[Senate Hearing 118-625, Part 7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
------
S. Hrg. 118-625, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 2226
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
----------
PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
----------
MARCH 14; APRIL 18; MAY 2, 9, 2023
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
Part 7 STRATEGIC FORCES
______
S. Hrg. 118-625, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 2226
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
__________
PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
__________
MARCH 14; APRIL 18; MAY 2, 9, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov/
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-100 WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York TOM COTTON, Arkansas
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
JONI ERNST, Iowa
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan TED BUDD, North Carolina
JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri,
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
MARK KELLY, Arizona
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John P. Keast, Minority Staff
Director
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine, DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
Chairman TOM COTTON, Arkansas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
MARK KELLY, Arizona
(ii)
C O N T E
march 14, 2023
Page
The United States Space Force Programs........................... 1
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Angus King.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 2
Witness Statements
Saltzman, General B. Chance, USSF, Chief of Space Operations..... 2
Questions for the Record......................................... 30
april 18, 2023
The Department of Energy's Atomic Energy Defense Activities and 33
Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Programs.
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Angus King.................................. 33
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 34
Witness Statements
Hruby, The Honorable Jill M., Administrator, National Nuclear 34
Security
Administration.
Caldwell, Admiral James F., Jr., USN, Deputy Administrator for 35
Naval Reactors, National Nuclear Security Administration.
William White, Senior Advisor for Environmental Management, 41
Department of Energy.
Adams, The Honorable Marvin L., Deputy Administrator for Defense 58
Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration.
Bussiere, General Thomas A., USAF, Commander, Air Force Global 75
Strike Command.
Wolfe, Vice Admiral Johnny R., Jr., USN, Director, Navy Strategic 82
Systems Programs.
Questions for the Record......................................... 98
(iii)
may 2, 2023
The Department of Defense Space Activities....................... 111
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Angus King.................................. 111
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 112
Witness Statements
Plumb, Dr. John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 112
Policy.
Calvelli, The Honorable Frank, Assistant Secretaryof the Air 118
Force for Space Acquisition and Integration.
Thompson, General David D., USSF, Vice Chief of Space Operations. 119
Questions for the Record......................................... 140
may 9, 2023
The Department of Defense Missile Defense Activities............. 143
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Angus King.................................. 143
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 144
Witness Statements
Plumb, The Honorable John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for 145
Space Policy, Department of Defense.
Hill, Vice Admiral Jon A., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency. 150
VanHerck, General Glen D., USAF, Commander, United States 156
Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.
Karbler, Lieutenant General Daniel L., USA, Commanding General, 166
United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 192
(iv)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 14, 2023
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE PROGRAMS
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:46 p.m., in
room 222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus S.
King, Jr. (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Subcommittee Members present: Senators King, Gillibrand,
Rosen, Kelly, Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Cramer, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.
Senator King. Call to order the meeting of the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.
Our hearing today is on the subject of the Space Force.
I want to thank General Saltzman for being with us today
before this Committee, and the purpose of the hearing is to
understand your vision and priorities for the Space Force as
its second Chief of Space Operations.
While the budget for the Department of Defense (DOD) in the
Space Force has just been released, we plan to have a Space
budget hearing which includes the Space Force later in May.
After we have had time to understand in detail the President's
Budget Request, there are many and complicated topics such as
missile warning and launch that will take time to understand
and are not really ripe for this hearing today, but we will
take up in May.
Instead, the hearing will focus on you, General Saltzman.
This is your opportunity to explain to the Subcommittee and to
the public how you will train and equip the Space Force as a
Department of Defense separate military service and be a
presenter of forces to the Combatant Commanders in order to
accomplish their missions as assigned by the President.
My understanding is that today you will explain to us your
three lines of effort for our Space Force Guardians. As I
understand it, they are to first field a combat ready force.
Second, amplify the Guardian spirit, and third, partner with
the interagency allies and industry to win.
I look forward to having you explain in detail what each of
these lines of effort are and give us examples, simple ones,
that we can take with us and explain to our constituents and
the public the importance of the work that you are doing.
Let me conclude that General Hayden said it best, there is
no such thing as a conflict in space by itself. Any conflict
will involve all domains, although I believe it will start in
space, the land, the sea, the air, and space all together at
once.
I hope that today you will explain to us how your vision
for the Space Force will meet General Hayden's astute
observation and enable our combatant commanders to accomplish
the mission that the President has directed them to perform, if
called upon.
After your opening statement, we will have questions of 5
minutes each. Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Saltzman,
thank you for being here today and for sharing your perspective
with the Subcommittee, and thank you, sir, for your many, many
years of service.
You are only the second ever Chief of Space Operations in a
unique position to leave your mark on what is still essentially
a brand new military service. An opportunity like this comes
around less than once in a generation, and I am sure you feel
the gravity and the expectation of this every single day.
I look forward to hearing more of your vision for this
newest service branch, specifically how you are forming it into
a fighting force that is ready to prosecute war as part of the
United States military.
I would also like to understand how you are shaping the
space acquisition enterprise to that vision enabling the Joint
Force. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. General Saltzman.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL B. CHANCE SALTZMAN, USSF, CHIEF OF SPACE
OPERATIONS
General Saltzman. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for your
continued support for the opportunity to discuss my vision and
priorities for the United States Space Force.
I have been in listening mode since becoming the second
Chief of Space Operations (CSO) just 4 months ago. One of my
first phone calls as the CSO was to the Commander of United
States European Command, General Calvelli.
My first trip as the CSO was to Colorado Springs to meet in
person with the Commander of U.S. Space Command, General
Dickinson. My first overseas trip was to Hawaii, where I met
with the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command,
Admiral Aquilino.
During these last 4 months, I have also prioritized
visiting with Guardians performing vital missions around the
world for the Space Force, for the Joint Force, and for the
Nation. In December, I met in person with military space chiefs
from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom.
In all these engagements, my goal was to better understand
how the Space Force should focus its near and mid-term efforts
as we integrate our capabilities to address the threats and
challenges. The themes from these engagements should surprise
no one.
Each combatant commander emphasized the vital role space
plays in strategic competition and integrated deterrence. The
guardians of the Space Force make this possible and are without
a doubt the brightest and boldest America has to offer.
Because of these advantages and our shared interest in the
domain, U.S. allies and international partners are eager for
expanded collaboration with the Space Force, especially in
areas that strengthen the effectiveness of coalition space
operations and reinforce norms of responsible behavior.
In short, our mission forces, people, and partnerships make
the Space Force the most formidable space organization on the
planet. China and Russia know this and are accelerating their
efforts to undermine United States advantages in the domain.
To meet this challenge, the Space Force will prioritize
three lines of effort, as Senator King has already stated,
fielding, combat ready forces, amplifying the guardian spirit,
and partnering to win.
These lines of efforts are designed to deliver the forces,
personnel, and partnerships required for the Space Force to
preserve U.S. advantages in space. Before I expand on the Space
Force lines of effort, I would like to update the Subcommittee
on the emerging threats Space Forces face.
As the handout I have provided indicates, space is
undeniably a contested and congested warfighting domain. When
describing space threats, it is important to account for two
kinds of threats. First, threats from space assets, and second,
threats to space assets. Threats from space present a growing
danger to the Joint Force.
[The information referred to follows:]
Both China and Russia have robust space-based capabilities
that allow them to find, target, and attack United States
military forces on land, at sea, and in the air. Equally
alarming are the threats that endanger the satellites the
Nation relies on for prosperity and security. Both China and
Russia continue to develop, field, and deploy a range of
weapons aimed at United States space capabilities.
The spectrum of threats to U.S. space capabilities includes
cyber warfare activities, electronic attack platforms, directed
energy lasers designed to blind or damage satellites sensors,
ground to orbit missiles to destroy satellites, and space to
space orbital engagement systems that can attack U.S.
satellites in space. The contested space domain shapes the
enduring purpose of the United States Space Force.
Congress established the Space Force to protect U.S.
interests in space. This means protecting U.S. space
capabilities and defending the Joint Force and the Nation from
space enabled attack.
My lines of effort are designed to achieve this vision by
providing the forces, personnel, and partnerships required for
the Space Force to preserve U.S. space superiority for the
foreseeable future. My first priority is to build resilient,
ready to combat credible space forces. To do this, we are
accelerating the pivot toward resilience satellite
constellations, ground stations, networks, and data links.
The space development agencies proliferated warfighter
space architecture provides a prime example of these efforts.
We are also emphasizing cybersecurity and preparing guardians
to detect and defeat cyber-attacks against our networks,
systems, ground stations, data links, and satellites.
We are developing an operational test and training
infrastructure that will be the backbone of Space Force
readiness as guardians prepare for a high intensity fight. This
infrastructure will allow guardians to execute realistic
training against simulated adversaries to validate their
tactics.
Space Training and Readiness Command executed one such
exercise last September with its inaugural Black Skies exercise
focused on space electromagnetic warfare. Through these events,
we are continuously enhancing tactics and operational concepts,
thereby creating a force ready for emerging threats.
My second priority is to amplify the guardian spirit by
embracing a modern talent management process that recruits the
best talent, develops and retains an elite workforce, and
empowers guardians to succeed.
One example is our constructive service credit program that
allows experienced professionals from key fields to directly
commission into the Space Force at ranks appropriate to their
civilian experience. The first constructive credit board served
as a pilot program in 2022 and recruited seven cyber
professionals to become guardians, one of which was onboarded
as a lieutenant colonel.
The second board will incorporate intelligence
professionals and assess 20 additional personnel. Over the last
year, we have also deployed space centric curriculum for basic
military training, the Reserve Officer Training Corps, and an
officer training school. In addition, our partnership with the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies for
Professional Military Education begins this summer.
With congressional support, we will improve our modern
talent management system by integrating the Air Force Reserve
space element into the Space Force as a single component. This
will allow guardians to transition between full-time and part-
time duty to pursue opportunities outside of full-time military
service and subsequently return to full-time duty without
barriers to reentry or detriment to their career.
We will ensure that such experience is utilized in strict
and careful compliance with Federal acquisition and ethics
regulations, and appropriate conflict of interest statutes. The
single service personnel management system will make retaining
highly qualified guardians easier by facilitating flexible
career paths, and we look forward to working with this
Subcommittee on that important initiative.
My third and final priority is to strengthen partnerships
the Space Force relies on to accomplish its mission. The Space
Force will strive to eliminate barriers to collaboration,
including over classification, so we can build enduring
advantages with our partners.
To date, personnel from over 50 countries have participated
in training, education, and exercise events hosted by the Space
Force. We are also leveraging allies and partners to expand our
warfighting capability.
Recent examples include deploying United States payloads on
Norwegian and Japanese satellites and establishing a
partnership with Luxembourg for satellite communication
services. In total, we have more than 200 foreign military
sales cases, with over 60 countries for a broad spectrum of
space capabilities.
Commercial partners will be key as we pursue emerging
technologies like advanced power promotion, propulsion
technologies, artificial intelligence, and machine learning,
and in-space servicing assembly and manufacturing. Space
Systems Command's Commercial Services Office is building these
partnerships to improve our ability to leverage more commercial
off the shelf capabilities.
In conclusion, thank you for the opportunity to share these
priorities with you today. The Space Force is the preeminent
military space organization in the world. Our adversaries seek
to surpass the United States and challenge our advantage. We
cannot and will not allow this to happen.
Our guardians will out work, out innovate, and out compete
our adversaries to ensure that we succeed. They will do
everything they can to deter conflict and maintain stability in
space. I very much look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General B. Chance Saltzman
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General B. Chance Saltzman
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, distinguished members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for your continued support and for the
opportunity to discuss my vision and priorities for the United States
Space Force. For the last 5 months, I have had the privilege of serving
as the Chief of Space Operations and leading the guardians of the Space
Force. They are, without a doubt, the brightest and boldest America has
to offer. The Space Force is the world's preeminent space warfighting
entity because of them. We must maintain that status so that the
threats we face in, to, and from space are never able to undermine
American prosperity and security. Space capabilities shape the modern
way of war and the human way of life. Without space, the Joint Force's
ability to project power and execute operations will be severely
degraded.
The Space Force develops and trains guardians, designs and acquires
space systems, and provides those personnel and systems to the Joint
Force. In accordance with the strategic direction provided in the
National Defense Strategy and the Department of the Air Force
Operational Imperatives, we will develop a resilient space order of
battle able to protect U.S. space capabilities and defend the Joint
Force from space-enabled targeting and attack. Should competition turn
to conflict, the Space Force will be prepared to rapidly transition to
a wartime posture against a peer adversary with the appropriate
systems, training, and sustainment to fight and win a long-term
conflict.
To do this, I will prioritize three key efforts: (1) fielding
combat-ready forces (2) amplifying the Guardian Spirit, and (3)
partnering to win. Our adversaries seek to supersede our advantages in
space. We cannot let that happen. Through these three efforts, the
Space Force will develop a competitive mindset and warfighting culture.
We will outpace and outcompete our adversaries. We will preserve
stability in space.
threat picture & operational environment
Congested Space Domain
Our efforts to maintain stability in space must account for the
increasing number of objects that congest the domain. In 2022, space
launch providers around the world conducted a record 177 launches, a 31
percent increase from 2021. Those launches put 2,215 payloads into
orbit, a 29 percent increase from 2021. Increasing launch cadence and
payloads in orbit expands demand for space domain awareness (SDA)
capabilities covering all orbital regimes. The Space Force's SDA unit,
Space Delta 2, currently tracks approximately 47,900 objects in space,
a 16 percent growth in objects from 2021 to 2022. Of those objects,
7,100 are active payloads, a 37 percent increase from 2021 to 2022.
Expended rocket bodies, inactive satellites, and debris further congest
the environment.
Proliferated mega constellations numbering in the hundreds or
thousands of satellites account for a growing percentage of launches
and active payloads on orbit. Of the 177 launches last year, 41
deployed satellites for mega constellations representing a 51 percent
increase from 2021. Those 41 missions put over 2000 payloads into
orbit. Six were rideshare missions which launched satellites for a wide
variety of government and private sector space entities.
These new satellites must be effectively tracked to alert operators
to prevent collisions that could generate more debris. The orbital
debris problem continued to worsen in 2022. Seven spacecraft broke
apart in orbit creating over 600 new pieces of debris, including one
Chinese rocket body accounting for over 530. The International Space
Station had 1,486 reportable conjunctions with space debris or
spacecraft in 2022, a 233 percent increase from 2021. The increase was
largely due to the Russian anti-satellite test in November 2021 which
created 1500 pieces of trackable debris, caused over half of the
conjunctions, and forced the ISS to maneuver twice to dodge debris.
In addition to the rocket that broke apart in orbit, the Chinese
Government allowed uncontrolled reentries of two additional rocket
bodies into Earth's atmosphere last year, while refusing to share
specific trajectory information. The Chinese and Russian Governments'
disregard for the safety and sustainability of space could lead to
debris generation and loss of human life. We are committed to setting
an example of professional behavior to ensure the space domain remains
secure, stable, and accessible while the United States Government works
to lead efforts to develop norms of responsible behavior in space.
Contested Space Domain
Space is undeniably a contested warfighting domain. China and
Russia both define space in such a manner. China, our pacing challenge,
is the most immediate threat in, to, and from space for which the Space
Force must maintain technological advantage and readiness to defend
vital national security interests. Russia, while less capable, remains
an acute threat that is developing asymmetric counterspace systems
meant to neutralize American satellites. Both states recognize the
advantage space provides the United States. Both expect space to be key
to future warfare by enabling long-range precision strike. Both seek
information superiority through disabling an adversary's space
communication and navigation systems. They are intent on targeting
perceived U.S. vulnerabilities and eliminating American advantage in
the space domain.
In 2015, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) created the Strategic
Support Force which integrates space, cyberspace, and electronic
warfare operations. China continues to aggressively invest in
technology meant to disrupt, degrade, and destroy our space
capabilities. Those technologies are key to their plan for a fully
modernized, world class military able to project power globally and for
achieving their ``Space Dream'' to become the foremost global space
power by 2045.
China has a range of operational counterspace capabilities,
including terrestrial lasers to disrupt and degrade satellite sensors,
electronic warfare jammers targeting GPS and SATCOM, and anti-satellite
missiles. They are testing on-orbit satellite systems which could be
weaponized as they have already shown the capability to physically
control and move other satellites. Their cyber capabilities are
extensive and dangerous. They are likely pursuing anti-satellite
systems able to destroy satellites in geosynchronous orbit. In July
2021, the Chinese Government successfully completed the first test of
fractional orbital launch of an ICBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle,
which traveled over 24,800 miles demonstrating a new method to hold at
risk and to attack the United States.
Over the last 6 months, China conducted 35 launches adding advanced
communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
satellites to their orbital architecture. Of China's over 700
operational satellites in orbit, 347 are PLA ISR platforms providing
optical, radar, and radio-frequency capabilities which track the Joint
Force worldwide. Their ISR satellites work in conjunction with
positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) and SATCOM satellites to
enable Chinese kill-chains and long-range precision guided attack.
These space capabilities allow China to monitor, track, target and
attack United States forces in conflict.
Russia is testing and fielding orbital anti-satellite systems,
extensive cyber capabilities, and terrestrial anti-satellite missiles,
jammers, and lasers. They are also likely developing an air launch
anti-satellite missile. Russia's ISR satellites are highly advanced,
providing geospatial and signals intelligence capabilities, but are
limited in number relative to the United States and China. Their ISR,
PNT, and communications satellites provide the basis for space-enabled
targeting and attack that must be taken seriously despite Russia's
performance in Ukraine and lack of follow-through on threats to space
capabilities.
The Space Force will protect the Joint Force from threats of
Russian and Chinese action. The Space Force must deter aggression and,
if necessary, defeat adversaries. We will do so responsibly and
sustainably. We will execute my priorities with the pacing challenge,
China, at the forefront of our minds.
the vital role of the space force
Congress established the Space Force to protect U.S. interests in
space. This charge has two components. First, we must protect U.S.
space capabilities so that the Nation has unfettered access to the
domain. Second, we must defend the Joint Force and the Nation from
space-enabled attack. Space superiority is the ability to accomplish
both at a time and place of our choosing. Military services are
organized around domains--air, land, and sea--because contesting a
domain with military force is a complex endeavor that requires
institutional specialization. Space superiority requires a similar
level of specialization. This mission is why the Space Force exists and
an operational outcome clearly in guardians' purview.
My lines of effort are designed to achieve this vision by providing
the forces, personnel, and partnerships required for the Space Force to
preserve U.S. space superiority for the foreseeable future.
line of effort 1--field combat-ready forces
My first priority is to build resilient, ready, combat-credible
space forces. A resilient force can withstand, fight through, and
recover from hostile attacks. A ready force has the training,
equipment, and sustainment required to accomplish any mission in
competition and high-intensity conflict. A combat-credible force has
power to deter by providing the ability to conduct full-spectrum
operations in a prompt and sustained manner against any adversary.
Space forces must be all three, resilient, ready, and combat-credible,
if they are going to outcompete adversaries, deter aggressors, and
defeat the Nation's enemies.
Resilient
We are accelerating the pivot toward resilient satellite
constellations, ground stations, networks, and data links. We are
conducting transformational force design analysis based on current and
future threats, operational needs, and costs so that we can deliver
resilient, effective systems and architecture. Force design will be
informed by extensive wargaming and prototyping to deliver combat and
cost-effective platforms. Satellite constellations must be
proliferated, disaggregated, and distributed. The Space Development
Agency's Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture provides a prime
example of those efforts.
Emphasis must be placed on cybersecurity. Cyber threats must be
understood. Networks must be hardened against hostile cyber operations.
The Space Force will employ highly trained guardians implementing
modern sensors, software, and analytics to detect and defeat cyber
operations against our networks, systems, ground stations, datalinks,
and satellites. The Space Force will strive to eliminate legacy
information technology to reduce cyber vulnerabilities.
Ready
To enhance our ability to field combat-ready forces, we are
experimenting with organizational constructs that strengthen readiness
by building tighter connections between operations and acquisitions
activities. The 15th Space Surveillance Squadron is an important
example of such a unit. This unit combines an operational space domain
awareness (SDA) mission under Space Delta 2 and a research and
development mission for SDA technologies aligned with the Air Force
Research Lab. The combination of operations and acquisitions expertise
accelerates technological transfer from engineers and acquirers to
warfighters. As experiments like this demonstrate positive results, we
will look for innovative ways to apply the lessons we learn across the
force.
The Space Force requires new, modern infrastructure to train
guardians, develop tactics, and validate performance. Developing
Operational Test and Training Infrastructure (OTTI) will enable
guardians to build readiness to fight and win high-intensity conflict.
With this infrastructure, we will aggressively pursue realistic
training. guardians will execute missions with validated tactics and
modern weapon systems. We are executing new, large scale training
exercises including Space Flag and Black Skies. At these exercises,
Guardian aggressor forces function as intelligent, highly capable
opponents to force guardians to account for our real-world adversaries.
Through training, exercises, and orbital experimentation, we will
develop, validate, and continuously enhance tactics and operational
concepts, thereby creating a force ready for emerging threats.
Combat-Credible
Only a credible Space Force can deter an adversary from extending a
conflict into space. A combat-credible force requires actionable
intelligence, decisive command and control, fortified networks,
maintained equipment, innovative operational concepts, validated
tactics, accredited facilities, and continuous sustainment. Neglecting
any of these elements jeopardizes a force's ability to conduct prompt
and sustained operations against an adversary. My emphasis on combat
credibility ensures that we are fielding all the combat and combat
support elements required to prevail against an adversary in space.
For Space Force forces to be combat-credible, they must be able to
protect space capabilities and defend the Joint Force from space-
enabled attack. To perform these missions, we are developing
strategies, concepts, and tactics that will allow space forces to
conduct prompt and sustained full spectrum operations against an
adversary in the emerging threat environment. We are also accelerating
the documentation of force designs related to orbital warfare; space
domain awareness; battle management command, control, and
communication; and other key functional areas. The Space Warfighting
Analysis Center plays a role in this effort by providing the modeling
and analysis to inform these activities. If the concepts we rely on to
protect and defend become stale or outdated, we risk falling behind the
adversary. Therefore, we are continuously evaluating the effectiveness
of strategies, concepts, and tactics through a Service-wide campaign of
learning.
line of effort 2--amplify the guardian spirit
My second priority is to unleash the spirit of creativity,
innovation, determination, and patriotism of our talented workforce.
Amplifying the Guardian Spirit requires the Space Force to continue to
embrace modern talent management processes so that we can recruit the
best talent, develop, and retain an elite workforce, and empower
guardians to succeed.
Recruit the Best Talent
The size and requirements of the Space Force present unique
recruiting challenges. We receive more applications than we have
positions available. Our focus must be selecting the right people who
will embrace the Guardian Spirit and dedicate themselves to the
accomplishment of our mission. Future guardians must be recruited from
across the United States, from all backgrounds ensuring selection of
high-quality people with diverse life experiences that will be critical
in solving complex problems and executing difficult missions. The Space
Force must outcompete the civilian market for talent by showing how
attractive careers as a Guardian are for all people.
The Space Force is implementing innovative recruitment practices to
attract talent. We are expanding digital recruiting efforts to include
interactions with potential recruits aimed at presenting the value of
service in the Space Force, training and educational opportunities, and
the importance of STEM. Recruit townhalls allow potential future
guardians to ask questions in preparation for joining the Space Force
and successful completion of Basic Military Training. STEM to Space is
a targeted outreach effort through which guardians give presentations
to elementary and high school students promoting STEM education and
careers. The Space Force recently launched a website to conduct public
outreach which provides information on careers, but also provides
personal insights and anecdotes from enlisted personnel, officers, and
civilians.
Through extremely valuable partnerships with Universities, the
Space Force will recruit highly educated guardians. The Space Force
University Partnership Program (UPP) creates a pipeline for future
Space Force officers and civilians through ROTC and internship
programs. We will recruit from a diverse group of universities to
ensure the strongest possible field of future guardians and STEM talent
including from underrepresented populations. We currently have 14
partner universities. Two of those universities are Historically Black
Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and four are Hispanic Serving
Institutions (HSIs).
Our constructive service credit program allows experienced
professionals from key fields to direct commission into the Space Force
at ranks appropriate to their years of experience. The program is
intended to recruit professionals in the cyber, intelligence, and space
fields who are already in the workforce allowing them to skip ROTC or
attendance at a service academy. The program is currently bringing
critical cyber experience from the private sector. The first board
served as a pilot program and recruited seven cyber professionals to
become guardians including one at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, who
are now in training or already serving in operational units. The second
board will incorporate intelligence professionals and intends to hire
20 personnel. The third board will incorporate space operations
professionals. These and all other recruits will bring exceptional
talent that will benefit the Space Force and enhance their career long
development as guardians.
Develop and Retain an Elite Work Force
The Space Force will maximize Guardian talent with an innovative,
modern talent management system that will train and educate the best
workforce. Our approach maximizes opportunities for education and
training. We are developing and implementing space centric curriculum
for Basic Military Training, Reserve Officer Training Corps, at the
U.S. Air Force Academy, and Officer Training School programs to ensure
our guardians are well prepared for entry into the Space Force.
Guardians will be provided more opportunities for and are encouraged to
pursue advanced STEM degrees. Further, we will mature our relationship
with the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
to provide mid and senior-level professional military education
programs.
With congressional support, we will improve our modern talent
management system by integrating the Air Force Reserve space element
into the Space Force as a single component. This will strengthen our
recruiting and retention efforts by providing unique, flexible career
paths. The proposed talent management system update would allow
guardians to transfer between full-time and part-time duty to pursue
opportunities outside full-time military service and subsequently
return to full-time duty without barriers to reentry or detriment to
their career. Part-time guardians would bring valuable commercial
industry experience back to the Space Force. Such opportunities will
help us attract highly skilled, technologically inclined people in an
increasingly competitive space enterprise talent market. The single
service personnel management system will allow guardians to achieve
their potential and drive innovation within the Space Force. The system
will also make retaining highly qualified guardians easier by
facilitating flexible career paths. We look forward to working with
this committee on this important initiative.
Empower Guardians to Succeed
Amplifying the Guardian Spirit requires leaders at all levels to
place the utmost emphasis on taking care of, trusting, and empowering
their subordinates. Empowerment requires that guardians adapt to any
situation and develop solutions in line with their commander's intent.
Guardians must be confident in their ability to innovate and execute in
the absence of orders in high-intensity conflict with or without all
requisite capabilities. Guardians must be able to figure out the how
when a commander only provides the what and why.
Each new challenge we face will require big ideas thought up by
bright, creative guardians. We are implementing an annual Guardian
Field Forum which will showcase exceptional junior officers, non-
commissioned officers, and civilians and allow them to share
recommendations and innovative ideas with peers and senior Space Force
leaders. The Forum will accelerate implementation of new ideas from the
ground up and demonstrate each Guardian's ability to implement mission
command. The intent of the
Forum is to provide open lines of communication between leaders of
all ranks across the Space Force to ensure that we remain at the
cutting edge technologically and tactically.
line of effort 3--partner to win
My third priority is to strengthen the partnerships the Space Force
relies on to accomplish our mission. Success in space requires
collaboration. The Space Force will strive to eliminate barriers to
collaboration, including over-classification, so the Space Force can
build enduring advantages with our partners.
Department of the Air Force
The Space Force maintains our deep relationship with the U.S. Air
Force which provides critical support services enabling the Space Force
to remain focused only on key mission areas. The Air Force delivers
medical, legal, security, engineering, information technology, and
public affairs support among a myriad of other functions to the Space
Force. For example, the Air Force Research Lab is a critical partner
researching and developing cutting-edge satellites, spacecraft,
propellants, PNT, SDA, and power collection and beaming technologies.
Joint Force
Our partnership with U.S. Space Command remains our most important
Joint Force relationship. The commander of U.S. Space Command's mission
in the space area of responsibility means that the two organizations
are closely entwined. One cannot succeed without the other. U.S. Space
Command directs military operations in space and plans to deter or
defeat potential adversaries in the domain. The Space Force makes this
mission possible by providing weapon systems, equipment, personnel,
expertise, and the execution of critical space operations required to
accomplish military objectives.
While the Department of the Air Force presents the preponderance of
space forces to U.S. Space Command, guardians are indispensable parts
of military operations conducted by every combatant command. In 2022,
the Space Force established service components to support United States
Indo-Pacific Command, United States Forces Korea, and United States
Central Command. Space Force personnel in those joint force commands
are already making tangible contributions to operations, training,
exercises, and international security cooperation initiatives. Strong
relationships with combatant commands are critical to our success. We
will use this service component model to strengthen space integration
in all the combatant commands.
Allies & Partners
The current geopolitical situation demands international
cooperation to deter aggression and defeat adversaries. The U.S. Space
Force Campaign Support Plan details how the Space Force will expand,
strength, and leverage our global partnerships. Through our allies and
partners, we gain economic and national security opportunities in space
otherwise impossible. We are engaging with partners to prioritize and
resource space capabilities, training, and interoperability. We are
building a Regional Space Advisor program to develop guardians who will
establish and grow international partnerships. The Space Force is
conducting or pursuing officer exchanges with key allies and partners.
We will exchange personnel with an increasing number and diversity of
countries over the next several years.
The Space Force is developing and executing training, exercises,
and educational courses with allies and partners in mind. Space
Training and Readiness Command offers a variety of courses which have
had personnel from over 50 countries participate. Allies and partners
are also participating in the Schriever Wargame where we identify
solutions to shared challenges and Space Flag which provides tactical
level training in a virtual battlefield. Educational and training
opportunities build our combined space advantage over our mutual
adversaries.
Maintaining that advantage requires operation of space systems in a
cooperative manner. Recent cooperative efforts include deploying United
States payloads on Norwegian and Japanese satellites. Our partners
provide SATCOM and SDA capabilities which mesh with our own to
distribute costs and improve coverage. Concurrently, the Space Force
has more than 200 foreign military sales cases with over 60 countries.
We will further relationships with spacefaring allies and partners
through additional payload sharing opportunities, personnel exchanges,
training exercises, professional military education, and security
cooperation initiatives. Our allies and partners remain critical to
deterring adversaries and defeating our enemies.
Whole-of-Government
Spacepower is a whole-of-government endeavor, and we continue to
strengthen partnerships with our vital interagency mission partners. We
are building relationships with intelligence community partners to
ensure national security requirements are met, including important
connections with the National Reconnaissance Office. The Space Force is
growing relationships with National Aeronautics and Space
Administration to support human spaceflight and space exploration
missions and with the Department of Commerce to support the transition
of commercial and civil space traffic management mission to their
Office of Space Commerce. In addition, the Space Force continues its
collaboration with the Department of State, both to encourage
interoperability and to leverage existing and planned space
capabilities of allies and partners.
Commercial Industry
We will build and strengthen partnerships with commercial industry.
All commercial partners, from small businesses and startups developing
groundbreaking technologies to large defense contractors producing
proven capabilities at scale, are critical to Space Force efforts to
exploit what we have, to buy what we can, and to only build what we
must. Once in place, the National Security Space Launch Phase 3
framework will provide a mechanism for emerging commercial launch
providers to compete for national security launch contracts while also
maintaining a separate mechanism for launch requirements best served by
mature providers with a certified record of mission assurance. This
innovative approach protects capacity for the DOD's most technically
challenging missions while allowing emerging providers to compete, when
ready, for the DOD's more commercial-like missions. We are also using
personnel exchanges, training with industry, and reverse industry days
will drive integration and a better understanding of each other's
requirements. Commercial services will increasingly fill growing
requirements and augment military decisionmaking. Commercial partners
and services will also be key in pursuit of emerging capabilities
including advanced power and propulsion technologies, artificial
intelligence and machine learning, and in-space servicing, assembly,
and manufacturing. Space Systems Command's Commercial Services Office
will provide a means through which to leverage more commercial off the
shelf capabilities with speed and agility.
conclusion
The Space Force is the preeminent military space organization in
the world. Our potential adversaries seek to surpass the United States
and to challenge our advantage. We cannot and will not allow this to
happen. Our guardians will out work, out innovate, and out compete our
adversaries to ensure that we succeed. They will do everything they can
to deter conflict and maintain stability in space. Semper Supra!
Senator King. Thank you very much, General. I want to jump
on the comment you made about recruiting, and particularly
bringing people in mid-career and having more flexibility about
leaving and coming back. That is a creative idea. Flesh that
out a bit for me. It strikes me that that is really going to be
necessary in today's environment, particularly in the
technology field.
General Saltzman. Yes, sir. We currently don't have the
ability, because our Reserves in the Guard are in the Air
Force. They are in the Air Force Reserves, in the Air National
Guard, so we don't have an option too.
If you leave full-time Active service from the Space Force,
we lose your expertise, and so, we are looking for anything
that can allow us to retain those people who might have
priorities that shift but are still willing to contribute to
the service.
Senator King. Do we need a Space National Guard?
General Saltzman. I need the capabilities that are
currently in the Air National Guard, I can assure you of that.
I think there is a couple of different ways to do it. We
assessed three different options.
We could leave things as they are, which I think is the
worst solution, because as General Brown points out, as the
Chief of the Air Force, he doesn't have organize, train, and
equip responsibilities for space missions, yet he has those
space capabilities in the Air National Guard.
It creates a little bit of a conundrum when I am trying to
figure out how to train forces that are aligned under the Air
National Guard. I think the status quo is the most untenable
position, but there are other options, and we are going through
a series of cost estimates to figure out what a preferred
option might be.
Senator King. Is one of them simply to sort of partner with
the Air National Guard and have different units, have different
functions? Is that one of the possibilities, rather than set up
an entirely new Space National Guard structure?
General Saltzman. Well, we are currently partnered with the
current status, so we are currently partnered to make sure we
can rely on the capabilities that are in the Air National
Guard. It just creates a long-term sustainment problem with the
difference in organize, train, equip responsibilities between
the Air Force and the Space Force.
Senator King. Let me back up a minute again on recruiting.
How are you doing on recruiting, both in terms of quality and
quantity? Some of our other services are having real problems
with recruiting in this economy. How is Space Force doing?
General Saltzman. I am almost embarrassed in front of my
peers to say it, but we are doing very well. Mostly associated
with the fact that we have much smaller numbers to recruit and
we have the ability to hand-pick those that decide they want to
join the Space Force.
Right now, we are doing okay. The problem is going to be
sustainment over time and the quality of the applicants that we
can pull in, and then retaining them for long enough to really
benefit from their experience.
Senator King. Turning to, you mentioned several times in
your testimony, commercial assets, commercial space assets. We
know that Russia is trying to jam or otherwise damage the
Starlink network, which is assisting in Ukraine.
Is that precedent making it more difficult to partner with
commercial satellite users? One of the strategies is
proliferation and using commercial satellites. What has been
the reaction to what has been going on with Starlink in
Ukraine?
General Saltzman. Commercial augmentation is important for
the Space Force for the reasons you mentioned, resiliency and
diversification of our portfolio across a broader number of
participants, if you will.
The commercial augmentation Space Reserve, we are trying to
establish what is kind of like a craft like. If you know, the
civilian Reserve air fleet that uses commercial capabilities.
We are exploring options to use something along those lines.
I think the key with commercial industry is to make sure
that the expectations are managed upfront. So, we are going
through a series of plans.
We are going through a series of industry days, if you
will, to clarify what are the policy, what are the contractual,
what are the legal responsibilities and hurdles that we have to
clear in order to establish this so the expectations are clear
across all spectrums of conflict, crisis, et cetera.
Senator King. So, this is an evolving kind of capability?
General Saltzman. It is. But I will tell you that we had
significant interest. We hosted an industry day along these
lines and there were 84 participants from commercial industry.
So, there is interest in doing this.
Senator King. Now, in my 45 seconds that is left, I am
going to ask you a question that I get asked at home. What is
the difference between Space Force and Space Command?
General Saltzman. I get asked that at home, too, sometimes,
so I appreciate it. It is as simple as any of the Combatant
Commands with the other services. If you were to think about
U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Air Force, or Indo-Pacific
Command and the U.S. Navy.
For the U.S. Space Command and U.S. Space Force, we simply
have different responsibilities. As the Chief of the Space
Force, I have responsibility to organize, train, equip, and
operate the forces that are then presented to U.S. Space
Command, who has the authority from the President and the
Secretary of Defense to direct those operations.
Senator King. So, you are organize, train, and equip. Space
Command is operate or fight.
General Saltzman. They have the authority from the
President to conduct those missions, and they would direct our
forces that are presented to them to conduct the operations.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, General. Senator
Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, as we
discussed last year, the NextGen OPIR [overhead persistent
infrared] satellite program is one of the key components of our
future missile warning architecture, along with proliferated
constellations of smaller satellites operating in the lower
orbits.
During your nomination hearing, you stated that having no
gaps in coverage for missile warning was a high priority. The
missile warning mission is the cornerstone of our strategic
deterrent. You know, if we can't effectively respond--if we
can't detect when our adversaries are launching nuclear
weapons, we are in trouble.
So, it is very important that we continue to fund this
NextGen OPIR. Given really the importance of this no fail
mission, I am concerned to see that the Space Force's fiscal
year 2024 budget request appears to propose cutting the third
GEO NextGen OPIR satellite.
Does the Space Force intend to complete that architecture
as planned? If not, how are you going to mitigate it? That is a
huge loss.
General Saltzman. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. The real
architecture that we need is the one that is survivable in a
contested domain. That is the proliferated LEO [low Earth
orbit] and multiple orbits to include middle Earth orbits as
well.
So that is what the Space Development Agency and the SWAC
analysis that we did is progressing toward, and that is the
investment we made in fiscal year 2024, to make that pivot.
Because that is a pretty big technical shift, we wanted to make
sure that we, for this no fail mission, had some hedges to make
sure that we didn't miss anything.
So NextGen OPIR, we are committed to putting that on orbit
and we felt like a two by two was sufficient to ensure, one,
that the mission did not have any gaps. It is a no fail
mission. Two, that it was a hedge against any technical risk
associated with the pivot to the more survivable missile
warning, missile track architecture.
Senator Fischer. So, you are saying that with this pivot to
the two lower orbits, you have no plans then to look at the GEO
now?
General Saltzman. We have the plans with NextGen OPIR for
two GEO and two EO. That constellation we are still supporting
in that fiscal year 2024 budget has those four satellites in
it. That is the long-term transition to the proliferated
missile warning. But GEO satellites are too much of a target.
So having them in low earth and middle Earth orbit creates
a targeting problem for an adversary, which actually lowers the
threshold for attack on orbit. It is more resilient and it
creates a level of deterrence because they can't attack the
satellites.
Senator Fischer. Good. It seems like on the major
acquisition programs that are executed by Space Force have been
late. They have cost overruns or both. Does the Space Force
acquisition community--I guess I would say to you, how do you
plan to address that, and do you agree with my assessment?
General Saltzman. Well, I have been in this business a long
time, so I have certainly seen the same things that you are
noting there. I can't argue with the facts about cost overruns
and schedules. What I will say is I have been very impressed
with the way Frank Calvelli has reorganized how we are doing
space acquisition.
With his appointment as the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, he is focused on
several different things. Buying small satellites, having
shorter term contracts, going with well-developed technology so
that we don't have as many nonrecurring engineering costs,
and----
Senator Fischer. When you say, I am sorry to interrupt you,
but when you say well developed technology, you want to make
sure things are proven? Would you say you are risk adverse
then?
General Saltzman. I would say we want to make sure before
we commit to putting something on orbit, if there is well-
developed technology, we want to leverage it to the max extent.
Otherwise, you have to build everything from scratch and it
delays things, and there is requirement shifts, and it can get
in that spiral where you spend more money and delay the
timelines.
So, where there are well-developed technologies, we should
take advantage of those. I think in satellite production, that
is exactly where Mr. Calvelli's head is on that. While, again,
I can't speak to all the programs that have existed since we
have been putting satellites on orbit, I can certainly tell you
that the acquisition community has shifted to a different
mindset for how it acquires systems.
I think the space development agencies acquisition strategy
for the missile warning, missile tracking, and space data
transport layer is an example where it is going, in about 4
years, from order to orbit. Which is substantially better than
we have seen in other programs.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator King. Now I would like to call on our only
Subcommittee Member who has been in space, Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had a couple
detailed questions, and then the Chairman asked both of them,
so I am going to go a little bit different approach here.
To the Ranking Member's question, you talked about that
there is a little bit of a deterrent by putting something at a
lower orbit, I think you said. Why is that? Why is it more
likely that an adversary goes after something at GEO than it is
if they are at a lower orbit?
General Saltzman. If this sounds at all like I am lecturing
an astronaut, I promise I am not. It is more than just the
orbital regime. In low-Earth orbit to provide the coverage, you
have to have a vastly greater number of satellites, dozens.
Instead of from GEO, you can have a single orbit that would
look at a third of the Earth. So, by going to the low earth
orbit, we are buying smaller satellites and more of them.
Senator Kelly. Oh, okay. It is the number.
General Saltzman. More satellites create a targeting
problem. Which one do you want to shoot down that you think is
going to be the problem for the mission?
Senator Kelly. Yes, it is just more targets.
General Saltzman. Proliferated LEO.
Senator Kelly. So more--they have got to shoot more rounds.
General Saltzman. A lot more.
Senator Kelly. To take out the capability.
General Saltzman. So much more that I think the escalatory
threshold is raised to the point where they probably wouldn't.
Senator Kelly. Wouldn't do it, okay. okay, that is helpful.
General, of the NRO, Air Force, Space Force satellites that we
put into orbit, what percentage of those is Space Force
responsible for the contracting, of the management, of the
operations to get these to their targeted orbit?
General Saltzman. Compared to the NRO?
Senator Kelly. Yes, like, what percentage do you have?
General Saltzman. Sir, let me get back to you with----
Senator Kelly. But the NRO----
General Saltzman. The NRO has a number of constellations
for its mission set. I am trying to think if there are any
examples. We have the vast majority of Department of Defense
satellites, have now migrated those missions.
Senator Kelly. But not all of the Department of Defense
satellites.
General Saltzman. I always hesitate to say all, but I am
struggling to think of an example.
Senator Kelly. How many launch providers do you have that
you contract with currently to get those satellites into orbit?
General Saltzman. Two.
Senator Kelly. Those are?
General Saltzman. United Launch Alliance (ULA) and SpaceX,
and actually, for demos and other things, we have contracted
other providers as well. I can get you the full----
Senator Kelly. It is to date, while you have been involved
with this, are we seeing typical kind of success rates and
safety records from both companies?
General Saltzman. Absolutely.
Senator Kelly. No identifiable problems that you feel puts
our satellites at risk?
General Saltzman. No.
Senator Kelly. I mean, it has been a while since we have
had an accident. I mean, I saw one a long time ago. An NRO
satellite actually that happened to be down at the Kennedy
Space Center. I watched this thing blow up right after liftoff.
General Saltzman. I was on console----
Senator Kelly. When that happened?
General Saltzman.--in California.
Senator Kelly. Yes, I had just walked out of crew quarters,
saw this, wasn't even expecting it, saw this rocket launch and
then explode about 15 seconds later.
General Saltzman. Something I never want to see.
Senator Kelly. Yes. So, it is great that we have gotten
better at this. SpaceX has a, I would say a pretty remarkable
record of success. ULA as well. We just need to keep that
going.
I think it is important to be just constantly trying to
look ahead and seeing what that next failure mode is and make
sure you have the workforce that is really tracking this stuff
closely.
Because some of these assets are in the billions, billions
of dollars, as you know, General. So, I have got another
question. Well, actually I do have about 50 seconds. Space
Force has been around now for a couple of years. I think maybe
3 years, is that right?
General Saltzman. A little over 3 years.
Senator Kelly. A little over 3 years, and some of the
guardians incurred about a 2-year commitment when they
transferred from the Air Force or from another service. They
are coming up on the end of that time. Are you seeing a good
re-enlistment rate for the enlisted ranks and officers that are
going to stay on?
General Saltzman. Yes, I think the final assessment is
still out a little bit because I want to see it all play out,
the full cycle play out before I really commit to this, but I
am encouraged so far. I think we are providing the kind of
challenges that the workforce is looking for, and so I am I am
still hopeful that we are going to be at good retention
numbers. But we probably need to let this full summer cycle
play out before we judge.
Senator Kelly. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know you
have been in your position now what, less than a year, right?
General Saltzman. Four months, Senator.
Senator Tuberville. Four months. Give us your number one
priority for Space Force.
General Saltzman. I need to make sure that the guardians
are ready to meet the threat. I have said this from day one,
the systems that we are buying are exquisite. I want to make
sure that the guardians have the training and the ability to
practice their tradecraft, reps and sets, I call it. We have
got to get those into the guardians so that they validate their
tactics and they are trained to meet any adversarial challenges
thrown at them.
Senator Tuberville. So, it is more training and people than
it is anything.
General Saltzman. There is a lot of challenges. That is
what I am focused on right now, because I think it was the
biggest gap. From converting--I like to use the example that we
are trying to turn a merchant marine into the U.S. Navy. We
have to convert this Space Force that we had for a benign
environment into one that is contesting the domain.
Senator Tuberville. Is this a slow process?
General Saltzman. Sometimes it is slower than I would like,
but I like our progress. So, I need to buy them the simulators,
the virtual ranges. That takes a little bit of time. But we are
already building a new first-generation model so that we have
established the time to do the training, we have established
the new training requirements, and now we just have to get
after it.
Senator Tuberville. SPACECOM has an RDT&E [Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation] budget of $19.2 billion, and a
proposed procurement budget of only $4.7 billion. What is
driving that difference, and do you see that change in the next
few years?
General Saltzman. Sir, this is the way that Space Force has
to do its business, because so much of our effort is spent in
developing the satellites and we don't have to put a lot of
satellites on orbit traditionally, so there is less procurement
than there is RDT&E.
I think it is just the nature of the space business that we
are frontloaded a little bit in terms of procurement to RDT&E
balance relative to what you might see in some of the other
services. They buy so many versions of that thing that they do
RDT&E for, fighters, or tanks, or the like.
Even when we go to a proliferated constellation, our
numbers will be so much smaller than what the other services
have to buy.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. In your mind, what cybersecurity
standards minimum do you think new commercial satellites should
have?
General Saltzman. I am worried about the ground
infrastructure and how the links are protected to make sure
that we have access to those capabilities that are put on
orbit. So, in commercial terms, I am a little less worried
about the on orbit cyber protections as much as I am the ground
network.
I think those cyber protection centers are well understood
and we can hold the commercial providers accountable for
putting cyber defense capabilities onto the ground networks.
Senator Tuberville. I have had several private companies
come by my office saying they have a great idea of how to take
space debris down. Have you talked to quite a few of those?
General Saltzman. I have.
Senator Tuberville. What do you think?
General Saltzman. I think----
Senator Tuberville. Will we privatize it at the end of the
day?
General Saltzman. I think there is a lot of different ways
to go after that sort of problem. I haven't seen demonstrated
capabilities, and I am always thinking in terms of, you know,
it is one thing to have a pitch that says we can do something,
it is another to have a demonstrated capability.
I will be honest, we do a lot of serious effort making sure
we understand what is on orbit and preventing debris from
hitting each other or things that we care about. Right now, I
would say this isn't my number one challenge, but if somebody
feels like they can demonstrate a capability, cleaning up
debris is an important concept as well.
Senator Tuberville. It is going to get worse and worse,
right.
General Saltzman. It is not going to clean itself up.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. A lot of people believe the
conflict with China could very well start in space. What might
that look like 1 day?
General Saltzman. The Chinese and the Russians have gone to
school on us over the last 20 years, and they know that we have
built a Joint Force structure that relies heavily on the
assumption that space capabilities will be there.
Whether it is our precision navigation and timing, whether
it is satellite communications, the missile warning that we
rely on, and the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
persistence that we have with space capabilities, they know we
rely on that.
If they can blind us, if they can interfere with those
capabilities or, God forbid, destroy them completely, they know
that that will diminish our advantages and put the Joint Force
at risk.
I can see interfering with. I can see blinding. I can see
some of those gray area kinds of attacks on our capabilities to
try to put us behind the eight ball.
Senator Tuberville. That balloon wasn't in your purview,
was it?
General Saltzman. No, sir.
Senator Tuberville. Sixty thousand feet.
General Saltzman. Well, they call it near space, but I like
to call it far air.
[Laughter.]
Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
Senator King. Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman King, and Ranking
Member Fischer. Good to be here today and to holding this
hearing. General Saltzman, thank you so much for everything you
are doing.
I know everyone has been talking about workforce is key. We
need a pipeline of qualified individuals going forward. You are
just young, 3 years old, trying to get this workforce and
especially, like you said, research and development, critical
to protect our country and our families from the threat we feel
from space.
So, STEM education, I talk about an awful lot, but I really
believe that investing in STEM education is just essential to
matching our adversaries' increasing capabilities, as you
alluded to, and also to addressing all of our tech workforce
shortages.
General Saltzman, during your confirmation hearing in
September, you highlighted that Space Force has established a
university partnership program, partnering with universities
across the country to provide STEM students with research
opportunities and increased Guardian retention.
How is Space Force growth and retention benefited from this
program? I am really excited to hear about that, and what can
Congress, what can we do better to support this program
specifically and maybe some national security focused STEM
education initiatives at American universities generally?
General Saltzman. Well, thank you for that, because any
opportunity I get to talk about how great our guardians are, I
will take full advantage of it. You would be really impressed
with the quality of the people that are joining the Space
Force.
The average age of our enlisted members is 22. That is a
relatively high number considering other services. We have an
educated workforce, very educated. We have the luxury of
handpicking the best and brightest of a large applicant pool
that wants to join the Space Force.
We are really benefiting, one, from the fact that we are
kind of small and we can take the cream of the crop, if you
will. We are looking for diversity. We are looking for high
quality STEM education, and going to the areas that maybe you
don't have a chance to get to in some of the other services.
A remarkable set of opportunities that we have taken full
advantage of. Every time I go out in the field, I am just
impressed with the quality and capabilities of the guardians
that I see doing the job.
Senator Rosen. So, we should help expand these programs to
make it a little--make your job a little better.
General Saltzman. Well, as long as you expand the number of
people that help me select. I think there were 42,000 hits of
interest to join the Space Force, and we have about 1,000
slots.
So, culling that down to who is eligible, who can meet the
requirements, and, you know, there is a lot of effort there,
too. So, I am really happy with the way the recruiting team has
done. I am really happy with the standards that we have set. I
am really happy with the quality of guardians we are getting
in.
Senator Rosen. That is great because as a Senator
Tuberville talked about, cyber-attacks in space. It is a war
fighting domain and cyber is really, probably more effective
there or as effective there as it would be anywhere else.
Last week, we discussed with General Dickinson during Space
Command's Posture hearing that both Russia and China are
developing, rapidly investing in developing and fielding these
technologies that will provide timing--that will threaten us,
and so we need to be sure that we are stopping that.
So, these sophisticated cyber-attacks are going to include
the threat of stealing data, jamming satellite signals, hacking
satellites, disrupting internet services. I know the
proliferation concept is really good because there is just so
many, it makes it not worth their while. So that resilient
space architecture, particularly in low-Earth orbit, as you
have alluded to, is really important.
What other kinds of things besides what you mentioned to
Senator Kelly and Senator Tuberville, how are you keeping our
most advanced space assets safe from cyber-attack by Russia,
China, and others, and increasing their resiliency?
General Saltzman. I would like to talk about two particular
areas that we are doing. First is I want to avoid operational
surprise. That is a tenant in my maybe theory of success, if
you will, for the Space Force's primary missions.
By avoiding operational surprises, what I mean is do we
have all the sensors in all the right places to see what is
going on, and that is cyber and space. Do we recognize hostile
activities, aggressive activities, irresponsible activities the
minute they occur? Can we attribute them to the bad actors?
That is the kind of avoidance of operational surprises that
I am talking about. Then second, we have to establish norms of
responsible behavior. What are the norms of behavior that are
acceptable, and developing a coalition of like-minded space
nations that supports those norms of behavior.
It is a powerful motivator to do the right things and call
out irresponsible behavior. All of that, I think, protects our
capabilities as well.
Senator Rosen. Well, that is great. I know my time is up,
but my next question was on international partnerships and how
this potentiates that. We will take it off the record, these
hunt forward operations to avoid operational surprise with our
allies and partners around the globe. We will submit that for
the record, but you were leading me right there. So, thank you
very much. I yield back.
Senator King. General, as one Member of this Subcommittee
who probably had more than--more to do with the founding of the
Space Force early and vocal supporter, and that is Senator
Cramer. Senator Cramer.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member,
and General, good to see you again. I don't think you were
lecturing Senator Kelly at all. He asked you the easiest
question he could, and you answered it brilliantly.
I think the issue of redundancy as a tool, it should answer
Senator Rosen's question in terms of how you secure them, as
well as how well they work as a kill web, if you will, versus a
kill chain. So, I thought it was brilliant. I also think you
are too humble.
You brag about the Guardians. But let's face it, you seem
to be the employer of choice in the service. You have that
luxury, and it is because I think of the mission. I think
because it is an important mission that particularly younger
people realize and they are attracted to it and it gets to
stretch them.
My hope is that the Space Force is so cool, it just
automatically creates more STEM students because they all want
to be part of the next big thing. Senator Fischer asked you
about the gap issue with regard to eyes in the sky and whatnot,
and we did see a little bit of a gap in defense when we learned
that our radars couldn't see everything. They could only see
what they were tuned to see. In terms of like PARCS radar as an
example, and we see some money coming for that. I would presume
that means that it will be upgraded, it will be modernized.
As you know, it is a high priority for me since we have one
that you are the landlord of up in North Dakota. Maybe speak a
little bit to the role of the PARCS radar and modernization,
and how that will help you and the other, the Joint Force in
terms of particularly early warning.
General Saltzman. Well, it is a two-part answer because I
don't want to be too distracted by the balloon issue because
that is not where those radars are looking. It is, you could
easily build radars that would look in that area, but that is
not our mission.
The mission that is being done in North Dakota and the
other ground-based radars is two fold. It is missile warning
and it is space surveillance, primarily, and those radars are
really good at those jobs.
So, the real challenge is, how do I go to a rapid
assessment and decision quality information of the data that
those radars are pulling in? That is my responsibility, is to
figure out how to take all that massive amount of data in and
quickly turn it into decisionmaking information.
We have got some work to do there, but it is more
associated with the latency of the data than--you know, I can
tell you where something was, but I can't tell you where it is
precisely at that moment, and we are getting better and better
at that.
Senator Cramer. With regard to some of things, the issues
that we have already talked about. The partnerships that you
started out talking about, that Senator Rosen asked about,
academic partnerships, alliances, obviously commercial
partnerships, one of the things when we stood up the Space
Force and we had this discussion many times, and your
predecessor certainly grabbed on to it. That is, make sure it
is lean, agile, fast, right?
How many times did you hear General--say lean, agile, fast.
Do you feel like you are still lean, agile and fast? Does the
budget help you be more lean, agile, and fast? I don't mean
cheap. I mean lean, agile, and fast.
Again, those relationships are so important. How valuable
is that and difficult is that balance to make sure you maintain
those characteristics?
General Saltzman. Well, there is no question we are still
lean, and there is no question we are going as fast as we can.
That is a tough standard for me to say we are fast. I am always
looking to go faster, I am always looking to be more agile.
So, I am going to be probably our toughest critic going
forward, trying to ensure that we stay as fast as possible.
Being small does offer some advantages. We can move rapidly
through a smaller bureaucracy than maybe some of the other
organizations can. But it also comes with, you know, that means
there is fewer eyes on ideas.
That means there is fewer opportunities to catch mistakes.
That means there is fewer opportunities. So, we have got to
have good, solid processes. We have to have good, innovative
technology that supports us.
There is no question we are still lean and now we are
trying to become optimized based on that size to make sure that
we are still producing high quality capabilities for a high-
quality workforce.
Senator Cramer. Well, that is a great point because the
bureaucracy can gobble you up and slow you down as well. We
like oversight. We are all about that. But we want you to be as
agile as you need to be to keep up with, well at the speed of
China, as I like to say, which is really important.
One last thing, just, I just want to make sure that you are
getting the type of the right policies that don't restrict your
offensive abilities. We have heard a lot about that. You have
spoken to it at some points.
Again, whether it is the budget, or the Administration or
chain of command, do you feel like you have the right policies
in place to both protect and in attack, if necessary?
General Saltzman. I can assure you there are no policies
that prevent us from exploring a full spectrum of operations.
It is just about doing the work, establishing the, what I would
call understanding of what the capabilities can and can't do.
Then we test and we learn from our experiences.
Senator Cramer. Thank you. Well done. Thank you.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Your lean, agile,
fast reminds me of my high school football coach who said he
wanted us to be mobile, agile, and hostile.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. I am not going to go into our record, but our
team motto was we are small, but we are slow. That was our
problem. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your budget
request this year includes a goal of increasing the number of
Space Force launches.
As you look to maintain and modernize launch ranges and
facilities in support of our space launch needs, can you speak
to how the ability to leverage commercial funding sources to
grow space, transportation, infrastructure, and service
capacity would impact the Space Force's space launch efforts?
General Saltzman. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. As we have talked
before, we have grown our capacity on our national launch
ranges, national space launch ranges from what I remember to be
10, 12 launches to, we are going to hit getting close to 100
launches a year now.
Most of that is commercial launches, and so, the
infrastructure that we are providing is being used and it needs
to be refurbished on a more regular basis than it did what I
would call the old days. So, I think the commercial industry
understands this and they are trying to figure out the best
ways to help support.
Now we just have to look for the contractual and legal
mechanisms to make sure that we can maintain that
infrastructure. Our investments in the range of the future
start us down that path, but we have still got a lot of work to
do over the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], I think, to
make sure we maintain the kind of infrastructure we need to
support the commercial industry.
Senator Gillibrand. As you have said, your mission is very
technical. Ensuring guardians are properly trained and able to
execute their missions requires access to advanced ranges. Do
you currently have the training resources you need to provide
fully trained guardians to combatant commanders? Are any
additional resources required to ensure we have a Space Force
fully capable of operating in the space domain?
General Saltzman. The fiscal year 2024 budget submission
includes about $340 million dedicated to operational tests and
training infrastructure. I think that is sufficient for this
year because we have got a lot of study to do to make sure we
are building the right kind of ranges, the right kind of
simulators, and we are learning as we go a little bit. So, I am
really comfortable with the level of investment we are at this
year for fiscal year 2024.
Senator Gillibrand. Last week, you spoke about the concept
of competitive endurance. From reporting, it appears to center
on space domain awareness, resilience to deter attack, and
responsible counter space activities. Can you speak to how the
Space Force's budget proposal will help to achieve competitive
endurance through each of these three core tenants?
General Saltzman. For avoiding operational surprise, that
is the Space Domain awareness tenant. We are investing heavily
in new sensors. We are investing in capabilities with our
allies and partners to also increase the dataset associated
with space domain awareness.
Perhaps most importantly, we are investing in space command
and control capabilities, which is kind of military talk for
how do you take that data in and rapidly turn it into
operational decisions.
I think we have good software investments to make sure that
we are doing the decision support tools that go with that space
domain awareness, and--go ahead----
Senator Gillibrand. Go ahead and finish.
General Saltzman. Well, the resiliency piece is also
important. This budget definitely invests in shifting to a more
resilient space architecture. We have started that pivot now in
earnest.
Senator Gillibrand. So, looking on your documents, you have
this contested space document about what China is doing. The
PRC [People's Republic of China] has developed counterspace and
anti-satellite weapons, including demonstrations of anti-
satellite missiles, which you say are launching orbit to
ground, and the ability to move a defunct satellite. Can you
speak to our ability to defend against these counterspace
assets and exercise space superiority?
General Saltzman. The transition to a proliferated LEO
missile warning, missile tracking architecture includes the
capacity to find, fix, and track hypersonic capabilities. So
that is why that is such an important transition that we are
making.
With regards to grappling satellites and pulling them out
of orbit, much tougher to deal with when you have less than
maneuverable, older legacy satellites. So again, shifting to a
proliferated LEO constellation where you don't have the, what
General Hayden called the big, juicy target sitting there at
GEO makes that a much tougher proposition for them to execute
against.
Senator Gillibrand. That makes sense. What lessons are you
learning from the war in Ukraine about the role of the space
domain in large scale military operations?
General Saltzman. Well, the most important observation is
that space is critical to modern warfare. We have seen the
Russians attack satellite communications. We have seen cyber-
attacks trying to dismantle.
We have seen GPS [global positioning system] jamming. They
recognize that space is a force multiplier and they are willing
to attack it. The fact that we have to defend against cyber-
attacks on the ground networks reminds us that ground is also a
part of space and that those networks are critical assets.
But I think we are also seeing the power of commercial
augmentation, that there is a viable path for commercial
augmentation to provide capabilities. Then I have been kind of
harping on it through the testimony here, but proliferated LEO.
That is what we are seeing used to support Ukraine, and it
is turning out to be a much tougher target for the Russians to
take apart.
Senator Gillibrand. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, Madam Ranking Member.
Senator King. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you
for your service. There have been efforts, General, driven by
political decisions regarding the shared use of the 3.1 through
3.45 gigahertz or S-band portions of the spectrum. Can you
confirm that you have systems critical to our national security
that reside on this portion of the spectrum?
General Saltzman. Yes, Senator, we have a space
surveillance radar that is currently in development that does
occupy that portion of the spectrum.
Senator Rounds. Would it be not just radar, but perhaps
communications that are in that portion as well?
General Saltzman. As it turns out, I think the key
emergency kinds of communications live just outside of that
band. So as long as we manage very narrowly that strip, we
would avoid those particularly.
Senator Rounds. Okay, so it is primarily radar.
General Saltzman. It is primarily radar for that for the
Space Force.
Senator Rounds. Okay. So, the communications portion is not
part?
General Saltzman. Well, I wouldn't want to talk to the
other services' capabilities. So, from a Space Force
perspective.
Senator Rounds. Okay, thank you. Can you provide your
professional military advice on how detrimental that would be
to your mission and the security of our Nation if you lost the
use of this portion of the spectrum?
General Saltzman. I think the most important thing I can
say is I am not exactly sure, because we haven't done the
technical analysis of exactly what vacating or sharing any of
that spectrum would look like in terms of cost and technical
performance.
But we do have a study ongoing, and so we would hope that
any legislative decisions or decisions along these lines would
wait for that study to come out later this fall so that we
could make the decision with data informed analysis.
Senator Rounds. Have you been given the opportunity to
provide your professional military advice on the DOD's use of
this portion of the spectrum?
General Saltzman. Yes.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. I presume you have expressed
your concern with regard to the sale prior to the September
study being completed.
General Saltzman. I have described my concern is not
knowing exactly what the impacts will be until I receive that
study.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. I would also like to go on
record saying that I am concerned about the DOD's approach to
providing space-based ground moving target indication
capabilities, the GBMTI, to warfighters following the
divestment of the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar System] platform.
It is my understanding that this capability is being moved
under the funding authorities of the intelligence community. We
do not have really to get into the fine details here. But can
you share with me how you are assuming that the validated
requirements are captured in the acquisitions process of a
platform owned by the IC [intelligence community]?
General Saltzman. Because of the way the funding is has
been moved, we are focusing on two areas where we think we can
provide some detailed level of collaboration. The first is in
milestone decision authority, which still there are some
decisions which reside at the OSD level and could be delegated
to Secretary Calvelli.
We are looking into what those options are, what the
possibilities might be. That is for program management
acquisition purposes. The other side is the operational
concepts. This is still a DOD mission, the Space Force mission,
to do this for the Joint Force.
We have the responsibility to provide the operational
concept for how this would work, and we will have to work
closely with the program managers and sensor developers to make
that happen.
Senator Rounds. Yes. With JSTARS, the tactical capabilities
to track these moving targets was available to our soldiers on
the ground. We just want to make sure that that same capability
is still found in a space-based system. That is what we are
really talking about here, isn't it?
General Saltzman. Yes, sir, and the beauty of the sensors
that are being developed is they are more survivable relative
to the current threats facing, and we are going to do it at a
global scale as opposed to a very small AOR [area of
responsibility], the way the JSTARS----
Senator Rounds. We just don't want to get lost and this
needs to be made available for title 10 operations.
General Saltzman. These are direct operational support
activities. The mission falls to the Space Force and the
Department of Defense.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. I understand it that there is a
legislative proposal in the works to integrate the Reserve
elements of the Space Force. This seems like a logical move as
your service matures and embraces its organized train and equip
roles.
It is also my understanding that the Space Force is
residing within the Guard element, still reside within the Air
National Guard, and is organized, trained, and equipped by the
Air Force. From your perspective as the Chief of Space
Operations, what should the Subcommittee consider to provide
the most seamless oversight of these forces as the Space Force
matures?
General Saltzman. First, let me describe the reserve
integration. I think this is a very important legislative
proposal that I hope you will give due consideration to. It
gives us the flexibility to have both part time and full time
guardians in the Space Force.
It is going to give incredible career flexibility and
hopefully serve as an innovative way to retain the kind of
expertise that we know we are going to need moving forward. I
think we have done a much better job of capturing kind of the
key details that are needed in legislation to make that
proposal work, and I hope that we can continue to work with
this Committee and others to make that happen.
From the Guard standpoint, I have been clear from the
beginning, the critical capabilities that are living in the Air
National Guard for space are must haves for the Space Force.
That is the most important thing.
I don't believe because of the way we organize, train,
equip authorities, reside with the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force and my responsibilities, that General Brown feels like he
can organize, train, and equip space capabilities inside the
Air National Guard.
It creates a little bit of a disconnect, and so, the
current status quo is the toughest to figure out how to do it
properly. Other than that, I think there might be some options
that are worth exploring that are based on cost estimates and
the like.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, and Mr. Chairman, I would just
like to commend the General. He has taken a very direct and
strong approach with regard to advocating for our airmen and
guardians on the subject of the missile community cancer study.
This is a case of where they are finding cancers in areas
where these guys that are basically working underground for
extended periods of time. The General has taken a very direct
and personal interest in seeing that this be pursued and that
anybody that is out there, any one of these airmen or
guardians, that they get help, they find out and they keep
track of.
I just want to commend him and I would hope that the
Committee would make available time for him to be able to share
with us moving forward just exactly what he has found with
regard to any health concerns surrounding the cancers that seem
to be more prevalent with these folks that are working
underground in these missile silos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Thank you. General, a couple of followup
questions. Several times you have mentioned the possibility of
norms, developing international norms. Expand on that. Is that
a realistic possibility? Will the Chinese and the Russians talk
about international norms in space?
General Saltzman. Unfortunately, the norms that they talk
about are not ones that we would support. They have kind of
shown a propensity to not support the ones we want to support.
This is a battle of narratives over international norms.
What I can tell you is when I talk to my counterparts in
the other nations, they are interested in this. The Secretary
of Defense issued his tenants for responsible behavior, and
U.S. Space Command followed up with even some more details.
Those are all widely viewed from my peers as helpful in
establishing what it means in a like-minded set of nations with
responsible behaviors in space. We have an initiative called
the Coalition Space Operations Initiative, which is seven
countries that have also detailed what responsible behaviors in
space means. Very consistent with the Secretary of Defense's
tenants.
I think this is kind of a widespread understanding that we
have to behave a certain way in order to maintain a safe,
secure, sustainable space domain. I believe there is widespread
agreement for that.
Senator King. Is the State Department engaged in this
discussion as well?
General Saltzman. They are.
Senator King. I think that would be an important aspect of
moving this forward, very important initiative.
General Saltzman. They are.
Senator King. Just a comment. You have mentioned cyber
protection several times. It seems to be the experience that
most major cyber-attacks start with a sub, not the general
contractor, but some small company, the smaller firm that is
working for a general contractor, and then they get into the
system.
I hope that is something, when you are talking about the
protection of your assets, and very rightfully you have talked
about ground and space, that you worry as well about those
small companies that might act as a gateway for a cyber-attack.
General Saltzman. Yes, sir. I have talked to my cyber
defenders at length. I am not really a cyber professional
myself. I don't understand all the technical details. But one
of the most important things that they start with is mapping
the cyber terrain.
In other words, understanding exactly what the network
looks like, where it might be vulnerable, and how they might
best censor it to rapidly detect any kind of intrusions. So, to
your point, understanding how all of the companies fit together
in the cyber terrain is an important foundational aspect of
cyber defense.
Senator King. Final question. Is Space Force in charge of
defensive--you have talked a lot about proliferated LEO. Are
you also in charge of developing the capability of maneuver and
otherwise defending our space assets? Is that part of Space
Force's mission?
General Saltzman. I would say it is important that as we
develop our DOD capabilities through the Space Force, that we
make sure we are applying all of the right concepts for active
and passive defense to meet the requirements so that we have a
survivable architecture on the U.S.'s worst day.
Senator King. Well, this is a relatively new concern. We
owned space for a long time, but the Russians and the Chinese
have been very active in anti-satellite technology, so we need
to be developing counters to that in order to maintain a
credible deterrent. Is that correct?
General Saltzman. Absolutely, and I think it is about how
fast can we go. Again, my weak analogy is converting the
Merchant Marine and the U.S. Navy.
We have got a little bit of a ways to go before we can take
our legacy platforms that we have got so much utility out of
and so much capability from but convert them to providing the
same or better capabilities, while being able to perform in a
contested domain. We will have to make that transition as
rapidly as possible.
Senator King. Thank you. Other questions? Thank you very
much, General. This has been a very illuminating hearing. I
appreciate your forthright responses to our question and your
leadership, and your long career of service to the United
States. Thank you.
General Saltzman. Thank you, sir.
Senator King. Hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:46 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky S. Rosen
international partnerships
1. Senator Rosen. General Saltzman, can you discuss the importance
of international collaboration when working on critical Space Force
projects and how we can continue to build on and expand existing
partnerships?
General Saltzman. International space security cooperation advances
our national security strategy, provides political and military
options, and enables the U.S. to expand all-domain capabilities needed
for today and for any future fight. My Line of Effort (LOE) #3,
``Partnering to Win,'' is critical to the USSF's ability to field
Combat-ready Forces. The USSF needs robust joint, coalition, and
international partnerships to be more effective and resilient. Space
architectures which include the full array of U.S., ally, and partner
security, civil, and commercial capabilities help protect all of us and
strengthen integrated deterrence. The Department of the Air Force will
continue frank conversations with Allies and partners on the pacing
threat, national strategies, capabilities, and RDT&E efforts to
buildupon existing partnerships.
Currently, the Wideband Global Satellite Communications (WGS)
program enables interoperability with 10 partner nations. The addition
of WGS satellite vehicle 12 will allow the USSF to seek additional
partnerships for wideband and protected communications. The Department
of the Air Force established a new satellite communications framework
agreement under NATO called the Global Commercially Contracted
Satellite Communications Support Partnership (GCC SATCOM SP). This new
agreement allows the U.S. DOD to pool financial resources with key
Allies and partners to procure commercial satellite communications.
2. Senator Rosen. General Saltzman, how does the Combined Space
Operations Vision 2031 initiative influence Space Force priorities and
objectives?
General Saltzman. The Combined Space Operations (CSpO) 2031 Vision
amplifies USSF's own priorities and objectives; providing the USSF
opportunities to further cultivate enduring operational advantages that
expand the capacity, capability, and resiliency of our space forces in
line with the Chief of Space Operations' Lines of Effort (LoEs) #1,
``Fielding Combat-Ready Forces,'' and #3, ``Partner to Win.'' USSF
participation in CSpO Steering Committees, Principal Boards, and
Working Groups alongside other DOD organizations ensures that we both
shape CSpO's work and that CSpO's objectives are incorporated back into
USSF corporate planning and strategy processes. For example, USSF
continues to incorporate Vision 2031 LOEs, including, ``Develop and
operate resilient, interoperable architectures to enable space mission
assurance and unity of effort, through identification of gaps and
collaborative opportunities,'' and ``Enhance command, control, and
communications capabilities and other operational linkages among CSPO
Participants to support unity of effort and the ability to conduct
combined and synchronized operations throughout the spectrum of
military operations.'' With CSPO Vision 2031 embedded throughout our
Service's planning and strategy, guardians at all levels of command and
across areas of expertise implement specific activities that amplify
our ability to conduct combined operations that ensure the United
States remains a leader within the initiative.
satellite interference
3. Senator Rosen. General Saltzman, our Nation continues to
experience significant growth in commercial space wireless services.
The number of Low Earth Orbiting (LEO) satellites is expected to rise
to over 20,000 over the next decade. With this growing number of
satellites orbiting the Earth, can we expect Space Force to face
emerging challenges, such as coordination, harmful radio interference,
and security? How should the U.S. Government increase coordination to
address these issues?
