    [Senate Hearing 118-625, Part 2]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                    S.Hrg. 118-625, Pt. 2

                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
                       REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
                       YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
                       PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                  BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2226

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024 FOR MILITARY
         ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CON-
         STRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
         ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR
         SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 2

                                    SEAPOWER

                                   ----------

                                 MARCH 28, 2023

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    60-096 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

     			JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman

    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York		DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut		TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii			MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia			JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine		DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts		KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan		RICK SCOTT, Florida
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois		MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada			TED BUDD, North Carolina
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                  	ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri

    		    Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
      		John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director

    _________________________________________________________________

                            Subcommittee on Seapower

       			TIM KAINE, Virginia Chairman

    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut		DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii			RICK SCOTT, Florida
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine		TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan         	ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri

                                      (ii)

                             C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                 March 28, 2023

                                                                       Page

    Navy and Marine Corps Investment Programs........................     1

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Tim Kaine...................................     1

    Statement of Senator Kevin Cramer................................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Stefany, Frederick, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for        6
      Research, Development, and Acquisition.

    Questions for the Record.........................................    60

                                     (iii)

      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
             FISCAL YEAR 2024 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 2023

                          United States Senate,
                             Subcommittees on Seapower,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                   NAVY AND MARINE CORPS INVESTMENT PROGRAMS

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m. in
    room SR-236, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Tim Kaine
    (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Subcommittee Members present: Kaine, Blumenthal, Hirono,
    King, Peters, Cramer, Sullivan, Scott, Tuberville, and Schmitt.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM KAINE

        Senator Kaine. The hearing will now come to order. I want
    to welcome our witnesses today, welcome my Subcommittee
    colleagues, Subcommittee Ranking Member Cramer. To all of our
    witnesses, thank you so much for your service to this country.
    I want to acknowledge the tremendous dedication of our sailors,
    marines, civilians, that serve in the Department of the Navy,
    thank their families for their unrelenting support of our
    Nation's defense.
        This is my first hearing as chair of the Seapower
    Subcommittee. I have been a Member during my entire time in the
    Senate, but I have been either Chair or Ranking Member on
    Readiness, and yet this year Senator Hirono, for a number of
    reasons I completely understand, decided that Readiness should
    be her portfolio, and so we have switched. I am truly honored
    and excited by the chance to lead this vital Subcommittee. As
    the father of a marine and as a Senator from a State that has
    some pretty significant Navy and Marine Corps equities and an
    amazing shipbuilding and submarine building and repair
    industrial base, it is a particularly welcome challenge for my
    team and I to take this role.
        I want to recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Cramer. He
    and I look forward to working together. We have already had a
    good working relationship on the Armed Services Committee. I do
    want to thank Senator Hirono. I had the chance to sit on the
    committee and watch her maneuver with skill over the last few
    years.
        The Subcommittee is going to continue to find broad
    agreement as we continue to confront the issues facing our
    sailors, marines, and their families, and in the past the nice
    thing about the Armed Services Committee and this Subcommittee
    is we agree so much more than we disagree.
        I will start with just throwing something down on the table
    that I am a little bit not happy with, which is we do not yet
    have a 30-year shipbuilding plan. When we hold a hearing like
    this and it is going to be about seapower investments in
    shipbuilding and ship repair, of course the idea is we get the
    plan first and then we would sound really smart in the
    questions that we ask you. That plan was supposed to come over
    with the President's Budget on March 9th. Today is the 28th,
    and we do not have it.
        We talked last week with Navy leadership that said that we
    would have it on Friday or Monday. I was like, well, Monday for
    a Tuesday hearing, I am not a speed reader but my staff is.
    Okay, maybe we can be ready. Well, we do not have it yet, and
    that means we have got a lot of questions for you, but we would
    have had probably more defined, sharp, precise questions for
    you if we had not only had just the budget submission, but the
    plan itself. I am mindful of my Subcommittee Members. I think
    they would have really benefited from that as well.
        So what are we going to do? We are going to do the hearing
    and ask the questions we have without that plan. I suspect we
    will get the plan before the full Navy posture hearing, before
    the committee with the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], the
    SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy], and the Commandant. Questions
    that we would have probably directed to you we are going to end
    up having to direct to them.
        But what I am going to do, and I just say this to my
    Subcommittee Members, after the posture hearing before the full
    Committee, if you feel like you have not really gotten a chance
    to ask the questions that you want about the 30-year
    shipbuilding plan--because there are a million things we should
    ask the SECNAV, Commandant, and CNO about--we will reconvene
    and we will do a followup of this hearing if it is the pleasure
    of the Subcommittee, so that we can dig into questions that are
    more detailed questions about the 30-year shipbuilding plan.
        Look, this year's budget, submitted to the Senate,
    continues to grow its investment in critical capabilities of
    the sea services with an overall seapower budget of $255.8
    billion, That is an increase of more than $11 billion from the
    fiscal year 2023 enacted budget. That includes over $76 billion
    in procurement and nearly $27 billion in research and
    development, and that growth from fiscal year 2023 is growth on
    a budget that had already grown pretty much from previous
    years, so it is growth on top of growth. That is important.
        Modernization investments include $32.8 billion in
    shipbuilding, $17.3 billion in naval aviation procurement,
    $16.9 billion in Marine Force Design equipping priorities, and
    nearly $7 billion, a $2 billion increase from last year, in
    weapons procurement.
        We are encouraged by the Department of the Navy's actions
    to take advantage of congressionally authorized authorities for
    munitions and critical capabilities such as Standard Missile,
    Naval Strike Missiles, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles, Advanced
    Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles.
        It is a robust budget. The Navy and Marine Corps, though,
    face difficult decisions as they seek to balance modernizing
    the fleet, maintaining a technological advantage over
    adversaries, supporting ongoing operations, which are becoming
    more complex, and always sustaining today's readiness.
        Although I am encouraged that the Navy has gotten serious
    about investing in critical infrastructure that has been
    neglected for far too long. We continue to see delays in
    delivering new ships from our shipbuilders and delays in
    returning ships to the fleet from our public and private ship
    repair yards, and some of these we have been able to predict
    but some have also been quirky, like the decision that we
    needed to pull some of the Puget Sound drydocks out of
    commission because of seismic activity there. How that is going
    to affect us and over what period of time is obviously not
    completely in our control, and I would like to hear about that
    today. I will be asking witnesses how your budget request
    either reduces or eliminates some of these performance
    challenges.
        Additionally, the Navy is again proposing to retire a
    number of ships before the end of their useful service lives,
    including several amphibious ships that would bring the total
    number of amphibs below the floor of 31 ships that we set in
    the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act. So I
    want to hear more about the future of the amphibious fleet and
    why there continues to be some in-the-atmosphere dispute, left
    hand not knowing what the right hand is doing, continual
    rethinking of what we assumed was an agreed upon priority to
    meet the Marine Corps' needs.
        Finally, as the Marine Corps continues to pursue
    significant structure and capabilities modernization, it would
    be helpful to understand how this Force Design better prepares
    the Marine Corps for not only the pacing threat but then for
    potential operations worldwide. I look forward to a productive
    discussion today on these and many other priority efforts.
        Before I introduce Senator Cramer I just want to say to my
    colleagues, I am managing these amendments that are on the
    floor in the AUMF [Authorization for Use of Military Force].
    There is one that is going to come up in about a half an hour.
    I need to go speak for a minute and then come back. Senator
    King said he would take the helm during that time. So you will
    see me----
        Senator Tuberville. Just 1 minute?
        Senator Kaine. Just 1 minute. Only 1 minute. You will see
    me exit, speak for a minute, vote, and come right back.
        But with that, Senator Cramer, good to have you.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR KEVIN CRAMER

        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Chairman Kaine, and I would like
    to say she--I just saw her poke her head in but now I lost
    Senator Hirono. But I do not know if you will be as skilled at
    managing the Committee as she was, but I hope you are as
    gracious to the Ranking Member as she was, because as you know,
    I come from the center of the North American continent--
    literally, we have a monument to prove it--in Rugby, North
    Dakota. But I always said together Senator Hirono and I knew a
    lot about seapower. So I am thinking that together you and I
    will too.
        I cannot imagine a higher priority for this Subcommittee
    than the 30-year plan. So I appreciate your willingness to
    reassemble, if necessary, after we get the plan.
        Oh, there she is.
        Senator Tuberville. You can start over again.
        Senator Cramer. I just said I hope he does as good a job as
    Mazie Hirono did.
        Senator Kaine. It is really a sincere compliment when the
    person is not in the room.
        Senator Cramer. That is true.
        But our Nation faces a generational challenge for sure, to
    peace and security, that we have only, in my view, only
    recently, at least as a Nation, recognized. It is worth stating
    that the challenge is clearly here today. The Chinese Communist
    Party (CCP) has become more assertive in using their military
    to achieve strategic goals. The Department of Defense's (DOD)
    new document, ``Joint Concept for Competing,'' described China
    as, ``the only competitor capable of mounting a sustained
    challenge to a stable and open international system.''
        Our Navy and Marine Corps provide the forces necessary to
    deter China through forward presence, sea control, and power
    projection. Appropriately funding naval capabilities is among
    the most critical constitutional duties Congress performs, and
    it is one that I take very seriously.
        To this end I thank the Chairman for calling today's
    hearing to examine Navy and Marine Corps programs in the
    President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request, and as I say, I
    look forward to the 30-year plan.
        But I must say I am very concerned that President Biden's
    Defense Budget Request is not adequate. The Department of the
    Navy's fiscal year 2024 budget only seeks 4.5 percent growth.
    Because this budget does not keep up with inflation, it is, in
    fact, a cut. At the same time, China's military budget will see
    substantial growth above inflation. I am hopeful we can come
    together again to provide the Department with real budget
    growth to fund critical modernization, readiness, and personnel
    shortfalls.
        The Administration's inadequate budget is reflected in the
    fact that the Navy's fleet size is set to decline to 293 ships
    and stagnate over the next 5 years--the next 5 years. This
    decrease in the number of ships alarms me because China is
    moving to increase the size of its fleet at a breakneck pace.
        Many have called the next 5 years the period of maximum
    danger in the Indo-Pacific region. A brief overview of China's
    growing capabilities makes that danger clear. China has truly
    unprecedented shipbuilding capacity, capturing 47 percent of
    the global market for commercial ships, and boasts more than
    4,500 merchant ships. In 2022, during the peacetime, China's
    shipyards built 38 million tons of shipping. That is more than
    double what the United States built at the peak of the
    Emergency Shipbuilding Program during World War II.
        In terms of warships, the Department of Defense expects
    that China's fleet will grow to 400 by 2025, and 440 by 2030.
    By contrast, under this budget, our Navy will not even reach
    300 ships by 2030. Two weeks ago a single Chinese shipyard
    launched two new destroyers with three more to follow in the
    coming months, and more under construction at a second
    shipyard. A new class of large frigates has apparently begun
    construction at another shipyard. A few months ago,
    construction of a new class of nuclear submarines emerged.
        China is also conducting more advanced operations. This
    past December, China deployed a carrier strike group just 460
    miles from Guam, launching aircraft over a 15-day period. China
    has also made significant progress in exercises using numerous
    military/ civilian Roll-On/Roll-Off vessels to practice large-
    scale lift of troops and equipment, which could be used in an
    amphibious invasion across the Taiwan Strait. China has also
    been practicing the use of long-range, anti-ship ballistic
    missiles against simulated targets representing United States
    ships.
        This small sample of Chinese naval capabilities, together
    with their expansionist policy goals, is alarming. It does not
    appear the Navy's budget takes the risk seriously. The Navy
    proposes decommissioning 11 ships, 8 of which are within their
    service life. Decommissioning 5 guided missile cruisers alone
    will result in the loss of more than 600 vertical launch system
    cells. While the Navy claims readiness issues are a cause for
    the decommissions, it also claims that the fiscal year 2024
    budget funds 100 percent of ship depot maintenance requirements
    and 97 percent of ship operations requirements. I would like to
    hear from the witnesses how the budget adequately funds
    sustainment when the General Accountability Office reported
    this year that part shortages, casualty reports, and
    maintenance delays have been on the rise since 2011.
        I would also like to hear from the witnesses how they plan
    to support industry to deliver ships on time and on cost.
    Attracting and retaining shipbuilding workforce is a primary
    challenge, as we have discussed in this Committee before.
    Disrupting production lines without a clear transition path
    creates needless uncertainty. Truncation of the LPD amphibious
    ship program is a key example of the Navy's unstable demand
    signal to industry. It also disregards the Commandant of the
    Marine Corps' requirement for a minimum of 31 large amphibious
    ships, a requirement Congress signed in the past and signed
    into law last year.
        Finally, I would like to hear from the witnesses how they
    plan to use innovation to bolster our ability to compete in the
    near term. I believe if we are stretching the limits ]of
    shipbuilding and maintenance we must look to smaller, more
    affordable, and more distributed systems that will complement
    the program plans already in place.
        All good ideas must be on the table because time matters.
    Time is the only fixed resource, and it may be short. I look
    forward to the testimony of our witnesses today. Thank you.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Cramer. I used to try
    cases, and there would be expert witnesses, and one of the
    things you do is you qualify an expert witness by giving a
    really long bio. Whenever one of my opposing counsel would do
    that I would just jump in and say, ``I stipulate they are
    qualified.'' I did not want the jury to hear how qualified they
    were.
        During my tenure as Chair of this Subcommittee I am going
    to give very short introductions, not long introductions.
        We have three great witnesses with us: Lieutenant General
    Karsten Heckl, who is the Deputy Commandant for Combat
    Development and Integration; Mr. Frederick Stefany, who is the
    Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
    Acquisition; and Vice Admiral Scott Conn, who is the Deputy
    Chief of Naval Operations for Warfighting Requirements and
    Capabilities.
        That is all the introduction you are getting, and we are
    going to go left to right. Please try to keep your comments to
    about 5 minutes. If you want to submit anything for the record
    that will be fine, and then we will get into the questions and
    answers.
        Mr. Stefany. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make just one
    statement----
        Senator Kaine. Please.
        Mr. Stefany----for all three of us.
        Senator Kaine. Please.
        Mr. Stefany. Before I go to that statement I will start
    with saying we are disappointed we are not able to get you the
    30-year plan before this hearing, and we will absolutely come
    back here at your convenience, whatever is good for you once
    you get the plan, and go through whatever questions you and the
    other Members have.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you. Thank you.
        Mr. Stefany. We are totally committed to that, sir.

     STATEMENT OF FREDERICK STEFANY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
          THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION

        Mr. Stefany. Okay, for an opening statement, Chairman
    Kaine, Ranking Member Cramer, distinguished Members of the
    Subcommittee, on behalf of myself, Vice Admiral Conn, and
    Lieutenant General Heckl, thank you for the opportunity to
    appear before you today to address the Department of Navy's
    fiscal year 2024 budget request for seapower capabilities. We
    thank the Subcommittee for your continued leadership and
    support of shipbuilding, naval aviation, and ground programs
    that maintain maritime superiority and defense of our Nation.
        The Department of the Navy's 2024 budget is guided by
    Secretary Del Toro's enduring priorities to strengthen our
    maritime dominance, to build a culture of warfighting
    excellence, and to enhance our strategic partnerships. It
    implements the CNO's navigation plan to expand our fleet
    capabilities for Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) while
    accelerating the Commandant's Force Design 2030 to rapidly
    modernize the expeditionary posture of the Marine Corps.
        This overall budget request increases investment across the
    Navy and Marine Corps portfolios you mentioned, Mr. Chairman,
    while providing stability and predictability in many of our
    long-term production lines. This budget request includes a
    record $32.8 billion for shipbuilding programs, and includes 55
    new construction ships across the Future Years Defense Program
    (FYDP), including a consistent two Arleigh Burke-class
    destroyers per year and two Virginia-class attack submarines
    per year.
        The President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2024 also
    procures the second Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine,
    and increases our production of frigates in this year to two
    ships. The President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2024
    program invests in 88 fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned
    aircraft in 2024, and 410 aircraft across the Fiscal Year
    Defense Program including a return to a consistent 15 F-35C
    fifth-generation fighters for our Navy and 20 B-or C-variant F-
    35s for our Marine Corps. The budget also includes 15 CH-53K
    aircraft to be purchased as part of the block buy that was
    authorized in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA), and we thank you for that.
        Looking back on the year since we last briefed this
    Committee, I am happy to report a number of successes in
    providing new capability for the fleet. The Gerald Ford, our
    first new aircraft carrier in half a century, made her first
    deployment last year. We declared, toward the end of the year,
    full-rate production of the CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter, one
    of the world's most powerful helicopters, and the DDG-125,
    which was our first Flight III destroyer with the new SPY-6
    radar. This air and missile defense radar has started sea
    trials and is expected to deliver later this year.
        As you know, I believe, we also started construction of the
    Constellation, our first frigate in a new class of frigates.
        The 2024 budget request includes significant investment in
    our industrial base for submarines, which will support the
    ability of the United States to sustain a building of one
    ballistic missile submarine and two attack submarines to meet
    our domestic demand. We will work with Congress and the United
    States industrial base to assess if there are any adjustments
    required, as the newly announced AUKUS [Australia, the United
    Kingdom, and the United States] trilateral security pact
    between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom
    matures.
        The budget also includes funding for Marine Corps Force
    Design priorities that will accelerate the modernization of
    capabilities in precision fires, resilient communications, and
    mobility platforms, optimizing the force for naval
    expeditionary warfare in a maritime littoral. The 2024 budget
    also increases our investment in munitions while taking
    advantage of the new authorities for streamlining multi-year
    procurements that were granted by Congress last year. Not only
    will this authority allow the Department to replenish our
    munitions stockpiles being used in support of the war in
    Ukraine, it will support efforts to strengthen our industrial
    base capacity to procure and field munitions at scale.
        With the tremendous support received from Congress we are
    continuing recapitalization of our naval shipyards through our
    Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program, with a request
    for $2.7 billion in 2024 and $9.9 billion across the Fiscal
    Year Defense Plan (FYDP). Of note, last month we awarded the
    $2.8 billion task order for the reconstruction of Dry Dock 3 at
    Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard.
        Looking forward with a focus on developing a full
    capability in the future force, we are investing $26 billion in
    research for a next-generation submarine, large surface
    combatant, and air dominance family of aircraft, as well as
    autonomy and unmanned enabling technologies.
        We thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
    Subcommittee today. Our mission begins and ends with providing
    the best capability to our sailors and marines, and we look
    forward to your questions.
        [The joint prepared statement by Frederick J. Stefany, Vice
    Admiral Scott Conn, and Lieutenant General Karsten S. Heckl
    follows:]

