    [Senate Hearing 118-625, Part 7]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                    ------
                                                      S. Hrg. 118-625, Pt. 7

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
                                DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2226

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   ----------

                       MARCH 14; APRIL 18; MAY 2, 9, 2023

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
             FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                            Part 7 STRATEGIC FORCES

                                     ______

                                                     S. Hrg. 118-625, Pt. 7

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
                                DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2226

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   __________

                       MARCH 14; APRIL 18; MAY 2, 9, 2023

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov/

                             ______

                  U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
     60-100              WASHINGTON : 2025

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

     JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman      ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire           DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York         TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut         MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                            JONI ERNST, Iowa
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii                 DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
                                            KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia                     RICK SCOTT, Florida
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine               TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts         MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan                TED BUDD, North Carolina
    JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia              ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri,
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    MARK KELLY, Arizona

               Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
                John P. Keast, Minority Staff
                 Director

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

        ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine,     DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
                 Chairman              TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts    KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia         TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    MARK KELLY, Arizona

                                      (ii)

                             C O N T E

                                 march 14, 2023

                                                                       Page

    The United States Space Force Programs...........................     1

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Angus King..................................     1

    Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................     2

                               Witness Statements

    Saltzman, General B. Chance, USSF, Chief of Space Operations.....     2

    Questions for the Record.........................................    30

                                 april 18, 2023

    The Department of Energy's Atomic Energy Defense Activities and      33
      Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Programs.

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Angus King..................................    33

    Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................    34

                               Witness Statements

    Hruby, The Honorable Jill M., Administrator, National Nuclear        34
      Security
      Administration.

    Caldwell, Admiral James F., Jr., USN, Deputy Administrator for       35
      Naval Reactors, National Nuclear Security Administration.

    William White, Senior Advisor for Environmental Management,          41
      Department of Energy.

    Adams, The Honorable Marvin L., Deputy Administrator for Defense     58
      Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration.

    Bussiere, General Thomas A., USAF, Commander, Air Force Global       75
      Strike Command.

    Wolfe, Vice Admiral Johnny R., Jr., USN, Director, Navy Strategic    82
      Systems Programs.

    Questions for the Record.........................................    98

                                     (iii)

                                  may 2, 2023

    The Department of Defense Space Activities.......................   111

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Angus King..................................   111

    Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................   112

                               Witness Statements

    Plumb, Dr. John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space        112
      Policy.

    Calvelli, The Honorable Frank, Assistant Secretaryof the Air        118
      Force for Space Acquisition and Integration.

    Thompson, General David D., USSF, Vice Chief of Space Operations.   119

    Questions for the Record.........................................   140

                                  may 9, 2023

    The Department of Defense Missile Defense Activities.............   143

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Angus King..................................   143

    Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................   144

                               Witness Statements

    Plumb, The Honorable John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for    145
      Space Policy, Department of Defense.

    Hill, Vice Admiral Jon A., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency.   150

    VanHerck, General Glen D., USAF, Commander, United States           156
      Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.

    Karbler, Lieutenant General Daniel L., USA, Commanding General,     166
      United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   192

                                      (iv)

      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
             FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 14, 2023

                          United States Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                     THE UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE PROGRAMS

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:46 p.m., in
    room 222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus S.
    King, Jr. (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Subcommittee Members present: Senators King, Gillibrand,
    Rosen, Kelly, Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Cramer, and Tuberville.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.

        Senator King. Call to order the meeting of the Strategic
    Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.
    Our hearing today is on the subject of the Space Force.
        I want to thank General Saltzman for being with us today
    before this Committee, and the purpose of the hearing is to
    understand your vision and priorities for the Space Force as
    its second Chief of Space Operations.
        While the budget for the Department of Defense (DOD) in the
    Space Force has just been released, we plan to have a Space
    budget hearing which includes the Space Force later in May.
    After we have had time to understand in detail the President's
    Budget Request, there are many and complicated topics such as
    missile warning and launch that will take time to understand
    and are not really ripe for this hearing today, but we will
    take up in May.
        Instead, the hearing will focus on you, General Saltzman.
    This is your opportunity to explain to the Subcommittee and to
    the public how you will train and equip the Space Force as a
    Department of Defense separate military service and be a
    presenter of forces to the Combatant Commanders in order to
    accomplish their missions as assigned by the President.
        My understanding is that today you will explain to us your
    three lines of effort for our Space Force Guardians. As I
    understand it, they are to first field a combat ready force.
    Second, amplify the Guardian spirit, and third, partner with
    the interagency allies and industry to win.
        I look forward to having you explain in detail what each of
    these lines of effort are and give us examples, simple ones,
    that we can take with us and explain to our constituents and
    the public the importance of the work that you are doing.
        Let me conclude that General Hayden said it best, there is
    no such thing as a conflict in space by itself. Any conflict
    will involve all domains, although I believe it will start in
    space, the land, the sea, the air, and space all together at
    once.
        I hope that today you will explain to us how your vision
    for the Space Force will meet General Hayden's astute
    observation and enable our combatant commanders to accomplish
    the mission that the President has directed them to perform, if
    called upon.
        After your opening statement, we will have questions of 5
    minutes each. Senator Fischer.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Saltzman,
    thank you for being here today and for sharing your perspective
    with the Subcommittee, and thank you, sir, for your many, many
    years of service.
        You are only the second ever Chief of Space Operations in a
    unique position to leave your mark on what is still essentially
    a brand new military service. An opportunity like this comes
    around less than once in a generation, and I am sure you feel
    the gravity and the expectation of this every single day.
        I look forward to hearing more of your vision for this
    newest service branch, specifically how you are forming it into
    a fighting force that is ready to prosecute war as part of the
    United States military.
        I would also like to understand how you are shaping the
    space acquisition enterprise to that vision enabling the Joint
    Force. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. General Saltzman.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL B. CHANCE SALTZMAN, USSF, CHIEF OF SPACE
                               OPERATIONS

        General Saltzman. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
    distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for your
    continued support for the opportunity to discuss my vision and
    priorities for the United States Space Force.
        I have been in listening mode since becoming the second
    Chief of Space Operations (CSO) just 4 months ago. One of my
    first phone calls as the CSO was to the Commander of United
    States European Command, General Calvelli.
        My first trip as the CSO was to Colorado Springs to meet in
    person with the Commander of U.S. Space Command, General
    Dickinson. My first overseas trip was to Hawaii, where I met
    with the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command,
    Admiral Aquilino.
        During these last 4 months, I have also prioritized
    visiting with Guardians performing vital missions around the
    world for the Space Force, for the Joint Force, and for the
    Nation. In December, I met in person with military space chiefs
    from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the
    United Kingdom.
        In all these engagements, my goal was to better understand
    how the Space Force should focus its near and mid-term efforts
    as we integrate our capabilities to address the threats and
    challenges. The themes from these engagements should surprise
    no one.
        Each combatant commander emphasized the vital role space
    plays in strategic competition and integrated deterrence. The
    guardians of the Space Force make this possible and are without
    a doubt the brightest and boldest America has to offer.
        Because of these advantages and our shared interest in the
    domain, U.S. allies and international partners are eager for
    expanded collaboration with the Space Force, especially in
    areas that strengthen the effectiveness of coalition space
    operations and reinforce norms of responsible behavior.
        In short, our mission forces, people, and partnerships make
    the Space Force the most formidable space organization on the
    planet. China and Russia know this and are accelerating their
    efforts to undermine United States advantages in the domain.
        To meet this challenge, the Space Force will prioritize
    three lines of effort, as Senator King has already stated,
    fielding, combat ready forces, amplifying the guardian spirit,
    and partnering to win.
        These lines of efforts are designed to deliver the forces,
    personnel, and partnerships required for the Space Force to
    preserve U.S. advantages in space. Before I expand on the Space
    Force lines of effort, I would like to update the Subcommittee
    on the emerging threats Space Forces face.
        As the handout I have provided indicates, space is
    undeniably a contested and congested warfighting domain. When
    describing space threats, it is important to account for two
    kinds of threats. First, threats from space assets, and second,
    threats to space assets. Threats from space present a growing
    danger to the Joint Force.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Both China and Russia have robust space-based capabilities
    that allow them to find, target, and attack United States
    military forces on land, at sea, and in the air. Equally
    alarming are the threats that endanger the satellites the
    Nation relies on for prosperity and security. Both China and
    Russia continue to develop, field, and deploy a range of
    weapons aimed at United States space capabilities.
        The spectrum of threats to U.S. space capabilities includes
    cyber warfare activities, electronic attack platforms, directed
    energy lasers designed to blind or damage satellites sensors,
    ground to orbit missiles to destroy satellites, and space to
    space orbital engagement systems that can attack U.S.
    satellites in space. The contested space domain shapes the
    enduring purpose of the United States Space Force.
        Congress established the Space Force to protect U.S.
    interests in space. This means protecting U.S. space
    capabilities and defending the Joint Force and the Nation from
    space enabled attack.
        My lines of effort are designed to achieve this vision by
    providing the forces, personnel, and partnerships required for
    the Space Force to preserve U.S. space superiority for the
    foreseeable future. My first priority is to build resilient,
    ready to combat credible space forces. To do this, we are
    accelerating the pivot toward resilience satellite
    constellations, ground stations, networks, and data links.
        The space development agencies proliferated warfighter
    space architecture provides a prime example of these efforts.
    We are also emphasizing cybersecurity and preparing guardians
    to detect and defeat cyber-attacks against our networks,
    systems, ground stations, data links, and satellites.
        We are developing an operational test and training
    infrastructure that will be the backbone of Space Force
    readiness as guardians prepare for a high intensity fight. This
    infrastructure will allow guardians to execute realistic
    training against simulated adversaries to validate their
    tactics.
        Space Training and Readiness Command executed one such
    exercise last September with its inaugural Black Skies exercise
    focused on space electromagnetic warfare. Through these events,
    we are continuously enhancing tactics and operational concepts,
    thereby creating a force ready for emerging threats.
        My second priority is to amplify the guardian spirit by
    embracing a modern talent management process that recruits the
    best talent, develops and retains an elite workforce, and
    empowers guardians to succeed.
        One example is our constructive service credit program that
    allows experienced professionals from key fields to directly
    commission into the Space Force at ranks appropriate to their
    civilian experience. The first constructive credit board served
    as a pilot program in 2022 and recruited seven cyber
    professionals to become guardians, one of which was onboarded
    as a lieutenant colonel.
        The second board will incorporate intelligence
    professionals and assess 20 additional personnel. Over the last
    year, we have also deployed space centric curriculum for basic
    military training, the Reserve Officer Training Corps, and an
    officer training school. In addition, our partnership with the
    Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies for
    Professional Military Education begins this summer.
        With congressional support, we will improve our modern
    talent management system by integrating the Air Force Reserve
    space element into the Space Force as a single component. This
    will allow guardians to transition between full-time and part-
    time duty to pursue opportunities outside of full-time military
    service and subsequently return to full-time duty without
    barriers to reentry or detriment to their career.
        We will ensure that such experience is utilized in strict
    and careful compliance with Federal acquisition and ethics
    regulations, and appropriate conflict of interest statutes. The
    single service personnel management system will make retaining
    highly qualified guardians easier by facilitating flexible
    career paths, and we look forward to working with this
    Subcommittee on that important initiative.
        My third and final priority is to strengthen partnerships
    the Space Force relies on to accomplish its mission. The Space
    Force will strive to eliminate barriers to collaboration,
    including over classification, so we can build enduring
    advantages with our partners.
        To date, personnel from over 50 countries have participated
    in training, education, and exercise events hosted by the Space
    Force. We are also leveraging allies and partners to expand our
    warfighting capability.
        Recent examples include deploying United States payloads on
    Norwegian and Japanese satellites and establishing a
    partnership with Luxembourg for satellite communication
    services. In total, we have more than 200 foreign military
    sales cases, with over 60 countries for a broad spectrum of
    space capabilities.
        Commercial partners will be key as we pursue emerging
    technologies like advanced power promotion, propulsion
    technologies, artificial intelligence, and machine learning,
    and in-space servicing assembly and manufacturing. Space
    Systems Command's Commercial Services Office is building these
    partnerships to improve our ability to leverage more commercial
    off the shelf capabilities.
        In conclusion, thank you for the opportunity to share these
    priorities with you today. The Space Force is the preeminent
    military space organization in the world. Our adversaries seek
    to surpass the United States and challenge our advantage. We
    cannot and will not allow this to happen.
        Our guardians will out work, out innovate, and out compete
    our adversaries to ensure that we succeed. They will do
    everything they can to deter conflict and maintain stability in
    space. I very much look forward to your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General B. Chance Saltzman
    follows:]

                Prepared Statement by General B. Chance Saltzman
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, distinguished members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for your continued support and for the
    opportunity to discuss my vision and priorities for the United States
    Space Force. For the last 5 months, I have had the privilege of serving
    as the Chief of Space Operations and leading the guardians of the Space
    Force. They are, without a doubt, the brightest and boldest America has
    to offer. The Space Force is the world's preeminent space warfighting
    entity because of them. We must maintain that status so that the
    threats we face in, to, and from space are never able to undermine
    American prosperity and security. Space capabilities shape the modern
    way of war and the human way of life. Without space, the Joint Force's
    ability to project power and execute operations will be severely
    degraded.
        The Space Force develops and trains guardians, designs and acquires
    space systems, and provides those personnel and systems to the Joint
    Force. In accordance with the strategic direction provided in the
    National Defense Strategy and the Department of the Air Force
    Operational Imperatives, we will develop a resilient space order of
    battle able to protect U.S. space capabilities and defend the Joint
    Force from space-enabled targeting and attack. Should competition turn
    to conflict, the Space Force will be prepared to rapidly transition to
    a wartime posture against a peer adversary with the appropriate
    systems, training, and sustainment to fight and win a long-term
    conflict.
        To do this, I will prioritize three key efforts: (1) fielding
    combat-ready forces (2) amplifying the Guardian Spirit, and (3)
    partnering to win. Our adversaries seek to supersede our advantages in
    space. We cannot let that happen. Through these three efforts, the
    Space Force will develop a competitive mindset and warfighting culture.
    We will outpace and outcompete our adversaries. We will preserve
    stability in space.
                    threat picture & operational environment
    Congested Space Domain
        Our efforts to maintain stability in space must account for the
    increasing number of objects that congest the domain. In 2022, space
    launch providers around the world conducted a record 177 launches, a 31
    percent increase from 2021. Those launches put 2,215 payloads into
    orbit, a 29 percent increase from 2021. Increasing launch cadence and
    payloads in orbit expands demand for space domain awareness (SDA)
    capabilities covering all orbital regimes. The Space Force's SDA unit,
    Space Delta 2, currently tracks approximately 47,900 objects in space,
    a 16 percent growth in objects from 2021 to 2022. Of those objects,
    7,100 are active payloads, a 37 percent increase from 2021 to 2022.
    Expended rocket bodies, inactive satellites, and debris further congest
    the environment.
        Proliferated mega constellations numbering in the hundreds or
    thousands of satellites account for a growing percentage of launches
    and active payloads on orbit. Of the 177 launches last year, 41
    deployed satellites for mega constellations representing a 51 percent
    increase from 2021. Those 41 missions put over 2000 payloads into
    orbit. Six were rideshare missions which launched satellites for a wide
    variety of government and private sector space entities.
        These new satellites must be effectively tracked to alert operators
    to prevent collisions that could generate more debris. The orbital
    debris problem continued to worsen in 2022. Seven spacecraft broke
    apart in orbit creating over 600 new pieces of debris, including one
    Chinese rocket body accounting for over 530. The International Space
    Station had 1,486 reportable conjunctions with space debris or
    spacecraft in 2022, a 233 percent increase from 2021. The increase was
    largely due to the Russian anti-satellite test in November 2021 which
    created 1500 pieces of trackable debris, caused over half of the
    conjunctions, and forced the ISS to maneuver twice to dodge debris.
        In addition to the rocket that broke apart in orbit, the Chinese
    Government allowed uncontrolled reentries of two additional rocket
    bodies into Earth's atmosphere last year, while refusing to share
    specific trajectory information. The Chinese and Russian Governments'
    disregard for the safety and sustainability of space could lead to
    debris generation and loss of human life. We are committed to setting
    an example of professional behavior to ensure the space domain remains
    secure, stable, and accessible while the United States Government works
    to lead efforts to develop norms of responsible behavior in space.
    Contested Space Domain
        Space is undeniably a contested warfighting domain. China and
    Russia both define space in such a manner. China, our pacing challenge,
    is the most immediate threat in, to, and from space for which the Space
    Force must maintain technological advantage and readiness to defend
    vital national security interests. Russia, while less capable, remains
    an acute threat that is developing asymmetric counterspace systems
    meant to neutralize American satellites. Both states recognize the
    advantage space provides the United States. Both expect space to be key
    to future warfare by enabling long-range precision strike. Both seek
    information superiority through disabling an adversary's space
    communication and navigation systems. They are intent on targeting
    perceived U.S. vulnerabilities and eliminating American advantage in
    the space domain.
        In 2015, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) created the Strategic
    Support Force which integrates space, cyberspace, and electronic
    warfare operations. China continues to aggressively invest in
    technology meant to disrupt, degrade, and destroy our space
    capabilities. Those technologies are key to their plan for a fully
    modernized, world class military able to project power globally and for
    achieving their ``Space Dream'' to become the foremost global space
    power by 2045.
        China has a range of operational counterspace capabilities,
    including terrestrial lasers to disrupt and degrade satellite sensors,
    electronic warfare jammers targeting GPS and SATCOM, and anti-satellite
    missiles. They are testing on-orbit satellite systems which could be
    weaponized as they have already shown the capability to physically
    control and move other satellites. Their cyber capabilities are
    extensive and dangerous. They are likely pursuing anti-satellite
    systems able to destroy satellites in geosynchronous orbit. In July
    2021, the Chinese Government successfully completed the first test of
    fractional orbital launch of an ICBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle,
    which traveled over 24,800 miles demonstrating a new method to hold at
    risk and to attack the United States.
        Over the last 6 months, China conducted 35 launches adding advanced
    communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
    satellites to their orbital architecture. Of China's over 700
    operational satellites in orbit, 347 are PLA ISR platforms providing
    optical, radar, and radio-frequency capabilities which track the Joint
    Force worldwide. Their ISR satellites work in conjunction with
    positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) and SATCOM satellites to
    enable Chinese kill-chains and long-range precision guided attack.
    These space capabilities allow China to monitor, track, target and
    attack United States forces in conflict.
        Russia is testing and fielding orbital anti-satellite systems,
    extensive cyber capabilities, and terrestrial anti-satellite missiles,
    jammers, and lasers. They are also likely developing an air launch
    anti-satellite missile. Russia's ISR satellites are highly advanced,
    providing geospatial and signals intelligence capabilities, but are
    limited in number relative to the United States and China. Their ISR,
    PNT, and communications satellites provide the basis for space-enabled
    targeting and attack that must be taken seriously despite Russia's
    performance in Ukraine and lack of follow-through on threats to space
    capabilities.
        The Space Force will protect the Joint Force from threats of
    Russian and Chinese action. The Space Force must deter aggression and,
    if necessary, defeat adversaries. We will do so responsibly and
    sustainably. We will execute my priorities with the pacing challenge,
    China, at the forefront of our minds.
                       the vital role of the space force
        Congress established the Space Force to protect U.S. interests in
    space. This charge has two components. First, we must protect U.S.
    space capabilities so that the Nation has unfettered access to the
    domain. Second, we must defend the Joint Force and the Nation from
    space-enabled attack. Space superiority is the ability to accomplish
    both at a time and place of our choosing. Military services are
    organized around domains--air, land, and sea--because contesting a
    domain with military force is a complex endeavor that requires
    institutional specialization. Space superiority requires a similar
    level of specialization. This mission is why the Space Force exists and
    an operational outcome clearly in guardians' purview.
        My lines of effort are designed to achieve this vision by providing
    the forces, personnel, and partnerships required for the Space Force to
    preserve U.S. space superiority for the foreseeable future.
                  line of effort 1--field combat-ready forces
        My first priority is to build resilient, ready, combat-credible
    space forces. A resilient force can withstand, fight through, and
    recover from hostile attacks. A ready force has the training,
    equipment, and sustainment required to accomplish any mission in
    competition and high-intensity conflict. A combat-credible force has
    power to deter by providing the ability to conduct full-spectrum
    operations in a prompt and sustained manner against any adversary.
    Space forces must be all three, resilient, ready, and combat-credible,
    if they are going to outcompete adversaries, deter aggressors, and
    defeat the Nation's enemies.
    Resilient
        We are accelerating the pivot toward resilient satellite
    constellations, ground stations, networks, and data links. We are
    conducting transformational force design analysis based on current and
    future threats, operational needs, and costs so that we can deliver
    resilient, effective systems and architecture. Force design will be
    informed by extensive wargaming and prototyping to deliver combat and
    cost-effective platforms. Satellite constellations must be
    proliferated, disaggregated, and distributed. The Space Development
    Agency's Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture provides a prime
    example of those efforts.
        Emphasis must be placed on cybersecurity. Cyber threats must be
    understood. Networks must be hardened against hostile cyber operations.
    The Space Force will employ highly trained guardians implementing
    modern sensors, software, and analytics to detect and defeat cyber
    operations against our networks, systems, ground stations, datalinks,
    and satellites. The Space Force will strive to eliminate legacy
    information technology to reduce cyber vulnerabilities.
    Ready
        To enhance our ability to field combat-ready forces, we are
    experimenting with organizational constructs that strengthen readiness
    by building tighter connections between operations and acquisitions
    activities. The 15th Space Surveillance Squadron is an important
    example of such a unit. This unit combines an operational space domain
    awareness (SDA) mission under Space Delta 2 and a research and
    development mission for SDA technologies aligned with the Air Force
    Research Lab. The combination of operations and acquisitions expertise
    accelerates technological transfer from engineers and acquirers to
    warfighters. As experiments like this demonstrate positive results, we
    will look for innovative ways to apply the lessons we learn across the
    force.
        The Space Force requires new, modern infrastructure to train
    guardians, develop tactics, and validate performance. Developing
    Operational Test and Training Infrastructure (OTTI) will enable
    guardians to build readiness to fight and win high-intensity conflict.
    With this infrastructure, we will aggressively pursue realistic
    training. guardians will execute missions with validated tactics and
    modern weapon systems. We are executing new, large scale training
    exercises including Space Flag and Black Skies. At these exercises,
    Guardian aggressor forces function as intelligent, highly capable
    opponents to force guardians to account for our real-world adversaries.
    Through training, exercises, and orbital experimentation, we will
    develop, validate, and continuously enhance tactics and operational
    concepts, thereby creating a force ready for emerging threats.
    Combat-Credible
        Only a credible Space Force can deter an adversary from extending a
    conflict into space. A combat-credible force requires actionable
    intelligence, decisive command and control, fortified networks,
    maintained equipment, innovative operational concepts, validated
    tactics, accredited facilities, and continuous sustainment. Neglecting
    any of these elements jeopardizes a force's ability to conduct prompt
    and sustained operations against an adversary. My emphasis on combat
    credibility ensures that we are fielding all the combat and combat
    support elements required to prevail against an adversary in space.
        For Space Force forces to be combat-credible, they must be able to
    protect space capabilities and defend the Joint Force from space-
    enabled attack. To perform these missions, we are developing
    strategies, concepts, and tactics that will allow space forces to
    conduct prompt and sustained full spectrum operations against an
    adversary in the emerging threat environment. We are also accelerating
    the documentation of force designs related to orbital warfare; space
    domain awareness; battle management command, control, and
    communication; and other key functional areas. The Space Warfighting
    Analysis Center plays a role in this effort by providing the modeling
    and analysis to inform these activities. If the concepts we rely on to
    protect and defend become stale or outdated, we risk falling behind the
    adversary. Therefore, we are continuously evaluating the effectiveness
    of strategies, concepts, and tactics through a Service-wide campaign of
    learning.
                 line of effort 2--amplify the guardian spirit
        My second priority is to unleash the spirit of creativity,
    innovation, determination, and patriotism of our talented workforce.
    Amplifying the Guardian Spirit requires the Space Force to continue to
    embrace modern talent management processes so that we can recruit the
    best talent, develop, and retain an elite workforce, and empower
    guardians to succeed.
    Recruit the Best Talent
        The size and requirements of the Space Force present unique
    recruiting challenges. We receive more applications than we have
    positions available. Our focus must be selecting the right people who
    will embrace the Guardian Spirit and dedicate themselves to the
    accomplishment of our mission. Future guardians must be recruited from
    across the United States, from all backgrounds ensuring selection of
    high-quality people with diverse life experiences that will be critical
    in solving complex problems and executing difficult missions. The Space
    Force must outcompete the civilian market for talent by showing how
    attractive careers as a Guardian are for all people.
        The Space Force is implementing innovative recruitment practices to
    attract talent. We are expanding digital recruiting efforts to include
    interactions with potential recruits aimed at presenting the value of
    service in the Space Force, training and educational opportunities, and
    the importance of STEM. Recruit townhalls allow potential future
    guardians to ask questions in preparation for joining the Space Force
    and successful completion of Basic Military Training. STEM to Space is
    a targeted outreach effort through which guardians give presentations
    to elementary and high school students promoting STEM education and
    careers. The Space Force recently launched a website to conduct public
    outreach which provides information on careers, but also provides
    personal insights and anecdotes from enlisted personnel, officers, and
    civilians.
        Through extremely valuable partnerships with Universities, the
    Space Force will recruit highly educated guardians. The Space Force
    University Partnership Program (UPP) creates a pipeline for future
    Space Force officers and civilians through ROTC and internship
    programs. We will recruit from a diverse group of universities to
    ensure the strongest possible field of future guardians and STEM talent
    including from underrepresented populations. We currently have 14
    partner universities. Two of those universities are Historically Black
    Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and four are Hispanic Serving
    Institutions (HSIs).
        Our constructive service credit program allows experienced
    professionals from key fields to direct commission into the Space Force
    at ranks appropriate to their years of experience. The program is
    intended to recruit professionals in the cyber, intelligence, and space
    fields who are already in the workforce allowing them to skip ROTC or
    attendance at a service academy. The program is currently bringing
    critical cyber experience from the private sector. The first board
    served as a pilot program and recruited seven cyber professionals to
    become guardians including one at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, who
    are now in training or already serving in operational units. The second
    board will incorporate intelligence professionals and intends to hire
    20 personnel. The third board will incorporate space operations
    professionals. These and all other recruits will bring exceptional
    talent that will benefit the Space Force and enhance their career long
    development as guardians.
    Develop and Retain an Elite Work Force
        The Space Force will maximize Guardian talent with an innovative,
    modern talent management system that will train and educate the best
    workforce. Our approach maximizes opportunities for education and
    training. We are developing and implementing space centric curriculum
    for Basic Military Training, Reserve Officer Training Corps, at the
    U.S. Air Force Academy, and Officer Training School programs to ensure
    our guardians are well prepared for entry into the Space Force.
    Guardians will be provided more opportunities for and are encouraged to
    pursue advanced STEM degrees. Further, we will mature our relationship
    with the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
    to provide mid and senior-level professional military education
    programs.
        With congressional support, we will improve our modern talent
    management system by integrating the Air Force Reserve space element
    into the Space Force as a single component. This will strengthen our
    recruiting and retention efforts by providing unique, flexible career
    paths. The proposed talent management system update would allow
    guardians to transfer between full-time and part-time duty to pursue
    opportunities outside full-time military service and subsequently
    return to full-time duty without barriers to reentry or detriment to
    their career. Part-time guardians would bring valuable commercial
    industry experience back to the Space Force. Such opportunities will
    help us attract highly skilled, technologically inclined people in an
    increasingly competitive space enterprise talent market. The single
    service personnel management system will allow guardians to achieve
    their potential and drive innovation within the Space Force. The system
    will also make retaining highly qualified guardians easier by
    facilitating flexible career paths. We look forward to working with
    this committee on this important initiative.
    Empower Guardians to Succeed
        Amplifying the Guardian Spirit requires leaders at all levels to
    place the utmost emphasis on taking care of, trusting, and empowering
    their subordinates. Empowerment requires that guardians adapt to any
    situation and develop solutions in line with their commander's intent.
    Guardians must be confident in their ability to innovate and execute in
    the absence of orders in high-intensity conflict with or without all
    requisite capabilities. Guardians must be able to figure out the how
    when a commander only provides the what and why.
        Each new challenge we face will require big ideas thought up by
    bright, creative guardians. We are implementing an annual Guardian
    Field Forum which will showcase exceptional junior officers, non-
    commissioned officers, and civilians and allow them to share
    recommendations and innovative ideas with peers and senior Space Force
    leaders. The Forum will accelerate implementation of new ideas from the
    ground up and demonstrate each Guardian's ability to implement mission
    command. The intent of the
        Forum is to provide open lines of communication between leaders of
    all ranks across the Space Force to ensure that we remain at the
    cutting edge technologically and tactically.
                        line of effort 3--partner to win
        My third priority is to strengthen the partnerships the Space Force
    relies on to accomplish our mission. Success in space requires
    collaboration. The Space Force will strive to eliminate barriers to
    collaboration, including over-classification, so the Space Force can
    build enduring advantages with our partners.
    Department of the Air Force
        The Space Force maintains our deep relationship with the U.S. Air
    Force which provides critical support services enabling the Space Force
    to remain focused only on key mission areas. The Air Force delivers
    medical, legal, security, engineering, information technology, and
    public affairs support among a myriad of other functions to the Space
    Force. For example, the Air Force Research Lab is a critical partner
    researching and developing cutting-edge satellites, spacecraft,
    propellants, PNT, SDA, and power collection and beaming technologies.
    Joint Force
        Our partnership with U.S. Space Command remains our most important
    Joint Force relationship. The commander of U.S. Space Command's mission
    in the space area of responsibility means that the two organizations
    are closely entwined. One cannot succeed without the other. U.S. Space
    Command directs military operations in space and plans to deter or
    defeat potential adversaries in the domain. The Space Force makes this
    mission possible by providing weapon systems, equipment, personnel,
    expertise, and the execution of critical space operations required to
    accomplish military objectives.
        While the Department of the Air Force presents the preponderance of
    space forces to U.S. Space Command, guardians are indispensable parts
    of military operations conducted by every combatant command. In 2022,
    the Space Force established service components to support United States
    Indo-Pacific Command, United States Forces Korea, and United States
    Central Command. Space Force personnel in those joint force commands
    are already making tangible contributions to operations, training,
    exercises, and international security cooperation initiatives. Strong
    relationships with combatant commands are critical to our success. We
    will use this service component model to strengthen space integration
    in all the combatant commands.
    Allies & Partners
        The current geopolitical situation demands international
    cooperation to deter aggression and defeat adversaries. The U.S. Space
    Force Campaign Support Plan details how the Space Force will expand,
    strength, and leverage our global partnerships. Through our allies and
    partners, we gain economic and national security opportunities in space
    otherwise impossible. We are engaging with partners to prioritize and
    resource space capabilities, training, and interoperability. We are
    building a Regional Space Advisor program to develop guardians who will
    establish and grow international partnerships. The Space Force is
    conducting or pursuing officer exchanges with key allies and partners.
    We will exchange personnel with an increasing number and diversity of
    countries over the next several years.
        The Space Force is developing and executing training, exercises,
    and educational courses with allies and partners in mind. Space
    Training and Readiness Command offers a variety of courses which have
    had personnel from over 50 countries participate. Allies and partners
    are also participating in the Schriever Wargame where we identify
    solutions to shared challenges and Space Flag which provides tactical
    level training in a virtual battlefield. Educational and training
    opportunities build our combined space advantage over our mutual
    adversaries.
        Maintaining that advantage requires operation of space systems in a
    cooperative manner. Recent cooperative efforts include deploying United
    States payloads on Norwegian and Japanese satellites. Our partners
    provide SATCOM and SDA capabilities which mesh with our own to
    distribute costs and improve coverage. Concurrently, the Space Force
    has more than 200 foreign military sales cases with over 60 countries.
    We will further relationships with spacefaring allies and partners
    through additional payload sharing opportunities, personnel exchanges,
    training exercises, professional military education, and security
    cooperation initiatives. Our allies and partners remain critical to
    deterring adversaries and defeating our enemies.
    Whole-of-Government
        Spacepower is a whole-of-government endeavor, and we continue to
    strengthen partnerships with our vital interagency mission partners. We
    are building relationships with intelligence community partners to
    ensure national security requirements are met, including important
    connections with the National Reconnaissance Office. The Space Force is
    growing relationships with National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration to support human spaceflight and space exploration
    missions and with the Department of Commerce to support the transition
    of commercial and civil space traffic management mission to their
    Office of Space Commerce. In addition, the Space Force continues its
    collaboration with the Department of State, both to encourage
    interoperability and to leverage existing and planned space
    capabilities of allies and partners.
    Commercial Industry
        We will build and strengthen partnerships with commercial industry.
    All commercial partners, from small businesses and startups developing
    groundbreaking technologies to large defense contractors producing
    proven capabilities at scale, are critical to Space Force efforts to
    exploit what we have, to buy what we can, and to only build what we
    must. Once in place, the National Security Space Launch Phase 3
    framework will provide a mechanism for emerging commercial launch
    providers to compete for national security launch contracts while also
    maintaining a separate mechanism for launch requirements best served by
    mature providers with a certified record of mission assurance. This
    innovative approach protects capacity for the DOD's most technically
    challenging missions while allowing emerging providers to compete, when
    ready, for the DOD's more commercial-like missions. We are also using
    personnel exchanges, training with industry, and reverse industry days
    will drive integration and a better understanding of each other's
    requirements. Commercial services will increasingly fill growing
    requirements and augment military decisionmaking. Commercial partners
    and services will also be key in pursuit of emerging capabilities
    including advanced power and propulsion technologies, artificial
    intelligence and machine learning, and in-space servicing, assembly,
    and manufacturing. Space Systems Command's Commercial Services Office
    will provide a means through which to leverage more commercial off the
    shelf capabilities with speed and agility.
                                   conclusion
        The Space Force is the preeminent military space organization in
    the world. Our potential adversaries seek to surpass the United States
    and to challenge our advantage. We cannot and will not allow this to
    happen. Our guardians will out work, out innovate, and out compete our
    adversaries to ensure that we succeed. They will do everything they can
    to deter conflict and maintain stability in space. Semper Supra!

        Senator King. Thank you very much, General. I want to jump
    on the comment you made about recruiting, and particularly
    bringing people in mid-career and having more flexibility about
    leaving and coming back. That is a creative idea. Flesh that
    out a bit for me. It strikes me that that is really going to be
    necessary in today's environment, particularly in the
    technology field.
        General Saltzman. Yes, sir. We currently don't have the
    ability, because our Reserves in the Guard are in the Air
    Force. They are in the Air Force Reserves, in the Air National
    Guard, so we don't have an option too.
        If you leave full-time Active service from the Space Force,
    we lose your expertise, and so, we are looking for anything
    that can allow us to retain those people who might have
    priorities that shift but are still willing to contribute to
    the service.
        Senator King. Do we need a Space National Guard?
        General Saltzman. I need the capabilities that are
    currently in the Air National Guard, I can assure you of that.
    I think there is a couple of different ways to do it. We
    assessed three different options.
        We could leave things as they are, which I think is the
    worst solution, because as General Brown points out, as the
    Chief of the Air Force, he doesn't have organize, train, and
    equip responsibilities for space missions, yet he has those
    space capabilities in the Air National Guard.
        It creates a little bit of a conundrum when I am trying to
    figure out how to train forces that are aligned under the Air
    National Guard. I think the status quo is the most untenable
    position, but there are other options, and we are going through
    a series of cost estimates to figure out what a preferred
    option might be.
        Senator King. Is one of them simply to sort of partner with
    the Air National Guard and have different units, have different
    functions? Is that one of the possibilities, rather than set up
    an entirely new Space National Guard structure?
        General Saltzman. Well, we are currently partnered with the
    current status, so we are currently partnered to make sure we
    can rely on the capabilities that are in the Air National
    Guard. It just creates a long-term sustainment problem with the
    difference in organize, train, equip responsibilities between
    the Air Force and the Space Force.
        Senator King. Let me back up a minute again on recruiting.
    How are you doing on recruiting, both in terms of quality and
    quantity? Some of our other services are having real problems
    with recruiting in this economy. How is Space Force doing?
        General Saltzman. I am almost embarrassed in front of my
    peers to say it, but we are doing very well. Mostly associated
    with the fact that we have much smaller numbers to recruit and
    we have the ability to hand-pick those that decide they want to
    join the Space Force.
        Right now, we are doing okay. The problem is going to be
    sustainment over time and the quality of the applicants that we
    can pull in, and then retaining them for long enough to really
    benefit from their experience.
        Senator King. Turning to, you mentioned several times in
    your testimony, commercial assets, commercial space assets. We
    know that Russia is trying to jam or otherwise damage the
    Starlink network, which is assisting in Ukraine.
        Is that precedent making it more difficult to partner with
    commercial satellite users? One of the strategies is
    proliferation and using commercial satellites. What has been
    the reaction to what has been going on with Starlink in
    Ukraine?
        General Saltzman. Commercial augmentation is important for
    the Space Force for the reasons you mentioned, resiliency and
    diversification of our portfolio across a broader number of
    participants, if you will.
        The commercial augmentation Space Reserve, we are trying to
    establish what is kind of like a craft like. If you know, the
    civilian Reserve air fleet that uses commercial capabilities.
    We are exploring options to use something along those lines.
        I think the key with commercial industry is to make sure
    that the expectations are managed upfront. So, we are going
    through a series of plans.
        We are going through a series of industry days, if you
    will, to clarify what are the policy, what are the contractual,
    what are the legal responsibilities and hurdles that we have to
    clear in order to establish this so the expectations are clear
    across all spectrums of conflict, crisis, et cetera.
        Senator King. So, this is an evolving kind of capability?
        General Saltzman. It is. But I will tell you that we had
    significant interest. We hosted an industry day along these
    lines and there were 84 participants from commercial industry.
    So, there is interest in doing this.
        Senator King. Now, in my 45 seconds that is left, I am
    going to ask you a question that I get asked at home. What is
    the difference between Space Force and Space Command?
        General Saltzman. I get asked that at home, too, sometimes,
    so I appreciate it. It is as simple as any of the Combatant
    Commands with the other services. If you were to think about
    U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Air Force, or Indo-Pacific
    Command and the U.S. Navy.
        For the U.S. Space Command and U.S. Space Force, we simply
    have different responsibilities. As the Chief of the Space
    Force, I have responsibility to organize, train, equip, and
    operate the forces that are then presented to U.S. Space
    Command, who has the authority from the President and the
    Secretary of Defense to direct those operations.
        Senator King. So, you are organize, train, and equip. Space
    Command is operate or fight.
        General Saltzman. They have the authority from the
    President to conduct those missions, and they would direct our
    forces that are presented to them to conduct the operations.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, General. Senator
    Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, as we
    discussed last year, the NextGen OPIR [overhead persistent
    infrared] satellite program is one of the key components of our
    future missile warning architecture, along with proliferated
    constellations of smaller satellites operating in the lower
    orbits.
        During your nomination hearing, you stated that having no
    gaps in coverage for missile warning was a high priority. The
    missile warning mission is the cornerstone of our strategic
    deterrent. You know, if we can't effectively respond--if we
    can't detect when our adversaries are launching nuclear
    weapons, we are in trouble.
        So, it is very important that we continue to fund this
    NextGen OPIR. Given really the importance of this no fail
    mission, I am concerned to see that the Space Force's fiscal
    year 2024 budget request appears to propose cutting the third
    GEO NextGen OPIR satellite.
        Does the Space Force intend to complete that architecture
    as planned? If not, how are you going to mitigate it? That is a
    huge loss.
        General Saltzman. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. The real
    architecture that we need is the one that is survivable in a
    contested domain. That is the proliferated LEO [low Earth
    orbit] and multiple orbits to include middle Earth orbits as
    well.
        So that is what the Space Development Agency and the SWAC
    analysis that we did is progressing toward, and that is the
    investment we made in fiscal year 2024, to make that pivot.
    Because that is a pretty big technical shift, we wanted to make
    sure that we, for this no fail mission, had some hedges to make
    sure that we didn't miss anything.
        So NextGen OPIR, we are committed to putting that on orbit
    and we felt like a two by two was sufficient to ensure, one,
    that the mission did not have any gaps. It is a no fail
    mission. Two, that it was a hedge against any technical risk
    associated with the pivot to the more survivable missile
    warning, missile track architecture.
        Senator Fischer. So, you are saying that with this pivot to
    the two lower orbits, you have no plans then to look at the GEO
    now?
        General Saltzman. We have the plans with NextGen OPIR for
    two GEO and two EO. That constellation we are still supporting
    in that fiscal year 2024 budget has those four satellites in
    it. That is the long-term transition to the proliferated
    missile warning. But GEO satellites are too much of a target.
        So having them in low earth and middle Earth orbit creates
    a targeting problem for an adversary, which actually lowers the
    threshold for attack on orbit. It is more resilient and it
    creates a level of deterrence because they can't attack the
    satellites.
        Senator Fischer. Good. It seems like on the major
    acquisition programs that are executed by Space Force have been
    late. They have cost overruns or both. Does the Space Force
    acquisition community--I guess I would say to you, how do you
    plan to address that, and do you agree with my assessment?
        General Saltzman. Well, I have been in this business a long
    time, so I have certainly seen the same things that you are
    noting there. I can't argue with the facts about cost overruns
    and schedules. What I will say is I have been very impressed
    with the way Frank Calvelli has reorganized how we are doing
    space acquisition.
        With his appointment as the Assistant Secretary of the Air
    Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, he is focused on
    several different things. Buying small satellites, having
    shorter term contracts, going with well-developed technology so
    that we don't have as many nonrecurring engineering costs,
    and----
        Senator Fischer. When you say, I am sorry to interrupt you,
    but when you say well developed technology, you want to make
    sure things are proven? Would you say you are risk adverse
    then?
        General Saltzman. I would say we want to make sure before
    we commit to putting something on orbit, if there is well-
    developed technology, we want to leverage it to the max extent.
    Otherwise, you have to build everything from scratch and it
    delays things, and there is requirement shifts, and it can get
    in that spiral where you spend more money and delay the
    timelines.
        So, where there are well-developed technologies, we should
    take advantage of those. I think in satellite production, that
    is exactly where Mr. Calvelli's head is on that. While, again,
    I can't speak to all the programs that have existed since we
    have been putting satellites on orbit, I can certainly tell you
    that the acquisition community has shifted to a different
    mindset for how it acquires systems.
        I think the space development agencies acquisition strategy
    for the missile warning, missile tracking, and space data
    transport layer is an example where it is going, in about 4
    years, from order to orbit. Which is substantially better than
    we have seen in other programs.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Senator King. Now I would like to call on our only
    Subcommittee Member who has been in space, Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had a couple
    detailed questions, and then the Chairman asked both of them,
    so I am going to go a little bit different approach here.
        To the Ranking Member's question, you talked about that
    there is a little bit of a deterrent by putting something at a
    lower orbit, I think you said. Why is that? Why is it more
    likely that an adversary goes after something at GEO than it is
    if they are at a lower orbit?
        General Saltzman. If this sounds at all like I am lecturing
    an astronaut, I promise I am not. It is more than just the
    orbital regime. In low-Earth orbit to provide the coverage, you
    have to have a vastly greater number of satellites, dozens.
        Instead of from GEO, you can have a single orbit that would
    look at a third of the Earth. So, by going to the low earth
    orbit, we are buying smaller satellites and more of them.
        Senator Kelly. Oh, okay. It is the number.
        General Saltzman. More satellites create a targeting
    problem. Which one do you want to shoot down that you think is
    going to be the problem for the mission?
        Senator Kelly. Yes, it is just more targets.
        General Saltzman. Proliferated LEO.
        Senator Kelly. So more--they have got to shoot more rounds.
        General Saltzman. A lot more.
        Senator Kelly. To take out the capability.
        General Saltzman. So much more that I think the escalatory
    threshold is raised to the point where they probably wouldn't.
        Senator Kelly. Wouldn't do it, okay. okay, that is helpful.
    General, of the NRO, Air Force, Space Force satellites that we
    put into orbit, what percentage of those is Space Force
    responsible for the contracting, of the management, of the
    operations to get these to their targeted orbit?
        General Saltzman. Compared to the NRO?
        Senator Kelly. Yes, like, what percentage do you have?
        General Saltzman. Sir, let me get back to you with----
        Senator Kelly. But the NRO----
        General Saltzman. The NRO has a number of constellations
    for its mission set. I am trying to think if there are any
    examples. We have the vast majority of Department of Defense
    satellites, have now migrated those missions.
        Senator Kelly. But not all of the Department of Defense
    satellites.
        General Saltzman. I always hesitate to say all, but I am
    struggling to think of an example.
        Senator Kelly. How many launch providers do you have that
    you contract with currently to get those satellites into orbit?
        General Saltzman. Two.
        Senator Kelly. Those are?
        General Saltzman. United Launch Alliance (ULA) and SpaceX,
    and actually, for demos and other things, we have contracted
    other providers as well. I can get you the full----
        Senator Kelly. It is to date, while you have been involved
    with this, are we seeing typical kind of success rates and
    safety records from both companies?
        General Saltzman. Absolutely.
        Senator Kelly. No identifiable problems that you feel puts
    our satellites at risk?
        General Saltzman. No.
        Senator Kelly. I mean, it has been a while since we have
    had an accident. I mean, I saw one a long time ago. An NRO
    satellite actually that happened to be down at the Kennedy
    Space Center. I watched this thing blow up right after liftoff.
        General Saltzman. I was on console----
        Senator Kelly. When that happened?
        General Saltzman.--in California.
        Senator Kelly. Yes, I had just walked out of crew quarters,
    saw this, wasn't even expecting it, saw this rocket launch and
    then explode about 15 seconds later.
        General Saltzman. Something I never want to see.
        Senator Kelly. Yes. So, it is great that we have gotten
    better at this. SpaceX has a, I would say a pretty remarkable
    record of success. ULA as well. We just need to keep that
    going.
        I think it is important to be just constantly trying to
    look ahead and seeing what that next failure mode is and make
    sure you have the workforce that is really tracking this stuff
    closely.
        Because some of these assets are in the billions, billions
    of dollars, as you know, General. So, I have got another
    question. Well, actually I do have about 50 seconds. Space
    Force has been around now for a couple of years. I think maybe
    3 years, is that right?
        General Saltzman. A little over 3 years.
        Senator Kelly. A little over 3 years, and some of the
    guardians incurred about a 2-year commitment when they
    transferred from the Air Force or from another service. They
    are coming up on the end of that time. Are you seeing a good
    re-enlistment rate for the enlisted ranks and officers that are
    going to stay on?
        General Saltzman. Yes, I think the final assessment is
    still out a little bit because I want to see it all play out,
    the full cycle play out before I really commit to this, but I
    am encouraged so far. I think we are providing the kind of
    challenges that the workforce is looking for, and so I am I am
    still hopeful that we are going to be at good retention
    numbers. But we probably need to let this full summer cycle
    play out before we judge.
        Senator Kelly. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know you
    have been in your position now what, less than a year, right?
        General Saltzman. Four months, Senator.
        Senator Tuberville. Four months. Give us your number one
    priority for Space Force.
        General Saltzman. I need to make sure that the guardians
    are ready to meet the threat. I have said this from day one,
    the systems that we are buying are exquisite. I want to make
    sure that the guardians have the training and the ability to
    practice their tradecraft, reps and sets, I call it. We have
    got to get those into the guardians so that they validate their
    tactics and they are trained to meet any adversarial challenges
    thrown at them.
        Senator Tuberville. So, it is more training and people than
    it is anything.
        General Saltzman. There is a lot of challenges. That is
    what I am focused on right now, because I think it was the
    biggest gap. From converting--I like to use the example that we
    are trying to turn a merchant marine into the U.S. Navy. We
    have to convert this Space Force that we had for a benign
    environment into one that is contesting the domain.
        Senator Tuberville. Is this a slow process?
        General Saltzman. Sometimes it is slower than I would like,
    but I like our progress. So, I need to buy them the simulators,
    the virtual ranges. That takes a little bit of time. But we are
    already building a new first-generation model so that we have
    established the time to do the training, we have established
    the new training requirements, and now we just have to get
    after it.
        Senator Tuberville. SPACECOM has an RDT&E [Research,
    Development, Test & Evaluation] budget of $19.2 billion, and a
    proposed procurement budget of only $4.7 billion. What is
    driving that difference, and do you see that change in the next
    few years?
        General Saltzman. Sir, this is the way that Space Force has
    to do its business, because so much of our effort is spent in
    developing the satellites and we don't have to put a lot of
    satellites on orbit traditionally, so there is less procurement
    than there is RDT&E.
        I think it is just the nature of the space business that we
    are frontloaded a little bit in terms of procurement to RDT&E
    balance relative to what you might see in some of the other
    services. They buy so many versions of that thing that they do
    RDT&E for, fighters, or tanks, or the like.
        Even when we go to a proliferated constellation, our
    numbers will be so much smaller than what the other services
    have to buy.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. In your mind, what cybersecurity
    standards minimum do you think new commercial satellites should
    have?
        General Saltzman. I am worried about the ground
    infrastructure and how the links are protected to make sure
    that we have access to those capabilities that are put on
    orbit. So, in commercial terms, I am a little less worried
    about the on orbit cyber protections as much as I am the ground
    network.
        I think those cyber protection centers are well understood
    and we can hold the commercial providers accountable for
    putting cyber defense capabilities onto the ground networks.
        Senator Tuberville. I have had several private companies
    come by my office saying they have a great idea of how to take
    space debris down. Have you talked to quite a few of those?
        General Saltzman. I have.
        Senator Tuberville. What do you think?
        General Saltzman. I think----
        Senator Tuberville. Will we privatize it at the end of the
    day?
        General Saltzman. I think there is a lot of different ways
    to go after that sort of problem. I haven't seen demonstrated
    capabilities, and I am always thinking in terms of, you know,
    it is one thing to have a pitch that says we can do something,
    it is another to have a demonstrated capability.
        I will be honest, we do a lot of serious effort making sure
    we understand what is on orbit and preventing debris from
    hitting each other or things that we care about. Right now, I
    would say this isn't my number one challenge, but if somebody
    feels like they can demonstrate a capability, cleaning up
    debris is an important concept as well.
        Senator Tuberville. It is going to get worse and worse,
    right.
        General Saltzman. It is not going to clean itself up.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. A lot of people believe the
    conflict with China could very well start in space. What might
    that look like 1 day?
        General Saltzman. The Chinese and the Russians have gone to
    school on us over the last 20 years, and they know that we have
    built a Joint Force structure that relies heavily on the
    assumption that space capabilities will be there.
        Whether it is our precision navigation and timing, whether
    it is satellite communications, the missile warning that we
    rely on, and the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    persistence that we have with space capabilities, they know we
    rely on that.
        If they can blind us, if they can interfere with those
    capabilities or, God forbid, destroy them completely, they know
    that that will diminish our advantages and put the Joint Force
    at risk.
        I can see interfering with. I can see blinding. I can see
    some of those gray area kinds of attacks on our capabilities to
    try to put us behind the eight ball.
        Senator Tuberville. That balloon wasn't in your purview,
    was it?
        General Saltzman. No, sir.
        Senator Tuberville. Sixty thousand feet.
        General Saltzman. Well, they call it near space, but I like
    to call it far air.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
        Senator King. Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman King, and Ranking
    Member Fischer. Good to be here today and to holding this
    hearing. General Saltzman, thank you so much for everything you
    are doing.
        I know everyone has been talking about workforce is key. We
    need a pipeline of qualified individuals going forward. You are
    just young, 3 years old, trying to get this workforce and
    especially, like you said, research and development, critical
    to protect our country and our families from the threat we feel
    from space.
        So, STEM education, I talk about an awful lot, but I really
    believe that investing in STEM education is just essential to
    matching our adversaries' increasing capabilities, as you
    alluded to, and also to addressing all of our tech workforce
    shortages.
        General Saltzman, during your confirmation hearing in
    September, you highlighted that Space Force has established a
    university partnership program, partnering with universities
    across the country to provide STEM students with research
    opportunities and increased Guardian retention.
        How is Space Force growth and retention benefited from this
    program? I am really excited to hear about that, and what can
    Congress, what can we do better to support this program
    specifically and maybe some national security focused STEM
    education initiatives at American universities generally?
        General Saltzman. Well, thank you for that, because any
    opportunity I get to talk about how great our guardians are, I
    will take full advantage of it. You would be really impressed
    with the quality of the people that are joining the Space
    Force.
        The average age of our enlisted members is 22. That is a
    relatively high number considering other services. We have an
    educated workforce, very educated. We have the luxury of
    handpicking the best and brightest of a large applicant pool
    that wants to join the Space Force.
        We are really benefiting, one, from the fact that we are
    kind of small and we can take the cream of the crop, if you
    will. We are looking for diversity. We are looking for high
    quality STEM education, and going to the areas that maybe you
    don't have a chance to get to in some of the other services.
        A remarkable set of opportunities that we have taken full
    advantage of. Every time I go out in the field, I am just
    impressed with the quality and capabilities of the guardians
    that I see doing the job.
        Senator Rosen. So, we should help expand these programs to
    make it a little--make your job a little better.
        General Saltzman. Well, as long as you expand the number of
    people that help me select. I think there were 42,000 hits of
    interest to join the Space Force, and we have about 1,000
    slots.
        So, culling that down to who is eligible, who can meet the
    requirements, and, you know, there is a lot of effort there,
    too. So, I am really happy with the way the recruiting team has
    done. I am really happy with the standards that we have set. I
    am really happy with the quality of guardians we are getting
    in.
        Senator Rosen. That is great because as a Senator
    Tuberville talked about, cyber-attacks in space. It is a war
    fighting domain and cyber is really, probably more effective
    there or as effective there as it would be anywhere else.
        Last week, we discussed with General Dickinson during Space
    Command's Posture hearing that both Russia and China are
    developing, rapidly investing in developing and fielding these
    technologies that will provide timing--that will threaten us,
    and so we need to be sure that we are stopping that.
        So, these sophisticated cyber-attacks are going to include
    the threat of stealing data, jamming satellite signals, hacking
    satellites, disrupting internet services. I know the
    proliferation concept is really good because there is just so
    many, it makes it not worth their while. So that resilient
    space architecture, particularly in low-Earth orbit, as you
    have alluded to, is really important.
        What other kinds of things besides what you mentioned to
    Senator Kelly and Senator Tuberville, how are you keeping our
    most advanced space assets safe from cyber-attack by Russia,
    China, and others, and increasing their resiliency?
        General Saltzman. I would like to talk about two particular
    areas that we are doing. First is I want to avoid operational
    surprise. That is a tenant in my maybe theory of success, if
    you will, for the Space Force's primary missions.
        By avoiding operational surprises, what I mean is do we
    have all the sensors in all the right places to see what is
    going on, and that is cyber and space. Do we recognize hostile
    activities, aggressive activities, irresponsible activities the
    minute they occur? Can we attribute them to the bad actors?
        That is the kind of avoidance of operational surprises that
    I am talking about. Then second, we have to establish norms of
    responsible behavior. What are the norms of behavior that are
    acceptable, and developing a coalition of like-minded space
    nations that supports those norms of behavior.
        It is a powerful motivator to do the right things and call
    out irresponsible behavior. All of that, I think, protects our
    capabilities as well.
        Senator Rosen. Well, that is great. I know my time is up,
    but my next question was on international partnerships and how
    this potentiates that. We will take it off the record, these
    hunt forward operations to avoid operational surprise with our
    allies and partners around the globe. We will submit that for
    the record, but you were leading me right there. So, thank you
    very much. I yield back.
        Senator King. General, as one Member of this Subcommittee
    who probably had more than--more to do with the founding of the
    Space Force early and vocal supporter, and that is Senator
    Cramer. Senator Cramer.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member,
    and General, good to see you again. I don't think you were
    lecturing Senator Kelly at all. He asked you the easiest
    question he could, and you answered it brilliantly.
        I think the issue of redundancy as a tool, it should answer
    Senator Rosen's question in terms of how you secure them, as
    well as how well they work as a kill web, if you will, versus a
    kill chain. So, I thought it was brilliant. I also think you
    are too humble.
        You brag about the Guardians. But let's face it, you seem
    to be the employer of choice in the service. You have that
    luxury, and it is because I think of the mission. I think
    because it is an important mission that particularly younger
    people realize and they are attracted to it and it gets to
    stretch them.
        My hope is that the Space Force is so cool, it just
    automatically creates more STEM students because they all want
    to be part of the next big thing. Senator Fischer asked you
    about the gap issue with regard to eyes in the sky and whatnot,
    and we did see a little bit of a gap in defense when we learned
    that our radars couldn't see everything. They could only see
    what they were tuned to see. In terms of like PARCS radar as an
    example, and we see some money coming for that. I would presume
    that means that it will be upgraded, it will be modernized.
        As you know, it is a high priority for me since we have one
    that you are the landlord of up in North Dakota. Maybe speak a
    little bit to the role of the PARCS radar and modernization,
    and how that will help you and the other, the Joint Force in
    terms of particularly early warning.
        General Saltzman. Well, it is a two-part answer because I
    don't want to be too distracted by the balloon issue because
    that is not where those radars are looking. It is, you could
    easily build radars that would look in that area, but that is
    not our mission.
        The mission that is being done in North Dakota and the
    other ground-based radars is two fold. It is missile warning
    and it is space surveillance, primarily, and those radars are
    really good at those jobs.
        So, the real challenge is, how do I go to a rapid
    assessment and decision quality information of the data that
    those radars are pulling in? That is my responsibility, is to
    figure out how to take all that massive amount of data in and
    quickly turn it into decisionmaking information.
        We have got some work to do there, but it is more
    associated with the latency of the data than--you know, I can
    tell you where something was, but I can't tell you where it is
    precisely at that moment, and we are getting better and better
    at that.
        Senator Cramer. With regard to some of things, the issues
    that we have already talked about. The partnerships that you
    started out talking about, that Senator Rosen asked about,
    academic partnerships, alliances, obviously commercial
    partnerships, one of the things when we stood up the Space
    Force and we had this discussion many times, and your
    predecessor certainly grabbed on to it. That is, make sure it
    is lean, agile, fast, right?
        How many times did you hear General--say lean, agile, fast.
    Do you feel like you are still lean, agile and fast? Does the
    budget help you be more lean, agile, and fast? I don't mean
    cheap. I mean lean, agile, and fast.
        Again, those relationships are so important. How valuable
    is that and difficult is that balance to make sure you maintain
    those characteristics?
        General Saltzman. Well, there is no question we are still
    lean, and there is no question we are going as fast as we can.
    That is a tough standard for me to say we are fast. I am always
    looking to go faster, I am always looking to be more agile.
        So, I am going to be probably our toughest critic going
    forward, trying to ensure that we stay as fast as possible.
    Being small does offer some advantages. We can move rapidly
    through a smaller bureaucracy than maybe some of the other
    organizations can. But it also comes with, you know, that means
    there is fewer eyes on ideas.
        That means there is fewer opportunities to catch mistakes.
    That means there is fewer opportunities. So, we have got to
    have good, solid processes. We have to have good, innovative
    technology that supports us.
        There is no question we are still lean and now we are
    trying to become optimized based on that size to make sure that
    we are still producing high quality capabilities for a high-
    quality workforce.
        Senator Cramer. Well, that is a great point because the
    bureaucracy can gobble you up and slow you down as well. We
    like oversight. We are all about that. But we want you to be as
    agile as you need to be to keep up with, well at the speed of
    China, as I like to say, which is really important.
        One last thing, just, I just want to make sure that you are
    getting the type of the right policies that don't restrict your
    offensive abilities. We have heard a lot about that. You have
    spoken to it at some points.
        Again, whether it is the budget, or the Administration or
    chain of command, do you feel like you have the right policies
    in place to both protect and in attack, if necessary?
        General Saltzman. I can assure you there are no policies
    that prevent us from exploring a full spectrum of operations.
    It is just about doing the work, establishing the, what I would
    call understanding of what the capabilities can and can't do.
    Then we test and we learn from our experiences.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you. Well done. Thank you.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Your lean, agile,
    fast reminds me of my high school football coach who said he
    wanted us to be mobile, agile, and hostile.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. I am not going to go into our record, but our
    team motto was we are small, but we are slow. That was our
    problem. Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your budget
    request this year includes a goal of increasing the number of
    Space Force launches.
        As you look to maintain and modernize launch ranges and
    facilities in support of our space launch needs, can you speak
    to how the ability to leverage commercial funding sources to
    grow space, transportation, infrastructure, and service
    capacity would impact the Space Force's space launch efforts?
        General Saltzman. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. As we have talked
    before, we have grown our capacity on our national launch
    ranges, national space launch ranges from what I remember to be
    10, 12 launches to, we are going to hit getting close to 100
    launches a year now.
        Most of that is commercial launches, and so, the
    infrastructure that we are providing is being used and it needs
    to be refurbished on a more regular basis than it did what I
    would call the old days. So, I think the commercial industry
    understands this and they are trying to figure out the best
    ways to help support.
        Now we just have to look for the contractual and legal
    mechanisms to make sure that we can maintain that
    infrastructure. Our investments in the range of the future
    start us down that path, but we have still got a lot of work to
    do over the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], I think, to
    make sure we maintain the kind of infrastructure we need to
    support the commercial industry.
        Senator Gillibrand. As you have said, your mission is very
    technical. Ensuring guardians are properly trained and able to
    execute their missions requires access to advanced ranges. Do
    you currently have the training resources you need to provide
    fully trained guardians to combatant commanders? Are any
    additional resources required to ensure we have a Space Force
    fully capable of operating in the space domain?
        General Saltzman. The fiscal year 2024 budget submission
    includes about $340 million dedicated to operational tests and
    training infrastructure. I think that is sufficient for this
    year because we have got a lot of study to do to make sure we
    are building the right kind of ranges, the right kind of
    simulators, and we are learning as we go a little bit. So, I am
    really comfortable with the level of investment we are at this
    year for fiscal year 2024.
        Senator Gillibrand. Last week, you spoke about the concept
    of competitive endurance. From reporting, it appears to center
    on space domain awareness, resilience to deter attack, and
    responsible counter space activities. Can you speak to how the
    Space Force's budget proposal will help to achieve competitive
    endurance through each of these three core tenants?
        General Saltzman. For avoiding operational surprise, that
    is the Space Domain awareness tenant. We are investing heavily
    in new sensors. We are investing in capabilities with our
    allies and partners to also increase the dataset associated
    with space domain awareness.
        Perhaps most importantly, we are investing in space command
    and control capabilities, which is kind of military talk for
    how do you take that data in and rapidly turn it into
    operational decisions.
        I think we have good software investments to make sure that
    we are doing the decision support tools that go with that space
    domain awareness, and--go ahead----
        Senator Gillibrand. Go ahead and finish.
        General Saltzman. Well, the resiliency piece is also
    important. This budget definitely invests in shifting to a more
    resilient space architecture. We have started that pivot now in
    earnest.
        Senator Gillibrand. So, looking on your documents, you have
    this contested space document about what China is doing. The
    PRC [People's Republic of China] has developed counterspace and
    anti-satellite weapons, including demonstrations of anti-
    satellite missiles, which you say are launching orbit to
    ground, and the ability to move a defunct satellite. Can you
    speak to our ability to defend against these counterspace
    assets and exercise space superiority?
        General Saltzman. The transition to a proliferated LEO
    missile warning, missile tracking architecture includes the
    capacity to find, fix, and track hypersonic capabilities. So
    that is why that is such an important transition that we are
    making.
        With regards to grappling satellites and pulling them out
    of orbit, much tougher to deal with when you have less than
    maneuverable, older legacy satellites. So again, shifting to a
    proliferated LEO constellation where you don't have the, what
    General Hayden called the big, juicy target sitting there at
    GEO makes that a much tougher proposition for them to execute
    against.
        Senator Gillibrand. That makes sense. What lessons are you
    learning from the war in Ukraine about the role of the space
    domain in large scale military operations?
        General Saltzman. Well, the most important observation is
    that space is critical to modern warfare. We have seen the
    Russians attack satellite communications. We have seen cyber-
    attacks trying to dismantle.
        We have seen GPS [global positioning system] jamming. They
    recognize that space is a force multiplier and they are willing
    to attack it. The fact that we have to defend against cyber-
    attacks on the ground networks reminds us that ground is also a
    part of space and that those networks are critical assets.
        But I think we are also seeing the power of commercial
    augmentation, that there is a viable path for commercial
    augmentation to provide capabilities. Then I have been kind of
    harping on it through the testimony here, but proliferated LEO.
        That is what we are seeing used to support Ukraine, and it
    is turning out to be a much tougher target for the Russians to
    take apart.
        Senator Gillibrand. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank
    you, Madam Ranking Member.
        Senator King. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you
    for your service. There have been efforts, General, driven by
    political decisions regarding the shared use of the 3.1 through
    3.45 gigahertz or S-band portions of the spectrum. Can you
    confirm that you have systems critical to our national security
    that reside on this portion of the spectrum?
        General Saltzman. Yes, Senator, we have a space
    surveillance radar that is currently in development that does
    occupy that portion of the spectrum.
        Senator Rounds. Would it be not just radar, but perhaps
    communications that are in that portion as well?
        General Saltzman. As it turns out, I think the key
    emergency kinds of communications live just outside of that
    band. So as long as we manage very narrowly that strip, we
    would avoid those particularly.
        Senator Rounds. Okay, so it is primarily radar.
        General Saltzman. It is primarily radar for that for the
    Space Force.
        Senator Rounds. Okay. So, the communications portion is not
    part?
        General Saltzman. Well, I wouldn't want to talk to the
    other services' capabilities. So, from a Space Force
    perspective.
        Senator Rounds. Okay, thank you. Can you provide your
    professional military advice on how detrimental that would be
    to your mission and the security of our Nation if you lost the
    use of this portion of the spectrum?
        General Saltzman. I think the most important thing I can
    say is I am not exactly sure, because we haven't done the
    technical analysis of exactly what vacating or sharing any of
    that spectrum would look like in terms of cost and technical
    performance.
        But we do have a study ongoing, and so we would hope that
    any legislative decisions or decisions along these lines would
    wait for that study to come out later this fall so that we
    could make the decision with data informed analysis.
        Senator Rounds. Have you been given the opportunity to
    provide your professional military advice on the DOD's use of
    this portion of the spectrum?
        General Saltzman. Yes.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. I presume you have expressed
    your concern with regard to the sale prior to the September
    study being completed.
        General Saltzman. I have described my concern is not
    knowing exactly what the impacts will be until I receive that
    study.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. I would also like to go on
    record saying that I am concerned about the DOD's approach to
    providing space-based ground moving target indication
    capabilities, the GBMTI, to warfighters following the
    divestment of the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack
    Radar System] platform.
        It is my understanding that this capability is being moved
    under the funding authorities of the intelligence community. We
    do not have really to get into the fine details here. But can
    you share with me how you are assuming that the validated
    requirements are captured in the acquisitions process of a
    platform owned by the IC [intelligence community]?
        General Saltzman. Because of the way the funding is has
    been moved, we are focusing on two areas where we think we can
    provide some detailed level of collaboration. The first is in
    milestone decision authority, which still there are some
    decisions which reside at the OSD level and could be delegated
    to Secretary Calvelli.
        We are looking into what those options are, what the
    possibilities might be. That is for program management
    acquisition purposes. The other side is the operational
    concepts. This is still a DOD mission, the Space Force mission,
    to do this for the Joint Force.
        We have the responsibility to provide the operational
    concept for how this would work, and we will have to work
    closely with the program managers and sensor developers to make
    that happen.
        Senator Rounds. Yes. With JSTARS, the tactical capabilities
    to track these moving targets was available to our soldiers on
    the ground. We just want to make sure that that same capability
    is still found in a space-based system. That is what we are
    really talking about here, isn't it?
        General Saltzman. Yes, sir, and the beauty of the sensors
    that are being developed is they are more survivable relative
    to the current threats facing, and we are going to do it at a
    global scale as opposed to a very small AOR [area of
    responsibility], the way the JSTARS----
        Senator Rounds. We just don't want to get lost and this
    needs to be made available for title 10 operations.
        General Saltzman. These are direct operational support
    activities. The mission falls to the Space Force and the
    Department of Defense.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. I understand it that there is a
    legislative proposal in the works to integrate the Reserve
    elements of the Space Force. This seems like a logical move as
    your service matures and embraces its organized train and equip
    roles.
        It is also my understanding that the Space Force is
    residing within the Guard element, still reside within the Air
    National Guard, and is organized, trained, and equipped by the
    Air Force. From your perspective as the Chief of Space
    Operations, what should the Subcommittee consider to provide
    the most seamless oversight of these forces as the Space Force
    matures?
        General Saltzman. First, let me describe the reserve
    integration. I think this is a very important legislative
    proposal that I hope you will give due consideration to. It
    gives us the flexibility to have both part time and full time
    guardians in the Space Force.
        It is going to give incredible career flexibility and
    hopefully serve as an innovative way to retain the kind of
    expertise that we know we are going to need moving forward. I
    think we have done a much better job of capturing kind of the
    key details that are needed in legislation to make that
    proposal work, and I hope that we can continue to work with
    this Committee and others to make that happen.
        From the Guard standpoint, I have been clear from the
    beginning, the critical capabilities that are living in the Air
    National Guard for space are must haves for the Space Force.
    That is the most important thing.
        I don't believe because of the way we organize, train,
    equip authorities, reside with the Chief of Staff of the Air
    Force and my responsibilities, that General Brown feels like he
    can organize, train, and equip space capabilities inside the
    Air National Guard.
        It creates a little bit of a disconnect, and so, the
    current status quo is the toughest to figure out how to do it
    properly. Other than that, I think there might be some options
    that are worth exploring that are based on cost estimates and
    the like.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, and Mr. Chairman, I would just
    like to commend the General. He has taken a very direct and
    strong approach with regard to advocating for our airmen and
    guardians on the subject of the missile community cancer study.
        This is a case of where they are finding cancers in areas
    where these guys that are basically working underground for
    extended periods of time. The General has taken a very direct
    and personal interest in seeing that this be pursued and that
    anybody that is out there, any one of these airmen or
    guardians, that they get help, they find out and they keep
    track of.
        I just want to commend him and I would hope that the
    Committee would make available time for him to be able to share
    with us moving forward just exactly what he has found with
    regard to any health concerns surrounding the cancers that seem
    to be more prevalent with these folks that are working
    underground in these missile silos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Thank you. General, a couple of followup
    questions. Several times you have mentioned the possibility of
    norms, developing international norms. Expand on that. Is that
    a realistic possibility? Will the Chinese and the Russians talk
    about international norms in space?
        General Saltzman. Unfortunately, the norms that they talk
    about are not ones that we would support. They have kind of
    shown a propensity to not support the ones we want to support.
    This is a battle of narratives over international norms.
        What I can tell you is when I talk to my counterparts in
    the other nations, they are interested in this. The Secretary
    of Defense issued his tenants for responsible behavior, and
    U.S. Space Command followed up with even some more details.
        Those are all widely viewed from my peers as helpful in
    establishing what it means in a like-minded set of nations with
    responsible behaviors in space. We have an initiative called
    the Coalition Space Operations Initiative, which is seven
    countries that have also detailed what responsible behaviors in
    space means. Very consistent with the Secretary of Defense's
    tenants.
        I think this is kind of a widespread understanding that we
    have to behave a certain way in order to maintain a safe,
    secure, sustainable space domain. I believe there is widespread
    agreement for that.
        Senator King. Is the State Department engaged in this
    discussion as well?
        General Saltzman. They are.
        Senator King. I think that would be an important aspect of
    moving this forward, very important initiative.
        General Saltzman. They are.
        Senator King. Just a comment. You have mentioned cyber
    protection several times. It seems to be the experience that
    most major cyber-attacks start with a sub, not the general
    contractor, but some small company, the smaller firm that is
    working for a general contractor, and then they get into the
    system.
        I hope that is something, when you are talking about the
    protection of your assets, and very rightfully you have talked
    about ground and space, that you worry as well about those
    small companies that might act as a gateway for a cyber-attack.
        General Saltzman. Yes, sir. I have talked to my cyber
    defenders at length. I am not really a cyber professional
    myself. I don't understand all the technical details. But one
    of the most important things that they start with is mapping
    the cyber terrain.
        In other words, understanding exactly what the network
    looks like, where it might be vulnerable, and how they might
    best censor it to rapidly detect any kind of intrusions. So, to
    your point, understanding how all of the companies fit together
    in the cyber terrain is an important foundational aspect of
    cyber defense.
        Senator King. Final question. Is Space Force in charge of
    defensive--you have talked a lot about proliferated LEO. Are
    you also in charge of developing the capability of maneuver and
    otherwise defending our space assets? Is that part of Space
    Force's mission?
        General Saltzman. I would say it is important that as we
    develop our DOD capabilities through the Space Force, that we
    make sure we are applying all of the right concepts for active
    and passive defense to meet the requirements so that we have a
    survivable architecture on the U.S.'s worst day.
        Senator King. Well, this is a relatively new concern. We
    owned space for a long time, but the Russians and the Chinese
    have been very active in anti-satellite technology, so we need
    to be developing counters to that in order to maintain a
    credible deterrent. Is that correct?
        General Saltzman. Absolutely, and I think it is about how
    fast can we go. Again, my weak analogy is converting the
    Merchant Marine and the U.S. Navy.
        We have got a little bit of a ways to go before we can take
    our legacy platforms that we have got so much utility out of
    and so much capability from but convert them to providing the
    same or better capabilities, while being able to perform in a
    contested domain. We will have to make that transition as
    rapidly as possible.
        Senator King. Thank you. Other questions? Thank you very
    much, General. This has been a very illuminating hearing. I
    appreciate your forthright responses to our question and your
    leadership, and your long career of service to the United
    States. Thank you.
        General Saltzman. Thank you, sir.
        Senator King. Hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:46 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky S. Rosen
                           international partnerships
        1. Senator Rosen. General Saltzman, can you discuss the importance
    of international collaboration when working on critical Space Force
    projects and how we can continue to build on and expand existing
    partnerships?
        General Saltzman. International space security cooperation advances
    our national security strategy, provides political and military
    options, and enables the U.S. to expand all-domain capabilities needed
    for today and for any future fight. My Line of Effort (LOE) #3,
    ``Partnering to Win,'' is critical to the USSF's ability to field
    Combat-ready Forces. The USSF needs robust joint, coalition, and
    international partnerships to be more effective and resilient. Space
    architectures which include the full array of U.S., ally, and partner
    security, civil, and commercial capabilities help protect all of us and
    strengthen integrated deterrence. The Department of the Air Force will
    continue frank conversations with Allies and partners on the pacing
    threat, national strategies, capabilities, and RDT&E efforts to
    buildupon existing partnerships.
        Currently, the Wideband Global Satellite Communications (WGS)
    program enables interoperability with 10 partner nations. The addition
    of WGS satellite vehicle 12 will allow the USSF to seek additional
    partnerships for wideband and protected communications. The Department
    of the Air Force established a new satellite communications framework
    agreement under NATO called the Global Commercially Contracted
    Satellite Communications Support Partnership (GCC SATCOM SP). This new
    agreement allows the U.S. DOD to pool financial resources with key
    Allies and partners to procure commercial satellite communications.