General Saltzman. The rapidly increasing number of satellites in
LEO will require the Space Force and its civil, commercial, and
international partners to field new capabilities and improve
coordination to respond to significant new challenges in the space
domain.
The USSF currently tracks approximately 47,900 objects in space, a
16 percent growth in objects from 2021 to 2022. Of those objects 7,100
are active payloads, a 37 percent increase from 2021 to 2022. Expended
rocket bodies, inactive satellites and debris further congest the
environment, and small satellite technology is enabling larger
constellations. For example, Starlink is projected to have over 12,000
satellites in its constellation.
New capabilities are coming online within the current Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) to greatly increase our ability to track and
identify small satellites. These include Deep-space Advanced Radar
Capability (DARC) (projected full operational capability by 2027),
Ground-Based Optical Sensor System (GBOSS) (projected full operational
capability by 2027), and SILENTBARKER (projected full operational
capability by 2026). In conjunction with the existing space
surveillance network, including the world's most precise sensor, Space
Fence, the USSF is prepared to identify, track and maintain custody of
satellites in space which will enhance security and mitigate harmful
radio interference.
The USSF and US Space Command are working with the Dept of
Commerce/NOAA to implement Space Policy Directive-3 to enable the DoC
to provide basic space situational awareness and space traffic
management to ensure a safe and secure environment as commercial,
civil, and governmental space traffic increases.
space launch services
4. Senator Rosen. General Saltzman, a 2022 study commissioned by
the U.S. Space Force, the Defense Innovation Unit, and the Air Force
Research Laboratory states: ``The procurement of space launch for
national security systems should be expanded to include a broad range
of space launch services--Diversity of launch options improves the
resiliency of national security space systems.'' As we look to improve
both launch capacity and capability, what is the national security
value expanding the Department of Defense's procurement of space launch
systems and providers, to include a broad range of space launch
services?
General Saltzman. The national security value in expanding DOD's
procurement of space launch systems and providers is found in the
improved flexibility, resilience, capacity, and affordability that
comes with having a greater number of commercial companies able to
provide both large and small national security space launch services.
The innovative National Security Space Launch (NSSL) Phase 3 Launch
Service Procurement Strategy consists of a dual-lane approach that
fosters competition and maintains assured access to space. NSSL Phase 3
Lane 1 is for more risk tolerant missions and provides on-ramping
opportunities for emerging Launch Service Providers (LSPs); providing
opportunities to grow the NSSL Launch provider industry base. Lane 1
will award multiple Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ)
contracts open to qualified bidders. Lane 2 is for our more risk
adverse National Security Space missions that require full mission
assurance.
The Rocket Systems Launch Program (RSLP), the Space Force's small
launch program established in 1972, complements NSSL to serve the full
spectrum of orbits and provides flexible access to space for national
security. RSLP hosts 11 LSPs on its Orbital Services Program-4 IDIQ
contract for small and medium launches to low earth orbit and provides
annual on-ramping opportunities for emerging LSPs through 2028. The
Rapid Agile Launch Initiative (RALI), a Space Test Program
congressionally funded initiative, is another small launch avenue the
RSLP supported to procure and launch five RALI missions.
Finally, the Space Force is evaluating the readiness and utility of
commercial space mobility and logistics capabilities and developing
business case approaches to incorporate emerging solutions into space
system architectures. Specific to improving launch capacity and
capability, on-orbit logistics and mobility services could potentially
enable increased launch capacity by allowing satellites to launch
partially or fully empty, if the satellite is designed to be refueled
on-orbit. This capability may further open the aperture for new mission
designs with increased resiliency supported by on-orbit logistics.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2023
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:49 p.m., in
room 222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus S. King
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Subcommittee Members present: Senators King, Gillibrand,
Warren, Rosen, Fischer, Rounds, and Cramer.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING
Senator King. We call today's hearing to order, and I thank
the witnesses for appearing, as well as their services to our
Nation. Before we get going, I want to thank Admiral Caldwell,
the Director of Naval Reactors, who will retire after 42 years
of service.
You are only the 7th Director of Naval Reactors, starting
with Admiral Rickover in 1949. You stand in this fearsome
giant's shoes upholding his unparalleled tradition of service
and excellence that is second to none.
You are responsible for the force projection of our
aircraft carriers and our submarines, which are the envy of
every military in the world. In fact, under AUKUS [Australia,
United Kingdom, United States], we know that they are trying to
duplicate that capability.
For any nuclear-powered vessel that is ready for sea
trials. You are the senior officer that goes to sea with her. I
want to thank you and your wife, Kim, for your service. Our
Nation owes you a debt of gratitude that only six other Navy
officers and their spouses can fully understand.
Today's hearing has two panels to review the budget request
for defense nuclear activities in the Department of Energy
(DOE) and the Department of Defense (DOD). We are undertaking
our third nuclear modernization.
The first two in 1960 and 1980, notice they were 20 years
apart. The third this time some 43 years apart. Unlike the
other two, we now have not one but two nuclear armed near-peer
competitors.
This is an entirely new paradigm in the defense of our
Nation. Now more than ever, we are relying on modernizing our
triad to perform the essential deterrence mission under this
new two near-peer paradigm.
I expect not only to hear what is going right, now in this
modernization cycle. Admiral Rickover would expect no less. But
importantly, I also expect to hear what is not going right and
how Congress can help.
Mr. White, you perhaps have the toughest of all jobs with
the largest backlog of cleanup in the Federal Government from
Cold War defense activities. Which in 2020 was estimated at a
cost of $512 billion.
I will want to know what you are doing to work your way
through this backlog of clean-up, which is a commitment to the
communities nearby these sites. After our opening statements
from each of our witnesses, we will have 5-minute rounds of
questions.
Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEBRA FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses for being here today. Admiral, I, too, want to
thank you for your many, many years of service and commitment
and dedication to this country. You are an example of a true,
true patriot and public servant.
All of you have a solemn responsibility of ensuring that
our nuclear deterrent remains safe, reliable, and effective.
Our nuclear deterrent, the weapons themselves, and the delivery
systems remains the indispensable backbone of United States
National Security.
The geopolitical threat environment has significantly
degraded since 2010, when our current nuclear force and
modernization plan was determined. We need to consider whether
the plan remains sufficient to address future threats, and we
have to rebuild the capability across the nuclear enterprise to
deliver faster.
The status quo is not tenable, and I look forward to
working with you all in the coming months to find creative
solutions to the significant challenges that we face. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Ms. Hruby.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JILL M. HRUBY, ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member
Fischer, Members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to
present the President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request for the
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA).
Chairman King, a written statement has been provided and I
respectfully request that it be submitted for the record.
NNSA's fiscal year 2024 budget request is $23.8 billion, an
increase of $1.7 billion over the fiscal year 2023 enacted
level. This budget request responds to today's challenging
global security environment.
The Weapons Activities budget request of $18.8 billion
supports the five ongoing weapon modernization programs and
continues significant investment in our infrastructure.
Infrastructure needs are acute at our production plants as we
continue to refurbish and reestablish capabilities.
In addition, the request supports two Phase 1 exploratory
efforts, enhance physical and cyber security, and digital
assurance of our weapons and enterprise. It also continues
investment in our stockpile research and advances stockpile
stewardship. We are actively addressing our biggest challenge
in weapon activities, the cost and schedule delays, and large
construction projects.
Supply chain delays, labor shortages, labor productivity,
combined with inflationary pressures, have plagued the uranium
processing facility and the plutonium pit production efforts,
both at Los Alamos and Savannah River.
As a result, we are implementing nationwide trade union
recruiting, incentives for labor, housing, and transportation,
early starts on long lead procurements, and introduction of new
project management models.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request is $2.5
billion, and invest in our nonproliferation, emergency
response, and counterterrorism programs. We continue important
work to reduce global nuclear risk, progress international
partnerships, and advance associated research.
To be prepared for the future, programs responsive to
nuclear energy expansion and future arms control verification
technologies are requested. We remain committed to the Ukraine
incident response training and information sharing to detect
and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency.
Work to assure allies who might be thinking about the need
for nuclear weapons. We work to assure them that we will be
with them and we keep our eye on threats from other weapons of
mass destruction with our bio-assurance program.
The challenges for NNSA are real but not insurmountable.
With your continued support, I am confident we will succeed.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Senator King. Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES F. CALDWELL JR., USN, DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR FOR NAVAL REACTORS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Admiral Caldwell. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
first off, thank you for your nice remarks. It is an honor to
serve. Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today.
Your consistent support of naval reactors allows my team to
provide the Navy with unmatched power and capability of nuclear
propulsion, which provides all of our submarines and all of our
aircraft carriers the reliability, mobility, and endurance to
carry out National Security missions around the world.
Today, nuclear powered warships are operating alongside
allies and partners on a global scale, providing forward
presence in a world that is increasingly polarized. We recently
completed the AUKUS consultation period and have set out on a
generational change in sharing critical technologies directly
supporting United States, United Kingdom, and Australia
trilateral commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
Naval Reactors' investment in research and development
(R&D) over decades has enabled the advanced technology that
gives our fleet a competitive advantage in the maritime
environment. Now we must step up our research and development
to sustain and exploit that advantage.
Our future will be built on a solid foundation of our
people, our technology, and our facilities. My budget request
for fiscal year 2024 is for $1.96 billion and invests in each
of these three key areas and two national priority projects.
First, my request supports our most important resource, our
people.
The talented and dedicated people at our headquarters and
our field offices are absolutely essential to the strong
centralized management and oversight of the important work we
do for the Nation.
Second, the budget request reflects continued investment in
research and development to achieve our goals of substantially
lowering costs, reducing construction timelines, and adding
fleet capability.
My request also focuses on investments to modernize our
critical infrastructure at my Department of Energy laboratories
where this important work is executed and to reduce our legacy
environmental liabilities.
I am also seeking your support for two national priority
projects. The first is the continued development of the reactor
plant for the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine,
directly supporting the Navy's number one acquisition priority.
The second project is the continued construction of the
naval spent fuel handling facility in Idaho, which enables long
term, reliable processing and packaging of spent fuel from the
Navy's nuclear fleet.
In closing, your strong and enduring support allows me to
carry out Naval Reactor's mission of delivering a nuclear-
powered fleet that is unrivaled around the world. I
respectfully urge your endorsement of our fiscal year 2024
budget request, and I thank you for your support.
[The prepared statement of Admiral James F. Caldwell
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral James F. Caldwell
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today and present the President's Fiscal Year 2024 budget for Naval
Reactors. Your strong support for the work we do ensures our nuclear
Navy can carry out vital missions around the world with agility and
endurance.
This year marks the 75th anniversary of the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program and is the final year of my 8-year tenure as
Director of Naval Reactors. As I reflect upon the decades of our
Program's history, one of our core principles that has enabled our
Program's success is ``challenge what's possible.''
In 1948 despite having no nuclear-trained submariners, no nuclear
industrial base, and no nuclear shipyards, the Navy promulgated the
formal requirement for a nuclear-powered submarine. Just 7 years after
the creation of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, under the
leadership of Admiral Hyman Rickover, and with tremendous congressional
support, Naval Reactors developed an industrial base in a new
technology, pioneered new materials, designed, built, and operated a
prototype reactor, established a training program, and took a nuclear-
powered submarine to sea. In less than 7 more years, Naval Reactors
designed and built the world's first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier,
USS Enterprise, forever changing our Nation's power projection.
Since then, follow-on classes of more capable U.S. nuclear-powered
submarines and aircraft carriers have ensured our warfighting edge over
potential adversaries. Congress' strong and enduring support of our
past efforts has allowed the Navy to maintain our advantages. Your
partnership with the Navy is needed now, more than ever, as we work on
current and future endeavors in naval nuclear propulsion that are
required to improve the capability of our nuclear fleet and protect the
national security of the United States.
Today's strategic environment is dynamic and complex, characterized
by a rapidly changing global balance of military capabilities,
requiring us to once again challenge what is possible. As stated in the
National Security Strategy, the world is at an inflection point, and
how we respond today will impact the security and prosperity of our
Nation for generations. As I serve in my final year at Naval Reactors,
I want to ensure that we sustain and build an enduring naval
warfighting advantage to maintain our dominance of the maritime
battlespace. Furthermore, we have the opportunity to reinforce our
strength by building the strongest possible coalition of allies to
shape the global strategic environment.
Our Nation took a new step when the President announced the AUKUS
enhanced tri-lateral security partnership. This historic agreement
demonstrates U.S. commitment to revitalizing our alliances and
strengthening them to take on the challenges of the 21st century.
Furthermore, the AUKUS partnership bolsters existing Navy initiatives
to strengthen our own shipbuilding capability and build the additional
industrial and vendor base capacity our Nation and our allies need.
Given the global threats we face, it is imperative that we ensure our
closest allies remain highly capable in the undersea domain.
As stated in the National Security Strategy and the National
Defense Strategy, it is vital for the Navy to maintain and expand our
competitive advantage by aggressively investing in emerging
technologies. The principal strategic issues driving the need for
technological advancement are the growing threats from China and
Russia. China is rapidly advancing and establishing a global naval
presence with the purpose of projecting power and challenging U.S.
maritime superiority. Meanwhile, Russia poses an immediate threat to
the free and open international systems, relying on coercive or unfair
practices to gain an edge over the United States and our allies. To
properly defend against these threats, increased numbers of nuclear-
powered submarines and improved capabilities for our submarines and
aircraft carriers will be required. To enable Navy efforts targeted to
combat these threats, Naval Reactors needs to develop and insert
technologies that will provide increased power and energy to support
increased speed, reduced noise signatures, and enhanced warfighting
capabilities. Additionally, our efforts are focused on identifying
technologies and processes that can substantially reduce the build-span
times and costs of these platforms to meet Navy needs.
Naval Reactors' historical investment in advanced technologies has
given the Nation an enviable position in the maritime environment;
however, further investments today are necessary. Our ships need to
retain their advantage against future threats across multiple domains,
but must also be affordable. Designing and building our propulsion
plants for improved operational capability and availability through
lifecycle maintenance enhancements and improved performance will ensure
the Navy stays ahead of increasing demands while continuing to deliver
the most capable, cost effective future force. Our success in the
future will rest on the foundation of what we build today while we
continue to challenge what's possible.
naval reactors overview
Naval Reactors' budget request for fiscal year 2024 is $1.96
billion. This committee's support has enabled the safe operation of the
nuclear fleet, substantial progress on our key projects, and our
continued oversight and regulation of all areas across the Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program. Your past support has allowed significant
progress on our three major Department of Energy funded projects--
Columbia-class propulsion plant development and production, the
refueling overhaul of our research and training reactor in New York,
and the construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility in
Idaho. When I first arrived at Naval Reactors in 2015, these three
projects had not yet hit their peak funding. Over the course of the
past several years we have reached a point where I can highlight
substantial progress of the first Columbia-class propulsion plant in
support of lead ship construction. In addition, the refueling overhaul
of our research and training reactor will complete later this year. The
Program also continues to make significant progress amid numerous
challenges during construction of the incredibly important Naval Spent
Fuel Handling Facility. While we are staying focused on completing
these efforts, we cannot simply rest on prior success as we continue to
develop and pursue innovative technologies.
major projects
Columbia-class Propulsion Plant
The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine remains the Navy's
number one acquisition priority. Naval Reactors is delivering the life-
of-ship reactor core and the electric drive propulsion system for the
Columbia-class. To date, multiple lead ship reactor plant components
have been delivered, and the reactor core is on track to support lead
ship delivery in 2027. The fiscal year 2024 budget includes $52.9
million to continue reactor plant design, fabrication, and safety
analysis work required for lead ship reactor testing. Additionally,
Naval Reactors will start the lead ship motor module testing of the
electric drive propulsion system at the compatibility test facility in
Philadelphia, PA.
S8G Prototype Refueling Overhaul
The fiscal year 2024 budget request does not include additional
funding for the refueling overhaul of the New York land-based
prototype, as previously provided funding will be sufficient to
complete the project. With strong oversight from Naval Reactors, the
overhaul is on track to complete in late 2023. Consistent support from
the committee has enabled the project to work through upgrades,
maintenance and performance testing challenges, and meet key
milestones. As an example of the impact of Naval Reactors efforts, this
reactor core, called the Technology Demonstration Core, will not only
train future operators for 20 years but also includes Columbia-class
type fuel modules. This has helped to prove out production scale
manufacturing for Columbia. I look forward to ensuring my relief is
able to deliver the final update on this multi-year project in next
year's appearance before the Committee as we resume training on this
site.
Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project
Naval Reactors is continuing construction of the Naval Spent Fuel
Handling Facility at the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho. The Naval
Spent Fuel Handling Facility is essential to our mission to manage
naval spent nuclear fuel and support aircraft carrier and submarine
fleet requirements. The fiscal year 2024 budget request includes $199.3
million for continuation of this project through near-term key
milestones. During the last several years, the project has encountered
several challenges. Specifically, the COVID-19 pandemic introduced work
delays and additional costs for final design activities and active
construction subcontracts. The discovery of unexpected bedrock
conditions upon completion of site excavation work resulted in
additional effort to remediate the bedrock and begin construction of
the massive concrete foundations for the facility. More recently, we
worked through subcontractor performance issues and continuing
significant volatility with economic conditions resulting in a revised
acquisition plan for the Project and additional funding requirements.
Consistent with the revised acquisition plan and funding need, I
approved a revision to the Project's Performance Baseline in October
2022. Funding in fiscal year 2024 will be vital to implementing our
revised construction sequence and achieving the project milestones in
the Performance Baseline revision. Naval Reactors remains committed to
keeping the Committee informed of progress on this complex and large-
scale infrastructure project.
technical base funding
In addition to our three priority projects, Naval Reactors
maintains a high-performing workforce across the technical base and
supporting functions. The technical base is the set of fundamental
skills and capabilities necessary to safely and effectively support the
nuclear Navy. It includes a foundation of specialists in nuclear
materials, nuclear physics, thermal-hydraulics testing, acoustics,
electronics, software development, systems integration, and other
specialized skills, along with the associated facilities and
laboratories to conduct our work. Specifically, the technical base: 1)
addresses emergent, daily needs and challenges of our globally deployed
nuclear fleet, 2) executes cutting edge nuclear reactor technology
research and development that supports improving today's reactor fleet
and assessing future reactor capabilities, and 3) modernizes critical
infrastructure and equipment while reducing the Program's legacy
environmental liabilities.
Attracting and retaining top talent in our government civilian and
contract workforce is critical to our ability to fulfill and mature our
mission amidst a wide array of challenges and new demands. The broad
range of talent in our organization is in high demand from all areas of
our economy. We remain focused on recruiting and retaining a well-
trained, highly qualified workforce and continue to work with the
leadership of our labs, private shipyards, Navy, and DOE to stay
competitive in this aggressive talent market.
Program Direction
Our lean and highly skilled Federal workforce is critical to the
execution of our responsibilities. With the fiscal year 2024 Program
Direction request, we remain highly focused on attracting, developing,
and retaining a talented and diverse workforce to oversee and manage a
wide array of work across the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program to
enable mission success. The talented and dedicated people at our
Washington, DC headquarters and field offices around the world report
directly to me and are absolutely essential to our strong centralized
management and oversight of the important work we perform every single
day for our Nation.
Building, maintaining, and deconstructing ships with over forty
years of expected life requires staffing continuity and longevity to
ensure the Nation has a workforce with the deep technical knowledge to
execute Naval Reactors' cradle-to-grave responsibilities. I must have
sufficient Federal staffing to meet the demands of sustaining and
improving today's fleet while simultaneously growing our future
capabilities. Diverse, complex systems, new and innovative research
efforts, and growing cyber and other vulnerabilities will require
additional expertise and new perspectives that can only be gained
through reaching our full personnel requirements.
The market demand for our highly skilled and experienced workforce
introduces challenges to recruit and retain a top-tier workforce. In
concert with our ongoing focus on research and development that I have
highlighted over the last several years, we need to find new ways to
bring in and retain the Nation's top talent into Naval Reactors and
give them resources to introduce technical innovations into our
submarines and aircraft carriers. I respectfully request Congress'
support of the fiscal year 2024 Program Direction budget request, which
will allow me to recruit, select, develop, and retain a highly skilled
workforce to support mission requirements.
Research and Development
Our research and development strategy remains focused on reversing
an eroding capability advantage over strategic adversaries like China
and Russia. Technology investment must be prioritized today to have new
technologies ready for future classes of ships and to reduce costs,
long lead times, and construction timelines. These investments have the
added benefit of enhancing and improving the performance of today's
fleet. Throughout the United States, important research and development
is conducted by the dedicated and talented teams of people at our Naval
Nuclear Laboratory sites--the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in
Pittsburgh, the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring Site in
greater Albany, and the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho.
Our first priority is to support today's fleet of nuclear powered
forces. Our labs perform an extensive amount of technical evaluations
annually that enable Naval Reactors to thoroughly assess and respond to
emergent issues, keeping our ships mission-ready, safely operating and
available for response to any global crises. These efforts are
essential to realizing the key advantages of nuclear propulsion that
allow our ships at-sea to operate abroad for longer periods of time,
our carrier strike groups to engage in any region, and ballistic
missile and attack submarines to respond at any time and place.
Two years ago, in the fiscal year 2022 budget, at my direction,
Naval Reactors embarked on a concentrated path to identify and develop
new technologies for inclusion in the next generation of nuclear
powered ships and submarines, including the Navy's next generation
attack submarine, SSN(X). We are pursuing advanced reactor core and
fuel systems, advanced manufacturing and inspection techniques, next-
generation instrumentation and control architectures and sensors, and
asymmetrical applications of emerging technologies. These advancements
have traditionally taken time to materialize but we are focused on
delivering greater capability in shorter order at lower acquisition and
lifecycle costs to improve and expand our advantage. I invite you to
visit our facilities with your staffs, talk with our experts onsite,
and enhance your understanding of where naval nuclear propulsion is
headed with respect to our technological advancements. I take great
pride in highlighting our innovative and new technologies and how we
can responsibly transition them into meeting requirements for the Fleet
of tomorrow.
I want to assure the Committee that our investments are supported
by a comprehensive and rigorous planning effort we undertake with our
partners at the Naval Nuclear Laboratory. While we continue to develop
and execute our research and development strategy, we are confronting a
range of challenging economic conditions that demand additional
resources to counteract price inflation, a tight labor market, and
other factors. This year's budget request will help us get closer to
our required investment needs to stay ahead of our adversaries.
Facilities and Infrastructure
Our Naval Nuclear Laboratory facilities and infrastructure are
essential in carrying out Naval Reactors' mission. This year's budget
request supports recapitalization of Naval Nuclear Laboratory
facilities and infrastructure systems, many of which have supported the
Program since its inception. Specifically, this budget supports
construction of a new Medical Science Complex at Naval Reactors
Facility located in Idaho to create professional space and efficient
integration of radiological, medical, and quality assurance
capabilities. Additionally, this year's budget supports recapitalizing
the Knolls Laboratory site steam and condensate system that has
exceeded its useful service life. Without these and similar
recapitalization efforts, we will be unable to effectively meet mission
requirements at the level required to support the next 75 years of
naval nuclear propulsion.
Decontaminating and decommissioning (D&D) older facilities that
have been in existence since the early 1950's is also part of our
facilities and infrastructure request. We have approximately $8 billion
in environmental liabilities requiring D&D efforts. Over one-third of
this estimate is associated with the cost to remediate and demolish
inactive facilities and infrastructure at each of the Naval Nuclear
Laboratory sites. We continue to retire these liabilities in an
environmentally responsible and cost-effective manner to support the
best use of our funding. This is an exciting opportunity for us, and I
look forward to future engagements with the Committee to discuss our
specific actions and tangible examples of Naval Reactors' long-term
plan to reach our goals. Through our established partnership with the
Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM), we
are leveraging their experience in efficient, safe, and cost-effective
remediation of environmental liabilities across the enterprise. Within
only 3 years under the new partnership, we have identified ways to
shorten the schedule to eliminate all of the legacy liabilities and
identified opportunities for cost avoidance.
aukus
In September 2021, President Biden announced an enhanced trilateral
security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States (AUKUS). The three governments have recently completed an
18-month consultation period to seek an optimal pathway for delivering
a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability to
Australia at the earliest achievable date. Naval Reactors has been
integral in informing discussions to ensure that our Nation's
preeminent expertise is applied to the nuclear-powered submarine
initiative.
As announced by the trilateral leaders on March 13, we are now
beyond the 18-month consultation period and are focused on ensuring
Australia establishes the full scope of capabilities necessary to
design, build, operate, and maintain a nuclear navy. Additionally, we
are concurrently beginning the process to provide a proportional uplift
in technology to the United Kingdom. We will increasingly utilize the
trilateral partners' existing regulatory frameworks; educational,
industrial, and technical capabilities; and capacities to collectively
strengthen each nation's defense. Along with a team of subject matter
experts from Naval Reactors and the United Kingdom, I have traveled to
Australia and the United Kingdom and routinely meet with senior
government officials from each nation. The three nations fully
understand that this is a generational commitment and will require
Australia to develop the stewardship necessary for owning and operating
nuclear powered submarines. Naval Reactors is strongly committed to
supporting Australia in developing this stewardship and acquiring a
nuclear powered submarine capability.
Let there be no doubt--AUKUS is a tremendous addition to my
existing mission. The pace and urgency for action has had an undeniable
impact on the Naval Reactors program over the past year and a half. My
Program will be a key element of the success of AUKUS, and it will
require a generational investment in people, nuclear propulsion
technologies, and facilities to ensure the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program is resilient and adaptive in order to meet its objectives.
conclusion
The Navy's ability to maintain mastery of the undersea domain and
sustain a formidable forward presence with its resultant value for
national security and defense cannot be assumed; we are being actively
challenged on a global scale. As I have said repeatedly, naval nuclear
propulsion is an incredible but unforgiving technology, and must be
treated with a constant focus on safe operation. Naval Reactors'
cradle-to-grave responsibility to manage this technology is paramount.
I assure this Committee that I will balance investments in today's
fleet with the requirements of the future fleet, steer future
cooperation efforts, and preserve the focus on effective naval nuclear
propulsion for the U.S. Navy. I appreciate the strong support of
Congress for this program and respectfully urge your full support for
our fiscal year 2024 budget request.
Senator King. Mr. White.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM WHITE, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. White. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before
you today. The Environmental Management Mission reflects the
commitment to cleaning up the environmental legacy of national
defense programs that helped end World War II and the Cold War.
While our mission is tied to the environmental legacy of
the past, we are also focused on the future. The cleanup
program of today is empowered to support ongoing National
Security and science missions, as well as strengthen local
communities.
Cleanup accomplishments are boosting the clean energy
economy in Tennessee and helping the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory and the Y-12 National Security Complex prepare for
expanding National Security and research missions. Our Idaho
team just marked a historic achievement with the startup of a
new tank waste treatment capability that has been decades in
the making.
With support from Congress, the Integrated Waste Treatment
Unit is now operational in Idaho. The Office of Environmental
Management (EM) has treated over 400,000 gallons of tank waste
at the Hanford site, and at Savannah River in South Carolina we
are processing record amounts of tank waste.
More than 200 transgenic waste shipments from five
generator sites were received last year at the waste isolation
pilot plant. The budget request for this year positions us for
success as we drive risk reduction, progress, skyline changes,
and ramp up efforts to tackle tank waste.
EM will operate tank waste treatment systems in South
Carolina, Idaho, and Washington State. Hanford's 56 million
gallons of tank waste represent our greatest environmental risk
and financial viability.
Treatment and disposal are the only way to permanently
address the risks posed by this waste. Recognizing that
additional delays bring greater risk, exacerbate the impacts of
already aging infrastructure, and increase cost, we are focused
on moving the entire Hanford tank waste mission forward.
We are advancing the system that will stabilize Hanford's
low activity waste in glass. The request also ramps up work on
the high-level waste facility so that we will be able to
address that portion of the Hanford tank waste as well.
The waste isolation pilot plant will be modernized to meet
the needs of legacy cleanup and ongoing National Security
programs. Waste shipments will continue and we will ensure
there is no backlog of shipments from Los Alamos National
Laboratory.
We will address excess contaminated facilities and
contaminated groundwater across the enterprise. This includes
work in Nevada, where we will demolish four buildings this year
and further reduce the clean-up footprint for fiscal year 2024.
As we deliver on these priorities, we are committed to
continuous improvement, whether it is investing in R&D,
analyzing options to save time and money, achieving regulatory
alignment, upgrading infrastructure, or building a pipeline of
talent for the future, we are preparing for the future.
The budget request for this year supports these efforts. It
also supports communities and tribal nations impacted by the
environmental legacy of the past. I appreciate the
Subcommittee's support for the EM mission. I thank you for your
time, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. William White follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. William ``Ike'' White
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Members of the
Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to represent
the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management
(EM).
EM's mission represents the Government's strong commitment to
cleaning up the environmental legacy of the national defense programs
that helped end World War II and the Cold War. EM's vital mission does
not just address past legacy, though, it also helps to support and
enable DOE's ongoing national security and scientific research
missions.
The fiscal year 2024 budget request of $8.3 billion for EM reflects
the Biden Administration's strong commitment to advancing the cleanup
mission and preparing for sustained success, maintaining national
security priorities, and supporting communities most impacted by the
environmental legacy of the past.
record of results for the environment
Over the last 30 years, EM has made significant progress. From an
original 107 sites, today EM is down to just 15 with legacy cleanup
work at the Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York completed last
year. EM's significant accomplishments to date have included completing
demolition of the Plutonium Finishing Plant, a facility that produced
two-thirds of the Nation's Cold War-era plutonium at the Hanford Site
in Washington state; completing the removal of the former uranium
enrichment complex at Oak Ridge in Tennessee; opening the world's only
deep geological repository for transuranic waste generated from atomic
energy defense activities at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New
Mexico; and completing construction on the entire tank waste treatment
system at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, enabling
significant progress in how the Department tackles one of its largest
environmental and financial liabilities at that site.
delivering results for doe sites and communities
While the mission is rooted in the environmental legacy of the
past, EM is also focused on the possibilities for the future. The EM
program of today is empowered to strengthen local communities and the
Nation as a whole.
Enabled by the significant investments Congress has made in the
program, EM has ushered in tangible results for communities and the
environment in a safe, effective, and responsible manner. Over the past
year, EM has cocooned the seventh reactor along the Columbia River at
the Hanford Site in Washington State, leaving just one more to go. EM
has also treated over 400,000 gallons of radioactive and chemical waste
from large underground tanks at the Hanford Site where work is
progressing toward initiation of the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste
(DFLAW) project that will convert this waste into glass for disposal.
At the Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina EM is now
processing record amounts of tank waste with more than 2.1 million
gallons treated last year alone.
More than 200 transuranic waste shipments were received last year
at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico from five
generator sites. This includes shipments from the Los Alamos National
Laboratory, where the EM team certified and completed 52 shipments to
WIPP last year, surpassing goals by over 70 percent.
This spring, EM met a key commitment to the State of Idaho by
completing the transfer of EM-owned spent nuclear fuel to onsite dry
storage. Last week, workers safely and successfully started up the
Integrated Waste Treatment Unit. This new tank waste treatment
capability has been decades in the making and will ultimately help
address one of the EM's greatest challenges in Idaho.
In addition, EM has launched demolition of the West Valley
Demonstration Project's Main Plant Process Building, a priority that
will continue this year and will further advance under the fiscal year
2024 budget request. The Nevada National Security Site is preparing to
demolish four Test Cell C buildings this year and will continue to
reduce the cleanup footprint there in fiscal year 2024.
EM continues a deliberate and broad view on the future of cleanup
sites while contributing to national security priorities, investing in
the next generation workforce and aiding Tribal and community efforts
to build strong economies, grow jobs and prepare for a clean energy
future.
Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in Oak Ridge, Tennessee
where historical cleanup accomplishments support national security
priorities and are building up the clean energy economy in Tennessee.
Following successful cleanup in the area, a commercial pilot fuel
manufacturing facility is now open at the East Tennessee Technology
Park. By putting DOE developed nuclear fuels research to work, this is
a cleanup to clean energy success story. With the first-ever demolition
of a reactor in the central campus area at the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (ORNL) and work continuing at the Y-12 National Security
Complex, EM's steady progress is a part of a broader vision focused not
only on cleaning up the past, but also advancing the ORNL and Y-12
research and national security research missions.
steady progress planned for fiscal year 2024
The fiscal year 2024 budget request reflects the Administration's
strong commitment to cleaning up the environment in communities that
supported or continue to support weapons programs and government-
sponsored nuclear research. Key investments position EM for sustained
achievement as the program continues to drive risk reduction, progress
skyline changes and ramp up efforts to tackle tank waste while enabling
DOE's vital national security and scientific research missions.
Protecting the environment by addressing radioactive waste stored
in underground tanks at Hanford, Savanah River and the Idaho National
Laboratory is a top priority for EM. The budget request advances
commissioning and startup of the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste system.
After decades of support from the local community, Congress and the
workforce, this transformational accomplishment is within sight.
As we prepare to begin operating Hanford's low-activity tank waste
vitrification capabilities, the budget request also invests $600
million to ramp up work on the Waste Treatment Plant's High Level Waste
facility to be able to tackle that portion of Hanford's tank waste
inventory. In parallel, EM continues to identify safe, effective, and
viable options for the treatment of all Hanford's tank waste.
Hanford's 56 million gallons of radioactive and chemical waste
stored in 177 aging storage tanks represent EM's greatest environmental
risk and financial liability. Recognizing that additional delays bring
greater environmental risks, exacerbate the impacts of already aging
infrastructure, and increase costs, we are focused on moving the entire
Hanford tank waste mission forward. EM has also developed a Research
and Development Roadmap to guide investments in additional technology
options to accelerate the Hanford high-level tank waste mission. EM is
also taking the next steps on the Test Bed Initiative Demonstration
project, which could have the potential to safely pretreat low-activity
waste from Hanford tanks, solidify the waste, and dispose of it offsite
in a manner that is protective of the workers, the public and the
environment.
In addition to helping solve the challenges of Hanford tank waste,
the request will enable EM to continue meaningful cleanup progress to
transfer radioactive capsules to safer dry storage, progress 324
Building waste excavation and treat another 2 billion gallons of
contaminated groundwater.
In South Carolina, the fiscal year 2024 budget request supports
continued utilization of capabilities to process tank waste. This
advances work at the Savannah River Site to complete the bulk of its
tank waste treatment mission.
At the Idaho National Laboratory, the request supports continued
operations of the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit which will ultimately
treat about 900,000 gallons of liquid waste by turning it into a
granular solid.
support for national security missions
In addition to reducing environmental risks at these and other
sites across the complex, the EM mission benefits the Department's
broader national security and scientific research missions.
Building on last year's successful demolition work, EM recently
completed the transfer of the 18-acre Biology Complex at the Y-12
National Security Complex to the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) which will use the area for a new Lithium
Processing Facility. The budget request supports additional cleanup of
high-risk excess facilities at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and
the Y-12 National Security Complex. It also supports work to advance
the Mercury Treatment Facility and a second On-Site Waste Disposal
Facility, both of which are pivotal to future efforts to reduce risks,
stabilize facilities, advance cleanup and ultimately provide land for
research and national security missions.
EM is in the midst of a significant infrastructure and
modernization campaign at WIPP. Work continues on mining the West
Access Drifts and sinking the utility shaft that is critical for
ventilation upgrades needed to improve air quality in the underground
portion of the site. Commissioning of the new Safety Significant
Containment Ventilation System (SSCVS) is slated to begin this year.
Along with providing for continued WIPP operations, as well as waste
characterization and transportation programs, the budget request
supports the continued infrastructure recapitalization projects, as
well as mine modernization activities and safety upgrades in fiscal
year 2024. Taken together these projects will help ensure EM has the
infrastructure in place to support disposal operations for years to
come.
At the Savannah River Site, where EM's role is decreasing as
cleanup work progresses, a joint process to transition primary
authority for the site to NNSA in fiscal year 2025 is underway. EM and
NNSA are committed to a successful transition that keeps national
security priorities as well as the long-term outlook for the site and
community front of mind.
investing in diverse workforce and communities
The talented and dedicated men and women across EM are the
program's greatest assets. While significant progress continues across
the DOE complex, the EM mission will span several decades at some
sites. With that in mind, EM is increasing efforts to foster, build and
maintain a next-generation workforce that promotes diversity, equity,
inclusion, and accessibility. A program-wide succession plan has been
developed to help identify and develop the next generation of program
leaders. EM has expanded the Minority Serving Institutions Partnership
Program to increase internships, develop a new technology curriculum,
and boost research activities. Funding has been provided to
participants across the country in states like Washington, Nevada,
Tennessee, South Carolina and others. The budget request provides $56
million to continue the Minority Serving Institutions Partnership
Program.
The Advanced Manufacturing Collaborative facility, to be
constructed in South Carolina, will be another tool to help meet the
needs of the EM cleanup mission and create an environment to develop a
diverse and talented next generation workforce. In addition, EM is
putting DOE's Justice40 Initiative to work by expanding outreach and
grants to include support for STEM and Community Based Education
programs.
The Justice40 Initiative has also provided new opportunities to
boost engagement with stakeholders and ensure the voice of those most
impacted by the EM mission is heard. In addition, EM has increased
stakeholder outreach and engagement across the complex, with particular
emphasis in New Mexico, where we have partnered with NNSA to hold
multiple public forums and prioritize meetings with State, local, and
Tribal leaders.
The fiscal year 2024 request represents a significant investment in
helping the communities that played such an important role in U.S.
history continue to grow and thrive in the future. The request includes
Payment in Lieu of Taxes funding for communities near Hanford and
Savannah River to support schools, roads and other local priorities. In
addition, $40 million is provided for the Community Capacity Building
initiative. This grant program will provide assistance to those
communities around EM sites and will be developed in consultation with
community stakeholders] to address their needs. By partnering with
local communities, prioritizing stakeholder engagement and implementing
environmental justice initiatives, EM is helping to foster successful
visions for the future.
conclusion
The fiscal year 2024 budget request is the latest sign of this
Administration's strong support for EM's vital mission. As the mission
is carried out, EM is committed to continuous improvement and making
further advancements to ensure that cleanup activities are conducted in
a safe, efficient, and cost-effective manner.
Across mission areas, EM utilizes science-based advancements that
provide opportunities to meet cleanup commitments safely, sooner and
more efficiently. EM is leveraging the expertise of the Savannah River
National Laboratory and the Network of National Laboratories for
Environmental Management and Stewardship to develop innovative
solutions in the fields of environmental cleanup, national security and
science and energy security that will benefit EM, the NNSA and other
DOE missions. Our goal is a fully integrated technology program that
enables EM to better meet the most complex challenges of today and
tomorrow.
Whether it is investing in R&D, analyzing disposal options,
reaching decisions about remaining waste streams, achieving regulatory
alignment, or upgrading infrastructure, EM is preparing for the future.
These multi-faceted activities are laid out in EM's annual priorities
list and 10-year strategic vision as part of EM's ongoing efforts to
improve prioritization, planning and mission execution.
As EM makes steady cleanup progress, EM is committed to working in
a collaborative manner with workers, unions, Tribal Nations, states,
local communities, and Congress on opportunities to achieve shared
goals of protecting the environment and preparing for continued cleanup
success.
Senator King. Thank you. Did you say you processed 400,000
gallons last year?
Mr. White. At Hanford through our tank side cesium removal
system. Which is the system we have in place to pre-treat the
tank waste that is going into the direct feed low activity
waste vitrification plant.
Senator King. But there is something on the order of 150
million gallons, isn't there--in various tanks?
Mr. White. There are currently--there are 56 million
gallons of tank waste. But when you think about the processes
required to treat the tank waste, it ends up resulting in about
150 million gallons of liquid needing to be treated over the
course of the program.
Senator King. I will follow up on that for--in a couple of
minutes. Admiral Caldwell, a couple of questions. Back when the
Navy stopped, or when we stop producing additional uranium for
fuel back in the 1990's, it was assumed that we had enough
stockpiled until the 2060. Is that assumption still true in
light of Columbia and other programs that are now underway?
Admiral Caldwell. Sir, we have looked at this over many
years and even recently as we have embarked on this AUKUS
consultation period, and currently we have enough fuel stock to
support the program out through the 2050's, mid to late 2050's.
That will depend, of course, on the Navy shipbuilding plan
and we will continue to evaluate that going forward. Ms. Hruby
and I have frequent dialogs on this. It is going to be a topic
we continue to talk about.
Senator King. But the projection hasn't changed radically?
Admiral Caldwell. Not radically, no, sir.
Senator King. A different question. Did I hear in your
testimony you are developing a new reactor for the Columbia? Is
this a brand-new reactor or is it a modification of existing?
Admiral Caldwell. Sir, to clarify, we have been working on
the reactor for Columbia for many years now, and it is a
reactor that has been funded by the support of this
Subcommittee. It will have a--the result is a 42-year reactor
core to power Columbia through life. That----
Senator King. No refueling?
Admiral Caldwell. No refueling, and that is important. That
allows us to do the mission with 12 versus 14 SPNs [Simplified
Pntransport Core], and that fact alone saves refueling costs
and saves the Nation about $40 billion.
So, it is a remarkable achievement. We are building that
core right now, and we are on track to deliver that core on
schedule.
Senator King. But this is a developed technology. You are
not inventing something.
Admiral Caldwell. We are taking technology that has been
built on decades worth of research and work. In fact, we took
the step to design the core for the S8G prototype, a training
and research reactor up in Kesselring.
We took the step to develop some Columbia components for
that core. This was a decision made over 10 years ago. That
proved to be a very important decision because it allowed us to
de-risk the manufacturing techniques and make sure we had that
down before we actually started the Columbia core.
So those two projects are actually integrated and both
supported by this Subcommittee.
Senator King. I am sure there is an answer to this
question. I also serve on Energy and Natural Resources, where
all the talk is about small modular reactors. Why aren't the
naval reactors models for that? Is there an utterly different
technology or is it cost? What--why couldn't you park a
submarine in the bay and power the city?
Admiral Caldwell. Well, first off, the requirements for a
warship are significantly different from the requirements for a
commercial reactor. We have to be able to withstand shock. We
have to be ready to operate in battle damage conditions. We
have to be responsive in speed.
A lot of the time the submarine or the carrier might be
going relatively slow and we have to accelerate rapidly. For
power generating reactors, the technology and the requirements
for that are very different.
I don't think that the submarine core would be the right
path for some of these small modular reactor concepts.
Senator King. Thank you. Mr. White, as I mentioned, there
is plenty of work left to do. I understand in Savannah River
there are going with a concrete solution as opposed to a glass
solution. Is that proving to be feasible, a, and b, is it a
more cost-effective solution that could be used at the Hanford
site?
Mr. White. So, at Savannah River, the capability we have
there can ultimately treat about 6 million gallons of the 9
million gallons of tank waste a year. So, I think it is
something we should definitely be looking at, at Hanford.
In fact, we are doing that. One of the things that we just
did was move forward with the test bed initiative, something
that Congress funded over the last couple of years. So as part
of that effort, we made a waste determination of about 2,000
gallons of tank waste at Hanford that we are planning to treat
commercially offsite with grouting technology and then dispose
of it at a commercial facility.
Right now, we are working on putting a permit together to
submit that to the State of Washington, and then once they have
approved that, about a year after that, we should be able to
move forward with this pilot effort.
If you think about the cumulative amount of waste we have
at Hanford, the vitrification capabilities we are putting in
place with the low activity waste vitrification plant and the
high-level waste plant, would treat about 40 percent of the
tank waste that we have at Hanford to treat.
That leaves about 60 percent of the supplemental waste that
we don't have a clear path forward on. In large part at the
urging of this Subcommittee, we have had the national
laboratories studying the best alternative for treating that
supplemental waste, that 60 percent of the waste that isn't
covered by those vitrification plants.
The National Academies recommended that we consider
grouting, that the technology is effective at treating the
waste, and it is by far the most cost effective and timely way
to deal with the waste, the bulk of the waste at Hanford.
So, as we move forward on the vitrification capabilities
that we need for the parts of the waste streams that have to be
vitrified, while simultaneously working on options to expand
our grouting capabilities as well to deal with the bulk of the
waste.
Senator King. Thank you. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
Administrator. While the NNSA has many competing missions,
delivering nuclear weapons to the Department of Defense remains
the top priority. With narrowing window time for our current
wave of modernization, can you identify your largest source of
concern? How are you going to meet those milestones?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, thanks for the question. They are--
undoubtedly our most challenging programs are our large nuclear
construction projects. I say that because our weapons programs
are certainly challenging, but we are on track.
We understand the long lead, the places where we really
need to increase our regular timelines, start timelines to meet
those. But the construction activities have been more fluid in
terms of what the issues are, and in part because we started
them pre-COVID and have needed to come out of that, and it is
the first time in many generations that we--this is really the
first rebuild of our enterprise since the Manhattan Project.
To answer your question, we are pulling out all the stops.
We are having external reviews. We are implementing
recommendations from those reviews. We are changing our
approach to procurements to not only start them earlier, but to
have them move along faster.
We are breaking projects into chunks. We are pausing some
projects in order to focus on others. We have a long list of
things that we are doing to try to bring those as far to the
left, if you will, as we can.
Senator Fischer. If you have any suggestions on how
Congress can help you do that to meet those requirements,
please let us know.
Ms. Hruby. Thank you. I would just, I know this is a big
ask, but the most important thing on some of these projects is
going to be timely budget appropriations.
Senator King. Yes. It shouldn't be a big ask. It will be
routine.
Senator Fischer. It should be what we do, yes. Meeting the
requirement of the 80 plutonium pits per year remains a
challenge. Can you provide us with an update on NNSA's efforts
to achieve that full production as close to 2030 as possible?
Ms. Hruby. Absolutely, thanks. We, as you know, we are
proceeding with our two-site solution at Los Alamos and
Savannah River. Los Alamos is the first up, if you will. We
started it earlier, but also is an existing plutonium facility
that we are modifying for the pit production activity that we
have.
We have completed a lot of equipment installation. We are
aiming to get to--the first project we are calling 30 base,
making 30 pits per year. We have done about 40 developmental
pits over the time we have been doing this project.
We are getting closer to WR [war reserve] certification, to
weapon certification----
Senator Fischer. You say, developmental pits. So those
aren't certified?
Ms. Hruby. Those are not yet certified and they are not
going to get certified for----
Senator Fischer. How long a process to get them certified?
What do you have to do?
Ms. Hruby. We are expecting that we will have our first
certified pit at the end of 2024, and so then let me also cover
Savannah River. So, we are about 50 percent way through the
design of the Savannah River pit production facility.
We are also doing parallel activities to modify the MOX
[mixed oxide] facility and take out equipment that we don't
need. We are doing site preparation work. We are preparing to
build a high-fidelity training center there.
The point of the training center is to make sure that as
soon as we have the construction complete, we can go as fast as
possible to get to making certified pits. That will be a few
years, even if we are really fast.
We are doing a lot of pre-buys of equipment. We are staging
our design so that the equipment is designed first so we can
get those out for procurement while the rest of the facility
design is being done.
Senator Fischer. Has the pre-buying equipment, has that
been an effective tool for you to be able to have that
capability and to continue to move along so you don't have to
wait months or a year or two and a half years for--?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, absolutely. It is particularly important
for gloveboxes, which is, there is a limited capability in the
United States and all of our facilities need them.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Senator Cramer.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses. Administrator, first of all, thank you for this
morning's briefing as well. Very, very informative. Appreciate
the detail of it all.
But when we talk about modernization, we always talk about,
of course, our own, and then we talk about our biggest
adversaries, but we rarely talk about allies or other places
other than Russia and China and the United States.
Can you enlighten us a little bit with what might be going
on in other places, if anything, that, you know, might be
instructive to how we view the future with regard to us, plus,
if that makes sense?
Ms. Hruby. Well, I will say that by far our closest ally on
things nuclear is the UK. Not only are we doing what Admiral
Caldwell talked about in terms of the AUKUS program with them,
we are also working on the W93 program with them, and we are
working on materials availability with them.
So that--by far our strongest ally. We do work
nonproliferation programs with all of our other allies, both
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and Pacific
allies. That is useful not only for the purpose of the
nonproliferation program, but it keeps us in close coordination
and communication with those allies in terms of their nuclear
capabilities, so I consider those very important programs.
Senator Cramer. Along those lines, and maybe you could
comment or you, Admiral, for that matter too, on how, with
regard to that relationship that you just outlined--I guess I
can say I worry a little bit about the reputational risk that
has been associated with the events of the last, you know, some
say a couple of years, us being seen as once the reliable
umbrella ally that we are--am I wrong to be concerned about
that or--and again Admiral, maybe you want to speak to that a
little bit as well.
Ms. Hruby. I will start and then let Admiral Caldwell talk
about the naval part. I am fond of saying if anybody ever asked
you if you want a Russian, a Chinese weapon, or a United States
weapon, say United States.
We still have, despite--we are very transparent about our
issues, but we still have an incredible capability in this
country. Our weapons are second to none and we are making sure
that they stay that way. So, I would say the NATO allies are
actually here this week.
They will be at Lawrence Livermore on Friday. I will be
with them for that meeting. We are doing a lot of assurance
meetings and they are always very impressed to see what
capabilities we have and to see the commitment to the
enterprise that we have.
Senator Cramer. Admiral, anything you would add to that?
Admiral Caldwell. Sir, I want to make sure I understand
your question. Is your question about our sharing and
relationship with the UK in particular, or how our allies and
partners view the viability of our nuclear--?
Senator Cramer. Yes, so I think it is--I would add a third
category and that is that their trust that we have the
political will as well as the capabilities to continue to be--
to provide that umbrella that helps you control some of the
issues you have talked about, Administrator.
Admiral Caldwell. I don't have as many interactions maybe
as some of the other Navy leaders with those key allies. I can
tell you we have a strong interaction with the UK. I think
there is absolutely trust there.
I just returned from a trip to Japan where I spoke with
Japanese leaders. Clearly, if you look at their National
Defense Strategy and National Security strategy, the United
States plays a huge role in their future as they have laid it
out in clear language.
I think there is a lot of faith and confidence in the U.S.
war plan, and our ability and commitment to follow through on
that.
Senator Cramer. Maybe, Mr. Chairman, I am more concerned
about our ability to persuade our own constituents sometimes of
this. But thank you, both of you, for your answers. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Admiral Hruby--Administrator
Hruby--yes, just, sorry. It would be nice to be an Admiral.
Administrator Hruby, inertial confinement fusion facilities,
including the Omega Laser facility at the University of
Rochester's Laboratory for Laser Energetics have not had major
infrastructure investment since the 2000's.
The demand on these world's leading high energy density
science facilities continues to grow. Is the fiscal year 2024
budget request sufficient to cover critical sustainment
activities while meeting increased operational demand on the
facilities? Are you including sustainment costs in your 5-year
future budget plan?
Ms. Hruby. Well, thank you for that question. The Omega
facility, the Laser Energetics lab, is a very impressive
facility and frankly, has made just very important
contributions to our programs, including ignition at NIF
[National Ignition Facility], because we are able to do many
experiments faster there and try things out.
We have produced a report which we have submitted that
talks about all the investments we need to make at all of our
fusionsites in the U.S., and it is a significant amount of
money.
We are trying to execute that plan in this budget and our
5-year budget, our request for Rochester is higher this year
than it was last year. But it will be a journey, a long-term
journey to make the investments in science and technology that
we need, including at this facility.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Admiral Caldwell, the
breakthroughs in December at the National Ignition Facility
have significant implications for nuclear energy production.
What are the implications of inertial confinement fusion on the
future of the U.S. nuclear fleet?
Admiral Caldwell. My team pays close attention to
development in the nuclear field, but as we see it, the
viability of nuclear fusion is still many decades away.
As we think about putting ships to sea, I need to make sure
that the reactors and the components and things we build into
the submarine are absolutely reliable. We are a proven
technology.
When you when you build a ship and you put the reactor in
and it is going to stay there for 30 plus or 40 years for
Columbia, it has got to work correctly first time and every
time. We are just not there with fusion. But we keep close tabs
on what is going on in science and technology throughout the
United States.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Mr. White, we are
increasingly looking toward expanded nuclear capacity and small
modular reactors for energy production as we try to meet our
net-zero goals.
At the same time, we are still struggling to figure out how
to manage existing radiological waste. As we balance our energy
needs and our defense needs, what policies or mechanisms do we
need to adopt to ensure that we are properly disposing of
nuclear waste products?
Mr. White. Certainly, when I think about the importance of
the clean-up program--and I mentioned earlier that, I think it
is extraordinarily important for our National Security and
scientific research missions.
Part of the reason for that is, I think our ability to
safely and effectively dispose of nuclear waste and treat that
waste underlies our ability to also move forward in the nuclear
security and nuclear energy realms.
From a policy perspective, certainly for the clean-up
program, the biggest thing outstanding is our ability to
dispose of high-level waste. We have an inventory of high-level
waste in the cleanup program that we manage for the Energy
Department, and the absence of a capability for disposal of
that waste certainly impacts our cleanup program.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, and, Administrator Hruby,
your agency is tasked with the managing nonproliferation
efforts. Where do you foresee nonproliferation efforts trending
in the next decade now that Russia has withdrawn from the New
Start? What effect will China's expansion of nuclear
capabilities have on our current nonproliferation regime and
the Nonproliferation Treaty?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, well, the nonproliferation efforts, and
this is a little bit to the question addressed earlier, we are
doubling down with our allies on nonproliferation activities to
make sure that we are collectively supportive of
nonproliferation programs, including the programs around the
hot zones right now.
Obviously, Ukraine, but there are other regions that we
want to make sure that we still have detection of materials
that could be lost or stolen from countries that have nuclear
materials. With Russia and China we would really like to be in
strategic stability dialogs, but we aren't.
What we are doing in the Department, in NNSA is working on
verification technologies so that when we--for these new
weapons, many new weapon systems, so that when there is a
window open again for discussion, which hopefully someday there
will be, there won't be a barrier associated with not having
proper verification technologies developed.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. and thanks to all
of you for your service to our country. This is an unclassified
discussion and I appreciated the opportunity that we have had
to have classified discussions on this.
I kind of got to thinking the vast majority of folks that
are probably watching or listening to this discussion, they are
wondering kind of maybe some of the basics. I would like to
take a few minutes, just kind of work our way through the
basics of why this is so important to our country.
I must start with Administrator Hruby. Let's talk about, we
are talking our national defense is really based upon a nuclear
deterrence. But the nuclear deterrence means not just land
based. It means submarine based, and it means air carried
weapons that have a nuclear weapon on them, whether it be a
bomb or a missile tip.
Can you talk a little bit about what it means when we--we
are talking here about plutonium pits and so forth. Can we just
take a minute here and perhaps explain a little bit about the
concern that we have got about the number of plutonium pits
that we actually do per year and so forth?
Talk to us a little bit and maybe explain that in a level
that I could understand, about third grade level or so, here.
Ms. Hruby. Well, I know you understand more than that,
because I know you--I have been in our model room with you and
you asked great questions. So, but let me try to address your
question.
To make a nuclear weapon, which is the core of our
deterrence in the United States, we have to be able to work
with nuclear materials, both plutonium and enriched uranium,
and many other materials that are difficult to work with.
We have to be able to have physics packages that we are
absolutely confident will work when we want them to and not
work at any other time. That requires a lot of engineering of
non-nuclear components.
We use in the United States a captive production complex
where we do buy parts from commercial supplies, but mostly
these materials--this is something we have to do ourselves. It
is perhaps the only captive production complex in the United
States, make sense, the way you make nuclear weapons.
We have to have a very strong understanding of the science.
We have to turn that into manufacturing capabilities and we
have to deliver weapons on time to the Department of Defense
(DOD).
Senator Rounds. The different weapons that we have, they
basically have a system inside of them that, when triggered,
create a nuclear reaction that is the bomb or the missile tip.
What sizes--can you talk a little bit about what that means
to somebody in the American public about the size? How huge
these weapon systems are?
Ms. Hruby. The physical size of the weapon system?
Senator Rounds. Not so much the physical size, but the
impact--the size of the blast, sort to speak.
Ms. Hruby. Yes. Well, we have weapon systems that have
yields from tens of kilotons----
Senator Rounds. Tens of kilotons, meaning in high
explosive, like a big bomb that you would--a conventional
bomb----
Ms. Hruby. Right, right----
Senator Rounds. That would be the size of how big of a
bomb? Ten kiloton?
Ms. Hruby. Let's--maybe the easiest way to say this is our
lowest yield weapons today are about the size of the weapon at
Hiroshima.
Senator Rounds. Our smallest, and they move up from there.
Ms. Hruby. They move up from there.
Senator Rounds. These are both fission and fusion.
Ms. Hruby. They are thermonuclear weapons, right.
Senator Rounds. Now, I think there is a question out there
about what that means. Let's just--I have got a minute left,
but let's walk our way through that a little bit.
Ms. Hruby. The physics.
Senator Rounds. Yes, let's talk about that.
Ms. Hruby. Yes, the plutonium pit and the weapons is
imploded by high explosives. It produces a blast that is
captive inside the weapon that goes to the secondary, and
implodes the secondary, and the secondary makes the large yield
from the weapon.
Senator Rounds. When you just say the secondary, you mean
the actual material that surrounds a--or that is next to a
plutonium pit. The plutonium pit is really the trigger
mechanism.
Ms. Hruby. The plutonium pit is a trigger mechanism. The
secondary is a uranium base.
Senator Rounds. When we do that, we are concerned about
plutonium pits because we have to have those in order to make
every one of these new weapons systems, these modern weapons
systems that we want to deploy.
Ms. Hruby. Right.
Senator Rounds. We can't make a lot of those per year, can
we?
Ms. Hruby. No, but we do have pits that can be reused. Not
all of them, but some of the pits that we already have can be
reused.
Senator Rounds. But it is still--that is a critical
component----
Ms. Hruby. Absolutely.
Senator Rounds. In terms of our national defense, when we
are talking about new facilities to modernize or to be able to
do those, it is a critical part of our national defense in
terms of deterrence.
Ms. Hruby. Yes.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses for being here today. Thank you for the work you
do. A key component of modernizing our nuclear weapons involves
the construction of new plutonium pits. These pits are the
central cores of nuclear weapons that are used to trigger the
nuclear explosion.
Congress mandated that NNSA produce at least 80 of these
pits by 2030. However, it is clear, perfectly clear that NNSA
will not be able to meet this requirement. NNSA has a terrible
track record of waste and mismanagement over the years and
failing to come even close to budget estimates.
It is important to me that we not see taxpayer dollars
wasted again. Now, the Government Accountability Office, GAO,
recently released a report in January. They found that NNSA has
still failed to establish even a cost estimate for the
production of these pits.
Administrator Hruby, last year, when you came before the
Subcommittee, you may remember you and I had this conversation.
We talked about how there were no clear cost estimates for this
program.
The GAO is now estimating that at least part of the program
will cost $18 to $24 billion, and that the total program will
be much higher if, and I want to underline the word if, it ever
even ends up being completed.
I am glad that GAO is working hard to try to keep you
honest on this, but it is NNSA's job to estimate these costs.
Why have you not established a lifecycle cost estimate for this
program?
Ms. Hruby. Well, thanks for your question. We agree with
the GAO report, and we also have agreed in our response to the
GAO report that by April of this year we will have our initial
lifecycle cost estimate. This is the cost for everything. That
is the whole point of----
Senator Warren. Wait, April of this year? That is like two
more weeks?
Ms. Hruby. Oh, April--I am sorry, April of 2024. I am
sorry, April of 2024--April of 2024, we will have--we are in
2024 budget request. So, it is April of 2024, we will have the
initial cost estimate. Then in 2025, we will have an improved
cost estimate.
Senator Warren. Okay. So let me just say, you didn't have
the numbers last year. You don't have the numbers this year.
The best answer I can get is we are going to have them a
year from now, which means that Congress and the public has to
wait just for another year before we even get a basic cost
estimate on what this program is going to cost?
Ms. Hruby. There are many elements of the overall plan.
Most of those elements have had cost estimates released. The
life cycle cost estimate referred to in the GAO report is the
total cost for everything involved with making pits. Some of
those are still pretty immature designs and therefore it is
very difficult to do the entire cost estimates----
Senator Warren. Okay, so I get it. This is hard. I
understand that it is hard, but this is a long time and we keep
allocating money into this program.
It looks like we are not going to know how much this
staggeringly expensive program is going to cost us for a while,
so let me ask you a different question. Let's look at whether
NNSA has a good plan to control costs in the meantime.
Best practice for budgeting these types of complex programs
is to develop what is called an integrated master schedule, an
analysis that is going to break down the project into steps,
resources, and budget needed to complete it. Sort of budgeting
101.
The GAO first raised this in 2020, that is 3 years ago, and
found that NNSA did not have such a plan in place. GAO now put
out a new report saying that NNSA still does not have such a
plan in place. According to GAO, the plan you do have is, ``not
a reliable plan.''
We see here again that NNSA is not following just basic
budgeting standards and planning for this program. So, with
total program costs running somewhere in the tens of billions
of dollars, we are talking about significant cost risks if
things get off schedule or run into problems.
The plan you have doesn't even tie budget resources to
activities. Administrator Hruby, when will NNSA have an IMS
[integrated master schedule] that meets budgeting 101
requirements?
Ms. Hruby. Again, on the individual projects we have IMS.
The GAO report is looking at their overall plan. We have
improved our overall planning for the items that we know there
is a tight connection like gloveboxes.
But within the Los Alamos pit production facility plan, it
is a highly integrated plan. We are still working on developing
the plan across the entire----
Senator Warren. So, I am sorry. So, what was the answer to
my question? When will NNSA have an IMS that meets basic
budgeting requirements--when?
Ms. Hruby. The plan--it will go along the--around the same
time as the life cycle plans, because we are still in the
design phase of the Savannah River pit production----
Senator Warren. Can I just suggest that it is not a plan if
you are making it up as you go along and just kind of
integrating this. You know, you have information on this
program because you are making budget requests for it.
So, you must know something because you are coming to us
asking us for money. But the current plan doesn't even have the
information on the resources that you will be using for the few
activities that you have included and asked for money for.
I just have to say, I am concerned that this looks like it
is just hiding information from the public and from Congress.
Either you don't know or you do know when you are not telling
us and that is a problem. I will just wrap up because I know I
am over time.
I just want to say here that the Defense Department is full
of a lot of really high-priced items. But even in that rarefied
environment, NNSA run some of the most shockingly expensive
programs. It is deeply concerning when just basic budgeting is
out of whack here.
At a minimum, we need to know how much resources we need
for a project before we start implementing it, and I am deeply
concerned that we are just going to use this as an excuse to
drag out the timeline even further and jack up the cost
overall.
It is not unreasonable for Congress to ask you to tell us
how long a project is going to take and how much it is going to
cost in exchange for our forking over billions of dollars. I
suggest that that is what NNSA be required to do before we give
them another penny. Thank you. Sorry for going over.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator. I would point out that
Northrop Grumman has given us a fixed price contract for the
entire rebuilding of the Sentinel program, one of the most
complex undertakings in the history of the world.
I understand the point that the Senator is making, that
having this vague assurances with no real firm cost estimates
or timeline is not--this is a difficult challenge, I
understand, but I don't think it is more complicated than
rebuilding the entire Sentinel program. Any further questions
on this round? Yes, sir, Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. When you submit the budget for the
production facilities, does it go through Energy or does it go
through DOD? Where does that come through at?
Ms. Hruby. The appropriations go through Energy and Water.
Senator Rounds. I am sorry?
Ms. Hruby. Energy and Water.
Senator Rounds. Yes. So, it would come under the Department
of Energy. But the products that you are producing are critical
to the national defense because this is the location where the
pits, a significant number of these pits would be produced for
the Department of Defense.
Ms. Hruby. Well, the responsibility for making nuclear
weapons is with the Department of Energy. Has been since the
Atomic Energy Commission, since the Manhattan Project, and
philosophically, the reason for that is so the weapons are not
produced by warfighters.
They are produced by people with deep scientific and
technical knowledge of the weapons and the materials in them.
Senator Rounds. So, and if I could just--I will wrap up. If
the Department of Energy had a similar access or could use a
management plan similar to what was designed for the Sentinel
program, but also for the B-21, where there was a fixed price
basically involved in it, has that been something that has been
discussed within the Department of Energy?
Ms. Hruby. We discussed this with the Department of Defense
all the time. We do have cost estimates and independent cost
estimating capabilities. We review this with the Nuclear
Weapons Council in detail on a regular basis.
We are quite transparent in what we know and what our
uncertainties are. What we don't have in the GAO report is the
total cost for the entire enterprise, because we are still in
the process of designing a major part of that enterprise.
We have cost ranges and we have completion date ranges
because we don't yet have the amount of information, we need to
nail down a projected cost.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. One quick followup question, Mr. White. Are
we processing waste on an ongoing basis, or are we adding to
the backlog? In other words, is the waste that is being
produced being processed as it comes, or is the backlog growing
larger?
Mr. White. Make sure I understand your question, Senator.
For a specific site or just in general?
Senator King. No, just in general, the waste that is being
produced by the entire enterprise. There is waste being
produced on a year-to-year basis. Is it being processed or is
it being processed on a current year to year basis, or is it
going into a repository for processing at some later date?
Mr. White. When we look at this, the terms we use are newly
generated waste and our legacy waste. For the most part, I
think we are keeping on top of our newly generated waste at the
same time that we are bringing down the inventory of our legacy
waste.
Senator King. So, we are not digging the hole deeper.
Mr. White. Right.
Senator King. Correct.
Mr. White. Right.
Senator King. Thank you. Go ahead, Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, I am
curious on the AUKUS. The agreements that we are reaching there
and really the outstanding potential, I think, that we are
going to see. It is a tremendous opportunity that we can
increase the capabilities of one of our closest allies.
It, I believe, also strengthens deterrence in the Indo-
Pacific, that we are able to do that. Can you provide us with
an update on how discussions with the Aussies and the Brits are
going, and how that looks since this 18-month consultation
period is concluded?
Admiral Caldwell. Yes, ma'am. I can--can you hear me?
Senator Fischer. Yes.
Admiral Caldwell. I can talk about our experiences over the
18 months, and then tell you that, and where we are headed now.
Over the 18 months, we have had incredible interactions with
both of our allies.
One of the foundational dialogs has been stewardship, to
make sure that we understand this incredible technology, but we
treat it with respect. That has been just inherent in every
part of the dialog that we have had.
As we think about the different phases of AUKUS, we built
the optimal path so that Australia could learn, grow. That
includes embedded opportunities here in the United States and
in the UK, and eventually grow toward where they not only
understand the technology, but they are ready to own and
operate. It includes governance and regulatory structures as
well.
I want to leave you with the view that these dialogs have
been rich. They have been strong. We have a lot of work ahead
of us. I think we have laid an excellent groundwork. But to
give you some sense, I have right now six Australian officers
attending nuclear power school down in Charleston.
They will graduate from that program and then they will go
into our U.S. fleet and they will serve initial junior officer
tours there, qualify as engineer officer, and then we are going
to find opportunities for them to continue to serve in our
Navy.
Likewise, we are considering embedded opportunities in our
shipyards, in our squadrons, and other areas where we can
continue to teach, mentor, train, develop their leaders, and
they are absolutely committed to this.
The same thing is true with the UK. So, we have completed
the consultation period. We have described the optimal path.
Now we are after the details to really make this happen. It is
exciting, but there is also a lot of work ahead of us.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, and Administrator, before the
next panel, I would like to highlight the phenomenal work by
the men and women at Lawrence Livermore to achieve that
ignition last December.
I recall being there and visiting NIF in I think it was
2014, and this is a huge accomplishment. Can you share with the
Committee really the significance of the breakthrough?
I know the Admiral said it is going to be a long time, and
we have all read the articles. It is going to be a long time
before we can really put this into practice. But gosh, how
cool. Tell us.
Ms. Hruby. Yes, thank you for that. It was very cool. It
speaks to the ingenuity of the scientists and engineers, and
frankly just the grit. There were a lot of people that didn't
think it could be done.
Not only did we do it, but we did it first. I think it
provides evidence of the power of science and technology in the
United States of America. For us in the NNSA, this allows us to
reach regimes, physics regimes for--to study nuclear weapons in
ways we haven't been able to do in the lab before.
That is our interest. Of course, the interest of the
American public and others is the ability to produce boundless
energy. There is still a lot of work to do to get there, but
this gives us hope.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator King. Thank you. This concludes the first panel,
and we will not take a break. We will have the second panel
come to the table and move forward. Thank you all very much.
Dr. Adams, you are in the center. You want to lead us off?
Mr. Adams. I would be happy to.
Senator King. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARVIN L. ADAMS, DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Adams. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget
Request for NNSA.
As Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, I am
committed to working closely with you, our other partners in
Congress, and the DOD to advance the nuclear security mission.
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for Weapons Activities is
$18.8 billion. This is a $1.7 billion increase over fiscal year
2023 enacted levels.
This budget will enable us to continue fielding safe,
secure, reliable nuclear warheads, and an effective nuclear
deterrent force. NNSA is executing five nuclear warhead
modernization programs. Two of them are in full rate production
now and delivering on schedule to the Navy and the Air Force.
The other three are making steady progress while remaining
aligned with the DOD platform programs. These modernization
programs address weapon aging, technology obsolescence, and
changes in delivery platforms.
As you know, much of this country's infrastructure for
manufacturing nuclear warheads has atrophied or disappeared,
and NNSA is engaged in a massive effort to rebuild this
infrastructure, an effort that will determine our capabilities
for decades to come.
As Administrator Hruby says, we have to get this right. Our
budget request will enable this rebuilding to proceed at an
aggressive but executable pace. NNSA's world class
computational, experimental, and test capabilities are used
every day to execute our mission. We can't do without them.
They also attract outstanding individuals and help them
develop the expertise and judgment that we need in our
stockpile stewards. They add credibility to our nuclear
deterrent by demonstrating world leading expertise, as with the
recent fusion ignition experiment at the National Ignition
Facility.
They enable us to maintain confidence in our weapon
performance without nuclear explosive testing. Our budget
request will allow us to keep these vital capabilities up to
date. Our tasks are urgent and challenging, but with continued
support from Congress, we will succeed.
Our mission is vital and our workforce is determined. Thank
you and I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of The Honorable Jill Hruby
and The Honorable Marvin L. Adams follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Jill Hruby and The Honorable
Marvin L. Adams
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's
fiscal year 2024 budget request for the Department of Energy's (DOE)
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). NNSA appreciates the
Subcommittee's ongoing bipartisan support for our mission and
workforce.
NNSA is making significant progress across the entire portfolio.
The weapon modernization programs are delivering to the Department of
Defense. The production modernization and infrastructure initiatives
are advancing with noticeable progress all around the nuclear security
enterprise. Nonproliferation and counterterrorism activities continue
to make the world safer, help Ukraine, and prepare for future threats
and opportunities. Naval reactors, in partnership with NNSA
nonproliferation and others across the government, successfully
completed the 18month consultation period for AUKUS. Our workforce
recruiting and retention programs have helped us turn the tide of
attrition post-Covid. Although there are plenty of challenges, it is
clear that the NNSA enterprise is delivering and creating new
approaches to accelerate delivery going forward.
NNSA's priorities, as outlined in the fiscal year 2024 budget
request, reflect a deteriorating international security environment,
expanded mission demands, and challenges in building unique large
nuclear facilities.
Russia is changing the global nuclear landscape in multiple
dimensions. As it has for several years, Russia continues development
of new strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and renewal of its
tactical nuclear weapons inventory. Its unjustified full-scale invasion
of Ukraine has also presented several new nuclear threats--the
potential for a radiological release from a nuclear power plant due to
active combat or operational missteps, or the use of a nuclear weapon
in war. In addition, the invasion of a country that voluntarily
relinquished its nuclear weapons by a nuclear weapon State sends an
unfortunate signal to the world. Russia's recent decision to suspend
its participation in New START has no valid legal basis and lends
uncertainty to the future of arms control and fuels stability concerns.
Russia's nuclear behavior is irresponsible, and its actions will impact
global conditions for some time to come.
In addition, China's advancing and growing nuclear capabilities,
its reimagined minimum deterrence requirements, and continued lack of
transparency or interest in arms control dialog are deeply troubling.
Therefore, the U.S. must prepare for China as a future peer nuclear
adversary.
Contending with two peer nuclear adversaries at once will take us
into uncharted territory and require breaking from strategies we relied
upon during and after the Cold War.
Furthermore, North Korea and Iran are destabilizing and present
persistent nuclear proliferators. North Korea actively tests missiles
and diversifies its nuclear delivery capabilities and expresses its
intent to threaten the U.S. and our allies. Meanwhile Iran continues to
enrich uranium to higher levels and expand its nuclear program far
beyond JCPOA limits.