     Joint Prepared Statement by Frederick J. Stefany, Vice Admiral Scott
                 Conn, and Lieutenant General Karsten S. Heckl
        Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Cramer and distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today to address the Department of Navy's fiscal year 2024 budget
    request for Seapower capabilities. Maintaining a world-class and
    worldwide deployable Navy and Marine Corps as a first line of defense
    for the United States is a continuous effort. The Department of the
    Navy (DON) appreciates the support of Congress and this Committee for
    the Department's acquisition, sustainment, research, and development
    programs that allow us to continue to build and operate a lethal,
    capable, integrated, and forward-postured Navy and Marine Corps.
        The security of our country and preservation of our national
    interests remains reliant on a superior naval force, strategically
    postured to adapt to constantly evolving geopolitical challenges and
    threats. The Navy and Marine Corps team must continue to provide
    unmatched operational capability to best support the regional Combatant
    Commanders in countering the People's Republic of China (PRC), the
    pacing challenge for the Department, the acute threat posed by Russia,
    and other persistent threats, while remaining prepared to respond to
    any global crisis. The Navy and Marine Corps continue to lead Joint and
    Coalition forces through integrated deterrence and remain postured to
    adapt to emerging threats as demand for our naval capabilities
    continues to increase. To maintain the maritime dominance of the Joint
    Force, the DON continues to invest in the modernization of our existing
    capabilities, and is pursuing initiatives for rapid innovation and
    streamlined acquisition of future capabilities, including those of our
    allies and partners.
        The DON is investing in lethal capabilities across a broad spectrum
    of platforms and programs to equip our warfighters for potential combat
    operations with credible and sufficient capability to deter, and when
    necessary, prevail in conflict. Since the start of fiscal year 2022 we
    have delivered 14 battle force ships to the Fleet including three
    Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDG 51), two Virginia-class submarines
    (SSN), five Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), one San Antonio-class
    amphibious transport dock (LPD), the first Fleet Replenishment Oiler of
    the new John Lewis-class (TAO-205), one Spearhead-class expeditionary
    fast transport dock with autonomy functions (EPF), and one Lewis B.
    Puller-class expeditionary sea base (ESB). Today, the Navy has 296
    battle force ships, with an additional 76 ships under contract and 56
    ships in construction, with the balance of ships in pre-construction
    activities such as long lead material procurement and planning efforts.
    We expect to take delivery of seven more ships and plan to award
    contracts for up to 17 more ships during fiscal year 2023, including
    the DDG 51 fiscal year 2023-2027 multi-year procurement contracts and
    the T-AO block buy contract as authorized in the fiscal year 2023
    National Defense Authorization Act.
        The Department has made great strides in recapitalizing Naval
    aviation platforms. Last year we delivered 91 new aircraft for the Navy
    and Marine Corps team, including F/A-18E/F production and ongoing
    procurement and fleet integration of F-35, E-2D, V-22, P-8, H-1, CH-
    53K, VH-92A, and unmanned aircraft MQ-4C, MQ-9A Extended Range (ER),
    and MQ-25. Naval Aviation is now predominantly comprised of new
    airframes, made possible through a deliberate strategy of evolutionary,
    controlled technical risk development programs. Unmanned aviation
    advancement has continued into fiscal year 2023 with three different
    integration events conducted to ``fly'' the MQ-25 virtually in the
    program's test lab with actual ground control station software and
    aircraft computer hardware and software. VUQ-10, the MQ-25 Fleet
    Replacement Squadron, stood up in October 2022, and is responsible for
    initial training of maintainers. For the Marine Corps, Unmanned Aerial
    Vehicle Squadron (VMU)-1 recently conducted phase zero operations with
    MQ-9A ER, including multisensory imagery reconnaissance, electronic
    support, unmanned escort of surface forces, and maritime domain
    awareness in support of the Joint Force and Coalition Partners in
    CENTCOM, totaling over 3,800 hours. VMU-3 started transition to the MQ-
    9A ER with flights to begin in 2023.
        Over the last year, global events have continued to pressurize the
    need for rapid change across the Services and the DON has taken note,
    aggressively seeking and implementing new and improved ways to operate,
    integrate, and sustain our forces. Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine
    has affirmed our perception of the modern-day character of war.
    Specifically, the war against Ukraine has displayed the value of
    enhanced sensors and long-range precision fires, and the importance of
    freedom of navigation and the ability to sustain a force. The war
    highlights the need for increased industrial capacity, and shown the
    genuine value in maintaining relationships among partners and allies.
    Additionally, it has shown us that persistent, forward presence is
    essential for the success of our Nation's deterrence efforts. Moreover,
    recent provocations by China, such as flying collection assets directly
    over the continental United States, clearly shows their willingness to
    compete below the threshold of armed violence.
        The Marine Corps' activation of new units, including the 3d Marine
    Littoral Regiment and Task Force 61/2 are indicative of efforts made to
    compete and reassure allies and partners. Additionally, the
    establishment of Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Blaz on Guam is yet
    another positive for the Marine Corps and the Joint Force, as it will
    serve as a critical logistics and inside force enabler. These new
    organizations and installations will actively participate and support
    operational concepts, including Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO),
    Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), and Stand-In Forces.
    However, continued fielding and sustainment of advanced capabilities in
    mobility, logistics, kill webs, and command and control will be
    essential for the entire Marine Corps to remain credible and lethal.
        The security environment demands ships, aircraft, subs,
    expeditionary forces, special operations forces, and Sailors ready to
    fight and win. Readiness is generated across the DON, from shipyards
    and aviation depots, to our global network of bases and stations, to
    the steaming and flight hours our Sailors and Marines need to hone
    their skills. For surface ship maintenance, we are reinforcing our
    commitment to our industry partners to share future demand signals, and
    we are seeing the benefits of improved maintenance package planning,
    earlier contract awards, and delivery of long-lead time material to our
    repair yards. Continued investments in spares supports the readiness
    for training and operational units while simultaneously improving
    endurance for sustained operations. Funding of some availabilities that
    cross fiscal year boundaries via the OPN funding pilot is also showing
    positive results. These initiatives enable a stable and predictable
    workload for our industry partners and ensure a balance of operational
    requirements with industrial capacity.
        The Navy continues to invest and mature autonomy to support future
    DMO through manned/unmanned teaming (MUM-T). To help increase
    opportunities to learn, the Navy has begun experimenting in the fleet
    with unmanned and autonomous systems at scale. Task Force 59 is
    exploring commercially available systems to augment their Maritime
    Domain Awareness, and 4th Fleet is building upon the Unmanned Campaign
    Framework to identify their needs to support the future hybrid fleet
    for the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility. In 2023 and 2024, we will be
    conducting numerous DON and multi-national unmanned experiments and
    exercises to explore MUM-T Maritime Domain Awareness, lethality,
    command and control, and contested logistics to include dual use
    technologies. This approach to innovation will leverage industries'
    pace of technology, allies, and partners' capabilities, while exploring
    new concepts. The return on investment includes a more flexible hybrid
    fleet that can be scaled with our allies and partners to help fill gaps
    brought on from world conflicts, or industrial base challenges at a
    more affordable cost.
                the fiscal year 2024 president's budget request
        The President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget provides the resources
    necessary for the Navy and Marine Corps to continue to implement the
    2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). This request builds and sustains
    the right mix of capabilities to keep the sea lanes open and free,
    deter conflict, and defend against current and future threats. In
    alignment with the Secretary of the Navy's priorities, the budget
    request enables the One Navy-Marine Corps Team to continue
    strengthening our maritime dominance, building on our culture of
    warfighting excellence, and enhancing our strategic partnerships.
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request is strategy-based and
    analytically driven to meet our strategic goals, while balanced with
    reform targeted at maximizing the value of every dollar. The budget
    reflects the Department's commitment to building and sustaining a
    modernized naval force and operating forward with sufficient
    capability, size, and mix to deter and defend. Fiscal year 2024
    continues key investments in advanced technologies and modernization of
    our current Seapower and Projection forces. In this request we are
    prioritizing the recapitalization of the strategic ballistic missile
    submarine, the Columbia-class, which remains the Department's top
    acquisition priority. It requests the first year of incremental funding
    for the second Columbia-class SSBN and full funding for two DDG Flight
    IIIs, two SSNs, two FFGs, one T-AO, and one AS(X), while providing the
    next increment of funding for construction of CVN 80, CVN 81, and LHA
    9. The budget supports modernization of our warfighting capabilities
    across all domains, including research and development (R&D) funding
    for the future fast attack submarine (SSN(X)), future destroyer
    (DDG(X)), the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) Family of Systems
    (FOS), Marine Corps Unmanned Expeditionary (MUX) FOS, and
    recapitalization of the Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) mission.
        The Department requests funding in fiscal year 2024 to support
    procurement of 88 aircraft, modification, spares, and support
    equipment--63 fixed wing aircraft including 15 Navy and four Marine
    Corps F-35C carrier variants; 16 F-35B Short Takeoff and Vertical
    Landing variants; two Marine Corps KC-130Js; and 26 T-54A multi-engine
    training system aircraft. Additional unmanned aircraft procurements
    include two MQ-4C Unmanned Aircraft in fiscal year 2024, five MQ-9A ER,
    two XQ-58 Valkyrie Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) for prototype
    experimentation, and three carrier-capable MQ-25 aircraft. Rotary wing
    investments include 15 CH-53Ks.
        The fiscal year 2024 budget prioritizes readiness recovery,
    continuing prior year gains on ship and aircraft maintenance efforts to
    improve overall department readiness. It includes a significant
    investment in submarine maintenance through the 15-Year SSN Maintenance
    Strategy with the goal of reducing maintenance periods and improving
    the operational availability of these critical assets. The request
    continues investment to develop improved war-fighting capabilities
    across all domains and distributed maritime operations, investing in
    long range fires and hypersonic weapons as well as increases to
    unmanned platforms. This budget also develops the Integrated Combat
    System (ICS) which will deliver decision superiority at rapid speed and
    enable ships to operate force-wide as an integrated system.
        The budget request increases investment in the Commandant's Force
    Design 2030 priorities by $705 million, moving programs from concept/
    experimentation to production within three lines of effort (LOE)--
    logistics, sensing, and fires. These investments provide unique
    capabilities the Marine Corps requires to enable joint force access,
    sense and make sense of the battlefield, to close kill chains, and
    apply lethal fires when required to deter or defeat adversaries.
        The fiscal year 2024 budget continues investment in the defense
    industrial base to ensure the continued viability of the crucial
    businesses and infrastructure needed to ensure our ships, aircraft, and
    ground equipment are available when needed for the defense of the
    Nation and our interests abroad. The budget request includes a $647
    million investment in the submarine industrial base to support serial
    production of Columbia-class nuclear-powered, ballistic missile
    submarines (SSBN) in parallel with Virginia-class nuclear-powered
    attack submarine (SSN) construction. The budget makes significant
    investments in the munitions industrial base, supporting multiyear
    procurement (MYP) contracts for critical munitions including Standard
    Missile (SM-6), the Naval Strike Missile (NSM), and the Long-Range
    Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). MYP contracts will generate Economic Order
    Quantity (EOQ) savings, stabilize the demand signal to the industrial
    base, and enable the Department to respond quickly to future
    contingencies.
                                    summary
        The Navy and Marine Corps team continues to meet challenges head
    on--in cyberspace, in outer space, on the sea, under the sea, in the
    littorals and in the air every single day. With Congress' support, the
    Department of the Navy is focused on rapidly researching, developing,
    acquiring, and fielding the material solutions required to be more
    lethal, sustainable, resilient, survivable, agile, and responsive. We
    are committed to providing the Nation with a combat-credible, dominant,
    globally responsive naval force to keep the sea lanes open, deter
    conflict, and when called upon, decisively win our Nation's wars.
        Programmatic details regarding Navy and Marine Corps capabilities
    are summarized in the following section.
                u.s. navy and marine corps seapower capabilities
                                 ship programs
    Submarines
        Ballistic Missile Submarines, coupled with the TRIDENT II D-5
    Strategic Weapons System (SWS), represent the most survivable leg of
    the Nation's strategic arsenal, and provide the Nation's most assured
    nuclear response capability. Modernizing this capability with both the
    Columbia-cSSBN and TRIDENT D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) will ensure the
    effectiveness and availability of the Nation's Sea Based Strategic
    Deterrent through the 2080's. Columbia-class is the Navy's #1
    acquisition priority as its construction and delivery are critical to
    pace the retirement of current ballistic missile submarines.
        The lead ship of the class, District of Columbia, started
    construction in fiscal year 2021. This ship must be on patrol in 2030
    to meet STRATCOM requirements. The second ship of the class, Wisconsin,
    will officially start construction in the first quarter of fiscal year
    2024. The fiscal year 2024 budget request includes the first year of
    incremental funding for the second ship, advance procurement and
    advance construction funds for future ships, and funding for continued
    class design efforts. The fiscal year 2024 budget continues funding for
    several initiatives that are essential to reducing construction
    schedule risk and enabling cost savings including continuous production
    of missile tubes and various critical components, multi-program
    material procurement and procurement of production backup units.
    Through these congressionally granted authorities, the Navy has
    realized significant benefit. In missile tube production, which is
    tightly coordinated with procurement of Common Missile Compartment
    material for the U.K. Dreadnought-class submarines being executed under
    the Polaris Sales Agreement, all missile tubes in support of Columbia
    Hull 1 and U.K. Dreadnought Hull 1 have been delivered. Using
    authorities provided by Congress, General Dynamics Electric Boat and
    Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News continue to procure material
    to maintain and grow the submarine industrial base as the program
    builds to annual procurements beginning in fiscal year 2026.
        The Navy has taken delivery of 21 Virginia-class submarines with 17
    additional under contract. Two deliveries are planned in 2023: Hyman G
    Rickover (SSN 795) this summer and New Jersey (SSN 796) this fall. The
    second ship of the Block V contract is under construction and will
    introduce the Virginia Payload Module, which helps mitigate the loss of
    undersea strike capability with the retirement of SSGNs later this
    decade. All Block V ships will incorporate Acoustic Superiority program
    improvements. The Navy recognizes that Virginia-class construction
    performance continues to be challenged to meet the required two per
    year delivery cadence and is working closely with shipbuilders to
    stabilize and improve performance in the industrial base. The fiscal
    year 2024 budget includes funding for two Virginia SSNs, which will be
    procured as options under the Block V contract as one Virginia Payload
    Module ship and a modified Virginia-class Subsea and Seabed Warfare
    platform. The budget also includes funding for advance procurement and
    economic order quantity funding for the next block (Block VI). The
    fiscal year 2024 budget also includes cost to complete funding for
    several Block IV boats to address COVID impacts, supplier disruptions
    and shipyard performance, as well as R&D funding for continued
    development of capabilities and technologies for future Blocks.
        The Navy is also working closely with our allies--Australia and the
    United Kingdom--to implement the AUKUS Optimal Pathway for Australia to
    acquire a conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarine capability.
    On March 13, the President announced plans to employ a phased approach
    to provide this capability on the fastest possible timeline, while
    upholding the highest standards for nuclear stewardship and setting a
    precedent that strengthens the nonproliferation regime. As the
    President made clear, our three nations are making concrete commitments
    to each other, and we are backing these commitments up with significant
    investments to strengthen the industrial bases of each of our nations.
        The submarine industrial base faces an increase in demand across
    the enterprise as the Navy ramps up production of the Columbia-class
    while continuing two-per-year Virginia-class procurements. The Navy is
    taking steps to expand and strengthen the submarine industrial base to
    support concurrent construction of Virginia and Columbia-class
    submarines, and appreciates congressional support to address these
    challenges. In 2021, the Navy partnered with the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense on a comprehensive study to assess the submarine
    industrial base's ability to design, construct, and deliver submarines
    at rates consistent with current and future shipbuilding plans. The
    fiscal year 2024 budget continues efforts to fund submarine industrial
    base investments identified in the study. Investments are targeted in
    six key areas to include shipbuilder infrastructure, supplier
    development for capability/capacity, scaling of new technologies,
    workforce trade skill gaps and constraints, expanding productive
    capacity via strategic outsourcing, and government oversight of these
    efforts. The Navy has seen significant benefit from this funding in
    areas such as new technology through standing up of the Additive
    Manufacturing Center of Excellence in Danville, VA, workforce
    development by scaling up the Accelerated Training in Defense
    Manufacturing program and launching of an aggressive campaign to
    recruit people into key defense trades and shipyard infrastructure in
    the groundbreaking for the multi-class submarine production facility at
    Newport News, VA.
        The fiscal year 2024 budget continues the efforts started in fiscal
    year 2022 in support of requirements development, Analysis of
    Alternatives execution, concept design and technology development for
    the Future Attack Submarine (SSN(X)). As the Columbia design workforce
    efforts diminish, SSN(X) design efforts will ramp up, thereby
    maintaining the strength of the submarine design workforce. SSN(X) is
    anticipated to start construction in the mid-2030's, which will ensure
    a production workforce is in place as Columbia production ramps down.
    Aircraft Carriers (CVNs)
        The fiscal year 2024 budget fully funds the operations and
    maintenance of 11 In-Service Aircraft Carriers, three Ford-class
    Carriers under construction, and a Service Life Extension that will
    allow USS Nimitz (CVN 68) to conduct one additional operational cycle
    in support of the Nation. The fiscal year 2024 budget also provides
    investment in Sailor Quality of Service at Newport News Shipbuilding to
    improve the living conditions of our sailors onboard aircraft carriers
    and other ships undergoing extensive maintenance or construction.
        The USS Gerald R Ford (CVN 78) has fully transitioned into an
    operational platform and joined six NATO allies in completing its first
    service-retained deployment in 2022. During deployment the ship sailed
    over 9,000 miles, flew 2,400 hours, and performed over 1,200 sorties.
    Training is currently ongoing to prepare CVN 78, its Carrier Air Wing,
    and the other ships of its Carrier Strike Group for future operational
    commitments later this year. Performance of key systems continue to
    improve as more than 13,000 launches and recoveries have been completed
    aboard CVN 78. Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) and Electromagnetic
    Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) average Availability (Ao) is greater
    than 0.977 for the last 5,500 launch and recoveries for both systems.
    John F Kennedy (CVN 79) is 89 percent construction complete and
    implementing a revised delivery/post-delivery strategy to prepare the
    ship for operations in the Indo-Pacific region and decrease the amount
    of time the ship will be required to be at the shipyard after ship
    delivery. Enterprise (CVN 80) construction is 28 percent complete, and
    Doris Miller (CVN 81) is in early production and pacing ahead of
    previous Ford-class carriers for material procurement. The Navy remains
    committed to reducing and controlling the cost of Ford-class aircraft
    carriers and continues to benefit from the up to $4 billion savings
    expected to be achieved through the two-ship CVN 80 and CVN 81 contract
    award.
        The Nimitz-class Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH) is the refueling
    of the ship's reactors and full recapitalization of the carrier in
    support of the second half of its service life. The USS George
    Washington's (CVN 73) RCOH is scheduled to complete in June. USS John C
    Stennis (CVN 74) is 42 percent complete, and USS Harry S Truman (CVN
    75) will award its execution Advanced Planning (AP) contract this year
    to support commencing RCOH in fiscal year 2025.
        The Navy is nearing completion of the final Environmental Impact
    Study (EIS) for the disposal of the ex-Enterprise (ex-CVN 65) and
    expect results before the end of 2023. This EIS will inform the Navy's
    decision on how to commercially recycle the first nuclear powered
    aircraft carrier.
    Large Surface Combatants
        Arleigh Burke-class (DDG 51) destroyers are the workhorse of the
    Fleet, with 72 ships delivered as of February 2023. In fiscal year 2023
    Congress authorized MYP authority for up to 15 DDGs in fiscal year
    2023-2027, and provided funding for three ships. The shipbuilders have
    a total of 17 DDG-51s under contract and 11 ships in various stages of
    production.
        Flight III DDG 51s will provide enhanced Integrated Air and Missile
    Defense (IAMD) with the AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar
    (AMDR) and AEGIS Baseline 10 (BL10). The Flight III leverages the
    proven Flight IIA platform with modifications for hull stability,
    cooling, and power to accommodate AMDR. AMDR meets the growing
    ballistic missile threat by improving radar sensitivity and enabling
    longer range detection of increasingly complex threats. The program
    demonstrated design maturity through its successful completion of all
    developmental testing. AMDR is in production for delivery to support
    Flight III ships. Initial shipboard testing of the radar and combat
    system has commenced on the first DDG 51 Flight III ship, USS Jack H
    Lucas (DDG 125), which has already undergone initial builders sea
    trials and will deliver in fiscal year 2023. As part of a two-phased
    testing approach, Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in fiscal year
    2024 will include Air and Missile Defense Commander (AMDC) capability
    with core ballistic missile defense capability for Long-Range Search
    and Track and Sea Based Terminal. This aligns with Fleet priorities for
    Flight III to replace Cruisers in the AMDC role. Follow-on testing will
    support the IAMD key performance parameters with completion of Initial
    Operational Test and Evaluation, which culminates with Flight Test
    Mission (FTM)-42 in the Q4FY27.
        Aligned with congressional intent, risk reduction integration
    testing of critical Flight III systems is ongoing. BL10 is being
    integrated with a LRIP SPY-6 array and power conversion equipment at a
    land-based development site to buy down risk of first-time integration
    at the waterfront aboard DDG 125. The first two successful at-sea
    testing trials of the Flight III electric plant were conducted in
    December 2022 and February 2023, proving operational integration and
    testing of the Machinery Control System software. The first combat
    system software incremental load was delivered to DDG 125 in February
    2022 with additional at-sea testing later in fiscal year 2023.
        The Zumwalt-class (DDG 1000) guided missile destroyers are multi-
    mission surface combatants designed to provide long-range, offensive
    surface strike capabilities. The DDG 1000 program continues to
    accomplish first-time integration of unique combat systems elements,
    complete Post Delivery Test and Trials, demonstrate operational
    performance, and planning efforts for the first integration of
    Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic weapon system. USS Zumwalt
    (DDG 1000) will be the first maritime platform to integrate the CPS
    weapons system, with work starting in October 2023.
        In fiscal year 2022, DDG 1000 conducted a deployment to the western
    Pacific that included port visits to Pearl Harbor, HI, Guam, and
    Yokosuka, Japan and included the first material inspection by INSURV
    for the class. DDG 1001 participated in submarine Command Course Mini-
    Wars February-March 2022, conducted Survivability test events in March
    2022, and Deck Landing Qualifications in April 2022 to include 16 deck
    landings with UH-1Y (Huey) and AH-1Z (Cobra) helicopters and fueling
    during the landing operations. DDG 1001 participated in the 28th
    edition of the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) international
    maritime exercises in July 2022, and completed Failure and
    Recoverability Mode Testing / Enhanced Total Ship Survivability Trial
    in September 2022. DDG 1002 sailed from Bath, ME to Pascagoula, MS for
    the first phase of the Combat Systems Activation (CSA) which was
    awarded in August 2022. In December 2022, the Navy approved a plan to
    install CPS during the CSA, allowing for delivery of a complete DDG
    1002 to the Fleet with CPS capability.
        DDG(X) will be the next enduring large surface combatant (LSC) that
    follows the highly successful DDG 51 Class. Like DDG 51's evolution
    from CG 47, the initial flight of DDG(X) is a new hull form built
    around the DDG 51 Flight III's AMDR with AEGIS BL10 to deliberately
    reduce execution risk. DDG(X) will provide
    significant increases in range, efficiency, and time-on-station
    compared to the DDG 51 Class, providing Fleet Commanders with increased
    operational flexibility and decreasing the demand on Fleet Logistics.
    When deployed with the FFG 62 Class, which is designed to relieve LSCs
    of lower-tier missions, the resulting Fleet mix will directly
    contribute to the Navy's concept of DMO. DDG(X) will provide the
    flexibility and margins (space, weight, power, and cooling
    reservations) to accommodate required future capacity and capability
    upgrades to counter evolving threats. The Navy is committed to a smooth
    and successful transition from DDG 51 to DDG(X), currently planned to
    begin around fiscal year 2032. The transition will preserve the
    critical shipbuilding and supplier industrial base by executing a
    collaborative design process with current DDG 51 shipyards and
    transitioning to a proven limited competition model between these
    shipyards at the right point in ship construction.
    Small Surface Combatants
        The Constellation-class Frigate (FFG 62) is the evolution of a
    proven parent design built to Naval combatant design standards with
    increased lethality, survivability, and improved capability to support
    the full range of military operations as part of a more lethal Joint
    Force. The FFG 62 program is managing development risk by combining
    proven ship designs with mature, best-of-breed Government Furnished
    Equipment designated combat system elements. Consistent with
    congressional intent, the Navy is establishing a FFG 62 Land Based
    Engineering Site to reduce integration risks and test power and
    propulsion systems. Equipped with Navy standard Government Furnished
    Equipment (GFE) combat system elements, the Navy is confident in the
    multi-mission capabilities FFG 62 will deliver to the Fleet. The first
    three ships, the future USS Constellation, USS Congress, and USS
    Chesapeake are under contract, and the lead ship started construction
    on August 31, 2022. The fourth ship will go on contract in fiscal year
    2023.
        The LCS program has delivered 29 of the 35 total funded ships. The
    Navy has installed NSM on eight Independence variant LCS platforms, and
    14 LCS hulls are programmed to receive the weapon system in the future.
    Additionally, execution of the first LCS Lethality and Survivability
    (L&S) upgrade is on track for USS Gabrielle Giffords in fiscal year
    2024. Development of the L&S Common Combat System continues and will
    support transition from shipbuilder-procured contractor-furnished
    equipment to program of record government furnished equipment. Through
    the efforts of the LCS Strike team and Task Force LCS, reliability of
    the LCS platform has continued marked improvement, with successful LCS
    deployments in fiscal year 2022 in 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets and
    planned operations across the Fleets in fiscal year 2023. In the past
    year, the Navy has made significant progress in its effort to modernize
    mine countermeasure (MCM) capability, as the MCM Mission Package (MP)
    completed initial operational test and evaluation in fiscal year 2022
    with declaration of IOC imminent. This capability is expected to fully
    replace the aging Avenger-class MCM fleet by the end of fiscal year
    2027.
    Large Deck Amphibious Warfare Ships
        Amphibious warfare ships remain a critical component of the
    Nation's global forward presence, supporting deterrence, crisis and
    contingency response missions and providing decision space for our
    Nation's leaders. These ships support the amphibious assault, special
    operations, and expeditionary warfare missions of U.S. Marines and
    often Special Operations Forces by providing sovereign bases at sea,
    offering flexible services that provide shelter and sustainment, and
    enabling Marines, Sailors, and Special Operations Forces to plan and
    train a tailorable force.
        The America-class Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA 6) program provides
    a lethal and versatile platform to serve as the flagship for the
    Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG)/Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) now and
    in the future. Among other capabilities, these ships host the fifth-
    generation F-35B Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft that are critical
    to maintaining air combat superiority. USS Tripoli (LHA 7) transitioned
    to in-service and completed its maiden deployment in 2022. LHA 7 also
    completed the ``JSF Heavy'' operational test in 2022, embarking 20
    Joint Strike Fighters for the first time compared to a normal embark of
    ten aircraft. Bougainville (LHA 8), first of the LHA Flt I class, is at
    63 percent construction complete with launch planned for summer 2023.
    LHA 8 includes a well deck to increase operational flexibility and a
    reduced island structure increasing flight deck space to enhance
    aviation capability. The Fallujah (LHA 9) construction contract was
    awarded in October 2022 and fabrication started in December 2022.
    Following advance procurement funding appropriated in fiscal year 2023,
    this year's budget request accelerates LHA 10 by 4 years to a fiscal
    year 2027 ship.
    Other Amphibious Warfare Ships
        San Antoni-class Amphibious Transport Docks (LPD 17) provide the
    ability to operate offensively in a medium-density, multi-threat, anti-
    access littoral environment by being a seabase for the Marine
    Expeditionary Unit (MEU), capable of launching and recovering
    helicopters, tiltrotor aircraft, landing craft, and amphibious
    vehicles, and Special Operations Forces. The San Antonio-class LPD is
    an essential component of the amphibious warfare ship inventory, and
    continues to be constructed in a cost-efficient manner with
    capabilities critical to providing strategic mobility, force
    projection, and the range to campaign across the globe. NASA's Orion
    spacecraft for the Artemis I mission was successfully recovered inside
    the well deck of the USS Portland (LPD 27) in December 2022 off the
    coast of Baja California. USS Fort Lauderdale (LPD 28) commissioned in
    July 2022. Richard M McCool Jr (LPD 29) is 87 percent complete and is
    planned for delivery in the second quarter of fiscal year 2024. LPD 28
    and LPD 29 are the last of the LPD 17 Flight I line to be constructed
    and are the transition ships to the LPD 17 Flight II. The first
    Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar antenna was fitted on LPD 29 in
    January 2023, bringing the Navy one step closer to having a common
    radar hardware variant for carrier and amphibious ships. The first
    Flight II ship, Harrisburg (LPD 30), is 34 percent complete with a
    planned delivery in fiscal year 2026. Pittsburgh (LPD 31) started ship
    fabrication in September 2022.
    Connectors
        The Ship to Shore Connector (SSC) program provides a robust, modern
    operational capability to land credible combat power from amphibious
    ships across beaches not accessible by conventional landing craft, thus
    enabling the Marine Corps and Navy to project combat power ashore from
    the sea. The SSC provides a one-for-one enhanced replacement platform
    for legacy Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), which are beginning to
    reach an average 30 years of age. While no SSC are requested in fiscal
    year 2024 as the Navy works through orders under contract, SSC
    procurement is planned to continue in fiscal year 2025. The Navy is
    continuing to support production progress in serial SSC deliveries and
    evidenced by the delivery of four crafts (Hulls 103 to 106) over the
    last 15 months. The 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act added funding
    for three additional SSC for five total. The 2023 National Defense
    Authorization Act granted the authority to enter into one or more
    contracts for the procurement of up to 25 craft.
        The Navy is also replacing its aging Landing Craft Utility (LCU)
    fleet with the LCU 1700 program which recapitalizes the capabilities
    and flexibility currently provided by the LCU 1610 class in a more fuel
    efficient, cost effective, and updated design. The fiscal year 2024
    budget request continues to modernize the aging LCU fleet, which is
    currently approaching an average age of 50 years, with a request for
    two additional LCU 1700.
    Expeditionary, Auxiliary, and Other Vessels
        Expeditionary support vessels are flexible platforms used across a
    broad range of military operations in support of multiple operational
    phases. Moving forward the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) is being
    referred to as the Medium Landing Ship (LSM) to better align name to
    mission and differentiate the platform from traditional larger, multi-
    purpose amphibious warfare ships classes. LSM is not a forcible entry
    platform. It is planned to fill the capability gap that exists between
    the Navy's large, globally deployable, high endurance, multipurpose
    amphibious ships and smaller complementary landing craft. The Navy and
    Marine Corps have come to an agreement on requirements and will pursue
    a commercial parent design with vulnerability and recoverability
    improvements to support overall vessel survivability. LSM concepts were
    refined and matured with the five initial industry partners under
    preliminary design studies awarded in January 2022 with follow-on
    studies awarded in January 2023. The fiscal year 2024 funding request
    continues the development of acquisition documentation, equipment
    baseline, and efforts to support a lead hull contract award in fiscal
    year 2025.
        In the interim, the DON is evaluating a diverse group of existing
    naval platforms (e.g., EPF, SLV, LCU, etc.) to act as the bridging
    solution to support Stand-in Forces operating in the Indo-Pacific until
    LSM is available. Interim material solutions can support limited
    subsets of the overall LSM operational concept and may require
    additional modifications. The Marine Corps has chartered a commercial
    Stern Landing Vessel (SLV) to experiment and prototype the SLV's use in
    providing logistics/sustainment capability to support EABO and Stand in
    Forces with a flexibility to navigate the littorals to deliver cargo
    initially or for resupply and maneuver Marines. The SLV offers the
    Marine Corps the ability to experiment with a roll-on/roll-off vessel
    capable of beaching on sand, gravel, shale, small stone, and man-made
    marine ramps. On February 13, 2023, the first SLV was officially
    undocked from its dry-dock location and is undergoing final shipyard
    modifications and various trials and inspections. Once complete and
    following acceptance, the vessel will undergo a thorough technical
    evaluation period and then conduct experiments and participate in
    exercises. The fiscal year 2024 budget requests $31 million to support
    the planned acquisition of a 3d SLV to be delivered in fiscal year
    2025.
        In addition to the SLV, the Marine Corps is pursuing a future
    strategy for a smaller surface distribution connector--the Ancillary
    Surface Connector (ASC). ASC will be built by the commercial market to
    answer a Service requirement for a III Marine Expeditionary Force
    inter-island connector that supports the delivery of logistics over the
    ``last tactical mile.'' In this effort, the Marine Corps is currently
    conducting trade space analysis and evaluating contracting options to
    pursue the most cost-effective options for continued experimentation.
        Finally, the Navy is investigating the use of existing platforms to
    provide subsets of the overall LSM maneuver mobility and sustainment
    mission. These include, but are not limited to, the EPF which can
    provide a pier-to-pier role, and the LCU which can provide intra-island
    lift over limited ranges.
        Fast Transport (EPF) provides rapid, agile, intra-theater personnel
    and equipment lift in support of DMO and Littoral Operations in a
    Contested Environment. These vessels have and continue to support
    critical partnerships throughout the Indo-Pacific, to include theater
    security cooperation events such as Task Force Koa Moana with the
    Republic of Palau. During this annual event in 2021 and 2022, USNS City
    of Bismarck (EPF-9) supported Marines and Sailors from I Marine
    Expeditionary Force. The newest EPF, the Apalachicola (T-EPF 13),
    includes installation of evolutionary autonomy functions, serving as an
    important point of learning as Navy advances its unmanned vessel
    efforts. Apalachicola was delivered in February 2023 and successfully
    completed Unmanned Logistics Prototype trials. Cody (EPF 14) and Point
    Loma (EPF 15) are under construction with deliveries planned in fiscal
    year 2023 and fiscal year 2025 respectively. EPF 16 is scheduled to
    start construction in fiscal year 2023.
        The EPF Flight II (EPFs 14-16) does not have the autonomous
    capability of EPF 13 but is a modified EPF design that incorporates
    engineering, design and operational improvements which will provide
    Combatant Commanders with a more flexible and capable platform, and
    enable an embarkable Role 2 Enhanced (R2E) medical capability. EPF
    Flight II will be capable of conducting the same missions conducted by
    the EPF but with a reduced lift capacity.
        Fiscal year 2023 appropriations included the addition of two
    Expeditionary Medical Ships (EMS). EMS is an EPF variant that has a
    similar shallow draft, is all aluminum, and is a commercial-based
    catamaran design. However, it is optimized to provide dedicated R2E
    medical care and intra-theater patient movement. The EMS will provide
    combatant commanders high-speed transport mobility to move casualties
    over operational distances. Construction of the first EMS ship is
    expected to start in fiscal year 2024.
        The Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) is a modified commercial ship that
    acts as an afloat forward staging base. ESBs are versatile ships that
    provide a flight deck platform, mission deck and cargo capacity, and
    command and control capabilities for mission planning and execution.
    The Navy accepted delivery of USS John L Canley (ESB-6) on March 1,
    2023. ESB 7 had its keel laid in October 2022, and ESB 8 is planned to
    start construction in August 2023.
        The fiscal year 2024 request continues to expand DON combat
    logistics capacity with construction of the John Lewis (T-AO 205) class
    fleet replenishment oiler to recapitalize the T-AO 187 class, which has
    been in-service since the mid-1980's. USNS John Lewis, the lead ship of
    the T-AO 205 class, delivered in July 2022. T-AO hulls 206 to 209 are
    currently under construction, and hulls 211 and 212 were put on
    contract in August 2022. The Navy is working through revised economic
    assumptions to support inflation-related cost growth and schedule
    delays due to late material and shipyard workforce challenges.
        The T-ATS Towing, Salvage, and Rescue vessels are intended to
    replace the mission requirements of both retiring T-ARS 50 and T-ATF
    166 classes. They provide ocean-going tug, salvage, and rescue
    capabilities to support U.S. fleet operations and will be a multi-
    mission common hull platform capable of towing heavy ships. There are
    nine T-ATS on contract and seven under construction across two
    shipyards. A second production source was established in June 2021 to
    support the shipbuilding industrial base and expedite delivery to the
    fleet.
        The Auxiliary General Ocean Surveillance ships (T-AGOS 25 class)
    consists of a seven-vessel program of record, with four vessels
    procured through the FYDP. Ocean Surveillance ships gather underwater
    acoustical data by providing a ship platform capable of anti-submarine
    passive and active acoustic surveillance. T-AGOS ships are operated by
    Military Sealift Command and support the anti-submarine warfare mission
    of Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Commanders. Fiscal year 2024 includes the
    SCN funds necessary to award the Detail Design & Construction contract
    for the first ship this year. The T-AGOS 25 ships will replace the T-
    AGOS 19 and T-AGOS 23 class ships.
    Strategic Sealift
        The DON remains committed to sealift readiness and
    recapitalization, working with our partners in USTRANSCOM and the
    Maritime Administration (MARAD). This recapitalization strategy
    includes procurement and refurbishment of used commercial Roll-On Roll-
    Off ships for replacement of aging Ready Reserve Force capacity. The
    buy-used recapitalization program provides a stable acquisition profile
    with forecasted maintenance and repair costs to meet strategic mobility
    requirements at a moderate level of risk. The work to modify and outfit
    these used vessels will continue to be performed by U.S. shipyards. On
    February 27, 2023, MARAD completed the purchase of three ships that
    recapitalize over 660,000 square feet of Sealift capacity. In March
    2023, two used vessels, the Cape Arundel and Cape Cortes, will complete
    modification and outfitting availabilities with commercial industry
    partners and enter into the Ready Reserve Force with 432,000 square
    feet of capacity.
        In parallel with recapitalizing strategic sealift, the Navy and
    Marine Corps are in the early stages of developing requirements for the
    next generation of maritime prepositioned ships. The DON will initiate
    a new construction program to replace the current Maritime
    Prepositioning Force (MPF) ship portfolio. New MPF ships will include
    capability adaptations that support reliance on sea-basing to
    persistently project, sustain, and maintain discrete forces forward in
    the competition space. Funding included over the FYDP will support
    industry studies to prepare for new construction design work.
    Currently, five of the 12 maritime prepositioning ships have returned
    to CONUS in fiscal year 2023 and have been placed in reduced operating
    status-5 (ROS-5). ROS-5 is designed to have the ships fully ready to
    activate and load cargo 5 days after notification. All ships,
    regardless of status, will continue to be maintained by, and operate
    through, Military Sealift Command for MPF usage through fiscal year
    2024. Two of the five ROS-5 ships will remain partially pre-loaded with
    prepositioned materiel at Blount Island Command. The remaining three
    ships will be in various CONUS lay berths and not be loaded with
    prepositioned materiel. In fiscal year 2025 those three ships are
    scheduled to transition to MARAD and be removed from the Naval
    prepositioned force.
    Sustainment, Modernization, Service Life Extensions and Divestments
        The Department continues to prioritize proper maintenance and
    modernization of the Navy's fleet to ensure the Fleet Commanders have
    the ships they need with the required capabilities to quickly respond
    to evolving operational demands. The Navy is making headway in reducing
    deferred maintenance backlogs and driving down the days of maintenance
    delay by improving the timely delivery of ships back to the Fleet on
    time and with all required work completed. The Navy is focusing efforts
    across the entire maintenance planning and execution spectrum from work
    package planning, procurement strategies, and waterfront execution to
    drive out unnecessary delays and improve performance. The DON is also
    leveraging the Perform to Plan approach across the portfolio to improve
    quality of specification packages, workload planning and port loading,
    earlier government material delivery to our industry partners,
    inspection streamlining, and ensuring roles and responsibilities are
    assigned to enable efficiency in execution without sacrificing proper
    oversight responsibilities. Proper planning and sharing of workload
    projections with industry allows for the Navy's partners to effectively
    manage their infrastructure and workforce and identify opportunities
    for targeted infrastructure investments.
        Beyond maintaining the current Fleet, the Navy is also focused on
    critical modernization efforts that will ensure the Navy's in-service
    Fleet has relevant combat capability. The Navy is investing $17 billion
    over 17 years to modernize 25 Flight IIA DDGs that will ensure
    sustained combat effectiveness, mission relevancy, and enable the AEGIS
    Fleet to achieve their full expected service lives. The fiscal year
    2024 budget funds the second procurement of a SPY-6 variant for back-
    fit on in-service DDGs, the combined hull, mechanical & electrical and
    combat system/AEGIS modernization upgrade installations on three DDGs
    in fiscal year 2024, the necessary procurements for another two
    installs planned in fiscal year 2026, and the procurement of the first
    high efficiency super chiller shipset planned for installation in
    fiscal year 2026. The Navy is working to ensure lessons learned from
    Cruiser Modernization are incorporated in the availability planning for
    DDG Modernization availabilities across acquisition planning, including
    contract type and procurement strategies, system lay-up and
    reactivation, crew manning, and training. Additionally, to ensure the
    Navy and its industry partners are properly prepared for the magnitude
    and complexity of DDG Mod 2.0 availabilities scheduled to commence in
    fiscal year 2028, the Navy is utilizing a ``crawl-walk-run'' approach
    of stand-alone and incremental modernization for the early Flight IIA
    hulls.
        The Navy is committed to balancing the submarine maintenance
    workload within the public and private shipyards, as well as
    maintaining a healthy industrial base for both submarine maintenance
    and new construction. To that end, the Navy has a new 15-Year
    Maintenance Strategy to improve SSN material availability and outline
    approaches to optimize submarine repair at all shipyards, including
    private-sector maintenance execution. In fiscal year 2023, the Navy
    with OSD(CAPE) is conducting a shipyard capacity and capability study
    to identify additional areas for improvement. The Navy will continue to
    work with our industry partners to improve cost and schedule
    performance for submarine maintenance, providing valuable maintenance
    surge capacity.
        To ensure the Navy's resources are most effectively utilized across
    the portfolio and support the NDS priorities, the fiscal year 2024
    budget proposes decommissioning 11 ships in fiscal year 2024. Of these
    11 ships, three are at or beyond expected service life (ESL) and eight
    are prior to ESL. For the three ships at or beyond their ESL,
    inactivation in fiscal year 2024 is a standard practice at the end of a
    ship's lifecycle. For the eight ships the Navy plans to divest of in
    fiscal year 2024 (3 CG, 3 LSD, 2 LCS), substantial maintenance, repair,
    and modernization costs significantly outweigh warfighting
    contribution, and the cost savings from these divestments allow for
    realignment to higher priority, more capable platforms for strategic
    competition. The Navy is continuing to trade near-term Fleet size and
    capacity for long-term capability. The fiscal year 2024 budget does not
    resource a Fleet size beyond what the Navy forecasts can be reasonably
    sustained, accounting for manning, training, maintenance, ordnance,
    operations, and future modernization.
        The CG and LSDs have exceeded their expected utility for current
    and future conflict. Keeping these platforms longer than the Navy plans
    would require significant resources to maintain, modernize, and operate
    them with limited return on that investment. The Navy cannot justify
    the resultant limited capability these assets would provide over their
    remaining service life when compared with the benefits of investing in
    critical modernization and new construction efforts. For the LCS, the
    fiscal year 2024 budget maintains the Navy's plan to divest LCS 6 and
    LCS 8 in fiscal year 2024. These hulls are the oldest of the ``block-
    buy'' Independence-class LCS and are in excess to the planned LCS force
    requirements.
    Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP)
        The Navy's four public shipyards perform an essential role in
    national defense by executing maintenance on submarines and aircraft
    carriers to provide combat-ready ships to the fleet. SIOP, when fully
    executed, will deliver required dry dock repairs and upgrades to
    support current and planned future classes of nuclear-powered aircraft
    carriers and submarines, optimize workflow within the shipyards through
    significant changes to their physical layout, and recapitalize
    industrial plant equipment with modern technology that will
    substantially increase productivity and
    safety.
        The Navy is instituting a first-of-its-kind infrastructure
    acquisition process for SIOP, similar to major defense acquisition
    programs. The SIOP-tailored acquisition process will guide program
    execution and establishes threshold and objective parameters for
    overall cost, schedule, and performance of the SIOP at each shipyard
    with total program cost.
        With the tremendous support received from Congress--to include the
    $1.9 billion appropriated in fiscal year 2023--the program is advancing
    three lines of effort: dry dock modernization, optimization, and
    capital equipment. The Navy has completed construction of the $158
    million Super Flood Basin at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) and
    commenced the construction of two new dry docks; completed construction
    of the $73 million Norfolk Naval Shipyard (NNSY) Production Training
    Facility; completed $167 million of design for Pearl Harbor Naval
    Shipyard (PHNS) Dry Dock (DD) 3 Replacement, and on March 10, awarded a
    $2.8 billion task order for the construction of the PHNS DD3
    Replacement. Planning for DD3 Replacement successfully employed early
    contractor involvement at multiple milestones throughout design
    development and continuous macroeconomic assessments which contributed
    to a competitive bid environment and multiple bids being received. The
    fiscal year 2024 budget confirms the Administration's commitment to
    this program and requests $2.7 billion for SIOP.
    Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles
        The DON continues to invest and mature all the enabling and core
    technologies needed to deliver unmanned surface and undersea
    capabilities. These capabilities along with the platforms are
    foundational to creating the hybrid fleet of the future. MUM-T will
    increase capacity, standoff, reach, and provide protection of our
    manned platforms while reducing risk to our sailors and marines. USVs
    will expand Information Operations and missile magazine depth.
        In keeping with the USV systems engineering pillars, fiscal year
    2022 efforts continued work with the Navy's industry partners on
    maturing reliable Hull, Mechanical and Electrical capability; advancing
    the required networks and radios; common core USV Combat System; vessel
    control software; sensory perception and autonomy; and platform and
    payload prototyping. In fiscal year 2022, the Navy's autonomous-enabled
    ships traveled over 45,000 miles in the autonomy mode, and SeaHawk, a
    medium USV, provided operational support to US Pacific Fleet for an
    extended period of time.
        By the end of fiscal year 2024, the Navy will have an operational
    MUSV Land-Based Test Site, will have initiated LUSV land-based testing,
    and will operate several USV prototypes including, four Overlord USVs,
    Sea Hunter and SeaHawk. Additionally, the first autonomy-enabled EPF-13
    will be available for operations to support experimentation and CONOPs
    development.
        The MCM USV program includes the development and production of MCM
    USV craft and Payload Delivery Systems to deliver multiple capabilities
    to meet MCM MP requirements. MCM USV reached IOC in July 2022 alongside
    the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS), one of its two baseline
    payloads. Initial operational test and evaluation of the MCM MP
    concluded in August 2022, followed by operational testing focused on
    mine hunting capability from the MCM USV which completed in September
    2022. A MCM MP onboard USS Cincinnati (LCS 20) successfully executed
    the full MCM sequence. This included both the semi-autonomous MCM USV
    operating with the AQS-20 mine-hunting sonar, minesweeping payload, and
    MH-60S operating with the Archerfish Airborne Mine Neutralization
    System (AMNS) and Airborne Laser Mine Detection System. Together, these
    systems were able to find, fix, identify, target, and neutralize mines.
    The program continues to develop Barracuda to provide future mine
    neutralizing capability.
        Investing in a family of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) will
    expand Navy reach and persistence by augmenting manned platform
    capacity with unmanned autonomous systems. The Navy remains committed
    to completing the fabrication of the Orca, Extra Large Unmanned
    Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV), a pier-launched UUV capable of carrying large
    payloads. The Navy christened the XLUUV Test and Evaluation asset in
    Q3FY22 and internal component testing completed in Q2FY23. The Large
    Displacement Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (LDUUV) which will support
    Subsea and Seabed Warfare (SSW) and Intelligence Preparation of the
    Operating Environment conducted in-water testing during fiscal year
    2022, but was divested in fiscal year 2023 due to deferment of the
    primary host interface platform (SSN Payload Handling System) and to
    support higher Navy priorities. The LDUUV program aimed to address a
    critical gap with increased depth, endurance, and payload capacity. The
    Navy is re-evaluating LDUUV hosting requirements while continuing to
    conduct LDUUV experimentation and demonstrations of SSW capabilities.
        The Navy awarded the Medium UUV (MUUV) Program of Record contract
    in July 2022. It supports the development of a common Medium vehicle
    merging Expeditionary Mine Countermeasures Viperfish with Submarine
    Force Razorback Torpedo Tube Launch and Recovered requirements,
    demonstrating Navy commitment to identify efficiencies in procurement
    and sustainment of unmanned systems.
        Through a partnership with the Defense Innovation Unit, the DON
    used accelerated acquisition authorities such as commercial solution
    openings and other transactions to award the Lionfish contract.
    Lionfish is a small, lightweight, highly portable vehicle that can be
    mission configured to support Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Naval
    Special Warfare, Underwater Construction Teams, and Mobile Diving &
    Salvage Units. The program continues prototype development and user
    testing, and plans to award a production contract for 10 MK18 MOD3
    Lionfish vehicles for the Marine Corps and three NSW vehicles for the
    Navy in Q3FY23. Lionfish will include advancements to the artificial
    intelligence, machine learning, Automated Target Recognition, and
    autonomy processes currently fielded with the MK18 MOD2 UUV, expanding
    the capabilities of the DON's intelligent family of UUVs.
        The Marine Corps continues developing the Long-Range Unmanned
    Surface Vessel (LRUSV). LRUSV will be capable of launching the Organic
    Precision Fires loitering munition to engage targets on land and at sea
    to enhance Naval and Joint Force Commanders' sea denial campaigns. The
    Marine Corps accepted delivery of five LRUSV prototypes between 2QFY22
    and 2QFY23 for experimentation and analysis, and an early operational
    assessment will be conducted in Q3FY23. The Marine Corps remains on
    schedule and within budget to deliver an LRUSV Experimental Platoon for
    further development and unit training.
        In accordance with our plans to build a DMO hybrid fleet, the Navy
    and Marine Corps are conducting studies to assess the supporting
    infrastructure requirements of unmanned systems, to include
    ``motherships'' to provide on demand command and control nodes in a
    denied environment, launch and recovery, maintenance, and resupply/
    refuel for all unmanned systems at sea, in all domains in addition to
    evaluating potential new concepts of operations.
    Combat Systems
        The Navy continues to field the most capable and lethal surface and
    submarine combat systems in the world, making investments that take
    full advantage of open architecture and continuously evolving
    commercial technology to rapidly deliver real-time and reliable
    capability to the warfighter and to break the paradigm of hardware-
    software dependent deliveries. Continued investment in the Forge, the
    Navy's combat system software factory, supports the continuing
    advancement in implementing industry standards of Infrastructure as a
    Service, Platform as a Service, and Software as a Service to rapidly
    deliver iterative updates to the AEGIS Weapon System. As the Navy
    continues Integrated Combat System development efforts, new
    construction and in-service Aegis BL9 and BL10 ships will continue to
    receive upgrades via Capability Packages. AEGIS BL10 with the
    integration of the AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)
    will deliver significant performance improvements over BL9 and the AN/
    SPY-1 radar, expanding the sensor coverage and enhancing the Navy's
    ability to perform the IAMD mission to defeat more advanced and more
    numerous threats. The DON is leveraging the AMDR's design and testing
    maturity as well as the common training and sustainment benefits to
    field the AN/SPY-6(V)2 and SPY-6(V)3 to CVNs, LPDs, LHAs and FFGs, and
    to backfit existing DDG Flight IIA destroyers with SPY-6(V)4.
        The Navy continues to equip its submarines with ever-evolving
    undersea combat systems, utilizing the Submarine Warfare Federated
    Tactical Systems (SWFTS) modernization process for hardware Technology
    Insertions and Advanced Processing Build software upgrades. This
    process leverages commercial off-the-shelf technologies to provide
    advanced capability improvements at lower cost. SWFTS has successfully
    delivered a progression in warfighting capabilities for decades to our
    Fleet SSNs, SSGNs and SSBNs including advancements in the combat,
    sonar, electronic warfare, and imaging systems. SWFTS delivered the
    first TI-20 installs to the Fleet in fiscal year 2022, bringing added
    capability and improved system architecture, strengthening
    cybersecurity and integrating new payload capabilities to provide
    increased lethality. The fiscal year 2024 budget supports continued
    implementation of Agile and DevSecOps software development best
    practices at SWFTS vendors to increase quality, expedite capability
    delivery, and improve cybersecurity by engraining cyber resiliency into
    the system architecture. These efforts improve the Fleet's ability to
    protect against known threats, detect unknown threats when they occur,
    and respond and recover quickly to an operational State.
                               tactical aviation
    Carrier Air Wing (CVW)
        The striking power of the CVW remains the cornerstone of power
    projection capability from 11 of the world's most survivable airfields,
    our aircraft carriers (CVNs). The modernization of the air wing, and
    weapons, keeps the aircraft carrier relevant through the carrier's 50
    year service life. Today's Air Wing is transitioning to a mixture of
    4th and 5th Generation strike fighter aircraft that continue to
    incorporate advanced capabilities to support the objectives of the NDS.
    The F-35C is replacing the early lot F/A-18E/Fs. E-2Ds, with an
    advanced airborne radar, networking, and aerial refueling capability
    are replacing the legacy E-2C. The CMV-22B is replacing legacy C-2As in
    support of strike group logistics, and Next Generation Jammer (NGJ)
    pods will replace the legacy ALQ-99 pods on the EA-18G and provide full
    spectrum integrated non-kinetic effects.
        The Air Wing of the Future (AWOTF) refers to the composition of the
    CVW as it on-ramps advanced capabilities and capacity, measured at key
    milestones in the near-, mid-, and long-term. The CVW will adapt and
    transform from an all ``manned'' to a teamed ``manned-unmanned'' force
    structure over the next two decades. When discussing the AWOTF, a time
    horizon may be included to specify the force composition at that time.
        In the near-term, the AWOTF achieves a mix of F-35C Lightning II,
    F/A-18E/F Block III strike fighters, and EA-18G Growlers, and
    introduces the MQ-25 Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV). The MQ-25 will take
    over the aerial refueling mission, extending strike range, enhancing
    maneuverability, and enabling all strike fighters to focus on the high-
    end fight. In the mid-and long-term, the AWOTF will deliver game-
    changing lethality and survivability through the NGAD FoS.
        The DON has submitted a legislative proposal to remove the title 10
    requirement to stand up a 10th CVW by October 1, 2025. The current CVN
    maintenance schedule efficiently pairs nine CVWs to nine operational
    CVNs according to ship availability; 11 total CVNs with two under
    maintenance protocols. The Navy prioritizes investments in AWOTF over
    constituting a 10th CVW ahead of need.
    Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Aviation Combat Element (ACE)
        The MEU is the embodiment of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force
    (MAGTF) as a self-contained, forward-deployed response force. The ARG/
    MEU is a lethal, forward-deployed, sea-based, expeditionary force that
    can operate across the range of military operations with a tailorable
    and uniquely suited complement of aircraft. The MEU's available
    inventory includes the F-35B, MV-22B, H-1, and CH-53K. The F-35B is the
    only 5th Generation platform designed to operate aboard amphibious
    warfare ships and expeditionary landing fields. The F-35B is a vital
    part of the Marine Corps' modernization efforts, is part of the Stand-
    in Force, and is a critical enabler for the Joint Force. The F-35B
    provides commanders with strategic agility, enhanced situational
    awareness, and greater freedom of maneuver in a highly contested
    environment.
        The MV-22B tiltrotor aircraft continues to be the most capable
    assault support platform in the joint inventory and has revolutionized
    how assault support is conducted with its superior speed, range, and
    survivability. The new CH-53K is the only fully marinized heavy-lift
    rotorcraft, and is a critical asset for mobility and logistical support
    to distributed operations in a contested environment. The future ACE
    will also feature a Group 3 UAS capability that provide both an organic
    land-and maritime-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    capability. Additionally, Marine Corps efforts are underway to conduct
    a demonstration of an afloat mission control element (MCE) for MQ-9A
    ER. This capability could potentially be tethered to the MEUs, adding a
    critical, over-the-horizon, persistent surveillance, reconnaissance,
    and target acquisition capability and airborne network gateway services
    to the MEU's overall abilities.
                        airborne electronic attack (aea)
        The EA-18G Growler is a critical enabler for the Joint Force,
    bringing fully netted electronic warfare capabilities to the fight and
    providing essential capabilities in the Electromagnetic Maneuver
    Warfare environment. The fiscal year 2024 budget retains and fully
    funds the EA-18G aircraft and squadrons across the FYDP. Next
    Generation Jammer (NGJ) pods will replace the legacy ALQ-99 pods on the
    EA-18G and provide full spectrum integrated non-kinetic effects. The
    delivery of NGJ increases EA-18G Growler's lethality and provides a
    multi-generational leap in capability against radar and communication
    targets utilizing advanced AEA techniques as well as improved
    reliability and maintainability. NGJ is phased by threat, with initial
    focus on Mid-Band (MB), followed by Low-Band (LB).
        NGJ-MB is a cooperative development and production program with
    Australia, with IOC scheduled in 4QFY23. Delivery of the six production
    representative System Demonstration Test Articles (SDTAs) began in July
    2022, with 5 of 6 SDTA delivered as of February 2023 and the 6th to be
    delivered the end of March 2023. These Test Articles will be used to
    support the completion of Developmental Test and the entirety of
    Operational Test (OT). OT is currently on track to start spring 2023,
    with a focus on the completion of aeromechanical and mission systems
    flight test. The fiscal year 2024 budget includes $40.5 million in
    RDT&E funding to complete the Verification of Correction of
    Deficiencies (VCD) of the baseline NGJ-MB program and to begin
    development of the NGJ-MB Extended (MBX) Engineering Change Proposal
    (ECP) to extend the upper frequency range coverage limit of the system
    to counter modern and adaptive threats. The fiscal year 2024 budget
    request also includes $426.4 million in APN funding for nine Full Rate
    Initial Production I shipsets, associated support equipment, training
    equipment and production support. Three LRIP I shipsets are scheduled
    to begin delivery 4QFY23.
        NGJ-LB is a critical AEA capability to augment and replace the
    legacy ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System on the EA-18G in the low
    frequency bands, and is a cooperative development program with
    Australia. The fiscal year 2024 budget request $250.6 million RDT&E for
    NGJ-LB to focus on pod design, advanced capabilities development, and
    the build of aeromechanical and mission systems test pods to support
    ground and flight testing.
        Growler Block 2 (GB2) will deliver capabilities to the warfighter
    to detect, locate, identify and counter advanced Integrated Air Defense
    Systems and Complex Emitters. GB2 will utilize a phased approach for
    spiral development of AEA capabilities to modernize processing,
    sensors, and aircrew decision aids to maintain dominance in the modern
    electromagnetic spectrum. Phase 1 will include an upgraded Next
    Generation Electronic Attack Unit with Open Mission Systems
    architecture, Multi-Level Security, and incorporation of the Reactive
    Electronic Attack Measures capability. Phase 2 is the addition of the
    advanced Multi-function Array into the inboard leading edge flaps of
    the aircraft, augmenting the ALQ-218 functionality and capability. GB2
    serves as a critical technology development and risk reduction effort
    to support Naval Aviation's Air Wing of the Future.
        The Marine Corps, through the INTREPID TIGER II program, is
    bringing advanced Electronic Warfare (EW) to all its aviation
    platforms, and is focused on MUM-T to answer the MAGTF's requirements
    for AEA. The Marine Corps has worked in conjunction with OSD to
    purchase the first two XQ-58 Valkyrie CCA platforms to test EW effects
    in partnership with F-35 and our Assault Support platforms.
                     airborne command and control aircraft
        The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye is the Navy's carrier-based Airborne
    Command and Control aircraft, equipped with an advanced airborne radar,
    aerial refueling capability, and network connectivity required by Naval
    and Joint Force commanders to provide command and control to achieve
    and maintain air and sea superiority, and counter adversaries Anti-
    Access and Area Denial strategies. The E-2D provides unique Theater Air
    and Missile Defense capabilities, and is a cornerstone of the Naval
    Integrated Fire Control system of systems linking Navy and Marine Corps
    fighter aircraft, Navy surface combatants, and Marine Corps ground
    units.
        The sixth Full Rate Production Lot 7 aircraft delivered in January
    2023. Modernization priorities focus on Fleet capabilities to pace the
    threat, including Interoperability, Crypto Modernization, Communication
    and Navigation Hardware; essential Command and Control; networking and
    sensor performance capabilities that are critical enablers to Naval
    Integrated Fire Control; vital upgrades and improvements to enable
    Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) and Naval Operational
    Architecture [Theater Combat ID and Hawkeye Cockpit Technical Refresh].
    These modernization efforts are interdependent and required to keep
    pace with the rapidly advancing JADC2 environment and equally rapidly
    advancing adversary capability.
                 assault support and logistics support aircraft
    Tiltrotor Aircraft (USMC MV-22 Osprey and Navy CMV-22B)
        The V-22 tiltrotor capability has revolutionized military air
    transport with its unmatched combat range and airspeed. The Marine
    Corps MV-22 continues to support worldwide operations and provide a
    forward presence in INDOPACOM, CENTCOM, and EUCOM. In fiscal year 2023,
    the U.S. Air Force (USAF) continues nacelle improvement implementation,
    with an accelerated timeline for this readiness-and reliability-
    enhancing effort. The Marine Corps is working to coordinate and fund a
    tailored nacelle improvement program based on USAF efforts. This
    program is designed to enable a much faster fleet incorporation rate at
    a price the Marine Corps can afford, providing a significant reduction
    in required fleet maintenance hours than would have been otherwise
    possible.
        The Navy continues to leverage MV-22 investments to recapitalize
    the legacy C-2 fleet with CMV-22B aircraft in support of strike group
    logistics. The program declared IOC in December 2021, and completed its
    first two deployments in support of the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike
    group (CSG) and the USS Abraham Lincoln CSG in 2022. The third
    deployment will commence in 2023.
        The fiscal year 2024 budget requests $137.6 million in RDT&E for
    continued V-22 development and product improvements, including a Helmet
    Mounted Display/Degraded Visual Environment to improve pilot situation
    awareness and safety in degraded visual environments. Fiscal year 2024
    budget also includes $243.2 million in APN for production line
    shutdown, modifications, common configuration, and nacelle
    improvements. With the fiscal year 2023 congressional add of five V-22s
    (one MV-22 and four CMV-22), the program is funded for 360 MV-22
    aircraft for the Marine Corps and 48 CMV-22 aircraft for the Navy. Both
    programs are now fully funded to their programs of record. Fiscal year
    2022 was the final year of V-22 procurement under MYP III.
    CH-53K
        CH-53K is an optimized vertical, heavy lift, sea-based, long-range
    solution for the naval force, providing agile maritime logistical
    connectors with greater payloads and speed than any current or emerging
    rotorcraft. The CH-53K will complement connectors to enable littoral
    maneuver and provide logistical support to a widely disaggregated naval
    force. The Marine Corps achieved IOC for the CH-53K in April 2022, and
    in December 2022 the program was approved for Full Rate Production.
    This closely follows completion of a thorough Initial Operational Test
    and Evaluation period that resulted in over 3,000 mishap free hours
    flown in various challenging environments and terrain. In January 2023,
    Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron demonstrated the CH-53K
    performance with an external load certification lift of a 22,000 pound
    F-35 airframe. A contract to procure the sixth Low-Rate Initial
    Production Lot of nine aircraft was signed in January 2022, and the DON
    has been granted the authority to enter a block buy contract for the
    first Full Rate Production lots--Lot 7 in fiscal year 2023 and Lot 8 in
    fiscal year 2024. A block buy contract leverages aircraft volume
    quantity to realize significant cost savings, providing stability to
    the industrial base and improved production efficiencies while
    supporting the Marine Corps' plans to deploy the first CH-53K MEU
    detachment in fiscal year 2025.
        The Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget requests $222.3 million in
    RDT&E to continue the CH-53K development, test, and standup of organic
    test capabilities for follow-on improvements and $2.2 billion in APN
    for procurement of 15 Full Rate Production aircraft, initial spares,
    and modifications.
                           executive support aircraft
        The VH-92A Presidential Helicopter replaces the legacy VH-3D and
    VH-60N and will provide safe, reliable, and secure executive
    transportation. The fiscal year 2024 President's Budget requests $35.4
    million in RDT&E for VH-92A Helicopter Improvements and $60.5 million
    APN for Executive Helicopter Series (VH-3D, VH-60N and VH-92A). RDT&E
    funding is required for continued VH-92A improvements and follow-on
    test and evaluation activities. These efforts include VH-92A Mission
    Communications System upgrades to both software and hardware,
    enhancements to required Wideband Beyond Line-of-Sight capabilities,
    test aircraft and facilities; and test and evaluation efforts for
    distributed network communications, high-hot aircraft performance
    enhancements and cockpit upgrades. APN in the amount of $60.5 million
    is required for retrofit modifications to the VH-92A Mission
    Communications System and continued modifications to the VH-3D and VH-
    60N to ensure communications interoperability through the remainder of
    the lifecycle.
                              fixed-wing aircraft
    KC-130J (USMC)
        The KC-130J Super Hercules remains a force multiplier, supporting
    humanitarian, contingency, and expeditionary operations worldwide. The
    KC-130J has the highest deploy-to-dwell ratio in the Marine Corps as it
    provides critical tactical aerial refueling and organic lift
    capabilities to deployed MEUs and Combatant Commanders. Incorporation
    of the Block 8.1 upgrade and the Department of the Navy Large Aircraft
    Infrared Countermeasures will increase the platform's capability,
    performance, and survivability. The fiscal year 2024 budget requests
    $241.3 million in APN to procure two KC-130Js through a USAF contract.
    These aircraft will be fielded to a new Marine Corps Active Duty
    squadron, VMGR-153, in Hawaii in support of Indo-Pacific mobility.
    Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO)
        The Navy's TACAMO mission provides survivable, reliable, and
    endurable airborne nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)
    capabilities to the nuclear triad and is a vital link to the Navy's
    SSBN fleet, the most survivable leg of the triad. The TACAMO mission is
    currently flown on the E-6B Mercury (Boeing 707 airframe), an aging
    platform currently undergoing simultaneous sustainment and
    modernization. TACAMO mission recapitalization requires a new platform
    to ensure continued success of the mission in the future. The C-130J-30
    (stretched Super Hercules) aircraft has been selected as the
    recapitalization platform and TACAMO mission systems will be developed
    and integrated by a third-party contractor. In fiscal year 2024, the
    Navy will invest $213.7 million of RDT&E toward platform development
    and completion of Milestone B. Funding in fiscal year 2024 includes
    $12.2 million toward spares to support the three C-130J-30 test
    aircraft procured in fiscal year 2023, $76.7 million for non-recurring
    engineering contracts on the C-130J airframe, and $71.2 million for
    very low frequency (VLF) transmit system modernization. Investments in
    fiscal year 2024 set the stage for successful TACAMO mission
    integration on the C-130J-30 supporting U.S. nuclear deterrence and
    Columbia's assured second strike for decades to come.
                            maritime patrol aircraft
        The P-8A is a heavily modified and militarized variant of Boeing's
    737 commercial airframe and is DOD's only long-range full-spectrum ASW,
    cue-to-kill platform, with substantial armed Anti-Surface Warfare
    (ASuW) and networked Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
    (ISR) capabilities. The P-8A warfighting inventory requirement is 138
    aircraft and is fielding in three Increments. Increments 1, 2, and
    Increment 3 Block 1, which consisted of ECP 4 and ECP 5, have fielded.
    Increment 3 Block 2, consisting of ECP 6 and ECP 7, significantly
    improves Navy operational plan (OPLAN) outcomes with P-8A Increment 3
    modified aircraft--specifically in ASW warfighting scenarios. Block 2
    includes ASW Signal Intelligence, Wideband SATCOM, Higher-Than-Secret
    processing, enhanced track management and sensor fusion (Minotaur), and
    the ASW critical warfighting capability Enhanced Multi-Static Active
    Coherent (MAC-E), and is scheduled to initially field in fiscal year
    2026.
        The fiscal year 2024 budget request includes $168.5 million in
    RDT&E for integration of ECP 6 and ECP 7 to complete baseline
    capability fielding and P-8A rapid capability development efforts to
    pace emergent threats. $347.4 million in APN is requested for fleet
    modification kits, deficiency corrections, safety upgrades, and the
    initiation of Boeing's P-8A production line shutdown activities. Boeing
    intends to initiate P-8A production line shutdown activities in fiscal
    year 2024 if no additional P-8A orders are received. Funding requested
    in the fiscal year 2024 budget achieves 128 of 138 warfighting
    inventory objective addressing current threat and strategy. As of
    February 2023, 117 aircraft have been delivered.
                        unmanned aircraft systems (uas)
        Naval Aviation continues to integrate unmanned systems into the
    Fleet to enable a fundamental shift in the way the DON conducts naval
    aviation operations. Broadening unmanned aviation efforts will decrease
    risk to personnel, allow greater persistence, longer ranges, improved
    data speed and accuracy, and a faster decision cycle. These
    capabilities offer the DON increased asymmetric operational
    opportunities and tactical advantages that provide the warfighters an
    edge to dominate and win in ongoing and future conflicts. The fiscal
    year 2024 budget prioritizes the continued development and production
    of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to support current Fleet ISR
    requirements and future UAS integration into the CVW, ARG, and MEU.
    MQ-25A Unmanned Carrier Aviation
        MQ-25A will increase the strike range, capability, and lethality of
    the CVW through organic mission and recovery tanking, and provide an
    ISR capability to the CSG. As the primary CVW mission and recovery
    tanker, MQ-25A will increase available CVW Strike Fighter assets and
    preserve F/A-18E/F Fatigue Life Expenditure. MQ-25 is integral to the
    Air Wing of the Future and establishes the foundation for MUM-T and
    autonomous operations from the CVN. The fiscal year 2024 budget
    continues investment in MQ-25 and the Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission
    Control System (UMCS) development, begins testing of Navy MQ-25A and
    procures three MQ-25A air vehicles to increase fleet inventory. MQ-25A
    will IOC in late 2026. The fiscal year 2024 budget request supports
    procurement for the MQ-25 Stingray with $596.3 million in APN and
    continues RDTE funding with $220.4 million.
    MQ-4C Triton
        The MQ-4C Triton is a persistent force multiplier that delivers
    situational awareness of the battle space to shorten the sensor-to-
    shooter decision loop in the maritime domain. MQ-4C Triton's
    persistence and sensor mix is integral to Navy's Maritime Strategy to
    deliver a more lethal and effective global Joint Force.
        VUP-19 completed an Early Operational Capability (EOC) deployment
    with two aircraft in an IFC-3 configuration to INDOPACOM and executed
    2419.9 hours from January 2020 0-October 2022.
        The program has delivered the first two fleet MQ-4C Triton Multi-
    Intelligence (Multi-INT) Integrated Functional Capability Four (IFC-4)
    Increment 1 configuration Unmanned Aircraft (UA) on-schedule supporting
    Unit Level Training (ULT) and Operational Test (OT) ahead of IOC in
    August 2023.
        The fiscal year 2024 budget requests $416.0 million in APN to
    continue procurement of two MQ-4C Triton UA and associated support
    elements, and $12.1 million in RDTE, with an additional $300.4 million
    for MQ-4 modernization RDTE for Increment 2 capability development.
    MQ-9A Extended Range (ER)
        The Marine Corps MQ-9A ER is a critical enabler for the Naval and
    Joint Force providing an extended range, long-endurance multi-mission
    ISR capability through a suite of sensors designed to detect surface
    and air threats. The MQ-9A ER is a linchpin in providing Maritime
    Domain Awareness (MDA), as well as providing resilient and persistent
    information flow, enabling command and control of EABO and DMO forces
    against near or peer threats.
        The Indo-Pacific has unique challenges requiring the Stand-in Force
    to be able to operate over significant distances between ground units.
    An MQ-9A ER overhead equipped with an Airborne Network Extension (ANE)
    payload facilitates connectivity for Stand-in Forces operating at the
    forward edge of the battlespace. MQ-9A ER will also provide an
    Electronic Warfare and Airborne Early Warning capability to enhance the
    situational awareness of decisionmakers, and provide input to the joint
    common operational picture. With the addition of a Smart Sensor
    autonomous capability, the MQ-9A ER will be enhanced through automatic
    cueing and fusing of tracks to other onboard sensors. The Marine Corps
    is set to have 20x MQ-9A Block 5 air vehicles, 14 x Ground Control
    Stations (GCS), and payloads to conduct assigned missions.
        Existing U.S. Air Force and Air National Guard efforts are being
    leveraged to reduce cost as the Marine Corps matures this nascent
    Service-level capability, reducing risk.
                                weapons programs
    Munitions Inventory and Industrial Base
        The President's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Requests $6.9 billion for
    the Weapons Procurement account. This level of funding represents a
    significant increase over fiscal year 2023, allowing for continued
    modernization of our weapons inventory with critical capabilities to
    enhance warfighter readiness, as well as significant investment in
    production capacity to increase critical munitions inventories.
        Ongoing United States support to Ukraine has highlighted the need
    for investments in key areas across the industrial base to support
    United States, ally, and partner nation readiness. The DON is working
    closely with industry to expedite replenishment of stocks provided to
    Ukraine, engaging with industry partners to understand the barriers to
    accelerating production and determining how and where the Department
    can make strategic investments to improve inventory, capability, and
    capacity. The Department is investing in the industrial base to expand
    and accelerate production throughput, streamline testing, and
    strengthen critical component supply chains. Simultaneously, the
    Department is placing investments in recertification as a cost-
    effective way to improve near-term inventories. Coupled with the
    ongoing replenishment of DON stocks, these investments into the
    munitions industrial base send the demand signal that building
    munitions inventories is a top priority
        The Department is leveraging the authorities granted in the fiscal
    year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act to pursue MYP contracts
    for critical munitions programs such as Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), and
    Naval Strike Missile (NSM). MYP contracts for Advanced Medium-Range
    Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and LRASM will be joint efforts with the
    USAF. The strategy allows the Department to use savings generated
    through EOQ financing to procure additional lots of missiles under a
    Buy-to-Budget concept, to further improve efficiencies and yields.
    Missile Programs
        As the Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life of Ohio-
    class SSBNs, addressing the viability of the Strategic Weapons System
    (SWS) throughout the life of the Columbia-class SSBNs remains a
    priority. The current TRIDENT D5 Life Extension (D5LE) remains an
    effective and credible Strategic Weapon System on both the Ohio-class
    and Columbia-class SSBNs into the 2040's, supporting the Ohio-class
    submarine through end of service life and serving as the initial
    Strategic Weapon System for the Columbia-class SSBNs. Modernization of
    the SWS, D5LE2, is required to maintain the Sea Based Strategic
    Deterrent starting with the ninth Columbia-class submarine by ensuring
    sufficient missile inventory and seamlessly supporting USSTRATCOM
    requirements. D5LE2 incorporates the necessary flexibility and
    adaptability needed to maintain demonstrated performance and
    survivability in the dynamic threat environment until Columbia-class
    end of life. The Administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states
    that D5LE2 needs to begin deploying on Columbia-class in the late
    2030's to sustain sufficient missile inventories to support the U.S.
    sea-based strategic deterrent as well as the United Kingdom's
    independent nuclear deterrent. The Navy will prioritize near-term
    investments in accordance with the NPR to ensure that D5LE2 is
    effective in the expected threat environment and delivers on time.
    Fiscal year 2024 funding will support industrial base development,
    flight subsystem engineering, and flight component suppliers that are
    critical to the execution of D5LE2.
    Tomahawk
        The Navy is continuing investment into Tomahawk Block V new
    production, Maritime Strike Tomahawk, and recertification/modernization
    of Tomahawk Block IV. The fiscal year 2024 budget request adds $23.4
    million to reduce Tomahawk production lead time. These funds are being
    invested to increase industrial capacity, specifically by relieving
    chokepoints within the Tomahawk production line.
        In the fiscal year 2024 budget request, the Department sustains the
    Tomahawk as the Nation's premier all-weather, long-range, survivable
    deep strike offensive weapon to include new production of and
    recertification of current inventory into modernized BLK V Tomahawk
    missiles. BLK V(a) Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) provides a long-range
    moving maritime strike capability to meet current and future threats,
    supporting the Surface Warfare Mission area through the inclusion of a
    seeker suite in the Tomahawk BLK V missile. The fiscal year 2024 budget
    request for MST provides continuation of Test and Evaluation (T&E)
    plans that include missile functional ground testing and missile test
    flights from a ground launcher apparatus to assess seeker performance,
    mature and refine seeker algorithms, and provide verification and
    validation data for Modeling and Simulation. MST IOC is planned for
    fiscal year 2025. The fiscal year 2024 budget request continues
    engineering, manufacturing, and development of the Joint Multiple-
    Effects Warhead System (JMEWS), which will deliver a hardened target
    penetration capability with the Tomahawk BLK V(b) missile in fiscal
    year 2027. The fiscal year 2024 budget request continues engineering,
    manufacturing, and development of the Military Code Global Positioning
    System (GPS) receiver, which will deliver significant increased
    resiliency in spoofing and jamming threat environments to the Tomahawk
    BLK V missile in fiscal year 2026.
    Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 1/ Long Range Anti-
            Ship Missile (LRASM), LRASM C-1/C-3, and OASuW Increment 2 /
            HALO
        The Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget requests $639.6 million to
    initiate LRASM MYP with the USAF. The fiscal year 2024 procurement
    funding covers the EOQ materials along with the buy of 91 DON LRASM
    weapon systems in the initial year of the 5-year MYP. The Fiscal Year
    2024 President's Budget request also includes RDT&E funding for the
    completion of the LRASM 1.1 capability improvements.
        The LRASM C-1 and C-3 variants add near-term, cost-effective
    capacity to the DON's long range strike capability while enhancing the
    OASuW mission. The fiscal year 2024 budget requests funding for Navy
    strike mission integration and employment by upgrading the existing
    AGM-158 product to respond to rapidly changing threats. Navy AGM-158
    development efforts also involve development and integration of a
    Beyond Line-of-Sight radio subsystem to enable dual mission capability
    and enhanced operational flexibility, optimizing carrier magazine
    capacity to complement OASuW warfighting capability. The fiscal year
    2024 President's Budget requests $141.9 million to continue developing
    AGM-158 derived capability and radio integration on F/A-18; develop
    software for strike mission planning, Universal Armament Interface and
    missile Operational Flight Plan. The fiscal year 2024 President's
    Budget request also includes $83.7 million for procurement of the
    initial 10 LRASM in the C-3 configuration.
        The Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget includes $95.8 million in
    support of OASuW Increment 2, which is now referred as Hypersonic Air
    Launched OASuW (HALO). HALO supports the national imperative to mature
    hypersonic capabilities and will provide the Navy a necessary air-
    launched, carrier-based weapon to address evolving long range, high
    speed threats from near peer competitors. In order to deliver this
    capability to the warfighter when needed, the DON will collaborate
    heavily with the Air Force.
    Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) & AARGM Extended-Range
            (AARGM-ER)
        AARGM domestic procurement completed in fiscal year 2021 with the
    award of the last DON Full Rate Production (FRP) contract. There have
    been 1450 AARGMs (All Up Rounds, Training Missiles, and Spares)
    delivered to the Fleet as of March 2023. Program of record delivery is
    1803 missiles. Deliveries continue through fiscal year 2024 in support
    of the transition to AARGM-ER. AARGM-ER provides the DON with a 5th
    generation compatible extended-range asset to project power and provide
    Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, both at-sea and on land. The first
    AARGM-ER delivery is scheduled for 4QFY23. The budget requests $195.7
    million in Weapons Procurement, Navy (WPN) to procure 77 AARGM-ER all-
    up-rounds and six Captive Air Training Missiles. The fiscal year 2024
    President's Budget requests $51.8 million in RDT&E to support
    operational and Integration testing of production representative
    hardware.
    Hypersonic Program
        The DON is developing a hypersonic weapon system that will enable
    precise and timely strike capability against deep inland targets in
    contested environments. In collaboration with the Army, the Department
    is leveraging a common All Up Rounds missile design and test
    opportunities to field a conventional hypersonic weapon system.
    Zumwalt-class DDGs will be the first Navy platform to field this
    hypersonic capability in the mid-2020's, followed by Block V Virginia-
    class SSNs starting in the early 2030's. In March 2020, the Services
    executed a successful flight test of the Common Hypersonic Glide Body,
    and in June 2022, the Services followed up that testing with several
    static-fire tests and a flight test of the newly developed two-stage
    Solid Rocket Motor. The DON has validated the design of the Navy's
    cold-gas launch approach and continued sounding rocket testing in
    support of future capability, manufacturability, and affordability
    improvements. This rapid development and demonstration of hypersonic
    strike weapon systems supports the U.S. ability to deter, and if
    necessary, defeat potential adversaries.
        The Department's fiscal year 2024 budget request funds continued
    build of the first three All Up Rounds to be delivered to the first
    Zumwalt-class DDG and All Up Rounds for future flight testing, supports
    construction of the Underwater Launch Test Facility, and executes two
    flight tests, including the first launch of the CPS All Up Round using
    the cold-gas launch approach for sea-based fielding. The request totals
    $901 million in CPS R&D funding. Additionally, the request includes
    $341 million in funding to procure additional rounds in support of
    Zumwalt-class fielding.
        The Marine Corps is working toward the capability to employ
    smaller, highly mobile hypersonic weapons through science and
    technology initiatives. The Marine Corps is pursuing an acquisition
    strategy that leverages the developmental work of other Services and
    agencies, investing when the capability has reached a higher technology
    readiness level that allows for expedited prototype experimentation at
    reduced costs.
    Torpedoes
        The Department continues to invest heavily in increasing the
    capacity and capability of both the Heavyweight and Lightweight Torpedo
    inventories to maintain our advantage in the undersea domain against
    our strategic competitors. The MK 48 Heavyweight Torpedo is the Navy's
    primary submarine-launched ASW and ASuW weapon. While the Navy has
    continued to upgrade its existing inventory to incorporate the latest
    technology and capability, the Navy restarted production of the MK 48
    to meet munitions requirements and during the summer of 2022 accepted
    the first new production heavyweight torpedoes in over 20 years. In
    addition, the Department is progressing development of new capabilities
    with the MK 48 MOD 8 and MK 48 MOD 9 to maintain our advantage over the
    threat today and in the future. The MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo, which is
    employed by both surface ships and air platforms, continues to be
    produced and upgraded to keep pace with the ASW threat. At current
    production demand, the torpedo industrial base remains healthy,
    producing the MK 54 MOD 0 for the Nation's allied partners in addition
    to the upgraded MK 54 MOD 1 for the U.S. Navy.
        The Department has also partnered with industry and University
    Affiliated Research Centers to rapidly develop and field new and
    advanced capabilities to further our advantage in the undersea domain.
    This includes the MK 54 MOD 2, which will improve performance against
    the high-end threat, as well as a Very Light Weight Torpedo that will
    deliver multi-mission capability as both a hard-kill torpedo
    countermeasure and a short range ASW weapon. The Navy is also expanding
    the methods in which the MK 54 is employed to provide greater
    flexibility, effectiveness, and lethality. From high altitude via the
    P-8A and the High Altitude ASW Weapon Capability (HAAWC) wing kit, to
    the Hammerhead encapsulated effector and future stand-off ASW
    capabilities, MK 54 payloads will continue to be essential to the US
    Navy's and its Allies' ASW mission.
                          marine corps ground programs
        Fiscal year 2024 Marine Corps investments are prioritized to
    enhance combined and Joint Force lethality. Marine Corps modernization
    has involved replacing legacy approaches with threat-based operating
    concepts, new command arrangements, emerging technology and modernized
    programs. These new concepts and technologically advanced capabilities
    enable our Stand-in Forces to gain sharpened situational awareness, set
    conditions in case of crisis or conflict, and contribute to Joint All
    Domain Command and Control (JADC2). With a clear understanding of the
    NDS and the current operating environment, the Marine Corps' budget
    provides a modern force that can sense, make sense, and close the kill
    webs in support of the Naval and Joint Campaigns.
    Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar (G/ATOR)
        The Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) is a multi-role,
    ground-based, expeditionary three-dimensional radar system employed by
    both the Aviation Combat Element and Ground Combat Element within the
    MAGTF, satisfying the Marine Air Command and Control System and Ground
    Counter Fire/Counter Battery capability requirements. Deployable via
    KC-130J, the G/ATOR provides mobile, multi-functional, three-
    dimensional surveillance of airborne targets, detection of cruise
    missiles, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Rockets, Artillery, and Mortars.
    Once those threats have been tracked, the G/ATOR will then cue the
    appropriate air defense weapons. Providing persistent surveillance and
    detection of enemy air threats in the littorals and participating in a
    cooperative engagement network of sensors and shooters via the Common
    Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S), the G/ATOR contributes to
    both Naval and Joint Force domain awareness.
        Serving as the forward component of the Joint Force, the Marine
    Corps continues to invest in and enhance the sensor capabilities of the
    G/ATOR. Fiscal year 2023 appropriations funded $304 million to procure
    eight additional radars, bringing the total number to 53 of 57 planned.
    Additionally, the fiscal year 2024 budget requests $25.3 million for
    critical G/ATOR maintenance and software upgrades. This program was on
    full display in Spring 2022, when a Marine Corps G/ATOR deployed to
    Lithuania to support NATO's air policing mission for the first time.
    Building upon the radar's successes, G/ATOR seeks to further integrate
    with the Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC), providing protection
    to defended assets against airborne and cruise missile threats.
    Ultimately, as a modern and highly capable program, G/ATOR expands the
    Service's integration into Navy and Joint integrated air and missile
    defense missions.
    Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S)
        Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) connects and
    collates sensor inputs to facilitate MAGTF employment and targeting
    decisions. CAC2S fuses real-, near-, and non-real time data to provide
    a common operational picture across the Marine Air Command and Control
    System--this picture allows leaders to then task the air defense
    ``arms'' of the MAGTF, the Marine Air Defense Integrated System and the
    Medium Range Intercept Capability, to punch back and destroy threats as
    necessary. CAC2S fused information enables enhanced air control,
    improved situational awareness, sensor integration, full tactical data
    link integration, improved planning, and command functionality, as well
    as sensor-netting integration. CAC2S also provides integrated airspace
    command and control for the MAGTF and integrates real time sensor data
    into the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability network. As the
    primary C2 system that integrates MAGTF aviation operations with Joint,
    combined, and coalition aviation agencies, the Marine Corps intends to
    continue to procurement of these small form factor variants until
    fiscal year 2029. The small form factor (CAC2S SFF) aspect of CAC2S
    reduces the footprint of the system to transit cases that can be
    utilized from the front seat of a dune buggy. The fiscal year 2024
    budget requests approximately $55.8 million to produce 32 CAC2S SFF
    that can be flown and resupplied via assault support aircraft to
    dispersed locations and will provide both the Joint force and the
    Marine Corps with a complete, common air command and control
    operational picture.
    Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS)
        Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) is designed to counter
    the expected swarms of enemy drones and aircraft that will assault
    Marines on modern battlefields. MADIS provides an expeditionary,
    upgradable, state-of-the-art capability, developed to protect maneuver
    forces, installations, and other designated critical assets from Fixed
    and Rotary Wing aircraft along with Group 1-3 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
    (UAS). MADIS will also utilize sensors to provide Beyond-Line-of-Sight
    cueing and targeting. Organically transportable via KC-130J aircraft,
    MADIS incorporates a pair of Joint Light Tactical Vehicles that are
    designed to defeat airborne threats with a turret mounted 30mm cannon,
    Stinger missiles, and an electronic warfare jammer. MADIS will also
    employ CAC2S and its own organic radar sensors to collect, interpret,
    and pass radar tracks for target engagements. Funded to 113 of 131
    systems, MADIS will begin fielding in late fiscal year 2024.
        While MADIS represents the Marine Corps' larger air defense program
    of record, the Light-MADIS (L-MADIS) provides similar capabilities to
    Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU), but with a smaller form factor on a
    pair of ultra-light tactical vehicles. Utilizing sensors to provide
    cueing and targeting, the L-MADIS employs electronic warfare jammers to
    defeat airborne threats. This system is actively employed by the Fleet
    Marine Force and during a Straits of Hormuz transit aboard the USS
    Boxer, the 11th MEU employed the L-MADIS in support of the defense of
    the amphibious task force. Utilizing electronic jamming, the L-MADIS
    successfully defeated an Iranian drone flying within 1km of the ship.
    L-MADIS is fully funded to 21 systems; 12 urgent-need variants are
    fielded to the Fleet at the present time. Whether MADIS or L-MADIS, the
    Marine Corps continues to pursue these critical force protection
    capabilities to defeat aerial threats.
    Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC)
        The Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC) defends the MAGTF
    against inbound cruise missiles and other precision munitions. Fully
    deployable via KC-130J aircraft, MRIC defends forward-deployed forces
    primarily against cruise missile threats, and secondarily against UAS
    and other aerial threats that enter the MRIC's Weapons Engagement Zone.
    This capability is accomplished through the integration of fielded
    Marine Corps and Israeli systems that include the CAC2S, G/ATOR, the
    Iron Dome Battle Management Controller, and the Tamir missile and
    guidance uplink. Force Design plans to provide a cruise missile defense
    capability to each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) with a battery
    comprised of a headquarters element and four independently deployable
    firing platoons able to protect four defended assets. The fiscal year
    2024 budget requests approximately $43.9 million to fund the prototype
    platoon and build out three batteries, one for each MEF, that will
    allow Marines to survive within the adversary's Weapons Engagement Zone
    Unmanned Aircraft System Payloads
        The Marine Corps currently operates two MQ-9A Extended Range (ER)
    and is scheduled to receive four additional aircraft by Q3 FY24. The
    MQ-9A ER serves as the platform solution for the MAGTF Unmanned
    Aircraft System Expeditionary Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MUX/
    MALE), hosting a suite of interoperable and complementary payloads that
    provides a persistent, networked, multi-domain reconnaissance,
    surveillance, and target acquisition capability to the Marine Corps,
    Naval and Joint Force. It enhances battlespace awareness by fusing
    information from onboard sensors and mission systems; detecting,
    identifying, and tracking targets in multiple domains; and
    disseminating information in advance of distributed friendly elements.
    Moreover, sensors are augmented by robust communications and data relay
    capabilities, enabling distributed platforms and systems to receive
    mission-critical sensor information in real-time via multiple networks,
    enhancing the lethality and survivability of force echelons at the
    tactical edge.
        Onboard systems provide airborne early warning (AEW), maritime
    domain awareness (MDA), electromagnetic support (ES), and
    communications bridging. AEW and MDA is delivered through autonomous
    scanning, detection, identification, sorting, and tracking of targets.
    Operationally relevant, full-spectrum electronic warfare capabilities
    enable persistent stand-off ES. Supporting these capabilities, the MUX/
    MALE's Airborne Network Extension capability provides additional
    communications pathways for forces across the battlespace and allows
    for the transmission of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
    targeting data via multiple, redundant networks and information
    systems. As UAS sensor payloads mature, the Marine Corps, through the
    MUX/MALE capability, will continue to enhance situational awareness and
    sensor overwatch with the goal of reducing ambiguity in the operational
    area around Naval and Joint Forces while mitigating human exposure to
    threats.
    Networking On The Move (NOTM)
        Networking-On-The-Move (NOTM) provides the MAGTF with a robust,
    over-the-horizon and beyond line-of-sight (BLOS), digital command and
    control (C2) capability while on-the-move and at-the-halt. NOTM is a
    critical enabler for C2 in a degraded environment. It enables a
    continuous and reliable flow of information inside contested
    environments, and provides the communications gateway needed to conduct
    sea control and sea denial operations as part of the Naval
    Expeditionary and Joint Force. This is achieved by providing an open
    architecture solution that enables forces to exercise C2 across
    operational domains--land, sea, air, space, and while transitioning
    between domains. The NOTM program encompasses three subordinate
    components, the NOTM Ground Combat Vehicle, incorporated onto the
    Ultra-Light and Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, as well as the
    Amphibious Combat Vehicle, the NOTM Airborne, incorporated on MV-22Bs
    and KC-130Js, and NOTM Tactical Entry Point kits, integrated with
    amphibious warfare ships to provide BLOS services to Marine forces
    ashore and afloat. The Marine Corps continues to procure and field
    these systems to distributed Fleet Marine Force units, enabling command
    and control, now and in the future.
    Secure Expeditionary Resilient Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
        Secure Expeditionary Resilient Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
    (SERPNT) provides Marines with the ability to navigate reliably and
    acquire precise timing information for both themselves and their
    platforms. Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) capabilities
    across the enterprise will be maintained and future PNT capabilities
    supported by funding proposals in the fiscal year 2024 President's
    Budget request. The Marine Corps will update its Military-Code PNT
    capabilities, which offer improved defenses against hostile jamming and
    spoofing threats, as part of the SERPNT program. A crucial component of
    the program is that it further enables the Marine Corps' ability to
    participate in Joint All-Domain Command and Control efforts across the
    Department of Defense.
    Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
        Marine Corps Wide Band Satellite Communications FoS provides the
    MAGTF with resilient and diverse spectrum capabilities, enhances
    command and control of the distributed maritime force, and enables
    dissemination of intelligence and sensor-to-shooter communications. The
    Marine Wideband System (MCWS) FoS is modernizing our aging and very
    small aperture terminals. MCWS increases the MAGTF's orbital and
    spectrum options and the Satellite Communication Agile Reachback (SCAR)
    provides the MAGTF with options to incorporate low earth orbit
    capabilities at time of need.
    Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)
        Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) and Satellite Communications
    (SATCOM)/Re-Broadcast is the primary means for tactical units to
    rapidly receive and transmit Intelligence, Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance (ISR) data from national and theater assets. The SATCOM
    solution consists of the AN-PRS-11A system which provides the high
    bandwidth required to ingest large GEOINT datasets from globally
    streamed national, theater, and tactical sensors and data repositories.
    The Re-Broadcast transmits ISR data from local sensor collection over a
    Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) enabled global broadcast
    network for near-real-time data access to decisionmaking and targeting
    solutions. Both capabilities are compatible with existing Marine Corps
    ISR and Operations systems and enable organic sensing capabilities,
    supporting Long-Range Precision Fires as part of the Naval
    Expeditionary Force and Joint Force, writ-large. The Marine Corps
    intends to increase fielding of the AN/PRS-11A and Re-Broadcast suites
    to 37 systems for Fleet Marine Forces to employ in support of Combatant
    Commander's requirements.

