerous actions to improve the quality of life of sailors. These
include improving access to food options consistent with 24/7 work
hours by bringing in food trucks in the evenings, reopening the self-
use kitchen in unaccompanied housing, and opening a Navy Exchange mini-
mart within the confines of the industrial area of the shipyard. We are
also providing increased Wi-Fi access for sailor personal use. We have
taken steps to improve the parking concerns. We centralized parking,
allowing closure of some of the most remote parking areas.
General Berger. Preserving the psychological health of
servicemembers and their families is as much a warfighting matter as it
is a sacred duty, and it is of paramount importance to mission
readiness. The Marine Corps' Combat and Operational Stress Control
(COSC) Deployment Cycle Training principles enable a cohesive ready
force and promote long-term health and well-being among marines and
attached personnel. The COSC program has three main goals--prevention,
identification, and treatment of combat and operational stress (COS),
stress arising from military training and operations, and typical life
stressors experienced by servicemembers. COSC assists commanders in
maintaining warfighting capabilities by prevention, identification, and
management of COS. Training is focused on both warrior and leader
audiences at three stages: pre-deployment (30 days prior to
deployment), re-deployment (15-30 days prior to return), and post-
deployment (60-90 days after deployment).
COSC is executed by Marine Corps' Operational Stress Control and
Readiness (OSCAR) teams. They consist of command-selected marines who
assist commanders in prevention and identification of COS, early
intervention to mitigate stress, and reintegration efforts in all
units, whether operational, deployed, in training, or in garrison.
OSCAR team members act as sensors for the commander by noticing small
changes in behavior and acting early. OSCAR marines become certified as
the commander's representatives on COSC efforts in the unit. They
support the commander in building unit strength, resilience, and
readiness and keeping marines in the fight.
89. Senator Rosen. Admiral Gilday, just this past week, U.S. Naval
Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) held a mental health stand-down as a
part of the Navy's mental health pilot program in Bahrain. We want to
make sure that each of our sailors and their families have mental
health resources available to them and communities that support them.
Are there plans for this mental health pilot program to be expanded to
other Navy installations, both overseas and right here at home?
Admiral Gilday. The health and well-being of sailors and their
families is a vital responsibility and a top priority for the Navy. We
are focused on improving programs and investing additional resources to
ensure that sailors and their families have access to the best possible
mental health and community support resources. These investments are
being made both at the command level and Navy-wide (e.g. deploying
mental health trained chaplains on smaller ships for the first time and
increasing the number of mental health care practitioners across the
Navy). The work that NAVCENT is doing is a great example of a command-
level initiative to optimally tailor resources to meet the needs of
sailors and families in an overseas environment. The Navy will employ
the best practices from this and other similar initiatives as we strive
to better care for our people.
impact of military health system genesis on recruitment
90. Senator Rosen. The transition to Military Health System (MHS)
Genesis and digitized medical records is necessary to ensure that
servicemembers, veterans, and their families are receiving proper
health care with continuity between providers. Not only is this system
used for the men and women already serving in the military, but it is
also used to screen the medical history of potential recruits prior to
accession.
Secretary Del Toro, given the Navy and Marine Corps' recruitment
challenges and a decrease of people eligible for military service, how
has the transition from the previous medical intake process to MHS
Genesis impacted recruitment efforts?
Secretary Del Toro. The capabilities and expectations from MHS
Genesis were welcomed. It was thought that MHS Genesis would provide a
more efficient and comprehensive medical history of an applicant during
the enlistment process, allowing the Navy and Marine Corps to avoid the
costs associated with undisclosed pre-existing medical conditions on
overall service readiness. After 1 year, the transition has not yet
generated the expected efficiencies. During the same period, it has
exposed issues within the processing of applicants at Military Entrance
Processing Stations (MEPS). Collectively, those results have impacted
recruiting.
One of the expected efficiencies from MHS Genesis was that an
applicant's medical history would be made readily available through
data gathered through the Health Information Exchange (HIE) networks.