This environment reinforces the need for both continued efforts at
nuclear arms control and nonproliferation and for the U.S. nuclear
deterrent as the cornerstone of our national defense and as assurance
for our allies. As our weapons and infrastructure exceed their design
lifetimes, we continue to simultaneously execute five weapon
modernization programs and refurbish significant parts of the NNSA
production and scientific enterprise to maintain a safe, secure,
reliable, and effective deterrent for today and into the future.
NNSA remains acutely aware of the need to increase the pace of our
modernization efforts while retaining confidence in our nuclear
stockpile. We also realize this is a once-in-a-severalgeneration
opportunity to reform our enterprise. NNSA is using the weapon,
production, and infrastructure modernization programs to intentionally
create a more flexible and resilient enterprise that can respond to
unforeseen changes in mission requirements at the pace of the threat.
This is a significant undertaking, and we have strong headwinds in our
construction activities. Difficulties in construction are being felt
across the United States and being studied by economists. Although
initially thought to be caused by Covid, NNSA projects have continued
to experience supply chain and craft worker shortages, exacerbated by
higher-thanexpected inflation. We must adjust our cost estimates, delay
starting additional large projects, and find innovative ways to
successfully deliver.
The challenging security environment, and the demands it places on
our nuclear weapons enterprise cannot distract us from progress on
nonproliferation, terrorism prevention, partnering with the
international community, and keeping pace with new technologies and
threats. We are facing an increased international demand for nuclear
energy as a response to the climate crises. As new nuclear energy
programs emerge, a heightened burden is placed on the nuclear
nonproliferation regime to prevent nuclear energy programs from
becoming latent nuclear weapon capabilities or targets for terrorists.
Excellence in naval propulsion continues to provide the U.S. with a
competitive advantage. Sustaining, modernizing, and advancing the naval
propulsion efforts is a priority for NNSA. We will continue to stay
focused on building the spent fuel handling facility, delivering
Columbia-class propulsion, and developing next generation capabilities.
The AUKUS activities have increased the intersection of the naval
reactors program with nonproliferation and nuclear material production
activities, and we will continue to stay tightly coordinated.
The NNSA nuclear security enterprise is meeting today's
requirements and building for the future. We have a challenging mission
in a challenging time and are committed to its near-and long-term
success. Continuous support from this Administration and Congress is
essential to that success.
nnsa significant accomplishments in 2022
Life Extension and Weapons Modernization Programs: In 2022, NNSA
transitioned both the B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) and the W88
Alteration (Alt) 370 Program into Phase 6.6, Full-Scale Production and
met the deployment requirements set by the Department of Defense.
National Ignition Facility (NIF): In December, the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) NIF reached ignition in a
controlled fusion experiment resulting in a net energy gain for the
first time after six decades of global effort. Achieving ignition
allows new regimes relevant for stockpile understanding to be studied
and represents an important step toward laser fusion as a potential
abundant clean energy source.
Plutonium Pit Production: Los Alamos National Laboratory's
Plutonium Facility manufactured ten W87-1 development pits in 2022.
Progress on build rates and quality has been excellent.
Ukraine: NNSA has provided a wide range of equipment, training, and
technical aid to Ukraine to help prevent and respond to the dangers of
a nuclear emergency at Ukraine's nuclear power plants. Equipment
provided includes emergency diesel generators and generator fuel. We
also continuously monitor radiation sensor data in Ukraine and the
region to provide independent results for early warning, and regularly
practice emergency communications with the Ukrainians.
Surplus Plutonium Disposition: In December, NNSA completed its
first shipment of downblended surplus plutonium from the Savannah River
Site (SRS) in Aiken, South Carolina to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico. NNSA has converted a cumulative total
of 1,298 kilograms of plutonium to an oxide form in preparation for
final disposition.
Nuclear Material Reduction: In 2022, NNSA removed more than 55
kilograms of weapons-usable nuclear material from partner countries in
Asia, Europe, and North America, achieving permanent threat reduction.
The third nuclear research reactor in Kazakhstan was converted from
highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and
Japan transferred HEU from Kyoto University to the United States for
permanent disposition.
Global Material Security: NNSA removed 101 cesium blood and
research irradiators from U.S. facilities, the largest number in a
single year; 93 were replaced by radioactive source-free alternative
technologies. We are on track to meet the statutory requirements of
replacing all cesium-based blood irradiators in the United States by
2027.
Counterterrorism: NNSA participated in Cobalt Magnet 2022, the
latest in a series of full-scale exercises with Federal, State, and
local stakeholders to test concepts of operations and methods for
assessing, interpreting, and communicating the impacts of a release of
radioactive material. NNSA also assumed the role of vice chair of the
Nuclear Forensics Executive Council and helped develop the Nuclear
Forensics and Attribution Strategic Plan that establishes milestones
and requirements to shorten timelines to support Presidential
decisionmaking during a crisis.
Infrastructure Innovation: NNSA completed construction of an
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at LLNL in California under the
innovative Enhanced Minor Construction and Commercial Standards (EMC2)
initiative for streamlining non-complex, non-nuclear construction
projects. This project finished 13 months after receiving construction
funding, ahead of schedule and under budget.
Workforce Recruitment: NNSA expanded recruitment efforts for top
talent in the sciences, engineering, and skilled crafts and trades in
coordination with our M&O partners. This has resulted in the highest
Federal staffing levels since 2013 and over 11,000 people hired in the
enterprise. Additionally, NNSA continues to develop the next-generation
workforce through its Minority Serving Institutions (MSI) and Tribal
Educational partnership programs and supported 84 MSI interns in 2022.
Workforce Retention: In response to high attrition, a mid-year
salary adjustment was granted at our laboratories, plants, and sites to
better pace inflation and changing employee expectations. More flexible
benefit packages were also implemented. These timely actions have
helped lower attrition to levels closer to normal.
nnsa's fiscal year 2024 budget request
The President's fiscal year 2024 budget request for NNSA is $23.8
billion, an increase of $1.7 billion, or 7.6 percent, above the fiscal
year 2023 enacted level. \1\ This funding request reflects the
requirements in the nuclear weapons program of record, the National
Security Strategy, the Nuclear Posture Review, and other national
security strategies and requirements. The funding request supports
expanded mission due to the global environment and takes into account
increased costs and delays in construction projects. We are mindful and
deeply appreciative of the sustained support from Congress, multiple
administrations, and the American people.
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\1\ Fiscal year 2023 enacted levels throughout this document do not
reflect the mandated transfer of $99.7 million fromNaval Reactors to
the Office of Nuclear Energy for operation of the Advanced Test
Reactor.
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Fiscal year 2023 enacted levels throughout this document do not
reflect the mandated transfer of $99.7 million from Naval Reactors to
the Office of Nuclear Energy for operation of the Advanced Test
Reactor.
weapons activities appropriation
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for the Weapons Activities
account is $18.8 billion, an increase of $1.72 billion, or 10 percent,
above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. The request will be
supplemented with prior year balances of $61.6 million.
The budget request represents the Administration's firm commitment
to a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent
underpinned by world-class science and modern resilient infrastructure
and protected with advanced physical and cybersecurity measures. The
fiscal year 2024 request reflects the increased urgency needed to
modernize weapons and refurbish, revitalize, and reinvest in the
nuclear enterprise and workforce.
stockpile management
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for Stockpile Management is
$5.2 billion, an increase of $251 million, or 5.1 percent, above the
fiscal year 2023 enacted level. Activities include: (1) weapons
modernization, (2) stockpile sustainment, (3) production operations,
(4) weapons dismantlement and disposition, and (5) nuclear enterprise
assurance.
Weapon Modernization Programs
The Weapon Modernization Program request is $3.1 billion, an
increase of $200 million, or 6.9 percent, above the fiscal year 2023
enacted level.
W88 Alt 370: The W88 Alt 370 program has entered Phase 6.6, Full-
Scale Production, and is currently on schedule to meet Department of
Defense (DOD) deployment schedules. The budget request of $179 million
is $17 million higher than the fiscal year 2023 enacted level, with the
increase needed to mitigate risks encountered in Pantex production.
B61-12 LEP: The B61-12 LEP has entered Phase 6.6, Full-Scale
Production. The B61-12 LEP consolidates multiple variants of the B61
gravity bomb and improves the safety and security of the weapon.
Production is currently on schedule to meet DOD deployment schedules.
The budget request of $450 million, $222 million lower than the fiscal
year 2023 enacted level, is informed by carryover and reflects
completion of production of many components.
W80-4 LEP: The W80-4 LEP has entered Phase 6.4, Production
Engineering. NNSA revised the first production unit (FPU) schedule in
response to COVID-19 impacts, slower than planned hiring and increased
attrition, and increased component technical challenges. NNSA's revised
schedule is fully aligned with the U.S. Air Force's (USAF) Long Range
Standoff Missile's schedule for initial and full operating capability.
The budget request of $1.01 billion is $123 million lower than the
fiscal year 2023 enacted level, consistent with long-standing plans and
with typical warhead program profiles, with expenditures ramping down
from the current peak as the program moves through its remaining
phases.
W87-1 Modification Program: The W87-1 will replace the aging W78
warhead using a modification to the existing W87-0 design. The W87-1
will deploy new technologies that improve safety and security, address
obsolete designs and materials, and simplify warhead manufacturability.
The W87-1 has entered Phase 6.3, Development Engineering, and
expenditures are ramping up accordingly. The fiscal year 2024 request
of $1.07 billion is $389 million higher than the fiscal year 2023
enacted level. This request fully supports the increased activity
needed to execute Phase 6.3 in fiscal year 2024. The request is
informed by the recently completed Weapon Design Cost Report, the
associated Independent Cost Review by the Office of Cost Estimating and
Program Evaluation, and analysis of achievable execution rates by the
enterprise.
W93 Program: The W93 is a third warhead for our submarine launched
ballistic missiles and is a new warhead. The key nuclear components
will be based on currently deployed and previously tested nuclear
designs that will not require nuclear explosive testing to certify. The
W93 program is a separate but parallel program to the replacement
warhead program in the United Kingdom. In February 2022, the W93
entered Phase 2, Feasibility Study and Design Options. The budget
request of $390 million, an increase of $149 million over the fiscal
year 2023 enacted level, reflects the ramp-up associated with Phase 2
and is informed by improved cost estimates.
Stockpile Sustainment
Sustaining today's stockpile is the top priority for NNSA. The
Stockpile Sustainment program executes warhead maintenance, limited
life component exchanges, minor alterations, surveillance, assessments
including annual assessments and significant findings investigations,
surety studies and capability developments, and management activities
for all weapons systems in today's stockpile. The fiscal year 2024
budget request for Stockpile Sustainment is $1.28 billion, a decrease
of $44.6 million, or 3.4 percent, below the fiscal year 2023 enacted
level. Most of the decrease is due to completion of certain sustainment
activities for the W78 and W80 and reduced program requirements for the
B83.
Production Operations
Production operations maintains capabilities for warhead
manufacturing and surveillance that are not specific to ``tail
numbers''. The budget request of $711 million is $80 million higher
than the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. Activities supported by the
request budget include full rate production of the B61-12 and W88 Alt
370, capability support for Power Sources and Energetics at Sandia
National Laboratories, capability support for production of neutron
generators and detonators, expansion and equipment relocation at Kansas
City, maintenance of production and dismantlement equipment, and
recruitment and development of skilled personnel to perform production
activities.
Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition
Warhead modification and alterations since the end of the Cold War
have relied heavily on reuse of components from dismantled warheads,
and this will continue at least through the W80-4 program. Warhead
programs, Naval Reactors, the tritium program, and Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation's research-reactor programs all depend on recycled
material from dismantled warheads. The fiscal year 2024 request of
$53.7 million, a decrease of $2.3 million from the fiscal year 2023
enacted level, supports the dismantlements and dispositions that are
needed in fiscal year 2024 for B6112 production, W88 Alt 370
production, naval-reactor material, research-reactor material, and
uranium to fuel the Watts Bar nuclear reactors in which tritium is
produced.
Nuclear Enterprise Assurance (NEA)
The NEA program assists the nuclear security enterprise in actively
managing subversion risks to the nuclear weapons stockpile and
associated design, production, and testing capabilities from subversion
threat pathways. The fiscal year 2024 budget request of $66.6 million,
an increase of $17.7 million, or 36.2 percent, over the fiscal year
2023 enacted level, represents the planned ramp-up of this new program
that began in its current form in fiscal year 2022. The requested
funding is needed to establish cross-site, multi-disciplinary assurance
capabilities; address highest priority subversion risks at each of the
eight NNSA sites; institute cybersecurity of nuclear weapon policy,
requirements, and oversight processes; and establish, update, and
expand NEA training and qualification programs.
production modernization
The production modernization program re-establishes and modernizes
the manufacturing capabilities for nuclear weapons that degraded or
were eliminated after the Cold War. The fiscal year 2024 budget request
for Production Modernization is $5.6 billion, an increase of $439
million, or 8.6 percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. This
funding is focused on the timely establishment of nuclear weapon
production capabilities for primaries, secondaries, tritium and
depleted uranium, and non-nuclear components.
Primary Capability Modernization
Pit Production: NNSA's most pressing recapitalization effort is
reconstitution of plutonium pit production. NNSA is statutorily
required to produce no fewer than 80 pits per year (ppy) by 2030. The
Secretary of Energy and the Nuclear Weapons Council have previously
notified Congress that NNSA will not meet the 80 ppy by 2030
requirement. However, NNSA remains firmly committed to achieving 80 ppy
as close to 2030 as possible. Through close coordination with DOD, NNSA
will maintain the reliability and effectiveness of the nuclear
stockpile until pit production capabilities are fully established.
NNSA is proceeding with the two-site approach for producing at
least 80 ppy, with the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium
facility set to produce 30 ppy and the Savannah River Plutonium
Processing Facility (SRPPF) set to produce at least 50 ppy. The two-
site approach is a key component of NNSA's development of a modern
nuclear security enterprise, with an emphasis on flexibility and
resilience. The fiscal year 2024 budget request for the Los Alamos
Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP4) is $670 million, an increase of
$82 million, or 13.9 percent, over the fiscal year 2023 enacted level.
For SRPPF, the fiscal year 2024 request is $858 million, a decrease of
$342 million, or 28.5 percent, over the fiscal year 2023 enacted level.
This decrease reflects the use of projected fiscal year 2023 carryover
for long lead time equipment purchases that will not need to be
repeated in fiscal year 2024.
At Los Alamos, production processes continue to mature. Forty
development pits have been built, and build rates and quality are
increasing. NNSA expects the first war reserve (WR) pit to be produced
near the end of calendar year 2024 and an increasing number of WR pits
to be produced each subsequent year. The fiscal year 2024 budget
request for LAP4 will support an increase in engineering evaluations
and certification activities to produce WR plutonium pits in tandem
with increased equipment purchases and installation activities. NNSA
believes the fastest path to reaching 30 WR ppy at LAP4 involves
balancing the priorities for production maturation and equipment
installation so that both are ready for rate production. The budget
request also supports the hiring, training, and qualification of
additional staff necessary for WR pit production.
The fiscal year 2024 request for SRPPF will continue to support
design activities and the work started in fiscal year 2023 on early
site preparation, demolition and removal of old equipment and materials
from the main process building, and long-lead procurements.
High Explosives and Energetics (HE&E) Program: The HE&E program
focuses on modernization of high explosives processing facilities
across five NNSA sites. The HE&E program enables the production of high
explosives and energetic materials required for nuclear weapons,
including the main charge, boosters, detonators, actuators, timer/
drivers, and spin rockets.
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for the HE&E program is $195
million, a decrease of $53.4 million, or 21.5 percent, below the fiscal
year 2023 enacted level. The decreased budget reflects the decision to
put the High Explosives Synthesis, Formulation, and Production project
at Pantex and the Energetic Materials Characterization Facility at Los
Alamos on hold, while prioritizing the High Explosives Science and
Engineering (HESE) facility at Pantex, including capital equipment
purchases, construction, and transition to operation, as well as other
key projects currently under construction throughout the nuclear
security enterprise. The request also reflects prioritization of a
partnership that began in fiscal year 2022 with Naval Surface Warfare
Center Indian Head to manufacture and supply insensitive high
explosives equipment purchases and process development.
Secondary Capability Modernization
The fiscal year 2024 request for Secondary Capability Modernization
is $1.64 billion, an increase of $522 million, or 46.8 percent, above
the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. NNSA is restoring, modernizing, and
enhancing its enriched uranium, depleted uranium, and lithium
manufacturing processes needed to meet requirements for nuclear weapon
secondary stage production. This request includes an additional $398
million for the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) and other investments
needed to support overall secondary stage production.
Enriched Uranium Capability Modernization: NNSA's enriched uranium
manufacturing modernization strategy includes the relocation of
enriched uranium processing capabilities into UPF at the Y-12 National
Security Complex (Y-12) and other enduring facilities to reduce mission
dependency on Building 9212, which is over 75 years old. UPF will
provide for the long-term viability and security of enriched uranium
processing while improving worker and public safety and promoting
environmental stewardship. Ongoing supply chain issues, delayed
equipment delivery, contractor performance, inflation, and shortages of
qualified labor have contributed to cost growth and schedule delays
beyond the originally scheduled completion date of December 2025. UPF
is just over 50 percent complete with the first four non-nuclear
subprojects concluded.
In addition to UPF, NNSA is refurbishing buildings 9215, 9204-2E,
and 9995 to establish modern processes and extend their operational
lifetimes into the 2040's. A key change will be the establishment of
electrorefining to provide purified uranium metal and eliminate the
current high-hazard chemical process. To reduce overall mission risk
during the transition, NNSA has a service contract with Nuclear Fuel
Services in Erwin, TN for converting uranium oxide to metal.
Depleted Uranium Modernization: Along with revitalized enriched
uranium processing capabilities, NNSA continues to advance its depleted
Uranium (DU) modernization program. Established in fiscal year 2021 to
meet mission requirements to produce radiation cases and other DU
components, this program will reconstitute lapsed DU alloying and
component manufacturing capabilities at Y-12 while investing in new
technology to improve efficiency, reliability, and capacity. The
equipment at Y-12 formerly used in this process has been inoperable for
the last 15 years, and its reconstitution is a critical component of
successful weapons modernization. The timely introduction of new
technology will allow rebuilding a limited capacity for the former
processes.
Lithium Modernization: The NNSA Lithium modernization strategy
includes restarting processes while constructing the Lithium Processing
Facility to address increased mission demand in the future. LPF will
replace the lithium manufacturing processes within Y-12 buildings 9204-
2 and 9202, which are lithium recovery, purification, component
fabrication operations and salvaging. These buildings are in disrepair
and do not possess the capabilities or capacity to meet demands beyond
2035. LPF will provide modern technologies and a safer environment for
both workers and the public.
Tritium and Domestic Uranium Enrichment Modernization
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for the Tritium and Domestic
Uranium Enrichment Modernization effort is $593.0 million, an increase
of $13.0 million, or 2.2 percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted
level.
Tritium Modernization: The Tritium modernization program provides
tritium supplies for nuclear weapon requirements, including recycling
tritium gas and sustaining reliable supply chain infrastructure and
equipment. Multi-year modernization plans reflect increasing future
demand. NNSA is already increasing production levels at the Tennessee
Valley Authority and extracting the produced tritium at the Savannah
River Site (SRS). NNSA is designing and initiating site preparations
for the Tritium Finishing Facility (TFF) at SRS, which will replace a
1950's-era facility. The TFF site preparation subproject began in
fiscal year 2023 using carryover funds from prior years. The fiscal
year 2024 budget request reflects a prioritization decision to complete
the site preparation subproject but move the remainder of the project
out in time, as we focus resources on SRPPF and other higher-priority
construction projects.
Domestic Uranium Enrichment: Tritium production relies on enriched
uranium. The Domestic Uranium Enrichment (DUE) program is responsible
for providing sufficient capacity of unobligated enriched Low Enriched
Uranium (LEU) for tritium production and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
for naval propulsion fuel, as well as obligated or unobligated High
Assay LEU (HALEU) for research reactors. The fiscal year 2024 budget
request for the DUE program is $258.3 million, an increase of $113.4
million, or 78.3 percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. The
fiscal year 2024 budget request continues support for HEU downblending
that will extend the need date for unobligated LEU for tritium
production to 2044. The funding request also supports ongoing
enrichment technology development and acquisition activities to meet
future unobligated enriched uranium needs. New funding is requested to
leverage the Office of Nuclear Energy's procurement of HALEU from
industry to support defense needs and to begin conceptual design
activities for an unobligated enrichment technology pilot plant. Such
efforts complement the investments provided in the Inflation Reduction
Act to the Office of Nuclear Energy for HALEU to help the private
sector establish domestic uranium enrichment capabilities for the long
term, so we will be able to reduce our dependence on Russia and address
a critical strategic vulnerability.
Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization (NNCM)
The NNCM program funds the capability and capacity for non-nuclear
components (external to the primary or secondary stage of the nuclear
explosive package) in weapon systems. Nonnuclear components provide
arming, fuzing, and firing functions and safety and use control
features, among others. Providing these functions requires a wide range
of technologies and components including radiation-hardened
microelectronics, neutron generators, gas transfer systems, power
sources, electrical assemblies, cables, connectors, structural
elements, pads/cushions, and a multitude of other parts that are
incorporated into the systems that support or weaponize the nuclear
explosive package. NNCs make up more than half the cost of weapons due
to the number and complexity of the elements, and the need for
qualification in extreme environments over the warhead life. The fiscal
year 2024 budget request is $167 million, an increase of $44 million
over the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. The request includes funding
to provide equipment for increased manufacturing capacity at the Kansas
City National Security Campus (KCNSC); reconstitute thermal spray
capability at Sandia National Laboratories; recapitalize radiation and
major environmental test facilities at Sandia National Laboratories for
design and qualification; and provide tools and equipment for the
Microsystems Engineering, Science, and Applications (MESA) Complex at
Sandia National Laboratories as the only approved source of trusted,
strategically radiation hardened microelectronics.
Fiscal year 2024 funding will also be used to develop production
modernization strategies for weapon staging and warhead assembly
operations at Pantex.
infrastructure and operations
A well-organized, well-maintained, and modern infrastructure system
is the bedrock of a flexible and resilient nuclear security enterprise.
NNSA's infrastructure consists of $134 billion in assets and
facilities. More than 60 percent are beyond their life expectancy, with
some of the most important dating back to the Manhattan Project.
Modernization and recapitalization of deteriorating infrastructure will
allow NNSA to meet expanded mission needs, provide a safe and up-to-
date work environment to attract and retain a high-quality workforce,
and incorporate new technologies and techniques to make the nuclear
security enterprise more efficient, reliable, secure, and
environmentally responsible. NNSA must accelerate infrastructure
delivery while also balancing investments to optimize execution
capacity and value delivery. NNSA is challenging its traditional
mindset to shift to agile delivery methods, such as focusing on minimal
viable projects, phased delivery, and whole site approaches.
When the Cold War ended NNSA was left with large and aged
buildings, environmental contamination, and the need to close
facilities for some key weapon components such as plutonium pits. Going
forward, we need to be creative in facility design and cultivate
capabilities that can rapidly scale up or down depending on the
international environment and mission need while being minimally
disruptive to contracts, workforce, facilities, and the environment.
This includes developing strategic partnerships with industry and using
new acquisition approaches to purchase facilities rather than pursuing
traditional Federal construction projects. NNSA is increasingly
exploring the use of its real eState authority to achieve timely
acquisition of modern, non-complex infrastructure to support the
mission.
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for Infrastructure and
Operations is $2.77 billion, an increase of $164.5 million, or 6.3
percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. This increase will
enable NNSA to operate and modernize NNSA's infrastructure to support
expanded mission objectives and future enterprise resilience. The
increase also enables NNSA to address external factors such as supply
chain delays, inflation, and labor shortages which have raised costs
and extended timelines for projects, making it difficult to deliver
projects within the baselines established. To address these challenges,
NNSA is focused on improving early stage project and portfolio level
planning, identifying and applying lessons learned through independent
project reviews, and taking actions to streamline project delivery and
increase buying power.
A significant portion of the requested increase will support the
Kansas City Non-Nuclear Expansion Transformation (KCNExT) plan. NNSA is
currently pursuing acquisition of 245 acres of land immediately
adjacent to the KCNSC because the current KCNSC manufacturing capacity
is inadequate to support the Program of Record. Since its initial
conception, the KCNExT strategy has shifted from a land acquisition
with government construction to a lease-purchase acquisition with
landowner construction. The execution of the lease-purchase agreement
in fiscal year 2024 will allow for immediate construction using
commercial building standards and accelerate completion of the first
major phase of the expansion. Funding in fiscal year 2024 will protect
NNSA's interests in the property and accelerate overall completion of
KCNExT.
Funding is also requested to initiate three new mission enabling
construction projects at the site.
NNSA continues to refine innovative solutions developed over the
last several years to streamline low-risk, non-nuclear construction
projects to save time and money. Consistent congressional support has
been invaluable in bringing these innovations to fruition. NNSA is
grateful for the additional authority in the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2023, which raised the minor
construction threshold from $25 million to $30 million and provided a
3-year pilot program to raise the threshold to account for inflation.
This will make a critical difference in NNSA's ability to further
innovate minor construction and complete low-risk projects on time even
during a period of higher-than-normal inflation.
Using data-driven risk-informed tools, NNSA pinpoints when and
where infrastructure investments are needed and develops innovative
execution initiatives to streamline processes, accelerate delivery, and
increase buying power. For example, in fiscal year 2019 NNSA
established the EMC2 pilot program to streamline commercial-like
construction projects. The initial program quickly expanded from four
projects to ten in 2021, including the addition of five office
buildings at LANL to support plutonium pit production. In fiscal year
2022, NNSA completed the LLNL's Emergency Operations Center in just 13
months after receiving full construction funding, the first project
under this pilot program. This year, NNSA held the ribbon cutting for
the Y-12 Fire Station and the Y-12 Emergency Operations Center. Both
projects began construction in 2021 and were ready for full operations
in just 2 years.
stockpile research, technology, and engineering
For Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering, the fiscal
year 2024 budget request is $3.2 billion, an increase of $246.6
million, or 8.4 percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level.
Approximately $100 million of the requested increase is for the Z-pinch
Experimental Underground System (Zeus) Test Bed Facilities Improvement
Project and the Advanced Sources and Detectors Scorpius radiography
capability, which provide the main capabilities within Enhanced
Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments at the Nevada National
Security Site (NNSS).
The Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering portfolio
covers activities that serve as the foundation for science-based
stockpile activities, including the capabilities, tools, and components
that are used every day to assess the active stockpile and to certify
warhead modernization programs without the need for underground nuclear
testing. NNSA's unparalleled science and technical capabilities, and
commitment to their constant improvement, helps cultivate the knowledge
and expertise to maintain confidence in the stockpile. The major
activities in the Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering
portfolio are described here.
Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments (ECSE)
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for ECSE is $292.3 million, an
increase of $15.1 million, or 5.5 percent, above the fiscal year 2023
enacted level. ECSE will produce experimental data in underground
tunnels at the NNSS that enables high fidelity assessment of the
current stockpile and certification of the future stockpile without the
need to return to underground nuclear explosive testing. ECSE
experiments are designed to remain subcritical throughout the
experiment to adhere to the current U.S. policy of a ``zero yield''
nuclear testing moratorium. Funding in fiscal year 2024 will support
the continued preparation and implementation of ECSE.
Stockpile Responsiveness Program (SRP)
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for SRP is $69.8 million, an
increase of $6.1 million, or 9.6 percent, above the fiscal year 2023
enacted level. SRP is responsible for exercising and enhancing
capabilities through the entire nuclear weapons lifecycle to improve
the responsiveness of the United States to future threats,
technological trends, and international developments not addressed by
current warhead modernization programs. SRP is investing in efforts to
address issues in design for manufacturability, digital engineering,
component, and system prototyping and testing.
Weapons Technology and Manufacturing Maturation (WTMM)
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for WTMM is $327.7 million, an
increase of $41.5 million, or 14.5 percent, above the fiscal year 2023
enacted level. The WTMM program invests in system-agnostic technology
development and advanced manufacturing capabilities to reduce the
technological risks and life-cycle costs of maintaining and enhancing
the stockpile. Technology and manufacturing maturation enables the
development and delivery of design-to-manufacturing capabilities to
meet the current programs of record and future nuclear weapons design
and production needs of the nuclear security enterprise.
Inertial Confinement Fusion Program (ICF)
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for ICF is $601.6 million, a
decrease of $28.3 million, or 4.5 percent, below the fiscal year 2023
enacted level, reflecting the use of projected carryover for fiscal
year 2024 requirements. The ICF program provides high energy density
(HED) science capabilities and expertise that support research and
testing across the breadth of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Its
twofold mission is to meet immediate and emerging HED science needs to
support the deterrent of today, and to advance the R&D capabilities
necessary to meet those needs for the deterrent of the future. In a
breakthrough on December 5, 2022, the ICF Program reached fusion
ignition and achieved net energy gain for the first time in history.
The fiscal year 2024 request supports ICF research and facilities,
enabling access to experimental data that underpins the safety,
security, and effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile and building on
the success of last year's achievement.
NNSA Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC)
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for ASC is $782.5 million, a
decrease of $7.5 million, or 1.0 percent, below the fiscal year 2023
enacted level. ASC will provide NNSA with leading edge simulation
capabilities to support weapons design, science-based stockpile
stewardship, and stockpile certification activities. The fiscal year
2024 budget request will continue funding maturation of next-generation
simulation and computing technologies. Additionally, El Capitan, the
first exascale computer for national security, is expected to come
online at LLNL for classified computing in 2024. At over two exaflops,
it will be the world's fastest supercomputer.
academic programs and community support
For Academic Programs and Community Support, the fiscal year 2024
budget request is $152 million, an increase of $40 million, or 36
percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. This budget increase
includes the addition of $30 million for the new Community Capacity
Building Program.
Starting in fiscal year 2024, NNSA is proposing to elevate Academic
Programs from a congressional-control level within SRT&E to a stand-
alone Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) Unit/control level,
and to also establish a Community Capacity Building Program to provide
benefits to disadvantaged communities, including Tribal Nations and
rural communities, that are affected by activities at NNSA's sites.
These changes will enable improved program integration, agility,
development, and alignment to critical workforce needs, promote the
President's goal of advancing diversity, equity, inclusion, and
accessibility through the Federal Government, and bolster underserved
communities affected by activities at the NNSA sites in the areas of
job creation, community restoration, infrastructure projects, and
educational resources.
The challenges of modernizing our nuclear stockpile demand a strong
and diverse base of national expertise in specialized technical areas
that uniquely contribute to nuclear stockpile stewardship. Academic
Programs supports educational capacity building in unique disciplines,
such as nuclear science, radiochemistry, materials at extreme
conditions, high energy density science, advanced manufacturing, and
high-performance computing. This budget supports our key objectives to
strengthen these fields of research through scientific advancement,
drive academic innovation that can be leveraged by our national
laboratories, ensure that a diverse and robust cadre of experts are
trained in these key fields and recruited into careers in the nuclear
security enterprise, and maintain U.S. preeminence in these disciplines
to ensure that nuclear deterrence remains effective. This budget
supports managing academic solicitations and competitive awards in
these disciplines, enabling connections between these academic research
communities and the nuclear security enterprise, and attracting and
retaining this pipeline of developed talent to ensure the future
workforce of NNSA can meet the evolving needs of the enterprise. NNSA
is also building the pipeline for technicians and skilled craft trades
to meet ongoing and emerging needs at national laboratories, plants,
and sites. The Apprenticeships for Complete and Committed Employment
for Specialized Skills (ACCESS) programoutlined in the fiscal year 2020
NDAA--was motivated by the need to support apprenticeships for
specialized skills that are vital to the nuclear security enterprise. A
Funding Opportunity Announcement was issued late last year and the
first awards for this program were distributed in February 2023.
secure transportation asset
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for Secure Transportation Asset
(STA) is $357.1 million, an increase of $12.6 million, or 3.7 percent,
above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. STA supports the safe and
secure transportation of nuclear weapons, components, and special
nuclear material throughout and across the nuclear security enterprise
to meet nuclear security requirements. Multiple activities critical to
the successful execution of NNSA's missions, including weapon
modernization programs, limited-life component exchanges, surveillance,
dismantlement, nonproliferation activities, and experimental programs,
rely on STA for safe, secure, and on-schedule transport.
The Office of Secure Transportation's (OST) priorities for fiscal
year 2024 include the sustainment and ongoing modernization of
operations and equipment. This includes the Safeguards Transporter life
extension program until it can be replaced by the Mobile Guardian
Transporter (MGT). The FPU for the MGT is planned in fiscal year 2028.
Additional funding is requested to support minor construction projects
essential for replacement and refurbishment of aging facilities and
mission requirements.
OST remains focused on recruiting and retaining a well-trained,
highly qualified Federal Agent and staff workforce to support mission
requirements. OST has implemented strategies to increase the Federal
Agent workforce by offering higher incoming pay, recruitment
incentives, and the creation of ladder positions for high performers.
defense nuclear security
Defense Nuclear Security's fiscal year 2024 budget request is $1.02
billion, an increase of $144.7 million, or 16.6 percent, above the
fiscal year 2023 enacted level. The Office of Defense Nuclear
Security's primary mission is protecting the facilities, assets, and
people responsible for successfully carrying out NNSA's national
security missions. Growth in NNSA's mission portfolio, and the
associated growth in projects in secure areas such as LAP4, UPF, and
SRPPF, along with increased resources necessary to meet core security
requirements, has led to increased program requirements for Defense
Nuclear Security.
Full funding of the fiscal year 2024 budget request will support
these larger requirements as well as high-priority initiatives for the
Physical Security Center of Excellence and the Center for Security,
Technology, Analysis, Response, and Testing. Additionally, this
increase includes additional funding for the West End Protected Area
Reduction (WEPAR) project at Y-12 to address cost increases associated
with contractor performance, delays in other projects outside WEPAR's
scope, and external factors affecting projects enterprise wide.
information technology and cybersecurity
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for information technology and
cybersecurity is $578.4 million, an increase of $132.7 million, or 29.8
percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. This request funds
current operations and continues investments across NNSA to modernize
both unclassified and classified systems and the execution of a robust
and effective cybersecurity capability.
The fiscal year 2024 budget request supports the cost necessary to
maintain a secure and resilient cyber program. The request invests in
operations, mission support, infrastructure modernization, labor
growth, and associated investments to execute statutory requirements,
Executive Order 14028, policy requirements, and Office of Management
and Budget memorandums. The fiscal year 2024 requested increase
reflects investments in endpoint detection and response, zero trust
architecture, operational technology, enterprise cybersecurity tools
and services, and cyber workforce growth at the labs, plants, and
sites.
The request funds cybersecurity programs at NNSA's laboratories,
plants, and sites to address the significant increase in technology use
and keep pace with expanded NNSA mission requirements. The funding
increase supports the ongoing modernization of NNSA's network
architecture and classified systems, including the Emergency
Communications Network. The fiscal year 2024 request includes the costs
associated with classified infrastructure and capabilities,
implementation of cloud infrastructure, and unclassified IT services.
These improvements reflect NNSA priorities in improving both
unclassified and classified collaboration tools and network services,
as well as providing redundancy and improved performance for mission
partners around the world.
defense nuclear nonproliferation
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for the Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation account is $2.51 billion, an increase of $19 million,
or 0.8 percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. The request
will be supplemented with prior year balances of $20.0 million.
Reducing nuclear risks and supporting a robust nonproliferation regime
and partnerships improves the effectiveness of our deterrent and
enhances U.S. and global security. Expanding priorities include support
for Ukraine with our allies and partners, preparing for a growing and
evolving nuclear power fleet, assuring allies who might be rethinking
the need for nuclear weapons, and getting ahead of biological threats.
This account funds all nonproliferation-related activities in the
offices of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), Emergency Operations
(EO), and Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP). The
activities carried out by these offices support the Administration's
2022 National Security Strategy, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review,
Presidential Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the
recently signed National Security Memorandum to Counter Weapons of Mass
Destruction Terrorism and Secure Nuclear and Radioactive Material.
NNSA's defense nuclear nonproliferation programs are part of a whole-
ofgovernment approach to extend U.S. defenses against nuclear threats
far beyond our borders. They help prevent adversaries from acquiring
nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials, technology, and expertise;
develop monitoring technology for arms control and early detection of
proliferation activities; counter adversary efforts to acquire such
weapons or materials; and respond to nuclear or radiological incidents
and accidents worldwide.
defense nuclear nonproliferation
From its inception, DNN has developed and implemented policy and
technical solutions to minimize or eliminate proliferation sensitive
materials and limit or prevent the spread of materials, technology, and
expertise necessary for nuclear and radiological weapons. Longstanding
and growing cooperation with partner governments; international
organizations such as the IAEA, the World Customs Organization, and
INTERPOL; and the private sector help develop and implement solutions.
These programs work side-by-side with both NNSA's Weapons Activities
and Naval Reactors programs to implement best practices for
nonproliferation and materials security in our own programs.
The fiscal year 2024 budget request will allow DNN to work in a
global landscape that has radically changed in the last 12 months.
Russia's unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine; the expansion and
diversification of Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals; the
destabilizing activities of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea (DPRK); the expected growth in nuclear material, technology,
and technical expertise resulting from the global expansion of nuclear
power and nuclear technology adoption; and the associated risk of
illicit smuggling and procurement networks all complicate nuclear
nonproliferation missions and demonstrate the need for additional
resources and deeper engagement with allies and partners. DNN will
utilize these resources to improve capacity and capabilities, develop
and incorporate cutting-edge technology required to address future
threats, and deepen cooperation with partners.
Material Management and Minimization (M3)
The M3 program's fiscal year 2024 budget request is $446 million, a
decrease of $18.3 million, or 3.9 percent, below the fiscal year 2023
enacted level. This reduction reflects the availability of prior year
balances to fund planned activities for fiscal year 2024.
M3 programs are focused on the reduction and, when possible,
elimination of weapons-usable material globally. The fiscal year 2024
budget request supports the conversion or shutdown of research reactors
fueled by HEU. The program will build on the success of the molybdenum-
99 (Mo-99) program, which last year enabled the Secretaries of Energy
and Health and Human Services to jointly certify that a sufficient
supply of non-HEU-based Mo-99 is available to meet the needs of
patients in the U.S. The request further supports the optimization of
proliferation resistance in new reactor designs, the recovery of
critically needed high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), the removal
and disposal of weapons-usable material located abroad, and the removal
of HALEU from a partner country. Finally, the budget request supports
the downblending of the removed HEU in the United States, and the
downblending and removal of surplus plutonium from South Carolina per
the settlement reached in August 2020. As previously noted, at the end
of 2022 the first shipment of downblended surplus plutonium was shipped
from K Area at SRS to WIPP in New Mexico. Additionally, to date, M3 has
removed or confirmed the disposition of nearly 7,300 kilograms of
weapons-usable nuclear material from 48 countries and Taiwan and has
eliminated the need for weapons-grade material at 108 civilian research
reactors and isotope production facilities.
Global Material Security (GMS)
The GMS program's fiscal year 2024 budget request is $524.0
million, a decrease of $8.7 million, or 1.6 percent, below the fiscal
year 2023 enacted level. The fiscal year 2024 request supports program
efforts to prevent terrorists and other non-State actors from acquiring
the nuclear and radioactive materials, equipment, and technical
expertise for the construction and use of an improvised nuclear device
(IND) or radiological dispersal device. This work is carried out in
coordination with domestic and international partners to improve the
security of vulnerable materials and facilities and build partner
capacity to detect, disrupt, investigate, and interdict illicit
trafficking of these materials. This workload is expected to increase
with the anticipated growth in nuclear material acquisition and usage.
Nuclear and radioactive materials have widespread power generation,
agricultural, medicinal, and industrial applications. In 2021 alone the
IAEA's Incident and Trafficking Data base recorded over 120 incidents
of attempted theft and/or smuggling of such materials. GMS maintains 84
bilateral partnerships and works with multilateral organizations such
as the IAEA, INTERPOL, and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) to counter theft and smuggling networks and improve security of
vulnerable assets. Finally, as part of an ongoing strategic analysis
process, GMS is exploring innovative approaches, technologies, and
tools to adapt to emerging threats and the growing demand for nuclear
energy and technology. This includes ongoing efforts to replace all 400
cesium-137 based blood irradiators in the United States by 2027 as
mandated in the fiscal year 2019 NDAA and further contributions to find
alternatives for Cobalt-60 in the recycling and reuse of plastic waste.
Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC)
The NPAC program's fiscal year 2024 budget request is $212.4
million, a decrease of $18.3 million, or 7.9 percent, below the fiscal
year 2023 enacted level. The reduced request reflects a planned
decrease in annual budget required for the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) test bed because the peak budget year has passed. It also
reflects successful efforts to accelerate the Advanced Reactor
International Safeguards Engagement (ARISE) program in fiscal year
2023. Activities funded under this request support NNSA efforts in two
critical areas: (1) preventing nuclear and dual use technology from
becoming nuclear proliferation concerns; and (2) bolstering the
international verification regime by technology development and
implementation for safeguards, arms control, and emerging challenges.
Ensuring the highest nonproliferation standards for AUKUS while
protecting naval nuclear propulsion technology has become an added
dimension to our nonproliferation efforts.
The greater use of nuclear technology is an issue of increased
salience for NPAC. In particular, nuclear energy programs are rapidly
expanding as countries seek sources of zero-carbon electricity to
combat climate change. Promoting stringent safeguards and security
policies, and developing new monitoring and verification technologies
are key to preventing proliferation. NPAC also supports the development
and implementation of section 123 agreements and the regulation of
nuclear technology exports through part 810 authorizations.
The fiscal year 2024 request supports IAEA and partner countries'
efforts to implement international safeguards obligations and builds
domestic and international capacity to implement export control
obligations. The request also supports the Arms Control Advancement
Initiative (ACAI) to maintain expertise and technology development
during a period when new arms control agreements are less likely and to
be prepared for future opportunities. NNSA also continues development
of approaches and strategies to address emerging nonproliferation and
arms control challenges and opportunities.
During the 18-month consultation period on AUKUS, we participated
in an international working group tasked with developing
nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the AUKUS program fully
consistent with our status as a responsible nuclear power and our
obligations as a nuclear-weapon State Party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). NNSA provided technical advice to the
interagency and our AUKUS partners on the full suite of requirements
that underpin nuclear stewardship to implement the strongest possible
safeguards and verification measures and achieve the overall objectives
of AUKUS. NNSA looks forward to taking the next steps in the process of
helping a key ally improve both its security and the security of the
Indo-Pacific region, while maintaining the highest nonproliferation
standards. The fiscal year 2024 request supports the foundation of our
nonproliferation and safeguards work on AUKUS.
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D)
DNN R&D is vital in the development of technical capabilities which
support nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and emergency response
missions. In addition, DNN R&D sustains and develops the foundational
nonproliferation technical competencies that promote the agility needed
to support a broad array of nonproliferation missions and potential
threats. These include the detection of nuclear detonations; foreign
nuclear weapons programs' activities; and the presence, movement, or
diversion of special nuclear materials.
The DNN R&D program fiscal year 2024 budget request is $728.2
million, a decrease of $39.7 million, or 5.2 percent, below the fiscal
year 2023 enacted level. The decrease is a result of the early
completion of Phase 1 of the Uranium Science and Technology Center
testbed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
The fiscal year 2024 budget request supports planned activities for
the early detection of proliferation-related R&D and the continued
production of nuclear detonation detection satellite payloads. The
request also supports continued efforts to sustain and develop
foundational nonproliferation technical competencies by providing
targeted, long-term support for enabling infrastructure, science and
technology, and an expert workforce. The request also continues to
develop and maintain advanced technical nuclear forensics analysis
capabilities at the U.S. national laboratories that can support time-
critical decisions in the event of a nuclear or radiological incident
and assist in determining the origin of interdicted materials or
nuclear devices.
NNSA Bioassurance
The bioassurance program's fiscal year 2024 budget request is $25
million, an increase of $5 million, or 25 percent, above the fiscal
year 2023 enacted level. NNSA appreciates Congress' support in the
establishment of this program. The program focuses on developing core
capabilities at the U.S. national laboratories, such as high-
performance computing for accelerated threat assessment and rapid
countermeasure design; surveillance and detection capability
development; safeguards and export controls; and forensics to support
attribution. NNSA coordinates closely with the DOE's Office of Science
in leveraging national laboratory capabilities and technical expertise
by making complementary investments in biological sciences and
engineering, computational capability, and classified workspaces to
advance fundamental understandings of biology and adapt those
understandings to bio-resilience. The fiscal year 2024 request supports
the establishment of the initial operating capability and coordinated
DOE programs in biosciences, including phased science plan
implementation with exploratory research and equipment purchases.
Nonproliferation Construction
The nonproliferation construction program fiscal year 2024 budget
request is $77.2 million, an increase of $5.4 million, or 7.6 percent,
above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. This program consolidates
construction costs for DNN projects. In support of the dilute and
dispose strategy for surplus plutonium disposition, the Surplus
Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project will add additional glovebox
capacity at SRS to increase plutonium dilution and aid in the removal
of plutonium from the State of South Carolina. The fiscal year 2024
request will support completing the final design review and activities
to request CD-2/3, Approval of Performance Baseline and Start of
Construction, to initiate full construction of the SPD project.
nuclear counterterrorism and incident response
The fiscal year 2024 request for Nuclear Counterterrorism and
Incident Response (NCTIR) is $493.5 million, an increase of $23.6
million, or 5 percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. The
NCTIR program supports two subprograms: Counterterrorism and
Counterproliferation (CTCP) and Emergency Operations (EO). The CTCP
fiscal year 2024 budget request is $474.4 million, an increase of $34.3
million, or 7.8 percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. The
EO fiscal year 2024 budget request is $19.1 million, a decrease of
$10.7 million, or 36 percent, below the fiscal year 2023 enacted level.
The CTCP subprogram advances the Nation's technical capabilities to
understand, defeat, and attribute nuclear threat devices, including
INDs and lost or stolen nuclear weapons; provides technical guidance on
physical security requirements for nuclear materials; and conducts
Nuclear Threat Reduction exchanges with the United Kingdom and France
to prevent, counter, and respond to nuclear terrorism and nuclear
proliferation.
CTCP also manages NEST, NNSA's multi-mission emergency response
capability comprised of scientific and technical experts who are
trained and equipped to respond rapidly in the event of a nuclear or
radiological incident or accident worldwide. NEST includes nuclear
forensics capabilities that enable technical personnel to identify the
origin of nuclear material interdicted outside of regulatory control or
used in a nuclear attack.
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has resulted in an
increased operational posture for CTCP since February 2022. In fiscal
year 2023, CTCP received supplemental appropriations of $110.3 million
to support the U.S. Government's response to the conflict in Ukraine.
CTCP is using these funds for radiation detection and monitoring of
Ukrainian nuclear facilities; personal protective equipment; emergency
diesel generators; and procurement of diesel fuel and consumables for
Ukraine's nuclear power plants. CTCP will continue to deliver incident
response training and build capacity among responders in Ukraine and
other partner nations.
The fiscal year 2024 budget request is driven by changes in the
operating environment, as CTCP's core capabilities are being leveraged
by key domestic and international partners, including DOD, Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. allies and partners bilaterally and
multilaterally, and international organizations such as the IAEA. The
request will support additional NEST capacity for large and complex
nuclear and radiological emergencies, with a particular focus on
nuclear threat reduction activities as part of the U.S. Government's
response to the Ukraine conflict. Additionally, this increased capacity
will allow NEST to expand interagency partner training to improve
regional capabilities nation-wide to characterize and defeat weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) devices. This effort leverages many of the
investments made and experiences gained from the recently completed
``Capability Forward'' initiative to train and equip the FBI's regional
render safe teams in 14 U.S. cities to take decisive action against a
wide range of WMD devices. Additional funding will also enable the
continuation of planned investments to provide solutions for countering
nuclear proliferation through applied analysis, testing, concept
development, technology development, predictive modeling, and testing.
These investments include targeted funding for High Performance
Computing, which will support modernizing and improving the unique
assessment capabilities at the NNSA national laboratories.
The CTCP subprogram also supports the interagency National
Technical Nuclear Forensics (NTNF) mission, a central pillar of the
U.S. strategy to deter hostile states from providing nuclear material
to terrorists. Fiscal year 2024 funding enables CTCP to support NTNF
efforts to close gaps in the fulfillment of new interagency forensics
and attribution requirements. Funding will bridge a longstanding gap
between research and development activities geared toward technology
transition and NTNF operational capabilities.
The EO subprogram provides both the structure and processes to
ensure a comprehensive and integrated approach to all-hazards emergency
management across the Department. The EO program aims to improve
readiness and effectiveness of the DOE Emergency Management System and
the nuclear security enterprise response regardless of the nature or
location of the emergency. This unity of effort and culture of
continuous improvement helps safeguard the health and safety of workers
and the public, protect the environment, and enhance the resilience of
the Department and the Nation. EO coordinates plans and procedures for
prevention, protection, mitigation, response to, and recovery from, all
hazards emergency accidents, incidents, events, and to support
operational emergencies. In addition, the fiscal year 2024 budget
request supports Continuity of Operations, Continuity of Government,
and Enduring Constitutional Government programs to advance the National
Continuity Policy and ensure the continued performance and delivery of
essential lines of business and services under any circumstances.
Fiscal year 2024 funding provides for 24/7/365 Consolidated Emergency
Operations Center communications and coordination support to the DOE/
NNSA Emergency Management Enterprise, nuclear security enterprise, and
Departmental senior leadership. The decrease in the budget request for
fiscal year 2024 is due to the completion of certain investments in the
consolidated emergency operations center's and alternate operations
centers' infrastructure and supporting communications equipment, and
classified communications systems improvements in fiscal year 2023.
naval reactors appropriation
With 79 ships, or more than 40 percent of the Navy's major
combatants1A\2\, relying on nuclear propulsion technology, maintaining
a qualitative edge in this area remains critical to our national
security posture. Providing the Nation's submarines and aircraft
carriers with unparalleled mobility, flexibility, responsiveness, and
endurance is vital in today's complex geopolitical environment. The
ability to maintain robust fleet capabilities on long-term missions is
essential for the security of global trade and our allies. The Office
of Naval Reactors remains the foundation of this national achievement
in global security. Continuous progress in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program gives the U.S. Navy a decisive edge in naval warfare and
enhances the security and reliability of the sea-based leg of our
nuclear triad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Major combatants, in this instance, include aircraft carriers,
submarines, and surface combatants based on the ``Active in
Commission'' column from the Naval Vessel Register
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The fiscal year 2024 budget request for Naval Reactors is $1.96
billion, a decrease of $117.3 million, or 5.6 percent, below the fiscal
year 2023 enacted level. This decrease reflects the revised funding
profile for the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project that was
recently re-baselined, and near-complete refueling and overhaul of the
S8G Prototype land-based reactor in New York. The budget request
supports the continued safe and reliable operation of the nuclear-
powered fleet and provides for the continued maintenance, oversight,
and operations at the four Naval Nuclear Laboratory sites and the
associated contractor workforce. Funding also supports requirements for
the office's major initiatives: Columbia-class ballistic missile
submarine reactor systems development; development of the next
generation SSN(X) attack submarine; and continued progress on base
technology development, infrastructure recapitalization at program
sites, and decontamination and decommissioning efforts.
Consistent, sustained funding is vital for the support of these
efforts and will allow Naval Reactors to meet current and future force
needs; this foundational support of Naval Reactors is critical to our
ability to deliver on AUKUS. The Columbia-class lead ship remains under
construction and the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project at
the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho is ongoing. Additionally, work is
underway to invigorate long lead-time technology development for the
current and future nuclear fleet while supporting specific requirements
to meet the Navy's timeline for the next-generation attack submarine
ship authorization.
federal salaries and expenses appropriation
The fiscal year 2024 budget request for Federal Salaries and
Expenses (FSE) is $539 million, an increase of $64 million, or 13.5
percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. Part of the increase
is driven by the one-time use of carryover balances in fiscal year
2023. The increase in this account will support an additional 90
Federal Full-time Equivalents (FTE) for a total of 2,006. FSE
appropriations will also support pay and benefit escalation, travel
costs, support service contractors, training, space and occupancy
expenses, the working capital fund, and other related expenses.
NNSA's workforce represents the backbone of the Nation's nuclear
security enterprise. The fiscal year 2024 request supports staffing
levels sufficient to provide oversight and leadership for our growing
mission requirements in the modernization, recapitalization,
nonproliferation, and counterterrorism programs. NNSA seeks to recruit
and retain top talent in a wide array of fields including science,
engineering, crafts and trade, business, foreign affairs and social
sciences, and project and program management. This workforce is
distributed across the nuclear security enterprise and can be found in
eight states and Washington, DC.
NNSA continues to face significant demographic and competition-
based challenges to its recruitment and retention strategy. As of
fiscal year 2023, 18.7 percent of NNSA FTE Federal staff are eligible
to retire, a number that is expected to rise to 34.3 percent by fiscal
year 2028. While attrition rates are today lower than the above-average
rates in fiscal year 2021, high overall attrition remains a concern.
NNSA must also compete for top-tier talent with private sector
companies. Many of the skills needed for NNSA to meet expanded and
future mission requirements are also in high demand for both
established and emerging industries, all of whom are drawing from a
limited applicant pool.
NNSA must continue achieving modest increases in the size of the
Federal workforce required to manage the Nation's national nuclear
security programs. Using innovative recruiting techniques, coupled with
available excepted service and direct hiring authorities, NNSA's
recruitment team will focus on outreach and recruitment for mission
critical occupations. We will continue agency-sponsored career fairs
and other events targeted toward college students, military personnel
and spouses, as well as persons with disabilities. Additionally, NNSA
continues to expand use of programs with engaged and dedicated entry-
level talent, including the Presidential Management Fellows Program,
Pathways Intern Program, Operation Warfighter Program, Minority
Servicing Partnership program, and the NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program
among others.
NNSA's hiring efforts will support mission and growth requirements
with an overall goal of reaching 2,130 FTEs by fiscal year 2027. These
goals will also support the Administration's objective of promoting
diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility across the Federal
Government as a means of fostering new technological advancements,
cultivating the next generation of researchers to maintain America's
role as a leader in scientific excellence, and enhancing national
security.
conclusion
NNSA's enduring responsibility is to provide the United States with
a nuclear weapons stockpile and naval nuclear propulsion systems
capable of providing a credible and effective deterrent while
simultaneously executing nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs
aimed at reducing global nuclear risk. In an increasingly complex
international environment where the existential threats of both nuclear
war and climate change loom larger than ever, these efforts are vital
to protecting and promoting American and global security.
As the only U.S. Government organization capable of designing,
manufacturing, and delivering nuclear weapons, NNSA has a unique
responsibility to protect our Nation and our allies. The fiscal year
2024 budget request recognizes the urgency with which NNSA must execute
its present mission needs while simultaneously preparing the nuclear
security enterprise to handle future missions in a less stable
geopolitical climate. It provides funding for the five concurrent life
extension and modernization programs supporting all three legs of the
nuclear triad, as well as two phase one studies. It also continues
significant investments in revitalized or new production facilities for
plutonium pits, secondaries, and other critical nuclear and non-nuclear
components. The budget request has made priority decisions on
construction projects recognizing that worker shortages and supply
chain issues that confound progress will not improve if more projects
are underway in the enterprise simultaneously. The request supports the
manufacturing base of the future by advancing the incorporation of
scientific and technological breakthroughs during our revitalization.
NNSA will continue to provide a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile
without resuming nuclear explosive testing by advancing our scientific
tools and understanding. We will be innovative and responsive to
recruit and retain the brightest, most diverse scientific and
engineering minds of the next generation.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request reflects the
ongoing need to minimize and secure nuclear and radiological materials
to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands and pairing it with
policies and cooperation in an international community that is rapidly
embracing nuclear energy and technology. The DNN portfolio recognizes a
world where risks are more diffuse and new innovations in arms control
verification and international cooperation are both necessary to
maintain security and more challenging to realize. The increased budget
for the counterterrorism and counterproliferation program is similarly
attuned to the changing threat environment and supports the nuclear
aspects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Finally, the growth in NNSA's
bioassurance program recognizes a future where these threats must also
be managed while allowing the full benefit of new technology.
The Naval Reactors budget request recognizes and supports the
incredible partnership between NNSA and the U.S. Navy in consistently
supporting the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad through
infrastructure recapitalization, a new spent fuel handling facility,
ongoing work to deliver the Columbia-class propulsion system on time
for deployment, and investment in the nuclear propulsion for SSN(X).
Not since the Manhattan Project has there been a more challenging
moment for NNSA. We face an urgent, expanded mission at a time when
labor is limited, supply chain disruptions abound, and inflation rates
are higher than planned. Successfully meeting our objectives requires
consistent investment and clear-eyed prioritization. We appreciate your
support for our fiscal year 2024 budget.
Senator King. Thank you, sir. General.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMAS A. BUSSIERE, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
General Bussiere. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
and distinguished Committee Members, I am honored to be here
today to represent the men and women of Air Force Global Strike
Command and provide you an update on our mission, our airmen,
our modernization programs, and the challenges we face in
sustaining our legacy weapons systems.
As you all know, the world is a very different place than
it was in 2009 when this command was activated. Air Force
Global Strike Command was created to ensure the Air Force
dedicated the appropriate leadership and oversight of our
Nation's nuclear mission.
As the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, I
intend to make sure no one forgets why this command exists. For
the first time in history, the U.S. faces two major nuclear
strategic competitors.
China continues to expand, modernize, and diversify their
nuclear forces, and is the foremost country positioned to
reshape its region and the international order to comply with
its authoritarian purposes.
Meanwhile, President Putin has engaged in reckless rhetoric
about the use of nuclear weapons as Russia persists in their
unprovoked attacks on Ukraine in an attempt to expand their
power and influence. Air Force Global Strike Command remains
the bedrock of our Nation's defense and the international
insurance against these threats.
I would like to thank the Members of this Committee for
your steadfast support as we continue to modernize our weapons
systems. I will briefly highlight some of our ongoing
initiatives. We continue to maintain and operate our current
minimum three ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], and
we are already preparing our wings in their surrounding
communities to receive the future ICBM, the Sentinel.
Additionally, our bomber fleet, including the B-1s and our
dual capable B-2s and B-52s, are being sustained with
innovative solutions as we prepare for the future bomber fleet,
including the B-21 Raider and the B-52 Juliet. In addition to
ICBM and bombers, we continue our efforts to modernize our
nuclear command and control communications, or NC3.
NC3 is integral to the national military command system
used to exercise and conduct continuous survivable and secure
nuclear command and control. To maintain the security of our
Nation and our allies and partners, the U.S. must ensure our
weapons are capable and ready.
Our airmen are empowered and equipped. The airmen of Air
Force Global Strike Command fulfill our mission with
discipline, excellence, and pride. However, a number of our
airmen also face personal challenges, including health
concerns, housing and childcare availability, and we are
working tirelessly to develop prompt and comprehensive
solutions to ensure our airmen are getting the care and support
they deserve.
Last December, I was honored to be confirmed by you to be
the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. There is no
other place I would rather be. Strategic deterrence and long-
range strike are foundational to our Nation's defense, and Air
Force Global Strike Command is the backbone of these mission
sets.
With our legacy platforms, our modernized forces, and our
devoted airmen, we safeguard our Nation now and, in the
decades, to come. Thank you for this opportunity. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Thomas A. Bussiere
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Thomas A. Bussiere
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
and discuss the readiness, sustainment, and modernization of our
nuclear and long-range strike weapons and platforms. The mission of Air
Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) is to provide strategic deterrence
and long-range strike. This command is the lead for sustaining current
forces and fielding future long-range strike weapon systems. The demand
signal for these capabilities is unlimited; they are the foundation to
an independent Air Force (AF), and the backbone of our National Defense
Strategy.
The threat to international stability continues to grow,
highlighting the importance of both strategic deterrence and long-range
strike. The global risks have escalated to a tipping point. We are in
the novel territory of great power competition; thus we must be able to
credibly provide a nuclear deterrent against two nuclear adversaries
concurrently. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is in the midst of a
strategic breakout through a rapid nuclear expansion and continues to
develop new military capabilities. Additionally, Russia's full-scale
war against Ukraine continues alongside its efforts to develop anti-
satellite weapons, hypersonic technology, and cyberspace activities.
The aggressive and provocative behaviors occurring within the strategic
arena underscore the urgency of our efforts to modernize our weapon
systems while we maintain our strategic posture, and this
responsibility falls on AFGSC. This is a no fail mission.
AFGSC is ready today to meet the requirements given to us from the
President and the Commander of United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM), but there is zero operational margin left. Supply chains
responsible for legacy system parts are closing, and require innovation
to fill those gaps. Additionally, there are mission areas that I feel
have received less attention than other high value acquisition programs
but are equally critical to our strategic deterrence. I aim to
illuminate those mission areas and highlight the risks to our national
security if we do not provide them more focus. Unique to this mission
area and to AFGSC, we must maintain our legacy weapon systems at full
operational capability until the future force is ready to take on the
operational requirement. For example, the B-21 ``Raider'' is the
world's first sixth generation aircraft and will offer the United
States unparalleled capabilities, but until it is mission capable, we
must be postured to deter and, if necessary, fight with our current
force of B-1, B-2, and B-52 bomber aircraft. Nearly every portfolio in
AFGSC is going through modernization, and the balance of these
transitions is critical.
As the Commander of AFGSC, my priority is to ensure we are ready to
conduct our mission with great discipline, that we strive for
excellence, and our airmen take pride in our historic legacy. Our
``Strikers'' are proud to be the backstop of integrated deterrence and
the sole provider of air-delivered long-range conventional and nuclear
strike and land-based nuclear strike capabilities for our allies and
partners. Our personnel have remained focused in the face of a rapidly
changing geopolitical environment. As the Air Component to USSTRATCOM,
we continue to preserve our ability to execute nuclear options upon
direction from the President with safe, secure, credible, and reliable
weapons, while we concurrently ensure conventional, long-range strike
viability. What we do every day of every week is the foundation of our
Nation's defense. We are stewards of our Nation's most important
mission, which is an absolute privilege. Continued congressional
support through stable, reliable funding ensures our Strikers are
equipped with the necessary resources to ensure we compete effectively
and responsibly as our Nation moves into a new strategic era.
airmen and families
Our airmen and their families represent the greatest strength of
AFGSC. Through their service and sacrifice, they operate, maintain, and
secure the most powerful weapons ever designed and execute continuous
long-range strike operations across the globe. Such critical missions
require the complete focus and attention of our Strikers. To continue
the development of our airmen, AFGSC has established academic alliances
with education programs, encouraged Command sponsored research, and
continued to develop our personnel through internships and
participation in exercises. Retaining talent is also crucial to our
mission success and providing the right environment for families is a
large piece of an airman's decision to remain in the AF. We know there
are challenges to families outside the struggles of daily military
life. Our wings are working hard within their abilities to provide
solutions to healthcare challenges, housing shortages, and long
childcare waitlists.
AFGSC established a collaboration with Louisiana Tech University
through the Global Strike National Security Fellowship Program,
utilizing a small team of interns trained in coding, automation,
machine learning, and artificial intelligence to develop tailored
analytic tools for bomber operations. Moreover, AFGSC has championed
implementing the Envision cloud computing platform to produce
operational dashboards and provide data-driven insights for
decisionmakers across the nuclear enterprise. Finally, AFGSC has
institutionalized a Data Modernization and Analytics Board to create
data-centric, insight-driven organizations capable of achieving and
maintaining decision advantage. The board, comprised of subject matter
experts in technology, analysis, information systems, and data, advises
on technical and modernization efforts across the Command.
Our Strikers and their families are the key ingredient to our
command's success. Their exceptional resiliency and commitment to
excellence have enabled AFGSC to maximize our combat capacity and
strategic readiness. To maintain this level of success, we are actively
engaged in initiatives to recruit and retain a diverse and talented
group of future Striker leaders. However, in recent years, these
efforts have become increasingly difficult to sustain as we encounter
challenges to provide for the needs of our airmen and families. These
challenges are not unique to AFGSC, but many of our rurally located
installations and their unique nuclear mission sets have amplified the
impact of many of these challenges.
AFGSC has taken an active role in addressing the concerns about a
potential correlation between missile field service and elevated health
risks. We are responding with both urgency and transparency to compile
comprehensive data to understand the risk to our airmen and their
families. Our command team is working with the USAF School of Aerospace
Medicine to ensure a thorough study is conducted covering a variety of
geographic locations, AF Specialties, and work environments. In
coordination with Headquarters Air Force (HAF) and the Defense Health
Agency (DHA), we will ensure this study addresses the concerns of and
appropriately communicates the progress to our airmen, families,
retirees, congressional members, and the American people.
Across the command, but especially pronounced within our more rural
communities, AFGSC installations are combatting housing concerns for
inventory, adequacy, and affordability. This challenge is most
intensified at installations with significant military construction
(MILCON) efforts that are preparing for an increased amount of
personnel such as Ellsworth Air Force Base (AFB), South Dakota. Over
the last several years, the Rapid City region and surrounding areas
have experienced a surge in housing demand which far outpaces current
availability.
AFGSC is also experiencing childcare needs beyond the capacity of
our Child Development Centers (CDC). Hiring challenges are the primary
driver of the current shortfalls at installation CDCs. Additionally,
there are limited options within the local community, which are often
cost-prohibitive for military families. However, various wings are
implementing initiatives to combat these gaps. The Malmstrom AFB school
liaison officer championed a pilot ``Transitional-K'' program for
military children. This early childhood development program within the
on-base CDC intends to address childcare issues and enhance academic
performance. The pilot program includes 18 military families with
support from local high schools and the local university to help
children transition between pre-K and a kindergarten educational
environment. Additionally, this program helps offset childcare needs
and allows military families access to early childhood development
resources. Minot AFB has also taken several steps to enhance the
quality of life concerning childcare. They have reduced onboarding
timelines from 60 to 30 days. Additional advocacy has resulted in the
base CDC receiving top priority from AF Installation and Mission
Support Center to plan, design, and construct two additional classrooms
and renovate an existing classroom into two separate rooms; this
initiative will enable the care of 30 more children. Furthermore, Minot
AFB has implemented a $5,000 hiring incentive for an 18-month
commitment as part of recruiting and retention initiatives. The
installation's Childcare Working Group examines all avenues to expand
available, quality childcare.
operations
The 20th Air Force (20AF) continues to operate, maintain, and
defend the Minuteman III (MMIII) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM) weapon system and meet all USSTRATCOM operational requirements.
The last 3 years showed the resiliency and ingenuity of our airmen as
they faced the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic while still
operating, maintaining, and defending our land-based strategic
deterrent at the highest readiness levels seen across the entire
Department of Defense. The lessons and adaptations to mission
accomplishment will play a vital role in the force development
structure employed in the future. Additionally, we continue to provide
critical sustainment programs to maintain our MMIII's lethality through
the end of life, and our forces remain ready to transition to on-time
fielding of Sentinel, our new Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD).
Our nuclear security teams remain ready and lethal to meet any
challenge. Additionally, 20AF is home to the AF's largest contingent of
Security Forces Airmen. As such, 20AF faces many challenges associated
with organizing, training, and equipping such a substantial force of
dedicated professionals. However, these airmen continue to thrive,
working within current constraints and capabilities to support the
USSTRATCOM operational plan requirements while gearing toward our
future and the fielding of the Sentinel system.
At Malmstrom AFB, the 40th Helicopter Squadron and the 341st
Missile Security Operations Squadron have joined forces in the
Integrated Alert/Operations Facility--having these on-demand response
entities housed under one roof streamlines operational functions and
training activities. As Security Forces begin to enter the operations
world, with many staffs now under the Ops Directorate, Security Forces'
officers are now integrating to new depths at the tactical level. By
living, eating, and operating together, these teams are becoming more
lethal and more responsive than ever before.
Since 2019, we have been working with the Pentagon as part of the
Federal Aviation Administration's Obstruction Evaluation process to
evaluate requests from energy developers consistent with title 10, U.S.
Code, section 183a. In 2021, after completing a substantial analysis
and a formal safety risk assessment, Global Strike determined that wind
turbines located within two nautical miles (NM) of an ICBM launch or
missile alert facility would unacceptably degrade national security and
threaten the safety of our pilots in the event of an emergency
response. One of the critical components of nuclear security for the MM
III ICBM weapon system is the ability to respond rapidly and with
sufficient force over a dispersed ICBM complex the size of the State of
South Carolina. The UH-1N and its replacement MH-139 provide the
airlift, surveillance, and overwatch capabilities to enable nuclear
security, day or night, and in all weather conditions. Wind turbines
over 200 feet in height create an unacceptable collision risk within
that critical airspace. AFGSC currently assesses that 46 ICBM launch
and missile alert facilities are severely encroached on by existing
wind turbines. AFGSC continues to work with energy developers through
the processes established in title 10, U.S. Code, section 183a to
reduce the number of existing turbines and develop alternate locations
to avoid any additional turbines within 2NM. In addition, our Sentinel
team and the missile wings continue to engage with and educate
landowners and other key stakeholders on AFGSC's vital ICBM mission and
the risks created by wind turbines within 2NM.
AFGSC has experienced several mission successes within 20AF,
including the ICBM Cryptographic Upgrade II, which will reach initial
operating capability by mid-2023. Although fielding this capability has
faced a few delays, its implementation allows for remote ICBM
cryptography changes, has already saved hundreds of labor-hours, and
increases nuclear surety and security. Additionally, the Tactical
Response Force/Helicopter integration working group was initiated in
late 2021 and continues to meet the full spectrum of nuclear security
challenges successfully. Last, we continue to engage with partners and
develop plans for cooperation on training and knowledge exchange as we
begin employing the MH-139A, Grey Wolf helicopter.
Looking forward, we have completed 65 percent construction of the
first Weapons Generation Facility at F.E. Warren, Air Force Base (AFB),
Wyoming. This facility is an ultra-secure combined nuclear maintenance
and storage facility. We will continue using the lessons learned from
F.E. Warren to gain efficiencies at future Weapons Generation Facility
constructionsites. In addition, we deployed the first high-speed data
backbone command and control unit at our first ICBM wing. Three hundred
personnel trained and equipped 72 vehicle systems, created 12 tech ops
centers and erected 40 towers which provide the missile field complex a
$94 million high-speed, self-healing communication system.
AFGSC continues to encourage our Wings and personnel to innovate to
execute the mission better. New ICBM security response procedures will
allow security experts to lead security response in the missile
complex. As part of Sentinel, each missile wing will receive a new on-
base Launch Facility Trainer specifically for security forces' use--
including active alarm systems and cameras. AFGSC has also coordinated
a lease with Camp Guernsey, Wyoming, to provide 24/7 unimpeded access
to 6 small arms ranges enabling distance shooting up to 500 meters. The
new $23 million indoor small arms range complex at Minot AFB, North
Dakota, is complete and FOC. Malmstrom AFB, Montana, has three
operational small arms ranges and uses nearby Fort Harrison, Montana,
for long-distance small arms firing. Last, as the new Payload
Transporter (PT) completes fielding, we anticipate de-certified PTs
will be available for SF training.
The MMIII ICBM remains viable as the ground leg of our nuclear
triad. However, the 50-year weapon system and accompanying
infrastructure will face significant challenges as it nears end-of-
life, with the major factors being parts obsolescence and diminishing
manufacturing sources. Over 150 ICBM launch vehicles and operational
ground equipment components require risk mitigation to remain
operationally viable until their end-of-life. The missile wings have
logged over 2.4 million maintenance hours over the last 5 years, which
is a 30 percent increase over the previous 5 years. However, our
installations still carry a maintenance backlog of 21,000 work orders,
and models predict a 25 percent increase over the next Future Year
Defense Program (FYDP). Additionally, our weapon system sustainment
execution budget has grown over 17 percent within the last 5 years.
MMIII sustainment acquisition programs such as Launch Control Center
Block Upgrade, Automatic Switching Unit replacement, and Payload
Transporter Replacement are critical in maintaining capability.
However, the fundamental mitigation action for MMIII to avoid exceeding
its operational viability is the fielding of our next generation weapon
system program, Sentinel.
Sentinel, the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), will
modernize or replace MMIII flight systems, weapon system command and
control, and launch systems, including missile silos, control centers,
and other ground infrastructure. The program is in its third year of a
7-year development effort. Sentinel faces the same challenges that many
major defense acquisition programs are facing. Macroeconomic factors,
manpower challenges, and inflationary effects pose significant
challenges; nevertheless, the Sentinel program's top priority is
keeping Sentinel on a path to meet the warfighters' need. The
Department of the Air Force (DAF) is currently identifying acquisition
levers to capitalize on opportunities to keep this projected IOC date.
