[Senate Hearing 118-625, Part 2]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S.Hrg. 118-625, Pt. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 2226
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CON-
STRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR
SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
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PART 2
SEAPOWER
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MARCH 28, 2023
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-096 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
MARK KELLY, Arizona ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director
_________________________________________________________________
Subcommittee on Seapower
TIM KAINE, Virginia Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii RICK SCOTT, Florida
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
March 28, 2023
Page
Navy and Marine Corps Investment Programs........................ 1
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Tim Kaine................................... 1
Statement of Senator Kevin Cramer................................ 3
Witness Statements
Stefany, Frederick, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 6
Research, Development, and Acquisition.
Questions for the Record......................................... 60
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 2023
United States Senate,
Subcommittees on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NAVY AND MARINE CORPS INVESTMENT PROGRAMS
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m. in
room SR-236, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Tim Kaine
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Subcommittee Members present: Kaine, Blumenthal, Hirono,
King, Peters, Cramer, Sullivan, Scott, Tuberville, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM KAINE
Senator Kaine. The hearing will now come to order. I want
to welcome our witnesses today, welcome my Subcommittee
colleagues, Subcommittee Ranking Member Cramer. To all of our
witnesses, thank you so much for your service to this country.
I want to acknowledge the tremendous dedication of our sailors,
marines, civilians, that serve in the Department of the Navy,
thank their families for their unrelenting support of our
Nation's defense.
This is my first hearing as chair of the Seapower
Subcommittee. I have been a Member during my entire time in the
Senate, but I have been either Chair or Ranking Member on
Readiness, and yet this year Senator Hirono, for a number of
reasons I completely understand, decided that Readiness should
be her portfolio, and so we have switched. I am truly honored
and excited by the chance to lead this vital Subcommittee. As
the father of a marine and as a Senator from a State that has
some pretty significant Navy and Marine Corps equities and an
amazing shipbuilding and submarine building and repair
industrial base, it is a particularly welcome challenge for my
team and I to take this role.
I want to recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Cramer. He
and I look forward to working together. We have already had a
good working relationship on the Armed Services Committee. I do
want to thank Senator Hirono. I had the chance to sit on the
committee and watch her maneuver with skill over the last few
years.
The Subcommittee is going to continue to find broad
agreement as we continue to confront the issues facing our
sailors, marines, and their families, and in the past the nice
thing about the Armed Services Committee and this Subcommittee
is we agree so much more than we disagree.
I will start with just throwing something down on the table
that I am a little bit not happy with, which is we do not yet
have a 30-year shipbuilding plan. When we hold a hearing like
this and it is going to be about seapower investments in
shipbuilding and ship repair, of course the idea is we get the
plan first and then we would sound really smart in the
questions that we ask you. That plan was supposed to come over
with the President's Budget on March 9th. Today is the 28th,
and we do not have it.
We talked last week with Navy leadership that said that we
would have it on Friday or Monday. I was like, well, Monday for
a Tuesday hearing, I am not a speed reader but my staff is.
Okay, maybe we can be ready. Well, we do not have it yet, and
that means we have got a lot of questions for you, but we would
have had probably more defined, sharp, precise questions for
you if we had not only had just the budget submission, but the
plan itself. I am mindful of my Subcommittee Members. I think
they would have really benefited from that as well.
So what are we going to do? We are going to do the hearing
and ask the questions we have without that plan. I suspect we
will get the plan before the full Navy posture hearing, before
the committee with the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], the
SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy], and the Commandant. Questions
that we would have probably directed to you we are going to end
up having to direct to them.
But what I am going to do, and I just say this to my
Subcommittee Members, after the posture hearing before the full
Committee, if you feel like you have not really gotten a chance
to ask the questions that you want about the 30-year
shipbuilding plan--because there are a million things we should
ask the SECNAV, Commandant, and CNO about--we will reconvene
and we will do a followup of this hearing if it is the pleasure
of the Subcommittee, so that we can dig into questions that are
more detailed questions about the 30-year shipbuilding plan.
Look, this year's budget, submitted to the Senate,
continues to grow its investment in critical capabilities of
the sea services with an overall seapower budget of $255.8
billion, That is an increase of more than $11 billion from the
fiscal year 2023 enacted budget. That includes over $76 billion
in procurement and nearly $27 billion in research and
development, and that growth from fiscal year 2023 is growth on
a budget that had already grown pretty much from previous
years, so it is growth on top of growth. That is important.
Modernization investments include $32.8 billion in
shipbuilding, $17.3 billion in naval aviation procurement,
$16.9 billion in Marine Force Design equipping priorities, and
nearly $7 billion, a $2 billion increase from last year, in
weapons procurement.
We are encouraged by the Department of the Navy's actions
to take advantage of congressionally authorized authorities for
munitions and critical capabilities such as Standard Missile,
Naval Strike Missiles, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles, Advanced
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles.
It is a robust budget. The Navy and Marine Corps, though,
face difficult decisions as they seek to balance modernizing
the fleet, maintaining a technological advantage over
adversaries, supporting ongoing operations, which are becoming
more complex, and always sustaining today's readiness.
Although I am encouraged that the Navy has gotten serious
about investing in critical infrastructure that has been
neglected for far too long. We continue to see delays in
delivering new ships from our shipbuilders and delays in
returning ships to the fleet from our public and private ship
repair yards, and some of these we have been able to predict
but some have also been quirky, like the decision that we
needed to pull some of the Puget Sound drydocks out of
commission because of seismic activity there. How that is going
to affect us and over what period of time is obviously not
completely in our control, and I would like to hear about that
today. I will be asking witnesses how your budget request
either reduces or eliminates some of these performance
challenges.
Additionally, the Navy is again proposing to retire a
number of ships before the end of their useful service lives,
including several amphibious ships that would bring the total
number of amphibs below the floor of 31 ships that we set in
the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act. So I
want to hear more about the future of the amphibious fleet and
why there continues to be some in-the-atmosphere dispute, left
hand not knowing what the right hand is doing, continual
rethinking of what we assumed was an agreed upon priority to
meet the Marine Corps' needs.
Finally, as the Marine Corps continues to pursue
significant structure and capabilities modernization, it would
be helpful to understand how this Force Design better prepares
the Marine Corps for not only the pacing threat but then for
potential operations worldwide. I look forward to a productive
discussion today on these and many other priority efforts.
Before I introduce Senator Cramer I just want to say to my
colleagues, I am managing these amendments that are on the
floor in the AUMF [Authorization for Use of Military Force].
There is one that is going to come up in about a half an hour.
I need to go speak for a minute and then come back. Senator
King said he would take the helm during that time. So you will
see me----
Senator Tuberville. Just 1 minute?
Senator Kaine. Just 1 minute. Only 1 minute. You will see
me exit, speak for a minute, vote, and come right back.
But with that, Senator Cramer, good to have you.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR KEVIN CRAMER
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Chairman Kaine, and I would like
to say she--I just saw her poke her head in but now I lost
Senator Hirono. But I do not know if you will be as skilled at
managing the Committee as she was, but I hope you are as
gracious to the Ranking Member as she was, because as you know,
I come from the center of the North American continent--
literally, we have a monument to prove it--in Rugby, North
Dakota. But I always said together Senator Hirono and I knew a
lot about seapower. So I am thinking that together you and I
will too.
I cannot imagine a higher priority for this Subcommittee
than the 30-year plan. So I appreciate your willingness to
reassemble, if necessary, after we get the plan.
Oh, there she is.
Senator Tuberville. You can start over again.
Senator Cramer. I just said I hope he does as good a job as
Mazie Hirono did.
Senator Kaine. It is really a sincere compliment when the
person is not in the room.
Senator Cramer. That is true.
But our Nation faces a generational challenge for sure, to
peace and security, that we have only, in my view, only
recently, at least as a Nation, recognized. It is worth stating
that the challenge is clearly here today. The Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) has become more assertive in using their military
to achieve strategic goals. The Department of Defense's (DOD)
new document, ``Joint Concept for Competing,'' described China
as, ``the only competitor capable of mounting a sustained
challenge to a stable and open international system.''
Our Navy and Marine Corps provide the forces necessary to
deter China through forward presence, sea control, and power
projection. Appropriately funding naval capabilities is among
the most critical constitutional duties Congress performs, and
it is one that I take very seriously.
To this end I thank the Chairman for calling today's
hearing to examine Navy and Marine Corps programs in the
President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request, and as I say, I
look forward to the 30-year plan.
But I must say I am very concerned that President Biden's
Defense Budget Request is not adequate. The Department of the
Navy's fiscal year 2024 budget only seeks 4.5 percent growth.
Because this budget does not keep up with inflation, it is, in
fact, a cut. At the same time, China's military budget will see
substantial growth above inflation. I am hopeful we can come
together again to provide the Department with real budget
growth to fund critical modernization, readiness, and personnel
shortfalls.
The Administration's inadequate budget is reflected in the
fact that the Navy's fleet size is set to decline to 293 ships
and stagnate over the next 5 years--the next 5 years. This
decrease in the number of ships alarms me because China is
moving to increase the size of its fleet at a breakneck pace.
Many have called the next 5 years the period of maximum
danger in the Indo-Pacific region. A brief overview of China's
growing capabilities makes that danger clear. China has truly
unprecedented shipbuilding capacity, capturing 47 percent of
the global market for commercial ships, and boasts more than
4,500 merchant ships. In 2022, during the peacetime, China's
shipyards built 38 million tons of shipping. That is more than
double what the United States built at the peak of the
Emergency Shipbuilding Program during World War II.
In terms of warships, the Department of Defense expects
that China's fleet will grow to 400 by 2025, and 440 by 2030.
By contrast, under this budget, our Navy will not even reach
300 ships by 2030. Two weeks ago a single Chinese shipyard
launched two new destroyers with three more to follow in the
coming months, and more under construction at a second
shipyard. A new class of large frigates has apparently begun
construction at another shipyard. A few months ago,
construction of a new class of nuclear submarines emerged.
China is also conducting more advanced operations. This
past December, China deployed a carrier strike group just 460
miles from Guam, launching aircraft over a 15-day period. China
has also made significant progress in exercises using numerous
military/ civilian Roll-On/Roll-Off vessels to practice large-
scale lift of troops and equipment, which could be used in an
amphibious invasion across the Taiwan Strait. China has also
been practicing the use of long-range, anti-ship ballistic
missiles against simulated targets representing United States
ships.
This small sample of Chinese naval capabilities, together
with their expansionist policy goals, is alarming. It does not
appear the Navy's budget takes the risk seriously. The Navy
proposes decommissioning 11 ships, 8 of which are within their
service life. Decommissioning 5 guided missile cruisers alone
will result in the loss of more than 600 vertical launch system
cells. While the Navy claims readiness issues are a cause for
the decommissions, it also claims that the fiscal year 2024
budget funds 100 percent of ship depot maintenance requirements
and 97 percent of ship operations requirements. I would like to
hear from the witnesses how the budget adequately funds
sustainment when the General Accountability Office reported
this year that part shortages, casualty reports, and
maintenance delays have been on the rise since 2011.
I would also like to hear from the witnesses how they plan
to support industry to deliver ships on time and on cost.
Attracting and retaining shipbuilding workforce is a primary
challenge, as we have discussed in this Committee before.
Disrupting production lines without a clear transition path
creates needless uncertainty. Truncation of the LPD amphibious
ship program is a key example of the Navy's unstable demand
signal to industry. It also disregards the Commandant of the
Marine Corps' requirement for a minimum of 31 large amphibious
ships, a requirement Congress signed in the past and signed
into law last year.
Finally, I would like to hear from the witnesses how they
plan to use innovation to bolster our ability to compete in the
near term. I believe if we are stretching the limits ]of
shipbuilding and maintenance we must look to smaller, more
affordable, and more distributed systems that will complement
the program plans already in place.
All good ideas must be on the table because time matters.
Time is the only fixed resource, and it may be short. I look
forward to the testimony of our witnesses today. Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Cramer. I used to try
cases, and there would be expert witnesses, and one of the
things you do is you qualify an expert witness by giving a
really long bio. Whenever one of my opposing counsel would do
that I would just jump in and say, ``I stipulate they are
qualified.'' I did not want the jury to hear how qualified they
were.
During my tenure as Chair of this Subcommittee I am going
to give very short introductions, not long introductions.
We have three great witnesses with us: Lieutenant General
Karsten Heckl, who is the Deputy Commandant for Combat
Development and Integration; Mr. Frederick Stefany, who is the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition; and Vice Admiral Scott Conn, who is the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Warfighting Requirements and
Capabilities.
That is all the introduction you are getting, and we are
going to go left to right. Please try to keep your comments to
about 5 minutes. If you want to submit anything for the record
that will be fine, and then we will get into the questions and
answers.
Mr. Stefany. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make just one
statement----
Senator Kaine. Please.
Mr. Stefany----for all three of us.
Senator Kaine. Please.
Mr. Stefany. Before I go to that statement I will start
with saying we are disappointed we are not able to get you the
30-year plan before this hearing, and we will absolutely come
back here at your convenience, whatever is good for you once
you get the plan, and go through whatever questions you and the
other Members have.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Stefany. We are totally committed to that, sir.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK STEFANY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION
Mr. Stefany. Okay, for an opening statement, Chairman
Kaine, Ranking Member Cramer, distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee, on behalf of myself, Vice Admiral Conn, and
Lieutenant General Heckl, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to address the Department of Navy's
fiscal year 2024 budget request for seapower capabilities. We
thank the Subcommittee for your continued leadership and
support of shipbuilding, naval aviation, and ground programs
that maintain maritime superiority and defense of our Nation.
The Department of the Navy's 2024 budget is guided by
Secretary Del Toro's enduring priorities to strengthen our
maritime dominance, to build a culture of warfighting
excellence, and to enhance our strategic partnerships. It
implements the CNO's navigation plan to expand our fleet
capabilities for Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) while
accelerating the Commandant's Force Design 2030 to rapidly
modernize the expeditionary posture of the Marine Corps.
This overall budget request increases investment across the
Navy and Marine Corps portfolios you mentioned, Mr. Chairman,
while providing stability and predictability in many of our
long-term production lines. This budget request includes a
record $32.8 billion for shipbuilding programs, and includes 55
new construction ships across the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP), including a consistent two Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers per year and two Virginia-class attack submarines
per year.
The President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2024 also
procures the second Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine,
and increases our production of frigates in this year to two
ships. The President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2024
program invests in 88 fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned
aircraft in 2024, and 410 aircraft across the Fiscal Year
Defense Program including a return to a consistent 15 F-35C
fifth-generation fighters for our Navy and 20 B-or C-variant F-
35s for our Marine Corps. The budget also includes 15 CH-53K
aircraft to be purchased as part of the block buy that was
authorized in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA), and we thank you for that.
Looking back on the year since we last briefed this
Committee, I am happy to report a number of successes in
providing new capability for the fleet. The Gerald Ford, our
first new aircraft carrier in half a century, made her first
deployment last year. We declared, toward the end of the year,
full-rate production of the CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter, one
of the world's most powerful helicopters, and the DDG-125,
which was our first Flight III destroyer with the new SPY-6
radar. This air and missile defense radar has started sea
trials and is expected to deliver later this year.
As you know, I believe, we also started construction of the
Constellation, our first frigate in a new class of frigates.
The 2024 budget request includes significant investment in
our industrial base for submarines, which will support the
ability of the United States to sustain a building of one
ballistic missile submarine and two attack submarines to meet
our domestic demand. We will work with Congress and the United
States industrial base to assess if there are any adjustments
required, as the newly announced AUKUS [Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States] trilateral security pact
between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom
matures.
The budget also includes funding for Marine Corps Force
Design priorities that will accelerate the modernization of
capabilities in precision fires, resilient communications, and
mobility platforms, optimizing the force for naval
expeditionary warfare in a maritime littoral. The 2024 budget
also increases our investment in munitions while taking
advantage of the new authorities for streamlining multi-year
procurements that were granted by Congress last year. Not only
will this authority allow the Department to replenish our
munitions stockpiles being used in support of the war in
Ukraine, it will support efforts to strengthen our industrial
base capacity to procure and field munitions at scale.
With the tremendous support received from Congress we are
continuing recapitalization of our naval shipyards through our
Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program, with a request
for $2.7 billion in 2024 and $9.9 billion across the Fiscal
Year Defense Plan (FYDP). Of note, last month we awarded the
$2.8 billion task order for the reconstruction of Dry Dock 3 at
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard.
Looking forward with a focus on developing a full
capability in the future force, we are investing $26 billion in
research for a next-generation submarine, large surface
combatant, and air dominance family of aircraft, as well as
autonomy and unmanned enabling technologies.
We thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
Subcommittee today. Our mission begins and ends with providing
the best capability to our sailors and marines, and we look
forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement by Frederick J. Stefany, Vice
Admiral Scott Conn, and Lieutenant General Karsten S. Heckl
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Frederick J. Stefany, Vice Admiral Scott
Conn, and Lieutenant General Karsten S. Heckl
Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Cramer and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to address the Department of Navy's fiscal year 2024 budget
request for Seapower capabilities. Maintaining a world-class and
worldwide deployable Navy and Marine Corps as a first line of defense
for the United States is a continuous effort. The Department of the
Navy (DON) appreciates the support of Congress and this Committee for
the Department's acquisition, sustainment, research, and development
programs that allow us to continue to build and operate a lethal,
capable, integrated, and forward-postured Navy and Marine Corps.
The security of our country and preservation of our national
interests remains reliant on a superior naval force, strategically
postured to adapt to constantly evolving geopolitical challenges and
threats. The Navy and Marine Corps team must continue to provide
unmatched operational capability to best support the regional Combatant
Commanders in countering the People's Republic of China (PRC), the
pacing challenge for the Department, the acute threat posed by Russia,
and other persistent threats, while remaining prepared to respond to
any global crisis. The Navy and Marine Corps continue to lead Joint and
Coalition forces through integrated deterrence and remain postured to
adapt to emerging threats as demand for our naval capabilities
continues to increase. To maintain the maritime dominance of the Joint
Force, the DON continues to invest in the modernization of our existing
capabilities, and is pursuing initiatives for rapid innovation and
streamlined acquisition of future capabilities, including those of our
allies and partners.
The DON is investing in lethal capabilities across a broad spectrum
of platforms and programs to equip our warfighters for potential combat
operations with credible and sufficient capability to deter, and when
necessary, prevail in conflict. Since the start of fiscal year 2022 we
have delivered 14 battle force ships to the Fleet including three
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDG 51), two Virginia-class submarines
(SSN), five Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), one San Antonio-class
amphibious transport dock (LPD), the first Fleet Replenishment Oiler of
the new John Lewis-class (TAO-205), one Spearhead-class expeditionary
fast transport dock with autonomy functions (EPF), and one Lewis B.
Puller-class expeditionary sea base (ESB). Today, the Navy has 296
battle force ships, with an additional 76 ships under contract and 56
ships in construction, with the balance of ships in pre-construction
activities such as long lead material procurement and planning efforts.
We expect to take delivery of seven more ships and plan to award
contracts for up to 17 more ships during fiscal year 2023, including
the DDG 51 fiscal year 2023-2027 multi-year procurement contracts and
the T-AO block buy contract as authorized in the fiscal year 2023
National Defense Authorization Act.
The Department has made great strides in recapitalizing Naval
aviation platforms. Last year we delivered 91 new aircraft for the Navy
and Marine Corps team, including F/A-18E/F production and ongoing
procurement and fleet integration of F-35, E-2D, V-22, P-8, H-1, CH-
53K, VH-92A, and unmanned aircraft MQ-4C, MQ-9A Extended Range (ER),
and MQ-25. Naval Aviation is now predominantly comprised of new
airframes, made possible through a deliberate strategy of evolutionary,
controlled technical risk development programs. Unmanned aviation
advancement has continued into fiscal year 2023 with three different
integration events conducted to ``fly'' the MQ-25 virtually in the
program's test lab with actual ground control station software and
aircraft computer hardware and software. VUQ-10, the MQ-25 Fleet
Replacement Squadron, stood up in October 2022, and is responsible for
initial training of maintainers. For the Marine Corps, Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle Squadron (VMU)-1 recently conducted phase zero operations with
MQ-9A ER, including multisensory imagery reconnaissance, electronic
support, unmanned escort of surface forces, and maritime domain
awareness in support of the Joint Force and Coalition Partners in
CENTCOM, totaling over 3,800 hours. VMU-3 started transition to the MQ-
9A ER with flights to begin in 2023.
Over the last year, global events have continued to pressurize the
need for rapid change across the Services and the DON has taken note,
aggressively seeking and implementing new and improved ways to operate,
integrate, and sustain our forces. Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine
has affirmed our perception of the modern-day character of war.
Specifically, the war against Ukraine has displayed the value of
enhanced sensors and long-range precision fires, and the importance of
freedom of navigation and the ability to sustain a force. The war
highlights the need for increased industrial capacity, and shown the
genuine value in maintaining relationships among partners and allies.
Additionally, it has shown us that persistent, forward presence is
essential for the success of our Nation's deterrence efforts. Moreover,
recent provocations by China, such as flying collection assets directly
over the continental United States, clearly shows their willingness to
compete below the threshold of armed violence.
The Marine Corps' activation of new units, including the 3d Marine
Littoral Regiment and Task Force 61/2 are indicative of efforts made to
compete and reassure allies and partners. Additionally, the
establishment of Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Blaz on Guam is yet
another positive for the Marine Corps and the Joint Force, as it will
serve as a critical logistics and inside force enabler. These new
organizations and installations will actively participate and support
operational concepts, including Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO),
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), and Stand-In Forces.
However, continued fielding and sustainment of advanced capabilities in
mobility, logistics, kill webs, and command and control will be
essential for the entire Marine Corps to remain credible and lethal.
The security environment demands ships, aircraft, subs,
expeditionary forces, special operations forces, and Sailors ready to
fight and win. Readiness is generated across the DON, from shipyards
and aviation depots, to our global network of bases and stations, to
the steaming and flight hours our Sailors and Marines need to hone
their skills. For surface ship maintenance, we are reinforcing our
commitment to our industry partners to share future demand signals, and
we are seeing the benefits of improved maintenance package planning,
earlier contract awards, and delivery of long-lead time material to our
repair yards. Continued investments in spares supports the readiness
for training and operational units while simultaneously improving
endurance for sustained operations. Funding of some availabilities that
cross fiscal year boundaries via the OPN funding pilot is also showing
positive results. These initiatives enable a stable and predictable
workload for our industry partners and ensure a balance of operational
requirements with industrial capacity.
The Navy continues to invest and mature autonomy to support future
DMO through manned/unmanned teaming (MUM-T). To help increase
opportunities to learn, the Navy has begun experimenting in the fleet
with unmanned and autonomous systems at scale. Task Force 59 is
exploring commercially available systems to augment their Maritime
Domain Awareness, and 4th Fleet is building upon the Unmanned Campaign
Framework to identify their needs to support the future hybrid fleet
for the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility. In 2023 and 2024, we will be
conducting numerous DON and multi-national unmanned experiments and
exercises to explore MUM-T Maritime Domain Awareness, lethality,
command and control, and contested logistics to include dual use
technologies. This approach to innovation will leverage industries'
pace of technology, allies, and partners' capabilities, while exploring
new concepts. The return on investment includes a more flexible hybrid
fleet that can be scaled with our allies and partners to help fill gaps
brought on from world conflicts, or industrial base challenges at a
more affordable cost.
the fiscal year 2024 president's budget request
The President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget provides the resources
necessary for the Navy and Marine Corps to continue to implement the
2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). This request builds and sustains
the right mix of capabilities to keep the sea lanes open and free,
deter conflict, and defend against current and future threats. In
alignment with the Secretary of the Navy's priorities, the budget
request enables the One Navy-Marine Corps Team to continue
strengthening our maritime dominance, building on our culture of
warfighting excellence, and enhancing our strategic partnerships.
The fiscal year 2024 budget request is strategy-based and
analytically driven to meet our strategic goals, while balanced with
reform targeted at maximizing the value of every dollar. The budget
reflects the Department's commitment to building and sustaining a
modernized naval force and operating forward with sufficient
capability, size, and mix to deter and defend. Fiscal year 2024
continues key investments in advanced technologies and modernization of
our current Seapower and Projection forces. In this request we are
prioritizing the recapitalization of the strategic ballistic missile
submarine, the Columbia-class, which remains the Department's top
acquisition priority. It requests the first year of incremental funding
for the second Columbia-class SSBN and full funding for two DDG Flight
IIIs, two SSNs, two FFGs, one T-AO, and one AS(X), while providing the
next increment of funding for construction of CVN 80, CVN 81, and LHA
9. The budget supports modernization of our warfighting capabilities
across all domains, including research and development (R&D) funding
for the future fast attack submarine (SSN(X)), future destroyer
(DDG(X)), the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) Family of Systems
(FOS), Marine Corps Unmanned Expeditionary (MUX) FOS, and
recapitalization of the Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) mission.
The Department requests funding in fiscal year 2024 to support
procurement of 88 aircraft, modification, spares, and support
equipment--63 fixed wing aircraft including 15 Navy and four Marine
Corps F-35C carrier variants; 16 F-35B Short Takeoff and Vertical
Landing variants; two Marine Corps KC-130Js; and 26 T-54A multi-engine
training system aircraft. Additional unmanned aircraft procurements
include two MQ-4C Unmanned Aircraft in fiscal year 2024, five MQ-9A ER,
two XQ-58 Valkyrie Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) for prototype
experimentation, and three carrier-capable MQ-25 aircraft. Rotary wing
investments include 15 CH-53Ks.
The fiscal year 2024 budget prioritizes readiness recovery,
continuing prior year gains on ship and aircraft maintenance efforts to
improve overall department readiness. It includes a significant
investment in submarine maintenance through the 15-Year SSN Maintenance
Strategy with the goal of reducing maintenance periods and improving
the operational availability of these critical assets. The request
continues investment to develop improved war-fighting capabilities
across all domains and distributed maritime operations, investing in
long range fires and hypersonic weapons as well as increases to
unmanned platforms. This budget also develops the Integrated Combat
System (ICS) which will deliver decision superiority at rapid speed and
enable ships to operate force-wide as an integrated system.
The budget request increases investment in the Commandant's Force
Design 2030 priorities by $705 million, moving programs from concept/
experimentation to production within three lines of effort (LOE)--
logistics, sensing, and fires. These investments provide unique
capabilities the Marine Corps requires to enable joint force access,
sense and make sense of the battlefield, to close kill chains, and
apply lethal fires when required to deter or defeat adversaries.
The fiscal year 2024 budget continues investment in the defense
industrial base to ensure the continued viability of the crucial
businesses and infrastructure needed to ensure our ships, aircraft, and
ground equipment are available when needed for the defense of the
Nation and our interests abroad. The budget request includes a $647
million investment in the submarine industrial base to support serial
production of Columbia-class nuclear-powered, ballistic missile
submarines (SSBN) in parallel with Virginia-class nuclear-powered
attack submarine (SSN) construction. The budget makes significant
investments in the munitions industrial base, supporting multiyear
procurement (MYP) contracts for critical munitions including Standard
Missile (SM-6), the Naval Strike Missile (NSM), and the Long-Range
Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). MYP contracts will generate Economic Order
Quantity (EOQ) savings, stabilize the demand signal to the industrial
base, and enable the Department to respond quickly to future
contingencies.
summary
The Navy and Marine Corps team continues to meet challenges head
on--in cyberspace, in outer space, on the sea, under the sea, in the
littorals and in the air every single day. With Congress' support, the
Department of the Navy is focused on rapidly researching, developing,
acquiring, and fielding the material solutions required to be more
lethal, sustainable, resilient, survivable, agile, and responsive. We
are committed to providing the Nation with a combat-credible, dominant,
globally responsive naval force to keep the sea lanes open, deter
conflict, and when called upon, decisively win our Nation's wars.
Programmatic details regarding Navy and Marine Corps capabilities
are summarized in the following section.
u.s. navy and marine corps seapower capabilities
ship programs
Submarines
Ballistic Missile Submarines, coupled with the TRIDENT II D-5
Strategic Weapons System (SWS), represent the most survivable leg of
the Nation's strategic arsenal, and provide the Nation's most assured
nuclear response capability. Modernizing this capability with both the
Columbia-cSSBN and TRIDENT D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) will ensure the
effectiveness and availability of the Nation's Sea Based Strategic
Deterrent through the 2080's. Columbia-class is the Navy's #1
acquisition priority as its construction and delivery are critical to
pace the retirement of current ballistic missile submarines.
The lead ship of the class, District of Columbia, started
construction in fiscal year 2021. This ship must be on patrol in 2030
to meet STRATCOM requirements. The second ship of the class, Wisconsin,
will officially start construction in the first quarter of fiscal year
2024. The fiscal year 2024 budget request includes the first year of
incremental funding for the second ship, advance procurement and
advance construction funds for future ships, and funding for continued
class design efforts. The fiscal year 2024 budget continues funding for
several initiatives that are essential to reducing construction
schedule risk and enabling cost savings including continuous production
of missile tubes and various critical components, multi-program
material procurement and procurement of production backup units.
Through these congressionally granted authorities, the Navy has
realized significant benefit. In missile tube production, which is
tightly coordinated with procurement of Common Missile Compartment
material for the U.K. Dreadnought-class submarines being executed under
the Polaris Sales Agreement, all missile tubes in support of Columbia
Hull 1 and U.K. Dreadnought Hull 1 have been delivered. Using
authorities provided by Congress, General Dynamics Electric Boat and
Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News continue to procure material
to maintain and grow the submarine industrial base as the program
builds to annual procurements beginning in fiscal year 2026.
The Navy has taken delivery of 21 Virginia-class submarines with 17
additional under contract. Two deliveries are planned in 2023: Hyman G
Rickover (SSN 795) this summer and New Jersey (SSN 796) this fall. The
second ship of the Block V contract is under construction and will
introduce the Virginia Payload Module, which helps mitigate the loss of
undersea strike capability with the retirement of SSGNs later this
decade. All Block V ships will incorporate Acoustic Superiority program
improvements. The Navy recognizes that Virginia-class construction
performance continues to be challenged to meet the required two per
year delivery cadence and is working closely with shipbuilders to
stabilize and improve performance in the industrial base. The fiscal
year 2024 budget includes funding for two Virginia SSNs, which will be
procured as options under the Block V contract as one Virginia Payload
Module ship and a modified Virginia-class Subsea and Seabed Warfare
platform. The budget also includes funding for advance procurement and
economic order quantity funding for the next block (Block VI). The
fiscal year 2024 budget also includes cost to complete funding for
several Block IV boats to address COVID impacts, supplier disruptions
and shipyard performance, as well as R&D funding for continued
development of capabilities and technologies for future Blocks.
The Navy is also working closely with our allies--Australia and the
United Kingdom--to implement the AUKUS Optimal Pathway for Australia to
acquire a conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarine capability.
On March 13, the President announced plans to employ a phased approach
to provide this capability on the fastest possible timeline, while
upholding the highest standards for nuclear stewardship and setting a
precedent that strengthens the nonproliferation regime. As the
President made clear, our three nations are making concrete commitments
to each other, and we are backing these commitments up with significant
investments to strengthen the industrial bases of each of our nations.
The submarine industrial base faces an increase in demand across
the enterprise as the Navy ramps up production of the Columbia-class
while continuing two-per-year Virginia-class procurements. The Navy is
taking steps to expand and strengthen the submarine industrial base to
support concurrent construction of Virginia and Columbia-class
submarines, and appreciates congressional support to address these
challenges. In 2021, the Navy partnered with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense on a comprehensive study to assess the submarine
industrial base's ability to design, construct, and deliver submarines
at rates consistent with current and future shipbuilding plans. The
fiscal year 2024 budget continues efforts to fund submarine industrial
base investments identified in the study. Investments are targeted in
six key areas to include shipbuilder infrastructure, supplier
development for capability/capacity, scaling of new technologies,
workforce trade skill gaps and constraints, expanding productive
capacity via strategic outsourcing, and government oversight of these
efforts. The Navy has seen significant benefit from this funding in
areas such as new technology through standing up of the Additive
Manufacturing Center of Excellence in Danville, VA, workforce
development by scaling up the Accelerated Training in Defense
Manufacturing program and launching of an aggressive campaign to
recruit people into key defense trades and shipyard infrastructure in
the groundbreaking for the multi-class submarine production facility at
Newport News, VA.
The fiscal year 2024 budget continues the efforts started in fiscal
year 2022 in support of requirements development, Analysis of
Alternatives execution, concept design and technology development for
the Future Attack Submarine (SSN(X)). As the Columbia design workforce
efforts diminish, SSN(X) design efforts will ramp up, thereby
maintaining the strength of the submarine design workforce. SSN(X) is
anticipated to start construction in the mid-2030's, which will ensure
a production workforce is in place as Columbia production ramps down.
Aircraft Carriers (CVNs)
The fiscal year 2024 budget fully funds the operations and
maintenance of 11 In-Service Aircraft Carriers, three Ford-class
Carriers under construction, and a Service Life Extension that will
allow USS Nimitz (CVN 68) to conduct one additional operational cycle
in support of the Nation. The fiscal year 2024 budget also provides
investment in Sailor Quality of Service at Newport News Shipbuilding to
improve the living conditions of our sailors onboard aircraft carriers
and other ships undergoing extensive maintenance or construction.
The USS Gerald R Ford (CVN 78) has fully transitioned into an
operational platform and joined six NATO allies in completing its first
service-retained deployment in 2022. During deployment the ship sailed
over 9,000 miles, flew 2,400 hours, and performed over 1,200 sorties.
Training is currently ongoing to prepare CVN 78, its Carrier Air Wing,
and the other ships of its Carrier Strike Group for future operational
commitments later this year. Performance of key systems continue to
improve as more than 13,000 launches and recoveries have been completed
aboard CVN 78. Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) and Electromagnetic
Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) average Availability (Ao) is greater
than 0.977 for the last 5,500 launch and recoveries for both systems.