The Department of Health and Human Services mandated that HIE
information be provided into MHS Genesis. However, it was quickly
discovered that not all medical provider networks authorized or
participated in the release of medical information. For example, one
part of the country may only provide an applicant's prescription
information history, while another network may only provide
prescriptions with doctor's notes. This patchwork of inconsistent HIE
medical information resulted in MEPS medical personnel requesting the
applicant or recruiter obtain this information, which lengthened the
overall enlistment process and defeated one of the intended purposes of
MHS Genesis. Until the HIE networks provide a more uniform and
comprehensive medical history flow into MHS Genesis, the system will
not meet anticipated efficiency.
By its nature, MHS Genesis is designed to increase the volume of
medical information provided for each applicant in order to uncover
pre-existing medical conditions. Although the volume of information
increased as a result of HIE data, there was no corresponding increase
in MEPS personnel to screen and evaluate the documentation. This
resulted in a greater burden being placed on a workforce designed to
review and decipher medical information under the previous intake
methodology. Limitations on civilian labor hours, staffing shortages
due to less than competitive wages compared to the surrounding medical
community, and inability to acquire the services of fee-based medical
providers has compounded MEPS' ability to deliver optimum and timely
processing for the recruiting services.
cyber workforce
91. Senator Rosen. The establishment of a cyber-capable workforce
in the Navy is critical, recognizing that cyberspace is a warfighting
domain that continues to adapt in terms of threat and sophistication.
The fiscal year 2023 NDAA required the establishment of a dedicated
Navy Cyber Warfare Operations career field, which ensures that the Navy
has a capable cyber workforce that can integrate within the greater DOD
cyber-warfare community.
We must continue to invest in innovative, traditional and non-
traditional cyber capabilities and talent to support the Department of
Defense's cyber mission requirements.
Admiral Gilday, how do you envision that the creation of Cyber
Warfare specialists will impact the retention of high-skilled cyber-
capable sailors? Can you speak to the progress of the establishment of
a training pipeline and implementation plan?
Admiral Gilday. Creating a dedicated cyber warfare officer
designator, an enlisted rating, and applying appropriate retention
bonuses will help to increase retention rates. Cyber personnel will
have dedicated career paths allowing them to stay in cyber roles for
most--if not all--of their service. Before the creation of a dedicated
designator and rating, it was necessary for personnel to take non-cyber
tours within their communities to be considered competitive for
promotion and retention; however, cyber skills can quickly atrophy.
Now, those personnel will be competitive for promotion without having
to periodically leave the cyber community. This workplace stability is
a noted non-monetary benefit many of our sailors, regardless of
designator or rating, have expressed interest in. Between these
monetary and non-monetary incentives, the Navy is confident that we
will see increased retention rates.
For officer training, the Navy will pilot a new approach to create
Maritime Cyber Warfare Officers with on-keyboard skills this summer in
Pensacola, Florida. Navy plans to utilize current enlisted cyber rating
schools that are in high demand for Cyber Mission Force team work
roles. The intent is for new Maritime Cyber Warfare Officers to undergo
the same training as their enlisted Cyber Warfare Technician
counterparts. For more senior officers, the Navy will initially seek to
use other services' schools that have proven successful in delivering
the required skills to meet work role assignments. For enlisted
training, the ongoing coordination with USCYBERCOM to accomplish all
foundational training prior to assignment to Cyber Mission Forces will
be the basis of the new cyber warfare rating initial training.
The Navy established the Maritime Cyber Warfare Officer designator
and the Cyber Warfare Technician rating on 26 June and 28 June 2023,
respectively.
92. Senator Rosen. Admiral Gilday, as a former director of
operations for U.S. Cyber Command, can you discuss the value of reserve
models, including potentially establishing a civilian cybersecurity
reserve, to support the Department of Defense's cyberspace operations?
Admiral Gilday. The Naval Reserve Force is vital to our national
security. History has demonstrated the importance of maintaining a
warfighting ready strategic reserve of trained military personnel,
which reflects the essence of the Navy's mission and vision. Deploying
and training side-by-side with Active Duty counterparts, Navy Reserve
sailors provide a unique combination of military experience and
civilian expertise that gives the Navy a competitive advantage over our
adversary. Cybersecurity is one of the areas in which it is impossible
to have too much capability or too much expertise. Extending the
reserve force out to establish a civilian cybersecurity reserve corps
builds to our existing reserve programs and could prove beneficial. A
cost-benefit analysis determining further considerations (i.e., pay,
benefits, risk, limitations, etc.) would need to be executed across the
DOD to evaluate the advantage of tapping into the vast pool of
cybersecurity talent.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
recruiting
93. Senator Kelly. Secretary Del Toro, I understand the Navy hit
its Active Duty enlisted recruitment goals last year, but failed to
meet target numbers for Reserve enlisted personnel, and for both Active
Duty and Reserve officers. How has the Navy changed its strategy to
meet Officer and Reserve recruitment goals?