Like other systems within the Command, the Sentinel program will
require stable funding and a whole-of-government approach to ensure
prompt delivery and avoid critical shortfalls in our Nation's defense.
The MH-139A program accepted the first four MH-139s in August 2022.
Developmental Test has started at Duke Field at Eglin AFB, Florida, and
AFGSC expects Initial Operating Capability at Malmstrom AFB in Fiscal
Year 2025. Milestone C was approved early March 2023 and starts entry
into Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP). LRIP will consist of three
lots of two to 16 aircraft each, with the first lot delivering 13
aircraft. The UH-1N s quickly facing obsolescence challenges one would
expect of a weapons system of over 50 years. The MH-139 is the answer
to ensure safe, reliable security response to our missile fields
spreads.
Eighth Air Force (8AF) operates and maintains the only long-range
strategic bombers across all combatant commands and between our allies
and partners. AFGSC bombers continue to meet mission requirements
despite being below our readiness target goals for spare parts due to
parts obsolescence. Aircraft availability has decreased and downtime
for maintenance has increased, and this has added challenges and
focuses the importance of sustaining the current fleet while staying on
time with modernization. Despite the safety stand down, the B-2 is
ready for any national taskings. It is the only penetrating bomber and
must maintain full operational capacity, until replaced by the B-21
Raider. The crew force continues to find ways to maintain readiness
while maintainers utilize this time to repair aircraft discrepancies.
The safety investigation continues to progress as engineers, aircrew,
and maintenance subject matter experts look for a long-term engineering
solution to prevent future gear safety mishaps.
The B-52 continues to be the workhorse of long-range strike, but
also has its sustainment challenges. Parts obsolescence increases
aircraft down time and leads to higher cannibalization rates of parts
from other aircraft. This means to meet mission requirements, aircrews
are flying less training sorties. A lack of training sorties leads to a
lack of current aircrew to fly mission lines and an inability to absorb
the number of crews required. To combat availability issues, AFGSC is
pursuing a medium fidelity weapon system trainer to maintain aircrew
readiness and increase training quality. AFGSC has an obligation to
deliver solutions to our airmen if we continue to make them operate
this way. Proficiency and currency are part of the nuclear triad.
We will implement as directed the 4-Bin Force Generation Model and
the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept to achieve Commander,
USSTRATCOM and Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) objectives while
deterring our enemies and assuring our allies. The 4-Bin Model intends
to meet specific CSAF objectives, conform to the 2022 National Defense
Strategy, and move the AF to a more predictable and sustainable model
for our airmen. ACE exercises practice distributed operations from
dispersed locations to increase survivability while generating combat
power. We initially sent four B-52s to Fairchild AFB, Washington, to
execute the ACE mission. Each bomber transported a mobile maintenance
team and a Bomber Onboard Cargo System (BOCS) to practice the
capability of landing, rearming, and repairing the aircraft anywhere
that has enough runway. AFGSC has successfully deployed two B-52 ACE
operations to Alaska and Spain while taking maintenance personnel and
equipment using the Bomber Onboard Cargo System to remain agile and
lethal with a minimum logistical footprint and tanker requirement.
Additionally, B-1s completed a limited ACE deployment to Alaska with a
lean and agile maintenance footprint conducting combat training
missions out of Eielson AFB, Alaska. Other notable events include the
first B-52, C-17, and KC-46 large force exercise, demonstrating ACE to
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) with a KC-46 and B-52 in
formation, integrating AMC/CC and AFGSC/CC objectives.
As the Air Component to USSTRATCOM, AFGSC is leading the way in
accomplishing multiple site surveys of airfields and air bases
worldwide to determine their suitability to support bomber operations
in peacetime and during contingencies. In Fiscal Year 2022, AFGSC
surveyed 14 bases, eight countries, and three geographic combatant
commands with scheduled bomber task force missions to execute this
year.
AFGSC is committed to the requirements and funding stability on the
baseline acquisition program for the B-21 Raider. Since the program's
inception, the top-level key system attributes and performance
parameters have remained unchanged. Similarly, since the Engineering
and Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract was awarded in 2016, the
B-21 program has remained within its Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)
for both cost and schedule targets. The Fiscal Year 2024 President's
Budget includes funding to continue development and procurement funding
to continue the program's transition to low-rate initial production.
Therefore, the following significant milestones for the program are the
first flight and the start of low-rate initial production.
Aligned with the National Defense Strategy, the B-21 provides
survivable, long-range, penetrating strike capabilities to deter
aggression and strategic attack against the United States, its allies,
and partners. Six aircraft are in production. Test aircraft are being
built on the same production line, using the same tools, processes, and
technicians that will manufacture the production aircraft. The program
has completed loads calibration for the first test article that will
support first flight, has initiated full-scale static testing for the
second B-21 test article, and completed an integrated kill chain
demonstration using a Flying Test Bed. The recent public unveiling of
the B-21 on Dec 2, 2022, demonstrates our commitment to integrated
deterrence to the Nation, our allies, and our partners. The first
flight remains a key milestone, which will be an ``event-driven''
milestone that will, in turn, drive the flight test campaign for the B-
21.
Military construction at Ellsworth AFB is part of the critical path
to support the B-21 nuclear and conventional mission. In calendar year
2021, the Acting Secretary of the Air Force confirmed that Ellsworth
AFB would be the first B-21 Main Operating Base. Ellsworth has yet to
host a stealth, nuclear capable aircraft thus, requiring the necessary
facilities, infrastructure, and workforce to support the nuclear
mission and meet USSTRATCOM requirements. Funding for two military
construction projects, Phase Hangar and Fuel Systems Maintenance Dock
at Ellsworth AFB, have been requested in the Fiscal Year 2024
President's Budget to support aircraft arrival in the mid-2020's.
Additionally, the Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget includes
Planning and Design (P&D) funding for military construction (MILCON)
projects at Dyess AFB, TX, and Whiteman AFB, MO. Our MILCON projects
remain a crucial component to the execution of our bed-down activities
across all our AFGSC bases.
The design of the B-21 is an Open Systems Architecture that will
allow for rapid capability integration with minimal disruption to
production and aircraft availability, ensuring the weapon system will
keep pace with the highly contested threat environment. The recent
successful integration of a third-party sensor demonstration validates
these words are more than talking points and that the B-21 will provide
an enduring capability against present and emerging threats for our
Nation and our allies for decades. The Fiscal Year 2024 President's
Budget includes funding to begin modernization activities such as
nuclear certification, Long Range Standoff mission (LRSO) integration,
and other, more exquisite activities. Continued investments in new
capabilities like the B-21 ensure our Nation possesses cutting-edge
technology needed to maintain strategic deterrence and execute
effective operations across the globe. Furthermore, the Secretary of
the Air Force's operational imperatives, including the B-21 Long Range
Strike Family of-Systems, will further enable the B-21 to enhance
survivability, resiliency, and lethality while promoting
interoperability with the Joint Force.
The Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP) is critical to B-
52 viability through 2050. The AF Life Cycle Management Center's
Propulsion Directorate found the current B-52 TF-33 engines will be
unsustainable beyond 2030. As a result, USAF selected Rolls Royce as
the new engine supplier. The off-the-shelf variant of the F130 turbofan
will replace the obsolete TF-33. The program will be a net cost-saver
in place of continued TF-33 service life extensions, and AFGSC
anticipates an increase of 20 percent to the B-52's unrefueled range.
The program is transitioning from a Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA) to
a Major Capability Acquisition (MCA), with IOC occurring in Fiscal Year
2031.
The Radar Modernization Program (RMP) will integrate an off-the-
shelf radar system that will ensure the B-52's ability to employ
nuclear and conventional weapons in present and future fights. The
current B-52 radar is unsustainable and suffering from parts
obsolescence. The program will reduce maintenance repair times,
decrease operating costs, and provide for future growth capability. An
EMD contract award occurred in 3QFY21. We project IOC for Fiscal Year
2027 and FOC in Fiscal Year 2031.
The nuclear armed Long Range Standoff missile (LRSO) is an
Acquisition Category 1D Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) to
design, develop, produce and deploy a weapon system replacement for the
current nuclear armed Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). The LRSO
program completed its February 2023 Critical Design Review (CDR) on
time and remains on track for the scheduled IOC/Full Operational
Capability (FOC).
AFGSC continues to transition from a legacy to a modern Nuclear
Command, Control, and Communication (NC3) enterprise. The AF has begun
recapitalizing the aging E-4B with the Survivable Airborne Operations
Center (SAOC) program. The E-4B is a vital piece of the National
Military Command System, providing Nuclear Command and Control (NC2)
for the executive branch. AFGSC authored an AF-validated SAOC
Capabilities Development Document that gained Joint Requirement
Oversight Council validation in March 2022. The Department has
concluded its market research, finalized requirements, worked with key
stakeholders, including industry, to develop SAOC solicitation, and is
targeting a competitive contract award in CY2023. The AF continues to
refine the SAOC acquisition strategy, leveraging modernization
opportunities, open system architecture, and digital engineering to
reduce overall program costs. As a result, the SAOC will achieve FOC in
the early to mid-2030's.
NC3 is a program that fails to gain the notoriety of larger
acquisition programs. However, this is an important weapons system for
AFGSC and our national defense. Collectively, we need better
accountability and transparency of these systems and a clearer answer
to who oversees each system and the funding streams associated with the
programs. NC3 is a no-fail mission, and we aim to highlight its
importance as we continue striving to bring visibility to NC3. AFGSC
will work closely with USSTRATCOM, AF, Space Force, and industry
partners to generate the NC3 Next modernization plan.
We have several recent and upcoming ICBM command and control
modernization efforts for our Strategic Automated Command and Control
System, satellite communications, and very low-frequency radios. These
will ensure command and control capability for deployment of the new
Sentinel ICBM and the legacy MMIII ICBM fleet until it is retired.
AFGSC Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Directorate
partnered with the NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC) and other intelligence
organizations to produce the first-ever NC3 focused intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance Program of Analysis (POA). This effort
synchronizes NC3 intelligence requirements across the enterprise. In
addition, the POA provides a means to advocate within the wider
Intelligence Community to advocate for NC3 equities. It also provides a
way to assess the effectiveness of NC3-related collection and analysis.
AFGSC has successfully fielded 12 fixed Global Aircrew Strategic
Networking Terminal Systems at 18 main operating bases within the
continental United States at the close of CY22 and eight transportable
terminals to support the Mobile Nuclear Command and Control Mission to
execute USSTRATCOM's Nuclear Alert Mission. In Fiscal Year 2023, AFGSC
projects to release 42 additional terminals to 25 locations worldwide.
AFGSC maintenance and logistics aligns with the USSTRATCOM NEC and the
NC3 Program Office. Through this connection, we provide oversight on
NC3 weapon system status reporting to align operational units with the
Joint Global Strike Operations Center (J-GSOC) and the NEC reporting
requirements and timelines and routinely work with the Air Force
Nuclear Weapons Center's (AFNWC) Integrated Product Center to resolve
field-level sustainment concerns.
conclusion
AFGSC thanks Congress for your continual support to our mission.
The risks to our national security are becoming more apparent every
day. The PRC aims to surpass the United States in terms of global
influence and military might, while Russia continues to challenge
international norms increasing risk to strategic stability. AFGSC
understands the importance of sustaining our current fleet and will
continue to modernize at the speed of relevance. We are ready today to
meet the requirements given to us from the President and the Commander
of USSTRATCOM, but there is no operational margin left and we have a
plan to get where we need to go. Sustainment is the first piece of this
plan. AFGSC is not afforded the same luxury as other commands when
onboarding new systems. We must maintain full operational capability to
meet our national security requirements, while fielding new weapon
systems. These legacy systems still require stable funding until they
can be completely divested. Modernization is the second piece. We
cannot slow down and AFGSC is building the architecture to meet current
and future requirements. Nearly every portfolio is being modernized
from new sixth generation aircraft, to better vehicles for our security
forces in the missile fields. Last, our airmen and families are the
foundational component that make sustainment, modernization, and
deterrence possible. AFGSC and the Nation have an obligation to help
meet the challenges facing our airmen. We owe our airmen answers to
their health concerns, access to the required medical attention,
adequate childcare, and opportunities for education and growth for both
the member and their family. If we take care of them, they will take
care of the mission. Strategic deterrence and long-range strike are
foundational to our Nation's defense, and AFGSC is the backbone of
those
mission sets. Our success in this enterprise to field and sustain these
capabilities for our Nation requires coordination from Congress and the
continued support you provide.
Senator King. Thank you, General. Admiral Wolfe.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN, DIRECTOR,
NAVY STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS
Vice Admiral Wolfe. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify on the Department of the Navy's
budget priorities for nuclear forces.
I would like to thank the Subcommittee for its continued
support of the Navy's nuclear deterrence mission. The mission
of my command, Strategic Assistance Programs, is to provide
credible and affordable strategic solutions to our warfighter.
To quote from the administration's 2022 Nuclear Posture
Review, I quote, ``in a dynamic security environment, a safe,
effective nuclear deterrent is foundational to broader U.S.
defense strategy and the extended deterrence commitments we
have made to allies and partners.'' For nearly 7 decades, the
Navy has provided unwavering support to the sea-based leg of
the nuclear triad.
This coming year we will build on this remarkable history.
Later this year, the Navy will conduct the final demonstration
and shakedown operation for an Ohio-class ballistic missile
submarine. Alongside our partners in the United Kingdom, we
will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Polaris Sales
Agreement.
In coordination with our colleagues at NNSA, we will
continue to ensure the W93/Mk7 program remains on schedule. As
this work shows, we must continue to sustain today's deterrent
while modernizing for the future.
The Navy continues to manage the nuclear strategic weapons
system across three main mission priorities. First, sustaining
the weapon system D5LE through Ohio end of life. Second
developing the strategic weapon system in the future, D5 Life
Extension II for the Columbia-class, and third, safeguarding
our special relationship with the United Kingdom, embodied in
the Polaris Sales Agreement. First and foremost, we must
maintain the current D5LE missile inventory and provide the
necessary operational support to sustain Ohio-class submarines
through their end of life in the early 2040's.
All of our life extension programs remain on track, and our
current program will support the deployment of all existing
warheads. We must also recapitalize our supporting Navy nuclear
deterrence mission infrastructure to support and sustain
nuclear weapons and SSBN operations that enable sea based
strategic deterrence.
Second, along with PEO SSBN, we must continue to transition
between Ohio-class and Columbia-class submarines and make sure
they stay on schedule. For PEO SSBN, this means delivering the
largest, most capable, and most advanced submarine ever
produced by our Nation, representing a generational
recapitalization of the SSBN force.
For my command, this requires a seamless transition of the
current Trident II D5LE weapon system and missile inventory
onto the new Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine. We
have already started the work on the next variant of Trident
D5LE II and its corresponding weapon system. D5LE II will be
necessary to out load the Columbia-class SSBN, starting with
the 9th hull, ensuring that Trident remains credible until at
least 2084.
Finally, one of the greatest advantages the United States
has is its alliances and partnerships. For decades, United
States policy has recognized the contribution of an independent
British nuclear deterrent and how it adds to NATO and global
security, and SSP [Strategic Systems Program] will continue to
support this most important relationship.
Execution of these three mission priorities is only
possible through investment in our people, our infrastructure,
and our industrial base. Nuclear modernization will take time,
so sustained resourcing and enterprise effort is absolutely
essential. We can no longer put off recapitalizing our nuclear
triad.
Our adversaries are not idle. Russia's and China's nuclear
arsenal is our Nation's biggest existential threat. It is only
through your continued support that the Department's top
modernization priorities can be achieved and the Navy can
deliver a reliable, sea based strategic deterrent capability.
As the 14th Director, it is my highest honor to represent
the men and women of SSP. My personal number one priority is to
ensure that they are poised to execute the mission with the
same level of success, passion, and rigor that has
characterized our workforce since our program was founded in
1955.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of
the dedicated Americans that make deterrence of major power
conflict their life's work. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the
sustainment and recapitalization of the sea-based leg of the nuclear
triad. It is an honor to represent the Navy's Strategic Systems
Programs (SSP) and the contributions the Navy provides to our national
and global security through Sea Based Strategic Deterrence (SBSD).
I should start by noting that the priorities and lines of effort
that I am here to describe today are all in service of the 2022
National Defense Strategy (NDS), which--as the Secretary often says--is
our north star.
The Mission Priorities of SSP, in support of the NDS, are to:
1. Sustain the Trident II D5 (D5) and Trident II Life Extension
(D5LE) Strategic Weapons System (SWS) and ensure Nuclear Weapons Surety
on the Ohio-class SSBN and in supporting shore facilities through 2042
while providing Naval Nuclear Weapons Program Technical Authority for
Nuclear Weapon (NW) systems and Regulatory Oversight of the Navy
Nuclear Deterrence Mission (NNDM). SSP will re-host and sustain the
D5LE SWS onto the initial Columbia and United Kingdom (UK) Dreadnought
SSBNs.
2. Develop the Columbia and UK Dreadnought SWS and advanced weapon
capabilities in the Trident II D5LE2 missile and W93/Mk7 warhead and
reentry body assembly. Simultaneously, SSP will develop and deliver the
U.S. Navy's non-nuclear, Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missile
capability to fill a critical gap in our full spectrum of deterrence.
The two nations are working separate but parallel warhead programs with
collaboration between the two.
3. Safeguard the special relationship between the U.S. and UK
through the Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA), as amended, and Mutual
Defense Agreement (MDA), as amended, benefiting both nations and
supporting the UK's Continuous At Sea Deterrence (CASD).
SSP's core mission comprises two fundamental lines of effort: the
safety and security of our Nation's strategic assets entrusted to the
Navy; and the design, development, production, and sustainment of the
Navy's SWS. We strive to maintain a culture of excellence, underpinned
by rigorous self-assessment, to achieve the highest standards of
performance and integrity for personnel supporting the strategic
deterrent mission. We focus unremittingly on our tremendous
responsibility for the custody and accountability of our Nation's
nuclear assets. The men and women of SSP, our Sailors, our Marines, our
Navy Masters at Arms, our Coast Guardsmen, and our industry partners
remain dedicated to supporting the strategic deterrence mission; ready
to respond to the emerging needs of our warfighter, and to protect and
safeguard our Nation's assets with which we are entrusted. We certainly
could not do this without the support from this Committee.
state of the program
The Nation's nuclear triad consists of intercontinental ballistic
missiles, heavy bombers, and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). These
platforms and their associated weapons systems are essential to the
very foundation of our Nation's security and survival. The
Administration's recently released National Defense Strategy priorities
deterring strategic attacks against the United States, our allies, and
our partners, and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) affirms the
following roles for nuclear weapons: deter strategic attacks, assure
allies and partners, and achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails.
While the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure and effective, most
U.S. nuclear deterrent systems--including the SSBN fleet--are operating
beyond their original design life. Replacement programs are ongoing,
but there is little or no margin between the end of useful life of
existing programs and the fielding of their replacements. As noted by
the 2022 NPR, we need to fully fund the Columbia-class SSBN program to
deliver a minimum of 12 boats on time, as the Ohio-class SSBNs begin to
retire. We also need to continue to prioritize near term investments in
the submarine industrial base, Ohio-class sustainment and the second
life extension of the Trident II D5 SWS.
The U.S. Navy provides the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad
with the interdependent Ohio-class SSBNs and the Trident II D5 SWS. The
SSBN fleet is responsible for more than 70 percent of the Nation's
deployed nuclear warheads accountable as defined by the New START
Treaty. As the Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life of
Ohio-class SSBNs, addressing the viability of the SWS throughout the
life of the Columbia-class SSBNs remains a top priority. Columbia-class
SSBNs will ensure the effectiveness and availability of the Nation's
Sea Based Strategic Deterrent through the 2080's. The currently
deployed Trident II D5LE missiles will support initial load-outs on
Columbia, but modernization of the D5LE SWS, via D5LE2, is required to
support later Columbia-class missile inventory and seamlessly sustain
USSTRATCOM requirements. D5LE2 will ensure the SWS will be flexible and
adaptable in order to maintain demonstrated performance and
survivability despite the dynamic threat environment.
As the fourteenth Director, it is my highest honor to serve as the
program manager, technical authority, safety and security lead,
regulatory lead, and U.S. Project Officer under the Polaris Sales
Agreement (PSA), as amended, for the Naval Nuclear Weapons Program.
Most importantly, I am honored to represent the men and women of SSP,
comprising approximately 1,500 Sailors, 1,000 Marines, 300 Coast
Guardsmen, 1,400 civilians, and thousands of contractor personnel. It
is my most critical goal to ensure they are poised to execute the
mission with the same level of success, passion, and rigor both today
and tomorrow as they have since our program's inception in 1955.
sws sustainment on ohio-class ssbn and procurement for columbia-class
ssbn
The Ohio-class SSBN began a new phase of Sea Based Strategic
Deterrence (SBSD) when it started relieving the 41 for Freedom SSBNs in
the 1980's, initially employing the Trident I C4 Submarine Launched
Ballistic Missile and leveraging the nuclear warheads and missile
production infrastructure of the original Fleet Ballistic Missile
Program. As the U.S. sought to increase the range, accuracy,
reliability, and lethality of its Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
program, in 1988, USS Tennessee (SSBN734) dawned a new age of SBSD as
she ushered in the advanced Trident II D5 Strategic Weapons System in
the newly built Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base, specifically designed
to support this new weapon system. Over the following decade, as new
Ohio-class SSBNs were brought online (SSBN 735 through SSBN 743) with
the D5 missile system, the early Ohio-class SSBNs were also converted
from a C4 system to align with the rest of the D5 fleet. Originally
composed of 18 Ohio-class SSBNs, the SSBN fleet settled on a 14-ship
class carrying the Trident II D5 missile system executing SBSD, while
the first four Ohio-class SSBNs were converted to conventional guided
missile and special operations forces submarines (SSGN 726 through SSGN
729). The 14 ship Ohio-class SSBN fleet remains the backbone of U.S.
strategic deterrence, carrying approximately 70 percent of the United
States' treaty-accountable deployed nuclear warheads in the form of the
W76 and W88 families of warheads. Originally designed for a 30-year
service life, the Ohio-class submarines were called upon to extend this
service to 42 years, supporting a delay in investment in the next
generation of SSBNs. To account for this extension in service life, SSP
embarked on a life extension program for the D5 missiles to update
critical but aging missile electronics systems. SSP introduced the
Trident II D5 Life Extension (D5LE) program to the fleet in 2017 and
will continue through approximately 2025 to convert D5 missiles to D5LE
when they are pulled off the SSBNs during normal missile maintenance
times.
The final Ohio-class SSBN, USS Louisiana (SSBN 743), which recently
completed her mid-life Engineered Refueling Overhaul (ERO) will support
the sea-based strategic deterrent until her scheduled retirement in
2042. SSP must ensure the ``no fail'' SBSD mission is supported on the
Ohio-class through 2042, providing a reliable Trident II D5/D5LE
weapons systems with W76/W88 warheads until this final ship of the
class is decommissioned. In parallel, SSP's program efforts and
collaboration with the UK through the Polaris Sales Agreement and
Mutual Defense Agreement will support the UK's Continuous At Sea
Deterrence through Vanguard-class life and the transition to a
Dreadnought-class SSBN fleet.
To meet these critical program responsibilities, SSP will execute
Naval Nuclear Weapons Program Technical Authority for Nuclear Weapon
(NW) systems and Regulatory Oversight of the NNDM. Through programmatic
excellence in shipboard sustainment and modernization programs across
the SWS subsystems and in NW surety, and through diligent oversight of
the logistical supply chains, SSP not only will maintain a credible and
reliable weapons system, but will also continue unlocking new
capabilities the warfighter can leverage to enhance strategic
deterrence and act decisively should deterrence fail.
trident ii d5 life extension and life extension 2
The Trident II D5 SWS capability has been deployed on the Ohio-
class ballistic missile submarines for more than three decades and is
planned to be deployed more than 55 years. This demand to maintain
demonstrated high performance while extending the service life past
initial design requirements required a missile life extension effort,
D5LE. The current Trident D5 Life Extension (D5LE) remains an effective
and credible Strategic Weapon System on both the Ohio-class and
Columbia-class SSBNs into the 2040's, supporting the Ohio-class
submarine through end of service life and serving as the initial
Strategic Weapon System for the Columbia-class SSBNs.
As the Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life of our
Ohio-class SSBNs, we must address the viability of the SWS throughout
the life of the Columbia-class SSBNs. A minimum of 12 Columbia-class
SSBNs will replace today's 14 Ohio SSBNs and beginning in FY30, D5LE
missiles will support initial load-outs on Columbia (Hulls 1-8).
Production of additional D5LE missiles is not practical due to obsolete
parts and the lack of a robust industrial base. In order to meet
inventory requirements and maintain a credible strategic deterrent in
the face of evolving threats, a second life extension of the Trident II
Strategic Weapons System (D5LE2) is required to be designed,
engineered, produced and deployed by Columbia Hull #9's strategic
outload. It will be incorporated on all follow on Hulls as well as
Hulls 1-8 during their Extended Refit Period from fiscal year 2039 to
2049 to continue to meet USSTRATCOM requirements. D5LE2's architecture
will ensure the weapon system maintains demonstrated performance and
remains survivable while facing a dynamic threat environment driven by
two near peer competitors until Columbia end of life.
D5LE2 is a hy]brid of pull-through cost-effective technology (e.g.,
solid rocket motors, ignitors) and redesigned and updated components
(e.g., avionics, guidance, system architecture). D5LE2 is structured to
maintain today's unmatched reliability and demonstrated performance,
while unlocking untapped system potential to efficiently respond to
emerging needs and to maintain a credible Sea Based Strategic
Deterrent.
As directed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture review, SSP executed system
architecture studies in fiscal year 2020 to 2022 to evaluate solutions
to problems associated with emerging threats, supportability, and
adaptability required to address challenges in a dynamic threat
environment. Additionally, activities focused on missile and guidance
technology to determine the effective composition of redesign,
remanufacture, and pull-through of highly reliable components. Fiscal
year 2024 activities continue the refinement of systems studies and
critical Missile and Guidance Technology work while building up the
focused work on subsystem redesign and industrial base development
activities for the D5LE2 program.
Unlike SLBM programs of the past, D5LE2 does not have the benefit
of a healthy defense industrial base that comes from maintaining
production and continuous development. The 2022 NPR reiterated the need
for D5LE2 and stated that the United States will prioritize near-term
investments to ``ensure that D5LE2 is effective in the expected threat
environment and delivers on time.'' In short, full support of D5LE2
today is vital to achieving 2039 Initial Fleet Introduction and to
embarking on a path that maintains an SLBM deterrent capability through
the service life of the Columbia-class SSBN.
The Navy must also recapitalize our Strategic Weapons Facilities
and test locations to support the development and production of D5LE2
and to continue to support and sustain SSBN operations and weapons
activities that enable our continuous at-sea presence.
warhead and reentry body activities
The Navy is also working in partnership with the Department of
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to refurbish
our existing reentry systems and develop new reentry systems in
response to USSTRATCOM requirements. As the threat environment the
nuclear enterprise faces continues to evolve, it is critical that the
Navy designs, develops, and deploys programs that meet the needs of the
Warfighter. The TRIDENT II D5 missile is capable of carrying two types
of warhead families today, the W76 and the W88. The W93/Mk7 warhead and
reentry body system will be designed for use on both the D5LE and D5LE2
missiles and, the PSA and MDA, as amended, will support the United
Kingdom's sovereign Replacement Warhead program. In 2019, NNSA
completed the W76-1 Life Extension Program (W76-1/Mk4A), marking the
U.S. stockpile's first full-scale warhead refurbishment program. The
Navy continues to work on modernizing integrated aeroshells that house
these warheads through the Mk4B program with the inclusion of a Shape
Stable Nose Tip, which reduces reentry variability and improves
performance margins.
The W88/Mk5 warhead continues to undergo its refurbishment program
(ALT370) on a revised timeline based on capacitor component issues that
did not meet reliability requirements, a technical issue which has
since been resolved. The Navy and NNSA coordinated on tightly coupled
schedules for the fleet, the nuclear weapons complex, and production of
affected non-nuclear components to execute an 19-month delay to the
original schedule that was endorsed by the Nuclear Weapons Council
(NWC). This program reached the First Production Unit milestone on
schedule in 2021 and achieved Initial Operational Capability in January
2022. I am confident that our teams will continue to work together to
manage and deliver this program, as we have historically addressed
refurbishment challenges with a mission-focused attitude and rigor. The
Navy will continue to prioritize meeting our Warfighters' requirements
and minimizing disruption to the operational fleet to ensure that the
sea-based leg of the triad continues to fulfill its deterrence mission.
However, the setback this program faced is indicative of the pervasive
and overwhelming risk carried within the nuclear enterprise as
refurbishment programs face capacity, historic funding and schedule
challenges.
W93/Mk7 will provide flexibility and adaptability to meet future
warfighter needs. With the near simultaneous age out of the deployed
stockpile in the 2040's, the W93/Mk7 will help address production
concerns in the weapons complex and ensure an uninterrupted at-sea
deterrent for the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad. In 2021, the Navy
entered Phase 1 of the joint DOD-DOE Nuclear Weapons Lifecycle Process
with NNSA for the W93. This effort will address evolving ballistic
missile warhead modernization requirements; improve operational
effectiveness for USSTRATCOM; and mitigate technical, operational, and
programmatic risk in the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad while
simultaneously reinvigorating the atrophied industrial base and
modernizing a Cold War era stockpile. In FY22, the W93 program received
NWC authorization to proceed into Phase 2, Feasibility Study and Design
Options, which will further refine and mature the design of the W93/Mk7
program in a manner that provides an affordable, credible, safe, and
secure weapon to the Warfighter. Even with the addition of the W93/Mk7
to the stockpile, we will not increase the deployed stockpile. The Navy
will work in close coordination with the Department of Defense, NNSA,
the NWC, and the Congress as this effort matures, but we cannot
continue to life extend our leftover Cold War era weapons and systems
and successfully carry out our National Defense Strategy.
industrial base and infrastructure
The Nation requires a fully modernized nuclear force and supporting
infrastructure to execute our National Defense Strategy. Our
modernization needs cannot succeed without investing in the research
and development (R&D), critical skills, and facilities needed to
produce, sustain, and certify our nuclear systems. Ensuring robust
defense and aerospace industrial base capabilities--such as radiation-
hardened electronics, strategic inertial instrumentation, and solid
rocket motors--remains an important priority in conjunction with R&D
investment. SSP has placed particular emphasis on the solid rocket
motor industry and its sub-tier suppliers and appreciates the support
of the Congress to allow for the continuous production of these vital
components. Essential to the nuclear deterrent is a national aeroshell
production capability. The Navy has not delivered an integrated
aeroshell since the 1980's and needs to reinvigorate a production
capability that only resides in a small cadre of highly skilled experts
in an exceptionally niche industry. Aeroshell investment supports the
Navy but will also be cost-effectively leveraged by our colleagues in
the Air Force--and also our strategic partners in the United Kingdom as
they pursue their independent warhead program endeavors. Finally, R&D
investment is critical to today's nuclear modernization needs to ensure
that we advance necessary technology ahead of design needs and to train
our workforce during the early years of development. If the Nation does
not continue to address these concerns, no amount of money will be able
to adequately mitigate the risks associated with key stockpile and
infrastructure losses.
Regarding the program's infrastructure, existing facilities are
reaching their 30-year recapitalization windows as we enter into a
once-in-a-generation transition of both the weapons system and
platform. The Navy relies on a limited footprint to process missiles
and outfit the SSBNs. Maintaining and sustaining facilities is critical
to meeting USSTRATCOM and Fleet mission requirements. We will make
smart investments to address capability gaps, through-put constraints,
and build in surge capacity to address requirements presented by new
and emerging threats. The Administration has shown its commitment to
investment in our strategic infrastructure with the funding of multiple
MILCON projects in fiscal year 2024 that are required for the on-time
delivery of the D5LE2 SWS. We are re-establishing pad launch
capabilities on Florida's Space Coast over four decades after the final
Trident II D5 X-Flight in January 1989, as well as modernizing and
sustaining our Strategic Weapons Facilities that will produce and
deliver D5LE2 missiles to the Fleet. Our Nation and the Navy will
continue to prioritize and resource the sustainment and modernization
of its nuclear infrastructure enterprise to provide an effective and
flexible deterrent now and into the future.
As the Navy executes the modernization and replacement of the SSBN
and associated SLBM leg of the nuclear triad, DOD and NNSA's
infrastructure must be prepared to respond in tandem to the evolving
needs of the Nation. Of utmost importance, we must have an effective,
resilient, and responsive plutonium pit production capability. This
capability can address age-related risks, support planned
refurbishments, as well as prepare for future uncertainty.
Additionally, NNSA's tritium, lithium, uranium, and high explosives and
energetics, among other strategic materials, are vital to ensuring the
Navy can continue to meet its strategic deterrent requirements. Efforts
to sustain and modernize deterrent forces must continue. Our strategic
forces underpin every military operation around the world, and we
cannot afford to delay given the increasing threats facing our Nation.
workforce
History reminds us that the swift, successful creation and
execution of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program in the 1950's was
truly a result of national commitment, congressional support, and a
cadre of hand-selected scientists, engineers, and inspirational
leaders. Though process will always underpin our efforts, our dedicated
predecessors--civilians, military, and industry partners alike--
responded to the national need with focused determination and drove
this program with a vision. People are as fundamental to our nuclear
deterrent as the SWS itself. Today, SSP and its industry partners are
focused on inspiring, growing, and retaining a generation of workforce
that did not live through the darkest days of the Cold War. Connecting
a new workforce to this fundamental global security mission remains an
important task shared among the entire nuclear enterprise. A capable,
credible, and affordable strategic deterrent for our Nation for the
next 60 years requires not only technical, policy, management, and
financial acumen--it requires passion and a commitment to making this
our life's work.
SSP has made significant strides in recent years to honor our past,
innovate our present, and ensure our future workforce is connected to
the fundamental global security mission. In order to create the ideal
workforce and workplace, SSP developed the SSP Human Capital Operating
Plan (HCOP) in FY19. The HCOP is a 5-year plan aligning human capital
initiatives to SSP's strategic goals. SSP is now in the fifth year of
the HCOP execution and is realizing valuable change from these efforts.
The five goals and associated successes are outlined below.
Goal 1--Recruitment and Retention: create and implement effective
strategies to recruit and retain highly qualified candidates and
employees, internal and external, sufficient to ensure that SSP
fulfills its mission requirements. Accomplishments toward this end
include: developing a comprehensive Talent Pipeline strategy to
integrate Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics community
engagement, recruitment outreach, student internships, and entry-level
developmental programs; implementing the Compass Program to better
acclimate new employees to SSP's mission and culture; standardizing
SSP-enterprise Exit and Stay Interview processes; and integrating data
analytics across Human Resource (HR) functions;
Goal 2--Talent Development and Sustainment: support, develop, and
strengthen the workforce to continually evolve and successfully execute
the mission. Accomplishments toward this end include: developing
Science & Technology Subject Matter Expert (S&T SME) career tracks;
conducting a staffing study to assess current and future competencies
and capacities; implementing robust mentorship programs; establishing
the Career Development Counseling Program; and deploying the SSP
Academy and the Waypoints learning management system;
Goal 3--Leadership Development: strengthen enterprise leadership at
all levels through robust leadership development programs and clear
assignment and execution of authority, accountability, and
responsibility. Accomplishments toward this end include: Implementing
robust coaching programs for leaders and developmental employees;
delivering a Human Resources Management for Supervisors training; and
continuously promoting internal and external leadership development
programs.
Goal 4--Culture: clearly define and communicate SSP culture and
values. Reinforce and assess the organizational culture as necessary
for continuous improvement at every level. Accomplishments toward this
end include: expanding and improving employee recognition programs;
delivering on-going health and wellness activities; establishing a `We
Hear You' campaign to communicate SSP's responses to feedback; defining
SSP Culture and Values (Director's Intent); developing SSP Culture
Videos; and creating a Supervisory Corner, a centralized web-based hub
to equip supervisors with the resources, information, and tools
necessary to be an effective supervisor;
Goal 5--Diversity and Inclusion: create and implement effective
strategies to cultivate a diverse and inclusive work environment that
promotes employee engagement and the exchange of different ideas,
philosophies, and perspectives. Accomplishments toward this end
include: conducting barrier analysis; establishing Diversity and
Inclusion Council; increasing use of Individuals with Disabilities
Recruitment Program; and connecting a Leadership Learning Series with
Special Emphasis Programs.
Over the next several months, SSP will be preparing to release HCOP
FY24-FY28 with refined goals, measures of effectiveness, and other
programmatic enhancements.
polaris sales agreement: support to the uk
Fundamental to U.S. strategic and extended deterrence policies is
the special relationship between the U.S. and the UK through the 1963
Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA), as amended, and the 1958 Mutual Defense
Agreement (MDA), as amended. Under the PSA, the U.S. sells the Trident
II SWS to the UK along with associated defense services. Under the MDA,
the U.S. cooperates with the UK on the exchange of information and the
transfer of nuclear material and equipment for mutual defense purposes.
The two agreements are complementary, and together enable the U.S. Navy
to sell SWS delivery system and reentry body equipment to the UK, as
well as to exchange classified information, including Restricted Data
(RD) and Formerly Restricted Data (FRD), with the UK. This framework
has ensured the United States' ability to support the UK with
capabilities to ensure a robust nuclear deterrent. The Common Missile
Compartment (CMC) represents the most recent example of the PSA
partnership, in which the two nations are designing, developing, and
producing common shipboard infrastructure which improves the ease of
comingling the D5 missile inventory and sets the stage to improve
maintenance system consistency across the two fleets. SSP will support
PEO SSBN throughout the 2020's as they oversee U.S. industry delivery
of CMC components to both navies for installation into their new SSBNs.
As with Columbia, the Dreadnought-class SSBNs will initially carry the
D5LE missile. The development of the Mk7 reentry system to support the
U.S. W93 warhead program is also critical to the development of a next
generation nuclear warhead and reentry system for the UK. The two
nations are working separate but parallel warhead programs with
collaboration between the two.
Next month will mark sixty years since our two governments signed
the PSA. With sixty years behind us, SSP will continue to nurture and
safeguard this special relationship with the UK to sustain the SBSD and
support UK Continuous At Sea Deterrence (CASD) of today while
modernizing and building flexibility, adaptability, and resiliency into
SBSD 2084 and the UK's future CASD.
conclusion
Our Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent has been a critical
component of our national security since the 1950's and must continue
to assure our allies and partners and to deter potential adversaries
well into the future. SSP ensures a safe, secure, effective, flexible,
and tailorable strategic deterrent, with a steadfast focus on the
proper stewardship, custody, and accountability of the nuclear assets
entrusted to the Navy. Sustaining and modernizing the sea-based
strategic deterrent capability is a vital national security
requirement. I am privileged to represent this unique organization as
we work to serve the best interests of our great Nation. I thank the
committee for the opportunity to speak with you about the sea-based leg
of the nuclear triad and the vital role it plays in our national and
global security.
Senator King. I think your last statement is very important
in terms of the basic strategy of this country, which is
deterrence. The best way to prevent a war is to be sure that
adversaries know that they will pay an unacceptable price for
an attack on this country, and that is what has, in fact,
worked to deter--nuclear deterrence for over 70 years.
I think that is an important overall, overarching concept
of this hearing, and in fact, our entire military strategy.
Admiral Wolfe, we heard General Caldwell talk about a new or a
modified reactor.
Are you talking about modernization of the D5 missiles for
the new--for the Columbia-class? Is that a later development or
is that part of the current schedule?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. What we have requested, sir, as part of
SSP's strategy going forward in schedule to make sure that we
have what we call D5 Life Extension II. It is a new missile
that will replace aging assets that we have got in the current
system.
Senator King. Will that be ready when the first Columbia--?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. It will not be ready. The plan is for
Columbia, in order to reduce risk to the overall deterrent, the
decision was made because of where we are at with the Trident
weapons system.
We are ostensibly picking that system up and we are going
to install that onto the first eight platforms of the Columbia-
class. We have got the missile inventory. We have got the life
on the system to be able to do that.
In 2039 when we get to the 9th hull, we will have concerns
about aging electronics. We will have concerns about quantities
of missiles that we have because we flight test every year to
prove their reliability----
Senator King. I am assuming that the Columbia is going to
be designed on a modular basis so that as technology develops
you will be able to improve and add new technology without
rebuilding the whole platform.
Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. That is exactly right. So, we
already do that today on the shipboard systems. All of our
shipboard systems, we are able to modernize them and keep up
with technology of what industry is doing and others are doing.
Senator King. Let me followup with another question on the
Columbia. We have heard testimony in this Subcommittee and in
the larger Committee and all over Capitol Hill on workforce
problems.
We are talking about major workforce demands to do
Virginia, Columbia, and now AUKUS. Is it realistic that the
yards are going to be able to meet the schedules that we have
laid out for those programs, given the challenges of workforce
that we have--that we are experiencing everywhere?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. Sir, I think to your point, there is no
doubt we are going to continue to have challenges.
Those challenges are going to go well in the future. I
would tell you, I think that the strategy that the Navy has
taken with the things that we are doing for industrial base
investment, if you look at the request in President's Budget
2024, it is greater than $1 billion to invest in six key areas
of how we are going to get the industrial base revitalized, how
we are going to more rapidly train a workforce, a skilled
workforce that the Navy is going to need and the shipyards are
going to need.
In our program, we are also very concerned about that
workforce as well as we start to ramp up a number of missile
development programs, not just for what the Navy's doing, but
in parallel for what the Air Force is doing.
There are challenges everywhere. But we are working that
very diligently with the industrial base to make sure we keep
up with that demand.
Senator King. I think diligence is the right word. General,
you are going to be in charge of managing the Sentinel project,
one of the largest, as I mentioned, one of the largest projects
ever undertaken by the U.S. Government.
Are you satisfied with the progress--and this is an
unclassified setting. Are you satisfied with the progress that
is being made under that contract?
General Bussiere. Chairman King, so far, yes. It is
probably one of the most scrutinized and oversighted program in
the Department of Defense. Has the direct attention of
Honorable Plehn, Honorable Hunter, myself, obviously, the
Secretary and the Chief.
We do episodic and routine progress statuses with both
internal to the Defense Department as well as with the industry
partners. It will be one of the major work projects our Nation
has undertaken probably in the last 50 plus years.
So, it is not only just the aspects of building the new
weapons system itself, but the process of integrating that new
weapon system across the fabric of our Nation, while we
maintain full operational capability with our legacy Minuteman
III.
Senator King. I know you are aware that one of the great
challenges is NC3 also. The whole enterprise won't work if we
don't have invulnerable communication.
General Buss]iere. I couldn't agree more, Chairman King.
The underpinning of our deterrence is the ability to command
and control our forces.
Senator King. Thank you. Admiral Wolfe, one final point. I
am running out of time. But we have had testimony in the past
on the strategic importance of a sea launch cruise missile that
is nuclear tipped.
The Congress passed appropriations to support research, and
yet there is nothing for it in this budget that has just been
submitted. Can you give me your best military judgment about
whether the SLCM-N is a significant part of our strategic
deterrent?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. Sir, as I alluded to, the 2022 Nuclear
Posture Review, as they looked at the body of the requirements.
It was decided that the sea launch cruise missile was not going
to be part of the Nuclear Posture Review, not be part of a
supported system.
The 76-2, which we currently have, was stocked to fill that
gap. We are aware, though, and we will comply with the plus ups
that Congress has given us, $5 million in fiscal year 2022. We
are executing that for research and development.
The $25 million in fiscal year 2023, we have developed a
plan to continue to look at technologies, to look at what
infrastructure would be, to look at how we would integrate into
platforms as time goes forward.
Senator King. I think we have to take cognizance of the way
the world has changed since that Nuclear Posture Review was
prepared, particularly given Russia's continuous discussion of
the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
We don't want to be in a situation where our only response
is a massive one, which isn't credible given a lower level of
utilization. I hope that you will continue to review that
issue, and I know we are going to have further discussions in
this Subcommittee.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, I
appreciated our conversation yesterday about the significance
of developing new weapons based on proven designs, like the W-
93. Can you share with the rest of the Committee your
assessment of why this is important and necessary?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am. Certainly, as we look at
what the combatant commanders' requirements are, and to Senator
King's point, as we look at the changing environment that we
now face. We are faced with the challenge of making sure that
we have weapons--first of all, they have to be credible and
they have to be from our strategic competitors' eyes reliable
that they are going to work.
Which is why we talk about in partnership with NNSA, making
sure not only what they do with the explosive package, but what
we do with the system at large to make sure that if ever called
upon, it is going to work every single time. That is really the
essence of deterrence.
It is absolutely critical, as our systems start to age,
that we stay ahead of that and we never question the
reliability or the function of any of those weapons, which is
why modernization right now is so important for the entire
Department.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General, the Chairman touched
on NC3. It has become really common terminology within the
nuclear enterprise. With Sentinel's integration into our
nuclear architecture, can you describe any advances taking
place on items that you believe need congressional support?
General Bussiere. Specific to NC3, Senator Fischer? The
Sentinel weapon system will be fielded with probably the most
advanced communication systems that our Nation has developed.
It will take into account our new carrier pathways, for
example, fiber.
It will take advantage of our cybersecurity protocols. It
will be designed so that, like Admiral Wolfe illuminated, it
will be designed so that as technology is developed over the
years, it is not difficult to integrate that into the open
architecture of our NC2 systems.
Senator Fischer. Do you have any specifics on the
technologies that you have been briefed on that might be
emerging that you are looking ahead that Congress needs to know
about?
General Bussiere. I don't think we would require any
assistance of Congress now, but there may be some technologies
in the future that would require that.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Can you provide us with an update on
the SAOC program?
General Bussiere. So, the Survival Airborne Operations
Center, as everyone knows, is the replacement to our current E-
4B fleet, which is our airborne command and control platform.
It is a 747-200 platform now.
There are requests out to industry to come back with their
proposals and offerings for the SAOC program, and we are
optimistic we will see those in the next few weeks, if not
months.
Senator Fischer. Okay, and then for Admiral and General,
how are you both working with NNSA to ensure that the warheads
needed for Sentinel and for Trident missiles are delivered on
schedule?
Then I would like Dr. Adams to respond to that, to look at
how--what the possibilities are that we could accelerate the
delivery of those.
General Bussiere. Senator Fischer, specific to our
programs, whether it is the fielding of Sentinel or the
fielding of the LRSO [long range stand off] weapon system, we
work closely with NNSA. We work closely with the Nuke Weapons
Council, and the Department of Energy, Department of Defense
Forum that really has those oversight responsibilities.
We are integral into those discussions. We are confident
that the Sentinel will be fielded, as you know, with the W87-0.
So, we will be able to field that weapon system and then
transition in the future to the W87-1.
We are also confident in NNSA's estimates to get us the
required W80-4 for our current schedule for when we field the
RSO.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Admiral.
Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am. Much like General Bussiere
said, we work very closely within NNSA. We work at the Nuclear
Weapons Council. I would say for our systems, as Dr. Adams
alluded to, we have just come through the life extension for
W76/Mk4.
We are in the throes of having the deliveries for the W88
alteration that NNSA just completed, and those deliveries are
occurring. As we look to the future for the W93/Mk7, Dr. Adams
and I work very, very closely together.
We are in phase two right now to understand what the
options are and what options we want to carry forward, so that
as I get into the Navy work and the integration that has to
occur, and NNSA gets into the work they have to do, we are
absolutely in sync and aligned on schedules, and that we are
pushing each other to make sure that we stay true to those
schedules.
Senator Fischer. Dr. Adams, your comments?
Mr. Adams. Yes, those were the--[technical problems]--I am
sorry. Do I need to repeat that? Just it was a comment that
says that the two programs in production now, we have delivered
on schedule to both the Navy and the Air Force.
The next one up is the W80-4. We are holding very closely
to our scheduled first production unit of 2027. There is some
schedule risk. We are monitoring that very closely and putting
all hands-on deck to make sure we don't realize schedule risks.
Several components are difficult to manufacture and we are
working on that. We do remain closely aligned with the LRSO
program.
The LRSO delivery platform depends on us for hardware, for
their part of flight testing, and we depend on their flights
for our part of the flight testing. There are a lot of
environments that the LRSO is subject to because of a lot of
delivery platforms, a lot of aircraft, and we have to design
our warheads to make sure they can withstand those
environments.
The W87-1 is farther out. At this point, we talk in terms
of a schedule range. It is quite consistent with the Sentinel
schedule ranges that I have seen. We will be able to support
the deployed stockpile of that.
I am highly confident of that, and we are working hard to
make sure that we support the need for the hedge portion of
that as well. Details of that are classified. With the W93
farther out yet, as Admiral Wolfe said, we are in phase two,
but already--that is a tightly integrated program.
The Mk-7 is under development at the same time that the W93
warhead that will go in it is under development. Our teams work
incredibly closely together, and we have also begun working
very closely with the UK on their parallel program.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Senator King. Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman King, Ranking
Member Fischer, for holding this hearing. I would like to thank
you all for your service and for being here today. Before I
begin, I really want to start by offering my condolences to the
families of the U1a miners killed in a car accident last week
at the Nevada National Security Site, and to our entire NNSS
community.
They are a very tight knit group and I know how much this
is hurting all of them. I want to just give them my
condolences. I am going to move on and continue to talk about
Nevada National Security Site, build on some of the importance
of NNSA.
We have the NNSS and NNSA, all the NNs, but the audit of
the U1a complex and the enhancement projects. Dr. Adams, as you
and I have discussed, the Nevada National Security Site
oversees the Stockpile Stewardship Program, principally the U1a
facility.
It is an underground laboratory where scientists conduct
subcritical experiments to verify the safety and reliability of
our nuclear stockpile without explosive testing. U1a is
undergoing a major construction project that will soon host the
most capable weapons radiographic system in the world.
However, a November 2022 audit by the Department of
Energy's Inspector General found that the U1a Complex
Enhancements Project has faced unanticipated cost increases and
schedule overruns, which are going to threaten our stockpile
stewardship goals.
Dr. Adams, what actions has the NNSA taken to improve its
management of science and technology development projects that
are necessary to support the stockpiles through our stockpile
stewardship, and what management oversight changes are you
putting in place to avoid further cost and schedule changes in
the future?
Mr. Adams. Thank you for that question, Senator Rosen. We
agree with the recommendations made in that IG report, the
draft recommendations. We have taken corrective actions.
We had taken corrective actions prior to that audit and we
have been enhancing our management of these critical
activities. Like other construction projects around the country
and certainly within the NNSA portfolio, the construction
underground at U1a, those projects have suffered from the same
kind of supply chain problems, inflation, labor shortages, and
labor productivity being lower than expected.
Our response to that is manyfold. We have instituted, for
example, a lessons learned task force on UPF, which was one of
the first construction projects we saw kind of go off of the
anticipated cost and schedule a little less than a year ago,
that came to light. We are instituting recommendations based on
those studies.
A lot of those things, Administrator Hruby mentioned in the
first panel session. With regards to sort of the big picture of
how we are handling those things, given the causes for some of
these construction schedule problems and the costs that go
along with schedule extensions, our fiscal year 2024 budget
request reflects the prioritization that we have made to focus
our limited labor, supply, and dollars on a smaller number of
high priority projects to try to execute in parallel.
Those high priority projects include projects underground
U1a, the accelerator that you mentioned for the radiography
capability, the ASD Scorpius project. We have added money to
that in our request for fiscal year 2024. Similarly, what is
known as the ZEUS testbed is going to require some mining that
we didn't expect before and we have asked for the funding to
support that.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I have a short amount of time, so
General Bussiere, I am going to just ask you a little bit about
AFWERX. You have a location right here in Las Vegas--right
there in Las Vegas, designed to develop effective solutions to
the challenges facing the Air Force by establishing
partnerships with the private sector.
In a few short years, it has evolved into the innovation
engine of the Air Force. Is now part of the Air Force research
laboratories, and the Air Force Global Strike Command's
innovation hub STRIKEWERX is based on the AFWERX's model?
I just have a few seconds left, but I know that with cyber
innovation center, STRIKEWERX, we have saved the Air Force over
$248 million. It is nearly a fivefold return on the funding
that Congress originally appropriated to fund this agreement.
I didn't see any discussion of this in your fiscal year
2024 budget request, so what are your plans for expanding the
command's innovative efforts to take advantage of things like
STRIKEWERX?
General Bussiere. Senator Rosen, thanks for highlighting
the CIC and the innovation efforts of Global Strike Command. I
will briefly kind of give you an overview. We have several
different programs that highlight and give our airmen the
opportunity to use their most powerful tool, and that is their
ideas.
We have AFWERX at the Air Force level, as you are well
familiar with. We have STRIKEWERX, which was really a smaller
scale model of that entry port. We also have innovation cells
at all our installations. In addition to our airmen innovation
areas and cells, we also have started a partnership with the
help of Congress.
It is a commercial capabilities innovation team, which
basically does the same things with small business and
commercial entities in and around our business. It is sometimes
difficult to convince the system that an idea is worthy of a
program. But make no mistake, we invest and bring in our airmen
to get ideas.
We use the funding within our current top line and we use
our program. Whatever innovation that are saving money is, that
is where we would use the program dollars for. But I will take
for the record to go back and see what was submitted in 2024. I
don't have that in front of me and I will get back to you, if
that is acceptable.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Bussiere. Air Force Global Strike Command places
great importance on fostering innovation, including initiatives
like STRIKEWERX. However, the MAJCOM is currently leading major
nuclear modernization efforts across multiple platforms to
include Sentinel, B-21, SAOC, LRSO, MH-139, B-52 modernization
and several NC3 systems. Given the scope and magnitude of the
modernization efforts, as well as the need to sustain legacy
nuclear weapon systems through modernization, efforts such as
STRIKEWERX were deemed to be a lower priority.
However, recognizing the potential for advancements across
all AFGSC organizational units, we have taken a step by
establishing the Commercial Capabilities Integration and
Transition (CCIT) Division. Originally conceived as a
``Prototype'' organization within AFGSC, the CCIT aligned its
objectives with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force's vision of
effectively integrating and transitioning commercial
capabilities and technologies into the United States Air Force
(USAF). Under my direction, Major General Armagost provides the
day-to-day leadership and oversight of the CCIT. Together, we
have the goal of providing AFGSC (at all levels) access to the
best commercial capabilities and technologies available
throughout the Nation. Additionally, I envision AFGSC taking a
leading role within the USAF by proactively identifying,
expediting, and integrating the most cutting-edge commercial
solutions to tackle both USAF-wide and AFGSC-specific
challenges. Already, the CCIT has enhanced competition by
cultivating collaborative relationships with the private
technology sector, which will ensure continuous access to
state-of-the-art commercial technologies for the USAF.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate it. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
all of you for your service to our country. Admiral Wolfe, I
would like to begin with you. The--you mentioned the really
special anniversary coming up here, the 60th anniversary of our
agreement to Polaris sales of missiles to the United Kingdom.
As part of the Five Eyes group, they clearly are some of
our closest allies. But this particular agreement has continued
on through the years, and it really has been a way for us to
extend our capabilities. Can you talk a little bit about just
how critical it is that we continue that relationship with the
United Kingdom?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, Senator, thanks for that, because
I think you are absolutely spot on, our relationship with the
United Kingdom under the Polaris Sales Agreement. I am the
United States project officer as part of that Polaris Sales
Agreement, and what we provide to the United Kingdom is the
entire weapon system.
It is not just the missiles. As you look at where we are at
right now with the United Kingdom, they are modernizing their
entire SSBN force as well to include their replacement of their
Vanguard-class submarine, which would be the Dreadnought. We
work very closely with them, PEO SSBN.
We have a common missile compartments. Ostensibly, it looks
exactly the same as what the U.S. Columbia will have, and in so
doing, what that allows us to do is have--treat them like an
extra four SSBNs in my program.
I know the other panel talked about trust. I would tell you
that the trust that the UK has with us, and the system that we
provide, and the certifications that we give to them really
does provide an extension for the United States, it really
provides for NATO, and it really leads to global stability.
So, it is incredibly important that we continue to support
them in everything that they do as they modernize their entire
SSBN force. They have recently celebrated more than 50 years of
continuous at sea deterrence, which means one SSBN at sea 24
hours a day, 7 days a week for the last 50 plus years.
We have a big part in making sure that they continue that
record, and we are absolutely all in to do that.
Senator Rounds. That is one less that we have to have in
the water at the same time.
Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. I mean, it is all part of
that extended deterrence. Yes, sir.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Bussiere, the B-21
program is right now one of the shining stars out there with
regard to being on time, on budget, and one which the folks in
Rapid City, South Dakota, are really looking forward to having
it deployed there at Ellsworth Air Force Base.
I am just curious with regard to the implementation of its
nuclear capability as well that requires a weapons generation
facility which will be created there at Ellsworth. Can you
share a little bit about the timelines and so forth, and where
you are seeing the B-2, in this unclassified section, but at
least share a little bit about the development and the future
timelines that you can share with the public.
General Bussiere. Senator Rounds, as you know, the first
base for the B-21 raider will be Ellsworth Air Force Base.
Construction has already started on several different
facilities to support that sixth-generation low observable
platform, including adding a weapons generation facility to be
able to facilitate its dual docked mission.
I think the committee is also familiar that the Secretary
of Defense, I think 3 years ago, directed that the
certification of the B-21 Raider for conventional and nuclear
certification be closed. So, when we deliver that weapon system
to the wings, it will be capable of both missions.
Very happy with the way that program is going. Very happy
with both industry, as well as the Rapid Capabilities Office,
and obviously the Nation and the world got a sneak peek at that
in December when that weapon system was revealed.
Senator Rounds. Great, thank you, and I need to go back
just for a minute, Admiral Wolfe, with regard to the situation
we have got with trying to deploy the new submarines, as well
as keep the existing submarines operational. I go back to the
USS Boise as an example.
This is a Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine, attack
submarine, has now been in dry dock or prepared to be in dry
dock for its half-life basically, or close to 7 years now, if
my memory serves me right.
But it suggests the bigger problem that we have got in that
we are trying to not only maintain and configure the Ohio-
class, but also another Columbia-class. How are we going to
right now create the new submarines, maintain the existing
submarines, handle the half-lives for the attack submarines.
It seems to me that we just simply don't have enough
shipyard space and is there a priority for the Columbia-class
and the Ohio-class that is perhaps one of the reasons why the
Los Angeles-class submarines are sitting at dry dock.
Vice Admiral Wolfe. So, yes, sir, I would tell you that
from a Navy priority, Columbia-class as a new platform is the
priority. I would tell you that PEO SSBN and PEO SSN, both of
them frequently meet together to understand what needs to be
done to make sure Columbia stays a priority, to your point, so
that we have a replacement SSBN.
I would also tell you that the good news is, we are about
done with all of our--as I alluded to, we are going to do our
last demonstration and shakedown operation on our Ohio-class,
the USS Louisiana, and that will be the last of the Ohio-class
that goes through their mid-life refueling overhaul.
So those will be past us now. We will still have to do
normal maintenance and all the things that we do, but those big
availabilities are now going to be completed, and we will
continue to work through that capacity challenge as well.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. One thing we learned from Admiral Caldwell
was that the Columbia-class will never have to be refueled.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony, for your
service.
Thank you for joining us today and for giving us the
forthright answers to our questions. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:27 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
hanford tank waste treatment
1. Senator King. Mr. White, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) Report
and National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NAS) have
indicated that the Department of Energy (DOE) should proceed with
urgency the grouting and out of State disposal of mixed low-level waste
(MLLW) from Hanford tanks to save money and to accelerate the cleanup
schedule at Hanford in parallel with the direct-feed low-activity waste
(DFLAW) program. Can you please explain why DOE has not requested any
funds to pursue these recommendations for fiscal year 2024?
Mr. White. The Department agrees that this is a priority and DOE is
working expeditiously to complete these activities. DOE did not request
funds in fiscal year 2024 to pursue these recommendations because
funding is already available for the proposed 2,000-gallon Test Bed
Initiative Demonstration.
2. Senator King. Mr. White, please provide this committee with a
cost estimate and schedule to begin grouting and out of State disposal
of waste already treated by Tank-Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) and
awaiting vitrification.
Mr. White. Further implementation of grout beyond the 2,000-gallon
Test Bed Initiative Demonstration would require additional permits, a
public involvement process and a National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) review. One of the purposes of the Test Bed Initiative
Demonstration is to gain information about the costs, schedule and
regulatory processes associated with potentially expanding use of a
grouting technology. DOE looks forward to sharing additional
information with Congress as it becomes available.
3. Senator King. Mr. White, please explain why DOE cannot do both
out of State disposal and the DFLAW program today while the
vitrification plant is awaiting startup and commissioning.
Mr. White. In parallel with the DFLAW program, DOE is working with
the State of Washington to consider additional options for augmenting
and accelerating the tank waste mission. That includes taking
thoughtful steps to advance the Test Bed Initiative Demonstration. The
Test Bed Initiative Demonstration is designed to consider the most
effective combination of pretreatment, transportation, treatment, and
grouting processes and to gain experience through progressive
demonstrations. Once regulatory approvals are received, DOE will
complete the Test Bed Initiative Demonstration, evaluate the results,
and follow regulatory and legal processes, in concert with regulators
and in communication with Congress, for consideration of further
implementation of this approach.
4. Senator King. Mr. White, it has been almost 5 years since 3
gallons of MLLW from Hanford tanks was treated, grouted, and disposed
out of Washington State. Given the estimated cost savings and schedule
acceleration that, according to the FFRDC Report, multiple NAS reports
and GAO analyses, would be realized by grouting and out of State
disposal of MLLW, why hasn't DOE moved with extreme urgency on this
demonstration project?
Mr. White. DOE appreciates the work performed by the NAS/FFRDC at
the direction of Congress, the work of the GAO and others in analyzing
the potential benefits of options, including grout. While DOE focuses
on treatment via the DFLAW program, the Department continues working on
a path forward for addressing all Hanford tank waste in a safe,
effective manner and at a practical cost. Grout is one alternative for
the low activity liquid waste that scientific experts continue to
analyze, as well as several other options. DOE is committed to
following regulatory and legal processes, in concert with regulators
including the State of Washington and in communication with Congress,
stakeholders, and Tribal Nations as options like the TBI Demonstration
advance.
5. Senator King. Mr. White, are DOE and the Washington State
Department of Ecology aligned on the land disposal treatment standard
to be applied to waste that DOE determines through its processes and
methods is not high-level radioactive waste (HLW)? If not why not?
Mr. White. While the Test Bed Initiative Demonstration involves
out-of-State disposal, DOE and the State of Washington continue working
in a deliberate and constructive manner to reach agreement on many
issues related to the Hanford tank waste mission. DOE looks forward to
working with Congress on these issues as these discussions continue.
6. Senator King. Mr. White, what does DOE suggest be done to
address any such impasses between the two organizations?
Mr. White. DOE, the State of Washington, and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) recently reached conceptual agreement in
Holistic Negotiations on revising plans for managing millions of
gallons of waste stored in tanks at the Hanford Site. This agreement
demonstrates a commitment to resolving issues in good faith and upholds
the Tri-Party Agencies' shared commitment to a safe, effective, and
achievable path forward. Continuing constructive discussions among DOE,
EPA, and the State of Washington is the best way to addresses impasses
and reach agreement on solutions to advance the Hanford tank waste
mission.
7. Senator King. Mr. White, the GAO has recommended that
legislation is required to address and clarify which agency has
jurisdiction over the final treatment standard to be applied to waste
DOE determines is not HLW. DOE concurred in GAO's recommendations to
pursue legislation. Does the Department still stand by that
recommendation? If so when can we expect proposed legislation for
Congress to consider?
Mr. White. DOE does not believe additional clarification from
Congress is needed to classify Hanford reprocessing waste as non-high-
level waste (HLW). GAO recommended that Congress should consider
authorizing DOE to classify the volumes of waste corresponding to the
TBI Demonstration for out-of-State waste disposal as something other
than HLW and specifying that this waste is exempt from the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) vitrification standard for mixed
HLW. As stated above and in our response to GAO, DOE believes that the
authority to classify reprocessing waste as other than HLW already
resides with DOE.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
pit production program
8. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, the W87-1 Modification
Program is creating a warhead replacement for the U.S. Air Force Ground
Based Strategic Deterrent. The First Production Unit is planned for
2030, but its new design requires a newly manufactured pit. For those
overseeing this program, it is difficult for them to understand how
their program will be impacted by pit production capability schedule
changes without a proper Integrated Master Schedule (IMS). What has
been the impact on the lack of a proper IMS and cost estimate had on
planning for the W87-1 Modification Program?
Ms. Hruby. By way of background, the current Minuteman III
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) is armed with both W78 and
W87-0 warheads. The baseline Sentinel program plan, and the transition
of the ICBM force from Minuteman III to Sentinel has always included
deployment with W87-0 warheads first, followed by the W87-1 warheads.
The newly manufactured pits will be used in the W87-1. The schedule for
the W87-1 warheads has been closely synchronized between the NNSA and
the DOD Sentinel acquisition program. NNSA does not believe the level
of maturity and fidelity of the NNSA Integrated Master Schedule (NIMS)
for plutonium pit production has had a negative impact on the schedule
or planning for deployment of the W87-1 warhead.
The first version of the NIMS was implemented in October 2021 and
improved upon the original milestone schedule by incorporating detailed
schedule logic for first production unit at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory, while retaining all other milestones for scope supporting
the full 80 pits-per-year mission. NNSA continues to refine the NIMS
and update cost estimates in order to inform pit production schedules.
The next report on NIMS, requested through the House Armed Services
Committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act
for fiscal year 2023, will be delivered to Congress in the coming
months, but the NIMS has been implemented and NNSA is constantly
improving the schedule and project management tool with higher fidelity
data as the underlying projects and programs mature.
9. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, will the W87-1 Modification
Program be delayed due to the inability of National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) to meet its capability of producing 80 pits per
year by 2030?
Ms. Hruby. No. NNSA and the U.S. Air Force continue to work closely
with other Nuclear Weapons Council stakeholders to develop and refine
plans that accommodate schedule uncertainties in both the NNSA and DOD
programs. The baseline design for the W87-1 includes a newly
manufactured pit, and the program is on track to provide these pits on
a schedule that supports current plans. NNSA is also carrying a backup
option of a reuse pit, to ensure that warheads can be delivered to the
Air Force on the needed schedule in the event of unanticipated
disruptions to pit production schedules.
10. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, what plan is in place to
be able to complete the W87-1 Modification Program if the plutonium pit
is not able to be developed in time for the W87-1 production schedule?
Ms. Hruby. As noted in the answer to question 9, NNSA and the U.S.
Air Force continue to work closely with other Nuclear Weapons Council
stakeholders to develop and refine plans that accommodate schedule
uncertainties. The baseline design for the W87-1 includes a newly
manufactured pit, and the program is on track to provide these pits on
a schedule that supports current plans. NNSA is also carrying a backup
option of a reuse pit, to ensure that warheads can be delivered to the
Air Force on the needed schedule in the event of unanticipated
disruptions to pit production schedules.
11. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, the current NNSA IMS
includes activities only at two sites, Los Alamos and Livermore, to
manufacture one first production unit (FPU) by 2024. Will the updated
IMS include all of the information on activities at the other five
sites that have a role in the pit production process, including the
Nevada National Security Site, the Kansas City National Security
Campus, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, the Pantex Plant, and the
Savannah River Site?
Ms. Hruby. The current version of NNSA's Integrated Master Schedule
(NIMS) for plutonium pit production includes multi-site information at
a level of detail that makes it an effective management tool for the
program. Integrated detailed site schedule logic from Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and
the Kansas City National Security Campus is contained in the NIMS for
program scope focused on pit manufacturing and production efforts to
attain FPU at LANL. Schedule logic with less detail is included for
programs and projects at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing
Facility and those associated with later phases of equipment
installation at Los Alamos. NIMS will continue to integrate higher
fidelity schedule logic for those programs and projects as their
designs and schedules mature and this logic becomes available. In this
way NIMS capabilities will keep pace as more programs and projects
develop more detailed schedules, and it will remain an effective
management tool for the program.
12. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, which projects is the NNSA
currently undertaking that require these new pits and what is the
timeline for those projects to be completed?
Ms. Hruby. The preferred option for both the W87-1 Modification
Program and the W93 warhead, as well as any warhead program that
follows, is a newly manufactured pit. NNSA is carrying options for
reuse pits for the W87-1 and the W93, to support warhead delivery on
the required schedule in the event that newly manufactured pits cannot
be produced in time. Any subsequent warhead program is expected to use
newly manufactured pits. The W87-1 is expected to reach system-level
first production unit in the 2030-2032 timeframe, with newly
manufactured pits from Los Alamos, and will align with U.S. Air Force
timelines for the Sentinel ICBM program. DOE/NNSA continues to
coordinate closely with the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Nuclear
Weapons Council (NWC) to ensure this schedule alignment. The W93
program is still early in its development and has an anticipated FPU in
the mid-2030's. We continue to coordinate with the DOD, NWC, and the
United Kingdom to ensure schedule alignment between the W93 program and
the UK's separate but parallel Replacement Warhead program.
13. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, what steps is NNSA taking
to prevent against the backlog of projects that may arise when the
delay of the pit production program impacts these programs and there is
limited NNSA infrastructure to take operate all these projects?
Ms. Hruby. NNSA works closely and continuously with the Department
of Defense to account for pit production timeline uncertainties, and
NNSA is carrying pit reuse options for the W87-1 and W93 as insurance
against disruptive delays. We continue to assess and make changes to
schedules as needed as we jointly ensure that our nuclear deterrent
remains safe, secure, and effective. Once both pit production
facilities are operational there will be inherent resilience in the
NNSA enterprise.
14. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, why can't NNSA use the
approach that Government Accountability Office (GAO) describes that
should allow you to have an estimate much sooner?
Ms. Hruby. NNSA is tackling this challenge and will develop an
initial pit production total acquisition cost estimate by April 2024.
NNSA's Plutonium Program is planned and managed using NNSA practices
and procedures that are consistent with GAO and government project and
program management requirements. NNSA will develop its initial total
acquisition cost estimate in April 2024, although this estimate will
have significant uncertainties. An improved baseline total acquisition
cost estimate, with smaller uncertainties, will follow the
establishment of baseline cost and schedule estimates for the Savannah
River Plutonium Processing Facility Project and the Los Alamos
Plutonium Pit Production Project, which we expect to happen by mid-
2026. These cost and schedule estimates cannot be established until
designs are nearer to completion.
15. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, in 2021 the NNSA provided
to Congress a Research Program Plan for Plutonium and Pit Aging. Can
you please provide an unclassified version of that plan?
Ms. Hruby. NNSA's Research Program Plan for Plutonium and Pit Aging
report to Congress is classified and NNSA is ready and willing to
provide a classified briefing to appropriately cleared personnel. We do
not have an unclassified version of the plan.
16. Senator Warren. Deputy Administrator Adams, when do you expect
to see additional data that can be publicly shared from the 2021
Research Program Plan for Plutonium and Pit Aging? When would you
recommend the JASON group perform an assessment of that data?
Ms. Hruby. The experimental data on such weapons-relevant physics
regimes is classified. However, per Section 3124(d) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2023, NNSA will enter into an
arrangement with the JASON scientific advisory group to conduct an
updated assessment of plutonium pit aging not later than 2030. Such a
date allows NNSA to continue to research plutonium aging and make
progress against the milestones described in our Research Program Plan,
thereby providing the JASONs sufficient data for an updated assessment.
17. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, in 2006, the JASONs
concluded that pits last at least a century. Congress required a second
updated report. However, in a 2019 ``letter report'' the JASONs said
that NNSA did not give them time for a full study but laid out criteria
for what a future study should do. When will NNSA have an independent
updated pit life study completed when potentially tens of billions of
dollars are riding on the outcome?
Ms. Hruby. The 2006 JASON report on pit aging was more nuanced than
is commonly reported. It did not make a blanket statement that all pits
in today's warheads will meet military requirements until they are 100
years old. Pit performance degrades over time. It is difficult to
quantify how much the pit material properties will change over time,
and even more difficult to quantify how much those changes will affect
weapon performance under all relevant conditions. Estimating how long a
given pit type will meet requirements, in a given weapon system and
environment, is an extrapolatory exercise involving considerable
uncertainty. The answer is different for different warhead designs and
different environments.