        Senator Kaine. Wonderful. We will start a 5-minute round of
    questions, and I will hop around a bit and probably stay here
    for a second round too if anyone would like that.
        First, talk a little bit about the Puget Sound challenge
    with seismic activity and how the Navy is viewing that and what
    will the effect of that be, shuttering those drydocks for a
    period of time.
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, I will start. We updated our analysis
    based on computer models that are now available that were not
    available decades ago, looking at seismic, and we determined
    there were three docks at Puget Sound and one at Bangor, the
    Trident refit facility, that needed some upgrades. So we are
    doing temporary modifications to all of those. We expect at
    least three of those four docks, if not all four of those
    docks, to be back online in the coming months, by no later than
    June/July timeframe. And while we had to delay one availability
    going into one of those docks, overall we do not see any long-
    term mission impact on our ability to keep our submarine force
    sustained.
        There will be longer-term improvements to those docks that
    will be incorporated into the SIOP [Shipyard Infrastructure
    Optimization Program] program overall, but for the near term,
    another 3-or 4-month impact and we should be back in good
    shape, sir.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you.
        Mr. Stefany. Admiral if you want to hop in there too?
        Senator Kaine. Oh, please.
        Vice Admiral Conn. Sure. The only thing I would add is on
    CNO's UPL [Unfunded Priorities List] is a $300 million request
    for those drydocks, if not to pay for the drydocks, because we
    want to complete and we cannot wait. We are cash-flowing that,
    but it is the backfill of the resources that we were given.
        From an operational perspective, right now there is no
    operational impact other than having to move one submarine
    maintenance period, which is recoverable.
        Senator Kaine. Another item that was in the news last week
    was the announcement that the USS Kennedy aircraft carrier
    would be delivered in fiscal year 2025 rather than fiscal year
    2024, which made some news, as I have talked to the shipyard
    and the Secretary of the Navy, and I just want to make sure
    that I am understanding this correctly. It is actually not
    really a delay in the availability of that ship to deploy.
    There was an earlier delivery date but then they were going to
    do a lot of post-delivery work on the ship before it was
    eligible to deploy. So sliding the delivery date to fiscal year
    2025 just lines the delivery up with what was the expected time
    for the availability and deployment of the ship.
        Do I understand that correctly, Secretary?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. So the end date that is critical to
    us is the ability of that ship to be ready to deploy, and that
    date is not changing. As you mentioned, we have a construction
    period. Typically a ship will go off and do some workups and
    then it will go into what is called a post-shakedown
    availability period, and in this case it was set up to be a
    very long period. The Ford was a year and a half. For Kennedy
    it was looking at about a year-long period.
        What we were able to do by extending the work at the
    shipyard during construction is shorten that availability later
    on to just fix anything we find in the workup period, shorten
    it down, so that the time the ship deploys is the same time in
    the end.
        Senator Kaine. Mr. Secretary, let me ask one more question
    and then I will call on the ranking as I go over to the floor,
    to handle this next amendment. Last year during the posture
    hearing, where we had the SECNAV, the Commandant, and the CNO,
    a lot of us asked a lot of questions about the amphibs and
    about whether the Navy and Marines were on the same page. We
    were told, ``We are definitely on the same page and you are
    going to get a study soon that will show we are on the same
    page.'' We got the study in December, so it was not exactly
    soon, and I noted it was very brief. But it was almost a page,
    on the same page. It was a few pages. But it did show that
    everybody was on the same page with respect to a requirement
    that has been testified to publicly often, that we should have
    31 amphibs.
        I think a number of us were surprised when we saw the
    President's Budget this year that there was not funding to
    enable us to get there. In fact, the funding, at least in the
    current year, or the proposal, would have us dropping the
    number of amphibs rather than advancing to the 31. We
    understand there is an additional desire for a strategic pause
    to study yet again what the amphib requirement was.
        Just speaking for this Committee Member, everybody made
    such a good case last year that we are on the same page and the
    number is 31 that I kind of wonder about, well, what is the
    continuous review of whether 31 is the right number. Can you
    explain that to the Subcommittee?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, Mr. Chairman. So first of all, we are all
    in agreement, the Secretary, the Commandant, and the CNO that
    31 is the requirement. The question is how do we best get to
    that requirement, and what I will do is try to address the new
    construction side and I will let Admiral Conn here talk about
    the in-service ships, because there are two parts. We have to
    build enough new ones and we have to have enough existing ones
    in the inventory to get to that 31.
        Senator Kaine. Just be mindful I am now over time, so try
    to do both of those things promptly.
        Mr. Stefany. Okay. So quickly, two parts of the amphibious:
    10 large-deck amphibs and 21 of the LPDs [landing platform
    dock/amphibious transport dock]. In this budget, one priority
    was to move the LHA [landing, helicopter, assault], the large-
    deck amphib, from 2031 to 2027, so that it would be at that 4-
    year center. So on the large-deck amphib this budget improves
    by 4 years the ability to build those on center. So that piece
    that is the 10 large-decks, I think we got in a good place.
        The 21 LPDs we bought one with your help in 2023, and the
    next one is in 2025, sir, if you put them on 2-year centers. So
    there is a period where we can look at a more affordable way,
    potentially, to build those. We do not need to build one in
    2024. We can take some time to see if there is a more
    affordable way to build those before we buy the 2025 ships,
    sir.
        Senator Kaine. Admiral Conn, do you want to add anything to
    that?
        Vice Admiral Conn. I will try to be as quick as I can, so
    yes. The pressure that is being put on is decision on some of
    our older LSDs [dock landing ship/landing ship dock]. The
    original service life of an LSD was 35 years. Back in the
    1990's we changed it to 40 years, and that was based on two
    assumptions: normal operations at the time defined as 6-month
    deployments, and that we would fully fund the maintenance of
    those ships. The War on Terror, we operated those ships much
    longer than 6-month deployments, and we know--we know--we did
    not put the resources in those ships to be able to sustain
    them.
        Senator Kaine. Okay.
        Vice Admiral Conn. So now we are at a position where we
    have some hard choices to make. The three LSDs that are listed,
    we do not have the confidence, because we are seeing growth
    work and new work, that those ships will get out of the
    maintenance phase, be able to get through a workup cycle
    through the basic phase, the advanced phase, integrated phase,
    which is a year long, and then go on deployment, and stay
    inside its expected service lives.
        Senator Kaine. I need to cut you off now and turn it to
    Senator Cramer. Senator King, I will ask you to manage the air
    traffic control of this Committee until I return once the
    second vote starts. Thank you.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Chairman Kaine. Thank you,
    Senator King, for stepping in. This discussion we are having
    right now is a good one so I appreciate that. In fact, what I
    might do is just sort of tag onto that a little bit. Mr.
    Stefany, I will start with you, and maybe talk a little bit
    about the risk of not having the 31. In other words, on the
    phone we discussed the illustration of the Turkey disaster and
    not having availability either to respond to that tragedy or to
    demonstrate power should we need it.
        Maybe just expand a little bit on whether you think 31, 32,
    why 31 is important, besides it being required.
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, I think actually, sir, if you do not mind
    I would like General Heckl to take that one.
        Senator Cramer. That would be great.
        Mr. Stefany. He is closer to the warfighter.
        Senator Cramer. He sure is.
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, great question and thanks
    for the time today. So 31 is the requirement, sir, the
    absolutely floor, and what 31 assures is that we would have a
    2.0 MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] forward presence, with the
    ability to surge to 5 in time of crisis, right. We are beyond
    classification here but there is a reason for that being able
    to surge to 5. It is key maritime terrain and it is SLOCs [Sea
    Lines of Control], et cetera.
        My first 2 decades of Active Service we had a 3.0 presence.
    There was constantly a MEU forward deployed. In my case it was
    mostly in the Mediterranean, which, oddly enough, would have
    involved Ukraine. As Admiral Conn said, the War on Terror, we
    started riding assets a little bit hard and not properly
    maintaining them, so we started having problems, so we have
    larger gaps. So when the earthquake happened in Turkey, a NATO
    [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] ally, the MEU was not on
    station, and it should have been. That is what a MEU, a Marine
    Expeditionary Unit, is organized, trained, and equipped for. We
    can use surface-to-surface connectors, you know, the LCACs
    [Landing Craft Air Cushions], the LCUs [Landing Craft Utility],
    to deliver heavy equipment that could have assisted with search
    and rescue, and we would have come ashore with shelters that
    would have provided heat and supplies, and the ships would roll
    to hospitals. So that is the short answer.
        Senator Cramer. I think it is a great answer. I think it is
    a good illustration of the importance of it.
        Maybe, Admiral Conn, I will come over to you now and talk
    more generally about ship maintenance. If we accept that the
    procurement of new ships will not be ready until the end of
    this decade, maintaining the existing fleet for the next 5
    years, these critical 5 years I referenced earlier, becomes
    maybe one way to make sure we are okay.
        I am going to ask two questions sort of as one, so you can
    sort of opine more generally perhaps. Are the surface and
    undersea fleet readiness rates where you think they should be,
    first of all? Then second of all, is the Navy deferring ship
    maintenance to keep ships in operation?
        Vice Admiral Conn. Are we where we want to be? No. Do we
    know what we need to do? Yes. For the undersea domain there is
    over $2 billion dedicated as part of this President's Budget
    2024, dedicated to improving the maintenance of our submarine
    assets, decreasing the idle time for the ships that we already
    own. It is our most asymmetric advantage that we have in the
    undersea domain, but they have no advantage if they are tied to
    the pier, and same thing, just to be clear, on the LSDs. If we
    cannot get them away from the pier in the time that we have--
    and really, this is about opportunities. For the cruisers and
    the LSDs, to buy them back would be about $3 billion. Is that
    the right thing to do with those $3 billion? We believe, and
    from a best military advice perspective, based on our
    assessment, hull-by-hull of those ships, the answer is no.
        Then there is also the opportunity to perhaps free up some
    of those yard piers where we could do other work, and for the
    sailors that are on those ships to be able to go at sea and
    start buying down some of the significant gaps at sea that we
    have.
        So those are the opportunities and those are some of the
    tough choices. It was a tough choice for us and I realize it is
    a tough choice for you.
        Senator Cramer. Yes. No, well put.
        Mr. Stefany, my understanding is that while the Navy has
    made some progress on the maintenance backlog we still have,
    obviously, a long way to go, I think. There is a significant
    amount remaining.
        Can you tell me, what does it mean when it says 100 percent
    of ship depot maintenance requirements to be funded in this
    budget? What does that practically mean, 100 percent, because
    it does seem a little bit conflicting?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, so I think that is focused at our public
    shipyards and the planned availabilities, the number of
    submarines that are going to go into those yards and the amount
    of work that is planned in all those availabilities is funded.
    It does not fund unplanned work, but all the planned work in
    those availabilities, sir.
        Senator Cramer. Well, I am just following up real quickly
    on it because on the phone we talked about the workforce
    challenge, and the public shipyards are claiming they need
    5,000 to 10,000 more added to their workforce. Could that
    throughput even be done if we do not get that workforce up? I
    do not want to oversimplify getting that job done, but I just
    want to understand it.
        Vice Admiral Conn. You know, we typically talk in terms of
    money, as the input metric, but in terms of President's Budget
    2024, it funds 75 avails, 32 of which are private avails--15
    east, 17 west, and it continues the OPN [Other Procurement,
    Navy] pilot for the fleets. It is $2.7 billion but it is for 28
    ships and 1 submarine. That is all part of this plan. So I
    think that is part of funding that maintenance requirement.
        Mr. Stefany. To your point, sir, we have a national
    workforce availability issue. So even if we had more billets
    and more funding at the public yards, our ability to hire might
    be constrained in getting to that higher number, sir.
        Senator Cramer. I appreciate it. Thank you.
        Senator King. [Presiding.] On behalf of the Chairman,
    Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is nice to see
    you all again.
        Getting back to the amphibious ships, the LPDs, did you
    say, Mr. Secretary, that you are conducting yet another study
    regarding? Who is going to respond to that? Why do we need
    another study? There have been 11 previous studies on amphib
    ships. Admiral.
        Vice Admiral Conn. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
    (OSD) directed, as part of a cost capability study for the
    LPDs. We will have that study, we will complete that study, and
    that will inform the President's Budget 2025 shipbuilding plan.
    I think, as Mr. Stefany has stated, and I think the Commandant
    mentioned this morning, maintaining 2-year centers with a ship
    that was provided by Congress in 2023, the next opportunity for
    an LPD would be in 2025.
        Senator Hirono. What is yet another study going to show
    that the 11 other studies have not?
        Vice Admiral Conn. That is a fair question.
        Senator Hirono. Mm-hmm. What is the answer?
        Mr. Stefany. The previous studies you are talking about
    were looking at requirements, right. I think we are all locked
    on requirements.
        Senator Hirono. Thirty-one.
        Mr. Stefany. What this study is looking at is, now that we
    know the requirements----
        Senator Hirono. It took 11 studies to get us to 31.
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, ma'am. This is now--I know I have to
    build that ship. Now what is the most affordable way to build
    it? That is what this one is looking at. It not looking at the
    requirements. It is looking at, an LPD costs $1.9 billion. Is
    there a way to build it for a little bit less and still meet
    the requirements of the Marine Corps? That is what we have been
    asked to study as part of this. It is not a requirement study.
    It is a cost study, if you will, ma'am.
        Senator Hirono. This study is going to be pretty much it,
    right? I am sure General Berger would be very happy to come up
    with something pretty definitive so we can get on with it. Did
    you want to add something?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Well, ma'am, so we have already
    had a brief discussion about this, where this PDM-1 [Program
    Decision Memorandum-1] study has been directed, and the trade
    space will be my requirements, and I am the requirements
    officer of the Marine Corps. I am not coming off the
    requirement any further. We have already descoped LPD flight 1.
    Flight 2 has been descoped. It cannot be descoped anymore.
        Senator Hirono. Okay. So when is the study going to be
    finished, the cost study?
        Mr. Stefany. The tasking for the study is to be finished
    this summer in time to inform the 2025 budget, which again is
    the next opportunity, industrial base-wise, to build the next
    LPD, ma'am.
        Senator Hirono. Okay. Mr. Secretary, you are responsible
    for sustainment matters to include maintenance. Last year at
    this hearing we discussed the challenges the Navy has had
    getting their ships and submarines out of maintenance on time.
    It is still an issue. So the concern is clear this year those
    challenges remain.
        Last year I worked to get $40 million for the planning of a
    waterfront production facility at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard
    to address this very problem, and you mentioned the drydock
    that we need to build there. But the waterfront production
    facility should be very much, I think, included in the drydock
    coming online.
        So these types of investments in our public infrastructure
    are necessary to make sure our shipyard workers have the tools
    they need to get our Nation's ships and submarines out of
    maintenance on time.
        You have visited Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, have you not?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, ma'am. I was there last summer.
        Senator Hirono. So you know where the drydock is going. You
    do not want the workers to have to run all the way across the
    shipyard in order to get the tools they need to utilize the
    drydock. That is why I have been pushing for the waterfront
    facility so heavily.
        What role has years of failing to invest in aging
    infrastructure played in the Navy's sustainment challenges, and
    what are we doing about it?
        Mr. Stefany. So shipyard specific, ma'am, which I know you
    know, we appreciate the additional funding last year to start
    the design of that facility, and we will continue through the
    design process and ideally get the waterfront facility as close
    to the drydock timing-wise as possible. As you know, we cannot
    get them there at the same time.
        On the broader issue, though, we are putting together,
    Navy-wide, an infrastructure improvement plan that kind of
    looked at the shipyard and now expands into all of our
    infrastructure. While I am not the lead for that within the
    Navy. I am happy to get you an update on how that is
    progressing, that overall infrastructure improvement plan.
        Senator Hirono. I have been so focused on the
    infrastructure needs, particularly in Hawaii, as we have seen a
    number of crises starting with Red Hill and lights going off at
    Tripler, the biggest hospital there, and a number of other
    things, and that is why I think the maintenance of our
    facilities ought to be paid attention to. We should not wait
    until something breaks or something floods an area before we
    will go in and fix it, because these needs are identified and I
    would like to see a lot more attention being paid to fixing
    things before they create the kind of community issues that
    Hawaii has faced in the last year.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. On behalf of the Chairman, Senator Scott.
        Senator Scott. Thanks.
        General and Admiral, can you talk about the importance of
    the relationship with the Philippines, and military-to-
    military, is it getting better, is it as important, is it going
    to be important to deter China?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, absolutely. Of all of our
    allies and partners, I would say this is the one asymmetric
    advantage we do still maintain is our extensive allies and
    partners. But Philippines in particular, especially in to the
    Marine Corps, we train with them regularly. As you know or
    probably know, they are developing a coastal defense regiment
    that is very similar to where we are going, and they train with
    us in all the various exercises, Balikatan and all the rest. So
    absolutely, sir, vital and critically important.
        I do not know if you have anything to add.
        Vice Admiral Conn. I could look at a map and identify its
    key terrain, and broader than the Philippines, but in terms of
    the places and access that we are going to need, that we need
    to continue with our partners that are throughout the Pacific,
    building relationships and trust that could be future access.
        Senator Scott. Do both of you feel comfortable that our
    military-to-military relationship is improving?
        Vice Admiral Conn. As the RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific
    exercise] commander in 2020, I believe, the Philippines
    participated during COVID. During those types of exercises it
    is about building relationships and trust, at the task force
    level and below. The performance of the Philippines and all the
    allied and partners that were out there during COVID, they
    earned my trust.
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Likewise, sir, I mean, you know,
    our standing force right now is the 3d Marine Expeditionary
    Force. They are there, right? They train, live, eat, sleep
    inside the CCP's weapons engagement zone, and they partner with
    allies and partners there all the time, sir. It is regular.
        Obviously I think all of us are seeing accesses becoming
    opened up, right. I mean, things are moving. We just need to
    seize the initiative here and keep this momentum going, because
    quite frankly, my opinion is that I think Dictator Xi has
    overplayed his hand a little bit and people are starting to see
    what it is all about. So I think allies and partners are very
    quickly seeing they more align with the U.S.'s values and how
    we support international rules-based order. So I think it is
    moving in the right direction.
        Senator Scott. Can you two talk about the AUKUS agreement?
    I mean, there is some criticism now in Australia over it. Is
    that really at risk, and if it is, how important is that to us?
        Vice Admiral Conn. AUKUS presents an enormous opportunity
    that can lift all our industrial bases up by building dominance
    in the undersea domain.
        Senator Scott. Do you think it is at risk right now?
        Vice Admiral Conn. No, sir.
        Senator Scott. You do not think so?
        Vice Admiral Conn. We are committed. There is work to do.
    In 2023 we will start doing work calls and some embedded crews,
    if you will. Later, in 2027, we will get some--no, earlier than
    2027, getting some rotational forces, and then early 2030's
    will make a decision of how we are going to sell Virginia-class
    submarines up through five.
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, obviously I am not in the
    submarine business other than trying to help the fleet detect
    them and help them kill them, which is part of what we are
    doing in Stand In Force, but I will tell you from a MRF-D
    [Marine Rotational Force-Darwin] perspective--and I think we
    have changed now to Marine Rotational Force Southeast Asia
    (MRF-SEA)--that continues to expand. So you now actually have
    the first Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) from Camp Pendleton
    assuming responsibility for the MRF-SEA as well as you have III
    MEF obviously in Okinawa, and obviously with the U.K., sir, you
    know we deployed a JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] squadron aboard
    Queen Elizabeth that did a worldwide tour. So you had U.K. F-
    35Bs, Marine F-35Bs forward deployed on a really, really
    capable amphibious ship, and it obviously came over into the
    South China Sea. So all good news, sir.
        Senator Scott. Is 3D technology important? I mean, are we
    going to be able to be able to come up with things quicker? Is
    it going to reduce cost?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, absolutely. Maintenance
    cycle times, delivery, it is right there on the tactical edge.
    Obviously, my background is aviation so I have to be a little
    more careful. Things have to be certified, obviously, because
    bad things can happen. But we are using 3D printing now, sir,
    for small things, like consumables on airplanes that do not
    have to be certified, and it has been really helpful.
        Vice Admiral Conn. I will leave the company name out but I
    was recently at a 3D Manufacturing Company in Ohio for an
    engine manufacture, and what they are doing in printing engine
    components, and what they can do is faster than we can
    typically pour metal to build the stuff.
        I think there is enormous potential as this technology
    continues to mature. I am not an engineer so I am not going to
    talk about critical flight safety. I am aware of it. But just
    making sure we have an understanding of those critical
    components, that they meet the specifications.
        Senator Scott. Mr. Stefany, in the short time, if you have
    anything to add.
        Mr. Stefany. Yes. Unleashing this and making it at scale,
    everywhere part of our business is where we have to get to.
    Casting and forgings is one huge area, but applies to all of
    our industry.
        Senator Scott. Thank you.
        Senator King. On behalf of the chair, Senator Peters.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to first just say I commend the efforts made by the
    Navy in developing an Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) aircraft
    refueling platform. Certainly as you are well aware, the vast
    distances in INDOPACOM [United States Indo Pacific Command] is
    probably one of the main difficulties in operating in that AOR
    [area of responsibility], and I know many have argued that the
    MQ-25 Stingray could be a game-changer in many respects, to
    help extend the range of the aircraft and give our forces more
    flexibility in operating across vast geographical areas.
        My understand is, though, that the current planning calls
    for Active Duty squadrons to be stationed with carrier wings.
    But I also think it is potentially a mistake, and I would love
    to have your thoughts, to overlook the Reserve component as a
    place where additional force structure for these units could be
    situated. Reserve units could be forward deployed, if
    necessary, on a rotating basis to Luzon, Darwin, Guam, and
    elsewhere, to increase capacity.
        So my question for you, sir, is the Navy exploring the
    possibility of standing up Reserve component detachments to
    operate MQ-25?
        Vice Admiral Conn. Sir, the MQ-25 is the pathfinder for
    carrier aviation in terms of uncrewed capabilities. It is the
    first. We have to get it right.
        Specific to your question, the MQ-25 will operate off the
    carriers. We have not yet addressed whether we are going to put
    them at various places with the Marine Corps in terms of
    Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations. There are control
    centers they have to use. Even though the program is probably
    sliding to the right a year for an IOC [Initial Operational
    Capability] in 2026, we need to continue to invest in the
    command and control suite on those carriers because it is
    coming, and we have finite periods of time to do that.
        In terms of your questions on the Reserve, sir, I do not
    think that has been addressed right now but I will take that
    for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Vice Admiral Conn. The Navy does not currently have any efforts
    underway to implement Reserve component support to the MQ-25 program.
    Current efforts are focused on the development of the program and Fleet
    operations by Active Duty personnel. The Navy may consider the
    operation and or support of MQ-25 by Reserve component personnel in the
    future, much in the same manner that the Reserves support other
    aircraft platforms.