John F Kennedy (CVN 79) is 89 percent construction complete and
implementing a revised delivery/post-delivery strategy to prepare the
ship for operations in the Indo-Pacific region and decrease the amount
of time the ship will be required to be at the shipyard after ship
delivery. Enterprise (CVN 80) construction is 28 percent complete, and
Doris Miller (CVN 81) is in early production and pacing ahead of
previous Ford-class carriers for material procurement. The Navy remains
committed to reducing and controlling the cost of Ford-class aircraft
carriers and continues to benefit from the up to $4 billion savings
expected to be achieved through the two-ship CVN 80 and CVN 81 contract
award.
The Nimitz-class Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH) is the refueling
of the ship's reactors and full recapitalization of the carrier in
support of the second half of its service life. The USS George
Washington's (CVN 73) RCOH is scheduled to complete in June. USS John C
Stennis (CVN 74) is 42 percent complete, and USS Harry S Truman (CVN
75) will award its execution Advanced Planning (AP) contract this year
to support commencing RCOH in fiscal year 2025.
The Navy is nearing completion of the final Environmental Impact
Study (EIS) for the disposal of the ex-Enterprise (ex-CVN 65) and
expect results before the end of 2023. This EIS will inform the Navy's
decision on how to commercially recycle the first nuclear powered
aircraft carrier.
Large Surface Combatants
Arleigh Burke-class (DDG 51) destroyers are the workhorse of the
Fleet, with 72 ships delivered as of February 2023. In fiscal year 2023
Congress authorized MYP authority for up to 15 DDGs in fiscal year
2023-2027, and provided funding for three ships. The shipbuilders have
a total of 17 DDG-51s under contract and 11 ships in various stages of
production.
Flight III DDG 51s will provide enhanced Integrated Air and Missile
Defense (IAMD) with the AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar
(AMDR) and AEGIS Baseline 10 (BL10). The Flight III leverages the
proven Flight IIA platform with modifications for hull stability,
cooling, and power to accommodate AMDR. AMDR meets the growing
ballistic missile threat by improving radar sensitivity and enabling
longer range detection of increasingly complex threats. The program
demonstrated design maturity through its successful completion of all
developmental testing. AMDR is in production for delivery to support
Flight III ships. Initial shipboard testing of the radar and combat
system has commenced on the first DDG 51 Flight III ship, USS Jack H
Lucas (DDG 125), which has already undergone initial builders sea
trials and will deliver in fiscal year 2023. As part of a two-phased
testing approach, Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in fiscal year
2024 will include Air and Missile Defense Commander (AMDC) capability
with core ballistic missile defense capability for Long-Range Search
and Track and Sea Based Terminal. This aligns with Fleet priorities for
Flight III to replace Cruisers in the AMDC role. Follow-on testing will
support the IAMD key performance parameters with completion of Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation, which culminates with Flight Test
Mission (FTM)-42 in the Q4FY27.
Aligned with congressional intent, risk reduction integration
testing of critical Flight III systems is ongoing. BL10 is being
integrated with a LRIP SPY-6 array and power conversion equipment at a
land-based development site to buy down risk of first-time integration
at the waterfront aboard DDG 125. The first two successful at-sea
testing trials of the Flight III electric plant were conducted in
December 2022 and February 2023, proving operational integration and
testing of the Machinery Control System software. The first combat
system software incremental load was delivered to DDG 125 in February
2022 with additional at-sea testing later in fiscal year 2023.
The Zumwalt-class (DDG 1000) guided missile destroyers are multi-
mission surface combatants designed to provide long-range, offensive
surface strike capabilities. The DDG 1000 program continues to
accomplish first-time integration of unique combat systems elements,
complete Post Delivery Test and Trials, demonstrate operational
performance, and planning efforts for the first integration of
Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic weapon system. USS Zumwalt
(DDG 1000) will be the first maritime platform to integrate the CPS
weapons system, with work starting in October 2023.
In fiscal year 2022, DDG 1000 conducted a deployment to the western
Pacific that included port visits to Pearl Harbor, HI, Guam, and
Yokosuka, Japan and included the first material inspection by INSURV
for the class. DDG 1001 participated in submarine Command Course Mini-
Wars February-March 2022, conducted Survivability test events in March
2022, and Deck Landing Qualifications in April 2022 to include 16 deck
landings with UH-1Y (Huey) and AH-1Z (Cobra) helicopters and fueling
during the landing operations. DDG 1001 participated in the 28th
edition of the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) international
maritime exercises in July 2022, and completed Failure and
Recoverability Mode Testing / Enhanced Total Ship Survivability Trial
in September 2022. DDG 1002 sailed from Bath, ME to Pascagoula, MS for
the first phase of the Combat Systems Activation (CSA) which was
awarded in August 2022. In December 2022, the Navy approved a plan to
install CPS during the CSA, allowing for delivery of a complete DDG
1002 to the Fleet with CPS capability.
DDG(X) will be the next enduring large surface combatant (LSC) that
follows the highly successful DDG 51 Class. Like DDG 51's evolution
from CG 47, the initial flight of DDG(X) is a new hull form built
around the DDG 51 Flight III's AMDR with AEGIS BL10 to deliberately
reduce execution risk. DDG(X) will provide
significant increases in range, efficiency, and time-on-station
compared to the DDG 51 Class, providing Fleet Commanders with increased
operational flexibility and decreasing the demand on Fleet Logistics.
When deployed with the FFG 62 Class, which is designed to relieve LSCs
of lower-tier missions, the resulting Fleet mix will directly
contribute to the Navy's concept of DMO. DDG(X) will provide the
flexibility and margins (space, weight, power, and cooling
reservations) to accommodate required future capacity and capability
upgrades to counter evolving threats. The Navy is committed to a smooth
and successful transition from DDG 51 to DDG(X), currently planned to
begin around fiscal year 2032. The transition will preserve the
critical shipbuilding and supplier industrial base by executing a
collaborative design process with current DDG 51 shipyards and
transitioning to a proven limited competition model between these
shipyards at the right point in ship construction.
Small Surface Combatants
The Constellation-class Frigate (FFG 62) is the evolution of a
proven parent design built to Naval combatant design standards with
increased lethality, survivability, and improved capability to support
the full range of military operations as part of a more lethal Joint
Force. The FFG 62 program is managing development risk by combining
proven ship designs with mature, best-of-breed Government Furnished
Equipment designated combat system elements. Consistent with
congressional intent, the Navy is establishing a FFG 62 Land Based
Engineering Site to reduce integration risks and test power and
propulsion systems. Equipped with Navy standard Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) combat system elements, the Navy is confident in the
multi-mission capabilities FFG 62 will deliver to the Fleet. The first
three ships, the future USS Constellation, USS Congress, and USS
Chesapeake are under contract, and the lead ship started construction
on August 31, 2022. The fourth ship will go on contract in fiscal year
2023.
The LCS program has delivered 29 of the 35 total funded ships. The
Navy has installed NSM on eight Independence variant LCS platforms, and
14 LCS hulls are programmed to receive the weapon system in the future.
Additionally, execution of the first LCS Lethality and Survivability
(L&S) upgrade is on track for USS Gabrielle Giffords in fiscal year
2024. Development of the L&S Common Combat System continues and will
support transition from shipbuilder-procured contractor-furnished
equipment to program of record government furnished equipment. Through
the efforts of the LCS Strike team and Task Force LCS, reliability of
the LCS platform has continued marked improvement, with successful LCS
deployments in fiscal year 2022 in 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets and
planned operations across the Fleets in fiscal year 2023. In the past
year, the Navy has made significant progress in its effort to modernize
mine countermeasure (MCM) capability, as the MCM Mission Package (MP)
completed initial operational test and evaluation in fiscal year 2022
with declaration of IOC imminent. This capability is expected to fully
replace the aging Avenger-class MCM fleet by the end of fiscal year
2027.
Large Deck Amphibious Warfare Ships
Amphibious warfare ships remain a critical component of the
Nation's global forward presence, supporting deterrence, crisis and
contingency response missions and providing decision space for our
Nation's leaders. These ships support the amphibious assault, special
operations, and expeditionary warfare missions of U.S. Marines and
often Special Operations Forces by providing sovereign bases at sea,
offering flexible services that provide shelter and sustainment, and
enabling Marines, Sailors, and Special Operations Forces to plan and
train a tailorable force.
The America-class Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA 6) program provides
a lethal and versatile platform to serve as the flagship for the
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG)/Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) now and
in the future. Among other capabilities, these ships host the fifth-
generation F-35B Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft that are critical
to maintaining air combat superiority. USS Tripoli (LHA 7) transitioned
to in-service and completed its maiden deployment in 2022. LHA 7 also
completed the ``JSF Heavy'' operational test in 2022, embarking 20
Joint Strike Fighters for the first time compared to a normal embark of
ten aircraft. Bougainville (LHA 8), first of the LHA Flt I class, is at
63 percent construction complete with launch planned for summer 2023.
LHA 8 includes a well deck to increase operational flexibility and a
reduced island structure increasing flight deck space to enhance
aviation capability. The Fallujah (LHA 9) construction contract was
awarded in October 2022 and fabrication started in December 2022.
Following advance procurement funding appropriated in fiscal year 2023,
this year's budget request accelerates LHA 10 by 4 years to a fiscal
year 2027 ship.
Other Amphibious Warfare Ships
San Antoni-class Amphibious Transport Docks (LPD 17) provide the
ability to operate offensively in a medium-density, multi-threat, anti-
access littoral environment by being a seabase for the Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU), capable of launching and recovering
helicopters, tiltrotor aircraft, landing craft, and amphibious
vehicles, and Special Operations Forces. The San Antonio-class LPD is
an essential component of the amphibious warfare ship inventory, and
continues to be constructed in a cost-efficient manner with
capabilities critical to providing strategic mobility, force
projection, and the range to campaign across the globe. NASA's Orion
spacecraft for the Artemis I mission was successfully recovered inside
the well deck of the USS Portland (LPD 27) in December 2022 off the
coast of Baja California. USS Fort Lauderdale (LPD 28) commissioned in
July 2022. Richard M McCool Jr (LPD 29) is 87 percent complete and is
planned for delivery in the second quarter of fiscal year 2024. LPD 28
and LPD 29 are the last of the LPD 17 Flight I line to be constructed
and are the transition ships to the LPD 17 Flight II. The first
Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar antenna was fitted on LPD 29 in
January 2023, bringing the Navy one step closer to having a common
radar hardware variant for carrier and amphibious ships. The first
Flight II ship, Harrisburg (LPD 30), is 34 percent complete with a
planned delivery in fiscal year 2026. Pittsburgh (LPD 31) started ship
fabrication in September 2022.
Connectors
The Ship to Shore Connector (SSC) program provides a robust, modern
operational capability to land credible combat power from amphibious
ships across beaches not accessible by conventional landing craft, thus
enabling the Marine Corps and Navy to project combat power ashore from
the sea. The SSC provides a one-for-one enhanced replacement platform
for legacy Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), which are beginning to
reach an average 30 years of age. While no SSC are requested in fiscal
year 2024 as the Navy works through orders under contract, SSC
procurement is planned to continue in fiscal year 2025. The Navy is
continuing to support production progress in serial SSC deliveries and
evidenced by the delivery of four crafts (Hulls 103 to 106) over the
last 15 months. The 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act added funding
for three additional SSC for five total. The 2023 National Defense
Authorization Act granted the authority to enter into one or more
contracts for the procurement of up to 25 craft.
The Navy is also replacing its aging Landing Craft Utility (LCU)
fleet with the LCU 1700 program which recapitalizes the capabilities
and flexibility currently provided by the LCU 1610 class in a more fuel
efficient, cost effective, and updated design. The fiscal year 2024
budget request continues to modernize the aging LCU fleet, which is
currently approaching an average age of 50 years, with a request for
two additional LCU 1700.
Expeditionary, Auxiliary, and Other Vessels
Expeditionary support vessels are flexible platforms used across a
broad range of military operations in support of multiple operational
phases. Moving forward the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) is being
referred to as the Medium Landing Ship (LSM) to better align name to
mission and differentiate the platform from traditional larger, multi-
purpose amphibious warfare ships classes. LSM is not a forcible entry
platform. It is planned to fill the capability gap that exists between
the Navy's large, globally deployable, high endurance, multipurpose
amphibious ships and smaller complementary landing craft. The Navy and
Marine Corps have come to an agreement on requirements and will pursue
a commercial parent design with vulnerability and recoverability
improvements to support overall vessel survivability. LSM concepts were
refined and matured with the five initial industry partners under
preliminary design studies awarded in January 2022 with follow-on
studies awarded in January 2023. The fiscal year 2024 funding request
continues the development of acquisition documentation, equipment
baseline, and efforts to support a lead hull contract award in fiscal
year 2025.
In the interim, the DON is evaluating a diverse group of existing
naval platforms (e.g., EPF, SLV, LCU, etc.) to act as the bridging
solution to support Stand-in Forces operating in the Indo-Pacific until
LSM is available. Interim material solutions can support limited
subsets of the overall LSM operational concept and may require
additional modifications. The Marine Corps has chartered a commercial
Stern Landing Vessel (SLV) to experiment and prototype the SLV's use in
providing logistics/sustainment capability to support EABO and Stand in
Forces with a flexibility to navigate the littorals to deliver cargo
initially or for resupply and maneuver Marines. The SLV offers the
Marine Corps the ability to experiment with a roll-on/roll-off vessel
capable of beaching on sand, gravel, shale, small stone, and man-made
marine ramps. On February 13, 2023, the first SLV was officially
undocked from its dry-dock location and is undergoing final shipyard
modifications and various trials and inspections. Once complete and
following acceptance, the vessel will undergo a thorough technical
evaluation period and then conduct experiments and participate in
exercises. The fiscal year 2024 budget requests $31 million to support
the planned acquisition of a 3d SLV to be delivered in fiscal year
2025.
In addition to the SLV, the Marine Corps is pursuing a future
strategy for a smaller surface distribution connector--the Ancillary
Surface Connector (ASC). ASC will be built by the commercial market to
answer a Service requirement for a III Marine Expeditionary Force
inter-island connector that supports the delivery of logistics over the
``last tactical mile.'' In this effort, the Marine Corps is currently
conducting trade space analysis and evaluating contracting options to
pursue the most cost-effective options for continued experimentation.
Finally, the Navy is investigating the use of existing platforms to
provide subsets of the overall LSM maneuver mobility and sustainment
mission. These include, but are not limited to, the EPF which can
provide a pier-to-pier role, and the LCU which can provide intra-island
lift over limited ranges.
Fast Transport (EPF) provides rapid, agile, intra-theater personnel
and equipment lift in support of DMO and Littoral Operations in a
Contested Environment. These vessels have and continue to support
critical partnerships throughout the Indo-Pacific, to include theater
security cooperation events such as Task Force Koa Moana with the
Republic of Palau. During this annual event in 2021 and 2022, USNS City
of Bismarck (EPF-9) supported Marines and Sailors from I Marine
Expeditionary Force. The newest EPF, the Apalachicola (T-EPF 13),
includes installation of evolutionary autonomy functions, serving as an
important point of learning as Navy advances its unmanned vessel
efforts. Apalachicola was delivered in February 2023 and successfully
completed Unmanned Logistics Prototype trials. Cody (EPF 14) and Point
Loma (EPF 15) are under construction with deliveries planned in fiscal
year 2023 and fiscal year 2025 respectively. EPF 16 is scheduled to
start construction in fiscal year 2023.
The EPF Flight II (EPFs 14-16) does not have the autonomous
capability of EPF 13 but is a modified EPF design that incorporates
engineering, design and operational improvements which will provide
Combatant Commanders with a more flexible and capable platform, and
enable an embarkable Role 2 Enhanced (R2E) medical capability. EPF
Flight II will be capable of conducting the same missions conducted by
the EPF but with a reduced lift capacity.
Fiscal year 2023 appropriations included the addition of two
Expeditionary Medical Ships (EMS). EMS is an EPF variant that has a
similar shallow draft, is all aluminum, and is a commercial-based
catamaran design. However, it is optimized to provide dedicated R2E
medical care and intra-theater patient movement. The EMS will provide
combatant commanders high-speed transport mobility to move casualties
over operational distances. Construction of the first EMS ship is
expected to start in fiscal year 2024.
The Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) is a modified commercial ship that
acts as an afloat forward staging base. ESBs are versatile ships that
provide a flight deck platform, mission deck and cargo capacity, and
command and control capabilities for mission planning and execution.
The Navy accepted delivery of USS John L Canley (ESB-6) on March 1,
2023. ESB 7 had its keel laid in October 2022, and ESB 8 is planned to
start construction in August 2023.
The fiscal year 2024 request continues to expand DON combat
logistics capacity with construction of the John Lewis (T-AO 205) class
fleet replenishment oiler to recapitalize the T-AO 187 class, which has
been in-service since the mid-1980's. USNS John Lewis, the lead ship of
the T-AO 205 class, delivered in July 2022. T-AO hulls 206 to 209 are
currently under construction, and hulls 211 and 212 were put on
contract in August 2022. The Navy is working through revised economic
assumptions to support inflation-related cost growth and schedule
delays due to late material and shipyard workforce challenges.
The T-ATS Towing, Salvage, and Rescue vessels are intended to
replace the mission requirements of both retiring T-ARS 50 and T-ATF
166 classes. They provide ocean-going tug, salvage, and rescue
capabilities to support U.S. fleet operations and will be a multi-
mission common hull platform capable of towing heavy ships. There are
nine T-ATS on contract and seven under construction across two
shipyards. A second production source was established in June 2021 to
support the shipbuilding industrial base and expedite delivery to the
fleet.
The Auxiliary General Ocean Surveillance ships (T-AGOS 25 class)
consists of a seven-vessel program of record, with four vessels
procured through the FYDP. Ocean Surveillance ships gather underwater
acoustical data by providing a ship platform capable of anti-submarine
passive and active acoustic surveillance. T-AGOS ships are operated by
Military Sealift Command and support the anti-submarine warfare mission
of Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Commanders. Fiscal year 2024 includes the
SCN funds necessary to award the Detail Design & Construction contract
for the first ship this year. The T-AGOS 25 ships will replace the T-
AGOS 19 and T-AGOS 23 class ships.
Strategic Sealift
The DON remains committed to sealift readiness and
recapitalization, working with our partners in USTRANSCOM and the
Maritime Administration (MARAD). This recapitalization strategy
includes procurement and refurbishment of used commercial Roll-On Roll-
Off ships for replacement of aging Ready Reserve Force capacity. The
buy-used recapitalization program provides a stable acquisition profile
with forecasted maintenance and repair costs to meet strategic mobility
requirements at a moderate level of risk. The work to modify and outfit
these used vessels will continue to be performed by U.S. shipyards. On
February 27, 2023, MARAD completed the purchase of three ships that
recapitalize over 660,000 square feet of Sealift capacity. In March
2023, two used vessels, the Cape Arundel and Cape Cortes, will complete
modification and outfitting availabilities with commercial industry
partners and enter into the Ready Reserve Force with 432,000 square
feet of capacity.
In parallel with recapitalizing strategic sealift, the Navy and
Marine Corps are in the early stages of developing requirements for the
next generation of maritime prepositioned ships. The DON will initiate
a new construction program to replace the current Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF) ship portfolio. New MPF ships will include
capability adaptations that support reliance on sea-basing to
persistently project, sustain, and maintain discrete forces forward in
the competition space. Funding included over the FYDP will support
industry studies to prepare for new construction design work.
Currently, five of the 12 maritime prepositioning ships have returned
to CONUS in fiscal year 2023 and have been placed in reduced operating
status-5 (ROS-5). ROS-5 is designed to have the ships fully ready to
activate and load cargo 5 days after notification. All ships,
regardless of status, will continue to be maintained by, and operate
through, Military Sealift Command for MPF usage through fiscal year
2024. Two of the five ROS-5 ships will remain partially pre-loaded with
prepositioned materiel at Blount Island Command. The remaining three
ships will be in various CONUS lay berths and not be loaded with
prepositioned materiel. In fiscal year 2025 those three ships are
scheduled to transition to MARAD and be removed from the Naval
prepositioned force.
Sustainment, Modernization, Service Life Extensions and Divestments
The Department continues to prioritize proper maintenance and
modernization of the Navy's fleet to ensure the Fleet Commanders have
the ships they need with the required capabilities to quickly respond
to evolving operational demands. The Navy is making headway in reducing
deferred maintenance backlogs and driving down the days of maintenance
delay by improving the timely delivery of ships back to the Fleet on
time and with all required work completed. The Navy is focusing efforts
across the entire maintenance planning and execution spectrum from work
package planning, procurement strategies, and waterfront execution to
drive out unnecessary delays and improve performance. The DON is also
leveraging the Perform to Plan approach across the portfolio to improve
quality of specification packages, workload planning and port loading,
earlier government material delivery to our industry partners,
inspection streamlining, and ensuring roles and responsibilities are
assigned to enable efficiency in execution without sacrificing proper
oversight responsibilities. Proper planning and sharing of workload
projections with industry allows for the Navy's partners to effectively
manage their infrastructure and workforce and identify opportunities
for targeted infrastructure investments.
Beyond maintaining the current Fleet, the Navy is also focused on
critical modernization efforts that will ensure the Navy's in-service
Fleet has relevant combat capability. The Navy is investing $17 billion
over 17 years to modernize 25 Flight IIA DDGs that will ensure
sustained combat effectiveness, mission relevancy, and enable the AEGIS
Fleet to achieve their full expected service lives. The fiscal year
2024 budget funds the second procurement of a SPY-6 variant for back-
fit on in-service DDGs, the combined hull, mechanical & electrical and
combat system/AEGIS modernization upgrade installations on three DDGs
in fiscal year 2024, the necessary procurements for another two
installs planned in fiscal year 2026, and the procurement of the first
high efficiency super chiller shipset planned for installation in
fiscal year 2026. The Navy is working to ensure lessons learned from
Cruiser Modernization are incorporated in the availability planning for
DDG Modernization availabilities across acquisition planning, including
contract type and procurement strategies, system lay-up and
reactivation, crew manning, and training. Additionally, to ensure the
Navy and its industry partners are properly prepared for the magnitude
and complexity of DDG Mod 2.0 availabilities scheduled to commence in
fiscal year 2028, the Navy is utilizing a ``crawl-walk-run'' approach
of stand-alone and incremental modernization for the early Flight IIA
hulls.
The Navy is committed to balancing the submarine maintenance
workload within the public and private shipyards, as well as
maintaining a healthy industrial base for both submarine maintenance
and new construction. To that end, the Navy has a new 15-Year
Maintenance Strategy to improve SSN material availability and outline
approaches to optimize submarine repair at all shipyards, including
private-sector maintenance execution. In fiscal year 2023, the Navy
with OSD(CAPE) is conducting a shipyard capacity and capability study
to identify additional areas for improvement. The Navy will continue to
work with our industry partners to improve cost and schedule
performance for submarine maintenance, providing valuable maintenance
surge capacity.
To ensure the Navy's resources are most effectively utilized across
the portfolio and support the NDS priorities, the fiscal year 2024
budget proposes decommissioning 11 ships in fiscal year 2024. Of these
11 ships, three are at or beyond expected service life (ESL) and eight
are prior to ESL. For the three ships at or beyond their ESL,
inactivation in fiscal year 2024 is a standard practice at the end of a
ship's lifecycle. For the eight ships the Navy plans to divest of in
fiscal year 2024 (3 CG, 3 LSD, 2 LCS), substantial maintenance, repair,
and modernization costs significantly outweigh warfighting
contribution, and the cost savings from these divestments allow for
realignment to higher priority, more capable platforms for strategic
competition. The Navy is continuing to trade near-term Fleet size and
capacity for long-term capability. The fiscal year 2024 budget does not
resource a Fleet size beyond what the Navy forecasts can be reasonably
sustained, accounting for manning, training, maintenance, ordnance,
operations, and future modernization.
The CG and LSDs have exceeded their expected utility for current
and future conflict. Keeping these platforms longer than the Navy plans
would require significant resources to maintain, modernize, and operate
them with limited return on that investment. The Navy cannot justify
the resultant limited capability these assets would provide over their
remaining service life when compared with the benefits of investing in
critical modernization and new construction efforts. For the LCS, the
fiscal year 2024 budget maintains the Navy's plan to divest LCS 6 and
LCS 8 in fiscal year 2024. These hulls are the oldest of the ``block-
buy'' Independence-class LCS and are in excess to the planned LCS force
requirements.
Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP)
The Navy's four public shipyards perform an essential role in
national defense by executing maintenance on submarines and aircraft
carriers to provide combat-ready ships to the fleet. SIOP, when fully
executed, will deliver required dry dock repairs and upgrades to
support current and planned future classes of nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers and submarines, optimize workflow within the shipyards through
significant changes to their physical layout, and recapitalize
industrial plant equipment with modern technology that will
substantially increase productivity and
safety.
The Navy is instituting a first-of-its-kind infrastructure
acquisition process for SIOP, similar to major defense acquisition
programs. The SIOP-tailored acquisition process will guide program
execution and establishes threshold and objective parameters for
overall cost, schedule, and performance of the SIOP at each shipyard
with total program cost.
With the tremendous support received from Congress--to include the
$1.9 billion appropriated in fiscal year 2023--the program is advancing
three lines of effort: dry dock modernization, optimization, and
capital equipment. The Navy has completed construction of the $158
million Super Flood Basin at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) and
commenced the construction of two new dry docks; completed construction
of the $73 million Norfolk Naval Shipyard (NNSY) Production Training
Facility; completed $167 million of design for Pearl Harbor Naval
Shipyard (PHNS) Dry Dock (DD) 3 Replacement, and on March 10, awarded a
$2.8 billion task order for the construction of the PHNS DD3
Replacement. Planning for DD3 Replacement successfully employed early
contractor involvement at multiple milestones throughout design
development and continuous macroeconomic assessments which contributed
to a competitive bid environment and multiple bids being received. The
fiscal year 2024 budget confirms the Administration's commitment to
this program and requests $2.7 billion for SIOP.
Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles
The DON continues to invest and mature all the enabling and core
technologies needed to deliver unmanned surface and undersea
capabilities. These capabilities along with the platforms are
foundational to creating the hybrid fleet of the future. MUM-T will
increase capacity, standoff, reach, and provide protection of our
manned platforms while reducing risk to our sailors and marines. USVs
will expand Information Operations and missile magazine depth.
In keeping with the USV systems engineering pillars, fiscal year
2022 efforts continued work with the Navy's industry partners on
maturing reliable Hull, Mechanical and Electrical capability; advancing
the required networks and radios; common core USV Combat System; vessel
control software; sensory perception and autonomy; and platform and
payload prototyping. In fiscal year 2022, the Navy's autonomous-enabled
ships traveled over 45,000 miles in the autonomy mode, and SeaHawk, a
medium USV, provided operational support to US Pacific Fleet for an
extended period of time.
By the end of fiscal year 2024, the Navy will have an operational
MUSV Land-Based Test Site, will have initiated LUSV land-based testing,
and will operate several USV prototypes including, four Overlord USVs,
Sea Hunter and SeaHawk. Additionally, the first autonomy-enabled EPF-13
will be available for operations to support experimentation and CONOPs
development.
The MCM USV program includes the development and production of MCM
USV craft and Payload Delivery Systems to deliver multiple capabilities
to meet MCM MP requirements. MCM USV reached IOC in July 2022 alongside
the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS), one of its two baseline
payloads. Initial operational test and evaluation of the MCM MP
concluded in August 2022, followed by operational testing focused on
mine hunting capability from the MCM USV which completed in September
2022. A MCM MP onboard USS Cincinnati (LCS 20) successfully executed
the full MCM sequence. This included both the semi-autonomous MCM USV
operating with the AQS-20 mine-hunting sonar, minesweeping payload, and
MH-60S operating with the Archerfish Airborne Mine Neutralization
System (AMNS) and Airborne Laser Mine Detection System. Together, these
systems were able to find, fix, identify, target, and neutralize mines.
The program continues to develop Barracuda to provide future mine
neutralizing capability.
Investing in a family of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) will
expand Navy reach and persistence by augmenting manned platform
capacity with unmanned autonomous systems. The Navy remains committed
to completing the fabrication of the Orca, Extra Large Unmanned
Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV), a pier-launched UUV capable of carrying large
payloads. The Navy christened the XLUUV Test and Evaluation asset in
Q3FY22 and internal component testing completed in Q2FY23. The Large
Displacement Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (LDUUV) which will support
Subsea and Seabed Warfare (SSW) and Intelligence Preparation of the
Operating Environment conducted in-water testing during fiscal year
2022, but was divested in fiscal year 2023 due to deferment of the
primary host interface platform (SSN Payload Handling System) and to
support higher Navy priorities. The LDUUV program aimed to address a
critical gap with increased depth, endurance, and payload capacity. The
Navy is re-evaluating LDUUV hosting requirements while continuing to
conduct LDUUV experimentation and demonstrations of SSW capabilities.
The Navy awarded the Medium UUV (MUUV) Program of Record contract
in July 2022. It supports the development of a common Medium vehicle
merging Expeditionary Mine Countermeasures Viperfish with Submarine
Force Razorback Torpedo Tube Launch and Recovered requirements,
demonstrating Navy commitment to identify efficiencies in procurement
and sustainment of unmanned systems.
Through a partnership with the Defense Innovation Unit, the DON
used accelerated acquisition authorities such as commercial solution
openings and other transactions to award the Lionfish contract.
Lionfish is a small, lightweight, highly portable vehicle that can be
mission configured to support Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Naval
Special Warfare, Underwater Construction Teams, and Mobile Diving &
Salvage Units. The program continues prototype development and user
testing, and plans to award a production contract for 10 MK18 MOD3
Lionfish vehicles for the Marine Corps and three NSW vehicles for the
Navy in Q3FY23. Lionfish will include advancements to the artificial
intelligence, machine learning, Automated Target Recognition, and
autonomy processes currently fielded with the MK18 MOD2 UUV, expanding
the capabilities of the DON's intelligent family of UUVs.
The Marine Corps continues developing the Long-Range Unmanned
Surface Vessel (LRUSV). LRUSV will be capable of launching the Organic
Precision Fires loitering munition to engage targets on land and at sea
to enhance Naval and Joint Force Commanders' sea denial campaigns. The
Marine Corps accepted delivery of five LRUSV prototypes between 2QFY22
and 2QFY23 for experimentation and analysis, and an early operational
assessment will be conducted in Q3FY23. The Marine Corps remains on
schedule and within budget to deliver an LRUSV Experimental Platoon for
further development and unit training.
In accordance with our plans to build a DMO hybrid fleet, the Navy
and Marine Corps are conducting studies to assess the supporting
infrastructure requirements of unmanned systems, to include
``motherships'' to provide on demand command and control nodes in a
denied environment, launch and recovery, maintenance, and resupply/
refuel for all unmanned systems at sea, in all domains in addition to
evaluating potential new concepts of operations.
Combat Systems
The Navy continues to field the most capable and lethal surface and
submarine combat systems in the world, making investments that take
full advantage of open architecture and continuously evolving
commercial technology to rapidly deliver real-time and reliable
capability to the warfighter and to break the paradigm of hardware-
software dependent deliveries. Continued investment in the Forge, the
Navy's combat system software factory, supports the continuing
advancement in implementing industry standards of Infrastructure as a
Service, Platform as a Service, and Software as a Service to rapidly
deliver iterative updates to the AEGIS Weapon System. As the Navy
continues Integrated Combat System development efforts, new
construction and in-service Aegis BL9 and BL10 ships will continue to
receive upgrades via Capability Packages. AEGIS BL10 with the
integration of the AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)
will deliver significant performance improvements over BL9 and the AN/
SPY-1 radar, expanding the sensor coverage and enhancing the Navy's
ability to perform the IAMD mission to defeat more advanced and more
numerous threats. The DON is leveraging the AMDR's design and testing
maturity as well as the common training and sustainment benefits to
field the AN/SPY-6(V)2 and SPY-6(V)3 to CVNs, LPDs, LHAs and FFGs, and
to backfit existing DDG Flight IIA destroyers with SPY-6(V)4.
The Navy continues to equip its submarines with ever-evolving
undersea combat systems, utilizing the Submarine Warfare Federated
Tactical Systems (SWFTS) modernization process for hardware Technology
Insertions and Advanced Processing Build software upgrades. This
process leverages commercial off-the-shelf technologies to provide
advanced capability improvements at lower cost. SWFTS has successfully
delivered a progression in warfighting capabilities for decades to our
Fleet SSNs, SSGNs and SSBNs including advancements in the combat,
sonar, electronic warfare, and imaging systems. SWFTS delivered the
first TI-20 installs to the Fleet in fiscal year 2022, bringing added
capability and improved system architecture, strengthening
cybersecurity and integrating new payload capabilities to provide
increased lethality. The fiscal year 2024 budget supports continued
implementation of Agile and DevSecOps software development best
practices at SWFTS vendors to increase quality, expedite capability
delivery, and improve cybersecurity by engraining cyber resiliency into
the system architecture. These efforts improve the Fleet's ability to
protect against known threats, detect unknown threats when they occur,
and respond and recover quickly to an operational State.
tactical aviation
Carrier Air Wing (CVW)
The striking power of the CVW remains the cornerstone of power
projection capability from 11 of the world's most survivable airfields,
our aircraft carriers (CVNs). The modernization of the air wing, and
weapons, keeps the aircraft carrier relevant through the carrier's 50
year service life. Today's Air Wing is transitioning to a mixture of
4th and 5th Generation strike fighter aircraft that continue to
incorporate advanced capabilities to support the objectives of the NDS.
The F-35C is replacing the early lot F/A-18E/Fs. E-2Ds, with an
advanced airborne radar, networking, and aerial refueling capability
are replacing the legacy E-2C. The CMV-22B is replacing legacy C-2As in
support of strike group logistics, and Next Generation Jammer (NGJ)
pods will replace the legacy ALQ-99 pods on the EA-18G and provide full
spectrum integrated non-kinetic effects.