Secretary Del Toro. Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC)
established a Navy Recruiting Reserve Command (NRRC) on 1 April 2022, a
major command focused on Prior Service and Direct Commission Officer
Reserve missions. Prior to NRRC, Prior Service recruiting was part of
total force recruiting commands focused on both Active and Reserve
missions. NRRC's model is Reserve Recruiters in Reserve Markets,
working Reserve Only Missions and led by Reserve Leaders. In support of
this model, there is newly developed Reserve-centric Prior Service
Training and a new Reserve-centric Prior Service Marketing and
Advertising called Navy+, which targets Civilians, Veterans and Active
Duty separating from Service.
Since the execution of NRRC, 460 Enlisted and Officer recruiting
professionals have been transferred from Navy Recruiting Command and 26
Navy Talent Acquisition Groups (NTAGs) to NRRC. Reserve recruiting
billets (675) were transferred to NRRC commensurate with the reserve
missions that were transferred to the new command. NRRC's manning is
strategically built with Officer and Enlisted Canvasser Recruiters from
a variety of general and specialty rates and designators. Canvasser
Recruiters are Reservists on Active Duty recruiting tours for up to 3
years. In essence, NRRC recruiters are reservists selling reserve
careers. The Prior Service recruiters are strategically placed in
densely populated veteran markets in each State to include Hawaii and
Alaska, as well as Guam, Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin
Islands.
As of April 2023, NRRC has produced an additional 270 Enlisted and
additional 50 Officer contracts over the past year. Navy Recruiting is
expanding reach to the Prior Service and Active Duty market to ensure
separating individuals have the information they need to consider
extending service by way of the Navy Reserve. NRRC currently attends
all Transition Assistance Programs (TAP) in the local areas and they
have designated Benefit Advisors that partner with Active Duty Command
Career Counselors to educate separating sailors on Navy Reserve
benefits.
Navy Recruiting Command (NRC) has adjusted to a very aggressive
shipping posture. Upon receipt of selection results from the Officer
Community Managers (OCMs), selectees are immediately booked for the
next available Officer Candidate School (OCS) class, often within 2
weeks of board results. It has been communicated to the NTAGs to
prepare applicants to ship selects as soon as possible. A selection
memo has been introduced to reinforce candidate contact and reduce
close-in attrition or ``rolls'' by mandating recruiters contact
selectees directly following selection results to verify their
acceptance to the community and verify their shipping date.
Additionally, NRC has strategically overbooked designators with high
pre-shipping attrition in hopes to attain shipping goals before the
last OCS class of the fiscal year.
NRC is actively working with OCMs to reevaluate Program
Authorizations to allow more applicants to be sent to selection boards.
NRC provides a number of selections needed at each board to OCMs in
order to maintain mission glideslope. OCMs are encouraged to select
over their quota to allow for any potential attrition and build a
Delayed Entry Program for fiscal year 2024.
NRC is expanding the Mobile Medical Recruiting Academy training
topics to include Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidate programs and
renaming it Mobile Officer Recruiting Academy. This change should
increase penetration to quality colleges and universities for all non-
medical attainments if applied by field recruiters.
94. Senator Kelly. Secretary Del Toro, what can the Navy do to
expose our youth to the opportunities the military can provide? This is
critical to ensure we have the quality and quantity of sailors and
marines needed to support our national defense in the future
Secretary Del Toro. As propensity for military service has reached
record lows, the Navy and Marine Corps are heavily focused on expanding
and enhancing opportunities to tell our story and communicate the
opportunities and benefits of military service to young Americans.
Expanding community and school outreach. High schools remain the
most sustainable market for our recruiters, who are working hard to
reestablish relationships with educators and students lost as a result
of COVID closures and restrictions. We are also working closely with
State and Federal education officials to promote the value of military
service and military-connected recognition programs.