The choice of a ``letter report'' instead of a full study in 2019
was based on many factors, including availability of JASON person-hours
and prioritization of other studies sponsored by various government
agencies. The 2019 report acknowledged the difficulty of reducing
uncertainties in pit performance as a function of age and recommended
continued research. As directed by the Fiscal Year 2023 National
Defense Authorization Act, NNSA has developed a briefing that describes
its plan to study plutonium aging. Research efforts are making
significant progress, but uncertainties will diminish incrementally
over time due to the complexity of pit aging phenomena and the extreme
dynamic conditions of nuclear explosions. NNSA will enter into an
arrangement with the JASON scientific advisory group to conduct an
updated assessment of plutonium pit aging not later than 2030. Such a
date allows NNSA to continue to research plutonium aging and make
progress against the milestones described in our Research Program Plan,
thereby providing the JASONs sufficient data for an updated assessment.
18. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, expanded plutonium pit
production is NNSA's most expensive program ever. NNSA's last public
cost estimate was in 2018 with a price tag of 43 billion dollars. Costs
have gone up at both the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the
Savannah River Site, likely putting it above $60 billion. NNSA swore
that its Uranium Processing Facility would never exceed its declared
budget cap of $6.5 billion, but its fiscal year 2024 budget request
just doubled from last year to $760 million, with its total price
estimate now at $8.5 billion. When will NNSA meet the Government
Accountability Office's strong recommendations for a total cost
estimate and Integrated Master Schedule for pit production that
Congress and the public can rely upon?
Ms. Hruby. NNSA is tackling this challenge and will develop an
initial pit production total acquisition cost estimate by April 2024.
This estimate will have large uncertainties because the Savannah River
Plutonium Processing Facility design will still be far from complete,
but we will strive to ensure that assumptions are clearly stated and
uncertainties bound the cost and schedule. An improved ``baseline'' pit
production total acquisition cost estimate will follow the
establishment of baseline cost and schedule estimates for the Savannah
River Plutonium Processing Facility and the Los Alamos Plutonium Pit
Production Project, which we expect to happen by mid-2026. Please see
the answer to Question 11 for a discussion of the Integrated Master
Schedule.
19. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, media has reported that a
classified change is being made to the design of future W87-1 pits.
What is the rationale for changing pit designs that have been full
scale tested?
Ms. Hruby. In Fall 2022, NNSA, Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Kansas City
National Security Campus agreed to implement a design change that makes
the W87-1 pit more manufacturable, which means more War Reserve pits
will be produced at LANL on the time scales needed for the stockpile.
This W87-1 pit design change has a major effect on
manufacturability but a minor effect on performance. Both pre-and post-
change designs conform closely to previously tested pit designs,
resulting in minimal risks to qualification and certification.
20. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, what guarantees that
future pits will be reliable when they can't be full scale tested?
Ms. Hruby. Since the 1992 nuclear explosive test moratorium
decision, we have relied on our underground nuclear test history, ever-
improving experimental and computational tools, and continually
increasing scientific understanding to maintain confidence in the
safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear warheads. Future pit
designs will take advantage of this and will incorporate ample
performance margin to account for uncertainties. New subcritical
experimental capabilities at the Nevada National Security Site will be
used to strengthen our understanding in key areas associated with
weapon performance and will enable the nuclear security enterprise to
respond to an evolving security environment without a return to
underground nuclear explosive testing.
21. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, do nuclear weapons design
codes have high fidelity?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, today's codes on today's computers can execute
high-fidelity simulations of the performance of today's warheads under
nominal conditions.
22. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, what is the empirical
basis for having confidence in current nuclear weapons design codes?
Ms. Hruby. The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program's
modeling and simulation capabilities that have been developed over the
past 28 years underpin NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program. The ASC
weapons codes represent the primary design tools for the nuclear
security enterprise because they simulate performance and safety of
weapon systems over a wide range of conditions and environmental
effects. The empirical basis for confidence in current codes is
comparison with measured data collected from historical underground
nuclear explosive tests and from separate effects tests, e.g.,
subcritical experiments or experiments on NIF, Z, or Omega, as well as
experiments from around the world and across history that measure basic
material properties and characterize basic physical phenomena.
23. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, will new-design nuclear
weapons prompt the U.S. to resume testing?
Ms. Hruby. Warheads produced by U.S. modernization programs will be
certified without nuclear explosive testing. Since the 1992 moratorium
decision, we have relied on our nuclear explosive test history, ever-
improving experimental and computational tools, and continually
increasing scientific understanding to maintain confidence in the
safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear warheads. This will
continue.
The W87-1 Modification Program will replace the aging W78 warhead
using a modified existing legacy W87-0 design and will deploy new
technologies that improve safety and security, address material
obsolescence, and improve warhead manufacturability. Similarly, the W93
will not require additional nuclear explosive testing to be certified
since it is anchored on previously tested nuclear components. The W93
will also incorporate modern technologies to improve safety, security,
and flexibility to address future threats. It will be designed for ease
of manufacturing, maintenance, and certification. Key nuclear
components will be based on currently deployed, and previously tested
nuclear designs, and extensive stockpile component and materials
experience. Today's codes, which have been extensively tested against
data from historical nuclear explosions and from a vast array of other
experiments (as noted in the answer to Question 22), provide weapons
experts with quantitative results and insights that are essential for
their certification and assessments efforts.
24. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, the Project Data Sheets
(PDS) in the fiscal year 2024 Department of Energy congressional
Justification for NNSA for the Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production
Project (LAP4) and Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF)
State that total costs and total project duration could be
significantly greater than presented in the tables which follow. Please
provide alternative cost schedules which reflect these greater totals
and durations for each of the two projects, in order to bracket the
annual costs and durations you expect for each project and subproject
within some stated confidence level.
Ms. Hruby. Currently, CD-2, Approve Performance Baseline, is
planned for the 4Q of fiscal year 2025 for LAP4 and 3Q of 2026 for
SRPPF. We are re-evaluating our schedules as designs are advanced for
LAP4 and SRPPF. As we reported to committee staff in our 2d Quarterly
Construction Briefing during the week of August 14, we anticipate a 2-4
year schedule delay for LAP4 and are currently re-evaluating the
schedule delay for SRPPF. NNSA has committed to providing updated cost
and schedule estimates for SRPPF by April 2024, which will be the
culmination of a multi-month effort that will begin when SRPPF's design
is 50 percent complete. Additionally, NNSA remains committed to
providing quarterly construction updates that include the latest
estimates for costs and schedules, as well as updates in annual
congressional Justifications.
25. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, what is the expected
schedule for the production of War Reserve (WR) pits at a) Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL) and b) Savannah River Site (SRS) from fiscal
year 2024 through fiscal year 2039, with confidence levels for each
year?
Ms. Hruby. LANL Pit Production--The first War Reserve pit is
expected to be delivered by LANL in late 2024. The number of pits
manufactured per year will increase as more equipment is installed at
Los Alamos and the manufacturing capacity increases. The fraction of
manufactured pits that are judged to meet War Reserve standards will
also grow as pit production processes gain maturity. The rate of
equipment installation is a major factor in the WR pit production
timeline at Los Alamos, and it is uncertain for a variety of technical
and operational reasons not associated with deficiencies in planning.
The time required to decontaminate and remove old gloveboxes and
equipment is not precisely predictable, as each presents unique
challenges. Installation of new equipment, some highly specialized, is
subject to supply chain delays. The frequency and duration of facility
upsets is not precisely predictable. With these and other sources of
uncertainty, it is premature to definitively tighten the range for
reaching rate production, though we expect that Los Alamos will likely
achieve 15-30 WR pits per year between 2027 and 2029 if requested
funding and current progress continues.
SRS Pit Production--Before WR pits can be produced at SRS, we need
to complete construction of SRPPF, establish plutonium inventories and
radiological operations, and develop and certify processes and
products. The schedule estimate approved at Critical Decision (CD)-1,
Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range, had a CD-4, Approve Start
of Operations or Project Completion, schedule range of 1st Quarter
fiscal year 2032 to 4th Quarter fiscal year 2035. The project's
schedule will not be baselined until the design is complete at CD-2/3,
Approve Performance Baseline and Approve Start of Construction,
currently forecasted for approval by 3d Quarter fiscal year 2026. This
is later than the fiscal year 2024 construction project data sheets
indicated, reflecting information received from Savannah River Nuclear
Solutions, LLC, after those data sheets were submitted.
The uncertainty in the SRS pit production schedule will remain high
until the SRPPF design matures and the project is baselined at CD-2.
Once CD-4 is reached, the infrastructure and process equipment
necessary to establish a pit production capability will be turned over
to the Savannah River (SR) Plutonium Modernization Program for
operations. The Program will then introduce plutonium and begin
radiological ``hot'' operations, followed by the development,
qualification, and certification activities necessary to produce the
first production unit (FPU), followed by continued process and capacity
improvements until rate production is reached. Historically it has
taken more than 5 years for nuclear facilities to proceed from material
introduction to rate production. The Savannah River Site Plutonium
Modernization Program continues to explore and implement acceleration
strategies to reduce this rate production timeline at SRS, with a key
part of the strategy being the establishment and use of the High
Fidelity Training and Operations Center (HFTOC). The HFTOC will contain
identical process gloveboxes and equipment lines for key processes that
will be used in the SRPPF Main Processing Building. HFTOC is planned to
be completed ahead of the Main Process Building by as much as 6 years.
Using a surrogate material, cold development activities and training in
the HFTOC will reduce the number of activities that would normally
happen during hot operations in the Main Processing Building, thereby
reducing the time from CD-4 to rate production.
NNSA, working with both SRS and LANL, will continue to refine the
schedule for pit production at SRS.
26. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, please provide the
expected Plutonium Modernization Program spending level in each of the
main three geographic categories (LANL, SRS, Enterprise Support) for
the years fiscal year 2029 to fiscal year 2039, or the last year in
which you expect full production at SRPPF to occur.
Ms. Hruby. The table below provides estimated per year average
spending rate of the Plutonium Modernization Program, excluding
construction projects. The Plutonium Modernization Program includes
support for plutonium science, subcritical experiments, and other
activities involving plutonium, so it encompasses much more than
support for pit production. Many of these activities are conducted at
Los Alamos, which is the NNSA Center of Excellence for Plutonium. The
estimates in the table assume 2.2 percent escalation per year after
fiscal year 2039 to account for inflation on continuing steady State
activities. Spending rates through 2059 assume that current plans for
the stockpile will remain largely unchanged. While SRPPF is expected to
continue operating well beyond 2059, we have little basis for
speculating on pit production demands that far into the future.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ESTIMATED AVERAGE ESTIMATED AVERAGE ESTIMATED AVERAGE
Control Level SPENDING RATE FISCAL SPENDING RATE FISCAL SPENDING RATE FISCAL
YEAR 2029-2039 ($B) YEAR 2040-2049 ($B) YEAR 2050-2059 ($B)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Los Alamos Plutonium Operations..... 1.4 2.0 2.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Savannah River Plutonium Operations. 0.8 1.7 2.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enterprise Plutonium Support........ 0.2 0.2 0.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because time periods covered in this table are outside the planning
cycle and many details about the future are unknown, we stress that
these are rough estimates with significant uncertainty.
27. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, please provide a complete
schedule of line item construction projects, with associated estimated
costs, that you anticipate needing to support pit production in the
years up to and including fiscal year 2039.
Ms. Hruby. Line item projects that exist or are planned today are
listed below, with the requested estimates. As the designs mature for
the existing projects, other line-item projects might be identified
that could begin before 2039. CD-4, Complete Construction, dates may
change as projects achieve major acquisition milestones and are
baselined and/or re-baselined (dollars in thousands). The schedules and
costs shown below are based on assumptions about funding profiles and
will change if actual funding profiles differ from those assumed.
Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF)
CD-1 estimated CD-4 Date: fiscal year 2032-fiscal year
2035
CD-1 TPC: $11,100,000
Note: Cost estimate reflects the high end of the cost
range estimated at CD-1 in 2021. We now know that this estimate will
increase, partly because construction costs nationwide have grown
significantly and partly because the project design has matured,
providing more detailed information. The potential impact on the
project cost may be an increase of 60 percent to 125 percent. We remain
committed to providing updated cost and schedule ranges in April 2024.
Chemistry & Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR)
Estimated CD-4 Date: 2029
CD-1 TPC: $2,886,230
Note: NNSA is finalizing decisions on the scope of the
remaining CMRR subprojects. The reaffirmed scope will prioritize
equipment installations over infrastructure improvements to support the
original mission need to maximize utilization of existing facilities in
the absence of the CMRR Nuclear Facility. NNSA is evaluating options
for future projects to complete any required scope that is not
ultimately included in CMRR.
Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP-4)
Estimated CD-4 Date: 2032
Estimated TPC: $4,729,875
Note: The TPC reflects the fiscal year 2024 President's
Budget Request (PBR), which includes an increase to the 30 Reliable
subproject estimate that is greater than the high end of the CD-1 cost
range due to the transfer of scope from the 30 Base subproject at
approval of CD-2/3, Approve Project Baseline and Approve Start of
Construction. This estimate may change as project design reaches
completion and as the impact of economic factors on nuclear
construction projects is more fully understood. The potential impact on
the project cost may be an increase of 30 percent to 40 percent and
could extend the schedule by 2 to 4 years.
LANL Pajarito Corridor Office Complex (PCOC) Building
1: Operations and Waste Management Office
Estimated CD-4 Date: 2025
Estimated TPC: $50,048
LANL Plutonium Production Building (PCOC Building 2) (FY
2024 New Start)
Estimated CD-4 Date: 2026
Estimated TPC: $49,500
LANL Plutonium Mission Safety & Quality Building (PCOC
Building 3)
Estimated CD-4 Date: 2027
Estimated TPC: $49,437
LANL Plutonium Program Accounting Building (PCOC Building
4)
Estimated CD-4 Date: 2028
Estimated TPC: $50,213
LANL Plutonium Engineering Support Building (PCOC
Building 5)
Estimated CD-4 Date: 2031
Estimated TPC: $49,700
LANL TA-46 Protective Force Facility (FY 2024 New Start)
Estimated CD-4 Date: 2026
Estimated TPC: $50,000
LANL Protective Forces Support Facility
Estimated CD-4 Date: 2029
Estimated TPC: $50,213
TA-55 Reinvestment Project Phase 3
Estimated CD-4 Date: 2027
Estimated TPC: $236,030
Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility Transuranic
Liquid Waste
Estimated CD-4 Date: 2027
Estimated TPC: $206,394
SRS Office Space Project--This is in the early planning
stages but will support pit production. NNSA will provide cost and
schedule estimates when they become available.
CD-4 Date: unknown
TPC: unknown
28. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, will it be necessary to
replace or augment the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at Los Alamos? If so,
when will this be necessary, how do you propose to do it, and what do
you anticipate the generalized cost and investment schedule to be?
Ms. Hruby. PF-4 is undergoing a host of modifications/upgrades
through multiple activities to extend the life of the facility: Los
Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP4) line item; Plutonium
Facility Equipment Installation Phase 2 (PEI2) subproject; TA-55
Reinvestment Project (TRP) Phase III; Pu Modernization Program Major
Items of Equipment (MIE) portfolio; Capabilities Based Investments
(CBI) portfolio; and a series of Recapitalization projects to address
infrastructure and safety priorities. A first look at replacement of
PF-4 will likely take place in the 2050 - 2060 timeframe.
29. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, will it be necessary to
replace or augment other nuclear facilities at LANL to support pit
production and if so, when will this be necessary, how do you propose
to do it, and what do you anticipate the generalized cost and
investment schedule to be?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, it will be necessary to replace and augment nuclear
facilities at LANL other than PF-4 to support pit production over the
next 10 years. Our plans and budget requests include these investments,
which have already begun and will continue through approximately the
2032 timeframe. These investments are funded through a combination of
funding sources including the Plutonium Modernization (PuM) Program and
Line-Item Projects that have been included the PBR. LANL also uses
indirect funds for facility improvements across the laboratory,
including facilities that support pit production. The only identified
new nuclear facility currently being replaced is the TRU Liquid Waste
Treatment Facility which is estimated to complete in 2027 at $206M.
Additionally, Infrastructure and Operations is making upgrades to the
Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility (WCRRF)
which is necessary for size reducing and repackaging out dated and
aging PF-4 gloveboxes that are being replaced by the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) project and the Los Alamos
Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP4).
30. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, does the SRPPF encompass
all the construction required to support pit production at SRS and if
not what further facilities and infrastructure will be needed and what
will these improvements cost?
Ms. Hruby. The project includes the facilities and associated
infrastructure needed to establish a pit production capability at SRS
as defined in the Program Requirements Document (PRD). NNSA is
evaluating additional infrastructure that could be needed to provide
supporting capabilities for efficient operations at SRPPF, as an
alternative to outsourcing that support, to mitigate risks and improve
operational efficiencies and reduce development and production
timelines. NNSA is also evaluating additional infrastructure, such as
office space, to support the broader mission set at SRS because of the
significant and long-term nature of the pit production, tritium, and
nonproliferation missions we conduct at the site.
NNSA is evaluating the F-Area utilities at SRS such as fire water,
domestic water, or sewer that are currently under DOE-EM management and
are provided as a service to SRPPF. Initial reviews indicate that the
service water system may need refurbishment, domestic water may need
resizing, the 13.8 kV electrical distribution system may need a new
feeder extension, and the sanitary wastewater system may require a
higher capacity lift station to support SRPPF utility demands.
Estimates for these infrastructure enhancements are being developed as
further assessment of existing capabilities and capacities are
completed.
31. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, please provide a complete
list of construction projects and capital equipment projects necessary
to support plutonium pit production at each of the two main sites which
are neither line-items nor included in program costs.
Ms. Hruby. The majority of construction projects and capital
equipment projects necessary to support plutonium pit production at Los
Alamos and Savannah River are line-item projects or program costs.
There are a few projects LANL plans to execute using indirect funds
whose resulting infrastructure will support multiple laboratory
efforts, one of which is plutonium pit production. At this time three
multi-use office buildings are in progress and another three are in the
planning and evaluation phase; three cafeterias are in the planning and
evaluation phase; and one parking garage is in the planning and
evaluation phase. As DOE/NNSA works toward the SRS management
transition and SRS shifts from a closure site to an enduring site, NNSA
is evaluating the need for additional infrastructure to support the
broader national security mission set at SRS.
32. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, please provide an expected
schedule of full time equivalents (FTEs) required at each of the two
main sites to support pit production preparations and operations, by
year through fiscal year 2039.
Ms. Hruby. We cannot answer this question with high confidence at
this point because time periods covered here are outside the planning
cycle and many details about the future are unknown. Therefore, we
stress that these are rough estimates with significant uncertainty. In
addition, the number of FTEs that can be supported at each site depends
directly on funding profiles, which are not known this far into the
future. Our estimates assume that funding profiles will support timely
completion and thereby minimize total project costs. The estimates will
change if actual funding profiles are different. Finally, we have not
yet analyzed whether the two sites have done the FTE accounting the
same way, for example, whether these are direct FTEs only or also
include indirect funded FTEs.
To support both SRPPF construction and operations, it is expected
that FTEs at SRS will grow from about 1,370 FTEs in fiscal year 2023 to
a peak of approximately 6,000 around fiscal year 2031. After peaking at
approximately 6,000 it is expected that the required FTEs will decrease
to approximately 2,000 and stay steady through fiscal year 2039.
At LANL, FTEs associated with both construction and operations
plutonium work will grow from approximately 2,600 in fiscal year 2023
to about 3,600 in fiscal year 2026, and level out at approximately
3,000 FTEs from FYs 2029-2039. The LANL FTEs support multiple plutonium
missions including pit production, as noted in the answer to Question
26.
33. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, using the above data,
please provide a schedule of the projected annual and cumulative
spending by site for Plutonium Modernization, in the best and worst
cases.
Ms. Hruby. The table below shows the projected annual and
cumulative spending by site for the Plutonium program of record,
including both construction and operation costs, to deliver an 80 WR
pits per year capability at LANL and SRS. The estimates beyond the
fiscal year 2024-28 Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP)
include current project cost plans and inflation adjusted growth for
the remaining activities. As stated in the answers to question 26
(which only includes operations costs, excluding construction project
costs) and question 32 (which includes FTEs for both construction and
operations), these estimates have high uncertainty, as they extend well
beyond our planning cycle and contain significant assumptions about
things that cannot be known today. The estimates in the table, and
construction costs beyond 2030 in particular, are based on estimates
that were available when the fiscal year 2024 congressional
Justifications were created. More recent information suggests that
costs will increase, with SRS constructions costs likely to increase
significantly, as noted in the answer to question 27. We are working to
quantify the range of potential increases.
Notes:
1) Shown in $M
2) Fiscal year 2024-2028 numbers based on PBR data; fiscal year
2029+ operations based on escalation estimates and major expectations
(i.e. SRS Pit Production Operations staffing). These estimates could
change based on maturing project information as each activity completes
design and the complete scope of work is baselined at Critical
Decision-2
3) Includes SRPPF, LAP4, CMRR, TRP-III, TLW costs based on
Financial Schedule (#3) in fiscal year 2024 CPDS
34. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, please provide a schedule
of the cost savings, risks, benefits, and stockpile implications of
terminating preparations for all but de minimus pit production at LANL,
while retaining technology demonstration and training functions. Please
include the total number of glovebox replacements in PF-4 planned, how
many of these might be avoided under demonstration and training
scenario, and what effect this would have on project(s) schedule, as
well as on the number of personnel required and the program costs.
Presumably LAP4 would be terminated. What other economies in capital
asset management would be possible?
Ms. Hruby. Stockpile requirements could not be met if preparations
were terminated for all but de minimus pit production at LANL. Pit
reuse for future stockpile programs is planned and justified only for
limited applications. NNSA must meet current and future Department of
Defense (DoD) requirements and deliver safe, secure, reliable warheads
under a variety of possible scenarios. It is clear that new pit
production capacity, including the planned capacity at LANL, is
necessary to meet requirements as laid out in current stockpile plans,
and that delays beyond those currently anticipated would be difficult
to accommodate in stockpile planning.
Efforts in the LAP4 project include the replacement of 54
gloveboxes, including 18 that are highly complex. An additional 11
gloveboxes are also being procured and installed under the Plutonium
Modernization Program. Additional gloveboxes of lower complexity will
support the LAP4 Training and Development Center. The required number
of lower-complexity gloveboxes for these training purposes is still
being refined, but NNSA expects that approximately 72 will be needed.
For reasons given in the previous paragraph, NNSA has not developed
plans for the de minimus scenario outlined in the question, and we are
therefore not prepared to answer questions about schedule, people, or
costs associated with such a scenario.
35. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, if pit production at LANL
were kept to a single production shift, how many war reserve (WR) pits
could be produced in each year and how would personnel and capital
requirements change?
Ms. Hruby. The estimated capacity for single shift at LANL is 30 WR
pits per year once rate production is achieved. Current personnel and
capital plans support this capacity and do not need to change to
accommodate it. Second and third shifts are planned for maintenance,
equipment removal, and equipment installation.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
sea-launched cruise missile-nuclear (slcm-n)
36. Senator Cotton. Admiral Wolfe and Mr. Adams, last year,
Congress appropriated $25 million to the Navy for the SLCM-N and $20
million to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for the
SLCM-N warhead. It also required the Navy and the NNSA to submit a
spending plan for SLCM-N research and development. Can you provide an
update on how these funds are being spent and what progress has been
made on the SLCM-N?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. The Navy's Nuclear-Capable Sea-Launched Cruise
Missile (SLCM-N) spending plan was developed in accordance with Section
1642 of the National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 117-263) for
fiscal year 2023, and was completed and delivered to Congress on 14
April 2023. Although the Department of Defense does not currently have
a SLCM-N program of record, Navy continues RDT&E activities in support
of a potential SLCM program as required by congressional requirements.
There are a number of operational and technical challenges
associated with a potential SLCM-N program including adapting the SLCM-
N candidate missile for vertical launch from a Navy launch platform--
either surfaced or submerged. The SLCM-N candidate missile will also
need to be evaluated and qualified for an at-sea deployment from a
manned Navy platform which is a unique environment. Developing a
nuclear certified shipboard interface from the launch platform to the
missile as well as equipping the launch platform with the necessary
nuclear surety, safety, and security measures are also examples of
challenges to overcome since the most likely launch platforms were not
designed to deploy with nuclear weapons. The designated launch
platforms will also need to be updated to incorporate the necessary
nuclear command and control capabilities.
From a programmatic standpoint, the largest immediate challenge is
the need to update and validate the assumptions and variables in the
2019-2020 Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). Specifics surrounding
delivery vehicles, nuclear explosive package integration, platforms,
and lethality must be identified in order to inform a final course of
action (COA) and determine what candidate SLCM-N missile to develop and
deploy.
Mr. Adams. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review concluded, after
weighing many factors, that the SLCM-N program is no longer necessary
and should be canceled. Although the Department of Defense does not
currently have a SLCM-N program of record, funding appropriated for
SLCM-N will be used toward research and development activities of
system agnostic technologies (e.g., safety, security, and performance)
pertinent to cruise missile platforms that would inform and mature NNSA
architectures and components.
w93/mark 7 timeline
37. Senator Cotton. Admiral Wolfe and Mr. Adams, as you know, the
NNSA has reported it is unable to meet the requirement to produce 80
plutonium pits per year by 2030. How would this delay impact the
production timeline of the W93/Mark 7 warhead?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. Navy SSP defers to NNSA on their plans for
producing pits and/or utilizing pit reuse for the W93 warhead and how a
delay in production of pits would impact any planning factors NNSA has
for pit reuse.
Mr. Adams. DOE/NNSA, in coordination with the Department of Defense
(DoD), has identified options to mitigate against risks to required
warhead deliverables until pit production capacities are established.
Given what is known today about the effects of plutonium aging, the
reuse of high margin pits is a viable option to meet W93 production
requirements. If new pit production does not support the required
production timeline for the W93, then reused pits can be used to
support that timeline. NNSA continues to coordinate closely with the
DOD and the Nuclear Weapons Council to ensure schedule alignment.
38. Senator Cotton. Admiral Wolfe, what are some of the risks of a
delay in W93 production to the sea-based nuclear deterrent?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. Navy SSP defers to USSTRATCOM on any
operational risks within the sea-leg that may be realized should W93/
Mk7 be delayed. From a programmatic perspective, delays in the W93/Mk7
program may result in increased costs, put at risk the ability of the
program to respond to warfighter needs at the speed of relevance, and
challenge the ability of the Sea-Based Strategic Deterrence workforce
to transition to programs following W93/Mk7--such as the Future
Strategic Sea-based Warhead (FSSW). Delays in the W93/Mk7 program may
also negatively impact progress in the United Kingdom's Replacement
Warhead program.
w87-1 timeline
39. Senator Cotton. General Bussiere and Mr. Adams, as you know,
the NNSA has reported it is unable to meet the requirement to produce
80 plutonium pits per year by 2030. How would this delay impact the
production timeline of the W87-1 warhead?
General Bussiere. The current pit production plan supports the
ability for the W87-1 Modification Program to achieve first production
unit on schedule. The W87-1 Modification Program remains on-track to
meet warhead rate production and on-time deliveries to the Department
of Defense. If pit production delays worsen and put at risk the W87-1
warhead production rate, DOE/NNSA will employ contingency options,
including potential reuse of existing pits.
Mr. Adams. The baseline design for the W87-1 includes a newly
manufactured pit, and the program is on track to provide these pits on
a schedule that supports current plans. NNSA is also carrying a backup
option of pit reuse, to ensure that warheads can be delivered to the
Air Force on the needed schedule in the event of unanticipated
disruptions to pit production schedules.
40. Senator Cotton. General Bussiere, what are some of the risks of
a delay in W87-1 production to the land-based nuclear deterrent?
General Bussiere.
1) Delays to W87-1 have the potential to delay Minuteman III to
Sentinel transition.
a. The W78 weapon employed in the Mk12A is only compatible with
Minuteman III.
b. Delays in W87-1 fielding on Sentinel may require the
Minuteman III to remain fielded longer to meet operational requirements
for strategic target coverage.
c. Minuteman III remaining fielded longer than anticipated will
result in a proportional delay to Sentinel's Full Operational
Capability (FOC).
2) Depending on the length of delay, it may become necessary to
consider W78 (Mk12A) for integration into Sentinel.
a. Initial projections suggest integration would be major
modification effort requiring substantial financial and time cost, but
this option has not been fully evaluated by the Air Force. Rigorous
analysis will need to be done to capture exact costs.
minuteman iii tests
41. Senator Cotton. General Bussiere, can you explain the role that
routine tests of the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM) play in guiding the development of the Sentinel Ground Based
Strategic Deterrent?
General Bussiere.
1) Minuteman III (MM III) flight testing continues to assess the
reliability and confidence of the Mk21/W87 reentry vehicle (RV), the
baseline weapon for the Sentinel.
2) MMIII flight tests have been used to further the development of
the Arming and Fuzing Assembly for the Mk21A weapon system that is
expected to be employed on Sentinel.
3) MMIII flight tests enable collection of launch facility and
silo environment data to better understand the launch environment for
Sentinel.
4) MMIII flight tests aid in the further development of remote
scoring systems that can be used in broad ocean areas. These scoring
systems are being upgraded and expanded to meet the expected
requirements of Sentinel.
5) MMIII test provide weapon system accuracy data that establishes
a baseline for the progression of our Sentinel modeling efforts.
42. Senator Cotton. General Bussiere, what impact did the
cancelation of the Minuteman III ICBM test on April 1, 2022 have on the
timeline of Sentinel Ground Based Strategic Deterrent development?
General Bussiere. There was no impact on the overall Sentinel
timeline. The cancellation of the 1 April 2022 Minuteman III (MMIII)
flight test did delay the collection of silo fly out environment data
needed for the Sentinel program by 4 months, but this data was able to
be collected in the subsequent MMIII flight test which occurred in
August 2022.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 2, 2023
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPACE ACTIVITIES
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:45 p.m., in
room 222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus S.
King, Jr. (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Subcommittee Members present: Senators King, Gillibrand,
Rosen, Kelly, Fischer, Rounds, Cramer, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.
Senator King.
[Technical problems]--for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee
of the United States Committee on Armed Services. The hearing
today is on U.S. Space Force and programs in review of the
defense authorization request for fiscal year 2024 and future
years. I want to thank our witnesses today for agreeing to
appear before us, and I thank you for your service and your
testimony.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the fiscal
year 2024 budget of the Space Force, a separate title 10
service, which was authorized in the Fiscal Year 2020 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Mr. Plumb, you all have
finished up the Space Policy Review. In February, we had a
classified full committee brief on it with Secretary Hicks.
While the outcome satisfied many members' concerns, I still
want to make sure our Space Force Guardians have ample
opportunity to train and equip for conflict under this policy.
Mr. Calvelli, you are responsible for the acquisition of space
assets.
I would like to know how we can ensure our guardians are
equipped to have space assets to train with for a conflict in
space. For fiscal year 2024, the Space Force budget is $30
billion, a $3.7 billion increase over last year's enacted
budget, or a 14.7 percent increase over fiscal year 2022.
General Thompson, it will be important to explain to the
Committee in open session, if possible, what this increase will
be going for. Further, I want to know what is being transferred
into the Space Force, especially with the transfer of uniformed
Army and Navy personnel.
Last year, the Administration has submitted a proposal for
a new personnel system that would treat Space Force Guardians
as either full or part time components based on reserve status.
I want to know more about this, given this and given the
competing proposals for Space National Guard.
Again, I want to thank our witnesses for joining us, and
after the brief opening statements, we will have 5-minute
rounds of questions for the witnesses. Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Plum, Mr.
Calvelli, and General Thompson, thank you all for being here
today and for sharing your perspective with this Subcommittee.
And thank you each for your many years of service.
As Members of the Subcommittee know, space has and
continues to play a critical role in upholding our Nation's
security and maintaining our prosperity. The United States
leadership in space has been buoyed by a robust commercial
space industry and cooperation with our allies and partners.
But our adversaries, like Russia and China, are also
exploiting the benefits of space and are developing
capabilities that put U.S. space assets, and the benefits our
armed forces receive from those assets, at risk.
I look forward to hearing how each of you intends to play a
unique role in safeguarding U.S. space assets, countering the
capabilities of our adversaries, and integrating the advanced
capabilities of the U.S. commercial space industry.
I would also like to better understand how the Space Force
is being incorporated into the combatant commands to ensure
they have access to the full range of space expertise. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Secretary Plumb.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR SPACE POLICY
Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator King, thank you, Senator
Fischer, Members of the Committee. I appreciate the chance to
testify today on the Department's national security space
programs, and I am honored to appear alongside Secretary
Calvelli and General Thompson. Space plays a critical role in
our Nation's security, in our prosperity, and in our way of
life. For the DOD [Department of Defense], space is essential
to how we compete and fight in every domain. We simply cannot
fight without space.
Our competitors understand this. They are fielding and
developing increasingly complex systems to deny space missions
to our U.S. Joint Force. In just the last few years, the
quantity and quality of those threats has significantly
increased.
China has already fielded ground based counterspace
weapons, including direct ascent, ASAT [anti-satellite weapon]
missiles, and it continues to seek new methods to hold our
satellites at risk. China is also building a space architecture
to enable long range precision strikes by its military.
China ultimately seeks to challenge our ability to conduct
joint operations in the Indo-Pacific. Russia is developing,
testing, and fielding its own counter space systems, including
both ground and space based kinetic, anti-satellite weapons.
Their goal is to degrade or deny United States space systems.
As Senator King pointed out, President Biden's $33.3
billion space budget for this fiscal year 24 invests in the
capabilities necessary to meet these challenges and is roughly
15 percent over the fiscal year 2023 investments.
The President's Budget request includes almost $5 billion
for missile warning and missile track, and this includes $2.3
billion for new proliferated resilient architectures, $2.6
billion for next generation overhead persistent infrared, OPIR,
$1.3 billion for position navigation and timing, including the
development of the next generation operational control system
for GPS [Global Positioning System], $3 billion for 15 launch
vehicles and first associated range upgrades, $4.7 billion for
protected and jam resistant SATCOM [Satellite Communications],
and it includes additional investments in ground user
equipment, science and technology research, and, of course,
classified programs.
My office remains laser focused on the three priorities
that I briefed to this Committee before, which is space
control, space cooperation, and space classification. On space
control, the Department will protect and defend our national
security interests from the growing scope and scale of space
and counterspace threats, and we will protect and defend our
servicemen and women in harm's way from space enabled threats.
For space cooperation, we are investing in relationships
with allies, partners, and commercial space. These partnerships
are an enduring strength and an asymmetric advantage that our
competitors cannot hope to match.
For space classification, the Department is working at the
highest levels to remove barriers to sharing information with
our allies and to strengthen our ability to communicate really
with ourselves across the U.S. Government.
Our competitors have watched us. They have learned from us.
They have stolen from us. And they have developed capabilities
to hold us at risk. But they are not ready for us. They aren't'
ready for us today, and with congressional support for the
national security space investments in the President's Budget,
they will not be ready for us tomorrow.
Thank you to the Committee for this hearing, for your
dedication to the Department and U.S. National Security, and I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. John F. Plumb follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. John F. Plumb
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Committee: Thank you for inviting me to testify before you on the
Department's national security space programs. I am honored to appear
alongside Air Force Assistant Secretary Calvelli and General Thompson.
Space plays a critical role in American security, prosperity, and
way of life. Space-based services support the world's financial system,
scientific discoveries, and environmental monitoring. Every American
uses space every single day. For the Department of Defense, all U.S.
military service force structures are built assuming continued access
to space. Space access enables us to provide our military with
indications and warning of threats or attacks, command and control of
our forces across the globe, and monitoring of adversary activities.
U.S. space capabilities, such as positioning, navigation, and timing
(PNT), satellite communications (SATCOM), missile warning and missile
tracking, and other missions, are critical to overall military
effectiveness across all domains and, therefore, to successful homeland
defense, deterrence, and countering aggression. The intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support provided by space
capabilities is vital to identifying and exposing aggressive activity,
deterring escalation, and catalyzing international responses to crises.
The Department's fiscal year 2024 space budget request of $33.3
billion is driven by the priorities outlined in the National Defense
Strategy (NDS). This historic investment in space reflects a net
increase of $22.9 billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)
for the U.S. Space Force and an increase of approximately 15 percent
year to year from fiscal year 2023 to meet emerging threats. The
investments in the fiscal year 2024 space budget request will enable
the Department of Defense to: (1) maintain the benefits provided to all
from space by preserving stability in, access to, and freedom to
operate in, from, and through the space domain; and (2) deter hostile
uses of space that threaten the national security interests of the
United States and its allies and partners, while ensuring we are
prepared to prevail in conflict, if deterrence fails.
security environment
Today, the United States finds itself in a highly dynamic security
environment characterized by intensifying strategic competition,
assertive behavior by multiple competitors, rapidly evolving domains of
conflict, shifting balances of power, and, as a result, a growing risk
of military confrontation. Our competitors have placed space warfare
and space-enabled long-range strike capabilities at the center of their
strategies to coerce and, if necessary, fight the United States and its
allies and partners. They seek to create a future operating environment
in which they can leverage space and strike capabilities to hold at
risk our forces, ports, and airfields, and to deny U.S. freedom of
maneuver. The People's Republic of China (PRC) expects space-enabled
long-range precision strikes will play an important role in future
conflicts, and counterspace operations will be integral to potential
PRC military campaigns. Space capabilities also underwrite ongoing
efforts by U.S. competitors to gain advantage in ``gray zone''
competition, undercut U.S. leadership, and reshape global norms to
their advantage.
People's Republic of China
The Department's fiscal year 2024 budget is driven by the
seriousness of our strategic competition with the PRC, which remains
the most comprehensive challenge to U.S. national security. The PRC is
the greatest geopolitical challenge facing the United States because it
is the only competitor with the intent and, increasingly, the
capability to remake the rules-based international order. The PRC's
activities on the ground and, increasingly, in space are designed to
advance its global standing, strengthen the PRC's endeavor to erode
U.S. influence across military, technological, economic, and diplomatic
spheres, and challenge the interests and values of the United States
and our allies and partners. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) views
space superiority--the ability to control the space-enabled information
sphere and deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering
and communication capabilities--as a critical component of conducting
modern ``informatized warfare.'' As a result, the PRC reorganized its
military in 2015 to approach space more effectively as a warfighting
domain and to support the PLA's holistic approach to joint warfare.
The PLA continues to build a space architecture to enhance its
ability to fight and win a modern military conflict. In 2022, the PRC
conducted 62 successful space launches, placing 200 payloads into
orbit, more than half of which were PRC ISR satellites. Today, the PLA
benefits from more than 340 ISR satellites with optical, multispectral,
radar, and radiofrequency sensors, and now owns and operates roughly
half of the world's ISR systems. The PRC ISR architecture enhances the
PRC's worldwide situational awareness and could support the PLA's
monitoring, tracking, and targeting of U.S. and allied forces
worldwide, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.
The PRC expects ISR capabilities will play an important role in
future conflicts by enabling the PLA to acquire timely, high-fidelity
information in order to conduct long-range precision strikes and
conduct battlefield damage assessments. The PLA continues to integrate
ISR, PNT, and SATCOM capabilities into its weapons and command and
control (C2) systems to provide over-the-horizon targeting information
for its strike platforms in an effort to challenge U.S. freedom of
maneuver on land, sea, and in the air. Recent PLA improvements to its
ISR fleet enhance the PLA's ability to operate farther from the Chinese
coast and to monitor forces across the globe, including United States
aircraft carriers, expeditionary strike groups, and deployed air wings.
This makes U.S. and allied forces more susceptible to long-range strike
and ultimately challenges our ability to conduct joint operations,
particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.
The PRC also has a robust network of space surveillance sensors on
Earth capable of searching, tracking, and characterizing satellites in
all Earth orbits. This network includes a variety of telescopes,
radars, and other sensors that allow the PRC to support missions such
as intelligence collection, ballistic missile early warning, and
counterspace targeting.
The PRC views counterspace systems as a means to deny other
militaries' space-based information systems and to deter and counter
outside intervention during a regional conflict. The PRC has already
fielded ground-based counterspace weapons, including electronic warfare
systems, directed energy weapons, and direct-ascent (DA) anti-satellite
(ASAT) missiles designed to disrupt, damage, and destroy U.S.
satellites. The PRC has launched multiple DA-ASAT missiles, including a
2007 destructive DA-ASAT missile test in low Earth orbit (LEO), and
plans to pursue DA-ASAT weapons intended to destroy satellites up to
geo-synchronous Earth orbit.
The PRC is probably testing dual-use technologies in space that
could be applied to counterspace missions, such as robotic arm
technology that could be used for grappling other satellites, as
evidenced last year when the Shijian-21 moved a derelict satellite to a
graveyard orbit. The PRC continues to seek new methods, which probably
include space-based kinetic energy weapons, to hold our satellites at
risk, and is developing other sophisticated capabilities to deliver
effects through space, such as the PRC's fractional orbital launch of
an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a hypersonic glide
vehicle from China in 2021.
Russia
Russia reorganized its military in 2015 to create a separate space
force because Russia sees achieving supremacy in space as a decisive
factor in winning conflicts. Russia believes the importance of space
will continue to expand because of the growing role of precision
weapons and satellite-supported information networks in conflict, but
it seeks to avoid becoming excessively dependent on space to conduct
its national missions.
Russian has more than 30 ISR satellites, including some of the
world's most capable satellites for optical imagery, radar imagery,
signals intelligence, and missile warning. Russia can also employ its
civil and commercial remote sensing satellites to supplement military-
dedicated capabilities and has sought to acquire satellite imagery from
foreign companies. For example, in January 2023, the Department of
Treasury sanctioned a PRC company, Spacety China, for providing a
Russian-based technology firm with synthetic aperture radar satellite
imagery orders over Ukraine in order to enable Wagner Group combat
operations.
Russia is developing, testing, and fielding a suite of non-
destructive and destructive counterspace systems to degrade or deny
U.S. space-based services as a means of offsetting a perceived U.S.
military advantage and deterring the United States from entering a
regional conflict. Russia has fielded several ground-based lasers that
can blind satellite sensors and has a wide range of ground-based
electronic warfare systems that can counter the Global Positioning
System (GPS), tactical and satellite communications, radars, and
Western space-enabled C2 and weapons guidance systems. Russia also
considers space-enabled information collection and transmission to be
strategically decisive and has taken steps to modernize its military
information attack capabilities. For example, in support of Russia's
illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia conducted cyber
attacks against commercial satellite networks in February 2022 to
disrupt Ukrainian C2 and has sought to jam commercial SATCOM used by
Ukraine.
In November 2021, Russia demonstrated the capability to destroy
satellites in LEO with its test of a destructive DA-ASAT missile, which
created over 1,500 pieces of trackable space debris and tens of
thousands of pieces of potentially lethal but non-trackable debris,
which threatens spacecraft of all nations in LEO. Russia is also
reportedly developing an air-launched ASAT weapon that can target
satellites in LEO. Finally, Russia tested a space-based ASAT capable of
kinetically killing satellites in LEO in 2020 and is developing
sophisticated dual-use orbital capabilities that could be used to
conduct an attack on other countries' satellites.
While the PRC and Russia develop and field these counterspace
weapons, both nations simultaneously promote false claims that they
will not place weapons in space and have coordinated to propose a
flawed legally binding treaty on the non-weaponization of space at the
United Nations that would be unverifiable and unenforceable.
Other Challenges: Iran & the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK)
Iran recognizes the strategic value of space and counterspace
capabilities and will attempt to deny the United States its use of
space during a conflict. Iran has developed capabilities to jam SATCOM
and GPS signals, and Iran's advancements in space launch vehicle
technology could be applied to developing a DA-ASAT missile or could
shorten the timeline to an ICBM. The DPRK has also demonstrated non-
kinetic counterspace capabilities, including GPS and SATCOM jamming.
Under the guise of peaceful use of space, the DPRK has applied data
from its space program to aid in the development of long-range and
multistage ballistic missiles.
the president's budget request for fiscal year 2024
Strengthening Deterrence & Building Enduring Advantages in Space
In October 2022, the Department of Defense released the
unclassified version of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which
emphasized that the United States is entering a period of heightened
risk and articulated an urgent imperative to strengthen deterrence. In
support of this aim, the NDS outlined a strategy of integrated
deterrence, which provides a framework for working seamlessly across
domains, theaters, and the spectrum of conflict, as well as across all
instruments of U.S. power and with allies and partners. The
Department's efforts in the space domain undergird all four priorities
in the NDS: (1) defending the homeland; (2) deterring strategic
attacks; (3) deterring aggression while preparing to prevail in
conflict; and (4) building a resilient Joint Force and defense
ecosystem that can sustain U.S. strategic advantages.
The Department's fiscal year 2024 budget request is grounded in the
understanding that deterrence in space contributes to deterrence on the
ground. Space is a key node for integrated deterrence because
deterrence strategies rely on credible combat forces, which are
underwritten by space. Strengthening deterrence through enhanced
mission assurance and building enduring advantages today that sharpen
the edge of national security space in the coming years are, therefore,
central to our budget request this year.
Because the space domain empowers the entire Joint Force, the
Department is focused on assuring critical space-based missions by
accelerating our transition to more resilient architectures and by
defending critical systems against counterspace threats. The foundation
of mission assurance is resilience--being able to provide critical
space-based services across the Joint Force in competition, crisis, and
conflict. By focusing on the ability of space-based services to
withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption, DOD can
continue to support the Joint Force and deny adversaries the benefit of
attack and an information advantage that is critical to success in
modern warfare.
Even as the Department builds resilience in space as a means to
deter aggression, we must also be prepared to protect and defend our
national security interests in space. Consistent with our long-standing
policy, the Department will protect and defend U.S. space capabilities,
along with those of our allies, partners, and the commercial sector
when directed to do so. To effectively deter, and, if necessary,
counter and respond to hostile acts in space, the Department is focused
on protecting the whole of our space architecture, including ground
nodes and networks, in addition to assets on orbit. Defending our
national security interests from the growing scope and scale of space
and counterspace threats also requires that we strengthen our ability
to detect and credibly attribute hostile acts in, from, and to space.
Providing space operators with relevant, timely space domain awareness
data can help to prevent operational surprise and support efforts to
protect and defend space assets.
Finally, the United States must be prepared to protect the Joint
Force from attacks enabled by adversaries' increasingly sophisticated
and proliferated space-based ISR networks and C2 systems. The
Department of Defense is developing a range of solutions across all
domains in order to protect and defend U.S. and, as directed, allied,
partner, and commercial capabilities, as well as to prevent adversaries
from leveraging space-enabled targeting to attack the Joint Force. This
Committee's support for the investments outlined in the President's
Fiscal Year 2024 Budget is essential to strengthening deterrence and
building the enduring advantages in space necessary to defend our
systems against counterspace threats and protect the U.S. Joint Force
from adversary hostile use of space.
The DOD's fiscal year 2024 national security space budget request
provides for vital space capabilities, resilient architectures, and
enhanced space command and control to keep space safe for military,
civilian, and commercial operations, while modernizing U.S.
capabilities to secure the use of space in the face of increasing
threats to U.S. national security space systems. The budget request
would continue to strengthen mission assurance by accelerating the
transition to resilient-by-design architectures that are diverse,
proliferated, disaggregated, distributed, and protected; enhance our
ability to fight through disruption by improving defensive
capabilities; advance assured access to space across all orbits; invest
heavily in research, development, testing, and experimentation to
ensure we continue to meet emerging threats; and modernize our space
architecture to further integrate space-based services across the Joint
Force. Some of the highlights of the fiscal year 2024 budget request
include investments in:
Missile Warning: $5.0 billion to develop proliferated,
resilient missile warning / missile tracking architectures, and next-
generation overhead persistent infrared (OPIR) space and associated
ground architectures;
GPS Enterprise: $1.3 billion for PNT through GPS III
follow-on satellite support and development of the next-generation
operational control system (OCX) for GPS III and legacy satellites;
Launch Enterprise: $3.0 billion to fund 15 launch
vehicles and launch range upgrades; and
Satellite Communications: $4.7 billion for the Evolved
Strategic Satellite Communications (ESS), protected, robust, secure,
survivable, and jam-resistant tactical, wideband, and narrowband
capabilities, and Space Development Agency's (SDA) proliferated space
data transport layer.
Other Space Force investments include ground user equipment,
science & technology research, personnel funding, operations and
maintenance, and classified investments.
Campaigning in the Space Domain
As the United States invests in critical capabilities, the
Department of Defense is actively campaigning in and through the space
domain to strengthen integrated deterrence and build advantages with
allies and partners as well as the commercial sector, while
demonstrating responsible leadership.
Our allies and partners provide an enduring strength and asymmetric
advantage that our competitors cannot match. Our allies and partners
are essential to our integrated deterrence strategy. We therefore must
be able to integrate, plan, and operate with our most capable allies
and partners in the space domain. Combined operations require us to be
able to effectively share information. The Department is reviewing the
classification and disclosure policies of space-related information to
overcome barriers to integration with our allies and partners.
One example of how we are strengthening military-to-military ties
to our allies is through the Combined Space Operations (CSpO)
Initiative, which includes defense leaders from Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. In this forum, we are identifying ways to improve cooperation,
coordination, and interoperability to sustain freedom of action in
space, optimize resources, enhance mission assurance, and prevent
conflict. During last December's CSpO Principals Board meeting, leaders
emphasized the need to continue to increase information sharing to
enable space operations and collaboratively address challenges to the
safety and security of the domain.
The NDS also highlights the importance of partnering with the
commercial sector as part of our integrated deterrence efforts.
Commercial services and providers offer innovative solutions across
many mission areas at potentially lower cost and with more rapid
development cycles. Therefore, the Department is assessing how our
missions can increasingly leverage commercial space services as one
element of our broader approach to building resilience.
Last, day-to-day, the Department is upholding and strengthening the
rules-based international order and leading in the development of new
responsible behaviors that contribute to the safety, stability,
security, and long-term sustainability of space activities. Because the
Department is one of the world's most experienced space operators, we
play a significant role in the United States' observation and
demonstration of responsible space behaviors. The Department's policies
and practices, such as the Secretary of Defense's Tenets of Responsible
Behavior in Space memorandum, issued in 2021, serve as a key element
for U.S. proposals for international measures that contribute to the
safety, stability, security, and long-term sustainability of space
activities. Our operational expertise also leads us to participate in
United Nations' space-related committees as part of State Department-
led delegations.
Most recently, the Department assisted in developing the commitment
announced by the Vice President in April 2022 not to conduct
destructive DA-ASAT missile testing and to work to establish this as a
new international norm of responsible behavior in space. This U.S.
announcement led to a December 2022 vote at the United Nations General
Assembly that gave overwhelming approval of a U.S.-sponsored resolution
calling upon all States to commit not to conduct destructive DA-ASAT
missile tests. One hundred and fifty-five countries voted in favor,
with nine opposing, including the PRC and Russia. The Department
continues to engage with allies and partners to urge the widespread
adoption of this commitment. This approach to developing nonbinding
norms of responsible behavior that garner broad support can support the
long-term sustainability of the outer space environment directly. The
Department will continue to demonstrate leadership in both the
responsible use of space and stewardship of the space environment.
conclusion
U.S. space systems are central to our ability to deter our
competitors and to prevail in conflict, should deterrence fail. Our
competitors have watched us, they have learned from us, they have
stolen from us, and they are coming for us. But they are not ready for
us today. The investments in the fiscal year 2024 budget request are
essential to equip the Department of Defense with the capabilities
necessary to ensure they are not ready for us tomorrow. Thank you to
the Committee for its tireless dedication to our national security and
our servicemembers, and I look forward to answering your questions.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANK CALVELLI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE AIR FORCE FOR SPACE ACQUISITION AND INTEGRATION
Mr. Calvelli. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
me to testify before you today. We continue to face an
unprecedented strategic competitor in China and our space
environment continues to become more congested and contested.
To address these challenges, we are transforming our space
architecture from the large, highly capable but vulnerable
satellites today, to smaller, proliferated, resilient systems
across multiple mission areas.
For example, we are pivoting from the legacy missile
warning architecture to a proliferated, resilient architecture
that adds a new capability to actually track missile threats.
We are adding new critical space domain awareness capabilities.
We are fundamentally transforming our military satellite
communications and data transport architecture through
disaggregation of missions, proliferation, and partnerships
with allies and commercial. We are even collaborating with the
intelligence community to develop a proliferated, space based,
round moving target indication system.
As we transition to this architecture, we continue to
deliver new, credible capabilities to our warfighters. Over the
last year and a half, the Space Systems Command delivered to
new geosynchronous space situational awareness satellites, a
new space based infrared missile warning satellite, and a new
GPS 3 satellite.
The Space Rapid Capabilities Office delivered their first
set of missions to orbit this past January. In March, the Space
Development Agency delivered their first ten satellites to
orbit in less than 3 years from contract award to launch.
As the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space
Acquisition Integration, I am focused on adding speed to our
acquisitions and delivering programs on schedule and on cost. I
also recognize I inherited several troubled programs that are
behind schedule and overrun on costs, and I am paying close
attention to these programs.
Overall, I am proactively managing the space acquisition
enterprise through weekly status reports, biweekly tag ops with
my portfolio leads, and detailed quarterly program reviews.
These reviews enable me to ensure all our programs remain
focused on delivering capabilities to our warfighters on cost
and on schedule.
In October 2022, I issued strategic acquisition guidance to
the workforce outlining nine space acquisition tenants. These
tenants form the basis of a new direction for space
acquisition, and emphasize speed and program management
discipline, while addressing the fundamental issues that slow
up space acquisition.
I am committed to using all the tools and authorities
Congress has provided to help speed space acquisition. That
includes the use of section 804 middle tier of acquisition
pathway, use of other transactional authorities (OTA), and use
of the Space Acquisition Council to ensure collaboration and
integration while avoiding duplication of effort across the
entire national security space enterprise.
Thank you to the Committee, and I look forward to your
questions.
Senator King. General Thompson.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID D. THOMPSON, USSF, VICE CHIEF OF
SPACE OPERATIONS
General Thompson. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor
to appear before you today on behalf of the Secretary of the
Air Force, Chief of Space Operations, and 14,000 guardians
around the world executing our missions.
The capabilities and benefits provided from space are
essential to our way of life and crucial to effective military
operations in every other domain. Success in great power
competition depends on access and freedom to operate in space
while denying the same to potential adversaries.
Space access is increasingly threatened by a number of
hostile actors who are developing and deploying counterspace
weapons to threaten U.S. systems in every orbital regime, on
the ground and in cyberspace. We continue to respond to these
challenges through three lines of effort, fielding combat ready
forces, amplifying the guardian spirit, and partnering to win.
A combat ready force requires personnel, training, and
equipment, simple by description, but complex in execution. We
need innovative operational concepts, survivable platforms,
highly trained personnel, validated tactics, actionable
intelligence, decisive command and control, fortified networks,
suitable facilities, and perpetual sustainment and
modernization.
These elements must be in place to deter adversaries and,
if needed, prevail in conflict. The key to success in all of
these areas is our people. Military and civilian guardians are
dedicated and determined. They are imbued with a deep sense of
pride and purpose. But they must also be bold and innovative
problem solvers who can overcome any obstacle and thrive in the
current dynamic environment.
The Space Force must attract talented Americans who embody
these principles. We must then amplify them and keep those
guardians on the field of play. To do so, our members must have
challenging and rewarding work, the means to provide for their
families, quality affordable care and living conditions, and
acknowledgment from their leaders and all Americans that we
value and respect who they are and what they do. This is the
essence of the guardian spirit.
Finally, we do not propose to accomplish this alone. The
third tenet to our success is partnering to win. The Space
Force is pursuing and strengthening relationships across the
Department of Defense, within the rest of the U.S. Government,
with traditional defense industry and the rapidly growing
commercial sector, with longstanding allies, and with new
partners who share the vision of a stable, peaceful space
domain.
We seek partners who will be advocates for the space
capabilities that they need and will hold us accountable to
deliver them for them. The President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget
Request reaffirms the Space Force's commitment to a bold,
threat informed shift.
It extends the pivot to resilient constellations,
intelligence driven space domain awareness, aggressive
cybersecurity, measured investment in space superiority, and
combat credible forces anchored in a full spectrum test and
training enterprise.
Your timely enactment of the fiscal year 2024 Defense
Authorization Bill will enable the Space Force to remain the
world's leader in space and to preserve freedom of action for
the Nation. Thank you for your continued partnership and
support. I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of The Honorable Mr. Frank
Calvelli and General David D. Thompson follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Mr. Frank Calvelli and
General David D. Thompson
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for inviting us to testify before you today,
representing Secretary Kendall, General Saltzman, and our Nation's
Space Force.
We continue to face an unprecedented strategic competitor in China,
and our space environment continues to become more contested,
congested, and competitive. We have seen an exponential growth of in-
space activity, including counter-space threats. The Department of the
Air Force and the United States Space Force are fundamentally
transforming our space architecture to be more resilient, proliferated,
and integrated to meet warfighter requirements to counter the growing
threat from strategic competitors. In 3 years' time, we have made
significant progress to transform our force to counter the threat, but
there is still much more we must accomplish.
To that effect, on November 22, 2022, the CSO outlined three lines
of effort to ensure that the Space Force maintains urgency and momentum
in the progress we have made over the past 3 years:
Field Combat-Ready Forces so that the Space Force has the
personnel, training, and equipment required to prevail in a fight.
Amplify the Guardian Spirit so that the Space Force
attracts, develops, inspires, empowers, and retains individuals who
thrive in our organization and under our values.
Partner to Win so that the Space Force can collaborate
with mission partners to accomplish our critical set of roles and
functions.
These lines of effort ensure that the force is advancing its
readiness for the high-end fight. We must deliver and field the forces
and capabilities necessary to adequately deter and if deterence fails,
prevail against any potential adversaries.
transforming the space architecture to field combat-ready forces
As previously mentioned, the Department of the Air Force and the
United States Space Force are fundamentally transforming our space
architecture to be more resilient, proliferated, and integrated to meet
warfighter requirements to counter the growing threat from strategic
competitors.
We are actively moving away from building a small number of highly
capable but vulnerable large satellites, to a proliferated resilient
Missile Warning / Missile Tracking (MW/MT) architecture. Our resilient
MW/MT focuses on tracking advanced threats by integrating critical
missile tracking capabilities that previously did not exist. The Space
Development Agency (SDA) and Space Systems Command (SSC) are developing
the low earth orbit (LEO) and medium earth orbit (MEO) architecture
through an incremental process that allows us to incorporate new
technologies and get them on orbit fast. The Space Development Agency
just launched the first two LEO tracking satellites this month and will
launch six more by the end of this fiscal year. Thirty-nine more
tracking satellites will be delivered in their next Tranche, which is
set to launch in 2025. SSC's resilient MW/MT MEO portion will follow
with nine satellites in two orbital planes with launches in fiscal year
2026 and fiscal year 2027.
As we develop this new capability, we are continuing the
development of the Next Generation Geosynchronous and Next Generation
Polar missile warning programs as a bridge to enable the eventual
transition to the resilient MW/MT architecture.
Simultaneously we are transitioning our space domain awareness
architecture to focus on deterring and defending against attempts to
negate our critical space capabilities. We continue our Geosynchronous
Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP), which remains our hallmark
program for space domain awareness. We are adding three new radar sites
(United States, Australia, and United Kingdom) with the Deep Space
Advanced Radar Capability to enhance our deep-space object tracking.
Additionally, we are upgrading our space tracking telescopes in the
Continental United States and Hawaii as part of our Ground-Based
Operational Surveillance System program. These upgrades include new
cameras, better sensitivity, and better search capability. We are also
collaborating with the Intelligence Community (IC) on a new GEO-based
satellite system called Silent Barker that will launch this year, which
provides on-orbit optical space domain awareness for orbit
determination, discovery, custody, and change detection of deep space
objects.
We are fundamentally transforming our military satellite
communications architecture through disaggregation, proliferation,
capacity expansion, and partnerships with Allies and commercial
entities.
We are designing new architectures that disaggregate the strategic
and tactical missions currently found on the Advanced Extremely High
Frequency satellites. These future architectures increase resilience by
reducing vulnerabilities associated with very large multi-mission
satellites and increase architectural diversity via payload hosting
opportunities.
The proliferated transport layer will provide resilient low-latency
military data connectivity to a range of warfighter platforms. The
first eight of these satellites were launched in April. Another 12 will
launch this June, followed by 138 more in 2024.
We continue to expand and enhance our wideband satellite
communications capabilities by making ground system improvements that
will increase resiliency of the Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) satellites
11 and 12. Additionally, we are on track to operationalize the new
Protected Tactical Waveform by the end of 2024 to be used over WGS,
which adds critical anti-jam capabilities for our warfighters. We are
also beginning the service life extension development for two
additional Mobile User Objective System satellites to extend narrowband
services as interim gap-fillers as we define the future architecture.
In partnership with Norway, our Enhanced Polar System
Recapitalization payload will provide protected SATCOM coverage in the
North Polar Region and will launch next year. We are also beginning a
commercial SATCOM partnership with Luxembourg and have cooperative
agreements on the use of U.S. military satellite communications with 10
countries.
These holistic efforts enhance our ability to fight in contested
and degraded operational environments through increased capacity,
extended coverage, and anti-jam capabilities. Our pivot to a resilient,
integrated, and proliferated military satellite communications
architecture provides diverse capabilities that enable warfighters to
have data transport in any environment and whenever needed in daily
operations, crisis, or conflict.
We continue to buildupon the success of our Global Positioning
System (GPS) program. We have four GPS III satellites completed and in
storage and are on contract to produce another 10 satellites. GPS III
and IIIF satellites will increase military signal power as well as
produce a more resilient fourth civil signal. In fiscal year 2024, we
will launch and begin testing of the Navigation Technology Satellite 3,
an end-to-end space-based prototype across space, ground, and user
equipment segments to improve resiliency in contested environments
against jamming and spoofing. We are also making progress with the
development and testing of the cyber-hardened next-generation GPS
ground control segment and paying careful attention to this troubled
program which is years late and significantly overrun on costs.
We are transitioning our solution for moving target indication from
the air domain to the space domain. The Long-Range Kill Chains is a new
fiscal year 2024 program element that supports a proliferated space-
based ground moving target indication (GMTI) capability. The Space
Force is collaborating with the Intelligence Community to design,
develop, deploy, and operate space-based GMTI. It will provide
actionable information on adversary surface targets that the Space
Force will deliver to the warfighter through the Advanced Battle
Management System as an integral part of Joint All-Domain Command and
Control. The space-based systems will surpass the range limitations of
current air platforms and provide capabilities in contested and non-
contested environments to ensure the strategic advantage provided by
GMTI is available to warfighters even when facing near-peer
competitors.
At the same time, we are making tough budget choices. We are
reducing the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (NG OPIR)
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) (NGG) space vehicle purchases from
three to two, ensuring we have the resources to pivot to resilient MW/
MT. The NGG and NG OPIR Polar programs successfully completed several
major milestones, and the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
constellation continues to have positive performance, thus ensuring our
critical missile warning capability. We are also delaying the purchase
of additional GPS IIIF satellites in fiscal year 2024. The GPS
constellation is healthy, with four satellites ready for launch in
fiscal year 2024, fiscal year 2025, and fiscal year 2026. This enables
the Space Force to fund immediate resiliency priorities in other
mission areas with no impact to the GPS military code or civil service.
critical capabilities delivered in the last year (january 2022 to
present)
Over the past 15 months, the Department has provided significant
new capabilities on orbit. In January 2022, we launched two SSC-
developed GSSAP satellites bringing the constellation to a total of 6
satellites. Having two more GSSAP satellites enables the Space Force to
provide immediate and precise orbital predictions of all geosynchronous
objects, as well as detailed space domain awareness in the GEO belt,
which is critical to our space superiority.
In July 2022, SSC launched two experimental satellites, one of
which was the Wide Field of View demonstration. This new technology
will increase the amount of Earth coverage to over 3,000 kilometers at
any one time, an unprecedented area not previously incorporated into
any missile warning platform. The data from this demonstration will be
used to develop future missile warning sensors in LEO and MEO.
SSC completed the SBIRS constellation with the launch of the GEO-6
satellite in August 2022 and operational acceptance in March 2023. The
robust SBIRS constellation will continue providing persistent ballistic
missile warning and launch detection crucial to national defense and
deterrence, thus enabling the pivot to a resilient MW/MT architecture.
In November 2022, SSC launched the second Long Duration Propulsive
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Secondary Payload Adapter
(ESPA) (LDPE) mission. LDPE provides a low-cost, multi-mission
propulsive platform that enables multiple prototype demonstrations.
Both the LDPE and the ring-shaped payload adapter provide small
satellite providers with launch opportunities more readily than ever
before. This vehicle was delivered in only 4 years from contract award,
approaching SAF/SQ's recent guidance to drive contract scope to 3 years
or less from start to launch.
In January 2023, the sixth of ten SSC-developed GPS III satellites
launched. Enabled by on-orbit verification efficiencies to expedite
warfighter capability delivery, Space Operations Command operationally
accepted GPS III-06 just 12 days after launch.
Also, in January 2023, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office (SpRCO)
launched and initialized three operational prototypes, including two
for enhanced situational awareness and one cryptographic interface
payload providing secure space-to-ground communications capability.
These systems are the first SpRCO on-orbit assets, with all three
successfully testing within 2 months from launch, a major
accomplishment for critical rapid acquisitions.''
One of the most notable achievements in space acquisition occurred
when SDA successfully launched the first 10 satellites of the
Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture. On April 2, 2023, SDA
delivered 8 transport layer and 2 tracking layer Tranche 0 satellites
just 31 months after contract award. The second launch, to complete the
28-satellite Tranche 0, will occur Summer of 2023, providing the
warfighter immersion tranche by supporting military exercises, missile
tracking tests, and demonstrating technology and process feasibility.
This accelerated timeline represents a necessary benchmark for space
acquisitions.
Overall, in the past 15 months we conducted a total of 9 National
Security Space Launch missions to provide critical capabilities to the
Nation.
launch
Our launch programs, National Security Space Launch (NSSL) and
Rocket Systems Launch Program (RSLP), evolved tremendously over the
past 5 years with unprecedented growth in the commercial launch market
and focus on the pacing challenge. We are adapting our procurement
strategies and concept of operations to best leverage emerging
commercial launch capabilities to meet warfighter needs across the DOD,
IC, and other mission partners. We totaled seven successful NSSL
launches in fiscal year 2022 and are on track to exceed that count this
fiscal year.
NSSL has a long and respected legacy of success, delivering
reliable medium and heavy space lift for our Nation's most complex
payloads and demanding orbits without fail. In NSSL Phase 2, we met the
congressional mandate to end United States reliance on Russian-made
engines by investing in new rocket technologies and expanding
competition. We drove down government launch costs and provided assured
access to space through two launch service providers (SpaceX and United
Launch Alliance) capable of meeting all reference orbits.
We are in an exciting period of transition as fiscal year 2024
marks the fifth and final order year of the NSSL Phase 2 contract in
which we are ordering 20 launch services for the Space Force and
National Reconnaissance Office (60 percent increase from fiscal year
2023) along with the launch support required to place critical
capabilities on orbit. Simultaneously, we are preparing for the next
NSSL procurement phase starting in fiscal year 2025. Building upon
Phase 2, Phase 3 pursues a dual-lane, hybrid approach to maximize
competition and use of the Nation's robust commercial launch industry
as we transition to more proliferated space architectures. NSSL Phase 3
will provide Assured Access to Space and protects capacity for the
DOD's less risk-tolerant missions with two fully certified launch
service providers in one lane while allowing emerging providers to
compete, when ready, for the DOD's more risk-tolerant missions in
another lane. This diversification produces a resilient launch
architecture that allows the Space Force to rapidly harness new
technological discoveries to improve launch reliability and success.
Complementary to NSSL, the RSLP focuses primarily on launching our
smaller payloads, e.g., suborbital targets, experimental,
demonstration, and allows us to meet the full spectrum of launch. We
have access to 11 different launch service providers through RSLP and
we are working to on-ramp more providers in the next year. Our ability
to use space effectively relies on maintaining assured access, being
the first to field necessary capabilities, and the ability to rapidly
reconstitute them, if necessary. In sum, our portfolio of launch
programs continues to push the envelope to accelerate launch timelines
to deliver integrated, resilient capabilities more rapidly whenever and
wherever needed.
FY 2024 marks the first time the Space Force has specifically
budgeted for Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS), acknowledging TacRS
as an emerging imperative. Importantly, TacRS is more than just launch
capability; it also includes the end-to-end mission for satellite,
ground capability, integration activities, and operations. Together,
these activities constitute a complete mission set required to deliver
a space capability to the warfighter in a rapid manner, on-demand to
either reconstitute or augment capabilities in a more contested
environment.
We successfully completed the first TacRS demonstration, Tactically
Responsive Launch-2, in June 2021 after building a demonstration
satellite in 12 months and launching it 21 days after call-up. For the
next demo, VICTUS NOX, we plan to build the satellite in 10 months and
only have a 3.5-day call-up (60-hour activation and launch within 24
hours of an operational need); VICTUS NOX is scheduled to launch this
summer. In fiscal year 2024, we are investing $60 million to
demonstrate a 24-hour notification to launch timeline and to develop
the operations, training, testing, acquisitions, concept of operations,
and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures required to establish an
enduring TacRS capability.
managing the space acquisition enterprise
The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and
Integration (SAF/SQ), a new role created by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, is singularly focused on
transforming the space acquisition enterprise to add speed to our
acquisitions and meet the growing threat posed by strategic
competition. There are three organizations with unique capabilities and
authorities that procure space capabilities for the Space Force: Space
Systems Command (SSC), Space Development Agency (SDA), and Space Rapid
Capabilities Office (SpRCO). Each has unique strengths and, in some
cases, unique statutory authorities. SAF/SQ manages their programs as
an integrated portfolio leveraging their strengths and authorities.
As the Space Service Acquisition Executive, SAF/SQ conducts reviews
with each of the portfolio leads (Program Executive Officers) every 2
weeks to discuss the status of programs within their purview. SAF/SQ
also holds Quarterly Program Reviews for a deeper program analysis.
During these quarterly reviews, the government program managers present
the technical, schedule, cost, and staffing status, open risks and
issues, upcoming activities, and an overall assessment of program
health. Based on the data from the quarterlies so far--the latest in
February 2023--we identified a few troubled programs to track more
closely. For those programs, the program office provides a biweekly
update on progress against a detailed schedule to get to a healthy
status. Holistically, these reviews enable the space acquisition
workforce to remain focused on delivering rapid, resilient, and
integrated capabilities to our warfighters, on cost and on schedule.
In October 2022, SAF/SQ issued strategic acquisition guidance to
the workforce, outlining Nine Space Acquisition Tenets. The tenets form
the basis of a new direction to transform our space acquisition
approach and refocus our space acquisition professionals on addressing
the threat in the next decade by emphasizing speed and program
management discipline. The tenets are:
1) Build Smaller Satellites, Smaller Ground Systems, and Minimize
Non-Recurring Engineering
2) Get the Acquisition Strategy Correct
3) Enable Teamwork Between Contracting Officer and Program Manager
4) Award Executable Contracts
5) Maintain Program Stability
6) Avoid SAPs and Over Classifying
7) Deliver Ground Before Launch
8) Hold Industry Accountable for Results
9) Execute--Deliver Capabilities that Work, and Deliver them on
Schedule and on Cost To emphasize how these tenets enable speed, SAF/SQ
derived a simple formula for going fast in space acquisition which
includes:
1) Build smaller systems
+2) Use existing technology designs to minimize non-recurring
engineering
+3) Drive contract scope to 3 years or less from start to launch
+4) Use fixed-price contracts
_______________________________________________________________________
= Mission Capabilities Faster to Our Warfighters
This simple formula is the cornerstone of our approach to build
resilient architectures faster with innately integrated capabilities.
Together, the tenets and formula provide the vision for how our space
acquisition workforce is approaching a transformation to the process of
delivering space capabilities to meet and outpace the growing threat
posed by strategic competitors.
Further, thanks to Congress, SAF/SQ chairs the Space Acquisition
Council (SAC) for the Department of Defense, and the CSO is a key
statutory member. The SAC has been a valuable tool to ensure
collaboration and integration while avoiding duplication of effort
across the entire national security space enterprise across all
Departments. Additionally, SAF/SQ chairs the Acquisition Strategy Panel
for all Space Force programs seeking acquisition strategy changes. This
forum allows us to evaluate newly proposed space systems, contracts,
and incentive strategies to ensure we optimize our approach to
acquisitions and that our portfolio of programs remains concentrated on
delivering resilient capabilities faster and more integrated with the
warfighter.