        Senator Peters. I would appreciate that. I appreciate it.
        General Heckl, the Marine Corps continues to make
    significant investments in its organic UAS capabilities, and as
    we look to INDOPACOM as the theater of priority the ISR
    [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] capacities
    offered by MQ-9s would certainly be a tremendous value not only
    to the Marine Corps but the entire Joint Force.
        So my question for you, sir, is can you speak to the Marine
    Corps efforts to stand up UAV squadrons, and in particular,
    what role Reserve components could play in standing up and
    operating these units.
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Sure, sir. As you know, we
    already have one VMU stood up that is operating MQ-9s in
    theater now. We are going to be moving them from CENTCOM
    [United States Central Command] down to the Indo-Pacific. The
    plan is for two more. So we will have VMU 1, 2, and 3, and the
    long-term plan is for VMU 4, 5, and 6. Four, 5, and 6 are
    obviously in the later years of Force Design and we are doing
    some pretty close analysis, rigorous analysis, on what is next.
        MQ-9A is clearly not our long-term solution. We are looking
    at some other assets that are beyond the classification of this
    hearing. But we are working with Air Force and with DARPA
    [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] and others. So as
    you know, the Marine Corps is heavily invested in UAS of all
    categories.
        Vice Admiral Conn. Sir, if I could, just to add----
        Senator Peters. Yes, please.
        Admiral Conn.--as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
    Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities I have to look across
    all domains. So the investments we are making in the air
    domain, with MQ-25, Triton will complete that program of record
    in this year. Large unmanned surface vessels, ramping up to 3
    by the end of the decade for a total of 8, I believe. XLUUV
    [Extra-Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle], who just got its feet
    wet, the undersea piece, and then the MQ-25 that you mentioned.
        But I think there was mention about the growth of China and
    a mention about what our industrial base is willing to produce.
    It is these unmanned systems that are going to be force
    multipliers across the domain. We have some risks that we need
    to burn down, but we are not admiring the problem. We are not
    wringing our hands. We are rolling up our sleeves.
        Senator Peters. Yes, no question. Actually, General, the
    followup on the Marine Corps is a question I asked the admiral
    about Reserve components. Any plans to have Reserve components
    with UAS?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, I do not believe the plans
    are now but the Marine Corps relies heavily on our Reserves
    across the entire enterprise, sir, so it would not surprise me
    at all if we ended up going that route, especially for 4, 5,
    and 6.
        Senator Peters. Great. Great, and another question,
    General. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is the next
    generation replacement for the Amphibious Assault Vehicle
    (AAV), as you know. But I know the ACV has faced a somewhat
    rocky rollout to the fleet, and my understanding is that the
    Marine Corps has gotten its hands around these issues. But
    could you speak about what is happening, to this Committee,
    please?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Absolutely, sir. The ACV, the
    amphibious combat vehicle, replacing the AAV, built by BAE
    [British Aerospace Engineering], is a great vehicle, sir. Where
    we ran into the problems is the surf zone, and so what I would
    simply say for that is that part of the problem was how Marines
    have traditionally, for decades, assessed the surf zone. We did
    it very inaccurately. We now have technology that we are
    fielding. It is I MEF now, it is on now. They are autonomous
    drones that go out into the surf and collect accurate data so
    Marines can make correct decisions.
        So we are definitely moving in the right direction, sir,
    but the vehicle is going to be great. We have got to work out
    these problems and make sure when we make a decision to go or
    no-go through a surf zone, whether coming ashore or going back
    to the ship, that we have the right and accurate information to
    make that judgment.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. On behalf of the Chair, Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Senator King. Thank you all
    for being here today.
        Mr. Stefany, my understanding is in World War II we had 30
    shipyards. We have 8 now. Is that correct? Does anybody know?
        Mr. Stefany. As significant shipyards, yes, 8 would be
    about right.
        Senator Tuberville. Is that enough?
        Mr. Stefany. No, sir, that is not enough to meet the demand
    overall, particularly on our submarine side of our industrial
    base.
        Senator Tuberville. So we have got problems, big problems.
    I have been to a couple of shipyards lately and they are having
    to recruit out of McDonald's, Walmarts, Targets, going in and
    saying, ``Listen, we can teach you to weld. We can teach you to
    do plumbing, all those things.'' Do we need to get involved in
    this? I mean, are we going to leave it to the commercial
    shipyards? How are we going to handle this, because we are
    slipping on borrowed time here.
        Mr. Stefany. Sir, on the workforce side, which is frankly a
    national effort issue, for generations we have not kept our
    trade crafts as a Nation at the value that they need to be at.
        But in the area of shipyards and getting the workforce we
    need so that we are not competing with McDonald's or Walmart,
    like you mentioned, sir, we are working at three levels. At the
    local we have started some initiatives with funding from this
    Committee to work on going into the high schools and going into
    trade schools and actually reinstituting shop programs and
    things like that, where we can get people trained in high
    school to come out, and actually guarantee them jobs when we
    get on the outside. So we started that in Philadelphia last
    year, graduated about 200 people. We are repeating this year,
    moving to Pittsburgh, and then out to the Great Lakes, and then
    ultimately to the Gulf Coast as we expand that program.
        Regionally, we are working with our shipyards. Each one has
    a really good apprentice program, and we are trying to figure
    out how to expand that to larger areas regionally to get that
    workforce. Because you are right--it is all about having that
    skilled workforce, sir.
        Senator Tuberville. You know, when most of us went to
    school we had shop, and we had that elective, and we do not
    have that anymore. Pardon?
        Senator King. That was my best course.
        Senator Tuberville. That was your best course? You made an
    A in it, right?
        Mr. Stefany. Most schools do not even have the equipment in
    the schools.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes, but we can talk about
    appropriating all these ships and submarines and everything.
    Thank God we have got a lot of commercial people out there
    working. How are we going to build these things, especially if
    all hell breaks loose, to be honest with you.
        Mr. Stefany. Yes. That is our number one challenge,
    unquestionably, and we look forward to working with the
    shipyards and, again, your Committee on what we can do about
    it. But it really is a national----
        Senator Tuberville. Well, we need more shipyards, and then
    we need more places to where people build ships.
        Mr. Stefany. Exactly.
        Senator Tuberville. We need to spread out.
        Mr. Stefany. Yes.
        Senator Tuberville. Okay, and I am encouraged by the
    commercial solutions and all the military's tough problems,
    Maxar being one on imagery, and XOM Analytics. Why don't you
    talk a little bit about your domain, Saildrone, and how it has
    done, how you evaluate it?
        Mr. Stefany. So I will talk business-wise, but I will let
    the admiral go on the operational side first.
        Vice Admiral Conn. So sir, you are speaking to, I believe,
    some of the efforts of Task Force 59 on Bahrain is doing, and
    that has been a great environment, which out of operational
    necessity, how do we create maritime domain awareness from the
    Red Sea into the Gulf and the adjacent seas, and understand
    what is out there. A lot of it was contractor-owned,
    contractor-operated concepts that went out to Bahrain and tell
    you this is what we can have. Saildrone was one of them.
        It is also working with our allies and partners that are in
    that area, and it is not just the things, if you will. It is
    the mesh networks and the data analytics which come to a fused
    picture.
        So we need to look at what we are doing out in Bahrain and
    then how do we scale it for potential other areas? I think that
    will be kind of rolling out in the next few months.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. I understand Iran tried to swipe a
    couple of our Saildrones and we forced them to put them back.
    Correct?
        Vice Admiral Conn. Yes. But really the question is ``do we
    care, based on the level of technology.'' You know, it is
    affordable, plentiful, and----
        Senator Tuberville. Yes, and a lot cheaper.
        Admiral Conn.--a lot cheaper.
        Senator Tuberville. Let me ask you about the 14 of 18
    SSBNs. Is that going to be enough to meet the Nation's
    strategic force needs? You know, the Navy has transformed four
    Ohio-class submarines. Kind of evaluate that, as we get into
    near time.
        Vice Admiral Conn. Yes, the requirement is 12 right now,
    and based on the timing, those decisions to go in excess and
    above to the 12 would be made a long time from now, and whether
    or not we recapitalize the SSGN force.
        Senator Tuberville. How much would that cost to keep those
    in operation until we get the other submarines in? Would that
    cost us a fortune?
        Vice Admiral Conn. The SSGNs?
        Senator Tuberville. Yes.
        Vice Admiral Conn. I do not have the exact number. I know
    as a Third Fleet commander some of the SSGNs are too showing
    their signs of age, and we take care of our nuclear force,
    quite frankly, better than some of our non-nuclear force, and
    they are showing their age. There are some options to conduct
    PIRA [Pre-Inactivation Restricted Availabilities], but I will
    turn it back over to Mr. Stefany.
        Mr. Stefany. We will take it for the record to get you the
    cost to do what we call a PIRA [Pre-Inactivation Restricted
    Availability], which we would extend the life of those current
    boats, if they are able to be extended. So we can get that for
    you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Mr. Stefany. The Navy looked into the feasibility of
    further extending select SSGN hulls via a Pre-Inactivation
    Restricted Availability. As part of this feasibility review,
    cost and schedule assessments were conducted to identify risks
    and opportunities of incorporating these additional unplanned
    availabilities into the current effort to maintain the
    submarine force. Results from the review indicated an
    unacceptable impact to projected CVN, SSBN, and SSN operational
    availability given the current limited capacity at public and
    private shipyards. Capacity analysis at the shipyards looked at
    drydock availability, manning capacity, and material
    availability.
        Each SSGN PIRA is estimated to require more than 187,000
    man-days of shipyard labor and to require over 2 years in a
    drydock at a cost of at least $350 million. Additional costs
    above those directly associated with the PIRA include personnel
    (8$34 million per year per submarine) and operations/
    maintenance of each submarine after PIRA until inactivation
    (8$52 million per year per submarine).
        Given the limited capacity at the public shipyards, these
    unplanned three year availabilities would have significant
    impacts on CVN, SSBN and SSN maintenance availabilities,
    offsetting the benefit of additional service life of the SSGNs.
    SSN availabilities are likely to be delayed to provide capacity
    for any SSGN PIRA. Specifically, Navy estimates that two SSNs
    would become idle for each SSGN PIRA added to the public
    shipyard workload