        2. Senator Rosen. General Saltzman, how does the Combined Space
    Operations Vision 2031 initiative influence Space Force priorities and
    objectives?
        General Saltzman. The Combined Space Operations (CSpO) 2031 Vision
    amplifies USSF's own priorities and objectives; providing the USSF
    opportunities to further cultivate enduring operational advantages that
    expand the capacity, capability, and resiliency of our space forces in
    line with the Chief of Space Operations' Lines of Effort (LoEs) #1,
    ``Fielding Combat-Ready Forces,'' and #3, ``Partner to Win.'' USSF
    participation in CSpO Steering Committees, Principal Boards, and
    Working Groups alongside other DOD organizations ensures that we both
    shape CSpO's work and that CSpO's objectives are incorporated back into
    USSF corporate planning and strategy processes. For example, USSF
    continues to incorporate Vision 2031 LOEs, including, ``Develop and
    operate resilient, interoperable architectures to enable space mission
    assurance and unity of effort, through identification of gaps and
    collaborative opportunities,'' and ``Enhance command, control, and
    communications capabilities and other operational linkages among CSPO
    Participants to support unity of effort and the ability to conduct
    combined and synchronized operations throughout the spectrum of
    military operations.'' With CSPO Vision 2031 embedded throughout our
    Service's planning and strategy, guardians at all levels of command and
    across areas of expertise implement specific activities that amplify
    our ability to conduct combined operations that ensure the United
    States remains a leader within the initiative.
                             satellite interference
        3. Senator Rosen. General Saltzman, our Nation continues to
    experience significant growth in commercial space wireless services.
    The number of Low Earth Orbiting (LEO) satellites is expected to rise
    to over 20,000 over the next decade. With this growing number of
    satellites orbiting the Earth, can we expect Space Force to face
    emerging challenges, such as coordination, harmful radio interference,
    and security? How should the U.S. Government increase coordination to
    address these issues?
        General Saltzman. The rapidly increasing number of satellites in
    LEO will require the Space Force and its civil, commercial, and
    international partners to field new capabilities and improve
    coordination to respond to significant new challenges in the space
    domain.
        The USSF currently tracks approximately 47,900 objects in space, a
    16 percent growth in objects from 2021 to 2022. Of those objects 7,100
    are active payloads, a 37 percent increase from 2021 to 2022. Expended
    rocket bodies, inactive satellites and debris further congest the
    environment, and small satellite technology is enabling larger
    constellations. For example, Starlink is projected to have over 12,000
    satellites in its constellation.
        New capabilities are coming online within the current Future Years
    Defense Program (FYDP) to greatly increase our ability to track and
    identify small satellites. These include Deep-space Advanced Radar
    Capability (DARC) (projected full operational capability by 2027),
    Ground-Based Optical Sensor System (GBOSS) (projected full operational
    capability by 2027), and SILENTBARKER (projected full operational
    capability by 2026). In conjunction with the existing space
    surveillance network, including the world's most precise sensor, Space
    Fence, the USSF is prepared to identify, track and maintain custody of
    satellites in space which will enhance security and mitigate harmful
    radio interference.
        The USSF and US Space Command are working with the Dept of
    Commerce/NOAA to implement Space Policy Directive-3 to enable the DoC
    to provide basic space situational awareness and space traffic
    management to ensure a safe and secure environment as commercial,
    civil, and governmental space traffic increases.
                             space launch services
        4. Senator Rosen. General Saltzman, a 2022 study commissioned by
    the U.S. Space Force, the Defense Innovation Unit, and the Air Force
    Research Laboratory states: ``The procurement of space launch for
    national security systems should be expanded to include a broad range
    of space launch services--Diversity of launch options improves the
    resiliency of national security space systems.'' As we look to improve
    both launch capacity and capability, what is the national security
    value expanding the Department of Defense's procurement of space launch
    systems and providers, to include a broad range of space launch
    services?
        General Saltzman. The national security value in expanding DOD's
    procurement of space launch systems and providers is found in the
    improved flexibility, resilience, capacity, and affordability that
    comes with having a greater number of commercial companies able to
    provide both large and small national security space launch services.
        The innovative National Security Space Launch (NSSL) Phase 3 Launch
    Service Procurement Strategy consists of a dual-lane approach that
    fosters competition and maintains assured access to space. NSSL Phase 3
    Lane 1 is for more risk tolerant missions and provides on-ramping
    opportunities for emerging Launch Service Providers (LSPs); providing
    opportunities to grow the NSSL Launch provider industry base. Lane 1
    will award multiple Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ)
    contracts open to qualified bidders. Lane 2 is for our more risk
    adverse National Security Space missions that require full mission
    assurance.
        The Rocket Systems Launch Program (RSLP), the Space Force's small
    launch program established in 1972, complements NSSL to serve the full
    spectrum of orbits and provides flexible access to space for national
    security. RSLP hosts 11 LSPs on its Orbital Services Program-4 IDIQ
    contract for small and medium launches to low earth orbit and provides
    annual on-ramping opportunities for emerging LSPs through 2028. The
    Rapid Agile Launch Initiative (RALI), a Space Test Program
    congressionally funded initiative, is another small launch avenue the
    RSLP supported to procure and launch five RALI missions.
        Finally, the Space Force is evaluating the readiness and utility of
    commercial space mobility and logistics capabilities and developing
    business case approaches to incorporate emerging solutions into space
    system architectures. Specific to improving launch capacity and
    capability, on-orbit logistics and mobility services could potentially
    enable increased launch capacity by allowing satellites to launch
    partially or fully empty, if the satellite is designed to be refueled
    on-orbit. This capability may further open the aperture for new mission
    designs with increased resiliency supported by on-orbit logistics.

      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
             FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2023

                          United States Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND
                 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:49 p.m., in
    room 222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus S. King
    (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Subcommittee Members present: Senators King, Gillibrand,
    Warren, Rosen, Fischer, Rounds, and Cramer.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING

        Senator King. We call today's hearing to order, and I thank
    the witnesses for appearing, as well as their services to our
    Nation. Before we get going, I want to thank Admiral Caldwell,
    the Director of Naval Reactors, who will retire after 42 years
    of service.
        You are only the 7th Director of Naval Reactors, starting
    with Admiral Rickover in 1949. You stand in this fearsome
    giant's shoes upholding his unparalleled tradition of service
    and excellence that is second to none.
        You are responsible for the force projection of our
    aircraft carriers and our submarines, which are the envy of
    every military in the world. In fact, under AUKUS [Australia,
    United Kingdom, United States], we know that they are trying to
    duplicate that capability.
        For any nuclear-powered vessel that is ready for sea
    trials. You are the senior officer that goes to sea with her. I
    want to thank you and your wife, Kim, for your service. Our
    Nation owes you a debt of gratitude that only six other Navy
    officers and their spouses can fully understand.
        Today's hearing has two panels to review the budget request
    for defense nuclear activities in the Department of Energy
    (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DOD). We are undertaking
    our third nuclear modernization.
        The first two in 1960 and 1980, notice they were 20 years
    apart. The third this time some 43 years apart. Unlike the
    other two, we now have not one but two nuclear armed near-peer
    competitors.
        This is an entirely new paradigm in the defense of our
    Nation. Now more than ever, we are relying on modernizing our
    triad to perform the essential deterrence mission under this
    new two near-peer paradigm.
        I expect not only to hear what is going right, now in this
    modernization cycle. Admiral Rickover would expect no less. But
    importantly, I also expect to hear what is not going right and
    how Congress can help.
        Mr. White, you perhaps have the toughest of all jobs with
    the largest backlog of cleanup in the Federal Government from
    Cold War defense activities. Which in 2020 was estimated at a
    cost of $512 billion.
        I will want to know what you are doing to work your way
    through this backlog of clean-up, which is a commitment to the
    communities nearby these sites. After our opening statements
    from each of our witnesses, we will have 5-minute rounds of
    questions.
        Senator Fischer.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEBRA FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    our witnesses for being here today. Admiral, I, too, want to
    thank you for your many, many years of service and commitment
    and dedication to this country. You are an example of a true,
    true patriot and public servant.
        All of you have a solemn responsibility of ensuring that
    our nuclear deterrent remains safe, reliable, and effective.
    Our nuclear deterrent, the weapons themselves, and the delivery
    systems remains the indispensable backbone of United States
    National Security.
        The geopolitical threat environment has significantly
    degraded since 2010, when our current nuclear force and
    modernization plan was determined. We need to consider whether
    the plan remains sufficient to address future threats, and we
    have to rebuild the capability across the nuclear enterprise to
    deliver faster.
        The status quo is not tenable, and I look forward to
    working with you all in the coming months to find creative
    solutions to the significant challenges that we face. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Ms. Hruby.

       STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JILL M. HRUBY, ADMINISTRATOR,
                NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member
    Fischer, Members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to
    present the President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request for the
    Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA).
        Chairman King, a written statement has been provided and I
    respectfully request that it be submitted for the record.
    NNSA's fiscal year 2024 budget request is $23.8 billion, an
    increase of $1.7 billion over the fiscal year 2023 enacted
    level. This budget request responds to today's challenging
    global security environment.
        The Weapons Activities budget request of $18.8 billion
    supports the five ongoing weapon modernization programs and
    continues significant investment in our infrastructure.
    Infrastructure needs are acute at our production plants as we
    continue to refurbish and reestablish capabilities.
        In addition, the request supports two Phase 1 exploratory
    efforts, enhance physical and cyber security, and digital
    assurance of our weapons and enterprise. It also continues
    investment in our stockpile research and advances stockpile
    stewardship. We are actively addressing our biggest challenge
    in weapon activities, the cost and schedule delays, and large
    construction projects.
        Supply chain delays, labor shortages, labor productivity,
    combined with inflationary pressures, have plagued the uranium
    processing facility and the plutonium pit production efforts,
    both at Los Alamos and Savannah River.
        As a result, we are implementing nationwide trade union
    recruiting, incentives for labor, housing, and transportation,
    early starts on long lead procurements, and introduction of new
    project management models.
        The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request is $2.5
    billion, and invest in our nonproliferation, emergency
    response, and counterterrorism programs. We continue important
    work to reduce global nuclear risk, progress international
    partnerships, and advance associated research.
        To be prepared for the future, programs responsive to
    nuclear energy expansion and future arms control verification
    technologies are requested. We remain committed to the Ukraine
    incident response training and information sharing to detect
    and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency.
        Work to assure allies who might be thinking about the need
    for nuclear weapons. We work to assure them that we will be
    with them and we keep our eye on threats from other weapons of
    mass destruction with our bio-assurance program.
        The challenges for NNSA are real but not insurmountable.
    With your continued support, I am confident we will succeed.
    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
        Senator King. Admiral.

        STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES F. CALDWELL JR., USN, DEPUTY
      ADMINISTRATOR FOR NAVAL REACTORS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
                             ADMINISTRATION

        Admiral Caldwell. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
    first off, thank you for your nice remarks. It is an honor to
    serve. Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
    the opportunity to testify today.
        Your consistent support of naval reactors allows my team to
    provide the Navy with unmatched power and capability of nuclear
    propulsion, which provides all of our submarines and all of our
    aircraft carriers the reliability, mobility, and endurance to
    carry out National Security missions around the world.
        Today, nuclear powered warships are operating alongside
    allies and partners on a global scale, providing forward
    presence in a world that is increasingly polarized. We recently
    completed the AUKUS consultation period and have set out on a
    generational change in sharing critical technologies directly
    supporting United States, United Kingdom, and Australia
    trilateral commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
        Naval Reactors' investment in research and development
    (R&D) over decades has enabled the advanced technology that
    gives our fleet a competitive advantage in the maritime
    environment. Now we must step up our research and development
    to sustain and exploit that advantage.
        Our future will be built on a solid foundation of our
    people, our technology, and our facilities. My budget request
    for fiscal year 2024 is for $1.96 billion and invests in each
    of these three key areas and two national priority projects.
    First, my request supports our most important resource, our
    people.
        The talented and dedicated people at our headquarters and
    our field offices are absolutely essential to the strong
    centralized management and oversight of the important work we
    do for the Nation.
        Second, the budget request reflects continued investment in
    research and development to achieve our goals of substantially
    lowering costs, reducing construction timelines, and adding
    fleet capability.
        My request also focuses on investments to modernize our
    critical infrastructure at my Department of Energy laboratories
    where this important work is executed and to reduce our legacy
    environmental liabilities.
        I am also seeking your support for two national priority
    projects. The first is the continued development of the reactor
    plant for the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine,
    directly supporting the Navy's number one acquisition priority.
        The second project is the continued construction of the
    naval spent fuel handling facility in Idaho, which enables long
    term, reliable processing and packaging of spent fuel from the
    Navy's nuclear fleet.
        In closing, your strong and enduring support allows me to
    carry out Naval Reactor's mission of delivering a nuclear-
    powered fleet that is unrivaled around the world. I
    respectfully urge your endorsement of our fiscal year 2024
    budget request, and I thank you for your support.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral James F. Caldwell
    follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Admiral James F. Caldwell
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today and present the President's Fiscal Year 2024 budget for Naval
    Reactors. Your strong support for the work we do ensures our nuclear
    Navy can carry out vital missions around the world with agility and
    endurance.
        This year marks the 75th anniversary of the Naval Nuclear
    Propulsion Program and is the final year of my 8-year tenure as
    Director of Naval Reactors. As I reflect upon the decades of our
    Program's history, one of our core principles that has enabled our
    Program's success is ``challenge what's possible.''
        In 1948 despite having no nuclear-trained submariners, no nuclear
    industrial base, and no nuclear shipyards, the Navy promulgated the
    formal requirement for a nuclear-powered submarine. Just 7 years after
    the creation of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, under the
    leadership of Admiral Hyman Rickover, and with tremendous congressional
    support, Naval Reactors developed an industrial base in a new
    technology, pioneered new materials, designed, built, and operated a
    prototype reactor, established a training program, and took a nuclear-
    powered submarine to sea. In less than 7 more years, Naval Reactors
    designed and built the world's first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier,
    USS Enterprise, forever changing our Nation's power projection.
        Since then, follow-on classes of more capable U.S. nuclear-powered
    submarines and aircraft carriers have ensured our warfighting edge over
    potential adversaries. Congress' strong and enduring support of our
    past efforts has allowed the Navy to maintain our advantages. Your
    partnership with the Navy is needed now, more than ever, as we work on
    current and future endeavors in naval nuclear propulsion that are
    required to improve the capability of our nuclear fleet and protect the
    national security of the United States.
        Today's strategic environment is dynamic and complex, characterized
    by a rapidly changing global balance of military capabilities,
    requiring us to once again challenge what is possible. As stated in the
    National Security Strategy, the world is at an inflection point, and
    how we respond today will impact the security and prosperity of our
    Nation for generations. As I serve in my final year at Naval Reactors,
    I want to ensure that we sustain and build an enduring naval
    warfighting advantage to maintain our dominance of the maritime
    battlespace. Furthermore, we have the opportunity to reinforce our
    strength by building the strongest possible coalition of allies to
    shape the global strategic environment.
        Our Nation took a new step when the President announced the AUKUS
    enhanced tri-lateral security partnership. This historic agreement
    demonstrates U.S. commitment to revitalizing our alliances and
    strengthening them to take on the challenges of the 21st century.
    Furthermore, the AUKUS partnership bolsters existing Navy initiatives
    to strengthen our own shipbuilding capability and build the additional
    industrial and vendor base capacity our Nation and our allies need.
    Given the global threats we face, it is imperative that we ensure our
    closest allies remain highly capable in the undersea domain.
        As stated in the National Security Strategy and the National
    Defense Strategy, it is vital for the Navy to maintain and expand our
    competitive advantage by aggressively investing in emerging
    technologies. The principal strategic issues driving the need for
    technological advancement are the growing threats from China and
    Russia. China is rapidly advancing and establishing a global naval
    presence with the purpose of projecting power and challenging U.S.
    maritime superiority. Meanwhile, Russia poses an immediate threat to
    the free and open international systems, relying on coercive or unfair
    practices to gain an edge over the United States and our allies. To
    properly defend against these threats, increased numbers of nuclear-
    powered submarines and improved capabilities for our submarines and
    aircraft carriers will be required. To enable Navy efforts targeted to
    combat these threats, Naval Reactors needs to develop and insert
    technologies that will provide increased power and energy to support
    increased speed, reduced noise signatures, and enhanced warfighting
    capabilities. Additionally, our efforts are focused on identifying
    technologies and processes that can substantially reduce the build-span
    times and costs of these platforms to meet Navy needs.
        Naval Reactors' historical investment in advanced technologies has
    given the Nation an enviable position in the maritime environment;
    however, further investments today are necessary. Our ships need to
    retain their advantage against future threats across multiple domains,
    but must also be affordable. Designing and building our propulsion
    plants for improved operational capability and availability through
    lifecycle maintenance enhancements and improved performance will ensure
    the Navy stays ahead of increasing demands while continuing to deliver
    the most capable, cost effective future force. Our success in the
    future will rest on the foundation of what we build today while we
    continue to challenge what's possible.
                            naval reactors overview
        Naval Reactors' budget request for fiscal year 2024 is $1.96
    billion. This committee's support has enabled the safe operation of the
    nuclear fleet, substantial progress on our key projects, and our
    continued oversight and regulation of all areas across the Naval
    Nuclear Propulsion Program. Your past support has allowed significant
    progress on our three major Department of Energy funded projects--
    Columbia-class propulsion plant development and production, the
    refueling overhaul of our research and training reactor in New York,
    and the construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility in
    Idaho. When I first arrived at Naval Reactors in 2015, these three
    projects had not yet hit their peak funding. Over the course of the
    past several years we have reached a point where I can highlight
    substantial progress of the first Columbia-class propulsion plant in
    support of lead ship construction. In addition, the refueling overhaul
    of our research and training reactor will complete later this year. The
    Program also continues to make significant progress amid numerous
    challenges during construction of the incredibly important Naval Spent
    Fuel Handling Facility. While we are staying focused on completing
    these efforts, we cannot simply rest on prior success as we continue to
    develop and pursue innovative technologies.
                                 major projects
    Columbia-class Propulsion Plant
        The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine remains the Navy's
    number one acquisition priority. Naval Reactors is delivering the life-
    of-ship reactor core and the electric drive propulsion system for the
    Columbia-class. To date, multiple lead ship reactor plant components
    have been delivered, and the reactor core is on track to support lead
    ship delivery in 2027. The fiscal year 2024 budget includes $52.9
    million to continue reactor plant design, fabrication, and safety
    analysis work required for lead ship reactor testing. Additionally,
    Naval Reactors will start the lead ship motor module testing of the
    electric drive propulsion system at the compatibility test facility in
    Philadelphia, PA.
    S8G Prototype Refueling Overhaul
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request does not include additional
    funding for the refueling overhaul of the New York land-based
    prototype, as previously provided funding will be sufficient to
    complete the project. With strong oversight from Naval Reactors, the
    overhaul is on track to complete in late 2023. Consistent support from
    the committee has enabled the project to work through upgrades,
    maintenance and performance testing challenges, and meet key
    milestones. As an example of the impact of Naval Reactors efforts, this
    reactor core, called the Technology Demonstration Core, will not only
    train future operators for 20 years but also includes Columbia-class
    type fuel modules. This has helped to prove out production scale
    manufacturing for Columbia. I look forward to ensuring my relief is
    able to deliver the final update on this multi-year project in next
    year's appearance before the Committee as we resume training on this
    site.
    Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project
        Naval Reactors is continuing construction of the Naval Spent Fuel
    Handling Facility at the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho. The Naval
    Spent Fuel Handling Facility is essential to our mission to manage
    naval spent nuclear fuel and support aircraft carrier and submarine
    fleet requirements. The fiscal year 2024 budget request includes $199.3
    million for continuation of this project through near-term key
    milestones. During the last several years, the project has encountered
    several challenges. Specifically, the COVID-19 pandemic introduced work
    delays and additional costs for final design activities and active
    construction subcontracts. The discovery of unexpected bedrock
    conditions upon completion of site excavation work resulted in
    additional effort to remediate the bedrock and begin construction of
    the massive concrete foundations for the facility. More recently, we
    worked through subcontractor performance issues and continuing
    significant volatility with economic conditions resulting in a revised
    acquisition plan for the Project and additional funding requirements.
    Consistent with the revised acquisition plan and funding need, I
    approved a revision to the Project's Performance Baseline in October
    2022. Funding in fiscal year 2024 will be vital to implementing our
    revised construction sequence and achieving the project milestones in
    the Performance Baseline revision. Naval Reactors remains committed to
    keeping the Committee informed of progress on this complex and large-
    scale infrastructure project.
                             technical base funding
        In addition to our three priority projects, Naval Reactors
    maintains a high-performing workforce across the technical base and
    supporting functions. The technical base is the set of fundamental
    skills and capabilities necessary to safely and effectively support the
    nuclear Navy. It includes a foundation of specialists in nuclear
    materials, nuclear physics, thermal-hydraulics testing, acoustics,
    electronics, software development, systems integration, and other
    specialized skills, along with the associated facilities and
    laboratories to conduct our work. Specifically, the technical base: 1)
    addresses emergent, daily needs and challenges of our globally deployed
    nuclear fleet, 2) executes cutting edge nuclear reactor technology
    research and development that supports improving today's reactor fleet
    and assessing future reactor capabilities, and 3) modernizes critical
    infrastructure and equipment while reducing the Program's legacy
    environmental liabilities.
        Attracting and retaining top talent in our government civilian and
    contract workforce is critical to our ability to fulfill and mature our
    mission amidst a wide array of challenges and new demands. The broad
    range of talent in our organization is in high demand from all areas of
    our economy. We remain focused on recruiting and retaining a well-
    trained, highly qualified workforce and continue to work with the
    leadership of our labs, private shipyards, Navy, and DOE to stay
    competitive in this aggressive talent market.
    Program Direction
        Our lean and highly skilled Federal workforce is critical to the
    execution of our responsibilities. With the fiscal year 2024 Program
    Direction request, we remain highly focused on attracting, developing,
    and retaining a talented and diverse workforce to oversee and manage a
    wide array of work across the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program to
    enable mission success. The talented and dedicated people at our
    Washington, DC headquarters and field offices around the world report
    directly to me and are absolutely essential to our strong centralized
    management and oversight of the important work we perform every single
    day for our Nation.
        Building, maintaining, and deconstructing ships with over forty
    years of expected life requires staffing continuity and longevity to
    ensure the Nation has a workforce with the deep technical knowledge to
    execute Naval Reactors' cradle-to-grave responsibilities. I must have
    sufficient Federal staffing to meet the demands of sustaining and
    improving today's fleet while simultaneously growing our future
    capabilities. Diverse, complex systems, new and innovative research
    efforts, and growing cyber and other vulnerabilities will require
    additional expertise and new perspectives that can only be gained
    through reaching our full personnel requirements.
        The market demand for our highly skilled and experienced workforce
    introduces challenges to recruit and retain a top-tier workforce. In
    concert with our ongoing focus on research and development that I have
    highlighted over the last several years, we need to find new ways to
    bring in and retain the Nation's top talent into Naval Reactors and
    give them resources to introduce technical innovations into our
    submarines and aircraft carriers. I respectfully request Congress'
    support of the fiscal year 2024 Program Direction budget request, which
    will allow me to recruit, select, develop, and retain a highly skilled
    workforce to support mission requirements.
    Research and Development
        Our research and development strategy remains focused on reversing
    an eroding capability advantage over strategic adversaries like China
    and Russia. Technology investment must be prioritized today to have new
    technologies ready for future classes of ships and to reduce costs,
    long lead times, and construction timelines. These investments have the
    added benefit of enhancing and improving the performance of today's
    fleet. Throughout the United States, important research and development
    is conducted by the dedicated and talented teams of people at our Naval
    Nuclear Laboratory sites--the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in
    Pittsburgh, the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring Site in
    greater Albany, and the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho.
        Our first priority is to support today's fleet of nuclear powered
    forces. Our labs perform an extensive amount of technical evaluations
    annually that enable Naval Reactors to thoroughly assess and respond to
    emergent issues, keeping our ships mission-ready, safely operating and
    available for response to any global crises. These efforts are
    essential to realizing the key advantages of nuclear propulsion that
    allow our ships at-sea to operate abroad for longer periods of time,
    our carrier strike groups to engage in any region, and ballistic
    missile and attack submarines to respond at any time and place.
        Two years ago, in the fiscal year 2022 budget, at my direction,
    Naval Reactors embarked on a concentrated path to identify and develop
    new technologies for inclusion in the next generation of nuclear
    powered ships and submarines, including the Navy's next generation
    attack submarine, SSN(X). We are pursuing advanced reactor core and
    fuel systems, advanced manufacturing and inspection techniques, next-
    generation instrumentation and control architectures and sensors, and
    asymmetrical applications of emerging technologies. These advancements
    have traditionally taken time to materialize but we are focused on
    delivering greater capability in shorter order at lower acquisition and
    lifecycle costs to improve and expand our advantage. I invite you to
    visit our facilities with your staffs, talk with our experts onsite,
    and enhance your understanding of where naval nuclear propulsion is
    headed with respect to our technological advancements. I take great
    pride in highlighting our innovative and new technologies and how we
    can responsibly transition them into meeting requirements for the Fleet
    of tomorrow.
        I want to assure the Committee that our investments are supported
    by a comprehensive and rigorous planning effort we undertake with our
    partners at the Naval Nuclear Laboratory. While we continue to develop
    and execute our research and development strategy, we are confronting a
    range of challenging economic conditions that demand additional
    resources to counteract price inflation, a tight labor market, and
    other factors. This year's budget request will help us get closer to
    our required investment needs to stay ahead of our adversaries.
    Facilities and Infrastructure
        Our Naval Nuclear Laboratory facilities and infrastructure are
    essential in carrying out Naval Reactors' mission. This year's budget
    request supports recapitalization of Naval Nuclear Laboratory
    facilities and infrastructure systems, many of which have supported the
    Program since its inception. Specifically, this budget supports
    construction of a new Medical Science Complex at Naval Reactors
    Facility located in Idaho to create professional space and efficient
    integration of radiological, medical, and quality assurance
    capabilities. Additionally, this year's budget supports recapitalizing
    the Knolls Laboratory site steam and condensate system that has
    exceeded its useful service life. Without these and similar
    recapitalization efforts, we will be unable to effectively meet mission
    requirements at the level required to support the next 75 years of
    naval nuclear propulsion.
        Decontaminating and decommissioning (D&D) older facilities that
    have been in existence since the early 1950's is also part of our
    facilities and infrastructure request. We have approximately $8 billion
    in environmental liabilities requiring D&D efforts. Over one-third of
    this estimate is associated with the cost to remediate and demolish
    inactive facilities and infrastructure at each of the Naval Nuclear
    Laboratory sites. We continue to retire these liabilities in an
    environmentally responsible and cost-effective manner to support the
    best use of our funding. This is an exciting opportunity for us, and I
    look forward to future engagements with the Committee to discuss our
    specific actions and tangible examples of Naval Reactors' long-term
    plan to reach our goals. Through our established partnership with the
    Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM), we
    are leveraging their experience in efficient, safe, and cost-effective
    remediation of environmental liabilities across the enterprise. Within
    only 3 years under the new partnership, we have identified ways to
    shorten the schedule to eliminate all of the legacy liabilities and
    identified opportunities for cost avoidance.
                                     aukus
        In September 2021, President Biden announced an enhanced trilateral
    security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
    United States (AUKUS). The three governments have recently completed an
    18-month consultation period to seek an optimal pathway for delivering
    a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability to
    Australia at the earliest achievable date. Naval Reactors has been
    integral in informing discussions to ensure that our Nation's
    preeminent expertise is applied to the nuclear-powered submarine
    initiative.
        As announced by the trilateral leaders on March 13, we are now
    beyond the 18-month consultation period and are focused on ensuring
    Australia establishes the full scope of capabilities necessary to
    design, build, operate, and maintain a nuclear navy. Additionally, we
    are concurrently beginning the process to provide a proportional uplift
    in technology to the United Kingdom. We will increasingly utilize the
    trilateral partners' existing regulatory frameworks; educational,
    industrial, and technical capabilities; and capacities to collectively
    strengthen each nation's defense. Along with a team of subject matter
    experts from Naval Reactors and the United Kingdom, I have traveled to
    Australia and the United Kingdom and routinely meet with senior
    government officials from each nation. The three nations fully
    understand that this is a generational commitment and will require
    Australia to develop the stewardship necessary for owning and operating
    nuclear powered submarines. Naval Reactors is strongly committed to
    supporting Australia in developing this stewardship and acquiring a
    nuclear powered submarine capability.
        Let there be no doubt--AUKUS is a tremendous addition to my
    existing mission. The pace and urgency for action has had an undeniable
    impact on the Naval Reactors program over the past year and a half. My
    Program will be a key element of the success of AUKUS, and it will
    require a generational investment in people, nuclear propulsion
    technologies, and facilities to ensure the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
    Program is resilient and adaptive in order to meet its objectives.
                                   conclusion
        The Navy's ability to maintain mastery of the undersea domain and
    sustain a formidable forward presence with its resultant value for
    national security and defense cannot be assumed; we are being actively
    challenged on a global scale. As I have said repeatedly, naval nuclear
    propulsion is an incredible but unforgiving technology, and must be
    treated with a constant focus on safe operation. Naval Reactors'
    cradle-to-grave responsibility to manage this technology is paramount.
    I assure this Committee that I will balance investments in today's
    fleet with the requirements of the future fleet, steer future
    cooperation efforts, and preserve the focus on effective naval nuclear
    propulsion for the U.S. Navy. I appreciate the strong support of
    Congress for this program and respectfully urge your full support for
    our fiscal year 2024 budget request.

        Senator King. Mr. White.

     STATEMENT OF WILLIAM WHITE, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
                    MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. White. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
    Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before
    you today. The Environmental Management Mission reflects the
    commitment to cleaning up the environmental legacy of national
    defense programs that helped end World War II and the Cold War.
        While our mission is tied to the environmental legacy of
    the past, we are also focused on the future. The cleanup
    program of today is empowered to support ongoing National
    Security and science missions, as well as strengthen local
    communities.
        Cleanup accomplishments are boosting the clean energy
    economy in Tennessee and helping the Oak Ridge National
    Laboratory and the Y-12 National Security Complex prepare for
    expanding National Security and research missions. Our Idaho
    team just marked a historic achievement with the startup of a
    new tank waste treatment capability that has been decades in
    the making.
        With support from Congress, the Integrated Waste Treatment
    Unit is now operational in Idaho. The Office of Environmental
    Management (EM) has treated over 400,000 gallons of tank waste
    at the Hanford site, and at Savannah River in South Carolina we
    are processing record amounts of tank waste.
        More than 200 transgenic waste shipments from five
    generator sites were received last year at the waste isolation
    pilot plant. The budget request for this year positions us for
    success as we drive risk reduction, progress, skyline changes,
    and ramp up efforts to tackle tank waste.
        EM will operate tank waste treatment systems in South
    Carolina, Idaho, and Washington State. Hanford's 56 million
    gallons of tank waste represent our greatest environmental risk
    and financial viability.
        Treatment and disposal are the only way to permanently
    address the risks posed by this waste. Recognizing that
    additional delays bring greater risk, exacerbate the impacts of
    already aging infrastructure, and increase cost, we are focused
    on moving the entire Hanford tank waste mission forward.
        We are advancing the system that will stabilize Hanford's
    low activity waste in glass. The request also ramps up work on
    the high-level waste facility so that we will be able to
    address that portion of the Hanford tank waste as well.
        The waste isolation pilot plant will be modernized to meet
    the needs of legacy cleanup and ongoing National Security
    programs. Waste shipments will continue and we will ensure
    there is no backlog of shipments from Los Alamos National
    Laboratory.
        We will address excess contaminated facilities and
    contaminated groundwater across the enterprise. This includes
    work in Nevada, where we will demolish four buildings this year
    and further reduce the clean-up footprint for fiscal year 2024.
        As we deliver on these priorities, we are committed to
    continuous improvement, whether it is investing in R&D,
    analyzing options to save time and money, achieving regulatory
    alignment, upgrading infrastructure, or building a pipeline of
    talent for the future, we are preparing for the future.
        The budget request for this year supports these efforts. It
    also supports communities and tribal nations impacted by the
    environmental legacy of the past. I appreciate the
    Subcommittee's support for the EM mission. I thank you for your
    time, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. William White follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Mr. William ``Ike'' White
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to represent
    the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management
    (EM).
        EM's mission represents the Government's strong commitment to
    cleaning up the environmental legacy of the national defense programs
    that helped end World War II and the Cold War. EM's vital mission does
    not just address past legacy, though, it also helps to support and
    enable DOE's ongoing national security and scientific research
    missions.
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request of $8.3 billion for EM reflects
    the Biden Administration's strong commitment to advancing the cleanup
    mission and preparing for sustained success, maintaining national
    security priorities, and supporting communities most impacted by the
    environmental legacy of the past.
                     record of results for the environment
        Over the last 30 years, EM has made significant progress. From an
    original 107 sites, today EM is down to just 15 with legacy cleanup
    work at the Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York completed last
    year. EM's significant accomplishments to date have included completing
    demolition of the Plutonium Finishing Plant, a facility that produced
    two-thirds of the Nation's Cold War-era plutonium at the Hanford Site
    in Washington state; completing the removal of the former uranium
    enrichment complex at Oak Ridge in Tennessee; opening the world's only
    deep geological repository for transuranic waste generated from atomic
    energy defense activities at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New
    Mexico; and completing construction on the entire tank waste treatment
    system at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, enabling
    significant progress in how the Department tackles one of its largest
    environmental and financial liabilities at that site.
                delivering results for doe sites and communities
        While the mission is rooted in the environmental legacy of the
    past, EM is also focused on the possibilities for the future. The EM
    program of today is empowered to strengthen local communities and the
    Nation as a whole.
        Enabled by the significant investments Congress has made in the
    program, EM has ushered in tangible results for communities and the
    environment in a safe, effective, and responsible manner. Over the past
    year, EM has cocooned the seventh reactor along the Columbia River at
    the Hanford Site in Washington State, leaving just one more to go. EM
    has also treated over 400,000 gallons of radioactive and chemical waste
    from large underground tanks at the Hanford Site where work is
    progressing toward initiation of the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste
    (DFLAW) project that will convert this waste into glass for disposal.
    At the Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina EM is now
    processing record amounts of tank waste with more than 2.1 million
    gallons treated last year alone.
        More than 200 transuranic waste shipments were received last year
    at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico from five
    generator sites. This includes shipments from the Los Alamos National
    Laboratory, where the EM team certified and completed 52 shipments to
    WIPP last year, surpassing goals by over 70 percent.
        This spring, EM met a key commitment to the State of Idaho by
    completing the transfer of EM-owned spent nuclear fuel to onsite dry
    storage. Last week, workers safely and successfully started up the
    Integrated Waste Treatment Unit. This new tank waste treatment
    capability has been decades in the making and will ultimately help
    address one of the EM's greatest challenges in Idaho.
        In addition, EM has launched demolition of the West Valley
    Demonstration Project's Main Plant Process Building, a priority that
    will continue this year and will further advance under the fiscal year
    2024 budget request. The Nevada National Security Site is preparing to
    demolish four Test Cell C buildings this year and will continue to
    reduce the cleanup footprint there in fiscal year 2024.
        EM continues a deliberate and broad view on the future of cleanup
    sites while contributing to national security priorities, investing in
    the next generation workforce and aiding Tribal and community efforts
    to build strong economies, grow jobs and prepare for a clean energy
    future.
        Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in Oak Ridge, Tennessee
    where historical cleanup accomplishments support national security
    priorities and are building up the clean energy economy in Tennessee.
    Following successful cleanup in the area, a commercial pilot fuel
    manufacturing facility is now open at the East Tennessee Technology
    Park. By putting DOE developed nuclear fuels research to work, this is
    a cleanup to clean energy success story. With the first-ever demolition
    of a reactor in the central campus area at the Oak Ridge National
    Laboratory (ORNL) and work continuing at the Y-12 National Security
    Complex, EM's steady progress is a part of a broader vision focused not
    only on cleaning up the past, but also advancing the ORNL and Y-12
    research and national security research missions.
                  steady progress planned for fiscal year 2024
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request reflects the Administration's
    strong commitment to cleaning up the environment in communities that
    supported or continue to support weapons programs and government-
    sponsored nuclear research. Key investments position EM for sustained
    achievement as the program continues to drive risk reduction, progress
    skyline changes and ramp up efforts to tackle tank waste while enabling
    DOE's vital national security and scientific research missions.
        Protecting the environment by addressing radioactive waste stored
    in underground tanks at Hanford, Savanah River and the Idaho National
    Laboratory is a top priority for EM. The budget request advances
    commissioning and startup of the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste system.
    After decades of support from the local community, Congress and the
    workforce, this transformational accomplishment is within sight.
        As we prepare to begin operating Hanford's low-activity tank waste
    vitrification capabilities, the budget request also invests $600
    million to ramp up work on the Waste Treatment Plant's High Level Waste
    facility to be able to tackle that portion of Hanford's tank waste
    inventory. In parallel, EM continues to identify safe, effective, and
    viable options for the treatment of all Hanford's tank waste.
        Hanford's 56 million gallons of radioactive and chemical waste
    stored in 177 aging storage tanks represent EM's greatest environmental
    risk and financial liability. Recognizing that additional delays bring
    greater environmental risks, exacerbate the impacts of already aging
    infrastructure, and increase costs, we are focused on moving the entire
    Hanford tank waste mission forward. EM has also developed a Research
    and Development Roadmap to guide investments in additional technology
    options to accelerate the Hanford high-level tank waste mission. EM is
    also taking the next steps on the Test Bed Initiative Demonstration
    project, which could have the potential to safely pretreat low-activity
    waste from Hanford tanks, solidify the waste, and dispose of it offsite
    in a manner that is protective of the workers, the public and the
    environment.
        In addition to helping solve the challenges of Hanford tank waste,
    the request will enable EM to continue meaningful cleanup progress to
    transfer radioactive capsules to safer dry storage, progress 324
    Building waste excavation and treat another 2 billion gallons of
    contaminated groundwater.
        In South Carolina, the fiscal year 2024 budget request supports
    continued utilization of capabilities to process tank waste. This
    advances work at the Savannah River Site to complete the bulk of its
    tank waste treatment mission.
        At the Idaho National Laboratory, the request supports continued
    operations of the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit which will ultimately
    treat about 900,000 gallons of liquid waste by turning it into a
    granular solid.
                     support for national security missions
        In addition to reducing environmental risks at these and other
    sites across the complex, the EM mission benefits the Department's
    broader national security and scientific research missions.
        Building on last year's successful demolition work, EM recently
    completed the transfer of the 18-acre Biology Complex at the Y-12
    National Security Complex to the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) which will use the area for a new Lithium
    Processing Facility. The budget request supports additional cleanup of
    high-risk excess facilities at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and
    the Y-12 National Security Complex. It also supports work to advance
    the Mercury Treatment Facility and a second On-Site Waste Disposal
    Facility, both of which are pivotal to future efforts to reduce risks,
    stabilize facilities, advance cleanup and ultimately provide land for
    research and national security missions.
        EM is in the midst of a significant infrastructure and
    modernization campaign at WIPP. Work continues on mining the West
    Access Drifts and sinking the utility shaft that is critical for
    ventilation upgrades needed to improve air quality in the underground
    portion of the site. Commissioning of the new Safety Significant
    Containment Ventilation System (SSCVS) is slated to begin this year.
    Along with providing for continued WIPP operations, as well as waste
    characterization and transportation programs, the budget request
    supports the continued infrastructure recapitalization projects, as
    well as mine modernization activities and safety upgrades in fiscal
    year 2024. Taken together these projects will help ensure EM has the
    infrastructure in place to support disposal operations for years to
    come.
        At the Savannah River Site, where EM's role is decreasing as
    cleanup work progresses, a joint process to transition primary
    authority for the site to NNSA in fiscal year 2025 is underway. EM and
    NNSA are committed to a successful transition that keeps national
    security priorities as well as the long-term outlook for the site and
    community front of mind.
                 investing in diverse workforce and communities
        The talented and dedicated men and women across EM are the
    program's greatest assets. While significant progress continues across
    the DOE complex, the EM mission will span several decades at some
    sites. With that in mind, EM is increasing efforts to foster, build and
    maintain a next-generation workforce that promotes diversity, equity,
    inclusion, and accessibility. A program-wide succession plan has been
    developed to help identify and develop the next generation of program
    leaders. EM has expanded the Minority Serving Institutions Partnership
    Program to increase internships, develop a new technology curriculum,
    and boost research activities. Funding has been provided to
    participants across the country in states like Washington, Nevada,
    Tennessee, South Carolina and others. The budget request provides $56
    million to continue the Minority Serving Institutions Partnership
    Program.
        The Advanced Manufacturing Collaborative facility, to be
    constructed in South Carolina, will be another tool to help meet the
    needs of the EM cleanup mission and create an environment to develop a
    diverse and talented next generation workforce. In addition, EM is
    putting DOE's Justice40 Initiative to work by expanding outreach and
    grants to include support for STEM and Community Based Education
    programs.
        The Justice40 Initiative has also provided new opportunities to
    boost engagement with stakeholders and ensure the voice of those most
    impacted by the EM mission is heard. In addition, EM has increased
    stakeholder outreach and engagement across the complex, with particular
    emphasis in New Mexico, where we have partnered with NNSA to hold
    multiple public forums and prioritize meetings with State, local, and
    Tribal leaders.
        The fiscal year 2024 request represents a significant investment in
    helping the communities that played such an important role in U.S.
    history continue to grow and thrive in the future. The request includes
    Payment in Lieu of Taxes funding for communities near Hanford and
    Savannah River to support schools, roads and other local priorities. In
    addition, $40 million is provided for the Community Capacity Building
    initiative. This grant program will provide assistance to those
    communities around EM sites and will be developed in consultation with
    community stakeholders] to address their needs. By partnering with
    local communities, prioritizing stakeholder engagement and implementing
    environmental justice initiatives, EM is helping to foster successful
    visions for the future.
                                   conclusion
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request is the latest sign of this
    Administration's strong support for EM's vital mission. As the mission
    is carried out, EM is committed to continuous improvement and making
    further advancements to ensure that cleanup activities are conducted in
    a safe, efficient, and cost-effective manner.
        Across mission areas, EM utilizes science-based advancements that
    provide opportunities to meet cleanup commitments safely, sooner and
    more efficiently. EM is leveraging the expertise of the Savannah River
    National Laboratory and the Network of National Laboratories for
    Environmental Management and Stewardship to develop innovative
    solutions in the fields of environmental cleanup, national security and
    science and energy security that will benefit EM, the NNSA and other
    DOE missions. Our goal is a fully integrated technology program that
    enables EM to better meet the most complex challenges of today and
    tomorrow.
        Whether it is investing in R&D, analyzing disposal options,
    reaching decisions about remaining waste streams, achieving regulatory
    alignment, or upgrading infrastructure, EM is preparing for the future.
    These multi-faceted activities are laid out in EM's annual priorities
    list and 10-year strategic vision as part of EM's ongoing efforts to
    improve prioritization, planning and mission execution.
        As EM makes steady cleanup progress, EM is committed to working in
    a collaborative manner with workers, unions, Tribal Nations, states,
    local communities, and Congress on opportunities to achieve shared
    goals of protecting the environment and preparing for continued cleanup
    success.

        Senator King. Thank you. Did you say you processed 400,000
    gallons last year?
        Mr. White. At Hanford through our tank side cesium removal
    system. Which is the system we have in place to pre-treat the
    tank waste that is going into the direct feed low activity
    waste vitrification plant.
        Senator King. But there is something on the order of 150
    million gallons, isn't there--in various tanks?
        Mr. White. There are currently--there are 56 million
    gallons of tank waste. But when you think about the processes
    required to treat the tank waste, it ends up resulting in about
    150 million gallons of liquid needing to be treated over the
    course of the program.
        Senator King. I will follow up on that for--in a couple of
    minutes. Admiral Caldwell, a couple of questions. Back when the
    Navy stopped, or when we stop producing additional uranium for
    fuel back in the 1990's, it was assumed that we had enough
    stockpiled until the 2060. Is that assumption still true in
    light of Columbia and other programs that are now underway?
        Admiral Caldwell. Sir, we have looked at this over many
    years and even recently as we have embarked on this AUKUS
    consultation period, and currently we have enough fuel stock to
    support the program out through the 2050's, mid to late 2050's.
        That will depend, of course, on the Navy shipbuilding plan
    and we will continue to evaluate that going forward. Ms. Hruby
    and I have frequent dialogs on this. It is going to be a topic
    we continue to talk about.
        Senator King. But the projection hasn't changed radically?
        Admiral Caldwell. Not radically, no, sir.
        Senator King. A different question. Did I hear in your
    testimony you are developing a new reactor for the Columbia? Is
    this a brand-new reactor or is it a modification of existing?
        Admiral Caldwell. Sir, to clarify, we have been working on
    the reactor for Columbia for many years now, and it is a
    reactor that has been funded by the support of this
    Subcommittee. It will have a--the result is a 42-year reactor
    core to power Columbia through life. That----
        Senator King. No refueling?
        Admiral Caldwell. No refueling, and that is important. That
    allows us to do the mission with 12 versus 14 SPNs [Simplified
    Pntransport Core], and that fact alone saves refueling costs
    and saves the Nation about $40 billion.
        So, it is a remarkable achievement. We are building that
    core right now, and we are on track to deliver that core on
    schedule.
        Senator King. But this is a developed technology. You are
    not inventing something.
        Admiral Caldwell. We are taking technology that has been
    built on decades worth of research and work. In fact, we took
    the step to design the core for the S8G prototype, a training
    and research reactor up in Kesselring.
        We took the step to develop some Columbia components for
    that core. This was a decision made over 10 years ago. That
    proved to be a very important decision because it allowed us to
    de-risk the manufacturing techniques and make sure we had that
    down before we actually started the Columbia core.
        So those two projects are actually integrated and both
    supported by this Subcommittee.
        Senator King. I am sure there is an answer to this
    question. I also serve on Energy and Natural Resources, where
    all the talk is about small modular reactors. Why aren't the
    naval reactors models for that? Is there an utterly different
    technology or is it cost? What--why couldn't you park a
    submarine in the bay and power the city?
        Admiral Caldwell. Well, first off, the requirements for a
    warship are significantly different from the requirements for a
    commercial reactor. We have to be able to withstand shock. We
    have to be ready to operate in battle damage conditions. We
    have to be responsive in speed.
        A lot of the time the submarine or the carrier might be
    going relatively slow and we have to accelerate rapidly. For
    power generating reactors, the technology and the requirements
    for that are very different.
        I don't think that the submarine core would be the right
    path for some of these small modular reactor concepts.
        Senator King. Thank you. Mr. White, as I mentioned, there
    is plenty of work left to do. I understand in Savannah River
    there are going with a concrete solution as opposed to a glass
    solution. Is that proving to be feasible, a, and b, is it a
    more cost-effective solution that could be used at the Hanford
    site?
        Mr. White. So, at Savannah River, the capability we have
    there can ultimately treat about 6 million gallons of the 9
    million gallons of tank waste a year. So, I think it is
    something we should definitely be looking at, at Hanford.
        In fact, we are doing that. One of the things that we just
    did was move forward with the test bed initiative, something
    that Congress funded over the last couple of years. So as part
    of that effort, we made a waste determination of about 2,000
    gallons of tank waste at Hanford that we are planning to treat
    commercially offsite with grouting technology and then dispose
    of it at a commercial facility.
        Right now, we are working on putting a permit together to
    submit that to the State of Washington, and then once they have
    approved that, about a year after that, we should be able to
    move forward with this pilot effort.
        If you think about the cumulative amount of waste we have
    at Hanford, the vitrification capabilities we are putting in
    place with the low activity waste vitrification plant and the
    high-level waste plant, would treat about 40 percent of the
    tank waste that we have at Hanford to treat.
        That leaves about 60 percent of the supplemental waste that
    we don't have a clear path forward on. In large part at the
    urging of this Subcommittee, we have had the national
    laboratories studying the best alternative for treating that
    supplemental waste, that 60 percent of the waste that isn't
    covered by those vitrification plants.
        The National Academies recommended that we consider
    grouting, that the technology is effective at treating the
    waste, and it is by far the most cost effective and timely way
    to deal with the waste, the bulk of the waste at Hanford.
        So, as we move forward on the vitrification capabilities
    that we need for the parts of the waste streams that have to be
    vitrified, while simultaneously working on options to expand
    our grouting capabilities as well to deal with the bulk of the
    waste.
        Senator King. Thank you. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
    Administrator. While the NNSA has many competing missions,
    delivering nuclear weapons to the Department of Defense remains
    the top priority. With narrowing window time for our current
    wave of modernization, can you identify your largest source of
    concern? How are you going to meet those milestones?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, thanks for the question. They are--
    undoubtedly our most challenging programs are our large nuclear
    construction projects. I say that because our weapons programs
    are certainly challenging, but we are on track.
        We understand the long lead, the places where we really
    need to increase our regular timelines, start timelines to meet
    those. But the construction activities have been more fluid in
    terms of what the issues are, and in part because we started
    them pre-COVID and have needed to come out of that, and it is
    the first time in many generations that we--this is really the
    first rebuild of our enterprise since the Manhattan Project.
        To answer your question, we are pulling out all the stops.
    We are having external reviews. We are implementing
    recommendations from those reviews. We are changing our
    approach to procurements to not only start them earlier, but to
    have them move along faster.
        We are breaking projects into chunks. We are pausing some
    projects in order to focus on others. We have a long list of
    things that we are doing to try to bring those as far to the
    left, if you will, as we can.
        Senator Fischer. If you have any suggestions on how
    Congress can help you do that to meet those requirements,
    please let us know.
        Ms. Hruby. Thank you. I would just, I know this is a big
    ask, but the most important thing on some of these projects is
    going to be timely budget appropriations.
        Senator King. Yes. It shouldn't be a big ask. It will be
    routine.
        Senator Fischer. It should be what we do, yes. Meeting the
    requirement of the 80 plutonium pits per year remains a
    challenge. Can you provide us with an update on NNSA's efforts
    to achieve that full production as close to 2030 as possible?
        Ms. Hruby. Absolutely, thanks. We, as you know, we are
    proceeding with our two-site solution at Los Alamos and
    Savannah River. Los Alamos is the first up, if you will. We
    started it earlier, but also is an existing plutonium facility
    that we are modifying for the pit production activity that we
    have.
        We have completed a lot of equipment installation. We are
    aiming to get to--the first project we are calling 30 base,
    making 30 pits per year. We have done about 40 developmental
    pits over the time we have been doing this project.
        We are getting closer to WR [war reserve] certification, to
    weapon certification----
        Senator Fischer. You say, developmental pits. So those
    aren't certified?
        Ms. Hruby. Those are not yet certified and they are not
    going to get certified for----
        Senator Fischer. How long a process to get them certified?
    What do you have to do?
        Ms. Hruby. We are expecting that we will have our first
    certified pit at the end of 2024, and so then let me also cover
    Savannah River. So, we are about 50 percent way through the
    design of the Savannah River pit production facility.
        We are also doing parallel activities to modify the MOX
    [mixed oxide] facility and take out equipment that we don't
    need. We are doing site preparation work. We are preparing to
    build a high-fidelity training center there.
        The point of the training center is to make sure that as
    soon as we have the construction complete, we can go as fast as
    possible to get to making certified pits. That will be a few
    years, even if we are really fast.
        We are doing a lot of pre-buys of equipment. We are staging
    our design so that the equipment is designed first so we can
    get those out for procurement while the rest of the facility
    design is being done.
        Senator Fischer. Has the pre-buying equipment, has that
    been an effective tool for you to be able to have that
    capability and to continue to move along so you don't have to
    wait months or a year or two and a half years for--?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, absolutely. It is particularly important
    for gloveboxes, which is, there is a limited capability in the
    United States and all of our facilities need them.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Cramer.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
    witnesses. Administrator, first of all, thank you for this
    morning's briefing as well. Very, very informative. Appreciate
    the detail of it all.
        But when we talk about modernization, we always talk about,
    of course, our own, and then we talk about our biggest
    adversaries, but we rarely talk about allies or other places
    other than Russia and China and the United States.
        Can you enlighten us a little bit with what might be going
    on in other places, if anything, that, you know, might be
    instructive to how we view the future with regard to us, plus,
    if that makes sense?
        Ms. Hruby. Well, I will say that by far our closest ally on
    things nuclear is the UK. Not only are we doing what Admiral
    Caldwell talked about in terms of the AUKUS program with them,
    we are also working on the W93 program with them, and we are
    working on materials availability with them.
        So that--by far our strongest ally. We do work
    nonproliferation programs with all of our other allies, both
    NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and Pacific
    allies. That is useful not only for the purpose of the
    nonproliferation program, but it keeps us in close coordination
    and communication with those allies in terms of their nuclear
    capabilities, so I consider those very important programs.
        Senator Cramer. Along those lines, and maybe you could
    comment or you, Admiral, for that matter too, on how, with
    regard to that relationship that you just outlined--I guess I
    can say I worry a little bit about the reputational risk that
    has been associated with the events of the last, you know, some
    say a couple of years, us being seen as once the reliable
    umbrella ally that we are--am I wrong to be concerned about
    that or--and again Admiral, maybe you want to speak to that a
    little bit as well.
        Ms. Hruby. I will start and then let Admiral Caldwell talk
    about the naval part. I am fond of saying if anybody ever asked
    you if you want a Russian, a Chinese weapon, or a United States
    weapon, say United States.
        We still have, despite--we are very transparent about our
    issues, but we still have an incredible capability in this
    country. Our weapons are second to none and we are making sure
    that they stay that way. So, I would say the NATO allies are
    actually here this week.
        They will be at Lawrence Livermore on Friday. I will be
    with them for that meeting. We are doing a lot of assurance
    meetings and they are always very impressed to see what
    capabilities we have and to see the commitment to the
    enterprise that we have.
        Senator Cramer. Admiral, anything you would add to that?
        Admiral Caldwell. Sir, I want to make sure I understand
    your question. Is your question about our sharing and
    relationship with the UK in particular, or how our allies and
    partners view the viability of our nuclear--?
        Senator Cramer. Yes, so I think it is--I would add a third
    category and that is that their trust that we have the
    political will as well as the capabilities to continue to be--
    to provide that umbrella that helps you control some of the
    issues you have talked about, Administrator.
        Admiral Caldwell. I don't have as many interactions maybe
    as some of the other Navy leaders with those key allies. I can
    tell you we have a strong interaction with the UK. I think
    there is absolutely trust there.
        I just returned from a trip to Japan where I spoke with
    Japanese leaders. Clearly, if you look at their National
    Defense Strategy and National Security strategy, the United
    States plays a huge role in their future as they have laid it
    out in clear language.
        I think there is a lot of faith and confidence in the U.S.
    war plan, and our ability and commitment to follow through on
    that.
        Senator Cramer. Maybe, Mr. Chairman, I am more concerned
    about our ability to persuade our own constituents sometimes of
    this. But thank you, both of you, for your answers. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Admiral Hruby--Administrator
    Hruby--yes, just, sorry. It would be nice to be an Admiral.
    Administrator Hruby, inertial confinement fusion facilities,
    including the Omega Laser facility at the University of
    Rochester's Laboratory for Laser Energetics have not had major
    infrastructure investment since the 2000's.
        The demand on these world's leading high energy density
    science facilities continues to grow. Is the fiscal year 2024
    budget request sufficient to cover critical sustainment
    activities while meeting increased operational demand on the
    facilities? Are you including sustainment costs in your 5-year
    future budget plan?
        Ms. Hruby. Well, thank you for that question. The Omega
    facility, the Laser Energetics lab, is a very impressive
    facility and frankly, has made just very important
    contributions to our programs, including ignition at NIF
    [National Ignition Facility], because we are able to do many
    experiments faster there and try things out.
        We have produced a report which we have submitted that
    talks about all the investments we need to make at all of our
    fusionsites in the U.S., and it is a significant amount of
    money.
        We are trying to execute that plan in this budget and our
    5-year budget, our request for Rochester is higher this year
    than it was last year. But it will be a journey, a long-term
    journey to make the investments in science and technology that
    we need, including at this facility.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Admiral Caldwell, the
    breakthroughs in December at the National Ignition Facility
    have significant implications for nuclear energy production.
    What are the implications of inertial confinement fusion on the
    future of the U.S. nuclear fleet?
        Admiral Caldwell. My team pays close attention to
    development in the nuclear field, but as we see it, the
    viability of nuclear fusion is still many decades away.
        As we think about putting ships to sea, I need to make sure
    that the reactors and the components and things we build into
    the submarine are absolutely reliable. We are a proven
    technology.
        When you when you build a ship and you put the reactor in
    and it is going to stay there for 30 plus or 40 years for
    Columbia, it has got to work correctly first time and every
    time. We are just not there with fusion. But we keep close tabs
    on what is going on in science and technology throughout the
    United States.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Mr. White, we are
    increasingly looking toward expanded nuclear capacity and small
    modular reactors for energy production as we try to meet our
    net-zero goals.
        At the same time, we are still struggling to figure out how
    to manage existing radiological waste. As we balance our energy
    needs and our defense needs, what policies or mechanisms do we
    need to adopt to ensure that we are properly disposing of
    nuclear waste products?
        Mr. White. Certainly, when I think about the importance of
    the clean-up program--and I mentioned earlier that, I think it
    is extraordinarily important for our National Security and
    scientific research missions.
        Part of the reason for that is, I think our ability to
    safely and effectively dispose of nuclear waste and treat that
    waste underlies our ability to also move forward in the nuclear
    security and nuclear energy realms.
        From a policy perspective, certainly for the clean-up
    program, the biggest thing outstanding is our ability to
    dispose of high-level waste. We have an inventory of high-level
    waste in the cleanup program that we manage for the Energy
    Department, and the absence of a capability for disposal of
    that waste certainly impacts our cleanup program.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, and, Administrator Hruby,
    your agency is tasked with the managing nonproliferation
    efforts. Where do you foresee nonproliferation efforts trending
    in the next decade now that Russia has withdrawn from the New
    Start? What effect will China's expansion of nuclear
    capabilities have on our current nonproliferation regime and
    the Nonproliferation Treaty?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, well, the nonproliferation efforts, and
    this is a little bit to the question addressed earlier, we are
    doubling down with our allies on nonproliferation activities to
    make sure that we are collectively supportive of
    nonproliferation programs, including the programs around the
    hot zones right now.
        Obviously, Ukraine, but there are other regions that we
    want to make sure that we still have detection of materials
    that could be lost or stolen from countries that have nuclear
    materials. With Russia and China we would really like to be in
    strategic stability dialogs, but we aren't.
        What we are doing in the Department, in NNSA is working on
    verification technologies so that when we--for these new
    weapons, many new weapon systems, so that when there is a
    window open again for discussion, which hopefully someday there
    will be, there won't be a barrier associated with not having
    proper verification technologies developed.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. and thanks to all
    of you for your service to our country. This is an unclassified
    discussion and I appreciated the opportunity that we have had
    to have classified discussions on this.
        I kind of got to thinking the vast majority of folks that
    are probably watching or listening to this discussion, they are
    wondering kind of maybe some of the basics. I would like to
    take a few minutes, just kind of work our way through the
    basics of why this is so important to our country.
        I must start with Administrator Hruby. Let's talk about, we
    are talking our national defense is really based upon a nuclear
    deterrence. But the nuclear deterrence means not just land
    based. It means submarine based, and it means air carried
    weapons that have a nuclear weapon on them, whether it be a
    bomb or a missile tip.
        Can you talk a little bit about what it means when we--we
    are talking here about plutonium pits and so forth. Can we just
    take a minute here and perhaps explain a little bit about the
    concern that we have got about the number of plutonium pits
    that we actually do per year and so forth?
        Talk to us a little bit and maybe explain that in a level
    that I could understand, about third grade level or so, here.
        Ms. Hruby. Well, I know you understand more than that,
    because I know you--I have been in our model room with you and
    you asked great questions. So, but let me try to address your
    question.
        To make a nuclear weapon, which is the core of our
    deterrence in the United States, we have to be able to work
    with nuclear materials, both plutonium and enriched uranium,
    and many other materials that are difficult to work with.
        We have to be able to have physics packages that we are
    absolutely confident will work when we want them to and not
    work at any other time. That requires a lot of engineering of
    non-nuclear components.
        We use in the United States a captive production complex
    where we do buy parts from commercial supplies, but mostly
    these materials--this is something we have to do ourselves. It
    is perhaps the only captive production complex in the United
    States, make sense, the way you make nuclear weapons.
        We have to have a very strong understanding of the science.
    We have to turn that into manufacturing capabilities and we
    have to deliver weapons on time to the Department of Defense
    (DOD).
        Senator Rounds. The different weapons that we have, they
    basically have a system inside of them that, when triggered,
    create a nuclear reaction that is the bomb or the missile tip.
        What sizes--can you talk a little bit about what that means
    to somebody in the American public about the size? How huge
    these weapon systems are?
        Ms. Hruby. The physical size of the weapon system?
        Senator Rounds. Not so much the physical size, but the
    impact--the size of the blast, sort to speak.
        Ms. Hruby. Yes. Well, we have weapon systems that have
    yields from tens of kilotons----
        Senator Rounds. Tens of kilotons, meaning in high
    explosive, like a big bomb that you would--a conventional
    bomb----
        Ms. Hruby. Right, right----
        Senator Rounds. That would be the size of how big of a
    bomb? Ten kiloton?
        Ms. Hruby. Let's--maybe the easiest way to say this is our
    lowest yield weapons today are about the size of the weapon at
    Hiroshima.
        Senator Rounds. Our smallest, and they move up from there.
        Ms. Hruby. They move up from there.
        Senator Rounds. These are both fission and fusion.
        Ms. Hruby. They are thermonuclear weapons, right.
        Senator Rounds. Now, I think there is a question out there
    about what that means. Let's just--I have got a minute left,
    but let's walk our way through that a little bit.
        Ms. Hruby. The physics.
        Senator Rounds. Yes, let's talk about that.
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, the plutonium pit and the weapons is
    imploded by high explosives. It produces a blast that is
    captive inside the weapon that goes to the secondary, and
    implodes the secondary, and the secondary makes the large yield
    from the weapon.
        Senator Rounds. When you just say the secondary, you mean
    the actual material that surrounds a--or that is next to a
    plutonium pit. The plutonium pit is really the trigger
    mechanism.
        Ms. Hruby. The plutonium pit is a trigger mechanism. The
    secondary is a uranium base.
        Senator Rounds. When we do that, we are concerned about
    plutonium pits because we have to have those in order to make
    every one of these new weapons systems, these modern weapons
    systems that we want to deploy.
        Ms. Hruby. Right.
        Senator Rounds. We can't make a lot of those per year, can
    we?
        Ms. Hruby. No, but we do have pits that can be reused. Not
    all of them, but some of the pits that we already have can be
    reused.
        Senator Rounds. But it is still--that is a critical
    component----
        Ms. Hruby. Absolutely.
        Senator Rounds. In terms of our national defense, when we
    are talking about new facilities to modernize or to be able to
    do those, it is a critical part of our national defense in
    terms of deterrence.
        Ms. Hruby. Yes.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    our witnesses for being here today. Thank you for the work you
    do. A key component of modernizing our nuclear weapons involves
    the construction of new plutonium pits. These pits are the
    central cores of nuclear weapons that are used to trigger the
    nuclear explosion.
        Congress mandated that NNSA produce at least 80 of these
    pits by 2030. However, it is clear, perfectly clear that NNSA
    will not be able to meet this requirement. NNSA has a terrible
    track record of waste and mismanagement over the years and
    failing to come even close to budget estimates.
        It is important to me that we not see taxpayer dollars
    wasted again. Now, the Government Accountability Office, GAO,
    recently released a report in January. They found that NNSA has
    still failed to establish even a cost estimate for the
    production of these pits.
        Administrator Hruby, last year, when you came before the
    Subcommittee, you may remember you and I had this conversation.
    We talked about how there were no clear cost estimates for this
    program.
        The GAO is now estimating that at least part of the program
    will cost $18 to $24 billion, and that the total program will
    be much higher if, and I want to underline the word if, it ever
    even ends up being completed.
        I am glad that GAO is working hard to try to keep you
    honest on this, but it is NNSA's job to estimate these costs.
    Why have you not established a lifecycle cost estimate for this
    program?
        Ms. Hruby. Well, thanks for your question. We agree with
    the GAO report, and we also have agreed in our response to the
    GAO report that by April of this year we will have our initial
    lifecycle cost estimate. This is the cost for everything. That
    is the whole point of----
        Senator Warren. Wait, April of this year? That is like two
    more weeks?
        Ms. Hruby. Oh, April--I am sorry, April of 2024. I am
    sorry, April of 2024--April of 2024, we will have--we are in
    2024 budget request. So, it is April of 2024, we will have the
    initial cost estimate. Then in 2025, we will have an improved
    cost estimate.
        Senator Warren. Okay. So let me just say, you didn't have
    the numbers last year. You don't have the numbers this year.
        The best answer I can get is we are going to have them a
    year from now, which means that Congress and the public has to
    wait just for another year before we even get a basic cost
    estimate on what this program is going to cost?
        Ms. Hruby. There are many elements of the overall plan.
    Most of those elements have had cost estimates released. The
    life cycle cost estimate referred to in the GAO report is the
    total cost for everything involved with making pits. Some of
    those are still pretty immature designs and therefore it is
    very difficult to do the entire cost estimates----
        Senator Warren. Okay, so I get it. This is hard. I
    understand that it is hard, but this is a long time and we keep
    allocating money into this program.
        It looks like we are not going to know how much this
    staggeringly expensive program is going to cost us for a while,
    so let me ask you a different question. Let's look at whether
    NNSA has a good plan to control costs in the meantime.
        Best practice for budgeting these types of complex programs
    is to develop what is called an integrated master schedule, an
    analysis that is going to break down the project into steps,
    resources, and budget needed to complete it. Sort of budgeting
    101.
        The GAO first raised this in 2020, that is 3 years ago, and
    found that NNSA did not have such a plan in place. GAO now put
    out a new report saying that NNSA still does not have such a
    plan in place. According to GAO, the plan you do have is, ``not
    a reliable plan.''
        We see here again that NNSA is not following just basic
    budgeting standards and planning for this program. So, with
    total program costs running somewhere in the tens of billions
    of dollars, we are talking about significant cost risks if
    things get off schedule or run into problems.
        The plan you have doesn't even tie budget resources to
    activities. Administrator Hruby, when will NNSA have an IMS
    [integrated master schedule] that meets budgeting 101
    requirements?
        Ms. Hruby. Again, on the individual projects we have IMS.
    The GAO report is looking at their overall plan. We have
    improved our overall planning for the items that we know there
    is a tight connection like gloveboxes.
        But within the Los Alamos pit production facility plan, it
    is a highly integrated plan. We are still working on developing
    the plan across the entire----
        Senator Warren. So, I am sorry. So, what was the answer to
    my question? When will NNSA have an IMS that meets basic
    budgeting requirements--when?
        Ms. Hruby. The plan--it will go along the--around the same
    time as the life cycle plans, because we are still in the
    design phase of the Savannah River pit production----
        Senator Warren. Can I just suggest that it is not a plan if
    you are making it up as you go along and just kind of
    integrating this. You know, you have information on this
    program because you are making budget requests for it.
        So, you must know something because you are coming to us
    asking us for money. But the current plan doesn't even have the
    information on the resources that you will be using for the few
    activities that you have included and asked for money for.
        I just have to say, I am concerned that this looks like it
    is just hiding information from the public and from Congress.
    Either you don't know or you do know when you are not telling
    us and that is a problem. I will just wrap up because I know I
    am over time.
        I just want to say here that the Defense Department is full
    of a lot of really high-priced items. But even in that rarefied
    environment, NNSA run some of the most shockingly expensive
    programs. It is deeply concerning when just basic budgeting is
    out of whack here.
        At a minimum, we need to know how much resources we need
    for a project before we start implementing it, and I am deeply
    concerned that we are just going to use this as an excuse to
    drag out the timeline even further and jack up the cost
    overall.
        It is not unreasonable for Congress to ask you to tell us
    how long a project is going to take and how much it is going to
    cost in exchange for our forking over billions of dollars. I
    suggest that that is what NNSA be required to do before we give
    them another penny. Thank you. Sorry for going over.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator. I would point out that
    Northrop Grumman has given us a fixed price contract for the
    entire rebuilding of the Sentinel program, one of the most
    complex undertakings in the history of the world.
        I understand the point that the Senator is making, that
    having this vague assurances with no real firm cost estimates
    or timeline is not--this is a difficult challenge, I
    understand, but I don't think it is more complicated than
    rebuilding the entire Sentinel program. Any further questions
    on this round? Yes, sir, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. When you submit the budget for the
    production facilities, does it go through Energy or does it go
    through DOD? Where does that come through at?
        Ms. Hruby. The appropriations go through Energy and Water.
        Senator Rounds. I am sorry?
        Ms. Hruby. Energy and Water.
        Senator Rounds. Yes. So, it would come under the Department
    of Energy. But the products that you are producing are critical
    to the national defense because this is the location where the
    pits, a significant number of these pits would be produced for
    the Department of Defense.
        Ms. Hruby. Well, the responsibility for making nuclear
    weapons is with the Department of Energy. Has been since the
    Atomic Energy Commission, since the Manhattan Project, and
    philosophically, the reason for that is so the weapons are not
    produced by warfighters.
        They are produced by people with deep scientific and
    technical knowledge of the weapons and the materials in them.
        Senator Rounds. So, and if I could just--I will wrap up. If
    the Department of Energy had a similar access or could use a
    management plan similar to what was designed for the Sentinel
    program, but also for the B-21, where there was a fixed price
    basically involved in it, has that been something that has been
    discussed within the Department of Energy?
        Ms. Hruby. We discussed this with the Department of Defense
    all the time. We do have cost estimates and independent cost
    estimating capabilities. We review this with the Nuclear
    Weapons Council in detail on a regular basis.
        We are quite transparent in what we know and what our
    uncertainties are. What we don't have in the GAO report is the
    total cost for the entire enterprise, because we are still in
    the process of designing a major part of that enterprise.
        We have cost ranges and we have completion date ranges
    because we don't yet have the amount of information, we need to
    nail down a projected cost.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. One quick followup question, Mr. White. Are
    we processing waste on an ongoing basis, or are we adding to
    the backlog? In other words, is the waste that is being
    produced being processed as it comes, or is the backlog growing
    larger?
        Mr. White. Make sure I understand your question, Senator.
    For a specific site or just in general?
        Senator King. No, just in general, the waste that is being
    produced by the entire enterprise. There is waste being
    produced on a year-to-year basis. Is it being processed or is
    it being processed on a current year to year basis, or is it
    going into a repository for processing at some later date?
        Mr. White. When we look at this, the terms we use are newly
    generated waste and our legacy waste. For the most part, I
    think we are keeping on top of our newly generated waste at the
    same time that we are bringing down the inventory of our legacy
    waste.
        Senator King. So, we are not digging the hole deeper.
        Mr. White. Right.
        Senator King. Correct.
        Mr. White. Right.
        Senator King. Thank you. Go ahead, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, I am
    curious on the AUKUS. The agreements that we are reaching there
    and really the outstanding potential, I think, that we are
    going to see. It is a tremendous opportunity that we can
    increase the capabilities of one of our closest allies.
        It, I believe, also strengthens deterrence in the Indo-
    Pacific, that we are able to do that. Can you provide us with
    an update on how discussions with the Aussies and the Brits are
    going, and how that looks since this 18-month consultation
    period is concluded?
        Admiral Caldwell. Yes, ma'am. I can--can you hear me?
        Senator Fischer. Yes.
        Admiral Caldwell. I can talk about our experiences over the
    18 months, and then tell you that, and where we are headed now.
    Over the 18 months, we have had incredible interactions with
    both of our allies.
        One of the foundational dialogs has been stewardship, to
    make sure that we understand this incredible technology, but we
    treat it with respect. That has been just inherent in every
    part of the dialog that we have had.
        As we think about the different phases of AUKUS, we built
    the optimal path so that Australia could learn, grow. That
    includes embedded opportunities here in the United States and
    in the UK, and eventually grow toward where they not only
    understand the technology, but they are ready to own and
    operate. It includes governance and regulatory structures as
    well.
        I want to leave you with the view that these dialogs have
    been rich. They have been strong. We have a lot of work ahead
    of us. I think we have laid an excellent groundwork. But to
    give you some sense, I have right now six Australian officers
    attending nuclear power school down in Charleston.
        They will graduate from that program and then they will go
    into our U.S. fleet and they will serve initial junior officer
    tours there, qualify as engineer officer, and then we are going
    to find opportunities for them to continue to serve in our
    Navy.
        Likewise, we are considering embedded opportunities in our
    shipyards, in our squadrons, and other areas where we can
    continue to teach, mentor, train, develop their leaders, and
    they are absolutely committed to this.
        The same thing is true with the UK. So, we have completed
    the consultation period. We have described the optimal path.
    Now we are after the details to really make this happen. It is
    exciting, but there is also a lot of work ahead of us.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, and Administrator, before the
    next panel, I would like to highlight the phenomenal work by
    the men and women at Lawrence Livermore to achieve that
    ignition last December.
        I recall being there and visiting NIF in I think it was
    2014, and this is a huge accomplishment. Can you share with the
    Committee really the significance of the breakthrough?
        I know the Admiral said it is going to be a long time, and
    we have all read the articles. It is going to be a long time
    before we can really put this into practice. But gosh, how
    cool. Tell us.
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, thank you for that. It was very cool. It
    speaks to the ingenuity of the scientists and engineers, and
    frankly just the grit. There were a lot of people that didn't
    think it could be done.
        Not only did we do it, but we did it first. I think it
    provides evidence of the power of science and technology in the
    United States of America. For us in the NNSA, this allows us to
    reach regimes, physics regimes for--to study nuclear weapons in
    ways we haven't been able to do in the lab before.
        That is our interest. Of course, the interest of the
    American public and others is the ability to produce boundless
    energy. There is still a lot of work to do to get there, but
    this gives us hope.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Senator King. Thank you. This concludes the first panel,
    and we will not take a break. We will have the second panel
    come to the table and move forward. Thank you all very much.
    Dr. Adams, you are in the center. You want to lead us off?
        Mr. Adams. I would be happy to.
        Senator King. Thank you.

          STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARVIN L. ADAMS, DEPUTY
     ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
                             ADMINISTRATION

        Mr. Adams. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
    distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to discuss the President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget
    Request for NNSA.
        As Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, I am
    committed to working closely with you, our other partners in
    Congress, and the DOD to advance the nuclear security mission.
    The fiscal year 2024 budget request for Weapons Activities is
    $18.8 billion. This is a $1.7 billion increase over fiscal year
    2023 enacted levels.
        This budget will enable us to continue fielding safe,
    secure, reliable nuclear warheads, and an effective nuclear
    deterrent force. NNSA is executing five nuclear warhead
    modernization programs. Two of them are in full rate production
    now and delivering on schedule to the Navy and the Air Force.
        The other three are making steady progress while remaining
    aligned with the DOD platform programs. These modernization
    programs address weapon aging, technology obsolescence, and
    changes in delivery platforms.
        As you know, much of this country's infrastructure for
    manufacturing nuclear warheads has atrophied or disappeared,
    and NNSA is engaged in a massive effort to rebuild this
    infrastructure, an effort that will determine our capabilities
    for decades to come.
        As Administrator Hruby says, we have to get this right. Our
    budget request will enable this rebuilding to proceed at an
    aggressive but executable pace. NNSA's world class
    computational, experimental, and test capabilities are used
    every day to execute our mission. We can't do without them.
        They also attract outstanding individuals and help them
    develop the expertise and judgment that we need in our
    stockpile stewards. They add credibility to our nuclear
    deterrent by demonstrating world leading expertise, as with the
    recent fusion ignition experiment at the National Ignition
    Facility.
        They enable us to maintain confidence in our weapon
    performance without nuclear explosive testing. Our budget
    request will allow us to keep these vital capabilities up to
    date. Our tasks are urgent and challenging, but with continued
    support from Congress, we will succeed.
        Our mission is vital and our workforce is determined. Thank
    you and I look forward to your questions.
        [The joint prepared statement of The Honorable Jill Hruby
    and The Honorable Marvin L. Adams follows:]

    Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Jill Hruby and The Honorable
                                Marvin L. Adams
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's
    fiscal year 2024 budget request for the Department of Energy's (DOE)
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). NNSA appreciates the
    Subcommittee's ongoing bipartisan support for our mission and
    workforce.
        NNSA is making significant progress across the entire portfolio.
    The weapon modernization programs are delivering to the Department of
    Defense. The production modernization and infrastructure initiatives
    are advancing with noticeable progress all around the nuclear security
    enterprise. Nonproliferation and counterterrorism activities continue
    to make the world safer, help Ukraine, and prepare for future threats
    and opportunities. Naval reactors, in partnership with NNSA
    nonproliferation and others across the government, successfully
    completed the 18month consultation period for AUKUS. Our workforce
    recruiting and retention programs have helped us turn the tide of
    attrition post-Covid. Although there are plenty of challenges, it is
    clear that the NNSA enterprise is delivering and creating new
    approaches to accelerate delivery going forward.
        NNSA's priorities, as outlined in the fiscal year 2024 budget
    request, reflect a deteriorating international security environment,
    expanded mission demands, and challenges in building unique large
    nuclear facilities.
        Russia is changing the global nuclear landscape in multiple
    dimensions. As it has for several years, Russia continues development
    of new strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and renewal of its
    tactical nuclear weapons inventory. Its unjustified full-scale invasion
    of Ukraine has also presented several new nuclear threats--the
    potential for a radiological release from a nuclear power plant due to
    active combat or operational missteps, or the use of a nuclear weapon
    in war. In addition, the invasion of a country that voluntarily
    relinquished its nuclear weapons by a nuclear weapon State sends an
    unfortunate signal to the world. Russia's recent decision to suspend
    its participation in New START has no valid legal basis and lends
    uncertainty to the future of arms control and fuels stability concerns.
    Russia's nuclear behavior is irresponsible, and its actions will impact
    global conditions for some time to come.
        In addition, China's advancing and growing nuclear capabilities,
    its reimagined minimum deterrence requirements, and continued lack of
    transparency or interest in arms control dialog are deeply troubling.
    Therefore, the U.S. must prepare for China as a future peer nuclear
    adversary.
        Contending with two peer nuclear adversaries at once will take us
    into uncharted territory and require breaking from strategies we relied
    upon during and after the Cold War.
        Furthermore, North Korea and Iran are destabilizing and present
    persistent nuclear proliferators. North Korea actively tests missiles
    and diversifies its nuclear delivery capabilities and expresses its
    intent to threaten the U.S. and our allies. Meanwhile Iran continues to
    enrich uranium to higher levels and expand its nuclear program far
    beyond JCPOA limits.
        This environment reinforces the need for both continued efforts at
    nuclear arms control and nonproliferation and for the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent as the cornerstone of our national defense and as assurance
    for our allies. As our weapons and infrastructure exceed their design
    lifetimes, we continue to simultaneously execute five weapon
    modernization programs and refurbish significant parts of the NNSA
    production and scientific enterprise to maintain a safe, secure,
    reliable, and effective deterrent for today and into the future.
        NNSA remains acutely aware of the need to increase the pace of our
    modernization efforts while retaining confidence in our nuclear
    stockpile. We also realize this is a once-in-a-severalgeneration
    opportunity to reform our enterprise. NNSA is using the weapon,
    production, and infrastructure modernization programs to intentionally
    create a more flexible and resilient enterprise that can respond to
    unforeseen changes in mission requirements at the pace of the threat.
    This is a significant undertaking, and we have strong headwinds in our
    construction activities. Difficulties in construction are being felt
    across the United States and being studied by economists. Although
    initially thought to be caused by Covid, NNSA projects have continued
    to experience supply chain and craft worker shortages, exacerbated by
    higher-thanexpected inflation. We must adjust our cost estimates, delay
    starting additional large projects, and find innovative ways to
    successfully deliver.
        The challenging security environment, and the demands it places on
    our nuclear weapons enterprise cannot distract us from progress on
    nonproliferation, terrorism prevention, partnering with the
    international community, and keeping pace with new technologies and
    threats. We are facing an increased international demand for nuclear
    energy as a response to the climate crises. As new nuclear energy
    programs emerge, a heightened burden is placed on the nuclear
    nonproliferation regime to prevent nuclear energy programs from
    becoming latent nuclear weapon capabilities or targets for terrorists.
        Excellence in naval propulsion continues to provide the U.S. with a
    competitive advantage. Sustaining, modernizing, and advancing the naval
    propulsion efforts is a priority for NNSA. We will continue to stay
    focused on building the spent fuel handling facility, delivering
    Columbia-class propulsion, and developing next generation capabilities.
    The AUKUS activities have increased the intersection of the naval
    reactors program with nonproliferation and nuclear material production
    activities, and we will continue to stay tightly coordinated.
        The NNSA nuclear security enterprise is meeting today's
    requirements and building for the future. We have a challenging mission
    in a challenging time and are committed to its near-and long-term
    success. Continuous support from this Administration and Congress is
    essential to that success.
                    nnsa significant accomplishments in 2022
        Life Extension and Weapons Modernization Programs: In 2022, NNSA
    transitioned both the B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) and the W88
    Alteration (Alt) 370 Program into Phase 6.6, Full-Scale Production and
    met the deployment requirements set by the Department of Defense.
        National Ignition Facility (NIF): In December, the Lawrence
    Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) NIF reached ignition in a
    controlled fusion experiment resulting in a net energy gain for the
    first time after six decades of global effort. Achieving ignition
    allows new regimes relevant for stockpile understanding to be studied
    and represents an important step toward laser fusion as a potential
    abundant clean energy source.
        Plutonium Pit Production: Los Alamos National Laboratory's
    Plutonium Facility manufactured ten W87-1 development pits in 2022.
    Progress on build rates and quality has been excellent.
        Ukraine: NNSA has provided a wide range of equipment, training, and
    technical aid to Ukraine to help prevent and respond to the dangers of
    a nuclear emergency at Ukraine's nuclear power plants. Equipment
    provided includes emergency diesel generators and generator fuel. We
    also continuously monitor radiation sensor data in Ukraine and the
    region to provide independent results for early warning, and regularly
    practice emergency communications with the Ukrainians.
        Surplus Plutonium Disposition: In December, NNSA completed its
    first shipment of downblended surplus plutonium from the Savannah River
    Site (SRS) in Aiken, South Carolina to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
    (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico. NNSA has converted a cumulative total
    of 1,298 kilograms of plutonium to an oxide form in preparation for
    final disposition.
        Nuclear Material Reduction: In 2022, NNSA removed more than 55
    kilograms of weapons-usable nuclear material from partner countries in
    Asia, Europe, and North America, achieving permanent threat reduction.
    The third nuclear research reactor in Kazakhstan was converted from
    highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and
    Japan transferred HEU from Kyoto University to the United States for
    permanent disposition.
        Global Material Security: NNSA removed 101 cesium blood and
    research irradiators from U.S. facilities, the largest number in a
    single year; 93 were replaced by radioactive source-free alternative
    technologies. We are on track to meet the statutory requirements of
    replacing all cesium-based blood irradiators in the United States by
    2027.
        Counterterrorism: NNSA participated in Cobalt Magnet 2022, the
    latest in a series of full-scale exercises with Federal, State, and
    local stakeholders to test concepts of operations and methods for
    assessing, interpreting, and communicating the impacts of a release of
    radioactive material. NNSA also assumed the role of vice chair of the
    Nuclear Forensics Executive Council and helped develop the Nuclear
    Forensics and Attribution Strategic Plan that establishes milestones
    and requirements to shorten timelines to support Presidential
    decisionmaking during a crisis.
        Infrastructure Innovation: NNSA completed construction of an
    Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at LLNL in California under the
    innovative Enhanced Minor Construction and Commercial Standards (EMC2)
    initiative for streamlining non-complex, non-nuclear construction
    projects. This project finished 13 months after receiving construction
    funding, ahead of schedule and under budget.
        Workforce Recruitment: NNSA expanded recruitment efforts for top
    talent in the sciences, engineering, and skilled crafts and trades in
    coordination with our M&O partners. This has resulted in the highest
    Federal staffing levels since 2013 and over 11,000 people hired in the
    enterprise. Additionally, NNSA continues to develop the next-generation
    workforce through its Minority Serving Institutions (MSI) and Tribal
    Educational partnership programs and supported 84 MSI interns in 2022.
        Workforce Retention: In response to high attrition, a mid-year
    salary adjustment was granted at our laboratories, plants, and sites to
    better pace inflation and changing employee expectations. More flexible
    benefit packages were also implemented. These timely actions have
    helped lower attrition to levels closer to normal.
                     nnsa's fiscal year 2024 budget request
        The President's fiscal year 2024 budget request for NNSA is $23.8
    billion, an increase of $1.7 billion, or 7.6 percent, above the fiscal
    year 2023 enacted level. \1\ This funding request reflects the
    requirements in the nuclear weapons program of record, the National
    Security Strategy, the Nuclear Posture Review, and other national
    security strategies and requirements. The funding request supports
    expanded mission due to the global environment and takes into account
    increased costs and delays in construction projects. We are mindful and
    deeply appreciative of the sustained support from Congress, multiple
    administrations, and the American people.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Fiscal year 2023 enacted levels throughout this document do not
    reflect the mandated transfer of $99.7 million fromNaval Reactors to
    the Office of Nuclear Energy for operation of the Advanced Test
    Reactor.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Fiscal year 2023 enacted levels throughout this document do not
    reflect the mandated transfer of $99.7 million from Naval Reactors to
    the Office of Nuclear Energy for operation of the Advanced Test
    Reactor.
                        weapons activities appropriation
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request for the Weapons Activities
    account is $18.8 billion, an increase of $1.72 billion, or 10 percent,
    above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. The request will be
    supplemented with prior year balances of $61.6 million.
        The budget request represents the Administration's firm commitment
    to a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent
    underpinned by world-class science and modern resilient infrastructure
    and protected with advanced physical and cybersecurity measures. The
    fiscal year 2024 request reflects the increased urgency needed to
    modernize weapons and refurbish, revitalize, and reinvest in the
    nuclear enterprise and workforce.
                              stockpile management
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request for Stockpile Management is
    $5.2 billion, an increase of $251 million, or 5.1 percent, above the
    fiscal year 2023 enacted level. Activities include: (1) weapons
    modernization, (2) stockpile sustainment, (3) production operations,
    (4) weapons dismantlement and disposition, and (5) nuclear enterprise
    assurance.
    Weapon Modernization Programs
        The Weapon Modernization Program request is $3.1 billion, an
    increase of $200 million, or 6.9 percent, above the fiscal year 2023
    enacted level.
        W88 Alt 370: The W88 Alt 370 program has entered Phase 6.6, Full-
    Scale Production, and is currently on schedule to meet Department of
    Defense (DOD) deployment schedules. The budget request of $179 million
    is $17 million higher than the fiscal year 2023 enacted level, with the
    increase needed to mitigate risks encountered in Pantex production.
        B61-12 LEP: The B61-12 LEP has entered Phase 6.6, Full-Scale
    Production. The B61-12 LEP consolidates multiple variants of the B61
    gravity bomb and improves the safety and security of the weapon.
    Production is currently on schedule to meet DOD deployment schedules.
    The budget request of $450 million, $222 million lower than the fiscal
    year 2023 enacted level, is informed by carryover and reflects
    completion of production of many components.
        W80-4 LEP: The W80-4 LEP has entered Phase 6.4, Production
    Engineering. NNSA revised the first production unit (FPU) schedule in
    response to COVID-19 impacts, slower than planned hiring and increased
    attrition, and increased component technical challenges. NNSA's revised
    schedule is fully aligned with the U.S. Air Force's (USAF) Long Range
    Standoff Missile's schedule for initial and full operating capability.
    The budget request of $1.01 billion is $123 million lower than the
    fiscal year 2023 enacted level, consistent with long-standing plans and
    with typical warhead program profiles, with expenditures ramping down
    from the current peak as the program moves through its remaining
    phases.
        W87-1 Modification Program: The W87-1 will replace the aging W78
    warhead using a modification to the existing W87-0 design. The W87-1
    will deploy new technologies that improve safety and security, address
    obsolete designs and materials, and simplify warhead manufacturability.
    The W87-1 has entered Phase 6.3, Development Engineering, and
    expenditures are ramping up accordingly. The fiscal year 2024 request
    of $1.07 billion is $389 million higher than the fiscal year 2023
    enacted level. This request fully supports the increased activity
    needed to execute Phase 6.3 in fiscal year 2024. The request is
    informed by the recently completed Weapon Design Cost Report, the
    associated Independent Cost Review by the Office of Cost Estimating and
    Program Evaluation, and analysis of achievable execution rates by the
    enterprise.
        W93 Program: The W93 is a third warhead for our submarine launched
    ballistic missiles and is a new warhead. The key nuclear components
    will be based on currently deployed and previously tested nuclear
    designs that will not require nuclear explosive testing to certify. The
    W93 program is a separate but parallel program to the replacement
    warhead program in the United Kingdom. In February 2022, the W93
    entered Phase 2, Feasibility Study and Design Options. The budget
    request of $390 million, an increase of $149 million over the fiscal
    year 2023 enacted level, reflects the ramp-up associated with Phase 2
    and is informed by improved cost estimates.
    Stockpile Sustainment
        Sustaining today's stockpile is the top priority for NNSA. The
    Stockpile Sustainment program executes warhead maintenance, limited
    life component exchanges, minor alterations, surveillance, assessments
    including annual assessments and significant findings investigations,
    surety studies and capability developments, and management activities
    for all weapons systems in today's stockpile. The fiscal year 2024
    budget request for Stockpile Sustainment is $1.28 billion, a decrease
    of $44.6 million, or 3.4 percent, below the fiscal year 2023 enacted
    level. Most of the decrease is due to completion of certain sustainment
    activities for the W78 and W80 and reduced program requirements for the
    B83.
    Production Operations
        Production operations maintains capabilities for warhead
    manufacturing and surveillance that are not specific to ``tail
    numbers''. The budget request of $711 million is $80 million higher
    than the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. Activities supported by the
    request budget include full rate production of the B61-12 and W88 Alt
    370, capability support for Power Sources and Energetics at Sandia
    National Laboratories, capability support for production of neutron
    generators and detonators, expansion and equipment relocation at Kansas
    City, maintenance of production and dismantlement equipment, and
    recruitment and development of skilled personnel to perform production
    activities.
    Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition
        Warhead modification and alterations since the end of the Cold War
    have relied heavily on reuse of components from dismantled warheads,
    and this will continue at least through the W80-4 program. Warhead
    programs, Naval Reactors, the tritium program, and Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation's research-reactor programs all depend on recycled
    material from dismantled warheads. The fiscal year 2024 request of
    $53.7 million, a decrease of $2.3 million from the fiscal year 2023
    enacted level, supports the dismantlements and dispositions that are
    needed in fiscal year 2024 for B6112 production, W88 Alt 370
    production, naval-reactor material, research-reactor material, and
    uranium to fuel the Watts Bar nuclear reactors in which tritium is
    produced.
    Nuclear Enterprise Assurance (NEA)
        The NEA program assists the nuclear security enterprise in actively
    managing subversion risks to the nuclear weapons stockpile and
    associated design, production, and testing capabilities from subversion
    threat pathways. The fiscal year 2024 budget request of $66.6 million,
    an increase of $17.7 million, or 36.2 percent, over the fiscal year
    2023 enacted level, represents the planned ramp-up of this new program
    that began in its current form in fiscal year 2022. The requested
    funding is needed to establish cross-site, multi-disciplinary assurance
    capabilities; address highest priority subversion risks at each of the
    eight NNSA sites; institute cybersecurity of nuclear weapon policy,
    requirements, and oversight processes; and establish, update, and
    expand NEA training and qualification programs.
                            production modernization
        The production modernization program re-establishes and modernizes
    the manufacturing capabilities for nuclear weapons that degraded or
    were eliminated after the Cold War. The fiscal year 2024 budget request
    for Production Modernization is $5.6 billion, an increase of $439
    million, or 8.6 percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. This
    funding is focused on the timely establishment of nuclear weapon
    production capabilities for primaries, secondaries, tritium and
    depleted uranium, and non-nuclear components.
    Primary Capability Modernization
        Pit Production: NNSA's most pressing recapitalization effort is
    reconstitution of plutonium pit production. NNSA is statutorily
    required to produce no fewer than 80 pits per year (ppy) by 2030. The
    Secretary of Energy and the Nuclear Weapons Council have previously
    notified Congress that NNSA will not meet the 80 ppy by 2030
    requirement. However, NNSA remains firmly committed to achieving 80 ppy
    as close to 2030 as possible. Through close coordination with DOD, NNSA
    will maintain the reliability and effectiveness of the nuclear
    stockpile until pit production capabilities are fully established.
        NNSA is proceeding with the two-site approach for producing at
    least 80 ppy, with the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium
    facility set to produce 30 ppy and the Savannah River Plutonium
    Processing Facility (SRPPF) set to produce at least 50 ppy. The two-
    site approach is a key component of NNSA's development of a modern
    nuclear security enterprise, with an emphasis on flexibility and
    resilience. The fiscal year 2024 budget request for the Los Alamos
    Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP4) is $670 million, an increase of
    $82 million, or 13.9 percent, over the fiscal year 2023 enacted level.
    For SRPPF, the fiscal year 2024 request is $858 million, a decrease of
    $342 million, or 28.5 percent, over the fiscal year 2023 enacted level.
    This decrease reflects the use of projected fiscal year 2023 carryover
    for long lead time equipment purchases that will not need to be
    repeated in fiscal year 2024.
        At Los Alamos, production processes continue to mature. Forty
    development pits have been built, and build rates and quality are
    increasing. NNSA expects the first war reserve (WR) pit to be produced
    near the end of calendar year 2024 and an increasing number of WR pits
    to be produced each subsequent year. The fiscal year 2024 budget
    request for LAP4 will support an increase in engineering evaluations
    and certification activities to produce WR plutonium pits in tandem
    with increased equipment purchases and installation activities. NNSA
    believes the fastest path to reaching 30 WR ppy at LAP4 involves
    balancing the priorities for production maturation and equipment
    installation so that both are ready for rate production. The budget
    request also supports the hiring, training, and qualification of
    additional staff necessary for WR pit production.
        The fiscal year 2024 request for SRPPF will continue to support
    design activities and the work started in fiscal year 2023 on early
    site preparation, demolition and removal of old equipment and materials
    from the main process building, and long-lead procurements.
        High Explosives and Energetics (HE&E) Program: The HE&E program
    focuses on modernization of high explosives processing facilities
    across five NNSA sites. The HE&E program enables the production of high
    explosives and energetic materials required for nuclear weapons,
    including the main charge, boosters, detonators, actuators, timer/
    drivers, and spin rockets.
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request for the HE&E program is $195
    million, a decrease of $53.4 million, or 21.5 percent, below the fiscal
    year 2023 enacted level. The decreased budget reflects the decision to
    put the High Explosives Synthesis, Formulation, and Production project
    at Pantex and the Energetic Materials Characterization Facility at Los
    Alamos on hold, while prioritizing the High Explosives Science and
    Engineering (HESE) facility at Pantex, including capital equipment
    purchases, construction, and transition to operation, as well as other
    key projects currently under construction throughout the nuclear
    security enterprise. The request also reflects prioritization of a
    partnership that began in fiscal year 2022 with Naval Surface Warfare
    Center Indian Head to manufacture and supply insensitive high
    explosives equipment purchases and process development.
    Secondary Capability Modernization
        The fiscal year 2024 request for Secondary Capability Modernization
    is $1.64 billion, an increase of $522 million, or 46.8 percent, above
    the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. NNSA is restoring, modernizing, and
    enhancing its enriched uranium, depleted uranium, and lithium
    manufacturing processes needed to meet requirements for nuclear weapon
    secondary stage production. This request includes an additional $398
    million for the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) and other investments
    needed to support overall secondary stage production.
        Enriched Uranium Capability Modernization: NNSA's enriched uranium
    manufacturing modernization strategy includes the relocation of
    enriched uranium processing capabilities into UPF at the Y-12 National
    Security Complex (Y-12) and other enduring facilities to reduce mission
    dependency on Building 9212, which is over 75 years old. UPF will
    provide for the long-term viability and security of enriched uranium
    processing while improving worker and public safety and promoting
    environmental stewardship. Ongoing supply chain issues, delayed
    equipment delivery, contractor performance, inflation, and shortages of
    qualified labor have contributed to cost growth and schedule delays
    beyond the originally scheduled completion date of December 2025. UPF
    is just over 50 percent complete with the first four non-nuclear
    subprojects concluded.
        In addition to UPF, NNSA is refurbishing buildings 9215, 9204-2E,
    and 9995 to establish modern processes and extend their operational
    lifetimes into the 2040's. A key change will be the establishment of
    electrorefining to provide purified uranium metal and eliminate the
    current high-hazard chemical process. To reduce overall mission risk
    during the transition, NNSA has a service contract with Nuclear Fuel
    Services in Erwin, TN for converting uranium oxide to metal.
        Depleted Uranium Modernization: Along with revitalized enriched
    uranium processing capabilities, NNSA continues to advance its depleted
    Uranium (DU) modernization program. Established in fiscal year 2021 to
    meet mission requirements to produce radiation cases and other DU
    components, this program will reconstitute lapsed DU alloying and
    component manufacturing capabilities at Y-12 while investing in new
    technology to improve efficiency, reliability, and capacity. The
    equipment at Y-12 formerly used in this process has been inoperable for
    the last 15 years, and its reconstitution is a critical component of
    successful weapons modernization. The timely introduction of new
    technology will allow rebuilding a limited capacity for the former
    processes.
        Lithium Modernization: The NNSA Lithium modernization strategy
    includes restarting processes while constructing the Lithium Processing
    Facility to address increased mission demand in the future. LPF will
    replace the lithium manufacturing processes within Y-12 buildings 9204-
    2 and 9202, which are lithium recovery, purification, component
    fabrication operations and salvaging. These buildings are in disrepair
    and do not possess the capabilities or capacity to meet demands beyond
    2035. LPF will provide modern technologies and a safer environment for
    both workers and the public.
    Tritium and Domestic Uranium Enrichment Modernization
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request for the Tritium and Domestic
    Uranium Enrichment Modernization effort is $593.0 million, an increase
    of $13.0 million, or 2.2 percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted
    level.
        Tritium Modernization: The Tritium modernization program provides
    tritium supplies for nuclear weapon requirements, including recycling
    tritium gas and sustaining reliable supply chain infrastructure and
    equipment. Multi-year modernization plans reflect increasing future
    demand. NNSA is already increasing production levels at the Tennessee
    Valley Authority and extracting the produced tritium at the Savannah
    River Site (SRS). NNSA is designing and initiating site preparations
    for the Tritium Finishing Facility (TFF) at SRS, which will replace a
    1950's-era facility. The TFF site preparation subproject began in
    fiscal year 2023 using carryover funds from prior years. The fiscal
    year 2024 budget request reflects a prioritization decision to complete
    the site preparation subproject but move the remainder of the project
    out in time, as we focus resources on SRPPF and other higher-priority
    construction projects.
        Domestic Uranium Enrichment: Tritium production relies on enriched
    uranium. The Domestic Uranium Enrichment (DUE) program is responsible
    for providing sufficient capacity of unobligated enriched Low Enriched
    Uranium (LEU) for tritium production and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
    for naval propulsion fuel, as well as obligated or unobligated High
    Assay LEU (HALEU) for research reactors. The fiscal year 2024 budget
    request for the DUE program is $258.3 million, an increase of $113.4
    million, or 78.3 percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. The
    fiscal year 2024 budget request continues support for HEU downblending
    that will extend the need date for unobligated LEU for tritium
    production to 2044. The funding request also supports ongoing
    enrichment technology development and acquisition activities to meet
    future unobligated enriched uranium needs. New funding is requested to
    leverage the Office of Nuclear Energy's procurement of HALEU from
    industry to support defense needs and to begin conceptual design
    activities for an unobligated enrichment technology pilot plant. Such
    efforts complement the investments provided in the Inflation Reduction
    Act to the Office of Nuclear Energy for HALEU to help the private
    sector establish domestic uranium enrichment capabilities for the long
    term, so we will be able to reduce our dependence on Russia and address
    a critical strategic vulnerability.
    Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization (NNCM)
        The NNCM program funds the capability and capacity for non-nuclear
    components (external to the primary or secondary stage of the nuclear
    explosive package) in weapon systems. Nonnuclear components provide
    arming, fuzing, and firing functions and safety and use control
    features, among others. Providing these functions requires a wide range
    of technologies and components including radiation-hardened
    microelectronics, neutron generators, gas transfer systems, power
    sources, electrical assemblies, cables, connectors, structural
    elements, pads/cushions, and a multitude of other parts that are
    incorporated into the systems that support or weaponize the nuclear
    explosive package. NNCs make up more than half the cost of weapons due
    to the number and complexity of the elements, and the need for
    qualification in extreme environments over the warhead life. The fiscal
    year 2024 budget request is $167 million, an increase of $44 million
    over the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. The request includes funding
    to provide equipment for increased manufacturing capacity at the Kansas
    City National Security Campus (KCNSC); reconstitute thermal spray
    capability at Sandia National Laboratories; recapitalize radiation and
    major environmental test facilities at Sandia National Laboratories for
    design and qualification; and provide tools and equipment for the
    Microsystems Engineering, Science, and Applications (MESA) Complex at
    Sandia National Laboratories as the only approved source of trusted,
    strategically radiation hardened microelectronics.
        Fiscal year 2024 funding will also be used to develop production
    modernization strategies for weapon staging and warhead assembly
    operations at Pantex.
                         infrastructure and operations
        A well-organized, well-maintained, and modern infrastructure system
    is the bedrock of a flexible and resilient nuclear security enterprise.
    NNSA's infrastructure consists of $134 billion in assets and
    facilities. More than 60 percent are beyond their life expectancy, with
    some of the most important dating back to the Manhattan Project.
    Modernization and recapitalization of deteriorating infrastructure will
    allow NNSA to meet expanded mission needs, provide a safe and up-to-
    date work environment to attract and retain a high-quality workforce,
    and incorporate new technologies and techniques to make the nuclear
    security enterprise more efficient, reliable, secure, and
    environmentally responsible. NNSA must accelerate infrastructure
    delivery while also balancing investments to optimize execution
    capacity and value delivery. NNSA is challenging its traditional
    mindset to shift to agile delivery methods, such as focusing on minimal
    viable projects, phased delivery, and whole site approaches.
        When the Cold War ended NNSA was left with large and aged
    buildings, environmental contamination, and the need to close
    facilities for some key weapon components such as plutonium pits. Going
    forward, we need to be creative in facility design and cultivate
    capabilities that can rapidly scale up or down depending on the
    international environment and mission need while being minimally
    disruptive to contracts, workforce, facilities, and the environment.
    This includes developing strategic partnerships with industry and using
    new acquisition approaches to purchase facilities rather than pursuing
    traditional Federal construction projects. NNSA is increasingly
    exploring the use of its real eState authority to achieve timely
    acquisition of modern, non-complex infrastructure to support the
    mission.
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request for Infrastructure and
    Operations is $2.77 billion, an increase of $164.5 million, or 6.3
    percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. This increase will
    enable NNSA to operate and modernize NNSA's infrastructure to support
    expanded mission objectives and future enterprise resilience. The
    increase also enables NNSA to address external factors such as supply
    chain delays, inflation, and labor shortages which have raised costs
    and extended timelines for projects, making it difficult to deliver
    projects within the baselines established. To address these challenges,
    NNSA is focused on improving early stage project and portfolio level
    planning, identifying and applying lessons learned through independent
    project reviews, and taking actions to streamline project delivery and
    increase buying power.
        A significant portion of the requested increase will support the
    Kansas City Non-Nuclear Expansion Transformation (KCNExT) plan. NNSA is
    currently pursuing acquisition of 245 acres of land immediately
    adjacent to the KCNSC because the current KCNSC manufacturing capacity
    is inadequate to support the Program of Record. Since its initial
    conception, the KCNExT strategy has shifted from a land acquisition
    with government construction to a lease-purchase acquisition with
    landowner construction. The execution of the lease-purchase agreement
    in fiscal year 2024 will allow for immediate construction using
    commercial building standards and accelerate completion of the first
    major phase of the expansion. Funding in fiscal year 2024 will protect
    NNSA's interests in the property and accelerate overall completion of
    KCNExT.
        Funding is also requested to initiate three new mission enabling
    construction projects at the site.
        NNSA continues to refine innovative solutions developed over the
    last several years to streamline low-risk, non-nuclear construction
    projects to save time and money. Consistent congressional support has
    been invaluable in bringing these innovations to fruition. NNSA is
    grateful for the additional authority in the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2023, which raised the minor
    construction threshold from $25 million to $30 million and provided a
    3-year pilot program to raise the threshold to account for inflation.
    This will make a critical difference in NNSA's ability to further
    innovate minor construction and complete low-risk projects on time even
    during a period of higher-than-normal inflation.
        Using data-driven risk-informed tools, NNSA pinpoints when and
    where infrastructure investments are needed and develops innovative
    execution initiatives to streamline processes, accelerate delivery, and
    increase buying power. For example, in fiscal year 2019 NNSA
    established the EMC2 pilot program to streamline commercial-like
    construction projects. The initial program quickly expanded from four
    projects to ten in 2021, including the addition of five office
    buildings at LANL to support plutonium pit production. In fiscal year
    2022, NNSA completed the LLNL's Emergency Operations Center in just 13
    months after receiving full construction funding, the first project
    under this pilot program. This year, NNSA held the ribbon cutting for
    the Y-12 Fire Station and the Y-12 Emergency Operations Center. Both
    projects began construction in 2021 and were ready for full operations
    in just 2 years.
                stockpile research, technology, and engineering
        For Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering, the fiscal
    year 2024 budget request is $3.2 billion, an increase of $246.6
    million, or 8.4 percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level.
    Approximately $100 million of the requested increase is for the Z-pinch
    Experimental Underground System (Zeus) Test Bed Facilities Improvement
    Project and the Advanced Sources and Detectors Scorpius radiography
    capability, which provide the main capabilities within Enhanced
    Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments at the Nevada National
    Security Site (NNSS).
        The Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering portfolio
    covers activities that serve as the foundation for science-based
    stockpile activities, including the capabilities, tools, and components
    that are used every day to assess the active stockpile and to certify
    warhead modernization programs without the need for underground nuclear
    testing. NNSA's unparalleled science and technical capabilities, and
    commitment to their constant improvement, helps cultivate the knowledge
    and expertise to maintain confidence in the stockpile. The major
    activities in the Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering
    portfolio are described here.
    Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments (ECSE)
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request for ECSE is $292.3 million, an
    increase of $15.1 million, or 5.5 percent, above the fiscal year 2023
    enacted level. ECSE will produce experimental data in underground
    tunnels at the NNSS that enables high fidelity assessment of the
    current stockpile and certification of the future stockpile without the
    need to return to underground nuclear explosive testing. ECSE
    experiments are designed to remain subcritical throughout the
    experiment to adhere to the current U.S. policy of a ``zero yield''
    nuclear testing moratorium. Funding in fiscal year 2024 will support
    the continued preparation and implementation of ECSE.
    Stockpile Responsiveness Program (SRP)
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request for SRP is $69.8 million, an
    increase of $6.1 million, or 9.6 percent, above the fiscal year 2023
    enacted level. SRP is responsible for exercising and enhancing
    capabilities through the entire nuclear weapons lifecycle to improve
    the responsiveness of the United States to future threats,
    technological trends, and international developments not addressed by
    current warhead modernization programs. SRP is investing in efforts to
    address issues in design for manufacturability, digital engineering,
    component, and system prototyping and testing.
    Weapons Technology and Manufacturing Maturation (WTMM)
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request for WTMM is $327.7 million, an
    increase of $41.5 million, or 14.5 percent, above the fiscal year 2023
    enacted level. The WTMM program invests in system-agnostic technology
    development and advanced manufacturing capabilities to reduce the
    technological risks and life-cycle costs of maintaining and enhancing
    the stockpile. Technology and manufacturing maturation enables the
    development and delivery of design-to-manufacturing capabilities to
    meet the current programs of record and future nuclear weapons design
    and production needs of the nuclear security enterprise.
    Inertial Confinement Fusion Program (ICF)
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request for ICF is $601.6 million, a
    decrease of $28.3 million, or 4.5 percent, below the fiscal year 2023
    enacted level, reflecting the use of projected carryover for fiscal
    year 2024 requirements. The ICF program provides high energy density
    (HED) science capabilities and expertise that support research and
    testing across the breadth of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Its
    twofold mission is to meet immediate and emerging HED science needs to
    support the deterrent of today, and to advance the R&D capabilities
    necessary to meet those needs for the deterrent of the future. In a
    breakthrough on December 5, 2022, the ICF Program reached fusion
    ignition and achieved net energy gain for the first time in history.
    The fiscal year 2024 request supports ICF research and facilities,
    enabling access to experimental data that underpins the safety,
    security, and effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile and building on
    the success of last year's achievement.
    NNSA Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC)
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request for ASC is $782.5 million, a
    decrease of $7.5 million, or 1.0 percent, below the fiscal year 2023
    enacted level. ASC will provide NNSA with leading edge simulation
    capabilities to support weapons design, science-based stockpile
    stewardship, and stockpile certification activities. The fiscal year
    2024 budget request will continue funding maturation of next-generation
    simulation and computing technologies. Additionally, El Capitan, the
    first exascale computer for national security, is expected to come
    online at LLNL for classified computing in 2024. At over two exaflops,
    it will be the world's fastest supercomputer.
                    academic programs and community support
        For Academic Programs and Community Support, the fiscal year 2024
    budget request is $152 million, an increase of $40 million, or 36
    percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. This budget increase
    includes the addition of $30 million for the new Community Capacity
    Building Program.
        Starting in fiscal year 2024, NNSA is proposing to elevate Academic
    Programs from a congressional-control level within SRT&E to a stand-
    alone Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) Unit/control level,
    and to also establish a Community Capacity Building Program to provide
    benefits to disadvantaged communities, including Tribal Nations and
    rural communities, that are affected by activities at NNSA's sites.
    These changes will enable improved program integration, agility,
    development, and alignment to critical workforce needs, promote the
    President's goal of advancing diversity, equity, inclusion, and
    accessibility through the Federal Government, and bolster underserved
    communities affected by activities at the NNSA sites in the areas of
    job creation, community restoration, infrastructure projects, and
    educational resources.
        The challenges of modernizing our nuclear stockpile demand a strong
    and diverse base of national expertise in specialized technical areas
    that uniquely contribute to nuclear stockpile stewardship. Academic
    Programs supports educational capacity building in unique disciplines,
    such as nuclear science, radiochemistry, materials at extreme
    conditions, high energy density science, advanced manufacturing, and
    high-performance computing. This budget supports our key objectives to
    strengthen these fields of research through scientific advancement,
    drive academic innovation that can be leveraged by our national
    laboratories, ensure that a diverse and robust cadre of experts are
    trained in these key fields and recruited into careers in the nuclear
    security enterprise, and maintain U.S. preeminence in these disciplines
    to ensure that nuclear deterrence remains effective. This budget
    supports managing academic solicitations and competitive awards in
    these disciplines, enabling connections between these academic research
    communities and the nuclear security enterprise, and attracting and
    retaining this pipeline of developed talent to ensure the future
    workforce of NNSA can meet the evolving needs of the enterprise. NNSA
    is also building the pipeline for technicians and skilled craft trades
    to meet ongoing and emerging needs at national laboratories, plants,
    and sites. The Apprenticeships for Complete and Committed Employment
    for Specialized Skills (ACCESS) programoutlined in the fiscal year 2020
    NDAA--was motivated by the need to support apprenticeships for
    specialized skills that are vital to the nuclear security enterprise. A
    Funding Opportunity Announcement was issued late last year and the
    first awards for this program were distributed in February 2023.
                          secure transportation asset
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request for Secure Transportation Asset
    (STA) is $357.1 million, an increase of $12.6 million, or 3.7 percent,
    above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. STA supports the safe and
    secure transportation of nuclear weapons, components, and special
    nuclear material throughout and across the nuclear security enterprise
    to meet nuclear security requirements. Multiple activities critical to
    the successful execution of NNSA's missions, including weapon
    modernization programs, limited-life component exchanges, surveillance,
    dismantlement, nonproliferation activities, and experimental programs,
    rely on STA for safe, secure, and on-schedule transport.
        The Office of Secure Transportation's (OST) priorities for fiscal
    year 2024 include the sustainment and ongoing modernization of
    operations and equipment. This includes the Safeguards Transporter life
    extension program until it can be replaced by the Mobile Guardian
    Transporter (MGT). The FPU for the MGT is planned in fiscal year 2028.
    Additional funding is requested to support minor construction projects
    essential for replacement and refurbishment of aging facilities and
    mission requirements.
        OST remains focused on recruiting and retaining a well-trained,
    highly qualified Federal Agent and staff workforce to support mission
    requirements. OST has implemented strategies to increase the Federal
    Agent workforce by offering higher incoming pay, recruitment
    incentives, and the creation of ladder positions for high performers.
                            defense nuclear security
        Defense Nuclear Security's fiscal year 2024 budget request is $1.02
    billion, an increase of $144.7 million, or 16.6 percent, above the
    fiscal year 2023 enacted level. The Office of Defense Nuclear
    Security's primary mission is protecting the facilities, assets, and
    people responsible for successfully carrying out NNSA's national
    security missions. Growth in NNSA's mission portfolio, and the
    associated growth in projects in secure areas such as LAP4, UPF, and
    SRPPF, along with increased resources necessary to meet core security
    requirements, has led to increased program requirements for Defense
    Nuclear Security.
        Full funding of the fiscal year 2024 budget request will support
    these larger requirements as well as high-priority initiatives for the
    Physical Security Center of Excellence and the Center for Security,
    Technology, Analysis, Response, and Testing. Additionally, this
    increase includes additional funding for the West End Protected Area
    Reduction (WEPAR) project at Y-12 to address cost increases associated
    with contractor performance, delays in other projects outside WEPAR's
    scope, and external factors affecting projects enterprise wide.
                    information technology and cybersecurity
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request for information technology and
    cybersecurity is $578.4 million, an increase of $132.7 million, or 29.8
    percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. This request funds
    current operations and continues investments across NNSA to modernize
    both unclassified and classified systems and the execution of a robust
    and effective cybersecurity capability.
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request supports the cost necessary to
    maintain a secure and resilient cyber program. The request invests in
    operations, mission support, infrastructure modernization, labor
    growth, and associated investments to execute statutory requirements,
    Executive Order 14028, policy requirements, and Office of Management
    and Budget memorandums. The fiscal year 2024 requested increase
    reflects investments in endpoint detection and response, zero trust
    architecture, operational technology, enterprise cybersecurity tools
    and services, and cyber workforce growth at the labs, plants, and
    sites.
        The request funds cybersecurity programs at NNSA's laboratories,
    plants, and sites to address the significant increase in technology use
    and keep pace with expanded NNSA mission requirements. The funding
    increase supports the ongoing modernization of NNSA's network
    architecture and classified systems, including the Emergency
    Communications Network. The fiscal year 2024 request includes the costs
    associated with classified infrastructure and capabilities,
    implementation of cloud infrastructure, and unclassified IT services.
    These improvements reflect NNSA priorities in improving both
    unclassified and classified collaboration tools and network services,
    as well as providing redundancy and improved performance for mission
    partners around the world.
                        defense nuclear nonproliferation
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request for the Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation account is $2.51 billion, an increase of $19 million,
    or 0.8 percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. The request
    will be supplemented with prior year balances of $20.0 million.
    Reducing nuclear risks and supporting a robust nonproliferation regime
    and partnerships improves the effectiveness of our deterrent and
    enhances U.S. and global security. Expanding priorities include support
    for Ukraine with our allies and partners, preparing for a growing and
    evolving nuclear power fleet, assuring allies who might be rethinking
    the need for nuclear weapons, and getting ahead of biological threats.
        This account funds all nonproliferation-related activities in the
    offices of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), Emergency Operations
    (EO), and Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP). The
    activities carried out by these offices support the Administration's
    2022 National Security Strategy, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review,
    Presidential Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the
    recently signed National Security Memorandum to Counter Weapons of Mass
    Destruction Terrorism and Secure Nuclear and Radioactive Material.
    NNSA's defense nuclear nonproliferation programs are part of a whole-
    ofgovernment approach to extend U.S. defenses against nuclear threats
    far beyond our borders. They help prevent adversaries from acquiring
    nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials, technology, and expertise;
    develop monitoring technology for arms control and early detection of
    proliferation activities; counter adversary efforts to acquire such
    weapons or materials; and respond to nuclear or radiological incidents
    and accidents worldwide.
                        defense nuclear nonproliferation
        From its inception, DNN has developed and implemented policy and
    technical solutions to minimize or eliminate proliferation sensitive
    materials and limit or prevent the spread of materials, technology, and
    expertise necessary for nuclear and radiological weapons. Longstanding
    and growing cooperation with partner governments; international
    organizations such as the IAEA, the World Customs Organization, and
    INTERPOL; and the private sector help develop and implement solutions.
    These programs work side-by-side with both NNSA's Weapons Activities
    and Naval Reactors programs to implement best practices for
    nonproliferation and materials security in our own programs.
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request will allow DNN to work in a
    global landscape that has radically changed in the last 12 months.
    Russia's unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine; the expansion and
    diversification of Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals; the
    destabilizing activities of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic
    of Korea (DPRK); the expected growth in nuclear material, technology,
    and technical expertise resulting from the global expansion of nuclear
    power and nuclear technology adoption; and the associated risk of
    illicit smuggling and procurement networks all complicate nuclear
    nonproliferation missions and demonstrate the need for additional
    resources and deeper engagement with allies and partners. DNN will
    utilize these resources to improve capacity and capabilities, develop
    and incorporate cutting-edge technology required to address future
    threats, and deepen cooperation with partners.
    Material Management and Minimization (M3)
        The M3 program's fiscal year 2024 budget request is $446 million, a
    decrease of $18.3 million, or 3.9 percent, below the fiscal year 2023
    enacted level. This reduction reflects the availability of prior year
    balances to fund planned activities for fiscal year 2024.
        M3 programs are focused on the reduction and, when possible,
    elimination of weapons-usable material globally. The fiscal year 2024
    budget request supports the conversion or shutdown of research reactors
    fueled by HEU. The program will build on the success of the molybdenum-
    99 (Mo-99) program, which last year enabled the Secretaries of Energy
    and Health and Human Services to jointly certify that a sufficient
    supply of non-HEU-based Mo-99 is available to meet the needs of
    patients in the U.S. The request further supports the optimization of
    proliferation resistance in new reactor designs, the recovery of
    critically needed high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), the removal
    and disposal of weapons-usable material located abroad, and the removal
    of HALEU from a partner country. Finally, the budget request supports
    the downblending of the removed HEU in the United States, and the
    downblending and removal of surplus plutonium from South Carolina per
    the settlement reached in August 2020. As previously noted, at the end
    of 2022 the first shipment of downblended surplus plutonium was shipped
    from K Area at SRS to WIPP in New Mexico. Additionally, to date, M3 has
    removed or confirmed the disposition of nearly 7,300 kilograms of
    weapons-usable nuclear material from 48 countries and Taiwan and has
    eliminated the need for weapons-grade material at 108 civilian research
    reactors and isotope production facilities.
    Global Material Security (GMS)
        The GMS program's fiscal year 2024 budget request is $524.0
    million, a decrease of $8.7 million, or 1.6 percent, below the fiscal
    year 2023 enacted level. The fiscal year 2024 request supports program
    efforts to prevent terrorists and other non-State actors from acquiring
    the nuclear and radioactive materials, equipment, and technical
    expertise for the construction and use of an improvised nuclear device
    (IND) or radiological dispersal device. This work is carried out in
    coordination with domestic and international partners to improve the
    security of vulnerable materials and facilities and build partner
    capacity to detect, disrupt, investigate, and interdict illicit
    trafficking of these materials. This workload is expected to increase
    with the anticipated growth in nuclear material acquisition and usage.
    Nuclear and radioactive materials have widespread power generation,
    agricultural, medicinal, and industrial applications. In 2021 alone the
    IAEA's Incident and Trafficking Data base recorded over 120 incidents
    of attempted theft and/or smuggling of such materials. GMS maintains 84
    bilateral partnerships and works with multilateral organizations such
    as the IAEA, INTERPOL, and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
    (UNODC) to counter theft and smuggling networks and improve security of
    vulnerable assets. Finally, as part of an ongoing strategic analysis
    process, GMS is exploring innovative approaches, technologies, and
    tools to adapt to emerging threats and the growing demand for nuclear
    energy and technology. This includes ongoing efforts to replace all 400
    cesium-137 based blood irradiators in the United States by 2027 as
    mandated in the fiscal year 2019 NDAA and further contributions to find
    alternatives for Cobalt-60 in the recycling and reuse of plastic waste.
    Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC)
        The NPAC program's fiscal year 2024 budget request is $212.4
    million, a decrease of $18.3 million, or 7.9 percent, below the fiscal
    year 2023 enacted level. The reduced request reflects a planned
    decrease in annual budget required for the International Atomic Energy
    Agency (IAEA) test bed because the peak budget year has passed. It also
    reflects successful efforts to accelerate the Advanced Reactor
    International Safeguards Engagement (ARISE) program in fiscal year
    2023. Activities funded under this request support NNSA efforts in two
    critical areas: (1) preventing nuclear and dual use technology from
    becoming nuclear proliferation concerns; and (2) bolstering the
    international verification regime by technology development and
    implementation for safeguards, arms control, and emerging challenges.
    Ensuring the highest nonproliferation standards for AUKUS while
    protecting naval nuclear propulsion technology has become an added
    dimension to our nonproliferation efforts.
        The greater use of nuclear technology is an issue of increased
    salience for NPAC. In particular, nuclear energy programs are rapidly
    expanding as countries seek sources of zero-carbon electricity to
    combat climate change. Promoting stringent safeguards and security
    policies, and developing new monitoring and verification technologies
    are key to preventing proliferation. NPAC also supports the development
    and implementation of section 123 agreements and the regulation of
    nuclear technology exports through part 810 authorizations.
        The fiscal year 2024 request supports IAEA and partner countries'
    efforts to implement international safeguards obligations and builds
    domestic and international capacity to implement export control
    obligations. The request also supports the Arms Control Advancement
    Initiative (ACAI) to maintain expertise and technology development
    during a period when new arms control agreements are less likely and to
    be prepared for future opportunities. NNSA also continues development
    of approaches and strategies to address emerging nonproliferation and
    arms control challenges and opportunities.
        During the 18-month consultation period on AUKUS, we participated
    in an international working group tasked with developing
    nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the AUKUS program fully
    consistent with our status as a responsible nuclear power and our
    obligations as a nuclear-weapon State Party to the Nuclear Non-
    Proliferation Treaty (NPT). NNSA provided technical advice to the
    interagency and our AUKUS partners on the full suite of requirements
    that underpin nuclear stewardship to implement the strongest possible
    safeguards and verification measures and achieve the overall objectives
    of AUKUS. NNSA looks forward to taking the next steps in the process of
    helping a key ally improve both its security and the security of the
    Indo-Pacific region, while maintaining the highest nonproliferation
    standards. The fiscal year 2024 request supports the foundation of our
    nonproliferation and safeguards work on AUKUS.
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D)
        DNN R&D is vital in the development of technical capabilities which
    support nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and emergency response
    missions. In addition, DNN R&D sustains and develops the foundational
    nonproliferation technical competencies that promote the agility needed
    to support a broad array of nonproliferation missions and potential
    threats. These include the detection of nuclear detonations; foreign
    nuclear weapons programs' activities; and the presence, movement, or
    diversion of special nuclear materials.
        The DNN R&D program fiscal year 2024 budget request is $728.2
    million, a decrease of $39.7 million, or 5.2 percent, below the fiscal
    year 2023 enacted level. The decrease is a result of the early
    completion of Phase 1 of the Uranium Science and Technology Center
    testbed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request supports planned activities for
    the early detection of proliferation-related R&D and the continued
    production of nuclear detonation detection satellite payloads. The
    request also supports continued efforts to sustain and develop
    foundational nonproliferation technical competencies by providing
    targeted, long-term support for enabling infrastructure, science and
    technology, and an expert workforce. The request also continues to
    develop and maintain advanced technical nuclear forensics analysis
    capabilities at the U.S. national laboratories that can support time-
    critical decisions in the event of a nuclear or radiological incident
    and assist in determining the origin of interdicted materials or
    nuclear devices.
    NNSA Bioassurance
        The bioassurance program's fiscal year 2024 budget request is $25
    million, an increase of $5 million, or 25 percent, above the fiscal
    year 2023 enacted level. NNSA appreciates Congress' support in the
    establishment of this program. The program focuses on developing core
    capabilities at the U.S. national laboratories, such as high-
    performance computing for accelerated threat assessment and rapid
    countermeasure design; surveillance and detection capability
    development; safeguards and export controls; and forensics to support
    attribution. NNSA coordinates closely with the DOE's Office of Science
    in leveraging national laboratory capabilities and technical expertise
    by making complementary investments in biological sciences and
    engineering, computational capability, and classified workspaces to
    advance fundamental understandings of biology and adapt those
    understandings to bio-resilience. The fiscal year 2024 request supports
    the establishment of the initial operating capability and coordinated
    DOE programs in biosciences, including phased science plan
    implementation with exploratory research and equipment purchases.
    Nonproliferation Construction
        The nonproliferation construction program fiscal year 2024 budget
    request is $77.2 million, an increase of $5.4 million, or 7.6 percent,
    above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. This program consolidates
    construction costs for DNN projects. In support of the dilute and
    dispose strategy for surplus plutonium disposition, the Surplus
    Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project will add additional glovebox
    capacity at SRS to increase plutonium dilution and aid in the removal
    of plutonium from the State of South Carolina. The fiscal year 2024
    request will support completing the final design review and activities
    to request CD-2/3, Approval of Performance Baseline and Start of
    Construction, to initiate full construction of the SPD project.
                 nuclear counterterrorism and incident response
        The fiscal year 2024 request for Nuclear Counterterrorism and
    Incident Response (NCTIR) is $493.5 million, an increase of $23.6
    million, or 5 percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. The
    NCTIR program supports two subprograms: Counterterrorism and
    Counterproliferation (CTCP) and Emergency Operations (EO). The CTCP
    fiscal year 2024 budget request is $474.4 million, an increase of $34.3
    million, or 7.8 percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. The
    EO fiscal year 2024 budget request is $19.1 million, a decrease of
    $10.7 million, or 36 percent, below the fiscal year 2023 enacted level.
        The CTCP subprogram advances the Nation's technical capabilities to
    understand, defeat, and attribute nuclear threat devices, including
    INDs and lost or stolen nuclear weapons; provides technical guidance on
    physical security requirements for nuclear materials; and conducts
    Nuclear Threat Reduction exchanges with the United Kingdom and France
    to prevent, counter, and respond to nuclear terrorism and nuclear
    proliferation.
        CTCP also manages NEST, NNSA's multi-mission emergency response
    capability comprised of scientific and technical experts who are
    trained and equipped to respond rapidly in the event of a nuclear or
    radiological incident or accident worldwide. NEST includes nuclear
    forensics capabilities that enable technical personnel to identify the
    origin of nuclear material interdicted outside of regulatory control or
    used in a nuclear attack.
        Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has resulted in an
    increased operational posture for CTCP since February 2022. In fiscal
    year 2023, CTCP received supplemental appropriations of $110.3 million
    to support the U.S. Government's response to the conflict in Ukraine.
    CTCP is using these funds for radiation detection and monitoring of
    Ukrainian nuclear facilities; personal protective equipment; emergency
    diesel generators; and procurement of diesel fuel and consumables for
    Ukraine's nuclear power plants. CTCP will continue to deliver incident
    response training and build capacity among responders in Ukraine and
    other partner nations.
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request is driven by changes in the
    operating environment, as CTCP's core capabilities are being leveraged
    by key domestic and international partners, including DOD, Federal
    Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. allies and partners bilaterally and
    multilaterally, and international organizations such as the IAEA. The
    request will support additional NEST capacity for large and complex
    nuclear and radiological emergencies, with a particular focus on
    nuclear threat reduction activities as part of the U.S. Government's
    response to the Ukraine conflict. Additionally, this increased capacity
    will allow NEST to expand interagency partner training to improve
    regional capabilities nation-wide to characterize and defeat weapons of
    mass destruction (WMD) devices. This effort leverages many of the
    investments made and experiences gained from the recently completed
    ``Capability Forward'' initiative to train and equip the FBI's regional
    render safe teams in 14 U.S. cities to take decisive action against a
    wide range of WMD devices. Additional funding will also enable the
    continuation of planned investments to provide solutions for countering
    nuclear proliferation through applied analysis, testing, concept
    development, technology development, predictive modeling, and testing.
    These investments include targeted funding for High Performance
    Computing, which will support modernizing and improving the unique
    assessment capabilities at the NNSA national laboratories.
        The CTCP subprogram also supports the interagency National
    Technical Nuclear Forensics (NTNF) mission, a central pillar of the
    U.S. strategy to deter hostile states from providing nuclear material
    to terrorists. Fiscal year 2024 funding enables CTCP to support NTNF
    efforts to close gaps in the fulfillment of new interagency forensics
    and attribution requirements. Funding will bridge a longstanding gap
    between research and development activities geared toward technology
    transition and NTNF operational capabilities.
        The EO subprogram provides both the structure and processes to
    ensure a comprehensive and integrated approach to all-hazards emergency
    management across the Department. The EO program aims to improve
    readiness and effectiveness of the DOE Emergency Management System and
    the nuclear security enterprise response regardless of the nature or
    location of the emergency. This unity of effort and culture of
    continuous improvement helps safeguard the health and safety of workers
    and the public, protect the environment, and enhance the resilience of
    the Department and the Nation. EO coordinates plans and procedures for
    prevention, protection, mitigation, response to, and recovery from, all
    hazards emergency accidents, incidents, events, and to support
    operational emergencies. In addition, the fiscal year 2024 budget
    request supports Continuity of Operations, Continuity of Government,
    and Enduring Constitutional Government programs to advance the National
    Continuity Policy and ensure the continued performance and delivery of
    essential lines of business and services under any circumstances.
    Fiscal year 2024 funding provides for 24/7/365 Consolidated Emergency
    Operations Center communications and coordination support to the DOE/
    NNSA Emergency Management Enterprise, nuclear security enterprise, and
    Departmental senior leadership. The decrease in the budget request for
    fiscal year 2024 is due to the completion of certain investments in the
    consolidated emergency operations center's and alternate operations
    centers' infrastructure and supporting communications equipment, and
    classified communications systems improvements in fiscal year 2023.
                          naval reactors appropriation
        With 79 ships, or more than 40 percent of the Navy's major
    combatants1A\2\, relying on nuclear propulsion technology, maintaining
    a qualitative edge in this area remains critical to our national
    security posture. Providing the Nation's submarines and aircraft
    carriers with unparalleled mobility, flexibility, responsiveness, and
    endurance is vital in today's complex geopolitical environment. The
    ability to maintain robust fleet capabilities on long-term missions is
    essential for the security of global trade and our allies. The Office
    of Naval Reactors remains the foundation of this national achievement
    in global security. Continuous progress in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
    Program gives the U.S. Navy a decisive edge in naval warfare and
    enhances the security and reliability of the sea-based leg of our
    nuclear triad.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Major combatants, in this instance, include aircraft carriers,
    submarines, and surface combatants based on the ``Active in
    Commission'' column from the Naval Vessel Register
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request for Naval Reactors is $1.96
    billion, a decrease of $117.3 million, or 5.6 percent, below the fiscal
    year 2023 enacted level. This decrease reflects the revised funding
    profile for the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project that was
    recently re-baselined, and near-complete refueling and overhaul of the
    S8G Prototype land-based reactor in New York. The budget request
    supports the continued safe and reliable operation of the nuclear-
    powered fleet and provides for the continued maintenance, oversight,
    and operations at the four Naval Nuclear Laboratory sites and the
    associated contractor workforce. Funding also supports requirements for
    the office's major initiatives: Columbia-class ballistic missile
    submarine reactor systems development; development of the next
    generation SSN(X) attack submarine; and continued progress on base
    technology development, infrastructure recapitalization at program
    sites, and decontamination and decommissioning efforts.
        Consistent, sustained funding is vital for the support of these
    efforts and will allow Naval Reactors to meet current and future force
    needs; this foundational support of Naval Reactors is critical to our
    ability to deliver on AUKUS. The Columbia-class lead ship remains under
    construction and the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project at
    the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho is ongoing. Additionally, work is
    underway to invigorate long lead-time technology development for the
    current and future nuclear fleet while supporting specific requirements
    to meet the Navy's timeline for the next-generation attack submarine
    ship authorization.
                  federal salaries and expenses appropriation
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request for Federal Salaries and
    Expenses (FSE) is $539 million, an increase of $64 million, or 13.5
    percent, above the fiscal year 2023 enacted level. Part of the increase
    is driven by the one-time use of carryover balances in fiscal year
    2023. The increase in this account will support an additional 90
    Federal Full-time Equivalents (FTE) for a total of 2,006. FSE
    appropriations will also support pay and benefit escalation, travel
    costs, support service contractors, training, space and occupancy
    expenses, the working capital fund, and other related expenses.
        NNSA's workforce represents the backbone of the Nation's nuclear
    security enterprise. The fiscal year 2024 request supports staffing
    levels sufficient to provide oversight and leadership for our growing
    mission requirements in the modernization, recapitalization,
    nonproliferation, and counterterrorism programs. NNSA seeks to recruit
    and retain top talent in a wide array of fields including science,
    engineering, crafts and trade, business, foreign affairs and social
    sciences, and project and program management. This workforce is
    distributed across the nuclear security enterprise and can be found in
    eight states and Washington, DC.
        NNSA continues to face significant demographic and competition-
    based challenges to its recruitment and retention strategy. As of
    fiscal year 2023, 18.7 percent of NNSA FTE Federal staff are eligible
    to retire, a number that is expected to rise to 34.3 percent by fiscal
    year 2028. While attrition rates are today lower than the above-average
    rates in fiscal year 2021, high overall attrition remains a concern.
    NNSA must also compete for top-tier talent with private sector
    companies. Many of the skills needed for NNSA to meet expanded and
    future mission requirements are also in high demand for both
    established and emerging industries, all of whom are drawing from a
    limited applicant pool.
        NNSA must continue achieving modest increases in the size of the
    Federal workforce required to manage the Nation's national nuclear
    security programs. Using innovative recruiting techniques, coupled with
    available excepted service and direct hiring authorities, NNSA's
    recruitment team will focus on outreach and recruitment for mission
    critical occupations. We will continue agency-sponsored career fairs
    and other events targeted toward college students, military personnel
    and spouses, as well as persons with disabilities. Additionally, NNSA
    continues to expand use of programs with engaged and dedicated entry-
    level talent, including the Presidential Management Fellows Program,
    Pathways Intern Program, Operation Warfighter Program, Minority
    Servicing Partnership program, and the NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program
    among others.
        NNSA's hiring efforts will support mission and growth requirements
    with an overall goal of reaching 2,130 FTEs by fiscal year 2027. These
    goals will also support the Administration's objective of promoting
    diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility across the Federal
    Government as a means of fostering new technological advancements,
    cultivating the next generation of researchers to maintain America's
    role as a leader in scientific excellence, and enhancing national
    security.
                                   conclusion
        NNSA's enduring responsibility is to provide the United States with
    a nuclear weapons stockpile and naval nuclear propulsion systems
    capable of providing a credible and effective deterrent while
    simultaneously executing nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs
    aimed at reducing global nuclear risk. In an increasingly complex
    international environment where the existential threats of both nuclear
    war and climate change loom larger than ever, these efforts are vital
    to protecting and promoting American and global security.
        As the only U.S. Government organization capable of designing,
    manufacturing, and delivering nuclear weapons, NNSA has a unique
    responsibility to protect our Nation and our allies. The fiscal year
    2024 budget request recognizes the urgency with which NNSA must execute
    its present mission needs while simultaneously preparing the nuclear
    security enterprise to handle future missions in a less stable
    geopolitical climate. It provides funding for the five concurrent life
    extension and modernization programs supporting all three legs of the
    nuclear triad, as well as two phase one studies. It also continues
    significant investments in revitalized or new production facilities for
    plutonium pits, secondaries, and other critical nuclear and non-nuclear
    components. The budget request has made priority decisions on
    construction projects recognizing that worker shortages and supply
    chain issues that confound progress will not improve if more projects
    are underway in the enterprise simultaneously. The request supports the
    manufacturing base of the future by advancing the incorporation of
    scientific and technological breakthroughs during our revitalization.
    NNSA will continue to provide a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile
    without resuming nuclear explosive testing by advancing our scientific
    tools and understanding. We will be innovative and responsive to
    recruit and retain the brightest, most diverse scientific and
    engineering minds of the next generation.
        The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request reflects the
    ongoing need to minimize and secure nuclear and radiological materials
    to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands and pairing it with
    policies and cooperation in an international community that is rapidly
    embracing nuclear energy and technology. The DNN portfolio recognizes a
    world where risks are more diffuse and new innovations in arms control
    verification and international cooperation are both necessary to
    maintain security and more challenging to realize. The increased budget
    for the counterterrorism and counterproliferation program is similarly
    attuned to the changing threat environment and supports the nuclear
    aspects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Finally, the growth in NNSA's
    bioassurance program recognizes a future where these threats must also
    be managed while allowing the full benefit of new technology.
        The Naval Reactors budget request recognizes and supports the
    incredible partnership between NNSA and the U.S. Navy in consistently
    supporting the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad through
    infrastructure recapitalization, a new spent fuel handling facility,
    ongoing work to deliver the Columbia-class propulsion system on time
    for deployment, and investment in the nuclear propulsion for SSN(X).
        Not since the Manhattan Project has there been a more challenging
    moment for NNSA. We face an urgent, expanded mission at a time when
    labor is limited, supply chain disruptions abound, and inflation rates
    are higher than planned. Successfully meeting our objectives requires
    consistent investment and clear-eyed prioritization. We appreciate your
    support for our fiscal year 2024 budget.

        Senator King. Thank you, sir. General.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMAS A. BUSSIERE, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
                      FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

        General Bussiere. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
    and distinguished Committee Members, I am honored to be here
    today to represent the men and women of Air Force Global Strike
    Command and provide you an update on our mission, our airmen,
    our modernization programs, and the challenges we face in
    sustaining our legacy weapons systems.
        As you all know, the world is a very different place than
    it was in 2009 when this command was activated. Air Force
    Global Strike Command was created to ensure the Air Force
    dedicated the appropriate leadership and oversight of our
    Nation's nuclear mission.
        As the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, I
    intend to make sure no one forgets why this command exists. For
    the first time in history, the U.S. faces two major nuclear
    strategic competitors.
        China continues to expand, modernize, and diversify their
    nuclear forces, and is the foremost country positioned to
    reshape its region and the international order to comply with
    its authoritarian purposes.
        Meanwhile, President Putin has engaged in reckless rhetoric
    about the use of nuclear weapons as Russia persists in their
    unprovoked attacks on Ukraine in an attempt to expand their
    power and influence. Air Force Global Strike Command remains
    the bedrock of our Nation's defense and the international
    insurance against these threats.
        I would like to thank the Members of this Committee for
    your steadfast support as we continue to modernize our weapons
    systems. I will briefly highlight some of our ongoing
    initiatives. We continue to maintain and operate our current
    minimum three ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], and
    we are already preparing our wings in their surrounding
    communities to receive the future ICBM, the Sentinel.
        Additionally, our bomber fleet, including the B-1s and our
    dual capable B-2s and B-52s, are being sustained with
    innovative solutions as we prepare for the future bomber fleet,
    including the B-21 Raider and the B-52 Juliet. In addition to
    ICBM and bombers, we continue our efforts to modernize our
    nuclear command and control communications, or NC3.
        NC3 is integral to the national military command system
    used to exercise and conduct continuous survivable and secure
    nuclear command and control. To maintain the security of our
    Nation and our allies and partners, the U.S. must ensure our
    weapons are capable and ready.
        Our airmen are empowered and equipped. The airmen of Air
    Force Global Strike Command fulfill our mission with
    discipline, excellence, and pride. However, a number of our
    airmen also face personal challenges, including health
    concerns, housing and childcare availability, and we are
    working tirelessly to develop prompt and comprehensive
    solutions to ensure our airmen are getting the care and support
    they deserve.
        Last December, I was honored to be confirmed by you to be
    the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. There is no
    other place I would rather be. Strategic deterrence and long-
    range strike are foundational to our Nation's defense, and Air
    Force Global Strike Command is the backbone of these mission
    sets.
        With our legacy platforms, our modernized forces, and our
    devoted airmen, we safeguard our Nation now and, in the
    decades, to come. Thank you for this opportunity. I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Thomas A. Bussiere
    follows:]