SAF/SQ is committed to using all the tools and authorities Congress
has provided, which are aiding us in speeding up space acquisition and
delivering capabilities to the warfighter rapidly and effectively. We
will continue to leverage Middle Tier of Acquisition to quickly
identify, prototype, and field innovative solutions to our challenging
problems. At the same time, we are using Other Transaction Authorities
to increase program flexibility, as well as the pool of possible
vendors. Overall, these tools and authorities enable us to use industry
practices to move faster, utilize non-traditional companies, expand
flexibility, and improve affordability. The priorities and tenets
enable our acquisition force to develop and acquire capabilities our
guardians and warfighters need to maintain readiness and deter the
threat posed by strategic competitors.
space force readiness
More Resilient and Effective Space Capabilities
As the CSO recently testified, the Space Force is accelerating its
pivot toward resilient satellite constellations, ground stations,
networks, and data links; informed by transformational force design
analysis. Space Force readiness, and the Department's broader
integrated deterrence emphasis, ultimately demands resilient space
systems and capabilities that effectively deter both on-orbit and
terrestrial threats. As such, most of the Space Force's on-orbit assets
must be proliferated, disaggregated, and distributed.
Through effective and efficient resilience, the Space Force will
not only ensure enduring access to space capabilities, but it will also
disincentivize and deter targeted aggression. The President's Fiscal
Year 2024 Budget Request demonstrates the Department's significant,
analytically informed investments in resilient systems. Planned
upgrades include military MW/MT, Space Data Transport, Command,
Control, Communications, and Battle Management (C3BM) systems, and
space-based targeting proliferated architecture that will be more
resilient during a strategic attack.
As always, the Space Force will continue to work closely with DOD
and IC stakeholders, as well as our allied and commercial partners, to
develop and deliver a digital engineering ecosystem that enables the
Space Force to rapidly mature innovative concepts into integrated
solutions and deliver warfighting capabilities faster.
Force Design
A key element of readiness are the capabilities inherent in the
systems the Space Force uses to execute its missions. The Space Force,
primarily through the Space Warfighting Analysis Center, executes a
force design process intended to assess future capabilities through the
lens of operational need, counter-space threat, and cost.
Additionally, in implementing the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2022, the Secretary of Defense designated the CSO
as the Force Design Architect for Space Systems of the Armed Forces. In
this new role, the CSO presents the Secretary of Defense with
coordinated space-mission force design recommendations for the Armed
Forces. Such recommendations are informed by high-fidelity modeling and
analysis which balance warfighting performance, resilience against
potential adversaries, and affordability. Recommendations include a
transition plan to position the Department to make programmatic and
budgetary decisions related to science and technology investments,
force development, and acquisition. Current force design priorities are
space data transport and tactical targeting--both of which are vital to
prevailing in high intensity conflicts.
Operational Test and Training Infrastructure
At its very core, Space Force readiness requires our systems and
operators to be ready for full spectrum operations in a contested space
domain. And while our organizational structures and processes increase
our ability to assess and sustain readiness levels, the Space Force
needs an appropriate infrastructure to adequately conduct test and
evaluation, advanced training, and tactics development activities
against a thinking adversary to effectively deliver readiness
generation.
In previous testimony before this subcommittee, we described the
Space Force's operating concept and core elements of its Operational
Test and Training Infrastructure (OTTI). OTTI is an ``umbrella'' term,
describing a collection of distributed, enterprise-wide test and
training systems and processes, effectively integrated and synchronized
to establish and sustain combat readiness across the spectrum of
conflict. It aggregates multiple program elements and their associated
activities, programs, capabilities, and funding.
Space Force's current OTTI is a loose federation of systems that
build proficiency and procedural currency for a benign environment--it
does not build warfighting capacity demanded by the current and
emerging strategic environment. The Space Force does not yet have the
ability to present realistic threat-stimuli to missions specific
trainers; conduct integrated--both intra-service and joint--training;
or visualize and ``experience'' the domain.
That said, Congress's strong support for Space Force's OTTI efforts
has greatly accelerated these priorities, and the Space Force continues
to make significant strides in developing and implementing its planned
OTTI architecture, governance structure, and resourcing strategy, which
is appropriately reflected in the President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget
Request and in the Department's Future Years Defense Program.
Readiness and Training
The Space Force continues to prioritize and advance our updated
readiness, training, and force generation initiatives. The new Space
Force Generation model, SPAFORGEN, reached Initial Operational
Capability on October 1, 2022, and cycles guardians through three
phases to increase individual and overall force readiness. The
``Prepare'' and ``Ready'' phases afford guardians with the time and
capacity for training to develop the tools, skills, and capabilities
necessary for mission execution in a contested domain against a
thinking adversary. This includes both operational procedures and high-
end training to certify forces for contested operations in space.
As part of SPAFORGEN, Space Training and Readiness Command
(STARCOM) is making great strides to prepare space forces to prevail in
conflict, if deterrence fails, through innovative education, training,
doctrine, and testing. Last August, STARCOM completed the first and
largest to-date of a new series of exercises that included both live
and simulated events to test combat tactics of our Total Force
including both Guardians and Air National Guard space professionals. As
we move forward, STARCOM will continue to increase space-related
content and engagement for guardians in Basic Military Training (BMT);
Non-Commissioned Officer Academy; United States Air Force Academy;
Officer Training School (OTS); and Reserve Officer Training Corps.
Force Presentation to Combatant Commands
The Space Force presents space capabilities that underpin all
instruments of our national power. Pursuant to law, the Space Force
retains the responsibility to organize, train, and equip space forces.
To that end, the Space Force generates and presents ready space forces
to Combatant Commands to deter aggression and, if necessary, prevail in
conflict.
Our SPAFORGEN model ensures that forces presented to Combatant
Commands can execute missions and tasks and are equipped to make
appropriate recommendations on the effective employment, task
organization, operational synchronization, and command relationships of
space forces. Unlike the previous force generation model, the new
approach packages forces into optimized capabilities-based elements and
standardizes the way we present forces to the Combatant Commanders.
To ensure full integration and synchronization of space activities
with other domains in combatant commands' areas of responsibility in
2022, the Space Force activated three new component field commands for
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Forces Korea.
Component field command guardians provide space planning and employment
expertise, as well as command and control for the combatant commanders.
Unit/Mission Transfers
In accordance with existing statute and congressional intent, the
DOD continues to transfer fully mission-capable space operational
units, support equipment, property, and related resources from other
services and organizations to the Space Force with no mission
degradation or adverse personnel impact.
In fiscal year 2022, the U.S. Army transferred its Satellite
Payload, Planning, Management, & Control function, which included five
Wideband Satellite Communications Operations Centers, four Regional
Satellite Communications Support Centers, Consolidated Satellite
Communication Systems Experts, and 502 associated manpower
authorizations (302 military/200 civilian). The transfer of this
function and associated resources is directly in line with the USSF
Military Satellite Communications mission.
Additionally, in accordance with Title 10, United States Code,
Section 9086, the DOD successfully transferred the SDA to the Space
Force. The Space Force continues to ensure SDA's seamless integration
within the service and remains steadfast in its commitment to ensure
adequate resourcing and manning.
Looking forward, in fiscal year 2024, the United States Army
intends to transfer its Theater Missile Warning Battlespace
Characterization (TMW-BC) functions, including four Joint Tactical
Ground Station (JTAGS) locations (Osan, Misawa, Al Udeid, Sigonella),
one skill qualification Training Suite, the JTAGS Product Office (JPO),
and 97 associated manpower positions to the Space Force. The transfer
of this function and associated resources is directly associated with
the Space Force's Missile Warning mission. The Space Force already
operates the SBIRS constellation and Strategic Missile Warning ground
infrastructure; adding the Theater Missile Warning function will
consolidate global Missile Warning under one military Service.
Integration with Allies and Partners
Allies and Partners represent a significant advantage for the
United States. Our strategic competitors do not have the potential for
establishing the coalitions and cooperation that the U.S. can
establish. This is especially true in the space domain. The Space Force
continuously engages with our allied and partner spacefaring nations to
guarantee shared military, civil, and industrial success in space.
Especially as our competitors continue to demonstrate threatening
actions within the space domain, it remains imperative that the United
States deepen our existing ties with Allies and Partners to maintain
space stability. As the CSO has stated, spacepower is a collective
endeavor, and the Space Force is prioritizing partnerships most likely
to deliver combat ready forces and capability to allow the United
States and our allies to deter aggression, and if deterrence fails,
prevail in a fight.
Space Force is executing the CSO's Partner to Win Line of Effort
which states we cannot succeed without robust joint, coalition,
international, interagency, academic, and commercial partnerships. We
are striving to eliminate barriers to collaboration in any form, to
include over classification and incompatible systems. The Space Force
must also prioritize direct collaboration and placing guardians in
positions where such collaboration can organically strengthen. To that
end, in January 2023 the Space Force published its Guidance for Global
Partnerships, which directs the service and all its components to
evolve from data-sharing agreements to operations integration, payload
sharing, and mission sharing, where appropriate. Further, the Space
Force continues to lead international Space Engagement Talks, and
efforts to share our force design analysis, which are identifying
focused resource commitments that allow trusted partners to share the
burden of delivering combat-ready space forces and the spectrum of
worldwide capabilities.
Weapon System Sustainment
Space Force Weapon System Sustainment directly supports Space
Force's ability to sustain the day-to-day readiness of 52 weapon
systems performing Space missions, to include Sensing, Navigation,
Satellite Communications, Space Domain Awareness, Battlefield Command &
Control, and Space Control. The President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget
Request supports missions to provide space capabilities to the joint
force while balancing Service priorities and managing risk. This
position takes a predictive planning and proactive approach to
mitigating obsolescence as our future requirements continue to grow due
to increasing costs for hardware, software, and cybersecurity
maintenance driven by aging space systems.
Facilities and Infrastructure Investment
Space Force Facility, Restoration, Modernization and Military
Construction total obligation authority enables the Service to
prioritize requirements to reduce risk to mission and the force.
Structural, electrical, and power improvements to operational
facilities reduces risk to mission and enables our joint and coalition
partners in the fight, while quality of life infrastructure and
facility improvements reduce risk to the force by improving resiliency
amongst our guardians, airmen, and their families. The Space Force
derives almost all of its support from the Air Force, including
logistics, security, medical services, and human resources; however,
Space Force's ability to prioritize its unique requirements at our 14
installations, more than 70 sites, and other geographically separated
units ensures we appropriately align responsibility, resources,
accountability, and authorities for the Space Force to execute assigned
missions as an independent service.
Space Force's top installation priorities include sustaining
critical facilities and infrastructure that enable the full spectrum of
missions--from launch and command and control to post-launch and into
the operational phase of sustaining 52 Space Force Weapons Systems.
The President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request reflects an
increase from last year due to the Service prioritizing projects that
reduce risk to Space and Combatant Command missions at Pituffik Space
Base, and the Eastern and Western Ranges to support Assured Access to
Space. Moving forward, the Space Force will continue to prioritize
projects that increase facility and infrastructure resiliency and
Service readiness.
conclusion
The rich history of America's space endeavors is defined by
determination, persistence, and willingness to innovate. Now is the
time to invest in accelerating such innovation and fielding the
capabilities to our warfighters to deter those who seek to disrupt such
endeavors. We will strive to maintain access to, through, and from
space in order to preserve the benefits that the domain provides for
all nations.
The Department of the Air Force and the United States Space Force
have made good progress in transforming our space architecture to be
more resilient, more integrated, and more capable.
We must ensure that we field the greatest fighting force, systems,
and capabilities necessary to deter potential adversaries from acts of
aggression and, if necessary, defeat them in conflict. Our innovative
approaches to space systems acquisition and integration will sustain
our advantage in space and allow our Nation to pursue groundbreaking
civil, military, and commercial capabilities.
As our strategic competitors, specifically China and Russia,
continue to make significant space-related advances that seek to
threaten our freedom of movement, maintaining our strategic edge has
never been more critical. Destructive direct-ascent antisatellite
missile tests, hypersonic and maneuverable missile demonstrations, and
a host of dangerous behaviors by our strategic competitors require the
Department of the Air Force and the Space Force to be prepared to
protect and defend our national security interests in space--through a
resilient, reliable, and effective set of space capabilities. Our
competitors seem to have figured out speed. We must do the same.
Thank you to the Committee for your dedication to the Department of
the Air Force and our United States Space Force. We look forward to
your questions.
Senator King. Thank you very much. Following up on your
last comment, you talked about the Authorization Act. How about
a budget? Would a continuing resolution be a problem for the
priorities that you all have identified?
General Thompson. Senator King, it would. As a specific
example, as you noted, our budget has grown by almost $4
billion it includes----
Senator King. That would be gone--and that would be gone
and that would be the solution.
General Thompson. That would be gone. One example is that
our missile warning, missile tracking enterprise is vital to
tracking the hypersonic threats that are growing from Russia
and China. That budget doubles from 2023 to 2024. We are on a
path to rapidly field that by 2027. That schedule would
immediately be called into question with a continuing
resolution.
Senator King. I asked the Secretary of Air Force this
morning if a continuing resolution would be a threat to our
national security. His answer was absolutely. Do you agree with
that assessment?
General Thompson. Yes, Senator, I do.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Plumb, every question I think
of has a classified side to it, so we have to be careful. This
is an open hearing. But our adversaries are not only putting up
satellites for traditional communications intelligence work but
have a military aspect. Is that correct?
Dr. Plumb. Absolutely correct. They are putting up systems
to attack our satellites and they are putting up systems to
help them target our Joint Force.
Senator King. Isn't it true that in a conflict, this would
be the first beachhead would be space, to try to blind us, in
effect?
Dr. Plumb. There are many people that think that sir. I
mean, that is certainly one theory of how a conflict might
progress.
Senator King. In your budget, which you outline--you went
down, and I didn't--I may have missed it, but I didn't hear a
specific line for R&D. Is that part of your----
Dr. Plumb. It is. I didn't have a specific call out but--in
dollar size in my statement. But there is significant science
and technology, and research and development investment.
Senator King. Because if ever there was an area that would
require ongoing R&D investment, it would seem to me this one.
Dr. Plumb. Yes, sir, and many of those are, of course,
classified.
Senator King. And you talked about resilience, and one of
the key strategies is proliferation. In case of a conflict,
what would be the relationship between our Strategic Forces and
the commercial satellite industry?
Amazon is putting up a whole fleet, Starlink is up, and of
course, there are multiple other private sector satellites. Is
there a pre-established relationship? For example, in TRANSCOM
[United States Transportation Command], we have a relationship
with airlines and shipping agencies that in time of conflict
they will be available to us.
Do we have similar relationships with the commercial
satellite industry?
Dr. Plumb. Senator, let me just take that in two parts. You
asked about Strategic Forces. When you say that I hear nuclear.
As far as----
Senator King. I wasn't using it in that sense.
Dr. Plumb. Okay. For that, that would be really an
inherently Government problem to make sure nuclear command
control is protected. As far as relationship with commercial
industry and how can we ensure access to their products, to
their imagery, just for an example, through a conflict?
I will just say the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy
Secretary are both invested in this question. They have tasked
really all of us and more, including NRO [National
Reconnaissance Office], to look at this and get back to them on
ways to go forward. A lot of those answers are currently in the
way different contracts are structured.
I don't know, Senator, if Mr. Calvelli would want to weigh
in, but we are working on this across the Department, and I
will just offer that perhaps in late summer we could come back
up and give you kind of a coordinated answer as to where we are
along each component.
Senator King. Thank you.
Mr. Calvelli. Yes, the folks at Space Systems Command are
actually looking at sort of a craft like model for space and
how we would take advantage of that, and trying to figure out
which are the mission areas like SATCOM, or satellite
communications, or even space domain awareness that we could
take advantage of. Like Secretary Plumb said, we are looking at
that now.
Senator King. General Thompson, you touched on this. One of
your tenants is partnering to win. Space strikes me as an area
where cooperation with allies would have value instead of
having to reinvent everything, we do every launch. Is that an
ongoing process to develop a kind of space Five Eyes, if you
will?
General Thompson. It is. In fact, Secretary Plumb hosts a
forum that we call the Combined Space Operations Initiative
that has been going on for more than a decade. It includes not
only the Five Eyes partner, but we have expanded to other like-
minded allies, Germany and France and Japan and even folks like
South Korea. The idea is exactly that.
First of all, is not only do we not want to provide all the
capabilities, we can no longer afford to provide all of the
capabilities ourselves. In the area of combined operations and
system acquisition and other things, we work with them
consistently and continuously.
Senator King. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Plumb,
I appreciated our conversation yesterday about the problem of
over classification, particularly with respect to intelligence
derived from space-based programs.
I think we have to strike a better balance between keeping
our sources and methods protected and also then letting the
American people know and understand the true nature and the
severity of the threats that we face as a Nation.
Do you share these concerns? If you do, I hope you do, if
you do, how do we then more effectively be able to share that
information with allies?
Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator. I do share your concerns,
and also know the right answer when told. As far as how to
share classified information better, first of all, I deeply
appreciated our conversation yesterday on this.
I will just say here for the record that a lot of the
issues we look at when we try to figure out how to do closer
space cooperation, even with our closest allies, really comes
down to the ability to share some types of classified
information.
A lot of classified information is not actually DOD
originated. It often originates from different parts of the
intelligence community, and so we need to be able to
collaborate very closely with our partners in the IC
[intelligence community] to kind of break down these legacy
barriers that really are legacy systems, not designed for
fighting or for operationally relevant speeds, and find a way
to be able to share those portions of those types of classified
information that are needed for combined space operations.
We are working on it, but it is hard, and it does require a
tight collaboration. But I do think that right now is the right
time. We have got the right partners in the IC, and we have got
a good collaboration, I would say, across the board here and
working on it.
Senator Fischer. I would be happy to work with you on that
as well. I think the world we live in is going to require speed
and in being able to share information, not just within our
Government, but with our allies as well. And----
Senator King. Not the 21-year-old National Guardsman----
Senator Fischer. No, Senator King, but with the people that
need to know--with the people that need to know who are with us
in the event that we would need to rely on our allies even
more. What steps are you taking right now to change that
culture of over classification? Or what do you believe should
be the first steps?
Dr. Plumb. Senator, I have run a series of high-level
meetings with Pentagon stakeholders on this. I have been out
communicating with both the--not just Pentagon--Government
stakeholders on this. Been communicating with allies within the
building, with my partners in the IC, and both here and at the
White House, on the urgency of this. I am not the only person
carrying this message and so I think it is gaining steam.
I think making sure that we have a way to develop a plan
forward and understand that everything won't be solved at once,
but we need to start with some test cases. I think from where I
sit, and the General already referenced the combined space
operations initiative that I chair.
I think that is the right place to start from where I sit.
There can be other bilateral pieces, but to be able to do a
multilateral operation would really be, I think, a real
testament to our ability to show that we have moved past legacy
systems and sharing plans.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Thompson, how are Space
Force's ongoing efforts to integrate itself with Joint Force
progressing? I understand that Space Force is still in the
process of establishing some component commands with the
combatant commands, and can you provide us with an update on
how that process is coming along?
General Thompson. Yes, Senator Fischer. Actually, we
established the first three of our Space Force component
commands late last year. The first one was with Indo-Pacific
Command and Admiral Aquilino in November, rapidly followed by
Space Force--or by United States forces Korea and United States
Central Command.
We focused on those three areas first, as you might
imagine, because of the pacing challenge and the fight we are
in today in the Middle East. We have also been deeply engaged
with United States European Command. We are in the final stages
of working with them.
In that regard, it is not just a matter of United States
commands because of the need to establish that in Europe or
after an overseas force structure request. But we have also
been from the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, our guardians
who are out there have been working both with our forces and
with NATO allies in terms of integrating space capabilities
effectively.
Senator Fischer. Do you feel good about the progress that
you have made there?
General Thompson. I do.
Senator Fischer. Do you feel that you have learned some
good lessons?
General Thompson. Absolutely. Yes, Senator. I think we have
learned some that we could share here. I think our force design
moving toward proliferation is proving to be valid. I think we
have learned a lot about the integration of commercial
capabilities.
I think both on our side and on with commercial companies,
I think we have some things to work on together there. But it
has been a--we have learned a lot of lessons and work to do as
a result of that interaction.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator King. Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. General Thompson, as we look at the
national security launch schedule, do you feel confident that
the schedule is going to keep us ahead of China?
General Thompson. Senator, from the standpoint of national
security needs, absolutely. I will tell you, though, our launch
ranges are at this point in time about at their limit. We have
actually--we are actually approaching, I think, 16 we had in--
launches in 2022.
The vast majority of those were actually commercial
launches. And I think in order--if we were going to be able to
meet the commercial sector with the growth that they forecast,
we are going to need to make some more additional investments
in our launch range.
We have got a legislative proposal to let them help share
some of that cost burden. But I would say we are on a path
today, and assuming that we can continue that path, the launch
capacity of the Nation will absolutely allow us to keep pace
with China.
Senator Tuberville. Would you like to answer that Secretary
Calvelli?
Mr. Calvelli. I disagree with what--I totally agree with
General Thompson's statement, so--he is correct.
Senator Tuberville. General Thompson, we have got in this
year's budget Space Force, $19 billion for research and
development (R&D), $4.7 for procurement. If you had a crystal
ball, how long is it going to take us to get balance set up? I
know there is a lot to space and this new frontier. We all know
that.
General Thompson. Well, Senator, and that is a reflection
of our nature for a very, very long time, because we have
bought so many--for so many years, we bought a relatively small
number of very sophisticated satellites.
For years, we have tended toward the research, development,
test, and evaluation funding versus procurement. But I believe
in the switch over to these proliferating constellations.
We have a force design right now for 120 low Earth
orbiting, about 16 medium Earth orbit satellites for missile
warning, missile tracking. I think you will see as a result of
that activity, we are going to probably shift a whole lot more
to a smaller investment percentage in R&D teaming and start
ramping up production very quickly.
You will probably see the same thing in--as we work with
the NRO on ground moving target indication, air moving target
indication, and some of the other constellations as well.
Senator Tuberville. But we see China moving faster. You see
us being able to catch up?
General Thompson. I do. I would tell you that in the last
several years, I have gone from very concerned to confident
that we can given that we stay on the trajectory we are on.
Senator Tuberville. Mr. Secretary, for the evaluation
criteria you recently released in the draft request for the
proposal for phase three of the National Security Space Launch
Program, properly cites table performances, past performances
as top criteria to choose your next launch providers for your
5-year block back cost is a secondary factor.
Within the stated criterion by limiting, it to just two
providers in the block, aren't you just creating another 5-year
block buy for the two incumbent carriers?
Senator Tuberville. The nice thing about the phase three
strategy is that includes dual lanes and two separate
contracting approaches. Lane one consists of about half the
launches, is for more than two providers.
In fact, we are anticipating ramping on to IDIQ [Indefinite
Delivery, Indefinite Quantity] approach, maybe 5 to 7, or 6 to
9 kind of providers that can launch more commercial like
missions. Then lane two is very similar to what we have today
in contract or phase two where we have got two providers that
would be able to provide our most stressing, high energy,
complex missions to orbit to a variety of orbits.
I am actually--given that we have got the two contracts
rising two lanes, I think it opens up a more folks to be able
to compete.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Secretary Plumb, U.S. policy
is to have at least two space launch vehicles to launch DOD and
NRO satellites. Space has changed a lot in the last 20 years
since the law was written in 2004.
Meanwhile, the demand for launch vehicles, commercial,
civil, and defense, has skyrocketed. Would you like to see at
least three space launch vehicles for assured access?
Dr. Plumb. Senator, thank you for the question. I know the
laws are in this, too. I am aware of a study from some time ago
that suggested three would be better. The NSL is really the
purview of my colleagues here. But generally speaking, I do
think that getting to the place where you can have more
providers to certain orbits, if not all of them, is a good step
in the right direction.
Senator Tuberville. He has handed it off to you then,
Secretary.
Mr. Calvelli. You know, I really--and actually enjoyed our
conversation this morning. You have given me some things to
think about and I can get back to you on that.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank Mr. Chair.
Senator King. Senator Cramer
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all
of you for being here. General Thompson, you will be
disappointed, I know, if I didn't bring up PARCS [Perimeter
Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System] radar
modernization.
As I listened to Secretary Calvelli talk about the
transition and, of course, this wonderful piece about the
transition to a more modern architecture, during that
transition, some legacy pieces need to be improved upon.
Maybe I would start with you, and then, Secretary, you
could followup on what do you think--how do you see the PARCS
integrating into this transition to the new architecture?
General Thompson. Senator Cramer, right now, our challenge
with all of those, PARCS is one, we have got four other large
ground-based radars, is understanding how they fit into the
future.
The first is when you talk about missile warning and
missile tracking and hypersonic vehicles, because we are no
longer in an era of ballistic missiles, we are now in an era of
maneuvering vehicles, we are going to have to understand how
those warning systems contribute and how they need to be
changed or perhaps improved to be able to adjust to that.
The second piece is to continue to evaluate how they fit
into our overall space domain awareness enterprise. Those
sensors play a tremendous role in keeping track of all the
objects in orbit.
What we need to do is understand how we are using them
today and what improvements can be made to continue in the
future. But right now, it is a matter of thoughtful design and
investment before we commit large dollars to how we are going
to modernize.
Senator Cramer. That is a good point, and Secretary, you
can followup, but as I think about, I think, are we talking
about something that is like a stopgap during the transition,
or are we talking about something that becomes a dynamic part
of the future? I suspect that is part of what you are still
trying to discover, but.
Mr. Calvelli. Yes, thanks to Congress, there was an upward
of $3 million in 2023 that we are using to help digitize some
components. And I think you will find in our 2024 POM [Program
Objective Memorandum], a $6.4 million additional dollars to
continue to renovate the PARCS radar systems.
Senator Cramer. Yes, unless somebody has seen it, you
almost can't believe what you are talking about in terms of
just digitizing the images is a big deal.
So anyway, as you know, watch it carefully. Grateful that
you were able to get some more money to do that. But at the
same time, I am not advocating we waste it, so I appreciate the
thoughtful approach.
The acquisition timeline. The timeline is going to get back
to that--I know all of you have something to say about that,
particularly rapid acquisition. As I said this morning in the
briefing, I mean, the reason we stood up Space Force--not the
reason, but we still have Space Force and SDA specifically with
some ability--a white sheet of paper, like I like to say, a
white sheet of paper, not bound to too many traditions.
And of course, the juxtaposition and the important role
that the private sector in commercial space plays is both
helpful to that, but we could do a lot to arm it as well. So
maybe elaborate, Secretary, both Secretary Plumb, Secretary
Calvelli on the acquisition timeline is, how we can be more
helpful.
I want to be the guy that watches it, has appropriate
oversight, but that doesn't get in the way and become the
gotcha person. In other words, do it well, report regularly. If
things need to change, yes, change quickly.
Mr. Calvelli. The trick is to quit building big, right----
Senator Cramer. Yes.
Mr. Calvelli. Big satellites take time. It doesn't matter
if you even have an existing design, big satellites take a long
time to go build. The fundamental model we need to drive to is
to build much smaller systems, to use existing technology, and
do it on about 3 year's center.
So, from contract start to launch in about 3 years, and
then what we will find by doing that is not only will we gain
speed, but we will do technology refresh dramatically faster
because every 3 years or updating the technology.
Compared to today, where we might build a satellite over 7
to 9 years, and then upgrading that technology till the next
block which is another 7 to 9 years. So, you are taking 15
years to upgrade the technology. We can move faster, get more
on orbit, and upgrade technology faster by building smaller,
and that is what we are driving to go do.
Senator Cramer. Yes. Who would have ever thought that
rockets and satellites would be a commodity? I mean, really
with what you guys are doing in space, if that could be
duplicated with the other systems that would do better than the
other way around. Secretary Plumb.
Dr. Plumb. Yes, Senator. I would just add to what Mr.
Calvelli said, which is, you asked how you could help, and I
think, moving at speed is really important. I think it is going
to unlock things we haven't even considered yet.
But we should also remember that if we are going to buy a
lot more things and move faster, that some of those things may
fail, and we cannot afford to have systems shut down because
some small percentage of them failed.
I think that has been the tendency for large, exquisite
systems, which has added cost and time. When we try to move
faster, we are going to have to have some tolerance for failure
in there so we can keep moving fast.
Senator Cramer. Well, that is where the R&D question was--
again, all of this has to work together. We don't want to ever
stop innovating, obviously. Wasn't it Napoleon that said, the
logical conclusion of defense is defeat? Being a Viking fan, I
am very familiar with the concept. But yes, we want you to be
nimble with appropriate oversight, and I hear you loud and
clear. Thank you.
Senator King. Senator Rounds is returning from the vote,
and Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Calvelli, to followup on the acquisition discussion that we had
here, you have some tools that are available to be able to
utilize that rapid acquisition like the OTA and mid-tier
acquisition.
Can you tell me how much focus is being given to software
and ground systems on acquisition to help us better operate the
satellites?
Senator Cramer.
[Technical problems]--making sure that we have our ground
systems, our software systems in place is really critical to
speed. We have a history, unfortunately, of delivering
satellites to orbit and not having the ground or the user
equipment ready to go.
And so, I put out, when I put out my guidance, one of my
key things I put in there was deliver ground before a launch.
And I think the way we do that is we need to get away from
building very large software developments and break things up
into more manageable pieces that can be more quickly done.
I think when Government tries to build large monolithic
software systems, we all tend to struggle with that. So, build
smaller.
Senator Fischer. The history of the acquisition programs of
the Air Force isn't necessarily a good one, you know, with
overruns and late. Do you feel confident that that program, if
you build smaller ones, is going to be able to help?
Mr. Calvelli. I do. And I think also----
Senator Fischer. Is that going to be your main focus or are
you looking at other areas as well?
Mr. Calvelli. For software? I think taking advantage of
cloud computing is important, especially commercial clouds.
There are a lot of great environments out there from commercial
companies, and the intelligence community has done a lot of
great work in cloud computing, and the Department Defense is
moving in that direction as well.
I think again, moving software into small, manageable
pieces is something to help out. So, you get into the fact
where you run applications on the cloud environment, as opposed
to building your own solutions.
I think that is a big help. I think just a fundamental
focus on program management discipline, which is basically
really focusing the team on delivering on schedule and
delivering on cost is an important facet of that as well.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator King. One point on cloud, I think all of us assume
that there is greater security in the cloud because it is a
larger entity.
I think we have to be careful with that assumption because
even though it may be more secure, if an adversary penetrates
that security, they hit the jackpot because there is so much
data there.
So, cybersecurity has to be a high priority. Even though we
are dealing with the cloud, we can't be lulled by the assumed
cyber defenses of the cloud. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Plumb, first
of all, I want to thank you for being one of the first leaders
in the Department of Defense to speak out very publicly about
the concern with the sale of certain portions of the
electromagnetic spectrum, particularly that which is a 3.1 to
3.45 gigahertz, or the S-band area.
I appreciate what you have said. I think that gave a lot of
other people confidence to speak up as well about how serious
that part is, and the fact that we really need to get this
assessment completed before we start deciding that we are going
to sell parts of that asset, and I thank you for that.
I would also like to just ask, Dr. Plumb, the Commander of
Space Command cited space domain awareness as the Command's top
priority amid escalating threats from China and Russia in his
March 2022 testimony in front of the Committee.
What is DOD's assessment of its current ability to maintain
the space domain awareness required to predict potential
adversary activity?
Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator. I would just say thank you
also for your continued conversation on spectrum.
On space domain awareness, I think we probably have
agreement at this table, and I hope you will ask my colleagues
here, that we need to be doing better. I think there is a
recognition that, one, there is a lot more things in space now,
and a lot more players in space now, and a lot more things that
are maneuvering constantly in space now.
To be able to have an understanding of all of that and be
able to pick out which pieces could be a threat in one time or
attract pieces of interest is hard. The kind of legacy systems
that we have, that we publish, these two elements are not
suitable for that job, and I think the Department is looking
hard at this.
I might ask General Thompson if he has----
General Thompson. Senator, a couple of things in that
regard. First of all, I will start by saying that nobody does,
and nobody can do space domain awareness today the way U.S.
Space Force and Armed Forces to U.S. Space Command do. However,
you are right, and the Commander of U.S. Space Command is
right, it is not good enough for what we need. And so, a couple
of things we are doing in that regard.
First is an increased number of sensors that we are putting
in space to get a whole lot more data on what is happening. One
example is the deep space advanced radar concept that operates
in the 3 gigahertz band.
Senator Rounds. Specifically, the area that we are
concerned with.
General Thompson. Correct. The second is using others'
data, partners' and allies' commercial data. Then the third is
really applying AI [artificial intelligence] and machine
learning to help sense and make sense of all that data so that
we do exactly what you are describing.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Secretary Calvelli, I really
appreciate our conversations earlier today. I would like to
just walk this through a little bit.
As I told General Saltzman this morning, I have gone on
record many times regarding my concern about the DOD's approach
to providing space based, ground and moving target indication
capabilities to tactical DOD users, following the divestment of
the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System]
platform.
We supported the divestment of that under the assumption
that we would have this space capability available. I am even
more concerned now as it is my understanding that funding for
this capability was moved to the military intelligence program
and out of Space Force funding lines.
This is a program that was developed for a tactical title
10 mission executed by the Space Force in support of the Joint
Force to provide target tracking in custody of immediate
effects. This means life and death for folks on the front line.
Now, we do not have to get into the fine details here, but
can you share with me how you are assuring that the JROC [Joint
Requirements Oversight Council] validated requirements are
captured in the acquisitions process of a platform whose
acquisition is executed by the intelligence community as
opposed to the title 10 DOD community? Will the DOD maintain
milestone authority?
Mr. Calvelli. Yes, sir. On the good news side, the Space
Force, we are writing what is known as this capability
description documents. We are also writing the concept of
employment. And we will own those, and those match up with the
JROC requirements, and those will be allocated to the IC to
execute.
So that is a good thing. The DOD will remain milestone in
authority. I believe it is at the Undersecretary to build a
plans level for now. The good news about this approach is this
really fits my priority of speed, speed, and speed.
The IC had an existing design that we could scale up and we
can get there years earlier with, and that was really a
deciding factor for partnering with them. And also, the IC has
other assets in their constellation that we need to augment and
integrate in with at GMTI to make it even more useful for the
troops.
From a speed perspective, it is a win for the Department.
We are going to control the requirements. We will control
milestone decision authority. It should be a really great
partnership that is going to enable us to get capability to the
warfighter much faster than we had originally planned.
Senator Rounds. In plain English, priority will be for the
tactical needs when lives are at stake.
Mr. Calvelli. Correct.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Senator Rounds, you can continue if you wish.
Senator Gillibrand is on the way. I just received a note. If
you have further questions.
Senator Rounds. Well, I would just add one--here is Senator
Gillibrand right now, so I will defer to Senator Gillibrand as
she is ready to go.
Senator Gillibrand. Yes.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rounds. If----
Senator Gillibrand. Questions--okay. At the start of
Russian's renewed invasion of Ukraine last year, Russian forces
targeted a satellite operation with a cyber-attack to degrade
communications during the initial invasion.
Since then, Russia has targeted Starlink systems relied on
by Ukraine. Increasingly, commercial providers play critical
roles in our space program, and the Space Force is exploring
the idea of a commercial augmentation space reserve. From a
policy perspective at DOD, how should we approach hostile acts
against U.S. commercial space assets?
Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator. First of all, we are looking
throughout the Department at how to engage and maintain
relationships with these commercial partners that we have, and
we are trying to develop more of those.
One of the questions we have to be faced with is, how can
we guarantee access to their products in a time of crisis or
conflict? We are looking at a number of ways we could do that
and how we might do that. A lot of these pieces are being
solved maybe contract by contract.
We say one basic thing is being able to share threat
information with commercial partners. We have some mechanisms
for that, both through the NSA [National Security Agency] and
through other places to allow us to share the classified level
threat activities so they are aware, and our goal is to make
sure that that is actionable.
In other words, it is no good to say Russia is interested
in coming after Starlink. That doesn't tell Starlink anything
useful, and they already know that. If we have specific
information that they can take action on.
As we look at this across the Department, there are efforts
underway through the Air Force, through the Space Force--I am
sorry, through the Department of the Air Force, through the
Space Force in policy, at NRO, and I have already offered to
some senators, but I am hoping to come back in late summer with
an explanation of kind of where we are in all of those lines of
effort. It is a new, but we are seized with this in the
building.
Senator Gillibrand. The example I used was an international
example. But if it happened to a U.S. domestic provider for
supplies for troops abroad, let's say in Guam or in Hawaii, do
you have the ability to be the point person for those
particular contracts with the private sector?
Dr. Plumb. I do not have any contract authority. Certainly,
Secretary Calvelli has some, but I have no contract authority.
Senator Gillibrand. I think it is--we just had a hearing on
this topic about the first 3 months of a cyber-conflict with
China and how they would attack critical infrastructure around
the country, but also supply chains and critical supply chains
for the military.
One thought that I have is that you should have MOUs
[Memorandums of Understanding] in place in advance, that you
can--you have agreements that they will not only share cyber
intel, but they will work with you in a cyber-defense capacity.
Something like that with Starlink in advance of the Russian
conflict would have meant that you could immediately go in,
tell them what is happening, give them guidance, and make sure
they can continue to do the work that is necessary for the
defeat of Russia. Is that something that the DOD should look
at?
Dr. Plumb. Madam Senator, I would say we already are, and a
lot of it driven by--certainly, we have thought about it for
years, but Ukraine has definitely amped up the understanding
that on both sides as to what that would really look like and
the considerations.
I would tell you, the General Counsel of the Department of
the Air Force is helping us with the ideas of contractual, but
other policy implications that they are also working with us to
sort out.
Senator Gillibrand. I find in these conversations that the
DOD is more comfortable if these things are happening abroad.
But that same comfort level needs to be if it is happening
domestically, because if it is your supply chain as
warfighters, it is going to be a huge problem.
Being able to be very facile with domestic targets that are
being attacked by China, Russia, or Iran, to--that you need to
do--to conduct defense or warfighting, you need to have the
same ability to be able to reach out to those private sector
participants, to say, we need your commitment and we need your
first in line commitment in a time of war or at a time of
adversarial attacks from a nation State.
Do you agree with that?
General Thompson. Ma'am, speaking from a standpoint of
commercial space companies, absolutely, and that is the
conversation we are having with them. I can't speak to the
larger supply chain and other elements of----
Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Plumb.
Dr. Plumb. In one of my hats, ma'am, I also do
cybersecurity and these pieces are also--we are working on this
very same problem set with the defense industrial base and
providers through cyber. There is a good relationship being
built there because you are correct, we need to be able to move
fast and it is geography independent.
Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Calvelli.
Mr. Calvelli. I agree with you, ma'am. The more we can
share across the board in terms of these kind of things across
the private sector and with the Government, the faster we can
respond.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. I think Senator Gillibrand has a good point
that these arrangements should be made in advance, not on the
fly in the middle of conflict. MOUs, as she suggests--I commend
that suggestion. This completes our hearing. We all have--how
long until questions?
Senator Fischer. Two weeks.
Voice. A week?
Voice. Close of business, tomorrow?
Senator King. Close of business, Thursday afternoon for
additional questions, additional statements from the witnesses.
Thank you very much, gentlemen, for joining us today, and for
the work that you are doing on behalf of our country. The
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
emerging technologies
1. Senator Rosen. Secretary Calvelli, utilizing emerging
technologies like machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) to
maintain and build our space capabilities is a critical component in
combating our adversaries' counter-space capabilities. What are the
innovative ways the Department of Defense (DOD) is leveraging data and
AI to boost U.S. space capabilities, and have such developments kept up
with those of our near-peer adversaries like Russia and China?
Mr. Calvelli. The Department recognizes the rapidly increasing
impact of data and AI in the space domain, and the ability to enhance
resiliency, bolster counter-space capabilities, and improve space
domain awareness. The USSF space architecture offers on-ramps for
emerging technologies and incorporates innovative machine learning
techniques for dynamic sensor management, precision orbital maneuvers,
and data exploitation. For example, the USSF has an autonomous space
domain awareness sensor management prototype to autonomously task,
collect, and exploit data from a worldwide network of optical sensors.
The prototype uses AI for autonomous operations, and it uses machine
learning and deep learning for data exploitation. The prototype is not
yet operational, but the USSF is investing in demonstrating this
prototype at the end of 2023, with plans to operationalize it after
successful demonstration. By actively pursuing these capabilities, the
Department will maintain a technological advantage in the contested
space domain.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
offensive space weapons
2. Senator Cotton. Secretary Plumb and General Thompson, both China
and Russia have developed several types of offensive space weapons
capable of damaging or destroying U.S. satellites in space. Can you
discuss the role that U.S. offensive space weapons would play in
securing U.S. interests in space?
Secretary Plumb. Space is essential to the U.S. way of war. My job,
along with my colleagues in the Department, is to ensure that we are
able to support the Joint Force and support the four Defense priorities
of the National Defense Strategy in, from, and through space throughout
competition, crisis, and conflict. We will defend our national security
interests from the growing scope and scale of space and counterspace
threats, as directed in the 2021 U.S. Space Priorities Framework, by
leveraging a breadth of options across all operational domains.
General Thompson. The increasingly contested nature of the Space
Domain means that potential adversaries are fielding space systems that
threaten our military forces and will seek to deny the use of our space
systems in conflict. The Space Force is fielding combat credible forces
that are prepared to protect U.S. interests, defend our own assets,
deny adversaries use of Space, and ensure national decisionmakers have
a full spectrum of options to deter aggression and respond to attack.
missile warning/missile tracking
3. Senator Cotton. Secretary Calvelli, the Space Force intends to
launch satellites that are part of its missile warning and missile
tracking system through fiscal year 2027, but the Chinese and Russian
hypersonic missile threats are already here today. Are there satellites
up and running already that have any capability yet to detect and track
hypersonic missiles?
Mr. Calvelli. The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) constellation
currently on-orbit provides high fidelity missile warning capabilities,
but it does not have the capability to track against hypersonic
threats. SBIRS provides early detection of ballistic missile launches,
tracks their trajectory, and offers real-time data for threat
assessment and response planning. SBIRS plays a vital role in cueing
missile defense systems, which direct interceptors to engage and
destroy incoming threats. The Space Force is working to launch and
field proliferated constellations with the sensitivity, accuracy, and
latency to track hypersonic missiles and other advanced missile targets
from low and medium earth orbit (LEO and MEO) by 2026. This new
architecture will be more resilient and provide detection and tracking
of not only traditional missile threats, but also advanced maneuvering
threats like hypersonic glide vehicles. In April 2023, we launched two
LEO Tracking Layer satellites that will demonstrate tracking of
advanced missile threats. Later this fall, we will launch six more LEO
Tracking Layer satellites and the Missile Defense Agency will launch
the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) prototypes
to demonstrate Fire Control sensor capabilities to enhance missile
targeting capabilities. The Space Force will leverage these
demonstrations to reduce risk for operational implementation in
subsequent iterations for detection, tracking, and closing the kill
chain against advanced missile threats.
fractional orbital bombardment system (fobs)
4. Senator Cotton. General Thompson, as you know, in 2021 China
tested a fractional orbital bombardment system that orbited the globe
before releasing a hypersonic glide vehicle toward its target. This
type of weapon is greatly concerning for many reasons, but primarily
because it would be difficult for us to detect and then track once it
goes into orbit. Can you describe the Space Force's ongoing efforts to
improve our ability to surveil objects in orbit, like this Chinese
orbital missile?
General Thompson. The Space Force is pivoting to a resilient,
proliferated missile warning/missile tracking (MW/MT) architecture. The
resilient MW/MT systems will utilize satellites in both low earth orbit
and medium earth orbit, which will be better able to track fractional
orbital bombardment systems and hypersonic glide vehicles. This flight
data is also shared with Missile Defense Agency systems for targeting
purposes. The Next Gen Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) program has
a proven, heritage from the SBIRS program and will provide a legacy
ballistic missile warning capability that will minimize risk during the
transition to the resilient MW/MT architecture.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 9, 2023
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MISSILE DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:47 p.m., in
room 222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus S. King
Jr. (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Subcommittee Members present: Senators King, Gillibrand,
Rosen, Kelly, Fischer, Cramer, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING JR.
Senator King. Before we begin today's hearing, I want to
acknowledge that Lieutenant General Karbler, and General
VanHerck, and Admiral Hill, this may be your last hearing
before this Subcommittee, before you enter retirement. So I
want to thank you especially for your work. We are hoping to be
able to replace you, but we will see.
Thank you very much for the work and support that you have
provided to the men and women and to the entire country, but
particularly the men and women under your commands. I want to
thank the witnesses again for appearing before us and for your
service.
The purpose of our hearing is to examine the President's
Budget submission for the missile agency and missile defense
policies in preparation for the Fiscal Year 2024 National
Defense Authorization Act, which we plan to go to work on in
June. Last year, the Department of Defense submitted to the
Congress a Missile Defense Review.
It continues the policy of defense of the Homeland, as well
as deterring attacks against the United States, while assuring
our allies through a regional missile defense strategy. I note
that it also continues the policy that we rely on our nuclear
deterrent against large and sophisticated missile attacks
against our Homeland from near-peer adversaries such as Russia
and China.
Missile defense has two new aspects that we hope to examine
in today's hearing. First and foremost is the defense against
hypersonic missiles. They do not follow a ballistic trajectory.
Second is the requirement to protect Guam against any threats
that China might impose.
This is a daunting task that integrates missile defense
systems from the Army, Navy, and Missile Defense Agency, and
what I hope we will learn more about in today's hearing. The
Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
tasks the Secretary of Defense with designating a senior
official, a senior individual for this effort by March 23,
2024.
To date, this Committee has not heard anything about this.
I will want to know its status. The President's Fiscal Year
2024 Budget submission for Missile Defense Agency is $10.9
billion. This is an increase from the fiscal year 2023 enacted
level of $10.5 billion.
I would like to know how the Fiscal Year 2024 Budget
Request continues your effort for Homeland and regional missile
defense, as well as defense against new threats such as
hypersonic weapons.
Again, let me thank today's witnesses for agreeing to
appear and for their extraordinary service to the country.
After opening statements, we will have rounds of 5-minute
questions to the witnesses. Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEBRA FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, would
like to thank our military members today, General VanHerck,
General Karbler, and Admiral Hill for your many years of
service to this country. What you do every single day may not
be known by every American, but you keep every American safe.
Thank you.
We appreciate you appearing before us today and we look
forward to hearing from each of you. As we continue to develop
and field integrated air and missile defense capabilities, it
is important to recognize that the threat landscape has evolved
significantly since the inception of our missile defense
programs.
This evolution of adversary missile and offensive strike
technology, including hypersonic weapons and unmanned aerial
systems, increasingly holds at risk+, not only our military
installations, but also civilian populations and critical
infrastructure.
As you know, for many years now, this Subcommittee has
strongly advocated for getting more capability on Guam and
getting it there as fast as we can. I look forward to hearing
more about the Department's plan for the defense of Guam and
how the investments proposed by this budget would strengthen
the missile defense of the island.
The incursion of the Chinese spy balloon earlier this year
also highlights the need for increased domain awareness. We
cannot intercept what we cannot see and track. It is critical
that we continue to invest in terrestrial over-the-horizon
radars (OTHR) and space-based missile warning and missile
tracking systems, including the hypersonic ballistic tracking
space sensor or HBTSS.
I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about
these issues and about how the fiscal year 2024 would impact
their mission. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Secretary Plumb, are you leading off?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Plumb. Yes, sir. So, thank you. Chairman King, Ranking
Member Fischer, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank
you for this opportunity to testify today on the fiscal year
2024 missile defense budget, and I am honored to appear
alongside my colleagues here, General VanHerck and Vice-Admiral
Hill and Lieutenant General Karbler. If it is all of your last
hearing, then I just--I have really appreciated working with
all of you. Look how sad they are, sir.
Today, our competitors are using advanced offensive missile
capabilities as a principal means to execute their war fighting
strategies. We know China is our Department's pacing challenge.
China has accelerated its efforts to develop, test, and field
thousands of missile systems across all classes and ranges.
Russia remains our acute threat.
Russia has conducted thousands of missiles and drone
strikes to terrorize the civilian population of Ukraine and
degrade Ukraine's warfighting capability. Iran has launched
missile attacks into neighboring states and provided rockets
and drones to non-State actors who in turn use them to target
United States Forces and partners.
Of course, they have also provided unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS) to Russia, which is using them in the battle in
Ukraine, and North Korea continues to conduct ICBM
[intercontinental ballistic missiles] and other missile tests
to threaten and coerce its neighbors.
Given these threats, missile defense has never been more
important. The 2022 Missile Defense Review was released in
unclassified form last fall, and this review updated U.S.
policy to reflect the current security environment, with three
kinds of large updates.
One, emphasizing that we will stay ahead of the North
Korean missile threat to the Homeland through a comprehensive
missile defeat approach, which will be complemented by the
credible threat of direct cost imposition.
Second, it makes crystal clear that an attack on Guam or
any other United States territory by any adversary will be
considered a direct attack on the United States and it will be
met with an appropriate response. We are committed to the
missile defense of Guam to simultaneously protect United States
civilians, United States Forces, and our ability to project
power in the region.
Third, to deter attempts by adversaries to stay under the
nuclear threshold and achieve strategic results with
conventional capabilities, the U.S. is pursuing active and
passive measures to decrease the risk of adversary cruise
missile strikes against critical assets in the Homeland.
The President's Budget invests $29.8 billion in missile
defeat and defense capabilities. This is an increase of nearly
$3 billion over last year--well, this year, actually, fiscal
year 2023. Specific to missile defense, this includes $3.3
billion for the ground-based midcourse defense, including $2.2
billion for the next generation interceptor, $1.5 billion for
the defense of Guam. Nearly $5 billion for missile warning,
missile track, both the new P-LEO [proliferated low Earth
orbit] Constellation and the next generation overhead
persistent infrared architecture, $2.2 billion for Standard
Missile 3 (SM3), terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD),
and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptors. Nearly
$1.5 billion to counter lower tier missile threats, and
hundreds of millions of dollars for over-the-horizon radars,
hypersonic defense, and directed energy development. Finally,
the fiscal year 2024 budget continues to prioritize U.S.
support to allies and partners.
The U.S. does not face missile threats on our own. Missile
defense cooperation strengthens our common protection, enhances
deterrence, and provides assurance that bolsters the cohesion
of our alliances.
The President's Budget makes significant investments in
missile defense. Those missile defenses are foundational to
integrated deterrence. I would just like to thank the Committee
for your tireless support of the Department and U.S. national
security, and for your support of the President's Budget, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. John Plumb follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. John Plumb
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished members of
the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Fiscal
Year 2024 budget request for missile defeat and defense programs on
behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I am honored to join
General Glen VanHerck, Commander of the North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command; Vice
Admiral Jon Hill, Director of the Missile Defense Agency; and
Lieutenant General Daniel Karbler, Commanding General of the Army's
Space and Missile Defense Command.
Integrated air and missile defense has never been more relevant to
U.S. defense strategy, plans, and posture. The increasing development
and use of advanced missiles--including ballistic, cruise, and
hypersonic--as well as Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) has become a
defining feature of modern warfare.
Today, I will review how air and missile threats have evolved over
the last year, provide a policy update on the Department's response,
and explain how the Department's fiscal year 2024 budget request of
$29.8 billion for missile defeat and missile defense programs supports
this response.
advanced air and missile threats
As Secretary Austin has said since his first days in office, the
People's Republic of China (PRC) is the Department's pacing challenge,
while Russia remains an acute threat. Our competitors are rapidly
developing, fielding, and integrating advanced offensive air and
missile capabilities into their strategies to favorably shape the
course of a potential crisis or conflict.
People's Republic of China
The PRC has accelerated its efforts to develop, test, and field
advanced missile systems of all classes and ranges, including
ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic glide vehicles. The PRC is also
rapidly expanding its ability to deliver nuclear payloads through the
development of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the
construction of new ICBM missile fields. In August 2022, the PRC
launched ballistic missiles over and around Taiwan in an unsuccessful
attempt to intimidate and demonstrate it capability to forcefully unify
with Taiwan.
Russia
In its illegal war of aggression in Ukraine, Russia has employed
thousands of air and missile platforms of all types ranging from
hypersonic missiles to short range UAS. Russia's use of missiles, often
against non-military targets, is designed to terrorize the Ukrainian
people while degrading Ukraine's warfighting capability. Russia is
trying also to diminish Ukraine's will to fight through the destruction
of infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, and the energy grid.
Russia has even converted thousands of surface-to-air missiles to
surface-to-surface mode and launched hundreds of Iranian UAS systems in
attacks against Ukrainian critical infrastructure targets. Russia also
continues to invest in long-range cruise missiles, ballistic missiles,
and hypersonic glide vehicles--capabilities that place the United
States Homeland at risk.
Iran
Over the last several years, Iran has launched missile attacks into
neighboring states while providing ballistic missiles and UAS to non-
State actors, who in turn used them to target United States Forces and
partners in the Middle East. Iran has become the world's leading
proliferator of missiles and UAS as demonstrated through its UAS
transfers to Russia as well as its provision of these systems to armed
groups throughout the Middle East. Iran continues to invest in space-
launch vehicles that could shorten the pathway to a future long-range
missile capability.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK):
The DPRK continues to test and demonstrate a growing number of
developmental ballistic and cruise missiles, including test launches of
missiles that have directly over-flown and landed near the sovereign
territory of regional neighbors. This year alone, DPRK has showcased a
vast array of missile systems, including 11 Hwasong-17 ICBM missiles
and associated launchers, in an extensive military parade celebrating
the 75th anniversary of the DPRK army; conducted two ICBM tests and
more than a dozen shorter range missiles tests; and unveiled a new,
purported nuclear warhead dubbed the Hwasan-31.
Non-State Actors
Non-State actors pose an increasing danger to United States
regional interests, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. This is
evidenced by the attack against United States Forces in Syria in late
March. These armed groups--operating autonomously or as proxy forces--
are employing more complex UAS, rocket, and missile capabilities and
continue to benefit from the proliferation of dual-use commercial air,
UAS, and missile systems and technology.
united states missile defense policy
As outlined in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the
Department is focused on a strategy of integrated deterrence, which
incorporates our efforts to prevent and, if necessary, defeat air and
missile threats to the United States Homeland, our allies and partners,
and regionally deployed forces. Integrated deterrence weaves together
all instruments of national power--with the diplomacy in the
forefront--to work seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the
spectrum of conflict, and our network of alliance and partners.
Nested within the NDS, the 2022 Missile Defense Review (MDR)
describes how missile defense contributes to integrated deterrence as a
deterrence-by-denial component against competitors that seek to use
missiles as a means to project conventional and nuclear military power.
Missile defense undermines adversary confidence in offensive missile
use by introducing doubt and uncertainty into attack planning; by
raising the threshold for conflict by reducing the incentive to conduct
small-scale coercive attacks; by reinforcing U.S. diplomatic and
security posture; and by reassuring allies and partners that the United
States will not be deterred from fulfilling its global security
commitments. Missile defenses expand the decision space for our
military and civilian leaders and preserve our forces' freedom to
maneuver.
The Department's top priority is to defend the U.S. Homeland,
including U.S. territories. As the scale and complexity of North Korean
missile threats to the Homeland increase, we are staying ahead of the
threat through improvements to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
system as part of a comprehensive missile defeat approach, complemented
by the credible threat of direct cost imposition through nuclear and
non-nuclear means. A key component of the GMD system will be the Next
Generation Interceptor (NGI), which is scheduled for delivery beginning
in 2028. The NGI will greatly enhance our ability to defend the country
against North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile threats.
The 2022 MDR states clearly that Guam, along with all United States
territories, is part of the United States Homeland and will be
protected against any and all provocations and attacks. The Integrated
Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture for the defense of Guam,
for example, will simultaneously protect United States Forces and our
ability to project power in the region. Similarly, we are investing in
efforts to strengthen our protection of Hawaii, Alaska, and the
continental United States.
Broadly speaking, different adversary capabilities--from ballistic
to cruise to hypersonic threats--present unique missile defense
challenges depending on the technology and the theater in which they
are employed. We are taking steps to ensure we can defeat these threats
now and into the future.
The conflict in Ukraine illustrates the importance of air and
missile defense. Russia's ruthless barrage of attacks in Ukraine have
been a wake-up call to the power and destructiveness of missiles and
the extent to which they have become a defining feature of modern
warfare, especially in the absence of air superiority. Ukrainian
sovereignty endures today in large part because Ukrainian forces have
made air defense a top priority. The United States has provided Ukraine
with over 1,600 stinger missiles, a Patriot battery, two National
Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile (NASAM) systems, and 12 Avenger air
defense systems. In addition, we are providing equipment to integrate
Western air defense launchers, missiles, and radars with Ukraine's
current inventory of air defense systems. Our allies and partners have
also stepped forward to provide vital advanced air and missile defense
systems to Ukraine.
investments
The $29.8 billion budget request for missile defeat and defense
provides $10.9 billion of Missile Defense Agency (MDA) programs, as
well as another $18.9 billion for investments across all Services that
contribute to our total missile defeat and missile defense capability.
These investments are tied to the strategic objectives of the national
defense strategy.
Homeland Missile Defense
As stated previously, the Department's top priority is to defend
the Homeland and deter attacks against the United States. To achieve
this strategic objective, the President's budget requests $3.3 billion
to improve the reliability, capability, and cyber resiliency of GMD.
This request includes $2.2 billion for the continued development of the
NGI, which will improve the reliability and performance of our system
against advancing ICBM threats from North Korea and against potential
future ICBM threats from Iran.
As an element of Homeland defense and regional defense, the
Department is committed to strengthening the defense of Guam through a
layered IAMD architecture. As such, the Department is requesting $1.5
billion in Fiscal Year 202024 to strengthen missile defense of the
island, which is a critical operational hub in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Department is also in the process of designating, as required by
statute, a single senior official to manage the missile defense effort
on Guam.
The Department is requesting $64 million to improve the defense of
Hawaii through investments in upgrades to its air surveillance radar
capabilities, which will enhance air domain awareness and support
defense against cruise missiles and a variety of other emerging air and
missile threats. Hawaii is already defended from North Korean long-
range attacks by the GMD system, comparable to the other 49 states and
the District of Columbia.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the Department of the
Air Force as the acquisition authority for air and cruise missile
defense of the Homeland in July 2022. To that end, the Department is
requesting $428.7 million in Fiscal Year 202024 for the continued
fielding of four new over-the-horizon radars. These radars will provide
long-range sensor coverage of likely air and cruise missile threats to
North America, as well as capability against hypersonic threats, and
maritime surface vessels.
We are also investing in the modernization of space sensor
capabilities that are crucial to missile warning, missile tracking, and
missile defense and that support the protection of our Homeland and the
missions of our forces globally. This includes $4.8 billion in Fiscal
Year 202024 to develop new proliferated resilient missile warning/
missile tracking architectures and the Next-Gen Overhead Persistent
Infrared (OPIR) space and ground architecture. We are optimizing
existing missile defense radars and other sensors in support of our
broader all-domain awareness objectives.
Regional Missile Defense
The Department is strengthening our regional missile defenses to
counter all missile threats--including hypersonic threats--regardless
of origin. The United States must continue to develop defenses against
regional missile threats, to include building a persistent and
resilient sensor network to characterize, track, and improve
attribution while also developing and delivering capabilities to enable
engagement of all missile threat types, including hypersonic missiles.
The President's budget request makes substantial investments in
regional ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile defense capabilities
to accomplish these objectives, including:
$259 million for regional hypersonic and ballistic
missile defense space sensors and development of the Glide Phase
Interceptor (GPI);
$1.024 billion for Aegis Standard Missile-3 and Terminal
High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors; and
$1.2 billion for additional PAC-3 interceptors.
U.S. deployed forces, allies, and partners also face a
proliferation of lower-tier threats, such as rockets and armed UAS. Our
adversaries will continue to seek ways to use these relatively
inexpensive, flexible, and expendable systems to achieve their
purposes. The Department is working to field technical and integrated
counter-UAS solutions to ensure we can collectively meet the range of
threats and appropriately hedge against future advancements. We are
requesting nearly $1.5 billion in Fiscal Year 202024 to support this
effort.
Today directed energy plays an increasingly important role in
countering UAS. In the future, directed energy could complement our
current programs to defeat more complex air and missile attacks. The
Department is requesting $308 million this year to continue work in
this area.
strengthening international cooperation with allies and partners
Air and missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners
continues to expand. Not only do allied and partner missile defense
capabilities offer important value during
peacetime, but they also allow our alliances and coalitions to plan
collectively and to counter missile threats together in crisis and
conflict and in ways that reduce the potential for escalation. The
United States does not face international threats on its own; we need a
unified, collective presence of integrated allied and partner missile
defense capabilities to deter and defeat growing missile threats.
The United States also continues to work with our allies and
partners to improve our ability to share sensing and tracking data in
real time and support each other in air and missile defense engagements
to maximize our collective capabilities. Multilateral air and missile
defense exercises, such as Formidable Shield and Pacific Dragon, and
bilateral test activities such as Japanese Aegis destroyers launching
SM-3 Block IIAs to intercept ballistic missiles at United States test
ranges, give us opportunities to work together to accomplish these
goals.
In Europe, initial acceptance testing is ongoing at the Aegis
Ashore site in Poland, which will become operational in 2024 after
completion of all testing and receiving additional software upgrades.
The Aegis Ashore site in Poland will complete the European Phased
Adaptive Approach--the United States voluntary contribution to NATO
Ballistic Missile Defense--as it joins the Aegis Ashore site in
Romania, the BMD capable ships homeported in Spain, and the AN/TPY-2
radar in Turkey. We also recently deployed two Patriot batteries to
Poland and one Patriot battery to Slovakia in support of NATO's
defense. Overall, our Patriot and THAAD forces are deployed worldwide,
including throughout the Middle East and Indo-Pacific regions, where
they defend United States forward-deployed forces and other national
security interests in concert with our allies and partners.
The United States is increasing our ally and partner capabilities
through Foreign Military Sales of equipment as well as through
training, co-development, and co-production programs.
We are also exploring joint opportunities to invest in the
cooperative development of complementary IAMD technologies and
capabilities such as hypersonic defenses. In particular, the Department
welcomes Japan's interest in pursuing cooperation on the GPI program.
We engage regularly throughout the year with key allies and
partners through a series of bilateral and multilateral dialogs to
enhance our collective regional missile defense efforts in Europe, the
Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region. Our missile defense
cooperation strengthens our common protection, enhances deterrence, and
provides assurance that bolsters the cohesion of our alliances.
conclusion
The commitment of adversaries to the use of offensive missile
systems as a central component of their military strategies and tactics
has never been more evident. As a result, missile defeat and integrated
air and missile defenses can no longer be viewed as peripheral
capabilities. These capabilities must be foundational elements of
integrated deterrence and modern defense in U.S. national security. The
United States remains committed to improving our Homeland and regional
missile defeat and defense capabilities as we work to deter conflict,
and to prevail in battle if deterrence fails. The Department's Fiscal
Year 202024 budget request supports this approach.
I look forward to working with the Congress to advance this shared
goal. Thank you.
Senator King. Admiral Hill.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JON A. HILL, USN, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY
Vice Admiral Hill. Chairman King, Ranking Member of
Fischer, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you
for the opportunity to discuss missile defense today. I would
like to take a quick moment to thank the women and men of the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) for the hard work they do every
day, delivering capabilities to the services to meet joint
combatant command requirements to counter ballistic
maneuvering, and hypersonic, and missile threats.
If I were to summarize missile threat, it is three things.
It is large numbers, it is high speed, and heavy maneuver.
Those are the challenges right now and they are the challenges
for the future. MDA is requesting, as mentioned, $2.9 billion
to continue our mission of meeting these threats, and I am
going to talk to you about three priorities. The first is
Homeland ballistic missile defense.
Then I will talk about defense of Guam and hypersonic
defense. The first priority of homeland ballistic missile
defense, which includes Alaska and Hawaii, the ground-based
midcourse defense system (GMD) has protected the Homeland from
rogue nation ballistic missile attacks since 2004.
Our current focus is on new capabilities to counter the
limited but advancing North Korean long range ballistic missile
threat. The GMB system is undergoing a service life extension
program to improve reliability and extend the GBI fleet to
ground-based interceptors beyond 2030. These upgrades mitigate
the risk until the Nation fields the next generation
interceptor (NGI), which is on track for first emplacement no
later than the end of 2028.
NGI development is executing to deliver advanced
interceptors featuring multiple kill vehicle technology, which
we will add to the current fleet of interceptors at Fort
Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Space Force Base in California.
Finally, we are on track for operational acceptance of the long
range discrimination radar in Clear, Alaska next year. This
advanced radar will ensure a stronger homeland defense posture
against long range missiles.
To achieve priority two, the defense of Guam, also part of
the Homeland, the Department is developing an integrated air
and missile defense system to defend against diverse missile
threats. Working with the services and other stakeholders, we
are driving to meet INDOPACOM's [United States Indo-Pacific
Command] requirement for a persistent 360-degree layered
defense capability on the island against simultaneous rates of
cruise, ballistic, maneuvering, and hypersonic missile threats.
We are delivering operational capability in phases to meet
these clear warfighting needs.
For the third priority, hypersonic defense, we have
integrated tracking capabilities into existing space, ground,
and sea-based radars. That capability is here today. Today's
sensor architecture and command and control can track
hypersonic threats to support warning and domain awareness.
Aegis ships equipped with a sea-based terminal capability
can engage some hypersonic threats in the terminal phase today.
Due to the global maneuver capabilities of hypersonic missiles,
a space-based tracking and targeting capability is a clear
need. In collaboration with the Space Force, the Missile
Defense Agency is developing the hypersonic ballistic tracking
space sensor.
Later this year, HBTSS will start on orbit operations to
demonstrate unique tracking and targeting to support hypersonic
engagements. HBTSS will participate in flight tests and real-
world threat collections throughout fiscal year 2024. The
capability will be proliferated and operated by the Space
Force.
We continue to work closely with the Navy to upgrade sea-
based terminal (SBT) defenses to counter more advanced
maneuvering and hypersonic threats. Based on threat evolution,
we will deliver the next SBT incremental upgrade in 2025. Aegis
sea-based terminal is the only active defense available today
to counter hypersonic missile threats.
In order to expand the battle space against hypersonic
threats, we have initiated the Aegis Glide Phase Interceptor
Program (GPI). GPI leverages proven Aegis weapon system, engage
on remote network sensors to provide a depth of fire needed to
thin the raid for terminal defenses.
One final regional defense note, we continue ship upgrades
and SM3 Block 1B and 2A missile deliveries and have made
significant progress with the Aegis ashore site in Poland,
which is on track for operational acceptance at the end of this
fiscal year.
Also, we are working toward fielding THAAD and Patriot
integration enhancements that were successfully delivered to
the United States Forces of Korea to other THAAD batteries to
expand engagement battle space against shorter range stress.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you and I look forward to answering
questions. It has been an honor serving as the Director of MDA.
[The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for taking my testimony today. The Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) budget request of $10.9 billion for Fiscal Year
(FY) 2024 enables the continued execution of the MDA mission to design,
develop and deploy a layered Missile Defense System to defend the
United States and its deployed forces, allies, and international
partners from increasingly diverse missile threats.
Potential U.S. adversaries are developing more advanced ballistic,
hypersonic, and cruise missile systems, making them more mobile,
survivable, reliable, accurate, and capable of achieving longer ranges.
Ballistic and hypersonic missiles capable of high velocity and heavy
maneuver, and their use in large numbers and combination attacks, which
may also involve cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems, could
undermine the effectiveness of our missile defenses without continued
development.
We are in the process of updating the September 17, 2009 DOD
Directive for Missile Defense Agency acquisition authorities.\1\ The
update is needed to reflect changes incorporated in Directive-Type
Memorandum 20-002 Missile Defense System Policies and Governance, the
organization of the Department of Defense, and statutory law impacting
MDA. The Department established MDA in 2002 as a capability-based
develop and field a missile defense capability rapidly and
incrementally improve that capability over time. The update will
finalize the MDA Director's acquisition authorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The review is led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) with participation by the Office of the Director of
Administration and Management (ODA&M) and in consultation with OSD
Research and Engineering (R&E), Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S),
Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), Office of
General Counsel (OGC), Policy (P), the Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The
directive update is expected to be signed by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense by March 1, 2024 in compliance with 10 USC 205 120-day
congressional notification and waiting period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I continue to believe the Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP) is
essential to the missile defense enterprise, and MDA is working with
stakeholders to update the WIP to better support the Warfighter. MDA
continues a very fruitful and important collaboration with the
Combatant Commanders and Services to address the rapidly advancing and
expanding threat with speed and agility. That collaboration includes
the establishment of Service and MDA agreements, hybrid program
offices, and regular Service and MDA Board of Directors meetings to
address manning, training, and equipping requirements for fielded
missile defense systems and sustainment support throughout the
element's life-cycle.
working with the services to meet combatant command requirements
MDA is developing, delivering, sustaining, and improving
affordable, proven, and leading-edge capabilities to counter advanced
ballistic and hypersonic missiles.
Space and Terrestrial Sensors
Space-based sensors are critical to integrated sensor-to-shooter
capabilities used to defeat ballistic and hypersonic missile threats.
MDA will continue collaborating with the U.S. Space Force (USSF) to
deliver integrated capabilities that meet Warfighter requirements for
missile warning, tracking, and defense.\2\ USSF and MDA are enable the
tracking, targeting, cueing, and intercept of ballistic and hypersonic
missiles. In fourth quarter fiscal year 2023, the Hypersonic and
Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) will launch and begin
demonstration of unique tracking and targeting capabilities needed to
defend against hypersonic glide vehicles. HBTSS will participate in
flight tests and real-world target-of-opportunity collections
throughout fiscal year 2024, and the proven capability will be
proliferated and operated by the Space Force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ In 2022, MDA collaborated with the USSF Space Systems Command
and the Space Development Agency to form a Combined Program Office for
missile warning, tracking and defense. MDA is also a member of the
Program Executive Officer level Program Integration Council that
facilitates cooperation and de-conflicts efforts enabling the National
Security Space Enterprise force design to provide the Warfighter with
integrated and synchronized space-based capabilities; and a member of
the larger space acquisition community's Space Acquisition Council. MDA
is also a full participant in the USSF Space Warfighter Analysis Center
future Force Design studies and analysis to integrate missile defense
space sensor capabilities into space enterprise architectures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The current Space-based Kill Assessment (SKA) network of infrared
sensors hosted on commercial satellites will continue demonstrating hit
assessment capabilities for homeland defense. SKA sensors provide hit
situational awareness to U.S. Northern Command and participate in
flight tests and engineering activities to characterize sensor
capabilities and provide valuable data to support future Post Intercept
Assessment capabilities. Additionally, the Discriminating Space Sensor
(DSS) continues to mature ballistic missile birth-to-death tracking and
discrimination technology to provide a pivotal capability as part of
MDA's space architecture.
MDA also is developing, deploying, and sustaining a robust, cyber-
secure and networked ground-and sea-based radar architecture. The Long
Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) will complete acceptance testing and
participate in an operational flight test in fiscal year 2023.
Development of LRDR software will continue to enhance tracking and
discrimination, hit assessment, space domain awareness (SDA), space-
intelligence data collection, and modeling and simulation capabilities.
Following operational fielding in fiscal year 2024. LRDR will support
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) capability against Pacific
theater long-range missile threats.
The Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) radar provides precision midcourse
tracking and discrimination capabilities to support homeland defense
operations, Missile Defense System testing, data collection, and SDA.
SBX completed an in-port maintenance and capability upgrade period this
past March, and it is again deployed at-sea. Fabrication of the SBX
replacement radome continues on schedule for installation in fiscal
year 2025.
AN/TPY-2 radars deployed abroad support Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) batteries for regional defense. Radar 13, planned for
delivery in March 2025, will be part of THAAD Battery 8 and be a fully
modernized configuration that includes significant obsolescence
redesigns leveraged from our ongoing Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
cases. AN/TPY-2 radars deployed abroad in forward-based mode support
homeland defense to provide early warning, precision tracking,
discrimination capabilities, and space domain awareness.
MDA sustains and updates the USSF Upgraded Early Warning Radars
(UEWRs) in Alaska, Massachusetts, United Kingdom, Greenland, and
California, and the Cobra Dane radar in Alaska. UEWRs support homeland
missile defense and improve midcourse Missile Defense System sensor
coverage by providing critical early warning, tracking, object
classification and cueing data. The UEWRs and Cobra Dane radar provide
space object detection and tracking data to the Space Surveillance
Network.