        Senator Tuberville. Would we want to do that?
        Mr. Stefany. We would want to. Again, depending on how many
    cycles they have done they may not be extendable. So we are
    going to look at each ship and then let you know. We will let
    you know what it would take to extend their lives, sir.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
        Senator King. I understand the Chairman is still caught on
    the floor, that the first vote is not completed yet. If St.
    Peter ever comes to any of you fellows and says you have 10
    minutes to live, you should say, ``Could it please be during a
    10-minute Senate vote?''
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. It will give you a lot more leeway.
        Mr. Stefany, first I want to commend you--I know you get
    hard questions at these kinds of hearings--for the funding of
    the drydock project over the last 2 years at Portsmouth Naval
    Shipyard. That is going to be a dramatic increase of capacity
    at that shipyard, and it is going to serve the Navy well. So I
    appreciate that the funding is there, and was last year, and
    again this year at a slightly higher amount. So thank you for
    that.
        Mr. Stefany, I want to talk about the transition from DDG
    Flight 3 to DDG(X). As you know, the Congress encouraged the
    Navy, and the Navy, I think, has been working in this
    direction, to allow and encourage Ingalls and Bath Iron Works
    to work together on the design, on getting it right. I am a
    great believer in competition, but I believe that having a
    design in place on a consistent basis, and that the
    manufacturers can be a lot of help in being sure that what is
    designed is buildable. So I hope you will continue to maintain
    that posture of allowing the two shipyards to be in discussion
    with the Navy on the DDG(X).
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir, that is exactly our approach, to
    come up with the design together with the same digital tools,
    digital manufacturing, and then once we get into production
    then we will start competing them going forward. We have
    awarded a contract to Bath and to Ingalls just recently to be
    part of our design team, and as we get into the design process
    we are going to work together very closely.
        Senator King. Two thoughts, as I have served on this
    Committee for 10 years. Let us be sure that the design is
    mature before we start building. In looking at some of the
    overrun problems of the Ford, for example, it is when we are
    doing R&D [research and development] while we are building that
    we get into trouble. So that is one observation.
        The other is, having worked closely with Bath Iron Works,
    and knowing of Ingalls' work situation, we want to try to avoid
    a trough between the DDG Flight 3 and the DDG(X). In other
    words, if these yards lose welders they ain't coming back.
    There are just too many other places for them to go. So we have
    to be thinking about the transition so that it is a smooth one
    and not a loss of work, a loss of employment during a 2-or 3-
    year period where one ship ends and the other starts. Do you
    see what I am suggesting?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. You are right where we are. We see
    it as a 3-year period, and so we will have to be building DDG-
    51s and the new destroyer over that 3-year transition period,
    and we are committed to do that. We are not going to stop 51s
    and then just immediately go to the new program. We are going
    to have this 3-year overlap.
        Senator King. That is helpful and I appreciate that.
        I was concerned there were only two DDGs in the President's
    Budget. We are talking about the industrial base. Part of
    maintaining the industrial base is a consistent demand signal.
    That is why this Committee recommended, and the Congress
    adopted, a 15-ship multiyear. So I am sure we are going to be
    discussing this in the Committee, but I am hopeful that we are
    not going to be able to add an additional destroyer.
        Admiral Conn, you have a wonderful title. You are in charge
    of warfighting requirements and capabilities. My question is,
    and I asked General Milley this question this morning in the
    full committee, warfare has changed dramatically, just in the
    last like 5 years. Electronic, cyber, directed energy, space.
    Do you feel that we are taking adequate account of the changing
    nature of the battlefield in terms of our strategy going
    forward of shipbuilding and projection of power by the Navy?
        Vice Admiral Conn. I do, sir. I think it is a three-FYDP
    view in terms of getting to that hybrid fleet, which is part of
    CNO's vision for the future. There are risks that we have to
    burn down. We are already making investments in cyber, for
    defensive cyber. We are up to 30 ships by 2030 that will have
    the capabilities from at least HM&E [Hull, Mechanical and
    Engineering] perspective, from a cyber perspective. I will stop
    there, as for your time.
        Senator King. Okay. General, I know that your marines have
    to be prepared for no GPS [Global Positioning System],
    electronics out, no communication. I mean, this is the first
    step in a conflict is going to be this overall electronic,
    cyberspace compromise, and I hope that is something you are
    taking into account.
        Lieutenant General Heckl. So we are exercising that way
    right now. Alternative PNT--position, navigation, timing--we
    are doing that all the time now, sir, and we are going to
    continue to stress that.
        Kind of what you are alluding to, though, is the ``left of
    bang'' people say, which is term I really do not care for
    because bang is happening now in cyberspace, info----
        Senator King. It sure is.
        General Heckl.--domain, and we train to that time now, sir.
    So yes, we are absolutely taking that into account.
        Senator King. The Secretary of the Navy was in my office
    last week and he brought a sextant with me to prove to me that
    this is being taken into account.
        Admiral Conn, one more point, and it sounds somewhat
    facetious but it is serious. We would like you to bring some
    Navy ships to Maine, and I will tell you why. There is a huge
    diminution of military presence in New England, in the
    Northeast generally. Almost all the bases are closed. Our young
    people are growing up without seeing anybody in uniform, and
    for you to have a ship at the Eastport Fourth of July Festival,
    or a Fourth of July in Portland, that means a lot, and it means
    a lot to the citizens but also to exposing the military to
    young people.
        We are having a recruiting problem, as you well know, and
    one way to counteract that, not to compromise readiness in any
    way, is to have the Navy show a presence along our coastline. I
    am partial to Maine, but I think there is other coastline in
    this country. I am not sure.
        Vice Admiral Conn. Sir, there are various Fleet Weeks on
    both sides of the coast, but I will take your point. Having
    been up in Bath for the commissioning of John Basilone, and
    being able to speak up there where people were thanking
    previous military members who served, and then I had the chance
    to speak and I asked the shipbuilders to stand up and say thank
    you for your service. There are many ways to serve your Nation.
    So I think recognizing shipbuilding is serving your country is
    part of the narrative that we need to get out there.
        Senator King. Absolutely. It has got to be more than a job.
    It is a mission, and you can help us to underline that.
        Senator Cramer, further questions?
        Senator Cramer. Well, in an effort to stall while the
    chairman returns from the second vote, let me just say,
    Admiral, no need to bring ships to North Dakota.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cramer. But we will take the Blue Angels every 2
    years at the Fargo Air Show, if you do not mind. The commander
    just happens to be from North Dakota right now.
        I think what I would like to do is just do the thing that
    is most dangerous, and I do it too much, is think out loud a
    little bit. But going back to the discussion of AUKUS--and,
    Admiral, I think you and Mr. Secretary referenced the
    opportunity. I think both of you may have even used that term--
    with that in mind and considering some of the recent details
    that have come out, that Australia would like to start buying
    Virginia-class submarines by 2030, you know, you both talked
    about two a year and we are at about 60 percent of that, some
    cuts to nuclear reactors, given all the stresses we are under.
        What are some of the challenges of AUKUS, because I would
    see some? I happen to agree, though, there are more
    opportunities, certainly not just in alliances but even
    synergies as we talked about with regard to this workforce
    challenge and the industrial base. Maybe just talk a little bit
    about that challenge that AUKUS would bring as well, and maybe
    elaborate more on some of those opportunities.
        Mr. Stefany. So I will start on the business side. Two big
    challenges. One is a workforce in Australia to ultimately
    build. It has taken us 70 years to get the workforce we have to
    build nuclear submarines, and they are looking at less than 10.
    So I think that is a huge challenge to actually create the
    culture and the workforce that can build nuclear submarines. It
    is not commercial ships. You know, it is a special skill and
    talent.
        So when they will be ready to do that, we have said is not
    date-driven. It is event driven. You have to show us you are
    ready, both on the nuclear propulsion plant side and the
    submarine side as well. So I think that is a huge item.
        Then the second is what the design of the new submarine
    will look like. It is a mix of the U.K. submarine and a little
    other stuff, and what that actually is going to look like. How
    much of it will be United States content, Australia content,
    U.K. content I think is another huge, I will not say obstacle
    but something we have to work through.
        On the operational side I will turn it over to the admiral.
        Vice Admiral Conn. I think on the operational side--I have
    to check classification--in terms of some of the embedded
    crews, that is going to buy down some of those challenges that
    we have, both in terms of operating the power plant and then on
    the boat. But there is path. There is an optimal path to get
    there.
        My real focus, sir, even if AUKUS was not out there, is
    getting our industrial base and our maintenance facilities to
    be able to produce and sustain two Virginia-class submarines a
    year on top of Columbia. We have to do that for ourselves, and
    both in the 2023 budget and in the 2024 budget the money is
    laid in but now we are going to have to execute.
        Senator Cramer. Well, and that is where I think market
    demand signals are fairly important as well. We have not talked
    a lot about that, but just your statement right there sends a
    signal, you know, of some sort to the market.
        I mentioned earlier synergies once AUKUS is fleshed out a
    little bit more. While they need to get ready, they have the
    advantage of our 70 years of experience, right? So hopefully
    there is a synergy there.
        With that I have stalled long enough for the chairman to
    get back here. In the meantime, two others showed up, so I will
    yield the rest of my time.
        Senator Kaine. [Presiding.] I will go to Senator Blumenthal
    and then Senator Schmitt, and then Senator Sullivan, and then
    some of us will have second rounds of questions as well,
    because I understand the three of you have not yet asked
    questions. Is that correct? So we will go Blumenthal, Schmitt,
    and Sullivan.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you for being here. I
    thank you for your service and to the teams behind you.
        None of this is going to happen, and I agree, two
    submarines, Virginia-class attack submarines a year. We need to
    build the Columbia. It is done in Connecticut, in Groton, the
    submarine capital of the world. But it is not going to be done
    if we do not hire more people, if we do not give them the
    skills and the training.
        I just think we are not investing in the vocational and
    career education that we need to produce those welders, pipe
    fitters, electricians, the folks who have the trades and who
    will receive not just jobs but careers if they are given that
    kind of training.
        I know that colleagues are waiting to ask questions, but I
    just want to know if you can tell me what kind of major
    investment the military will advocate in this next NDAA so that
    we meet the national security need of a trained workforce?
        Mr. Stefany. So Senator, in the President's budget about
    $600 million is requested between Navy money and DOD, what they
    call IBAS [Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment] money, for
    the submarine industrial base, and about a third of that is for
    workforce development efforts. So we have some funding in 2023
    and we are asking for more in 2024, to actually get into the
    schools in the areas that we think there is opportunity. Most
    schools do not have shop equipment anymore. They do not have
    shop teachers. You know, get in there and start investing with
    our Department of Labor folks and Education in recreating what
    maybe was in the 1970's and 1980's, a normal path through those
    schools to have opportunities coming out the back end.
        Senator Blumenthal. Are there resources that can be devoted
    right now?
        Mr. Stefany. We have 2023 money that was in last year's
    appropriation and authorization, that we are starting that
    process. We have a couple nascent programs. I am happy to come
    and brief you and your staff on that, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Could you do that?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. I would appreciate it.
        I just left a family--different topic--a family of Xavier
    Sandor, a sailor on the USS George Washington. His ship came in
    for maintenance, and he was living in the midst of a
    construction zone, literally. Eventually he was sleeping in his
    car, driving home, against orders because he could not live or
    sleep. There are sailors who will spend their entire contract
    possibly stationed on a ship undergoing maintenance
    availability in a shipyard, essentially a construction zone.
    Currently sailors E-3 and below are not eligible for basic
    housing allowance, as you know. They are required to reside at
    duty station, under intolerable conditions, no real eating
    place, no chow hall, a 2-mile walk to the ship if they have
    anywhere to live, even in their car.
        One idea I discussed was allowing the commander of ships in
    long-term maintenance availability to waive the prohibition on
    the basic allowance for housing for those junior sailors. I do
    not know what the options might be, but I would like a
    commitment--maybe I should ask Admiral Conn--will you look into
    this idea and report back to me and this Committee, give us
    your assessment of how conditions can be changed?
        There is a report, an investigation ongoing. I spoke to
    Admiral Myers about it, literally moments ago, when the
    family--the dad, mom, and brother--came to visit in my office
    with Admiral Myers. It just happens, coincidentally, I asked
    the Secretary of Defense about it this morning, in a hearing,
    mentioning this specific instance.
        The heartbreak is just almost impossible to describe,
    especially for a dad. I have had two sons who have been in the
    military, one Marine Corps infantry officer in Afghanistan, the
    other a Navy SEAL. This is just something that we need to do
    better on, I think.
        Vice Admiral Conn. Sir, I will take that for the record and
    work with the Chief of Naval Personnel or others to get you the
    answer.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Vice Admiral Conn. The Secretary of the Navy currently has
    authority to waive the prohibition on the receipt of a housing
    allowance for Sailors without dependents assigned to sea duty
    in the paygrades of E-5 and E-4. It remains preferable to house
    junior Sailors without dependents in unaccompanied housing or
    government leased housing. However, the Navy is reviewing your
    request and if appropriate, the Administration may propose
    changes in future legislative cycles.

        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I appreciate. Thanks, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Stefany. Sir, I will quickly offer there are, in the
    budget, some infrastructure, like parking garages and crew
    facilities that are actually in our proposed budget to
    alleviate some of those issues, but overall I definitely share
    your view. We have to do better.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Schmitt.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        This is my first Subcommittee hearing and I want to note
    that Missouri has an Air Force base and an Army base, but I
    specifically wanted to be on this Subcommittee because I think
    I am going to be advocating plenty for those branches, but I
    think the challenges that we face in the Indo-Pacific and the
    pacing challenge of China is so critical, and the work that you
    all will be doing as we hopefully step up our game. The ships
    that you need, the weapons that you need, it is certainly going
    to be a focus of mine.
        My question, I guess, Vice Admiral Conn, I have two
    questions. The first one to you, I know there have been some
    concerns about the tactical aviation inventory, and by some
    assessments three to four carrier air wings short of what we
    need, and the capability we need to project the power in the
    Indo-Pacific. What is your assessment of where we are at and
    the efforts that might be undertaken to shore that up?
        Vice Admiral Conn. Sir, in terms of meeting Navy force
    structure requirements, from a tactical air perspective, the
    strike fighter inventory management shortfall is 31 aircraft in
    2027, that goes to zero by 2031. That is number one.
        In terms of modernizing the air wing, you will see in this
    budget significant resources going after NGAD [Next Generation
    Air Dominance] and specifically F/A-XX. You will see MQ-25. I
    think you will see Collaborative Combat Aircraft. All these we
    are working in partnership with the Air Force, so that DOD does
    not have to pay twice in some cases. We are building different
    airplanes. They will be different. But some of the internals,
    if you will, the mission systems, is where we are trying to
    design as best we can.
        Senator Schmitt. Well, I want to followup, Mr. Stefany--am
    I saying that right? Stefany, Okay. I apologize. I want to
    followup a little bit on that as far as the strategy and the
    inventory and what we need. For 2 consecutive years now,
    Congress has added F/A-18 Super Hornets, and you might know
    where those are constructed, in St. Louis, Missouri. Where are
    we at with this, because Congress has appropriated it. There is
    really not a plan. I think a lot of even the maintenance we are
    falling short at this point. The F/A-18 Super Hornets, where
    does that fit in? I understand the modernization, but the needs
    that we have right now, it is a big concern.
        Mr. Stefany. So first of all our funding ended in 2021, but
    Congress added funding in 2022 and 2023, of 20 total aircraft.
    We asked, in January, for Boeing to give us pricing for that so
    we can get a proposal and start negotiating it. We expect that
    to come in in the June timeframe. We will then negotiate with
    them and hopefully have a contract in place toward later this
    year for those 20 aircraft.
        As part of that, I am sure you have heard discussions of
    the data delivery and getting the right data for our sailors
    and marines to maintain our aircraft, on aircraft carriers or
    at our facilities, in a logistically constrained environment of
    the future, potentially. That is a detail that we are working
    in parallel to getting the pricing from Boeing to buy those 20
    aircraft. We need to actually have their proposal so we can
    work on a contract.
        Senator Schmitt. One of the concerns that I have heard is
    that there are new challenges being placed on suppliers, so
    that would make the reality of actually paying for and building
    the F/A-18 Super Hornets nearly impossible because of the
    onerous restrictions and regulations on subcontractors. So I
    hope that is something that we can talk about.
        Mr. Stefany. Yes. I actually have not heard a specific case
    of that, but I am happy to either work with you or with Boeing
    on that.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Schmitt.
        Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,
    thank you.
        I want to begin, Admiral, with this recent disturbing
    ``Defense One'' article, and I would like to submit it for the
    record, Mr. Chairman, ``Navy on path to violate 31 amphib ship
    requirement in 2024.''
        Senator Kaine. Submitted without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

     Navy On Path To Violate 31-Amphibious-Ship Requirement in 2024

    BUDGET PROPOSAL ASKS CONGRESS TO ALLOW SHIP RETIREMENTS THAT LAWMAKERS
                          EXPLICITLY NIXED LAST YEAR.

    By Caitlin M. Kenney
    Staff Reporter, Defense One
    March 13, 2023

        The Navy is proposing to drop its amphibious fleet below 31
    ships, despite an agreement with the Marine Corps and a
    potential violation of last year's defense policy law.
        Sent to Congress on Monday, the Navy's proposed $255.8
    billion 2024 budget aims to retire eight warships before the
    end of their intended service life, including three Whidbey
    Island-class dock landing ships, or LSDs, that it proposed to
    scrap last year but which were saved by the 2023 National
    Defense Authorization Act.
        The Navy's $32.8 billion shipbuilding request buys nine
    battle force ships but no amphibs, including the San Antonio-
    class amphibious transport dock ships, or LPDs, that are meant
    to replace the LSDs.
        The LSDs chosen for early retirement were found to be in
    ``poor material condition,'' according to Defense Department
    budget slides.
        ``We've gone through, not only on LSDs but the other
    divestments proposed in this budget, did a ship-by-ship review,
    to understand the material State of each of the ships. What we
    found on the LSDs is that they are challenged in terms of
    readiness. We want to make sure that the capabilities that we
    field are the right capabilities, and are able to perform the
    mission to the standards that we expect,'' Navy Undersecretary
    Erik Raven told reporters ahead of the proposed budget's
    release.
        ``And so we're proposing those divestments because we think
    the return on investment, on further investments on those
    particular ships, as judged hull by hull, that return on
    investment is not there,'' Raven said. ``Additionally, say that
    we have sailors and Marines who are serving on these ships, we
    think that getting them matched up to the right platforms is
    the way to go.''
        Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger last week
    rejected any plans that would cut these aging LSDs before their
    replacements were delivered.
        Despite the delivery of one LPD in 2024, the early
    retirement of the three LSDs would mean the total number of
    amphibs that year would drop below the legally required 31
    ships minimum laid out in the 2023 NDAA, according to the
    budget documents. Raven told reporters that the Navy is not
    seeking a waiver at this time.
        It was a surprise that the Navy ``has thumbed its nose that
    defiantly to the Congress'' after lawmakers supported the ship
    minimum last year, said a congressional staffer who spoke to
    Defense One on condition of anonymity. ``So what the Navy has
    done with this budget is they took all of those signals and all
    those indications and warnings, if you will, from the Congress
    and . . . said you know, `Thanks, but no thanks, we're going to
    do what we think what we ought to be doing, and we don't really
    care what the Congress has to say on this subject.' ''
        Berger on Monday reiterated the reasoning behind the 31-
    ship requirement for amphibs.
        ``Anything less incurs risk to national defense by limiting
    the options for our combatant commanders,'' he said in a
    statement to Defense One. ``Per strategic guidance, the Marine
    Corps must be able to provide the Nation with crisis response
    capabilities and build partnerships with allies and partners in
    support of integrated deterrence--difficult to achieve without
    the requisite number of amphibious warships.''
        The requirement is linked to the Nation's defense, said
    Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., and ranking member of the Senate
    Armed Services Committee, at the March 9 Amphibious Warship
    Industrial Base Coalition event on Capitol Hill.
        ``We cannot defend this Nation, we cannot do what we need
    to do to prevent war, to prevent war, without the 31 ships,''
    Wicker said. ``And so the National Defense Authorization Act .
    . . makes it clear that the Commandant of the Marine Corps is
    the one we're finally going to listen to in terms of our ship
    requirement.''
        This year's 30-year shipbuilding plan, and what it may say
    about the long-term future of these ships, will be released
    ``very soon,'' Raven told reporters ahead of the budget roll
    out.

                                  PROCUREMENT

        The Navy budget documents also chart out the ship
    procurements from 2024 to 2028, and there are a lot of zeros in
    the amphibious fleet's future. The Navy plans to buy its next
    America-class amphibious assault ship or LHA in 2027 and does
    not plan to buy any San Antonio-class LPD 17 Flight IIs in any
    of the years listed.
        The shipbuilding topline includes new ship construction as
    well as funds for other vessels like the Landing Craft, Air
    Cushion (LCAC) Service Life Extension Program and the Landing
    Craft Utility LCU 1700 class.
        The future Landing Ship Medium or LSM, is still planned for
    2025. However, that is already 2 years past the original plan
    to buy the first ship in 2023. The Marine Corps just started to
    experiment with a commercially leased ship to inform the LSM's
    future capabilities.
        Last month, Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro said the service
    is taking a ``strategic pause'' on buying more LPDs until
    additional studies are completed, Defense News reported.
    Afterward, the Navy would ``probably'' start buying them again,
    according to the report.
        On Monday, Raven told reporters at the Pentagon that the
    office of the Secretary of Defense had directed the pause and a
    capabilities-based assessment, and that there is an
    ``integrated team'' to assess the ships.
        ``What we are making sure that we are doing as we move
    forward with our budget plans, is making sure that we have the
    right capabilities at the right price aligned to not only
    meeting military requirements, but working with industry,''
    Raven said. ``And for LPD, we're taking a look at the
    acquisition strategy moving forward, again, to make sure that
    we would have the right capabilities at the right price and
    working with industry partners to put together that plan moving
    forward.''
        The Navy has ``time to get this right'' with the LPD, and
    that the Navy and Marine Corps are ``fundamentally aligned'' on
    the 31-ship requirement, Rear Adm. John Gumbleton, the deputy
    assistant secretary of the Navy for budget, said Monday.
        ``Both service chiefs like 31 [ships] as a requirement.
    Both service chiefs like multiyear procurements. Both service
    chiefs want to buy in a predictable future. And so if we can do
    a study and actually lower the costs of this, that's all to the
    good of the Department of the Navy and Marine Corps,''
    Gumbleton said.
        Buying amphibious ships tends to be the last priority for
    the Navy after spending shipbuilding funds on aircraft
    carriers, submarines, and destroyers, Hudson Institute Senior
    Fellow Bryan Clark said March 9 during Defense One's State of
    the Navy event.
        ``Whatever gets left over is what can go toward the
    amphibious ships and the support ships. And when you do all the
    numbers for that, you always end up with you know maybe not
    quite enough for the amphibious ships, because if you're
    building one LHA every four or 5 years that you can
    incrementally fund, that's a chunk of money that's on the scale
    of you know, $500 million a year. And then you've got maybe
    $500 million or a billion dollars leftover for one more
    amphibious ship, which isn't quite an LPD,'' Clark said.

        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. As you probably know, a number
    of us--myself, the chairman--worked hard on this 31 amphib ship
    floor. This is not a suggestion. It is a law. It is a law, so
    my view is you do not even have the authority to do this. I
    have raised this with the CNO and others, but this is something
    that the Navy, the Marine Corps worked on, and out of the gate
    you guys say, ``Eh, maybe we will just blow off those Senators
    and Congressmen.''
        Again, not a suggestion. I am actually really pissed about
    this. So how do you answer this? My view is there is no answer.
    You have a law. We passed it. It went through. The President of
    the United States signed it. By the way, in the Committee it
    was unanimous. This Committee was in the base bill. So it was
    not controversial, and the Navy comes out and says, ``Eh, we
    will just blow off those silly U.S. Senators.''
        So what are we doing here, Admiral, and how can you rectify
    this? It is a big issue.
        Vice Admiral Conn. It is a big issue.
        Senator Sullivan. I am not pleased about it, and no U.S.
    Member of Congress should be pleased about it. You guys do not
    have that authority to do what you just did in the President's
    Budget. That is my view.
        Vice Admiral Conn. Yes, sir. In terms of the impact and in
    terms of getting below 31 amphibs is with our LSDs.
        Senator Sullivan. But why don't you address the threshold
    issue, which is we told you not to go below it.
        Vice Admiral Conn. The cost, in terms of----
        Senator Sullivan. No. We told you, in a law, signed by the
    President, not to go below the floor. So what is your answer to
    that?
        Vice Admiral Conn. My answer to that----
        Senator Sullivan.--costs or anything. We balance the costs.
        Vice Admiral Conn. Yes, sir. But the answer to that, sir,
    is having 31 ships, of which three of them may be tied to a
    pier for the next 5 years, is not really 31. We have an aging
    platform that came into the service about the same time I did,
    back in the mid 1980's.
        Senator Sullivan. We need a serious discussion on this
    issue, because in my view the Navy would be pretty darn worried
    about a headline saying, ``Navy on path to violate 31 amphib
    ship requirement in 2024.'' If you are saying the 31 ships, 3
    of which are just going to be sitting there in maintenance for
    5 more years, that is a problem.
        I think what you guys needed to do, before you issued the
    budget, is come to this Committee. Given how important this was
    to a number of us, given, by the way, how important this was to
    the U.S. Marine Corps, and not surprise us with, in my view, a
    violation of a law that we worked really hard on last year.
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. We will certainly take that, if we
    are going to be doing anything that looks like it is not going
    to make it, we will come and talk to you in advance. So that is
    a great request on your part, and happy to do that.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. Very important.
        General, I want to turn to Force Design. I have written an
    , it was a while ago, in ''Defense News.'' Mr. Chairman, I
    would like to submit this for the record.
        Senator Kaine. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

    If the Marine Corps' Force Design plan is going to succeed, it
                 needs more money and more Navy support

    By Dan Sullivan
    Jun 13, 2022

        The Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 effort has come under
    considerable scrutiny. Supporters and detractors have waged a
    public debate on the merits of Commandant David Berger's 10-
    year modernization effort to adapt the Marine Corps to current
    and future national security threats.
        I commend my Marine veteran colleagues in the House and
    Senate for their recent Wall Street Journal op-ed focusing on
    the bold, innovative effort Gen. Berger is leading, and I agree
    with most of their points. But the actual success of Force
    Design--scheduled for completion by 2030--depends on addressing
    three key areas my congressional colleagues did not mention.
        First, the Marine Corps must carefully manage the gap
    between divestment of current combat capability and future
    combat capability development--and the significant risk that
    entails. This is critical so as to not leave the Marine Corps
    less combat capable at a time when such capabilities are needed
    most, for example, around the second half of this decade when
    many see a heightened risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
        Specifically, the Marine Corps has gotten rid of its tanks
    and bridging units as well as a significant portion of its
    cannon artillery and aviation units so it could buy mobile
    anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft systems, loitering munitions
    and unmanned aerial vehicles. But many of these systems have
    not been purchased yet and some are still going through testing
    and development and field integration with newly developed
    Marine Corps units.
        The risks inherent in this combat capability gap could be
    substantially mitigated if the Marine Corps had a more robust
    budget, allowing them to modernize the force before getting rid
    of proven weapon systems.
        The commandant recently acknowledged this fact during a May
    Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. But the Biden
    administration continues to send Congress inflation-adjusted
    budget cuts for the Marine Corps and all other services,
    forcing the commandant to substantially divest current
    capabilities to pay for future ones.
        Indeed, that is one of the underlying assumptions of Force
    Design 2030, that the Marine Corps' bold modernization efforts
    would have to be undertaken with flat or declining defense
    budgets. Such budgets are clearly not commensurate with global
    threats facing our Nation and require the services to make the
    difficult choice between current combat readiness and force
    modernization for future foes, while managing the resulting
    risk.
        Second, Force Design's success depends on the U.S. Navy,
    both in terms of greater Marine Corps-Navy integration and the
    Navy's critical role in delivering and sustaining Marine Corps
    stand-in forces to fight from remote littoral areas in the
    Indo-Pacific and across the world.
        Presently, the Navy's enthusiasm for these innovative, and
    likely dangerous, Marine Corps operations appears non-existent.
    None of the Navy's current strategy documents mention, let
    alone highlight, its important role in supporting concepts like
    Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and stand-in forces,
    which are the essential operational components of Force Design.
    Without robust Navy support and buy-in, the Marine Corps Force
    Design efforts and strategy will fail.
        Finally, although appropriately focused on China, Force
    Design must deliver what the American people have come to
    expect from the Marine Corps: a global force ready to deploy to
    any clime and place on Navy ships to deliver a lethal combined
    arms, kick-in-the-door capability in response to a major
    national security crisis.
        It is for that reason I am introducing bipartisan
    legislation for the upcoming National Defense Authorization Act
    to require a minimum of 31 amphibious ships in the Navy fleet
    to ensure the continuing global response capability of the
    Marine Corps both during and after Force Design 2030.
        Dan Sullivan, a Republican, represents Alaska in the U.S.
    Senate. He is a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee
    and a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve.