The Air Wing of the Future (AWOTF) refers to the composition of the
CVW as it on-ramps advanced capabilities and capacity, measured at key
milestones in the near-, mid-, and long-term. The CVW will adapt and
transform from an all ``manned'' to a teamed ``manned-unmanned'' force
structure over the next two decades. When discussing the AWOTF, a time
horizon may be included to specify the force composition at that time.
In the near-term, the AWOTF achieves a mix of F-35C Lightning II,
F/A-18E/F Block III strike fighters, and EA-18G Growlers, and
introduces the MQ-25 Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV). The MQ-25 will take
over the aerial refueling mission, extending strike range, enhancing
maneuverability, and enabling all strike fighters to focus on the high-
end fight. In the mid-and long-term, the AWOTF will deliver game-
changing lethality and survivability through the NGAD FoS.
The DON has submitted a legislative proposal to remove the title 10
requirement to stand up a 10th CVW by October 1, 2025. The current CVN
maintenance schedule efficiently pairs nine CVWs to nine operational
CVNs according to ship availability; 11 total CVNs with two under
maintenance protocols. The Navy prioritizes investments in AWOTF over
constituting a 10th CVW ahead of need.
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Aviation Combat Element (ACE)
The MEU is the embodiment of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) as a self-contained, forward-deployed response force. The ARG/
MEU is a lethal, forward-deployed, sea-based, expeditionary force that
can operate across the range of military operations with a tailorable
and uniquely suited complement of aircraft. The MEU's available
inventory includes the F-35B, MV-22B, H-1, and CH-53K. The F-35B is the
only 5th Generation platform designed to operate aboard amphibious
warfare ships and expeditionary landing fields. The F-35B is a vital
part of the Marine Corps' modernization efforts, is part of the Stand-
in Force, and is a critical enabler for the Joint Force. The F-35B
provides commanders with strategic agility, enhanced situational
awareness, and greater freedom of maneuver in a highly contested
environment.
The MV-22B tiltrotor aircraft continues to be the most capable
assault support platform in the joint inventory and has revolutionized
how assault support is conducted with its superior speed, range, and
survivability. The new CH-53K is the only fully marinized heavy-lift
rotorcraft, and is a critical asset for mobility and logistical support
to distributed operations in a contested environment. The future ACE
will also feature a Group 3 UAS capability that provide both an organic
land-and maritime-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capability. Additionally, Marine Corps efforts are underway to conduct
a demonstration of an afloat mission control element (MCE) for MQ-9A
ER. This capability could potentially be tethered to the MEUs, adding a
critical, over-the-horizon, persistent surveillance, reconnaissance,
and target acquisition capability and airborne network gateway services
to the MEU's overall abilities.
airborne electronic attack (aea)
The EA-18G Growler is a critical enabler for the Joint Force,
bringing fully netted electronic warfare capabilities to the fight and
providing essential capabilities in the Electromagnetic Maneuver
Warfare environment. The fiscal year 2024 budget retains and fully
funds the EA-18G aircraft and squadrons across the FYDP. Next
Generation Jammer (NGJ) pods will replace the legacy ALQ-99 pods on the
EA-18G and provide full spectrum integrated non-kinetic effects. The
delivery of NGJ increases EA-18G Growler's lethality and provides a
multi-generational leap in capability against radar and communication
targets utilizing advanced AEA techniques as well as improved
reliability and maintainability. NGJ is phased by threat, with initial
focus on Mid-Band (MB), followed by Low-Band (LB).
NGJ-MB is a cooperative development and production program with
Australia, with IOC scheduled in 4QFY23. Delivery of the six production
representative System Demonstration Test Articles (SDTAs) began in July
2022, with 5 of 6 SDTA delivered as of February 2023 and the 6th to be
delivered the end of March 2023. These Test Articles will be used to
support the completion of Developmental Test and the entirety of
Operational Test (OT). OT is currently on track to start spring 2023,
with a focus on the completion of aeromechanical and mission systems
flight test. The fiscal year 2024 budget includes $40.5 million in
RDT&E funding to complete the Verification of Correction of
Deficiencies (VCD) of the baseline NGJ-MB program and to begin
development of the NGJ-MB Extended (MBX) Engineering Change Proposal
(ECP) to extend the upper frequency range coverage limit of the system
to counter modern and adaptive threats. The fiscal year 2024 budget
request also includes $426.4 million in APN funding for nine Full Rate
Initial Production I shipsets, associated support equipment, training
equipment and production support. Three LRIP I shipsets are scheduled
to begin delivery 4QFY23.
NGJ-LB is a critical AEA capability to augment and replace the
legacy ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System on the EA-18G in the low
frequency bands, and is a cooperative development program with
Australia. The fiscal year 2024 budget request $250.6 million RDT&E for
NGJ-LB to focus on pod design, advanced capabilities development, and
the build of aeromechanical and mission systems test pods to support
ground and flight testing.
Growler Block 2 (GB2) will deliver capabilities to the warfighter
to detect, locate, identify and counter advanced Integrated Air Defense
Systems and Complex Emitters. GB2 will utilize a phased approach for
spiral development of AEA capabilities to modernize processing,
sensors, and aircrew decision aids to maintain dominance in the modern
electromagnetic spectrum. Phase 1 will include an upgraded Next
Generation Electronic Attack Unit with Open Mission Systems
architecture, Multi-Level Security, and incorporation of the Reactive
Electronic Attack Measures capability. Phase 2 is the addition of the
advanced Multi-function Array into the inboard leading edge flaps of
the aircraft, augmenting the ALQ-218 functionality and capability. GB2
serves as a critical technology development and risk reduction effort
to support Naval Aviation's Air Wing of the Future.
The Marine Corps, through the INTREPID TIGER II program, is
bringing advanced Electronic Warfare (EW) to all its aviation
platforms, and is focused on MUM-T to answer the MAGTF's requirements
for AEA. The Marine Corps has worked in conjunction with OSD to
purchase the first two XQ-58 Valkyrie CCA platforms to test EW effects
in partnership with F-35 and our Assault Support platforms.
airborne command and control aircraft
The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye is the Navy's carrier-based Airborne
Command and Control aircraft, equipped with an advanced airborne radar,
aerial refueling capability, and network connectivity required by Naval
and Joint Force commanders to provide command and control to achieve
and maintain air and sea superiority, and counter adversaries Anti-
Access and Area Denial strategies. The E-2D provides unique Theater Air
and Missile Defense capabilities, and is a cornerstone of the Naval
Integrated Fire Control system of systems linking Navy and Marine Corps
fighter aircraft, Navy surface combatants, and Marine Corps ground
units.
The sixth Full Rate Production Lot 7 aircraft delivered in January
2023. Modernization priorities focus on Fleet capabilities to pace the
threat, including Interoperability, Crypto Modernization, Communication
and Navigation Hardware; essential Command and Control; networking and
sensor performance capabilities that are critical enablers to Naval
Integrated Fire Control; vital upgrades and improvements to enable
Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) and Naval Operational
Architecture [Theater Combat ID and Hawkeye Cockpit Technical Refresh].
These modernization efforts are interdependent and required to keep
pace with the rapidly advancing JADC2 environment and equally rapidly
advancing adversary capability.
assault support and logistics support aircraft
Tiltrotor Aircraft (USMC MV-22 Osprey and Navy CMV-22B)
The V-22 tiltrotor capability has revolutionized military air
transport with its unmatched combat range and airspeed. The Marine
Corps MV-22 continues to support worldwide operations and provide a
forward presence in INDOPACOM, CENTCOM, and EUCOM. In fiscal year 2023,
the U.S. Air Force (USAF) continues nacelle improvement implementation,
with an accelerated timeline for this readiness-and reliability-
enhancing effort. The Marine Corps is working to coordinate and fund a
tailored nacelle improvement program based on USAF efforts. This
program is designed to enable a much faster fleet incorporation rate at
a price the Marine Corps can afford, providing a significant reduction
in required fleet maintenance hours than would have been otherwise
possible.
The Navy continues to leverage MV-22 investments to recapitalize
the legacy C-2 fleet with CMV-22B aircraft in support of strike group
logistics. The program declared IOC in December 2021, and completed its
first two deployments in support of the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike
group (CSG) and the USS Abraham Lincoln CSG in 2022. The third
deployment will commence in 2023.
The fiscal year 2024 budget requests $137.6 million in RDT&E for
continued V-22 development and product improvements, including a Helmet
Mounted Display/Degraded Visual Environment to improve pilot situation
awareness and safety in degraded visual environments. Fiscal year 2024
budget also includes $243.2 million in APN for production line
shutdown, modifications, common configuration, and nacelle
improvements. With the fiscal year 2023 congressional add of five V-22s
(one MV-22 and four CMV-22), the program is funded for 360 MV-22
aircraft for the Marine Corps and 48 CMV-22 aircraft for the Navy. Both
programs are now fully funded to their programs of record. Fiscal year
2022 was the final year of V-22 procurement under MYP III.
CH-53K
CH-53K is an optimized vertical, heavy lift, sea-based, long-range
solution for the naval force, providing agile maritime logistical
connectors with greater payloads and speed than any current or emerging
rotorcraft. The CH-53K will complement connectors to enable littoral
maneuver and provide logistical support to a widely disaggregated naval
force. The Marine Corps achieved IOC for the CH-53K in April 2022, and
in December 2022 the program was approved for Full Rate Production.
This closely follows completion of a thorough Initial Operational Test
and Evaluation period that resulted in over 3,000 mishap free hours
flown in various challenging environments and terrain. In January 2023,
Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron demonstrated the CH-53K
performance with an external load certification lift of a 22,000 pound
F-35 airframe. A contract to procure the sixth Low-Rate Initial
Production Lot of nine aircraft was signed in January 2022, and the DON
has been granted the authority to enter a block buy contract for the
first Full Rate Production lots--Lot 7 in fiscal year 2023 and Lot 8 in
fiscal year 2024. A block buy contract leverages aircraft volume
quantity to realize significant cost savings, providing stability to
the industrial base and improved production efficiencies while
supporting the Marine Corps' plans to deploy the first CH-53K MEU
detachment in fiscal year 2025.
The Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget requests $222.3 million in
RDT&E to continue the CH-53K development, test, and standup of organic
test capabilities for follow-on improvements and $2.2 billion in APN
for procurement of 15 Full Rate Production aircraft, initial spares,
and modifications.
executive support aircraft
The VH-92A Presidential Helicopter replaces the legacy VH-3D and
VH-60N and will provide safe, reliable, and secure executive
transportation. The fiscal year 2024 President's Budget requests $35.4
million in RDT&E for VH-92A Helicopter Improvements and $60.5 million
APN for Executive Helicopter Series (VH-3D, VH-60N and VH-92A). RDT&E
funding is required for continued VH-92A improvements and follow-on
test and evaluation activities. These efforts include VH-92A Mission
Communications System upgrades to both software and hardware,
enhancements to required Wideband Beyond Line-of-Sight capabilities,
test aircraft and facilities; and test and evaluation efforts for
distributed network communications, high-hot aircraft performance
enhancements and cockpit upgrades. APN in the amount of $60.5 million
is required for retrofit modifications to the VH-92A Mission
Communications System and continued modifications to the VH-3D and VH-
60N to ensure communications interoperability through the remainder of
the lifecycle.
fixed-wing aircraft
KC-130J (USMC)
The KC-130J Super Hercules remains a force multiplier, supporting
humanitarian, contingency, and expeditionary operations worldwide. The
KC-130J has the highest deploy-to-dwell ratio in the Marine Corps as it
provides critical tactical aerial refueling and organic lift
capabilities to deployed MEUs and Combatant Commanders. Incorporation
of the Block 8.1 upgrade and the Department of the Navy Large Aircraft
Infrared Countermeasures will increase the platform's capability,
performance, and survivability. The fiscal year 2024 budget requests
$241.3 million in APN to procure two KC-130Js through a USAF contract.
These aircraft will be fielded to a new Marine Corps Active Duty
squadron, VMGR-153, in Hawaii in support of Indo-Pacific mobility.
Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO)
The Navy's TACAMO mission provides survivable, reliable, and
endurable airborne nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)
capabilities to the nuclear triad and is a vital link to the Navy's
SSBN fleet, the most survivable leg of the triad. The TACAMO mission is
currently flown on the E-6B Mercury (Boeing 707 airframe), an aging
platform currently undergoing simultaneous sustainment and
modernization. TACAMO mission recapitalization requires a new platform
to ensure continued success of the mission in the future. The C-130J-30
(stretched Super Hercules) aircraft has been selected as the
recapitalization platform and TACAMO mission systems will be developed
and integrated by a third-party contractor. In fiscal year 2024, the
Navy will invest $213.7 million of RDT&E toward platform development
and completion of Milestone B. Funding in fiscal year 2024 includes
$12.2 million toward spares to support the three C-130J-30 test
aircraft procured in fiscal year 2023, $76.7 million for non-recurring
engineering contracts on the C-130J airframe, and $71.2 million for
very low frequency (VLF) transmit system modernization. Investments in
fiscal year 2024 set the stage for successful TACAMO mission
integration on the C-130J-30 supporting U.S. nuclear deterrence and
Columbia's assured second strike for decades to come.
maritime patrol aircraft
The P-8A is a heavily modified and militarized variant of Boeing's
737 commercial airframe and is DOD's only long-range full-spectrum ASW,
cue-to-kill platform, with substantial armed Anti-Surface Warfare
(ASuW) and networked Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR) capabilities. The P-8A warfighting inventory requirement is 138
aircraft and is fielding in three Increments. Increments 1, 2, and
Increment 3 Block 1, which consisted of ECP 4 and ECP 5, have fielded.
Increment 3 Block 2, consisting of ECP 6 and ECP 7, significantly
improves Navy operational plan (OPLAN) outcomes with P-8A Increment 3
modified aircraft--specifically in ASW warfighting scenarios. Block 2
includes ASW Signal Intelligence, Wideband SATCOM, Higher-Than-Secret
processing, enhanced track management and sensor fusion (Minotaur), and
the ASW critical warfighting capability Enhanced Multi-Static Active
Coherent (MAC-E), and is scheduled to initially field in fiscal year
2026.
The fiscal year 2024 budget request includes $168.5 million in
RDT&E for integration of ECP 6 and ECP 7 to complete baseline
capability fielding and P-8A rapid capability development efforts to
pace emergent threats. $347.4 million in APN is requested for fleet
modification kits, deficiency corrections, safety upgrades, and the
initiation of Boeing's P-8A production line shutdown activities. Boeing
intends to initiate P-8A production line shutdown activities in fiscal
year 2024 if no additional P-8A orders are received. Funding requested
in the fiscal year 2024 budget achieves 128 of 138 warfighting
inventory objective addressing current threat and strategy. As of
February 2023, 117 aircraft have been delivered.
unmanned aircraft systems (uas)
Naval Aviation continues to integrate unmanned systems into the
Fleet to enable a fundamental shift in the way the DON conducts naval
aviation operations. Broadening unmanned aviation efforts will decrease
risk to personnel, allow greater persistence, longer ranges, improved
data speed and accuracy, and a faster decision cycle. These
capabilities offer the DON increased asymmetric operational
opportunities and tactical advantages that provide the warfighters an
edge to dominate and win in ongoing and future conflicts. The fiscal
year 2024 budget prioritizes the continued development and production
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to support current Fleet ISR
requirements and future UAS integration into the CVW, ARG, and MEU.
MQ-25A Unmanned Carrier Aviation
MQ-25A will increase the strike range, capability, and lethality of
the CVW through organic mission and recovery tanking, and provide an
ISR capability to the CSG. As the primary CVW mission and recovery
tanker, MQ-25A will increase available CVW Strike Fighter assets and
preserve F/A-18E/F Fatigue Life Expenditure. MQ-25 is integral to the
Air Wing of the Future and establishes the foundation for MUM-T and
autonomous operations from the CVN. The fiscal year 2024 budget
continues investment in MQ-25 and the Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission
Control System (UMCS) development, begins testing of Navy MQ-25A and
procures three MQ-25A air vehicles to increase fleet inventory. MQ-25A
will IOC in late 2026. The fiscal year 2024 budget request supports
procurement for the MQ-25 Stingray with $596.3 million in APN and
continues RDTE funding with $220.4 million.
MQ-4C Triton
The MQ-4C Triton is a persistent force multiplier that delivers
situational awareness of the battle space to shorten the sensor-to-
shooter decision loop in the maritime domain. MQ-4C Triton's
persistence and sensor mix is integral to Navy's Maritime Strategy to
deliver a more lethal and effective global Joint Force.
VUP-19 completed an Early Operational Capability (EOC) deployment
with two aircraft in an IFC-3 configuration to INDOPACOM and executed
2419.9 hours from January 2020 0-October 2022.
The program has delivered the first two fleet MQ-4C Triton Multi-
Intelligence (Multi-INT) Integrated Functional Capability Four (IFC-4)
Increment 1 configuration Unmanned Aircraft (UA) on-schedule supporting
Unit Level Training (ULT) and Operational Test (OT) ahead of IOC in
August 2023.
The fiscal year 2024 budget requests $416.0 million in APN to
continue procurement of two MQ-4C Triton UA and associated support
elements, and $12.1 million in RDTE, with an additional $300.4 million
for MQ-4 modernization RDTE for Increment 2 capability development.
MQ-9A Extended Range (ER)
The Marine Corps MQ-9A ER is a critical enabler for the Naval and
Joint Force providing an extended range, long-endurance multi-mission
ISR capability through a suite of sensors designed to detect surface
and air threats. The MQ-9A ER is a linchpin in providing Maritime
Domain Awareness (MDA), as well as providing resilient and persistent
information flow, enabling command and control of EABO and DMO forces
against near or peer threats.
The Indo-Pacific has unique challenges requiring the Stand-in Force
to be able to operate over significant distances between ground units.
An MQ-9A ER overhead equipped with an Airborne Network Extension (ANE)
payload facilitates connectivity for Stand-in Forces operating at the
forward edge of the battlespace. MQ-9A ER will also provide an
Electronic Warfare and Airborne Early Warning capability to enhance the
situational awareness of decisionmakers, and provide input to the joint
common operational picture. With the addition of a Smart Sensor
autonomous capability, the MQ-9A ER will be enhanced through automatic
cueing and fusing of tracks to other onboard sensors. The Marine Corps
is set to have 20x MQ-9A Block 5 air vehicles, 14 x Ground Control
Stations (GCS), and payloads to conduct assigned missions.
Existing U.S. Air Force and Air National Guard efforts are being
leveraged to reduce cost as the Marine Corps matures this nascent
Service-level capability, reducing risk.
weapons programs
Munitions Inventory and Industrial Base
The President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Requests $6.9 billion for
the Weapons Procurement account. This level of funding represents a
significant increase over fiscal year 2023, allowing for continued
modernization of our weapons inventory with critical capabilities to
enhance warfighter readiness, as well as significant investment in
production capacity to increase critical munitions inventories.
Ongoing United States support to Ukraine has highlighted the need
for investments in key areas across the industrial base to support
United States, ally, and partner nation readiness. The DON is working
closely with industry to expedite replenishment of stocks provided to
Ukraine, engaging with industry partners to understand the barriers to
accelerating production and determining how and where the Department
can make strategic investments to improve inventory, capability, and
capacity. The Department is investing in the industrial base to expand
and accelerate production throughput, streamline testing, and
strengthen critical component supply chains. Simultaneously, the
Department is placing investments in recertification as a cost-
effective way to improve near-term inventories. Coupled with the
ongoing replenishment of DON stocks, these investments into the
munitions industrial base send the demand signal that building
munitions inventories is a top priority
The Department is leveraging the authorities granted in the fiscal
year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act to pursue MYP contracts
for critical munitions programs such as Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), and
Naval Strike Missile (NSM). MYP contracts for Advanced Medium-Range
Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and LRASM will be joint efforts with the
USAF. The strategy allows the Department to use savings generated
through EOQ financing to procure additional lots of missiles under a
Buy-to-Budget concept, to further improve efficiencies and yields.
Missile Programs
As the Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life of Ohio-
class SSBNs, addressing the viability of the Strategic Weapons System
(SWS) throughout the life of the Columbia-class SSBNs remains a
priority. The current TRIDENT D5 Life Extension (D5LE) remains an
effective and credible Strategic Weapon System on both the Ohio-class
and Columbia-class SSBNs into the 2040's, supporting the Ohio-class
submarine through end of service life and serving as the initial
Strategic Weapon System for the Columbia-class SSBNs. Modernization of
the SWS, D5LE2, is required to maintain the Sea Based Strategic
Deterrent starting with the ninth Columbia-class submarine by ensuring
sufficient missile inventory and seamlessly supporting USSTRATCOM
requirements. D5LE2 incorporates the necessary flexibility and
adaptability needed to maintain demonstrated performance and
survivability in the dynamic threat environment until Columbia-class
end of life. The Administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states
that D5LE2 needs to begin deploying on Columbia-class in the late
2030's to sustain sufficient missile inventories to support the U.S.
sea-based strategic deterrent as well as the United Kingdom's
independent nuclear deterrent. The Navy will prioritize near-term
investments in accordance with the NPR to ensure that D5LE2 is
effective in the expected threat environment and delivers on time.
Fiscal year 2024 funding will support industrial base development,
flight subsystem engineering, and flight component suppliers that are
critical to the execution of D5LE2.
Tomahawk
The Navy is continuing investment into Tomahawk Block V new
production, Maritime Strike Tomahawk, and recertification/modernization
of Tomahawk Block IV. The fiscal year 2024 budget request adds $23.4
million to reduce Tomahawk production lead time. These funds are being
invested to increase industrial capacity, specifically by relieving
chokepoints within the Tomahawk production line.
In the fiscal year 2024 budget request, the Department sustains the
Tomahawk as the Nation's premier all-weather, long-range, survivable
deep strike offensive weapon to include new production of and
recertification of current inventory into modernized BLK V Tomahawk
missiles. BLK V(a) Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) provides a long-range
moving maritime strike capability to meet current and future threats,
supporting the Surface Warfare Mission area through the inclusion of a
seeker suite in the Tomahawk BLK V missile. The fiscal year 2024 budget
request for MST provides continuation of Test and Evaluation (T&E)
plans that include missile functional ground testing and missile test
flights from a ground launcher apparatus to assess seeker performance,
mature and refine seeker algorithms, and provide verification and
validation data for Modeling and Simulation. MST IOC is planned for
fiscal year 2025. The fiscal year 2024 budget request continues
engineering, manufacturing, and development of the Joint Multiple-
Effects Warhead System (JMEWS), which will deliver a hardened target
penetration capability with the Tomahawk BLK V(b) missile in fiscal
year 2027. The fiscal year 2024 budget request continues engineering,
manufacturing, and development of the Military Code Global Positioning
System (GPS) receiver, which will deliver significant increased
resiliency in spoofing and jamming threat environments to the Tomahawk
BLK V missile in fiscal year 2026.
Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 1/ Long Range Anti-
Ship Missile (LRASM), LRASM C-1/C-3, and OASuW Increment 2 /
HALO
The Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget requests $639.6 million to
initiate LRASM MYP with the USAF. The fiscal year 2024 procurement
funding covers the EOQ materials along with the buy of 91 DON LRASM
weapon systems in the initial year of the 5-year MYP. The Fiscal Year
2024 President's Budget request also includes RDT&E funding for the
completion of the LRASM 1.1 capability improvements.
The LRASM C-1 and C-3 variants add near-term, cost-effective
capacity to the DON's long range strike capability while enhancing the
OASuW mission. The fiscal year 2024 budget requests funding for Navy
strike mission integration and employment by upgrading the existing
AGM-158 product to respond to rapidly changing threats. Navy AGM-158
development efforts also involve development and integration of a
Beyond Line-of-Sight radio subsystem to enable dual mission capability
and enhanced operational flexibility, optimizing carrier magazine
capacity to complement OASuW warfighting capability. The fiscal year
2024 President's Budget requests $141.9 million to continue developing
AGM-158 derived capability and radio integration on F/A-18; develop
software for strike mission planning, Universal Armament Interface and
missile Operational Flight Plan. The fiscal year 2024 President's
Budget request also includes $83.7 million for procurement of the
initial 10 LRASM in the C-3 configuration.
The Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget includes $95.8 million in
support of OASuW Increment 2, which is now referred as Hypersonic Air
Launched OASuW (HALO). HALO supports the national imperative to mature
hypersonic capabilities and will provide the Navy a necessary air-
launched, carrier-based weapon to address evolving long range, high
speed threats from near peer competitors. In order to deliver this
capability to the warfighter when needed, the DON will collaborate
heavily with the Air Force.
Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) & AARGM Extended-Range
(AARGM-ER)
AARGM domestic procurement completed in fiscal year 2021 with the
award of the last DON Full Rate Production (FRP) contract. There have
been 1450 AARGMs (All Up Rounds, Training Missiles, and Spares)
delivered to the Fleet as of March 2023. Program of record delivery is
1803 missiles. Deliveries continue through fiscal year 2024 in support
of the transition to AARGM-ER. AARGM-ER provides the DON with a 5th
generation compatible extended-range asset to project power and provide
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, both at-sea and on land. The first
AARGM-ER delivery is scheduled for 4QFY23. The budget requests $195.7
million in Weapons Procurement, Navy (WPN) to procure 77 AARGM-ER all-
up-rounds and six Captive Air Training Missiles. The fiscal year 2024
President's Budget requests $51.8 million in RDT&E to support
operational and Integration testing of production representative
hardware.
Hypersonic Program
The DON is developing a hypersonic weapon system that will enable
precise and timely strike capability against deep inland targets in
contested environments. In collaboration with the Army, the Department
is leveraging a common All Up Rounds missile design and test
opportunities to field a conventional hypersonic weapon system.
Zumwalt-class DDGs will be the first Navy platform to field this
hypersonic capability in the mid-2020's, followed by Block V Virginia-
class SSNs starting in the early 2030's. In March 2020, the Services
executed a successful flight test of the Common Hypersonic Glide Body,
and in June 2022, the Services followed up that testing with several
static-fire tests and a flight test of the newly developed two-stage
Solid Rocket Motor. The DON has validated the design of the Navy's
cold-gas launch approach and continued sounding rocket testing in
support of future capability, manufacturability, and affordability
improvements. This rapid development and demonstration of hypersonic
strike weapon systems supports the U.S. ability to deter, and if
necessary, defeat potential adversaries.
The Department's fiscal year 2024 budget request funds continued
build of the first three All Up Rounds to be delivered to the first
Zumwalt-class DDG and All Up Rounds for future flight testing, supports
construction of the Underwater Launch Test Facility, and executes two
flight tests, including the first launch of the CPS All Up Round using
the cold-gas launch approach for sea-based fielding. The request totals
$901 million in CPS R&D funding. Additionally, the request includes
$341 million in funding to procure additional rounds in support of
Zumwalt-class fielding.
The Marine Corps is working toward the capability to employ
smaller, highly mobile hypersonic weapons through science and
technology initiatives. The Marine Corps is pursuing an acquisition
strategy that leverages the developmental work of other Services and
agencies, investing when the capability has reached a higher technology
readiness level that allows for expedited prototype experimentation at
reduced costs.
Torpedoes
The Department continues to invest heavily in increasing the
capacity and capability of both the Heavyweight and Lightweight Torpedo
inventories to maintain our advantage in the undersea domain against
our strategic competitors. The MK 48 Heavyweight Torpedo is the Navy's
primary submarine-launched ASW and ASuW weapon. While the Navy has
continued to upgrade its existing inventory to incorporate the latest
technology and capability, the Navy restarted production of the MK 48
to meet munitions requirements and during the summer of 2022 accepted
the first new production heavyweight torpedoes in over 20 years. In
addition, the Department is progressing development of new capabilities
with the MK 48 MOD 8 and MK 48 MOD 9 to maintain our advantage over the
threat today and in the future. The MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo, which is
employed by both surface ships and air platforms, continues to be
produced and upgraded to keep pace with the ASW threat. At current
production demand, the torpedo industrial base remains healthy,
producing the MK 54 MOD 0 for the Nation's allied partners in addition
to the upgraded MK 54 MOD 1 for the U.S. Navy.
The Department has also partnered with industry and University
Affiliated Research Centers to rapidly develop and field new and
advanced capabilities to further our advantage in the undersea domain.
This includes the MK 54 MOD 2, which will improve performance against
the high-end threat, as well as a Very Light Weight Torpedo that will
deliver multi-mission capability as both a hard-kill torpedo
countermeasure and a short range ASW weapon. The Navy is also expanding
the methods in which the MK 54 is employed to provide greater
flexibility, effectiveness, and lethality. From high altitude via the
P-8A and the High Altitude ASW Weapon Capability (HAAWC) wing kit, to
the Hammerhead encapsulated effector and future stand-off ASW
capabilities, MK 54 payloads will continue to be essential to the US
Navy's and its Allies' ASW mission.
marine corps ground programs
Fiscal year 2024 Marine Corps investments are prioritized to
enhance combined and Joint Force lethality. Marine Corps modernization
has involved replacing legacy approaches with threat-based operating
concepts, new command arrangements, emerging technology and modernized
programs. These new concepts and technologically advanced capabilities
enable our Stand-in Forces to gain sharpened situational awareness, set
conditions in case of crisis or conflict, and contribute to Joint All
Domain Command and Control (JADC2). With a clear understanding of the
NDS and the current operating environment, the Marine Corps' budget
provides a modern force that can sense, make sense, and close the kill
webs in support of the Naval and Joint Campaigns.
Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar (G/ATOR)
The Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) is a multi-role,
ground-based, expeditionary three-dimensional radar system employed by
both the Aviation Combat Element and Ground Combat Element within the
MAGTF, satisfying the Marine Air Command and Control System and Ground
Counter Fire/Counter Battery capability requirements. Deployable via
KC-130J, the G/ATOR provides mobile, multi-functional, three-
dimensional surveillance of airborne targets, detection of cruise
missiles, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Rockets, Artillery, and Mortars.
Once those threats have been tracked, the G/ATOR will then cue the
appropriate air defense weapons. Providing persistent surveillance and
detection of enemy air threats in the littorals and participating in a
cooperative engagement network of sensors and shooters via the Common
Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S), the G/ATOR contributes to
both Naval and Joint Force domain awareness.
Serving as the forward component of the Joint Force, the Marine
Corps continues to invest in and enhance the sensor capabilities of the
G/ATOR. Fiscal year 2023 appropriations funded $304 million to procure
eight additional radars, bringing the total number to 53 of 57 planned.
Additionally, the fiscal year 2024 budget requests $25.3 million for
critical G/ATOR maintenance and software upgrades. This program was on
full display in Spring 2022, when a Marine Corps G/ATOR deployed to
Lithuania to support NATO's air policing mission for the first time.
Building upon the radar's successes, G/ATOR seeks to further integrate
with the Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC), providing protection
to defended assets against airborne and cruise missile threats.
Ultimately, as a modern and highly capable program, G/ATOR expands the
Service's integration into Navy and Joint integrated air and missile
defense missions.
Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S)
Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) connects and
collates sensor inputs to facilitate MAGTF employment and targeting
decisions. CAC2S fuses real-, near-, and non-real time data to provide
a common operational picture across the Marine Air Command and Control
System--this picture allows leaders to then task the air defense
``arms'' of the MAGTF, the Marine Air Defense Integrated System and the
Medium Range Intercept Capability, to punch back and destroy threats as
necessary. CAC2S fused information enables enhanced air control,
improved situational awareness, sensor integration, full tactical data
link integration, improved planning, and command functionality, as well
as sensor-netting integration. CAC2S also provides integrated airspace
command and control for the MAGTF and integrates real time sensor data
into the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability network. As the
primary C2 system that integrates MAGTF aviation operations with Joint,
combined, and coalition aviation agencies, the Marine Corps intends to
continue to procurement of these small form factor variants until
fiscal year 2029. The small form factor (CAC2S SFF) aspect of CAC2S
reduces the footprint of the system to transit cases that can be
utilized from the front seat of a dune buggy. The fiscal year 2024
budget requests approximately $55.8 million to produce 32 CAC2S SFF
that can be flown and resupplied via assault support aircraft to
dispersed locations and will provide both the Joint force and the
Marine Corps with a complete, common air command and control
operational picture.
Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS)
Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) is designed to counter
the expected swarms of enemy drones and aircraft that will assault
Marines on modern battlefields. MADIS provides an expeditionary,
upgradable, state-of-the-art capability, developed to protect maneuver
forces, installations, and other designated critical assets from Fixed
and Rotary Wing aircraft along with Group 1-3 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS). MADIS will also utilize sensors to provide Beyond-Line-of-Sight
cueing and targeting. Organically transportable via KC-130J aircraft,
MADIS incorporates a pair of Joint Light Tactical Vehicles that are
designed to defeat airborne threats with a turret mounted 30mm cannon,
Stinger missiles, and an electronic warfare jammer. MADIS will also
employ CAC2S and its own organic radar sensors to collect, interpret,
and pass radar tracks for target engagements. Funded to 113 of 131
systems, MADIS will begin fielding in late fiscal year 2024.
While MADIS represents the Marine Corps' larger air defense program
of record, the Light-MADIS (L-MADIS) provides similar capabilities to
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU), but with a smaller form factor on a
pair of ultra-light tactical vehicles. Utilizing sensors to provide
cueing and targeting, the L-MADIS employs electronic warfare jammers to
defeat airborne threats. This system is actively employed by the Fleet
Marine Force and during a Straits of Hormuz transit aboard the USS
Boxer, the 11th MEU employed the L-MADIS in support of the defense of
the amphibious task force. Utilizing electronic jamming, the L-MADIS
successfully defeated an Iranian drone flying within 1km of the ship.
L-MADIS is fully funded to 21 systems; 12 urgent-need variants are
fielded to the Fleet at the present time. Whether MADIS or L-MADIS, the
Marine Corps continues to pursue these critical force protection
capabilities to defeat aerial threats.
Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC)
The Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC) defends the MAGTF
against inbound cruise missiles and other precision munitions. Fully
deployable via KC-130J aircraft, MRIC defends forward-deployed forces
primarily against cruise missile threats, and secondarily against UAS
and other aerial threats that enter the MRIC's Weapons Engagement Zone.
This capability is accomplished through the integration of fielded
Marine Corps and Israeli systems that include the CAC2S, G/ATOR, the
Iron Dome Battle Management Controller, and the Tamir missile and
guidance uplink. Force Design plans to provide a cruise missile defense
capability to each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) with a battery
comprised of a headquarters element and four independently deployable
firing platoons able to protect four defended assets. The fiscal year
2024 budget requests approximately $43.9 million to fund the prototype
platoon and build out three batteries, one for each MEF, that will
allow Marines to survive within the adversary's Weapons Engagement Zone
Unmanned Aircraft System Payloads
The Marine Corps currently operates two MQ-9A Extended Range (ER)
and is scheduled to receive four additional aircraft by Q3 FY24. The
MQ-9A ER serves as the platform solution for the MAGTF Unmanned
Aircraft System Expeditionary Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MUX/
MALE), hosting a suite of interoperable and complementary payloads that
provides a persistent, networked, multi-domain reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition capability to the Marine Corps,
Naval and Joint Force. It enhances battlespace awareness by fusing
information from onboard sensors and mission systems; detecting,
identifying, and tracking targets in multiple domains; and
disseminating information in advance of distributed friendly elements.
Moreover, sensors are augmented by robust communications and data relay
capabilities, enabling distributed platforms and systems to receive
mission-critical sensor information in real-time via multiple networks,
enhancing the lethality and survivability of force echelons at the
tactical edge.
Onboard systems provide airborne early warning (AEW), maritime
domain awareness (MDA), electromagnetic support (ES), and
communications bridging. AEW and MDA is delivered through autonomous
scanning, detection, identification, sorting, and tracking of targets.
Operationally relevant, full-spectrum electronic warfare capabilities
enable persistent stand-off ES. Supporting these capabilities, the MUX/
MALE's Airborne Network Extension capability provides additional
communications pathways for forces across the battlespace and allows
for the transmission of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
targeting data via multiple, redundant networks and information
systems. As UAS sensor payloads mature, the Marine Corps, through the
MUX/MALE capability, will continue to enhance situational awareness and
sensor overwatch with the goal of reducing ambiguity in the operational
area around Naval and Joint Forces while mitigating human exposure to
threats.
Networking On The Move (NOTM)
Networking-On-The-Move (NOTM) provides the MAGTF with a robust,
over-the-horizon and beyond line-of-sight (BLOS), digital command and
control (C2) capability while on-the-move and at-the-halt. NOTM is a
critical enabler for C2 in a degraded environment. It enables a
continuous and reliable flow of information inside contested
environments, and provides the communications gateway needed to conduct
sea control and sea denial operations as part of the Naval
Expeditionary and Joint Force. This is achieved by providing an open
architecture solution that enables forces to exercise C2 across
operational domains--land, sea, air, space, and while transitioning
between domains. The NOTM program encompasses three subordinate
components, the NOTM Ground Combat Vehicle, incorporated onto the
Ultra-Light and Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, as well as the
Amphibious Combat Vehicle, the NOTM Airborne, incorporated on MV-22Bs
and KC-130Js, and NOTM Tactical Entry Point kits, integrated with
amphibious warfare ships to provide BLOS services to Marine forces
ashore and afloat. The Marine Corps continues to procure and field
these systems to distributed Fleet Marine Force units, enabling command
and control, now and in the future.
Secure Expeditionary Resilient Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
Secure Expeditionary Resilient Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
(SERPNT) provides Marines with the ability to navigate reliably and
acquire precise timing information for both themselves and their
platforms. Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) capabilities
across the enterprise will be maintained and future PNT capabilities
supported by funding proposals in the fiscal year 2024 President's
Budget request. The Marine Corps will update its Military-Code PNT
capabilities, which offer improved defenses against hostile jamming and
spoofing threats, as part of the SERPNT program. A crucial component of
the program is that it further enables the Marine Corps' ability to
participate in Joint All-Domain Command and Control efforts across the
Department of Defense.
Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
Marine Corps Wide Band Satellite Communications FoS provides the
MAGTF with resilient and diverse spectrum capabilities, enhances
command and control of the distributed maritime force, and enables
dissemination of intelligence and sensor-to-shooter communications. The
Marine Wideband System (MCWS) FoS is modernizing our aging and very
small aperture terminals. MCWS increases the MAGTF's orbital and
spectrum options and the Satellite Communication Agile Reachback (SCAR)
provides the MAGTF with options to incorporate low earth orbit
capabilities at time of need.
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) and Satellite Communications
(SATCOM)/Re-Broadcast is the primary means for tactical units to
rapidly receive and transmit Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) data from national and theater assets. The SATCOM
solution consists of the AN-PRS-11A system which provides the high
bandwidth required to ingest large GEOINT datasets from globally
streamed national, theater, and tactical sensors and data repositories.
The Re-Broadcast transmits ISR data from local sensor collection over a
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) enabled global broadcast
network for near-real-time data access to decisionmaking and targeting
solutions. Both capabilities are compatible with existing Marine Corps
ISR and Operations systems and enable organic sensing capabilities,
supporting Long-Range Precision Fires as part of the Naval
Expeditionary Force and Joint Force, writ-large. The Marine Corps
intends to increase fielding of the AN/PRS-11A and Re-Broadcast suites
to 37 systems for Fleet Marine Forces to employ in support of Combatant
Commander's requirements.
Senator Kaine. Wonderful. We will start a 5-minute round of
questions, and I will hop around a bit and probably stay here
for a second round too if anyone would like that.
First, talk a little bit about the Puget Sound challenge
with seismic activity and how the Navy is viewing that and what
will the effect of that be, shuttering those drydocks for a
period of time.
Mr. Stefany. Yes, I will start. We updated our analysis
based on computer models that are now available that were not
available decades ago, looking at seismic, and we determined
there were three docks at Puget Sound and one at Bangor, the
Trident refit facility, that needed some upgrades. So we are
doing temporary modifications to all of those. We expect at
least three of those four docks, if not all four of those
docks, to be back online in the coming months, by no later than
June/July timeframe. And while we had to delay one availability
going into one of those docks, overall we do not see any long-
term mission impact on our ability to keep our submarine force
sustained.
There will be longer-term improvements to those docks that
will be incorporated into the SIOP [Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Program] program overall, but for the near term,
another 3-or 4-month impact and we should be back in good
shape, sir.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Mr. Stefany. Admiral if you want to hop in there too?
Senator Kaine. Oh, please.
Vice Admiral Conn. Sure. The only thing I would add is on
CNO's UPL [Unfunded Priorities List] is a $300 million request
for those drydocks, if not to pay for the drydocks, because we
want to complete and we cannot wait. We are cash-flowing that,
but it is the backfill of the resources that we were given.
From an operational perspective, right now there is no
operational impact other than having to move one submarine
maintenance period, which is recoverable.
Senator Kaine. Another item that was in the news last week
was the announcement that the USS Kennedy aircraft carrier
would be delivered in fiscal year 2025 rather than fiscal year
2024, which made some news, as I have talked to the shipyard
and the Secretary of the Navy, and I just want to make sure
that I am understanding this correctly. It is actually not
really a delay in the availability of that ship to deploy.
There was an earlier delivery date but then they were going to
do a lot of post-delivery work on the ship before it was
eligible to deploy. So sliding the delivery date to fiscal year
2025 just lines the delivery up with what was the expected time
for the availability and deployment of the ship.
Do I understand that correctly, Secretary?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. So the end date that is critical to
us is the ability of that ship to be ready to deploy, and that
date is not changing. As you mentioned, we have a construction
period. Typically a ship will go off and do some workups and
then it will go into what is called a post-shakedown
availability period, and in this case it was set up to be a
very long period. The Ford was a year and a half. For Kennedy
it was looking at about a year-long period.
What we were able to do by extending the work at the
shipyard during construction is shorten that availability later
on to just fix anything we find in the workup period, shorten
it down, so that the time the ship deploys is the same time in
the end.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Secretary, let me ask one more question
and then I will call on the ranking as I go over to the floor,
to handle this next amendment. Last year during the posture
hearing, where we had the SECNAV, the Commandant, and the CNO,
a lot of us asked a lot of questions about the amphibs and
about whether the Navy and Marines were on the same page. We
were told, ``We are definitely on the same page and you are
going to get a study soon that will show we are on the same
page.'' We got the study in December, so it was not exactly
soon, and I noted it was very brief. But it was almost a page,
on the same page. It was a few pages. But it did show that
everybody was on the same page with respect to a requirement
that has been testified to publicly often, that we should have
31 amphibs.
I think a number of us were surprised when we saw the
President's Budget this year that there was not funding to
enable us to get there. In fact, the funding, at least in the
current year, or the proposal, would have us dropping the
number of amphibs rather than advancing to the 31. We
understand there is an additional desire for a strategic pause
to study yet again what the amphib requirement was.
Just speaking for this Committee Member, everybody made
such a good case last year that we are on the same page and the
number is 31 that I kind of wonder about, well, what is the
continuous review of whether 31 is the right number. Can you
explain that to the Subcommittee?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, Mr. Chairman. So first of all, we are all
in agreement, the Secretary, the Commandant, and the CNO that
31 is the requirement. The question is how do we best get to
that requirement, and what I will do is try to address the new
construction side and I will let Admiral Conn here talk about
the in-service ships, because there are two parts. We have to
build enough new ones and we have to have enough existing ones
in the inventory to get to that 31.
Senator Kaine. Just be mindful I am now over time, so try
to do both of those things promptly.
Mr. Stefany. Okay. So quickly, two parts of the amphibious:
10 large-deck amphibs and 21 of the LPDs [landing platform
dock/amphibious transport dock]. In this budget, one priority
was to move the LHA [landing, helicopter, assault], the large-
deck amphib, from 2031 to 2027, so that it would be at that 4-
year center. So on the large-deck amphib this budget improves
by 4 years the ability to build those on center. So that piece
that is the 10 large-decks, I think we got in a good place.
The 21 LPDs we bought one with your help in 2023, and the
next one is in 2025, sir, if you put them on 2-year centers. So
there is a period where we can look at a more affordable way,
potentially, to build those. We do not need to build one in
2024. We can take some time to see if there is a more
affordable way to build those before we buy the 2025 ships,
sir.
Senator Kaine. Admiral Conn, do you want to add anything to
that?
Vice Admiral Conn. I will try to be as quick as I can, so
yes. The pressure that is being put on is decision on some of
our older LSDs [dock landing ship/landing ship dock]. The
original service life of an LSD was 35 years. Back in the
1990's we changed it to 40 years, and that was based on two
assumptions: normal operations at the time defined as 6-month
deployments, and that we would fully fund the maintenance of
those ships. The War on Terror, we operated those ships much
longer than 6-month deployments, and we know--we know--we did
not put the resources in those ships to be able to sustain
them.
Senator Kaine. Okay.
Vice Admiral Conn. So now we are at a position where we
have some hard choices to make. The three LSDs that are listed,
we do not have the confidence, because we are seeing growth
work and new work, that those ships will get out of the
maintenance phase, be able to get through a workup cycle
through the basic phase, the advanced phase, integrated phase,
which is a year long, and then go on deployment, and stay
inside its expected service lives.
Senator Kaine. I need to cut you off now and turn it to
Senator Cramer. Senator King, I will ask you to manage the air
traffic control of this Committee until I return once the
second vote starts. Thank you.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Chairman Kaine. Thank you,
Senator King, for stepping in. This discussion we are having
right now is a good one so I appreciate that. In fact, what I
might do is just sort of tag onto that a little bit. Mr.
Stefany, I will start with you, and maybe talk a little bit
about the risk of not having the 31. In other words, on the
phone we discussed the illustration of the Turkey disaster and
not having availability either to respond to that tragedy or to
demonstrate power should we need it.
Maybe just expand a little bit on whether you think 31, 32,
why 31 is important, besides it being required.
Mr. Stefany. Yes, I think actually, sir, if you do not mind
I would like General Heckl to take that one.
Senator Cramer. That would be great.
Mr. Stefany. He is closer to the warfighter.
Senator Cramer. He sure is.
Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, great question and thanks
for the time today. So 31 is the requirement, sir, the
absolutely floor, and what 31 assures is that we would have a
2.0 MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] forward presence, with the
ability to surge to 5 in time of crisis, right. We are beyond
classification here but there is a reason for that being able
to surge to 5. It is key maritime terrain and it is SLOCs [Sea
Lines of Control], et cetera.
My first 2 decades of Active Service we had a 3.0 presence.
There was constantly a MEU forward deployed. In my case it was
mostly in the Mediterranean, which, oddly enough, would have
involved Ukraine. As Admiral Conn said, the War on Terror, we
started riding assets a little bit hard and not properly
maintaining them, so we started having problems, so we have
larger gaps. So when the earthquake happened in Turkey, a NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] ally, the MEU was not on
station, and it should have been. That is what a MEU, a Marine
Expeditionary Unit, is organized, trained, and equipped for. We
can use surface-to-surface connectors, you know, the LCACs
[Landing Craft Air Cushions], the LCUs [Landing Craft Utility],
to deliver heavy equipment that could have assisted with search
and rescue, and we would have come ashore with shelters that
would have provided heat and supplies, and the ships would roll
to hospitals. So that is the short answer.
Senator Cramer. I think it is a great answer. I think it is
a good illustration of the importance of it.
Maybe, Admiral Conn, I will come over to you now and talk
more generally about ship maintenance. If we accept that the
procurement of new ships will not be ready until the end of
this decade, maintaining the existing fleet for the next 5
years, these critical 5 years I referenced earlier, becomes
maybe one way to make sure we are okay.
I am going to ask two questions sort of as one, so you can
sort of opine more generally perhaps. Are the surface and
undersea fleet readiness rates where you think they should be,
first of all? Then second of all, is the Navy deferring ship
maintenance to keep ships in operation?
Vice Admiral Conn. Are we where we want to be? No. Do we
know what we need to do? Yes. For the undersea domain there is
over $2 billion dedicated as part of this President's Budget
2024, dedicated to improving the maintenance of our submarine
assets, decreasing the idle time for the ships that we already
own. It is our most asymmetric advantage that we have in the
undersea domain, but they have no advantage if they are tied to
the pier, and same thing, just to be clear, on the LSDs. If we
cannot get them away from the pier in the time that we have--
and really, this is about opportunities. For the cruisers and
the LSDs, to buy them back would be about $3 billion. Is that
the right thing to do with those $3 billion? We believe, and
from a best military advice perspective, based on our
assessment, hull-by-hull of those ships, the answer is no.
Then there is also the opportunity to perhaps free up some
of those yard piers where we could do other work, and for the
sailors that are on those ships to be able to go at sea and
start buying down some of the significant gaps at sea that we
have.
So those are the opportunities and those are some of the
tough choices. It was a tough choice for us and I realize it is
a tough choice for you.
Senator Cramer. Yes. No, well put.
Mr. Stefany, my understanding is that while the Navy has
made some progress on the maintenance backlog we still have,
obviously, a long way to go, I think. There is a significant
amount remaining.
Can you tell me, what does it mean when it says 100 percent
of ship depot maintenance requirements to be funded in this
budget? What does that practically mean, 100 percent, because
it does seem a little bit conflicting?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, so I think that is focused at our public
shipyards and the planned availabilities, the number of
submarines that are going to go into those yards and the amount
of work that is planned in all those availabilities is funded.
It does not fund unplanned work, but all the planned work in
those availabilities, sir.
Senator Cramer. Well, I am just following up real quickly
on it because on the phone we talked about the workforce
challenge, and the public shipyards are claiming they need
5,000 to 10,000 more added to their workforce. Could that
throughput even be done if we do not get that workforce up? I
do not want to oversimplify getting that job done, but I just
want to understand it.
Vice Admiral Conn. You know, we typically talk in terms of
money, as the input metric, but in terms of President's Budget
2024, it funds 75 avails, 32 of which are private avails--15
east, 17 west, and it continues the OPN [Other Procurement,
Navy] pilot for the fleets. It is $2.7 billion but it is for 28
ships and 1 submarine. That is all part of this plan. So I
think that is part of funding that maintenance requirement.
Mr. Stefany. To your point, sir, we have a national
workforce availability issue. So even if we had more billets
and more funding at the public yards, our ability to hire might
be constrained in getting to that higher number, sir.
Senator Cramer. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Senator King. [Presiding.] On behalf of the Chairman,
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is nice to see
you all again.
Getting back to the amphibious ships, the LPDs, did you
say, Mr. Secretary, that you are conducting yet another study
regarding? Who is going to respond to that? Why do we need
another study? There have been 11 previous studies on amphib
ships. Admiral.
Vice Admiral Conn. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) directed, as part of a cost capability study for the
LPDs. We will have that study, we will complete that study, and
that will inform the President's Budget 2025 shipbuilding plan.
I think, as Mr. Stefany has stated, and I think the Commandant
mentioned this morning, maintaining 2-year centers with a ship
that was provided by Congress in 2023, the next opportunity for
an LPD would be in 2025.
Senator Hirono. What is yet another study going to show
that the 11 other studies have not?
Vice Admiral Conn. That is a fair question.
Senator Hirono. Mm-hmm. What is the answer?
Mr. Stefany. The previous studies you are talking about
were looking at requirements, right. I think we are all locked
on requirements.
Senator Hirono. Thirty-one.
Mr. Stefany. What this study is looking at is, now that we
know the requirements----
Senator Hirono. It took 11 studies to get us to 31.
Mr. Stefany. Yes, ma'am. This is now--I know I have to
build that ship. Now what is the most affordable way to build
it? That is what this one is looking at. It not looking at the
requirements. It is looking at, an LPD costs $1.9 billion. Is
there a way to build it for a little bit less and still meet
the requirements of the Marine Corps? That is what we have been
asked to study as part of this. It is not a requirement study.
It is a cost study, if you will, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. This study is going to be pretty much it,
right? I am sure General Berger would be very happy to come up
with something pretty definitive so we can get on with it. Did
you want to add something?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Well, ma'am, so we have already
had a brief discussion about this, where this PDM-1 [Program
Decision Memorandum-1] study has been directed, and the trade
space will be my requirements, and I am the requirements
officer of the Marine Corps. I am not coming off the
requirement any further. We have already descoped LPD flight 1.
Flight 2 has been descoped. It cannot be descoped anymore.
Senator Hirono. Okay. So when is the study going to be
finished, the cost study?
Mr. Stefany. The tasking for the study is to be finished
this summer in time to inform the 2025 budget, which again is
the next opportunity, industrial base-wise, to build the next
LPD, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. Okay. Mr. Secretary, you are responsible
for sustainment matters to include maintenance. Last year at
this hearing we discussed the challenges the Navy has had
getting their ships and submarines out of maintenance on time.
It is still an issue. So the concern is clear this year those
challenges remain.
Last year I worked to get $40 million for the planning of a
waterfront production facility at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard
to address this very problem, and you mentioned the drydock
that we need to build there. But the waterfront production
facility should be very much, I think, included in the drydock
coming online.
So these types of investments in our public infrastructure
are necessary to make sure our shipyard workers have the tools
they need to get our Nation's ships and submarines out of
maintenance on time.
You have visited Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, have you not?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, ma'am. I was there last summer.
Senator Hirono. So you know where the drydock is going. You
do not want the workers to have to run all the way across the
shipyard in order to get the tools they need to utilize the
drydock. That is why I have been pushing for the waterfront
facility so heavily.
What role has years of failing to invest in aging
infrastructure played in the Navy's sustainment challenges, and
what are we doing about it?
Mr. Stefany. So shipyard specific, ma'am, which I know you
know, we appreciate the additional funding last year to start
the design of that facility, and we will continue through the
design process and ideally get the waterfront facility as close
to the drydock timing-wise as possible. As you know, we cannot
get them there at the same time.
On the broader issue, though, we are putting together,
Navy-wide, an infrastructure improvement plan that kind of
looked at the shipyard and now expands into all of our
infrastructure. While I am not the lead for that within the
Navy. I am happy to get you an update on how that is
progressing, that overall infrastructure improvement plan.
Senator Hirono. I have been so focused on the
infrastructure needs, particularly in Hawaii, as we have seen a
number of crises starting with Red Hill and lights going off at
Tripler, the biggest hospital there, and a number of other
things, and that is why I think the maintenance of our
facilities ought to be paid attention to. We should not wait
until something breaks or something floods an area before we
will go in and fix it, because these needs are identified and I
would like to see a lot more attention being paid to fixing
things before they create the kind of community issues that
Hawaii has faced in the last year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. On behalf of the Chairman, Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Thanks.
General and Admiral, can you talk about the importance of
the relationship with the Philippines, and military-to-
military, is it getting better, is it as important, is it going
to be important to deter China?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, absolutely. Of all of our
allies and partners, I would say this is the one asymmetric
advantage we do still maintain is our extensive allies and
partners. But Philippines in particular, especially in to the
Marine Corps, we train with them regularly. As you know or
probably know, they are developing a coastal defense regiment
that is very similar to where we are going, and they train with
us in all the various exercises, Balikatan and all the rest. So
absolutely, sir, vital and critically important.
I do not know if you have anything to add.
Vice Admiral Conn. I could look at a map and identify its
key terrain, and broader than the Philippines, but in terms of
the places and access that we are going to need, that we need
to continue with our partners that are throughout the Pacific,
building relationships and trust that could be future access.
Senator Scott. Do both of you feel comfortable that our
military-to-military relationship is improving?
Vice Admiral Conn. As the RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific
exercise] commander in 2020, I believe, the Philippines
participated during COVID. During those types of exercises it
is about building relationships and trust, at the task force
level and below. The performance of the Philippines and all the
allied and partners that were out there during COVID, they
earned my trust.
Lieutenant General Heckl. Likewise, sir, I mean, you know,
our standing force right now is the 3d Marine Expeditionary
Force. They are there, right? They train, live, eat, sleep
inside the CCP's weapons engagement zone, and they partner with
allies and partners there all the time, sir. It is regular.
Obviously I think all of us are seeing accesses becoming
opened up, right. I mean, things are moving. We just need to
seize the initiative here and keep this momentum going, because
quite frankly, my opinion is that I think Dictator Xi has
overplayed his hand a little bit and people are starting to see
what it is all about. So I think allies and partners are very
quickly seeing they more align with the U.S.'s values and how
we support international rules-based order. So I think it is
moving in the right direction.
Senator Scott. Can you two talk about the AUKUS agreement?
I mean, there is some criticism now in Australia over it. Is
that really at risk, and if it is, how important is that to us?
Vice Admiral Conn. AUKUS presents an enormous opportunity
that can lift all our industrial bases up by building dominance
in the undersea domain.
Senator Scott. Do you think it is at risk right now?
Vice Admiral Conn. No, sir.
Senator Scott. You do not think so?
Vice Admiral Conn. We are committed. There is work to do.
In 2023 we will start doing work calls and some embedded crews,
if you will. Later, in 2027, we will get some--no, earlier than
2027, getting some rotational forces, and then early 2030's
will make a decision of how we are going to sell Virginia-class
submarines up through five.
Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, obviously I am not in the
submarine business other than trying to help the fleet detect
them and help them kill them, which is part of what we are
doing in Stand In Force, but I will tell you from a MRF-D
[Marine Rotational Force-Darwin] perspective--and I think we
have changed now to Marine Rotational Force Southeast Asia
(MRF-SEA)--that continues to expand. So you now actually have
the first Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) from Camp Pendleton
assuming responsibility for the MRF-SEA as well as you have III
MEF obviously in Okinawa, and obviously with the U.K., sir, you
know we deployed a JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] squadron aboard
Queen Elizabeth that did a worldwide tour. So you had U.K. F-
35Bs, Marine F-35Bs forward deployed on a really, really
capable amphibious ship, and it obviously came over into the
South China Sea. So all good news, sir.
Senator Scott. Is 3D technology important? I mean, are we
going to be able to be able to come up with things quicker? Is
it going to reduce cost?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, absolutely. Maintenance
cycle times, delivery, it is right there on the tactical edge.
Obviously, my background is aviation so I have to be a little
more careful. Things have to be certified, obviously, because
bad things can happen. But we are using 3D printing now, sir,
for small things, like consumables on airplanes that do not
have to be certified, and it has been really helpful.
Vice Admiral Conn. I will leave the company name out but I
was recently at a 3D Manufacturing Company in Ohio for an
engine manufacture, and what they are doing in printing engine
components, and what they can do is faster than we can
typically pour metal to build the stuff.
I think there is enormous potential as this technology
continues to mature. I am not an engineer so I am not going to
talk about critical flight safety. I am aware of it. But just
making sure we have an understanding of those critical
components, that they meet the specifications.
Senator Scott. Mr. Stefany, in the short time, if you have
anything to add.
Mr. Stefany. Yes. Unleashing this and making it at scale,
everywhere part of our business is where we have to get to.
Casting and forgings is one huge area, but applies to all of
our industry.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Senator King. On behalf of the chair, Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to first just say I commend the efforts made by the
Navy in developing an Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) aircraft
refueling platform. Certainly as you are well aware, the vast
distances in INDOPACOM [United States Indo Pacific Command] is
probably one of the main difficulties in operating in that AOR
[area of responsibility], and I know many have argued that the
MQ-25 Stingray could be a game-changer in many respects, to
help extend the range of the aircraft and give our forces more
flexibility in operating across vast geographical areas.
My understand is, though, that the current planning calls
for Active Duty squadrons to be stationed with carrier wings.
But I also think it is potentially a mistake, and I would love
to have your thoughts, to overlook the Reserve component as a
place where additional force structure for these units could be
situated. Reserve units could be forward deployed, if
necessary, on a rotating basis to Luzon, Darwin, Guam, and
elsewhere, to increase capacity.
So my question for you, sir, is the Navy exploring the
possibility of standing up Reserve component detachments to
operate MQ-25?
Vice Admiral Conn. Sir, the MQ-25 is the pathfinder for
carrier aviation in terms of uncrewed capabilities. It is the
first. We have to get it right.
Specific to your question, the MQ-25 will operate off the
carriers. We have not yet addressed whether we are going to put
them at various places with the Marine Corps in terms of
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations. There are control
centers they have to use. Even though the program is probably
sliding to the right a year for an IOC [Initial Operational
Capability] in 2026, we need to continue to invest in the
command and control suite on those carriers because it is
coming, and we have finite periods of time to do that.
In terms of your questions on the Reserve, sir, I do not
think that has been addressed right now but I will take that
for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Vice Admiral Conn. The Navy does not currently have any efforts
underway to implement Reserve component support to the MQ-25 program.
Current efforts are focused on the development of the program and Fleet
operations by Active Duty personnel. The Navy may consider the
operation and or support of MQ-25 by Reserve component personnel in the
future, much in the same manner that the Reserves support other
aircraft platforms.
Senator Peters. I would appreciate that. I appreciate it.
General Heckl, the Marine Corps continues to make
significant investments in its organic UAS capabilities, and as
we look to INDOPACOM as the theater of priority the ISR
[Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] capacities
offered by MQ-9s would certainly be a tremendous value not only
to the Marine Corps but the entire Joint Force.
So my question for you, sir, is can you speak to the Marine
Corps efforts to stand up UAV squadrons, and in particular,
what role Reserve components could play in standing up and
operating these units.
Lieutenant General Heckl. Sure, sir. As you know, we
already have one VMU stood up that is operating MQ-9s in
theater now. We are going to be moving them from CENTCOM
[United States Central Command] down to the Indo-Pacific. The
plan is for two more. So we will have VMU 1, 2, and 3, and the
long-term plan is for VMU 4, 5, and 6. Four, 5, and 6 are
obviously in the later years of Force Design and we are doing
some pretty close analysis, rigorous analysis, on what is next.
MQ-9A is clearly not our long-term solution. We are looking
at some other assets that are beyond the classification of this
hearing. But we are working with Air Force and with DARPA
[Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] and others. So as
you know, the Marine Corps is heavily invested in UAS of all
categories.
Vice Admiral Conn. Sir, if I could, just to add----
Senator Peters. Yes, please.
Admiral Conn.--as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities I have to look across
all domains. So the investments we are making in the air
domain, with MQ-25, Triton will complete that program of record
in this year. Large unmanned surface vessels, ramping up to 3
by the end of the decade for a total of 8, I believe. XLUUV
[Extra-Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle], who just got its feet
wet, the undersea piece, and then the MQ-25 that you mentioned.
But I think there was mention about the growth of China and
a mention about what our industrial base is willing to produce.
It is these unmanned systems that are going to be force
multipliers across the domain. We have some risks that we need
to burn down, but we are not admiring the problem. We are not
wringing our hands. We are rolling up our sleeves.
Senator Peters. Yes, no question. Actually, General, the
followup on the Marine Corps is a question I asked the admiral
about Reserve components. Any plans to have Reserve components
with UAS?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, I do not believe the plans
are now but the Marine Corps relies heavily on our Reserves
across the entire enterprise, sir, so it would not surprise me
at all if we ended up going that route, especially for 4, 5,
and 6.
Senator Peters. Great. Great, and another question,
General. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is the next
generation replacement for the Amphibious Assault Vehicle
(AAV), as you know. But I know the ACV has faced a somewhat
rocky rollout to the fleet, and my understanding is that the
Marine Corps has gotten its hands around these issues. But
could you speak about what is happening, to this Committee,
please?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Absolutely, sir. The ACV, the
amphibious combat vehicle, replacing the AAV, built by BAE
[British Aerospace Engineering], is a great vehicle, sir. Where
we ran into the problems is the surf zone, and so what I would
simply say for that is that part of the problem was how Marines
have traditionally, for decades, assessed the surf zone. We did
it very inaccurately. We now have technology that we are
fielding. It is I MEF now, it is on now. They are autonomous
drones that go out into the surf and collect accurate data so
Marines can make correct decisions.
So we are definitely moving in the right direction, sir,
but the vehicle is going to be great. We have got to work out
these problems and make sure when we make a decision to go or
no-go through a surf zone, whether coming ashore or going back
to the ship, that we have the right and accurate information to
make that judgment.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. On behalf of the Chair, Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Senator King. Thank you all
for being here today.
Mr. Stefany, my understanding is in World War II we had 30
shipyards. We have 8 now. Is that correct? Does anybody know?
Mr. Stefany. As significant shipyards, yes, 8 would be
about right.
Senator Tuberville. Is that enough?
Mr. Stefany. No, sir, that is not enough to meet the demand
overall, particularly on our submarine side of our industrial
base.
Senator Tuberville. So we have got problems, big problems.
I have been to a couple of shipyards lately and they are having
to recruit out of McDonald's, Walmarts, Targets, going in and
saying, ``Listen, we can teach you to weld. We can teach you to
do plumbing, all those things.'' Do we need to get involved in
this? I mean, are we going to leave it to the commercial
shipyards? How are we going to handle this, because we are
slipping on borrowed time here.
Mr. Stefany. Sir, on the workforce side, which is frankly a
national effort issue, for generations we have not kept our
trade crafts as a Nation at the value that they need to be at.
But in the area of shipyards and getting the workforce we
need so that we are not competing with McDonald's or Walmart,
like you mentioned, sir, we are working at three levels. At the
local we have started some initiatives with funding from this
Committee to work on going into the high schools and going into
trade schools and actually reinstituting shop programs and
things like that, where we can get people trained in high
school to come out, and actually guarantee them jobs when we
get on the outside. So we started that in Philadelphia last
year, graduated about 200 people. We are repeating this year,
moving to Pittsburgh, and then out to the Great Lakes, and then
ultimately to the Gulf Coast as we expand that program.
Regionally, we are working with our shipyards. Each one has
a really good apprentice program, and we are trying to figure
out how to expand that to larger areas regionally to get that
workforce. Because you are right--it is all about having that
skilled workforce, sir.
Senator Tuberville. You know, when most of us went to
school we had shop, and we had that elective, and we do not
have that anymore. Pardon?
Senator King. That was my best course.
Senator Tuberville. That was your best course? You made an
A in it, right?
Mr. Stefany. Most schools do not even have the equipment in
the schools.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, but we can talk about
appropriating all these ships and submarines and everything.
Thank God we have got a lot of commercial people out there
working. How are we going to build these things, especially if
all hell breaks loose, to be honest with you.
Mr. Stefany. Yes. That is our number one challenge,
unquestionably, and we look forward to working with the
shipyards and, again, your Committee on what we can do about
it. But it really is a national----
Senator Tuberville. Well, we need more shipyards, and then
we need more places to where people build ships.
Mr. Stefany. Exactly.
Senator Tuberville. We need to spread out.
Mr. Stefany. Yes.
Senator Tuberville. Okay, and I am encouraged by the
commercial solutions and all the military's tough problems,
Maxar being one on imagery, and XOM Analytics. Why don't you
talk a little bit about your domain, Saildrone, and how it has
done, how you evaluate it?
Mr. Stefany. So I will talk business-wise, but I will let
the admiral go on the operational side first.
Vice Admiral Conn. So sir, you are speaking to, I believe,
some of the efforts of Task Force 59 on Bahrain is doing, and
that has been a great environment, which out of operational
necessity, how do we create maritime domain awareness from the
Red Sea into the Gulf and the adjacent seas, and understand
what is out there. A lot of it was contractor-owned,
contractor-operated concepts that went out to Bahrain and tell
you this is what we can have. Saildrone was one of them.
It is also working with our allies and partners that are in
that area, and it is not just the things, if you will. It is
the mesh networks and the data analytics which come to a fused
picture.
So we need to look at what we are doing out in Bahrain and
then how do we scale it for potential other areas? I think that
will be kind of rolling out in the next few months.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. I understand Iran tried to swipe a
couple of our Saildrones and we forced them to put them back.
Correct?
Vice Admiral Conn. Yes. But really the question is ``do we
care, based on the level of technology.'' You know, it is
affordable, plentiful, and----
Senator Tuberville. Yes, and a lot cheaper.