Currently, recruiter access requirements set a low threshold for
compliance in schools that fulfill just their minimal obligations. We
encourage Congress to modernize these requirements in a way that
supports the ability of our recruiters to establish meaningful
connections with both students and educators.
Enhancing marketing to youth and influencers. Today's fragmented
media environment means television ads do not have the same impact on
young people as in the past. Instead, we must employ creative and more
personal approaches that directly appeal to our audience, highlight the
diversity of our career opportunities, and convey the military's
tangible and intangible benefits to youth and those who influence them,
such as educators, family members, and community leaders.
Our advertising programs are vital to building awareness among
high-quality, diverse populations that are increasingly disconnected
from military service. A strong advertising program that reaches young
people in formats they heavily utilize enables our recruiting commands
to modernize, attract, and recruit the highest quality accession
cohorts.
Attracting a diverse and skilled talent pool. The Navy and Marine
Corps strive to recruit every zip code in the country and have
implemented community outreach within under-represented communities to
attract a wider range of potential recruits. The Department of the Navy
continues to assess where our Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
units are established and how we are leveraging cross-town affiliations
at Minority-Serving Institutions in communities with large minority
populations. Recruiters also seek diverse and innovative STEM talent by
visiting magnet schools, specialized high schools, and career and
technical education programs. By continuing to highlight our commitment
to diversity and inclusion, we promote the Department of the Navy as an
attractive and welcoming option for young people of all backgrounds.
95. Senator Kelly. General Berger, I understand that most of the
services have recruiting challenges, but the Marine Corps has been
doing well with retention. What does the data suggest is the reason for
this success?
General Berger. The Marine Corps has achieved exceptional retention
rates, surpassing our goals. This achievement is a testament to the
fact that once your marines become marines, they want to stay marines.
The marines who we are retaining are extremely high quality; this year,
over 70 percent come from the top 40 percent of our force. We are
decisively retaining and increasing the number of marines who have
innate ability, skills, and commitment to continued service, in line
with our Talent Management 2030 strategy. Introducing initiatives, such
as increased lateral move opportunities, allows marines to continue
service while further aligning individual desires to service
requirements. Our culture of warfighting excellence coupled with Talent
Management initiatives that seek to enhance the marine and family
experience significantly contribute to our retention success. Overall,
the Marine Corps' retention achievements are a testament to its ability
to attract and retain high-caliber personnel who are committed to
serving their country with excellence. Also, we only select the best of
our marines to serve on recruiting duty. As an example, a great
majority of our General Officers have commanded recruiting stations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
littoral combat ship
96. Senator Cotton. Secretary Del Toro, Congress asked you to look
at alternative uses for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). You currently
have a requirements study out for an unmanned mothership. Has there
been any consideration of the LCS as a mothership for unmanned systems?
Secretary Del Toro. Yes, LCS (Freedom Class) is among the various
ships we have included in our SECNAV Unmanned Mothership Study.
Additionally, it will also be evaluated as a potential solution, if/
when required, as part of the Unmanned Systems (UxS) Expeditionary
Support and Integration Requirements Evaluation Team (RET) commencing
this summer.
97. Senator Cotton. Secretary Del Toro, what is the feasibility of
experimentation with the LCS to inform those requirements as opposed to
simply paper studies?
Secretary Del Toro. Fourth fleet has commenced with their initial
concept exploration. Additionally, the Navy is about to award a
contract to put Unmanned Aerial System Intelligence Surveillance
Reconnaissance, Commercially Owned / Commercially Operated Services on
three LCS from Multiple Fleets. This is an expansion of the work that
was done last year to put the same capability on DDG FLTI/II (x2) in
7th Fleet. This is meant to be complementary to the MQ-8 (if available)
and not replace.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
additive manufacturing
98. Senator Rounds. Admiral Gilday, do you believe additive
manufacturing provides a major opportunity for reducing maintenance
lead times both on board ships and at the shipyards?
Admiral Gilday. Additive manufacturing provides a strong
opportunity to reduce maintenance lead times. It is currently being
used at the shipyards with conventional manufacturing and sustainment,
particularly with tooling and fixtures. Additive manufacturing on board
ship has focused primarily on low criticality parts due to the current
maturity of the materials and processes. Additively manufactured high
criticalaity end-use items require qualification and certification for
specific applications. The Department of the Navy is continuing to
mature its processes and invest in research and development to take
advantage of additive manufacturing opportunities.