                Prepared Statement by General Thomas A. Bussiere
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    and discuss the readiness, sustainment, and modernization of our
    nuclear and long-range strike weapons and platforms. The mission of Air
    Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) is to provide strategic deterrence
    and long-range strike. This command is the lead for sustaining current
    forces and fielding future long-range strike weapon systems. The demand
    signal for these capabilities is unlimited; they are the foundation to
    an independent Air Force (AF), and the backbone of our National Defense
    Strategy.
        The threat to international stability continues to grow,
    highlighting the importance of both strategic deterrence and long-range
    strike. The global risks have escalated to a tipping point. We are in
    the novel territory of great power competition; thus we must be able to
    credibly provide a nuclear deterrent against two nuclear adversaries
    concurrently. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is in the midst of a
    strategic breakout through a rapid nuclear expansion and continues to
    develop new military capabilities. Additionally, Russia's full-scale
    war against Ukraine continues alongside its efforts to develop anti-
    satellite weapons, hypersonic technology, and cyberspace activities.
    The aggressive and provocative behaviors occurring within the strategic
    arena underscore the urgency of our efforts to modernize our weapon
    systems while we maintain our strategic posture, and this
    responsibility falls on AFGSC. This is a no fail mission.
        AFGSC is ready today to meet the requirements given to us from the
    President and the Commander of United States Strategic Command
    (USSTRATCOM), but there is zero operational margin left. Supply chains
    responsible for legacy system parts are closing, and require innovation
    to fill those gaps. Additionally, there are mission areas that I feel
    have received less attention than other high value acquisition programs
    but are equally critical to our strategic deterrence. I aim to
    illuminate those mission areas and highlight the risks to our national
    security if we do not provide them more focus. Unique to this mission
    area and to AFGSC, we must maintain our legacy weapon systems at full
    operational capability until the future force is ready to take on the
    operational requirement. For example, the B-21 ``Raider'' is the
    world's first sixth generation aircraft and will offer the United
    States unparalleled capabilities, but until it is mission capable, we
    must be postured to deter and, if necessary, fight with our current
    force of B-1, B-2, and B-52 bomber aircraft. Nearly every portfolio in
    AFGSC is going through modernization, and the balance of these
    transitions is critical.
        As the Commander of AFGSC, my priority is to ensure we are ready to
    conduct our mission with great discipline, that we strive for
    excellence, and our airmen take pride in our historic legacy. Our
    ``Strikers'' are proud to be the backstop of integrated deterrence and
    the sole provider of air-delivered long-range conventional and nuclear
    strike and land-based nuclear strike capabilities for our allies and
    partners. Our personnel have remained focused in the face of a rapidly
    changing geopolitical environment. As the Air Component to USSTRATCOM,
    we continue to preserve our ability to execute nuclear options upon
    direction from the President with safe, secure, credible, and reliable
    weapons, while we concurrently ensure conventional, long-range strike
    viability. What we do every day of every week is the foundation of our
    Nation's defense. We are stewards of our Nation's most important
    mission, which is an absolute privilege. Continued congressional
    support through stable, reliable funding ensures our Strikers are
    equipped with the necessary resources to ensure we compete effectively
    and responsibly as our Nation moves into a new strategic era.
                              airmen and families
        Our airmen and their families represent the greatest strength of
    AFGSC. Through their service and sacrifice, they operate, maintain, and
    secure the most powerful weapons ever designed and execute continuous
    long-range strike operations across the globe. Such critical missions
    require the complete focus and attention of our Strikers. To continue
    the development of our airmen, AFGSC has established academic alliances
    with education programs, encouraged Command sponsored research, and
    continued to develop our personnel through internships and
    participation in exercises. Retaining talent is also crucial to our
    mission success and providing the right environment for families is a
    large piece of an airman's decision to remain in the AF. We know there
    are challenges to families outside the struggles of daily military
    life. Our wings are working hard within their abilities to provide
    solutions to healthcare challenges, housing shortages, and long
    childcare waitlists.
        AFGSC established a collaboration with Louisiana Tech University
    through the Global Strike National Security Fellowship Program,
    utilizing a small team of interns trained in coding, automation,
    machine learning, and artificial intelligence to develop tailored
    analytic tools for bomber operations. Moreover, AFGSC has championed
    implementing the Envision cloud computing platform to produce
    operational dashboards and provide data-driven insights for
    decisionmakers across the nuclear enterprise. Finally, AFGSC has
    institutionalized a Data Modernization and Analytics Board to create
    data-centric, insight-driven organizations capable of achieving and
    maintaining decision advantage. The board, comprised of subject matter
    experts in technology, analysis, information systems, and data, advises
    on technical and modernization efforts across the Command.
        Our Strikers and their families are the key ingredient to our
    command's success. Their exceptional resiliency and commitment to
    excellence have enabled AFGSC to maximize our combat capacity and
    strategic readiness. To maintain this level of success, we are actively
    engaged in initiatives to recruit and retain a diverse and talented
    group of future Striker leaders. However, in recent years, these
    efforts have become increasingly difficult to sustain as we encounter
    challenges to provide for the needs of our airmen and families. These
    challenges are not unique to AFGSC, but many of our rurally located
    installations and their unique nuclear mission sets have amplified the
    impact of many of these challenges.
        AFGSC has taken an active role in addressing the concerns about a
    potential correlation between missile field service and elevated health
    risks. We are responding with both urgency and transparency to compile
    comprehensive data to understand the risk to our airmen and their
    families. Our command team is working with the USAF School of Aerospace
    Medicine to ensure a thorough study is conducted covering a variety of
    geographic locations, AF Specialties, and work environments. In
    coordination with Headquarters Air Force (HAF) and the Defense Health
    Agency (DHA), we will ensure this study addresses the concerns of and
    appropriately communicates the progress to our airmen, families,
    retirees, congressional members, and the American people.
        Across the command, but especially pronounced within our more rural
    communities, AFGSC installations are combatting housing concerns for
    inventory, adequacy, and affordability. This challenge is most
    intensified at installations with significant military construction
    (MILCON) efforts that are preparing for an increased amount of
    personnel such as Ellsworth Air Force Base (AFB), South Dakota. Over
    the last several years, the Rapid City region and surrounding areas
    have experienced a surge in housing demand which far outpaces current
    availability.
        AFGSC is also experiencing childcare needs beyond the capacity of
    our Child Development Centers (CDC). Hiring challenges are the primary
    driver of the current shortfalls at installation CDCs. Additionally,
    there are limited options within the local community, which are often
    cost-prohibitive for military families. However, various wings are
    implementing initiatives to combat these gaps. The Malmstrom AFB school
    liaison officer championed a pilot ``Transitional-K'' program for
    military children. This early childhood development program within the
    on-base CDC intends to address childcare issues and enhance academic
    performance. The pilot program includes 18 military families with
    support from local high schools and the local university to help
    children transition between pre-K and a kindergarten educational
    environment. Additionally, this program helps offset childcare needs
    and allows military families access to early childhood development
    resources. Minot AFB has also taken several steps to enhance the
    quality of life concerning childcare. They have reduced onboarding
    timelines from 60 to 30 days. Additional advocacy has resulted in the
    base CDC receiving top priority from AF Installation and Mission
    Support Center to plan, design, and construct two additional classrooms
    and renovate an existing classroom into two separate rooms; this
    initiative will enable the care of 30 more children. Furthermore, Minot
    AFB has implemented a $5,000 hiring incentive for an 18-month
    commitment as part of recruiting and retention initiatives. The
    installation's Childcare Working Group examines all avenues to expand
    available, quality childcare.
                                   operations
        The 20th Air Force (20AF) continues to operate, maintain, and
    defend the Minuteman III (MMIII) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
    (ICBM) weapon system and meet all USSTRATCOM operational requirements.
    The last 3 years showed the resiliency and ingenuity of our airmen as
    they faced the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic while still
    operating, maintaining, and defending our land-based strategic
    deterrent at the highest readiness levels seen across the entire
    Department of Defense. The lessons and adaptations to mission
    accomplishment will play a vital role in the force development
    structure employed in the future. Additionally, we continue to provide
    critical sustainment programs to maintain our MMIII's lethality through
    the end of life, and our forces remain ready to transition to on-time
    fielding of Sentinel, our new Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD).
        Our nuclear security teams remain ready and lethal to meet any
    challenge. Additionally, 20AF is home to the AF's largest contingent of
    Security Forces Airmen. As such, 20AF faces many challenges associated
    with organizing, training, and equipping such a substantial force of
    dedicated professionals. However, these airmen continue to thrive,
    working within current constraints and capabilities to support the
    USSTRATCOM operational plan requirements while gearing toward our
    future and the fielding of the Sentinel system.
        At Malmstrom AFB, the 40th Helicopter Squadron and the 341st
    Missile Security Operations Squadron have joined forces in the
    Integrated Alert/Operations Facility--having these on-demand response
    entities housed under one roof streamlines operational functions and
    training activities. As Security Forces begin to enter the operations
    world, with many staffs now under the Ops Directorate, Security Forces'
    officers are now integrating to new depths at the tactical level. By
    living, eating, and operating together, these teams are becoming more
    lethal and more responsive than ever before.
        Since 2019, we have been working with the Pentagon as part of the
    Federal Aviation Administration's Obstruction Evaluation process to
    evaluate requests from energy developers consistent with title 10, U.S.
    Code, section 183a. In 2021, after completing a substantial analysis
    and a formal safety risk assessment, Global Strike determined that wind
    turbines located within two nautical miles (NM) of an ICBM launch or
    missile alert facility would unacceptably degrade national security and
    threaten the safety of our pilots in the event of an emergency
    response. One of the critical components of nuclear security for the MM
    III ICBM weapon system is the ability to respond rapidly and with
    sufficient force over a dispersed ICBM complex the size of the State of
    South Carolina. The UH-1N and its replacement MH-139 provide the
    airlift, surveillance, and overwatch capabilities to enable nuclear
    security, day or night, and in all weather conditions. Wind turbines
    over 200 feet in height create an unacceptable collision risk within
    that critical airspace. AFGSC currently assesses that 46 ICBM launch
    and missile alert facilities are severely encroached on by existing
    wind turbines. AFGSC continues to work with energy developers through
    the processes established in title 10, U.S. Code, section 183a to
    reduce the number of existing turbines and develop alternate locations
    to avoid any additional turbines within 2NM. In addition, our Sentinel
    team and the missile wings continue to engage with and educate
    landowners and other key stakeholders on AFGSC's vital ICBM mission and
    the risks created by wind turbines within 2NM.
        AFGSC has experienced several mission successes within 20AF,
    including the ICBM Cryptographic Upgrade II, which will reach initial
    operating capability by mid-2023. Although fielding this capability has
    faced a few delays, its implementation allows for remote ICBM
    cryptography changes, has already saved hundreds of labor-hours, and
    increases nuclear surety and security. Additionally, the Tactical
    Response Force/Helicopter integration working group was initiated in
    late 2021 and continues to meet the full spectrum of nuclear security
    challenges successfully. Last, we continue to engage with partners and
    develop plans for cooperation on training and knowledge exchange as we
    begin employing the MH-139A, Grey Wolf helicopter.
        Looking forward, we have completed 65 percent construction of the
    first Weapons Generation Facility at F.E. Warren, Air Force Base (AFB),
    Wyoming. This facility is an ultra-secure combined nuclear maintenance
    and storage facility. We will continue using the lessons learned from
    F.E. Warren to gain efficiencies at future Weapons Generation Facility
    constructionsites. In addition, we deployed the first high-speed data
    backbone command and control unit at our first ICBM wing. Three hundred
    personnel trained and equipped 72 vehicle systems, created 12 tech ops
    centers and erected 40 towers which provide the missile field complex a
    $94 million high-speed, self-healing communication system.
        AFGSC continues to encourage our Wings and personnel to innovate to
    execute the mission better. New ICBM security response procedures will
    allow security experts to lead security response in the missile
    complex. As part of Sentinel, each missile wing will receive a new on-
    base Launch Facility Trainer specifically for security forces' use--
    including active alarm systems and cameras. AFGSC has also coordinated
    a lease with Camp Guernsey, Wyoming, to provide 24/7 unimpeded access
    to 6 small arms ranges enabling distance shooting up to 500 meters. The
    new $23 million indoor small arms range complex at Minot AFB, North
    Dakota, is complete and FOC. Malmstrom AFB, Montana, has three
    operational small arms ranges and uses nearby Fort Harrison, Montana,
    for long-distance small arms firing. Last, as the new Payload
    Transporter (PT) completes fielding, we anticipate de-certified PTs
    will be available for SF training.
        The MMIII ICBM remains viable as the ground leg of our nuclear
    triad. However, the 50-year weapon system and accompanying
    infrastructure will face significant challenges as it nears end-of-
    life, with the major factors being parts obsolescence and diminishing
    manufacturing sources. Over 150 ICBM launch vehicles and operational
    ground equipment components require risk mitigation to remain
    operationally viable until their end-of-life. The missile wings have
    logged over 2.4 million maintenance hours over the last 5 years, which
    is a 30 percent increase over the previous 5 years. However, our
    installations still carry a maintenance backlog of 21,000 work orders,
    and models predict a 25 percent increase over the next Future Year
    Defense Program (FYDP). Additionally, our weapon system sustainment
    execution budget has grown over 17 percent within the last 5 years.
    MMIII sustainment acquisition programs such as Launch Control Center
    Block Upgrade, Automatic Switching Unit replacement, and Payload
    Transporter Replacement are critical in maintaining capability.
    However, the fundamental mitigation action for MMIII to avoid exceeding
    its operational viability is the fielding of our next generation weapon
    system program, Sentinel.
        Sentinel, the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), will
    modernize or replace MMIII flight systems, weapon system command and
    control, and launch systems, including missile silos, control centers,
    and other ground infrastructure. The program is in its third year of a
    7-year development effort. Sentinel faces the same challenges that many
    major defense acquisition programs are facing. Macroeconomic factors,
    manpower challenges, and inflationary effects pose significant
    challenges; nevertheless, the Sentinel program's top priority is
    keeping Sentinel on a path to meet the warfighters' need. The
    Department of the Air Force (DAF) is currently identifying acquisition
    levers to capitalize on opportunities to keep this projected IOC date.
    Like other systems within the Command, the Sentinel program will
    require stable funding and a whole-of-government approach to ensure
    prompt delivery and avoid critical shortfalls in our Nation's defense.
        The MH-139A program accepted the first four MH-139s in August 2022.
    Developmental Test has started at Duke Field at Eglin AFB, Florida, and
    AFGSC expects Initial Operating Capability at Malmstrom AFB in Fiscal
    Year 2025. Milestone C was approved early March 2023 and starts entry
    into Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP). LRIP will consist of three
    lots of two to 16 aircraft each, with the first lot delivering 13
    aircraft. The UH-1N s quickly facing obsolescence challenges one would
    expect of a weapons system of over 50 years. The MH-139 is the answer
    to ensure safe, reliable security response to our missile fields
    spreads.
        Eighth Air Force (8AF) operates and maintains the only long-range
    strategic bombers across all combatant commands and between our allies
    and partners. AFGSC bombers continue to meet mission requirements
    despite being below our readiness target goals for spare parts due to
    parts obsolescence. Aircraft availability has decreased and downtime
    for maintenance has increased, and this has added challenges and
    focuses the importance of sustaining the current fleet while staying on
    time with modernization. Despite the safety stand down, the B-2 is
    ready for any national taskings. It is the only penetrating bomber and
    must maintain full operational capacity, until replaced by the B-21
    Raider. The crew force continues to find ways to maintain readiness
    while maintainers utilize this time to repair aircraft discrepancies.
    The safety investigation continues to progress as engineers, aircrew,
    and maintenance subject matter experts look for a long-term engineering
    solution to prevent future gear safety mishaps.
        The B-52 continues to be the workhorse of long-range strike, but
    also has its sustainment challenges. Parts obsolescence increases
    aircraft down time and leads to higher cannibalization rates of parts
    from other aircraft. This means to meet mission requirements, aircrews
    are flying less training sorties. A lack of training sorties leads to a
    lack of current aircrew to fly mission lines and an inability to absorb
    the number of crews required. To combat availability issues, AFGSC is
    pursuing a medium fidelity weapon system trainer to maintain aircrew
    readiness and increase training quality. AFGSC has an obligation to
    deliver solutions to our airmen if we continue to make them operate
    this way. Proficiency and currency are part of the nuclear triad.
        We will implement as directed the 4-Bin Force Generation Model and
    the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept to achieve Commander,
    USSTRATCOM and Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) objectives while
    deterring our enemies and assuring our allies. The 4-Bin Model intends
    to meet specific CSAF objectives, conform to the 2022 National Defense
    Strategy, and move the AF to a more predictable and sustainable model
    for our airmen. ACE exercises practice distributed operations from
    dispersed locations to increase survivability while generating combat
    power. We initially sent four B-52s to Fairchild AFB, Washington, to
    execute the ACE mission. Each bomber transported a mobile maintenance
    team and a Bomber Onboard Cargo System (BOCS) to practice the
    capability of landing, rearming, and repairing the aircraft anywhere
    that has enough runway. AFGSC has successfully deployed two B-52 ACE
    operations to Alaska and Spain while taking maintenance personnel and
    equipment using the Bomber Onboard Cargo System to remain agile and
    lethal with a minimum logistical footprint and tanker requirement.
    Additionally, B-1s completed a limited ACE deployment to Alaska with a
    lean and agile maintenance footprint conducting combat training
    missions out of Eielson AFB, Alaska. Other notable events include the
    first B-52, C-17, and KC-46 large force exercise, demonstrating ACE to
    U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) with a KC-46 and B-52 in
    formation, integrating AMC/CC and AFGSC/CC objectives.
        As the Air Component to USSTRATCOM, AFGSC is leading the way in
    accomplishing multiple site surveys of airfields and air bases
    worldwide to determine their suitability to support bomber operations
    in peacetime and during contingencies. In Fiscal Year 2022, AFGSC
    surveyed 14 bases, eight countries, and three geographic combatant
    commands with scheduled bomber task force missions to execute this
    year.
        AFGSC is committed to the requirements and funding stability on the
    baseline acquisition program for the B-21 Raider. Since the program's
    inception, the top-level key system attributes and performance
    parameters have remained unchanged. Similarly, since the Engineering
    and Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract was awarded in 2016, the
    B-21 program has remained within its Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)
    for both cost and schedule targets. The Fiscal Year 2024 President's
    Budget includes funding to continue development and procurement funding
    to continue the program's transition to low-rate initial production.
    Therefore, the following significant milestones for the program are the
    first flight and the start of low-rate initial production.
        Aligned with the National Defense Strategy, the B-21 provides
    survivable, long-range, penetrating strike capabilities to deter
    aggression and strategic attack against the United States, its allies,
    and partners. Six aircraft are in production. Test aircraft are being
    built on the same production line, using the same tools, processes, and
    technicians that will manufacture the production aircraft. The program
    has completed loads calibration for the first test article that will
    support first flight, has initiated full-scale static testing for the
    second B-21 test article, and completed an integrated kill chain
    demonstration using a Flying Test Bed. The recent public unveiling of
    the B-21 on Dec 2, 2022, demonstrates our commitment to integrated
    deterrence to the Nation, our allies, and our partners. The first
    flight remains a key milestone, which will be an ``event-driven''
    milestone that will, in turn, drive the flight test campaign for the B-
    21.
        Military construction at Ellsworth AFB is part of the critical path
    to support the B-21 nuclear and conventional mission. In calendar year
    2021, the Acting Secretary of the Air Force confirmed that Ellsworth
    AFB would be the first B-21 Main Operating Base. Ellsworth has yet to
    host a stealth, nuclear capable aircraft thus, requiring the necessary
    facilities, infrastructure, and workforce to support the nuclear
    mission and meet USSTRATCOM requirements. Funding for two military
    construction projects, Phase Hangar and Fuel Systems Maintenance Dock
    at Ellsworth AFB, have been requested in the Fiscal Year 2024
    President's Budget to support aircraft arrival in the mid-2020's.
        Additionally, the Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget includes
    Planning and Design (P&D) funding for military construction (MILCON)
    projects at Dyess AFB, TX, and Whiteman AFB, MO. Our MILCON projects
    remain a crucial component to the execution of our bed-down activities
    across all our AFGSC bases.
        The design of the B-21 is an Open Systems Architecture that will
    allow for rapid capability integration with minimal disruption to
    production and aircraft availability, ensuring the weapon system will
    keep pace with the highly contested threat environment. The recent
    successful integration of a third-party sensor demonstration validates
    these words are more than talking points and that the B-21 will provide
    an enduring capability against present and emerging threats for our
    Nation and our allies for decades. The Fiscal Year 2024 President's
    Budget includes funding to begin modernization activities such as
    nuclear certification, Long Range Standoff mission (LRSO) integration,
    and other, more exquisite activities. Continued investments in new
    capabilities like the B-21 ensure our Nation possesses cutting-edge
    technology needed to maintain strategic deterrence and execute
    effective operations across the globe. Furthermore, the Secretary of
    the Air Force's operational imperatives, including the B-21 Long Range
    Strike Family of-Systems, will further enable the B-21 to enhance
    survivability, resiliency, and lethality while promoting
    interoperability with the Joint Force.
        The Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP) is critical to B-
    52 viability through 2050. The AF Life Cycle Management Center's
    Propulsion Directorate found the current B-52 TF-33 engines will be
    unsustainable beyond 2030. As a result, USAF selected Rolls Royce as
    the new engine supplier. The off-the-shelf variant of the F130 turbofan
    will replace the obsolete TF-33. The program will be a net cost-saver
    in place of continued TF-33 service life extensions, and AFGSC
    anticipates an increase of 20 percent to the B-52's unrefueled range.
    The program is transitioning from a Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA) to
    a Major Capability Acquisition (MCA), with IOC occurring in Fiscal Year
    2031.
        The Radar Modernization Program (RMP) will integrate an off-the-
    shelf radar system that will ensure the B-52's ability to employ
    nuclear and conventional weapons in present and future fights. The
    current B-52 radar is unsustainable and suffering from parts
    obsolescence. The program will reduce maintenance repair times,
    decrease operating costs, and provide for future growth capability. An
    EMD contract award occurred in 3QFY21. We project IOC for Fiscal Year
    2027 and FOC in Fiscal Year 2031.
        The nuclear armed Long Range Standoff missile (LRSO) is an
    Acquisition Category 1D Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) to
    design, develop, produce and deploy a weapon system replacement for the
    current nuclear armed Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). The LRSO
    program completed its February 2023 Critical Design Review (CDR) on
    time and remains on track for the scheduled IOC/Full Operational
    Capability (FOC).
        AFGSC continues to transition from a legacy to a modern Nuclear
    Command, Control, and Communication (NC3) enterprise. The AF has begun
    recapitalizing the aging E-4B with the Survivable Airborne Operations
    Center (SAOC) program. The E-4B is a vital piece of the National
    Military Command System, providing Nuclear Command and Control (NC2)
    for the executive branch. AFGSC authored an AF-validated SAOC
    Capabilities Development Document that gained Joint Requirement
    Oversight Council validation in March 2022. The Department has
    concluded its market research, finalized requirements, worked with key
    stakeholders, including industry, to develop SAOC solicitation, and is
    targeting a competitive contract award in CY2023. The AF continues to
    refine the SAOC acquisition strategy, leveraging modernization
    opportunities, open system architecture, and digital engineering to
    reduce overall program costs. As a result, the SAOC will achieve FOC in
    the early to mid-2030's.
        NC3 is a program that fails to gain the notoriety of larger
    acquisition programs. However, this is an important weapons system for
    AFGSC and our national defense. Collectively, we need better
    accountability and transparency of these systems and a clearer answer
    to who oversees each system and the funding streams associated with the
    programs. NC3 is a no-fail mission, and we aim to highlight its
    importance as we continue striving to bring visibility to NC3. AFGSC
    will work closely with USSTRATCOM, AF, Space Force, and industry
    partners to generate the NC3 Next modernization plan.
        We have several recent and upcoming ICBM command and control
    modernization efforts for our Strategic Automated Command and Control
    System, satellite communications, and very low-frequency radios. These
    will ensure command and control capability for deployment of the new
    Sentinel ICBM and the legacy MMIII ICBM fleet until it is retired.
        AFGSC Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Directorate
    partnered with the NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC) and other intelligence
    organizations to produce the first-ever NC3 focused intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance Program of Analysis (POA). This effort
    synchronizes NC3 intelligence requirements across the enterprise. In
    addition, the POA provides a means to advocate within the wider
    Intelligence Community to advocate for NC3 equities. It also provides a
    way to assess the effectiveness of NC3-related collection and analysis.
        AFGSC has successfully fielded 12 fixed Global Aircrew Strategic
    Networking Terminal Systems at 18 main operating bases within the
    continental United States at the close of CY22 and eight transportable
    terminals to support the Mobile Nuclear Command and Control Mission to
    execute USSTRATCOM's Nuclear Alert Mission. In Fiscal Year 2023, AFGSC
    projects to release 42 additional terminals to 25 locations worldwide.
    AFGSC maintenance and logistics aligns with the USSTRATCOM NEC and the
    NC3 Program Office. Through this connection, we provide oversight on
    NC3 weapon system status reporting to align operational units with the
    Joint Global Strike Operations Center (J-GSOC) and the NEC reporting
    requirements and timelines and routinely work with the Air Force
    Nuclear Weapons Center's (AFNWC) Integrated Product Center to resolve
    field-level sustainment concerns.
                                   conclusion
        AFGSC thanks Congress for your continual support to our mission.
    The risks to our national security are becoming more apparent every
    day. The PRC aims to surpass the United States in terms of global
    influence and military might, while Russia continues to challenge
    international norms increasing risk to strategic stability. AFGSC
    understands the importance of sustaining our current fleet and will
    continue to modernize at the speed of relevance. We are ready today to
    meet the requirements given to us from the President and the Commander
    of USSTRATCOM, but there is no operational margin left and we have a
    plan to get where we need to go. Sustainment is the first piece of this
    plan. AFGSC is not afforded the same luxury as other commands when
    onboarding new systems. We must maintain full operational capability to
    meet our national security requirements, while fielding new weapon
    systems. These legacy systems still require stable funding until they
    can be completely divested. Modernization is the second piece. We
    cannot slow down and AFGSC is building the architecture to meet current
    and future requirements. Nearly every portfolio is being modernized
    from new sixth generation aircraft, to better vehicles for our security
    forces in the missile fields. Last, our airmen and families are the
    foundational component that make sustainment, modernization, and
    deterrence possible. AFGSC and the Nation have an obligation to help
    meet the challenges facing our airmen. We owe our airmen answers to
    their health concerns, access to the required medical attention,
    adequate childcare, and opportunities for education and growth for both
    the member and their family. If we take care of them, they will take
    care of the mission. Strategic deterrence and long-range strike are
    foundational to our Nation's defense, and AFGSC is the backbone of
    those
    mission sets. Our success in this enterprise to field and sustain these
    capabilities for our Nation requires coordination from Congress and the
    continued support you provide.

        Senator King. Thank you, General. Admiral Wolfe.

    STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN, DIRECTOR,
                    NAVY STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
    and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
    the opportunity to testify on the Department of the Navy's
    budget priorities for nuclear forces.
        I would like to thank the Subcommittee for its continued
    support of the Navy's nuclear deterrence mission. The mission
    of my command, Strategic Assistance Programs, is to provide
    credible and affordable strategic solutions to our warfighter.
        To quote from the administration's 2022 Nuclear Posture
    Review, I quote, ``in a dynamic security environment, a safe,
    effective nuclear deterrent is foundational to broader U.S.
    defense strategy and the extended deterrence commitments we
    have made to allies and partners.'' For nearly 7 decades, the
    Navy has provided unwavering support to the sea-based leg of
    the nuclear triad.
        This coming year we will build on this remarkable history.
    Later this year, the Navy will conduct the final demonstration
    and shakedown operation for an Ohio-class ballistic missile
    submarine. Alongside our partners in the United Kingdom, we
    will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Polaris Sales
    Agreement.
        In coordination with our colleagues at NNSA, we will
    continue to ensure the W93/Mk7 program remains on schedule. As
    this work shows, we must continue to sustain today's deterrent
    while modernizing for the future.
        The Navy continues to manage the nuclear strategic weapons
    system across three main mission priorities. First, sustaining
    the weapon system D5LE through Ohio end of life. Second
    developing the strategic weapon system in the future, D5 Life
    Extension II for the Columbia-class, and third, safeguarding
    our special relationship with the United Kingdom, embodied in
    the Polaris Sales Agreement. First and foremost, we must
    maintain the current D5LE missile inventory and provide the
    necessary operational support to sustain Ohio-class submarines
    through their end of life in the early 2040's.
        All of our life extension programs remain on track, and our
    current program will support the deployment of all existing
    warheads. We must also recapitalize our supporting Navy nuclear
    deterrence mission infrastructure to support and sustain
    nuclear weapons and SSBN operations that enable sea based
    strategic deterrence.
        Second, along with PEO SSBN, we must continue to transition
    between Ohio-class and Columbia-class submarines and make sure
    they stay on schedule. For PEO SSBN, this means delivering the
    largest, most capable, and most advanced submarine ever
    produced by our Nation, representing a generational
    recapitalization of the SSBN force.
        For my command, this requires a seamless transition of the
    current Trident II D5LE weapon system and missile inventory
    onto the new Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine. We
    have already started the work on the next variant of Trident
    D5LE II and its corresponding weapon system. D5LE II will be
    necessary to out load the Columbia-class SSBN, starting with
    the 9th hull, ensuring that Trident remains credible until at
    least 2084.
        Finally, one of the greatest advantages the United States
    has is its alliances and partnerships. For decades, United
    States policy has recognized the contribution of an independent
    British nuclear deterrent and how it adds to NATO and global
    security, and SSP [Strategic Systems Program] will continue to
    support this most important relationship.
        Execution of these three mission priorities is only
    possible through investment in our people, our infrastructure,
    and our industrial base. Nuclear modernization will take time,
    so sustained resourcing and enterprise effort is absolutely
    essential. We can no longer put off recapitalizing our nuclear
    triad.
        Our adversaries are not idle. Russia's and China's nuclear
    arsenal is our Nation's biggest existential threat. It is only
    through your continued support that the Department's top
    modernization priorities can be achieved and the Navy can
    deliver a reliable, sea based strategic deterrent capability.
        As the 14th Director, it is my highest honor to represent
    the men and women of SSP. My personal number one priority is to
    ensure that they are poised to execute the mission with the
    same level of success, passion, and rigor that has
    characterized our workforce since our program was founded in
    1955.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of
    the dedicated Americans that make deterrence of major power
    conflict their life's work. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe
    follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the
    sustainment and recapitalization of the sea-based leg of the nuclear
    triad. It is an honor to represent the Navy's Strategic Systems
    Programs (SSP) and the contributions the Navy provides to our national
    and global security through Sea Based Strategic Deterrence (SBSD).
        I should start by noting that the priorities and lines of effort
    that I am here to describe today are all in service of the 2022
    National Defense Strategy (NDS), which--as the Secretary often says--is
    our north star.
        The Mission Priorities of SSP, in support of the NDS, are to:
        1.  Sustain the Trident II D5 (D5) and Trident II Life Extension
    (D5LE) Strategic Weapons System (SWS) and ensure Nuclear Weapons Surety
    on the Ohio-class SSBN and in supporting shore facilities through 2042
    while providing Naval Nuclear Weapons Program Technical Authority for
    Nuclear Weapon (NW) systems and Regulatory Oversight of the Navy
    Nuclear Deterrence Mission (NNDM). SSP will re-host and sustain the
    D5LE SWS onto the initial Columbia and United Kingdom (UK) Dreadnought
    SSBNs.
        2.  Develop the Columbia and UK Dreadnought SWS and advanced weapon
    capabilities in the Trident II D5LE2 missile and W93/Mk7 warhead and
    reentry body assembly. Simultaneously, SSP will develop and deliver the
    U.S. Navy's non-nuclear, Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missile
    capability to fill a critical gap in our full spectrum of deterrence.
    The two nations are working separate but parallel warhead programs with
    collaboration between the two.
        3.  Safeguard the special relationship between the U.S. and UK
    through the Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA), as amended, and Mutual
    Defense Agreement (MDA), as amended, benefiting both nations and
    supporting the UK's Continuous At Sea Deterrence (CASD).
        SSP's core mission comprises two fundamental lines of effort: the
    safety and security of our Nation's strategic assets entrusted to the
    Navy; and the design, development, production, and sustainment of the
    Navy's SWS. We strive to maintain a culture of excellence, underpinned
    by rigorous self-assessment, to achieve the highest standards of
    performance and integrity for personnel supporting the strategic
    deterrent mission. We focus unremittingly on our tremendous
    responsibility for the custody and accountability of our Nation's
    nuclear assets. The men and women of SSP, our Sailors, our Marines, our
    Navy Masters at Arms, our Coast Guardsmen, and our industry partners
    remain dedicated to supporting the strategic deterrence mission; ready
    to respond to the emerging needs of our warfighter, and to protect and
    safeguard our Nation's assets with which we are entrusted. We certainly
    could not do this without the support from this Committee.
                              state of the program
        The Nation's nuclear triad consists of intercontinental ballistic
    missiles, heavy bombers, and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
    equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). These
    platforms and their associated weapons systems are essential to the
    very foundation of our Nation's security and survival. The
    Administration's recently released National Defense Strategy priorities
    deterring strategic attacks against the United States, our allies, and
    our partners, and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) affirms the
    following roles for nuclear weapons: deter strategic attacks, assure
    allies and partners, and achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails.
    While the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure and effective, most
    U.S. nuclear deterrent systems--including the SSBN fleet--are operating
    beyond their original design life. Replacement programs are ongoing,
    but there is little or no margin between the end of useful life of
    existing programs and the fielding of their replacements. As noted by
    the 2022 NPR, we need to fully fund the Columbia-class SSBN program to
    deliver a minimum of 12 boats on time, as the Ohio-class SSBNs begin to
    retire. We also need to continue to prioritize near term investments in
    the submarine industrial base, Ohio-class sustainment and the second
    life extension of the Trident II D5 SWS.
        The U.S. Navy provides the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad
    with the interdependent Ohio-class SSBNs and the Trident II D5 SWS. The
    SSBN fleet is responsible for more than 70 percent of the Nation's
    deployed nuclear warheads accountable as defined by the New START
    Treaty. As the Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life of
    Ohio-class SSBNs, addressing the viability of the SWS throughout the
    life of the Columbia-class SSBNs remains a top priority. Columbia-class
    SSBNs will ensure the effectiveness and availability of the Nation's
    Sea Based Strategic Deterrent through the 2080's. The currently
    deployed Trident II D5LE missiles will support initial load-outs on
    Columbia, but modernization of the D5LE SWS, via D5LE2, is required to
    support later Columbia-class missile inventory and seamlessly sustain
    USSTRATCOM requirements. D5LE2 will ensure the SWS will be flexible and
    adaptable in order to maintain demonstrated performance and
    survivability despite the dynamic threat environment.
        As the fourteenth Director, it is my highest honor to serve as the
    program manager, technical authority, safety and security lead,
    regulatory lead, and U.S. Project Officer under the Polaris Sales
    Agreement (PSA), as amended, for the Naval Nuclear Weapons Program.
    Most importantly, I am honored to represent the men and women of SSP,
    comprising approximately 1,500 Sailors, 1,000 Marines, 300 Coast
    Guardsmen, 1,400 civilians, and thousands of contractor personnel. It
    is my most critical goal to ensure they are poised to execute the
    mission with the same level of success, passion, and rigor both today
    and tomorrow as they have since our program's inception in 1955.
     sws sustainment on ohio-class ssbn and procurement for columbia-class
                                      ssbn
        The Ohio-class SSBN began a new phase of Sea Based Strategic
    Deterrence (SBSD) when it started relieving the 41 for Freedom SSBNs in
    the 1980's, initially employing the Trident I C4 Submarine Launched
    Ballistic Missile and leveraging the nuclear warheads and missile
    production infrastructure of the original Fleet Ballistic Missile
    Program. As the U.S. sought to increase the range, accuracy,
    reliability, and lethality of its Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
    program, in 1988, USS Tennessee (SSBN734) dawned a new age of SBSD as
    she ushered in the advanced Trident II D5 Strategic Weapons System in
    the newly built Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base, specifically designed
    to support this new weapon system. Over the following decade, as new
    Ohio-class SSBNs were brought online (SSBN 735 through SSBN 743) with
    the D5 missile system, the early Ohio-class SSBNs were also converted
    from a C4 system to align with the rest of the D5 fleet. Originally
    composed of 18 Ohio-class SSBNs, the SSBN fleet settled on a 14-ship
    class carrying the Trident II D5 missile system executing SBSD, while
    the first four Ohio-class SSBNs were converted to conventional guided
    missile and special operations forces submarines (SSGN 726 through SSGN
    729). The 14 ship Ohio-class SSBN fleet remains the backbone of U.S.
    strategic deterrence, carrying approximately 70 percent of the United
    States' treaty-accountable deployed nuclear warheads in the form of the
    W76 and W88 families of warheads. Originally designed for a 30-year
    service life, the Ohio-class submarines were called upon to extend this
    service to 42 years, supporting a delay in investment in the next
    generation of SSBNs. To account for this extension in service life, SSP
    embarked on a life extension program for the D5 missiles to update
    critical but aging missile electronics systems. SSP introduced the
    Trident II D5 Life Extension (D5LE) program to the fleet in 2017 and
    will continue through approximately 2025 to convert D5 missiles to D5LE
    when they are pulled off the SSBNs during normal missile maintenance
    times.
        The final Ohio-class SSBN, USS Louisiana (SSBN 743), which recently
    completed her mid-life Engineered Refueling Overhaul (ERO) will support
    the sea-based strategic deterrent until her scheduled retirement in
    2042. SSP must ensure the ``no fail'' SBSD mission is supported on the
    Ohio-class through 2042, providing a reliable Trident II D5/D5LE
    weapons systems with W76/W88 warheads until this final ship of the
    class is decommissioned. In parallel, SSP's program efforts and
    collaboration with the UK through the Polaris Sales Agreement and
    Mutual Defense Agreement will support the UK's Continuous At Sea
    Deterrence through Vanguard-class life and the transition to a
    Dreadnought-class SSBN fleet.
        To meet these critical program responsibilities, SSP will execute
    Naval Nuclear Weapons Program Technical Authority for Nuclear Weapon
    (NW) systems and Regulatory Oversight of the NNDM. Through programmatic
    excellence in shipboard sustainment and modernization programs across
    the SWS subsystems and in NW surety, and through diligent oversight of
    the logistical supply chains, SSP not only will maintain a credible and
    reliable weapons system, but will also continue unlocking new
    capabilities the warfighter can leverage to enhance strategic
    deterrence and act decisively should deterrence fail.
               trident ii d5 life extension and life extension 2
        The Trident II D5 SWS capability has been deployed on the Ohio-
    class ballistic missile submarines for more than three decades and is
    planned to be deployed more than 55 years. This demand to maintain
    demonstrated high performance while extending the service life past
    initial design requirements required a missile life extension effort,
    D5LE. The current Trident D5 Life Extension (D5LE) remains an effective
    and credible Strategic Weapon System on both the Ohio-class and
    Columbia-class SSBNs into the 2040's, supporting the Ohio-class
    submarine through end of service life and serving as the initial
    Strategic Weapon System for the Columbia-class SSBNs.
        As the Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life of our
    Ohio-class SSBNs, we must address the viability of the SWS throughout
    the life of the Columbia-class SSBNs. A minimum of 12 Columbia-class
    SSBNs will replace today's 14 Ohio SSBNs and beginning in FY30, D5LE
    missiles will support initial load-outs on Columbia (Hulls 1-8).
    Production of additional D5LE missiles is not practical due to obsolete
    parts and the lack of a robust industrial base. In order to meet
    inventory requirements and maintain a credible strategic deterrent in
    the face of evolving threats, a second life extension of the Trident II
    Strategic Weapons System (D5LE2) is required to be designed,
    engineered, produced and deployed by Columbia Hull #9's strategic
    outload. It will be incorporated on all follow on Hulls as well as
    Hulls 1-8 during their Extended Refit Period from fiscal year 2039 to
    2049 to continue to meet USSTRATCOM requirements. D5LE2's architecture
    will ensure the weapon system maintains demonstrated performance and
    remains survivable while facing a dynamic threat environment driven by
    two near peer competitors until Columbia end of life.
        D5LE2 is a hy]brid of pull-through cost-effective technology (e.g.,
    solid rocket motors, ignitors) and redesigned and updated components
    (e.g., avionics, guidance, system architecture). D5LE2 is structured to
    maintain today's unmatched reliability and demonstrated performance,
    while unlocking untapped system potential to efficiently respond to
    emerging needs and to maintain a credible Sea Based Strategic
    Deterrent.
        As directed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture review, SSP executed system
    architecture studies in fiscal year 2020 to 2022 to evaluate solutions
    to problems associated with emerging threats, supportability, and
    adaptability required to address challenges in a dynamic threat
    environment. Additionally, activities focused on missile and guidance
    technology to determine the effective composition of redesign,
    remanufacture, and pull-through of highly reliable components. Fiscal
    year 2024 activities continue the refinement of systems studies and
    critical Missile and Guidance Technology work while building up the
    focused work on subsystem redesign and industrial base development
    activities for the D5LE2 program.
        Unlike SLBM programs of the past, D5LE2 does not have the benefit
    of a healthy defense industrial base that comes from maintaining
    production and continuous development. The 2022 NPR reiterated the need
    for D5LE2 and stated that the United States will prioritize near-term
    investments to ``ensure that D5LE2 is effective in the expected threat
    environment and delivers on time.'' In short, full support of D5LE2
    today is vital to achieving 2039 Initial Fleet Introduction and to
    embarking on a path that maintains an SLBM deterrent capability through
    the service life of the Columbia-class SSBN.
        The Navy must also recapitalize our Strategic Weapons Facilities
    and test locations to support the development and production of D5LE2
    and to continue to support and sustain SSBN operations and weapons
    activities that enable our continuous at-sea presence.
                      warhead and reentry body activities
        The Navy is also working in partnership with the Department of
    Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to refurbish
    our existing reentry systems and develop new reentry systems in
    response to USSTRATCOM requirements. As the threat environment the
    nuclear enterprise faces continues to evolve, it is critical that the
    Navy designs, develops, and deploys programs that meet the needs of the
    Warfighter. The TRIDENT II D5 missile is capable of carrying two types
    of warhead families today, the W76 and the W88. The W93/Mk7 warhead and
    reentry body system will be designed for use on both the D5LE and D5LE2
    missiles and, the PSA and MDA, as amended, will support the United
    Kingdom's sovereign Replacement Warhead program. In 2019, NNSA
    completed the W76-1 Life Extension Program (W76-1/Mk4A), marking the
    U.S. stockpile's first full-scale warhead refurbishment program. The
    Navy continues to work on modernizing integrated aeroshells that house
    these warheads through the Mk4B program with the inclusion of a Shape
    Stable Nose Tip, which reduces reentry variability and improves
    performance margins.
        The W88/Mk5 warhead continues to undergo its refurbishment program
    (ALT370) on a revised timeline based on capacitor component issues that
    did not meet reliability requirements, a technical issue which has
    since been resolved. The Navy and NNSA coordinated on tightly coupled
    schedules for the fleet, the nuclear weapons complex, and production of
    affected non-nuclear components to execute an 19-month delay to the
    original schedule that was endorsed by the Nuclear Weapons Council
    (NWC). This program reached the First Production Unit milestone on
    schedule in 2021 and achieved Initial Operational Capability in January
    2022. I am confident that our teams will continue to work together to
    manage and deliver this program, as we have historically addressed
    refurbishment challenges with a mission-focused attitude and rigor. The
    Navy will continue to prioritize meeting our Warfighters' requirements
    and minimizing disruption to the operational fleet to ensure that the
    sea-based leg of the triad continues to fulfill its deterrence mission.
    However, the setback this program faced is indicative of the pervasive
    and overwhelming risk carried within the nuclear enterprise as
    refurbishment programs face capacity, historic funding and schedule
    challenges.
        W93/Mk7 will provide flexibility and adaptability to meet future
    warfighter needs. With the near simultaneous age out of the deployed
    stockpile in the 2040's, the W93/Mk7 will help address production
    concerns in the weapons complex and ensure an uninterrupted at-sea
    deterrent for the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad. In 2021, the Navy
    entered Phase 1 of the joint DOD-DOE Nuclear Weapons Lifecycle Process
    with NNSA for the W93. This effort will address evolving ballistic
    missile warhead modernization requirements; improve operational
    effectiveness for USSTRATCOM; and mitigate technical, operational, and
    programmatic risk in the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad while
    simultaneously reinvigorating the atrophied industrial base and
    modernizing a Cold War era stockpile. In FY22, the W93 program received
    NWC authorization to proceed into Phase 2, Feasibility Study and Design
    Options, which will further refine and mature the design of the W93/Mk7
    program in a manner that provides an affordable, credible, safe, and
    secure weapon to the Warfighter. Even with the addition of the W93/Mk7
    to the stockpile, we will not increase the deployed stockpile. The Navy
    will work in close coordination with the Department of Defense, NNSA,
    the NWC, and the Congress as this effort matures, but we cannot
    continue to life extend our leftover Cold War era weapons and systems
    and successfully carry out our National Defense Strategy.
                       industrial base and infrastructure
        The Nation requires a fully modernized nuclear force and supporting
    infrastructure to execute our National Defense Strategy. Our
    modernization needs cannot succeed without investing in the research
    and development (R&D), critical skills, and facilities needed to
    produce, sustain, and certify our nuclear systems. Ensuring robust
    defense and aerospace industrial base capabilities--such as radiation-
    hardened electronics, strategic inertial instrumentation, and solid
    rocket motors--remains an important priority in conjunction with R&D
    investment. SSP has placed particular emphasis on the solid rocket
    motor industry and its sub-tier suppliers and appreciates the support
    of the Congress to allow for the continuous production of these vital
    components. Essential to the nuclear deterrent is a national aeroshell
    production capability. The Navy has not delivered an integrated
    aeroshell since the 1980's and needs to reinvigorate a production
    capability that only resides in a small cadre of highly skilled experts
    in an exceptionally niche industry. Aeroshell investment supports the
    Navy but will also be cost-effectively leveraged by our colleagues in
    the Air Force--and also our strategic partners in the United Kingdom as
    they pursue their independent warhead program endeavors. Finally, R&D
    investment is critical to today's nuclear modernization needs to ensure
    that we advance necessary technology ahead of design needs and to train
    our workforce during the early years of development. If the Nation does
    not continue to address these concerns, no amount of money will be able
    to adequately mitigate the risks associated with key stockpile and
    infrastructure losses.
        Regarding the program's infrastructure, existing facilities are
    reaching their 30-year recapitalization windows as we enter into a
    once-in-a-generation transition of both the weapons system and
    platform. The Navy relies on a limited footprint to process missiles
    and outfit the SSBNs. Maintaining and sustaining facilities is critical
    to meeting USSTRATCOM and Fleet mission requirements. We will make
    smart investments to address capability gaps, through-put constraints,
    and build in surge capacity to address requirements presented by new
    and emerging threats. The Administration has shown its commitment to
    investment in our strategic infrastructure with the funding of multiple
    MILCON projects in fiscal year 2024 that are required for the on-time
    delivery of the D5LE2 SWS. We are re-establishing pad launch
    capabilities on Florida's Space Coast over four decades after the final
    Trident II D5 X-Flight in January 1989, as well as modernizing and
    sustaining our Strategic Weapons Facilities that will produce and
    deliver D5LE2 missiles to the Fleet. Our Nation and the Navy will
    continue to prioritize and resource the sustainment and modernization
    of its nuclear infrastructure enterprise to provide an effective and
    flexible deterrent now and into the future.
        As the Navy executes the modernization and replacement of the SSBN
    and associated SLBM leg of the nuclear triad, DOD and NNSA's
    infrastructure must be prepared to respond in tandem to the evolving
    needs of the Nation. Of utmost importance, we must have an effective,
    resilient, and responsive plutonium pit production capability. This
    capability can address age-related risks, support planned
    refurbishments, as well as prepare for future uncertainty.
    Additionally, NNSA's tritium, lithium, uranium, and high explosives and
    energetics, among other strategic materials, are vital to ensuring the
    Navy can continue to meet its strategic deterrent requirements. Efforts
    to sustain and modernize deterrent forces must continue. Our strategic
    forces underpin every military operation around the world, and we
    cannot afford to delay given the increasing threats facing our Nation.
                                   workforce
        History reminds us that the swift, successful creation and
    execution of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program in the 1950's was
    truly a result of national commitment, congressional support, and a
    cadre of hand-selected scientists, engineers, and inspirational
    leaders. Though process will always underpin our efforts, our dedicated
    predecessors--civilians, military, and industry partners alike--
    responded to the national need with focused determination and drove
    this program with a vision. People are as fundamental to our nuclear
    deterrent as the SWS itself. Today, SSP and its industry partners are
    focused on inspiring, growing, and retaining a generation of workforce
    that did not live through the darkest days of the Cold War. Connecting
    a new workforce to this fundamental global security mission remains an
    important task shared among the entire nuclear enterprise. A capable,
    credible, and affordable strategic deterrent for our Nation for the
    next 60 years requires not only technical, policy, management, and
    financial acumen--it requires passion and a commitment to making this
    our life's work.
        SSP has made significant strides in recent years to honor our past,
    innovate our present, and ensure our future workforce is connected to
    the fundamental global security mission. In order to create the ideal
    workforce and workplace, SSP developed the SSP Human Capital Operating
    Plan (HCOP) in FY19. The HCOP is a 5-year plan aligning human capital
    initiatives to SSP's strategic goals. SSP is now in the fifth year of
    the HCOP execution and is realizing valuable change from these efforts.
    The five goals and associated successes are outlined below.
        Goal 1--Recruitment and Retention: create and implement effective
    strategies to recruit and retain highly qualified candidates and
    employees, internal and external, sufficient to ensure that SSP
    fulfills its mission requirements. Accomplishments toward this end
    include: developing a comprehensive Talent Pipeline strategy to
    integrate Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics community
    engagement, recruitment outreach, student internships, and entry-level
    developmental programs; implementing the Compass Program to better
    acclimate new employees to SSP's mission and culture; standardizing
    SSP-enterprise Exit and Stay Interview processes; and integrating data
    analytics across Human Resource (HR) functions;
        Goal 2--Talent Development and Sustainment: support, develop, and
    strengthen the workforce to continually evolve and successfully execute
    the mission. Accomplishments toward this end include: developing
    Science & Technology Subject Matter Expert (S&T SME) career tracks;
    conducting a staffing study to assess current and future competencies
    and capacities; implementing robust mentorship programs; establishing
    the Career Development Counseling Program; and deploying the SSP
    Academy and the Waypoints learning management system;
        Goal 3--Leadership Development: strengthen enterprise leadership at
    all levels through robust leadership development programs and clear
    assignment and execution of authority, accountability, and
    responsibility. Accomplishments toward this end include: Implementing
    robust coaching programs for leaders and developmental employees;
    delivering a Human Resources Management for Supervisors training; and
    continuously promoting internal and external leadership development
    programs.
        Goal 4--Culture: clearly define and communicate SSP culture and
    values. Reinforce and assess the organizational culture as necessary
    for continuous improvement at every level. Accomplishments toward this
    end include: expanding and improving employee recognition programs;
    delivering on-going health and wellness activities; establishing a `We
    Hear You' campaign to communicate SSP's responses to feedback; defining
    SSP Culture and Values (Director's Intent); developing SSP Culture
    Videos; and creating a Supervisory Corner, a centralized web-based hub
    to equip supervisors with the resources, information, and tools
    necessary to be an effective supervisor;
        Goal 5--Diversity and Inclusion: create and implement effective
    strategies to cultivate a diverse and inclusive work environment that
    promotes employee engagement and the exchange of different ideas,
    philosophies, and perspectives. Accomplishments toward this end
    include: conducting barrier analysis; establishing Diversity and
    Inclusion Council; increasing use of Individuals with Disabilities
    Recruitment Program; and connecting a Leadership Learning Series with
    Special Emphasis Programs.
        Over the next several months, SSP will be preparing to release HCOP
    FY24-FY28 with refined goals, measures of effectiveness, and other
    programmatic enhancements.
                   polaris sales agreement: support to the uk
        Fundamental to U.S. strategic and extended deterrence policies is
    the special relationship between the U.S. and the UK through the 1963
    Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA), as amended, and the 1958 Mutual Defense
    Agreement (MDA), as amended. Under the PSA, the U.S. sells the Trident
    II SWS to the UK along with associated defense services. Under the MDA,
    the U.S. cooperates with the UK on the exchange of information and the
    transfer of nuclear material and equipment for mutual defense purposes.
    The two agreements are complementary, and together enable the U.S. Navy
    to sell SWS delivery system and reentry body equipment to the UK, as
    well as to exchange classified information, including Restricted Data
    (RD) and Formerly Restricted Data (FRD), with the UK. This framework
    has ensured the United States' ability to support the UK with
    capabilities to ensure a robust nuclear deterrent. The Common Missile
    Compartment (CMC) represents the most recent example of the PSA
    partnership, in which the two nations are designing, developing, and
    producing common shipboard infrastructure which improves the ease of
    comingling the D5 missile inventory and sets the stage to improve
    maintenance system consistency across the two fleets. SSP will support
    PEO SSBN throughout the 2020's as they oversee U.S. industry delivery
    of CMC components to both navies for installation into their new SSBNs.
    As with Columbia, the Dreadnought-class SSBNs will initially carry the
    D5LE missile. The development of the Mk7 reentry system to support the
    U.S. W93 warhead program is also critical to the development of a next
    generation nuclear warhead and reentry system for the UK. The two
    nations are working separate but parallel warhead programs with
    collaboration between the two.
        Next month will mark sixty years since our two governments signed
    the PSA. With sixty years behind us, SSP will continue to nurture and
    safeguard this special relationship with the UK to sustain the SBSD and
    support UK Continuous At Sea Deterrence (CASD) of today while
    modernizing and building flexibility, adaptability, and resiliency into
    SBSD 2084 and the UK's future CASD.
                                   conclusion
        Our Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent has been a critical
    component of our national security since the 1950's and must continue
    to assure our allies and partners and to deter potential adversaries
    well into the future. SSP ensures a safe, secure, effective, flexible,
    and tailorable strategic deterrent, with a steadfast focus on the
    proper stewardship, custody, and accountability of the nuclear assets
    entrusted to the Navy. Sustaining and modernizing the sea-based
    strategic deterrent capability is a vital national security
    requirement. I am privileged to represent this unique organization as
    we work to serve the best interests of our great Nation. I thank the
    committee for the opportunity to speak with you about the sea-based leg
    of the nuclear triad and the vital role it plays in our national and
    global security.

        Senator King. I think your last statement is very important
    in terms of the basic strategy of this country, which is
    deterrence. The best way to prevent a war is to be sure that
    adversaries know that they will pay an unacceptable price for
    an attack on this country, and that is what has, in fact,
    worked to deter--nuclear deterrence for over 70 years.
        I think that is an important overall, overarching concept
    of this hearing, and in fact, our entire military strategy.
    Admiral Wolfe, we heard General Caldwell talk about a new or a
    modified reactor.
        Are you talking about modernization of the D5 missiles for
    the new--for the Columbia-class? Is that a later development or
    is that part of the current schedule?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. What we have requested, sir, as part of
    SSP's strategy going forward in schedule to make sure that we
    have what we call D5 Life Extension II. It is a new missile
    that will replace aging assets that we have got in the current
    system.
        Senator King. Will that be ready when the first Columbia--?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. It will not be ready. The plan is for
    Columbia, in order to reduce risk to the overall deterrent, the
    decision was made because of where we are at with the Trident
    weapons system.
        We are ostensibly picking that system up and we are going
    to install that onto the first eight platforms of the Columbia-
    class. We have got the missile inventory. We have got the life
    on the system to be able to do that.
        In 2039 when we get to the 9th hull, we will have concerns
    about aging electronics. We will have concerns about quantities
    of missiles that we have because we flight test every year to
    prove their reliability----
        Senator King. I am assuming that the Columbia is going to
    be designed on a modular basis so that as technology develops
    you will be able to improve and add new technology without
    rebuilding the whole platform.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. That is exactly right. So, we
    already do that today on the shipboard systems. All of our
    shipboard systems, we are able to modernize them and keep up
    with technology of what industry is doing and others are doing.
        Senator King. Let me followup with another question on the
    Columbia. We have heard testimony in this Subcommittee and in
    the larger Committee and all over Capitol Hill on workforce
    problems.
        We are talking about major workforce demands to do
    Virginia, Columbia, and now AUKUS. Is it realistic that the
    yards are going to be able to meet the schedules that we have
    laid out for those programs, given the challenges of workforce
    that we have--that we are experiencing everywhere?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Sir, I think to your point, there is no
    doubt we are going to continue to have challenges.
        Those challenges are going to go well in the future. I
    would tell you, I think that the strategy that the Navy has
    taken with the things that we are doing for industrial base
    investment, if you look at the request in President's Budget
    2024, it is greater than $1 billion to invest in six key areas
    of how we are going to get the industrial base revitalized, how
    we are going to more rapidly train a workforce, a skilled
    workforce that the Navy is going to need and the shipyards are
    going to need.
        In our program, we are also very concerned about that
    workforce as well as we start to ramp up a number of missile
    development programs, not just for what the Navy's doing, but
    in parallel for what the Air Force is doing.
        There are challenges everywhere. But we are working that
    very diligently with the industrial base to make sure we keep
    up with that demand.
        Senator King. I think diligence is the right word. General,
    you are going to be in charge of managing the Sentinel project,
    one of the largest, as I mentioned, one of the largest projects
    ever undertaken by the U.S. Government.
        Are you satisfied with the progress--and this is an
    unclassified setting. Are you satisfied with the progress that
    is being made under that contract?
        General Bussiere. Chairman King, so far, yes. It is
    probably one of the most scrutinized and oversighted program in
    the Department of Defense. Has the direct attention of
    Honorable Plehn, Honorable Hunter, myself, obviously, the
    Secretary and the Chief.
        We do episodic and routine progress statuses with both
    internal to the Defense Department as well as with the industry
    partners. It will be one of the major work projects our Nation
    has undertaken probably in the last 50 plus years.
        So, it is not only just the aspects of building the new
    weapons system itself, but the process of integrating that new
    weapon system across the fabric of our Nation, while we
    maintain full operational capability with our legacy Minuteman
    III.
        Senator King. I know you are aware that one of the great
    challenges is NC3 also. The whole enterprise won't work if we
    don't have invulnerable communication.
        General Buss]iere. I couldn't agree more, Chairman King.
    The underpinning of our deterrence is the ability to command
    and control our forces.
        Senator King. Thank you. Admiral Wolfe, one final point. I
    am running out of time. But we have had testimony in the past
    on the strategic importance of a sea launch cruise missile that
    is nuclear tipped.
        The Congress passed appropriations to support research, and
    yet there is nothing for it in this budget that has just been
    submitted. Can you give me your best military judgment about
    whether the SLCM-N is a significant part of our strategic
    deterrent?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Sir, as I alluded to, the 2022 Nuclear
    Posture Review, as they looked at the body of the requirements.
    It was decided that the sea launch cruise missile was not going
    to be part of the Nuclear Posture Review, not be part of a
    supported system.
        The 76-2, which we currently have, was stocked to fill that
    gap. We are aware, though, and we will comply with the plus ups
    that Congress has given us, $5 million in fiscal year 2022. We
    are executing that for research and development.
        The $25 million in fiscal year 2023, we have developed a
    plan to continue to look at technologies, to look at what
    infrastructure would be, to look at how we would integrate into
    platforms as time goes forward.
        Senator King. I think we have to take cognizance of the way
    the world has changed since that Nuclear Posture Review was
    prepared, particularly given Russia's continuous discussion of
    the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
        We don't want to be in a situation where our only response
    is a massive one, which isn't credible given a lower level of
    utilization. I hope that you will continue to review that
    issue, and I know we are going to have further discussions in
    this Subcommittee.
        Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, I
    appreciated our conversation yesterday about the significance
    of developing new weapons based on proven designs, like the W-
    93. Can you share with the rest of the Committee your
    assessment of why this is important and necessary?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am. Certainly, as we look at
    what the combatant commanders' requirements are, and to Senator
    King's point, as we look at the changing environment that we
    now face. We are faced with the challenge of making sure that
    we have weapons--first of all, they have to be credible and
    they have to be from our strategic competitors' eyes reliable
    that they are going to work.
        Which is why we talk about in partnership with NNSA, making
    sure not only what they do with the explosive package, but what
    we do with the system at large to make sure that if ever called
    upon, it is going to work every single time. That is really the
    essence of deterrence.
        It is absolutely critical, as our systems start to age,
    that we stay ahead of that and we never question the
    reliability or the function of any of those weapons, which is
    why modernization right now is so important for the entire
    Department.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. General, the Chairman touched
    on NC3. It has become really common terminology within the
    nuclear enterprise. With Sentinel's integration into our
    nuclear architecture, can you describe any advances taking
    place on items that you believe need congressional support?
        General Bussiere. Specific to NC3, Senator Fischer? The
    Sentinel weapon system will be fielded with probably the most
    advanced communication systems that our Nation has developed.
    It will take into account our new carrier pathways, for
    example, fiber.
        It will take advantage of our cybersecurity protocols. It
    will be designed so that, like Admiral Wolfe illuminated, it
    will be designed so that as technology is developed over the
    years, it is not difficult to integrate that into the open
    architecture of our NC2 systems.
        Senator Fischer. Do you have any specifics on the
    technologies that you have been briefed on that might be
    emerging that you are looking ahead that Congress needs to know
    about?
        General Bussiere. I don't think we would require any
    assistance of Congress now, but there may be some technologies
    in the future that would require that.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Can you provide us with an update on
    the SAOC program?
        General Bussiere. So, the Survival Airborne Operations
    Center, as everyone knows, is the replacement to our current E-
    4B fleet, which is our airborne command and control platform.
    It is a 747-200 platform now.
        There are requests out to industry to come back with their
    proposals and offerings for the SAOC program, and we are
    optimistic we will see those in the next few weeks, if not
    months.
        Senator Fischer. Okay, and then for Admiral and General,
    how are you both working with NNSA to ensure that the warheads
    needed for Sentinel and for Trident missiles are delivered on
    schedule?
        Then I would like Dr. Adams to respond to that, to look at
    how--what the possibilities are that we could accelerate the
    delivery of those.
        General Bussiere. Senator Fischer, specific to our
    programs, whether it is the fielding of Sentinel or the
    fielding of the LRSO [long range stand off] weapon system, we
    work closely with NNSA. We work closely with the Nuke Weapons
    Council, and the Department of Energy, Department of Defense
    Forum that really has those oversight responsibilities.
        We are integral into those discussions. We are confident
    that the Sentinel will be fielded, as you know, with the W87-0.
    So, we will be able to field that weapon system and then
    transition in the future to the W87-1.
        We are also confident in NNSA's estimates to get us the
    required W80-4 for our current schedule for when we field the
    RSO.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Admiral.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am. Much like General Bussiere
    said, we work very closely within NNSA. We work at the Nuclear
    Weapons Council. I would say for our systems, as Dr. Adams
    alluded to, we have just come through the life extension for
    W76/Mk4.
        We are in the throes of having the deliveries for the W88
    alteration that NNSA just completed, and those deliveries are
    occurring. As we look to the future for the W93/Mk7, Dr. Adams
    and I work very, very closely together.
        We are in phase two right now to understand what the
    options are and what options we want to carry forward, so that
    as I get into the Navy work and the integration that has to
    occur, and NNSA gets into the work they have to do, we are
    absolutely in sync and aligned on schedules, and that we are
    pushing each other to make sure that we stay true to those
    schedules.
        Senator Fischer. Dr. Adams, your comments?
        Mr. Adams. Yes, those were the--[technical problems]--I am
    sorry. Do I need to repeat that? Just it was a comment that
    says that the two programs in production now, we have delivered
    on schedule to both the Navy and the Air Force.
        The next one up is the W80-4. We are holding very closely
    to our scheduled first production unit of 2027. There is some
    schedule risk. We are monitoring that very closely and putting
    all hands-on deck to make sure we don't realize schedule risks.
    Several components are difficult to manufacture and we are
    working on that. We do remain closely aligned with the LRSO
    program.
        The LRSO delivery platform depends on us for hardware, for
    their part of flight testing, and we depend on their flights
    for our part of the flight testing. There are a lot of
    environments that the LRSO is subject to because of a lot of
    delivery platforms, a lot of aircraft, and we have to design
    our warheads to make sure they can withstand those
    environments.
        The W87-1 is farther out. At this point, we talk in terms
    of a schedule range. It is quite consistent with the Sentinel
    schedule ranges that I have seen. We will be able to support
    the deployed stockpile of that.
        I am highly confident of that, and we are working hard to
    make sure that we support the need for the hedge portion of
    that as well. Details of that are classified. With the W93
    farther out yet, as Admiral Wolfe said, we are in phase two,
    but already--that is a tightly integrated program.
        The Mk-7 is under development at the same time that the W93
    warhead that will go in it is under development. Our teams work
    incredibly closely together, and we have also begun working
    very closely with the UK on their parallel program.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chair.
        Senator King. Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman King, Ranking
    Member Fischer, for holding this hearing. I would like to thank
    you all for your service and for being here today. Before I
    begin, I really want to start by offering my condolences to the
    families of the U1a miners killed in a car accident last week
    at the Nevada National Security Site, and to our entire NNSS
    community.
        They are a very tight knit group and I know how much this
    is hurting all of them. I want to just give them my
    condolences. I am going to move on and continue to talk about
    Nevada National Security Site, build on some of the importance
    of NNSA.
        We have the NNSS and NNSA, all the NNs, but the audit of
    the U1a complex and the enhancement projects. Dr. Adams, as you
    and I have discussed, the Nevada National Security Site
    oversees the Stockpile Stewardship Program, principally the U1a
    facility.
        It is an underground laboratory where scientists conduct
    subcritical experiments to verify the safety and reliability of
    our nuclear stockpile without explosive testing. U1a is
    undergoing a major construction project that will soon host the
    most capable weapons radiographic system in the world.
        However, a November 2022 audit by the Department of
    Energy's Inspector General found that the U1a Complex
    Enhancements Project has faced unanticipated cost increases and
    schedule overruns, which are going to threaten our stockpile
    stewardship goals.
        Dr. Adams, what actions has the NNSA taken to improve its
    management of science and technology development projects that
    are necessary to support the stockpiles through our stockpile
    stewardship, and what management oversight changes are you
    putting in place to avoid further cost and schedule changes in
    the future?
        Mr. Adams. Thank you for that question, Senator Rosen. We
    agree with the recommendations made in that IG report, the
    draft recommendations. We have taken corrective actions.
        We had taken corrective actions prior to that audit and we
    have been enhancing our management of these critical
    activities. Like other construction projects around the country
    and certainly within the NNSA portfolio, the construction
    underground at U1a, those projects have suffered from the same
    kind of supply chain problems, inflation, labor shortages, and
    labor productivity being lower than expected.
        Our response to that is manyfold. We have instituted, for
    example, a lessons learned task force on UPF, which was one of
    the first construction projects we saw kind of go off of the
    anticipated cost and schedule a little less than a year ago,
    that came to light. We are instituting recommendations based on
    those studies.
        A lot of those things, Administrator Hruby mentioned in the
    first panel session. With regards to sort of the big picture of
    how we are handling those things, given the causes for some of
    these construction schedule problems and the costs that go
    along with schedule extensions, our fiscal year 2024 budget
    request reflects the prioritization that we have made to focus
    our limited labor, supply, and dollars on a smaller number of
    high priority projects to try to execute in parallel.
        Those high priority projects include projects underground
    U1a, the accelerator that you mentioned for the radiography
    capability, the ASD Scorpius project. We have added money to
    that in our request for fiscal year 2024. Similarly, what is
    known as the ZEUS testbed is going to require some mining that
    we didn't expect before and we have asked for the funding to
    support that.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I have a short amount of time, so
    General Bussiere, I am going to just ask you a little bit about
    AFWERX. You have a location right here in Las Vegas--right
    there in Las Vegas, designed to develop effective solutions to
    the challenges facing the Air Force by establishing
    partnerships with the private sector.
        In a few short years, it has evolved into the innovation
    engine of the Air Force. Is now part of the Air Force research
    laboratories, and the Air Force Global Strike Command's
    innovation hub STRIKEWERX is based on the AFWERX's model?
        I just have a few seconds left, but I know that with cyber
    innovation center, STRIKEWERX, we have saved the Air Force over
    $248 million. It is nearly a fivefold return on the funding
    that Congress originally appropriated to fund this agreement.
        I didn't see any discussion of this in your fiscal year
    2024 budget request, so what are your plans for expanding the
    command's innovative efforts to take advantage of things like
    STRIKEWERX?
        General Bussiere. Senator Rosen, thanks for highlighting
    the CIC and the innovation efforts of Global Strike Command. I
    will briefly kind of give you an overview. We have several
    different programs that highlight and give our airmen the
    opportunity to use their most powerful tool, and that is their
    ideas.
        We have AFWERX at the Air Force level, as you are well
    familiar with. We have STRIKEWERX, which was really a smaller
    scale model of that entry port. We also have innovation cells
    at all our installations. In addition to our airmen innovation
    areas and cells, we also have started a partnership with the
    help of Congress.
        It is a commercial capabilities innovation team, which
    basically does the same things with small business and
    commercial entities in and around our business. It is sometimes
    difficult to convince the system that an idea is worthy of a
    program. But make no mistake, we invest and bring in our airmen
    to get ideas.
        We use the funding within our current top line and we use
    our program. Whatever innovation that are saving money is, that
    is where we would use the program dollars for. But I will take
    for the record to go back and see what was submitted in 2024. I
    don't have that in front of me and I will get back to you, if
    that is acceptable.

        [The information referred to follows:]
        General Bussiere. Air Force Global Strike Command places
    great importance on fostering innovation, including initiatives
    like STRIKEWERX. However, the MAJCOM is currently leading major
    nuclear modernization efforts across multiple platforms to
    include Sentinel, B-21, SAOC, LRSO, MH-139, B-52 modernization
    and several NC3 systems. Given the scope and magnitude of the
    modernization efforts, as well as the need to sustain legacy
    nuclear weapon systems through modernization, efforts such as
    STRIKEWERX were deemed to be a lower priority.
        However, recognizing the potential for advancements across
    all AFGSC organizational units, we have taken a step by
    establishing the Commercial Capabilities Integration and
    Transition (CCIT) Division. Originally conceived as a
    ``Prototype'' organization within AFGSC, the CCIT aligned its
    objectives with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force's vision of
    effectively integrating and transitioning commercial
    capabilities and technologies into the United States Air Force
    (USAF). Under my direction, Major General Armagost provides the
    day-to-day leadership and oversight of the CCIT. Together, we
    have the goal of providing AFGSC (at all levels) access to the
    best commercial capabilities and technologies available
    throughout the Nation. Additionally, I envision AFGSC taking a
    leading role within the USAF by proactively identifying,
    expediting, and integrating the most cutting-edge commercial
    solutions to tackle both USAF-wide and AFGSC-specific
    challenges. Already, the CCIT has enhanced competition by
    cultivating collaborative relationships with the private
    technology sector, which will ensure continuous access to
    state-of-the-art commercial technologies for the USAF.

        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate it. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    all of you for your service to our country. Admiral Wolfe, I
    would like to begin with you. The--you mentioned the really
    special anniversary coming up here, the 60th anniversary of our
    agreement to Polaris sales of missiles to the United Kingdom.
        As part of the Five Eyes group, they clearly are some of
    our closest allies. But this particular agreement has continued
    on through the years, and it really has been a way for us to
    extend our capabilities. Can you talk a little bit about just
    how critical it is that we continue that relationship with the
    United Kingdom?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, Senator, thanks for that, because
    I think you are absolutely spot on, our relationship with the
    United Kingdom under the Polaris Sales Agreement. I am the
    United States project officer as part of that Polaris Sales
    Agreement, and what we provide to the United Kingdom is the
    entire weapon system.
        It is not just the missiles. As you look at where we are at
    right now with the United Kingdom, they are modernizing their
    entire SSBN force as well to include their replacement of their
    Vanguard-class submarine, which would be the Dreadnought. We
    work very closely with them, PEO SSBN.
        We have a common missile compartments. Ostensibly, it looks
    exactly the same as what the U.S. Columbia will have, and in so
    doing, what that allows us to do is have--treat them like an
    extra four SSBNs in my program.
        I know the other panel talked about trust. I would tell you
    that the trust that the UK has with us, and the system that we
    provide, and the certifications that we give to them really
    does provide an extension for the United States, it really
    provides for NATO, and it really leads to global stability.
        So, it is incredibly important that we continue to support
    them in everything that they do as they modernize their entire
    SSBN force. They have recently celebrated more than 50 years of
    continuous at sea deterrence, which means one SSBN at sea 24
    hours a day, 7 days a week for the last 50 plus years.
        We have a big part in making sure that they continue that
    record, and we are absolutely all in to do that.
        Senator Rounds. That is one less that we have to have in
    the water at the same time.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. I mean, it is all part of
    that extended deterrence. Yes, sir.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Bussiere, the B-21
    program is right now one of the shining stars out there with
    regard to being on time, on budget, and one which the folks in
    Rapid City, South Dakota, are really looking forward to having
    it deployed there at Ellsworth Air Force Base.
        I am just curious with regard to the implementation of its
    nuclear capability as well that requires a weapons generation
    facility which will be created there at Ellsworth. Can you
    share a little bit about the timelines and so forth, and where
    you are seeing the B-2, in this unclassified section, but at
    least share a little bit about the development and the future
    timelines that you can share with the public.
        General Bussiere. Senator Rounds, as you know, the first
    base for the B-21 raider will be Ellsworth Air Force Base.
    Construction has already started on several different
    facilities to support that sixth-generation low observable
    platform, including adding a weapons generation facility to be
    able to facilitate its dual docked mission.
        I think the committee is also familiar that the Secretary
    of Defense, I think 3 years ago, directed that the
    certification of the B-21 Raider for conventional and nuclear
    certification be closed. So, when we deliver that weapon system
    to the wings, it will be capable of both missions.
        Very happy with the way that program is going. Very happy
    with both industry, as well as the Rapid Capabilities Office,
    and obviously the Nation and the world got a sneak peek at that
    in December when that weapon system was revealed.
        Senator Rounds. Great, thank you, and I need to go back
    just for a minute, Admiral Wolfe, with regard to the situation
    we have got with trying to deploy the new submarines, as well
    as keep the existing submarines operational. I go back to the
    USS Boise as an example.
        This is a Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine, attack
    submarine, has now been in dry dock or prepared to be in dry
    dock for its half-life basically, or close to 7 years now, if
    my memory serves me right.
        But it suggests the bigger problem that we have got in that
    we are trying to not only maintain and configure the Ohio-
    class, but also another Columbia-class. How are we going to
    right now create the new submarines, maintain the existing
    submarines, handle the half-lives for the attack submarines.
        It seems to me that we just simply don't have enough
    shipyard space and is there a priority for the Columbia-class
    and the Ohio-class that is perhaps one of the reasons why the
    Los Angeles-class submarines are sitting at dry dock.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. So, yes, sir, I would tell you that
    from a Navy priority, Columbia-class as a new platform is the
    priority. I would tell you that PEO SSBN and PEO SSN, both of
    them frequently meet together to understand what needs to be
    done to make sure Columbia stays a priority, to your point, so
    that we have a replacement SSBN.
        I would also tell you that the good news is, we are about
    done with all of our--as I alluded to, we are going to do our
    last demonstration and shakedown operation on our Ohio-class,
    the USS Louisiana, and that will be the last of the Ohio-class
    that goes through their mid-life refueling overhaul.
        So those will be past us now. We will still have to do
    normal maintenance and all the things that we do, but those big
    availabilities are now going to be completed, and we will
    continue to work through that capacity challenge as well.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. One thing we learned from Admiral Caldwell
    was that the Columbia-class will never have to be refueled.
    Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony, for your
    service.
        Thank you for joining us today and for giving us the
    forthright answers to our questions. This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 6:27 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
                          hanford tank waste treatment
        1. Senator King. Mr. White, the Government Accountability Office
    (GAO), federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) Report
    and National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NAS) have
    indicated that the Department of Energy (DOE) should proceed with
    urgency the grouting and out of State disposal of mixed low-level waste
    (MLLW) from Hanford tanks to save money and to accelerate the cleanup
    schedule at Hanford in parallel with the direct-feed low-activity waste
    (DFLAW) program. Can you please explain why DOE has not requested any
    funds to pursue these recommendations for fiscal year 2024?
        Mr. White. The Department agrees that this is a priority and DOE is
    working expeditiously to complete these activities. DOE did not request
    funds in fiscal year 2024 to pursue these recommendations because
    funding is already available for the proposed 2,000-gallon Test Bed
    Initiative Demonstration.

        2. Senator King. Mr. White, please provide this committee with a
    cost estimate and schedule to begin grouting and out of State disposal
    of waste already treated by Tank-Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) and
    awaiting vitrification.
        Mr. White. Further implementation of grout beyond the 2,000-gallon
    Test Bed Initiative Demonstration would require additional permits, a
    public involvement process and a National Environmental Policy Act
    (NEPA) review. One of the purposes of the Test Bed Initiative
    Demonstration is to gain information about the costs, schedule and
    regulatory processes associated with potentially expanding use of a
    grouting technology. DOE looks forward to sharing additional
    information with Congress as it becomes available.

        3. Senator King. Mr. White, please explain why DOE cannot do both
    out of State disposal and the DFLAW program today while the
    vitrification plant is awaiting startup and commissioning.
        Mr. White. In parallel with the DFLAW program, DOE is working with
    the State of Washington to consider additional options for augmenting
    and accelerating the tank waste mission. That includes taking
    thoughtful steps to advance the Test Bed Initiative Demonstration. The
    Test Bed Initiative Demonstration is designed to consider the most
    effective combination of pretreatment, transportation, treatment, and
    grouting processes and to gain experience through progressive
    demonstrations. Once regulatory approvals are received, DOE will
    complete the Test Bed Initiative Demonstration, evaluate the results,
    and follow regulatory and legal processes, in concert with regulators
    and in communication with Congress, for consideration of further
    implementation of this approach.

        4. Senator King. Mr. White, it has been almost 5 years since 3
    gallons of MLLW from Hanford tanks was treated, grouted, and disposed
    out of Washington State. Given the estimated cost savings and schedule
    acceleration that, according to the FFRDC Report, multiple NAS reports
    and GAO analyses, would be realized by grouting and out of State
    disposal of MLLW, why hasn't DOE moved with extreme urgency on this
    demonstration project?
        Mr. White. DOE appreciates the work performed by the NAS/FFRDC at
    the direction of Congress, the work of the GAO and others in analyzing
    the potential benefits of options, including grout. While DOE focuses
    on treatment via the DFLAW program, the Department continues working on
    a path forward for addressing all Hanford tank waste in a safe,
    effective manner and at a practical cost. Grout is one alternative for
    the low activity liquid waste that scientific experts continue to
    analyze, as well as several other options. DOE is committed to
    following regulatory and legal processes, in concert with regulators
    including the State of Washington and in communication with Congress,
    stakeholders, and Tribal Nations as options like the TBI Demonstration
    advance.

        5. Senator King. Mr. White, are DOE and the Washington State
    Department of Ecology aligned on the land disposal treatment standard
    to be applied to waste that DOE determines through its processes and
    methods is not high-level radioactive waste (HLW)? If not why not?
        Mr. White. While the Test Bed Initiative Demonstration involves
    out-of-State disposal, DOE and the State of Washington continue working
    in a deliberate and constructive manner to reach agreement on many
    issues related to the Hanford tank waste mission. DOE looks forward to
    working with Congress on these issues as these discussions continue.

        6. Senator King. Mr. White, what does DOE suggest be done to
    address any such impasses between the two organizations?
        Mr. White. DOE, the State of Washington, and the U.S. Environmental
    Protection Agency (EPA) recently reached conceptual agreement in
    Holistic Negotiations on revising plans for managing millions of
    gallons of waste stored in tanks at the Hanford Site. This agreement
    demonstrates a commitment to resolving issues in good faith and upholds
    the Tri-Party Agencies' shared commitment to a safe, effective, and
    achievable path forward. Continuing constructive discussions among DOE,
    EPA, and the State of Washington is the best way to addresses impasses
    and reach agreement on solutions to advance the Hanford tank waste
    mission.

        7. Senator King. Mr. White, the GAO has recommended that
    legislation is required to address and clarify which agency has
    jurisdiction over the final treatment standard to be applied to waste
    DOE determines is not HLW. DOE concurred in GAO's recommendations to
    pursue legislation. Does the Department still stand by that
    recommendation? If so when can we expect proposed legislation for
    Congress to consider?
        Mr. White. DOE does not believe additional clarification from
    Congress is needed to classify Hanford reprocessing waste as non-high-
    level waste (HLW). GAO recommended that Congress should consider
    authorizing DOE to classify the volumes of waste corresponding to the
    TBI Demonstration for out-of-State waste disposal as something other
    than HLW and specifying that this waste is exempt from the Resource
    Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) vitrification standard for mixed
    HLW. As stated above and in our response to GAO, DOE believes that the
    authority to classify reprocessing waste as other than HLW already
    resides with DOE.

                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                             pit production program
        8. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, the W87-1 Modification
    Program is creating a warhead replacement for the U.S. Air Force Ground
    Based Strategic Deterrent. The First Production Unit is planned for
    2030, but its new design requires a newly manufactured pit. For those
    overseeing this program, it is difficult for them to understand how
    their program will be impacted by pit production capability schedule
    changes without a proper Integrated Master Schedule (IMS). What has
    been the impact on the lack of a proper IMS and cost estimate had on
    planning for the W87-1 Modification Program?
        Ms. Hruby. By way of background, the current Minuteman III
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) is armed with both W78 and
    W87-0 warheads. The baseline Sentinel program plan, and the transition
    of the ICBM force from Minuteman III to Sentinel has always included
    deployment with W87-0 warheads first, followed by the W87-1 warheads.
    The newly manufactured pits will be used in the W87-1. The schedule for
    the W87-1 warheads has been closely synchronized between the NNSA and
    the DOD Sentinel acquisition program. NNSA does not believe the level
    of maturity and fidelity of the NNSA Integrated Master Schedule (NIMS)
    for plutonium pit production has had a negative impact on the schedule
    or planning for deployment of the W87-1 warhead.
        The first version of the NIMS was implemented in October 2021 and
    improved upon the original milestone schedule by incorporating detailed
    schedule logic for first production unit at the Los Alamos National
    Laboratory, while retaining all other milestones for scope supporting
    the full 80 pits-per-year mission. NNSA continues to refine the NIMS
    and update cost estimates in order to inform pit production schedules.
    The next report on NIMS, requested through the House Armed Services
    Committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act
    for fiscal year 2023, will be delivered to Congress in the coming
    months, but the NIMS has been implemented and NNSA is constantly
    improving the schedule and project management tool with higher fidelity
    data as the underlying projects and programs mature.

        9. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, will the W87-1 Modification
    Program be delayed due to the inability of National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) to meet its capability of producing 80 pits per
    year by 2030?
        Ms. Hruby. No. NNSA and the U.S. Air Force continue to work closely
    with other Nuclear Weapons Council stakeholders to develop and refine
    plans that accommodate schedule uncertainties in both the NNSA and DOD
    programs. The baseline design for the W87-1 includes a newly
    manufactured pit, and the program is on track to provide these pits on
    a schedule that supports current plans. NNSA is also carrying a backup
    option of a reuse pit, to ensure that warheads can be delivered to the
    Air Force on the needed schedule in the event of unanticipated
    disruptions to pit production schedules.

        10. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, what plan is in place to
    be able to complete the W87-1 Modification Program if the plutonium pit
    is not able to be developed in time for the W87-1 production schedule?
        Ms. Hruby. As noted in the answer to question 9, NNSA and the U.S.
    Air Force continue to work closely with other Nuclear Weapons Council
    stakeholders to develop and refine plans that accommodate schedule
    uncertainties. The baseline design for the W87-1 includes a newly
    manufactured pit, and the program is on track to provide these pits on
    a schedule that supports current plans. NNSA is also carrying a backup
    option of a reuse pit, to ensure that warheads can be delivered to the
    Air Force on the needed schedule in the event of unanticipated
    disruptions to pit production schedules.

        11. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, the current NNSA IMS
    includes activities only at two sites, Los Alamos and Livermore, to
    manufacture one first production unit (FPU) by 2024. Will the updated
    IMS include all of the information on activities at the other five
    sites that have a role in the pit production process, including the
    Nevada National Security Site, the Kansas City National Security
    Campus, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, the Pantex Plant, and the
    Savannah River Site?
        Ms. Hruby. The current version of NNSA's Integrated Master Schedule
    (NIMS) for plutonium pit production includes multi-site information at
    a level of detail that makes it an effective management tool for the
    program. Integrated detailed site schedule logic from Los Alamos
    National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and
    the Kansas City National Security Campus is contained in the NIMS for
    program scope focused on pit manufacturing and production efforts to
    attain FPU at LANL. Schedule logic with less detail is included for
    programs and projects at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing
    Facility and those associated with later phases of equipment
    installation at Los Alamos. NIMS will continue to integrate higher
    fidelity schedule logic for those programs and projects as their
    designs and schedules mature and this logic becomes available. In this
    way NIMS capabilities will keep pace as more programs and projects
    develop more detailed schedules, and it will remain an effective
    management tool for the program.

        12. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, which projects is the NNSA
    currently undertaking that require these new pits and what is the
    timeline for those projects to be completed?
        Ms. Hruby. The preferred option for both the W87-1 Modification
    Program and the W93 warhead, as well as any warhead program that
    follows, is a newly manufactured pit. NNSA is carrying options for
    reuse pits for the W87-1 and the W93, to support warhead delivery on
    the required schedule in the event that newly manufactured pits cannot
    be produced in time. Any subsequent warhead program is expected to use
    newly manufactured pits. The W87-1 is expected to reach system-level
    first production unit in the 2030-2032 timeframe, with newly
    manufactured pits from Los Alamos, and will align with U.S. Air Force
    timelines for the Sentinel ICBM program. DOE/NNSA continues to
    coordinate closely with the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Nuclear
    Weapons Council (NWC) to ensure this schedule alignment. The W93
    program is still early in its development and has an anticipated FPU in
    the mid-2030's. We continue to coordinate with the DOD, NWC, and the
    United Kingdom to ensure schedule alignment between the W93 program and
    the UK's separate but parallel Replacement Warhead program.

        13. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, what steps is NNSA taking
    to prevent against the backlog of projects that may arise when the
    delay of the pit production program impacts these programs and there is
    limited NNSA infrastructure to take operate all these projects?
        Ms. Hruby. NNSA works closely and continuously with the Department
    of Defense to account for pit production timeline uncertainties, and
    NNSA is carrying pit reuse options for the W87-1 and W93 as insurance
    against disruptive delays. We continue to assess and make changes to
    schedules as needed as we jointly ensure that our nuclear deterrent
    remains safe, secure, and effective. Once both pit production
    facilities are operational there will be inherent resilience in the
    NNSA enterprise.

        14. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, why can't NNSA use the
    approach that Government Accountability Office (GAO) describes that
    should allow you to have an estimate much sooner?
        Ms. Hruby. NNSA is tackling this challenge and will develop an
    initial pit production total acquisition cost estimate by April 2024.
    NNSA's Plutonium Program is planned and managed using NNSA practices
    and procedures that are consistent with GAO and government project and
    program management requirements. NNSA will develop its initial total
    acquisition cost estimate in April 2024, although this estimate will
    have significant uncertainties. An improved baseline total acquisition
    cost estimate, with smaller uncertainties, will follow the
    establishment of baseline cost and schedule estimates for the Savannah
    River Plutonium Processing Facility Project and the Los Alamos
    Plutonium Pit Production Project, which we expect to happen by mid-
    2026. These cost and schedule estimates cannot be established until
    designs are nearer to completion.

        15. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, in 2021 the NNSA provided
    to Congress a Research Program Plan for Plutonium and Pit Aging. Can
    you please provide an unclassified version of that plan?
        Ms. Hruby. NNSA's Research Program Plan for Plutonium and Pit Aging
    report to Congress is classified and NNSA is ready and willing to
    provide a classified briefing to appropriately cleared personnel. We do
    not have an unclassified version of the plan.

        16. Senator Warren. Deputy Administrator Adams, when do you expect
    to see additional data that can be publicly shared from the 2021
    Research Program Plan for Plutonium and Pit Aging? When would you
    recommend the JASON group perform an assessment of that data?
        Ms. Hruby. The experimental data on such weapons-relevant physics
    regimes is classified. However, per Section 3124(d) of the National
    Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2023, NNSA will enter into an
    arrangement with the JASON scientific advisory group to conduct an
    updated assessment of plutonium pit aging not later than 2030. Such a
    date allows NNSA to continue to research plutonium aging and make
    progress against the milestones described in our Research Program Plan,
    thereby providing the JASONs sufficient data for an updated assessment.