        Senator Sullivan. It essentially lauds the Commandant for
    really focusing on a bold, innovative plan. However, there are
    a number of issues that are out there that are being debated
    within the Marine Corps. This is the biggest restructuring of
    the Corps at least in decades, maybe in 100 years, and I let
    the Commandant know this. I think it is important we have
    hearings on this, that we stress-test it, that the light of
    congressional hearings, people who are for Force Design, people
    who have issues with Force Design, that we do that either on
    this Committee, Mr. Chairman, as you and I have talked about,
    or the Readiness Subcommittee, or the full committee.
        But let me ask a really basic question that is one of the
    criticisms, and again, recognizing what the Marine Corps is
    trying to do. As you probably know I am a little biased in
    terms of the services, and the Marine Corps is one that I have
    a lot of respect for, for obviously reasons.
        But there is this issue of, as I wrote in this op-ed,
    ``Managing the gap between divestment of current combat
    capability and future combat capability development entails
    significant risk.'' The Commandant acknowledged that in a
    hearing last year. Some critics have stated that the Marine
    Corps is starting to be designed for a niche force with a niche
    important combat mission--China, Taiwan--but leaving out the
    statutory mandates of a combined arms, three-division--again,
    that is the law, right, the 1947 act, so the Marine Corps does
    not have a choice on that either. In the very significant cuts
    that have already occurred with regard to infantry, 100 percent
    of armor, bridging, mine-clearing capabilities, combat engineer
    capabilities, very significant cannon artillery, Military
    Police are gone.
        I mean, there is a whole host of things from my perspective
    that the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) seems to be
    something that has been the most important issue in the Marine
    Corps for decades. We do not rely on anyone for logistics, for
    clearing, for bridging, for air, for artillery, and all of a
    sudden, when I am pressing on these people, talking about,
    ``Well, we are going to do an MOU [Memorandum of Understanding]
    with the Army for bridging.'' Really? ``We are going to do an
    Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Army for road
    clearing.'' Really? That, to me, seems to go fundamentally
    against the whole idea of the MAGTF and self-sustainment.
        I guess the bottom-line big question is that force-in-
    readiness capability, that is the kick-in-the-door capability,
    anywhere in the world, which is the hallmark of the Marine
    Corps, some of the critics are saying that Force Design is
    dramatically undermining this, particularly when divestments
    have not been made up with future combat capabilities.
        That is a lot to throw at you, General. I think this
    deserves its own hearing. But do you care to respond to any of
    that?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, look, that answer does
    deserve--I would offer myself and my staff to come back with
    you and sit down.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, I am talking about a hearing on it.
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Yes, sir, and we would do that as
    well.
        But, sir, I can tell you that having been in this job now
    for almost 18 months--I am a fleet Marine, sir. I came from
    commanding the First Marine Expeditionary Force--we are on the
    right track. The MAGTF, sir, is as strong, if not stronger,
    than it ever has been.
        The issue, sir, let me just put it this way. How III MEF,
    the Stand In Force that has been that way for decades, right,
    and all the MEFs are different. They always have been
    different--different sizes, different capabilities--but they
    are MAGTFs. We simply did not equip III MEF with the tools to
    deal with the National Defense Strategy (NDS)-directed pacing
    threat. General Dunford acknowledged it. General Miller
    acknowledged it, that the Marine Corps was not organized,
    trained, and equipped to deal with the Communist Chinese Party,
    and we are doing that. But sir, I think----
        Senator Sullivan. I appreciate that, and like I said, I
    applauded General Berger for his--he is getting on it more than
    anyone else. But that does not mean that it does not have
    flaws, and that does not mean that some of the criticisms or
    Wargaming or this big issue, and the General acknowledged it, I
    mean, we have divested a lot. I mean, I have one number here--
    21 percent of infantry, 100 percent of armor, bridging, and
    mine-clearing capability, 100 percent of Military Police, 67
    percent of cannon artillery, a significant amount of critical
    fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. My numbers are 35 percent
    of all F-35s.
        Now maybe those numbers are wrong and this is why we need a
    hearing, but that is a lot of divestment.
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, all I would say to some of
    the--and, sir, I do not like to get into the, you know, because
    a lot of these are respected individuals. But they are entitled
    to their own opinions. They are not entitled to their own
    facts.
        We have not diminished a single program of record. I am a
    V-22 guy, and I am going to stay in classification level, but
    now we are going to stop at 16 VMMs. The Commandant added 2
    more, right? He was going to go to 14. He added 2 more. We are
    going to be at 16, of 10 planes. If I maintained 16 squadrons
    of 12 planes, I would be coming to you with a bill for an
    addition 34 V-22s. Our program is 360. We bought 360. Our
    program of record for JSF is 420--353 Bravos, 67 Charlies. We
    are buying those, and the program record for CH-53 Kilo is 200.
    We are buying 200.
        Sir, I would just point out that like we are fielding
    HIMARS [High Mobility Artilery Rocket System], and we are
    working on loitering munitions, and we are going to follow the
    Army down the path, because we are not big enough to pay our
    own way. GMLRS [Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System], which is
    going to be a phenomenal capability, we got the Naval Strike
    Missile that is going to be followed up by the Maritime Strike
    Tomahawk. These are real capabilities, sir, that not only apply
    in the Indo-Pacific--look what we did with the 61/2 and Major
    General Donovan in the High North, right in the wake of
    Ukraine.
        What I would tell you is the existential threat to the
    Marine Corps, just from Karsten Heckl's point, is the lack of
    amphibious ships.
        Senator Sullivan. So you agree with my point with the
    Admiral?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, I could not agree more. Sir,
    I have said this numerous times, in multiple forums, CSIS
    [Center for Strategic and International Studies] and others.
    The concern for me and for the Marine Corps is not tied to
    artillery or tanks. See what is happening to tanks in Ukraine.
    I am not saying--tanks have their place. Most grunts said they
    like them in an urban fight. I can pull up open-source video of
    Ukrainians using a $200 quadcopter that has been modified to
    hold an 81-millimeter mortar, destroying a T-72.
        Senator Sullivan. Tanks are pretty relevant in Ukraine
    right now.
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, yes, well----
        Senator Sullivan. Loitering munitions are not--what about--
    sorry, Mr. Chairman. We are waiting on others?
        Senator Kaine. No. We had Members that did second rounds
    already so I am just going to let you go. I have got some other
    things too, but I am here until you are done, and then I have
    got a few more things. Go ahead.
        Senator Sullivan. Again, it requires a further debate. I
    mean, combat engineers, road-clearing, bridging--it seems to be
    one of the most basic elements of Marine Corps ground
    capability is gone.
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir, I mean----
        Senator Sullivan. How do we cross a river when we do
    something in Taiwan or Iran? Call the Army?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Well, sir, I mean, right now the
    Commandant's focus was getting us--sir, look, multiple tours in
    Afghanistan and Iraq. My opinion is, and I do not know what
    your opinion is, that we have become a second land Army. We
    have walked away from the fleet. In 2010, we did not have a BLT
    [Battalion Landing Team] to put against a MEU, a Marine
    Expeditionary Unit. Everything thing got big. You know, the ACV
    [Amphibious Combat Vehicle] is a great vehicle, but it is built
    to MRAP [Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected] standards, right? It
    is completely survivable. It does not fit in the upper V, on
    ships. It weighs 70,000 pounds. We are working around it but
    these are issues. It takes 18 ACVs to do what 12 AAVs did.
        So we got big, heavy, immobile, and we are just trying to
    get back to being a Fleet Marine Force again.
        Senator Sullivan. So let me ask one of the big criticisms,
    and maybe you can address it, and I already mentioned it, and
    again, I know there is this notion that it is all the retired
    four-stars, and it is not. It is not just the retired four-
    stars. But this idea that Force Design--and again, I am not
    saying I agree with it. I am saying these issues need to be
    aired. It is time for oversight on this very--whether you love
    Force Design or hate it--I love the Marine Corps, right? I
    mean, I loved being a marine more than I love being a U.S.
    Senator, so this is important to all marines.
        One of the criticisms is that Force Design appears to be
    building a niche force construct for only one situation in one
    location, and the whole concept of a combined arms Force-in-
    readiness that needs amphibs has been diminished or will be
    diminished or is being diminished.
        So let me tee that one up for you, General.
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Sir.
        Senator Sullivan. I am sure you have heard it, and I am
    sure you want to disagree with it.
        Lieutenant General Heckl. I completely and absolutely,
    fundamentally disagree with the whole premise. It is still a
    MAGTF. We are still a Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Depending
    on the scenario, just like we did for 61/2, you know, in the
    wake of Ukraine, we task organized, and we put together a
    MAGTF, and quite frankly, where we found our value, sir, in the
    High North, when this started, was the recon, counter-recon
    and, you know, countersense, make sense. We were passing off
    high-fidelity, target-quality track data to our allies on what
    the adversary was doing with some assets that I cannot talk
    about here.
        So the direct application to everything the Commandant--
    what we have moved out on, not just the Commandant--what we
    have moved out on Force Design--and so remember, this is the
    fleet. These are the Marine regional forces, and these are all
    the MEFs involved with this. So to think we are making this for
    a niche market I just fundamentally disagree with. We have
    fielded HIMARS. We are going to continue. We are taking that to
    the next level. Right now we are working on the loitering
    munitions to give us the full, all-weather capability that is
    going to cover that 5-kilometer to 18-kilometer gap that we
    currently have with HIMARS.
        I just want to point out also, sir, that we kept seven
    batteries of tube artillery. There are 3 East, 4 West, and we
    actually, as you know an artillery battery, at that point
    traditionally it had been six guns. We upped them to eight. We
    are going to hold onto those for any kind of contingency.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, General--and thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Sorry I went on so long but I think it is an important issue.
    Two final comments. One is in last year's NDAA I had a
    provision--again, unanimous--that was requiring reporting from
    the Marine Corps on this very topic of what has been divested
    and what is the incoming combat capability. Those are due every
    6 months. The first one is due in April, so in a couple of
    days. I hope we get it on time.
        Then the other issue that I have been raising, which I
    believe the Marine Corps leadership agrees with, is that
    without full Navy support, Force Design fails, because you are
    talking about integration, which I am in agreement with you on
    that, General.
        But one of the things I mentioned in this Defense News op-
    ed from a while ago is presently I said State of the Navy's
    enthusiasm for these innovative and likely dangerous marine
    missions--the Stand-In Force is a dangerous mission--and the
    ability to get logistics and delivering marines and
    sustainability in many ways is going to rely on the Marine
    Corps, but it is going to rely on the Navy. As I mentioned
    there--this is a year ago--the Navy's current strategy
    documents never mention once, or highlight once Marine Corps
    Force Design or concepts like Stand In Forces, or expeditionary
    operating base forces.
        So where is the Navy on that, Admiral, because again, you
    could be the biggest proponent of Marine Corps Force Design
    2030 there is, but if the Navy is indifferent or does not care
    or wants to cut amphibs, then Force Design is going to fail.
        Vice Admiral Conn. There is no daylight between myself and
    Lieutenant General Heckl.
        Senator Sullivan. Have the Navy documents been updated to
    reflect interest in Force Design, because last year there was
    zero.
        Vice Admiral Conn. Yes. Okay, sir. I mean, I acknowledge or
    I will take a look at that----
        Senator Sullivan. Well----
        Admiral Conn.--get back to you on that.
        Senator Sullivan.--is what I am saying.
        Vice Admiral Conn. So Lieutenant General Heckl and I, we go
    on the road and we give briefs together, that talks to the
    Stand In Force and the Commandant's design, as well as where
    the Navy is going in the future. Went up to the Massachusetts
    Institute of Technology (MIT), a very classified setting with
    over 300 industry partners, to give them a set of headlights in
    terms of how we are going to fight so they understand the
    context, and what do we need to fight with. That is from the
    Marine Corps and the Navy perspective.
        The medium landing ship is going to be late to need. We
    acknowledge that. So we are committed to have a bridging
    strategy to get to that medium landing ship capability, that
    the ship will start construction in 2025. We have to look for
    other alternatives. We are committed to that.
        We are a naval team. We are out in contact across the globe
    day in and day out for the various combatant commanders. We are
    a family. Is there friction at times? Certainly. But we are
    committed to the outcomes that we are both driving to.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator, I
    mentioned something before you came, which was at the beginning
    of the hearing. They did not deliver the 30-year ship plan to
    us. So normally we would have the plan and then we would have
    this hearing and be able to really direct questions to the
    plan. We thought we were going to get it last week. It did not
    happen. So I committed to the Committee Members, we will get
    that plan soon. We will get it before the posture hearing. But,
    in fact, for the posture hearing, because there is so much to
    ask the SECNAV and the Commandant and the CNO, if after the
    posture hearing Members of this Subcommittee still have
    questions based on the 30-year ship plan that we did not get
    until after this hearing we will reconvene to enable us to dig
    into that. Secretary Stefany was very good about saying they
    are ready to do that.
        Senator Sullivan. Great.
        Senator Kaine. Then I will just say to you, General Heckl,
    when a witness says to a Senator, ``I completely disagree with
    you,'' it just so reminds me of my conversations with my own
    staff. I mean, it is kind of like, it just kind of gives me
    that homesick feeling for Russell 231.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, I appreciate the frankness because
    it is great. It is what we need.
        Senator Kaine. Yes, it is good.
        Senator Sullivan. It is what we expect, especially from the
    Marine Corps.
        Senator Kaine. Let me ask a couple of things, and they may
    have been covered when I was over on the floor, but first I
    just want to do a little bit on block buy. Inflation is a
    challenge and connected too, but there are some separate
    issues, supply chain disruptions are a challenge. The block
    buy, when it is done right, is not only a hedge against
    inflation, because you can buy up front before price goes up of
    various components, but it also enables you to avoid some of
    the supply chain delays because you are able to purchase in
    advance, and then when you are finally getting ready for maybe
    the second in a class or something like that you have got a
    huge percentage of the material together.
        I have heard very strong pro block buy testimony from the
    SECNAV in the past, but do you see it the same way, Secretary
    Stefany?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. Block buy really enables, whether it
    is a second, third, or fourth, it takes that whole ``having the
    right material at the right time'' issue out. That is one of
    our key constraints we have right now in getting ships and
    aircraft out on time is getting the material there when we need
    it. So block buy totally facilitates making sure the material
    is not an issue for following units.
        Senator Kaine. Great. Let me ask about the SIOP. Is the
    fiscal year 2024 budget and what we are thinking going forward,
    are we putting enough resources in the SIOP to enable you to
    accomplish what you need to?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. For the major projects, fully funded
    through the FYDP, so that is really very, very helpful. Then
    what we call the optimization plans or the area plans, that
    analysis started last year, this year, and next year, going
    through that process, and we have sufficient funds in the
    budget to meet the need as those reports come out on how we
    optimize each of the shipyards.
        Senator Kaine. Admiral Conn, if I remember right from my
    first round of questions, the $300 million that you need for
    the kind of current fixes on the bases where there is seismic
    activity, that is in the unfunded priorities list, right?
        Vice Admiral Conn. Yes, sir, it is.
        Senator Kaine. Okay. Let me ask you, finally, a question
    about Navy aviation. As I understand the Navy's striker fighter
    shortfall estimate has fluctuated pretty widely over the past
    few years. In simple terms there are two pieces to solving
    strike fighter inventory gap--buying new aircraft and extending
    service lift of existing. The budget does not include buying
    new F/A-18E/F aircraft, only F-35B and F-35C.
        What the latest assessment of the strike fighter shortfall?
        Vice Admiral Conn. Sir, we got to a deficit peak of 31 in
    fiscal year 2027, and we go to zero by 2031.
        Senator Kaine. So the deficit hits its peak in 2027----
        Vice Admiral Conn. Yes.
        Senator Kaine.--but then down to zero by 2031.
        Vice Admiral Conn. That is correct.
        Senator Kaine. Then let me ask you on pilots and
    maintainers. The Air Force has been experiencing significant
    shortfalls in both. I mean, everybody is having a hard time
    hiring the people they need, and some of our pilots and
    maintainers have a lot of other options. Have you seen, in the
    Navy and Marine Corps, shortages in the pilots and maintainers,
    and if so what are you doing to try to counter that?
        Vice Admiral Conn. We are in competition for the air crew
    and we are in competition with the airlines that are hiring. We
    have been here before. Through the bonus structures and
    whatnot, I do not have particular insight of how well the bonus
    or the input metric, what are the outcomes. I do not have any
    insight on that, sir.
        We do, in CNATRA [Chief of Naval Air Training], the
    aircraft, we had some trouble with the T-45s, with the engine,
    with that engine. The aircraft will be back up to our levels
    prior to the engine problem in April. We are going to continue
    to ramp up and probably meet in excess of 90 percent of the
    requirement for the year, and the maintainers, I think
    retention as well. But in terms of our ability to recruit
    talent and retain talent and talk conversations with the Chief
    of Naval Personnel, we are going to have our challenges in
    meeting some of our recruiting goals.
        Senator Kaine. In many of the MOSs [Military Occupational
    Specialties] in the military--we had a full committee hearing
    on just recruitment and retention about 2 weeks ago, and most
    of the services were coming in with pretty positive message on
    the retention side, and most were coming in with some real
    challenges on the recruiting side. But I would think in the
    pilot and maintainer space the retention challenge is very
    real. I mean, the airline industry sort of went flat on its
    back during COVID, but it is really coming back strong now. So
    in periods where you see that ramping up then the competition
    for your folks is pretty intense.
        Vice Admiral Conn. Sir, I agree with that. I mean, people
    join the Navy for a lot of different reasons. They stay in the
    Navy because they want to be on a winning team, and they stay
    in the Navy because they think they are making a difference.
    They enjoy the job. They like the people they work with. But
    what we need to continue to go after is some of those quality-
    of-life aspects that the Secretary of the Navy is very hot on.
        Senator Kaine. Well, there was good testimony about that
    even today with the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] and the head
    of the Joint Chiefs about some aspects of the budget. You
    mentioned them, Senator Stefany. You know, investing in a
    parking garage does not sound like a great quality-of-life
    thing, but if you are a ship that is in drydock and you are
    having to walk a mile across a constructionsite to and from
    every day, and it is hard to find a place to park near, that is
    an agitator. When you are on a berthing barge that is old, and
    the quality of it is not high, and there is not great internet
    access on it, that is a real issue for people. It is about
    readiness, it is about retention, and it also can exacerbate or
    create mental health challenges that we all, I think, are
    committed to dealing with.
        So, listen, I appreciate this hearing today. Good candid
    dialog back and forth. My Committee Members are very, very
    focused on this Committee. We look forward to meeting again,
    and with that the hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                       navy and marine corps integration
        1. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Stefany, in your testimony you stated the
    [3d Marine Littoral Regiment and Task Force 61/2] will actively
    participate and support operational concepts, including Distributed
    Maritime Operations, Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations, and
    Stand-in Forces. As I have stated before, the success of Marine Corps
    Force Design 2030 is in large part based on the Navy's buy-in. Will the
    Department of the Navy release any updated documentation this year
    which clearly articulates how the Navy will support the Marine Corps in
    Distributed Maritime Operations, Expeditionary Advanced Based
    Operations, and Stand-in Forces?
        Mr. Stefany. The Navy and Marine Corps continue to lead Joint and
    Coalition forces through integrated deterrence and remain postured to
    adapt to emerging threats as demand for our naval capabilities
    continues to increase. Last July the CNO released an updated Navigation
    Plan, aligning our priorities to the 2022 National Defense Strategy
    (NDS). In this document, the CNO states that Naval Forces will leverage
    warfighting concepts including the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC),
    Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), the concept for Stand-in Forces
    (SIF), Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operations (EABO), and Littoral
    Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) to persist forward,
    prevail in conflict, and end hostilities on favorable U.S. terms.
        Due to the rigor associated with developing or revising Navy
    directives I am not able to provide an update on any pending CNO
    directives, but the Naval Board continuously seeks ways to improve
    Navy-Marine Corps integration. The PB24 budget request is in alignment
    with the Secretary of the Navy's priorities, and enables the One Navy-
    Marine Corps Team to continue strengthening our maritime dominance,
    building on our culture of warfighting excellence, and enhancing our
    strategic partnerships.
                       san antonio-class amphibious ship
        2. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Stefany and Vice Admiral Conn, I want to
    revisit the San Antonio-class LPD-17 Flight II Warship, which is the
    Marine's Corps number one unfunded priority by the way. Vice Admiral
    Conn, in your testimony you described the LPD-17 as an essential
    component of the amphibious warfare ship inventory. During the annual
    McAleese Conference, the Commandant doubted the Navy's fear that
    purchasing a single ship in fiscal year 2025 is not going to drive the
    price down or make it more competitive. As the Commandant stated, the
    initial production of a ship always has a learning curve and stopping
    production now is only going to increase the price curve. The San
    Antonio-class Landing Platform, Dock LPD-17 Flight II is a critical
    component of the Navy and Marine Corps' Amphibious Ready Group, tasked
    by our Nation with forward-deployed conventional deterrence,
    humanitarian assistance, and crisis response. This is a capability we
    are lacking in, as Lieutenant General Karsten Heckl stated last year in
    front of this Committee. The Marine Corps was unable to respond to the
    NATO/ EUCOM commander's urgent tasking in 2022 due to existing LPD
    maintenance and excess capability. How many marines are currently
    working on the Navy's shipbuilding plan?
        Mr. Stefany and Vice Admiral Conn. I agree that the San Antonio-
    class is a critical component of the Amphibious Ready Group, and
    amphibious ships in general provide capabilities critical to providing
    strategic mobility, force projection, and the range to respond across
    the globe. I will note that there were no Combatant Commander requests
    for ARGs to support the crisis response in Ukraine or Humanitarian
    Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) operations in Turkey.
        As to the shipbuilding plan, it was coordinated across the
    Department, and was reviewed by senior uniformed and civilian marines
    including; the Director, Expeditionary Warfare Division of OPNAV, the
    Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, the Deputy
    Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations, and the Assistant
    Commandant of the Marine Corps. Prior to final approval, the Secretary
    of the Navy reviewed the plan with the Commandant of the Marine Corps
    and the Chief of Naval Operations.
                               force design 2030
        3. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, what does title 10
    require the Marine Corps to do?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Title 10 United States Code, Section 8063
    (United States Marine Corps: composition; functions) states that:

           (a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall
    be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and
    three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other
    services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be
    organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of
    combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service
    with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and
    for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the
    prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall
    provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of
    the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of
    naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such
    other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional
    duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which
    the Marine Corps is primarily organized.

           (b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the
    Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that
    pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing
    forces.

           (c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with
    integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime
    components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

        The following amendments were made in the Fiscal Year 2023 National
    Defense Authorization Act. Specific amendments are indicated in BOLD
    text.
        Fiscal Year 2923 NDAA--Section 1022. Navy Consultation with Marine
    Corps on Major Decisions Directly Concerning Marine Corps Amphibious
    force structure and capability.
        ``The Secretary of the Navy shall ensure that the views of the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps are given appropriate consideration
    before a major decision is made by an element of the Department of the
    Navy outside the Marine Corps on a matter that directly concerns Marine
    Corps aviation or amphibious force structure and capability.''
        Fiscal year 2023 NDAA--Section 1023. Amphibious Warship Force
    Structure.

           (a) The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in
    general, naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be
    organic therein. The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped
    primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at
    sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary
    for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and,
    in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the
    expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of
    war.

           (b) The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less
    than 11 operational aircraft carriers and not less than 31 operational
    amphibious warfare ships, of which not less than 10 shall be amphibious
    assault ships. For purposes of this subsection, an operational aircraft
    carrier or amphibious warfare ship includes an aircraft carrier or
    amphibious warfare ship that is temporarily unavailable for worldwide
    deployment due to routine or scheduled maintenance or repair.

        Add new subsection (g)--(g) In this section, the term `amphibious
    warfare ship' means a ship that is classified as an amphibious assault
    ship (general purpose) (LHA), an amphibious assault ship (multi-
    purpose) (LHD), an amphibious transport dock (LPD), or a dock landing
    ship (LSD).

        4. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, does Force Design
    adhere to those requirements?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Yes, Force Design adheres to the
    requirements set forth in Title 10 of the United States Code. The
    Marine Corps regularly assesses our force structure, capabilities, and
    readiness to ensure that we can fulfill our obligations as outlined in
    title 10. Force Design 2030 optimizes Marine Corps force structure to
    meet the demands the National Defense Strategy and of modern warfare.
    This plan was developed with the direction and oversight of senior
    civilian and military leaders.
        After the Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG) was released in the
    summer of 2019 and Force Design modernization began, the Marine Corps
    has conducted over 400 congressional engagements with Members,
    Professional Staff Members, and staff from personal offices some of
    which were repeated engagements or deep dives with the same staff. The
    Marine Corps has averaged more than five congressional engagements a
    month for the past 3.5 years. Marine Corps leadership values and honors
    the need for congressional oversight and has actively supported that
    lawful requirement. My Command, Combat Development and Integration
    (CD&I) alone has conducted 209 of those engagements as of April 2023.
    Of those 209 engagements roughly 30 percent were classified briefs at
    the secret level and above, we must respect the threat and the
    associated security classification protocols to safeguard critical
    capabilities. The remaining 70 percent of those engagements were at the
    unclassified level to be as transparent as possible in our
    modernization efforts.
        Force Design was also informed by an extensive and continuous
    review of current and future threats. The Intelligence Community (IC)
    Annual Threat Assessment continues to highlight the increase in
    military modernization from the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). The
    2023 IC Annual Threat Assessment has identified the PRC as working to
    field a military by 2027 designed to deter U.S. intervention in a
    future cross-strait crisis. Furthermore, the 2022 NSS identifies the
    People's Republic of China (PRC) as the only competitor with the intent
    and the capacity to reshape the international order. The 2018 and 2022
    NDS clearly State the case for change by identifying the Indo-Pacific
    as the priority theater from a competition and threat perspective.
        Force Design 2030 creates a more agile, flexible, and lethal force
    that is better equipped to operate forward, compete, project power and
    influence as directed by the National Defense Strategy and other
    strategic guidance documents. This includes enhancing the Marine Corps'
    ability to conduct expeditionary and amphibious operations, improving
    our ability to operate in contested and denied environments, and
    increasing our capacity to conduct distributed operations with joint
    and allied partners. These efforts are directly tied to our title 10
    requirements of:
        ``The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to
    provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting
    air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of
    advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may
    be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.''
        Over the past two decades the Marine Corps has been involved in a
    land campaign as the Nation directed and required. Force Design
    redirects the Marine Corps to our original mission as a naval
    expeditionary force in readiness that supports the fleet commanders
    within the naval campaign. Overall, Force Design intends to ensure that
    the Marine Corps remains a highly capable and responsive force that can
    effectively fulfill our obligations under title 10 and other statutory
    and regulatory requirements.
        The Marine Corps has also worked this year to adhere to the amended
    Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA requirements that require the Department of the
    Navy to maintain no less than 31 amphibious warfare ships. The current
    30-year Ship Building Plan (SBP) does not achieve nor maintain the
    Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA directed requirement for no less than 31
    amphibious warfare ships and does not continue the LPD Flight II
    program. The Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA and appropriations actions
    authorized and appropriated advanced procurement funds ($250 million)
    for LPD to be procured in fiscal year 2024.

        5. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, what does the 2022
    National Defense Strategy require the Marine Corps to do?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS)
    requires the Marine Corps to be trained and equipped as a naval
    expeditionary force-in-readiness and prepared to operate inside
    actively contested maritime spaces in support of fleet and Joint
    operations to deter adversary aggression. Furthermore, the NDS requires
    the Marine Corps to divest in legacy platforms that are less relevant
    and to modernize the force with asymmetric capabilities supported by
    innovative concepts.
        Integrated Deterrence, Section IV, 2022 NDS, page. 8:
        Deterrence by Denial. To deter aggression, especially where
    potential adversaries could act to rapidly seize territory, the
    Department will develop asymmetric approaches and optimize our posture
    for denial. In the near-term, we will continue to develop innovative
    operational concepts and supplement current capabilities and posture
    through investments in mature, high-value assets. Over the mid-to long-
    term, we will develop new capabilities, including in long-range strike,
    undersea, hypersonic, and autonomous systems, and improve information
    sharing and the integration of non-kinetic tools.
        Force Planning, Section VII, 2022 NDS, page. 17:
        To enhance our ability to deny aggression, we will improve the
    speed and accuracy of detection and targeting to deny adversary freedom
    of action. To mitigate adversary anti-access/area-denial capability,
    the Department will develop concepts and capabilities that improve our
    ability to reliably hold at risk those military forces and assets that
    are essential to adversary operational success, while managing
    escalation. For logistics and sustainment, we will reinforce our
    capability to quickly mobilize and deploy forces and to sustain high-
    intensity joint denial operations despite kinetic and non-kinetic
    attack and disruption.
        Achieving success in these operational areas requires tightly
    linking our concepts and capabilities for operating forces. The
    Department will continue to develop operational concepts that
    realistically expand U.S. options and constrain those of potential
    adversaries. The Department will explore force employment concepts and
    capabilities that degrade adversary power projection while weighing
    crisis stability and escalation risk; integrate new technologies;
    experiment with creative applications of existing capabilities; and
    selectively share the most effective asymmetric capabilities with
    threatened allies and partners.
        Building Enduring Advantages, 2022 NDS, page 19:
        Transform the Foundation of the Future Force. Building the Joint
    Force called for by this strategy requires overhauling the Department's
    force development, design, and business management practices. Our
    current system is too slow and too focused on acquiring systems not
    designed to address the most critical challenges we now face. This
    orientation leaves little incentive to design open systems that can
    rapidly incorporate cutting-edge technologies, creating longer-term
    challenges with obsolescence, interoperability, and cost effectiveness.
    The Department will instead reward rapid experimentation, acquisition,
    and fielding. We will better align requirements, resourcing, and
    acquisition, and undertake a campaign of learning to identify the most
    promising concepts, incorporating emerging technologies in the
    commercial and military sectors for solving our key operational
    challenges. We will design transition pathways to divest from systems
    that are less relevant to advancing the force planning guidance, and
    partner to equip the defense industrial base to support more relevant
    modernization efforts.

        6. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, did the Marine Corps
    divest of certain equipment and capabilities to cut cost and invest the
    savings in capabilities it deemed a higher priority because it assumed
    defense budgets would not grow to allow it to bring new capabilities
    online before divesting old ones?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Yes, over the past five President's
    Budget cycles from fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2024, the
    Marine Corps divested $18.2 billion of legacy equipment and invested
    $15.8 billion in modernization. The Marine Corps adopted a funding
    strategy based on investing in capabilities to maintain operational
    relevance, budget constraints, and compliance to strategic guidance.
    The following table shows the amount of funding divested and invested
    over the Future Years Defense Program in each of the five most recent
    budget cycles:

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        With the drawdown of forces supporting operations in CENTCOM in
    2014, the Marine Corps identified the necessity to transition from
    sustaining a land campaign to modernizing the force in support of
    maritime campaigning inherent in our title 10 requirements. To maintain
    operational and tactical relevance on a modern battlefield due to the
    evolution of technology, the Marine Corps to divest of legacy force
    structures that were of lesser relevance for a naval expeditionary
    service. Additionally, budget constraints were identified by NDS
    architects and Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 planners with the
    underlying assumption that the department's topline budget would grow
    modestly at a 2 percent inflation rate. Furthermore, the Marine Corps'
    divestment strategy followed the 2018 and 2022 NDS and the associated
    Defense Planning Guidance that directed the divestment of legacy
    capabilities and modernization at the speed of the pacing threat.
        In the President's Budget 2020 cycle, the Marine Corps reallocated
    $0.7 billion by divesting of the AN/TPS-59 Air Defense Radar, AAV7A1
    Project Improvement Program, and the MV-22 Aerial Refueling System
    (VARS). These funds were used to invest in such programs as Ground
    Based Air Defense (GBAD), F-35 spares and Block 4 modification, nascent
    Command-and-Control systems, sensors, and communications platforms.
        In the President's Budget 2021 cycle, we reallocated $1.8 billion
    by divesting of certain ground programs such as the Light Armored
    Vehicle Program Improvement Project (LAV PIP) and M1A1 Weapons and
    Combat Vehicle Modification Kits. The Marine Corps also made a 2,300
    Active component reduction in end-strength, and unit modifications of
    Fleet Anti-terrorism teams and Combat Logistics Battalion. The Marine
    Corps used $1.2 billion of these funds to invest in Strike/Anti-surface
    warfare capabilities, network, sensors, intelligence platforms, Air
    Defense, Ground Combat lethality modernization, and S&T programs.
        In the President's Budget 2022 cycle, as part of the overall Force
    Design 2030 investment strategy, the Marine Corps made our second
    largest divestment of $5.9 billion by reducing the Active component
    end-strength by 5,100, completing our divestments in legacy force
    structure such as Tanks, Bridging Companies, and Law Enforcement
    Battalions in addition to reducing Active and Reserve Infantry
    Battalions, Cannon Artillery Batteries, and Aviation Squadrons. One
    hundred percent of these divestments were directly used to invest in
    critical ground-based fires programs such as Navy Marine Corps
    Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) and Organic Precision
    Fires Family of Systems (OPF FOS). Advanced sensor investments included
    the MAGTF Unmanned Aircraft System Expeditionary (MUX)/Medium Altitude
    Long Endurance (MALE)--MQ9A, Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR)
    and MAGTF Electronic Warfare Ground Family of Systems (MEGFOS).
    Furthermore, critical ground networking investments were made in our
    Network on The Move (NOTM) and Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN).
        In the President's Budget 2023 cycle, the Marine Corps made our
    largest divestment of $8.7 billion with a 744 reduction in Active
    component end-strength, as well as further reduction to legacy
    capabilities such as the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group
    (MCSCG) and Marine Augmentation Program-Korea (MAP-K) programs and
    delayed procurement of Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs), F-35B
    Joint Strike Fighters, CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters. We also took
    unique approaches to save resources by reducing capacity during Marine
    Week, made a 10 percent reduction to Permanent Change of Station (PCS)
    moves, and a 15 percent reduction to Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC)
    staff positions to include Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORES) and the
    supporting establishment. Nearly all these divestments, over $7.0
    billion, were directly used to modernize critical areas that enable
    Force Design by investing in multi-domain areas such as Command and
    Control (Big Data Platform), Counter Air, Counter C5ISR-T, MQ-9A
    Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) sensors and enablers, and Anti-Surface
    Warfare capabilities.
        In the President's Budget 2024 cycle, the Marine Corps reallocated
    over $1.1 billion from such programs as Organic Precision Fires,
    Amphibious Combat Vehicles, and Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicles, as
    well as a 15 percent reduction in the Marine Corps Bands program to
    eight field bands. All divested funds were directed utilized to invest
    in critical warfighting capabilities such as Signature Management
    (YETI), Secure Expeditionary Resilient Position, Navigation and Timing
    (SERPNT), Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (L-MADIS), and
    Tactical Communication Modernization. Aviation investments were
    utilized to increase Flight Hour Program and the MV-22 nacelle
    improvement program. Additionally, several Talent Management
    investments were made, including increased funding for Sexual Assault
    Prevention and Response programs and the Marine Corps Embassy Security
    Guard.
        After completing five budget cycles with this approach, the Marine
    Corps does not plan to divest any more capacity or legacy programs. As
    part of the modernization strategy, the CMC prioritized the
    identification of risk areas to mitigate near term readiness and
    installations. The Marine Corps understands that modernization
    strategies in any organization will not be successful if the Marine
    Corps:

          fails to resource our major initiatives;

          fails to make the hard choices to align available
    resources with the strategy's level of ambition;

          fails to effectively incorporate new technologies and
    identify, recruit, and leverage new talent; and

          fails to reduce the barriers that limit collaboration
    with allies and partners.

        We aim to mitigate these and other risks through ruthless
    prioritization. The Marine Corps is now at a juncture where the service
    can no longer accept additional risk in readiness and installations.

        7. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, if the Marine Corps
    had a larger budget, would it make any different divestment or force
    structure decisions going forward?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. If the Marine Corps had a larger budget,
    we would accelerate Force Design priorities to include additional
    investments in retention, infrastructure, and quality of life. The
    Marine Corps Unfunded Priority List (UPL) identifies areas that would
    be accelerated if a larger budget was provided.

        *  Refer to page 11 that identifies the Marine Corps UPL submitted
    to Congress.

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        It is important to note that budget alone does not determine
    decisions related to divestment and force structure. Strategic
    considerations, service priorities, and operational needs also play
    important roles in these decisions. Therefore, even with a larger
    budget, the Marine Corps would still need to carefully evaluate our
    priorities and make decisions based on a range of factors.
        8. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, did the decision to
    divest certain capabilities result from a capability analysis or from a
    cost analysis?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. The decision to divest certain
    capabilities resulted from a threat informed, strategy driven, concept-
    based capability analysis. As described in the response to question #6
    above, with the drawdown of forces supporting operations in CENTCOM in
    2014, the Marine Corps identified the necessity to transition from
    sustaining a land campaign to modernize the force in support of
    maritime campaigning inherent in our title 10 requirements. To maintain
    operational and tactical relevance on a modern battlefield due to the
    evolution of technology, the Marine Corps divested of programs that
    were of lesser relevance for a naval expeditionary service.
    Additionally, budget constraints were identified by NDS architects and
    Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 planners with the underlying assumption
    that the department's topline budget would grow modestly at a 2 percent
    inflation rate. Furthermore, the Marine Corps' divestment strategy
    followed the 2018 and 2022 NDS and the associated Defense Planning
    Guidance that directed the divestment of legacy capabilities and
    modernization at the speed of the pacing threat.

        Threat Informed

        The opening forward of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the
    U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) states:
         ``Threats to U.S. national security will expand and diversify in
    the coming year, driven in part by China and Russia as they
    respectively compete more intensely with the United States and its
    traditional allies and partners. This competition cuts across all
    domains, involves a race for technological and military superiority,
    and is increasingly about values. Russia and China seek to shape the
    international system and regional security dynamics and exert influence
    over the politics and economies of states in all regions of the world
    and especially in their respective backyards.''

        In the same annual threat assessment, the emerging and disruptive
    technologies, and threats to economic competitiveness section states:
         ``For 2019 and beyond, the innovations that drive military and
    economic competitiveness will increasingly originate outside the United
    States, as the overall U.S. lead in science and technology (S&T)
    shrinks; the capability gap between commercial and military
    technologies evaporates; and foreign actors increase their efforts to
    acquire top talent, companies, data, and intellectual property via
    licit and illicit means. Many foreign leaders, including Chinese
    President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, view strong
    indigenous science and technology capabilities as key to their
    country's sovereignty, economic outlook, and national power.''

        In the same annual threat assessment, the China section states:
         ``We [The IC] assess that China will continue increasing its
    maritime presence in the South China Sea and building military and
    dual-use infrastructure in the Spratly Islands to improve its ability
    to control access, project power, and undermine U.S. influence in the
    area. A body of open-source reporting shows that China seeks to achieve
    effective control over its claimed waters with a Whole-of-Government
    strategy, compel Southeast Asian claimants to acquiesce in China's
    claims--at least tacitly--and bolster Beijing's narrative in the region
    that the United States is in decline and China's preeminence is
    inevitable. Meanwhile, Beijing almost certainly will continue using
    pressure and incentives to try to force Taipei to accept the One China
    framework and ultimately Chinese control, and it will monitor the U.S.
    reaction as an indicator of U.S. resolve in the region.''
         ``The People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues to develop and
    field advanced weapons and hardware while honing its ability to fight
    in all military domains. The force is undergoing its most comprehensive
    restructuring ever to realize China's long-held goal of being able to
    conduct modern, rapid military operations based on high technology to
    assert and defend China's regional and growing global interests. PLA
    reforms seek to reinforce the Chinese Communist Party's control of the
    military, improve the PLA's ability to perform joint operations,
    increase combat effectiveness, and curb corruption. As China's global
    footprint and international interests have grown, its military
    modernization program has become more focused on investments and
    infrastructure to support a range of missions beyond China's periphery,
    including a growing emphasis on the maritime domains, offensive air
    operations, and long-distance mobility operations.''