Admiral Conn.--a lot cheaper.
Senator Tuberville. Let me ask you about the 14 of 18
SSBNs. Is that going to be enough to meet the Nation's
strategic force needs? You know, the Navy has transformed four
Ohio-class submarines. Kind of evaluate that, as we get into
near time.
Vice Admiral Conn. Yes, the requirement is 12 right now,
and based on the timing, those decisions to go in excess and
above to the 12 would be made a long time from now, and whether
or not we recapitalize the SSGN force.
Senator Tuberville. How much would that cost to keep those
in operation until we get the other submarines in? Would that
cost us a fortune?
Vice Admiral Conn. The SSGNs?
Senator Tuberville. Yes.
Vice Admiral Conn. I do not have the exact number. I know
as a Third Fleet commander some of the SSGNs are too showing
their signs of age, and we take care of our nuclear force,
quite frankly, better than some of our non-nuclear force, and
they are showing their age. There are some options to conduct
PIRA [Pre-Inactivation Restricted Availabilities], but I will
turn it back over to Mr. Stefany.
Mr. Stefany. We will take it for the record to get you the
cost to do what we call a PIRA [Pre-Inactivation Restricted
Availability], which we would extend the life of those current
boats, if they are able to be extended. So we can get that for
you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Stefany. The Navy looked into the feasibility of
further extending select SSGN hulls via a Pre-Inactivation
Restricted Availability. As part of this feasibility review,
cost and schedule assessments were conducted to identify risks
and opportunities of incorporating these additional unplanned
availabilities into the current effort to maintain the
submarine force. Results from the review indicated an
unacceptable impact to projected CVN, SSBN, and SSN operational
availability given the current limited capacity at public and
private shipyards. Capacity analysis at the shipyards looked at
drydock availability, manning capacity, and material
availability.
Each SSGN PIRA is estimated to require more than 187,000
man-days of shipyard labor and to require over 2 years in a
drydock at a cost of at least $350 million. Additional costs
above those directly associated with the PIRA include personnel
(8$34 million per year per submarine) and operations/
maintenance of each submarine after PIRA until inactivation
(8$52 million per year per submarine).
Given the limited capacity at the public shipyards, these
unplanned three year availabilities would have significant
impacts on CVN, SSBN and SSN maintenance availabilities,
offsetting the benefit of additional service life of the SSGNs.
SSN availabilities are likely to be delayed to provide capacity
for any SSGN PIRA. Specifically, Navy estimates that two SSNs
would become idle for each SSGN PIRA added to the public
shipyard workload
Senator Tuberville. Would we want to do that?
Mr. Stefany. We would want to. Again, depending on how many
cycles they have done they may not be extendable. So we are
going to look at each ship and then let you know. We will let
you know what it would take to extend their lives, sir.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
Senator King. I understand the Chairman is still caught on
the floor, that the first vote is not completed yet. If St.
Peter ever comes to any of you fellows and says you have 10
minutes to live, you should say, ``Could it please be during a
10-minute Senate vote?''
[Laughter.]
Senator King. It will give you a lot more leeway.
Mr. Stefany, first I want to commend you--I know you get
hard questions at these kinds of hearings--for the funding of
the drydock project over the last 2 years at Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard. That is going to be a dramatic increase of capacity
at that shipyard, and it is going to serve the Navy well. So I
appreciate that the funding is there, and was last year, and
again this year at a slightly higher amount. So thank you for
that.
Mr. Stefany, I want to talk about the transition from DDG
Flight 3 to DDG(X). As you know, the Congress encouraged the
Navy, and the Navy, I think, has been working in this
direction, to allow and encourage Ingalls and Bath Iron Works
to work together on the design, on getting it right. I am a
great believer in competition, but I believe that having a
design in place on a consistent basis, and that the
manufacturers can be a lot of help in being sure that what is
designed is buildable. So I hope you will continue to maintain
that posture of allowing the two shipyards to be in discussion
with the Navy on the DDG(X).
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir, that is exactly our approach, to
come up with the design together with the same digital tools,
digital manufacturing, and then once we get into production
then we will start competing them going forward. We have
awarded a contract to Bath and to Ingalls just recently to be
part of our design team, and as we get into the design process
we are going to work together very closely.
Senator King. Two thoughts, as I have served on this
Committee for 10 years. Let us be sure that the design is
mature before we start building. In looking at some of the
overrun problems of the Ford, for example, it is when we are
doing R&D [research and development] while we are building that
we get into trouble. So that is one observation.
The other is, having worked closely with Bath Iron Works,
and knowing of Ingalls' work situation, we want to try to avoid
a trough between the DDG Flight 3 and the DDG(X). In other
words, if these yards lose welders they ain't coming back.
There are just too many other places for them to go. So we have
to be thinking about the transition so that it is a smooth one
and not a loss of work, a loss of employment during a 2-or 3-
year period where one ship ends and the other starts. Do you
see what I am suggesting?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. You are right where we are. We see
it as a 3-year period, and so we will have to be building DDG-
51s and the new destroyer over that 3-year transition period,
and we are committed to do that. We are not going to stop 51s
and then just immediately go to the new program. We are going
to have this 3-year overlap.
Senator King. That is helpful and I appreciate that.
I was concerned there were only two DDGs in the President's
Budget. We are talking about the industrial base. Part of
maintaining the industrial base is a consistent demand signal.
That is why this Committee recommended, and the Congress
adopted, a 15-ship multiyear. So I am sure we are going to be
discussing this in the Committee, but I am hopeful that we are
not going to be able to add an additional destroyer.
Admiral Conn, you have a wonderful title. You are in charge
of warfighting requirements and capabilities. My question is,
and I asked General Milley this question this morning in the
full committee, warfare has changed dramatically, just in the
last like 5 years. Electronic, cyber, directed energy, space.
Do you feel that we are taking adequate account of the changing
nature of the battlefield in terms of our strategy going
forward of shipbuilding and projection of power by the Navy?
Vice Admiral Conn. I do, sir. I think it is a three-FYDP
view in terms of getting to that hybrid fleet, which is part of
CNO's vision for the future. There are risks that we have to
burn down. We are already making investments in cyber, for
defensive cyber. We are up to 30 ships by 2030 that will have
the capabilities from at least HM&E [Hull, Mechanical and
Engineering] perspective, from a cyber perspective. I will stop
there, as for your time.
Senator King. Okay. General, I know that your marines have
to be prepared for no GPS [Global Positioning System],
electronics out, no communication. I mean, this is the first
step in a conflict is going to be this overall electronic,
cyberspace compromise, and I hope that is something you are
taking into account.
Lieutenant General Heckl. So we are exercising that way
right now. Alternative PNT--position, navigation, timing--we
are doing that all the time now, sir, and we are going to
continue to stress that.
Kind of what you are alluding to, though, is the ``left of
bang'' people say, which is term I really do not care for
because bang is happening now in cyberspace, info----
Senator King. It sure is.
General Heckl.--domain, and we train to that time now, sir.
So yes, we are absolutely taking that into account.
Senator King. The Secretary of the Navy was in my office
last week and he brought a sextant with me to prove to me that
this is being taken into account.
Admiral Conn, one more point, and it sounds somewhat
facetious but it is serious. We would like you to bring some
Navy ships to Maine, and I will tell you why. There is a huge
diminution of military presence in New England, in the
Northeast generally. Almost all the bases are closed. Our young
people are growing up without seeing anybody in uniform, and
for you to have a ship at the Eastport Fourth of July Festival,
or a Fourth of July in Portland, that means a lot, and it means
a lot to the citizens but also to exposing the military to
young people.
We are having a recruiting problem, as you well know, and
one way to counteract that, not to compromise readiness in any
way, is to have the Navy show a presence along our coastline. I
am partial to Maine, but I think there is other coastline in
this country. I am not sure.
Vice Admiral Conn. Sir, there are various Fleet Weeks on
both sides of the coast, but I will take your point. Having
been up in Bath for the commissioning of John Basilone, and
being able to speak up there where people were thanking
previous military members who served, and then I had the chance
to speak and I asked the shipbuilders to stand up and say thank
you for your service. There are many ways to serve your Nation.
So I think recognizing shipbuilding is serving your country is
part of the narrative that we need to get out there.
Senator King. Absolutely. It has got to be more than a job.
It is a mission, and you can help us to underline that.
Senator Cramer, further questions?
Senator Cramer. Well, in an effort to stall while the
chairman returns from the second vote, let me just say,
Admiral, no need to bring ships to North Dakota.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cramer. But we will take the Blue Angels every 2
years at the Fargo Air Show, if you do not mind. The commander
just happens to be from North Dakota right now.
I think what I would like to do is just do the thing that
is most dangerous, and I do it too much, is think out loud a
little bit. But going back to the discussion of AUKUS--and,
Admiral, I think you and Mr. Secretary referenced the
opportunity. I think both of you may have even used that term--
with that in mind and considering some of the recent details
that have come out, that Australia would like to start buying
Virginia-class submarines by 2030, you know, you both talked
about two a year and we are at about 60 percent of that, some
cuts to nuclear reactors, given all the stresses we are under.
What are some of the challenges of AUKUS, because I would
see some? I happen to agree, though, there are more
opportunities, certainly not just in alliances but even
synergies as we talked about with regard to this workforce
challenge and the industrial base. Maybe just talk a little bit
about that challenge that AUKUS would bring as well, and maybe
elaborate more on some of those opportunities.
Mr. Stefany. So I will start on the business side. Two big
challenges. One is a workforce in Australia to ultimately
build. It has taken us 70 years to get the workforce we have to
build nuclear submarines, and they are looking at less than 10.
So I think that is a huge challenge to actually create the
culture and the workforce that can build nuclear submarines. It
is not commercial ships. You know, it is a special skill and
talent.
So when they will be ready to do that, we have said is not
date-driven. It is event driven. You have to show us you are
ready, both on the nuclear propulsion plant side and the
submarine side as well. So I think that is a huge item.
Then the second is what the design of the new submarine
will look like. It is a mix of the U.K. submarine and a little
other stuff, and what that actually is going to look like. How
much of it will be United States content, Australia content,
U.K. content I think is another huge, I will not say obstacle
but something we have to work through.
On the operational side I will turn it over to the admiral.
Vice Admiral Conn. I think on the operational side--I have
to check classification--in terms of some of the embedded
crews, that is going to buy down some of those challenges that
we have, both in terms of operating the power plant and then on
the boat. But there is path. There is an optimal path to get
there.
My real focus, sir, even if AUKUS was not out there, is
getting our industrial base and our maintenance facilities to
be able to produce and sustain two Virginia-class submarines a
year on top of Columbia. We have to do that for ourselves, and
both in the 2023 budget and in the 2024 budget the money is
laid in but now we are going to have to execute.
Senator Cramer. Well, and that is where I think market
demand signals are fairly important as well. We have not talked
a lot about that, but just your statement right there sends a
signal, you know, of some sort to the market.
I mentioned earlier synergies once AUKUS is fleshed out a
little bit more. While they need to get ready, they have the
advantage of our 70 years of experience, right? So hopefully
there is a synergy there.
With that I have stalled long enough for the chairman to
get back here. In the meantime, two others showed up, so I will
yield the rest of my time.
Senator Kaine. [Presiding.] I will go to Senator Blumenthal
and then Senator Schmitt, and then Senator Sullivan, and then
some of us will have second rounds of questions as well,
because I understand the three of you have not yet asked
questions. Is that correct? So we will go Blumenthal, Schmitt,
and Sullivan.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you for being here. I
thank you for your service and to the teams behind you.
None of this is going to happen, and I agree, two
submarines, Virginia-class attack submarines a year. We need to
build the Columbia. It is done in Connecticut, in Groton, the
submarine capital of the world. But it is not going to be done
if we do not hire more people, if we do not give them the
skills and the training.
I just think we are not investing in the vocational and
career education that we need to produce those welders, pipe
fitters, electricians, the folks who have the trades and who
will receive not just jobs but careers if they are given that
kind of training.
I know that colleagues are waiting to ask questions, but I
just want to know if you can tell me what kind of major
investment the military will advocate in this next NDAA so that
we meet the national security need of a trained workforce?
Mr. Stefany. So Senator, in the President's budget about
$600 million is requested between Navy money and DOD, what they
call IBAS [Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment] money, for
the submarine industrial base, and about a third of that is for
workforce development efforts. So we have some funding in 2023
and we are asking for more in 2024, to actually get into the
schools in the areas that we think there is opportunity. Most
schools do not have shop equipment anymore. They do not have
shop teachers. You know, get in there and start investing with
our Department of Labor folks and Education in recreating what
maybe was in the 1970's and 1980's, a normal path through those
schools to have opportunities coming out the back end.
Senator Blumenthal. Are there resources that can be devoted
right now?
Mr. Stefany. We have 2023 money that was in last year's
appropriation and authorization, that we are starting that
process. We have a couple nascent programs. I am happy to come
and brief you and your staff on that, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Could you do that?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. I would appreciate it.
I just left a family--different topic--a family of Xavier
Sandor, a sailor on the USS George Washington. His ship came in
for maintenance, and he was living in the midst of a
construction zone, literally. Eventually he was sleeping in his
car, driving home, against orders because he could not live or
sleep. There are sailors who will spend their entire contract
possibly stationed on a ship undergoing maintenance
availability in a shipyard, essentially a construction zone.
Currently sailors E-3 and below are not eligible for basic
housing allowance, as you know. They are required to reside at
duty station, under intolerable conditions, no real eating
place, no chow hall, a 2-mile walk to the ship if they have
anywhere to live, even in their car.
One idea I discussed was allowing the commander of ships in
long-term maintenance availability to waive the prohibition on
the basic allowance for housing for those junior sailors. I do
not know what the options might be, but I would like a
commitment--maybe I should ask Admiral Conn--will you look into
this idea and report back to me and this Committee, give us
your assessment of how conditions can be changed?
There is a report, an investigation ongoing. I spoke to
Admiral Myers about it, literally moments ago, when the
family--the dad, mom, and brother--came to visit in my office
with Admiral Myers. It just happens, coincidentally, I asked
the Secretary of Defense about it this morning, in a hearing,
mentioning this specific instance.
The heartbreak is just almost impossible to describe,
especially for a dad. I have had two sons who have been in the
military, one Marine Corps infantry officer in Afghanistan, the
other a Navy SEAL. This is just something that we need to do
better on, I think.
Vice Admiral Conn. Sir, I will take that for the record and
work with the Chief of Naval Personnel or others to get you the
answer.
[The information referred to follows:]
Vice Admiral Conn. The Secretary of the Navy currently has
authority to waive the prohibition on the receipt of a housing
allowance for Sailors without dependents assigned to sea duty
in the paygrades of E-5 and E-4. It remains preferable to house
junior Sailors without dependents in unaccompanied housing or
government leased housing. However, the Navy is reviewing your
request and if appropriate, the Administration may propose
changes in future legislative cycles.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I appreciate. Thanks, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Stefany. Sir, I will quickly offer there are, in the
budget, some infrastructure, like parking garages and crew
facilities that are actually in our proposed budget to
alleviate some of those issues, but overall I definitely share
your view. We have to do better.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Schmitt.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is my first Subcommittee hearing and I want to note
that Missouri has an Air Force base and an Army base, but I
specifically wanted to be on this Subcommittee because I think
I am going to be advocating plenty for those branches, but I
think the challenges that we face in the Indo-Pacific and the
pacing challenge of China is so critical, and the work that you
all will be doing as we hopefully step up our game. The ships
that you need, the weapons that you need, it is certainly going
to be a focus of mine.
My question, I guess, Vice Admiral Conn, I have two
questions. The first one to you, I know there have been some
concerns about the tactical aviation inventory, and by some
assessments three to four carrier air wings short of what we
need, and the capability we need to project the power in the
Indo-Pacific. What is your assessment of where we are at and
the efforts that might be undertaken to shore that up?
Vice Admiral Conn. Sir, in terms of meeting Navy force
structure requirements, from a tactical air perspective, the
strike fighter inventory management shortfall is 31 aircraft in
2027, that goes to zero by 2031. That is number one.
In terms of modernizing the air wing, you will see in this
budget significant resources going after NGAD [Next Generation
Air Dominance] and specifically F/A-XX. You will see MQ-25. I
think you will see Collaborative Combat Aircraft. All these we
are working in partnership with the Air Force, so that DOD does
not have to pay twice in some cases. We are building different
airplanes. They will be different. But some of the internals,
if you will, the mission systems, is where we are trying to
design as best we can.
Senator Schmitt. Well, I want to followup, Mr. Stefany--am
I saying that right? Stefany, Okay. I apologize. I want to
followup a little bit on that as far as the strategy and the
inventory and what we need. For 2 consecutive years now,
Congress has added F/A-18 Super Hornets, and you might know
where those are constructed, in St. Louis, Missouri. Where are
we at with this, because Congress has appropriated it. There is
really not a plan. I think a lot of even the maintenance we are
falling short at this point. The F/A-18 Super Hornets, where
does that fit in? I understand the modernization, but the needs
that we have right now, it is a big concern.
Mr. Stefany. So first of all our funding ended in 2021, but
Congress added funding in 2022 and 2023, of 20 total aircraft.
We asked, in January, for Boeing to give us pricing for that so
we can get a proposal and start negotiating it. We expect that
to come in in the June timeframe. We will then negotiate with
them and hopefully have a contract in place toward later this
year for those 20 aircraft.
As part of that, I am sure you have heard discussions of
the data delivery and getting the right data for our sailors
and marines to maintain our aircraft, on aircraft carriers or
at our facilities, in a logistically constrained environment of
the future, potentially. That is a detail that we are working
in parallel to getting the pricing from Boeing to buy those 20
aircraft. We need to actually have their proposal so we can
work on a contract.
Senator Schmitt. One of the concerns that I have heard is
that there are new challenges being placed on suppliers, so
that would make the reality of actually paying for and building
the F/A-18 Super Hornets nearly impossible because of the
onerous restrictions and regulations on subcontractors. So I
hope that is something that we can talk about.
Mr. Stefany. Yes. I actually have not heard a specific case
of that, but I am happy to either work with you or with Boeing
on that.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Schmitt.
Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,
thank you.
I want to begin, Admiral, with this recent disturbing
``Defense One'' article, and I would like to submit it for the
record, Mr. Chairman, ``Navy on path to violate 31 amphib ship
requirement in 2024.''
Senator Kaine. Submitted without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Navy On Path To Violate 31-Amphibious-Ship Requirement in 2024
BUDGET PROPOSAL ASKS CONGRESS TO ALLOW SHIP RETIREMENTS THAT LAWMAKERS
EXPLICITLY NIXED LAST YEAR.
By Caitlin M. Kenney
Staff Reporter, Defense One
March 13, 2023
The Navy is proposing to drop its amphibious fleet below 31
ships, despite an agreement with the Marine Corps and a
potential violation of last year's defense policy law.
Sent to Congress on Monday, the Navy's proposed $255.8
billion 2024 budget aims to retire eight warships before the
end of their intended service life, including three Whidbey
Island-class dock landing ships, or LSDs, that it proposed to
scrap last year but which were saved by the 2023 National
Defense Authorization Act.
The Navy's $32.8 billion shipbuilding request buys nine
battle force ships but no amphibs, including the San Antonio-
class amphibious transport dock ships, or LPDs, that are meant
to replace the LSDs.
The LSDs chosen for early retirement were found to be in
``poor material condition,'' according to Defense Department
budget slides.
``We've gone through, not only on LSDs but the other
divestments proposed in this budget, did a ship-by-ship review,
to understand the material State of each of the ships. What we
found on the LSDs is that they are challenged in terms of
readiness. We want to make sure that the capabilities that we
field are the right capabilities, and are able to perform the
mission to the standards that we expect,'' Navy Undersecretary
Erik Raven told reporters ahead of the proposed budget's
release.
``And so we're proposing those divestments because we think
the return on investment, on further investments on those
particular ships, as judged hull by hull, that return on
investment is not there,'' Raven said. ``Additionally, say that
we have sailors and Marines who are serving on these ships, we
think that getting them matched up to the right platforms is
the way to go.''
Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger last week
rejected any plans that would cut these aging LSDs before their
replacements were delivered.
Despite the delivery of one LPD in 2024, the early
retirement of the three LSDs would mean the total number of
amphibs that year would drop below the legally required 31
ships minimum laid out in the 2023 NDAA, according to the
budget documents. Raven told reporters that the Navy is not
seeking a waiver at this time.
It was a surprise that the Navy ``has thumbed its nose that
defiantly to the Congress'' after lawmakers supported the ship
minimum last year, said a congressional staffer who spoke to
Defense One on condition of anonymity. ``So what the Navy has
done with this budget is they took all of those signals and all
those indications and warnings, if you will, from the Congress
and . . . said you know, `Thanks, but no thanks, we're going to
do what we think what we ought to be doing, and we don't really
care what the Congress has to say on this subject.' ''
Berger on Monday reiterated the reasoning behind the 31-
ship requirement for amphibs.
``Anything less incurs risk to national defense by limiting
the options for our combatant commanders,'' he said in a
statement to Defense One. ``Per strategic guidance, the Marine
Corps must be able to provide the Nation with crisis response
capabilities and build partnerships with allies and partners in
support of integrated deterrence--difficult to achieve without
the requisite number of amphibious warships.''
The requirement is linked to the Nation's defense, said
Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., and ranking member of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, at the March 9 Amphibious Warship
Industrial Base Coalition event on Capitol Hill.
``We cannot defend this Nation, we cannot do what we need
to do to prevent war, to prevent war, without the 31 ships,''
Wicker said. ``And so the National Defense Authorization Act .
. . makes it clear that the Commandant of the Marine Corps is
the one we're finally going to listen to in terms of our ship
requirement.''
This year's 30-year shipbuilding plan, and what it may say
about the long-term future of these ships, will be released
``very soon,'' Raven told reporters ahead of the budget roll
out.
PROCUREMENT
The Navy budget documents also chart out the ship
procurements from 2024 to 2028, and there are a lot of zeros in
the amphibious fleet's future. The Navy plans to buy its next
America-class amphibious assault ship or LHA in 2027 and does
not plan to buy any San Antonio-class LPD 17 Flight IIs in any
of the years listed.
The shipbuilding topline includes new ship construction as
well as funds for other vessels like the Landing Craft, Air
Cushion (LCAC) Service Life Extension Program and the Landing
Craft Utility LCU 1700 class.
The future Landing Ship Medium or LSM, is still planned for
2025. However, that is already 2 years past the original plan
to buy the first ship in 2023. The Marine Corps just started to
experiment with a commercially leased ship to inform the LSM's
future capabilities.
Last month, Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro said the service
is taking a ``strategic pause'' on buying more LPDs until
additional studies are completed, Defense News reported.
Afterward, the Navy would ``probably'' start buying them again,
according to the report.
On Monday, Raven told reporters at the Pentagon that the
office of the Secretary of Defense had directed the pause and a
capabilities-based assessment, and that there is an
``integrated team'' to assess the ships.
``What we are making sure that we are doing as we move
forward with our budget plans, is making sure that we have the
right capabilities at the right price aligned to not only
meeting military requirements, but working with industry,''
Raven said. ``And for LPD, we're taking a look at the
acquisition strategy moving forward, again, to make sure that
we would have the right capabilities at the right price and
working with industry partners to put together that plan moving
forward.''
The Navy has ``time to get this right'' with the LPD, and
that the Navy and Marine Corps are ``fundamentally aligned'' on
the 31-ship requirement, Rear Adm. John Gumbleton, the deputy
assistant secretary of the Navy for budget, said Monday.
``Both service chiefs like 31 [ships] as a requirement.
Both service chiefs like multiyear procurements. Both service
chiefs want to buy in a predictable future. And so if we can do
a study and actually lower the costs of this, that's all to the
good of the Department of the Navy and Marine Corps,''
Gumbleton said.
Buying amphibious ships tends to be the last priority for
the Navy after spending shipbuilding funds on aircraft
carriers, submarines, and destroyers, Hudson Institute Senior
Fellow Bryan Clark said March 9 during Defense One's State of
the Navy event.
``Whatever gets left over is what can go toward the
amphibious ships and the support ships. And when you do all the
numbers for that, you always end up with you know maybe not
quite enough for the amphibious ships, because if you're
building one LHA every four or 5 years that you can
incrementally fund, that's a chunk of money that's on the scale
of you know, $500 million a year. And then you've got maybe
$500 million or a billion dollars leftover for one more
amphibious ship, which isn't quite an LPD,'' Clark said.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. As you probably know, a number
of us--myself, the chairman--worked hard on this 31 amphib ship
floor. This is not a suggestion. It is a law. It is a law, so
my view is you do not even have the authority to do this. I
have raised this with the CNO and others, but this is something
that the Navy, the Marine Corps worked on, and out of the gate
you guys say, ``Eh, maybe we will just blow off those Senators
and Congressmen.''
Again, not a suggestion. I am actually really pissed about
this. So how do you answer this? My view is there is no answer.
You have a law. We passed it. It went through. The President of
the United States signed it. By the way, in the Committee it
was unanimous. This Committee was in the base bill. So it was
not controversial, and the Navy comes out and says, ``Eh, we
will just blow off those silly U.S. Senators.''
So what are we doing here, Admiral, and how can you rectify
this? It is a big issue.
Vice Admiral Conn. It is a big issue.
Senator Sullivan. I am not pleased about it, and no U.S.
Member of Congress should be pleased about it. You guys do not
have that authority to do what you just did in the President's
Budget. That is my view.
Vice Admiral Conn. Yes, sir. In terms of the impact and in
terms of getting below 31 amphibs is with our LSDs.
Senator Sullivan. But why don't you address the threshold
issue, which is we told you not to go below it.
Vice Admiral Conn. The cost, in terms of----
Senator Sullivan. No. We told you, in a law, signed by the
President, not to go below the floor. So what is your answer to
that?
Vice Admiral Conn. My answer to that----
Senator Sullivan.--costs or anything. We balance the costs.
Vice Admiral Conn. Yes, sir. But the answer to that, sir,
is having 31 ships, of which three of them may be tied to a
pier for the next 5 years, is not really 31. We have an aging
platform that came into the service about the same time I did,
back in the mid 1980's.
Senator Sullivan. We need a serious discussion on this
issue, because in my view the Navy would be pretty darn worried
about a headline saying, ``Navy on path to violate 31 amphib
ship requirement in 2024.'' If you are saying the 31 ships, 3
of which are just going to be sitting there in maintenance for
5 more years, that is a problem.
I think what you guys needed to do, before you issued the
budget, is come to this Committee. Given how important this was
to a number of us, given, by the way, how important this was to
the U.S. Marine Corps, and not surprise us with, in my view, a
violation of a law that we worked really hard on last year.
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. We will certainly take that, if we
are going to be doing anything that looks like it is not going
to make it, we will come and talk to you in advance. So that is
a great request on your part, and happy to do that.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Very important.
General, I want to turn to Force Design. I have written an
, it was a while ago, in ''Defense News.'' Mr. Chairman, I
would like to submit this for the record.
Senator Kaine. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
If the Marine Corps' Force Design plan is going to succeed, it
needs more money and more Navy support
By Dan Sullivan
Jun 13, 2022
The Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 effort has come under
considerable scrutiny. Supporters and detractors have waged a
public debate on the merits of Commandant David Berger's 10-
year modernization effort to adapt the Marine Corps to current
and future national security threats.
I commend my Marine veteran colleagues in the House and
Senate for their recent Wall Street Journal op-ed focusing on
the bold, innovative effort Gen. Berger is leading, and I agree
with most of their points. But the actual success of Force
Design--scheduled for completion by 2030--depends on addressing
three key areas my congressional colleagues did not mention.
First, the Marine Corps must carefully manage the gap
between divestment of current combat capability and future
combat capability development--and the significant risk that
entails. This is critical so as to not leave the Marine Corps
less combat capable at a time when such capabilities are needed
most, for example, around the second half of this decade when
many see a heightened risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Specifically, the Marine Corps has gotten rid of its tanks
and bridging units as well as a significant portion of its
cannon artillery and aviation units so it could buy mobile
anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft systems, loitering munitions
and unmanned aerial vehicles. But many of these systems have
not been purchased yet and some are still going through testing
and development and field integration with newly developed
Marine Corps units.
The risks inherent in this combat capability gap could be
substantially mitigated if the Marine Corps had a more robust
budget, allowing them to modernize the force before getting rid
of proven weapon systems.
The commandant recently acknowledged this fact during a May
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. But the Biden
administration continues to send Congress inflation-adjusted
budget cuts for the Marine Corps and all other services,
forcing the commandant to substantially divest current
capabilities to pay for future ones.
Indeed, that is one of the underlying assumptions of Force
Design 2030, that the Marine Corps' bold modernization efforts
would have to be undertaken with flat or declining defense
budgets. Such budgets are clearly not commensurate with global
threats facing our Nation and require the services to make the
difficult choice between current combat readiness and force
modernization for future foes, while managing the resulting
risk.
Second, Force Design's success depends on the U.S. Navy,
both in terms of greater Marine Corps-Navy integration and the
Navy's critical role in delivering and sustaining Marine Corps
stand-in forces to fight from remote littoral areas in the
Indo-Pacific and across the world.
Presently, the Navy's enthusiasm for these innovative, and
likely dangerous, Marine Corps operations appears non-existent.
None of the Navy's current strategy documents mention, let
alone highlight, its important role in supporting concepts like
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and stand-in forces,
which are the essential operational components of Force Design.
Without robust Navy support and buy-in, the Marine Corps Force
Design efforts and strategy will fail.
Finally, although appropriately focused on China, Force
Design must deliver what the American people have come to
expect from the Marine Corps: a global force ready to deploy to
any clime and place on Navy ships to deliver a lethal combined
arms, kick-in-the-door capability in response to a major
national security crisis.
It is for that reason I am introducing bipartisan
legislation for the upcoming National Defense Authorization Act
to require a minimum of 31 amphibious ships in the Navy fleet
to ensure the continuing global response capability of the
Marine Corps both during and after Force Design 2030.
Dan Sullivan, a Republican, represents Alaska in the U.S.
Senate. He is a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee
and a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve.
Senator Sullivan. It essentially lauds the Commandant for
really focusing on a bold, innovative plan. However, there are
a number of issues that are out there that are being debated
within the Marine Corps. This is the biggest restructuring of
the Corps at least in decades, maybe in 100 years, and I let
the Commandant know this. I think it is important we have
hearings on this, that we stress-test it, that the light of
congressional hearings, people who are for Force Design, people
who have issues with Force Design, that we do that either on
this Committee, Mr. Chairman, as you and I have talked about,
or the Readiness Subcommittee, or the full committee.
But let me ask a really basic question that is one of the
criticisms, and again, recognizing what the Marine Corps is
trying to do. As you probably know I am a little biased in
terms of the services, and the Marine Corps is one that I have
a lot of respect for, for obviously reasons.
But there is this issue of, as I wrote in this op-ed,
``Managing the gap between divestment of current combat
capability and future combat capability development entails
significant risk.'' The Commandant acknowledged that in a
hearing last year. Some critics have stated that the Marine
Corps is starting to be designed for a niche force with a niche
important combat mission--China, Taiwan--but leaving out the
statutory mandates of a combined arms, three-division--again,
that is the law, right, the 1947 act, so the Marine Corps does
not have a choice on that either. In the very significant cuts
that have already occurred with regard to infantry, 100 percent
of armor, bridging, mine-clearing capabilities, combat engineer
capabilities, very significant cannon artillery, Military
Police are gone.
I mean, there is a whole host of things from my perspective
that the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) seems to be
something that has been the most important issue in the Marine
Corps for decades. We do not rely on anyone for logistics, for
clearing, for bridging, for air, for artillery, and all of a
sudden, when I am pressing on these people, talking about,
``Well, we are going to do an MOU [Memorandum of Understanding]
with the Army for bridging.'' Really? ``We are going to do an
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Army for road
clearing.'' Really? That, to me, seems to go fundamentally
against the whole idea of the MAGTF and self-sustainment.
I guess the bottom-line big question is that force-in-
readiness capability, that is the kick-in-the-door capability,
anywhere in the world, which is the hallmark of the Marine
Corps, some of the critics are saying that Force Design is
dramatically undermining this, particularly when divestments
have not been made up with future combat capabilities.
That is a lot to throw at you, General. I think this
deserves its own hearing. But do you care to respond to any of
that?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, look, that answer does
deserve--I would offer myself and my staff to come back with
you and sit down.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I am talking about a hearing on it.
Lieutenant General Heckl. Yes, sir, and we would do that as
well.
But, sir, I can tell you that having been in this job now
for almost 18 months--I am a fleet Marine, sir. I came from
commanding the First Marine Expeditionary Force--we are on the
right track. The MAGTF, sir, is as strong, if not stronger,
than it ever has been.
The issue, sir, let me just put it this way. How III MEF,
the Stand In Force that has been that way for decades, right,
and all the MEFs are different. They always have been
different--different sizes, different capabilities--but they
are MAGTFs. We simply did not equip III MEF with the tools to
deal with the National Defense Strategy (NDS)-directed pacing
threat. General Dunford acknowledged it. General Miller
acknowledged it, that the Marine Corps was not organized,
trained, and equipped to deal with the Communist Chinese Party,
and we are doing that. But sir, I think----
Senator Sullivan. I appreciate that, and like I said, I
applauded General Berger for his--he is getting on it more than
anyone else. But that does not mean that it does not have
flaws, and that does not mean that some of the criticisms or
Wargaming or this big issue, and the General acknowledged it, I
mean, we have divested a lot. I mean, I have one number here--
21 percent of infantry, 100 percent of armor, bridging, and
mine-clearing capability, 100 percent of Military Police, 67
percent of cannon artillery, a significant amount of critical
fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. My numbers are 35 percent
of all F-35s.
Now maybe those numbers are wrong and this is why we need a
hearing, but that is a lot of divestment.
Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, all I would say to some of
the--and, sir, I do not like to get into the, you know, because
a lot of these are respected individuals. But they are entitled
to their own opinions. They are not entitled to their own
facts.