The Navy is embracing new technologies in order to deliver and
maintain quality ships and submarines on time to meet the threat posed
by our Nation's adversaries. The Navy sees significant opportunity for
advanced manufacturing technology, particularly additive manufacturing,
to deliver benefits across the shipbuilding industrial base and supply
chain as a means to:
Increase manufacturing resilience.
Reduce reliance on sole-source supply points and address
constraints in challenged markets.
Reduce manufacturing lead-times and fabrication spans.
Address obsolescence concerns for ship maintenance,
modernization, repair, and sustainment.
Reduce the manpower needed for critical manufacturing
while attracting, upskilling, and retaining the skilled workforce
needed across the supply chain.
99. Senator Rounds. General Berger, would forward deploying
printers, capable of producing additively manufactured components, with
logistics units help improve the ability of the marines to sustain
themselves in a denied environment?
General Berger. Yes. A forward deployed manufacturing capability
(additive, subtractive, and hybrid versions of the two) are critical in
sustaining Marine Corps and joint forces in a denied environment. In
addition to fielding the hardware that produces these parts
(Expeditionary Fabrication (XFAB) at the intermediate level, and
Tactical Fabrication (TACFAB) at the organizational level), the Marine
Corps is working to field the authoritative digital data thread
required for those machines to produce required parts. We have fielded
a deployable additive manufacturing capability to all three Active Duty
Maintenance Battalions and additional logistics units are scheduled to
receive this capability across the FYDP. We are on track to begin
fielding polymer additive manufacturing capabilities to every battalion
within the Marine Corps this calendar year (CY23). We are on course to
update our dedicated maintenance unit's capabilities to be able to
print metal parts in fiscal year 2026. Additionally, we intend to
undergo a modernization effort for our deployable machine shop that
will replace our legacy deployable subtractive manufacturing capability
and provide our logistics units with a better sustainment capability.
100. Senator Rounds. Secretary Del Toro, what will you do to enable
the Navy and Marine Corps to rapidly qualify additively manufactured
components?
Secretary Del Toro. The ability to rapidly qualify additive
manufacturing (AM) processes and certify parts within the Department of
the Navy (DON) is continuing to mature. The diverse nature of Navy and
Marine Corps operational environments requires different qualification/
certification approaches across various weapons systems. For example,
approval of low-critical parts for ships, submarines, and ground units
are delegated down to the waterfront and unit level while higher
criticality parts (i.e., air-worthy and nuclear SUBSAFE/Level 1 parts)
require higher levels of approval.
The AM industry at large is limited by a lack of AM standards,
material data, and qualification/certification approaches. The DON is
coordinating with other government, academic and industry partners in
the development of these standards and approaches to enable more rapid
AM qualification and certification. Current processes only enable
approval of individual parts for particular platforms produced by
specific machines. The DON is improving this process in the near term
by identifying ways of scaling process qualification to multiple AM
vendors as well as implementing approaches for ``families of parts'' in
which parts with similar design features, performance requirements, and
consequence of failure are certified together. In the longer term,
qualification will be accomplished by analyzing the vast amounts of
data captured through AM processes comparing the ``as designed'' part
to the ``as built'' part. While these efforts are in their beginning
stages, DON will continue to fund the efforts that contribute to the
maturation of the AM qualification and certification process.
naval maintenance
101. Senator Rounds. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, the USS
Boise still sits in dry dock at Newport News Shipyard. Due to
compounding problems with the Navy's ship maintenance schedules and
workflow, it has been over 8 years since this submarine completed its
last mission. It has now spent 6 years in port due to maintenance
issues. I view this case and the ship maintenance backlog as an
extremely grave matter. What is the plan to get USS Boise and other
ships out of dry dock and back into the fight?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. Boise is currently in an
Early Production Period (EPP), an availability that authorizes a
portion of the Engineered Overhaul (EOH) Availability Work Package, at
HII-NNS Shipyard in Newport News, VA. As Boise awaits commencement of
the full EOH, the currently authorized and ongoing EPP is being
executed by HII-NNS with the intent of reducing the risk associated
with executing the entire EOH. The EPP commenced in September 2020.
An EOH is a CNO-scheduled depot level maintenance availability that
is required within the submarine life cycle to perform repairs, upgrade
capabilities, and reset the operating interval and certification.