        17. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, in 2006, the JASONs
    concluded that pits last at least a century. Congress required a second
    updated report. However, in a 2019 ``letter report'' the JASONs said
    that NNSA did not give them time for a full study but laid out criteria
    for what a future study should do. When will NNSA have an independent
    updated pit life study completed when potentially tens of billions of
    dollars are riding on the outcome?
        Ms. Hruby. The 2006 JASON report on pit aging was more nuanced than
    is commonly reported. It did not make a blanket statement that all pits
    in today's warheads will meet military requirements until they are 100
    years old. Pit performance degrades over time. It is difficult to
    quantify how much the pit material properties will change over time,
    and even more difficult to quantify how much those changes will affect
    weapon performance under all relevant conditions. Estimating how long a
    given pit type will meet requirements, in a given weapon system and
    environment, is an extrapolatory exercise involving considerable
    uncertainty. The answer is different for different warhead designs and
    different environments.
        The choice of a ``letter report'' instead of a full study in 2019
    was based on many factors, including availability of JASON person-hours
    and prioritization of other studies sponsored by various government
    agencies. The 2019 report acknowledged the difficulty of reducing
    uncertainties in pit performance as a function of age and recommended
    continued research. As directed by the Fiscal Year 2023 National
    Defense Authorization Act, NNSA has developed a briefing that describes
    its plan to study plutonium aging. Research efforts are making
    significant progress, but uncertainties will diminish incrementally
    over time due to the complexity of pit aging phenomena and the extreme
    dynamic conditions of nuclear explosions. NNSA will enter into an
    arrangement with the JASON scientific advisory group to conduct an
    updated assessment of plutonium pit aging not later than 2030. Such a
    date allows NNSA to continue to research plutonium aging and make
    progress against the milestones described in our Research Program Plan,
    thereby providing the JASONs sufficient data for an updated assessment.

        18. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, expanded plutonium pit
    production is NNSA's most expensive program ever. NNSA's last public
    cost estimate was in 2018 with a price tag of 43 billion dollars. Costs
    have gone up at both the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the
    Savannah River Site, likely putting it above $60 billion. NNSA swore
    that its Uranium Processing Facility would never exceed its declared
    budget cap of $6.5 billion, but its fiscal year 2024 budget request
    just doubled from last year to $760 million, with its total price
    estimate now at $8.5 billion. When will NNSA meet the Government
    Accountability Office's strong recommendations for a total cost
    estimate and Integrated Master Schedule for pit production that
    Congress and the public can rely upon?
        Ms. Hruby. NNSA is tackling this challenge and will develop an
    initial pit production total acquisition cost estimate by April 2024.
    This estimate will have large uncertainties because the Savannah River
    Plutonium Processing Facility design will still be far from complete,
    but we will strive to ensure that assumptions are clearly stated and
    uncertainties bound the cost and schedule. An improved ``baseline'' pit
    production total acquisition cost estimate will follow the
    establishment of baseline cost and schedule estimates for the Savannah
    River Plutonium Processing Facility and the Los Alamos Plutonium Pit
    Production Project, which we expect to happen by mid-2026. Please see
    the answer to Question 11 for a discussion of the Integrated Master
    Schedule.

        19. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, media has reported that a
    classified change is being made to the design of future W87-1 pits.
    What is the rationale for changing pit designs that have been full
    scale tested?
        Ms. Hruby. In Fall 2022, NNSA, Los Alamos National Laboratory
    (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Kansas City
    National Security Campus agreed to implement a design change that makes
    the W87-1 pit more manufacturable, which means more War Reserve pits
    will be produced at LANL on the time scales needed for the stockpile.
        This W87-1 pit design change has a major effect on
    manufacturability but a minor effect on performance. Both pre-and post-
    change designs conform closely to previously tested pit designs,
    resulting in minimal risks to qualification and certification.

        20. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, what guarantees that
    future pits will be reliable when they can't be full scale tested?
        Ms. Hruby. Since the 1992 nuclear explosive test moratorium
    decision, we have relied on our underground nuclear test history, ever-
    improving experimental and computational tools, and continually
    increasing scientific understanding to maintain confidence in the
    safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear warheads. Future pit
    designs will take advantage of this and will incorporate ample
    performance margin to account for uncertainties. New subcritical
    experimental capabilities at the Nevada National Security Site will be
    used to strengthen our understanding in key areas associated with
    weapon performance and will enable the nuclear security enterprise to
    respond to an evolving security environment without a return to
    underground nuclear explosive testing.

        21. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, do nuclear weapons design
    codes have high fidelity?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, today's codes on today's computers can execute
    high-fidelity simulations of the performance of today's warheads under
    nominal conditions.

        22. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, what is the empirical
    basis for having confidence in current nuclear weapons design codes?
        Ms. Hruby. The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program's
    modeling and simulation capabilities that have been developed over the
    past 28 years underpin NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program. The ASC
    weapons codes represent the primary design tools for the nuclear
    security enterprise because they simulate performance and safety of
    weapon systems over a wide range of conditions and environmental
    effects. The empirical basis for confidence in current codes is
    comparison with measured data collected from historical underground
    nuclear explosive tests and from separate effects tests, e.g.,
    subcritical experiments or experiments on NIF, Z, or Omega, as well as
    experiments from around the world and across history that measure basic
    material properties and characterize basic physical phenomena.

        23. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, will new-design nuclear
    weapons prompt the U.S. to resume testing?
        Ms. Hruby. Warheads produced by U.S. modernization programs will be
    certified without nuclear explosive testing. Since the 1992 moratorium
    decision, we have relied on our nuclear explosive test history, ever-
    improving experimental and computational tools, and continually
    increasing scientific understanding to maintain confidence in the
    safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear warheads. This will
    continue.
        The W87-1 Modification Program will replace the aging W78 warhead
    using a modified existing legacy W87-0 design and will deploy new
    technologies that improve safety and security, address material
    obsolescence, and improve warhead manufacturability. Similarly, the W93
    will not require additional nuclear explosive testing to be certified
    since it is anchored on previously tested nuclear components. The W93
    will also incorporate modern technologies to improve safety, security,
    and flexibility to address future threats. It will be designed for ease
    of manufacturing, maintenance, and certification. Key nuclear
    components will be based on currently deployed, and previously tested
    nuclear designs, and extensive stockpile component and materials
    experience. Today's codes, which have been extensively tested against
    data from historical nuclear explosions and from a vast array of other
    experiments (as noted in the answer to Question 22), provide weapons
    experts with quantitative results and insights that are essential for
    their certification and assessments efforts.

        24. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, the Project Data Sheets
    (PDS) in the fiscal year 2024 Department of Energy congressional
    Justification for NNSA for the Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production
    Project (LAP4) and Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF)
    State that total costs and total project duration could be
    significantly greater than presented in the tables which follow. Please
    provide alternative cost schedules which reflect these greater totals
    and durations for each of the two projects, in order to bracket the
    annual costs and durations you expect for each project and subproject
    within some stated confidence level.
        Ms. Hruby. Currently, CD-2, Approve Performance Baseline, is
    planned for the 4Q of fiscal year 2025 for LAP4 and 3Q of 2026 for
    SRPPF. We are re-evaluating our schedules as designs are advanced for
    LAP4 and SRPPF. As we reported to committee staff in our 2d Quarterly
    Construction Briefing during the week of August 14, we anticipate a 2-4
    year schedule delay for LAP4 and are currently re-evaluating the
    schedule delay for SRPPF. NNSA has committed to providing updated cost
    and schedule estimates for SRPPF by April 2024, which will be the
    culmination of a multi-month effort that will begin when SRPPF's design
    is 50 percent complete. Additionally, NNSA remains committed to
    providing quarterly construction updates that include the latest
    estimates for costs and schedules, as well as updates in annual
    congressional Justifications.

        25. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, what is the expected
    schedule for the production of War Reserve (WR) pits at a) Los Alamos
    National Laboratory (LANL) and b) Savannah River Site (SRS) from fiscal
    year 2024 through fiscal year 2039, with confidence levels for each
    year?
        Ms. Hruby. LANL Pit Production--The first War Reserve pit is
    expected to be delivered by LANL in late 2024. The number of pits
    manufactured per year will increase as more equipment is installed at
    Los Alamos and the manufacturing capacity increases. The fraction of
    manufactured pits that are judged to meet War Reserve standards will
    also grow as pit production processes gain maturity. The rate of
    equipment installation is a major factor in the WR pit production
    timeline at Los Alamos, and it is uncertain for a variety of technical
    and operational reasons not associated with deficiencies in planning.
    The time required to decontaminate and remove old gloveboxes and
    equipment is not precisely predictable, as each presents unique
    challenges. Installation of new equipment, some highly specialized, is
    subject to supply chain delays. The frequency and duration of facility
    upsets is not precisely predictable. With these and other sources of
    uncertainty, it is premature to definitively tighten the range for
    reaching rate production, though we expect that Los Alamos will likely
    achieve 15-30 WR pits per year between 2027 and 2029 if requested
    funding and current progress continues.
        SRS Pit Production--Before WR pits can be produced at SRS, we need
    to complete construction of SRPPF, establish plutonium inventories and
    radiological operations, and develop and certify processes and
    products. The schedule estimate approved at Critical Decision (CD)-1,
    Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range, had a CD-4, Approve Start
    of Operations or Project Completion, schedule range of 1st Quarter
    fiscal year 2032 to 4th Quarter fiscal year 2035. The project's
    schedule will not be baselined until the design is complete at CD-2/3,
    Approve Performance Baseline and Approve Start of Construction,
    currently forecasted for approval by 3d Quarter fiscal year 2026. This
    is later than the fiscal year 2024 construction project data sheets
    indicated, reflecting information received from Savannah River Nuclear
    Solutions, LLC, after those data sheets were submitted.
        The uncertainty in the SRS pit production schedule will remain high
    until the SRPPF design matures and the project is baselined at CD-2.
    Once CD-4 is reached, the infrastructure and process equipment
    necessary to establish a pit production capability will be turned over
    to the Savannah River (SR) Plutonium Modernization Program for
    operations. The Program will then introduce plutonium and begin
    radiological ``hot'' operations, followed by the development,
    qualification, and certification activities necessary to produce the
    first production unit (FPU), followed by continued process and capacity
    improvements until rate production is reached. Historically it has
    taken more than 5 years for nuclear facilities to proceed from material
    introduction to rate production. The Savannah River Site Plutonium
    Modernization Program continues to explore and implement acceleration
    strategies to reduce this rate production timeline at SRS, with a key
    part of the strategy being the establishment and use of the High
    Fidelity Training and Operations Center (HFTOC). The HFTOC will contain
    identical process gloveboxes and equipment lines for key processes that
    will be used in the SRPPF Main Processing Building. HFTOC is planned to
    be completed ahead of the Main Process Building by as much as 6 years.
    Using a surrogate material, cold development activities and training in
    the HFTOC will reduce the number of activities that would normally
    happen during hot operations in the Main Processing Building, thereby
    reducing the time from CD-4 to rate production.
        NNSA, working with both SRS and LANL, will continue to refine the
    schedule for pit production at SRS.

        26. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, please provide the
    expected Plutonium Modernization Program spending level in each of the
    main three geographic categories (LANL, SRS, Enterprise Support) for
    the years fiscal year 2029 to fiscal year 2039, or the last year in
    which you expect full production at SRPPF to occur.
        Ms. Hruby. The table below provides estimated per year average
    spending rate of the Plutonium Modernization Program, excluding
    construction projects. The Plutonium Modernization Program includes
    support for plutonium science, subcritical experiments, and other
    activities involving plutonium, so it encompasses much more than
    support for pit production. Many of these activities are conducted at
    Los Alamos, which is the NNSA Center of Excellence for Plutonium. The
    estimates in the table assume 2.2 percent escalation per year after
    fiscal year 2039 to account for inflation on continuing steady State
    activities. Spending rates through 2059 assume that current plans for
    the stockpile will remain largely unchanged. While SRPPF is expected to
    continue operating well beyond 2059, we have little basis for
    speculating on pit production demands that far into the future.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              ESTIMATED AVERAGE        ESTIMATED AVERAGE        ESTIMATED AVERAGE
                Control Level               SPENDING RATE FISCAL     SPENDING RATE  FISCAL    SPENDING RATE  FISCAL
                                            YEAR 2029-2039  ($B)      YEAR  2040-2049 ($B)     YEAR  2050-2059 ($B)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Los Alamos Plutonium Operations.....  1.4                       2.0                      2.5
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Savannah River Plutonium Operations.  0.8                       1.7                      2.1
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Enterprise Plutonium Support........  0.2                       0.2                      0.3
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Because time periods covered in this table are outside the planning
    cycle and many details about the future are unknown, we stress that
    these are rough estimates with significant uncertainty.

        27. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, please provide a complete
    schedule of line item construction projects, with associated estimated
    costs, that you anticipate needing to support pit production in the
    years up to and including fiscal year 2039.
        Ms. Hruby. Line item projects that exist or are planned today are
    listed below, with the requested estimates. As the designs mature for
    the existing projects, other line-item projects might be identified
    that could begin before 2039. CD-4, Complete Construction, dates may
    change as projects achieve major acquisition milestones and are
    baselined and/or re-baselined (dollars in thousands). The schedules and
    costs shown below are based on assumptions about funding profiles and
    will change if actual funding profiles differ from those assumed.

          Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF)
            CD-1 estimated CD-4 Date: fiscal year 2032-fiscal year
    2035
            CD-1 TPC: $11,100,000
            Note: Cost estimate reflects the high end of the cost
    range estimated at CD-1 in 2021. We now know that this estimate will
    increase, partly because construction costs nationwide have grown
    significantly and partly because the project design has matured,
    providing more detailed information. The potential impact on the
    project cost may be an increase of 60 percent to 125 percent. We remain
    committed to providing updated cost and schedule ranges in April 2024.

          Chemistry & Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR)
            Estimated CD-4 Date: 2029
            CD-1 TPC: $2,886,230
            Note: NNSA is finalizing decisions on the scope of the
    remaining CMRR subprojects. The reaffirmed scope will prioritize
    equipment installations over infrastructure improvements to support the
    original mission need to maximize utilization of existing facilities in
    the absence of the CMRR Nuclear Facility. NNSA is evaluating options
    for future projects to complete any required scope that is not
    ultimately included in CMRR.

          Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP-4)
            Estimated CD-4 Date: 2032
            Estimated TPC: $4,729,875
            Note: The TPC reflects the fiscal year 2024 President's
    Budget Request (PBR), which includes an increase to the 30 Reliable
    subproject estimate that is greater than the high end of the CD-1 cost
    range due to the transfer of scope from the 30 Base subproject at
    approval of CD-2/3, Approve Project Baseline and Approve Start of
    Construction. This estimate may change as project design reaches
    completion and as the impact of economic factors on nuclear
    construction projects is more fully understood. The potential impact on
    the project cost may be an increase of 30 percent to 40 percent and
    could extend the schedule by 2 to 4 years.
            LANL Pajarito Corridor Office Complex (PCOC) Building
    1: Operations and Waste Management Office
            Estimated CD-4 Date: 2025
            Estimated TPC: $50,048

          LANL Plutonium Production Building (PCOC Building 2) (FY
    2024 New Start)
            Estimated CD-4 Date: 2026
            Estimated TPC: $49,500
          LANL Plutonium Mission Safety & Quality Building (PCOC
    Building 3)
            Estimated CD-4 Date: 2027
            Estimated TPC: $49,437

          LANL Plutonium Program Accounting Building (PCOC Building
    4)
            Estimated CD-4 Date: 2028
            Estimated TPC: $50,213

          LANL Plutonium Engineering Support Building (PCOC
    Building 5)
            Estimated CD-4 Date: 2031
            Estimated TPC: $49,700

          LANL TA-46 Protective Force Facility (FY 2024 New Start)
            Estimated CD-4 Date: 2026
            Estimated TPC: $50,000

          LANL Protective Forces Support Facility
            Estimated CD-4 Date: 2029
            Estimated TPC: $50,213

          TA-55 Reinvestment Project Phase 3
            Estimated CD-4 Date: 2027
            Estimated TPC: $236,030

          Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility Transuranic
    Liquid Waste
            Estimated CD-4 Date: 2027
            Estimated TPC: $206,394

          SRS Office Space Project--This is in the early planning
    stages but will support pit production. NNSA will provide cost and
    schedule estimates when they become available.
            CD-4 Date: unknown
            TPC: unknown

        28. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, will it be necessary to
    replace or augment the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at Los Alamos? If so,
    when will this be necessary, how do you propose to do it, and what do
    you anticipate the generalized cost and investment schedule to be?
        Ms. Hruby. PF-4 is undergoing a host of modifications/upgrades
    through multiple activities to extend the life of the facility: Los
    Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP4) line item; Plutonium
    Facility Equipment Installation Phase 2 (PEI2) subproject; TA-55
    Reinvestment Project (TRP) Phase III; Pu Modernization Program Major
    Items of Equipment (MIE) portfolio; Capabilities Based Investments
    (CBI) portfolio; and a series of Recapitalization projects to address
    infrastructure and safety priorities. A first look at replacement of
    PF-4 will likely take place in the 2050 - 2060 timeframe.

        29. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, will it be necessary to
    replace or augment other nuclear facilities at LANL to support pit
    production and if so, when will this be necessary, how do you propose
    to do it, and what do you anticipate the generalized cost and
    investment schedule to be?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, it will be necessary to replace and augment nuclear
    facilities at LANL other than PF-4 to support pit production over the
    next 10 years. Our plans and budget requests include these investments,
    which have already begun and will continue through approximately the
    2032 timeframe. These investments are funded through a combination of
    funding sources including the Plutonium Modernization (PuM) Program and
    Line-Item Projects that have been included the PBR. LANL also uses
    indirect funds for facility improvements across the laboratory,
    including facilities that support pit production. The only identified
    new nuclear facility currently being replaced is the TRU Liquid Waste
    Treatment Facility which is estimated to complete in 2027 at $206M.
    Additionally, Infrastructure and Operations is making upgrades to the
    Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility (WCRRF)
    which is necessary for size reducing and repackaging out dated and
    aging PF-4 gloveboxes that are being replaced by the Chemistry and
    Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) project and the Los Alamos
    Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP4).

        30. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, does the SRPPF encompass
    all the construction required to support pit production at SRS and if
    not what further facilities and infrastructure will be needed and what
    will these improvements cost?
        Ms. Hruby. The project includes the facilities and associated
    infrastructure needed to establish a pit production capability at SRS
    as defined in the Program Requirements Document (PRD). NNSA is
    evaluating additional infrastructure that could be needed to provide
    supporting capabilities for efficient operations at SRPPF, as an
    alternative to outsourcing that support, to mitigate risks and improve
    operational efficiencies and reduce development and production
    timelines. NNSA is also evaluating additional infrastructure, such as
    office space, to support the broader mission set at SRS because of the
    significant and long-term nature of the pit production, tritium, and
    nonproliferation missions we conduct at the site.
        NNSA is evaluating the F-Area utilities at SRS such as fire water,
    domestic water, or sewer that are currently under DOE-EM management and
    are provided as a service to SRPPF. Initial reviews indicate that the
    service water system may need refurbishment, domestic water may need
    resizing, the 13.8 kV electrical distribution system may need a new
    feeder extension, and the sanitary wastewater system may require a
    higher capacity lift station to support SRPPF utility demands.
    Estimates for these infrastructure enhancements are being developed as
    further assessment of existing capabilities and capacities are
    completed.

        31. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, please provide a complete
    list of construction projects and capital equipment projects necessary
    to support plutonium pit production at each of the two main sites which
    are neither line-items nor included in program costs.
        Ms. Hruby. The majority of construction projects and capital
    equipment projects necessary to support plutonium pit production at Los
    Alamos and Savannah River are line-item projects or program costs.
    There are a few projects LANL plans to execute using indirect funds
    whose resulting infrastructure will support multiple laboratory
    efforts, one of which is plutonium pit production. At this time three
    multi-use office buildings are in progress and another three are in the
    planning and evaluation phase; three cafeterias are in the planning and
    evaluation phase; and one parking garage is in the planning and
    evaluation phase. As DOE/NNSA works toward the SRS management
    transition and SRS shifts from a closure site to an enduring site, NNSA
    is evaluating the need for additional infrastructure to support the
    broader national security mission set at SRS.

        32. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, please provide an expected
    schedule of full time equivalents (FTEs) required at each of the two
    main sites to support pit production preparations and operations, by
    year through fiscal year 2039.
        Ms. Hruby. We cannot answer this question with high confidence at
    this point because time periods covered here are outside the planning
    cycle and many details about the future are unknown. Therefore, we
    stress that these are rough estimates with significant uncertainty. In
    addition, the number of FTEs that can be supported at each site depends
    directly on funding profiles, which are not known this far into the
    future. Our estimates assume that funding profiles will support timely
    completion and thereby minimize total project costs. The estimates will
    change if actual funding profiles are different. Finally, we have not
    yet analyzed whether the two sites have done the FTE accounting the
    same way, for example, whether these are direct FTEs only or also
    include indirect funded FTEs.
        To support both SRPPF construction and operations, it is expected
    that FTEs at SRS will grow from about 1,370 FTEs in fiscal year 2023 to
    a peak of approximately 6,000 around fiscal year 2031. After peaking at
    approximately 6,000 it is expected that the required FTEs will decrease
    to approximately 2,000 and stay steady through fiscal year 2039.
        At LANL, FTEs associated with both construction and operations
    plutonium work will grow from approximately 2,600 in fiscal year 2023
    to about 3,600 in fiscal year 2026, and level out at approximately
    3,000 FTEs from FYs 2029-2039. The LANL FTEs support multiple plutonium
    missions including pit production, as noted in the answer to Question
    26.

        33. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, using the above data,
    please provide a schedule of the projected annual and cumulative
    spending by site for Plutonium Modernization, in the best and worst
    cases.
        Ms. Hruby. The table below shows the projected annual and
    cumulative spending by site for the Plutonium program of record,
    including both construction and operation costs, to deliver an 80 WR
    pits per year capability at LANL and SRS. The estimates beyond the
    fiscal year 2024-28 Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP)
    include current project cost plans and inflation adjusted growth for
    the remaining activities. As stated in the answers to question 26
    (which only includes operations costs, excluding construction project
    costs) and question 32 (which includes FTEs for both construction and
    operations), these estimates have high uncertainty, as they extend well
    beyond our planning cycle and contain significant assumptions about
    things that cannot be known today. The estimates in the table, and
    construction costs beyond 2030 in particular, are based on estimates
    that were available when the fiscal year 2024 congressional
    Justifications were created. More recent information suggests that
    costs will increase, with SRS constructions costs likely to increase
    significantly, as noted in the answer to question 27. We are working to
    quantify the range of potential increases.

        Notes:
        1)  Shown in $M
        2)  Fiscal year 2024-2028 numbers based on PBR data; fiscal year
    2029+ operations based on escalation estimates and major expectations
    (i.e. SRS Pit Production Operations staffing). These estimates could
    change based on maturing project information as each activity completes
    design and the complete scope of work is baselined at Critical
    Decision-2
        3)  Includes SRPPF, LAP4, CMRR, TRP-III, TLW costs based on
    Financial Schedule (#3) in fiscal year 2024 CPDS

        34. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, please provide a schedule
    of the cost savings, risks, benefits, and stockpile implications of
    terminating preparations for all but de minimus pit production at LANL,
    while retaining technology demonstration and training functions. Please
    include the total number of glovebox replacements in PF-4 planned, how
    many of these might be avoided under demonstration and training
    scenario, and what effect this would have on project(s) schedule, as
    well as on the number of personnel required and the program costs.
    Presumably LAP4 would be terminated. What other economies in capital
    asset management would be possible?
        Ms. Hruby. Stockpile requirements could not be met if preparations
    were terminated for all but de minimus pit production at LANL. Pit
    reuse for future stockpile programs is planned and justified only for
    limited applications. NNSA must meet current and future Department of
    Defense (DoD) requirements and deliver safe, secure, reliable warheads
    under a variety of possible scenarios. It is clear that new pit
    production capacity, including the planned capacity at LANL, is
    necessary to meet requirements as laid out in current stockpile plans,
    and that delays beyond those currently anticipated would be difficult
    to accommodate in stockpile planning.
        Efforts in the LAP4 project include the replacement of 54
    gloveboxes, including 18 that are highly complex. An additional 11
    gloveboxes are also being procured and installed under the Plutonium
    Modernization Program. Additional gloveboxes of lower complexity will
    support the LAP4 Training and Development Center. The required number
    of lower-complexity gloveboxes for these training purposes is still
    being refined, but NNSA expects that approximately 72 will be needed.
    For reasons given in the previous paragraph, NNSA has not developed
    plans for the de minimus scenario outlined in the question, and we are
    therefore not prepared to answer questions about schedule, people, or
    costs associated with such a scenario.

        35. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, if pit production at LANL
    were kept to a single production shift, how many war reserve (WR) pits
    could be produced in each year and how would personnel and capital
    requirements change?
        Ms. Hruby. The estimated capacity for single shift at LANL is 30 WR
    pits per year once rate production is achieved. Current personnel and
    capital plans support this capacity and do not need to change to
    accommodate it. Second and third shifts are planned for maintenance,
    equipment removal, and equipment installation.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                  sea-launched cruise missile-nuclear (slcm-n)
        36. Senator Cotton. Admiral Wolfe and Mr. Adams, last year,
    Congress appropriated $25 million to the Navy for the SLCM-N and $20
    million to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for the
    SLCM-N warhead. It also required the Navy and the NNSA to submit a
    spending plan for SLCM-N research and development. Can you provide an
    update on how these funds are being spent and what progress has been
    made on the SLCM-N?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. The Navy's Nuclear-Capable Sea-Launched Cruise
    Missile (SLCM-N) spending plan was developed in accordance with Section
    1642 of the National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 117-263) for
    fiscal year 2023, and was completed and delivered to Congress on 14
    April 2023. Although the Department of Defense does not currently have
    a SLCM-N program of record, Navy continues RDT&E activities in support
    of a potential SLCM program as required by congressional requirements.
        There are a number of operational and technical challenges
    associated with a potential SLCM-N program including adapting the SLCM-
    N candidate missile for vertical launch from a Navy launch platform--
    either surfaced or submerged. The SLCM-N candidate missile will also
    need to be evaluated and qualified for an at-sea deployment from a
    manned Navy platform which is a unique environment. Developing a
    nuclear certified shipboard interface from the launch platform to the
    missile as well as equipping the launch platform with the necessary
    nuclear surety, safety, and security measures are also examples of
    challenges to overcome since the most likely launch platforms were not
    designed to deploy with nuclear weapons. The designated launch
    platforms will also need to be updated to incorporate the necessary
    nuclear command and control capabilities.
        From a programmatic standpoint, the largest immediate challenge is
    the need to update and validate the assumptions and variables in the
    2019-2020 Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). Specifics surrounding
    delivery vehicles, nuclear explosive package integration, platforms,
    and lethality must be identified in order to inform a final course of
    action (COA) and determine what candidate SLCM-N missile to develop and
    deploy.
        Mr. Adams. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review concluded, after
    weighing many factors, that the SLCM-N program is no longer necessary
    and should be canceled. Although the Department of Defense does not
    currently have a SLCM-N program of record, funding appropriated for
    SLCM-N will be used toward research and development activities of
    system agnostic technologies (e.g., safety, security, and performance)
    pertinent to cruise missile platforms that would inform and mature NNSA
    architectures and components.
                              w93/mark 7 timeline
        37. Senator Cotton. Admiral Wolfe and Mr. Adams, as you know, the
    NNSA has reported it is unable to meet the requirement to produce 80
    plutonium pits per year by 2030. How would this delay impact the
    production timeline of the W93/Mark 7 warhead?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Navy SSP defers to NNSA on their plans for
    producing pits and/or utilizing pit reuse for the W93 warhead and how a
    delay in production of pits would impact any planning factors NNSA has
    for pit reuse.
        Mr. Adams. DOE/NNSA, in coordination with the Department of Defense
    (DoD), has identified options to mitigate against risks to required
    warhead deliverables until pit production capacities are established.
    Given what is known today about the effects of plutonium aging, the
    reuse of high margin pits is a viable option to meet W93 production
    requirements. If new pit production does not support the required
    production timeline for the W93, then reused pits can be used to
    support that timeline. NNSA continues to coordinate closely with the
    DOD and the Nuclear Weapons Council to ensure schedule alignment.

        38. Senator Cotton. Admiral Wolfe, what are some of the risks of a
    delay in W93 production to the sea-based nuclear deterrent?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Navy SSP defers to USSTRATCOM on any
    operational risks within the sea-leg that may be realized should W93/
    Mk7 be delayed. From a programmatic perspective, delays in the W93/Mk7
    program may result in increased costs, put at risk the ability of the
    program to respond to warfighter needs at the speed of relevance, and
    challenge the ability of the Sea-Based Strategic Deterrence workforce
    to transition to programs following W93/Mk7--such as the Future
    Strategic Sea-based Warhead (FSSW). Delays in the W93/Mk7 program may
    also negatively impact progress in the United Kingdom's Replacement
    Warhead program.
                                 w87-1 timeline
        39. Senator Cotton. General Bussiere and Mr. Adams, as you know,
    the NNSA has reported it is unable to meet the requirement to produce
    80 plutonium pits per year by 2030. How would this delay impact the
    production timeline of the W87-1 warhead?
        General Bussiere. The current pit production plan supports the
    ability for the W87-1 Modification Program to achieve first production
    unit on schedule. The W87-1 Modification Program remains on-track to
    meet warhead rate production and on-time deliveries to the Department
    of Defense. If pit production delays worsen and put at risk the W87-1
    warhead production rate, DOE/NNSA will employ contingency options,
    including potential reuse of existing pits.
        Mr. Adams. The baseline design for the W87-1 includes a newly
    manufactured pit, and the program is on track to provide these pits on
    a schedule that supports current plans. NNSA is also carrying a backup
    option of pit reuse, to ensure that warheads can be delivered to the
    Air Force on the needed schedule in the event of unanticipated
    disruptions to pit production schedules.

        40. Senator Cotton. General Bussiere, what are some of the risks of
    a delay in W87-1 production to the land-based nuclear deterrent?
        General Bussiere.

        1)  Delays to W87-1 have the potential to delay Minuteman III to
    Sentinel transition.
           a.  The W78 weapon employed in the Mk12A is only compatible with
    Minuteman III.
           b.  Delays in W87-1 fielding on Sentinel may require the
    Minuteman III to remain fielded longer to meet operational requirements
    for strategic target coverage.
           c.  Minuteman III remaining fielded longer than anticipated will
    result in a proportional delay to Sentinel's Full Operational
    Capability (FOC).

        2)  Depending on the length of delay, it may become necessary to
    consider W78 (Mk12A) for integration into Sentinel.
           a.  Initial projections suggest integration would be major
    modification effort requiring substantial financial and time cost, but
    this option has not been fully evaluated by the Air Force. Rigorous
    analysis will need to be done to capture exact costs.
                              minuteman iii tests
        41. Senator Cotton. General Bussiere, can you explain the role that
    routine tests of the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
    (ICBM) play in guiding the development of the Sentinel Ground Based
    Strategic Deterrent?
        General Bussiere.

        1)  Minuteman III (MM III) flight testing continues to assess the
    reliability and confidence of the Mk21/W87 reentry vehicle (RV), the
    baseline weapon for the Sentinel.

        2)  MMIII flight tests have been used to further the development of
    the Arming and Fuzing Assembly for the Mk21A weapon system that is
    expected to be employed on Sentinel.

        3)  MMIII flight tests enable collection of launch facility and
    silo environment data to better understand the launch environment for
    Sentinel.

        4)  MMIII flight tests aid in the further development of remote
    scoring systems that can be used in broad ocean areas. These scoring
    systems are being upgraded and expanded to meet the expected
    requirements of Sentinel.

        5)  MMIII test provide weapon system accuracy data that establishes
    a baseline for the progression of our Sentinel modeling efforts.

        42. Senator Cotton. General Bussiere, what impact did the
    cancelation of the Minuteman III ICBM test on April 1, 2022 have on the
    timeline of Sentinel Ground Based Strategic Deterrent development?
        General Bussiere. There was no impact on the overall Sentinel
    timeline. The cancellation of the 1 April 2022 Minuteman III (MMIII)
    flight test did delay the collection of silo fly out environment data
    needed for the Sentinel program by 4 months, but this data was able to
    be collected in the subsequent MMIII flight test which occurred in
    August 2022.

      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
             FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                              TUESDAY, MAY 2, 2023

                          United States Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                   THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPACE ACTIVITIES

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:45 p.m., in
    room 222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus S.
    King, Jr. (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Subcommittee Members present: Senators King, Gillibrand,
    Rosen, Kelly, Fischer, Rounds, Cramer, and Tuberville.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.

        Senator King.
        [Technical problems]--for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee
    of the United States Committee on Armed Services. The hearing
    today is on U.S. Space Force and programs in review of the
    defense authorization request for fiscal year 2024 and future
    years. I want to thank our witnesses today for agreeing to
    appear before us, and I thank you for your service and your
    testimony.
        The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the fiscal
    year 2024 budget of the Space Force, a separate title 10
    service, which was authorized in the Fiscal Year 2020 National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Mr. Plumb, you all have
    finished up the Space Policy Review. In February, we had a
    classified full committee brief on it with Secretary Hicks.
        While the outcome satisfied many members' concerns, I still
    want to make sure our Space Force Guardians have ample
    opportunity to train and equip for conflict under this policy.
    Mr. Calvelli, you are responsible for the acquisition of space
    assets.
        I would like to know how we can ensure our guardians are
    equipped to have space assets to train with for a conflict in
    space. For fiscal year 2024, the Space Force budget is $30
    billion, a $3.7 billion increase over last year's enacted
    budget, or a 14.7 percent increase over fiscal year 2022.
        General Thompson, it will be important to explain to the
    Committee in open session, if possible, what this increase will
    be going for. Further, I want to know what is being transferred
    into the Space Force, especially with the transfer of uniformed
    Army and Navy personnel.
        Last year, the Administration has submitted a proposal for
    a new personnel system that would treat Space Force Guardians
    as either full or part time components based on reserve status.
    I want to know more about this, given this and given the
    competing proposals for Space National Guard.
        Again, I want to thank our witnesses for joining us, and
    after the brief opening statements, we will have 5-minute
    rounds of questions for the witnesses. Senator Fischer.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Plum, Mr.
    Calvelli, and General Thompson, thank you all for being here
    today and for sharing your perspective with this Subcommittee.
    And thank you each for your many years of service.
        As Members of the Subcommittee know, space has and
    continues to play a critical role in upholding our Nation's
    security and maintaining our prosperity. The United States
    leadership in space has been buoyed by a robust commercial
    space industry and cooperation with our allies and partners.
        But our adversaries, like Russia and China, are also
    exploiting the benefits of space and are developing
    capabilities that put U.S. space assets, and the benefits our
    armed forces receive from those assets, at risk.
        I look forward to hearing how each of you intends to play a
    unique role in safeguarding U.S. space assets, countering the
    capabilities of our adversaries, and integrating the advanced
    capabilities of the U.S. commercial space industry.
        I would also like to better understand how the Space Force
    is being incorporated into the combatant commands to ensure
    they have access to the full range of space expertise. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Secretary Plumb.

    STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                            FOR SPACE POLICY

        Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator King, thank you, Senator
    Fischer, Members of the Committee. I appreciate the chance to
    testify today on the Department's national security space
    programs, and I am honored to appear alongside Secretary
    Calvelli and General Thompson. Space plays a critical role in
    our Nation's security, in our prosperity, and in our way of
    life. For the DOD [Department of Defense], space is essential
    to how we compete and fight in every domain. We simply cannot
    fight without space.
        Our competitors understand this. They are fielding and
    developing increasingly complex systems to deny space missions
    to our U.S. Joint Force. In just the last few years, the
    quantity and quality of those threats has significantly
    increased.
        China has already fielded ground based counterspace
    weapons, including direct ascent, ASAT [anti-satellite weapon]
    missiles, and it continues to seek new methods to hold our
    satellites at risk. China is also building a space architecture
    to enable long range precision strikes by its military.
        China ultimately seeks to challenge our ability to conduct
    joint operations in the Indo-Pacific. Russia is developing,
    testing, and fielding its own counter space systems, including
    both ground and space based kinetic, anti-satellite weapons.
    Their goal is to degrade or deny United States space systems.
        As Senator King pointed out, President Biden's $33.3
    billion space budget for this fiscal year 24 invests in the
    capabilities necessary to meet these challenges and is roughly
    15 percent over the fiscal year 2023 investments.
        The President's Budget request includes almost $5 billion
    for missile warning and missile track, and this includes $2.3
    billion for new proliferated resilient architectures, $2.6
    billion for next generation overhead persistent infrared, OPIR,
    $1.3 billion for position navigation and timing, including the
    development of the next generation operational control system
    for GPS [Global Positioning System], $3 billion for 15 launch
    vehicles and first associated range upgrades, $4.7 billion for
    protected and jam resistant SATCOM [Satellite Communications],
    and it includes additional investments in ground user
    equipment, science and technology research, and, of course,
    classified programs.
        My office remains laser focused on the three priorities
    that I briefed to this Committee before, which is space
    control, space cooperation, and space classification. On space
    control, the Department will protect and defend our national
    security interests from the growing scope and scale of space
    and counterspace threats, and we will protect and defend our
    servicemen and women in harm's way from space enabled threats.
        For space cooperation, we are investing in relationships
    with allies, partners, and commercial space. These partnerships
    are an enduring strength and an asymmetric advantage that our
    competitors cannot hope to match.
        For space classification, the Department is working at the
    highest levels to remove barriers to sharing information with
    our allies and to strengthen our ability to communicate really
    with ourselves across the U.S. Government.
        Our competitors have watched us. They have learned from us.
    They have stolen from us. And they have developed capabilities
    to hold us at risk. But they are not ready for us. They aren't'
    ready for us today, and with congressional support for the
    national security space investments in the President's Budget,
    they will not be ready for us tomorrow.
        Thank you to the Committee for this hearing, for your
    dedication to the Department and U.S. National Security, and I
    look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. John F. Plumb follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Dr. John F. Plumb
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee: Thank you for inviting me to testify before you on the
    Department's national security space programs. I am honored to appear
    alongside Air Force Assistant Secretary Calvelli and General Thompson.
        Space plays a critical role in American security, prosperity, and
    way of life. Space-based services support the world's financial system,
    scientific discoveries, and environmental monitoring. Every American
    uses space every single day. For the Department of Defense, all U.S.
    military service force structures are built assuming continued access
    to space. Space access enables us to provide our military with
    indications and warning of threats or attacks, command and control of
    our forces across the globe, and monitoring of adversary activities.
    U.S. space capabilities, such as positioning, navigation, and timing
    (PNT), satellite communications (SATCOM), missile warning and missile
    tracking, and other missions, are critical to overall military
    effectiveness across all domains and, therefore, to successful homeland
    defense, deterrence, and countering aggression. The intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support provided by space
    capabilities is vital to identifying and exposing aggressive activity,
    deterring escalation, and catalyzing international responses to crises.
        The Department's fiscal year 2024 space budget request of $33.3
    billion is driven by the priorities outlined in the National Defense
    Strategy (NDS). This historic investment in space reflects a net
    increase of $22.9 billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)
    for the U.S. Space Force and an increase of approximately 15 percent
    year to year from fiscal year 2023 to meet emerging threats. The
    investments in the fiscal year 2024 space budget request will enable
    the Department of Defense to: (1) maintain the benefits provided to all
    from space by preserving stability in, access to, and freedom to
    operate in, from, and through the space domain; and (2) deter hostile
    uses of space that threaten the national security interests of the
    United States and its allies and partners, while ensuring we are
    prepared to prevail in conflict, if deterrence fails.
                              security environment
        Today, the United States finds itself in a highly dynamic security
    environment characterized by intensifying strategic competition,
    assertive behavior by multiple competitors, rapidly evolving domains of
    conflict, shifting balances of power, and, as a result, a growing risk
    of military confrontation. Our competitors have placed space warfare
    and space-enabled long-range strike capabilities at the center of their
    strategies to coerce and, if necessary, fight the United States and its
    allies and partners. They seek to create a future operating environment
    in which they can leverage space and strike capabilities to hold at
    risk our forces, ports, and airfields, and to deny U.S. freedom of
    maneuver. The People's Republic of China (PRC) expects space-enabled
    long-range precision strikes will play an important role in future
    conflicts, and counterspace operations will be integral to potential
    PRC military campaigns. Space capabilities also underwrite ongoing
    efforts by U.S. competitors to gain advantage in ``gray zone''
    competition, undercut U.S. leadership, and reshape global norms to
    their advantage.
    People's Republic of China
        The Department's fiscal year 2024 budget is driven by the
    seriousness of our strategic competition with the PRC, which remains
    the most comprehensive challenge to U.S. national security. The PRC is
    the greatest geopolitical challenge facing the United States because it
    is the only competitor with the intent and, increasingly, the
    capability to remake the rules-based international order. The PRC's
    activities on the ground and, increasingly, in space are designed to
    advance its global standing, strengthen the PRC's endeavor to erode
    U.S. influence across military, technological, economic, and diplomatic
    spheres, and challenge the interests and values of the United States
    and our allies and partners. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) views
    space superiority--the ability to control the space-enabled information
    sphere and deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering
    and communication capabilities--as a critical component of conducting
    modern ``informatized warfare.'' As a result, the PRC reorganized its
    military in 2015 to approach space more effectively as a warfighting
    domain and to support the PLA's holistic approach to joint warfare.
        The PLA continues to build a space architecture to enhance its
    ability to fight and win a modern military conflict. In 2022, the PRC
    conducted 62 successful space launches, placing 200 payloads into
    orbit, more than half of which were PRC ISR satellites. Today, the PLA
    benefits from more than 340 ISR satellites with optical, multispectral,
    radar, and radiofrequency sensors, and now owns and operates roughly
    half of the world's ISR systems. The PRC ISR architecture enhances the
    PRC's worldwide situational awareness and could support the PLA's
    monitoring, tracking, and targeting of U.S. and allied forces
    worldwide, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.
        The PRC expects ISR capabilities will play an important role in
    future conflicts by enabling the PLA to acquire timely, high-fidelity
    information in order to conduct long-range precision strikes and
    conduct battlefield damage assessments. The PLA continues to integrate
    ISR, PNT, and SATCOM capabilities into its weapons and command and
    control (C2) systems to provide over-the-horizon targeting information
    for its strike platforms in an effort to challenge U.S. freedom of
    maneuver on land, sea, and in the air. Recent PLA improvements to its
    ISR fleet enhance the PLA's ability to operate farther from the Chinese
    coast and to monitor forces across the globe, including United States
    aircraft carriers, expeditionary strike groups, and deployed air wings.
    This makes U.S. and allied forces more susceptible to long-range strike
    and ultimately challenges our ability to conduct joint operations,
    particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.
        The PRC also has a robust network of space surveillance sensors on
    Earth capable of searching, tracking, and characterizing satellites in
    all Earth orbits. This network includes a variety of telescopes,
    radars, and other sensors that allow the PRC to support missions such
    as intelligence collection, ballistic missile early warning, and
    counterspace targeting.
        The PRC views counterspace systems as a means to deny other
    militaries' space-based information systems and to deter and counter
    outside intervention during a regional conflict. The PRC has already
    fielded ground-based counterspace weapons, including electronic warfare
    systems, directed energy weapons, and direct-ascent (DA) anti-satellite
    (ASAT) missiles designed to disrupt, damage, and destroy U.S.
    satellites. The PRC has launched multiple DA-ASAT missiles, including a
    2007 destructive DA-ASAT missile test in low Earth orbit (LEO), and
    plans to pursue DA-ASAT weapons intended to destroy satellites up to
    geo-synchronous Earth orbit.
        The PRC is probably testing dual-use technologies in space that
    could be applied to counterspace missions, such as robotic arm
    technology that could be used for grappling other satellites, as
    evidenced last year when the Shijian-21 moved a derelict satellite to a
    graveyard orbit. The PRC continues to seek new methods, which probably
    include space-based kinetic energy weapons, to hold our satellites at
    risk, and is developing other sophisticated capabilities to deliver
    effects through space, such as the PRC's fractional orbital launch of
    an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a hypersonic glide
    vehicle from China in 2021.
    Russia
        Russia reorganized its military in 2015 to create a separate space
    force because Russia sees achieving supremacy in space as a decisive
    factor in winning conflicts. Russia believes the importance of space
    will continue to expand because of the growing role of precision
    weapons and satellite-supported information networks in conflict, but
    it seeks to avoid becoming excessively dependent on space to conduct
    its national missions.
        Russian has more than 30 ISR satellites, including some of the
    world's most capable satellites for optical imagery, radar imagery,
    signals intelligence, and missile warning. Russia can also employ its
    civil and commercial remote sensing satellites to supplement military-
    dedicated capabilities and has sought to acquire satellite imagery from
    foreign companies. For example, in January 2023, the Department of
    Treasury sanctioned a PRC company, Spacety China, for providing a
    Russian-based technology firm with synthetic aperture radar satellite
    imagery orders over Ukraine in order to enable Wagner Group combat
    operations.
        Russia is developing, testing, and fielding a suite of non-
    destructive and destructive counterspace systems to degrade or deny
    U.S. space-based services as a means of offsetting a perceived U.S.
    military advantage and deterring the United States from entering a
    regional conflict. Russia has fielded several ground-based lasers that
    can blind satellite sensors and has a wide range of ground-based
    electronic warfare systems that can counter the Global Positioning
    System (GPS), tactical and satellite communications, radars, and
    Western space-enabled C2 and weapons guidance systems. Russia also
    considers space-enabled information collection and transmission to be
    strategically decisive and has taken steps to modernize its military
    information attack capabilities. For example, in support of Russia's
    illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia conducted cyber
    attacks against commercial satellite networks in February 2022 to
    disrupt Ukrainian C2 and has sought to jam commercial SATCOM used by
    Ukraine.
        In November 2021, Russia demonstrated the capability to destroy
    satellites in LEO with its test of a destructive DA-ASAT missile, which
    created over 1,500 pieces of trackable space debris and tens of
    thousands of pieces of potentially lethal but non-trackable debris,
    which threatens spacecraft of all nations in LEO. Russia is also
    reportedly developing an air-launched ASAT weapon that can target
    satellites in LEO. Finally, Russia tested a space-based ASAT capable of
    kinetically killing satellites in LEO in 2020 and is developing
    sophisticated dual-use orbital capabilities that could be used to
    conduct an attack on other countries' satellites.
        While the PRC and Russia develop and field these counterspace
    weapons, both nations simultaneously promote false claims that they
    will not place weapons in space and have coordinated to propose a
    flawed legally binding treaty on the non-weaponization of space at the
    United Nations that would be unverifiable and unenforceable.
    Other Challenges: Iran & the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
            (DPRK)
        Iran recognizes the strategic value of space and counterspace
    capabilities and will attempt to deny the United States its use of
    space during a conflict. Iran has developed capabilities to jam SATCOM
    and GPS signals, and Iran's advancements in space launch vehicle
    technology could be applied to developing a DA-ASAT missile or could
    shorten the timeline to an ICBM. The DPRK has also demonstrated non-
    kinetic counterspace capabilities, including GPS and SATCOM jamming.
    Under the guise of peaceful use of space, the DPRK has applied data
    from its space program to aid in the development of long-range and
    multistage ballistic missiles.
              the president's budget request for fiscal year 2024
    Strengthening Deterrence & Building Enduring Advantages in Space
        In October 2022, the Department of Defense released the
    unclassified version of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which
    emphasized that the United States is entering a period of heightened
    risk and articulated an urgent imperative to strengthen deterrence. In
    support of this aim, the NDS outlined a strategy of integrated
    deterrence, which provides a framework for working seamlessly across
    domains, theaters, and the spectrum of conflict, as well as across all
    instruments of U.S. power and with allies and partners. The
    Department's efforts in the space domain undergird all four priorities
    in the NDS: (1) defending the homeland; (2) deterring strategic
    attacks; (3) deterring aggression while preparing to prevail in
    conflict; and (4) building a resilient Joint Force and defense
    ecosystem that can sustain U.S. strategic advantages.
        The Department's fiscal year 2024 budget request is grounded in the
    understanding that deterrence in space contributes to deterrence on the
    ground. Space is a key node for integrated deterrence because
    deterrence strategies rely on credible combat forces, which are
    underwritten by space. Strengthening deterrence through enhanced
    mission assurance and building enduring advantages today that sharpen
    the edge of national security space in the coming years are, therefore,
    central to our budget request this year.
        Because the space domain empowers the entire Joint Force, the
    Department is focused on assuring critical space-based missions by
    accelerating our transition to more resilient architectures and by
    defending critical systems against counterspace threats. The foundation
    of mission assurance is resilience--being able to provide critical
    space-based services across the Joint Force in competition, crisis, and
    conflict. By focusing on the ability of space-based services to
    withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption, DOD can
    continue to support the Joint Force and deny adversaries the benefit of
    attack and an information advantage that is critical to success in
    modern warfare.
        Even as the Department builds resilience in space as a means to
    deter aggression, we must also be prepared to protect and defend our
    national security interests in space. Consistent with our long-standing
    policy, the Department will protect and defend U.S. space capabilities,
    along with those of our allies, partners, and the commercial sector
    when directed to do so. To effectively deter, and, if necessary,
    counter and respond to hostile acts in space, the Department is focused
    on protecting the whole of our space architecture, including ground
    nodes and networks, in addition to assets on orbit. Defending our
    national security interests from the growing scope and scale of space
    and counterspace threats also requires that we strengthen our ability
    to detect and credibly attribute hostile acts in, from, and to space.
    Providing space operators with relevant, timely space domain awareness
    data can help to prevent operational surprise and support efforts to
    protect and defend space assets.
        Finally, the United States must be prepared to protect the Joint
    Force from attacks enabled by adversaries' increasingly sophisticated
    and proliferated space-based ISR networks and C2 systems. The
    Department of Defense is developing a range of solutions across all
    domains in order to protect and defend U.S. and, as directed, allied,
    partner, and commercial capabilities, as well as to prevent adversaries
    from leveraging space-enabled targeting to attack the Joint Force. This
    Committee's support for the investments outlined in the President's
    Fiscal Year 2024 Budget is essential to strengthening deterrence and
    building the enduring advantages in space necessary to defend our
    systems against counterspace threats and protect the U.S. Joint Force
    from adversary hostile use of space.
        The DOD's fiscal year 2024 national security space budget request
    provides for vital space capabilities, resilient architectures, and
    enhanced space command and control to keep space safe for military,
    civilian, and commercial operations, while modernizing U.S.
    capabilities to secure the use of space in the face of increasing
    threats to U.S. national security space systems. The budget request
    would continue to strengthen mission assurance by accelerating the
    transition to resilient-by-design architectures that are diverse,
    proliferated, disaggregated, distributed, and protected; enhance our
    ability to fight through disruption by improving defensive
    capabilities; advance assured access to space across all orbits; invest
    heavily in research, development, testing, and experimentation to
    ensure we continue to meet emerging threats; and modernize our space
    architecture to further integrate space-based services across the Joint
    Force. Some of the highlights of the fiscal year 2024 budget request
    include investments in:
          Missile Warning: $5.0 billion to develop proliferated,
    resilient missile warning / missile tracking architectures, and next-
    generation overhead persistent infrared (OPIR) space and associated
    ground architectures;
          GPS Enterprise: $1.3 billion for PNT through GPS III
    follow-on satellite support and development of the next-generation
    operational control system (OCX) for GPS III and legacy satellites;
          Launch Enterprise: $3.0 billion to fund 15 launch
    vehicles and launch range upgrades; and
          Satellite Communications: $4.7 billion for the Evolved
    Strategic Satellite Communications (ESS), protected, robust, secure,
    survivable, and jam-resistant tactical, wideband, and narrowband
    capabilities, and Space Development Agency's (SDA) proliferated space
    data transport layer.
        Other Space Force investments include ground user equipment,
    science & technology research, personnel funding, operations and
    maintenance, and classified investments.
    Campaigning in the Space Domain
        As the United States invests in critical capabilities, the
    Department of Defense is actively campaigning in and through the space
    domain to strengthen integrated deterrence and build advantages with
    allies and partners as well as the commercial sector, while
    demonstrating responsible leadership.
        Our allies and partners provide an enduring strength and asymmetric
    advantage that our competitors cannot match. Our allies and partners
    are essential to our integrated deterrence strategy. We therefore must
    be able to integrate, plan, and operate with our most capable allies
    and partners in the space domain. Combined operations require us to be
    able to effectively share information. The Department is reviewing the
    classification and disclosure policies of space-related information to
    overcome barriers to integration with our allies and partners.
        One example of how we are strengthening military-to-military ties
    to our allies is through the Combined Space Operations (CSpO)
    Initiative, which includes defense leaders from Australia, Canada,
    France, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United
    States. In this forum, we are identifying ways to improve cooperation,
    coordination, and interoperability to sustain freedom of action in
    space, optimize resources, enhance mission assurance, and prevent
    conflict. During last December's CSpO Principals Board meeting, leaders
    emphasized the need to continue to increase information sharing to
    enable space operations and collaboratively address challenges to the
    safety and security of the domain.
        The NDS also highlights the importance of partnering with the
    commercial sector as part of our integrated deterrence efforts.
    Commercial services and providers offer innovative solutions across
    many mission areas at potentially lower cost and with more rapid
    development cycles. Therefore, the Department is assessing how our
    missions can increasingly leverage commercial space services as one
    element of our broader approach to building resilience.
        Last, day-to-day, the Department is upholding and strengthening the
    rules-based international order and leading in the development of new
    responsible behaviors that contribute to the safety, stability,
    security, and long-term sustainability of space activities. Because the
    Department is one of the world's most experienced space operators, we
    play a significant role in the United States' observation and
    demonstration of responsible space behaviors. The Department's policies
    and practices, such as the Secretary of Defense's Tenets of Responsible
    Behavior in Space memorandum, issued in 2021, serve as a key element
    for U.S. proposals for international measures that contribute to the
    safety, stability, security, and long-term sustainability of space
    activities. Our operational expertise also leads us to participate in
    United Nations' space-related committees as part of State Department-
    led delegations.
        Most recently, the Department assisted in developing the commitment
    announced by the Vice President in April 2022 not to conduct
    destructive DA-ASAT missile testing and to work to establish this as a
    new international norm of responsible behavior in space. This U.S.
    announcement led to a December 2022 vote at the United Nations General
    Assembly that gave overwhelming approval of a U.S.-sponsored resolution
    calling upon all States to commit not to conduct destructive DA-ASAT
    missile tests. One hundred and fifty-five countries voted in favor,
    with nine opposing, including the PRC and Russia. The Department
    continues to engage with allies and partners to urge the widespread
    adoption of this commitment. This approach to developing nonbinding
    norms of responsible behavior that garner broad support can support the
    long-term sustainability of the outer space environment directly. The
    Department will continue to demonstrate leadership in both the
    responsible use of space and stewardship of the space environment.
                                   conclusion
        U.S. space systems are central to our ability to deter our
    competitors and to prevail in conflict, should deterrence fail. Our
    competitors have watched us, they have learned from us, they have
    stolen from us, and they are coming for us. But they are not ready for
    us today. The investments in the fiscal year 2024 budget request are
    essential to equip the Department of Defense with the capabilities
    necessary to ensure they are not ready for us tomorrow. Thank you to
    the Committee for its tireless dedication to our national security and
    our servicemembers, and I look forward to answering your questions.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANK CALVELLI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
         OF THE AIR FORCE FOR SPACE ACQUISITION AND INTEGRATION

        Mr. Calvelli. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
    me to testify before you today. We continue to face an
    unprecedented strategic competitor in China and our space
    environment continues to become more congested and contested.
        To address these challenges, we are transforming our space
    architecture from the large, highly capable but vulnerable
    satellites today, to smaller, proliferated, resilient systems
    across multiple mission areas.
        For example, we are pivoting from the legacy missile
    warning architecture to a proliferated, resilient architecture
    that adds a new capability to actually track missile threats.
    We are adding new critical space domain awareness capabilities.
        We are fundamentally transforming our military satellite
    communications and data transport architecture through
    disaggregation of missions, proliferation, and partnerships
    with allies and commercial. We are even collaborating with the
    intelligence community to develop a proliferated, space based,
    round moving target indication system.
        As we transition to this architecture, we continue to
    deliver new, credible capabilities to our warfighters. Over the
    last year and a half, the Space Systems Command delivered to
    new geosynchronous space situational awareness satellites, a
    new space based infrared missile warning satellite, and a new
    GPS 3 satellite.
        The Space Rapid Capabilities Office delivered their first
    set of missions to orbit this past January. In March, the Space
    Development Agency delivered their first ten satellites to
    orbit in less than 3 years from contract award to launch.
        As the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space
    Acquisition Integration, I am focused on adding speed to our
    acquisitions and delivering programs on schedule and on cost. I
    also recognize I inherited several troubled programs that are
    behind schedule and overrun on costs, and I am paying close
    attention to these programs.
        Overall, I am proactively managing the space acquisition
    enterprise through weekly status reports, biweekly tag ops with
    my portfolio leads, and detailed quarterly program reviews.
    These reviews enable me to ensure all our programs remain
    focused on delivering capabilities to our warfighters on cost
    and on schedule.
        In October 2022, I issued strategic acquisition guidance to
    the workforce outlining nine space acquisition tenants. These
    tenants form the basis of a new direction for space
    acquisition, and emphasize speed and program management
    discipline, while addressing the fundamental issues that slow
    up space acquisition.
        I am committed to using all the tools and authorities
    Congress has provided to help speed space acquisition. That
    includes the use of section 804 middle tier of acquisition
    pathway, use of other transactional authorities (OTA), and use
    of the Space Acquisition Council to ensure collaboration and
    integration while avoiding duplication of effort across the
    entire national security space enterprise.
        Thank you to the Committee, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        Senator King. General Thompson.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID D. THOMPSON, USSF, VICE CHIEF OF
                            SPACE OPERATIONS

        General Thompson. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
    and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor
    to appear before you today on behalf of the Secretary of the
    Air Force, Chief of Space Operations, and 14,000 guardians
    around the world executing our missions.
        The capabilities and benefits provided from space are
    essential to our way of life and crucial to effective military
    operations in every other domain. Success in great power
    competition depends on access and freedom to operate in space
    while denying the same to potential adversaries.
        Space access is increasingly threatened by a number of
    hostile actors who are developing and deploying counterspace
    weapons to threaten U.S. systems in every orbital regime, on
    the ground and in cyberspace. We continue to respond to these
    challenges through three lines of effort, fielding combat ready
    forces, amplifying the guardian spirit, and partnering to win.
        A combat ready force requires personnel, training, and
    equipment, simple by description, but complex in execution. We
    need innovative operational concepts, survivable platforms,
    highly trained personnel, validated tactics, actionable
    intelligence, decisive command and control, fortified networks,
    suitable facilities, and perpetual sustainment and
    modernization.
        These elements must be in place to deter adversaries and,
    if needed, prevail in conflict. The key to success in all of
    these areas is our people. Military and civilian guardians are
    dedicated and determined. They are imbued with a deep sense of
    pride and purpose. But they must also be bold and innovative
    problem solvers who can overcome any obstacle and thrive in the
    current dynamic environment.
        The Space Force must attract talented Americans who embody
    these principles. We must then amplify them and keep those
    guardians on the field of play. To do so, our members must have
    challenging and rewarding work, the means to provide for their
    families, quality affordable care and living conditions, and
    acknowledgment from their leaders and all Americans that we
    value and respect who they are and what they do. This is the
    essence of the guardian spirit.
        Finally, we do not propose to accomplish this alone. The
    third tenet to our success is partnering to win. The Space
    Force is pursuing and strengthening relationships across the
    Department of Defense, within the rest of the U.S. Government,
    with traditional defense industry and the rapidly growing
    commercial sector, with longstanding allies, and with new
    partners who share the vision of a stable, peaceful space
    domain.
        We seek partners who will be advocates for the space
    capabilities that they need and will hold us accountable to
    deliver them for them. The President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget
    Request reaffirms the Space Force's commitment to a bold,
    threat informed shift.
        It extends the pivot to resilient constellations,
    intelligence driven space domain awareness, aggressive
    cybersecurity, measured investment in space superiority, and
    combat credible forces anchored in a full spectrum test and
    training enterprise.
        Your timely enactment of the fiscal year 2024 Defense
    Authorization Bill will enable the Space Force to remain the
    world's leader in space and to preserve freedom of action for
    the Nation. Thank you for your continued partnership and
    support. I look forward to your questions.
        [The joint prepared statement of The Honorable Mr. Frank
    Calvelli and General David D. Thompson follows:]

       Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Mr. Frank Calvelli and
                           General David D. Thompson
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee, thank you for inviting us to testify before you today,
    representing Secretary Kendall, General Saltzman, and our Nation's
    Space Force.
        We continue to face an unprecedented strategic competitor in China,
    and our space environment continues to become more contested,
    congested, and competitive. We have seen an exponential growth of in-
    space activity, including counter-space threats. The Department of the
    Air Force and the United States Space Force are fundamentally
    transforming our space architecture to be more resilient, proliferated,
    and integrated to meet warfighter requirements to counter the growing
    threat from strategic competitors. In 3 years' time, we have made
    significant progress to transform our force to counter the threat, but
    there is still much more we must accomplish.
        To that effect, on November 22, 2022, the CSO outlined three lines
    of effort to ensure that the Space Force maintains urgency and momentum
    in the progress we have made over the past 3 years:
          Field Combat-Ready Forces so that the Space Force has the
    personnel, training, and equipment required to prevail in a fight.
          Amplify the Guardian Spirit so that the Space Force
    attracts, develops, inspires, empowers, and retains individuals who
    thrive in our organization and under our values.
          Partner to Win so that the Space Force can collaborate
    with mission partners to accomplish our critical set of roles and
    functions.
        These lines of effort ensure that the force is advancing its
    readiness for the high-end fight. We must deliver and field the forces
    and capabilities necessary to adequately deter and if deterence fails,
    prevail against any potential adversaries.
        transforming the space architecture to field combat-ready forces
        As previously mentioned, the Department of the Air Force and the
    United States Space Force are fundamentally transforming our space
    architecture to be more resilient, proliferated, and integrated to meet
    warfighter requirements to counter the growing threat from strategic
    competitors.
        We are actively moving away from building a small number of highly
    capable but vulnerable large satellites, to a proliferated resilient
    Missile Warning / Missile Tracking (MW/MT) architecture. Our resilient
    MW/MT focuses on tracking advanced threats by integrating critical
    missile tracking capabilities that previously did not exist. The Space
    Development Agency (SDA) and Space Systems Command (SSC) are developing
    the low earth orbit (LEO) and medium earth orbit (MEO) architecture
    through an incremental process that allows us to incorporate new
    technologies and get them on orbit fast. The Space Development Agency
    just launched the first two LEO tracking satellites this month and will
    launch six more by the end of this fiscal year. Thirty-nine more
    tracking satellites will be delivered in their next Tranche, which is
    set to launch in 2025. SSC's resilient MW/MT MEO portion will follow
    with nine satellites in two orbital planes with launches in fiscal year
    2026 and fiscal year 2027.
        As we develop this new capability, we are continuing the
    development of the Next Generation Geosynchronous and Next Generation
    Polar missile warning programs as a bridge to enable the eventual
    transition to the resilient MW/MT architecture.
        Simultaneously we are transitioning our space domain awareness
    architecture to focus on deterring and defending against attempts to
    negate our critical space capabilities. We continue our Geosynchronous
    Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP), which remains our hallmark
    program for space domain awareness. We are adding three new radar sites
    (United States, Australia, and United Kingdom) with the Deep Space
    Advanced Radar Capability to enhance our deep-space object tracking.
    Additionally, we are upgrading our space tracking telescopes in the
    Continental United States and Hawaii as part of our Ground-Based
    Operational Surveillance System program. These upgrades include new
    cameras, better sensitivity, and better search capability. We are also
    collaborating with the Intelligence Community (IC) on a new GEO-based
    satellite system called Silent Barker that will launch this year, which
    provides on-orbit optical space domain awareness for orbit
    determination, discovery, custody, and change detection of deep space
    objects.
        We are fundamentally transforming our military satellite
    communications architecture through disaggregation, proliferation,
    capacity expansion, and partnerships with Allies and commercial
    entities.
        We are designing new architectures that disaggregate the strategic
    and tactical missions currently found on the Advanced Extremely High
    Frequency satellites. These future architectures increase resilience by
    reducing vulnerabilities associated with very large multi-mission
    satellites and increase architectural diversity via payload hosting
    opportunities.
        The proliferated transport layer will provide resilient low-latency
    military data connectivity to a range of warfighter platforms. The
    first eight of these satellites were launched in April. Another 12 will
    launch this June, followed by 138 more in 2024.
        We continue to expand and enhance our wideband satellite
    communications capabilities by making ground system improvements that
    will increase resiliency of the Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) satellites
    11 and 12. Additionally, we are on track to operationalize the new
    Protected Tactical Waveform by the end of 2024 to be used over WGS,
    which adds critical anti-jam capabilities for our warfighters. We are
    also beginning the service life extension development for two
    additional Mobile User Objective System satellites to extend narrowband
    services as interim gap-fillers as we define the future architecture.
        In partnership with Norway, our Enhanced Polar System
    Recapitalization payload will provide protected SATCOM coverage in the
    North Polar Region and will launch next year. We are also beginning a
    commercial SATCOM partnership with Luxembourg and have cooperative
    agreements on the use of U.S. military satellite communications with 10
    countries.
        These holistic efforts enhance our ability to fight in contested
    and degraded operational environments through increased capacity,
    extended coverage, and anti-jam capabilities. Our pivot to a resilient,
    integrated, and proliferated military satellite communications
    architecture provides diverse capabilities that enable warfighters to
    have data transport in any environment and whenever needed in daily
    operations, crisis, or conflict.
        We continue to buildupon the success of our Global Positioning
    System (GPS) program. We have four GPS III satellites completed and in
    storage and are on contract to produce another 10 satellites. GPS III
    and IIIF satellites will increase military signal power as well as
    produce a more resilient fourth civil signal. In fiscal year 2024, we
    will launch and begin testing of the Navigation Technology Satellite 3,
    an end-to-end space-based prototype across space, ground, and user
    equipment segments to improve resiliency in contested environments
    against jamming and spoofing. We are also making progress with the
    development and testing of the cyber-hardened next-generation GPS
    ground control segment and paying careful attention to this troubled
    program which is years late and significantly overrun on costs.
        We are transitioning our solution for moving target indication from
    the air domain to the space domain. The Long-Range Kill Chains is a new
    fiscal year 2024 program element that supports a proliferated space-
    based ground moving target indication (GMTI) capability. The Space
    Force is collaborating with the Intelligence Community to design,
    develop, deploy, and operate space-based GMTI. It will provide
    actionable information on adversary surface targets that the Space
    Force will deliver to the warfighter through the Advanced Battle
    Management System as an integral part of Joint All-Domain Command and
    Control. The space-based systems will surpass the range limitations of
    current air platforms and provide capabilities in contested and non-
    contested environments to ensure the strategic advantage provided by
    GMTI is available to warfighters even when facing near-peer
    competitors.
        At the same time, we are making tough budget choices. We are
    reducing the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (NG OPIR)
    Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) (NGG) space vehicle purchases from
    three to two, ensuring we have the resources to pivot to resilient MW/
    MT. The NGG and NG OPIR Polar programs successfully completed several
    major milestones, and the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
    constellation continues to have positive performance, thus ensuring our
    critical missile warning capability. We are also delaying the purchase
    of additional GPS IIIF satellites in fiscal year 2024. The GPS
    constellation is healthy, with four satellites ready for launch in
    fiscal year 2024, fiscal year 2025, and fiscal year 2026. This enables
    the Space Force to fund immediate resiliency priorities in other
    mission areas with no impact to the GPS military code or civil service.
       critical capabilities delivered in the last year (january 2022 to
                                    present)
        Over the past 15 months, the Department has provided significant
    new capabilities on orbit. In January 2022, we launched two SSC-
    developed GSSAP satellites bringing the constellation to a total of 6
    satellites. Having two more GSSAP satellites enables the Space Force to
    provide immediate and precise orbital predictions of all geosynchronous
    objects, as well as detailed space domain awareness in the GEO belt,
    which is critical to our space superiority.
        In July 2022, SSC launched two experimental satellites, one of
    which was the Wide Field of View demonstration. This new technology
    will increase the amount of Earth coverage to over 3,000 kilometers at
    any one time, an unprecedented area not previously incorporated into
    any missile warning platform. The data from this demonstration will be
    used to develop future missile warning sensors in LEO and MEO.
        SSC completed the SBIRS constellation with the launch of the GEO-6
    satellite in August 2022 and operational acceptance in March 2023. The
    robust SBIRS constellation will continue providing persistent ballistic
    missile warning and launch detection crucial to national defense and
    deterrence, thus enabling the pivot to a resilient MW/MT architecture.
        In November 2022, SSC launched the second Long Duration Propulsive
    Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Secondary Payload Adapter
    (ESPA) (LDPE) mission. LDPE provides a low-cost, multi-mission
    propulsive platform that enables multiple prototype demonstrations.
    Both the LDPE and the ring-shaped payload adapter provide small
    satellite providers with launch opportunities more readily than ever
    before. This vehicle was delivered in only 4 years from contract award,
    approaching SAF/SQ's recent guidance to drive contract scope to 3 years
    or less from start to launch.
        In January 2023, the sixth of ten SSC-developed GPS III satellites
    launched. Enabled by on-orbit verification efficiencies to expedite
    warfighter capability delivery, Space Operations Command operationally
    accepted GPS III-06 just 12 days after launch.
        Also, in January 2023, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office (SpRCO)
    launched and initialized three operational prototypes, including two
    for enhanced situational awareness and one cryptographic interface
    payload providing secure space-to-ground communications capability.
    These systems are the first SpRCO on-orbit assets, with all three
    successfully testing within 2 months from launch, a major
    accomplishment for critical rapid acquisitions.''
        One of the most notable achievements in space acquisition occurred
    when SDA successfully launched the first 10 satellites of the
    Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture. On April 2, 2023, SDA
    delivered 8 transport layer and 2 tracking layer Tranche 0 satellites
    just 31 months after contract award. The second launch, to complete the
    28-satellite Tranche 0, will occur Summer of 2023, providing the
    warfighter immersion tranche by supporting military exercises, missile
    tracking tests, and demonstrating technology and process feasibility.
    This accelerated timeline represents a necessary benchmark for space
    acquisitions.
        Overall, in the past 15 months we conducted a total of 9 National
    Security Space Launch missions to provide critical capabilities to the
    Nation.
                                     launch
        Our launch programs, National Security Space Launch (NSSL) and
    Rocket Systems Launch Program (RSLP), evolved tremendously over the
    past 5 years with unprecedented growth in the commercial launch market
    and focus on the pacing challenge. We are adapting our procurement
    strategies and concept of operations to best leverage emerging
    commercial launch capabilities to meet warfighter needs across the DOD,
    IC, and other mission partners. We totaled seven successful NSSL
    launches in fiscal year 2022 and are on track to exceed that count this
    fiscal year.
        NSSL has a long and respected legacy of success, delivering
    reliable medium and heavy space lift for our Nation's most complex
    payloads and demanding orbits without fail. In NSSL Phase 2, we met the
    congressional mandate to end United States reliance on Russian-made
    engines by investing in new rocket technologies and expanding
    competition. We drove down government launch costs and provided assured
    access to space through two launch service providers (SpaceX and United
    Launch Alliance) capable of meeting all reference orbits.
        We are in an exciting period of transition as fiscal year 2024
    marks the fifth and final order year of the NSSL Phase 2 contract in
    which we are ordering 20 launch services for the Space Force and
    National Reconnaissance Office (60 percent increase from fiscal year
    2023) along with the launch support required to place critical
    capabilities on orbit. Simultaneously, we are preparing for the next
    NSSL procurement phase starting in fiscal year 2025. Building upon
    Phase 2, Phase 3 pursues a dual-lane, hybrid approach to maximize
    competition and use of the Nation's robust commercial launch industry
    as we transition to more proliferated space architectures. NSSL Phase 3
    will provide Assured Access to Space and protects capacity for the
    DOD's less risk-tolerant missions with two fully certified launch
    service providers in one lane while allowing emerging providers to
    compete, when ready, for the DOD's more risk-tolerant missions in
    another lane. This diversification produces a resilient launch
    architecture that allows the Space Force to rapidly harness new
    technological discoveries to improve launch reliability and success.
        Complementary to NSSL, the RSLP focuses primarily on launching our
    smaller payloads, e.g., suborbital targets, experimental,
    demonstration, and allows us to meet the full spectrum of launch. We
    have access to 11 different launch service providers through RSLP and
    we are working to on-ramp more providers in the next year. Our ability
    to use space effectively relies on maintaining assured access, being
    the first to field necessary capabilities, and the ability to rapidly
    reconstitute them, if necessary. In sum, our portfolio of launch
    programs continues to push the envelope to accelerate launch timelines
    to deliver integrated, resilient capabilities more rapidly whenever and
    wherever needed.
        FY 2024 marks the first time the Space Force has specifically
    budgeted for Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS), acknowledging TacRS
    as an emerging imperative. Importantly, TacRS is more than just launch
    capability; it also includes the end-to-end mission for satellite,
    ground capability, integration activities, and operations. Together,
    these activities constitute a complete mission set required to deliver
    a space capability to the warfighter in a rapid manner, on-demand to
    either reconstitute or augment capabilities in a more contested
    environment.
        We successfully completed the first TacRS demonstration, Tactically
    Responsive Launch-2, in June 2021 after building a demonstration
    satellite in 12 months and launching it 21 days after call-up. For the
    next demo, VICTUS NOX, we plan to build the satellite in 10 months and
    only have a 3.5-day call-up (60-hour activation and launch within 24
    hours of an operational need); VICTUS NOX is scheduled to launch this
    summer. In fiscal year 2024, we are investing $60 million to
    demonstrate a 24-hour notification to launch timeline and to develop
    the operations, training, testing, acquisitions, concept of operations,
    and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures required to establish an
    enduring TacRS capability.
                   managing the space acquisition enterprise
        The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and
    Integration (SAF/SQ), a new role created by the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, is singularly focused on
    transforming the space acquisition enterprise to add speed to our
    acquisitions and meet the growing threat posed by strategic
    competition. There are three organizations with unique capabilities and
    authorities that procure space capabilities for the Space Force: Space
    Systems Command (SSC), Space Development Agency (SDA), and Space Rapid
    Capabilities Office (SpRCO). Each has unique strengths and, in some
    cases, unique statutory authorities. SAF/SQ manages their programs as
    an integrated portfolio leveraging their strengths and authorities.
        As the Space Service Acquisition Executive, SAF/SQ conducts reviews
    with each of the portfolio leads (Program Executive Officers) every 2
    weeks to discuss the status of programs within their purview. SAF/SQ
    also holds Quarterly Program Reviews for a deeper program analysis.
    During these quarterly reviews, the government program managers present
    the technical, schedule, cost, and staffing status, open risks and
    issues, upcoming activities, and an overall assessment of program
    health. Based on the data from the quarterlies so far--the latest in
    February 2023--we identified a few troubled programs to track more
    closely. For those programs, the program office provides a biweekly
    update on progress against a detailed schedule to get to a healthy
    status. Holistically, these reviews enable the space acquisition
    workforce to remain focused on delivering rapid, resilient, and
    integrated capabilities to our warfighters, on cost and on schedule.
        In October 2022, SAF/SQ issued strategic acquisition guidance to
    the workforce, outlining Nine Space Acquisition Tenets. The tenets form
    the basis of a new direction to transform our space acquisition
    approach and refocus our space acquisition professionals on addressing
    the threat in the next decade by emphasizing speed and program
    management discipline. The tenets are:
        1)  Build Smaller Satellites, Smaller Ground Systems, and Minimize
    Non-Recurring Engineering
        2)  Get the Acquisition Strategy Correct
        3)  Enable Teamwork Between Contracting Officer and Program Manager
        4)  Award Executable Contracts
        5)  Maintain Program Stability
        6)  Avoid SAPs and Over Classifying
        7)  Deliver Ground Before Launch
        8)  Hold Industry Accountable for Results
        9)  Execute--Deliver Capabilities that Work, and Deliver them on
    Schedule and on Cost To emphasize how these tenets enable speed, SAF/SQ
    derived a simple formula for going fast in space acquisition which
    includes:
         1)  Build smaller systems
        +2)  Use existing technology designs to minimize non-recurring
    engineering
        +3)  Drive contract scope to 3 years or less from start to launch
        +4)  Use fixed-price contracts