MDA provides software upgrades to Aegis integrated missile defense
destroyers equipped with the SPY-1 radar to support the USSF SDA
mission. The Aegis SDA capability is fully compatible with deployed
U.S. Navy operations and has appropriate 2022, we supported the Navy's
first demonstration of SDA capability with the USS Nimitz (CVN 68)
Carrier Strike Group during their Composite Training Unit Exercise. In
fiscal year 2024, we will continue to develop, test, and deliver this
upgrade and support the Navy in future SDA demonstrations.
Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications
C2BMC is the integrating element of the Missile Defense System,
providing Combatant Commanders and decisionmakers with a global,
persistent, and near-realtime missile defense common operating picture.
C2BMC joins space-based infrared, land-, and sea-based sensor threat
observations to provide acquisition, tracking, cueing, discrimination,
and targeting data to engagement elements in support of U.S. and
coalition-partner missile defense and SDA operations. C2BMC also
connects with Service, NATO, and international systems.
Funding in fiscal year 2024 sustains the C2BMC planner, situational
awareness, battle management, training, and SDA capabilities within
Combatant Command user nodes as well as the global missile defense
network. Additionally, this funding continues integrating space
surveillance sensors with C2BMC in order to enhance the missile
warning, missile tracking, missile defense, and SDA missions and
address trans-regional threats. We continue to develop new capabilities
to improve overall C2BMC system resiliency, enhance system
discrimination of threat objects, and refine space track data to
improve Missile Defense System operational effectiveness. MDA recently
fielded a key software upgrade to integrate LRDR and the Ballistic
Missile Defense System Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) Architecture
in order to bring a prototype System. This spiral upgrade significantly
expands SDA capabilities for U.S. Space Command using LRDR and the
Aegis SPY-1 radar and integrates the U.S. Army's Integrated Air and
Missile Defense Battle Command System with the Missile Defense System.
Homeland Defense
The GMD system has protected the U.S. Homeland from rogue long-
range ballistic missile attacks since 2004. Today, we are delivering
new capabilities to address the limited but increasingly advanced North
Korean long-range ballistic missile threat. Earlier in this fiscal
year, we increased US Northern Command Ground Based Interceptor
capacity in the most advanced configuration with Capability Enhanced-II
Block 1 Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicles integrated on new Configuration 2
boost vehicles. These interceptors will help mitigate the risk until
the Next Generation Interceptors are fielded no later than the end of
2028. The Ground Based Interceptors continue to undergo a Service Life
Extension Program to improve reliability and availability, which we
anticipate will extend portions of the existing fleet beyond 2030. In
parallel, MDA continues to upgrade the ground system infrastructure,
communications network, fire control system, Warfighter training
systems, and missile fields to improve the reliability, capability,
cybersecurity, and resiliency of the GMD weapon system.
In fiscal year 2024, we will execute an intercept flight test
demonstrating the capability to select a 2-or 3-stage burn of a Ground
Based Interceptor booster, which enables an earlier release of the kill
vehicle to expand significantly the engagement area and time to counter
inbound threats. This flight test also will demonstrate the latest
incremental representative long-range target equipped with
countermeasures.
We awarded two Next Generation Interceptor contracts in March 2021,
and our competing Industry prime contractors are on track and rapidly
advancing through the design development process with full technical
rigor to deliver this new capability as soon as possible. Both designs
feature multiple kill vehicle payloads to reduce the number of
interceptors required to defeat a single ballistic missile threat to
our Nation. Our fiscal year 2024 budget request transitions the
programs from Technology Development to the Product Development Phase.
Regional Defense
Globally deployed ship-based and land-based Aegis BMD capabilities
are critical to the Nation's defense of our deployed forces, allies,
and partners against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missile
threats. In fiscal year 2024, MDA is designing improvements to the
Aegis BMD capability, to include procuring and delivering Standard
Missile (SM)-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade (TU) and Block IIA missiles,
improving Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) defense, advance ing weapon system
and missile reliability, and enhancing Aegis BMD engagement capacity
and lethality. We will continue to develop Aegis BMD weapon system
software to enhance functionality and leverage more-capable radars and
national technical means.
MDA continues to support defense of NATO's European territory and
forces against the ballistic missile threat from the southeast of the
Alliance's border. Aegis Ashore in Romania is operational, and we are
working to complete and prepare Aegis Ashore in Poland for Navy
acceptance, followed by transfers of authority to U.S. European Command
and NATO. We recently completed installation and testing of the combat
system equipment at Naval Support Facility Redzikowo, Poland, in
parallel with construction activity. Both Aegis Ashore sites are
designed to launch the SM-3 Block IBTU and Block IIA missiles.
In fiscal year 2022, MDA successfully executed PACIFIC DRAGON 22
(PD-22). Event 1 marked the first use of a SM-3 Block IA engagement of
a Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) in a fleet exercise. Event 2
demonstrated J7.1 Sea-Based Terminal capability by conducting a
simulated SM-6 engagement with the new Maya-class Japanese destroyer
against a live target. We also executed an intercept flight test
campaign (Japan Flight Test Aegis Weapon System-07, or JFTM-07) with
Japan, demonstrating the newest engagement capability of the Japan (J7)
Aegis BMD configuration with SM-3 Block IIA against a Medium Range
Ballistic Missile (MRBM). JFTM-07 also demonstrated Aegis ship-to-ship
engage-on-remote in a simulated engagement, an integrated missile
defense capability using SM-2 surface-to-air defense missiles, and an
engagement of an SRBM with a SM-3 Block IBTU.
MDA plans to conduct a Tracking Exercise, Flight Test Other (FTX)-
23, with two Aegis ships to perform target scene data collection of an
MRBM with countermeasures. We will also demonstrate Aegis SBT with a
salvo engagement in Flight Test Aegis Weapon System (FTM)-32, firing
two (salvo) SM-6 Dual II software upgrade guided missiles against a
MRBM. In FTX-40 we will fire a simulated SM-6 missile against a
hypersonic glide vehicle.
The THAAD Weapon System is a globally transportable, ground-based
system that is highly effective against short-, medium-and
intermediate-range missile threats inside and outside the atmosphere in
the terminal phase of flight. MDA currently supports forward-deployment
of two batteries stationed in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM)
area of responsibility, cooperates with the United Arab Emirates in
support of two operational FMS THAAD batteries, and supports the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the production of seven additional FMS THAAD
batteries scheduled to begin fielding in fiscal year 2025. In fiscal
year 2024, we will continue THAAD interceptor procurement, production
of battery hardware, obsolescence mitigation efforts, fielding and
training support, the THAAD Stockpile Reliability Program, and
modifications to meet growing cybersecurity threats.
In October 2022, MDA, in conjunction with the U.S. Army,
successfully delivered capability and enhancements to one of the
forward-deployed THAAD batteries in support of INDOPACOM. The battery
can now execute THAAD remote launch capability, execute Patriot Launch-
on-Remote, and integrate Patriot Missile Segment Enhanced (MSE)
launchers and missiles into the THAAD battery. This capability
increases Patriot-defended area and engagement opportunities by
allowing the MSE interceptor to leverage the highly effective THAAD AN/
TPY-2 radar. In August 2022, the U.S. Army validated the requirement
for accelerated fielding of this capability to all other U.S. THAAD
batteries. MDA is currently coordinating fielding of this capability
with the U.S. Army and will begin global fielding this fiscal year.
Rigorous testing will continue in fiscal year 2023 with the
execution of Flight Test THAAD Weapon System-25, which will demonstrate
for the first time the THAAD weapon system's concurrent control of both
a THAAD interceptor and firing a salvo of two Patriot MSE interceptors
in an engagement of multiple MRBM targets. In fiscal year 2024, we will
execute FTX-28 to demonstrate interoperability with Patriot by
exchanging Link-16 messages and assess THAAD's capability to detect,
track, and discriminate SRBMs with countermeasures (no interceptors).
The Department is continuing development of a missile defense
system for defense of Guam against diverse missile threats. We will
expand capability and capacity as the threat evolves. In collaboration
with the Army and Navy, we are moving toward meeting an INDOPACOM
requirement for a persistent 360-degree layered defense capability on
Guam against simultaneous raids of cruise, ballistic, maneuvering, and
hypersonic threats. Today we are in the early stages of developing the
Homeland Defense Radar-Guam (now designated as the AN/TPY-6 radar) and
the Aegis Guam System to provide persistent long-range midcourse
discrimination, precision tracking, missile engagements, and hit
assessment to protect Guam.
We also are developing a layered defense capability against
regional hypersonic threats and have initiated a development program
for a Glide Phase Interceptor, leveraging existing systems where
possible, including proven engage-on-remote and launch-on-remote
capabilities. We are focusing on the proven Aegis Weapon System to
provide the depth-of-fire needed for a layered defense against
hypersonic threats. In fiscal year 2024, MDA will continue to develop
and mature the GPI capability and leverage the Aegis Weapon System.
Today, MDA already provides the Navy an initial terminal defense
capability. We also are working closely with the Navy to develop,
field, and upgrade SBT defenses to counter more advanced maneuvering
and hypersonic threats. We anticipate delivering these Increment 3
capabilities in 2025. In fiscal year 2024, Aegis SBT will demonstrate
an engagement against an advanced target in the terminal phase (FTM-32)
and a simulated engagement against a hypersonic glide vehicle (FTX-40).
In fiscal year 2025, SBT Increment 3 will demonstrate an engagement
against a hypersonic glide vehicle firing an SM-6 Block IAU missile
(FTM-43).
We are continuing our cooperative missile defense relationship with
Israel, jointly developing and delivering systems to strengthen its
missile defenses and increase interoperability between United States
and Israeli forces. In fiscal year 2024, our two nations continue to
cooperate on engineering, development, co-production, testing, and
fielding of the Arrow Weapon System, the David's Sling Weapon System,
and co-production for the Iron Dome Defense System. I would like to
highlight the March 22, 2022 ceremony for the transfer of the David's
Sling Elevated Sensor System from the Israel Missile Defense
Organization (IMDO) to the Israel Air Force, a significant milestone
for our joint program, with final validation and testing occurring this
year. MDA also executed the $1 billion Iron Dome Replenishment funding
to Israel, and participated in contract negotiations and awards, where
agreement with suppliers and IMDO increased the U.S. workshare to 30
percent. This increase of U.S. workshare is $50 million above the
mandated 25 percent, thus providing more funding back to the U.S.
industrial base.
developing technology to support missile defense
MDA has an integrated, strategic Science and Technology (S&T)
approach to identify, develop, and transition key enabling technologies
to the Missile Defense System and the Warfighter. Our S&T investment
strategy balances rapid development and fielding of capabilities with
leap-ahead technologies for the future system.
MDA is collaborating with the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Services and Warfighters, National Laboratories, Universities/
Academia, International partners, and industry (traditional and non-
traditional defense partners) to implement a coordinated S&T approach
to develop advanced missile defenses. We are aligning our S&T roadmap
to close capability gaps, develop strategic thrusts, deliver Warfighter
requirements, and enhance the future architecture to maximize the
transition of cutting-edge and transformational technology to outpace
the current and future threat. Specifically, MDA is developing key
technologies to support hypersonic defense with the Hypersonic Defense
Architecture Risk Reduction and Testing, High Operational Tempo for
Hypersonics, and Hypersonic Test Bed efforts, including axial upper
stage throttling, communications, seeker windows, material
characterization, hypersonic wind tunnel testing, and thermal
protection systems.
In the future, MDA seeks to enhance current kinetic kill
capabilities with directed energy and other non-kinetic solutions to
keep pace with the volume and complexity of threats. MDA is working
with OSD and the Services to develop the technologies to support the
development and integration of lasers and high power microwave systems,
and we are participating in studies to assess the viability of various
directed energy weapons to optimize tracking, typing, targeting, and
engagement management. MDA continues to work closely with OSD to
develop and transition Diode-Pumped Alkali Laser technology out of the
laboratory to Industry, and MDA is determining lethality mechanisms
using pulsed lasers. We are also developing advanced sensors to improve
position accuracy and range estimates of missile threats. The NanoSat
Testbed Initiative is a collaborative, experimental approach leveraging
commercial satellite platforms to mature technology and perform risk
reduction for encrypted communications in a meshed network in space to
support Service and Agency initiatives.
MDA has started Left Through Right-of-launch Integration (LTRI)
activities, which will enhance offensive-defensive integration. LTRI
will optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of situational awareness
between intelligence activities, offensive attack operations, and right
of launch defenses, improving overall missile defeat capabilities. MDA
has developed a medium fidelity model to simulate LTRI and is beginning
to apply Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning to LTRI. MDA's
LTRI activities and collaboration with other partners will optimize
missile launch operations and provide data to inform decisionmaking in
time critical situations.
conclusion
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the Subcommittee,
we are committed to attracting and building a strong, talented future
workforce to meet the mission challenges of tomorrow. I would like to
recognize and thank the men and women who serve in our Armed Forces at
home and abroad and who operate the integrated Missile Defense System
with the support of our dedicated civilian and contractor workforce. I
appreciate your continued support for MDA and the missile defense
mission, and I look forward to answering the Committee's questions.
Thank you.
Senator King. Thank you very much, Admiral. General
VanHerck.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL GLEN D. VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
COMMAND
General VanHerck. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear today and to represent the men and
women of United States Northern Command and North American
Aerospace Defense Command.
To address today's strategic environment, for nearly 3
years I have focused on four key priorities domain awareness,
or the ability to see and detect potential threats in all
domains; information dominance, which is the use of artificial
intelligence and machine learning to process data more rapidly
for strategic advantage; decision superiority, which is the
dissemination of data and information to the right leader at
the right time from the tactical to the strategic level; and
finally, global integration, addressing today's environment
with a global and all domain approach vis legacy regional
policies and practices.
Those priorities are critical to the successfully defending
the Homeland and providing our national leaders with the only
thing I can never give them enough of, and that is time. Time
to create deterrence options, and if required, defend and
defeat options. I believe the greatest risk for the United
States stems from our inability to change at the pace required
by the changing strategic environment.
Homeland defense must be recognized as essential to
contingency plans at home and for power projection abroad, and
it is vital that all military planning account for that in
reality. In an area of incredible innovation and technological
achievement, inflexible, outdated processes are a greater
impediment to success than many of our competitors'
advancements.
I would like to highlight two areas for the Subcommittee.
First, today I remain confident in our current capability to
defend the Homeland against a limited Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) ballistic missile threat. Looking
forward, I am concerned about future capacity and capability to
respond to advancing DPRK ballistic missile threats, making it
crucial to field the next generation interceptor on time, if
not faster.
Second, Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC)
continue to aggressively pursue and field a number of advanced
capabilities, including hypersonic weapons and delivery
platforms designed to evade detection across multiple domains
to strike targets anywhere on the globe, including North
America.
Hypersonic weapons are extremely difficult to detect, and
counter given the weapons speed, maneuverability, low flight
paths, and unpredictable trajectories. Hypersonic weapons
challenge North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD's)
ability to provide threat warning and attack assessments for
Canada and the United States.
Finally, I would like to recognize the tremendous work done
by Vice Admiral Hill and the Missile Defense Agency. In my
view, the Missile Defense Agency should be the Department's
technical integrator to best leverage ongoing multi-domain
design and experimentation efforts against current and future
air and missile threats regardless of geographical area.
It is clear that the missile threats we face at home and
abroad will only continue to grow, and I have been fortunate to
work together with a great partner like Vice Admiral Hill in
the ongoing efforts to outpace those threats. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General VanHerck follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Glen D. VanHerck
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to testify, and for the
honor of representing the men and women of U.S. Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). From
the day I assumed Command in August 2020, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have
worked tirelessly to defend the Homeland and North America in an
extraordinarily challenging strategic environment requiring the
commands to adapt new approaches to how we plan, prepare, and operate.
That innovation and evolution is necessary to outpace our competitors
and is a testament to the devotion of our military and civilian
personnel who stand constant watch over the United States and Canada.
The commands have made tremendous progress in a short time, yet
much work remains. While the United States military remains the most
powerful and professional force in history, and our alliances and
partnerships provide a vital strategic advantage over any potential
adversary, it is clear that our competitive advantage is eroding. The
successful defense of North America requires the Department of Defense
to move beyond outdated assumptions and plans that do not fully reflect
competitor capability, capacity, and intent to threaten the Homeland.
Likewise, continued action is required to build enduring advantages and
outpace the gains made by competitors around the globe. This will
require the Department to invest in modernization, implement innovative
processes, prioritize our personnel and improve civilian hiring
practices, and increase agile decisionmaking at all levels.
strategic environment
Today's strategic environment is the most complicated and
potentially dangerous in my 35+ years of service. Our competitors and
potential adversaries, particularly the People's Republic of China
(PRC) and Russia, continue to challenge the rules-based international
order that has provided global stability and prosperity over the last
seven decades. They seek to advance their interests and gain global
advantages through political intimidation, economic coercion, cyber and
information operations, asymmetric attacks on infrastructure, and the
direct threat or actual employment of military force.
The People's Republic of China (PRC)
The PRC remains NORAD and USNORTHCOM's long-term pacing challenge.
Beijing continues ambitious military modernization at an alarming pace.
It would be naive to think their sprint to develop advanced cyber
tools, maritime capabilities, and hypersonic technology has only
regional applications, as the PRC continues to develop advanced long-
range conventional and strategic capabilities and the infrastructure
necessary to project military power at greater distances. Underpinning
this growth is a rapid nuclear expansion that is on pace for the PRC to
expand their nuclear stockpile from what DOD estimates is over 400
today to about 1,500 by 2035. While less observable, the PRC's
aggressive efforts to exploit the information technology sector are
accelerating an increasing threat to North America.
The PRC's aggressive actions in the Pacific in mid-2022 following
congressional visits to Taiwan illustrate how regional events create
geostrategic ripple effects that can quickly reach our shores.
President Xi is likely to use his next term in office to double down on
the PRC's revisionist foreign policy, and is likely to include global
efforts to undermine the United States and bolster partnerships with
U.S. competitors, including Russia. In February 2022, Xi signaled his
intent to follow this path when he declared the PRC-Russia friendship
would have no limits in a public pronouncement just weeks before
Russia's illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The PRC
has almost certainly watched the war to draw lessons that will inform
its next steps toward Taiwan.
Xi's statement also proved to be more than rhetorical when, in May
2022, the PRC and Russia conducted a combined bomber patrol over the
Sea of Japan coinciding with the Quad Leaders' Summit in Tokyo. The May
2022 bomber patrol was followed by a second bomber patrol in November
2022. The cooperation is not confined to the air domain. PRC and
Russian naval forces conducted a combined patrol in the fall of 2022
that covered 7,000 nautical miles in the Pacific, included a first-ever
combined naval transit of the Aleutian Islands, and came on the heels
of Xi sending scores of troops to Russia to participate in Moscow's
largest annual military exercise. For years, the PRC has relied on
Russian military materiel to build its armed forces, and I am aware of
reports that the PRC has transferred materiel with military
applications to Russia during Russia's war against Ukraine. These
actions are more than symbolic and demonstrate the PRC's growing power
projection capabilities, which will likely encompass the Arctic in the
next decade--a region the PRC is eying with its self-proclaimed status
as a near-Arctic State.
Russia
As USNORTHCOM and NORAD take necessary measures to defend against a
growing PRC threat, the commands continue to defend the United States
and Canada every day against Russian aggression in all domains.
Russia's brazen and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022
proved that Russia has the capability and capacity to inflict
significant damage to infrastructure and other critical targets with
its all-domain long-range strike capabilities. Russia also has a
history of conducting clandestine operations in other nations to
achieve its political objectives. While Russia has overplayed its hand,
suffered significant losses to the heroic Ukrainian defense forces, and
inadvertently helped to unify NATO, it has gained real-world combat
experience as it enters its second year of the full-scale invasion. The
meager performance of Russia's ground forces in Ukraine should not
overshadow other capabilities it has showcased in Ukraine, including
air-and sea-launched cruise missiles capable of striking North America,
cyber activities, and economic coercion. For the first time, we also
saw Russia employ its new KILLJOY air-launched hypersonic missile in
combat.
Concurrent with its war against Ukraine, Russia has also continued
to conduct major military exercises and test developmental capabilities
that will compound the threat to North America once fielded. In April
2022, Russia tested the massive SARMAT ICBM, a highly capable strategic
weapon that helps reinforce the critical importance of a modern and
reliable U.S. strategic deterrent. Meanwhile, Russia is testing its
special mission Belgorod nuclear submarine, a modern platform capable
of carrying the nuclear-capable Poseidon torpedo, designed to hold the
Homeland at risk by striking coastal targets from thousands of miles
away.
The test of the Belgorod followed Russia's Arctic military exercise
that included live-fire cruise missile launches designed to test
Moscow's readiness for a conflict in the high north. Last fall, Russia
added its first Severodvinsk-class conventional and nuclear capable
cruise missile submarine to the Pacific Fleet, which poses a new
challenge to our defense of the western approaches to North America. In
October 2022, in the midst of elevated international tensions stemming
from Russian threats to escalate its already brutal campaign in
Ukraine, Russia chose to proceed with its annual strategic forces
exercise, including demonstrations of multiple nuclear strike
capabilities. Finally, in January 2023, a Russian Gorshkov-class
frigate transited the western Atlantic while armed with Tsirkon
hypersonic cruise missiles.
I believe it would be shortsighted to view Russia's war against
Ukraine as a limited regional crisis. Russia's actions increase the
very real risk of miscalculation and the conflict's expansion beyond
its current boundaries--scenarios that could rapidly increase the risks
to North America and continental defense. If Russia should seek to
compel allies to reconsider their support for Ukraine through
escalatory actions or follow through with the desperate threats to use
nuclear weapons in Ukraine, the risks to the Homeland would increase.
DPRK and Iran
The Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) tested at least 65
conventional theater and long-range nuclear capabilities over the last
year. That number includes the first tests of a new larger, longer
range, and more capable ICBM, adding another missile that can likely
reach the entire Homeland and one the regime claims is capable of
carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle payload. The DPRK tested more
missiles in 2022 than any time in its history, showing that the regime
will continue to prioritize military capabilities at the expense of
needed food and pandemic relief for its people. Public reports of
renewed nuclear test preparations further highlight the grave danger
this regime poses to regional and global stability. We must remain
ready for multiple contingencies and potential crisis on the Korean
Peninsula.
The DPRK's reckless pursuit of advanced nuclear capabilities and
robust ballistic missile research, development, and testing threatens
regional stability, our allies and partners, and potentially the
Homeland. However, today I remain confident in our current capability
to defend the Homeland against a limited DPRK ballistic missile threat.
Looking forward, I am concerned about future capacity and capability to
respond to advancing DPRK ballistic missile threats, making it crucial
to field the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) as funded in the fiscal
year 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328).
Iran has not shied away from pursuing malign global activities,
including in North America; the regime continues to pose a significant
threat to the United States, as well as our partners in the Central
Command region. The August 2022 disclosure of an Iranian plot to
assassinate a former senior United States official on United States
territory illustrated the brazenness of the Iranian Government. The
regime's decision to provide Russia with unmanned loitering munitions
used to attack civilian infrastructure in Ukraine provides further
evidence of Iran's embrace of destabilizing activity. A future decision
by the regime to pursue an ICBM-class missile would add yet another
threat vector capable of striking North America.
Regional Security Threats
I remain concerned about transnational organized crime in Mexico
and the Western Hemisphere and the unrelenting violence it spawns and
insecurity it creates, as cartels vie for control of lucrative illicit
markets. Cartels control fentanyl, cocaine and methamphetamine
trafficking as well as other drugs, and are demonstrating the
capability to use improvised explosives and small-unmanned aerial
systems against Mexican security forces in Mexico, which will likely
embolden the cartels and challenge our partners. As USNORTHCOM supports
our law enforcement and international partners in countering
transnational criminal organizations in our area of operations, I
remain steadfast in my commitment to our military partners in Mexico
and The Bahamas.
I commend Mexico's arrest last summer of the cartel member who
brutally murdered a DEA agent decades earlier, as well as the recent
arrests of Ovidio Guzman Lopez, the son of Sinaloa Cartel leader
Joaquin ``El Chapo'' Guzman, and Jose Rodolfo Villareal-Hernandez, a
Mexican cartel leader known as ``El Gato.'' These arrests are examples
of a shared commitment to justice, buttressed by shared values and our
decades-long partnership, which stands in stark contrast to PRC and
Russian malign and self-serving activities in the Western Hemisphere.
I am committed to deepening the already strong partnership with the
Mexican and Bahamian militaries to advance our mutual goals, from
upholding human rights to ensuring hemispheric defense. I was proud to
host my counterparts from the Mexican Department of National Defense
(SEDENA) and Department of the Navy (SEMAR) in early 2022 and visit The
Bahamas in late 2021, and we will continue to work with Mexico and The
Bahamas to stamp out attempts by the PRC or Russia to divide our
countries and our partnerships.
Transnational challenges
USNORTHCOM's 20th anniversary offered a reminder of the
transnational challenges that have shaped the Command from its
inception. Foremost is the enduring transnational terrorist threat to
North America, led by Sunni extremist groups and their supporters in
North America. The arrest in August 2022 of an ISIS-inspired individual
in New Mexico who had surveilled a United States military base is a
stark reminder that military facilities remain attractive targets to
terrorists. More broadly, the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan
and violent extremist groups' ongoing presence in the region indicate a
renewed threat to the region that we cannot discount. This extremist
threat transcends south Asia and extends to other regions with security
challenges, including the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, where
terrorists continue to operate, train, and plan.
Where We Are Today: 20 Years of USNORTHCOM and 65 Years of NORAD
USNORTHCOM was established on October 1st, 2002, in the immediate
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States,
marking the first time since the colonial era a single commander was
responsible for the defense of the U.S. Homeland. Twenty years later,
the likelihood of a major attack inside the United States by a foreign
violent extremist organization has diminished following a generational,
whole-of-nation effort. However, the primary threat to the Homeland is
now far more significant and consequential. Multiple peer competitors
and rogue states possess the capability and capacity to threaten our
citizens, critical infrastructure, and vital institutions. These
competitors possess, or are developing, the modern capabilities that
limit the time and options available to decisionmakers responsible for
defending our interests. In addition to destructive kinetic and cyber
capabilities, malign actors actively exploit our democratic society by
spreading disinformation that drives wedges between our citizens,
undermines democracy, and weakens our alliances.
In crisis or conflict, potential adversaries will likely seek to
interfere with the Department's ability to project power abroad.
Disruptions of military and civilian transportation infrastructure in
North America could impede the ability of the United States and Canada
to project combat power. Today I assess, as I have for nearly 3 years,
that homeland defense is a potential limiting factor to ensuring rapid
and effective implementation and execution of global contingency plans.
This is due to my lack of domain awareness, limited timely access to
forces that are ready to operate throughout my areas of responsibility,
including the Arctic, and a lack of resilient infrastructure enabling
the Joint Force to fight in and from the Homeland while ensuring
forward power projection.
Defending the Homeland against an ever-growing array of kinetic and
non-kinetic threats will continue to require a collaborative, whole-of-
nation approach to assessing vulnerabilities and developing appropriate
deterrence, denial, and defense strategies. Cyber risks to critical
infrastructure remain a significant concern and a domain awareness gap.
DOD is tasked only with defending defense networks, but military
facilities and missions frequently rely on civilian lifelines such as
energy grids, transportation infrastructure, and other critical
infrastructure. USNORTHCOM, due to law and policy, has limited insight
into potential risks to commercial networks, which could lead to
uncertainty in planning for consequence management. DOD's establishment
of policy regarding the defense of critical infrastructure is a
necessary step forward, and USNORTHCOM will continue to work with the
Department and key mission partners, to include agencies with critical
infrastructure security and cybersecurity responsibilities, to ensure
key defense infrastructure is defended from attacks.
NORAD, the unique United States and Canadian bi-national command,
was established in May 1958 to defend North America from cold war-era
Russian strategic bombers entering United States and Canadian airspace
from the Arctic approaches. Sixty-five years later, Russia has restored
its capability to threaten North America with modernized bombers,
surface ships, and submarines armed with long-range, highly precise
nuclear and conventional cruise missiles. The PRC is making rapid
progress in developing similar capabilities, which will further
complicate NORAD's warning missions and affect national strategic
decisionmaking.
While NORAD's missions to provide aerospace warning, aerospace
control, and maritime warning remain critical to homeland defense,
action and investment are needed to keep pace with competitors that
clearly seek to hold North America at risk above and below the nuclear
threshold. For decades, NORAD has relied heavily on the North Warning
System arrayed along the Arctic coasts of Canada and Alaska to detect
potential airborne threats to North America. It is clear that our
competitors possess long-range strike capabilities that could be used
to attack the United States and Canada from outside the detection range
of legacy sensors.
In order to maintain domain awareness and ensure integrated threat
warning and attack assessment to national leadership, the United States
and Canada must continue to move swiftly to field Over the Horizon
Radar (OTHR), as funded in the fiscal year 2023 Consolidated Omnibus
Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328). OTHR is a proven, affordable
technology that will ensure our ability to detect threats from surface
to space in the approaches to North America. I commend both the
Department of Defense and the Canadian Department of National Defence
for their commitment in fiscal year 2023 to investing in OTHR, and I
respectfully urge both Governments to ensure this vital capability is
fielded as quickly as possible.
NORAD's contributions to homeland and continental defense will
remain vital for many years to come, and will continue to rely on
strong cooperation and shared investment between the United States and
Canada. The United States and Canadian continental defense framework
has an unrivaled legacy of success and serves as an international model
of defense cooperation. I remain encouraged by the bi-national
commitments to modernizing the platforms, sensors, and capabilities
necessary to execute NORAD's missions; this collaborative approach to
deterring and defending against threats to North America is critical.
NORAD must continue to look to the future and take necessary measures
today to counter the threats of tomorrow, and investments by the United
States and Canada must address kinetic and non-kinetic threats to our
nations.
Potential threats to North America routinely transit international
borders and the boundaries between United States geographic combatant
command areas of responsibility. NORAD's ability to provide timely
aerospace warning and control and maritime warning will be bolstered by
the United States and Canada's joint commitment to improving global
domain awareness, modernizing command and control systems to provide
faster, better-informed decisionmaking, and continuing collaborative
research, development, and innovation. These efforts will ensure
NORAD's ability to compete with the PRC and Russia for years to come
while clearly signaling a lasting commitment to a robust, modern, and
effective defense of North America.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD Priorities
My priorities for NORAD and USNORTHCOM directly reflect the need to
inform the rapid, agile decisions required of senior leaders in this
dynamic and complex strategic environment. Our competitors continue to
field capabilities specifically intended to strike with limited
warning, which decreases the time and options available to national
leaders in a crisis. Continuing to trust legacy processes and
capabilities increases risk to the Homeland and compounds the risk of
miscalculation and inadvertent escalation. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are
working urgently to increase the domain awareness, information sharing,
and global integration necessary to ensure national leaders have as
much time and as many options as possible.
As competitors and potential adversaries continue to field advanced
all-domain capabilities with the potential to create significant
effects in the Homeland, it is imperative that the United States and
Canada move quickly to improve domain awareness from the seafloor to
space and cyberspace for all approaches to North America. The Over-the-
Horizon Radars (OTHR) funded in the fiscal year 2023 President's
Budget, along with the OTHRs announced by the Government of Canada as
part of NORAD modernization, will leverage proven technology and will
significantly improve the ability of USNORTHCOM and NORAD to detect and
track potential threats to North America and the Homeland from the
Earth's surface to space. That capability, in turn, will directly
correlate to more time available to leaders at all levels, enabling the
creation and employment of better deterrence options and if required,
defeat options.
U.S. Space Force investments in advanced space-based missile
warning sensor capabilities show great promise with particular regard
to hypersonic and advanced missile threats. These future systems will
detect, track, and identify threats, including hypersonic threats,
enable better warning and assessment, and develop actionable targeting
solutions, at a much faster pace than we currently experience, while
also delivering an inherent operational resilience. Given our
competitors' advanced maritime domain capabilities, I fully support the
Navy's investment in a modernized Integrated Undersea Surveillance
System. These capabilities, in turn, will directly correlate to more
time and options available to produce a favorable outcome for the
United States and Canada.
Canada's plans to fund a layered surveillance system that will
improve shared domain awareness in the northern air and maritime
approaches to North America will have significant, long-term benefits
for both NORAD and USNORTHCOM's missions. Planned Canadian investment
in Arctic and Polar radars and spaced-based surveillance systems, along
with advanced munitions, communications, and infrastructure clearly
demonstrates shared commitment to NORAD and the combined defense of the
United States and Canada.
In addition to the investment in OTHR, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have
also demonstrated the potential for linking existing platforms and
sharing data with multiple commands, interagency and international
partners. By sharing data previously trapped in bureaucratic and
organizational stovepipes through innovative programs like Pathfinder,
Northstar, and the Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE),
USNORTHCOM and NORAD have proven that it is possible to rapidly improve
domain awareness and streamline global information sharing without the
costs associated with fielding exquisite new capabilities. It is
crucial that the Department of Defense and the Services, as well as the
Canadian Department of National Defence, continue the work to unlock
the remarkable potential of these initiatives.
I am encouraged by the establishment of the Department's Chief
Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO), and I believe that
the CDAO must be empowered to rapidly integrate systems, software and
platforms in order to maintain our competitive advantage across the
Joint Force. Over the past several years, actions by each of our
competitors and potential adversaries have made it clear that regional
actions have global diplomatic, economic, and military ramifications.
It is simply unrealistic to assume that crises will remain confined by
artificial boundaries, and we must adapt plans and perspectives to
account for that global reality.
The feasibility of every other Geographic Combatant Command's plans
will require active campaigning in and from North America, and
successful defense of the Homeland is necessary to deter adversaries
and assure allies and partners. Therefore, I have also directed that
USNORTHCOM and NORAD prioritize homeland defense campaigning to
demonstrate our readiness, capabilities, and resiliency. I am also
operationalizing the commands to accelerate the flow of information
from sensor to decisionmaker. Our competitors and potential adversaries
have shown that they will hold the Homeland at risk in a conflict, and
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are acting today to ensure homeland defense plans
are understood, exercised, and resourced.
While USNORTHCOM and NORAD have made strides in the Homeland
defense mission, building a resilient Joint Force is a fundamental
element of all Department planning, exercises, and operations. The
DOD's worldwide missions and responsibilities must evolve from
regionally focused approaches to globally integrated efforts that
account for finite resources and associated risks. At present, I am
concerned for the commands' ability to execute assigned missions--
including contingency and operations plans in support of homeland
defense. I am limited by a lack of timely access to forces that are
organized, trained, and equipped to operate throughout the NORAD area
of operations and the NORTHCOM area of responsibility, as well as by
insufficient supporting infrastructure.
A strong homeland defense is the foundation of our Nation's ability
to project power globally while deterring aggression and achieving our
strategic objectives in competition, crisis, and conflict. As such,
every plan, exercise, and policy decision must consider the necessity
of defending the Homeland when evaluating competing demands for forces
and threats to global campaigning. That, in turn, will require the
Department of Defense and the Canadian Department of National Defence
to place greater focus on developing the depth, flexibility, advanced
technologies, and supporting infrastructure required to respond to
future challenges while addressing growing threats to the Homeland.
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
When directed by the Secretary of Defense, USNORTHCOM provides
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in the Continental United
States, Alaska, and Puerto Rico. In preparing for and responding to
major natural and human-caused disasters, USNORTHCOM serves as the DSCA
synchronizer to support assessment and recovery while simultaneously
acting as the supported combatant command in the command's area of
operations.
USNORTHCOM often supports Federal, State, tribal, territorial, and
local (FSTTL) disaster relief efforts. These collaborative, whole-of-
government efforts demonstrate national resilience that should reassure
the American public, while also making clear to potential aggressors,
that the United States routinely executes interagency domestic relief
operations that allow our Nation to recovery quickly following even
large-scale disasters. It is equally important for our FSTTL partners
to identify and address their capabilities and capacity gaps to fully
perform the roles, missions, and operations under their authorities.
This kind of response, particularly when it is accomplished with little
or no military support, can generate a deterrent effect by casting
doubt in competitors' minds about their ability to produce significant
effects from an attack on the Homeland.
USNORTHCOM is uniquely suited to support our Federal partners in
the aftermath of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
(CBRN) attack. The Department must remain committed to this crucial
mission to ensure these highly trained, specialized elements stand
ready to respond immediately in the event of a weapon of mass
destruction event in the United States.
I continue to stress the importance of USNORTHCOM's defense support
of civil authorities, as rapidly executed, well-planned, multi-agency
responses to wildfires, hurricanes, pandemics, and other significant
disruptions are perhaps the most visible demonstration of the
military's support to the American people. USNORTHCOM works year-round
with our mission partners at every level to strengthen relationships,
improve communications, and incorporate lessons learned from previous
responses in order to deliver rapid and effective support to lead
Federal agencies. Our command takes tremendous pride in supporting our
FSTTL partners, while helping to highlight the resourcefulness and
solidarity of the American people in the face of adversity. It should
be clear to competitors and potential aggressors that the United States
routinely responds to and recovers quickly from large-scale
disruptions--and USNORTHCOM is always ready to support those efforts
with military capabilities as directed by the Secretary.
USNORTHCOM support to civil authorities includes the command's
ongoing support of Federal law enforcement efforts to counter the
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) that have caused so much
harm to our Nation. Illicit drugs trafficked by transnational criminal
enterprises kill more than one hundred thousand U.S. citizens each
year, and the number of fatal overdoses have risen dramatically as
cartels have increased the volume of fentanyl smuggled into the United
States. As directed by the Secretary of Defense and in accordance with
my direct guidance, USNORTHCOM's subordinate command, Joint Task Force
North (JTF-N), provides U.S. Federal law enforcement partners with
intelligence and counter-threat finance analysis and other support as
requested to disrupt the sophisticated financial and physical networks
used to infiltrate illicit goods and exploited human traffic into the
United States. The important work done by USNORTHCOM and JTF-N in
countering transnational criminal organizations and disrupting the flow
of illegal drugs into the United States is a national security
imperative that directly supports homeland defense.
Natural disasters, public health threats, and transnational
irregular migration will likely continue to require DOD support for our
lead Federal partners. Environmental change will also continue to have
a direct impact on military readiness and resources, as was made clear
by the massive destructive power of Hurricane Ian in September 2022 and
by western wildfires that are growing in scale and frequency as fire
seasons now extend throughout most of the year. It is necessary to plan
and account for the growing likelihood of natural disasters that
disrupt military operations and damage critical infrastructure, while
units involved in response operations require time to reset and recover
after completing their missions. The long-term consequences of extreme
weather, rising sea levels, and increased flooding will continue to
affect DOD missions, infrastructure, and personnel, especially those in
the Homeland.
Security Cooperation
In addition to our more visible homeland defense and DSCA
operations, USNORTHCOM continues to reap tremendous benefits from our
military-to-military relationships with our allies and partners in
Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas. Security cooperation with our
neighbors is crucial to regional security, countering the influence of
peer competitors, and addressing shared challenges. Security
cooperation provides a critical and lasting advantage over our more
isolated competitors, and I am grateful to the Department and to this
Committee for your ongoing support of USNORTHCOM's vital work with our
allies and partners. I am proud to work with my military counterparts
in Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas as we support one another's efforts
to defend our nations and stand united against malign actors seeking to
expand influence and presence in the Western Hemisphere.
The military-to-military relationship between the United States and
Canada remains extraordinary and vital. In addition to standing side by
side as partners in NORAD for nearly 65 years, Canada has been a
stalwart ally in continental defense and operations overseas for
decades. The unique trust between our militaries is immediately
apparent within the USNORTHCOM and NORAD headquarters, as United States
and Canadian personnel work side-by-side in pursuit of shared missions
and objectives. The Canadian Armed Forces' shared commitment to
improved domain awareness, information sharing, and modernization of
the capabilities necessary for deterrence and continental defense is
essential to our united efforts to defend North America, and I am
fortunate to serve alongside such steadfast and trusted allies.
The Mexican Department of National Defense (SEDENA) and Department
of the Navy (SEMAR) continue to meet daunting internal and external
security challenges with professionalism and resiliency. Keenly focused
on enhancing regional defense, our Mexican military partners continue
to make major investments in a modern, capable, and reliable force
capable of interoperability with the United States and other partners.
In light of that important effort, USNORTHCOM strongly supports SEDENA
and SEMAR modernization initiatives, including the potential divestment
of their fleet of MI-17 helicopters in favor of Western helicopters.
In April 2022, it was my honor to host the Secretaries of SEDENA
and SEMAR at USNORTHCOM for the Bilateral Military Cooperation
Roundtable (BMCR). During this important annual dialog, USNORTHCOM and
our Mexican military partners conducted a candid and highly productive
assessment of our mutual security challenges, associated requirements,
and shared commitment to addressing threats to our nations. Over the
course of 3 days, Secretary General Sandoval, Secretary Admiral Ojeda,
and I reaffirmed our military-to-military relationship and committed to
a number of concrete steps that will have significant and lasting
positive impacts on regional security.
Our partners in the Royal Bahamian Defence Force (RBDF) continue to
punch above their weight as they continue to provide important
contributions to regional security. USNORTHCOM and the RBDF operate
maritime surveillance systems at Great Inagua and Coral Harbour, and
plans are on track to add a third site in the coming years. That shared
capability has significant benefits for domain awareness in the
southern approaches to North America and demonstrates The Bahamas'
ongoing commitment to security cooperation with USNORTHCOM. Our
collaboration has taken on added importance as the PRC's diplomatic
corps in Nassau continues to produce anti-United States public
statements while highlighting Chinese economic investment and
humanitarian relief efforts in The Bahamas.
USNORTHCOM is strongly committed to a long-term partnership with
the RBDF, and continued whole-of-government engagement and investment
by the United States. As you know, the United States has been without a
confirmed Ambassador to The Bahamas since 2011. No action was taken on
the President's nominee last year, and the nomination was resubmitted
in January 2023. This senior diplomatic position is critical to
demonstrating the importance of the relationship between the United
States and The Bahamas and to mitigating the PRC's efforts to gain a
foothold only 50 miles from the United States east coast.
The Arctic
The ability of the joint force to operate and campaign in the
Arctic remains a pressing concern for USNORTHCOM and NORAD. The PRC and
Russia continue to invest in Arctic capabilities as both seek to
increase presence and influence in the region while shifting the rules-
based international order to their advantage. More than 50 percent of
USNORTHCOM's area of operations is in the Arctic, and USNORTHCOM and
NORAD's priorities in the region continue to focus on increased
presence, campaigning through joint training and exercises, and close
collaboration with allies and partners.
The effects of environmental change in the Arctic will have
significant impacts on accessibility, infrastructure, and competition
for the foreseeable future, and the region remains the most unforgiving
operational environment on earth. As the Department balances the
demands of global mission requirements with difficult budgetary
choices, USNORTHCOM and NORAD require access to trained and ready
forces capable of operating throughout the commands' areas of
responsibility--to include the Arctic. The Joint Force must keep sight
of the fact that special training and purpose-built equipment are
necessary to operate in a region in which extreme climate, distance,
and geography quickly overtake the unprepared.
Over the last year, USNORTHCOM and NORAD collaborated with USEUCOM,
USINDOPACOM, USTRANSCOM, USSOCOM and the military Services while
conducting joint exercises in Alaska, Greenland, and northern Canada.
These demanding events expose Joint Force participants to the demands
of the Arctic operating environment and help to reinforce the necessity
of a force trained and equipped to survive in the extreme cold and
remoteness that defines much of the region. I am encouraged by the
strategic objectives stated in the United States National Strategy for
the Arctic that support better understanding of the region, exercising
presence, and capitalizing on the definitive advantage of our
international alliances and partnerships.
While the military Services' respective Arctic strategies
acknowledge the importance of the Arctic and the need to develop the
capabilities needed to operate and compete in the region, direct
investment in Arctic-capable platforms, training, and infrastructure
continues to lag. It is necessary that the Joint Force has the ability
to compete, fight, and win in the Arctic in the coming years, and the
time for the Services to invest in the required equipment,
infrastructure, and training is now. The PRC and Russia have clearly
demonstrated their intent to expand their Arctic presence and
operations, and I urge the Department of Defense, the Services, my
fellow combatant commanders, and the Canadian Department of National
Defence to move faster toward improving our collective ability to
succeed in this strategically vital region.
Conclusion
Homeland defense remains the core mission of both USNORTHCOM and
NORAD. The one constant throughout my time in command has been the
extraordinary pace at which our competitors have advanced their
capabilities to threaten the Homeland. Despite those clear risks, the
processes used by the Department of Defense and the Canadian Department
of National Defence for planning, acquisitions, personnel hiring,
technology development, and other activities necessary to the success
of the defense enterprise remain largely unchanged from when I received
my commission nearly 36 years ago.
As competitors develop greater capability, capacity, and intent to
challenge the United States, Canada, and the rules-based international
order, I believe that the greatest strategic risk for the United States
stems from our own inability to adapt at a pace required by the
changing strategic environment. In an era of incredible innovation and
technological achievement, inflexible, outdated processes are a greater
impediment to success than many of our competitors' capability
advancements. We cannot continue to rely on Industrial Age practices
and legacy platforms to compete in a digital age, and if we fail to
evolve at the pace demanded by the strategic environment, our
competitive advantage will continue to erode.
The Department and Congress must also be more willing to accept the
relatively low risks associated with retiring legacy platforms in order
to ensure our ability to fight and win against advanced and well-
resourced competitors. Over the last decade, the PRC and Russia have
made extraordinary technological advancements while the Department
remains encumbered by obsolete capabilities and associated costs. To
defend the Homeland, USNORTHCOM and NORAD require a modern force with
the capacity and capability to deter and if required defeat advanced
peer competitors. Retiring systems that have exceeded their operational
lifespans--to include fighters and command and control platforms at the
end of their service lives--is necessary to accelerate the arrival of
next generation capabilities.
Along with faster, more flexible development and acquisitions, the
Joint Force requires predictable and timely funding to maintain
readiness and increase capability, capacity, and resilience. The
Continuing Resolutions that have become commonplace over the last
decade have direct and lasting adverse consequences for military
readiness, modernization, and planning. Predictable, on-time annual
budgeting and appropriations, along with streamlined Department
processes and greater tolerance for risk in developing and testing new
capabilities, are essential to maintaining our competitive advantage.
The need to move faster is clear. The PRC and Russia have already
fielded highly advanced hypersonic capabilities, while the United
States' hypersonic program, although accelerating, still languishes
well behind our competitors' efforts. Further, DOD faces operational
challenges with civilian hiring processes for recruiting and hiring the
innovative and experientially diverse workforce needed to drive
innovation and advancement on pace with the civilian tech sector.
Simply put, the Department must continue to strategically tackle hiring
and personnel management improvements to move its workforce goal of
being an employer of choice forward.
Finally, the PRC high altitude balloon (HAB) incursion into our
national airspace was obviously a significant event that shined a light
on the PRC's brazen intelligence collection against the United States
and Canada. It was the first time USNORTHCOM conducted an engagement
over the United States in our history, and it made it clear that our
competitors have the capability and intent to reach the Homeland. The
three Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAPs), also shot down days later
by USNORTHCOM and NORAD, clearly demonstrated the challenges associated
with detecting and identifying unmanned objects in U.S. airspace. As
for NORAD and NORTHCOM, I commit to you that this event has already
generated critical lessons learned for my commands and our mission
partners, and I can guarantee that NORTHCOM and NORAD are going to
continue to learn from it and do whatever is necessary to keep our
country safe.
While we face significant challenges, there should be no doubt we
have the finest military on the planet and that the commands will
defend our nations with tenacity and resolve. In what is likely my
final appearance before this subcommittee, I remain deeply humbled and
immensely proud to lead the noblest mission of any Combatant Command--
defending the Homeland. I am grateful to the subcommittee for your
longstanding support of our missions and of the men and women who stand
watch over our Nation every day. I thank you for the honor of
representing our soldiers, sailors, airmen, guardians, marines, and
civilians.
Senator King. Thank you, General. General Karbler.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL L. KARBLER, USA,
COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE
DEFENSE COMMAND
Lieutenant General Karbler. Chairman King, Ranking Member
Fischer, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I am
honored to again testify before you and to represent an
incredible people-first organization of 2,600 soldiers and
civilians across 13 time zones in 19 dispersed locations.
Every day these amazing professionals provide space, high
altitude, and missile defense forces and capabilities to the
Army and joint warfighters. First, let me express my sincere
appreciation for your steadfast support of our people and their
families.
I serve as the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Space
and Missile Defense Command, the Commander of the Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense,
and as the Army's Proponent for Air and Missile Defense, or
AMD.
I provide U.S. Northern Command the soldiers who stand
ready to defend our Nation from intercontinental ballistic
missile attack, serve as the Army's Service Component Commander
to both U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command, and I am
the Chief of Staff of the Army's AMD enterprise integrator.
I would like to first discuss the threats that confront us
worldwide. In Europe, we see daily the continuation of the
largest employment of offensive missiles since World War II and
the unprecedented use of attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
in Russia's nearly 15-month war against Ukraine. In the
Pacific, against the backdrop of multiple missile tests by the
DPRK and China, threats of regional and trans regional, complex
missile attacks still loom.
In the United States Central Command area of responsibility
(CENTCOM AOR), our adversaries continue to attack partner
nations and U.S. Forces using missiles, UAVs, and rockets,
artillery, and mortars. I have been an air defender for 36
years, stationed and deployed in the European, Pacific, and
Middle Eastern theaters, and I have never seen adversary threat
activity, whether that be test or operational use, as great as
I see it today.
Adversary actions in the space domain are equally as
aggressive as they continue to challenge us across multiple
space-enabled mission areas critical to supporting our missile
defense mission. To address these threats, we must strengthen
our capabilities to deny our adversaries the benefit of
aggression.
We must continue investment in sustainment of combat ready,
capable, and lethal space and air and missile defense
capabilities. Fortunately, we do not face these threats alone.
We have allies and partners who contribute significantly to the
air and missile defense and space missions. Please allow me to
briefly outline just a couple of milestones accomplished by our
space and missile defense soldiers and civilians.
This past year, we have partnered with U.S. Army Special
Operations Command and U.S. Army Cyber Command to create a
Space, Cyber, Special Operations triad to provide deterrence
and response options through the integrated use of our unique
capabilities.
We have continued to mature the triad through multiple
exercises to include the Army's Project Convergence 22 and U.S.
Army Special Operations Command Capability Exercise, which was
held just last week.
Recently, we reached a historic milestone in the air
defense enterprise, with the full rate production decision for
the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System,
IBCS. This any-sensor, best shooter construct allows us to
integrate the right quantity and mix of air and missile defense
capabilities across all echelons, building an effective,
tiered, and layered defense.
We need to greatly add incredible soldiers to the any
sensor, best shooter construct, as these men and women will
play the most critical role in this transformative capability.
This is the linchpin of the Army's broader air and missile
defense modernization efforts, crucial to enhancing our air and
missile defense capabilities well into the future.
In closing and on a personal note, this will be my last
opportunity to address the distinguished Members of this
Subcommittee, and I went to, again, thank you for your support.
I am confident in the direction and momentum of the Army's air
and missile defense, and space enterprises. I look forward to
addressing your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Karbler
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Daniel L. Karbler
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for your continued support for our
servicemembers, civilians, and families and your continued support for
the Army, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), U.S. Space Command
(USSPACECOM), Department of Defense (DOD), and the space and missile
defense community. Thank you also for inviting me to highlight the
importance of space and missile defense capabilities and ongoing
enhancements that enable the defense of our Nation, forward stationed
and deployed forces, allies, and partners.
Today, with my assigned roles, I bring both an Army and a joint
perspective on effective space and missile defense concepts and
capabilities. Within the Army and joint communities, my
responsibilities encompass several mission areas.
As commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
(USASMDC), I serve as the Army's force modernization proponent and
operational integrator for space, missile defense, and high-altitude
capabilities. In short, USASMDC provides trained and ready space and
missile defense forces and capabilities to the warfighter and the
Nation. With regard to missile defense, I am the Army Service Component
Commander responsible for planning, integrating, coordinating, and
providing Army missile defense forces and capabilities in support of
USSTRATCOM missions. Additionally, I am a supporting commander to the
Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), for the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) System. In the space mission area, I am the
Army Service Component Commander to USSPACECOM, providing trained and
ready Army space warfighters and capabilities to compete, fight, and
win in the space domain.
As the Army's air and missile defense (AMD) enterprise integrator,
I synchronize the balanced execution of the Army's AMD posture across
the functions of force planning and sourcing requirements, combat and
materiel development, AMD acquisition, and life cycle management. I
coordinate with the AMD community of interest to balance priorities,
inform resourcing decisions, and pursue innovative approaches to
fulfill our AMD mission requirements.
Finally, as Commander of USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component
Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), I am responsible for
providing operational-level comprehensive missile defense expertise in
support of USSTRATCOM's Unified Command Plan (UCP)-assigned trans-
regional missile defense (MD) mission. This trans-regional MD mission
includes plans and policy support and assessment, integration of MD
security cooperation activities, operations support, joint MD training,
education, and exercise support, and support to missile defense
capability development on behalf of the combatant commanders (CCDRs),
the Joint Staff and the Secretary of Defense. These efforts contribute
to an integrated deterrence approach that denies the benefits of
missile attack to adversaries, assures allies, and defends U.S.
deployed forces, allies, and partners.
The operational environment continues to evolve at unprecedented
speed. China continues to bolster its anti-access/area denial strategy
in the Western Pacific and pressure its neighbors with increasingly
provocative behavior. In their unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the
Russian Federation launched an unprecedented number of offensive
missile systems, including hypersonic weapons. China, Russia, and other
potential adversaries form a globally capable, mutually supporting,
threat set. The United States and our allies face significant increases
in the density, diversity, and operational reach of lethal offensive
missile systems. The proliferation, range, and maneuverability of these
weapons require an increasingly trans-regional approach to missile
defense. The sensors; battle management, command, control and
communication and intelligence (BMC3I) architectures; and other
supporting components of trans-regional missile defense will
progressively migrate to space-based platforms such as the Space
Development Agency's Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture in the
years to come. This greater emphasis on the convergence of space and
missile defense is the logical extension of our need to evolve our
means for birth-to-death tracking and targeting complex missile and
hybrid hypersonic threats from a position of advantage. However, given
the scale of the problem, these new tracking and warning capabilities
must be complemented by a broader whole-of-government approach to
comprehensive missile defeat, leveraging the full range of available
activities and capabilities to counter both the use of adversary
missiles, and their development, acquisition, and proliferation. The
trans-regional missile defense contribution to this missile defeat
initiative includes existing as well as new and novel approaches to
negate adversary systems both before and after launch without reliance
on the increasingly difficult hit-to-kill mechanisms of our legacy
missile defense systems. Integrating this diverse set of capabilities
focused specifically on this initiative is critical to its success.
We must advance trans-regional missile defense through continued
investment and sustainment of combat-ready, integrated, capable, and
lethal air and missile defense and space capabilities, combined with
those of our allies' and partners' as part of a comprehensive approach
to missile defeat supporting integrated deterrence. This remains
essential in ensuring our Nation's security.
people first
USASMDC and JFCC IMD, comprised of multi-component Soldiers,
Airmen, Sailors, Marines, Guardians, and dedicated civilians and
contractors, cannot carry out our wide-ranging, no-fail national
security missions without the commitment of our greatest asset--our
people. We prioritize ``People First'' as we recruit, train, and
develop space and missile defense professionals. Our People First
mandate has six values: communication, recognition, trust, teamwork,
transparency, and empowerment. Despite the many challenges introduced
by the COVID-19 pandemic, our professionals continued providing space
and missile defense capabilities that support combatant command (CCMD)
plans and operations. It is our people who make us strong; it is our
people who make winning possible.
u.s. army space and missile defense command
To accomplish our vision of providing space, missile defense, and
high-altitude forces and capabilities to support joint and combined
warfighting readiness in all domains, USASMDC is organizationally
aligned to accomplish three major tasks. These are: providing forces
and capabilities for current operations; preparing forces and
capabilities for the future fight; and researching and developing Army
technologies to provide future advancements in space, air, and missile
defense capabilities.
The command aligns its activities to these priorities:
Accomplish our mission as a People First team of
empowered, innovative, ready, and resilient professionals.
Provide trained and ready forces for space, missile
defense, and high-altitude missions.
Conduct integrated planning and synchronized operations
in the execution of our space and missile defense missions.
Prepare for future conflict.
recent contributions and upgrades to army space and missile defense
capabilities
The people of USASMDC and JFCC IMD continue to learn new ways to
operate, accomplish our missions, enhance capabilities, and support
global theaters. Throughout the last several months, we have realized
essential space and missile defense operational, capability, and
training successes, a few of which follow.
We are currently upgrading our Joint Tactical Ground
Stations (JTAGS) configuration at our four theater missile warning
company locations. Once fielded, this upgrade will significantly
improve our missile warning, missile defense cueing, and battlespace
characterization capabilities in support of multidomain operations, and
it will enable us to keep pace with rapidly growing, complex, and
capable threat systems.
In March 2022, the Army relocated two European-based
Patriot missile defense batteries to Poland. This defensive relocation
reinforces our Nation's commitment to Article 5 and to proactively
deter any threats on NATO's Eastern flank.
During a March 2022 joint exercise, a subordinate air
defense regiment under the European-based 10th Army Air and Missile
Defense Command successfully deployed four Maneuver-Short Range Air
Defense (M-SHORAD) Stryker-based platforms to the eastern NATO region.
This deployment demonstrated the Army's newest short-range air defense
system's ability to defend maneuver forces against unmanned aerial
systems (UAS), rotary-wing, and fixed-wing air threats.
Our Army Space Training Division (ASTD) served as the
lead proponent for equipping Army divisions and training centers with
essential training aid devices that enable organizations to train in a
degraded and disrupted space operations environment. With fielding
completed, ASTD will lead future efforts on life cycle replacement of
these devices.
The USASMDC Technical Center leveraged commercial
synthetic aperture radar imaging of current interest locations and,
using artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms, provided
key operational data to tactical warfighting organizations.
Support to significant testing and exercises remains a
priority. Earlier this year, Air Defense Artillery (ADA) soldiers
participated in the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Flight
Test-21, where two Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile
Segment Enhanced (MSE) interceptors were integrated with THAAD software
to successfully intercept two short-range ballistic missiles. This
integration enables earlier interceptor launch and results in a longer
fly out time, which increases the defended area or battlespace. Our ADA
soldiers also recently participated in the initial operational test and
evaluation of the successful Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle
Command System (IBCS) test. During this event, IBCS maintained
continuous tracking of two cruise missile targets by fusing data from
multiple sensors while degraded by an electronic attack. Finally, we
continue to deploy Army space professionals to numerous joint and
partner nation exercises and wargames.
In addition to exercise support, operational deployments
to CCMDs continue. Our 1st Space Brigade rotated an Army Space Control
Crew to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), an Army Space Support
Team to both U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. European Command
(USEUCOM), and Space Control Planning Teams to USEUCOM and USSPACECOM.
Our Force Tracking Mission Management Center continues to
support global operations in the USCENTCOM, U.S. Africa Command, and
other CCMD geographic areas of responsibility. The Center provided
vital management and dissemination of friendly force tracking data to
theater commands.
Our Advanced Warfare Environment / Tactical Geospatial
Environment system developed to provide AMD Intelligence Preparation of
the Battlespace for Army AMD units has proven to be a primary analysis
system used by the Missile and Space Intelligence Center to analyze and
document Russia-Ukraine missile operations for intelligence community
assessments.
providing forces and capabilities for current operations
In accordance with Title 10 responsibilities, USASMDC is a force
provider of missile defense capabilities. Our first major task is to
provide trained and ready missile defense forces and capabilities to
CCDRs. USASMDC soldiers serving in the Homeland and stationed in remote
and austere forward locations operate the GMD and AN/TPY-2 Forward-
Based Mode (FBM) radars. Highlights of the capabilities provided to
current operations and readiness by our missile defense professionals
include:
Support to Homeland Missile Defense: Soldiers from the 100th
Missile Defense Brigade (MDB), headquartered in Colorado Springs,
Colorado, and 49th Missile Defense Battalion, headquartered at Fort
Greely, Alaska, stand ready to defend our Nation from intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) attack 24/7/365. In support of USNORTHCOM,
Army National Guard and Active Component soldiers operate the GMD Fire
Control Systems located at the Fire Direction Center in Alaska; Missile
Defense Element in Colorado; a detachment that oversees operations at
Vandenberg Space Force Base, California; and a detachment that secures
GMD sensor infrastructure at Fort Drum, New York. At the Fort Greely
Missile Defense Complex, the 49th Missile Defense Battalion military
police, with augmentation from the Mississippi National Guard, secure
interceptors and command and control (C2) facilities from physical
threats. These security soldiers perform their duties in some of the
most austere conditions in the United States, with winter temperatures
plummeting to 50 degrees below zero and fewer than 4 hours of sunlight
in the winter months.
1st Space Brigade soldiers provide CCDRs certified AN/TPY-2 FBM
missile defense batteries that support strategic and regional missions.
These batteries are globally located in five strategic, yet remote and
austere locations, where they provide ballistic missile search, track,
and discrimination operations, as well as Space Domain Awareness, in
support of both homeland and regional defense and USSPACECOM's Global
Sensor Manager responsibilities. These soldiers continuously
demonstrate our Nation's commitment to defend deployed forces, allies,
and partners from ballistic missile attacks.
Support to Global Missile Defense Test and Development: Soldiers
from the 100th MDB and 49th Missile Defense Battalion participate in
GMD test activities and work with Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
developers on enhancements to the GMD. The MDA's testing regime,
conducted through a series of ground-based and operational flight
tests, emphasizes operational realism during test design and execution.
This realism enables system operators to sustain and improve their
proficiency and validate the system's operational employment.
Global Missile Defense System Development: MDA continues to evolve
the GMD weapon system to enhance existing capabilities, as well as
deliver new capabilities. The Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), once
developed and fielded, will be a significant upgrade compared to the
current interceptor fleet, providing the warfighter with improved
system performance and greater reliability.
Space Support to Missile Early Warning: Space-enabled capabilities
are essential for missile defense operations. They provide and enable
communications; positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT);
intelligence; and surveillance to meet the demands of modern warfare.
In support of joint force commanders, USASMDC continues to provide
missile warning within the USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USINDOPACOM theaters
of operations. The 1st Space Brigade's forward stationed JTAGS theater
missile warning companies are essential for USSPACECOM's assured
missile warning mission. They are operated by USASMDC soldiers who
monitor launch activity and other events observed by infrared sensor
platforms and quickly provide information to members of the AMD and
operational communities. The JTAGS forward stationing reduces the risk
of solely relying on long-haul communications and ensures the
resilience of USSPACECOM's comprehensive missile warning system.
preparing forces and capabilities for the future fight
USASMDC's second major task is to develop future missile defense
forces and mature current capabilities. The Space and Missile Defense
Center of Excellence (SMD CoE) is the Army's force modernization
proponent responsible for managing change to Army doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) requirements for space, strategic
missile defense, and high-altitude capabilities. The SMD CoE trains and
educates soldiers and leaders to be agile, adaptive, and ready;
executes life cycle management for Army space operations officers;
develops Army Space soldiers; and enables informed decisionmaking.
To carry out its mission, the SMD CoE executes practices
established by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and Army Futures
Command to meet force management and Army modernization enterprise
responsibilities. These functions include performing concept
development, capabilities determination, and capabilities integration
relative to DOTMLPF-P for process change, integration, and transition
for materiel development.
Specifically, in the training arena, SMD CoE conducts the Army's
institutional soldier qualification training and education for space
and GMD mission areas. The SMD School writes, coordinates, and
publishes Army doctrine for space and GMD while also integrating space
training and education in curriculum across all Army proponent schools,
operational unit home stations, and pre-deployment training events.
These efforts prepare soldiers across all warfighting functions to
integrate Army and joint space and missile defense capabilities and
effects in the conducting of multidomain operations.
research and development of army technologies
USASMDC's third major task is to provide critical technologies to
address future needs that will enhance warfighter effectiveness.
USASMDC's Technical Center supports joint warfighters by providing
science, technology, and test and evaluation expertise to enable
warfighter dominance both today and in the future. The Technical Center
contributes to warfighter and joint force success in four major areas:
directed energy (DE); tactical responsive space and high altitude; test
and evaluation; and hypersonic and strategic weapons.
Directed Energy: The Technical Center, in coordination with the
Army's Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, is the Army
lead for high-energy laser technology development. High-energy lasers
complement kinetic systems in addressing threats from rocket,
artillery, and mortars; small UASs; and cruise missiles. Additionally,
the Technical Center is exploring high-power microwave technology for
use in interdicting a multitude of improvised threats. As systems are
fielded, the Technical Center will continue developing new and improved
DE technologies for insertion into weapon systems to maintain
warfighter dominance.
Tactical Responsive Space and High Altitude: As the Army lead for
space and high-altitude research, development, and engineering, the
Technical Center identifies, develops, demonstrates, and integrates
technologies in the areas of responsive space, space superiority, and
high altitude. Working with other Army, DOD, and industry partners, the
Technical Center focuses on persistent beyond line-of-sight
communications for forces in remote areas; functionally effective
resolution imagery; solutions for assured PNT; ground C2 systems; and
direct downlink of data from space-based systems to deployed forces.
Test and Evaluation: As an invaluable part of the Army test and
evaluation enterprise, the Technical Center supports developmental and
operational AMD defense testing with a suite of low-cost ballistic
missile targets, transportable and configurable launchers, and test
execution and evaluation. These ballistic missile targets are critical
to threat-representative, operationally realistic testing of high-
priority Army systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and IBCS, with ongoing
testing for the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS).
Hypersonic and Strategic Weapons: Since completing the Nation's
first successful hypersonic weapon test in 2011, the Technical Center
has continued supporting hypersonic testing for the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, from test planning and design through mission execution and
post-flight analysis. Additionally, the Technical Center continues to
develop capabilities that enable rapid systems development and fielding
through integration and interoperability testing, sensor and C2 design,
flight test analysis, verification and validation, and warfighter
training within an independent laboratory infrastructure.
Missile Defense Testing Assets and Range: The Technical Center also
oversees the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Test Site (RTS) at U.S.
Army Garrison-Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands. The
RTS is a vital national asset that provides live-fire developmental and
operational flight testing of offensive and defensive missile,
hypersonic, and space systems; equatorial satellite launch capability;
space object tracking and characterization; and atmospheric science
research. This unique range and test facility, located 2,300 miles
west-southwest of Hawaii, provides test support to MDA, NASA, the U.S.
Air Force, and other agencies.
The RTS supports developmental and operational testing of both
homeland and regional missile defense systems, as well as unarmed ICBM
testing for the Air Force Global Strike Command, ensuring the safety,
security, and reliability of the Nation's nuclear deterrence forces.
Hypersonic system testing has also become a significant element of
near-term test planning at RTS. In concert with its testing mission and
using a suite of the world's most sophisticated radar systems,
including the U.S. Space Force's Space Fence, RTS also supports space
object identification and space domain awareness missions in support of
USSPACECOM. This mission includes space object tracking and
characterization, providing critical orbital information on new foreign
launches and high-resolution images in support of space situational
awareness.
army contributions to the nation's missile defense capabilities
The DOD adopted new strategic guidance documents in 2022, with a
new National Defense Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review, and Missile
Defense Review, which elaborated on the President's National Security
Strategy. To achieve an AMD force capable of supporting the Army of
2030, we must continue modernizing and developing AMD capabilities,
building sufficient AMD capacity for multidomain operations, and
ensuring AMD forces are trained and ready. We must also ensure that our
capabilities and associated C2 systems are resilient and interoperable
with joint and allied forces. Accomplishing these essential tasks will
allow us to provide deterrence through deployments and forward
stationing enabling a more robust, comprehensive defense by
coordinating and integrating with our allies and partners.
Army AMD is undergoing its most significant modernization in the
last four decades, as it is one of the Army's six modernization
priorities receiving substantially increased investment. The AMD Cross
Functional Team (CFT) supports Army modernization efforts and works
closely with the other Services, Joint Staff, and MDA toward joint
integrated AMD (IAMD) capabilities. The Program Executive Office
Missiles and Space is the Army's materiel developer for these
capabilities and works closely with AMD CFT and U.S. Army Aviation and
Missile Command. A summary of the Army's AMD strategic direction and
major programs follows.
Air and Missile Defense Readiness: Multiple factors--including the
enduring demand from CCDRs, the transition to great power competition
and its associated complex threat set, and the overdue and critical
need to modernize the Army's AMD force--have all converged to impact
Army AMD force readiness. High operational demand of missile defense
forces to support joint warfighters continues stressing Army AMD force
readiness, modernization, and soldier welfare. Enduring high
operational tempo and limited deployment predictability negatively
impact soldier readiness and family well-being. Currently, twice as
many ADA soldiers are dwell restricted as compared to the overall Army.
Our focus on the ADA force has seen positive results, specifically
in the retention of our soldiers. In fiscal year (FY) 2022, 32d Army
Air and Missile Defense Command was the first overall in the division-
size category in Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) with a
109.7 percent overall retention mission rate. Currently in fiscal year
2023, 32d remains first within HQDA with over a 70 percent mission
completion rate and the highest stabilization rate within U.S. Forces
Command at 39 percent. What this tells us is, despite our high
operational tempo, our ADA soldiers believe in the mission and are
confident the Army, the ADA branch, and leaders are taking care of them
and their families.
Mission Command: Closely linked to AMD readiness is the ability to
provide low density, high demand AMD mission command elements. These
elements are pivotal to laying the foundation for and creating an
environment that supports integration of Army AMD forces into joint and
combined Command and Control architectures. During the past few years,
the Army has activated an additional Active component ADA brigade
headquarters in USINDOPACOM (38th ADA BDE at Sagami General Depot,
Japan) and in the USEUCOM theater (52d ADA BDE at Sembach, Germany).
The Army has also rotated a National Guard ADA brigade headquarters to
USEUCOM.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System: The IBCS
program is a top Army AMD modernization priority that integrates
current and future AMD sensors and weapons into a common integrated
fire control capability, allowing warfighters to fully integrate AMD
capabilities across all echelons. The IBCS is the direct replacement
for mission command nodes in the PATRIOT weapon system, headquarters
elements, and air defense airspace management cells. IBCS also allows
rapid convergence of sensors, shooters, and mission command components
on an integrated fire control network. Once fully fielded, IBCS will
provide a game-changing capability that allows appropriate tailoring
and scaling of AMD forces to meet the given threat. The quantity and
mix of capabilities can be dynamically retasked into a formation with
an inherent, integrated mission command system to build tiered and
layered defenses. The IBCS open architecture enables rapid integration
of legacy and developmental sensors and shooters that provide
capabilities to defeat emerging threats in multidomain operations. The
program completed Initial Operational Test and Evaluation in the first
quarter of fiscal year 2023 and is progressing to a Full Rate
Production Decision Review in March 2023 and Initial Operational
Capability in April 2023.
The IBCS program will field common mission command nodes for Army
AMD forces to defend against manned aircraft, UAS, air-to-ground
missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and rockets,
artillery, and mortar (RAM) attacks. Ultimately, IBCS will operate with
air surveillance and fire control capabilities across the Army, Air
Force, and Navy, and with joint and multinational AMD forces at all
echelons, thereby enhancing AMD force lethality. By dismantling the
current system-centric mission command paradigm, it will dramatically
increase systems capability and facilitate open industry competition in
support of the AMD community. The IBCS is one of the Army's
contributions to the Joint All Domain Command and Control concept
currently in development. Additional efforts are currently underway to
support IBCS interoperability with MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense
System, exploring the feasibility and potential benefits of integrating
IBCS with MDA's Command and Control, Battle Management, and
Communications (C2BMC) capability.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System: THAAD is a key
component of the ballistic missile defense system-of-systems
architecture and designed for area defense against short, medium, and
intermediate range ballistic missiles. It is a mobile and globally
transportable, low density, high demand asset that has a unique endo-
and exoatmospheric intercept capability using proven hit-to-kill
technology. There are currently seven operational THAAD batteries, two
of which are forward-stationed in Guam and the Republic of Korea in
response to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. Development
efforts associated with U.S. Forces Korea Joint Emergent Operational
Need improved Patriot and THAAD interoperability, as successfully
demonstrated in a recent THAAD/Patriot MSE developmental and
operational test where THAAD software used two MSE interceptors to
engage a ballistic missile target. The Army, in conjunction with Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and MDA, reassessed the THAAD
requirement to eight batteries.