Commencement of the Boise EOH has been delayed due to resource
shortages at HII-NNS, due primarily to the Navy's assignment of two
higher priority submarine repair availabilities, the Helena (SSN 725)
Drydocking Selected Restricted Availability (DSRA) and the Columbus
(SSN 762) EOH, at the same time Boise entered the shipyard. The Helena
DSRA is complete and the ongoing Columbus EOH has been progressing
steadily following a slower than expected start.
The Navy is working with HII-NNS to award a Boise EOH contract that
will incentivize performance and share risk. Once this contract is
awarded, the Boise EOH will begin and then availability duration,
undocking, and completion dates will be determined.
In July 2022, the Navy approved a 15-Year Attack Submarines (SSN)
Maintenance Strategy, a holistic approach to SSN Maintenance that
includes leveraging public and private sector capability and capacity
to increase submarine operational availability and sustain material
readiness.
The 15-Year SSN Maintenance Strategy provides long term guidance
and planning of Public Shipyard and Private Shipyard Repair
availabilities. The goal of this effort is to level load depot
maintenance facilities, smoothing out peaks and troughs in combined
workloads and enabling the facilities to execute maintenance with
predictability.
Execution of the 15-year SSN Maintenance Strategy requires
investment across public and private sector, to include:
Fully funding public shipyards
Establishing stable requirements and funding for private
shipyard availabilities
Addressing funding shortfalls for Virginia Class (VCS)
material, obsolescence, rotatable pools, etc.
Engaging industry on discrete jobs to outsource
Executing funding options/processes to support material
availability
The President's Budget 2024 adds for VCS material parts,
obsolescence, acquisition, and private yard availability planning to
improve SSN maintenance execution at public and private shipyards.
Additionally, this fully funds Submarine Maintenance (1B4B) which will
enable greater confidence in schedule execution and material
availability for planned submarine overhauls.
Key President's Budget 2024 investments in SSN maintenance are:
Invests in the long lead-time (LLTM) materials that are
causing significant delays in VCS availabilities.
Addresses obsolete systems or components and invests in
outsourced work to enable shipyard worker focus on critical path work.)
Restores Navy Working Capital Fund investment in VCS
material made in fiscal year 2023.--$350 million (fiscal year 20DP)
Funds planning of a private shipyard VCS availability in
heel-to-toe fashion following Boise EOH, continuing Navy's partnership
with private industry.
Fully funds Submarine Maintenance (1B4B) which will
improve confidence in schedule execution and material availability for
planned submarine overhauls.
Additionally, President's Budget 2024 budget request adds $600
million in OPN to fund remaining shortfall for Boise EOH.
The Navy is committed to these investments, and executing the 15-
Year SSN Maintenance Strategy to improve our national defense posture.
102. Senator Rounds. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, in
recognition of the poor State of our public shipyards, Navy leadership
developed the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) in
2018. Can you tell me what the State of this program is, whether the
Navy is getting the resources it needs to recapitalize our public
shipyards on an appropriate timeline to provide a credible naval
deterrent to China, and whether resourcing this requirement to a higher
level is something that this Committee needs to seriously consider?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Navy's primary
initiative to modernize and optimize the four public shipyards is the
Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP). Shipyards with
resilient facilities, efficient layouts, modernized equipment, and
digital interconnections generate Fleet readiness and strengthen our
Nation's security. The Navy's fiscal year 2024 budget submission
confirms the Administration's commitment to SIOP with $9.9 billion of
funding across the fiscal years 2024 to 2028 Future Years Defense
Program.
With the support received from Congress--to include the $1.9
billion appropriated in fiscal year 2023--SIOP is advancing three lines
of effort (LOE): (1) deliver required dry dock repairs and upgrades to
support current and planned classes of nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers and submarines, (2) optimize workflow within the shipyards
through significant changes to their physical layout, and (3)
recapitalize obsolete industrial plant equipment with modern
technology, substantially increasing productivity and safety.