We have not diminished a single program of record. I am a
V-22 guy, and I am going to stay in classification level, but
now we are going to stop at 16 VMMs. The Commandant added 2
more, right? He was going to go to 14. He added 2 more. We are
going to be at 16, of 10 planes. If I maintained 16 squadrons
of 12 planes, I would be coming to you with a bill for an
addition 34 V-22s. Our program is 360. We bought 360. Our
program of record for JSF is 420--353 Bravos, 67 Charlies. We
are buying those, and the program record for CH-53 Kilo is 200.
We are buying 200.
Sir, I would just point out that like we are fielding
HIMARS [High Mobility Artilery Rocket System], and we are
working on loitering munitions, and we are going to follow the
Army down the path, because we are not big enough to pay our
own way. GMLRS [Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System], which is
going to be a phenomenal capability, we got the Naval Strike
Missile that is going to be followed up by the Maritime Strike
Tomahawk. These are real capabilities, sir, that not only apply
in the Indo-Pacific--look what we did with the 61/2 and Major
General Donovan in the High North, right in the wake of
Ukraine.
What I would tell you is the existential threat to the
Marine Corps, just from Karsten Heckl's point, is the lack of
amphibious ships.
Senator Sullivan. So you agree with my point with the
Admiral?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, I could not agree more. Sir,
I have said this numerous times, in multiple forums, CSIS
[Center for Strategic and International Studies] and others.
The concern for me and for the Marine Corps is not tied to
artillery or tanks. See what is happening to tanks in Ukraine.
I am not saying--tanks have their place. Most grunts said they
like them in an urban fight. I can pull up open-source video of
Ukrainians using a $200 quadcopter that has been modified to
hold an 81-millimeter mortar, destroying a T-72.
Senator Sullivan. Tanks are pretty relevant in Ukraine
right now.
Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, yes, well----
Senator Sullivan. Loitering munitions are not--what about--
sorry, Mr. Chairman. We are waiting on others?
Senator Kaine. No. We had Members that did second rounds
already so I am just going to let you go. I have got some other
things too, but I am here until you are done, and then I have
got a few more things. Go ahead.
Senator Sullivan. Again, it requires a further debate. I
mean, combat engineers, road-clearing, bridging--it seems to be
one of the most basic elements of Marine Corps ground
capability is gone.
Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, I mean----
Senator Sullivan. How do we cross a river when we do
something in Taiwan or Iran? Call the Army?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Well, sir, I mean, right now the
Commandant's focus was getting us--sir, look, multiple tours in
Afghanistan and Iraq. My opinion is, and I do not know what
your opinion is, that we have become a second land Army. We
have walked away from the fleet. In 2010, we did not have a BLT
[Battalion Landing Team] to put against a MEU, a Marine
Expeditionary Unit. Everything thing got big. You know, the ACV
[Amphibious Combat Vehicle] is a great vehicle, but it is built
to MRAP [Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected] standards, right? It
is completely survivable. It does not fit in the upper V, on
ships. It weighs 70,000 pounds. We are working around it but
these are issues. It takes 18 ACVs to do what 12 AAVs did.
So we got big, heavy, immobile, and we are just trying to
get back to being a Fleet Marine Force again.
Senator Sullivan. So let me ask one of the big criticisms,
and maybe you can address it, and I already mentioned it, and
again, I know there is this notion that it is all the retired
four-stars, and it is not. It is not just the retired four-
stars. But this idea that Force Design--and again, I am not
saying I agree with it. I am saying these issues need to be
aired. It is time for oversight on this very--whether you love
Force Design or hate it--I love the Marine Corps, right? I
mean, I loved being a marine more than I love being a U.S.
Senator, so this is important to all marines.
One of the criticisms is that Force Design appears to be
building a niche force construct for only one situation in one
location, and the whole concept of a combined arms Force-in-
readiness that needs amphibs has been diminished or will be
diminished or is being diminished.
So let me tee that one up for you, General.
Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir.
Senator Sullivan. I am sure you have heard it, and I am
sure you want to disagree with it.
Lieutenant General Heckl. I completely and absolutely,
fundamentally disagree with the whole premise. It is still a
MAGTF. We are still a Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Depending
on the scenario, just like we did for 61/2, you know, in the
wake of Ukraine, we task organized, and we put together a
MAGTF, and quite frankly, where we found our value, sir, in the
High North, when this started, was the recon, counter-recon
and, you know, countersense, make sense. We were passing off
high-fidelity, target-quality track data to our allies on what
the adversary was doing with some assets that I cannot talk
about here.
So the direct application to everything the Commandant--
what we have moved out on, not just the Commandant--what we
have moved out on Force Design--and so remember, this is the
fleet. These are the Marine regional forces, and these are all
the MEFs involved with this. So to think we are making this for
a niche market I just fundamentally disagree with. We have
fielded HIMARS. We are going to continue. We are taking that to
the next level. Right now we are working on the loitering
munitions to give us the full, all-weather capability that is
going to cover that 5-kilometer to 18-kilometer gap that we
currently have with HIMARS.
I just want to point out also, sir, that we kept seven
batteries of tube artillery. There are 3 East, 4 West, and we
actually, as you know an artillery battery, at that point
traditionally it had been six guns. We upped them to eight. We
are going to hold onto those for any kind of contingency.
Senator Sullivan. Well, General--and thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Sorry I went on so long but I think it is an important issue.
Two final comments. One is in last year's NDAA I had a
provision--again, unanimous--that was requiring reporting from
the Marine Corps on this very topic of what has been divested
and what is the incoming combat capability. Those are due every
6 months. The first one is due in April, so in a couple of
days. I hope we get it on time.
Then the other issue that I have been raising, which I
believe the Marine Corps leadership agrees with, is that
without full Navy support, Force Design fails, because you are
talking about integration, which I am in agreement with you on
that, General.
But one of the things I mentioned in this Defense News op-
ed from a while ago is presently I said State of the Navy's
enthusiasm for these innovative and likely dangerous marine
missions--the Stand-In Force is a dangerous mission--and the
ability to get logistics and delivering marines and
sustainability in many ways is going to rely on the Marine
Corps, but it is going to rely on the Navy. As I mentioned
there--this is a year ago--the Navy's current strategy
documents never mention once, or highlight once Marine Corps
Force Design or concepts like Stand In Forces, or expeditionary
operating base forces.
So where is the Navy on that, Admiral, because again, you
could be the biggest proponent of Marine Corps Force Design
2030 there is, but if the Navy is indifferent or does not care
or wants to cut amphibs, then Force Design is going to fail.
Vice Admiral Conn. There is no daylight between myself and
Lieutenant General Heckl.
Senator Sullivan. Have the Navy documents been updated to
reflect interest in Force Design, because last year there was
zero.
Vice Admiral Conn. Yes. Okay, sir. I mean, I acknowledge or
I will take a look at that----
Senator Sullivan. Well----
Admiral Conn.--get back to you on that.
Senator Sullivan.--is what I am saying.
Vice Admiral Conn. So Lieutenant General Heckl and I, we go
on the road and we give briefs together, that talks to the
Stand In Force and the Commandant's design, as well as where
the Navy is going in the future. Went up to the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT), a very classified setting with
over 300 industry partners, to give them a set of headlights in
terms of how we are going to fight so they understand the
context, and what do we need to fight with. That is from the
Marine Corps and the Navy perspective.
The medium landing ship is going to be late to need. We
acknowledge that. So we are committed to have a bridging
strategy to get to that medium landing ship capability, that
the ship will start construction in 2025. We have to look for
other alternatives. We are committed to that.
We are a naval team. We are out in contact across the globe
day in and day out for the various combatant commanders. We are
a family. Is there friction at times? Certainly. But we are
committed to the outcomes that we are both driving to.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator, I
mentioned something before you came, which was at the beginning
of the hearing. They did not deliver the 30-year ship plan to
us. So normally we would have the plan and then we would have
this hearing and be able to really direct questions to the
plan. We thought we were going to get it last week. It did not
happen. So I committed to the Committee Members, we will get
that plan soon. We will get it before the posture hearing. But,
in fact, for the posture hearing, because there is so much to
ask the SECNAV and the Commandant and the CNO, if after the
posture hearing Members of this Subcommittee still have
questions based on the 30-year ship plan that we did not get
until after this hearing we will reconvene to enable us to dig
into that. Secretary Stefany was very good about saying they
are ready to do that.
Senator Sullivan. Great.
Senator Kaine. Then I will just say to you, General Heckl,
when a witness says to a Senator, ``I completely disagree with
you,'' it just so reminds me of my conversations with my own
staff. I mean, it is kind of like, it just kind of gives me
that homesick feeling for Russell 231.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I appreciate the frankness because
it is great. It is what we need.
Senator Kaine. Yes, it is good.
Senator Sullivan. It is what we expect, especially from the
Marine Corps.
Senator Kaine. Let me ask a couple of things, and they may
have been covered when I was over on the floor, but first I
just want to do a little bit on block buy. Inflation is a
challenge and connected too, but there are some separate
issues, supply chain disruptions are a challenge. The block
buy, when it is done right, is not only a hedge against
inflation, because you can buy up front before price goes up of
various components, but it also enables you to avoid some of
the supply chain delays because you are able to purchase in
advance, and then when you are finally getting ready for maybe
the second in a class or something like that you have got a
huge percentage of the material together.
I have heard very strong pro block buy testimony from the
SECNAV in the past, but do you see it the same way, Secretary
Stefany?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. Block buy really enables, whether it
is a second, third, or fourth, it takes that whole ``having the
right material at the right time'' issue out. That is one of
our key constraints we have right now in getting ships and
aircraft out on time is getting the material there when we need
it. So block buy totally facilitates making sure the material
is not an issue for following units.
Senator Kaine. Great. Let me ask about the SIOP. Is the
fiscal year 2024 budget and what we are thinking going forward,
are we putting enough resources in the SIOP to enable you to
accomplish what you need to?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. For the major projects, fully funded
through the FYDP, so that is really very, very helpful. Then
what we call the optimization plans or the area plans, that
analysis started last year, this year, and next year, going
through that process, and we have sufficient funds in the
budget to meet the need as those reports come out on how we
optimize each of the shipyards.
Senator Kaine. Admiral Conn, if I remember right from my
first round of questions, the $300 million that you need for
the kind of current fixes on the bases where there is seismic
activity, that is in the unfunded priorities list, right?
Vice Admiral Conn. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Kaine. Okay. Let me ask you, finally, a question
about Navy aviation. As I understand the Navy's striker fighter
shortfall estimate has fluctuated pretty widely over the past
few years. In simple terms there are two pieces to solving
strike fighter inventory gap--buying new aircraft and extending
service lift of existing. The budget does not include buying
new F/A-18E/F aircraft, only F-35B and F-35C.
What the latest assessment of the strike fighter shortfall?
Vice Admiral Conn. Sir, we got to a deficit peak of 31 in
fiscal year 2027, and we go to zero by 2031.
Senator Kaine. So the deficit hits its peak in 2027----
Vice Admiral Conn. Yes.
Senator Kaine.--but then down to zero by 2031.
Vice Admiral Conn. That is correct.
Senator Kaine. Then let me ask you on pilots and
maintainers. The Air Force has been experiencing significant
shortfalls in both. I mean, everybody is having a hard time
hiring the people they need, and some of our pilots and
maintainers have a lot of other options. Have you seen, in the
Navy and Marine Corps, shortages in the pilots and maintainers,
and if so what are you doing to try to counter that?
Vice Admiral Conn. We are in competition for the air crew
and we are in competition with the airlines that are hiring. We
have been here before. Through the bonus structures and
whatnot, I do not have particular insight of how well the bonus
or the input metric, what are the outcomes. I do not have any
insight on that, sir.
We do, in CNATRA [Chief of Naval Air Training], the
aircraft, we had some trouble with the T-45s, with the engine,
with that engine. The aircraft will be back up to our levels
prior to the engine problem in April. We are going to continue
to ramp up and probably meet in excess of 90 percent of the
requirement for the year, and the maintainers, I think
retention as well. But in terms of our ability to recruit
talent and retain talent and talk conversations with the Chief
of Naval Personnel, we are going to have our challenges in
meeting some of our recruiting goals.
Senator Kaine. In many of the MOSs [Military Occupational
Specialties] in the military--we had a full committee hearing
on just recruitment and retention about 2 weeks ago, and most
of the services were coming in with pretty positive message on
the retention side, and most were coming in with some real
challenges on the recruiting side. But I would think in the
pilot and maintainer space the retention challenge is very
real. I mean, the airline industry sort of went flat on its
back during COVID, but it is really coming back strong now. So
in periods where you see that ramping up then the competition
for your folks is pretty intense.
Vice Admiral Conn. Sir, I agree with that. I mean, people
join the Navy for a lot of different reasons. They stay in the
Navy because they want to be on a winning team, and they stay
in the Navy because they think they are making a difference.
They enjoy the job. They like the people they work with. But
what we need to continue to go after is some of those quality-
of-life aspects that the Secretary of the Navy is very hot on.
Senator Kaine. Well, there was good testimony about that
even today with the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] and the head
of the Joint Chiefs about some aspects of the budget. You
mentioned them, Senator Stefany. You know, investing in a
parking garage does not sound like a great quality-of-life
thing, but if you are a ship that is in drydock and you are
having to walk a mile across a constructionsite to and from
every day, and it is hard to find a place to park near, that is
an agitator. When you are on a berthing barge that is old, and
the quality of it is not high, and there is not great internet
access on it, that is a real issue for people. It is about
readiness, it is about retention, and it also can exacerbate or
create mental health challenges that we all, I think, are
committed to dealing with.
So, listen, I appreciate this hearing today. Good candid
dialog back and forth. My Committee Members are very, very
focused on this Committee. We look forward to meeting again,
and with that the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
navy and marine corps integration
1. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Stefany, in your testimony you stated the
[3d Marine Littoral Regiment and Task Force 61/2] will actively
participate and support operational concepts, including Distributed
Maritime Operations, Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations, and
Stand-in Forces. As I have stated before, the success of Marine Corps
Force Design 2030 is in large part based on the Navy's buy-in. Will the
Department of the Navy release any updated documentation this year
which clearly articulates how the Navy will support the Marine Corps in
Distributed Maritime Operations, Expeditionary Advanced Based
Operations, and Stand-in Forces?
Mr. Stefany. The Navy and Marine Corps continue to lead Joint and
Coalition forces through integrated deterrence and remain postured to
adapt to emerging threats as demand for our naval capabilities
continues to increase. Last July the CNO released an updated Navigation
Plan, aligning our priorities to the 2022 National Defense Strategy
(NDS). In this document, the CNO states that Naval Forces will leverage
warfighting concepts including the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC),
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), the concept for Stand-in Forces
(SIF), Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operations (EABO), and Littoral
Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) to persist forward,
prevail in conflict, and end hostilities on favorable U.S. terms.
Due to the rigor associated with developing or revising Navy
directives I am not able to provide an update on any pending CNO
directives, but the Naval Board continuously seeks ways to improve
Navy-Marine Corps integration. The PB24 budget request is in alignment
with the Secretary of the Navy's priorities, and enables the One Navy-
Marine Corps Team to continue strengthening our maritime dominance,
building on our culture of warfighting excellence, and enhancing our
strategic partnerships.
san antonio-class amphibious ship
2. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Stefany and Vice Admiral Conn, I want to
revisit the San Antonio-class LPD-17 Flight II Warship, which is the
Marine's Corps number one unfunded priority by the way. Vice Admiral
Conn, in your testimony you described the LPD-17 as an essential
component of the amphibious warfare ship inventory. During the annual
McAleese Conference, the Commandant doubted the Navy's fear that
purchasing a single ship in fiscal year 2025 is not going to drive the
price down or make it more competitive. As the Commandant stated, the
initial production of a ship always has a learning curve and stopping
production now is only going to increase the price curve. The San
Antonio-class Landing Platform, Dock LPD-17 Flight II is a critical
component of the Navy and Marine Corps' Amphibious Ready Group, tasked
by our Nation with forward-deployed conventional deterrence,
humanitarian assistance, and crisis response. This is a capability we
are lacking in, as Lieutenant General Karsten Heckl stated last year in
front of this Committee. The Marine Corps was unable to respond to the
NATO/ EUCOM commander's urgent tasking in 2022 due to existing LPD
maintenance and excess capability. How many marines are currently
working on the Navy's shipbuilding plan?
Mr. Stefany and Vice Admiral Conn. I agree that the San Antonio-
class is a critical component of the Amphibious Ready Group, and
amphibious ships in general provide capabilities critical to providing
strategic mobility, force projection, and the range to respond across
the globe. I will note that there were no Combatant Commander requests
for ARGs to support the crisis response in Ukraine or Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) operations in Turkey.
As to the shipbuilding plan, it was coordinated across the
Department, and was reviewed by senior uniformed and civilian marines
including; the Director, Expeditionary Warfare Division of OPNAV, the
Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, the Deputy
Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations, and the Assistant
Commandant of the Marine Corps. Prior to final approval, the Secretary
of the Navy reviewed the plan with the Commandant of the Marine Corps
and the Chief of Naval Operations.
force design 2030
3. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, what does title 10
require the Marine Corps to do?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Title 10 United States Code, Section 8063
(United States Marine Corps: composition; functions) states that:
(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall
be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and
three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other
services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be
organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of
combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service
with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and
for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the
prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall
provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of
the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of
naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such
other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional
duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which
the Marine Corps is primarily organized.
(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the
Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that
pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing
forces.
(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with
integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime
components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.
The following amendments were made in the Fiscal Year 2023 National
Defense Authorization Act. Specific amendments are indicated in BOLD
text.
Fiscal Year 2923 NDAA--Section 1022. Navy Consultation with Marine
Corps on Major Decisions Directly Concerning Marine Corps Amphibious
force structure and capability.
``The Secretary of the Navy shall ensure that the views of the
Commandant of the Marine Corps are given appropriate consideration
before a major decision is made by an element of the Department of the
Navy outside the Marine Corps on a matter that directly concerns Marine
Corps aviation or amphibious force structure and capability.''
Fiscal year 2023 NDAA--Section 1023. Amphibious Warship Force
Structure.
(a) The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in
general, naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be
organic therein. The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped
primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at
sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary
for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and,
in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the
expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of
war.
(b) The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less
than 11 operational aircraft carriers and not less than 31 operational
amphibious warfare ships, of which not less than 10 shall be amphibious
assault ships. For purposes of this subsection, an operational aircraft
carrier or amphibious warfare ship includes an aircraft carrier or
amphibious warfare ship that is temporarily unavailable for worldwide
deployment due to routine or scheduled maintenance or repair.
Add new subsection (g)--(g) In this section, the term `amphibious
warfare ship' means a ship that is classified as an amphibious assault
ship (general purpose) (LHA), an amphibious assault ship (multi-
purpose) (LHD), an amphibious transport dock (LPD), or a dock landing
ship (LSD).
4. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, does Force Design
adhere to those requirements?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Yes, Force Design adheres to the
requirements set forth in Title 10 of the United States Code. The
Marine Corps regularly assesses our force structure, capabilities, and
readiness to ensure that we can fulfill our obligations as outlined in
title 10. Force Design 2030 optimizes Marine Corps force structure to
meet the demands the National Defense Strategy and of modern warfare.
This plan was developed with the direction and oversight of senior
civilian and military leaders.
After the Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG) was released in the
summer of 2019 and Force Design modernization began, the Marine Corps
has conducted over 400 congressional engagements with Members,
Professional Staff Members, and staff from personal offices some of
which were repeated engagements or deep dives with the same staff. The
Marine Corps has averaged more than five congressional engagements a
month for the past 3.5 years. Marine Corps leadership values and honors
the need for congressional oversight and has actively supported that
lawful requirement. My Command, Combat Development and Integration
(CD&I) alone has conducted 209 of those engagements as of April 2023.
Of those 209 engagements roughly 30 percent were classified briefs at
the secret level and above, we must respect the threat and the
associated security classification protocols to safeguard critical
capabilities. The remaining 70 percent of those engagements were at the
unclassified level to be as transparent as possible in our
modernization efforts.
Force Design was also informed by an extensive and continuous
review of current and future threats. The Intelligence Community (IC)
Annual Threat Assessment continues to highlight the increase in
military modernization from the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). The
2023 IC Annual Threat Assessment has identified the PRC as working to
field a military by 2027 designed to deter U.S. intervention in a
future cross-strait crisis. Furthermore, the 2022 NSS identifies the
People's Republic of China (PRC) as the only competitor with the intent
and the capacity to reshape the international order. The 2018 and 2022
NDS clearly State the case for change by identifying the Indo-Pacific
as the priority theater from a competition and threat perspective.
Force Design 2030 creates a more agile, flexible, and lethal force
that is better equipped to operate forward, compete, project power and
influence as directed by the National Defense Strategy and other
strategic guidance documents. This includes enhancing the Marine Corps'
ability to conduct expeditionary and amphibious operations, improving
our ability to operate in contested and denied environments, and
increasing our capacity to conduct distributed operations with joint
and allied partners. These efforts are directly tied to our title 10
requirements of:
``The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to
provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting
air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of
advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may
be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.''
Over the past two decades the Marine Corps has been involved in a
land campaign as the Nation directed and required. Force Design
redirects the Marine Corps to our original mission as a naval
expeditionary force in readiness that supports the fleet commanders
within the naval campaign. Overall, Force Design intends to ensure that
the Marine Corps remains a highly capable and responsive force that can
effectively fulfill our obligations under title 10 and other statutory
and regulatory requirements.
The Marine Corps has also worked this year to adhere to the amended
Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA requirements that require the Department of the
Navy to maintain no less than 31 amphibious warfare ships. The current
30-year Ship Building Plan (SBP) does not achieve nor maintain the
Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA directed requirement for no less than 31
amphibious warfare ships and does not continue the LPD Flight II
program. The Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA and appropriations actions
authorized and appropriated advanced procurement funds ($250 million)
for LPD to be procured in fiscal year 2024.
5. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, what does the 2022
National Defense Strategy require the Marine Corps to do?
Lieutenant General Heckl. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS)
requires the Marine Corps to be trained and equipped as a naval
expeditionary force-in-readiness and prepared to operate inside
actively contested maritime spaces in support of fleet and Joint
operations to deter adversary aggression. Furthermore, the NDS requires
the Marine Corps to divest in legacy platforms that are less relevant
and to modernize the force with asymmetric capabilities supported by
innovative concepts.
Integrated Deterrence, Section IV, 2022 NDS, page. 8:
Deterrence by Denial. To deter aggression, especially where
potential adversaries could act to rapidly seize territory, the
Department will develop asymmetric approaches and optimize our posture
for denial. In the near-term, we will continue to develop innovative
operational concepts and supplement current capabilities and posture
through investments in mature, high-value assets. Over the mid-to long-
term, we will develop new capabilities, including in long-range strike,
undersea, hypersonic, and autonomous systems, and improve information
sharing and the integration of non-kinetic tools.
Force Planning, Section VII, 2022 NDS, page. 17:
To enhance our ability to deny aggression, we will improve the
speed and accuracy of detection and targeting to deny adversary freedom
of action. To mitigate adversary anti-access/area-denial capability,
the Department will develop concepts and capabilities that improve our
ability to reliably hold at risk those military forces and assets that
are essential to adversary operational success, while managing
escalation. For logistics and sustainment, we will reinforce our
capability to quickly mobilize and deploy forces and to sustain high-
intensity joint denial operations despite kinetic and non-kinetic
attack and disruption.
Achieving success in these operational areas requires tightly
linking our concepts and capabilities for operating forces. The
Department will continue to develop operational concepts that
realistically expand U.S. options and constrain those of potential
adversaries. The Department will explore force employment concepts and
capabilities that degrade adversary power projection while weighing
crisis stability and escalation risk; integrate new technologies;
experiment with creative applications of existing capabilities; and
selectively share the most effective asymmetric capabilities with
threatened allies and partners.
Building Enduring Advantages, 2022 NDS, page 19:
Transform the Foundation of the Future Force. Building the Joint
Force called for by this strategy requires overhauling the Department's
force development, design, and business management practices. Our
current system is too slow and too focused on acquiring systems not
designed to address the most critical challenges we now face. This
orientation leaves little incentive to design open systems that can
rapidly incorporate cutting-edge technologies, creating longer-term
challenges with obsolescence, interoperability, and cost effectiveness.
The Department will instead reward rapid experimentation, acquisition,
and fielding. We will better align requirements, resourcing, and
acquisition, and undertake a campaign of learning to identify the most
promising concepts, incorporating emerging technologies in the
commercial and military sectors for solving our key operational
challenges. We will design transition pathways to divest from systems
that are less relevant to advancing the force planning guidance, and
partner to equip the defense industrial base to support more relevant
modernization efforts.
6. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, did the Marine Corps
divest of certain equipment and capabilities to cut cost and invest the
savings in capabilities it deemed a higher priority because it assumed
defense budgets would not grow to allow it to bring new capabilities
online before divesting old ones?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Yes, over the past five President's
Budget cycles from fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2024, the
Marine Corps divested $18.2 billion of legacy equipment and invested
$15.8 billion in modernization. The Marine Corps adopted a funding
strategy based on investing in capabilities to maintain operational
relevance, budget constraints, and compliance to strategic guidance.
The following table shows the amount of funding divested and invested
over the Future Years Defense Program in each of the five most recent
budget cycles:
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
With the drawdown of forces supporting operations in CENTCOM in
2014, the Marine Corps identified the necessity to transition from
sustaining a land campaign to modernizing the force in support of
maritime campaigning inherent in our title 10 requirements. To maintain
operational and tactical relevance on a modern battlefield due to the
evolution of technology, the Marine Corps to divest of legacy force
structures that were of lesser relevance for a naval expeditionary
service. Additionally, budget constraints were identified by NDS
architects and Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 planners with the
underlying assumption that the department's topline budget would grow
modestly at a 2 percent inflation rate. Furthermore, the Marine Corps'
divestment strategy followed the 2018 and 2022 NDS and the associated
Defense Planning Guidance that directed the divestment of legacy
capabilities and modernization at the speed of the pacing threat.
In the President's Budget 2020 cycle, the Marine Corps reallocated
$0.7 billion by divesting of the AN/TPS-59 Air Defense Radar, AAV7A1
Project Improvement Program, and the MV-22 Aerial Refueling System
(VARS). These funds were used to invest in such programs as Ground
Based Air Defense (GBAD), F-35 spares and Block 4 modification, nascent
Command-and-Control systems, sensors, and communications platforms.
In the President's Budget 2021 cycle, we reallocated $1.8 billion
by divesting of certain ground programs such as the Light Armored
Vehicle Program Improvement Project (LAV PIP) and M1A1 Weapons and
Combat Vehicle Modification Kits. The Marine Corps also made a 2,300
Active component reduction in end-strength, and unit modifications of
Fleet Anti-terrorism teams and Combat Logistics Battalion. The Marine
Corps used $1.2 billion of these funds to invest in Strike/Anti-surface
warfare capabilities, network, sensors, intelligence platforms, Air
Defense, Ground Combat lethality modernization, and S&T programs.
In the President's Budget 2022 cycle, as part of the overall Force
Design 2030 investment strategy, the Marine Corps made our second
largest divestment of $5.9 billion by reducing the Active component
end-strength by 5,100, completing our divestments in legacy force
structure such as Tanks, Bridging Companies, and Law Enforcement
Battalions in addition to reducing Active and Reserve Infantry
Battalions, Cannon Artillery Batteries, and Aviation Squadrons. One
hundred percent of these divestments were directly used to invest in
critical ground-based fires programs such as Navy Marine Corps
Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) and Organic Precision
Fires Family of Systems (OPF FOS). Advanced sensor investments included
the MAGTF Unmanned Aircraft System Expeditionary (MUX)/Medium Altitude
Long Endurance (MALE)--MQ9A, Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR)
and MAGTF Electronic Warfare Ground Family of Systems (MEGFOS).
Furthermore, critical ground networking investments were made in our
Network on The Move (NOTM) and Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN).
In the President's Budget 2023 cycle, the Marine Corps made our
largest divestment of $8.7 billion with a 744 reduction in Active
component end-strength, as well as further reduction to legacy
capabilities such as the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group
(MCSCG) and Marine Augmentation Program-Korea (MAP-K) programs and
delayed procurement of Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs), F-35B
Joint Strike Fighters, CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters. We also took
unique approaches to save resources by reducing capacity during Marine
Week, made a 10 percent reduction to Permanent Change of Station (PCS)
moves, and a 15 percent reduction to Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC)
staff positions to include Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORES) and the
supporting establishment. Nearly all these divestments, over $7.0
billion, were directly used to modernize critical areas that enable
Force Design by investing in multi-domain areas such as Command and
Control (Big Data Platform), Counter Air, Counter C5ISR-T, MQ-9A
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) sensors and enablers, and Anti-Surface
Warfare capabilities.
In the President's Budget 2024 cycle, the Marine Corps reallocated
over $1.1 billion from such programs as Organic Precision Fires,
Amphibious Combat Vehicles, and Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicles, as
well as a 15 percent reduction in the Marine Corps Bands program to
eight field bands. All divested funds were directed utilized to invest
in critical warfighting capabilities such as Signature Management
(YETI), Secure Expeditionary Resilient Position, Navigation and Timing
(SERPNT), Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (L-MADIS), and
Tactical Communication Modernization. Aviation investments were
utilized to increase Flight Hour Program and the MV-22 nacelle
improvement program. Additionally, several Talent Management
investments were made, including increased funding for Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response programs and the Marine Corps Embassy Security
Guard.
After completing five budget cycles with this approach, the Marine
Corps does not plan to divest any more capacity or legacy programs. As
part of the modernization strategy, the CMC prioritized the
identification of risk areas to mitigate near term readiness and
installations. The Marine Corps understands that modernization
strategies in any organization will not be successful if the Marine
Corps:
fails to resource our major initiatives;
fails to make the hard choices to align available
resources with the strategy's level of ambition;
fails to effectively incorporate new technologies and
identify, recruit, and leverage new talent; and
fails to reduce the barriers that limit collaboration
with allies and partners.
We aim to mitigate these and other risks through ruthless
prioritization. The Marine Corps is now at a juncture where the service
can no longer accept additional risk in readiness and installations.
7. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, if the Marine Corps
had a larger budget, would it make any different divestment or force
structure decisions going forward?
Lieutenant General Heckl. If the Marine Corps had a larger budget,
we would accelerate Force Design priorities to include additional
investments in retention, infrastructure, and quality of life. The
Marine Corps Unfunded Priority List (UPL) identifies areas that would
be accelerated if a larger budget was provided.
* Refer to page 11 that identifies the Marine Corps UPL submitted
to Congress.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
It is important to note that budget alone does not determine
decisions related to divestment and force structure. Strategic
considerations, service priorities, and operational needs also play
important roles in these decisions. Therefore, even with a larger
budget, the Marine Corps would still need to carefully evaluate our
priorities and make decisions based on a range of factors.
8. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, did the decision to
divest certain capabilities result from a capability analysis or from a
cost analysis?
Lieutenant General Heckl. The decision to divest certain
capabilities resulted from a threat informed, strategy driven, concept-
based capability analysis. As described in the response to question #6
above, with the drawdown of forces supporting operations in CENTCOM in
2014, the Marine Corps identified the necessity to transition from
sustaining a land campaign to modernize the force in support of
maritime campaigning inherent in our title 10 requirements. To maintain
operational and tactical relevance on a modern battlefield due to the
evolution of technology, the Marine Corps divested of programs that
were of lesser relevance for a naval expeditionary service.
Additionally, budget constraints were identified by NDS architects and
Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 planners with the underlying assumption
that the department's topline budget would grow modestly at a 2 percent
inflation rate. Furthermore, the Marine Corps' divestment strategy
followed the 2018 and 2022 NDS and the associated Defense Planning
Guidance that directed the divestment of legacy capabilities and
modernization at the speed of the pacing threat.
Threat Informed
The opening forward of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the
U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) states:
``Threats to U.S. national security will expand and diversify in
the coming year, driven in part by China and Russia as they
respectively compete more intensely with the United States and its
traditional allies and partners. This competition cuts across all
domains, involves a race for technological and military superiority,
and is increasingly about values. Russia and China seek to shape the
international system and regional security dynamics and exert influence
over the politics and economies of states in all regions of the world
and especially in their respective backyards.''
In the same annual threat assessment, the emerging and disruptive
technologies, and threats to economic competitiveness section states:
``For 2019 and beyond, the innovations that drive military and
economic competitiveness will increasingly originate outside the United
States, as the overall U.S. lead in science and technology (S&T)
shrinks; the capability gap between commercial and military
technologies evaporates; and foreign actors increase their efforts to
acquire top talent, companies, data, and intellectual property via
licit and illicit means. Many foreign leaders, including Chinese
President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, view strong
indigenous science and technology capabilities as key to their
country's sovereignty, economic outlook, and national power.''
In the same annual threat assessment, the China section states:
``We [The IC] assess that China will continue increasing its
maritime presence in the South China Sea and building military and
dual-use infrastructure in the Spratly Islands to improve its ability
to control access, project power, and undermine U.S. influence in the
area. A body of open-source reporting shows that China seeks to achieve
effective control over its claimed waters with a Whole-of-Government
strategy, compel Southeast Asian claimants to acquiesce in China's
claims--at least tacitly--and bolster Beijing's narrative in the region
that the United States is in decline and China's preeminence is
inevitable. Meanwhile, Beijing almost certainly will continue using
pressure and incentives to try to force Taipei to accept the One China
framework and ultimately Chinese control, and it will monitor the U.S.
reaction as an indicator of U.S. resolve in the region.''