PATRIOT/PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment
Enhancement (MSE): The Army PATRIOT force remains the cornerstone of
AMD protection for our deployed forces and allies. The PAC-3 MSE is a
high velocity, hit-to-kill, surface-to-air missile capable of
intercepting and destroying tactical ballistic missiles and air-
breathing threats. The PAC-3 MSE, a follow-on variant of the PAC-3, is
in full-rate production and the latest generation hit-to-kill PAC-3
interceptor in the PATRIOT force to meet global capability
requirements. The PAC-3 MSE fills the engagement gap between THAAD and
PAC-3 missiles while also defeating advanced threats earlier, at
greater range, and with increased lethality. The PAC-3 MSE's improved
capability is achieved through a high-performance solid rocket motor,
modified lethality enhancer, more responsive control surfaces, upgraded
guidance software, and insensitive munitions improvements.
PATRIOT must continually modernize through software and hardware
upgrades to address obsolescence and evolving threats, and best utilize
extended battlespace performance afforded by the PAC-3 MSE interceptor.
Modernization efforts provide combat identification enhancements,
address upper-tier debris mitigation, improve PAC-3 MSE interceptor
performance, and enable increased Army and joint interoperability. The
Army leverages the program's stable funding profile to reduce price
risk to the Government through firm fixed price contracting and value
engineering initiatives. The Army mitigates obsolescence and counters
emerging threats through the improvement of the hardware and software
systems. In addition to the LTAMDS and IBCS integration efforts with
PATRIOT, the Army supports the MDA-led integration of PAC-3 MSE
interceptors and launchers into the THAAD weapon system. PAC-3 MSE
integrated with THAAD, LTAMDS and IBCS expand the battlespace by
leveraging the THAAD AN/TPY-2 and PATRIOT radars together to detect
threat targets at greater ranges. The Army is continuously improving
PATRIOT while moving toward an IBCS architecture that enables kill-
chain contributions from a wider spectrum of Army and joint sensors and
weapon components to overmatch the near-term evolving threat.
Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS): LTAMDS replaces
the current PATRIOT radar and provides networked sensing capabilities
in lower tier air and missile defense battlespace while enabling the
full capability of the PAC-3 MSE interceptor. The LTAMDS significantly
improves legacy PATRIOT radar capabilities by providing expanded range
and 360-degree coverage combined with the benefits of a networked
sensor on the Army IAMD integrated fire control network. LTAMDS
technology will reduce current PATRIOT radar operations and sustainment
costs by offsetting system equipment requirements and enhancing
reliability and maintainability. The Army will begin testing LTAMDS
prototypes with IBCS and the PATRIOT family of interceptors in the
second quarter, fiscal year 2023, with the objective of providing
initial early operational capability to a PATRIOT battalion by the end
of 2023 with follow-on testing in 2024.
Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) Increment (Inc) 2: The
IFPC Inc 2 is a mobile, ground-based weapon system designed to defeat
cruise missiles, Groups 2 and 3 unmanned aircraft systems, rockets,
artillery, and mortars and other fixed-wing and rotary-wing threats.
The Army's IFPC Inc 2 system will integrate with IBCS as its C2 and
leverage the Sentinel sensor to enable multidomain operations--ready
Army by 2030. The Iron Dome Defense System-Army (IDDS-A) is the interim
cruise missile defense solution against the IFPC threat set until IFPC
Inc 2 is available. The Army completed acceptance and fielding of two
IDDS-A batteries in accordance with the Fiscal Year 2019 National
Defense Authorization Act. The Army is on schedule to field and train
two operational IDDS-A units in the second quarter, fiscal year 2023.
IFPC Inc 2 will be an industry-built solution for a launcher
platform and an all-up-round-magazine capable of firing the AIM 9X
missile. The IFPC Inc 2 system features a modular open system
architecture to integrate future kinetic effectors to defeat advanced
threats. The Army is on track to execute developmental tests, system
qualifications, and operational assessments in fiscal year 2023, as
well as a system of systems operational assessment prior to
transitioning to a Major Capability Acquisition pathway.
Army Long-Range Persistent Surveillance: The Army Long Range
Persistent Surveillance (ALPS) passive sensor provides continuous, 360-
degree, long range surveillance against fixed and rotary wing aircraft,
UAS, and cruise missile threats. ALPS is integrated into joint and Army
C2 systems, including IBCS and is deployed in support of operations in
USEUCOM and INDOPACOM.
Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS): Technological
advances and the proliferation of commercial and tactical UAS in both
reconnaissance and attack capabilities have matured to the point where
they present a significant threat to Army operations from both State
and nonState actors. The Secretary of Defense designated the Army as
the executive agent for countering UAS threats and established the
Joint Counter-Small UAS (C-sUAS) Office (JCO). Key JCO focus areas
include developing joint requirements and materiel solutions, as well
as joint training and doctrine. The Army deployed more than 500-man
portable, fixed site, and mobile C-sUAS systems in response to a
warfighter JUONS. The Army is continually improving equipment to
mitigate ever-evolving threats. The Army is providing critical C-sUAS
capabilities to Army operational divisions while also establishing C-
sUAS protection of vital CONUS and OCONUS fixed and semi-fixed sites.
The Army provided kinetic and non-kinetic C-sUAS capabilities in
support of the Immediate Response Force in Europe to facilitate the
detection, tracking, and the defeat of sUAS threats.
Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD): M-SHORAD provides
maneuver forces a dedicated, Stryker-based air defense kinetic
capability against fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and UAS threats. In fiscal
year 2018, the Army approved the development of kinetic energy M-SHORAD
systems that integrate existing Army capabilities into Stryker combat
vehicles. The program successfully delivered four prototype systems
with residual combat capability to an Air Defense Artillery Regiment in
April 2021. The Army will deliver four M-SHORAD battalions by fiscal
year 2026. The Army is maturing high energy laser and electronic
warfare technologies to increase M-SHORAD capabilities in support of
the maneuver force. Ultimately, the Army envisions M-SHORAD battalions
will contain a mix of complementary direct energy and kinetic intercept
systems to protect the maneuver force. The Army is initiating an
acquisition program in fiscal year 2023 to develop a Next Generation
Short Range Interceptor (NGSRI) to replace the aging Stinger missile.
The NGSRI capability will provide increased lethality, range, and
target acquisition, and is expected to be available to the warfighter
in fiscal year 2028.
joint functional component command for integrated missile defense--
integrating and synchronizing trans-regional missile defense
The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense (JFCC IMD) is USSTRATCOM's integrating element for trans-
regional missile defense. USSTRATCOM formed JFCC IMD to execute its
UCP-assigned trans-regional missile defense responsibilities as the
``deny benefit'' contribution to its overall strategic deterrence
strategy. Established in 2005 and headquartered at Schriever Space
Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, JFCC IMD is manned by a
cohesive team of subject matter experts from the Army, Navy, Air Force,
Space Force, and Marine Corps, as well as government civilian and
contractor personnel.
JFCC IMD is the recognized subject matter expert across the joint
missile defense enterprise in matters of trans-regional missile defense
operational support, policy, plans, intelligence, communications,
training and education, and operational risk assessment. The command's
principal mission is to integrate these trans-regional missile defense
functions across the joint and combined warfighting force. In
coordination with of the Joint Staff, and on behalf of USSTRATCOM and
other CCDRs, JFCC IMD champions warfighter priorities and operational
needs. These include continued development of robust terrestrial and
space-based missile defense sensors, integrated discrimination
capabilities, redundant and resilient BMC3I networks with enhanced
cybersecurity defenses, and improved means of intercepting or negating
all missile and hybrid threats.
The JFCC IMD works across DOD and alongside allies and key partners
to improve integration of existing capabilities, maximizing efficiency
and effectiveness in trans-regional missile defense missions.
Integration is the essential force multiplier--a critically important
mission enabler that JFCC IMD directly supports. As a functional
component command of USSTRATCOM, JFCC IMD supports designated UCP
responsibilities along four lines of effort:
Conducting global missile defense planning and security
cooperation activities.
Conducting trans-regional missile defense operations
support, cyber operations/security, and provide Intelligence Community-
coordinated intelligence.
Executing joint and combined global missile defense
training and education.
Assessing warfighter missile defense needs in support of
capability development, testing, and fielding.
To accomplish these efforts, JFCC IMD maintains close collaborative
relationships with CCDRs, the MDA, the OSD staff, the Joint Staff,
Services, the Intelligence Community, and our allies and partners. JFCC
IMD continually seeks to enhance deployed forces' missile defense
capabilities while increasing operational effectiveness and confidence
in our collective ability to defend the Nation, deployed forces,
allies, and partners. Some key efforts to enhance missile defense
planning and capabilities for homeland and regional architectures
follow.
Policy and Planning Support: JFCC IMD worked closely with the Joint
Staff and the Combatant Commands in developing modifications to
strategic guidance and operational planning documents to posture the
Joint Force in planning and assessing trans-regional missile defense
operations to include Global Campaign Planning and Geographic Combatant
Commander specific plans. Additionally, JFCC IMD methodically examined
the mission's roles, responsibilities, and authorities in an
enterprise-wide Joint Staff effort ensuring the best alignment of
responsibilities across the joint force to ensure effective warfighter
support. JFCC IMD also provided OSD with policy support as the Missile
Defense subject matter experts supporting the Department's development
of strategic guidance documents and security and defense strategies
addressing the integrative challenges in this important mission space.
Allied and Partner Missile Defense Integration: Given that we will
never have enough active defense capacity, integrating our allies and
partners into a common and mutually supportive architecture is a
critical warfighter priority. The continued integration of space and
missile defense will see greater opportunities for allies and partners
to contribute to both missions. We must evolve beyond existing
cooperation mechanisms with allies and partners to an environment of
mutual trust and information sharing that empowers truly integrated
planning and operations enabled by combined force development,
simulation, and execution. Future conflicts will not be fought alone,
and our greatest strategic advantage is the power of our alliances and
partnerships. We should not hamstring this historic advantage with
continued information-sharing policies and practices that preclude
operational planning and hinder collective action.
The Nimble Titan Campaign of Experimentation, a biennial series of
multinational missile defense experiments, is one venue to promote this
increased cooperation. This event brings together subject matter
experts from allied and partner nations to explore the national policy
and military interfaces and dynamics involved in collaborative
coalition and alliance missile defense planning. Meeting this intent is
necessary for developing regional defense designs, C2 relationships,
and collective, bilateral, and multilateral policy. Nimble Titan
fosters greater confidence in combined missile defenses and provides a
means to advance U.S. efforts in collaboration, interoperability, and
operational integration with our allies and partners.
Expansion and Integration of the Trans-regional Missile Defense
Architecture: In response to the evolving strategic environment, JFCC
IMD continues to bolster trans-regional, homeland, and regional missile
defense capabilities through advancement of new capabilities. These
advancements include the Defense of Guam, Aegis Ashore site in Poland;
continued development of the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA; the Long-
Range Discrimination Radar; Space-based Kill Assessment; MDA's
Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor, the MD and Missile
Warning elements of SDA's Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture;
the Next Generation Interceptor for homeland defense; and the Glide
Phase Interceptor for regional hypersonic defense. Given the challenges
associated with integrating these capabilities into a global
architecture, JFCC IMD, in support of USSTRATCOM, provides essential
collaboration with CCDRs to assess and address gaps in planning,
policy, capabilities development, and operations.
Warfighter Inputs to Capability Development: The JFCC IMD is making
every effort to help streamline and accelerate MDA's efforts to provide
warfighters integrated kill chain capabilities (sense, C2, and effect)
as quickly as possible to meet increased threat developments. As
multiple reviews have identified, the Nation must have requirement,
acquisition, and fiscal processes and cultures that enable MDA, Defense
Agencies, and the Services to quickly develop, test, and deliver
effective, reliable, and sustainable missile defense capabilities. We
must do more to improve these processes and cultures from the top down
to the lowest levels. Our adversaries are not waiting, so we must
change our typical ways with innovation, adaptability, risk acceptance,
and speed. The JFCC IMD collaborates with CCDRs, MDA, and the Services,
as well as their respective test agencies, to leverage emerging
technologies to enhance existing systems, explore innovative
operational concepts, and prioritize maturing technological
advancements with the most promising near-term potential. To that end,
JFCC IMD continues to optimize the collaboration inherent in the
warfighter involvement process as an operational proponent for required
missile defense capabilities and performance enhancements.
Sustaining our competitive advantage through innovation and
expedience depends on well-resourced and operationally relevant test
campaigns, high fidelity modeling and simulation infrastructure and
forward looking wargaming to challenge assumptions regarding our future
missile defense readiness and posture. In testing over the past year,
JFCC IMD supported an Aegis organic engagement of a Medium Range
Ballistic Missile (MRBM) using a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA
missile; a U.S. 3d Fleet interoperability and live-fire exercise with
allied Navies; several data collections of hypersonic vehicle flight
tests to characterize sensor performance; and initial testing to
demonstrate the Long-Range Discrimination Radar's capabilities.
Joint Integrated Air & Missile Defense Training and Education: The
Joint Ballistic Missile Defense Training and Education Center of
Excellence (JBTEC), in coordination with USSTRATCOM, the Joint Staff,
Services, and CCMDs, continue developing and delivering comprehensive
and innovative joint training programs to close gaps between Service,
joint, and regional air and missile defense training and education. The
JBTEC, as DOD's only Joint Center of Excellence and the joint training
center for IAMD, offers 18 mission-focused resident, online, and mobile
training team joint-certified courses, including orientation, staff and
planning, all domain operations, asset management, C2BMC situational
awareness, and general and flag officer executive seminar training. In
2022, JBTEC instructors executed 222 courses that trained more than
3,500 students worldwide. These courses supported ranks from E-1
through O-10/SES encompassing almost every DOD agency. Meeting
strategic and theater security cooperation plans, JBTEC also provided
training to 27 allied and partner nations through both military-to-
military and foreign military sales training venues increasing
warfighter readiness. In 2022, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command and Commander, U.S. Space Command
identified Joint Missile Warning as an area where warfighters needed
training. Based on the success of joint IAMD training, USSPACECOM
designated and funded JFCC IMD's JBTEC to rapidly develop and field
validated Joint Missile Warning training.
Integrated Trans-regional Missile Defense Asset Management: The
JFCC IMD, in coordination with USSTRATCOM and the CCDRs, manages trans-
regional missile defense operational readiness posture, coordinates
trans-regional missile defense system maintenance, and supports MDA and
Service tests. The asset management process allows JFCC IMD to
continually assess system readiness to defend against missile attacks
and recommend adjustments to optimize overall missile defense
architecture.
Cybersecurity of the Missile Defense System: JFCC IMD, in
coordination with USSTRATCOM and MDA, serves as the cybersecurity
service provider for missile defense architecture to ensure cyber
defenses and operations are planned and executed across the globe.
Working with key stakeholders, JFCC IMD enhances the cyber defense
posture of the missile defense operational architecture against
malicious activity. The JFCC IMD also collaborates with mission
partners to incorporate realistic cybersecurity testing to support the
warfighter capability acceptance process. Additionally, JFCC IMD works
closely with the Joint Staff, CCMDs, and MDA to educate, train, and
exercise cybersecurity protocols to ensure the highest levels of global
missile defense readiness.
Comprehensive Missile Defeat: As I have highlighted above,
adversary offensive missile and hybrid systems are increasingly complex
and challenging in their delivery means, range, maneuverability, and
lethality. As such, an optimal missile defeat approach requires the
ability to counter the use of adversary missiles and their development,
acquisition, and proliferation. The Department's contribution to this
approach must integrate offensive and defensive capabilities to defeat
trans-regional missile defense threats across the full spectrum of
conflict. By developing and sustaining these capabilities, we lower
overall costs and reduce the risk of failure.
Importantly, as we continue developing innovative capabilities to
empower this effort, we must implement these actions as part of an
integrated deterrence framework using all instruments of national
power. These actions include diplomacy at the forefront and advancing
cross-domain deterrence with the capabilities and actions of allies and
partners to ensure the costs and risks of adversary aggression remain
disproportionate to any conceivable benefit. Within the Department,
these capabilities must include conventional kinetic attack operations,
directed energy and electromagnetic attack, cyber, and special
operations activities. Each capability provides opportunities to reduce
the eventual burden on prohibitively expensive hit-to-kill active
defenses. However, none of these alone is a ``silver bullet'' against
the threat. Our future material solutions should consist of a mutually
supportive portfolio of capabilities with the associated integrated
development, testing, and fielding within the joint force. To this end,
we must understand how these systems complements one another and, more
importantly, have the appropriate planning and execution authorities
and BMC3I systems in place to maximize their effect.
In summary, JFCC IMD continues to expand our Nation's trans-
regional missile defense architecture and explore developing
capabilities across all domains to maintain an operational advantage
against current and future threats. We maintain our competitive edge
through integrated planning and operational support, the development of
warfighters through education and training, the expansion of collective
capabilities in collaboration with our allies and partners, and the
rapid delivery of innovative and impactful capabilities to warfighters
to enhance our national security.
conclusion
Chairman King and Ranking Member Fischer, as members of the joint
missile defense community, the Army continues pursuing enhancements to
the Nation's IAMD systems, from tactical to strategic levels of
warfare. As outlined here, USASMDC and JFCC IMD perform a broad set of
critical national security missions. These missions include providing
professional warfighters and capabilities to support current
operations, ensuring they are prepared for tomorrow's fight, and
developing the new technologies required to achieve and maintain a
technological advantage against our adversaries. Our trained and ready
soldiers, operating GMD elements in Colorado, Alaska, New York, and
California, and from remote, globally deployed locations, remain
prepared to defend the Homeland against ICBM attack. As a force
provider to CCDRs, we provide essential regional sensor capabilities,
ballistic missile early warning, and space-enabled communications. Our
regional forces continue to leverage allied collaboration and planning
efforts in developing integrated and interoperable defenses against
various threat sets. USSTRATCOM, through JFCC IMD, continues to
integrate missile defense capabilities to counter global missile
threats and protect our Nation, deployed forces, and allies and
partners.
While operational, doctrinal, and materiel developments are
essential, our most important assets are the thousands of soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, civilians, and contractors who
deploy and employ our IAMD systems. As recognized by Department
leadership, the strength behind our outstanding workforce is their
families. Their contributions and sacrifices are foundational to the
dedication and performance of our workforce--the role and support of
our families empowers mission accomplishment.
Senator King. Thank you. I am going to start with a sort of
odd first question because my problem, Secretary Plumb, is I
don't know who to address my question to. Does that suggest
that we need a more integrated central functionality?
Here we have three people in front of us, all of whom have
different responsibilities. Maybe Admiral Hill, you are
nodding. I mean, I just wonder if we need to need to clean up
the organizational chart a bit. It bothers me that we have got
missile defense and then you are the operational piece.
General, you are in the middle of it for homeland defense.
Do we have the proper organization to allow sufficient timely
response and deterrence, frankly? Who wants to take the
question?
Dr. Plumb. I am happy to start, Senator.
Senator King. Please.
Dr. Plumb. I do think we do have a good organizational
structure here. I think what you are seeing is that missile
defense kind of runs throughout our forces, right?
The Navy needs missile defense, the Army needs missile
defense, the Homeland is missile defense, and so, and of
course, the Pentagon has multiple layers. But I actually think
this is structured quite well. I think we have good working
relationships and I think we are making significant progress.
Senator King. You don't think we need a kind of combatant
command that would centralize these functions?
Dr. Plumb. Well, since you asked, so the unified common
plan (UCP) change--of course we have NORTHCOM, we will do
defense of the Homeland, and so General VanHerck can speak to
that much better than I can.
The UCP change that has just been signed will transfer
Joint Functional Component Command for Missile Defense (JFCC
IMD) to Space Command, which makes sense because we had already
transferred all the sensors to Space Command, and so that
aligns.
Missile defense sensors and space domain awareness sensors
are often the same sensor, and it is good to have a kind of a
global sensor management piece there, too. But every combatant
commander with geographic responsibility still has missile
defense responsibilities.
Senator King. Well--all right, let me go back to what would
have been my first question, and I will--I guess I will ask it
of Admiral Hill. THAAD, Aegis, GBI, Patriot, do all--are all or
any of those systems effective against a hypersonic missile?
Vice Admiral Hill. Thanks for the question. I would say
that we have capability within Patriot. It was not a
requirement that flowed to the system, but it is got the
natural ability to do it because it is a cruise missile killer,
and if you have a fast-moving cruise missile, it can bite off
part of that threat.
When you look at the SM-6 within Aegis, Aegis has been
dealing with maneuvering low on the deck threats for years, I
would say decades. Taking that missile with its ability and
going after hypersonics makes good sense, which is why we use
it for sea-based terminal.
THAAD operates right on the edge of the atmosphere. It is
an energetic missile. It has got a great hit to kill record
behind it.
We haven't tested against hypersonic threats, but I believe
there is like Patriot and like Aegis, there is likely some
capability that can be leveraged there.
Senator King. Why not more emphasis on directed energy? A
missile--a bullet on a bullet is an expensive proposition. How
much--well, let me ask that question, how much is a single
THAAD bullet?
Vice Admiral Hill. Well, I will give you a range between
Patriot up to SM3, and they range everywhere from $4 million up
to $10 million or so.
Senator King. Per shot?
Vice Admiral Hill. Per shot, yes, sir.
Senator King. Okay----
Vice Admiral Hill. I will also, just to kind of followup on
direct energy. You know, to be effective, you have to be on a
target for some period of time with high energy, right. Today,
that high energy is scaling its way there. It is also going to
be on a platform where it can be transported. That scaling
effort to draw down the amount of power usage and those space
and weight, that work is being done today. But when you----
Senator King. Is it being done with a sense of urgency? I
have been asking these questions for about 5 years and I don't
get a sense of urgency in the Department on directed energy,
which to me is clearly preferable to a $4 million bullet.
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir, and I agree. I think the
Department has done great work by consolidating those efforts
to specifically talk to scaling in terms of power, power out of
the laser, what it takes to put that laser on the target. But
let's talk about the target for a second, right.
We are using it now generally for unmanned air vehicles,
right, smaller, loitering, that kind of vehicles. When you talk
about very fast-moving targets that were designed to operate in
very high heat environments, and you are going to try to take
them out with high heat, that is a really tough equation to
close.
So, more investment is required, more focus on getting to
those areas. But it is science and engineering right now. That
just happens to be where we are today, sir.
Senator King. Thank you. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Plumb, how
does the budget request support the development and fielding of
an integrated air and missile defense system for Guam?
Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator. There is $1.5 billion in the
budget for fiscal year 2024 between, I think, roughly $900
million MDA and $600 million for the Army--although I may have
those reversed.
But there is a lot of money toward that, and we are working
to try to get initial capability there and then build out on
that. I actually think--well, actually, frankly, I think
Admiral Hill might have some to add on the sequencing of that.
But the goal is how fast can we get some capability and then
build out on it.
Of course, the challenge of 360 degrees against all the
different types of missile threats, is a new one for that
sizable area.
Senator Fischer. Admiral Hill, in this setting, what can
you add to that and the progress that we are making, and if you
can, some of the challenges that you are facing on deployment?
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am. First, I will say we have a
great partnership with the Army in terms of the system
development, great partnership with the Navy, in terms of
identifying the sites on where this equipment would go.
We have a really tough customer named Admiral Aquilino who
constantly drives us to get there as early as we can, and he
removes barriers for us to do that. One of the hardest things
we are doing right now, this year in 2023, is site selection
and the start of the environmental impact surveys.
You have to do that. We have the sites selected. We know
that once we go to those sites and do more work, that we may
not be able to land on all those sites. There is a dozen or so
sites. About half of those are for MDA and the other half are
Army. That is a real challenge.
But the good news is, while we are doing that, we haven't
slowed down on the development. The Army is moving very quickly
on the integrated battle command system (IBCS). MDA is moving
very quickly on the Aegis capability.
We are doing something different with Aegis. It is not a
consolidated deck house like you see on a ship. It is not
radars overlooking the launcher so they can immediately capture
the missile upon launch.
The radars are external to get to the 360-degree coverage,
along with the Army radar systems associated with IBCS. So, it
is a tough engineering challenge just because of the physical
lay down, and the land use, and the environmental impact
surveys are definitely a challenge, but we are going to come
through those within the next couple of years and you will
start to see the capability land on the island progressively.
I owe Admiral Aquilino a year-by-year status update on
where we are with the integration and the operations of that
material.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Secretary Plumb, section 1660
of the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA required the Secretary to
designate a single senior official to be responsible for the
missile defense of Guam. How close is the Department to making
that designation?
Dr. Plumb. Senator, we are pretty close. We already held a
missile defense executive board that is run by Under Secretary
LaPlante, and on this issue, we still have to get the
recommendation staffed up and through the Secretary, but it is
in train.
Senator Fischer. Okay, and General Karbler, how does the
high ops-tempo rate for air defenders in Guam impact the
quality of life for soldiers with their families that they have
there as well?
Lieutenant General Karbler. [Technical problems]--okay. We
have had soldiers on Guam since 2013, so for 10 years we have
had a THAAD battery there. Initially, it was a year deployment
and then we transitioned that into a 3-year permanent change of
station (PCS) so that they could bring dependents and families
there.
We have learned lessons from the THAAD battery being in
Guam that we will apply as we go forward. One of the critical
elements is the fact that the infrastructure--in addition to
the missile defense capability that we will bring, we also have
got to ensure that the infrastructure is there to support
soldiers and family.
That is a key point that we have brought up, and I know
General Flynn at United States Army Pacific Command (USARPAC)
is making sure that he emphasizes as well.
Senator Fischer. Yes, thank you. As we move forward on the
timeline that the Admiral pointed out, it is important to get
that infrastructure in place, correct?
Lieutenant General Karbler. Yes, ma'am, and that structure
will be added to the Army. That will not come from the current
structure that we have, recognizing the op-tempo challenges
that we have within the air and missile defense force today.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General VanHerck, United States
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and NORAD are required to track
various threats to our Homeland, and I appreciated our
discussions earlier this year on some of the items on your
unfunded priorities list that would help increase that domain
awareness.
Are there additional changes that the Department can make
in order to field capabilities faster, for example, using
digital engineering during the development or increasing
testing tempo? We had some good examples that you gave us
earlier on limits that you face.
General VanHerck. Certainly, Senator. I think culturally we
are an industrial age department transitioning into a digital
age. I recently went to a major defense firm, I will just say
that, who is building that capability, who has embraced the
digital aspect of buying down risk during multiple portions.
So, I think there are things that we can do in a virtual
environment. We can do things--now, what I would say is in
parallel, not serial, as we develop capabilities to buy down
risk and to go faster in the long run.
Senator Fischer. Can I just have one followup there?
Secretary Plumb, do you have anything to add to that? To me
what the General just said, it kind of shows the importance of
the organizational setup that is currently in place with you
guys here at the table, that Senator King referred to in his
first question to you. Am I reading that right?
Dr. Plumb. Senator, I am not----
Senator Fischer. You can--so you can work in parallel
instead of in serial, or am I just going to--tease my colleague
here a little bit----
Dr. Plumb. I think what General VanHerck is getting at is
if you can transition to digital design, you can change your
plans and your structure and even what you build faster because
you have a much quicker feedback loop into your system.
I think some of the more forward leaning parts of the
industrial base, and even the commercial base, have figured
this out. I am happily not the acquisition person, but I fully
support moving faster and smarter, especially when it saves
money and gets us capability sooner.
Senator Fischer. And we do as well, which I think is
important to be able to have the focus that General Karbler
has, and that Admiral Hill has to be able for them to have that
focus on what they are trying to accomplish and get done under
the current organization. Does that make sense? No?
Dr. Plumb. Yes.
Senator Fischer. Yes. Thank you.
Senator King. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General
VanHerck, last July, you told reporters at the Aspen Security
Forum that AARO's [All Anomaly Resolution Office] formation did
not change how NORAD did business.
Following the events involving the Chinese high-altitude
balloon and three unidentifiable anomalous phenomenon (UAP),
has NORAD increased its coordination with AARO? And have you
begun to identify a higher volume of unidentified aerial
phenomenon?
General VanHerck. Senator, absolutely. As a matter of fact,
the lead of AARO came out to NORAD, NORTHCOM, gave us a visit.
Senator Gillibrand. Great.
General VanHerck. Working much closer on the challenges
that we face, ensuring that we are sharing data and information
from anything that we see or do not see to ensure that we pass
it to the organization so they can further investigate it.
Absolutely.
Senator Gillibrand. The last time we had a hearing with
AARO, we discussed investing in over-the-horizon radar and
other type of new sensors that would help with collection. Have
you been consulted on any of that discussion?
General VanHerck. I have been heavily involved in the
discussions on over-the-horizon radar with both Canada and the
United States. The Department is funding over-the-horizon for
the United States, and Canada has announced too. So absolutely,
yes, I am directly involved.
Senator Gillibrand. Have you been in the discussions about
the type of sensors that could be used or deployed to garner
information specifically for the airspace that we don't really
look at because it is not related to missiles?
General VanHerck. I am not sure I understand that. So more
broadly, I would just tell you that over-the-horizon, radar is
not the end all, be all solution. That will give me domain
awareness further away from the Homeland.
I am still confident in my ability to detect the balloons
that we saw, the PRC high altitude balloon, and the subsequent
objects that we saw and shutdown. But that is not the end all,
be all. There has to be domain awareness between the over-the-
horizon radars, that links the data from there to an endgame
effector, and so there needs to be additional domain awareness.
We need to look more broadly at the rest of the
infrastructure, the radars as well, and ensure the data from
those systems is incorporated in an integrated air and missile
defense system that can lead to effectors. I will go back to
the comments of the Chairman. I am focused not on endgame
kinetic kill.
I am focused primarily on the policy for what we must have
in game kinetic kill, but more broadly, for developing
capabilities such as the use of the electromagnetic spectrum,
non-kinetic effectors to deny and deceive, and limited area or
wide area defense capabilities, to include the use of
autonomous unmanned platforms with domain awareness
capabilities that could be maritime and airborne.
Senator Gillibrand. Are you coordinating that--those
recommendations and those plans with AARO?
General VanHerck. Not directly with AARO right now,
Senator. Into the Department, which I am assuming the
Department is going to pull in AARO as part of that. So right
now, we are relooking the policy for Homeland defense. I have
provided my commanders estimate, which is a plan for that.
I am also in the middle of developing what I call Homeland
Defense Design 2035, which gets after exactly what I talked
about, a new way of defending the Homeland. That is vastly
different than the way we do it today with fighters, tankers,
AWACS [airborne early warning and control system], those kinds
of things.
Senator Gillibrand. I appreciate that, and I am looking
forward to that myself. We have heard that our radar sites,
depending on who you asked, are based on 1980's technology, or
1990's era technology and 1960's era decision process.
How--I assume, based on your last answer, that you are
improving the Northern Warning System and bringing other
critical defensive infrastructure to be fully modernized.
General VanHerck. So, the over-the-horizon radars will be
addition to the North Warning Systems. The Department hasn't
made a decision on modernization of the North Warning System or
further replacement of the radars associated with the North
Warning System, but that has to be a discussion. Like I said,
OTHR is not the end all, be all solution.
Senator Gillibrand. Understood. So, are you going to give
us recommendations for updating the Northern Warning System?
General VanHerck. As part of the relook at Homeland defense
and the policy study ongoing right now, that has to absolutely
be part of the way forward.
Senator Gillibrand. I look forward to seeing that. Admiral
Hill--there is still time, right? 30 seconds, okay. I didn't
know if your tap was hurry up. I didn't know it was a hurry up
tap. Okay.
Admiral Hill, while at the House Armed Services Committee
hearing in March, General Milley told Congresswoman Stefanik
that he believed a potential third missile defense site at Fort
Drum would be strategically worthwhile.
Do you agree with that assessment? What advantage does this
provide us when dealing with a potential nuclear threat from
Iran?
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am. During my last testimony, I
did mention that I support the Chairman's comments. I think
another site--you can never have too many sensors. You can
never have too many effectors to deal with the kind of threats
that we are dealing with.
I do think it is part of a mix of other options that we can
look at. We are doing a study now that we owe back to the Hill
by the end of June, and so we will complete that and deliver
that.
Senator Gillibrand. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I am going to
submit a question for the record concerning cyber to Secretary
Plumb. Thank you.
Senator King. Senator Cramer.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Admiral Hill,
I am going to start with you just to relieve General VanHerck,
who is thinking he is going to ask me about PARCS [Perimeter
Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System]. I know he
has asked me about PARCS.
He always asks me about PARCS. So, I--maybe building on
what he has just been talking about, maybe I will get back to
him as well, related to Senator Gillibrand, what role does
ground-based radar play?
And since I brought up ground-based, and what about PARCS?
What do you see is the future for PARCS, and in this
transition, at least to more space-based?
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. I believe the PARCS radar is
owned and operated by the Space Force. We did and continue to
assess the utility of it based on where our threat regions are
and our focus for our sensor architecture.
Right now, PARCS is not a part of the overall missile
defense architecture. I think the Space Force has ideas for it.
I am just, I am not familiar with them yet, so I would probably
have to go back and----
Senator Cramer. So, does that mean I have to ask General
VanHerck again, to remind us of the importance of PARCS, short-
term, mid-term, maybe long-term? General.
General VanHerck. There is $108 million in the President's
request in fiscal year 2024 for PARCS to go forward. It is
crucial for missile warning today. As we go forward, and the
proliferated low-Earth orbit capabilities come online, then I
am sure the Department will reassess the need. I am confident
if it is still required, the Department will continue to fund
it.
Senator Cramer. The policy that you were visiting with
Senator Gillibrand about--when would we expect that and how
would that affect, say, a budget a year from now, 2 years from
now, as we are trying to, you know, beat--move at the pace of
China.
General VanHerck. Yes, I would defer to Department on that.
I expect that policy within weeks to a few months, and it
should inform the next budget cycle.
Senator Cramer. Very good. Thank you. I will yield back,
Mr. Chairman. Thank you all.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator. My impression, and
perhaps you have the figures, Mr. Secretary, is that we are
spending a lot more money on developing hypersonic missiles
than we are in defending against hypersonic missiles. Is that
true?
Dr. Plumb. I don't have hard numbers on that, sir.
Senator King. I will take that for the record, please.
Dr. Plumb. Yes.
[The information referred to follows:]
Dr. Plumb. The Department requested $5.7 billion in its
fiscal year 2024 budget request for offensive hypersonicmissile
development. This amount includes:
$713 million for Air Force programs
$1.4 billion for Army programs
$1.3 billion for Navy programs
$2.3 billion for Defense Wide activities
The Department requested $278 million in its fiscal year
2024 budget request for the development of defensive
capabilities to counter hypersonic missiles, specifically. This
amount includes:
$209 million for the Missile Defense Agency's
(MDA) hypersonic defense programs including the Glide Phase
Interceptor
$69 million for MDA's Hypersonic and Ballistic
Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS
Additionally, MDA's Sea-Based Terminal provides hypersonic
defense capability. Program and funding details are available
at a higher classification.
The Department also requested $7.7 billion \1\ in its
FY2024 budget request for multi-mission capabilities that will
support defense against more than one threat type (ballistic,
cruise, and hypersonic).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This amount does not include several efforts (e.g., command and
control (C2), engineering, and testing) that enable missile defense
capabilities.
$2.3 billion for Air Force Missile Warning/
Missile Track (MW/MT) Architecture
$2.6 billion for Air Force Next-Gen Overhead
Persistent Infrared Architecture
$428 million for Air Force Over-the-Horizon
Radars
$1.2 billion for Army Patriot Missile Segment
Enhancement (MSE)
$1.2 billion for Navy Standard Missile-6 (SM-6)
procurement
Senator King. If I am correctly informed that that is the
case, that we are spending more, it seems to me that we ought
to be reconsidering that in terms of the importance of defense.
Let me go back to my question to Admiral Hill. Can we stop
a hypersonic missile today? You are on an aircraft carrier in
the Western Pacific. Hypersonic missiles, fires coming at you
7,000 miles an hour. Do we have the capability to stop that
missile?
Vice Admiral Hill. We have the capability to stop it in two
places. One is in its ballistic flight and----
Senator King. But it is a hypersonic missile. Does it
necessarily go into ballistic flight?
Vice Admiral Hill. Not all of them do, but the ones that
are currently in the theater we are talking about will normally
start with a boost, and then go into a glide, and then into the
terminal phase. In the terminal phase, it can be defeated.
Senator King. Do we have--it can be defeated by a ship at
sea?
Vice Admiral Hill. By a destroyer guarding the carrier.
Yes, sir.
Senator King. Why aren't we testing more? I couldn't find
it in my notes, but I think China is testing something like 20
times as many missiles we are. Why are we so--they seem to be
more tolerant of failure, and they learn more. Our tests have
to be perfect. Talk to me about testing.
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. Testing is really the end of
the system engineering loop, right. You are validating that you
have met your requirements through the system development.
Clearly, they are moving faster than we are. I would say
that many of the tests that we do in some of these more high-
end threat areas that we don't report out publicly because of
the classified nature of them.
There is, I would say, a reasonable amount of testing that
is occurring against those sorts of advanced threats. We just
don't publicize them.
Senator King. Well, I think it was you in your testimony
that said we are not reacting fast enough, that this climate is
changing so rapidly that we are not--what should we be doing?
What can this Committee do in the way of additional
resources, additional organizational changes so that we are not
continually trying to catch up? Because we are--we have--this
is a strategic change in the in the world that we are not
adequately addressing. What do we need--I am talking about
hypersonics. What do we need to do to be able to address that
more effectively?
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. So, we have addressed the
policy, so, the hypersonic defense that we do today is regional
based, meaning we will take care of forward sea bases, and
forward deployed Army maneuver forces. That is our focus today.
We want to do layered defense, which is why I will talk
about glide phase. I will talk about kill it in the boost
phase. We know how to kill aircraft. When we are down in that
terminal phase, we have to have a robust capability to do that
in the load out on the ships. So that is our focus today is on
regional.
We do not have the policy to go after the strategic
hypersonics, and that may be where you are going, Senator. I am
not sure.
Senator King. Well, it seems to me that this is a
deterrence gap, where we need our adversaries to know that this
weapon is not going to be effective. The whole idea of
deterrence is that there is a level of resilience, and that is
what worries me. Is that by not having the defensive
capability, you are inviting, in effect, a strike.
Vice Admiral Hill. We do have the defensive capabilities
within the sea-based today. I want to work with the Army to
build out the Patriot capability that we talked about earlier
and to add to that capability.
We have a program in place called the Glide Phase
Interceptor to thin the raid up in a different part of that
flight regime, because we, from a layered defense perspective,
we want to attack every part of that trajectory, and
particularly where they are vulnerable, which is the glide
phase.
Senator King. Taking account of chaff and diversions and--
--
Vice Admiral Hill. absolutely----
Senator King.--decoys and all of that kind of thing.
General Karbler, can you see a hypersonic from space, single
missile?
Lieutenant General Karbler. Depending on the platform,
delivery systems, sir, yes. If it is on the end of a boosting
missile, we will see the initial--we will get an initial
indication of it launching. But once it starts going into its
flight phase, it becomes a very difficult target to track, to
keep it from--to keep track custody of it really from birth to
death, as I would----
Senator King. Particularly if it is at a low altitude. Is
that correct?
Lieutenant General Karbler. Correct.
Senator King. This is an entirely different question.
Obviously, missile defense is very important to the Ukrainians.
Why isn't Iron Dome being deployed to Ukraine? Secretary Plumb.
We helped pay for it.
We have spent something like $3 billion to Israel to
develop it. $500 million a year, my understanding is. Wouldn't
this be a very important resource for the Ukrainians since
their principal problem right now is air defense?
Dr. Plumb. So, Senator, what we are using for supplying
Ukraine with missile defenses from the United States stock is
things we can draw down from our own stock. You know, we
supplied Patriot batteries, for example. We supplied
significant investments in missile defense, and we have
encouraged allies to do the same.
Senator King. I understand a Patriot just took down a
Russian missile yesterday, I believe.
Dr. Plumb. It certainly has been in the news.
Senator King. Open source, I guess.
Dr. Plumb. Open source, there was a Patriot interceptor
that killed a hypersonic missile in the last few days, yes,
sir.
Senator King. What about Iron Dome?
Dr. Plumb. I am not aware of an Iron Dome system being
offered to Ukraine, but that could be incorrect. I just don't
know. Maybe someone else at the table, but I am not sure.
Senator King. Any other thoughts?
Lieutenant General Karbler. Sir, our two Iron Dome batters
that we have right now, one completed its no equipment,
training, no equipment, fielding. It is prepared for
deployment. The second one is wrapping up its new equipment
fielding right now. The Army does have one battery available
for deployment pending a request for it.
Senator King. Thank you. Secretary Rosen.
Senator Rosen. I was going to say that I got----
[Laughter.]
Senator King. I promoted you.
Senator Rosen.--I got a promotion or----
Senator King. Senator Rosen, sorry.
Senator Rosen. It is a flying day, so it is a long flight
from the West Coast. So, there you go. Just got in. Thank you
very much, Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer. Appreciate
it, and appreciate all of you and for your service, everything
you are doing here today. So, I am going to talk a little bit
about safeguarding domain awareness.
So General VanHerck, as you well know, our adversaries
continue to field advanced capabilities across domains that
have the potential to threaten the Homeland. So, in light of
these threats, NORTHCOM and NORAD must ensure that the systems
providing the Homeland with domain awareness are survivable,
adaptable, and modern.
In addition, these systems must be hardened, as they will
be subject to an array of cyber-attacks during any contingency,
and so, I am encouraged by NORTHCOM's continued efforts to
modernize legacy detection systems such as the over-the-horizon
radar. Detection alone isn't sufficient.
Operators have to have the ability to effectively
communicate the operational picture to other commands, as well
as to our partners and allies, often under highly compressed
timeframes.
We see those with hypersonics and others. General VanHerck,
what steps are you taking to sufficiently harden our command
and control nodes, particularly in the cyber domain, so that we
are able to effectively share the operational picture during
our potential conflict?
General VanHerck. Senator, thanks for that. I am advocating
to the Department that the foundational infrastructure, the IT
[information technology] network and backbones that the data
and information rides on, it allows us to share data and
information internally, and with the allies and partners and my
fellow combat commanders, is resilient and redundant in the way
we go.
The Department this year has put several billion dollars
into foundational infrastructure, which I think is crucial as
we move forward to get after the cyber vulnerabilities that you
talked to. Candidly, my most concerning domain awareness
problem is exactly that.
It is the limited knowledge of cyber vulnerabilities for
the critical infrastructure that we rely on to project power
from our Homeland, to defend our Homeland, to do command and
control within our Homeland. So, I continue to advocate for
that to the Department.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that, because I
think the resiliency of redundancy and the agility of those
systems are going to help us be successful.
In the technology space, of course, Admiral Hill, as you
are aware, China's missile defense strategy heavily emphasizes
developing anti-access, aerial denial capabilities, which use a
combination of ballistic and cruise missiles launched from air,
land, and sea to target the United States and, of course, our
allied military assets in the Asia Pacific Theater, such as
those in Guam or Okinawa.
Admiral Hill, with the rapid increase in China's
technological advancement and missile accuracy, what kind of
measures are we employing to increase the survivability of our
own platforms to ensure that we can operate in and around these
highly contested environments in the Pacific?
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am. Thanks, Senator. I use the
aircraft carriers, since Senator King brought that up a little
bit earlier, that is where we focused our energies on
increasing the ability to take on the hypersonic threat. The
ships currently are outfitted with ballistic missile defense.
From a missile defense perspective, ships moving forward
into the island chain have the ability to defend against
ballistic missiles. They have their own capability to do self-
defense against cruise missiles, and we have hypersonic
defense. A ship has to worry about a lot, so, I am not going to
speak for the Navy.
I can just speak to the missile defense missions that we
provide in coordination with the Navy. With the Army, we have
talked a lot about the maneuver force in terms of Patriots,
THAAD, and station forward. Defense is important if you want to
either buy time or to ensure that you can live to fight another
day.
Senator Rosen. That is right. Well, thank you, and I know
that Chairman King talked about hypersonic weapons. So,
Secretary Plum, Russia and China, no secret they are fielding
hypersonic weapons. There are highly maneuverable vehicles that
fly around more than five times the speed of sound.
The weapons have the potential to overwhelm our U.S.
missile defense systems, undermine our strategic deterrence.
So, I know we are not in a classified setting, so I would like
to hear a little bit about your assessment of our hypersonic
missile defense programs, our space-based sensors, what do we
do to neutralize the threat?
I notice as I read some of the background, and you alluded
to this earlier, that of course, we have the--we know much
earlier on a ballistic missile where it is going, and we have
to not able to track the hypersonic once it may have left its
launch.
So that timeframe of difference, and I know we are not in
classified setting, but are we able to be agile enough to track
it, to notify our allies and partners to make adequate
decisions across the spectrum?
Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Senator. Just a couple of pieces, if I
may. So just to start, five times the speed of sound is--all
the ballistic missiles travel pretty fast, right. So, it is not
really just a speed piece. It is the maneuverability of a
hypersonic weapon that bothers everyone at the table, because
you can't predict the end point by knowing the initial launch
conditions.
There is a lot of ballistic missiles in the world that
still maneuver at the end, but they still give you a better
arabesque, and you just kind of know about where they are going
to end up if you do your math right, but you can't do that with
a cruise missile because it can keep maneuvering.
One of the things we are really heavily investing in is a
space-based architecture that can at least have awareness of
where these things are through their flight. Admiral Hill is
working on something called HBTSS--which I call hobbits, I
don't know if anyone else does. But the idea there is to
actually be able to do custody of it and be able to track a
piece all the way through.
We are working on this, and that is a big problem because
you can't just rely on one vector or one radar phase to tell
you a thing is coming, and so it is a hard problem. We are
working on that. So that is one piece. You got to have that
domain awareness and ability to track these things, and we are
working hard on that.
Also, you have to have something to be able to actually
shoot at it, otherwise all you can do is watch it, and so, it
turns out Patriot even has some ability against the hypersonic.
But the Glide Phase Intercept Program is one thing that is
being worked on, for example. Admiral Hill has already spoken
at some length about sea-based terminal mode of the SM-6, which
is good for ship defense and point defense. So, we are working
on all these pieces together.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I see my time is up.
Senator King. Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Rosen, for the lead into my question, which is about----
Senator Rosen. I predicted it.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. About SM-6--so, Admiral Hill,
Secretary Plumb, the SM-6 ship launched anti-air and anti-
surface interceptor, this missile is produced at Raytheon in
Tucson, Arizona.
Admiral Hill, last year during this hearing, you noted that
the SM-6 is the only weapon in the country's arsenal capable of
engaging highly maneuverable hypersonic missiles, threats,
incoming threats.
So, in the context of potential adversaries, can you please
speak a little bit more about how important it is for the U.S.
to have an arsenal capable of engaging highly maneuverable,
hypersonic threats?
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir, and it is a full kill chain
answer, right. Secretary Plumb already talked about our ability
to detect and track them. If you can't do that, you can't fire
anything at it.
It is a very complex--once it comes into the glide phase,
it has got the ability to maneuver globally. So that is why we
need to see them from space and have a total track custody, all
the way to the end game.
When they dip into the atmosphere and start that maneuver,
you have to have a shooting battery, whether it is a ship or
some sort of land-based unit, that can do that, fine-tune,
tracking in the endgame to launch and control that missile.
But it is important to have an arsenal, and when you say
arsenal, I translate that as an inventory. You need a large
inventory of them because, again, the threat can be defined as
big, big numbers, very high speed and maneuver.
Senator Kelly. Before we get to the procurement and the
inventory numbers, can you comment a little bit about when we
get to that endgame, when we--and maybe you can't because this
is not a classified setting, but when we look at like cross
range for an SM-6, can it match the cross range capability of
any hypersonic missile that China is currently developing?
Vice Admiral Hill. I think in this environment I can say
yes that we are matched very well with the threat and where it
is today. We are going to have to continue to improve our
missile capability. At some point we will over overmatch the G
capability of that missile frame.
Senator Kelly. Secretary Plumb, Admiral Hill mentioned that
we would need a lot of them. I understand DOD is requesting a
multiyear procurement in the next budget request to include 825
SM-6 missiles. Can you explain why it's such a critical request
as we face this capable adversary, and why doing large lot
procurements is the best way to do this?
Dr. Plumb. Well, first of all, Senator, again, I am not the
acquisition professional at this table, but I will just say
that once you have a proven capability, being able to buy in
large lots gives you insight into how the missile performs. It
is much better than just building a few at a time. It is a much
better way to do your statistics on your manufacturing and how
it works.
Senator Kelly. You know, if we have a high value target and
we have got an incoming hypersonic missile, I imagine the ops
plan there is not to just launch one of these things at it.
Hence the 825 number to protect----
Dr. Plumb. That is true----
Senator Kelly.--protect the fleet and the high value
targets.
Dr. Plumb. Sir, in air defense, it is really an operational
question because it will vary. But most commanding officers of
a ship, most commanding officers of a battery will determine
what their salvo size is based on the threat and numbers that
they are dealing with. Yes, sir.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. Another subject. So, the request,
I think, is for $1.6 billion for Aegis in fiscal year 2024,
which gets us 27 SM-3 Block 1Bs and 12 SM3 Block 2As and
develops upgrades to the system.
The Aegis site is expected to be among the first to receive
the SM-3 Block 2A. I think this is going to be at the Aegis
Ashore site in Poland, is my understanding. Can you provide a
status of Aegis ashore in Poland, and what it will be able to
do when fully operational?
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. So, Aegis Ashore in Romania,
operational today. Poland is going through the board of
inspection survey today.
We are leveraging the Navy processes there that drive us to
Chief of Naval Operations' acceptance by the end of this fiscal
year. It will then go through European Command and NATO's
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] acceptance throughout next
year.
So, we are right now operating the site, but we will come
through those different certifications over the course of the
next few months, and it will be fully operational.
What it provides is it completes European phase--phase
three, which means that we can defend against ballistic
missiles from rogue countries to protect Europe and the United
States.
Senator Kelly. In my remaining 15 seconds, real quick, when
I was over in the Middle East in January, Israel and some of
our Middle East partners made a request in looking for support
for an integrated missile defense architecture in the Middle
East between Israel, other countries, and the United States.
What are your thoughts on an integrated regional missile
defense for the Middle East?
Vice Admiral Hill. Is that a question for me?
Senator Kelly. Yes.
Vice Admiral Hill. It is probably more of an operational
question, but from an acquisition and development perspective,
we work very closely with Israel. Senator King mentioned that
$500 million of our budget every year goes to building out the
defense capabilities for Israel, focused mostly on upper tier
Arrow, David's Sling, and Iron Dome.
We integrate as far as we can integrate, whether it is
across the sensor architecture to provide tracks, or if it is a
deeper set of integration, as a General Karbler does within the
Army on Iron Dome. But I think there is nothing wrong with
being integrated across friends and allies.
Senator Kelly. Thank you.
Senator King. I want to thank all of you for joining us
today. I have a couple of concluding thoughts. One, is it
strikes me as bothersome that all three of you are leaving at
the same time. It also strikes me as bothersome that I think
that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Chief of the Navy, I believe
the Air Force are also all leaving this summer at the same
time.
There ought to be a staggered system so that there is
continuity in this critically important function. That is not
your problem, but it is one that, Mr. Secretary, I think we
ought to think about. To have the entire upper echelon of this
particular, critical function walking out the door essentially
within months strikes me as not a good organizational
structure.
Second, the three of you are in an extraordinary position
to be able to give us some strong exit interview data. In other
words, as you are leaving, what would you change? What would
you suggest to the Committee in terms of authorities,
organizational structures, priorities? Where do you think we
could improve this entire missile defense enterprise?
As I say, all three of you are in an exceptional position
to do that, and I am not in the position of assigning homework
here, but it would be very important to the Committee if you
could give--just give us two or three pages. Here is what I
would change, as I am going out the door, to improve the
functioning of this critically important part of our deterrent
and our national defense posture.
I want to thank you all again for your service,
congratulate you, and look forward to your suggestions. And the
only--other thing I would say is, do it soon. We are about to
do the National Defense Authorization Act in about 5 weeks, and
we would love to have your input as the Subcommittee makes its
report to the full Committee.
Thank you again and thank you for your service to the
country. Senator Fischer, did you want to add any conclusion?
Senator Fischer. Well, I would say, well said, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you all.
Senator King. Thank you. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:48 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
hypersonic missiles
1. Senator King. Admiral Hill, today I asked you if we had the
capability to stop a hypersonic missile `today' coming at an aircraft
carrier in the Western Pacific. You answered that the Navy could stop
it in two places: ballistic flight and terminal phase. Furthermore, you
relayed that a Navy guided-missile destroyer (DDG) can stop a
hypersonic missile from approaching an aircraft carrier. However, the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) testified earlier this year that there
is more work to be done in hypersonic defense. The CNO further
testified that he is not satisfied with where we are regarding naval
defense against a hypersonic attack in the Indo-Pacific. What are the
hypersonic threats (capacity and capability) in the maritime and land
domains (against our ship formations, land formations overseas, and in
the homeland) today through 2030? Please provide a detailed answer,
classified up to TS-SCI if needed, that includes a year-by-year
analysis from now until 2030.
Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]
2. Senator King. Admiral Hill, what kinetic capability and capacity
do we have to defeat these threats in the boost, glide, and terminal
phases? Please provide a detailed answer, classified up to TS-SCI if
needed, that includes a year-by-year analysis from now until 2030.
Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]
3. Senator King. Admiral Hill, what capability gaps should be
addressed, in priority, from technical feasibility for defeating a
hypersonic arsenal? Please provide a detailed answer, classified up to
TS-SCI if needed, that includes a year-by-year analysis from now until
2030.
Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]
high-energy laser
4. Senator King. Secretary Plumb and Admiral Hill, Although only
one Navy surface combatant, the USS Preble (DDG 88), is equipped with a
high-energy laser (HELIOS), no additional Surface Navy Laser Weapon
Systems were funded in the fiscal year 2024 President's Budget Request.
What is the Department of Defense's (DOD's) roadmap and funding profile
for equipping Army, Navy, and Air Force platforms with integrated
directed energy weapons?
Secretary Plumb. The DOD's roadmap for Directed Energy Weapons
(DEWs) consists of high-power laser and microwave technology and system
development with near, mid, and far-term objectives to field
capabilities against increasingly stressing threats. The Military
Departments and Agencies are investing accordingly to incrementally
mature technology while leveraging DOD-wide directed energy efforts to
accelerate development of DEWs. Collaboration between the Military
Services and Agencies has been beneficial for technological
advancements and opportunities to expand the industrial base. The DE
funding included in the fiscal year 2024 President's Budget Request is
approximately $920 million, inclusive of science and technology (S&T)/
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities across
all Military Departments and Agencies as well as the integrated DE
weapon developments by the Military Departments.
The Army is on track to deliver combat-capable integrated DE
systems within the Future Years Defense Program that will address a
range of threats:
The DE Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD)
50kW-class laser weapon will defeat Group 1-3 Unmanned Aerial Systems
(UAS), Rotary Wing and Rocket, Artillery and Mortar threats. The Army
will deliver 4 prototype systems in fiscal year 2023 and has funds
allocated to transition DE M-SHORAD to a program of record in the FYDP.
Army is teaming with the Joint community on the Indirect
Fire Protection Capability-High Power Microwave (IFPC-HPM) program to
deliver four prototype systems in fiscal year 2024. These prototype
systems will defeat Group 1-2 UAS threats and swarms.
The IFPC-High Energy Laser (IFPC-HEL) 300kW-class laser
weapon will defeat Cruise Missiles in addition to Group 1-3 Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UAS), Fixed Wing, Rotary Wing and Rocket, Artillery and
Mortar threats. The Army will deliver two prototype systems in fiscal
year 2025.
The Army is also developing the Army Multipurpose-High
Energy Laser (AMP-HEL) 20kW-class laser weapon to be integrated on an
infantry squad vehicle and plans to deliver four prototype systems in
fiscal year 2024. These prototype systems will defeat Group 1-2 UAS
threats.
The Army's budget request for integrated DE weapons in fiscal year
2024 is $210 million and approximately $1 billion through the FYDP.
The Navy has already delivered several combat-capable DE systems
that are being operated and sustained as Fleet assets while other
systems are being developed.
The AN/SEQ-4 Optical Dazzler Interdictor, Navy (ODIN)
Counter-ISR (C-ISR) laser system is on eight Guided Missile Destroyers
(DDG) platforms. The Department plans to request funding across the
FYDP to support capability upgrades, maintenance, and sustainment.
The 60 kW HELIOS weapon system has been installed on USS
Preble and is undergoing system checkouts and crew training prior to
deployment in 2024. HELIOS addresses UAS threats and also provides C-
ISR capabilities.
The Navy is also developing the HELCAP S&T laser weapon
testbed for Counter Anti-Ship Cruise Missile demonstrations in fiscal
year 2024-2025.
The Navy budget request for these integrated DE weapon systems and
demonstrations in fiscal year 2024 is $51 million and $239 million
through the FYDP.
The Air Force is developing two High-Power Microwave (HPM)
integrated weapon system demonstrators called Directed Energy Frontline
Electromagnetic Neutralization and Defeat (DEFEND) that will evaluate
capabilities supporting Integrated Air and Missile Defense. The Navy is
working closely with the Air Force on DEFEND to assess the options for
shipboard applications. The Air Force budget request for DEFEND in
fiscal year 2024 is $80 million and $115 million through the FYDP.
Vice Admiral Hill. We refer your question to Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)).
OUSD(R&E) acts as the central coordinator for all directed energy
development across the Department of Defense (DOD). They are best
suited to provide a full and holistic picture of the Department's
roadmap and the progress being made on directed energy.
5. Senator King. Secretary Plumb, how could the High Energy Laser
prototypes developed under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
High Energy Laser Scaling Initiative (HELSI) program coupled with the
HELIOS scalable architecture be leveraged to enable simultaneous
development and deployment of even more capable integrated Surface Navy
Laser Weapon System (SNLWS) prototypes at 120kW-, 300kW-and 500kW-class
power levels?
Secretary Plumb. The OSD HELSI program successfully demonstrated
300 kW class laser sources from multiple vendors in fiscal year 2023.
The second phase of HELSI initiated in fiscal year 2023 with the goal
of demonstrating scalability of those laser architectures to between
500 kW and 1 MW by 2026.
As part of the Navy's SNLWS program, the 60 kW HELIOS weapon system
has been installed on USS Preble and is undergoing system checkouts and
crew training. The Navy is planning a Counter Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
maritime test with HELIOS in late calendar 2023 prior to deployment of
the USS Preble in fiscal year 2024. In parallel to HELIOS, the Navy is
preparing to integrate one of the already demonstrated OSD 300kW HELSI
sources into their HELCAP S&T laser weapon testbed for c-ASCM
demonstrations in fiscal year 2024-2025.
The Navy is also exploring options for integration of a HELSI
source with scalable power architecture, with considerations for:
Operationalizing a 300kW-class maritime prototype laser
weapon system onboard a DDG 51 surface combatant.
Designing, manufacturing, integrating, and testing new/
upgraded/modified systems needed to convert a 300kW HELSI laser into a
laser weapon system for a Navy ship.
Minimizing installation complexity and integration time
by superstructure removal/replacement (pre-built) and shipboard-
consistent configuration for integration at a West Coast land-based
site.
6. Senator King. Admiral Hill, does the Missile Defense Agency have
an overall roadmap for directed energy weapon research and development
and eventual fielding to counter threats in the land and air domains?
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has a
roadmap for directed energy weapon research and development which flows
into the OUSD(R&E) directed energy enterprise. The MDA participates in
all appropriate directed energy and enabling technology Communities of
Interest, which builds the directed energy roadmaps across the
Department. These foundational plans support a DOD wide rollout of
directed energy solutions across the breadth of applicable mission
areas, to augment existing layered missile defenses.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
cybersecurity
7. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Plumb and Admiral Hill, I
understand that the Missile Defense Agency entered a $266 million
dollar contract last year to improve cybersecurity within our weapons
systems. Can you address how the Department of Defense is working to
expand its internal cyber workforce? How can Congress help improve your
capabilities?
Secretary Plumb. On March 1, 2023, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Kathleen Hicks signed the 2023-2027 Department of Defense (DOD) Cyber
Workforce (CWF) Strategy, which sets the foundation for how DOD will
foster a cyber workforce capable of executing the Department's complex
and varied cyber missions. The strategy will enable DOD to retain
highly skilled cyber operators. It will close workforce development
gaps, drive workforce management and development initiatives, and help
transform the Department into a data-centric enterprise including
optimized workforce analytics.
DOD is aligning strategic efforts to four human capital pillars: 1)
identification; 2) recruitment; 3) development; and 4) retention. Our
efforts within each of these pillars will ensure the DOD workforce is
agile, flexible, and responsive to the evolving cyber domain.
Vice Admiral Hill. The $266 million contract is not an additional
investment in cybersecurity but a continuation of both cyber and non-
cyber support requirements replacing two of our legacy Advisory and
Assistance Support contracts.
The Department of Defense (DOD) released the Cyber Workforce
Strategy 2023-2027 on March 1, 2023. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
will align the management of its cyber workforce to the DOD strategy.
The DOD strategy takes a proactive approach in setting unifying
direction and guidance for the DOD to foster a cyber workforce that
will be ready to execute cyber missions. To support the accomplishment
of the strategic goals in the strategy, the DOD is planning to produce
a cyber workforce implementation plan. The plan will ensure that the
strategy's talent identification, recruitment, development, retention,
and management objectives of the strategy are achieved.
Key MDA Efforts: The MDA developed and created a Cyberspace
Workforce Management Program in August 2020. The program supports
mission readiness, provides for management review and leadership
oversight, and satisfies MDA, DOD, and Federal Information Security
Management Act compliance. The program provided the agency with
direction to implement and maintain; the MDA Cyberspace Workforce
Management Program, and a tracking mechanism and repository to support
the Cyberspace Workforce Management Program. Additionally, the program
directed standardized tracking of cybersecurity credentials and
supporting documentation for MDA personnel. The MDA will update the
Cyberspace Workforce Management Program to ensure alignment with the
objectives and goals from the February 2023, publication of the DOD
Cyberspace Workforce Qualification and Management Program. In 2021 MDA
developed and implemented the Cyberspace Workforce Qualification
Tracking (CWQT) tool to formally track the MDA cyber workforce skills
and certifications. The automated CWQT facilitates the generation of
reports to support Federal Information Security Modernization Act
reporting requirements and enhances the ability to respond to
cyberspace workforce requests.
In August 2021, the MDA Director published the MDA's Cyberspace
Defense Strategy. The strategy describes the Director's intent and
guidance for the cyberspace defense of the missile defense system and
the MDA. It outlines desired outcomes, strategic initiatives, and major
tasks to ensure that the missile defense system and the MDA is
protected from the activities of our cyber adversaries. One of the
strategic initiatives is to increase the cyber technical competency of
the missile defense system workforce. The strategy includes three major
tasks to accomplish the initiative:
1. Cyberspace Workforce Management: Execute the MDA Cyberspace
Workforce Management Program.
2. Cyberspace Workforce Training: Develop a tailored cyber
curriculum and hands-on training.
3. Cyberspace Workforce Hiring: All MDA organizations will
strategically hire, reskill, retain, and contract for additional
cybersecurity engineering expertise.
Regarding how Congress can help improve capability, Please support
the current and future President's Budget, to improve the MDA cyber
workforce program capabilities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
aegis ashore system
8. Senator Warren. Admiral Hill, in a Department of Defense (DOD)
press briefing on March 14, 2023 regarding the President's fiscal year
2024 missile defense budget request, when asked about the completion of
the Poland Aegis Ashore system, you said `` . . . it will be
operational to conduct ballistic missile defense of the homeland and of
the European continent.'' How does Aegis Ashore and the European Phased
Adaptive Approach defend the U.S. Homeland?
Vice Admiral Hill. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)--
including the AEGIS Ashore sites in Romania and Poland and a Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) radar in Turkey--is a U.S. voluntary national
contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) BMD
mission, aimed at providing full coverage and protection for all NATO
European populations, territory, and forces against ballistic missiles
from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO BMD is designed to counter
the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles
in the vicinity of the south-eastern border of the Alliance.
U.S. missile defense capabilities deployed as part of EPAA and NATO
BMD, including the AEGIS-Ashore sites in Poland and Romania, are not
intended, nor have the capability to defend against missile threats to
the U.S. Homeland.
sm-3 block iia interceptor
9. Senator Warren. Admiral Hill, in that same briefing, you said
that while the SM-3 Block IIA Interceptor was tested against an
International Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-range threat, it was
out of the system's design space. What hardware or sensors changes
would need to be made to give these interceptors a role in homeland
defense, as envisioned by the previous administration? What is the
estimated cost of these changes?
Vice Admiral Hill. (CUI) The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) approach
to provide a layered homeland defense capability was to leverage
existing regional capabilities with demonstrated or assessed residual
capability. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and the Standard Missile-3
(SM-3) Block (Blk) IIA were identified as contributing systems. Aegis
Weapon System (AWS) BL 9.C2 (BMD 5.1) ships are capable of employing
the SM-3 Blk IIA which demonstrated residual capability against a
simple ICBM threat in Flight Test Aegis Weapon System-44 conducted
November 2020. While residual capability exists today to use the SM-3
Blk IIA for U.S. homeland defense, the Department has chosen not to
pursue this option as a persistent element of the U.S. homeland
ballistic missile defense architecture. Additional updates to the AWS
and SM-3 Blk IIA would be required to expand the threat set and
increase performance against moderate and complex ICBMs.
ground-based midcourse defense (gmd) system for flight test ground-
based interceptor-12
10. Senator Warren. Admiral Hill, please outline the technical
goals of the upcoming GMD test FTG-12 beyond demonstrating the
interceptor in the two-stage booster mode.
Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]
11. Senator Warren. Admiral Hill, which countermeasures do you
expect the test to demonstrate the system's capability against?
Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
next generation interceptor
12. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, can you provide an update on the
Missile Defense Agency's (MDA's) efforts to develop a cost plan to
acquire no fewer than 64 Next Generation Interceptors (NGIs), as
required by last year's National Defense Authorization Act?
Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]
13. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, how would buying 64 NGIs to
in order to deploy a uniform fleet of interceptors improve your ability
to stay ahead of the North Korean threat?
General VanHerck. The current Department of Defense plan to procure
20 Next Generation Interceptors (NGIs) in addition to the current fleet
of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) enables USNORTHCOM to stay ahead of
the projected North Korean threat. NGIs are being designed to have a
significant increase of reliability and lethality over the current
GBIs. Based on the expected increased performance of the NGI, I am
expecting to be able to reduce the ratio of interceptors per inbound
threat, therefore 64 NGIs would allow engagements of more inbound
threats than a mixed fleet of 64 would allow.
glide phase interceptor
14. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, you recently testified before the
House Armed Services Committees that not fielding the Glide Phase
Interceptor until ``out in the mid `30's is . . . almost irrelevant.''
I agree with that. Would additional funding or authorities from
Congress help to accelerate this program?
Vice Admiral Hill. Additional funding would allow the MDA to
deliver the Glide Phase Interceptor capability as early as fiscal year
2032, without incurring concurrency risk. In fiscal year 2024, an
additional $298 million over MDA's Presidents Budget 2024 request would
support this acceleration
guam defense system
15. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, the budget plans for an
``enhanced capability'' on Guam by 2029 and future additional
capabilities in the 2030's, but Admiral Davidson's window for a Chinese
invasion of Taiwan closes in 2027. Will there be an initial operating
capability for Guam defense capable of intercepting Chinese missiles,
and if so, when do you anticipate that will be?
Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]
16. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, how many Chinese missiles would
it take to overwhelm the Guam Defense System once it achieves enhanced
capability in 2029?
Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]
ground-based interceptors
17. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, for how long will the Service
Life Extension Program for the Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) allow
the GBIs to remain in the fleet?
Vice Admiral Hill. The service life requirement for Ground Based
Interceptors is 20 years. Of the 47 Ground Based Interceptors currently
deployed, there are 20 interceptors equipped with Capability
Enhancement (CE)-I Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), the first
generation configuration initially fielded in 2004. As the Ground Based
Interceptor fleet continues to age, the assessed reliability will
degrade over time due to the effects of aging, but it is a gradual
decline and ``end of life'' is not a specific date. The CE-I
interceptors are currently undergoing a SLEP to increase their
reliability and performance. The SLEP will improve the reliability of
each upgraded Ground Based Interceptor by up to 20 percent through low-
risk, cost-effective upgrades and replacement of limited-life parts.
See classified attachment 2, ``GMD Interceptor Fleet Reliability with
CE-1 Comparison.'' In addition to service life, the Agency manages the
Ground Based Interceptor fleet to ensure the most capable and reliable
fleet is available for Homeland Defense.
18. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, in what year do you expect that
GBIs will need to begin being retired?
Vice Admiral Hill. In addition to the above response regarding the
CE-I EKV equipped Ground Based Interceptors, the service life
requirement for the newer Ground Based Interceptors is also 20 years.
Of the 47 Ground Based Interceptors currently deployed, there are 27 of
these newer interceptors equipped with either the CE-II or CE-II Block
1 EKV mated to either a Configuration 1 or Configuration 2 Booster
Vehicle, with emplacements initiated in 2008. As the CE-II Ground Based
Interceptor fleet continues to age, the assessed reliability will
degrade over time due to the effects of aging, but it is a gradual
decline and ``end of life'' is not a specific date. The MDA will
continue to assess overall and configuration specific reliability
predictions in conjunction with the ongoing development, acquisition,
and fielding of the Next Generation Interceptors.
The eventual mix of Next Generation Interceptors and Ground Based
Interceptors should be informed by a variety of threat, operational,
and programmatic considerations, including: threat evolution; Next
Generation Interceptor performance; performance and reliability of the
Ground Based Interceptor fleet including the first CE-II Ground Based
Interceptor approaching 20 years of service in 2028; and the maturation
of U.S. Northern Command's missile defense Concept of Operations
required to negate the threat. The Department will continue to evaluate
these considerations as the Next Generation Interceptor technology
matures and the development program progresses with the objective of
synchronizing any inventory decisions, as appropriate, with key program
milestones to generate economic efficiencies, and, in conjunction with
other missile defeat activities, stay ahead of the threat.
terminal high altitude area defense (thaad) launch-on-remote
19. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, can you explain how the THAAD
Launch-On-Remote capability recently deployed in United States Indo-
Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will improve our missile defense
capabilities in that region?
Vice Admiral Hill. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) fielded three
capabilities recently to INDOPACOM as part of Joint Emergent
Operational Need (JEON) PC-0021 solution:
i. THAAD Remote Launch (fielded in TH 3.2, June 2020): THAAD Remote
Launcher capability using the THAAD Remote Launch Kit provides flexible
communication paths to increase launcher emplacement distance and
defended area.
ii. Patriot Launch on Remote (THAAD) (fielded in TH 3.2, June
2020): Enables Patriot to launch Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile
Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors utilizing THAAD AN/TPY-2 radar
track data to detect and track threat ballistic missiles at longer
ranges while utilizing MSE's full kinematic capability.
iii. Integration of Patriot/MSE with THAAD (fielded in TH 4.0 Oct
2022): Incorporates MSE launchers and missiles into the THAAD Weapon
System to provide additional engagement opportunities and enhanced
performance against threat ballistic missiles.
20. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, can you ` the Missile Defenses
Agency's plans to continue fielding this capability globally?
Vice Admiral Hill. The JEON PC-0021 capabilities are planned to
begin fielding globally at end of calendar year 2023. The MDA is
procuring hardware now and coordinating with the Army for availability
to complete installation, check-out, and training. Fielding will be
based on coordination with the Army and unit availability. The Army
will prioritize the upgrades based on each unit's needs.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
spectrum
21. Senator Rounds. Admiral Hill, There is an effort by some in
Congress to require sharing of all or some of the 3.1-3.45 GHz band of
the electromagnetic spectrum between the Department of Defense and
commercial interests in the private sector. As I understand it, the
3.1-3.45 GHz band is primarily used by Department of Defense ground-,
air-and sea-based radars and sensors to detect airborne and missile
threats. For example, the Navy's Aegis Combat System's AN/SPY radar
uses that band and is one of the few systems able to track the new
threat posed by low flying, highly maneuverable hypersonic missiles.
Can you confirm that many of the missile defense systems your agency
develops, which are critical to our national security, reside on this
portion of the spectrum? If so, can you share examples of either
specific systems that currently operate there or some of the missions
and capabilities which rely on this portion of the spectrum?
Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]
22. Senator Rounds. Admiral Hill, providing this committee with
your best military advice, can you characterize the risk to mission and
the potential impact on extant missile defense systems the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) has developed if action were taken to enable the
auction of portions of this band prior to the analysis of the results
of the statutorily required Department of Defense-National
Telecommunications and Information Administration study, which is
required to be completed by September 2023?
Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]