    _______________________________________________________________________
        = Mission Capabilities Faster to Our Warfighters
        This simple formula is the cornerstone of our approach to build
    resilient architectures faster with innately integrated capabilities.
    Together, the tenets and formula provide the vision for how our space
    acquisition workforce is approaching a transformation to the process of
    delivering space capabilities to meet and outpace the growing threat
    posed by strategic competitors.
        Further, thanks to Congress, SAF/SQ chairs the Space Acquisition
    Council (SAC) for the Department of Defense, and the CSO is a key
    statutory member. The SAC has been a valuable tool to ensure
    collaboration and integration while avoiding duplication of effort
    across the entire national security space enterprise across all
    Departments. Additionally, SAF/SQ chairs the Acquisition Strategy Panel
    for all Space Force programs seeking acquisition strategy changes. This
    forum allows us to evaluate newly proposed space systems, contracts,
    and incentive strategies to ensure we optimize our approach to
    acquisitions and that our portfolio of programs remains concentrated on
    delivering resilient capabilities faster and more integrated with the
    warfighter.
        SAF/SQ is committed to using all the tools and authorities Congress
    has provided, which are aiding us in speeding up space acquisition and
    delivering capabilities to the warfighter rapidly and effectively. We
    will continue to leverage Middle Tier of Acquisition to quickly
    identify, prototype, and field innovative solutions to our challenging
    problems. At the same time, we are using Other Transaction Authorities
    to increase program flexibility, as well as the pool of possible
    vendors. Overall, these tools and authorities enable us to use industry
    practices to move faster, utilize non-traditional companies, expand
    flexibility, and improve affordability. The priorities and tenets
    enable our acquisition force to develop and acquire capabilities our
    guardians and warfighters need to maintain readiness and deter the
    threat posed by strategic competitors.
                             space force readiness
    More Resilient and Effective Space Capabilities
        As the CSO recently testified, the Space Force is accelerating its
    pivot toward resilient satellite constellations, ground stations,
    networks, and data links; informed by transformational force design
    analysis. Space Force readiness, and the Department's broader
    integrated deterrence emphasis, ultimately demands resilient space
    systems and capabilities that effectively deter both on-orbit and
    terrestrial threats. As such, most of the Space Force's on-orbit assets
    must be proliferated, disaggregated, and distributed.
        Through effective and efficient resilience, the Space Force will
    not only ensure enduring access to space capabilities, but it will also
    disincentivize and deter targeted aggression. The President's Fiscal
    Year 2024 Budget Request demonstrates the Department's significant,
    analytically informed investments in resilient systems. Planned
    upgrades include military MW/MT, Space Data Transport, Command,
    Control, Communications, and Battle Management (C3BM) systems, and
    space-based targeting proliferated architecture that will be more
    resilient during a strategic attack.
        As always, the Space Force will continue to work closely with DOD
    and IC stakeholders, as well as our allied and commercial partners, to
    develop and deliver a digital engineering ecosystem that enables the
    Space Force to rapidly mature innovative concepts into integrated
    solutions and deliver warfighting capabilities faster.
    Force Design
        A key element of readiness are the capabilities inherent in the
    systems the Space Force uses to execute its missions. The Space Force,
    primarily through the Space Warfighting Analysis Center, executes a
    force design process intended to assess future capabilities through the
    lens of operational need, counter-space threat, and cost.
        Additionally, in implementing the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2022, the Secretary of Defense designated the CSO
    as the Force Design Architect for Space Systems of the Armed Forces. In
    this new role, the CSO presents the Secretary of Defense with
    coordinated space-mission force design recommendations for the Armed
    Forces. Such recommendations are informed by high-fidelity modeling and
    analysis which balance warfighting performance, resilience against
    potential adversaries, and affordability. Recommendations include a
    transition plan to position the Department to make programmatic and
    budgetary decisions related to science and technology investments,
    force development, and acquisition. Current force design priorities are
    space data transport and tactical targeting--both of which are vital to
    prevailing in high intensity conflicts.
    Operational Test and Training Infrastructure
        At its very core, Space Force readiness requires our systems and
    operators to be ready for full spectrum operations in a contested space
    domain. And while our organizational structures and processes increase
    our ability to assess and sustain readiness levels, the Space Force
    needs an appropriate infrastructure to adequately conduct test and
    evaluation, advanced training, and tactics development activities
    against a thinking adversary to effectively deliver readiness
    generation.
        In previous testimony before this subcommittee, we described the
    Space Force's operating concept and core elements of its Operational
    Test and Training Infrastructure (OTTI). OTTI is an ``umbrella'' term,
    describing a collection of distributed, enterprise-wide test and
    training systems and processes, effectively integrated and synchronized
    to establish and sustain combat readiness across the spectrum of
    conflict. It aggregates multiple program elements and their associated
    activities, programs, capabilities, and funding.
        Space Force's current OTTI is a loose federation of systems that
    build proficiency and procedural currency for a benign environment--it
    does not build warfighting capacity demanded by the current and
    emerging strategic environment. The Space Force does not yet have the
    ability to present realistic threat-stimuli to missions specific
    trainers; conduct integrated--both intra-service and joint--training;
    or visualize and ``experience'' the domain.
        That said, Congress's strong support for Space Force's OTTI efforts
    has greatly accelerated these priorities, and the Space Force continues
    to make significant strides in developing and implementing its planned
    OTTI architecture, governance structure, and resourcing strategy, which
    is appropriately reflected in the President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget
    Request and in the Department's Future Years Defense Program.
    Readiness and Training
        The Space Force continues to prioritize and advance our updated
    readiness, training, and force generation initiatives. The new Space
    Force Generation model, SPAFORGEN, reached Initial Operational
    Capability on October 1, 2022, and cycles guardians through three
    phases to increase individual and overall force readiness. The
    ``Prepare'' and ``Ready'' phases afford guardians with the time and
    capacity for training to develop the tools, skills, and capabilities
    necessary for mission execution in a contested domain against a
    thinking adversary. This includes both operational procedures and high-
    end training to certify forces for contested operations in space.
        As part of SPAFORGEN, Space Training and Readiness Command
    (STARCOM) is making great strides to prepare space forces to prevail in
    conflict, if deterrence fails, through innovative education, training,
    doctrine, and testing. Last August, STARCOM completed the first and
    largest to-date of a new series of exercises that included both live
    and simulated events to test combat tactics of our Total Force
    including both Guardians and Air National Guard space professionals. As
    we move forward, STARCOM will continue to increase space-related
    content and engagement for guardians in Basic Military Training (BMT);
    Non-Commissioned Officer Academy; United States Air Force Academy;
    Officer Training School (OTS); and Reserve Officer Training Corps.
    Force Presentation to Combatant Commands
        The Space Force presents space capabilities that underpin all
    instruments of our national power. Pursuant to law, the Space Force
    retains the responsibility to organize, train, and equip space forces.
    To that end, the Space Force generates and presents ready space forces
    to Combatant Commands to deter aggression and, if necessary, prevail in
    conflict.
        Our SPAFORGEN model ensures that forces presented to Combatant
    Commands can execute missions and tasks and are equipped to make
    appropriate recommendations on the effective employment, task
    organization, operational synchronization, and command relationships of
    space forces. Unlike the previous force generation model, the new
    approach packages forces into optimized capabilities-based elements and
    standardizes the way we present forces to the Combatant Commanders.
        To ensure full integration and synchronization of space activities
    with other domains in combatant commands' areas of responsibility in
    2022, the Space Force activated three new component field commands for
    U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Forces Korea.
    Component field command guardians provide space planning and employment
    expertise, as well as command and control for the combatant commanders.
    Unit/Mission Transfers
        In accordance with existing statute and congressional intent, the
    DOD continues to transfer fully mission-capable space operational
    units, support equipment, property, and related resources from other
    services and organizations to the Space Force with no mission
    degradation or adverse personnel impact.
        In fiscal year 2022, the U.S. Army transferred its Satellite
    Payload, Planning, Management, & Control function, which included five
    Wideband Satellite Communications Operations Centers, four Regional
    Satellite Communications Support Centers, Consolidated Satellite
    Communication Systems Experts, and 502 associated manpower
    authorizations (302 military/200 civilian). The transfer of this
    function and associated resources is directly in line with the USSF
    Military Satellite Communications mission.
        Additionally, in accordance with Title 10, United States Code,
    Section 9086, the DOD successfully transferred the SDA to the Space
    Force. The Space Force continues to ensure SDA's seamless integration
    within the service and remains steadfast in its commitment to ensure
    adequate resourcing and manning.
        Looking forward, in fiscal year 2024, the United States Army
    intends to transfer its Theater Missile Warning Battlespace
    Characterization (TMW-BC) functions, including four Joint Tactical
    Ground Station (JTAGS) locations (Osan, Misawa, Al Udeid, Sigonella),
    one skill qualification Training Suite, the JTAGS Product Office (JPO),
    and 97 associated manpower positions to the Space Force. The transfer
    of this function and associated resources is directly associated with
    the Space Force's Missile Warning mission. The Space Force already
    operates the SBIRS constellation and Strategic Missile Warning ground
    infrastructure; adding the Theater Missile Warning function will
    consolidate global Missile Warning under one military Service.
    Integration with Allies and Partners
        Allies and Partners represent a significant advantage for the
    United States. Our strategic competitors do not have the potential for
    establishing the coalitions and cooperation that the U.S. can
    establish. This is especially true in the space domain. The Space Force
    continuously engages with our allied and partner spacefaring nations to
    guarantee shared military, civil, and industrial success in space.
    Especially as our competitors continue to demonstrate threatening
    actions within the space domain, it remains imperative that the United
    States deepen our existing ties with Allies and Partners to maintain
    space stability. As the CSO has stated, spacepower is a collective
    endeavor, and the Space Force is prioritizing partnerships most likely
    to deliver combat ready forces and capability to allow the United
    States and our allies to deter aggression, and if deterrence fails,
    prevail in a fight.
        Space Force is executing the CSO's Partner to Win Line of Effort
    which states we cannot succeed without robust joint, coalition,
    international, interagency, academic, and commercial partnerships. We
    are striving to eliminate barriers to collaboration in any form, to
    include over classification and incompatible systems. The Space Force
    must also prioritize direct collaboration and placing guardians in
    positions where such collaboration can organically strengthen. To that
    end, in January 2023 the Space Force published its Guidance for Global
    Partnerships, which directs the service and all its components to
    evolve from data-sharing agreements to operations integration, payload
    sharing, and mission sharing, where appropriate. Further, the Space
    Force continues to lead international Space Engagement Talks, and
    efforts to share our force design analysis, which are identifying
    focused resource commitments that allow trusted partners to share the
    burden of delivering combat-ready space forces and the spectrum of
    worldwide capabilities.
    Weapon System Sustainment
        Space Force Weapon System Sustainment directly supports Space
    Force's ability to sustain the day-to-day readiness of 52 weapon
    systems performing Space missions, to include Sensing, Navigation,
    Satellite Communications, Space Domain Awareness, Battlefield Command &
    Control, and Space Control. The President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget
    Request supports missions to provide space capabilities to the joint
    force while balancing Service priorities and managing risk. This
    position takes a predictive planning and proactive approach to
    mitigating obsolescence as our future requirements continue to grow due
    to increasing costs for hardware, software, and cybersecurity
    maintenance driven by aging space systems.
    Facilities and Infrastructure Investment
        Space Force Facility, Restoration, Modernization and Military
    Construction total obligation authority enables the Service to
    prioritize requirements to reduce risk to mission and the force.
    Structural, electrical, and power improvements to operational
    facilities reduces risk to mission and enables our joint and coalition
    partners in the fight, while quality of life infrastructure and
    facility improvements reduce risk to the force by improving resiliency
    amongst our guardians, airmen, and their families. The Space Force
    derives almost all of its support from the Air Force, including
    logistics, security, medical services, and human resources; however,
    Space Force's ability to prioritize its unique requirements at our 14
    installations, more than 70 sites, and other geographically separated
    units ensures we appropriately align responsibility, resources,
    accountability, and authorities for the Space Force to execute assigned
    missions as an independent service.
        Space Force's top installation priorities include sustaining
    critical facilities and infrastructure that enable the full spectrum of
    missions--from launch and command and control to post-launch and into
    the operational phase of sustaining 52 Space Force Weapons Systems.
        The President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request reflects an
    increase from last year due to the Service prioritizing projects that
    reduce risk to Space and Combatant Command missions at Pituffik Space
    Base, and the Eastern and Western Ranges to support Assured Access to
    Space. Moving forward, the Space Force will continue to prioritize
    projects that increase facility and infrastructure resiliency and
    Service readiness.
                                   conclusion
        The rich history of America's space endeavors is defined by
    determination, persistence, and willingness to innovate. Now is the
    time to invest in accelerating such innovation and fielding the
    capabilities to our warfighters to deter those who seek to disrupt such
    endeavors. We will strive to maintain access to, through, and from
    space in order to preserve the benefits that the domain provides for
    all nations.
        The Department of the Air Force and the United States Space Force
    have made good progress in transforming our space architecture to be
    more resilient, more integrated, and more capable.
        We must ensure that we field the greatest fighting force, systems,
    and capabilities necessary to deter potential adversaries from acts of
    aggression and, if necessary, defeat them in conflict. Our innovative
    approaches to space systems acquisition and integration will sustain
    our advantage in space and allow our Nation to pursue groundbreaking
    civil, military, and commercial capabilities.
        As our strategic competitors, specifically China and Russia,
    continue to make significant space-related advances that seek to
    threaten our freedom of movement, maintaining our strategic edge has
    never been more critical. Destructive direct-ascent antisatellite
    missile tests, hypersonic and maneuverable missile demonstrations, and
    a host of dangerous behaviors by our strategic competitors require the
    Department of the Air Force and the Space Force to be prepared to
    protect and defend our national security interests in space--through a
    resilient, reliable, and effective set of space capabilities. Our
    competitors seem to have figured out speed. We must do the same.
        Thank you to the Committee for your dedication to the Department of
    the Air Force and our United States Space Force. We look forward to
    your questions.

        Senator King. Thank you very much. Following up on your
    last comment, you talked about the Authorization Act. How about
    a budget? Would a continuing resolution be a problem for the
    priorities that you all have identified?
        General Thompson. Senator King, it would. As a specific
    example, as you noted, our budget has grown by almost $4
    billion it includes----
        Senator King. That would be gone--and that would be gone
    and that would be the solution.
        General Thompson. That would be gone. One example is that
    our missile warning, missile tracking enterprise is vital to
    tracking the hypersonic threats that are growing from Russia
    and China. That budget doubles from 2023 to 2024. We are on a
    path to rapidly field that by 2027. That schedule would
    immediately be called into question with a continuing
    resolution.
        Senator King. I asked the Secretary of Air Force this
    morning if a continuing resolution would be a threat to our
    national security. His answer was absolutely. Do you agree with
    that assessment?
        General Thompson. Yes, Senator, I do.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Plumb, every question I think
    of has a classified side to it, so we have to be careful. This
    is an open hearing. But our adversaries are not only putting up
    satellites for traditional communications intelligence work but
    have a military aspect. Is that correct?
        Dr. Plumb. Absolutely correct. They are putting up systems
    to attack our satellites and they are putting up systems to
    help them target our Joint Force.
        Senator King. Isn't it true that in a conflict, this would
    be the first beachhead would be space, to try to blind us, in
    effect?
        Dr. Plumb. There are many people that think that sir. I
    mean, that is certainly one theory of how a conflict might
    progress.
        Senator King. In your budget, which you outline--you went
    down, and I didn't--I may have missed it, but I didn't hear a
    specific line for R&D. Is that part of your----
        Dr. Plumb. It is. I didn't have a specific call out but--in
    dollar size in my statement. But there is significant science
    and technology, and research and development investment.
        Senator King. Because if ever there was an area that would
    require ongoing R&D investment, it would seem to me this one.
        Dr. Plumb. Yes, sir, and many of those are, of course,
    classified.
        Senator King. And you talked about resilience, and one of
    the key strategies is proliferation. In case of a conflict,
    what would be the relationship between our Strategic Forces and
    the commercial satellite industry?
        Amazon is putting up a whole fleet, Starlink is up, and of
    course, there are multiple other private sector satellites. Is
    there a pre-established relationship? For example, in TRANSCOM
    [United States Transportation Command], we have a relationship
    with airlines and shipping agencies that in time of conflict
    they will be available to us.
        Do we have similar relationships with the commercial
    satellite industry?
        Dr. Plumb. Senator, let me just take that in two parts. You
    asked about Strategic Forces. When you say that I hear nuclear.
    As far as----
        Senator King. I wasn't using it in that sense.
        Dr. Plumb. Okay. For that, that would be really an
    inherently Government problem to make sure nuclear command
    control is protected. As far as relationship with commercial
    industry and how can we ensure access to their products, to
    their imagery, just for an example, through a conflict?
        I will just say the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy
    Secretary are both invested in this question. They have tasked
    really all of us and more, including NRO [National
    Reconnaissance Office], to look at this and get back to them on
    ways to go forward. A lot of those answers are currently in the
    way different contracts are structured.
        I don't know, Senator, if Mr. Calvelli would want to weigh
    in, but we are working on this across the Department, and I
    will just offer that perhaps in late summer we could come back
    up and give you kind of a coordinated answer as to where we are
    along each component.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Mr. Calvelli. Yes, the folks at Space Systems Command are
    actually looking at sort of a craft like model for space and
    how we would take advantage of that, and trying to figure out
    which are the mission areas like SATCOM, or satellite
    communications, or even space domain awareness that we could
    take advantage of. Like Secretary Plumb said, we are looking at
    that now.
        Senator King. General Thompson, you touched on this. One of
    your tenants is partnering to win. Space strikes me as an area
    where cooperation with allies would have value instead of
    having to reinvent everything, we do every launch. Is that an
    ongoing process to develop a kind of space Five Eyes, if you
    will?
        General Thompson. It is. In fact, Secretary Plumb hosts a
    forum that we call the Combined Space Operations Initiative
    that has been going on for more than a decade. It includes not
    only the Five Eyes partner, but we have expanded to other like-
    minded allies, Germany and France and Japan and even folks like
    South Korea. The idea is exactly that.
        First of all, is not only do we not want to provide all the
    capabilities, we can no longer afford to provide all of the
    capabilities ourselves. In the area of combined operations and
    system acquisition and other things, we work with them
    consistently and continuously.
        Senator King. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Plumb,
    I appreciated our conversation yesterday about the problem of
    over classification, particularly with respect to intelligence
    derived from space-based programs.
        I think we have to strike a better balance between keeping
    our sources and methods protected and also then letting the
    American people know and understand the true nature and the
    severity of the threats that we face as a Nation.
        Do you share these concerns? If you do, I hope you do, if
    you do, how do we then more effectively be able to share that
    information with allies?
        Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator. I do share your concerns,
    and also know the right answer when told. As far as how to
    share classified information better, first of all, I deeply
    appreciated our conversation yesterday on this.
        I will just say here for the record that a lot of the
    issues we look at when we try to figure out how to do closer
    space cooperation, even with our closest allies, really comes
    down to the ability to share some types of classified
    information.
        A lot of classified information is not actually DOD
    originated. It often originates from different parts of the
    intelligence community, and so we need to be able to
    collaborate very closely with our partners in the IC
    [intelligence community] to kind of break down these legacy
    barriers that really are legacy systems, not designed for
    fighting or for operationally relevant speeds, and find a way
    to be able to share those portions of those types of classified
    information that are needed for combined space operations.
        We are working on it, but it is hard, and it does require a
    tight collaboration. But I do think that right now is the right
    time. We have got the right partners in the IC, and we have got
    a good collaboration, I would say, across the board here and
    working on it.
        Senator Fischer. I would be happy to work with you on that
    as well. I think the world we live in is going to require speed
    and in being able to share information, not just within our
    Government, but with our allies as well. And----
        Senator King. Not the 21-year-old National Guardsman----
        Senator Fischer. No, Senator King, but with the people that
    need to know--with the people that need to know who are with us
    in the event that we would need to rely on our allies even
    more. What steps are you taking right now to change that
    culture of over classification? Or what do you believe should
    be the first steps?
        Dr. Plumb. Senator, I have run a series of high-level
    meetings with Pentagon stakeholders on this. I have been out
    communicating with both the--not just Pentagon--Government
    stakeholders on this. Been communicating with allies within the
    building, with my partners in the IC, and both here and at the
    White House, on the urgency of this. I am not the only person
    carrying this message and so I think it is gaining steam.
        I think making sure that we have a way to develop a plan
    forward and understand that everything won't be solved at once,
    but we need to start with some test cases. I think from where I
    sit, and the General already referenced the combined space
    operations initiative that I chair.
        I think that is the right place to start from where I sit.
    There can be other bilateral pieces, but to be able to do a
    multilateral operation would really be, I think, a real
    testament to our ability to show that we have moved past legacy
    systems and sharing plans.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Thompson, how are Space
    Force's ongoing efforts to integrate itself with Joint Force
    progressing? I understand that Space Force is still in the
    process of establishing some component commands with the
    combatant commands, and can you provide us with an update on
    how that process is coming along?
        General Thompson. Yes, Senator Fischer. Actually, we
    established the first three of our Space Force component
    commands late last year. The first one was with Indo-Pacific
    Command and Admiral Aquilino in November, rapidly followed by
    Space Force--or by United States forces Korea and United States
    Central Command.
        We focused on those three areas first, as you might
    imagine, because of the pacing challenge and the fight we are
    in today in the Middle East. We have also been deeply engaged
    with United States European Command. We are in the final stages
    of working with them.
        In that regard, it is not just a matter of United States
    commands because of the need to establish that in Europe or
    after an overseas force structure request. But we have also
    been from the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, our guardians
    who are out there have been working both with our forces and
    with NATO allies in terms of integrating space capabilities
    effectively.
        Senator Fischer. Do you feel good about the progress that
    you have made there?
        General Thompson. I do.
        Senator Fischer. Do you feel that you have learned some
    good lessons?
        General Thompson. Absolutely. Yes, Senator. I think we have
    learned some that we could share here. I think our force design
    moving toward proliferation is proving to be valid. I think we
    have learned a lot about the integration of commercial
    capabilities.
        I think both on our side and on with commercial companies,
    I think we have some things to work on together there. But it
    has been a--we have learned a lot of lessons and work to do as
    a result of that interaction.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Senator King. Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. General Thompson, as we look at the
    national security launch schedule, do you feel confident that
    the schedule is going to keep us ahead of China?
        General Thompson. Senator, from the standpoint of national
    security needs, absolutely. I will tell you, though, our launch
    ranges are at this point in time about at their limit. We have
    actually--we are actually approaching, I think, 16 we had in--
    launches in 2022.
        The vast majority of those were actually commercial
    launches. And I think in order--if we were going to be able to
    meet the commercial sector with the growth that they forecast,
    we are going to need to make some more additional investments
    in our launch range.
        We have got a legislative proposal to let them help share
    some of that cost burden. But I would say we are on a path
    today, and assuming that we can continue that path, the launch
    capacity of the Nation will absolutely allow us to keep pace
    with China.
        Senator Tuberville. Would you like to answer that Secretary
    Calvelli?
        Mr. Calvelli. I disagree with what--I totally agree with
    General Thompson's statement, so--he is correct.
        Senator Tuberville. General Thompson, we have got in this
    year's budget Space Force, $19 billion for research and
    development (R&D), $4.7 for procurement. If you had a crystal
    ball, how long is it going to take us to get balance set up? I
    know there is a lot to space and this new frontier. We all know
    that.
        General Thompson. Well, Senator, and that is a reflection
    of our nature for a very, very long time, because we have
    bought so many--for so many years, we bought a relatively small
    number of very sophisticated satellites.
        For years, we have tended toward the research, development,
    test, and evaluation funding versus procurement. But I believe
    in the switch over to these proliferating constellations.
        We have a force design right now for 120 low Earth
    orbiting, about 16 medium Earth orbit satellites for missile
    warning, missile tracking. I think you will see as a result of
    that activity, we are going to probably shift a whole lot more
    to a smaller investment percentage in R&D teaming and start
    ramping up production very quickly.
        You will probably see the same thing in--as we work with
    the NRO on ground moving target indication, air moving target
    indication, and some of the other constellations as well.
        Senator Tuberville. But we see China moving faster. You see
    us being able to catch up?
        General Thompson. I do. I would tell you that in the last
    several years, I have gone from very concerned to confident
    that we can given that we stay on the trajectory we are on.
        Senator Tuberville. Mr. Secretary, for the evaluation
    criteria you recently released in the draft request for the
    proposal for phase three of the National Security Space Launch
    Program, properly cites table performances, past performances
    as top criteria to choose your next launch providers for your
    5-year block back cost is a secondary factor.
        Within the stated criterion by limiting, it to just two
    providers in the block, aren't you just creating another 5-year
    block buy for the two incumbent carriers?
        Senator Tuberville. The nice thing about the phase three
    strategy is that includes dual lanes and two separate
    contracting approaches. Lane one consists of about half the
    launches, is for more than two providers.
        In fact, we are anticipating ramping on to IDIQ [Indefinite
    Delivery, Indefinite Quantity] approach, maybe 5 to 7, or 6 to
    9 kind of providers that can launch more commercial like
    missions. Then lane two is very similar to what we have today
    in contract or phase two where we have got two providers that
    would be able to provide our most stressing, high energy,
    complex missions to orbit to a variety of orbits.
        I am actually--given that we have got the two contracts
    rising two lanes, I think it opens up a more folks to be able
    to compete.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Secretary Plumb, U.S. policy
    is to have at least two space launch vehicles to launch DOD and
    NRO satellites. Space has changed a lot in the last 20 years
    since the law was written in 2004.
        Meanwhile, the demand for launch vehicles, commercial,
    civil, and defense, has skyrocketed. Would you like to see at
    least three space launch vehicles for assured access?
        Dr. Plumb. Senator, thank you for the question. I know the
    laws are in this, too. I am aware of a study from some time ago
    that suggested three would be better. The NSL is really the
    purview of my colleagues here. But generally speaking, I do
    think that getting to the place where you can have more
    providers to certain orbits, if not all of them, is a good step
    in the right direction.
        Senator Tuberville. He has handed it off to you then,
    Secretary.
        Mr. Calvelli. You know, I really--and actually enjoyed our
    conversation this morning. You have given me some things to
    think about and I can get back to you on that.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank Mr. Chair.
        Senator King. Senator Cramer
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all
    of you for being here. General Thompson, you will be
    disappointed, I know, if I didn't bring up PARCS [Perimeter
    Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System] radar
    modernization.
        As I listened to Secretary Calvelli talk about the
    transition and, of course, this wonderful piece about the
    transition to a more modern architecture, during that
    transition, some legacy pieces need to be improved upon.
        Maybe I would start with you, and then, Secretary, you
    could followup on what do you think--how do you see the PARCS
    integrating into this transition to the new architecture?
        General Thompson. Senator Cramer, right now, our challenge
    with all of those, PARCS is one, we have got four other large
    ground-based radars, is understanding how they fit into the
    future.
        The first is when you talk about missile warning and
    missile tracking and hypersonic vehicles, because we are no
    longer in an era of ballistic missiles, we are now in an era of
    maneuvering vehicles, we are going to have to understand how
    those warning systems contribute and how they need to be
    changed or perhaps improved to be able to adjust to that.
        The second piece is to continue to evaluate how they fit
    into our overall space domain awareness enterprise. Those
    sensors play a tremendous role in keeping track of all the
    objects in orbit.
        What we need to do is understand how we are using them
    today and what improvements can be made to continue in the
    future. But right now, it is a matter of thoughtful design and
    investment before we commit large dollars to how we are going
    to modernize.
        Senator Cramer. That is a good point, and Secretary, you
    can followup, but as I think about, I think, are we talking
    about something that is like a stopgap during the transition,
    or are we talking about something that becomes a dynamic part
    of the future? I suspect that is part of what you are still
    trying to discover, but.
        Mr. Calvelli. Yes, thanks to Congress, there was an upward
    of $3 million in 2023 that we are using to help digitize some
    components. And I think you will find in our 2024 POM [Program
    Objective Memorandum], a $6.4 million additional dollars to
    continue to renovate the PARCS radar systems.
        Senator Cramer. Yes, unless somebody has seen it, you
    almost can't believe what you are talking about in terms of
    just digitizing the images is a big deal.
        So anyway, as you know, watch it carefully. Grateful that
    you were able to get some more money to do that. But at the
    same time, I am not advocating we waste it, so I appreciate the
    thoughtful approach.
        The acquisition timeline. The timeline is going to get back
    to that--I know all of you have something to say about that,
    particularly rapid acquisition. As I said this morning in the
    briefing, I mean, the reason we stood up Space Force--not the
    reason, but we still have Space Force and SDA specifically with
    some ability--a white sheet of paper, like I like to say, a
    white sheet of paper, not bound to too many traditions.
        And of course, the juxtaposition and the important role
    that the private sector in commercial space plays is both
    helpful to that, but we could do a lot to arm it as well. So
    maybe elaborate, Secretary, both Secretary Plumb, Secretary
    Calvelli on the acquisition timeline is, how we can be more
    helpful.
        I want to be the guy that watches it, has appropriate
    oversight, but that doesn't get in the way and become the
    gotcha person. In other words, do it well, report regularly. If
    things need to change, yes, change quickly.
        Mr. Calvelli. The trick is to quit building big, right----
        Senator Cramer. Yes.
        Mr. Calvelli. Big satellites take time. It doesn't matter
    if you even have an existing design, big satellites take a long
    time to go build. The fundamental model we need to drive to is
    to build much smaller systems, to use existing technology, and
    do it on about 3 year's center.
        So, from contract start to launch in about 3 years, and
    then what we will find by doing that is not only will we gain
    speed, but we will do technology refresh dramatically faster
    because every 3 years or updating the technology.
        Compared to today, where we might build a satellite over 7
    to 9 years, and then upgrading that technology till the next
    block which is another 7 to 9 years. So, you are taking 15
    years to upgrade the technology. We can move faster, get more
    on orbit, and upgrade technology faster by building smaller,
    and that is what we are driving to go do.
        Senator Cramer. Yes. Who would have ever thought that
    rockets and satellites would be a commodity? I mean, really
    with what you guys are doing in space, if that could be
    duplicated with the other systems that would do better than the
    other way around. Secretary Plumb.
        Dr. Plumb. Yes, Senator. I would just add to what Mr.
    Calvelli said, which is, you asked how you could help, and I
    think, moving at speed is really important. I think it is going
    to unlock things we haven't even considered yet.
        But we should also remember that if we are going to buy a
    lot more things and move faster, that some of those things may
    fail, and we cannot afford to have systems shut down because
    some small percentage of them failed.
        I think that has been the tendency for large, exquisite
    systems, which has added cost and time. When we try to move
    faster, we are going to have to have some tolerance for failure
    in there so we can keep moving fast.
        Senator Cramer. Well, that is where the R&D question was--
    again, all of this has to work together. We don't want to ever
    stop innovating, obviously. Wasn't it Napoleon that said, the
    logical conclusion of defense is defeat? Being a Viking fan, I
    am very familiar with the concept. But yes, we want you to be
    nimble with appropriate oversight, and I hear you loud and
    clear. Thank you.
        Senator King. Senator Rounds is returning from the vote,
    and Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
    Calvelli, to followup on the acquisition discussion that we had
    here, you have some tools that are available to be able to
    utilize that rapid acquisition like the OTA and mid-tier
    acquisition.
        Can you tell me how much focus is being given to software
    and ground systems on acquisition to help us better operate the
    satellites?
        Senator Cramer.
        [Technical problems]--making sure that we have our ground
    systems, our software systems in place is really critical to
    speed. We have a history, unfortunately, of delivering
    satellites to orbit and not having the ground or the user
    equipment ready to go.
        And so, I put out, when I put out my guidance, one of my
    key things I put in there was deliver ground before a launch.
    And I think the way we do that is we need to get away from
    building very large software developments and break things up
    into more manageable pieces that can be more quickly done.
        I think when Government tries to build large monolithic
    software systems, we all tend to struggle with that. So, build
    smaller.
        Senator Fischer. The history of the acquisition programs of
    the Air Force isn't necessarily a good one, you know, with
    overruns and late. Do you feel confident that that program, if
    you build smaller ones, is going to be able to help?
        Mr. Calvelli. I do. And I think also----
        Senator Fischer. Is that going to be your main focus or are
    you looking at other areas as well?
        Mr. Calvelli. For software? I think taking advantage of
    cloud computing is important, especially commercial clouds.
    There are a lot of great environments out there from commercial
    companies, and the intelligence community has done a lot of
    great work in cloud computing, and the Department Defense is
    moving in that direction as well.
        I think again, moving software into small, manageable
    pieces is something to help out. So, you get into the fact
    where you run applications on the cloud environment, as opposed
    to building your own solutions.
        I think that is a big help. I think just a fundamental
    focus on program management discipline, which is basically
    really focusing the team on delivering on schedule and
    delivering on cost is an important facet of that as well.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Senator King. One point on cloud, I think all of us assume
    that there is greater security in the cloud because it is a
    larger entity.
        I think we have to be careful with that assumption because
    even though it may be more secure, if an adversary penetrates
    that security, they hit the jackpot because there is so much
    data there.
        So, cybersecurity has to be a high priority. Even though we
    are dealing with the cloud, we can't be lulled by the assumed
    cyber defenses of the cloud. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Plumb, first
    of all, I want to thank you for being one of the first leaders
    in the Department of Defense to speak out very publicly about
    the concern with the sale of certain portions of the
    electromagnetic spectrum, particularly that which is a 3.1 to
    3.45 gigahertz, or the S-band area.
        I appreciate what you have said. I think that gave a lot of
    other people confidence to speak up as well about how serious
    that part is, and the fact that we really need to get this
    assessment completed before we start deciding that we are going
    to sell parts of that asset, and I thank you for that.
        I would also like to just ask, Dr. Plumb, the Commander of
    Space Command cited space domain awareness as the Command's top
    priority amid escalating threats from China and Russia in his
    March 2022 testimony in front of the Committee.
        What is DOD's assessment of its current ability to maintain
    the space domain awareness required to predict potential
    adversary activity?
        Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator. I would just say thank you
    also for your continued conversation on spectrum.
        On space domain awareness, I think we probably have
    agreement at this table, and I hope you will ask my colleagues
    here, that we need to be doing better. I think there is a
    recognition that, one, there is a lot more things in space now,
    and a lot more players in space now, and a lot more things that
    are maneuvering constantly in space now.
        To be able to have an understanding of all of that and be
    able to pick out which pieces could be a threat in one time or
    attract pieces of interest is hard. The kind of legacy systems
    that we have, that we publish, these two elements are not
    suitable for that job, and I think the Department is looking
    hard at this.
        I might ask General Thompson if he has----
        General Thompson. Senator, a couple of things in that
    regard. First of all, I will start by saying that nobody does,
    and nobody can do space domain awareness today the way U.S.
    Space Force and Armed Forces to U.S. Space Command do. However,
    you are right, and the Commander of U.S. Space Command is
    right, it is not good enough for what we need. And so, a couple
    of things we are doing in that regard.
        First is an increased number of sensors that we are putting
    in space to get a whole lot more data on what is happening. One
    example is the deep space advanced radar concept that operates
    in the 3 gigahertz band.
        Senator Rounds. Specifically, the area that we are
    concerned with.
        General Thompson. Correct. The second is using others'
    data, partners' and allies' commercial data. Then the third is
    really applying AI [artificial intelligence] and machine
    learning to help sense and make sense of all that data so that
    we do exactly what you are describing.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Secretary Calvelli, I really
    appreciate our conversations earlier today. I would like to
    just walk this through a little bit.
        As I told General Saltzman this morning, I have gone on
    record many times regarding my concern about the DOD's approach
    to providing space based, ground and moving target indication
    capabilities to tactical DOD users, following the divestment of
    the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System]
    platform.
        We supported the divestment of that under the assumption
    that we would have this space capability available. I am even
    more concerned now as it is my understanding that funding for
    this capability was moved to the military intelligence program
    and out of Space Force funding lines.
        This is a program that was developed for a tactical title
    10 mission executed by the Space Force in support of the Joint
    Force to provide target tracking in custody of immediate
    effects. This means life and death for folks on the front line.
        Now, we do not have to get into the fine details here, but
    can you share with me how you are assuring that the JROC [Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council] validated requirements are
    captured in the acquisitions process of a platform whose
    acquisition is executed by the intelligence community as
    opposed to the title 10 DOD community? Will the DOD maintain
    milestone authority?
        Mr. Calvelli. Yes, sir. On the good news side, the Space
    Force, we are writing what is known as this capability
    description documents. We are also writing the concept of
    employment. And we will own those, and those match up with the
    JROC requirements, and those will be allocated to the IC to
    execute.
        So that is a good thing. The DOD will remain milestone in
    authority. I believe it is at the Undersecretary to build a
    plans level for now. The good news about this approach is this
    really fits my priority of speed, speed, and speed.
        The IC had an existing design that we could scale up and we
    can get there years earlier with, and that was really a
    deciding factor for partnering with them. And also, the IC has
    other assets in their constellation that we need to augment and
    integrate in with at GMTI to make it even more useful for the
    troops.
        From a speed perspective, it is a win for the Department.
    We are going to control the requirements. We will control
    milestone decision authority. It should be a really great
    partnership that is going to enable us to get capability to the
    warfighter much faster than we had originally planned.
        Senator Rounds. In plain English, priority will be for the
    tactical needs when lives are at stake.
        Mr. Calvelli. Correct.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Rounds, you can continue if you wish.
    Senator Gillibrand is on the way. I just received a note. If
    you have further questions.
        Senator Rounds. Well, I would just add one--here is Senator
    Gillibrand right now, so I will defer to Senator Gillibrand as
    she is ready to go.
        Senator Gillibrand. Yes.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Rounds. If----
        Senator Gillibrand. Questions--okay. At the start of
    Russian's renewed invasion of Ukraine last year, Russian forces
    targeted a satellite operation with a cyber-attack to degrade
    communications during the initial invasion.
        Since then, Russia has targeted Starlink systems relied on
    by Ukraine. Increasingly, commercial providers play critical
    roles in our space program, and the Space Force is exploring
    the idea of a commercial augmentation space reserve. From a
    policy perspective at DOD, how should we approach hostile acts
    against U.S. commercial space assets?
        Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator. First of all, we are looking
    throughout the Department at how to engage and maintain
    relationships with these commercial partners that we have, and
    we are trying to develop more of those.
        One of the questions we have to be faced with is, how can
    we guarantee access to their products in a time of crisis or
    conflict? We are looking at a number of ways we could do that
    and how we might do that. A lot of these pieces are being
    solved maybe contract by contract.
        We say one basic thing is being able to share threat
    information with commercial partners. We have some mechanisms
    for that, both through the NSA [National Security Agency] and
    through other places to allow us to share the classified level
    threat activities so they are aware, and our goal is to make
    sure that that is actionable.
        In other words, it is no good to say Russia is interested
    in coming after Starlink. That doesn't tell Starlink anything
    useful, and they already know that. If we have specific
    information that they can take action on.
        As we look at this across the Department, there are efforts
    underway through the Air Force, through the Space Force--I am
    sorry, through the Department of the Air Force, through the
    Space Force in policy, at NRO, and I have already offered to
    some senators, but I am hoping to come back in late summer with
    an explanation of kind of where we are in all of those lines of
    effort. It is a new, but we are seized with this in the
    building.
        Senator Gillibrand. The example I used was an international
    example. But if it happened to a U.S. domestic provider for
    supplies for troops abroad, let's say in Guam or in Hawaii, do
    you have the ability to be the point person for those
    particular contracts with the private sector?
        Dr. Plumb. I do not have any contract authority. Certainly,
    Secretary Calvelli has some, but I have no contract authority.
        Senator Gillibrand. I think it is--we just had a hearing on
    this topic about the first 3 months of a cyber-conflict with
    China and how they would attack critical infrastructure around
    the country, but also supply chains and critical supply chains
    for the military.
        One thought that I have is that you should have MOUs
    [Memorandums of Understanding] in place in advance, that you
    can--you have agreements that they will not only share cyber
    intel, but they will work with you in a cyber-defense capacity.
        Something like that with Starlink in advance of the Russian
    conflict would have meant that you could immediately go in,
    tell them what is happening, give them guidance, and make sure
    they can continue to do the work that is necessary for the
    defeat of Russia. Is that something that the DOD should look
    at?
        Dr. Plumb. Madam Senator, I would say we already are, and a
    lot of it driven by--certainly, we have thought about it for
    years, but Ukraine has definitely amped up the understanding
    that on both sides as to what that would really look like and
    the considerations.
        I would tell you, the General Counsel of the Department of
    the Air Force is helping us with the ideas of contractual, but
    other policy implications that they are also working with us to
    sort out.
        Senator Gillibrand. I find in these conversations that the
    DOD is more comfortable if these things are happening abroad.
    But that same comfort level needs to be if it is happening
    domestically, because if it is your supply chain as
    warfighters, it is going to be a huge problem.
        Being able to be very facile with domestic targets that are
    being attacked by China, Russia, or Iran, to--that you need to
    do--to conduct defense or warfighting, you need to have the
    same ability to be able to reach out to those private sector
    participants, to say, we need your commitment and we need your
    first in line commitment in a time of war or at a time of
    adversarial attacks from a nation State.
        Do you agree with that?
        General Thompson. Ma'am, speaking from a standpoint of
    commercial space companies, absolutely, and that is the
    conversation we are having with them. I can't speak to the
    larger supply chain and other elements of----
        Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Plumb.
        Dr. Plumb. In one of my hats, ma'am, I also do
    cybersecurity and these pieces are also--we are working on this
    very same problem set with the defense industrial base and
    providers through cyber. There is a good relationship being
    built there because you are correct, we need to be able to move
    fast and it is geography independent.
        Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Calvelli.
        Mr. Calvelli. I agree with you, ma'am. The more we can
    share across the board in terms of these kind of things across
    the private sector and with the Government, the faster we can
    respond.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. I think Senator Gillibrand has a good point
    that these arrangements should be made in advance, not on the
    fly in the middle of conflict. MOUs, as she suggests--I commend
    that suggestion. This completes our hearing. We all have--how
    long until questions?
        Senator Fischer. Two weeks.
        Voice. A week?
        Voice. Close of business, tomorrow?
        Senator King. Close of business, Thursday afternoon for
    additional questions, additional statements from the witnesses.
    Thank you very much, gentlemen, for joining us today, and for
    the work that you are doing on behalf of our country. The
    hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
                             emerging technologies
        1. Senator Rosen. Secretary Calvelli, utilizing emerging
    technologies like machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) to
    maintain and build our space capabilities is a critical component in
    combating our adversaries' counter-space capabilities. What are the
    innovative ways the Department of Defense (DOD) is leveraging data and
    AI to boost U.S. space capabilities, and have such developments kept up
    with those of our near-peer adversaries like Russia and China?
        Mr. Calvelli. The Department recognizes the rapidly increasing
    impact of data and AI in the space domain, and the ability to enhance
    resiliency, bolster counter-space capabilities, and improve space
    domain awareness. The USSF space architecture offers on-ramps for
    emerging technologies and incorporates innovative machine learning
    techniques for dynamic sensor management, precision orbital maneuvers,
    and data exploitation. For example, the USSF has an autonomous space
    domain awareness sensor management prototype to autonomously task,
    collect, and exploit data from a worldwide network of optical sensors.
    The prototype uses AI for autonomous operations, and it uses machine
    learning and deep learning for data exploitation. The prototype is not
    yet operational, but the USSF is investing in demonstrating this
    prototype at the end of 2023, with plans to operationalize it after
    successful demonstration. By actively pursuing these capabilities, the
    Department will maintain a technological advantage in the contested
    space domain.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                            offensive space weapons
        2. Senator Cotton. Secretary Plumb and General Thompson, both China
    and Russia have developed several types of offensive space weapons
    capable of damaging or destroying U.S. satellites in space. Can you
    discuss the role that U.S. offensive space weapons would play in
    securing U.S. interests in space?
        Secretary Plumb. Space is essential to the U.S. way of war. My job,
    along with my colleagues in the Department, is to ensure that we are
    able to support the Joint Force and support the four Defense priorities
    of the National Defense Strategy in, from, and through space throughout
    competition, crisis, and conflict. We will defend our national security
    interests from the growing scope and scale of space and counterspace
    threats, as directed in the 2021 U.S. Space Priorities Framework, by
    leveraging a breadth of options across all operational domains.
        General Thompson. The increasingly contested nature of the Space
    Domain means that potential adversaries are fielding space systems that
    threaten our military forces and will seek to deny the use of our space
    systems in conflict. The Space Force is fielding combat credible forces
    that are prepared to protect U.S. interests, defend our own assets,
    deny adversaries use of Space, and ensure national decisionmakers have
    a full spectrum of options to deter aggression and respond to attack.
                        missile warning/missile tracking
        3. Senator Cotton. Secretary Calvelli, the Space Force intends to
    launch satellites that are part of its missile warning and missile
    tracking system through fiscal year 2027, but the Chinese and Russian
    hypersonic missile threats are already here today. Are there satellites
    up and running already that have any capability yet to detect and track
    hypersonic missiles?
        Mr. Calvelli. The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) constellation
    currently on-orbit provides high fidelity missile warning capabilities,
    but it does not have the capability to track against hypersonic
    threats. SBIRS provides early detection of ballistic missile launches,
    tracks their trajectory, and offers real-time data for threat
    assessment and response planning. SBIRS plays a vital role in cueing
    missile defense systems, which direct interceptors to engage and
    destroy incoming threats. The Space Force is working to launch and
    field proliferated constellations with the sensitivity, accuracy, and
    latency to track hypersonic missiles and other advanced missile targets
    from low and medium earth orbit (LEO and MEO) by 2026. This new
    architecture will be more resilient and provide detection and tracking
    of not only traditional missile threats, but also advanced maneuvering
    threats like hypersonic glide vehicles. In April 2023, we launched two
    LEO Tracking Layer satellites that will demonstrate tracking of
    advanced missile threats. Later this fall, we will launch six more LEO
    Tracking Layer satellites and the Missile Defense Agency will launch
    the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) prototypes
    to demonstrate Fire Control sensor capabilities to enhance missile
    targeting capabilities. The Space Force will leverage these
    demonstrations to reduce risk for operational implementation in
    subsequent iterations for detection, tracking, and closing the kill
    chain against advanced missile threats.
                  fractional orbital bombardment system (fobs)
        4. Senator Cotton. General Thompson, as you know, in 2021 China
    tested a fractional orbital bombardment system that orbited the globe
    before releasing a hypersonic glide vehicle toward its target. This
    type of weapon is greatly concerning for many reasons, but primarily
    because it would be difficult for us to detect and then track once it
    goes into orbit. Can you describe the Space Force's ongoing efforts to
    improve our ability to surveil objects in orbit, like this Chinese
    orbital missile?
        General Thompson. The Space Force is pivoting to a resilient,
    proliferated missile warning/missile tracking (MW/MT) architecture. The
    resilient MW/MT systems will utilize satellites in both low earth orbit
    and medium earth orbit, which will be better able to track fractional
    orbital bombardment systems and hypersonic glide vehicles. This flight
    data is also shared with Missile Defense Agency systems for targeting
    purposes. The Next Gen Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) program has
    a proven, heritage from the SBIRS program and will provide a legacy
    ballistic missile warning capability that will minimize risk during the
    transition to the resilient MW/MT architecture.

       DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
             FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                              TUESDAY, MAY 9, 2023

                          United States Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MISSILE DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:47 p.m., in
    room 222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus S. King
    Jr. (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Subcommittee Members present: Senators King, Gillibrand,
    Rosen, Kelly, Fischer, Cramer, and Tuberville.

             OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING JR.

        Senator King. Before we begin today's hearing, I want to
    acknowledge that Lieutenant General Karbler, and General
    VanHerck, and Admiral Hill, this may be your last hearing
    before this Subcommittee, before you enter retirement. So I
    want to thank you especially for your work. We are hoping to be
    able to replace you, but we will see.
        Thank you very much for the work and support that you have
    provided to the men and women and to the entire country, but
    particularly the men and women under your commands. I want to
    thank the witnesses again for appearing before us and for your
    service.
        The purpose of our hearing is to examine the President's
    Budget submission for the missile agency and missile defense
    policies in preparation for the Fiscal Year 2024 National
    Defense Authorization Act, which we plan to go to work on in
    June. Last year, the Department of Defense submitted to the
    Congress a Missile Defense Review.
        It continues the policy of defense of the Homeland, as well
    as deterring attacks against the United States, while assuring
    our allies through a regional missile defense strategy. I note
    that it also continues the policy that we rely on our nuclear
    deterrent against large and sophisticated missile attacks
    against our Homeland from near-peer adversaries such as Russia
    and China.
        Missile defense has two new aspects that we hope to examine
    in today's hearing. First and foremost is the defense against
    hypersonic missiles. They do not follow a ballistic trajectory.
    Second is the requirement to protect Guam against any threats
    that China might impose.
        This is a daunting task that integrates missile defense
    systems from the Army, Navy, and Missile Defense Agency, and
    what I hope we will learn more about in today's hearing. The
    Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
    tasks the Secretary of Defense with designating a senior
    official, a senior individual for this effort by March 23,
    2024.
        To date, this Committee has not heard anything about this.
    I will want to know its status. The President's Fiscal Year
    2024 Budget submission for Missile Defense Agency is $10.9
    billion. This is an increase from the fiscal year 2023 enacted
    level of $10.5 billion.
        I would like to know how the Fiscal Year 2024 Budget
    Request continues your effort for Homeland and regional missile
    defense, as well as defense against new threats such as
    hypersonic weapons.
        Again, let me thank today's witnesses for agreeing to
    appear and for their extraordinary service to the country.
    After opening statements, we will have rounds of 5-minute
    questions to the witnesses. Senator Fischer.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEBRA FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, would
    like to thank our military members today, General VanHerck,
    General Karbler, and Admiral Hill for your many years of
    service to this country. What you do every single day may not
    be known by every American, but you keep every American safe.
    Thank you.
        We appreciate you appearing before us today and we look
    forward to hearing from each of you. As we continue to develop
    and field integrated air and missile defense capabilities, it
    is important to recognize that the threat landscape has evolved
    significantly since the inception of our missile defense
    programs.
        This evolution of adversary missile and offensive strike
    technology, including hypersonic weapons and unmanned aerial
    systems, increasingly holds at risk+, not only our military
    installations, but also civilian populations and critical
    infrastructure.
        As you know, for many years now, this Subcommittee has
    strongly advocated for getting more capability on Guam and
    getting it there as fast as we can. I look forward to hearing
    more about the Department's plan for the defense of Guam and
    how the investments proposed by this budget would strengthen
    the missile defense of the island.
        The incursion of the Chinese spy balloon earlier this year
    also highlights the need for increased domain awareness. We
    cannot intercept what we cannot see and track. It is critical
    that we continue to invest in terrestrial over-the-horizon
    radars (OTHR) and space-based missile warning and missile
    tracking systems, including the hypersonic ballistic tracking
    space sensor or HBTSS.
        I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about
    these issues and about how the fiscal year 2024 would impact
    their mission. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Secretary Plumb, are you leading off?

     STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
           OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Dr. Plumb. Yes, sir. So, thank you. Chairman King, Ranking
    Member Fischer, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank
    you for this opportunity to testify today on the fiscal year
    2024 missile defense budget, and I am honored to appear
    alongside my colleagues here, General VanHerck and Vice-Admiral
    Hill and Lieutenant General Karbler. If it is all of your last
    hearing, then I just--I have really appreciated working with
    all of you. Look how sad they are, sir.
        Today, our competitors are using advanced offensive missile
    capabilities as a principal means to execute their war fighting
    strategies. We know China is our Department's pacing challenge.
    China has accelerated its efforts to develop, test, and field
    thousands of missile systems across all classes and ranges.
    Russia remains our acute threat.
        Russia has conducted thousands of missiles and drone
    strikes to terrorize the civilian population of Ukraine and
    degrade Ukraine's warfighting capability. Iran has launched
    missile attacks into neighboring states and provided rockets
    and drones to non-State actors who in turn use them to target
    United States Forces and partners.
        Of course, they have also provided unmanned aircraft
    systems (UAS) to Russia, which is using them in the battle in
    Ukraine, and North Korea continues to conduct ICBM
    [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and other missile tests
    to threaten and coerce its neighbors.
        Given these threats, missile defense has never been more
    important. The 2022 Missile Defense Review was released in
    unclassified form last fall, and this review updated U.S.
    policy to reflect the current security environment, with three
    kinds of large updates.
        One, emphasizing that we will stay ahead of the North
    Korean missile threat to the Homeland through a comprehensive
    missile defeat approach, which will be complemented by the
    credible threat of direct cost imposition.
        Second, it makes crystal clear that an attack on Guam or
    any other United States territory by any adversary will be
    considered a direct attack on the United States and it will be
    met with an appropriate response. We are committed to the
    missile defense of Guam to simultaneously protect United States
    civilians, United States Forces, and our ability to project
    power in the region.
        Third, to deter attempts by adversaries to stay under the
    nuclear threshold and achieve strategic results with
    conventional capabilities, the U.S. is pursuing active and
    passive measures to decrease the risk of adversary cruise
    missile strikes against critical assets in the Homeland.
        The President's Budget invests $29.8 billion in missile
    defeat and defense capabilities. This is an increase of nearly
    $3 billion over last year--well, this year, actually, fiscal
    year 2023. Specific to missile defense, this includes $3.3
    billion for the ground-based midcourse defense, including $2.2
    billion for the next generation interceptor, $1.5 billion for
    the defense of Guam. Nearly $5 billion for missile warning,
    missile track, both the new P-LEO [proliferated low Earth
    orbit] Constellation and the next generation overhead
    persistent infrared architecture, $2.2 billion for Standard
    Missile 3 (SM3), terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD),
    and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptors. Nearly
    $1.5 billion to counter lower tier missile threats, and
    hundreds of millions of dollars for over-the-horizon radars,
    hypersonic defense, and directed energy development. Finally,
    the fiscal year 2024 budget continues to prioritize U.S.
    support to allies and partners.
        The U.S. does not face missile threats on our own. Missile
    defense cooperation strengthens our common protection, enhances
    deterrence, and provides assurance that bolsters the cohesion
    of our alliances.
        The President's Budget makes significant investments in
    missile defense. Those missile defenses are foundational to
    integrated deterrence. I would just like to thank the Committee
    for your tireless support of the Department and U.S. national
    security, and for your support of the President's Budget, and I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. John Plumb follows:]

                      Prepared Statement by Dr. John Plumb
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished members of
    the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Fiscal
    Year 2024 budget request for missile defeat and defense programs on
    behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I am honored to join
    General Glen VanHerck, Commander of the North American Aerospace
    Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command; Vice
    Admiral Jon Hill, Director of the Missile Defense Agency; and
    Lieutenant General Daniel Karbler, Commanding General of the Army's
    Space and Missile Defense Command.
        Integrated air and missile defense has never been more relevant to
    U.S. defense strategy, plans, and posture. The increasing development
    and use of advanced missiles--including ballistic, cruise, and
    hypersonic--as well as Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) has become a
    defining feature of modern warfare.
        Today, I will review how air and missile threats have evolved over
    the last year, provide a policy update on the Department's response,
    and explain how the Department's fiscal year 2024 budget request of
    $29.8 billion for missile defeat and missile defense programs supports
    this response.
                        advanced air and missile threats
        As Secretary Austin has said since his first days in office, the
    People's Republic of China (PRC) is the Department's pacing challenge,
    while Russia remains an acute threat. Our competitors are rapidly
    developing, fielding, and integrating advanced offensive air and
    missile capabilities into their strategies to favorably shape the
    course of a potential crisis or conflict.
    People's Republic of China
        The PRC has accelerated its efforts to develop, test, and field
    advanced missile systems of all classes and ranges, including
    ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic glide vehicles. The PRC is also
    rapidly expanding its ability to deliver nuclear payloads through the
    development of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the
    construction of new ICBM missile fields. In August 2022, the PRC
    launched ballistic missiles over and around Taiwan in an unsuccessful
    attempt to intimidate and demonstrate it capability to forcefully unify
    with Taiwan.
    Russia
        In its illegal war of aggression in Ukraine, Russia has employed
    thousands of air and missile platforms of all types ranging from
    hypersonic missiles to short range UAS. Russia's use of missiles, often
    against non-military targets, is designed to terrorize the Ukrainian
    people while degrading Ukraine's warfighting capability. Russia is
    trying also to diminish Ukraine's will to fight through the destruction
    of infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, and the energy grid.
    Russia has even converted thousands of surface-to-air missiles to
    surface-to-surface mode and launched hundreds of Iranian UAS systems in
    attacks against Ukrainian critical infrastructure targets. Russia also
    continues to invest in long-range cruise missiles, ballistic missiles,
    and hypersonic glide vehicles--capabilities that place the United
    States Homeland at risk.
    Iran
        Over the last several years, Iran has launched missile attacks into
    neighboring states while providing ballistic missiles and UAS to non-
    State actors, who in turn used them to target United States Forces and
    partners in the Middle East. Iran has become the world's leading
    proliferator of missiles and UAS as demonstrated through its UAS
    transfers to Russia as well as its provision of these systems to armed
    groups throughout the Middle East. Iran continues to invest in space-
    launch vehicles that could shorten the pathway to a future long-range
    missile capability.
    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK):
        The DPRK continues to test and demonstrate a growing number of
    developmental ballistic and cruise missiles, including test launches of
    missiles that have directly over-flown and landed near the sovereign
    territory of regional neighbors. This year alone, DPRK has showcased a
    vast array of missile systems, including 11 Hwasong-17 ICBM missiles
    and associated launchers, in an extensive military parade celebrating
    the 75th anniversary of the DPRK army; conducted two ICBM tests and
    more than a dozen shorter range missiles tests; and unveiled a new,
    purported nuclear warhead dubbed the Hwasan-31.
    Non-State Actors
        Non-State actors pose an increasing danger to United States
    regional interests, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. This is
    evidenced by the attack against United States Forces in Syria in late
    March. These armed groups--operating autonomously or as proxy forces--
    are employing more complex UAS, rocket, and missile capabilities and
    continue to benefit from the proliferation of dual-use commercial air,
    UAS, and missile systems and technology.
                      united states missile defense policy
        As outlined in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the
    Department is focused on a strategy of integrated deterrence, which
    incorporates our efforts to prevent and, if necessary, defeat air and
    missile threats to the United States Homeland, our allies and partners,
    and regionally deployed forces. Integrated deterrence weaves together
    all instruments of national power--with the diplomacy in the
    forefront--to work seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the
    spectrum of conflict, and our network of alliance and partners.
        Nested within the NDS, the 2022 Missile Defense Review (MDR)
    describes how missile defense contributes to integrated deterrence as a
    deterrence-by-denial component against competitors that seek to use
    missiles as a means to project conventional and nuclear military power.
    Missile defense undermines adversary confidence in offensive missile
    use by introducing doubt and uncertainty into attack planning; by
    raising the threshold for conflict by reducing the incentive to conduct
    small-scale coercive attacks; by reinforcing U.S. diplomatic and
    security posture; and by reassuring allies and partners that the United
    States will not be deterred from fulfilling its global security
    commitments. Missile defenses expand the decision space for our
    military and civilian leaders and preserve our forces' freedom to
    maneuver.
        The Department's top priority is to defend the U.S. Homeland,
    including U.S. territories. As the scale and complexity of North Korean
    missile threats to the Homeland increase, we are staying ahead of the
    threat through improvements to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
    system as part of a comprehensive missile defeat approach, complemented
    by the credible threat of direct cost imposition through nuclear and
    non-nuclear means. A key component of the GMD system will be the Next
    Generation Interceptor (NGI), which is scheduled for delivery beginning
    in 2028. The NGI will greatly enhance our ability to defend the country
    against North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile threats.
        The 2022 MDR states clearly that Guam, along with all United States
    territories, is part of the United States Homeland and will be
    protected against any and all provocations and attacks. The Integrated
    Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture for the defense of Guam,
    for example, will simultaneously protect United States Forces and our
    ability to project power in the region. Similarly, we are investing in
    efforts to strengthen our protection of Hawaii, Alaska, and the
    continental United States.
        Broadly speaking, different adversary capabilities--from ballistic
    to cruise to hypersonic threats--present unique missile defense
    challenges depending on the technology and the theater in which they
    are employed. We are taking steps to ensure we can defeat these threats
    now and into the future.
        The conflict in Ukraine illustrates the importance of air and
    missile defense. Russia's ruthless barrage of attacks in Ukraine have
    been a wake-up call to the power and destructiveness of missiles and
    the extent to which they have become a defining feature of modern
    warfare, especially in the absence of air superiority. Ukrainian
    sovereignty endures today in large part because Ukrainian forces have
    made air defense a top priority. The United States has provided Ukraine
    with over 1,600 stinger missiles, a Patriot battery, two National
    Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile (NASAM) systems, and 12 Avenger air
    defense systems. In addition, we are providing equipment to integrate
    Western air defense launchers, missiles, and radars with Ukraine's
    current inventory of air defense systems. Our allies and partners have
    also stepped forward to provide vital advanced air and missile defense
    systems to Ukraine.
                                  investments
        The $29.8 billion budget request for missile defeat and defense
    provides $10.9 billion of Missile Defense Agency (MDA) programs, as
    well as another $18.9 billion for investments across all Services that
    contribute to our total missile defeat and missile defense capability.
    These investments are tied to the strategic objectives of the national
    defense strategy.
    Homeland Missile Defense
        As stated previously, the Department's top priority is to defend
    the Homeland and deter attacks against the United States. To achieve
    this strategic objective, the President's budget requests $3.3 billion
    to improve the reliability, capability, and cyber resiliency of GMD.
    This request includes $2.2 billion for the continued development of the
    NGI, which will improve the reliability and performance of our system
    against advancing ICBM threats from North Korea and against potential
    future ICBM threats from Iran.
        As an element of Homeland defense and regional defense, the
    Department is committed to strengthening the defense of Guam through a
    layered IAMD architecture. As such, the Department is requesting $1.5
    billion in Fiscal Year 202024 to strengthen missile defense of the
    island, which is a critical operational hub in the Indo-Pacific region.
    The Department is also in the process of designating, as required by
    statute, a single senior official to manage the missile defense effort
    on Guam.
        The Department is requesting $64 million to improve the defense of
    Hawaii through investments in upgrades to its air surveillance radar
    capabilities, which will enhance air domain awareness and support
    defense against cruise missiles and a variety of other emerging air and
    missile threats. Hawaii is already defended from North Korean long-
    range attacks by the GMD system, comparable to the other 49 states and
    the District of Columbia.
        The Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the Department of the
    Air Force as the acquisition authority for air and cruise missile
    defense of the Homeland in July 2022. To that end, the Department is
    requesting $428.7 million in Fiscal Year 202024 for the continued
    fielding of four new over-the-horizon radars. These radars will provide
    long-range sensor coverage of likely air and cruise missile threats to
    North America, as well as capability against hypersonic threats, and
    maritime surface vessels.
        We are also investing in the modernization of space sensor
    capabilities that are crucial to missile warning, missile tracking, and
    missile defense and that support the protection of our Homeland and the
    missions of our forces globally. This includes $4.8 billion in Fiscal
    Year 202024 to develop new proliferated resilient missile warning/
    missile tracking architectures and the Next-Gen Overhead Persistent
    Infrared (OPIR) space and ground architecture. We are optimizing
    existing missile defense radars and other sensors in support of our
    broader all-domain awareness objectives.
    Regional Missile Defense
        The Department is strengthening our regional missile defenses to
    counter all missile threats--including hypersonic threats--regardless
    of origin. The United States must continue to develop defenses against
    regional missile threats, to include building a persistent and
    resilient sensor network to characterize, track, and improve
    attribution while also developing and delivering capabilities to enable
    engagement of all missile threat types, including hypersonic missiles.
    The President's budget request makes substantial investments in
    regional ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile defense capabilities
    to accomplish these objectives, including:

          $259 million for regional hypersonic and ballistic
    missile defense space sensors and development of the Glide Phase
    Interceptor (GPI);
          $1.024 billion for Aegis Standard Missile-3 and Terminal
    High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors; and
          $1.2 billion for additional PAC-3 interceptors.

        U.S. deployed forces, allies, and partners also face a
    proliferation of lower-tier threats, such as rockets and armed UAS. Our
    adversaries will continue to seek ways to use these relatively
    inexpensive, flexible, and expendable systems to achieve their
    purposes. The Department is working to field technical and integrated
    counter-UAS solutions to ensure we can collectively meet the range of
    threats and appropriately hedge against future advancements. We are
    requesting nearly $1.5 billion in Fiscal Year 202024 to support this
    effort.
        Today directed energy plays an increasingly important role in
    countering UAS. In the future, directed energy could complement our
    current programs to defeat more complex air and missile attacks. The
    Department is requesting $308 million this year to continue work in
    this area.
        strengthening international cooperation with allies and partners
        Air and missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners
    continues to expand. Not only do allied and partner missile defense
    capabilities offer important value during
        peacetime, but they also allow our alliances and coalitions to plan
    collectively and to counter missile threats together in crisis and
    conflict and in ways that reduce the potential for escalation. The
    United States does not face international threats on its own; we need a
    unified, collective presence of integrated allied and partner missile
    defense capabilities to deter and defeat growing missile threats.
        The United States also continues to work with our allies and
    partners to improve our ability to share sensing and tracking data in
    real time and support each other in air and missile defense engagements
    to maximize our collective capabilities. Multilateral air and missile
    defense exercises, such as Formidable Shield and Pacific Dragon, and
    bilateral test activities such as Japanese Aegis destroyers launching
    SM-3 Block IIAs to intercept ballistic missiles at United States test
    ranges, give us opportunities to work together to accomplish these
    goals.
        In Europe, initial acceptance testing is ongoing at the Aegis
    Ashore site in Poland, which will become operational in 2024 after
    completion of all testing and receiving additional software upgrades.
    The Aegis Ashore site in Poland will complete the European Phased
    Adaptive Approach--the United States voluntary contribution to NATO
    Ballistic Missile Defense--as it joins the Aegis Ashore site in
    Romania, the BMD capable ships homeported in Spain, and the AN/TPY-2
    radar in Turkey. We also recently deployed two Patriot batteries to
    Poland and one Patriot battery to Slovakia in support of NATO's
    defense. Overall, our Patriot and THAAD forces are deployed worldwide,
    including throughout the Middle East and Indo-Pacific regions, where
    they defend United States forward-deployed forces and other national
    security interests in concert with our allies and partners.
        The United States is increasing our ally and partner capabilities
    through Foreign Military Sales of equipment as well as through
    training, co-development, and co-production programs.
        We are also exploring joint opportunities to invest in the
    cooperative development of complementary IAMD technologies and
    capabilities such as hypersonic defenses. In particular, the Department
    welcomes Japan's interest in pursuing cooperation on the GPI program.
        We engage regularly throughout the year with key allies and
    partners through a series of bilateral and multilateral dialogs to
    enhance our collective regional missile defense efforts in Europe, the
    Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region. Our missile defense
    cooperation strengthens our common protection, enhances deterrence, and
    provides assurance that bolsters the cohesion of our alliances.
                                   conclusion
        The commitment of adversaries to the use of offensive missile
    systems as a central component of their military strategies and tactics
    has never been more evident. As a result, missile defeat and integrated
    air and missile defenses can no longer be viewed as peripheral
    capabilities. These capabilities must be foundational elements of
    integrated deterrence and modern defense in U.S. national security. The
    United States remains committed to improving our Homeland and regional
    missile defeat and defense capabilities as we work to deter conflict,
    and to prevail in battle if deterrence fails. The Department's Fiscal
    Year 202024 budget request supports this approach.
        I look forward to working with the Congress to advance this shared
    goal. Thank you.

        Senator King. Admiral Hill.

     STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JON A. HILL, USN, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
                             DEFENSE AGENCY

        Vice Admiral Hill. Chairman King, Ranking Member of
    Fischer, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you
    for the opportunity to discuss missile defense today. I would
    like to take a quick moment to thank the women and men of the
    Missile Defense Agency (MDA) for the hard work they do every
    day, delivering capabilities to the services to meet joint
    combatant command requirements to counter ballistic
    maneuvering, and hypersonic, and missile threats.
        If I were to summarize missile threat, it is three things.
    It is large numbers, it is high speed, and heavy maneuver.
    Those are the challenges right now and they are the challenges
    for the future. MDA is requesting, as mentioned, $2.9 billion
    to continue our mission of meeting these threats, and I am
    going to talk to you about three priorities. The first is
    Homeland ballistic missile defense.
        Then I will talk about defense of Guam and hypersonic
    defense. The first priority of homeland ballistic missile
    defense, which includes Alaska and Hawaii, the ground-based
    midcourse defense system (GMD) has protected the Homeland from
    rogue nation ballistic missile attacks since 2004.
        Our current focus is on new capabilities to counter the
    limited but advancing North Korean long range ballistic missile
    threat. The GMB system is undergoing a service life extension
    program to improve reliability and extend the GBI fleet to
    ground-based interceptors beyond 2030. These upgrades mitigate
    the risk until the Nation fields the next generation
    interceptor (NGI), which is on track for first emplacement no
    later than the end of 2028.
        NGI development is executing to deliver advanced
    interceptors featuring multiple kill vehicle technology, which
    we will add to the current fleet of interceptors at Fort
    Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Space Force Base in California.
    Finally, we are on track for operational acceptance of the long
    range discrimination radar in Clear, Alaska next year. This
    advanced radar will ensure a stronger homeland defense posture
    against long range missiles.
        To achieve priority two, the defense of Guam, also part of
    the Homeland, the Department is developing an integrated air
    and missile defense system to defend against diverse missile
    threats. Working with the services and other stakeholders, we
    are driving to meet INDOPACOM's [United States Indo-Pacific
    Command] requirement for a persistent 360-degree layered
    defense capability on the island against simultaneous rates of
    cruise, ballistic, maneuvering, and hypersonic missile threats.
    We are delivering operational capability in phases to meet
    these clear warfighting needs.
        For the third priority, hypersonic defense, we have
    integrated tracking capabilities into existing space, ground,
    and sea-based radars. That capability is here today. Today's
    sensor architecture and command and control can track
    hypersonic threats to support warning and domain awareness.
        Aegis ships equipped with a sea-based terminal capability
    can engage some hypersonic threats in the terminal phase today.
    Due to the global maneuver capabilities of hypersonic missiles,
    a space-based tracking and targeting capability is a clear
    need. In collaboration with the Space Force, the Missile
    Defense Agency is developing the hypersonic ballistic tracking
    space sensor.
        Later this year, HBTSS will start on orbit operations to
    demonstrate unique tracking and targeting to support hypersonic
    engagements. HBTSS will participate in flight tests and real-
    world threat collections throughout fiscal year 2024. The
    capability will be proliferated and operated by the Space
    Force.
        We continue to work closely with the Navy to upgrade sea-
    based terminal (SBT) defenses to counter more advanced
    maneuvering and hypersonic threats. Based on threat evolution,
    we will deliver the next SBT incremental upgrade in 2025. Aegis
    sea-based terminal is the only active defense available today
    to counter hypersonic missile threats.
        In order to expand the battle space against hypersonic
    threats, we have initiated the Aegis Glide Phase Interceptor
    Program (GPI). GPI leverages proven Aegis weapon system, engage
    on remote network sensors to provide a depth of fire needed to
    thin the raid for terminal defenses.
        One final regional defense note, we continue ship upgrades
    and SM3 Block 1B and 2A missile deliveries and have made
    significant progress with the Aegis ashore site in Poland,
    which is on track for operational acceptance at the end of this
    fiscal year.
        Also, we are working toward fielding THAAD and Patriot
    integration enhancements that were successfully delivered to
    the United States Forces of Korea to other THAAD batteries to
    expand engagement battle space against shorter range stress.
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you and I look forward to answering
    questions. It has been an honor serving as the Director of MDA.
        [The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill
    follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for taking my testimony today. The Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA) budget request of $10.9 billion for Fiscal Year
    (FY) 2024 enables the continued execution of the MDA mission to design,
    develop and deploy a layered Missile Defense System to defend the
    United States and its deployed forces, allies, and international
    partners from increasingly diverse missile threats.
        Potential U.S. adversaries are developing more advanced ballistic,
    hypersonic, and cruise missile systems, making them more mobile,
    survivable, reliable, accurate, and capable of achieving longer ranges.
    Ballistic and hypersonic missiles capable of high velocity and heavy
    maneuver, and their use in large numbers and combination attacks, which
    may also involve cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems, could
    undermine the effectiveness of our missile defenses without continued
    development.
        We are in the process of updating the September 17, 2009 DOD
    Directive for Missile Defense Agency acquisition authorities.\1\ The
    update is needed to reflect changes incorporated in Directive-Type
    Memorandum 20-002 Missile Defense System Policies and Governance, the
    organization of the Department of Defense, and statutory law impacting
    MDA. The Department established MDA in 2002 as a capability-based
    develop and field a missile defense capability rapidly and
    incrementally improve that capability over time. The update will
    finalize the MDA Director's acquisition authorities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The review is led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    (OSD) with participation by the Office of the Director of
    Administration and Management (ODA&M) and in consultation with OSD
    Research and Engineering (R&E), Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S),
    Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), Office of
    General Counsel (OGC), Policy (P), the Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic
    Command (USSTRATCOM) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The
    directive update is expected to be signed by the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense by March 1, 2024 in compliance with 10 USC 205 120-day
    congressional notification and waiting period.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I continue to believe the Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP) is
    essential to the missile defense enterprise, and MDA is working with
    stakeholders to update the WIP to better support the Warfighter. MDA
    continues a very fruitful and important collaboration with the
    Combatant Commanders and Services to address the rapidly advancing and
    expanding threat with speed and agility. That collaboration includes
    the establishment of Service and MDA agreements, hybrid program
    offices, and regular Service and MDA Board of Directors meetings to
    address manning, training, and equipping requirements for fielded
    missile defense systems and sustainment support throughout the
    element's life-cycle.
        working with the services to meet combatant command requirements
        MDA is developing, delivering, sustaining, and improving
    affordable, proven, and leading-edge capabilities to counter advanced
    ballistic and hypersonic missiles.
        Space and Terrestrial Sensors
        Space-based sensors are critical to integrated sensor-to-shooter
    capabilities used to defeat ballistic and hypersonic missile threats.
    MDA will continue collaborating with the U.S. Space Force (USSF) to
    deliver integrated capabilities that meet Warfighter requirements for
    missile warning, tracking, and defense.\2\ USSF and MDA are enable the
    tracking, targeting, cueing, and intercept of ballistic and hypersonic
    missiles. In fourth quarter fiscal year 2023, the Hypersonic and
    Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) will launch and begin
    demonstration of unique tracking and targeting capabilities needed to
    defend against hypersonic glide vehicles. HBTSS will participate in
    flight tests and real-world target-of-opportunity collections
    throughout fiscal year 2024, and the proven capability will be
    proliferated and operated by the Space Force.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ In 2022, MDA collaborated with the USSF Space Systems Command
    and the Space Development Agency to form a Combined Program Office for
    missile warning, tracking and defense. MDA is also a member of the
    Program Executive Officer level Program Integration Council that
    facilitates cooperation and de-conflicts efforts enabling the National
    Security Space Enterprise force design to provide the Warfighter with
    integrated and synchronized space-based capabilities; and a member of
    the larger space acquisition community's Space Acquisition Council. MDA
    is also a full participant in the USSF Space Warfighter Analysis Center
    future Force Design studies and analysis to integrate missile defense
    space sensor capabilities into space enterprise architectures.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The current Space-based Kill Assessment (SKA) network of infrared
    sensors hosted on commercial satellites will continue demonstrating hit
    assessment capabilities for homeland defense. SKA sensors provide hit
    situational awareness to U.S. Northern Command and participate in
    flight tests and engineering activities to characterize sensor
    capabilities and provide valuable data to support future Post Intercept
    Assessment capabilities. Additionally, the Discriminating Space Sensor
    (DSS) continues to mature ballistic missile birth-to-death tracking and
    discrimination technology to provide a pivotal capability as part of
    MDA's space architecture.
        MDA also is developing, deploying, and sustaining a robust, cyber-
    secure and networked ground-and sea-based radar architecture. The Long
    Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) will complete acceptance testing and
    participate in an operational flight test in fiscal year 2023.
    Development of LRDR software will continue to enhance tracking and
    discrimination, hit assessment, space domain awareness (SDA), space-
    intelligence data collection, and modeling and simulation capabilities.
    Following operational fielding in fiscal year 2024. LRDR will support
    the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) capability against Pacific
    theater long-range missile threats.
        The Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) radar provides precision midcourse
    tracking and discrimination capabilities to support homeland defense
    operations, Missile Defense System testing, data collection, and SDA.
    SBX completed an in-port maintenance and capability upgrade period this
    past March, and it is again deployed at-sea. Fabrication of the SBX
    replacement radome continues on schedule for installation in fiscal
    year 2025.
        AN/TPY-2 radars deployed abroad support Terminal High Altitude Area
    Defense (THAAD) batteries for regional defense. Radar 13, planned for
    delivery in March 2025, will be part of THAAD Battery 8 and be a fully
    modernized configuration that includes significant obsolescence
    redesigns leveraged from our ongoing Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
    cases. AN/TPY-2 radars deployed abroad in forward-based mode support
    homeland defense to provide early warning, precision tracking,
    discrimination capabilities, and space domain awareness.
        MDA sustains and updates the USSF Upgraded Early Warning Radars
    (UEWRs) in Alaska, Massachusetts, United Kingdom, Greenland, and
    California, and the Cobra Dane radar in Alaska. UEWRs support homeland
    missile defense and improve midcourse Missile Defense System sensor
    coverage by providing critical early warning, tracking, object
    classification and cueing data. The UEWRs and Cobra Dane radar provide
    space object detection and tracking data to the Space Surveillance
    Network.
        MDA provides software upgrades to Aegis integrated missile defense
    destroyers equipped with the SPY-1 radar to support the USSF SDA
    mission. The Aegis SDA capability is fully compatible with deployed
    U.S. Navy operations and has appropriate 2022, we supported the Navy's
    first demonstration of SDA capability with the USS Nimitz (CVN 68)
    Carrier Strike Group during their Composite Training Unit Exercise. In
    fiscal year 2024, we will continue to develop, test, and deliver this
    upgrade and support the Navy in future SDA demonstrations.
    Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications
        C2BMC is the integrating element of the Missile Defense System,
    providing Combatant Commanders and decisionmakers with a global,
    persistent, and near-realtime missile defense common operating picture.
    C2BMC joins space-based infrared, land-, and sea-based sensor threat
    observations to provide acquisition, tracking, cueing, discrimination,
    and targeting data to engagement elements in support of U.S. and
    coalition-partner missile defense and SDA operations. C2BMC also
    connects with Service, NATO, and international systems.
        Funding in fiscal year 2024 sustains the C2BMC planner, situational
    awareness, battle management, training, and SDA capabilities within
    Combatant Command user nodes as well as the global missile defense
    network. Additionally, this funding continues integrating space
    surveillance sensors with C2BMC in order to enhance the missile
    warning, missile tracking, missile defense, and SDA missions and
    address trans-regional threats. We continue to develop new capabilities
    to improve overall C2BMC system resiliency, enhance system
    discrimination of threat objects, and refine space track data to
    improve Missile Defense System operational effectiveness. MDA recently
    fielded a key software upgrade to integrate LRDR and the Ballistic
    Missile Defense System Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) Architecture
    in order to bring a prototype System. This spiral upgrade significantly
    expands SDA capabilities for U.S. Space Command using LRDR and the
    Aegis SPY-1 radar and integrates the U.S. Army's Integrated Air and
    Missile Defense Battle Command System with the Missile Defense System.
    Homeland Defense
        The GMD system has protected the U.S. Homeland from rogue long-
    range ballistic missile attacks since 2004. Today, we are delivering
    new capabilities to address the limited but increasingly advanced North
    Korean long-range ballistic missile threat. Earlier in this fiscal
    year, we increased US Northern Command Ground Based Interceptor
    capacity in the most advanced configuration with Capability Enhanced-II
    Block 1 Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicles integrated on new Configuration 2
    boost vehicles. These interceptors will help mitigate the risk until
    the Next Generation Interceptors are fielded no later than the end of
    2028. The Ground Based Interceptors continue to undergo a Service Life
    Extension Program to improve reliability and availability, which we
    anticipate will extend portions of the existing fleet beyond 2030. In
    parallel, MDA continues to upgrade the ground system infrastructure,
    communications network, fire control system, Warfighter training
    systems, and missile fields to improve the reliability, capability,
    cybersecurity, and resiliency of the GMD weapon system.
        In fiscal year 2024, we will execute an intercept flight test
    demonstrating the capability to select a 2-or 3-stage burn of a Ground
    Based Interceptor booster, which enables an earlier release of the kill
    vehicle to expand significantly the engagement area and time to counter
    inbound threats. This flight test also will demonstrate the latest
    incremental representative long-range target equipped with
    countermeasures.
        We awarded two Next Generation Interceptor contracts in March 2021,
    and our competing Industry prime contractors are on track and rapidly
    advancing through the design development process with full technical
    rigor to deliver this new capability as soon as possible. Both designs
    feature multiple kill vehicle payloads to reduce the number of
    interceptors required to defeat a single ballistic missile threat to
    our Nation. Our fiscal year 2024 budget request transitions the
    programs from Technology Development to the Product Development Phase.
    Regional Defense
        Globally deployed ship-based and land-based Aegis BMD capabilities
    are critical to the Nation's defense of our deployed forces, allies,
    and partners against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missile
    threats. In fiscal year 2024, MDA is designing improvements to the
    Aegis BMD capability, to include procuring and delivering Standard
    Missile (SM)-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade (TU) and Block IIA missiles,
    improving Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) defense, advance ing weapon system
    and missile reliability, and enhancing Aegis BMD engagement capacity
    and lethality. We will continue to develop Aegis BMD weapon system
    software to enhance functionality and leverage more-capable radars and
    national technical means.
        MDA continues to support defense of NATO's European territory and
    forces against the ballistic missile threat from the southeast of the
    Alliance's border. Aegis Ashore in Romania is operational, and we are
    working to complete and prepare Aegis Ashore in Poland for Navy
    acceptance, followed by transfers of authority to U.S. European Command
    and NATO. We recently completed installation and testing of the combat
    system equipment at Naval Support Facility Redzikowo, Poland, in
    parallel with construction activity. Both Aegis Ashore sites are
    designed to launch the SM-3 Block IBTU and Block IIA missiles.
        In fiscal year 2022, MDA successfully executed PACIFIC DRAGON 22
    (PD-22). Event 1 marked the first use of a SM-3 Block IA engagement of
    a Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) in a fleet exercise. Event 2
    demonstrated J7.1 Sea-Based Terminal capability by conducting a
    simulated SM-6 engagement with the new Maya-class Japanese destroyer
    against a live target. We also executed an intercept flight test
    campaign (Japan Flight Test Aegis Weapon System-07, or JFTM-07) with
    Japan, demonstrating the newest engagement capability of the Japan (J7)
    Aegis BMD configuration with SM-3 Block IIA against a Medium Range
    Ballistic Missile (MRBM). JFTM-07 also demonstrated Aegis ship-to-ship
    engage-on-remote in a simulated engagement, an integrated missile
    defense capability using SM-2 surface-to-air defense missiles, and an
    engagement of an SRBM with a SM-3 Block IBTU.
        MDA plans to conduct a Tracking Exercise, Flight Test Other (FTX)-
    23, with two Aegis ships to perform target scene data collection of an
    MRBM with countermeasures. We will also demonstrate Aegis SBT with a
    salvo engagement in Flight Test Aegis Weapon System (FTM)-32, firing
    two (salvo) SM-6 Dual II software upgrade guided missiles against a
    MRBM. In FTX-40 we will fire a simulated SM-6 missile against a
    hypersonic glide vehicle.
        The THAAD Weapon System is a globally transportable, ground-based
    system that is highly effective against short-, medium-and
    intermediate-range missile threats inside and outside the atmosphere in
    the terminal phase of flight. MDA currently supports forward-deployment
    of two batteries stationed in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM)
    area of responsibility, cooperates with the United Arab Emirates in
    support of two operational FMS THAAD batteries, and supports the
    Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the production of seven additional FMS THAAD
    batteries scheduled to begin fielding in fiscal year 2025. In fiscal
    year 2024, we will continue THAAD interceptor procurement, production
    of battery hardware, obsolescence mitigation efforts, fielding and
    training support, the THAAD Stockpile Reliability Program, and
    modifications to meet growing cybersecurity threats.
        In October 2022, MDA, in conjunction with the U.S. Army,
    successfully delivered capability and enhancements to one of the
    forward-deployed THAAD batteries in support of INDOPACOM. The battery
    can now execute THAAD remote launch capability, execute Patriot Launch-
    on-Remote, and integrate Patriot Missile Segment Enhanced (MSE)
    launchers and missiles into the THAAD battery. This capability
    increases Patriot-defended area and engagement opportunities by
    allowing the MSE interceptor to leverage the highly effective THAAD AN/
    TPY-2 radar. In August 2022, the U.S. Army validated the requirement
    for accelerated fielding of this capability to all other U.S. THAAD
    batteries. MDA is currently coordinating fielding of this capability
    with the U.S. Army and will begin global fielding this fiscal year.
        Rigorous testing will continue in fiscal year 2023 with the
    execution of Flight Test THAAD Weapon System-25, which will demonstrate
    for the first time the THAAD weapon system's concurrent control of both
    a THAAD interceptor and firing a salvo of two Patriot MSE interceptors
    in an engagement of multiple MRBM targets. In fiscal year 2024, we will
    execute FTX-28 to demonstrate interoperability with Patriot by
    exchanging Link-16 messages and assess THAAD's capability to detect,
    track, and discriminate SRBMs with countermeasures (no interceptors).
        The Department is continuing development of a missile defense
    system for defense of Guam against diverse missile threats. We will
    expand capability and capacity as the threat evolves. In collaboration
    with the Army and Navy, we are moving toward meeting an INDOPACOM
    requirement for a persistent 360-degree layered defense capability on
    Guam against simultaneous raids of cruise, ballistic, maneuvering, and
    hypersonic threats. Today we are in the early stages of developing the
    Homeland Defense Radar-Guam (now designated as the AN/TPY-6 radar) and
    the Aegis Guam System to provide persistent long-range midcourse
    discrimination, precision tracking, missile engagements, and hit
    assessment to protect Guam.
        We also are developing a layered defense capability against
    regional hypersonic threats and have initiated a development program
    for a Glide Phase Interceptor, leveraging existing systems where
    possible, including proven engage-on-remote and launch-on-remote
    capabilities. We are focusing on the proven Aegis Weapon System to
    provide the depth-of-fire needed for a layered defense against
    hypersonic threats. In fiscal year 2024, MDA will continue to develop
    and mature the GPI capability and leverage the Aegis Weapon System.
    Today, MDA already provides the Navy an initial terminal defense
    capability. We also are working closely with the Navy to develop,
    field, and upgrade SBT defenses to counter more advanced maneuvering
    and hypersonic threats. We anticipate delivering these Increment 3
    capabilities in 2025. In fiscal year 2024, Aegis SBT will demonstrate
    an engagement against an advanced target in the terminal phase (FTM-32)
    and a simulated engagement against a hypersonic glide vehicle (FTX-40).
    In fiscal year 2025, SBT Increment 3 will demonstrate an engagement
    against a hypersonic glide vehicle firing an SM-6 Block IAU missile
    (FTM-43).
        We are continuing our cooperative missile defense relationship with
    Israel, jointly developing and delivering systems to strengthen its
    missile defenses and increase interoperability between United States
    and Israeli forces. In fiscal year 2024, our two nations continue to
    cooperate on engineering, development, co-production, testing, and
    fielding of the Arrow Weapon System, the David's Sling Weapon System,
    and co-production for the Iron Dome Defense System. I would like to
    highlight the March 22, 2022 ceremony for the transfer of the David's
    Sling Elevated Sensor System from the Israel Missile Defense
    Organization (IMDO) to the Israel Air Force, a significant milestone
    for our joint program, with final validation and testing occurring this
    year. MDA also executed the $1 billion Iron Dome Replenishment funding
    to Israel, and participated in contract negotiations and awards, where
    agreement with suppliers and IMDO increased the U.S. workshare to 30
    percent. This increase of U.S. workshare is $50 million above the
    mandated 25 percent, thus providing more funding back to the U.S.
    industrial base.
                developing technology to support missile defense
        MDA has an integrated, strategic Science and Technology (S&T)
    approach to identify, develop, and transition key enabling technologies
    to the Missile Defense System and the Warfighter. Our S&T investment
    strategy balances rapid development and fielding of capabilities with
    leap-ahead technologies for the future system.
        MDA is collaborating with the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
    the Services and Warfighters, National Laboratories, Universities/
    Academia, International partners, and industry (traditional and non-
    traditional defense partners) to implement a coordinated S&T approach
    to develop advanced missile defenses. We are aligning our S&T roadmap
    to close capability gaps, develop strategic thrusts, deliver Warfighter
    requirements, and enhance the future architecture to maximize the
    transition of cutting-edge and transformational technology to outpace
    the current and future threat. Specifically, MDA is developing key
    technologies to support hypersonic defense with the Hypersonic Defense
    Architecture Risk Reduction and Testing, High Operational Tempo for
    Hypersonics, and Hypersonic Test Bed efforts, including axial upper
    stage throttling, communications, seeker windows, material
    characterization, hypersonic wind tunnel testing, and thermal
    protection systems.
        In the future, MDA seeks to enhance current kinetic kill
    capabilities with directed energy and other non-kinetic solutions to
    keep pace with the volume and complexity of threats. MDA is working
    with OSD and the Services to develop the technologies to support the
    development and integration of lasers and high power microwave systems,
    and we are participating in studies to assess the viability of various
    directed energy weapons to optimize tracking, typing, targeting, and
    engagement management. MDA continues to work closely with OSD to
    develop and transition Diode-Pumped Alkali Laser technology out of the
    laboratory to Industry, and MDA is determining lethality mechanisms
    using pulsed lasers. We are also developing advanced sensors to improve
    position accuracy and range estimates of missile threats. The NanoSat
    Testbed Initiative is a collaborative, experimental approach leveraging
    commercial satellite platforms to mature technology and perform risk
    reduction for encrypted communications in a meshed network in space to
    support Service and Agency initiatives.
        MDA has started Left Through Right-of-launch Integration (LTRI)
    activities, which will enhance offensive-defensive integration. LTRI
    will optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of situational awareness
    between intelligence activities, offensive attack operations, and right
    of launch defenses, improving overall missile defeat capabilities. MDA
    has developed a medium fidelity model to simulate LTRI and is beginning
    to apply Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning to LTRI. MDA's
    LTRI activities and collaboration with other partners will optimize
    missile launch operations and provide data to inform decisionmaking in
    time critical situations.
                                   conclusion
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the Subcommittee,
    we are committed to attracting and building a strong, talented future
    workforce to meet the mission challenges of tomorrow. I would like to
    recognize and thank the men and women who serve in our Armed Forces at
    home and abroad and who operate the integrated Missile Defense System
    with the support of our dedicated civilian and contractor workforce. I
    appreciate your continued support for MDA and the missile defense
    mission, and I look forward to answering the Committee's questions.
    Thank you.

        Senator King. Thank you very much, Admiral. General
    VanHerck.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL GLEN D. VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
     STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
                                COMMAND

        General VanHerck. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
    and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
    the opportunity to appear today and to represent the men and
    women of United States Northern Command and North American
    Aerospace Defense Command.
        To address today's strategic environment, for nearly 3
    years I have focused on four key priorities domain awareness,
    or the ability to see and detect potential threats in all
    domains; information dominance, which is the use of artificial
    intelligence and machine learning to process data more rapidly
    for strategic advantage; decision superiority, which is the
    dissemination of data and information to the right leader at
    the right time from the tactical to the strategic level; and
    finally, global integration, addressing today's environment
    with a global and all domain approach vis legacy regional
    policies and practices.
        Those priorities are critical to the successfully defending
    the Homeland and providing our national leaders with the only
    thing I can never give them enough of, and that is time. Time
    to create deterrence options, and if required, defend and
    defeat options. I believe the greatest risk for the United
    States stems from our inability to change at the pace required
    by the changing strategic environment.
        Homeland defense must be recognized as essential to
    contingency plans at home and for power projection abroad, and
    it is vital that all military planning account for that in
    reality. In an area of incredible innovation and technological
    achievement, inflexible, outdated processes are a greater
    impediment to success than many of our competitors'
    advancements.
        I would like to highlight two areas for the Subcommittee.
    First, today I remain confident in our current capability to
    defend the Homeland against a limited Democratic People's
    Republic of Korea (DPRK) ballistic missile threat. Looking
    forward, I am concerned about future capacity and capability to
    respond to advancing DPRK ballistic missile threats, making it
    crucial to field the next generation interceptor on time, if
    not faster.
        Second, Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC)
    continue to aggressively pursue and field a number of advanced
    capabilities, including hypersonic weapons and delivery
    platforms designed to evade detection across multiple domains
    to strike targets anywhere on the globe, including North
    America.
        Hypersonic weapons are extremely difficult to detect, and
    counter given the weapons speed, maneuverability, low flight
    paths, and unpredictable trajectories. Hypersonic weapons
    challenge North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD's)
    ability to provide threat warning and attack assessments for
    Canada and the United States.
        Finally, I would like to recognize the tremendous work done
    by Vice Admiral Hill and the Missile Defense Agency. In my
    view, the Missile Defense Agency should be the Department's
    technical integrator to best leverage ongoing multi-domain
    design and experimentation efforts against current and future
    air and missile threats regardless of geographical area.
        It is clear that the missile threats we face at home and
    abroad will only continue to grow, and I have been fortunate to
    work together with a great partner like Vice Admiral Hill in
    the ongoing efforts to outpace those threats. I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General VanHerck follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Glen D. VanHerck
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished members of
    the Subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to testify, and for the
    honor of representing the men and women of U.S. Northern Command
    (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). From
    the day I assumed Command in August 2020, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have
    worked tirelessly to defend the Homeland and North America in an
    extraordinarily challenging strategic environment requiring the
    commands to adapt new approaches to how we plan, prepare, and operate.
    That innovation and evolution is necessary to outpace our competitors
    and is a testament to the devotion of our military and civilian
    personnel who stand constant watch over the United States and Canada.
        The commands have made tremendous progress in a short time, yet
    much work remains. While the United States military remains the most
    powerful and professional force in history, and our alliances and
    partnerships provide a vital strategic advantage over any potential
    adversary, it is clear that our competitive advantage is eroding. The
    successful defense of North America requires the Department of Defense
    to move beyond outdated assumptions and plans that do not fully reflect
    competitor capability, capacity, and intent to threaten the Homeland.
    Likewise, continued action is required to build enduring advantages and
    outpace the gains made by competitors around the globe. This will
    require the Department to invest in modernization, implement innovative
    processes, prioritize our personnel and improve civilian hiring
    practices, and increase agile decisionmaking at all levels.
                             strategic environment
        Today's strategic environment is the most complicated and
    potentially dangerous in my 35+ years of service. Our competitors and
    potential adversaries, particularly the People's Republic of China
    (PRC) and Russia, continue to challenge the rules-based international
    order that has provided global stability and prosperity over the last
    seven decades. They seek to advance their interests and gain global
    advantages through political intimidation, economic coercion, cyber and
    information operations, asymmetric attacks on infrastructure, and the
    direct threat or actual employment of military force.
    The People's Republic of China (PRC)
        The PRC remains NORAD and USNORTHCOM's long-term pacing challenge.
    Beijing continues ambitious military modernization at an alarming pace.
    It would be naive to think their sprint to develop advanced cyber
    tools, maritime capabilities, and hypersonic technology has only
    regional applications, as the PRC continues to develop advanced long-
    range conventional and strategic capabilities and the infrastructure
    necessary to project military power at greater distances. Underpinning
    this growth is a rapid nuclear expansion that is on pace for the PRC to
    expand their nuclear stockpile from what DOD estimates is over 400
    today to about 1,500 by 2035. While less observable, the PRC's
    aggressive efforts to exploit the information technology sector are
    accelerating an increasing threat to North America.
        The PRC's aggressive actions in the Pacific in mid-2022 following
    congressional visits to Taiwan illustrate how regional events create
    geostrategic ripple effects that can quickly reach our shores.
    President Xi is likely to use his next term in office to double down on
    the PRC's revisionist foreign policy, and is likely to include global
    efforts to undermine the United States and bolster partnerships with
    U.S. competitors, including Russia. In February 2022, Xi signaled his
    intent to follow this path when he declared the PRC-Russia friendship
    would have no limits in a public pronouncement just weeks before
    Russia's illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The PRC
    has almost certainly watched the war to draw lessons that will inform
    its next steps toward Taiwan.
        Xi's statement also proved to be more than rhetorical when, in May
    2022, the PRC and Russia conducted a combined bomber patrol over the
    Sea of Japan coinciding with the Quad Leaders' Summit in Tokyo. The May
    2022 bomber patrol was followed by a second bomber patrol in November
    2022. The cooperation is not confined to the air domain. PRC and
    Russian naval forces conducted a combined patrol in the fall of 2022
    that covered 7,000 nautical miles in the Pacific, included a first-ever
    combined naval transit of the Aleutian Islands, and came on the heels
    of Xi sending scores of troops to Russia to participate in Moscow's
    largest annual military exercise. For years, the PRC has relied on
    Russian military materiel to build its armed forces, and I am aware of
    reports that the PRC has transferred materiel with military
    applications to Russia during Russia's war against Ukraine. These
    actions are more than symbolic and demonstrate the PRC's growing power
    projection capabilities, which will likely encompass the Arctic in the
    next decade--a region the PRC is eying with its self-proclaimed status
    as a near-Arctic State.
    Russia
        As USNORTHCOM and NORAD take necessary measures to defend against a
    growing PRC threat, the commands continue to defend the United States
    and Canada every day against Russian aggression in all domains.
    Russia's brazen and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022
    proved that Russia has the capability and capacity to inflict
    significant damage to infrastructure and other critical targets with
    its all-domain long-range strike capabilities. Russia also has a
    history of conducting clandestine operations in other nations to
    achieve its political objectives. While Russia has overplayed its hand,
    suffered significant losses to the heroic Ukrainian defense forces, and
    inadvertently helped to unify NATO, it has gained real-world combat
    experience as it enters its second year of the full-scale invasion. The
    meager performance of Russia's ground forces in Ukraine should not
    overshadow other capabilities it has showcased in Ukraine, including
    air-and sea-launched cruise missiles capable of striking North America,
    cyber activities, and economic coercion. For the first time, we also
    saw Russia employ its new KILLJOY air-launched hypersonic missile in
    combat.
        Concurrent with its war against Ukraine, Russia has also continued
    to conduct major military exercises and test developmental capabilities
    that will compound the threat to North America once fielded. In April
    2022, Russia tested the massive SARMAT ICBM, a highly capable strategic
    weapon that helps reinforce the critical importance of a modern and
    reliable U.S. strategic deterrent. Meanwhile, Russia is testing its
    special mission Belgorod nuclear submarine, a modern platform capable
    of carrying the nuclear-capable Poseidon torpedo, designed to hold the
    Homeland at risk by striking coastal targets from thousands of miles
    away.
        The test of the Belgorod followed Russia's Arctic military exercise
    that included live-fire cruise missile launches designed to test
    Moscow's readiness for a conflict in the high north. Last fall, Russia
    added its first Severodvinsk-class conventional and nuclear capable
    cruise missile submarine to the Pacific Fleet, which poses a new
    challenge to our defense of the western approaches to North America. In
    October 2022, in the midst of elevated international tensions stemming
    from Russian threats to escalate its already brutal campaign in
    Ukraine, Russia chose to proceed with its annual strategic forces
    exercise, including demonstrations of multiple nuclear strike
    capabilities. Finally, in January 2023, a Russian Gorshkov-class
    frigate transited the western Atlantic while armed with Tsirkon
    hypersonic cruise missiles.
        I believe it would be shortsighted to view Russia's war against
    Ukraine as a limited regional crisis. Russia's actions increase the
    very real risk of miscalculation and the conflict's expansion beyond
    its current boundaries--scenarios that could rapidly increase the risks
    to North America and continental defense. If Russia should seek to
    compel allies to reconsider their support for Ukraine through
    escalatory actions or follow through with the desperate threats to use
    nuclear weapons in Ukraine, the risks to the Homeland would increase.
    DPRK and Iran
        The Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) tested at least 65
    conventional theater and long-range nuclear capabilities over the last
    year. That number includes the first tests of a new larger, longer
    range, and more capable ICBM, adding another missile that can likely
    reach the entire Homeland and one the regime claims is capable of
    carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle payload. The DPRK tested more
    missiles in 2022 than any time in its history, showing that the regime
    will continue to prioritize military capabilities at the expense of
    needed food and pandemic relief for its people. Public reports of
    renewed nuclear test preparations further highlight the grave danger
    this regime poses to regional and global stability. We must remain
    ready for multiple contingencies and potential crisis on the Korean
    Peninsula.
        The DPRK's reckless pursuit of advanced nuclear capabilities and
    robust ballistic missile research, development, and testing threatens
    regional stability, our allies and partners, and potentially the
    Homeland. However, today I remain confident in our current capability
    to defend the Homeland against a limited DPRK ballistic missile threat.
    Looking forward, I am concerned about future capacity and capability to
    respond to advancing DPRK ballistic missile threats, making it crucial
    to field the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) as funded in the fiscal
    year 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328).
        Iran has not shied away from pursuing malign global activities,
    including in North America; the regime continues to pose a significant
    threat to the United States, as well as our partners in the Central
    Command region. The August 2022 disclosure of an Iranian plot to
    assassinate a former senior United States official on United States
    territory illustrated the brazenness of the Iranian Government. The
    regime's decision to provide Russia with unmanned loitering munitions
    used to attack civilian infrastructure in Ukraine provides further
    evidence of Iran's embrace of destabilizing activity. A future decision
    by the regime to pursue an ICBM-class missile would add yet another
    threat vector capable of striking North America.
    Regional Security Threats
        I remain concerned about transnational organized crime in Mexico
    and the Western Hemisphere and the unrelenting violence it spawns and
    insecurity it creates, as cartels vie for control of lucrative illicit
    markets. Cartels control fentanyl, cocaine and methamphetamine
    trafficking as well as other drugs, and are demonstrating the
    capability to use improvised explosives and small-unmanned aerial
    systems against Mexican security forces in Mexico, which will likely
    embolden the cartels and challenge our partners. As USNORTHCOM supports
    our law enforcement and international partners in countering
    transnational criminal organizations in our area of operations, I
    remain steadfast in my commitment to our military partners in Mexico
    and The Bahamas.
        I commend Mexico's arrest last summer of the cartel member who
    brutally murdered a DEA agent decades earlier, as well as the recent
    arrests of Ovidio Guzman Lopez, the son of Sinaloa Cartel leader
    Joaquin ``El Chapo'' Guzman, and Jose Rodolfo Villareal-Hernandez, a
    Mexican cartel leader known as ``El Gato.'' These arrests are examples
    of a shared commitment to justice, buttressed by shared values and our
    decades-long partnership, which stands in stark contrast to PRC and
    Russian malign and self-serving activities in the Western Hemisphere.
        I am committed to deepening the already strong partnership with the
    Mexican and Bahamian militaries to advance our mutual goals, from
    upholding human rights to ensuring hemispheric defense. I was proud to
    host my counterparts from the Mexican Department of National Defense
    (SEDENA) and Department of the Navy (SEMAR) in early 2022 and visit The
    Bahamas in late 2021, and we will continue to work with Mexico and The
    Bahamas to stamp out attempts by the PRC or Russia to divide our
    countries and our partnerships.
    Transnational challenges
        USNORTHCOM's 20th anniversary offered a reminder of the
    transnational challenges that have shaped the Command from its
    inception. Foremost is the enduring transnational terrorist threat to
    North America, led by Sunni extremist groups and their supporters in
    North America. The arrest in August 2022 of an ISIS-inspired individual
    in New Mexico who had surveilled a United States military base is a
    stark reminder that military facilities remain attractive targets to
    terrorists. More broadly, the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan
    and violent extremist groups' ongoing presence in the region indicate a
    renewed threat to the region that we cannot discount. This extremist
    threat transcends south Asia and extends to other regions with security
    challenges, including the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, where
    terrorists continue to operate, train, and plan.
    Where We Are Today: 20 Years of USNORTHCOM and 65 Years of NORAD
        USNORTHCOM was established on October 1st, 2002, in the immediate
    aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States,
    marking the first time since the colonial era a single commander was
    responsible for the defense of the U.S. Homeland. Twenty years later,
    the likelihood of a major attack inside the United States by a foreign
    violent extremist organization has diminished following a generational,
    whole-of-nation effort. However, the primary threat to the Homeland is
    now far more significant and consequential. Multiple peer competitors
    and rogue states possess the capability and capacity to threaten our
    citizens, critical infrastructure, and vital institutions. These
    competitors possess, or are developing, the modern capabilities that
    limit the time and options available to decisionmakers responsible for
    defending our interests. In addition to destructive kinetic and cyber
    capabilities, malign actors actively exploit our democratic society by
    spreading disinformation that drives wedges between our citizens,
    undermines democracy, and weakens our alliances.
        In crisis or conflict, potential adversaries will likely seek to
    interfere with the Department's ability to project power abroad.
    Disruptions of military and civilian transportation infrastructure in
    North America could impede the ability of the United States and Canada
    to project combat power. Today I assess, as I have for nearly 3 years,
    that homeland defense is a potential limiting factor to ensuring rapid
    and effective implementation and execution of global contingency plans.
    This is due to my lack of domain awareness, limited timely access to
    forces that are ready to operate throughout my areas of responsibility,
    including the Arctic, and a lack of resilient infrastructure enabling
    the Joint Force to fight in and from the Homeland while ensuring
    forward power projection.
        Defending the Homeland against an ever-growing array of kinetic and
    non-kinetic threats will continue to require a collaborative, whole-of-
    nation approach to assessing vulnerabilities and developing appropriate
    deterrence, denial, and defense strategies. Cyber risks to critical
    infrastructure remain a significant concern and a domain awareness gap.
    DOD is tasked only with defending defense networks, but military
    facilities and missions frequently rely on civilian lifelines such as
    energy grids, transportation infrastructure, and other critical
    infrastructure. USNORTHCOM, due to law and policy, has limited insight
    into potential risks to commercial networks, which could lead to
    uncertainty in planning for consequence management. DOD's establishment
    of policy regarding the defense of critical infrastructure is a
    necessary step forward, and USNORTHCOM will continue to work with the
    Department and key mission partners, to include agencies with critical
    infrastructure security and cybersecurity responsibilities, to ensure
    key defense infrastructure is defended from attacks.
        NORAD, the unique United States and Canadian bi-national command,
    was established in May 1958 to defend North America from cold war-era
    Russian strategic bombers entering United States and Canadian airspace
    from the Arctic approaches. Sixty-five years later, Russia has restored
    its capability to threaten North America with modernized bombers,
    surface ships, and submarines armed with long-range, highly precise
    nuclear and conventional cruise missiles. The PRC is making rapid
    progress in developing similar capabilities, which will further
    complicate NORAD's warning missions and affect national strategic
    decisionmaking.
        While NORAD's missions to provide aerospace warning, aerospace
    control, and maritime warning remain critical to homeland defense,
    action and investment are needed to keep pace with competitors that
    clearly seek to hold North America at risk above and below the nuclear
    threshold. For decades, NORAD has relied heavily on the North Warning
    System arrayed along the Arctic coasts of Canada and Alaska to detect
    potential airborne threats to North America. It is clear that our
    competitors possess long-range strike capabilities that could be used
    to attack the United States and Canada from outside the detection range
    of legacy sensors.
        In order to maintain domain awareness and ensure integrated threat
    warning and attack assessment to national leadership, the United States
    and Canada must continue to move swiftly to field Over the Horizon
    Radar (OTHR), as funded in the fiscal year 2023 Consolidated Omnibus
    Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328). OTHR is a proven, affordable
    technology that will ensure our ability to detect threats from surface
    to space in the approaches to North America. I commend both the
    Department of Defense and the Canadian Department of National Defence
    for their commitment in fiscal year 2023 to investing in OTHR, and I
    respectfully urge both Governments to ensure this vital capability is
    fielded as quickly as possible.
        NORAD's contributions to homeland and continental defense will
    remain vital for many years to come, and will continue to rely on
    strong cooperation and shared investment between the United States and
    Canada. The United States and Canadian continental defense framework
    has an unrivaled legacy of success and serves as an international model
    of defense cooperation. I remain encouraged by the bi-national
    commitments to modernizing the platforms, sensors, and capabilities
    necessary to execute NORAD's missions; this collaborative approach to
    deterring and defending against threats to North America is critical.
    NORAD must continue to look to the future and take necessary measures
    today to counter the threats of tomorrow, and investments by the United
    States and Canada must address kinetic and non-kinetic threats to our
    nations.
        Potential threats to North America routinely transit international
    borders and the boundaries between United States geographic combatant
    command areas of responsibility. NORAD's ability to provide timely
    aerospace warning and control and maritime warning will be bolstered by
    the United States and Canada's joint commitment to improving global
    domain awareness, modernizing command and control systems to provide
    faster, better-informed decisionmaking, and continuing collaborative
    research, development, and innovation. These efforts will ensure
    NORAD's ability to compete with the PRC and Russia for years to come
    while clearly signaling a lasting commitment to a robust, modern, and
    effective defense of North America.
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD Priorities
        My priorities for NORAD and USNORTHCOM directly reflect the need to
    inform the rapid, agile decisions required of senior leaders in this
    dynamic and complex strategic environment. Our competitors continue to
    field capabilities specifically intended to strike with limited
    warning, which decreases the time and options available to national
    leaders in a crisis. Continuing to trust legacy processes and
    capabilities increases risk to the Homeland and compounds the risk of
    miscalculation and inadvertent escalation. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are
    working urgently to increase the domain awareness, information sharing,
    and global integration necessary to ensure national leaders have as
    much time and as many options as possible.
        As competitors and potential adversaries continue to field advanced
    all-domain capabilities with the potential to create significant
    effects in the Homeland, it is imperative that the United States and
    Canada move quickly to improve domain awareness from the seafloor to
    space and cyberspace for all approaches to North America. The Over-the-
    Horizon Radars (OTHR) funded in the fiscal year 2023 President's
    Budget, along with the OTHRs announced by the Government of Canada as
    part of NORAD modernization, will leverage proven technology and will
    significantly improve the ability of USNORTHCOM and NORAD to detect and
    track potential threats to North America and the Homeland from the
    Earth's surface to space. That capability, in turn, will directly
    correlate to more time available to leaders at all levels, enabling the
    creation and employment of better deterrence options and if required,
    defeat options.
        U.S. Space Force investments in advanced space-based missile
    warning sensor capabilities show great promise with particular regard
    to hypersonic and advanced missile threats. These future systems will
    detect, track, and identify threats, including hypersonic threats,
    enable better warning and assessment, and develop actionable targeting
    solutions, at a much faster pace than we currently experience, while
    also delivering an inherent operational resilience. Given our
    competitors' advanced maritime domain capabilities, I fully support the
    Navy's investment in a modernized Integrated Undersea Surveillance
    System. These capabilities, in turn, will directly correlate to more
    time and options available to produce a favorable outcome for the
    United States and Canada.
        Canada's plans to fund a layered surveillance system that will
    improve shared domain awareness in the northern air and maritime
    approaches to North America will have significant, long-term benefits
    for both NORAD and USNORTHCOM's missions. Planned Canadian investment
    in Arctic and Polar radars and spaced-based surveillance systems, along
    with advanced munitions, communications, and infrastructure clearly
    demonstrates shared commitment to NORAD and the combined defense of the
    United States and Canada.
        In addition to the investment in OTHR, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have
    also demonstrated the potential for linking existing platforms and
    sharing data with multiple commands, interagency and international
    partners. By sharing data previously trapped in bureaucratic and
    organizational stovepipes through innovative programs like Pathfinder,
    Northstar, and the Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE),
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD have proven that it is possible to rapidly improve
    domain awareness and streamline global information sharing without the
    costs associated with fielding exquisite new capabilities. It is
    crucial that the Department of Defense and the Services, as well as the
    Canadian Department of National Defence, continue the work to unlock
    the remarkable potential of these initiatives.
        I am encouraged by the establishment of the Department's Chief
    Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO), and I believe that
    the CDAO must be empowered to rapidly integrate systems, software and
    platforms in order to maintain our competitive advantage across the
    Joint Force. Over the past several years, actions by each of our
    competitors and potential adversaries have made it clear that regional
    actions have global diplomatic, economic, and military ramifications.
    It is simply unrealistic to assume that crises will remain confined by
    artificial boundaries, and we must adapt plans and perspectives to
    account for that global reality.
        The feasibility of every other Geographic Combatant Command's plans
    will require active campaigning in and from North America, and
    successful defense of the Homeland is necessary to deter adversaries
    and assure allies and partners. Therefore, I have also directed that
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD prioritize homeland defense campaigning to
    demonstrate our readiness, capabilities, and resiliency. I am also
    operationalizing the commands to accelerate the flow of information
    from sensor to decisionmaker. Our competitors and potential adversaries
    have shown that they will hold the Homeland at risk in a conflict, and
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are acting today to ensure homeland defense plans
    are understood, exercised, and resourced.
        While USNORTHCOM and NORAD have made strides in the Homeland
    defense mission, building a resilient Joint Force is a fundamental
    element of all Department planning, exercises, and operations. The
    DOD's worldwide missions and responsibilities must evolve from
    regionally focused approaches to globally integrated efforts that
    account for finite resources and associated risks. At present, I am
    concerned for the commands' ability to execute assigned missions--
    including contingency and operations plans in support of homeland
    defense. I am limited by a lack of timely access to forces that are
    organized, trained, and equipped to operate throughout the NORAD area
    of operations and the NORTHCOM area of responsibility, as well as by
    insufficient supporting infrastructure.
        A strong homeland defense is the foundation of our Nation's ability
    to project power globally while deterring aggression and achieving our
    strategic objectives in competition, crisis, and conflict. As such,
    every plan, exercise, and policy decision must consider the necessity
    of defending the Homeland when evaluating competing demands for forces
    and threats to global campaigning. That, in turn, will require the
    Department of Defense and the Canadian Department of National Defence
    to place greater focus on developing the depth, flexibility, advanced
    technologies, and supporting infrastructure required to respond to
    future challenges while addressing growing threats to the Homeland.
    Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
        When directed by the Secretary of Defense, USNORTHCOM provides
    Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in the Continental United
    States, Alaska, and Puerto Rico. In preparing for and responding to
    major natural and human-caused disasters, USNORTHCOM serves as the DSCA
    synchronizer to support assessment and recovery while simultaneously
    acting as the supported combatant command in the command's area of
    operations.
        USNORTHCOM often supports Federal, State, tribal, territorial, and
    local (FSTTL) disaster relief efforts. These collaborative, whole-of-
    government efforts demonstrate national resilience that should reassure
    the American public, while also making clear to potential aggressors,
    that the United States routinely executes interagency domestic relief
    operations that allow our Nation to recovery quickly following even
    large-scale disasters. It is equally important for our FSTTL partners
    to identify and address their capabilities and capacity gaps to fully
    perform the roles, missions, and operations under their authorities.
    This kind of response, particularly when it is accomplished with little
    or no military support, can generate a deterrent effect by casting
    doubt in competitors' minds about their ability to produce significant
    effects from an attack on the Homeland.
        USNORTHCOM is uniquely suited to support our Federal partners in
    the aftermath of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
    (CBRN) attack. The Department must remain committed to this crucial
    mission to ensure these highly trained, specialized elements stand
    ready to respond immediately in the event of a weapon of mass
    destruction event in the United States.
        I continue to stress the importance of USNORTHCOM's defense support
    of civil authorities, as rapidly executed, well-planned, multi-agency
    responses to wildfires, hurricanes, pandemics, and other significant
    disruptions are perhaps the most visible demonstration of the
    military's support to the American people. USNORTHCOM works year-round
    with our mission partners at every level to strengthen relationships,
    improve communications, and incorporate lessons learned from previous
    responses in order to deliver rapid and effective support to lead
    Federal agencies. Our command takes tremendous pride in supporting our
    FSTTL partners, while helping to highlight the resourcefulness and
    solidarity of the American people in the face of adversity. It should
    be clear to competitors and potential aggressors that the United States
    routinely responds to and recovers quickly from large-scale
    disruptions--and USNORTHCOM is always ready to support those efforts
    with military capabilities as directed by the Secretary.
        USNORTHCOM support to civil authorities includes the command's
    ongoing support of Federal law enforcement efforts to counter the
    transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) that have caused so much
    harm to our Nation. Illicit drugs trafficked by transnational criminal
    enterprises kill more than one hundred thousand U.S. citizens each
    year, and the number of fatal overdoses have risen dramatically as
    cartels have increased the volume of fentanyl smuggled into the United
    States. As directed by the Secretary of Defense and in accordance with
    my direct guidance, USNORTHCOM's subordinate command, Joint Task Force
    North (JTF-N), provides U.S. Federal law enforcement partners with
    intelligence and counter-threat finance analysis and other support as
    requested to disrupt the sophisticated financial and physical networks
    used to infiltrate illicit goods and exploited human traffic into the
    United States. The important work done by USNORTHCOM and JTF-N in
    countering transnational criminal organizations and disrupting the flow
    of illegal drugs into the United States is a national security
    imperative that directly supports homeland defense.
        Natural disasters, public health threats, and transnational
    irregular migration will likely continue to require DOD support for our
    lead Federal partners. Environmental change will also continue to have
    a direct impact on military readiness and resources, as was made clear
    by the massive destructive power of Hurricane Ian in September 2022 and
    by western wildfires that are growing in scale and frequency as fire
    seasons now extend throughout most of the year. It is necessary to plan
    and account for the growing likelihood of natural disasters that
    disrupt military operations and damage critical infrastructure, while
    units involved in response operations require time to reset and recover
    after completing their missions. The long-term consequences of extreme
    weather, rising sea levels, and increased flooding will continue to
    affect DOD missions, infrastructure, and personnel, especially those in
    the Homeland.
    Security Cooperation
        In addition to our more visible homeland defense and DSCA
    operations, USNORTHCOM continues to reap tremendous benefits from our
    military-to-military relationships with our allies and partners in
    Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas. Security cooperation with our
    neighbors is crucial to regional security, countering the influence of
    peer competitors, and addressing shared challenges. Security
    cooperation provides a critical and lasting advantage over our more
    isolated competitors, and I am grateful to the Department and to this
    Committee for your ongoing support of USNORTHCOM's vital work with our
    allies and partners. I am proud to work with my military counterparts
    in Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas as we support one another's efforts
    to defend our nations and stand united against malign actors seeking to
    expand influence and presence in the Western Hemisphere.
        The military-to-military relationship between the United States and
    Canada remains extraordinary and vital. In addition to standing side by
    side as partners in NORAD for nearly 65 years, Canada has been a
    stalwart ally in continental defense and operations overseas for
    decades. The unique trust between our militaries is immediately
    apparent within the USNORTHCOM and NORAD headquarters, as United States
    and Canadian personnel work side-by-side in pursuit of shared missions
    and objectives. The Canadian Armed Forces' shared commitment to
    improved domain awareness, information sharing, and modernization of
    the capabilities necessary for deterrence and continental defense is
    essential to our united efforts to defend North America, and I am
    fortunate to serve alongside such steadfast and trusted allies.
        The Mexican Department of National Defense (SEDENA) and Department
    of the Navy (SEMAR) continue to meet daunting internal and external
    security challenges with professionalism and resiliency. Keenly focused
    on enhancing regional defense, our Mexican military partners continue
    to make major investments in a modern, capable, and reliable force
    capable of interoperability with the United States and other partners.
    In light of that important effort, USNORTHCOM strongly supports SEDENA
    and SEMAR modernization initiatives, including the potential divestment
    of their fleet of MI-17 helicopters in favor of Western helicopters.
        In April 2022, it was my honor to host the Secretaries of SEDENA
    and SEMAR at USNORTHCOM for the Bilateral Military Cooperation
    Roundtable (BMCR). During this important annual dialog, USNORTHCOM and
    our Mexican military partners conducted a candid and highly productive
    assessment of our mutual security challenges, associated requirements,
    and shared commitment to addressing threats to our nations. Over the
    course of 3 days, Secretary General Sandoval, Secretary Admiral Ojeda,
    and I reaffirmed our military-to-military relationship and committed to
    a number of concrete steps that will have significant and lasting
    positive impacts on regional security.
        Our partners in the Royal Bahamian Defence Force (RBDF) continue to
    punch above their weight as they continue to provide important
    contributions to regional security. USNORTHCOM and the RBDF operate
    maritime surveillance systems at Great Inagua and Coral Harbour, and
    plans are on track to add a third site in the coming years. That shared
    capability has significant benefits for domain awareness in the
    southern approaches to North America and demonstrates The Bahamas'
    ongoing commitment to security cooperation with USNORTHCOM. Our
    collaboration has taken on added importance as the PRC's diplomatic
    corps in Nassau continues to produce anti-United States public
    statements while highlighting Chinese economic investment and
    humanitarian relief efforts in The Bahamas.
        USNORTHCOM is strongly committed to a long-term partnership with
    the RBDF, and continued whole-of-government engagement and investment
    by the United States. As you know, the United States has been without a
    confirmed Ambassador to The Bahamas since 2011. No action was taken on
    the President's nominee last year, and the nomination was resubmitted
    in January 2023. This senior diplomatic position is critical to
    demonstrating the importance of the relationship between the United
    States and The Bahamas and to mitigating the PRC's efforts to gain a
    foothold only 50 miles from the United States east coast.
    The Arctic
        The ability of the joint force to operate and campaign in the
    Arctic remains a pressing concern for USNORTHCOM and NORAD. The PRC and
    Russia continue to invest in Arctic capabilities as both seek to
    increase presence and influence in the region while shifting the rules-
    based international order to their advantage. More than 50 percent of
    USNORTHCOM's area of operations is in the Arctic, and USNORTHCOM and
    NORAD's priorities in the region continue to focus on increased
    presence, campaigning through joint training and exercises, and close
    collaboration with allies and partners.
        The effects of environmental change in the Arctic will have
    significant impacts on accessibility, infrastructure, and competition
    for the foreseeable future, and the region remains the most unforgiving
    operational environment on earth. As the Department balances the
    demands of global mission requirements with difficult budgetary
    choices, USNORTHCOM and NORAD require access to trained and ready
    forces capable of operating throughout the commands' areas of
    responsibility--to include the Arctic. The Joint Force must keep sight
    of the fact that special training and purpose-built equipment are
    necessary to operate in a region in which extreme climate, distance,
    and geography quickly overtake the unprepared.
        Over the last year, USNORTHCOM and NORAD collaborated with USEUCOM,
    USINDOPACOM, USTRANSCOM, USSOCOM and the military Services while
    conducting joint exercises in Alaska, Greenland, and northern Canada.
    These demanding events expose Joint Force participants to the demands
    of the Arctic operating environment and help to reinforce the necessity
    of a force trained and equipped to survive in the extreme cold and
    remoteness that defines much of the region. I am encouraged by the
    strategic objectives stated in the United States National Strategy for
    the Arctic that support better understanding of the region, exercising
    presence, and capitalizing on the definitive advantage of our
    international alliances and partnerships.
        While the military Services' respective Arctic strategies
    acknowledge the importance of the Arctic and the need to develop the
    capabilities needed to operate and compete in the region, direct
    investment in Arctic-capable platforms, training, and infrastructure
    continues to lag. It is necessary that the Joint Force has the ability
    to compete, fight, and win in the Arctic in the coming years, and the
    time for the Services to invest in the required equipment,
    infrastructure, and training is now. The PRC and Russia have clearly
    demonstrated their intent to expand their Arctic presence and
    operations, and I urge the Department of Defense, the Services, my
    fellow combatant commanders, and the Canadian Department of National
    Defence to move faster toward improving our collective ability to
    succeed in this strategically vital region.
    Conclusion
        Homeland defense remains the core mission of both USNORTHCOM and
    NORAD. The one constant throughout my time in command has been the
    extraordinary pace at which our competitors have advanced their
    capabilities to threaten the Homeland. Despite those clear risks, the
    processes used by the Department of Defense and the Canadian Department
    of National Defence for planning, acquisitions, personnel hiring,
    technology development, and other activities necessary to the success
    of the defense enterprise remain largely unchanged from when I received
    my commission nearly 36 years ago.
        As competitors develop greater capability, capacity, and intent to
    challenge the United States, Canada, and the rules-based international
    order, I believe that the greatest strategic risk for the United States
    stems from our own inability to adapt at a pace required by the
    changing strategic environment. In an era of incredible innovation and
    technological achievement, inflexible, outdated processes are a greater
    impediment to success than many of our competitors' capability
    advancements. We cannot continue to rely on Industrial Age practices
    and legacy platforms to compete in a digital age, and if we fail to
    evolve at the pace demanded by the strategic environment, our
    competitive advantage will continue to erode.
        The Department and Congress must also be more willing to accept the
    relatively low risks associated with retiring legacy platforms in order
    to ensure our ability to fight and win against advanced and well-
    resourced competitors. Over the last decade, the PRC and Russia have
    made extraordinary technological advancements while the Department
    remains encumbered by obsolete capabilities and associated costs. To
    defend the Homeland, USNORTHCOM and NORAD require a modern force with
    the capacity and capability to deter and if required defeat advanced
    peer competitors. Retiring systems that have exceeded their operational
    lifespans--to include fighters and command and control platforms at the
    end of their service lives--is necessary to accelerate the arrival of
    next generation capabilities.
        Along with faster, more flexible development and acquisitions, the
    Joint Force requires predictable and timely funding to maintain
    readiness and increase capability, capacity, and resilience. The
    Continuing Resolutions that have become commonplace over the last
    decade have direct and lasting adverse consequences for military
    readiness, modernization, and planning. Predictable, on-time annual
    budgeting and appropriations, along with streamlined Department
    processes and greater tolerance for risk in developing and testing new
    capabilities, are essential to maintaining our competitive advantage.
        The need to move faster is clear. The PRC and Russia have already
    fielded highly advanced hypersonic capabilities, while the United
    States' hypersonic program, although accelerating, still languishes
    well behind our competitors' efforts. Further, DOD faces operational
    challenges with civilian hiring processes for recruiting and hiring the
    innovative and experientially diverse workforce needed to drive
    innovation and advancement on pace with the civilian tech sector.
    Simply put, the Department must continue to strategically tackle hiring
    and personnel management improvements to move its workforce goal of
    being an employer of choice forward.
        Finally, the PRC high altitude balloon (HAB) incursion into our
    national airspace was obviously a significant event that shined a light
    on the PRC's brazen intelligence collection against the United States
    and Canada. It was the first time USNORTHCOM conducted an engagement
    over the United States in our history, and it made it clear that our
    competitors have the capability and intent to reach the Homeland. The
    three Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAPs), also shot down days later
    by USNORTHCOM and NORAD, clearly demonstrated the challenges associated
    with detecting and identifying unmanned objects in U.S. airspace. As
    for NORAD and NORTHCOM, I commit to you that this event has already
    generated critical lessons learned for my commands and our mission
    partners, and I can guarantee that NORTHCOM and NORAD are going to
    continue to learn from it and do whatever is necessary to keep our
    country safe.
        While we face significant challenges, there should be no doubt we
    have the finest military on the planet and that the commands will
    defend our nations with tenacity and resolve. In what is likely my
    final appearance before this subcommittee, I remain deeply humbled and
    immensely proud to lead the noblest mission of any Combatant Command--
    defending the Homeland. I am grateful to the subcommittee for your
    longstanding support of our missions and of the men and women who stand
    watch over our Nation every day. I thank you for the honor of
    representing our soldiers, sailors, airmen, guardians, marines, and
    civilians.

        Senator King. Thank you, General. General Karbler.

        STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL L. KARBLER, USA,
       COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE
                            DEFENSE COMMAND

        Lieutenant General Karbler. Chairman King, Ranking Member
    Fischer, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I am
    honored to again testify before you and to represent an
    incredible people-first organization of 2,600 soldiers and
    civilians across 13 time zones in 19 dispersed locations.
        Every day these amazing professionals provide space, high
    altitude, and missile defense forces and capabilities to the
    Army and joint warfighters. First, let me express my sincere
    appreciation for your steadfast support of our people and their
    families.
        I serve as the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Space
    and Missile Defense Command, the Commander of the Joint
    Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense,
    and as the Army's Proponent for Air and Missile Defense, or
    AMD.
        I provide U.S. Northern Command the soldiers who stand
    ready to defend our Nation from intercontinental ballistic
    missile attack, serve as the Army's Service Component Commander
    to both U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command, and I am
    the Chief of Staff of the Army's AMD enterprise integrator.
        I would like to first discuss the threats that confront us
    worldwide. In Europe, we see daily the continuation of the
    largest employment of offensive missiles since World War II and
    the unprecedented use of attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
    in Russia's nearly 15-month war against Ukraine. In the
    Pacific, against the backdrop of multiple missile tests by the
    DPRK and China, threats of regional and trans regional, complex
    missile attacks still loom.
        In the United States Central Command area of responsibility
    (CENTCOM AOR), our adversaries continue to attack partner
    nations and U.S. Forces using missiles, UAVs, and rockets,
    artillery, and mortars. I have been an air defender for 36
    years, stationed and deployed in the European, Pacific, and
    Middle Eastern theaters, and I have never seen adversary threat
    activity, whether that be test or operational use, as great as
    I see it today.
        Adversary actions in the space domain are equally as
    aggressive as they continue to challenge us across multiple
    space-enabled mission areas critical to supporting our missile
    defense mission. To address these threats, we must strengthen
    our capabilities to deny our adversaries the benefit of
    aggression.
        We must continue investment in sustainment of combat ready,
    capable, and lethal space and air and missile defense
    capabilities. Fortunately, we do not face these threats alone.
    We have allies and partners who contribute significantly to the
    air and missile defense and space missions. Please allow me to
    briefly outline just a couple of milestones accomplished by our
    space and missile defense soldiers and civilians.
        This past year, we have partnered with U.S. Army Special
    Operations Command and U.S. Army Cyber Command to create a
    Space, Cyber, Special Operations triad to provide deterrence
    and response options through the integrated use of our unique
    capabilities.
        We have continued to mature the triad through multiple
    exercises to include the Army's Project Convergence 22 and U.S.
    Army Special Operations Command Capability Exercise, which was
    held just last week.
        Recently, we reached a historic milestone in the air
    defense enterprise, with the full rate production decision for
    the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System,
    IBCS. This any-sensor, best shooter construct allows us to
    integrate the right quantity and mix of air and missile defense
    capabilities across all echelons, building an effective,
    tiered, and layered defense.
        We need to greatly add incredible soldiers to the any
    sensor, best shooter construct, as these men and women will
    play the most critical role in this transformative capability.
    This is the linchpin of the Army's broader air and missile
    defense modernization efforts, crucial to enhancing our air and
    missile defense capabilities well into the future.
        In closing and on a personal note, this will be my last
    opportunity to address the distinguished Members of this
    Subcommittee, and I went to, again, thank you for your support.
    I am confident in the direction and momentum of the Army's air
    and missile defense, and space enterprises. I look forward to
    addressing your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Karbler
    follows:]

           Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Daniel L. Karbler
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for your continued support for our
    servicemembers, civilians, and families and your continued support for
    the Army, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), U.S. Space Command
    (USSPACECOM), Department of Defense (DOD), and the space and missile
    defense community. Thank you also for inviting me to highlight the
    importance of space and missile defense capabilities and ongoing
    enhancements that enable the defense of our Nation, forward stationed
    and deployed forces, allies, and partners.
        Today, with my assigned roles, I bring both an Army and a joint
    perspective on effective space and missile defense concepts and
    capabilities. Within the Army and joint communities, my
    responsibilities encompass several mission areas.
        As commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
    (USASMDC), I serve as the Army's force modernization proponent and
    operational integrator for space, missile defense, and high-altitude
    capabilities. In short, USASMDC provides trained and ready space and
    missile defense forces and capabilities to the warfighter and the
    Nation. With regard to missile defense, I am the Army Service Component
    Commander responsible for planning, integrating, coordinating, and
    providing Army missile defense forces and capabilities in support of
    USSTRATCOM missions. Additionally, I am a supporting commander to the
    Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), for the Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense (GMD) System. In the space mission area, I am the
    Army Service Component Commander to USSPACECOM, providing trained and
    ready Army space warfighters and capabilities to compete, fight, and
    win in the space domain.
        As the Army's air and missile defense (AMD) enterprise integrator,
    I synchronize the balanced execution of the Army's AMD posture across
    the functions of force planning and sourcing requirements, combat and
    materiel development, AMD acquisition, and life cycle management. I
    coordinate with the AMD community of interest to balance priorities,
    inform resourcing decisions, and pursue innovative approaches to
    fulfill our AMD mission requirements.
        Finally, as Commander of USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component
    Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), I am responsible for
    providing operational-level comprehensive missile defense expertise in
    support of USSTRATCOM's Unified Command Plan (UCP)-assigned trans-
    regional missile defense (MD) mission. This trans-regional MD mission
    includes plans and policy support and assessment, integration of MD
    security cooperation activities, operations support, joint MD training,
    education, and exercise support, and support to missile defense
    capability development on behalf of the combatant commanders (CCDRs),
    the Joint Staff and the Secretary of Defense. These efforts contribute
    to an integrated deterrence approach that denies the benefits of
    missile attack to adversaries, assures allies, and defends U.S.
    deployed forces, allies, and partners.
        The operational environment continues to evolve at unprecedented
    speed. China continues to bolster its anti-access/area denial strategy
    in the Western Pacific and pressure its neighbors with increasingly
    provocative behavior. In their unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the
    Russian Federation launched an unprecedented number of offensive
    missile systems, including hypersonic weapons. China, Russia, and other
    potential adversaries form a globally capable, mutually supporting,
    threat set. The United States and our allies face significant increases
    in the density, diversity, and operational reach of lethal offensive
    missile systems. The proliferation, range, and maneuverability of these
    weapons require an increasingly trans-regional approach to missile
    defense. The sensors; battle management, command, control and
    communication and intelligence (BMC3I) architectures; and other
    supporting components of trans-regional missile defense will
    progressively migrate to space-based platforms such as the Space
    Development Agency's Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture in the
    years to come. This greater emphasis on the convergence of space and
    missile defense is the logical extension of our need to evolve our
    means for birth-to-death tracking and targeting complex missile and
    hybrid hypersonic threats from a position of advantage. However, given
    the scale of the problem, these new tracking and warning capabilities
    must be complemented by a broader whole-of-government approach to
    comprehensive missile defeat, leveraging the full range of available
    activities and capabilities to counter both the use of adversary
    missiles, and their development, acquisition, and proliferation. The
    trans-regional missile defense contribution to this missile defeat
    initiative includes existing as well as new and novel approaches to
    negate adversary systems both before and after launch without reliance
    on the increasingly difficult hit-to-kill mechanisms of our legacy
    missile defense systems. Integrating this diverse set of capabilities
    focused specifically on this initiative is critical to its success.
        We must advance trans-regional missile defense through continued
    investment and sustainment of combat-ready, integrated, capable, and
    lethal air and missile defense and space capabilities, combined with
    those of our allies' and partners' as part of a comprehensive approach
    to missile defeat supporting integrated deterrence. This remains
    essential in ensuring our Nation's security.
                                  people first
        USASMDC and JFCC IMD, comprised of multi-component Soldiers,
    Airmen, Sailors, Marines, Guardians, and dedicated civilians and
    contractors, cannot carry out our wide-ranging, no-fail national
    security missions without the commitment of our greatest asset--our
    people. We prioritize ``People First'' as we recruit, train, and
    develop space and missile defense professionals. Our People First
    mandate has six values: communication, recognition, trust, teamwork,
    transparency, and empowerment. Despite the many challenges introduced
    by the COVID-19 pandemic, our professionals continued providing space
    and missile defense capabilities that support combatant command (CCMD)
    plans and operations. It is our people who make us strong; it is our
    people who make winning possible.
                  u.s. army space and missile defense command
        To accomplish our vision of providing space, missile defense, and
    high-altitude forces and capabilities to support joint and combined
    warfighting readiness in all domains, USASMDC is organizationally
    aligned to accomplish three major tasks. These are: providing forces
    and capabilities for current operations; preparing forces and
    capabilities for the future fight; and researching and developing Army
    technologies to provide future advancements in space, air, and missile
    defense capabilities.
        The command aligns its activities to these priorities:

          Accomplish our mission as a People First team of
    empowered, innovative, ready, and resilient professionals.

          Provide trained and ready forces for space, missile
    defense, and high-altitude missions.

          Conduct integrated planning and synchronized operations
    in the execution of our space and missile defense missions.

          Prepare for future conflict.

      recent contributions and upgrades to army space and missile defense
                                  capabilities
        The people of USASMDC and JFCC IMD continue to learn new ways to
    operate, accomplish our missions, enhance capabilities, and support
    global theaters. Throughout the last several months, we have realized
    essential space and missile defense operational, capability, and
    training successes, a few of which follow.
          We are currently upgrading our Joint Tactical Ground
    Stations (JTAGS) configuration at our four theater missile warning
    company locations. Once fielded, this upgrade will significantly
    improve our missile warning, missile defense cueing, and battlespace
    characterization capabilities in support of multidomain operations, and
    it will enable us to keep pace with rapidly growing, complex, and
    capable threat systems.
          In March 2022, the Army relocated two European-based
    Patriot missile defense batteries to Poland. This defensive relocation
    reinforces our Nation's commitment to Article 5 and to proactively
    deter any threats on NATO's Eastern flank.
          During a March 2022 joint exercise, a subordinate air
    defense regiment under the European-based 10th Army Air and Missile
    Defense Command successfully deployed four Maneuver-Short Range Air
    Defense (M-SHORAD) Stryker-based platforms to the eastern NATO region.
    This deployment demonstrated the Army's newest short-range air defense
    system's ability to defend maneuver forces against unmanned aerial
    systems (UAS), rotary-wing, and fixed-wing air threats.
          Our Army Space Training Division (ASTD) served as the
    lead proponent for equipping Army divisions and training centers with
    essential training aid devices that enable organizations to train in a
    degraded and disrupted space operations environment. With fielding
    completed, ASTD will lead future efforts on life cycle replacement of
    these devices.
          The USASMDC Technical Center leveraged commercial
    synthetic aperture radar imaging of current interest locations and,
    using artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms, provided
    key operational data to tactical warfighting organizations.
          Support to significant testing and exercises remains a
    priority. Earlier this year, Air Defense Artillery (ADA) soldiers
    participated in the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Flight
    Test-21, where two Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile
    Segment Enhanced (MSE) interceptors were integrated with THAAD software
    to successfully intercept two short-range ballistic missiles. This
    integration enables earlier interceptor launch and results in a longer
    fly out time, which increases the defended area or battlespace. Our ADA
    soldiers also recently participated in the initial operational test and
    evaluation of the successful Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle
    Command System (IBCS) test. During this event, IBCS maintained
    continuous tracking of two cruise missile targets by fusing data from
    multiple sensors while degraded by an electronic attack. Finally, we
    continue to deploy Army space professionals to numerous joint and
    partner nation exercises and wargames.
          In addition to exercise support, operational deployments
    to CCMDs continue. Our 1st Space Brigade rotated an Army Space Control
    Crew to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), an Army Space Support
    Team to both U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. European Command
    (USEUCOM), and Space Control Planning Teams to USEUCOM and USSPACECOM.
          Our Force Tracking Mission Management Center continues to
    support global operations in the USCENTCOM, U.S. Africa Command, and
    other CCMD geographic areas of responsibility. The Center provided
    vital management and dissemination of friendly force tracking data to
    theater commands.
          Our Advanced Warfare Environment / Tactical Geospatial
    Environment system developed to provide AMD Intelligence Preparation of
    the Battlespace for Army AMD units has proven to be a primary analysis
    system used by the Missile and Space Intelligence Center to analyze and
    document Russia-Ukraine missile operations for intelligence community
    assessments.
            providing forces and capabilities for current operations
        In accordance with Title 10 responsibilities, USASMDC is a force
    provider of missile defense capabilities. Our first major task is to
    provide trained and ready missile defense forces and capabilities to
    CCDRs. USASMDC soldiers serving in the Homeland and stationed in remote
    and austere forward locations operate the GMD and AN/TPY-2 Forward-
    Based Mode (FBM) radars. Highlights of the capabilities provided to
    current operations and readiness by our missile defense professionals
    include:
        Support to Homeland Missile Defense: Soldiers from the 100th
    Missile Defense Brigade (MDB), headquartered in Colorado Springs,
    Colorado, and 49th Missile Defense Battalion, headquartered at Fort
    Greely, Alaska, stand ready to defend our Nation from intercontinental
    ballistic missile (ICBM) attack 24/7/365. In support of USNORTHCOM,
    Army National Guard and Active Component soldiers operate the GMD Fire
    Control Systems located at the Fire Direction Center in Alaska; Missile
    Defense Element in Colorado; a detachment that oversees operations at
    Vandenberg Space Force Base, California; and a detachment that secures
    GMD sensor infrastructure at Fort Drum, New York. At the Fort Greely
    Missile Defense Complex, the 49th Missile Defense Battalion military
    police, with augmentation from the Mississippi National Guard, secure
    interceptors and command and control (C2) facilities from physical
    threats. These security soldiers perform their duties in some of the
    most austere conditions in the United States, with winter temperatures
    plummeting to 50 degrees below zero and fewer than 4 hours of sunlight
    in the winter months.
        1st Space Brigade soldiers provide CCDRs certified AN/TPY-2 FBM
    missile defense batteries that support strategic and regional missions.
    These batteries are globally located in five strategic, yet remote and
    austere locations, where they provide ballistic missile search, track,
    and discrimination operations, as well as Space Domain Awareness, in
    support of both homeland and regional defense and USSPACECOM's Global
    Sensor Manager responsibilities. These soldiers continuously
    demonstrate our Nation's commitment to defend deployed forces, allies,
    and partners from ballistic missile attacks.
        Support to Global Missile Defense Test and Development: Soldiers
    from the 100th MDB and 49th Missile Defense Battalion participate in
    GMD test activities and work with Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
    developers on enhancements to the GMD. The MDA's testing regime,
    conducted through a series of ground-based and operational flight
    tests, emphasizes operational realism during test design and execution.
    This realism enables system operators to sustain and improve their
    proficiency and validate the system's operational employment.
        Global Missile Defense System Development: MDA continues to evolve
    the GMD weapon system to enhance existing capabilities, as well as
    deliver new capabilities. The Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), once
    developed and fielded, will be a significant upgrade compared to the
    current interceptor fleet, providing the warfighter with improved
    system performance and greater reliability.
        Space Support to Missile Early Warning: Space-enabled capabilities
    are essential for missile defense operations. They provide and enable
    communications; positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT);
    intelligence; and surveillance to meet the demands of modern warfare.
    In support of joint force commanders, USASMDC continues to provide
    missile warning within the USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USINDOPACOM theaters
    of operations. The 1st Space Brigade's forward stationed JTAGS theater
    missile warning companies are essential for USSPACECOM's assured
    missile warning mission. They are operated by USASMDC soldiers who
    monitor launch activity and other events observed by infrared sensor
    platforms and quickly provide information to members of the AMD and
    operational communities. The JTAGS forward stationing reduces the risk
    of solely relying on long-haul communications and ensures the
    resilience of USSPACECOM's comprehensive missile warning system.
             preparing forces and capabilities for the future fight
        USASMDC's second major task is to develop future missile defense
    forces and mature current capabilities. The Space and Missile Defense
    Center of Excellence (SMD CoE) is the Army's force modernization
    proponent responsible for managing change to Army doctrine,
    organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
    facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) requirements for space, strategic
    missile defense, and high-altitude capabilities. The SMD CoE trains and
    educates soldiers and leaders to be agile, adaptive, and ready;
    executes life cycle management for Army space operations officers;
    develops Army Space soldiers; and enables informed decisionmaking.
        To carry out its mission, the SMD CoE executes practices
    established by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and Army Futures
    Command to meet force management and Army modernization enterprise
    responsibilities. These functions include performing concept
    development, capabilities determination, and capabilities integration
    relative to DOTMLPF-P for process change, integration, and transition
    for materiel development.
        Specifically, in the training arena, SMD CoE conducts the Army's
    institutional soldier qualification training and education for space
    and GMD mission areas. The SMD School writes, coordinates, and
    publishes Army doctrine for space and GMD while also integrating space
    training and education in curriculum across all Army proponent schools,
    operational unit home stations, and pre-deployment training events.
    These efforts prepare soldiers across all warfighting functions to
    integrate Army and joint space and missile defense capabilities and
    effects in the conducting of multidomain operations.
                 research and development of army technologies
        USASMDC's third major task is to provide critical technologies to
    address future needs that will enhance warfighter effectiveness.
    USASMDC's Technical Center supports joint warfighters by providing
    science, technology, and test and evaluation expertise to enable
    warfighter dominance both today and in the future. The Technical Center
    contributes to warfighter and joint force success in four major areas:
    directed energy (DE); tactical responsive space and high altitude; test
    and evaluation; and hypersonic and strategic weapons.
        Directed Energy: The Technical Center, in coordination with the
    Army's Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, is the Army
    lead for high-energy laser technology development. High-energy lasers
    complement kinetic systems in addressing threats from rocket,
    artillery, and mortars; small UASs; and cruise missiles. Additionally,
    the Technical Center is exploring high-power microwave technology for
    use in interdicting a multitude of improvised threats. As systems are
    fielded, the Technical Center will continue developing new and improved
    DE technologies for insertion into weapon systems to maintain
    warfighter dominance.
        Tactical Responsive Space and High Altitude: As the Army lead for
    space and high-altitude research, development, and engineering, the
    Technical Center identifies, develops, demonstrates, and integrates
    technologies in the areas of responsive space, space superiority, and
    high altitude. Working with other Army, DOD, and industry partners, the
    Technical Center focuses on persistent beyond line-of-sight
    communications for forces in remote areas; functionally effective
    resolution imagery; solutions for assured PNT; ground C2 systems; and
    direct downlink of data from space-based systems to deployed forces.
        Test and Evaluation: As an invaluable part of the Army test and
    evaluation enterprise, the Technical Center supports developmental and
    operational AMD defense testing with a suite of low-cost ballistic
    missile targets, transportable and configurable launchers, and test
    execution and evaluation. These ballistic missile targets are critical
    to threat-representative, operationally realistic testing of high-
    priority Army systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and IBCS, with ongoing
    testing for the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS).
        Hypersonic and Strategic Weapons: Since completing the Nation's
    first successful hypersonic weapon test in 2011, the Technical Center
    has continued supporting hypersonic testing for the Army, Navy, and Air
    Force, from test planning and design through mission execution and
    post-flight analysis. Additionally, the Technical Center continues to
    develop capabilities that enable rapid systems development and fielding
    through integration and interoperability testing, sensor and C2 design,
    flight test analysis, verification and validation, and warfighter
    training within an independent laboratory infrastructure.
        Missile Defense Testing Assets and Range: The Technical Center also
    oversees the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Test Site (RTS) at U.S.
    Army Garrison-Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands. The
    RTS is a vital national asset that provides live-fire developmental and
    operational flight testing of offensive and defensive missile,
    hypersonic, and space systems; equatorial satellite launch capability;
    space object tracking and characterization; and atmospheric science
    research. This unique range and test facility, located 2,300 miles
    west-southwest of Hawaii, provides test support to MDA, NASA, the U.S.
    Air Force, and other agencies.
        The RTS supports developmental and operational testing of both
    homeland and regional missile defense systems, as well as unarmed ICBM
    testing for the Air Force Global Strike Command, ensuring the safety,
    security, and reliability of the Nation's nuclear deterrence forces.
    Hypersonic system testing has also become a significant element of
    near-term test planning at RTS. In concert with its testing mission and
    using a suite of the world's most sophisticated radar systems,
    including the U.S. Space Force's Space Fence, RTS also supports space
    object identification and space domain awareness missions in support of
    USSPACECOM. This mission includes space object tracking and
    characterization, providing critical orbital information on new foreign
    launches and high-resolution images in support of space situational
    awareness.
        army contributions to the nation's missile defense capabilities
        The DOD adopted new strategic guidance documents in 2022, with a
    new National Defense Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review, and Missile
    Defense Review, which elaborated on the President's National Security
    Strategy. To achieve an AMD force capable of supporting the Army of
    2030, we must continue modernizing and developing AMD capabilities,
    building sufficient AMD capacity for multidomain operations, and
    ensuring AMD forces are trained and ready. We must also ensure that our
    capabilities and associated C2 systems are resilient and interoperable
    with joint and allied forces. Accomplishing these essential tasks will
    allow us to provide deterrence through deployments and forward
    stationing enabling a more robust, comprehensive defense by
    coordinating and integrating with our allies and partners.
        Army AMD is undergoing its most significant modernization in the
    last four decades, as it is one of the Army's six modernization
    priorities receiving substantially increased investment. The AMD Cross
    Functional Team (CFT) supports Army modernization efforts and works
    closely with the other Services, Joint Staff, and MDA toward joint
    integrated AMD (IAMD) capabilities. The Program Executive Office
    Missiles and Space is the Army's materiel developer for these
    capabilities and works closely with AMD CFT and U.S. Army Aviation and
    Missile Command. A summary of the Army's AMD strategic direction and
    major programs follows.
        Air and Missile Defense Readiness: Multiple factors--including the
    enduring demand from CCDRs, the transition to great power competition
    and its associated complex threat set, and the overdue and critical
    need to modernize the Army's AMD force--have all converged to impact
    Army AMD force readiness. High operational demand of missile defense
    forces to support joint warfighters continues stressing Army AMD force
    readiness, modernization, and soldier welfare. Enduring high
    operational tempo and limited deployment predictability negatively
    impact soldier readiness and family well-being. Currently, twice as
    many ADA soldiers are dwell restricted as compared to the overall Army.
        Our focus on the ADA force has seen positive results, specifically
    in the retention of our soldiers. In fiscal year (FY) 2022, 32d Army
    Air and Missile Defense Command was the first overall in the division-
    size category in Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) with a
    109.7 percent overall retention mission rate. Currently in fiscal year
    2023, 32d remains first within HQDA with over a 70 percent mission
    completion rate and the highest stabilization rate within U.S. Forces
    Command at 39 percent. What this tells us is, despite our high
    operational tempo, our ADA soldiers believe in the mission and are
    confident the Army, the ADA branch, and leaders are taking care of them
    and their families.
        Mission Command: Closely linked to AMD readiness is the ability to
    provide low density, high demand AMD mission command elements. These
    elements are pivotal to laying the foundation for and creating an
    environment that supports integration of Army AMD forces into joint and
    combined Command and Control architectures. During the past few years,
    the Army has activated an additional Active component ADA brigade
    headquarters in USINDOPACOM (38th ADA BDE at Sagami General Depot,
    Japan) and in the USEUCOM theater (52d ADA BDE at Sembach, Germany).
    The Army has also rotated a National Guard ADA brigade headquarters to
    USEUCOM.
        Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System: The IBCS
    program is a top Army AMD modernization priority that integrates
    current and future AMD sensors and weapons into a common integrated
    fire control capability, allowing warfighters to fully integrate AMD
    capabilities across all echelons. The IBCS is the direct replacement
    for mission command nodes in the PATRIOT weapon system, headquarters
    elements, and air defense airspace management cells. IBCS also allows
    rapid convergence of sensors, shooters, and mission command components
    on an integrated fire control network. Once fully fielded, IBCS will
    provide a game-changing capability that allows appropriate tailoring
    and scaling of AMD forces to meet the given threat. The quantity and
    mix of capabilities can be dynamically retasked into a formation with
    an inherent, integrated mission command system to build tiered and
    layered defenses. The IBCS open architecture enables rapid integration
    of legacy and developmental sensors and shooters that provide
    capabilities to defeat emerging threats in multidomain operations. The
    program completed Initial Operational Test and Evaluation in the first
    quarter of fiscal year 2023 and is progressing to a Full Rate
    Production Decision Review in March 2023 and Initial Operational
    Capability in April 2023.
        The IBCS program will field common mission command nodes for Army
    AMD forces to defend against manned aircraft, UAS, air-to-ground
    missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and rockets,
    artillery, and mortar (RAM) attacks. Ultimately, IBCS will operate with
    air surveillance and fire control capabilities across the Army, Air
    Force, and Navy, and with joint and multinational AMD forces at all
    echelons, thereby enhancing AMD force lethality. By dismantling the
    current system-centric mission command paradigm, it will dramatically
    increase systems capability and facilitate open industry competition in
    support of the AMD community. The IBCS is one of the Army's
    contributions to the Joint All Domain Command and Control concept
    currently in development. Additional efforts are currently underway to
    support IBCS interoperability with MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense
    System, exploring the feasibility and potential benefits of integrating
    IBCS with MDA's Command and Control, Battle Management, and
    Communications (C2BMC) capability.
        Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System: THAAD is a key
    component of the ballistic missile defense system-of-systems
    architecture and designed for area defense against short, medium, and
    intermediate range ballistic missiles. It is a mobile and globally
    transportable, low density, high demand asset that has a unique endo-
    and exoatmospheric intercept capability using proven hit-to-kill
    technology. There are currently seven operational THAAD batteries, two
    of which are forward-stationed in Guam and the Republic of Korea in
    response to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. Development
    efforts associated with U.S. Forces Korea Joint Emergent Operational
    Need improved Patriot and THAAD interoperability, as successfully
    demonstrated in a recent THAAD/Patriot MSE developmental and
    operational test where THAAD software used two MSE interceptors to
    engage a ballistic missile target. The Army, in conjunction with Office
    of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and MDA, reassessed the THAAD
    requirement to eight batteries.
        PATRIOT/PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment
    Enhancement (MSE): The Army PATRIOT force remains the cornerstone of
    AMD protection for our deployed forces and allies. The PAC-3 MSE is a
    high velocity, hit-to-kill, surface-to-air missile capable of
    intercepting and destroying tactical ballistic missiles and air-
    breathing threats. The PAC-3 MSE, a follow-on variant of the PAC-3, is
    in full-rate production and the latest generation hit-to-kill PAC-3
    interceptor in the PATRIOT force to meet global capability
    requirements. The PAC-3 MSE fills the engagement gap between THAAD and
    PAC-3 missiles while also defeating advanced threats earlier, at
    greater range, and with increased lethality. The PAC-3 MSE's improved
    capability is achieved through a high-performance solid rocket motor,
    modified lethality enhancer, more responsive control surfaces, upgraded
    guidance software, and insensitive munitions improvements.
        PATRIOT must continually modernize through software and hardware
    upgrades to address obsolescence and evolving threats, and best utilize
    extended battlespace performance afforded by the PAC-3 MSE interceptor.
    Modernization efforts provide combat identification enhancements,
    address upper-tier debris mitigation, improve PAC-3 MSE interceptor
    performance, and enable increased Army and joint interoperability. The
    Army leverages the program's stable funding profile to reduce price
    risk to the Government through firm fixed price contracting and value
    engineering initiatives. The Army mitigates obsolescence and counters
    emerging threats through the improvement of the hardware and software
    systems. In addition to the LTAMDS and IBCS integration efforts with
    PATRIOT, the Army supports the MDA-led integration of PAC-3 MSE
    interceptors and launchers into the THAAD weapon system. PAC-3 MSE
    integrated with THAAD, LTAMDS and IBCS expand the battlespace by
    leveraging the THAAD AN/TPY-2 and PATRIOT radars together to detect
    threat targets at greater ranges. The Army is continuously improving
    PATRIOT while moving toward an IBCS architecture that enables kill-
    chain contributions from a wider spectrum of Army and joint sensors and
    weapon components to overmatch the near-term evolving threat.
        Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS): LTAMDS replaces
    the current PATRIOT radar and provides networked sensing capabilities
    in lower tier air and missile defense battlespace while enabling the
    full capability of the PAC-3 MSE interceptor. The LTAMDS significantly
    improves legacy PATRIOT radar capabilities by providing expanded range
    and 360-degree coverage combined with the benefits of a networked
    sensor on the Army IAMD integrated fire control network. LTAMDS
    technology will reduce current PATRIOT radar operations and sustainment
    costs by offsetting system equipment requirements and enhancing
    reliability and maintainability. The Army will begin testing LTAMDS
    prototypes with IBCS and the PATRIOT family of interceptors in the
    second quarter, fiscal year 2023, with the objective of providing
    initial early operational capability to a PATRIOT battalion by the end
    of 2023 with follow-on testing in 2024.
        Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) Increment (Inc) 2: The
    IFPC Inc 2 is a mobile, ground-based weapon system designed to defeat
    cruise missiles, Groups 2 and 3 unmanned aircraft systems, rockets,
    artillery, and mortars and other fixed-wing and rotary-wing threats.
    The Army's IFPC Inc 2 system will integrate with IBCS as its C2 and
    leverage the Sentinel sensor to enable multidomain operations--ready
    Army by 2030. The Iron Dome Defense System-Army (IDDS-A) is the interim
    cruise missile defense solution against the IFPC threat set until IFPC
    Inc 2 is available. The Army completed acceptance and fielding of two
    IDDS-A batteries in accordance with the Fiscal Year 2019 National
    Defense Authorization Act. The Army is on schedule to field and train
    two operational IDDS-A units in the second quarter, fiscal year 2023.
        IFPC Inc 2 will be an industry-built solution for a launcher
    platform and an all-up-round-magazine capable of firing the AIM 9X
    missile. The IFPC Inc 2 system features a modular open system
    architecture to integrate future kinetic effectors to defeat advanced
    threats. The Army is on track to execute developmental tests, system
    qualifications, and operational assessments in fiscal year 2023, as
    well as a system of systems operational assessment prior to
    transitioning to a Major Capability Acquisition pathway.
        Army Long-Range Persistent Surveillance: The Army Long Range
    Persistent Surveillance (ALPS) passive sensor provides continuous, 360-
    degree, long range surveillance against fixed and rotary wing aircraft,
    UAS, and cruise missile threats. ALPS is integrated into joint and Army
    C2 systems, including IBCS and is deployed in support of operations in
    USEUCOM and INDOPACOM.
        Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS): Technological
    advances and the proliferation of commercial and tactical UAS in both
    reconnaissance and attack capabilities have matured to the point where
    they present a significant threat to Army operations from both State
    and nonState actors. The Secretary of Defense designated the Army as
    the executive agent for countering UAS threats and established the
    Joint Counter-Small UAS (C-sUAS) Office (JCO). Key JCO focus areas
    include developing joint requirements and materiel solutions, as well
    as joint training and doctrine. The Army deployed more than 500-man
    portable, fixed site, and mobile C-sUAS systems in response to a
    warfighter JUONS. The Army is continually improving equipment to
    mitigate ever-evolving threats. The Army is providing critical C-sUAS
    capabilities to Army operational divisions while also establishing C-
    sUAS protection of vital CONUS and OCONUS fixed and semi-fixed sites.
    The Army provided kinetic and non-kinetic C-sUAS capabilities in
    support of the Immediate Response Force in Europe to facilitate the
    detection, tracking, and the defeat of sUAS threats.
        Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD): M-SHORAD provides
    maneuver forces a dedicated, Stryker-based air defense kinetic
    capability against fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and UAS threats. In fiscal
    year 2018, the Army approved the development of kinetic energy M-SHORAD
    systems that integrate existing Army capabilities into Stryker combat
    vehicles. The program successfully delivered four prototype systems
    with residual combat capability to an Air Defense Artillery Regiment in
    April 2021. The Army will deliver four M-SHORAD battalions by fiscal
    year 2026. The Army is maturing high energy laser and electronic
    warfare technologies to increase M-SHORAD capabilities in support of
    the maneuver force. Ultimately, the Army envisions M-SHORAD battalions
    will contain a mix of complementary direct energy and kinetic intercept
    systems to protect the maneuver force. The Army is initiating an
    acquisition program in fiscal year 2023 to develop a Next Generation
    Short Range Interceptor (NGSRI) to replace the aging Stinger missile.
    The NGSRI capability will provide increased lethality, range, and
    target acquisition, and is expected to be available to the warfighter
    in fiscal year 2028.
      joint functional component command for integrated missile defense--
          integrating and synchronizing trans-regional missile defense
        The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
    Defense (JFCC IMD) is USSTRATCOM's integrating element for trans-
    regional missile defense. USSTRATCOM formed JFCC IMD to execute its
    UCP-assigned trans-regional missile defense responsibilities as the
    ``deny benefit'' contribution to its overall strategic deterrence
    strategy. Established in 2005 and headquartered at Schriever Space
    Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, JFCC IMD is manned by a
    cohesive team of subject matter experts from the Army, Navy, Air Force,
    Space Force, and Marine Corps, as well as government civilian and
    contractor personnel.
        JFCC IMD is the recognized subject matter expert across the joint
    missile defense enterprise in matters of trans-regional missile defense
    operational support, policy, plans, intelligence, communications,
    training and education, and operational risk assessment. The command's
    principal mission is to integrate these trans-regional missile defense
    functions across the joint and combined warfighting force. In
    coordination with of the Joint Staff, and on behalf of USSTRATCOM and
    other CCDRs, JFCC IMD champions warfighter priorities and operational
    needs. These include continued development of robust terrestrial and
    space-based missile defense sensors, integrated discrimination
    capabilities, redundant and resilient BMC3I networks with enhanced
    cybersecurity defenses, and improved means of intercepting or negating
    all missile and hybrid threats.
        The JFCC IMD works across DOD and alongside allies and key partners
    to improve integration of existing capabilities, maximizing efficiency
    and effectiveness in trans-regional missile defense missions.
    Integration is the essential force multiplier--a critically important
    mission enabler that JFCC IMD directly supports. As a functional
    component command of USSTRATCOM, JFCC IMD supports designated UCP
    responsibilities along four lines of effort:

          Conducting global missile defense planning and security
    cooperation activities.
          Conducting trans-regional missile defense operations
    support, cyber operations/security, and provide Intelligence Community-
    coordinated intelligence.
          Executing joint and combined global missile defense
    training and education.
          Assessing warfighter missile defense needs in support of
    capability development, testing, and fielding.