        The 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the IC states:
         ``Beijing is working to meet its goal of fielding a military by
    2027 designed to deter U.S. intervention in a future cross-Strait
    crisis. The PLA Navy and Air Force already are the largest in the
    region and continue to field advanced platforms that improve China's
    ability to try to establish air superiority and project power beyond
    the first island chain. The PLA Rocket Force's (PLARF) short-, medium-,
    and intermediate-range conventional systems probably already can hold
    U.S. forces and bases in the region at risk.''

        Strategy Driven

        The 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) identified the People's
    Republic of China (PRC) as the only competitor with the intent and the
    capacity to reshape the international order. The 2018 and 2022 National
    Defense Strategy (NDS) clearly State the case for change by identifying
    the Indo-Pacific as the priority theater from a competition and threat
    perspective. China has rapidly modernized and has accelerated its
    forecasted, out-year modernization objectives. According to the DOD's
    2022 Annual Report on China, ``the PLA's evolving capabilities and
    concepts continue to strengthen the PRC's ability to ``fight and win
    wars'' against a ``strong enemy [a likely euphemism for the United
    States], coerce Taiwan and rival claimants in territorial disputes,
    counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC's
    periphery, and project power globally.'' The report highlights the
    People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) battle force of 355 ships and
    submarines ``that is largely composed of modern, multi-role
    platforms.'' Additionally, the report describes China's long-range
    precision strike capabilities from cruise and ballistic missiles.

        Concept Based

        The Marine Corps' Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and
    Stand-in Forces (SIF) concepts meet the 2022 National Defense Strategy
    (NDS) intent and are theater agnostic. The plan for light, lethal, and
    distributed forces would be successful in other Combatant Commands
    (COCOMs), such as European Command (EUCOM) or Central Command
    (CENTCOM)--and have shown to be successful. For example, Task Force
    6\1/2\ executed a proof of concept during 2022 in which they provided
    6th Fleet Headquarters with real-time Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).
    In that effort, Marine forces tested, refined, and validated concepts
    of employment for MDA and closing kill webs, while also conducting
    real-world, time sensitive reconnaissance-counter reconnaissance
    missions. These efforts continue to support 6th Fleet operations as
    nested within EUCOM and Africa Command (AFRICOM) priorities and have
    sense turned into a rotational force.

        9. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, can the Marine Corps
    field the same, fewer, or more Marine Expeditionary Units after Force
    Design 2030 than with the previous force structure (assuming sufficient
    amphibious ship numbers)?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Force Design 2030 has not changed the
    number of MEUs the Marine Corps can field; in fact, Force Design 2030
    reinforces the need for the continued global employment of this
    versatile and highly capable unit. The Marine Corps continues to have
    capacity for seven MEUs. That is, regardless of the availability or
    readiness of amphibious warfare ships, the Marine Corps has and will
    continue to field the same number of Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU)
    even as the service continues to modernize. In the late 1980's, the
    Marine Corps changed the nomenclature of the Marine Amphibious Units to
    become the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Since then, and for the
    foreseeable future, the Marine Corps will maintain seven MEUs.
        However, unrelated to the Marine Corps modernization efforts with
    Force Design 2030, the Navy's readiness and inventory of amphibious
    warfare ships do impact the ability of the MEUs to be forward postured
    and available for Combatant Commander requirements. Over the past 10
    years the average operational readiness or availability of amphibious
    warfare ships has been 46 percent. This challenges the Amphibious Ready
    Group (ARG)/MEU team to adequately conduct critical pre-deployment
    training requirements and qualifications to conduct day and night
    operations at sea. This not only decreases the safety of our forces by
    reducing proficiency, but also decreases the Flexible Response Options
    (FDOs) and Flexible Deterrence Options (FDOs) of the Combatant
    Commanders to have ready and available forces for operational
    requirements.
        During the 1990's the amphibious warfare ship inventory exceeded
    operational employment allowing adequate time for maintenance, and more
    materially available ships to surge when required. For example, in 1991
    the Department of the Navy maintained roughly 60 amphibious warfare
    ships while only 37 percent were deployed. However, in the early 2000's
    the amphibious warfare ship inventory decreased by nearly half while
    the operational requirements maintained the same. Overtime as the
    operational demand remained consistent to historical baselines while
    inventory decreased, the material condition of amphibious warfare ships
    has been strained. This has led to common delays of ARG/MEU deployments
    and provides fewer ready ships to surge if directed.
        The 22d, 24th, and 26th MEUs will continue to garrison and deploy
    from Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. The 11th,
    13th, and 15th MEUs will continue to garrison and deploy from MCB Camp
    Pendleton in California. Last, the 31st MEU will continue to garrison
    and deploy from MCB Butler in Okinawa, Japan.
        The structural organization of our MEUs will also remain the same
    and will be comprised of a Command Element (CE), a Battalion Landing
    Team (BLT) as the Ground Combat Element (GCE), a Composite Aviation
    Squadron as the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a Combat Logistics
    Battalion (CLB) as the Logistics Combat Element (LCE).
        Currently, the 26th MEU is conducting their Pre-Deployment Training
    Period (PTP) with the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) in
    preparation for their upcoming deployment this Summer. The Artillery
    Battery within the BLT for the MEU will be organized with a traditional
    M777 Howitzers platoon and a Force Design incorporated High Mobility
    Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) platoon. Throughout the PTP, the
    battery has been training on new Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
    (TTPs) for HIMARS-Tactical Insertion Dynamic Employment (HI-TIDE) that
    will enable the rapid employment of long-range precision fires after
    ship-to-shore connectors have maneuvered the assets. This employment
    concept is an aspect that supports the ability of expeditionary units
    that can contribute to sea-denial and sea-control operations.
    Maintaining control of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and the race
    for key maritime terrain is critical in the current operating threat
    that has created an Anti-Access, Area-Denial (A2AD) environment through
    the proliferation of low-cost long-range fires, sensors, and a
    communications architecture that place U.S. assets at risk. Although
    Force Design is modernizing, the capabilities resident within the MEU
    has increased lethality while the core structure and organization of
    the MEUs remain the same.

        10. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, how has the
    composition and capabilities of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force
    changed with Force Design 2030?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Composition of the Marine Air-Ground Task
    Force (MAGTF) remains unchanged from its defined construct as a task
    organized, air-ground, combined arms formation under a single
    commander. MAGTFs continue to consist of four core elements--a Command
    Element, a Ground Combat Element (GCE), an Aviation Combat Element
    (ACE), and a Logistics Combat Element (LCE). The exact composition and
    capability inherent in each MAGTF are determined by what is required
    for that MAGTF's given mission.
        Notably, post Force Design 2030, MAGTFs are both more capable and
    lethal. The pre-Force Design MAGTF was capable of fighting in three
    domains--land, air, and sea. Today, the MAGTF is capable of fighting in
    all five domains with significant additional investments in space and
    cyber capabilities. The Marine Corps has primarily invested in these
    capabilities at the Command Element (CE) level with the increase in
    cyber and space military occupation specialties and the establishment
    of the Marine Information Group (MIG) within the MEF. Furthermore, we
    have significantly increased the lethality of the Ground Combat Element
    (GCE) with long range precision fires, loitering munitions, and sensor
    capabilities to track and detect adversary targets at distance. The
    Aviation Combat Element (ACE) has increased both operational reach and
    lift capacity with investments in the CH-53K, MV-22B, and an increase
    in Active component KC-130C squadrons. The ACE has also increased in
    our ability to sense and make sense of the environment with fifth
    generation F-35 platforms. As the pacing function the Logistics Combat
    Element (LCE) is developing new concepts for afloat and shore
    sustainment capabilities that are tethered within a network of
    appropriate command arrangements that expedite logistics in a contested
    environment.
        The most common MAGTFs in the Marine Corps is the Marine
    Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The composition of the MEU is described in
    the previous response. However, the composition of how the MEU is
    spread across the three ship Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and what
    capabilities that are within it will be tailored to the threat
    environment and historical trends of Combatant Commander mission
    assignments to the ARG/MEU team. Prior to deployments, the ARG/MEU will
    conduct a 9-month pre-deployment training period (PTP) with various at
    sea exercises that allow the two commands to build and work on Standard
    Operating Procedures (SOPs) for assigned Mission Essential Tasks
    (METs). During at sea periods the ARG/MEU commanders, staff, and major
    subordinate commands will execute a variety of full mission profile
    exercises such as amphibious raids, amphibious assaults, non-combat
    evacuation operations (NEO), etc. The two commands will also coordinate
    with Fleet and Joint headquarters in the Combatant Commands that the
    ARG/MEU is expected to be assigned to during the deployment to
    coordinate Theatre Security Cooperation (TSC) exercises and receive
    intelligence briefs to understand the threat environment. Through the
    combination of the at sea training periods, development of SOPs,
    understanding of anticipated assigned missions, and the threat
    environment, the ARG/MEU team tailors what assets are assigned to each
    amphibious warfare ship within the ARG to be appropriately organized
    for operational deployment. As such, MAGTFs can and will vary in size
    and capability according to their assigned or likely missions.
        Given its modular organization, the MAGTF remains tailorable, able
    to receive attached units from other services or nations, such as naval
    construction battalions, or infantry/armor brigades. In 2016, the 26th
    MEU with the Kearsarge ARG was operating in the Central Command
    (CENTCOM) area of operations when the Combined Joint Task Force-
    Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) was exploring different options
    for fire support accelerants in support of the fight against Islamic
    State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) forces in Northern Iraq. The CJTF-OIR
    tasked the 26th MEU with sending an artillery battery ashore to provide
    an Indirect Fire (IDF) capability to support Iraqi Forces in offensive
    operations to regain control of Mosul. The 26th MEU rapidly tasked
    organized a force that was comprised of an artillery battery, a reduced
    infantry company, and critical enablers that would provide specific
    capabilities for the unit. However, the artillery battery did not have
    a robust counter fire radar system that was critical for the threat
    environment. The Army had a AN/TPQ-53 radar system in Kuwait that
    accurately detects mortars, rockets, and artillery point of origins
    (POO) and expected point of impact (POI) to rapidly develop a counter-
    fire mission. The Army also had a Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar
    (CRAM) system in Kuwait that provides force protection measures to
    ground force units from enemy IDF. Both the AN/TPQ-53 and the C-RAM
    assets were attached to the task organized force that the 26th MEU
    assigned to the mission. This is just one small example of the
    flexibility of the MAGTF to rapidly task organize for an assigned
    mission and integrate within the Joint Force to meet the operational
    requirements of the Combatant Command.
        The recently established Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) is an
    example of a MAGTF that has been optimized to its assigned mission. The
    MLR is organized with a Regimental Headquarters (Command Element), a
    Littoral Combat Team (GCE), a Littoral Anti-Air Battalion (ACE), and a
    Littoral Logistics Battalion (LCE). As such, the MLR, as part of the
    Stand-in-Force, disrupts the adversary in a contested littoral
    environment through reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and sea
    denial operations to support the Naval Expeditionary Force's maritime
    campaign.
        When replying to a question during the House Armed Services
    Committee (HASC) hearing on the Indo-Pacific National Security
    Challenges. Admiral John C. Aquilino provided the following response
    when asked about the MLR in this theatre of operations.
        ``First the Marine Littoral Regiment again, General Berger who came
    out of MARFORPAC as you know I think was pretty understanding of the
    threat, the scenario, and what was needed. So, I appreciate his effort
    to focus on the Indo Pacific problem set. That said, we need to deliver
    that organization with the capabilities to deliver effects to surface
    to air, surface to surface, surface to ship. When that force is armed,
    prepared, and that set of capability, it's exactly what we need in the
    Indo-Pacific to support the fight.''

        11. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, where does the
    Marine Corps define combined arms in its doctrinal publications? Has
    that definition been revised since Force Design started?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. The Marine Corps defines combined arms in
    our doctrinal publications, specifically in Marine Corps Doctrinal
    Publication (MCDP) 1 Warfighting (dtd 4 April 2018). According to MCDP
    1, combined arms is ``the synchronized and simultaneous application of
    different arms and elements of combat power to achieve an effect
    greater than if each element were used separately or sequentially.'' In
    detail the combined arms section of MCDP-1 states that:
        ``In order to maximize combat power, we must use all the available
    resources to best advantage. To do so, we must follow a doctrine of
    combined arms. Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a
    way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to
    another. We pose the enemy not just with a problem, but with a
    dilemma--a no-win situation.
        We accomplish combined arms through the tactics and techniques we
    use at the lower levels and through task organization at higher levels.
    In so doing, we take advantage of the complementary characteristics of
    different types of units and enhance our mobility and firepower. We use
    each arm for missions that no other arm can perform as well; for
    example, we assign aviation a task that cannot be performed equally
    well by artillery. An example of the concept of combined arms at the
    very lowest level is the complementary use of the automatic weapon and
    grenade launcher within a fire team. We pin an enemy down with the
    high-volume, direct fire of the automatic weapon, making them a
    vulnerable target for the grenade launcher. If they move to escape the
    impact of the grenades, we engage them with the automatic weapon.
        We can expand the example to the MAGTF level: We use assault
    support aircraft to quickly concentrate superior ground forces fora
    breakthrough. We use artillery and close air support to support the
    infantry penetration, and we use deep air support to interdict enemy
    reinforcements that move to contain the penetration. Targets which
    cannot be effectively suppressed by artillery are engaged by close air
    support. In order to defend against the infantry attack, the enemy must
    make themselves vulnerable to the supporting arms. If they seek cover
    from the supporting arms, our infantry can maneuver against them. In
    order to block our penetration, the enemy must reinforce quickly with
    their reserve. However, in order to avoid our deep air support, they
    must stay off the roads, which means they can only move slowly. If they
    move slowly, they cannot reinforce in time to prevent our break-
    through. We have put them in a dilemma.''
        MCDP 1 explains that combined arms are a fundamental concept of
    Marine Corps warfare, which involves the integration of various combat
    kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. The goal of combined arms,
    employed with maneuver, `` . . . is to shatter the enemy's cohesion
    through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create
    a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy
    cannot cope.'' Furthermore, MCDP 1 emphasizes that combined arms are
    not limited to the integration of combat arms but includes other
    elements of combat power, such as intelligence, logistics, and command
    and control.
        The definition of combined arms remains valid, though the means and
    methods of employment continue to evolve under Force Design 2030. One
    of the Marine Corps' capstone research and development projects in
    Force Design is the family of integrated targeting cells. The effort
    accelerates the evolution of combined arms multi-domain formations by
    fusing operations, intelligence, and fires functions (i.e., Combined
    Arms) together in a single center, creating the means for Marine units
    to participate in and control joint fires, while also gaining and
    maintaining persistent custody of adversary targets. The Marine Corps
    today now has the ability to fight and contest in all five warfighting
    domains to include space and cyber. The integration of advanced
    technological capabilities has increased the lethality of the MAGTF to
    deter, but also contend against our adversaries in these domains with
    combat credible formations and capabilities that can provide precision
    fires at range. Additionally, Force Design investments have prioritized
    sensing and communication capabilities that enable forward postured
    formations to detect and track adversaries' targets and provide the
    Joint Force with the necessary target data to project combat power into
    an Anti-Access/Area Denial environment. These efforts will continue to
    enable maneuver of units, but more importantly the maneuver of Joint
    Force units and the maneuver of maritime platforms.

        12. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, can the Marine
    Corps still conduct combined arms operations without any tanks and with
    less cannon artillery?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Yes, the Marine Corps can still conduct
    combined arms operations without tanks and with less cannon artillery.
    At its core, the Marine Corps modernization effort is focused on
    enhancing the ability to conduct combined arms. A key element of Force
    Design 2030 is developing and employing modern capabilities that
    contribute to a multiple joint ``kill webs.'' This approach also
    improves our ability to leverage non-lethal fires that provide the
    combatant commander more options in day-to-day competition and pre-
    conflict deterrence activities. However, we continue to invest in
    modern lethal fire platforms that provide a more effective capability
    than legacy systems. This includes legacy systems such as heavy tanks
    and towed, tubed cannon artillery that lack the precision and range to
    be relevant in the maritime and littoral battlespaces applicable to our
    directed pacing threat. See question #20 for breakdown of retained
    artillery, as part of our kinetic, combined arms capability.
        Prior to Force Design initiatives, the Marine Corps focused
    primarily on kinetic combined arms consisting of surface and air assets
    making our combined arms capabilities two dimensional. Today, the
    Marine Corps still maintains the ability to conduct combined arms in
    the surface, air, and sea domains but we have significantly increased
    both the kinetic and non-kinetic combined arms capabilities in the
    cyber and space domains creating a multi-domain capability. Regardless
    of what assets are utilized to employ combined arms, they will only be
    as effective as the Command and Control (C2) architecture that is
    designed to enable the execution of the assets. Therefore, Force Design
    has focused significantly on organizing, training, and resourcing the
    MAGTF to effectively conduct MAGTF C2 at echelon and rapidly transition
    across the competition continuum to enable all-domain joint and
    combined kill webs. To do this we must transition from a legacy, air-
    land battle paradigm to a 21st century, all-domain, joint single battle
    mindset. We can no longer accept multiple, disparate C2 systems
    optimized for single-domain awareness bound by analog/human-speed
    processing. There are a variety of ongoing efforts to evolve the
    Service's C2 capability to conduct all domain operations, enable kill
    webs, and further expand our value to the joint and combined force.
        Our Marine Air Command and Control System remains the exemplar for
    the Service's evolving C2 ecosystem and has showcased an innovative
    capability to enable kill webs across multiple domains via the Multi-
    functional Air Operations Center (MAOC). Additionally, we are on track
    to create the first cadre of kill web subject matter experts via the C2
    Interface Control Officer Primary Military Occupational Specialty in
    2025.
        As evidenced by experiments, exercises, wargames, and analyses, the
    integration of intelligence, fires, and C2 is at the heart of the
    targeting cycle and is required to enable and conduct kill webs across
    multiple domains.

        13. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, what engineering
    and breaching capabilities have been divested?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Through detailed operational planning,
    historical analysis, and a rigorous Campaign of Learning we made some
    hard decisions regarding engineering and breaching capabilities. The
    requirement for a globally responsive Marine Air Ground Task Force
    (MAGTF) remains imperative. More specifically, strategic guidance has
    driven us to focus on enabling the Naval Expeditionary Force to rapidly
    respond to crisis and persist in the distributed maritime operating
    environment of the Indo-Pacific region. This focus requires a force
    that is distributed but lethal, low signature, mobile, and sustainable
    in a forward environment. The equipment we field to our Marine forces
    needs to match those force attributes, and many of our legacy
    engineering and breaching capabilities were not appropriate to enable
    this responsiveness. Our legacy engineering and breaching capabilities
    were designed for land-centric campaigns with mechanized and motorized
    forces that we experienced in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
    operations over the past 30 years.
        Based on analysis, wargaming, and experimentation the Commandant
    concluded in 2020 that the Marine Corps' inventory of bridging
    platforms--Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB), Medium Girder
    Bridges (MGB), and Improved Ribbon Bridges (IRB), were too heavy and
    slow to be relevant in modern operations. For reference, the AVLBs,
    MGBs, and IRBs all require large black-bottom commercial sealift or
    Maritime Prepositioning Ships to get to the fight, requiring permissive
    offload at seaports and significant preparation time to prepare for
    onward movement to support maneuver. During the opening land conflict
    of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, maneuver forces routinely outpaced
    supporting assets such as heavy logistical assets, bridging, and
    breaching capabilities. The tempo and threat environment of the future
    operating environment renders these heavy capabilities much less
    relevant, particularly considering the limited quantity of systems and
    the significant requirements for large shipping and aircraft to move
    these capabilities into position across a maritime theater. The Marine
    Corps and Army are working collectively with industry to develop a more
    suitable lightweight, scalable tactical bridging platform that can be
    transported on current Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs). The
    Marine Corps is currently awaiting delivery of three test vehicles for
    experimentation within our engineer formations.
        We retain our capability to do nonstandard bridging. Marine
    engineers are receiving enhanced training in the classification,
    design, and construction of non-standard bridging using locally
    available resources to enable light motorized and mounted maneuver. On
    a frequent basis, marine engineers are used for theater security
    cooperation and for support to other government agencies to construct
    non-standard bridges, which continues to build their experience with
    the use of local materials. Additionally, marine engineers also employ
    rope bridges to enable dismounted maneuver.
        Marine forces still require a capability to conduct tactical
    bridging for maneuver and mobility; however, the characteristics of
    this bridging are lighter, more scalable, and employable by non-
    specialized units. From this change in requirements, we are researching
    and identifying new bridging options, as well as enhancing the training
    of our engineers to construct non-standard bridging using locally
    available or procurable materials.
        Breaching remains a critical capability to support maneuver,
    however with the decision to divest the M1A1 main battle tank, the
    Marine Corps also divested the Combat Engineer M1150 Assault Breacher
    Vehicle (ABV) as well as associated force structure. The ABV is built
    upon the M1A1 chassis which presents significant embarkation and
    debarkation challenges for amphibious and littoral operations. As with
    legacy bridging solutions, the ABV requires black-bottom shipping or
    Maritime Prepositioning Ships to get into the theater. This limitation
    restricts the ability to even get the ABV to many of the locations
    where we will be operating across the Indo-Pacific region or as a 911
    Force in Readiness. With the divestment of tanks, this heavy breacher
    vehicle was no longer relevant to support maneuver.

        14. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, can the Marine
    Corps still breach mine fields, conduct route clearance, and cross
    water obstacles using organic equipment?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Yes, the Marine Corps can still breach
    minefields, conduct route clearance, and cross water obstacles using
    organic equipment and enhanced tactics, techniques, and procedures more
    aligned with the lighter, highly mobile, and low signature maneuver
    capabilities required to survive in a contested operating environment.
        Breaching consists of four sequential activities: detect, reduce,
    mark, and proof mined areas and obstacles. The Marine Corps can detect
    and mark explosive hazards by hand and still explosively create lanes
    through minefields and mark those lanes. Marine engineer battalions
    remain equipped with the man-portable Anti-Personnel Obstacle Breaching
    Systems (APOBS) for clearing 45m lanes for foot-traffic, as well as
    with the trailer mounted M58 Mine Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC) for
    clearing up to 100m vehicle-capable lanes.
        Through large land battles in CENTCOM over the past 20 years, route
    clearance capabilities have erroneously become synonymous with large
    Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. In 2007, Secretary of
    Defense Robert Gates initiated the MRAP Task Force to rapidly procure
    the Department of Defense's highest priority program to meet the need
    of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat in the Central Command
    (CENTCOM) theater. These vehicles were a critical asset during a
    prolonged land campaign against an inferior adversary that relied on
    improvised capabilities and saved many American lives.
        Today's threat environment is characterized by great power
    competition with multiple peer adversaries that maintain advanced
    threat capabilities that put large, heavy, high-signature vehicles at
    risk. Furthermore, the size of these vehicles requires heavy sealift or
    airlift capabilities to get into the region, which limits the global
    responsiveness demanded of our Marine Forces as America's Force in
    Readiness. Even the employment of these 18-ton vehicles is limited on
    the unimproved roads across the landscape of archipelagos in the Indo-
    Pacific region. In 2021, the Marine Corps divested of mounted route
    clearance capabilities that used 18-ton Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
    (MRAP) vehicles as base platforms.
        Currently, we are investing in the development of lighter route
    clearance capabilities; using unmanned air and ground platforms
    intended to detect and neutralize landmines and IEDs from a safe
    distance (i.e., outside the serious injury zone around the mine/IED).
    Between fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2028, $80M will be invested
    into these emerging capabilities. One of these capabilities is the
    Littoral Explosive Ordnance Neutralization (LEON) program of record
    designed to provide an initial organic Marine Corps counter-mine
    capability from shallow water through the beach zone. Derived from a
    2019 Rapid Statement of Need (RSON), the program fields a family of
    systems (FoS) that enables Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Marines to
    detect and neutralize underwater explosive hazards from standoff
    distances with robotic and autonomous platforms. When fully
    operationally capable, this FoS complements Navy Mine Countermeasure
    (MCM) capability and capacity, enhances multi-domain awareness, and
    ensures the maneuver, protection, and sustainment of the Naval
    expeditionary force. In the interim, marine engineers will continue to
    use hand-held detectors and sickle sticks to execute route sweeping
    operations and use combinations of emplaced charges and remote
    detonation techniques to sympathetically detonate explosive hazards to
    clear routes for smaller, light maneuver forces.
        The Marine Corps divested manufactured assault and support bridging
    and rafting platforms, primarily due to size, weight, signature, and
    limited mobility. The Marine Corps' inventory of bridging platforms--
    Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB), Medium Girder Bridges (MGB),
    and Improved Ribbon Bridges (IRB)--all require large black-bottom
    sealift or Maritime Prepositioning Ships to get to the fight, requiring
    permissive offload at seaports and significant preparation time to
    prepare for onward movement to support maneuver. These limitations in
    transport are not compatible with the mission profiles and globally
    responsiveness required of America's 911 Force.
        We retain our capability to do nonstandard bridging. Marine
    engineers are receiving enhanced training in the classification,
    design, and construction of non-standard bridging using locally
    available resources to enable light motorized and mounted maneuver. On
    a frequent basis, Marine engineers are used for theater security
    cooperation and for support to other government agencies to construct
    non-standard bridges, which continues to build their experience with
    the use of local materials. Additionally, marine engineers also employ
    rope bridges to enable dismounted maneuver. The Amphibious Combat
    Vehicle (ACV) and Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) are both capable of
    swimming across wet gaps if depth, current, and bottom conditions
    allow. Moreover, the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
    (HMMWV), the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), and the Medium
    Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) can negotiate limited water
    obstacles with appropriate fording capabilities of up to 60 inches. To
    ensure that the Marine Corps is capable of expeditionary MAGTF
    operations globally, Marine Corps is working with the Army and Defense
    Industry to develop a lightweight, scalable tactical bridging
    capability which can be transported on current Marine Corps Tactical
    Vehicles (i.e., JLTV). The Service is currently awaiting delivery of
    three test vehicles for experimentation with our engineer formations.

        15. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, are Stand-in Forces
    viable without the Light Amphibious Warship/Landing Ship Medium?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. All forces are dependent on Joint, Naval,
    and organic mobility assets to maneuver throughout the battlespace.
    However, the current programmatic timeline for LSM does not support
    delivery to support (1) Marine Regiment until fiscal year 2033. Until
    the LSM becomes fully operational, the service has explored other
    interim solutions to support SIF. The interim planned composition is
    (2) T-EPFs, (5) SLVs, and (5) LCUs until the Medium Landing Ship
    becomes available to support (1) Marine Regiment in fiscal year 2033.
    T-EPF is a Military Sealift Command (MSC) operated vessel with
    capabilities comparable to LSM during competition (speed and lift
    capacity) but faces challenges in higher sea states and has no shore-
    to-shore capability. SLVs operated by contracted civilian crews provide
    shore-to-shore capabilities comparable to LSM during competition.
    Moreover, emerging platforms such as the stern landing vessel (SLV) and
    ancillary surface connectors (ASC) will be experimented with to
    determine the tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to best
    support the SIF. LCUs provide marine elements of the SIF with proven
    tactical mobility that does not necessitate T-EPF or SLV but will face
    adequate crewing and maintenance challenges.
        Once LSMs are available in fiscal year 2033, the Marine Corps
    current requirement is (35) Medium Landing Ships (LSMs). The LSM
    requirement stems from a minimum of (9) LSMs required to support (1)
    Marine Regiment. Our SIF required maritime mobility for (3) Regiments.
    To ensure (27) LSMs are available for these forces at any given time,
    procurement includes (8) additional LSMs due to routine maintenance
    cycles at an 80 percent readiness rate. The LSM provides the Stand-in
    Forces (SIF) maneuver options and connect logistics webs within
    contested spaces. The LSM will be an important littoral maneuver
    platform that supports the SIF while forward deployed, engaging in
    campaigning activities that assure integrated deterrence. The LSM is
    capable of transporting personnel and equipment within an archipelagic
    environment such as the first island chain (1IC) where there is limited
    access to ports or runways.
        III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), as the service's only forward
    postured MEF, is uniquely suited to validate new concepts such as
    Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations (EABO) and Stand-in Forces
    (SIF). As an element of the SIF, III MEF supports naval, joint, and
    allied and partnered forces with agile, capable, and lethal forces able
    to operate across the competition continuum. Forces Stand in during
    competition alongside partners and allies, are forward postured to
    respond during crisis, and are capable of seizing and defending key
    maritime terrain during conflict while maintaining critical target data
    and maritime domain awareness for the Joint Force to project fires into
    the battlespace.
        One of the most significant contributions the SIF makes to the
    Joint Force is the ability to sense and make sense of the environment
    by creating maritime domain awareness. Task Force 61/2 demonstrated
    this capability in the European Command (EUCOM) area of operations with
    a Navy-Marine Corps integrated team. TF 61/2, led by a Marine General
    Officer with a task-organized staff was integrated into the U.S. 6th
    Fleet Headquarters in Naples, Italy, and executed a combined joint
    exercise, planned operations for various ARG/MEU teams in multiple
    locations throughout the theater, and improved Maritime Domain
    Awareness for the Fleet Commander and partners and allies. This proof
    of concept has now transitioned into a rotational headquarters that
    aligns forces under a Naval Amphibious Force Commander to orchestrate a
    wide range of integrated operations, from exercises to contingency
    planning.
        Although III MEF demonstrates the ability to operate as a SIF
    without the Medium Landing Ship (LSM), the service and III MEF have
    registered the requirement for both inter-(operational) and intra-
    (tactical) mobility.

        16. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, what percent
    complete would you estimate Force Design is?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Force Design is happening now. We are
    done divesting. Force Design is happening now. As with all
    modernization initiatives across the DOD, optimization strategies are
    not conditions based and do not have a set end date. Modernization
    strategies are an ever-evolving process tied to the changing character
    of war that adapt and maintain pace with the threat environment with
    the objective of creating a warfighting advantage that ultimately
    deters conflict but is prepared to prevail if directed. It is our
    obligation to continue modernization of the force as the threat
    continues to evolve.
        In 2014, Commandant James Amos published Expeditionary Force 21
    (EF21) as a vision for designing and developing the Marine Corps into
    2025. During this timeframe the drawdown of forces from Operation Iraqi
    Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was taking place and
    the Marine Corps was refocusing on title 10 requirements of maintaining
    an expeditionary naval force in readiness. EF21 stated:
            ``The increased likelihood of operations in the littorals
            requires a renewed focus on the Marine Corps `Title 10
            responsibility to be organized, trained, and equipped, ``for
            service with the fleet in the seizure and defense of advanced
            naval bases.'' While this task appeared anachronistic to some
            during much of the cold war and the years immediately
            thereafter, it is taking on renewed importance in this emerging
            security environment. Conflicting claims over portions of the
            sea and its resources, growing naval competition, and the rise
            in land-based threats to access are all indicators that future
            joint campaigns are more likely to be naval in character. The
            development and proliferation of anti--access and area-denial
            (A2/AD) capabilities threaten freedom of action at sea and
            endanger the limited number of U.S bases overseas. These
            conditions are remarkably similar to those that existed before
            and during World War II in the Pacific, but with the added
            challenge of the increased range and precision of modern
            sensors and weapons. During that conflict, the ability to
            establish advanced bases and deny an adversary the use of his
            bases played a key role in gaining and maintaining air and
            maritime superiority.''
        In 2016, Commandant Robert Neller published the Marine Corps
    Operating Concept (MOC) that continues to build off EF21 while
    identifying a path forward that adapts to the changing character of war
    with the proliferation of technology advancements. The MOC identifies
    the central problem with the status of the Marine Corps in 2016 as:
            ``Over the past 15 years, we have been continuously involved in
            both major combat and crisis response missions. All that time,
            our competitors have observed and learned much from how we
            operate. As a result, our future enemies will use that
            knowledge to oppose us in the physical and cognitive dimensions
            of conflict. In contrast, we have not been able to adapt at the
            rate of change required to ensure our success in future
            conflict. Restoring our advantage requires to us address our
            central problem--The Marine Corps is currently not organized,
            trained, and equipped to meet the demands of a future operating
            environment characterized by complex terrain, technology
            proliferation, information warfare, the need to shield and
            exploit signatures, and an increasingly non-permissive maritime
            domain. The MOC is the starting point to address this problem
            by reaffirming the primacy of maneuver warfare and combined
            arms for the 21stcentury and identifying the critical tasks to
            develop the future force.''
        As with previous Commandants, General Berger's planning guidance
    provided his vision and direction for the service over a 10-year
    period. EF21, the MOC, and Force Design have all identified similar if
    not identical problem sets to the current threat environment and the
    changing character of war. Furthermore, each vision prioritized the
    necessity to adapt to these emerging threats. Over the past 4 years,
    Force Design has been executing the modernization strategy of the
    Marine Corps that multiple Commandants have identified in the past. Our
    next Commandant may provide a similar outlook to 2035 and will continue
    to modernize the force based on the threat environment. Overall, given
    the ever-changing character of war, the Marine Corps must be postured
    to evolve accordingly. The same goes for the entire joint force. If we,
    as a Nation, do not modernize, we risk losing our strategic military
    advantage.

        17. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, what capabilities
    have not reach full operating capability yet?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. The Marine Corps began the early stages
    of Force Design in 2019. As a result, many of the capabilities enabled
    by Force Design will be in full operating capability (FOC) by 2027.
    Even more of these capabilities have already reached initial operating
    capability (IOC) and are in the hands of marines in the field today.
        The terms IOC and FOC are used to track contractual obligations
    between the vendor and the Marine Corps for the delivery of materiel
    solutions to capability requirements. With each platform being
    different and with a unique set of requirements, there is no
    standardized metric for IOC and FOC. The metrics for each program are
    captured during the drafting of the capability documents process
    between Marine Corps Systems Command and Combat Development &
    Integration. It is important to note, platforms and systems do not
    translate into capabilities until placed into the hands of trained
    marines. However, many of these capabilities are currently being
    fielded to units today such as the CH-53K, MV-22B, KC-130J, ACV, JLTV,
    NMESIS, MADIS & L-MADIS, I-CUAS, FSJ F-35, MQ-9ER, Small UAS,
    Expeditionary Tactical UAS, G/ATOR, Network on the Move (NOTM), and the
    Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2). Last, the below list
    of programs that have and have not reached FOC. The projected FOC dates
    are subject to change.