SIOP has achieved a number of accomplishments toward each LOE:
Completion of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) Super Flood Basin
and the modernized Norfolk Naval Shipyard Dry Dock 4; awarding
construction of the Norfolk Naval Shipyard Dry Dock 8 Saltwater
Upgrades and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (PHNS) Dry Dock 5; commencing
design of a Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier capable dry dock at
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard; awarding multiple Facilities Sustainment,
Restoration, and Modernization projects across all four shipyards; and
continuing capital equipment investments to include delivery of a 175-
ton portal crane to PNSY.
The foundation of SIOP's optimization effort are the industrial
modeling and simulation, engineering studies, and area development
plans (ADPs) underway for each shipyard. SIOP completed the first
increment of industrial modeling in 2022, which provided facility-level
data describing optimized workflow among buildings and validated
reductions in availability durations possible by optimizing facility
layouts and infrastructure. The second increment of industrial modeling
started in 2022 and focuses on processes within facilities to optimize
shop floor layout and equipment to further increase efficiencies. The
modeling and simulation of the ideal shipyard layout, combined with the
engineering studies that describe local constraints allow the
development of shipyard specific ADP that provide the Navy a range of
options and sequencing for facilities recapitalization. The PHNS ADP
was delivered by the contractor in July 2022, and the Navy expects to
make a recapitalization decision this year. The ADPs for the other
shipyards will complete in 2024 and 2025.
The Navy budget balances requirements across all domains, and the
scale of SIOP requires that it remain a Navy priority for many years.
Consistent, predictable funding for the program is necessary to move
swiftly through planning, design, and construction, while synchronizing
the recapitalization with shipyard operations and fleet requirements.
Acceleration opportunities exist if project designs can be further
advanced to take advantage of operational windows for construction.
Navy readiness demands that all SIOP investments are coordinated
with fleet operational commitments to ensure alignment of requirements,
construction, and ship maintenance, while remaining mindful of the
impact SIOP will have on our shipyard workers and our need for
sustainable infrastructure. This includes ensuring the program is
integrated with the Naval Sea Systems Command Performance to Plan, the
Naval Sustainment System--Shipyards efforts, local communities and
regulators, and the Administration's climate initiatives.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
weapons procurement
103. Senator Ernst. Secretary Del Toro, since the Navy proposes
growing the weapons procurement account by more than 40 percent in
fiscal year 2024, what production lines for missiles have been maxed
out?
Secretary Del Toro. Senator, the following weapons procurement
production lines are maxed out:
AIM-120 AMRAAM through fiscal year 2026. This is an Air
Force led effort, to include the DON procurements.
AGM-158C LRASM is near max capacity as annual quantities
procured fluctuate year-to-year across the FYDP. LRASM is a Navy led
program with Air Force as the contracting lead for procurement with
both Navy and Air Force procurements.
RIM-174 SM-6 is maxed out across the FYDP.
RGM/UGM-109E Tactical Tomahawk is at maximum capacity and
coordinating investments to increase capacity. The Tomahawk production
line, and sub-vendors, are shared across new production and
recertification and multiple service customers, including Navy, Marine
Corps, Army and Foreign Military Sales.
104. Senator Ernst. Secretary Del Toro, what production lines have
excess capacity?
Secretary Del Toro.
Naval Strike Missile has some additional capacity that
the Navy could leverage as part of the planned fiscal year 2024 to 2028
Multi-Year Procurement. With additional funds, the Navy can procure up
to 104 missiles across the FYDP on the planned fiscal year 2024 MYP for
NSM.
ESSM has additional capacity that can be leveraged. Due
to investments made to increase production capacity, ordering capacity
will increase from 300 up to 540 ESSM Block 2 missiles starting in
fiscal year 2024.
LRASM will achieve additional capacity in fiscal year
2025 following planned investments in fiscal year 2024.
AGM-88G AARGM-ER currently has excess production capacity
for up to 91 missiles. Fiscal year 2024 production capacity will be
updated once the fiscal year 2023 contract is awarded.
AIM-9X will have additional capacity that can be
leveraged in fiscal year 2025. They are currently at 1,400/year with a
stretch goal to reach 1,650 in fiscal year 2024. Multiple efforts are
ongoing to increase production capacity up to 2,000/year with an
eventual end State of 2,500/year.
105. Senator Ernst. Secretary Del Toro, can you describe how you
have been using multi-year authorities for select munitions?
Secretary Del Toro.
The DON is moving in lock-step with the Air Force and OSD
to support the Department's Critical Munitions Strategy (CMS).