        To accomplish these efforts, JFCC IMD maintains close collaborative
    relationships with CCDRs, the MDA, the OSD staff, the Joint Staff,
    Services, the Intelligence Community, and our allies and partners. JFCC
    IMD continually seeks to enhance deployed forces' missile defense
    capabilities while increasing operational effectiveness and confidence
    in our collective ability to defend the Nation, deployed forces,
    allies, and partners. Some key efforts to enhance missile defense
    planning and capabilities for homeland and regional architectures
    follow.
        Policy and Planning Support: JFCC IMD worked closely with the Joint
    Staff and the Combatant Commands in developing modifications to
    strategic guidance and operational planning documents to posture the
    Joint Force in planning and assessing trans-regional missile defense
    operations to include Global Campaign Planning and Geographic Combatant
    Commander specific plans. Additionally, JFCC IMD methodically examined
    the mission's roles, responsibilities, and authorities in an
    enterprise-wide Joint Staff effort ensuring the best alignment of
    responsibilities across the joint force to ensure effective warfighter
    support. JFCC IMD also provided OSD with policy support as the Missile
    Defense subject matter experts supporting the Department's development
    of strategic guidance documents and security and defense strategies
    addressing the integrative challenges in this important mission space.
        Allied and Partner Missile Defense Integration: Given that we will
    never have enough active defense capacity, integrating our allies and
    partners into a common and mutually supportive architecture is a
    critical warfighter priority. The continued integration of space and
    missile defense will see greater opportunities for allies and partners
    to contribute to both missions. We must evolve beyond existing
    cooperation mechanisms with allies and partners to an environment of
    mutual trust and information sharing that empowers truly integrated
    planning and operations enabled by combined force development,
    simulation, and execution. Future conflicts will not be fought alone,
    and our greatest strategic advantage is the power of our alliances and
    partnerships. We should not hamstring this historic advantage with
    continued information-sharing policies and practices that preclude
    operational planning and hinder collective action.
        The Nimble Titan Campaign of Experimentation, a biennial series of
    multinational missile defense experiments, is one venue to promote this
    increased cooperation. This event brings together subject matter
    experts from allied and partner nations to explore the national policy
    and military interfaces and dynamics involved in collaborative
    coalition and alliance missile defense planning. Meeting this intent is
    necessary for developing regional defense designs, C2 relationships,
    and collective, bilateral, and multilateral policy. Nimble Titan
    fosters greater confidence in combined missile defenses and provides a
    means to advance U.S. efforts in collaboration, interoperability, and
    operational integration with our allies and partners.
        Expansion and Integration of the Trans-regional Missile Defense
    Architecture: In response to the evolving strategic environment, JFCC
    IMD continues to bolster trans-regional, homeland, and regional missile
    defense capabilities through advancement of new capabilities. These
    advancements include the Defense of Guam, Aegis Ashore site in Poland;
    continued development of the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA; the Long-
    Range Discrimination Radar; Space-based Kill Assessment; MDA's
    Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor, the MD and Missile
    Warning elements of SDA's Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture;
    the Next Generation Interceptor for homeland defense; and the Glide
    Phase Interceptor for regional hypersonic defense. Given the challenges
    associated with integrating these capabilities into a global
    architecture, JFCC IMD, in support of USSTRATCOM, provides essential
    collaboration with CCDRs to assess and address gaps in planning,
    policy, capabilities development, and operations.
        Warfighter Inputs to Capability Development: The JFCC IMD is making
    every effort to help streamline and accelerate MDA's efforts to provide
    warfighters integrated kill chain capabilities (sense, C2, and effect)
    as quickly as possible to meet increased threat developments. As
    multiple reviews have identified, the Nation must have requirement,
    acquisition, and fiscal processes and cultures that enable MDA, Defense
    Agencies, and the Services to quickly develop, test, and deliver
    effective, reliable, and sustainable missile defense capabilities. We
    must do more to improve these processes and cultures from the top down
    to the lowest levels. Our adversaries are not waiting, so we must
    change our typical ways with innovation, adaptability, risk acceptance,
    and speed. The JFCC IMD collaborates with CCDRs, MDA, and the Services,
    as well as their respective test agencies, to leverage emerging
    technologies to enhance existing systems, explore innovative
    operational concepts, and prioritize maturing technological
    advancements with the most promising near-term potential. To that end,
    JFCC IMD continues to optimize the collaboration inherent in the
    warfighter involvement process as an operational proponent for required
    missile defense capabilities and performance enhancements.
        Sustaining our competitive advantage through innovation and
    expedience depends on well-resourced and operationally relevant test
    campaigns, high fidelity modeling and simulation infrastructure and
    forward looking wargaming to challenge assumptions regarding our future
    missile defense readiness and posture. In testing over the past year,
    JFCC IMD supported an Aegis organic engagement of a Medium Range
    Ballistic Missile (MRBM) using a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA
    missile; a U.S. 3d Fleet interoperability and live-fire exercise with
    allied Navies; several data collections of hypersonic vehicle flight
    tests to characterize sensor performance; and initial testing to
    demonstrate the Long-Range Discrimination Radar's capabilities.
        Joint Integrated Air & Missile Defense Training and Education: The
    Joint Ballistic Missile Defense Training and Education Center of
    Excellence (JBTEC), in coordination with USSTRATCOM, the Joint Staff,
    Services, and CCMDs, continue developing and delivering comprehensive
    and innovative joint training programs to close gaps between Service,
    joint, and regional air and missile defense training and education. The
    JBTEC, as DOD's only Joint Center of Excellence and the joint training
    center for IAMD, offers 18 mission-focused resident, online, and mobile
    training team joint-certified courses, including orientation, staff and
    planning, all domain operations, asset management, C2BMC situational
    awareness, and general and flag officer executive seminar training. In
    2022, JBTEC instructors executed 222 courses that trained more than
    3,500 students worldwide. These courses supported ranks from E-1
    through O-10/SES encompassing almost every DOD agency. Meeting
    strategic and theater security cooperation plans, JBTEC also provided
    training to 27 allied and partner nations through both military-to-
    military and foreign military sales training venues increasing
    warfighter readiness. In 2022, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
    Commander, U.S. Strategic Command and Commander, U.S. Space Command
    identified Joint Missile Warning as an area where warfighters needed
    training. Based on the success of joint IAMD training, USSPACECOM
    designated and funded JFCC IMD's JBTEC to rapidly develop and field
    validated Joint Missile Warning training.
        Integrated Trans-regional Missile Defense Asset Management: The
    JFCC IMD, in coordination with USSTRATCOM and the CCDRs, manages trans-
    regional missile defense operational readiness posture, coordinates
    trans-regional missile defense system maintenance, and supports MDA and
    Service tests. The asset management process allows JFCC IMD to
    continually assess system readiness to defend against missile attacks
    and recommend adjustments to optimize overall missile defense
    architecture.
        Cybersecurity of the Missile Defense System: JFCC IMD, in
    coordination with USSTRATCOM and MDA, serves as the cybersecurity
    service provider for missile defense architecture to ensure cyber
    defenses and operations are planned and executed across the globe.
    Working with key stakeholders, JFCC IMD enhances the cyber defense
    posture of the missile defense operational architecture against
    malicious activity. The JFCC IMD also collaborates with mission
    partners to incorporate realistic cybersecurity testing to support the
    warfighter capability acceptance process. Additionally, JFCC IMD works
    closely with the Joint Staff, CCMDs, and MDA to educate, train, and
    exercise cybersecurity protocols to ensure the highest levels of global
    missile defense readiness.
        Comprehensive Missile Defeat: As I have highlighted above,
    adversary offensive missile and hybrid systems are increasingly complex
    and challenging in their delivery means, range, maneuverability, and
    lethality. As such, an optimal missile defeat approach requires the
    ability to counter the use of adversary missiles and their development,
    acquisition, and proliferation. The Department's contribution to this
    approach must integrate offensive and defensive capabilities to defeat
    trans-regional missile defense threats across the full spectrum of
    conflict. By developing and sustaining these capabilities, we lower
    overall costs and reduce the risk of failure.
        Importantly, as we continue developing innovative capabilities to
    empower this effort, we must implement these actions as part of an
    integrated deterrence framework using all instruments of national
    power. These actions include diplomacy at the forefront and advancing
    cross-domain deterrence with the capabilities and actions of allies and
    partners to ensure the costs and risks of adversary aggression remain
    disproportionate to any conceivable benefit. Within the Department,
    these capabilities must include conventional kinetic attack operations,
    directed energy and electromagnetic attack, cyber, and special
    operations activities. Each capability provides opportunities to reduce
    the eventual burden on prohibitively expensive hit-to-kill active
    defenses. However, none of these alone is a ``silver bullet'' against
    the threat. Our future material solutions should consist of a mutually
    supportive portfolio of capabilities with the associated integrated
    development, testing, and fielding within the joint force. To this end,
    we must understand how these systems complements one another and, more
    importantly, have the appropriate planning and execution authorities
    and BMC3I systems in place to maximize their effect.
        In summary, JFCC IMD continues to expand our Nation's trans-
    regional missile defense architecture and explore developing
    capabilities across all domains to maintain an operational advantage
    against current and future threats. We maintain our competitive edge
    through integrated planning and operational support, the development of
    warfighters through education and training, the expansion of collective
    capabilities in collaboration with our allies and partners, and the
    rapid delivery of innovative and impactful capabilities to warfighters
    to enhance our national security.
                                   conclusion
        Chairman King and Ranking Member Fischer, as members of the joint
    missile defense community, the Army continues pursuing enhancements to
    the Nation's IAMD systems, from tactical to strategic levels of
    warfare. As outlined here, USASMDC and JFCC IMD perform a broad set of
    critical national security missions. These missions include providing
    professional warfighters and capabilities to support current
    operations, ensuring they are prepared for tomorrow's fight, and
    developing the new technologies required to achieve and maintain a
    technological advantage against our adversaries. Our trained and ready
    soldiers, operating GMD elements in Colorado, Alaska, New York, and
    California, and from remote, globally deployed locations, remain
    prepared to defend the Homeland against ICBM attack. As a force
    provider to CCDRs, we provide essential regional sensor capabilities,
    ballistic missile early warning, and space-enabled communications. Our
    regional forces continue to leverage allied collaboration and planning
    efforts in developing integrated and interoperable defenses against
    various threat sets. USSTRATCOM, through JFCC IMD, continues to
    integrate missile defense capabilities to counter global missile
    threats and protect our Nation, deployed forces, and allies and
    partners.
        While operational, doctrinal, and materiel developments are
    essential, our most important assets are the thousands of soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, civilians, and contractors who
    deploy and employ our IAMD systems. As recognized by Department
    leadership, the strength behind our outstanding workforce is their
    families. Their contributions and sacrifices are foundational to the
    dedication and performance of our workforce--the role and support of
    our families empowers mission accomplishment.

        Senator King. Thank you. I am going to start with a sort of
    odd first question because my problem, Secretary Plumb, is I
    don't know who to address my question to. Does that suggest
    that we need a more integrated central functionality?
        Here we have three people in front of us, all of whom have
    different responsibilities. Maybe Admiral Hill, you are
    nodding. I mean, I just wonder if we need to need to clean up
    the organizational chart a bit. It bothers me that we have got
    missile defense and then you are the operational piece.
        General, you are in the middle of it for homeland defense.
    Do we have the proper organization to allow sufficient timely
    response and deterrence, frankly? Who wants to take the
    question?
        Dr. Plumb. I am happy to start, Senator.
        Senator King. Please.
        Dr. Plumb. I do think we do have a good organizational
    structure here. I think what you are seeing is that missile
    defense kind of runs throughout our forces, right?
        The Navy needs missile defense, the Army needs missile
    defense, the Homeland is missile defense, and so, and of
    course, the Pentagon has multiple layers. But I actually think
    this is structured quite well. I think we have good working
    relationships and I think we are making significant progress.
        Senator King. You don't think we need a kind of combatant
    command that would centralize these functions?
        Dr. Plumb. Well, since you asked, so the unified common
    plan (UCP) change--of course we have NORTHCOM, we will do
    defense of the Homeland, and so General VanHerck can speak to
    that much better than I can.
        The UCP change that has just been signed will transfer
    Joint Functional Component Command for Missile Defense (JFCC
    IMD) to Space Command, which makes sense because we had already
    transferred all the sensors to Space Command, and so that
    aligns.
        Missile defense sensors and space domain awareness sensors
    are often the same sensor, and it is good to have a kind of a
    global sensor management piece there, too. But every combatant
    commander with geographic responsibility still has missile
    defense responsibilities.
        Senator King. Well--all right, let me go back to what would
    have been my first question, and I will--I guess I will ask it
    of Admiral Hill. THAAD, Aegis, GBI, Patriot, do all--are all or
    any of those systems effective against a hypersonic missile?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Thanks for the question. I would say
    that we have capability within Patriot. It was not a
    requirement that flowed to the system, but it is got the
    natural ability to do it because it is a cruise missile killer,
    and if you have a fast-moving cruise missile, it can bite off
    part of that threat.
        When you look at the SM-6 within Aegis, Aegis has been
    dealing with maneuvering low on the deck threats for years, I
    would say decades. Taking that missile with its ability and
    going after hypersonics makes good sense, which is why we use
    it for sea-based terminal.
        THAAD operates right on the edge of the atmosphere. It is
    an energetic missile. It has got a great hit to kill record
    behind it.
        We haven't tested against hypersonic threats, but I believe
    there is like Patriot and like Aegis, there is likely some
    capability that can be leveraged there.
        Senator King. Why not more emphasis on directed energy? A
    missile--a bullet on a bullet is an expensive proposition. How
    much--well, let me ask that question, how much is a single
    THAAD bullet?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Well, I will give you a range between
    Patriot up to SM3, and they range everywhere from $4 million up
    to $10 million or so.
        Senator King. Per shot?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Per shot, yes, sir.
        Senator King. Okay----
        Vice Admiral Hill. I will also, just to kind of followup on
    direct energy. You know, to be effective, you have to be on a
    target for some period of time with high energy, right. Today,
    that high energy is scaling its way there. It is also going to
    be on a platform where it can be transported. That scaling
    effort to draw down the amount of power usage and those space
    and weight, that work is being done today. But when you----
        Senator King. Is it being done with a sense of urgency? I
    have been asking these questions for about 5 years and I don't
    get a sense of urgency in the Department on directed energy,
    which to me is clearly preferable to a $4 million bullet.
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir, and I agree. I think the
    Department has done great work by consolidating those efforts
    to specifically talk to scaling in terms of power, power out of
    the laser, what it takes to put that laser on the target. But
    let's talk about the target for a second, right.
        We are using it now generally for unmanned air vehicles,
    right, smaller, loitering, that kind of vehicles. When you talk
    about very fast-moving targets that were designed to operate in
    very high heat environments, and you are going to try to take
    them out with high heat, that is a really tough equation to
    close.
        So, more investment is required, more focus on getting to
    those areas. But it is science and engineering right now. That
    just happens to be where we are today, sir.
        Senator King. Thank you. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Plumb, how
    does the budget request support the development and fielding of
    an integrated air and missile defense system for Guam?
        Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator. There is $1.5 billion in the
    budget for fiscal year 2024 between, I think, roughly $900
    million MDA and $600 million for the Army--although I may have
    those reversed.
        But there is a lot of money toward that, and we are working
    to try to get initial capability there and then build out on
    that. I actually think--well, actually, frankly, I think
    Admiral Hill might have some to add on the sequencing of that.
    But the goal is how fast can we get some capability and then
    build out on it.
        Of course, the challenge of 360 degrees against all the
    different types of missile threats, is a new one for that
    sizable area.
        Senator Fischer. Admiral Hill, in this setting, what can
    you add to that and the progress that we are making, and if you
    can, some of the challenges that you are facing on deployment?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am. First, I will say we have a
    great partnership with the Army in terms of the system
    development, great partnership with the Navy, in terms of
    identifying the sites on where this equipment would go.
        We have a really tough customer named Admiral Aquilino who
    constantly drives us to get there as early as we can, and he
    removes barriers for us to do that. One of the hardest things
    we are doing right now, this year in 2023, is site selection
    and the start of the environmental impact surveys.
        You have to do that. We have the sites selected. We know
    that once we go to those sites and do more work, that we may
    not be able to land on all those sites. There is a dozen or so
    sites. About half of those are for MDA and the other half are
    Army. That is a real challenge.
        But the good news is, while we are doing that, we haven't
    slowed down on the development. The Army is moving very quickly
    on the integrated battle command system (IBCS). MDA is moving
    very quickly on the Aegis capability.
        We are doing something different with Aegis. It is not a
    consolidated deck house like you see on a ship. It is not
    radars overlooking the launcher so they can immediately capture
    the missile upon launch.
        The radars are external to get to the 360-degree coverage,
    along with the Army radar systems associated with IBCS. So, it
    is a tough engineering challenge just because of the physical
    lay down, and the land use, and the environmental impact
    surveys are definitely a challenge, but we are going to come
    through those within the next couple of years and you will
    start to see the capability land on the island progressively.
        I owe Admiral Aquilino a year-by-year status update on
    where we are with the integration and the operations of that
    material.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Secretary Plumb, section 1660
    of the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA required the Secretary to
    designate a single senior official to be responsible for the
    missile defense of Guam. How close is the Department to making
    that designation?
        Dr. Plumb. Senator, we are pretty close. We already held a
    missile defense executive board that is run by Under Secretary
    LaPlante, and on this issue, we still have to get the
    recommendation staffed up and through the Secretary, but it is
    in train.
        Senator Fischer. Okay, and General Karbler, how does the
    high ops-tempo rate for air defenders in Guam impact the
    quality of life for soldiers with their families that they have
    there as well?
        Lieutenant General Karbler. [Technical problems]--okay. We
    have had soldiers on Guam since 2013, so for 10 years we have
    had a THAAD battery there. Initially, it was a year deployment
    and then we transitioned that into a 3-year permanent change of
    station (PCS) so that they could bring dependents and families
    there.
        We have learned lessons from the THAAD battery being in
    Guam that we will apply as we go forward. One of the critical
    elements is the fact that the infrastructure--in addition to
    the missile defense capability that we will bring, we also have
    got to ensure that the infrastructure is there to support
    soldiers and family.
        That is a key point that we have brought up, and I know
    General Flynn at United States Army Pacific Command (USARPAC)
    is making sure that he emphasizes as well.
        Senator Fischer. Yes, thank you. As we move forward on the
    timeline that the Admiral pointed out, it is important to get
    that infrastructure in place, correct?
        Lieutenant General Karbler. Yes, ma'am, and that structure
    will be added to the Army. That will not come from the current
    structure that we have, recognizing the op-tempo challenges
    that we have within the air and missile defense force today.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. General VanHerck, United States
    Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and NORAD are required to track
    various threats to our Homeland, and I appreciated our
    discussions earlier this year on some of the items on your
    unfunded priorities list that would help increase that domain
    awareness.
        Are there additional changes that the Department can make
    in order to field capabilities faster, for example, using
    digital engineering during the development or increasing
    testing tempo? We had some good examples that you gave us
    earlier on limits that you face.
        General VanHerck. Certainly, Senator. I think culturally we
    are an industrial age department transitioning into a digital
    age. I recently went to a major defense firm, I will just say
    that, who is building that capability, who has embraced the
    digital aspect of buying down risk during multiple portions.
        So, I think there are things that we can do in a virtual
    environment. We can do things--now, what I would say is in
    parallel, not serial, as we develop capabilities to buy down
    risk and to go faster in the long run.
        Senator Fischer. Can I just have one followup there?
    Secretary Plumb, do you have anything to add to that? To me
    what the General just said, it kind of shows the importance of
    the organizational setup that is currently in place with you
    guys here at the table, that Senator King referred to in his
    first question to you. Am I reading that right?
        Dr. Plumb. Senator, I am not----
        Senator Fischer. You can--so you can work in parallel
    instead of in serial, or am I just going to--tease my colleague
    here a little bit----
        Dr. Plumb. I think what General VanHerck is getting at is
    if you can transition to digital design, you can change your
    plans and your structure and even what you build faster because
    you have a much quicker feedback loop into your system.
        I think some of the more forward leaning parts of the
    industrial base, and even the commercial base, have figured
    this out. I am happily not the acquisition person, but I fully
    support moving faster and smarter, especially when it saves
    money and gets us capability sooner.
        Senator Fischer. And we do as well, which I think is
    important to be able to have the focus that General Karbler
    has, and that Admiral Hill has to be able for them to have that
    focus on what they are trying to accomplish and get done under
    the current organization. Does that make sense? No?
        Dr. Plumb. Yes.
        Senator Fischer. Yes. Thank you.
        Senator King. Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General
    VanHerck, last July, you told reporters at the Aspen Security
    Forum that AARO's [All Anomaly Resolution Office] formation did
    not change how NORAD did business.
        Following the events involving the Chinese high-altitude
    balloon and three unidentifiable anomalous phenomenon (UAP),
    has NORAD increased its coordination with AARO? And have you
    begun to identify a higher volume of unidentified aerial
    phenomenon?
        General VanHerck. Senator, absolutely. As a matter of fact,
    the lead of AARO came out to NORAD, NORTHCOM, gave us a visit.
        Senator Gillibrand. Great.
        General VanHerck. Working much closer on the challenges
    that we face, ensuring that we are sharing data and information
    from anything that we see or do not see to ensure that we pass
    it to the organization so they can further investigate it.
    Absolutely.
        Senator Gillibrand. The last time we had a hearing with
    AARO, we discussed investing in over-the-horizon radar and
    other type of new sensors that would help with collection. Have
    you been consulted on any of that discussion?
        General VanHerck. I have been heavily involved in the
    discussions on over-the-horizon radar with both Canada and the
    United States. The Department is funding over-the-horizon for
    the United States, and Canada has announced too. So absolutely,
    yes, I am directly involved.
        Senator Gillibrand. Have you been in the discussions about
    the type of sensors that could be used or deployed to garner
    information specifically for the airspace that we don't really
    look at because it is not related to missiles?
        General VanHerck. I am not sure I understand that. So more
    broadly, I would just tell you that over-the-horizon, radar is
    not the end all, be all solution. That will give me domain
    awareness further away from the Homeland.
        I am still confident in my ability to detect the balloons
    that we saw, the PRC high altitude balloon, and the subsequent
    objects that we saw and shutdown. But that is not the end all,
    be all. There has to be domain awareness between the over-the-
    horizon radars, that links the data from there to an endgame
    effector, and so there needs to be additional domain awareness.
        We need to look more broadly at the rest of the
    infrastructure, the radars as well, and ensure the data from
    those systems is incorporated in an integrated air and missile
    defense system that can lead to effectors. I will go back to
    the comments of the Chairman. I am focused not on endgame
    kinetic kill.
        I am focused primarily on the policy for what we must have
    in game kinetic kill, but more broadly, for developing
    capabilities such as the use of the electromagnetic spectrum,
    non-kinetic effectors to deny and deceive, and limited area or
    wide area defense capabilities, to include the use of
    autonomous unmanned platforms with domain awareness
    capabilities that could be maritime and airborne.
        Senator Gillibrand. Are you coordinating that--those
    recommendations and those plans with AARO?
        General VanHerck. Not directly with AARO right now,
    Senator. Into the Department, which I am assuming the
    Department is going to pull in AARO as part of that. So right
    now, we are relooking the policy for Homeland defense. I have
    provided my commanders estimate, which is a plan for that.
        I am also in the middle of developing what I call Homeland
    Defense Design 2035, which gets after exactly what I talked
    about, a new way of defending the Homeland. That is vastly
    different than the way we do it today with fighters, tankers,
    AWACS [airborne early warning and control system], those kinds
    of things.
        Senator Gillibrand. I appreciate that, and I am looking
    forward to that myself. We have heard that our radar sites,
    depending on who you asked, are based on 1980's technology, or
    1990's era technology and 1960's era decision process.
        How--I assume, based on your last answer, that you are
    improving the Northern Warning System and bringing other
    critical defensive infrastructure to be fully modernized.
        General VanHerck. So, the over-the-horizon radars will be
    addition to the North Warning Systems. The Department hasn't
    made a decision on modernization of the North Warning System or
    further replacement of the radars associated with the North
    Warning System, but that has to be a discussion. Like I said,
    OTHR is not the end all, be all solution.
        Senator Gillibrand. Understood. So, are you going to give
    us recommendations for updating the Northern Warning System?
        General VanHerck. As part of the relook at Homeland defense
    and the policy study ongoing right now, that has to absolutely
    be part of the way forward.
        Senator Gillibrand. I look forward to seeing that. Admiral
    Hill--there is still time, right? 30 seconds, okay. I didn't
    know if your tap was hurry up. I didn't know it was a hurry up
    tap. Okay.
        Admiral Hill, while at the House Armed Services Committee
    hearing in March, General Milley told Congresswoman Stefanik
    that he believed a potential third missile defense site at Fort
    Drum would be strategically worthwhile.
        Do you agree with that assessment? What advantage does this
    provide us when dealing with a potential nuclear threat from
    Iran?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am. During my last testimony, I
    did mention that I support the Chairman's comments. I think
    another site--you can never have too many sensors. You can
    never have too many effectors to deal with the kind of threats
    that we are dealing with.
        I do think it is part of a mix of other options that we can
    look at. We are doing a study now that we owe back to the Hill
    by the end of June, and so we will complete that and deliver
    that.
        Senator Gillibrand. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I am going to
    submit a question for the record concerning cyber to Secretary
    Plumb. Thank you.
        Senator King. Senator Cramer.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Admiral Hill,
    I am going to start with you just to relieve General VanHerck,
    who is thinking he is going to ask me about PARCS [Perimeter
    Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System]. I know he
    has asked me about PARCS.
        He always asks me about PARCS. So, I--maybe building on
    what he has just been talking about, maybe I will get back to
    him as well, related to Senator Gillibrand, what role does
    ground-based radar play?
        And since I brought up ground-based, and what about PARCS?
    What do you see is the future for PARCS, and in this
    transition, at least to more space-based?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. I believe the PARCS radar is
    owned and operated by the Space Force. We did and continue to
    assess the utility of it based on where our threat regions are
    and our focus for our sensor architecture.
        Right now, PARCS is not a part of the overall missile
    defense architecture. I think the Space Force has ideas for it.
    I am just, I am not familiar with them yet, so I would probably
    have to go back and----
        Senator Cramer. So, does that mean I have to ask General
    VanHerck again, to remind us of the importance of PARCS, short-
    term, mid-term, maybe long-term? General.
        General VanHerck. There is $108 million in the President's
    request in fiscal year 2024 for PARCS to go forward. It is
    crucial for missile warning today. As we go forward, and the
    proliferated low-Earth orbit capabilities come online, then I
    am sure the Department will reassess the need. I am confident
    if it is still required, the Department will continue to fund
    it.
        Senator Cramer. The policy that you were visiting with
    Senator Gillibrand about--when would we expect that and how
    would that affect, say, a budget a year from now, 2 years from
    now, as we are trying to, you know, beat--move at the pace of
    China.
        General VanHerck. Yes, I would defer to Department on that.
    I expect that policy within weeks to a few months, and it
    should inform the next budget cycle.
        Senator Cramer. Very good. Thank you. I will yield back,
    Mr. Chairman. Thank you all.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator. My impression, and
    perhaps you have the figures, Mr. Secretary, is that we are
    spending a lot more money on developing hypersonic missiles
    than we are in defending against hypersonic missiles. Is that
    true?
        Dr. Plumb. I don't have hard numbers on that, sir.
        Senator King. I will take that for the record, please.
        Dr. Plumb. Yes.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Dr. Plumb. The Department requested $5.7 billion in its
    fiscal year 2024 budget request for offensive hypersonicmissile
    development. This amount includes:

          $713 million for Air Force programs

          $1.4 billion for Army programs

          $1.3 billion for Navy programs

          $2.3 billion for Defense Wide activities

        The Department requested $278 million in its fiscal year
    2024 budget request for the development of defensive
    capabilities to counter hypersonic missiles, specifically. This
    amount includes:

          $209 million for the Missile Defense Agency's
    (MDA) hypersonic defense programs including the Glide Phase
    Interceptor

          $69 million for MDA's Hypersonic and Ballistic
    Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS

        Additionally, MDA's Sea-Based Terminal provides hypersonic
    defense capability. Program and funding details are available
    at a higher classification.
        The Department also requested $7.7 billion \1\ in its
    FY2024 budget request for multi-mission capabilities that will
    support defense against more than one threat type (ballistic,
    cruise, and hypersonic).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ This amount does not include several efforts (e.g., command and
    control (C2), engineering, and testing) that enable missile defense
    capabilities.

          $2.3 billion for Air Force Missile Warning/
    Missile Track (MW/MT) Architecture
          $2.6 billion for Air Force Next-Gen Overhead
    Persistent Infrared Architecture
          $428 million for Air Force Over-the-Horizon
    Radars
          $1.2 billion for Army Patriot Missile Segment
    Enhancement (MSE)
          $1.2 billion for Navy Standard Missile-6 (SM-6)
    procurement

        Senator King. If I am correctly informed that that is the
    case, that we are spending more, it seems to me that we ought
    to be reconsidering that in terms of the importance of defense.
        Let me go back to my question to Admiral Hill. Can we stop
    a hypersonic missile today? You are on an aircraft carrier in
    the Western Pacific. Hypersonic missiles, fires coming at you
    7,000 miles an hour. Do we have the capability to stop that
    missile?
        Vice Admiral Hill. We have the capability to stop it in two
    places. One is in its ballistic flight and----
        Senator King. But it is a hypersonic missile. Does it
    necessarily go into ballistic flight?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Not all of them do, but the ones that
    are currently in the theater we are talking about will normally
    start with a boost, and then go into a glide, and then into the
    terminal phase. In the terminal phase, it can be defeated.
        Senator King. Do we have--it can be defeated by a ship at
    sea?
        Vice Admiral Hill. By a destroyer guarding the carrier.
    Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Why aren't we testing more? I couldn't find
    it in my notes, but I think China is testing something like 20
    times as many missiles we are. Why are we so--they seem to be
    more tolerant of failure, and they learn more. Our tests have
    to be perfect. Talk to me about testing.
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. Testing is really the end of
    the system engineering loop, right. You are validating that you
    have met your requirements through the system development.
        Clearly, they are moving faster than we are. I would say
    that many of the tests that we do in some of these more high-
    end threat areas that we don't report out publicly because of
    the classified nature of them.
        There is, I would say, a reasonable amount of testing that
    is occurring against those sorts of advanced threats. We just
    don't publicize them.
        Senator King. Well, I think it was you in your testimony
    that said we are not reacting fast enough, that this climate is
    changing so rapidly that we are not--what should we be doing?
        What can this Committee do in the way of additional
    resources, additional organizational changes so that we are not
    continually trying to catch up? Because we are--we have--this
    is a strategic change in the in the world that we are not
    adequately addressing. What do we need--I am talking about
    hypersonics. What do we need to do to be able to address that
    more effectively?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. So, we have addressed the
    policy, so, the hypersonic defense that we do today is regional
    based, meaning we will take care of forward sea bases, and
    forward deployed Army maneuver forces. That is our focus today.
        We want to do layered defense, which is why I will talk
    about glide phase. I will talk about kill it in the boost
    phase. We know how to kill aircraft. When we are down in that
    terminal phase, we have to have a robust capability to do that
    in the load out on the ships. So that is our focus today is on
    regional.
        We do not have the policy to go after the strategic
    hypersonics, and that may be where you are going, Senator. I am
    not sure.
        Senator King. Well, it seems to me that this is a
    deterrence gap, where we need our adversaries to know that this
    weapon is not going to be effective. The whole idea of
    deterrence is that there is a level of resilience, and that is
    what worries me. Is that by not having the defensive
    capability, you are inviting, in effect, a strike.
        Vice Admiral Hill. We do have the defensive capabilities
    within the sea-based today. I want to work with the Army to
    build out the Patriot capability that we talked about earlier
    and to add to that capability.
        We have a program in place called the Glide Phase
    Interceptor to thin the raid up in a different part of that
    flight regime, because we, from a layered defense perspective,
    we want to attack every part of that trajectory, and
    particularly where they are vulnerable, which is the glide
    phase.
        Senator King. Taking account of chaff and diversions and--
    --
        Vice Admiral Hill. absolutely----
        Senator King.--decoys and all of that kind of thing.
    General Karbler, can you see a hypersonic from space, single
    missile?
        Lieutenant General Karbler. Depending on the platform,
    delivery systems, sir, yes. If it is on the end of a boosting
    missile, we will see the initial--we will get an initial
    indication of it launching. But once it starts going into its
    flight phase, it becomes a very difficult target to track, to
    keep it from--to keep track custody of it really from birth to
    death, as I would----
        Senator King. Particularly if it is at a low altitude. Is
    that correct?
        Lieutenant General Karbler. Correct.
        Senator King. This is an entirely different question.
    Obviously, missile defense is very important to the Ukrainians.
    Why isn't Iron Dome being deployed to Ukraine? Secretary Plumb.
    We helped pay for it.
        We have spent something like $3 billion to Israel to
    develop it. $500 million a year, my understanding is. Wouldn't
    this be a very important resource for the Ukrainians since
    their principal problem right now is air defense?
        Dr. Plumb. So, Senator, what we are using for supplying
    Ukraine with missile defenses from the United States stock is
    things we can draw down from our own stock. You know, we
    supplied Patriot batteries, for example. We supplied
    significant investments in missile defense, and we have
    encouraged allies to do the same.
        Senator King. I understand a Patriot just took down a
    Russian missile yesterday, I believe.
        Dr. Plumb. It certainly has been in the news.
        Senator King. Open source, I guess.
        Dr. Plumb. Open source, there was a Patriot interceptor
    that killed a hypersonic missile in the last few days, yes,
    sir.
        Senator King. What about Iron Dome?
        Dr. Plumb. I am not aware of an Iron Dome system being
    offered to Ukraine, but that could be incorrect. I just don't
    know. Maybe someone else at the table, but I am not sure.
        Senator King. Any other thoughts?
        Lieutenant General Karbler. Sir, our two Iron Dome batters
    that we have right now, one completed its no equipment,
    training, no equipment, fielding. It is prepared for
    deployment. The second one is wrapping up its new equipment
    fielding right now. The Army does have one battery available
    for deployment pending a request for it.
        Senator King. Thank you. Secretary Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. I was going to say that I got----
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. I promoted you.
        Senator Rosen.--I got a promotion or----
        Senator King. Senator Rosen, sorry.
        Senator Rosen. It is a flying day, so it is a long flight
    from the West Coast. So, there you go. Just got in. Thank you
    very much, Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer. Appreciate
    it, and appreciate all of you and for your service, everything
    you are doing here today. So, I am going to talk a little bit
    about safeguarding domain awareness.
        So General VanHerck, as you well know, our adversaries
    continue to field advanced capabilities across domains that
    have the potential to threaten the Homeland. So, in light of
    these threats, NORTHCOM and NORAD must ensure that the systems
    providing the Homeland with domain awareness are survivable,
    adaptable, and modern.
        In addition, these systems must be hardened, as they will
    be subject to an array of cyber-attacks during any contingency,
    and so, I am encouraged by NORTHCOM's continued efforts to
    modernize legacy detection systems such as the over-the-horizon
    radar. Detection alone isn't sufficient.
        Operators have to have the ability to effectively
    communicate the operational picture to other commands, as well
    as to our partners and allies, often under highly compressed
    timeframes.
        We see those with hypersonics and others. General VanHerck,
    what steps are you taking to sufficiently harden our command
    and control nodes, particularly in the cyber domain, so that we
    are able to effectively share the operational picture during
    our potential conflict?
        General VanHerck. Senator, thanks for that. I am advocating
    to the Department that the foundational infrastructure, the IT
    [information technology] network and backbones that the data
    and information rides on, it allows us to share data and
    information internally, and with the allies and partners and my
    fellow combat commanders, is resilient and redundant in the way
    we go.
        The Department this year has put several billion dollars
    into foundational infrastructure, which I think is crucial as
    we move forward to get after the cyber vulnerabilities that you
    talked to. Candidly, my most concerning domain awareness
    problem is exactly that.
        It is the limited knowledge of cyber vulnerabilities for
    the critical infrastructure that we rely on to project power
    from our Homeland, to defend our Homeland, to do command and
    control within our Homeland. So, I continue to advocate for
    that to the Department.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that, because I
    think the resiliency of redundancy and the agility of those
    systems are going to help us be successful.
        In the technology space, of course, Admiral Hill, as you
    are aware, China's missile defense strategy heavily emphasizes
    developing anti-access, aerial denial capabilities, which use a
    combination of ballistic and cruise missiles launched from air,
    land, and sea to target the United States and, of course, our
    allied military assets in the Asia Pacific Theater, such as
    those in Guam or Okinawa.
        Admiral Hill, with the rapid increase in China's
    technological advancement and missile accuracy, what kind of
    measures are we employing to increase the survivability of our
    own platforms to ensure that we can operate in and around these
    highly contested environments in the Pacific?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am. Thanks, Senator. I use the
    aircraft carriers, since Senator King brought that up a little
    bit earlier, that is where we focused our energies on
    increasing the ability to take on the hypersonic threat. The
    ships currently are outfitted with ballistic missile defense.
        From a missile defense perspective, ships moving forward
    into the island chain have the ability to defend against
    ballistic missiles. They have their own capability to do self-
    defense against cruise missiles, and we have hypersonic
    defense. A ship has to worry about a lot, so, I am not going to
    speak for the Navy.
        I can just speak to the missile defense missions that we
    provide in coordination with the Navy. With the Army, we have
    talked a lot about the maneuver force in terms of Patriots,
    THAAD, and station forward. Defense is important if you want to
    either buy time or to ensure that you can live to fight another
    day.
        Senator Rosen. That is right. Well, thank you, and I know
    that Chairman King talked about hypersonic weapons. So,
    Secretary Plum, Russia and China, no secret they are fielding
    hypersonic weapons. There are highly maneuverable vehicles that
    fly around more than five times the speed of sound.
        The weapons have the potential to overwhelm our U.S.
    missile defense systems, undermine our strategic deterrence.
    So, I know we are not in a classified setting, so I would like
    to hear a little bit about your assessment of our hypersonic
    missile defense programs, our space-based sensors, what do we
    do to neutralize the threat?
        I notice as I read some of the background, and you alluded
    to this earlier, that of course, we have the--we know much
    earlier on a ballistic missile where it is going, and we have
    to not able to track the hypersonic once it may have left its
    launch.
        So that timeframe of difference, and I know we are not in
    classified setting, but are we able to be agile enough to track
    it, to notify our allies and partners to make adequate
    decisions across the spectrum?
        Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Senator. Just a couple of pieces, if I
    may. So just to start, five times the speed of sound is--all
    the ballistic missiles travel pretty fast, right. So, it is not
    really just a speed piece. It is the maneuverability of a
    hypersonic weapon that bothers everyone at the table, because
    you can't predict the end point by knowing the initial launch
    conditions.
        There is a lot of ballistic missiles in the world that
    still maneuver at the end, but they still give you a better
    arabesque, and you just kind of know about where they are going
    to end up if you do your math right, but you can't do that with
    a cruise missile because it can keep maneuvering.
        One of the things we are really heavily investing in is a
    space-based architecture that can at least have awareness of
    where these things are through their flight. Admiral Hill is
    working on something called HBTSS--which I call hobbits, I
    don't know if anyone else does. But the idea there is to
    actually be able to do custody of it and be able to track a
    piece all the way through.
        We are working on this, and that is a big problem because
    you can't just rely on one vector or one radar phase to tell
    you a thing is coming, and so it is a hard problem. We are
    working on that. So that is one piece. You got to have that
    domain awareness and ability to track these things, and we are
    working hard on that.
        Also, you have to have something to be able to actually
    shoot at it, otherwise all you can do is watch it, and so, it
    turns out Patriot even has some ability against the hypersonic.
        But the Glide Phase Intercept Program is one thing that is
    being worked on, for example. Admiral Hill has already spoken
    at some length about sea-based terminal mode of the SM-6, which
    is good for ship defense and point defense. So, we are working
    on all these pieces together.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I see my time is up.
        Senator King. Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
    Rosen, for the lead into my question, which is about----
        Senator Rosen. I predicted it.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you. About SM-6--so, Admiral Hill,
    Secretary Plumb, the SM-6 ship launched anti-air and anti-
    surface interceptor, this missile is produced at Raytheon in
    Tucson, Arizona.
        Admiral Hill, last year during this hearing, you noted that
    the SM-6 is the only weapon in the country's arsenal capable of
    engaging highly maneuverable hypersonic missiles, threats,
    incoming threats.
        So, in the context of potential adversaries, can you please
    speak a little bit more about how important it is for the U.S.
    to have an arsenal capable of engaging highly maneuverable,
    hypersonic threats?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir, and it is a full kill chain
    answer, right. Secretary Plumb already talked about our ability
    to detect and track them. If you can't do that, you can't fire
    anything at it.
        It is a very complex--once it comes into the glide phase,
    it has got the ability to maneuver globally. So that is why we
    need to see them from space and have a total track custody, all
    the way to the end game.
        When they dip into the atmosphere and start that maneuver,
    you have to have a shooting battery, whether it is a ship or
    some sort of land-based unit, that can do that, fine-tune,
    tracking in the endgame to launch and control that missile.
        But it is important to have an arsenal, and when you say
    arsenal, I translate that as an inventory. You need a large
    inventory of them because, again, the threat can be defined as
    big, big numbers, very high speed and maneuver.
        Senator Kelly. Before we get to the procurement and the
    inventory numbers, can you comment a little bit about when we
    get to that endgame, when we--and maybe you can't because this
    is not a classified setting, but when we look at like cross
    range for an SM-6, can it match the cross range capability of
    any hypersonic missile that China is currently developing?
        Vice Admiral Hill. I think in this environment I can say
    yes that we are matched very well with the threat and where it
    is today. We are going to have to continue to improve our
    missile capability. At some point we will over overmatch the G
    capability of that missile frame.
        Senator Kelly. Secretary Plumb, Admiral Hill mentioned that
    we would need a lot of them. I understand DOD is requesting a
    multiyear procurement in the next budget request to include 825
    SM-6 missiles. Can you explain why it's such a critical request
    as we face this capable adversary, and why doing large lot
    procurements is the best way to do this?
        Dr. Plumb. Well, first of all, Senator, again, I am not the
    acquisition professional at this table, but I will just say
    that once you have a proven capability, being able to buy in
    large lots gives you insight into how the missile performs. It
    is much better than just building a few at a time. It is a much
    better way to do your statistics on your manufacturing and how
    it works.
        Senator Kelly. You know, if we have a high value target and
    we have got an incoming hypersonic missile, I imagine the ops
    plan there is not to just launch one of these things at it.
    Hence the 825 number to protect----
        Dr. Plumb. That is true----
        Senator Kelly.--protect the fleet and the high value
    targets.
        Dr. Plumb. Sir, in air defense, it is really an operational
    question because it will vary. But most commanding officers of
    a ship, most commanding officers of a battery will determine
    what their salvo size is based on the threat and numbers that
    they are dealing with. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you. Another subject. So, the request,
    I think, is for $1.6 billion for Aegis in fiscal year 2024,
    which gets us 27 SM-3 Block 1Bs and 12 SM3 Block 2As and
    develops upgrades to the system.
        The Aegis site is expected to be among the first to receive
    the SM-3 Block 2A. I think this is going to be at the Aegis
    Ashore site in Poland, is my understanding. Can you provide a
    status of Aegis ashore in Poland, and what it will be able to
    do when fully operational?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. So, Aegis Ashore in Romania,
    operational today. Poland is going through the board of
    inspection survey today.
        We are leveraging the Navy processes there that drive us to
    Chief of Naval Operations' acceptance by the end of this fiscal
    year. It will then go through European Command and NATO's
    [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] acceptance throughout next
    year.
        So, we are right now operating the site, but we will come
    through those different certifications over the course of the
    next few months, and it will be fully operational.
        What it provides is it completes European phase--phase
    three, which means that we can defend against ballistic
    missiles from rogue countries to protect Europe and the United
    States.
        Senator Kelly. In my remaining 15 seconds, real quick, when
    I was over in the Middle East in January, Israel and some of
    our Middle East partners made a request in looking for support
    for an integrated missile defense architecture in the Middle
    East between Israel, other countries, and the United States.
    What are your thoughts on an integrated regional missile
    defense for the Middle East?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Is that a question for me?
        Senator Kelly. Yes.
        Vice Admiral Hill. It is probably more of an operational
    question, but from an acquisition and development perspective,
    we work very closely with Israel. Senator King mentioned that
    $500 million of our budget every year goes to building out the
    defense capabilities for Israel, focused mostly on upper tier
    Arrow, David's Sling, and Iron Dome.
        We integrate as far as we can integrate, whether it is
    across the sensor architecture to provide tracks, or if it is a
    deeper set of integration, as a General Karbler does within the
    Army on Iron Dome. But I think there is nothing wrong with
    being integrated across friends and allies.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you.
        Senator King. I want to thank all of you for joining us
    today. I have a couple of concluding thoughts. One, is it
    strikes me as bothersome that all three of you are leaving at
    the same time. It also strikes me as bothersome that I think
    that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Chief of the Navy, I believe
    the Air Force are also all leaving this summer at the same
    time.
        There ought to be a staggered system so that there is
    continuity in this critically important function. That is not
    your problem, but it is one that, Mr. Secretary, I think we
    ought to think about. To have the entire upper echelon of this
    particular, critical function walking out the door essentially
    within months strikes me as not a good organizational
    structure.
        Second, the three of you are in an extraordinary position
    to be able to give us some strong exit interview data. In other
    words, as you are leaving, what would you change? What would
    you suggest to the Committee in terms of authorities,
    organizational structures, priorities? Where do you think we
    could improve this entire missile defense enterprise?
        As I say, all three of you are in an exceptional position
    to do that, and I am not in the position of assigning homework
    here, but it would be very important to the Committee if you
    could give--just give us two or three pages. Here is what I
    would change, as I am going out the door, to improve the
    functioning of this critically important part of our deterrent
    and our national defense posture.
        I want to thank you all again for your service,
    congratulate you, and look forward to your suggestions. And the
    only--other thing I would say is, do it soon. We are about to
    do the National Defense Authorization Act in about 5 weeks, and
    we would love to have your input as the Subcommittee makes its
    report to the full Committee.
        Thank you again and thank you for your service to the
    country. Senator Fischer, did you want to add any conclusion?
        Senator Fischer. Well, I would say, well said, Mr.
    Chairman. Thank you all.
        Senator King. Thank you. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:48 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
                              hypersonic missiles
        1. Senator King. Admiral Hill, today I asked you if we had the
    capability to stop a hypersonic missile `today' coming at an aircraft
    carrier in the Western Pacific. You answered that the Navy could stop
    it in two places: ballistic flight and terminal phase. Furthermore, you
    relayed that a Navy guided-missile destroyer (DDG) can stop a
    hypersonic missile from approaching an aircraft carrier. However, the
    Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) testified earlier this year that there
    is more work to be done in hypersonic defense. The CNO further
    testified that he is not satisfied with where we are regarding naval
    defense against a hypersonic attack in the Indo-Pacific. What are the
    hypersonic threats (capacity and capability) in the maritime and land
    domains (against our ship formations, land formations overseas, and in
    the homeland) today through 2030? Please provide a detailed answer,
    classified up to TS-SCI if needed, that includes a year-by-year
    analysis from now until 2030.
        Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]

        2. Senator King. Admiral Hill, what kinetic capability and capacity
    do we have to defeat these threats in the boost, glide, and terminal
    phases? Please provide a detailed answer, classified up to TS-SCI if
    needed, that includes a year-by-year analysis from now until 2030.
        Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]

        3. Senator King. Admiral Hill, what capability gaps should be
    addressed, in priority, from technical feasibility for defeating a
    hypersonic arsenal? Please provide a detailed answer, classified up to
    TS-SCI if needed, that includes a year-by-year analysis from now until
    2030.
        Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]
                               high-energy laser
        4. Senator King. Secretary Plumb and Admiral Hill, Although only
    one Navy surface combatant, the USS Preble (DDG 88), is equipped with a
    high-energy laser (HELIOS), no additional Surface Navy Laser Weapon
    Systems were funded in the fiscal year 2024 President's Budget Request.
    What is the Department of Defense's (DOD's) roadmap and funding profile
    for equipping Army, Navy, and Air Force platforms with integrated
    directed energy weapons?
        Secretary Plumb. The DOD's roadmap for Directed Energy Weapons
    (DEWs) consists of high-power laser and microwave technology and system
    development with near, mid, and far-term objectives to field
    capabilities against increasingly stressing threats. The Military
    Departments and Agencies are investing accordingly to incrementally
    mature technology while leveraging DOD-wide directed energy efforts to
    accelerate development of DEWs. Collaboration between the Military
    Services and Agencies has been beneficial for technological
    advancements and opportunities to expand the industrial base. The DE
    funding included in the fiscal year 2024 President's Budget Request is
    approximately $920 million, inclusive of science and technology (S&T)/
    research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities across
    all Military Departments and Agencies as well as the integrated DE
    weapon developments by the Military Departments.
        The Army is on track to deliver combat-capable integrated DE
    systems within the Future Years Defense Program that will address a
    range of threats:

          The DE Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD)
    50kW-class laser weapon will defeat Group 1-3 Unmanned Aerial Systems
    (UAS), Rotary Wing and Rocket, Artillery and Mortar threats. The Army
    will deliver 4 prototype systems in fiscal year 2023 and has funds
    allocated to transition DE M-SHORAD to a program of record in the FYDP.

          Army is teaming with the Joint community on the Indirect
    Fire Protection Capability-High Power Microwave (IFPC-HPM) program to
    deliver four prototype systems in fiscal year 2024. These prototype
    systems will defeat Group 1-2 UAS threats and swarms.

          The IFPC-High Energy Laser (IFPC-HEL) 300kW-class laser
    weapon will defeat Cruise Missiles in addition to Group 1-3 Unmanned
    Aerial Systems (UAS), Fixed Wing, Rotary Wing and Rocket, Artillery and
    Mortar threats. The Army will deliver two prototype systems in fiscal
    year 2025.

          The Army is also developing the Army Multipurpose-High
    Energy Laser (AMP-HEL) 20kW-class laser weapon to be integrated on an
    infantry squad vehicle and plans to deliver four prototype systems in
    fiscal year 2024. These prototype systems will defeat Group 1-2 UAS
    threats.

        The Army's budget request for integrated DE weapons in fiscal year
    2024 is $210 million and approximately $1 billion through the FYDP.
        The Navy has already delivered several combat-capable DE systems
    that are being operated and sustained as Fleet assets while other
    systems are being developed.

          The AN/SEQ-4 Optical Dazzler Interdictor, Navy (ODIN)
    Counter-ISR (C-ISR) laser system is on eight Guided Missile Destroyers
    (DDG) platforms. The Department plans to request funding across the
    FYDP to support capability upgrades, maintenance, and sustainment.

          The 60 kW HELIOS weapon system has been installed on USS
    Preble and is undergoing system checkouts and crew training prior to
    deployment in 2024. HELIOS addresses UAS threats and also provides C-
    ISR capabilities.

          The Navy is also developing the HELCAP S&T laser weapon
    testbed for Counter Anti-Ship Cruise Missile demonstrations in fiscal
    year 2024-2025.

        The Navy budget request for these integrated DE weapon systems and
    demonstrations in fiscal year 2024 is $51 million and $239 million
    through the FYDP.
        The Air Force is developing two High-Power Microwave (HPM)
    integrated weapon system demonstrators called Directed Energy Frontline
    Electromagnetic Neutralization and Defeat (DEFEND) that will evaluate
    capabilities supporting Integrated Air and Missile Defense. The Navy is
    working closely with the Air Force on DEFEND to assess the options for
    shipboard applications. The Air Force budget request for DEFEND in
    fiscal year 2024 is $80 million and $115 million through the FYDP.
        Vice Admiral Hill. We refer your question to Office of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)).
    OUSD(R&E) acts as the central coordinator for all directed energy
    development across the Department of Defense (DOD). They are best
    suited to provide a full and holistic picture of the Department's
    roadmap and the progress being made on directed energy.

        5. Senator King. Secretary Plumb, how could the High Energy Laser
    prototypes developed under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
    High Energy Laser Scaling Initiative (HELSI) program coupled with the
    HELIOS scalable architecture be leveraged to enable simultaneous
    development and deployment of even more capable integrated Surface Navy
    Laser Weapon System (SNLWS) prototypes at 120kW-, 300kW-and 500kW-class
    power levels?
        Secretary Plumb. The OSD HELSI program successfully demonstrated
    300 kW class laser sources from multiple vendors in fiscal year 2023.
    The second phase of HELSI initiated in fiscal year 2023 with the goal
    of demonstrating scalability of those laser architectures to between
    500 kW and 1 MW by 2026.
        As part of the Navy's SNLWS program, the 60 kW HELIOS weapon system
    has been installed on USS Preble and is undergoing system checkouts and
    crew training. The Navy is planning a Counter Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
    maritime test with HELIOS in late calendar 2023 prior to deployment of
    the USS Preble in fiscal year 2024. In parallel to HELIOS, the Navy is
    preparing to integrate one of the already demonstrated OSD 300kW HELSI
    sources into their HELCAP S&T laser weapon testbed for c-ASCM
    demonstrations in fiscal year 2024-2025.
        The Navy is also exploring options for integration of a HELSI
    source with scalable power architecture, with considerations for:

          Operationalizing a 300kW-class maritime prototype laser
    weapon system onboard a DDG 51 surface combatant.

          Designing, manufacturing, integrating, and testing new/
    upgraded/modified systems needed to convert a 300kW HELSI laser into a
    laser weapon system for a Navy ship.

          Minimizing installation complexity and integration time
    by superstructure removal/replacement (pre-built) and shipboard-
    consistent configuration for integration at a West Coast land-based
    site.

        6. Senator King. Admiral Hill, does the Missile Defense Agency have
    an overall roadmap for directed energy weapon research and development
    and eventual fielding to counter threats in the land and air domains?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has a
    roadmap for directed energy weapon research and development which flows
    into the OUSD(R&E) directed energy enterprise. The MDA participates in
    all appropriate directed energy and enabling technology Communities of
    Interest, which builds the directed energy roadmaps across the
    Department. These foundational plans support a DOD wide rollout of
    directed energy solutions across the breadth of applicable mission
    areas, to augment existing layered missile defenses.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
                                 cybersecurity
        7. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Plumb and Admiral Hill, I
    understand that the Missile Defense Agency entered a $266 million
    dollar contract last year to improve cybersecurity within our weapons
    systems. Can you address how the Department of Defense is working to
    expand its internal cyber workforce? How can Congress help improve your
    capabilities?
        Secretary Plumb. On March 1, 2023, Deputy Secretary of Defense
    Kathleen Hicks signed the 2023-2027 Department of Defense (DOD) Cyber
    Workforce (CWF) Strategy, which sets the foundation for how DOD will
    foster a cyber workforce capable of executing the Department's complex
    and varied cyber missions. The strategy will enable DOD to retain
    highly skilled cyber operators. It will close workforce development
    gaps, drive workforce management and development initiatives, and help
    transform the Department into a data-centric enterprise including
    optimized workforce analytics.
        DOD is aligning strategic efforts to four human capital pillars: 1)
    identification; 2) recruitment; 3) development; and 4) retention. Our
    efforts within each of these pillars will ensure the DOD workforce is
    agile, flexible, and responsive to the evolving cyber domain.
        Vice Admiral Hill. The $266 million contract is not an additional
    investment in cybersecurity but a continuation of both cyber and non-
    cyber support requirements replacing two of our legacy Advisory and
    Assistance Support contracts.
        The Department of Defense (DOD) released the Cyber Workforce
    Strategy 2023-2027 on March 1, 2023. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
    will align the management of its cyber workforce to the DOD strategy.
    The DOD strategy takes a proactive approach in setting unifying
    direction and guidance for the DOD to foster a cyber workforce that
    will be ready to execute cyber missions. To support the accomplishment
    of the strategic goals in the strategy, the DOD is planning to produce
    a cyber workforce implementation plan. The plan will ensure that the
    strategy's talent identification, recruitment, development, retention,
    and management objectives of the strategy are achieved.
        Key MDA Efforts: The MDA developed and created a Cyberspace
    Workforce Management Program in August 2020. The program supports
    mission readiness, provides for management review and leadership
    oversight, and satisfies MDA, DOD, and Federal Information Security
    Management Act compliance. The program provided the agency with
    direction to implement and maintain; the MDA Cyberspace Workforce
    Management Program, and a tracking mechanism and repository to support
    the Cyberspace Workforce Management Program. Additionally, the program
    directed standardized tracking of cybersecurity credentials and
    supporting documentation for MDA personnel. The MDA will update the
    Cyberspace Workforce Management Program to ensure alignment with the
    objectives and goals from the February 2023, publication of the DOD
    Cyberspace Workforce Qualification and Management Program. In 2021 MDA
    developed and implemented the Cyberspace Workforce Qualification
    Tracking (CWQT) tool to formally track the MDA cyber workforce skills
    and certifications. The automated CWQT facilitates the generation of
    reports to support Federal Information Security Modernization Act
    reporting requirements and enhances the ability to respond to
    cyberspace workforce requests.
        In August 2021, the MDA Director published the MDA's Cyberspace
    Defense Strategy. The strategy describes the Director's intent and
    guidance for the cyberspace defense of the missile defense system and
    the MDA. It outlines desired outcomes, strategic initiatives, and major
    tasks to ensure that the missile defense system and the MDA is
    protected from the activities of our cyber adversaries. One of the
    strategic initiatives is to increase the cyber technical competency of
    the missile defense system workforce. The strategy includes three major
    tasks to accomplish the initiative:

        1.  Cyberspace Workforce Management: Execute the MDA Cyberspace
    Workforce Management Program.

        2.  Cyberspace Workforce Training: Develop a tailored cyber
    curriculum and hands-on training.

        3.  Cyberspace Workforce Hiring: All MDA organizations will
    strategically hire, reskill, retain, and contract for additional
    cybersecurity engineering expertise.

        Regarding how Congress can help improve capability, Please support
    the current and future President's Budget, to improve the MDA cyber
    workforce program capabilities.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                              aegis ashore system
        8. Senator Warren. Admiral Hill, in a Department of Defense (DOD)
    press briefing on March 14, 2023 regarding the President's fiscal year
    2024 missile defense budget request, when asked about the completion of
    the Poland Aegis Ashore system, you said `` . . . it will be
    operational to conduct ballistic missile defense of the homeland and of
    the European continent.'' How does Aegis Ashore and the European Phased
    Adaptive Approach defend the U.S. Homeland?
        Vice Admiral Hill. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)--
    including the AEGIS Ashore sites in Romania and Poland and a Ballistic
    Missile Defense (BMD) radar in Turkey--is a U.S. voluntary national
    contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) BMD
    mission, aimed at providing full coverage and protection for all NATO
    European populations, territory, and forces against ballistic missiles
    from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO BMD is designed to counter
    the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles
    in the vicinity of the south-eastern border of the Alliance.
        U.S. missile defense capabilities deployed as part of EPAA and NATO
    BMD, including the AEGIS-Ashore sites in Poland and Romania, are not
    intended, nor have the capability to defend against missile threats to
    the U.S. Homeland.
                           sm-3 block iia interceptor
        9. Senator Warren. Admiral Hill, in that same briefing, you said
    that while the SM-3 Block IIA Interceptor was tested against an
    International Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-range threat, it was
    out of the system's design space. What hardware or sensors changes
    would need to be made to give these interceptors a role in homeland
    defense, as envisioned by the previous administration? What is the
    estimated cost of these changes?
        Vice Admiral Hill. (CUI) The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) approach
    to provide a layered homeland defense capability was to leverage
    existing regional capabilities with demonstrated or assessed residual
    capability. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and the Standard Missile-3
    (SM-3) Block (Blk) IIA were identified as contributing systems. Aegis
    Weapon System (AWS) BL 9.C2 (BMD 5.1) ships are capable of employing
    the SM-3 Blk IIA which demonstrated residual capability against a
    simple ICBM threat in Flight Test Aegis Weapon System-44 conducted
    November 2020. While residual capability exists today to use the SM-3
    Blk IIA for U.S. homeland defense, the Department has chosen not to
    pursue this option as a persistent element of the U.S. homeland
    ballistic missile defense architecture. Additional updates to the AWS
    and SM-3 Blk IIA would be required to expand the threat set and
    increase performance against moderate and complex ICBMs.
      ground-based midcourse defense (gmd) system for flight test ground-
                              based interceptor-12
        10. Senator Warren. Admiral Hill, please outline the technical
    goals of the upcoming GMD test FTG-12 beyond demonstrating the
    interceptor in the two-stage booster mode.
        Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]

        11. Senator Warren. Admiral Hill, which countermeasures do you
    expect the test to demonstrate the system's capability against?
        Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                          next generation interceptor
        12. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, can you provide an update on the
    Missile Defense Agency's (MDA's) efforts to develop a cost plan to
    acquire no fewer than 64 Next Generation Interceptors (NGIs), as
    required by last year's National Defense Authorization Act?
        Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]

        13. Senator Cotton. General VanHerck, how would buying 64 NGIs to
    in order to deploy a uniform fleet of interceptors improve your ability
    to stay ahead of the North Korean threat?
        General VanHerck. The current Department of Defense plan to procure
    20 Next Generation Interceptors (NGIs) in addition to the current fleet
    of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) enables USNORTHCOM to stay ahead of
    the projected North Korean threat. NGIs are being designed to have a
    significant increase of reliability and lethality over the current
    GBIs. Based on the expected increased performance of the NGI, I am
    expecting to be able to reduce the ratio of interceptors per inbound
    threat, therefore 64 NGIs would allow engagements of more inbound
    threats than a mixed fleet of 64 would allow.
                            glide phase interceptor
        14. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, you recently testified before the
    House Armed Services Committees that not fielding the Glide Phase
    Interceptor until ``out in the mid `30's is . . . almost irrelevant.''
    I agree with that. Would additional funding or authorities from
    Congress help to accelerate this program?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Additional funding would allow the MDA to
    deliver the Glide Phase Interceptor capability as early as fiscal year
    2032, without incurring concurrency risk. In fiscal year 2024, an
    additional $298 million over MDA's Presidents Budget 2024 request would
    support this acceleration
                              guam defense system
        15. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, the budget plans for an
    ``enhanced capability'' on Guam by 2029 and future additional
    capabilities in the 2030's, but Admiral Davidson's window for a Chinese
    invasion of Taiwan closes in 2027. Will there be an initial operating
    capability for Guam defense capable of intercepting Chinese missiles,
    and if so, when do you anticipate that will be?
        Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]

        16. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, how many Chinese missiles would
    it take to overwhelm the Guam Defense System once it achieves enhanced
    capability in 2029?
        Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]
                           ground-based interceptors
        17. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, for how long will the Service
    Life Extension Program for the Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) allow
    the GBIs to remain in the fleet?
        Vice Admiral Hill. The service life requirement for Ground Based
    Interceptors is 20 years. Of the 47 Ground Based Interceptors currently
    deployed, there are 20 interceptors equipped with Capability
    Enhancement (CE)-I Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), the first
    generation configuration initially fielded in 2004. As the Ground Based
    Interceptor fleet continues to age, the assessed reliability will
    degrade over time due to the effects of aging, but it is a gradual
    decline and ``end of life'' is not a specific date. The CE-I
    interceptors are currently undergoing a SLEP to increase their
    reliability and performance. The SLEP will improve the reliability of
    each upgraded Ground Based Interceptor by up to 20 percent through low-
    risk, cost-effective upgrades and replacement of limited-life parts.
    See classified attachment 2, ``GMD Interceptor Fleet Reliability with
    CE-1 Comparison.'' In addition to service life, the Agency manages the
    Ground Based Interceptor fleet to ensure the most capable and reliable
    fleet is available for Homeland Defense.

        18. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, in what year do you expect that
    GBIs will need to begin being retired?
        Vice Admiral Hill. In addition to the above response regarding the
    CE-I EKV equipped Ground Based Interceptors, the service life
    requirement for the newer Ground Based Interceptors is also 20 years.
    Of the 47 Ground Based Interceptors currently deployed, there are 27 of
    these newer interceptors equipped with either the CE-II or CE-II Block
    1 EKV mated to either a Configuration 1 or Configuration 2 Booster
    Vehicle, with emplacements initiated in 2008. As the CE-II Ground Based
    Interceptor fleet continues to age, the assessed reliability will
    degrade over time due to the effects of aging, but it is a gradual
    decline and ``end of life'' is not a specific date. The MDA will
    continue to assess overall and configuration specific reliability
    predictions in conjunction with the ongoing development, acquisition,
    and fielding of the Next Generation Interceptors.
        The eventual mix of Next Generation Interceptors and Ground Based
    Interceptors should be informed by a variety of threat, operational,
    and programmatic considerations, including: threat evolution; Next
    Generation Interceptor performance; performance and reliability of the
    Ground Based Interceptor fleet including the first CE-II Ground Based
    Interceptor approaching 20 years of service in 2028; and the maturation
    of U.S. Northern Command's missile defense Concept of Operations
    required to negate the threat. The Department will continue to evaluate
    these considerations as the Next Generation Interceptor technology
    matures and the development program progresses with the objective of
    synchronizing any inventory decisions, as appropriate, with key program
    milestones to generate economic efficiencies, and, in conjunction with
    other missile defeat activities, stay ahead of the threat.
          terminal high altitude area defense (thaad) launch-on-remote
        19. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, can you explain how the THAAD
    Launch-On-Remote capability recently deployed in United States Indo-
    Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will improve our missile defense
    capabilities in that region?
        Vice Admiral Hill. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) fielded three
    capabilities recently to INDOPACOM as part of Joint Emergent
    Operational Need (JEON) PC-0021 solution:

        i. THAAD Remote Launch (fielded in TH 3.2, June 2020): THAAD Remote
    Launcher capability using the THAAD Remote Launch Kit provides flexible
    communication paths to increase launcher emplacement distance and
    defended area.

        ii. Patriot Launch on Remote (THAAD) (fielded in TH 3.2, June
    2020): Enables Patriot to launch Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile
    Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors utilizing THAAD AN/TPY-2 radar
    track data to detect and track threat ballistic missiles at longer
    ranges while utilizing MSE's full kinematic capability.

        iii. Integration of Patriot/MSE with THAAD (fielded in TH 4.0 Oct
    2022): Incorporates MSE launchers and missiles into the THAAD Weapon
    System to provide additional engagement opportunities and enhanced
    performance against threat ballistic missiles.

        20. Senator Cotton. Admiral Hill, can you ` the Missile Defenses
    Agency's plans to continue fielding this capability globally?
        Vice Admiral Hill. The JEON PC-0021 capabilities are planned to
    begin fielding globally at end of calendar year 2023. The MDA is
    procuring hardware now and coordinating with the Army for availability
    to complete installation, check-out, and training. Fielding will be
    based on coordination with the Army and unit availability. The Army
    will prioritize the upgrades based on each unit's needs.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                                    spectrum
        21. Senator Rounds. Admiral Hill, There is an effort by some in
    Congress to require sharing of all or some of the 3.1-3.45 GHz band of
    the electromagnetic spectrum between the Department of Defense and
    commercial interests in the private sector. As I understand it, the
    3.1-3.45 GHz band is primarily used by Department of Defense ground-,
    air-and sea-based radars and sensors to detect airborne and missile
    threats. For example, the Navy's Aegis Combat System's AN/SPY radar
    uses that band and is one of the few systems able to track the new
    threat posed by low flying, highly maneuverable hypersonic missiles.
    Can you confirm that many of the missile defense systems your agency
    develops, which are critical to our national security, reside on this
    portion of the spectrum? If so, can you share examples of either
    specific systems that currently operate there or some of the missions
    and capabilities which rely on this portion of the spectrum?
        Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]

        22. Senator Rounds. Admiral Hill, providing this committee with
    your best military advice, can you characterize the risk to mission and
    the potential impact on extant missile defense systems the Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA) has developed if action were taken to enable the
    auction of portions of this band prior to the analysis of the results
    of the statutorily required Department of Defense-National
    Telecommunications and Information Administration study, which is
    required to be completed by September 2023?
        Vice Admiral Hill. [Deleted.]