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        18. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, how does the
    composition and capabilities of the Marine Littoral Regiment differ
    from other infantry regiments?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. The Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) is an
    optimized Marine Air Ground Task Force--organized to accomplish a
    prescribed mission set based on our threat-informed and concept-based
    capabilities analysis. The MLR and Marine Infantry Regiment differ
    based on the mission, task organization, and equipment of each
    organization. 3d Marine Division's basing and posture in the western
    Pacific required modernization to align with strategy; importantly, the
    MLR is key a Force Design output with global applicability. The Marine
    Infantry Regiment exists within all three Marine Divisions and is
    tailorable and scalable to support operations across the conflict
    continuum. Both the MLR and the Marine Infantry Regiment support the
    Marine Corps' roles as the Nation's premier global crisis response
    force; to seize and defend key maritime terrain; and to support stand-
    in force operations to enable joint and combined operations. These two
    different and combat credible formations fight as a Marine Air Ground
    Task Force (MAGTF) to support naval, joint, and combined operations.
        The MLR is commanded by a Marine Colonel. Currently, 3d MLR in
    Hawaii is one of three planned MLRs task organized within 3d Marine
    Division, III Marine Expeditionary Force.
        Posture changes announced on January 11, 2023, by the United States
    and the Government of Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2)
    ensure the Marine Corps remains ready to address evolving regional and
    global security challenges. In 2025, the 12th Marine Regiment, an
    existing unit on Okinawa, will undergo a transition to the 12th Marine
    Littoral Regiment in accordance with Marine Corps modernization
    efforts. The 12th MLR will provide a ready and capable stand-in force
    in the first island chain, prepared to support the U.S-Japanese
    alliance, bolstering our ability to support deterrence efforts and
    respond to contingencies, while the 3d Marine Division Headquarters
    (3dMARDIV) will provide command and control capabilities.
        MLR mission: The MLR, as part of the stand-in force, disrupts the
    adversary in a contested littoral environment through reconnaissance,
    counter-reconnaissance, and sea denial operations to support a maritime
    campaign.
        MLR Tasks:

          Conduct Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations

          Support Maritime Domain Awareness

          Conduct Reconnaissance in the Maritime Domain

          Support Littoral Targeting

          Conduct Littoral Transportation Operations

          Conduct Air Direction in Support of Expeditionary
    Advanced Base Operations

          Command and Control Distributed Maritime Operations

          Plan and Direct Littoral Maneuver

          Plan and Direct Sea Denial Operations

          Support Sea Denial Operations

          Support Operations in the Information Environment

        The MLR comprises a headquarters (Headquarters Company,
    Communications Company, and the Long-Range Unmanned Surface Vessel
    Company), and three subordinate commands--Littoral Combat Team (LCT),
    Littoral Anti-Air Battalion (LAAB), and Littoral Logistics Battalion
    (LLB), each command by a Lieutenant Colonel.
        LCT mission: The LCT conducts reconnaissance and counter-
    reconnaissance, employs, and enables multi-domain fires, and
    establishes expeditionary sites to support the maritime campaign across
    the competition continuum.
        The LCT is composed of an infantry battalion, a medium range
    missile battery, and an engineer platoon. The LCT seizes, secures,
    controls, and defends key maritime terrain to allow expeditionary
    advanced base operations, conducts bilateral operations with the host
    nation, and attacks enemy maritime targets with naval strike missiles
    (NSM) utilizing naval and joint sensors.
        LAAB mission: The LAAB conducts anti-air warfare and enables
    integration of aviation operations with organic and joint fires to
    support the maritime campaign across the competition continuum.
        The LAAB is composed of a low altitude air defense battery and an
    air control squadron with an air surveillance platoon and air support
    platoon. The battery is capable of short-range air defense and counter-
    unmanned aircraft systems. The squadron provides the MLR with multiple
    scalable command and control nodes providing air control and fires
    integration throughout the MLR area of operations. Additionally, the
    LAAB provides airspace surveillance, limited air direction, air
    control, air intercept control, and coordination of support anti-air
    and anti-surface fires. The LAAB's capabilities enable joint or
    combined forces to gain and maintain custody of littoral targets
    supporting sea denial operations.
        LLB mission: The LLB provides tactical logistics and explosive
    ordinance disposal support to sustain regimental operations across the
    competition continuum.
        The LLB is composed of two direct support combat logistics
    companies that support the LCT and LAAB, and a general support
    logistics company. The direct support logistics companies support
    managing cache sites and connects tactical and operational logistics
    distribution. The support companies provide functional logistic support
    across all functions of logistics and classes of supply. The general
    support logistics company establish logistics support areas for
    logistics command and control to provide timely support to forward
    expeditionary advanced base positions.
        The Marine Infantry Regiment is commanded by a Marine Colonel.
    Currently, the Marine Corps has six Active component Marine Infantry
    Regiments across 1st, 2d, and 3d Marine Divisions.
        Marine Infantry Regiment mission: Conduct expeditionary combined
    arms operations as the ground combat element (GCE) of a Marine
    Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) sized MAGTF or as part of the division in
    larger MAGTFs, in the execution of amphibious forcible entry operations
    and land operations across the range of military operations (ROMO) to
    defeat the enemy and otherwise influence the operational environment.
        Marine Infantry Regiment Marine Corps Tasks:
          Conduct Amphibious Operations

          Conduct Offensive Operations

          Conduct Defensive Operations

          Conduct Stability Operations

        * Provide Forces
        The Marine Infantry Regiment comprises of a headquarters company,
    and three infantry battalions.
        Marine Infantry Battalion mission: Conduct expeditionary,
    offensive, and defensive operations as an element of a Marine
    Expeditionary Unit (MEU), Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), or infantry
    regiment to enable fleet or joint operations.
        The Marine Infantry Battalion comprises of a Headquarters and
    Service Company and three rifle companies.

        19. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, does Force Design
    degrade the Marine Corps' ability to conduct a forced entry operation?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. No, but it does make necessary
    adjustments to ensure the Marine Corps will continue to effectively
    deter, fight, and win in the future operating environment.
        The Marine Corps still possesses (7) Marine Expeditionary Units.
    Additionally, III MEF is capable of being employed as Joint Task Force
    headquarters (JTF-HQ) for various missions to include a forcible entry
    operation. Furthermore, the Commandant in his 2022 annual Force Design
    update directed the service to develop another JTF-HQ in II MEF to
    enhance our force offerings to the Combatant Commands.
        The Marine Corps still maintains all organic crisis response
    capabilities that enable the forward posture and rapid deployment of
    flexible and tailorable forces to the needs of the Combatant Commanders
    (COCOMs). The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and Marine Expeditionary
    Units (MEU) are the most well-known naval expeditionary Navy-Marine
    Corps tactical units that are forward deployed at the operational level
    and can accomplish strategic level engagements.
        The Marine Corps routinely trains to forcible entry operations in a
    number of joint and service-level exercises to include, but not limited
    to, exercises Talisman Saber, Cold Response, and various Marine
    Expeditionary Force exercises and Marine Warfighting Exercises (MWXs).
        Furthermore, the Marine Corps continues to train for all crisis
    response missions during the MEUs pre-deployment training period (PTP).
    Training consists of afloat and ashore training environment that
    require the synchronization of assets across the MAGTF to accomplish an
    assigned objective. Our Training and Education 2030 publication
    describes the investment in Live, Virtual, and Constructive training
    environment (LVC-TE) that is inherently joint and enables the
    simultaneous training of geographically dispersed units. This
    capability will replicate, to the greatest extent possible, the
    conditions and threats that a commander will experience on tomorrow's
    battlefield.
        When the Marine Corps was completing the withdrawal from
    Afghanistan and there was a need for forces to support the embassy and
    non-combatant evacuation operations, the ARG/MEU was a key component of
    those operations. At a moment's notice, the Marine Corps was able to
    hold a defensive perimeter and process evacuees while providing a
    variety of aviation and other assets to support the broader evacuation.
        A heel-to-toe ARG/MEU provides the Nation a mobile, multi-mission
    force that is forward deployed and able to quickly move to any number
    of crises around the world. A naval crisis response force is
    significantly more flexible than other land-based crisis response
    forces because it is less restricted by issues of access, basing, and
    overflight. The ability to maneuver by sea to the point of crisis makes
    the ARG/MEU critical to our Nation's ability to demonstrate resolve in
    a HA/DR mission or to project power in a limited conflict.
        In the next two to 5 years, many of our amphibious ships will reach
    the end of their service life and will cause delays in ARG/MEU
    deployments. When there are gaps in global ARG/MEU coverage, the Nation
    risks not having the right assets capable of getting to the crisis in
    time. If the U.S. is not able to perform this role, our adversaries
    would be happy to step in with their forces and their messaging. The
    best way to address the complex situation in Afghanistan and other
    similarly chaotic areas around the world is to maintain a minimum of 31
    amphibious ships to support our ARG/MEU deployments.
        In recent crises, like the earthquake in Turkey and the non-
    combatant evacuation (NEO) in Sudan, the Marine Corps had the ready-
    trained force with the right equipment; however, the readiness of
    amphibious shipping was not available.
        The Marine Corps, more than any other service, has a unique nature
    regarding essential requirements that are subject to the Naval Service
    budgetary process. For example, the amphibious warfare ship (AWS)
    statutory requirement includes capabilities that are critical for
    amphibious ships such as connectors, C4I afloat capabilities,
    preposition afloat assets, and the Next Generation Logistics Ship
    (NGLS). All of these are essential to the Stand-in Forces (SIF) and
    crisis response operations, yet all fall outside the Marine Corps Total
    Obligation Authority (TOA). We identify the Marine Corps' dependency on
    the Navy to champion naval requirements. Our Nation is a maritime
    nation that requires a modern, ready, and forward postured naval force
    that can deter war and prevail in conflict if deterrence fails.

        20. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, what logistics
    capabilities have been divested?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. The limited divestment of logistics
    capabilities resulted from extensive studies, wargames, and historical
    analysis through a deliberate Campaign of Learning. The only logistics
    platforms divested were heavy legacy systems, ill-suited toward
    operating in a distributed, contested littoral environment. These heavy
    legacy platforms increased the logistics burden on supported commanders
    due to their size, transportability, and sustainment requirements. The
    Marine Corps has retained existing logistics capabilities and is
    actively capitalizing upon technology advancements and modernization.
        The Marine Corps is currently completing initial phases toward
    optimizing logistics organizational structure, adjusting legacy assets
    and platform inventories, and seeking future acquisition to ensure the
    logistics organizations are prepared to effectively support maneuver
    forces in distributed and contested environments. Developed against the
    pacing threat, our logistics capabilities must be transportable,
    survivable, and sustainable across the spectrum of conflict. Below are
    some examples of programs divested, or reduced in quantity based on the
    analytic rigor provided by the Campaign of Learning:

          Logistics Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR) variants
    designed to support the Improved Ribbon Bridge (IRB) raft composed of
    (2) ramp bays, (2) interior bays and (2) Bridge Erection Boats. Since
    the IRBs were divested, these LVSR variants are no longer relevant.

          Six Bridge Companies and associated equipment sets
    divested in fiscal year 2021 in conjunction with the divestment of Tank
    Battalions.

          Bridge unit divestments included over 1,050 legacy items
    such as:

          o  Armored Vehicle Launcher Bridge (AVLB)
          o  Bridge Erection Sets
          o  Medium Girder Bridges
          o  Boats and associated cradles
          o  Bridge Pallets and Ramp Bays
          o  Bridge Unit divestment included 1,037 personnel within the
    fiscal year 2025 FYDP

          Additional heavy horizontal, earth-moving engineer
    equipment and heavy or medium motor transport capabilities tied to the
    Bridge and Tank organizations.

        Outside of the divestments related to Tank and Bridge units, the
    Marine Corps has only marginally reduced legacy logistic platforms.
    Selective reductions of legacy medium and heavy motor transport
    platforms (Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement and Logistics Vehicle
    System Replacement) over the course of the FYDP have been tied to
    specific unit reconfigurations. High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
    Vehicles (HMMWV) have begun a programmatic sunset synched with the
    fielding and complete service transition to the Joint Light Tactical
    Vehicles.

        21. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, what logistics
    capabilities have been added?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. The most significant logistics
    capabilities that have been added, or will be added, are tied to
    distribution, forward prepositioned stocks, and medical capabilities.
    In terms of equipment, we are increasing our options for multi-domain
    distribution to include the replacement of a majority of our fleet of
    HMMWVs with JLTVs and Ultra-lightweight Tactical Vehicles, and the
    fielding of the Tactical Resupply Unmanned Aircraft System (or TRUAS).
    The TRUAS provides low signature distribution capability for small,
    distributed forces.
        Our experimentation with theater mobility in the littorals is
    underway. Programs such as the Stern-landing Vessel (SLV) and various
    littoral connectors and enablers ensure that Stand-in Forces are
    capable as we transition to the acquisition and employment of the
    Landing Ship Medium.
        The Marine Corps is in the process of developing, testing, or
    procuring enhanced all domain manned and unmanned logistics
    distribution capabilities. These are critical capabilities to operate
    in distributed and contested environments. New capabilities include,
    but are not limited to, development of a new Medium Tactical Truck with
    hybrid energy attributes and Unmanned Logistics Systems Air (ULS-A)
    platforms of various sizes, ranges, and payload capacity that
    autonomously support distributed forces. We have just initiated
    production of the small ULS-A to be fielded to logistics units this
    summer.
        The future operating environment requires a deep look at core
    methods of how the Service has closed and employs forces. At an
    enterprise level, the service's prepositioning program of record
    requires modernization. It lacks flexibility across the competition
    continuum, its Maritime Prepositioning Fleet (MPF) is aging and incurs
    long force closure times. Analysis supports transforming our current
    program into a Global Positioning Network or GPN. The GPN will
    integrate afloat/ashore capabilities to enable day-to-day campaigning,
    rapid response to crisis and contingency, and deterrence. Fully
    realized, the GPN will dynamically employ multiple ashore sites and a
    modernized MPF fleet responsive to the joint force commander. It will
    be regionally aligned yet globally employable and positioned astride
    key maritime terrain. In fiscal year 2023 to begin this modernization,
    Additional resources in POM-24 and future budget submissions. Current
    and requested programmed funding will support initial equipment
    maintenance, facility leasing, contracted labor, and varying level of
    consumable support. We intend to establish three GPN sites in the
    priority theater NLT fiscal year 2027.
        Specific to the future concept of operations in the Pacific,
    expeditionary medicine advances underway will position critical trauma
    level care closer to the point of injury and enhance patient holding
    capacity. Examples of enhancement include the Emergency Fresh Whole
    Blood program that enables walking blood banks and direct transfusions,
    smaller and more capable expeditionary Damage Control Resuscitation and
    Damage Control Surgery equipment and advanced team training, to enable
    greater survivability. The ability to constantly sustain forces across
    the conflict spectrum is critical and will be accomplished through the
    Global Positioning Network, a combination of new ashore and legacy
    afloat prepositioned equipment and supply stocks. Near term investment
    will complete the realization of several initial Global Positioning
    Network ashore locations, deemed most essential, while the legacy
    afloat capabilities and capacity will be tailored to the needs of the
    future concept of operations.

        22. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, where does the
    Marine Corps define the composition of a division?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP)
    1-10.1 Organization of the United States Marine Corps defines the
    composition of a division. This reference publication is currently in
    the final stages of republication in the first time since August 2015.
    Key updates to this republication will include the additions of the
    Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), Marine Corps Information Command
    (MCIC), Marine Forces Cyber, and updated missions, capabilities, and
    organizational charts. This publication will also include the
    Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) for the first time, along with
    references to Force Design formations like the Littoral Anti-Air
    Battalion (LAAB), Littoral Combat Team (LCT), and Littoral Logistics
    Battalion (LLB). Finally, the publication standardizes all doctrinal
    terms in accordance with the latest Marine Corps and DOD dictionaries.
        As the MCRP provides the high-level overview of the current
    structure of the Marine Corps at the time of publication, it is not a
    prescribed document. Thus, the three MEFs and the subordinate
    divisions, wings, and logistics elements will not be identical across
    the service. For example, 3d Marine Division has always been organized
    differently than the other divisions (pages 5-2 through 5-4 of the 2015
    publication). In this document, 3d Marine Division is composed of only
    two infantry regiments, one of which is filled by units throughout the
    Marine Corps under the unit deployment program (UDP). After its full
    transition with three operational MLRs, 3d Marine Division retains a
    similar structure but with a different organization of the units within
    it.
        As defined in the publication, the mission of the MARDIV is to
    provide forces for amphibious assaults or to execute other operations
    as may be directed. The MARDIV must be able to provide the ground
    amphibious forcible-entry capability to an amphibious task force and
    conduct subsequent land operations in any operational environment. The
    division commander fights by using combined arms tactics and tailors
    the force to the demands of each mission.
        The MARDIV is employed as the GCE of the MEF or may provide task-
    organized forces for smaller MAGTFs. The MARDIV depends on the MLG as
    its primary source of logistic support. However, the organic capability
    of the division must be fully understood and used before requesting
    support from the MLG. In the areas of combat engineer support and motor
    transport support, the division possesses the significant capabilities
    of the combat engineer battalion (CEB) and the truck company of the
    headquarters battalion.
        The capabilities being developed as part of our modernization will
    ensure all three divisions have the tools needed to accomplish their
    mission in the 21st century operating environments. The Marine Corps
    has retained our ability to conduct combined arms at echelon while
    modernization enhances our ability to serve a critical role in gaining
    and maintaining custody of targets. Subsequently, this unique ability
    enables the closing of ``kill webs'' for the Naval and Joint force. Our
    continuous experimentation in reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance
    is informing these capabilities.
        Since 2019, the lethal capacity of the Marine Divisions has
    increased. As measured by crew served weapons and above, to include
    artillery firing systems, combat vehicles, and infantry weapons
    systems, the Marine Corps more combat power. By 2030 towed artillery,
    rockets, and missiles more than double (132 percent) than since 2019.

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Overall, the Marine Corps remains a combined arms force that will
    operate across multiple domains. Combined arms in the 21st century now
    encompasses additional domains such as space, cyber, and information,
    and new capabilities in each of these domains must be integrated within
    our combined arms approach. Additionally, the Marine Corps will still
    sense, communicate, and fire--just in new ways that are effective
    against technologically advanced peer adversaries.
        As it relates to lethal fires, the Marine Corps will retain 7 AC
    and 6 RC tube-artillery batteries, 14 Medium Range Missile (MMSL)
    batteries that employs the Navy Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship
    Interdiction System (NMESIS), and 3 Long Range Missile (LMSL) batteries
    that employs the Long-Range Fires (LRF) Launcher. Each future AC tube-
    artillery battery will be structured to have eight pieces of tube
    artillery vice the pre-Force Design standard of six. Moreover,
    following the completion of the AC artillery restructure, six pieces of
    tube-artillery will remain with 3d Battalion, 12th Marine Artillery
    Regiment. While initially fielded with an anti-ship missile, the MMSL
    will incorporate the MLRS Family of Munitions (MFOM) allowing a wider
    array of effects. The NMESIS launcher will fire the Naval Strike
    Missile, but the Marine Corps is developing a launch unit that will
    also have the ability to mount and fire upwards of six MFOM. In
    aggregate, we have increased our ground indirect fires capability.
        Legacy systems such as tanks provided a protected, direct-fire
    capability, their logistics burden, limited range, and vulnerability
    against modern weapons made them a lower priority, especially in
    INDOPACOM. The Marine Corps retains other direct-fire capabilities
    within other platforms such as, the AH-1Z and UH-1Y.
        The Marine Corps is pursuing a new capability, the Organic
    Precision Fires (OPF). This long-range capability provides a javelin
    type warhead capability with ranges more than 100nm.
        These new capabilities at echelon enhance the combined arms effects
    (both kinetic and non-kinetic) that units can generate. Combining anti-
    armor (loitering munitions, Multi-purpose Anti-Armor Anti-personnel
    Weapon System (MAAWS), Javelin and manned aviation) systems along with
    fielding the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) provides an ability for
    armor protected maneuver, fires, and anti-armor capability.

        23. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, does the transition
    of three regiments into Marine Littoral Regiments mean that Third
    Marine Division is no longer a division?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. No, the transition of 3d, 12th, and 4th
    Regiments into Marine Littoral Regiments does not mean 3d Marine
    Division is no longer a division. It is important to note that the
    composition of a Marine Corps Division may vary based on the mission
    and specific needs of the unit as described in question twenty. MCRP 1-
    10.1 serves as a guide for the organizational structure and composition
    of Marine Corps Divisions.
        MLRs in III MEF operate in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility
    (AOR). The MLRs are purpose built MAGTFs that are designed to support
    the National Defense Strategy in achieving integrated deterrence. Of
    note, the MLR's ability to support sea denial, sense, and conduct
    counter-reconnaissance in support of a maritime campaign has value to
    all geographic combatant commands. Wargames and experimentation
    continue to evaluate the effectiveness and efficacy of MLRs in key
    maritime terrain globally. The Marine Corps' modernization initiatives
    may provide similar capabilities to other geographic combatant
    commands. NMESIS Battalions, GLCM Batteries, LAAD Battalions, and MACCs
    units from I and II MEFs can dynamically task organize to provide MLR
    capabilities.
        While we do not currently plan to create MLRs in I and II MEF or
    Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), every MEF and MARFORRES are included
    in our modernization process, to develop the ability to conduct tasks
    associated with sea denial. I and II MEF remain focused in the near-
    term on employing MAGTFs to support global requirements and crisis
    response. These MEFs maintain capabilities across the spectrum of
    offensive and defensive operations to provide a credible combat
    capability, ready to rapidly respond globally to all ranges of threats.
        The Hawaii, Okinawa, and Guam based MLRs will reach IOC in fiscal
    year 2023, fiscal year 2025, and fiscal year 2027, respectively. We are
    fielding Force Design capabilities to MLRs today. (23) Ground/Air Task-
    Oriented Radars (G/ATORs) were fielded by the end of 2022, (31) will be
    fielded by the end of June 2023, and (57) will be in the fleet by the
    end of 2025. (6) Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System
    (NMESIS) medium missile batteries will be fielded in Q4 fiscal year
    2023, providing 3d MLR with the capability to contribute to sea denial
    and control operations. (13) Marine Air Defense Integrated Systems
    (MADIS) will begin fielding in fiscal year 2024. (31) Network on the
    Move (NOTM) systems will be mounted onto ultra-light tactical vehicles
    (ULTVs) providing 3d MLR with more resilient Satellite Communication
    (SATCOM) capabilities in September of this year.
        The Marine Corps will continue our Campaign of Learning (CoL) to
    validate concepts and capabilities required to maintain pace with the
    threat environment. Experimentation was invaluable in fiscal year 2022
    leveraging Balikatan, Valiant Shield, and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC).
    The Marine Corps will continue to expand MLR experimentation in fiscal
    year 2023 concentrating on developing 3d MLR in Hawaii in exercises,
    such as Balikatan, Kamandag, Keen Sword, and Northern Edge. The
    synthesis of these experiments and training will be the focus of a
    capability demonstration by 3d MLR in late fiscal year 2023.
    Experiments will continue in fiscal year 2024 with expanded
    participation in Valiant Shield and RIMPAC.

        24. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, how have the Marine
    Corps' aviation capabilities changed with Force Design?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. Marine Aviation has evolved and changed
    since Lieutenant A.A. Cunningham reported to the aviation camp in
    Annapolis on 22 May 1912. Strategic guidance today calls for a Marine
    Corps able to survive and thrive inside contested spaces and to meet
    the demands of current and future national security interests.
        Our adversaries are modernizing and optimizing themselves by
    building a robust, lethal force with capabilities spanning the air,
    maritime, space, and information domains. To face the reality of this
    ever-changing operating environment, Force Design provides a roadmap
    for modernizing and optimizing Marine Aviation to deliver lethal,
    effective, and survivable capabilities to satisfy Joint Force
    requirements and better support Service needs to organize, train, and
    equip. The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) remains central to the Marine
    Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), the JFMCC, and the Joint Force.
        Marine Aviation contributes to massing distributed effects across
    the Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) as the stand-in ACE through the Six
    Functions of Marine aviation, which consists of Offensive Air Support,
    Anti-Air Warfare, Assault Support, Air Reconnaissance, Electronic
    Warfare, and Control of Aircraft and Missiles, and, in the future, the
    four types of maritime aviation operations: anti-submarine warfare
    (ASW), surface warfare (SUW), information operations warfare (IWC), and
    intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) missions.
        Today, Marine Aviation consists of fifth generation F-35s,
    tiltrotor MV-22s, the only marinized heavy lift helicopter in the US
    arsenal--the CH-53K, H-1s that have been upgraded in lethality and
    survivability, the venerable C-130J, new MQ-9As, the Ground/Air Task
    Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) and the Marine Air Defense Integrated System
    (MADIS). As a result of Force Design 2030, no aviation programs of
    record were reduced.
        The MV-22 has revolutionized military air transport. The
    revolutionary capability of the tiltrotor, with the optimized
    organizational construct, enables the Marine Corps to generate
    unprecedented tempo across our operating environment, allowing
    commanders to seize and retain the initiative not found in traditional
    rotary platforms. For the MV-22, Force Design modernization from a 12
    to 10-aircraft squadron enables the Marine Corps to extend the service
    life of this unmatched capability from the mid-2030's to the early
    2050's.
        From the sea, Marine Aviation deploys and employs off amphibious
    ships while serving as the ACE of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
    A MEU ACE onboard an amphibious assault ship brings formidable and
    sustainable aviation capabilities to every corner of the globe.
        For the F-35, Force Design modernization directing an
    organizational construct change to 18 squadrons of 10 F35 aircraft
    allows the Marine Corps to deploy 10 F-35Bs aboard our MEUs compared to
    the traditional six AV-8B TACAIR contingent. This offers the Combatant
    Commanders (COCOMs) a 66 percent increase in TACAIR--5th Gen aircraft--
    forward deployed and globally engaged with our Marine Expeditionary
    Units (MEUs) time now. The transition to 5th Gen TACAIR provides the
    MAGTF, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), and Joint
    Force enhanced situational awareness, greater freedom of maneuver, and
    flexible response options in what was previously considered a denied
    environment.
        Additionally, the MEU ACE can transition to two squadrons of 5th
    Gen TACAIR aircraft consisting of 20 F-35B onboard an amphibious
    assault ship operating as a ``lightning carrier.'' The Navy and Marine
    Corps demonstrated this critical capability last April when they
    operated 20 F-35B from America-class amphibious assault carrier USS
    Tripoli from March 30 through April 8, 2022, fully exercising the
    Marine Corps' lightning carrier concept for the first time in naval
    history on an amphibious assault ship.
        For the CH-53K, as the only marinized heavy-lift helicopter in the
    DOD in development or production, provides a greater payload capability
    for Assault Support than any current or emerging rotorcraft at sea
    level and high-altitude conditions at great ranges. The CH-53K program
    of record has remained at 200. Achieving Initial Operational Capability
    (IOC) in April 2022, the CH-53K was approved for Full Rate Production
    in December 2022 and plans to deploy for the first CH-53K MEU
    detachment in fiscal year 2025. The CH-53K provides critical
    expeditionary organic heavy-lift sustainment and mobility capability to
    the MAGTF, Joint Force, JFMCC, and COCOM.
        For the AH-1Z and UH-1Y, Force Design modernization increases the
    H-1s readiness and provides flexibility for our operational commanders
    for decades to come. Deploying in detachments as part of the MEU
    onboard amphibious shipping, H-1s provide a wide variety of
    capabilities and mission sets and the entire spectrum of conflict.
        Additionally, the post-Force Design force construct enables the
    activation of an additional KC-130J squadron in the Pacific, as well as
    the additional three squadrons of UAS. The KC-130J provides organic
    lift and tactical aerial-refueling capabilities to the Marine Corps. At
    the same time, MQ-9A supports the MAGTF by providing multi-sensor
    surveillance, maritime domain awareness, and enables the detection and
    engagement of targets during expeditionary, joint, and combined
    operations. As a result of Force Design efforts, the KC-130J has
    increased from 79 in fiscal year 2018 to 86 in fiscal year 2024.
    Additionally, the MQ-9A has increased as a new program of record to 18
    in this coming fiscal year 2024.
        In sum, evolutionary change is not new to Marine Aviation; we have
    led in the past with Close Air Support, Vertical Envelopment, and the
    development of tiltrotor aviation. Marine Aviation capabilities have
    expanded since Force Design efforts began in 2019. Across all
    platforms, modernization efforts have integrated readiness initiatives,
    incorporated advanced technologies, and ensured the capabilities
    procured meet or exceed those of their preceding platform. Force Design
    has expanded, optimized, and enhanced Marine Aviation's ability to
    continue to deliver more lethal, effective, and survivable capabilities
    to enable naval and joint campaigning in all domains across the
    continuum of conflict.

        25. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Heckl, is there anything
    in terms of aviation the Marine Corps cannot do that it could do with
    the previous force structure?
        Lieutenant General Heckl. No. In fact, Force Design 2030 brings
    significant additional capabilities to the Aviation Combat Element.
        Force Design efforts have expanded Marine Aviation with modernized
    capabilities, increased readiness, and enhanced lethality across all
    platforms to meet the demands of global force management, rapidly
    changing technology, and the ever-changing operating environment.
    Historically, the number of squadrons (organizational construct) and
    aircraft (composition) within aviation units has always evolved inside
    the Program of Records (POR) to ensure the Marine Corps remains the
    Nation's crisis response force while modernizing and optimizing the
    fleet to meet the challenges of the future operating environment. To
    provide examples of this evolution, between 1990 and 2016;

          Between 1990 and 2015, CH-53 Active component Marine
    Heavy Lift Helicopter Squadrons (HMH) fluctuated from nine to ten, to
    nine, to ten, to eight.

          Between 1990 and 2016, H-1 Active component Marine Light
    Attack Helicopter Squadrons (HMLA) fluctuated from six to eight, to
    nine, to eight, to seven.

          Between 2011 to 2014, MV-22 Active component Marine
    Medium Tiltrotor Squadrons (VMM) fluctuated from 18 to 16 to 18.

          F/A-18 squadrons changed organizational construct or
    composition nine times between 1990-2016.

          In 1992, the Marine Corps had only one 18 plane EA-6B
    Prowler squadron which disaggregated into four squadrons with five
    planes each.

          In 2007, the Marine Corps planned an all F-35B fleet
    consisting of 14 squadrons of 10 aircraft and seven squadrons of 14
    aircraft.

          o  In 2009, we increased seven of the squadron's allocations to
    16 aircraft.

          o  In 2011, F-35C was incorporated.

          o  In 2013, the plan changed to nine squadrons of 16 aircraft and
    nine squadrons of 10 aircraft.

          o  All these changes were done without adjusting the Program of
    Record.

              To support the 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013
    organizational constructs, a POR of 510 F35s would have been required.

        Force Design modernization optimized Marine Aviation to operate
    from austere, distributed locations and across extended distances while
    providing cutting-edge advantages to the naval expeditionary force
    through the six functions of Marine Aviation, which consists of:
    Offensive Air Support, Anti-Air Warfare, Assault Support, Air
    Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, and Control of Aircraft and
    Missiles. Marine Aviation is manned, trained, and equipped to conduct
    the six functions and is integral to tomorrow's Marine Air-Ground Task
    Force (MAGTF), bringing lethal, agile, and sustainable capabilities to
    compete with, deter, and--if necessary--defeat our Nation's
    adversaries. These functions have not changed as a result of Force
    Design 2030.
        Last, Force Design not only provides a roadmap for Marine Aviation
    to modernize and optimize into a more capable agile expeditionary
    force, but Force Design also sets Marine Aviation on the path to look
    to the future. For example, Marine Aviation is teaming with U.S. Navy
    in the development of the Marine Air Ground Task Force Unmanned
    Expeditionary Family of Systems (FoS). These efforts include
    acceleration of prototyping and experimentation of TACAIR Collaborative
    Combat Aircraft and building a common interoperable system control
    architecture for control of Joint assets. In parallel, Marine Aviation
    is also exploring the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Family of Systems
    (VTOL FoS), where the Logistics Connector is the first major effort to
    support the execution of the Stand-in Force (SiF) through airborne
    logistics in a contested environment. This portfolio also includes but
    is not limited to Air Loitering Munitions, an Attack/strike capability,
    and a future Assault support capability to replace our extant
    platforms.
        In sum, Force Design has expanded, optimized, and enhanced Marine
    Aviation's ability to provide unique and unmatched lethal, sustainable,
    and fiscally responsible capabilities to the MAGTF, JFMCC, and Joint
    Force.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Eric Schmitt
                        outstanding f/a-18 appropriation
        26. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Stefany, considering the Navy's
    significant strike fighter shortfall, I am concerned that the Navy has
    yet to contract for the 20 additional F/A-18 Super Hornets that
    Congress appropriated in fiscal years 2022 and 2023. Given this ongoing
    delay, do you assess that the Navy will still be able to procure the
    full complement of 20 F/A-18s with the funding that Congress
    appropriated?
        Mr. Stefany. It is the Navy's intent to award 20 aircraft with the
    appropriated fiscal year 2022 and fiscal year 2023 funding. We will be
    able to provide a more definitive answer when we receive pricing
    information in Boeing's proposal, which we expect in the late June
    timeframe.

        27. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Stefany, is the Navy experiencing any
    delays due to similar proposal disputes with prime contractors for any
    other major platforms?
        Mr. Stefany. For each acquisition, the Navy requests delivery of
    technical data and computer software to align to the particular
    acquisition and sustainment strategy or plan. As might be expected,
    negotiation timelines and the impact to award schedules varies.
    However, the F/A-18 Lot 46 production negotiation regarding technical
    data delivery is one of the larger Navy programs in this position at
    this time.

        28. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Stefany, what is the impetus for the
    Navy's change in technical data requirements for this instance of F/A-
    18 procurement considering the Navy's long history of procuring F/A-
    18s?
        Mr. Stefany. There is no change in the data requirement/rights in
    this procurement. The Navy sought delivery of the required technical
    data under previous F/A-18 contracts, which the contractor agreed to
    deliver, but did not and still has not. This technical data is the
    minimum required for organic repair capability, which is critical to
    maintain Fleet assets on our ships or at our Fleet Readiness Centers
    during wartime or in a contested logistics environment.

        29. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Stefany, is a build-to-print Level 3
    Technical Data Package required for every major weapons system that
    composes the carrier air wing, e.g., MH-60, E-2C, F-35C, CMV-22?
        Mr. Stefany. Technical data package requirements vary by platform,
    as the mission sets and support requirements are not identical between
    the platforms. The Navy is only asking for the minimum data required to
    support organic maintenance, which will be critical in a high end fight
    or during wartime.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
                  large surface combatant acquisition strategy
        30. Senator King. Mr. Stefany, we have worked in a bipartisan
    manner to encourage the Navy to continue collaborating on the design
    and production of DDG(X). The best way to avoid first of class problems
    is to make sure we collaborate, which in turn will save money and
    achieve the best value for the tax payer. The fiscal year 2023 NDAA
    section 130 requires maximum collaboration between the two DDG
    shipbuilders and the Navy.
        Is collaboration a priority for the Department of the Navy as you
    develop the acquisition strategy for DDG(X)?
        Mr. Stefany. Collaboration is a priority for the Navy and the
    DDG(X) program. As part of Concept Refinement and early adoption of a
    collaborative Integrated Product & Process Development (IPPD)-type
    programmatic approach, the DDG(X) program has integrated shipbuilders
    and other Navy industry partners into the design team as part of a
    collaborative, multi-disciplinary team. Concept Refinement through
    Detail Design for DDG(X) will also be accomplished through a
    collaborative, multi-disciplinary Navy-industry effort composed of the
    DDG 51 shipbuilders, suppliers, ship design agents and other subject
    matter experts. In March 2021, the DDG 51 shipbuilders, General
    Dynamics Bath Iron Works (BIW) and Huntington Ingalls Industries
    Ingalls Shipbuilding Division (HII), were integrated into the Navy's
    Concept Refinement team. In fiscal year 2022, the DDG(X) program
    awarded a Surface Combatant Ship Design Engineering contract to Gibbs &
    Cox and separate Preliminary through Contract Design contracts to BIW
    and HII. These contracts are integral to the Navy's plan to fully
    involve the shipbuilders and industrial base into the DDG(X) design
    efforts. It is the Navy's intention and plan to maintain this
    collaborative strategy with both BIW and HII to leverage their
    expertise and experience in the identification of opportunities to
    improve the productivity and affordability of the ship, prior to the
    detail design and construction phase of the program.

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