``The People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues to develop and
field advanced weapons and hardware while honing its ability to fight
in all military domains. The force is undergoing its most comprehensive
restructuring ever to realize China's long-held goal of being able to
conduct modern, rapid military operations based on high technology to
assert and defend China's regional and growing global interests. PLA
reforms seek to reinforce the Chinese Communist Party's control of the
military, improve the PLA's ability to perform joint operations,
increase combat effectiveness, and curb corruption. As China's global
footprint and international interests have grown, its military
modernization program has become more focused on investments and
infrastructure to support a range of missions beyond China's periphery,
including a growing emphasis on the maritime domains, offensive air
operations, and long-distance mobility operations.''
The 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the IC states:
``Beijing is working to meet its goal of fielding a military by
2027 designed to deter U.S. intervention in a future cross-Strait
crisis. The PLA Navy and Air Force already are the largest in the
region and continue to field advanced platforms that improve China's
ability to try to establish air superiority and project power beyond
the first island chain. The PLA Rocket Force's (PLARF) short-, medium-,
and intermediate-range conventional systems probably already can hold
U.S. forces and bases in the region at risk.''
Strategy Driven
The 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) identified the People's
Republic of China (PRC) as the only competitor with the intent and the
capacity to reshape the international order. The 2018 and 2022 National
Defense Strategy (NDS) clearly State the case for change by identifying
the Indo-Pacific as the priority theater from a competition and threat
perspective. China has rapidly modernized and has accelerated its
forecasted, out-year modernization objectives. According to the DOD's
2022 Annual Report on China, ``the PLA's evolving capabilities and
concepts continue to strengthen the PRC's ability to ``fight and win
wars'' against a ``strong enemy [a likely euphemism for the United
States], coerce Taiwan and rival claimants in territorial disputes,
counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC's
periphery, and project power globally.'' The report highlights the
People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) battle force of 355 ships and
submarines ``that is largely composed of modern, multi-role
platforms.'' Additionally, the report describes China's long-range
precision strike capabilities from cruise and ballistic missiles.
Concept Based
The Marine Corps' Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and
Stand-in Forces (SIF) concepts meet the 2022 National Defense Strategy
(NDS) intent and are theater agnostic. The plan for light, lethal, and
distributed forces would be successful in other Combatant Commands
(COCOMs), such as European Command (EUCOM) or Central Command
(CENTCOM)--and have shown to be successful. For example, Task Force
6\1/2\ executed a proof of concept during 2022 in which they provided
6th Fleet Headquarters with real-time Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).
In that effort, Marine forces tested, refined, and validated concepts
of employment for MDA and closing kill webs, while also conducting
real-world, time sensitive reconnaissance-counter reconnaissance
missions. These efforts continue to support 6th Fleet operations as
nested within EUCOM and Africa Command (AFRICOM) priorities and have
sense turned into a rotational force.
9. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, can the Marine Corps
field the same, fewer, or more Marine Expeditionary Units after Force
Design 2030 than with the previous force structure (assuming sufficient
amphibious ship numbers)?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Force Design 2030 has not changed the
number of MEUs the Marine Corps can field; in fact, Force Design 2030
reinforces the need for the continued global employment of this
versatile and highly capable unit. The Marine Corps continues to have
capacity for seven MEUs. That is, regardless of the availability or
readiness of amphibious warfare ships, the Marine Corps has and will
continue to field the same number of Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU)
even as the service continues to modernize. In the late 1980's, the
Marine Corps changed the nomenclature of the Marine Amphibious Units to
become the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Since then, and for the
foreseeable future, the Marine Corps will maintain seven MEUs.
However, unrelated to the Marine Corps modernization efforts with
Force Design 2030, the Navy's readiness and inventory of amphibious
warfare ships do impact the ability of the MEUs to be forward postured
and available for Combatant Commander requirements. Over the past 10
years the average operational readiness or availability of amphibious
warfare ships has been 46 percent. This challenges the Amphibious Ready
Group (ARG)/MEU team to adequately conduct critical pre-deployment
training requirements and qualifications to conduct day and night
operations at sea. This not only decreases the safety of our forces by
reducing proficiency, but also decreases the Flexible Response Options
(FDOs) and Flexible Deterrence Options (FDOs) of the Combatant
Commanders to have ready and available forces for operational
requirements.
During the 1990's the amphibious warfare ship inventory exceeded
operational employment allowing adequate time for maintenance, and more
materially available ships to surge when required. For example, in 1991
the Department of the Navy maintained roughly 60 amphibious warfare
ships while only 37 percent were deployed. However, in the early 2000's
the amphibious warfare ship inventory decreased by nearly half while
the operational requirements maintained the same. Overtime as the
operational demand remained consistent to historical baselines while
inventory decreased, the material condition of amphibious warfare ships
has been strained. This has led to common delays of ARG/MEU deployments
and provides fewer ready ships to surge if directed.
The 22d, 24th, and 26th MEUs will continue to garrison and deploy
from Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. The 11th,
13th, and 15th MEUs will continue to garrison and deploy from MCB Camp
Pendleton in California. Last, the 31st MEU will continue to garrison
and deploy from MCB Butler in Okinawa, Japan.
The structural organization of our MEUs will also remain the same
and will be comprised of a Command Element (CE), a Battalion Landing
Team (BLT) as the Ground Combat Element (GCE), a Composite Aviation
Squadron as the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a Combat Logistics
Battalion (CLB) as the Logistics Combat Element (LCE).
Currently, the 26th MEU is conducting their Pre-Deployment Training
Period (PTP) with the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) in
preparation for their upcoming deployment this Summer. The Artillery
Battery within the BLT for the MEU will be organized with a traditional
M777 Howitzers platoon and a Force Design incorporated High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) platoon. Throughout the PTP, the
battery has been training on new Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
(TTPs) for HIMARS-Tactical Insertion Dynamic Employment (HI-TIDE) that
will enable the rapid employment of long-range precision fires after
ship-to-shore connectors have maneuvered the assets. This employment
concept is an aspect that supports the ability of expeditionary units
that can contribute to sea-denial and sea-control operations.
Maintaining control of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and the race
for key maritime terrain is critical in the current operating threat
that has created an Anti-Access, Area-Denial (A2AD) environment through
the proliferation of low-cost long-range fires, sensors, and a
communications architecture that place U.S. assets at risk. Although
Force Design is modernizing, the capabilities resident within the MEU
has increased lethality while the core structure and organization of
the MEUs remain the same.
10. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, how has the
composition and capabilities of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force
changed with Force Design 2030?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Composition of the Marine Air-Ground Task
Force (MAGTF) remains unchanged from its defined construct as a task
organized, air-ground, combined arms formation under a single
commander. MAGTFs continue to consist of four core elements--a Command
Element, a Ground Combat Element (GCE), an Aviation Combat Element
(ACE), and a Logistics Combat Element (LCE). The exact composition and
capability inherent in each MAGTF are determined by what is required
for that MAGTF's given mission.
Notably, post Force Design 2030, MAGTFs are both more capable and
lethal. The pre-Force Design MAGTF was capable of fighting in three
domains--land, air, and sea. Today, the MAGTF is capable of fighting in
all five domains with significant additional investments in space and
cyber capabilities. The Marine Corps has primarily invested in these
capabilities at the Command Element (CE) level with the increase in
cyber and space military occupation specialties and the establishment
of the Marine Information Group (MIG) within the MEF. Furthermore, we
have significantly increased the lethality of the Ground Combat Element
(GCE) with long range precision fires, loitering munitions, and sensor
capabilities to track and detect adversary targets at distance. The
Aviation Combat Element (ACE) has increased both operational reach and
lift capacity with investments in the CH-53K, MV-22B, and an increase
in Active component KC-130C squadrons. The ACE has also increased in
our ability to sense and make sense of the environment with fifth
generation F-35 platforms. As the pacing function the Logistics Combat
Element (LCE) is developing new concepts for afloat and shore
sustainment capabilities that are tethered within a network of
appropriate command arrangements that expedite logistics in a contested
environment.
The most common MAGTFs in the Marine Corps is the Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The composition of the MEU is described in
the previous response. However, the composition of how the MEU is
spread across the three ship Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and what
capabilities that are within it will be tailored to the threat
environment and historical trends of Combatant Commander mission
assignments to the ARG/MEU team. Prior to deployments, the ARG/MEU will
conduct a 9-month pre-deployment training period (PTP) with various at
sea exercises that allow the two commands to build and work on Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) for assigned Mission Essential Tasks
(METs). During at sea periods the ARG/MEU commanders, staff, and major
subordinate commands will execute a variety of full mission profile
exercises such as amphibious raids, amphibious assaults, non-combat
evacuation operations (NEO), etc. The two commands will also coordinate
with Fleet and Joint headquarters in the Combatant Commands that the
ARG/MEU is expected to be assigned to during the deployment to
coordinate Theatre Security Cooperation (TSC) exercises and receive
intelligence briefs to understand the threat environment. Through the
combination of the at sea training periods, development of SOPs,
understanding of anticipated assigned missions, and the threat
environment, the ARG/MEU team tailors what assets are assigned to each
amphibious warfare ship within the ARG to be appropriately organized
for operational deployment. As such, MAGTFs can and will vary in size
and capability according to their assigned or likely missions.
Given its modular organization, the MAGTF remains tailorable, able
to receive attached units from other services or nations, such as naval
construction battalions, or infantry/armor brigades. In 2016, the 26th
MEU with the Kearsarge ARG was operating in the Central Command
(CENTCOM) area of operations when the Combined Joint Task Force-
Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) was exploring different options
for fire support accelerants in support of the fight against Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) forces in Northern Iraq. The CJTF-OIR
tasked the 26th MEU with sending an artillery battery ashore to provide
an Indirect Fire (IDF) capability to support Iraqi Forces in offensive
operations to regain control of Mosul. The 26th MEU rapidly tasked
organized a force that was comprised of an artillery battery, a reduced
infantry company, and critical enablers that would provide specific
capabilities for the unit. However, the artillery battery did not have
a robust counter fire radar system that was critical for the threat
environment. The Army had a AN/TPQ-53 radar system in Kuwait that
accurately detects mortars, rockets, and artillery point of origins
(POO) and expected point of impact (POI) to rapidly develop a counter-
fire mission. The Army also had a Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar
(CRAM) system in Kuwait that provides force protection measures to
ground force units from enemy IDF. Both the AN/TPQ-53 and the C-RAM
assets were attached to the task organized force that the 26th MEU
assigned to the mission. This is just one small example of the
flexibility of the MAGTF to rapidly task organize for an assigned
mission and integrate within the Joint Force to meet the operational
requirements of the Combatant Command.
The recently established Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) is an
example of a MAGTF that has been optimized to its assigned mission. The
MLR is organized with a Regimental Headquarters (Command Element), a
Littoral Combat Team (GCE), a Littoral Anti-Air Battalion (ACE), and a
Littoral Logistics Battalion (LCE). As such, the MLR, as part of the
Stand-in-Force, disrupts the adversary in a contested littoral
environment through reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and sea
denial operations to support the Naval Expeditionary Force's maritime
campaign.
When replying to a question during the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) hearing on the Indo-Pacific National Security
Challenges. Admiral John C. Aquilino provided the following response
when asked about the MLR in this theatre of operations.
``First the Marine Littoral Regiment again, General Berger who came
out of MARFORPAC as you know I think was pretty understanding of the
threat, the scenario, and what was needed. So, I appreciate his effort
to focus on the Indo Pacific problem set. That said, we need to deliver
that organization with the capabilities to deliver effects to surface
to air, surface to surface, surface to ship. When that force is armed,
prepared, and that set of capability, it's exactly what we need in the
Indo-Pacific to support the fight.''
11. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, where does the
Marine Corps define combined arms in its doctrinal publications? Has
that definition been revised since Force Design started?
Lieutenant General Heckl. The Marine Corps defines combined arms in
our doctrinal publications, specifically in Marine Corps Doctrinal
Publication (MCDP) 1 Warfighting (dtd 4 April 2018). According to MCDP
1, combined arms is ``the synchronized and simultaneous application of
different arms and elements of combat power to achieve an effect
greater than if each element were used separately or sequentially.'' In
detail the combined arms section of MCDP-1 states that:
``In order to maximize combat power, we must use all the available
resources to best advantage. To do so, we must follow a doctrine of
combined arms. Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a
way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to
another. We pose the enemy not just with a problem, but with a
dilemma--a no-win situation.
We accomplish combined arms through the tactics and techniques we
use at the lower levels and through task organization at higher levels.
In so doing, we take advantage of the complementary characteristics of
different types of units and enhance our mobility and firepower. We use
each arm for missions that no other arm can perform as well; for
example, we assign aviation a task that cannot be performed equally
well by artillery. An example of the concept of combined arms at the
very lowest level is the complementary use of the automatic weapon and
grenade launcher within a fire team. We pin an enemy down with the
high-volume, direct fire of the automatic weapon, making them a
vulnerable target for the grenade launcher. If they move to escape the
impact of the grenades, we engage them with the automatic weapon.
We can expand the example to the MAGTF level: We use assault
support aircraft to quickly concentrate superior ground forces fora
breakthrough. We use artillery and close air support to support the
infantry penetration, and we use deep air support to interdict enemy
reinforcements that move to contain the penetration. Targets which
cannot be effectively suppressed by artillery are engaged by close air
support. In order to defend against the infantry attack, the enemy must
make themselves vulnerable to the supporting arms. If they seek cover
from the supporting arms, our infantry can maneuver against them. In
order to block our penetration, the enemy must reinforce quickly with
their reserve. However, in order to avoid our deep air support, they
must stay off the roads, which means they can only move slowly. If they
move slowly, they cannot reinforce in time to prevent our break-
through. We have put them in a dilemma.''
MCDP 1 explains that combined arms are a fundamental concept of
Marine Corps warfare, which involves the integration of various combat
kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. The goal of combined arms,
employed with maneuver, `` . . . is to shatter the enemy's cohesion
through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create
a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy
cannot cope.'' Furthermore, MCDP 1 emphasizes that combined arms are
not limited to the integration of combat arms but includes other
elements of combat power, such as intelligence, logistics, and command
and control.
The definition of combined arms remains valid, though the means and
methods of employment continue to evolve under Force Design 2030. One
of the Marine Corps' capstone research and development projects in
Force Design is the family of integrated targeting cells. The effort
accelerates the evolution of combined arms multi-domain formations by
fusing operations, intelligence, and fires functions (i.e., Combined
Arms) together in a single center, creating the means for Marine units
to participate in and control joint fires, while also gaining and
maintaining persistent custody of adversary targets. The Marine Corps
today now has the ability to fight and contest in all five warfighting
domains to include space and cyber. The integration of advanced
technological capabilities has increased the lethality of the MAGTF to
deter, but also contend against our adversaries in these domains with
combat credible formations and capabilities that can provide precision
fires at range. Additionally, Force Design investments have prioritized
sensing and communication capabilities that enable forward postured
formations to detect and track adversaries' targets and provide the
Joint Force with the necessary target data to project combat power into
an Anti-Access/Area Denial environment. These efforts will continue to
enable maneuver of units, but more importantly the maneuver of Joint
Force units and the maneuver of maritime platforms.
12. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, can the Marine
Corps still conduct combined arms operations without any tanks and with
less cannon artillery?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Yes, the Marine Corps can still conduct
combined arms operations without tanks and with less cannon artillery.
At its core, the Marine Corps modernization effort is focused on
enhancing the ability to conduct combined arms. A key element of Force
Design 2030 is developing and employing modern capabilities that
contribute to a multiple joint ``kill webs.'' This approach also
improves our ability to leverage non-lethal fires that provide the
combatant commander more options in day-to-day competition and pre-
conflict deterrence activities. However, we continue to invest in
modern lethal fire platforms that provide a more effective capability
than legacy systems. This includes legacy systems such as heavy tanks
and towed, tubed cannon artillery that lack the precision and range to
be relevant in the maritime and littoral battlespaces applicable to our
directed pacing threat. See question #20 for breakdown of retained
artillery, as part of our kinetic, combined arms capability.
Prior to Force Design initiatives, the Marine Corps focused
primarily on kinetic combined arms consisting of surface and air assets
making our combined arms capabilities two dimensional. Today, the
Marine Corps still maintains the ability to conduct combined arms in
the surface, air, and sea domains but we have significantly increased
both the kinetic and non-kinetic combined arms capabilities in the
cyber and space domains creating a multi-domain capability. Regardless
of what assets are utilized to employ combined arms, they will only be
as effective as the Command and Control (C2) architecture that is
designed to enable the execution of the assets. Therefore, Force Design
has focused significantly on organizing, training, and resourcing the
MAGTF to effectively conduct MAGTF C2 at echelon and rapidly transition
across the competition continuum to enable all-domain joint and
combined kill webs. To do this we must transition from a legacy, air-
land battle paradigm to a 21st century, all-domain, joint single battle
mindset. We can no longer accept multiple, disparate C2 systems
optimized for single-domain awareness bound by analog/human-speed
processing. There are a variety of ongoing efforts to evolve the
Service's C2 capability to conduct all domain operations, enable kill
webs, and further expand our value to the joint and combined force.
Our Marine Air Command and Control System remains the exemplar for
the Service's evolving C2 ecosystem and has showcased an innovative
capability to enable kill webs across multiple domains via the Multi-
functional Air Operations Center (MAOC). Additionally, we are on track
to create the first cadre of kill web subject matter experts via the C2
Interface Control Officer Primary Military Occupational Specialty in
2025.
As evidenced by experiments, exercises, wargames, and analyses, the
integration of intelligence, fires, and C2 is at the heart of the
targeting cycle and is required to enable and conduct kill webs across
multiple domains.
13. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, what engineering
and breaching capabilities have been divested?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Through detailed operational planning,
historical analysis, and a rigorous Campaign of Learning we made some
hard decisions regarding engineering and breaching capabilities. The
requirement for a globally responsive Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) remains imperative. More specifically, strategic guidance has
driven us to focus on enabling the Naval Expeditionary Force to rapidly
respond to crisis and persist in the distributed maritime operating
environment of the Indo-Pacific region. This focus requires a force
that is distributed but lethal, low signature, mobile, and sustainable
in a forward environment. The equipment we field to our Marine forces
needs to match those force attributes, and many of our legacy
engineering and breaching capabilities were not appropriate to enable
this responsiveness. Our legacy engineering and breaching capabilities
were designed for land-centric campaigns with mechanized and motorized
forces that we experienced in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
operations over the past 30 years.
Based on analysis, wargaming, and experimentation the Commandant
concluded in 2020 that the Marine Corps' inventory of bridging
platforms--Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB), Medium Girder
Bridges (MGB), and Improved Ribbon Bridges (IRB), were too heavy and
slow to be relevant in modern operations. For reference, the AVLBs,
MGBs, and IRBs all require large black-bottom commercial sealift or
Maritime Prepositioning Ships to get to the fight, requiring permissive
offload at seaports and significant preparation time to prepare for
onward movement to support maneuver. During the opening land conflict
of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, maneuver forces routinely outpaced
supporting assets such as heavy logistical assets, bridging, and
breaching capabilities. The tempo and threat environment of the future
operating environment renders these heavy capabilities much less
relevant, particularly considering the limited quantity of systems and
the significant requirements for large shipping and aircraft to move
these capabilities into position across a maritime theater. The Marine
Corps and Army are working collectively with industry to develop a more
suitable lightweight, scalable tactical bridging platform that can be
transported on current Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs). The
Marine Corps is currently awaiting delivery of three test vehicles for
experimentation within our engineer formations.
We retain our capability to do nonstandard bridging. Marine
engineers are receiving enhanced training in the classification,
design, and construction of non-standard bridging using locally
available resources to enable light motorized and mounted maneuver. On
a frequent basis, marine engineers are used for theater security
cooperation and for support to other government agencies to construct
non-standard bridges, which continues to build their experience with
the use of local materials. Additionally, marine engineers also employ
rope bridges to enable dismounted maneuver.
Marine forces still require a capability to conduct tactical
bridging for maneuver and mobility; however, the characteristics of
this bridging are lighter, more scalable, and employable by non-
specialized units. From this change in requirements, we are researching
and identifying new bridging options, as well as enhancing the training
of our engineers to construct non-standard bridging using locally
available or procurable materials.
Breaching remains a critical capability to support maneuver,
however with the decision to divest the M1A1 main battle tank, the
Marine Corps also divested the Combat Engineer M1150 Assault Breacher
Vehicle (ABV) as well as associated force structure. The ABV is built
upon the M1A1 chassis which presents significant embarkation and
debarkation challenges for amphibious and littoral operations. As with
legacy bridging solutions, the ABV requires black-bottom shipping or
Maritime Prepositioning Ships to get into the theater. This limitation
restricts the ability to even get the ABV to many of the locations
where we will be operating across the Indo-Pacific region or as a 911
Force in Readiness. With the divestment of tanks, this heavy breacher
vehicle was no longer relevant to support maneuver.
14. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, can the Marine
Corps still breach mine fields, conduct route clearance, and cross
water obstacles using organic equipment?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Yes, the Marine Corps can still breach
minefields, conduct route clearance, and cross water obstacles using
organic equipment and enhanced tactics, techniques, and procedures more
aligned with the lighter, highly mobile, and low signature maneuver
capabilities required to survive in a contested operating environment.
Breaching consists of four sequential activities: detect, reduce,
mark, and proof mined areas and obstacles. The Marine Corps can detect
and mark explosive hazards by hand and still explosively create lanes
through minefields and mark those lanes. Marine engineer battalions
remain equipped with the man-portable Anti-Personnel Obstacle Breaching
Systems (APOBS) for clearing 45m lanes for foot-traffic, as well as
with the trailer mounted M58 Mine Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC) for
clearing up to 100m vehicle-capable lanes.
Through large land battles in CENTCOM over the past 20 years, route
clearance capabilities have erroneously become synonymous with large
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. In 2007, Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates initiated the MRAP Task Force to rapidly procure
the Department of Defense's highest priority program to meet the need
of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat in the Central Command
(CENTCOM) theater. These vehicles were a critical asset during a
prolonged land campaign against an inferior adversary that relied on
improvised capabilities and saved many American lives.
Today's threat environment is characterized by great power
competition with multiple peer adversaries that maintain advanced
threat capabilities that put large, heavy, high-signature vehicles at
risk. Furthermore, the size of these vehicles requires heavy sealift or
airlift capabilities to get into the region, which limits the global
responsiveness demanded of our Marine Forces as America's Force in
Readiness. Even the employment of these 18-ton vehicles is limited on
the unimproved roads across the landscape of archipelagos in the Indo-
Pacific region. In 2021, the Marine Corps divested of mounted route
clearance capabilities that used 18-ton Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
(MRAP) vehicles as base platforms.
Currently, we are investing in the development of lighter route
clearance capabilities; using unmanned air and ground platforms
intended to detect and neutralize landmines and IEDs from a safe
distance (i.e., outside the serious injury zone around the mine/IED).
Between fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2028, $80M will be invested
into these emerging capabilities. One of these capabilities is the
Littoral Explosive Ordnance Neutralization (LEON) program of record
designed to provide an initial organic Marine Corps counter-mine
capability from shallow water through the beach zone. Derived from a
2019 Rapid Statement of Need (RSON), the program fields a family of
systems (FoS) that enables Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Marines to
detect and neutralize underwater explosive hazards from standoff
distances with robotic and autonomous platforms. When fully
operationally capable, this FoS complements Navy Mine Countermeasure
(MCM) capability and capacity, enhances multi-domain awareness, and
ensures the maneuver, protection, and sustainment of the Naval
expeditionary force. In the interim, marine engineers will continue to
use hand-held detectors and sickle sticks to execute route sweeping
operations and use combinations of emplaced charges and remote
detonation techniques to sympathetically detonate explosive hazards to
clear routes for smaller, light maneuver forces.
The Marine Corps divested manufactured assault and support bridging
and rafting platforms, primarily due to size, weight, signature, and
limited mobility. The Marine Corps' inventory of bridging platforms--
Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB), Medium Girder Bridges (MGB),
and Improved Ribbon Bridges (IRB)--all require large black-bottom
sealift or Maritime Prepositioning Ships to get to the fight, requiring
permissive offload at seaports and significant preparation time to
prepare for onward movement to support maneuver. These limitations in
transport are not compatible with the mission profiles and globally
responsiveness required of America's 911 Force.
We retain our capability to do nonstandard bridging. Marine
engineers are receiving enhanced training in the classification,
design, and construction of non-standard bridging using locally
available resources to enable light motorized and mounted maneuver. On
a frequent basis, Marine engineers are used for theater security
cooperation and for support to other government agencies to construct
non-standard bridges, which continues to build their experience with
the use of local materials. Additionally, marine engineers also employ
rope bridges to enable dismounted maneuver. The Amphibious Combat
Vehicle (ACV) and Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) are both capable of
swimming across wet gaps if depth, current, and bottom conditions
allow. Moreover, the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV), the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), and the Medium
Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) can negotiate limited water
obstacles with appropriate fording capabilities of up to 60 inches. To
ensure that the Marine Corps is capable of expeditionary MAGTF
operations globally, Marine Corps is working with the Army and Defense
Industry to develop a lightweight, scalable tactical bridging
capability which can be transported on current Marine Corps Tactical
Vehicles (i.e., JLTV). The Service is currently awaiting delivery of
three test vehicles for experimentation with our engineer formations.
15. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, are Stand-in Forces
viable without the Light Amphibious Warship/Landing Ship Medium?
Lieutenant General Heckl. All forces are dependent on Joint, Naval,
and organic mobility assets to maneuver throughout the battlespace.
However, the current programmatic timeline for LSM does not support
delivery to support (1) Marine Regiment until fiscal year 2033. Until
the LSM becomes fully operational, the service has explored other
interim solutions to support SIF. The interim planned composition is
(2) T-EPFs, (5) SLVs, and (5) LCUs until the Medium Landing Ship
becomes available to support (1) Marine Regiment in fiscal year 2033.
T-EPF is a Military Sealift Command (MSC) operated vessel with
capabilities comparable to LSM during competition (speed and lift
capacity) but faces challenges in higher sea states and has no shore-
to-shore capability. SLVs operated by contracted civilian crews provide
shore-to-shore capabilities comparable to LSM during competition.
Moreover, emerging platforms such as the stern landing vessel (SLV) and
ancillary surface connectors (ASC) will be experimented with to
determine the tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to best
support the SIF. LCUs provide marine elements of the SIF with proven
tactical mobility that does not necessitate T-EPF or SLV but will face
adequate crewing and maintenance challenges.
Once LSMs are available in fiscal year 2033, the Marine Corps
current requirement is (35) Medium Landing Ships (LSMs). The LSM
requirement stems from a minimum of (9) LSMs required to support (1)
Marine Regiment. Our SIF required maritime mobility for (3) Regiments.
To ensure (27) LSMs are available for these forces at any given time,
procurement includes (8) additional LSMs due to routine maintenance
cycles at an 80 percent readiness rate. The LSM provides the Stand-in
Forces (SIF) maneuver options and connect logistics webs within
contested spaces. The LSM will be an important littoral maneuver
platform that supports the SIF while forward deployed, engaging in
campaigning activities that assure integrated deterrence. The LSM is
capable of transporting personnel and equipment within an archipelagic
environment such as the first island chain (1IC) where there is limited
access to ports or runways.
III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), as the service's only forward
postured MEF, is uniquely suited to validate new concepts such as
Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations (EABO) and Stand-in Forces
(SIF). As an element of the SIF, III MEF supports naval, joint, and
allied and partnered forces with agile, capable, and lethal forces able
to operate across the competition continuum. Forces Stand in during
competition alongside partners and allies, are forward postured to
respond during crisis, and are capable of seizing and defending key
maritime terrain during conflict while maintaining critical target data
and maritime domain awareness for the Joint Force to project fires into
the battlespace.
One of the most significant contributions the SIF makes to the
Joint Force is the ability to sense and make sense of the environment
by creating maritime domain awareness. Task Force 61/2 demonstrated
this capability in the European Command (EUCOM) area of operations with
a Navy-Marine Corps integrated team. TF 61/2, led by a Marine General
Officer with a task-organized staff was integrated into the U.S. 6th
Fleet Headquarters in Naples, Italy, and executed a combined joint
exercise, planned operations for various ARG/MEU teams in multiple
locations throughout the theater, and improved Maritime Domain
Awareness for the Fleet Commander and partners and allies. This proof
of concept has now transitioned into a rotational headquarters that
aligns forces under a Naval Amphibious Force Commander to orchestrate a
wide range of integrated operations, from exercises to contingency
planning.
Although III MEF demonstrates the ability to operate as a SIF
without the Medium Landing Ship (LSM), the service and III MEF have
registered the requirement for both inter-(operational) and intra-
(tactical) mobility.
16. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, what percent
complete would you estimate Force Design is?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Force Design is happening now. We are
done divesting. Force Design is happening now. As with all
modernization initiatives across the DOD, optimization strategies are
not conditions based and do not have a set end date. Modernization
strategies are an ever-evolving process tied to the changing character
of war that adapt and maintain pace with the threat environment with
the objective of creating a warfighting advantage that ultimately
deters conflict but is prepared to prevail if directed. It is our
obligation to continue modernization of the force as the threat
continues to evolve.
In 2014, Commandant James Amos published Expeditionary Force 21
(EF21) as a vision for designing and developing the Marine Corps into
2025. During this timeframe the drawdown of forces from Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was taking place and
the Marine Corps was refocusing on title 10 requirements of maintaining
an expeditionary naval force in readiness. EF21 stated:
``The increased likelihood of operations in the littorals
requires a renewed focus on the Marine Corps `Title 10
responsibility to be organized, trained, and equipped, ``for
service with the fleet in the seizure and defense of advanced
naval bases.'' While this task appeared anachronistic to some
during much of the cold war and the years immediately
thereafter, it is taking on renewed importance in this emerging
security environment. Conflicting claims over portions of the
sea and its resources, growing naval competition, and the rise
in land-based threats to access are all indicators that future
joint campaigns are more likely to be naval in character. The
development and proliferation of anti--access and area-denial
(A2/AD) capabilities threaten freedom of action at sea and
endanger the limited number of U.S bases overseas. These
conditions are remarkably similar to those that existed before
and during World War II in the Pacific, but with the added
challenge of the increased range and precision of modern
sensors and weapons. During that conflict, the ability to
establish advanced bases and deny an adversary the use of his
bases played a key role in gaining and maintaining air and
maritime superiority.''
In 2016, Commandant Robert Neller published the Marine Corps
Operating Concept (MOC) that continues to build off EF21 while
identifying a path forward that adapts to the changing character of war
with the proliferation of technology advancements. The MOC identifies
the central problem with the status of the Marine Corps in 2016 as:
``Over the past 15 years, we have been continuously involved in
both major combat and crisis response missions. All that time,
our competitors have observed and learned much from how we
operate. As a result, our future enemies will use that
knowledge to oppose us in the physical and cognitive dimensions
of conflict. In contrast, we have not been able to adapt at the
rate of change required to ensure our success in future
conflict. Restoring our advantage requires to us address our
central problem--The Marine Corps is currently not organized,
trained, and equipped to meet the demands of a future operating
environment characterized by complex terrain, technology
proliferation, information warfare, the need to shield and
exploit signatures, and an increasingly non-permissive maritime
domain. The MOC is the starting point to address this problem
by reaffirming the primacy of maneuver warfare and combined
arms for the 21stcentury and identifying the critical tasks to
develop the future force.''
As with previous Commandants, General Berger's planning guidance
provided his vision and direction for the service over a 10-year
period. EF21, the MOC, and Force Design have all identified similar if
not identical problem sets to the current threat environment and the
changing character of war. Furthermore, each vision prioritized the
necessity to adapt to these emerging threats. Over the past 4 years,
Force Design has been executing the modernization strategy of the
Marine Corps that multiple Commandants have identified in the past. Our
next Commandant may provide a similar outlook to 2035 and will continue
to modernize the force based on the threat environment. Overall, given
the ever-changing character of war, the Marine Corps must be postured
to evolve accordingly. The same goes for the entire joint force. If we,
as a Nation, do not modernize, we risk losing our strategic military
advantage.
17. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, what capabilities
have not reach full operating capability yet?
Lieutenant General Heckl. The Marine Corps began the early stages
of Force Design in 2019. As a result, many of the capabilities enabled
by Force Design will be in full operating capability (FOC) by 2027.
Even more of these capabilities have already reached initial operating
capability (IOC) and are in the hands of marines in the field today.
The terms IOC and FOC are used to track contractual obligations
between the vendor and the Marine Corps for the delivery of materiel
solutions to capability requirements. With each platform being
different and with a unique set of requirements, there is no
standardized metric for IOC and FOC. The metrics for each program are
captured during the drafting of the capability documents process
between Marine Corps Systems Command and Combat Development &
Integration. It is important to note, platforms and systems do not
translate into capabilities until placed into the hands of trained
marines. However, many of these capabilities are currently being
fielded to units today such as the CH-53K, MV-22B, KC-130J, ACV, JLTV,
NMESIS, MADIS & L-MADIS, I-CUAS, FSJ F-35, MQ-9ER, Small UAS,
Expeditionary Tactical UAS, G/ATOR, Network on the Move (NOTM), and the
Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2). Last, the below list
of programs that have and have not reached FOC. The projected FOC dates
are subject to change.
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18. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, how does the
composition and capabilities of the Marine Littoral Regiment differ
from other infantry regiments?
Lieutenant General Heckl. The Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) is an
optimized Marine Air Ground Task Force--organized to accomplish a
prescribed mission set based on our threat-informed and concept-based
capabilities analysis. The MLR and Marine Infantry Regiment differ
based on the mission, task organization, and equipment of each
organization. 3d Marine Division's basing and posture in the western
Pacific required modernization to align with strategy; importantly, the
MLR is key a Force Design output with global applicability. The Marine
Infantry Regiment exists within all three Marine Divisions and is
tailorable and scalable to support operations across the conflict
continuum. Both the MLR and the Marine Infantry Regiment support the
Marine Corps' roles as the Nation's premier global crisis response
force; to seize and defend key maritime terrain; and to support stand-
in force operations to enable joint and combined operations. These two
different and combat credible formations fight as a Marine Air Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) to support naval, joint, and combined operations.
The MLR is commanded by a Marine Colonel. Currently, 3d MLR in
Hawaii is one of three planned MLRs task organized within 3d Marine
Division, III Marine Expeditionary Force.
Posture changes announced on January 11, 2023, by the United States
and the Government of Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2)
ensure the Marine Corps remains ready to address evolving regional and
global security challenges. In 2025, the 12th Marine Regiment, an
existing unit on Okinawa, will undergo a transition to the 12th Marine
Littoral Regiment in accordance with Marine Corps modernization
efforts. The 12th MLR will provide a ready and capable stand-in force
in the first island chain, prepared to support the U.S-Japanese
alliance, bolstering our ability to support deterrence efforts and
respond to contingencies, while the 3d Marine Division Headquarters
(3dMARDIV) will provide command and control capabilities.
MLR mission: The MLR, as part of the stand-in force, disrupts the
adversary in a contested littoral environment through reconnaissance,
counter-reconnaissance, and sea denial operations to support a maritime
campaign.
MLR Tasks:
Conduct Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations
Support Maritime Domain Awareness
Conduct Reconnaissance in the Maritime Domain
Support Littoral Targeting
Conduct Littoral Transportation Operations
Conduct Air Direction in Support of Expeditionary
Advanced Base Operations
Command and Control Distributed Maritime Operations
Plan and Direct Littoral Maneuver
Plan and Direct Sea Denial Operations
Support Sea Denial Operations
Support Operations in the Information Environment
The MLR comprises a headquarters (Headquarters Company,
Communications Company, and the Long-Range Unmanned Surface Vessel
Company), and three subordinate commands--Littoral Combat Team (LCT),
Littoral Anti-Air Battalion (LAAB), and Littoral Logistics Battalion
(LLB), each command by a Lieutenant Colonel.
LCT mission: The LCT conducts reconnaissance and counter-
reconnaissance, employs, and enables multi-domain fires, and
establishes expeditionary sites to support the maritime campaign across
the competition continuum.
The LCT is composed of an infantry battalion, a medium range
missile battery, and an engineer platoon. The LCT seizes, secures,
controls, and defends key maritime terrain to allow expeditionary
advanced base operations, conducts bilateral operations with the host
nation, and attacks enemy maritime targets with naval strike missiles
(NSM) utilizing naval and joint sensors.
LAAB mission: The LAAB conducts anti-air warfare and enables
integration of aviation operations with organic and joint fires to
support the maritime campaign across the competition continuum.
The LAAB is composed of a low altitude air defense battery and an
air control squadron with an air surveillance platoon and air support
platoon. The battery is capable of short-range air defense and counter-
unmanned aircraft systems. The squadron provides the MLR with multiple
scalable command and control nodes providing air control and fires
integration throughout the MLR area of operations. Additionally, the
LAAB provides airspace surveillance, limited air direction, air
control, air intercept control, and coordination of support anti-air
and anti-surface fires. The LAAB's capabilities enable joint or
combined forces to gain and maintain custody of littoral targets
supporting sea denial operations.
LLB mission: The LLB provides tactical logistics and explosive
ordinance disposal support to sustain regimental operations across the
competition continuum.
The LLB is composed of two direct support combat logistics
companies that support the LCT and LAAB, and a general support
logistics company. The direct support logistics companies support
managing cache sites and connects tactical and operational logistics
distribution. The support companies provide functional logistic support
across all functions of logistics and classes of supply. The general
support logistics company establish logistics support areas for
logistics command and control to provide timely support to forward
expeditionary advanced base positions.
The Marine Infantry Regiment is commanded by a Marine Colonel.
Currently, the Marine Corps has six Active component Marine Infantry
Regiments across 1st, 2d, and 3d Marine Divisions.
Marine Infantry Regiment mission: Conduct expeditionary combined
arms operations as the ground combat element (GCE) of a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) sized MAGTF or as part of the division in
larger MAGTFs, in the execution of amphibious forcible entry operations
and land operations across the range of military operations (ROMO) to
defeat the enemy and otherwise influence the operational environment.
Marine Infantry Regiment Marine Corps Tasks:
Conduct Amphibious Operations
Conduct Offensive Operations
Conduct Defensive Operations
Conduct Stability Operations
* Provide Forces
The Marine Infantry Regiment comprises of a headquarters company,
and three infantry battalions.
Marine Infantry Battalion mission: Conduct expeditionary,
offensive, and defensive operations as an element of a Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU), Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), or infantry
regiment to enable fleet or joint operations.
The Marine Infantry Battalion comprises of a Headquarters and
Service Company and three rifle companies.
19. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, does Force Design
degrade the Marine Corps' ability to conduct a forced entry operation?
Lieutenant General Heckl. No, but it does make necessary
adjustments to ensure the Marine Corps will continue to effectively
deter, fight, and win in the future operating environment.
The Marine Corps still possesses (7) Marine Expeditionary Units.
Additionally, III MEF is capable of being employed as Joint Task Force
headquarters (JTF-HQ) for various missions to include a forcible entry
operation. Furthermore, the Commandant in his 2022 annual Force Design
update directed the service to develop another JTF-HQ in II MEF to
enhance our force offerings to the Combatant Commands.
The Marine Corps still maintains all organic crisis response
capabilities that enable the forward posture and rapid deployment of
flexible and tailorable forces to the needs of the Combatant Commanders
(COCOMs). The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and Marine Expeditionary
Units (MEU) are the most well-known naval expeditionary Navy-Marine
Corps tactical units that are forward deployed at the operational level
and can accomplish strategic level engagements.
The Marine Corps routinely trains to forcible entry operations in a
number of joint and service-level exercises to include, but not limited
to, exercises Talisman Saber, Cold Response, and various Marine
Expeditionary Force exercises and Marine Warfighting Exercises (MWXs).
Furthermore, the Marine Corps continues to train for all crisis
response missions during the MEUs pre-deployment training period (PTP).
Training consists of afloat and ashore training environment that
require the synchronization of assets across the MAGTF to accomplish an
assigned objective. Our Training and Education 2030 publication
describes the investment in Live, Virtual, and Constructive training
environment (LVC-TE) that is inherently joint and enables the
simultaneous training of geographically dispersed units. This
capability will replicate, to the greatest extent possible, the
conditions and threats that a commander will experience on tomorrow's
battlefield.
When the Marine Corps was completing the withdrawal from
Afghanistan and there was a need for forces to support the embassy and
non-combatant evacuation operations, the ARG/MEU was a key component of
those operations. At a moment's notice, the Marine Corps was able to
hold a defensive perimeter and process evacuees while providing a
variety of aviation and other assets to support the broader evacuation.
A heel-to-toe ARG/MEU provides the Nation a mobile, multi-mission
force that is forward deployed and able to quickly move to any number
of crises around the world. A naval crisis response force is
significantly more flexible than other land-based crisis response
forces because it is less restricted by issues of access, basing, and
overflight. The ability to maneuver by sea to the point of crisis makes
the ARG/MEU critical to our Nation's ability to demonstrate resolve in
a HA/DR mission or to project power in a limited conflict.
In the next two to 5 years, many of our amphibious ships will reach
the end of their service life and will cause delays in ARG/MEU
deployments. When there are gaps in global ARG/MEU coverage, the Nation
risks not having the right assets capable of getting to the crisis in
time. If the U.S. is not able to perform this role, our adversaries
would be happy to step in with their forces and their messaging. The
best way to address the complex situation in Afghanistan and other
similarly chaotic areas around the world is to maintain a minimum of 31
amphibious ships to support our ARG/MEU deployments.
In recent crises, like the earthquake in Turkey and the non-
combatant evacuation (NEO) in Sudan, the Marine Corps had the ready-
trained force with the right equipment; however, the readiness of
amphibious shipping was not available.
The Marine Corps, more than any other service, has a unique nature
regarding essential requirements that are subject to the Naval Service
budgetary process. For example, the amphibious warfare ship (AWS)
statutory requirement includes capabilities that are critical for
amphibious ships such as connectors, C4I afloat capabilities,
preposition afloat assets, and the Next Generation Logistics Ship
(NGLS). All of these are essential to the Stand-in Forces (SIF) and
crisis response operations, yet all fall outside the Marine Corps Total
Obligation Authority (TOA). We identify the Marine Corps' dependency on
the Navy to champion naval requirements. Our Nation is a maritime
nation that requires a modern, ready, and forward postured naval force
that can deter war and prevail in conflict if deterrence fails.
20. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, what logistics
capabilities have been divested?
Lieutenant General Heckl. The limited divestment of logistics
capabilities resulted from extensive studies, wargames, and historical
analysis through a deliberate Campaign of Learning. The only logistics
platforms divested were heavy legacy systems, ill-suited toward
operating in a distributed, contested littoral environment. These heavy
legacy platforms increased the logistics burden on supported commanders
due to their size, transportability, and sustainment requirements. The
Marine Corps has retained existing logistics capabilities and is
actively capitalizing upon technology advancements and modernization.
The Marine Corps is currently completing initial phases toward
optimizing logistics organizational structure, adjusting legacy assets
and platform inventories, and seeking future acquisition to ensure the
logistics organizations are prepared to effectively support maneuver
forces in distributed and contested environments. Developed against the
pacing threat, our logistics capabilities must be transportable,
survivable, and sustainable across the spectrum of conflict. Below are
some examples of programs divested, or reduced in quantity based on the
analytic rigor provided by the Campaign of Learning:
Logistics Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR) variants
designed to support the Improved Ribbon Bridge (IRB) raft composed of
(2) ramp bays, (2) interior bays and (2) Bridge Erection Boats. Since
the IRBs were divested, these LVSR variants are no longer relevant.
Six Bridge Companies and associated equipment sets
divested in fiscal year 2021 in conjunction with the divestment of Tank
Battalions.
Bridge unit divestments included over 1,050 legacy items
such as:
o Armored Vehicle Launcher Bridge (AVLB)
o Bridge Erection Sets
o Medium Girder Bridges
o Boats and associated cradles
o Bridge Pallets and Ramp Bays
o Bridge Unit divestment included 1,037 personnel within the
fiscal year 2025 FYDP
Additional heavy horizontal, earth-moving engineer
equipment and heavy or medium motor transport capabilities tied to the
Bridge and Tank organizations.
Outside of the divestments related to Tank and Bridge units, the
Marine Corps has only marginally reduced legacy logistic platforms.
Selective reductions of legacy medium and heavy motor transport
platforms (Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement and Logistics Vehicle
System Replacement) over the course of the FYDP have been tied to
specific unit reconfigurations. High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWV) have begun a programmatic sunset synched with the
fielding and complete service transition to the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicles.
21. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, what logistics
capabilities have been added?
Lieutenant General Heckl. The most significant logistics
capabilities that have been added, or will be added, are tied to
distribution, forward prepositioned stocks, and medical capabilities.
In terms of equipment, we are increasing our options for multi-domain
distribution to include the replacement of a majority of our fleet of
HMMWVs with JLTVs and Ultra-lightweight Tactical Vehicles, and the
fielding of the Tactical Resupply Unmanned Aircraft System (or TRUAS).
The TRUAS provides low signature distribution capability for small,
distributed forces.
Our experimentation with theater mobility in the littorals is
underway. Programs such as the Stern-landing Vessel (SLV) and various
littoral connectors and enablers ensure that Stand-in Forces are
capable as we transition to the acquisition and employment of the
Landing Ship Medium.
The Marine Corps is in the process of developing, testing, or
procuring enhanced all domain manned and unmanned logistics
distribution capabilities. These are critical capabilities to operate
in distributed and contested environments. New capabilities include,
but are not limited to, development of a new Medium Tactical Truck with
hybrid energy attributes and Unmanned Logistics Systems Air (ULS-A)
platforms of various sizes, ranges, and payload capacity that
autonomously support distributed forces. We have just initiated
production of the small ULS-A to be fielded to logistics units this
summer.
The future operating environment requires a deep look at core
methods of how the Service has closed and employs forces. At an
enterprise level, the service's prepositioning program of record
requires modernization. It lacks flexibility across the competition
continuum, its Maritime Prepositioning Fleet (MPF) is aging and incurs
long force closure times. Analysis supports transforming our current
program into a Global Positioning Network or GPN. The GPN will
integrate afloat/ashore capabilities to enable day-to-day campaigning,
rapid response to crisis and contingency, and deterrence. Fully
realized, the GPN will dynamically employ multiple ashore sites and a
modernized MPF fleet responsive to the joint force commander. It will
be regionally aligned yet globally employable and positioned astride
key maritime terrain. In fiscal year 2023 to begin this modernization,
Additional resources in POM-24 and future budget submissions. Current
and requested programmed funding will support initial equipment
maintenance, facility leasing, contracted labor, and varying level of
consumable support. We intend to establish three GPN sites in the
priority theater NLT fiscal year 2027.
Specific to the future concept of operations in the Pacific,
expeditionary medicine advances underway will position critical trauma
level care closer to the point of injury and enhance patient holding
capacity. Examples of enhancement include the Emergency Fresh Whole
Blood program that enables walking blood banks and direct transfusions,
smaller and more capable expeditionary Damage Control Resuscitation and
Damage Control Surgery equipment and advanced team training, to enable
greater survivability. The ability to constantly sustain forces across
the conflict spectrum is critical and will be accomplished through the
Global Positioning Network, a combination of new ashore and legacy
afloat prepositioned equipment and supply stocks. Near term investment
will complete the realization of several initial Global Positioning
Network ashore locations, deemed most essential, while the legacy
afloat capabilities and capacity will be tailored to the needs of the
future concept of operations.
22. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, where does the
Marine Corps define the composition of a division?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP)
1-10.1 Organization of the United States Marine Corps defines the
composition of a division. This reference publication is currently in
the final stages of republication in the first time since August 2015.
Key updates to this republication will include the additions of the
Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), Marine Corps Information Command
(MCIC), Marine Forces Cyber, and updated missions, capabilities, and
organizational charts. This publication will also include the
Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) for the first time, along with
references to Force Design formations like the Littoral Anti-Air
Battalion (LAAB), Littoral Combat Team (LCT), and Littoral Logistics
Battalion (LLB). Finally, the publication standardizes all doctrinal
terms in accordance with the latest Marine Corps and DOD dictionaries.
As the MCRP provides the high-level overview of the current
structure of the Marine Corps at the time of publication, it is not a
prescribed document. Thus, the three MEFs and the subordinate
divisions, wings, and logistics elements will not be identical across
the service. For example, 3d Marine Division has always been organized
differently than the other divisions (pages 5-2 through 5-4 of the 2015
publication). In this document, 3d Marine Division is composed of only
two infantry regiments, one of which is filled by units throughout the
Marine Corps under the unit deployment program (UDP). After its full
transition with three operational MLRs, 3d Marine Division retains a
similar structure but with a different organization of the units within
it.
As defined in the publication, the mission of the MARDIV is to
provide forces for amphibious assaults or to execute other operations
as may be directed. The MARDIV must be able to provide the ground
amphibious forcible-entry capability to an amphibious task force and
conduct subsequent land operations in any operational environment. The
division commander fights by using combined arms tactics and tailors
the force to the demands of each mission.
The MARDIV is employed as the GCE of the MEF or may provide task-
organized forces for smaller MAGTFs. The MARDIV depends on the MLG as
its primary source of logistic support. However, the organic capability
of the division must be fully understood and used before requesting
support from the MLG. In the areas of combat engineer support and motor
transport support, the division possesses the significant capabilities
of the combat engineer battalion (CEB) and the truck company of the
headquarters battalion.
The capabilities being developed as part of our modernization will
ensure all three divisions have the tools needed to accomplish their
mission in the 21st century operating environments. The Marine Corps
has retained our ability to conduct combined arms at echelon while
modernization enhances our ability to serve a critical role in gaining
and maintaining custody of targets. Subsequently, this unique ability
enables the closing of ``kill webs'' for the Naval and Joint force. Our
continuous experimentation in reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance
is informing these capabilities.
Since 2019, the lethal capacity of the Marine Divisions has
increased. As measured by crew served weapons and above, to include
artillery firing systems, combat vehicles, and infantry weapons
systems, the Marine Corps more combat power. By 2030 towed artillery,
rockets, and missiles more than double (132 percent) than since 2019.
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Overall, the Marine Corps remains a combined arms force that will
operate across multiple domains. Combined arms in the 21st century now
encompasses additional domains such as space, cyber, and information,
and new capabilities in each of these domains must be integrated within
our combined arms approach. Additionally, the Marine Corps will still
sense, communicate, and fire--just in new ways that are effective
against technologically advanced peer adversaries.
As it relates to lethal fires, the Marine Corps will retain 7 AC
and 6 RC tube-artillery batteries, 14 Medium Range Missile (MMSL)
batteries that employs the Navy Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship
Interdiction System (NMESIS), and 3 Long Range Missile (LMSL) batteries
that employs the Long-Range Fires (LRF) Launcher. Each future AC tube-
artillery battery will be structured to have eight pieces of tube
artillery vice the pre-Force Design standard of six. Moreover,
following the completion of the AC artillery restructure, six pieces of
tube-artillery will remain with 3d Battalion, 12th Marine Artillery
Regiment. While initially fielded with an anti-ship missile, the MMSL
will incorporate the MLRS Family of Munitions (MFOM) allowing a wider
array of effects. The NMESIS launcher will fire the Naval Strike
Missile, but the Marine Corps is developing a launch unit that will
also have the ability to mount and fire upwards of six MFOM. In
aggregate, we have increased our ground indirect fires capability.
Legacy systems such as tanks provided a protected, direct-fire
capability, their logistics burden, limited range, and vulnerability
against modern weapons made them a lower priority, especially in
INDOPACOM. The Marine Corps retains other direct-fire capabilities
within other platforms such as, the AH-1Z and UH-1Y.
The Marine Corps is pursuing a new capability, the Organic
Precision Fires (OPF). This long-range capability provides a javelin
type warhead capability with ranges more than 100nm.
These new capabilities at echelon enhance the combined arms effects
(both kinetic and non-kinetic) that units can generate. Combining anti-
armor (loitering munitions, Multi-purpose Anti-Armor Anti-personnel
Weapon System (MAAWS), Javelin and manned aviation) systems along with
fielding the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) provides an ability for
armor protected maneuver, fires, and anti-armor capability.
23. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, does the transition
of three regiments into Marine Littoral Regiments mean that Third
Marine Division is no longer a division?
Lieutenant General Heckl. No, the transition of 3d, 12th, and 4th
Regiments into Marine Littoral Regiments does not mean 3d Marine
Division is no longer a division. It is important to note that the
composition of a Marine Corps Division may vary based on the mission
and specific needs of the unit as described in question twenty. MCRP 1-
10.1 serves as a guide for the organizational structure and composition
of Marine Corps Divisions.
MLRs in III MEF operate in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility
(AOR). The MLRs are purpose built MAGTFs that are designed to support
the National Defense Strategy in achieving integrated deterrence. Of
note, the MLR's ability to support sea denial, sense, and conduct
counter-reconnaissance in support of a maritime campaign has value to
all geographic combatant commands. Wargames and experimentation
continue to evaluate the effectiveness and efficacy of MLRs in key
maritime terrain globally. The Marine Corps' modernization initiatives
may provide similar capabilities to other geographic combatant
commands. NMESIS Battalions, GLCM Batteries, LAAD Battalions, and MACCs
units from I and II MEFs can dynamically task organize to provide MLR
capabilities.
While we do not currently plan to create MLRs in I and II MEF or
Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), every MEF and MARFORRES are included
in our modernization process, to develop the ability to conduct tasks
associated with sea denial. I and II MEF remain focused in the near-
term on employing MAGTFs to support global requirements and crisis
response. These MEFs maintain capabilities across the spectrum of
offensive and defensive operations to provide a credible combat
capability, ready to rapidly respond globally to all ranges of threats.
The Hawaii, Okinawa, and Guam based MLRs will reach IOC in fiscal
year 2023, fiscal year 2025, and fiscal year 2027, respectively. We are
fielding Force Design capabilities to MLRs today. (23) Ground/Air Task-
Oriented Radars (G/ATORs) were fielded by the end of 2022, (31) will be
fielded by the end of June 2023, and (57) will be in the fleet by the
end of 2025. (6) Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System
(NMESIS) medium missile batteries will be fielded in Q4 fiscal year
2023, providing 3d MLR with the capability to contribute to sea denial
and control operations. (13) Marine Air Defense Integrated Systems
(MADIS) will begin fielding in fiscal year 2024. (31) Network on the
Move (NOTM) systems will be mounted onto ultra-light tactical vehicles
(ULTVs) providing 3d MLR with more resilient Satellite Communication
(SATCOM) capabilities in September of this year.
The Marine Corps will continue our Campaign of Learning (CoL) to
validate concepts and capabilities required to maintain pace with the
threat environment. Experimentation was invaluable in fiscal year 2022
leveraging Balikatan, Valiant Shield, and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC).
The Marine Corps will continue to expand MLR experimentation in fiscal
year 2023 concentrating on developing 3d MLR in Hawaii in exercises,
such as Balikatan, Kamandag, Keen Sword, and Northern Edge. The
synthesis of these experiments and training will be the focus of a
capability demonstration by 3d MLR in late fiscal year 2023.
Experiments will continue in fiscal year 2024 with expanded
participation in Valiant Shield and RIMPAC.
24. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, how have the Marine
Corps' aviation capabilities changed with Force Design?
Lieutenant General Heckl. Marine Aviation has evolved and changed
since Lieutenant A.A. Cunningham reported to the aviation camp in
Annapolis on 22 May 1912. Strategic guidance today calls for a Marine
Corps able to survive and thrive inside contested spaces and to meet
the demands of current and future national security interests.
Our adversaries are modernizing and optimizing themselves by
building a robust, lethal force with capabilities spanning the air,
maritime, space, and information domains. To face the reality of this
ever-changing operating environment, Force Design provides a roadmap
for modernizing and optimizing Marine Aviation to deliver lethal,
effective, and survivable capabilities to satisfy Joint Force
requirements and better support Service needs to organize, train, and
equip. The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) remains central to the Marine
Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), the JFMCC, and the Joint Force.
Marine Aviation contributes to massing distributed effects across
the Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) as the stand-in ACE through the Six
Functions of Marine aviation, which consists of Offensive Air Support,
Anti-Air Warfare, Assault Support, Air Reconnaissance, Electronic
Warfare, and Control of Aircraft and Missiles, and, in the future, the
four types of maritime aviation operations: anti-submarine warfare
(ASW), surface warfare (SUW), information operations warfare (IWC), and
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) missions.
Today, Marine Aviation consists of fifth generation F-35s,
tiltrotor MV-22s, the only marinized heavy lift helicopter in the US
arsenal--the CH-53K, H-1s that have been upgraded in lethality and
survivability, the venerable C-130J, new MQ-9As, the Ground/Air Task
Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) and the Marine Air Defense Integrated System
(MADIS). As a result of Force Design 2030, no aviation programs of
record were reduced.
The MV-22 has revolutionized military air transport. The
revolutionary capability of the tiltrotor, with the optimized
organizational construct, enables the Marine Corps to generate
unprecedented tempo across our operating environment, allowing
commanders to seize and retain the initiative not found in traditional
rotary platforms. For the MV-22, Force Design modernization from a 12
to 10-aircraft squadron enables the Marine Corps to extend the service
life of this unmatched capability from the mid-2030's to the early
2050's.
From the sea, Marine Aviation deploys and employs off amphibious
ships while serving as the ACE of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
A MEU ACE onboard an amphibious assault ship brings formidable and
sustainable aviation capabilities to every corner of the globe.
For the F-35, Force Design modernization directing an
organizational construct change to 18 squadrons of 10 F35 aircraft
allows the Marine Corps to deploy 10 F-35Bs aboard our MEUs compared to
the traditional six AV-8B TACAIR contingent. This offers the Combatant
Commanders (COCOMs) a 66 percent increase in TACAIR--5th Gen aircraft--
forward deployed and globally engaged with our Marine Expeditionary
Units (MEUs) time now. The transition to 5th Gen TACAIR provides the
MAGTF, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), and Joint
Force enhanced situational awareness, greater freedom of maneuver, and
flexible response options in what was previously considered a denied
environment.
Additionally, the MEU ACE can transition to two squadrons of 5th
Gen TACAIR aircraft consisting of 20 F-35B onboard an amphibious
assault ship operating as a ``lightning carrier.'' The Navy and Marine
Corps demonstrated this critical capability last April when they
operated 20 F-35B from America-class amphibious assault carrier USS
Tripoli from March 30 through April 8, 2022, fully exercising the
Marine Corps' lightning carrier concept for the first time in naval
history on an amphibious assault ship.
For the CH-53K, as the only marinized heavy-lift helicopter in the
DOD in development or production, provides a greater payload capability
for Assault Support than any current or emerging rotorcraft at sea
level and high-altitude conditions at great ranges. The CH-53K program
of record has remained at 200. Achieving Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) in April 2022, the CH-53K was approved for Full Rate Production
in December 2022 and plans to deploy for the first CH-53K MEU
detachment in fiscal year 2025. The CH-53K provides critical
expeditionary organic heavy-lift sustainment and mobility capability to
the MAGTF, Joint Force, JFMCC, and COCOM.
For the AH-1Z and UH-1Y, Force Design modernization increases the
H-1s readiness and provides flexibility for our operational commanders
for decades to come. Deploying in detachments as part of the MEU
onboard amphibious shipping, H-1s provide a wide variety of
capabilities and mission sets and the entire spectrum of conflict.
Additionally, the post-Force Design force construct enables the
activation of an additional KC-130J squadron in the Pacific, as well as
the additional three squadrons of UAS. The KC-130J provides organic
lift and tactical aerial-refueling capabilities to the Marine Corps. At
the same time, MQ-9A supports the MAGTF by providing multi-sensor
surveillance, maritime domain awareness, and enables the detection and
engagement of targets during expeditionary, joint, and combined
operations. As a result of Force Design efforts, the KC-130J has
increased from 79 in fiscal year 2018 to 86 in fiscal year 2024.
Additionally, the MQ-9A has increased as a new program of record to 18
in this coming fiscal year 2024.
In sum, evolutionary change is not new to Marine Aviation; we have
led in the past with Close Air Support, Vertical Envelopment, and the
development of tiltrotor aviation. Marine Aviation capabilities have
expanded since Force Design efforts began in 2019. Across all
platforms, modernization efforts have integrated readiness initiatives,
incorporated advanced technologies, and ensured the capabilities
procured meet or exceed those of their preceding platform. Force Design
has expanded, optimized, and enhanced Marine Aviation's ability to
continue to deliver more lethal, effective, and survivable capabilities
to enable naval and joint campaigning in all domains across the
continuum of conflict.
25. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, is there anything
in terms of aviation the Marine Corps cannot do that it could do with
the previous force structure?
Lieutenant General Heckl. No. In fact, Force Design 2030 brings
significant additional capabilities to the Aviation Combat Element.
Force Design efforts have expanded Marine Aviation with modernized
capabilities, increased readiness, and enhanced lethality across all
platforms to meet the demands of global force management, rapidly
changing technology, and the ever-changing operating environment.
Historically, the number of squadrons (organizational construct) and
aircraft (composition) within aviation units has always evolved inside
the Program of Records (POR) to ensure the Marine Corps remains the
Nation's crisis response force while modernizing and optimizing the
fleet to meet the challenges of the future operating environment. To
provide examples of this evolution, between 1990 and 2016;
Between 1990 and 2015, CH-53 Active component Marine
Heavy Lift Helicopter Squadrons (HMH) fluctuated from nine to ten, to
nine, to ten, to eight.
Between 1990 and 2016, H-1 Active component Marine Light
Attack Helicopter Squadrons (HMLA) fluctuated from six to eight, to
nine, to eight, to seven.
Between 2011 to 2014, MV-22 Active component Marine
Medium Tiltrotor Squadrons (VMM) fluctuated from 18 to 16 to 18.
F/A-18 squadrons changed organizational construct or
composition nine times between 1990-2016.
In 1992, the Marine Corps had only one 18 plane EA-6B
Prowler squadron which disaggregated into four squadrons with five
planes each.
In 2007, the Marine Corps planned an all F-35B fleet
consisting of 14 squadrons of 10 aircraft and seven squadrons of 14
aircraft.
o In 2009, we increased seven of the squadron's allocations to
16 aircraft.
o In 2011, F-35C was incorporated.
o In 2013, the plan changed to nine squadrons of 16 aircraft and
nine squadrons of 10 aircraft.
o All these changes were done without adjusting the Program of
Record.
To support the 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013
organizational constructs, a POR of 510 F35s would have been required.
Force Design modernization optimized Marine Aviation to operate
from austere, distributed locations and across extended distances while
providing cutting-edge advantages to the naval expeditionary force
through the six functions of Marine Aviation, which consists of:
Offensive Air Support, Anti-Air Warfare, Assault Support, Air
Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, and Control of Aircraft and
Missiles. Marine Aviation is manned, trained, and equipped to conduct
the six functions and is integral to tomorrow's Marine Air-Ground Task
Force (MAGTF), bringing lethal, agile, and sustainable capabilities to
compete with, deter, and--if necessary--defeat our Nation's
adversaries. These functions have not changed as a result of Force
Design 2030.
Last, Force Design not only provides a roadmap for Marine Aviation
to modernize and optimize into a more capable agile expeditionary
force, but Force Design also sets Marine Aviation on the path to look
to the future. For example, Marine Aviation is teaming with U.S. Navy
in the development of the Marine Air Ground Task Force Unmanned
Expeditionary Family of Systems (FoS). These efforts include
acceleration of prototyping and experimentation of TACAIR Collaborative
Combat Aircraft and building a common interoperable system control
architecture for control of Joint assets. In parallel, Marine Aviation
is also exploring the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Family of Systems
(VTOL FoS), where the Logistics Connector is the first major effort to
support the execution of the Stand-in Force (SiF) through airborne
logistics in a contested environment. This portfolio also includes but
is not limited to Air Loitering Munitions, an Attack/strike capability,
and a future Assault support capability to replace our extant
platforms.
In sum, Force Design has expanded, optimized, and enhanced Marine
Aviation's ability to provide unique and unmatched lethal, sustainable,
and fiscally responsible capabilities to the MAGTF, JFMCC, and Joint
Force.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Eric Schmitt
outstanding f/a-18 appropriation
26. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Stefany, considering the Navy's
significant strike fighter shortfall, I am concerned that the Navy has
yet to contract for the 20 additional F/A-18 Super Hornets that
Congress appropriated in fiscal years 2022 and 2023. Given this ongoing
delay, do you assess that the Navy will still be able to procure the
full complement of 20 F/A-18s with the funding that Congress
appropriated?
Mr. Stefany. It is the Navy's intent to award 20 aircraft with the
appropriated fiscal year 2022 and fiscal year 2023 funding. We will be
able to provide a more definitive answer when we receive pricing
information in Boeing's proposal, which we expect in the late June
timeframe.
27. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Stefany, is the Navy experiencing any
delays due to similar proposal disputes with prime contractors for any
other major platforms?
Mr. Stefany. For each acquisition, the Navy requests delivery of
technical data and computer software to align to the particular
acquisition and sustainment strategy or plan. As might be expected,
negotiation timelines and the impact to award schedules varies.
However, the F/A-18 Lot 46 production negotiation regarding technical
data delivery is one of the larger Navy programs in this position at
this time.
28. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Stefany, what is the impetus for the
Navy's change in technical data requirements for this instance of F/A-
18 procurement considering the Navy's long history of procuring F/A-
18s?
Mr. Stefany. There is no change in the data requirement/rights in
this procurement. The Navy sought delivery of the required technical
data under previous F/A-18 contracts, which the contractor agreed to
deliver, but did not and still has not. This technical data is the
minimum required for organic repair capability, which is critical to
maintain Fleet assets on our ships or at our Fleet Readiness Centers
during wartime or in a contested logistics environment.
29. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Stefany, is a build-to-print Level 3
Technical Data Package required for every major weapons system that
composes the carrier air wing, e.g., MH-60, E-2C, F-35C, CMV-22?
Mr. Stefany. Technical data package requirements vary by platform,
as the mission sets and support requirements are not identical between
the platforms. The Navy is only asking for the minimum data required to
support organic maintenance, which will be critical in a high end fight
or during wartime.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
large surface combatant acquisition strategy
30. Senator King. Mr. Stefany, we have worked in a bipartisan
manner to encourage the Navy to continue collaborating on the design
and production of DDG(X). The best way to avoid first of class problems
is to make sure we collaborate, which in turn will save money and
achieve the best value for the tax payer. The fiscal year 2023 NDAA
section 130 requires maximum collaboration between the two DDG
shipbuilders and the Navy.
Is collaboration a priority for the Department of the Navy as you
develop the acquisition strategy for DDG(X)?
Mr. Stefany. Collaboration is a priority for the Navy and the
DDG(X) program. As part of Concept Refinement and early adoption of a
collaborative Integrated Product & Process Development (IPPD)-type
programmatic approach, the DDG(X) program has integrated shipbuilders
and other Navy industry partners into the design team as part of a
collaborative, multi-disciplinary team. Concept Refinement through
Detail Design for DDG(X) will also be accomplished through a
collaborative, multi-disciplinary Navy-industry effort composed of the
DDG 51 shipbuilders, suppliers, ship design agents and other subject
matter experts. In March 2021, the DDG 51 shipbuilders, General
Dynamics Bath Iron Works (BIW) and Huntington Ingalls Industries
Ingalls Shipbuilding Division (HII), were integrated into the Navy's
Concept Refinement team. In fiscal year 2022, the DDG(X) program
awarded a Surface Combatant Ship Design Engineering contract to Gibbs &
Cox and separate Preliminary through Contract Design contracts to BIW
and HII. These contracts are integral to the Navy's plan to fully
involve the shipbuilders and industrial base into the DDG(X) design
efforts. It is the Navy's intention and plan to maintain this
collaborative strategy with both BIW and HII to leverage their
expertise and experience in the identification of opportunities to
improve the productivity and affordability of the ship, prior to the
detail design and construction phase of the program.
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